SUMMARY

This thesis undertakes to examine critically the notions of transcendence in certain recent theologies and philosophies and to compare and contrast them with Biblical teaching concerning the transcendence of God. Seven recent theologies and philosophies are chosen, and they are presented in four sections. In section one, two ontological theologies are studied—those of E. L. Mascall and Paul Tillich; in section two, two existentialist philosophies are treated—those of Karl Jaspers and Jean-Paul Sartre; and in section three, two experiential theologies are investigated—those of Rudolf Otto and Martin Buber. To each of these theologians or philosophers we address three questions: (1) How does his approach to theology or philosophy arrive at, or fail to arrive at, the conception of a transcendent God? (2) How does his theological or philosophical position allow or prohibit his knowing and speaking about a transcendent God? (3) What does his notion of transcendence seek to express and safeguard in the conception of God?

In section four an investigation is made of Karl Heim's presentation of the doctrine of God's transcendence. In this treatment two questions are especially considered: (1) How can one meaningfully and honestly conceive of a transcendent God? (2) How can one express the notion of a God who is, at the same time, transcendent and omnipresent?
In section five a study is made of the Logos doctrine of
the Fourth Gospel. Here, two approaches are employed. First
the Logos doctrine is treated as a Christological element of
the thesis, i.e. an attempt is made to determine what under-
standing of God's transcendence is to be found in the Logos
Christology of the Fourth Evangelist. In the second place,
the Logos doctrine is treated as an expression, from the
position of faith, not only of the relation between God and
the Incarnate Logos, but also between God and the world. This
means that the work of this section is directed towards finding
out what the Logos Christology means as well as towards the
statement of its implications for the doctrine of God's
transcendence, and this meaning and significance is then used
as a standard by which to judge the expressions of transcendence
in the theologies and philosophies which are previously studied.

In section six an attempt is made to arrive at a clear
understanding of what the doctrine of the transcendence of
God seeks to safeguard and express. To this end a considera-
tion is made of what each theology and philosophy studied seeks to
safeguard and express, and the success or failure of each is
judged by the standard established in section five. The method
by which these conclusions are reached is a discussion of key
questions which arise in the course of the investigation, and
broadly speaking, these questions may be grouped into the
three more embracing questions which were addressed to each
theologian or philosopher. (1) How does one arrive at the reality or conviction of a transcendent God? (2) How can a transcendent God be present to men, and how can one know and speak of a transcendent God? (3) What does the idea of transcendence seek to express and safeguard in the nature of God?

This thesis investigates the doctrine of God in terms of ontology and in terms of God's presence and activity in the world, and arrives at the conclusion that any adequate treatment of God's transcendence must acknowledge the importance of both aspects. It concludes that expressions such as 'Being-itself' and 'Transcendence' are legitimate and necessary in presenting God as qualitatively transcendent of all beings, while at the same time it concludes that a balanced doctrine of God's transcendence must allow for the reality of God's out-going and self-giving action, which the Christian sees supremely executed and revealed in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.
THE NOTION OF TRANSCENDENCE IN SELECTED RECENT THEOLOGIES AND PHILOSOPHIES

A THESIS IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Submitted to the Faculty of Divinity of the University of Glasgow for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

James Ivey Warren, Jr.
P R E F A C E

The purpose of this thesis is to examine critically the notions of transcendence in certain recent theologies and philosophies and to compare and contrast them with Biblical teaching concerning the transcendence of God. Seven recent theologies and philosophies are chosen and they are presented in four sections. Each of the first three sections undertakes to investigate two systems. This division is employed not only in order to show similarities and differences between the two theologians or philosophers of each section, but also to point out the essential issues involved. Section four differs from the first three in that it treats primarily the expression of the doctrine of transcendence and in that it treats the writings of only one theologian. In the fifth section an investigation of the Logos Christology and its significance for the doctrine of the transcendence of God is undertaken, and in the sixth section an attempt is made to evaluate the selected theologies and philosophies as regards their successes and failures in safeguarding and expressing the transcendence of God.

In section one a study of God's transcendence is undertaken in terms of ontology. The two theologies chosen are those of E. L. Mascall and Paul Tillich. Both men are interested in 'being' as the key to God's transcendence, and
both show a great interest in the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Therefore, we begin this section by noting the classic presentations and rejections of these arguments. Thereafter, we study Mascall's theology in regard to his method, his consideration of the problem of knowledge and speech about God, and his explicit and implicit doctrine of transcendence. Then we study Tillich's theology in regard to the same three areas. Lastly, we note some similarities and differences between the two positions.

In section two we investigate the philosophies of Karl Jaspers and Jean-Paul Sartre. We consider these two systems as existentialist—Jaspers' as a theistic existentialist system and Sartre's as an atheistic existentialist system. Our main concern in this section is with the teaching of Jaspers, inasmuch as his position is more immediately relevant to our investigation of the transcendence of God. Again, we are interested in the three areas of method or approach, knowledge and speech about the Transcendent, and the notion of transcendence, itself.

Our third section treats the idea of transcendence in the theologies of Rudolf Otto and Martin Buber. We consider as a unifying bond the emphasis each places upon personal conviction of God, and in this connection we study each man's approach. We also consider the answers each gives to the
questions of if and how one may know or know about God and what, if anything, one may know about God. Finally, we seek to draw conclusions concerning each man's doctrine of God's transcendence.

In the fourth section, we study the theology of Karl Heim. Here we take a different approach in our investigation of the notion of transcendence. Heim's work is primarily directed towards expressing the doctrine of God's transcendence. Hence, we may not ask how his teaching of transcendence follows from his method or approach to theology. Nor is Heim greatly interested in the problem of knowledge and speech about God. However, he is concerned with two matters of interest to our whole investigation— (1) How can one meaningfully and honestly conceive of a transcendent God? (2) How can one express the notion of God's transcendent, yet omnipresent, nature? Consequently, our investigation of Heim's theology is largely expository, seeking to determine how he answers these two questions.

