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AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE OF GLASGOW, 1975-2000
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SYNOPSIS

This research sought to investigate the effectiveness of the ‘new urban governance’ in addressing the problems experienced by disadvantaged communities in a deindustrialised city. This was achieved by examining the changing structure and process of contemporary urban governance in Glasgow and how this has impacted upon urban policy developments. Central to the ‘new urban governance’ is the pursuit of urban entrepreneurial policies, which it is claimed are in the best interest of all the city’s residents. However, in the case of Glasgow, the above is debatable. This research demonstrated how Glasgow policy makers developed a strategy that favoured business in the city centre over other areas of the city. This in turn, resulted in the emergence of a ‘dual urban policy’. Within this context, urban policies pursued and adopted by city decision makers still fundamentally matter to the quality of life of all citizens.

In striving to provide the fullest explanation with regards to the nature of contemporary urban governance in Glasgow this study adopted a political-economy approach. While previous research attempts have investigated the emergence of a ‘new urban politics’, analysis to date has been far from complete or comprehensive. The exact lineaments and nature of the ‘new urban governance’ are open to dispute and can differ from place to place. A further key finding of this research has shown how Glasgow does not fit neatly into any ideal type of local governance. This research has shown that while regime and regulation theory can assist in
improving our understanding of the 'new urban governance' they are limited in their analysis. This research argues that a fusion of both theories enables a deeper understanding of contemporary urban governance. In the case of Glasgow, while there is no shortage of research into urban regeneration, there is a lack of any comprehensive analysis regarding the governance of the city. This research has significantly contributed to the aforementioned debate in that for the first time the nature of contemporary governance in Glasgow has been contextualised.

The effectiveness of social inclusion policies designed to address the problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods has also been examined in this work. Specifically this study draws upon detailed research material obtained from a case-study of the 'Greater Pollokk' social inclusion partnership. The difficulties of including the local community in urban decision making was identified and that recent top-down partnership structures only serve to legitimate and help implement policy decisions taken by powerful non locally-accountable regeneration agencies.
Acknowledgements

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the help and assistance of a number of individuals. First, thanks and appreciation go to my supervisor Professor Bill Lever, who provided both invaluable support and wise guidance throughout the duration of my research. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of Annette Hastings who most ably guided me through the final stages of my thesis. I am extremely grateful to Dr Gerry Mooney, whose comments on draft chapters were most helpful and insightful. Much appreciation must also go to Dr James McCormick who helped me with ideas and discussion. My gratitude also extends to all of those individuals whom I interviewed in the course of my research, who gave up their valuable and pressing time.

Finally, on a more personal level this thesis is dedicated with love to my parents Eileen and Michael McCWilliams, my wife Dr Ann McDowell (who also helped to edit this work) and son Mark, all of whom have all been constant sources of support and inspiration to me throughout my life.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH

"....they're closing down the textile mills across the railroad tracks, foreman said these jobs are going boy, and they ain't coming back to your home town......"
(Bruce Springsteen, My Hometown, 1984).

This study aims to investigate the effectiveness of the 'new urban governance' in addressing the problems experienced by disadvantaged communities living in a deindustrialised city. This will be achieved through an analysis and examination of the nature of urban policy decision making in the city of Glasgow between 1975-2000. This year is chosen as a starting point for two reasons. First, the reorganisation of local government in 1975 would have far reaching consequences for the future of urban government in Scotland. Second, in terms of urban policy developments the mid-1970s witnessed the movement away from large-scale public sector led slum clearance projects and the scaling down of the New Towns programme. This coincided with the 'rediscovery of poverty' in the inner city and subsequent focus of regeneration on these areas through a partnership approach.
It may seem somewhat unusual to introduce the first chapter of a thesis with a line from an American rock music artist, but the sentiments reflecting the decline of traditional industries in the USA should not be lost on Glasgow. While Bruce Springsteen (1984) spoke of the decline of the textile mills and the implications on working class communities in the USA, a not too dissimilar industrial decline was happening in Glasgow. However, in Glasgow, the jobs that were ‘going’ (and on which the city was so heavily reliant) and not coming back, were in shipbuilding and associated heavy industries. Glasgow, famed for its shipbuilding prowess - ‘Clyde built’ being synonymous with quality - has in the last thirty years experienced massive deindustrialisation. As Lever and Mather (1986) point out, the economy of Glasgow has been dramatically transformed since the 1950s. The old traditional heavy industries of iron and steel, heavy engineering and shipbuilding have rapidly declined in the last 30 years, and new industries (e.g. electronics) have been established at different locations within the conurbation from those previously occupied by the old industries. This has resulted in the substantial growth of the service industries. MacInnes (1995:73) claims that the deindustrialisation of Glasgow represents the most extreme form of a shift which has itself proceeded farther and faster in Great Britain than elsewhere in the world.
The impact of this large scale deindustrialisation, has, however, been unevenly felt. While few areas in Glasgow have not experienced the effects of contemporary economic restructuring, certain locations have suffered more than others. Specifically, the decline of the traditional heavy industries have devastated former working class areas, for example inner city areas (such as Govan) and the peripheral estates (such as Pollok) which were once reliant on traditional heavy industries. As later chapters discuss, the resulting social, economic and environmental problems have absorbed a substantial amount of time and money in the pursuit of finding adequate solutions. The extent to which these problems have been effectively addressed by the ‘new urban governance’ is the central question of this research.

This first chapter looks very generally at the growth and development of Glasgow. A brief historical overview of the development of Glasgow will help to set the context for the interpretation of the contemporary governance of the city. Further, chapter one will also provide an overview of the central issues and theoretical approaches adopted in the present research. It will also briefly outline public policy responses to the contemporary restructuring of Glasgow and associated problems (issues which are discussed in more detail in later chapters).
The Rise and Decline of Heavy Industries in Glasgow

The purpose of this section is to briefly discuss the industrial historical development of Glasgow. This city, arguably more than any other city in Britain, has undergone dramatic economic change, as well as experiencing most of the state urban policy initiatives devised since the late 1960s. The following section focuses on the rise and decline of Glasgow’s heavy industries. In short, the historical analysis outlined here will provide a useful context for understanding the contemporary scene outlined later on in this research thesis.

By the mid-19th century Glasgow had emerged as the command and control centre for west central Scotland with worldwide trading connections (Boyle, 1990). The growth in heavy engineering and associated industries together strengthened Glasgow’s proud boast to be the ‘second city of the empire’. As MacInnes (1995:74), argues the “technological innovation, skill development and technological as well as market linkages between each industry fuelled rapid growth”. It was for shipbuilding, however, that Glasgow gained its position in the world economy. Between 1870 and 1914 Scottish shipyards were responsible for one-third of the total British output, and a fifth of world production (Boyle, 1990:111). Around 60,000 men were employed in the shipyards, with another 40,000 in dependent industries (figures quoted
in Boyle, 1990:111). MacInnes (1995:76) rightly points out that “Glasgow built the ships and railways which formed the arteries of an expanding world capitalist system”.

The industrial boom gave subsequent rise to urban growth. Migrants flooded into the city from the countryside and Highlands of Scotland and Ireland (a legacy of the Irish potato famine) in search of employment. As a result the population of the city rose from 77,000 in 1801 to 300,000 in 1851, reaching 785,000 in 1911 (Boyle, 1990:111). The poverty and low wages of the majority of migrants resulted in high-density tenements being constructed as a way of housing the poorest people in the city. The result was some of the worst slum housing conditions in western Europe, with densities of up to 1800 people per hectare (Pacione, 1995; MacInnes, 1995; Boyle, 1990; Keating, 1988). For example, a survey of Scottish housing conducted in 1917 found that 56% of Glaswegians lived in housing where three or more people lived in one room. The equivalent figures for England and Wales were 7% and 9% (figures quoted in MacInnes, 1995:76). Thus, rapid industrialisation and growth produced a city of contrasts. The wealth of industry existed side by side with some appalling social conditions, most notably overcrowding and ill health (Keating, 1988:4). While Engels had identified Manchester as England’s ‘industrial shock city’,
Glasgow was clearly Scotland's equivalent. Of significant interest to this research is the way in which this alternative urban legacy would eventually determine much of the shape and direction of public policy in the twentieth century (see Boyle, 1990:111).

Thus, throughout the twentieth century, industrial problems were never far from the surface as increased foreign competition and low levels of domestic investment allied to poor industrial relations, resulted in periodic crises (see MacInnes 1995; Keating, 1988). For example, Boyle (1990:112) highlights how the depression of the 1930s weakened the economic base of the city, exposing the vulnerability of its heavy industries to stagnation in world trade. Further, Glasgow's industrial expansion was too dependent upon a narrow imperial role. The problem was, once competitor industries developed abroad, the city's future depended on diversification into new products and industries by its enterprises (MacInnes, 1995). Moreover, accentuating Glasgow's industrial problems the Scottish economy failed to capture its share of modern industries in the inter-war years (Boyle, 1990). On a similar theme Keating (1988:7) explained how the entrepreneurial culture of the Victorian period all but disappeared. This meant that the attention of the remaining big industries concentrated on cartelisation, protection and monopolisation.
Checkland's (1981) *Upas Tree* analogy has been invoked to illustrate what was happening to a declining Glasgow. This 'over-specialisation' thesis demonstrated how the heavy engineering of Glasgow killed off anything that sought to grow beneath its branches. In short, the heavy industries frustrated rather than fostered conditions for subsequent regrowth. While the writing of industrial decline may have been on the wall, it was partly masked by two world wars (1914-18 and 1939-45) and associated post-war booms. Rearmament and then replacement demand sustained the city's traditional industries, but unfortunately, hid the underlying structural problems (MacInnes, 1995; Pacione, 1995; Keating, 1988; Gibb, 1983). The next section strives to put the previous historical discussion of economic change in Glasgow into context, by examining some of the main issues surrounding the process of industrial restructuring.

**Industrial Restructuring**

All urban areas in the developed world have experienced the effects of contemporary restructuring, albeit in unique historical and geographical specific ways. The impact of international economic changes has led to the restructuring of industry which has in turn taken different forms. This includes the movement of cheap labour or the updating of production processes through the use of new technology.
Some of the older industrial regions whose wealth was created during previous rounds of capitalist accumulation (particularly those based upon heavy and extractive industries) have been very negatively affected by these processes. In the case of Glasgow the rise of heavy industries in the 19th-early 20th centuries (especially shipbuilding), represents a major phase in the industrial history of the city. By the early 1960s, however, the city was experiencing severe economic problems. The pace and extent of the economic decline was startling. This in turn led to massive unemployment especially amongst the manufacturing industries, leading to huge areas of industrial dereliction throughout the city. In sum, Glasgow, like many other major industrial cities in North America and Europe, has experienced rapid deindustrialisation (see Lever and Moore, 1986).

Moreover, Glasgow’s dependence upon heavy industries has accentuated the problems which resulted from deindustrialisation. As this thesis will demonstrate this has had a dramatic effect on how urban decision makers have responded to deindustrialisation. One of the most spectacular demonstrations of the loss of economic dynamism in the industrial sector in Glasgow has been the fall in the city’s population. This was predominantly due to out-migration (and partly due to the end of in-migration). However, this was mainly a
selective process, with middle-class residents moving to the suburbs or beyond, while more disadvantaged groups (e.g. the working classes) were far less mobile, because of their position in the housing as well as the labour market. During the 1950s/60s working class residents who resided in the slum inner city were either relocated to public sector housing estates built at the periphery of the city (e.g. Pollok) (see chapter six), or to state sponsored new towns (e.g. East Kilbride) or, remained where they were (in the redeveloped inner city). With the migration of industry out of large urban areas and subsequent factory closures, this led to an economic vacuum developing in the inner city areas. Social polarisation of urban populations based around income, lifestyle and opportunities developed. However, these problems have become even more acute in the four peripheral estates that circle Glasgow (see Sim, 1984). Increasingly the peripheral estates found themselves disconnected from the formal economy as the dynamics shifted elsewhere, and failed as places to live and work (see chapters six and seven). This research will investigate the nature of the policies developed and governance approaches designed to address the problems of the Greater Pollok peripheral estate.

However, as Fothergill et al, (1986) remark, there is no generally accepted theory to account for the deindustrialisation of western urban
areas. According to the above authors, two perspectives can be adopted to assist in explaining this shift. First, the characteristics of the industrial districts themselves must be considered. This takes into account certain features of locations, such as inadequate premises, high rents or militant workers, which make them unsuitable locations for contemporary manufacturing industry. The second perspective concerns the 'restructuring' and 'rationalisation' of industry, and focuses upon the economic system as a whole. The overall logic of such an argument is that the interests of industrial capital and the maintenance of urban industrial employment were irreconcilably opposed.

Scott (1988) argues that the new flexible ensembles of productive activity often locate at some distance from the major foci of Fordist industrialisation, given that they have little demand for the types of inputs and labour available in such centres. Thus, the old industrial centres, with their high levels of worker unionisation and their relatively politicised working-class populations (leading to stubborn rigidities in both workplace and the local labour market) were often assumed to constitute hostile environments for new flexible production forms (see Swyngedouw, 1989). Consequently, many of the producers in the new ensembles have sought out alternative kinds of locational
environments uncontaminated by previous historical experience of large-scale manufacturing activity, and Fordist employment relations. In the case of Glasgow the former image of Red Clydeside with its Fordist industrial relations, political activism and perceived union militancy was considered as a threat to new waves of inward investment. In this sense Glasgow was not as seriously considered as other environments (e.g. suburban and edge of the city areas) where new and experimental kinds of socio-technical structures of production could be established with minimum local obstruction.

During the first half of the 1970s, the decline of the old industrial regions was the result of so-called ‘agglomeration diseconomies’ (see Massey, 1988). Fiscal constraints imposed by their location in a major urban area included the cost of land and premises. This could effect companies through high housing and travel costs for their workers, and the relative congestion and old age of buildings in cities. In this sense, the previous relative advantages of an urban location were outweighed by the disadvantages.

Lash and Urry (1987:307) use the term ‘spatial fix’ to refer to the set of inter-connected spatial structures in the process of dissolution, between the dominant manufacturing/extractive industries, major
industrial cities, particular regions dominated by such industries, and labour and capital organised in a given structural pattern. In this account, the spatial fix was the most characteristic aspect of the former development of distinct regional economies, shaped by a small number of industries and organised around large plants in the major urban centres. As Lash and Urry (1987) argue, the dissolution of this spatial fix is due to spatial deconcentration and dispersal of manufacturing, and the use made of local diversity by industry to fragment their operations and settle them in a variety of locations. Ultimately, the private sector sought out cheaper locations where production and labour costs were lower so as to maximise its profits.

All of these explanations, however, have to be framed within the wider context of the restructuring of industry which involved many different forms. Some firms simply moved to new locations where cheaper labour was available. Other firms used the opportunity to update their production processes thus making them less dependent on traditionally skilled labour forces (Massey, 1988). Along this line, Cox (1989) notes that the search for cheaper labour is only one strategy, and that others can have quite severely localising rather than spatially dispersing effects. Furthermore, new industrial spaces have also been identified within the older manufacturing regions (see Tickell and Peck, 1992).
The above demonstrates that in some circumstances, capital will adopt a spatial strategy for the establishment of flexible employment relations (such as the choice of production locations peripheral to the geography of Fordist production), while in others, a social strategy will be adopted. One example is the in situ remaking of management-labour relations within one of the Fordist heartlands.

Therefore, even if many traditional industrial centres have lost their former prevailing role, not everything within manufacturing has been in decline. The deindustrialisation process has involved the death of some manufacturing plants and the birth of others (see Burtenshaw et al, 1991). Broadly speaking, the sectors which have fared worst are the primary and heavy manufacturing industries. Within this context, the overdependence of Glasgow and its region on heavy engineering made the local economy vulnerable to structural changes in the national and global economy particularly during periods of recession. On the other hand, there have been a group of selected industries and their associated occupations which have steadily moved towards a more crucial position in the overall economic structure. In particular, this relates to the emerging ‘high-tech’ sectors of electronics industries and those which are either research and development-intensive or produce specialist, namely designer goods for affluent consumers in niche
markets (Harding et al, 1994). However, in the case of Glasgow what is noticeable is that while it can boast to having the most designer retail shops outside London, in the UK, its has failed to attract hi-tech industries on a large scale. These industries have been directed by Locate in Scotland and have shown a preference to establish plants in new town locations, for example East Kilbride (Roberston, 1998).

Furthermore, industrial restructuring has been interpreted as an inevitable trend in the transition towards tertiary-dominant societies. The division of labour in complex processes has augmented the number of workers engaged in indirect productive activities, leaving proportionately fewer workers engaged in direct, hands-on tasks of transforming materials into useful forms. In this sense, the hands-on work of processing, assembling and moving materials has diminished relative to the work of regulating, administering, organising and improving production systems (Sayer and Walker, 1992). This has reshaped the boundaries between the two sectors. In Massey’s (1988) opinion, the distinction between manufacturing and services is increasingly arbitrary since services are an integral part of the whole production system.
According to Sayer and Walker (1992), moreover, not only is the term 'services' unsuitable as a unifying concept for understanding the new social economy, the idea of a transition to a services economy is a crude shorthand to capture the current transformations in modern capitalism. In this context, it is no surprise that the importance of services has been the subject of widespread controversy (see Massey, 1988; Sayer and Walker, 1992). In the context of global restructuring of industry and the subsequent attempt to improve the competitiveness of their city, urban policy makers developed more activist, entrepreneurial strategies and created new institutional structures of urban governance. It is to this theme that this chapter now turns for a brief discussion.

**From Local Government to Local Governance**

The term 'governance' has become one of the keywords of anglophone social sciences in recent years in political theory, political science and geography. While the term is often regarded as being synonymous with government, recent academic use has come to distinguish between them. Thus, governance has been defined as:

"the involvement of a wide range of institutions and actors in the production of policy outcomes, including non-governmental organisations, quangos, private companies, pressure groups and social
movements as well as those state institutions traditionally regarded as formally part of government” (Painter, 2000:317).

In this sense, ‘governance’ is a broader category than government, with government being one component of governance among many. This definition has gone some way in recognising that the management of complex social systems and the guiding of societal development has never been the responsibility of the state alone (i.e. government), but has always involved interaction between a wide variety of state and non-state actors. Further, others have talked about the shift from government to governance involving a hollowing out of the state, as their powers are displaced in various ways. For example, where local state institutions have been relegated to providing increasingly weak regulatory and coordinating roles for the private and voluntary sector delivery of services (see Jessop, 1994; Mohan, 1999). Imrie and Raco (1999:46) also note that the “transition to the ‘new local governance’ is also seen as being underpinned by wide-ranging shifts in policy objectives, styles and trajectories”. While there is broad agreement amongst those who have written about the changing nature of local governance (which may include the increase in institutional fragmentation, a decline in local government influence and some increased private sector and voluntary sector involvement in local
policy-making and service delivery), the preciseness of the change is in doubt. As Mayer (1995) has argued, the exact nature of change is difficult to discern. Further, the scale and character of reform is marked by spatial and temporal diversity, institutional stasis as well as a processes of revolution. Thus, the importance of continuing to conduct research into the ‘new urban governance’ remains an important objective. Within this context, the study of Glasgow is important, in that it will add and improve upon existing knowledge, and assist in understanding the nature of contemporary urban governance.

While there is some dispute over the exact nature of the ‘new local governance’ (see Valler et al, 2000; Imrie and Raco, 1999; Ward, 2000), what is less in doubt is in the way in which cities are managed has fundamentally changed (see Healey, 1995; Valler et al., 2000; Ward, 2000). Thus, chapters four, five, six and seven will seek to closely analyse the changing position of the public sector, the private sector and local communities in local governance in the case of Glasgow.

This research strives to build-upon existing research as well as exploring new unchartered aspects of the contemporary governance of the city of Glasgow. While there is no shortage of research into urban regeneration in Glasgow (see Lever and Moore, 1986; Donnison and
Middleton, 1987; Keating, 1988; Mooney, 1988; Boyle, 1988; Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Pacione, 1995) there is, however, an absence of a comprehensive debate about the governance of contemporary Glasgow. Moreover, while previous research (see Checkland, 1981; Gibb, 1983; Keating, 1988; Pacione, 1995) has produced detailed accounts of the transformation of the city of Glasgow, they have not always contextualised their observations in terms of debates about the nature of urban governance. This research is intended to inform the aforementioned debate and help to fill the gap in this area.

It is argued that while decision makers are constrained with regards to the policies they pursue, they do have a degree of choice about policies being adopted. In sum, policy makers still have considerable power to shape their cities’ future. The real world of urban politics involves many conflicting forces, but also leaves plenty of room for political opposition and alternative views. However, the extent to which these voices are heard and listened to is debatable. As this research will demonstrate, in Glasgow, for example, the majority of citizens are still marginalised in terms of influencing public policy decisions. For cities to be truly “inclusive” this must change.
While the main focus of this research is the contemporary governance of Glasgow, it also sought to examine the governance of one particular part of the city, namely ‘Greater Pollok’. This area, one of Glasgow’s four peripheral estates built largely after the second world war to rehouse overcrowded inner city slum dwellers, was chosen for a number of important reasons. One reason is that, for at least 30 years, this area has been and still is experiencing massive socio-economic problems. However, it has not been subjected to any of the large-scale urban regeneration projects implemented within other areas of Glasgow over the same period. The designation of ‘Greater Pollok’ in April 1999 as a Social Inclusion Partnership (SIP) area, by the then Scottish Office (now The Scottish Executive), is in part a recognition of the neglect and decline of the area. Chapters six and seven analyse the governance of this area and the emergence of New Labour’s social inclusion agenda. Of interest, is the way in which, in their early stages, such policies are being played out in ‘Greater Pollok’. Thus, ‘Greater Pollok’ is the context in which this research can explore how city and local governance impacts in a disadvantaged neighbourhood. Of interest is the way in which the social inclusion agenda works in an area not subject to re-current policy initiatives.
Finally, with the exception of Mooney’s (1988) study there has been a general absence of academic research conducted into this part of the city. Certainly there has been no attempt to study the governance of this particular part of Glasgow. Thus, this research is important in breaking new ground with a detailed study of the governance of ‘Greater Pollok’ which has for the most part been excluded from contemporary urban policy developments in Glasgow.

Later chapters will discuss how the politics of ‘Greater Pollok’ are more complex than other areas in Glasgow, a city which is overwhelmingly Labour dominated. For example, the local Labour Party’s hegemony in ‘Greater Pollok’ is challenged by the leader of the Scottish Socialist Party and Member of the Scottish Parliament for the city and still Councillor, Tommy Sheridan. As this research will demonstrate, the political machinations, both at the local and the national level have played no small part in the neglect and decline of ‘Greater Pollok’.

**Explaining the Changes in Urban Governance**

To understand the city it is essential to locate it within the wider socio-economic context. This research adopts a political economy approach which allows for a fuller, if not complete, analysis of the complexity of the city. This approach, it is argued, is best placed to understand the
subtle intricacies of urban restructuring. An understanding of the processes that shape and reshape cities cannot be achieved by only looking within cities. It is essential to adopt a wider perspective, one that recognises that cities are shaped by processes from far beyond their boundaries, as well as factors much closer to home. Adopting a political economy perspective enables the researcher to achieve this. In this context, it is important to recognise that while cities are not 'masters of their own destiny', neither are they 'helpless pawns' who have little or no control over the processes which shape and influence them. Global forces may be strong, but they are mediated locally. That is, their outcomes are determined by local factors such as the nature of local urban government, economies and cultures. Thus, cities are shaped by the interplay of local, regional, national and international forces (see Healey and Ilbery, 1990:3-6). In this context there is still a 'politics of opportunity', and as such, policies pursued and adopted by cities still matter to the quality of life of all its citizens. In sum, a political economy approach recognises that cities are built environments that have been shaped by powerful development actors, both those in the private sector and those in government, working within the capital accumulation structure of modern capitalism.
Cities, however, are not conflict free environments indeed, they often appear to be racked with insoluble problems. Cities seem to move from one ‘crisis’ to another, never really solving problems, merely displacing them and postponing the time when they must address them fully. To paraphrase Friedrich Engels, the bourgeoisie has only one solution to its urban problems: it moves them around (Engels, 1978). Thus, the problems in cities take many forms: poverty and deprivation, poor, inadequate housing and public services, alienation and exclusion as well as environmental problems. Two of the biggest problems which have been experienced by all cities in recent years are unemployment and social polarisation. In Glasgow, both of these problems have been felt most sharply by those who live in the city’s peripheral estates.

The next section briefly discusses state urban policy responses to the contemporary restructuring of urban areas. It is designed to set the context for a more detailed discussion in later chapters with respect to contemporary urban policy developments.
**Urban Policy Responses**

Urban policies pursued in recent years reflect the constraints placed upon decision makers by the restructuring of contemporary capitalism and the political response to these changes. Policies developed demonstrate a movement away from redistributational aspects of urban policy, to encouraging capital accumulation (see Harvey, 1989). For example, local authorities have become more entrepreneurial in recent years in attempts to attract external funds, thus forming an increasing number of partnerships with the private sector. Glasgow has and is experiencing massive urban restructuring, the impact of which is spatially uneven and only partially reflected in policies devised to address the situation. It is within this context that this research attempts to analyse the contemporary governance of Glasgow and its impact on tackling the problems of the city. In terms of 'urban policies' this research will specifically focus upon two areas. First, the policy shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism and second, the emergence of New Labour's social inclusion policies.

The new context of generalised competition has shifted the focus of local governments' activities from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, in other words, from welfare goals towards 'wealth creation' forms of action. Government, or the role of directly elected
local government institutions, has given way to governance or the exercise of authority by non-governmental institutions and public-private partnerships. This often entails a transfer of public policy making and implementation away from local authorities. All of these new combinations are supposed to secure a new economy of services, as much as competitive advantages all allied to the attraction of investment capital for localities.

Yet, despite its prevalence, this entrepreneurial discourse (though enthusiastically embraced by the local authority in Glasgow) has been questioned as being the only response to the new competitive environment. On the one hand, the discourse conceals political purposes under the form of structural imperatives, as the restructuring of local government in the UK illustrates. On the other, (even if in most cases it has not demonstrated to be effective), this discourse has prevented debate over alternative ways of defining and solving current problems.

Quite often, entrepreneurial discourse adopts the form of place marketing strategies (e.g. Glasgow’s Miles Better campaign) and policies designed to promote growth. This is implemented through the use of different practices such as hallmark events, cultural policies,
promotion of tourism or image improvement. The above are all different versions of the same approach: the attempt to regenerate or to further develop the economic basis of the urban area. As such, the task of urban governance has increasingly become the creation of urban conditions sufficiently attractive to lure prospective employers. In this sense, particularly important challenges have been imposed on traditional industrial cities such as Glasgow, most affected by the crisis. Even if starting from a much more deteriorated situation, they are still obliged to construct new images to replace the old, and to recreate an attractive new landscape consonant with current preferences.

Macro-necessity shows that while Glasgow previously constituted a dominant centre of heavy industry, it now belongs to a group of cities which, as a consequence of the restructuring of the international economy, have a number of similar features. Not only have they lost their former leading role, they have also had to experience very high levels of long-term unemployment, growing social exclusion and alienation, huge swaths of derelict industrial areas and very negative threatening images. In a context of generalised competition, Glasgow’s response to the downfall of its crucial role as an industrial centre has been imbued by the dominant pattern of triumphant discourses which underlie the importance of the creation of a not very well defined
service-based economy and the reconstruction of its image (see Gomez, 1998).

Finally, within the context of analysing the ‘new urban governance’ and its impact on tackling the problems faced by disadvantaged communities in Glasgow four key research questions can be identified:

1) What form does the ‘new urban governance’ adopted by policymakers in Glasgow take?

2) To what extent does regime or regulation theory best explain the development of the ‘new urban governance’ in Glasgow?

3) In the case of Glasgow, do the pursuit of urban entrepreneurial policies and social inclusion policies compliment or contradict each other?

4) How effective has the adoption of the above policies been in addressing the problems of Pollok, a disadvantaged neighbourhood in Glasgow?

Chapter two critically examines theoretical attempts to explain and understand the changing nature of contemporary government. Overall, debate has coalesced around two main conceptual tools: first, regime theory, which is essentially a neo-pluralist approach towards explaining urban governance; and second, regulation theory, which adopts a
A contemporary slant on Marxist theory with regards to the role cities play in the changing structure of capitalist economies. Chapter two will also analyse previous Conservative governments (1979-97) and New Labour’s (1997-) urban discourse which were used as political legitimating tools.

Following on from this, chapter three discusses and explains the main research methods used within this study. Discussion will focus upon the research design and methodology and include an outline of how access to the research setting was negotiated, a description of sources and types of data available within urban policy, and how the research information was analysed. The project is essentially qualitative, an approach usually associated with such methods as interviewing and observational fieldwork (see Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979), both of which were key tools in this research.

Chapter four will strive to identify the form of the ‘new urban governance’ adopted by policy makers in Glasgow. Further, this chapter will also seek to discuss the extent to which regime or regulation theory best explains the development of the ‘new urban governance’ in Glasgow.
Chapter five will discuss the extent to which the pursuit of ‘urban entrepreneurial policies’ and ‘social inclusion policies’ compliment or contradict each other. Chapter six seeks to analyse the contemporary governance of ‘Greater Pollok’. Chapter seven aims to analyse the effectiveness of the adoption of ‘social inclusion policies’ in addressing the problems of this area. Finally, chapter eight will discuss the main research findings of this thesis.

In Summary

The deindustrialisation of Glasgow, both in terms of absolute and relative decline in industrial employment, reflects the restructuring of industrial capitalism. This has had a devastating impact on the city. The effects, however, have been spatially uneven. Some individuals and places have been more adversely affected than others. The majority of the jobs lost have derived from changes in the city’s economic base, particularly the closure and rationalisation of shipbuilding and heavy engineering. Despite service sector growth, unemployment still remains high, especially in the city’s peripheral estates and parts of the inner city. It is within this context that this research seeks to analyse the ‘new urban governance’ of Glasgow and its attempts to address the contemporary problems of the city. The following chapters will, therefore, examine and analyse the changing nature and the
complexities of governing the ‘new Glasgow’.

Chapter two now turns towards an analysis of the main theories which have come to dominate explanation of the ‘new urban governance’. It will also discuss the changing urban policy discourse from Conservatives through to “New Labour”. This will include an examination of state responses to perceived ‘urban problems’.
CHAPTER TWO
URBAN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Introduction
This chapter has two main aims. First, to examine the extent to which regime theory and regulation theory can contribute towards explaining the 'new urban governance'. Specifically, it seeks to provide the theoretical framework in which the governance of the city of Glasgow is analysed. In this context this chapter will stress the underlying connection between structural context and local socio-economic affairs, which is all the more significant because Glasgow, like many other Western urban areas, belongs to a category of places which have experienced the severest impacts of the recent phases of capitalist restructuring.

Second, it will aim to analyse the changing discourse surrounding the 'urban problem' and state policy responses. In this sense this chapter is also important in striving to explore the connections between the theory and practice (i.e. policy responses) of urban governance. In this context the adoption of a discourse analysis approach can be helpful in examining the changing nature of the 'new urban governance' (see Atkinson, 2000).
Theories of Urban Politics: An Introduction

Theories of urban politics are essentially concerned with the fundamentals of city life and the decisions which ultimately shape the physical, economic and social life of a city. They are a direct attempt to understand the reality of what happens in a city by analysing the way that decisions are made, who is involved in making them, and the power that lies behind them.

Despite increasing research aimed at trying to explain the changing nature of urban government, our understanding and analysis of the ‘new urban politics’ is still weak and far from complete (see Ward, 2000; Valler et al, 2000; Imrie and Raco, 1999). In the past urban politics has been concerned mainly with two schools of thought, incorporating pluralism (see Dahl, 1961) and elite theory (see Hunter, 1953). Pioneering work by Dahl (1961) in a now famous study of New Haven sought to answer the question of who governs and deepen our understanding of urban politics. Dahl (1961) concluded that no one single individual or group of people controlled or dominated the decision making process in New Haven. He postulated a pluralist model of urban politics where people from various socio-economic backgrounds have the opportunity to influence urban decision making. Whether or not they all have equal opportunity to influence decision
making is more debatable. Dahl (1961) acknowledged that individuals and groups had unequal access to resources. In sum, the wealthiest individuals had greater access to resources compared to poorer individuals and thus possess greater potential to influence decision making.

Hunter (1953) challenged the pluralist view of urban decision making. Hunter argued that within cities a small group of elites control and dominate urban decision making. The elite, consisting of key actors from the business community, members of socially prominent and affluent families and other figures from the local community, met and discussed on a regular basis the main issues which affected their city. In sum, these elites made all the important decisions in their city: Atlanta.

Each, however, has been criticised on a number of grounds, and neither is considered to be a realistic reflection on the way governance in cities actually operates. More recently, two main ideas namely regime theory, which attempts to find the middle ground between elite and pluralist theory and regulation theory, which is more Marxist inspired, have come to dominate attempts to explain the ‘new urban governance’. Both theories are analysed in more detail below.
Explaining the ‘New Urban Governance’

In terms of city governance, regime theory is the concept at the moment. In general, regime theory argues that key local actors in a city come together in a loose or informal partnership to make or carry out specific governing decisions (see Harding, 1991). In sum, they act in partnership so as to ‘get things done’. As Hall and Hubbard (1998:9) state “the formation of partnerships is thus seen as one of the principle means by which governors achieve this capacity to act”. Although essentially imported from the USA, regime theory has gained popularity and a relatively sympathetic hearing in the UK (see Ward, 1996), thus supporting Stoker’s (1995) claim of its ability to travel.

One of the strongest and initial proponents of regime theory was Stone (1987) in his studies of the local state in the United States. According to Stone (1987:6) regime theory can be understood as an informal arrangement “by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make governing decisions”. Stone is effectively claiming that government has to work with other bodies in order to implement and make decisions relating to the future of the city. Stoker (1995:59) argues that the “new urban politics is about achieving governing capacity which has to be created and maintained”. In terms of capacity to act Stone has maintained that city government
alone is inadequate to carry out this task satisfactorily. An important component of this perspective is the notion that regimes do not need to exert total power over a city to act effectively, but rather they merely need the power to act (Hall and Hubbard, 1998). Thus, with respect to regime theory it is not a question of who governs, but rather who has the capacity to act and why? (see Leitner, 1990). Stone (1987) further stresses how the diverse interests of various urban actors can be moulded together in an urban coalition or partnership so as to govern effectively. The effectiveness of their relationship and the way they work together to overcome conflict and enable governance to take place is the central theme of regime theory.

The maintenance of the regime is, however, the key to governance being successfully achieved. For successful decision making to happen regimes have to have a common agenda. For example, Watson (1999) points out how regime theory highlights the interdependency of government and non-governmental organisations in urban coalitions, and although they may have different interests, these key actors work in partnerships to achieve their desired goals. Urban regime theory is also viewed as being very useful in emphasising the importance of the role of local actors and organisations in the ‘moving’ and ‘shaking’ of new agendas, and highlighting the subtle intricacies and dynamics of
urban coalitions and partnerships. Regime analysis also recognises the growing importance of quasi-non governmental organisations (quangos) and the private sector in local governance. Rather than viewing urban decision making as coming from the top down, this analysis stresses that decision making is not hierarchical, but increasingly fragmented (Stone, 1989). However, while urban decision making has become increasingly fragmented it still remains largely hierarchal. In this sense, regime theory shares many common features with neo-pluralist concerns regarding the fragmentation and complexity of (post)modern government decision making (see Stoker, 1995). On a similar point, Cochrane (1999:325) argues that regime theory recognises the importance of fluid and changing networks of power within cities and the need to consider ways of managing them dynamically instead of seeking to fix them for all time.

When considering the political nature of urban regimes it is evident that an emerging regime attempts to mobilise and bind together various urban actors around specific policy agendas. Such agendas are more often than not likely to be dominated by the pursuit of economic growth. The justification of a regime approach in governance is that the benefits from economic growth can be shared locally (see Cochrane, 1999). However, if there are 'benefits' it is worthwhile
asking how widely are they shared? Is it just crumbs for the few or benefits for the many? More recent research (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000:306) maintain that the main impetus for regime formation in today's global economy is the development of policies, "in favour of economic development, jobs and a more secure fiscal basis for local government". This has led to the idea of the pursuit of the "entrepreneurial city" being propounded (see Hall and Hubbard, 1998). While many cities have pursued entrepreneurial policies it is not the dominant form of politics or policy in every city (see Gibbs and Jonas, 2000). However, who actually benefits from such agendas is often not fully considered or made explicit to the public, an issue considered in the present research thesis.

Urban regimes are not stable entities and as such, are always open to conflict and change. This has been acknowledged by Stone (1989:25) who states that "urban regimes are not fixed entities. They form and reform as groups with differing aims seeking to shape arrangements in ways that promote their sometimes competing goals. In the process, groups adjust to one another, while individual groups themselves undergo change". During this process of change, the regime has to restabilise itself, new relationships have to be formed and a new way of working discovered, as well as a new system of incentives created.
Furthermore, the political exclusion of various groups in the city is a major concern which has the potential to undermine any regime. The nature of the workings of regimes may operate to exclude some sections of the city from the informal networks of power.

The similarity between regime theory and the pluralist approach in the study of urban politics should not be ignored. Thus, while regime theory could be regarded as a slightly more sophisticated attempt to understand and answer the old question of *who governs*, it is still essentially an elite pluralist position which recognises that access to local politics is uneven (Peck, 1995). Further, certain groups enjoy greater access to power than others. This can and does result in their interests dominating the course of redevelopment undertaken (see Hall and Hubbard, 1998). Nonetheless, Cochrane (1999:325), argues that one of the main strengths of regime theory lies in the way it allows us “......to explore political arrangements and power beyond the boundaries of government as it is commonly understood”. Thus, it brings together neo-pluralist analyses of power with a recognition of the significance of economic power. Stoker (1995:56) goes on to argue that for regime theorists ‘politics still matters’ and in this sense their work challenges economic determinist theory (see Peterson, 1981) and some neo-Marxist work. Thus, while systematic power is constraining,
there still exists a ‘politics of opportunity’ (Ward, 2000).

Critics of urban regime theory (Horan, 1997; Jonas, 1997) argue that it provides a weak and narrow framework for investigating the process of urban restructuring. Thus, while urban regime theory can provide a rich picture of local interests, and types of struggles and strategies involved in urban transformations, it is too silent on certain issues of strategic significance (see Jonas, 1997). Further criticism is suggested by Cox (1997) who argues that regime analysis fails to move beyond descriptive references as to why various forms of partnership approaches develop, to a more reasoned questioning of why these types of structures actually emerge, are reproduced, transformed and contested.

Jessop (1995) criticises urban regime theory for failing to analyse and to take into account the wider economic and political context within which urban strategies are formulated. Similarly, Cochrane (1991) also emphasises the flaw in regime theory of approaching the analysis of change within the local government system as if it were independent of wider social and economic shifts. Thus, there is always a two-way, (if typically asymmetrical), flow between local economic, political and ideological forces and those existing on supra-local scales (see Jessop
Growing concern has been voiced over the ease in which regime theory has been imported from the U.S. and adopted uncritically in the U.K. (Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Laurie, 1997a). It is argued (see Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Ward, 1996) that the significant political and cultural differences between the two countries needs to be fully considered, ultimately questioning the relevance of regime theory to the U.K. For example, the relative weakness of local government in the United States contrasts sharply with the more proactive local state in the United Kingdom. Further, while in the U.S. the local state may have been captured by the private sector, this has generally not been the case in the U.K. For example, in Glasgow, the private sector is still marginal in terms of its direct influence on local economic policy making.

Finally, urban regime analysis is often viewed as being superficial and thus cannot provide penetrating theoretical analysis. It succumbs instead to empiricism and 'excessive localism' (see Jessop 1995; Feldman, 1997; Beauregard, 1997). The main criticisms of regime analysis have come from those who claim that 'regulation theory' is
more helpful in explaining the 'new urban governance'. This chapter now turns to this 'theory' which is discussed in more detail below.

At its most basic, 'regulation theory' attempts to construct a historically and geographically grounded account of capitalism's development (see Laurie, 1997a). 'Regulation theory' is essentially a neo-Marxist approach, the roots of which can be traced to the French Marxist school collectively known as 'Regulation Theorists'. Jessop (1990) argues that regulation theory should be viewed as a fast growing research programme, rather than as a single coherent theoretical system. As Painter (1995:276) points out, regulation theory is still very young with much scope for further development. In sum, it is a method of analysis not a complete theory; it contains a rich diversity of thought and ideas so much so that it is best thought of as a 'regulation approach'; no one 'regulation theory' currently exists. Jessop (1990) has, however, identified several different regulation 'schools', which co-exist under the banner of regulation. Others (e.g. Aglietta, 1979) have attempted to summarise the various schools placing them into two distinctive regulation camps. They view the French School which has devoted its efforts to identifying the technological and macro-economic possibilities (specifically labour processes and industrial organisations) of capital accumulation as
being central to the regulation approach. The French School has as a result developed a distinctive economic-focused approach to capitalist regulation. On the other hand, new approaches have emerged which have commonly been more loyal to Gramsci’s original idea of Fordism, in that they try to specify the society-wide regulatory processes by which a new regime of accumulation obtains its authenticity as a hegemonic structure.

Painter (1995:276) claims that the appeal of a regulationist approach to urban theorists comes from three main sources. First, it presents an account of the changing character of capitalist economies and the place of cities within them. Secondly, it analyses the interrelationship between social, economic, political and cultural change. Finally, it strives to avoid overtly economic determinist arguments of some versions of Marxism which relegate political processes to only a secondary role. As Painter (1995:277) points out, regulationists argue that “successful regulation of the crises and contradictions of capitalism does not occur automatically and inevitably, but neither does it occur purely by conscious and deliberate design”. When it does happen, it could be the unintended consequence of the interaction of activities and processes which might have been undertaken deliberately, but perhaps for quite other reasons. In sum, regulation
theory adopts a political economy approach to the theorisation of capitalist restructuring. Tickell and Peck (1992:194) claim that "regulation theory provides a 'solution' for that paradox of contemporary Marxist theory - that in spite of its inherent contradictions and deeply embedded crisis tendencies, the capitalist system appears capable of sustaining itself (original emphasis). According to Laurie (1997b:6) the "attraction of regulation theory is that it offers a way of linking change in the economy to those in politics at a high level of abstraction". Within this context, the state and local politics are closely connected to the mode of regulation within a specific accumulation regime.

