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KENNEDY'S CHILDREN: THE PEACE CORPS, 1961-3

By

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"In the Dominican Republic, the rebel soldiers called the Peace Corps Volunteers 'Hijos de Kennedy' - Children of Kennedy."

-HARRIS WOFFORD -

ABSTRACT

The first part of this dissertation traces the roots of the Peace Corps idea in American history, its development during the Presidential campaign of 1960 and its establishment as a government agency by John F. Kennedy in 1961. The Peace Corps' battle for autonomy within the Federal bureaucracy and its struggle to win legislation on Capitol Hill are also analysed. The style and nature of this new institution, the principles and policies on which it functioned, its relationship to President Kennedy and the calibre of the men who staffed it, complete the study of the Peace Corps organisation in Washington.

The second half of the thesis deals primarily with the Volunteers who served overseas. Recruitment, training and selection methods are assessed as are the programming techniques by which young Americans were placed in jobs in Third World countries. The various trials, tribulations and triumphs experienced by the Volunteers are discussed and described. The American press and the public's view of the Volunteers' work overseas is summarised as is the Peace Corps' role in politics and American foreign policy. Finally, a comprehensive evaluation is made of Kennedy's Peace Corps and its impact on the United States and the world. Overall, the intention is to investigate and explain how the Peace Corps came about, what it accomplished - in America and overseas - and why, in two years, it came to be regarded as the most visible embodiment of the idealism of Kennedy's New Frontier.
"Like an Odyssey, the Peace Corps moved from adventure to adventure, crisis to crisis, point to point," wrote Harris Wofford, one of the agency's founding fathers. "It was a Socratic seminar writ large, the one rule being to follow the question where it led, the next step known by careful attention to the step just taken." In many ways, this description could be applied to my research on the Peace Corps. It began with the aim of analysing how a campaign idea became a government organisation; however, as one question followed another, this turned out to be only half my story. On reaching American shores - and particularly the Peace Corps Archives in Washington - I discovered an enormous amount of previously unused material on the Volunteers and their activities overseas. This became the second part of my thesis and doubled its length. However, since the evidence was substantially new and the story previously untold, perseverance seemed the best policy.

My pursuit of sources took me from the Denis Brogan Centre For American Studies in Glasgow to the Kennedy Library in Boston and the Johnson Library in Texas. In the process, I received the advice and assistance of scores of people. I would like to thank Lord Harlech and the Kennedy Memorial Trust for granting me a year's scholarship to Harvard University in academic session 1978-9. While there, under the supervision of Professor Frank Freidel, I was able to conduct the greater part of my research. I would also like to express my undying gratitude to all those who submitted themselves to a personal interview with me; a list of their names appears in the bibliography. A special debt is owed to Sargent Shriver, Bill Josephson, Warren Higgins, Bill Kelly and Harris Wofford for spending hours in conversation. To Harris Wofford, in particular, I owe thanks for showing me - through his knowledge, sensitivity and humour - the essence of Kennedy's Peace Corps. Others who offered unique insight were Don Romine, Paul Tsongas, etc.

At the Kennedy Library, Will Johnson was a constant source of strength and Debbie Green, of enthusiasm. My special appreciation also goes to Joe Manno at the Peace Corps Archives in Washington and the ever-helpful Freedom of Information Officer there, Genoa Godbey. For his valued counsel on a number of matters - not least, the rigours of conducting a modern research programme - I wish to thank Dick Mahoney; and for applying her editorial skills on my behalf, Elizabeth McCormick. Finally, I will always be grateful to my parents and Anne Marie for their support and understanding and to Eilish Hughes for typing the rough drafts of this dissertation and for encouraging me to fulfil the goals I had set for myself.

Gerard T. Rice
June 8, 1980.
A NOTE ON SOURCES

A few weeks after the Peace Corps had been established, Sargent Shriver, its first Director, told his staff that "Students and writers interested in researching the Peace Corps should be encouraged to do so, especially if their product will make a research contribution to the Corps." Without exception, everyone I met or dealt with in regard to this dissertation followed Shriver's instructions enthusiastically. In particular, the archivists in the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library and the Peace Corps Library and Records office provided me not only with the relevant historical materials but with unstinting encouragement and support. Without them, this "research contribution" would not have been possible.

As far as primary evidence is concerned, this work rests on three major sources. The John F. Kennedy Memorial Library in Boston has the official record of the Peace Corps as a government agency, 1961-1963. This consists of internal memoranda, the Peace Corps' weekly reports to the President and records of the Director's staff meetings. Complementing these, the personal and organisational papers of two former Peace Corps staff members, William Josephson and Gerald Bush are also lodged at the Library. I found both of inestimable value. In addition, the Library holds transcripts of numerous oral history interviews of which I made extensive use.

In the Peace Corps Archives in Washington D.C., I was given full access to previously classified documents relating to the agency's origins, policies, programmes and performance. There are literally hundreds of thousands of papers available for inspection. In particular, I relied on the Evaluation Reports of Peace Corps country programmes. Written by the agency's own "evaluators", these are lengthy, detailed and often brutally frank reports on every aspect of the Peace Corps as it functioned overseas. Many contain

* Director's Staff Meeting, March 30, 1961.
Sargent Shriver and other senior staff members' handwritten comments in the margin. I am indebted to the ACTION agency for declassifying nearly sixty of these reports on my behalf.

As well as these two sources, I was dependent upon published government documents, newspapers and periodicals, and secondary works on the Peace Corps. I also paid a short, but profitable, visit to the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas. However, my third major source came in the form of personal meetings and interviews with over sixty former members of the Kennedy administration, the Peace Corps organisation and the Volunteers themselves. I have limited quotations from these conversations to short phrases which were recorded verbatim and to facts and hypotheses which can be supported either by context or documentary evidence. However, these interviews allowed me the privilege of a fresh, and vital perspective on John F. Kennedy's Peace Corps and - to a great extent - provided the insight necessary to make this small contribution to its history.
INTRODUCTION
"Well, they may ask you what you have done in the sixties for your country, and you will be able to say, 'I served in the Peace Corps'."

-JOHN F. KENNEDY -

(Remarks To The Peace Corps Staff, June 14, 1962)

"The Peace Corps is one of the finest programs ever evolved by the United States and gives Americans a chance in many nations to put our best foot forward, to harness the tremendous goodwill, and the generosity, and the dedication and the idealism of the American people."

-JIMMY CARTER-

(Remarks To The Peace Corps Staff, May 23, 1979)
On March 1, 1981, the Peace Corps will celebrate its twentieth anniversary. Over those two decades its fortunes have fluctuated greatly. Advocated by John F. Kennedy during the 1960 Presidential campaign and established within the first hundred days of his administration, it became—according to his biographer, Theodore C. Sorensen—"the most stirring symbol of Kennedy's hope and promise."¹ Yet, in the later 1960's and throughout the 1970's it seemed as if that promise might go unfulfilled. However, as the 1980's approached, the Peace Corps rallied under President Carter and embarked upon what was termed its "second Spring."² Of course, strictly speaking, what happened to the Peace Corps after 1963 is not part of this history. Nevertheless, in order to place Kennedy's Peace Corps in proper context, it is worthwhile making a brief, overall assessment of the agency in the years between 1960 and 1980.

The Peace Corps is a government agency which sends young Americans into the Third World to work at grassroots levels and help poorer peoples help themselves.³ In the process, it is hoped that the people who work in the Peace Corps—the Volunteer—will supply a needed technical service, give foreign nations the opportunity to get to know Americans and allow Americans to become more thoroughly acquainted with other cultures and mores. As defined by the Peace Corps Act of 1961, these became known as the "Three Aims." The Peace Corps recruits, selects, supervises and provides material support for its Volunteers; they must be American citizens, eighteen years old or over and either possess, or be capable of being trained in, a skill. The vast majority of Volunteers are university or college graduates with a Bachelor of Arts degree; however, no academic qualification is necessary for service. When selected by the Peace Corps, applicants undergo a three month period of intensive training in a basic skill and then serve a two year stint in a designated country. The intention is to
provide manpower which will help countries satisfy their essential human needs - education, health, nutrition, energy and general community development. As Sargent Shriver, the first Director of the Peace Corps put it: "There is nothing complicated about what the Peace Corps is trying to accomplish. The Volunteer is a catalyst for self-help projects that will produce something of value that was not there before he arrived. It is that simple." 4

In the Kennedy era, the Peace Corps was regarded both at home and abroad as an outstanding success on a foreign policy stage increasingly beset by problems and dissent. Kennedy praised the Peace Corps for contributing a "fresh, personal meaning to our diplomacy." 5 By the time of his assassination, over 7000 Volunteers were serving in 44 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Far East. Despite the death of the President who had inspired it with his invocation to "ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country", the Peace Corps continued to expand. Indeed, in 1966, it reached its zenith with 15,556 Volunteers involved in various kinds of work in more than 7000 separate locations. On the domestic front, hardly a word of criticism was heard; the Peace Corps was adjudged a nonpartisan issue by both left and right. Overseas, it was one of the few American government organisations not associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. Moreover, it was constantly being requested to increase its presence in foreign lands. 6

Much of the Peace Corps' excellent reputation was attributable to the extraordinary qualities of leadership possessed by Sargent Shriver, its Director between 1961 and 1966. With a genius for organisation and an uncompromising idealism, he supplied the energy and the aptitude not only to create the Peace Corps, but to make it the most admired government institution in Washington. Even Shriver's most severe
critics conceded that he "epitomised the New Frontier better than anyone else among Kennedy's cadres." Shriver personally demanded of both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson that the Peace Corps should have independent status and not be used as an arm of American foreign policy. In achieving these goals, he supervised an operation which in inception, style and character was unique in American history. In a sense, the early 1960's was the perfect time for the Peace Corps. There was widespread affluence, the black revolution had not yet begun and Vietnam was only a rumble on the horizon. As William Manchester noted, "The liberal hero of the hour who in the 1930's had been the angry young workman, in the 1940's the G.I., and in the 1950's the youth misunderstood by his mother, had become, in the early 1960's, the dedicated Peace Corpsman battling hunger and disease with the tools of peace."3

However, with Sargent Shriver's departure in 1966, difficulties emerged that were to plague the Peace Corps until the present day. The American war effort in Vietnam eventually led to conflict within the Peace Corps. A substantial number of Volunteers began to see a contradiction between striving to "serve" the native peoples of one Third World country while the American government attacked and killed the native peoples of another. Jack Vaughn, Shriver's successor, found it well-nigh impossible to maintain an idealistic, uninvolved stance for the Peace Corps. Volunteers were censured and brought home between 1966 and 1968 for making political statements indicting their homeland as an "imperialist aggressor." The Committee of Returned Volunteers, formed in 1964, became an important spearhead of the general anti-war protest movement. In the light of the Vietnam war overseas and the apparent discovery of what Michael Harrington called "the Other America" at home (that is, the ill-educated, deprived, poverty-stricken minority groups), the clarity of national purpose that had characterised the Kennedy years faded in the heat of a new and more troubled style of
politics. Peace Corps recruitment numbers fell as more and more young people devoted their time and energy to underprivileged Americans through the domestic programme, Volunteers In Service To America (V.I.S.T.A.) Besides, on college campuses - the traditional heartland of Peace Corps recruits - there developed a sceptical attitude towards American altruism; this soon spread abroad. Accordingly between 1966 and 1973, the Peace Corps was obliged to leave sixteen countries.

The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 was another serious blow to an already weakened Peace Corps. His neurotic dislike for John Kennedy is well-documented. To Nixon, the Peace Corps remained as a physical manifestation of "Camelot" and the effete liberalism which he felt Kennedy had represented. He especially disapproved of some Volunteers' vociferous criticism of American policy in Vietnam. Nixon had poured vitriolic abuse upon the Peace Corps proposal during the 1960 Presidential campaign; ten years later, he found himself with an opportunity to deactivate it. He did this subtly, but nonetheless effectively.

In July 1971, Nixon created a new Federal agency entitled ACTION, which was to serve as an umbrella for all domestic and overseas voluntary programmes including the Peace Corps. He sacked Jack Vaughn - an experienced staff member of the Kennedy era - and emasculated the Peace Corps' autonomy by an Executive Order that gave total control of its policies to the ACTION Chief. He also robbed it of its impartial nature by giving its top staff positions to his political appointees. Both Directors of ACTION during the Nixon era, Joseph H. Blatchford (1971 - 73) and Michael P. Balzano (1973-76), were staunch Republicans and ardent Nixon supporters. With the catchphrase of "New Directions", they succeeded in distorting the original thrust of the Peace Corps. They no longer concentrated on the so-called "B.A. generalist" type of Volunteer working at a grassroots level. Instead, they sought older, more qualified personnel with specific technical skills for use in sophisticated urban programmes.
Experienced Peace Corps staffers had learned from the past that not only were specialists extremely difficult to recruit, but—despite their expertise—often did not have the enthusiasm, adaptability and ultimately, the people-to-people impact of the well-trained, dedicated generalist.

Under Nixon, Peace Corps staff and Volunteers were demoralised. Furthermore, the agency lost its independence and became incarcerated in a massive new bureaucracy. (APPENDIX I) President Gerald Ford (who, as a congressman, had voted for the Peace Corps in 1961), did nothing to halt the decline. The Peace Corps' budget was cut by a colossal 47 per cent and, by 1976, Volunteer numbers had fallen below 6000—a drop of 60 per cent from the 15,000 of 1966. In Washington and overseas, the Peace Corps was regarded as just another technical assistance organisation. Moreover, many members of the public were uncertain as to whether it was still in existence. With his well-renowned instinct for the jugular, it seemed that Richard Nixon had succeeded in strangling the Peace Corps. 11

Ironically, the mother of the man who became President in 1976—Jimmy Carter—had been a rather senior Peace Corps Volunteer in India in the late 1960's. Encouraged by "Miss Lillian", Carter set about the daunting task of not only restoring the Peace Corps to health, but suiting its policies and programmes to the much-changed world order of the late 1970's and 1980's. Vietnam, Watergate and the C.I.A. revelations had fostered a cynicism in the Third World towards the much—vaunted idealism of the United States. Some countries refused Peace Corps participation in their affairs and there was a definite feeling among Third World leaders that American assistance was paternalistic and rooted in self-interest. Simultaneously, there had been a strong and steady development of nationalistic consciousness among the emerging states. Also, they had gained substantial economic and hence, political power—perhaps best epitomised by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.).
This led many underdeveloped countries to establish indigenous self-help programmes rather than submissively depend upon the offerings of Western voluntary services.

In America too, critics of the Peace Corps argued that it had become an anachronism, a hold-over from the Kennedy years when New Frontiersmen believed that the best and the brightest of American youth could go forth among the poverty-stricken nations and bring them salvation. Two of the most virulent critics were Kevin Lowther (a former Volunteer) and G. Payne Lucas (one of the first Peace Corps administrators) who claimed in their book, *Keeping Kennedy's Promise*, that "the great majority of Volunteers have been sent abroad without sufficient skill, without sufficient language ability, without sufficient cultural awareness - and without a clear or critical job assignment. They are the unmet hope of the Peace Corps." Lowther and Lucas argued that the goodwill and belief in American amateurism ("can-doism") characteristic of the Peace Corps in the Kennedy years, had done little to help satisfy the real development needs of the Third World. This revisionist interpretation shocked and upset Sargent Shriver and many other Peace Corps officials. Indeed, one of them wrote Lucas a 300-page rebuttal. However, Sam Brown, appointed by Carter as Director of ACTION in 1977, agreed with Lowther and Lucas. Moreover, he added the charge that Kennedy's Peace Corps had been an instrument of American cultural imperialism. "Fifteen years ago, we felt we knew everything, could do anything, were always right," said Brown. "That was Camelot and Camelot gave us Vietnam. Now we no longer believe we can go out and change the world." 

In 1977, many political observers viewed Brown as the perfect personality to guide the Peace Corps into its "second Spring." The organiser of the Vietnam Moratorium and the Students - for-McCarthy crusade in 1968, Brown was seen as the symbol of the end of the era of upheaval - the radical young war protestor turned government servant.
He was sympathetic to the sensitivities of the Third World, and a keen disciple of the controversial economist E.P. Schumacher, who believed that aid should concentrate on people and be labour-intensive rather than technically-oriented and capital-intensive. Cushioning his statements in the language of the New Left, Brown spoke encouragingly of focusing the Peace Corps' resources on "basic human needs" and placing it "on the cutting edge of social and economic change." His progressive inclinations were well-illustrated by his choice of Peace Corps Director: a black, female professor of psychology from Howard University named Carolyn R. Payton.

Yet, despite all the good omens, a brief honeymoon period of great expectation was followed by just as much turmoil and disappointment as before. Brown's background made him a target of both liberals and conservatives; his former allies on the left, like Congressman Michael Harrington, accused him of "selling out"; those on the right, like House Republican Whip Robert Michels, depicted him as a wild-eyed socialist. Charges of maladministration, political cronyism and chronic ineptitude were laid against Brown. Critics pounced on his mooted plans for Volunteers to protest against multinational corporations in the Third World and for unemployed black youths from Harlem to go to Jamaica as a people-to-people project. It was even rumoured that Brown intended to send a Peace Corps contingent to communist Cuba. To many, it seemed as if he was subverting the essential non-political nature of the Peace Corps. Certainly, his decision to withdraw Peace Corps services from Nicaragua, Chad and Afghanistan was based on his personal distaste for the political complexion of their governments. Brown's strident, often oversimplistic criticism of Kennedy's Peace Corps as "a missionary band out to save the world" did not help him.

Not only did it irritate the Congress - where the Peace Corps had many longstanding advocates - but also the Peace Corps staff, many of whom remained loyal to the ideals inspired by Kennedy. Matters came to a
head when Brown clashed with Carolyn Payton over the future direction of the Peace Corps. Under shameful and well-publicised circumstances, Payton was sacked in November 1978. Once again, the Peace Corps was leaderless and in a state of complete disarray.

Throughout the first half of 1979 there was bitter debate in the Congress as to whether the Peace Corps should be taken away from Brown, out of ACTION, and made autonomous within an international Development Cooperation Administration - a new unit proposed under President Carter's foreign aid reorganisation plan. Many people felt that, in the best interests of the Peace Corps, such an extreme measure was necessary. For example, former Volunteer of the Kennedy era, Senator Paul E. Tsongas of Massachusetts, claimed that the Peace Corps needed "a fresh start... out of politics." 17

Thus, in the summer of 1979, the Peace Corps was at its most momentous juncture since its inception in 1961; one congressman even feared, "The Peace Corps may not survive." 18 There was argument within the agency, debate in the Congress and a general confusion in the public mind regarding the future relevance of the Peace Corps. Sargent Shriver entered the controversy and defended what the Peace Corps had represented under Kennedy. "We were seekers. We were hopers," he said, "We committed ourselves intellectually in the past to a concept of conduct and purpose and we are now wondering whether we were right. And if right, are we out of date now?" In conclusion, Shriver raised the fundamental question at issue: "Is there any substance to the Peace Corps idea today or are we just survivors of Camelot?" 19
On May 16, 1979, President Carter took decisive steps towards resolving the crisis with an Executive Order re-establishing the Peace Corps as an autonomous agency within ACTION. Carter endowed the Peace Corps Director with total power over the budget, programmes, and support functions necessary to the efficient maintenance of the organisation. Moreover, he explained that "The purpose of this order is to strengthen the vitality, visibility and independence of the Peace Corps while preserving its position as a joint venture with our domestic volunteer service programs within the framework of ACTION."

Debate continued in the Congress until, on July 31, 1979 it confirmed the President's decision by voting to keep the Peace Corps in ACTION, but with independent decision-making powers. Both Houses reaffirmed their confidence in Carter's proposal by immediately authorising the Peace Corps a budget of 105.4 million dollars for fiscal year 1980, a 40 per cent increase over the last figure of the Ford administration.

In the summer of 1979, Carter appointed a new Peace Corps Director, Richard D. Celeste. Celeste, who helped organise the Youth-For-Kennedy movement in 1960 and was an administrator in the Peace Corps in 1963, immediately stressed his commitment to the New Frontier ethos of public service and pragmatic idealism. However, he clearly recognised that the Peace Corps would have to adapt to the needs of the modern world. Nevertheless he envisioned an exciting future for the Peace Corps. "As we move into the 1980's," said Celeste, "I believe many of our citizens will commit their personal experience and energy to work as joint ventures in village-level development efforts throughout the Third World." Working off a base of 6,300 Volunteers in 63 countries, Celeste spoke of making the Peace Corps more "international", by working with the United Nations and indigenous service organisations; more "reciprocal", by inviting native counterpart volunteers to work in the United States; and more oriented towards "appropriate technology" by making extensive use of host countries' resources and skills. With a healthy respect for both the strengths and weaknesses of the agency in the past, Celeste promised
a Peace Corps evolving towards "a fresh sense of partnership and mutual respect because these days the leaders of the Third World countries in which we operate have a clear idea of how they want to develop and how we can work alongside them." 22

The Peace Corps in 1980 did not appear as the pioneering, exciting new idea that it had done in 1960. In fact, the agency never really recovered the glamour and appeal of the Kennedy era. Yet, in twenty years despite political machinations, leadership crises and radically changing global conditions, some 90,000 young Americans gave two years of their lives in service to the world's underprivileged - the largest American non-military overseas operation in history. In many ways, 1979-80 was as crucial a period for the Peace Corps as 1960-61. The confusion within and without the agency was resolved and the steady decline in funding and in Volunteer numbers was arrested. Perhaps even more significantly, with renewed Presidential support and public interest, and with a vigorous young Director, the Peace Corps looked more maturely robust than at any time since its heyday in the early 1960's. As Vice-President Walter Mondale remarked in May 1979:

"Today the Peace Corps has resumed its priority in our government... for this administration believes in the importance of voluntary efforts. Whether in the fight to rebuild our cities, the delivery of social services or assisting the Third World, we are committed to tapping the energies of dedicated volunteers... President Carter has rekindled the dream of President Kennedy." 23
The history of John F. Kennedy's dream, 1961-3, and how it became reality is the subject of the following dissertation. However, there can be no doubt that the Peace Corps remains relevant to the modern world and it is fitting that it should be seen in that context. In many ways, the Peace Corps was the New Frontier's most original, most visible bequest to history - certainly its most idealistic. Even in the early 1960's, President Johnson sensed that Kennedy's new agency was a link with both the American past and the future. "History is going to be written about your movement," he told a group of Peace Corpsmen, "about what you have done, about the contributions you have made, what you have done to defeat the ancient enemies of mankind - disease, hunger, poverty and illiteracy, bigotry, hatred and prejudice. You will have kept afire the torch of service that has been part of America's tradition from the time we were born."
PART I

THE PEACE CORPS / ORGANISATION
"I recall feeling myself a very instrumental part of what I thought would be the beginnings of an historical precedent on a significant scale. The Peace Corps denoted an idea and a movement....the organisation was incidental....the idea is the crux. It emerged long before the Peace Corps....The American Peace Corps was only the form that carried forth this idea at this stage of history."

- PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER -

(Quoted in Evaluation Report On Recruiting by David Gelman and Patricia Mc Dermott, May 1965)
President Kennedy proudly claimed that the concept of the Peace Corps was "entirely new." Certainly the idea of the United States government recruiting, training, selecting and financing Americans to do philanthropic work in the Third World was original. However, numerous individuals and voluntary organizations had provided relevant precedents. In *Democracy In America*, first published in 1835, the eminent French scholar, Alexis de Tocqueville, noted that Americans were happiest when doing things for others. "These Americans are an unusual people," he wrote. "When they see a problem - a canal to be dug or a school to be built - they immediately form a group or a committee, whatever is necessary to get the job done." During the debate on the Peace Corps bill in the House of Representatives in 1961, Congressman Henry Reuss of Wisconsin - one of the new agency's founding fathers - counted Saint Benedict, Frederick Jackson Turner, Henry Thoreau, Theodore Roosevelt, William James and Franklin D. Roosevelt among its spiritual precursors. "Each idea," concluded Reuss; "the humanitarianism of the missionaries, the frontier of Turner, the 'obedience to the heart' of Thoreau, the strenuous life of Roosevelt, William James's 'moral equivalent of war' and the world fellowship of F.D.R. - each has played its part in the fashioning of the Peace Corps." It was a significant point. Viewed in the broad sweep of history, the Peace Corps continued traditions and adapted methods already established by religious missions, private voluntary organizations and government agencies. "Wars come out of tempers, not out of circumstances," the Reverend Charles Jefferson told the one hundredth anniversary meeting of the American Board of Foreign Missions in 1910: "Our best defense is not weapons, but the goodwill of islands of human beings around the world, healed in our hospitals, taught in our schools." On such principles, John F. Kennedy founded the Peace Corps in 1961.
Christian missionaries were the most obvious predecessors of Peace Corps Volunteers. From the very discovery of the New World, Franciscan friars demonstrated the effectiveness of the grassroots, people-to-people approach which came to distinguish the Peace Corps. By working with natives on equal terms, teaching them useful skills and imparting improved medical techniques, the missionary fathers fulfilled their religious beliefs while making friends and raising living standards. Sixteenth century American Indians praised and admired the friars who went about "poorly dressed and barefooted like us; they eat what we eat, they settle down among us, and their intercourse with us is gentle." New England missionaries continued in the Franciscan vein. In 1648, John Eliot proposed that the poverty-stricken Indians of Massachusetts should be taught "letters, Trades and Labours, as building, fishing, Flax and Hemp dressing, planting orchards etc.," in order to settle and pacify them. From 1809 onwards, Christian evangelists from the United States travelled overseas not only to preach the Gospel, but to build schools, teach trades, and educate doctors and nurses. It was significant that the first American missionary group to Hawaii, which sailed from New England on October 24, 1819, included two teachers, one doctor, one printer and a farmer. With the intention of "raising up the whole people to an elevated state of Christian civilisation," they initiated all types of community development projects.

In 1886, the Student Volunteer Movement was formed from a student conference in Massachusetts. Backed by charitable contributions from their home parishes, a few thousand college graduates travelled to underdeveloped countries in the three decades before World War One. They followed the religious precept of "the evangelisation of the world in this generation." However, they took plumbing, literacy, education and health care - as well as Protestantism - to the peoples of Asia. In the early twentieth century, Sam Higginbottom, a Presbyterian minister, took modern
agricultural techniques to India, in addition to his religious zeal. His notable success proved a persuasive factor in the decision of the national mission councils of India to undertake technical assistance as a relevant manifestation of Christian witness. Of course, American missionaries in China provided medical care and training, assisted in agrarian reform and taught useful languages, skills and various subjects throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the historian J.K. Fairbank has pointed out, the "missionary enterprise" in China endeavoured in countless ways to improve the lives of the natives in this world as well as to prepare them for the next.

Many voluntary religious organisations established themselves in modern times: Catholic Relief Services, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the National Lutheran Council, the Church World Service and so forth. Indeed, as Kennedy set up the Peace Corps in 1961, there were over thirty-three thousand missionaries abroad, under the auspices of some four hundred religious bodies. Moreover, Norman J. Parmer, one of the Peace Corps' first overseas administrators, suggested that Volunteers only carried out "in greater numbers and without religious connotations much of the same work which church and church-inspired groups have done for many years." Given this, it was slightly ironical that the First Amendment, with its demand for the complete separation of church and state, prevented the Peace Corps from contracting directly with religious organisations - much to the chagrin of American missionaries.

Yet, in a way, Peace Corps Volunteers could not escape the connection with their religious forbears. Some congressmen deemed the Peace Corps a pre-emption of the church's role overseas and objected to this "federalisation of the missionary movement." Others only wished Volunteers would display a little of the ardour so characteristic of religious groups. "The missionary is dedicated to the spreading
of the philosophy of religion," said Frank Moss, Democratic Senator from Utah, "the Peace Corps man must be dedicated, among other things, to spreading a philosophy of government." Senator Stephen Young (D., Ohio) demanded that Volunteers show "the zeal of hardy missionaries... by example, they will win friends for America and our way of life." Viewing the Volunteers as latter-day apostles, Senator Stuart Symington (D., Missouri) concluded, "there is nothing better than to have young Americans spread the doctrine of free enterprise, and carry abroad word of what our country stands for." Of course, Volunteers were strictly forbidden to preach or proselytise in any manner whatsoever. Nevertheless, Congress and the public wished upon them the missionary zeal of their holy ancestors - even if it was to be spent propounding "Americanism" rather than a religious faith. Peace Corps officials also were conscious of the missionary precedent. Indeed, in a 1963 report critical of a programme in Morocco, staff member Kenneth Love claimed the Peace Corps sometimes lacked the dedication so necessary for working among the uneducated and destitute of north Africa. "After all," he said wistfully, "we were going to be the Franciscan friars of overseas aid."

However, the philanthropic impulse in the American past was by no means confined to the religious milieu. As the New York Times observed in an editorial in March 1961, the Peace Corps "spirit" could be traced back to the days when "the great procession of covered wagons rolled across our continent." Once a frontiersman had erected his own barn he moved into the next field and helped a neighbour. On meeting the very first group of Peace Corps Volunteers to go overseas - road surveyors bound for Tanganyika - President Kennedy was reminded of the frontier ethos. "I'm particularly glad that you are going there to help open up the back land," he told them. Sargent Shriver agreed that the Peace Corps was "a milestone
on the way to a new era of American pioneering." Certainly, the
notion of the "doer" rather than the "adviser" appealed to Yankee
traditions of industriousness and self-reliance.

Besides, the Biblical maxim, "from those to whom much is given,
much is required" was deeply imbedded in the American Protestant
heritage. In the nineteenth century, as Frederick Merk wrote,
"Philanthropy for public purposes was encouraged as part of the
American tradition." For example, in 1820, before he embarked upon
his great career of service to the infirm at home, Dr. Samuel Gridley
Howe of Massachusetts went overseas to impart knowledge of up-to-date
medical methods and western agricultural improvements to peoples of
the Near East. On the domestic front, Andrew Carnegie, Jane Addams,
Frances Perkins, Herbert Lehman and Henry Morgenthau Jr. provided
obvious examples of the deeply-held altruistic convictions of nine­
teenth century Americans. This tradition of "noblesse oblige" was
not lost on John Kennedy when he assumed leadership of the richest
and most powerful country in the world. He often reminded his
contemporaries that "Western Europe and the United States really are
islands of prosperity in a sea of poverty. South of us live hundreds
of millions of people on the edge of starvation, and I think it is
essential that we demonstrate....our concern for their welfare."

Kennedy felt the Peace Corps gave America the opportunity to be of
assistance, "not merely in the cold field of economic help, but in
the human relations which must exist for a happy understanding between
people."

In the twentieth century, there was a proliferation of voluntary
assistance organisations. These were to prove highly significant for
the Peace Corps. Not only did they contribute useful advice and
experience, but they also provided individuals who were to play
important roles in the development of the new agency. Harris Wofford,
one of the major architects of the Peace Corps, helped set up the
International Development Placement Association. In the early 1950's,
this organisation sent a small number of technically-skilled graduates to the Third World. Wofford later described it as "a little pilot program of the Peace Corps." Albert Sims, first head of the Peace Corps Division of University Relations, spent eight years at the International Institute of Education in charge of its overseas exchange programmes. Senator Jacob Javits of New York, one of the few leading Republicans to endorse the Peace Corps in 1961, claimed he had been part of a private effort to send young Americans to help the poor peoples of Latin America just after World War Two. "I have been on this wicket for years," he told his colleagues. Likewise, John Brademas (D., Ind.) informed his fellow congressmen that, while in college, he had embarked on a "Peace Corps type" venture among the Aztecs. Of course, he voted in favour of the Peace Corps bill. One of the co-sponsors of the bill in the Senate, Claiborne Pell (D., R.I.), had served as a Vice-President of the International Rescue Committee. In turn, this private body backed M.E.D.I.C.O., the overseas medical aid mission which numbered among its members Dr. Tom Dooley. Harlan Cleveland, formerly a top official in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and later, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisations, lent all his experience to the Peace Corps during its formative period. Cleveland's background and his continued interest in people-to-people programmes ensured that the Peace Corps would not be without a friend in the State Department.

Cleveland had also been a member of one of the most well-known private voluntary organisations in America - the Experiment In International Living. Launched in 1932, by Dr. Donald B. Watt, the Experiment encouraged cross-cultural exchange through the placement of young Americans with native families overseas. Although only established on a small scale, some of the "Experimenters" proved major influences on the evolution of the Peace Corps. Henry Reuss, the Democratic congressman who introduced the first Peace Corps legislation in 1960, was married to a former Experimenter; moreover one of his children actually took part in the Experiment's summer
programme in 1960. The Peace Corps' first Chief of Private Organisations and a key adviser in 1961, was Gordon Boyce, a former President of the Experiment In International Living. Another Experimenter who had led groups to Europe in the late 1930's contributed more to the development and execution of the Peace Corps than any other single individual: this was Sargent Shriver, Director and inspiration of the new organisation.

Numerous other private bodies had given a lead to the Peace Corps in the kind of task it was to undertake overseas. In 1960, the Quaker-sponsored American Friends Service Committee expressed its aim of world peace and understanding by extending its previously American-based camps to India and Africa. Through these Voluntary International Service Assignments, young Americans shared work-loads and community services with native peoples. The International Farm Youth Exchange sent young people to underdeveloped countries to help improve agricultural techniques. Operation Crossroads Africa, established in 1957 by a Harlem minister, James H. Robinson, was one of the most effective promoters of understanding between Americans and Africans. The Operation's volunteers paid half their own costs for a summer's work-and-study tour of an African country; the other half came from donations. Although they were not technically-skilled, volunteers were encouraged to participate in community development projects in Africa. The emphasis was on people-to-people contact by whatever means possible. Significantly, James Robinson went on to serve as the first Vice-Chairman of the Peace Corps' National Advisory Council. Furthermore, in addressing a group from Operation Crossroads Africa in 1962, President Kennedy chose to amend slightly his earlier statement that the Peace Corps was "entirely new." Indeed, he conceded, "This group and this effort really were the 22 progenitors of the Peace Corps."
The Cooperative for American Remittances Everywhere (C.A.R.E.), the National 4-H Club Foundation, Project Hope, Volunteers for International Development, and the African-American Institute were among fifty other voluntary and non-profit private agencies engaged in assistance programmes to the Third World. At the same time, many universities and colleges developed their own voluntary aid schemes. These ranged from brief periods of service during vacations to years of work overseas at the graduate level. Harvard, Yale, Columbia, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Williams and the University of California were only a few of the larger educational institutions involved. In the postwar era, the volunteer working in the villages and jungles of the Third World, became something of a folk-hero. The achievements of Dr. Tom Dooley, who brought advanced medical techniques to the peoples of Southeast Asia, were particularly well publicised. In 1960 a "pop" record which sung the praises of "Tom Dooley" sold over two million copies. Indeed, during his first public announcement on the Peace Corps, John Kennedy remarked on how struck he had been by the "selfless example of Dr. Tom Dooley."

However, Dooley's admirable but lone performance was not the most accurate forerunner of the Peace Corps programme. A private group entitled International Voluntary Services (I.V.S.) was a closer prototype. Founded by Christian leaders from various countries in 1953, I.V.S. contracted with both governments and private agencies. Like the Peace Corps it was non-denominational; also, like the Peace Corps, it sought to make an impact at grassroots levels. Its volunteers were college graduates on a two-year contract, they were paid only subsistence wages and trained in a specific skill. Between 1953 and 1961, I.V.S. sent nearly two hundred young Americans overseas to work in native communities. Peace Corps Volunteers were identical in almost every respect; the major difference being that they were direct employees of the United States government. However, I.V.S. was so similar in every other way that proponents of the Peace Corps in 1960,
cited it as a working example of their idea. In proposing what he called a "Point Four Youth Corps," Henry Reuss used the work of I.V.S. in Vietnam as an argument in his favour:

"The May, 1960 report of the I.V.S. team in Vietnam gives an exciting account of how the dozen or so young Americans comprising the team have been conveying agricultural know-how to the Vietnamese on a shirt-sleeve basis. Those who have become disillusioned with our foreign aid program will find themselves singing 'three cheers for the red, white and blue' when they hear about what these young Americans are doing in Vietnam. It may well be a model for what the Point Four Youth Corps seeks to accomplish." 25

Advocates of the Peace Corps also pointed out that many European countries had enjoyed considerable success with their assistance programmes. Some of these were partially financed by national governments. For instance, Australia's Volunteer Graduate Association, West Germany's Council for Development Aid and Holland's Bureau for International Technical Assistance. Of particular distinction was Britain's Voluntary Services Overseas (V.S.O.). Founded by Alec Dickson, a former United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (U.N.E.S.C.O.) worker, V.S.O. was financed by a small grant from the government as well as private contributions. It began sending British youngsters (aged between 18 and 24) overseas in 1958. They were given a very brief training and were required to serve for two years. Although it was a very limited operation (there were only eighty-five workers overseas in 1960), V.S.O.'s similarities to the proposed Peace Corps, and its success, made it one of the more timely precedents of the latter organisation.

The steady growth of private voluntary agencies, in number and strength, was an important factor in persuading the United States government to institute the Peace Corps. In 1960, U.N.E.S.C.O.'s Coordination Committee listed 133 work camps in 32 countries with 80 different organisations as patrons. Almost all of these were private in sponsorship and funds. However, that Americans were in favour of the effort was beyond question. Between 1940 and 1960,
they donated over three billion dollars to private assistance organisations. This seemed to indicate that the public would not be averse to the formation of a national voluntary service agency. The generally excellent record of the private bodies helped. The Peace Corps' supporters put even more pressure on the government to make the idea official policy - and to back that policy with Treasury funds. Indeed, Sargent Shriver went so far as to claim, "It was the success of these private efforts which led to the development of the Peace Corps idea."

The Federal government sometimes contracted with private agencies and universities to carry out specific technical and educational services overseas. Indeed, by 1960, over fifty universities had such contracts in thirty-seven countries. However, in the main, the United States government did not consider grassroots assistance programmes to be its responsibility. The first significant suggestion of a government-sponsored "peace army" limited its scope to working within the continental United States. In 1904, during an address to the Universal Peace Conference in Boston, the philosopher William James proposed that the government should conscript young men to work among the deprived people of America. James argued this would not only ameliorate the conditions of the poor, but would provide an outlet for baser, aggressive instincts which, he claimed, were an intrinsic part of man's nature. He extended his abstract in 1911 in an essay entitled The Moral Equivalent Of War. "The war against war," he wrote, "is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party." For the greater good of American society, James suggested young men should be packed off to:
"coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dishwashing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas. They would have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in the immemorial human warfare against nature." 30

Not surprisingly, James's plan for a "peace army" was totally disregarded by the government. Conscription was repugnant to the American public and this rendered the plan politically unfeasible.

Ironically, about the time of James's pronouncement of a "Moral Equivalent of War," hundreds of young American school-teachers and missionaries were answering President William McKinley's call to "educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilise and Christianise them." Following the Spanish War of 1898, the "Thomasites" named after the ship, the U.S.S. Thomas, in which they sailed - went to the Philippines to help develop an education system there. Many were young college graduates imbued with the desire to teach the natives about democracy and Protestantism; others were veterans of the Spanish War. By 1902, there were over a thousand of them in the Philippines. Despite their messianic spirit, the Thomasites endeared themselves to the natives by teaching in the barrios (the local communities), living in makeshift homes and enduring hardships with them. They were noteworthy as the first technical assistance volunteers to be linked with the government - although this association was tenuous. Since the Philippine Islands had the official status of an "unincorporated territory", the Thomasites received little direct Federal support. As "volunteers" they commanded no salaries but rather lived off funds sent by American religious bodies and charities. The Thomasites were representative only of a private response to what had been little more than an informal Presidential exhortation. Nevertheless, they remained in the Philippines until 1933 and their example was not entirely forgotten. During the congressional hearings on the Peace Corps in 1961, Sargent Shriver was advised by Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, to keep the Thomasites in mind as "a source of considerable knowledge and experience." Furthermore, in one of the very first Peace Corps programmes, hundreds of teachers were assigned to the Philippines.

During the years of the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's youth organisation programmes bore a certain resemblance to the Peace Corps. Although the Civilian Conservation Corps had a somewhat militaristic style, with its members wearing uniforms and living in large camps, its notion of young Americans in service to the community was inherent in the Peace Corps. The Conservation Corps was limited to projects in American public parks and it was aimed primarily at the unemployed; yet, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Special Assistant to President Kennedy, argued that in its origins at least, the Peace Corps was "undoubtedly suggested by Roosevelt's C.C.C." The National Youth Administration, although again limited to the domestic scene, came even closer to the ideals of the Peace Corps. Over two million students and nearly three million jobless youths took on a wide range of activities - building schools and hospitals, teaching illiterate adults, exterminating rats and digging roads. Besides, the Youth Administration did not have the paramilitary characteristics of the Conservation Corps. In January, 1961, an Editorial Research Report investigating the Peace Corps proposal noted that "N.Y.A. youths performed a kind of domestic Point Four service at a time when economic conditions in some parts of the United States differed little from those in underdeveloped countries today." An interesting footnote on the National Youth Administration was that one of its young officials in Texas went on to play a vital part in the survival of the Peace Corps as an independent agency; he was Lyndon B. Johnson.
As war broke out in Europe in 1940, H.G. Wells wrote of a New World Order in which dedicated scientists and teachers would replace marching soldiers. The closest contemporary model was Franklin D. Roosevelt's Civilian Public Service which allowed conscientious objectors to substitute "useful service" within the domestic community for combat duty. However, the programme was a minor one and consisting as it did of "pacifists" who were refusing to fight for their country, did not evoke the most favourable of public responses. Indeed, the most vehement criticism of the Peace Corps in 1960 was that it might allow young Americans to "dodge the draft."

A series of developments after the Second World War obliged the United States to focus greater attention on its assistance programmes to the Third World. In the new and dangerous nuclear age, America became locked in a global struggle with the Soviet Union. Foreign policy strategists feared that the underdeveloped countries, in their dire need, would fall prey to communism. "The periphery of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away," warned John Kennedy.

"The balance of power will gradually shift against us. The key areas vital to our security will gradually undergo Soviet infiltration and domination....through Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-covert aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies." 36

In this atmosphere, the idea of technical assistance took on different connotations; as well as an expression of American idealism, it also became an instrument of an avidly anti-communist foreign policy. Kennedy was not alone in his interpretation of economic aid as "a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world and sustains a good many countries which would definitely collapse, or pass into the Communist bloc." To an extent, the Peace Corps was seen in this context. 37
Idealism and self-interest were inextricably entwined in most postwar American foreign policy initiatives. The billions of dollars doled out to the Third World under President Truman's Point Four programme evinced a generosity hitherto unknown in history; yet, there is little doubt that its major motivation was to fight communism. It began as a bold attempt at "shirt-sleeve diplomacy" and its great appeal lay in its people-to-people, "grass-roots" approach. However, in many cases the intended benefits did not "trickle down" to the lower echelons of society. As the anti-communist struggle intensified under President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles in the 1950's, Point Four concentrated more on governments than people. Throughout this period, critics attacked the International Cooperation Administration (I.C.A. was Eisenhower's foreign aid agency) and its policy of massive capital investment accompanied by a few expert advisers. Thus it was somewhat ironic that several of the Peace Corps' most outstanding administrators - men like Warren Wiggins and William Josephson - came from I.C.A.

As the decade wore on, opinion grew in favour of a government-backed assistance programme which would have a direct impact on native peoples. Congressman Henry Reuss was in the vanguard of a number of groups and individuals who declared the bankruptcy of American aid policies:

"Our grandiose Eisenhower-age economic type aid projects weren't really working. For example, in Cambodia I was struck that our principal and very expensive - some thirty million dollar - aid project to Cambodia was something designed to curry favour with Prince Sihanouk - an enormous superhighway from Phnom Penh....I pointed out that this had no impact at all on the average Cambodian who couldn't ever use this highway, and that great military projects like this were the mark of decadence. This is what the Roman Empire built in its last days....the Roman Empire built these vast highways....and then, to their embarrassment, the barbarians came down those highways and sacked Rome." 33
A group of World Federalists advanced the idea of a national voluntary "peace force" in 1950. In the same year, the Public Affairs Institute published a pamphlet proposing American "work centers" in the Third World. The United Automobile Workers, led by Walter Reuther, put forward a blue-print for young American engineers, teachers, doctors, nurses and agricultural specialists to use their energies and talents "to assist and train the people of underdeveloped countries."

David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority had a plan for a youth public service programme based largely on New Deal models. President Olpin of the University of Utah, urged the State Department to sponsor "missions" of young Americans to help the poorer peoples of the world. After visits to several Asian countries in the 1950's, Sargent Shriver submitted one of the more adventurous people-to-people schemes to President Eisenhower:

"I proposed a plan of sending three-man political action teams to Asia, Africa and Latin America. These teams were to consist of vigorous and imaginative young labor leaders, businessmen and politicians. They would offer their services at a grass-roots level and work directly with the people, contributing to the growth of the economies, to the democratic organisation of the societies and the peaceful outcome of the social revolutions under way."

The Republican administration ignored Shriver's suggestion. However, in later years he recalled, "The Peace Corps offered the possibility of realizing, in a new form, this old idea." 39

One of the most audible proponents of a "peace army" was Heinz Rollman, an industrialist refugee from Nazi Germany who had settled in North Carolina. In 1954, his book, *World Construction*, proposed that millions of skilled Americans should be conscripted by the government and sent to help Third World peoples "and thus make it possible for them to achieve their own necessities." Rollman's plan bore a likeness to the Peace Corps. For example, conscripts would be "carefully screened", trained in a technical skill, and given material support in the field. However, Rollman envisaged
his "peace army" playing a vigorous anti-communist role overseas. Indeed, he advised that any young men with "left wing political sympathies" should be immediately dismissed from service. This thorny question of political involvement was one which was to plague the Peace Corps.

Rollman, at this point a Democrat, sent a copy of his book to many congressmen and political figures. He even won the sanction of the doyen of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. In 1961, the Republican congressman from North Carolina, Charles Jonas, went so far as to acclaim Rollman as "the father of the Peace Corps." Certainly, Rollman gave some minor publicity to the idea of a people-to-people overseas programme; but, in practical terms, his earnest plea did little more than add another voice to an already crowded wilderness. He lacked a public platform, popular support and, most importantly, the energy and commitment of a prominent politician.

In the later 1950's, two members of the U.S. Congress at last aroused political interest in the Peace Corps idea. They began by making speeches to college groups about the possibility of a "Point Four Youth Corps" or a "Peace Corps." One of these men was Henry Reuss; the other, was the Democratic senator from Minnesota, Hubert Humphrey. Reuss traced his interest in the Peace Corps back to 1957 when, as a member of the Joint Economic Committee, he travelled to Southeast Asia to evaluate how American tax dollars were being spent overseas. He was not impressed by the capital-intensive projects then in operation. However, while in Cambodia, he chanced upon a U.N.E.S.C.O. team consisting of a few people from America and other countries. Reuss was struck by the effect these young teachers were having as they made their way through the jungle, setting up small schools in local villages.
"This seemed to me such a good idea," said Reuss, "that out of it, I generated the general concept of the Peace Corps." For the next three years, he spoke about a "Point Four Youth Corps" at student conferences and wrote articles in numerous magazines. Finally, in January, 1960, he introduced the first Peace Corps-type legislation. His bill, H.R. 9638, sought a study of "the advisability and practicability of the establishment of a Point Four Youth Corps."

Hubert Humphrey was one of the most highly-respected figures in the Democratic Party and a member of the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He recalled that, in 1957, he too had suggested the enlistment of talented young men and women in an overseas operation for education, health care, vocational training and community development:

"I envisioned a program of national service in an international endeavor. This was not to be a substitute for Selective Service, for the military. It was to be another dimension of American aid to the less fortunate - not in the form of massive economic aid but, rather, personal aid in the form of training and education." 44

Although Humphrey's scheme was always warmly received on college campuses, it did not inspire much enthusiasm in the State Department or the Senate. "Some traditional diplomats quaked at the thought of thousands of young Americans scattered across the world," he noted, "and many senators, including liberal ones, thought it a silly and unworkable idea." Nevertheless, Humphrey had his staff, led by Peter Grothe, investigate the prospect of a Peace Corps. After months of research, they concluded there was tremendous popular support for the idea and that it would be politically viable. Thus, in June, 1960, Humphrey presented in the Senate not just a proposal for the study of a "Peace Corps", but a full-fledged bill to send "young men to assist the peoples of the underdeveloped areas of the world to combat poverty, disease, illiteracy and hunger." 46
Humphrey, an experienced parliamentarian, realised it was too late in the session for his bill to have any hope of passing into legislation; but that had not been his main objective. "I wanted the bill to be printed and appropriately referred," he said, "so that it could be the subject of discussion and intensive study in the coming months." In this respect, he was successful. Indeed, some of the specific details of his bill, S. 3675, were incorporated into the Peace Corps as established in 1961. For example, it was a "separate agency" working in cooperation with the Department of State and I.C.A., volunteers served for two years and, in the first year, only five hundred entered the field. In other ways, the bill was not quite so accurate. He wanted to limit service to those under 21½ years old and he suggested it should be an alternative to the draft; neither of these conditions applied to the Peace Corps. However, although Humphrey's bill was not an identical precursor, it was close enough to have a telling effect on the Peace Corps' establishment. Besides this, it focused the congressional and the public eye on the Peace Corps idea at a crucial moment - just before the Presidential election of 1960.

Henry Rouss's bill actually had more legislative success than Humphrey's. In August, 1960, the House Foreign Affairs Committee added a rider to the Mutual Security Act which authorised ten thousand dollars for a study of a "Point Four Youth Corps." This study was to be carried out by a non-governmental research group, university or foundation. The contract was awarded to the Research Foundation at Colorado State University which reported its findings to the Congress in February, 1961. However, in a lengthy discussion of the Peace Corps idea, the House Foreign Affairs Committee criticised the Republican administration for having failed to take "vigorous action in this direction" beforehand. The Committee concluded that, should the study support the proposal, the Congress would expect the Executive branch to make a "serious and constructive effort to put the program into effective operation."
The Congress's commitment to the Peace Corps idea before 1961 was limited to this authorisation for a study of its general feasibility. Also, it tended to view the proposal from an anti-communist perspective. Hubert Humphrey told his colleagues, "The United States enjoying good relations with non-Communist countries and helping them along to economic self-sufficiency is much more persuasive to the Soviet Union than the most articulate statement prepared for a foreign ministers' summit conference." Yet, the discussion and attention centred on the Peace Corps in Congress gave legislators an introduction to the idea at an embryonic stage and even established a small base of support. Moreover, it was significant that the eventual Peace Corps Act of 1961, did not substantially differ from the basic models offered by Reuss and Humphrey. The objectives of the Point Four Youth Corps, as Reuss saw them, were:

"To make technical manpower available to United States agencies and to private agencies carrying out economic, medical, educational and community development programs in underdeveloped friendly countries; second, to assist in broadening the understanding by the peoples of other nations of the ideals and aspirations of Americans, through close contact with young Americans participating in the Point Four Youth Corps; third, to offer our young people the opportunity to serve their country in a stimulating way, while broadening their understanding of the problems facing other peoples and nations, and thereby helping them better to understand American policies and purposes abroad." 50

Essentially, Reuss's description encapsulated what became known as the "Three Aims" of the Peace Corps Act: to supply trained manpower, to give foreign peoples an understanding of Americans and to give Americans an understanding of other peoples and cultures.

Sargent Shriver was very conscious of the Congress's early interest in the Peace Corps. Indeed, during hearings in August, 1961, he told the House Foreign Affairs Committee "All of us connected with the Peace Corps are well aware of the fact that the Peace Corps is, in a very real sense, a child of this House." However, although Henry Reuss and Hubert Humphrey deserve to be
considered among the Peace Corps' founding fathers, neither they nor anyone else had really applied consistent or concentrated political pressure on behalf of the idea. "If it had been just left to us" admitted Henry Reuss, "the Peace Corps idea would still be cluttering up the legislative corridors." It only became an issue of national political importance during the Presidential campaign of 1960. The man who brought it to its zenith was the junior senator from Massachusetts and the Democratic Presidential nominee, John F. Kennedy.

Sargent Shriver believed the real importance of the Peace Corps lay in its attempt to create "a sufficient number of people in this country who know people in other countries so that we won't want to go to war, so we'll know them as human beings." Although none of the precedents of the Peace Corps had its scope, some at least, shared Shriver's vision. Moreover, the success of the missionary, private and governmental efforts, engendered an atmosphere conducive to the new proposal in 1960. The discussion of the idea in Congress heightened the effect. The ethos of the Peace Corps - voluntary service on behalf of others - was evident in many movements and individuals in the American past. Helping people to help themselves - albeit for idealistic or self-interested reasons - was one of the strongest American traditions. As one Volunteer suggested, the Peace Corps spirit emerged long before the actual organisation - "the Peace Corps was only the form that carried forth the idea at this stage of history."
CHAPTER TWO

THE MEETING OF IDEA AND FATE IN A CREATIVE HOUR
"The truth is that the Peace Corps owes much of its success to its birth in a political campaign. Because of the response of the American people President Kennedy decided to establish the Peace Corps as one of his first major acts. This is an example of what Martin Buber calls 'the meeting of idea and fate in a creative hour.' It is the way ideas are born in American politics."

- SARGENT SHRIVER -

(Point Of The Lance, p.12)
According to Theodore Sorensen, John F. Kennedy's chief aide, the Peace Corps was the "only important new proposal to come out of the 1960 campaign." The idea had been in the air for a long time, but it only came to fruition when Kennedy proposed it during the race for the Presidency. Logically speaking, a "domestic Peace Corps" should probably have come before an overseas organisation. That it did not, owed much to Kennedy's preference for foreign affairs. In the spring of 1959, he told Harris Wofford (a member of his campaign team and a central figure in the development of the Peace Corps) that he wanted to run for President because he hoped to initiate a foreign policy that would establish "a new relationship with the developing nations." The Peace Corps was Kennedy's first step in this direction. Ironically, it came about as much by accident as design and, as Sargent Shriver pointed out, it owed "much of its success to its birth in a political campaign."

Wednesday, November 2, 1960, was yet another strenuous day in Senator John Kennedy's campaign for the Presidency of the United States. The election was less than one week in the offing and Kennedy had taken to working a twenty-hour-a-day schedule. He began his hectic itinerary in Los Angeles before moving on to San Diego, San Jose, Oakland and then, finally, San Francisco where he was to deliver a speech at the city's Cow Palace auditorium in the evening. In addition to the by now mandatory exhortation to "get this country moving again," Kennedy's campaigning that day had been marked by his emphasis on the issue of "peace" and the means of securing it. The huge rally at the Cow Palace was by far the most important event of the day and an enormous crowd of between thirty and forty thousand people crammed the hall on a mild autumn night. None but the closest of aides had any prior knowledge of the topic of Kennedy's speech, but they knew he had employed his best writers - Theodore Sorensen, Richard Goodwin and Archibald Cox - for its composition under his own specific direction. Since the candidate
had been insistent there should be no "leaks" to the press in advance, staffers sensed something "new in the wind" but few knew exactly what it was.6

The audience greeted Kennedy with tumultuous applause and it was several minutes before he could launch into his speech entitled "Staffing A Foreign Policy For Peace."7 "One week from tonight," began Kennedy, "the next President of the United States will be turning to the arduous tasks that lie ahead - selecting a Cabinet - and preparing a program for peace." Borrowing from Clemenceau, Kennedy criticised the Eisenhower administration and its methods of diplomacy. "In this nuclear age," he warned, "peace is much too serious a matter to be entrusted to either generals or summit conferences. We need a stronger America, militarily, economically, scientifically, and educationally. We need a stronger free world, a stronger attack on world poverty, a stronger U.N., a stronger U.S. foreign policy - and, above all, a stronger foreign policy staff that is dedicated to peace." Commenting further on the weaknesses in "vital areas" of the Republican foreign policy machinery, Kennedy attacked its "ill-chosen, ill-equipped and ill-briefed ambassadors" and the generally poor quality of the Foreign Service. In particular, he railed against the failure of American diplomats to learn the indigenous languages of the countries to which they were assigned. Kennedy unleashed a torrent of statistics: 70 percent of all new Foreign Service officers had no language skills whatsoever, only three of the forty-four Americans in the Embassy in Belgrade spoke Yugoslavian, not a single American in New Delhi could speak Indian dialects and only two of the nine ambassadors in the Middle East spoke Arabic. He also pointed out that there were only twenty-six black officers in the entire Foreign Service corps - less than one per cent.

Kennedy next assailed the Eisenhower administration for not paying enough attention and respect to the newly independent countries of the Third World. "These are nations that vote in the U.N.," he said, "they can affect our security." Indeed, placing America's grave deficiency in
a Cold War context, he claimed that "diplomats skilled in the languages and customs of the nation to whom they are accredited - teachers, doctors, technicians, and experts desperately needed in a dozen fields by underdeveloped nations - are pouring forth from Moscow to advance the cause of world communism." Kennedy was adamant: "We have to do better."

Kennedy then addressed the problem of the paucity of America technicians actually at work with the peoples of the developing world "outside the normal diplomatic channels." Again he made an unfavourable comparison with the Lenin Institute which produced thousands of young people willing to serve at grassroots levels in the emerging countries. He noted that Asia had more Soviet than American technicians and that the trend was already extending to Africa. "Where," he asked, "are we going to obtain the technicians?" He reflected upon the potential of skilled American personnel "building goodwill, building the peace." Adroitly and eloquently, Kennedy brought his rhetoric to a climax by proposing a new government organisation - a Peace Corps:

"There is not enough money in all America to relieve the misery of the underdeveloped world in a giant and endless soup kitchen. But there is enough know-how and enough knowledgeable people to help those nations help themselves. I therefore propose that our inadequate efforts in this area be supplemented by a 'peace corps' of talented young men willing and able to serve their country in this fashion for three years as an alternative to peace-time selective service - well-qualified through rigorous standards - well-trained in the language, skills and customs they will need to know - and directed and paid by the International Cooperation Administration Point Four Agencies. We cannot discontinue training our young men as soldiers of war - but we also need them as ambassadors of peace."

Kennedy stressed that although Peace Corps service might be considered as an alternative to the military draft, no conscription would be involved. "This would be a volunteer corps," he said. Also, he insisted that the Peace Corps would be open to women and to young Americans from "every race and walk of life." He was convinced that America was "full of young people eager to serve the cause of peace.... I have met them on campaigns across the country." Having underlined the idealism inherent in the proposal, Kennedy returned to the pragmatic political benefits.
"I am convinced," he concluded, "that our young men and women, dedicated to freedom, are fully capable of overcoming the efforts of Mr. Khruschev's missionaries who are dedicated to undermining that freedom."^8

Kennedy's speech received an uproarious standing ovation from the people of San Francisco and the cheers continued long after he had left the Cow Palace auditorium. Pierre Salinger, Kennedy's Press Secretary, later described San Francisco as "the most appropriate forum for the exposition of the Peace Corps idea."^9 In choosing the venue for his announcement, Kennedy had been aware that no American city was more outward-looking or receptive to new ideas. However, the enthusiastic reaction was by no means confined to the West Coast. The New York Times gave the speech a front-page headline of "Kennedy Favors U.S. 'Peace Corps' To Work Abroad."^10 Newspapers nationwide followed suit with reports extolling the virtues of the concept. During the last few days of the campaign, Kennedy focused the public eye on the Peace Corps by mentioning it on two different occasions. In the Chicago Auditorium on November 4, he recommended "letting young Americans serve the cause of freedom as servants of peace, as the communists work for their system." Again, on election eve itself, he referred to "a Peace Corps of young men and women who will be willing to spend two or three years of their lives as teachers and nurses working in different countries....spreading the cause of freedom."^11

President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon immediately assailed Kennedy's plan. Both took particularly strong exception to the prospect of the Peace Corps as a substitute for "a tour of duty in the uniformed service."^12 Indeed, this complaint of draft evasion became the major criticism of the proposition. Richard Nixon used it to substantiate his charge that Kennedy was inexperienced and reckless in foreign affairs. According to Nixon, the Peace Corps was another example of Kennedy's "fast and flashy technique of proposing a program that looks good on the surface but which is inherently dangerous."^13 Kennedy retorted with the suggestion that, rather than an "alternative", Peace Corps duty
would actually be a "supplement" to the Selective Service. Nevertheless, the Republicans remained unrelenting in their accusation that Kennedy was providing an "escape hatch for those who did not want to serve in the armed forces." Thus, in the last week of the campaign, the Peace Corps became a minor "party" issue. Moreover, the idea was so popularly acclaimed that Vice-President Nixon was forced to make a counter-proposal. On November 6, he promised that if he was elected, one of his first acts would be to "increase the effectiveness of our recruiting programs for service abroad, provide more accurate training facilities for those going abroad, and provide improved incentives for making a career out of such service."

On November 8, 1960, in the closest-run Presidential election of the twentieth century, Kennedy's popular vote margin of victory over Nixon was a mere 112,881 out of a record 68,838,565 votes cast. Yet, even in the excitement of Kennedy's triumph, his espousal of a "Peace Corps" at the Cow Palace was not forgotten by the American electorate. Between the election and the inauguration, Kennedy's office received more mail on that subject than on any other and Pierre Salinger was bombarded with enquiries by the press - clear evidence that the new proposal had fired the imagination of many Americans. While it was unlikely that the Peace Corps had converted large numbers of Republicans to Kennedy, it may have had a persuasive effect on independent voters and, especially, young voters. In such a close-fought election, the introduction of a fresh, popular idea like the Peace Corps, could have had a telling influence on the final result.

Certainly, Vice-President Nixon interpreted Kennedy's proposal as "superficial and obviously concocted solely for campaign purposes." In the bitter aftermath of the election, Republicans arraigned Kennedy for using a "gimmick", a publicity stunt to win attention to himself at a crucial moment in the campaign. Fredrick Dutton, Deputy-Chairman of the Committee of Citizens For Kennedy and Johnson, admitted there was the aspect of getting some "political mileage out of it....it had high P.R.
content." Senator William Fulbright, another member of the Committee of Citizens for Kennedy and Johnson, also described the Peace Corps as an idea with "great public appeal." With a week to go until voting day, the Kennedy campaign team was aware of the political benefits to be gleaned from the introduction of a distinctive new proposal. As far as issues were concerned, there seemed little to choose between Kennedy or Nixon. Premier Khrushchev compared the candidates to Tweedledum and Tweedledee.

Moreover, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the Harvard historian and one of Kennedy's academic advisers, had deemed it necessary to publish a small volume outlining the specific differences between the two. *Kennedy or Nixon - Does It Make Any Difference?* asked Schlesinger. In opinion polls taken in late October, the two candidates were neck and neck. If anything, Nixon had the advantage. As Vice-President, he had been in the public spotlight for eight years. Kennedy was not so well-known. Dave Powers, (Kennedy's closest friend and assistant) recalled that most people knew Kennedy was the junior Senator from Massachusetts, a Roman Catholic of Irish descent, a Harvard graduate and a millionaire's son - but not much else.

Besides, in the last week of October, Nixon had introduced his biggest campaign asset - President Eisenhower. Until this point, Eisenhower had not openly endorsed Nixon; thus, when the President began actively campaigning on his behalf, it was a shattering blow to the Kennedy camp. Indeed, on the very evening of the Cow Palace address, Kennedy had confided his greatest concern to an old war-time friend, Paul Fay. "Last week Nixon hit the panic button and started Ike speaking," said Kennedy, "and with every word he utters I can feel the votes leaving me." In that last week of the campaign, Kennedy badly needed a new, attractive proposal.

John Kenneth Galbraith, the Harvard economist and another of Kennedy's academic advisers, admitted they had been searching for "new material" throughout the autumn of 1960. The liberal Peace Corps idea was deemed especially appropriate because it held out the potentiality
of attaining maximum media coverage as well as winning the votes of young people, undecided Humphrey and Stevenson Democrats, and wavering, left-of-centre Republicans. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. might also have tutored Kennedy on the advantages Franklin D. Roosevelt had gained from his proposal of a Civilian Conservation Corps in his first Presidential race. In addition to publicity considerations and political advice, there was a memorandum circulating the Kennedy campaign headquarters to the effect that Nixon was about to propose a programme for sending young American college graduates to the Third World to "teach the native peoples basic skills to assist them in fighting poverty, disease, illiteracy and hunger." Nixon never did advocate such a plan but the rumour that he intended to do so may have incited Kennedy to quick and decisive action. Certainly, Kennedy would have enjoyed the irony in making his first major pronouncement on the Peace Corps in his opponent's home state.

Thus, in bringing the concept to national prominence exactly one week before the Presidential election, Kennedy was perhaps displaying a penchant for the opportunistic. Undoubtedly, it was an excellent political strategem. Ralph Dungan and Dave Powers, two of the professional "pols" in the Kennedy team, admitted that in the vital run-in to the election, the Peace Corps was the sort of issue "everyone was looking for." However, Kennedy's interest in, and his final adoption of the idea was not as simplistically Machiavellian as Nixon and other Republicans charged. As Pierre Salinger insisted, the speech at the Cow Palace was the culmination of an idea which had been "gradually building" in Kennedy's mind. It was not just a last-ditch, electioneering stunt. Throughout 1960, Kennedy had been subject to widespread exposure to various Peace Corps-type plans and indeed, he had shown consistent interest in them.

When Kennedy announced his candidature for the Presidency on January 2, 1960, the Peace Corps was not on his list of potential campaign proposals. However, Theodore Sorensen recalled that Kennedy had been a longtime admirer of the work done overseas by the Mormons, the Quakers and other voluntary religious services. Moreover, Sorensen traced Kennedy's
interest in the general subject of technical aid to the Third World back to the early 1950's. Henry Reuss, who served with Kennedy on Congress's Joint Economic Committee, remembered discussing a "Point Four Youth Corps" plan with him "several times" before 1960. However, when Reuss introduced his bill calling for a study of the programme in January, 1960, (co-introduced in the Senate by Richard Neuberger of Oregon), there was no evidence of any significant enthusiasm on Kennedy's part. Of course, this could be explained by his near total immersion in the Presidential campaign which had already begun.

Kennedy's first direct association with the Peace Corps came on February 21, 1960. While appearing on a college television show in New York, he was questioned on the Reuss-Neuberger bills. Kennedy was obliged to answer that he did not have a comprehensive knowledge of the legislative proposals but that he definitely favoured more opportunities for young Americans to do needful work in the developing countries. After the show, Kennedy - annoyed at having been caught off-guard by the question - ordered one of his brightest young staff members, Richard Goodwin, to investigate the "Youth Peace Corps" idea. This proved to be the beginning of a specific Kennedy interest.

In March, 1960, Goodwin wrote to Professor Archibald Cox of Harvard Law School, who was acting as a channel of communication between Kennedy and his academic "brains trust" at Harvard. Goodwin asked Cox to "discuss the idea with some of the Cambridge group, get some reactions, and - if they think the idea is a good one - some specific questions as to how to proceed." Cox was briefed that Kennedy envisioned "several thousand college graduates" working at minimum pay for the United States government in technical and scientific jobs in the Third World. He was as yet unsure of the finer points of how to finance, train and select these students but "The whole idea would be to appeal to the imagination and interest of college graduates, give them an opportunity to make a real contribution to world peace and to receive valuable training and responsibility." With a view to political commodities, Goodwin concluded, "the idea of a 'Youth
For Peace' program might have propaganda advantages," Cox later recalled that although this letter "stimulated some discussion" at Harvard among Kennedy's "think tank", in the spring of 1960, the Peace Corps remained a "peripheral" rather than a central concern.32

In April and May, during the hard-fought primaries against Hubert Humphrey in Wisconsin and West Virginia, Kennedy again found himself confronted by the Peace Corps idea. A Wisconsin newspaper poll showed a very favourable response when Humphrey offered a "Peace Corps" as one of his campaign pledges.33 Although Humphrey lost to Kennedy in both states, he made sure there was some "serious discussion" of the potential of such a programme. "Since I was not to get the Presidential nomination," Humphrey wrote in his memoirs, "I was determined that Kennedy adopt as many of my proposals as possible -- for example, the Peace Corps." Of course, in June, 1960, Humphrey introduced in the Senate, his bill for a Peace Corps.35 He knew that -- legislatively speaking -- it was doomed from the very beginning; however, he wanted to focus Congress's eye on the idea. Moreover, during the summer, he transferred all his research materials and details of the Peace Corps to Kennedy's office. Kennedy was much impressed by the solid groundwork done by Humphrey and his staff. Indeed, his speech at the Cow Palace, with its proposals for draft exemption and three-year overseas service stints, owed a great deal to Humphrey's plan.

When Kennedy accepted his party's Presidential nomination in July, he stood on a Democratic platform which stated that America must attempt to change her "image" in the Third World by giving more technical and less military aid. The manifesto also maintained that those chosen to represent America abroad would have to improve their language skills and increase their cultural awareness.36 At the same time, the Research Unit of the Democratic Party compiled a report for Kennedy on the Peace Corps. Solis Horwit, a leading member of the Research Unit, claimed that its favourable findings "really gave the positive push to the Peace Corps idea."37 In early September, Kennedy asked both Congressman Reuss and Professor Samuel Hayes of the University of Michigan (who had extensive experience in international economic programmes), to prepare "position
papers" on a national youth service programme. By the end of the month, they had returned affirmative opinions to Kennedy along with some particulars on which he could construct a plan. However, Kennedy remained wary of a total commitment to the Peace Corps idea in the form of an outright proposal. He feared it might prove a liability and leave him open to the charge of political immaturity.

The warm response to a speech given by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, Kennedy's running-mate, on September 22, 1960, helped nudge Kennedy towards a full endorsement of the Peace Corps. At the University of Nebraska, Johnson called for a "Volunteers for Peace and Humanity program sponsored by our government....that would shatter the forces of communism." The details of his plan were by no means fully developed and he skirted around the logistics of sending young Americans into the Third World. As Bill Moyers, his chief campaign aide conceded, "it was not a well-done speech...but it got a great reception." That night the politically astute Johnson telephoned Kennedy and told him the Peace Corps would not prove too great a political risk. He urged Kennedy to make a formal proposal.

However, Kennedy was still not fully convinced of the feasibility of the programme. Hence, he chose a minor and a very safe platform for his first public exposition of the idea. On October 5, 1960, he was scheduled to give a "Message To The Nation's New Voters," arranged by the Young Democrats. Inspired by Senator Humphrey, this organisation had already taken up the idea of a "Youth Corps" in 1960. They had spoken of it at student meetings and rallies and had specifically mentioned the possibility of a proposal in their literature. In talks to university and college groups, Richard Murphy, national Director of the Young Democrats, and Charles Manatt, the College Programme chief, always spoke of the Democratic Party's intent to establish an overseas service organisation as one of the major reasons why young people should vote the Democratic ticket. Taking advantage of this enthusiastic audience, Kennedy vowed that if elected, he would "explore thoroughly the possibility of utilising the services of the very best of our trained and qualified
young people to give from three to five years of their lives to the cause of world peace by forming themselves into a Youth Peace Corps, going to the places that really need them and doing the sort of work jobs that need to be done.\textsuperscript{42}

This "message" was nothing more than a guarded first step. It promised only to explore the "possibility" of a Peace Corps. Certainly, Kennedy's office received some mail on the speech and the delighted Young Democrats sent copies of it to college newspapers and Students-For-Kennedy groups. However, his remarks received no national attention and the general reaction was modest. Kennedy could not yet be sure that the idea would not prove a political liability. During the famous "debates" with Richard Nixon in October, 1960, Kennedy discussed the Third World, communism, and the need for new foreign policy initiatives; but there was no specific mention of a Peace Corps. Indeed, his next reference to it came almost entirely by accident. Yet, ironically, it resulted in Kennedy's wholehearted commitment to a proposal of the Peace Corps.

At about 2 a.m. on October 14, 1960, Kennedy flew into Michigan from New York where he had just completed his third debate with Nixon. Dave Powers, who was with Kennedy, remembered "it was very late and we were all exhausted."\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, Kennedy had agreed to say a few brief words to the students at the University of Michigan who had waited up to greet him. Since there was no prepared text or press release, it was expected that he would offer them the statutory campaign clichés and Democratic slogans. However, on arrival at Ann Arbor, Kennedy found, to his astonishment, some ten thousand young students anxious to see him. They chanted his name as he mounted the steps of the Student Union building. Moved by this tremendous reception, Kennedy launched into an extemporaneous address. He threw out challenges to students: how many would be prepared to give years of their lives working in Asia, Africa, and Latin America? How many would serve as volunteer teachers, doctors and engineers for the cause of freedom? He spoke of the need for them to make a personal contribution, of the greater effort to be made and of the value of sacrifice on behalf of others. The audience responded
wildly to his impromptu exhortations and, as the tired and hoarse Kennedy made his way to bed, he told Dave Powers that he felt he had "hit a winning number."^4^4

The enthusiasm which he encountered at Michigan made a deep impression on Kennedy. Inspired by his speech, several of the students there formed an organisation called Americans Committed to World Responsibility and held seminars to discuss the Peace Corps idea. On November 4, Kennedy met with representatives of this group in Toledo, Ohio. Indeed, Kennedy mentioned them during the Cow Palace address as evidence that there was an available pool of talented and idealistic youths willing to serve in the Third World. "When I suggested at the University of Michigan lately," said Kennedy, "that we needed young men and women willing to give up a few years to serve their country in this fashion, the students proposed a new organisation to promote such an effort."^4^5

Although the incident at Ann Arbor was a turning point for Kennedy, his remarks there attracted not the slightest national attention. Since the late-night speech had been unscheduled, Kennedy's press entourage completely missed out on it. Indeed, journalist Russell Baker, who was covering the Kennedy campaign in Michigan for the New York Times, reported "nothing that was new."^4^6 However, the crucial factor was that Kennedy, ever the intuitive politician, had been finally persuaded by the students at Michigan to make a formal proposal of a "Peace Corps" before the campaign ended.

Sargent Shriver, himself a Kennedy campaign worker, later wrote that "No one is sure why Kennedy raised the question in the middle of the night at the University of Michigan."^4^7 Possibly, Kennedy associated the Peace Corps with Michigan because he knew that Professor Samuel Hayes of the university's International Studies Department had a deep interest in the idea. Hayes, in the report which he submitted to Kennedy in September, 1960, had been one of the first to enunciate the need for "middle-level manpower" in the Third World. This may have impressed Kennedy and suggested a line of approach to him at Michigan. However, Dave Powers stressed that Kennedy always held a deep affection for young people
and that he had been particularly warmed by the enthusiasm of the Michigan students. Thus, on the spur-of-the-moment he spoke to them of something which he felt would be inspirational. "It was a college speech to a college group," said Powers. Whatever his motivation, after Michigan Kennedy ordered his speech-writers to prepare a major address on the Peace Corps.

Between October 14 at Ann Arbor and November 2 at San Francisco, Kennedy did not publicly mention the Peace Corps. Nevertheless, he clearly alluded to it on October 18 in Florida, when he promised that a Democratic administration would step up the effort to "educate the future leaders of Africa and Asia and Latin America. The youth of these areas are desperately in need of the training which will enable them to man the governments, and run the economies of the developing nations." Again, on October 29, he told an audience in Pennsylvania, "We need young men and women who will spend some of their years in Latin America, Africa and Asia in the service of freedom." The Michigan episode had persuaded Kennedy to make a definite commitment to the Peace Corps, but he bided his time and awaited the Cow Palace and the perfect moment for his announcement.

As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted, both John Kennedy and his brother Robert (who managed the 1960 campaign) were "great improvisers." They left the campaign schedule loose enough to allow for "picking up" on new issues even at a very late stage. Therefore, although Kennedy did not decide upon a formal proposal of the Peace Corps until mid-October, his schedule was flexible enough to incorporate it in a major speech. Despite Nixon's accusations, there was nothing particularly cynical about this. The Cow Palace address was intended to amplify the responsive chord which Kennedy had struck - almost inadvertently - at Michigan. He was an instinctive politician with an acute sense of the feasible and the popular. To that extent, his espousal of the Peace Corps was opportunistic. However, throughout 1960, Kennedy had shown considerable - albeit intermittent - interest in the idea and this flowered under the hothouse circumstances surrounding the race for the Presidency.

Furthermore, the Peace Corps idea would have been likely to appeal
to Kennedy on deeper, more personal grounds. In 1960, other politicians - including Richard Nixon - had a chance to adopt the concept. Yet, only Kennedy chose to propound it. For him, it was not just a campaign issue, but more a symbol for many of his deep-felt and long-held sympathies and beliefs. Kennedy's political and legislative interests during his fourteen years in the Congress suggested that, while his promotion of the Peace Corps was not inevitable, it was certainly quite probable. Indeed, Theodore Sorensen described the Peace Corps as the "lake" into which a lot of "streams" running together flowed.\(^5^1\)

One "stream" was Kennedy's personal empathy with the poor and oppressed of the underdeveloped world. As a young man he had travelled extensively through Europe, Asia and Latin America. At first hand, he had seen economically and politically enfeebled cultures. His sympathy was further inspired by his paternal ancestors' history of oppression and want in colonial Ireland. "I grew up in a community where the people were barely a generation away from colonial rule," he wrote to Prime Minister Nehru of India. "I can claim the company of many historians in saying that the colonialism to which my immediate ancestors were subject was more sterile, oppressive, and even cruel than that of India. The legacy of Clive was on the whole more tolerable than that of Cromwell."\(^5^2\) As Chairman of the Senate Sub-Committee on African Affairs and as a member of the Sub-Committee on Latin American Affairs, Kennedy was an outspoken and articulate advocate of Third World causes. "Call it nationalism, call it anti-colonialism, call it what you will," Kennedy warned his colleagues in the Senate. "The word is out and spreading like wildfire in nearly a thousand languages and dialects - that it is no longer necessary to remain forever in bondage."\(^5^3\)

His travels across Asia in 1951 had persuaded Kennedy that nationalism was the most vital political emotion in the Third World. Throughout the decade, he opposed "imperialist" nations and "imperialist" wars. He warned against American support of the colonial French presence in Southeast Asia and, in one of the most controversial speeches of the 1950's, he advocated independence for Algeria. "The single most important test
of American foreign policy today is how we meet the challenge of imperialism," he told the Senate in July, 1957. "On this test more than any other, this nation shall be critically judged by the uncommitted millions in Asia and Africa."54

Kennedy consistently argued that America would have to pay more attention to the winds of change blowing through the developing countries. Under Eisenhower, the foreign policy of the United States was rigid in its monocular view of the world as an east-west Cold War, with Europe as the main battlefield. Little consideration was given to the emerging nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America whose main concern was the north-south confrontation. North represented white, European colonialism; south stood for black, Third World freedom. In June, 1956, Kennedy criticised the Republican administration for allowing the reputation of the United States to be "hitched to the chariot of the conqueror."55

Urging Americans to extend a helping hand to the underdeveloped countries, Kennedy stressed, "We can never escape the fact that we are dependent upon the decisions of people who have hated, as their ancestors before them hated for centuries, the white men who bled them, beat them, exploited them and ruled them."56

Kennedy voted against the bill to stop Point Four aid to the Third World; he was involved in the Friends of Vietnam movement; he helped finance African students' journeys to the United States through the Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation; and, he urged the Federal government to introduce more scholarship programmes for peoples of the underdeveloped countries.57 He realised that the barriers of ignorance and poverty between the rich nations and the poor would have to be broken down before mutual respect and understanding could be established. The Peace Corps was entirely consistent with this notion. As President Abboud of Sudan noted in 1961, "Throughout his years in Congress, Kennedy consistently displayed an interest in the emerging nations. Not only in his adherence to principle, but in his specific contributions."58

A second "stream" running into Kennedy's eventual plan for a Peace Corps, was his desire to renew, freshen and reinvigorate America's
foreign assistance programmes. During his congressional career, Kennedy persistently criticised the United States' failure to make the basic distinction between the type of aid needed for Western Europe, where an expanding industrial process was already under way, and the Third World where technical, grassroots assistance was needed in addition to capital. To Kennedy, American foreign aid seemed excessively oriented towards the short-term military and political considerations of the Cold War rather than the long-term social and economic amelioration of the underdeveloped nations. Calling for "A New Approach In Foreign Policy," he pointed out:

"Our present foreign aid programs have neglected the great visionary partnership principles of the Marshall Plan and Point Four - they have been subordinated to narrow, expedient and temporary ends. Money has been poured into military assistance programs, and in many cases has been wasted, at the expense of vitally necessary economic development. The next President will have to devise an entirely revamped foreign aid program." 59

In 1959, Kennedy was one of a small group of liberal Democratic senators who petitioned President Eisenhower to reassess the relative importance of military as opposed to technical assistance. He described the International Cooperation Administration as being devoid of idealism and suffering from "bureaucratosclerosis." As for the Foreign Service, Kennedy deemed it too much preoccupied with "tennis and cocktails." 60 As a congressman Kennedy was rarely impressed with United States "officialdom" overseas. In a foreign country he was more often to be found talking to local peoples and administrators (or American newspaper reporters) than State Department officers and ambassadors.

Kennedy had long been convinced that technical instruction and educational programmes should be in the vanguard of American aid rather than bureaucrats, dollars and guns. In June, 1959, he argued that American foreign assistance needed to reorient itself towards basic human needs. He emphasised that in the emerging countries, "There is an acute shortage of technical, managerial, and skilled labor. Our aid must be concentrated not on large-scale monuments to American engineering but on the village and the farm." 61 Kennedy actively encouraged all kinds of student, cultural and technical exchanges in the hope that the poorer
peoples might learn how to help themselves. At the same time, he hoped to break down the ethnocentrism so typical of the vast majority of American aid programmes in the 1950's. With these ideas in mind, Kennedy was gradually advancing towards the essence of the Peace Corps concept - a direct people-to-people foreign assistance initiative. "For we have not always recognised," he told Democrats in 1958, "that the ideal contact is between peoples rather than governments. Governments come and go while lasting personal friendships and impressions remain."62

A third "stream" which converged with the others, was Kennedy's historic sense of mission and sacrifice. He firmly believed that the American forms of liberty and democracy were the best in the world and that it was the United States' duty to share these virtues with other peoples, especially the poverty-stricken masses of the underdeveloped world. He outlined this belief before the Senate in 1954:

"I trust the United States has learned that it cannot ignore the moral and ideological principles at the root of today's struggles....The United States is the leader of the free world today; but this is not so because our citizens are anxious that we take the lead in military battles; nor because our policies are faultless nor the most popular. The mantle of leadership has been placed upon our shoulders not by any nation nor by our own government or citizens but by destiny and circumstance, by the sheer fact of our physical and economic strength,...and what Washington termed 'the sacred fire of liberty'.'63

Kennedy appreciated that the burden of providing moral and physical leadership for the world would involve tremendous sacrifice on America's part, but this made the prospect even more attractive to him. He felt that America's richness in both ideals and material resources obliged her to help the less fortunate nations. "The 1960's will require much more from each of us than we have given in the past," he said during the 1960 campaign.64 Indeed, the major theme of the Kennedy campaign was the need for courage, dedication, hard work and sacrifice in meeting the "challenge" of his proposed New Frontier. In particular, Kennedy told Arthur Schlesinger Jr. that he believed there was a great "fund of idealism" among the youth of America, waiting to be harnessed and discharged for a worthy cause. Schlesinger wrote that the Peace Corps was Kennedy's way of "demonstrating the reality of this idealism to the
However, since as Schlesinger also noted, Kennedy was "a son of the Cold War," his sense of mission and idealism was inextricably interspersed with a fervent anti-communism. Kennedy's interpretation of the struggle with the Soviets was much more refined than that of John Foster Dulles; indeed, he was one of the Secretary of State's most persevering and incisive critics. Kennedy rejected Dulles's contention that the "neutralism" of newly-independent nations could not be tolerated and that every conflict was a "moral crusade requiring the unconditional surrender of the enemy." Nevertheless, Kennedy was a man of his times and, although not so dogmatic as Dulles, still an avid Cold Warrior. "The great danger is the Communist system itself and its relentless determination to destroy us," he proclaimed in September 1960. "We and the Communists are locked in a deadly embrace all around the world," he told an audience in Ohio. Anti-communist invective permeated Kennedy's campaign rhetoric, especially the argument that the Soviets were making advances in the Third World while American power and prestige declined. Such a philosophy proved conducive to a foreign policy initiative which might contribute, at least a little, to the battle for the "hearts and minds" of the uncommitted nations. Hence, when he proposed the Peace Corps, Kennedy placed it in a Cold War context where America's "ambassadors of peace" would compete in the underdeveloped countries against "Castro-type or Communist exploitation."

Kennedy's empathy with Third World people, his intention of reforming the foreign aid programme and his belief in missionary idealism, sacrifice and anti-communism all played a part in his espousal of the Peace Corps. Indeed, all three "streams" ran through the Cow Palace address. Besides, Kennedy's genuine affection for young people as well as his sense of adventure and idealism would have made the programme appear very attractive to him. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. described it, "The Peace Corps was something the Kennedy boys would have done."

In many ways, 1960 was the perfect time for the announcement of
the Peace Corps. Throughout the year, a number of people discussed the feasibility of such a programme. Some even claimed responsibility for having suggested the idea to Kennedy. On October 27, a week before the Cow Palace address, General James Gavin, the celebrated army commander and author, proposed a Peace Corps-type plan at the Regional Advisory Council on Nuclear Energy in Miami; he urged Kennedy to accept the idea. Schlesinger, Sorensen and Galbraith felt Gavin was a very strong influence on Kennedy. Milton J. Shapp, a Philadelphia businessman, submitted the idea to Robert Kennedy on October 25. Democratic Congressman Barratt O'Hara of Illinois, also claimed that he gave some material on a Peace Corps plan to Chester Bowles (Kennedy's foreign policy adviser) during the campaign. Bowles, who collated information on the Peace Corps for Kennedy during the transition period, gave a speech on the subject at the University of Michigan in late October.

For a long time preceding and including election year, William O. Douglas, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, tried to persuade Kennedy to propose an overseas service project; perhaps with this in mind, Kennedy appointed Douglas as first Honorary Chairman of the National Advisory Council to the Peace Corps in 1961. Before the campaign began, Victor Reuther, director of the United Automobile Worker's (U.A.W.) international affairs programme, urged Kennedy to make a "youth corps" one of his "issues." In the summer of 1960, C.L. Sulzberger, editor of the New York Times and a personal friend of Kennedy, discussed with him a plan for sending young, qualified technicians to the Third World. Likewise, on June 20, 1960, the influential journalist James Reston, asked in his column in the New York Times:

"If the main war is the battle in the underdeveloped areas, why not offer talented young men of draft age the option of using their brains in a civilian service in Indochina rather than sentencing them to Army KP in Hoboken? It is not fair or accurate to say that the voluntary system cannot compete with the directed system in recruiting men for service in the underdeveloped areas, for no really imaginative effort has been made to attract the volunteers." 72

Kennedy could conceivably have "picked up" on the idea from listening to any of these people.
Many others showed a keen interest in the idea in 1960, and they also may have influenced Kennedy. In August, Professor Walt W. Rostow of the Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) and a member of Kennedy's "brains trust," suggested to hundreds of Cambridge students that they might begin to think about "service" overseas. When Professor Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Harvard International Affairs Centre, appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery in early November, he proposed a Foreign Service "corps" to provide technical assistance to the Third World. Having changed his political colours by 1960, Heinz Rollman stood as a Republican candidate for North Carolina; not surprisingly, a "Peace Army" plan was central to his platform. In a book appropriately entitled The Overseas Americans, Harlan Cleveland (Dean of Syracuse University) called for a reinvigoration of the United States diplomatic Corps. Kennedy may also have noticed that the President's Commission of National Goals, established in 1960, recommended that greater numbers of qualified Americans should be encouraged by the Federal government to "live and work abroad....Their number and their ability to represent the United States creditably must rise rapidly in the next decade."

At the same time, Senator Humphrey and Congressman Reuss were diligently publicising the Peace Corps in 1960. Not only did they have the ear of Kennedy but they also gained support for their proposal from doctors, teachers, students and religious leaders. As the election approached, the idea became more and more widely known. For instance, Congressman John Brademas of Indiana, indicated that approbatory signals for a Peace Corps-type programme had come from church, civic and university leaders in his state. Two hundred and seventy students at Antioch College sent a petition to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favour of legislation for an overseas service agency. Thus, by the time Kennedy made his formal proposal in San Francisco, the Peace Corps idea had already developed a strong - albeit limited - popular base. Even some important Republicans supported it. Senator Jacob Javits recalled that he had "urged" Nixon to adopt an overseas service plan
before the 1960 campaign. "I am sorry he did not accept it," said Javits during the debate on the Peace Corps bill in August, 1961. With no little magnanimity, he conceded that Kennedy's endorsement of the Peace Corps "does not mean it is a bad idea. It is a very good idea. This is one of the original initiatives coming out of the campaign which inspired American youth and people of other lands. We ought to do it."76

Certainly, the public pronouncements on the Peace Corps by Kennedy, Humphrey, Reuss, Johnson, Bowles, Gavin and the others, helped build a climate of opinion favourable to the idea. However, they were only partly responsible for the wildly enthusiastic general response which immediately greeted Kennedy's address at the Cow Palace. That reaction owed more to the feeling among American people in 1960 that the country needed something new, adventurous and idealistic. The dominant characteristics of Kennedy's campaign were youth, purpose and vigour - best encapsulated in his perennial invocation "to get this country moving again." Despite a much-vaunted affluence, Kennedy condemned the Eisenhower era as a period of "slippage in our intellectual and moral strength."77 Throughout 1960, Kennedy issued one jeremiad after another, often making an analogy between the flatulent America of the 1950's and the appeasing Great Britain of the 1930's. He told his audience in Philadelphia that he had seen "another election just like this one in 1935, when England was engaged in a deadly competition with Germany. Stanley Baldwin chose to tell the people that everything was being done in good time, and that England's security was assured. Mr. Baldwin won that election and the British almost lost World War Two."78 Comparing Richard Nixon to Baldwin, Kennedy saw himself as Churchill warning of the perilous times ahead. The American democracy was depicted as flabby and comfortable, being led to the slaughter by a lean and ruthless Soviet Union. "We seem to have lost both the sense of the promise of America and the will to fulfil it," complained Kennedy in a speech entitled "The Years The Locusts Have Eaten."79

In the spring of 1959, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote Kennedy a memorandum entitled "The Shape Of National Politics To Come." His basic
theory was that "there is an inherent cyclical rhythm in our national affairs." Drawing on historical examples, Schlesinger advised Kennedy that periods of quietude in American politics were invariably followed by periods of action and liveliness. Schlesinger concluded that the current period of passivity and acquiescence under Eisenhower was about to come to an end and that a politician of "intelligence and creativity" would be required to lead America's "national renaissance." In total agreement with his academic adviser, Kennedy challenged Americans to rededicate themselves to long-lost ideals and goals. He led the attack on the affluent, purposeless society with his famous enunciation of a New Frontier which represented "not what I intend to offer the American people but what I intend to ask of them." Kennedy was not alone in his dissatisfaction. In 1960, many Americans were ill-at-ease with their country's performance. Throughout the year, there was an almost incessant state of the union debate on whether America had indeed lost her sense of national purpose. For the first time, a President's Commission On National Goals was established. Among its findings it stated the need for "extraordinary personal responsibility, sustained effort and sacrifice." A report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also stressed the necessity to exhibit "not only our material prosperity but also our dynamism, creativity and desire for peace." Walter Lippman criticised the lethargy of America in his book The National Purpose. Time magazine devoted issues to the controversy. Kennedy and many other politicians attended a Convention in Miami on "National Purpose." Intellectuals, journalists, theologians and politicians agreed with President Nathan M. Pusey of Harvard that the United States was "wandering along with no more thought....than the desire for diversion, personal comfort and safety." It was particularly in foreign affairs that Kennedy criticised Eisenhower for allowing the country to vegetate. No significant new policies had been undertaken towards the emerging nations despite some forty countries having gained independence since 1945. In the minds of many Third World peoples, America had come to be associated with the C.I.A.
to the foreign policy objectives of the United States. The C.I.A. overthrew "pro-Communist" governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 and failed to do so in Indonesia in 1958. It also helped install supposedly "pro-Western" governments in Egypt in 1954 and in Laos in 1959. By 1960, the C.I.A. had already begun to plan the overthrow and murder of Fidel Castro. "Covert action was over-used as an instrument of foreign policy," wrote Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research in the Kennedy administration, "and the reputation of America suffered more and more." 85

In the late 1950's, one foreign policy panic followed another. There was national alarm in 1957 when the Soviets launched the Sputnik and in 1958 when Castro defeated Batista in Cuba. President Eisenhower was forced to cancel a tour of Japan for fear of protesters and Vice-President Nixon was stoned in Caracas. An alarming number of new nations voted against America in the United Nations and Kennedy claimed that Russia had a "missile gap" advantage over America. The Russian capture of an American U-2 spy-plane in 1960, was the capstone on a series of embarrassing débâcles. Kennedy sprinkled his campaign speeches with statistics which charted the American decline: the low number of student exchanges with Africa and Latin America, the multifarious underdeveloped countries without American diplomats and the ridiculous imbalance in the distribution of American foreign aid. For instance, Yugoslavia received more money than the whole of the African continent. 87 As the campaign neared conclusion, the Kennedy camp leaked some of the United States Information Agency's confidential polls to the press. They showed that American standing in Third World eyes was at an all-time low. 88

This sense of decline was not confined to Kennedy's campaign rhetoric. Highly critical and prophetic books such as The Affluent Society by John Kenneth Galbraith, The Lonely Crowd by David Riesman, The End Of Ideology by Daniel Bell and Foreign Aid: Our Tragic Experiment by Thomas Loeber, became national bestsellers. In the entire postwar period, few books had more impact on the national consciousness than Eugene Burdick and William Lederer's The Ugly American. Although fictional,
it attempted to reveal the "blundering hypocrisy of some of our top-level diplomats," and unmask the "opportunism, incompetence and cynical deceit that have become imbedded in the fabric of our foreign relations." The villains of the piece were the professional American diplomats who, more often than not, confined their work to moving from their air-conditioned offices to government-bought limousines, American expatriate clubs and cocktail parties. They rarely learned a native tongue, met local workers or peasants, or felt a genuine concern for the real development needs of the country in which they purported to "serve." The main character, Homer Atkins, was called the "Ugly American" because of his grotesque physical appearance. However, he was a skilled technician committed to helping at a grassroots level by building water-pumps, digging roads, and building bridges. He lived with the native peoples, worked with them, and, at the end of the book, was beloved and admired by them. The bitter message was that the majority of American professional diplomats were neither competent nor effective and that the more America relied on them, the more her power and influence would decline. Atkins held the professionals in utter disdain. When an official asked him how the United States might improve the standard of its foreign assistance functionaries, Atkins's answer was painfully blunt: "Tell 'em to get off their asses and out into the boondocks." 91

In a factual epilogue, Burdick and Lederer summarised their major criticism of American foreign aid programmes and pointed the way towards a new and fresher approach:

"Whatever the reasons, our overseas services attract far too few of our brightest and best qualified college graduates.... What we need is a small force of well-trained, well-chosen, hard-working and dedicated professionals. They must be willing to risk their comforts and—in some lands— their health. They must go equipped to apply a positive policy promulgated by a clear-thinking government. They must speak the language of the land of their assignment and they must be more expert in its problems than are the natives." 92

The Ugly American had a prevailing and a shocking effect on domestic public opinion. First issued in July, 1958, it was a Book-of-the-Month Club selection in October and by November, it had gone through twenty printings. It was so influential that, in later paperwork editions, its
advertising blurb claimed that "President Kennedy's Peace Corps is the answer to the problem raised by this book. "Although this claim was somewhat exaggerated, Sargent Shriver admitted that the book "stimulated a lot of people in this country to an awareness that the way you do something is sometimes just as important as what you do." Significantly, Shriver hired Burdick and Lederer as consultants to the Peace Corps and asked them to evaluate programmes in the field. Moreover, at the Cow Palace, Kennedy referred to The Ugly American and conceded that he had "shuddered" upon reading it.

The publication and astounding success of The Ugly American, helped create a perfect environment for Kennedy's Peace Corps proposal. America had come out of a decade considered by many to have been stale and placid. Perhaps the youth of the nation had felt most stultified. The "baby boom" which followed World War Two, had led to the growth of a population fifty per cent of which was under twenty-five years old in 1960. Unlike their parents, who had suffered the deprivations caused by Depression and war, these children had grown up surrounded by material prosperity. For the first time, a university or college education came within the grasp of the majority of young people. Kennedy was very conscious of these "war babies of the 1940's who overcrowded our schools in the 1950's and are now descending in 1960 on our colleges." In the 1950's, adults had been engrossed in the pursuit of a decent standard of living; at the beginning of the 1960's, their children, well-provided for and increasingly well-educated, did not need to aspire to the same ambition. Indeed, the Harvard Crimson proclaimed, "This is the first generation of students which is not going to school for purely economic reasons." Unprecedented material wealth freed the younger generation to heed their consciences and follow their ideals. Tom Hayden, the doyen of radical student politics in the 1960's, argued that status and money were "not goals to be striven for." In their own way, these young people were contributing to the national purpose debate. The question they asked was: affluence for what? Ironically, Hayden was in the early morning
audience at the University of Michigan when Kennedy attempted to provide at least one answer.98

Strictly speaking, John Kennedy was not of this younger generation. He had fought in the Second World War with their fathers. Yet, the youth of America seemed especially attracted to his athletic and exciting image. His proposal for a Peace Corps epitomized the idealism and hope which they invested in him. Kennedy asked them if they were prepared to travel to distant lands, work under straitened conditions and help impoverished peoples. It was this spirit of generosity and participation that had been sorely missed under Eisenhower. Their answer was resoundingly affirmative. As David Galman, one of the first young administrators, put it:

"The Peace Corps is a part of the awakening that began with the 1960 campaign exhilaration of John F. Kennedy. The 1950's made ancient mariners of us all - becalmed, waiting and a little parched in the throat. Then we picked up momentum on the winds of change that Kennedy brought in - the New Frontier, the fresh faces in government, the vigorous, hopeful speeches, the Peace Corps."99

John Kennedy once told John Kenneth Galbraith that "the finest strategies are usually the results of accidents."100 With Kennedy's late-night, off-the-cuff remarks to the students of Michigan University in mind, this maxim was certainly applicable to the Peace Corps. It owed its birth almost entirely to the extraordinarily propitious circumstances surrounding the 1960 Presidential campaign. America's renewed search for "national purpose", the impact of *The Ugly American* and the general craving for an adventurous, idealistic initiative created an atmosphere conducive to the new proposal. Kennedy - with his sympathies geared towards helping the developing nations and inspiring the youth of America to sacrifice - sensed this and took advantage of the moment. Young Americans were ready and willing to follow the example of Homer Atkins - the "Ugly American" - who worked overseas at grassroots levels and helped people help themselves. John Kennedy offered them the opportunity. In this way, the Peace Corps idea and fate met and found, in the 1960 campaign, their truly creative hour.
CHAPTER THREE

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE CORPS
"Section 1: Establishment of the Peace Corps. The Secretary of State shall establish an agency in the Department of State which shall be known as the Peace Corps."

-JOHN F. KENNEDY-

(Executive Order 10924: Establishment and Administration Of The Peace Corps in The Department of State, March 1961)
John F. Kennedy’s espousal of a “Peace Corps” during the 1960 Presidential campaign had fired the imagination of the American people. Yet, in the aftermath of Kennedy’s victory, many doubted that the proposal would actually come to fruition. After all, most political candidates are popularly known for their faithlessness. Moreover, Richard Nixon had suggested from the very beginning that Kennedy had adopted the Peace Corps solely for “campaign purposes.” In the so-called “transition” period – the seven or eight weeks between election and inauguration – Kennedy would be required to answer Nixon’s charge by taking vigorous action on the Peace Corps. Of course, the problem was that no one had ever attempted such a venture before.

Less than one week after the 1960 election, Professor Walt Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (one of Kennedy’s academic advisers during the campaign) wrote to the President-elect informing him that “The notion of a Youth Corps has excited the imagination of university people and students all over the land.” While urging Kennedy to make efforts to ensure that the acquired momentum behind the Peace Corps should not be lost, he posed a number of difficult but pertinent questions concerning the size, nature and administration of the programme:

“What is a realistic maximum rate of build-up for the Youth Corps? To what extent is it likely to be able to use men and women without a B.A. degree?... What are the major lessons for the Youth Corps to be derived from the experience of the Quakers, Operation Crossroads Africa etc. ...with projects of this kind? Should service in the Youth Corps be a potential substitute for national service under the military draft? If so, how should the legislative and the administrative arrangements be worked out?”

Rostow advised Kennedy it would be worthwhile consulting with the
religious and private organisations that had relevant experience in this area. He felt they might be particularly helpful with the "hard practical problems of selection, logistical support, administration and relations with the local populations and governments."²

Kennedy immediately replied that Rostow should confer with Professor Max Millikan, a friend and colleague of Rostow's at M.I.T. and a longstanding economic adviser to Kennedy on Third World problems. "Have Max take on the responsibility of working up a Peace Corps idea into something I could implement," wrote Kennedy.³ Although he clearly intended to establish a Peace Corps, Kennedy emphasised that he did not wish to appear precipitate. Somewhat guardedly, Kennedy envisaged putting the Peace Corps into effect sometime in the winter of 1961. Obviously he still had certain reservations about the idea and he conceded that it might very well be "a mistake" to utilise young college graduates. He was worried that naive, young Americans might become embroiled in some débâcle abroad and the blame would be charged to their President's inexperience in foreign affairs. At this stage, Kennedy remained unsure of the logistics of the programme. However, he wanted an assurance that Volunteers would be responsible and useful to the countries in which they served.⁴ Yet, despite some lingering doubts, Kennedy's probing of the possibilities of a Peace Corps programme so soon after his electoral victory inferred that it remained one of the campaign proposals which he would most like to put into effect.

Certainly, the enthusiasm of the American public had not waned. On November 20, an editorial in the Washington Post impelled Kennedy to make the Peace Corps more than another campaign promise broken immediately after the election. "We hope he will return to it when he assumes the Presidency as a serious scheme for using talent in a manner likely to benefit both the Foreign Service of the United States
and the welfare of emerging nations abroad," said the Post. In a forceful letter to the New York Times, Eugene Burdick, co-author of The Ugly American, heartily approved of Kennedy's idea. Meanwhile, mail on the subject continued to flood Kennedy's offices in Boston and Washington as well as the Democratic National Committee headquarters and the White House. A substantial portion was from young people volunteering their services, but other letters contained endorsements, ideas or blueprints on the Peace Corps. Before the end of the year Kennedy had received more than twenty-five thousand letters on the subject — more than on any other topic. Moreover, on November 23, 1960, Richard Goodwin (the campaign aide who had researched the idea) reminded Kennedy in a memorandum that the Peace Corps had been one of his most popular campaign pledges. In terms of political benefits alone, Goodwin advised Kennedy that the proposal would be worth following up.

Without official sanction from Washington, various meetings and conferences on the Peace Corps were arranged all over the country, especially by student organisations on college campuses. On November 11 and 12, 1960, Princeton University sponsored "The Conference To Discuss The Challenge To American Youth From the World's Emerging Nations" with representatives from the educational, business and political spheres. Ms. Winifred Armstrong, a secretary from the office of President-elect Kennedy, heard the participants resolve that "thousands of America's youth are ready to answer the New Frontier's demands in the name of peace." Over the Thanksgiving weekend, a students' meeting in New York endorsed the Peace Corps. At Harvard, three young faculty members proposed a "youth project" consisting of students going to work in Nigeria. Five hundred students at Amherst petitioned the President-elect to institute a Peace Corps. Thus, between the election and the inauguration, there was overwhelming evidence of the favourable public response. Indeed, the New York Times
reported "Peace Corps" conferences taking place in every major state from New York to California. At a "Point Four Youth Corps Discussion Meeting" in Washington D.C. on December 20, Congressman Henry Reuss argued that Kennedy's electoral victory was a sufficient enough "mandate" for establishment of the Peace Corps; although, most delegates from both government and private agencies opposed the substitution of Peace Corps service for the military draft. Also in December, the International Economic and Social Development Conference was attended by over a hundred organisations interested in a "youth service."

Furthermore — as if to remind Kennedy before his inauguration — the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored two symposia on the "Youth Peace Corps" proposal on January 11 and 12, 1961. Another sign of the voracious public appetite for information on the Peace Corps was the avalanche of reports and position papers which cascaded into Kennedy's offices. Whenever there was a conference then a report inevitably followed. It was as if everyone had an opinion on how the new programme would be best run. Universities, foundations, private voluntary services and religious organisations sent in hundreds of suggestions. At the University of Michigan, the graduate students who had been inspired by Kennedy's words to form an organisation called Americans Committed to World Responsibility sent him their highly favourable report in January, 1961. Harvard, Notre Dame, Yale, Berkeley, the National Student Association, the United Auto Workers, the Industrial Union Development, the American Friends Service Committee and the Institute of International Education were among the countless number of bodies that channelled their viewpoints towards Kennedy. Some were a little over-enthusiastic. American labour unions, represented by the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Executive Council on the Peace Corps, saw few problems in mobilising the "energies and skills of American
workers in the gigantic task of assisting the new nations to spark their industrial development." Others were a good deal more cautious. I.V.S. warned against "too large an initial program" and envisaged only five hundred Volunteers in the field by 1963. As yet, Kennedy had given little indication of which view he favoured.

His last public reference to the Peace Corps had been on election eve, 1960. Since then, he had been engrossed in the great "talent hunt" for the new members of his administration. He appointed Chester Bowles as a general "caretaker" of the material coming in on the Peace Corps, but laid down no definite guidelines. The unprompted popular response in the interim period put him under considerable pressure to make a statement of renewed commitment. Kennedy's difficulty was that, as yet, he had very little detailed knowledge to impart. He simply had not had the time or the opportunity to investigate and evaluate the various options.

By December 30, 1960, Professor Max Millikan of M.I.T. had acted upon Kennedy's instructions to Rostow and had prepared a lengthy "personal memorandum" for Kennedy entitled "An International Youth Service." Straight away, Millikan conceded "we simply do not know a great deal about how to make a program of this kind of work." Accordingly, his recommendations were extremely tentative. All the same, he was definitely in favour of a "youth service" and did at least give Kennedy a framework on which to base a public statement.