Tickell and Peck (1992:192) argue that the main contribution of the regulation school lies in the integration of the role of political and social relations, the so-called 'mode of social regulation' into the conception of capitalist reproduction and crisis (also see Painter, 1995; Jessop, 1997). The stabilisation of a 'mode of social regulation' with a particular pattern of production and consumption occurs under what is termed a 'regime of accumulation', a macro-economically coherent phase of capitalist development (Tickell and Peck, 1992:192). According to Jessop (1997), regulationist's study the historically contingent ensembles of complimentary economic and extra-economic
mechanisms and practices, which enable capital accumulation to occur in a relatively stable way over long periods, despite inherent capitalist contradictions. The regulating mechanisms include social norms, habits and customs, rules of conduct, state forms and legislature, political practices and institutionalised compromises. As they emerge and become established they create 'regulatory systems' which have the effect of guiding and sustaining the accumulation process (see Tickell and Peck, 1992).

Painter (1995) has attempted to apply regulation theory to the study of urban politics. He claims that this 'theory' has the potential to provide a theoretical account of the changing urban politics. The break-down of the Fordist mode of regulation and the emergence of neo-Fordism has generated a great deal of interest in the impact on urban politics. However, the precise role which urban governance might play in an emerging post-Fordist mode of social regulation is open to debate (Goodwin and Painter, 1996). The importance of the Keynesian welfare state in the Fordist mode of regulation in the United States has been demonstrated by Florida and Jonas (1991). They argue that federal urban policy in the 1960s was closely related in attempts to stabilise and maintaining the Fordist mode of regulation, despite its inherent tensions and contradictions. Policies like inner city renewal and the
enhancement of the ‘social wage’ which were directed at poorer groups were developed by Federal government to address some of the worst problems of US Fordism.

When applied to Britain it has been demonstrated that local government, a key component of the modern welfare state, played an important role in the regulation of Fordism. Painter (1991) identifies three crucial areas of importance. Firstly, local government provided a range of services, the production of which was unprofitable, but had to be sustained because of political demand and pressure. The state (in many cases the local state) effectively strove to meet the needs for which the market had failed to provide. Secondly, local government was responsible for planning (including land-use and resource planning) and regulatory activities (such as environmental health control). Thirdly, legitimacy was afforded to local government given that it was elected. However, this also provided a channel for political opposition at the local level. This has been demonstrated, most recently, by political activity from the left with the rise of the new urban left e.g. the Greater London Council in the early 1980s and the rise of new right councils during the Thatcher years e.g. Wandsworth.
The crisis of Fordism which began in the 1970s was simultaneously a crisis of local government. As Painter (1991:29) states, the "Fordist mode of regulation went into crisis because it could no longer regulate the contradictions of the regime of accumulation". The post-war Keynesian agreement had, in effect, carried with it seeds of a new upheaval. For regulation theory, the compromise between capital and labour provided by the Fordist mode of regulation, guaranteed the working class a de facto minimum wage level and regular (if often unspectacular) real wage increases for workers in acceptance for regular productivity increases (Painter, 1995).

At the same time an enlarged and modern welfare state made available to nearly all the population the possibility to consume, even in the case of temporary or indefinite incapacity to earn money from work due to illness, unemployment and retirement (see Lipietz, 1992). However, this post-war Keynesian welfare state consensus which supported the Fordist mode of accumulation began to break down by the time of the mid-1970s oil crises. As a result, capitalism underwent tremendous restructuring that ushered in a new era in terms of political and economic relations. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, all advanced capitalist countries experienced a slow-down in the rate of productivity. However, real wages continued to rise with a resulting fall
in profitability. This led firms to react, first, by reducing real wages, which led to a sectoral and general crises of underconsumption, and second, by spreading and socialising their losses through mark-up pricing policies, which led to the cost-push inflation that was allowed by the nature of credit money (see Lipietz, 1992). De Vroey (1984) argues that leading branches reached the end of a certain line of technical progress and further improvements required profound qualitative changes, such as the movement away from Fordist assembly line production techniques towards the introduction of computer aided robotisation. Massey (1988) points out that this presented a strong challenge to firms in terms of innovation, investment and changes in social relations within factories (see also Meegan, 1989)

All of these changes resulted in a fiscal crisis of the welfare state which placed a question mark over the legitimacy of state social policies and then made the Fordist compromise economically unsustainable. While some (e.g. Tickell and Peck, 1992) saw this unfolding crisis as triggering a further internationalisation of production, others (e.g. Lipietz, 1992) saw international reasons for the erosion of this compromise. In his opinion, the search for a larger scale of production and for regions with lower wages led to an internationalisation of productive processes, which stood in contrast to the national character
of economic regulation. Lipietz (1992) argues that competition from newly industrialising countries became disruptive for old industries, and poorly-paid replaced well-paid workers, leading to a negative-sum game with respect to world effective demand.

Painter (1997) argues that regulation theorists disagree about the precise impact of these changes which has generated a great deal of controversy. For some they herald the emergence of a post-Fordist flexible mode of regulation constituted around customised production, niche (rather than mass) consumption, flexible wage bargaining and financial deregulation and globalisation (see Harvey, 1989). Others, accept a new mode of regulation is a possibility, but argue either that its development to date is at best embryonic or that there are a variety of alternative feasible neo or post-Fordisms. Finally, other commentators argue that the present period is marked by the continuing turmoil of the breakdown of Fordist forms and its aftermath, with little evidence that a dominant new mode of regulation is emerging (see Tickell and Peck, 1992). As Amin (1994) points out, the regulation approach is reluctant to predict the precise characteristics of what comes after Fordism.
Therefore, while few commentators would dispute that a fundamental change in the global political economy occurred, there is little agreement as to the nature of that change. When capitalism is changing in so many different ways simultaneously, there is no empirical benchmark by which to judge which of these ways is 'leading/cutting edge' and 'central' and which is 'contingent' and 'peripheral' (see Amin, 1994).

Tickell and Peck (1992) note how, in the short term, capital responded to these developments through spatial relocation, plant closure or by substituting fixed for variable capital. Swyngedouw (1989) argues that capitalist firms trade-off between space and technology in their strategies to overcome possible problems of decreasing profitability. In this context, western capitalism's emphasis on information technology and knowledge as the basis of its comparative advantage effectively excludes (mainly the unskilled and poorly educated) many from the labour market. Further, companies may also decide to spatially relocate (part of) the production process in search of either new markets or lower production costs, especially lower labour costs.

Laurie (1997a) in stating and acknowledging the failings and limitations of both regime and regulation theories argues that potential benefits
exist from closer collaboration between both theories. Clearly, much theoretical and empirical research remains to be done for the benefits to become evident. Thus, while regulation theory offers a fruitful set of abstractions in which to embed urban regime analysis, the latter is well placed to provide some of the explanatory links missing in the regulationist account, in that it focuses on the content of political disputes and on the forms of political conflict and cooperation at the urban scale (see Laurie, 1997a). When analysing local policy 'regimes' consideration must be given to wider economic and extra-economic (regulatory) contexts. In this sense, Gibbs and Jonas (2000:301) argue that there is a need to recognise and examine the possible relationships between local policy regimes and wider institutional forms, such as institutions of the state and the political economy, as well as national and international policies and regulations. Thus, as Laurie (1997c:239) argued; "it should be clear that the political economy of cities and the regulation of the capitalist economy are best understood in relation to each other".

Combining both theories, helps us to explain 'why both politics and economics matter'. Regime theory, however, must resist the tendency
to explain urban politics by using the rational behavioural processes model (Laurie, 1997a). While on the other hand regulation theory is weak in dealing with material and discursive practices and thus in explaining concrete situations. Horan (1991) argues that the two approaches have a common focus, specifically as regards the contingent nature of urban governance. She and others (see Laurie, 1997a) call for a dialectical synthesis of urban regime theory and regulation theory to assist in our understanding of urban politics and regulatory processes. This synthesis has the potential to provide greater analytical understanding into both urban regime transition and the dynamics of evolving modes of social regulation and emerging regimes of accumulation (see Laurie, 1997a).

Analysing the complex nature of urban governance with its focus on local actors, their strategic capacities and struggles and the wider economic context in which all of this is set leads to the necessity of developing new theoretical tools, which may help to deepen our understanding of a changing urban governance. A dialectical synthesis of both urban regime and regulation theories may provide such an opportunity. Another of the main advantages of this synthesis is that it highlights the importance of discourse, particularly the key role of economic discourses in framing accumulation strategies and
hegemonic projects. Given its importance in influencing urban policy developments, this chapter now turns to discuss the nature of the changing urban discourse in Britain.

**Changing Urban Discourse and Urban Policy**

Examination of the language surrounding contemporary urban policy developments emphasises the way in which the focus and nature of urban policy has changed in recent years (see Harvey, 1989; Parkinson 1996; Stewart, 1996). Brugue and Goma (1996:48) have argued that “the scope, values, spaces and actors involved in framing urban policy have changed dramatically”. The evolving nature of urban policy and associated language reflects ideological changes in political thinking. Urban policy has become even more political than before, which is evident in the language developed, firstly by the New Right and currently by New Labour. As such, it has become ever more contested political terrain. Stewart (1996:21) stresses that urban policy is increasingly affected by the shift towards a perspective which emphasises competition and the competitive position of cities. Cities now have to compete more openly with one another and are encouraged to do so by government for increasingly footloose capital, as well as scarce public resources (e.g. City Challenge and Social Inclusion Partnerships). Moreover, regulation theorists argue that the
fate of cities is increasingly bound up with the restructuring of contemporary capitalism and how economic restructuring is regulated (see Goodwin and Painter, 1996). In sum, regulation of the economy is the main objective of government regulation. It is unclear, however, who actually benefits from this regulation; this is the stuff of the 'new urban politics'. The new urban discourse and language therefore reflects the contemporary restructuring of capitalism and its impact on urban areas (Harvey, 1989).

Cities, however, need not be passive victims of contemporary global restructuring, but neither do they have total local autonomy to make their own decisions. Cities, however, do have to become increasingly more sensitive to global economic changes and have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to transform their fortunes using a variety of what Harvey (1989) calls entrepreneurial strategies (e.g. place marketing). His profile of inter-urban competition, underlines the importance of cities’ exploitation of advantages for the production of goods and services, as well as increasing competition with respect to localities’ position in relation to consumption. This mirrors concern to make cities more attractive as consumer centres. In this respect, Jessop (1997) also notes that localities are being re-branded or reimaged not only as an economic and political, but also as a cultural
phenomenon. While this may be designed for citizens/consumers it is also crucially designed for the enhancement of the localities' competitiveness. If the formation and reformation of local partnerships has become a common feature of entrepreneurial localities, property development exercises and the cultivation of city pride and place marketing have also played their role in this regard. Depending upon the geographical and political context, the entrepreneurial solution has drawn on a range of strategies, such as the funding of public and private-sector ‘partnerships’ to regenerate urban areas through flagship property redevelopment projects. High-visibility initiatives are also part of the entrepreneurial strategy and these have included theme parks, leisure centres and popular cultural events (the Glasgow Garden Festival, 1988; Glasgow City of Culture, 1990 and Glasgow City of Architecture and Design, 1999 are good examples of such initiatives).

Therefore, the entrepreneurial approach frequently adopts the form of unique events, cultural policies, promotion of tourism and image improvement, which are supposed to regenerate or to further develop the economic base of the urban areas. Since it is thought that urban wasteland and images of economic decline may undermine investor confidence, property development projects, as Healey et al., (1992) remark, have become key components in the transformation of urban
environments. In this sense derelict, run down, former industrial areas, (in particular on waterfront locations) as well as the declining, neglected historical parts of city centres have been targeted to be transformed in to the new patterns of land uses. This is achieved by providing an appropriate accommodation and environment for the new sectors of consumption and production activities, such as leisure-retailing complexes and high-technology industries. This strategy encourages the speculative private developer, providing property in the hope of future demand.

With regard to this kind of initiative in the UK during the 1980s, Healey et al., (1992) stress how this approach has contained significant ambiguities. They argue that the rhetoric of policy presentation has shifted between reacting to market demand and market signals, towards making markets which the private sector will respond to. Although, intended to be market led, the strategy involved public investment to lead the market. The public sector took the initiative trying out ideas, coordinating and managing development and handing over opportunities to the private sector, once the early investment had been made, and the risks minimised. In doing that, it subsidised development, undertook land assembly, provided sites with infrastructure and became the risk taker (see Healey et al., 1992). Yet,
in practice, it is often simply assumed that private-sector property development is synonymous with economic development, or that there is an inevitable one-way process leading from physical to economic regeneration (Turok, 1992). Further, as Turok (1992) notes in relation to the limited scale of institutional involvement in industrial property in Scotland, reliance on private-sector property development is limited by its spatial selectivity.

Booth and Boyle (1993) in their analysis of Glasgow regeneration strategies up to the early 1990s, point to the fact that culture has been used as an economic tool in many different ways. They point out how, ".....culture is defined in the language of economics, with the subsequent measurements applied to policy analysis". Thus, ".....words, such as investment, leverage, employment, direct and indirect income effects, become in this context, common parts of the language of regeneration" (Booth and Boyle, 1993:22). Crucially, they are also used to measure the 'success/failure' of specific policies.

The use of language accompanying the changing nature of urban policy is not without significance. In this age of mass communications and sound bites, the politics of language has taken on a new importance where getting what you want to say across to others is vital in winning
the battle of ideas (see Cameron, 1994:17); language is crucial in helping to achieve this. Language, therefore, “is not just about representing private mental states, it is also about affirmation of values” (Cameron, 1994:26). The importance of language in legitimising political values and culture has been emphasised by Newman (1996). He also claims that language can play an important part in shaping perceptions. Thus, the power of language should not be underestimated in the production, maintenance and change of social relations (see Fairclough, 1993); the relationship between language, discourse and power is complex. The study of this relationship, however, gives a deeper understanding of the nature of power, the struggle for power, the distribution of power and how and why it is used.

Hall (1994:167) argues that “our relationship to ‘reality’ is always mediated in and through language and that language and discourse are central to operations of power”. The next section will consider in more detail how, between 1979-97, the Conservatives sought to redefine the urban ‘problem’ and change the focus of urban policy. Further, it will also discuss to what extent New Labour’s urban policy agenda differs from the Conservatives.
Urban Public Policy Before and After 1979

Before the late 1960s 'urban problems' were largely seen in physical terms. They were to be tackled by the redevelopment of the city (namely slum clearance and subsequent comprehensive redevelopment) and by the dispersal of problems through the creation of new towns and the fostering of regional policy (see Atkinson and Moon, 1994:21). This approach, however, was challenged through the 'rediscovery' of poverty in the mid-1960s. It is now accepted by most that the contemporary (post-1970) 'urban problem' is a multidimensional one that involves a host of interrelated forms of disadvantage (see Pacione, 1997). Until recently a general consensus and relative coherence of thought had existed in the perception if not the solutions to the problems of urban areas.

The contemporary 'urban problem' has been viewed as economic (economic restructuring, deindustrialisation and loss of employment opportunities), social (poverty and deprivation, welfare dependency, poor and inadequate housing, crime, racial tension and conflict, social polarisation and social exclusion), political (political alienation and marginalisation of particular individuals and groups), and environmental (decaying infrastructure, degraded environment and environmental pollution). All or some of these may or may not be
experienced by urban areas and urban dwellers. If they are, then they result in both disadvantage and a reduction in the quality of life of those affected. However, while there may be general agreement about the description of the problem and its many components there is much less agreement concerning the root causes and the best solutions to the ‘urban problem’.

Between 1945 and the 1960s a political consensus (although it would be wrong to suggest there was no difference in policies between the two parties) developed between the Conservative and Labour parties. This consensus, in general, supported a strong role for the state in solving society’s problems and managing the economy. The state, it was argued, could and crucially should intervene to alleviate the worst aspects of the urban ‘problem’. The term ‘Butskellism’ came to represent the post-war period which was characterised by Keynesian demand management of the economy, commitment to full employment, the development of a social security system, and an interventionist modern welfare state and state planning. It was on these policies that the postwar settlement was constructed.

Criticisms, however, were levelled at the failure of both political parties to develop a coherent urban policy (see Eyles, 1989). Most policies
implemented were criticised as being short-term, piecemeal and ad-hoc, reacting to particular problems e.g. unemployment caused by the closure of a factory, rather than policies which were proactive, coherent and long-term. Initially, politicians believed that sustained economic growth and the creation of a welfare state would solve the problems of urban areas. In this context, urban policy was viewed as marginal and a temporary political expedient (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). Weight was given to this argument by the relatively meagre resources which were allocated directly to urban policy. They represented a small fraction of total welfare spending. Even by the early 1990s only £4 billion was being spent on urban policy a year (see Robson et al., 1994b), compared to approximately £80 billion spent on social security alone in 1994 (Commission on Social Justice, 1994). Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of the emergence of urban initiatives should not be underestimated.

It is also important to note that ideas on how to tackle urban problems came from both United States and Britain. Racial tension in Britain and especially the United States where rioting and alienation were growing problems had a strong influence upon the emergence of an 'inner city' policy targeted at areas of poverty and immigration. In this context as Hill (2000:23) states, "it is notable that the first specifically inner-city
policy was devised by the Labour government's 1968 Urban Programme, which was closely tied to the issue of race and racism”. From the start, the Urban Programme was a response to fears about racial tensions in British cities, both because of images drawn from the US and the predictions of Enoch Powell, who in 1968 threatened 'foaming rivers of blood’ and prophesied that Britain’s inner cities would be transformed into ‘alien territories’ (see Atkinson and Moon, 1994:231-4). Moreover, the imagery of a specifically ‘inner city problem’ was largely borrowed from the US.

The mid-1970s witnessed a major shift away from both cultural and managerialist theories of urban deprivation. A new consensus emerged in which it was accepted that the problems of distinct urban localities could only be viewed in relation to wider structural weaknesses in the economy. It was recognised that poverty could not simply emanate from localised factors, be they community malfunction or inefficiency in state service provision. The 1977 White Paper identified economic problems within the inner city areas as a crucial factor:

"the decline of the economic fortunes of the inner area lies at the heart of the problem".
In this context the public sector (namely local government) was to be afforded the lead role in urban regeneration. Where appropriate and possible, however, it should work with the private sector, forming public-private partnerships in a way earlier approaches had never really suggested or encouraged. However, by 1979 the postwar consensus had broken down. The following quote from Deakin and Edwards (1993:1) highlights the perception that it should be the private sector that takes a leading role in urban regeneration:

"once the 1977 White Paper had put down a marker that the fundamental problem was the collapse of the economic infrastructure of the inner cities, the way was clear for an incoming government, ideologically so inclined, to see economic regeneration as a job for the private sector".

After its election in 1979 the Conservatives began to encourage and champion the market/private sector as the solution to urban problems. In doing so the Conservatives began to advance the ‘enterprise solution’ to ‘urban problems’. They argued that fostering and encouraging an ‘enterprise culture’ would revitalise rundown and depressed urban areas (see Deakin and Edwards, 1993).
Faith in private enterprise to solve the problems of urban areas was typified by the introduction of Enterprise Zones (EZs). Originally conceived as a market-led, planning-free solution to urban problems, the actual evolution of the programme differed considerably from the rhetoric. Contrary to the original thinking, local authorities were reimbursed by the Exchequer for their loss in ratable income through zones’ ‘rates holiday’ provisions. This, together with capital allowances on new buildings, site preparation and infrastructural costs, represented a heavy state subsidisation (see Barnekov et al., 1989). In effect, the high level of state subsidy and the continued application of planning controls has meant the EZs operated in a highly interventionist manner, hugely at odds with free market ideals. This demonstrates the gap between, on the one hand, the then Conservative government’s right wing rhetoric, and on the other, the more ‘traditional’ ways in which it was put into practice.

What does this tell us about language and the formation of policy? The 1977 White Paper clearly emphasised the economic dimension to urban problems. Thus (economic) urban policy already existed before the introduction of New Right urban language. By 1979, with the introduction of a Conservative government, the time was right to develop the enterprise culture solution. As Deakin and Edwards

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(1993:1) point out, “there was a neat fit between economic logic and ideological leanings”. In this context, language followed ideas. Language, however, was to become important in being used to enable the New Right to ‘sell’ the new urban policy to the electorate and convince them of the virtues of the enterprise culture.

Language was to become very important in terms of winning the political argument and (re)defining the urban problem. Enterprise culture was to become one of the most important buzz words of the post-1979 political era. This term arguably more than any other symbolised Conservative thinking in the 1980s and early 1990s. As the following quote from Corner and Harvey (1990:24) shows, it became an integral part of four consecutive Conservative government’s philosophy:

"it was not simply a descriptive but a campaigning idea, a set of beliefs that permeated the government’s approach to everything it was doing".

Thus, the enterprise culture was to be at the heart of the Conservative government’s ‘political project’ designed to cure Britain from all its ills (see Deakin and Edwards, 1993). In the battle to win the political debate the Conservatives developed and colonised a whole new language by claiming (or reclaiming) words such as enterprise culture.
(in contrast to dependency culture), opportunity, choice, efficiency, privatisation, individualism, value-for-money, deregulation, marketisation and competition, as their own (it is important to note that New Labour have embraced many of these terms which in turn has influenced its policy thinking). The capturing and selling of this set of slogans allowed the Conservatives to set the policy agenda throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s. They subtly redefined urban problems by encouraging the electorate to see old issues in a new light. Thus, the Conservatives were successful in:

"fashioning a seductive appeal to selfishness, greed, possessive individualism, striking a populist alliance across the lines of traditional class alignments and introducing the gospel that market forces must prevail into the very heart of the left's traditional support" (Hall, 1994:169).

Conservative governments (1979-97) represented an individualistic free-for-all in economics. However, this totally free-market idea was never fully realised in practice. Thus, there is an important distinction between rhetoric/ideology and the reality of what actually took place. The market, the New Right argued, should be allowed to proceed without the interference or hindrance from the inefficient and bureaucratic state. Any group not willing to participate in the market,
was in Margaret Thatcher's language not 'one of us', and, in effect, ostracised:

"immigrants were to be feared, those without jobs derided and the poor written out of the script altogether" (Phillips, 1994:38).

In sum, greed and selfishness were good and were to be encouraged because they were seen as the solution to the problem. The antithesis of 'individualism, selfishness and greed' was 'collectivism, laziness and envy' (expressed also by and through the notion of an urban underclass), the New Right attributing this language to socialism and the failed politics of the past. The failure of the political left, until recently, has been to allow language to be colonised and distorted, without effective competition. On the one hand then, the Conservatives can be accused of 'abusing' language, on the other by privileging 'trivial' questions of language, they moved away from real politics (and hence real solutions to urban problems) into a world where it mattered more what things were called than whether anything was done about them (Cameron, 1994).

Redefining the 'Urban Problem'

It is widely accepted that three models have come to dominate government thinking regarding the nature of the urban problem. These
include the culture of poverty thesis; maldistribution of resources and opportunities; and structuralist positions (see Lawless, 1989).

The culture of poverty thesis was developed in America by writers such as Lewis (1968) and Banfield (1970). The ideas of a culture of poverty is seen as being both an adaptation to and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in society. It represents an effort by the poor to cope with the feelings of helplessness and despair which develop from the realisation of the improbability of achieving success within an essentially capitalist system (Knox and Pinch, 2000). As Lawless (1989) points out, these assumptions have been assimilated by both Conservative and Labour British government ministers. Keith Joseph (Conservative government minister in the 1970s) who was one of the strongest proponents of these ideas, argued that a culture of deprivation, characterised by early marriage, early child-rearing, poor educational attainment, vandalism and petty crime was evident in specific parts of Britain. The emphasis was focussed on the apparent weaknesses of individuals (blame the victim hypothesis) and inner-city communities. In short, all of this results in a vicious cycle of lack of opportunity and lack of aspiration. The advantages for government of adopting this position propounded by the culture of poverty thesis is clear. As Sinfield (1973) points out “an all out attack on a number of
specific areas is much more administratively attractive - certainly cheaper and potentially quicker than careful re-examination of the basic fabric of society”, quoted in Lawless (1989:8). Thus, wider issues such as the position of the poor in the urban economy and the unequal distribution of power and wealth were ignored.

The idea of a maldistribution of resources and opportunities can be accommodated within pluralist political theory. According to this idea better management and distribution of resources can substantially relieve urban deprivation. Technical inefficiencies, a lack of integrated service delivery and the failure of key services were seen as increasing poverty. The main advantage of adopting this approach is that few would disagree that better coordination and the drive towards achieving greater efficiency of service delivery is desirable, and may be beneficial to its recipients. Thus, poverty is seen almost as an administrative problem. However, critics argued that while addressing the symptoms of urban poverty, it failed to deal with the underlying root causes of poverty, namely the operations of the capitalist system.

A further explanation was advanced by those who saw (i.e. various Marxist inspired accounts) the structure and organisation of capitalist society as predominantly contributing to the development of urban
poverty. Rejecting the simplistic assumptions of the culture of poverty thesis and need for better coordination of resources arguments, this approach sets urban deprivation and poverty as inevitable results of the underlying economic order and of structural changes in labour markets, etc, that are attached to the overall restructuring of the economy and the built environment (Knox and Pinch, 2000).

Arguably one of the most important urban experiments, in terms of a rethinking of the urban problem was the Community Development Programme (CDP) which was set up first by the Labour government (1966-70) and then continued by the Conservative government (1970-74). In total twelve CDPs were established throughout Britain. It is somewhat ironic that while the CDPs were established under the focus of a social pathology approach, they concluded that urban poverty was a direct result of structural factors relating to technological change and economic restructuring in capitalist society (CDP, 1977a):

"it was clear that the problems of these areas were firmly tied to much more basic structural problems in society and that the solution does not consist in the poor pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, but in sufficient political will being directed toward fundamental and far reaching social change"

There can be little doubt that the CDPs produced valuable insights on the nature of urban problems in Britain. However, given that the conclusions of this research were influenced by some key aspects of Marxist thinking, it was viewed with great suspicion and apprehension by the government (see Atkinson and Moon, 1994:50). Simply put, no government would be likely to accept its recommendations that the only real solution to the problems created by capitalism was its abolition. It was no surprise that the findings of the CDPs resulted in the government disbanding this programme. However, government could not totally ignore the important questions that the CDP raised about the nature of capitalist development.

The ways in which the three ideas briefly outlined above have been utilised and interpreted by government have had substantial and important implications for the policy responses which have been put in place. Thus, the way in which 'urban problems' are constructed shapes the policy outcomes that emerge (Mooney and Johnstone, 2000:16). The last of the aforementioned perspectives, the structuralist perspective, has largely been omitted in recent debates concerning urban policy (see Atkinson, 2000 for a reassertion of the significance of this approach). This omission is clearly evident when New Labour’s urban discourse is more closely analysed and will be discussed later in
To what extent does New Labour’s discourse towards the urban problem differ from the Conservative’s urban discourse? In New Labour’s urban discourse is it all change or are elements of continuity evident? The rest of this section is concerned with the development of the new Labour government’s urban policy discourse. Specifically, it will explore the extent to which New Labour policies differ or reflect a continuation of policies introduced by previous Conservative governments.

**From Dependency Culture to Social Inclusion**

Tackling social exclusion is New Labour’s big idea. At the formal launch of the Social Exclusion Unit in December, 1997 Tony Blair spoke on the problems of socially excluded communities and individuals:

“The public knows only too well the dangers of a society that is falling apart. They know that worsening inequality, hopelessness, crime, and poverty undermine the decency on which any good society rests. They know how easily shared values and rules can unravel. Social exclusion is about income but it is about more. It is about prospects and networks and life chances. It is a very modern problem, and one that is more harmful to the individual, more damaging to self-esteem, more
As indicated in the above quote the key to ‘inclusion’ was paid employment. Gaining work was the way in which all excluded people of working age could be rejoined with society. The development of New Labour’s ‘welfare to work’ policy was to be the mechanism in which the unemployed were to return to employment. While those seeking work may have the right to work, this had to be linked to individual obligations and responsibilities which are key components in New Labour’s approach to social welfare. As Tony Blair himself put it:

“Social justice is about mutual responsibilities. It insists that we all accept duties as well as rights - to each other and to society” (quoted in Mooney and Johnstone, 2000:7).

Levitas (1998) argues that New Labour’s emerging agenda combines elements of two main discourses on welfare; namely the social integrationist and moral underclass discourses. Both of these discourses concentrate on the importance of paid employment and the need to address the growing problems of welfare dependency and family breakdown, crime and disorder. However, nowhere in New
Labour’s social inclusion discourse can the language of redistribution (of power and wealth) be found. According to New Labour this term is associated with failed socialist policies of the past. A fact highlighted by Mooney and Johnstone (2000:8):

“in stressing social inclusion and the pursuit of social justice, the idea that poverty and social exclusion can be effectively tackled by large-scale income redistribution has been removed. Equality has been replaced by social inclusion, an altogether more fuzzy idea”.

The moralist and at times authoritarian tone which emanates from much of New Labour’s thinking shares much in common with previous Conservative perspectives on social life and social relations. In this respect there are very direct connections between the policies being pursued by New Labour and by previous Conservative governments. Both clearly embrace market based solutions to social and economic problems. Both have placed a strong emphasis on the state and the market working in partnership. Labour in this sense have arguably gone even further than the Conservatives in stressing the need to govern in joined-up partnership in a new ‘third-way’ politics, which rejects the limitations and failings of both the market and state.
Another area in which there are close similarities between New Labour and Conservative thinking is the focus on social problems becoming increasingly localised. There is considerable evidence that points to the uneven geographical distribution of poverty and disadvantage across Britain especially within urban areas (Philo, 1995). For New Labour this necessitates policies that are area-specific and client based. The numerous policies implemented in New Labour's first three years in power are testament to this. These have include Housing Action Areas and Education Action Zones (in England), New Deal for Communities, Health Action and Employment Zones (in England) (see Mooney and Johnstone, 2000). In Scotland, SIPs are the main area-based policy, but there are also area-based regeneration programmes, Housing Partnerships and New Community Schools (Scotland's version of EAZs). Labour's keenness for zones represents one of its key mechanisms for managing social policy and in particular its desire to generate joined-up strategies for addressing social exclusion, a central element of third-way thinking.

New Labour's approach to the problems of excluded areas, is imbued with a language that owes much to the ideology of an underclass. Clear indication of this is evident by the Social Exclusion Unit in their reference to 'no go areas' and 'no exit zones'. Throughout many New
Labour policy documents most notably *Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal* (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998b) and the *National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal: A Framework for Social Exclusion* (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000), there is a strong emphasis on the deviant or pathological aspects of life in deprived places. New Labour’s approach is underpinned by an emphasis on institutional failure, whether it be employment, family, community or in public services. Changes in family structure, for example the rise of lone-parent households and teenage pregnancies, are seen as contributing to the process of decline in certain areas.

While the language of New Labour may be different from the Conservatives towards ‘distressed’ communities, it is altogether more questionable whether the policy mechanisms have altered to any great extent. Thus, New Labour may speak of ‘community’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘partnership’, all of which recognise the importance of the social in urban regeneration (see Ginsburg, 1999). However, the policies designed to tackle the problems of urban areas display a strong degree of continuity with those of previous Conservative governments. For example, while New Labour’s SIP policy stresses the need for *partnership* working, this is not too dissimilar to the Conservatives ‘New Life for Urban Scotland’ initiative, which also
emphasised the need for partnership involving all levels of government, business and the community. In practical terms SIPs are a continuation, albeit in another guise (especially in the language New Labour’s uses), of the Conservative government’s approach to urban policy. Behind the rhetoric of the social inclusion agenda there is a clear managerialist approach to solving urban problems. Further, SIPs are also partly influenced by the notion of a burgeoning underclass, with the emphasis placed upon individuals and communities which are excluded from mainstream society.

Furbey (1999) argues that for all its talk of ‘holistic’ and ‘inclusiveness’, New Labour’s urban discourse displays some familiar attributes of previous policy agendas. The government’s urban policy programme draws heavily on analyses and prescriptions that have accumulated over many years in the USA and which were taken on board by the previous Conservative government (Stepney et al., 1999). In sum, its understanding of the problem and associated policies rely upon established (but often discredited) discourses of poverty and exclusion, namely individual pathology and cultural deficiency arguments.
New Labour's pursuit of holistic urban regeneration and joined-up government is reflective of their recent emphasis on inclusion. In one sense this is not entirely new. Throughout much of the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, the Conservative government sought greater coordination, collaboration and partnership in urban policy (see Stewart, 1996). However, while the Conservatives viewed local authorities not just with suspicion, but often with contempt, New Labour have sought to 'reinclude' them as facilitators of local partnerships where they are often seen as the key to achieving joined-up thinking.

Not only is it emphasised that the full range of 'stakeholders' are to find a place at New Labour's policy table, but the 'community' is also to be involved in policy decisions. New Labour's claim is that the community is to be assigned a more pervasive and formalised role than ever before. In Scotland, social inclusion documents speak of building community capacity to empower people in poor urban areas (GP SIP, 1998a). While there are clear links with previous Conservative government policies especially 'New Life for Urban Scotland', which also stressed community involvement in decision making, SIP guidelines now require local partnerships to more specifically and actively promote social inclusion, and to make provision for effective
community involvement.

New Labour’s aspiration for inclusivity in urban regeneration is related in part to the need to weave together the disparate urban players that have emerged in recent years into networks of stakeholding ‘partners’ (see Furbey, 1999:430). They all, it is claimed, have a role to play in the renewal of the urban environment. Furbey (1999:430) argues that New Labour’s urban discourse echoes the conservative applications of social Darwinism a century ago with its subsequent focus of structural functionalism. This leads to a particular concern for social order (which New Labour call social cohesion) and with the integration and ‘participation’ of the poor who threaten the general health and economy of the urban arena. Thus, New Labour’s urban policy reflects the deepening problems of a ‘dual society’, with its focus on encouraging city competitiveness, and participation of the excluded.

The social exclusion discourse is attractive to politicians because of the imprecision of definition or causes attached to the idea. Thus, politicians can sign up to those parts of the whole which closely fit their ideas and which sections of the electorate they are seeking to attract (Mohan, 2000). Fraser (1995) emphases a damaging split which has emerged between the ‘old social left’ which was interested in
addressing and tackling issues of inequality and wealth redistribution and the ‘new cultural left’ concerned with issues of marginalisation, exclusion, and recognition. This has led to a general absence of a ‘politics of redistribution’ (Fraser, 1995). This absence can be discerned when New Labour’s social inclusion agenda is carefully analysed. While New Labour may speak of the goal of social justice (which is narrowly defined in terms of equality of opportunity), they are unwilling to intervene in the distributional outcomes of markets. Government has in the words of Jameson (1991) accepted that it cannot buck the market. The main area of intervention is to be through equality of opportunity (especially of education and health care) rather than outcomes. Further, this is very much dependent on the economy delivering a surplus sufficient for the task (Atkinson, 2000:223).

Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning how the link between the social and the spatial has helped shape the politics of social justice recently developed under New Labour (see Tonkiss, 2002 for a more in-depth discussion of these issues). In this context disadvantaged areas such as ‘Greater Pollok’ are identified as spaces of social exclusion, while also seemingly being referred to as “communities” of hope from which the basis of a politics of inclusion and civic solidarity can be constructed (Tonkiss, 2002). In Britain the emergence of a number of academic
centres and departments which focus on social justice/social inclusion issues is testament to the recent attempts to better understand the close relationship between the social and the spatial. While this is to be welcomed it is hoped that in the words of Lovering (1995) it amounts to much more than the 'creation of discourses rather than jobs'.

Conclusions

This chapter sought to analyse the 'new urban governance'. In doing so it has sought to discuss the two most prominent theories used in explaining contemporary urban governance. Regime theory and regulation theory have come to dominate the debate about the nature of contemporary urban governance. However, as highlighted in this chapter, both theories are not without their shortcomings. In brief, regulation theory while stronger on analysing extra local economic and political influences, is weaker on understanding the importance of local actors and organisations and thus has been unable to explain the concrete construction of regulatory mechanisms (see Painter, 1998; Laurie, 1997a; 1997b). On the other hand, regime theory inadequately theorises the connections between local agents and their wider institutional context, and succumbs instead to empiricism and 'excessive localism' (Jessop, 1995).
These criticisms have led some analysts to argue that integration of both could be potentially fruitful (see Laurie, 1997a). Others, (Ward, 1996) speak of a need to theoretically ground urban regime theory. Theoretical and empirical development in the complimentarities of both theories is essential, so as to avoid the increasing tendency towards mere descriptions of local governance which smooth over the complexities and contradictions of political practices (see Valler et al., 2000). While description is important it should also be:

"extended through a more fine-grained investigation of fragmented local governance forms, including a precise and detailed reporting of the mechanics of the new local governance in particular places"


Thus, in the case of Glasgow (or anywhere else) it would be naive to think that it would fit neatly into either theory. As this research will demonstrate while Glasgow has been influenced by the wider generalised context, this has been mediated by localised hetrogeneity in economic, cultural and political terms. Clearly, in this context the awareness of specific features in the case of Glasgow become a crucial task, since the peculiarities illuminate key aspects of local transformations and reflect political traditions, types of authority and local economic structure. Chapter Four will explore further the extent
that the ‘concrete’ study of Glasgow may contribute to the integration of regulation and regime theory.

Finally, this chapter also sought to analyse the changing urban discourse and associated urban policy developments in the ‘new urban governance’. This involved an analysis of British urban policy and the narratives operating within that policy area. The focus of analysis was on recent policy developments in urban policy first under the Conservatives and latterly New Labour. It is clear from this chapter that New Labour’s urban policy displays a large degree of continuity with previous Conservative policies. In this sense, the new Labour government has accepted much of the Thatcherite discourse with regards to ‘urban problems’ and their solutions.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Researchers need to be able to justify why they chose a particular research approach as well as discussing the advantages and limitations of such an approach. This chapter will deal with two interrelated dimensions to the process of research. First, it will address the main theoretical or philosophical judgments pertaining to the nature of research. Second, it will deal with the methods chosen to conduct the research. It is important to recognise that theory and methods are interconnected. One feeds into the other and vice versa e.g. the use of methods should relate back to existing and new theories. This emphasises that the research process is dynamic, a factor which must be taken into account by researchers.

Four methods were utilised in this research namely: semi-structured interviews, observational study (attendance at various policy making meetings), focus group discussions and a questionnaire (Appendix 1). The first three methods gathered predominantly qualitative information and the latter method, a mix of both qualitative and
quantitative information. An explanation will be given, later in this chapter, on why these methods were chosen and how they were used.

**Politics, Theory and Research**

"...policy analysis must not just be technical or concerned with empirical analysis, but must also take the ideological roots of policy more seriously, and subject them to critical and philosophical analysis. Such....critique cannot be value neutral." (Hepple, 1989:388).

The quote above makes clear that any analysis in the public policy field must engage with political theories in the terms in which they are applied. The comment is relevant because it has implications for how research into political decision-making should be approached and, as importantly, how the researcher does or does not make that approach clear. Political considerations in research are subtle, ambiguous and arguable.

The view that the researcher needs to define the normative assumptions informing the research itself is supported here. Thus, support for criticism of existing theories are probably necessary but
not enough: a theory of how a problem should be resolved not only how it has been experienced is also needed, similar to the need to define a 'world view'. In addition to Hepple identifying the failure of human geographers to engage in political practice, Smith (1989) states that the most problematic aspect...is a detachment from political theory and practice at a time when the boundaries between civil society and the state are being radically realigned. Although such explicit views have only recently been expressed in human geography, the arguments have been more common in other social science disciplines (particularly sociology). This 'detachment' from active involvement in the policy field has been considered to lead to an imbalance towards 'unconnected research' (i.e. unconnected from the realities of everyday experience, Payne et al, 1981). Thus, sociologists (and urban theorists) ought to explain why policies are problematic and attempt to change them through the use of knowledge: "this will force...a clarification of (the researcher's) own political and moral values." (Payne et al, 1981:156-157).

Quantitative approaches cannot be neutral or value-free because they still involve the researcher's judgments as to how 'the real world' relates to theoretical descriptions and how categorisations developed
as measurements for reality. Empirical techniques for social sciences can only be better or worse ways of seeing the relevant issues. This is not a criticism of the methods themselves (although an appreciation of the limits to any method is always justified). Instead it is a blow to the concept of attaining objectivity in social science research. In sum, social research can never be totally objective, since researchers are humanly subjective.

Governance and urban policy issues are set in such a dynamic and politically-charged context that it would be simply inappropriate to assume a neutral position. In the intentions of the policy-makers, its fiscal impact and its many wider effects, outcomes have never been objective, value-free or neutral. Whether a rigorous approach to research is achieved depends not on the ability to see merit in all sides of an argument, but on how appropriate a method is to the research questions, how it was applied and how the written account analyses the data. The pursuit of research neutrality is rejected as a method and as a philosophy because of the nature of the social worlds. The uncertainties of human behaviour certainly include the researcher, the researched and their interactions; these cannot be substituted in favour of the assumed orders of scientific prediction.
Above all when the issues concern political behaviour, empiricism (as distinct from empirical method) is inappropriate. To return to the argument of Hepple and of Smith, they are not entirely accurate when they imply that a political focus is often absent. In fact the attempt to legitimise work as value-free (even if the attempt is genuine) is a political project, since research findings either support or challenge the existing status quo. In this research there is no claim to be value-neutral. It is accepted by most academics that each researcher comes to the research with their own biases and prejudices. Interpretation of the social world is related to the researcher's own perspective. The social world offers not one verifiable truth but many for those interpreting it. In other words, the analysis of events in this thesis is a product of my own approach: the position from which I started and the way in which experiences have been prioritised. Thus, researchers are not 'neutral'; they are motivated to say something meaningful.

This research adopts a critical political economy perspective which probes not only the what of cities but also the how and the why. A political-economy approach does, after all, encapsulate an avowedly critical approach to society (see Peet and Thrift, 1989). There is a long tradition of studying urban government/governance in terms of
explaining the nature of local politics, where power resides and what are the outcomes of local political processes in conferring advantage and disadvantage for particular groups or neighbourhoods. Much of this analysis has been theoretically and politically positioned, in terms of the distribution of power, or in the role of institutions or within theories of the state. In sum, all research (especially into urban governance) has a political dimension (see Devine and Heath, 1999). While few would dispute this it is crucial that researchers are themselves reflexive about how they did their research. It is now more common place for researchers to consider the impact of political and other potential sources of bias on the conduct of their research, as well as to weave these issues into research publications. The position a researcher starts from will undoubtedly influence their choice of methods used to conduct the research. This research being predominantly qualitative had a central commitment to viewing the social world from the perspective of social actors. The interpretative paradigm stressing the dynamic, constructed and evolving nature of social reality is adopted, which seeks to understand social reality through the eyes of those being studied. In this context the importance of striving to understand the experiences of those excluded from local governance issues in the 'Greater Pollok'
Peripheral estate was a crucial component of this research. The use of focus groups helped this researcher to see from the position of those 'excluded' from local decision making and to enable them to 'tell it like it is' by giving 'them a voice' (see Devine and Heath, 1999).

This research like most social science research has had to take into consideration the nature of the subject matter. Given the dynamic nature of society and the constantly changing political debate surrounding urban problems and policies, the aims of this research changed over time and were updated to take account of emerging priorities. The phrase 'shooting a moving target' best sums this up. The moving target being that of urban policy, which has changed considerably in the last few years, not least because a new Labour government (1997-) has come to power with what it would argue is a new agenda. The changing nature of politics presents difficulties for the researcher of keeping up to date with the changing context of policy debate and how this may affect the research process. This demonstrates that research is not a smooth, linear process, but full of challenges and uncertainties. However, this is also what makes social research exciting. The next section turns to discuss the four main methods used in this research.
Qualitative Interviewing

The main means of collecting information for this research was through the technique of interviewing. Interviewing is regarded as the most widely used method of social research (Fielding, 1993). Three different types of interview are identified: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. This research used semi-structured interview techniques which allowed the researcher to take a flexible approach to questioning interviewees.

Given the central aim of this research was to investigate the effectiveness of the 'new urban governance' in addressing the problems experienced by disadvantaged communities living in the city of Glasgow, it was crucial that key urban actors were identified and interviewed. To achieve this I attempted to make contact with key individuals in both public and private sectors. A letter was sent to those regarded as key actors (who were chosen in consultation with the research supervisor as well as being identified by other urban governance researchers as being 'important') within departments in the various organisations who are responsible for urban policy design and implementation in Glasgow. This letter outlined the purpose of the research and the need to talk to key actors involved in urban
policy making. The initial interviews were informal to allow me to gain a 'foot in the door' of decision makers. Moreover, they helped identify the key players in each organisation to whom it would be crucial to speak. It may have been the person identified or someone else in the organisation identified by the initial contact. This highlights how it is not a simple task to track down the key urban actors in urban policy making within any city. This problem has become more acute given the plethora of organisations who are now involved in the governance of Glasgow. These discussions were also crucial in helping to refine specific questions which would later be needed to be asked about urban policy making in Glasgow (Appendix 2 indicates the types of question asked by the researcher during final interview). This would help to save a great deal of time in asking the right questions to the right people. The informal discussions lasted between 20 to 45 minutes and were spread over a six month period.

Once the appropriate person(s) were identified in each of the relevant organisations a letter of introduction was sent outlining the main purpose of the research and to seek a meeting at an appropriate time and place. All final interviews were held during office day time hours and were audio-tape recorded. None of the 30 people (Appendix 3)
interviewed refused to be tape-recorded. On all occasions I travelled
to the work-place of the interviewees. There are both advantages and
disadvantages of conducting interviews in such a way. The main
advantage is that it is more likely that the interviewee would feel
relaxed, comfortable and confident in surroundings which they are
familiar with. This could be important in that it may help the
interviewee to engage more fully and openly in answering questions
posed in the interview. There was also the advantage that there is no
need for those being interviewed to travel from their place of work to
some neutral venue or to the base of the interviewer. In general, the
interviewees were relaxed and willing to engage in answering the
question put to them in this setting. The main disadvantage, however,
is that the researcher is on 'foreign territory'. If the interviewer is
experienced, flexible and skilled then this should not present a major
problem.

The length of each interview is also of crucial importance in
contributing towards the success of an interview. It is widely accepted
that interviews should last no longer than one hour (Gilbert, 1993).
After this time both interviewee and interviewer begin to lose interest
and attention in the questions and thrust of the interview as tiredness
and boredom can emerge. An interviewer should detect problems that can arise from lengthy interviews and adjust their interview questions and technique to elicit what information they deem essential to their research. Most of the interviews conducted in the process of this research lasted between forty-five minutes and one hour. The skill is to ensure that the interviewee is allowed appropriate time to answer the questions posed as fully and openly as possible without them rambling and taking too much time over a few questions to the neglect of other relevant questions.

**Observational Research**

The second means by which information was gathered during this research was by using observational techniques. Observation is a major means by which people develop knowledge of the world they live in (Harvey and MacDonald, 1993). By undertaking observational research researchers attempt to see the world in new ways, as well as helping to confirm their preconceptions. In practical terms this involves 'looking hard' at all aspects of what is occurring in a given social situation. In sum, observation can be regarded as social inquiry. Like all forms of qualitative research it has both strengths and weaknesses. Given resource constraints and the complex nature of
observation, small numbers are usually studied. In this context the
generalisability of observational research may be questioned.

Other issues to consider include the difficulties of collecting
information in the field, and maintenance of relations in the field;
both of which were of particular relevance to this research and will be
discussed later. Shipman (1997:70) on commenting upon
observational research notes that it is "a ubiquitous technique. It
requires no necessary instrumentation and is endlessly fascinating. It
seems ideal for developing theory grounded in evidence, is unlikely to
disturb the natural situation which was the distinguishing feature of
these approaches and enables us to detect even the most subtle clues
in human interaction".

This approach to observation and recording touches on two of the
most important practical issues involved in collection of observational
data. Researchers have to decide what will be observed and why?
These decisions will be made in reference to the research questions
posed. Given that I would not be allowed to video or audio tape
tape record any meetings that I attended the only other means of collecting
information was to take notes and to observe individual/group
behaviour. The logistics of recording information and analysing data in such a way is demanding and challenging. Making and taking field notes raises questions of what to record, when and how. Not only is what would be discussed at the meeting be of importance, but also the way people respond (behave) to particular situations. Body language, tone of voice (e.g. friendly/hostile) can be revealing to the way people think. It must be remembered that observation is not an exact science. In this context, care must be taken when observing not to read too much into what a researcher appears to see. As Shipman (1997:72) argues "observations are not the result of senses detecting events out there that look the same to everyone. Our perceptions are structured. We see the world through our attitudes, prejudices, values and through the models in the mind that we have learned". Thus, our interpretation of a situation may not be as others would see it, though nevertheless still relevant. Given that each social situation is unique, it is impossible to replicate it over and over again (e.g. a Board meeting). Thus, the validity of the research can be put into question. In sum, observation research is a partial approach; the researcher chooses what they want to observe.
With regards to this research I believed it to be important to gain access to the Glasgow Alliance (GA) as it has emerged as an important body in the contemporary governance of Glasgow. Gaining access is crucial to observational research which usually involves negotiating with gatekeepers. In this instance the gatekeeper was the GA. This quango had the power to deny or allow me access to their meetings and crucially to determine my role at any meetings. To obtain access I contacted Andrew Fyfe the Executive Director of the GA by letter. The letter outlined the purpose of my research and requested that I attend a future GA board meeting. However, after some time had elapsed and there was no reply from the GA I met Andrew Fyfe's Deputy (Marion Keogh) at an urban regeneration meeting in Glasgow, and asked her if Andrew Fyfe had decided whether or not to allow me to attend a future GA board meeting. She said that 'he would be responding to me shortly and that I could attend if I so wished'. Some more time elapsed with no formal response from Andrew Fyfe. I then telephoned the GA offices to speak to Andrew Fyfe directly. He was not available so his depute Marion Keogh spoke on his behalf. She said that Andrew Fyfe had spoken to the partners who make up the GA to seek their permission for me to attend a future Board meeting. However, she said two of the partners had expressed reservations about my
attendance. When asked why they had raised concerns she responded by saying that those who had voiced reservations thought that my 'research was inherently political and that I had an agenda that I was pursuing'. She said that she would not reveal the names of those who raised concerns as it would betray their trust. She then said that Andrew Fyfe (whom I had previously interviewed) had no such objections and that I would be allowed to attend the next board meeting which took place on April 1999. After my attendance at the April board meeting it was agreed that I could attend one further meeting. I thought it important that for the sake of continuity in the study of the GA that I attend the next board meeting which took place in June 1999.

It was agreed that my role was to be as an observer and I was not allowed to participate in the GA Board meetings. It is worthwhile asking why Marion Keogh had informed me of some of the GA partners' feelings. In one sense it could be viewed as a message to watch my line of questioning to which clearly some individuals took exception. This is partly backed-up when she said to me "that you do not want to alienate yourself with these decision makers. It would be bad (politically) for you to do so. You have to think of your future". In
a sense this could be construed as a veiled threat to watch my step, by not standing on 'anyone's toes'. In sum, do not ask awkward questions. This brief incident raises a number of important issues. First, to gain access to a particular social situation means having to make appropriate contacts and follow established 'norms of protocol'; in effect researchers need to play the 'research game'. The 'rules of the game' were made up, in this case, by those I sought to study. The power to deny or allow entry to this social situation was held by the members of the GA. To have upset one/all of them was to run the risk of being denied access. Second, as a social researcher I was an outsider who may have been viewed as 'threatening' to some members of the GA. When I interviewed some of the members, prior to my request to attend a GA Board meeting, I questioned the decisions made by key players/bodies with regards to contemporary urban policies in Glasgow. It would appear that some were cautious regarding the nature of some of my questions.

Further, the above discussion raises key issues of access, power and accountability in urban governance. Raco (1999) has argued that recent changes to the institutional organisation of urban governance has had a significant impact on the ability of researchers to conduct
research in which access to key decision makers has to be negotiated. With the rise of the 'quango state', which has involved power shifting from local authorities to a range of institutional players drawn from the public and private sectors (see Cochrane, 1993), much criticism has been levelled at the way the decision making process has become increasingly 'closed off' from public scrutiny (see Raco, 1999; Keating, 1993; Stoker, 1996). Obviously, this creates potential difficulties and dilemmas for researchers of urban governance. As Raco (1999:271) claims, with "restricted access to decision makers and the records and files of their activities, researchers may find that their ability to document the practices of the new institutions becoming highly circumscribed". The importance of this should not be lost given that access is increasingly being negotiated and granted on the basis that researchers 'offer' their research findings to those to whom they have successfully gained access. Access, in this context is not seen as a right, but as a privilege to be earned by researchers.

During this research gaining access to both public and quango personnel and written material was not always easy. Thus, this research supports Imrie and Raco's (1999) conclusions which warned against exaggerating the extent of 'openness' of local authorities and
the 'closure' of contemporary quangos. My experience during this research was that both types of institution were problematic in terms of gaining access and obtaining information. For example, in terms of this research I did find that some of those questioned were very defensive and obtuse when answering questions I put to them. I especially found The Scottish Office (now Scottish Executive) civil servants, some members of local quangos and some Glasgow City Council officials to be the worst offenders in this respect. However, it should also be pointed out that some of those interviewed were open and forthcoming with information. All of the above raises a number of issues about accountability. Given that all (public) policy makers are accountable to either locally elected politicians directly or indirectly to the Secretary of State for Scotland this process is clearly not designed to be accessible and accountable to the public. If researchers have difficulty in questioning key players/bodies this situation might be even more problematic for the general public.

Focus Group Research

The third means of collecting information for this research involved conducting focus group interviews. Focus group or group interviewing as it is also known has been a popular means of gathering information
used widely by market research and political parties. An example is New Labour's enthusiasm for using focus groups pre and post their British General Election victory of 1997. Tony Blair famously declared that "there is no one more powerful than a member of a focus group" (quoted in Barbour and Kitzenger, 1999:1).

Focus groups are group discussions which allow researchers to explore a specific set of issues. The group is 'focused' in that it involves some kind of collective activity such as watching a video or debating a set of questions. The main difference between focus groups and group interviews is the explicit use of group interaction to generate data. Focus group participants are encouraged to discuss issues with each other, ask questions, comment on each others experiences, etc. As Barbour and Kitzenger (1999:2) argue "at the very least, research participants create an audience for one another". Comparison is often drawn with questionnaires which are generally regarded as better equipped in obtaining quantitative information. Focus groups, on the other hand are more suited to the study of attitudes and experiences around specific topics. Hence, given that the focus of this research is urban governance, it was considered crucial to seek the views and opinions of a 'sample' of citizens of
Glasgow, where specific urban programmes have been formulated and implemented. This involved a case-study of the 'Greater Pollok' area of Glasgow.

It is generally accepted that statistical 'representativeness' is not the aim of most focus groups. Researchers who use focus groups adopt a flexible approach to the 'sample' they want to question. This usually involves composing a structured rather than a random sample. Given that the views and opinions of the residents of 'Greater Pollok' were sought, it was deemed important to identify and speak to members of the local community. The nature of the focus group construction in this research sought demographic diversity of local opinion rather than representativeness as it was vital to consider the voices of those local people who might be excluded in urban decision making. It was decided that five focus groups would be questioned with the view of ascertaining their views on local decision making and experience of living in 'Greater Pollok'. The five groups were as follows: youth (6th year students at a local secondary school), the elderly (over 60 years of age), women with children (aged 20-45), men (aged 20-50) and members of a housing association (men/women aged 25-60). These five groups chosen allowed for intra and inter-group comparison to
be made. Moreover, it was considered that the range of age groups would allow for a wide perspective of experiences and future hopes and aspirations to be ascertained about governance and life in 'Greater Pollok'. Each group consisted of eight people. The size of the group was not without importance. For example, if the group is too small or too large then problems may emerge. If it is too small then not enough group discussion (information) may be generated. If it is too large then group management and control of discussion may be difficult.

Other important issues included group membership. Researchers must decide whether to aim for homogeneity or heterogeneity. Kitzenger (1994) argues that bringing together people on the basis of some shared experience is often most productive, however differences between participants can often be illuminating. This research has striven to take on board these important caveats to group composition when deciding on the number and theme of the five focus groups chosen. Thus, while all participants were from the 'Greater Pollok' area (a 'traditional' working-class community), which gave a commonality of class to all focus groups, the differences in age and life experiences also gave the focus groups the potential to be
diverse in discussion and thought. Some of the members of the groups (e.g. students and housing association members) knew each other prior to the group discussions, while the other groups of people did not. The advantage of pre-existing groups (such as students) is that people would be already acquainted through living, working and socialising together. Thus, they are more familiar and confident with group discussion. The main disadvantage is the potential 'inhibiting' and 'polluting' effects of existing relations between group members. However, the benefits of bringing together and talking to complete strangers is that participants are given the chance to talk without fear or apprehension. In this research, group participants whose voice and experiences might otherwise be excluded were selected.

Focus Group Research Recruitment and Access
The role of the researcher and overall purpose of the research needs to be explained as part of the 'bargain' or contract which underlies relationships with participants. Different people will bring different motives and expectations of the group's significance, so it is important that a minimum set of guidelines is established. This section discusses the early stages of the focus group discussions, emphasising particularly the introduction and explanation of the
format of the meetings. This involves the research guide for the focus group. The bargain to be struck with participants refers to practical as well as ethical issues. Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) provide a detailed guide to the arrangements a researcher will have to consider in organising focus groups. For example, one of the most important decisions to be made is choosing an appropriate location in which the focus group meetings will be held. Any venue must be accessible to all participants. Familiar and well-lit venues are more likely to be attractive and encourage attendance. With these criteria in mind, enquiries to key players (or gatekeepers) who could help me identify and negotiate access to the five focus groups I sought to question was important. Moreover, they could also assist in finding appropriate venues where the focus groups would meet.

This touches upon the issue of gaining access to the five focus groups I sought to question. It was considered important to write to those gatekeepers whom I thought could help me to set-up the focus groups. By making contact (through letter/telephone) with relevant individuals who were closely associated with the groups, I sought access to those who might 'fast track' me into setting the groups up. In effect, they were helping me to 'screen' potential participants. This
has both advantages and disadvantages. While this has the potential to save researchers a great deal of time, it may, however, result in a 'biased sample', as gatekeepers may choose people who they think should participate in the focus group. Thus, it was extremely important that all gatekeepers were well briefed about the characteristics of the participants I was looking to interview. In three of the five focus groups (youth, housing association and elderly) I sought to achieve a gender balance. This obviously was not relevant in the other two focus groups: males (aged 20-50) and women with children (aged 20-45).

As well as informing the gatekeepers of the purpose of my research and why I wanted to set-up a focus group. By contacting someone on the 'inside' of the community, this helped legitimise my research and the purpose of the focus groups. In sum, these individuals could 'sell' the focus group to potential participants. For example, they could answer any questions concerning the nature of the proposed meetings. This could alleviate any suspicions or fears local people have of researchers who they may perceive as 'outsiders'. This could also encourage higher participation rates among those who had agreed to attend as non attendance could be viewed as 'letting the
side down'. Gatekeepers were important here as they were often in contact with participants on a daily basis (e.g. school head teacher with young people). This allowed the opportunity to remind participants of the imminent focus group which they had agreed to participate in. Further, if any potential participant was going to drop out of the group discussion then I could be informed. In effect, the gatekeepers were 'my eyes and ears' on the ground, informing me of any changes when they happened. This allowed me to respond quickly to any changes that arose.

Making Contact with Focus Group Participants

Once contacts had been made with appropriate gatekeepers it was essential to inform participants of the purpose of the focus group, the time, date and location of the group meeting. This was to be achieved in a letter (Appendix 4) which would also serve to outline the main purpose of the research and why their involvement was crucial. Participants names and addresses (and phone numbers where they existed) were forwarded to me by five gatekeepers I had made contact with earlier.
Sometimes under-emphasised, but nonetheless a vital element in making contact with potential participants, is a introductory letter. The letter acts as way of introducing oneself to participants. In this context a letter is helpful in explaining clearly the main purpose of the meeting. The letters to each of the five focus groups were sent out one week before the group would formally meet. Along with this letter I also sent a copy of a location map (Appendix 5) highlighting the venue to ensure that participants knew exactly where they were going. The letter established that participants had agreed to attend the focus group and that their attendance and involvement was vital. Participants were informed that they would join another seven people and all would be encouraged to express their views on local decision making and experiences of life in 'Greater Pollok'.

**Recording Focus Group Discussions**

The most simple and least controversial way of recording group discussions is by taking notes. However, problems exist in that it is not possible to record all of what is said; this is made more difficult if more than one person is speaking at the same time. Thus, most researchers will supplement their note taking with other ways of recording information. While video is becoming a popular and more
widely used medium to record information it was thought that there would be strong objections by participants to being video recorded in group discussion. Video-recording can be inhibiting, cumbersome and can give a misleading illusion of comprehensiveness (Barbour and Kitzenger, 1999). Audio-tape recording is usually the preferred method of most researchers and together with note taking can give the researchers a rich seam of information.

Before each group meeting, the issue of audio-tape recording the imminent discussions had to be raised. When all participants were present I asked if anyone had any of objections to the discussion being recorded by audio tape. It was interesting to note that not one person in all of the five focus groups objected to my request to use a tape recorder. By explaining the reason for recording - to allow an accurate report to be written up about the discussion, to allow my supervisor to read the transcripts and to assist my own concentration by releasing me from the task of writing detailed notes - participants appeared to be at ease. The effect of the presence of a tape recorder is unknown and it is always possible that the reliability of some responses is compromised. However, my own experiences are similar to Burgess's et al., research (1988), in that the groups showed few
visible signs of being aware that their words were being recorded.

After reassuring participants of anonymity (even more important if a recording is being made), a typical introduction followed (see Appendix 6 for an extract from the housing association group). This attempt to 'break the ice' was based on an explanation of the structure of the group discussion. The content of the meeting was not circulated before participants met, however the introductory letter had indicated the main purpose of the meeting. Thus, participants were probably aware of the type of issues (Appendix 7) to be raised.

The Politics of Focus Groups
A number of important political issues are raised by the use of focus groups. Johnson (1996) acclaims focus groups as being useful additions to helping to develop a 'new politics of knowledge' by accessing uncodified knowledge and stimulating the imagination of both researchers and participants. For researchers, the nature of focus groups challenges their own assumptions and preconceptions surrounding particular issues or people. Focus group participants on the other hand are given an opportunity to piece together the fragmented experiences of group members and may come to view
events in their own lives in a new light in the course of such discussions (Barbour and Kitzenger, 1999). This last point is not without significance for this research. Some of the people invited along to the group discussions had expressed a sense of alienation and marginalisation from urban decision makers. More than half of the participants expressed the feeling that they viewed the focus group as chance to air their views about local policies and policy making (Appendix 7) in general and were pleased that someone wanted to know their views and hear their opinions. In this sense the group discussions could be viewed as 'empowering' and a feeling of 'inclusion' was for a short period of time experienced by some local people.

Focus groups can also be combined with quantitative methods such as questionnaire surveys. Given that I had a 'captive' audience of 40 people I saw this as an opportunity to elicit their perceptions of life in the area they lived. The main purpose for devising the questionnaire was to compliment the information collected from the focus groups. Thus, a short questionnaire became the fourth means of collecting information for this research.
It was considered important that the questionnaire be short but relevant to encourage a high response rate. Participants were informed at the start and the end of the focus group that it would be very much appreciated if they could spend a few more minutes of their time to complete a short questionnaire. There was no obligation for participants to do this. However, response rate was total and all participants (40 in total) completed the questionnaire. Participants were assured of confidentiality and there was no need for them to state any personal details such as name, age, address, etc.

The main focus of the questionnaire was to obtain information relating to local perceptions of living in 'Greater Pollok'. The questionnaire was designed to ensure ease and speed of completion. Respondents were required to tick an appropriate box or boxes in five out of six closed questions asked. The criticism levelled at these types of questions is that they channel respondents to the answer(s) the researcher wants, but do not allow respondents the opportunity to expand on their answer. Here people may have felt an obligation to give an answer (any answer) quickly to avoid appearing uninformed.
However, this type of question was preferred because it introduces a high degree of standardisation in the process of questioning. When researchers ask questions which are sensitive or about controversial issues (e.g. political questions) then standardised question forms are useful. An argument can also be made that this offers a degree of privacy for the respondent to provide more candid answers than would be forthcoming through interpersonal contact.

**Analysing Qualitative Data**

A priority once data was collected concerned the most effective means of analysing this information. The advantages and disadvantages of using computer packages was carefully considered as a means of helping analyse the qualitative data collected. While there can be potential benefits of using computer based software packages to help in qualitative analysis such as saving time and effort there are also disadvantages to such an approach. Clearly, the main limitations also need to be considered. These include the issue of whether computer programs are likely to impose a narrowly exclusive approach to qualitative data analysis. In sum, this researcher felt that given the time constraints of completing the research a 'manual' approach to analysis was appropriate for the data collected. While this
may give the impression of chaotic piles of paper strewn across the floor this was not the experience of the researcher. In practice while the manual approach may not be considered 'scholarly' or 'orderly', I do however, believe that this system of analysis allowed me to be flexible so as to search for 'order' and 'pattern' as well as inconsistency.

Interview material in the form of tape-recordings generated during this research (obtained from both semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews) was transcribed by a professional transcriber for a negotiated sum of money. Tapes of focus group discussions are obviously more difficult to transcribe than one-to-one interviews. It will normally take an experienced audio-typist at least three hours to transcribe a one hour tape recording fully and accurately. Those transcribing tapes also have the added difficulty of interpreting more than one voice being spoken at the one time. Focus group participants can make sudden, apparently 'illogical' leaps, and interrupt or shout over each other. The main advantage of hiring the services of a transcriber was to save the researcher time. In this sense, given the deadlines which this research had to meet it could be regarded as good 'value for money' and an effective use of resources. The
transcriber produced a hard paper copy of the transcript for each semi-structured interview and focus group interview. Thus, the researcher could consult both the original tape-recording and a paper copy of the transcribed tape-recording. This then afforded the researcher the opportunity to listen to the tape recordings as well as view the transcribed recordings in print.

The tape-recordings and transcripts become a vital research resource to be interpreted many times in different ways, although the summaries recorded (by the researcher) in note form were complementary in tracing changes in the mood of the group (not necessarily expressed verbally). The recordings were also valuable in not only allowing a critical evaluation of my own performance to help improve later discussions, but also to assist in analysing the effect of the researcher on the researched, influences which may often remain hidden.

In analysing qualitative data terms such as 'interpreting', 'making sense of' and 'transforming' were prominent in this analysis. When analysing interviews it is important to recognise that data produced are always situated and textual (Punch, 1998). The most pertinent
question is how to interpret the responses received in the research interview (both semi-structured and focus group). The following section deals directly with these issues.

I began by reading and listening to each interview through in full in order to get an overall feel for its whole content and what were the main points or concerns of those being interviewed. Given the amount of taped material was huge I would play them whenever an opportunity arose, for example I played the tape-recordings in my car on my journey to work or I listened to the tapes on a personal stereo in my house or when I was travelling. Allied to this I circled words and phrases that seemed to recur in the written transcriptions which were produced and which were relevant to the research questions posed. Using the circled words and phrases I sought to link these together. I began the actual process of coding as I categorised the words and phrases, and also the more abstract argumentative structures at work in the interview and focus group discussions. I then began the theory-build stage of the research as I sought to link the codes together, in order to ascertain what general themes were emerging from the text.
This system allows the researcher to get from the specific concerns of the participants through to the more general concerns present in all the texts. This also allowed me to explore inconsistency and difference at various levels. While this was a time consuming process, the 'richness' of material yielded largely negated this problem and helped keep my spirits up especially in times of tiredness and stress.

The next stage of the analysis was to extract the most appropriate codes on which to focus for the thesis. It was important to choose the thematic focus of the analysis with care. For example, from a broad theme such as 'community participation' in urban policy making, all material relevant to this category was ordered within this subheading and individual/group interviewee responses identified by a code number and then analysed in relation to the key research questions.

Clearly this type of data analysis generates a large amount of material all of which is not always or possible to use. It was important to select the most pertinent material so as to allow the research questions to be adequately addressed. Finally, at all stages of data analysis I made sure that I kept referring back to the original data to clarify and refine themes.
Conclusions

As discussed in this chapter a variety of primary research methods were used in this research. The use of interviews, observational research, focus groups and questionnaires formed the backbone of the primary sources of data. While each is separate and unique in their own right, they should be viewed as offering a complementary perspective, linked rather than separate. While the advantages of using multiple strategies (or 'methodological triangulation') is to obtain the widest possible picture of the research in question this type of approach is not without criticism. Burgess (1984) suggests that this is done as an insurance policy to guard against omitting important concepts. Others stress the constraints on researchers with regards time and money. Fletcher, (discussed in Payne et al., 1981) warns of the risks in substituting rigour with eclecticism for its own sake, wherein all (and any) methods are judged appropriate. This research has, however, sought to use a 'multi-method approach'. By taking this approach I have striven to present the fullest possible analysis of contemporary urban governance in Glasgow. Any shortcomings in this context are of my own making, as well as the methods used to obtain information. The hope is that each strategy used has been appropriate for the task, but equal validity is not necessarily attached to the
results. All research methods hold out promises and challenges even for the most experienced of researchers. In the course of any research project consideration must be given to access, sampling, settings, participants, time and money and the collection and analysis of information. Constraints are associated with all of the aforementioned factors and greatly influence the research design adopted. Constraints also make research difficult and challenging. No research is 'trouble free' and this research was no exception. For example, during this research obtaining information such as public sector spending levels (e.g. urban programme spending) for the city of Glasgow was virtually impossible (Appendix 8). I was informed by the Scottish Executive that until 1999 information regarding urban programme spending was not available in an accessible form (see Appendix 8). Thus, researchers have to be flexible and adaptable to whatever the research process throws up.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE OF GLASGOW

Introduction
This chapter has two main aims. First, to identify the form of the ‘new urban governance’ adopted by policy-makers in Glasgow. Second, to discuss the extent to which regime or regulation theory best explains the development of the ‘new urban governance’ in Glasgow. This will involve a discussion on the changing nature of local state intervention, and the resulting shift from government to governance in the city of Glasgow. Chapter four and chapter five are closely interlinked; chapter four sets the context for a discussion on the contemporary governance of Glasgow, whilst chapter five seeks to discuss policy responses to Glasgow’s contemporary problems.

Changing Urban Government
As discussed in chapter two, there is considerable dispute about the precise nature of what has been called the ‘new urban governance’, (see Valler et al, 2000; Ward, 2000; Imrie and Raco, 1999). Various analysts have sought to explain the changing nature of urban government. For example, Harvey (1989) has argued that the role of the local state has been transformed from managerialism (of the local
welfare state) to one of an emerging entrepreneurialism and a parallel transition from government to governance. Mayer's (1995:235) use of the regulationist approach focuses on shifts in local governance within the broad context of macro-economic and state restructuring. Others (Jessop, 1994) argue that the transition is one from a welfare to a workfare state. While it could be argued there is no shortage of research, the exact process of transformation in local governance remains hazy (Valler et al, 2000). This transition is not, however, without controversy or conflict, not least with respect to the difference in the degree of transition from one political context to another (Harvey, 1989; Boyle and Hughes, 1994). Imrie and Raco (1999) correctly point out that urban analysts need to recognise patterns and processes of continuity as much as change in assessing the changing nature of governance in the city.

On a similar theme, Boyle and Hughes (1994), in reference to their study of the governance of Glasgow, claim that the notion of a 'cultural politics of place' must be recognised. In Glasgow, the cultural turn engendered by the local state, designed to boost the local economy, triggered off community opposition and conflict over the reimaging of the city. Culture became a contested arena. Thus, a cultural politics of place is an important component which has by and large been
neglected in explanations of the ‘new urban politics’. In sum, further theoretical and empirical research is required, not least to explain the increasing complexity and fragmentation of governance.

However, what is less debatable is that the character of local government has changed substantially over the past quarter of a century (see Mohan, 1999; Paddison, 1997; Cochrane, 1996). The powers and functions of local government have dramatically changed in the past twenty years, subsequently local government’s ability to ‘do things’ and ‘get things done’ are now much reduced. However, to suggest that they are powerless would be completely wrong. Paddison (1997:317) highlights three aspects of change, which involve “radical changes to the institutional structure through which urban politics is conducted, to the shift in policy emphasis within urban arenas towards ensuring the production of proactive local economic development strategies and to the creation of quasi-public agencies alongside the formal machinery of local power”. Privatisation and market reform of public services (e.g. contracting out of public services and competitive tendering) have further weakened the power of the local state to deliver services and meet local needs. Moreover, the financial means available to local government to deliver services and tackle problems has been severely constrained and cut-back as governments (both
Labour and Conservative) since the mid-1970s have sought to control public expenditure (especially local government expenditure).

The ways in which the local state operates and intervenes in the urban arena has undergone somewhat of a transformation in the past 25 years. The relationship between central and local government (linked to the rise of neo-liberal state) is important in explaining these changes but equally important is the wider socio-economic and political context in which both must operate. The restructuring of contemporary capitalism has played no small part. Cochrane (1993), Duncan and Goodwin (1988) and Valler et al., (2000:413) argue that the shift in local governance in Britain derives in part from the discursive and political construction of the crisis of Fordism and the neo-liberal response of Thatcherism which sought to reform and limit elected local government. ‘New Right’ ascendency and ideas were important in the 1980s-early 1990s in influencing public policy decisions and attempts to restructure the role of the state (i.e. rolling it back). The American economist Milton Friedman and the Austrian academic Friedrich Hayek contributed much to the development of New Right thinking in the UK (see for example Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1944). These two public choice theorists were particularly critical of state intervention, bureaucracy and inefficiency in which they claimed individual
enterprise and initiative was stifled and the freedom of individuals was suppressed. The problem was seen as particularly acute in local government because of the large categories of working-class beneficiaries who, with their pressure groups and voting potential, were able to outgun the defenceless rate-payers (Pirie, 1981:11). Distributing services according to need rather than wallet size, local government stood in direct contradiction to the market order. Moreover, its independent ability to tax was a clear threat to the overriding mission to reduce public expenditure. Thus, not surprisingly it represented that part of the state which four consecutive Conservative governments (1979-97) were committed to 'roll back'.

Cities, as Paddison (1997:319) states, have borne the brunt of the restructuring process. However, the impact of these social, economic and political shifts have been spatially uneven and variable between social groups (see Hall and Hubbard, 1998). This chapter now turns to discuss the structure of subnational government and its significance in terms of its impact on the contemporary governance of Glasgow.

The Reorganisation of Scottish Local Government

McCrone (1991:924) claims that the reform of local government in Scotland in 1975 provided a much more effective structure for achieving progress in urban renewal (especially in the Clyde Valley)
than the multitude of authorities which it replaced. Criticism (e.g. the Wheatley Commission set up in 1966) was levelled at the fragmented nature of Scottish local government and how it lacked coherent mechanisms to achieve adequate levels of planning in a modern urban economy. The restructured local government that resulted during this period of reorganisation could be viewed as an important component in the 'modernisation' of Fordism.

Of particular relevance to Glasgow was the Wheatley commission's recommendation that the whole area of west-central Scotland (based upon the Clyde estuary with Glasgow as its hub) should become a single district (Keating, 1988). The importance of this 'economic region' was first recognised by the Clyde Valley Regional Plan (Abercrombie and Mathews, 1949). Wheatley argued (1969:186) that this economic unit should not be undermined and claimed that the lack of a unified administration was one of the greatest impediments to the economic and social regeneration of the West of Scotland. Similarly, a White Paper Central Scotland - A Programme for Development and Growth (HMSO, 1964) also reflected a strengthening of central attitudes to regional development and the need for more effective coordination in local planning (see Keating, 1988). The White Paper argued for a regional scale for economic development through a 'growth poles'
strategy, in which development could most profitably be encouraged. However, Glasgow (or Edinburgh for that matter) was not chosen as one of the eight growth poles identified.

The growth of middle-class dormitory suburbs to the north (e.g. Bearsden) and the south of Glasgow (e.g. Newton Mearns) meant that Glasgow had in effect outgrown its boundary. Glasgow argued that these areas should be considered functionally part of Glasgow given that approximately three-quarters of the residents of these areas worked and relied heavily upon the city for shopping and leisure experiences (Keating, 1988:39). In sum, Glasgow argued that these higher income earners were 'free-riding' on the city services without directly contributing towards them (this issue has never gone away, in fact it is an on-going and arguably even more topical issue today given the fiscal constraints on local government). The reaction, however, of the middle-class suburbs to resist incorporation with Glasgow was predictable. After much political lobbying, argument and confusion, the government conceded the case for not including Bearsden and Milngavie, Bishopbriggs, Newton Mearns, Giffnock and Clydebank to be brought under Glasgow’s control. As a result the city’s boundary remained largely unchanged (with the exception of Rutherglen which was brought under Glasgow’s control, although ironically under local
government reform of 1996 it opted out of Glasgow and became part of the newly formed South Lanarkshire Council).

Keating (1988:41) argues that the above policies had a profound effect on the social and political composition, and balance of housing tenure, of the new districts. A real opportunity had been lost to redistribute income from rates revenues which would surely have increased if the middle-class suburbs had been incorporated into Glasgow. Moreover, history was to repeat itself with the failure of the Conservative government to extend the boundary of the new Glasgow City Council (GCC) to incorporate the aforementioned middle-class suburbs in the new local government that emerged on the 1st of April 1996. Again, another important chance to boost the fiscal base of the city, through incorporating higher earning suburbs, was lost. The result was that a fiscally impotent GCC found it increasingly difficult to tackle the severe social and economic problems found predominantly, although not exclusively, within the city’s public sector housing areas.

It was argued that the two-tier compromised structure that emerged in 1975 was best placed to respond to the needs of both the locality and wider hinterland in which they were placed. With larger units of government, the potential existed to have a more equitable regional
redistribution of wealth (McAteer, 1997; Keating, 1988). Further, it was claimed that larger local government units would also be more effective to implement central government policies (Wheatley Report).

In Glasgow this resulted in the district council having responsibilities for the local environment and Strathclyde Regional Council whose remit was region wide. The balance of expenditure, however, was very uneven between both tiers of government. Regional government was overwhelmingly the main spender, spending approximately 80% of local government expenditure predominantly on two services; education and social work. This compares to approximately only 20% being spent by the district council, with the bulk of its spending being focussed on housing. Keating (1988) argues that the main motive for local government reform and the creation of the new regional council was the need for physical, social and economic planning. On a similar theme Midwinter et al., (1991:95) argue that the main aim of the new local government structure was to integrate urban regeneration, economic development and planning into the local government system. The main planning mechanisms were to be the regional council (structure plans) and the district council (local plans). However, neither the regional council nor the district council had much in the way of economic development powers. Economic development powers
were held by the then Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and Industrial Department Scotland, however neither body had a specific city remit. Allied to physical planning were a number of other important planning instruments the most important included financial plans (for both tiers), transport policies and programmes (for the region) and housing plans (for the district). It was expected that both local and regional government would work together in partnership to get things done. McAteer (1997:63) argues the key feature of the creation of the new local government was that government, both local and central working together in partnership and through improved coordination, had a positive role to play in managing the regional economy. Given changing social and economic circumstances the new local government would have to be flexible and adaptable so as it could promote economic growth and urban revitalisation.

While Wheatley envisaged regional authorities having a powerful strategic role in economic development and regional planning, this did not work out in practice. These main functions, it is argued (see Keating, 1988; Midwinter et al., 1991; McAteer, 1997), were undermined from an early stage. Two major forces greatly impacted upon the region’s ability to promote economic development and urban regeneration. Firstly, the emergence of the SDA established in 1975, by
the then Labour government, was given the task of promoting economic development throughout Scotland. Secondly, the election of a Conservative government in 1979, whose commitment and belief in regional government was not as strong as Labour's, led to the downgrading of Regional Structural Plans. This, in effect, weakened and undermined the potential for Regional Councils to plan and develop the whole of their area (see McAteer, 1997). Deep political suspicion (see Alexander, 1992) existed towards Strathclyde Regional Council, which contained over half of Scotland's total population (approximately 3 million people according to the General Registrars Office, mid-year estimate 1993) and Scotland's largest city, Glasgow. To the Conservatives, Strathclyde Regional Council was considered too big and powerful an organisation that had come to dominate the whole of Scottish local government. Further, it was overwhelmingly politically Labour controlled and policies were pursued that were not always in keeping with Conservative central government plans. To a large extent the two-tier structure set-up in 1975 was little more than tolerated by the Conservatives who would eventually abolish it in 1996.

Although they were weaker than Wheatley had wished, Regional Councils were still relatively powerful and important organisations. Of relevance to this research is the development of Strathclyde Regional
Council's Social Strategy. This strategy was important in the promotion and undertaking of housing and urban regeneration in Glasgow and West/Central Scotland throughout the 1980s and 1990s (see McAteer, 1994:63). However, with the abolition of regional government, this holistic approach to addressing urban problems was lost.

Given the antipathy of the Conservatives generally towards local government and specifically regional government it was no surprise that the two tiers of local government were abolished. The new local government came into operation on the 1st April 1996. Twenty nine all purpose unitary authorities (alongside three continuing unitary purpose island authorities) assumed the responsibilities previously held by the separate two tiers of local government.

The Conservatives argued that local government reorganisation 1990s style would create a more 'sensitive' local government which would allow greater local public participation and influence over decisions effecting them. Critics (see McCormick and Paddison, 1993), however, argued that the case for local government reform was driven more by political motives than any sense of promoting efficiency and public participation. Others (Alexander, 1992:59), argued that the government pursued reorganisation because of a continuing
resentment at its failure to control the two largest regions, Strathclyde and Lothian (both overwhelmingly Labour controlled). These regions had been powerful enough to challenge the government’s policies on public expenditure, local government finance and central-local relations. Fairley (1995) claimed that reorganisation would strengthen the power of the Scottish Office but weaken local government. Further, the disaggregation of large regional authorities into smaller unitary authorities would inevitably create problems for the delivery of important strategic services. Moreover, without the regions, resource distribution is left looking even more unequal. In this context, Glasgow is a clear loser who despite having the worst socio-economic problems of any Scottish city does not receive its fair share of resources (see Mooney and Johnstone, 2000; Turok and Hopkins, 1997a). Without the regions, local government no longer has the ability to plan strategically in a number of important policy areas e.g. economic development and transport. While the potential to work in joint arrangements to deliver services may exist (e.g. policing), embarking on such a course of action produces a complex and variable series of management arrangements (Kerley and Orr, 1993). Finally, Lloyd (1996) points out that regional councils played important and successful roles in relation to the coordination of policies by different public and private bodies. With abolition, the structure and culture of strategic planning has been
seriously undermined.

Transitions in the Governance of Glasgow

Over the past two decades the way in which the city of Glasgow has been governed has altered a great deal. This reflects the nature of contemporary capitalist restructuring, its impact on the city and of the policy objectives (i.e. pursuit of neo-liberal state objectives) as promoted by central government. At present, in the city, no single organisation has sole responsibility for urban policy formulation and implementation. This supports and confirms Keating’s (1988) research which also argued that no one agency has responsibility for managing the process of urban change in Glasgow. Instead a confusing array of bodies exist which although are assigned specific tasks linked to urban policy formulation and urban regeneration, ‘do their own thing’.

In Glasgow, as in many other parts of the UK, while local authorities remain important, they increasingly have to co-exist, collaborate and compete with a plethora of new agencies, networks and organisations (Table 1 highlights the main bodies responsible for urban policy in Glasgow) who all jostle for scarce local resources, power and influence (Tickell and Peck, 1996). As will be demonstrated later in this chapter effective collaboration and cooperation between the various agencies
has, however, been the exception rather than the rule. This is reflected in the fragmentation of contemporary urban policy making in Glasgow. During this research actually finding out and pinning down who precisely has responsibilities for the governance of the city was no easy task. This is not without significance especially in relation to public participation in urban decision making. Thus, if an urban researcher finds this difficult it is likely that the general public would also find it difficult to know who 'calls the shots' in Glasgow.