On January 9, 1961, from the Stanhope Hotel, New York City, President-elect Kennedy published verbatim, Millikan's paper. However, it was heralded as "a release from the office of John F. Kennedy." The statement recognised the "mounting
flow of incontestable evidence that there are large and growing numbers of Americans in their twenties deeply motivated to place their energies and talents at the service of constructive world causes and prepared to devote two or three years of their lives to such services irrespective of their long-term career objectives."

While this dedication was particularly ascribed to students, it was said to be "growing in all sections of the American public." An International Youth Service Agency was proposed "on a limited pilot basis." It was suggested the new organisation would be part of the "broader effort by the International Cooperation Administration" (I.C.A. was the U.S. government agency which administered all overseas assistance programmes). Therefore, it would not directly administer its own projects. International Youth Service workers would be paid "salaries" by their host governments and a minimum qualification for selection would be a Bachelor of Arts degree. Millikan felt it would be appropriate for the new agency's director to be chosen "from the academic world."

As it transpired, these particular speculations became obsolete when the Peace Corps was finally established in March, 1961. However, a number of Millikan's other proposals more accurately presaged the finished article. For instance, it was emphasised that "no selective service exemption should be granted to participants in this program." Thus, Kennedy was able to parry the major criticism that the Peace Corps would provide a haven for draft-dodgers. The statement also recommended rigorous training and selection standards and terms of service lasting two years. It stressed the "experimental" nature of the programme and estimated there
would be no more than "several hundred young people in the first year or two." Ending as it had begun - on a cautious note - the release warned that "The danger and risks to which such a program is exposed should not be underestimated. The whole program could be brought into irreparable disrepute in the very early stages if it is started on too ambitious a scale."16

The intention behind Kennedy's announcement was to quell the public clamour which had grown up during the transition period. Millikan's International Youth Service plan lacked confidence and precision when compared to the Peace Corps as it was finally established. However, from Kennedy's standpoint in early January, 1961 the release was a success on several fronts. It silenced the critics by appearing cautious and by eliminating the draft evasion charge, and at the same time, it satisfied vociferous supporters by giving substance to their dearest hopes. Tactically, Kennedy's statement was a triumph.

Of course, although Kennedy had temporarily deflected attention from his office, public discussion of the Peace Corps continued. Mr. Charles Montani, a ship repairs executive, wrote to the New York Times suggesting that American naval ships laid up in "mothball" fleets could be used as floating bases for the Peace Corps; he argued this would save the government the expense of establishing a new agency and would give the Peace Corps a flexible mode of operations. Foreign Policy Forum magazine devoted its January issue to the question of "Would a Peace Corps be Useful?" Franklin Wallick, public relations officer of the American Federation of Labor, defended the motion and Professor Michael Belshaw of Hunter College, New York, opposed it.
On January 13, 1961, Democratic congressman John Brademas of Indiana told sixteen hundred students at Ohio Wesleyan University that Kennedy's idea offered an "imaginative way to match the enthusiasm of young Americans for international service with the serious shortages of skilled manpower in underdeveloped areas." Just one week before Kennedy's inauguration, an editorial in the New York Times claimed that the Peace Corps was "something that is in the spirit of this democratic country, a forward-looking thing, and it is heartening that so many of our young people are responding with vigor and eagerness to it." A Gallup poll showed conclusively that popular interest in the Peace Corps had not abated. A massive 71 per cent of Americans said they were in favour of the proposal with only a meagre 18 per cent against.

On January 20, 1961, President John F. Kennedy made his famous Inaugural Address during which he exhorted Americans to "ask not what your country can do for you - ask what you can do for your country." There was no mention of a Peace Corps as such, but, significantly - Kennedy promised

"To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery....our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required - not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich."

During the hectic transition there had been little time for Kennedy to take action on the Peace Corps proposal. Nevertheless, he must have been aware that the tremendous public enthusiasm had not
diminished and that his campaign promise could not be abandoned or
even postponed. Hence, the day after the inauguration, Kennedy
telephoned his brother-in-law, Robert Sargent Shriver, and asked
him "to report to him how the Peace Corps could be organised and
then to organise it."¹

Shriver later recalled that, until President Kennedy asked
him to engineer it, he "did not know what the Peace Corps was."²
Related to Kennedy through marriage to his sister, Eunice, Shriver
had a professional background in business. Between 1948 and 1960
he had been assistant general manager at Joseph P. Kennedy's (the
President's father) Merchandise Mart in Chicago. He was also an
executive director of the philanthropic Joseph P. Kennedy Jr.
Foundation. During the transition, Shriver had been chief of the
nationwide quest for the most able people to staff the Kennedy
administration. This talent hunt was an unmitigated success with
Shriver personally finding and persuading some of the best and the
brightest men in the country — including Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara —
to come to Washington. Describing Shriver's style of determined
persuasiveness, David Halberstam called him a "big-game hunter."³

Shriver, exhausted after the hectic campaign and transition,
claimed he had "no idea" why Kennedy chose him to coordinate the
planning of the Peace Corps. His only reasoning was that he may
have impressed Kennedy with his work on Civil Rights, agricultural,
educational and other "issues" during the campaign as well as with
his personnel selections for the administration.⁴ In addition,
Shriver's experience of voluntary public service in education
would have made him an attractive choice. Between 1956 and 1960
he had been President of the Chicago Board of Education and a member
of various schools, universities and citizens' boards. He had also
given his services to numerous committees including those of the
Ford Foundation, Notre Dame University and the University of Illinois.
Nor would Kennedy have failed to notice that, as President of the
Catholic Interracial Council of Chicago, Shriver had won a
reputation as a strong proponent of Civil Rights. He had been
active in organisations involving hospitals, community service,
child care and other civic endeavours and, on a lighter note, he had
also served a term as President of the American National Council of
Boy Scouts. Besides, Kennedy was aware that in the 1930's, his
brother-in-law had been a leader of Experiment in International
Living groups and, in the 1950's, had actually submitted a Peace Corps-
type plan to President Eisenhower. In terms of dedication to the
ideals of public service and interest in the general Peace Corps
idea, Shriver's credentials were excellent.25

Shriver and Kennedy did not enjoy the closest of personal
relationships. Certainly, they liked and admired each other well
enough, but Kennedy's acute sense of irony and his cool, almost
detached, view of life was the opposite of Shriver's more earnest,
wholehearted approach. At the same time, Kennedy was probably
closer to Shriver's wife, Eunice, than any other of his brothers or
sisters; significantly, she sometimes acted as an effective
intermediary between the two men. On a purely professional level,
Kennedy had been impressed by Shriver's work for him during the
campaigns for the Senate in 1952 and 1956 as well as in the race
for the Presidency in 1960. Within the Kennedy entourage, Shriver
had gained a reputation as an "ideas man" who was bright, lively
and totally reliable. Ralph Dungan, an experienced political
manipulator and a member of the Kennedy staff, claimed that Shriver had "a thousand ideas every minute." 26

Shriver's innovative mind, his versatility and his past experience of dealing with young people, made him the perfect figure to forge out the path for Kennedy's new programme. Nevertheless, he was taken aback by Kennedy's post-inaugural phone-call. As he later described it:

"I needed help badly. Working out of a room in Washington's Mayflower Hotel, I started rounding up friends who had some knowledge of international student exchange and education programs, plus practical experience in managing them....President Kennedy wanted to know what was taking us so long.... I replied weakly that no one had ever tried to put together a Peace Corps before."27

On January 21, 1961, Shriver took his first direct step towards organising the Peace Corps when he telephoned Harris Wofford Jr., a law professor from Notre Dame University who had acted as Kennedy's adviser on Civil Rights during the campaign. While working together on the election and the talent hunt, Shriver and Wofford had become close friends. Wofford had long cherished the idea of a United States government service overseas. Indeed, he had been involved in establishing the International Development Placement Association (a small, government-subsidised overseas agency for students) in the 1950's. Hence, he was only too glad - if a little startled - to help in creating what he called "this strange new animal, the Peace Corps." In later years, Wofford recalled how quickly it all began:

"The morning after the inauguration Shriver called me and said 'You thought you were going to have a vacation didn't you? Well, the President just asked me to set up the task force to see whether this Peace Corps idea makes sense. When shall we have our first meeting?'28
In some ways, Shriver and Wofford were very much alike. Both were absolutely committed to Civil Rights, both interested in America's relationship with the Third World and both devoted to the idea of public service. Although Wofford shared Kennedy's sense of irony, it was allied to an unshakeable personal integrity and an irrepressible enthusiasm for ideals which was bound to be attractive to Shriver.

Indeed, Wofford described his understanding with Shriver as "telepathic." Their recent mutual experience of the campaign and talent hunt had been the introduction — for both men — to the workings of the Federal government. This was to prove highly significant for the future. Many of the distinctive ingredients of those exhilarating operations — initiative, spontaneity and the pursuit of excellence — soon came to characterise the government organisation they were in the process of building.

For the first few days the Peace Corps "task force" consisted solely of Shriver and Wofford, sitting in their suite at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington. Wofford remembered that most of their time was spent making telephone calls to people whom they thought might be helpful. Among these were Gordon Boyce, President of the Experiment in International Living; Albert Sims of the Institute of International Education; Adam Yarmolinsky, a foundation executive and a first-class lawyer; George Carter, a campaign worker on Civil Rights issues and a former member of the American Society for African Culture; Louis Martin, a journalist who had worked for the Democratic National Committee; and Franklin Williams, a Kennedy campaign helper with the black vote and a knowledgeable student of African affairs. All these men were personal friends of Shriver and Wofford. By the end of January,
they had gathered together the nucleus of a Peace Corps task force which contained considerable experience of overseas programmes.

Moreover, they soon found that one name led to another. Thus, during the last week of January and the first week of February, scores of people from the academic, government, business and religious communities passed through the makeshift Peace Corps headquarters in the Mayflower Hotel. It was a very informal set-up - more like a group of friends gathering together to discuss a pet subject than an official committee establishing a government organisation. Shriver had no long-term, premeditated vision of what the Peace Corps might be. "My style," he confessed, "was to get bright, informative, creative people and then pick their brains." 31

Besides people, Shriver was inundated by letters and reports from various sources. From within government circles, the International Cooperation Administration (I.C.A.) presented a study of The National Peace Corps. Professor Hayes of the University of Michigan submitted an extensive report on the potential of an International Youth Service. The ten thousand dollars appropriated by Congress to the University of Colorado for a study of the Peace Corps produced a preliminary paper on A Youth Corps for Service Abroad. From Britain, there came an advisory plan from Alec Dickson, chief of Voluntary Service Overseas. Quite literally, hundreds of reports were received - all in favour of the Peace Corps but all offering confusing, and often conflicting advice on its execution. 32

Professor Hayes recommended close cooperation with the United Nations and that Volunteers should work at home as well as abroad. Professor Maurice Albertson of the University of Colorado, advised a Volunteer age limit somewhere between twenty and thirty and that
the new agency should not directly control country programmes. The I.C.A. report stated that Volunteers should be paid a substantial salary of some three thousand dollars and that the Peace Corps organisation should not be independent of the general United States foreign assistance effort. Alec Dickson prescribed that the Peace Corps should ensure above all else, that its programmes would respond to the felt needs of Third World peoples and be desired by them. As Dickson pointed out, "One or two organisations in the United States have made a strategic error in starting with the recruitment of volunteers and the collection of money — only to find that there are no projects overseas." In an interesting footnote to his report, Dickson noted the difference between the financial stringency of the British government and the abundant resources available to the United States. In a slightly envious conclusion, he wrote, "the British government has recently given us (V.C.O.) a small grant, warning us at the same time that we should not assume that this will be an annual offering!"33

On attempting to distill this cornucopia of material, Shriver's group discovered the only point of unanimity was that the Peace Corps should begin very cautiously and on a small scale. Meanwhile, the Peace Corps continued to stimulate public debate. The correspondence columns of the New York Times showed that some Americans felt the new organisation should not be part of the United States government as this would lead to it being accused of "imperialism" by Third World countries; others argued that selection should not be limited to students. Congressman Reuss took issue with the "cautious approach" and claimed there was no reason why Volunteer numbers should not eventually reach the tens of thousands and undertake
almost everything under the sun." Conversely, one Mr. Charles Pemberton wrote to the editor of the *New York Times* ridiculing the idea of young Americans going to work abroad; he made an analogy with Henry Ford's "Peace Ship" and prophesied that the Peace Corps would meet a similar fate. However, Gertrude Samuëls, a journalist for the *New York Times* argued that with half the world starving, two-thirds of the world illiterate and a life expectancy of thirty-six years in the Third World as compared to seventy in the United States, the Peace Corps would provide a necessary outlet for "the individual American to do something positive and affirmative for peace." Yet, despite the undeniably great need for help in the underdeveloped lands, the reaction of many professional academics to the Peace Corps was guarded. Likewise, an editorial in the *New York Times* on February 13, 1961, warned that, of themselves, "youthful volunteers are not the answer." On January 30, President Kennedy kept the public spotlight on the great debate by reminding the country of the ongoing "formation of a National Peace Corps" in his first State of the Union address.35

Shriver had scheduled the first official meeting of the Peace Corps task force for Monday, February 6, 1961. As that date approached, Shriver and Wofford consulted with more and more experienced personnel. From International Cooperation Administration came Glenn McClelland, Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Management; Charles Nelson, Chief of Latin American and African Regional Divisions; Karl Bode, Assistant Deputy Director for Planning; John Grady, Deputy Director for Management; and James Grant, Deputy Director for Programme and Planning. Irving Lewis,
Deputy Chief of the International Division of the Bureau of the Budget, was another government administrator who contributed.

From academia there was Samuel Hayes of the University of Michigan, Carroll Wilson of M.I.T., Eugene Rostow of Yale, Gilbert White of the University of Chicago, Richard Neustadt of Columbia and Harlan Cleveland of Syracuse. James Scott, Vice-President of the National Student Association gave some advice as did James Russell, Secretary of the National Education Association. From the world of business and industry there was John Burnett, General Counsel of the Development and Resources Corporation and Victor Reuther of the United Automobile Workers. 36

Of course, Senator Humphrey and Congressman Reuss were regular visitors to the Mayflower Hotel and Richard Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President, acted as a channel of communications between the task force and the White House. Although divers recommendations, opinions and reports were circulating, Shriver had made relatively little headway in defining the fundamentals of the new programme in terms of specific size, costs, organisation and objectives. When, in the first week of February, Kennedy asked for a comprehensive report by the end of the month, Shriver was forced to concede that, as yet, the task force had not so much as settled upon an official name for the new agency. Shriver described the task force's predicament:

"The President called every seven or eight days asking what was the matter and why he couldn't announce the Peace Corps in Congress. And we hadn't even decided upon a name for it yet... All we had was two or three sentences from a campaign speech... There were no rules, no regulations on who should join, where they should go or how long they should stay. We spent the first thirty days over in the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, trying to assemble the most competent people ever involved in sending people overseas." 37.
Unbeknown to Shriver, at approximately the same time as he
was busily recruiting a task force, two bureaucrats in the Far
Eastern division of the International Cooperation Administration
were assiduously working on a Peace Corps plan of their own.
Warren W. Wiggins was the experienced Deputy Director of Far
Eastern operations in I.C.A. Still only in his thirties in
1960, Wiggins had already helped administer the Marshall Plan in
Western Europe, served as United States economic adviser to the
Philippines and acted as Director of the American aid programme
in Bolivia. Although a highly respected foreign aid administrator,
Wiggins was totally dissatisfied with the manner in which American
overseas programmes were run. He often referred disgustedly to
the luxurious "golden ghettos" where United States officials
lived in Third World countries - despite the poverty and disease
which surrounded them. "Reflecting on my own service abroad," said Wiggins, "I think we were too much encumbered by peripheral
service organisations, recreation associations, clubs, American-oriented theatre groups, even exclusively American churches. I
have sometimes had the feeling that the management of the official American community becomes an all-devouring juggernaut."

Wiggins's foil was the quite brilliant twenty-six year old Far
East Regional Counsel for I.C.A., William Josephson. Both Wiggins
and Josephson were attracted by the spirit and vision of John
Kennedy's campaign and were desperate to "get connected" to the
new administration. During the transition period they worked
on various "position papers" - on Vietnam, Laos, the reorganisation
of Foreign Aid and the Peace Corps. Josephson later admitted that,
at first, he had thought the Peace Corps "a silly idea." Indeed,
both he and Wiggins began with the understanding that the programme would be limited to sending young Americans overseas to teach English. However, as they wrote and re-wrote drafts of their report on the Peace Corps, their vision broadened. Wiggins explained how the new programme came to fascinate him:

"I was intrigued by the idea of the Peace Corps - and worried about it. The concept was challenging to me as a result of my twelve years experience with United States programs abroad. But I was concerned as to how the concept would be worked out. I wondered what the aims of the Peace Corps should be."

Wiggins did most of the actual writing on the final draft of their Peace Corps paper and it was completed by the end of January. They called their report The Towering Task, taking the title from the phrase Kennedy had used in his State of the Union address - "The problems... are towering and unprecedented - and the response must be towering and unprecedented as well." Wiggins and Josephson were not under the auspices of the official I.C.A. working party on the Peace Corps, although they did submit to it a copy of their plan. They also gave one to Harris Wofford and another to Richard Goodwin of the White House staff. They sent it by these three different routes because, as Wiggins put it, they "wanted to make sure that Shriver would get it." No one is quite sure how, but a copy did eventually fall into Shriver's hands and - according to Peace Corps mythology - he read it at 2 a.m. on the morning of February 6, 1961. Quite simply, he thought it brilliant. He immediately sent Wiggins a telegram inviting him to attend the task force meeting at 9 a.m. Thus, the so-called "midnight ride of Warren Wiggins" became a legend in Peace Corps annals. Harris
Wofford cited the "discovery" of Wiggins's paper as an outstanding example of his almost "telepathic" understanding with Sargent Shriver:

"I got Wiggins's paper the night before the task force meeting to begin at 9 a.m. in the morning, read it, around 2 a.m. finished it, and called Shriver at 7 in the morning to say I'd read this paper by a guy that sounds like he's right on target with the sort of thing you have in mind for this. Shriver said, "Great." I said, "Can I invite him to come to the meeting?" He said, "Fine. Go ahead and invite him. What's his name?" I said, "Warren Wiggins." He said, "You're a little late. I finished reading it around 2 o'clock last night and sent him a telegram saying to be there at 9 a.m. in the morning." This happened time and again with Shriver and me. He was often a few minutes ahead of me or on the same beam."46

Shriver began the meeting the next day by introducing Wiggins and Josephson and then distributing copies of The Towering Task. He advised the other members of the task force to read it carefully before making any comment whatsoever. It was a pregnant moment.

From this meeting onwards Wiggins, and his partner Josephson, became the intellectual base of the new agency. Indeed, according to Shriver, Warren Wiggins was the figure most responsible for the "miracle of planning and organisation that brought the Peace Corps into being."47 The Towering Task began with the modest hope that it might "stimulate thought". In fact, it went much further and provided a philosophy for the Peace Corps throughout the Kennedy era.48

Wiggins disagreed fundamentally with most of the academic and other institutional approaches which had counselled "caution and a slow beginning." He advocated a "quantum jump" in Peace Corps thinking which would consider initiating the programme with "several thousand Americans participating in the first twelve to
eighteen months." Whereas Millikan, Albertson and Hayes had
estimated Volunteer numbers in terms of hundreds, Wiggins threw
out figures of thirty, fifty and even one hundred thousand.
This was precisely why Shriver had been so struck by The Towering Task.
It was original, adventurous and sought to create the Peace Corps
as a truly significant force in the world arena. The argument for
"bigness" did not appear rash because Wiggins provided a highly-
persuasive rationale. He argued that "a small, cautious National
Peace Corps may be worse than no Peace Corps at all. It may not
receive the attention and talent it will require even for preventing
trouble." Moreover, Wiggins claimed that "a slow, cautious start
may maximise the chance of failure." To illustrate the benefits
of a large Peace Corps, Wiggins offered the "test-case" of an
English-teaching programme in a country he knew well from past
experience - the Philippines. He discussed the minutiae of how
the American government could provide salaries, transportation,
teaching materials, training, housing and administration for
Volunteers. Indeed, he even took into account unforeseen
"contingencies." Wiggins reckoned that, by 1965, there could be
five thousand young American volunteer teachers in the Philippines
at the cost of $12,002,750.49

From February 6, 1961, The Towering Task defined the direction
of the task force's planning for the Peace Corps. Wiggins and
Josephson had persuaded Shriver and many others that not only
could a sizeable Peace Corps be effective, but that it might well
be the best hope of success. The Towering Task captured the
quality which Shriver had desperately hoped to find - "professional,
practical idealism."50
With three weeks until the deadline set by President Kennedy, the Peace Corps had at last acquired a skeletal framework; but the substance - what Wiggins called "the arms and the legs" of the enterprise - had yet to be created. To a great extent the task force was still working in a vacuum, simply because this type of programme had never before been attempted by the government.

An organisation had to be legalised and constructed in Washington; the procedure for recruitment, training, selection and financing of volunteers had to be systematised; the nature of the work and general foreign policy objectives had to be defined. These were only a few of an intimidating array of problems. However, as Bill Josephson recalled, "We loved the opportunity to create something new."

On February 9, 1961, in a memorandum to Shriver entitled "Countdown for Launching", Al Sims argued that rather than attempt the impossible feat of tackling every problem simultaneously, the task force should concentrate on a few crucial priorities. Sims saw these as: settling the programme's terms of reference and nominating a Director, deciding on the size and nature of the organisation and recruiting key staff members, securing necessary funds and initiating a liaison with the Congress and, arranging for an Executive Order from the President which would quickly and effectively launch the Peace Corps as a going concern. Throughout February, there was intense debate within the task force. Various cabals and individuals fought for the issues and opinions which they wished to see expressed in the final report to Kennedy. Harris Offord continued to hold a brief for draft exemption for Volunteers - despite the weight of opinion against him. Gordon Boyce differed with Wiggins over the degree of direct administration of projects.
which the Peace Corps should have; Boyce, along with many academics and representatives from private organisations, argued that the Peace Corps should merely make grants to universities and private agencies and then leave the total administration of country programmes to them. But Wiggins felt this would lead to a "Peace Corps Foundation" operating rather like the National Science Foundation — appropriating funds but having no effective control. From the beginning, he was insistent that the Peace Corps should play the central role in every aspect of the programme.  

Besides these disagreements over specific details, a huge divide opened up within the task force between "maximalists" (foreign assistance professionals like Wiggins and Josephson) who wanted a large programme, and "minimalists" (academics like Carroll Wilson and Eugene Rostow) who believed that smallness would be the best policy. At all times, Sargent Shriver maintained control over the various factions and ensured that all discussion was creative by continually emphasising the simple but essential questions: "Were there people who wanted to volunteer? Was there a demand for them overseas? Could they serve effectively overseas?"

Relying on Bill Josephson's reputation as "one of the shrewdest, hardest-working young lawyers in I.C.A.," Shriver entrusted him to handle the various legal and technical complexities involved in setting up a new government agency. One of Josephson's most vital concerns was whether Kennedy should issue an Executive Order which would immediately set the Peace Corps in motion. It was highly probable that such an act would be interpreted by some members of the Congress as an infringement upon their legislative
prerogative. However at this stage, speed was the Peace Corps' primary consideration. There was not enough time for the detailed research and writing which the preparation of Congressional legislation would entail. Quite candidly, Josephson told Shriver that the Peace Corps was not yet ready to "talk convincingly to the Committees about specific numbers or specific members in specific places by specific dates through specific means." Josephson argued that if the Peace Corps waited the six months it would take to get a bill through the Congress, then it would miss the potential recruits from the colleges and universities in the summer of 1961 and would possibly not be in operation before the winter of 1962.

An Executive Order was the only viable alternative. Moreover, the diligent Josephson had discovered that "ample authority" and finance for the President to establish the Peace Corps existed in Section 400 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. An Executive Order also made sense in regard to future Congressional strategy. If the Peace Corps could put volunteers in the field and prove itself a success before the Congress had actually to consider its legal permanence, then its chances of survival would be measurably increased. Of course, there would be the risk of alienating the Congress by presenting it with a virtual "fait accompli" but, as Harris Wofford recalled, the task force decided the Peace Corps would be "much less precarious if it were a living body instead of just an idea."

The positive recommendation of an Executive Order was one of the many judgments made in that critical period when the report to Kennedy was being drafted. Another was the decision to adopt the name "Peace Corps" as the official title for the new organisation. Kennedy had used the phrase "Peace Corps" in the Cow Palace address.
However, several State Department officials complained that the word "peace" had come to be associated with Soviet propaganda and that "corps" carried undesirable military connotations. Dozens of alternative titles were suggested, including the previously used International Youth Service, Point Four Youth Corps and Youth for Peace; but, after much discussion, Shriver settled upon the original. "What we wanted," he wrote, "was a name which the public at large could grasp emotionally as well as intellectually." Shriver felt the term "Peace Corps" had this quality. He did not believe that "peace" should become the exclusive property of the Soviets and besides, the title "Peace Corps" maintained the spirit of Kennedy's original statement.

As the end of February approached, the task force stepped up its pace. Discussions continued well into the night and typists worked right down to the deadline. Twice in February Kennedy telephoned Shriver and questioned him about the progress of his investigations. Also, while addressing a Youth Fitness Conference on February 21, the President publicly expressed his hope that the Peace Corps proposal would soon come to "realisation." This pressure brought to bear from the White House was in turn exerted upon the task force. As Shriver put it, "We often were forced to make some drastic demands on people." Bill Johnson described the chaotic scene as the report was written in the early hours of Friday, February 24, 1961: "the final draft of the report was done with Charles Nelson sitting in one room writing basic copy, me sitting in another room rewriting it, Wofford sitting in yet another room doing the final rewrite, and Wiggins running back and forth between the three rooms delivering pieces of paper along the chain." Despite the last-minute rush, that morning Sargent Shriver was
able to deliver to Kennedy The Report To The President on The Peace Corps. 65

In a memorandum accompanying the Report - "Summary of Next Steps" - Shriver stressed that although he was making some recommendations, the final decisions on the design and purpose of the Peace Corps rested with Kennedy himself. "You must decide," wrote Shriver. 66 On the first page he described the Peace Corps as "a trained group of workers for world peace: young in years, mature in judgement, dedicated in spirit, volunteer in nature, ready to serve anywhere in the world at the discretion of the President and the Secretary of State."

He then urged Kennedy to establish the Peace Corps by the following steps. First, the President should issue an Executive Order and make twelve million dollars available from his emergency fund for fiscal year 1961. Next, he should appoint a Peace Corps Director and a National Advisory Council consisting of well-respected and experienced members of the public. Shriver also advised Kennedy to inform the entire United States diplomatic mission of the nature of the Peace Corps and explain its purpose to all member governments of the United Nations. Lastly, he suggested that Kennedy could launch the Peace Corps "with maximum impact" by making it the main item of a television-press conference. Shriver concluded this memorandum on a forceful note: "By these steps taken in the next few days or weeks, the Peace Corps can come into being." 67

Shriver began the Report with a very positive, confident first sentence. "Having studied at your request the problems of establishing a Peace Corps, I recommend its immediate establishment." 68 This sense of urgency became one of the most outstanding characteristics
of the Peace Corps in the Kennedy era. However, although he was "satisfied that we have sufficient answers to justify your going ahead," Shriver added a word of caution. "Since the Peace Corps is a new experiment in international cooperation," he wrote, "many of the questions considered below will only be finally answered in action by trial and error. Our tentative conclusions are therefore submitted as working hypotheses."

The Report stated that the great shortage of time justified the recommendation for an Executive Order and the request for appropriations from the "contingency fund" of the Mutual Security Act. "If the world situation were moving at a snail's pace" noted Shriver "the Peace Corps timidly conceived and administered could keep in step." It advised that the new organisation should be situated within the Department of State so that it could utilise the experience of professional diplomats. However, Shriver was adamant that the Peace Corps must not become a mere subdivision of I.C.A. He did not want it encumbered by I.C.A.'s political and bureaucratic disabilities. Shriver insisted, "This new wine should not be pruned into the old I.C.A. bottle." Rather, he suggested that the Peace Corps should be administered by a "small, new, alive agency operating as one component in our whole overseas operation."

Shriver's advocacy in the Report of a semi-autonomous new agency was the prelude to a bitter bureaucratic quarrel; but, from the outset, he sought to establish a distinctive "identity and spirit" for the Peace Corps.

For the internal workings of the Peace Corps, Shriver asked for "great flexibility to experiment with different methods of operation." While the Peace Corps would be closely related to other parts of the United States foreign aid effort, he was
emphatic that it should not become starchy and inflexible.

This was the first sign of Shriver's intense hatred of red tape and traditional bureaucratic methods:

"No one...wants to see a large centralised new bureaucracy grow up. The American genius for voluntary action and private organisation must come into full play. The resources, energy and experience of our non-governmental institutions, including colleges and universities, foundations, trade unions, businesses, civic groups and religious bodies must be tapped. This must be a cooperative venture of the whole American people - not the program of some alphabetical agency in Washington."

This aim of making the Peace Corps a "different" type of government agency was to become one of its consistently distinguishing features. To promote universal participation and avoid self-perpetuation, the Report said the Peace Corps would function simultaneously by five different means. Firstly, through grants to private voluntary agencies already engaged in grassroots assistance programmes; I.V.S., Operation Crossroads Africa, the 4-H Club and many others came under this category. Secondly, it was envisaged the Peace Corps would work through arrangements and contract agreements with colleges, universities and other educational institutions willing and able to participate in overseas projects. Another alternative was for the Peace Corps to develop its programmes in conjunction with the other government aid agencies like I.C.A. and the United States Information Agency. The Report claimed that these established organisations could use Peace Corps Volunteers as "personnel at the working level who can help translate high-level advice into action on the line." Fourthly, the Peace Corps could
function through the United Nations and other international technical assistance and development schemes. Lastly, the Report suggested that the Peace Corps might even directly administer some of its own projects - all the way from recruiting Volunteers to planning programmes and establishing contact with host countries. This latter suggestion was to cause a major policy argument at a later date. The Report implied that the Peace Corps would directly administer programmes only under extenuating circumstances when "complexity or novelty or urgency" demanded they could not be efficiently managed by the other four channels. However, this did not prove to be an accurate projection.

Naturally, the Report went into some detail concerning the role of the Volunteer. After all, the essential idea behind the Peace Corps was "the placement of Americans in actual operational work in newly developing areas of the world." It was strongly advised that there should be no automatic draft exemption. The Report predicted that in most cases service in the Corps would be considered a ground for temporary deferment and that few ex-Volunteers would be drafted. However, with a view to the criticism which had been levelled at the Peace Corps by Nixon and Eisenhower, the Report argued, "the Corps must never be seen, in this country or abroad, as a haven for draft-dodgers."

Since no one could really be sure of who or what "Volunteers" would be, the Report decided against any narrow, disqualifying regulations. Although, it was imagined that most Volunteers would be young, college graduates, there was to be no rigid age limit for either young or old. Any able-bodied American citizen over eighteen could volunteer. An academic qualification in the form of a college degree or otherwise, would not be compulsory.
The Report also emphasised that the Peace Corps would be open to both men and women.

"From one to three years" was the length of service recommended and a recruitment and selection centre would be established in Washington D.C. to ensure that the Peace Corps would have "the broadest possible national base." Following the procedure of the Foreign Service, applicants were to take both a written test and an oral interview. The development of appropriate training programmes was deemed an "urgent priority" by the Report. The Peace Corps would utilise college and university facilities and instructors wherever feasible and the emphasis would be on language instruction and preparation for a specific job overseas; training time could vary from six weeks to six months. Volunteers in the field would be paid the minimum to provide a "decent standard of living", live in circumstances apposite to those of their host country counterparts and "avoid all conspicuous consumption." However, by way of thanks for their service, a modest allowance would be made over to them on leaving the Peace Corps.

Drawing upon some of the evidence in the study undertaken by Professor Albertson and the Colorado State University Research Unit, the Report stated unequivocally that "the need for trained Peace Corpsmen is felt in every country in Latin America, Africa and Asia." It asserted that there was a lack of skilled personnel in teaching, public health, rural development, industrial projects and government administration. However, in its first year, the Peace Corps would probably concentrate on teaching projects; the need was obvious and besides — again, the need for speed was an important consideration — it would be more feasible to recruit and train qualified teachers than most other professions.
Shriver predicted that, providing it was administered in a proper fashion, the benefits of the Peace Corps would be manifold. It would contribute to a "more intelligent American participation in the world," to the social and economic development of "critical" countries and regions, and to the promotion of international cooperation and "good will towards this country." However, in a vitally important statement of intent, the Report urged Kennedy to take steps "to dispel the notion that the Peace Corps is merely an attempt to export surplus American spiritual or political zeal, and to show that the Peace Corps is not advanced as an arm of the Cold War but as a contribution to the world community." Shriver was determined that the Peace Corps should avoid being labelled as an instrument of American cultural imperialism or as a tool of United States foreign policy strategists. Accordingly, the Report emphasised the reciprocal educational advantages of the cross-cultural experience. "The Peace Corps can contribute to the education of America," it stated. Indeed, the Peace Corps was envisioned as a genuine experiment in international partnership, not as a political or propaganda venture. As the Report put it:

"The Peace Corps offers as much of an opportunity to bring home to the United States the problems of the world as it does an opportunity to meet urgent host country needs for relatively trained manpower. If presented in this spirit, the response and the results will be immeasurably better."

Moving towards conclusion, the Report claimed that the Peace Corps carried the potential to add "a new dimension" to America's view of the world. That dimension did not consist of subterfuge and intelligence estimates but rather of "a better understanding and more responsibility toward the world."
Shriver's Report To The President was very much in the spirit of The Towering Task. It advised programmes of a significant size, urged the government to provide bold and forceful leadership and set out to be forthright and ambitious. It promised Kennedy that, if he launched the Peace Corps "within the next two weeks in a determined way," there could be as many as two thousand Volunteers in the field by the end of the year. However, it also realised that "No matter how well conceived and efficiently run, there probably will be failures." Nevertheless, a resilient optimism was the dominant theme. "The potential is very great," Shriver told President Kennedy, "if you decide to go ahead, we can be in business Monday morning."  

The White House’s initial reaction to the task force’s findings was less than enthusiastic. Theodore Sorensen told Shriver that the Report had turned out to be completely different to what the White House had envisaged. Obviously, Kennedy and his staff had been thinking of a small, low-cost addendum to the general United States assistance programme - along similar lines to the cautious suggestions of Max Millikan. Instead, Shriver proffered a bold, prominent and independent new government agency which would be in the field within a few months. There was also the problem of the Executive Order. Although Kennedy was in his so-called "honeymoon" period with the Congress, he was not over-anxious to expend his Presidential prerogative unless it was absolutely necessary.

The last week of February, 1961, was taken up with frequent consultation between the task force members and their White House counterparts. Shriver’s group argued it was imperative that
momentum should not be lost; there was an organisation to be built, rooms full of mail to be answered and Volunteers to be recruited. All this had to be begun immediately if Volunteers were to be in action before 1962. On the other hand, the President's staff were understandably nervous that a hastily-assembled programme for young people to work abroad would prove a political liability for Kennedy. Not the least of their worries was the proposal for an Executive Order. Congressmen would not take kindly to such an early invasion of their legislative rights.

Warren Wiggins and Bill Josephson in particular, engaged in industrious research and persuasive argument on behalf of the Peace Corps. Josephson found relevant precedent for an Executive Order of the desired type going back to Roosevelt's establishment of the Emergency Conservation Corps in 1933. He also argued that it made good political sense to present the Peace Corps as a special case. In this way, senators and congressmen would not regard it as just another foreign aid "boondoggle" or a trespass against their privilege. Wiggins presupposed that if Kennedy did not set up the Peace Corps at the very beginning of his administration by swift, executive action, then there was a strong possibility the programme might never see the light of day. Wiggins reckoned history had shown well enough that opportunities for a President to be both creative and idealistic did not come around often and certainly not in the second and third years of his term in office. As March approached, Shriver and his task force felt it was a case of "now or never" for the Peace Corps.
Lawrence O'Brien, Special Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, recalled being "extremely impressed" by the Peace Corps' articulate advocates and he finally agreed that the Executive Order would be an effective tactic.

Kennedy himself was persuaded that the Peace Corps was a special case and it was his "personal undertaking" that it be launched as speedily as possible. Accordingly, the Peace Corps became the only programme of the Kennedy era allowed the distinctive status of an "emergency agency." On March 1, 1961, a few days after he had received Shriver's Report, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10924 which gave the Peace Corps the power to move into action as a new programme of assistance "for men and women of the United States...to nations and areas of the world." In an accompanying statement, Kennedy underlined his personal support for the project and gave some details of its logistics based on Shriver's Report.

Consistent with his previous cautious messages on the Peace Corps, he insisted that, it was established only on "a temporary pilot basis" with only five hundred or more going into the field by the end of the year.

As Shriver had suggested in the Report, Kennedy made a major announcement on the Peace Corps on radio and television during the Presidential News Conference on the afternoon of March 1, 1961. In answer to a reporter's question on the Peace Corps, Kennedy replied that he was hopeful it would become "a source of satisfaction to Americans." When asked a further question about a future Peace Corps Director, Kennedy commented "We are going to make a judgement about who will be the head and what its staff will be in several days."
On the same busy day, in a "Special Message to The Congress on The Peace Corps," Kennedy requested permanent legislation. He reaffirmed his faith in the "temporary Peace Corps" and flattered the Congress by mentioning the splendid work done on the proposal by Senator Humphrey and Congressman Reuss. He spoke of the beneficial impact which the Peace Corps would have on America's relationship with the Third World. "Our own freedom and the future of freedom around the world", said Kennedy, "depends, in a very real sense, on the underdeveloped countries' ability to build growing and independent nations where men can live in dignity, liberated from the bonds of hunger, ignorance and poverty." Kennedy also mentioned the "sacrifice" and "dedication" of the young Americans who would serve overseas in "the villages, the mountains, the towns and the factories of dozens of struggling nations." Developing the line of argument used in the Report, Kennedy stressed that "the benefits of the Peace Corps will not be limited to the countries in which it serves. Our own young men and women...will return better able to assume the responsibilities of American citizenship and with greater understanding of our global responsibilities." Finally, Kennedy reassured the Congress that "service with the Peace Corps will not exempt Volunteers from Selective Service." Moreover, he insisted that, as this stage, the programme was purely "experimental in nature." However, he ended his message to the Congress on an optimistic note. Kennedy predicted that should the Peace Corps prove successful there could be several thousand young Americans overseas within the next few years and that they would add a "new dimension" to the foreign policy of the United States.
The President's dramatic stroke of the pen within the first hundred days of his administration indicated both his personal and public commitment to the Peace Corps and his implicit trust in the judgement of Sargent Shriver. Kennedy was taking a considerable political risk with his speedy establishment of the Peace Corps. Had he not been convinced of its viability, it is unlikely he would have taken such strong measures. With the Executive Order, Kennedy made an uncompromising political pledge to the Peace Corps and confirmed its general direction consonant with the recommendations of Shriver's Report. He also focused popular attention on the new agency. "Kennedy Sets Up U.S. Peace Corps To Work Abroad," proclaimed the front-page headline of the New York Times on March 2, 1961. Journalist David Halberstam devoted a leader article to the Peace Corps' establishment - as did most of the other major dailies. Indeed, if the popular reaction to the Executive Order was in any way an accurate indicator then Sargent Shriver had been absolutely right in his Report to Kennedy that the Peace Corps was the type of initiative for which "people here and abroad have long been waiting."

However, while the Executive Order gave the Peace Corps a permit to operate in Washington, its effect should not be exaggerated. The gargantuan problems of function, organisation and - most crucial of all at this stage - leadership, had been left virtually untouched. They would soon have to be confronted. The period between November 1960 and March 1961, had been vital for the Peace Corps; in that short time an idea had developed from embryo to political birth. In the next few months it would be seen whether the fragile new organism could survive.
The Peace Corps was that rarest of political phenomena—a campaign promise not broken. Such was the popular feeling in support of the programme, it would have been difficult for John Kennedy to ignore it. However, in the busy and exciting period of the transition and the first month of his Presidency, it would have been understandable if he had preferred to delay taking the risks involved in establishing a new government agency. That he did not, was an indication of his personal interest and attraction to the idea. The Executive Order served to confirm his political commitment. Almost as a by-product of Kennedy's vigorous and speedy action, the major administrators in the Peace Corps' history took the stage—Shriver, Wofford, Wiggins and Josephson. These men became the backbone of the new organisation and, in The Towering Task and the Report To The President, they supplied it with a basic philosophy and mode of operation. Of course, as Shriver and the others surveyed the scene in March, 1961, they knew that many difficulties had still to be faced. Yet, they could take a great deal of satisfaction from the knowledge that the biggest problem had already been overcome—the Peace Corps was established. As an editorial in the New York Times put it, on March 2, 1961: "President Kennedy has started what is surely one of the most remarkable projects ever undertaken by any nation."
CHAPTER FOUR

THE BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
"Your decision to preserve the special identity of the Peace Corps by making it a semi-autonomous agency in the State Department seems important and right....Our best advisors warned against the Peace Corps slipping into the established patterns of foreign aid. The Peace Corps' people-to-people approach and educational emphasis offers an opportunity to create a new pattern. For this it needs the freedom and energy of autonomy."

- HARRIS WOFFORD -

(Memorandum to President Kennedy, May 25, 1961)
The days immediately following Kennedy's Executive Order on the Peace Corps were fraught with tension for Sargent Shriver and his colleagues. "We were worried that it would fail and that it would be used against the President," admitted Shriver. As yet, there was no organisational plan, machinery, staff, programmes or authorisation from Congress. Yet, to keep up interest and momentum, it was essential for the Peace Corps to prove - as quickly as possible - that it could work. "Everything was informal, creative, and risky," recalled Shriver, "not only were we walking on branches, but on the leaves." Indeed, as yet, the Peace Corps did not have so much as an official Director.

As early as January 31, 1961, the New York Times had tipped Sargent Shriver to become the first Director of the Peace Corps. However, Shriver, in the Report To The President had specifically suggested the names of several other well-qualified men as potential leaders of the new agency. In accordance with the Millikan report, they were from the academic world. Prominent among these were Dean Eugene Rostow of Yale Law School, Professor Carroll Willson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Doctor Gilbert White of the University of Chicago, and Chancellor Clark Kerr of the University of California. All men had experience in small overseas service programmes involving either the training or placement of American students in the Third World. Kennedy rejected Shriver's nominees on the grounds that the Peace Corps was going to be a daring, new foreign policy
initiative and he did not feel that a "bookish" type of person would be appropriate. On the day after the Executive Order, Kennedy pressed Shriver to accept the position. At forty-four, Shriver was young enough to give the Peace Corps the vital image which Kennedy hoped it might project. He was bright, handsome and — in the style of the New Frontier — "vigorous."

In his own right, Shriver was a highly-respected figure in the world of education, business and civil liberties and his family ties to Kennedy would give the Peace Corps a much needed visibility. At the same time, the appointment of his brother-in-law as Peace Corps Director would indicate Kennedy's close personal interest in the undertaking. These factors, as well as Shriver's sterling work as head of the task force, made him an attractive choice.

For a number of reasons, Shriver was reluctant to accept the offer. Firstly, Kennedy had already vetoed his appointment as Assistant-Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for fear of the charge of nepotism. As Shriver himself recalled, referring to the controversial appointment of the President's brother as head of the Department of Justice, "Bobby Kennedy as Attorney-General was bad enough."

Besides, Shriver had a very promising career in Chicago politics to return to — his name had already been mentioned as a future Governor of Illinois. Moreover, since the Peace Corps had been established as an executive agency, its Directorship was an office requiring Presidential appointment rather than confirmation by the Senate. These latter grounds gave Shriver most cause for concern. After discussing the legal technicalities with Bill Josephson, Shriver decided to refuse his brother-in-law.

In a tactful but forceful note, he outlined his acute awareness
not only of Kennedy's political vulnerability but also of the mountainous task awaiting the chosen Peace Corps chief:

"Dear Jack,

I hope you realise by now that I'd do anything within reason to help your administration to the best of my ability. But the question of my proposed appointment and its confirmation by the Senate is causing me and the people working for me deep concern. I know that Kenny O'Donnell and Ted Sorenson and perhaps others, disagree with my position - but despite them, I don't want to embark on a difficult mission with one arm tied behind my back.

It would be a serious mistake, in my judgement, to appoint me as Director of the Peace Corps, which is now a full-fledged agency, and then make me the only agency head in the government not approved by the Senate. This is not good for the agency, the people in it, or for me. When I do have to face Congress in May, June or July, they'll be tougher then - and they will have no responsibility for having O.K.'d me now.

Consequently, I respectfully suggest that you select another person to head the Corps which is now well-organised, well-manned, and aimed in the right direction. There are plenty of qualified people - Rostow of Yale; White of Chicago; Clark Kerr of California etc. They or others like them would be glad to serve you. And they would relieve you of this difficult burden. You have enough problems. Let's eliminate this one.

Best,
Sarge.

Kennedy refused to accept Shriver's answer. After consultation with Larry O'Brien (his aide for Congressional relations) Kennedy agreed that Senate confirmation should be sought. He then encouraged Shriver to "Go ahead, you can do it!" Thus, on March 4, 1961, Kennedy announced the appointment of Sargent Shriver as first Director of the Peace Corps - subject to Senate confirmation. Warren Wiggins was made Director "ad interim". A few weeks later - on March 21 - Shriver made a very successful appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and his appointment was confirmed. The Committee hearing was a formality but, with a view to the imminent Peace Corps legislation, Shriver
sensed the importance of paying attention to political etiquette. This correct deference shown by Shriver impressed congressmen, helped allay fears that had been raised by the Executive Order and laid the foundation for an amicable relationship between the Peace Corps and Congress. His polite consideration at this early stage was to pay great dividends when the Peace Corps bill went to Capitol Hill in May 1961.

Having accepted his appointment, Shriver immediately set to work. In a "Work Plan for March, 1961", he outlined the main objectives for accomplishment during the Peace Corps' first month in existence. Based on the Report to the President, Shriver's "Fourteen Points" (as his plan was nicknamed by staff members) formed a comprehensive summary of necessary tasks to be performed, from the development of "pilot" country programmes to the presentation of legislation to the Congress. However, although he had identified the major policy issues, Shriver as yet had no organisation with which to execute them. As Al' Sims, a member of the first task force group told him, "much of the skeleton has yet to be fleshed out before our creature can walk like a man."

Kennedy's Executive Order had given the Peace Corps governmental authority, one and a half million dollars from the President's discretionary fund, and some office space on the sixth floor of the International Cooperation Administration's Maiatico building in Connecticut Avenue - a few hundred yards from the White House. Aside from these bare necessities, the Peace Corps had no desks, stationery, organisational plans or volunteers. Since there was not enough working space in the Maiatico building for secretaries, typists and the lower echelons of the staff, additional rooms had to be rented in the nearby Rochembeau hotel. Indeed, Sargent Shriver wrote his first
memoranda on paper borrowed from his last place of employment — the Merchandise Mart in Chicago. Ed Bayley, the newly-appointed Press Secretary for the Peace Corps, described the general chaos of those first few days as "all hell broke loose."

On March 2, 1961, Shriver and Wiggins began the search for a staff for the Peace Corps. One of their first recruits was John D. Young, Deputy-Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.). Young, by his own description "a management type" had had experience of organising several government agencies. N.A.S.A. granted him a month's leave of absence to help put the Peace Corps together. As far as the Washington bureaucracy was concerned, Young knew how to get things done. Within a few days he had seen to the provision of the logistics of the organisation — desks, stationery, pencils, telephones and typewriters. Also within the first week, Young prepared for Shriver one of the most crucial memoranda in Peace Corps history — "Basic Concepts for Peace Corps Interim Organisation."

In this important document, Young cited the prerequisites for an effective Peace Corps organisation. Firstly, he advised the appointment of a Deputy-Director to whom Shriver could delegate the day to day problems of programming, management and general operation. Young foresaw that much of Shriver's time would be taken up with high-level meetings and Congressional and press duties. Thus it was imperative that there should be someone to take his place in dealing with the more mundane, but equally important, organisational functions. Next, Young envisaged a single office for the planning and development of Peace Corps overseas programmes. He told Shriver that this office should be designed in such a way as to "bring together in a coherent manner both area and professional skills."
That is, it should have the power to decide not only where Peace Corps projects would be established, but what type of projects these would be. Young then advised the setting up of an Evaluation division which could analyse and formulate plans on all aspects of Peace Corps operations. To deal with private voluntary agency and university participation in the Peace Corps, he felt two separate divisions would be necessary. The all-important recruitment and general publicity functions would be handled by an office of Public Affairs. Lastly, Young outlined the sine qua non of any government organisation - the Management division. Young pointed out that no new bureaucracy could expect to survive without someone to take care of budgetary, personnel and administrative matters. However, he stressed that if these management services were made "responsive" enough to the needs of the Peace Corps, they could be kept at a "minimum."¹⁶ Jack Young's memorandum and line-and-staff chart of March 8, 1961 became the touchstone of the Peace Corps' organisational thinking - especially its emphasis on minimal levels of management and bureaucracy. It was exactly what Shriver had wanted - a solid government structure that left plenty of scope for individual initiative. Although he was only with the Peace Corps for the month of March, Young gained a reputation among contemporary Peace Corps officials as "the governmental genius who put the first organisation chart together."¹⁷ (Appendix II)

Having designed a basic organisation and identified certain priorities, Shriver continued his "talent hunt" for people to man the Peace Corps. Several members of the task force stayed on to help with the administration of the new agency. Wiggins took over the essential function of the planning and development of overseas programmes; Josephson began drafting
Peace Corps legislation; Gordon Boyce, with his experience as head of the Experiment In International Living, started contacting private voluntary agencies; and Al Sims, a former director of the International Education Institute's international exchange programmes, worked on the Peace Corps' relationship with universities and educational institutions. Harris Wofford had taken up a very useful position between the Peace Corps and the White House. In early March, President Kennedy asked him to become his Special Assistant on Civil Rights. Wofford accepted the job - but only on the condition that he could continue to devote half his time to the Peace Corps. Kennedy agreed. With one foot in Connecticut Avenue and the other in Pennsylvania Avenue, Wofford served as an effective channel of communications between the Peace Corps and the President.

In his search for first-class administrators, Shriver telephoned people all over the United States and invited them to Washington. When Shriver was looking for a top-class psychologist to develop standards for the crucial function of selecting volunteers, Nicholas Hobbs (who had served on the faculties at Columbia, Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania and Louisiana State University) was recommended to him. Hobbs, at that time working on a multi-million dollar research project on mentally-retarded children, recalled receiving Shriver's telephone call at the George Peabody College of Teachers in Tennessee. "How much time do I have to decide?" he asked. "Twenty minutes," said Shriver. Twenty minutes later, Hobbs booked a flight to Washington.¹⁸

Shriver's interviewing style was discursive and provocative. Sometimes he presented interviewees with the
Millikan report and treated approval of its guarded recommendation as grounds for immediate rejection. Shriver also informed applicants that he had no idea when or how Peace Corps staff would be paid. Thomas Quimby, a successful interviewee, recalled that "Shriver did not want anyone around who was going to be too cautious." Shriver could be very persuasive. Charles Peters, a journalist and former worker for the Kennedy campaign in West Virginia, recalled that when Shriver asked him to come to Washington he thought, "I would just come up for about three months to share in the exciting task of getting the New Frontier started." In fact, Peters stayed with the Peace Corps until 1964 and, as Chief of Evaluation, became one of the most important men in the agency's development.

More people applied for staff positions with the Peace Corps than all the other federal bureaucracies put together. However, Shriver's extraordinary style brought to the new agency a talented, yet unusually adventurous group of government administrators. Among them were Morris Abram, a prominent attorney in Georgia who helped with legal problems; Thomas Quimby, chairman of the Democratic National Committee in Michigan who dealt with volunteer recruitment; Bradley Patterson, an assistant secretary to the Cabinet in the Eisenhower administration who established the Peace Corps Executive Secretariat; and William Haddad, a prize-winning journalist with the New York Post who took on a "special projects" portfolio, with power to research and evaluate all Peace Corps functions. Shriver found that one name soon led to another. For instance, Jack Young suggested that William Kelly, a colleague of his at N.A.S.A. would make an excellent head of Peace Corps contracts and logistics. On interview,
Kelly enjoyed Shriver's lively questions covering all kinds of topics and Shriver was impressed by Kelly's intelligence, integrity and eminent common sense. Thus, Kelly took over the problem of how best to transport Peace Corps Volunteers from the United States to all corners of the earth. Shriver recruited from both inside and outside government circles; ability was the sole criterion. This deliberate policy of using professional bureaucrats like Wiggins, Josephson, Young and Kelly as well as uninitiated "laymen" such as Haddad, Peters, Boyce and Sims, gave the Peace Corps' approach to problems a beneficial mixture of experience and freshness.

At the White House, Harris Wofford heard a rumour that Bill Moyers, the shining young star of Vice-President Johnson's staff, was desperately keen to become involved with the Peace Corps. Moyers had told Johnson during the 1960 campaign that if Kennedy instituted the Peace Corps then that was where he wanted to work. Wofford contacted Moyers and set up an interview with Shriver. This sparked off a minor brouhaha among the White House staff. Moyers was a key man in the relationship between Kennedy and Johnson and the President's aides did not want to lose him to the Peace Corps. Wofford recalled receiving an angry telephone call from Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President. "What the hell are you doing trying to screw up our thing?" he exploded. "Bill Moyers is the only man around the Vice-President who we can deal with that we like and trust and we want to keep him right here." Kennedy and Johnson went to great lengths to persuade Moyers to stay. They were unsuccessful. Moyers, only twenty-six in 1961, felt a commitment to the Peace Corps and he was determined to participate. "That boy (Moyers) cajoled and begged and pleaded and connived and threatened and politicked to leave
me to go to work for the Peace Corps," recalled Johnson in later days. Named as a special consultant to the Peace Corps on March 14, 1961, Bill Moyers went on to join Shriver, Wofford, Wiggins and Josephson as one of the major architects of the new organisation. Indeed, when he was appointed Deputy-Director of the Peace Corps in 1963, he became the youngest official to hold such a position in the history of American governmental institutions. However, White House aides regarded Moyer's departure as an act of "piracy" by the Peace Corps. Indeed, throughout the Kennedy years the Peace Corps gained a reputation for enticing people away from other government organisations.

To Shriver, the early days of the Peace Corps were "like the campaign of 1960 - but with no election in sight." Letters and reports came in from all over the country and the elevators disgorged constant sorties of "interested persons, newspaper reporters, job seekers, academic figures and generous citizens offering advice." One dismayed job applicant went into the Miacatco building for a scheduled interview and emerged two hours later having helped move file cabinets, office furniture and office supplies into place. Some prospective staff members left after a few days of working at the furious pace. Several secretaries had nervous breakdowns. Urgency forced the Peace Corps' new administrators to cut through established procedure and sometimes to violate regulations. After a mere fifteen days, Jack Young had counted at least twenty-two illegal actions.

On March 13, 1961, Shriver established routine meetings for senior staff members on every Monday, Wednesday and Friday; on Tuesdays and Thursdays meetings would be open to all staff members. During those conferences in the months of March and April, 1961, Shriver recalled, "We hammered out basic policies in long, detailed discussions." There were
countless problems to be solved and memoranda constantly flowed from one staff member to another. There was a wide range of issues to be decided regarding Volunteers' medical protection abroad, taxes, insurance and material support. Some staff members favoured the idea of a uniform for Volunteers; others suggested a Peace Corps oath should be taken before serving overseas. On the subject of Volunteers' accommodation, Jack Young asked Shriver, "Are we serious about the 'mud hut' approach or are we going to provide minimum housing e.g. quonset huts, walled tents and similar types of shelter?"28

As far as the Washington organisation was concerned there were decisions to be taken on staff ratios, response to mail, information output, coordination with other government agencies and the form and timing of the Peace Corps' congressional presentation. Salary scales provided one of the more sensitive issues. Early on, John Kenneth Galbraith advised Shriver to put an absolute ceiling of ten thousand dollars on staff salaries.29 Shriver agreed in principle that there should not be a huge gap between payments to Volunteers and payments to officials. Yet, at the same time, he wanted to recruit the best staff members possible; it was likely that many would be married with financial obligations and unable to afford a drastic cut in wages. Therefore, Shriver decided against the low ceiling on salaries. However, he did insist that staff members overseas should forego extra remuneration for "hardship posts", luxurious housing, fancy automobiles and the various other trappings of diplomatic privilege. Bill Josephson agreed with Shriver that Peace Corps officials overseas should live, and be seen to live, in a more austere manner than their compatriots in the United States embassy compound and expatriate clubs. Nevertheless, he wondered whether a policy of not granting a hardship post allowance might not be a little too
harsh. He reminded Shriver that in some Third World countries the cost of living could be very high. "Toothpaste costs 3 dollars a tube in Conarky," noted Josephson. However, Shriver stood by his decision.

Along with Morris Abram, Josephson began to tackle the legal complexities involved in establishing the policies and conditions of service of a new government organisation. "There was an enormous amount of work to be done," Josephson recalled, "very dull, administrative legal work, writing delegations of authority, getting the fiscal process going, getting the administrative process going, getting the personnel process going, getting the procurement process going." These pressures notwithstanding, in early March, Josephson and Abram overcame one of the Peace Corps' most controversial policy problems - whether Volunteers should be exempt from the draft. Despite Kennedy's statement on March 1, 1961, that the Peace Corps would not be a substitute for military service, the precise legal position remained fuzzy. Moreover, Nixon's remarks about "draft-dodgers" continued to haunt the new agency. Josephson and Abram sought to clarify this issue once and for all. Thus, Abram arranged a meeting with General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service. Under the circumstances, Hershey decided that draft deferment for Peace Corps Volunteers would be a perfectly appropriate Selective Service action. According to Josephson, Hershey wrote the legal procedure down on a brown paper bag - which was all he had to hand as he travelled with Abram in his car; the decision took all of two minutes. This speedy solution to the draft problem allowed Shriver to make an unequivocal public statement to the effect that Peace Corps Volunteers would be deferred, but not exempted from military service.
On March 8, Abram confirmed that Hershey was very keen to cooperate with the Peace Corps. He informed Shriver that Hershey only asked "notice of at least a few hours before any crisis arises in any individual case regarding the deferment problem." Abram reassured Shriver that should any embarrassing cases occur, "remember Hershey still has a good deal of experience in manoeuvering to help get the ox out of the ditch." Off the record, Hershey hinted that the chances of any Volunteer being drafted were very slim. Moreover, he explained to Abram that if a Volunteer continued to work in health, education or government after his Peace Corps service, a prolonged deferment would normally come into play; he asked only that conscientious objectors should not be selected as they could conceivably cause complications. Thus, by the end of the first week in March, Josephson, Abram and General Hershey had finally quashed the "draft-dodging" accusation. In later years, Josephson claimed that the "draft" problem was really a false issue used by Nixon and other critics for political reasons. In the early 1960's very few Americans were called up for national service; only when involvement in Vietnam escalated under President Johnson did the pressures on the manpower pool begin to have any bearing on the Peace Corps. In the Kennedy era, there is no evidence to suggest that the Selective Service deferment was a substantial factor in motivating young Americans to join the Peace Corps.

By no means all the difficulties were overcome in this first month. In particular, the enigma of the eventual status of the Peace Corps and its exact location within the Federal bureaucracy loomed large. Nevertheless, the new agency had been launched with considerable vigour by the President, Shriver had assembled an extraordinarily talented staff and a few of the more immediately important decisions regarding internal
structure had been taken. As he prepared to leave the Peace Corps and return to N.A.S.A. at the end of March, Jack Young advised Shriver that it was not too early to begin planning for the logistical support required for the various Peace Corps programmes. By March 27, a questionnaire form for Volunteers had been drafted and begun to be distributed among the ten thousand "would-be volunteers" who had already applied to the Peace Corps.36

The atmosphere on the sixth floor of the Maiatico building was electrifying. C. Payne Lucas, a bright young administrator who joined the staff in 1961, described those early days of the Peace Corps as "a massive orgasm - that was exactly what it was like here." To many of these new government officials everything was fresh and exhilarating. "We were dabbling in foreign affairs, catching planes and learning foreign languages," said Lucas. "We had never written a cable before - we didn't even know what a cable was."37

Everything was open to question; everyone was on first-name terms. This spirit of adventure and informality was best exemplified by Sargent Shriver. A newcomer to government himself, he elicited everyone's opinion and kept the midnight oil burning. He inspired his staff to excel "for Sarge." Secretaries refused to send out letters if they contained even the slightest mistake - "that wasn't good enough for Sarge Shriver," recalled Genoa Godbey, a young typist who joined the Peace Corps in March 1961. In this somewhat emotional environment, C. Payne Lucas remembered, "There were those of us who came in in the morning just to wait outside the door - so we could all ride up on the elevator with Sarge."38

On March 30, 1961, following the recommendation in Shriver's Report, President Kennedy announced the establishment of a Peace Corps National Advisory Council. This consisted of a
group of "outstanding American men and women who will give
to this program guidance and counsel in the development of
its activities." William O. Douglas, Associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, was appointed as Honorary
Chairman and Vice-President Johnson was named as Chairman
proper. Having Johnson as a friend in court, was to prove
providential for the Peace Corps in the very near future.

Council members were prominent Democratic and Republican
men and women from all walks of life. Among them were
Joseph Beirne, Vice-President of A.F.L.-C.I.O.; Harry
Belafonte, singer and actor; William Sloan Coffin, Chaplain
of Yale University; David E. Lilienthal, former Director
of the Tennessee Valley Authority; Benjamin E. Mays, President
of the United Negro College Fund; Eugene Rostow, Dean of Yale
College; and Mrs Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Advisory Council
was an attempt by Kennedy to align every shade of political
opinion behind the Peace Corps. Indeed, he had striven to
persuade the former Republican President, Herbert Hoover, to
become the first Honorary Chairman; Hoover declined, on the grounds
that he could not possibly devote the necessary time and energy
to the post. Hoover told Kennedy he was already overburdened
by commitments. "Some day you will find yourself in the
same predicaments." he warned the young President - a remark
which took on added poignancy in the light of later events.

Yet, despite Hoover's non-acceptance of the Chair, Kennedy's
second stroke of the pen for the Peace Corps at the end of
March, allowed it to transcend political squabbles and become
a truly "national" concern. It also carried through Shriver's
wish "to demonstrate the importance of this program and to generate
public support."

On March 6, 1961, Under-Secretary of State, Chester Bowles,
sent a memorandum to President Kennedy in which he made clear
that there was "wide agreement on the necessity and importance
of the Peace Corps maintaining its own separate identity."
Bowles suggested that any organisational plans should be kept "sufficiently flexible so that the Peace Corps may move in the most productive directions which time and experience dictate." Despite Bowles' elegant plea, there was no consensus within the Federal bureaucracy as to the status of the Peace Corps. Indeed, such was the ferocity of feeling against the Peace Corps becoming independent of the general foreign assistance programme, a bitter bureaucratic battle ensued in which the President himself was forced to act as final arbiter.

Shriver's Report To The President in February, had recommended that, while the Peace Corps should draw upon the experience and facilities of the International Cooperation Administration (I.C.A.) it should be "a small, new alive agency." The Report warned that "Beginning the Peace Corps as another I.C.A. operation runs the risk of losing its new appeal." Of course, Shriver never intended the Peace Corps to be completely separate from the State Department but equally, as he told Secretary of State Dean Rusk, he did not want it identified by the public, by the Congress, or by foreign countries as just "another foreign aid resource like development loans or food for peace." Shriver reminded Rusk that when Kennedy had first mentioned the Peace Corps he had implied that it would be "an identifiable, visible body of people, a corps in the fullest sense of the word with an esprit de corps all its own." Shriver insisted that the Peace Corps should not be seen as part of existing foreign aid programmes but rather, should be "consistently referred to at home and abroad as President Kennedy's Peace Corps."

As early as February 19, 1961, Bill Josephson, himself an experienced former official with I.C.A., argued strongly that the Peace Corps should not be linked in any way to the
traditional foreign aid establishment which was associated with "boondoggles" by many congressmen and with "imperialism" by many Third World leaders. During March, President Kennedy reorganised the entire United States assistance programme. He incorporated all the government's economic and social development programmes - including I.C.A., the Development Loan Fund and the Food-For-Peace - into one gigantic new bureaucratic unit which he called the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) Throughout March and April, Peace Corps officials resiliently resisted integration with A.I.D.

Within government circles there was a weighty body of opinion which felt threatened by the prospect of untrained young Americans going into the Third World. As Bill Moyers put it, "the old-line employees of State and A.I.D. coveted the Peace Corps greedily. It was a natural instinct; established bureaucracies do not like competition from new people." Henry Labouisse, who had been head of I.C.A. before it was replaced in 1961 by A.I.D., admitted that he had had mixed feelings on the Peace Corps. He feared that sending inexperienced youngsters into strange environments and cultures would be inviting disaster and embarrassment. Hence, he proposed the Peace Corps should be placed under the firm control of A.I.D. where its progress could be strictly monitored. "Those who had been presiding over foreign aid all those years simply thought they knew best how to do it," wrote Bill Moyers, "and they pooh-poohed the idea that volunteers could contribute to a field which had been dominated by professionals." One Assistant Secretary of State told Moyers that not only were many diplomats indifferent to the Peace Corps but, in some quarters, there was frank opposition. This bureaucratic conservatism did not apply to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Indeed, he told Shriver
that he thought the idea first-class. "The plan is practical, experimental, does not promise the moon to anybody and we should get under way with it right away." he said.\textsuperscript{49} Under-Secretary of State Chester Bowles (whose daughter Sally, was one of the very first Peace Corps staff members), also promised Sargent Shriver his assistance "in every possible way."\textsuperscript{50} Nevertheless, despite the President's personal commitment to the Peace Corps and the support of influential figures such as Rusk and Bowles, the intransigence of an exceedingly powerful group of experienced bureaucrats had yet to be overcome. Bill Moyers later recalled that "they couldn't outright oppose the Peace Corps because it had such high visibility with the President. So they did the next best thing: they sought to absorb it."\textsuperscript{51}

The Peace Corps' first severe problem arose in late March over President Kennedy's proposed "Special Message To The Congress On Foreign Aid." Kennedy's aides - Sorensen, Goodwin, Dungan, O'Brien and O'Donnell - felt it would be best, in terms of organisational tidiness, to tie the Peace Corps to the foreign aid bill and then later with a separate Peace Corps bill. Thus, when Shriver was shown the first draft of Kennedy's proposed speech, he was horrified to note that the President was fully intending to locate the Peace Corps in the new foreign assistance organisation, A.I.D.. Shriver, Wiggins and Josephson immediately composed a memorandum to the President and argued the case for the independence of the Peace Corps as forcibly as possible. Shriver also paid a visit to Kennedy in the White House and made a personal plea. Again, Goodwin, Dungan and Sorensen claimed it was only logical to place all the overseas aid programmes - including the Peace Corps - under one umbrella. Kennedy, impressed by Shriver's appeal, but used to accepting his aides' advice, remained undecided.\textsuperscript{52} Consequently, his speech on foreign aid on March
22, 1961, was nebulous in regard to the Peace Corps' organisational status. Citing the Peace Corps as one of the "flexible tools" of the new American foreign assistance policy, he said that far from being submerged, its "distinctive identity and appeal" would be preserved. Shriver's personal petition to his brother-in-law had won the Peace Corps a reprieve.

On March 24, 1961, Shriver wrote to Richard Goodwin of the White House staff and explained that "legislative leaders...have expressed strong opinions that Peace Corps legislation should be introduced separately and before the general foreign aid bill." By arguing that the Peace Corps would have a better chance in Congress if it was not tied to foreign aid appropriations, Shriver strongly reiterated the case for independence. However, it soon appeared that his efforts had been in vain. For on March 30, 1961, Kennedy sent Shriver a memorandum to the effect that Henry Labouisse had been appointed as Chairman of a foreign aid task force which would set about incorporating all foreign assistance programmes - including the Peace Corps - into the new A.I.D. agency. Almost reprovingly, Kennedy warned Shriver that he expected Labouisse to be accorded "complete cooperation." The task force on foreign aid met on a number of occasions but scheduled its final meeting for April 26. On that day the President himself would decide on the Peace Corps' status. The timing of the meeting could not have been worse for the Peace Corps. Shriver had already been advised by Kennedy that he should attempt to persuade Third World leaders of the Peace Corps' usefulness by making a three week visit to several developing countries; his trip was due to begin on April 22 - four days before the decision on the independence of the Peace Corps.

Throughout April, Shriver lobbied Sorensen, Dungan and
Labouisse and tried to persuade them of the absolute necessity of Peace Corps autonomy. At this stage, Shriver wanted to avoid bothering the President over this issue, but he let it be known that - if needs be - he was prepared to do so. Labouisse objected to even the possibility of Shriver making use of his personal relationship with Kennedy. He wanted this battle to be fought under the traditional rules of the bureaucratic game; invocation to the President on a personal basis were not regarded as fair play. Shriver replied to Labouisse in a strongly-worded memorandum - a copy of which he sent to the President:

"I agree that we should, if at all possible, avoid troubling the President at this time. I believe however, that although organisational, these issues about the future place and role of the Peace Corps are of such fundamental importance that he ought to participate in their resolution. His espousal of the Peace Corps notion in the course of his campaign was an important political commitment, and he has a genuine personal interest in the success of the Peace Corps as well."  

Shriver wrote that he had consulted with Vice-President Johnson and other congressional leaders and they had advised "it would be a grave political mistake for the Peace Corps to be authorised at the same time and as but one of the categories of assistance in the new foreign aid bill." With a final blast against "conceptual and organisational neatness", Shriver embarked upon his journey to the Third World. He had done all he could to win independence for the Peace Corps. Ironically, the Peace Corps' battle was now in the hands of two former I.C.A. bureaucrats - Warren Wiggins and Bill Josephson.

President Kennedy did not, if fact, chair the meeting on April 26 - at this point, virtually all his time was taken up in dealing with the repercussions of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Instead, he designated his Special Assistant, Ralph Dungan to act for him. Labouisse and David Bell (Director of the Bureau
of the Budget) recommended the Peace Corps should be a sub-division of A.I.D.; of course, Wiggins and Josephson disagreed, arguing that the only advantage of this arrangement was bureaucratic tidiness. Dungan decided in favour of incorporation. A somewhat dismayed Bill Josephson made a record of the conversation at the meeting: "Mr Dungan said that the Peace Corps was not an extra-governmental thing. He said that the Peace Corps could not be favoured or given extraordinary treatment at the expense of over-all government considerations." Warren Wiggins cabled a few brief dispirited words to Shriver, who at this time was in India. "Peace Corps not, repeat not, to have autonomy," he wrote. "Dungan describes himself as acting on behalf of the President." Shriver recollected his feelings upon reading Wiggins's message - "I was sitting in a hotel room in New Delhi when I received a cable....I remember just sitting there for some time....holding the bad news in my hands and feeling helpless. I was convinced a terrible mistake had been made, that the Peace Corps was about to die a-borning."

Wiggins and Josephson suspected Dungan had not been an entirely dispassionate adjudicator; there was some evidence he had intercepted Shriver's memorandum to the President and prevented it from reaching him. Like Labouisse, Dungan believed the Peace Corps should be part of A.I.D. and that the President need not be troubled by the arguments of amateurs. Josephson blamed himself for being "innocent in the extreme" when confronted by wily, bureaucratic in-fighters like Labouisse and Dungan. Quite in despair at the defeat, he described the Peace Corps' mood in late April as "neurotic and leaderless." He fired off a forceful memorandum to the President arguing that many Americans would not have volunteered for the Peace Corps if they had imagined it was going to be just another part
of the United States assistance programme. Abroad too, he said, leaders like Nehru, Nkrumah and Nyrere would be willing to accept the idea of a Peace Corps where they would not accept other United States international efforts.\textsuperscript{62} His words fell on deaf ears; Dungan's decision seemed final.

As a last-ditch effort, Shriver had advised Wiggins to ask Vice-President Johnson - in his capacity as Chairman of the National Advisory Council - if he would intercede on behalf of the Peace Corps to the President. With this new development, Bill Moyers took on the crucial role. No one knew Johnson better; moreover, the Vice-President was fond of remarking that in all his years in the Congress, he had never seen a more capable aide than Moyers. Well aware that Johnson had been a Director of the National Youth Administration during the New Deal, Moyers played on his sympathy for the Peace Corps idea and arranged a meeting with Wiggins and Josephson. In later years, Moyers recalled the gist of Johnson's advice against accepting Dungan's decision:

"Boys, this town is full of folks who believe the only way to do something is their way. That's especially true in diplomacy and things like that, because they work with foreign governments, protocol is oh-so-mighty-important to them, with guidebooks and rulebooks and do's-and-don'ts to keep you from offending someone. You put the Peace Corps into the foreign service and they'll put striped pants on your people when all you'll want them to have is a knapsack and a tool kit and a lot of imagination. And they'll give you a hundred and one reasons why it won't work every time you want to do something different." \textsuperscript{63}

Johnson agreed that if the Peace Corps became part of A.I.D., it would lose its unique appeal to young people, become entangled in red tape and end up nothing more than "just another box in an organisational chart, reporting to a third assistant director of personnel for the State Department."\textsuperscript{64}

After this informal cabal, Johnson called Kennedy and asked for a personal meeting. It was arranged for May 1, 1961.
According to Bill Josephson, on his way to the Oval Office, Johnson "picked up Henry Labouisse and Dave Bell by their respective ears and began by telling them what the foreign aid program really should do. It should be healing the sick and the lame and the blind - very earthy, pithy stuff.... very close to what Peace Corps Volunteers could and would do." Unfortunately, no record was kept of the conversation between Kennedy and Johnson. However, again according to Josephson, the legend grew up that "Johnson collared Kennedy.... and in the course of the conversation badgered him so much that Kennedy finally said all right." 

Kennedy's reversal of Dungan's earlier verdict was confirmed by a somewhat terse memorandum from Dungan to Dean Rusk on May 2, 1961. "This is to inform you," wrote Dungan, "that yesterday evening the President, in consultation with the Vice-President, decided that the Peace Corps should be organised as a semi-autonomous unit within the Department of State and that the Director of the Corps would have an Assistant Secretary status and would report directly to the Secretary of State." A front-page headline in the New York Times was much more enthusiastic and illuminating - "Peace Corps Wins Fight For Autonomy" it proclaimed. Quite mysteriously, someone had "leaked" the whole story of the Peace Corps' battle for independence to the press - much to the embarrassment of Labouisse, Dungan and several other of Kennedy's aides. "The President's decision followed a two-month tug-of-war within the administration," noted New York Times reporter, Peter Braestrup. "For Peace Corps officials, it was an important victory." 

Harris Wofford rated the winning of independent status as "the biggest early decision" in Peace Corps history. It had some very important implications. Dungan, Bell, Labouisse and the other professional bureaucrats who had been in opposition to
the "independistes" were extremely upset by the Peace Corps' unusual methods of achieving their objectives. In particular, the Peace Corps' use of Vice-President Johnson was considered very sharp practice. Accordingly, a few days after Kennedy's reversal decision, Dungan called Wiggins and Josephson into his office in the White House and informed them, in no uncertain manner, of his displeasure. Josephson remembered Dungan saying something to the effect that "if we wanted to go it alone - we were really going to go it alone." The White House staff and officials of A.I.D. were extremely irritated; they did not take kindly to what they regarded as a surreptitious infringement of their authority. Furthermore, the breach was never healed. From the time of the battle for independence, there was always a certain coolness between the White House staff and the Peace Corps. Dungan had meant what he said. "We really were on our own," recalled Josephson. However, on the positive side, Lyndon Johnson became a staunch advocate of the Peace Corps and took a prolonged and serious interest in its well-being. Referring to his inestimable contribution to the battle for independence, Sargent Shriver praised Johnson as "a founding father of the Peace Corps."71

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the Peace Corps' winning of independence was that it left the new agency free to develop outside the constricting boundaries of a huge bureaucracy. The Peace Corps was regarded as a "different" type of government body - separate and apart with a life and identity of its own. As Bill Moyers put it, "a remarkable manifestation of a spirit too particular and personal to be contained by a bureaucratic organization."72 A delighted Harris Wofford praised Kennedy for his decision to preserve the special identity and fresh appeal of the Peace Corps by making it a semi-autonomous agency. "This decision seems
important and right," he told the President. "Our
best advisors warned against the Peace Corps slipping into
the established patterns of foreign aid. The Peace Corps'
people-to-people approach and educational emphasis offers an
opportunity to create a new pattern. For this it needs the
freedom and energy of autonomy." 73

During the months of March and April 1961, the American
public - unaware of the internecine bureaucratic squabbles -
maintained a keen interest in the Peace Corps. Indeed,
popular enthusiasm seemed even more pronounced after the
Executive Order had made the idea a reality. Life magazine
reported that "the hottest topic on college campuses and among youn
generally... was neither studies nor panty raids, but
President Kennedy's Peace Corps." According to Life, "The
majority of collegians were strongly in favor... their earnest
debates proved that their generation was not silent, selfish
and conformist, as has often been charged, but world-minded,
idealistic and responsive." Kennedy's appeal for volunteers
instigated an unprecedented mail response to a concept which,
the New York Times lauded as "in harmony with the American
dream." A public opinion poll taken in early April, 1961,
revealed that 68 per cent of the public approved of the Peace
Corps; a survey undertaken by the American Council on Education
showed a massive 94 per cent of college students in favour. 74
A few days after the President's announcement, Ralph Dungan
informed Harris Wofford that letters of support for the
Peace Corps were flowing into the White House from business,
industry, religious organisations, journalists and lawyers.
Nearly five thousand arrived on the single day after the
Executive Order had been issued. 75

On university and college campuses in particular, the
response was ecstatic. The Guardsman of San Francisco City
College observed, "Campaign platforms, it has been said, are to
get in on, not to stand on. Be this as it may, one prominent plank in the platform of President Kennedy is now in the process of becoming a reality." The students claimed that the establishment of the Peace Corps proved that Kennedy was not just another cynical politician - "It helped to get the President 'in' and now he's not only standing on it, but he is actively working on it attempting to give it life and meaning." Farleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey, proposed a plan to offer academic credit and grants for those interested in Peace Corps service. Six hundred students at New York University sent a twenty-eight foot long telegram to Sargent Shriver requesting that a project be prepared on their campus. By June, over one hundred and fifty educational establishments had made similar offers. A conference of twelve eastern colleges decided to send a resolution to the Organisation of American States endorsing the Peace Corps - as did the convention of the Student National Education Association.76

In the Congress, Senator Bible was contacted by the University of Nevada and told of the enthusiasm for the Peace Corps in his home constituency. The American Institute of Foreign Trade in Phoenix, Arizona indicated their interest to Senator Goldwater. Private foundations and industries in New York began to urge Senator Keating to support the Peace Corps. Senator Humphrey told his colleagues on March 7, that the twelve thousand inquiries which had already reached the Peace Corps offered proof that the public response to Kennedy's proposal was "overwhelming".77 Moreover, by March 7, Sargent Shriver claimed that a dozen countries had shown interest in the Peace Corps. The New York Times noted that the Washington embassies of Brazil, Nigeria, Colombia and Vietnam had given early endorsements to the Peace Corps. Prime Mininster Nehru of India spoke approvingly of the idea, as did General Azikiwe of Nigeria.
In West Germany, Mayor Brandt of Berlin lauded the idea. In
the House of Commons, it was praised by both Labour and
Conservative members of Parliament. Indeed, Newsweek magazine
reported that Prime Minister Harold MacMillan was "so
enthusiastic" about the Peace Corps he had asked President
Kennedy to include a British contingent among the first group
to go overseas.78

Almost every day in March and April the media focused
on the latest developments in the Peace Corps. Meanwhile,
Sargent Shriver gave press conferences, wrote articles for
national magazines, and worked very hard at keeping up the Peace
Corps' momentum. However, while most reports were well—inclined, a perceptible element of scepticism survived. Kennedy
received a confidential poll from Louis Harris which showed that
although the balance of opinion was 2:1 in favour of the Peace
Corps, it was a "far cry" from the overall 10:1 which the
Kennedy administration generally enjoyed. Harris predicted
that the Peace Corps would arouse deep cleavages within the
country. While it would attract the support of young
people and others sensitive to Third World problems,
conservatives would attack it as "a dead ringer for the
National Youth Administration, the Works Project Administration
and several other New Deal experiments." Looking ahead to
1964 and re-election prospects, Harris pointed out that although
the Peace Corps would give heart and inspiration to important
segments of the Kennedy support, it would also "solidify
more than any other measure to date, the opposition of
support that unquestionably will be lost in a re-election
situation in 1964."79 The liberal New Republic suggested
that rather than pack off "our evangelical youth" to the
underdeveloped world, America should send substantial amounts
of what really mattered - money. One businessman called
the Peace Corps a "crack-pot" idea. The Daughters of the
American Revolution passed a resolution at their seventieth
Continental Congress which urged United States legislators
to defeat the Peace Corps bill. The Young Republican National
Federation issued a statement objecting to the Peace Corps
and editorial comment in the New York Times warned that the
new organisation should not degenerate into a public relations
exercise aimed at combatting the image of the "Ugly American." 80

At a conference sponsored by the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund and other major foundations, Peace Corps officials sensed
there was great suspicion of Kennedy's new agency. This
stemmed from the behaviour of past government programmes which
had not consulted with the private foundations. The Peace
Corps was seen in this context. Morris Abram advised Shriver that
he must break down this pessimistic attitude by personally
talking to the foundation heads; in the meantime however,
Abram predicted little help would be forthcoming from the important
foundations. Also, Carroll Willson of M.I.T. told Shriver
that throughout the academic world there was both scepticism
and indifference. He warned Shriver that this would have to
be alleviated if the Peace Corps was to function effectively. 81

More troublesome to Kennedy and Shriver than the
dissenters at home were the unbelievers overseas. President
Keita of Mali thought that while the Peace Corps might be of
some value to young Americans, it would probably be
ineffective in the amount of help it could give to underdeveloped
countries. While attending a conference on Africa at New
York University, Averell Harriman (United States Ambassador-
at-large), noted that the strong interest in the Peace
Corps was tainted with scepticism. Also, Arthur Schlesinger
Jr. was informed that labour union delegates from India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Turkey were "Skeptical of its eventual success." The Johannesburg Star voiced a serious doubt that American youth could endure the sacrifice that Peace Corps work would entail, and a Burmese student, Khin Khin Kla, wrote an open letter to all prospective volunteers in the New York Herald Tribune. "Will you be able to take all this?" he questioned:

"You will live in a small wooden house, sleep on the floor on a bamboo mat, with a pillow stuffed with rice grain and a mosquito net to protect you from the swarms of bloodthirsty mosquitoes. The heavy, humid heat and the hard bed will not be comfortable....you will suffer from the damp weather....leeches will cling to you; worms, frogs and snakes will be numerous."82

The Washington correspondent of the respected Times of India also wondered whether American youngsters accustomed to air-conditioned houses, fast-food and cars would be able to "suffer the Indian summer smilingly and, if they go into an Indian village, will they be able to sleep on unsprung beds under the canopy of the bejeweled sky or indoors in mud huts, without writing home about it?" These doubting opinions were reflected in the faint response to the Peace Corps from Third World governments. Despite President Kennedy's well-publicised hope that "those countries which are interested in understanding our country and traditions will welcome these young men and women", as March ended, not a single formal invitation had come from abroad.83 Shriver quoted the sceptics as saying "Go ahead with your idealistic ventures; Americans have always oversimplified foreign affairs. The Peace Corps is no exception. Waste your monies and your energies but don't expect us to attach much significance to your effort."84

Kennedy and Shriver knew that if the Peace Corps was
ever to be successful, then Third World leaders would have
to be persuaded that it was an important new American initiative.
More than dislike or distrust, Shriver felt the problem was
one of indifference; the governments of the underdeveloped
countries quite simply did not think the Peace Corps was
very important. To change this perspective, Kennedy
suggested Shriver should travel to some of the developing
countries and inform their heads of state of the value of
the Peace Corps. Kennedy also felt the trip would allow
Shriver the opportunity of seeing at first hand, the
circumstances of need and the conditions under which
volunteers would live and work. On April 22, 1961,
Shriver began his twenty-six day venture in personal diplomacy;
it took him to Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Burma, Malaya,
Thailand and the Philippines. Accompanied by Harris Wofford,
Ed Bayley and Franklin Williams, Shriver conferred at length
with leading foreign ministers and Cabinet members as well
as with American technical assistance officers and embassy
staffs. Not all government officials were instant converts
to the idea. U Nu asked Shriver whether he really believed that
young Americans could compete with the Chinese communists
who had already offered assistance to Burma. President
Nkrumah of Ghana wanted only the most highly-qualified
Americans and was reluctant to accept "ordinary" university
and college graduates. Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith
in India anticipated "great trouble" in selling the Peace
Corps to Nehru.

However, although Shriver had had no previous diplomatic
experience, his personal style overcame all initial reservations.
When Harris Wofford made his report to the President on the
trip, he told him that Shriver was a born diplomat. Wofford
was effusive in his praise:
"I have never been witness to so successful an international operation. Shriver's meetings with government officials, newsmen and private citizens all produced good results for the Peace Corps and United States relations. Our ambassador and other overseas officers in every country expressed to me and others their admiration and appreciation of Shriver, their amazement at how much was accomplished in such a short time, and their increased hopes for the Peace Corps in their respective countries."87

Ed Bayley stressed that Shriver's kinship with Kennedy made a great impression on foreign leaders. "He was 'royalty' to them," he explained, "a concept which they understood."88 Indeed, the fact that Shriver was Kennedy's brother-in-law won privileges and concessions for the Peace Corps at this early stage which might otherwise have taken months, or even years of diplomatic negotiations to achieve. Ambassador Galbraith described Shriver's style of diplomacy as "just right....natural, uncontrived and sincere." Nehru was so impressed that he asked Shriver to send even more Volunteers than either he or Galbraith had dared hope. Galbraith noted in his diary that he had left Nehru's office "a little dazed and with my reputation as a strategist in poor condition."89

The aborted invasion at the Bay of Pigs took place only one week before Shriver's trip overseas. Harris Wofford informed Kennedy that the Cuban affair had undoubtedly shocked those Third World leaders who had believed that the new administration's foreign policy would be a real departure from the rabid anti-communism of John Foster Dulles. However, Wofford claimed that the situation would have been much worse had Kennedy gone ahead and used American military force to overthrow Castro. His restraint had saved his image in the Third World. "There exists a reservoir of goodwill and hope for you in these countries," insisted Wofford, "the high expectations for a new American approach to the world which you have aroused in Nkrumah, Nehru and U Nu, to name three important cases, are
Wofford believed the Peace Corps represented Kennedy's best hope of taking full advantage of this opportunity. The evidence suggested that he was absolutely right. For, in May, 1961, despite the Bay of Pigs, Shriver returned triumphantly to Washington with invitations from all eight countries he had visited to send a total of three thousand Volunteers to begin Peace Corps programmes. These first few invitations opened the floodgates. Less than one week after Shriver's return from the Third World, Kennedy was able to announce at the first meeting of the Peace Corps National Advisory Council that he had received over two dozen formal requests for Volunteers from various Third World countries.

Shriver's journey abroad to "invite invitations" was the crucial last step in ensuring that the Peace Corps would be successfully established. It not only destroyed the sceptical view that foreign governments would not want young Americans meddling in their internal affairs, but also gave the Peace Corps' organisers an insight into what Third World leaders felt was needed and what they would accept. As Ed Bayley noted, "We didn't really know what the Peace Corps was going to be until we made that trip." The period from Kennedy's issue of the Executive Order in March to Shriver's trip to the Third World in May, 1961, was probably the most momentous in the history of the Peace Corps. On the basis of an election campaign speech, a new government agency was created and launched within one hundred days - an achievement of monumental proportions.

In July, six definite Peace Corps projects were announced for Tanganyika, Colombia, the Philippines, Chile, St. Lucia and Ghana. Seven thousand applicants were prepared to take the first Peace Corps tests and the first volunteers soon
began training at a field school founded especially for that purpose in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Also, a budget had been estimated and a Peace Corps bill drafted and sent to the Congress for consideration. The Peace Corps had come a long way from the Cow Palace. Even so, there was no time for smugness. Indeed, Warren Wiggins reminded all staff members that complacency would not be tolerated:

"A period of extremely intensive activity for the whole Peace Corps is now at hand...there will be a host of policy and administrative decisions....Much will be required of all the members of the Peace Corps staff in the next few weeks. Having been given autonomy within the State Department, we must now clearly demonstrate that we are capable of discharging the responsibilities that go with the status."94

"In little more than six months," Sargent Shriver told his staff in the summer of 1961, "a vision has become a reality."95 By May, the Peace Corps had been established, organised and staffed. Moreover, it had been invited to begin programmes in some of the most politically powerful countries of the developing world. Also, with the help of Vice-President Johnson, the new agency had fought for, and eventually won, the battle for independence within the Federal bureaucracy. This was a turning point; the Peace Corps was now free to develop as a truly "different" type of government organisation. Yet, the months between March and May, 1961, had been full of risks and danger. Many sceptics were quick to pronounce the Peace Corps a "second children's crusade." Indeed, only half-jokingly, Sargent Shriver later suggested that President Kennedy had chosen him to lead the Peace Corps because "no
one thought it would succeed and it would be easier to
fire a relative than a political friend. 96 However,
the Peace Corps' winning of independence rendered its
future a good deal less precarious. "We now have our
first opportunity to step back and look at what we have
accomplished," wrote Shriver to his colleagues. "We
must analyse this experience, reflect seriously about what
kind of a program we want and do something about it." Very
much aware that the Peace Corps had reached a watershed
in its history, Shriver concluded, "This is the last time
that we will have such an opportunity. Soon all the energies
of our staff will again be concentrated on program
development, operations and the legislative presentation
to Congress." 97
CHAPTER FIVE

ASSAULT ON THE HILL
"An Act: To provide for a Peace Corps to help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for skilled manpower."

- THE PEACE CORPS ACT -

(Signed by President Kennedy, September 22, 1961)
In the precarious summer of 1961, the Peace Corps' foremost aim was sheer political survival. If the United States Congress did not make it law and grant funds then all would be lost before a single Volunteer got into the field. Yet, to win approval on Capitol Hill, Sargent Shriver would have to overcome enormous inertia, scepticism and even some latent isolationism.

He was extremely conscious of President Kennedy's great political gamble. Many — including Eisenhower and Nixon — had openly derided the Peace Corps idea; if it failed to pass through the Congress, it would be taken as a sign of his inexperience and reinforce the charge that he was too young for the job. Thus, despite its loftier ends, the Peace Corps' immediate means were inescapably domestic and political. The jungle of Washington had to be conquered before any jungles in Ghana or Guatemala.

In the later years of the Kennedy administration, commentators liked to describe the Peace Corps' relationship with the eighty-seventh and eighty-eighth Congresses as a "love affair." In April, 1962, the Peace Corps' legislation was supported in the House of Representatives by an overwhelming vote of 317 to 70 and it passed the Senate by voice vote. By November 1962, the voice vote formality was sufficient in both House and Senate. Also, in each of those years Congress increased its funding of the Peace Corps by some 30 million dollars. The Washington Daily News adjudged this latter action more notable in view of "Congressional determination to clamp down on foreign
aid spending in general."

With no little pleasure, Sargent Shriver charted the conversion of confirmed sceptics to the Peace Corps cause. In March, 1962, Shriver sent Kennedy what he jokingly entitled the "Statement-Of-the Month" from Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. At a Harvard-Princeton-Yale Club luncheon, the conservative Republican was quoted as saying, "At first I thought that the Peace Corps would be advance work for a group of beatniks, but this is not so.... I have been impressed (and) I'll back it all the way." Shriver also relayed to the President a message, left at his office by Richard Russell of Georgia, the second-ranking Democrat on the Senate Committee on Appropriations and a prominent southern conservative. "I just wanted to say that somebody down there has been doing a good job with a difficult challenge," said Russell, "the Peace Corps seems to be in mighty good shape in Congress."

Howard Smith, Chairman of the House Committee on Rules and leader of the southern Democratic bloc in Congress, was so persuaded of the Peace Corps' merit by 1962, that he permitted his Committee to vote unanimously in favour of it in open session. "This is something House parliamentarians tell me is unprecedented," a delighted Shriver wrote to Kennedy.³

Such warm Congressional endorsements had not always been forthcoming. In 1961, the Peace Corps had been forced to fight very hard for its legislative life on Capitol Hill; success did not come effortlessly. The Democratic Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, recalled that even he had had some doubts about the Peace Corps in the beginning. "I felt that it might be a failure and have adverse repercussions for the Administration," he said. Likewise, the Majority Whip, Hubert Humphrey, wrote in later years that "while everybody praises the Peace Corps now....anyone who has taken the trouble to look at the votes on the amendments to the Peace Corps proposal at the time we were debating it in the Congress or read all the speeches, knows that it wasn't easy."⁴

In his "Special Message To The Congress On The Peace Corps" on March
President Kennedy insisted that, at this stage, The Peace Corps was only "temporary" that it would be funded from appropriations "currently available for our foreign aid programme" and that it would follow a "similar approach" to the Humphrey-Reuss proposals of 1960. Yet, despite this deferential attitude trouble was anticipated for any future Peace Corps legislation in Congress. For one thing, the very concept of foreign assistance was - by tradition - unpopular on Capitol Hill. Indeed, in the same week as Kennedy announced the Peace Corps, the House Committee on Appropriations refused to vote a single dollar of the 150 million dollars in emergency funds which he had requested to carry out his foreign economic policy. Furthermore, many legislators felt their authority had been usurped by the Executive Order, and the "back-door" funding of the Peace Corps from the President's special contingency supply. Senator Bennett (R., Utah) was alarmed that the Congress had permitted the President to pre-empt its legislative prerogative. "No matter how excellent the Peace Corps idea may be," he argued, "there is no reason for setting it up in this manner, which evidences such disdain for the constitutional division of powers."

Similarly, Congressman Johansen (R., Mich.) believed it was "an unconstitutional act to initiate this programme without Congressional authorisation." A substantial number of disgruntled Congressmen wrote letters of complaint to the President and Bill Josephson recalled a "little bad taste in some committee staff mouths." The Peace Corps had not got off on the best of footing with the Congress and hence, could not afford to be over-optimistic about its chances of winning legislation in 1961. To cover the worst of eventualities, the Peace Corps' General Counsel prepared a paper entitled "Authority To Continue a Peace Corps Should The Congress Not Pass a Peace Corps Act At This Session."

The Executive Order had given the Peace Corps some breathing space from seeking appropriations for fiscal year 1961. Thus, between March and June, Shriver and his staff could concentrate on the form of the Peace Corps bill and the Congressional strategy to gain appropriations for fiscal year 1962. Bill Josephson remembered their determination to
"make the best impression on the Congress that anybody had ever made." In early March, the Peace Corps began making some informal overtures to important figures on the Hill. Hubert Humphrey and Henry Reuss were the natural choices as floor managers of the legislation in the Senate and House respectively; the Peace Corps consulted regularly with both men. Humphrey, in his seat of leverage as Majority Whip in the Senate and also, as an experienced member of the powerful Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, played an especially significant part in nursing the Peace Corps through the Congress at delicate moments. His commitment to the Peace Corps ideal was longstanding and, in his memoirs, he described the bill as being "of particular emotional importance to me."12

The influential chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William J. Fulbright, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman, Thomas Morgan, were also kept well-informed at the early planning stages. Moreover, on March 5, 1961, Shriver paid an essential visit to the office of the Speaker, Sam Rayburn - the most senior ranking Democrat in the Congress. With impeccable tact, Shriver wrote to thank Rayburn for spending time with him discussing the viability of the Peace Corps:

"The problem, of course, as you pointed out, is to carry it out in such a way that will be constructive and beneficial to everyone concerned. We want it to be a down-to-earth, people-to-people approach that will avoid waste and unnecessary expense, and I was glad to get your thinking along these lines."13

At this point, Shriver realised that the Congress held the power of life and death over the Peace Corps. To give this relationship the attention it deserved, he set up an office of Congressional Liaison within the Peace Corps. Its functions were to work on the form and presentation of legislation, to reply to Congressional mail, to keep the Peace Corps organisation informed of Congressional visits in Washington and the field, and to report to the White House on Legislative developments. In charge of this office was Bill Moyers, the twenty-six year old former executive assistant to Vice-President Johnson. For all his youth, Moyers had worked for Johnson (then Majority Leader) on Capitol Hill since 1954 and his political acuity was highly valued by the comparatively inexperienced Shriver. Moyers was ably supported by Wilson McCarthy, Warren Wiggins,
Bill Josephson and Ed Bayley. In the Director's staff meeting on March 22, 1961, these men planned the Peace Corps' assault on the Hill. The predominant questions likely to prove troublesome in Congress were outlined: Will enough people volunteer? Will the Peace Corps move cautiously enough? Will Volunteers be "salesmen" for the American way of Life? Will Peace Corps service be more attractive to the wealthy than the poor? Will the United States government be liable for injuries to, and mistakes by, the Volunteers? Slowly, around the answers to these questions, the Peace Corps' Congressional presentation evolved. 14

Meanwhile, in Congress, discussion of the Peace Corps had already begun. "The bloom is off the rose so far as the Peace Corps is concerned," said Senator Goldwater in a speech critical of the new agency. Frances Bolton (R., Ohio) a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called the idea "terrifying" while Alexander Wiley, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, felt it was being pushed much too fast. John Rhodes (R., Az.) of the House Appropriations Committee assailed the proposed Peace Corps as an easy target for communist infiltrators. On the other hand, a number of Democrats made favourable statements. Senators Young, Hart, Muskie and Mo Gee spoke enthusiastically of the Peace Corps as an embodiment of the spirit of the New Frontier while Congressman Libonati saw it as an idea portraying "the pioneer spirit of the American youth." 15

While congressmen shaped up for the debate on the Peace Corps bill, Shriver's staff were busily writing it. Based on the Report To The President, the final product was the cumulative effort of Josephson, Moyers, Wiggins, Abram and Nelson; Ted Sorensen of the White House staff gave a little advice and Roger Kuhn, a young lawyer who had some experience of drafting legislation with the International Cooperation Administration, made a major contribution. Two specific issues proved the most controversial: authority and funding. Kuhn and Abram argued for the vesting of authority in the Director or in the Peace Corps as a sovereign institution, whereas Josephson wanted to place the Peace Corps under the President and thus be able to invoke his name whenever possible. With a view to future bureaucratic battles, Josephson sensed that the Peace Corps would be better placed, strategically, under the wing of the
resident—whose power was virtually absolute—than on its own. This meant sacrificing total autonomy but the long-term advantages of being the President's agency would prove worthwhile. As Josephson explained, "I felt that we would be in a stronger position if we were able to say these functions are conferred upon the President who will be able to supervise and regulate them and reorganise them if need be, rather than lock us in institutionally." Josephson's reasoning won the day.  

Josephson also proposed that the Peace Corps should ask the Congress for only one year's appropriation at a time. More experienced foreign aid administrators forecast that such an innovation would cause untold chaos within the Peace Corps bureaucracy and forestall necessary long-term planning. But again, Josephson's ineluctable logic prevailed. By requesting only annual grants, he argued that fretful congressmen would be reassured that the Peace Corps would not become a renegade, uncontrollable organisation. There was an element of risk involved. In any year it chose, Congress could cut the Peace Corps' money supply. Nevertheless, Josephson believed there was "an absolute utility each year in going up to the Hill. Congress knows that each year it will get at the program, and it also keeps it up-to-date about your program."  

He was right and his argument proved particularly persuasive to reluctant congressmen who were worried that the Peace Corps might become a costly, self-perpetuating government bureaucracy. In writing the legislation, Josephson and Kuhn worked especially hard on making it as acceptable to the Congress as possible. For example, in describing the Peace Corps, they were careful to avoid use of the word "presumptive."  

At the same time, they deliberately attempted to leave the Peace Corps as free a hand as possible. The draft bill gave the Director substantial powers to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or appropriate to carry out such functions, and may delegate to any of his subordinates authority to perform any of such functions, including, if he shall so specify, the authority successively to redelegate any of such functions." The training and selection of Volunteers was left for the Peace Corps itself to control, as were their living, travel and leave allowances and their housing, transportation and subsistence supplies.
However, the bill did require the Peace Corps to report to the Congress every year and to request its funds annually. For fiscal year 1962, it asked for 40 million dollars. Also, as Josephson had suggested, the Peace Corps' ultimate authority rested with the President - he could dismiss any Volunteer at his discretion.19

By May 11, 1961, the finalised draft of the Peace Corps bill was ready for inter-agency review by the Bureau of the Budget, the State Department and the White House. Warren Wiggins urged that this procedure be carried through speedily, indeed, "on an urgent basis." He told Dean Rusk that the time was ripe for the passage of "legislation since there was "high public and Congressional interest in the Peace Corps."20

Moreover, by the beginning of May, the Peace Corps had won its battle for independence. This not only guaranteed its autonomy within the Federal bureaucracy, but also its freedom from being sent to the Congress as a part of the Administration's general foreign aid package. This was crucial, for it was axiomatic that foreign aid fared disastrously in appropriations committees.21 Since the Peace Corps' inception, Shriver had been consistently advised by legislative leaders to take the Peace Corps to the Congress as a separate commodity. As Shriver told Kennedy, Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen "expressed the opinion that the Peace Corps should be the subject of separate legislation if we hope to get any prompt and substantial action at this session."22 This distinctiveness was pivotal to the Peace Corps' success in the Congress. However, it caused some discomfort in another direction. Certain Presidential aides - most notably Congressional Liaison officer Larry O'Brien - had been very displeased at the Peace Corps' fight for independence. In the bitter aftermath of the Peace Corps' victory, Wiggins and Josephson had been warned by Ralph Dungan that they could expect no help from the White House staff. Bill Josephson explained that Dungan and O'Brien looked upon the Peace Corps' administrators as obstinate "Loners" and ambitious "empire-builders." Thus, as far as the President's aides were concerned, the Peace Corps was on its own - in every respect including Congressional support.

So, despite Shriver's obvious lack of experience, the White House staff
At first, Shriver's greenness seemed an insurmountable barrier to his and the Peace Corps' success with Congress. He had never held political office; he had never lobbied on Capitol Hill; and he had never testified before a Congressional committee. His chief political experience had been as adviser to Kennedy in the 1960 campaign and his administrative background was in business, not government. Thus the Congressional committees had to be convinced not only of the feasibility of the Peace Corps idea but also of the competence of its administrators. For his part, Shriver believed his Congressional innocence was an asset rather than a liability. In retrospect, he claimed that "If you don't know how it's supposed to work, then sometimes you do better." Certainly, his technique was unconventional and, in some ways, unprecedented.

Shriver's forte was the personal touch. Between March and September 1961, he personally met with some three hundred and sixty three members of the Congress. The usual tactic of a government administrator with a bill before Congress was to concentrate on the "big men" on Capitol Hill - the Majority and Minority leaders, the Whips, the Speaker and the committee chairmen. While Shriver made sure that he saw these men, he also talked to everyone else - or at least, three out of every four congressmen. He termed this strategy "saturation bombing." In an entertaining memorandum of September 6, 1961, - "from one brother-in-law to another" - Shriver outlined for President Kennedy a typical day on the Hill:

"If you want to know what it takes to get your Peace Corps through the House and the Senate, you may find out by looking at the following schedule for tomorrow's activities:

9:00-- Congressman Avery
9:45-- Senator Saltonstall
10:45-- Congressman Bow
11:30-- Congressman Brown
12:15-- Congressman Gallagher
1:00-- Lunch with Senator Ellender and the Senate Appropriations Committee (this is a private luncheon arranged on his own initiative by Senator Ellender)
3:00-- T.V. Tape with Senator Smith of Massachusetts
3:40-- Congressman Kitchin
In a postscript, the ebullient Shriver claimed that although this had been his daily routine for two months, "We all love it - and the Volunteers think you are the greatest."26

Shriver held hundreds of breakfast meetings with groups of congressmen. These were extraordinary in that they were based on the geographical region which a congressman represented rather than his party affiliation. By meeting Democrats and Republicans at the same time, Shriver cultivated the notion that the Peace Corps was above partisan politics. In later years, he recollected, "I zealously went out to win over Republicans as well as Democrats."27 Naturally, legislators felt flattered when they saw the Director of a government agency - and the President's brother-in-law to boot - personally carrying out his own lobbying programme. It was a significant factor in persuading many of them to vote for the Peace Corps.

As one member of the House Rules Committee explained to Bill Haddad:

"You know why I really voted for the Peace Corps? One night I was leaving at 7:30 and there was Shriver, walking up and down the halls of the House Office Building, by himself, looking into all the doors. He came in and talked to me. I still didn't like the program, but I was sold on Shriver. I voted for him."28

Shriver was a brilliant performer in committee hearings, always effervescent and thoroughly prepared. Prior to his appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in June 1961, Shriver asked his staff for a complete rundown on some of the Peace Corps' more vital statistics. "I should have the cost of administration to date," he wrote, "and the contemplated cost of administration. Also, I should have the number of people involved, their salaries, and the relationship of their expenses to the cost, per capita, of maintaining a Volunteer abroad."29 Thus Shriver could reply to expected questions on expenditure with the precise information that a Peace Corps Volunteer would cost the United States taxpayer $3,336 dollars for two years service. (Appendix III) Before the vote in the Senate Appropriations Committee, Shriver analysed opinion and corresponded with Hubert Humphrey regarding the precarious tension within the Committee. At this stage, it seemed the Peace Corps would be defeated by one vote:
Shriver felt that the Peace Corps' best hope of success was to lobby senators Stennis and Holland; he left little to chance.