Emerging alongside the new local government is a plethora of bodies and organisations which have a remit to deliver various social services and promote economic development. Strategic development functions such as economic regeneration, training, business development, environmental improvement, conservation and housing development, have all experienced dramatic change in recent years (see Lloyd, 1994:37). Within Glasgow new government agencies most noticeably quangos such as Scottish Enterprise Glasgow (the local enterprise company and formerly the Glasgow Development Agency) and Scottish Homes have emerged with considerable power and authority. These agencies have been used by the Scottish Office over the last ten years to promote an agenda that was not thought possible through local authorities (Ward, 2000). This has resulted in by-passing and a
marginalisation of local government. In sum, local government especially in Glasgow has not been trusted to implement change. While this may have eroded and weakened local government power, Imrie and Raco (1999:46) rightly point out that because local government has a significant resource base it is still a critical player in the emerging local governance. Moreover, in relation to Glasgow, Boyle and Hughes (1994:460) have demonstrated that the local council is the main spender of public money which it overwhelmingly uses in fulfilment of its managerialist responsibilities in providing services. Thus, GCC is still a key player in the governance of the city.

While these new urban players have been encouraged to work with GCC in pursuit of policy objectives they have not always been in agreement on the best way to achieve policy aims as set out by the Scottish Executive (formerly the Scottish Office). Tensions and conflict have often resulted, for example it has frequently meant the various organisations going off to ‘do their own thing’. This has led to duplications and a wastage of scarce resources. Further, the capacity to plan for the whole of the city has been undermined as disparate bodies have found it difficult to engage with each other and to agree on a strategy for the city. The problems of fragmentation of policy aims and delivery were acknowledged by some the key actors in the city of
Glasgow and led to the emergence of the Glasgow Regeneration Alliance (GRA) in 1993.

The GRA was set-up as a partnership between Strathclyde Regional Council, Glasgow District Council, Glasgow Development Agency and Scottish Homes. Over time other partners would join such as Greater Glasgow Health Board. Rather than being opposed to each other the main aim of the GRA was to encourage the main urban agencies to work together more formally than they had previously. Little, however, was achieved by the GRA in terms of concrete policy formulation, co-ordination and long-term commitment of partners towards regenerating the city. During research interview, Andrew Fyfe, the Executive Director of the GA, (which superseeded the GRA in 1998) pointed out how political commitment to the GRA was not always forthcoming:

"while the GRA did achieve a bit more integration between the four partners, it found it very difficult to sustain the impetus through local government reorganisation. The region disappeared, the council went through all sorts of change and because nobody was independent and dedicated to the GRA it was tough going. People tried hard but it was very hard to keep the momentum going. Further, resources in the city were cut and reduced. There was also a kerfuffle about the selection of
Priority Partnership Areas in the city. Glasgow put forward seven and only three were designated by the Scottish Office”.

(Interview with Andrew Fyfe, Executive Director of the GA, 1998)

Clearly, while the pursuit of a partnership approach to urban regeneration was deemed desirable, the actual achievements and real progress made by the GRA in its five years of existence were somewhat limited. Fyfe identifies cuts in Glasgow’s resource budget and conflict between central (i.e. Scottish Office) and local government (Glasgow) as the most important reasons for lack of progress under the GRA.

While it may appear that the main motive for the emergence of the GRA was to encourage partnership working between the various urban actors within Glasgow, it is not the only one. The then Scottish Office which had long since encouraged partnership working in urban regeneration was keen to see Scotland’s largest (problem) city develop a partnership approach. Further, with the rise of the ‘quango state’ and the diminution of local government power, the emergence of the GRA could be viewed as a ‘marriage of convenience’ as the various local urban regeneration bodies displayed the type of arrangements which they believed the Scottish Office wished to see. It could also be argued that GCC was responding internally and externally to the challenge
posed by the restructuring of local political relations under neo-liberal policies. In this context, local government could be viewed as an enabler who sought to work with others in partnerships, believing that it had limited scope and resources to tackle urban problems on its own.

What is interesting to note is that the main stimulus for the setting up of the GRA came from Glasgow District Council. Possibly, fearful of losing even more power and being relegated to becoming a 'bit player' in the running of the city, the local council saw no other realistic alternative (given the political opposition of central government towards local government) but to 'work' in partnership with other local actors. Better, the council believed, to play a constructive role in partnership with others rather than been marginalised with little influence, as the quote below indicates. During research interviews David Comely, GCC Housing Director summed up the feelings of the council:

"the establishment of the GRA was in recognition that the local council could not tackle regeneration alone and that it needed help from other bodies in the city. Even the politicians accepted this. There was a sense of realism that things had changed. Working in partnership was not new to the council and the genesis had come from the council working
with Scottish Homes in partnership. So the development of GRA was an attempt to make the process more formal and to encourage the agencies involved in regeneration to take a more holistic view”.

(Interview with David Comely, Director of Housing GCC, 1999)

A new political pragmatism in Glasgow had emerged. This was manifest in local politicians facing up to the realism of the changing institutional context of policy making. Partnership working was in vogue and the local council wanted to be an active player in the emerging new consensus.

Imrie and Raco (1999) argue that the establishment of particular partnership arrangements provided the opportunity for Sheffield City Council to maintain its position as the pivotal agency in local economic development. In Glasgow a not too dissimilar story could be told about GCC. Thus, while the council was being challenged by other local actors (especially the GDA and Scottish Homes) and some of their powers were being eroded, the city council did not become powerless.

It is now clear that the nature of local state intervention has changed. While local authorities are still heavily involved they are no longer considered the ‘natural agencies’ of urban regeneration. By the early
1980s the Conservative government had rejected the idea that local government should be a major player in urban policy (Lawless, 1991). A number of policy initiatives (most notably competitive compulsory tendering and the introduction of the 'Poll Tax') confirmed the belief that central government sought more control over local government policy making and finance (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). Local government has been joined and challenged, as briefly mentioned above, by a number of local state bodies who are given considerable power and monies denied to democratically elected local authorities.

Throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s there has been a concerted attack on local democracy and intermediate institutions. Of importance to this research, as Mohan (1999:39-40) has argued is the widespread sense that local democracy had been undermined by a battery of centralising measures, and the emergence of the 'quango state', in which appointments depend on political patronage. Those who saw advantages of introducing quangos pointed towards their potential to introduce 'market disciplines' to the provision of public services and reduce the size and direct power of state institutions (e.g. local government). Further, quangos are championed as more efficient, responsive, innovative and risk taking than bureaucratic and inefficient local government in delivering what consumers want. In relation to the
urban condition quangos may be seen as one part of the solution in addressing ever-more complex urban problems as monolithic 'remedies' increasingly give way to multiple post-welfarist solutions.

As outlined in *The Directory of Scottish Government* (2000) by the year 2000 there were 86 quangos with a specific Scottish remit, covering everything from equal opportunities to urban regeneration to agriculture. Transformation in the governance of Glasgow has been marked by the extension of the 'quango state'. It is important to note, however, that the 'quango state' has not suddenly just appeared. It has been an established feature of local politics in Glasgow long before the rise of Thatcherism in 1980s. For example, in 1975 the Scottish Development Agency (a non-elected quango) was established to spearhead economic development. This organisation was expected, where appropriate, to work in partnership with Glasgow District Council and Strathclyde Regional Council in the field of urban revitalisation. This is evidence to support Imrie and Raco's (1999:50) point that elected institutions of local government have always relied on a plethora of non-elected and voluntary organisations existing way beyond its frontier. Thus, local government is and always has been enmeshed within local governance networks. The emergence of the 'quango state' also raises important questions about accountability and
public participation in urban governance. In Scotland, the debacle in summer 2000 over Higher Grade examination results issued by the quango Scottish Qualifications Authority\(^1\) highlights the concern critics have over insulating decisions from the arena of local accountability (see Peck and Tickell, 1994a). The rise of unelected institutions has been viewed as part of a wider geographical agenda of diminishing the powers of left-wing local authorities and expanding the potential for the unfettered operation of market forces (Mohan, 1999). The general effect has been to “diminish the scope for autonomous action by local public sector agencies. The partial policy vacuum that has been created has been occupied by various forms of public-private partnerships” (Mohan, 1999:176). This invariably involves the promotion of a different agenda to that of local government, issues which are discussed in detail in the next section.

**The Rise of the Urban Partnership Model in Glasgow**

Chapter two discussed in some detail the evolution of the partnership model in urban development and its importance to the emergence of a new ‘local governance’. This section, though, will concentrate upon the partnership model of urban governance as applied to Glasgow. The

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\(^1\) During the summer of 2000 Scottish Qualifications Authority issued thousands of incorrect Higher Grade examination results to Scottish students, as a result the chief executive of the organisation resigned immediately. Much criticism was levelled at the lack of public accountability towards this organisation. The exams problem resulted in many students failing to gain entry to university in the autumn of the same year.
emergence of the partnership model in urban development is arguably symbolic of the 'new urban governance' (Hall and Hubbard, 1998). As Peck and Tickell (1994a:251) argue “partnership approaches have come to dominate the field of urban regeneration and local economic development”. The pursuit of so-called entrepreneurial policies, designed to promote economic growth, which have involved public-private partnerships, has come to epitomise the way in which cities are now governed. Glasgow was arguably the first city in the UK to actively adopt and promote policies, amongst them explicit place marketing, intended primarily to enhance and demonstrate its attractiveness to mobile capital and consumption.

The city has suffered urban decline more acutely than any other in Britain. It is claimed that nowhere else has experienced more severely the failures of established policy approaches (Keating, 1988; Boyle, 1993; Boyle and Hughes, 1994). While there was a growing fatalism over the industrial decline of the city, Glasgow enthusiastically embarked upon the pursuit of an entrepreneurial strategy to revive its fortunes. Ward (1998:191) claims that it was Glasgow, traditionally perceived as hard, dirty, violent and a stronghold of the political left, which took Britain into a new era of place marketing in 1983-84. Civic leaders, despite being in the midst of serious long-term economic
decline, began to talk up the city at every opportunity. Marketing and vigorous PR campaigns became the corner stones by which Glasgow took its message to the outside world (see chapter five for a detailed discussion of this policy turn). Glasgow even managed to get on the cover of Time Magazine where it was proclaimed that Glasgow was ‘The City That Refused to Die’ (Boyle, 1988:83). Boyle and Hughes (1994:455) correctly point out that it was the Glasgow District Council (and not the private sector) that orchestrated the local shift to entrepreneurialism. Glasgow turned its back on its illustrious industrial past and sought to market the ‘new Glasgow’ as a post-industrial city. The leaders of the council accepted that they alone could not tackle the problems of the city. This would mean having to work in partnership with the private and voluntary sectors. The council had by the early 1980s adopted a very different perspective towards the private sector than it previously held. However, it is important to note that the city had actually laid the foundations for working more closely with the private sector in the late 1970s through its involvement in the field of house construction. By the early 1980s the council had convinced itself that its goals were now the same as the private sector and even of local Glaswegians. Pat Lally who was leader of Glasgow District Council between (1987-92) and Lord Provost of GCC (1996-99) confirmed this during research interviews:
“as a result of deindustrialisation the city had to find a new way to earn its living. There was a philosophical change in attitude towards working with the private sector and other bodies in order to ensure that a change occurred in the fortunes of the city. I think we realised long before anyone else did that public and private sectors have common objectives and that is to improve the city and to improve the prosperity of the city. While we may disagree, and have disagreed over the years as to how that might be achieved, we agreed that our objectives were virtually identical so we set about working in co-operation and partnership with the private sector and with a variety of agencies that had been set up over the years such as Scottish Development Agency, Glasgow Development Agency, Scottish Homes and Scottish Enterprise. There was no grand plan, it was a kind of evolving situation”.

(Interview with Pat Lally, Lord Provost of GCC, 1999)

Lally makes it clear that while there was no strategic blueprint designed to regenerate the city the council could not work alone in solving the problems of the city. The local council recognised early on that it had to work in partnership with other agencies especially the private sector in order to regenerate Glasgow. From his perspective times had certainly changed and this was reflected in a new political pragmatism.
Glasgow's turn towards the private sector partly reflected the nationally prescribed political and economic necessity of the neo-liberal agenda, which championed private sector solutions to urban problems. However, it is also reflective of local political decision making. What is of particular significance to this research is that this most public of cities, which was overwhelmingly politically controlled by the 'left', should openly and freely adopt the neo-liberal agenda earlier than any other city in the UK. The local authority had a political mandate to pursue alternative policies, but decided not to do so. The irony is that Glasgow, once famed for its Red Clydeside past, enthusiastically embraced the Thatcherite agenda; in short it had accepted the Conservatives rallying cry that there was no alternative. Pat Lally commented thus:

"the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had extolled the virtues of Glasgow to me and everybody else on numerous occasions in terms of what we could do and what we had achieved, while elsewhere there was disputes and disagreements (e.g. Liverpool, Sheffield and Lambeth) with no real attempts to set about transforming their cities".

(Interview with Pat Lally, Lord Provost of GCC, 1999)

Glasgow not surprisingly was held up by the Thatcher governments (and Prince Charles) as a model of urban regeneration. To the
Conservatives it was how a city should and could be run. Thus, as a reward for its political acquiescence Glasgow received support for *publicly* funded flagship city centre regeneration schemes (these are discussed in chapter five). It is somewhat ironic that the city of the 'left' should be held up a paragon of virtue by the neo-liberal state. Thus, unlike some other Labour controlled councils, such as Sheffield who were *in* and *against* the market in the pursuit of alternative strategies, Glasgow was *in* and *with* the market (Cochrane, 1988).

As indicated above, and from discussion with key actors in the city, it is evident that no formal structured plan was ever devised by the local authority to chart a route forward for the 'new Glasgow'. While it maybe true to claim that the responses to problems facing the city were for the most part ad-hoc and transient, the pursuit of civic boosterist policies, discussed in more detail in chapter five, were more calculated and enduring.

**Local Governance and the Private Sector**

Those who favour a more 'growth coalition' type structure of urban governance suggest that business involvement in urban regeneration can be beneficial to city development. This line of thinking claims that the private sector can bring to partnership working leadership skills,
vital extra resources (especially important in times of public fiscal stress) and its expertise at local level to help create public-private partnerships designed to encourage and plan growth in co-operation with community interests. The idea of a reformed city government made more efficient and professionally competent by private sector involvement and techniques are recurrent themes in American and to a lesser extent British urban politics and policy throughout the twentieth century. Calls and movement towards the 'privatisation' of local government services in the 1980s/90s in the UK and the US represented another expression of faith in the capacities and efficiencies of the private sector.

While the movement towards local governance suggests a greater role for the private sector in urban regeneration (Peck, 1995) in the case of Glasgow, this has simply not occurred. While there was some attempts throughout the 1980s to work more closely with the private sector e.g. through Glasgow Action (GA), Glasgow Opportunities (GO) and Scottish Business in the Community, these organisations were more concerned with providing business advice, assisting in the provision of training courses and attempting to create employment opportunities. GO and GA were relatively short lived and all three organisations had little in the way of resources at their disposal (either money or staff). Crucially,
to no large extent were they involved in urban policy making in Glasgow (see Keating, 1988). Moreover, despite moves by the public sector to work with and to include the private sector in more recent years (for example, through the emergence of the urban partnership the GA), the private sector are still for the most part neither consulted nor involved in the formulation of urban policy in Glasgow. While there has not been a 'business agenda', the local authority has issued a local 'your city needs you plea'. In this sense little has changed from what Boyle and Hughes (1994) discovered in the early 1990s about Glasgow that despite encouragement from the public sector (even most recently through the newly formed GA, which is certainly 'business sympathetic'), private sector involvement in the management of the city has been very limited. The case of Glasgow supports what Imrie and Raco (1999) have highlighted in the city of Sheffield; that local decision making has not been captured by the private sector and that the public sector is still the pivotal agency in local development. According to regime theory as the local state is recast and local relations between institutions remade, business elites will become more involved in development and co-operation with local government will increase. However, in the case of Glasgow, it is clear from this research that problems and specific barriers to greater private sector involvement still remain. As one senior executive from a major private
sector house building company put it:

"The new GA and particularly its Executive Director (Andrew Fyfe) understands the importance of the private sector and the need to involve business more. However, it strikes me that what is what you have actually got is that you have still some way to go in terms of pulling together some of the political things and against that backdrop the private sector won't come in to that. I don't think the private sector would be bothered with all that stuff".

(Harry O'Donnell, Senior Executive, Miller Partnerships, April 1999)

It is evident from the above quote that the private sector is still suspicious of what it sees as the political nature of public policy decision making in Glasgow. This according to Harry O'Donnell has restricted business involvement in local policy making. In this sense, Glasgow is still a very public city.

While private sector involvement in local decision-making is limited in the formal sense, there is a degree of consultation at a more informal level. This was acknowledged by representatives, when interviewed, from two major house builders in Glasgow namely: Miller Homes and Crudens. While both said that they were not involved in policy formulation and implementation, they were given some opportunities
to be consulted. The comments below partially reflect private sector views on policy involvement in Glasgow:

"Private sector membership for example of the GA and Scottish Enterprise Boards allows for a degree of consultation. However, at present we are not really involved. Despite the emergence of the GA which has the role of pulling together all of the main strands of policy formulations, business involvement is still weak and fragmented. There is no real formal private sector representative on the Alliance Board."

(Harry O’Donnell, Senior Executive, Miller Partnerships, April 1999)

Private sector involvement according to a number key business figures interviewed for this research has also been hindered by the outdated and poorly designed policy frameworks and fora that have been in place for at least twenty years. According to the private sector this has not encouraged or facilitated business involvement in local policy making. In Glasgow, the private sector have argued that unless these policy frameworks are altered, then its involvement will remain limited. The following comments are reflective of this line of thinking:

"I don't believe that we have moved far enough in the city to involve the private sector. I think that we have actually got people in the city who believe that the policy frameworks that are set are effectively public policy frameworks. Those are the same sorts of frameworks that
we have had in the last twenty years or longer. But for twenty years or more the public sector has not been thriving in the city. Now what you have actually got is the same sorts of structures in place that we had twenty years ago which do not really allow for private sector involvement. That is one of the problems”.

(Harry O’Donnell, Senior Executive, Miller Partnerships, April 1999)

During discussions with key figures from both the public and private sectors, the evidence in this research suggests that local business leaders are more likely to get involved with opportunistic ‘shaking’ than purposeful ‘moving’ (Peck and Tickell, 1995). With the emergence of the GA to some prominence, however, the private sector may yet become more involved in setting the city’s agenda. In sum, in the case of Glasgow, regime theory’s over-emphasis on the politics of business interests at the expense of the wide variety of local practices and interests that make up local politics in the city is not supported.

The evolving nature of the partnership model can be clearly seen when it is applied to Glasgow. A study of the partnership approach adopted by Glasgow, will allow for an examination of both the institutional and political balance of power which underpins it, as well as what the different partners bring to the table. While the GRA was a loosely
bound public sector partnership set-up by the local authority (locally-
grown), its replacement, the GA, is intended to be a more formally
structured public-private partnership and was the brain-child of the
then Scottish Office (centrally-grown). The next section will discuss in
more detail the emergence of the GA as a important player in the
governance of the ‘new Glasgow’ deploying where appropriate regime
and regulation theory to explain the ‘new institutional turn’.

**Governing the ‘New Glasgow’ - The Emergence of the Glasgow
Alliance**

In part recognition of the lack of progress under the former GRA and
allied to New Labour’s faith in the partnership model of urban
regeneration, the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar\(^2\)
decided to reconstitute the GRA. Given the amount of disparate bodies
in the city it has been rumoured that when New Labour came to power
in 1997, Donald Dewar commented that he did not know ‘who the heck
was in charge of governing Glasgow’ and that there was ‘no clear
leadership in the city’. During interviews David Comely, Director of
Glasgow City Housing, confirmed Donald Dewar’s feelings and attitude
towards the way the city had been governed. He commented:

> “the Secretary of State was heavily critical of the running of the city.

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\(^2\) Donald Dewar died in October 2000, less than one year after he had become the First Scottish
Minister of the new Scottish Parliament which was elected in May 1999.
There was a challenge from the Secretary of State basically saying that you (the main players in the city) need to get your act together. He said the government has spent a lot of money in the city and a lot of money goes into the city and it doesn’t look to me like there is a coherence behind it. And there wasn’t. He had recognised that the under the GRA little in the way of significant progress had been achieved”.

(Interview with David Comely, Director of Housing GCC, 1999)

As the above quote confirms severe criticism had been levelled at the way in which the city of Glasgow was governed. Politically speaking this was not acceptable and clearly the way the city was governed had to change. It should be recognised that the position of Donald Dewar was somewhat ambivalent given that he was Secretary of State for Scotland and could not be seen to be favouring Glasgow. However, as the Member of Parliament for one of Glasgow’s most depressed constituencies Anniesland (which included Drumchapel peripheral estate) he had to do something. He decided to relaunch, repackage and rename the GRA the GA in 1998. The GA was charged, by the Secretary of State, with getting the various actors in the city to work in partnership. It was expected that by late-1999 that the GA would have a plan in place for the the whole of the city which was to be approved by the Secretary of State for Scotland, it was then intended to be open for
public scrutiny and comment. Under the new structure for the first time the GA was to have its own executive director (Andrew Fyfe), who was appointed by the Secretary of State, whose role it is to ensure that the remit set out by the Secretary of State is fulfilled. During interview Andrew Fyfe explained this role further:

"the main priority of the GA is to get a strategy for the whole city which all the partners will agree to. As far as the partners are concerned that will be submitted to Donald Dewar for his comments and then over the next three years there will be a process of publicising the strategy and getting further comment from a much wider constituency on the strategy".

(Interview with Andrew Fyfe, Executive Director of the GA, 1998)

According to Fyfe the key role of the GA was to ensure that all the main participants agreed to develop a city wide strategy through a partnership approach. Only through negotiation and partnership working could a coherent, long-term city strategy be developed.

In the case of Glasgow urban regime theory may offer a useful entry point into analysing new institutional forms and the rise of local coalitions. Accepting Painter’s (1997) broad definition of an urban regime as a coalition of interests at the urban scale, where the coalition
includes, but is not limited to, elected local government officials, then in the case of Glasgow coalitions such as the GA and to a much lesser extent the GRA have sought to co-ordinate resources and thus generate governing capacity (see Stone, 1989). In Glasgow, the emphasis has been placed upon the management of interests (Ward, 1996). In the case of the GA, the regime formed through a meshing of interests, involving a number of various groups cooperating together behind a negotiated agenda to achieve a set of policies. In the case of the rise of the GA, it was not a ‘regime’ that was created from scratch, it emerged from the old GRA. In this sense, it supports what Stone (1989) has argued that the creation of a regime from scratch is imaginable but not likely. The main reason being the cost of co-ordinating would be prohibitive. Better to use existing ‘alliances of collectives’ (in Glasgow’s case the GRA) to reinvent the regime. In sum, regimes are unlikely to appear as if by magic, they are created for a purpose. The GA was created by the Scottish Office to ensure that all the main urban agencies in the city were working together in partnership to achieve the goal of a more coordinated approach to carry our governing decisions. This, contradicts DiGaetano and Klemanski’s (1993) argument that regimes develop from the ‘bottom-up’. However, their claim relates to regimes in the United States, whereas in a United Kingdom context, the central state has a more defined role to play and exerts influence over
what develops at the local level. The highly centralised mode of
government in the UK indicates that a more structural ‘top-down’
approach may be more relevant. It also highlights difficulties of
applying regime theory to the UK, which is not sensitive to difference.

The role of elected local government is very important in the
emergence of regimes. Indeed, the importance of politics is emphasised
as a legitimising tool necessary for the successful implementation of
policies which emerge from regimes. Thus, civic co-operation is
stressed wherein city governers are seen as agents who attempt to
achieve certain goals. Thus, when the GA was initially set up in 1998
the leader of the GCC was Frank McAveety (who subsequently became a
Member of the Scottish Parliament for Glasgow Shettleston). He was an
important player in managing to get the city council to agree to
support the relaunched GA. An incentive was offered to the city council
in the way of allowing them to pick the chair of the GA Board. This
supports Stone’s (1987) claim that regimes operate a system of
‘selective incentives’ to encourage those who become involved in the
regime to maintain their interest and commitment to it. At the time all
of the partners agreed that the city council should lead the GA. Thus, to
use DiGaetano (1989) words the GA could be viewed as a ‘political
regime’. To date this chair has not surprisingly been chosen from a
member of the city council. The Secretary of State and the other partners of the GA recognised the importance of getting GCC on board, otherwise it would not have credibility or legitimacy. This was acknowledged by GA Board member Duncan MacLennan:

"the only way in which the new GA would succeed was if the local authority would lead it. It is their Alliance, they chair it. We are going to be there to be partners, but we are only going to be partners if you are going to lead it. In other words, don't hide behind us at any time. If the Alliance tries to set themselves up as the all trumpet blowing......we do everything singing and dancing organisation......which it came close to at the formal launch of the Alliance in March 1999 then it runs the risk of putting noses out of joint in partner's organisations".

(Interview with Professor Duncan MacLennan, Labour Government Policy Advisor, 1999)

It could also be argued that GCC have had to respond internally and externally to the challenges posed by the restructuring of local political relations under first Thatcherism and most recently New Labour. In terms of the emergence of the the GRA and the GA local government continued to be pivotal to how these initiatives impacted on, and within, the city.
The partners of the GA include GCC, Scottish Enterprise Glasgow, Greater Glasgow Health Board, Scottish Homes, Scottish Business in the Community and finally Glasgow Council for the Voluntary Sector. The Scottish Executive is represented by the Chief Planner for Scotland. The introduction of a number of key actors; most notably the private sector, the Chief Planner for Scotland and the voluntary sector, are not without significance to the direction in which the GA was moving when compared to the former GRA. The involvement of the private sector (in this more formal setting) would hopefully send out a message that it was serious about working in partnership with them. The city’s faith in private sector involvement (especially in what it could bring to partnership working i.e. finances and business expertise) was voiced by Andrew Fyfe the GA executive director:

"Glasgow will not improve without a big big input from the private sector. That means not just city centre development but much of the housing and neighbourhood development is going to be driven, I think, by the private sector".

(Interview with Andrew Fyfe, Executive Director of the GA, 1998)

The involvement of the Chief Planner for Scotland (a Scottish Executive civil servant) would help to legitimise the whole new partnership approach adopted by Glasgow, and crucially allow central government
to keep a watchful eye on proceedings. This enabled the Scottish Executive to monitor the progress of the GA. Clearly from the Scottish Executive’s perspective it was important to monitor the progress of the GA, thus allowing them the opportunity to ensure that the aims and objectives of the GA were being met. During research interviews this was confirmed by Alistair Mackenzie (Chief Planner for Scotland):

"the Scottish Office has the benefit of being able to see from the centre what is happening and how it is happening and how effective the GA is".

(Interview with Alistair MacKenzie Chief Planner for Scotland, March 1999)

This again challenges the prevailing American arguments of how a regime operates (see Stone, (1989); DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993)) which states that regimes function within a localised system, that is not closely regulated by the central state. However, as argued here the operation of the GA exists within a set of constraints imposed by the prevailing system of formal government control.

The Chief Planner also spoke of the need to develop more strategic thinking and policy making at the city level. He identified and acknowledged the failure of Glasgow to develop a coherent sustainable urban policy designed to address contemporary problems. He was keen
to promote the GA as the body to drive forward this agenda:

"you need to be able to think and act strategically at the city level and I think that the GA is a very healthy step in the right direction. This organisation provides the opportunity to think and act strategically and it is beginning to do it. It has produced a strategy document that provides the context in which to do it. We need to think where are the very severe concentrations of problems like youth unemployment or long-term unemployment or whatever and develop policies that address these problems on a city wide basis. The GA will help us to do that”.

(Interview with Alistair MacKenzie Chief Planner for Scotland, 1999)

Implicit in the Chief Planner’s comments is Scottish Executive trust and confidence afforded to the GA. The Executive believed that the GA could be the organisation to ensure that all the key players in Glasgow work more closely in partnership than ever before. On a more theoretical level, the emergence of new institutional arrangements such as the GA could represent the central state’s most recent attempt to find an organisation capable of providing an ‘institutional fix’ with which to deliver to Glasgow a coherent city strategy and contribute to resolving ‘local crisis’ tendencies. Further, the establishment of the GA form of governance could also operate as a key generator of any future
strategy. In sum, the GA could be viewed as a local regulatory mechanism designed by the state to ensure effective governance and local accumulation occurs by attempting to secure (temporary) stability and coherence to the local urban system.

One of the major issues surrounding the emergence of urban partnerships is local accountability. It is important to note that the GA is a quango which has not been elected. While it is accountable to the new Scottish Parliament, it is not directly accountable to the local people of Glasgow. Further, there are no representatives from local communities sitting on the GA Board. The GA does not actually run any of the projects, it is the partners who do that. Andrew Fyfe’s explained the structure and the aim of this partnership further:

"we are not a rival to the partners we actually co-ordinate the strategy. Our job is to pull together all the different views in the city and make sure that people are making the most of their efforts by working together".

(Interview with Andrew Fyfe, Executive Director of the GA, 1998)

As indicated earlier the main actors in the city of Glasgow had worked more often than not on their own, this inevitably led to much duplication and wastage of resources. The irony is that the
proliferation of local agencies, initiatives and players throughout the 1980s and 1990s that the government is now trying to (re)coordinate has in fact encouraged the emergence and growth of partnerships like the GA (see Peck and Tickell, 1994a). Thus, the GA is attempting to knit together the 'patchwork quilt' of initiatives which exist into a 'seamless duvet' at the local level. Again Andrew Fyfe reaffirmed his earlier argument:

"the GA must ensure that the spending of the various agencies in the city are closely tied into the Alliance's strategy as far as they possibly can be, and hitting the mark as much as they can be".

(Interview with Andrew Fyfe, Executive Director of the GA, 1998)

Harding (1991) argues that access to resources is key to regimes being formed. This is particularly pertinent in a United Kingdom context given the 'enabling' role of local authorities, which requires them to work with other agencies in order to achieve their aims and objectives. Thus, the 'new urban policy' partnerships have become the key to unlocking competitively-allocated resources (see Peck and Tickell, 1995; 1994a). New Labour's SIP regime is a case in point. The GA was invited in 1998 by the Scottish Office to bid for SIP monies for deprived and run-down areas in the city. It put forward a plan for eight SIPs to be designated. The result was the designation of five area-based and three
thematic based SIPs. The criteria used to decide the chosen areas was loosely based upon the methods used to select Priority Partnership Areas (an urban initiative implemented by the last Conservative government) as well as those areas identified by the GA as in need of priority treatment. Given New Labour’s (and especially the Secretary of State’s) commitment to the GA it was no surprise that the eight areas the GA had prioritised in its bid document all received SIP status. Failure to secure SIP status would have undermined the GA’s credibility as a key player in shaping the ‘new Glasgow’.

In practice the GA partnership is a corporatist-style coalition. It was constructed at the behest of the Scottish Office with the belief that organisations (both public and private) must increasingly work together in order to achieve anything in the field of urban regeneration for the city of Glasgow. In relation to emergence of the GA, the New Labour government clearly did not trust GCC to be the lead agency in urban regeneration. If partnerships are so good why then does Edinburgh, Scotland’s capital and second largest city, not have a GA style partnership? The answer is, of course, political. Thus, while Charlie Gordon, the current leader of GCC believes the council should be the lead agency in regenerating the city he also admitted that the city was not trusted on its own to run the show:
“there is an extent to which the New Labour government want to promote the GA because they have their doubts about the capacity of the city council to modernise itself and they wanted to put resources into Glasgow without been seen necessarily as bailing out a council that wasn’t prepared to modernise so there was a political agenda there”.

(Interview with Charlie Gordon, Leader of GCC, 1999)

While few of the key players in Glasgow disagree with the potential benefits of working in partnership (such as sharing ideas, resources and responsibilities), the actual mechanisms and processes are not unproblematic. Stuart Gulliver (GDA) pointed out some the practical difficulties of partnership working:

“I think co-operation, collaboration and partnership do not come naturally. I think there are some people who are well disposed to it, who will naturally lean towards being a collaborator and in the last analysis it is people who collaborate rather than institutions and organisations. There are also cultural barriers to actual working together that need to be overcome”.

(Interview with Stuart Gulliver, Chief Executive GDA, 1999)

An awareness of the problems and difficulties of working in partnership was also mirrored by Stuart Patrick (also from the GDA).
The suggestion being put forward by Patrick was that, so far partnership working was very much unchartered waters for many organisations. Many of the institutions had little practical experience of working in partnership. Coalitions such as the GA are constructed and maintained through cooperation, loyalty, trust and mutual support. In this context Patrick suggests that these key criteria were not always present and that many of the key partners were not always clear about the nature and the processes of partnership working:

"for the GA to work the partners will have to recognise that if you give a little here and there it is not necessarily going to be the end of the world. You’ve got to give and take and give a wee bit more enthusiasm. We’ve got to get a more practical idea of what working together, trusting each other, agreeing priorities means....what that really involves”.

(Interview with Stuart Patrick, Senior Executive, GDA, 1998)

Despite the emergence of the partnership model and new institutional relations with surrounding rhetoric of a more pluralistic and inclusive process of decision making Glasgow’s politics and policy making is still for the most part, patriarchal. What follows is brief but important discussion on this issue in relation to Glasgow, however for a more in-depth commentary concerning issues of cities, power and gender see

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Like Tickell and Peck's (1996) characterisation of politics in contemporary Manchester as being dominated by 'Manchester Men', so too is Glasgow. The GA Board (Table 2 shows GA membership and affiliation) is overwhelmingly dominated by white middle-class men (of the fifteen members of the Board only one is a woman). In Glasgow, like many other cities, the agenda is set and driven by men. This supports Thomas' (1996) research which documents the absence of women and ethnic minorities in powers of position in the city of Cardiff. In the case of Glasgow, while women may be involved at the lower levels, for example as SIP managers (lower/middle managers) they are, however, still excluded from influencing the major decisions in the city. When interviewed Helen McNeil (who was the voluntary sector representative) the only women on the GA Board, acknowledged that for the most part women were not in position of power in the city, and that their scope in influencing and making the major decisions in the city was extremely limited:

"I am the token woman on the GA Board. I accept that. Clearly this situation is not representative and needs to be changed. I am confident that it will change but it will take a long time. Even though I am a member of the Board I am rarely consulted about the major issues. It can get a little embarrassing when you are the only woman on the
Board and who does not get fully consulted”.

(Interview with Helen McNeil, Glasgow Voluntary Sector, August 1999)

Thus, not just do patterns of representation need to considered when analysing the new urban government, more importantly there is a need to consider what Tickell and Peck (1996:596) termed the “discursive and institutional channels through which male power is being exercised within the new urban structures”. In Glasgow little has changed in terms of a restructuring of urban governance that encourages and facilitates female inclusion in local decision making. In sum, the major decisions in the city are still fundamentally patriarchal.

Without question Glasgow still exhibits many of the old style social and political closures of past government arrangements that characterised the post-war urban agenda. Thus, despite the claims that a new more open form of government is being put in place, the reality as far as Glasgow is concerned, is that this has yet to fully materialise. Urban government in Glasgow is still characterised by an opaqueness that makes it difficult for researchers let alone the general public to study and analyse the subtleties of the changing nature of urban governance in the city. Many decisions are still taken outside formal policy fora, for example during informal meetings where a limited circle of (Male)
middle-class actors, design and dictate key policies.

It was hoped that this will change with the emergence of the GA, however, this is debatable given that the GA Board meetings are not open to public scrutiny. While there has been some movement to involve previously excluded groups e.g. the voluntary sector (through membership of the GA Board) and the general public through membership of SIP Boards (see chapter seven for discussion of community involvement in the Greater Pollokk SIP), these groups are still excluded from the key policy decisions. Thus, while the rhetoric claims that the new urban government in Glasgow is more open it is still riddled with many of the old closures of the past system (see Imrie and Raco, 1999). Given the quango nature of the GA it is questionable that it can deliver a more open, participatory and accountable policy and decision making process in Glasgow.

Finally, one of the major weaknesses of regime analysis is that the structural positions of different partners is often ignored as the role of agency is stressed. Thus, the wider political economic context may actually be driving regime formation. Given this problem, regulation theory could be regarded as a more suitable tool to connect broader tendencies with local political responses. Regulation analysis helps to
link agency to structure in the study of urban governance, via the ‘mode of regulation’. The crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian ‘regime of accumulation’ has led to increased competition among localities. Local responses (such as Glasgow’s) in this context have been mediated by the discourses of local competitiveness and entrepreneurialism (Peck and Tickell, 1995). Although urban regime theory illuminates key aspects of development politics this paradigm remains too narrow a framework for investigating the process of urban political and economic restructuring. While local structures and processes need to be considered, there is also a need to take into account the constraints and opportunities derived from ‘modes of regulation’ operating at wider spatial scales. Thus, the application of regime theory should be linked to structural processes such as the New Labour’s project in the UK (which is following on from the previous Thatcherite project), globalisation and the enlarged role of the European Union in urban regeneration. With this type of approach the conceptual gap between the micro-level approach of regime theory and the macro-level approach of regulation theory could be narrowed.

Conclusions

This chapter sought to discuss the changing structure and process of local governance in relation to Glasgow. As far as Glasgow is
concerned, the partnership model has not just become the only game in town it is *the* game in town. While the setting up of the GRA was initiated by the local council, its predecessor the GA was reconstituted by the then Scottish Office. GCC have had little alternative but to 'play ball' with the GA and join in Glasgow's newest partnership. The local council despite all its internal changes and willingness to work with the private sector is not trusted to govern the city. For partnerships to work there needs to be a local, political and institutional consensus, especially in relations to aims and objectives. If these exist in Glasgow at all, and this is doubtful, then what has emerged is an extremely fragile consensus. Glasgow as in many other cities has much to learn in terms of working in a true partnership. As Peck and Tickell (1994a:262) argue, partnerships (*like the GA*) - which comprise organisations with different goals, different political objectives, different policy capacities - can be united around generalities, such as the will for change, or vague visions of the future, but are likely to splinter over questions of resources and policy mechanisms. The GA has and will become increasingly involved and bogged down with keeping the partners 'on line' and together as the strains and tensions within the partnership begin to emerge. Thus, regulation in the form of the GA is in the words of Hay and Jessop (1995:305) 'provisional' and 'contested'. In this sense while the GA may attempt to deliver a new
coherent framework for urban management it could be regarded as being a mere example of a transitional form of crisis management.

A clear sign of tension was evident when the new leader of GCC (Charlie Gordon) refused to take the chair of the GA (unlike his predecessor Frank McAveety at the city council). Instead he sent his deputy, Councillor Jim Coleman to accept the chair. The council leader's comments towards the GA is indicative of the changing political mood in the city towards the GA style partnership approach:

"I think the GA could be a helpful vehicle if it concentrates on people issues like social inclusion. I have got doubts about their neighbourhood strategy of physical regeneration. The GA has got a role, but I worry about the plethora of organisations that we have. I worry that when it comes to Glasgow we don't have a one stop shop and that is why I think the City Council has to take the lead".

(Interview with Charlie Gordon, Leader of GCC, 1999)

Thus, the failure of GCC to take up the chair was viewed by some partners as a snub to the GA. For example, the representative of the GDA stressed that the commitment of the city council towards the GA was now in question:

"what sort of message is this sending out to the rest of the partners. If
you are supportive of the partnership you don’t send your deputy, you should come yourself. I saw this as a slap in the face for the Alliance, as did a few other GA Board members”.

(Interview with Stuart Gulliver, Chief Executive GDA, 1999)

Glasgow may have embraced the partnership approach to regeneration, but it has done so more out of pragmatism and because of a centrally imposed agenda rather than of any great desire for more effective urban coordination. In this context it should be no surprise that partnership working is precarious and fragile, all of which questions the durability and the limits of partnerships like the GA to actively get things done.

This chapter also sought to deploy both regime and regulation theory in helping to explain the emergence of the ‘new urban governance’ in Glasgow. However, both approaches can be criticised as neither are fully sensitive to the complexities of contemporary political and economic restructuring. Whereas regime theory was useful in helping to better understand the emergence and growth of coalitions such as the GA, regulation theory was important in contextualising the emergence of the ‘new urban governance’ in the case of Glasgow to wider economic and political restructuring.
The exact nature of the 'new urban governance' is rightly open to debate and dispute (see Imrie and Raco, 1999; Ward, 2000 and Valler, 2000). As Imrie and Raco (1999:59) argue, analysis of the changing nature of the 'new local governance' requires a more nuanced approach and interpretation. Ward (2000:182) also correctly argues that each city needs to be understood and conceptualised in terms of the geographies and histories of local governance (emphasis in original). In sum, there is no one general type of local governance. This focus on the governance of Glasgow in this chapter has demonstrated this fact.
CHAPTER FIVE

GLASGOW: A CITY IN TRANSITION

Introduction

This aim of this chapter is to discuss the extent to which the pursuit of 'urban entrepreneurial policies' and 'social inclusion policies' compliment or contradict each other. This will include an analysis of the main policy developments in the last twenty years in Glasgow. While Glasgow, as well as other cities, may not be the 'master of their own destiny', they are equally not 'passive victims' of capitalist economic restructuring. Thus, public policy decisions still matter. Those policies which are pursued will have considerable impact on the fortunes of the city and the quality of life of its residents as this chapter will demonstrate.

Urban Policy Developments in the 1980s and 1990s

By the 1980s Glasgow, not unlike many other older industrial areas in the UK, was experiencing severe problems (e.g. with the decline of traditional heavy industries unemployment began to rise sharply). Thus, by the late 1970s the city council began to address the question of Glasgow's economic decline (see Boyle and Hughes, 1994:456). How the city's problems should be tackled led to the council promoting
their own local economic development policies. Global economic changes and in particular shifts in international patterns of investment encouraged an increase in urban entrepreneurialism as local authorities sought to compete for mobile investment by creating the 'right business climate' (see Harvey, 1989). In Glasgow, the development of urban entrepreneurialism would have to take place within the context and constraints of the decline of local capitalism. While the local council would be a major player in attempts to regenerate Glasgow it would not be the only organisation with a remit to do so.

As a result of the shift towards local governance, urban policy has changed from a previous focus on dealing with social distress to actively promoting economic growth. The emergence of a more entrepreneurial local state has sought to use boosterist policies (e.g. Glasgow's Miles Better campaign) and other policies to attract private investment and capital. It is not just the democratically elected local state that is involved in this 'new urban policy', but also a large number of private, semi-private actors (e.g. quangos) and voluntary organisations, as witnessed by the rise in public-private partnerships (Hall and Hubbard, 1998; Leitner, 1990). It is worthwhile pointing out, however, that there exist significant variations in partnership
development across the United Kingdom as national policies and
general processes intersect with local conditions (Haughton and White,
1999:4). For example, the partnership model adopted by the London
Docklands Development Corporation (with its emphasis on levering-in
private sector capital) is clearly different to the partnership model
adopted by the city of Glasgow (which is much more like the
Merseyside Urban Development Corporation’s approach to
partnership), where the local economy is less buoyant and where
severe social problems exist.

Central to urban entrepreneurialism is the concept of public-private
partnership through which public money is used to attempt to lever-in
private sector investment. The suggestion is that if cities can get their
acts together through partnership working then a new era of urban
economic development may be anticipated (see Lovering, 1995). On
the surface, the popularity and plausibility of urban entrepreneurialism
holds out much in the way of reversing the downwards spiral of
deindustrialisation and decline. Through local boosterist strategies
new, innovative and novel ways of trying to attract investment capital
or new employment sources are sought. Thus, the pursuit of urban
entrepreneurial policies are concerned primarily with improving the
prosperity of the city and its ability to create jobs and investment. It is
claimed that for cities like Glasgow local governors had little other choice than to pursue urban boosterist policies designed to reverse the city’s economic fortunes.

Civic Boosterism and the Marketing of the ‘New Glasgow’

To the outside world, Glasgow’s image, was frequently one of negativity. Violence, bigotry, unemployment and poverty, slums and alcoholism were words consistently used to describe Glasgow by the 1970s. Some argued that this negative image was a major disincentive to potential inward investors (see Paddison, 1993). The ‘new Glasgow’ was to be marketed as a cultural and tourist city, where service industries would dominate in a post-industrial landscape. The lead agency in the reimagining of the city was not, however, the private, but the public sector. The state, as it had in much of the past became the main driver in the promotion of the ‘new Glasgow’. As Gomez (1998:111) states “the first approach to city marketing, in the context of Glasgow’s adaptation to a post-industrial world began in 1983 with the Glasgow District Council’s campaign Glasgow’s Miles Better”. Boyle (1990) has shown that with the support of the local private sector, the District Council (Michael Kelly the Lord Provost in the early 1980s was a key figure in actively promoting the city to outsiders) adopted a vigorous approach to place marketing in an attempt to reconstruct the
old declining Glasgow.

Glasgow’s leaders were so impressed by the *I Love New York* campaign (where the word ‘love’ was replaced with a red heart), which was targeted at both the local population and the wider world, that they decided to embark on a similar image-boosting campaign. At the heart of the campaign was a slogan: Glasgow’s Miles Better incorporating a Mr. Man cartoon figure Mr. Happy (which was widely known through children’s books, TV cartoons and use in merchandising). The original campaign ran until 1990, to be replaced by the slogan *Glasgow’s Alive*, (the joke in Glasgow, however, was that it too was replaced because it sounded too much like ‘Glasgow’s A Dive!’ , the word ‘dive’ being a slang word for disreputable or seedy place) however, this was short-lived and was subsequently replaced by a revamped Glasgow’s Miles Better Campaign. Moreover, along side this campaign, throughout the 1990s, Glasgow has also been promoted as the ‘*The Great European City*’ and ‘*The Friendly City*’. It is clear that as far as Glasgow is concerned place marketing is here to stay.

The concentration on place marketing by the local council partly reflected its limited ability to intervene in influencing local factors of production. While it hoped that it could create the right mix of
conditions to attract inward investment there was no guarantee that investment would come to Glasgow and crucially remain there. Boyle and Hughes (1994:459) further assert that “aside from the local factors of production being too big for the local council to influence, many areas of local economic development remain ultra vires”. Thus, despite legislation which encouraged local authorities to become more actively involved in local economic development, they were still limited in what they could hope to achieve under an essentially capitalist system. As Glasgow and many other cities have found out to their cost, it truly is difficult to buck the market.

As Harvey (1988:108) has argued “if money and development capital are highly mobile, then cities must increasingly function as lures for capital and for people...and to do so they have to sell themselves and their image right”. Place marketing (which involved working closely with the private sector) was being used by Glasgow as the central policy tool for post-industrial economic regeneration (see Paddison, 1993). Glasgow sought to create conditions in which mobile capital and businesses would become attracted. This meant focussing on policies designed to redevelop the city centre. As Boyle and Hughes (1994:459) correctly argue “there can be no doubt that the reaestheticisation and the representation of Glasgow city centre for office development and
consumption (particularly tourists) has been the central plank of local economic policy in Glasgow”. The strategy has been one which assumed that the benefits of inward investment and increased consumption of leisure, retail and tourist facilities would ‘trickle down’ to those unable to consume much of these directly themselves. Lovering’s (1997:81) take on contemporary urban regeneration seems most appropriate for Glasgow when he argues that “from within glossy centres of redeveloped cities, the offices of innovation agencies, or the new market-orientated universities, it is easy to be seduced by the idea that we are in the midst of change....disadvantage appears as a regrettable, but unavoidable pain of transition. It can be soothed by charity, and its disruptive effects contained by stronger coercion, until a new economic order arrives to benefit us all”.

The promotion of culture (at least of certain kinds) has become a centrally important theme in social events in all post industrial cities (see Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993). Booth and Boyle (1993) argue that Glasgow took cultural marketing further than any other British city. Glasgow has not been slow in the promotion of cultural and tourist events in the hope that it would bring major benefits to the city, not least in tourism and increased employment opportunities. Pat Lally, former leader of the council, believed that the spin-offs from pursuing
such policies, through working in partnership with the private sector, would manifest itself in terms of job and wealth creation in the city centre:

"we wanted to make the city more attractive to visitors so that the tourist industry would expand. But you must also make the city centre more attractive for private investment. We believed that there was tremendous scope for investment in these areas, thus we pushed Glasgow in this policy direction".

(Pat Lally, former Glasgow District Council Leader, 1999)

The ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow began in 1982 with the establishment of Mayfest, a publicly funded annual arts festival, (it is somewhat ironic, however, that Mayfest was scrapped in 1998 because of lack of public funding). By 1983, the Burrell Collection was opened to international acclaim. Local chauvinism and civic hype was at its peak in the late 1980s-early 1990s when Glasgow was selected by the then Conservative government to host the National Garden Festival in 1988. In 1990, Glasgow was bestowed the title of European City of Culture and in the same year the New International Royal Concert Hall was opened. In 1999 Glasgow was acclaimed as British City of Architecture and Design beating off fierce competition from Edinburgh and Liverpool.
In sum, Glasgow was sold to the world as a vibrant and exciting place in which to work, rest and play. Thus, while the city centre is partially renewed and boasts the greatest number of designer retail shops outside London, the peripheral estates and other areas of deprivation are characterised by poverty, poor housing, ill-health, chronic dependency and alienation. The new designer spaces in the city centre (e.g. The Italian Centre and Buchanan Galleries) have become enshrined as a readily identifiable symbol of the ‘renaissance’ of Glasgow. While there can be little doubt that the pursuit of entrepreneurial policies has led to a remarkable transformation in conditions in Glasgow city centre the overall effect, however, has been spatially divisive for the city. Beneath the glitz and the image of a cultural city, Glasgow has become increasingly divided (see Mooney and Johnstone, 2000). In this respect the periphery of the city has suffered worse.

It is the ‘local community interests’ in Glasgow that have been seriously neglected in pursuit of the creation of a distinctive image of the city which has been promoted by ‘civic boosters’ to attract capital investment through cultural spectacles and ‘hallmark events’. The focus on regenerating Glasgow city centre coincided with the neglect and decline of the peripheral estates. Thus, while the city centre sought to renew itself, the problems of these estates became ever more
intractable (Mooney and Danson, 1997). Further, there has been a failure of local policy makers to properly and appropriately link city centre regeneration (beyond a vague filtration theory) to the problems of peripheral estates or to the unemployed of the city. On this very theme, Frank McAveety, then Leader of GCC and Chair of GA acknowledged that while jobs had been created in the city centre there was still a problem of matching these to unemployed individuals who live in peripheral estates. In his opinion there was a failure of local development agencies to deal with this jobs-skills mismatch problem:

"With city centre growth there has been more employment opportunities available. The trick is to make sure that the skills of residents in peripheral estates match those jobs available. The problem with Glasgow is that we are still substantially short of that because of the gap between our educational attainment skills and the jobs that are available. This is what economic development agencies in local areas need to address, which they have not done very well so far".

(Frank McAveety, Leader of GCC and Chair of GA, 1998)

It was also acknowledged by other key urban actors that policies devised to tackle the problems of disadvantaged communities have been weakly integrated or coordinated, if at all, with wider city regeneration They commented thus:
"I don’t think it is any great secret that urban regeneration has been concentrated in the city centre. While there has been much success of this high profile strategy, what is less successful is attempts to connect this to Glasgow’s peripheral estates. This in a policy sense has not really been attempted”.

(Interview with Dr Tony O’Sullivan, Senior Policy Officer Scottish Homes, 1998)

“Policy has been aimed at the city centre rather than the peripheral estates. The city centre has more economic potential than other parts of the city. There has been no attempt to look at the problems of the city in a holistic sense. Yes, there have been some policies for the peripheral estates but these have stood in isolation from policies designed for the city centre”.

(Interview with Stuart Gulliver, Chief Executive GDA, 1999)

Economic and commercial development has been presented in Peterson’s (1981) terms as in the interest of the whole city regardless of the distributive implications. Further, during interviews for this research, the Executive Director of the GA also acknowledged the problems of developing a coherent policy for the city. Clearly this was an issue he believed the GA could successfully address. He also
commented upon the perceived conflict between the various actors who have been involved in regenerating the city and acknowledged that they have not always seen eye to eye. This in his opinion had been detrimental to the total regeneration of the city. In this context, the GA deemed the pursuit of an holistic urban policy crucial to the future development of Glasgow:

"the main priority is to get a strategy for the whole city which all the partners (who make up the GA) will agree to. We are working on connecting the city to the local area which is something that has never happened before".

(Interview with Andrew Fyfe, Executive Director of the GA, 1999)

Given the perceived need for Glasgow to speak with one voice and for the city to develop a coherent urban strategy, the emergence of the GA is in part recognition of the fragmentation of policy making and implementation. Frank McAveety leader of the GCC and first Chair of the reconstituted GA highlighted the difficulties of governing the contemporary city:

"decision making has become fragmented in the city of Glasgow what with the proliferation of non-elected bodies. The GA has been asked to address the problem. The Secretary of State has already said that he
wants the major players to pull their resources”.

(Interview with Frank McAveety, Leader of GCC and Chair of GA, 1998)

In the quote above McAveety suggests that the growth of non-elected bodies has resulted in decision making becoming fragmented in Glasgow. He also indicates that the major urban players in the city were encouraged, by the Secretary of State for Scotland, to work more closely together in a coordinated fashion through the GA urban partnership.

With remarkable similarity to Councillor McAveety comments about governing the city, Andrew Fyfe went on to argue for a more unified and co-ordinated approach to policy making within Glasgow and how in his opinion the GA could achieve this:

“in terms of organisational politics if you have separate organisations or even separate departments it is often quite hard to get people to think beyond their box. Sometimes that is because of pressure of time and work and sometimes people are holding on to something, say the influence they hold. I think the Alliance can pull together all the different views and make sure that people are pulling together and making the most of their efforts by working together, which
unfortunately has not always been the case in the past”.

(Interview with Andrew Fyfe, Executive Director of the GA, 1999)

While the GA (and Andrew Fyfe) claim that their approach is new, on closer examination however, it is all very similar to the previous language of strategic, integrated and coordinated policy. For example, the similarities of the GA strategy with previous urban policies such as New Life for Urban Scotland are remarkable. Thus, New Life also clearly stated that a “comprehensive, coordinated, long-term strategic approach to regeneration is essential to address the problems of urban deprivation” (Scottish Office, 1988).

The above quotes indicate and acknowledge that urban policies designed for the city have been poorly integrated. Little serious thought or attention has been attributed towards connecting city centre regeneration to wider city regeneration. The failure to link city centre regeneration to the problems of peripheral estates has resulted in the city becoming increasingly fragmented along class lines. Research clearly demonstrates that the gap between the rich and poor in Glasgow has markedly widened in recent years, with a commensurate increase of social exclusion and alienation (Mooney and Johnstone, 2000). In the city of Glasgow and in the wider metropolitan area there has been a
growing polarisation of rich and poor neighbourhoods and associated rising inequalities. For example, twenty-seven of the top thirty most deprived districts in Scotland are found in Glasgow (Mooney and Johnstone, 2000). Nearly 60% of the population of the city live in areas of multiple deprivation (Glasgow City Council, 1999). Further, it is no coincidence that men in Drumchapel (an overwhelmingly working-class area) live on average 10 years less than men in neighbouring Bearsden (an overwhelmingly middle-class area) (figures quoted on Panorama, 1996). Contemporary restructuring has had a devastating effect upon some individuals within particular neighbourhoods (e.g. public sector housing estates) as urban areas socially fragment and polarise. Urban government has not been an innocent by-stander in all of this. Policies it can, or has pursued can accentuate or negate the worst aspects of contemporary restructuring. It has been demonstrated that entrepreneurial forms of governance (which have been pursued for at least 20 years) have had particular implications for urban policy making, with boosterism seeming to be inevitably linked to a focus on high-profile city centre strategies, the politics of ‘trickle-down’, a tendency to increase polarisation within cities, and the privileging of private-sector interests over those of the local community (Haughton and While, 1999:3). The deepening of social divisions and forms of ‘social exclusion’ that have emerged within Glasgow in recent years are
partly as a consequence of policy choices which have led to the growth of low-paid, part-time employment in restaurants, bars, night-clubs, galleries, cinemas and other forms of service sector employment (Gomez, 1998). While urban regeneration was overwhelmingly focussed on Glasgow city centre policy makers, however, did not totally abandon Glasgow's periphery. It is to this theme that the next section turns towards.

Retargeting of Urban Policy, Towards New Life

The 1980s witnessed the accentuation of urban policies begun under the last Labour government (1974-79), for example, successive governments (both left and right) have in different ways backed the idea of targeting areas for intervention, in fact targeting has long been central to British urban policy (see McKay and Cox, 1979:247; Edwards and Bailey, 1978:15). However, when examined in more detail the character of intervention from the late 1970s has changed markedly in recent years, in two main respects. First, the policy of deliberately discouraging economic development in older urban areas was reversed. Secondly, regional policy instruments were progressively dismantled with the emphasis in the 1980/90s now very much on 'intervention' at the micro-level within closely-defined, extremely small geographical areas. Rather than promoting regions newly developing and expanding
economic sectors were actively promoted such as tourism, retailing, business and information services.

Both of the above developments began before the election of the Thatcher governments, but the latter, the concentration of urban policies on very small areas, was a particular feature of Conservative policy since its election in 1979. It could be argued that between 1979-97, Conservative governments pursued this line of approach because there were clearly some political dividends to be reaped from highly visible transformations of limited areas. In effect, it is possible to detect in urban policy in recent years a series of shifts in concern towards places rather than people. From 1977 both Labour and Conservative governments have moved away from creating essentially temporary, ad-hoc exploratory projects to the formation of more permanent administrative vehicles, including partnerships, enterprise zones and urban development corporations (see Lawless, 1986). Many of these new policy instruments are not without contention and have stimulated a number of debates and arguments in relation to local democracy, and more importantly, the effectiveness and appropriateness of these policies in solving 'urban problems'. A good example of government (re)targeting of urban policy, which emphasised a spatial shift in urban policies from the inner city towards
peripheral housing estates, was the New Life for Urban Scotland Partnership initiative launched by the Conservative government in 1988.

By the late 1980s it is argued that the 'peripheral estate problem' had reached the top of the political hierarchy, at least in Scotland, with the publication of New Life for Urban Scotland Partnership Areas (Scottish Office, 1988). Finally, the problems of such areas were recognised. The Scottish Office document seemed to confirm this by stating that:

"since the 1970s much has been done to revive Scotland's urban areas and in particular to bring new life to inner areas. But in the 1980s it is the people living in the large peripheral estates who are suffering most from social and economic deprivation who have least say in running their communities and who are most dependent on state benefits and services" (Scottish Office, 1988:5).

While this appeared to signal a shift in thinking towards the problems of the peripheral estates, the euphoria of these neglected areas was short lived. Only four areas were chosen as New Life Partnership Areas: Castlemilk (Glasgow), Ferguslie Park (Renfrew), Wester Hailes (Edinburgh) and Whitfield (Dundee). Why these particular areas were chosen has never really been fully explained, although to a large extent
the decision was seen as political. When the choice of areas is looked at more closely, some potential interesting explanations can be put forward. The choice of Castlemilk (Glasgow) was not without controversy. Although, suffering from severe social and economic problems, these were arguably no greater than in Glasgow's three other peripheral estates. What is especially relevant to this research is that Pollok, one of Glasgow’s other peripheral estates which was also experiencing severe problems was ignored.

The four areas chosen were all experiencing a plethora of problems, and were expected to receive special attention if not extra resources over a ten year period (1988-98). These four areas were to be targeted for action through the combined efforts of central and local government and the private and voluntary sectors. State subsidisation involved Scottish Office grants, provided that the local authorities agreed to divert extra resources from their existing budgets towards the partnership estates. The next section will discuss the emergence of this policy initiative in the context of Castlemilk and its relevance to the main theme of this chapter, policies designed to address Glasgow’s problems.
The New Life initiative demonstrated both a continuity while also some departures from previous urban policy initiatives. While the Conservative government’s rhetoric nationally spoke of stimulating and freeing enterprise the Scottish Office New Life initiative smacked of old fashioned state targeting albeit with a 1980/90s New Right slant. Arguably, at the heart of New Life was the emphasis placed upon overcoming the social deficiencies of the local community (Collins, 1999). To a certain extent, the New Life Partnerships mirror the social pathological explanation of poverty propounded in the late 1960s/early 1970s (see Rees and Lambert, 1985 for a discussion on these issues). However, this cultural/behavioural explanation was partially revised to give it a distinctly New Right look for the 1980s/90s. Whereas the 1960s/70s view was that the state could intervene to break into the culture of poverty evident in certain communities, in the 1980s/90s it was state involvement itself which was seen as fostering deviance and community malfunction. Armed with a set of 1980s jargon, the New Right argument pointed towards a culture of dependency which had grown in certain areas, where dependence on collective forms of welfare provision - housing, social security and so on - had grown to the exclusion of individual initiative and enterprise. Moreover, this dependence extended across the whole gamut of people’s behaviour, incorporating, for example patterns of voting behaviour which sustains
local authority profligacy and the bureaucratic inefficiency which in turn perpetuates dependency culture. Thus, the New Life initiative was supposed to ‘break up’ the council estates and overcome the unquestioning and apathetic behaviour of “permanent tenants of the state” (Peter Walker, quoted in Mason, 1989:99). The expectation for Castlemilk was to foster a community made-up of self reliant individuals and active citizens keen to maximise their utility by participating as consumers and competing as producers in a thrusting, innovative enterprise economy.

It was the refocussing of the New Life policy towards overcoming the internal deficiencies of the community, which gave rise to suggestions that it constituted a strand of urban policy which was marginalised and peripheralised from the main body of urban policy. In contrast to the glamour of highly visible ‘honey pot’ developments in the city centre, areas like Castlemilk have policies which were aimed at tackling problems in education, housing and crime. Whereas Glasgow Action sought to boost the city’s image as a location for new service employment and, with it, a business and professional elite, the ‘Safe Castlemilk’ project was geared towards the supposedly more mundane issues of road safety, safety at work and fear of crime.
While the rhetoric underpinning the New Life initiative demonstrates how social and behavioural explanations have shifted right-wards, it is altogether more questionable whether the policy mechanisms designed around these have altered to any great extent. The New Life initiative emphasised the need for a partnership involving all levels of government, business and the community. Indeed, there are similarities with the traditional urban programme approach and its focus on improving social and community services, educational facilities, health care and policing. Of course, the similarities should not be overstated; the New Life initiative did encompass some distinctly Thatcherite elements, most notably in terms of the tacit desire to reorientate the role of council housing towards virtually a form of special needs housing for the poor (Flynn, 1988). Yet even these tenure diversification goals received some measure of consensual support, albeit tempered by strong anti-landlordism from the left, and suspicion of all forms of collectivist provision from the right (Saunders, 1984).

While the Conservative government’s rhetoric throughout the 1980s and early 1990s had stressed the need for a market orientated road to urban change, in practice this has not fully materialised. On the one hand, programmes like New Life failed to any large extent to attract private capital. Boyle (1990:128) notes that “very small proportions of
private capital have found their way to the core problem areas: the peripheral estates and other desolate public-sector housing schemes in the city". This in stark contrast to the level of private investment in Glasgow's city centre. During research interviews a number of key decision makers acknowledged and agreed that investment and funding had been concentrated within the city centre:

"the GDA has sought to promote Glasgow as a commercial centre providing certain types of services to a wider region, in sense a great European City which looked outwards. Thus, we developed policies and strategies to promote and encourage investment and regeneration of the city centre".

(Interview with Stuart Patrick, Senior Executive GDA, 1998)

"The city centre really has been Glasgow's key opportunity for the last ten years. I mean the way that the economy is going it is service based and it is would have been short-sighted of the council to not bother with the city centre. I think we have been successful in the city centre in terms of bringing new jobs to Glasgow. These have created opportunities for people. In terms of our pattern of spending much has been designed to identify growth opportunities in the city centre. An element of our budget has also been used to design a strategy aimed at helping people gain access to the new opportunities generated in the
city centre, e.g. training programmes which focus on recruitment”.
(Interview with Steve Inch, Deputy Director of Development and Regeneration Services, GCC, May 1999)

“Of course the private sector has invested more overwhelmingly in Glasgow city centre compared to the level of investment in deprived areas such as the peripheral estates. The investment returns in the city centre are much more assured. The same cannot be said for peripheral estates where any investment is a genuine risk. Simply put more profits can be made in the city centre than in other parts of the city”.
(Interview with Harry O’Donnell, Senior Executive Miller Partnerships, April 1999)

From either public or private perspectives it is clear from the above quotes that both sectors viewed the city centre as the main area for investment. Pursuit of entrepreneurial policies designed to regenerate the city centre and create the conditions for capital investment became central to building the ‘new Glasgow’. The nurturing of service sector investment was used a means to broaden the city’s economic base. However, the focus on the city centre led to the neglect of Glasgow’s disadvantaged communities most notably the peripheral estates. The needs of these local communities have been supressed in the interests
of capital accumulation as the pursuit of economic growth takes priority over distributional issues.

The dual structure of the Glasgow economy has resulted in the emergence of a dual urban policy (Keating and Boyle, 1986; Keating, 1988), where a robust urban economic policy which supports city centre regeneration is the opposite of an underfunded, fragmented social policy devised for 'problem' peripheral estates. To date Glasgow's dualism has been relatively successfully politically managed. Thus, unlike what has happened in many English cities there has not been widespread disorder. Apathy has been more the mood and experience of those who live on the periphery as opposed to the pursuit of rebellion or revolution.

Of course, a dual urban policy is not necessarily a bad thing. As Keating (1988) correctly notes, a flexible, pluralist urban policy could accurately reflect the differing priorities of different areas. Clearly, the needs of the peripheral estates differ considerably from those of city centre traders and residents. However, problems arise when this duality becomes more of a dichotomy, that is where one strand of policy is subordinate in terms of finance and ideological backing. New Life became a residualised strand of policy which focussed more on
managing decline and social anomie than creating any meaningful sort of regeneration.

Further, during research interviews Bob Holman (a former Professor of Social Policy who for the past twenty years has lived in Easterhouse, one of Glasgow’s ‘problem’ peripheral estates) argued that ‘new’ urban policies (i.e. social inclusion policies) were inward-looking, designed more to allow the poor to manage their own poverty without addressing the root causes of the problems. These marginal strands of urban policy with their focus on underclass ‘explanations’ of urban distress, stands in sharp contrast to the glamour of highly visible developments in Glasgow city centre like the Buchanan Galleries and the Italian Centre which fit snugly into the national economy.

Moreover, a number of critics (Hall, 1997; Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993; Sim, 1990) argue that recent policy initiatives towards peripheral estates have been inward-looking, piecemeal and ad-hoc. This has tended to represent a limited and unbalanced approach to the regeneration of these areas. Such policies Hall (1997:885) argues “have failed to tackle many of the root causes of estate decline”. The implication of this suggests the need to develop outward-looking policies, which recognise that many of the forces which impact on
peripheral estates are out with their control. Hall (1997:887) argues that to “develop outward-looking policies requires the development of new institutional frameworks which can provide a city wide vision”. There is clearly a need for an integrated and holistic approach to address the problems of peripheral estates that reflects the inter-related and dynamic nature of the problems.

To date this has not been achieved in Glasgow despite the development of the GA, which has a remit to coordinate and drive the city’s regeneration policies in a more strategic fashion. Thus, while Glasgow city centre may have renewed itself, this redevelopment has been poorly linked to peripheral estates regeneration which has been largely neglected, and in turn have experienced massive decline (Mooney and Danson, 1997; Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Pacione, 1993). The previous Conservative government’s reliance on an approach based on privatism which stressed the importance of local economic development in dealing with urban problems has largely failed to materialise for those living in peripheral estates. It was hoped that the benefits of local economic development would ‘trickle down’ to deprived neighbourhoods. In reality they did not (see Robson et al, 1994). The political and social exclusion of peripheral estates by the then Conservative government, if not deliberate, would appear to have been
acceptable to it. A structural analysis based on the Fordist/post-Fordist dichotomy could be used to reinforce that point. Peripheral estates, it could be argued, now fulfil the function of housing a social layer that is excluded from the labour market. The social polarisation on peripheral estates reflects the polarisation of the labour market in post-Fordist society (see Hoggett, 1994).

Finally, despite the rhetoric of ‘New Life emerging’ for residents of run down estates the reality is somewhat different. As research has demonstrated the New Life for Castlemilk failed to materialise for many of its residents. Gibb et al., (1999) show that in terms of deprivation Castlemilk’s two postcode sector’s (G45 9 and G45 0) improved between 1991 and 1998 from only 4th worst and 6th worst respectively to 9th worst and 11th worst, out of 990 postcodes in Scotland (quoted in Webster, 2000:43). Furthermore, by 1998 Castlemilk had the highest proportion of households on Income Support in Glasgow at 60%, which was more than double the Scottish average of 27% (Webster, 2000:43). In sum, unemployment, poverty and ill-health are still extremely high in Castlemilk despite ten years of government funding (£230m in total) through its New Life initiative.
Many other deprived areas within Glasgow were even less fortunate than Castlemilk. Glasgow’s other three large peripheral estates (Drumchapel, Easterhouse and Pollok) received little in the way of attention and policy initiatives throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s. In particular (as this thesis demonstrates in chapters six and seven) Greater Pollok, which has experienced massive problems in recent times has been largely neglected and ignored by policy makers, the private sector and academics. Despite the clear evidence of need in the aforementioned areas (and other areas within Glasgow) only Easterhouse (out of the three other peripheral estates) was successful in securing Scottish Office support and funds under their Priority Partnership Area (PPAs) policy initiative in the mid-1990s. Overall, the PPAs bidding process has been heavily criticised (Turok and Hopkins, 1997a; 1997b; Taylor et al., 1998). Two main criticisms point towards the ‘political gerrymandering’ by the Scottish Office/Conservative government, and inconsistency between the two main criteria (need and quality of proposal) which were used to judge bids and PPA selection. Of particular interest to this research is that Glasgow was the biggest loser in the 1996 PPA competition (see chapter six for a detailed discussion on the PPA process). As Kearns and Turok (2000:182-3) point out “Glasgow had 45% of the poorest census districts in Scotland but was awarded only 3 of the 12 successful bids”. This, therefore,
raised questions about the government's commitment to tackling inequality and deprivation, and risked further impoverishment of parts of Scotland's biggest city.

From New Life to Social Inclusion

More recently the emergence of New Labour's 'social inclusion policies' owes a great deal to the previous New Life initiative. While the focus of the 'new policy' is on tackling exclusion amongst local people the ways of achieving this are not so different from the New Life agenda. Both stress the importance of working in partnership, of putting the local community at the heart of the policy agenda and including those who have been excluded from decisions which impact on their life (see chapters six and seven for a more detailed discussion of how in their early stages the New Labour's social inclusion policies are being played out in Greater Pollok a disadvantaged neighbourhood in Glasgow).

Given the dynamic nature of contemporary restructuring and state responses, recent changes to the way urban areas are currently governed may suggest a movement away from the overtly entrepreneurial policies, pursued by many local states since the mid-1980s (Haughton and While, 1999). While there is little doubt that the promotion of local economic development still dominates, there does
appear to be a shift, at the rhetorical level at least, towards an agenda which also recognises the importance of social and environmental issues in urban regeneration. Although, in its early stages New Labour has attempted to translate some of these ideas into its social inclusion policy agenda. However, the need to join-up government thinking and promote a more holistic approach to urban policies, much espoused by New Labour, is far from being realised as this research has discovered.

When interviewed for this research Duncan MacLennan (a Labour government adviser on urban policy), shared these views, while also stressing some of the difficulties in the case of achieving joined up thinking and policy making in Glasgow:

"it is not just that there is a lack of joined up thinking, but an absolute hostility and resistance to it. I think that the real problem in joined up thinking is not that there are lots of things to sort through at the level of Glasgow City with the GA, but we still don't have any delivery agents that are multi-sectoral. If you compare our housing associations with community development corporations in the United States they do child care and they do housing and they do local jobs and training so it is a whole range of programmes. This is not how we do it in Scotland, we have set up just housing associations. So yes joined up thinking is the order of the day, but I think it has to be joined up vertically and
horizontally i.e. from Edinburgh to the sort of almost natural regions of Scotland to the cities and to the local areas”.

(Interview with Duncan MacLennan, Scottish Office Advisor, 1999)

The above quote makes it clear that there are still many barriers to achieving joined up policy. According to MacLennan urban actors in cities like Glasgow need to learn important lessons from their counterparts in US, which he makes clear think much more strategically and holistically about how to manage urban development than compared to what happens in the UK. In sum, urban actors who have key roles in shaping urban development in the UK do so in isolation from each other and in the words of MacLennan “are resistant and hostile to a co-ordinated approach to policy making”.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s poverty and deprivation became more widespread within the UK. Nearly 20 years of neo-liberal government policies have seen Britain and cities like Glasgow becoming more unequal. As Mooney and Johnstone (2000:156) point out the “evidence makes for stark reading: in 1996-97 almost one-quarter of the entire population were living on a income below 50% of the national average, while the numbers of children being raised in poverty had increased from 1 in 10 in 1979 to 1 in 3 in 1997. In Scotland, in
1995, 38% of children and 42% of under fives were living in poverty". If this was not tragic enough, it is not just poverty that has increased but social polarisation between the rich and poor. Again, Mooney and Johnstone (2000:156) note that between 1970 and 1997 the real income of the bottom 10% of the population fell by 9% compared with an increase of 70% for the top 10% (DSS, 1998).

The above discussion demonstrates the scale of the problems facing New Labour, who came to power in May 1997. While New Labour’s rhetoric suggests that their social inclusion agenda is somewhat different from previous Conservative government policies, the reality indicates, however, that strong elements of continuity exists with past poverty experiments. New Labour’s SIPs demonstrate the persistence of, although now much tarnished, targeting in urban policy. Further, the similarities with the previous Conservative government’s New Life for Urban Scotland initiative introduced in 1988, underpinned by a dependency culture ethos, are also quite revealing about the future direction of urban public policy under New Labour.

On closer examination, New Labour’s social inclusion agenda demonstrates an acceptance of key aspects of the dependency culture arguments as articulated by neo-liberals. As Webster (2000:29) points
The underclass problem, according to Murray (1989), is essentially a behavioural one which is reinforced by the 'benevolence' of the welfare state. Behavioural deviance encompasses three main aspects: a high level of illegitimacy, the growth of violent crime and general 'work shyness' or lack of interest in finding and keeping a job. The language post-1979 has stressed the importance of employment and the willingness of individuals to take personal responsibility for obtaining work. This was clearly evident in the repetition of the word 'work' as in work experience, work share, and work schemes and even work fare, which was suggested, but never actually put into practice, by the New Right as a means of employing the underclass whom they perceived had failed to seek and hold down a job. However, the increasing use of sanctions within the welfare state such as requiring people to seek and apply for employment or engage in retraining or lose benefit has became even more common place over time under New Labour.
While it is easy to reject the likes of Murray as pernicious and simplistic, they have to some extent impacted on British urban policy. For example, Murray’s ideas of the fecklessness of the underclass certainly has similarities with the ‘dependency culture’ rhetoric behind the New Life for Urban Scotland Partnership areas and to a lesser extent New Labour’s social inclusion policies. Eisenschitz (1997:154) argues that by focussing on the problems of a burgeoning urban underclass, and linking this to the urban ‘problem’, both the New Right and New Labour have demonstrated a political response to the structuralist explanation of poverty, which denies the significance of capitalist social relations in creating urban problems. Instead the victim of poverty is regarded as the cause (Loney, 1983). In this context the underclass are being used as an easy scapegoat for the plethora of urban problems.

It is clear that large-scale funding is unlikely to be forthcoming from the Scottish Executive to address the problems of cities like Glasgow. The reliance on national (i.e. Westminster programmes) social and economic policies e.g. New Deal and welfare reform to tackle what New Labour see as the problems is also apparent. As Webster (2000:29) pointed out these policies aimed to raise ‘employability’ and persuade people into jobs, as well as to remove the supposed incentives to lone parenthood. Others, (Mohan, 2000:296) claim that the British Labour
government, were largely copying the Democrats in the USA, in that they have defined social exclusion principally in terms of nonparticipation in paid employment. New Labour’s much trumpeted social inclusion policy involves only £16 million per year of new money which must be shared by 26 SIPs (figures quoted in Webster, 2000:290). All SIPs have to rely on the main partners within their area reallocating or ‘bending’ mainstream funding to the needs of each area. Thus, SIPs are expected to be the glue that binds together the disparate urban players in order to tackle the problems of an area.

Continuity rather than change in urban policy is also demonstrated as Webster (2000:43) argues by the endorsement of the Castlemilk Partnership by New Labour’s social exclusion unit as being an example of ‘good practice’ and ‘what works’. New Labour’s commitment to the ‘if its not broke don’t fix it’ ethos is clear for all to see.

Through the GA, eight areas (SIPs) are to be targeted for special attention. New Labour’s clear political need to be seen to be doing something for those parts of Glasgow (where many of their supporters live) experiencing widespread poverty and hardship have lead to the designation of eight SIPs areas within Glasgow. While New Labour spoke of comprehensive renewal of those communities at the margins the
reality is somewhat different. For example, the Secretary of State for Scotland informed the chairman of the then GRA (12th December, 1997) that there was no prospect of any significant increase in the resources available to Glasgow and requested that a new strategy be drawn up on the assumption that no additional resources can be provided (quoted in Webster, 2000:31).

The role of the SIP boards are crucial in this respect. Each Board attempts to build institutional thickness and capacity between all of its key players so as to create a genuine partnership which will get things done. However, research has demonstrated how many partnerships seem to be largely cosmetic arrangements, disguising an imbalance of power and responsibility, lack of trust and only superficial interaction between partners (see Kearns and Turok, 2000:179). Thus, although local urban actors may come together they do so because government demands it rather than through any great commitment to working in genuine partnership. The government in a recent report, even admitted that there has been a danger of paper partnerships set up to secure funding and little else (DETR, 1997 par. 5.4). While working in partnership might be the only game in town, it may amount to little more than a ‘marriage of convenience’ (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell, 1996).
New Labour’s social inclusion agenda does little more than in the words of Atkinson (2000:227) ‘tinker at the margins’. Oatley (1998a:3) takes this idea further by arguing that New Labour’s approach demonstrates a pragmatic response to urban problems which is uncritical of the capitalist system that is itself causing the problems. In this sense, social inclusion policies are little more than most recent government attempts to manage economic decline and social anomie. The symbolism attached to these (new) policies, however, should not be ignored. New Labour’s policies are designed to give the impression of doing something to ‘solve’ a problem about which relatively little can actually be done under the prevailing system (see Oatley, 1998a;1998b).

Finally, another major criticisms of New Labour’s social inclusion initiative is that it largely neglects the employment problem of deprived areas in Glasgow and other parts of Scotland. It is somewhat ironic that since 1945 Glasgow has been wrestling with a housing problem at the cost of economic issues, and will once again miss out on developing an economic strategy (see Webster, 2000; Robertson, 1998). In terms of economic development history is repeating itself, although the lessons of the past have not been sufficiently learned by those in power. In this sense SIPs will continue the trend of recent regeneration initiatives.
stretching back as far as Slum Clearance and ending with the New Life initiative. These projects have concentrated to a large extent upon physical renewal and managing decline (Webster, 2000; Robertson, 1998; Turok, 1987). While physical renewal is important it should be considered as only part of the 'regeneration jigsaw'. There must be, however, concerted action on the social and economic side. A major argument of this research is that failure to grasp the holistic nature of urban problems demonstrates that joined-up policy making is far from being realised.

Conclusions

Glasgow truly is a city in transition. No other city has undergone such rapid and wholesale deindustrialisation (see MacInnes, 1995). The 'new Glasgow' has been held up as the epitome of the 'post-industrial' city. Gone are the old, polluting, heavily unionised traditional industries which made the 'old Glasgow' famous. Boosterist policies (e.g. Glasgow's Miles Better campaign) have sought to reinvent Glasgow as a tourist and cultural city where the service sector is now dominant. While Glasgow may have a renewed self confidence, it is more debatable about who exactly has benefited from these changes. This chapter, however, has shown how Glasgow stands out in Scotland as the area with the most acute poverty.
Finally, the 1980s and 1990s have been characterised by policies that involved a shift from urban managerialism and collectivist social policies, to urban entrepreneurialism, in which the private sector was encouraged to take on a greater role in urban regeneration. In contemporary urban regeneration, public-private partnerships have been held up as the only way forward for cities like Glasgow. As resources become ever more squeezed such partnerships are increasingly envisaged as the key for urban regeneration (see Squires, 1991). In the pursuit of the private city there has been an emphasis on economic innovation and wealth creation (in the city centre) and the subordination of social programmes (designed for disadvantaged and marginal communities) to these economic priorities. This agenda has been detrimental to cities like Glasgow. The effect on a city like Glasgow is to accentuate further the gap between the rich and poor deepening social divisions which threaten to decay civil society. The plethora of urban initiatives which have been implemented since 1945 have enjoyed some successes but also gigantic failures, most notably in the city’s peripheral estates and inner city areas. The inability of Glasgow’s urban decision makers to link (and to understand the linkages) between city centre and peripheral estate development and regeneration represents one of their greatest failures. Glasgow’s regeneration strategy post-1945 has been inherently flawed. Policies to
link city centre business growth with the needs of disadvantaged
neighbourhoods have been inadequate. Overall, the city has failed to
come up with a strategic and coherent regeneration plan. Despite the
emergence of the GA who have been charged with bringing together the
various local actors, it is debatable, given past failures, whether such a
plan can be formulated and fully implemented.

The challenge for Glasgow is to develop policies that equate economic
efficiency with social justice. Cities need to be livable for all, not just
profitable. This is what the progressive city may look like. While cities
remain subject to the imperatives of national and international
economic restructuring, the last 50 years of ‘urban policies’ in Glasgow
has taught us a valuable lesson, that ‘politics still matter’. Redevelopment, as has been shown in this chapter, remains a highly
contentious political matter. As discussed in chapter two and four
while there are constraints, there are also opportunities and choices in
the ways cities are governed. As has happened in the past, whichever
policies are pursued will no doubt have a significant effect on Glasgow
and its citizens, for better or for worse.
CHAPTER SIX
GOVERNING THE PERIPHERY: THE CASE OF ‘GREATER POLLOK’

Introduction
This chapter aims to analyse the governance of the ‘Greater Pollok’ peripheral estate. It is divided into two interrelated sections. The first section briefly discusses the emergence of Glasgow’s ‘peripheral estate problem’. This is designed to set the context from which to discuss the governance of ‘Greater Pollok’. The second part of this chapter will seek to discuss the changing fortunes of this area through to the emergence of New Labour’s social inclusion policies. This will involve an analysis of the neglect and decline of ‘Greater Pollok’ over space and time.

Chapter six and seven should be viewed as being closely interrelated. The former puts the governance of the ‘Greater Pollok’ area into context, and creates the backdrop for chapter seven which will seek to analyse the emergence of New Labour’s social inclusion policies in a disadvantaged neighbourhood.

Key decision makers such as politicians and policy officers were questioned about governance issues in ‘Greater Pollok’. The views and
opinions of local people were also obtained through focus group discussions (supplemented by a questionnaire) which aimed to question local people about life in 'Greater Pollok'. The main findings of the focus groups will be discussed in chapter seven, however this chapter will, where appropriate, discuss some aspects relevant to the governance of 'Greater Pollok'. The next section turns towards a discussion of Glasgow's 'peripheral estate problem'.

**The Emergence of Glasgow's 'Peripheral Estate Problem'**

Even from their inception in the late 1940s-early 1950s Glasgow's four peripheral estates exhibited problems. In the urgency to build housing as quickly as possible to rehouse the residents of Glasgow's slum inner city, there was a failure of the then Glasgow Corporation to provide adequate services (see Gibb, 1983; Keating, 1988). It was some time (if at all) before these services were provided (Gibb, 1983).