In his own cogent and articulate fashion, Shriver reassured congressmen on every facet of Peace Corps operations - that training and selection standards would be rigorous, costs would be minimal, and caution their watchword. He also paid great attention to detail. When Senator Capehart (D., Ind.) asked him a question about equipment and cost during a Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Shriver's meticulous answer ran to exact figures on jeeps (135), horses (20) and outboard motors (1); his figure on cost was to the cent - 10,712,894 dollars and 58 cents.31

Shriver's innate political sense soon became apparent. When needs be, he used the President's name; for instance, he insisted that Kennedy himself - rather than the Secretary of State - should always present the Peace Corps' legislation to the Congress. Shriver illustrated the Peace Corps' bipartisan nature by pointing our the number of prominent Republicans as well as Democrats chosen to serve on the National Advisory Council. Also, during committee hearings, he always managed to produce a string of star witnesses - everyone from Heinz Rollman to Dean Rusk. Most of all, Shriver was consistently deferential in his attitude towards the Congress. "During the exploratory stages of this program," he told committee men, "we have tried to keep clearly in focus the will of Congress." Indeed, he was fond of reminding Congress that, to an extent, it was responsible for the birth of the Peace Corps. After all, the House Foreign Affairs Committee sanctioned Henry Reuss's original proposal for a study of the idea. Shriver's painstaking efforts paid handsome dividends. Congresswoman Church (R., Ill.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told him that she knew of no government administrator who "has made such an effort to bring his story personally to members of Congress."32 Dean Rusk echoed this sentiment: "I doubt that any individual or agency has ever had so favorable a situation in the Congress as Sargent Shriver built for the Peace Corps."33

Shriver's polished performances owed a great deal to the research and planning undertaken by his superb congressional liaison back-up team. Bill Moyers in particular guided him through Congress by anticipating potentially difficult questions and cantankerous members. Knowing cost would be a critical issue, Moyers prepared the Peace Corps' economic brief long before its legislation went to Congress. In May, 1961, he told Bill Josephson that "There is a certain amount of distrust on the Hill now towards the Peace Corps' expenses - growing out of the use of the
Executive Order and Mutual Security fund." Moyers maintained that "Congress is not going to want to walk in the dark as far as our administrative budget is concerned. Again and again I have been asked questions like "How large is your administrative staff going to be?" Moyers advised that the Peace Corps should "take the initiative here and show Congress that we are prudent and compassionate on a sensitive issue... we ought not to move in any direction that heightens the possibility of distrust." He also correctly predicted that Otto Passman (D., La.), the notoriously frugal Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, would prove the Peace Corps' strongest single opponent in the Congress.

To create a convivial atmosphere for the Peace Corps on the Hill, Moyers and his staff met formally and informally with countless congressmen; they established a three-day deadline on replies to congressional mail; phone-calls from legislative offices were never delayed or refused; and congressmen were invited to visit training sites in their home states. For example, in early August Senator Ralph Yarborough saw trainees at the University of Texas in El Paso. "I have never seen a more intelligent, dedicated group of students," he told his colleagues during the debate on the Peace Corps bill.

Another of the Peace Corps' subtle techniques was to ensure that a Volunteer from each state had been selected by the time the bill was set up for passage. As the first Volunteers were chosen, they became news - at the local and state levels - and congressmen in Washington were often required to make at least token statements of acknowledgement on the floor of the House and Senate. This kept members aware that people back home were joining the Peace Corps and that it was a generally popular grassroots issue. No time or effort was spared to maintain this congressional involvement and interest. Don Romine, one of Bill Moyers's assistants, recalled rushing up to the congressional Post Office at four o'clock one morning in June, 1961, just to make sure that congressmen would receive a briefing-paper which Moyers had prepared for them for that day's hearing.

With this extensive lobbying network in the background, Hubert Humphrey introduced the Peace Corps' legislation in the Senate on June 1,
1961. Senate bill S. 2000 sought to "establish a Peace Corps of American Volunteers to carry America's skills and talents and idealism abroad to help other peoples help themselves." Four days later, Henry Reuss brought a similar bill (H.R. 7500) into the House. After hearings in late June, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously reported out the bill and on September 14, 1961, it passed the body of the House by a roll-call vote of 288 to 97. One week later, the conferees from both houses reached agreement and the amended bill passed the House by a vote of 253 to 79. Again, a voice vote was sufficient for passage in the Senate. On September 22, 1961, President Kennedy signed the Peace Corps Act which stated:

"The purpose of this Act is to promote world peace and friendship through a Peace Corps, which shall make available to interested countries and areas, men and women of the United States qualified for service abroad and willing to serve, under conditions of hardship if necessary, to help the peoples of such countries and areas in meeting their needs for trained manpower, and to help promote a better understanding of the American people on the part of the peoples served and a better understanding of other peoples on the part of the American people."

In peace Corps terminology, these requirements specified by the Congress became known as the "Three Aims". These re-emphasised that the Peace Corps was not just a technical assistance agency but a means for allowing Third World peoples to learn about Americans and vice-versa. These "Three Aims" were consonant with Kennedy's original purpose for the Peace Corps and its success was judged in these terms.

However, the Peace Corps' passage through the Congress was by no means all plain sailing. Although congressmen opposed to the actual Peace Corps concept were few, many Republicans stressed that, in its first year, they would regard the new agency as "experimental". Resistance to the idea was strongest in the House. Led most vociferously by H.R. Gross (R., Iowa) a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, these congressmen viewed the Peace Corps as a "a shining example of ....a legislative pig-in-a-poke" and another "foreign aid boondoggle". Most notable among their number was John Tabor of New York, the ranking Republican on the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations and Otto Passman, who held the Chair of that Committee. Throughout the Kennedy years, Passman's unrelenting
opposition remained the Peace Corps' most serious obstacle to full funding.

The attack on the Peace Corps in the upper chamber was led by Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa who, as third-ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was in a position of some influence. Barry Goldwater, Homer Capehart (R., Ind.) and Richard Russell (D., Ga.) were of similar persuasion. George Aiken, the second-ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also recalled thinking that the Peace Corps seemed to offer "an exceptional opportunity to get into difficulty." However, of more immediate importance than the outright hostility of these few was the apparent indifference of the Democratic senator from Arkansas, William Fulbright. The Chairman of the prestigious Senate Foreign Relations Committee admitted that, from the start, the Peace Corps was not one of his "pet projects." He was dubious about the quality of applicant it would attract, he did not admire its "one-way" approach of sending young Americans to the Third World without reciprocation, and he was concerned as to the effect the Peace Corps might have on his own highly-successful Fulbright programme for educational exchange.

On August 2, 1961, an alarming rumour swept Peace Corps/Washington: Fulbright was about to recommend to his committee that the Peace Corps' authorisation request be cut from 40 million dollars to 10 million dollars. Under a headline of "Peace Corps Bill Is Facing Curbs", the New York Times quoted Fulbright as saying the Peace Corps should adopt a slower approach. The Times stated that "such a deep cut in funds...would cripple the Peace Corps, embarrass the President abroad, and encourage the more conservative House to make even deeper cuts." Minority leader Everett Dirksen predicted that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee might "completely transform" the Peace Corps' legislation. As it transpired, the Committee voted 14 to 0 in reporting out the bill - Republicans Hickenlooper, Capehart and Williams abstained. However, it soon became known that, before this favourable vote, the Committee had rejected 6 to 11 a motion by Hickenlooper to downgrade the Peace Corps' first year's authorisation to 25 million dollars. Furthermore, two Democrats - Fulbright and Frank Lausche of Ohio - had voted with Hickenlooper. Had it
not been for a sterling defence by Hubert Humphrey in Committee, the vote
could well have been catastrophic for the Peace Corps. Indeed, even as the
bill was reported out, Fulbright repeated that he would like to see the
Peace Corps begun "on a more modest level." His unenthusiastic attitude
augured ominously for the Peace Corps' safe passage through the Senate.43

Sargent Shriver, worried and angry about the lack of pressure being
exerted on the Peace Corps' behalf by the White House Congressional
Liaison and the Democratic leadership on the Hill, fired off a strongly-
worded memorandum to President Kennedy. "Unless we can build a climate
of opinion in which the Peace Corps is considered 'must legislation!,' he
warned, "we are in trouble - regardless of the general goodwill that
surrounds this proposal." Shriver claimed that congressional leaders
like Mansfield, Fulbright and Rayburn were "openly lukewarm toward the
Peace Corps - at least in terms of the legislative priority accorded it."
He pleaded with Kennedy to provide the necessary leadership on the Hill:
"The White House must provide sufficient leadership and pressure so that
there will be no doubt in the minds of Congress that the President feels
the bill must be passed this session. Unless the White House supplies
this leadership, the lateness of the session alone may doom the chances
for Peace Corps legislation and appropriations this session....The bill
is at least a week from the Senate floor." Shriver added that, at this
moment, he felt thoroughly frustrated. "Bill Moyers and I have been living
on the Hill," he wrote. "We may even have laid the foundation for at
least the beginnings of a good working relationship with Congressman
Passman." However, in a forceful conclusion, Shriver told Kennedy that it
was time for the White House to lend the Peace Corps some assistance:
"Not that we intend to relax in our efforts, but I think that at this point the
Peace Corps itself has done all it can on the Hill." In this crucial
memorandum, Shriver made it clear to Kennedy that if he did not give some
assistance at this stage, the Peace Corps legislation might be aborted.44

Shriver's powerful message had the desired effect. At a news
conference on August 10, 1961, Kennedy - without being asked a question
about it - made a strongly supportive statement on the Peace Corps. He
outlined the tremendous response which it had been receiving and he spoke of it as one of the most encouraging features of his administration: "It has had a most promising beginning, and we have an opportunity if the amount requested by the Peace Corps is approved by the Congress, of having 2,700 Volunteers serving the cause of peace in fiscal year 1962." With Shriver's memorandum in mind, Kennedy added his weight to the Peace Corps' assault on the Hill. "I am hopeful," he said, "that the Congress will support this effort."45 The President's remarks were short but to the point and - less than two weeks before the debate on the Peace Corps would begin in the Senate - strategically important. In appealing directly to the public, Kennedy was letting the Congress know that he was committed to the Peace Corps.

Even so, the battle was not yet won. On August 24, during the debate in the Senate, the major issue once again was Hickenlooper's proposed amendment "to cut 15 million dollars out of the unnecessary fat in this authorisation."46 He was supported by Senators Lausche and Bennet (R. Utah). Senator Symington (D., Miss.) advocated full funding, noting that it amounted to a mere tenth of one per cent of the latest defense appropriations. Majority leader Mike Mansfield also backed the Peace Corps' request. He predicted that - like all foreign aid efforts - the Peace Corps would run up against difficulties in Otto Passman's House Sub-Committee on appropriations. However, he hoped that "at least in getting the program afloat, we will on this occasion allow the full amount requested by the Committee on Foreign Relations."47 The arguments of Symington, Mansfield and Humphrey fended off the proposed 37.5 per cent cut. In a roll-call vote the Hickenlooper amendment was defeated 32 to 59. Nevertheless, Fulbright again went on record as being "not without misgivings" and he, along with seven other Democratic senators, voted with Hickenlooper.48

As it happened, the Peace Corps' victory on the floor of the Senate proved transitory. As Mansfield had feared, Congressman Passman's Sub-Committee on Appropriations made a deep inroad into the Peace Corps' authorised funds. Before it was finally signed into law on October 1, 1961, the Peace Corps' budget had been cut from 40 million dollars to 30 million dollars - a massive 25 per cent - by Passman's Committee. In that respect,
Hickenlooper and Fulbright had the last word.

Overall, Hickenlooper offered over thirty amendments to the Peace Corps bill. Most were of a minor, technical nature and Humphrey accepted three-quarters of them virtually without question. For example, the possibility of draft evasion persisted as a problem for many congressmen despite Shriver's announcement in March, 1961, that Peace Corps service would defer not exempt, Volunteers from their military duty. Humphrey readily allowed a Hickenlooper amendment to this effect since it merely formalised what was already established Peace Corps practice. The greatest fear of Hickenlooper and other critics was that the Peace Corps might become another entrenched and expanding Washington bureaucracy. Congressman Gross predicted that the Peace Corps would go the way of all previous foreign aid programmes - "with too many chiefs and not enough Indians." To guard against this, Hickenlooper proposed that Peace Corps administrative personnel be limited to two hundred and seventy five in its first year; that ten "supergrade" (that is, not subject to Civil Service pay scales) staff positions be cut from the forty requested by the Peace Corps; and that the number of Volunteers assigned to the United Nations and other international organisations not exceed one hundred and twenty-five. Also, the House cut the proposed Career Planning Board - to assist returned Volunteers - from the bill.49 Legislators felt these measures would prevent the Peace Corps from becoming over-bureaucratised. Some Peace Corps staff members were not so reassured by these strictures. Bill Josephson felt that the staff limitation (275) might prove disabling. "The vice of personnel ceilings" he told Shriver, "is that for want of a secretary a whole program was lost."50

The Congress's other major worries were firstly, that young, unworldly Americans working in foreign countries would fall prey to communist infiltrators; and secondly, that the Peace Corps would attract sundry socialists, radicals and beatniks. The first fear was effectively allayed by yet another Hickenlooper amendment which demanded that Volunteers receive training and instruction from the Peace Corps on the "philosophy, strategy, tactics, and menace of Communism."51 To an extent, the second concern was satisfied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.). J. Edgar
Hoover's agency carried out investigations of all volunteers up to September, 1961 and agreed to keep a benevolently watchful eye on the Peace Corps thereafter. Shriver also attempted to mollify worried congressmen by explaining to them the Peace Corps' position on this sensitive subject: "As you know, we in the Peace Corps share your firm conviction that it is essential for Volunteers to be loyal Americans and to possess a full understanding of, and deep commitment to, the free system." Despite these placatory measures, the fear that the Peace Corps would become infested by radicals was exacerbated in August, 1961 by a twenty-two year old Peace Corps trainee named Charles Kamen.

Kamen, by all accounts an upstanding young student, had been involved in an incident in Florida at a Rotary Club function in December, 1960. He had dared to laugh during a showing of the rabid anti-communist film *Operation Abolition*. Rotarians claimed that this proved he had communist sympathies and hence they forcibly ejected him from their club. When it was discovered that Kamen had been accepted by the Peace Corps for training at Pennsylvania State University, a few congressmen - notably Hickenlooper and Gross - made an issue of it. "The impression we get is that the Peace Corps is going to be staffed by beatniks and Kamen is a classic example" said one indignant congressman. In fact, Kamen had a history of involvement in nuclear disarmament and anti-segregationist movements; so much so, Bill Josephson described him as "a highly-motivated and idealistic young man who holds his political beliefs strongly." Nevertheless, right-wing Republicans and southern Democrats called for Kamen's immediate dismissal. Hickenlooper raised the "Kamen Incident" during the Senate's debate on the Peace Corps bill, and Passman grilled Shriver on the subject when he appeared before the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations. Indeed, such was the furore over Kamen that on August 30, the President himself was asked by a reporter for his opinion on Kamen. Kennedy tactfully replied that he had "every confidence in the judgement of those who make the selections."

This answer did not satisfy the popular press. *Newsweek* informed its readers that Kamen ("Until recently he was bearded - a fact which his critics have not overlooked") was a perfect example of "going overboard on
idealism." The Peace Corps came under tremendous pressure to "drop" him forthwith. Ed Bayley remembered members of Passman's Appropriations Committee phoning Shriver to say "If you want ten million dollars cut - keep Kamen in." Despite these threats, the Peace Corps permitted Kamen to complete his training course.

However, at the end of his training stint in September, Kamen was deemed "unsuitable" for Peace Corps service. Inevitably, there were suggestions that Shriver had made a deal with Passman to drop Kamen after training. If indeed Shriver struck up such a bargain with the chairman of the House Appropriations Sub-Committee then he certainly got a raw deal - for 10 million dollars was cut from the Peace Corps budget anyhow. It seems more likely that Shriver withstood this early challenge to the integrity of the Peace Corps' selection process and insisted that Kamen be allowed to finish his training. Although, the "deselection" of such an apparently able applicant certainly created the suspicion that Shriver had bowed to the will of reactionary legislators. The whole sordid affair ill became the Congress.

In the aftermath, the New York Times criticised conservative congressmen for attacking "irrelevant" issues such as Kamen and it praised Shriver for not bending to their whims.

The "Kamen Incident" had its own repercussions on the Peace Corps bill. Firstly, on September 19, 1961, the House - Senate conference added an amendment requiring Volunteers to take an oath of office in which they would swear that they neither advocated, nor knowingly belonged to an organisation which advocated the overthrow of the United States government. Secondly, Passman's argument for a large cut in Peace Corps appropriations was strengthened by the great hullabaloo over Kamen. On September 25, 1961, the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations reduced the Peace Corps' first year budget from 40 million dollars to 30 million dollars; thus, the unhappy ghost of Charles Kamen was exorcised from the Peace Corps.

Despite Passman's appropriations cuts, Hickenlooper's amendments and Kamen's "deselection", the Peace Corps assault on Capitol Hill was a great triumph. It received the second biggest margin of favourable votes for any
new non-defence measure sent by Kennedy to the Congress and, notwithstanding a few minor changes, the bill was left intact. Senator Hubert Humphrey gave enormous credit to Shriver:

"(I wish) to commend you again on the outstanding manner in which you presented your case for your recommendations. Also, you deserve unceasing praise for the splendid manner in which you have administered your agency. It is your record of administration, your careful and meticulous personal supervision and direction of the Peace Corps' activities, and your frankness and candour with the members of the Congress that have earned for you respect and support which was so evident....I know that it is not necessary for me to advise you, but as a friend and one of your admirers, may I remind you to always follow the pattern that you have set this far....You can get what you want from this Congress."

Unstinting praise also came from the White House. Congressional Liaison officer Larry O'Brien told Shriver, "You unquestionably get the whole credit for getting this one through." 60

On signing the Peace Corps bill, President Kennedy expressed particular pleasure at "the bipartisan effort and support in the shaping of this new Agency." 61 A brief analysis of the voting in 1961 would seem to confirm that the Peace Corps was an issue which went beyond the narrow confines of party; rather, it divided the Congress by conservative - liberal lines. As it passed by "voice" in the Senate, it is difficult to discern divisions from the vote on the bill. However, the vote on Senator Hickenlooper's proposed amendment to cut 15 million dollars from the Peace Corps' authorisation might serve as a useful indicator. The amendment was defeated by 32 to 59; a vote in its favour is counted, in effect, as a vote against the Peace Corps. 62

Eight Democrats voted for the amendment with fifty-one against, while twenty-four Republicans voted for, with eight against. This gives the appearance of a straight party division. However, the eight Democrats who voted in favour were all recognised conservatives - like Russell of Georgia, Stennis of Mississippi and Thurmond of South Carolina. Senator Fulbright, with his reputation as a liberal - at least in foreign affairs - was a possible exception. These conservative Democrats joined with mostly southern or mid-western Republicans - traditionally conservative and isolationist - to vote for the amendment. On the other hand, many of the Republicans who voted against the amendment were noted liberals - like Javits and Keating of New York. These liberal
Republicans tended to join with the remaining majority of Democrats to vote against the amendment. This voting pattern suggests that the Peace Corps cut across partisan party lines in the Senate. It was significant that, in his remarks to the Senate at the end of the debate on the Peace Corps, Humphrey chose to single out two Republican senators - Dirksen and Wiley - for their cooperation. "And I am pleased indeed" concluded Humphrey, "that it has won the support of senators on both sides of the aisle." (Appendix IV)

Opinion in the House can be gauged from the roll-call vote on the Peace Corps bill on September 14, 1961. It passed by 288 to 97. Two hundred and six Democrats voted for the bill and twenty-nine against; eighty-two Republicans voted for, with sixty-eight against. While the Democratic support for the bill was overwhelming, the majority of Republicans also voted in favour of the measure. As in the upper chamber, conservative Democrats (like Passman of Louisiana and J.C. Davis of Georgia) joined with mostly southern or mid-western Republican conservatives in opposition to the bill. The less conservative Republicans voted with the remaining majority of Democrats to support the Peace Corps. (Appendix V)

Thus, as Kennedy suggested, the Peace Corps transcended party feuds in both chambers of Congress. Indeed, Congressman Hemphill of South Carolina equated the political inoffensiveness of the Peace Corps with that of Grace Kelly, Billy Graham and the Pope. On the other hand, in a memorandum to Shriver in October 1961, Bill Moyers forecast that the Peace Corps would not always escape the murky waters of party politics. He mentioned former President Eisenhower's latest statement which described the Peace Corps as a juvenile experiment. "If you want to send Peace Corps Volunteers to an underdeveloped area", "he said,"send them to the moon!" Moyers told Shriver that the Congress would have to be won over again in 1962 and he predicted that the Republicans would make criticism of the Peace Corps a major issue in the mid-term election campaign.

For once, Moyers was not absolutely accurate. In general, the Peace Corps had very few congressional problems of any consequence after 1961. Once the glowing reports on the Volunteers' achievements in the field began to filter back to Washington, there was little danger to be feared on Capitol
Hill. There were some, not insignificant irritations. The House Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations Appropriations persistently attempted to limit the Peace Corps' funds. Nevertheless, although Otto Passman remained a mortal enemy of the Peace Corps, in 1962 and 1963 he could only manage to inflict cuts of 7.5 per cent and 9.7 per cent on its appropriations - nowhere near the swingeing 25 per cent of 1961. (APPENDIX VI)

In the Senate, criticism of the Peace Corps virtually ceased. One indication of this was the defeat by voice vote of Senator Lausche's proposed amendment to cut 28 per cent from the Peace Corps' authorisation for fiscal year 1963. In the House, Congressman Gross vainly attempted to muster his forces against the Peace Corps but even he found it difficult to make complaints. His proposed amendment in November 1963, to cut the Peace Corps' authorisation from 102 million dollars to 64 million dollars was easily defeated by a voice vote. Another indication of the Peace Corps' overwhelming support in the lower chamber came in 1962 when one hundred and seven Republicans voted for the Peace Corps bill with only fifty-four against while, in 1963, a voice vote proved sufficient for passage.

Of course, other minor annoyances cropped up periodically. John Moss (D., Calif.) Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Government Operations questioned whether the Peace Corps' use of classified documents did not indicate its involvement in some kind of intelligence operations. Shriver was forced to explain that in dealing with sensitive personnel information, he sometimes needed the "Confidential" or "Secret" stamps - but he assured Moss that these classifications were few and had nothing whatsoever to do with intelligence work. Shriver also had to give written assurance to Senator Fulbright that no more than 15 per cent of all Volunteers would be stationed in any one country. Fulbright's complaint originated from his discovery that there were more Volunteers in the Philippines than in all other countries put together in March, 1962. A resolution by Congressman Selden (D., Ala.) limited to 300,000 dollars, the Peace Corps' financial assistance to other nations for the development of their
own Peace Corps-type projects. This greatly hindered the Peace Corps' proposed participation in the International Peace Corps Secretariat, which had been created by the forty-three nation conference on Middle-Level Manpower held in Puerto Rico in October, 1962. It aimed to foster indigenous voluntary service programmes. Thus, the Congress effectively wrecked Shriver's dream of instigating a world-wide "Peace Corps movement." From time to time then, the Peace Corps suffered minor rebuffs on the Hill. On occasion, Shriver had to admit to a rotten programme— for example in Jamaica— or to mistakes in the field. But after 1961, the Peace Corps was widely regarded by congressmen as a respectable and permanent government institution. Even southern Democrats came to look upon it favourably—if only for the negative reasoning that "it's good we have all those liberals in one place where we can watch them." Shriver maintained good congressional relations by constantly urging his staff to encourage the participation of Congress and to keep it informed on Peace Corps activities. Once every week— throughout the Kennedy years— Shriver had breakfast on Capitol Hill with twenty or thirty congressmen; he invited them to staff meetings and to inspect country programmes; and Shriver, as well as the Volunteers themselves, kept up a constant stream of letters to congressmen from the field. The Peace Corps never took for granted its excellent rapport with Congress. For instance, while mild cuts in appropriations authorisation had to be expected, Josephson told Moyers, "It does not follow that we go up to the Hill like patsies leading with our chins." Hence, the Peace Corps used every tactic at its disposal to win full funding. It was Josephson's idea to begin the Peace Corps' congressional presentation for fiscal year 1963 with an informal and effusive letter from Volunteer Tom Scanlon in Santiago, Chile. It proved an effective—if impish—tactic. Josephson recalled that it was the first time Congressmen had heard a legislative request from a government agency begin with the words "Hello Everybody!" One of Shriver's most persuasive arguments was that the Peace Corps was as parsimonious as any government organisation could possibly be. He supplied detailed figures on the break-down cost of all Peace Corps
operations; he outlined economies made by cutting down on overtime payments, long-distance telephone calls and shipment of equipment overseas; and, in a virtually unprecedented action, he actually returned unspent monies to the Treasury - 1.9 million dollars at the end of fiscal year 1962 and 3.9 million dollars at the end of fiscal year 1963. The latter act intensely irritated congressional critics like Passman who had always claimed the Peace Corps was just another spendthrift agency. Sensing where the average congressman's priorities lay, Shriver went to great lengths to minimise Peace Corps expenditure. "Ours is a bone and muscle budget" he told Senator Fulbright. 74

Another of Shriver's most potent arguments for winning congressional favour was that the Peace Corps would aid America's fight against the communist threat. The majority of congressmen - including Humphrey and Reuss - liked to think of the Peace Corps as a new, if more humane, weapon in the Cold War. Humphrey pointed out that although it would cost the taxpayer less than the price of one Atlas missile, the Peace Corps would help the United States compete for "the leadership of world revolution"; Senator Pell (D., R.I.) saw the Peace Corps as a "dire threat to the Communists in the developing world"; and Congressman Judd (R., Minn.) claimed that the new programme would engage American youth in "open cultural competition against the youth of the Communist system." 75 Shriver did not contradict these views. Notwithstanding his claim that the Peace Corps was above politicking, his speeches on Capitol Hill were often flavoured with anti-communist rhetoric. "One thing we are doing," he told The House Sub-Committee on Appropriations, "we are annoying the Communists extraordinarily. We are aggravating and exciting them by the mere fact that we send Peace Corps Volunteers." When asked by Congressman Gross why the United States government should pay for sending Peace Corps teachers to Ethiopia, Shriver played the anti-communist card:

"But think of it, Congressman Gross, suppose we knew there were five hundred secondary school teachers in Ethiopia and they all came from Communist Russia and they were teaching all of the schoolkids in Ethiopia. I think a lot of people in the United States would be worried about that." 76
Just how seriously the Peace Corps accepted its Cold War role — as thrust upon it by the Congress — is questionable. Sargent Shriver was always careful to emphasise the Peace Corps' freedom from any entanglement in American foreign policies. However, in the early 1960's congressmen were reluctant to vote for any proposal which did not toe the anti-communist line. Shriver realised this and accordingly added some anti-communist spice to his lobbying tactics on the Hill. From his point of view, it was a functional congressional strategy which redounded to the greater good of the Peace Corps.

In 1962, President Kennedy heard from Shriver that the Peace Corps' hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had been a "love-feast;" in 1963, only two members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations turned up to question Shriver — an indication of Congress's uncritical attitude towards the Peace Corps by that time. Indeed, Senator McGee (D., Wy) of the Senate Committee on Appropriations effused that "if we had ten Sargent Shrivers we could conquer the world". In November 1963, Congressman Fascell (D., Fla.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee was more succinct: "The Peace Corps is doing a good job...nothing can be said in criticism about the program." Clearly, the Peace Corps had won the Congress.
In 1963, the Peace Corps was very favourably regarded by most Democratic and Republican members of the Congress. Indeed, it was one of Kennedy's few legislative proposals that managed to transcend party politics. The unrelenting diligence and shrewd tactics of the Peace Corps' congressional liaison team dissipated the substantial scepticism which had been evident on Capitol Hill in early 1961. They were fortunate in that, with the Peace Corps, they were not negotiating with any really hard political currency. Few congressmen were eager to covet jobs teaching in Malaya or road building in Tanganyika; therefore, the Peace Corps lobby was not forced into the sordid political compromises and pork-barrel deals which often accompany the passage of any legislation. In that respect, it was a "clean" issue. Nevertheless, Sargent Shriver's political achievement should not be underestimated. Many congressmen were so impressed by his charismatic personality, they admitted that they voted for him as much as for the Peace Corps legislation. At the beginning of 1961, he went to the Congress with the reputation of being a political novice. Yet, upon signing the Peace Corps bill in September, President Kennedy expressed his esteem for "the most effective lobbyist on the Washington scene - Sargent Shriver."
CHAPTER SIX

THE ANTI-BUREAUCRATIC BUREAUCRACY
"It has even been described as an anti-bureaucratic bureaucracy, an organization for those who do not want to be organization men, an agency of programmed diversity, programmed uncertainty, sufficient unpredictability - just going to the threshold of chaos but not quite reaching it."

- HARRIS WOFFORD -

("The Future Of The Peace Corps" in The Annals, May 1966)
"The Peace Corps is a bold, new idea requiring a bold, new effort," Sargent Shriver told Dean Rusk on May 26, 1961. "The Peace Corps should be, and do, something different," he wrote, "different from all other kinds of organizations which the United States has heretofore undertaken abroad." In this early declaration of intent, Shriver emphasised his aim of making the Peace Corps a unique kind of government agency. Its winning of independence gave it the opportunity to develop in the direction chosen by Shriver and his staff. They were determined not to fall into the tried and routine ways of most bureaucracies. Certainly, the Peace Corps organisation, 1961-64, was very much in the style of post-Rooseveltian, liberal ideas. It was rational, intelligent, literate and informal. Yet, in many ways, it went beyond this. For it was also athletic, daring and self-deprecatory. Indeed, in its refusal to be bamboozled by esoteric, bureaucratic rules, it was unprecedented.

"In many ways," wrote Sargent Shriver in a memorandum to the Peace Corps staff, "our entire effort has been directed at simplifying and streamlining the structure of this organisation." Sharing Kennedy's abhorrence of what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called "bureaucratosclerosis", Shriver was determined to build an agency which would function in the fastest, most efficient manner possible. Bill Kelly, an experienced government administrator who became Director of the Peace Corps' Division of Contracts and Logistics, recalled that the most detested word in his new boss's lexicon was "bureaucracy". In the very early days of the Peace Corps, rumour had it that Jack Young - who was attempting to erect an organisational superstructure - was forced to hide his line-and-staff charts from Shriver for fear of incurring his wrath. Young claimed that it was Shriver's proclivity to "get everybody into the act and then worry about the niceties of how one would manage the enterprise later". Although Shriver had asked him to help set up a governmental framework for the Peace Corps, Young always felt this was more for appearances' sake ("store front") than from any overwhelming desire to organise and manage. Shriver
was determined to keep control of the Peace Corps in his hands and, as an outsider to governmental procedure, was not about to become entangled in its convoluted web of red tape. He stated emphatically that his approach was "incompatible with the existence of...any...strategy' or 'plan' to have things come out one month, five months or ten months later in accordance with some preconceived notion as to how they should come out."

Shriver held no truck with grand designs and had no hesitation in admitting that in beginning this new venture he "did not know all the answers and few, if any people did."

Despite Shriver's thoughts on this subject, the able bureaucrats who surrounded him - Wiggins, Josephson, Young and Kelly - argued that, from a purely pragmatic point of view, a minimum level of organisational planning was essential for the effective function of any government agency. Bill Josephson joked with Shriver that he too had seen, during the Eisenhower administration, "the days when not much progress was made but, boy, were we organized!" Nevertheless, he warned that "while good decisions don't automatically follow from good organization, it is hard to make them without it." Shriver took the point but demanded that the watchword of all plans be "flexibility."

Given Shriver's predilection it was inevitable that the Peace Corps' detailed design would be prone to almost constant change and adaptation as new situations and ideas occurred. In March, 1961, Jack Young remembered drafting "lots of organizational charts" and, he added, "some I believe Sarge Shriver actually signed!" Only in 1963 did a permanently stabilised organisational design emerge. (APPENDIX VII) However, notwithstanding continual minor emendations, Jack Young's memorandum on "Basic Concepts For Peace Corps Interim Organization" of March 3, 1961, remained at the root of all subsequent structural thinking. In this plan, Young had outlined certain "rudimentary management processes" such as programme development and operations, recruitment and financing. That is, those functions deemed critical for getting the Peace Corps job done.
To Young and Shriver, the effective performance of these essential tasks was always of much greater importance than "organizational boxes or division of work."

The Peace Corps was headed, in every sense, by its first Director, Sargent Shriver. From the beginning he grabbed hold of the reins of power and never relinquished his firm grip. He was aided by an Executive Secretariat which attempted to formalise the organisation's procedures and by the National Advisory Council which made itself available for consultation. The latter body was not very forceful since its role was nebulous and its powers undefined. Its first honorary Chairman, William O. Douglas, remembered spending "hours and days sitting around with a dozen people trying to decide what to do." In effect, every debate or policy question was ultimately decided by Shriver himself. Hence, the Peace Corps centred unequivocally around his charismatic personality.

Before the end of March 1961, Shriver had insisted that all written materials be sent to his office for review. Bradley Patterson, the first Executive Secretary of the Peace Corps, recalled that "everybody sent everything up to him for approval ahead of time before it got sent out." This procedure became just about the only unthinking bureaucratic response within the Peace Corps.

In the very early days of the Peace Corps, because it was such a small agency and also because Shriver had such boundless energy and enthusiasm, it was possible for him to take a hand in everything from sending out cables to reading volunteers' application forms. Patterson was amazed at how Shriver coped - "his kids and his wife didn't see much of him, but he kept on top of it." Of course, as the organisation grew, Shriver was obliged to delegate some of his powers. Even so, he was always liable to inquire into any Peace Corps matter, from the timing of a public statement on a policy issue, to what books should be shelved in the library of the Corps' training camp in Puerto Rico. On one occasion, Shriver took umbrage at a seemingly routine cable sent by a Peace Corps
official to the embassy in Ghana. The cable outlined what the Peace Corps overseas staff might need—office space, ancillary staff, a car, a chauffeur and so forth. Bradley Patterson recalled that Shriver "took one look at that message and that word 'chauffeur' caught his eye, and you could pick him off the ceiling he was so outraged." Shriver immediately summoned the staff member responsible and told him "the Peace Corps wasn't going to have any chauffeurs, by God." Shriver cancelled and rewrote the cable himself and the staff learnt a lesson about his vigilance—on matters great and small.

Patterson described Shriver as "not a systematic person" but rather "a guy who leaps into the breach and gets things done, crossing channels or speeding things up or taking short cuts or cutting corners and so forth in any moment that he feels necessary." This highly unbureaucratic procedure made it extremely difficult for more traditional administrators like Patterson, to maintain any semblance of organisational routine; however, as Patterson later conceded, it was Shriver's way of "projecting himself onto his staff and everybody who worked or had relations with the Peace Corps." Indeed, Shriver so personally dominated all Peace Corps decisions that he found it nearly impossible to find someone willing to take the post of Deputy-Director. Professor Carroll Willacn of M.I.T. turned it down in the spring of 1961 because, under Shriver, he considered he would be no more than an office-manager. In fact, Paul Gersn the Peace Corps' first Deputy-Director did not arrive until the autumn of 1961. No organisational diagram could possibly convey the all-pervading influence of Director Shriver. Since everything important went through him, the image of the Peace Corps and Sargent Shriver became virtually a single entity. As Patterson put it, "the Shriver idea was the Peace Corps because he ran it out of the palm of his hand."

Below the Director, the agency was further organised into five major offices, each headed by an Associate Director responsible to Shriver and five staff support Divisions, the chiefs of which also reported to the
Director. Responsibility for the selection, training and general support of prospective Volunteers from the moment of application was vested in the Office of Peace Corps Volunteers. This office maintained communication between the Peace Corps administration in Washington and the actual Volunteers in the field. Larry Dennis, educationalist and journalist, was its first Associate Director and significantly, Shriver had it placed at the focal point of the organisation chart and linked directly to him.

The Office of Programme Development and Operations (P.D.O.) was responsible for the selection, negotiation and establishment of Peace Corps projects overseas and for their operation after the Volunteers had arrived. Besides the Volunteers themselves, P.D.O. was at the very heart of Peace Corps functions. Warren Wiggins was its first Associate Director and it was organised into a Division of general Programme Development and Coordination and four regional offices - Latin America, Africa, the Far East and North Africa/Near East/South East Asia. These ambitious Regional Directors were among the most powerful staff members.

Bill Moyers was the first Associate Director of the important Office of Public Affairs which directed the Peace Corps' recruiting activities and coordinated the agency's essential relations with members of the Congress. It distributed information about the Peace Corps to thousands of organisations - educational, business, labour, civic and agricultural - by providing public notices of where and how to volunteer for the Peace Corps and by responding to the tremendous volume of mailed applications and enquiries.

The Office of Management handled all Peace Corps finances including the allocation and control of funds appropriated by Congress. It also administered personnel procedures - employment, promotion, termination, rating, security - and supplied office space and equipment. The Associate Director of this office had one of the most difficult jobs in the Peace Corps. For, in an agency committed to unbureaucratic procedure, the Office of Management was obliged to be at least moderately bureaucratic.
Hence, four unhappy men came and went in as many years.

General inspection and examination of all Peace Corps activities was carried out by the Office of Planning and Evaluation. Under its controversial first Associate Director, Bill Haddad, it served as a device for self-criticism within the Peace Corps. It sent candid and often scathing "evaluation" reports to Shriver on all aspects of operations and generally advised him on long-term Peace Corps goals.

From the beginning, the cooperation and assistance of private voluntary agencies, universities, colleges and international organisations (such as the United Nations) was recognised as crucial to the success of the Peace Corps. The Division of University, Private and International Cooperation attempted to maintain a healthy partnership between the Peace Corps and autonomous voluntary bodies. By 1963, Franklin Williams had taken control of this Division. Responsibility for the actual negotiation and administration of contracts between the Peace Corps and other organisations for services rendered either during training or overseas, was assumed by the Division of Contracts and Logistics, led by the experienced, hard-bargaining Bill Kelly. This Division also arranged material support for the Volunteers. The Division of Research was designed to validate and improve the Peace Corps' training and selection methods. Physical and psychiatric examinations of Volunteers as well as care and instruction during the training period and overseas was carried out by the Medical Programme Division. Lastly, the Peace Corps' General Counsel provided legal representation in all matters with other United States government agencies, private organisations and foreign powers. Bill Delano was the first General Counsel but the real driving force in this office was Bill Josephson. Such were the main components of the Peace Corps organisation situated in the Maestoco building at 806 Connecticut Avenue, diagonally across from the White House.

Overseas, operations in each country were supervised by a Peace Corps Representative (commonly referred to as the Rep) and his supporting staff. These Reps were very young men usually in their early thirties who had
made an outstanding mark in their particular occupations - government, education, the law or business. Shriver told Kennedy that he gave Peace Corps Reps "an unusual degree of responsibility," allowed them to "make many decisions in the field" and urged them to adapt Peace Corps/Washington's general policies and guidelines to local situations. The Rep had to report to the U.S. ambassador and keep up contact with other American agencies overseas. However, as Shriver's proxy in the field, he had sole responsibility for the general performance, behaviour and welfare of all the Volunteers stationed in his country. There were usually up to twelve people on his staff, among whom there would certainly be a doctor, a secretary and one or more assistant Reps. The Rep was also commonly assisted by a Volunteer Leader in the field - a notable character chosen in training. To facilitate operations, experienced foreign nationals were recruited whenever possible to assist the Peace Corps. The remainder, and by far the majority of the Peace Corps organisation was made up by the Volunteers themselves. By the end of 1963, nine out of every ten Peace Corps employees were Volunteers and Shriver instructed Reps to give them a substantial amount of responsibility. At the end of the day, the Peace Corps was dependent upon the quality of, and the work done by the Volunteers overseas.

In theory at least, the Peace Corps organisation chart of 1963-64, indicated an equanimous, finely-balanced agency with powers and functions evenly distributed between the various boxes and units. However, the neat diagram did not show the reality of constant turmoil and intense power struggles which raged within the Peace Corps between different offices, divisions and personalities. Underlying the conventional line-and-staff exterior there were many furiously competitive elements and several explosive characters. The Peace Corps was no place for faint hearts. Bill Josephson, one of the toughest in-fighters, recalled that "You had to be resilient, capable of taking a knock on the head and come bouncing back." Franklin Williams, who came into the Peace Corps with no experience of internecine governmental competitiveness remembered it as "one hell
Sargent Shriver was also a complete stranger to government procedure but he was well-versed in efficient business technique. "One of the things Mr. Joe Kennedy taught me," he said, "was that in laying out a new project, you shouldn't try to cope with every little problem; the thing to do was to get a kind of bird's eye view of the project and then single out its four or five major problems. Once these were solved, all the little ones would fall into place." Shriver always maintained this sense of administrative priorities. Moreover, he had the ability to articulate - whether orally or in writing. Bill Josephson was astonished at how quickly and skilfully Shriver handled the legal complexities involved in establishing a new government organization. "It never ceased to amaze me how well he handled the paperwork," said Josephson, "particularly the difficult paperwork coming out of my shop. . . . he had this amazing ability to simplify a complicated problem." At a personal level, Shriver communicated very well. He was charming and tactful; but at the same time, he was ruthlessly critical of incompetence. He believed in competition as a practical method of achieving the best results on any given issue. In writing a political science essay on the Peace Corps, Mr. George La Noue – a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institute in 1964 – ascribed to Shriver "the competitive theory of administration" as outlined by Professor Richard E. Neustadt of Harvard in his influential book Presidential Power. While Shriver admitted having consulted with Neustadt during the formation of the Peace Corps, he denied having read his book. Shriver pointed out that his administrative style was always more empirical than ideological:

"I am unaware that I have any fixed notions about public administration or public administration techniques. . . . I have always believed in competition and in the value of bringing together many persons of differing views to analyse and solve any new problems. . . . the sharp and vigorous inter-play of personality, opinion and action. . . . will guarantee that the right issues will be clearly raised, correctly framed and decided when ripe for action."
By setting up competing factions, Shriver deliberately cultivated an atmosphere of diversity and, sometimes, contradiction. Harris Wofford wryly described this as "creative chaos." Every battle was Darwinian, the toughest fighters, hardest workers and most persuasive debaters emerging on the winning side - with Sargent Shriver as the final arbiter.

The Peace Corps experience was so intensely personal for every individual that rifts and disagreements were inevitable. Indeed, it was often said that there was not one, but as many Peace Corps as there were Volunteers. One of the major tensions was between what Professor Robert Textor, an early Peace Corps consultant, called the three "subcultures" of the Peace Corps: the Peace Corps/Washington staff subculture, the Volunteer subculture and - in an intermediate position - the overseas Representative subculture. Professor Textor claimed that "Almost any sensitive observer, if given two weeks in Washington headquarters and two weeks at an overseas post, would agree that the separateness of these three is something that is real and demonstrable. The different systems of values and standards between these subcultures will be analysed in a further chapter. At this point, suffice to say that the wide disparities between the three was one of the greatest sources of "creative chaos" or "creative tension." Peace Corps/Washington sometimes tended to regard itself as the "real" Peace Corps with the Volunteers viewed as some kind of abstract addendum. On the other hand, the Volunteers in the field considered themselves the true cutting edge of the Peace Corps and were often resentful and sometimes downright hostile towards the paid, professional "bureaucrats" in Washington. In many ways, the Representative subculture was in the worst position. Professor Lawrence Fuchs, himself a Peace Corps Rep in the Philippines, explained how they were caught between the major conflicting parties, subject to a "credibility gap" on both sides. This situation held the advantage of ensuring constant argument and revision over Peace Corps policy and thus helped maintain the vitality of the organisation both in Washington
in the field. However, as Rep Charles Houston pointed out to Bill Moyers, the Washington-field dichotomy, was also potentially disastrous:

"A schism is looming. The fatal identification of the forgotten staff overseas versus the uncaring and impersonal 'they' in Washington seems to be closing in. This can well evolve (or degenerate) into such a serious split that, as the initial blush of enthusiasm wears off from the overseas staff, both many of Sarge's original appointees as well as some of your better, 'career' people may either toss in the sponge or become alienated from Washington. If we are to follow or allow ourselves to be dragged into this time-worn path, then I submit that the Peace Corps is on the way down. This kind of occupational disease can become an inoperable cancer if let go on long enough."

In conclusion, Houston noted that he had seen the International Cooperation Administration ruined by internal cliques and factions. "Please don't let it happen with the Peace Corps!" he pleaded.

Within Peace Corps/Washington itself, there were numerous differences of style, character and opinion. From the start there was an antagonism between the experienced government bureaucrats who had joined the Peace Corps from other agencies - the "insiders" - and the people who were coming into the government for the first time - the "outsiders." Patterson recalled that "there was a friendly, and sometimes not always friendly dialogue between the two." Most of the insiders had come from the International Cooperation Administration - Wiggins, Josephson, Alexander, Nelson, Singer, Ottinger. The outsiders were from diverse backgrounds - Wofford (law), Moyers (staff of Lyndon Johnson), Haddad (journalism), Sims (education), Boyce (the Experiment in International Living) and Peters (local state politics). While Shriver was in theory an outsider he always straddled both fences very well. As Bradley Patterson recalled, "Shriver kept all these tigers in check because he was a bigger tiger than all of them."

This conflict stemmed from the Peace Corps' unusual origins. After all, it had begun on an intensely personal basis with Shriver, Wofford and a few friends sitting around a table in an hotel room - an unnatural birth for an official bureaucracy. The outsiders were determined that the
agency should not lose this personal, creative flavour. On the other hand, people like Wiggins and Patterson knew that a modicum of formality and procedural rules were necessary for survival. They tended to regard the committed anti-bureaucratic men as incurable romantics. The one group acted as a goad on the other to produce the blend Shriver wanted. Patterson described it as a mixture of "charismatic action" with "bureaucratic organization." Harris Wofford said the synthesis was "an organization for those who don't want to become organization men."

Certainly, a job on the Peace Corps staff was not for the stuffy or the staid. One officer claimed "you must be prepared to run a hundred-yard sprint for ten miles every day." Offices consistently fought over various plans and policies. For instance, P.D.O. constantly battled with Planning and Evaluation over their "unscientific" methods of assessment. In May 1963, Richard Ottinger, Chief of the Latin American regional office, fired off an angry memorandum to Charles Peters, Chief of Evaluation, concerning a report on Peru. Ottinger complained of the short time spent in evaluating programmes, the journalistic style of reporting and the scathing criticism of personalities. "As an overall comment," he concluded, "I object to the evaluators getting into the programming business." When the Evaluation Division submitted a highly critical report on the Peace Corps' community action project in Guatemala, Sargent Shriver invited Jack Vaughn (then Chief of the Latin American Division) to respond - "Jack Vaughn, may I have one of your hot rebuttals?" he wrote in the margin of the report. A common complaint from all Divisions was that P.D.O.'s programme projections habitually outstripped the Peace Corps' ability to select and train the required number of Volunteers. In September 1962, Elizabeth Harris (of the Office of Peace Corps Volunteers) criticised Warren Wiggins and his Office thus:

"Too often...P.D.C. officers have treated both Training and Selection as a supermarket where charge accounts are honored...P.D.O. has too often demanded the merchandise only to bring it back time and again for exchange before deciding on the final purchase. This has resulted in confusion, duplication of work and considerable ill-feeling...Thus P.D.O. and Peace Corps Volunteers must work together
on matters concerning the individual Volunteers, and must start doing so immediately, not on a 'my office is more important than your office' basis, but on the fact that Peace Corps/Washington exists only to provide for and support the Volunteers regardless of the necessary bureaucratic distinction between P.D.C. and Peace Corps Volunteers in its major responsibilities."

Bill Josephson recalled that almost everyone enjoyed undercutting the Office of Management which was regarded as the biggest single stifler of creativity in the Peace Corps.

Peace Corps staff meetings had the reputation of being among the most brutally frank in Washington. Certainly, some acrimonious exchanges took place. If a Division chief was adjudged ill-briefed or negligent in some way, he found himself severely criticised by his peers. Bob Gale, Chief of Recruitment, remembered one particularly ferocious debate when an ill-informed official fled the staff meeting in tears and consequently offered his resignation - which was accepted. Sargent Shriver snubbed Bill Kelly for two weeks after they had argued furiously over the validity of a proposed contractual agreement with the University of Notre Dame. Yet, even the Director himself was not above censure. In September 1961, Josephson rebuked Shriver and John Corcoran, Associate Director for Management, for drawing up an organisation chart without prior consultation with the rest of the senior staff. "As I have said to you before," Josephson scolded Shriver, "a substantial amount of the anxiety that reigns around here from time to time stems from bilateral dealings with you on matters of multilateral concern." Josephson advised the Director to think again.

The fierce competitive element was extended to the Regional Chiefs and country Reps in their quest for the best available Volunteers and resources. Thomas Quimby, Peace Corps Rep in Liberia, admitted "stealing" twelve of the best Volunteers from Harris Wofford's Ethiopia consignment, while Don Romine, an assistant to Wofford, recalled taking a leading Selection officer to dinner in order to "persuade" him to add more Volunteers to his project. Indeed, one of the most disliked men in the
entire Peace Corps organisation was the somewhat eccentric, but ruthlessly scrupulous John Alexander, a Regional Chief of the Africa Division, who also headed P.D.O.'s Coordination section; that is, he had the crucial power to either approve a proposed programme or quash it as unfeasible. The meetings over which he presided were known, in Peace Corps parlance, as "the murder boards" - an indication of the seriousness with which these decisions were regarded.

By the end of 1963, Charles Houston had become so embittered at the continual internecine fighting, he complained to Bill Moyers that "Allegiance, dedication and relation to the Peace Corps as a warm, living entity now seems rare." As Houston saw it, there was too much in-fighting and petty possessiveness with its concomitant "back-biting, rumor-mongering, petty jealousies and unproductive competitiveness to out-do, give a black eye to, or put in its place another office, division or employee." Houston came to the conclusion that "team work and team spirit have become pretty rare commodities." However, if the ferocious in-fighting caused casualties - personal and organisational - it also produced victors. Warren Wiggins's Office of P.D.O. won one bureaucratic battle after another and in so doing, gained for itself a prized place at the very centre of the Peace Corps organisation. It had most staff (forty-six out of the first one hundred members), was highly-disciplined, manned by "insiders" - mostly foreign aid experts - and led by the extraordinarily able Wiggins. From the very outset, the bureaucrats - Wiggins and Josephson outstanding - had made an indelible mark on the Peace Corps. They had drafted the Towering Task and they had been mainly responsible for the winning of independence in Shriver's absence. Shriver was impressed not only by their intelligence and idealism but also by their eminent ability to weave their way through the labyrinthine passage of the Federal bureaucracy. They were tough and wily in-fighters who relished a challenge and whose force of opinion had to be reckoned with on any major issue. Though Shriver often fulminated against "bureaucratic
nonsense", he appreciated that he himself had little knowledge of how
to get things done in Washington and would need to rely on experienced
administrators; that they were of the calibre of Wiggins, Josephson
and Kelly was a bonus.

In charge of programmes and development Wiggins held, next to
Shriver, the most important single position in the Peace Corps. P.D.O.
negotiated and established projects with host governments, determined
numbers and skills of the Volunteers that could be used effectively,
supervised co-ordination with the State Department, A.I.D., and other
U.S. government agencies, and maintained internal balance and control of
projects - particularly with reference to Volunteers and funds available.
When other Peace Corps offices and divisions wanted something, sooner or
later they had to go through P.D.O. - and Warren Wiggins was a very
difficult man to defeat. He was insistent that the Peace Corps should
have total control over its own destiny and in one of the earliest major
battles within the new agency he made certain that this would be so.
Well aware that most universities were slow-moving, distant and more
interested in research and publication than social and political action,
Wiggins sensed it would be disastrous to allow them control of the Peace
Corps' overseas programme. He was equally sceptical of the capabilities
of private agencies whose experience was limited to small projects. Of
course, Wiggins realised that educational institutions and private
organisations would be helpful on the domestic side of the operation -
especially in training Volunteers. However, overseas, Wiggins wanted
the Peace Corps to be the master of its own fate - "even to the extent
of personal approval by Director Shriver of University and Private Agency
personnel abroad with Peace Corps responsibilities."

The Towering Task had not attempted to deal with the issue of
whether programmes should be direct or contract administered, let alone
how bureaucratic responsibility for them should be assigned. However,
the Report To The President of February 1961, had been quite clear: the
Peace Corps would directly administer projects only in highly unusual circumstances when reasons of "complexity or novelty or urgency" forestalled administration by private agencies, educational institutions, international organisations or other U.S. government agencies. "As a high educational venture," Sargent Shriver advised Kennedy, "its proper carriers are our traditional institutions of higher education." The first very rough, hand-drawn organisation chart reflected this intention by allocating equal power divisions to private voluntary agencies, universities and P.D.O. Yet, by the end of 1961, a much revised chart clearly indicated that the lion's share of programming would be done directly by P.D.O., which had been made into a major Office, whilst Private Agencies, Universities and International Organisations remained as mere Divisions. (APPENDIX VII). By 1963, the further amended chart showed that the three Divisions of Private Agencies, Universities and International Organisations had been merged into a single unit, indicating their significant loss of both power and status. (APPENDIX VII). Thus, in the foundational struggle for control over Peace Corps projects, the private sector had been defeated by the Office of P.D.O. In February 1964, during an executive session of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Bill Josephson confirmed what had been common knowledge within the Peace Corps since the summer of 1961 - "Most Peace Corps projects are directly administered by the Peace Corps."

Behind Josephson's terse statement lay the history of the most bitter bureaucratic battle fought within the Peace Corps: the struggle for control over programmes between P.D.O. and the division of Private, University and International Relations.

The Hayes, Millikan and Albertson reports had all recommended that the Peace Corps would best operate as a decentralised organisation - like the National Science Foundation - operating its programmes through selected private agencies and educational institutions. It was thought that the Peace Corps would greatly benefit from the skill and experience of the
private sector in voluntary service overseas and from the public support which these bodies would bring with them. It was also hoped that by extensive use of the machinery already available through private means, the Peace Corps would manage to avoid the administrative elephantiasis which beset most other government bureaus. On March 8, 1961, Gordon Boyce, Chief of the Division of Private Organisations, told Sargent Shriver that there was little doubt that "with appropriate support, private agencies can bring to the Peace Corps a vigor and vitality whose equal will be hard to find. Their resources are deep, their contracts broad, their programs far-flung." Richard Ottinger also argued that universities and private agencies should be given the power necessary to administer projects and thus "identify institutional programs primarily with the institution rather than with the Peace Corps." Professor Carroll Wilson of M.I.T., working in the Division of University Relations, called for a "sister relationship" between academic institutions and the Peace Corps.  

Publicly at least, the Peace Corps always paid homage to this notion of full cooperation with the private sector. Indeed, President Kennedy spoke of the "trained men and women to be sent overseas....by private institutions and organisations" when he established the Peace Corps. On March 24, 1961, during the hearing on the proposed nomination of the Director of the Peace Corps, Sargent Shriver was asked by Senator Fulbright how the Peace Corps intended to administer its programmes; significantly, Shriver put "direct administration" at the bottom of a list which laid emphasis on private organisations, educational institutions, government agencies and the U.N.O. In April 1961, Shriver stated that the Peace Corps wanted to "help, not replace private agencies which are doing an excellent job in this field." A few months later he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he hoped to utilise American universities and private voluntary agencies "to the maximum." Thus, the American public and the Congress were constantly reassured by official Peace Corps pronouncements that "the Peace Corps will give
preference to the administration of projects by qualified private organizations which are interested, available and acceptable to the host country." In 1961, this proved a persuasive political tactic, particularly on Capitol Hill. During congressional hearings Sargent Shriver brought forward witnesses from private organizations who testified in favour of the Peace Corps. He also argued that the Peace Corps' partnership with business, industry and agriculture would open doors to millions of Americans. Thus, tremendous public pressure was brought to bear on conservative congressmen. Walter Judd, a ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee admitted that he voted for the Peace Corps because "all my life I have been an admirer of the 4-H movement with whom you are contracting."

However, despite the Peace Corps' continual public statements about a "broad and valuable" relationship with the private sector, the minutes of one of the very first Director's Staff Meetings on March 30, 1961, revealed that Shriver had told administrators to concentrate their initial efforts on programmes where "the direct Peace Corps label and image is engaged." This order set a pattern for the administration of Peace Corps projects which was never reversed. There were many reasons why an equal programming partnership between the Peace Corps and the private sector was never fully realised. A crippling factor was that, since most of the major private voluntary agencies were religious-based, the Peace Corps could not afford to become involved with them. Any infringement of the First Amendment would have had disastrous political consequences for the Peace Corps at this early stage. Besides, in March, 1961, speed was the dominant consideration. To make an impact on the Congress and the public, Shriver simply had to get programmes into the field quickly; and speed was not a characteristic normally associated with either private organisations or academic institutions. Wiggins, Josephson, Kelly and others who had experience of government dealings with the private sector advised Shriver that if he handed control over to academic "perfectionists"
it could well take a very long time before a Peace Corps Volunteer ever got into the field. As Harris Wofford explained it:

"The great semi-autonomous bodies....the Red Cross and things like that....don't have a lot of sex appeal in terms of a very fast moving operation. He (Shriver) put enormous weight on speed and the more he saw of the complaints about the State Department and A.I.D, particularly - how long it takes in their pipeline to get anything done; how, in many projects, the time for them has passed by the time the experts and the money arrive - he was determined that in a few months we'd be able to produce Volunteers to fill jobs that took fourteen months in the old agencies."46

Another problem, as Bill Josephson noted, was that administrators found it exceedingly difficult to find private organisations willing to make a wholehearted commitment to a Peace Corps project. They wanted to help with some part of the overseas administration but rarely with it all. Naturally, the Peace Corps was reluctant to split up programmes in this way. Furthermore, as Sargent Shriver told his staff, the Peace Corps intended to go to Third World countries where the United States had "not yet succeeded in making a significant social, economic or political impression." In many cases, outside organisations had little expertise in these areas; hence it seemed more practical to let the Peace Corps discover for itself the problems of establishing programmes in these countries.

Now the least contributing factor to the frail relationship between the Peace Corps and the private sector was Warren Wiggins's sceptical attitude. During his years with the International Cooperation Administration he had seen the Federal government taken advantage of ("screwed" was how he put it) by both private organisations and academic institutions. Wiggins claimed that in too many cases the private sector had been awarded huge grants by the government only to produce sloppy and inefficient programmes overseas. He was absolutely determined that this should not happen to the Peace Corps. Indeed, such was his feeling on this matter, that it was rumoured Wiggins had told Shriver he would resign unless the Peace Corps was equipped with its own central core programming unit which could fight against the poor administration of
Peace Corps projects by outside bodies. Bill Kelly strongly supported
Wiggins on this issue. Accordingly, as Director of Contracts and
Logistics, he proposed that the Peace Corps should not give "grants"
to private organisations but rather should make "contracts." To Kelly -
who during his time at N.A.S.A. had also seen the government "screwed"
by private and academic institutions - this difference in bargaining
method was all-important. In later years he recalled that his thinking
had been: "Grants do not demand performance, contracts do."

Shriver agreed to both the Wiggins and the Kelly proposals; all his
administrative instincts inclined towards executive control. Thus, he gave
Wiggins and his experienced "insiders" in P.D.O. the potential to become
the boiler-room of the Peace Corps. They seized their opportunity.
Shriver did not intend to emasculate the valuable contribution of the
private sector - indeed he was well aware that he depended upon it for
the selection and training functions - but equally, he did not want to
relinquish the supreme power over the administration of overseas projects.
Harris Wofford summed up Shriver's thinking on this matter: "If it had
been parcelled out, granted the habits of higher education, the like­
lihood is that you would have had little pieces of it run by different
departments and they'd cut up the pie. It would have been awful."

To a great extent then, the programming relationship between the
Peace Corps and outside organisations was settled very early. To be
precise, Interim Policy Directive 2.1 made the Associate Director of
P.D.C. (Wiggins) responsible "for the overseas administration of all
projects and the coordination and balance of the Peace Corps program." Shriver
signed this in June 1961 - before all but the first five or so Peace
Corps projects had been approved for implementation. After this
directive, Gordon Boyce and Al Sims, the respective Chiefs of Private
Agency and University Relations, who had been with Shriver since the
very first task force meeting on the Peace Corps, resigned. They
complained bitterly that the life-line to the private sector had been
Their resignations were the visible outcome of a ferocious bureaucratic battle between the "insiders" led by Wiggins and the "outsiders" led by Boyce and Sims over the issue of who should control Peace Corps programmes. The "outsiders" lost. In a bitter memorandum - written before he left - Boyce warned Shriver that more power would have to be given to the private agencies and universities if he wanted to avoid P.D.O.'s victory leading to the Peace Corps becoming "impaled upon the thorns of bureaucratic necessity."

However, although P.D.O. gained the upper hand at the outset, Shriver consistently encouraged the private sector to participate more fully in Peace Corps projects. Certainly this was a sound political stratagem. A congressman would be much more likely to give his vote to the Peace Corps if it had a contract with one of his constituency's colleges, universities or private agencies. The press also liked to see the Peace Corps acting responsibly by working hand-in-hand with experienced, non-profit making overseas organisations. An editorial in the New York Times in June 1961, argued that the Peace Corps' proposed collaboration with the Cooperative For American Relief Everywhere (C.A.R.E.) in Columbia was a wise way of avoiding mistakes. Yet, political considerations notwithstanding, Shriver's personal administrative style also led him to constantly encourage competition from the private sector over Peace Corps projects. Hence, he made countless speeches to academic institutions urging them to help in working out "this new marriage between government and education." In a memorandum to Peace Corps staff on January 9, 1963, Shriver pointed out that private organisations should be invited - whenever possible - to share their experience and acumen, and to strengthen the Peace Corps' recruitment drive and its links to the American public. Jack Young confirmed Shriver's early commitment to a cooperative relationship with the private agencies:
"I agreed with Sarge Shriver's view of the roles of Universities and private agencies. Whatever we were trying to do, these groups knew more about it and had much more experience than anybody in the public service at that time. They had performed all the functions at one time or another... You always have to build new organizations from the current knowledge of what others have done or are doing that is similar."53

Indeed, it was with the express intention of giving more bureaucratic muscle to the private sector that Shriver merged together the three divisions - Private, University and International - in 1963. There was no question of his ignoring them. Between 1961 and 1963 he had seen that they were not strong enough to compete with P.D.O. on their own, so he pooled their resources in the hope of buttressing their collective position.

Even so, P.D.O. remained in the ascendant. With its tough "insiders" it was in a better position to win projects than the "outsiders" from private agencies or academia. Wiggins and his men jealously guarded what they considered to be "their" Peace Corps and to an extent, they resented the intruders from the private sector. Wiggins was the master of getting the right memorandum to the right man at the right time and - in the bureaucratic battling over projects - the private bodies had no one to match him. Yet, if P.D.O. had the edge when it came to bureaucratic intrigue and caballing, it also had the edge in consistently producing the best projects and ultimately, that was what mattered to Sargent Shriver. Certainly, in the first year of the Peace Corps, Wiggins used the private agencies and the universities to plug gaps in his own programming machinery or to enable the Peace Corps to begin a project right away— for example, the C.A.R.E. rural development project in Colombia, or the University of Notre Dame rural community action in Chile. But simultaneously, he skilfully constructed the Office of P.D.O. as the hub of Peace Corps projects around which all else would revolve.

One of the first programmes contracted to the private sector was the University of Notre Dame's rural action project in Chile in June, 1961. However, Bill Kelly recalled that it was very expensive, badly trained and poorly planned; as such, it set a very important precedent. It
proved to be an exceedingly complicated process to coordinate plans and actions between Peace Corps/Washington and the University of Notre Dame. Misunderstandings led to delay and incompetence. This experience scared the professionals in the Peace Corps and made them reluctant to contract out the administration of future programmes to "outsiders." As Thomas Scott, a former Director of the Division of Private and International Organisations admitted, "all too often, failures on the part of the contractors justified and strengthened the voice of the opposition on the staff." On the other hand, P.D.O. could be guilty of bloody-mindedness and on occasion the good work done by the private sector was overlooked - for example, the C.A.R.E./Peace Corps project in Colombia or the Y.M.C.A./Peace Corps project in Venezuela - and its mistakes emphasised. In the early years, blunders were plentiful both in those programmes which the Peace Corps administered itself and in those it contracted out. But because of P.D.O.'s defensiveness and possessiveness they tended to forgive the failings of their own men in the field as "normal problems of cross-cultural adjustment." However, when the same problem affected the Contract Representative Overseas (C.O.R.), then the fault lay indubitably with the inefficiency of "those damn private organizations." As Scott put it, "The private agencies would make the same mistakes as the Peace Corps, learn the same lessons, but not get the same chances to try again." 

A fundamental difficulty was "identity." Shriver and Higgins feared that in a programme administered by a private organisation Volunteers would be confused as to whether they were working for the Peace Corps or for an outside body - especially in programmes in which both participated. In July, 1961, Bill Haddad reported to Shriver that some Volunteers in training felt uneasy that they were being "tied up with C.A.R.E. rather than the Peace Corps." Bill Kelly also complained that educational institutions and private agencies were getting in the way of Volunteers' loyalty to the Peace Corps. Furthermore, he argued that the partnership was adding nothing to Peace Corps programmes except duplication, red tape and
On another occasion, Kelly became furious when he discovered that, instead of the standard Peace Corps jeeps, a couple of Harvard professors on contract as advisers in Nigeria, had bought brand new Mercedes-Benz cars as their in-country transportation and charged them to the Peace Corps. This type of action hardly endeared the academic community to the "insiders".

The private sector continued to battle gamely with P.D.O. throughout the Kennedy era; but even at the peak period of their involvement in 1963, only sixteen private organisations — including C.A.R.E., Heifer Project Inc., the 4-H Club Foundation, the National Farm Union and the American Association For Health, Physical Education and Recreation — had programming contracts with the Peace Corps. Although these helped administer some thirty projects in twenty-one countries, their participation was usually peripheral — in the form of C.O.R.'s or specialist advisers — and only covered 20 per cent of Volunteers in the field. The University Division, with its vast potential of hundreds of eager educational institutions, provided a mere thirteen colleges and universities as contractors in sixteen programmes. They administered barely 10 per cent of all Volunteers. Also, contracts with international organisations were negligible; although there were exceptions like the programme in Pakistan jointly administered by the Food and Agricultural Organisation.

Some Peace Corps staffers vainly attempted to restore the initially intended balance. Harris Wofford recalled having a "running argument" on that for five years. I favored giving more power to the Universities."

Rogers Finch was one in a long line of Chiefs of University Relations who resigned after a sharp disagreement with Shriver about the role of educational institutions in the Peace Corps. Franklin Williams, first Chief of the Division of Private Agency Relations and later head of the merged Division of Private, University and International Organisations, was probably the most vociferous champion of the private sector's cause. In a memorandum of May 1962, he argued that the Peace Corps should become
more international through a deeper involvement with the United Nations and foreign private organisations. In a terse, hand-written note in the margin, Shriver vetoed this proposal: "Let's get our own private organizations fully developed before we put in much time on these 'triple cross bucks'. We need to play straight football - block, tackle, and run. Leave the fancy stuff to others." In a volatile staff meeting in December 1962, Williams again challenged Shriver to implement the Peace Corps' publicly-stated "policy of preference" for the university and private agencies programmes. Again Shriver retorted, "We have a policy of preference for agencies with professional qualifications. We do not just bring in agencies or universities to add something to projects if that something is merely sharing the administrative load. I have often said that it is insulting to have University professors overseas simply to perform administration chores." Shriver was unwilling to be tied to the theory of a Peace Corps relationship with the private sector if, in practice, it did not prove efficient, practical and economic. "Just show me dollars and results," he told Bill Kelly. As early as January 8, 1962, Sargent Shriver admitted to the New York Times that the role of private organisations in the Peace Corps had been "less than expected." From the beginning, Wiggins, Josephson, Kelly and indeed Shriver himself, had been convinced that the Peace Corps would operate faster, cheaper and more efficiently if it directed its own programmes. This did not preclude the participation of private organisations, but it assigned to them a much lesser role than they had at first anticipated. Their disappointment was deep. As far as Thomas Scott was concerned, the programming relationship between the Peace Corps and the private sector could only be characterised as the downright "failure of a partnership."

P.D.O.'s victory left it as the powerful nucleus of the Peace Corps. Thus, somewhat ironically, it was around Wiggins's P.D.O. - in many ways the most tightly-disciplined and most bureaucratic single unit within the Peace Corps - that the agency which prided itself in being "unbureaucratic"
revolved. However, although P.D.O. won the battle over programming, the Peace Corps contracted out, between 1961 and 1964 an average of 30 per cent of its appropriations to the private sector for selection, training and professional support services. The Peace Corps' cooperation with the private sector, though nowhere near as broad as had been envisioned in the Report To The President, was still much wider than any other Federal agency. Virtually all selection and training of Volunteers was carried out by educational institutions, particularly colleges. This was an extremely important role which they managed very successfully. Thus, in an extraordinary gesture of openness, the Peace Corps allowed its final product - the Volunteer - to be chosen by "outsiders."

The great need for speed had forced the Peace Corps and private institutions together; yet, despite a relationship which was sometimes stormy, the marriage was fertile and mixed parentage added richness and flavour to its progeny. In the first four years, over four hundred and fifty Peace Corps projects were prepared at eighty-six educational institution representing thirty-two states; nearly five thousand regular and special faculty members participated in various ways and over thirty private organisations helped with training and overseas support. Since 80 per cent of Volunteers came from universities or colleges, the Peace Corps claimed it had made over eight thousand "associations" with outside bodies. Psychologists, educationalists, linguists, overseas representatives and other experts were hired on a consultative basis. The agricultural, business, philanthropic and industrial sectors all participated in the Peace Corps by providing advice, equipment or manpower. For example, on July 24, 1962, Sargent Shriver reported to President Kennedy on the "significant help" and "high degree of cooperation" which the Peace Corps was receiving from the private sector - including I.B.M., the National Advertising Council, Caterpillar Tractors and American Telegraph and Telephone.

This relationship with outside bodies was of profound significance
in the character development of the Peace Corps organisation. By extending and sharing its responsibilities, the Peace Corps became more like a federation of different entities rather than one monolithic government institution. Indeed, the only functions which remained the sole domain of Peace Corps/Washington were overseas programming, budgeting, general policy-making, invitations to training and contracts with foreign governments. All others were contracted out, giving the maximum number of people - from all walks of life - the opportunity to participate in the Peace Corps at some level. This established for the Peace Corps, a strong domestic constituency which had its roots in the pluralism of American life. Also, it obviated the need for the Peace Corps to hire and train a huge technical staff of its own. In theory, if not often in practice, it was possible for a Volunteer to go through his service without meeting a directly-employed Peace Corps official.

This great potential for diversity within the agency reinforced the truisim of not one Peace Corps, but many. Different agencies and different personalities had their own distinctive methods for any given project or situation. This continuous leasing of power meant that few procedures ever became routine; there was always a different way of doing things, always room for debate. In other words, the "extended organisation" - as it came to be called in Peace Corps circles - ensured the provision of the essential ingredients which Shriver had desired for his "different" government organisation: flexibility, vitality and, most of all, non-bureaucracy.

In leading the Peace Corps, Shriver placed little value on theoretical principles or traditional modes of bureaucratic behaviour; each issue was approached on its merits with only one pre-eminent question - will it work? Since, as Shriver said, the Peace Corps was setting out "to do what no government agency had ever done before," there were few rules or precedents to be applied. Gerald Bush, a training Coordinator, recalled that in any staff controversy, "the worst
possible argument that could be made was that the Department of State did it that way. The second weakest argument that could be made was that it had been done that way before. The strongest argument was that it had never been done before and let's try it.

The complete lack of an institutional history often meant that decisions had to be made in totally unforeseen circumstances, and sometimes with little time for great discussion. For this reason, Shriver usually made Peace Corps policy as he went along, on an ad hoc basis. The staff nicknamed his policy-decisions "Shriverisms." An in-house joke was that whatever Shriver said to the New York Times or on Meet The Press had to be carefully monitored - lest he should make a policy while answering a reporter's question, without telling his associates.

Shriver's only rule was that all policies should be flexible enough to allow for any possible contingency. Hence, every Peace Corps policy directive was entitled "interim" - denoting that it could be changed if necessary. Bill Josephson, who devised this nomenclature, explained that the quality they were trying to capture in their procedure was that Peace Corps policy was not immutable. "It was not a substitute for thought," said Josephson. Since the Peace Corps was dealing with thousands of Volunteers all working in diverse circumstances and subject to the vagaries of their particular locale, this elasticity in policy-making was essential. "A routine application of policy to issues raised by Volunteers," argued Josephson, "would have killed the Peace Corps." Like Shriver, Josephson was committed to flexibility whenever possible. When the Management Division argued that the Peace Corps should have an Instruction Manual in line with other government agencies, Josephson prevailed upon Shriver that the Peace Corps must avoid writing a rule-book. "I knew from my experience in I.C.A.," he said, "the stultifying impact on the program that would have." Josephson's argument was successful and, under Shriver, the Peace Corps never printed a policy manual. The closest approximation was a Peace Corps Representative's Handbook. Collated by Josephson and printed for internal consumption.
only, it was a miscellany of documents containing what he termed "bits of written policy" - an important letter, a telling memorandum or sometimes just a telegram. Its purpose was to provide a little guidance for Representatives abroad. As Josephson described it, "it didn't tell you the way the government manuals usually do, to take Form 23, and fill in this block, and so on. It told you things that were there really to make you think."

Out of necessity then, as much as desire, official Peace Corps policy guidelines were flexible and, according to Shriver, "carefully evaluated in each country." Since circumstances could vary greatly from one programme to another or from one Volunteer to another, there had to be sufficient scope for individual initiative and adaptability. This was never better illustrated than when a coup d'état in the Dominican Republic left the Peace Corps in the position of dealing with a government not officially recognised by the United States. After sending a cable to Washington, the Rep maintained normal Peace Corps relations; he adjudged that the Volunteers could continue their work without danger to their lives and without becoming politically involved. Later when the United States recognised the new government, Shriver commended the Rep for his performance: "You were there, we weren't and we were relying on you." In an illuminating conclusion Shriver emphasised, "We don't want global policies that may not apply in a particular situation." Peace Corps Interim Policy Directive 4.6 stated that it was the job of the Rep to "provide imagination and ingenuity necessary to retain the freshness and uniqueness of the Peace Corps and keep its objectives clear and its organization appropriately modest."

When Charles Houston, Peace Corps Rep in New Delhi wrote to headquarters in Washington with an organisational problem, Bill Josephson's reply was indicative of the unique philosophy at the base of the Peace Corps: "in response to your question as to whether you are being 'sufficiently bureaucratic', as you know, the general approach is to
discourage this whenever, wherever, however possible." This attitude went a long way to explain Harris Wofford's description of the Peace Corps as "an antibureaucratic bureaucracy...an agency of programmed diversity, programmed uncertainty, sufficient unpredictability- just going to the threshold of chaos but not quite reaching it!" Even the office of P.D.O. which - outwith Management was probably the most bureaucratic arm of the Peace Corps - was subject to the stricture of its Chief, Warren Wiggins, that "policy and programming directives particularly should allow for flexibility." Wiggins made it clear that he wished transmitted "only those directives which are absolutely necessary."

Although an experienced administrator, Wiggins could in no way be described as a traditional organisation man. "I would like to pass on to you the Director's advice," he told his staff in 1964, "that paper never won a war."

Ironically, on paper, the Peace Corps had the appearance of any other line-and-staff government bureaucracy with the normal functions of recruitment, budget, personnel and so forth. Even the bureaucratese used to describe its product - "middle-level manpower" - had the ring of a traditional government agency. In early 1961, some feared that this would, in fact, become the case. John Kenneth Galbraith noted in his diary:

"I am dissatisfied with the way the Peace Corps is being handled. It should be an amateur enterprise led by dedicated individuals who live at or near the economic level of those recruited...I fear it will pass under the direction of high-salaried bureaucrats who will inculcate the Volunteers with their attitudes."77

Galbraith and other sceptics did not take into account the extraordinary determination of Shriver, Wofford, Wiggins, Moyers, Josephson and others to make the Peace Corps a truly "different" type of organisation. "We can't have any negative, efficient bureaucrats here," Bill Hadded told Shriver in a memorandum of May 1961, "no cynics allowed!" Shriver's administrators were very conscious of how Point Four - at one time a
bold new programme - had become ossified; they were intent that such bureaucratic dinosaurism would not overtake the Peace Corps. "Working with the Peace Corps," Shriver told his new staff, "should not be exactly like working with another government agency. We have a special mission which can only be accomplished if everyone believes in it and works for it in a manner consistent with the ideals of service and volunteerism."

The first priority was to keep administrative staff to a minimum. Warren Wiggins informed Dean Rusk on May 3, 1961, that "the Peace Corps does not wish to have a large administrative staff of its own." All Peace Corps officials were very conscious of Shriver's desire to keep down the administrative apparatus. Bill Moyers wrote Shriver a memorandum on "How To Keep The Punch In The Peace Corps" in which he compared the agency to a "trim ship" with no frills or extravagances. On March 5, 1961, there were 101 people working at Peace Corps headquarters and no Volunteers in the field. After three years - and the development of a government agency - there were 647 staffers in Washington with a further 365 in training camps or in overseas posts. There were also over 7000 Volunteers in training or in the field. Yet, despite this necessary expansion, Warren Wiggins maintained that "the sense of smallness was retained." Between 1961 and 1964, there was an average of 10 Volunteers in the field for every administrative person in support - clerks, typists and overseas staff included. Shriver was always quite proud to compare the figure of his trim ship to the Federal government's average of one person in Washington to every four abroad.

The Peace Corps' disdain of bureaucratic procedure led to some friction with the more traditional agencies. For instance, the Bureau of the Budget and the Executive Office frequently requested the Peace Corps' projections for the next few years - quite a legitimate inquiry from their standpoint since, acting as bureaucratic mechanisms of control, they wanted to make long-term estimates based on size. However, for the Peace Corps, the question was absurd. Under Shriver, the agency lurched
spasmodically from day to day, increasing or decreasing staff as the situation demanded. Bradley Patterson recalled Shriver's reaction when a Budget officer asked him to make a long-term estimation: "I remember Shriver almost started laughing at him. He said, 'Look, it's a very legitimate question, but how the hell do I know where we're going to be in five years?" Indeed, Patterson concluded, "we hardly knew where the next day was coming from." While this sometimes caused disorder and untidiness, the Peace Corps' philosophy of cutting its cloth to suit its needs ensured that bureaucratic growth per se never became a goal.

The informal, personal atmosphere within the Peace Corps organisation was another safeguard against the norm of bureaucratic atrophy. Since it dealt directly with people, it was important that the Peace Corps should not become an impersonal machine. "Our interest is the individual" said Wiggins. Thus there was a particular effort to maintain relations between Peace Corps/Washington and the Volunteers in the field on a plane more personal than institutional. The Division of Volunteer Field Support established this direct link by setting up Volunteer conferences, visiting and listening to the Volunteers, helping them settle back home and by publishing a monthly newspaper The Volunteer. "In general," recalled Padraic Kennedy, Chief of this Division, "we attempted to treat the Volunteer as a human being rather than a number." A book was published - Who's Who In Peace Corps/Washington - to make the "faceless bureaucrats" at headquarters more familiar to the Volunteers overseas. Volunteers were encouraged to send letters to Washington - which they did in abundance - and Peace Corps Reps to send tapes or letters. Shriver was always made sure these were answered. Indeed, the Peace Corps' ubiquitous Director was the consummate exponent of the personal touch. He personally said yea or nay on every major decision, he personally interviewed every candidate for an upper-echelon post. Newell Flather, a Harvard graduate, decided in the spring of 1961 to volunteer for the Peace Corps. When he telephoned Washington to ask for an application form he was absolutely astounded
to find himself talking not to a clerk or a secretary but to Sargent Shriver himself.

Although Wiggins was in charge of P.D.O., Moyers of Public Affairs, Josephson of General Counsel and so forth, Shriver deliberately left it unclear where one office's jurisdiction ended and another's began. This vague delegation of authority provided the essence of the Peace Corps' anti-bureaucratic character. For, especially as there were so many enthusiastic generalists in the new agency, it became inevitable that almost every important idea or issue transcended bureaucratic compartmentalisation. As Bill Kelly recalled, "It was open house on all issues and everyone was fair game." During a staff meeting in 1963, Bob Gale of P.D.O. criticised the methods of the Recruitment Division. However, instead of rebuking him for commenting on something which he knew little about, Shriver gave him the job of Chief of Recruitment and ordered him to do better. Even in the first organisation chart, nomenclature had not been downgraded; everyone was a Director or a Chief - thus avoiding a rigid sense of hierarchy. As Gerald Bush explained it, "In this type of organization, vertical and lateral communication was relatively free and unencumbered by divisional lines. The structure of the organisation was loose, fragmented, and duplicative."

Shriver did not worry about the duplication which this vagueness sometimes caused - so long as the job was done efficiently - and the constant debate and argument which it fuelled was consonant with his style of leadership. He never had fewer than thirty-five members of his senior staff at their meetings on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and everyone in the Peace Corps from Volunteers to secretaries was invited to the general meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays. He assigned problem issues to committees made up from representatives of various Divisions. This kept debate open and gave each sector of the Peace Corps an equal opportunity to state its opinion. The Peace Corps was in fact administered more by these ad hoc, "task force"
committees than by the Offices and Divisions shown on the organisation charts. Those who like to think of themselves as purists or theorists soon foundered; the only means of survival were originality, adaptability, and knowledgeable argument. In this respect, as Bush argued, "The Peace Corps consistently asserted the opposite of the orthodox view of administration... a conflict and consensus type of bureaucracy."\(^{89}\)

In characterising the Peace Corps organisation, Warren Wiggins used the words "flexibility", "imagination" and "constructive conflict". He noted that, "some on the outside characterise the Peace Corps as just a bit of madness"; and, he concluded, "from time to time, we who work on the inside find that a correct characterisation." Sargent Shriver described the position in the early days: "We knew the Peace Corps would have only one chance to work. As with the parachute jumper, the chute had to open first time."\(^{90}\)

This explained the unconventional manner in which the Peace Corps approached its many problems of organisation. Shriver savoured the opportunity to create something new and he and the majority of his staff shared an iconoclastic attitude towards established procedure. Risk-taking was openly encouraged. "We do not rely upon the rule-book," Wiggins told his staff, "but the exceptional privileges granted by the rule-book." Gerald Bush recalled being ordered to "operate fast and stay legal, but if something goes wrong - just operate fast." George Carter, first Rep in Ghana described the Peace Corps as "an environment of institutionalised uncertainty." Shriver was determined that the Peace Corps would be an open organisation; indeed, as Warren Wiggins put it, "an open society of open personalities."\(^{91}\) He had no time for the timid proposal or the bureaucratically-inhibited response. He demanded boldness and intellectual daring. "There will be little tolerance of a 'tomorrow'
philosophy," Shriver wrote, or "an 'it can't be done because it hasn't been done before' attitude." The Peace Corps welcomed the "different." 92

Shriver was fond of claiming that the Volunteer had a "24-hour a day job" and he judged his staff by similar criterion. Late hours, weekend work and early-morning phone-calls became the standard fare of Peace Corps staffers. The difference between home and office became indistinguishable for anyone "on board" - the Peace Corps always came first. To encourage officials to identify with Volunteers, it became an unwritten law that everyone - senior staff included - should actually serve in the field at some point. The aim was to prevent a huge gap developing between the officials in Washington and the Volunteers overseas. Thus, Harris Wofford served as a Rep in Ethiopia, Tom Quimby in Liberia, Frank Mankiewicz in Peru and so forth. Of course, Shriver paid as many visits abroad as possible; by the autumn of 1963 he had already visited thirty-six of the forty-four countries where the Peace Corps was present. Attempts were constantly made to avoid the situation where desk-bound bureaucrats planned programmes, unaware of the actual conditions under which the Volunteer had to work.

To keep the organisation on its toes and avoid self-perpetuation, Shriver set up within the Peace Corps, an Evaluation Division. In the words of its first Chief, Charles Peters, its function was "to take an independent, no axe-to-grind look at all aspects of the Peace Corps." As early as April, 1961, Bill Haddad argued for an "Inspector General-type" who could make continuous assessments on the value of Peace Corps work. 93 In other words, evaluation was to be the eyes and ears of the Director.

Charles Peters recalled that his first evaluations were no more than brief, patchy reports on Peace Corps training methods. 94 But soon, a process was devised whereby an individual evaluator or a team
of evaluators - often journalists - went overseas for a two or three-week period, observed the Peace Corps at work, gathered information through intensive interviewing and sent back their analyses to Sargent Shriver. Their reports were readable, journalistic impressions which concentrated on the "living and working" problems faced by Volunteers. Thus, the evaluations dealt with the appropriateness of the Volunteer life-style and living standards, the use of Peace Corps vehicles, contact with Americans from other agencies, the placing of too many Americans in one city, the congregation of Volunteers to the exclusion of host country nationals, vacation, personal adjustment problems, staff inadequacies, host country reactions and the effectiveness of selection and training methods. They were deliberately impressionistic rather than technically detailed and were designed to impart the "mood" of a programme. Nevertheless, they were extremely candid and classified as "Eyes Only" for the Director.

Although the main concern of the evaluators was the Volunteer, every aspect of the organisation was open to criticism; there were no sacred cows. Part of the reasoning behind evaluation was to avoid mistakes or, at least, to discover them before the press did so. Shriver described this as "getting the Time magazine story before Time magazine." However, just as important was his desire to have an insider who performed in a capacity that was not part of the regular functioning structure of the Peace Corps and who could be relatively objective. Shriver dispatched these evaluators all over the globe and urged them to cast a cold eye on all the Peace Corps' activities. He wanted to know what was good, but more importantly, what was weak or inefficient. The good news tended to come to light rather quickly in the press; the bad often remained hidden. "As an evaluator," Peters wrote in a 1963 evaluation report on Brazil, "you feel you have a duty to raise
To guard against the self-congratulatory tendencies certain to arise in even the most enlightened bureaucracies, Shriver often contracted with people who had no government ties—journalists, academics, scientists—to perform evaluations. The hypercritical and sweeping extent of this process was, wrote evaluator Meridan Bennet, "unique in government operations."97

In the early days, Haddad and Peters were sometimes denigrated by their peers as "Shriver's spies." Evaluators paid brief visits to projects, had no scientific methodology and their findings were seen only by Shriver. Some of the more professional bureaucrats claimed that this procedure was highly irregular. Every so often Peace Corps/Washington would rock with the news of the latest scandalous exposé from the field. Country Reps were often dismissed and, after one particularly devastating report on Pakistan, Peters recalled that the entire overseas staff was sacked. Tom Quimby was once moved to write a twenty-page rebuttal to a critical evaluation report on Liberia where he was Rep. "Frankly," he admitted "they made me madder than hell."98 "Misleading" and "false" were a few of the adjectives hurled at Evaluation by Joseph Kauffman, Director of Training. In a memorandum to Bill Moyers in September 1962, he was almost categoric in his denunciation of its role "in visiting training centers, of their reports (which are not always seen), of the low level of analysis, colored language and superficiality." Indeed, the enraged Kauffman said there was "a strong feeling that if the agency has to economize, Planning and Evaluation ought to go first! As presently run, the operation is ineffective at best and an affront to our dignity at the least."99

Certainly, evaluators were irreverent. They cared little for bureaucratic procedure or established reputations. They judged performance by the highest standards and were scathing of even the
slightest incompetence. Returned Volunteers especially relished
the opportunity - as evaluators - to criticise their former bosses.
In later years, Charles Peters admitted that evaluation reports
sometimes showed too much emotion and relied on "gut feelings".
Indeed, at one point in 1962, Peters was positive he was about to
be fired by Shriver because his reports were proving too disruptive.
He recalled the Director being very upset at Evaluation's
"colorful" assessments. However, in the autumn of that year
Shriver made a visit to Africa and sent back a cable to Washington
headquarters which said, in effect, "Tell Peters he was right."
Complaints continued throughout 1961-64, but Shriver never heeded
the calls for Evaluation's destruction; indeed, he said he found
its reports "95 per cent reliable." 100

In time, the Evaluation Division refined its methods and
brought in more sociologists, psychologists and scholars. Yet,
as Bill Haddad pointed out to Shriver in 1963, "It is interesting
to note that the scholars...with all their academic training, still
produce reports not significantly different from those produced by
the newspaper types we have here." 101 Constant self-criticism meant
the loss of many reputations in Peace Corps/Washington. One
evaluation report of a Peace Corps official read: "While he is a
very lovable old gentleman, it has never been clear why this individual
was hired...it would be well not to continue his employment."
Another described a Peace Corps Rep as "too pompous, far too church-
oriented and too formal." His retention was not recommended.

No one in Peace Corps/Washington was more respected than Charles
Peters. He was bright, superbly irreverent and extraordinarily far-
seeing. Time without number, Peters gave Shriver warning of
potential disasters in the field; on every subject, from use of
vehicles to sexual behaviour and political scandal, Peters provided
the Peace Corps hierarchy with the soundest advice. His critical reports and biting memoranda were sometimes hard for administrators to accept; but if it was difficult not to hate Evaluation, it was equally difficult not to like Peters personally. He was convinced that "if the Peace Corps is to get better — and unless we keep trying to make it better it will surely get worse — we must raise our standards." He was a perennial seeker after excellence who, despite friction with his peers, was dubbed by them "the conscience of the Peace Corps."

As well as Evaluation there was also a Research Division. Volunteers were chosen at all stages of training and field work and asked to fill out forms, talk with interviewers and take special tests in a continual effort to improve the selection and training procedures. The Peace Corps often contracted out this type of work to distinguished social scientists and worked in cooperation with researchers and universities in the host country. Completion of Service Conferences for Volunteers were another source of valuable feedback to Washington. At the end of their stint overseas, Volunteers would meet with Peace Corps officials for two or three days to talk and write about their experience. In addition to providing information which helped improve operations, the end-of-term meetings allowed administrators a unique insight into the Peace Corps as it functioned on the ground. As Dr. Joseph Colmen, Chief of Research pointed out, "The Peace Corps would be derelict if it did not take advantage of the kinds of knowledge which is available to it from the Volunteer by getting his first-hand opinion."

These various reflective mechanisms lent credence to Shriver's boast that no one was more critical of the Peace Corps that it was of itself. This self-examining attitude allowed it to escape from the ossification endemic in most government bureaucracies and kept it athletic and vigorous. Even in 1966, Andrew Kopkind of the New
Republic could praise the Peace Corps as "the last, remaining, isolated and beleaguered outpost of the New Frontier. All the other fortresses have fallen to the captains of consensus."  

Based on Shriver and Wofford's talent hunt for capable people to man the Kennedy administration during the transition period, the Peace Corps established its own permanent Talent Search Operation. Bill Haddad was described as Shriver's "vacuum-cleaner for talent in staff positions". In June 1961, he contacted over one hundred individuals and asked for names of "quality" people. By July 27, he had received four hundred names. The Talent Hunt was Shriver's device for ensuring a constant flow of new ideas and first-class personnel to the Peace Corps. Top staff posts were filled on a short-term basis by men on leave of absence from private business, the law, labour unions, universities and industry. The competition for places was intense and only the very highest standard of performance ensured any degree of permanence. Shriver kept the Talent Hunt as part of his own office and if a candidate for a senior staff position made it through the barrage of interviews (which ranged between ten and thirty) then he was always finally confronted by Shriver himself. In this manner Shriver made sure that he knew and approved of his top men. 

In 1963, the first of the returning Volunteers were given administrative positions in Washington. Indeed, in 1962, Bill Haddad argued that the Peace Corps staff should eventually consist entirely of "returnees" and thus make the organisation thoroughly "volunteer" in nature. While Haddad's dream was never fully realised, by the spring of 1965, returned Volunteers numbered 183 out of a total of approximately 1000 Peace Corps staff employees. Of about 700 employees in Washington, 101 were returnees and of the 300 employees overseas, 82 were returnees. Thus ex-Volunteers comprised about 14
per cent of the Washington staff and 27 per cent of the overseas staff. Indeed, by 1965, 33 per cent of all Peace Corps Reps were returned Volunteers. This development added to the process of regeneration within the Peace Corps and formed the seeds of self-revision. The "new wave" of administrators created an amorphous underground in Peace Corps/Washington, got their feet on the rungs of power and became an important force for change and innovation in the bureaucracy.

The Peace Corps' "different" air, its freshness, was best characterised by Shriver's "no-career" philosophy which he had propounded since its inception. In informal, but unmistakeable fashion, Shriver made it clear to all prospective staff that the Peace Corps was a "service" not a "job" and that the standard emoluments of a career in government - tenure, promotion, retirement schemes - did not apply. Shriver wanted to maintain experimentation, creativity and risk; he did not wish to attract "careerist" types. Thus, as Bill Josephson explained, "we almost never made a tenured appointment in the Peace Corps and we resisted all efforts at establishing registers." 109

On March 6, 1963, in a memorandum entitled "In-Up-And-Out - A Plan To Keep The Peace Corps Permanently Young, Creative And Dynamic", Franklin Williams argued that the Peace Corps should formally legislate against careerism:

"Unless we permanently build in some protections, it is inevitable that the Peace Corps, as a number of other unvented federal agencies, will eventually become so bureaucratic, hide-bound, 'know-that-is-the-way-we-did-it-yesterday-is-the-way-it-should-be-done-today' in our attitudes that all the wonderful vigor, originality, flexibility, etc, that we talk about will slowly disappear... This kind of bureaucratic hardening of the arteries can be avoided. The secret is staffing. I propose an 'in-up-and-out' procedure for the Peace Corps." 110

Based on an idea first put forward in December, 1961 by Professor Robert Textor (then a consultant to the Peace Corps), Williams proposed that all Peace Corps personnel should be subject to a
limited tenure period of five years. Other staff members agreed with the Williams thesis that the Peace Corps—in its third year at this point—was in danger of becoming a burgeoning bureaucracy.

Charles Houston put it this strongly to Bill Moyers:

"Names of our own "alphabet divisions" are tumbling from the lips of too many people too often. What 'my division' or 'our people' may say, think or do on any given question or issue has become paramount. I had the strong feeling that far fewer people are still asking what they can do for their country or for the Peace Corps. A growing number seem to be asking what Sarge and the Peace Corps can do for them....I get the impression that new ideas are frequently now screened by a careful analysis of the relative benefits which may accrue to the office or employees considering them....The old spectre which haunts so many government offices, 'it is unprecedented, therefore impossible' is breathing down close."

To investigate these criticisms and Williams's proposed remedy for them, Shriver placed Bill Moyers in charge of a special task force committee "To Keep The Peace Corps Flexible". The committee agreed that the Peace Corps was in need of a guard against careerism, but envisaged a major problem in gaining legislation to restrict the number of years a person might work with the agency. Bill Haddad told Shriver that the forced cut-off date and its concomitant, "administration by rookies", was causing him some concern. Also Shriver had to take into account the inevitable hostility of the Civil Service Commission, the loss of experienced and able people simply through this rotation and the possibility that this controversial piece of legislation might obscure the Peace Corps' more urgent needs in Congress. Despite probable repercussions, Shriver was willing to pay the price necessary to ensure that "new energy, spirit and ideas are constantly injected in the Peace Corps' administration." Thus the long, hard drive for legislation began.

Notwithstanding certain reservations about the wisdom of going all-out for legislation, Shriver's staff threw all their weight behind what they nicknamed the "Five Year Flush". In a memorandum to Myer Feldman, Special Assistant to President Kennedy, Moyers argued that the Peace Corps was "unique" among government agencies:
"Why is it unique? A number of reasons could be offered, but the central reason is that most of its people - now totalling about 7,000 - are Volunteers. Volunteers are a very special breed. Their idealism, the nature of the commitment they have made, their goals all deserve special respect and require special handling... I think Sarge is also concerned to try to create a device which will assure that the Peace Corps will retain its fresh, critical and spirited approach to its business. A five year limitation on employment will guarantee constant turnover and, therefore, constant injection into the Peace Corps of new ideas and energies."¹¹⁴

When Under-Secretary of State George Ball warned Shriver of possible Congressional intransigence, Shriver answered, "Frankly, I think that anything legislated about this organisation is sui-generis almost, even in the minds of Congressmen."¹¹⁵ As predicted, John W. Macy, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission proved an obstacle to legislation. "This approach is so fundamentally in conflict with the concept of the career service", he told Shriver "that I believe, even under the special circumstances of the Peace Corps, that this limitation would constitute inappropriate public policy."¹¹⁶

Thus, 1963 ended with the "Five Year Limitation" legislation, mired in the Congress. It remained so until October 10, 1965. Effective on that day, an amendment to the Peace Corps Act required that no staff member above the grade of GS-9 would be permitted to remain in the organisation's employ longer than five years. Professor Textor claimed that this was "the first time in the history of the American republic that a federal agency has deliberately moved to limit drastically the tenure of its own personnel for the specific purpose of avoiding bureaucratic arteriosclerosis."¹¹⁷ Certainly, it was a turning point in Peace Corps history; the five year law applied to all senior staff. Accordingly, and with characteristic propriety, Sargent Shriver resigned the Peace Corps Directorship on March 1, 1966 - five years to the day since his appointment by President Kennedy.
The enactment of the five year limitation was perhaps the most emphatic symbol of the Peace Corps' anti-bureaucratic tendencies. Indeed, it took enormous satisfaction from being unlike normal government institutions. As Charles Peters put it in June 1963, "In the Peace Corps we pride ourselves on being as unbureaucratic as possible." It disdained civil service regulations; outsiders were invited to participate in its most important functions; staff meetings and controversial issues were open to everyone; there was fluent and regular communication between officials and Volunteers; policy was always flexible; and there were numerous devices for self-criticism. It was true that at the very heart of the organisation there was the disciplined, highly-efficient P.D.O. with its hard-nosed in-fighters. Yet, even Wiggins's bureaucrats were atypical of the kind usually found in government. Besides, within P.D.O. there were constant arguments and differences of opinion. Andrew Kopkind claimed that it was these unique qualities which made the atmosphere in the Peace Corps' offices, "different from any other large bureau in Washington...(it) retains those paradoxes of style and substance which informed the best inventions of the Kennedy years; it is expectant, contradictory, optimistic, innovative and thoroughly frantic."
CHAPTER SEVEN

PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND THE PRESIDENT
"In Washington, we have given much thought to the policies and practices necessary to carry out our unusual program successfully...The basic philosophy of the Peace Corps is one of service."

- SARGENT SHRIVER -

(Memorandum To The Peace Corps Staff, December 1961)
Although semi-autonomous, the Peace Corps organisation did not exist in a vacuum. It was obliged to work with other countries, peoples and agencies. To perform successfully, it needed to establish basic principles, policies and relationships. "It chilled the blood of Shriver and the people who didn't want directives and red tape...and bureaucracy," recalled Bradley Patterson, "but we had to have them."

Patterson, an experienced administrator, realised that no government body could function without laying down necessary rules, regulations and policies. "You had to have some guidance as to who the hell would be a Volunteer," he said, "what their procedures of selection would be, what their standards would be, what the projects would be, whether we would work with religious projects or not." As a fragile, new agency, the Peace Corps also had to work very hard at building fruitful relationships with the more traditional Federal organisations. In early 1961, there was a good deal of scepticism about sending young Americans overseas as "middle-level manpower." The Peace Corps had to overcome the cynics. In this respect, President Kennedy was of inestimable help. More than any other government agency - at home or abroad - his name was associated with the Peace Corps. This relationship with the President was most important. As Harris Wofford shrewdly put it, "In those first years, nobody outside the White House was going to lay a hand on the Peace Corps or Shriver because of his own power and Kennedy's behind him."

On December 15, 1961, in a memorandum to President Kennedy, Sargent Shriver outlined "the policies and practices
necessary to carry out our unusual program successfully."
This unique treatise on Peace Corps "philosophy" was intended not only for Volunteers in the field, but for the overseas and the Washington organisation too. "The basic philosophy of the Peace Corps," wrote Shriver, "is one of service."

Volunteers would be expected to live simply and unostentatiously. "They have a 24-hour a day job," said Shriver, "They receive no pay and accept substantial hazards to their health and even to their safety." Since the overseas staff were the Volunteers' leaders, they also had to "live simply and inconspicuously like the Volunteers, maintaining close and continuous contact and identification with the Volunteers."

Despite difficult living conditions, Shriver warned his colleagues that there would be no special rewards or privileges attached to employment with the Peace Corps. He instructed them that "The Peace Corps is not just a job. There are no 9.00 to 5.00 days in our operation." While Peace Corps rules were flexible and "may not be uniform for all stations," Shriver concluded, "it is urgent that everyone not only understand, but fully accept the basic philosophy of the Peace Corps. There is no place for anyone who disagrees with the goals of service." Although this memorandum was brief and to the point, there was never a clearer, more concise exposition of basic Peace Corps principles. 3

Some rules and regulations concerning Peace Corps service were relatively easily defined. For example, every Volunteer received 75 dollars per month "termination allowance." This accumulated and was paid to the Volunteer in a lump sum - 1800 dollars at the end of his term overseas.
Volunteers were given "leave" at the rate of two and a half days for each month of service. Again, this leave could be accumulated and travel was permitted outside the Volunteer's host country. Volunteers could resign from the Peace Corps at any time; however, to discourage them from just packing up and leaving when they felt like it, Shriver ruled that the Peace Corps would only pay return fares home at the end of two years of service.

Of course, some policy questions were not open to specific or rigid solutions. For instance, in May 1962, General Counsel Bill Delano noted that the controversial issue of Volunteer marriage had "sharply divided the agency." Bill Josephson said "no question has been longer discussed within the Peace Corps." Some hard-line staff members felt that marriage either before or during service should lead to immediate exclusion from the Peace Corps. They feared that the responsibilities of married life would impair the Volunteer's performance in the field. However, in a persuasive memorandum, which became in effect Peace Corps policy, Bill Delano countered this opinion and argued that marriage either to a private American citizen, a host country national or a fellow Volunteer, should not be an irrevocable barrier to Peace Corps service. Delano argued that if deterrence of marriage became firm policy, "then we may be getting the Peace Corps into many more difficult and controversial situations than would otherwise occur." On legal, ethical and practical grounds, he feared the Peace Corps would be charting treacherous waters if an arbitrary judgement was made on this fundamental issue:
"I invite you to put yourself in the situation of a Peace Corps Rep abroad, trying to do a job, probably with too few Volunteers, whose Volunteers are, by and large, very good, mature, dedicated people, telling one of them who comes to him and says he wants to get married to a non-Volunteer that there is a presumption that his marriage is not consistent with continued effective service. And I am not sure that many Congressmen (or women) will understand that point of view either."^5

Delano's arguments prevailed. Interim Policy Directive 3.3 (Policy With Regard To The Selection For Training Or Service Overseas Of Married Volunteers) stated that married couples would be accepted into the Peace Corps and marriages during service would not imply automatic disqualification. As in the vast majority of Peace Corps policies, the main criterion was the practical one - will the Volunteer continue to be as effective after marriage as before? The flexible policy decided each case "should be handled on its own merits." The same question was applied to pregnancy during service: can the mother and father continue effectively as Volunteers after the birth of a child? "Our policy," wrote Shriver in July 1962, "is to decide each situation on a case-by-case basis." A caveat to this was that unmarried female Volunteers who became pregnant would be immediately sent home since the Peace Corps could not be expected to take on the maintenance of the child.^6

Thus, despite Shriver's hatred of rules and regulations, he soon realised that the Peace Corps could not survive without them. After an initial reluctance to keep files and make policy statements, Bradley Paterson recalled "a feverish time of writing directives and guidelines and doing the things that bureaucracies do."^7 On almost every
issue concerning the Volunteer it was necessary for the Peace Corps to have an opinion — even if that opinion was not to be seen as the last word. One policy guideline followed another. There should be a full-field security investigation of all Volunteers conducted either by the Civil Service Commission or, if necessary, the F.B.I. Volunteers were not U.S. diplomatic personnel and therefore should not seek the privileges and immunities customarily enjoyed by such personnel. Only essential equipment should be supplied to Volunteers for their work lest they be regarded as "Santa Clauses with handouts." After one Volunteer in the Philippines was discovered carrying a gun, Shriver demanded that all fire-arms in the Peace Corps' possession be returned to Washington immediately by classified pouch. "The Peace Corps must never even resemble soldiers," he ordered, "the carrying of fire-arms by Volunteers may remind some of colonial repressions." In a letter to Peace Corps Reps on "The Social Behaviour of Volunteers" Shriver laid down guidelines on the eating of food, dress, language, alcohol-intake and use of leisure time. For example, on the matter of dress, Shriver pointed out that all Volunteers should be aware that their "personal appearance can reflect credit or discredit upon them and the Corps." The question of beards (and their association with "beatniks") was a contemporary problem. However, Shriver took a liberal view. "There seems little reason to tell a man who normally wears a neat, regular beard that he should shave it off," he wrote. On the other hand, he warned that "a group of Volunteers who suddenly decide to grow shaggy, semi-ludicrous beards as a lark or evidence of 'roughing it', will bring discredit on the Peace
Corps and make it more difficult for all of us to do the job."^9

Shriver made it clear that he expected every Volunteer to be exemplary in his social behaviour - including his sexual behaviour. There was even a Peace Corps policy on the use of contraception. To avoid an excess of "Peace Corps babies" in Third World countries, some officials argued that Volunteers should be issued with contraceptive devices - in much the same manner as soldiers were supplied by the U.S. army. Shriver ruled this out, arguing that contraception was a private matter:

"In every aspect of creature comfort needs, we have tried to keep the Volunteers as far from the military approach as possible on the theory that we are dealing with intelligent adults who will live closer to their host country nationals if they cope with food, clothing, shelter and travel on an individual basis. I do not think, therefore, that the G.I. 'pro' kit precedent is persuasive in the Peace Corps context."^10

By the end of 1963, policy guidelines for the Volunteer had been set down on everything from health precautions to where they could - and could not - travel during their leave period. After a few Volunteers were discovered to have taken a "holiday" in Paris, the Peace Corps prohibited all journeys to Western Europe. "Volunteers are supposed to learn about the Third World," said Shriver, "not the developed, industrialised Western world."^11 Policies also emerged for organisational procedure. The Peace Corps had its own cable series (TOPEC-PECTO) for the frequent and fast flow of information to and from the field. Access to security classification of certain documents was also deemed necessary since the
Peace Corps dealt with some highly sensitive personnel information. If a staff member appeared at a function, made a speech or wrote an article then he or she could not accept any payment whatsoever.  