There may be some sympathy for Glasgow Corporation whose first priority was to provide housing for former slum tenants. The legacy of failure, however, of the Corporation to provide appropriate services and employment opportunities for such a large resident population is more enduring. Their goal, if not vision, was to improve the living conditions of the working classes. Initially the housing built was a far
better quality than what people had left behind in the old inner city. For example, the provision of a bathroom with inside toilet, for the first time, would have been viewed by residents as progress compared to the shared outside toilet which they previously had to endure. Although the estates represented a real improvement in working class housing conditions and were initially well received, there was evidence of problems on some peripheral estates from their inception. As early as the late-1940s there have been incidents of anti-social behaviour and criticisms of the environments that had been created. By the 1960s and increasingly by the 1970s and 1980s there has been evidence of increases in the incidence of poverty, multiple deprivation and social problems on peripheral estates (see CES, 1985). In fact, Power and Tunstall (1997) demonstrate that the majority of the 28 areas which had violent disturbances or riots between 1991 and 1995 were peripheral estates. Over time essential services did come (often too slowly for many residents), however new problems emerged, most notably unemployment, which would accentuate peripheral estates precarious position (in relation to Glasgow see Keating, 1988; Mooney, 1988; Pacione, 1993).

The failure of Glasgow’s four peripheral estates to establish sustainable local economic bases was to have an enduring legacy. In the 1950s and
1960s this was not viewed as a serious problem as post-war economic growth led to a period of full employment. Full employment in this period was an unchallenged assumption. Further, until the early 1980s local authorities lacked real economic powers and were thus left with responsibility for housing and services provision. However, it is important to note that the latter services are important both in terms of the quality of provision and their effect on the quality of life of the citizens of Glasgow who consume them. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that the peripheral estates during this period contained a disproportionate amount of Glasgow’s poor people even in times of full employment (Keating, 1988; Mooney, 1988). Moreover, even in boom times Glasgow was never an affluent city and the majority of its inhabitants experienced poverty and hardship (Mooney, 1988; Damer, 1990). The old traditional heavy industries (notably shipbuilding and heavy engineering) continued to provide, if somewhat declining, employment opportunities. As a result unemployment in the peripheral estates, in the early post-war years remained relatively low.

Severe economic decline aggravates the general precariousness of life within peripheral estates and led to a deepening of existing social problems. Glasgow’s image as a city in decline was now complete. This was partly reflected in media attention which painted a very bleak
picture of the once proud 'second city of the empire'. It was the
tendency for many writers, television and film makers to perpetuate
the Glasgow myth - that all Glaswegians were hard-drinking, hard-
fighting, bigoted and violent and that the city was ugly, dangerous,
depressing, a cultural wasteland lacking in soul (Peter McDougall’s play
Just Another Saturday about a young man’s experiences during an
Orange Walk [starring Glaswegian comedian Billy Connolly] and the
violence he encounters during the day seemed to some to symbolise
Glasgow’s malaise). To outsiders 'Glasgow was the city that had died'.
Moreover, on a more academic footing Glasgow emerged unenviably as
a league table leader in a plethora of socio-economic deprivation
indicators (such as unemployment and ill-health) which were published
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Keating, 1988; Damer, 1990).

By the 1970s Glasgow’s four peripheral estates housed approximately
250,000 people: one-third of Glasgow’s total population. ‘Greater
Pollok’ itself was home to approximately 45,000 people at its peak
(Pacione, 1995). However, since the 1970s all peripheral estates have
lost population. In 1998 the population of ‘Greater Pollok’ stood at
approximately 27,000 a reduction of some 17,000. The local plan for
‘Greater Pollok’ suggests that population will continue to decline,
although it expects the population to stabilise around 20,000 by the
year 2001 (GCC, 1997). If an increase in population is viewed as an indicator of the success of an area then conversely a decline in population can be viewed as an indicator of the decline of an area. The sharp decline in population in the area is partly a legacy of previous attempts to ‘break-up’ concentrations of poor people through wholesale demolition of slum housing (see Mooney, 1988). This last point is important given that a research paper which discussed an evaluation of the New Life For Urban Scotland initiative found that “in order to deal effectively with tackling deprivation on an area basis, population levels have to be stabilised as far as possible” (Cambridge Economic Consultants, 1999).

The census of 1971 and especially 1981 identified large pockets of multiple deprivation located in all four of Glasgow’s peripheral estates. Census indicators of deprivation revealed particular concentrations in the Priesthill/Nitshill (unemployment was over 20% according to the 1981 census), part of the ‘Greater Pollok’ area. Despite this, national urban policy was still focused on the problems of the inner city. In effect, the peripheral estates were being discriminated against (which were in the main, outside the inner city areas designated for funding). While the peripheral estates could no longer be ignored, by politicians, neglect of the ‘peripheral problem’ continued. This chapter now turns
to discuss the governance and the changing fortunes of Pollok peripheral estate from its establishment in the late 1930s up until the emergence of New Labour’s social inclusion policies in the late 1990s.

The Origins and Development of ‘Greater Pollok’

Originally proposed as a ‘garden suburb’, ‘old Pollok’ was built as a high quality residential environment, designed to attract skilled manual labour. The idealism of the garden suburb was clearly seen in the carefully planned environment and much sought after semi-detached housing with gardens, which were built in the late-1930s. It was the intention to create a socially balanced community with a strong community identity. The original idealism gave way (post-1945 first generation new towns designed on earlier garden city ideas did not entirely break with this idealism, however the second generation of new towns clearly did) to post-war reality when the emphasis was placed upon tackling Glasgow’s slum housing. ‘Greater Pollok’ peripheral estate built after 1945, was, however, very different from the old Pollok garden suburb ideal that had preceded it. The housing built consisted predominantly of four-storey ‘tenement-style blocks’ built to a much higher density.
‘Greater Pollok’ is located in the south-west of Glasgow (Map 1). The geography of ‘Greater Pollok’ is interesting. ‘Greater Pollok’ is situated between Pollok Estate to the east and open countryside (the green belt) to the west. It is hard to disagree with the Local Plan (GCC, 1997) when it suggests that the presence of river valleys, woods and undulating topography gives parts of Pollok a rural character. This is far removed from the image of urban squalor which many outsiders may have: of a place not to be visited, of gangs, drugs, unemployment, poor health and shootings.

During research interviews with local people and elected and non-elected officials it became clear that no one distinctive homogeneous Pollok exists. Instead a dispersed set of sub-areas make up what is commonly known as ‘Greater Pollok’. This reflects the different stages in the development of the estate as well as reflecting the sheer physical size of Pollok. Areas which make up ‘Greater Pollok’ include old Pollok, Nitshill, Priesthill, Carnwadric and Crookston (Map 2). This fragmented geography partly explains why a distinctive ‘Greater Pollok’ community identity has not emerged. This has meant that within the ‘Greater Pollok’ area distinctive individual communities have emerged pursuing their own particular agendas, often at odds with each other. If one was to ask a resident of Nitshill or Priesthill if they belonged to ‘Greater
Pollok’ it is unlikely that they would answer yes. During focus group discussion not one out of the forty participants said that they associated with the identity of ‘Greater Pollok’. They associate more closely with the neighbourhood where they live. Glasgow’s other peripheral estates, most notably Castlemilk, exhibit a more coherent geography which has helped to create a stronger sense of community identity. Moreover, this sense of community identity in Castlemilk partly explains the formation of the Castlemilk Umbrella Group, a distinctive community group set up in the early 1980s. The development of this Castlemilk community group is significant. This group gave the people of Castlemilk a voice and acted as a forum where they could express their ideas and needs. Within Pollok such a community group has never been established. The residents of Pollok have never had a community forum striving to achieve similar things. The fragmentation of community identity partly explains why decision-makers have found it easier to ignore or dismiss Greater Pollok’s needs and demands.

Discussions with local decision makers revealed that when Pollok speaks it does so with ‘many weak voices’. Thus, instead of one strong Pollok voice emerging a disparate set of voices are heard, which can be more easily managed or even ignored by decision makers.
Acknowledgement, by local actors, of the absence of a strong community spirit has led some of them to tackle this problem. Recent attempts to promote a stronger sense of community identity, however, have shown little success (e.g. interview with Horizons - local training and employment agency, 16/4/98). When Horizons called a local community meeting designed to encourage local cooperation and dialogue only four people turned up and one of these was a local community activist. However, these attempts have failed to fully acknowledge that the fragmentation of the local community has also been accentuated by the large scale demolition and depopulation of many parts of ‘Greater Pollok’ e.g. Nitshill, which has had a tremendous impact on the composition of the local population and their sense of local identity.

When asked what she regarded as the main problems facing ‘Greater Pollok’ Margaret Daly (Greater Pollok Social Inclusion Partnership [GP SIP] manager) clearly recognised and acknowledged the problems of a fragmented and disparate community. She identified the lack and inadequacy of existing community structures as barriers to the development of a strong community identity:

“I think the diversity of the community is probably the hardest problem and trying to create some kind of structure where communities can
organise. Creating a forum where they can make their views known is probably going to be the biggest challenge for us over the next few months and possibly over the next year. To be perfectly honest I don’t feel that the partnership can be fully operational until those structures are in place and the community feel that they are organised enough to play a full role in it. There has been a lot of criticism about the big document (Social Inclusion Partnership Implementation Plan) having been written without community input and to be perfectly honest we have had no mechanism for doing that before”.

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, June 1999)

Ms Daly concurred with my research findings with regards to weak community association with respect to the issue of a ‘Greater Pollok’ identity. She confirmed that local people do not, as yet, identify with ‘Greater Pollok’ rather identifying with the area in which they live and have closest associations. She stressed that this presents its own challenges:

“people tended to be strongly identified not with Greater Pollok but with their own communities. People from Arden think of themselves as being from Arden, people from Darnley think of themselves as being from Darnley, people from Pollok think of themselves as being from Pollok, etc. Greater Pollok is an administrative title and invariably
people talk about it as the Pollok Partnership and the Pollok Project and I spend an awful lot of my time saying Greater and it would be nice to get some kind of catchy phrase which everyone could associate with. The communities that we have within this area don’t often sit comfortably with the title ‘Greater Pollok’ which at present they don’t identify with”.

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, June 1999)

It is clear from the above quotes that the GP SIP manager had identified the weakness of community identity and organisation as the main problem facing the ‘Greater Pollok’ area. Clearly, the GP SIP should not assume that people in the area would or even should identify with a ‘Greater Pollok’ identity. In the words of the partnership manager, ‘Greater Pollok’ is an “administrative title”. The community in part was being used a scapegoat for its own problems. Further, if community structures were not developed and the success of the GP SIP was questioned, then the SIP Board could point to the failure of the ‘community’ to organise itself and to get involved in decision making. At policy level it would mean that a group of officers (local policy makers) would be setting the agenda, not the local community.
The Neglect and Decline of ‘Greater Pollok’

Physical evidence of the neglect and decline of Greater Pollok is everywhere. Boarded up vacated houses are a common sight within ‘Greater Pollok’ (See Appendix 9 which shows photographs of decay and dereliction). The effects on local communities of closure/deterioration of local buildings has led to a loss of pride in the area’s heritage and feelings of powerlessness and alienation (as indicated to the researcher during focus group discussions). Many of these derelict houses cannot be let as there are few people willing to live in them. GCC’s strategy to the growing number of derelict unlet housing is to demolish them. Better they argue to see a site left vacant than areas blighted by derelict housing. However, it should be noted that although the derelict housing may have been physically removed the debt charges still remain. These, debts, of course, have to be paid by existing GCC tenants for housing which was built less than 30 years ago; a clear and costly failure of housing policy. All of this is about to change, however, given that GCC tenants voted (April 2002) in favour of a plan to transfer the entire housing stock to locally based housing associations. This will, of course, result in the local authority losing its housing landlord function. However, it will still retain a strategic role in the housing of Glasgow.
Some of the more common indicators of neglect and decline typical of disadvantaged areas include minimal provision of shops, low access to employment opportunities (partly reflected in high levels of unemployment), no cinemas or theatres, few community centres (the ones which are still open are often in a state of disrepair) and a lack of amenities for young people, etc (see chapter seven for a more detailed discussion of the good and bad things about living in 'Greater Pollok').

Moreover, indicators of socio-economic deprivation are predictably high as shown in Table 3. Poverty is one of the major problems faced by the area to the extent that 62% of households in ‘Greater Pollok’ received a gross weekly income of less than £99 in June 1998 and unemployment stood at 41.7% in January 1998 (figures quoted in Greater Pollok Social Inclusion Strategy, 1999a). Moreover, the Greater Pollok constituency has some of the worst health related problems in the UK, for example working class males die on average 10 years earlier than middle class men in the city of Glasgow (Panorama, 14/12/97). Despite the extent of the socioeconomic problems as indicated in Table 3 ‘Greater Pollok’ has not been included among the plethora of major urban projects which have been implemented within Glasgow over the last 30 years (e.g. New Life for Urban Scotland Partnerships and Priority Partnership Areas - these policies will be discussed later in this chapter.
with reference to Pollok). This is one of the main reasons why this area was chosen for study. Pollok has remained until recently the peripheral estate which had no additional policy initiatives or joint programmes designed to bring about major urban regeneration. In this context, McGregor et al., (1992:27) correctly described Pollok as essentially the 'policy-off' case.

Further, little in the way of private sector investment is evident in Greater Pollok. Even where the private sector has attempted to invest in the area e.g. within the Pollok retail centre vacant premises are testimony to the lack of demand and private investment. The Pollok PPA bid document (GCC, 1996) actually noted that private owned industrial estates were under occupied and suffering from a lack of investment. To some extent, however, this is about to change with the completion of a private sector housing development at Greenfields (formerly the run-down Darnley council estate) and a planned leisure and housing development for the site of the former Leverndale hospital. These proposals seem to suggest that some sections of the private sector now view Greater Pollok as an area of potential investment. The recent opening up of the M77, which runs through parts of 'Greater Pollok', has played no small part in stimulating recent private sector interest in the area. Close examination of the local plan bears this out, where it
emphasises the importance of the new road and other infrastructural improvements (e.g. the Nitshill and Darnley railway stations). Further, state incentives such as free land and sympathetic local planning have also contributed towards attempts to stimulate private sector investment.

By examining semi-structured interviews, focus groups discussions and council minutes and policy papers this chapter will now aim to investigate the neglect of the Pollok area. It will be argued that Pollok has become Glasgow’s forgotten peripheral estate especially among public sector agencies.

Research by Turok and Hopkins (1997a; 1997b) suggests that in recent years Glasgow, and in particular ‘Greater Pollok’, has been discriminated against in terms of receiving urban funding. Obtaining urban spending data (e.g. urban programme, education and health spending levels) from the relevant bodies/organisations was virtually impossible (see Appendix 8). However, what few data were available can be seen in Table 4 which clearly demonstrates that Pollok has received far less funding than Glasgow’s three other peripheral estates. What is also noticeable is that Castlemilk and Easterhouse received the largest sums of monies out of the four peripheral estates. In fact, as
indicated in Table 4, neither Pollok or Drumchapel received any urban funding monies, between 1996-99. This stands in sharp contrast to Castlemilk and Easterhouse both of which received nearly £4 million each over the same period. This to a large extent can be attributed to New Life Partnership monies Castlemilk received between 1988-98 (and subsequent SIP monies) and in the case of Easterhouse to Priority Partnership funding. Further, analysis of Priority Partnership Area (PPA) bids suggest that ‘Greater Pollok’ had a very strong case for designation on the grounds of need and priority, but was refused by the Scottish Office (SO) on political grounds (Turok and Hopkins, 1997a:30).

During semi-structured interviews, the issue of the failure of ‘Greater Pollok’ to be designated a PPA was discussed with the SO. Christie Smith, the then Head of the Urban Regeneration Unit was asked why ‘Greater Pollok’ had not been chosen as one of the PPAs. He responded by explaining that a “selective approach” was adopted by SO Ministers to certain areas in Glasgow:

“only twelve areas were chosen out of I think twenty nine. As Greater Pollok didn’t fall into the twelve, the most appropriate candidates were selected by the Minister responsible”.

(Interview with Christie Smith, SO, December 1998)
Commenting on Professor Turok’s research, Mr Smith clearly did not want to discuss the matter further:

"I think I have probably given you as much as I can say on that. It was the decision of the previous Minister to select the top twelve".

(Interview with Christie Smith, SO, December 1998)

Turok and Hopkins (1997a; 1997b) research indicates, however, that they were not the top twelve judged by need. The issue was pursued during discussions with Christie Smith who was asked to discuss the criteria used by the SO to determine whether bids should accepted or rejected. Mr Smith stated that “need, quality of proposal and the priority attached to the area” were all important considerations. However, he was not willing to say how these criteria were measured. Even given the criteria as outlined by Christie Smith ‘Greater Pollok’ had a very strong case especially on the grounds of social need (for example, it had 80% of its population in the worst 10 enumeration districts in Scotland the only other area to have a higher figure was North Glasgow at 89% and it was selected as a PPA) and quality of bid (figures quoted in Turok and Hopkins, 1997b).

However, according to Turok and Hopkins (1997a; 1997b) research, the ‘Greater Pollok’ PPA bid was a strong contender for selection on the
criteria set down by the SO (as mentioned above by Mr Smith), and 'Greater Pollok' was one of the biggest losers. Mr Smith responded:

"that is his (Turok's) opinion. It is not one I share".

(Interview with Christie Smith, SO, December 1998)

Mr Smith went onto argue that he did not regard Pollok in any way having been biased or discriminated against:

"all bids are considered and the Minister makes the final decision".

This line of argument was further developed in order to understand the rationale for such decisions. When asked if the decision was a political one, Mr Smith replied:

"I think you are barking up the wrong tree here......a Minister is a politician and they make all sorts of decisions and this is formally a matter for the Minister to make those decisions".

(Interview with Christie Smith, SO, December 1998)

SO Ministers, though, take advice from civil servants and Mr Smith conceded that this occurs as a matter of course:

"yes they get advice from officials like myself".

(Interview with Christie Smith, SO, December 1998)
Another important factor in the failure of 'Greater Pollok' to be selected was revealed by Taylor et al., (1998) and confirmed by this research. During interviews for this research it became clear that while GCC had submitted seven bids for PPA funding they were not all given equal priority. GCC were asked by the SO to prioritise the seven bids they had submitted. The upshot was that 'Greater Pollok' was ranked seventh out of seven bids. The top three ranked areas; Easterhouse, East End and Glasgow North were all successful in obtaining PPA status. To understand why 'Greater Pollok' was not chosen it is important to understand why it was ranked in seventh and last place by GCC. From interview discussions with both elected and non-elected official of GCC it became clear that two factors were important in deciding the ranking position of the seven bids. First, it was claimed by more than one local authority officer that 'Greater Pollok' lacked a political champion (unlike East End which was represented by the then GCC leader Frank McAveety and was ranked second out of the seven bids and not unsurprisingly was chosen as a PPA) who could persuade the city council that this area should be given a high 'political priority'. Second, and closely allied to this was the ambiguous position of Councillor Tommy Sheridan (the then leader of Militant in Scotland). While he could certainly be said to have championed the 'Greater Pollok' cause he can be regarded as a lone and marginal figure who often incurred
the wrath of the ruling Labour group (to whom Tommy Sheridan was not one of them) who held political control of the council. Thus, local politics was in no small way responsible for marginalising ‘Greater Pollok’. The issue of local politics and its significance to ‘Greater Pollok’ is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. In sum, both local and national politics were responsible for the failure of ‘Greater Pollok’ to be chosen as a PPA.

The above discussion is quite revealing. While Christie Smith sought to defend SO decisions, in this instance, the designation of PPA areas, he inadvertently confirmed Turok’s and Hopkins’ (1997a) findings that the decision was political. Ministers had taken a political decision (on the advice of civil servants). ‘Greater Pollok’ it could be claimed had been passed over against by not being designated as a PPA area on political grounds. This was the result not just of central government but, as outlined above, of local government.

The theme of neglect and decline was further discussed with Christie Smith, who was asked if the SO had thought that ‘Greater Pollok’ had received fair treatment over the years given the extent of the problems it faced, Mr Smith said:

“I don’t know. I have no evidence to the contrary or to support that. By
and large Pollok came to our attention over the national policy. I mean we are aware of the deprivation that has existed in this area. In 1996 it bid to become a PPA. It has now recently bid to become a SIP area. It has not been an issue for the National Government to resolve, it has been an issue which Glasgow has had to resolve. It was up to local institutions to decide upon priorities. I think the city council and partners should determine city priorities”

(Interview with Christie Smith, SO, December 1998).

The above comments clearly suggest that the SO have adopted to a degree a hands-off approach to urban priorities of local areas. They argue that this allows local areas autonomy to make decisions. It could, however, be construed as a mechanism whereby the SO argue they are not responsible for local priorities and decisions, thus leaving local areas to deal with any criticisms over local policy decisions made. This allows them to become detached, while still crucially setting the policy agenda, from the policy making processes and ultimately, it is more convenient to place the blame on local areas for any policy decisions and subsequent failures. With respect to the PPA process Turok and Hopkins (1997a:2051) criticised the SO by suggesting that they could have got more closely involved in local partnerships thus helping to promote institutional learning, rather than remaining at arms length
from local efforts to grapple with these difficult problems. The damage that this poorly designed process caused should not be underestimated. In the case of ‘Greater Pollok’ it accentuated the growing mistrust and suspicion between local policy officers and the SO, and between local people and decision makers. Arguably, the biggest effect was on the local community. A number of people interviewed during focus group discussions were dismayed at the failure to be designated a PPA given the severity of the problems that the area was experiencing. Thus, another opportunity had been lost to regenerate, at least as determined from the SO, ‘Greater Pollok’.

**Local Politics in ‘Greater Pollok’**

The political dimension in ‘Greater Pollok’ is interesting and complex. The hegemony of the local Labour Party is challenged by the Scottish Socialist Party (formally Militant), led in ‘Greater Pollok’ by the Scottish Socialist Party leader, GCC and Member of the Scottish Parliament for Glasgow, Tommy Sheridan. It is possible that the complex political dimension has played a role in the problems of ‘Greater Pollok’.

During research interviews local Labour Pollok Councillor Willie O’Rourke argued that the emergence of Militant, which promoted a left wing policy agenda (for example, direct opposition in the form of civil
disobedience against the Poll Tax/warrant sales stood in contrast to the Labour Party’s acquiescence towards these issues), had created a number of problems for the ‘Greater Pollok’ area and the Labour Party: “the presence of the then leader of Militant (local Councillor Tommy Sheridan) was used by the members of the GCC who hold power, to discriminate against the Greater Pollok area. In reality this meant that few, if any, initiatives had been devised to address the problems of this area. Greater Pollok had suffered because of the (Labour) council’s bias against Tommy Sheridan”.

(Interview with Councillor O’Rourke, GCC, October 1998).

Also during interviews for this research local GCC policy officers confirmed this feeling of bias, as suggested above by Councillor O’Rourke, against the ‘Greater Pollok’ area by the ruling Labour council. This bias it was claimed was manifest in the lack of policy initiatives and resources conferred on the ‘Greater Pollok’ area: “he (Tommy Sheridan) is viewed with suspicion and as a threat to the Labour Party. He is a popular local figure who cares about the Pollok area and has campaigned on many rights and issues which are important to local people, for example the Poll Tax/warrant sales and poor housing. While it is very difficult to prove, there is little doubt in most minds that when resources have been handed out Greater Pollok
has not received its fair share. While this cannot all be put down to Councillor Sheridan alone it is, however, a key factor in explaining why the area has not been prioritised”.

(Interview with GCC Policy Officer, June 1999).

As the above quotes suggest the leader of Scottish Socialist Party was being used as scapegoat for the problems of ‘Greater Pollok’. However, few would publicly admit to this suggestion. The Labour dominated council took great offence to their political hegemony being attacked by someone from their own heartland. A general opinion was that if this was the way people from Pollok were going to vote (for the Scottish Socialist Party) then they would receive little or no help for the problems they faced; the Sheridan factor would never be too far away from decisions made regarding the governance of ‘Greater Pollok’.

Councillor Willie O’Rourke concluded by highlighting the isolation of Councillor Sheridan:

“Tommy Sheridan was a bright and intelligent young man, but was a lone voice who could easily be marginalised by those who wielded power in the city council”

(Interview with Councillor O’Rourke, GCC, October 1998).
The issue of political neglect and failure was taken up with Iain Davidson local MP for ‘Greater Pollok’. He said:

"Politicians and policy makers will not necessarily acknowledge that they themselves have been guilty and have failed. I think it comes back to the fact that an area like Pollok has been less well represented politically both with a capital and small ‘P’ than some other areas in the city and in turn the city has less of a voice than other parts of the west of Scotland and the west of Scotland has in turn been less well represented than higher reaches of administrative politics than say Edinburgh has”

(Interview with Iain Davidson MP for Greater Pollok, 12 February 1999).

Wide ranging discussions and interviews with key politicians and public policy makers in Glasgow has thrown-up some interesting potential reasons for the failure of public agencies (most notably the then SO, GCC, GDA and Scottish Homes) to tackle the severe problems of the area. As indicated by Iain Davidson local politicians have failed to properly and successfully articulate the case for assistance for ‘Greater Pollok’. In reality what this has meant is that politicians from other areas (most notably the East End of Glasgow, Castlemilk and Easterhouse) have been more successful in securing support and crucially public funding.
Local MP Iain Davidson agreed the area had been neglected in terms of financial support and policy initiatives. However, he also claimed that the resources received by the area had not always been used efficiently:

"it was well evident and acknowledged that the area had not received its fair share. Well I think it is certainly evident that there has been underspending but on the other hand there has been poor management of existing resources"

(Interview with Iain Davidson Greater Pollok MP, 12 February 1999).

Local councillor Tommy Sheridan also shared the belief that the area had been neglected:

"I would say that neglect in terms of financial support and policy initiatives was evident. Pollok is greatly under resourced compared to Drumchapel, Castlemilk and Easterhouse the other big three peripheral estates in Glasgow"

(Interview with Councillor Tommy Sheridan, November 1998).

What is interesting to note from the above quotes by local politicians is they both believed that ‘Greater Pollok’ has not received its fair share of resources in comparison to other disadvantaged areas in Glasgow over a number of years. Monies and policy initiatives have not been forthcoming to ‘Greater Pollok’ as they have to other deprived areas of
Glasgow e.g. Castlemilk and Easterhouse.

During research interviews Stuart Patrick (GDA) acknowledged that the GDA have not put into the ‘Greater Pollok’ area the scale of resources that other peripheral estates have received.

"I can’t deny we have not had a strong as focus on Pollok as we have had on Castlemilk, Easterhouse or Drumchapel. In the case of Pollok we had too many needs. Our resources were stretched and we could not prioritise every area”.

(Interview with Stuart Patrick, Senior Executive GDA, 1999)

Pressed further to explain why other areas were prioritised over Pollok Stuart Patrick said:

"Pollok sat there kind of in the middle. It was not viewed on the one hand as a clear peripheral estate in the way Castlemilk or Easterhouse was. Neither was it viewed as inner city estate containing basic industry which you had a real chance to use, which may help reduce unemployment. It did not appear to offer the same opportunities as other areas. In this sense Pollok was clearly the loser”.

(Interview with Stuart Patrick, Senior Executive GDA, 1999)
Patrick indicates that given the many demands on GDA resources some areas were bound to lose out. The GDA viewed Pollok as not being able to offer the same development opportunities as other areas of the city. While it may not have been intentional not to prioritise Pollok the effect was the same; the area lost out in terms of resource allocation.

During further discussions Councillor Sheridan described ‘Greater Pollok’ as the forgotten peripheral estate:

"the area had certainly lost out in terms of initiatives. No doubt about that. This had been made worse as we are trying to catch up at a time when there is nothing left in the pot. Castlemilk, Drumchapel and Easterhouse have all had initiatives whereas Pollok has not. Pollok in my opinion has been forgotten and neglected". 

(Interview with Councillor Tommy Sheridan, November 1998).

Councillor Sheridan was then asked if GCC would admit and acknowledge this neglect. He thought it an unlikely prospect:

“I would personally love them to do so. I would have so much more respect for local Councillors if they were prepared to stand up and say we didn’t operate as skillfully and as effectively as our counterparts in those other areas. But they won’t”.

(Interview with Councillor Tommy Sheridan, November 1998).
Further, responding to why the area had not received fair treatment Councillor Sheridan argued that local politicians had failed to articulate the case for ‘Greater Pollok’. In effect, he was supporting Iain Davidson’s claim that the area had been poorly and ineffectively represented over a number of years:

“that it has had not because....I’ve got to say it....it has not had the same advocacy that these other areas have had and I just feel in my heart of hearts that the group of Pollok Councillors (and MPs) over the years haven’t operated as a group of Pollok Councillors. They have been very sectional, they have not put the Greater Pollok area first and therefore they have not delivered. In my opinion they have failed crucially in their responsibilities. I would lay the blame firstly on Central Government. Second blame would be local elected members because they are the ones that are supposed to be advocates for the area. Third blame has got to be bodies such as GDA and GCC”.

(Interview with Councillor Tommy Sheridan, November 1998)

Councillor O’Rourke shared Councillor Sheridan’s and MP Iain Davidson’s views that ‘Greater Pollok’ had been neglected. He suggested that the decline and neglect stretched back at least twenty years. In this context it is important to remember that previous decisions taken by the local council and the private sector are not without significance.
Councillor O’Rourke also acknowledged that local elected officials had failed the ‘Greater Pollok’ area:

“there had been a failure of local politicians to carry out their public responsibilities. It is their duty to strive to come together for the benefit of the area, which has suffered neglect”.

(Interview with Councillor O’Rourke, GCC, October 1998).

Continuing on this theme Councillor O’Rourke commented on the failure of local elected officials to cooperate, leading to their easy marginalisation within the council, as an important factor in explaining neglect:

“Greater Pollok politicians had been marginalised in the council. Power lay in other parts of the city other than Pollok. Greater Pollok had no councillor in a prominent political position within the council who could wield influence over major decisions. Local politicians could and should do more for Greater Pollok. This marginalisation within the council was also compounded by the fragmented nature of politics within Greater Pollok. There is little in the way, if any, of cooperation between Councillors within the Greater Pollok area”.

(Interview with Councillor O’Rourke, GCC, October 1998).
It is of interest to note that three locally elected politicians openly acknowledged that they had failed to adequately represent the local electorate to the best of their ability. They were willing to take individual and collective responsibility for ineffective representation of the needs and demands of their local electorate.

However, another local elected councillor (Councillor Timoney) for the ‘Greater Pollok’ area took a very different view of the neglect and decline of the area, while he was prepared to cite monetary concerns as a key issue, he was not willing to accept personal or collective councillor responsibility. In his opinion there was simply not enough resources to go around and meet all of Glasgow’s needs:

“well I wouldn’t have said that you know, I think it goes back to a question of finance. I mean there are so many things that we could do if we had the resources and what you have got to remember in any democracy is that there is only a limited slice of the cake the council can break up. Now if that is limited then clearly what the council’s have got to do is exercise priorities and if by exercising priorities in specific areas whether it is mine as a constituency Councillor or whether it is somebody else over the other side of the city that doesn’t get enough then it is no reflection on the local councillor. It is maybe just a
reflection on the amount of money that is available”
(Interview with Councillor Timoney, GCC, December 1998).

A number of local urban gatekeepers also shared similar views to the elected officials interviewed regarding the neglect and decline of ‘Greater Pollok’. The quotes below are typical of the views which they expressed:

“there is evidence that this area has not benefited from the urban programme in the past. There is evidence that it has not benefited from lottery applications and it is probably fairly low on the list and whether that is down to the lack of community structures in the area which I think is probably the case or less a lack of drive perhaps on the part of the staff working in policy groups to promote the area I couldn’t say. But I think yes there is a recognition that Greater Pollok is an area that has been disadvantaged down the years and has had a lower priority than some of the other peripheral housing estates in the city”.
(Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, June 1999)

“it is certainly my view that Pollok doesn’t yet get a fair part of the cake. Ask GDA how much of their money goes into Pollok and how much goes into other areas. Now I am pretty confident that not a lot of their money goes into Pollok. GDA do not really have an excuse. They
should be allocating their resources to the areas of greatest need or greatest potential and as I say in both cases I think Pollok should be top of their list. As for the GCC, they too have failed to give Pollok their fair share of resources. I think it has possibly been political. It is as simple as that. I have worked in Easterhouse and Castlemilk and know the kind of resources that go into those areas and Pollok has not received the investment they have’.

(John Jenkins, Senior Policy Officer, Scottish Homes and Member of GP SIP Board, December 1998)

The two quotes above clearly indicate that in the policy officer’s opinion ‘Greater Pollok’ had not received fair and adequate attention to address the considerable problems the area has experienced over a number of years. They also concur with the views of the local elected politicians with regards to the failure of various institutions (both elected and unelected) to properly and successfully articulate the case for policies and resources to tackle the problems of the area. Clearly from either position, both local politicians and local policy officers agreed that ‘Greater Pollok’ was long overdue policy attention.

When asked to explain the importance of local politics in Glasgow and the effects on decision making, Iain Davidson MP highlighted how some
politicians had more power and influence than others. He also shared Councillor O’Rourke’s view which pointed towards a lack of cohesion among local representatives which has weakened the case for ‘Greater Pollok’:

“this area (‘Greater Pollok’) has got no sense of collective belonging. I mean that the political representatives from this area as far as I can see do not seem to have operated as a group in the way that say the Councillors in Maryhill had, and lacks the cohesion of say Drumchapel or Easterhouse (two other of Glasgow’s peripheral estates) which are more readily recognisable. Castlemilk was largely the domain of Pat Lally who used his influence and power as (former) leader of the council and provost of the city of Glasgow to promote this area. The Greater Pollok area has none of this and we have seen the results of a failure of elected representatives to pull together. I think local elected representatives are increasingly becoming aware of the opportunities that we have missed”.

(Interview with Councillor O’Rourke, GCC, October 1998).

When asked who was responsible for the neglect and decline of ‘Greater Pollok’ local MP Iain Davidson took a broader perspective than Councillor Timoney, stressing the importance of social class, and the lack of interest shown by local representatives in tackling the problems
of the area:

“There was no single bad guy. There is no one person or action and all the rest of it that is responsible. The People in Pollok are all working class and are overwhelmingly less articulate that some other parts of the city of Glasgow, and certainly some other parts of society. Because they have not been presenting their voice coherently and forcefully they have been neglected. But the local officials (both elected and unelected) have also failed to properly represent the people and this area”.

(Interview with Iain Davidson Greater Pollok MP, February 1999).

Furthermore, the role of local policy makers (e.g. GCC, GDA, Scottish Homes, etc) was also stressed by Iain Davidson MP who argued in that if a problem (e.g. poor housing) wasn’t clearly highlighted, even if it was apparent, it was ignored or neglected by the aforementioned agencies:

“Many of the officials adopted a sort of containment strategy, you know they were feart (afraid) to deal with problems as and when they were presented and that it wasn’t their job and so forth. I think that a lot of local government service was very intensely reactive and it was all about presenting problems as a sort of doctor’s surgery, you know that if you turned up you got served and if you you didn’t you lost out.
I think that because this community again was less articulate and less complaining it was easy to ignore and neglect this area. I mean that there are things going on in here (unemployment, crime, drugs and vandalism) all the time that would not be tolerated for a moment in Bearsden and Eastwood (middle-class areas of Glasgow) because people would be onto the police and the police would probably be quick to respond. The people from middle-class areas are more articulate and coherent and are not so easily ignored”.

(Interview with Iain Davidson MP, 12 February 1999).

**Conclusions**

This chapter sought to analyse the main issues surrounding the governance of the ‘Greater Pollok’ peripheral estate. This chapter has demonstrated that local politics has played a significant role in the neglect and decline of the area. Power lies in areas other than ‘Greater Pollok’. Those councillors who determined the city’s priorities did not represent ‘Greater Pollok’. This coupled with ineffective and disparate local councillors meant that ‘Greater Pollok’ has been poorly represented at a political level. Scottish Socialist Party leader, MSP and local councillor Tommy Sheridan has also been conveniently used as a means to justify political bias against ‘Greater Pollok’.

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The public and private sector have both failed the residents of this area. The private sector has in general viewed ‘Greater Pollok’ as too risky an area for large-scale investment. Capital accumulation, the capitalist imperative cannot be guaranteed. The public sector on the other hand would be expected to at least provide an adequate level of services (including housing, health and education) for social reproduction. In this sense the failure to adequately plan and resource peripheral estates stands in stark contrast to the long-term strategic focus applied to the Scottish new towns programme.

The demise of Glasgow socially and economically is reflected in the neglect and decline of Glasgow’s peripheral estates and in particular ‘Greater Pollok’. It seems incredible that this disadvantaged area which has experienced severe problems for more than 20 years has not been subjected to any of the large-scale urban regeneration projects implemented within Glasgow in the last 30 years. This, though, may be about to change with the designation of ‘Greater Pollok’ as a SIP area (April 1999), which is discussed in depth in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND LIFE IN 'GREATER POLLOK'

Introduction
This chapter aims to analyse the effectiveness of the adoption of social inclusion policies in addressing the problems of 'Greater Pollok' a disadvantaged neighbourhood in Glasgow. It was demonstrated in chapters five and six that the pursuit of urban entrepreneuerial policies in Glasgow was detrimental to areas like 'Greater Pollok'. So much so that within disadvantaged neighbourhoods poverty, inequality and exclusion have all increased in recent years (see Mooney and Johnstone, 2000). Thus, discussion in this chapter will focus upon the emergence of New Labour's social inclusion policies and to examine how, in their early stages, these policies are being applied to the 'Greater Pollok' area.

Chapter seven, then, will examine broad aspects of social exclusion in 'Greater Pollok', this will include seeking the views and opinions of a 'sample' of citizens who have experience of living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood. This task was achieved by use of five focus group discussions. Chapter two discussed in detail the emergence of New Labour's social inclusion agenda from an urban policy context,
However this chapter draws upon this information to discuss the significance of these policies for ‘Greater Pollok’, which was designated a SIP area on the 1st of April 1999.

Including ‘Greater Pollok’: Getting on the Social Inclusion Train

“Social inclusion relates to those citizens who are excluded from participating in mainstream society by virtue of their lack of employment or low wages, illness or sickness, homelessness or poor accommodation”

(Social Exclusion Unit, 1998a).

An announcement in Glasgow’s Easterhouse peripheral estate on Friday the 13th of November 1998, by the Prime Minister Tony Blair signalled New Labour’s agenda for disadvantaged communities in Scotland. New Labour claims that their strategies and policies for tackling exclusion and poverty places more emphasises upon prevention than cure. While this is to be welcomed it will, however, require a long-term commitment towards the poor and disadvantaged. Does the political will exist to sustain a long-term commitment to addressing poverty and exclusion? Given contemporary governments short-term priority for re-election this commitment is questionable.
An important point often forgotten is that the poor are generally excluded from debates about the poverty they experience. As Beresford and Green (1996) point out, the Social Justice Commission and the 1995 Rowntree Inquiry into Income and Wealth failed to include poorer people in their investigating teams. During semi-structured interviews for this research the then SO also acknowledged that they had failed to include any poor people when setting up a number of policy working groups and forums to look at the nature of social exclusion. Importantly, these policy working groups set the policy context and the agenda from which emerged the Scottish SIP initiative. The significance of this is clear given that the rhetoric of New Labours’ social inclusion policies claim to put the community at the heart of policy making. For example, a SO report Social Inclusion: Opening the Door to a Better Scotland (1999:49) states that:

“one of the reasons that single issue approaches fail is that they are conceived by those responsible for a single function as a solution to problems which are multi-dimensional. Often the only people who understand all those dimensions are those who experience them - the excluded community. For this reason it is essential that communities are placed at the heart of decision-making about initiatives being designed for their benefit”.

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Further, while the rhetoric of SIPs claims that they *are* different from the most recent (Conservative) government ‘urban policies’ i.e. PPA policies and the New Life for Urban Scotland Partnership initiative, closer inspection reveals many aspects of *continuity* exist. For example, while *SIPs* argued that “there is a need to involve communities in the decisions that affect them, and to support them to take on ever greater responsibility for taking those decisions themselves” (Scottish Office, 1999:6), this is not too dissimilar from *New Life* which argued that: “plans for the regeneration of problem areas must have the full understanding, involvement and commitment of the local community” (Scottish Office, 1988:9).

Moreover, during semi-structured interviews for this research with two urban academics (Andrew McArthur and Gerry Stoker) it was suggested that while on the surface SIPs appear to be less ideological driven than previous ‘urban policies’, closer inspection is more revealing. Both academics argued that while New Labour’s approach has recognised the importance of need and social criteria when allocating resources, they have not thrown out all of the ideology of competition and ‘value for money’ culture which so characterised previous Conservative urban regeneration policies.
Disadvantaged areas in Scotland were invited to bid for SIP funding, through the SO. In Glasgow bids from deprived communities were coordinated by the GA. The GA set down the strategic framework within which all SIPs in Glasgow must operate. Initially, three areas were taken out of the competitive bidding process namely Drumchapel and ‘Greater Pollok’ in Glasgow and Blantyre/North Hamilton in South Lanarkshire. Although the three aforementioned areas were taken out of the bidding process they still had to submit a social inclusion plan by the 12th February 1999 - only two months after the initiative was announced. Final approval lay with the SO who would scrutinise the SIP plans using criteria that they had laid down. Thus, the GP SIP still had a few hurdles to clear and a few hoops to jump through before they were given final SO approval. In these three areas interim Partnership Boards were established. Membership of the ‘Greater Pollok’ interim Board was decided by the GA and the SO. The local MP Iain Davidson initially took the chair with three local councillors representing GCC. Also represented were GDA, Scottish Homes, Greater Glasgow Health Board, Horizons (a local project proving training places and assistance into work) and the GA. The people of ‘Greater Pollok’ were represented at Board level by five volunteer representatives (four of these five people were identified by the GA as ‘active’ in the community - although to what extent they were representative of the community was more
It was envisaged that through time a member of the private sector would also join the Board. It was intended that the interim Board would stay in place until the local community had developed its own electoral process to select community representation (Greater Pollok SIP Consultation Document, 1999b). This was not achieved until late summer some five months after the formal designation of the GP SIP.