In fact by 1963, some staffers and Volunteers were complaining that the Peace Corps was becoming policy-laden and that there were too many attempts at "control." Yet, despite the seeming proliferation of policies, Shriver always emphasised that these should be thought of as flexible guidelines rather than binding laws. Shriver was a firm believer in individual initiative. As he told President Kennedy, "Trust and respect will solve more difficult situations than any directive." Only one Peace Corps policy was written in stone: there should be no religious, racial or sexual discrimination of any kind.

In the summer of 1961, Bill Moyers warned Shriver that the religious question was "an emotional controversy with strong political overtones" which could well affect the Peace Corps. John F. Kennedy's Catholicism was adjudged by Ted Sorensen to have been "the strongest factor against him" in attaining the Presidency. The problem was exacerbated for the Peace Corps by Kennedy's choice of his Catholic brother-in-law as its first Director. Moyers explained that if the Peace Corps contracted with religious voluntary organisations - especially Catholic ones - then the charge of government involvement in religious proselytising would inevitably follow with its concomitant infringement upon the First Amendment. Jack Young recalled that during the first days of the Peace Corps "in the background lurked the problem of separation of Church and State." In an early editorial entitled "A Secular Peace Corps," the New York Times advised the Peace Corps to learn from religious agencies working in the development field but not to finance them:

"No sectarian religious organization should receive financial support, either direct or indirect, from the Corps. For a Federal government agency to give such assistance would be to violate the constitutional separation of church and state, which should be kept sacred - especially in these days when it is being taken far too lightly in the educational field here at home."
By June 1961, the American Jewish Congress and the United Presbyterian Church had forcefully stated their objection to any Peace Corps - church relationship. This raised an acute problem for the Peace Corps' proposed partnership with the private sector in overseas projects. If religious welfare and Mission programmes were excluded from the Peace Corps then relatively few private organisations would be left with which to contract. It was noted that of nearly twenty thousand secular American foundations, only twenty-nine were listed as having overseas projects greater than $10,000 dollars. In terms of voluntary work overseas, the ecclesiastical bodies - Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief, American Friends Service etc. - sponsored the bulk of the programmes. With its projects about to be launched and a bill before the Congress, it was imperative that Shriver should not alienate the support of organised religion. Yet, as Bill Josephson put it, he would have to be very conscious of President Kennedy's "understandable sensitivity in this area." Shriver decided that unless directly challenged on its stance, the Peace Corps should adopt a public policy of silence. Internally however, it was one of the most thoroughly considered issues of 1961. Ted Sorensen constantly reminded the Peace Corps of the President's particular vulnerability in the area of church-state relations. Therefore, during a weekend trip to Hyannisport, Shriver personally explained to Kennedy the Peace Corps' reasons for the delaying tactics. In June, Josephson gave the legal opinion that no Volunteers should be chosen on a religious basis, but the nettle of the direct contractual relationship with religious agencies had still to be plucked.
Like many subsequent Peace Corps decisions, the religious policy was made by Shriver himself in response to a specific crisis. The problem came to a head in July 1961, while the first Volunteers were in training at Harvard for a proposed teaching programme in Nigeria. When Nigeria had gained independence in 1960, its new Ministry of Education had incorporated the many colonial Mission schools, although these continued to retain their religious base. The question arose as to whether Volunteers could teach in these schools without violating the principle of separation of church and state. Some American private organisations working in Nigeria suggested that Volunteers should be selected according to their religion and then sent to the respective Catholic or Protestant schools. On July 14, Shriver vetoed this suggestion in a telegram to the U.S. embassy in Lagos:

"If U.S. voluntary operated schools in Nigeria are suggesting that religious criteria be applied in selecting Volunteers for programs of such agencies, then it is apparent that failure of communication exists between U.S. and Nigerian officials...any group of Peace Corps Volunteers will have great diversity of religious affiliation and non-affiliation." 23

In effect, this message established a firm Peace Corps policy. After consultation with Sorensen, Moyers and Josephson, Shriver decided that since Volunteers would be employed by the Nigerian government and not by a religious body, the programme could go ahead. They could teach secular subjects in Mission schools under the strict condition that no religious instruction would be asked of them. This decision was formalised in a document entitled "The Religious Policies of the Peace Corps." The Peace Corps would consider projects from foreign governments
which used religious organisations provided Volunteers would not become in any way involved in proselytising. However, direct contracts with religious agencies themselves were strictly prohibited. Bill Josephson tempered this somewhat by explaining that although the Peace Corps would not contract with a private agency in connection with a proselytising project there remained a broad spectrum of religiously affiliated private groups whose proposals would be considered "on a case-by-case basis." 24

As ever, flexibility was the watchword.

On December 15, 1961, Shriver publicly announced this policy at a Private Voluntary Agencies conference. He used the Nigerian example to illustrate the Peace Corps' religious objectivity:

"In Nigeria we will have 100 people by January - many of them teaching in church schools. It is inevitable that some Volunteers will be teaching in a Mission school different from their faith. Some people will write us and say 'This is awful.' I think it is great. Our basic policy is - no religious proselytising or propagandising."

Shriver insisted that because of the legal and constitutional question there could be no direct contracting with a "100% church program." Of course, he explained that Volunteers in the field would work on a practical basis with experienced professionals. He gave the example of the Peace Corps working with Catholic priests in Colombia:

"Some people advised us that the priests in the local villages would be opposed to the Peace Corps. Some advised us that the Church in Colombia was so strong that the Peace Corps should not go there. Our experience, however, has shown that the local priests have been cordial. Our Volunteers are putting up a basketball court, are building a sewage system; is this aiding religion?" 25
Despite Shriver's reasoned arguments, many religious organisations were livid at what they considered a snub by a new agency composed of inexperienced amateurs. "We greatly regret to see this precedent set," said Miss Owens of American Voluntary Agencies, "the church-related agencies have a tremendous wealth of experience." Bishop Swanstrora of the National Catholic Welfare Conference was even more vehement. "I deplore this policy," he protested, "we regret, and in a sense, are disturbed that the Peace Corps has set up this policy."26

The church-state conundrum continued to bother the Peace Corps from time to time. For instance, the legality of Volunteers teaching in a Catholic school in St. Lucia was questioned in 1961, and was still causing problems in 1963.27 The Peace Corps did work with some religious-affiliated bodies - International Voluntary Services, Heifer Project and the Y.W.C.A.; but, in general, it was forced to rely heavily on the secular organisations - M.E.D.I.C.O., C.A.R.E., the National 4-H Club and the Experiment in International Living.

The Peace Corps' religious policy was an important factor in crippling the participation of the private sector in direct administration of overseas programmes. Ironically, the Catholic church was hurt most since it had the majority of denominational projects, especially in Latin America. It had hoped for the support of the Peace Corps, in both money and manpower. Moreover, for a few years, Shriver was consistently criticised by Bishop Swanstrom and the National Catholic Council. Bradley Patterson saw the paradox in Sargent Shriver, a prominent Catholic layman,
Shriver himself took ironic pleasure in reminding his brother-in-law that he was defending him and his new agency from this charge of religious bias - towards Catholics or any other denomination. In one delightful memorandum, Shriver told Kennedy about "A Protestant Volunteer from Kansas, teaching in a Catholic Mission school in Ghana (under a Catholic headmaster) who is conducting the weekly meetings of the Student Christian Movement made up of sixty Protestant students attending the Catholic school." 29

Regarding the racial problem, the Peace Corps went beyond mere neutrality to a policy of positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged minorities. Shriver explained this policy to the National Conference on Religion and Race in Chicago on January 15, 1963:

"We have tried in the Peace Corps to deal positively with the problem.....we set out deliberately to recruit as many Negroes and representatives of other minority groups as possible for jobs in every echelon. We knew Negroes would not ordinarily seek out these jobs so we decided to seek them out." 30

In his original address on the Peace Corps at the Cow Palace, John Kennedy had stressed that service would be open to "every race and walk of life." However, the policy of deliberately "seeking out" blacks and non-whites emanated from the convictions of the Peace Corps' founding fathers, Shriver and Wofford. Shriver, a liberal Catholic, liberal educationalist and long-standing member of the Catholic Interracial Council had witnessed brutal discrimination in Chicago; indeed, he served on the Board of Education there at the time of the historic "Brown" decision and had seen the violence and riots caused by racial disharmony. His personal commitment to Civil Rights was deep and unwavering.
Wofford had many ties to the black community and, in 1960, was one of the few white men close to Martin Luther King Jr. In March 1961, Kennedy appointed Wofford as his Special Assistant on Civil Rights. Together Shriver and Wofford had led the highly successful Civil Rights section of the Kennedy Presidential campaign; seven out of ten blacks voted Democratic. Even in a Kennedy administration generally committed to Civil Rights, the Peace Corps - inspired by Shriver and Wofford - was far ahead of its time in its strenuous effort to provide equal opportunity for blacks. 31

As ever, Shriver’s purpose was practical as well as ideological. He knew that a multiracial Peace Corps group would have a better chance of effective people-to-people contact with black Africans and Indians than a group made up solely of white Americans. On February 24, 1961 Derek Singer sent a memorandum to Warren Wiggins advising the use of Howard University in Washington D.C. - the top black American educational institution-to “provide Corpsmen with a basic feel and understanding of ‘the best’ in American Negro culture and thought.” In August, Shriver made black recruitment a Peace Corps “priority” and ordered “a specialised public information attack” on the black community. Harris Wofford circulated a memorandum to Peace Corps staff in October 1961, advocating positive efforts “to promote equal opportunity within our agency.” Deputy-Director Paul Geren and Franklin Williams responded that more minorities had, in fact, been taken into “the higher-grade categories” and that a special recruiting drive for blacks was being organised. Puerto Ricans were another minority group who found the Peace Corps “discriminating in their favour.” Derek Singer argued that this was a valid policy since they would add an important texture to the Peace
Corps initiative, especially in Latin America. In February 1962, Bill Moyers also noticed that "special steps" were being taken to recruit on Indian Reservations. In the summer of that year, Shriver informed President Kennedy that the Peace Corps was doing everything in its power "to encourage American Indians to volunteer."\(^{32}\)

During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in June 1961, Shriver made it clear that the Peace Corps would not send Volunteers to any country which would not accept Jews. Bill Josephson recalled this issue being raised in 1961, by a request from Ambassador William Rountree for a Peace Corps project to be launched in the Sudan - on condition that no Jewish Volunteers would be included. The Peace Corps flatly refused this limitation and the possibility of a programme there died.\(^{34}\) Universities in the southern states of America were also refused training and selection contracts because they refused to accept blacks. In particular, Shriver publicised his anger at the University of Texas's avowed segregationist system. Also, in July 1962, he publicly protested the refusal of an inn near Olney, Maryland to serve black Peace Corps trainees.\(^{35}\)

Yet, despite the Peace Corps' great efforts, blacks never made up more than 5 per cent of Volunteers in the field between 1961-3 - a period when the American population in general was 11 per cent black.\(^{36}\) This low figure was attributable to two major factors. Firstly, many of the most able black American youths were beginning to make a commitment to poverty and ignorance at home rather than abroad by enlisting in the ensuing Civil Rights crusade. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, most blacks simply could not afford the time and the implied economic sacrifice.
involved in two years service in the Peace Corps. By 1963, recruiters were "selling" the Peace Corps to blacks on positive economic grounds, arguing that after two years of service they would be guaranteed a superior type of job. However, the argument never proved very persuasive. C. Payne Lucas, the most outspoken black in the Peace Corps administration, explained the dearth in these terms:

"Most of the black kids in the sixties were kids whose parents struggled to get them through college. Suddenly, we were talking about going into the Peace Corps. But black kids finished school and their parents expected them to help them. We offered them 75 dollars a month readjustment pay....It comes down to dollars and cents." 37

Nevertheless, in Peace Corps/Washington at least, giant strides in the field of Civil Rights were taken. In January 1963, 7.4 per cent of higher echelon posts in the Peace Corps were filled by blacks. The comparative figure in other Federal agencies was 0.8 per cent; 24 per cent of lower administrative positions were also occupied by blacks as against 5.3 per cent in other government bodies. Also, by 1964, 10 per cent of all Reps were black. In the early 1960's, this was a marvellous effort and an impressive record. 38 Its effects on the countries where the Peace Corps went should not be underestimated. Young, white American Volunteers openly mixing with blacks made a strong impact on Third World peoples. "So far as the American image goes," wrote Kevin Delany and David Gelman in an evaluation report on Liberia in 1963, "we are probably doing more good on the race issue than any other aspect....The race question is still the hottest one going, where the Americans are concerned, and the mere fact that we are willing to discuss it with students and others in a reasonable, candid way, makes a solid impression." 39
Also outstanding was the Peace Corps' emphasis on giving women the same opportunity for service as men - at a period in history when champions of women's liberation and sexual equality were not conspicuous. Again, Kennedy had given the lead at the Cow Palace by stating that Peace Corps service would be open to women. In March 1961, at one of the first Director's meetings, Shriver ordered that attention should be given to "opportunities to include outstanding professional women on the headquarters staff." Again, at the first session of the National Advisory Council in May 1961, Shriver pledged his commitment to "women as Volunteers." In New York, Shriver gave a major address on "Women in The Peace Corps" in which he called for women to do necessary work overseas as nurses, teachers and doctors. An even more obvious sign of the Peace Corps' determination to give equal opportunities to women was its recruitment literature which stressed that "American women doing Peace Corps work abroad will give a personal nudge to history in terms of improving the status of women in many of the newly emerging countries of the world."40

In the early days, there were some reports which advised the omission of the "weaker sex" because of the dangers of rape and single-girl pregnancies in the Peace Corps, especially in the "machismo" cultures of Latin America. Nevertheless, despite some initial worries, Shriver believed women should be given the chance to prove themselves as able as their male counterparts. This, they did. By 1963, one third of the seven thousand Volunteers serving around the world were female. During a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1964, Shriver admitted
he had not recruited as many women administrators as he would have liked.\footnote{41} Even so, Dorothy Jacobsen (Chief of Division of Personnel), Ruth Olson (Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Volunteer Support) and Alice Gilbert (Chief of the Division of U.N. and International Agency Programmes) made it to upper echelon posts in Peace Corps/Washington. Besides, at the Volunteer level—as Shriver proclaimed in a speech "On Women" in June 1962—"The role of the woman in the Peace Corps is exactly the same as that of the male."\footnote{42}

The Peace Corps' excellent non-sexist record was slightly flawed by one issue. If a single female Volunteer became pregnant she was sent home immediately, while the father—often a Volunteer too—was allowed to remain in the programme. Many women Volunteers deemed this a blind spot in the Peace Corps' otherwise fair and undiscriminating attitude towards the sexes. However, even given this sexist flaw and the lack of success in recruiting minorities as Volunteers, the Peace Corps could be described, with some justice, as visionary in both areas when compared to the deficiencies of contemporary Federal agencies. Indeed, Warren Wiggins went so far as to claim that, for its time, the Peace Corps was "unique in the history of government institutions."\footnote{43}

Of course, although the Peace Corps' policies and principles were liberal, flexible and—to a great extent—far-seeing, it could not live by these alone. No government organisation, no matter how "different" it thought itself, could afford to ignore its fellow agencies. Hence, the Peace Corps' relationships with its peers were central to its effective functioning. Yet, in the first days of the Kennedy administration, Bradley Patterson recalled experienced bureaucrats throwing up their hands in horror
at the prospect of the Peace Corps. "We haven't the faintest idea what this one's going to be about," he quoted them as saying, "This is an unmeasurable to us!" 44

From the very beginning then, there was a mixture of concern and fear within the Federal bureaucracy over the Peace Corps. This apprehension was accentuated in May 1961, when the Peace Corps - after some bitter in-fighting - won its independence. As Bill Josephson told Shriver, this victory was not exactly "greeted with cheers by the rest of the concerned bureaucracy." Ralph Dungan in the White House and Henry Labouisse, head of I.C.A., "clearly felt unhappy and embarrassed." In particular, they felt the Peace Corps' use of Vice-President Johnson to exert pressure on the President had been "an end run" and, indeed, that "the Peace Corps had behaved irresponsibly throughout." Some were depicting the Peace Corps as "a ruthless and unruly place." To dispel this image Josephson advised Shriver to consolidate upon his personal relationships with senior officials. For, although the Peace Corps was semi-autonomous, it was required under law to co-ordinate its activities with the State Department, A.I.D. and the U.S. Information Agency. It would also need the help of other agencies. Josephson gave the specific example of the Peace Corps utilising the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for the development of medical programmes.45

Since the Peace Corps Director had the rank of Assistant Secretary of State, he reported directly to the Secretary of State. Happily, Dean Rusk sympathised with Sargent Shriver's desire for Peace Corps independence. According to Rusk, they came to an early understanding:

"We agreed that the Peace Corps should operate outside of the framework of American foreign policy. That it should not be looked upon as an instrument of the U.S. Embassy in any particular country...I told Sargent Shriver that he should not look over his shoulder at me or at the Department of State but that he should organise and administer the Peace Corps with as much independence as possible...I told him that I would always be available to him in the event he needed my support or if any particular problems arose, but that he should not feel that I expected him to make regular or written reports to me on how things were going. He accepted that role and performed it brilliantly"
Rusk's warm rapport with the Peace Corps was natural. Firstly, he personally liked the idea very much - "it was one of my favourite undertakings." Secondly, in 1960, he had been Chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation which had given a ten thousand dollar grant to the University of Colorado to make a study of the Peace Corps proposal. Thirdly, he had "a tremendous respect for Shriver's abilities and talents and thought that he was the ideal man to launch this interesting undertaking." Coincidentally, Rusk had been recruited for the Kennedy administration by the Shriver-Wofford talent hunt team. At the swearing-in ceremony of Shriver as Peace Corps Director, he gave him a glowing endorsement. He also paid Shriver the compliment of inviting him to attend all State Department staff meetings. Moreover, Under-Secretaries Chester Bowles and George Ball assured Shriver of their early support and Assistant Secretary William Crockett pledged that "We in the State Department wish to do everything in our power to assure the success of the Peace Corps.

Despite the friendship of high officials, the overall Peace Corps - State relationship was not uniformly cordial. In the summer of 1961, Bill Josephson told Shriver that "carping comments" on the Peace Corps were still being heard in the middle and lower ranks of State. Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Philip Coombs put it this way:
"Some of the 'old hands' in the State Department had strong misgivings about the Peace Corps idea at first - fearing that these young people running loose would create all sorts of problems for U.S. relations. Most of the new Kennedy appointees, however, such as Chester Bowles, Ed Murrow, Averell Harriman (and myself) who tended to be better tuned in with the younger generation, viewed the Peace Corps idea with confidence and enthusiasm from the outset."51

Shriver made supreme efforts to allay the fears of conservative State officials. In the first week in March, 1961, he gave a brilliantly reassuring speech before the Foreign Service Association - the "blue blood" of the American diplomatic corps - which turned many potential enemies into friends. Shriver reported to Chester Bowles that he felt his speech had left them "a little less worried, scared or even terrified at the prospects of Volunteers rushing wildly and aimlessly around the world."52

Peace Corps operations were submitted to review by the State Department. "I have arranged with Ken Mansfield, State's Inspector-General, "Shriver told President Kennedy, "that we shall normally rely on him for needed inspections."53 Also, Shriver made no objection to all Peace Corps cable traffic being subject to State's clearance.

Shriver's cooperative measures notwithstanding, there remained an element of mistrust between the Peace Corps and State and occasionally, this led to a blow-up. One such row took place in July, 1962, during a State Department - Peace Corps meeting on educational aid to Africa. Bill Haddad described it:
"Immediately, a few of the people at this meeting questioned our competence to select people to teach in African universities. Without the use of four-letter words, I carefully explained to them our selection and training processes...This didn't satisfy them...they talked about our sudden intrusion into the education field...In checking with the staff, I found that everyone got the same bitter taste in his mouth that I did, and their first reaction was to tell them to go to hell."

Haddad concluded that he would like Shriver "to show up to answer the questions of these pontifical, pompous idiots...What I would really love to see is your technique in levelling these people."

On another occasion, Bill Josephson became upset with State's failure to reciprocate the Peace Corps' free flow of information:

"Can anyone explain to me why we never appear to see State or A.I.D. messages involving major decisions on issues involving countries in which we have programmes, but seem to receive thousands of copies of every blankety-blank and end-of-tour report of every broken-down A.I.D. technician, not to mention the scholarly bi-weekly dispatches aspiring young F.S.O. 7's and 8's write for promotional purposes?"

To an extent, the Peace Corps had only itself to blame for its occasionally fraught relations with State. Its insistence on being "different" - abnegating privileges and disdaining the hospitality of the American diplomatic community - led to a certain self-righteousness. For instance, Warren Wiggins's remarks about the traditional Foreign Service living in "golden ghettos" overseas, caused much resentment. The Peace Corps' ardour in guarding its independent status sometimes lapsed into an arrogance which proved just as destructive as the conservatism of some officials at Foggy Bottom. In general however, the friction was not obtrusive. The superb understanding between Shriver and Rusk ensured an efficient if not a perfect Peace Corps - State partnership. As Assistant-Secretary Coombs put it:
"Once the young people got out there and predominantly favourable reports began to flow back, it became clear that they were an unique and a significant new asset, and the misgivings sharply subsided. I was not aware of any serious intransigence, in the sense of trying to undermine the program."56

A useful case in point was George Springsteen, Special Assistant to Under-Secretary George Ball, and responsible for State-Peace Corps relations. As Bill Josephson told Shriver in 1962, Springsteen had at first been "quite cool" towards the Peace Corps; however, once he saw it working in the field he "warmed up."57

Overseas, the U.S. ambassador's sanction was required for all Peace Corps programme requests but, apart from that very formal duty, the Peace Corps had little contact with embassy staff. While Shriver recommended "Courteous and respectful regard for the Ambassador," he advised that Peace Corps offices should not be located in the U.S. embassy and he insisted that Peace Corps members should not be used for "propaganda purposes."58 Shriver was willing to forego charges of Peace Corps "aloofness" since he felt it was essential to avoid congregation in the areas where all other Westerners lived. "Separateness from other overseas operations of the U.S. is important to achieving the desired image.....these policies may come as a blow, but they must be applied," he wrote.59

There was an initial reticence on the part of the American diplomatic community to accept the Peace Corps. As Chester Bowles described it: "The old-timers didn't want the Peace Corps in their hair. Their thinking was 'Some Volunteer goes out and gets caught in some raid, and I, the ambassador, get the blame for it."
In August 1962, Bill Haddad complained to Ralph Dungan in the White House about the reluctance of the American community—diplomatic, business and private—to work with the Peace Corps. However, as the Peace Corps began to prove itself in the field, relations improved beyond measure.

At first, Ambassador Charles Baldwin in Malaya told Shriver that he wanted no more than thirty Volunteers; but later, as the Peace Corps expanded, he admitted that it was "very successful." Ambassador Douglas Henderson in Bolivia recalled his dealings with the Peace Corps as "informal but pragmatic." In the Philippines, Ambassador William Stevenson resented the "foolishness" of the Peace Corps—their refusal to use the embassy or the P.X. club; yet, he admitted that the Volunteers did a good job. "It got to be such a thing," he said, "that when I would visit a governor say in Palavan—which is a far-off-area—his first words to me would be that he wanted more Peace Corps people. And it got to be sort of a status symbol. He wanted six because the other governor had five and so forth."

Likewise, Ambassador Charles Cole thought the Peace Corps a "great success" in Chile while Ambassador William Mahoney in Ghana assessed it as "the only effective thing we're doing out here." Of course, relations between the Peace Corps and the diplomatic community varied from country to country. In general, however, although close contact remained only between high officials, country teams worked well together with the Peace Corps usually going its own way and handling its own affairs. Ambassador Baldwin described this arrangement:
"I tried insofar as possible to keep hands off the Peace Corps people - to refrain from interfering. I had a compact with my Peace Corps supervisor that while I recognised my responsibility as Ambassador for the Peace Corps activities, I felt it was desirable to play down as much as possible the official aspect of the Peace Corps, to emphasise the people-to-people aspect. We carried out that policy. While I provided office space in the Embassy chancery for the Peace Corps for a while, it later moved out of the chancery completely. This was part of the agreement between me and the Peace Corps supervisor, that they should function physically outside the Embassy. It was a desirable arrangement."  

The effective, if distant, cordiality which characterised the Peace Corps' relationship with the U.S. official Mission, was not evident in its dealings with the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). Josephson told Shriver that many A.I.D. officials had felt "betrayed" by the Peace Corps at the time of the battle for independence and this antipathy prevailed throughout the Kennedy era. In July, 1961 Bill Moyers reported that some A.I.D. trainees in Washington had made caustic criticisms of the Peace Corps. This antagonism was extended to the field where, as Peace Corps evaluator Herb Wegner noted, "even the average petty cash reimbursement turnaround takes three months." Ty Wood, A.I.D. chief in India noted "a vast suspicion of Peace Corps generally at that time." In Bolivia there was an "under-current of ill-will towards the Peace Corps" and A.I.D. officials felt that the Volunteers should drop their pretensions to being "different" and "get on the team." Larry Fuchs, the Peace Corps Rep. in the Philippines wrote of the constant "bickering and politicking between the agencies."  

The problem was a fundamental one of approach. The Peace Corps proclaimed itself people-oriented whereas A.I.D. concentrated on the supply of needed equipment and was basically technically-oriented. The Peace Corps sought to do the special "personal"
job that A.I.D. or any other programme of technical assistance would not attempt. This caused bitter resentment. Though sometimes Peace Corps and A.I.D. undertook successful cooperative ventures - like the educational television project in Colombia - in general, Peace Corps staffer Robert Carey wrote that "The early relationships between the Peace Corps and A.I.D. were dismal."67

Other agencies were much more forthcoming with helpful offers. On March 2, 1961, George McGovern, Director of the Food-For-Peace programme, wrote to Shriver:

"The announcement by the President yesterday, on the establishment of the Peace Corps, was a high tribute to the work you have done in making this idea a reality.....I should like very much to discuss with you the most constructive ways in which we can be of service to you".68

Likewise, Ed Murrow, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, told Shriver that "The success of the Peace Corps will be closely linked to our objectives. We are eager for it to succeed. We think we can help to see that it does." In April, 1961, Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman pledged the services of his department to the Peace Corps - for instance, in the supply of farm-trained people. During that summer Luther Hodges, Secretary of Commerce, offered to help the Peace Corps recruit people from middle management so that "industry would be emotionally involved in the Peace Corps and what it stands for."69 Indeed, the vast majority of the well-established Federal bureaucracies proved most cooperative. The Civil Service Commission agreed to take on the responsibility of administering the Peace Corps Entrance Exam; the General Accounting Office allowed the Peace Corps a flexible financial remit; even the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
allowed the Peace Corps to "borrow" from its staff - one such loan being the invaluable Jack Young. Also, during the first year, the Peace Corps received the full cooperation of J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.).

The F.B.I. conducted full-field investigations of the first prospective Volunteers. Shriver felt this action would reassure worried Congressmen that "undesirables" would be excluded and thus help with what Bill Delano called "the legislative midwifery" on Capitol Hill. It also aided the Peace Corps in its selection process. Shriver wrote to Hoover in September 1961, thanking him and telling him that Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy - with whom Hoover did not enjoy the warmest relations - would get to know of this great favour. However, after 1961, the Civil Service Commission took over the investigative procedures and thereafter only 3 per cent of all applicants, trainees and Volunteers were ever referred to the F.B.I. This minority consisted of extraordinary cases. For example, Bill Josephson recalled a problem over the identity of one Volunteer arising from a report that the Soviet Union was attempting to influence his behaviour by exerting pressure on his parents who lived in Russia. The F.B.I. was called in and, in fact, ascertained that he had been confused with another man of the same name; the Volunteer had no relatives in Russia. As Josephson explained, the Peace Corps' use of the F.B.I. was exceptional and only concerned with "protecting the integrity of our operation from subversion rather than using the intelligence resources of the U.S. as a tool in the conduct of our operations."
The subject of the Peace Corps' relationship with the intelligence community – particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) – was extremely sensitive throughout the Kennedy era. Leftist governments continually accused the Peace Corps of being a "cover" for American espionage. As early as March 16, 1961, Radio Moscow attacked the Peace Corps as a plan for "the collection of espionage information for Allen Dulles's agency." A year later it was broadcast that "U.S. agents are sent to Afro-Asian countries under the U.S. Peace Corps label. The plan to organise the Corps was jointly prepared by the U.S. State Department, Pentagon and C.I.A. Director of the Corps, Shriver, is an old employee of the C.I.A." Radio Peking joined in, as did Castro and the Eastern bloc press. One of the more ridiculous propaganda pieces appeared in an article in a Polish newspaper in March 1963. Alongside photographs of girl Volunteers in training, the caption read: "The Americans consider all means acceptable. Where other means do not succeed, sex may be very useful. Girl members of the Corps on the exercise field." Tass also had a flair for misconstrued sexual innuendo. It charged that a promiscuous woman Volunteer teacher in Somalia corrupted her pupils by demonstrating the "indecent movements" of the Twist.

A more sober analysis might note that not a single case of C.I.A. infiltration of the Peace Corps, or use of C.I.A. resources by the Peace Corps has ever been substantiated. As George W. Owens, C.I.A. Information and Privacy Coordinator wrote in October 1978, "it has been Agency policy to scrupulously
avoid Peace Corps relationships which could ever be construed as cooperation with the C.I.A. for intelligence purposes."  

No investigation - including the thorough searchings of Senator Frank Church's Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities in 1975 - has turned up the slightest evidence of the Peace Corps' use as an arm of U.S. intelligence. Sargent Shriver knew that any such association would utterly destroy the Peace Corps' credibility. Hence, he took the strictest precautions. Most importantly, he was given an assurance by President Kennedy that the C.I.A. would not attempt to infiltrate the Peace Corps and would not enlist a former Volunteer until at least five years after his Peace Corps service. Kennedy personally relayed this message to Allen Dulles and John McCone, the two C.I.A. Directors of this period. This understanding on the inviolability of the Peace Corps was referred to (in Peace Corps circles) as "The Treaty."  

On February 28, 1962, the C.I.A.'s Assistant Director, Stanley J. Grogan, reassured the White House that the "C.I.A. has nothing whatever to do and wants nothing whatever to do with the Peace Corps. Nothing could be more fatal to the Peace Corps than to have a C.I.A. connection."  In a National Security airgram to all U.S. embassies in the Third World, Dean Rusk reiterated the principles of the treaty:  

"From the beginning of the Peace Corps, I have considered it understood that Peace Corps Volunteers would not be used as intelligence sources on the countries in which they are serving. Because of the geographic dispersion of Volunteers and the access which they have to the people of the country, some members of your staff, through either unfamiliarity with policy or over-zealousness, may be tempted to regard the Volunteers as instruments of foreign policy designed to serve the particular
ends of the staff members' job. In order that there
should be no misunderstanding as to the role of Peace
Corps Volunteers, I wish to state the relevant policy:
Peace Corps Volunteers are not to be regarded or
utilised as official members of the Mission and in
particular they are not requested to undertake any
formal or informal intelligence functions. They
are to be treated in the same manner as are other
responsible and loyal private American citizens
resident in your area and are not to be singled
out for intelligence interviews." 77

To a great extent, the true role of the C.I.A. in the early 1960's
remains to be defined. Such was the nature of its operations,
almost every American working abroad could have been accused of
being an "agent"; it is always very difficult to disprove being
a spy. There may have been an instance or indeed, instances,
of "over-zealousness" by C.I.A. agents in the field and a few
Volunteers could conceivably have been recruited. But the evidence
is negligible. Charles Peters recalled only one incident, when
a C.I.A. agent tried to influence a Volunteer in Thailand; once
discovered, a message was sent directly from the White House putting
an immediate stop to it. The U.S. ambassador in Liberia ordered
Peace Corps Rep. Tom Quimby to make intelligence reports to him
on field situations. Quimby refused, and when he protested to
Washington, the erring ambassador was severely reprimanded.
Bradley Patterson knew of only one occasion when the Peace Corps
asked the C.I.A. for help and that was to seek advice on how to
deal with the problem of loneliness and frustration facing the
Volunteer in the field — and hence possible entrapment by
communists. However, even this mild example of collaboration
was of little consequence since the Peace Corps never used the
C.I.A.'s proffered instructions. 78
Within the Peace Corps, policy regarding the C.I.A. was established on September 6, 1961. Specifically, it said that no former employee of the C.I.A. and generally, no one who had worked in "intelligence" - up to ten years previously - would be employed. Even someone married to an intelligence officer was excluded. This directive entitled Employment Of Personnel Who Have Been Employed In Intelligence Work was unequivocal: "We do not want the Peace Corps publicly identified in any way with intelligence work and we do not want the Peace Corps used as a vehicle for intelligence work." Excellent people were refused entry into the Peace Corps - both at staff and Volunteer levels - if they had the slightest "intelligence" connection. Bill Delano had the special portfolio on this problem. He remembered two first-class secretaries were turned down because they had done some part-time typing for the C.I.A. years earlier. Volunteers too, were warned during training about possible C.I.A. infiltration. They were told that the slightest hint of solicitation should be immediately reported to their Rep.

All available evidence indicates that, in the Kennedy years, the Peace Corps and the C.I.A. had a perfect relationship - they stayed as far away from each other as possible. This understanding worked to the advantage of both agencies. Notwithstanding communist assertions that Shriver was a "bloodthirsty Chicago butcher and sausage-maker" and the Peace Corps "a nest of spies," Bill Josephson recalled "a lot of generalised charges, but no specific charges naming specific people." Administrators of the calibre of Shriver, Moyers, Wiggins and Josephson would not have been easily gullled.
Thus, as Bill Josephson concluded, "We may have been kidding ourselves, but so far as I know, the C.I.A. conscientiously honored its undertakings."^81

In many ways, the Peace Corps' most crucial organisational relationship was with the White House staff and the President himself - for there rested the ultimate source of power. Sargent Shriver recalled that Kennedy "never ever turned down anything we asked him to do."^82 Whenever he was requested to greet Volunteers in the Rose Garden, announce a new programme or sign a letter of congratulations to those serving abroad, Kennedy willingly complied. In this respect, he certainly did his duty by the Peace Corps. Shriver, for his part, kept up a constant stream of personal letters and memoranda to the President on various issues pertaining to the Peace Corps: the warm reception given to the first Peace Corps contingent in India, or the dangers Volunteers faced from rebels in the outback of North Borneo, or the news that Kennedy's "alma mater" - Harvard - was participating in a training project.\(^83\) One newsy letter from Shriver in Colombia, informed Kennedy that "Your Peace Corps is proving to be an asset in Colombia....The Volunteers are in towns where no North Americans are living or have lived." On the ever-sensitive religious question, Shriver wrote:

"Our Volunteers are not living in the homes of priests (as reported in the Washington Star.) They have their own private accommodations which are shared in every case with a Colombian counterpart. But cooperation from Church and local priests is essential to success. We're getting it."
Shriver told Kennedy that the Volunteers "have your photo affixed to a map of the U.S.A. in many of their rooms" and asked him to "Please tell Jackie she's the new pin-up queen of the Latinos. They have dubbed her 'La Reina' and her picture appears on many a wall." 84

These personal messages did not usually contain very serious material. They were merely a reflection of Shriver's desire to keep the President informed and interested in the progress of the Peace Corps. However, Shriver also made an official weekly report to the President on Peace Corps activities. These reports hit a slightly more serious note—difficulties with a Senate committee (usually Appropriations), a critical article in the press, an analysis of early terminations from Peace Corps service. Occasionally, a piece of bad news was related—for instance, that Governor Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, had ordered the Volunteers out of his area. 85 But, more often than not, the reports glowed with Peace Corps achievements—a record number of Peace Corps applications, a word of praise from a Third World leader, or an extraordinary job done by a Volunteer. After reading one such report, Kennedy remarked, "Sarge is really on the ball." 86

There is little doubt that Kennedy looked at the Peace Corps with an endearing eye. In a memorandum to the President, Harris Wofford dubbed it Kennedy's "special baby, and in a sense the first offspring of the New Frontier." Extending the metaphor, Fred Dutton (Special Assistant To The President) said that the rest of the Federal bureaucracy was well aware that the Peace Corps was "a favorite child." Dave Powers recalled that the President loved to meet and talk with the Volunteers.
When Ambassador Baldwin met with Kennedy, the President asked him to tell the Tunku in Malaya that he was "very pleased indeed that he is interested in what I think will be a very important program (the Peace Corps)." Likewise, Ambassador Galbraith noted that whenever he returned from India and met with the President, he would ask "How are Sarge's kids doing?"

Kennedy himself told a group of Volunteers that "The White House belongs to all the people, but I think it particularly belongs to you." 87

Yet, although Kennedy always displayed his interest in the Peace Corps - and it was a crucial factor in its success - he actually paid very little specific attention to it and, with few exceptions, Shriver only used the presidential relationship for cosmetic or publicity purposes. As Harris Wofford put it, "Shriver only went to Kennedy to add juice to the Peace Corps, to send off the first group. Kennedy did anything Shriver asked him to do like that." 88 Certainly, Kennedy signed the Executive Order which gave the Peace Corps an auspicious beginning and he also helped define the Peace Corps' relationship with the C.I.A. However, for the most part, he took no direct hand in Peace Corps affairs. Significantly, during the all-important fight for independence, Vice-President Johnson was much more active on the Peace Corps' behalf than the President.

Evaluator David Gelman attributed this inattentive attitude to an "apparent lack of serious regard for the Peace Corps at the White House." Harris Wofford agreed that there was not much evidence of White House interest in Peace Corps issues but he put this down to the President's preoccupation with crises - Berlin,
Cuba, Civil Rights - than to downright indifference. Similarly, Presidential assistant Ralph Dungan did not consider the Peace Corps central to Kennedy's immediate thinking. "It was not often discussed or debated in the White House," said Dungan, "it was nice but it just wasn't that important." Likewise Fred Dutton described Kennedy's perspective on the Peace Corps as "a bright speck on a general picture of problems and politics." While Kennedy liked to remind his staff that he was very fond of the Peace Corps, he was quite happy to leave its management with Sargent Shriver and his associates. "They paddled their own canoe," said McGeorge Bundy. 89

Some Peace Corps officials, especially in the early days, were disturbed at the seeming lack of enthusiasm at the White House. Bradley Patterson was disappointed that there was such little response to the Peace Corps' weekly reports - "nobody ever called up and said this was good, or we want more of this....you sent it into a blank wall, so to speak." More disillusioned, Bill Kelly believed that the White House staff ignored the Peace Corps because they were certain it would prove an impracticable flop and they did not want its failure directly associated with the President. This analysis certainly sheds new light on Shriver's lighthearted statement that Kennedy only chose him as the Peace Corps Director because "no-one thought it could succeed and it would be easier to fire a relative than a friend." However, Shriver's more serious view was that he should make the Peace Corps a success without troubling the President; he told Patterson that he didn't want to "bother Jack with problems.....I don't want to wash my dirty linen in front of him." 90
Shriver's stoical philosophy camouflaged a coolness between the Peace Corps and certain White House officials. This can be traced back to the 1960 campaign when there had been a cleavage between the Shriver wing of Kennedy's staff and the experienced, professional wing - O'Brien, O'Donnell, and Dungan - known collectively as the "Irish Mafia." The latter group felt that Shriver's team was not hard-headed or realistic enough. They adjudged Shriver a political lightweight and, rather patronisingly, dubbed him the "Boy Scout" - implying that he was too naive for the tough political arena. This friction increased during the transition period when some of Shriver's talent hunt choices - Bundy, Rusk, McNamara - were more favoured by Kennedy than those of the Irish Mafia. According to Harris Wofford, Larry O'Brien was especially "sore at Shriver for shovelling all these people in that hadn't done anything in the campaign and he was particularly sore when some egghead who hadn't done anything in the campaign was being treated more respectfully than somebody that he was recommending." Of course, the Irish Mafia were further upset by the Peace Corps' determined stand over the independence issue in April and May, 1961. On a more general level, the Presidential aides were completely different in character from the people who joined the Peace Corps staff. Shriver attracted confirmed idealists; indeed, Peace Corps officials sometimes joked about "working for Halleluiah." However, the more cynical members of the White House staff deemed them insufferable romantics. At least one Special Assistant to the President found the Peace Corps' "we-can-walk-on-water" attitude intolerable.

This uneasiness between the Peace Corps and White House aides was not helped by the fact that Shriver and Kennedy were never very close at a personal level. Shriver had always been
much more radical than Kennedy - especially in the area of civil liberties. Indeed, as David Halberstam put it, Shriver was regarded as the "family communist" by the Kennedys. His effusive brand of idealism went against the grain of John Kennedy who was, wrote Halberstam, "at least as sceptical as he was idealistic, curiously ill-at-ease with other people's overt idealism, preferring in private the tart and darker view of the world and of mankind." Harris Wofford also noted that Kennedy was "put off by too far-reaching ideas....Certainly, idealism or liberalism in any conventional sense was uncongenial to him."93 In effect, Kennedy's somewhat existential sense of irony was the polar opposite of Shriver's unbounded idealism and optimism.

Yet, although Shriver was not particularly intimate with the President or the Kennedy family, he was desperately keen to prove his worth to them. He was extremely sensitive to insinuations that he was merely riding on Kennedy's coat-tails. When a reporter asked him about his personal relationship with the President, Shriver replied curtly, "It's a fact of life, why think about it at all? I'm perfectly capable of looking after myself."94 A rebuff suffered by Shriver at the hands of his brother-in-law in May 1961, did nothing to assuage this feeling. Shriver, completely inexperienced in Congressional affairs, was due to take the Peace Corps legislation to Capitol Hill. Nervous, and worried about the lack of help coming from the White House congressional liaisons office - led by Larry O'Brien - Shriver took advantage of a weekend trip to Hyannisport to ask the President for some advice and cooperation; his wife Eunice, acted as intermediary. However, referring to the fight for independence, Kennedy told his sister that Shriver and the
Peace Corps had wanted to be on their own and now they were completely on their own. It was as if Kennedy was telling Shriver that it was time he woke up to the harsh realities of political life. In later years, Shriver recalled that from that moment on, he vowed never again to ask the President for so much as "a light for a cigarette."  

Despite this slight dryness between the Peace Corps and the White House, they managed a very successful working relationship. Since the White House staff tended not to take it very seriously the Peace Corps was free to develop in any direction that Shriver and his aides chose; hence, it could often presume authority on issues even when that authority had not been specifically designated. Besides, the Peace Corps could rely on at least one staunch supporter in the White House - Lyndon Johnson. "I am proud of you, your conduct and your record and you have my complete admiration and confidence," he told Shriver.  

As for President Kennedy, he obviously felt a very special affection for the Peace Corps. It appealed to his idealistic side. It was a bright idea which he had thrown out in the heat of the Presidential campaign; but, once ensconced in the White House, it was not one of his principal concerns. Shriver ran it so efficiently that it did not have to be. No matter the attitude of some of the White House staff, there was no question of the President's personal commitment to the Peace Corps. For him, there was only ever the question of political priorities; the Peace Corps was not one of them. Besides, the very slight tension between the Peace Corps and some Presidential aides was imperceptible to the vast majority of observers. Indeed, most thought Kennedy was "closer" to the
Peace Corps than any other government agency. In principle at least - if not in actual practice - this was true. Theodore Sorensen dubbed Kennedy "the Volunteer."97 Moreover, in Washington, Jack Young noted that "The ever present 'shroud of the Presidency'... set an environment where 'things got easier to do' once the bureaucracy understood Kennedy was truly behind the Peace Corps."98 Overseas, Kennedy was even more closely identified with the Peace Corps. In Africa, the local peoples referred to Volunteers as "Wakina Kennedy" - followers of Kennedy; in the town of Bassari in Togo, the lone Volunteer there was nicknamed "Kennedy in Bassari" by the natives. In the Dominican Republic, the Volunteers were called "los hijos de Kennedy" - Kennedy's children.99 In later years, Juan Bosch, President of the Dominican Republic, explained how - in the minds of Third World peoples - Kennedy and the Peace Corps were as one:

"For the first time we found in the U.S. a man who felt as we did, who suffered with us. That is what Kennedy signified. To us he was not just an American president. He was a Latin American leader. That was the great transformation he produced in Latin America. Unfortunately he is dead. But I believe that Kennedy's message must continue in American young people. I believe that the Peace Corps has done much more for good relations between Latin America and the United States than all the United States Ambassadors since 1820. And the Peace Corps, what is it? Kennedy in action."100

The first principle of the Peace Corps was service; all other policies flowed from that source. They were pragmatic and flexible. In some respects they were also visionary. The Peace Corps' unparalleled, positive attitude towards religious, racial and sexual equality, characterised it as an institution far ahead of its time. In its relations with other government agencies
it generally succeeded in maintaining its independence - particularly from the intelligence community - while cooperating wholeheartedly. Despite some friction with White House aides, there was a special bond between the President and the Peace Corps. "It was an enterprise which was as close as any I knew to President Kennedy's heart," Lyndon Johnson told the Peace Corps staff a few days after Dallas. This affinity was perhaps best described by a young Volunteer in Africa who sent a letter to Peace Corps/Washington shortly after the President's death. "Being in the Peace Corps we all here felt we had a special attachment to him," he wrote. "Hell, most of us felt we were working for him and would refer to him as Jack - as if he were a Peace Corps Volunteer."
CHAPTER EIGHT

AN EXAMPLE FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE
"The concept of the Peace Corps was entirely new. It was subjected to a great deal of criticism at the beginning. If it had not been done with such great care and really in a sense of loving and prideful care, it could have defeated a great purpose and could have set back the whole cause of public service internationally for a good many years. That it has turned out to be the success that it has been has been due to the tireless work of Sargent Shriver, and to all of you. You have brought to government service a sense of morale and a sense of enthusiasm and really, commitment, which has been absent from too many governmental agencies for too many years. So that while the Peace Corps men overseas have rendered unusual service, those of you who have worked to make it a success here in Washington I think have set an example for government service which I hope will be infectious."

- JOHN F. KENNEDY -

(Remarks To The Peace Corps Staff, June 14, 1962)
The Peace Corps, a daring new government agency, was greatly inspired by its staff members. Sargent Shriver described them as "an unusual group of dedicated Americans". Led by Shriver, they initiated a massive overseas programme almost overnight and on a shoestring budget; many had no previous government experience. As a group of administrators, they made a fascinating study. The anthropologist Margaret Mead wrote that they were characterised by "high intelligence, goodwill, an almost infinite capacity to improvise, an enthusiastic willingness to learn by doing and a readiness to correct errors that perhaps need not have occurred". These Peace Corpsmen also had one other outstanding quality in common - idealism.

As a newcomer to Washington, Shriver went about staffing the Peace Corps in much the same way as he had seen President Kennedy staff his administration - through a "talent hunt". Of course, Shriver's job was much more difficult than Kennedy's. People invited to come and work for the President did not normally refuse; without too much difficulty, Kennedy was able to persuade the crème de la crème from the legal, business and academic professions to come to the White House. Thus, Bundy, McNamara, Rusk, Dillon, Schlesinger and the others whom David Halberstam immortalised as "the best and the brightest", came to Washington. However, in beginning his precarious, new
venture, Shriver knew that he could not hope to attract the
doyens of the American establishment. With its great risk of failure, a job with the Peace Corps was not the kind of offer likely to entice those with reputations to lose.

Nevertheless, Shriver was determined to find administrators of the very highest quality. He succeeded by recruiting from outside established circles and by refusing to make reputation a sine qua non of qualification. In this way, he drew into the Peace Corps many men and women who had not previously set their sights on public life but who had outstanding records in their own chosen professions. Among the first 275 staff members 43 had a degree in Arts, 23 in Law and 31 had Ph.D.'s. There were illustrious university professors, top-class businessmen, medical doctors, authors and former journalists. Since they had no experience of the Federal bureaucracy, they were largely ignorant of what was considered "impossible" in government operations. However, this only made them even more attractive to Shriver.

Of course, not everyone came from outside the government. A substantial number were tested foreign aid bureaucrats - like Wiggins and Josephson. Nevertheless, everyone who accepted Shriver's offer was well aware that the entire project might flog, pay was non-luxury and jobs non-career. These men and women sought something new and adventurous. They enjoyed the element of risk. Moreover, like Shriver, they had an uncompromising sense of idealism. Warren Wiggins described the qualities Shriver was looking for: "practical
common sense, idealism, a concern with America's role
vis à vis other cultures, administrative flexibility and
intellectual daring". Peace Corps staffers did not view
their service as just another stepping stone in a carefully-
plotted career. Indeed, in joining the Peace Corps many
gave up years of seniority in other government agencies or
sacrificed high incomes in private industry. Inspired by
the ethos of Kennedy and his New Frontier, they saw the
Peace Corps as an opportunity to enrich their lives and the
lives of others, be creative and put their ideals into
action.

Certainly, idealism was not the sole motivation. Men
like Wiggins, Josephson and Kelly were not without ambition —
for themselves, their organisation and their country. They
were hungry for success and the recognition accompanying it.
With the stakes so high and reputations there for the making,
several power-brokers emerged. In the Peace Corps these
characters were known as "empire-builders". Size, that
inevitable gauge of success in America of the early 1960's,
rapidly made the Peace Corps a force to be reckoned with in
Washington. Within the agency, Associate-Directors and
Chiefs fought to make their power greater, their Division
stronger. This fierce competitiveness ensured that the Peace
Corps never became a mere haven for romantics. Yet, without
idealism and a belief in the principles of public service,
even the wildest bureaucratic battler could not have survived.
As Robert Textor, an early academic consultant to the Peace
Corps observed, "they were, by and large, a worldly-wise
group, highly intelligent and administratively experienced and politically - in the manner of the New Frontier - 'tough'. At the same time, most of them were dedicated, liberal and altruistic'.

The Peace Corps also had its share of the intellectual hubris associated with the Kennedy administration. The institutional pride was overwhelming and there was some conceit, arrogance and insensitivity. These bright young men were supremely confident in their own ability and the success of their undertaking. On discussing traditional foreign aid during one of the very first Peace Corps staff meetings, the twenty-six year old Bill Moyers proclaimed, "We can do it better". This was the Peace Corps' credo. Yet, this cockiness was tempered by a vein of humour which coursed through the agency. From the beginning, the Peace Corps' sense of irony was self-evident. Staff members parodied The Towering Task as "the Tottering Tisk"; one of the first memoranda on organisational structure became known as "Shriver's Fourteen Points". The office of Donovan McClure, a Chief of Public Affairs, featured a dartboard with a photograph of Sargent Shriver's face on the front. Shriver himself used to joke that Kennedy had only chosen him to lead the Peace Corps because it would be easier to fire a relative than a friend. Humour was an essential ingredient of any staff meeting. No Peace Corps official was more self-confident or able than Warren Wiggins; yet, even he could compare the organisation of which he was so desperately proud to "an adolescent, gangling, growing, unpredictable and
often awkward ...... but gaining strength, learning fast, with lots of sex appeal". Informality, vitality and irony accompanied the air of self-righteousness within the Peace Corps to produce an impressive and, in many ways, a unique esprit de corps.

C. Payne Lucas, one of the first administrators claimed that, "The Peace Corps was not a job; it was a way of life". Indeed, for many, it was an emotional as well as a work experience. Don Romine, one of Bill Moyers's assistants, recalled that Peace Corps staffers believed in what they were doing "to the point of being fanatical about it...it was close to a religious experience". Some officials worked the first three months without pay; all staff worked public holidays without pay. The lights burned bright in the Maitico Building on Saturdays, Sundays and weekday evenings - staff positions in the Peace Corps demanded a total commitment of time and energy. This kind of dedication was exemplified by the chief official in Peace Corps/Washington - Sargent Shriver. As Lucas put it, "Anyone who would understand the Peace Corps must first understand the meaning of leadership within that unique Federal agency; and anyone who would understand that must first study the executive genius of the Peace Corps' first Director, Sargent Shriver".

Shriver was a "workaholic" and he expected the same relentless drive from his staff. When a Division Chief suggested an early morning meeting "about ten o'clock", Shriver shook his head. "By ten, the day is half over," he
In true Kennedy fashion, he disliked weakness or failure; he liked to think of himself as tough-minded. Signs on his office door read "Nice Guys Finish Last" and "Good Guys Don't Win Ball Games". Certainly, he gained a reputation as a demanding task-master. As one staff member put it, "When he assigns you to a job, he expects you to do it 100 per cent and at once!" Yet, although colleagues sometimes complained of his tongue-lashings, 2 a.m. phone-calls and undying effervescence, Shriver commanded a rare loyalty. Bill Haddad, one of the most irreverent of Peace Corps officials, conceded that "No one ever dreamed that he could do the job as well as Shriver". Likewise, Bill Josephson claimed that Shriver's boundless energy and quickness of mind left him feeling that "I was always running to catch up with him". Perhaps the highest compliment came - through Jacqueline Kennedy - from the President himself. On a photograph of Shriver talking with Kennedy she wrote, "Jack always said that no one could have made the Peace Corps work but Sarge".

What inspired Shriver to such great efforts is open to conjecture. Perhaps he felt he had something to prove to the professional politicians surrounding Kennedy who dismissed him as a "lightweight". On a more philosophical level, his liberal Catholicism and compassionate social beliefs - as evinced by his voluntary public service in the 1950's - would have made his commitment to Peace Corps ideals total. His wife, Eunice, may have been another influence. She had a long association with service in the Settlement Houses of
Chicago and work with the mentally-retarded. Indeed, it was Mrs. Shriver, who in 1963 persuaded President Kennedy of the need for a "Domestic Peace Corps". Whatever the combination of factors, it made Sargent Shriver the hub of the Peace Corps. On praising Shriver for his sterling performance, Kennedy pointed out that it had been by no means a straightforward task. "I don't think it is altogether fair to say that I handed Sarge a lemon from which he made lemonade," he quipped, "but I do think that he was handed one of the most sensitive and difficult assignments which any administrator in Washington has been given almost in this century".

Much of Shriver's talent and hence his success, lay in his choice of administrators. In later years, he wrote that he was "immensely proud" of his staff and believed them to be "among the finest at work in government". Despite the continual process of loss and replenishment, the Peace Corps consistently managed to attract top-flight personnel. "When a brand new, untried, untested organisation is able to attract able and devoted workers," wrote Shriver "it's proof that you've got something fresh and challenging and worthwhile". Of course, every staffer had an important part to play, but four major personalities outshone all others: Wofford, Moyers, Josephson and Wiggins.

Harris Wofford was the philosopher-king of the Peace Corps who, throughout the Kennedy era, acted as Shriver's foil. No one was more loyal or more valuable in terms of providing
new ideas and setting the tone of the Peace Corps organisation. Wofford combined a deep humanitarianism with a sensitivity for the practical requirements of a successful overseas programme—a synthesis seldom found in the executive branch of government. Bill Moyers was Shriver's brilliant and highly articulate aide-de-camp. Although only in his twenties, Moyers had already gained a wealth of experience in government and he used his acumen in guiding Shriver through the Congress and acting as troubleshooter on virtually every policy issue. The legal sword of the Peace Corps was Bill Josephson—another man in his twenties. An adept and—when needs be—ruthless lawyer, Josephson was an indispensable source of ideas and sound counsel. As Shriver recalled, "Josephson's careful legal work and boundless intellectual energy combined not only to keep us on the right track but to move us rapidly ahead, within, through, and sometimes around the bureaucracy of Washington."20

Warren Wiggins was a cool and superbly efficient professional bureaucrat who sensed that the Peace Corps was an opportunity to create something new and who broke many of the traditional rules of government in the process. Seated at the centre of the organisation, he designed the Peace Corps' programmes. One colleague felt that Wiggins best typified that unique blend of "enthusiasm and charisma with organization man" so characteristic of the Peace Corps.21

Neither Shriver nor any of his administrators had the reputation of their White House contemporaries—Bundy, McNamara, Rusk and the others. Yet, in some ways, Shriver
and his senior staff were as able as the men who surrounded Kennedy. Indeed, in the sense that the Peace Corps' officials worked off an idealistic base, it might be suggested that they had even more to offer. The famous "best and brightest" in the White House led America into Vietnam and a disastrous war; the less well-known, but equally talented members of the Peace Corps sent young Americans into the Third World to teach, minister to the sick and build bridges with other cultures. Indeed, President Kennedy's preference for the Peace Corps' chosen priorities was underlined when he told its staff members, "You have brought to government service a sense of morale and a sense of enthusiasm and really, commitment, which has been absent from too many governmental agencies for too many years". Moreover, Kennedy felt that the Peace Corps' idealism and general pursuit of excellence had set "an example for government service which I hope will be infectious". 22

In March 1963, James Reston of the New York Times wrote that "Of all the agencies of the Federal government, only the Peace Corps has surpassed the hopes and claims of the Kennedy administration". Although it was the youngest, most fragile organisation in Washington, he reported that it had developed "the spirit of innovation that was supposed to inspire the whole government when President Kennedy took over". Sadly, Reston observed, the Peace Corps "stands above the rest as the
only thing new and vigorous that has managed to avoid the pessimism of intractable problems.\textsuperscript{23} That the Peace Corps was able to maintain its fresh approach owed a great deal to its administrators. Many of them newcomers to government, they brought to Washington a unique blend of intelligence, irreverence and originality. Indeed, in the light of their tremendous enthusiasm and dedication to public service, it might be argued that they were truly the best and the brightest New Frontiersmen - certainly they were the most idealistic. As Bradley Patterson, the Peace Corps' first Executive Secretary put it: "More than any other agency of government, the Peace Corps personified the whole Kennedy philosophy of 'Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country'. And all of us believed it and lived it and felt we were part of an enterprise which was the personification of that philosophy.......it was a pleasure.\textsuperscript{24}
PART II

THE PEACE CORPS / VOLUNTEERS
CHAPTER NINE

THE RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND SELECTION OF VOLUNTEERS
"The Peace Corps will make every effort to ensure that the Volunteers who go abroad will be the cream-of-the-crop, talented, fit, well-adjusted and devoted American men and women."

- SARGENT SHRIVER -

(Statement of Peace Corps Policies With Respect To The Qualifications Of Peace Corps Volunteers, August, 1961)
A few days after the Peace Corps had been established by Executive Order, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson took Sargent Shriver aside and gave him some advice on the selection of Volunteers. "Do it like I did the Texas Youth Conservation Corps," said Johnson, "keep out the three 'C's'."

"The three 'C's'?

"The three 'C's'," repeated Johnson, "The Communists, the Consumptives and the Cocksuckers." In his own inimitable fashion, the Vice-President was telling Shriver that if the wrong type of person was selected to go overseas, the Peace Corps would face embarrassment at home and disaster abroad. Yet, in so many ways, Shriver was charting new territory. He had to recruit, train and select thousands of young people to go to strange new countries and perform tasks which Americans had never even attempted before. The only means of learning would be trial and error. After all, as Warren Wiggins recalled, at this stage, "no one even knew what a Peace Corps Volunteer looked like."'

Shriver's Report To The President of February, 1961, had deliberately left the opportunity for service open to as many American citizens as possible. Any single male or female over the age of eighteen could volunteer; marrieds also - so long as they had no dependents. Within early Peace Corps councils it had been argued that service should be restricted to skilled technicians and those with sophisticated academic qualifications. Shriver strongly disagreed; he felt there was so much work to be done in the underdeveloped world that any intelligent, caring, well-motivated American - whether
technically skilled or academically brilliant - should be given the opportunity to contribute. In the area of people-to-people contact, Shriver argued that an unskilled but enthusiastic "generalist" could do at least as well as a skilled but diffident technocrat. "There was no point in having just Ph.D's and mini-Nobel prizewinners in the boondocks," he recalled.  

Shriver's sentiments reinforced Kennedy's original aim of giving as many American youths as possible the chance to serve at a grassroots level in Third World countries. His Cow Palace proposal had been aimed primarily at the college senior completing his liberal arts degree (B.A.) - bright, healthy, interested in the outside world and well-educated in a general sense. Kennedy and Shriver knew that the "B.A. generalist" would be much more likely to give up two or three years of his life to service in an underdeveloped land than the qualified technician or tradesman already embarked upon a career. Nevertheless, many were sceptical of the abilities of the untrained, inexperienced B.A. generalists and of the wisdom of Shriver's decision to build the Peace Corps around them. Undaunted, Shriver told Kennedy in August 1961, that he was absolutely certain the Peace Corps could attract Volunteers who would personify the "motivation, vitality and democracy which distinguishes the new Kennedy administration."  

Despite his confidence, Shriver experienced some initial difficulty in finding sufficient numbers of suitable applicants - mostly because the Peace Corps paid only perfunctory attention to the recruitment function. In those early, frenetic days when an organisation had to be built, programmes developed and Congress faced, recruitment was left
to take care of itself. The level of popular interest in the Peace Corps had been such, that Shriver and his colleagues - somewhat naively - expected Volunteers to appear in droves without an intensive recruitment campaign. Indeed, the Peace Corps' official policy position was that it did not "recruit" but merely supplied "information." Shriver emphasised that while applicants need not be of the "Rhodes Scholar elite", service was an exceptional privilege open to only the very best of Americans. He was determined that Peace Corps advertising would not become a desperate "we need recruits" campaign; accordingly he issued a stern warning that the Peace Corps should never attempt to "enlist" people in the manner of the U.S. Marine Corps. A few advertisements were placed in the media, an information booth set up in Times Square and pamphlets dispersed sporadically on college campuses; but, basically, the Peace Corps waited and hoped that enough people would answer Kennedy's call of their own volition.

Answering that call was not as simple as it first appeared. In order to become a Volunteer, any interested person had to fulfil the rigorous requirements established by Dr. Nicholas Hobbs, the highly-experienced psychologist who became the Peace Corps' first Chief of Selection. On March 28, 1961, a conference on Peace Corps selection decided that applicants should take written tests rather than interviews since - as Hobbs argued - the latter had little or no "predictive efficiency". Any applicant had therefore to go through a substantial amount of paperwork before acceptance. There was first a comprehensive questionnaire which dealt with every aspect of his life, from medical history to legal status - including criminal convictions. Next, he had to nominate six referees whom the Peace Corps asked to supply
information on the applicant's emotional maturity, honesty, relationships with other people and so forth. Then a six-hour long Peace Corps Placement Exam consisting of general aptitude and language tests was conducted at some eight hundred regular Civil Service Commission centres around the country. The applicant also had to undergo a thorough medical examination. Physical and medical problems were not disqualifying factors per se; for instance, there were opportunities for the blind, crippled, diabetics and the like. Each case was judged on its merits depending upon the availability of assignments compatible with the applicant's condition. The information from the questionnaire, the letters of reference and the tests were collated and evaluated by a Peace Corps Assessment Team.

Applicants deemed suitable were then invited to training. The success rate was not high; between 1961 and 1963 only one out of every five applicants was selected for training.7

Training sites were chosen to match the skills and preferences of the applicant with a programme and a country where these would be best utilised. During training, applicants were observed and tested under conditions of stress. Meanwhile, their background was investigated by the Civil Service Commission, although, in some dubious cases — and before the Peace Corps bill had passed the Congress in 1961 — the F.B.I. undertook full-field investigations. A Peace Corps Selection Board made the final decision on which applicants would be invited to serve.

This careful and sometimes protracted procedure meant there was a world of difference between the expression of
good-natured interest in the Peace Corps and the time-consuming process of finding referees, answering difficult, personal questions and actually applying. At first Peace Corps administrators did not appreciate this difference; they took "interest" to be synonymous with "application". The error of their ways was very soon driven home.

In March, 1961, the Peace Corps received ten thousand letters of interest from would-be Volunteers. By the end of the month, application forms had been printed and distributed to all U.S. Post Offices. It looked like the Peace Corps was about to be overwhelmed by an avalanche of eager applicants. However, by the end of April, although letters of interest continued to pour in, it was clear that instead of the fifteen thousand applicants which Shriver had expected, only eight thousand people had actually returned questionnaires. This was little short of a disaster - made worse by Shriver's absence on a trip to Third World countries where he was busy informing foreign governments of the supposed vast numbers of young Americans anxious to serve. Warren Wiggins immediately cabled Shriver in New Delhi and told him that obtaining even an "adequate" supply of Volunteers was going to be a major problem. The rate of returned questionnaires did not exceed two hundred per week and was going down. "With each day it is becoming clearer," wrote Wiggins, "that recruitment is as important a Peace Corps task as program development." He proposed that all the Peace Corps' immediate energies should be concentrated on recruitment and that Bill Moyers should be placed in charge with Tom Quimby and Bill Haddad as his assistants. Accordingly, the Recruitment Division was transferred from the Office of Peace Corps Volunteers to the Office of Public Affairs under Bill Moyers. Nevertheless, even this "dynamic team" (as Wiggins described them) could not
produce thousands of applicants overnight. On May 7, 1961, *The New York Times* criticised the Peace Corps for its failure to provide enough specific data to the public. It also reported that Peace Corps applications were lagging far behind expectations. Despite the Peace Corps' prediction that seven thousand people would sit the first Placement Tests on May 27, officials were forced to admit that only half that number had attended.

In public, Shriver told *The New York Times* that, while numbers had undoubtedly fallen below expectations, he was pleased with the high calibre of those who had applied. In private, he admitted his extreme disappointment. He was worried that he would be unable to honour his commitments abroad and he feared the adverse impact of the mild response on the Congress. He plunged into the recruitment drive himself, asking businesses to grant leave of absence to those willing to volunteer and urging labour unions to guarantee re-employment rights to workers who wanted to join the Peace Corps. Subway and bus cards carrying information on Peace Corps service were printed and it was advertised on radio and television. By mid-June these efforts yielded ten thousand applications — enough to satisfy the first year's requests for Volunteers — but thereafter the daily rate dwindled steadily. If the Peace Corps was to reach its proposed target of seven and a half thousand Volunteers in the field by fiscal year 1962, more productive recruitment techniques would have to be found.

The popular response to the Peace Corps, as well as the polls undertaken by the *New York Times*, indicated there was a great reservoir of talent available for service but that the
free flow of information to potential applicants was impeded.\footnote{13} The problem was made worse by the administrative chaos rife in Peace Corps/Washington in those early days. Applications were lost, files were misplaced and enquiries sometimes had to wait three or four months for a reply. "Sooner or later," Bill Moyers told Shriver in July 1961, "this...is going to react against us and cause us serious trouble in recruiting and public relations."\footnote{14}

When a survey of the Peace Corps' accessibility to university and college students reported that the most serious weakness was lack of information on campus, Quimby immediately stepped up the recruitment drive.\footnote{15} The Peace Corps publicity machine churned out stories for newspapers and magazines, radio and television stations carried Peace Corps advertisement and the National Advertising Council donated its services for the preparation and distribution of publicity. Journalist Dave Garroway produced a highly-acclaimed film on the Peace Corps which was televised nationwide. Numerous brochures described specific activities and opportunities for service. Booklets were aimed at students, teachers, farmers, doctors, architects and engineers while a pamphlet called \textit{Two's Company} invited married couples to join. Another with the tongue-in-cheek title of \textit{You Can't Send A Girl There!} stressed equal opportunities for women while \textit{Over My Dead Body} sought to reassure anxious parents. At the same time, Sargent Shriver wrote hundreds of personal letters to college presidents, education boards and captains of industry, coaxing them to endorse the Peace Corps. His efforts did not go unrewarded. For instance, in 1962, the New York City Education Board was only the most prominent of many which allowed teachers leave of absence for Peace Corps service without loss of job or
And, in 1963 - at the personal request of Shriver - President Nathan Pusey of Harvard publicly encouraged his students to take the Peace Corps' Placement Tests.

To establish the crucial relationship with universities and colleges, Moyers brought in Samuel Babbit, former Dean of Men at Vanderbilt University.

Adopting a low-key approach, Babbit set up a single Peace Corps faculty contact on campuses all across the country with instructions to conduct a continuous non-aggressive information programme at each college. In this way, Babbit hoped to win the Peace Corps a reputation for honesty and integrity which - in the long-term - would bring a consistent flow of high-quality applicants. He refused to indulge in a mass, "hard-sell" campaign which might bring immediate results but would eventually damage the Peace Corps' image and attract the wrong type.

These various measures had the required effect. In 1962, the Peace Corps received 26,155 applications compared to 11,578 in 1961. The monthly rate of Volunteer Questionnaire went up by a massive 60 per cent from 1,286 in 1961 to 2,180 in 1962. (APPENDIX IX) Even so, recruitment could hardly keep pace with expansion. During 1962, the Peace Corps went through its most staggering period of growth. Established in eleven countries in December 1961, it moved into a further thirty in the following year, putting tremendous pressure on the Recruitment Division. This could not have come at a worse time, as the early months of 1963 saw a drastic decline in applications and the agency suffered one of its worst shortfalls. With more and more countries clamouring for Volunteers,
During a staff meeting in March 1963, Bob Gale (then Chief of Special Projects) criticised recruitment methods as "amateurish." He argued that the Peace Corps' efforts should be focused much more on college campuses than on agricultural and technical professions. "After all, that's where the young liberals were," recalled Gale. He advocated an in-depth, professional "sales" campaign. Attacking Babbit's methods as too timid, Gale said there was little point in having a solitary Peace Corps man on campus who put up a notice from time to time and then sat waiting for the students to come to him. Gale proposed that teams of well-briefed, enthusiastic Peace Corps officials should engage in "mass" or "blitz" recruitment drives on campuses all over America. To his complete surprise, Sargent Shriver agreed and gave him the job of organising this effort.\textsuperscript{18}

In the spring of 1963, Gale took several of the most attractive and persuasive Peace Corps/Washington staff members to the University of Wisconsin and began his "blitzkrieg" experiment. "The aim," the effervescent Gale told his colleagues, "is to raise all kinds of hell without being idiotic." Literature was handed out in bulk, classes were interrupted for Peace Corps "seminars", a colourful information booth was set up in the middle of campus and every senior student was openly solicited as a potential Peace Corps applicant. Gale's recruitment methods were forceful and aggressive – the opposite of Babbit's. They were also immediately effective. After one week, a total of four hundred and twenty six Wisconsin students had applied for Peace Corps service – approximately 10 per cent of the senior class.\textsuperscript{19}
With Gale's success in mind, the Peace Corps geared up for "saturation-bombing" of campuses. All available hands in Peace Corps/Washington - including Sargent Shriver - were pressed into service for a huge national recruitment drive. In 1963 and 1964, "Wisconsin Plan" teams visited over two thousand campuses from New York to California. Simultaneously, a continuous stream of information flowed from the Office of Public Affairs. Over fifty Peace Corps Service Councils - composed mainly of friends and relatives of Volunteers - were established to assist the Peace Corps by giving talks at junior colleges, high schools and local community meetings. Hundreds of returned Volunteers also participated in the massive recruitment campaign. Bob Gale estimated that over seven hundred speeches on the Peace Corps were given monthly. This stupendous effort produced an unprecedented number of applicants. By the end of 1963, 40,000 Americans had actually volunteered, while letters of interest came in at the rate of 7,000 per week - compared to 3,000 in 1962. Shriver estimated a further 55,000 applications would arrive in 1964.

Yet, despite this astonishing success - in terms of numbers - not everyone was gratified at the Peace Corps' sometimes over-zealous pursuit of recruitment goals. Ever-vigilant evaluators warned of the evils of excess and the grave danger of becoming over-anxious to "sign up" people for their two years service. "Under cover of an information campaign," wrote evaluator David Gelman, "the Marines had long since landed."

Gelman and other critics felt the Peace Corps' mass recruitment methods too often lacked taste, restraint and honesty. "The final failure of team recruiting is that its effects on our great uncaptured mass of potential Volunteers are about as enduring as those of a travelling circus," wrote
Gelman, "once the sawdust is swept up, there's nothing left but the odour of performing elephants." In terms of cost alone, by 1964 the Peace Corps was spending two million dollars on recruitment. The Recruitment Division developed such a neurosis about big numbers and rapid growth that Gelman accused it of trying every trick and advertising device in the book short of "dropping questionnaires from aeroplanes." On more than one occasion, Peace Corps recruiters were seen "grabbing a student and forcing him to listen to a spiel on the Peace Corps." A member of the original advance team at Wisconsin outlined the recruiter's general line of persuasion to the senior students: "Go ahead and take the test - it doesn't obligate you - you can always change your mind - two years out of school might do you good - etc." However, he admitted that since almost every final-year student was encouraged to apply, there was the distinct possibility of "picking up some real kooks." The "mass" technique certainly pushed up the quantity of applicants but the quality became increasingly mixed. One recruit expressed his disillusion: "I thought we were something special. Then I saw that they were just pulling people off the streets and testing them later."

In the Washington headquarters, David Gelman felt, "we have allowed ourselves to get hooked on the aphrodisiac of Instant Results." He called for the complete abolition of recruitment in name and in fact and for a return to Sam Babbit's subtle approach - building small, year-round Peace Corps support constituencies on campuses. Gelman warned that unless the imperative of "growth" was supplanted by an imperative of "improvement" then the Peace Corps would not only continue to acquire too many "high risk" applicants but -
by its avaricious methods - would also drink dry the well of potential recruits. Before very long his prophecy rang true. From 1964 onwards the level of Peace Corps applications steadily declined. In May, 1965, Bob Gale admitted, "With few exceptions, we are coming back from schools with fewer and fewer numbers. Results from team recruiting are down 22 per cent from last year." 29

A more general criticism of the style of Peace Corps recruitment throughout this period was that all too often it succumbed to "Madison Avenue hoopla" and took to "selling the Peace Corps the way ad-men sell Volkswagens." 30 Volunteers consistently criticised the travelogue style and holiday brochure-type content of some of the Peace Corps' recruitment literature. For instance, in Peace Corps advertisements Nepal was depicted as "The Land of The Yeti and Everest"; in Venezuela, another Volunteer had been told by a recruiter to "Bring your bathing suit, the swimming is great." 31 It was not uncommon for committed recruiters to over-emphasise the "opportunities" which the Peace Corps could offer the Volunteer at the expense of the "service" which the Volunteer could offer the peoples of the developing world. Evaluator Tim Adams described Peace Corps/Washington's recruitment blurb as a "you-too-can-be-a-world-saver" approach which often misled the public and the Volunteer. 32 David Gelman also condemned the Recruitment Division's glib, eye-catching publicity and the "enormous quantity of dishonest or simply inaccurate twaddle uttered in the name of informing the public." Indeed, he classified some Peace Corps recruitment drives as "mass misinformation campaigns." 33 Most irritating was the concentration on the theme of "Volunteer service in the boondocks" or "living in a mud-hut under arduous
conditions." In reality, the majority of Volunteers lived comfortably in cities or towns.

Gelman and other evaluators persistently called for a more serious and thoughtful information programme that would attract the most sincere motivations for service rather than the most superficial:

"To do this we have to generate some serious public dialogue on the lessons and values of public service as we have experienced it. We have to do this in the popular press as well as in the college press, the education journals, the political science journals, the psychology journals, the trade publications and the house organs... Instead of concentrating on press handouts, Sunday Supplement puffery, poster art and slick brochures, we ought to bend our P.R. efforts to promoting such dialogues on a perceptive level... we could be making our own contribution to the professional journals. By neglecting such journals in the past, we have overlooked an important avenue of communication with faculty members whose influence on the college generation is obviously considerable."34

This sort of criticism had some effect. Towards the end of 1963, the Peace Corps began to remedy some of its weaknesses. A new poster campaign stressed "16 hour days", "monotony", "bloodthirsty mosquitoes" and "one fraction of the results you'd hoped for." A more ironical spirit entered Peace Corps pamphlet literature. "This is how the Peace Corps measures success" proclaimed a picture of one inch on a ruler; the caption beneath a picture of a solitary shovel was "The Peace Corps brings idealists down to earth." Young Americans were told why they should not join the Peace Corps: "You were expecting romance? glamor? Then forget about the Peace Corps. One huge poster showed two identical pictures; one was titled "Before Peace Corps", the other "After Peace Corps". The blunt went on to explain why Volunteers should not expect their Peace Corps service to change the world overnight. David Gelman claimed that this deflationary approach was more
commensurate with "the modest spirit of the Volunteers and the unspectacular realities of their overseas experience."35

Peace Corps recruitment in the Kennedy era was sometimes carried out in a shoddy fashion. Its advertising often glamourised overseas service and the "blitz" approach to recruitment was a short-sighted and indeed, a potentially disastrous development. On his return to Washington after two years in Nigeria, Roger Landrum, one of the first and most perceptive Volunteers, advised the Peace Corps hierarchy to make radical changes in recruitment procedures and in the tone of Peace Corps publicity in general:

"By using its current methods of approach the Peace Corps is losing the very people it needs to make the Corps strong. Recruiters, should address themselves to particular audiences within the colleges and universities, rather than gearing to everyone in general. By being more sophisticated, recruiters can reach the segment of the campus population that the Peace Corps is really interested in sending overseas. The literature that is being distributed does not convey the proper message, nor does it create the proper image of the Peace Corps to the people that we should want as Volunteers. Some of my friends have said that after reading various Peace Corps brochures, they felt that the Peace Corps was too superficial an organisation. A solution to the problem would be to add more insight and a fuller picture to the Peace Corps informational material and to cut-out the Madison Avenue approach."36

Bill Moyers, a dogged fighter against both the "numbers" approach and publicity gimmicks, reminded Shriver that "for the Peace Corps...recruiting is never a matter of induction; we can't draft anyone, and if we set up appeals ('opportunity to learn about other people', 'travel' etc...) beyond the basic desire of an individual to involve himself in this program simply because he feels it is worth doing, we will fail."37

Yet, despite these justifiable criticisms, Peace Corps
recruitment had achieved its most important goal. In March 1961, there was not a single Peace Corps recruit; by December 1963, some 78,000 completed application forms had been received. The "quality" of these applicants was a controversial subject meriting further discussion. Although, one major argument against the charge that the Recruitment Division sought big numbers at any price, was that between 1961 and 1963, a mere 20 per cent of all applicants were deemed of high enough calibre to be invited to training. Furthermore, at its height, the Peace Corps received applications from less than 5 per cent of the graduating classes of American colleges and universities. Considering these figures, the chronic shortage of time, the importance of making an immediate impact on public consciousness and the difficulty of actually persuading people to give up two years of their lives in service, the Peace Corps' recruitment function could be said to have served its purpose marvellously well.

Although recruitment was one of Sargent Shriver's most serious problems, devising an appropriate training procedure seemed even more intractable. A number of options were available. The Peace Corps, could set up its own training centres around the country or establish a single Peace Corps Academy in Washington, or use the facilities of private organisations like International Voluntary Services and the Experiment in International Living. Alternatively - and more obviously - the Peace Corps could use the services of higher education. This expedient won the day - but not without heated discussion. Although colleges and universities seemed the best qualified bodies to prepare educational programmes overseas, some Peace Corps staff members -
notably Warren Wiggins and Bill Kelly - were worried that academics might push training in a theoretical rather than a practical direction. After all, the whole point of the Peace Corps Volunteer was to be a "doer" more than a "thinker." Against this, it was indisputable that colleges and universities had the experience, the educational resources and staff, and the space to accommodate Peace Corps trainees. Moreover, they could begin training programmes without delay and, in those early days, time was always a crucial factor. By taking up an immediate partnership with higher educational institutions, the Peace Corps could save valuable months during that hectic summer of 1961. Besides, Shriver was eager to involve as many Americans as possible in the new experiment. Contracting out the training function to colleges and universities across the country seemed a convenient and significant way of accomplishing this.

In its first two years, the Peace Corps cooperated with over seventy academic institutions. This extension into the world of higher education had a salutary domestic impact. Not only were students and their families made aware of the Peace Corps' presence but, as Dr. Virgil Hancher, President of Iowa State University noted, training programmes also had a beneficial effect on faculties:

"The members of our faculty are having to come together across disciplines. They are having to think through old problems of education freshly and to tackle new ones. Along with the Peace Corps trainees, they are learning, learning how to teach languages in the new method, how to teach area studies better...The project is increasing the international dimension of the State University of Iowa. This international dimension is being shared, in various ways, with the people of the state." 39

Colleges and universities usually took on training programmes during the summer months when lecturers had time to devote
sufficient attention to the Peace Corps and Volunteers could take up rooms in the dormitories vacated by regular students. Academic institutions received a welcome addition to their revenues at 211 dollars per trainee per week.\textsuperscript{40} In return, the Peace Corps gained the knowledge and advice of academia's area experts, linguists and psychologists. This marriage between the Peace Corps and higher education was subject to frequent breakdowns of communication and administration. Yet, as Donald Shea, head of the Peace Corps Training Center at the University of Wisconsin noted, "it developed into one of the most challenging and potentially one of the most mutually profitable educational partnerships between the Federal government and higher education."\textsuperscript{41}

In Peace Corps/Washington, there was debate as to whether training should be brief and relaxed or lengthy and competitive. Since Shriver wanted Volunteers in the field as soon as possible, the shortest method had obvious attractions. Some private voluntary agencies, such as I.V.S. and V.S.O., had worked quite successfully without rigorous training procedures; but these had been basically small-scale programmes. Shriver concluded that it would court disaster to thrust large numbers of young Americans into developing countries without thorough preparation. During a staff discussion on training methods for the first group of Volunteers - bound for Tanganyika and Ghana - Shriver decided upon an eight to ten week intensive training period. He described the enormity of the task facing the Peace Corps in setting up a brand new training system:
"We found that we had to choose men and women of differing backgrounds, occupations, and education and in 90 days, equip them to contribute their skills effectively within societies and cultures far different from any they had ever known. Men ranging from University presidents and professors to labor leaders, mountain climbers and veterans of African safaris streamed into Washington to help us develop radically new and intensive curricula. We had to teach languages as rapidly and intensively as had ever been attempted. Some of the languages were so exotic that we found ourselves writing our own textbooks and dictionaries, to teach, for example, Somali, Tshi, and Pasar Malay."

From the beginning, Shriver was insistent that training should be job-oriented and the project, not academic theory, would define its nature. To guard against the danger of training becoming too "academic", Shriver assigned a Peace Corps Training Officer to every educational institution. This officer, often a professional educator, supervised all aspects of the training schedule - from choosing the university or college where the programme would be most suitably established to collaboration with lecturers on its implementation. The Training Officer was the official Peace Corps representative to both the educational institutions and the trainees. Thus the Peace Corps retained a considerable amount of control even though training programmes were administered by a wide variety of educational institutions.

The Office of Programmes Development and Operations produced a document entitled "Form 104" which described the skills, knowledge and other materials needed for each country project. These 104's were among the most important documents in the Peace Corps because they shaped both overseas and domestic training programmes. For every 104, a distinct training programme had to be devised. This guaranteed that the training element would always be vital.
and flexible. As ever, Shriver would have no truck with a didactic approach.

Adaptability was also the watchword of the Peace Corps' first Chief of Training, Dr. Joseph Kauffman, a former President of the University of Rhode Island. While he realised that each educational institution had its own distinctive character, Kauffman established eight basic components for "the preparation of a Volunteer for effective service overseas." Firstly, Technical Studies gave the Volunteer a grounding in the knowledge and skills required to perform the specified job overseas. To deal with the historical, economic, political and cultural aspects of the host country, there was an Area Studies course. Language Studies concentrated on conversation practice and technical terms appropriate to the work assignment. The history of the American democratic process as well as contemporary social and economic problems were included under American Studies. International politics and the role of the United States was analysed in a course on World Affairs; this also attempted to instruct trainees on how to deal with communist subversion in the Third World. Physical training and Recreational Studies included learning about and practising host country sports and pastimes. Health training and Medical Studies advised the Volunteer on necessary precautions for personal hygiene in underdeveloped countries and gave him a basic introduction to First Aid. Lastly, a general orientation course encompassed the aims and organisation of the Peace Corps and the Volunteers' role within it.

These eight basic components were taught by a variety
of methods of instruction: lectures, discussions, seminars, field work and films. The time allocated to each differed according to the training institution, the type of technical skill required and the desired degree of language proficiency. For instance, Volunteers going to teach in English-speaking Africa, did not need to spend as much time on language studies as those going to community development projects in Latin America. If engineers bound for Tanganyika were already professionals then the technical studies section of their course could be modified. Flexibility was the key. In general, Peace Corps groups received training according to a three-phase pattern. Eight to ten weeks at a college or university in the United States; two or four weeks field training at one of the Peace Corps' outdoor camps; finally, a brief one or two week period of "in-country" training overseas.

A typical campus schedule would have the trainees in class from 7.00 a.m. to 10.00 p.m., six days a week. Outdoors training programmes were even more demanding. They sought to give Volunteers a "feel" for the situation they would face overseas. For example trainees bound for social work in Colombian city slums were given on-the-job training in New York City's Spanish Harlem. A group for Nepal was trained outdoors in mountainous Colorado. New Mexican Indian Reservations and Spanish-speaking villages provided appropriate environments for community development trainees. The island of Hawaii, with its multi-racial population, remote valleys and a varied rural economy, performed a similar function for Volunteers headed for Southeast Asia. The Peace Corps' own training camps in Puerto Rico were modelled on the British Outward Bound
school camps. Dawn rises, two-mile runs, half-day hikes through the wilderness, obstacle courses and mountain climbing became standard fare. Many Volunteers, particularly older ones, complained that this extreme physical exertion was all rather unnecessary. However, Bill Delano, the senior staff member who devised the programme, explained that the idea was to prepare Volunteers for "stress-type" situations in the field - psychological and physical. Delano argued that strenuous exercise sections were beneficial to people who had never lived a rough, outdoors life. It was also designed to induce a psychological control of fear. For example, Volunteers were sometimes required to survive for three hours in the water by learning "drown-proofing" techniques. "The idea was to test the Volunteers to the limit before they went abroad," recalled Delano.

Training was the most visible domestic aspect of the Peace Corps and as such, very important in terms of impact on the American public. The early training programmes were constantly featured in magazines and newspapers. Everyone wanted to read about this new breed of American - the Volunteer. Reporters filed into the Peace Corps' two field camps in Puerto Rico - named Crozier and Radley after Volunteers killed in a plane crash - to see trainees swinging through trees, scaling sheer cliffs and being thrown into rivers bound hand and foot. As Gerald Bush, a staff member in the Training Division put it, "The ten-hour day, six-day week with calisthenics at 5.00 a.m. became a part of the Peace Corps image." The media gave unstinting praise to the Peace Corps' adventurous training techniques. They seemed a step in the right direction - away from the boring Foreign Service instruction manuals and the stultifying procedures
of the State Department and A.I.D. The Nation forecast that the Peace Corps' methods would imbue Volunteers with "visions of what they could do for the underdog, the torch of learning they would carry to remote and illiterate settlements, the prosperity they would spread with their American knowledge and skill, the sanitary latrines and clean water supplies they would create, the misery they would erase." Unfortunately, training for the Peace Corps was never that simple. Indeed, in their revisionist analysis of the Peace Corps - Keeping Kennedy's Promise - Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas reckoned, "The great majority of Volunteers have been sent abroad without sufficient skill, without sufficient language ability, without sufficient cultural awareness."

Since the Peace Corps was virtually flying blind, the early training programmes were fraught with error. "It was like declaring war without having trained the army at hand" recalled Doug Kiker, Chief of the Peace Corps' Division of Public Information. There was such a dearth of relevant experience, many of the difficulties involved simply could not have been anticipated. Training chief Joseph Kauffman admitted, "Our first programmes often suffered from a lack of contemporary area studies information, precise job information or ambiguity of the structure within which Volunteers would operate." Only when Volunteers actually got into the field could the Peace Corps begin to learn how it might improve its training methods. Given these precarious beginnings, it was not surprising that early programmes were patchy. As Peace Corps consultant Robert Textor wrote, "The quality of training has ranged from
Some of the Training Division's most serious problems stemmed from the 104's sent out by the Office of Programme Development and Operations (P.D.O.). These were often hastily written, nebulous programme descriptions. Yet, the training courses had to be built around them. Hence the Training Division laboured under the handicap of having to prepare Volunteers for vague and sometimes even non-existent jobs. A badly written 104 could render the most competent training course irrelevant. However, even when programmes were well researched and described; there often remained a basic misunderstanding between trainers and programmers. The Training Division sought to prepare the Volunteer for a specific job overseas; but P.D.O. was more concerned with creating a general setting for the Volunteer in which he could create his own "role" - the specific job was only one aspect of this. In an evaluation report on Senegal, David Hapgood pointed out this profound contradiction in aims between Peace Corps training and programming: "The jobs the Volunteers will do in Senegal are highly unstructured, but the training is highly structured. This is like training for cabinet-making in order to run cross-country. It just is not relevant."52

Irrelevance was one of the major charges levelled against the Training Division in the Kennedy era. Charles Peters and his colleagues in the Evaluation Division consistently complained to Sargent Shriver that Peace Corps instructors were not giving trainees the realistic preparation necessary for going overseas. For instance, 70 per cent of Volunteers were actually located in other than isolated and rural communities, yet the approach in very good to very poor."51
training was strongly oriented towards the standard image of the Volunteer working alone in the boondocks. "He misled the trainees badly," wrote Tim Adams in a 1963 evaluation report on East Pakistan. "No one levelled with them about the harsh realities. They were hoodwinked into believing everything was all set. As a result, their disillusion upon arrival was magnified by their sense of betrayal." In the early training programmes, Volunteers were led to expect well-planned jobs and immediate results. This rarely proved to be the case. In 1963, evaluator Paul Jacobs stressed that "much more emphasis should be given in training to convince the Volunteers that they are workers in the vineyard and that they may not be around to see the crop harvested." The failure to prepare Volunteers for the probable frustration awaiting them overseas became a consistent criticism of training programmes. "Given the hopeful American nature, its naivete, lack of experience and susceptibility, we are just not training our Volunteers well enough," reported David Gelman in 1962. "I am not talking about American Studies or First Aid, I am talking about their whole disposition to the experience - mainly the frustration that awaits them." Training courses tended to emphasise constant activity and job satisfaction. However, many Volunteers found that boredom and frustration could be just as common. As one discontented Volunteer teacher in Sierra Leone put it:

"They just don't tell it to you the right way in training. It's not romantic. It's hot, sweaty and tedious. It's not the challenge of the mud-hut and all that - that would be too easy. It's the challenge of the principal changing schedules on you every day and sending two teachers to the same class. It's the unruliness of the students, the indifference of the other teachers...That's what they ought to tell you in training."
The Peace Corps was obliged to rely upon academia to provide training personnel. At Georgetown University in February, 1963, Sargent Shriver described the work of the Peace Corps' academic trainers as "wonderful... The fundamental, big, dramatic fact is that, from the very beginning, training given to the Volunteers by the American academic community has been superb." However, despite Shriver's polite tribute, the training programmes supervised by academics were far from flawless. The essential difficulty stemmed from the early debate on whether Volunteers should be trained as "thinkers" or "doers". Some of the academic lectures were sublimely irrelevant to the conditions which Volunteers actually found overseas. Academics tended to concentrate on scholarly texts and abstract theories whereas Shriver and the Peace Corps' Training Officers on campus wanted the emphasis placed firmly on "action". In 1963, Charles Peters tried to define a happy medium:

"I would like to discuss the difficulty of getting the conventional academic disciplines to focus their attention on the problems our Volunteers will actually encounter overseas. We are not preparing these people to write learned treatises; we are preparing them to live and work in a foreign country. For example, a good American is likely to arrive in an under-developed country with a respect for work, a concern for the individual and a spirit of democratic informality that are lacking in his counterparts. Unless the Volunteer understands these differences and has done some thinking about the difficult decisions that he will have to make as to what to say and do in light of these differences, he may have some unhappy experiences and make some serious mistakes. Training must help him understand the attitudes of the people with whom he will be working. Training must illuminate the differences between their attitudes and typical American attitudes. It must not waste time telling a trainee that King Bumboo overthrew King Schook in 1622 unless that fact helps the Volunteer understand the people he is working with." 58
In 1961 and 1962 this conflict between the theory and practice of training a Volunteer caused some friction between the Peace Corps and higher education; it also led to difficulties for the trainees. One of the more egregious examples was an agricultural extension project for the Sao Francisco Valley in Brazil, trained by the faculties at the University of Oklahoma and Kansas State University. Once overseas, Volunteers complained that their instruction had borne little relation to the field situation. Only one of their instructors had had any practical, first-hand experience of Brazil and "half the professors did not even know the name of the Brazilian President."

One Volunteer claimed bitterly, "The professors knew they did not have the proper material to feed us. Their attitude was one of hoping for a Lourdes miracle to rescue the program - but it never came off."59

The training programme at the California Polytechnic Institute for a teaching project in Morocco left its participants almost totally dissatisfied. The area studies course was biased (with Moroccan politics and history given a strongly pro-monarchist interpretation), the physical education was regarded as a "joke" and the health training "repetitious". One Volunteer concluded, "Our lectures were all by incompetents." The trainer in health care admitted to the Volunteers that he knew nothing about Morocco - so he showed them his slides of a big game safari in East Africa!60

The lack of coordination between the various courses was another regular complaint. Trainees bound for Ceylon in 1962 criticised the faculty at the University of Pennsylvania for totally ignoring the rather sensitive local political situation. On investigation, it was discovered the American studies lecturer had left that particular aspect of training to the area studies lecturer and vice-versa.61

One of the most persistent criticisms of academic trainers was that all too often they had never been to the countries on which they were giving instruction. Indeed at a Peace Corps conference on training and selection in June 1963, Charles Peters said he had occasionally
been "appalled at the gap between what is known about a program overseas and what is known about it at the training center." Not infrequently, lecturers were chosen more because they happened to be regular faculty members of the training institution than because they were experts on a specific subject. Peters attacked this playing of academic politics: "When we find a Project Director (the academic in charge of a training programme) engaging a lecturer because that lecturer can do a favor for him, we do not like it." He also rebuked academics for not being absolutely frank about their training capabilities. Just because a university had, for example, a department of Latin American Studies, did not necessarily mean it was capable of preparing Volunteers to do community development work in Uruguay. Yet, for reasons of prestige and finance, colleges or universities rarely refused to administer training programmes when asked. Peters hinted that academia had not always given the Peace Corps value for money:

"An example of what I mean is that occasionally we have found ourselves stuck with programs in which there are 20 or more different lecturers in each course. Upon investigation we learn the reason is that the school has a rule against extra compensation for its faculty working in outside activities such as Peace Corps training programs; and therefore the work has to be spread around for no extra pay. One time, the no-extra-pay rule resulted in the following situation: The Peace Corps training program started September 1, the regular school term started September 20. Almost all of the contribution of the school faculty was compressed into the period September 1-20. The program was wildly distorted, but the faculty got their extra pay." 63

Thus, the relationship with academic training institutions was not always as "wonderful" as Shriver had described it. The Peace Corps had been obliged to use them because shortage of time left it with little other choice. For its part, higher education never seemed quite sure of what the Peace Corps was trying to do. Hence, it attempted to produce its usual academic product. In most cases, that was exactly what the Peace Corps did not want.
However, by no means all the evils which bedevilled Peace Corps training could be laid at the door of academia. The training Division itself made some fundamental errors. Probably the most blatant was the failure to concentrate on language training. At Syracuse University, language was treated as an "afterthought"; it was six weeks before the trainees bound for Malawi had an instructor who knew the native tongue. Likewise, to trainees going to a teaching project in Morocco it seemed that instruction in French at the California Polytechnic Institute was "squeezed into odd spots in the program.... for teachers, they scrounged around among the student body and found some Lebanese students whom they used."

In 1963 Eugene Burdick and William Lederer—authors of The Ugly American—wrote an evaluation report on the Peace Corps in the Philippines. "We are convinced," they said, "that a successful Peace Corps operation is dependent upon language facility more than any other single factor. The Volunteers we found to be operating at a high degree of capacity, accepted in the barrios and integrated into their communities, were those who had mastered the language. Volunteer morale and frustration was also linked directly to language facility."

Between 1961 and 1963, evaluators consistently complained that too many Volunteers were sent overseas without sufficient proficiency in the languages of their host countries. In Brazil, evaluators Herb Wegner and Paul Vanderwood estimated that 55 per cent of Volunteers had language deficiencies to the point where "their entire effort is seriously hindered." In a report on Ethiopia in 1964, Richard Richter made a scathing attack on the Training Division's continued inadequacy in language training. The Peace Corps' publicity picture of Volunteers dedicatedly pursuing their hosts' languages he described as "one of the greater triumphs of modern press-agentry. Except for Latin America and French Africa, the picture is a lie."
In later years, Sargent Shriver made sure that much more training time was devoted to language instruction. When, in 1963, an evaluation report on Afghanistan informed him that Volunteers were not at all fluent in Farsi, he immediately ordered the Peace Corps Rep there - Bob Steiner - to "get into action on this language situation." Indeed, acting on the advice of Charles Peters, Shriver sent out a letter to all Peace Corps missions in 1963 which explicitly ordered Reps to make "continued efforts to upgrade language competence." Furthermore by the end of that year, Shriver had allocated more than half of every training programme's time to language instruction.67

A lack of detail and sometimes relevance, was a criticism of the Peace Corps' technical studies programmes. For example, the majority of Volunteers were sent to the underdeveloped countries as teachers; for most of them it was their first classroom experience. Yet although they were given lectures on education, training provided very little teaching practice.

Again Volunteers in Uruguay complained that although they had received general instruction on agricultural extension at Iowa State University, there had been far too much emphasis on "how we grow this in Iowa" instead of a concentration on the adaptation of these techniques to the very different conditions they would find on Latin American farms. At Indiana State University, Volunteers in training for a construction programme in Tunisia were annoyed that they were not given even the most elementary facts about conditions on building-sites in northern Africa; instead, everything was based on American methods. Similarly, agricultural workers in Panama received no instruction on how to combat swarming ants or use compost in tropical soils; trainee builders were told nothing of how to construct a bridge, drill a well or mend a fence with local tools. In an indictment of the Training Division's technical studies programmes in 1964, evaluator Dee Jacobs argued it was high
time the Peace Corps realised that the Volunteer who was not properly
trained in a relevant skill would find difficulty being effective
overseas — "The B.A. generalist who has a degree and nothing else, is a poor
risk."

The U.S. Congress had insisted that Volunteers be trained to
counteract possible communist attempts to subvert them. However, in its
eyears the Training Division was wont to devote too much time to the
euphemistically entitled "World Affairs" courses. In 1961,
trainees preparing for the first teaching programme in Ghana spent less time
learning Twi than they did on the theory and practice of Marxism.69
Every Volunteer was furnished with a pamphlet called What You Must Know
About Communism. Yet no section of the Peace Corps' training programme
was more disliked by the Volunteers - mostly because they found it boring
and irrelevant. The Training Division's approach to communism was
usually based on a theoretical Marxist dialectic rather than on local
situations overseas and how they might affect Volunteers. In an
evaluation report on the Dominican Republic in 1962, Charles Peters noted
that Volunteers there adjudged their instruction on communism "a
waste of time... in agreement with the majority of Volunteers everywhere."
Most Volunteers advocated that less training time should be devoted
to the Cold War and more spent on "the real jobs and questions asked -
Birmingham, Jazz, the Twist, Mahalia Jackson, Ray Charles and Johnny
Halliday." Indeed, one Volunteer's major criticism of his instructors
was, "they taught us nothing about American Jazz."71 In December, 1962,
Charles Peters recommended to Shriver that the "anti-communist" section of
training should be completely abolished.72 Although this was never
quite achieved - the Congress would have been loath to allow it -
by the end of 1963, the amount of time allocated to it in training
had been sealed down to a few hours.

Between 1961 and 1963, a plethora of other minor deficiencies plagued
Peace Corps training. At first, instructors preferred to avoid giving
explicit advice on sexual behaviour. However, after reports of sexual
indiscretion in various countries, the Training Division concurred
with David Gelman that ignorance of the sexual mores of a foreign culture could prove "disastrous - for the Volunteers themselves and for their project." First aid instruction was another weakness.

Training for emergencies at Iowa State University consisted of two firemen reading the First Aid manual out loud. Too much emphasis on physical exercise was another minor annoyance. Volunteers frequently complained that the real challenges they had to face were not physical exertion and hardship but tedium and frustration. One Volunteer in Tanganyika only half-jokingly suggested that rather than sliding down ropes and climbing mountains, training programmes might better consist of "days being waited on hand-and-foot by a servant." Some trainees disliked the dormitory environment of campus programmes. They resented the reinforcement of college-type discipline which they thought they had just escaped. Two former Volunteers, David Hapgood and Meridan Bennett, claimed that the trainee had less autonomy than a college freshman: "He was bedded in a dormitory, tumbled out at an arbitrary hour, fed in a prescribed place at a prescribed time. He hardly had time to sleep far less to think - it was like boot camp." A few training programmes were too unwieldy, like the first Philippines programme made up of one hundred and eighty Volunteers, and a subsequent programme for Ethiopia of three hundred. Others tried to cram far too many subject into too little time. Some of those subjects were extremely esoteric. Trainees for Liberia at the University of Pittsburgh, complained that a disproportionate amount of time had been spent learning about the life cycle of the mosquito.

Without a doubt, the Training Division's greatest failure was its often futile attempts to prepare Volunteers for the various cross-cultural differences which would confront them overseas. Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas wrote that Peace Corps training "failed to reveal the cultural structure and
subtleties that make the host country function...failed to prepare Volunteers for the minor annoyances that drive many to cynical denigration of the entire culture." Inevitably, some crass errors were perpetrated. An area studies course at the University of Minnesota crudely lumped together East and West Pakistan as a single cultural entity. Instructors for a programme in Sierra Leone did not bother to find out that the national sport was soccer; thus, Volunteers were overseas readily prepared to establish friendly relations by encouraging basketball practice. However, most of training's cross-cultural weaknesses originated from the dire lack of relevant past experience. Few Americans had a deep understanding of the sophisticated cultures of the developing countries. It was only after years of directing programmes that Peace Corps trainers came to realise that every country had not just one cultural pattern but many complex ones - each with its own subtle nuances. Joseph Kauffman admitted that awareness of "a third or fourth culture within the host country could be a significant factor in the success or failure of Volunteers." Although unavoidable, the lack of detailed cross-cultural understanding in training programmes was, in many ways, the Volunteers' most disabling weakness in the field. They often criticised training lectures for "beautifying" native peoples. Volunteers in Senegal complained that their instructors had given them great expectations of being welcomed with open arms by a nation of poor but eager workers. Reality came as a brutal shock. They found an elite that was indolent and corrupt - more interested in prestige than production - and a mass that was apathetic and difficult to arouse to new forms of endeavour. One Volunteer in Afghanistan told Charles Peters that the widespread apathy and lack of incentive had been his deepest disappointment; he was bitter that training had not warned him about "people spitting or blowing their nose in public - sometimes on you - the tendency not to plan but to live from day to day, and the widespread homosexuality." In Iran, Volunteers
experienced severe difficulty in adjusting to the constant "one-upmanship" practised by the natives and the widespread suspicion of all Americans because they were associated with the Shah and repression. The training programme for the Dominican Republic had left Volunteers ignorant of the fact that men raised four or five families simultaneously and that 70 per cent of births were illegitimate. A Volunteer in Nigeria was completely disillusioned to find that not all the students who came to visit him were just being friendly — but were sometimes looking for hand-outs or acting as pimps for native women.

In some Third World countries, cheating, stealing and graft were accepted as normal, everyday occurrences — but the Volunteers learned little of this beforehand. Training programmes for Africa often overlooked cities and the special kinds of problems raised in them by the clash of tribal tradition with industrial modernisation. Volunteers working in the Near East were obliged to adapt to a strange phenomenon which they later dubbed "The Asian State Of Mind", depending on interpretation, this could be used to describe the relaxation, solitude loneliness or underemployment which affected them in the developing countries of Asia. Early training courses missed out on these important cross-cultural dimensions — much to the discomfort of Volunteers. "Ten minutes after a guy is in this country," said on highly critical Volunteer in Tanganyika, "he knows more than he was given in a hundred and fifty hours of training."

Overall however, Peace Corps training had at least as many virtues as vices. The quality and value of a training programme depended on the individual Volunteers, instructors and institution involved. Trainees for a community development project in Peru assessed Cornell University very highly. They had been given a practical, technical training, and, since almost all the lecturers had been to Peru, the area-studies course was first-class. Volunteer nurses going to Tanganyika felt their training at Syracuse University had been excellent. The language instruction in Swahili had been effective and analyses of local conditions were full and
accurate. One girl exclaimed, "In some ways we know more than the people
born and raised here." Evaluator Richard Richter reported that trainee
teachers bound for Ghana gave the faculty at Berkeley "rave notices...it can
be said that nearly all Volunteers feel they were well prepared for the
Ghanaian situation by the training program." Joe Walsh, a trainee at the
University of New Mexico in 1962 for an agricultural extension project in
Guatemala felt that his instructors had given him the best possible
preparation. He was taught how to vaccinate pigs, raise chickens and
dig wells; moreover, he described the outdoors field training on an
Indian Reservation as "an eye-opener." Indeed, most Volunteers
appreciated the Peace Corps' outdoor training courses, whether
carried out in Puerto Rico or some other appropriate location.
Notwithstanding the minor complaints about extreme physical exertion,
many Volunteers considered the outdoors camps to have been the very best part
of their training schedule. For instance, Volunteers in Malawi deemed
the Puerto Rico field camp to have been the single most important factor
in preparing them for their overseas environment.