This is important given that the SIPs claim to put community involvement, as discussed above, at the centre of their agenda. This issue was raised during semi-structured interviews with Ms Daly the GP SIP manager who acknowledged the limitations of the first SIP Implementation Plan which failed to adequately consult with the local community and to let them set the agenda:

"the mechanisms to get the partnership up and running were put into place before the community were given the opportunity to be consulted. There was not any choice for the area because of the structures that were seriously lacking and the tight time scales that were set down for the SIP implementation plan by the SO".

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, 1999)
When pressed further on community involvement and who was setting the policy priorities for the area Ms Daly said:

"I certainly have over the last few weeks consistently said yes we recognise the SIP bid (to the SO) was developed by a group of local policy officers. Yes, we recognise that the implementation plan was developed in the same way albeit it was said to the local community that they would be consulted from now on and they turned on that. My fear is that the SO having said that the SIPs have to place the community at the heart and then they put mechanisms in place and make it very difficult for communities like Greater Pollok to make this criteria work".

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, 1999)

The SO bidding process was flawed from the beginning. The community were not given adequate opportunity to become involved at any level in the early stages of working-up the 'Greater Pollok' social inclusion plan which had to be submitted under the tight time constraints laid down by the SO. Similar criticism was levelled at the New Life for Urban Scotland initiative launched by the SO in 1988 (see Collins, 1999).

The GP SIP Manager continued by saying that the bidding process was far from inclusive:
"the whole sort of expression of interest process and then follow up was ridiculous. The expression of interest was for November and the interim Board had to have the full bid in by the early February. You are talking about the Christmas break in the middle. How on earth do you organise community consultation in that time to allow you to write a bid document. It is not the sort of thing that you sit down and dash off in an hour. There is a fair amount of intensive work that goes in to such a document. So the time scale the SO set us meant that we could not meet one of the key principles: community consultation......we are trying to make the process now more inclusive as possible, having recognised that the process we have gone through to date has been a bit on the exclusive side”.

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, June 1999)

As GP SIP manager indicates in the above quote the tight deadlines set-down by the SO made community consultation and involvement virtually impossible. The partnership manager readily conceded the failure to engage the local community in decision making and saw this as something that had to be rectified. Thus, the failure to properly involve the local community in decision making meant that in reality the development of the GP SIP agenda was an exclusive process. The policy agenda was set by local policy officers (coordinated by the GA)
and local politicians in conjunction with the SO thus one of the key criteria of social inclusion: community involvement was ignored.

According to one of the interim community representatives interviewed the whole consultation process was inadequate. A strong emphasis was placed on aspects related to tokenism. Unease at the way the process had emerged and evolved was voiced:

"we kept being told that they (the GP SIP) want community participation and community involvement. But all they are offering is lip service. They are looking for five monkeys who will just sit there and nod their heads. You need monkeys who are sitting there who don't have a clue what is happening. They then keep their mouths shut and things just get rubber stamped".

(Interview with Community Representative Interim GP SIP Board, June 1999)

Given the lack of community consultation and participation in the emerging social inclusion agenda it was no surprise that local criticism would be levelled at the GP SIP. The partnership manager dually acknowledged this, while also accepting that local public criticism was justified:

"the local community had been critical of what has emerged. You
(researcher) may have heard some of it at the SIP Board meeting on the implementation plan but very certainly there has been criticism. I think we all stand and put our hands up and say the community are right, we can't argue against it”.

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, June 1999)

Further, a report to the Interim Board also acknowledged the failure to properly consult and engage with local people on the GP SIP priorities. Citing the incredibly tight time scales as dictated by the SO as one of the main barriers towards a more inclusive process. The Board accepted that it had failed in its responsibilities and that it would need to address this failure:

"the timescale available for the development of the bid for SIP status for Greater Pollok was such that no meaningful involvement of the local community in the identification of priorities took place. There is a need to address this lack of community involvement" (GP SIP Consultation Document, 1999b:1).

Finally, a local policy officer admitted during interview discussion that the half day Community Conferences which were held on 29th of January and the 28th of February 1999 were used more as legitimation exercises for the SO bid document, than as vehicles to consult and
inform the local people of the intentions of the GP SIP. This was partly backed up by a SO civil servant who stated that “the SIP bid documents have to show evidence of community involvement, one of the key criteria which must be met if bids are to be successful” (interview with Christie Smith, SO, December 1998). Clearly, the formulaic bid-process as set out by the SO had compromised the real qualitative choices of the local community. A similar process occurred in the development of the Implementation Plan where again time scales precluded involvement of local groups and organisations in the process.

The community were effectively absent in the early, crucial agenda setting, stages of the GP SIP. This resulted in tension, mistrust and suspicion developing between the local community and the GP SIP. This was demonstrated during two community conferences held to publicise the intentions of the GP SIP. Thus, although the community may have been invited to attend the Community Conferences the agenda had been set prior to these by the interim GP SIP Board and the SO. Despite the pretensions that the views of the local community mattered, they were in effect being used at the conferences to ‘rubber stamp’ the Greater Pollok interim Board’s bid document to the SO. The community were unaware that this was happening (Focus Group Discussions, 1999). In such circumstances it is possible that local communities
could become suspicious and mistrusting of decision makers.

While the language of New Labour’s social inclusion policies spoke of ‘partnership’, in this case, it was clearly not an equal partnership. Thus, despite New Labour’s claims to establish a new context for urban regeneration and a new framework of social relations the application of the SIPs appeared to make many of the same mistakes that previous urban regeneration initiatives had made (Cambridge Economic Consultants, 1999). It is most noticeable that existing power structures and decision making did not change. Power still emphatically lay with the SO and policy officers, not the local community. Arguably, the initial community representatives (undemocratically elected) who sat on the Interim Partnership Board were being used to legitimise the whole GP SIP exercise.

Collins (1999) has demonstrated similar findings, in Ferguslie Park (Paisley) a New Life Partnership Area, where the failure of community participation led to tensions and conflict between local people and the SO. Despite academic research (Collins, 1999) and SO evaluation (Cambridge Economic Consultants, 1999) it would appear that the right lessons have not been learnt from past regeneration initiatives. In sum, local communities are still not properly consulted and able to
participate with regards to policy formulation. Further, where they do participate and become involved in urban regeneration programmes they do so unequally, and are often used to legitimise the whole regeneration process (McCarthy, 1997; Collins, 1999). Hence while local people are invited to get involved in SIPs they do so on very unequal terms. For example, those community representatives who were invited to sit on the GP SIP Interim Board were clearly less powerful than institutional partners who have control over resources. Thus, as McCarthy (1997:21) argues; “while Scottish Urban Partnerships appear inclusive, this inclusiveness does not involve the effective dispersal of power and influence to local communities”. As a result partnerships can disempower and exclude those who are intended to be included.

**Designation of ‘Greater Pollok’ as a Social Inclusion Partnership Area**

The designation of ‘Greater Pollok’ as a SIP was in part recognition of the neglect and decline experienced by this area over a number of years (acknowledged during interviews with Andrew Fyfe, Director of GA, 1998 and Civil Servants, SO, 1998/99). In fact the then GRA stated that:

“Greater Pollok is one of eight priority areas within the City that
are characterised by the most severe concentration of disadvantage” [their emphasis] (GRA, 1993).

Councillor and MSP Tommy Sheridan reacted more strongly to the designation of ‘Greater Pollok’ as a SIP area. In his opinion various agencies and bodies (including the SO) had finally acknowledged the problems of this disadvantaged area and that it was now time to address these problems:

“I think the SO have been embarrassed into recognising that Greater Pollok has been ignored for so long now that they had to do something. They are acknowledging that for too long Pollok has been neglected in terms of major regeneration monies and therefore when it came to the SIP bids Pollok had to be accepted because to ignore it again would have been an absolute crime never mind a dereliction of duty”.  
(Interviews with Councillor Tommy Sheridan, 1998/99)

While there has been a great deal of publicity surrounding SIPs on closer examination very little ‘new’ money is being made available to SIP areas. For example, in ‘Greater Pollok’ over a three year period (1999-2002) only £7m will be made available. It is claimed that SIP status is more important than the money directly allocated to each SIP (GP SIP Strategy, 1999a:1). SIPs envisage that each of the main social
inclusion partners will bend existing mainstream budgets to the needs of each SIP area. In this sense SIPs display strong elements of continuity with the New Life for Urban Scotland Partnership Programme (Scottish Office, 1988) and the PPA initiative which also relied upon existing agencies bending their mainstream budgets. Of course, whether agencies do and in the scale needed to address the problems of ‘Greater Pollok’ is more debatable. This point was acknowledged by the GP SIP manager:

"I recognise that there is a difficulty in bending mainstream spending because we have got eight SIP areas in Glasgow who are all governed by the same principle and you have got to question how often you can bend a mainstream”.

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, June 1999)

The GP SIP manager expressed hope that the area would receive its fair share of resources given past neglect of the area:

"all agencies have to look closely at what they have been doing in this area over the last fifteen years and look at the problems that we have got and the lack of services and facilities that we have got and address them”.

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, June 1999)
Even by late 1999 (six months after the GP SIP had been set up) complete commitment was yet to be received from the various agencies which make up the partnership. The issue revolved around the extent that they would bend their mainstream budgets towards the ‘Greater Pollok’ area:

“total commitment is still to be had with a lot of agencies. I have started the process of discussion. I’ve certainly got the recognition and the hands up from some agencies who have said yes you are right okay we need to do more in the area so let’s talk about it. That doesn’t necessarily mean that I have got total commitment that they are going to do it......”.

“......in the past agencies have signed up to documents as a token exercise. The new SIPs are saying that token exercises are over this is a real commitment and we want to see it backed up by real action”.

(Interview with Margaret Daly, GP SIP Manager, June 1999)

As indicated in the above quotes all of the partnership agencies must fully commit themselves to allocating appropriate resources to address the severe problems of this disadvantaged community. The partnership manager indicated that if the players who make up the GP SIP do not deliver on the commitments that they had made then they would have to be made to do so. She suggested that the GP SIP Board itself should
be able to put pressure on the partners to deliver. Further, she argued that if necessary, the GA would be called upon to use its power and influence on the partnership players who were not fully committed. The partnership manager did not outline in any detail the sanctions that would be implemented if the partners did not bend their spending in line with local needs. The need for the GP SIP to deliver on what it has promised will be crucial in terms of how the community responds. Given that the local community has, to date, been inadequately consulted and given few opportunities to participate in decision making, then any failure or underachievement could generate more mistrust, suspicion and cynicism of the GP SIP. Ultimately, conflict may be unavoidable between the local community and GP SIP, as has occurred within previous partnership regeneration areas (see Collins, 1999). The next section will seek to explore community experiences of living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood.

Vision and Reality: Focus Group Discussions on Social Inclusion and Life in ‘Greater Pollok’

In keeping with the spirit of the times the GP SIP Board sought to promote their vision of a ‘New Greater Pollok’. Whether or not this coincided with the aspirations and views of local people is more questionable. Focus group discussions in ‘Greater Pollok’ revealed that
not one person had any knowledge of the GP SIP vision. One person commented (from the Women with Children focus group) that, although some of the aspects of the vision might find support among local people why were local people not setting the vision agenda?

The GP SIP Board claim that their vision is to be achieved through concentrating on five major policy themes: Community Capacity Building and Empowerment, Employment and Training, Childcare, Education and Health (GP SIP Strategy, 1999a:2). Interestingly, crime and safety issues were not seen as a priority by the GP SIP. However, these issues were highlighted by more than a three-quarters of those who attended the focus group meetings as important concerns to the area. However, it is interesting to note that the GP SIP vision statement (see below) and the aforementioned five key policy themes were identified and generated by the SO in conjunction with local policy officers, and not by local people (interviews with SO Civil Servants and GCC Policy Officers and local focus groups, 1998/99):

"to ensure the development of Greater Pollok as a sustainable suburb whose people enjoy a good quality of life with access to training and employment opportunities and high quality health, housing, education shopping and leisure"

(Vision Statement, Greater Pollok SIP Strategy, 1999a).
During focus group discussions a member of the Women with Children group said:

"the GP SIP never asked what we wanted. As in the past you just get what you get. I am not confident that anything will change. They have managed to ignore us for so long, they could keep doing it".

(Women with Children Focus Group Discussions, Greater Pollok 1999)

Another women from the same focus group placed much emphasis on her experience of exclusion both in a physical and social sense. Her physical isolation in a boarded-up and run-down housing estate was compounded by her social isolation due to her need to care for her children. She rarely left the house and had experienced some depression and illness:

"I am stuck in this depressed and run-down estate, with no job and three children to look after. I am a single parent and cannot afford to work at the moment. My life revolves around my children. I rarely get out to see friends or family. I feel isolated and alone. I often get depressed".

(Women with Children Focus Group Discussions, Greater Pollok 1999)

Similarly, a number of participants from the Elderly focus group also emphasised their physical and social exclusion from local community
life. As one participant put it:

"I am in a wheel chair and this restricts my mobility. I only really get out when I have someone to take me out. I would never go out on my own. I don't feel confident on my own. The streets are not safe. The threat and fear of crime in this area puts people off from going out more than they should. Sometimes I feel like a prisoner in my own home. Have these people (decision makers) asked us about this. No they have not".

(Elderly Focus Group Discussions, Greater Pollok 1999)

Another participant from the same focus group also highlighted crime, safety, security and the area’s drug problem. These according to this participant led her to restrict her mobility at specific times of the day and towards specific spaces. These problems had, in her opinion, become more severe over time:

"there are some parts of Pollok that I would just not visit, especially at certain times of the day. In some areas I just don't feel safe. Things are getting worse not better. At our age it is sad and depressing. But I fear more for the young people of this area. What is the future going to be like for them"?

(Elderly Focus Group Discussions, Greater Pollok 1999)
Further, during focus group discussion with young adults aged 16-17, it became clear that the majority of them had experienced a large degree of exclusion from many aspects of life in 'Greater Pollok'. Young people interviewed in this research felt marginalised and that they were for the most part ignored. They were not of voting age and had few people who spoke up for their views and opinions. The quotes below were typical of the Youth Focus Group’s response:

Young People: “we are powerless and you need power to get a say in anything”.

Interviewer: What do you mean, can you explain this a little further?

Young People: “no one listens to us, we are easy to ignore. No-one really cares what we say or think. Politicians, the city council, our family, our schools don’t care, they all don’t care. They do what they want to do anyway, whatever we say”.

(Youth Focus Group, Bellarmine Secondary School, June 1999)

Wider issues of youth exclusion were raised during focus group discussion. The young people argued that there was little for them to do in Greater Pollok in their spare time which did not involve travel or money or both:

“there is nowhere to go in the evenings, people just walk about or hang about the street corners. Then we usually get moved on by the police.”
If you have little money what else can you do?
(Youth Focus Group, Bellarmine Secondary School, 1999).

This partly relates to the lack of provision of facilities in ‘Greater Pollok’ and partly to the youth in the area’s lack of financial resources. In such circumstances it is easy for young people to become bored and frustrated. Some individuals may become involved in criminal activities while others will feel alienated from a society which appears not to care for them. This feeling of youth exclusion should be of major concern to decision makers and those who want to promote a culture of inclusion; the youth of today are the adult citizens of tomorrow.

An example of a lack of faith in decision makers was demonstrated when one of the young participants said that he had spoken to his local councillor with the view of repairing a (public) basketball hoop. The councillor said that he would see to it and that it would soon be repaired. Some time after their initial approach the young person attempted to contact his councillor by letter, again the councillor failed to respond to his request. This event took place four years ago and it is still not repaired. In this kind of situation it is possible to see how mistrust develops. The findings of this research support the findings of Garratt et al, (1997) who argued that young people are
easily marginalised and lose faith and trust in decision makers who fail to treat their views seriously and engage with them properly.

All of this is further evidence that while the rhetoric of social inclusion policies claim to put the community at the heart of decision making the reality is that local people are still excluded from key decisions which effect their lives. Moreover, it also highlights a contradiction in New Labour’s thinking. Thus, while on the one hand New Labour say they want to decentralise and involve local communities in decision making in reality they still want to retain central control. There appears little difference from previous partnership arrangements (e.g. New Life and PPAs, both of which were very heavily centrally controlled) where devolution of power either to the partnerships themselves or to the local communities did not occur (Hastings, 1996). Clearly, New Labour do not trust the poor to set local agendas and to run programmes in their own areas.

Colenutt and Cutten (1994) argue that contemporary use of the phrase ‘community’ in urban policy has more to do with the political and financial objectives of government than it has for improving cities. They further argue that “by involving the community, government can legitimise its national policies and by localising and internalising these
problems firmly within the context of the community, it rids the
government of responsibility for them” (Colenutt and Cutten,
1994:239). Others (e.g. Duffy and Hutchison, 1997) are sceptical and
pessimistic about what they call the turn to community. The
fragmentation and disintegration of community coupled with the rise
in poverty and exclusion make the task of involving the
‘community’ incredibly difficult. It is difficult, therefore, not to
disagree with Duffy and Hutchison (1997:359) when they say “just as
with earlier waves of urban policy, the experiment with ‘community’ is
as likely to end in perceptions of failure”.

Robinson and Shaw (1995) are more optimistic about involving
community participation in the process of urban regeneration claiming
that the benefits can be enormous. They argue that “above all else
community participation seems the only way to ensure that
regeneration is relevant to meeting local needs” (Robinson and Shaw,
1995:71). While the potential benefits of community involvement may
be enormous it is also fraught with problems. The idea of community
itself may be misleading. As chapter six of this research has
demonstrated, not one homogeneous ‘Greater Pollok’ with one shared
set of interests and a consensus view exists. In reality, there are many
‘communities of interest’ with differing views and opinions. It is also
important to ask who participates and why they participate. While there are always people who want to get involved there are also many people who take little or no part in community affairs and politics. Robinson and Shaw (1995:71) point out how this creates problems, in that community participation often means that “some groups are able to exert disproportionate influence while others (notable women, ethnic minorities, the unemployed) are almost ignored”. All of this indicates that genuine community involvement is not easy, something that has been acknowledged by the GP SIP. In this context, maybe the best that the GP SIP can do is to ensure that different groups’ aspirations don’t get in one another’s way.

During focus group discussions participants identified a number of priorities that they thought would improve their life in ‘Greater Pollok’. It is interesting to note that while they may support some of the aims and objectives of the GP SIP, such as education, employment and training, as well as the need to improve childcare and health, they also highlighted other issues that should be addressed. In particular, inadequate housing was identified by all of the focus groups as a serious problem in need of attention. The quotes below were typical of the feelings concerning the poor quality of housing in ‘Greater Pollok’:

“I would like to see the GP SIP do something about the poor quality of
housing in this area. The amount of boarded up houses are a scandal given the high levels of homelessness in Glasgow”.

(Focus Group Discussions, Greater Pollok, 1999)

Further, the relevance of having a SIP was questioned especially if it was not willing to address the local ‘housing crisis’:

“What is the point in having a SIP that does not tackle the appalling housing we have to put up with each day. The agencies that should do something have failed in their responsibilities. So why shouldn’t the SIP play a role in improving housing?”

(Focus Group Discussions, Greater Pollok, 1999)

Indeed, it came as somewhat of a surprise to all of the focus groups that house improvements was not one of the five key themes of the GP SIP. The SIP Board stated that existing agencies (e.g. Scottish Homes, GCC and locally based housing associations), who have a remit to do so, should address the housing problems of the area (Interview with GP SIP Board Members, 1999).

Another important concern raised by a number of focus group participants related to the issue of limited choice and poor quality of shopping facilities found locally. While the Pollok Centre is located in
the heart of Pollok, the choice of shops on offer is limited and of low-order. The shopping centre built in the 1970s is in urgent need of redevelopment, a fact which has been recognised by both the GCC and the GP SIP Board. Despite the opening of a Sainsbury’s supermarket in 1997 and an expanded B&Q warehouse at Darnley Retail Park, this area is characterised by its failure to attract other retailers. Moreover, this retail park is located on the periphery of Pollok and is not well served by public transport. This has meant that many local people who do not have access to a car have limited access to these retailers. However, while the SIP Board would like to see existing shopping provisions improve, this is not one of the five key themes which the GP SIP will focus on.

Each of the focus groups also discussed the good/bad points about living in ‘Greater Pollok’. On the whole the majority of inhabitants were negative about living in the area. Emphasis was placed upon the problems of ‘Greater Pollok’ such as unemployment, poor quality housing, drug problems and safety/security issues. According to the participants there were few good points about living in ‘Greater Pollok’. With the exception of family and friends, there were few redeeming qualities of living in this area. What became clear through discussion was that family and friends were to some extent negating the worst
aspects of life in ‘Greater Pollok’.

Two of the focus groups (Elderly and Women with Children) overwhelmingly said that their family connections kept them in the area. Participants in the youth focus group took an opposing view. They overwhelmingly said that wanted to leave the area as soon as they possibly could. The identified the lack of employment opportunities and leisure/recreational facilities as key factors in motivating them to consider moving. While all of the focus groups stressed the importance of community, one person who had lived in the area for a long time said ‘that in recent years they had witnessed a decline in community spirit and community cooperation’. The elderly focus group in particular, all of whom had lived in the area for at least 30 years, expressed a sadness and a fear that the area, to quote one participant, “had lost its sense of community and purpose”.

Another participant stressed the problems associated with the increasing number of vacant and subsequently boarded-up properties in the area (Appendix 10). A number of other group members also drew attention to the negative impact this had on the people and the area. Overall, the general feeling was that it was leading to low morale among local people. Another participant spoke of how the area is being
allowed to fall into decline: “look at how many houses are boarded-up and unused. Many of these are now being demolished (e.g. South Nitshill). All of this has led to many people moving out of the area”. The physical decline (Appendix 11) of the area allied to the exodus of so many people in recent years, has led many to feel that what they previously had was slipping away. The quotes below are typical of individual/group responses to good/bad things about living in Greater Pollok:

“I don't really think there are any good things about living in Greater Pollok”.

(Focus Group Discussion Women with Children, 1999)

“The area has so many problems. For example drugs (which is a horrendous problem in this area), crime, unemployment, bad housing, poor quality shopping facilities”.

(Focus Group Men aged 20-50, 1999)

“There are lots of fighting between young people in my area because there is nothing else to do”.

(Youth Focus Group, 1999)
"There is nowhere for the children to play and there never has been".
(Focus Group Men Aged 20-50, 1999)

"There is no where to hang about at night so you need to walk about the streets. This always leads to trouble".
(Youth Focus Group, 1999)

"Your family and friends help to make life more bearable in this area".
(Housing Association Focus Group, 1999)

"You know everybody and just about everybody knows everybody".
(Elderly Focus Group, 1999)

"If I had the money to move from this area tomorrow I would".
(Women with Children Focus Group, 1999)

The above quotes give us some clues as to the different attitudes and concerns between the different focus groups towards life in 'Greater Pollok'. Many of the groups share similar views on certain issues such as the problems of unemployment, crime and drugs. However, it is important to note that experiences and views do differ and this was reflective of age, gender, employment status and location.
Given the general level of dissatisfaction about living in the area, each member of the focus groups were asked the following question: if you had the chance to move from the area would you move, and to where? Just under half of the participants said they would move if they could, with a preference for moving to what are perceived as more desirable areas e.g. Clarkston and Newton Mearns (middle class suburban areas located just outside Glasgow city boundary), while some had a preference to move to the countryside. When asked to explain why these areas were appealing, one young participant said that “Clarkston is quiet and peaceful. You can walk down the road in Clarkston without getting jumped (attacked)”. Other focus group participants (Women with Children) showed a preference for the countryside, as they thought that the “countryside would be a good place to bring up children. In the countryside there is so much space where the children can play in safety. There is also fresh air, and peace and quietness in the countryside, what more could you ask for?”.

Those who said they would move also recognised the reality of their situation, in that, given their lack of financial resources, a move to one of the aforementioned areas was likely to remain no more than a hope. One participant from the Men aged 20-50 focus group summed up the general feelings well when he said, “I would like to move but I have nae
money to move into a better area. So I am just stuck here. I've nae choice". While financial constraints was an important consideration to the majority of participants it was not the only barrier to moving. For example, of those who participated in the Elderly focus group, the feeling was one that they would see out the remaining years of their lives in this area: "at our time of life moving is not such a good idea. There are many problems such as cost and stress. The biggest problem is to leave behind your family and friends who are here. We would have to start all over again. Which is too much at our time of life". This point of leaving family and friends was also mentioned by two other focus groups (Youth and Housing Association) who said that they would not consider moving. Research into migration studies have similarly demonstrated that one of the main reasons why people do not move is because of their local connections especially their family ties (Jones, 1990:200-201). Thus, the ties that bind can be very strong; as demonstrated by over half of the people in these focus groups.

**Local Views of Governance Issues**

Two of the most important issues in urban regeneration are power and accountability. The issue of who governs has long since fascinated political scientists and urban theorists (Hunter, 1953; Dahl, 1961 and Judge et al, 1995). In sum, answers have been sought to the questions
of who really runs the community and what difference does it make to the local quality of life? While chapter two deals directly with the more theoretical issues of governance the next section discusses local views with reference to the governance of Glasgow.

This general theme of ‘who governs’ was discussed with the focus groups who were asked who does the city of Glasgow belong to. The quotes below are typical of those who responded to this question:

“You would like to think it belongs to the people, but I am not naive to realise that it doesn’t”.
(Women with Children Focus Group, 1999)

“We might belong to Glasgow, but we don’t run it”.
(Elderly Focus Group, 1999)

“the city belongs to the people who live in Glasgow”.
(Men 20-50 Focus Group, 1999)

“It does nae belong to us. I don’t know who it belongs to”.
(Youth Focus Group, 1999)
As the quotes above indicate there was no appreciable differences between the groups and their views towards the question of who Glasgow belongs to. In sum, they did not believe that Glasgow belonged to them. Moreover, local people were critical of who they thought was in charge of the city and how, in their opinion, they had neglected ‘Greater Pollok’ and failed to adequately address its problems. They were firmly of the belief that the people who ‘called the shots’ in the city should meet their responsibilities and be accountable to the public. One participant (from the Women with Children focus group) said that “it was the responsibility of both those living in ‘Greater Pollok’, and who is in charge of the area, to work together to improve ‘Greater Pollok’. They should be consulting with the residents and asking them what they think is best for them. But they have never asked us what we want”.

Further, focus group discussions revealed a deep level of mistrust between local people and those who had responsibilities for regeneration. One participant said that trust had completely broken down and that local people have little faith in decision makers to improve the area. This is a common feature in most disadvantaged areas (see Byrne, 1999; Collins, 1999). The discussion then moved on to what decision makers could do to rebuild and restore the trust and
confidence of local people. One person (from the Women with Children focus group) said that “decision makers need to keep their promises. They need to start to do things they say they are going to do and make an effort to do it. They need also to say they can’t do it if they can’t. They also need to say if it hasn’t worked, or if they make a mistake. It shows they are human doesn’t it? I have got respect for people that can do that”. Similarly, those young people interviewed in this research had little hope that their life in general would improve. In a sense a ‘new realism’ has emerged amongst the youth of ‘Greater Pollok’. The failed policy experiments of the past, or more especially in the case of ‘Greater Pollok’, the neglect of the area over a long period of time has had a negative effect on the youth of the area. In short, they are pessimistic about the future and any claims to make things better.

Recent research (see Byrne, 1999) also suggests that local people have increasingly become suspicious and apathetic towards claims by decision makers that they can improve their quality of life. Local communities point to the evidence of neglect and decline in their areas as proof of a legacy of broken promises and past failures. This has resulted in people having low expectations of any ‘new urban policies’. For example, in focus group discussions few people held out any real hope that things would be immeasurably better despite Greater Pollok’s
designation as a SIP area. Local people while welcoming the designation, were also realistic to know that whatever its claims, the GP SIP could not solve all the problems of the area. While the designation of 'Greater Pollok' as a SIP area may have generated a lot of debate (mainly among local policy officers and agencies who will be directly involved in GP SIP), it is questionable how much local people really know what is going on. This research found that despite two community conferences and a relatively high profile marketing and publicity campaign, only 3 out of 40 people interviewed in focus group discussions had heard of the GP SIP. This should be of major concern to those who want to involve local people in decision making as clearly the social inclusion message was being poorly registered. Further, it is worth noting that not one of eight young people who had participated in the discussion had heard of the GP SIP, even though the SIP had been been up and running for four months and had held two public meetings, one of which actually took place in Bellarmine Secondary school from where the focus group was chosen. Possibly more worrying is that the lack of awareness with regards to the SIP may be symbolic of public apathy which surrounds the launch of contemporary regeneration policies. In 'Greater Pollok' apathy should not be underestimated given past neglect of the area.
Conclusions

This chapter has sought to discuss two main issues. First, how in their early stages New Labour's social inclusion policies were being applied to the 'Greater Pollok' area. Secondly, it sought to discuss local community views about their experiences of living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood using focus group discussions.

While it is still too early to properly evaluate New Labour's social inclusion policies some preliminary comments can be made at this stage. This research has demonstrated that the process of community consultation and participation, during the early stages of the GP SIP, was woefully inadequate. At best it was tokenistic, and at worst, local people were being 'exploited' to legitimise the policy process. The policy agenda and priorities for the area were set by the SO and local policy agencies and officers. This has led to a serious growth of mistrust and suspicion on the part of the local community. Even more important the GP SIP has left local people feeling powerless and excluded from decision making which effects them directly. During focus group discussions and public meetings residents expressed the view that they wanted to be in control of deciding priorities which then professionals would pursue on their behalf. Other research (Forest and Kearns, 1999) suggests similar findings, where local people were
unsatisfied with inadequate consultation exercises and sceptical about the ability of regeneration to tackle community priorities. As one focus group participant in ‘Greater Pollok’ put it “they (decision making) hear but they don’t listen”.

The use of focus groups were viewed as a very useful means of ascertaining local views on life in ‘Greater Pollok’. This allowed local people the opportunity to engage in discussion and debate about issues which effected them and the area in which they lived. Indeed, evidence of exclusion was apparent, when a few of the participants remarked that this was the first time that they had ever been asked to express their views on anything. What became clear throughout the focus group discussions and community conferences held by the GP SIP was that local people want to have a say in the decisions which affect them. Residents in general were poorly informed about regeneration activities (so much so that only 3 out of 40 people had heard about the GP SIP, some four months after it was established). The majority interviewed thought that they would have little control over what the GP SIP would do over time. While people welcomed SIP status they had reservations about what it could achieve for the area. Local people expressed the view that given the extent of neglect of the area over such a long period of time, the GP SIP would need to start delivering very quickly.
Finally, while there is a general welcome towards the emergence of a social inclusion agenda which values the contribution of all people to society, a note of caution needs to be sounded. John Veit Wilson (1998:45) has made a very crucial distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of the idea of social exclusion. Thus, he argues that in the ‘weak’ version of this discourse, the solutions lie in altering these excluded people’s handicapping characteristics and enhancing their integration into the dominant society. However, ‘stronger’ forms of this discourse also emphasise the role of those who are doing the excluding and therefore aim for solutions which reduce the powers of exclusion.

New Labour’s current social inclusion policies seem to follow and support the weak discourse, which depoliticises poverty, as a means of tackling social exclusion. Byrne (1999) argues that the way in which the social exclusion agenda has been used in the UK in the late 1990s by New Labour seems to be exactly as a method of closure. Thus, it excludes other potential discourses, in relation to challenges to inequality as a general social issue. In sum, if redistribution of income and wealth and power are not addressed then New Labour’s social inclusion policies may succeed at the rhetorical level but will have failed to reduce growing inequalities. It is worthwhile then asking, who
will have benefited most from New Labour’s social inclusion policies?
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
This study sought to investigate the effectiveness of the ‘new urban governance’ in addressing the problems experienced by disadvantaged communities in a deindustrialised city, namely Glasgow. Further, analysis related to the study of one specific part of the city: ‘Greater Pollok’. Thus, this area was the context in which this research could explore local governance and policy impacts in a disadvantaged neighbourhood. Research took the form of interviewing key urban actors at the city and the local level, while focus group interviews explored local community views and their experiences of living in a disadvantaged community. This conclusion aims to summarise the key research findings of this thesis. It also seeks to inform the debate about city governance by explaining how this is achieved in Glasgow. Finally, it will also indicate and discuss areas in which further research is required.

Glasgow truly is a city in transition. No other city has undergone such rapid and wholesale deindustrialisation (see MacInnes, 1995; Lever and Moore, 1986). The ‘new Glasgow’ has been held up by some as the epitome of the post-industrial city. Beneath the glitz and image of “cultural city”, however, Glasgow has increasingly become a fragmented and divided city. Thus, while the city centre is partly
renewed where private capital flourishes, the peripheral estates and other locations of deprivation are more characterised by widespread poverty, poor housing, ill-health and alienation. Glasgow, as recent research (see Mooney and Johnstone, 2000) has indicated, is the city in Scotland experiencing the most acute poverty. In this context, it should be of no surprise that out of the top thirty most deprived districts in Scotland, twenty-seven are found in Glasgow (Mooney and Johnstone, 2000). The above factors influenced the researcher's decision to select Glasgow as a study area. Moreover, the researcher was also interested in Glasgow as presented as a 'model of urban renewal and place marketing' (see Hall and Hubbard, 1998). Finally, on a more personal level another factor which was significant in this choice of city for this study was the fact that the researcher has lived in and around the Glasgow district and has thus witnessed many of the changes which have occurred over the past thirty years.

Local Policy Makers and the New Urban Governance: The Case of Glasgow

One of the key research questions addressed in this thesis related to identifying the form of the 'new urban governance' adopted by policymakers in Glasgow. While cities may not be 'masters of their own destiny' there is, however, still much scope for the local state to influence the development of their localities. There can be little doubt
that in Glasgow the local state has been instrumental in shaping the city's development trajectory. For example, as this research has demonstrated, the development of urban entrepreneurial policies and the pursuit of the partnership approach to urban regeneration is testament to the role and influence of the local state in shaping the development of contemporary Glasgow. Here the implications of an 'entrepreneurial' form of local governance and the developing nature of local networks or coalitions have been important. At a general level Harvey (1989:4) has identified public-private partnerships as the centre of the new 'urban entrepreneurialism' which has replaced the predominantly 'managerial' form of the 1960s. This new urban entrepreneurialism has intensified inter-urban competition for mobile capital as well as for scarce central government and European funds. Moreover, urban entrepreneurialism is associated with the politics of coalition-building. This research has shown how the local authority in Glasgow has used place marketing strategies as a coalition-building tool. The impetus for partnership working has come in many instances from the local authority. For example, the establishment of the GRA in 1993 was at the initial request of the then Glasgow District Council. While its predecessor the GA has moved towards a more overtly public-private partnership model, the strategic position of GCC in local coalition-building is still important.
The way modern cities are now governed is qualitatively different from than in the past (see Imrie and Raco, 1999). It is now generally recognised that since the early 1980s the dominance of elected local government has given way to a broader local governance (see Valler et al., 2000; Ward, 2000; Imrie and Raco, 1999). However, this research has argued and demonstrated that the governance of Glasgow does not fit neatly into any generally described pattern of urban governance. Thus, supporting claims that the precise nature of local governance can and does vary from place to place, reflecting specific economic, political and cultural contexts (see Ward, 2000; Boyle and Hughes, 1994).

Harvey (1989) has argued that it is more appropriate to talk of governance than government, because real power to reorganise urban life lies outside local government and within a broader coalition forces, in which democratic urban government and administration have only a facilitative role to play. This local governance is broader and more fragmented than conventional local government structures.

The movement towards local governance in Glasgow has led to an emergence of a plethora of organisations as the local authority’s power and resources have been diminished. Local government in Glasgow has now been joined and challenged by agencies such as Enterprise
Glasgow, Scottish Homes, Greater Glasgow Health Board and the GA who all have specific remits related to ‘urban policy’. As a result this has led to the fragmentation of urban policy making and inter-agency conflict which make genuine partnership working more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Thus, despite the rhetoric of partnership working the various urban agencies in Glasgow all too often ‘do their own thing’, often without due policy and financial considerations. The implications for this are clear: a significant amount of time and money is being wasted in the name of ‘urban policy’.

This research has also highlighted how no single agency has sole responsibility for managing urban change in Glasgow. Depressingly, little has changed since the late 1980s when Keating’s (1988) research also found that no one agency had complete responsibility for managing urban change in Glasgow. What is different today compared with a decade ago is that fragmentation of policy has continued to increase not decrease. However, despite the emergence of various urban agencies the local authority is still the key player in the governance of Glasgow. GCC is still overwhelmingly the main spender of public money given its managerialist responsibilities in the provision of services (see Boyle and Hughes, 1994).
This research then supports Imrie and Raco’s (1999) argument that given the significant resource base at the disposal of local government it remains a critical player in the emerging local governance. However, given New Labour’s mistrust of local government and GCC in particular, it is possible that further erosion of local authority power will continue. Further, New Labour’s pursuit of a “third way” political strategy envisages local government becoming more of an ‘enabler’ than as a provider of services. Previous Conservative governments saw politically (and financially) the advantages of by-passing and marginalising local authorities. The emergence of specific quangos (such as Scottish Homes and Scottish Enterprise) over the last ten years was designed by the then SO to promote its own agenda, something that was not thought possible through local authorities. While New Labour promised a ‘Bonfire of the Quangos’, this now looks increasingly unlikely to happen. Even less likely to happen is the return of former local authority powers. In this context the removal from GCC of control over its housing stock should be viewed as further evidence of the continued erosion of its powers and weakening of its pivotal role in urban regeneration.

Moreover, many services and functions that were previously under democratic control have been handed over to unelected quangos. For example, the GA has been charged with developing a “city-wide”
strategy. Much criticism, however, has been levelled at the rise of the so-called 'quango state', this relates specifically to a lack of accountability and abuse of power. Important institutions like the GA are not elected and, therefore, not directly accountable to the local electorate. It is 'free' to make important decisions about the governing of Glasgow which local people have little or no say over (issues highlighted to the researcher during focus group interviews). This research has argued that this reconstituted body was given more power and influence over the way the city is governed is clear evidence that GCC is not in charge or trusted to run the city on its own. The way Glasgow is now governed demonstrates that a reconstituted institutional framework, containing as it does a multitude of urban players, has assumed responsibility for important elements of service provision and policy making on a scale never before experienced.

The shift from local government to local governance in Britain derives in part from the discursive and political construction of the crisis in Fordist capitalism and subsequent 'neo-liberal' state responses, of firstly, Thatcherism and most recently, New Labour. Politically, it began with a neo-liberal hostility towards local government, which was linked to the persistence of an ideological faith in the market, privatisation, competition, deregulation and business involvement in decision making. More recently while a 'new social democratic' Labour
government (1997-) may be less hostile to local government, it is, however, still wedded to much of the previous Conservative governments (1979-97) agenda. Crucially, its faith in markets seems unshakable and it does not trust local government to deliver specific services or to have the lead role in urban regeneration.

In the city of Glasgow, evidence of this lack of faith and trust is witnessed by Scottish Executive plans to rid GCC of its entire housing stock. Plans have gained public acceptance to place regeneration and management of the city council’s housing in the hands of local-based housing associations. In this context, faith is placed in a “third-way” (or third sector) to deliver what the state and the market could not. In return, GCC’s massive housing debt (standing at £1 Billion in the year 2000) will be cancelled by the Scottish Executive. The crux, however, is that GCC is not trusted to regenerate its own dilapidated housing stock.

Furthermore, the city council’s past failings were all to evident to the Scottish Executive. During research interviews, Charlie Gordon (the current leader of GCC), admitted that the council was not trusted by the Scottish Executive. Thus, while the city council is involved in New Labour’s regeneration policies in the city (e.g. “social inclusion partnerships”) this now takes place in a context of a dramatically altered external institutional environment. In this sense, while the city
council is a key player in helping to deliver New Labour's social inclusion policies it is the GA that has *total* control over the SIP strategy within the city.

Within the new local governance literature a key discussion centres around the role and influence of the private sector in local policy making. However, as this research has demonstrated private sector involvement in urban policy decision making in Glasgow is minimal. There are a number of reasons to help explain this. Firstly, there is a lack of generally acknowledged industrial elite within Glasgow. This research support Cooke's (1988:192) earlier findings when he reported that many localities in the UK do not have a strong and politically motivated business class. The public sector has found it difficult to mobilise support from the private sector and this has led to a rather limited engagement of business interests in governing of the 'new Glasgow'. This research, therefore, also supports North et al.'s., (1999) findings which also emphasised the general failure of the private sector to become involved in British local governance. Secondly, while the public sector has closely worked with the private sector in various partnerships within Glasgow (e.g. housing partnerships) there is still an underlying suspicion between both. In Glasgow, which for much of the post second world war years has been politically Labour dominated, working closely with the private sector has never been easy. For the
private sector suspicion of working closely with ‘left-wing’ councils should not be underestimated. This has to some extent acted as a break on partnership working. Public sector suspicion was partly demonstrated by Charlie Gordon, the leader of GCC at a conference titled *The Future of Scottish Towns and Cities* in February 2001. At the aforementioned conference a chief executive from the private sector suggested to the leader GCC that it ‘should let the private sector bid on its behalf for inward investment. The private sector was already out there communicating with each other and therefore why not let the private sector do the council’s bidding, thus saving the council time and crucially money’. Charlie Gordon, however, refused the open invitation to work more closely with the private sector. He responded by curtly saying ‘that the private sector should not tout for business through the council and that business interests were not always the same as the city council’s.

The case of Glasgow also lends weight to Imrie and Raco’s (1999) argument that local decision making has not been captured by the private sector and that the public sector is still the pivotal agency in local development. During research interviews with key actors from the public, private and voluntary sectors the evidence from Glasgow also supports Peck’s (1995) earlier findings that local businesses are more likely to get involved in opportunistic ‘shaking’ than purposeful
'moving'. In sum, this research argues that there has not been a 'business agenda', although the local authority has issued what could be called a 'your city needs you' plea to the private sector.