There were so many variables to be taken into account that it is
difficult to generalise about the "quality" of training. Language
training for a community development project in Panama in 1963
was done at four different institutions. Volunteers reckoned it had
been "good" at the University of Missouri, "average" at the University
of Wisconsin and "downright bad" at Berkeley and Arizona State University.
Trainees at the University of Oklahoma bound for Bolivia found their
area studies lectures particularly good in a generally excellent training
programme. However, the eccentric lecturer who had concentrated on
military strategy during the "World Affairs" course was deemed a "nut."
At Georgetown University, trainees going to Afghanistan thought that the
Peace Corps /Washington personnel who participated in their programme
were "rah-rah and laughable." Yet, they praised the area studies course
and some Volunteers felt that, once overseas, nothing they saw or experienced
came as a complete surprise — "And this is a country where stones serve as
toilet paper," noted evaluator Thorburn Reid. However, a second group going to Afghanistan in 1964 did not agree with the first group's favourable judgement. Likewise, English teachers in training for Ethiopia at Georgetown in 1963, considered their area studies course inaccurate and uninformative. Yet, the health instruction was excellent as was the training in teaching science. 85

Engineers trained at Washington State University for Ecuador in 1962, found their medical and technical instruction "excellent", whereas Volunteers trained at the University of Maryland had "no kind memories of their training." On the other hand, Volunteers in an English-teaching programme for Turkey trained at Maryland, described the faculty as "excellent" although they had noticed a few mistakes; for instance, their instructors had used pork for a demonstration of hygiene in cooking - not the most helpful example for Volunteers bound for a Moslem country. At Utah State University in 1963, trainees going to Iran were given little idea of what to expect; instead of being prepared for the complex social structure and the shock of the Iranian-style toilet, Volunteers were shown slides of gazelle hunts and exotic swimming pools; but then again, most felt they had benefited from the outdoors section of their training which had taken place on a Navajo Indian Reservation in Utah. Although, as ever, there were some dissenters who deemed it a "waste of time." 86

Peace Corps training was a very personal experience - different for every Volunteer. One adjudged the training programme for Liberia at the University of Pittsburgh completely useless - "we haven't even looked at our notes since we came here," he told David Gelman. Yet, another Volunteer in the same programme claimed, "The training is beginning to fit more and more into the the picture here." 87 In the summer of 1962, the first group of English teachers bound for Ethiopia were trained at Georgetown University in a haphazard and rushed manner; one year later, a second group was trained at the University of California and the course was smooth and carefully planned. However, once in the field,
evaluator Richard Richter deemed both groups very successful and could not discern whether one had been better prepared than the other.88

Most of the failings of the early training programmes were inevitable. As Joseph Kauffman put it: "There was not enough time to reach a professional level in the technical training, not enough time to reach a useful level in the language training, too much was being attempted."89 At the time, most of the Peace Corps/Washington staff had no experience of overseas work. Given such a situation, it followed that the methods and the quality of Peace Corps training would vary. Since it was not professionally experienced, the Training Division was always open to criticism and - to an extent - it became the "whipping boy" for all the misfortunes that befell Volunteers overseas. Evaluators were particularly quick to pounce. Yet, as Sargent Shriver argued in an angry riposte to a critical evaluation report on training in the summer of 1963: "After all, we've only been doing this for thirty months!"90

In 1961, the task facing the Training Division had been unenviable. For instance, in Nigeria alone there were two hundred and fifty different languages. To prepare a completely comprehensive language training programme would have been well-nigh impossible. As it was, between 1961 and 1963, the Peace Corps gave instruction on some forty-seven languages, over half of which had never been taught before in the United States. It also trained Volunteers in over two hundred different skills. Nevertheless, as the Training Division candidly conceded: "It is difficult to see how the Peace Corps could assure itself (in eight to twelve weeks of training) that an applicant has, in fact the skills necessary to perform the specific task he has been requested to perform and the additional knowledge and attitudes necessary for success."91 Training Officers soon came to describe their job as "no-win". No matter
how competent they were or how well their programmes were administered, training could always be criticised for not being "realistic" enough or "thorough" enough; training could always be "better." Yet, inadequate as much of the early training was, its immediate objectives were accomplished. By and large, it moved trainees from a sheltered environment to a more exposed one and gave them a language, a skill and an all-important sense of independence.

Besides, the Training Division made a good deal of progress in the Kennedy years. By 1963, training for the Peace Corps had come to be regarded as a continuing experience. While the eight basic components remained, they were subject to many refinements. The training period was lengthened to a minimum of twelve weeks and language instruction was made the central focus. On average, over three hundred hours of every training programme were given over to language. Indeed, Allan Kulakow, chief of Language Training, suggested that the most outstanding characteristic of the "Ugly American" was being erased by the Peace Corps Volunteer: "he is no longer tongue-tied. Volunteers are trained to speak as equals with people through the world who remember too well the disdain and depreciation expressed in the linguistic ethnocentrism of the old colonial powers." Significantly, the Peace Corps began to incorporate information from the Volunteers into new training programmes. The 1964 summer courses had the assistance of seventy-five Volunteers who had completed their two years service. These returned Volunteers often proved to be the Peace Corps' most productive source of "feed-back" to the training process. Another improvement was the Training Division's cognisance of the broader question of the Volunteer's "role" overseas rather than just his narrowly-defined job. As a policy paper on Peace Corps training stated in 1964:

"The Peace Corps may teach trainees how to build a school, but they must also know French of a local African tongue to work with their co-workers. A school teacher trainee should know some linguistics in order to help in English instruction, but he also should know the game his students will play and perhaps how to organise young people to dig fish ponds or latrines after class hours. A
Volunteer who travels by canoe should know how to swim as well as how to organize 4-H clubs and teach community health.\textsuperscript{93}

Academic institutions were given more "lead time" to prepare for training programmes and much more specific detail on overseas assignments. Also, programmes containing huge numbers of trainees were abolished; an optimal size was found between fifty and one hundred.

However, having made all these improvements, the Peace Corps came to much the same conclusion in 1964 as it had done in 1961: "It has been found that the single most significant factor of good training is the people involved."\textsuperscript{94} The Volunteers realised that training could not possibly prepare them for every aspect of their service. "Everyone should expect at least a couple of months floundering around," wrote a young Volunteer in Nyasaland, "There are some things which unfortunately can't be learned in the training program" Another Volunteer in Ethiopia encountered difficulties which he felt "no American experience and no amount of verbal orientation can prepare one for."\textsuperscript{95} Yet Bill Hutchison, an early Peace Corps instructor who had administered Foreign Service programmes, reckoned that the Peace Corps' methods were a vast improvement. Also, compared to the voluntary service programmes of other countries, Peace Corps training often proved far superior. For example, in Ghana, evaluator Richard Richter noticed that, comparing Peace Corpsmen with Canadian and British volunteers, "we come off well, displaying special superiority in training. The Canadians and the British have to spend an awful lot of time finding out things about Ghana they feel it is essential to know if they are to operate effectively." Likewise, Peace Corps Volunteers seemed better prepared than their Russian
counterparts in Ghana. According to Richter, the Soviet teachers
looked "pretty much like our Volunteers as to age, dress and physical
characteristics." They served two-year terms and their living allowances
were similar to the Peace Corps. However, the Russians spent little
time socialising or becoming involved in extra-curricular activities with
their hosts and they had not received as much training in Ghanaian politics,
geography and history as the Peace Corps Volunteers. "Clearly,"
Richter concluded, "Peace Corps Volunteers are better teachers, are
better liked, have more Ghanaian friends and have fitted more fully into the
fabric of Ghanaian life." 97

The major contributing factor to the general success of Peace Corps
training was the quality of trainees. To a significant extent, they
selected themselves. After all, Volunteers asked to join the Peace Corps.
Although only 20 per cent of all applicants were invited to training,
roughly 55 per cent of that group then chose to decline the invitation. 98
Their various reasons include career concerns, emotional commitments,
parental fears and so on. Those who accepted the invitation were reminded
that selection for training was not a guarantee of selection for overseas
service. Indeed, the invitee was advised: "Do not sell your home, furniture
or car, or cut your ties completely, when you accept an invitation for
training. Before reporting, and during training, make arrangements
for these things but try to postpone final action until you are sure you
are going overseas." 99 Before final selection, applicants had to withstand
the rigours of a Peace Corps training programme during which they were
continuously assessed. Poor performance during training, health problems,
psychological instability or general unsuitability were all potential
grounds for "deselection." Trainees were also subject to an inspection into
their background with respect to character, reputation and loyalty.

The discovery of a major criminal misdemeanour or a serious social
indiscretion could well lead to the trainee being requested to withdraw.
However, each case was judged on its merits. For example, in 1961, Bill
Josephson defended and won the case of a trainee who had been given a $35 - dollar traffic ticket a few years previously. Likewise, Charles Kamen's controversial social gaffe at the Rotary Club in Miami was not of itself deemed an act meriting deselection. On the other hand, in 1961, the F.B.I. discovered a confessed habitual homosexual among the trainees at Iowa State University. Another man in training at Rutgers University had concealed a larceny conviction. Both were asked to withdraw from their programmes.

Dr Joseph Colmen, the leading psychologist in the Division of Selection, felt that his unit had, in some ways, the most important job in the Peace Corps - for the agency depended upon personnel it selected to go overseas. "An ounce of selection is worth a pound of training" Colmen told Shriver in a staff meeting in 1962. If the applicants were of poor quality then no amount of training would make them into first-class Volunteers. In a policy statement "With Respect To The Qualifications Of Peace Corps Volunteers", Shriver emphasised he would make every effort to ensure that those going abroad would be "the cream-of-the-crop, talented, fit, well-adjusted and devoted American men and women." To meet these standards, the Peace Corps decided upon a process of selection by continuous testing and review.

By the time an applicant arrived at his designated training site, an Assessment Summary - an analysis of the information from the Volunteer Questionnaire, personal references and assorted tests - had been compiled. This was the first part of a cumulative record on the prospective Volunteer. Throughout the training period an ad hoc Selection Board (usually made up of the Training Officer, the Project Director, a doctor, a psychologist, a host country national and sometimes, the country Art), observed the progress of trainees. Training instructors provided information on their participation in courses and furnished impressions of academic values and attitudes. Trainees themselves contributed extensive peer
evaluations and pooled ratings on each other. Also, staff psychologists assessed each trainee on the basis of tests and clinical interviews. All this material was reviewed in Selection Board conferences held halfway through the training period and again at the end. Trainees were rated on an ascending scale of 1 to 5. Obviously unsuitable characters were "selected out" at the halfway stage; others who scored below an average of 3 were deselected at the meeting of the Final Advisory Selection Board.

The most well-publicised "deselection" controversy of the early years centred on Mrs Janie Fletcher, a 65-year-old Texan in training for a home economics programme in Brazil in May, 1962. Mrs Fletcher alleged she was selected out because she had been unable to run a mile before breakfast, do push-ups each morning and swim with her feet tied and her clothes on. Senator John Tower (R., Texas) defended Mrs Fletcher's allegations and accused the Peace Corps of physical cruelty towards an elderly citizen. "She fell while swinging from a rope on an obstacle course where she was expected to participate along with those in their early 20's," Tower told the Senate. With Peace Corps appropriations for fiscal year 1963 just about to pass the Congress, the brouhaha came at an awkward moment for Shriver. All the same, he defended the Selection Division's decision and pointed out that Mrs Fletcher had been deselected because of her low language facility rather than her inability to master the physical exercise schedule at Puerto Rico. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was satisfied with the "excellent report" which Shriver submitted and took the matter no further. However, the incident was an indication of the serious attitude trainees held toward the final selection decision.

Indeed, there was much disappointment and bitterness surrounding the deselection process. An applicant from a small town who had been invited to training often left home with brass bands playing and front-page headlines in the local newspaper. If he was then selected out, his homecoming could prove a humiliating experience. Most trainees were haunted by the fear of
"deselection". Indeed, some became neurotic about it. As one Volunteer explained:

"It was in the front of everybody's mind. 'I've got to be selected' was a constant desperate refrain in the mind's ear. If you sat in the coffee shop and the psychologist or one of the staff came in, you became self-conscious of everything you did. People were scared to death they wouldn't make it. Most of them had left their small towns like returning heroes, with the flags flying and the drums beating, and you could hardly face making it. You tried to avoid any action or word that might prevent selection ...... it cast a pull over the whole of training."

Several found the tension unbearable. A Volunteer in Sierra Leone told David Gelman that during training "we weren't worried about Sierra Leone, we were worried about selection. It always felt like you versus Washington until you were finally selected." Undoubtedly the pressure was intense as selectors from the training institution and Peace Corps/Washington watched over proceedings. Trainees from India at the University of Illinois complained of the "Big Brother atmosphere."

Trainees selected out at the halfway stage literally disappeared overnight from their programme. Rumours of deselection were rife. Since the factors governing selection were variable and often intangible, Shriver ordered that no attempt should be made to explain assessment methods to the trainees during their programmes. Of course, given these circumstances it was inevitable trainees would criticise selection as clandestine, inhumane, arbitrary and even farcical. Sometimes there was a time gap of a few weeks between the end of training and the final decision on selection. Trainees at Georgetown University waiting for confirmation of their selection for Ethiopia, described this period as "limbo - haunted". At the University of Pennsylvania in 1962, trainees bound for Ceylon told of the "torture and hellish apprehension" they endured before the final selection decision.
The trainees' antipathy towards anyone from Peace Corps/Washington grew as the date for final selection drew near. All officials came to be regarded as potential "deselectors". Joseph Fox, Peace Corps Rep in North Borneo noted that all his Volunteers, without exception, felt that "anyone who voluntarily discussed problems with any staff member at training was an idiot and deserved the deselection he would undoubtedly get." There soon developed a general feeling among trainees that "the best way to beat selection was to keep your mouth shut." This applied particularly to the incessant questioning of the psychologists. No section of the training staff was more detested or derided by the Volunteers. Most trainees deemed the psychologists not just irrelevant, but downright silly. Evaluator Richard Elwell reported that trainees "generally" laugh when the psychiatric interviews are mentioned. One Volunteer described his interviews: "You'd come in and they'd ask, 'Well, what crisis are you going through?" Other trainees remembered questions such as "Do you have a dirty word in your mind which you cannot get rid of?" and "Do you love your father and mother?" Some Volunteers complained that the outstanding or extrovert candidates who dared poke fun at the psychologists' questions were often the ones selected out of the programme.

Another of the trainees' grave dislikes was the use of peer ratings as a selection device. They were sometimes asked crude questions like "Who are the five trainees you would least like to be stationed with?" This type of negative questioning not only helped foment a plot-ridden atmosphere during training but sometimes produced the worst Volunteers in the field. For instance, evaluator Dee Jacobs noted that the most effective Volunteer in Panama had received "very low" peer ratings during training. Most evaluators called for the abolition of peer judgements. However, Charles Peters disagreed. He argued that it was better for trainees to be partly assessed by their fellows who knew them intimately rather than judged solely by objective observers from Peace Corps/Washington or the
training institution. However, he stressed that only positive
questions should be asked - "Skilfully drawn, positive questions will
elicit the necessary information." he told Shriver. 113

Like recruitment and training, selection had mixed results.
Even low quality groups had their share of successful individuals and
highly-effective groups often contained the occasional "drone"
Volunteer. Dee Jacobs described the Volunteers selected for Uruguay
as "the right group for the right project in the right country."
In 1963, Charles Peters ranked the first group of Volunteers to go to rather
nebulous assignments in East Pakistan as "one of the great Peace Corps
groups. Not one quitter when most of them had every excuse to quit.
We may have screwed up in every other way with them, but we sure as hell
didn't when we selected them." Likewise, Volunteers in Costa Rica were
a "top-notch group", while selection for Nyasaland had been
"excellent, with only a few who are not first-class." 114

Of course, all was not perfection. While selection for a project
in the Dominican Republic had been "reasonably successful", there was one
Volunteer who was an alcoholic and a gambler; his main prowess was
"shooting one handed pool" and he had "close connections" with nationally
known underworld figures. Another Volunteer in the same group had been
selected despite a history of mental disturbances. In the rural
public works project in West Pakistan, evaluator Tim Adams saw some
Volunteers of the highest quality, but he also noted, "the general level
is not high enough..., there are probably a good thirty who shouldn't have
been sent in the first place." In Guatemala there was reckoned to be
only one absolutely top-class Volunteer among a "barrel-scraped crew"
were generally much too young and immature: the U.S. ambassador
had been forced to send a couple of them home. "A below average group,"
was how evaluators Herb Wegner and Paul Vanderwood assessed the Volunteers
they saw in Brazil. The root of the problem was that trainees had been
"inadequately weeded by the final selection board." Group moral was damaged when two trainees who had been "selected out" were then selected back in. One of them claimed that his father (a leading Democrat in North Carolina) had used his "political pull" to get him reinstated.\textsuperscript{115}

Again, selection was deemed "the real culprit" in the failure of an agricultural extension project in Venezuela. Evaluators Jacobs and Delany reported that the group was riddled with "greedy, complaining, unimaginative, immature, unproductive Volunteers." For the Ceylon teaching project in 1962 some Volunteers had been invited to training before they had taken the prerequisite aptitude and language tests. Evaluator Arthur Dudden fumed when he discovered that "the trainees for Ceylon were chosen from among applications left over or passed over by Peace Corps Reps choosing people for their projects....Ceylon, in other words, got what was left."

Sent to a country accustomed to exacting British educational standards, Dudden felt the low quality of the group bore witness to the failure of the selection process.\textsuperscript{116}

In their scathing critique on the Peace Corps, Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas claimed that the early Peace Corps programmes were ridden with "drone" or marginal-performing Volunteers. To compensate for shortfalls in recruitment numbers, Lowther and Lucas argued that the Peace Corps often relaxed its selection standards and discouraged Peace Corps from dismissing "borderline" Volunteers.\textsuperscript{117}

Certainly there was substantial evidence of questionable individual and sometimes group selection choices; but this had only to be expected. Peace Corps selectors had little relevant experience on which to base their predictive findings; to a great extent, they were working in a vacuum.

Naturally, with the Peace Corps still to prove itself before Congress and the public, there was a reluctance to admit Volunteer shortages or low-quality performances overseas. In this respect, George Carter, Peace Corps Rep in the very first project in Ghana was much to blame. He set his fellow-Reps the highest of standards by not sending home a single
Volunteer. After that, no Rep wanted to be responsible for dismissing batches of weak Volunteers. Carter's precedent sometimes led to Peace Corps Reps retaining low-performing Volunteers. For instance, in Panama the Rep persuaded a Volunteer described as "discouraged, inflexible..... listless and hitting the bottle hard", to stay on when he wanted to resign. Volunteers in the Philippines also gained the "definite impression" that their Rep preferred not to send anyone home in their first year; although they later noted a change in this attitude.

Certainly it was Peace Corps policy to discourage early quitters. Most Volunteers lost heart a few weeks after their arrival in-country and so the agency had to guard itself against people just leaving when they felt like it. Early returnees - for other than medical reasons - were required to pay their own fare home and forfeited their termination payment. However, these necessary precautions did not in any way amount to an active policy of discouraging Reps from sending home "drone" Volunteers. Indeed, in a letter to George Carter in 1962, John Alexander (Chief Coordinator of Programmes) admitted it was inevitable that problem Volunteers would "slip by" selection and training or might even develop in the field. He defined a weak Volunteer as one who "jeopardises the effectiveness of the Peace Corps program." Alexander wrote that the Peace Corps did not want a situation where - at all costs - Reps "keep as many Volunteers in the program as possible" moreover he advised Carter on the procedure for dismissing any troublesome Volunteers. "The evidence required need only be reasonable," noted Alexander, "You have to be satisfied that not only have you been fair to the Volunteer in terms of affirmatively counselling him and giving him an opportunity to improve but that you could defend the fairness of your conduct and decision to an inquiring Representative or Senator or in some public forum,
In September, 1964, Warren Wiggins revealed that Volunteers were sent home "for personal adjustment reasons" at the rate of about one per day; that is, 8 per cent of those selected for service. Another 7 per cent returned for purely medical reasons or "compassionate causes"; 85 per cent of all Volunteers stayed on the job for the full two years. It would have been difficult and dangerous for the Peace Corps to settle for mediocrity in its selection of Volunteers. With Charles Peters and the Evaluation Division constantly on the look-out the Selection Division could not afford to rely on marginal Volunteers. In September, 1963, Peters advised Shriver to "make nonfeasance just as much a ground for sending Volunteers home as malfeasance presently is. Our highest duty at this moment in the history of the Peace Corps," Peters continued, "is to concentrate our efforts on making Peace Corps service tougher and more demanding because the natural tendency is increasing softness, and softness, the Cuerpo de Tourista, is the thing that can kill us." In May 1961, Interim Policy Directive 3.6 - Criteria For Selection of Peace Corps Volunteers - had stated, "merit alone will determine admission to the Peace Corps." In a memorandum to his senior staff in August, 1962, Sargent Shriver re-emphasised this rigorous guideline:

"In case of any serious doubt regarding a trainee's suitability for overseas duty, it is advisable to resolve the doubt in favor of the Peace Corps and the project. Perhaps, it would be well for each member of the Final Advisory Selection Board to imagine himself in the role of the prospective Peace Corps Representative for the project and ask himself: 'Do I want this trainee on my country team?' Only if the answer is an unequivocal 'yes' should the decision be to 'select in' The above guidelines may seem unusually rigorous, but remember that the Volunteers' tour of overseas duty is much longer and far more stressful than the training program. Trainees not selected are, of course, usually greatly disappointed and sometimes indignant, but they are far less of a problem for the Peace Corps than maladjusted, or noneffective Volunteers overseas who can embarrass not only themselves but their country."
Between 1961 and 1963, the Selection Division generally adhered to these high standards. Accordingly, approximately 22 per cent of all trainees were "deselected."

A major criticism of selection was that far too many Volunteers rated as "3's" - qualified trainees but not outstanding ones - were included in overseas programmes. The ability, proven or potential, of 3's was the subject of constant debate within the Peace Corps. Charles Peters and many evaluators maintained that if 3's were not outstanding in training then they were not likely to be outstanding in the field. For example, Volunteers in Panama were described as "mediocre...unobtrusively ineffectual"; evaluator Dee Jacobs attributed this to the inclusion of eleven 3's in the programme. In a biting memorandum to Sargent Shriver in October, 1963 evaluator Tim Adams wrote that "We seem to have learned....we are inviting disaster when we load a group with trainees who are assessed as 3's....Too often when the Peace Corps has found itself forced to make a choice between shortfall (or cancellation) and a dip in selection standards, we have gone for the dip." Adams concluded, "The results of such a choice are not happy."

Adams claimed a direct correlation existed between the general weakness of Peace Corps projects in Guatemala, Ceylon and Pakistan and the high percentage of 3's in those programmes - 55 per cent, 68 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. In an attempt to provide a certain measure of quality control, Adams proposed that Shriver should put a mandatory 20 or 25 per cent limit on the number of 3's in each Peace Corps group. However, in a spirited reply, Shriver denied any direct link between 3's and poor programmes:
"I disagree enthusiastically with this approach which implies that 3's are automatically weak. Overseas, 3's have done as well as 4's and 5's. Under your theory we should take only 5's. But even then I doubt whether we would improve overseas performance by more than 5 per cent."124

Shriver had a point. In Venezuela some of the best Volunteers in the field had been assessed as 3's in training. And, in Jamaica, evaluator Richard Elwell reported that of the nine 3's in a programme of thirty-eight Volunteers, one was "outstanding"; five were doing "good work", two were "marginal" and one had been dismissed. On this evidence, he found it difficult to generalise that 3's should never be selected.125

If there was a relation between performance in training - on which selection was based - and performance overseas, then it was a nebulous one. No matter how meticulous the Selection Division was, the difference between the training site and actual field conditions was glaring. This factor lent an air of unpredictability to the entire selection process. Indeed the Volunteers themselves - more than a little sceptical of the psychologists' contributions to final ratings - adjudged selection "a hit-or-miss affair."126 One Volunteer in St. Lucia in 1963, had been dropped from another programme bound for Latin America because of his poor Spanish; his undistinguished academic record almost got him selected out of the St. Lucia project. Yet, once overseas he was rated, "The best of a good lot in the field. He came to St. Lucia to help and he doesn't see anything stopping him." One of the best Volunteers in Iran was a girl who had been described as "beatnicky" in training. She had had to be warned about social niceties such as crossing her legs and not slurping her soup. Yet, she was one of the most effective Volunteers in Tehran. She taught English in girls' vocational schools, Iranian government offices and the University of Tehran's medical institute; and at night, she supervised hair-dressing, knitting and dress-making classes for Iranian women.127
On the other hand, a Volunteer in British Honduras who had been assessed as a "5" by his selection board, turned out to be a "plain phoney" overseas. "He left the project early" noted Richard Elwell, "he tried to get others to leave with him, and now he writes them letters about the easy life back home." A Volunteer teacher in Somalia - described as intellectually "brilliant" by the training staff at New York University - took to heavy drinking overseas. "And when he drinks, he gets nasty," reported evaluator Richard Richter. At a Somalian party the Volunteer accused one of the guests - a native education official - of sleeping with the girls in the school where he taught. "That the incident didn't lead to at least a minor explosion is due to the official's good humor", wrote Richter.

These examples were enough to suggest that although the psychological, medical and educational information amassed during training might act as a rough indicator of overseas performance, it was far from being a precise prediction. Indeed, in the Philippines in 1963, Eugene Burdick and William Lederer found that "no necessary connection existed between those Volunteers who seemed the best in training and those who turned out to be the best in the field." They also came to some perceptive conclusions on the Peace Corps' selection process in general. Most startlingly of all perhaps, they suggested that it was the "average" trainee who often made the best Volunteer:

"The Volunteers we met in the Philippines who seemed to be functioning best, fitted into the following very rough outlines: They were neither the brightest nor the best educated; they were less rather than more interested in politics, and they were motivated by a mixture of reasons for joining the Peace Corps rather than being driven to the Peace Corps by a compelling desire to get away from it all (whatever it may have been) or an intense commitment to service. Overall, they were more average than extreme."129
This became a common finding of evaluators. The quiet, unobtrusive, hard-working Volunteer often fulfilled the aims of the Peace Corps more satisfactorily than the multi-talented, brilliant fellow who was always very "visible". Moreover, Burdick and Lederer advised selectors to be wary of the "all-American, cheerful, rah-rah, outgoing, extroverted campus hero or heroine." Equally, of course, they warned against the introverted graduate student, buried in his books and his thoughts. Certainly, the Peace Corps preferred applicants to have a college degree. Early experience in training and overseas indicated that graduates were more amenable to language-learning and general community contact than the skilled technician or tradesman. Hence, college seniors were regarded by recruiters as "prime" peace Corps personnel. However, people from all walks of life, volunteered, were selected and went on to prove themselves overseas.

It would be dangerous to attempt across-the-board value judgements on Peace Corps selection. In one country alone - East Pakistan - Tim Adams reported one group "of very high quality", another was "relatively weak", while a third was "better than the second but not nearly as good as the first." In Senegal, evaluator David Hapgood noted the great diversity within a group in which ten Volunteers were "complete failures" and nine others were "doing an outstanding job". Evaluator Charles Caldwell described the Peace Corps programme in Iran as a colourless mosaic of Volunteers cemented together by William J. Cousins, a patient and sensitive diplomat. "There are a few brilliant tiles, a considerable number of slightly cracked ones, and one or two which have shattered," wrote Caldwell, "Nevertheless, the total impression is one of moderate success in the baffling culture of today's Iran - never-never land.

In the light of this type of report, the Peace Corps gradually began to refine its elaborate selection process. Application forms were simplified, psychological tests minimised. These had not taken enough cognisance of the human factor - the changes that might affect a Volunteer under the hot-house conditions of a developing country.
Under the pressures of overseas service, quirks or strengths of character could emerge which no amount of testing could predict. By 1963, the Peace Corps had realised that the best selectors of Volunteers were Volunteers. Nicholas Hobbs, the Peace Corps' chief of Selection and Research explained this irony:

"What happened was that the Peace Corps appealed to a very select type of American...usually educated, college graduates. So the elaborate screening apparatus that was developed was not appropriate and was rather quickly abandoned on the research evidence that the tests were not making any difference, that just a few of them, notably language learning were holding up, because we were dealing with such a select population already. They'd already been self-screened so that the screening tests had no real function."131

Eugene Burdick and William Lederer reinforced this finding in their report to Shriver on the Philippines programme, "Just as very few men come out of the military forces better than they went in," they wrote, "so too we think the Peace Corps can do little more than reinforce those personal qualities the Volunteers already have."132

A pattern soon emerged for the "typical" Volunteer. He or she (the male - female ratio was 3:2) was usually a recent graduate in the liberal arts, unmarried, and aged between twenty-one and twenty-five. Within Peace Corps circles, Volunteers were sometimes referred to as the "in-betweeners." Most and just finished college but were undecided as to whether they should find a steady job or continue on to graduate school. Some were already involved in further education courses; for others, immediate job prospects had fallen through and they felt the Peace Corps would allow them time to think about their future. For many then, Peace Corps service provided a useful breathing space at a decisive time in their lives.

Although no degree was required and there was no upper limit on age, applicants who had not attended college or who were over thirty years old, were in the minority. In fact, 36 per cent of all Volunteers
had a degree and only 0.7 per cent were over sixty.

There were few "blue collar" Americans in the Peace Corps; they never really found a home in an organisation which had an essentially middle-class, liberal ethos. Indeed, journalist Andrew Kopkind's major criticism of the Peace Corps was that "the 12-page application form is enough to put off almost everyone but college types." However, in 1964, the Peace Corps sent out 40,000 application forms to automotive workers in Michigan in the hope of getting skilled mechanics for programmes in Latin America. Only 300 applications were returned, producing about 25 "blue collar" workers - a reflection of the Peace Corps' lack of appeal to that group. Most applicants came from the established groups in American society - White, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant - and were the children of middle-income, financially-secure parents. Poorer children could not afford the two years of economic sacrifice. This also largely explained the vast under-representation of minority groups, despite repeated specialised recruitment efforts and the Peace Corps' outstanding record of non-discrimination.

Two-thirds of all Volunteers were Democrats rather than Republicans. Although Peace Corps applications came from every part of the United States, the West Coast always led in the number of Volunteers per capita - evidence of Kennedy's superb political intuition in choosing San Francisco for his first public espousal of the Peace Corps idea. Next to California came New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts and Michigan. (APPENDIX X) The Southern States lagged behind. The segregationist policies of Southern colleges prevented the Peace Corps from using them as recruiting or training grounds. Indeed, in June 1962, The New York Herald Tribune reported that not a single college or university in the South had a Peace Corps training contract. A staff member was quoted as saying there had been "racial incidents" at an early stage when the Peace Corps had miscalculated by using college facilities in a Southern community. In the North, the Peace Corps had contracts
The reasons why Volunteers chose to join the Peace Corps was one of the questions most commonly asked of them. John Demos, a Volunteer in Ghana, described his annoyance at the tiresome queries:

"From the very start the question of motives was raised i.e. 'Why did you join the Peace Corps?' Everyone seemed to want to know - newspapermen, psychologists, politicians and even the people you met at cocktail parties. Invariably we gave these queries an unfriendly response - partly because they soon acquired the hollow ring of a cliché, partly because the reasons were complex, profound, and personal and partly, perhaps, because we weren't quite sure of the answer ourselves."  

A more cynically-minded Volunteer in India admitted that one of his strongest reasons was to avoid the draft; another claimed that the "glamor" of the new agency attracted him - "I would never have joined I.V.S.," he said. Former Deputy - Director of the Peace Corps, Brent K. Ashabranner described Volunteers as "the last of the old-fashioned patriots." Various analyses indicated that Volunteers' motivations were usually complex. In 1962, Suzanne Gordon and Nancy Sizer undertook a systematic study of Why People Join The Peace Corps. Their results were based on the replies of 2,612 applicants (22.5 per cent of the total at the time) to a question asked by the Volunteer Questionnaire:

"What do you hope to accomplish by joining the Peace Corps?" Answers had a widespread range - to help the poorer countries, to develop or improve as an individual, to work with people and help them help themselves, to get to know or understand people in general. Some gave the selfish reason "to further my career" while others were moved by an altruistic impulse "to build a better world and encourage international brotherhood." (APPENDIX XX)

Few applicants gave a single answer and most attributed their joining to a mixture of motivations. By far the most recurring answer was "To help people and humanity in general"; next was "to improve international relations and promote international understanding" followed
by, "to gain intercultural experience." At the bottom of the list was "to fight communism" followed by, "to spread or promote freedom and democracy" and "to travel and have some adventure."

However, although these sets of reasons were at opposite ends of the spectrum, applicants often combined both types in their answers. Indeed, Peace Corps officials preferred to see a mixture of motives. As Burdick and Lederer pointed out:

"Volunteers who gave signs of too intense motivation need to be looked at with some degree of uncertainty. We think it better to have Peace Corps Volunteers whose motivations are not totally pure, who openly admit that they are interested in the Peace Corps because, for example, among other things it gives them an opportunity to travel they might not otherwise have. Obviously, it is going to be difficult to determine the nature of an applicant's real motivation for, since the Peace Corps recruiting stresses service, the potential Peace Corps Volunteer will try to project the face he thinks most likely to win approval of his application. Better a Peace Corps Volunteer with a capacity to admit his mixed motivations. Such Peace Corps Volunteers may be better able to adjust to the realities of life in the Peace Corps than those who say they come primarily to the Peace Corps for purely altruistic motives. In addition, too strong protests of commitment may be covering up less desirable characteristics."140

Nevertheless, nearly all Volunteers expressed a desire "to give" to other people. Indeed, 93 per cent of Volunteers reported a desire "to give" as basic to their applying while only 65 per cent reported a desire "to gain." The all-important overlap between the two was 60 per cent.141

Another major reason was the special affinity which most young Volunteers felt with John F. Kennedy. Paul E. Tsongas, who volunteered in 1962 (and later became a Democratic Senator for Massachusetts), recalled that Kennedy's influence was the "major factor" which inspired him to overcome all obstacles in his path - including the grave doubts of his Republican father.142 On the day after Kennedy's
assassination, the Peace Corps was flooded with requests from young people on college campuses all over America. In the week after his death, the Peace Corps received its all-time record number of applications - 2,550.$43

Aside from these very broad generalisations, few Volunteers cared to pin-point any single reason for their decision to join. Moreover, they considered it a simplistic and extremely infuriating question. Sensing their frustration, Vice-President Johnson deliberately avoided asking it while addressing a group of Volunteers in training at Puerto Rico in July, 1962:

"I flatly refuse to ask you, "Why did you join the Peace Corps?"
I understand you expect that question now for the thousandth time.
Let me suggest the next time someone asks you that question, simply turn it around - like Thoreau turned Emerson's question around,
Emerson had paid a visit to his friend in the Concord jail. "My dear Thoreau," Emerson said. "Why are you here?" To which Thoreau replied, "My dear Emerson, why are you not here?"$44

Inevitably Peace Corps recruitment, training and selection were very much like the curate's egg. It was a new venture into uncharted territory. Its members could only learn by osmosis. Experience - mistakes and successes - led to gradual improvement and refinement. Yet, despite blunders, the record of those early years was far from disastrous. By the end of 1963, over twelve thousand of this new breed had been recruited, trained and placed in forty-four countries. The "quality" of that personnel is, and always will be debatable. In that respect, the Peace Corps' Evaluation Division was its own sternest critic.

Even so, in July, 1963 evaluator Kenneth Love conceded that the Peace Corps' record thus far had been "remarkably good, especially in view of the flailing haste with which most of it has been done. When an organisation grows by leaps and bounds, it is likely to recruit a lot of leapers and bounders. We have been pretty lucky on this score."$45
CHAPTER TEN

PROGRAMMING FOR PEACE
"Programming is the key. Having proved that we can recruit, select, train, and send abroad large numbers of committed Americans, we cannot stop there. As a tree grows up the roots must find rich sources of life to sustain it.
Programming is to the Peace Corps what those 40-foot roots are to the 20-foot willow tree in my back yard."

-BILL MOYERS

(Memorandum to Warren Wiggins, August 17, 1965)
The project descriptions by the Office of Programme Development and Operations (P.D.O.) — the Form 104's — were responsible for the context and tone of every Peace Corps programme. Recruitment, training and selection, though indispensable, were dependent upon the quality of the work produced by Warren Wiggins and his programming Division. If it was well done — comprehending and adapting to the socio-cultural conditions of each host country — it could compensate for the inadequacies of other Divisions. However, badly conceived or poorly executed programmes could negate even superlative efforts on the part of selection and training or the Volunteers themselves. Situated at the heart of the Peace Corps, P.D.O. integrated and directed the professional efforts of all the other Divisions. The general direction of these efforts was decided in an early staff meeting attended by the economist John Kenneth Galbraith. During a discussion on the development priorities of the Third World, Galbraith proposed that the newly-independent countries of Africa needed education and exposure to modern ideas, whereas in Latin America the essential requirement was change in the rigid social stratifications which prohibited all but the rich from participating in the decisions which affected the majority. Galbraith's astute analysis provided the basis for the two major types of programme undertaken by the Peace Corps: teaching, and various kinds of work in societies which came under the single heading of Community Development.

Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas defined programming as "understanding people and institutions in their cultural, political and economic environment." At best, it was a broad concept; a congeries of often conflicting interpretations. In the lexicon of traditional foreign aid agencies it had become a word freighted with bureaucracy. Preparing a programme in the International Cooperation Administration (I.C.A.) had been a protracted process involving a great deal of time, hordes of people and vast sums of money. Sargent Shriver, with his administrative inclinations geared towards speed, experimentation and thrift, was determined that the Peace Corps' daring initiatives in the Third World would not become hidebound by convoluted programming procedures. Yet, notwithstanding his personal abhorrence of almost everything "bureaucratic", Shriver realised that programming would be the vital link between the Volunteer and the people served. Without it, the Peace Corps could not possibly obey President Kennedy's command to send abroad Americans who were "wanted by the host country - who have a real job to do - and who are qualified to do that job." Shriver's task was to devise an incisive, flexible programming mechanism adaptable to the adventurous aims of the new agency. To prevent any possible blunting of directness, he decided early on that the Peace Corps would have ultimate control over all its projects. This was a contentious but highly significant move because it virtually ensured that the vast majority of programmes would be directly administered by the Peace Corps rather than by different private agencies, higher educational institutions and international organisations - as had at first been envisaged. The continuous bureaucratic battling that ensued between P.D.O. and the private sector over the administration
of programmes has already been described. At the end of the
day, Warren Wiggins and his programmers had the final say on
all Peace Corps projects.

Wiggins, principal drafter of *The Towering Task*, was a
composed and experienced foreign aid administrator and a
master of bureaucratic in-fighting. However, he was
in no sense a traditional "bureaucrat". Certainly, he was
ambitious, but he was also brilliantly creative. P.D.O. was
the most highly-structured, tightly-disciplined unit within
the Peace Corps - situated at the centre of a somewhat anarchic
organisation - but its compass was always the bold and bright
imagination of Warren Wiggins. Shriver was in total agreement
with Wiggins' broad definition of Peace Corps programming:

"Our charge is relatively simple, the charge we
received from the Congress. We have three purposes.
The first purpose is to provide skills to interested
countries when desired. Our second purpose is to increase
the understanding of Americans by other peoples. And the
third purpose is to increase the understanding of
Americans of other peoples. These are rather simple
notions and they don't give too much of a guide to
programming. You can't talk about GNP for example, as a
goal to be achieved. What you can talk about is the
provision of middle-level skills and the increase of
understanding and in a world as big as it is and the
skills stretched as wide as they are, you can do almost
anything you want in the Peace Corps."

This non-specific interpretation was subject to two major
restrictions. Firstly, the Peace Corps was dependent upon
"volunteers", the vast majority of whom were B.A. generalists.
This put a severe limitation on choice. Technically skilled
and professional people could not be drafted. Thus, P.D.O.
was obliged to create a role for the unskilled generalist
overseas - something never before attempted. Secondly, P.D.O.
could only respond to projects which had been requested by
host countries. It could not just set up programmes which it thought best.

Ironically then, Peace Corps programmers did not have total control over their own programmes. They were subject to the limitations imposed by both the domestic supply of Volunteers and the demand for specific projects abroad. Their difficult predicament was compounded by the chronic shortage of time. In those early days the Peace Corps had yet to gain credibility. It could only achieve this by producing program and getting them into the field immediately. Despite the problems, Wiggins maintained his characteristic sang-froid. On May 1, 1961, he assured a perplexed Shriver - who was in India trying to "sell" the Peace Corps - that finding "sound projects.........will not be the major Peace Corps problem."

However, there were few precedents for finding and establishing Peace Corps programmes. Indeed, by the end of March, 1961, despite worldwide media interest, the Peace Corps had not received a definite project request from any Third World government. Hence, Shriver and other Peace Corps officials began to "invite invitations" through various channels. For instance, on April 5, 1961, Shriver met with Ambassador Aub Aziz Ahmed of Pakistan in Washington and discovered that Pakistan could welcome secondary school teachers, economists, doctors and engineers. Ambassador Ahmed thought it best to place Volunteers in the cities at first and not subject them to the rigours of village life until "they are ready."

A few days later, Bill Josephson met with Tongsun Park, an enterprising young administrator in the Korean government, and discussed the possibility of a Peace Corps meteorological study project in Korea; Josephson thought the idea "promising but it did not materialise." Overseas, some official representatives of the U.S. government had been making preliminary
overtures on behalf of the Peace Corps. In India, Ambassador Galbraith told Shriver in late April that his discussions with the government had not been fruitful:

"There have been very few official reactions by Indian officials to the prospect of Peace Corps personnel placements in India; official comment, to the extent there has been any, has largely emphasised the applicability of Peace Corps to Africa and other even less developed areas. Although there have been several expressions of skepticism and few of enthusiasm, the attitude may be characterised generally as cautious and only mildly interested."

In the face of this unenthusiastic response, Shriver visited eight Third World countries in the spring of 1961. This proved exactly the needed catalyst. By the end of May, over two dozen interested countries had made specific requests for Peace Corps Volunteers. On August 28, 1961, President Kennedy met the first group of fully-fledged Volunteers in the Rose Garden. They were teachers and road surveyors bound for Ghana and Tanganyika. "We're all proud of you," began Kennedy, "the fact that you are willing to do this for your country in the larger sense, as the name suggests, for the cause of peace and understanding, I think should make all Americans proud and make them all appreciative.... we put a good deal of hope in the work that you do." Thus, by the beginning of September, the first two Peace Corps programmes had been established.

Although most of Wiggins' programmes were former I.C.I. administrators, very few had experience of actual field conditions in the developing world. Thus the initial planning and development of programmes was done on a completely ad hoc basis. The most outstanding example was the very first Peace Corps project - road surveys for Tanganyika. It was negotiated almost single-handedly by Lee St Lawrence, Wiggins'
choice as Chief of the Far Eastern regional office in P.D.O.

St Lawrence, a former programme officer for I.C.A., had worked in some of the most politically turbulent Third World countries of the 1950's - Laos, Vietnam and the Congo. He had the reputation of being both a brilliantly astute programmer and something of a swashbuckler. Bill Josephson described St Lawrence as "foolishly courageous". Certainly, he played an important role in the early history of the Peace Corps. During a staff meeting in March, 1961, St Lawrence had suggested that Tanganyika (which was due to gain independence in December, 1961) might be an appropriate country for the Peace Corps to begin a programme. To his surprise, Shriver gave him the task of researching into its feasibility. According to Josephson, St Lawrence left the meeting and without any official guidance whatsoever, "he got into a plane, went to Tanganyika and vanished. We didn't hear a word from him for weeks - literally. Then he appeared one day with this program, having visited most, if not all, of the surveying sites, checked out the jobs with the people the surveyors would be working for, checked out their living conditions, emergency procedures, health care and so forth and so on." In the first few weeks of April, St Lawrence "bushwacked" Tanganyika from end to end investigating the conditions under which Volunteers would live. After meeting Prime Minister Julius Nyerere, St Lawrence returned to Washington with the first Peace Corps overseas contract and the first details of a programme.

In terms of speed, first-hand knowledge of the field and audacity, St. Lawrence's "bushwacking" in Tanganyika set his fellow programmers a remarkable precedent. With enough determination and imagination, it seemed anything was possible.
On April 21, 1961, less than two months after the Executive Order, President Kennedy announced that the Peace Corps was sending twenty surveyors, four geologists and four civil engineers to Tanganyika in response to a request from her government. Basing his remarks on St Lawrence’s findings, Kennedy claimed, "There is nothing more important in Tanganyika than the development of roads to open up the country." 

Not all successive Peace Corps projects were as thoroughly and accurately researched as the first, but Lee St Lawrence’s example did contribute to the establishment of some ground rules. In particular, an in-country examination of every proposed project by either an official from Peace Corps/Washington or by the Peace Corps Rep in that country became standard programming procedure. All proposals were investigated by the appropriate Regional Division of P.D.O. (Africa, Latin America, Far East, North Africa/Near East/ South Asia), and only after the potential benefits and liabilities had been assessed was a final decision reached on whether to initiate a programme. For example, in January, 1962, Richard Griscott of the Latin American Division travelled to Colombia and reported on the "Possible Pit-Falls of community development programmes there. Griscom noted the danger of Volunteers becoming involved in "liberal-conservative-communist controversies." He advised that as few Volunteers as possible should be placed in "potential areas of conflict." Another problem would be the pervasive influence of the activist Catholic priest in Latin America. If they were to penetrate the campesinos, Volunteers would be forced into "intimate association" with these local padres. Obviously, this would make the programme vulnerable to
Congressional criticism. However, despite these "possible pit-falls", community development programmes in Colombia, and throughout Latin America, went ahead. Over the years, Peace Corps programmes originated from a number of sources - a meeting between Shriver and a foreign head of state, a suggestion by a U.S. Ambassador, A.I.D. chief or Peace Corps programme officer, or a direct request from a host country institution or official. The specific details governing each programme varied. Some host governments insisted on maintaining an element of independence by paying part of the cost of the Volunteers' service; for instance, Ghana provided Volunteers with their living allowances. Other projects were partly administered by an American private organisation - in St Lucia, Heifer Project Inc. helped in the Peace Corps' community action programme. Some host institutions - like the education board in the Philippines - allocated each Volunteer a native 'counterpart' who worked side-by-side with him in a reciprocal learning process. In dealing with these new, sensitive, foreign governments, programming policy had to be flexible. However, there were two fundamental - if broad - preconditions for any project: it should meet "felt needs" of the host country and it should be wanted by the local peoples. In the field, Volunteers were the employees of their host government, not the United States. As Shriver put it, "The Volunteers go to work with people, not to employ them, use them or advise them. They do what the country they go to wants them to do, not what we think is best."

Of course, once requests from Third World countries began to flow in, the Peace Corps had to establish some conditions of priority. There simply were not enough
Volunteers to satisfy the overwhelming demand, John Alexander chaired P.D.O.'s Coordination committee which gave final approval to programmes. Before these infamous "murder boards" (where many programmes were "killed"), the Regional Chiefs argued their cases for new programmes. Of prime consideration was the supply of Volunteers. If the necessary Volunteers for a proposed programme were not in the "pool" of applicants or could not be recruited, then it was scrapped. However, this decision was complex. Since most Volunteers were generalists and, in theory, adaptable to any job situation, there was intense competition between the four Regional Chiefs over both the quantity and the quality of Volunteers assigned to their programmes. For example, there was always conflict between the African Division which dealt with teaching programmes, and the Latin American Division which was concerned mostly with community development. The African Division thought it should get first choice of the best Volunteers because its programmes showed "definite" results, whereas the effects of unstructured community development were problematical. Ultimately, John Alexander ran his cold, objective eye over all programme proposals and settled any disputes arising between the power-brokers in the different Regional Offices.

The potential impact of a project received high priority. Preference was given to programmes involving maximum contact with host country peoples rather than those which required a finely-honed skill but minimal participation in the native community. Wiggins gave an example of the nature of this priority:
"If a decision were necessary between a project calling for thirty laboratory technicians and one calling for thirty physical education instructors—both skills which are available and which are consistent with the middle-manpower concept—in terms of satisfying the purposes of the Peace Corps Act, the latter should be selected. Although the lab technicians might make a more apparent contribution to the social and economic development of the host country, the physical education instructors would have an opportunity to relate more closely to more people of that country and the direct results of their work would be more obvious. They would therefore serve more effectively all three purposes of the Act."

Further important criteria for all programmes were general economic, social and political considerations. Interim Policy Directive 2.1 stated that while need, desire and feasibility should be the major prerequisites, Peace Corps programmes should not be "inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy." Shriver was always insistent that the Peace Corps supported "peoplea not governments," and maintained that it was not an arm of American foreign policy. All the same, he was a realist. If he had allowed Volunteers to be employed by governments of countries openly hostile to the United States—say, Cuba—the political consequences would have been disastrous both in the Congress and in other "neutralist" states. Of necessity, the Peace Corps had to take account of political pressures on these high-level decision-making units.

After P.D.O.'s Coordination unit had approved a project, a working agreement was signed by the Peace Corps and the host country government. The programme was then assigned to the appropriate Regional Chief. Under his aegis the Peace Corps Form 104—the detailed description of the proposed assignment—was written. Based upon the 104, training and selection procedures got under way. On average, the entire programming process—from initial suggestion or request, to
arrival of Volunteers in the field - took between sixty to ninety days. Although, in 1961 and 1962, when there was tremendous pressure to produce programmes quickly, many were set up in an even shorter time. By the end of its first year, the Peace Corps was working in three continents and by 1964 over seven thousand Volunteers were in the field in forty-six countries. In this respect, the "towering task" was accomplished.

Warren Wiggins described the Peace Corps as being in the "people business":

"Our speciality is the people at the middle level. Not the man with the shovel, although use shovels we will if the job requires that we lead by sharing the labor. Not the man engrossed in remote research — although doctors, engineers and scientists are serving and teaching as Volunteers: . . . . the bulk of our Volunteers are the man and woman 'in the middle'.

Kennedy's original idea had been to recruit young college graduates and train them for a relatively simple task overseas. In the main, Volunteers would not have highly specialised skills but they would be capable of doing - and of teaching their hosts to do - a basic job. The Peace Corps described Volunteers as "middle level manpower" — in a category between the few highly-trained experts and the completely untrained masses. Simultaneously, Kennedy hoped Volunteers would contribute to an understanding between Americans and Third World peoples. These objectives were reflected in the three aims of the Peace Corps Act.

In early Peace Corps councils it had been seriously questioned whether there was a "middle-level" role for the B.A. generalist; some proposed that only technically skilled and qualified people should be used. Another major debate had concerned whether Peace Corps jobs should be "structured" (detailed, secure and specific, like teaching, engineering
and construction), or "unstructured" (vague, and reliant upon the Volunteer's personal initiative, like community action). Although only three hundred and sixty-four Volunteers actually took up overseas assignments in 1961, they provided significant illumination on both these points.

During that first year, the five basic models for programmes were set up: skilled techniques in Tanganyika, teachers of general subjects in Ghana and Nigeria, teachers' aides in the Philippines, teachers of English as a foreign language (T.E.F.L.) in Thailand, and general community action workers in Colombia and St Lucia. Early reports on these projects confounded those who had doubted the use of generalists. Of course, there were problems of adjustment for the Volunteers involved in teaching in Africa and community development in Latin America; but there were no complaints from their host governments about lack of skills or failure to participate in the local communities. On the other hand, the original Tanganyika programme experienced severe difficulties. The skilled surveyors and engineers had no problem finding the specific jobs outlined for them by Lee St Lawrence; but, a sudden cut in the road development budget by the Tanganyikan government rendered much of their work ineffectual. These unforeseen local government actions meant that all their planning and surveying did not culminate in actual road construction by their hosts. Perhaps even more importantly, the itinerant nature of their work effectively prevented the Volunteer technicians from establishing any close, personal relationships with their hosts. George Carter, first Peace Corps Rep in Ghana, recalled,

"The Tanganyika experience taught us that the provision of technical skills was no guarantee of success."
The lessons of these first few projects had a salutary effect on both the size and the nature of all future Peace Corps programming. Indeed, Warren Wiggins was heard to remark that the Peace Corps would never do another "Tanganyika! In terms of satisfying the Three Aims of the Peace Corps Act, the early programmes seemed to indicate that the trained generalist would be more effective than the technician - in either structured or unstructured work situations. Certainly, the generalist did not have the expertise of the technician, but he had a greater aptitude for language and was more receptive to training in a wide range of basic skills - teaching, elementary construction, agricultural extension, public health improvement and so on. The relatively short training period could not transform the generalist into an "expert", but it could make him proficient in a limited skill area such as poultry-breeding, literacy-teaching or malaria-eradication. Former Deputy-Director of the Peace Corps, Brent K. Ashabranner, described this process for one programme in India:

"The generalists spent their time on just one thing: learning the rudiments of starting and taking care of small poultry units in India. They learned about the right kind of mud chicken houses by actually building them; they learned the deep litter, close confinement system of raising chickens. They learned the right feed formulas and how to improvise with ingredients available in India. They learned to vaccinate, debeak, and kill diseased chickens. After three months of sharply focused training these Volunteers were as ignorant as they had ever been about general farming and animal husbandry.... But they knew one thing reasonably well: how to house, raise, cull and keep healthy a small flock of chickens in India."

Moreover, the generalist was more adaptable to working conditions in the under-developed countries. The specialist was sometimes inhibited by the rigidities of his formal training. Thomas Quimby, Chief of Recruitment and later, Peace Corps Rep in Liberia, explained that the B.A. generalist...
proved much more resilient than the skilled expert who tended to "climb the wall" on discovering that his host country co-workers could not conceive of a straight line.24 Perhaps of most importance - in terms of the Three Aims - the generalist usually turned out to have a more effective social impact than the technician. The generalist did not rely on his technical skill as the sole means of communication with his hosts. No matter what specific job he was given, he was usually prepared to take part in local society in as many ways as possible. In particular, it seemed the generalist was suited to community development work. Since the job was unstructured and sometimes completely undefined, it allowed plenty of scope for individual initiative and personality.

All things considered, the first programmes in 1961 convinced Tom Quimby and the Peace Corps staff that there was "something about an ability to sustain yourself in the cross-cultural experience that was helped by a college education, particularly liberal arts as opposed to a technical education."25 The early projects implied that the promotion of mutual understanding - perhaps the quintessential Peace Corps aim - would be better achieved by generalists than by skilled technicians. This finding was not displeasing to Shriver and Wiggins. Although the first few programmes - especially in Tanganyika - had included a fair proportion of technicians, specifically skilled workers became increasingly difficult to recruit. Most American tradesmen and technicians tended to establish themselves in jobs, marry, and generally take on commitments which prevented them from applying for Peace Corps service. The first year's recruitment figures made it patently obvious that the Peace Corps' principal catchment would be B.A. generalists. Hence, four out of five of the model programmes set up in 1961 consisted mostly of this group.
Clearly, had these programmes been outright failures, the very future of the Peace Corps would have been at risk. At the very least, Shriver and Wiggins would have been obliged to dismiss The Towering Task's notion of a large Peace Corps. As it happened, the opposite was true. The one programme - in Tanganyika - which had relied almost totally upon skill and technical expertise had proven to be the least successful in its people-to-people impact. Indeed, evaluator David Selman described it derisively as a "junior A.I.D." technical assistance programme where the highly skilled Volunteers had only an employer-employee relationship with their hosts. 

On the other hand, the generalist programmes appeared to be thriving. As early as March, 1962, evaluator Dan Chamberlain reported on the "outstanding group" of young generalists working in community development in Colombia: "To those who think there is no such thing as the practical do-gooder..... that helping mankind is the work of evangelists and cranks, I suggest the catharsis of a visit to Colombia." These reports were a signal for the Peace Corps - based upon the B.A. generalist - to expand. In a document entitled "Programming Guidelines for Second and Third Years", Wiggins directed the Peace Corps' emphasis towards programmes which involved both trained manpower and intensive people-to-people contact:

"Many programs developed so far tend to place too great an emphasis on the specific job to be done, which has resulted in a multiplicity of volunteers representing particular skills, each devoted to a particular and therefore somewhat narrow, end. This has further complicated the work of the Peace Corps, both in Washington and overseas, and it has led to undue concentration on only one of the three purposes of the Peace Corps Act.....While the provision of needed manpower is of central importance to the Peace Corps and must always be recognised in the course of project development, it should never be so strongly emphasised that it jeopardises our success in meeting the second and third purposes of the Act, dealing with the promotion of international understanding."
Given these guidelines, school-teaching was a "natural" Peace Corps programme. It could be established quickly, liberal arts degree-holders could do it, it had a definite structure and it had a direct people-to-people impact.

Moreover, the newly-independent nations of Africa and the Far East desperately sought the intellectual stimulus so necessary for the responsibilities of self-government. Teachers—of English and general subjects—were in great demand in the Third World. In 1962, the average illiteracy rate in Sub-Saharan Africa was between 80 and 85 per cent, with only 3 per cent of all children receiving a secondary school education.26 Thus, in the first year, 65 per cent of all Volunteers were sent overseas as teachers. Throughout the Kennedy era, they always represented more than half of the Peace Corps' total work force. The majority of these teachers were in secondary schools in Africa, although there were large numbers also in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Most taught English, but there was substantial concentration on physics, maths, biology, chemistry and general science. Besides, Shriver stressed that the teacher's role in the Peace Corps went beyond the narrow confines of academic subjects and classroom timetables.

Realising that teaching could influence students, staff, members, and the local society in general, Shriver put a broad interpretation on the Peace Corps teacher's role: he was to be an "agent of change" in his host community. Peace Corps teachers were encouraged to go beyond their professional duties, to lead and take part in extra-curricular activities—from organising summer camps and taking adult literacy classes to constructing new classrooms and building latrines and bridges. In April, 1962, Shriver expounded his catholic
view of teaching in the Peace Corps:

"We have sent five hundred teachers overseas... We brought one of them back because he refused to participate in the social and recreational life of Nigeria. He wanted only to be a teacher. But we're not sending people overseas who want to be only teachers.... A teacher whose role is restricted to the classroom is like a fighter with one hand tied behind his back. Our Peace Corps teachers must be human beings who participate in the full life of a foreign country."

Shriver's philosophy of "participation" found its fullest expression in the other major activity of Peace Corps Volunteers: community development. By 1963, over 30 per cent of all Volunteers were involved in community development in nineteen countries. Again, these projects could be set up almost immediately, were ideally suited to generalists, and made an immediate grassroots impression. In terms of specific work, community development was almost impossible to define; literally, it could be applied to any action — even the most elementary — which led to the "betterment" of the local community. For instance, children in underdeveloped countries often had distended stomachs caused by a parasitic germ in their drinking water. Their parents regarded this as quite "normal" and paid little attention to it. Volunteers could help simply by giving the example of sanitising water by boiling. No great skill was needed; just common sense and friendliness. Indeed, the community development concept sprang from Shriver's belief that any intelligent, compassionate, young American, given brief training in a basic skill, could make a positive contribution to developing societies.

Shriver's staunchest ally in the espousal of community development was Frank Mankiewicz, first Peace Corps Rep in Peru and later Regional Chief of all Latin American programmes.
Mankiewicz described community development as, "essentially revolutionary: the ultimate aim of community development is nothing less than complete change, reversal - or a revolution if you wish - in the social and economic patterns of the countries to which we are accredited." In Latin America, where Mankiewicz estimated 97 per cent of the population had no say in the political, social, and economic decisions which affected their lives, he deemed it the Volunteers' duty to "call attention to his fragmental community, to ease the sense of alienation, to function, in short, in the best Christian sense of the word, as a 'witness' to the existence of the majority of the nation's citizens." Thus, the central purpose of the Volunteer working in community development was to encourage and inspire - by his example - apathetic villagers and dispirited slum-dwellers to participate in the development of their own community. Although in many cases native peoples worked with the Volunteers to alleviate physical poverty - by improving agricultural methods or initiating a local industry or by building homes, schools and sanitary sewers - community development was aimed more at the poverty in men's minds. Mankiewicz recalled the poor peoples of the barrios (local communities) in Latin America drawing pictures of themselves without hands or feet - an indication of how they saw themselves as powerless with absolutely no control over their own destiny. "People talk about themselves as abandoned or forgotten," wrote Mankiewicz. "Acción communal" aimed to show the lower classes they would not be "forgotten" if they made the best of their local resources - labour, material and money - and tried to help themselves rather than wait for aid from the alcalde, the Church or the entrenched aristocracy. Therefore, although
community development was often the source of greater food production, purer water and cleaner streets, its effects were not measurable solely in those terms. For it also sought to change attitudes in such a way that the poor would grasp an understanding of collective action and its power to solve their problems. Ultimately, it was an attempt to convince people of the value of the democratic process. A successful community development was one that left a self-reliant local movement or community organisation which would continue to function long after the Volunteer's departure. As Mankiewicz put it: "If the aims of community development, as the Peace Corps sees it in Latin America, can be summed up in one sentence, it is that success is in sight, not when the economic statistics have reached a certain level, not when a certain number of miles of roads or cinderblock houses have been built, but when the forgotten and ignored have been invited to join in society."^30"

Between them, teaching and community development project accounted for the activities of approximately 80 per cent of all Volunteers. The other major types of Peace Corps programmes were agricultural extension, health care, physical education, university education, public works and public administration. (APPENDIX XII) Different groups of Volunteer were sent to individual countries, each group concentrating on a different type of project. However, Peace Corps assignments, especially in community development, were never narrowly defined; there was a great deal of overlap between jobs. Indeed, Peace Corps programmers incessantly exhorted all Volunteers to "participate" overseas in as many ways as possible.
The quality of the programming which shaped that "participation" was the subject of the most serious ongoing debate within the Peace Corps. The biggest criticism of P.D.O. in the Kennedy era was that it played what evaluators called the "Numbers Game". That is, in order to make an immediate impact on the Congress at home and on foreign governments abroad, the Peace Corps pushed too many unskilled Volunteers into too many countries - to the detriment of both. Lowther and Lucas wrote that "In its quest to become a credible force for international amity and development..... the Peace Corps sought to overwhelm human problems with massive numbers of Volunteers. Quality was sacrificed to quantity." Brent K. Ashabranner, noting that Volunteer numbers rose from none in 1961 to fifteen thousand in 1966, also claimed, "commitment to growth dominated all other thinking." Evaluator David Oelman was only one of many who described "rapid growth" as the "religion" of the Peace Corps. The philosophy of "bigness" had originated with The Towering Task. However, Wiggins' aim of having thousands of Volunteers first in one country and then in a few others, was never realised. Rather, relatively small groups - ranging from twenty to six hundred - were assigned to very many countries. Still, the concept of "bigness" was there, even if not in the sense that Wiggins had originally intended. In a memorandum of September 1961, Shriver told his senior staff that "The world will not wait while we attempt to fill an ocean with an eye-dropper." Taking a firm stand against small programmes and a cautious approach, he warned, "We must achieve optimum utilisation of our administrative capacities. To anticipate our limits before we must would be a disastrous error." Accordingly, the Peace Corps began with a quantum jump.
Between July 1961 and June 1963, it placed nearly six thousand Volunteers in forty-four countries. (APPENDIX XIII However, as early as January 1962, Annie Gutierrez of the Latin American Division warned her boss, Jack Vaughn, that it would be dangerous to produce too many programmes too quickly and thus "sacrifice quality for quantity."

There was no doubt Sargent Shriver preferred large programmes to modest ones. This was only practical. In terms of expenditure on selection and training, programming and administration, it often cost as much to set up a small programme as a big one. Also, in the early days, the Peace Corps had to make a good impression on Capitol Hill. Placing significant numbers of Volunteers overseas was the best and most obvious way to do this. However, these considerations sometimes led Shriver to make over-optimistic projections. He favoured country Reps who were bold, who spoke of "expanding" programmes and "significant" numbers. During his visit to the programme in Thailand in 1962, Volunteers noticed that Shriver "seemed to have taken special pride in talking big numbers." Tom Quimby recalled that Warren Wiggir could also be "bullish" over numbers. In 1963, Bob Hellawell Peace Corps Rep in Tanganyika, proposed a small programme which called for twelve surveyors to work in teams under two experienced civil engineers. Wiggins rejected this as too expensive and complex a training programme to mount. However, evaluator Richard Richter argued the real reason was, "the number did not satisfy Washington which finally came through with a nice round proposal for two hundred teachers."

The very first "numbers game" was played in the Philippines - the country which Wiggins had used for his example in The Towering Task. The historic relationship
between America and the Philippines suggested the likelihood of a conducive atmosphere for a spectacular programme. Thus, hundreds of generalist Volunteers were quickly channelled into ill-conceived jobs as "teacher's aides". Rep Larry Fuchs recalled:

"The Philippines was the place where you could get the largest number of bodies most quickly, because you had the fewest intergovernmental problems. And what problems would emerge could be dealt with intergovernmentally and hidden from the public and so on. So we planned 600 people over there and we got them over within one and a half years – three hundred in the first year. The first year we had one third of all the Volunteers in the world in the Philippines. But people didn't know this generally, we talked about being in fifteen different countries?"

Evaluators consistently uncovered other examples of the "numbers game". In 1963, David Gelman and Kevin Delany hit out at P.D.O.'s proposal to assign 150 additional Volunteers to Liberia – where there already were 300. With the native population well under a million, they reckoned that any enlargement of the programme would make the country top-heavy with Volunteers. The 104 had justified expansion in terms of the United States' "historic commitment to Liberia." Gelman suggested that it more probably reflected the Peace Corps' "present commitment to wedge a thousand more Volunteers into Africa by hook or by crook."

P.D.O.'s plan to push more Volunteers into Morocco in 1963 evinced – in the words of evaluator Kenneth Love – "a lust for growth that would put a cancer cell to shame." As it was, many Volunteers were already struggling in ill-defined jobs. The pressure to meet the growth targets set by Peace Corps/Washington deterred project officers in the field from admitting that suitable work simply did not exist for hundred
of young American generalists. In West Pakistan, the 104
for a salinity project called for 240 Volunteers in one fell
swoop, while a technical school project wished to assign 150
Volunteers to one place. Evaluator Tim Adams described these
plans as at best, "hyperbolic examples of the numbers game"
and at worst, "grandiose and dangerous." Likewise, in
Turkey, evaluator Thomas Dugan felt the voracious desire for
increased numbers of Volunteers "overshadows sound reasoning."

The evaluation report on Ecuador in 1963 was concerned
that there were far too many underemployed Volunteers visibly
congregating in the streets - a sure sign that the numbers game
was being played. The report warned that while big numbers of
Volunteers might please the Ecuadorian government and make a
"good reading in the U.S." it was nonetheless "a sham and a
delusion to 'sell' it as either necessary or desirable."

For a project in cooperation with the 4-H foundation in
Venezuela, P.D.O. was faced with the choice of either cancel-
ing or using "bottom of the barrel" Volunteers (many were 3's)
It went ahead with the project. In 1963, 210 Volunteers were
already working in an undistinguished programme in Brazil.
Yet, despite its inherent weakness, P.D.O. ordered the Peace
Corps staff in Rio to prepare for 300 more Volunteers. In
an angry memorandum to Sargent Shriver, Charles Peters gave
vent to his feelings on this matter:

"When one sees the Peace Corps idea being prostituted
by an attempt to play the numbers game with a sick
project, one's blood pressure tends to rise and a dispas-
sionate tone is hard to come by. As an evaluator, you
feel you have a duty to raise hell - that, regardless
of the consequences to you, you've got to make clear to
the people in Washington how demoralising the numbers
game can be when witnessed by unemployed Volunteers."

It was not the numbers per se that infuriated Peters,
but rather that they too often consisted of unskilled
generalists for whom P.D.O. could not provide definite jobs. The 104 for an agricultural extension project in Panama had called for a dozen agriculturists; but only three Volunteers turned up with the required skills. Perifirio Gomez, the Panamanian Director of Agrarian Reform, implied that he had been a victim of the Peace Corps' numbers game: "Next time if I ask for thirty who know agriculture and you have only ten, please send only the ten." The only qualification of the Volunteers assigned to a fishing project in the Dominican Republic was that they "liked the outdoors". None had any experience of commercial fishing; the natives they were going to "help" had been fishing all their lives. "It's a great experience for the Volunteers," noted Dee Jacobs and Philip Hardberger, "When they get home they'll know something about fishing. But how much the old weather-beaten Dominican fishermen will be edified in the process remains to be seen."

In Pakistan, there were only two hundred Volunteers. Even so, local Pakistanis appeared indifferent at the prospect of further expansion. Indeed, they were already disappointed that so many of the current Volunteers lacked the necessary skills for their jobs. "Our current task," wrote Tim Adams, "is to expand at their speed, rather than at ours. Selection for Pakistan must cease to be careless; we must send only those Volunteers who have both the skills and the sensitivity to function in this most trying Peace Corps country."

The great programming problem was how to match the applicants in the Peace Corps pool - mostly generalists - with the needs of the host country. Charles Peters felt, "too often this problem has been met, not by giving the host government what it needs, but by talking it into taking what we have. The country says 'We want 16 agricultural: ..."
specialists.' We say 'We're fresh out of those, but we have some lovely English teachers.' In a memorandum of August 22, 1963, Peters warned Shriver of the great risks the Peace Corps was running in "dumping" more groups of unskilled Volunteers on the Third World. "We played that game in the Philippines," said Peters, "and it brought us one hell of a lot of trouble." The Volunteers realised that their presence alone did not constitute an effective programme. As a Volunteer in West Pakistan told Tim Adams:

"One of the major problems plaguing the effectiveness of the Peace Corps is that it is expanding too fast. It is compounding failure and problems by growing in response to government requests (mainly forwarded to be polite to the U.S. government or because it is free), on the premise that this indicates success. I'm not contending that numerically we have too many people, but for Pete's sake get jobs that exist and are needed. Then get people that have needed skills and have the character to take them into their positions. The main things missing are skills, skills, skills."

As early as December 18, 1961, Bill Moyers argued that the Peace Corps should be recruitment-oriented rather than programme-oriented: "Rather than going out to take orders, I strongly recommend that we begin to pick good Volunteers from the pool, train them, and ship them where they are wanted." It was understandable that, in 1961, when the Peace Corps had neither Volunteers nor programme requests, Sargent Shriver should go to the Third World to find out the demand and then try to satisfy it. It had been a critical situation and Shriver's reaction had been fitting. However, by 1962, there were enough Volunteers in the pool to begin matching supply with demand, rather than vice-versa. "I'm simply asking for a shift in emphasis," Moyers wrote to Shriver, "from saying 'What can we do for you?' to, 'These people are available and qualified. Can you use them?" This change of
direction would have guaranteed that a project would never have to be cancelled for the lack of qualified Volunteers—because it would never be accepted in the first place. It would also have freed the Peace Corps from playing the numbers game and allowed it to concentrate on excellence in the field. Moyers concluded:

"The Peace Corps came into being, Sarge, not primarily because foreign governments were beating us over the head asking us for Volunteers but because of the desire of thousands of Americans to serve their country. Our first priority now should be to match the desire and qualifications of those people who do volunteer with the needs that exist abroad, rather than to go out and try to turn up people with desire plus qualifications for requests that originate abroad."

The direction of the Peace Corps, though modified, never changed as much as Moyers, Peters, and the evaluators would have liked. Shriver and Wiggins continued to sign the programme contracts first and worry about finding the required Volunteers later. Often the qualified Volunteers could not be found and programmes had to be either cancelled or diluted. Dilution—filling programmes with unqualified people—sometimes led to anguish for the Volunteers and the host country. As evaluator Kenneth Love put it:

"In the beginning we needed above all else to establish programs. We went out and sold our ideas to governments that had their own preoccupations and were too busy to have noticed this new thing, the Peace Corps. We accepted soft programs and hard programs alike because we wanted to show Congress and the world that we were established in many different countries. The soft programs, the ones where the jobs for the Volunteers were illusory or where the hosts only accepted the Peace Corps reluctantly, were the ones where we ran into problems."

The numbers game stemmed partly from the so-called "empire-building" tendencies within the Peace Corps hierarchy.
In an uncompromising evaluation report, David Gelman questioned the motivations of the Peace Corps leadership's drive for expansion:

"It's been said that in every revolutionary movement, the rank and file remain fervently devoted to the bread-and-butter goals of the revolution, while the leadership develops a growing investment in the movement itself. At the Peace Corps, the majority views with alarm what it regards as a precipitous and dangerous growth, while the leadership seeks, endorses and encourages this growth....the leadership must make plain the reasoning that supports an expensive, exhausting, deleterious effort to double the size of the Peace Corps within a given time.....The danger lies in substituting the goals of the organisation for the goals of the movement. Twenty thousand Volunteers? Fine. But why 20,000 by August of nineteen sixty-blank? That is the kind of goal that baffles many staff members."

Notwithstanding the extraordinary honesty and openness of leaders who could allow such an evaluation to be published, they were also extremely ambitious— for themselves as well as the organisation. Most had reputations still to win. They wanted the Peace Corps to make an immediately favourable impression on the world. And in the America of the early 1960's, bigger was always better.

From Shriver's point of view, there were political considerations to be taken into account. A small, slow, expansive Peace Corps— even if it had been of absolutely unquestionable quality— would not have won favour and appropriations on Capitol Hill. Congressmen reading a quick resume of Peace Corps achievements before a vote did not normally take the time to analyse the sophisticated socio-cultural implications of every programme. They looked at how many Volunteers were in how many countries. Quite simply, they correlated success with numbers. Evaluators tended to ignore this fact. "Our basic strategy for Congress," advised David Gelman, "needs to be nothing more complex than excellence.
and service. Numbers have little to do with either. Unfortunately, things were not quite that straightforward. As Peace Corps Director, Sargent Shriver had always to be conscious of his domestic political constituency. Evaluators did not. They could afford to analyse the Peace Corps in "pure" terms. To his credit, Shriver realised this; after all, it was he who employed the evaluators.

A miniscule, cautious Peace Corps would not have been in harmony with the order which President Kennedy had given Shriver to "create a New Frontier image abroad." Kennedy wanted to give aid of a personal kind to the developing world, but equally, he wanted as many young Americans as possible to have the experience of living and working with Third World peoples. One of his major reasons for proposing the Peace Corps in 1960 had been to break down the prevalent American ignorance of foreign cultures. Shriver strove to comply with the President's wishes. Even so, he consistently denied that the Peace Corps was committed to numbers for numbers' sake. "We have no such expansionist policy", he told evaluators. His response to the "numbers game" charge was that a Peace Corps of twenty or fifty or even a hundred thousand Volunteers would do no more than scratch the surface of the gargantuan development problems confronting the Third World. He argued that if he had heeded "numbers game" critics in February 1961, then the Peace Corps would never have got off the ground:

"There were also arguments in those early days about "saturation" of the foreign country, either in terms of jobs or the psychological impact of the American presence. I have since noticed that the same arguments made about a 500-1,000 man program in 1961 were also made about our plans to expand to 5,000 Volunteers (March 1963), to 10,000 Volunteers (March 1964) and to 13,000 (September 1964). I am not suggesting that
the Peace Corps should continue to grow indefinitely. But I am
proposing that much time and energy are wasted in theoretical
musings, introspections and worries about the future. Peace Corps
Volunteers are a new type of overseas American. Who is to say how many
of them will be welcome abroad next year, or in the next decade? Our
country and our times have had plenty of experience with programs
that were too little, too late."

Shriver did not agree that the mere twelve thousand used by the Peace
Corps in the Kennedy years constituted an "excessive" number. In fact,
the Peace Corps only managed to respond to a tiny minority of both
those at home who applied for service and those abroad who requested
that service. As Harris Wofford noted, "the pressure for increased
numbers is real, but it comes mainly from the field in response to the
demands and needs of expanding programs in 46 host countries and
requests from countries where the Peace Corps has not yet gone."

The Peace Corps was born into an immediate crisis. With little
experience and no help from history, Sargent Shriver was asked to take
unskilled American college graduates and make a favourable impression
on the world. Shriver - a business man to trade - solicited programmes
and matched them with substantial numbers of Volunteers. It was an
experiment. He could not be sure of success. Nevertheless, he was
nothing but optimistic. Given these circumstances surrounding the
launching of the Peace Corps in 1961, he had no choice but to operate
by crisis and - to an extent - the Peace Corps always functioned in that
manner. Indeed, it was a major cause of the "numbers game" problem.
"Reckless expansion and frantic scrambling - initially necessary to get
the agency on its feet - seems to have taken on the qualities of
absolute virtue," complained evaluator Thorburn Reid in 1953. "The
Peace Corps has acquired a certain momentum. This is desirable, but
only so long as we control it. Presently it seems to be controlling
us."56

This strong element of uncontrolled momentum was inevitable if the
Peace Corps was to begin on the speedy and significant scale demanded
by President Kennedy. However, the pressure for speed and numbers
locked the Peace Corps into a mode of operation by crisis and led to
problems overseas - nebulous programming and sometimes, inferior
Volunteers. In August, 1963, Bill Moyers sought a remedy. He
proposed the Peace Corps should move into a "second stage" of
development whereby the quantity of programmes would be commensurate
with the quality:

"And programming is the key. Having proved that we can recruit,
select, train, and send abroad large numbers of committed Americans,
we cannot stop there. Neither can we safely assume that the
excitement and creative tensions of the Peace Corps will continue
to be supplied by constantly expanding numerical goals; it is
important to grow, and I am personally committed to a Peace Corps
that gets larger in size from one year to the next. But as a tree
grows up the roots must find rich sources of life to sustain it.
Programming is to the Peace Corps what those 40-foot roots are to
the 20-foot willow tree in my back yard."57

In a damming indictment of Kennedy's Peace Corps, Kevin Lowther and
C. Payne Lucas blamed most of its weaknesses on inept programming. As
they saw it (both were part of the Peace Corps at this time), "Thousands
of Volunteers arrived overseas to discover that their jobs did not
exist, did not need doing, were beyond their ability and training, or
were better left to local nationals." In complete contradiction to the
"success stories" printed in the American press, Lowther and Lucas
claimed that "the great majority of Volunteers were sent abroad..., without
a clear or critical job assignment."58 They described Shriver as an
"incorrigible optimist" who, in settling for less than perfect
programming, compromised the potential of the Peace Corps and made a
virtue of "amateurism." Certainly, Lowther and Lucas's conclusions
were extreme; however, there were, undoubtedly, many errors of judgement
surrounding Peace Corps programmes.

Some of these were directly attributable to Shriver. His uninhibited
enthusiasm sometimes led him to over-obligate the Peace Corps' limited
resources. During his trips abroad in 1961 to "invite invitations", he
promised more than the Peace Corps could deliver. For instance, he left
Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana with the impression that the
Peace Corps would provide him with qualified plumbers and maths teachers.
In fact, the Peace Corps sent few tradesmen and of the first fifty-one
teachers, only thirteen had a background in maths. Indeed, a minor row ensued when Nkrumah discovered some Volunteers teaching history in Ghanaian secondary schools—something which he had specifically prohibited.59 Gerald Maryanov, Peace Corps Rep in Malaya, also found that Shriver had "oversold" the qualifications of Volunteers. Instead of the qualified teachers promised, the Malayan Ministry of Education actually received recent college graduates without any previous teaching experience.60 From time to time Shriver's unrestrained gusto led Volunteers into irrelevant projects. The plan for a street-sign project in the slums of Addis Ababa was only one of many Shriver-inspired ideas which Volunteers considered "silly."61

In his zeal to avoid the expense, delay and over-bureaucratization which had plagued American foreign assistance programmes in the past, Shriver took a "laissez-faire" approach to programming. Thus in 1961 and 1962 especially, officials from Peace Corps/Washington rushed in and out of Third World countries, setting up programmes which sometimes proved unrealistic. With a view to establishing a community development project in Panama, a P.D.O. officer visited some forty villages, spending no more than an hour in each one. "In all fairness," commented evaluator Dee Jacobs, "the most experienced, professional community developer would have difficulty coming to valid conclusions on the basis of such short visits." Andres Hernandez, Rep in the Dominican Republic, noted that the 104 for the community development project there had been written after a two-day flying visit by the Washington programmers. 62

Programmers tended to establish projects at "policy" levels in foreign countries—a shake of hands with state leaders or ministers—without finding out whether there was any enthusiasm for the Peace Corps at the working level. It was not uncommon for Volunteers to find great resentment in the localities. While the host country's Minister of Education may have appeared delighted at the prospect of a few inexperienced young Americans teaching in his schools, local headmasters might not be quite so enamoured. On occasion the local peoples were not even informed—either by their own government or Peace Corps/
Washington — that Volunteers were on their way. In southern Brazil, evaluator Leveo Sanchez described the local reaction to Volunteers as "hostile and indifferent...Most people knew nothing of the Peace Corps and some wondered why it was in Brazil." In Panama, Dee Jacobs reported on the unenticing prospect which had greeted the Volunteers upon arrival:

"Like so many other projects programmed as quickie visits from Washington, it had been achieved by an agreement at high levels with inadequate follow-through at medium and lower echelons of the cooperating agency...few people knew who the Volunteers were, what they were to do, or even that they were coming." 63

Given Shriver and Wiggins's reliance upon daring, imagination and flexibility, such misunderstandings were inevitable. Moreover, "imagination" and "flexibility" sometimes obscured feasibility and reality. "Do we really think that Americans are so superior that they can do anything?" asked one sceptical Volunteer in Pakistan. "Do we really think that an economics major with no construction experience can build a bridge or a road?" 64 Time and again evaluators asked the same type of questions about Peace Corps projects. Their answers were often negative: not enough Volunteers had sufficient skills, not enough programming had addressed itself to skills that were absolutely essential for the success of a specific programme. In an evaluation report on Pakistan in 1964, Tim Adams emphasised that if the Peace Corps persisted in sending Volunteers overseas without a basic skill then the consequences would be disastrous for them and for the host country:

"Of the six 'mechanics' in the Khanewal Cooperative Project in West Pakistan, I was told only three are qualified. And of the seven in agricultural extension in the Rural Public Works program in East Pakistan, only three meet what are called the 'minimum requirements' in the 104. Their performance in the field shows a strong correlation: the ones with the skills are out-performing the others by a great margin. And this pattern is repeated in every project in both East and West Pakistan. Aside from the idleness, and even failure, that can result, the ones without skills often become hangdog Volunteers whose self-confidence has been jostled, if not shattered, by misassignment." 65
Indeed, such was the poor quality of some of the early programme descriptions, Lowther and Lucas called them "literary documents bordering on fiction." 66

One of the major difficulties was that Peace Corps programmers — along with everyone else — did not have an exact idea of what Volunteers could or could not do overseas. Their confusion was reflected in the early "shopping list" programmes which assigned Volunteers to do everything, from teaching to public health care, agricultural extension and physical education, in a single country. Programmers were often forced to rely on little more than personal instinct. While this left scope for individual creativity, it also guaranteed that there would be an unevenness in quality. Different officials in P.D.O. had different ideas about what a Peace Corps programme should be. Bill Josephson complained to Warren Wiggins about this "lack of uniformity" in the way project descriptions were written and circulated. 67

Since most of Wiggins' staff had come from T.C.A., some of that organisation's bad habits re-emerged from time to time. For example, a project description for Nigeria was copied verbatim from a 104 on Sierra Leone. 68 On another occasion, General Counsel Bill Delano discovered a Peace Corps programmer in the Latin American Division about to transfer a project from one country to another without any change in the original description. Delano prevented this particular scandal, but the incident reminded him of T.C.A.'s tendency to lump the "underdeveloped world" into a single, bland category without sufficient reference to the unique locale of each area. In a memorandum to John Alexander, Delano criticised P.D.O.'s blatant neglect of the local political, socio-economic and religious ramifications of any given project and he condemned the "cursory attitude which P.D.O. appears more and more to be taking towards 104's when actually they should be becoming more and more comprehensive." 69 Peace Corps Rep, Gerald Maryanov, also noted how "insensitive" Washington programmers could be to a particular
country's customs and mores while their project descriptions often revealed, "unrealistic, overenthusiastic notions as to how fast economic and social change could occur."  

A hurriedly produced or badly written 104 took its toll on every other component of the Peace Corps operation. Possibly the worst affected were selection and training. Their functions were to choose and prepare Volunteers for a specific job overseas. If the 104 was vague or mistaken about the work, then selection and training could be rendered virtually irrelevant. In September, 1962, Chief of training, Joseph Kauffman, made a scathing attack upon P.D.O.: "For most programmes, the project and job definitions are too vague and cause undue anxiety. It is our feeling that a principal cause of Volunteers' unhappiness overseas is a feeling of nothing worthwhile to do or a feeling of inadequacy about what needs to be done." This was the Training Division's common cry. Too often the 104 did not contain precise information. For example, the description of a teaching project in Senegal in 1963, maintained that only "some few" of the natives did not speak French. Naturally then, Peace Corps instructors concentrated their efforts on French language. However, after a few hours in Senegal the Volunteers came to realise that the vast majority of people spoke Wolof - only the educated classes spoke French. Similarly, the instructors at Syracuse University, training Volunteers bound for Tanganyika, complained of the "slap-dash programming" which required them to contend with eighty-eight trainees in fifteen different job categories. A 104 for Sierra Leone in 1963, had described preventive medicine and public health projects as "felt needs." However, on arriving in the country, Volunteers discovered that the local Ministry of Health was interested in neither of these occupations. Thus, the Volunteers had been trained for jobs which were not wanted or deemed important by the host country. The effect on the Volunteers was shattering. "It has taken them one and a half years to reorient themselves psychologically," reported evaluator Robert McGuire.
Ultimately, it was the Volunteers and the host country nationals who suffered most from what Peace Corps evaluators referred to as "spilt-milk projects."

"Only innocents continue to rely on the 104 as some reflection of reality," wrote Dee Jacobs in a highly critical evaluation report on the Dominican Republic. The 104 had stated that, along with host country counterparts, the Volunteers would be helping to construct low-cost, "self-help" school houses. However, when the Volunteers arrived, they found that they were actually expected to build the schools, on their own, not just assist. In addition, several key host government officials were obviously hostile to the Volunteers. After a few months, the school construction project collapsed and the Volunteers moved into general community development work. Jacobs blamed P.D.O. for the superficial planning which had pushed Volunteers into ill-conceived work situations: "The pressure to produce was on and it shows in the 104's and in the field. Not enough time was spent to investigate carefully the need for, and feasibility of various projects." 73

The Jamaican programme was another which gave the impression of being a hasty improvisation. According to evaluator Richard Elwell, it was "as if the Rep had been given a planeload of randomly selected applicants and told to find an island." Indeed, he estimated that some of the Volunteers working in a library in Kingston would "make about the same impression if they were working in the back rooms of the historical society in Springfield, Illinois...They get the same mysterious satisfaction out of working with cards and books that librarians get everywhere, but it is far from a Peace Corps assignment."

In Nigeria, Peace Corps Rep Sam Proctor, reported that the Peace Corps lawyers teaching in the universities of Ibadan and Ife were almost completely superflous to the nation's basic needs. Even worse was an irrigation project for the Ganges-Kobadak valley in East Pakistan - ambitiously described in a 104 outlining jobs in irrigation management, agriculture extension and irrigation extension. Unfortunately, the
Volunteers discovered that they had been assigned to an irrigation project which lacked one essential ingredient — water. The IO had not reflected the grave doubts voiced by those familiar with the area as well as the gloomy forecast of a Harvard Study Group. Franklin Williams (Chief of the Division of International Organisations) had been desperate for a Peace Corps link-up with the United Nations; collaboration with the Food and Agricultural Organisation on the Ganges-Kobadak project appeared to provide the opportunity. However, as evaluato Tim Adams pointed out, the result was a pitiable operation, sloppily researched, unrealistically planned and, thus far at least, poorly executed." Furthermore, Chief of Evaluation, Charles Peters counselled Shriver that Adams description of the Ganges-Kobadak project should be read by all programming officers as a guide to "how we don't want things done." 74

Derek Singer, author of the IO for Brazil in 1963, specifically advised the Peace Corps against undertaking an agricultural extension project in the Sao Francisco valley region. His warning was ignored. P.D.O. pushed ahead with a programme which became one of the least effective in Peace Corps annals. Evaluators reckoned that, due to faulty planning, a mere 13 per cent of the Volunteers were working in their original job assignments. In Turkey, evaluator Thomas Dugan compared the effect of the Volunteers working in an agriculture and forestry programme to, "young, semi-skilled foreigners entering the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the dead of winter with little or no advance warning and stating that they would like to assist in programs." 75

Some of the errors perpetrated by P.D.C. were downright careless. One Volunteer bee-keeper was sent to a part of India where bees were almost totally unheard of. A Volunteer horticulturist was sent to work on date palms in Niger — only to find an absolute deficiency of date palms there. A Volunteer fluent in Spanish and with a Latin American background was sent to Sierra Leone — despite his request to
be assigned to Latin America; he could only conclude that someone in P.D.O. must have thought Sierra Leone was in Latin America. A married couple of Volunteers were first assigned to Burma, then Thailand, then Chile, then West Africa, then Malaya and then North Borneo; finally, they were told they were going to "perfect jobs" in East Pakistan - these turned out to be in the disastrous Ganges-Kobadak project.

Another young Volunteer in the Ganges-Kobadak valley recalled: "When they told me I was going to Pakistan, I assumed it would be West Pakistan, because cotton is my speciality. But there's no cotton in East Pakistan - and here I am." On July 19, 1963, Charles Peters emphasised to Shriver, "Good Volunteers join the Peace Corps to work overseas. When the Peace Corps indicates by weak or non-existent technical training and by sloppy programming that we really don't take their work seriously, we're playing a dangerous game." Nowhere was that game more dangerously played - or more vehemently criticised - than in the sphere of community development. Since community development sought to reorganise societies by encouraging positive attitudes on behalf of the natives, it was exceedingly difficult to plan in advance. Moreover, since local situations were changeable from day to day, it could not afford to be too rigidly programmed.

Frank Mankiewicz, the dynamic force behind the Peace Corps' community development philosophy, admitted this made it the "easiest thing in the world to do badly." The plight of the community development worker was that he often had no specific skill and - what was worse - no specific assignment. After a few months training, the Peace Corps plunged him into a totally alien environment under the vague instruction to "participate."

Experience was to show that only the very best Volunteers could carry out community development entirely successfully. P.D.O.'s mistake was to make it the Peace Corps' second largest programme. By 1963, nearly three thousand Volunteers were involved. Evaluators' reports from Latin America reflected the discrepancy between numbers.
In criticising the Peace Corps' community development project in Panama, Thorburn Reid reported:

"The project's aims were not clearly understood in either Panama or Washington because the Panamanian Health Service does not seem to have a clear conception of community development. To what degree the project was to emphasise community development as against public health and sanitation has never been resolved. The selection and training of the Volunteers reflected this confusion. Some Volunteers are generalists, while others have skills in health and sanitation. During training neither Berkeley nor the trainees ever quite knew what the jobs would be. There still is confusion in the Panamanian Health Service about the role of the Volunteers."

In Venezuela, inadequate preparation led to disaster for the community developers working with the 4-H Foundation. The project had actually been programmed by a Peace Corps official who never strayed from his cosy office in Caracas. Not surprisingly then, nobody knew the Volunteers were coming, they had no counterparts and no jobs. Evaluators Delany and Jacobs ranked the programme with "any of A.I.D.'s smaller fiascos... everything that could possibly go wrong has gone wrong." In Guatemala, evaluators found it difficult to assess the "rationales" of the original community development plan; the actual work done by the Volunteers turned out to be completely different from the jobs outlined in the 104. Likewise, in El Salvador by September 1963 only ten Volunteers (out of twenty-three) remained in the "swamp of imprecision and generalities" which P.D.C. had prepared for them.

Charles Peters claimed that "imprecision" characterised the programming for most community development projects in Latin America. Indeed, in later years, even Frank Mankiewicz admitted community development's major flaw was that it had been applied too quickly in too many countries. He also felt the Peace Corps had been slightly over-optimistic in its belief that nearly every young American generalist could make some sort of material contribution without a basic skill and a definite job. Other critics were even more severe. Brent K. Ashabramner put the community development failure rate as high as 50 per cent. Lowther
and Lucas maintained most programming for community development was "pure fantasy" and that only one Volunteer in every twenty was truly effective. 81

Lowther and Lucas were also critical of the job to which most Volunteers were assigned—teaching. "Peace Corps teaching programs . . . never justified the allocation of large numbers of Volunteers to the classroom," they wrote. "Teaching programs have served the Peace Corps by providing easy placement for thousands of generalist Volunteers." 82 In Africa and the Far East, more than 80 per cent of all Volunteers were teachers; in the Near East, Latin America and South East Asia the figure was around 33 per cent. 83 With such large numbers of inexperienced college graduates involved, mistakes were inevitable. Again, much of the blame lay with P.D.O. For example, in 1962, English teachers could hardly be described as one of Ceylon's most desperate "felt needs". Ceylon's teacher-training colleges were already over-staffed in this subject and besides, the Ceylonese were trying to repudiate their colonial past by de-emphasising English teaching. This made education in Ceylon a delicate and controversial issue. The situation was exacerbated by the Volunteers' low facility in Sinhalese and by their arrival in Ceylon in the middle of term. Hence, as far as their actual job was concerned, they were regarded by their hosts as irrelevant incompetents. "To send a group of Volunteers with sub-professional qualifications into such a situation was to invite trouble," commented evaluator Arthur Dudden. 84

The 104 for Senegal had justified a T.E.F.L. project there by arguing that English was essential for "inter-African cooperation." Evaluator David Hapgood called this "nonsense" and went on to describe the programme as "conceived in illusion and suckled on ignorance." The schools in Senegal did not need English teachers and most were unaware that Volunteers were coming in this capacity. Besides, the host officials in Dakar had asked for fifteen Volunteer
teachers at the most - P.D.O. assigned twenty-three. Their jobs fell through immediately and many were soured by months of unemployment. In the Philippines in 1962, Eugene Burdick and William Lederer noted that host nationals were not impressed by Volunteers teaching English: "Since English has been taught by Filipino teachers, this activity has no novelty, no fresh impact on the community...the teaching function is not only invisible - it is also unimportant." Likewise in Niger, in the Dominican Republic and a goodly number of other countries where it was of marginal significance, T.E.F.L. was a slot-filling programme.

Even more subject to abuse was the nebulous "teacher's aide" assignment. This reached scandalous proportions in the Philippines where hundreds of Volunteers served as "aides" to native teachers. The 104 said Volunteers should observe, participate and help in elementary and secondary schools. However, since no specific status or responsibility went with the job, they were, in effect, required to define their own role. Larry Fuchs, Rep in the Philippines, described the Volunteers' assignments as useless "non-jobs". Burdick and Lederer noticed that the teacher's aide "usually admitted that his sense of dissatisfaction grew from a basic sense of inadequacy about his formal job; the aide program just does not allow sufficient outlets for the energy and talents of the average Volunteer." In 1963, they recommended that this disastrous programme should be phased out as quickly as possible. So-called "conversation assistants" in other countries also found themselves in meaningless and, often demeaning, jobs. One female Volunteer in Costa Rica summed up her six-hour contribution to classwork: "The teacher said to me 'Say horse!' I stood up and said 'horse' and sat down. That was it for the day." Between 1961 and 1963 the Peace Corps landscape became littered with the ill-begotten refuse of P.D.O. Evaluator David Gelman attributed this to the arrogance of Washington officials who took the attitude that the Volunteers' jobs were "not too important in the long run and somehow we succeed anyway, no matter what the problems."

Brent K. Ashabranner blamed the "fictional documentation" passed off as project descriptions which inevitably caused inadequate training and selection followed by poor programme execution. He concluded the whole process was a "vicious circle" usually begun by a badly-written 104. Yet, although multitudinous mistakes were made, these were only one side of the story. Peace Corps programming also had many outstanding successes. And, since on many occasions P.D.O. accepted its culpability, so too - on many occasions - it deserved tremendous credit.
"This is a country where the Peace Corps looks almost too good," wrote evaluator John Griffin in Thailand. The Volunteers had been thoroughly prepared and most were well placed in structured teaching jobs in the secondary schools. The programme was tightly administered, there was close cooperation between Rep Glenn Ferguson and the Volunteers, and not one Volunteer resigned or was sent home. Indeed, such was its success, Griffin recommended that the Peace Corps should expand into university teaching where an impact could be made on the future leaders of Thailand. "This program deserves its reputation as one of our best run and anyone looking for real trouble will be disappointed," he concluded.

In Gabon, the school construction project was "one of the most successful programs the Peace Corps has ever put into the field... meeting a direct and immediate need of the Gabonese government." The Volunteers were enormously popular with their hosts, they had personal contact with at least thirty local Gabonese communities, and native counterparts were plentiful and enthusiastic. Evaluator Philip Cook was ecstatic:

"The Gabon project, to date, proves that the Peace Corps can make effective use of young, low-octane Volunteers in structured assignments... one can certainly conclude that the Peace Corps can put nineteen and twenty-year olds together in groups of ten or fifteen, show them how to do a relatively complex job, and then leave them to continue the performance with little direct supervision."

Similarly, Volunteers working in F.E.T.L., nursing and mechanical engineering in Afghanistan were all busy performing needed tasks and were described by Thorburn Reid as, "excellent... not a word, not even a suggestion, or criticism of the Peace Corps program did I hear in Kabul." Despite the mysterious Afghan environment and a delicate political situation, their work presented a good example of a small, well-directed Peace Corps project with high standards of programming.

Dee Jacobs noted that the home economists and agriculturalists in
Uruguay had scored a "definite, if unspectacular, success in meeting all three Peace Corps goals." And the physical education and sports programme in British Honduras - as in almost every country - was an outstanding success. Indeed, Richard Elwell saw it as a great force of social education which gave the Peace Corps its "greatest exposure." Nor were there any major problems for the solid agricultural extension project in Costa Rica which in July, 1963, was already "good...with prospects of becoming better."

The more structured teaching programmes were consistently praised by evaluators - despite Lowther and Lucas's contention that it was a job at which "surprisingly few Volunteers have excelled." If providing trained manpower in education can be equated with success, then Peace Corps teaching programmes were, by and large, eminently successful. Not only did Volunteers provide knowledge and help break down the Third World students' traditional fear of attempting anything beyond his text book's rigid instructions, but they also initiated school libraries, school newspapers, the adoption of audio-lingual methods, sports clubs and numerous other activities associated with the "modern" Western school.

In the secondary education project in Nyasaland, evaluator Richard Elwell reckoned that not a single Volunteer was less than first-class. "Nowhere in the Peace Corps have I seen a more fortunate combination of events, purposes and people," he wrote. "It proves that under the right conditions a few sincere, hard-working, young Americans can be as powerful an influence as the Peace Corps had planned they should be."
Likewise, the groundwork done by P.W.Q for the 10L on the teaching programme in Ethiopia was detailed, accurate and - as Elwell put it - "heroic". Hardly any Volunteers were ill-assigned and there was little underemployment. Four hundred Volunteers taught approximately 80 per cent of the twenty-five thousand secondary school students in Ethiopia. In 1964, the Ministry of Education asked for an additional six hundred teachers. Elwell left Ethiopia with the teaching programme "going beautifully". He was convinced of the "basic rightness of the project" and confident it would be of great and enduring consequence to Ethiopians.

The teaching project in Ghana was also deemed most satisfactory. The morale of the Volunteers was universally high and there was a sense that they were really making a positive contribution to Ghanaian society.94

In 1964, Richard Richter described the Volunteer teachers in Tanganyika as "exceptionally able...exuding an aura of courage and devotion.95 Evaluators in Nigeria, Liberia, Togo and many other African countries came to similar conclusions. Indeed, even in non-African countries, teaching programmes were generally effective. For example, in Turkey, the Volunteers overcame substantial provincial scepticism and conservatism to make their teaching project a "resounding success."95

Besides, even where teaching programmes themselves did not appear very successful, Volunteers often made worthwhile contributions outside the classroom. Teacher's aides in the Philippines, disillusioned with their ill-defined assignments, participated in every type of community project in the barrios. Thus, although evaluators
Burdick and Lederer criticised the vague teaching jobs, they
recognised that the reservoir of good will which Volunteers were
building was a "key achievement." There was a "genuine feeling of
warmth" for the Peace Corps and there was little doubt that it had taken
on a special meaning for most Filipinos:

"Perhaps most Filipinos are still convinced that all Americans
are rich and live in big houses but they are also convinced that
these rich American youth are willing to live in barrios. The
children, especially, will always carry this memory with them: in
the long run, perhaps this alone makes the whole effort worthwhile
even if it might be done better in some important ways." 66

In Ceylon, little more than half of the Volunteers' talents were
properly utilised in a "spilt-milk" project. Yet, Arthur Dudden
reported, "people-to-people successes between the Volunteers and
Ceylonese are to be found everywhere...and in general it must be said that
the Peace Corps is probably the most successful institution in Ceylon
today." Likewise, although the conversation assistants in Costa Rica
found their jobs superfluous, they threw themselves into physical
education, library construction and the organization of all sorts of
community activities. Thus, while the evaluation report was critical
of the teaching programme, Dee Jacobs was nonetheless impressed at how
the Volunteers had "wholeheartedly and enthusiastically become a part of
their communities and in most cases have made a permanent impact upon
Costa Rica." 97

If teaching projects were usually sound, the programming for
community development was by no means always disastrous. On the
contrary. The 104's for community development projects in Peru proved
remarkably accurate. Indeed, evaluator Herb Wegner nicknamed Peru,
"The Peace Corps program in Peru is healthy," he reported, "There appear to be no big or dramatic problems. In general, the program exhibits vitality, maturity and stability." Soon after arriving, the Volunteers found themselves in structured nutrition and medical projects. The local Peruvian agencies were eagerly waiting to put them to work. By 1963, Volunteers were helping to feed 4,000 children during the school year. "The question in Peru is not so much of going from bad to good - but from good to better," concluded Vegner. "We are in Peru, we are accepted and we are wanted. The Peace Corp idea is working." The '64's for the Peace Corps' largest country programme - in Colombia - were also basically sound. By January, 1964, over six hundred Volunteers were working in various community action projects and, despite the huge size of the programme, it was a significant success. Indeed, evaluator Meridan Bennet claimed, "the Peace Corps' ability to work in community development has been proven in Colombia." Since much of the work was undefined, the Volunteers were free to tackle everything. This they did with a vengeance as they took on literacy-teaching, arts and crafts classes, agricultural extension and pre and post-natal care. Female Volunteers working in the machismo-dominated campesinos proved as effective as males and Bennett concluded the fear - held by some Washington officials - that girls could not function as community developers, should be banished forever. 68

In 1962, Charles Peters described the community development programme in the Dominican Republic which consisted of chicken-breeding, well-digging, and market-gardening, as "a successful Peace Corps project...making good use of the Volunteers' talents and meeting real needs of the Dominican Republic." Likewise, the rural action programme in Chile was "farin well" and had established the Peace Corps' good name. 99 Community development in Bolivia was another effective programme. Jack Vaughn, Chief of the Latin American Division and later Peace Corps Director, recalled how Volunteers helped the hostile Indians of the high
plains near Lake Titicaca build their first-ever school, their first clinic and their first sewage system: "They had made more physical progress in a couple of years than they had made in the previous thousand. But more important was the attitude, the openness, the willingness to look you in the eye and tell you about who they were and what they had done, and the pride and self-respect of citizenship. This was done by the Peace Corps...in about three years."  

Of course, not all Peace Corps programmes had such happy endings. Indeed, every project was an inextricable mixture of success and failure which defied simplistic "good" or "bad" value judgements. Conditions could be altered by the appointment of a new Rep, a change in the host government, an infusion of a new batch of Volunteers or - quite simply - time. When the community development programme in Panama began in 1963, trouble abounded. It was a victim of instant programming, poor selection and miserable training. The majority of Volunteers felt inadequate and unhappy. However, only one year later, the programme had been completely transformed by Rep David Soubion. He had found the Volunteers useful jobs, boosted morale, and put the programme on a sound footing. Indeed, in 1964, Jack Vaughn (then U.S. Ambassador to Panama) complimented the Peace Corps as, "the best thing the U.S. has done in Panama." Evaluator David Gelman had left Sierra Leone in December, 1962, with grave reservations about the future of the teaching programme there. Yet, in February, 1964, another evaluator, Robert McGuire, argued it had shown "vast improvement in job productivity, programming and morale during the past year." There was virtually no underemployment among the 102 teachers and, for the most part, they were competent and highly regarded by both the government and the local peoples. On November 18, 1963, Charles Peters told Shriver the Peace Corps should "get out of English teaching in Niger." Peters described the history of that project as "sad." Nevertheless, he remained optimistic about "a reasonably good second year" for the Peace Corps in Niger if it
transferred from T.E.F.L. to village literacy, agricultural extension, fire control and other community projects. Thus, the "quality" of Peace Corps programmes could change from year to year and sometimes, from day to day. 101

In a 1963 evaluation report on East Pakistan, Tim Adams made a typical analysis of the wide range of quality likely to be produced in any one programme:

"The health of the Peace Corps in East Pakistan ranges widely from the stumbling, ill-advised Ganges-Kobadak project to the almost ideally-successful operation at the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development in Comilla... In between are a multiplicity of individual assignments. Some have worked out extremely well; others have suffered from inadequate Volunteers and/or unpromising assignments." 102

Similarly, in Liberia in 1963, David Gelman's rather vague conclusion was that "about fifty per cent" of Volunteers were doing an "average to outstanding" job, slightly less than that were "breaking little ground", and a "few cases" were actually hindering the programme. An evaluation of the Peace Corps programme in Ethiopia in 1964, noted the disparity between the secondary education project which was "firmly established", the medical health project which was in "disorder", the university education extension project which was "groping for its place" and the university teaching project which was downright "bad". In Venezuela, a jointly-administered Peace Corps/YMCA project showed programming "at its best" while - in the same country - a Peace Corps/FH Foundation cooperative venture had been "sick since its inception." 105

No Peace Corps programmes were ever described in terms of absolute success: Iran was a "moderate success", Tunisia was a "mixed success", El Salvador was "good, but not exciting" and, in the Camerons, success could only be measured "in degrees."