The emergence of new and revised institutional forms such as the GA may, however, signal a greater role for private sector involvement in local governance in Glasgow. The fact that the private sector, albeit under the banner of 'Business in the Community', is represented on the GA board is evidence that its governing influence may become more important in the future. The emergence of the GA promoting a more 'coalition politics' involving increasingly more round-table bargaining structures and partnership working may suggest that private sector involvement will increase rather than diminish. However, as research interviews with private sector representatives has indicated, while the GA may wish for greater business involvement in local policy decisions, this is by no means certain.

However, it would be wrong to create the impression that the private sector are in no way involved in local policy decision making in Glasgow. Indeed, more recently the private sector has and is set to become more involved in the upgrading and building of new schools for Glasgow through the rise of the private finance initiative. Further, with the promotion and pursuit of public-private partnerships within
housing and urban regeneration the role of the private sector is likely to increase not diminish.

It is clear that more research is required to fully analyse the changing nature of private sector involvement in the governance of the 'new Glasgow'. While urban researchers have developed more sophisticated means of studying and analysing business involvement in local governance there is still as Valler et al., (2000:419) correctly claims a deficiency of research into the complex mechanisms involved which remain largely concealed. Recent attempts to analyse the form and character of private sector representation in urban governance in the UK have been only limited and partial (see Wood et al., 1998). Thus, the nature of local policy decision making is still to some extent a political black box, which can sometimes conceal more than it reveals.

**Regime or Regulation Theory: What Best Explains the Emergence of the New Urban Governance?**

This work adopted a political economy approach in an attempt to analyse and explain contemporary urban restructuring. In this sense, to fully comprehend the nature of contemporary urban restructuring requires an understanding of the social and political as well as the economic spheres which influence urban change.
Recent academic research into the nature of the 'new urban governance' has come to be dominated by two theories. First, regime theory, which is essentially an elite pluralist position which recognises that access to local politics is uneven (see Peck, 1995). Second, regulation theory, which adopts a Marxist political economy approach developed to explain the structure of capitalist economies and how these change over time (see Laurie, 1997a). Another research question sought to explore the extent to which regime or regulation theory best explains the development of the 'new urban governance' in Glasgow. As this research has shown, both theories are not without criticisms.

In the case of Glasgow extensive reform of metropolitan government (most notably the removal of a tier of regional government and the erosion of local government powers) has led to new types of arrangements coming into place to secure some control and regulation of public and private activities within the city, or in other words, forms of metropolitan governance. Regime theory would appear to offer a reasonable mode of explanation for the operation of Glasgow politics. At its heart is the working together in partnership of local government and other local institutions to address the challenges posed by deindustrialisation. The pursuit of a partnership approach has come to symbolise the 'new urban governance' in Glasgow. Faith is placed in management and leadership skills to deliver success to the city. In
Glasgow the emergence of the GA which places greater emphasis upon closer institutional collaboration appears to symbolise this faith. As this research has demonstrated partnership working, with its pursuit of economic regeneration and development, has become the major policy foci for Glasgow in recent years. However, while such a focus may have helped Glasgow to continue to compete in the face of continued global economic competition it has failed to effectively address the growing problems of Glasgow. Specifically, socio-spatial inequality in the city has increased and subsequent problems such as social marginalisation and exclusion are now the major policy problems for Glasgow (see Mooney and Johnstone, 2000).

While regime theory can be regarded as helpful in explaining recent changes in the transformation of urban governance, especially in its effectiveness in explaining the importance of local actors and institutions in urban development in Glasgow, it cannot provide a full explanation given it is weak theoretically and thus cannot fully explain the important connections between local agents and their wider institutional context. As such it is necessary to place the restructuring of urban government within the context of regulation theory. Arguably, it provides the most suitable tool to connect broader tendencies with local political responses. Thus, regulation theory is much stronger on analysing extra local economic and political influences. In the case of
Glasgow, local politicians and policy makers where faced with the challenge of a situation as Harvey (1989:5) has argued of "deindustrialisation, widespread and seemingly 'structural' unemployment, fiscal austerity at both national and local levels, all coupled with...much stronger appeal to market rationality and privatisation, which provide a backdrop to understanding why so many urban governments, often of quite different political persuasions and armed with very different legal and political powers, have all taken a broadly similar direction towards the provision of a 'good business climate' and the attraction of capital". Given the imperatives of the new situation, the pursuit of urban entrepreneurialism could be regarded as an inevitable response by city governors as they sought to reposition the city more favourably on the global economic stage. This echoes the idea that urban and regional restructuring are closely tied to trends at the global level and consequently leads to the adoption of entrepreneurial policies, which is frequently posited as a principal means by which it is possible to attract new business and investment to a locality.

Most recently, some commentators have come to claim that combining the complimentarities of both theories could be promising and potentially important. According to Laurie (1997c), the complementarity of a focus on political practices and extra-local and
extra-economic regulatory processes allows research to focus on how urban regimes can orient local accumulation strategies to help position their local economic spaces in the urban hierarchy. In this sense, while regulation theory offers a fruitful set of abstractions in which to embed urban regime analysis, urban regime theory can be useful in filling some of the explanatory links missing in the regulationist account. Potentially, this could be achieved, given that it focuses almost exclusively on the nature of political disputes and on the forms of political conflict and cooperation at the urban level (see Laurie, 1997a). There is still, however, an absence of research into analysing local economic strategies within national political projects and accumulation strategies or shifts in global accumulation dynamics (see MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In sum, there needs to be a greater readiness to analyse the relational interplay between economic development, political governance and scale.

Further, more cognizance must be attributed towards the active processes of state restructuring and political strategizing through and around which economic development is itself constituted. We still know very little empirically about the forms of urban governance which are emerging in different contexts, and the extent to which local innovation is compromised and structured by wider economic and political relations. In this context, this research has argued that by
attempting to weave together regime and regulation theory then a
deeper and in the words of Imrie and Raco (1999) a more nuanced
understanding of the ‘new urban governance’ can be achieved. In the
case of Glasgow while the promotion of economic growth through a
partnership approach may have been paramount in terms of
regenerating the city the changing economic and political context
strongly influenced the evolving nature of policy and its aims. It is
suggested here that the emerging urban governance in Glasgow has
over time (and space) sought to reconcile the more ‘local regime’ aims
of boosting local economic development with the more ‘national
regulatory’ aims of the promotion of social inclusion and
environmentally sustainable policies. Moreover, as this research argues
while the governance of Glasgow has been strongly influenced by the
wider structural context in which it is set, this has been mediated by
local peculiarities which reflect political traditions, types of authority
and (changing) local economic structure. As a result tensions and
conflict have occurred at a variety of scales and levels of the state. For
example, the neglect and decline of ‘Greater Pollok’ and subsequent
application of New Labour’s social inclusion policies towards this
disadvantaged area generated social conflict, regulatory crisis and
governance failure at a variety of levels of the state. This research
argues that only through a fused analysis of both regime and regulation
theory can this be fully understood.
Given the widespread industrial disinvestment that has occurred in Glasgow, city governors argued that they were left with little alternative but to compete for investment in an attempt to reverse their economic fortunes. During research interviews Pat Lally former leader of the Glasgow District Council admitted that the local authority pushed Glasgow in the direction of adopting strategies and policies (e.g. place marketing/retailing/tourism) designed to attract investment capital. This was also confirmed by senior executives from GCC and GDA who also admitted that their main task was to secure economic growth for the city. In this context, it could be claimed that Glasgow’s political and policy response was framed by the wider restructuring of capitalism and state responses to contemporary restructuring.

Therefore, from being guided by welfare interventionism, the local state has now emerged as concerned fundamentally with ‘accumulation’ in the local arena. From ‘welfare for the community’ this research has found that its ethos now is ‘welfare for capital’ (see Boyle, 1993; Harvey, 1989). Harvey (1989) argues that in taking up more friendly initiatives, local governments have become less concerned with issues of social distribution, compensation for negative externalities and provision of public services, and more enthralled by questions of economic competitiveness and attraction of investment capital.
In Pursuit of Urban Entrepreneurial and Social Inclusion Policies: Complimentary or Contradictory?

A further research question sought to analyse whether the pursuit of urban entrepreneurial policies and social inclusion policies compliment or contradict each other. This research has shown how the local state in Glasgow openly and willingly adopted the notion of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ in its attempts to revitalise the city. Glasgow, in the early 1980s, was the first city in the UK to actively adopt and promote policies designed to market itself. The strategy was designed around enticing and attracting mobile capital and consumption (see Paddison, 1993). The promotion of the ‘new Glasgow’ has involved its reimagining and reinvention, not only as an economic and political, but also as a cultural phenomena in search of the enhancement of its competitiveness. The famous Glasgow’s Miles Better place marketing campaign was an attempt by the local authority in Glasgow to use overtly boosterist policies to transform the fortunes of the city. However, it is worth noting that for every ‘successful’ Glasgow’s Miles Better campaign there are equally less successful ones e.g. Bradford’s Bouncing Back campaign.

According to Leitner and Garner (1993), the major argument made by proponents of urban entrepreneurialism is that development strategies designed to improve the city’s attractiveness to business are in the best
interest of the city as a whole and of all urban residents (see Harvey, 1989). However, in the case of Glasgow this is debatable. This research has outlined how Glasgow developed a strategy that favoured business in the city centre (city centre regeneration) over the rest of the city. While private capital has found its way into the city centre, little has found its way into the peripheral estates and other deprived areas of the city.

The emerging dual structure of the Glasgow economy has resulted in the emergence of a ‘dual urban policy’. This has resulted, on the one hand, of the development of a robust entrepreneurial economic policy designed to support ‘glamourous’ city centre regeneration. On the other hand, is an underfunded, fragmented social policy devised for ‘problem’ areas (such as the peripheral estates). Nevertheless, as Keating (1988) notes a ‘dual urban policy’ is not necessarily a bad thing, where a flexible, pluralist urban policy could accurately reflect the differing priorities of different areas. However, problems arise when this duality becomes more of a dichotomy, that is where one strand of policy is subordinate in terms of finance and ideological backing. While there has been a great deal of excitement generated by New Labour’s social inclusion policies little in the way of new resources will be forthcoming. For example, in Scotland 26 SIPs will share only £16 million of new money per year, over a three year period (figures
quoted in Webster, 2000:290). Policies such as New Life for Urban Scotland and SIPs can be viewed as a residualised underfunded strand of urban policy which have focussed more on managing decline and social anomie, than creating any lasting meaningful regeneration. According to Leitner and Garner (1993), the emphasis on local entrepreneurship has been propagated as the panacea for urban areas seeking to adapt to national and international economic and political restructuring during the last two decades. This has led to the fact that today, most redevelopment professionals and policy analysts advocate urban entrepreneurialism and its mainstay - public-private partnerships - as essential to urban growth and revitalisation. As this research has shown Glasgow has openly and enthusiastically embraced the partnership approach to regeneration. So much that it is not merely the only game in town it is the game in town.

Thus, where public agencies were once seen as an essential part of the solution to the urban crisis, they are now viewed as part of the problem itself (Goodwin, 1993). Market forces are promoted as the only possible way of reviving urban economies and new political agencies have taken the place of local authorities in many urban areas to ensure that such rhetoric is put into practice. This would explain the continuous flow of experiments to find new and more adequate forms of economic governance and the new fads and fashions for models that
appear to promise success (Jessop, 1997).

In Glasgow, the emergence of the GA would seem to support this idea. Yet, far from the emergence of this institution being attributable to purely economic changes, the motives for its development can be found in distinctive political reasons prompting state managers to engage in closer partnership working, institutional redesign and strategic reorientation regarding local economic strategy. This has resulted in GCC no longer being in charge of the regeneration of the city. It was clear in 1998 just six months after New Labour came to power that they no longer trusted GCC to ‘call the shots’. The then GRA was criticised by key actors during interviews for the present research. The majority of those interviewed thought this agency had at best under achieved and at worst failed outright. Although, potentially this forum could have been scraped it was reconstituted under a new name the GA, and given more powers and a much wider remit. A clear message was being sent by the then Secretary of State for Scotland Donald Dewar that the GA was the preferred vehicle to drive Glasgow’s urban agenda and develop a city wide strategy and not democratically elected local government.

Some critics remark that the promotion of new urban images and ‘city myths’ has been regarded as a necessary prelude to the establishment
of new urban economies and the promotion of investment (Goodwin, 1993; Hall and Hubbard, 1998). Lever (1993), looking at the European context, sees economic multiplier effects stemming from ‘hall-mark’ events such as major sporting events, cultural festivals and trade fairs. According to Lever (1993), these examples show the increasing competition of European cities in order to attract investment in financial services as well as to become the location of European institutions. Similarly, Harding et al. (1994) claim that the promotion of the city’s image is carried out by many cities as a means to reinforce its economic status and attract new investment and tourists in the hope of mobilising private, local government, national and - when this has been possible, as in the case of Europe - European efforts in a common scheme. The increasing European Union monies (e.g. Strathclyde European Partnership) which Glasgow has managed to secure in recent years is testimony to this.

However, the practice of selling places generates ‘sameness’, despite its appearance of bringing geographical difference into the context of contemporary economic and political discourse. The repetition of cities’ attempt to sell themselves as tourist, convention, shopping and cultural centres, as well as trying to attract mobile international capital may according to Bianchinni et al., (1992) result in a zero-sum game. In Amin’s (1994) words, there are obvious limits to the possible range
of projects, and the risk of failure is even higher once places are forced to copy each other as the barrel of new ideas becomes depleted (see also Harvey, 1994).

Furthermore, as Peck and Tickell (1994b) argue, while some localities may be successful for some of the time, their success is only being achieved at the expense of failure elsewhere. Holcomb's (1993) criticism goes even further by contending that this kind of practice produces packaged images which reflect the aesthetic tastes of post-modern society, and therefore, eclectic conformity, commodified ethnic culture and sanitised classlessness. Lastly, Goodwin (1993) notes that culture has been frequently used as an instrument by the elite in the advancement of their own interests, potentially lubricating the transition from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism.

Glasgow used civic boosterist policies to reinvent itself as a cultural and tourist city where the service sector is now dominant. The 'new Glasgow' was sanitised from the past negatively perceived images of union militancy, violence, bigotry, pollution and poverty. Glasgow has used prestigious cultural facilities (e.g. the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall) which have been designed primarily to appeal to wealthy external audiences. These facilities, however, are typically very exclusive; they hold little appeal to the majority of Glaswegians either because of the
activities that go on there or because of the expense involved. The latter was confirmed during focus group interviews at which more than three-quarters of the participants had indicated that they had never attended an event at the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall because of admission prices were too high for them to afford. The promotion of high culture in Glasgow has led to less prestigious community-based cultural activities suffering cuts in funding forcing them to restrict their activities or to close altogether. The recent scraping of the once high profiled Mayfest festival is evidence of this.

To some all of this is evidence (see Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Boyle and Hughes, 1991) that Glasgow’s working class culture and its contribution to the development of Glasgow has been undervalued. In Glasgow the emergence of Workers’ City, a group promoting the working-class history of Glasgow at the height of cultural promotion in the city, is symbolic of the feelings that their culture has become devalued because it does not represent a ‘marketable’ commodity to be sold to inward investors (Boyle and Hughes, 1991).

Hall and Hubbard (1998) claim that the manipulation of image is not only an attempt to make the city more attractive to external investors, but also plays a role in a ‘social control’ logic, convincing local people as to the benevolence of entrepreneurial strategies, and providing a
strong base for coalition building. In Glasgow those objecting to the 'new Glasgow' are viewed by those in power as being stuck in the past and an obstacle to attracting investment and tourists. Holcomb (1993) states that the primary goal of the place marketeer is to construct a new image of the place, a new 'product' based on the good attributes of the area, whose target is to replace either vague or negative images previously held by current or potential residents, investors and visitors. It is clear that in the case of Glasgow, key decision makers (in both the public and private sectors) decided that the city had to change its image. Hence the promotion of the city under the slogan Glasgow’s Miles Better.

Short et al., (1993) underline the challenges that old industrial areas, like Glasgow, face in this context, since they allegedly have to contend with newly industrialising countries, regions and cities which have lower labour costs and taxes and are considered to have a more 'business friendly' environment. As Goodwin (1993) stresses, old industrial areas are challenged by the treble problems of deindustrialisation, falling tax base and declining public expenditure. These problems are especially important in the context of contemporary Glasgow which has to face massive deindustrialisation, a declining tax base and swinging cuts in public expenditure (see Carmichael and Midwinter, 1999). According to Short et al., (1993)
localities with more positive imagery are associated with the ‘post-industrial’ era, the new, the clean, the high-tech, the economically upbeat and the socially progressive, the world of leisure as opposed to work. In contrast, industrial cities are identified with the past and the old; work, pollution and the world of production. Consequently, intense competition is driving these old industrial areas to change their image, to move away from the negative connotations of ‘industrial’ and to tap the positive imagery of post-industrialism (see also Hall and Hubbard, 1998). As Healey et al., (1992) remark, a refurbished fabric also symbolises a new imagery of vital urbanity. If in the past, these old industrial cities used their rivers, seas and lakes as part of the process of production, at present these water resources are more regarded as recreational and assets for visual consumption, as the recent attempts in Glasgow to exploit the River Clyde illustrates.

In the same line, Barnekov et al., (1989) also underline how older manufacturing centres have responded to erosion of their economic bases, partly by intensifying efforts to outbid municipal rivals for new private investment. Glasgow’s ‘battle’ to beat off competition from other rival cities (such as Edinburgh) for the designation of Garden Festival (1988), European City Of Culture (1990) and UK City of Architecture and Design (1999) are evidence of the increased competition between places for flagship developments and scarce
public resources. Furthermore, Sadler (1993) remarks how the selling of places has been most actively pursued in the old industrial regions, as part of an attempt to impose an alternative form of hegemony to traditional, working-class values. In this sense, there is a clear effort to neutralise former images of solid defensive working structures stemming from the large size of industrial plant which, at present, appear to be perceived as dissuasive elements in investment terms. Thus, flagship development projects and promotional imagery are used vigorously, as Healey et al., (1992) underline, to supplant the imagery of rustbelt cities and clothcap citizens which, it was assumed, would inhibit inward investment by the private sector, with the life-style imagery of a globalised ‘yuppified’ middle-class. Glasgow once the highly politicised working-class city, is now sold as a model of post-industrial pragmatism. The private sector need no longer fear or be apprehensive of investing in the ‘new Glasgow’. However, as this research has shown while the private sector sector may invest in the renewed Glasgow city centre it is still reluctant to invest in the most deprived parts of the city (i.e. the peripheral estates).

The Impact of Social Inclusion Policies on Disadvantaged Areas

A final research question sought to analyse the effectiveness of the adoption of social inclusion policies in addressing the problems of
Pollok, a disadvantaged neighbourhood. The continuity between New Labour and previous Conservative governments in urban policy is remarkable. Both political parties have articulated a narrative which restricted 'urban problems' to discrete pockets of poverty in urban areas. Thus, the 'solution' was to identify these areas and then target the 'deviant' populations in the areas and modify their pathological behaviour. The cause of the problems were therefore deemed to originate within the areas concerned and thus do not require the consideration of wider societal forces. A clear advantage of this approach is that it is inexpensive. With more effective targeting of resources, little in the way of additional resources would be required to effectively address the problems of distressed communities.

In April 1999 the then SO announced the creation of locally based SIPs. The local community are intended to be “at the heart of the process” (Scottish Office, 1998). While there is a great deal of rhetorical bluster concerning New Labour’s SIPs, only a limited amount of ‘new money’ is being made available to SIP areas. As this research points out Greater Pollok will receive only £7million pounds of extra money over a three year period (1999-2002). Not unlike the New Life for Urban Scotland initiative mainstream funding is intended to be ‘bent’ towards SIP areas. However, in Glasgow where there are eight SIPs it is debatable whether they will all receive extra money from ‘bending the spend’. In this
context, further research is required to investigate the extent to which mainstream budgets are bent to SIP areas. The SIP programme may be helping to create 'winners' and 'losers' in terms of areas receiving adequate levels of funding to address the severe problems that they experience.

As Raco (2000:573) has pointed there is a long term tradition of 'community involvement' in urban regeneration policies in the UK stretching back for at least 30 years. However, we need to distinguish between the rhetoric and reality of genuine “community involvement”. Most recently, community “involvement” has been given more prominence by New Labour who have placed, (rhetorically at least) much emphasis on a more inclusive politics under the guidance of the partnership approach. As Raco (2000:573) argues “the new administration, with its emphasis on the stakeholder’ society seems set to continue the trends of the 1990s by promoting a concepts of partnership as something of a panacea for the difficulties and exclusionary politics that have dogged urban policy programmes”.

A number of commentators, however, have criticised the nature of contemporary partnerships in urban policy. Peck and Tickell (1994a) are critical of the construction of partnerships from above. They argue that the emergence of local partnerships in the 1990s had more to do
with central government funding programmes which emphasised local competition and the construction of local partnerships to bid for funds, than with bottom-up genuine community empowerment. In Scotland, for example, central funds are now delivered through the SIP budget which forces places to bid against one another for government funding. The Scottish Executive, through its social inclusion policies, has also encouraged the creation of local partnerships, as bids are expected to involve the public, private and voluntary sectors working together. Local authorities cannot bid on their own, and thus by definition governance replaces government as the guiding force behind urban policy.

While much has been made of partnership working over the last decade, it is somewhat perverse that as the organs of the state they have been transformed in the pursuit of the ‘new public management’ (see Stewart, 1996). As institutional fragmentation has increased, so has the necessity for inter-agency and partnership working (see Hastings, 1996). The emergence of the GA is, in part, recognition of the fragmentation of policy making and implementation, given the perceived need for Glasgow to speak with one voice and crucially, for city to develop a coherent urban strategy. However, as this research has demonstrated, Glasgow’s embracing of the partnership approach has been motivated more out of a pragmatic response (the local
authority initiated the setting up of the GRA and/or the GA) to institutional fragmentation and the erosion of the power of democratically elected local government.

Another criticism over the growing prominence of partnership with its new community development approach, relates to the wider neo-liberal objective of creating more 'active consumers' which promotes increased self-reliance and reduced 'dependence' on the welfare state (see Kearns, 1992; Cochrane, 1993). As a result the promotion of partnerships has subsequently led to the growth of non-elected quangos and restructured mechanisms of local accountability.

Politically constructed and powerful institutions, such as quangos, are able to shape and limit local political agendas. Thus, while the development of a partnership approach is hailed in some quarters, one of its main weaknesses is that it only involves the devolution of decision making power for relatively minor aspects of policy implementation (see Raco, 2000). In Glasgow, GA and SO executives admitted that their central regeneration programmes (SIPs) were enshrined in the foundation legislation and were not up for negotiation. Thus, local communities (like 'Greater Pollok') had little impact in the initial process of drawing up the agenda for the area. The primary decisions concerning regeneration were taken by local policy officers
in Glasgow who in turn had to work within guidelines as set out by the SO. In sum, the parameters of social inclusion policies were constructed elsewhere and largely beyond local community involvement. Therefore, SIPs will do very little to address the inequalities of power that exist at local levels.

This research has also highlighted a contradiction in New Labour’s social inclusion thinking. Thus, while New Labour rhetoric claims that it wants to decentralise and involve local communities in decision making in reality central control is still retained. There is little difference from previous partnership arrangements (e.g. the New Life for Urban Scotland Partnership initiative) where devolution of power either to the partnerships themselves or to the local communities did not occur (see Hastings, 1996). This research has argued that the process of involving the community from the start was woefully inadequate. At best it was tokenistic, at worst local people were being used to legitimise the policy process. During research interviews, it was admitted that local policy agendas and priorities were set down by the then SO in conjunction with local policy agencies (most noticeably the GA) and officers, not the local community. SIPs rhetorically claim to put the community at the heart of decision making, however, local people’s experience was completely different. During focus group interviews, ‘representatives’ from the local community expressed the view that
despite SIP intentions they were largely excluded from local decision making and still experienced a sense of powerlessness. All of this led in the early stages to much mistrust and suspicion between the local community and the Greater Pollok SIP. With the emergence of policy initiatives like SIPs local expectations are often raised only to be dashed in terms of lack of genuine community participation in decision making. As one focus group participant put it “they (decision makers) hear but they don’t listen, we might be invited but we soon become suspicious of why we are invited to participate”.

Veit Wilson (1998) argues how New Labour has adopted a somewhat ‘weak’ version of the idea of social inclusion. Within this weak version the solution to social exclusion and poverty lies in altering individual deviance and handicaps that are restricting their full integration into society. A ‘stronger’ version of this discourse places more emphasis on the role of those who are doing the excluding and the maldistribution of power and wealth within society. In this sense, New Labour’s adoption of a ‘weak’ social inclusion discourse depoliticises poverty as a means of addressing the socially excluded. New Labour’s SIP approach in Glasgow will do very little to address the marginalised position of the poorest members of the city, given its failure to address the root causes of exclusion and poverty. The eight SIPs chosen in Glasgow do, however, demonstrate that these areas are viewed (by New Labour and
the city) as 'problem areas' somehow detached and excluded from the rest of the city. As such they are need of remedial attention, however, as indicated above, they will receive little in the way of new resources to address their problems.

Contemporary urban policy, under New Labour, is on a quest for 'sustainable' regeneration. There now appears to be an acceptance that social, economic and environmental sustainability are inter-related and that these are in turn linked to institutional and cultural sustainability (see Furbey, 1999). However, how sustainable regeneration is to be achieved is not always made clear. In Glasgow, while many of the various agencies involved in urban regeneration talk the language of "sustainability", practical policies have yet to be fully formulated. The "environmentally friendly" city seems as far off as ever. While the government may help and guide regeneration through policy initiatives, there is also a stress on the importance of 'key individuals' and the quality of local partnership leaders (Stewart, 1996). The emphasis here is upon what Oatley (1998b) terms 'charismatic entrepreneurialism', with particular weight placed upon the contribution of 'social entrepreneurs' in 'moving and shaking' the community sector. The focus on 'community', 'participation' 'inclusiveness', and 'partnership' is addressed to particular understandings of 'regeneration', with particular appeal for local, more subordinate, stakeholders (see
Recent urban regeneration, however, has been much more centralised, fragmented and competitive (Stewart, 1994:135). Thus, there is a clear gap between what is desired and what is still in place. Moreover, the myth that ‘community solidarity’ (see Harvey, 1996:437) (in so far as it exists - and this is doubtful as this research has demonstrated in the case of ‘Greater Pollok’) can provide stability and power needed to control, manage and alleviate urban problems is questionable. Moreover, the view that ‘community’ can substitute for public politics needs to be exposed. This idea is not without significance given New Labour’s pursuit of ‘community partnership based’ solutions to local problems.

Further, ‘community’ can often be an exclusionary and oppressive social form that can be as much at the root of urban conflict and urban degeneration as it can be a panacea for political-economic difficulties. Reliance on ‘capacity building’ and training to enable people and ‘communities’ to fulfil their potential is not enough. As Dazinger (1997:15) correctly points out for the excluded “it is not the sophisticated elite that is threatened by an out of control planet and its wilder inhabitants, its the sophisticated elite that’s out of control”.

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Despite support for ‘holism’ and ‘inclusiveness’ of recent urban initiatives in Britain, the dominant agenda is less radical than it appears. This is partly borne out by local residents of ‘Greater Pollok’ who at focus group discussions, held out little real hope that their life would dramatically improve now that the area had been designated as a SIP. These findings mirror views on how regeneration seems to offer “an almost infinitely inclusive canopy under which all may be persuaded to shelter and find agreement, yet vital issues remain beyond the pale” (Furbey, 1999:240). In terms of New Labour’s social inclusion agenda there is a failure to address the activities of the excluders. Those who need ‘regenerating’ remain poor, as well as the operations of the increasingly complex organisational networks (hence the New Labour drive to join up government and policies) which engage with them. The ‘included’ remain largely untouched. Furbey (1999:240) using the metaphor of the body argues that it is not just the extremities (the excluded) but the whole body (the included) that needs attention.

Thoughts for an Epilogue
Harvey (1996) argues that the city and the urban question have all but disappeared from political discourse. This has resulted in the burying of those caught in the maelstrom of urban decay in a politics of contempt and neglect. In Glasgow, the lack of serious attention given to three out of four peripheral estates is evidence of this neglect. Given
the dominance of these attitudes, thinking on urban issues has focussed on how best to escape the consequences of the urban poor “that are always with us” or how to protect and secure the rich’s interests from the infectious plague of surrounding urban squalor. This research has shown how urban policies developed in Glasgow have in part reflected the above through policies which are designed to attract new wealth and capital (i.e. high profiled city centre policies) and policies which are designed to manage ‘problem’ areas and social alienation.

Capitalism is here, class and class inequalities remain, and wealth redistribution matters. This research argues that the ‘progressive city’ will need to think more fundamentally about redefinitions of wealth, well-being and values, in ways that are more conducive to the development of the human potentialities of all sections of the population. To date, cities have not been good at that. What we need now is a new vocabulary to talk about them and a new politics to contest them. Further, more creative forms of socio-ecological change for the many must be explored as opposed to mere capital accumulation for the select few. The city it should be remembered (and be celebrated as such) is a site of diversity and difference, heterogeneity of values, lifestyle oppositions and migrational flows which should not be feared as sources of disorder. The celebrated city
of difference, shared space and objectives has given way to cities of indifference and intolerance which are increasingly characterised by spaces of exclusion and division (see McDowell, 1999). Rather than the existence of a cohesive urban society, we find the city of ‘bits and pieces’, which has become increasingly fragmented and unequal (see Amin and Thrift, 1995). As the case of Glasgow demonstrates, the city has become increasingly fragmented and divided between rich and poor. Harvey (1996:438) argues “that one of the biggest challenges in the twenty first century is to develop a politics that can bridge the multiple heterogeneities found in the city”. Those cities that can accommodate diversity, economic, political and cultural heterogeneity will survive and flourish. Those who cannot will die.

Modern cities are relatively poor at engaging with the majority of people. Glasgow is no exception. During focus group discussions in this research study, many of the participants said that this was the first time that they had been asked to give their opinions on any issues within the city; when asked questions respondents were pleased to respond. We should not then be surprised that individuals feel increasingly marginalised and excluded from key decisions which influence their quality of life. Moreover, during research fieldwork, it became evident that while the majority of decision makers were willing to be interviewed, they were much less willing to engage in an open
debate about the contemporary governance of Glasgow. Of those interviewed only two (out of over thirty key urban actors) asked to be kept informed of this research. This is quite revealing about the contemporary governance of Glasgow. In one sense it may have reflected an arrogance on the part of those urban actors interviewed. What had they to learn from academic research, that they didn’t already know? In another sense it could be reflective of their need not to know (i.e. a lack of interest) what academic research could contribute towards the nature of governing the contemporary city. Either way, it points to a serious indictment (both in terms of ‘arrogance’ on the part of those interviewed and further evidence of their failure to engage with the public and be willing to listen to alternative voices - in Glasgow exclusion comes in many shapes and form) on the part of those interviewed who have, and will continue to have, a major impact on the governance of Glasgow.

During research interviews, it became clear that few policy makers questioned the wisdom of the strategies and policies they adopt and pursue. In Glasgow, like many other cities, questions about alternative policy directions have become foreclosed and dissenting voices are marginalised. Cities need to and can be more innovative concerning ways of governing themselves. The challenge is to find new ways of governing that include rather than exclude. A more inclusive and
progressive urban agenda must make all citizens, especially the most marginalised, integral to urban policy making. There needs also to be a re-engagement with questions of social justice and whether entrepreneurial strategies produce a fair and defendable distribution of benefits and burdens in society. In sum, there needs to be more analysis on the 'real' costs and benefits of such strategies and their impact on different places and social groups in the city. This is as vital a starting point as any, in our attempts to map out alternative ways of governing the contemporary city.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 - QUESTIONNAIRE

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES
LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF GREATER POLLOK

Please answer the following questions
Tick the appropriate boxes which correspond to your answer
All answers will be treated in the strictest confidence

1) How do you feel about living in your area?
   - Very Satisfied
   - Satisfied
   - Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied
   - Dissatisfied
   - Very Dissatisfied

2) Please indicate, in rank order, your 3 top priorities that would improve your area?
   Use 1 to denote first preference, 2 to denote second and 3 to denote third
   - New Housing
   - New Employment Opportunities
   - New Shopping Facilities
   - New Leisure Facilities
   - New Health Facilities
   - New Educational Facilities
   - Other (please state)
3) Whose responsibility is it to improve the quality of life of the people in your area?
   - Local People
   - Glasgow City Council
   - Scottish Homes
   - Glasgow Development Agency
   - Private Sector
   - Other (please state) ..........................................................
   - Don't Know

4) Which of the following organisation(s) has the strongest influence in your area?
   - Scottish Homes
   - Glasgow Development Agency
   - Glasgow City Council
   - Private Sector
   - Other (please state) ..........................................................
   - Don't Know

5) Have you heard about the Greater Pollok Social Inclusion Partnership?
   - Yes
   - No

6) If you answered YES to question 3, what do you think the Greater Pollok Social Inclusion Partnership aims to do?
   .............................................................................................................
   .............................................................................................................

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APPENDIX 2

Interview Questions

1) What are the main objectives of urban policy?

2) Who are the main participants in the formulation and implementation of urban policy in Glasgow?

3) To what extent are the private sector involved in urban policy making in the city of Glasgow?

b) To what extent has this involvement changed over time?

4) What are the main problems currently facing the city of Glasgow?

b) How are these problems being addressed?

c) To what extent have these problems changed over time?

5) What are the main problems currently facing Glasgow's peripheral estates?

b) To what extent have these problems changed over time?

c) Have the problems of peripheral estates been adequately addressed?

6) Has urban policy towards Glasgow's peripheral estates changed in the last twenty years. If so, in what ways has it changed?

7) What would you say are the main lessons that have been learnt from urban policy developments in Glasgow?

8) What kind of future does your organisation envisage for the city
# APPENDIX 3

Names and Affiliation of those Interviewed During Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June Bell</td>
<td>Policy Officer Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neil Bell</td>
<td>Head of Urban Regeneration Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Comely</td>
<td>Director of Housing Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Corrigan</td>
<td>Head Teacher of Bellarmine Secondary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Daly</td>
<td>Greater Pollok Social Inclusion Partnership Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iain Davidson</td>
<td>Member of Parliament for Glasgow Pollok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Holman</td>
<td>Local Resident Easterhouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Fyfe</td>
<td>Executive Director Glasgow Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gallacher</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer Crudens House Builders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe Glen</td>
<td>Policy Officer Horizons Employment &amp; Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlie Gordon</td>
<td>Glasgow City Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuart Gulliver</td>
<td>Chief Executive Glasgow Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Inch</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Development and Regeneration Services Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Jenkins</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer Scottish Homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pat Lally</td>
<td>Lord Provost Glasgow City Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew McArthur</td>
<td>Strathclyde University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank McAveety</td>
<td>Leader of Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger McConnell</td>
<td>Director of Development and Regeneration Services Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alastair MacKenzie</td>
<td>Chief Planner for Scotland Scottish Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan MacLennan</td>
<td>Labour Government Policy Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helen MacNeil</td>
<td>Glasgow Voluntary Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry O'Donnell</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer Miller Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William O'Rourke*</td>
<td>Glasgow City Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony O'Sullivan</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer Scottish Homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuart Patrick</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer Glasgow Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Robertson</td>
<td>GP SIP Board Member Community Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janice Schollar</td>
<td>Policy Officer Greater Glasgow Health Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommy Sheridan*</td>
<td>Glasgow City Councillor and MSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christie Smith</td>
<td>Head of Urban Regeneration Unit Scottish Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry Stoker</td>
<td>Strathclyde University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Timoney*</td>
<td>Glasgow City Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alf Young</td>
<td>Editor of The Sunday Herald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joanna Young</td>
<td>Scottish Executive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Councillor for the Greater Pollok area of Glasgow*
Local Views Within Greater Pollok: A Community Discussion

Dear Anne Marie,

I am a researcher based at the Department of Urban Studies, Glasgow University. Part of my research involves finding out about the attitudes of local people towards the area in which they live and any decisions which effect them and their area.

I, therefore, invite you and five other local people to join me in a focus group meeting to be held in the Glen Oaks Housing Association Darnley Office, H/7, 66 Glen Esk Drive on Wednesday 28th of July at 7.00pm. I have enclosed a map for your convenience. A creche will be provided at this venue. If you wish to bring along your children please feel free to do so. Your attendance and participation at this meeting is important in that it will be a very useful vehicle for you to express any views you have concerning your local community.

A focus group discussion will be chaired by myself, and a colleague will also be in attendance to take notes. All those invited to participate from the local community will be asked a number of questions e.g. negative/positive perceptions of living in the Greater Pollok area. This will form the focus of the discussion. Your views are very important so please express them.

If you have any queries about the group meeting please do not hesitate to contact me. If for any reason you cannot attend the meeting it is very important that you notify me as soon as possible. My home telephone number can be found at the top of this letter.

May I thank you once again for agreeing to participate in this group discussion. Your attendance/comments are invaluable to this debate. I hope you find it enjoyable and interesting evening. I look forward to meeting you on the 28th July.

Yours sincerely,

Christopher McWilliams
PhD Research Student
APPENDIX 5 - Location of Focus Group Meeting

"Firstly, can I thank you for attending this focus group. The purpose of the meeting is so we can discuss some of your thoughts and attitudes of living in the Greater Pollok area and also of local decision making. Please express your views as openly and forthrightly as you want to. Your opinions matter so express them freely. Do not worry what the person next to you thinks of your opinion or what I think. Everyone here is entitled to give their opinion and each is of value to me.

Think of me as a sort of chairperson, who will move the discussion on as time progresses. There is not a formal agenda for the meeting. There are six or seven themes to discuss. However, do feel free to bring up your own priorities as we go along. The only rule is to speak one at a time. Could we make a start by going round the table and saying what your name is and what part of Greater Pollok you come from”.

(Introduction to Housing Association Focus Group)
APPENDIX 7

Issues Raised During Focus Group Discussion Meetings

1) What are your positive and negative perceptions about living in Greater Pollok?

2) If you had the opportunity to move out of the Greater Pollok area would you move?
   b) If so, to which area?
   c) If not, why not?

3) What do you regard as the top priority that would improve Greater Pollok?

4) Whose responsibility is to improve the quality of life of those living in Greater Pollok?

5) Do you think that Greater Pollok has received adequate resources and attention to address its problems?

6) Who does the city (Glasgow) belong to?

7) Who do you think makes the decisions which effect that areas in which you live?

8) I would like to get your views on the New Scottish Parliament. Will the Scottish Parliament have an effect on an area like Greater Pollok?
Dear Mr McWilliams

I refer to your telephone conversation of 25 April with my colleague, when you asked if it would be possible to collate the financial data that has been spent on the areas of Drumchapel, Easterhouse, Castlemilk, and Pollok from 1988 to 1998.

Unfortunately, under the old Urban Programme, which ran from 1969 and is due to end in March 2002, we are unable to gather this information for you, as the systems that were in place at that time do not allow this. However, as the applications for Urban Programme were originally submitted by Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District Council, I would suggest that you contact Glasgow City Council, who may have systems in place which would enable them to provide this information.

I can provide you with details of the spend under the new Social Inclusion Partnerships (SIPs) for 3 of these areas, and for Castlemilk, which is now a New Life Urban Partnership area, for the years 1996 to date. I have also enclosed a map which shows all of the 48 SIPs for your information.

I hope you will find this information useful.

Yours sincerely

Mrs Dylais Mattison
Regeneration Administrator (Glasgow)
APPENDIX 9 - Photograph of Dereliction in Greater Pollok
APPENDIX 10 - Photograph of Boarded-up Housing
in Greater Pollok
APPENDIX 11 - Photograph of Physical Decline

in Greater Pollok
MAPS
MAP 1

Glasgow's Peripheral Estates

MAP 2 – Areas which make up Greater Pollok

Taken from Greater Pollok Social Inclusion Strategy, 1999a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations with Responsibilities for Urban Policy in Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise Glasgow (formerly Glasgow Development Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow City Council*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Glasgow Health Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Executive (formerly Scottish Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Homes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This is a democratically elected organisation, all the other organisations are unelected.
TABLE 2

Membership of the Glasgow Alliance Board as of April 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Andrews</td>
<td>Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Davidson</td>
<td>Glasgow Development Agency</td>
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<td>Andrew Fyfe</td>
<td>Glasgow Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Gallacher</td>
<td>Scottish Business in the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor Charles Gordon</td>
<td>Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart Gulliver</td>
<td>Glasgow Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor David Hamblen</td>
<td>Greater Glasgow Health Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ewan Johnston</td>
<td>Scottish Homes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alastair MacKenzie</td>
<td>Scottish Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Duncan MacLennan</td>
<td>Scottish Homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helen MacNeil</td>
<td>Glasgow Council for the Voluntary Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor Frank McAvety (Chair)</td>
<td>Glasgow City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Marshall</td>
<td>Member of Parliament for Shettleston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Sinclair</td>
<td>Wise Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Spry</td>
<td>Greater Glasgow Health Board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF DEPRIVATION IN GREATER POLLOK

61.8% of Households have a gross income of less than £99 per week
75.4% of Primary school children receive clothing and footwear grants
56.9% of Primary school children receive free school meals
46.6% of children live in a households where no adult is in work
11% of the workforce (aged 16-65) considered permanently sick
41.7% of individuals are unemployed (includes 'hidden unemployment')
26.6% of individuals are considered long-term unemployed
45.4% of under twenty-fives are unemployed
37.2% of Households with children headed by lone parents

All postcodes in the Greater Pollok SIP are in the worst 5% of postcodes in Scotland

All figures taken from Greater Pollok Social Inclusion Partnership Strategy, 1999a.
TABLE 4

Urban Programme Funding Levels in Glasgow’s Peripheral Estates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estates</th>
<th>Grant Paid in £’s 1996-1999</th>
<th>Grant Paid in £’s 1999-2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Castlemilk</td>
<td>4,219,575(^1)</td>
<td>4,346,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterhouse</td>
<td>3,788,312(^2)</td>
<td>4,652,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drumchapel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,744,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Pollok</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,838,577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 - Funding includes New Life Partnership monies
2 - Funding includes Priority Partnership Area monies

Source: Scottish Executive, Development Department Area Regeneration Division