However, there was usually something positive to be taken even from the least successful programmes. For example, the community development project in Guatemala was by no means one of the Peace Corps' leading lights; yet, evaluator Dee Jacobs conceded it had "scored solid
results in meeting all three Peace Corps aims." Shriver officially
recognised the teaching programme in Somalia as one of the weakest of the
Kennedy era. Indeed, it provided an almost perfect study in how not to
conduct a Peace Corps operation - inadequate training, dreadful
programming, poor administration, a Volunteer attrition rate of 40 per
cent and finally, in March, 1964, war broke out between Somalia and
Ethiopia and the Volunteers had to be evacuated. Nevertheless, in 1963,
evaluator Richard Richter reported that the Peace Corps in Somalia
was "on the right road at last... a solid little project proud of what it
has achieved and praying that Peace Corps/Washington will see fit to send
in a large replacement project." The diversified Jamaican project was
described as a "fiasco." Yet, even in its most troubled moments, Richard
Elwell perceived "patient, constructive efforts by individuals that
measure up to the best Peace Corps work anywhere." In 1963, Elwell
went so far as to recommend the phasing out of another "shopping list"
programme in St Lucia; but again, he noted a "bright spot" in the shape
of the adult education project. Even in the outrageously ineffective
programme in Brazil, at least 17 per cent of the Volunteers were well-
utilised and an even higher percentage had developed close, personal
relationships with natives. 104

The "quality" judgement on any project depended upon the individual
standards by which it was evaluated. Shriver had a running battle with
evaluators who, while admitting that a Peace Corps programme was
satisfactory, would nevertheless describe it as "nice, comfortable,
dull, basically useful but uninspiring." When Dee Jacobs described a
programme in Uruguay as "unexciting", Shriver retorted, "This type of
evaluation doesn't mean a goddamned thing!" 105 Indeed, experience
proved that it was often the quiet, unobtrusive programmes which
permeated beneath the skin of a culture and made a real and lasting
impression. Besides, to be "exciting" was not one of the Three Aims of
the Peace Corps Act.

Some evaluators emphasised the "job" aspect of Peace Corps
programming whereas others stressed the "people-to-people" purposes.

Of course, Shriver strove for the ideal of success on both fronts. This was not always achieved. On many occasions P.D.O. did not provide Volunteers with relevant jobs. Yet, as Charles Peters reminded Shriver in a memorandum of July, 1963, any meaningful evaluation of a programme could not afford to look only at the job. "Our most important success is often the people-to-people success," wrote Peters, "and even our most underemployed projects usually do have a people-to-people impact." 106

Long before the first programme had begun, Shriver knew blunders would be inevitable. All the same, he was determined to preserve programming from the "bureaucratosclerosis" which had beset Point Four, I.C.A. and A.I.D. Shriver never intended P.D.O.'s to be taken as gospel. Indeed, in the Peace Corps' Handbook, issued to all Volunteers in 1961, Shriver wrote:

"No matter how good a job of programming the Peace Corps has done, the job to which you are assigned may turn out to be quite different from the way it is described to you... The Volunteer must anticipate that the job may be different from the way it is described and be prepared to adjust to the new circumstances or even be reassigned to a new position within the country. In many cases, we ask the Volunteer to help in the development of the job to its full potential. We expect Volunteers to be versatile." 107

In the newly-independent countries of Africa and the perpetually turbulent states of Latin America, there were so many imponderables that it would have been foolish to expect programmes to work out exactly as planned. Latin American countries were notorious for the gap which was apt to occur between the glowing promise of a host government's support in the project agreement and the actual performance which was often tantamount to indifference or intransigence. "You can do everything," said a frustrated Volunteer in Colombia, "but if you can't get a two-peso bag of cement when you need it, everything goes to pieces." 108

Many host administrators, especially in the post-colonial countries did not really know what to expect of the Peace Corps. Similarly, the Peace Corps was not aware of the nature or value of the local cooperating organisation. Volunteers often had to argue and
cajole for months before local government bodies would supply necessary equipment. Host country governments or personnel involved in the original agreement could change, leaving Volunteers to face uncooperative or even hostile new masters. This happened to Volunteers in Tanganyika and Jamaica. Also, funds could be cut back and proposed projects shelved. Harsh local economies struck at the very first Peace Corps programme in Tanganyika; and in Jacobina, Brazil, the hospital where several nurses had been assigned never opened.109

With such vicissitudes in mind, Shriver knew that project descriptions could never be more than rough outlines upon which "felt needs" perceived in the field could be transposed. Shifting and searching for jobs and personnel characterised the first few months of even the best projects. Shriver gave enormous power to Peace Corps Reps and placed his faith in the initiative of the Volunteer. Sometimes performance fell below expectations. Still, Shriver resisted the temptation to establish a new overseas bureaucracy staffed by professional programme officers. Despite the arguments of Peters and other evaluators, Shriver was not persuaded that programming "experts", "job kits" and in-depth "analyses" would - in the final outcome - produce better projects than P.D.O. In a sarcastic reply to yet another critical evaluation, Shriver predicted what would become of the Peace Corps should it succumb to the regimental charms of "efficiency" and "professionalism":

"We create 'programmers'... They will be 'experts'. They will issue forth from a program 'office'. They will zoom around telling the overseas staff what is permissible - huge 'program documents' will be prepared in the field at huge expense in time and money. Secretaries will type them with copies for five different Washington offices, all of whom will have to 'sign off'. They will begin to display their program 'submissions' to visitors instead of the Volunteers. It will all be done to raise 'quality', maximise Volunteers' time and talent and save money. The Peace Corps will receive an award for clean-cut, hard administrative efficiency from Forbes Magazine and the Director of the Peace Corps will move from his post to an executive Vice-President's post in a large industrial concern in Dayton." 110

Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas argued that the Peace Corps did not supply nearly enough skilled manpower to the developing countries
and that it took the softer option of sending huge numbers of generalists who "could be had simply by shaking the nearest tree". Certainly the range of the Volunteers' skills and the quality of their performance were inadequate to the needs of the developing world; but given the magnitude of those needs, that was (and probably always will be) unavoidable. Even so, the Peace Corps' skill contribution to Third World countries was not inconsiderable. No Volunteer was sent overseas without training - albeit elementary - in a skill. As Kevin Delany and David Gelman noted in June 1963, "even such rudimentary matters as how to dig a hole or put together a wood frame can go a long way in Africa." Besides, the provision of trained manpower was only one of the Three Aims of the Peace Corps. Building social relationships with host peoples was at least half of the Volunteer's job. Initiative, energy and friendliness were as important as technical expertise. While Charles Peters stressed that the Peace Corps should beware of becoming a "glorified Experiment in International Living", indifferent to the job and solely concerned with improving relations between Americans and the host people, he also warned against metamorphosis into a "junior AID" concentrating merely on technical skills. The Volunteer's attitude towards his hosts was as significant as the task he sought to perform with them. As an old missionary in Morocco told Kenneth Love in 1963: "The quality of the man counts more here than the technical skill." Andre Kopkind of the New Republic wrote that "Although the gap between the hopes it raises and its own performance is huge...the experience seems to energise rather than enervate the Peace Corps." This was certainly true of programming. By 1963, there were signs that it was learning from its mistakes and becoming much more sophisticated in its approach to the "felt needs" of the Third World. The Peace Corps was established in many countries and additional projects could be programmed from the field with relevant experience and support. "Shopping list" programmes were dispensed with and "pyramid programming" - placing a few technically-skilled Volunteers at the base of
generalist groups - was introduced. Also by 1963, the Peace Corps had realised that its most useful commodity - in terms of preparing programmes - was the advice of its two thousand returned Volunteers. They were employed in P.D.O., in the Evaluation and Training Divisions and as overseas staff. At long last there were people in the Peace Corps administration who had actually had the Volunteer experience. This was invaluable. For example, during a staff meeting on the perennial "skills" versus "people-to-people" controversy, former Volunteer Roger Landrum could say with a conviction derived from his service in Nigeria:

"If a technical job is all the Peace Corps contributes, it makes no profound impact either for social change or in person-to-person relations...if the Volunteer is only a technical assistant, then the Peace Corps' days and contribution in these countries are limited and will wash away the rising tide." 116

By the summer of 1963, Peace Corps programmers had accepted that it was a Volunteers' right to have a relevant job with definite responsibility awaiting him overseas. From that necessary base he could work his way into a community and create his own role. P.D.O. had also learned that big numbers - of themselves - did not provide solutions. The Peace Corps continued to expand, but not at the breakneck speed of 1961 and 1962. Indeed, between 1964 and 1966, Peace Corps expansion was limited to two countries: Kenya and Uganda.

"Where do we go from here?", Bill Moyers asked Warren Wiggins in the summer of 1963. "The answer is not in the numbers of people you ask for, not 'from 9,000 to 13,000' but in the nature of the programs you develop." Lucidly, and with his customary sensitivity, Moyers raised the serious questions to be asked if Peace Corps programmers were to improve and move into the future with confidence and integrity:
"Do they make it possible for the Peace Corps seriously to affect the development of a country? Do they provide Volunteers with real possibilities for creative service on Peace Corps terms? Will they be programs from which the Volunteers return satisfied that they have made at least a little difference?" 117

C. Payne Lucas claimed that Third World countries only accepted the Peace Corps because they were too polite or too frightened to say "no" to President Kennedy. "To satisfy our requirements" said Lucas, "we put people abroad whom no one really wanted. . . . We ended up doing jobs that the host country was not really interested in." 118 This was a gross exaggeration. Certainly there were many mistakes. Sometimes Volunteers succeeded almost in spite of, rather than because of, programming. Projects were not perfectly prepared. They never could be. As evaluator Robert McGuire put it, "in two years, even our most conscientious and sensitive Volunteers cannot get through all the barriers." 119 Yet, in April, 1964, in an over-all evaluation report on Peace Corps programmes, Dr William Craig, then Chief of Training, estimated that only 20 per cent of Volunteers in unstructured job situations were not performing as desired; in structured jobs the figure fell to a mere 10 per cent. 120

Perhaps even more convincingly, in 1964 there were requests from the developing countries for ever-increasing numbers of generalist Volunteers. This demand persuaded Shriver that - even in its worst programs - the Peace Corps "must have been doing something right." 121 Moreover, in the Cow Palace Auditorium on November 2, 1964 - the fourth anniversary of Kennedy's first address on the Peace Corps - President Johnson suggested that the single most important indicator of the success of Peace Corps programmes was that "nearly every country where Volunteers are now serving has asked for more - often two, three or four times more. Many countries are on the waiting list." 122
Peace Corps programming in the Kennedy era was not faultless. Various factors contributed to weakness: big numbers, haste, inexperience, over-optimism. However, failure - and its extent is a vexed question - was only one aspect of programming. There were many triumphs - although these too can be judged only in relative terms. Perhaps the most useful measurement of success came in the Third World's **incessant clamouring** for more and more Volunteers. Meridan Bennett, one of the first returned Volunteers to be employed as an evaluator, gave a hint of the difficulty involved in making any kind of glib value judgement on the contribution of Peace Corps programmes to the felt needs of underdeveloped countries. "One always hates to talk too boldly of success in the Peace Corps," he wrote. "What we have undertaken to accomplish is so difficult and elusive that failure is always lurking just around the corner from success."
CHAPTER ELEVEN

A SPECIAL GROUP OF YOUNG AMERICANS
"I want to express my great pleasure at welcoming....the first members of the Peace Corps to go overseas....There are of course a great many hundreds of millions of people scattered throughout the world. You will come in contact with only a few, but the great impression of what kind of country we have and what kind of people we are, will depend on their judgement, in these countries, of you. You will be the personification of a special group of young Americans, and if you can impress them with your commitment to freedom, to the advancement of the interests of people everywhere, to your pride in your country and its best traditions and what it stands for, the influence may be far-reaching and will go far beyond the immediate day-to-day tasks that you may do in the months that are ahead....we put a good deal of hope in the work that you do."

- JOHN F. KENNEDY -

(Remarks In The Rose Garden To The First Group Of Volunteers Before Their Departure For Tanganyika And Ghana, August 28, 1961)
Sargent Shriver was fond of reiterating that "The front lines of the Peace Corps are overseas." Indeed, the most hallowed maxim of Peace Corps/Washington officials was: "The Peace Corps is the Volunteer." The strenuous efforts to shape the organisation in a flexible, "anti-bureaucratic" mould, to ensure that selection and training were relevant, to streamline programming and leave enough scope for the individual, were focused on one objective - to give the Volunteer the best opportunity possible to do the best job possible in the field. At the end of the day, the Peace Corps would stand or fall by its chosen representatives overseas. Warren Wiggins roughly outlined what was required of them:

"For every Peace Corps Volunteer the rules and expectations were that living was simple, allowances only covered basic needs, learning the language of the country of assignment was a prerequisite, host country job supervision was the standard, integration into the culture was a necessity, most privileges and immunities were foresworn, and learning about the people with whom one served was equal in importance to providing them with needed skills. These expectations applied worldwide." 2

Yet, despite these "rules and expectations", as the first Volunteers left for Africa in the summer of 1961, no one could predict whether this great experiment would be a spectacular success or a dramatic failure. In an impromptu speech to the Volunteers boarding the plane for Ghana in August, 1961, Shriver reminded them that "Foreigners don't think you've got the stuff to make personal sacrifices for our way of life. You must show them. And if you don't, you'll be yanked out of the ball-game." 3 In those early days, the Peace Corps rested on little more than faith - a belief in the talent and maturity of the people it had trained and selected to work in the Third World.

Shriver's first major concern was the health of the Volunteers. The Peace Corps represented the largest single group of Americans who had ever tried to live abroad at "grassroots" levels. More Americans had been sent overseas during World War Two, but the troops were in organised units with safe food, clean water and medical care - these relative comforts would not
always be available to Volunteers. Shriver recalled:

"I used to wake up in the middle of the night with the question tearing at me: How are we ever going to protect the health of the Peace Corps Volunteers? This question seemed to have no ready answer. And yet, could we go to the parents of this nation and say to them, yes, we want your sons and daughters, and admit at the same time that for two years they would be overseas—many of them in primitive and remote towns and villages—with no medical assistance?"

Dr Luther Terry, Surgeon-General of the United States, solved Shriver's problem. He proposed that, since the Peace Corps was a public service, Public Health Service doctors should be assigned to each Peace Corps country. Under Dr Leo Gehrig, first chief of the Peace Corps' Medical Programme Division, a unique service was created whereby preventive health measures for Volunteers would be provided by American doctors while actual illnesses and diseases which developed in individual Third World countries would be handled by host country doctors. It was a system suited to Peace Corps needs and consonant with Peace Corps ideals. In addition, it was supremely effective. Of the first 117 early terminations only 20 came back for medical reasons. Inevitably, there were many cases of hepatitis, amoebic dysentery and malaria, as well as exotic fevers and multifarious skin ailments. Also, in the first two years there were five accidental deaths. In general, however, Shriver need not have been unduly worried about the health of the Volunteers. Indeed, by 1963, Charles Peters was advising Shriver that instead of zealously protecting Volunteers against illness, it might be better in the long run—for them and for the Peace Corps—to "let them get sick and develop immunities."

To the Volunteers the problems of "culture shock" and—more seriously—"culture fatigue" were much more troublesome than physical illness. Culture shock was experienced by every Volunteer immediately after arrival in his host country. It could be triggered off by a combination of various factors—strange food, pervasive disease, extremes of climate, dire poverty, or indigenous class and caste distinctions. One Volunteer in the Philippines admitted, "When I arrived here nothing appealed to my sense of taste—not sights, nor sounds, smells, food....I felt completely cut off from
everything I had ever known, and came as close as possible to having a nervous breakdown without actually cracking up." More succinctly, another Volunteer stated, "My being felt repulsion and I wanted to draw away." In *Keeping Kennedy's Promise*, Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas complained that "Nothing (the Peace Corps did) fully prepared Volunteers for the cultural shock that all experience in some degree." This was, of course, true. However, it was unlikely that relatively affluent young Americans could ever have been "fully" prepared for the shock of living in a culture of poverty for the first time. Peace Corps training programmes did try to stress the bad sanitation, the poor health and the physical ugliness endemic to underdeveloped areas; but this could not prevent the Volunteers' inevitable horror on encountering - for themselves - the "starving dogs, sore-ridden children, spitting women and constant lice-picking." Volunteers were bound to be disgusted by some of the habits and mores of Third World societies - the streets being used as a toilet, the indifference to and sometimes the downright enjoyment of human suffering, the perennial presence of beggars in the cities and the unhygienic preparation of foul-smelling foodstuffs.

These aspects of life in the developing countries could never be adequately described before the Volunteer's arrival. As Neil Boyer, a Volunteer in Ethiopia, put it, "it is a baptism by fire...a collision of different values and different expectations, of values that are never wholly transferable, of expectations that are never fully realised." A female Volunteer stationed in the Far East agreed that when faced with "rotten teeth, foul breath, smells, sores, filth, rags, I couldn't take it. I was astonished to find that my reactions were so diametrically opposed to my ideals...I simply and truthfully hated it and wanted to go home." Most Volunteers were shaken and depressed on initial contact with their host culture. Certainly, their expectations and motivations were severely tested by the raw physicality of an alien environment. "I spend much of my time looking for places to urinate and being angry with the presence of mosquitoes," said a Volunteer in one of his first letters from the barrios. "I am constantly annoyed by spitters and careless coughers. I request napkins in vain and eat and drink the most disagreeable concoctions sometimes until I
The rate of early returnees was always highest during these first few months of service. Tom Carter, an able and sensitive Volunteer in Peru, described the horrible feeling of culture shock:

"I get a lot of letters from people saying 'how exciting your work must be' or 'how picturesque' or 'how much you must enjoy it'... But there comes a day when things are no longer picturesque, they are dirty, no longer quaint but furiously frustrating and you want like crazy to just get out of there, to go home. This is called culture shock and you don't find it mentioned on recruiting posters. It happens to one and all, usually about the third or fourth month. How hard it hits you and for how long depends largely on this problem of false motives. More Volunteers quit and go home at this stage than any other. Unhappy, with a lot of time out of their lives wasted, full of bad memories of their experience, they fall victims to their own imagination." 13

Despite these few "victims", the vast majority of Volunteers overcame culture shock and went on to complete their two year term. Indeed, most Volunteers stated that once they got over their initial revulsion, the actual physical conditions of their host surroundings were the least irritating aspects of their service. (Appendix XIV) Much more debilitating than culture shock was "culture fatigue". "Fatigue" set in after nine months or a year of the Volunteer's service. It was a term used to describe the psychological and emotional exhaustion that invariably resulted from the Volunteer's gradual discovery that his efforts - no matter how laudable - were ultimately not enough to satisfy the mountainous needs of his hosts. "I sat for a long time tonight just thinking of all the things I'd seen" wrote Volunteer Mary Seberger in Venezuela. "What can I - one person - do in two years that will help reduce in any way, the problems that I've seen?" Another Volunteer in Colombia wondered, "Just how beneficial our project is and if we could ever make a dent in the situation?" Training instructors tried to warn Volunteers that they should not expect to be "world savers." Nevertheless, as one Volunteer perceived, "Even when your expectations are low, they may be too high." 15 The result was that the Volunteer's morale hit rock-bottom as he slid into a depression.

When asked how she rated her impact on the barrios, a Volunteer in the Philippines commented, "It is rather like pouring water into a sieve." 16 A major obstacle was that the Volunteers came from the fast, profit-oriented, high-achieving American society. It was painful for them to adjust
to the relaxed and ponderous ways of Third World peoples. As one Volunteer serving in a Muslim country put it, "We're in competition with Allah" - a reference to his hosts' passive acceptance of their poverty-stricken lives."\(^{17}\) The pace of life in the underdeveloped nations was radically different from America. Volunteers who complained to Peace Corps/Washington of being "underemployed" were often considered "over-industrious" by their more restrained hosts. As one Volunteer in Morocco noted, "To avoid frustration... you kind of have to gear yourself down."\(^{18}\) One of the main causes of "culture fatigue" was that the Volunteers' hosts did not necessarily want to be "Americanised." Many Volunteers expected willing converts to hard-working, rational, efficiency. Although this seemed natural to a Westerner it was anathema to an Asian, African or a Latin American. A Peace Corps Volunteer teaching in the Ivory Coast was confronted by this stark cultural gap during a lesson:

"I spoke to a class recently about life in the United States, saying that everyone had a chance at education and that after you had completed it, you want to work. There was a silence, then one student raised his hand... 'What,' he asked 'if you do not want to work?' And do you know, the question stopped me!"\(^{19}\)

To the chagrin of Volunteers, work was not regarded as the supreme virtue by all Third World peoples. Quite unconsciously, most Volunteers expected that all "decent people" would yearn for the material aspects of American culture - money, luxury gadgets, plenty of food and the other benefits to be gleaned from a shared work ethic. They were distressed to find that not everyone held these values. As Eugene Burdick and William Lederer wrote in an evaluation report on the Philippines, "the psychic underpinnings of the puritanical American which have seeped into the Volunteer - whether he knows it or not - are outraged in day-to-day life."\(^{20}\)

The realisation that their hosts often lacked initiative, were not self-motivated, had to be constantly supervised and accepted bribery and corruption as the natural order, came hard to most young Americans. Moreover, it had the single most devastating effect on their overseas experience. A disenchanted Volunteer in Togo complained:

"What we have accomplished seems insignificant. We are tired, a little bored, discouraged by the lack of cooperation..."
we have a strong urge to quit such a discouraging situation and find some place where you can really do something...because the people we came to help don't act as if they needed or wanted any help. Also, they don't appreciate it when they get it."  21

In St Lucia where - as one Volunteer noted - 75 per cent of the children were under-nourished and 90 per cent of the adults had syphilis or other social diseases, the biggest problem was an unshakeable conservatism: "Everyone is positively afraid to try anything new. Often an idea is rejected not because it is bad or impractical or too expensive but solely because it has never been done before."  22 Volunteers in a small town in Colombia were frustrated by the intransigence of petty bureaucrats. After their fourth visit to the local mayor in the town hall, a couple of Volunteers were finally promised a much-needed bulldozer. Yet, they remained sceptical that they would ever receive it. "As we walked down the hall," said one, "we looked at each other and laughed because we knew the son-of-a-bitch was lying - just as he lied before."  23 Evaluator Kenneth Love noted that, while the Volunteers in Morocco were annoyed by the flies, the dirt and the climate, their real frustration came from "the corruption, the indifference to suffering in animals and people, petty bureaucratic obstructionism, and the lack of trust and cooperation among the Arabs."  24 Stephen Chesebrough, a Volunteer in Ethiopia, felt he and his colleagues were "beating our heads against a brick wall." He wrote of the "unheard and unimagined problems that you face here, one is frustrated, one despairs, one wants to give it up as hopeless and go home...How much do you think it is worth to personally stand knee-deep in desperate poverty and stinking filth and hopeless illiteracy?"  25

A different set of cultural values and attitudes was the problem at the heart of every Volunteer's "culture fatigue". The various other, relatively minor, hardships did not help - the tedious diet of fish and rice, the convoluted process involved in posting a letter, the same predictable questions asked about America, and the embarrassment felt at being constantly stared at and pointed out as the "Yanqui" or the "gringo." It was difficult for young Americans to come to terms with a country where - for example - farmers used urine as a disinfectant, women defecated on the beach, and teachers spat out of the classroom window during the course of a lesson.  26 Confronted by these
cultural opposites, even the best Volunteers faltered. A Volunteer in the Philippines - described by her Rep as "extremely dedicated and determined" - admitted that she too had gone through the period of frustration when she had felt "very small and weak in the light of this thing called culture." 27

Most Volunteers were well-balanced enough to accept what they could not hope to change and by their second year had managed to shake off the ill-effects of "culture fatigue." They became more settled, more accepting of their limitations and more understanding towards their hosts. This majority conscientiously persisted in trying to contribute to the overall objectives of the Peace Corps. A Volunteer in Morocco exemplified the more philosophical approach: "There are times when one needs to look to a power greater than oneself in order to overcome the loneliness and frustration and to persevere long enough to be able one day to bask in the warmth of a job well-done, a smile genuinely returned or a friendship and trust well-merited." In a rather more straightforward fashion, a Volunteer in Sierra Leone claimed that he was much more effective, "now that the idealism has been knocked out of me." 28

Unfortunately, not all Volunteers were as resilient. Some were so disillusioned by the various cultural shocks received during their first year that the Peace Corps experience was virtually foreclosed for them by the beginning of their second. They sank into a well of cynical and apathy; it was usually the uncompromising idealists who were hurt most. However, the most tragic consequence of a Volunteer's failure to cross the great cultural divide was not an uncaring apathy but more an activist, brutish, American arrogance. With no respect for, and little understanding of the mores of their hosts, some insensitive Volunteers plunged into their jobs determined to show the natives "how things should be done." In Peace Corps terminology this was known as the "gung-ho" syndrome. "Of course we're better teachers than they are" was how evaluators in Liberia described the supercilious attitude of some Volunteer teachers towards their native colleagues. "They are reluctant to do a goddam thing," wrote another boorish Volunteer about his Somalian students. "Add to this the fact that 99 per cent of them are intrinsically stupid and 100 per cent of them can't understand English, and teaching becomes a job which is sometimes funny, often frustrating and always..."
Gung-ho Volunteers preferred to effect immediate, though often superficial, change in their host country rather than go through the painstaking process of waiting, establishing confidence and trust and making a long-term contribution. They were usually domineering and sought to force their opinions upon their hosts. "After all," said one arrogant Volunteer in Liberia "all they know about is their rice farms." A Volunteer in East Pakistan had been excited at the prospect of discovering the delights of "the mysterious East." However, halfway through her service she came to the rather astonishing conclusion that "The fact is there is no culture here whatsoever. Nothing." These gung-ho Volunteers never accepted that they were the victims of their own cultural effrontery, that their job was to persuade and give example rather than blatantly impose. As evaluator Thorburn Reid noted, the gung-ho Volunteers retained the attitudes of "American guests who think as Americans in a foreign country." 29

In more severe cases, where the Volunteers had utterly failed to adapt to their new environment, their resentment was transferred into a thoroughgoing antipathy towards the indigenous culture. "I thought I had no prejudices," said one disillusioned Volunteer in Pakistan, "but here I am hating people I've never met." Another openly admitted to evaluator Tim Adams that he hated Pakistan and Pakistanis." A dejected Volunteer in Indonesia persuaded himself that his failure was the fault of his hosts who were "so stupid....I feel they don't deserve me. I don't think they deserve anybody. They should just rot." One despondent Volunteer in India explained why he preferred to forego the company of his hosts in the evening "I've had enough of the Indians all day long," he said. In Togo, an exceptionally coarse Volunteer wrote, "I'm for the Peace Corps image and all that - but I'm never going to get that interested in uneducated Mobo women that I'm going to really learn to speak the language." The feeling of the culture-shocked, disillusioned Volunteer was summed up by a young man in Morocco when he commented on "the injustice that such a lovely country should be inhabited by such dull and unattractive people." These negative Volunteers were the most dangerous kind - unhappy, prone to gossip and eager to utilise all the arrogance they could muster in a last-ditch defence against their own sense of failure. They were
not many but their influence sometimes belied their paucity. A Volunteer
in Peru described his destructive colleagues, "counting the days until their
two years are up, hating each day, souring themselves, their friends and
all the natives they talk with. What a waste! Two years of their lives
ruined by idealistic daydreams."30

Completely negative Volunteers were few and far between. All Volunteers
suffered "culture fatigue", but most came through it without a total
capitulation to self-pity and frustration. Some went "native." That is,
they went through a phase of trying to live as much like their hosts as was
humanly possible - they would not boil their water, or use mosquito netting,
or take precautions against the sun. On a few occasions this had disastrous
consequences. One Volunteer in the Philippines died after he had refused
medical treatment for an intestinal complaint - because he wanted to be "like
the natives."31 At the other extreme, some Volunteers got sucked into what
was referred to as the "expats. syndrome", spending too much time with
Americans in the embassy compound or in exclusive private clubs. A poor
language facility or underemployment were always factors that could entice
a lonely Volunteer to fraternise more with fellow westerners than with his
hosts. One of Sargent Shriver's few iron laws was that Volunteers should foreg:
the pleasures and privileges of the "expat." community; but sometimes, during
a bout of homesickness or frustration, even the best Volunteers were tempted.
In Tanganyika, evaluator David Gelman argued that, after a few hard weeks
work in the bush, Volunteers could not be blamed if, during a weekend in
town, they wanted nothing more than "drinks and darts at the pub or 'cherchez
la femme'."32 In a few cases the "expats. syndrome" got out of hand. Some
Volunteers actively excluded themselves from extra-curricular contact with
their hosts and spent most of their leisure time in the P.K. bar or on the
tennis court. In East Pakistan, Associate Rep Jay Crook reprimanded
Volunteers for not making enough people-to-people contacts outside of working
hours:
"A great deal has been said jokingly about the 'Golden Ghetto', in which Americans overseas are presumed to reside like potentates. But the Peace Corps can, and to some extent has, established its own little ghettos. That is not to say that Volunteers set out deliberately to make their own world, but sometimes in answer to weakness of flesh and spirit, they unconsciously slip into a secluded existence where their contacts with Pakistanis are limited to work contact and their private lives remain unintruded upon...." 33

However, the Volunteers who went "native", spent all their spare time in the P.X., or became totally negative forces, were the exceptions. The vast majority managed to find a happy medium between going "native" and joining the "expats syndrome". Even if Volunteers did not conquer every aspect of their own cultural absolutism, most at least initiated a cross-cultural dialogue - which was, after all, the quintessential Peace Corps purpose. Volunteers in Uruguay lived with the locals, paid rent to them, and developed such intimate relations that they referred to their host family members as "my father, my mother, brother or sister." In British Honduras, Volunteers could not walk down the streets of Belize without becoming involved in several conversations with clusters of local folk. Evaluator Richard Elwell adjudged the Volunteers to have been "very successful" in making social contacts. The Volunteers in Thailand disappeared among the natives and worked with a "quiet earnestness." When Volunteers melted into their host society in this way, it was a sure sign they had established effective cross-cultural relations. The natives of Senegal took note of how the Volunteers lived simply in their midst - an indication that these were white men who had come to help rather than exploit. "Unlike the French," observed David Hapgood, "the Volunteers mix with the people instead of staying aloof; they work with their hands with the Senegalese instead of handing down orders." When Volunteer teachers in Sierra Leone made their way to work, the natives ran after them chanting "Peace Corps, Peace Corps." When evaluator Dan Chamberlin asked them why, they replied "because no other white people would do this." 34

David Espay, a young Volunteer teacher in Morocco, established a warm rapport with his host students whom he found friendly, cooperative and grateful. "I have no trouble getting in contact with Moroccans," he wrote
since I live and eat with the students. It's amazing how much help is needed, can be so easily given and is so greatly appreciated." Likewise a young Volunteer building water filters in the schools of Togo received a "terrific amount of cooperation....from all parts of the community and the remarkable amount of work that the kids did was encouraging and very satisfying." He felt he had broken through the cultural barrier and established a base for mutual respect. Certainly, the concept of self-help - working to ameliorate problems in the community with no promise of remuneration - was strange to the Togolese. "Yet, once they see it in action," he wrote, "they pitch in with far greater enthusiasm and good will than I ever expected. This is surely one of the answers to progress in Africa." In Iran, a Volunteer who married a native girl was described as having a superb "affinity for the culture, ably abetted by his attractive wife....one of the best Volunteers in the terms of relating to Iranians." Likewise, a female Volunteer working in Asmara, Ethiopia, was regarded as something of a "legend" both by the natives and her fellow Volunteers. She taught herself the local language (Tigrinya), visited her students in their homes, and was known to "every urchin in the streets." Similarly, two married couples of Volunteers teaching English in the small town of Bolu in Turkey were known by just about everyone of the fourteen thousand natives; their adult education classes were looked upon as one of the town's highlights, and were very well attended. Evaluators in the Dominican Republic came across a robust sixty-year old Volunteer named Pete who was "respected, even loved, by nearly everyone." His hog-breeding, rat-eradication and water-filtering projects had become the talk of La Vega. Evaluators Dee Jacobs and Philip Hardberger described him as "opinionated, straightforward, demanding, honest and shrewd. He has fantastic energy and ingenuity....although he is a threat to those who want things done 'manana'." Another Volunteer in Afghanistan mixed in so well with the natives that two mullahs asked her to give them English lessons. "This is a breakthrough," noted Charles Peters, "roughly equivalent to Hubert Humphrey being asked to lead a John Birch study group."
Few Volunteers broke through all the inter-cultural barriers, but the vast majority did make a beginning. At the very least they were forced to confront their own ethnocentrism. Many did this successfully and went on to involve themselves in the lives of their host peoples. For evaluator Richard Richter, this was the Peace Corps' "big message":

"They prove it can be done. This message is crucially important because there are so many on our training faculties, in the Peace Corps administration, in the American communities, in the host countries, who really think it can't be done and whose siren song of defeatism threatens to make the Peace Corps in Africa a pure technical assistance project in the field of education." 38

David Szanton, one of the first Volunteers in the Philippines, agreed that despite "culture fatigue" and its accompanying frustrations, many of his colleagues learned and accepted that the American way was not the only way, that bigger was not always better, that work and efficiency were not qualitatively superior to an appreciation of aesthetics. "After some while in the field," he wrote, "many Volunteers did finally begin to accept emotionally the idea - and its extraordinary implications - that a people could be equally human, could be equally entitled to consideration, while at the same time they were significantly different in their values and behaviour." 39

Cultural confrontation permeated the Peace Corps experience. However, as well as coming to terms with living in an alien society, the Volunteer had also to learn how to work in it. Although never entirely independent of the ubiquitous cultural dynamic, the Volunteer's job engendered its own problems. In the summer of 1962, after the Peace Corps had been one full year in the field, Nicholas Hobbs, Chief of the Research Division, reported to Sargent Shriver that, thus far, the major problem faced by the Volunteer was not culture shock, disease or physical hardship but rather, the difficulty in finding "meaningful work to do." 40 In the Kennedy era, Volunteers did not often gripe about cross-cultural differences per se. By far the most common Volunteer complaints were about underemployment and boredom. "How to avoid being half-occupied ranks as the number one problem
in the eyes of most Volunteers," wrote evaluator Kevin Delany in 1963.
"The Volunteers who never lack for activity always seem to be in the
minority of any project." A frustrated Volunteer in Thailand explained that
"The big culture shock comes when you find that they (the host nation) don't
really need you, that maybe they don't know what to do with you." To an
extent, the blame lay with Warren Wiggins and his programmers. A combination
of haste, inexperience, over-optimism and imprecision on their part often
left the Volunteer in a vulnerable position overseas. And yet, faulty job
programming notwithstanding, the Volunteer's role could only ever be what
each individual made of it. Volunteers reacted in different ways to both
structured and unstructured work situations. To many, the vague or ill-
defined nature of their jobs was the biggest single source of frustration.
A Volunteer who had been assigned to Morocco as an agricultural extensionist,
discovered after his arrival in-country that it would be up to himself to find
work. "But in a country where fiscal funds are often lacking and sometimes
non-existent," he wrote, "finding useful occupations can be a tiresome
chore."42

In this respect, community development was the most maligned assignment
in the Peace Corps. Volunteers had to spend their first three or four months
just getting to know their community before they could even begin to help
meet its "felt needs". There was no official method of introduction into
local society, no specific projects outlined, and often, no material support.
In effect, the Volunteer was left without a "handle" on his job. One
Volunteer described the great potential for frustration inherent in any
community development assignment:

"The community developer comes into town and takes
up residence with a local family. For weeks he
seemingly does nothing. He plays with the children,
talks with the shopkeepers, drinks in the bars. His
Spanish or his Quechua is a little halting and quaint.
It takes quite a while until the people see that he
sincerely wants to help them tackle a few problems.
In any event the Volunteer, is faced with the task
of making himself acceptable, and he remains guilty
(or at least suspect) of all types of contrived
motives until he proves himself innocent." 43

This type of unstructured charge left enormous scope for either extensive
individual initiative or severe underemployment. Some Volunteers appreciated the opportunity to create a role for themselves. Indeed, to the bright, dedicated Volunteer, an ill-defined or even badly programmed assignment could be something of an asset, since it offered him a challenge and gave an "edge" to his attitudes in general. Others did not relish the prospect of adapting to new situations as they arose or of introducing themselves to strangers and inviting themselves along to work sites. For them, the loosely structured assignment was little more than a license to be miserably unemployed. Almost every Peace Corps programme consisted of a combination of these two opposite reactions. Kevin Delany sent back a typical report from India:

"A remarkable number of Volunteers in India know precisely what they are doing, and are doing it well. It hasn't been automatic, a good percentage of the Volunteers have arrived to find either a non-existent job or a small fragment of one. A number of Volunteers did nothing for the first three months and then found work for themselves. Many others enlisted the assistance of the staff. Some have acquired lots of small jobs that add up to full employment. A few Volunteers have many small jobs that add up to nothing." 44

In a similar vein, the community development project in Peru started out on a shaky footing. The Peruvian government was tardy in giving support and many of the initially assigned jobs fell through. However, ably supported by Peace Corps Rep Frank Mankiewicz, the Volunteers proved versatile and most managed to adapt to the trying circumstances. "Everything has not worked out as they expected it or wanted it," wrote evaluator Herb Wegner. "But where they have been overcome by their problems they have not surrendered. They have fought back - or they have moved on to other work on different Peace Corps projects." Four Volunteers around Puno had begun a small nutrition programme which by the summer of 1963 was helping to feed ninety-five thousand students in thirteen hundred schools. In Panama, a young Volunteer began to participate in his local community by castrating pigs and giving inoculations to cows. Through his work he came in contact with many natives and, after a few months, he had won their confidence to the extent that they became willing to experiment with his ideas for new types of rice plants, fertilizers, insecticides and seeds.
Another Volunteer in Chile gradually helped develop campesino co-operatives to the point where twelve hundred host families were involved. He had not been specifically assigned to this task but he was resourceful and had "an integrity about him and a dedication to his work." On the other hand, a Volunteer in Brazil - described by evaluators as a "sun-bather" and a "playboy" - felt no compulsion to participate in his local community. "I was sent here as a co-op expert," he complained, "and I know nothing about co-ops." Two other Volunteers from the same programme admitted that they considered themselves little more than tourists. Eighteen Volunteers in Bolivia were supposed to be acting as social workers, mechanics and agricultural extensionists around Santa Cruz. However, when evaluators Philip Cook and Thorburn Reid visited the area in 1963, they found that the Volunteers had yet to embark on any kind of meaningful projects. Likewise in Guatemala, there were a couple of Volunteers who showed a definite aversion to work and a disinclination even to attempt speaking Spanish.45

Many Volunteers working in community development eventually surrendered to frustration and created tight, specific jobs for themselves where they could see each day that they were producing something definite. To counteract local indifference to their schemes, Volunteers sometimes fired ahead on their own. However, in a way, this defeated the whole purpose of community development, which was to persuade the natives to do things for themselves. Certainly the Volunteers felt more fulfilled when they were constantly active; but, in the long run, their individualistic efforts were not conducive to the nurturing of the self-help principle. Volunteers in Chimbote, Peru, refused to put a roof on a local school building until the natives offered to help. "It would be a ten dollar project and about one day's work for two or three Peace Corpsmen," noted one of the Volunteers. "Yet, we don't do it. If we gave that school a roof, it would always be a gift, the 'gringos', roof. When it needed fixing no one would fix it. If it takes a year to talk our neighbours into putting on that roof, it will be worth it. Because it will then be their roof on their school."45

Some Third World governments - the Ivory Coast was an outstanding
example - took Volunteers simply because they wanted the status of having a Peace Corps project in their country. When Volunteers arrived they quickly discovered that as "teachers' assistants" they would be seriously underemployed. Again, reactions to this varied. In Sierra Leone, the teaching assistant jobs were described as "hopeless". Yet this did not prevent a number of enterprising Volunteers from becoming sports instructors, librarians and even broadcasters on local radio. Volunteers who were assigned to teach English in Venezuelan universities found their services required only three hours of the week. Some became embittered and took to grumbling among themselves; but others went out into the barrios and instigated general community projects. At first, the Volunteers' teaching duties in Iran utilised only a small portion of their normal working week. However, after a few months of readjustment, one Volunteer happily reported that he and a fellow teacher no longer had any idle hours. "Joe has taken on the teaching of first aid," he wrote, "and I teach English in Rasht two mornings per week, and maintain English and French clubs for interested students."47

Underemployment often led to boredom - nicknamed "Teacher's Blight!" by the Volunteers. Letters or documents from Peace Corps/Washington to the Volunteers in the field began enthusiastically - "If you can afford a few minutes from your busy schedule to read etc...." - but were greeted derisively by teachers whose time often hung heavily on their hands. However, in the course of two years in a foreign setting it was somewhat inevitable that even the most exciting, time-consuming job would have its boring interludes. "If someone had told me I'd be bored sitting at the foot of Kilimanjaro with elands galloping around me, I would have said, 'You're out of your mind!'," reported one bored Volunteer. In Tanganyika, Volunteers worked in the wild out-back, living the kind of vibrant life that many restless Peace Corps teachers dreamed of. Yet, as an astonished David Gelman reported, not only were the adventurous Volunteers bored but "the majority are convinced that teaching must be the only satisfying and useful work a Volunteer can do."48
The sometimes harrowing isolation of Volunteer life contributed to the tedium. It was ironical that although one of the principal aims of the Peace Corps was to foster people-to-people contact, a few Volunteers never established any deep extra-curricular relationships with their hosts. Worst afflicted were the teaching programmes in West Africa where classroom friendships were sometimes never extended beyond the school compound. Some Volunteer teachers preferred the narrowest possible definition of their job, while others never found the courage to breach the social gulf that existed in Africa between the professional classes and the uneducated masses.

Evaluator Richard Elwell noted that a couple of the Volunteers teaching in Addis Ababa showed "little interest in overcoming the comfortable barriers of status and convenience to make contact with a thicker slice of Ethiopian life." But again, the isolation of Peace Corps teachers was only one side of the coin. For example, some teachers in Ghana refused to allow either their job or social convention to isolate them from the local population. They instituted a weekend programme of bike rides whereby they travelled around as many outlying villages as they could. In this way, observed evaluator Robert Lystad, they established "excellent rapport" with native Ghanaians.

One of the major causes of frustration overseas was the widespread failure of the "Counterpart System." The influencing of host country nationals through professional and technical training by Volunteers, was one of the essential goals of Peace Corps service. Accordingly, at least one native counterpart was supposed to be assigned to every Volunteer. For various reasons, this rarely occurred. Either the host government did not send anyone, or the person they did send quickly lost interest and stopped turning up, or else, the generalist Volunteer was simply not proficient enough to impart knowledge of a skill to his counterpart. On occasion, financially embarrassed Third World governments merely used Volunteers as stop-gap labour. To them, the main advantage of the Peace Corps was that it saved them paying wages to natives. They cared little for the long term educational value. For instance, Volunteer nurses in Tanganyika were kept so busy dealing with day-to-day emergencies, they had neither the time nor the opportunity to impress upon their native counterparts the virtues of sterile
techniques. Sometimes Volunteers were resented because they worked longer hours - bosses would expect their native colleagues to do the same after the Volunteers left - or because they earned more and thus had higher social status. For instance, in East Pakistan the native overseers of an agricultural extension project earned 130 rupees per month, while the Volunteers working under their supervision got 380 rupees - and most of the Pakistanis had families to support. In 1963, evaluator Dee Jacobs stated that friction, rather than cooperation, with counterparts had become "an old story (and) conflict is likely to continue for some time to come." Nevertheless, the Peace Corps adjudged it an idea worthy of perseverance. In August, 1963, Bill Moyers suggested to Warren Wiggins that it was time the Peace Corps established "as a program necessity" the condition that every Volunteer must have the opportunity to train a counterpart. After all, as Moyers put it, "the fundamental premise of the Peace Corps philosophy is that people can affect people."

Every Peace Corps job had its occupational hazards. The nebulousness surrounding unstructured community development was infamous. However, structured assignments also carried their own handicaps. Certainly, Volunteer teachers had set positions to go to - but this factor alone did not make their task any less formidable. For example, maintaining discipline in rowdy African classrooms was a thorny problem for young, basically inexperienced Volunteers. Native African teachers freely wielded the cane to discipline pupils who were badly behaved. Of course, once the students realised that Americans were not accustomed to using corporal punishment, they took every advantage. At least one Volunteer broke under the strain and resorted to using the "paddle" (a wooden stick) to reprimand an unruly Liberian youth. In the process he transgressed the fine line between discipline and assault and instigated an ugly incident. On another occasion, a Volunteer in Nyasaland was not quite sure of what action to take when he caught his pupils smoking marijuana in class.

Volunteer teachers also had to overcome apathy among students, colleagues and temperamental headmasters. In Sierra Leone some Volunteers came across
an odd British headmaster who walked around all day hugging a chimpanzee to his chest. Others had to deal with an eccentric African principal who would not permit electricity to be installed in his school because it would attract the "devil". Old fashioned teaching methods - rote learning and out-of-date syllabi - were additional bugbears. In one classroom textbook a Volunteer found sentences such as "a nurse is pushing a pram across a zebra-crossing on her way home to afternoon tea." He wondered what sense this could possibly make to the native Togolese.53

The Volunteers came to associate such irrelevancies with the school system in Africa as established by the British who - as one Volunteer put it - had only wished "to produce automatons for the colonial civil service."54 Indeed, many Volunteers claimed that their greatest "culture shock" was not in coming face to face with Africa and Africans but rather, having to live and work in a remnant colonial society. Volunteer teachers often found themselves in uncomfortable and uncreative situations vis-à-vis the natives because they taught in a school system set up by the British (or the French) which actively discouraged any extra-curricular personal relationships with Africans. The rules of the old colonial game sometimes made adjustments and adherence to Peace Corps philosophy very difficult. One Volunteer in Tanganyika told David Gelman that her biggest "culture shock" had been her introduction to the snobbish and sometimes racist British expatriates.55

As the sun set on the British Empire, many "expats" retained teaching and administrative posts in the decolonised lands. They were often hostile towards the young "amateurish" Americans. Professionally qualified British school - teachers looked down their noses at U.S. university degree-holders. At the same time, they felt jealous or threatened that America was about to fill the void left in the developing countries by a Britain rapidly declining as a world power. Volunteers in Nigeria also sensed that some resentment still lingered on from the days of World War Two when the clichéd British description of American troops had been "overpaid, over-dressed, over-sexed and over here."56 Volunteers angered the British because they would not accept the colonial interpretation of the "African Mentality" - that Africans were basically ignorant, greedy, violent, and hence had to be
kept in their place. Fraternisation with the natives outside of working hours was frowned upon. "The vanishing colonialist is a bitter fellow." said one Volunteer, "he came not to help but to exploit; most of them sought a prestige - the white shorts, the white socks, the club, and the household servants - they could not attain in the U.K. ... many of them would not give an African the right time of day." The British applied strong pressure on the Volunteers to conform to colonial patterns of behaviour. The colonial educational system was based on the "Cambridge exam"; the economic system provided luxury housing and black "stewards" for Europeans; and the social system dictated that whites should remain "aloof" from natives. In effect, Volunteers had not only to satisfy African standards and expectations - but British ones too. Africans were not quite sure how to react to the Volunteers who did not behave in the usual "white" way - distant, wealthy and condescending.

On the other hand, if the Volunteers did not conform to British standards then they often found themselves ostracised and hated by the "expats". For instance, Volunteer teachers in Nyasaland had to contend with rumours spread by their British colleagues that they were only there to relieve the U.S. unemployment problem, that they ran around naked at night and that they had become pregnant by African men. British doctors were highly indignant that Peace Corps nurses were not qualified in midwifery - a standard part of the British nurse's training. Yet, despite what David Gelman called the "spit-and-polish first, patients last" attitude of the British surgeons, Volunteer nurses were always in high demand in the Third World and they did have a measurable impact on both the technical and human values of hospital service. To be fair, the British sometimes admitted that the Peace Corps provided certain worthwhile benefits. In 1962, despite some concern at the prospect of the Peace Corps moving into Nyasaland and Rhodesia, the British government announced its pleasure at the way Volunteer teachers were "fitting into Africa". Indeed, a crusty, old "expat" in Tanganyika conceded that "I don't know how we did without you chaps before this." The British were not the only "expats" with whom the Volunteers had to
Indeed, they sometimes found their own compatriots the bigger nuisance. However, relations between the Peace Corps and the American diplomatic community varied from one country to another. In Gabon, relations with the embassy were "good"; in Ecuador, Ambassador Bernbaum was "friendly"; while in Guinea, Ambassador Loeb and his staff were "extraordinarily helpful". Conversely, in the Philippines, some members of the embassy staff were resentful that the Peace Corps did not keep them informed about its activities; Ambassador Stevenson was angry that he was not fully briefed on the whereabouts of all Volunteers. In Bolivia, evaluators sensed that the official Mission was intent on making Volunteers "more subservient to the goals of U.S. policy." Similarly, in Togo, Ambassador Poullada was desperately keen to exert more control over the Peace Corps. Evaluator Philip Cook was equally as determined this should not happen. During a meeting in the embassy on the subject of the Peace Corps' role in Togo, the Ambassador's staff spent the entire time discussing whether Volunteers should take part in a "sack race" planned for the Fourth of July celebrations. In Costa Rica, relations between the Peace Corps and the Embassy were strained when the Ambassador sent out his own "evaluation team" to investigate Peace Corps operations. To his chagrin, they returned with an entirely favourable report.

More troublesome than disagreements over Peace Corps operations was the resentment felt at the style in which they were carried out. Professional American diplomats consistently accused Volunteers of being self-righteous, priggish and downright unfriendly. The problem stemmed from the policy laid down by Shriver that Volunteers should avoid the P.X. club, the embassy restaurant, swimming pool and so forth. Indeed, he made it clear that it was preferable for Peace Corps offices to be established outside the embassy compound. Some ambassadors found this infuriating. "They refused to come into our embassy or have offices there," recalled Ambassador Stevenson. "They (the Volunteers) came with stars in their eyes...they thought they were going to fix the Philippines in eighteen months...this, I thought, was absolutely foolish, that they had to take this attitude that they knew the right way to handle people, that we were all wrong and all that business. However, if
Stevenson had had his way, he would have stationed the Peace Corps office on the sixth floor of the embassy - the same floor as the C.I.A. The consequences of such an obviously maladroit arrangement would have been disastrous for the Peace Corps' image and impact. Thus, although Stevenson continued to complain to Shriver about "renegade" Volunteers, it was to no avail. 61

Officials of other U.S. agencies in the Third World were quick to point out that not all Volunteers or Reps lived at the "grassroots" level - despite the Peace Corps' pontifical statements about American diplomats living in "Golden Ghettos" overseas. Embassy staff in Morocco laughed at the luxurious housing rented by Peace Corps officials, "especially after all this bullshit about the Peace Corps image and the new kind of American". 62 All the same, while Sargent Shriver recognised that not every Peace Corpsman lived up to the organisation's ideals, he deeply resented expatriates poking fun at Volunteers who were at least trying to make sacrifices - no matter how small - like shopping in the local bazaars or taking the bus instead of using a U.S. vehicle. "My don't they do so?" asked a furious Shriver. "It would save taxpayers some money if all U.S. persons abroad did likewise." 63

A.I.D. officials in Guinea were "openly hostile" to the Peace Corps; they offered no help by way of logistics or equipment. "There must be well over a thousand hard-core Communists in Guinea," noted evaluator Philip Cook, "but they are no match for the U.S. Embassy/A.I.D. contingent when it comes to making trouble for the Peace Corps." In Morocco the United States Official Mission objected to the Peace Corps' mode of operation on the grounds that it was "slap-dash, emergency style, grandly indifferent to costs, ungrateful for help, impatient with the red tape imposed upon those who gave the help, and hoggish for the credit." 64 The United States Information Agency in the Far East was also extremely annoyed at the Peace Corps' "aloofness", and throughout Latin America there was periodic friction with the Alliance For Progress.

To an extent, the Peace Corps got caught in a trap of its own making. It did not want its name to be associated with A.I.D. or U.S.I.A. or the traditional Foreign Service, yet it did want the help of those bodies when it came to supplying Peace Corps programmes with materials and equipment. In
private, the Peace Corps wished to cooperate with the other American agencies but publicly, it kept them at arm's length. It was no wonder A.I.D. and embassy officials were mistrustful of the Peace Corps and slightly bewildered as to its stance. In the early days, Shriver had worried that the Peace Corps would be identified with big-money U.S. foreign aid programmes; his favourite slogan was "we deal in people not materials." Yet, in one of the first projects in Colombia, Volunteers were mistaken for officials of the Alliance For Progress - Kennedy's economic aid programme for Latin America. They found that a typical greeting was for the locals to ask them "where's the money?" This was exactly what Shriver was determined to avoid. However, Volunteers soon came to realise that it was to their advantage to work closely with the "Kennedy cum Alianza" organisation. Since Kennedy was associated with the Alliance, the Volunteers also reaped the harvest of its resounding popularity. Besides, Alliance officials were much more thoughtful about the placement and disbursement of their funds when the Volunteers did not treat them like social lepers outside of working hours. Thus, in January 1963, Bill Haddad advised Shriver that it was high time the Peace Corps relaxed its "artificial" policy towards its fellow agencies overseas. With a view to changing the somewhat priggish attitude which Volunteers sometimes adopted, Haddad proposed, "we should now work more closely with other agencies, while still maintaining our apartness."

The problem of "separateness" cropped up again when Volunteers were assigned to religious schools or had to work in the campesinos with missionaries. Notwithstanding the Peace Corps' policy of avoiding any organisation or assignment that involved direct religious proselytising, Volunteers were advised that in a variety of field situations a certain amount of flexibility would be required. Peace Corps officials were well aware that in Latin America the Catholic Church had the power (if it wanted to use it) to block all community development projects. Therefore Volunteers were told in training that they should approach the local padre upon first alighting in their community. They were wary of being used as religious propagandists but, where necessary, they worked hand-in-hand with activist priests. For example, in
Tamopata, Peru, Pr. Kearns helped a Peace Corps project for teaching natives mechanical skills; and in Guatemala, the local priests helped Volunteers establish agricultural co-operatives. In some areas, the Volunteers came dangerously close to appearing as if they were working through the Catholic Church. In Ecuador, Volunteers taught in Catholic schools, worked in agencies directed by priests, and one Volunteer even lived in the rectory. However, the Peace Corps Rep was vigilant and ensured that the programme was kept free of religious entanglements. Although, as Richard Elwell noted, he was realistic enough to recognise "the necessity of working with things as they are in Ecuador." In its milk-distribution, health care and agricultural extension programmes in Bolivia, the Peace Corps took a further risk by working with Catholic Relief Services (Caritas); but again, all these projects were absolutely free of proselytising. In Senegal however, evaluator David Hapgood adjudged that Volunteers teaching in mission schools beside monks were actually "aiding a proselytising effort". To avoid further infringement of the First Amendment, he advised that the Volunteers should be immediately transferred from mission schools to the government's public schools.

Missionaries could also prove personally troublesome to Volunteers - especially in African countries where they sometimes viewed the Peace Corps as a competitor in the field of education rather than a helper. Besides, they often deemed young Volunteers neither strict enough with their students nor religious enough in themselves. For their part, Volunteers found some missionaries imbued with much the same educational "zeal" as the British colonialists. One Volunteer teacher in Liberia described his religious colleague as being "full of contempt for the Liberians - they think they're dirty and cheat and steal, and they beat them." Another Volunteer in El Salvador dissuaded the good friars from beating pupils with sticks by beating the good friars with sticks. Many Volunteers working in mission schools experienced some awkwardness with the staff over religious participation. For example, a Volunteer assigned to a Presbyterian mission in the Cameroons was quite bluntly told by her colleagues that she was not wanted because she was a Catholic; the mission had to relent when the Cameroon government insisted she be allowed
to take up her appointment. Again, when Volunteers working in the Evangelical United Brethren, and the United Brethren in Christ mission schools in Sierra Leone refused to attend religious services they were insulted by their British headmasters. However, in the vast majority of cases religious resentment was finally overcome and Volunteers worked effectively with all religious groups. For instance, Protestant Volunteers managed to work intimately and successfully with Catholic padres in the highlands of Ecuador. Moreover, by 1963, Volunteers of every religious persuasion were established in both Catholic and Protestant schools all over the underdeveloped world - without too much injury to either private conscience or constitutional principle. Indeed, in Latin America, where the danger of over-stepping the fine line between Church and State was greatest, evaluators Philip Cook and Thorburn Reid thought it "worth a reminder now and then, that the Peace Corps in many Latin American countries does ask and receive a good deal from a remarkably tactful and undemanding Catholic Church - especially its American missionaries and relief agencies."

Sargent Shriver claimed that, in many ways, the "most difficult problem" for Volunteers overseas was racial disharmony in the United States. In Africa especially, Volunteers were continually being asked difficult questions about racial discrimination back home. Racial incidents in America were widely broadcast in African countries. In an emotive letter to Peace Corps/Washington in June, 1963, Jim Crandel - a young Volunteer in Niger - described the effect racial unrest could have on an overseas project:

"Our time here in Africa has really opened our eyes to many problems of the U.S. and given us a look at our country from a different viewpoint. Peace Corps in Africa is very important, not only from the standpoint of educational, technical and agricultural help, but to show the Africans that not all American whites are anti-Negro. ...(but) it sure is a funny feeling attending a show with some close African friends and have a newsreel show those white bastards in the South hosing, turning dogs loose on people and men beating coloured women."70

There was "polite disappointment" among African nations that only four of the first one hundred and twenty Volunteers were black. Throughout the Kennedy years
Peace Corps Reps (10 per cent of whom were blacks) were subjected to embarrassing questions about the low number of non-white Volunteers. Despite the commendable efforts of Sargent Shriver and Harris Wofford to recruit blacks for service in Africa, Asian-Americans for service in Asia and so forth, 95 per cent of all Volunteers were white; furthermore, a few held segregationist views. In March 1962, evaluator Dan Chamberlin overheard some Volunteers speak disparagingly about "niggers", "spics" and "Jews" in front of native Colombians. "To some degree," wrote Chamberlin "this is the kind of barracks humor that one hears a great deal in the army, but I think that it is pretty dangerous especially when the Volunteers do it in public places." On the other hand, a white Volunteer from Alabama - who admitted he had been guilty of racist feelings at home - was shocked when the Peace Corps assigned him to Liberia. Yet, it proved to be an enlightening experience; for the first time in his life he worked with blacks and by 1963 he admitted that his attitude "towards the Negro race" had been revolutionised. Many others became very close both to black natives and fellow Volunteers. One Volunteer in Nigeria found that his association with the locals had given him a profound insight into the problems faced by blacks in America. Moreover, he acknowledged, "What was before a rather distant, ideological commitment to Civil Rights... has become a very personal one."71

Significantly, the few black Volunteers there were always emphasised that their colour gave them an advantage in establishing people-to-people contacts in Africa. Inevitably, Volunteers found that some Third World countries had developed their own brand of racial hatred. For instance, in British Honduras, Volunteers were criticised for consorting with blacks. A local white bar-man told a Volunteer that the blame lay with "all that Kennedy business in the U.S." To win over such attitudes was one of the Peace Corps' primary aims. President Kennedy helped. In Africa and in the Caribbean he was widely renowned as the knight-errant of black equality. This gave the Volunteers a firm base on which to build relationships with native Africans and Creoles. However, it was somewhat ironical - and
Kennedy would have been the first to appreciate it — that, in the Caribbean at least, the other famed champion of black aspirations was Fidel Castro.

Although the Volunteers were glad to have Kennedy's popular image behind them, they tended to regard the Washington officials who ran the Peace Corps as "bumbling idiots who don't know what the heck they are talking about." The Volunteers' attitude was similar to that of front-line soldiers towards the general staff — the individuals who worked and sacrificed in the field were unlikely to feel kindly towards their bosses whom they imagined sitting in their comfortable Washington offices. In Peace Corps terminology this dichotomy was known as the "we/they" syndrome. The Volunteers felt that Peace Corps officials had no sense of the realities of the field and when they spoke of the Washington bureaucracy it was as "it" or "them". Once overseas, the Volunteers formed their own exclusive "subculture." To them Peace Corps officialdom soon came to resemble an alien — even a hostile — outside body. According to David Gelman, the Volunteers' feeling of being pitted against Washington "begins in training and never lets up. The Peace Corps administration to them is a bureaucratic bungler. The inadequacies of training cultivate this feeling. Selection methods heighten it, then breakdowns in field support, wrongheaded publicity etc...all add to it." Gelman concluded that "most Volunteers feel they succeed despite Washington."

Ironically, no one idolised the Volunteers more than the chief official in Washington — Sargent Shriver. He travelled tens of thousands of miles to every corner of the world to congratulate and encourage them. Volunteers wrote long, personal letters to him; he always replied. When one disgruntled Volunteer in Colombia asked an evaluator to "Tell Sargent Shriver not to make promises he can't keep," Shriver's comment was, "That's right!" He then asked what promises were being referred to and attempted to have something done about them. Shriver was inspirational — guaranteed to motivate even the most lackluster Volunteer. Volunteers were often deprecating of Shriver's lightning visits to the field, his "hail-fellow-well-met" style, and his pep-pill speeches. However, as Eugene Burdick and William Lederer noticed when Shriver visited the Philippines:
"All the Volunteers went to considerable trouble to get to the places where Shriver was talking, analysed his talk in very great detail and were somewhere between bemused and admiring about his appearance - even when this attitude was carefully buried under cynicism. And when he did not arrive as he had been scheduled to do, they were openly disappointed ...he is an important element in Volunteer enthusiasm."79

Yet, although he spent a substantial amount of time in the field, Shriver was never as sensitive to the Volunteers' problems - cultural, logistical or personal - as they would have liked. When Shriver visited some disgruntled Volunteers in Niger, Philip Cook recorded that "they accosted him like the English barons cornering King John at Runnymede."77 However, it must be doubtful whether any leader could have lived up to the Volunteers' lofty expectations. As Burdick and Lederer told Shriver, "It is inevitable that there will be hostility from people in the field directed at whatever administrative headquarters are set up."78 The insurmountable obstacle was that neither Shriver nor his staff had undergone the Volunteer experience. No matter how hard they tried, they could not possibly be aware of all the complexities involved in living and working at a grassroots level in the Third World. Robert Textor, an early Washington staff member noted, "Many of the Corps' most serious problems stemmed from that simple fact."79 There was a certain lack of empathy between Peace Corps/Washington and the field. Volunteers detested the manner in which Peace Corps officials paid flying visits to their projects, asked a lot of elementary questions and then sped off with reports back to Washington. At an end of term conference on Colombia, one Volunteer described how a staff person came "whizzing through his town, stayed for a quick meal, asked 'How's your sex life?', gave me a whack on the back and told me to keep up the good work" - and then the Volunteer was waving wanly at the trail of dust disappearing down the road. On another occasion, Volunteers in Nigeria were upset by the visit of a chronically ill-informed official from Peace Corps/Washington. Their annoyance became all the greater when they discovered that she was the niece of a well-known Democratic leader. They concluded that she had been sent on a "junket" to Nigeria - at the Peace Corps' expense - for the sole purpose of currying political favour with her uncle.80

The sometimes over-exuberant messages relayed to the field from Peace Corps/Washington which began "You are the pioneers etc...." were treated
whimsically by the Volunteers. "I was prepared for urinating in the streets, for rats, fleas, malaria, leprosy" said one sceptical Volunteer, "but I was not prepared for slow as molasses response from Washington."81 Certainly, the general level of communication between 806 Connecticut Avenue and the field left room for improvement. Often the "bunglers" in Washington failed to get the Volunteers' sea freight delivered on time or took months to assign him to a new job or forgot to send his monthly subsistence allowance. The policies laid down by Peace Corps/Washington were, of course, a constant source of friction. Indeed, evaluator David Gelman claimed that some official directives only served to confuse, and even mislead, the Volunteers:

"One week we send them a man who tells them their role is to work for headmasters as docilely and anonymously as possible. Next week we send a man who tells them they are going abroad to serve in the front line of the battle to stem the communist tide. One week our man tells them their role is to teach the leaders of the future, next week someone else tells them they've got to go out and make friends for us, the teaching is secondary."82

In later years, Peace Corps/Washington became much more receptive to the exacting demands of Volunteers in the field. In June, 1962, a Division of Volunteer Field Support was set up to maintain the liaison between Peace Corps Washington and the Volunteers overseas. It responded to Volunteers' inquiries, supplied them with various support materials and published a magazine The Volunteer - to which every Peace Corpsman was encouraged to contribute. Many officials saw the Volunteers' difficulties at first hand when they served as in-country Reps and hundreds of returned Volunteers were incorporated into the administrative side. This gave the bureaucracy a new perspective on the problems faced by those overseas. However, in the first few years of the Peace Corps, the "we/they"syndrome persisted. Indeed, in 1963 it was at its height. One Volunteer in Morocco told Kenneth Love, "A lot of kids, myself included, aren't quite sure if somebody didn't just pull a big joke - a big political ploy of some kind. I don't know what to write home. I don't want to write all the things I have against the Peace Corps because they wouldn't understand. And I don't want to write that everything is hunky dory when it isn't."83

A common complaint from Volunteers was that Peace Corps/Washington was encroaching far too much on their individual initiative. There were regulations on dress, travel during vacations, social activities and use of vehicles.
Volunteers claimed that, while Peace Corps/Washington preached self-reliance and individualism, it practised a stultifying paternalism. Volunteers valued their independence. The feeling of being "on their own" in a far country gave them a sense of adventure and responsibility. However, by 1963, many had begun to fear that the regular check-ups from Washington, the conferences and questionnaires (in the interests of research and assessment) and the proliferation of rules would eventually erode their autonomy. In 1963, a Volunteer in East Pakistan claimed, "The Peace Corps attracted more bold adventurers in its early days - before it was safe."^84

The Peace Corps administration's difficult task was to strike a balance between support and interference. If Peace Corps/Washington did not provide enough information or equipment, it would be accused of indifference to the needs of the Volunteer; if it provided too much, then it was doubting his maturity. Each Volunteer had his own idea of where the golden mean lay. Some Volunteers in East Pakistan who had set up an impromptu minor medication centre were deeply resentful when Peace Corps/Washington ordered them to shut it down because - technically speaking - they were not qualified to deal with medicine. "We're becoming the typical American bureaucracy," opined one Volunteer.^85 In 1961, Margery Michelmore, a young Volunteer in Nigeria, lost a postcard on which she had graphically described the less salubrious aspects of life in Ibadan. The card fell into the hands of radical native students and an international incident ensued. From then on, the Peace Corps placed a ban on postcards - but some Volunteers resented this as a curtailment of their personal freedom. Volunteers in Jamaica became furiously indignant when Sargent Shriver attempted to interfere with their weekly newspaper - The Bullsheet -
which was critical of Peace Corps/Washington. Shriver deemed it negative and insensitive but evaluators Elwell and Love agreed with the Volunteers that there should be no censorship of their publications. However, Charles Peters supported Shriver. While he agreed that censorship should be restricted to material offensive to host citizens, he also recognised that "even the best young people can be damned silly at times. I think Margery Michelmore is a good illustration. Margery was as sensitive and as intelligent a Volunteer as we ever had in the Peace Corps. Yet, she wrote that postcard. "Peters argued that mild censorship was sometimes necessary and not always the last resort of "frightened bureaucrats." Volunteers in Malaya and Morocco - whose publications were also modified by Peace Corps/Washington - failed to agree. "Big Daddy Peace Corps is too much," moaned one Volunteer. 86

Unfortunately, it was the in-country administrators - the Reps and their staffs - who had to bear the brunt of the Volunteers' resentment of Peace Corps officialdom in general. This was slightly ironical since, as Shriver pointed out, most Reps shared the Volunteers' feelings of being "out of touch" with Peace Corps/Washington. 87 After all, both were victims of the same bureaucratic bungling. For example, in the autumn of 1962, P.D.O.'s African Division sent out a new contingent of Volunteers to Nigeria but, to the consternation of Rep Murray Frank, Washington neglected to inform him of their intended arrival. 88 Situated between the Peace Corps hierarchy and the Volunteers, the Reps formed their own unique "subculture." Their job was all-encompassing. As the head of the Peace Corps mission in the field, the Rep had great prestige both with host country nationals and with other American agencies. Therefore, although
somewhat removed from official protocol and routine, he had to be skilled in the arts of diplomacy. He also had to be a vigorous administrator. Endowed by Shriver with an enormous amount of responsibility, the Rep had to be capable of delegating and exercising power in strange circumstances with very few procedural guidelines to aid his choices. The long distances separating the Rep's country headquarters (usually in the capital city) from the various regions where the Volunteers worked, complicated the administrative picture even more. Communication became difficult and confusion almost inevitable. It took a Volunteer stationed in the back-country of Brazil, three days to reach the Peace Corps headquarters in Rio where he had been told an urgent telegram awaited him; but when he arrived he discovered the cable was for someone else. Despite such mishaps, Peace Corps Reps retained an aura not usually found within government agencies. Indeed, Burdick and Lederer deemed that the in-country Rep had "the single most important external and internal role in the Peace Corps." 89

The Rep had to have outstanding qualities of personal leadership. Given the youth of most Volunteers, their inexperience in foreign countries, and their commitment to the Peace Corps, it was axiomatic that they would look to their Rep not only for guidance but for approbation. For his part, the Rep had to win their confidence, fuel their enthusiasm and - at the same time - enforce discipline when necessary. Somehow the Rep had to avoid being regarded by the Volunteers as a "tyrant" but, simultaneously, he had to beware of becoming overly-permissive. As Rep Roderic E. Buller in Venezuela put it, "You've got to give them a kick in the butt when they need it and still make them like it." 90

As a result of their high demands upon the Rep, the Volunteers often became disappointed if he did not measure up to what they expected of him - even though their expectations were sometimes totally unreasonable. The Rep soon became aware that everything about him -
luxurious, whether he sent his children to local or expatriate schools, whether his wife shopped at the local market or the P.X. commissariat - was under the continual and critical scrutiny of the Volunteers in his programme. His proximity to the field meant that his time and his home always had to remain open to Volunteers; a private life was impossible. Every programme had its information network or "jungle telegraph", which operated over thousands of miles, keeping the Volunteers up to date on their Rep's most personal activities. Gossip was rife and programmes were often divided into factions. Volunteers in Venezuela "revolted" against their Rep. He had made little effort to keep in contact with them, had allowed private agencies to take advantage of them, and when it became known that he had sauntered off to Mexico on vacation, it was the last straw. The Regional Director for Latin America, Jack Vaughn, travelled to Venezuela to placate the angry Volunteers and the Rep was fired. In May, 1963, there was a "mutiny" in the clique-ridden programme in Somalia. The situation was only resolved when the Rep and seven other Volunteers were dismissed. In Turkey twenty-eight out of thirty-nine Volunteers would not sign a petition to have their Acting Rep made permanent - he was replaced. There was also a small "mutiny" in Ethiopia in January, 1963, when a few Volunteers spread the false rumour that their Rep had been guilty of a "racist" action against a black member of his staff. The Rep in question, Harris Wofford - a former Special Assistant To The President On Civil Rights and the founding father of the Peace Corps' positive discrimination policy in favour of blacks - was easily able to clear up the misunderstanding. Nevertheless, that a man like Wofford could ever be accused of racism was a lesson for all Reps to be on their guard against incestuous gossip-mongering in the field.91

The Rep and his staff were assisted by a Volunteer Leader - an outstanding character usually chosen during training - who was supposed to help his colleagues with their personal and occupational problems. Sometimes these Leaders won the respect of their peers and stimulated camaraderie; they were given an extra stipend for this purpose. However, more often than not, the Leaders came to be regarded by their fellows as "errand boys" for Peace Corps/Washington; their extra money merely became a "booze fund" for themselves and their friends.
A typical Volunteer Leader in Brazil - a Harvard law graduate who enjoyed playing the "big shot" - infuriated, rather than inspired his colleagues. Charles Peters and most evaluators felt the Leader role was too vague and that it inspired jealousy more than anything else. Hence in a memorandum to Sargent Shriver in July, 1963, Peters recommended that the entire Volunteer Leader concept should be scrapped.

In the final outcome, the relationship between the overseas staff and the Volunteers depended almost entirely upon the Reps. "Their personal leadership," wrote Shriver, "is the least known but most vital factor in the overseas achievements." The Rep had to cope with difficulties in communication and administration, gross under-staffing and bureaucratic blemishes in Washington - and yet he had to make his programme a success. In a tongue-in-cheek memorandum to Peace Corps/Washington, in May, 1962, Glenn Ferguson, Rep in Thailand, eloquently analysed his "no-win" occupation:

"Peace Corps existence is a lonely existence. To the Volunteer, the Rep is too inaccessible for a companion, too harried for a confidante, too committed for a friend. To the Foreign Service compatriot, the Rep is too youthful for equality, too idealistic for acceptance, too busy for golf. To the counterpart, the Rep is too new for sharing ideas, too alien for sharing problems and too affluent for sharing a home....If the Rep is approaching success, he is lonely....Loneliness is his creed, independence his cause. Too close to the Volunteers, he becomes a crutch. Too distant he becomes a threat....The skills of the Rep are the skills of the den mother, the clerk, the personnel director, the salesman and the diplomat...His family will decry his schedule, the Volunteers will decry his motives, his compatriots will decry his approach...His headquarters becomes an adversary, his home becomes a haven, his job becomes his life. Select the man who is introspective; the man who enjoys being alone, and the man who communicates with all." 95

Despite the difficult nature of the job, the Peace Corps produced some marvellously successful Reps. Frank Mankiewicz, in Peru, was the epitome of the Peace Corps Rep par excellence. Almost without exception, the Volunteers liked and respected him and - along with his staff in Lima - he was constantly involved in negotiations with Peruvian agencies to improve and adjust programme deficiencies. Evaluator Herb Wegner estimated that Mankiewicz reached "about the best possible mix between leadership, guidance and free-rein in programming Volunteer projects." Likewise in Costa Rica, Rep Frank Appleton provided a first-class example of how to build effective and mutually amicable Volunteer-staff relations. "It would be hard to find a man more personally concerned with the
welfare and success of his Volunteers, " reported Dee Jacobs. Robert Steiner in Afghanistan was another model Rep. "Very soft-spoken, Bob works in a gentle, smooth, soft-sell way that is equally effective with Volunteers, Afghans and the U.S.O.M.," wrote Thorburn Reid, "Patient, good-humoured, understanding and perceptive, there is little to fault him." Steiner set his Volunteers an excellent example by speaking fluent Farsi, including native Afghans among his staff and by living at a "grassroots" level. Of a weekend, Steiner was to be found in the local bazaars shopping and bargaining for various items such as rope beds for his Volunteers. In Togo, Rep C. Payne Lucas covered thousands of miles in his Peace Corps jeep to maintain communication with his far-flung Volunteers. The roads were bumpy and dangerous and Lucas had many accidents. However, he broke through some serious bottlenecks and kept in touch with his Volunteers while managing to uphold an uneasy truce with a somewhat hostile U.S. Embassy staff. As Philip Cook pointed out, Lucas was "young, frenetic, and a bit unsteady in his management, but he has generally done a superb job." 96

Sargent Shriver consistently stressed to in-country support staffs that they were there to satisfy the needs of the Volunteers. "Let it be clear, he wrote "not one staff member is more important to the Peace Corps than the freshest, most apprehensive Volunteer in the field."\textsuperscript{97} Even so, Shriver's instructions were not always followed to the letter. The most serious shortcoming was a failure to keep up communication. In many countries, the Rep's reluctance to visit Volunteers in faraway projects contributed to his general lack of awareness and understanding of Volunteer attitudes, problems, behaviour and jobs. Some Reps over-emphasised the Peace Corps' diplomatic relationship with the Embassy and the host government - at the expense of Volunteers. Others acted as if the field was an annoying nuisance which interrupted the really important work of administration and organisation. A Rep in Sierra Leone did not make a habit of travelling long distances to see his Volunteers. "He makes it pretty clear that he likes his comfort," wrote David Gelman, "he likes the gracious life, he likes his leisurely lunch on the verandah."\textsuperscript{98}

One staff member in Morocco obviously regarded the Volunteers as "pains in the neck that cause her to get up earlier than she likes"; a Rep in the Ivory Coast was reported to Shriver as being "not exactly warmly human with the Volunteers."
In the Philippines a Rep was "too lax with the staff and the Volunteers"; and, in Brazil, another Rep was just "too nice" to be effective. Fearful that a high number of early terminations would reflect badly upon their administrative capabilities, weak Reps sometimes retained unsatisfactory performers in their programmes - much to the disgust of the other Volunteers. Some staff members did not make any attempt to learn the language of their host country - yet, they expected the Volunteers to do so. When Shriver discovered that one Contract Representative Overseas in the Ivory Coast could neither speak French nor knew about French customs, he ordered Rogers Finch (Chief of University Relations) to "Take prompt action...this must be changed immediately." In 1963, Charles Peters advocated that all Reps - as well as Volunteers - who did not maintain an adequate language proficiency, should be dismissed from the Peace Corps. "We talk a lot about Peace Corps service being tough," he told Shriver, "Let's make it tough by giving language tests every six months and throwing out all Volunteers and staff who fail to show reasonable improvement." Between 1961 and 1964, many Reps were ordered to "take a purgative"; indeed, attrition was greater among overseas staff than among Volunteers.

One of the more conspicuous excesses of the Peace Corps administration - caused by Washington as well as country Reps - was the amount of money, materials and supplies which it provided for Volunteers in the field. Despite the popular media image of the Peace Corpsman living in a "mud hut", very few Volunteers suffered extreme physical hardship. They were paid a monthly "subsistence allowance" from which they had to feed, clothe and shelter themselves. The amount of this allowance varied according to the general standard of living in different countries. In some countries - for example, Peru, Panama, India, Morocco - Volunteers were paid almost the same as their native hosts. However, in most cases, the Volunteers' subsistence allowance - although meagre by American standards - permitted them to enjoy a lifestyle far above that of their counterparts. For instance, the 110 dollars which Peace Corps nurses in Tanganyika received was twice what their native colleagues earned in salary. In Costa Rica, Dee Jacobs reckoned that the Volunteers' 125 dollars "subsistence" payment
was at least 10 or 15 dollars too high. In Senegal, Volunteers admitted that - with a little effort - they could save a full half of their living allowance. In many places over-generous payments to Volunteers led to extravagant living conditions and - more seriously - social ostracisation from the poorer native peoples. "The Peace Corps is known to exist in Usukka, but is not seen," wrote one native Nigerian, disappointed at the Volunteers' social exclusiveness. "One of them just speeds on his scooter all the time...were J.F.K. to resurrect in Usukka, I am sure he would be sad." Another Volunteer in Venezuela was able to afford a brand new motor bike on which, according to evaluators, he clocked up "five thousand fun-filled miles" - far away from his host community.

Almost all Volunteer teachers had very comfortable accommodation; indeed, sometimes evaluators deemed it too comfortable. Herb Wegner estimated that in Brazil, nearly two thirds of all Volunteers were living in "pure luxury". Nor did Volunteers in Ethiopia endure a spartan existence; in fact, evaluator Richard Richter's main criticism of an otherwise excellent programme was that too many Volunteers were enjoying "la dolce vita."

In Africa, Volunteer teachers usually employed native stewards, houseboys and cleaners who could be hired for a few dollars a month. To a great extent, the Volunteers were pressurised into this situation. African teachers were expected to have a comfortable abode and at least one servant. If the Volunteers refused, they would not only have been guilty of contravening an important social custom, but would have found it impossible to win the respect of their native colleagues and students alike. Some Volunteers reluctantly accepted what they found personally repugnant, while other heartily enjoyed the pleasure of cross-cultural readjustment. A number of Volunteers in Sierra Leone had their own cooks, and one fellow went so far as to have breakfast served to him every morning - in bed. A few Volunteers admitted that they "never had it so good in the States". Only a tiny minority of Volunteers lived in excessive luxury, but the general danger of too much comfort was that Volunteers were tempted to spend time enjoying themselves at home when they should have been making people-to-people contacts outside. Some Volunteers' relationships with natives soon became limited to their students, houseboys and cooks - like the teacher in Brazil who...
worked fourteen hours a week but otherwise enjoyed "reading and resting and lolling around the nice house." In early 1964, Charles Peters intensified his campaign to discourage Volunteers from employing servants whenever possible. "It's important to show that the Volunteer can do the dirty work around the house," he told Shriver.  

The Peace Corps administration did not help matters by supplying Volunteers with a constant stream of equipment - from pencil-sharpeners, pots and pans and refrigerators, to Polaroid cameras, Gestetner machines and tape recorders. Some overseas staff members complained that they spent half their time requisitioning and paying for goods - household and work - for the Volunteers. In some countries, the supply of "goodies" got completely out of hand. In British Honduras, Volunteers were provided with two 19-foot fiberglass yachts and four 28-horsepower outboard motor-boats - allegedly for "recreational and working purposes." Whether they were used for work or not, the boats reinforced the stereotyped Latin American image of the ostentatious, affluent "Yanquis."  

The most prominent sign of what evaluators sarcastically referred to as the "Cuerpo de Tourista" image of the Volunteers, was the proliferation in almost every country of the Peace Corps' blue-coloured jeeps. In the poorer countries of Latin America, Philip Cook and Thorburn Reid pointed out, "Peace Corps vehicles stand out like President Kennedy's white Lincoln with the armour plate." For many assignments there was little need for vehicles - but programmes were usually liberally sprinkled with them just the same. The jeeps caused fights between Volunteers as to who should have them at what times, they were a distraction from the job, they were expensive, time-consuming and, most of all, they served to symbolise the difference in standards of living between the young Americans and the natives. To the peoples of the campesinos and barrios, the blue jeeps represented the typical soft-living, easy-going crowd of 'gringos' out for a pleasant vacation. Besides, it was not the best advertisement for the Peace Corps when - as in Venezuela - the blue jeeps were sometimes spotted parked outside the local brothel. With a view to making Peace Corps jeeps slightly less prominent, Sargent Shriver had them painted from blue to green in the summer of 1963.
Moreover, by 1963, the worst health hazard to Volunteers had proven to be not malaria or beri-beri, but rather, Peace Corps jeeps. Some Volunteers tended to drive the jeeps on the dirt roads of Africa and Latin America at much the same speed as they would have driven them in New York. There were numerous accidents involving Volunteers, natives and livestock. In the Dominican Republic, Dee Jacobs counted three major and thirteen minor accidents in two years. In some countries there were law suits over injuries to host nationals and animals. In short, jeeps were a menace. They cost the Peace Corps money in gasoline and repair-bills and wayward Volunteers were inclined to use them for unscheduled vacations, visits to fellow Volunteers in faraway towns - occasionally - for drag races. Of course, in some countries vehicles were necessary. In Peru, they were essential for getting Volunteers to the coastal areas; and in Nyasaland, evaluator Richard Elwell commented on the moderate and "level-headed" way in which jeeps were being used. In general however, most evaluators reckoned that the fewer Peace Corps jeeps in a country, the better it was for the programme. In September, 1963, Charles Peters recommended a policy to Shriver of "no Peace Corps-supplied vehicles for Volunteers". Where jeeps were absolutely necessary, Peters suggested the Peace Corps should get A.I.D. to supply them through the host government. He added impishly that the difficulty involved in getting vehicles through A.I.D. would serve as a deterrent against Volunteers asking for too many, too often, "Of course," Peters concluded, "we should continue to supply motor bikes, bikes and horses - where necessary."

The danger of giving Volunteers too much money or equipment was ever-present in the Peace Corps. Inevitably, there was a good deal of miscalculation. To define exactly appropriate "living standards" for all Volunteers in every country was an impossible task. There was some abuse - and not only by the Volunteers. Peace Corps Reps and staff members often lived very well overseas. While they were not expected to live at the "grassroots" level, if they wallowed in luxury they could not expect to be taken seriously when they asked their Volunteers to live more austerely. For example, some Volunteers in Caracas rented pretentious apartments in the best part of town. However, their Rep had set a precedent by ensconcing himself in a lavish house formerly occupied by an American oil company
executive. Evaluators looked more favourably upon the Peace Corps offices established in a slum in Dacca; "most appropriate," commented Tim Adams. Charles Peters and other evaluators noted that the Peace Corps administration sometimes supplied Volunteers with equipment to make up for their being badly-programmed. A Volunteer who had a jeep and a stereo would not have as much spare time to spend complaining that he had nothing to do. Or, as Peters put it to Shriver, "It's a hell of a lot easier to get a Volunteer a tape recorder than to find him a good job." 110

Yet, with a few exceptions, Volunteers did make a physical sacrifice during their Peace Corps service. For example, although jeeps were regarded as extravagances by host nationals and evaluators, most young Volunteers - used to having a car back home - complained that the Peace Corps did not provide enough vehicles. No Volunteers had to starve or sleep out in the open, but there were varying degrees of discomfort. A "subsistence allowance" which was very comfortable by Third World standards, was still very meagre in American terms. Each Volunteer managed his finances in his own way. Some saved their money for travel during summer vacation, others used their personal allowance to invest in materials for their projects - like the Volunteer in Brazil who bought food with her own money to supplement the diet of local children. 111

Volunteers were usually the biggest critics of the relatively affluent life which they led in the underdeveloped world. One Volunteer in Liberia chided himself and his colleagues that "We're not living as the natives live. We have plenty of clothes, we eat better and ride around and drink Fanta and have lots of books." Paradoxically, evaluator David Gelman reported that Volunteers in Liberia were living much more stringently than the majority of their colleagues in Africa. The same subsistence allowance which implied luxury for one Volunteer could easily mean hardship to another. While few Volunteers had to suffer abject poverty, few lived the life of an opulent nabob. "To the average Volunteer", Kevin Delany noted, "happiness is a cold beer." 112

The American press tended to associate physical deprivation with a successful Peace Corps programme. This was a simple-minded distortion of the Peace Corps' purpose. The Peace Corps Act said Volunteers should be "willing to
serve under conditions of hardship"; but discomfort, per se, was not a goal. Certainly, as Sargent Shriver insisted, Volunteers had to show a willingness "to share the life of another people, to accept sacrifice when sacrifice is necessary and to show that material privilege has not become the central and indispensable ingredient in an American's life." However, although Volunteers did not live in mud huts, the majority fulfilled those objectives.

It was often the case that the happiest Volunteers were those with the most difficult living conditions. Most Volunteers seemed to enjoy lonely jobs in the remote outback more than big city work. In the city there were many expatriates and the Volunteers could easily become just another face in the crowd. Also, cities were impersonal; it was difficult for Volunteers to make a contribution that was distinctly their own. While they had the company of each other in the city, there was the danger of social clannishness and that contacts with natives would become limited; Volunteers would congregate for "bull" sessions where they could gripe, complain, gossip and generally waste their time. On the other hand, although up-country assignments lacked social amenities and conversation with Americans, they held the attractions of a freer, more informal style of life, increased contact with the local folk, and greater opportunities to make a personal impact.

Naturally, not all Volunteers preferred to be on their own and the best results were not always produced working - as they called it - "à la Schweitzer." The needs of different projects varied and many demanded the application of a group of Volunteers working in close harmony. However, Volunteer morale was almost always higher in the up-country programmes. These were studded with characters who thrived on the freedom and responsibility which isolation allowed them. In Panama, a young Volunteer working with the Caribbean coastal Indians did not visit Panama City for ten months; every few weeks he took a boat upstream to deliver fish, rice and pig-meat to the natives. A Volunteer working in the Liberian bush became so popular that he was adopted as a son of the local tribe and had a baby named after him. In West Pakistan, a lone Volunteer taught agricultural classes, organised a local P.T.A., set up demonstration gardens and coached the school basketball team; he was even given 700 rupees by
the Katlang Town Council to develop a farm. An arts and crafts worker in Peru helped the native Indians of Arequipa with their designs and took advantage of the great love of music in the barriadas to organise a local choir. In Ethiopia, Paul Tsongas not only taught but, with the help of his students, cut down trees and built footbridges over muddy streams and ditches. During his vacation he remained alone with his students to construct a hostel for the village of Ghion. Evaluator Richard Richter noted that Tsongas - like many other Volunteers working alone in isolated areas - had achieved "a very close relationship" with his hosts.¹¹⁴

Not all Volunteers were as outstanding. Indeed, many were guilty of both public and private indiscretions. One Volunteer in Nigeria was "terminated" for taking a completely unauthorised fifty day vacation in Europe. In Ethiopia, evaluator Richard Elwell noted that some Volunteers' manners had deteriorated so badly that "they fart out loud at meal-time". A Volunteer in Indonesia spent most of his working day writing up his Master's thesis; another was described as having "the experience and most of the attributes of a Californian beach-boy." Some Volunteers in Latin America were dismissed for becoming involved in the local "black market"; others for showing "poor judgement" in joining a public demonstration against their school administrators. A couple of Volunteers in Africa were sent home for smoking marihuana. In Morocco, a Volunteer was "a spoiled, lazy oaf, he yawns and complains of hunger and... avoids Moroccans." Another Volunteer in Brazil, a welder by trade, ordered and received, two thirty-pound clamps for use in his work, but he preferred to use them as bar-bells; he was reported as being "passive, doesn't relate well with nationals, doesn't want to work - and has tremendous biceps."¹¹⁵

Inevitably, some Volunteers over-indulged in alcohol. The most outrageous incident occurred in 1965 when a group from East Pakistan visited a bar in downtown Dacca. When the party broke up, one Volunteer had to be carried out of the place; meanwhile, his colleagues commandeered the bicycle rickshaws at the kerb, put the native drivers in the passenger seats, and raced each other through the streets. The local Pakistanis were not impressed at this particular form of "people-to-people" contact.¹¹⁶ A few characters made frighteningly unsuitable
Peace Corps Volunteers. One teacher in the Cameroons insisted to evaluator Wilson Mc Carthy that she had been sent by God on a "mission" to save the natives. A rather sadistic fellow in Liberia took great delight in telling evaluators how he had burned a live rat with kerosene. In one of the more macabre incidents overseas, two Volunteers drove around Guatemala in a Peace Corps jeep purposely running over dogs - some two dozen of them. Ambassador Bell ended the incident by sending the obviously deranged pair home. These two extreme cases joined one hundred and fourteen other Volunteers who, between 1961 and 1965, received the "Braniff Low Achievement Award" - the Volunteers' facetious euphemism for an early plane ticket home.

Sexual relations presented the Volunteers with some of their most sensitive personal dilemmas overseas. Peace Corps/Washington established some very general policies: cohabitation was forbidden, contraceptive devices were not supplied, brothels were off-limits. During training Volunteers were told that, while the Peace Corps wanted to give them maximum freedom in their personal lives, going overseas was not a license for sexual adventure. They were left in no doubt that any sexual conduct which endangered either the success of their programme or the reputation of the Peace Corps, would result in instant dismissal. However, it was impossible to regulate the sexual behaviour of thousands of young men and women. Under lonely and often frustrating circumstances, Volunteers did not always act discreetly. In Togo, evaluator Philip Cook reported ample evidence of affairs involving female Volunteer teachers and Togolese men. There are affairs involving female Volunteer teachers and Peace Corps men. There are affairs involving Peace Corps men and Togolese women. And there is a bit of V.D. While such behaviour did not necessarily offend the moral code of Sub-Sahara Africans, Charles Peters emphasised to Shriver that Volunteers must be made to understand that "even though their particular hosts might not object to nightly orgies, a world-wide reputation for such behaviour could get the Peace Corps un-invited in a lot of other places and unsupported in the U.S. Congress."

Peace Corps Reps struggled manfully to limit imprudence, but not always with complete success. Despite the Peace Corps' ruling against cohabitation, the problem of "mixed housing" - male and female Volunteers sharing the same
accommodation - persisted in several countries. When evaluators in Venezuela discovered a male Volunteer and a female Volunteer living under the same roof together with a native male and female, they dubbed the situation "the ultimate in counterpart relations." Both Volunteers were sent home. In West Pakistan there were three Volunteers' households containing two single girls and a single man. These menages à trois had become the subject of a good deal of Pakistani gossip and had strengthened the already prevalent feeling that American women were immodest and immoral. As evaluator Tim Adams pointed out:

"In a Muslim country where separation of the sexes is so strictly observed, it is curious that we Americans should import a living arrangement that is opprobrious even in our own relaxed society. To be sure, the relationship between male and female Volunteers in such households is quite clearly that of brother and sister. But the housing arrangement has the appearance of a greater intimacy than that, and in Pakistan the appearance is the reality."

In the margin of this report Shriver ordered Warren Wiggins to take immediate action on this "inexcusable" situation.

While the vast majority of Volunteers behaved with exemplary modesty and tact, there were a few embarrassing faux pas. One Volunteer in a Latin American country went around throwing herself "literally and figuratively at the opposite sex." Another immature girl whose sexual proclivities had already got her transferred from Nigeria, again brought herself to the brink of scandal in Liberia. A number of female Volunteers became pregnant and there were cases where native girls filed paternity suits against male Volunteers. A few Volunteers became fathers to "Peace Corps babies;" there were also instances of "marriages of necessity" between Volunteers. In some Far Eastern countries, even the most casual relationship with a native female was regarded as a prelude to marriage. Hence, several impressionable young men found themselves married to native girls after only a few months of Peace Corps service. A twenty-one year old Volunteer in Colombia was sent home after marrying a native grandmother.

Most Peace Corps programmes suffered at least a few cases of venereal disease. In Thailand, the Peace Corps staff was concerned that only three cases of V.D. had been reported among the more than sixty male Volunteers - it was felt others might be getting inadequate or no treatment. "But before I left," wrote evaluator
John Griffin in February 1963, "other reports came in, building the number up to what the Peace Corps doctor called a 'healthy average.'" By way of comparison, Griffin noted that some U.S. army units in Thailand suffered 100 per cent infection.

Most of the Volunteers' sexual quandaries stemmed from cross-cultural differences. In some Moslem countries, native women were forbidden to go out with westerners. In Tanganyika, male Volunteers told David Gelman that, as far as sexual relations were concerned, they "might as well have been eunuchs". Another exasperated Volunteer in Indonesia claimed that not only was "dating impossible, but even visiting a native girl was difficult. In countries such as Turkey, Iran and Ceylon, male Volunteers had to come terms with the homosexuality prevalent in those societies. As evaluator Arthur Dudden noted in Ceylon, the widespread homosexuality was "an alarming challenge to some Volunteers."\(^{123}\)

The complications raised by a different culture's approach to sexuality were exacerbated for female Volunteers. In some Near Eastern societies where females were closely protected, only a certain type of woman walked the streets and took active part with men in community life. In other countries, it was against "social etiquette for an unmarried woman to be seen alone with a man. Then again, in Africa, men often expected a physical relationship to develop on a first "date". Female Volunteers had to overcome these predicaments and, at the same time, avoid offending racial and cultural sensitivities. Sometimes Peace Corps training courses did not give females enough warning of the sexually aggressive attitudes of African and Latin American men. In the Third World, the image of the American woman was that projected by Hollywood—glamorous, sexy-headed and promiscuous. Evaluator Thomas Dugan noted that in Turkey, American films had given the Turks the impression that "the American woman jumps from bad to bad." As a result, American girls were regarded as "fair game" by their male hosts. In Ecuador, Richard Elwell warned Peace Corps girls that they would have to be careful—"an unescorted female is very likely to get raped after dark in Guanquil." In the Philippines, nearly every female Volunteer had been either "pinched, grabbed, abused, attacked, raped or near-raped."\(^{124}\)

Although difficulties and temptation abounded, only a tiny minority of
Volunteers chose to over-indulge their sexual appetites. Normal human weakness notwithstanding, most Volunteers proved to be dedicated, healthy personalities who held a responsible perspective on their own moral priorities. Nightly orgies and cohabitation were far from being the "norm" overseas. The Volunteers' general level of morality was more typified by the Volunteer who spent his vacation digging dirt roads in the slums of Santo Domingo, or the Peace Corps nurse in Vicos who made rounds to her patients by long and difficult foot-trails, or the young man who spent six hours a day at a leper colony in Liberia. Volunteers were rarely "holier-than-thou" types. However, they did pride themselves on being different from the swaggering, loud-mouthed, "macho" American, too often on view overseas. If a Volunteer was in danger of disgracing his programme, his colleagues usually reprimanded him before Peace Corps/Washington did. In Thailand, evaluator John Griffin noted one case where a Volunteer took up with a prostitute; but the other Volunteers had a serious talk with him to the effect that he was spoiling Peace Corps impact by behaving like a G.I. He promised to mend his ways.

Despite the many problems of cross-cultural adjustment, the vast majority of Volunteers - both male and female - did make a favourable impact on their host societies. Evaluation reports - written from a critical standpoint - were freighted with stories of the positive contributions made by Peace Corps Volunteers. "On the job, most of them resemble Al Cap," wrote Philip Cook in Gabon. "Bearded, sweaty, the few clothes they wear dirty or torn, they are a frightening sight. . . . (but) Volunteers are providing sound, on-the-job training in carpentry and construction to unskilled Gabonese villagers." Incidentally, these Volunteers rose at 5:30 a.m. and were in bed at 9:00 p.m. In the Toledo district of British Honduras, Volunteers "blazed romantic trails through the bush" moving from village to village teaching handicrafts. One Volunteer in Peru - in addition to teaching - invented a skin-cream from the water left over from wool-making and thus began a new "cottage industry" for the native Indians. And, in a community development project in the Dominican Republic, evaluators reckoned that at least one Volunteer would leave behind evidence of his significant contribution:
"A town council already convinced that it can bring about civic improvements by utilising its own resources. He will leave behind scores of farmers using modern methods of feeding and breeding their animals, along with others who realise the advantages of prime seed, fertilisation and use of insecticides. Unless we miss our guess, he will also leave a model home construction and agrarian reform project to be admired and copied." 128

In criticising, Kennedy's Peace Corps, Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas argued that the agency surrendered to "benign mediocrity" and retained "nonperforming" Volunteers in order to give the American public the impression that the bold experiment was succeeding. They described the majority of Volunteers as "do-gooders and dilettantes...the unmet hope of the Peace Corps." 129

Certainly there were weak links. With so many young people sent overseas for the first time there were bound to be problems, embarrassing incidents and personal indiscretions. Indeed, the Volunteers were their own most virulent critics. However, it is impossible to generalise about the quality of Peace Corps Volunteers. In every programme there were at least three very broad levels. There were a few absolutely outstanding Volunteers who were effective in achieving all three Peace Corps goals; they worked hard, showed real empathy with their hosts and colleagues, and were the epitome of capable, selfless Americans striving for understanding of another culture. In the middle was the largest group, who made a contribution in terms of providing knowledge and exchanging cultural values but - because of difficult local conditions or a lack of talent, energy or empathy - did not have first-class, all-round impact. At the lower end of the scale were a minority of Volunteers who, for various reasons, ended up frustrated, defeated and perhaps even embittered; but at all costs - at least for some of their time overseas - even this group acted as good-will ambassadors. Evaluators observed both strong and weak Volunteers in every country - and often the pendulum swung between the two. Paraphrasing President Kennedy, one Volunteer described his Peace Corps experience as having a rhythm which ebbed and flowed every day. 130

In Ecuador, two groups of Volunteers had a completely different morale and impact. Group I had the "weary, independent pessimism of tired soldiers", whereas Group II were "a bunch of sweethearts - amicable, enthusiastic and fearless - perfectly at home in Ecuador." In El Salvador one Volunteer had an alcohol
problem, another had "a talent for community development and women" and a third individual was "thoughtful, hardworking, logical and successful." One lazy Volunteer in Brazil admitted that he joined the Peace Corps for "a joyride."

However, a colleague worked "twenty-four hours a day" ministering to sick natives; indeed, the evaluators were delighted when she excused herself from their intensive questioning because she had to get back to work. In Sierra Leone, a Volunteer felt he had little in common with Africans because, he said, "their educational level is so much lower." Other Volunteers gave up their vacation and stayed with their host community to build new schools. A chauvinistic Volunteer in East Pakistan "crowed loud and long about the superiority of American life," while another Volunteer in the same programme, "immersed himself deeply in Pakistani life." It was not uncommon to find good and bad combined in a single Volunteer. Evaluator Arthur Dudden gave the example of a Volunteer in Ceylon who was "perpetually and publicly scratching the itch in his groin, or exploring the contents of his nose"; his "skinny-dipping" in the stream near the school where he taught had earned him a reprimand from his principal. Yet, the principal also said the Volunteer was "a good influence on the other teachers because of his dedication and enthusiasm"; the young man gave up his vacation to help the staff devise new curricula and - mostly through hard study at night - he had made himself fluent in Sinhalese. "In effect," concluded Dudden, "the two exist side by side. One is unpredictable and capable of doing serious damage. The other is generous and willing as well as anxious to be helpful."

Again, Lowther and Lucas claimed that most Volunteers were bland and ineffective - "The truly exceptional Volunteer became the exception," they wrote. This statement was true enough in the sense that few Volunteers were "supermen". Although, it might be suggested that young people who willingly gave up two years of their lives to help the underprivileged could hardly be called anything but "exceptional". The majority of Volunteers worked attentively, lived modestly, and made friends where they could. The efforts of most went unrecorded. Often, the Volunteers' most satisfying work was done during summer vacations when they travelled up-country and became involved in local communities. Sometimes their most long-lasting successes were achieved in unconscious moments when they taught
their hosts - by "doing" - how to put a fence around chickens, or cover the
tenure in electrical wires, or sterilise water before drinking. Volunteers
probably made their strongest impression on the minds of children - teaching them,
laughing with them, showing them that not all Americans were "Yanqui imperialists."
These subtle forms of impact were not easily or immediately discernible. What the
Volunteers were doing did not appear "exceptional". Although to natives -
especially in the decolonised lands - there was always something unique about the
Peace Corps nurse and the Peace Corps teacher. As Charles Peters pointed out, the
really "outstanding" Volunteer was rarely the brilliant innovator or the tireless
adventurer, but rather "the dependable, self-reliant, feet-on-the-ground man" -
and there were many Volunteers in that category.133

All Volunteers experienced moments of unhappiness, disillusion and despair
overseas. Brent K. Ashabranner estimated that in community development work, "job
frustration" was as high as 75 per cent. Lowther and Lucas felt that "many
Volunteers" only remained in the Peace Corps because they feared they would be
labelled "quitters" back home. Tim Adams wrote that Volunteers needed the
"imagination of Leonardo, the patience of Job, the courage of Sergeant York and
the hide of an elephant." 134 One crestfallen Volunteer in Morocco made his
disappointment plain:

"Something has been wrong with this project from the goddam
beginning. We have no transportation, no work, no instruments
that are any use. It's embarrassing. If things won't work
out the way they are, then for God's sake change it. I can
just see it. For two years we'll fuck up here and get sent
home to mild dishonor and that'll be it." 135

It was difficult for Volunteers ever to feel fully satisfied with their work. In
the early programmes especially, there were few definable gauges of achievement.
For most Volunteers, Peace Corps service involved the painful process of
accommodating themselves to alternate feelings of frustration and satisfaction.
As Arnold Deutchman, a Volunteer in Malaya, put it, "actors on the stage of an
imperfect world must of necessity accept imperfect solutions." 136

Some Volunteers never managed to bridge the gap between their expectations
and reality. A few became cynical time-servers. However, the majority proved
resilient. "A really good Volunteer receives little credit - keep that in mind
when you read Peace Corps success stories," wrote a young Volunteer in Peru. "I have a lot of failures, a few tangible successes and a great deal of frustration. (I was a dreamer once too, and my fall was hard). Now, all things considered, I think I'm doing something worthwhile. I don't think I'll sign up for another stretch, but you can't drag me away from this one." Another girl in Tunisia complained, "The red tape, inefficiency and lack of comprehension seem insurmountable walls blocking any progress... but, if I had the chance to do it over again, knowing what I do now, I would not hesitate. It is a remarkable experience." Between 1963 and 1965 a massive 94 per cent of all Volunteers agreed; despite all the drawbacks, they would go through their Peace Corps experience again. Indeed, 10 per cent of them extended their service for a further year. In a letter to Sargent Shriver, Mike O'Donnell, a Volunteer in Morocco, explained what made the Peace Corps experience worthwhile:

"Peace Corps Morocco is, at the very least, typical of projects everywhere insofar as it has had its share of work shortage, partial success, entanglement in bureaucratic red tape, and so on. But these negative factors have been in the minority, a minority richly interwoven with success in personal contact at the grassroots level, with the satisfaction of having passed on technical knowledge, though basic, to Moroccans who will do the job when the Peace Corps is no longer here, and with the firm realisation that we here are part of a vital and growing community of good-will ambassadors to developing countries throughout the world." Feelings such as this reinforced President Kennedy's suggestion that, indeed, Peace Corps Volunteers were "a special group of young Americans."

One Volunteer in the front-lines of the Peace Corps in Ethiopia described the life as filled with "excitement, boredom, achievement and frustration." Many Volunteers went through "culture shock"; but making some adjustment to another way of life was the basic idea behind the Peace Corps. The administration - in Washington and the field - was often lacking in sensitivity and support; but to the independent Volunteer busy working in the outback, Peace Corps/Washington was almost completely irrelevant. There were many mistakes and personal indiscretions on behalf of the Volunteers; but unpleasantnesses were only a small
part of the story, especially when compared to the willingness of the
Volunteers to make personal sacrifices on behalf of others. There was much
disillusion and disappointment involved in the Peace Corps experience, but the
vast majority of Volunteers had not the slightest regret about joining. As one
young Volunteer in British Honduras put it, in a letter to Peace Corps/Washington,
"Many Volunteers feel frustrations and discouragements of one kind or another —
but no-one writes of failure."
"Not many people took the Peace Corps seriously during its first five years. It was welcomed as a gesture, an antidote to The Ugly American, a symbol of a friendlier America. In the American mind, it took its place somewhere between the Boy Scouts and motherhood."

- HARRIS WOFFORD -

(From "The Future Of The Peace Corps" The Annals, May, 1966)
Even as President Kennedy launched the Peace Corps in March, 1961, Sargent Shriver was aware of "a thousand suspicious eyes peering over our shoulders. Some of them were the eyes of friendly critics but many belonged to unfriendly skeptics." From the time of the Cow Palace address, the Peace Corps was the subject of constant media exposure. Shriver cautioned Volunteers and staff that life in the Peace Corps was akin to living in a goldfish bowl; he warned them that the Peace Corps would be under continual, and sometimes critical, scrutiny by the press. At the same time, he avidly sought publicity. Shriver was aware of the new agency's vulnerability to criticism but he also recognised that without popular support - at home and abroad - the Peace Corps would surely fail. Accordingly, he deliberately encouraged media interest, knowing full well that "the fourth branch of government" had the power to make or break the Peace Corps.  

In a memorandum of April 20, 1961, Ed Murrow, Director of the United States Information Agency, informed Sargent Shriver that "world press reaction to the Peace Corps to date has been predominantly favourable." As expected, the new programme was ridiculed by the communist press as a "spy corps", but editorials in Western Europe, Latin America, Africa and the Far East were generally very positive. The Voice of Ethiopia lauded the enthusiastic response of American youth and "the sincerity of the United States in its efforts to promulgate policies that lead to the establishment of world peace and the encouragement of peaceful pursuits." In Brazil, the Jornal do Comercio predicted the idea would permit young Americans to "put into practice their ideas of democracy, human fraternity and the dignity of work by means of person-to-person contracts."
Express of India said the outstanding feature of the programme was that "the Volunteers will be sent only to the countries which need them and request them." In Vietnam, Tu Do praised the young Americans who would "win the hearts of Afro-Asian people."

Notwithstanding this positive reaction, there was considerable concern as to whether the youth selected for the Peace Corps would be able to cope with unfamiliar environmental factors in strange lands. In an article entitled "Peace Corps Must Behave," Britain's Daily Telegraph warned Sargent Shriver to expect "certain scepticism in many quarters." Typical of this scepticism was an editorial in Austria's Wiener Zeitung:

"Experts on the developing countries of Africa, and Asia are not very enthusiastic over the proposal of the U.S. President, who wants to send some 1,000 Americans into the world so they can help where there is need. They doubt that these youths, who have grown up with the benefit of air conditioning, would stand a summer in India, could sleep in an adobe hut, or simply with the stars as their cover, and yet find the strength for work. What the developing areas need are experts and capital rather than idealists without skills."

The most influential newspaper in Thailand, Siam Rath, praised the principles and objectives of the Peace Corps, but it wondered whether Volunteers would be willing to "sacrifice their personal comfort." In Tanganyika, the conservative Standard carried a bitingy humorous article captioned "Eager-Beaver Invasion." This described the Peace Corps as consisting of thousands of students who would "pour into underdeveloped countries...spreading peace and the American way of life." The editor suggested that the Peace Corps would be put to better "educative" use in the corn-growing belt of America's mid-west. In general, however, the Peace Corps was more applauded than attacked by the foreign press. James Morris of the
Manchester Guardian typified the warm reception "for one sceptical alien at least, John Kennedy's Peace Corps has restored some of the decency in patriotism, regenerated some warmth in our reluctant alliance, and, above all, for all our poor sakes, revived a little of the romance of America."^4

On the domestic front, the Peace Corps was received with a similar mixture of scepticism and enthusiasm, with more weight on the latter. The responsible press — The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times — advised caution and careful planning, but generally endorsed the idealism inherent in the programme. The New York Times saw it as "an experiment in international brotherhood." An editorial cited the hero of Burdick and Lederer's Ugly American as the prototype for the Peace Corps Volunteer. He would "give the lie to the notion that Americans are dedicated only to the suburban split-level, the dry martini, and the vice-presidency of the company", proclaimed The Nation. On a less serious level, the popular newspapers and magazines latched onto the glamour of the Peace Corps. "Telephones jangled, the switchboard blinked and drifts of incoming mail accumulated on the desks" reported Time magazine. "The Peace Corps has captured the public imagination as has no other single act of the Kennedy administration." From the beginning, romantic images were conjured up of "emotionally cool and dedicated workers," "ever-youthful dreams of forging a better world" and "idealistic, patriotic, freedom-loving, adventuresome youths (with) the patience of Job, the forbearance of a saint and the digestive system of an ostrich."

Newsweek wondered whether Volunteers should have an official uniform or a slogan or a Peace Corps song. "Do you know Spanish, French, Italian, Portuguese, Urdu, Mandarin or Arabic?", asked Time. This type of glib coverage suggested that although the popular press supported the Peace Corps, they did not take it very seriously. "It was just
like a wedding," said *Time*, reporting on President Kennedy's meeting with the first group of Volunteers to go overseas. "A long line of young men and women stood among the rosebushes in the White House garden...and everyone was smiling and chatting amiably - sometimes in Swahili and sometimes in Twi....For brains and looks and verve, those chosen so far would rank high in any enterprise."\(^7\)

As well as the facile reports, there were also the cynical. The *New York Daily News* had a vision of "hordes of well-meaning youngsters, sticking their snoots into people's private lives telling them how to bring up their children and what or what not to eat and drink." The conservative *National Review* wondered why American youths were "so caught up in the enthusiasm for bringing electric dish-washers to the Angolese?" There were headlines such as "Crew-cut Crusade," "Brownie Troop of Do-Gooders" and "Kennedy's Kiddie Korps."\(^8\) Sceptics viewed the Peace Corps as "pony-tailed co-eds and crew-cut Jack Armstrongs playing Albert Schweitzer - an appalling army of innocents abroad." The *New Yorker* conceded that while the Peace Corps had fired the imagination of American youth, "a distressing number of Asians and Africans are saying that they want no help from it, and some of their leaders have predicted that it will turn out to be nothing but a youth division of the C.I.A."

At a more humorous level, Art Buchwald offered to serve as a Volunteer on the French Riviera where, "people walk around half-naked, lacking shelter, and many still don't have their own boats." Satirising President Kennedy's address to Congress on the Peace Corps, Mr. Buchwald promised, "to live the way they do, share their homes, eat the food they do, and show them that an American is not too proud to become one of them, no matter what hardships he has to face."\(^9\)

A cautious editorial in *The New Republic* in March, 1961, suggested that a voluntary service would have been more sensibly begun at home, where Volunteers could be tested before going overseas. Rather
surprisingly perhaps, this liberal journal questioned the ability of young Americans to adapt to Third World cultures and doubted their resolve to live at the "grassroots" level: "The first time one of them has an attack of appendicitis in say, Nigeria, we shall see how conditional this resolve is." As the detractors awaited the first catastrophe, pressure mounted on the Peace Corps.

Shriver and his staff knew there would be blunders, but they worried that a spectacular calamity in the early days - a death, a rape, or a case of communist infiltration - would completely destroy the new agency's credibility. After only one month in the field, disaster struck; but in a most unlikely manner. In October, 1961, a young female Volunteer in Nigeria lost a postcard and brought the Peace Corps its first crisis.

After seven weeks training at Harvard, Margery Michelmore, a twenty-three year old former researcher with Reader's Digest, was assigned to a school-teaching post in Nigeria. The daughter of a wealthy manufacturer, Miss Michelmore was shocked on encountering slums, squalor and open sewers in Ibadan. She wrote a postcard to a boyfriend in Cambridge, Massachusetts, describing her new environment:

"I wanted you to see the incredible and fascinating city we were in. With all the training we had, we really were not prepared for the squalor and absolutely primitive living conditions rampant both in the city and in the bush. We had no idea what 'underdeveloped' meant. It really is a revelation and after we got over the initial horrified shock, a very rewarding experience. Everyone except us lives in the streets, cooks in the street, sells in the streets, and even goes to the bathroom in the streets."

Unfortunately, she dropped the postcard on the way to the post office and it fell into the hands of some left-wing students at the University of Ibadan. They distributed copies of the card and staged a demonstration. Volunteers were denounced as "agents of imperialism" and "members of America's international spy ring." The protest was widely reported in the Nigerian press and it created a minor
international incident.

There was a flurry of cables between Peace Corps/Washington and Rep Sam Proctor. Sargent Shriver met with the President. They decided it would be best for all concerned - including Margery Michelmore - if she were brought home. However, they refused to accept her proffered resignation. Kennedy felt she had been a victim of circumstances and he sympathised with her predicament. "I want you to know that we are most appreciative of your steadfastness in recent days," he wrote in a personal note to Miss Michelmore, "we are strongly behind you and hope that you will continue to serve in the Peace Corps." Shriver did not panic; he was not intimidated by sensational headlines. Miss Michelmore came back to Washington and worked in the Division of Volunteer Support. "I regret very much my part in the unfortunate affair at Ibadan," she wrote to President Kennedy, "I hope that the embarrassment it caused the country and the Peace Corps effort will be neither serious nor lasting." Miss Michelmore need not have been over-worried.

Five weeks after the postcard incident, a second contingent of Volunteers arrived in Nigeria to be greeted warmly by Prime Minister Abubakar Balewa.

However, the more fickle American magazines pounced on the story. Their attitude was more patronising than ruthlessly critical, but nevertheless, they made much of the dropped postcard. "From the moment of its inception, despite laudable aims, the Peace Corps was bound to run into trouble," commented Time. U.S. News and World Report condemned the naivété of the entire concept and claimed, "this is only the first big storm." Newsweek said the Michelmore episode would damage "the whole idea of young Americans aiding less privileged peoples." Associated Press reported the protest was "communist-inspired" and that thousands of Nigerians had taken part. President
Eisenhower fuelled the furore by adding that there was now "postcard evidence" of the worthlessness of Kennedy's ideas. 14

The serious press attempted to place the misadventure in a more reasoned perspective. "The problem involved," noted a sensible editorial in Commonweal, "is really bigger than the Peace Corps, for it reflects the gap that exists between the wealthy U.S. and most of the rest of the world. Given this fact, incidents like the postcard affair are bound to happen. Peace Corps officials did the right thing by refusing to panic." The New York Times pointed out that only 150 to 200 students had joined in the demonstration, not thousands. The New Republic made it clear the protest was not "communist-inspired" but merely an indication of sensitive African nationalism. 15 James Weschler of the New York Post made a plea for common sense:

"Nothing in the card was sinister. It contained the instinctive expression of horror of an affluent American girl in her first direct encounter with the gruesome squalor of Nigeria (which might have been East Harlem). She was neither patronising nor self-righteous in her comment; yet, whoever found the lost card managed to stage a big production. Like many other people, the Nigerians need and want help; but they do not like to be told how desperate is their need. The demagogues in their midst swiftly exploited the incident." 15

Tai Solarin of the Lagos Daily Times agreed with Weschler, "if Michelmore was out to ridicule the country, she would be intelligent enough to protect her stings with an envelope...not a single Nigerian who knew this part of Nigeria would suggest that she was sending home a made-up story. 17 However, the Nigerian press was generally kinder to the Peace Corps than the sensation-seeking popular magazines in America which exploited and ridiculed the episode. "Why," asked James Weschler, "is there so much desire to burlesque the Peace Corps?" The answer lay in the popular press's superficial view of the new agency.
Yet, to an extent, the "dropped postcard" proved fortunate for the Peace Corps. Its first mishap - whatever it had been - would have attracted a disproportionate amount of publicity. Certainly, the "faux pas" was embarrassing and was treated as a genuine "crisis" by Peace Corps officials; yet, that it was of such a relatively mild nature was a blessing in disguise. "Something more serious could have done us in," recalled Warren Wiggins. In later years, there were much more sensational incidents - female Volunteers were raped, Volunteers stood trial, one Volunteer was even eaten by a crocodile - but the media paid little attention. To the press and the public the Peace Corps' first tragedy was its greatest - a dropped postcard.

Thus, the new agency survived its ordeal before the public. "We took on the anti-bodies," said Warren Wiggins, "and we overcame them."

After Margery Michelmore's blunder, the American media viewed the Peace Corps with an almost totally uncensorious eye. "From the front porches of the U.S.", said Time in July, 1963, "the view of the Peace Corps is just beautiful." Volunteers were seen as "a battalion of cheery, crew-cut kids who hopped off their drugstore stools and hurried out around the world to wage peace." To the popular press the Peace Corps was virtuous and wholesome. It would show the Third World that America was "a loving country" said Vogue. "Goodbye to the 'Ugly American'", proclaimed Parade magazine. U.S. News And World Report described how Volunteers would explain to natives that "the U.S. is determined to build a peaceful world and that Americans oppose any government that tries to make war and spread tyranny." Indeed, the Peace Corps was credited as a new instrument of American foreign policy. Broadcaster Howard K. Smith told his television audience that Peace Corps was "America's answer to Moscow's possession of local Communist cadres in all emergent countries." Comparing the Cold War to a football game,
Newsweek called the Peace Corps America's "freshman team." Certainly the press supported the Peace Corps, but only in a shallow, usually lighthearted fashion. Articles were not balanced or well-researched. Emphasis was on adventure and hardship. In the Philippines — probably one of the least effective programmes — Volunteers were reported "living in mud huts among the natives, teaching in the schools and travelling freely among the people."

Time praised one Volunteer who walked eight miles every day to and from the school where he taught; another was reputed to be living in a hut along with goats and snakes. One female Volunteer in Chile was said to have "revolutionised" her community by giving local women the recipe for apple pie! A typical story, headlined "Peace Corps Life Is Rugged", appeared in the Baltimore Sun in May, 1962:

"Wading hip-deep in swamps with hippos snorting behind a curtain of tall grass, riding the river in a dugout canoe, palavering with tribal chiefs at sunset after a long day on Safari, sleeping under thatch-roof shelters, getting up in the morning to find a crowd of natives wanting to join the hike because there is safety in numbers in elephant country. Such is the rugged outdoor life that enlistment in the Peace Corps has brought."

The American press approved of the Peace Corps, but preferred its romantic, quaint and amusing aspects to the mundane but realistic. There were tales of great works performed. In Pakistan, Volunteers invented a new machine to par-boil newly harvested rice; in Colombia a loom was invented to weave bamboo. St. Lucia's wanted to learn "the Twist" but, as Time noted, "the Volunteers did not know how to twist and ended up by learning instead an island dance called Sangantine."

A Volunteer geologist became an honorary blood-brother of the nomadic Wagogo tribe because he had saved the life of a pregnant tribeswoman by rushing her in his jeep to a hospital thirty miles away. In the Punjab a young Volunteer's achievement was that he persuaded his Indian counterpart to take down the hammer and sickle emblem which he had placed on top of the chicken coop they were building. In a
nightclub in Accra, two Volunteers "proudly won" second place in a Ghanaian High Life Dance Contest. Another Volunteer in Bangkok "Thai-boxed" a native and held him to a draw. There were reports on romance and marriage in the Peace Corps, lush descriptions of evenings in the Andes and banner headlines such as "Colombia's Peasants Love Peace Corps."21

Sometimes the exotic and bizarre stories printed by the American press caused great embarrassment overseas. In a letter to friends back home, a Volunteer in Ethiopia described the national dish "Injera-watt" as, "a terrifying assault on one's innards by tomatoes, peppers, eggs, chicken, sheep's intestines and a murky sponge-rubber-like bread." He then added whimsically, "and maybe a few, fat pussycats."

Four months later, a letter from Peace Corps/Washington informed him that an Associated Press article entitled "Peace Corps Diet: Fat Pussy Cats", had appeared in nearly two hundred newspapers across America. After a few months, a front-page headline in the Voice of Ethiopia read, "Peace Corps Volunteer Says Ethiopians Eat 'Fat Pussy Cats'."

A furiously indignant editorial accused the Peace Corps of telling "Damned Bad Lies" and concluded, "the infected eye must be plucked out."

Fortunately, Rep Harris Wofford was able to pacify native officials and persuade them of the trivial nature of the entire affair. The Ethiopians accepted his apology and a nasty incident was averted. The Volunteer - completely dumbfounded to find himself at the centre of the furore - was allowed to remain in service. However, by its thoughtless distortion of a Volunteer's innocent observations, the American press had placed the Peace Corps in a compromising situation.22

Only on very rare occasions were the Peace Corps' real problems mentioned by the press. In March, 1963, the New York Times hinted that all was not well with the Jamaican programme. In the same month U.S. News and World Report heard "whispers" that young Volunteers were
"running wild" in Venezuela. In a cover story in July, 1963, Time reported on some minor "Poul-ups" overseas; Newsweek carried a story on a Volunteer in Ghana who lived in luxury and spent his weekends "surfing and sun-bathing in the company of a most delightful blonde."

In the Washington Star, journalist Eric Severeid prefaced a critical article entitled "Pure Intentions Backed By Pure Publicity" by saying he was well aware that, in the current atmosphere of euphoric reverence, "an expressed doubt about the Peace Corps will receive the same treatment as a doubt expressed about virginity." All the same, he was highly sceptical of the "jazzed up publicity that surrounded the birth and recruitment of the original Peace Corps, the romanticising of their missions, the lionising of individuals in the glossy magazines."

Severeid and the critics were a tiny minority. By 1963, even the Republican press endorsed the Peace Corps. "They have won the envy and the enmity of the communists, and the admiration and affection of forty-six countries," said the New York Herald Tribune. The Los Angeles Times praised the Peace Corps as the most effective U.S. agency operating overseas. Of course, the more liberal newspapers were eulogistic. "What is amazing is that the adverse incidents have been so few," exclaimed the Washington Post, "indeed only the famous affair of the postcard is worth mentioning at all." In an editorial congratulating the Peace Corps on reaching its "Second Birthday", the New York Times stated: "Now and then, some new agency of government clicks from the start - mark this one down with a plus sign."

The foreign press followed suit. Indeed, by the summer of 1963, even the normally restrained London Times commended the Peace Corps thus: "Many of their stories could have come straight from "The Ugly American" in which the hero revolutionises the irrigation methods of Asian peasants by showing them how to make an irrigation pump."
However, in an article in the Manchester Guardian, Alec Dickson — founder of the British Voluntary Services Overseas — warned Peace Corps administrators of the dangers of being lulled into a false sense of security by glossy success stories. He suggested success did not necessarily lie in spectacular individual achievements and that failure often came "in the apparently placid projects where Volunteers may feel themselves completely superfluous." The American press was in no mood for Dickson's informed analysis of the realities of Volunteer existence. Indeed, by 1963, even the New York Times had succumbed to the glamorised image of "ruddy-cheeked youths and idealistic oldsters." Volunteers were described as living in hovels, digging with picks and shovels, and working in leper colonies. Their only complaint was that Peace Corps life was not tough enough. This was the Volunteers' image in the press; a simplistic stereotype. The American public was never told that most Volunteers were teachers, most lived in big cities in relative comfort, most suffered periods of extreme frustration. Instead, the New York Times informed them:

"Female Volunteers have learned to grind meal for flour, to launder clothes by stomping on them in a bathtub, to fashion curtains out of feed sacks, to live alone in outposts two days from civilisation and to contend with daily visits from snakes and lizards. Male Volunteers have created crude furnishings out of boxes, made mattresses from car tyres, and prepared pickles on a hot-plate. Too commonplace to be included in reports home is the fact that most shiver through winters, sweat through summers and exist without adequate heating, cooling and plumbing facilities."  

To some extent, the stereotype was fostered by Sargent Shriver and his staff. From the beginning, they sensed there would be intense public interest in the Peace Corps and they decided to make the most of it. "This is the kind of program that is best run in a goldfish bowl," Al Sims (then Chief of the University Division) advised Shriver in March, 1961, "I believe public participation should be invited from the beginning and at each step of the way. This is the way to provide an outlet for mounting interest, the basis for continuing support and a
much needed new formula for public involvement. To inspire and harness public enthusiasm, Shriver established the Office of Public Affairs. Led by Bill Moyers, it kept up a constant stream of brochures and documentaries to the general public and handled the recruitment function. Shriver also set up a Division of Public Information which produced stories and news releases on the Peace Corps and dealt directly with the press and media. In a memorandum to President Kennedy, Shriver spoke of a "planned campaign to dramatise as widely as possible" the advantages of the Peace Corps.

The Advertising Council (a non-profit voluntary organisation established by American advertising agencies) adopted the Peace Corps as a public service programme; this meant millions of dollars worth of free advertising. The New York advertising agency, Young and Rubicam, advised the Peace Corps on how to plan and execute a media campaign. By 1963, it was at the top of the public advertising list. At the same time, the Division of Public Information formed an excellent rapport with the press. Articles appeared in almost every kind of magazine and newspaper, from national sellers like the New York Times and Time to small-town rural dailies. All types of trade papers for engineers, doctors, miners, teachers and farmers carried stories on the Peace Corps. In August, 1962, Shriver informed President Kennedy that between three and four hundred editorials, articles and special features on the Peace Corps appeared in the national press each week. Ed Bayley, first Chief of the Division of Public Information, estimated that 98 per cent of all newspaper stories and 80 per cent of editorials were favourable to the Peace Corps:

"Publicity regarding all aspects of the Peace Corps has been lavish. Almost no phase of our operation has been considered too small for public notice, and only one or two of the 50 releases issued by my office has failed to produce news stories ....Most of the reporters with whom we deal, both in Washington and elsewhere, are sympathetic to the idea of the Peace Corps and anxious to help it along."
Shriver was particularly pleased to tell the President that, the black press, though sceptical at first, "has now generally endorsed the Peace Corps."\textsuperscript{30}

The Peace Corps' public relations exercises were slick, professional and effective. Shriver sent letters to thousands of newspapers and magazines asking for their support, offering them Peace Corps stories, and so forth. Television cameras were invited into training camps. Volunteers appeared as guests on \textit{What's My Line}. Celebrities' visits to training sites or programmes overseas made national headlines, like Senator Edward Kennedy's trip to Puerto Rico in 1962.\textsuperscript{31} Of course, the President's association with the Peace Corps was well-publicised - meeting Volunteers in the Rose Garden or congratulating them on their return. Sometimes Kennedy wrote personal letters to journalists or broadcasters who had been particularly kind to the Peace Corps. In April, 1962, he wrote to Stephen Riddleberger, President of the American Broadcasting Company: "I want to thank you for the significant help the ABC-owned radio and television stations have been to the Peace Corps...I think this is an example of public service at its best."\textsuperscript{32}

There were several former journalists within the Peace Corps: Bayley, Haddad, Moyers, Kiker, even Shriver had been a "stringer" for \textit{Time} in the 1930's and an assistant editor of \textit{Newsweek} in the 1940's. This allowed the Peace Corps informal as well as formal ties to the media. For example, Peter Braestrup, a journalist with the \textit{New York Times}, was very friendly with Bill Haddad (Chief of Special Projects). At propitious moments - at the time of the battle for independence, on the Peace Corps' anniversary and so forth - very positive articles tended to appear on the front page of the \textit{New York Times}; they were usually
As Ed Bayley noted, "We have a considerable number of former reporters among our staff members - this has made hay for us on many occasions and saved our necks on others." Peace Corps officials, with their experience and knowledge of the newspaper world, knew exactly how to "sell" a story.

In a memorandum of August 4, 1961, Bayley confirmed that many Peace Corps stories were "planted." "We have been told to steer the direction of news," said Bayley to Richard McGuire of P.D.O., "and to take part in policy decisions within the organisation which affect the public image of the Peace Corps." Referring to the informal links with the media, Bayley reckoned, "Most of our best work has been done on the telephone and in conversation with reporters." He concluded it would be possible, "if done deftly, to subvert the press by playing up to its prejudices, its traditions and its own values." Since the media seemed to "value" glamorous - albeit superficial - news, that was what the Division of Public Information sought to provide. Little attempt was made to explain the complexity of Volunteer life or the frustration and failure which often accompanied success. Instead, Peace Corps releases stressed one "magnificent" accomplishment after another. A few officials attempted to quell this penchant for self-congratulation. Reviewing the Peace Corps' Annual Report for 1963, Bill Josephson complained there was far too much emphasis on the glib "Jack-the-Giant-Killer" type of success. He noted that a few Congressmen and almost all Volunteers already felt the Peace Corps "brags too much about itself." He called for a more modest tone in Peace Corps releases to the press: "Let us say what we have done and let that speak for itself." However, most staff members worried that if the Peace Corps became too candid and admitted too many weaknesses, then the public might become confused and even turn against the idea. As Doug Kiker, appointed Chief of Public Information in 1962, explained: "We are neither in the business of publicizing our mistakes nor of hiding them. Our obligation is to
state what the Peace Corps is doing simply and authoritatively... and without raising an unnecessary ruckus by the failure to explain properly or emphasising those parts of our operation which are matters of delicacy. When asked, it is necessary to respond; it is not necessary to raise issues ourselves." Kiker argued that if "enough goofs" became known in the press, the Peace Corps would soon be out of business.  

Sargent Shriver played a central role in the creation of the Peace Corps' public image. Indeed, Shriver himself became the epitome of that image. He was young, handsome and athletic, always well-groomed and highly photogenic. The press soon built up a picture of a superbly cool but enterprising executive: to save money, he travelled "tourist-class", to save time, he took "cat-naps" on the floor during long plane journeys. Of course, when he went abroad he never carried a tuxedo. After a visit to Africa he appeared before a Congressional committee still suffering from amoebic dysentery. Sleepless nights, pre-dawn telegrams and constant action were associated with the Director of the Peace Corps. "He never stops," said the New York Times, "even in his pajamas." Look magazine described him as "A combination of Billy Graham and Tom Dooley - with a dash of advertising salesman thrown in."

The press nicknamed Shriver "Mr. Clean." Even the Republican-minded New York Herald Tribune conceded, "this seems to have been one case in which a little nepotism was good for the country." Shriver took considerable care to ensure that he and the Peace Corps were always seen in the best light. In March, 1961, he gave Ed Byley the following instructions:

"In connection with all releases... I believe we should play up the fact that I was President of the Chicago Board of Education, a businessman, and have been active in interracial matters. Overseas, the brother-in-law relationship is probably very important to emphasise, but domestically, at least, let's focus on the educational, civil rights and business background."
Hundreds of articles appeared under Shriver's name, he became a regular guest of television and radio interviewers and, by July, 1963, he had even made the cover of *Time* magazine. In many ways, Shriver was the ideal public relations man — ever ready with an amusing anecdote, sophisticated under pressure and invariably congenial. "Sarge was never much of an administrator," said Ed Bayley, referring to Shriver's somewhat idiosyncratic style of management, "but it wasn't an administrator that was needed at the outset, it was a person like Sarge who was a promotions man really."

Enthusiastically, but not ingenuously, Shriver promoted the good name of the Peace Corps. He suggested to staff — in Washington and overseas — that they should be willing "at all times, to respond to newspapermen's requests for information (and) provide them with Peace Corps stories and literature." Shriver often sent notes of thanks to editors or journalists who had expressed confidence in the Peace Corps. At the same time, he reacted strongly to criticism. Through the pages of *Saturday Review*, he waged a literary battle with journalists Eric Sevareid and George Sokolsky. In January, 1962, he rebuked a television show for mistaking I.V.S. workers in Vietnam for Peace Corps Volunteers. He also chastised the editor of the *Washington Star* for printing an "inaccurate" story that government officials in India had complained about the inexperience of Volunteers assigned there. Shriver was in Colombia when he read about Eisenhower's criticism of the Peace Corps as a "juvenile experiment"; he immediately sent a copy of the report to President Kennedy. "Articles like this which greeted us upon our arrival in Bogota are creating great obstacles to acceptance of the Peace Corps in Latin America," he told the President. When the *David Brinkley Journal* television show featured a "Disenchanted Volunteer", Shriver explained to Kennedy that the Volunteer in question was completely atypical, "one of the weakest of all Volunteers... persistently troublesome
and a loud-mouth." Then, in a not unrevealing conclusion, he wrote, "It's incredible how the press, radio and T.V. can always ferret out this kind if they are around."\(^\text{45}\)

Shriver harboured a suspicion that the press were always looking to publicise something disparaging or seamy about the Peace Corps. After it was discovered a reporter had got a Volunteer drunk in order to get a story, Shriver told Bradley Patterson that sometimes he thought the American press was the Peace Corps' real "enemy".\(^\text{46}\) To some extent, Shriver was overprotective of Peace Corps operations. He clamped down on "leaks" to the press (from people like Bill Haddad) and he was prone to exaggerate the Peace Corps' achievements. He faced down reporters over the "dropped postcard" affair arguing, "it won't happen again, we've got some money in the bank now." He rarely admitted a mistake or a problem. "I sometimes say the Peace Corps is like a Volkswagen," he told a Meet The Press panel, "we continue to improve it all the time inside, but it remains just about the same externally."

Shriver presented the romantic image of the Peace Corps to the public. Occasionally verging on the trite, he depicted Volunteers as happy-go-lucky, all-American kids leading a physically tough but spiritually rewarding life in the boondocks. "The first law of the Volunteers", he wrote in National Geographic, "seems to be: the rougher it is, the better we like it." Volunteers disdainfully referred to this kind of hyperbole as "Shriver's hair-shirt stuff."\(^\text{47}\)

Indeed, between 1961 and 1963, almost every report coming out of the Evaluation Division was sure to contain some observations on the displeasure, or even bitterness, of Volunteers over the "phoney image" or the "fake glamour" projected by Peace Corps/Washington and the American press. Almost unanimously, Volunteers resented the stories of physical hardship, self-sacrifice and devotion to duty. "The American image of the typical Volunteer is pretty distorted," wrote Volunteer Chuck Cuminer in Senegal. "I guess the image depends
on whether you read the jokes in *Playboy*, the *New Yorker* or the *Saturday Evening Post* or the various editorials in the syndicated newspapers.48 Another angry Volunteer in Chile vowed that when he returned home "if there's one thing I'm going to do, it's destroy the Peace Corps' image."49 Volunteers rebelled against the bland newspaper reports about "mud huts", suffering and fighting communism in the out-back. Real hardship lay in adapting to subtle cultural differences and frustration. The American media preferred a sentimental image of the Volunteer as a "hero". Peace Corps/Washington did little to refute this. Indeed, as Volunteer Roger Landrum argued, "Public Affairs and Public Information are the furthest away from understanding the Volunteers' outlook....This is most obvious in the mud-hut and forces-of-light-marching-into-darkness picture."50 Volunteers bitterly attacked the image-making proclivities of Peace Corps/Washington. "I just wish they'd stop trying to make us something we're not," said a Volunteer in Brazil.51 Peace Corps publicity devoted a disproportionate amount of attention to community development because it provided more "exciting" news than teaching. Yet, most Volunteers were teachers and their quiet, unobtrusive efforts were often the most effective. Volunteers complained of the "Mickey Mouse tone" of publications like *The Volunteer* and *Peace Corps News*, printed by the Division of Public Information. A Volunteer in Tanganyika criticised *The Volunteer* for promoting an image of "American kids going around the world and putting their finger in the dyke."52 Volunteers were scathing of headlines such as "Sing Along With Volunteers in Ibadan", "One, Two, Three - Kick! Volunteer in Thai Boxing Match", and "West Indies Island Welcomes Geese Corps."53 Of course, Sargent Shriver was regarded as the biggest "P.R." culprit. Volunteers in Tanganyika recalled Shriver visiting them - photographers in tow - wanting "mud hut" pictures. In East Pakistan, Volunteers ridiculed a "rosy" article written by
It neglected to mention any problems but, as one Volunteer commented, "everybody over here knew better." One of Shriver's most oft-repeated anecdotes concerned a mob in the Dominican Republic who allegedly broke off from chanting "Yanquis go home" to explain to a Peace Corps Volunteer, "We want the Yanquis to go home, not you." However, Charles Peters discovered from Volunteers in the Dominican Republic that the episode had actually involved an American priest, not a Volunteer. Some Volunteers felt that no matter what difficulties he witnessed in the field, Shriver retained his own image of the Volunteer. Few doubted Shriver's personal sincerity and belief in that image, but most wished that "we could work without publicity, as missionaries have done for many years."

There was an element of truth in the popular image. Very few Volunteers lived in a "mud-hut" but equally, few had the usual comforts of their American homes. Relatively speaking, they did endure some hardship. Besides, some Volunteers - especially in Latin America - did genuinely live on the romantic edge of the Peace Corps. For instance, Volunteers in Chimbote, Peru, lived in houses made of woven straw mats; and, in Tanganyika, David Gelman described Volunteers "living rather like white hunters, operating out of a tent in the bush....walking through vast herds of zebra at sunrise with gentle winds bending the brown grass." The glamorous stories were not false, but they were representative of only one small aspect of Peace Corps service.

Nor was life in the Peace Corps all jolly camaraderie; there were internal jealousies and arguments. Indeed, Volunteers were often sceptical of the much-publicised "esprit de corps." For most Volunteers there was "no crashing of guns, no booming of heavy seas against our frail ship, no firm resolution in the face of death;
but instead, an English classroom, a hot African town and the relative pronoun 'who' and 'whom'.  Most lived much more comfortably than they had expected. "They like a cold drink and a good meal at the end of the day," wrote evaluator Richard Richter. "They like music and pleasant surroundings... This is the expressed attitude of many of the most committed Volunteers as well as the average or poor ones." There was nothing whatsoever wrong with this - except that it rendered the media's glib "mud-hut" image completely inappropriate.

"I'm sick and tired of reading stateside papers my parents send me which contain nothing but positive comments about the work of the Peace Corps," said one Volunteer in the Philippines. In Tanganyika another asked "What's all this 'suffering' jazz?" The press took the Peace Corps' smallest triumphs and blew them up out of all proportion; the slightest hint of tangible success was exaggerated. Volunteers, who quickly learned that any successes would most probably be intangible, were bound to feel resentful.

In an interesting footnote to a 1963 evaluation report on Tanganyika, David Gelman pointed out that the favourite magazine of all the Volunteers he interviewed was New Republic (although many had never heard of it until they got a free subscription through the Peace Corps). Gelman suggested this indicated their increasing awareness of the sham and excess of the popular American press which had given the American public an almost completely distorted image of the Peace Corps Volunteer. Yet, perhaps this was the image which the American public wanted.

In the early 1960's, the influence of Burdick and Lederer's Ugly American was pervasive. Basically, it had said Americans were not liked overseas. Reacting to this, Americans desperately wanted to believe that their country was capable of doing something good. They looked to the Peace Corps. In the process, they invested it with a degree of virtue,
idealism and piety which could never have been matched by the realities of the field; but, in a sense, Americans wanted something which would outstrip reality. Quite literally, they wanted it to be "fantastic". The image of American youths, dressed in T-shirts, Levi jeans and tennis sneakers, living in hovels and feeding African children, gave the public the psychic income they had craved. In August, 1963, a Harris poll showed that the Peace Corps was the third most popular act of the administration (behind Kennedy's general positions on "national security" and "Berlin"). A massive 75 per cent of all Americans approved of it. "We older, squarer citizens love our Peace Corps," wrote journalist Ira Mothner in Look magazine. "It is homey as a hound dog, healthy as vitamin D. And it's a success - because we just couldn't bear for it not to be. The Peace Corps is our dream for ourselves and we want the world to see us as we see the Volunteers - crew-cuts and ponytails, soda-fountain types, hardy and smart and noble."62

The press enhanced this image by printing only the specious, exceptional accounts of Peace Corps life. A Volunteer in a "mud-hut" made better copy than a teacher living quietly and comfortably in a big city. As evaluator Tim Adams put it, "much of the rosiness in our clippings is due to the sloth of the Washington press corps."63 Yet, "sloth" aside, American journalists found themselves in a somewhat compromising position. They had to write about an organisation involved in highly sophisticated, complex, socio-cultural issues. At the same time, they had to disseminate an impression of that organisation which would be readily understood by a public which had already made an emotional investment in its "good image". This made it almost impossible to write seriously about the Peace Corps. The problems and the more subtle aspects of Volunteer service were not usually suitable for mass consumption. Therefore, difficulties were not reported and the Peace Corps was not treated in a serious manner.
Harris Wofford outlined the press's conundrum: "If the American press had taken the Peace Corps seriously enough to report the failures and frustrations of the Volunteers instead of just the romantic success stories, the public might have been confused and the Peace Corps' image tarnished."\(^{64}\)

Of course, Volunteers felt exploited by all this "image-making." They accused Shriver and the Division of Public Information of demeaning Peace Corps service by supplying the American press with trivia. One particularly bitter Volunteer concluded:

"The Peace Corps wanted to expand because it was politically 'hot'...To expand, it would make the Kennedy administration look good. What the Peace Corps failed to do was look in at itself. It became a 'P.R.' operation. The line was to tell everyone at home that everything was rosy overseas. The line overseas was to tell the different countries the many things a Volunteer could do. In the process, they oversold the Volunteer abroad and oversold the American people on the idea of 'making friends for America'."\(^{65}\)

Bill Haddad admitted Shriver always had "one eye on the press."

Shriver himself described how he had sought to build a "Peace Corps mystique."\(^{66}\) In pursuit of a "good image", Peace Corps/Washington did oversimplify the role of a Volunteer. However, in 1961, the new agency had needed support from Congress and the public. To achieve this, it was necessary to have a basic, "concrete" image which would be generally identified and accepted. Therefore, Shriver believed in "human interest" stories and even "schmaltz", when necessary. He conceded that the glossy image expanded out of all proportion, but he had to satisfy the Peace Corps' domestic constituencies.\(^{67}\) The Volunteers never truly appreciated this; they jumped to the conclusion that Peace Corps/Washington simply did not understand the realities of field conditions. It was not quite that simple. Charles Peters recalled that there were some "inspired hustlers" who contributed to the "credibility gap" between what happened in the field and how it was reported back home; but he also
noted that the press and the public were "willing partners" in this exercise in self-delusion.68

By 1963, the Peace Corps had begun to openly publicise some of its weaknesses. Peace Corps press releases, Congressional presentations and articles written by staff members became much more balanced. "The Volunteers have many discouragements," noted The Volunteer in September, 1962, "success or failure is difficult to measure."69 In December, 1963, Shriver informed President Johnson that the Peace Corps' news releases were beginning to move towards "realism" with as much emphasis on frustration as achievement.70 However, Shriver also recalled that in 1963, when he offered an article entitled "Failures in the Peace Corps" to This Week magazine, the editor refused it. He told Shriver that his readers did not want to know about the Peace Corps' "mistakes".71

There was no question of the Peace Corps "covering up" its problems. Indeed, Shriver instituted the Evaluation Division to find out about difficulties in the field. The Division of Public Information never "killed" an unfavourable story. "We certainly didn't advertise our mistakes - no government agency does," recalled Chief of Information, Doug Kiker, "but nobody asked about them. If they had asked, we would have told them."72 The "sensational" stories were there to be written - the "numbers game", weak programmes in the Philippines, Brazil, East Pakistan, Volunteers' foibles and peccadilloes - but journalists were not interested in following up "leads" to disasters. There was a general feeling that the Peace Corps was new and idealistic and therefore it deserved a "honeymoon" period. More importantly, in the early 1960's there was no great zeal for the investigative journalism so characteristic of the American media after Vietnam and Watergate. In the Kennedy years, the nature of the press and public reading habits were basically simpler and more innocent than in later years. James Reston of
the New York Times, one of the more perceptive journalists of the postwar era, suggested that 1960 was the "perfect time" for the Peace Corps to be established. Quite simply, Americans wanted a "success story."73

The irony of this "success story" was that, to an extent, it was based on a distortion of what Peace Corps life was really like. The vast majority of Volunteers did not live in mud-huts and most had no intention of actively counteracting communism. Therefore, despite the overwhelmingly favourable impression which the Peace Corps made on the American public, not many people had any accurate perspective on what Volunteers were actually doing. They only read about dropped postcards, sultry days in exotic climates and other ephemera. Most Americans did not ponder long on the Volunteers' painstaking efforts to break down often imperceptible cross-cultural barriers. Instead, the Peace Corps was regarded as something quaint, inoffensive and wholesome. As Warren Wiggins joked, "in most people's minds we were right beside Smokey the Bear."74

In general, the American press and public had a much too simplistic view of the Peace Corps. Encouraged by Sargent Shriver and Peace Corps/Washington, an image was projected of the heroic Volunteer enduring physical hardship in the Third World for the sake of democracy and freedom. Volunteers bitterly resented this stereotype. A compromise was never really struck between the un-heroic but nevertheless admirable and burdened Volunteer. The media avoided complex or unfavourable reports. Straightforward "success stories" made better news and, since the American public regarded the Peace Corps as an embodiment of their personal ideals, there was no great market for investigative "exposes." From the Peace Corps administration's point of view, its public relations were excellent. Within two
years, the new agency had won the support of Congress, the nation
and millions of people all over the world. It was a momentous
achievement in the field of public communications. Although,
whether a truly accurate message was communicated is another
question. As Harris Wofford noted, in the American mind, the
Peace Corps remained "somewhere between the Boy Scouts and
motherhood."
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE PEACE CORPS AND POLITICS
"The Peace Corps is not an instrument of foreign policy because to make it so would rob it of its contribution to foreign policy.

- DEAN RUSK -

(Remarks To The Peace Corps National Advisory Council, May 22, 1961)
As the Peace Corps began in 1961, the Cold War was still very real to both the United States foreign policy establishment and the American public. The Soviet Union was seen as the embodiment of the international communist menace, with Red China looming forebodingly in the background. In Moscow, on January 5, 1961, Nikita Khruschev, the Soviet Premier, predicted a communist world victory would be achieved through wars of national liberation, with the Third World the main battleground. This belligerent speech confirmed John Kennedy and America's belief that communism continued on the offensive. During his State of the Union address on January 30, 1961 - in which he announced the formation of a "National Peace Corps" - Kennedy told the nation he was convinced that the struggle between communism and democracy would reach its climax in the 1960's:

"I speak today in an hour of national peril..... Before my term has ended, we shall have to test anew whether a nation organised and governed such as ours can endure. The outcome is by no means certain....Each day the crises multiply. Each day their solution grows more difficult. Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger".

Given this intense atmosphere, it would have been impossible for any foreign policy initiative not to have Cold War implications. The Peace Corps was no exception. Launched in the spring of 1961, it coincided with America's biggest-ever armaments budget and the Bay of Pigs invasion. Yet, Sargent Shriver was always insistent that the Peace Corps should not be thought of, or used, as a means of achieving the short-range political aims of the United States. In a
memorandum of September, 1961, entitled "The Shape Of The Peace Corps Program," Shriver emphasised that the Peace Corps would not just go to countries deemed politically favourable to the United States. Moreover, the Peace Corps would avoid states ruled by small, militaristic elites unresponsive to the will and needs of the majority; it would also avoid countries where massive financial and military assistance had served only to identify the United States with an unpopular ruling circle. At the same time, Shriver was realistic about the Peace Corps' position vis-à-vis American foreign policy: "We cannot shut our eyes to the realities of world conditions. The Peace Corps is a part of the United States foreign policy effort even though it has a special role and separate identity. We must be conscious at all times of the contribution the Peace Corps can make to that effort. The effect and quality of the contribution depends upon its uniqueness". This was the paradox at the heart of the Peace Corps. It had no direct political aims; indeed, most Peace Corpsmen - staff and Volunteers - saw themselves as distinctly apolitical. Yet, they were employees of the U.S. government and as such had responsibilities and obligations to it. Besides, foreign observers were bound to see Volunteers as representatives of American foreign policy in its broadest sense. The Peace Corps could not escape the times into which it was born; it was involved in the Cold War - whether it wanted to be or not.
Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas viewed the Peace Corps as a new weapon in America's Cold War arsenal - "a daring stroke in the ideological contest between Western democracy and the socialist doctrines for the allegiance of the post-colonial world". Likewise, historian Charles J. Wetzel wrote that the Peace Corps was a direct "product of American anti-communist foreign policy". Certainly, the anti-communist argument was used by early proponents of the Peace Corps idea. Indeed, Congress's original study of the Peace Corps in 1960, had been authorised under the terms of the Mutual Security Act which sought to "maintain the security of the United States and the free world from communistic aggression and thereby maintain peace". Moreover, Hubert Humphrey told his colleagues in the Senate, "This program is to be a part of the total foreign policy of the United States...to combat the virus of Communist totalitarianism". Humphrey gave the specific example of Soviet "incursions" into Guinea and how America could compete by sending in teachers of English.

Many congressmen were convinced that the Peace Corps would help the United States win the Cold War. Senator Randolph (D., W.Va.) urged the prompt passage of S. 2000 because it would combat "atheistic communism" in the Third World. "A dire threat to the Communists in the developing nations" was how Senator Pell (D., R.I.) described the Peace Corps. Congressman Landrum (D., Ga.) predicted the new agency would become America's "most effective weapon" against the Soviets.

John Kennedy's public espousal of the Peace Corps at the Cow Palace in November, 1960, was also tinged with Cold War
rhetoric. He spoke of Russian geologists, electrical engineers, architects, farmers and fishermen working in Ghana and "Castro-type or Communist exploitation" in Brazil:

"The Lenin Institute for Political Warfare exports each year hundreds of agents to disrupt free institutions in the uncommitted world. A friend of mine visiting the Soviet Union last year met a young Russian couple studying Swahili and African customs at the Moscow Institute of Languages. They were not language teachers - he was a sanitation engineer and she was a nurse. And they were being prepared to live among African nations as missionaries for communism. Already Asia has more of these Soviet than American technicians - and Africa may by this time. Russian diplomats are the first to arrive, the first to offer aid, the only ones represented by key officials at diplomatic receptions. They know the country, they speak the language - and in Guinea, Ghana, Laos, and all over the globe, they are working fast and effectively. Missiles and arms cannot stop them - neither can American dollars."

It was in this context that Kennedy called for skilled and dedicated Americans to counter the Soviets - "If I am elected, I ask you to help me find those Americans". Newsweek called the Peace Corps "America's latest weapon in the Cold War" and Reporter magazine compared it directly to the Soviet Union's Institute of Africa (which trained Russians in the languages and customs of developing countries). David Halberstam also inferred that the pervasive sense of competition with the Soviets - over politics, economics and ideas - was an important factor in persuading "bright young men off the Eastern campuses" to join the Peace Corps in 1961.

Certainly, the Peace Corps was not impervious to America's obsessive Cold War complex. No government agency -
especially one that was new and rather "liberal" - could be. To win the support of Congress, the press and the public, it was necessary for Sargent Shriver to imply that the Peace Corps would make a contribution to the anti-communist cause. "Either we do these jobs or the Communists will," Shriver told an audience at Indiana. "The Communists are offering a totalitarian system, we must demonstrate and help the developing peoples of the world to show that democratic methods are ultimately the most successful way to solve their problems." Shriver never over-emphasised the point, but in public speeches and during congressional hearings, he often referred to the Peace Corps as "a new American export, one that the Soviets can't match; the Russians can export everything except people." When Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) asked if the Peace Corps would go to communist countries like Cuba, Shriver replied that no relationship would be established with any country which did not have formal diplomatic ties with the United States.

Yet, despite these public concessions to the realities of American foreign policy, Shriver strove to safeguard the Peace Corps from becoming a mere diplomatic or propaganda venture. Indeed, in the Report To The President of February, 1961, he asked Kennedy to take steps to ensure that the Peace Corps would not be seen as an attempt to export surplus American political zeal:

"In a message to the Heads of State of all member governments of the United Nations or to the United Nations itself you could explain the purpose and policy of the Peace Corps and suggest that every nation should consider the formation of its own Peace Corps. You could propose that
the United Nations sponsor the idea and form an international coordinating committee for all Peace Corps work underway. You could express your hope that Peace Corps projects will be truly international and that our citizens will find themselves working alongside citizens of the host country and also volunteers from other lands. You could offer to supply U.S. Peace Corps personnel as technical helpers in development projects of the U.N. and other international organisations. 

In this way, Shriver hoped to show that the Peace Corps was not advanced as an "arm of the Cold War", but rather as a contribution to the world community and a genuine experiment in international understanding. During a staff meeting in December, 1961, Shriver again stressed that Volunteers were not to be regarded as instruments or agents of American Cold War policies:

"They were not expected to represent official American views on current affairs; they are not 'instructed'; they are, of course, to be prudent. They are rather free men and free women, the products of a free society, sent abroad to serve and to do their assigned work with such dedication and such skills that their hosts will, by this example, be brought to reflect on the nature of the society that produced them," 12

Shriver pleaded with President Kennedy not to send military "civic action" teams - like the Special Forces - into the Third World to carry out peaceful projects such as digging roads and building bridges. He was concerned that native peoples would be confused by military units doing "Peace Corps-type" work. "This could kill the Peace Corps," he warned the President. Besides, he argued, "past experience shows that large numbers of U.S. armed forces, stationed abroad, tends to accelerate a general militar-
ization of less developed countries...which is something we should prevent, not encourage. The whole rigmarole of huge P.X.'s, big automobiles, and special privilege has done the U.S.A. little or any good. Let's not add additional millions for civic action undertaken or supervised by soldiers rather than civilians. Shriver had no hesitation in sending the Peace Corps to "neutralist" states like Ghana, Guinea, Pakistan and Indonesia, although they did not always support U.S. policies. "The fact that a country might vary back and forth from friendly to not-so-friendly, should not mean we move the Peace Corps in and out like an accordion," he told a Meet The Press panel, "We are not there for political purposes."

Shriver emphasised this point to Third World leaders. For example, the mercurial but highly influential President of Guinea, Sekou Toure, was reputed to have set his country on a communist course. However, in offering the Peace Corps to Toure, Shriver told him the United States recognised that each country had to choose the political system most suited to its needs. Shriver explained there were no political strings attached to the Peace Corps. It was not concerned whether there were "one, two or four Communists in the Government or outside it," but only with, "the desire of the people of Guinea for a better society and a higher standard of living." Indeed, Shriver claimed he would send the Peace Corps to Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union so long as Volunteers could be guaranteed freedom of speech, travel and association. Obviously, the Soviets would first
have to request the Peace Corps, but this never transpired. Interim Policy Directive 2.1., Subsection 2, "Relationship to U.S. Foreign Policy," attempted to define the Peace Corps' role in this difficult sphere: "A project must not be inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy. However, in order to make the maximum contribution to the foreign policy effort, a project should maintain the unique role and separate identity of the Peace Corps." 17

Of course, the Peace Corps' claim to a "separate identity" did not preclude all political calculations. In an early memorandum to his senior staff, Shriver ordered that special efforts should be made to establish Peace Corps programmes in countries where the United States "has not yet succeeded in making a significant social, economic or political impression." 18 Shriver's main motivation was not to win over "neutralist" countries for the United States; although, he was not totally unaware of the political advantages to be gained from making a favourable impact on non-aligned Third World nations. Rather, he knew that if the Peace Corps was to win credibility as a force of change, it would have to prove its worth not only in already friendly, pro-Western states, but also in the turbulent, uncommitted ones. In order to gain prestige in America and the world, the Peace Corps had to court disinterested or suspicious governments as well as those which traditionally requested American aid programmes. Accordingly, on September 18, 1961, Warren Wiggins outlined "high-priority countries" in terms of socio-economic needs and American policy in the developing world.
In Africa, Wiggins placed most importance on Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Mali, and Senegal. In the Far East, Indonesia and the Pacific Trust Territories were said to be of particular value. Indonesia had "a tremendous development potential," wrote Wiggins, "and its size, location, and leadership make it a key to much of the Far East." The Trust Territories, in which Wiggins envisaged an education programme, were "of high priority in terms of American foreign policy as a result of their status as one of the last U.N. trusteeships. All American activity there will be closely scrutinised by the rest of the world". Wiggins also argued that the proposed programme for Japan would be of vital concern to both the United States and the Peace Corps:

"To a great extent, that country will determine the future of America in Asia, and the proposed English teaching project can be expected to have a widespread and favorable influence upon our image there. In addition, the fact that such a relatively advanced country would accept a Peace Corps project on its merits would do much toward enhancing the prestige of the Peace Corps in other countries at a relatively high stage of development, who might be suspicious of the motives or the utility of the Peace Corps."

The entire Latin American region was given high priority, with Argentina especially singled out as "significant for political reasons"; Mexico's unique relationship with the United States was also stressed. In the Near East and South Asia, Wiggins suggested that Iran, Afghanistan and Nepal had a "a political importance resulting from their geographic locations."

He also mentioned "local political considerations" in Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Finally, he
included Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic because of their "particular political priority." Wiggins noted that Yugoslavia might open the door to an eventual Peace Corps presence in Soviet bloc countries; and, if programmes could be established in the United Arab Republic, he felt, "we may expect to find the possibility of participation in other Arab countries, which have so far been unenthusiastic about the Peace Corps."

Wiggins's programming decisions were by no means based solely on political circumstances; social and economic need, as well as an indigenous desire to have the Peace Corps, were always more important. Indeed, because of the latter, the Peace Corps never entered Japan, Argentina, Mexico, Yugoslavia or the United Arab Republic. Nevertheless, that they were given "high priority" in the early days, indicated that the Peace Corps was not immune to political considerations. Since the Cold War often spilled over into the Third World, the Peace Corps could not afford to be entirely indifferent to its inevitable repercussions.

Evaluators sometimes noted that the Peace Corps was not always completely non-political in its programme choices. Dee Jacobs seriously questioned whether the Peace Corps should be in Uruguay. The country had advanced social welfare programmes, educational levels were high and half the population lived in sophisticated, cosmopolitan Montevideo. "Certainly it is not an underdeveloped nation," wrote Jacobs. Yet, the Peace Corps began making overtures to the Uruguayan government in 1961; eventually, it accepted eighteen Volunteers...
in 1963. Jacobs suggested that the government's "neutral-to-mildly-hostile stance" towards America was an important element behind the Peace Corps' eagerness to begin a programme there:

"The Peace Corps has a vital role to play in the U.S.'s effort to combat strong Communist pressures in Uruguay. Ambassador Coerr says he feels the Volunteers are already fulfilling 'a political purpose.' He says the United States 'needs their presence' especially in the northern and western areas where the Communists and far-leftists are concentrating attention on the rural sugar workers. He maintains the presence and activities of the Volunteers definitely weaken the leftist, anti-American and anti-democratic stand." 20

Indonesia was another politically lucrative country where the host government was courted by Shriver and the Peace Corps. "At the top, we more begged than were begged to come to Indonesia," reported evaluator John Griffin. "The fact that we are there is more a tribute to our persistence and patience and to political considerations than to any sudden recognition of our potential value." Peace Corps teachers in Ceylon found themselves superfluous in a country with one of the highest literacy rates in Asia, a large class of trained intellectuals and nearly one thousand unemployed native teachers. Evaluator Arthur Dudden could only conclude that the Volunteers were there for reasons of political prestige. "U.S. - Ceylon relationships on the matter of the Volunteers' presence," he noted, "seem to be a mixture of package deals, coercion and reluctant acceptance on the part of the host country." 21
In Guinea, the Peace Corps soon became aware of the presence of some twelve hundred Soviet and Chinese teachers and technicians. Evaluator Philip Cook felt this direct competition provided "an especially appealing challenge.... if we can continue to recruit, train and find proper assignments for the right categories of Volunteers in Guinea, the Peace Corps may succeed in upstaging the Chinese and Bloc technicians now working there." The Russians were also making persistent efforts to penetrate Togo; indeed, the Peace Corps contingent and the American diplomatic staff combined, did not total the numerical strength of the Soviet embassy in Lome. Yet, again Philip Cook was pleased to report that the Peace Corps was making a "substantial impact" in communist strongholds. In Ghana - one of the most volatile of the non-aligned states - evaluator Richard Richter described how the arrival of 98 Russian teachers had "spiced up" the Volunteers' experience:

"There is a Volunteer in almost every school where there is a Russian teacher. In fact, the volunteer without a Russian pet feels cheated. The presence of the Russians, while perhaps somewhat distressing politically, can be viewed favorably in just about every other respect. It adds unusual dimension in the Volunteers' experience and gives us an opportunity to influence some Russians."

In a not unrevealing conclusion, Richter acknowledged that the Peace Corps was fully aware of its political implications. "So far," he reckoned in 1964, "we have outshone our cold War antagonists both in and out of the classroom." 22

Of course, while the Volunteers were aware of the element
of competition between themselves and their Russian counterparts in the field, they never engaged in narrow, anti-Soviet activities. For example, in Ghana the natives tended to be disparaging about "those Russians" who did not speak Twi and always appeared diffident. Yet, as Richard Richter happily reported, Volunteers intelligently avoided any comments that would lead to tension. "They (the Russians) know who we are and they're the Russian equivalent of the Peace Corps," said one Volunteer. "Last year one of them was convinced we were spies. Later we used to joke about this with him".23

Indeed, the Volunteers usually enjoyed cordial relations with their Russian colleagues and there was often a good deal of professional - and sometimes, non-professional - fraternisation. In Guinea, sick Volunteers were occasionally attended by Bloc doctors. In Ghana, Volunteers invited Russians to dinner, went out for drinks and played sports together. One Volunteer was supposedly friendlier with a Soviet teacher than any of the other four Volunteers in his town. Moreover, in some cases of Peace Corps-Soviet amity, there were signs of incipient romance. Richter lightheartedly described the scene at a Ghanaian Ministry of Education party when Volunteers and Russian teachers had been thrown together:

"One male Volunteer, spotting a fair-haired lovely across the crowded room, asked a Russian official if he might have permission to date the girl. The official very emphatically said the girl was free to do as she wished. The implication was clear: why should anyone suppose that Russia would want to keep a tight rein on the actions of their bright young teachers? It is somewhat disappointing to report that our hero never did date the lass, but he did find another Russian girl teaching in his school."
Peace Corps Rep, Frank Broderick allegedly had a recurring nightmare about a Volunteer and a Russian falling in love and wanting to marry. The Cold War notwithstanding, Richter concluded, "The possibility is not remote." 24

These less serious diversions aside, Sargent Shriver was very conscious of the potential political power of the Peace Corps. Like most Americans in the early 1960's, he was imbued with the Cold War spirit. In June, 1961, he told President Kennedy, "The impression we (the Peace Corps) could make on the neutralist nations could be profound," 25 Shriver met and spoke with more of the great Third World leaders than Kennedy himself - Nehru, Nkrumah, Selassie, Toure, Sukarno, Betancourt, Tubman, Nyerere, Ayub Khan and many more. He had the unprecedented opportunity to impress these men at a personal level as well as make an impact upon their countries with the Peace Corps. "Countries and leaders all over the world, give every appearance of expecting and wanting something new in the policies and attitudes of this new administration," he advised Kennedy. "They will be disappointed if all they get is the same old treatment," 26 After meeting Sekou Toure, Shriver reported to Kennedy that he was convinced the Peace Corps could help steer Guinea and other strategically-positioned states away from Moscow's influence:

"Here we have an opportunity to move a country from an apparently clear Bloc orientation to a position of neutrality or even one of orientation to the West. This is the first such opportunity I know of in the underdeveloped world. The consequences of success in terms of our relations with countries like Mali or Ghana, or even Iraq or the United Arab Republic could be very good indeed." 27
Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas claimed that Shriver was intrigued by the idea of placing large numbers of Volunteers on the faculties of Latin American universities to "counteract the revolutionary appeal of Castroism among students." While in Latin America in September, 1961, Shriver informed Kennedy that the "leading Commie in Colombia" had just returned from Moscow along with 280 Colombian students whom the Russians had taken for a three-month educational trip. "Therefore," wrote Shriver, "to make a real dent in the Colombian situation, we should plan on 500 Volunteers." He proposed that Volunteers should be assigned to at least half of the twelve thousand small towns in Colombia. "What's more," he concluded, "they should have been there for the last ten years." Shriver was always pleased to report that the Peace Corps had gained a little ground for the United States in its fight against Communism. In March, 1963, he told Kennedy that in the Cuzco province of Peru, communists had infiltrated all the campesinos except one; the pocket of resistance was a village where Volunteers had set up a medical clinic and were working in home economics, irrigation and public health. While visiting Volunteers in the Philippines in 1962, Shriver relayed his obvious delight (in a personal letter to his wife, Eunice) that he had been invited to Jakarta to discuss with President Sukarno the possibility of a Peace Corps programme in Indonesia. "Sukarno has been very pro-Soviet," he wrote, "and this is the first time since Jack has been President that Sukarno has invited any operating agency of the U.S." 29 However, although Shriver greatly appreciated the Peace
Corps' political benefits, these were secondary to the aims of supplying trained manpower and establishing people-to-people contact. No project was set up for purely political purposes. Even in Uruguay, where, as Dee Jacobs noted, "the political overtones weigh heavier than usual," the Peace Corps' primary objective was to improve the country's economic situation through working with the agricultural sector.

Shriver categorically denied that Volunteers were assigned to Latin America to combat Castro's influence. "We are not doing it for political reasons," he insisted; more simply, he explained that parts of Latin America were in dire need, a lot of young Americans wanted to help and a good many already spoke Spanish. Shriver argued that the Peace Corps could not be classed alongside standard foreign policy initiatives. After all, it went to "neutralist" states and it did not go where it was not invited - even if sometimes it had to beg an invitation. More convincingly perhaps - despite Shriver's response to Senator Church's earlier inquiry about diplomatic ties - the Peace Corps did go to countries which had broken off relations with the United States. In the Dominican Republic and Honduras in 1963 and in Panama in 1964, the Peace Corps remained in service despite military coups which had caused the breakdown of formal relationships with the American government. Indeed, the Congress legitimised such unusual behaviour by approving an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Proposed by senators Humphrey and Keating, the amendment authorised Peace Corps programmes to continue even in countries which nationalised or expropriated American property without compensation. If the Peace Corps
had been a mere political tool then such extraordinary license would have been most unlikely. Shriver explained the Peace Corps' essentially non-political philosophy:

"With the newly-developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, we must be clear about our aim... Peace Corps Volunteers are not on the front lines of the Cold War.... What we are seeking is not the support of these nations but their success. If they succeed in their plans for economic, social and political progress, it will not matter much whether they agree or disagree with us, even whether they like us. If they become healthy, democratic societies in their own right, they will not become threats to world peace." 32

The traditional foreign policy establishment took a similarly non-political view of the Peace Corps. Since it was a semi-autonomous agency, all the Peace Corps' programmes had to be cleared by the State Department. However, while Secretary of State Dean Rusk occasionally requested the Peace Corps to give priority status to some pivotal, non-aligned states - such as Ghana or Guinea - he agreed that the Peace Corps would best operate outside the framework of American foreign policy. The strength of Rusk's conviction on this subject was underscored by his spontaneous remarks before the first meeting of the Peace Corps National Advisory Council on May 22, 1961:

"The Peace Corps is not an instrument of foreign policy because to make it so would rob it of its contribution to foreign policy.... the Peace Corps is an opportunity for the nations of the world to learn what America is all about. This is one of the most important things our country can do in the world today. Outside of the shadows and struggles of the cold war, outside of the military rivalries which heighten dangers all over the world, outside of the constant sense of national advantage which pervades diplomacy,
if the Peace Corps can let other peoples find out what this country is all about, we shall be surprised to discover how many allies America has all over the world." \(^3\)  

Like Shriver, Rusk believed the Peace Corps would best serve American foreign policy by remaining distinctively separate from it. At the end of the day, he reckoned the United States would profit - in terms of political good-will - from the Peace Corps' altruistic initiatives. However, Rusk acknowledged, "any foreign policy benefits would simply be a by-product to be cherished but not an aim to be deliberately sought." \(^3\)4  

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to President Kennedy, did not recall the Peace Corps ever meriting formal discussion in the National Security Council. In retrospect, Harris Wofford suggested that the "Cold Warriors" in the White House did not consider the Peace Corps important enough to use as a weapon against communism - even if they had wanted to.\(^3\)5 However, on the extremely rare occasions when political pressure was exerted from the top, Sargent Shriver fought doggedly to preserve the Peace Corps' individuality. In 1962-3, the foreign policy establishment urged the Peace Corps to move into Algeria. The ostensible reason was to help with rural rehabilitation projects; but there was also a strong political motivation to maximise American presence in the newly-independent state led by the socialist Ahmed Ben Bella. Shriver persistently refused to send the Peace Corps where it was not invited. Irritated by this stubbornness, Harold Saunders and Robert Komer (two National
Security staff members asked McGeorge Bundy to make sure Shriver received "a gentle straightening out" on this matter. Saunders was sceptical of Shriver's argument that the Peace Corps was "independent of strategic concerns"; he pointed out that, as a foreign policy priority, Algeria outranked most other countries in which the Peace Corps was already working. "Shouldn't we quash this nonsense that the Peace Corps is independent of U.S. Policy interest?" asked Saunders. 36

In turn, Bundy tried to persuade Shriver to initiate a programme in Algeria. "I know you don't like to get into nasty international political considerations," Bundy wrote, "but nevertheless there are only two or three countries in Africa that are as important, and none more so for the long run". Bundy also suggested the Peace Corps' presence in Algeria would be "mildly irritating to some of those in Europe who are giving us most trouble at the moment" (an allusion to the French, from whom Algeria had gained independence in 1962 after a bitter war). "But fooling aside," he concluded, "the real point is that Ben Bella is impressed with the Peace Corps, with you, and with the President. And a little help here might butter a lot of parsnips." 37

Despite Bundy's eloquent plea, Shriver remained unmoved by what he considered to be an attempt to use the Peace Corps as a political instrument. "I really see very little evidence of the Algerian government's interest in having a Peace Corps project," he told G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. "If the government were really interested, I believe that we would have had a
specific request by now. Ben Bella's ambassador is free to come and see me here in Washington at any time." Needless to say, the Peace Corps did not go to Algeria. Nor did Shriver bend to President Johnson's request in 1964 to send Volunteers into Vietnam. Indeed, he infuriated Johnson by insisting that the Peace Corps would never go to countries where the United States was actively waging war. 39

However, in general, American foreign-policy makers let the Peace Corps go its own way. Any political gains were seen in terms of promoting a good "image" for the United States in the underdeveloped world. In this respect, Lucius D. Battle, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, described the Peace Corps as "superbly successful." Likewise, Assistant Secretary of State, George McGee told Shriver in 1962, "It becomes increasingly obvious that the work the Peace Corps is doing in many countries is playing a decisive part in fostering good-will for the U.S. among the peoples of those countries." Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, George Ball, went even further when he told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "I and the top group in the State Department are extremely well pleased with the experience which we have had so far with the Peace Corps." Ball concluded, "We probably are getting more for our money in the Peace Corps than in almost anything we are doing.... the publicity they get, the image that they create, all these intangibles." 40

President Kennedy had no illusions about what a few thousand young Americans could achieve overseas - either in
socio-economic or political terms. When Sargent Shriver was asked whether Kennedy had considered the Peace Corps one of his larger political successes, his answer was quite candid: "He never said anything like that to me and I never suggested it to him." Kennedy rarely intervened directly in Peace Corps matters. Occasionally he made a suggestion to Shriver or asked a question. For example, in August, 1962, he hinted that the Peace Corps should "keep in mind the importance of Latin America, which I think should be a primary area." When he asked in June, 1961, why there were no Volunteers going to the Ivory Coast — a newly independent and politically important state in West Africa — Shriver replied matter-of-factly: "I have looked into this matter and find that Houphouet-Boigny (the President) has made no overtures to us requesting the Peace Corps."

Kennedy's first concern was with the educational impact the Peace Corps might have on Americans and Third World peoples. He was determined to break down the tremendously insular outlook characteristic of most Americans in the early 1960's. "The Peace Corps Volunteers will learn far more than they will teach," predicted Kennedy, "and we will therefore have another link which binds us to the world around us." He also knew that in the eyes of many underdeveloped countries, the United States appeared as a "harsh, narrow-minded, militaristic, materialistic society." Kennedy was particularly worried that students, "the future leaders of these countries," had never seen any of the "cultural" aspects of America. "There may be only a thousand Volunteers scattered thinly around through millions of people," he said, "but they
give us a chance to call attention to this side of our life which is extremely important and which is so frequently ignored.⁴³

Kennedy also hoped the Peace Corps would touch the traditional American idealistic spirit. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Special Assistant to the President, remembered Kennedy remarking almost wistfully about Cuba, "Each weekend 10,000 teachers go into the countryside to run a campaign against illiteracy. A great communal effort like this is attractive to people who wish to serve their country."⁴⁴ Kennedy saw the Peace Corps as a means of tapping a comparable fund of idealism which he believed was present in Americans. Time and again, he stressed that this physical representation of American altruism was the most valuable and enduring advantage of the Peace Corps:

"The Peace Corps, it seems to me, gives us an opportunity to emphasise a very different part of our American character, and that which has really been the motivation for American foreign policy, or much of it, since Woodrow Wilson, and that is the idealistic sense of purpose which I think motivates us, which is very important and a real part of American character, and has motivated a good deal of our international policy in the private church groups, in the aid groups, and all the others. It is a part of American character and purpose and policy which is submerged frequently by the press, by political speeches, by the political dialogue that goes on in this country. But the great efforts which have been made by American missionaries in so many parts of the world, the AID programs and all the rest, have their roots not only in the national self-interest of the United States, but also in this quality. The Peace Corps it seems to me, gives this particular side of American life a channel for expression and also gives us a chance to express it overseas."⁴⁵
At the same time, John Kennedy was a vigorous proponent of the Cold War. His Cow Palace address on the Peace Corps made it clear that his brand of idealism was utterly pragmatic. Indeed, "an idealist without illusions," was how he liked to describe himself. When it came to resisting communist subversion, Kennedy claimed, "you cannot separate guns from roads and schools." He often spoke of halting the communist advance by developing agriculture, industry and educational resources in the Third World. To this extent, his view of the Peace Corps was influenced by his staunch anti-communism. Kennedy maintained that every American had a duty to participate in the Cold War Volunteers were no exception:

"Two thousand years ago, the proudest boast was to say, 'I am a citizen of Rome.' Today, I believe, in 1962, the proudest boast is to say, 'I am a citizen of the United States'... the United States is the great and chief guardian of freedom, all the way in a great half circle from the American soldier guarding the Brandenburg Gate to the Americans now in Vietnam, or the Peace Corps men in Colombia... at a time of climax in the struggle for freedom."  

Kennedy was convinced communism was making insidious inroads into the developing nations, "every day, without fanfare in thousands of villages and markets... and in the classroom." In this global struggle, he felt America was entitled to use all the means at her disposal - including counter-revolution and counter-insurgency - to compete for the hearts and minds of native peoples. At a military level, he introduced the Special Forces (of "green beret" fame). Their instructions were to combat communism: with constructive civic action programmes where possible, with torture and destruction where necessary. In this context, the Peace Corps might have been interpreted as a more genial and definitively unmilitary expression of Kennedy's counter-insurgency philosophy.

Yet, although he considered the Peace Corps to have a part to play in the fight against communism, Kennedy's perspective was never one-
dimensional. He instinctively sympathised with the decolonised countries struggling for survival. In an address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, he said: "My nation was once a colony, and we know what colonialism means; the exploitation and subjugation of the weak by the powerful, of the many by the few, of the governed who have given no consent to be governed, whatever their continent, their class and their color." Kennedy treated the new Third World leaders with the utmost respect and he welcomed them to Washington. "My country intends to be a participant and not merely an observer, in the peaceful, expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals," he informed them. "That continuing tide of self-determination which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support." The Peace Corps, headed by his brother-in-law, was a striking manifestation of that support. "There can be no better evidence of our good will," he told the Peace Corps National Advisory Council, "than days of honest work in behalf of our neighbours."

In another way, the Peace Corps helped Kennedy fulfill his desire to place a more informal, adventurous emphasis on American diplomatic initiatives. "(He) wanted to replace protocol-minded, striped-pants officials by reform-minded missionaries of democracy," wrote Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Kennedy instructed this new breed to make people-to-people contact, speak native languages, eat the same food and participate in the community life of the uneducated and the needy. "Peace Corps Volunteers will give a fresh, personal meaning to our diplomacy," said Kennedy, "by building human relations." Also, that the Peace Corps was assigned to non-aligned states spoke volumes for Kennedy's stance in favour of "neutralism" and pluralistic political systems. Indeed, rather than defeating communism, Kennedy suggested the Peace Corps' greater contribution would be to help realize his dream of a "world of diversity." In the long run, he did not regard the Peace Corps as an instrument of political power. Rather, Kennedy felt its value to his foreign policy was that it stood as a symbol of the moral impulse of America. "That the Peace Corps is a vivid and obvious demonstration
of this side of American life," he said, "is of great material help to the foreign policy of the United States, and therefore to the peace of the world."\(^{53}\)

Kennedy also emphasised that the Peace Corps sought to "encourage the responsibility of local people and not to repress but to respect the individual characteristics and traditions of the local culture."\(^{54}\)

However, one of the major charges levelled against the Peace Corps by contemporary critics and revisionist historians was that it functioned as an arm of American imperialism - economic, cultural and political. In his Marxist critique, *The Peace Corps And Pax Americana*, Marshall Windmiller (an academic who taught "World Affairs" courses to Peace Corps trainees at San Francisco State College) claimed that Volunteers acted as "advance men" for American capitalism. By establishing friendly relations, Windmiller surmised that the Peace Corps made Third World peoples amenable to American business promotions. "The more I examine the Peace Corps," he wrote, "the more it seems that its essential role is this kind of public relations work in behalf of American power and influence in the developing world." Sargent Shriver deemed this interpretation ridiculous.\(^{55}\) The Peace Corps had no ties whatsoever to big business and there is no evidence that it helped create an economic climate favourable to American enterprise. The Peace Corps went to some of the most poverty-stricken countries in the world where people did not have enough money to buy basic food let alone American products. Indeed, many Volunteers worked in the remote out-back where natives were not likely to be influenced by advertising campaigns and Western sales techniques. Moreover, the predominant aim of the Peace Corps was not to persuade Third World peoples to buy American goods, or any other goods. On the contrary, the Peace Corps aimed to encourage natives to be self-sufficient and to produce for themselves what their communities needed. In this light, a Marxist analysis of the Peace Corps is not convincing.

Windmiller also charged that the Peace Corps' major function was "to assist in the expansion of American cultural values to develop
pro-American, English speaking elites, and to make America's role in world affairs more palatable." Comparing the Peace Corps to the nineteenth-century British colonial civil service, he argued that it impinged Western education, arts and morals on Third World peoples with the express aim of keeping a firm grip on their political sympathies.56 A British critic, Henry Fairlie, agreed that Kennedy sent the youth of America to "the outposts of the empire, to exercise the right to the moral leadership of the planet," Fairlie claimed the Peace Corps fostered the idea that empire-building was an "exciting moral adventure, good for the character." More flippantly than Windmiller, he compared the Peace Corps to the British Outward Bound movement as "a school for the youth of the United States as it turned outward bound on its course in the world."57 Although these analogies were somewhat extreme, there was a hint of cultural imperialism about the Peace Corps in the Kennedy years. Endemic to that era was the idea that the export of American values and traditions per se, would be of inestimable benefit to the rest of the world. "Much more than most," noted Larry Fuchs, Peace Corps Rep in the Philippines, "Volunteers believed in America's historic mission to spread the value of freedom of choice...they agreed with President Kennedy that it is 'the American people who should be marching at the head of the worldwide revolution'."58

Certainly, many congressmen felt American answers - partially provided by the Peace Corps - would solve Third World problems. Senator Saltonstall (R., Mass.) saw Volunteers as "missionaries for the American way of life," and Congressman Durno (R., Ore.) claimed the Peace Corps' major task was to "export Americanism." Likewise Congressman Libonati (D., Ill.) praised the Peace Corps for giving "the backward nations a sense of understanding as to our American ideologies." Perhaps the Peace Corps' role in imparting American values and customs was most forcefully explained by Senator Frank
"What could be more magnificent than sending well-prepared and useful Americans to other lands to help teach and train them there for a better life?...acquainting the people of other countries, and particularly of the underdeveloped countries, in which freedom is new and raw, of the basic concepts of America through contact with our most effective apostles, our American youth...we must make them understand that the fruits of self-government are far superior to those of an authoritarian state, and we must make them realise that, in choosing the direction they will take, it will be wisest and most rewarding to walk in the ways of freedom."59

To Peace Corps administrators, the aim of cross-cultural exchange was always of primary importance; but sometimes they tended to over-emphasise the "American" element of the programme. In a speech reminiscent of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (one of the "imperialists of 1898"), Warren Wiggins proclaimed in 1963: "America must go abroad. It is our only hope. If we in America...don't go abroad, we will find our once rich, easy, healthy and educated society distorted, disfigured, and ultimately overwhelmed by world forces. We will either lead or be led."60

However, for the most part, the Peace Corps assiduously sought to avoid association with any form of cultural imperialism. In his Report to the President, Sargent Shriver had stressed that the Peace Corps would contribute to America's education in other cultures. "This must be a truly international and mutual venture," he told Kennedy, "Our aim must be to learn as much as we teach."61 Shriver's background in the Civil Rights movement made him acutely conscious of the need to overcome white America's attitude of cultural superiority. "There are some things we do not want in the Peace Corps," he wrote in March, 1961. "We do not want to send people abroad who think they are carrying the 'White man's burden' to civilise the rest of the world in their image." Emphasising that the Peace Corps would not tolerate discrimination - racial or cultural - Shriver stated: "A Volunteer must be committed
to the ideal of equal rights for all men and he must be willing to put these ideas into practice by working and living on equal terms with all peoples of all races." 62

Inevitably, some individual Volunteers were guilty of acting in a self-righteous, supercilious manner. Besides, in some of the more sensitive of the developing nations, the slightest non-native act - like eating tinned food - could be regarded as a form of cultural imperialism. However, for most Volunteers, their overseas experience led to an awareness and a serious questioning of their own customs and beliefs. In effect, the Peace Corps took young Americans away from American values. Puzzled by the different mores of a mysterious culture, Volunteers were often forced to ask themselves whether they had any right to attempt to change it. One Volunteer in East Pakistan described the problem:

"If you're going to do the job right, it often means being insubordinate. But by being insubordinate you can be accused of cultural imperialism because you're trying to change the system towards something that seems obviously right to you, but may seem only 'American' to them. On the other hand, if you just fit yourself into their way of doing things, you feel guilty because you don't think you're contributing much to them or to the Peace Corps. So you end up doing a little of each." 63

The Peace Corps originated in a culture which placed greater importance on social responsibility, efficiency and material well-being than the cultures of the emerging nations. To varying degrees, Volunteers were bound to reflect these values overseas. This left them open to the charge of cultural imperialism. Yet, as Charles Peters argued, "The cultures of the world are so far along the road to getting mixed up with one another that the relevant question is not should this happen, but how can we help the best values win out...The point is that there are different ways that our culture and our hosts' are superior to one another and our aim should be to see that the exchange we encourage is of the best elements in each." 64

Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas accused the Peace Corps'
community development programmes of tampering with another society's
community dynamics. "Community development epitomized the Peace Corps
at the height of its imagined power to remake the world," they wrote. 65
Sargent Shriver and Frank Mankiewicz totally disagreed. They argued that
since there was a huge mass of people in the underdeveloped countries
in dire need, it was legitimate to help them in any way possible. Of
course, this assistance sometimes triggered off or influenced changes
in native attitudes. However, Mankiewicz stressed there was absolutely
no coercion involved in community development. The host peoples' views
on what were their "felt needs" always held priority over the Peace
Corps'. Besides, the ultimate objective of community development was to
help people help themselves and thereby increase their sense of dignity
and independence - the opposite of cultural imperialism. When the
natives of Vicos in Peru asked the Peace Corps to leave their community
in 1964, Mankiewicz claimed a great victory. He believed the Volunteers
had helped inspire the natives to take democratic action on their own
initiative and he was genuinely ecstatic:

"They threw the Peace Corps out - lock, stock and barrel. They
got together and had a vote - out! All the 'gringos.' People
who took a short range view thought that the Vicos vote was a
great defeat for the Peace Corps. I think it was a great
triumpb for community development. Where else in Latin
America will the native population vote out, vote out
'gringos'?' 66

Another persistent criticism of the Peace Corps was that it served
as an instrument of American political imperialism. In the United
Nations Economic and Social Council in 1961, the Soviets made much of the
Cold War context in which Kennedy had proposed the Peace Corps and they
constantly attacked this "army of ill-prepared youngsters engaging in
nefarious activities in far-off places." 67 In later years, Lowther and
Lucas claimed Kennedy's Peace Corps was representative of an up-dated
version of "manifest destiny." Sam Brown, Director of ACTION (the
Federal umbrella agency in which the Peace Corps was placed in the 1970's provoked deep rancour when he said, "The missionary zeal that gave us the Peace Corps is not so far from the zeal that gave us the Vietnam war." In the most extreme interpretation, Marshall Windmiller cited the Peace Corps as part of America's attempt to "police the world to protect its interests and to establish a sort of Pax Americana over the Third World... The Peace Corps (made) Pax Americana seem legitimate and benevolent... It was counter-insurgency in a velvet glove."68

The confluence of idealism and self-interest in foreign policy has been a perennial American conundrum. By tradition, Americans have always believed it self-evident that other countries would benefit from the application of their democratic form of government. Yet, although the Peace Corps exhibited an element of this messianic spirit, it was never aimed at interfering with the internal political systems of Third World nations. Indeed, Sargent Shriver took very careful steps to ensure that, despite the inevitable accusations of imperialism, the Peace Corps would remain free of any narrow political interest. In a letter of June, 1961, to Walt Rostow (Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) Shriver defended the Peace Corps against the charge that it was forcing itself on the Third World. Shriver explained that if people had the impression thousands of young Americans were about to invade the developing countries then "they did not get it from anything the Peace Corps or the President has said. From the beginning, we have emphasised that Peace Corps operations this year would be pilot and experimental." Giving specific examples of the Third World's interest in the Peace Corps, Shriver told Rostow that the first Volunteers were going to Ghana and Tanganyika because both countries had invited them. Nkrumah called the Peace Corps "a bold, splendid idea," said Shriver, and Nyerere expressed his "strong support for the Peace Corps!" Stressing that the Peace Corps did not wish to become involved in foreign policy manoeuvres, Shriver concluded that he was determined
In a telegram to Dean Rusk in July, 1961, Ambassador Greene in Nigeria emphasised there would be "no question of Nigeria's sovereign rights as an independent nation being infringed" by the Peace Corps. Nigerian government officials were consulted at "all stages of negotiations," they decided where Volunteers were needed and they ensured that the "full employment" of native peoples would not be endangered. Greene assured Rusk that the Peace Corps venture was a "general partnership between the two governments." 

In some countries, the Peace Corps "invited the invitation" to begin a programme, but this was mainly because Third World leaders had no idea what the new agency was or how it could help solve their development needs. There was no question of political force being exerted. While explaining how the Peace Corps functioned to Sekou Toure of Guinea, Shriver made it clear:

"The Peace Corps would go only where needed and wanted; it would be imposed on no one. If it was not wanted, the United States' feelings would not be hurt. The objective of the Peace Corps would be to provide skilled men and women to work with the people under the direction of their government...Volunteers would not be diplomatic personnel. They would be responsible for their work, to the people of Guinea and to their Government." 

Sensitive to the fears of newly-independent states, "Shriver declared that the Peace Corps was "not a part of any new colonialism, imperialism or attempt at Americanization." Service to the host nation was the principle on which all Peace Corps programmes were based. "Our activity
is not imperialism" wrote Charles Peters, "because the purpose is to strengthen not America, but our host countries." 73

The Peace Corps' community development projects ran the highest risk of becoming involved in internal politics. Frank Mankiewicz's claim that the Peace Corps was a "revolutionary force" was subject to much misinterpretation. First and foremost, community development aimed at social reorganisation - informing people of their democratic rights and encouraging them to take the necessary action to secure them. On occasion, this had political consequences; for instance, the shake-up of the privileged aristocracy in various regions of Latin America. However, the principal role of the Volunteer was not in leading a revolt against the mayor or the alcalde, but rather to advise and teach about the means available for community action. Unavoidably, some political apple-carts were overthrown in the process. "Our job," wrote Mankiewicz, "is to give them an awareness of where the tools are to enable them to assert their political power. By that I don't mean register them to vote, obviously - we don't mean to say that the way to a better life is through the Christian Democratic Party or the Socialist Party or the Conservative Party or whatever it may be. When I talk about political power I am talking about the ability to be noticed and to be taken into account." 74

Volunteers were strictly forbidden to engage in any kind of political proselytising or subversive activity overseas. The Peace Corps was meticulous in its avoidance of the slightest involvement in local political or military affairs. For example, when evaluator Richard Richter discovered that a political science course taught by Volunteers in an Ethiopian university was being taken by native military and diplomatic personnel, he recommended it should be
immediately discontinued. "We must avoid any association with the 
things of war," he wrote.\textsuperscript{75} Moreover, in an unequivocal statement in 
June, 1963, Shriver reiterated that the Peace Corps had no truck with 
imperialism of any kind:

"The Peace Corps Volunteer goes to a foreign country to 
work within the country's system; he helps fill their 
needs as they see them; he speaks their language; he 
lives in the way they live and under their laws; he 
does not try to change their religion; he does not 
seek to make a profit from conducting business in 
their country; he does not interfere in their 
religious, political or military affairs."\textsuperscript{76}

Of course, despite its high intentions the Peace Corps could not 
avoid all political difficulties overseas. Indeed, part of the 
problem stemmed from political innocence. Young Americans came 
from a political environment based on consensus. Fundamental views 
on property, social structure, language, foreign policy and so forth 
could usually be taken for granted and election issues generally 
devolved safely upon questions of degree, detail and personality. 
By contrast, Third World nations were seething cauldrons of sharply 
defined political antagonisms. Nothing or nobody was without 
political significance. However, since Peace Corps/Washington 
intended Volunteers to be "above politics", training programmes often
did not go into any great detail on local political conditions. Therefore, it came as something of a shock to Volunteers when they arrived overseas and found they had to contend with tension-filled situations arising from indigenous political conflicts. For instance, Peace Corps teachers in Ceylon discovered that all educational matters were the subject of intense political debate.

"The newspapers are filled by controversies over teachers politicking or being victimised by politicians," reported evaluator Arthur Dudden, "Banishments to rural areas are political punishments meted out to teachers and school administrators alike. Promotions and better assignments are more likely to come from interfering M.P.'s than from within the educational system." To the Volunteers' astonishment they discovered that, despite their non-political stance, they became the subject of a ministerial and parliamentary controversy. As evaluator John Griffin noted, most Volunteers tended to see themselves as "some sort of free souls armed with a mission to teach and tied to the U.S. only by financial support." To their chagrin, they soon realised that Peace Corps life was not that simple.

Peace Corps officials hoped that Volunteers would circumvent the fixities of Cold War armaments, diplomacy and foreign aid. Yet, once overseas, Volunteers could not help but be affected by tensions created by a country's Cold War, anti-colonial or non-aligned position. Volunteers were seen by the Third World as part of a larger mechanism - American foreign policy and its world-wide interests. In some countries Volunteers were welcomed as prestigious tokens of the government's friendly relationship with the United States. In Nyasaland (which was to become the independent Malawi in 1964), evaluator Richard Elwell reported that "Politically, the project has been a smash." The timely arrival of the Peace Corps in 1963 gave a dramatic boost to Dr. Banda's hopes for nationhood. He pointed to the Volunteers
as proof that an independent Malawi could get assistance outside the sphere of the British Colonial Office. On the other hand, President Kaunda refused to invite Volunteers to Zambia because he feared they would be taken as a sign that he had committed himself in the East-West struggle. Revealingly, he did accept British V.S.O. workers.

The Cold War presented the Peace Corps with its most serious problems. Since the Third World was the effective battleground between East and West, Volunteers often found themselves being treated as political symbols or issues by their hosts. The Tanganyikan government sometimes criticised the Peace Corps because it wanted to make an anti-American statement which would appease the Soviets and ensure that aid would continue to flow from East as well as West. Likewise, in Indonesia, the Peace Corps was attacked by the local communist party not because it was unpopular or inefficient but because it was American and thus by implication, "imperialist." Evaluator John Griffin predicted that, such were the Cold War pressures being brought to bear on Sukarno, "We may even get kicked out of here for reasons unrelated to our efforts." This in fact happened in 1964.

Afghanistan, with its government intent on playing the U.S.S.R off against America, was another country where the Peace Corps found itself in a delicate political position. Certainly, it was not looked upon quite as suspiciously as the official U.S. Mission. Evaluator Thorburn Reid noted, "Nobody yet has accused us of having engineered the recent change in government - which by and large is looked on as a further shift West." All the same, Volunteers were subjected to very close scrutiny. There was a highly developed grapevine system in Kabul which meant that nearly everyone knew who the Volunteers were. For instance, as a Volunteer was cycling to
work, he was astounded to overhear one of a group of lounging camel
drivers on a street corner remark to another, "Oh, he's one of the
Americans teaching here now." A policeman was assigned to each
street where Volunteers lived - presumably to see and report on all
Peace Corps activities. "One slip," said evaluator Thorburn Reid,
"and the Peace Corps may be through in Afghanistan."81

In Pakistan, America's provision of military assistance to
neighbouring enemy India in 1962, led to Foreign Minister Bhutto's
decision to move the government towards China and the Soviet Union.
Despite Pakistan's almost total dependence on U.S. economic and
military aid, by 1963 America was regarded as a major foe. The
Peace Corps was caught in this Cold War cross-fire. In 1961,
Pakistan had requested over a thousand Volunteers; two years
later, the number had dropped to a handful. The Volunteers already
there were labelled "spies". They were watched carefully, their
mail was intercepted, read, and crudely resealed. Pakistani suspicion
was strengthened by the innocent but ill-advised curiosity of a few
Volunteers during the communal strife between Moslems and Hindus in
1963. Two Volunteers in East Pakistan left their posts to look into
rumours of communal fighting near the Indian border. Shortly after
their return from this reconnaissance trip, they were abruptly trans­
ferred by the provincial government. For a time, all Volunteer
nurses were forbidden to go to India on leave - the Pakistanis feared
that they would inform enemies (Indian or American) about the wholesale
slaughter of Hindus which was taking place in and around Dacca. As
tension reached fever pitch, one Volunteer's house was burned down.
The local police implied it had been serving as a weapons arsenal -
although there was absolutely no evidence to substantiate this.
When evaluator Timothy Adams visited the Volunteers in 1964, his
report back to Washington was bleak:
"Pakistan, perhaps the most difficult country for the Peace Corps even when the political winds were blowing sweetly, is now in a period of increasing hostility with the United States. The future looks gloomy both for U.S.-Pakistan relations and for the Peace Corps in Pakistan. We have entered what one Volunteer aptly called the 'Era of Active Non-Cooperation' and it can be felt at many levels of the government, from President Ayub Khan down to the Sub-Divisional officers, principals, hospital administrators, and other supervisors for whom our men and women work...55 per cent of our troubles are attributable to the mutual disenchantment between Pakistan and the U.S....The more frost there is in the air, the less Volunteers are able to do. The less they are able to do, the less they try to do. And the less they try to do, the more we are blamed for poor performance. It is a knot that gets tighter and tighter." 82

Ghana was another country where the Cold War atmosphere was intense. Kwame Nkrumah was intent on straddling the fence between East and West. He viewed his importation of Russian teachers and technical experts to match the Peace Corps Volunteers as a brilliant ideological coup. However, his brushes with the United States over issues such as the Congo, Portuguese Africa and South Africa made him appear to Americans as being Bloc-oriented. Certainly, Nkrumah was suspicious of the United States. He was convinced that the C.I.A. had assassinated Patrice Lumumba, leader of the Congo, in 1961. (Interestingly, he also blamed the C.I.A. for the death of President Kennedy in 1963). Evaluator Richard Richter warned that if there was a serious altercation between Nkrumah and the American government then "he may need a scapegoat, and he may have to turn on the Peace Corps." For the Volunteer in Ghana, perseverance meant shrugging off the question, "You’re not a spy, are you?" Native students attending the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute were told to beware of "neo-colonialist nations" (Nkrumah’s euphemism for America and Britain) because their real purpose was to gather information. Volunteers were regularly vilified in the local, daily newspapers. "The chances for any improvement in the political climate are exceedingly slim," reported Richard Richter in 1964. His warning was underscored by the comment of the American ambassador in Ghana, William Mahoney, that "there should be no more than two hundred Volunteers in Ghana because any more than that would make the Peace Corps
Flash-points in the Cold War provided Peace Corpsmen with some of their most uncomfortable moments. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962, Volunteers all over Latin America were taunted as "imperialists" by students who had been listening to the latest developments over Radio Havana. When a Peace Corps staff member visited Ayacucho, Peru, at the height of the crisis, a mob gathered outside his hotel chanting "Peace Corps, War Corps," and, "Cuba, Yes! Yanquis, No!" Of course, a few Volunteers were zealots who believed - like a couple of characters in Honduras - that "After all, we're down here to beat communism aren't we?" Evaluator Richard Elwell dismissed these misguided youths as "knuckleheads,"

Most Volunteers resented being included in the dialogue of the Cold War. "We're not here to plant the flag and give democracy a hard sell," protested one Volunteer in Tanganyika. Yet, despite the beneficial work which they performed, Volunteers were often associated with the United States and its backing of anti-communist but reactionary and highly unpopular governments. In some countries, Volunteers became much more radical in reaction to militaristic; repressive regimes which had the official blessing of the United States. Iran was an outstanding example. "Some of us feel we are in an ambiguous position because we are not convinced that our government is pursuing a morally justified policy," a Volunteer told evaluator Charles Caldwell. "The U.S. government supports the Shah, yet most of the teachers and doctors I work with are very dissatisfied with the Shah's policies." The Soviet Union's powerful local radio station exploited this situation and tied the Peace Corps to America's sanction of the Shah.

Not all the Peace Corps' political difficulties were linked to the Cold War. For instance, in Arab lands - because of the highly emotional climate surrounding all initiatives by the American or any other non-Moslem government - the Peace Corps was involved in politics from the very
Jewish Volunteers, in particular, encountered deep hostility. In Africa, residual colonial influences presented political problems when Volunteers were confronted by resentful British and French expatriates. Also, the newly-independent nations were extremely sensitive to the slightest lack of political tact. For instance, two bemused Volunteers in Tanganyika found themselves arrested for leaning against a fence during the playing of the national anthem. Throughout Latin America, local communist parties and revolutionary groups generally slowed up the Peace Corps' progress. In Guatemala, Sargent Shriver tried to overcome communist hostility by persuading the self-exiled guerrilla Leader, Arevalo, to endorse the Peace Corps. Had Arevalo's confidence been gained, it would certainly have put a different connotation on Frank Mankiewicz's claim that the Peace Corps was a "revolutionary force".

The Peace Corps also had some minor problems with American political agencies overseas. In Ecuador, the U.S. Embassy gave Volunteers stacks of anti-Castro leaflets to distribute before Sargent Shriver put a stop to it. American diplomatic officials in Guinea tried unsuccessfully to elicit information from Volunteers on local politico-economic situations. In the only recorded case of attempted C.I.A. infiltration, there were some uneasy days in Thailand when a Volunteer was sounded out by an agent for military intelligence. However, Peace Corps Rep Glenn Ferguson immediately sent a cable to Shriver and no further approaches were made.

Inevitably, several individual Volunteers were guilty of political indiscretion. One young man in Ceylon was sent home for actively participating in a local election campaign. When a female Volunteer in a Latin American country became romantically involved with the Leader of a local political faction, an enemy group attacked the Peace Corps. The girl's service was terminated. In Ethiopia, a few Volunteers became sympathetic to Eritrean separatism and engaged in criticism of the official church and government. In the Philippines, Eugene Burdick
and William Lederer noticed that some Volunteers, shocked and frustrated at the injustice prevalent in a society dominated by the land-owning aristocracy, were in danger of falling under the influence of professional Marxist organisers. Of course, sometimes Volunteers had no choice but to play active parts in political imbroglios. At one time or another, a few Volunteers in Tanganyika, North Borneo and the Dominican Republic were taken prisoner by local rebel gangs - although all were later freed unhurt. Peace Corps Reps always had to be aware of the possible political consequences of elections, assassinations and revolutions. Accordingly, most prepared tentative evacuation plans for the Volunteers. Fortunately, few ever had to be implemented.

In March, 1964, the Peace Corps was obliged to leave Cyprus when war broke out between Greece and Turkey. It was the first time Volunteers had been forced out of a country. Military or political pressures pushed them out of Ceylon, Indonesia and the Dominican Republic within the next year. However, in the vast majority of countries, the Peace Corps survived every kind of political tergiversation and retained its unique identity. The Peace Corps could not avoid entanglement in all political snares but, simultaneously, was never regarded as a run-of-the-mill American foreign policy initiative - even by the most over-sensitive Third World governments.

In Guinea, evaluator Philip Cook reported Sekou Toure's "special interest in the Volunteers." There was intense criticism of the A.I.D. programme, but not of the Peace Corps. Volunteers were allowed a remarkable amount of freedom and Toure requested an increase in numbers because, "Volunteers comport themselves properly...(and) behave themselves well in political matters." In Togo, despite a government coup and the assassination of President Olympio (who had extended the original invitation to the Peace Corps) Volunteers managed to maintain a neutral course. "The Togolase confide in them," wrote Cook, "but do not insist that they take sides or become involved." Ironically, in terms of political impact, Cook reckoned the Peace Corps to be "the most welcome and commendable U.S. activity in Togo." Even in Ghana where political nerve-ends were extremely
frayed, the local peoples genuinely liked the American Volunteers and seemed to prefer them to the rather unemotional and aloof Russian technicians. Moreover, Richard Richter insisted that "For all his irrationality, Nkrumah likes the Peace Corps." Although prone to frequent anti-American outbursts, Richter noted that the Ghanaian leader never hinted at expulsion of the Peace Corps. "Its contribution is fully realised," he wrote. "The people realize the importance of education. They realise they've gotten their money's worth from the Peace Corps." 93

To Sargent Shriver, the Peace Corps was the best example of John F. Kennedy's "new politics of peace." 94 Certainly, the new agency was one of the President's outstanding political successes - at home and abroad. There was some criticism on the domestic front from extreme right-wing groups like the John Birch Society who claimed the Peace Corps was "soft on Communism." In an angry riposte, Kennedy fought fire with fire: "If they (the John Birch Society) really want to do something about Communism... they will encourage their children to join the Peace Corps." 95 America's general response to the Peace Corps was overwhelmingly favourable. "The Peace Corps is in high gear," Harris Wofford wrote to Kennedy in January 1962. "It is doing a good job overseas - and will do a great job of political education for us at home. It can be a big thing going for us politically in the years ahead." Indeed, keeping Kennedy's re-election prospects in mind, Wofford noted, "By 1964, it can yield a real political harvest." 96

Of course, the Peace Corps' greatest impact was overseas. Again, it was the politically astute Wofford who pointed out to Kennedy - in July, 1961 - that the Peace Corps would restore the sparkle to a foreign policy badly tarnished by the Bay of Pigs fiasco. "You may underestimate the degree to which doubts have been building up since Cuba," wrote Wofford. "There is a growing feeling...that there is little new, aside from the Peace Corps and our position on Angola, and that the Democratic foreign policy is in danger of becoming merely a more elegant version of..."
Wofford advised Kennedy, "much more needs to be said and done...(but) the Peace Corps strikes the note the developing nations are waiting for."  

In 1961 a Bolivian government official characterised the Peace Corps as "the point of the lance" in America's attempt to win a new image and a new respect in countries long neglected by her. In 1960, Third World peoples viewed America as monolithic rather than pluralistic. Most Americans they had seen were either intelligence agents or soldiers. Peace Corpsmen gave an indication of the diversity of American life. This had a tremendous effect. For example in Gabon, natives living in remote eastern towns -- where newspapers and radio were not available -- asked government official when the Americans would arrive to help them build schools. At a different level, the Minister of Education was overhead at a government reception telling President Mba about the Volunteers he had seen "swinging machetes and carrying heavy loads." In the Dominican Republic in 1964 evaluators contrasted the popularity of the Peace Corps with the rampant anti-American sentiment they had encountered in 1962. "There is little doubt," they reported, "that having personable, hard-working Volunteers scattered throughout the Republic has favorably and significantly influenced the attitude of the Dominican people towards the U.S."  

The Peace Corps was not always responsible for such sweeping changes in the attitude of Third World peoples towards the United States. With America represented overseas by the State Department, the military and the C.I.A, as well as the Peace Corps, it was inevitable that she would present a composite image to the world. The Peace Corps was seen as a distinctive part of this composition. This was rather ironically exemplified during the anti-American riots in Panama in January, 1964. Natives protected Volunteers in their homes because they were regarded as "gringos who are different." Of course, the step from liking these individual Americans to accepting U.S. foreign policy as a whole, was a
long one. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps did at least indicate to suspicious, non-aligned countries that the United States was capable of idealism. Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, expressed his surprise that:

"this important idea, the most powerful idea in recent time, of a Peace Corps, of youth mingling, living working with youth, should come from the mightiest nation on earth, the United States. Many of us... thought of this great nation as a wealthy nation, a powerful nation endowed with great material strength and many powerful weapons. But how many of us know that in the United States ideas and ideals are so powerful?" 102

In 1961, Ambassador Galbraith in India told Shriver that the Third World would welcome the Peace Corps as "an affirmation of American idealism. It is particularly important in rubbing out the impression that we are excessively prone to military solutions." 103 A young Volunteer relayed a similar message to Shriver from Tunisia in 1962:

"The Peace Corps...exhibits to the world the fact that the U.S. is interested, and in a personal, direct and humanitarian way." 104

To young Volunteers, their Peace Corps service was a declaration of their faith that they could escape becoming pawns in the Cold War. David Crozier, the first Volunteer to die while serving overseas (he was killed in a plane crash in Colombia in 1962), set forth this belief in a letter to his parents. "Should it come to it," he wrote, "I had rather give my life trying to help someone than to have to give my life looking down a gun barrel at them." 105 It was this idealistic spirit which allowed the Peace Corps to transcend the often murky waters of international politics. For it was almost universally recognised that the Peace Corps had less to do with governments and their foreign relations than peoples and their human relations. It was a point well taken by John Kennedy in his discussion of the development needs of the Third World and their political consequences. "In the end," he said, in his State of the Union address in January, 1963 "the crucial effort is one of purpose, requiring the fuel of finance but also a torch of idealism."
And nothing carries the spirit of this American idealism more effectively to the far corners of the earth than the Peace Corps.\textsuperscript{106}

The Peace Corps emerged in part from America's intense feeling of competition with the Soviet Union in the early 1960's. In this sense, it was a Cold War creation. However, it was not narrowly anti-Russian and it had no specifically political purpose. Neither President Kennedy nor the American foreign policy establishment attempted to mould it or push it in a particular direction. Volunteers were not sent overseas as "agents" of American imperialism. They did not proselytise or seek to impose their beliefs in any way whatsoever. Yet paradoxically, because the Peace Corps engaged in no such activities, it became a uniquely significant political asset to the United States. By treating local people according to their own needs and customs, without undue reference to their political importance, the Peace Corps built the kind of goodwill that did, in the end, have considerable political effect. Speaking before the United States Foreign Policy Association in New York, Sargent Shriver asked, "In this world of the Cold War and many little hot wars, of the hydrogen bomb, the Atlantic Alliance and the Sino-Soviet split, what room is there for a Peace Corps?" In an editorial entitled "Idealism At Work" (written on November 21, 1963 - the day before President Kennedy's assassination), the \textit{New York Times} gave Shriver his answer: "In a little over two years, the Peace Corps has come to be recognised as the most idealistic arm of our foreign effort and one of its most successful expressions."\textsuperscript{107}
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

TO LEAVE SOMETHING BEHIND
"Volunteers joined the Peace Corps to shape, teach, influence and help other people and especially, they joined to leave something behind. It is in the nature of man to want to leave some monument, however small, however insignificant, however intangible."

- BILL MOYERS -

(Memorandum To Warren Wiggins, August 17, 1963)
Sargeant Shriver compared the effects of the Peace Corps to a
series of widening circles—"like the expanding rings from a stone
thrown into a pond." To Shriver, the inner circle represented
the immediate accomplishments overseas in terms of social and
economic development, education, skills imparted and the physical
improvements achieved. The second ring was the impact the returning
Volunteers had on American society, "on institutions and people,
on the creation of a new sense of participation in world events."
Shriver's last circle was more intangible than the other two but
nonetheless important—"a declaration of the irresistible strength
of a universal idea connected with human dignity, hope, compassion
and freedom." Very roughly, Shriver's analogy of the expanding
rings corresponded with the Three Aims of the Peace Corps Act: to
provide the developing countries with trained manpower, help promote a
better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served
and help increase American knowledge of other cultures. "The
Peace Corps touched many lives and made them better," claimed
Hubert Humphrey, "yet critics ask what visible lasting effects there
are, as if care, concern, love, help can be measured in concrete
and steel or dollars or ergs." Humphrey contended that "education,
whether in mathematics, language, health, nutrition, farm
techniques, or peaceful coexistence may not always be visible,
but the effects endure." The impact of the Peace Corps was
(and probably always will be), the key question concerning the entire
experiment; the difficulty is that it is almost impossible to quantify.

Not everyone agreed with Shriver and Humphrey's wide-ranging,
positive assessments of the Peace Corps' effects. In 1962, the
journalist Eric Sevareid argued that while Volunteers may have
been responsible for "some spot benefits in a few isolated places," the American taxpayer might well wonder what Volunteers had to do with the "fundamental investments, reorganizations and reforms upon which the true and long-term economic development of backward countries depend." Peace Corps evaluators could be equally sceptical of Volunteers' efforts. In Sierra Leone in 1962, David Gelman wrote that, as far as certain Volunteers were concerned, they might just as well "go home and file the whole thing in memory, like the two abortive years in the army or navy." In later years, Henry Fairlie referred to the Peace Corps sneeringly as "a lamentably frivolous experiment." Fairlie deemed the Volunteers extraordinarily presumptuous in their belief that they could "make a serious contribution to the countries to which they momentarily journeyed." Perhaps the most damaging criticism came from C. Payne Lucas (one of the agency's first administrators and an overseas Rep) in his scathing work on the Peace Corps, Keeping Kennedy's Promise. As Lucas saw it, "There was no overall purpose to the Peace Corps' presence in a country." Moreover, in a wholesale condemnation of the agency's achievement in the Kennedy years he concluded, "Thousands of Volunteers were committed to vaguely conceived and marginal projects that had little or no impact on people's lives or on national development."³

Shriver and his colleagues disagreed with Lucas's rather extreme view that Peace Corps service did not affect people's lives. By the summer of 1963, Shriver claimed the Peace Corps had brought learning to "tens of thousands of children, opened up new worlds for hundreds of villages, brought new meaning and perspective into the lives of thousands of Americans and showed the face of an America which many never dreamed existed."⁴ As Doug Kiker, Chief of Public Information recalled, "There was lots of idealism and lots of mistakes."

However Peace Corps administrators were not innocents. Indeed, it was with failures - as well as accomplishments in mind - that Bill Josephson described the Peace Corps to a prospective staff member as "simultaneously the most exciting and discouraging place in Washington."⁵
Besides, Charles Peters and his evaluators ensured that the Peace Corps was constantly confronted with its fallibility. In a typically frank and honest memorandum of July, 1963, Peters outlined the Peace Corps' most obvious weakness:

"You know, one of the sad things about the Peace Corps is how resistant many of us were to admitting we started out as the blind leading the blind. P.D.O. people felt they had to act like they knew something about Peace Corps programming; training people that they knew something about Peace Corps training; I, about Peace Corps evaluation. If we had only been willing to cheerfully acknowledge our ignorance, we would have been so much more receptive to constructive suggestions from each other. Much is still to be gained by the leadership encouraging an attitude of 'we're still learning and don't have to be afraid of admitting our mistakes.' The thing we really have to fear is, not our mistakes, but failing to learn from them."

Involved in the humbling task of helping to satisfy the Third World's development needs, Peace Corpsmen were well aware of their limitations. All the same, they deeply resented being treated as wholesome, but essentially insignificant, do-gooders. The Peace Corps paid a great deal of attention to its "first aim" - supplying trained manpower. "Our relevance to the world is not that we are a nice bunch of people offering low-paying overseas fellowships," said Warren Wiggins. Objective, academic reports reinforced Wiggins' statement. For instance, a survey of Peace Corps impact on the Philippines conducted by the Social Research Institute of the University of Hawaii reported:

"Our research teams found palpable evidence of the Volunteers' impact. Thus in 92% of these places our interviewers established that educational facilities and new teaching techniques had indeed been introduced. In 53.1% of the Peace Corps communities, scholarships had been instituted and material aid given to help the residents improve themselves one way or another. Slightly smaller percentages of communities showed other Peace Corps innovations: community development projects (51.3%); voluntary organizations of various kinds (42.3%); and recreational facilities (38.9%)."
Thus the social scientists concluded, "The Volunteers had definitely made a difference to their communities."

Unfortunately, very few Peace Corps programmes lent themselves to this type of rigidly defined analysis. A Volunteer in Senegal claimed there was no way of quantifying whatever benefits he may have brought by "convincing a mother to give protein foods to her child, taking someone with inflamed eyes to a hospital to get his possible trachoma diagnosed and operated on, or giving a shot that saves a life." Most Volunteers and officials agreed that it was almost impossible to gauge statistically the impact of their programmes on host societies. Indeed, according to Frank Mankiewicz, only one irreducible fact emerged: "That is, that the people who lived in those villages to which Volunteers were assigned were better off at the end of the two years in which the Volunteer was there than if the Volunteer had not come."

The value of the Peace Corps' contribution varied with the country, project and individual Volunteers concerned. When, at end of term conferences, Volunteers were asked what effect they had had on the economic, cultural or social development of their host country, their answers were often vague or non-committal. As evaluator Richard Elwell concluded in 1963, "Most Volunteers do not have a quantitative idea of what effect they have." Some Volunteers said it would be years before they could even begin to judge their contribution. Many felt they had had more impact on their place of work than the native community in general. Others said their contribution was marginal or intangible, resulting primarily from their mere presence in the community and their example of initiative, application, cleanliness and so forth. Some Volunteers suggested that whatever effect they had would be lost unless another Volunteer replaced them in their host community. Several claimed that because of the great diversity of Peace Corps activities in any one country it was impossible to gauge general impact. Others said it depended upon whether the Peace Corps' effects were judged in
terms of helping the host peoples or helping to build a favourable image for the United States in the Third World. Indeed, at the end of the day, most Volunteers shared only one feeling in common - guilt that they had gained much more than they had given. Yet, although highly self-critical, most Volunteers did eventually agree with a colleague in Senegal who concluded, "Gradually it will dawn on you that you're doing something for your country, for their country and also for yourself."¹²

In the sphere of economic development, the Peace Corps' contribution proved almost impossible to measure. Although 75 per cent of the first thousand returning Volunteers felt they had been responsible for small improvements in a country's economic condition, it was difficult to define what these were. In a rather typical evaluation of a programme (in the Dominican Republic), Dee Jacobs and Philip Hardberger found the Peace Corps' efforts "impressive, but often fragmented or, in the long run, irrelevant to any real economic development."¹³ Most cost-effective studies of the Peace Corps concluded that its people-to-people approach helped alleviate, in some way, the poverty of the local communities in which it worked; but they failed to find any evidence of its leading to a growth in the national economy. For this reason, the Peace Corps always preferred to articulate its goals in terms of human, rather than economic, development. "Sargent Shriver often pointed out that "we could send five hundred Volunteers into Borneo and do a good job and the Gross National Product (G.N.P.) might still go down."¹⁴ Certainly, when he appeared before Congressional committees, Shriver could rhyme off an impressive list of material accomplishments - 6 inland fish farms begun in 1966, 200 miles of road laid in Colombia, a 1,790-foot pipeline built in Morocco, a million eggs produced in four poultry cooperatives in India, 17 bridges erected in Sierra Leone - but even with these in mind, he admitted, "The Peace Corps' contribution has been less in direct
economic development than in social development: health, education, and community organization.5

Again, figures could be produced as evidence of the Peace Corps' positive contribution to social services in the Third World. The Volunteers working at the Magburaka hospital in Sierra Leone enabled its medical clinic to double its out-patient load from 42,000 cases in 1962 to 95,000 in 1963; in Bolivia, two Volunteers in the Alto Beni region administered penicillin to about 600 Mosetene Indians and gave 590 tuberculin tests in the Cochabamba area; Volunteers in Colombia helped establish over a thousand juntas; in a remote village in Panama, a Volunteer initiated a home sanitation project which in five months resulted in the construction of 71 latrines.6 However, although the communities in which Volunteers worked may have been physically cleaner and healthier than they were two years beforehand, the effect on the overall condition of a country was questionable. This was not to say that the Peace Corps' impact was insubstantial, but rather that it was more local than national.

Perhaps the only Peace Corps activity which could be said to have had a major national effect was the one in which most Volunteers were engaged - education. The Peace Corps' achievement in this sphere was momentous. In Africa especially, the presence of nearly 3,000 Volunteers in nineteen countries greatly increased educational opportunities in that continent. In Liberia, the 280 Volunteers teaching in elementary and secondary schools were in daily contact with nearly 15,000 students. Also, in Nigeria, 450 Volunteers were teaching over 40,000 pupils - 35 per cent of all Nigerians in secondary schools. Volunteers increased Nyasaland's secondary school teaching force by 25 per cent; and in Somalia they carried 50 per cent of the teaching load. In the Cameroons, the infusion of Peace Corps Volunteers permitted the doubling of secondary school enrollment and in Ethiopia, they comprised approximately one-third of all secondary teachers in the
country. In Ghana, evaluator Richard Richter reported that Peace Corps teachers were in danger of becoming too successful. With Volunteers in 64 per cent of Ghanaian secondary schools reaching some 43 per cent of all native students, Richter suggested that behind criticism in the press lay an increasing awareness by politicians that the educational system had become too dependent upon the Peace Corps. 17

Nor was this impact on Third World education limited to Africa or secondary schools. For instance, in Afghanistan in 1964, Volunteers were teaching 50 per cent of the country’s university students. However, in many ways, the Peace Corps’ most valuable contribution was to give tens of thousands of Third World children the chance to go to school. Moreover, evaluator Robert Lystad estimated that Volunteer teachers would leave behind "a reasonably good, possibly superior education of the students with whom they have worked, improvements in curricula and texts and a large reservoir of goodwill." As the economist Barbara Ward Jackson pointed out, the Peace Corps was a "valuable effort to provide in underdeveloped countries the massive number of teachers needed to carry out modernization." 18

Furthermore, taking education in its broadest sense, the Peace Corps’ contribution was by no means limited to the classroom. Sargent Shriver often argued that the Volunteers’ people-to-people approach had immeasurable educational value — no matter the job they were doing — and that this should not be regarded as a "fringe benefit." Evaluators agreed that, even where projects were unsuccessful or collapsed after the Volunteers left, "they had accomplished something merely by introducing, enunciating and clarifying ideas for the first time." 19

By working at the very roots of societies, Volunteers did influence them — in countless ways. For instance, in nutrition projects in Latin America, children were required to wash their hands before they were served
any food, line up in an orderly fashion (giving respect to others in the
queue), wash their plates after dining and store them. Thus, Volunteers not
only gave the children one square meal a day but taught them basic
hygiene and organizational discipline. Despite the inertia and
carelessness rife in many Third World hospitals, evaluator Tim Adams
felt "our nurses will leave behind new attitudes, new techniques and a
markedly higher level of nursing care." Volunteers in Somalia
irrigated the land around Amoud and gave the city its first electricity;
yet, Richard Richter felt the most "indelible Peace Corps imprint"
would be the running-track, libraries and other recreational
facilities created by the Volunteers.21

Time and again, evaluation reports stressed that the Peace Corps'
greatest impact was on people's attitudes. Objective observers tended
to agree. When anthropologists from Cornell University evaluated the
impact of the Peace Corps on the villages of the Peruvian Andes, they
noted the afforestation of eucalyptus trees, the potato-graders built,
the agricultural extension projects carried out, the athletics
programmes devised and the introduction of a brass band. Yet, their
main conclusion did not differ substantially from those of the Peace
Corps' own evaluators:

"The principal contribution Volunteers made has not been in
establishing new institutions and materially increasing the
scale of the social system. It has been rather in reinforcing
the modern institutions established during the previous
decade and in helping to lay the groundwork for others in the
future."22

In general, Volunteers did not expect to change countries' social,
economic or educational systems overnight. A young Volunteer in East
Pakistan told Tim Adams that he was not too disappointed with his two years
work. "In my estimation, I have accomplished one change," he said, "I have
gotten the kids to ask questions; for this, I am happy."23

Most Volunteers found they could only judge their impact in
these somewhat nebulous, but deeply personal and meaningful ways.
In Peru, a Volunteer saw the greatest indicator of his success in
"the happy faces of the children being fed by our nutrition projects."
Another Volunteer in Liberia felt his major contribution had been to
persuade his pupils to wear shoes – thus helping to reduce the incidence
of worms acquired by barefoot children. In Honduras, a Volunteer sensed
he was making an impact when the people of his campesino offered to
share their one egg of the week with him. For a Volunteer in Sierra
Leone, the greatest feeling of achievement came when a native stood up
at a village meeting and told him he was the only white man ever to shake
hands with him and speak in his tongue. For another, it was a little
boy saying "thank you" at the end of every lesson.24 Like Volunteers,
evaluators also tended to describe the Peace Corps' effects in a personal,
emotional manner. For instance, in Peru in 1963, Herb Wegner assessed
the Peace Corps' contribution in terms of:

"The small people, the endless parade of the impoverished
ones, the little old ladies who came to the meeting on the
wrong day at Calda, the kids on the Volunteer-made swings
at Chimbote, the radical University student at Cuzco who
wanted to meet me, the Vicosinos, who call a girl Volunteer
'Momita' the waiter who often serves Volunteers at a little
hotel in Huarez, a police captain who rode in the back of a
pick-up truck with me after the bus broke down, a taxi-driver,
the five little kids who sang songs for us in Quechua and
many others who had one message - 'Welcome!'"25

As far as the "second aim" of the Peace Corps Act was concerned –
helping to promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of
the peoples served – Volunteers had an unprecedented impact overseas.
Quite apart from supplying "trained manpower" and the concrete achievements
accompanying it, Peace Corps Volunteers succeeded, by and large, in
projecting a new image of North Americans. For the first time, Third
World peoples learned that there were Americans who were not wealthy,
bigoted or afraid to work with their hands. For many, the stereotype of the rich Yanqui tourist on vacation went crashing; Volunteers were not only willing to speak their language but also take an interest in them as human beings. "We have sent 8,000 Americans to 46 countries speaking 40 languages," said Sargent Shriver in December 1963. "What's more, we have been very successful in almost eliminating that phrase 'Yankee go home' from the countries where we go." 26

Again, this effect was more a matter of perception than quantification. Yet, there could be no doubt the Peace Corps was seen as a new direction for America. "They came to live with our people not in hotels, not in sumptuous houses," exclaimed Thanat Khoman (Foreign Minister of Thailand), "they lived in our farmer's huts, sharing their food and the roof." 27 In Asmara, Ethiopia, where (thanks to the G.I. influence) the average American was treated to a greeting of "Fuck you Joe," Volunteers came to be addressed with the more respectful "Good evening, teacher." Volunteers in Tanganyika recalled that they were often complimented - albeit in a back-handed fashion - by natives telling them "We like you much better than the British." 28 Likewise, Nigerian journalist Tai Solarin estimated that "the lubrication of our teaching force with the Peace Corps is a greater service to this country than Britain did in a hundred years with all the epaulleted and sword-carrying governors who ever ruled this country." In India, Volunteers were told by local educationalists that they were more valuable than Fulbright professors "because Volunteers are always eager for more work, not less." 29 A tribal chief in Sierra Leone claimed that the Peace Corps showed his people "a world we never knew existed. We had never seen people from the outside who wanted to help us. We had heard of America but now we know what it means." 30 To a young Volunteer in Indonesia, this understanding of who and what Americans were, was the
Peace Corps' most important effect. "Five years from now these people probably won't remember much of what I taught," he said, "That will get lost... but I want them to say, 'I know about America and Americans - one of them is my friend.'"

Of course, to President Kennedy and most other Americans this "second aim" of the Peace Corps was crucial. The great need to be "understood" - and liked - overseas had been one of the burning issues of the 1960 campaign. "The Peace Corps has already erased some stereotyped images of America," Kennedy told Congress in July 1963, "and brought hundreds of thousands of people into contact with the first Americans they have ever known personally." Ambassadors all over the Third World praised the Peace Corps' positive contribution to cross-cultural relations. "Above all, I have found this is no experiment," said Ambassador William Mahoney in Ghana, "this is a working outfit; it is producing and I am immensely proud of it." Likewise, in Colombia, Ambassador Fulton Freeman reported to Shriver that "the vast and overwhelming majority of public and private opinion concerning the work of the Volunteers has been of a highly laudatory and almost completely uncritical nature." In retrospect, Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Coombs felt that "these well-motivated young people contributed something unique that older people and 'officials' could not possibly have contributed." More succinctly, Vice-President Johnson told Shriver that, as far as improving America's image was concerned, "It appears we are not only getting a dollar's value for a dollar spent with the Peace Corps, but two dollars value for every one spent."

In many ways, America's investment in the Peace Corps was most profitably returned through the effects the experience had on the Volunteers. Of course, these effects were deeply personal and again, impossible to quantify. However, every poll, questionnaire and conference on the impact of Peace Corps service suggested overwhelmingly,
that returned Volunteers felt they had undergone a radical change overseas. On coming home they felt different from their peers—in having a broader outlook on the world, being more mature and understanding and having greater sensitivity to cultural variety. (APPENDIX XV) "Until one has had the experience," wrote Neil Boyer, a returned Volunteer from Ethiopia, "one cannot realise how important two years can be in a lifetime." For Volunteers, the Peace Corps was as much a process of self-discovery as discovery of others. Yet, understandably, they found it difficult to articulate the extent and quality of the Peace Corps' impact upon themselves. There was always the possibility they would be accused of bragging or being self-righteous. Highlighting this problem, evaluator Thorburn Reid sent to Washington a transcript of a question-and-answer session on "personal impact" which he had conducted with a Volunteer in El Salvador:

Reid: "How will you describe your Peace Corps experience?"
Volunteer: Well, I won't sell it." (Pause)
Reid: "What will you say?"
Volunteer: "I'll tell them what it was like." (Pause)
Reid: "Such as?"
Volunteer: "The best goddam experience a young man can have. Worth four years of college." 35

From the very beginning, President Kennedy stressed this "third aim" of the Peace Corps Act and claimed that "the Volunteers will learn themselves far more than they will teach and we will therefore have another link which binds us to the world around us." 36 In later years, it became something of a cliché to say that the Peace Corps had more effect on the Volunteers than the peoples served. Too often, cynical commentators neglected the other two aims of the Peace Corps and the positive accomplishments overseas. However, there was no doubt that Peace Corps service did have a profound effect on those participating. Although, for most returning Volunteers, it raised more questions
than answers. Their personal encounter with other civilisations was painful and unsettling as well as enlightening. Many Volunteers experienced a "Re-Entry Crisis" on going home and found it exceedingly difficult to accept the old ways. The founders of the Peace Corps had expected that Volunteers would gain a useful familiarity with the Third World; they had not anticipated that many would undergo an intense personal experience that would profoundly alter their view of their own society. "This past year has given me a chance to see America and the American way of life the way others see it," wrote a Volunteer in Niger. "But the picture many times has been an ugly one."37

Most Volunteers came home more radically-minded, more concerned with the problems of others and more prepared to take action to solve them than they had been two years previously. A massive 85 per cent of returned Volunteers in 1964 saw racial inequality as America's most glaring domestic weakness. Poverty in general was listed second. (APPENDIX XVI) As far as foreign problems were concerned, the immediate priority of most returned Volunteers was to persuade the United States to withdraw her troops from Vietnam. However, in second place, they felt the needs of the Third World and the inadequacies of America's foreign aid methods to meet them, required urgent attention. (APPENDIX XVII) Perhaps even more importantly, 96 per cent of returned Volunteers indicated that they would be willing to "participate" in achieving these ends. Of course, the level of this commitment differed with each Volunteer; however, 68 per cent said they would take part in a demonstration and 47 per cent claimed they would, if necessary, participate in civil disobedience. (APPENDIX XVIII)

To Volunteers, the Peace Corps was a way of becoming involved in the issues of their time. That involvement continued after their return from overseas. Significantly, many former Volunteers committed themselves to the Civil Rights struggle in the 1960's and the Committee of Returned Volunteers (formed in 1964) was in the
vanguard of protest against American military presence in Vietnam.
Moreover, some of the most severe criticism of American policies, domestic
and foreign, was heard on those campuses which, in the Kennedy days,
had supplied large numbers of Volunteers - Harvard, Berkeley,
Michigan and so forth.

However, the effect of returned Volunteers on American society
cannot be gauged solely in terms of protest movements and visible
commitments to causes. Most returned Volunteers made their mark in
quieter, often less perceptible ways. "The thing about the Peace
Corps experience," said one former Volunteer, "is that it
doesn't end after two years - it lasts a life-time." Newell Flather,
a Volunteer in the first teaching programme in Ghana, claimed that the Peace
Corps opened many young Americans' minds to the possibility of
change. "The Peace Corps got people at a very formative age and
gave them new ideas," he recalled. "For many it was the opening of a
New Frontier of the psyche." Incidentally, Flather (who admitted he had
gone to Ghana a rather serious and reserved graduate student) came back to
help found the Committee of Returned Volunteers and picket the White
House over American policy in Vietnam. He later became Chairman
of Oxfam-America. "When we began organizing the Peace Corps,"
said Warren Wiggins, "we thought that it would prove the capacity of
American youth for idealism and service." Yet, as he later noted,
"I believe we misjudged the Peace Corps' effect - this experiment is
not really displaying our latent capacities, it is creating
them." Many returned Volunteers took up positions in American society
where change could be most readily affected. Encouraged by
President Kennedy's signing of Executive Order 11103 in April
1963, (which provided for the non-competitive Federal appointment of
former Volunteers) some 13 per cent of returnees took up positions with
government organisations at home and overseas - thus realising
Kennedy's hope that the Peace Corps would provide a steady flow of experienced personnel to the Foreign Service, A.I.D., the State Department and so on, (APPENDIX XIX) of course, these newcomers to the traditional agencies of American foreign policy started out at a very low level. However, as they gained promotion, it was hoped they would add a new tone to the actions of United States policy-makers. In this sense, former Volunteers working in overseas government organisations might, ultimately, be of more value to the Third World than they were during their service.

A further 4 per cent of returnees went into local or state government. Using their skills in inter-cultural communication and cooperation they proved particularly helpful in dealing with members of America's own "forgotten subcultures" - blacks, American Indians, Hispanics and many others. In 1978, Paul Tsongas became the most visible embodiment of former Volunteers' participation in political life when he was elected as a United States senator from Massachusetts. Tsongas claimed that his two years with the Peace Corps in Ethiopia shaped his view of the world; moreover, he cited the experience as "the most influential factor in my decision to enter public life."\[41\]

Perhaps the most exciting potential contribution of returned Volunteers lay in the area of education. Dean John Monro of Harvard rated two years in the Peace Corps "as significant as a Rhodes scholarship."\[43\] He saw Volunteers as a national educational resource of untold value. In fact, 16 per cent of returnees went into school-teaching and 36 per cent sought to further their own education.

Envisaging tens of thousands of these intelligent, motivated young people permeating all sectors of America's educational community, Sargent Shriver predicted they would become some of the most significant shapers of the nation's character. Indeed, by 1963, the Peace Corps had come to see itself as an "educational" as well as an "overseas service" institution. Or, as Harris Wofford termed it, "a kind of university in dispersion."\[43\]
In a broader interpretation of "education", returned Volunteers helped to take a lot of the mystery and fear out of the American view of the Third World. In the early 1960's, it was considered rather dangerous to send young, white people to what was still known as "Darkest Africa." Photographs of Volunteers feeding and teaching black children had a tremendous psychological impact on Americans back home. On a slightly more sophisticated level, returned Volunteers were able to impart the lessons they had learned overseas - that language is bound up with society and politics, that one culture is not qualitatively superior to another and so on. Thus, as returned Volunteers taught and participated in their own society, they contributed to a much better informed American public opinion, and eventually, foreign policy. As two former Volunteers put it, "In the Peace Corps, all Americans are getting a very special kind of education at a bargain price."44

Yet, for all these benefits, Volunteers who went into the Peace Corps expecting to see tangible results were usually disappointed. "The irony of the Peace Corps' work," wrote evaluator Meridan Bennett, "is that so frequently it will live to see almost everything it has done swept away in blood and chaos; everything done by the 'North Americans' may be destroyed come the next revolution."45 Ultimately, the Volunteers' impact was dependent upon the quality of the association between them and the peoples served. In that sense, their long-term achievements were mostly intangible. "The important thing we are doing here is not that which can be measured with a camera," said a girl in the Philippines. "Who can photograph the mind of a child?"46 At the end of their term of service, Volunteers could do little more than suggest, or hope, that they had achieved something concrete. "Maybe five years from now, one of my pupils will say 'Oh, teacher Fred taught us that'," said a young Volunteer in Liberia. Another hoped for no more than that "when I leave, somebody will go out and dig a latrine."47
Although difficult to quantify, there were suggestions that some of the long-term effects of the Peace Corps went beyond the Volunteers' modest hopes. On a personal level, there were several instances of former Volunteers returning to their host community to find that the locals had adopted the techniques they had been shown years before. One such Volunteer, who had done some chicken-farming in India, had finished his term of service feeling he had accomplished little. However, when he went back ten years later (in his capacity as a U.S. foreign aid administrator) he was astounded to discover tens of thousands of chickens in the area where he had worked - the project had been carried on by natives. "We do not have a catalogue of what happened ten or fifteen years later," said a former Peace Corps Director, Carolyn Payton, "but I believe it is anecdotes like this that tell the real Peace Corps story." Not only technical lessons survived the years, but personal relationships too. In the 1970's Paul Tsongas returned to Ghion in Ethiopia to meet some old friends there. When, in 1978, Joe Walsh returned to Guatemala, where he had been a Volunteer in the early 1960's, he found that a native friend of his had died, leaving a young son to fend for himself. Walsh adopted the boy and took him back with him to America. Many other Volunteers kept up correspondence or visited their former counterparts over the years. In this respect, the Peace Corps had a continuing impact down the years - for Volunteers and their hosts.

On a larger scale, it might be suggested that the Peace Corps acted as a catalyst for renewed worldwide interest in voluntary service organisations. By the mid-1960's, nearly fifty Peace Corps-type programmes had been started in various European - and perhaps more significantly - Third World countries. Inspired by the Peace Corps International Secretariat, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Panama, Bolivia, Pakistan, El Salvador and Honduras were among the many countries involved. As Sargent Shriver told M. George Bundy in February 1963, "The imitation of the President's idea by other countries is the
sincerest form of flattery." Moreover, U Thant, Secretary
General of the United Nations, foresaw a time when "the average
younger - and parent and employer - will consider one or two years of
work for the cause of development, either in a faraway country or a
depressed area of his own community, as a normal part of one's
education." Not the least important imitation came at home in the
shape of the "domestic Peace Corps" - Volunteers In Service To America
(V.I.S.T.A.). Suggested by Kennedy and established by Johnson, it had
200,000 members by 1970. This enthusiasm for voluntary service
confirmed Shriver's belief that the Peace Corps was not just an
American idea but a "universal" one. Moreover, as"evaluator David Gelman
told him in 1965, "We are still at the very barest beginnings
of the Peace Corps as an American experience and as a world movement."52

"A Peace Corps Volunteer has to be an idealist," said Hubert
Humphrey, "You have to believe that one person can make a difference
to what happens in this world." Although, John F. Kennedy and Sargent
Shriver agreed with Humphrey's optimistic sentiment, neither had any
illusions about what the Peace Corps might accomplish. At the most,
Kennedy hoped "In some small village, Volunteers will lay a seed which
will bring a rich harvest for us all in later days."54 The "richness"
of the yield depended very much on how and when it was measured. In
terms of national socio-economic development, the Peace Corps' impact was, to say the least, problematical. Nevertheless, Shriver claimed that, considering no one had heard of Schumacher's Small
Is Beautiful theories in 1961, the Peace Corps' concentration on local
communities rather than G.N.P. was both prophetic and - judged by those
standards - effective. In later years, John Kenneth Galbraith concurred
that "the test of the Peace Corps was whether it helped some people
live better in less pain - and I think it did." There was no doubt
that the Peace Corps contributed a great deal to cross-cultural
understanding. Indeed, by 1965, some staffers claimed that Volunteers
had reached "indirectly" some 25 million people. Certainly,
the Peace Corps broke down numerous physical and psychological
barriers that had grown up between America and the Third World. In
particular, returning Volunteers had a powerful effect on the education
of American society. In these various ways, the Peace Corps made its
impact felt or, as Bill Moyers put it, "left something behind." Yet,
notwithstanding the three aims of the Peace Corps Act and the many
statistics that can be produced to argue either for, or against,
the Volunteers' fulfilment of them, there remained many intangibles.
At the end of the day, Sargent Shriver saw the Peace Corps as America's
attempt to rejoin - after a long absence - "the world's majority: the young
and raw, the colored, the hungry and the oppressed." Shriver argued
that because human development was the Peace Corps' ultimate aim,
its ultimate impact could not be quantified in statistical terms.
Quoting Pablo Casals' remarks on the Peace Corps, Shriver concluded:

"It is new and it is also very old. We have come from the
tyrranny of the enormous, awesome, discordant machine, back
to the realization that the beginning and the end is man -
that it is man who is important, not the machine, and that
it is man who accounts for growth, not just dollars and
factories. Above all, that it is man who is the object of
all our efforts."
EPILOGUE

KENNEDY'S CHILDREN
"I feel a particular satisfaction because this is the most immediate response - the Peace Corps - that the country has seen to the whole spirit which I tried to suggest in my inaugural about the contribution which we could make to our country."

- JOHN F. KENNEDY -

(Remarks to The First Group Of Peace Corps Volunteers Before Their Departure For Ghana And Tanganyika, August 28, 1961)
"This generation of Americans, your generation of Americans," John F. Kennedy told a group of students, "has a rendezvous with destiny." Through the Peace Corps, he sought to give young Americans an opportunity to meet that "destiny" in a personal way. To Kennedy, the Peace Corps was not merely a political gimmick or a weapon in the Cold War. Rather, it was an expression of his special feeling for young people. He believed they had something unique to offer their society. Basically, he took the risk of establishing it - and there was a considerable political risk involved - because he liked, and had faith in, young people. "It was crazy to send ten or fifteen thousand Americans, most of them just out of college, off to thousands of different locations in the schools and villages of Asia, Africa and Latin America," said Harris Wofford. "It was crazy to think of turning such people loose, on their own, to teach and learn and organize; it was crazy and full of pitfalls." Yet, he concluded, "it worked better than all the other systems of assistance or partnership in world education and development yet tried."  

The Peace Corps went through its own particularly intense grief on the death of John Kennedy. The seven thousand Volunteers then in service witnessed, at first hand, the unprecedented and perplexing phenomenon of Kennedy's universal popularity as a figure of hope among the world's forgotten and destitute. In a letter to Peace Corps/Washington, a Volunteer described the reaction to Kennedy's assassination in a small, isolated village of North Borneo:  

"Living in a community where the native people live in relative seclusion, and know only smatterings of world affairs, I was surprised to look up and find several local boys standing at my door saying that they had heard on a radio that 'my President and dear friend had been shot and they were sorry for me because they knew I would be sad.' A mourning party was arranged.... and the natives living in the Borneo interior were reminded that John F. Kennedy was more than an important President and world leader in some faraway capital; he will be remembered as the man who sent his personal representative to live and teach in their village and who showed them some concrete evidence of the American willingness to improve the universal dignity of man."
The press in Ethiopia stressed Kennedy's commitment to Civil Rights at home and abroad and eulogised him as "the Second Emancipator."

Volunteers everywhere were reported as feeling that they had suffered a personal loss. Frank Mankiewicz, Rep in Peru, noted that his Volunteers felt the Peace Corps "won't be the same without President Kennedy." Some Volunteers wanted to come home.

As Bill Josephson wrote, on November 27, 1963, "The President's death has thrown the Peace Corps into a state of considerable confusion."

In many ways, the Peace Corps was never to recapture the vigour and enthusiasm which characterised it in the Kennedy era. Certainly, it continued; moreover, it doubled in size. Yet, somehow, it did not seem as potent a force. However, there was no doubt Kennedy had interested the younger generation in politics and - largely through the Peace Corps - made them aware of the possibilities of personal action. "My three years in the Peace Corps taught me that you can never know when your individual effort will make a difference," said Senator Paul Tsongas in 1979, "I have re-learned the lesson many times since then."

Throughout the 1960's there was strong evidence of a desire by the generation of Americans in their early twenties, to "participate" in the great issues of their time - whether through the War on Poverty, the Civil Rights crusade or the anti-war protest. Collectively, they added up to a movement among America's young people. While Kennedy provided much of the inspiration behind the movement, the Peace Corps was in its vanguard. As the political journalist Jack Newfield put it: "Kennedy liberated energies bottled up for a decade...he provided a friendly umbrella for the New Left to grow under and held up a vision of social idealism, represented by the Peace Corps."

The Volunteers of the years 1961-3 became symbols of the young President and what he had promised. In this sense they truly were - as the natives of the Dominican Republic called them - Kennedy's Children. "It was probably the best thing we've done overseas since the beginning," said William O. Douglas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
symbolically representing change and innovation rather than bolstering up an old status quo." Kennedy's Under Secretary of State, Chester Bowles, agreed that "Even with all its imperfections, I think the Peace Corps is one of the two or three really creative, positive things we have done in foreign affairs in the last generation." 

Some critics - like the revisionist historian Marshall Windmiller - claimed that the agency's name was pretentious and misleading. Certainly, the Peace Corps did not act as a mediator between combatants or bring about cease-fires. In fact, it was policy not to assign Volunteers to any countries where there was a "shooting war." Yet, only by the narrowest definition of "peace" - the mere absence of war - could it be argued that the Peace Corps contributed little to it. Volunteers made an effort to bring justice, education and a general spirit of well-being to thousands of underprivileged communities. They sought to break down the barriers of race, colour, culture, class and ideology. Instead, they attempted to create lasting friendships on a personal basis. Although perhaps not immediately discernible, this concentration on social construction did contribute to peaceful change. As Bradley Patterson, the Peace Corps' first Executive Secretary explained it:

"The entire objective...was slowly to build behind the defensive shields, little threads of contact and friendship. One little Mary from Massachusetts going to one little place in the Philippines builds halfway round the world a little thread. And many of these threads, of course, are fragile, and maybe some of them are only short-lived and so forth; but if, over the long period of time and the long development of American foreign policy, there are enough threads built and rebuilt and twisted together around the world...there will come a day when the threads of trade, commerce, culture, films, books and person-to-person visits will hold the world together so that it can't blow apart. I always thought of that as a very beautiful metaphor, not only in describing the fundamental long-range objectives of foreign policy, but in particularly showing how the Peace Corps fits into things."

Inspired by President Kennedy, the Peace Corps was the beginning of
a new generation's war on poverty and its corollaries of ignorance, disease and inequality. Moreover, it was a step towards the ideal of world community. As Harris Wofford advised Kennedy in 1962, the integration of rich with poor, and white with non-white, was the key not only to America's future, but the world's. "The American Negro is going to make it, sooner or later; he has the strength - and has on his side the Constitution, the Federal Government and the national conscience," wrote Wofford. "But the greater problem of integration is our integration into this largely colored world....whether we, the Western minority, make it in this new world is the more interesting question. That is the big integration." Of course, the problem of integrating the rich with the poor nations remains the world's most pressing need. Moreover, as the Brandt Commission on International Development Issues argued in 1980, the integration of the affluent northern half of the globe with the poverty-stricken south is, ultimately, mankind's only hope of survival. Twenty years before, Kennedy's Peace Corps took a first, modest step in that direction. "Most important of all," Sargent Shriver told the Foreign Policy Association in 1963, "these Volunteers will bring back home not only skills and experience, but the same ideals they carried overseas - ideals of world community and service to common needs which we have too often forgotten or neglected in our rush to power and affluence."
FOOTNOTES, APPENDICES, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCES
ABBREVIATIONS


P.O.F. - President's Office Files (in J.F.K.M.L.)

C.S.F. - Central Subject Files (in J.F.K.M.L.)

Bush Papers - Personal and Organisational Papers of Gerald Bush (in J.F.K.M.L.)

Josephson Papers - Personal and Organisational Papers of William Josephson (in J.F.K.M.L.)

P.C.A. - Peace Corps Archives, Washington D.C.

Public Papers - The Public Papers of President John F. Kennedy, containing his Public Speeches, Messages and Statements. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Volumes I - III)

C.R. - The Congressional Record

N.Y.T. - The New York Times

Footnotes

Introduction

The Peace Corps: 1960-80


2"Second Spring" was the catchphrase coined by Peace Corps staffers after President Carter had given the agency a renewed and strong endorsement in 1977.

3"Third World" comes from the French "Tiers Monde." It refers to all the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America - not just to those which are non-aligned. "Underdeveloped" or "developing" or "emerging" as they are used in this text are terms of convenience, not judgements about the quality of all aspects of life in Third World countries. They are synonyms for "Third World" and terms used even by people from those countries.


9Included in ACTION were V.I.S.T.A., R.S.V.P. (Retired Senior Volunteer Program), N.S.V.P. (National Student Volunteer Program), the University Year For Action Program and the Senior Companion Program.

ACTION is not an acronym but a title denoting the intended spirit of the agency.


When research on this dissertation began in 1976-77, many Americans with whom the author spoke did not know whether the Peace Corps was still in existence - such was its low public visibility.


In a Personal Interview on October 12, 1978, Warren, Wiggins (one of the Peace Corps' chief administrators) claimed that Lucas had only told one side of the Peace Corps' story - "the horror side" - in his book. Wiggins fired off a rebuttal to his former colleague.


Few books in the twentieth century have been as influential - in terms of the development needs of the Third World - as E.F. Schumacher's *Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). Very briefly, he argued for low-cost, small-scale production operations which are people-based and labour-intensive as against capital-intensive developments like huge highways and dams. His thesis depended upon utilising "appropriate technology." Schumacher argued that work places should be created where people live, that these places should be cheap and production methods simple.


21Details in ACTION Update, July/August, 1979 (Published by ACTION, Washington D.C.), P. 3.

22Richard Celeste quoted in ACTION Update, April, 1979, p.2.

Celeste, a 41-year old Ohioan was a Rhodes Scholar, an executive assistant to Ambassador Chester Bowles and a Lieutenant-Governor of Ohio, before accepting the Directorship of the Peace Corps.


CHAPTER ONE

Precedents Of The Peace Corps


Pp. 16953 (Moss)
16954 (Young)
16981 (Symington)


19 Harris Wofford, Oral History Interview conducted by the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library (Hereafter referred to as J.F.K.M.L.) P.102.


25 C.R., August 26th, 1960. 86th Congress, 2nd. Session, Volume 106, Part 8, P.17872 "Point Four Youth Corps" took its name from President Truman's "bold, new plan" for American technical assistance to, and private investment in, the Third World announced in 1949. This was, literally, the "fourth point" in a programme for American foreign policy which included the U.N.O., the Marshall Plan and N.A.T.O.


44. Henry Reuss, Oral History Interview conducted by the J.F.K.M.L., P. 71.

45 Ibid. P. 250


47 Ibid.


52 Henry Reuss, Oral History Interview conducted by the J.F.K.M.L., P. 71.


CHAPTER TWO

THE MEETING OF IDEA AND FATE IN A CREATIVE HOUR


2 Harris Wofford, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L. P. 2.

3 N.Y.T., November 3rd., 1960, 1 : 5.

4 This account of Kennedy's appearance in San Francisco owes a great deal to David F. Powers (Personal Interview, October 30th, 1978, Boston). Powers was with Kennedy on every stop of the 1960 campaign.

5 Pierre Salinger letter to George Sullivan, October 28th, 1963. Central Subject Files (Hereafter referred to as C.S.F.), Box 126, J.F.K.M.L.


Ibid.


Ibid.


31 Richard Goodwin letter to Archibald Cox, March 12th, 1960. Staff Files of Theodore Sorenson, Box 24, J.F.K.M.L.


37 Solis Horwitz, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L. p. 5.


William D. Moyers. As quoted in The New Republic, December 21st., 1963. Moyers was a member of Johnson's campaign staff who became Deputy - Director of the Peace Corps.


David F. Powers. Personal Interview, October 30th, 1978, Boston. This account of events at Michigan in the early hours of October 14th, 1960 owes much to Mr. Powers. There is no formal record of Kennedy's visit.

Ibid.


53 Ibid., P. 511.


67. Ibid.

68. John F. Kennedy, September 27th, 1960, Lorain Stadium, Ohio; and, October 8th, 1960, Paducah, Kentucky Airport. In Freedom of Communications, (Part I), Pp. 369 and 529.


Information from: Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.,
A Thousand Days, P. 557. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy,
P. 208, and John Kenneth Galbraith, Personal Interview,

See: C.R., March 21st., 1961, P. 4340 (Shapp);
C.R., June 20th, 1961, P. 10866 (O'Hara); Samuel P. Hayes,
An International Peace Corps: The Promise And The Problems,
P. 13 (Bowles); William O. Douglas, Oral History Interview
conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 23; The Annals (May, 1966),
P. 9 (Reuther) Roy Hoopes, The Complete Peace Corps Guide
(Sulzberger), P 50; and James Reston, Sketches In The Sand (New York:)
Vintage Books, 1967), P.18

See: Samuel P. Hayes, An International Peace Corps:
The Promise And The Problems, P. 12 (Rostow);
N.Y.T., November 4th, 1960, 23 : 2 (Bowie);
Hayes, An International Peace Corps, P. 11 (Rollman);
Harlan Cleveland, Gerald J. Mangone and John Clarke,
The Overseas Americans (New York, 1960) and
The President's Commission On National Goals, Goals For
Americans (New York; Columbia University Press, 1960)
P. 17.

C.R., February 2nd., 1961, 87th Congress 1st. Session,
Volume 107, Part 2, P. 1822 (Humphrey and Reuss); and
C.R., June 17th, 1960, 86th Congress, 2nd. Session, Volume 106,
Part 10, P. 13152 (Brademas).

Samuel P. Hayes, An International Peace Corps:
The Promise And The Problems, P. 12.

C.R., August 24th, 1961, 87th Congress, 1st. Session,
Volume 107, Part 12, P. 16982.

John F. Kennedy, "Acceptance Speech At The Democratic
Proceedings Of The Democratic National Convention (Washington,
1964).

John F. Kennedy, October 31st., 1960. Rayburn Plaza
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Freedom of Communications (Part I)
P. 834.


Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, P. 229.


91. Ibid., P. 178.


98. Paul Cowan, "The Making of An Un-American" (New York : Viking Press, 1970) P. 81. Cowan, a volunteer in the mid-60's, recalled Hayden talking about Kennedy's speech at Michigan in a "genuine, deeply nostalgic" tone, Hayden was one of the Chicago Seven, and in the vanguard of protest against the Vietnam war in the late 1960's.

Footnotes

CHAPTER THREE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
PEACE CORPS

1Walt Rostow letter to Fred Holborn (Office of Senator Kennedy), November 15th, 1960. P.O.F., Box 64, J.F.K.M.L.

2Ibid.

3John F. Kennedy letter to Walt Rostow, November 16th, 1960. Personal Papers of Max Millikan, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.

4Ibid.


7Figure given by Senator Hubert Humphrey in Congressional Record (C.R.), June 1st., 1961, 87th Congress, 1st. Session, Vol. 107, Part 6, P. 9287.

8Richard Goodwin memorandum to President - elect Kennedy, November 23rd., 1960, P.O.F., Box 30, J.F.K.M.L.


14 Max Millikan memorandum to President - elect Kennedy, December 30th, 1960, Personal Papers of Max Millikan, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.


16 Ibid.


Shriver was Director of the Peace Corps from 1961 to 1966. Between 1964 and 1968 he was also Director of Office of Economic Opportunity (commonly referred to as the War on Poverty). From 1965 to 1968 he was a Special Assistant to Lyndon Johnson. He was Ambassador to France between 1968 and 1970 and in 1972 he ran for the Vice-Presidency of the United States on the Democratic ticket with George McGovern. In 1976 he contested a number of primaries as a Presidential candidate. Shriver was still active in politics, though not in political office when he was interviewed by the author in 1978. At that time he was a partner in the Washington law firm of Fried, Frank, Strauss, Shriver and Kempelman.


Among the academic institutions which sent in reports were: Harvard, Princeton, University of California, Yale, New York University, Swarthmore College, American University, University of Utah, Monmouth College and Grinnell College.

Among the foundations and institutions were: Rockefeller, Brookings, the Foreign Policy Clearing House, the National Council of Churches, and the Stanford Research Unit.

As well as these, the Kennedy Library and the Peace Corps Archives have hundreds of reports from various groups and individuals.


36 Names listed in rough draft of article by Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps", in P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L. The final version of the article appeared in Foreign Affairs magazine July, 1963.


40 For background information on Bill Josephson, see Who's Who In Peace Corps Washington, Pp. 18 and 19.


42 This information is gathered from William Josephson's comprehensive Oral History Interview lodged in the Kennedy Library and from a Personal Interview with Mr. Josephson on December 6th, 1978 in New York City.


49. Ibid., Pp. 2 - 27.


55. Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps", Foreign Affairs, (July 1963), P. 698.


58. William Josephson memorandum to Sargent Shriver, February 27th, 1961, Bush Papers, Box 2., J.F.K.M.L.


60. Harris Wofford, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 106.


64. William Josephson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 8
65 Sargent Shriver, *Report To The President On The Peace Corps in P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.*


68 For further reference to this and other points concerning the Report, see Sargent Shriver, *Report To The President On The Peace Corps, P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.*


70 Sargent Shriver memorandum to John F. Kennedy, February 24th, 1961. *P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.*

71 Sargent Shriver, *Personal Interview, October 3rd., 1978, Washington D.C.*


Footnotes

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE


2 Ibid.


5 Sargent Shriver described President Kennedy's feeling on this matter in a Personal Interview, October 3rd., 1978, Washington D.C.

6 Ibid.

7 Sargent Shriver letter to John F. Kennedy (undated). P.O.F. Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.


10 Sargent Shriver memorandum to all Peace Corps Working Group members. February 27th, 1961. Personal Papers of Gerald Bush. (Hereafter referred to as Bush Papers), Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.
11 Al Sims memorandum to Sargent Shriver, March 7th, 1961; Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.


15 John D. Young memorandum to Sargent Shriver, March 8th, 1961; Staff Files of C. Bellino, Box 1642, J.F.K.M.L.

16 Ibid.

17 Thomas Quimby, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 57.


19 Thomas Quimby, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 36.


21 This section owes a great deal to a Personal Interview with William Kelly, December 16th, 1978, Washington D.C.
Kenny O'Donnell's words as well as the gist of this episode can be found in Harris Wofford Oral History Interview at the J.F.K.M.L., P. 102.


Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps", Foreign Affairs (July, 1963), no. 41, P. 694.


Sargent Shriver, "Five Years With The Peace Corps", in Peace Corps Reader (U.S. Peace Corps, 1967), P. 21.

Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps", Foreign Affairs (July, 1963), P. 694.

John D. Young memorandum to Sargent Shriver, March 20th, 1961; Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.


Ibid., P. 49.


36. John D. Young memorandum to Sargent Shriver, March 20th, 1961; Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.


40. Herbert Hoover letter to John F. Kennedy, March 4th, 1961; Central Subject Files (Hereafter referred to as C.S.F.), Box 126, J.F.K.M.L.


43. Sargent Shriver, Report To The President On The Peace Corps, Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.
Transcript of tape recorded message from Sargent Shriver to Dean Rusk, May 26th, 1961; Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.


Henry Labouisse, Personal Interview, December 7th, 1978, New York City.

See: William Moyers letter to Clem Zablocki, June 27th, 1978; and William Moyers memorandum to Sargent Shriver, February 27th, 1961; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.

Dean Rusk quoted by Sargent Shriver in a letter to Chester Bowles, February 28th, 1961; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.

Chester Bowles memorandum to John F. Kennedy, March 6th, 1961; Chester Bowles Papers, Yale University.


This reconstruction of events owes a great deal to William Josephson’s Oral History Interview in the J.F.K.M.L., P. 16.


55 John F. Kennedy memorandum to Sargent Shriver, March 30th, 1961; C.S.F., Box 126, J.F.K.M.L.


57 Ibid.


63 Lyndon Johnson quoted in William Moyers letter to Chairman Clem Zablocki (The International Relations Committee, U.S. Congress) "Moyers Views In Support Of The Peace Corps Reform Act", June 27th, 1978, Appendix 6, P. 86.

64 Ibid.

66. Ibid. This story is corroborated by other Oral Histories in the J.F.K.M.L. See: Harris Wofford, P. 104 and Bradley Patterson, P. 23.

67. Ralph Dungan, memorandum to Dean Rusk, May 2nd, 1961; C.S.F. Box 126, J.F.K.M.L.


70. William Josephson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 26; in a Personal Interview, Ralph Dungan recalled that he had been much displeased at Wiggins and Josephson.

71. Sargent Shriver, Point Of The Lance, P. 15.


73. Harris Wofford memorandum to John F. Kennedy, May 25th 1961; P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.

Ralph Dungan memorandum to Harris Wofford, March 7th, 1961; C.S.F., Box 670, J.F.K.M.L.

See: The Guardsman, March 22nd., 1961;
N.Y.T., March 5th, 1961, 46 : 5 (on Farleigh Dickinson University);
N.Y.T., March 18th, 1961, 11 : 2 (on students at New York University)
N.Y.T., June 25th, 1961, 23 : 1 (on educational establishments); and

See: Congressional Record (hereafter referred to as C.R.), 87th Congress, 1st. Session;
P. 4352 (Bible)
P. 5926 (Goldwater)
P. A2722 (Keating)
P. 3333 (Humphrey).

N.Y.T., March 3rd., 1961, 3 : 2 (embassies);
N.Y.T., March 8th, 1961, 13 : 2 (on Nehru);
N.Y.T., March 9th, 1961, 18 : 5 (on Azikiwe);
N.Y.T., March 7th, 1961, 29 : 5 (on Brandt);
N.Y.T., March 4th, 1961, 2 : 6 (on Parliament)
and Newsweek, February 5th, 1961 (on MacMillan).

Lou Harris, Confidential Poll to President Kennedy "Public Reaction To President Kennedy During First Sixty Days of Administration", P.O.F., Box 63, J.F.K.M.L.

See: New Republic, March 13th, 1961;
C.R., June 22nd., 1961, 87th Congress, 1st. Session P. A4762 (on "crackpot idea");
N.Y.T., April 19th, 1961, 25 : 1 (on Daughters of The American Revolution);
N.Y.T., March 24th, 1961, 25 : 2 (on Young Republicans); and

See memoranda from:
Morris Abram to Sargent Shriver, May 18th, 1961; and
Carroll Wilson to Sargent Shriver, June 11th, 1961;
Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.
See: N.Y.T., January 20th, 1961, 3 : 2 (on Keita)
N.Y.T., March 29th, 1961, 7 : 1 (on Harriman);
Val Burati memorandum to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., May 4th,
N.Y.T., March 7th, 1961, 29 : 6 (on Johannesburg Star ); and

For quote from the Times of India, see, Sargent Shriver,
"Two Years of The Peace Corps", Foreign Affairs, July, 1963,
P. 695; for Kennedy's words, see "Presidential News Conference",

Sargent Shriver, "The Job Was Tough", address to
the Seventeenth National Congress on Higher Education, Chicago,
April 6th, 1962. In Speeches of Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps
Archives.

Sargent Shriver, Personal Interview, October 3rd.,
1978, Washington D.C.

See: Sargent Shriver, Point Of The Lance (New York:
1964), P. 42 (on U.Nu); Ed Bayley, Oral History Interview
conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 40 (on Nkrumah); and
John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal (New York :

Harris Wofford memorandum to John F. Kennedy,
May 25th, 1961; P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.

Ed Bayley, Oral History Interview conducted by


Harris Wofford memorandum to John F. Kennedy,
May 25th, 1961, P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.


Sargent Shriver memorandum to Peace Corps senior staff, September, 1961; in "Beginnings" folder, Peace Corps Archives.


Sargent Shriver memorandum to Peace Corps senior staff, September, 1961; in "Beginnings" folder, Peace Corps Archives.
MARK EVANS, Vice-President of Metromedia interview with Sargent Shriver on television Talk-Show, March 8th, 1962.

"Mr. Shriver, your association with Congress has become almost a love affair. Would you care to tell us how?"

Transcript in J.F.K.M.L.


3 Sargent Shriver memoranda to President Kennedy: March 8th, 1962; February 12th, 1962; March 27th, 1962; In President's Office Files (P.O.F.) Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.


15. Quotations from C.R., March - April, 1961: 87th Congress, 1st. Session. Pp. 5926 (Goldwater) 6833 (Wiley) 4284 (Young) 5361 (Hart) 3790 (Muskie) 4759 (McGee) 5282 (Libonati). Bolton and Rhodes are quoted in the N.Y.T., March 9th, 1961 (18 : 5) and March 24th, 1961 (17 : 8).

16. William Josephson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L. My discussion of these legal controversies is based on Josephson's account.

17. Ibid.

From, draft of the Peace Corps bill. Staff files of Myer Feldman, Box 1561, J.F.K.M.L.


The Kennedy Administration did particularly badly over foreign aid appropriations. In 1961 (for 1962) there was an 18% cut. In 1962 (for 1963) there was an 18.4% cut. In 1963 (for 1964) there was a 33.8% cut.

Sargent Shriver memorandum to President Kennedy, March 14, 1961. P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.


Sargent Shriver memorandum to President Kennedy, September 6, 1961. Central Subject Files (C.S.F.) Box 710, J.F.K.M.L.

Sargent Shriver, Personal Interview, October 10, 1978, Washington D.C. Shriver also emphasised that his personal finances, not public funds, paid for these meals.


Sargent Shriver letter to Hubert Humphrey, September 1, 1961. Peace Corps Congressional Liaison Files, Peace Corps Archives, Washington D.C.


Don Romine. Personal Interview, October 6, 1978, Washington D.C.


For a fuller account of the chronology of the Peace Corps Act, see the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961, Vol. 17, Pp. 324-8; the Peace Corps' "Declaration of Purpose" is in Section 2 of The Peace Corps Act (Public Law 87 - 293).

Notwithstanding his oratorical deficiencies, Gross makes an interesting study of the mid-Western, Republican congressman. Until he retired (in 1974), he was a consistent opponent of government spending - especially foreign aid. In 1949 he voted against the Marshall Plan. He was variously described as "a pillar of parsimony", "the antidote to boondoggling", "a reactionary nit-picker" and "the abominable no-man". His final statement on foreign aid was: "I leave Congress with an unblemished record of opposition to foreign aid. If I could have but one epitaph on my grave it would be a simple one - Foreign aid was always cheaper by the Gross". His statements were usually entertaining - after a cantankerous fashion - but his attitude was deadly serious and indeed, was shared by many southern and mid-Western Republicans.


William J. Fulbright. Personal Interview, December 19, 1978, Washington D.C. Former Senator Fulbright was a most candid interviewee. He also expressed himself in numerous letters to, and about, the Peace Corps between 1961 and 1963. For instance, on January 23, 1962, he wrote a long letter criticising the Peace Corps, to Dean Rusk, complaining that Volunteer subsistence levels were too high in Colombia - when compared to the Fulbright grantees there.


Sargent Shriver memorandum to President Kennedy, August 2, 1961. C.S.F., Box 710, J.F.K.M.L.

The Career Planning Board was finally set up on the Peace Corps' own initiative in July, 1963 with the aid of a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. It was called the Career Information Service and helped Volunteers with problems of readjustment.


51 As quoted in the Peace Corps Act, Page 6, Section 8, paragraph (C).


54 William Josephson memorandum to Larry Dennis, September 1, 1961. Josephson Papers, J.F.K.M.L. Josephson went on record as saying he definitely did not consider Kamen a "security risk".


57 Ed Bayley, Oral History Interview conducted by the J.F.K.M.L. P. 90.


60 Hubert Humphrey letter to Sargent Shriver, April 2, 1962. Larry O'Brien memorandum to Sargent Shriver, November 3, 1961. From P.O.F., Box 86. J.F.K.M.L. Only the far less controversial Disarmament Agency received a more favourable margin of votes than the Peace Corps in the Congress.


62 This is not a strictly logical conclusion. Some senators who voted for the Hickenlooper amendment liked the Peace Corps idea but did not want to see too much money spent on it – Fulbright was probably in this category. However, Shriver insisted that the Peace Corps had asked for the absolute minimum (40 million dollars) it would need for fiscal year 1962. Therefore, any amendment was effectively cutting the Peace Corps' life supply at the crucial stage of its development. On this notion, I have based my analysis of voting patterns in the Senate.

63 Although he was considered a liberal in foreign affairs, Fulbright's domestic constituency was notably conservative (Arkansas) and, at times his voting record reflected this. His negative stance on Civil Rights, for instance, probably prevented Kennedy from choosing Fulbright as his Secretary of State in 1961.

64 C.R., August 25, 1961, 87th Congress, 1st. Session, Volume 107, Part 13, P. 17051. Everett Dirksen was Senate minority leader; Alexander Wiley was the ranking Republican on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

William Moyers memorandum to Sargent Shriver, October 25, 1961, Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.


House Committee On Foreign Affairs, Report (no. 759), December 10, 1963. The International Peace Corps Secretariat was supported primarily by a 40,000 dollar donation from the U.S. State Department. It operated out of the Peace Corps' offices in Washington from January, 1963 and had a staff of 15. Its Secretary-General was Richard Goodwin, one-time Special Assistant to President Kennedy and later Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. The Congress's refusal to grant it sufficient funds greatly curtailed its power and potential.


This information was gleaned from a number of sources: A Josephson memorandum to Moyers of September 13, 1963 (Records of Government Agencies, J.F.K.M.L.), the Peace Corps' Presentation To The U.S. Congress for F.Y. 1963, and a Personal Interview with Bill Josephson, December 6, 1978, New York.


76 Sargent Shriver during Hearings before: The House Sub-Committee on Foreign Aid Appropriations April, 30, 1963, P. 94 and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 15, 1963, P. 68. 88th Congress, 1st. Session.


There is no reason to doubt the sincerity behind Kennedy's remark. He might well have been inclined to admire Shriver's success with the Congress - especially in the area of foreign aid - when compared to his own undistinguished record.
Footnotes

CHAPTER SIX

THE ANTI-BUREAUCRATIC BUREAUCRACY

1 Sargent Shriver memorandum to Dean Rusk, May 26, 1961; Personal Papers of Gerald Bush (Hereafter referred to as Bush Papers), Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.

2 Sargent Shriver memorandum to the Peace Corps staff, April, 1965; Bush Papers, Box I, J.F.K.M.L.


5 Sargent Shriver letter to George La Noue, August 25, 1964; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.

6 William Josephson memorandum to Sargent Shriver, August 6, 1961; Personal Papers of William Josephson (Hereafter referred to as Josephson Papers), J.F.K.M.L.

7 Director's Staff Meeting, Report, March 20, 1961; Records of Government Agencies, The Peace Corps, Roll 1, J.F.K.M.L.

8 John D. Young letter to author, March 27, 1979.

9 Ibid. Young's memorandum on "Basic Concepts For Peace Corps Interim Organisation", has already been referred to in the chapter on "The Battle For Independence".

According to Lewis H. Butler, "The Overseas Staff" in The Annals, (May, 1966), P. 90, Peace Corps Reps came from the following occupations:
12 per cent from the legal profession;
12 per cent from Universities;
9 per cent from secondary education;
3 per cent from government agencies:
7 per cent from private business;
7 per cent from international organisations;
18 per cent from public health, social work, local administration etc...

Personal Interviews with:
William Josephson, December 6, 1978, New York;
Franklin Williams, December 5, 1978, New York.
20 Sargent Shriver quoted in Robert A. Liston, 
Sargent Shriver: A Candid Portrait (New York: Farrar, 
Strauss and Co., 1964), P. 127.

21 William Josephson, Oral History Interview conducted 
by J.F.K.M.L., P. 73.

22 Sargent Shriver letter to George L Noue, 
August 25, 1964; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L. 
See also, Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: 
The Politics of Leadership (New York: Signet Books, 
1960).

23 Harris Wofford, Oral History Interview conducted 

24 Robert B. Textor (ed.), Cultural Frontiers of 
The Peace Corps, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. 

25 Lawrence H. Fuchs, Those Peculiar Americans 

26 Charles Houston letter to William Moyers, 
(undated), 1964; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.

27 Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted 

28 Ibid., P. 45

29 See: Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview 
conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 15; and Harris Wofford, 
speech to Swarthmore College, November 22, 1965; in. 
Speeches of Harris Wofford, Peace Corps Archives.

30 Anonymous staff member quoted in Robert A. Liston, 
Sargent Shriver: A Candid Portrait (New York: 1964), 
P. 151.

32 Elizabeth Harris memorandum to Warren Wiggins, September 17, 1962; in "Peace Corps Early Days" file, Box 13, Peace Corps Archives.


37 Charles Houston letter to William Moyers, (undated), 1964; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.


39 Sargent Shriver, Report To The President On The Peace Corps, February, 1961; P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.

40 William Josephson quoted in Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive Session, February 5, 1964: "A Bill To Amend Further The Peace Corps Act". Transcript in Peace Corps Archives.


Sargent Shriver quoted in a Director's Staff Meeting, March 30, 1961; Records of Government Agencies, The Peace Corps, Roll I, J.F.K.M.L.


See: William Josephson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 60; and Sargent Shriver, memorandum to senior staff, September, 1961 in "Beginnings" folder, Peace Corps Archives.
The attitude of the professional bureaucrats in the Peace Corps (Wiggins and Kelly) towards the private sector is drawn from Personal Interviews with Warren Wiggins, October 12, 1978, Washington D.C. and William Kelly, December 16, 1978, Washington D.C. Reinforcement of these views can be found in the Oral History Interviews of William Josephson and Harris Wofford conducted by J.F.K.M.L.

Harris Wofford, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 105.

Gordon Boyce memorandum to Sargent Shriver, June 7, 1961; Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.


On the "marriage between government and education", see: Sargent Shriver, Commencement address at University of Notre Dame, Indiana June 4, 1961 (Speeches of Sargent Shriver in Peace Corps Archives); and Sargent Shriver memorandum to Peace Corps staff, January 9, 1963, Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.

John D. Young letter to author, March 27, 1979.


Ibid., p. 98


60 Harris Wofford, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 105.

61 Shriver's handwritten notes are in the margin of Franklin Williams's memorandum to him, May 29, 1962; Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.


22 Sargent Shriver letter to George La Noue, August 25, 1964; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.


73 Sargent Shriver memorandum to Peace Corps staff, December, 1961; P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.

74 Sargent Shriver quoted in Lewis H. Butler, "The Overseas Staff", The Annals, (May, 1966), P. 84.


76 Warren Wiggins memorandum to Regional Directors, June 19, 1964; Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.

78. William Haddad memorandum to Sargent Shriver, May 17, 1961; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.

79. Sargent Shriver memorandum to the Peace Corps staff, December, 1961; P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.


81. William Moyers memorandum to Sargent Shriver, March 5, 1964; Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.


83. Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 42.


86. Newell Flatter, Personal Interview, May 8, 1979, Boston.


89 Ibid.


92 Sargent Shriver memorandum to Peace Corps staff, December, 1961; P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.


95 Sargent Shriver, Personal Interview, October 10, 1978, Washington D.C.

96 Charles Peters memorandum to Sargent Shriver (attached to Evaluation Report on Brazil by Herb Wegner and Paul Vanderwood, 1963), Peace Corps Archives.

98 Information on evaluation from a Personal Interview with Charles Peters, December 18, 1978; and Thomas Quimby, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 54.

99 Joseph Kauffman memorandum to William Moyers, September 27, 1962; Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.


107. William Haddad memorandum to Peace Corps
Senior Staff, July 23, 1962; Bush Papers, Box 2,
J.F.K.M.L.

108. Statistics quoted in Robert B. Textor (ed.),
Cultural Frontiers of The Peace Corps (Cambridge,

109. William Josephson, Oral History Interview

110. Franklin Williams memorandum to Peace Corps
Staff, March 6, 1963; Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.

111. Charles Houston letter to William Moyers,
1963; Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.

112. William Haddad to Sargent Shriver, April 8,
1963; Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.

113. Sargent Shriver memorandum to Kermit Gordon
(Bureau of the Budget), May 21, 1963; Josephson Papers,
J.F.K.M.L.

114. William Moyers memorandum to Myer Feldman,
August 12, 1963; Staff Files of Myer Feldman, Box 1544,
J.F.K.M.L.

115. Sargent Shriver, record of conversation with
George Ball, April 29, 1963; Personal Papers of George Ball.

116. John W. Macy memorandum to Sargent Shriver,
June 12, 1963; Staff Files of Myer Feldman, Box 1544,
J.F.K.M.L.

117. Robert B. Textor, (ed.) Cultural Frontiers Of
The Peace Corps (Massachusetts, 1966), P. 323.
118 Charles Peters, speech at Peace Corps Selection and Training Conference, 1963; Carton 6, Peace Corps Archives.

Footnotes

CHAPTER SEVEN

PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
AND THE PRESIDENT

1 Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 15.

2 Harris Wofford, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 108.

3 Sargent Shriver memorandum to the President, December 15, 1961; President's Office Files (Hereafter referred to as P.O.F.), Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.


6 Sargent Shriver memorandum to all Peace Corps Reps., July 6, 1962; Director's Chronological File, Peace Corps Archives.

7 Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 15.


Sargent Shriver memorandum to All Peace Corps Reps., December 15, 1961; P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.


Sargent Shriver memorandum to President Kennedy, December 15, 1961; P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.


John D. Young letter to author, March 27, 1979.

N.Y.T., July 13, 1961, 14:1. The Times is referring here to Kennedy's bill proposing federal aid to all schools -- including Catholic ones. It was highly controversial and unsuccessful. Federal aid to religious schools had to wait for President Johnson.


Sargent Shriver, address to Private Voluntary Agencies Conference, December 15, 1961: in Speeches of Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps Archives.

Miss Owens and Bishop Swanstrom quoted at Private Voluntary Agencies Conference, December 15, 1961, New York City.


Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 53. By 1963, religious organisations had seen the valuable work done by the Peace Corps overseas and toned down their criticism. In early 1964, Shriver even persuaded Bishop Swanstrom to act as a supportive witness for Peace Corps legislation in the Congress.
29 Sargent Shriver memorandum to President Kennedy, January 8, 1962; P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.

30 Sargent Shriver, address to the National Conference On Religion and Race, January 15, 1963 (Chicago, Illinois). In Speeches of Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps Archives.

31 Wofford and Shriver had been responsible for persuading Kennedy to make the famous phone-call to Martin Luther King's wife when he was in jail during the 1960 campaign. More than any other action, this swung black opinion in favour of Kennedy.

The "Brown" decision referred to is the "Brown Vs. Board of Education of Topeka" Supreme Court ruling of 1954. This over-turned the Plessy Vs. Ferguson ruling of the late nineteenth century and said that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place".


35 See: N.Y.T., June 28, 1962, 28: 6 (on University of Texas); and N.Y.T., July 13, 1962, 10: 3 (on the inn in Maryland).


Figures on race given by Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps", Foreign Affairs (July, 1963), P. 499.


Director's Staff Meeting, March 7, 1961 (Records of Government Agencies, J.F.K.M.L.); Sargent Shriver, quoted during First Meeting of Peace Corps National Advisory Council, May 22, 1961 (Transcript in Peace Corps Archives); Sargent Shriver, address "On Women In The Peace Corps", address to Y.W.C.A, October 18, 1961 (Peace Corps Archives)


Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 2.


Dean Rusk, letter to author, December 8, 1978

Ibid.

William J. Crockett memorandum to the Peace Corps, June 6, 1961; Box 13, Peace Corps Archives.


William Haddad memorandum to Sargent Shriver, July 16, 1962; Carton 16, Peace Corps Archives.


William Haddad memorandum to Ralph Dungan, August 31, 1962; Central Subject Files, Box 126, J.F.K.M.L.


63 Charles Baldwin, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L. P. 60.


69 See memoranda to Sargent Shriver from Ed Murrow, March 14, 1961 (C.S.F., Box 126); Orville Freeman, April 11, 1961 (C.S.F., Box 126); and Luther Hodges, June 30, 1961 (C.S.F., Box 670), J.F.K.M.L.

The C.I.A. also agreed - should it enlist a former Volunteer - that it would never send him to the country in which he had served with the Peace Corps.


82. Sargent Shriver, Personal Interview, October 10, 1978, Washington D.C.

83. See Sargent Shriver memoranda to John F. Kennedy: January 5, 1962 (India), P.O.F. Box 85; December 12, 1962 (on North Borneo - Sarawak), National Security Files, Boxes 284 - 90; June 19, 1961 (on Harvard), P.O.F. Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.

84. Sargent Shriver handwritten letter to President Kennedy, October 27, 1961. P.O.F. Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.


86. Evelyn Lincoln memorandum to Sargent Shriver, December 28, 1961. P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L. Miss Lincoln told Shriver of Kennedy's praise (she was President Kennedy's private secretary).


Shriver quoted by Bradley Patterson, *Oral History Interview* conducted by J.F.K.M.L., Pp. 18 - 20; Bill Kelly's opinion was noted during a Personal Interview with him, December 16, 1978, Washington D.C. Shriver's remark has been mentioned before and was oft-repeated by him. It can be found in his article "Two Years Of The Peace Corps", *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1963.


100 Juan Bosch, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 21.


Footnotes

CHAPTER EIGHT

AN EXAMPLE FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE


2 Margaret Mead in "Foreword" to Robert Textor et al., Cultural Frontiers Of The Peace Corps (M.I.T. Press, 1966).


4 Statistics quoted by Sargent Shriver, address to St. Louis University, June 22, 1962. In Speeches of Sargent Shriver, P.C.A.


6 Robert Textor et al., Cultural Frontiers of The Peace Corps (Massachusetts, 1966), P. XII.


8 This information was gained from David Gelman in a Personal Interview, December 4, 1978, New York City.


Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, *Keeping Kennedy's Promise* (Colorado: 1978), P. 1


*Ibid*. Staff member also quoted by Haddad.


Handwritten remarks of Jacqueline Kennedy. The photograph referred to has pride of place on Sargent Shriver's office wall and was seen by the author during *Personal Interview* with Shriver, October 3 and 10, 1978.

Eunice Kennedy Shriver had a consuming interest in a "Domestic Peace Corps" based on Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps model. She had been executive secretary to the National Conference on Juvenile Delinquency in 1948 and had worked with teenage delinquents in Chicago. In 1963, she worried President Kennedy about the idea so much that he said finally "Why don't you call Bobby? (R.F.K.) See if Bobby could get it going. It's not a bad idea." Quoted in A.M. Schlesinger Jr, *Robert Kennedy And His Times* (London: Futura Books, 1979) P. 444.


Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., p.26 Harris Wofford, one of the most respected men in American public life, went on to become President of Bryn Mawr College; Bill Moyers became a Special Assistant to President Johnson and a highly influential journalist and commentator on current affairs; Bill Josephson is one of the top lawyers in New York City; Warren Wiggins became President of Trans-Century Corporation, a consultancy firm for development programmes.


N.Y.T., March 6, 1963, 8:3.

Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., p 55.
CHAPTER NINE

THE RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND
SELECTION OF VOLUNTEERS

1Lyndon B. Johnson to Sargent Shriver. Story recalled
by Warren Wiggins in A One Act Fantasy Dialogue: A Memorial
Service For Alex Firfer. (The Trans Century Pink Bag

2Warren Wiggins, Personal Interview, October 12, 1978,
Washington, D.C.

3Sargent Shriver, Personal Interview, October 10, 1978,
Washington D.C.

4Sargent Shriver memorandum to President Kennedy,

5Sargent Shriver, Director's Staff Meeting, February 19,

6Nicholas Hobbs, Oral History Interview conducted by

7Gerald Bush, Robert Iverson and Lowell E. Kelly,
Peace Corps: Selection and Training (Policy Paper published

8M.A. Guitar, "The Cautious Crusaders." Mademoiselle

9Warren Wiggins telegram to Sargent Shriver, May 1, 1961,
Records of Government Agencies, Peace Corps, Roll 9, J.F.K.M.L.

10N.Y.T., May 7, 1961, 52:1. It might be noted that a
second Placement Test on June 5, 1961 took the number up to
5,210. By the end of 1961 nearly 12,000 tests had been taken.
11. N.Y.T., June 1, 1961, 31:3. In a Personal Interview with the author, Shriver recalled that he was "in a sweat" about the low number of applications.


15. Herbert A. Hoffman (Special Assistant for Recruitment) memorandum to Thomas Quimby, (undated). Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.


17. Sargent Shriver letter to Nathan Pusey, April 20, 1963. Shriver Chronological File, Box 11, Peace Corps Archives (Hereafter referred to as P.C.A.)

18. Robert Gale, Personal Interview, December 21, 1978, Washington D.C. Gale was renowned - even within the Peace Corps - as one of the brightest but most irreverent of the "anti-bureaucratic" bureaucrats. He made a candid and witty interviewee.


20. Ibid P. 5.


24. Ibid, P. 46

25. As reported in a Large Staff Meeting, May 19, 1964. Bush Papers, Box I, J.F.K.M.L.


30. Ibid Pp 6 and 47.


34. Ibid, Pp. 75-76.

35. Ibid


45 William Delano, Personal Interview, December 5, 1978. New York City. The British Outward Bound Schools began during World War Two and were later used by British Industry as a technique for training potential leaders. The schools stressed the ideals of community and service. Two members of the Outward Bound Trust, Sir Spencer Summers and Captain Frederick Fuller, helped the Peace Corps establish its first outdoors camp in Puerto Rico in 1961.


57. Sargent Shriver, speech at Georgetown University, February 16, 1963. In Sargent Shriver: Speeches, P.C.A.


Ibid.


See: Evaluation Reports by Dee Jacobs, Uruguay, 1964, P. 17, Philip Cook, Tunisia, 1962, P.C.A.


83 Joe Walsh, Personal Interview May 1, 1979, Boston.


94 Ibid. P. 15.


100 William Josephson memorandum to Harry Van Cleve, August 8, 1961; Josephson Papers, J.F.K.M.L.


Ibid, P. 103


118 From Evaluation Report on Panama by Dee Jacobs, 1964, P. 54; and End of Term Conference on The Philippines, 1963 P.M. P.C.A.


122 Sargent Shriver memorandum to Peace Corps Senior Staff, August 1, 1962; Bush Papers, Box 3. J.F.K.M.L.


124 Ibid.


133 Brent K. Ashabranner, *A Moment In History: The First Ten Years of The Peace Corps* (New York, 1971), p. 133. Ashabranner was a former Deputy Director of the Peace Corps and thus had access to these figures.


135 Harris Wofford memorandum to President Kennedy, January 20, 1962. *Personal Papers of Harris Wofford, J.F.K.M.L.*

137 John Demos, "Ghana", The Volunteer, Volume 1, No. 3.


141 Suzanne N. Gordon and Nancy K. Sizer Why People Join The Peace Corps. In The Annals (May, 1966) P. 15. Only 6 per cent of applicants reported a "getting" statement without a "giving" one, but 33 per cent reported a "giving" statement without a "gaining" one.

142 Paul E. Tsongas, Personal Interview, May 9, 1979, Boston.


Footnotes

CHAPTER TEN

PROGRAMMING FOR PEACE

1 Frank Mankiewicz, Personal Interview, December 19 and 20, 1978, Washington D.C.

   Mankiewicz was the driving force behind the community development concept. He told the author of this early staff meeting.


Tongsun Park became the leading character in the "Koreagate" scandal of 1977-78. American senators and congressmen accepted bribes from Park in return for favours granted to the Korean government.
9 John Kenneth Galbraith memorandum to Sargent Shriver, April 29, 1961. Personal Papers of Harris Wofford, Box 6, J.F.K.M.L.


Lee St. Lawrence also programmed the first Peace Corps projects in Tunisia and Indonesia.


17 U.S. Peace Corps, Quarterly Statistical Summary, Table I, December 31, 1961. P.C.A.


22 Thomas Quimby, Oral History Interview conducted by the J.F.K.M.L., P. 50.


32 Sargent Shriver memorandum to Senior Staff, September, 1961. "Beginnings" Folder, P.C.A.
33 Annie Gutierrez memorandum to Jack Vaughn. In "Peace Corps - Early Days" folder, Box 13, P.C.A.


35 Thomas Quimby, Oral History Interview conducted by the J.F.K.M.L. P. 42.


37 Lawrence Fuchs, Oral History Interview conducted by the J.F.K.M.L. P. 49.


45. This memorandum from Peters to Shriver is quoted in Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, *Keeping Kennedy's Promise*, P. 26.


48. Ibid.


54. Ibid.


57 William Moyers memorandum to Warren Wiggins, August 17, 1963; Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.


60 Gerald Maryanov, "The Representative Staff As Intercultural Mediators in Malaya" in Cultural Frontiers of the Peace Corps by Robert Textor et al (Massachusetts, 1966) P. 73.


63 See: Evaluation Reports by Leveo Sanchez, Brazil, 1962, P. 17; Dee Jacobs, Panama, 1964, P. 2. P.C.A.


65 Ibid., P. 51

66 Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, Keeping Kennedy's Promise, P. 54.


68 As related by Roger Landrum. Large Staff Meeting, May 19, 1964; Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.

70 Gerald Maryanou. "The Representative Staff As Intercultural Mediators in Malaya" in Cultural Frontiers Of The Peace Corps, by Robert Texto et. al. P. 70.

71 Joseph Kauffman memorandum to William Moyers, September 27, 1962; Bush Papers, Box 3, J.F.K.M.L.

72 See Evaluation Reports by David Hapgood, Senegal, 1964, P. 6; Richard Richter, Tanganyika, 1964, P. 3; Robert McGuire, Sierra Leone, 1964, P. 27. P.C.A.


82 Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, Keeping Kennedy's Promise; P. 81.

83 Arnold Deutchman, "Volunteers In The Field: Teaching" in The Annals, P. 78.


88 See: Evaluation Reports by David Gelman, Sierra Leone, 1962, P. 62; Kevin Delany, India, 1963, P. 20. (Ashabranner, who was Assistant Rep. in India, is quoted by Delany). P.C.A.


91 See: Evaluation Reports by Dee Jacobs, Uruguay, 1964, p. 2; Richard Elwell, British Honduras, 1963, p. 3; Dee Jacobs, Costa Rica, 1963; P.C.A.

92 Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, Keeping Kennedy's Promise, p. 84.


98 See: Evaluation Reports by Herb Wegner, Peru, 1963; Meridan Bennett, Colombia, 1964, pp. 10 and 53. P.C.A.


100 Jack Vaughn quoted in Kirby Jones, "The Peace Corps Volunteer In The Field: Community Development". The Annals, p. 64.
See: Evaluation Reports by Dee Jacobs, Panama, 1964, P. 2; Robert McGuire, Sierra Leone, 1964; Philip Cook, Niger, 1963 (Peters memorandum to Shriver, November 18, 1963 attached to this report). P.C.A.


Ibid., P. 123.


Roger Landrum, *Large Staff Meeting*, May 19, 1964; *Bush Papers*, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.


Dr. William Craig, "Report From Wingspread", *Speech* at the University of Oklahoma, April 19, 1964. In P.C.A.


Footnotes

CHAPTER ELEVEN

A SPECIAL GROUP OF YOUNG AMERICANS


11 Volunteer quoted in Lawrence Fuchs, Those Peculiar Americans, P. 110.

12 Ibid.


16 Volunteer quoted in Lawrence Fuchs, Those Peculiar Americans, P. 113.

17 Volunteer quoted in Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, Keeping Kennedy's Promise, P. 17.


26 Conditions described in Lawrence Fuchs, Those Peculiar Americans, P. 111.

27 Volunteer quoted in Ibid, P. 1113.


36 See: Evaluation Reports by Charles Caldwell, Iran, 1964, P. 17; Richard Richter, Ethiopia, 1964, P. 64. P.C.A.


39 David Sszanton, "Cultural Confrontation In The Philippines", in Robert Textor et al, Cultural Frontiers of the Peace Corps (Massachusetts; 1966), Pp. 51-52.


41 See Evaluation Reports by Kevin Delany, India, 1963, P. 12, P.C.A.


79 Robert Textor (editor), *Cultural Frontiers Of The Peace Corps*, P. 11.

80 See: End of Term Conferences on Colombia, June 14-18, 1963 and Nigeria, June 17-19, 1963, P.C.A.


82 Ibid, P. 2.


85 Volunteer quoted, Ibid, P. 54.

86 Charles Peters memorandum to Sargent Shriver, September 17, 1963; attached to *Evaluation Report on Morocco* by Kenneth Love. The Volunteer is quoted from this same report, P. 123. P.C.A.


94 Sargent Shriver, Point Of The Lance, "Acknowledgements".


96 For assessments of these Reps see: Herb Wegner, Peru, 1963, P. 28; Dee Jacobs, Costa Rica, 1963, P. 26; Thorburn Reid, Afghanistan, 1963, P. 5; Philip Cook, Togo, 1964, P. 6. P.C.A.


111 This Volunteer is mentioned in, Herb Wegner and Paul Vanderwood, Evaluation Report on Brazil, 1963, P. 82. P.C.A.


113 Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps", Foreign Affairs (July, 1963), P. 274.


117 See: Evaluation Reports by Wilson McCarthy, The Cameroons 1962, P. 12; Kevin Delany and David Gelman, Liberia, 1963, P. 85; and Dee Jacobs, Guatemala, 1963, P. 33. P.C.A. Evaluator Dee Jacobs noted that the "Dog Incident" in Guatemala had taken place in a country where there were eighteen vehicles for twenty-seven Volunteers - in other words, far too many.


Dee Jacobs and Philip Hardberger, Evaluation Report on The Dominican Republic, 1964, P. 14, P.C.A.


132 Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, Keeping Kennedy's Promise P. X.

133 Charles Peters quoted in The Volunteer magazine, December, 1964.


136 Arnold Deutchman, "Volunteers In The Field: Teaching", The Annals (May, 1966), P. 82.


138 Figures quoted in, Brent K. Ashabranner, A Moment In History, P. 208.

140 Neil Boyer, "Volunteers In The Field: Great Expectations", The Annals (May, 1966), P. 55. Boyer was a Volunteer in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE IMAGE

1 Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps" Foreign Affairs, July, 1963. P. 694.

2 Douglass Cater's famous phrase, "the fourth branch of government" referred to the power of the media in America. See; Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (New York, 1959).

3 Ed Murrow Memorandum to Sargent Shriver, April 20, 1961 "Beginnings" folder. P.C.A.


7 See: Time, March 10, April 7, August 11 and September 8; Newsweek, March 13, April 17; Journal of Home Economics, April, 1961


12 President Kennedy letter to Margery Michelmore, October 18, 1961. P.O.F. Depts / Agencies, Box 85 J.F.K.M.L. It was the President's instructions that the letter should be handed to Miss Michelmore on arrival in London en route from Nigeria.

13 Margery Michelmore letter to President Kennedy, October 30, 1961. P.O.F., Depts / Agencies, Box 85 J.F.K.M.L.
14
See:
Time, October 27, 1961;
U.S. News And World Report, October 30, 1961
Newsweek, October 30, 1961;
New York Post, October 18, 1961;
San Francisco Chronicle, October 26, 1961

15
See:
Commonweal, November 3, 1961"
N.Y.T, October 29, 1961, IV, 10:1;
New Republic, November 6, 1961

16
James Weschler, New York Post, October 18, 1961

17
From, Brent K. Ashabranner, A Moment In History:
The First Ten Years Of The Peace Corps , (New York 1971), P. 83.

18
Warren Wiggins Personal Interview, October 12, 1978
Washington D.C.

19
See:
Time, July 5, 1963;
Vogue, February 1, 1963;
Parade, November 17, 1961;
U.S. News And World Report, December 4, 1961;
A.B.C. Telecast, January 20, 1963;
Newsweek, July 10, 1961

20
See:
Christian Service Monitor, June 1, 1962;
Time, November 17, 1961;
Good Housekeeping, April, 1963;
Baltimore Sun, May 18, 1962

21
See:
Catholic Digest, October, 1962;
Time, December 29, 1961;
N.Y.T. June 25, 1962;

22
Neil Boyer, "Volunteers In The Field: Great Expectations" The
Annals (May, 1966), Pp 61-62

23
See:
N.Y.T, March 4, 1963;
U.S. News And World Report, March 25, 1963
Time, July 5, 1963;
Newsweek, December 25, 1961; and
Washington Star, December 25, 1962
See:
New York Herald Tribune, July 8, 1963;
Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1963;
Washington Post, February 28, 1962;
N.Y.T., March 4, 1963, 10:1:

See:
London Times, August 13, 1963;
Manchester Guardian, January 29, 1962;

Al Sims memorandum to Sargent Shriver, March 23, 1961,
Bush Papers, Box 2, J.F.K.M.L.

Sargent Shriver memorandum to President Kennedy, December 18, 1961. P.O.F., Box 85. J.F.K.M.L.


President Kennedy to Stephen C. Riddleburger, April 13, 1962 C.S.F., Box 670, J.F.K.M.L.

See:
N.Y.T., May 3, 1961 and
N.Y.T., June 25, 1962

Ed Bayley memorandum to Richard McGuire, August 4, 1961
Personal Papers of Ed Bayley, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.


37. Doug Kiker memorandum to Public Information Staff, February 8, 1963. Public Information, Box 6, P.C.A.

38. See:
   N.Y.T., December 17, 1961;


41. Sargent Shriver memorandum to All Peace Corps Reps, September 9, 1963. Publicity, Box 3, P.C.A.


44. Sargent Shriver handwritten letter to President Kennedy (undated) 1961; P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.

45. Sargent Shriver memorandum to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962; P.O.F., Box 86, J.F.K.M.L.


47. See:
   Time, July 5, 1963;
   Meet The Press, December 15, 1963;
   National Geographic, September, 1964

50. Roger Landrum, Large Staff Meeting, May 19, 1964
Bush Papers, Box 1, J.F.K.M.L.

51. Volunteer quoted by Herb Wegner and Paul Vanderwood

52. Volunteer quoted by David Gelman, Evaluation Report
on Tanganyika, 1963, P. 45 P.C.A.

53. See:
Peace Corps News:

February, 1962
May,   1962
June, 1962         P.C.A.

54. See:
End of Term Conference on Tanganyika, 1963,
P.C.A.

See:

Arnold Deutchman "Volunteers In The Field: Teaching", The Annals (May, 1966), P. 73


Volunteer quoted by Lawrence Fuchs Those Peculiar Americans (New York, 1967), P. 128.


Harris Wofford, "The Future Of The Peace Corps", The Annals (May, 1966), P. 130


Sargent Shriver, Personal Interview, October 3, 1978 Washington, D.C.

Charles Peters, Personal Interview, December 18, 1978 Washington, D.C.


73 James Reston, Personal Interview, March 21, 1979, Washington. D.C.


Footnotes

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE PEACE CORPS AND POLITICS

1 Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions (New York: David McKay Company, 1976), p. 47. In later years, David Halberstam argued that Kennedy's interpretation of Khrushev's speech was mistaken. Halberstam claimed Khrushev had been warning the Chinese against incursions into the Third World. Of course, it was some years before American strategists realised that the Sino-Soviet split had taken place around 1960.


3 Sargent Shriver memorandum to Peace Corps Senior Staff, September, 1961. "Beginnings" folder. P.C.A.


6 See, C.R.: August 23, 1961, P. 16829 (Randolph); August 7, 1963, P. 14426 - 7 (Pell); April 3, 1952, P. 5835 (Landrum).


See: Sargent Shriver, Commencement Address at University of Notre Dame, Indiana, June 4, 1961 and Commencement Address at University of St. Louis, June 2, 1962. Speeches of Sargent Shriver, P.C.A.


Of course, the Special Forces became more popularly known as the "Green Berets".


15 Record of Conversation between Sargent Shriver and Sekou Toure June 14, 1961. P.O.F. Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.


Ibid., Pp. 32 - 37. P.C.A.


Ibid., J.F.K.M.L.

Ibid., J.F.K.M.L.

Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, Keeping Kennedy's Promise, P. 82.

See: Sargent Shriver, handwritten letter to John F. Kennedy, (undated), P.O.F., Box 85; Sargent Shriver; "Weekly Report To The President", March 19, 1963, Records of Government Agencies, Peace Corps, Roll 3; and handwritten letter to Eunice Kennedy Shriver (undated) P.O.F. Box 86. All in J.F.K.M.L.

Sargent Shriver, Meet The Press, December 15, 1953.


34 Dean Rusk letter to author, December 8, 1978.


38 Sargent Shriver memorandum to G. Mennen Williams, April 13, 1963, Director's File, Box 66A, P.C.A.

39 Sargent Shriver, Personal Interview, October 10, 1978, Washington, D.C.


42 See: John F. Kennedy to Sargent Shriver, August 29, 1962, P.O.F., Box 86; and Sargent Shriver memorandum to John F. Kennedy, June 21, 1961, P.O.F., Box 93. J.F.K.M.L.


56 Ibid., P. 37.


59 See C.R.: August 24, 1961, P. 16981 (Saltonstall); April 3, 1962, P. 5831 (Durno); March 27, 1961, P. 5282 (Libonati); August 24, 1961, P. 16952 (Moss).


65 Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, Keeping Kennedy's Promise P. 79.


67 Soviet remarks reported in the Director's Staff Meeting August 22, 1961, Records of Government Agencies, Peace Corps, Roll 3, J.F.K.M.L.


69 Sargent Shriver memorandum to Walt Rostow, June 16, 1961, National Security Files, Box 284 - 90, J.F.K.M.L.

70 Ambassador Greene telegram to Dean Rusk, July 21, 1961, National Security Files, Box 284 - 90, J.F.K.M.L.

71 Record of Conversation between Sargent Shriver and Sekou Toure, June 14, 1961. F.C.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.

72 Ibid.


76 Sargent Shriver, Commencement Address at The Agricultural and Technical College, North Carolina, June 1, 1963. Speeches of Sargent Shriver, P.C.A.


William Friedland, "Nurses In Tanganyika", in Cultural Frontiers Of The Peace Corps, (ed.) by Robert Texter, P. 53.


Peace Corps Exit Interviews, Box 16, P.C.A.


Sargent Shriver, Point Of The Lance, P. 7.

96 Harris Wofford memorandum to John F. Kennedy, January 20, 1962, Staff Files of Theodore Sorensen, Box 68, J.F.K.M.L.

97 Harris Wofford memorandum to John F. Kennedy, July 17, 1961, Staff Files of Chester Bowles, Box 28, J.F.K.M.L.

98 Harris Wofford to John F. Kennedy, May 25, 1961, P.O.F., Box 85, J.F.K.M.L.


FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

TO LEAVE SOMETHING BEHIND

1 Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps," Foreign Affairs (July, 1963), P. 707

2 Hubert Humphrey, The Education Of A Public Man: My Life In Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1976), P. 230


9 David Hapgood, Evaluation Report on Senegal, 1964, P. 34 P.C.A.

10 Frank Mankiewicz, Press Conference (undated), in "Beginnings" folder, Peace Corps Archives.


15 Shriver quoted these statistics in Hearings before the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations, May 26, 1964; his quote about the Peace Corps' impact is from his article, "Two Years of the Peace Corps" in Foreign Affairs (July, 1963) P.704.

16 Sargent Shriver quoted these figures in Hearings before the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations, May 26, 1964.

17 These statistics come from Evaluation Reports on the countries concerned, Richard Richter's comments are from his Evaluation Report on Ghana, 1964, P.38. P.C.A.


22 Paul L. Doughty and Alan R. Holmberg, Peace Corps Program Impact In The Peruvian Andes, (Ithaca, New York: Department of Anthropology, 1964)


38 Volunteer quoted in the Peace Corps' Third Annual Report, (U.S. Peace Corps, 1964) P.84

39 Newell Flather, Personal Interview, May 8, 1979, Boston.


41 Paul Tsongas quoted in ACTION Update, March 19, 1979. (Published by ACTION), P.11

42 John Monro quoted in The Volunteer magazine, February 1963. Unfortunately no detailed research has been undertaken on what became of Volunteers after their Peace Corps service - it would make an interesting subject for a future doctoral dissertation.


44 David Hapgood and Meridan Bennett, Agents of Change: A Close Look At The Peace Corps (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1968), P.220

45 Meridan Bennett, Evaluation Report on Colombia, 1964, P.86, P.C.A.


Statement of Carolyn R. Payton, Director of the Peace Corps, Before the Committee on International Relations Sub-Committee on International Development, February 14, 1978.

The author held conversations with many returned volunteers. The given examples are drawn from Personal Interviews with Paul Tsongas, May 19, 1979, Boston and Joe Walsh, May 1, 1979, Boston.

Sargent Shriver memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, February 12, 1963, National Security Files Boxes 284-90, J.F.K.M.L. The International Peace Corps Secretariat was established in 1963 to foster voluntary organisations in other countries. Congress limited its power to providing personnel (not money) but nevertheless, it was quite successful in promoting the "Peace Corps" idea.


Hubert Humphrey quoted in ACTION Update, March 1978. (Published by ACTION).

John F. Kennedy, "Remarks In Bonn At The Signing Of A Charter Establishing the German Peace Corps," June 24, 1963; Public Papers, Vol III, P.503


This figure is calculated by Gerald Bush in his unpublished doctoral dissertation The Peace Corps, 1961-65: A Study In Open Organisation (Northern Illinois University, Department of Political Science, 1966)

Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps," Foreign Affairs (July, 1963), P.707.
Footnotes

EPILLOGUE

KENNEDY'S CHILDREN


2 Harris Wofford, address to Swarthmore College, November 22, 1965. In Speeches of Harris Wofford, Peace Corps Archives (P.C.A.)


4 Press reaction and Volunteer response reported in a Small Staff Meeting, November 26, 1963; Box 68A, P.C.A.


6 Paul E. Tsongas, Commencement Address to Bradford College, May 19, 1979. On May 19, 1979, the author travelled with Senator Tsongas to Bradford College. A transcript of his remarks is available from his office.


10 Bradley Patterson, Oral History Interview conducted by J.F.K.M.L., P. 54
11 Harris Wofford memorandum to John F. Kennedy, January 20, 1962; Staff Files of Theodore Sorensen, Box 68, J.F.K.M.L.


13 Sargent Shriver, Address to the Foreign Policy Association, December 11, 1963: In Speeches of Sargent Shriver, P.C.A.
### Average Cost Per Volunteer

#### Postselection:

1. **Transportation:**
   - United States: $200
   - International: $1,240
   - Travel Allowance: 33
   - "Home Leave" allowance: 60

2. **Project equipment and supplies:** 730

3. **Vehicles:** 750

4. **Housing:** 1,240

5. **Medical kit:** 25

6. **Personal supplies:** 25

7. **Overseas orientation:** 100

8. **Readjustment allowance:** 1,638

9. **Settling-in allowance:** 125

10. **Living in allowance:** 2,525

11. **Leave allowance:** 273

12. **Clothing allowance:** 200

13. **In-country travel:** 225

14. **Medical care:** 315

15. **Medical evacuation/emergency leave:** 210

**Subtotal:** 10,024

**Total direct cost for 2 years of service:** 13,335

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*Congressional Record, November 13, 1953.*

88th Congress, 1st Session, Volume 97

Page 91.
APPENDIX IV

OPPOSITION TO THE PEACE CORPS IN SENATE, 1961

SENATE

(Based on the Hickenlooper Amendment, August 25, 1961; 32 - 59)

Democrats against the Peace Corps:
Byrd (Va.), Fulbright (Ark.), Holland (Fla.), Lausche (Ohio),
Robertson (Va.), Russell (Ga.), Stennis (Miss.) and Thurmond (S.Car.)

Republicans against the Peace Corps:
Allott (Colo.), Bennett (Utah), Boggs (Del.), Bush (Conn.),
Butler (Md.), Capehart (Ind.), Cotton (N.H.), Curtis (Neb.),
Dirksen (Ill.), Dworshak (Idaho), Goldwater (Ariz.),
Hickenlooper (Iowa), Hruska (Neb.), Kuchel (Calif.), Miller (Iowa),
Morton (Ky.), Mundt (S. Dak.), Prouty (Vt.), Saltonstall (Mass.),
Schoepel (Kansas), Smith (Maine), Tower (Texas), Williams (Del.)
and Young (N. Dak.).

TOTAL: 32 (8 Democrats; 24 Republicans)
APPENDIX V

OPPOSITION TO THE PEACE CORPS IN THE HOUSE, 1961

HOUSE

(Based on the roll-call vote on the Peace Corps bill, September 14, 1961; 288 - 97)

Democrats against the Peace Corps:
Andrews (Ala.), Alford (Ark.), Gathings (Ark.), Norrell (Ark.),
Haley (Fla.), Matthews (Fla.), J.C. Davis (Ga.), Flynt (Ga.),
Passman (La.), Abernathy (Miss.), Colmer (Miss.), Whitten (Miss.),
Williams (Miss.), Winstead (Miss.), Baring (Nev.), Ashmore (S. Car.),
Dorn (S. Car.), Mc Millam (S. Car.), Murray (Tenn.), Casey (Texas),
Burleson (Texas), Dowdy (Texas), Fisher (Texas), Kilgore (Texas),
Poage (Texas), Teague (Texas), Abbitt (Va.), Smith (Va.), and
Tuck (Va.).

Republicans against the Peace Corps:
Rhodes (Az.), Hiestand (Calif.), Hosmer (Calif.), Lipscomb (Calif.),
Rousselot (Calif.), Smith (Calif.), Hoffman (Ill.), Derwinski (Ill.),
Bruce (Ind.), Wilson (Ind.), Gross (Iowa), Kyl (Iowa), Avery (Kansas),
Dole (Kansas), Mc Vey (Kansas), Shriver (Kansas), Garland (Maine),
Mc Intire (Maine), Bennet (Mich.), Caderberg (Mich.), Hoffman (Mich.),
Johansen (Mich.), Knox (Mich.), Meader (Mich.), Battin (Mont.),
Beermann (Neb.), Cunningham (Neb.), Martin (Neb.), Auchincloss (N.J.),
Glenn (N.J.), Osmer (N.J.), Becker (N.Y.), Derounian (N.Y.),
King (N.Y.), Pillian (N.Y.), Taber (N.Y.), Wharton (N.Y.), Ray (N.Y.),
Jonas (N.C.), Nygaard (N.Dak.), Short (N.Dak.) Ashbrook (Ohio),
Betts (Ohio), Harsha (Ohio), Minstall (Ohio), Seherer (Ohio),
Belcher (Okla.), Norblati ( Ore.), Gevin (Pa.), Saylor (Pa.), Cline (Pa.),
Berry (S.Dak.), Reifel (S.Dak.), Baker (Tenn.), Race (Tenn.),
Pelly (Wash.), Moore (W.Va.), Harrison (Wyo.), Burns (Wis.),
Laird (Wis.), O' Kinski (Wis.), Schaadberg (Wis.), Thomson (Wis.) and
Van Pelk (Wis.).

TOTAL: 97 (29 Democrats; 68 Republicans)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Request</th>
<th>Amendment</th>
<th>Gap</th>
<th>Excess</th>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>63,750,000</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>63,750,000</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>102,000,000</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>102,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
APPENDIX IX

PEACE CORPS APPLICATIONS

QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED MARCH 1961 THROUGH MARCH 1963

1963 3 MONTH AVERAGE = 3602/MO.

TOTAL 10,805

1962 12 MONTH AVERAGE = 2180/MO.

TOTAL 26,155

1961 9 MONTH AVERAGE = 1,285/MO.

TOTAL 11,578

JAN.  FEB.  MAR.  APRIL  MAY  JUNE  JULY  AUG.  SEPT.  OCT.  NOV.  DEC.
### APPENDIX X

#### DISTRIBUTION OF VOLUNTEERS BY STATE OF LEGAL RESIDENCE AS OF APRIL 1, 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALABAMA</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALASKA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARIZONA</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARKANSAS</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLORADO</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONNECTICUT</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELAWARE</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLORIDA</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIA</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAII</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAHO</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIANA</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOWA</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANSAS</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENTUCKY</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUISIANA</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINE</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARYLAND</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSACHUSETTS</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICHIGAN</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINNESOTA</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSISSIPPI</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISSOURI</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTANA</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBRASKA</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEVADA</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW HAMPSHIRE</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW JERSEY</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW MEXICO</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>524</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTH DAKOTA</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHIO</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKLAHOMA</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OREGON</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENNSYLVANIA</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHODE ISLAND</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH DAKOTA</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENNESSEE</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXAS</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTAH</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERMONT</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIRGINIA</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST VIRGINIA</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISCONSIN</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WYOMING</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUERTO RICO</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIRGIN ISLANDS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From, Peace Corps Congressional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1964, Volume III, Page 71
APPENDIX XI

THE MOST POPULAR RESPONSES OF PEACE CORPS APPLICANTS TO QUESTION: "WHY DID YOU JOIN THE PEACE CORPS?"

1. To help people, humanity
2. To improve international relations, represent the U.S., promote international understanding
3. Gain intercultural experience
4. To serve or strengthen U.S.; become a better U.S. (or world) citizen
   - Belief in the Peace Corps as an organization, or instrument of change
5. To work for peace or against war
6. To give of oneself, serve, work hard
   - Learn or gain general or specific experience
7. To teach (general)
8. To apply specific skills or knowledge
9. General personal satisfaction
10. Previous relevant experience
11. To help a specific geographic area
   - Develop or improve as an individual
12. Further career or vocation
13. To work with people, help them help themselves
   - General moral or ethical considerations
14. Person-to-person contact
   - Identification with something bigger than self
   - Sense of duty or guilt
15. To build a better world, encourage international brotherhood
16. To spread or promote freedom and democracy; to fight tyranny
   - To help other countries
   - To correct past "mistakes" in U.S. foreign policy, change U.S. image abroad
   - Travel or adventure
17. To fight communism


(Washington D.C. Institute for International Services, 1963)
# Appendix XVII

## Returned Peace Corps Volunteers' View of Foreign Problems

### Volunteers Returning in 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vietnam</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw troops</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let Vietnamese take over</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help with knowledge and technical skills</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase, make more effective</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need better knowledge of needs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less selfish</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. as World Protector</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should not police world</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should uphold right to self-determination</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave developing economies alone</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Relations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy should be redefined</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need cross-cultural programs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>American Image</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. projects itself badly</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need better foreign representatives</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East Problem</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overpopulation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Dialogue with Communists</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Dialogue with Communists</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Arms Position</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop escalation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX XII
### VOLUNTEERS BY PROGRAM (JUNE 30, 1964)

#### LATIN AMERICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Extension</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Community Action</td>
<td>1339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Community Action</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Education</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Education</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Education</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>600</td>
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#### AFRICA

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural Extension</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Community Action</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Education</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>2369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Education</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Education</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
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#### NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

<table>
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<th>Program</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Extension</td>
<td>201</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Community Action</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Education</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Education</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-purpose</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>32</td>
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#### THE FAR

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Elementary Education</td>
<td>243</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Education</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vocational Education</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX XIII

**VOLUNTEERS BY COUNTRY (JUNE 30, 1964)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LATIN AMERICA</th>
<th>IN TRAINING</th>
<th>OVERSEAS</th>
<th>AFRICA</th>
<th>IN TRAINING</th>
<th>OVERSEAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Honduras</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>136</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>272</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>236</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
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<td>62</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>159</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>Somali Republic</td>
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<td>St. Lucia</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>2275</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>178</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA</th>
<th>IN TRAINING</th>
<th>OVERSEAS</th>
<th>FAR EAST</th>
<th>IN TRAINING</th>
<th>OVERSEAS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>498</td>
<td>652</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>178</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total: In Training Overseas**

| 4015 | 6053 |
PROBLEMS OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN OVERSEAS SERVICE

1. Activity of host country nationals in helping themselves
2. Frustrating work experiences
3. Support from host country officials
4. Effective working counterpart
5. Ability to see results
6. Support from Peace Corps officials in host country
7. Peace Corps policies
8. Keeping the problem Volunteers in the country
9. My ability to communicate in the local dialect
10. Giving all you could to the whole job of being a Peace Corps Volunteer
11. Transportation
12. Image of the Peace Corps held by host country nationals
13. My technical skills for the job
14. Interest of host country in Peace Corps work
15. Dating
16. Living allowances
17. Health
18. Number of visits from the staff
19. Relationships with other Peace Corps Volunteers
20. Food
21. Absence of challenge in the role of Peace Corps Volunteer
22. Excessive social demands by host country nationals
23. Isolation in living or work situation
24. Housing-living arrangements
25. Rivalry with other expatriates
26. Under-Friendliness of the local people
27. Medical care
28. Variation skills of Peace Corps Volunteers in this group
29. Physical hardships

FROM: Michigan State University (Computer Institute For Social Science Research) 
August, 1964.
APPENDIX XV

HOW RETURNED PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS FELT DIFFERENT FROM THEIR PEERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL VOLUNTEERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broader outlook on world</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More mature/responsible</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More sensitive to cultural differences</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More understanding of others</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More aware of world problems</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different set of values</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to view U.S. more objectively</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More concerned and knowledgeable about foreign affairs</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of poverty, hardship</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>15</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>1964 Volunteers Returning (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More opportunities</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforce civil rights</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept black power</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need true equality, not tokenism</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More and better job training</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More and better jobs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better welfare program</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaranteed annual wage</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More spent on poverty</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution of wealth</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus and Youth Protest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support students</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve communications between generations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-authority</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease military spending and use for domestic areas</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control inflation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make taxes more equitable</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control pollution</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conserve resources</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control overpopulation</td>
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<td>Urban problems</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>More schools, better schools</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Crime and law enforcement</td>
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<td>Stricter enforcement</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>Government</td>
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<td>Government and business too big and close</td>
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<td>Corruption in government</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breakdown in ethical values</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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RETURNED PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS' WILDERNESS OR PARTICIPATE

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sign petition</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in demonstration</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join picket line</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk losing security clearance</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violate the law</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to jail</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in civil disobedience</td>
<td>47</td>
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# Career Status of First 5,400 Returned Volunteers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Volunteers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Continuing education</th>
<th>36</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduate school</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate education</td>
<td>10</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>53</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal government</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>State &amp; local government</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Job Corps &amp; War on Poverty</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business &amp; profit-making organizations</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-profit organizations</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th>11</th>
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MERIDIA H. BENNETT
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KEVIN DELANY & DAVID DEC Mim
KEVIN DELANY & DIAH T. JACOBS
ARTHUR P. DUDDEK
ARTHUR P. DUDDEK
THOMAS M. DUCAN
RICHARD ELWELL
RICHARD ELWELL

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Missionaries,"
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8. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

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BATTLE, LUCIUS D., Executive Secretary of the Department of State.
December 14, 1978, Washington D.C.


BUNDY, NORM GEORGE, Special Assistant to President Kennedy; President

CELESTE, RICHARD, Peace Corps Director, 1979 -. June 7, 1979.
Washington D.C.

COX, ARCHIBALD, Academic Adviser to President Kennedy, 1960;

DAWLEY, DAVID, Former Peace Corps Volunteer, Honduras. May 1,
1979, Boston.

DESIRO, WILLIAM, General Counsel, The Peace Corps, December 5,
1978, New York City.

DUGGAN, RALEIGH, Staff Assistant to President Kennedy; Staff Member
Senate Committee on Labour and Public Welfare. December 12,
1978, Washington D.C.

DUTTON, FRED, Special Assistant to President Kennedy; Assistant
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations;
Deputy National Chairman Citizens for Kennedy and


FULBRIGHT, WILLIAM,  Senator from Arkansas; Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. December 19, 1978. Washington D.C.


GOODBY, GEORGE,  Peace Corps Secretary; Freedom of Information Officer, ACTION. October 13, 1978. Washington D.C.


HARRIMAN, AVERELL, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Harvard University.

JOSEPHSON, WILLIAM, General Counsel, Peace Corps. December 6,

KELLY, WILLIAM, Chief of Division of Contracts and Logistics,

KENNEDY, PADRAIG, Chief of Division of Volunteer Support, The

KIKER, DOUGLAS, Chief of Public Information, The Peace Corps.

LAROUSSE, HENRY, Director of International Cooperation

MAHONEY, WILLIAM P., Ambassador to Ghana, 1962 - 1964; Arizona

MANYREWICZ, FRANK, Regional Director of Latin American Programme,
Washington D.C.

MANSFIELD, J.K., Inspector General of Foreign Assistance,
Washington D.C.

O'BRIEN, LAWRENCE, Special Assistant to President Kennedy for Congressional Relations. December 6, 1978. New York City.


SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR, Special Assistant to President Kennedy; author. December 8, 1978. New York City.

The Watergate Complex, Washington D.C.

SORENSEN, THEODORE, Special Counsel to President Kennedy.

Senator from Massachusetts. May 19, 1979, Boston.


WASHINGTON D.C.


WILSON, CARROLL, Professor of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. May 11, 1979. M.I.T.

WOFFORD, EARRIS, Special Representative for Africa, Peace Corps.
BALL, GEORGE W., Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State. February 22, 1979.

BUNDY, McGEORGE, November 27, 1978.

COOMBS, PHILIP, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. March 9, 1979.

COX, ARCHIBALD, November 6, 1978.


RUSK, DEAN, Secretary of State, December 8, 1978.


YOUNG, JOHN D., Deputy Director of National Aeronautics and Space Administration; early organiser of The Peace Corps. March 27, 1979.