In the fifth section we study the Logos doctrine, and we do this for two reasons. First, it is treated as a Christological element of our investigation, i.e. we ask what understanding do we find of God's transcendence in the Logos Christology. In the second place, the Logos doctrine is treated as an expression, from the position of faith, not only of the relation between God and the Incarnate Logos, but
also between God and the world. This means that much of our study in this section will be directed towards finding out what the Logos Christology means rather than towards the statement of its implications for the doctrine of God's transcendence. However, after arriving at the meaning of the Logos doctrine, we investigate its significance for God's transcendence, and this meaning and significance is then used as a standard by which we judge the expressions of transcendence in the theologies and philosophies which we have previously studied. We deliberately choose to present this standard at the end of our investigation rather than at its beginning in order to allow each theologian or philosopher to present his teaching within the framework of his own system rather than in light of the teaching of the Logos doctrine.

In our final section, we attempt to arrive at a clear understanding of what the doctrine of the transcendence of God seeks to safeguard and express. To this end, we consider what each theology and philosophy which we have studied seeks to safeguard and express, and we judge the success or failure of each by the standard established in our fifth section. The method by which we reach our conclusions is a discussion of key questions which arise in the course of our investigation, and, broadly speaking, these questions may be grouped into the three more embracing questions which we addressed to each
theologian or philosopher—(1) How does one arrive at the reality or conviction of a transcendent God? (2) How can a transcendent God be present to men, and how can one know and speak of a transcendent God? (3) What does the idea of transcendence seek to express and safeguard in the nature of God?

The seven theologians and philosophers selected for investigation are chosen as representative of different theologies and philosophies, but no claim is made that these are exhaustive of recent trends. Indeed, at least two theologies of first importance, those of Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, are not treated in detail in our investigation. We have intentionally omitted these theologies from our investigation inasmuch as an adequate treatment of their doctrines of transcendence would require a separate and extensive study, and we considered that more light might be shed upon our subject by studying it from several aspects through the works of selected less prolific writers than by limiting ourselves to one or two particular treatments.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank some of the people who have been of particular help to me while undertaking this work. First, I wish to thank Professor Ian Henderson not only for his invaluable direction and always pertinent remarks concerning my studies, but also for his personal encouragement and generosity of time and
understanding. Secondly, I wish to thank the staff of the Library of Glasgow University and the Rev. James Mackintosh, Librarian of Trinity College, for their courteous assistance at all times. Thirdly, I should like to thank many friends at Glasgow University--Dr. William Barclay for his help with New Testament Studies, Dr. William McKane for his help with Old Testament Studies, The Rev. David Gourlay, Chaplain to the University, for his interest and consideration while we worked together, and many fellow students for their willingness to listen and to discuss theological matters of especial interest to me. Finally, I should like to thank most sincerely my wife and my parents for their patience and encouragement throughout this period of work.
## CONTENTS

**SECTION I. TRANSCENDENCE IN TWO ONTOLOGICAL THEOLOGIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Ontological and Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God and the Analogia Entis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Doctrine of Transcendence in the Theology of E. L. Mascall</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Doctrine of Transcendence in the Theology of Paul Tillich</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION II. TRANSCENDENCE IN TWO EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Notion of Transcendence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Notion of Transcendence in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jaspers' Notion of Transcendence and the Biblical Idea of God</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION III. TRANSCENDENCE IN TWO EXPERIENTIAL THEOLOGIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Doctrine of Transcendence in Rudolf Otto's <em>The Idea of the Holy</em></td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The Doctrine of Transcendence in the Theology of Martin Buber</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION IV. A SCIENTIFIC EXPRESSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The Doctrine of Transcendence in the Theology of Karl Heim</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION V. THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENCE IN THE LOGOS CHRISTOLOGY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The 'Word of the Lord'</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The Jewish Figure of Wisdom</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 12. The Logos Doctrine of Philo Judeaus ........ 295
Chapter 13. The Logos Doctrine and Gnosticism .......... 329
Chapter 14. The Logos Christology of the Fourth Gospel .. 349

SECTION VI. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................... 373

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................. 420
Books ................................................................. 421
Articles ................................................................. 431
SECTION I

TRANSCENDENCE

IN

TWO ONTOLOGICAL THEOLOGIES
CHAPTER I.

The Ontological and Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God and the Analogia Entis.

In our opening section we shall investigate the idea of transcendence in two theologies which we may call 'ontological', i.e. theologies which treat the question of being. These theologies are those of E.L. Mascall and Paul Tillich. Although both men deal with the question of being, their approaches and answers to this question are not the same. Mascall employs a 'cosmological' approach; whereas Tillich uses the method of 'ontological analyses'. Their agreements and disagreements basically stem from the value each places upon cosmological and ontological treatments of being and may be seen in their considerations of the cosmological and ontological arguments for the existence of God. Further, an investigation of their developments of these arguments sheds light not only upon their methods but also upon their solutions to the problem of how it is that one may speak about God and upon their ideas of God's transcendence. So it is that we purpose to study their
treatments of these arguments, but before we do this we shall consider the classical presentations and rejections of them.

We begin with the ontological argument as expressed by St. Anselm.

Now we believe that thou art a being than which none greater can be thought. Or can it be that there is no such being, since "the fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no God'? But when this same fool hears what I am saying - "A being than which none greater can be thought" - he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists .... But clearly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For if it is actually in the understanding alone, it can be thought of as existing also in reality, and this is greater. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, this same thing than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But obviously this is impossible. Without doubt, therefore, there exists, both in the understanding and in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought.

St. Anselm's argument has been criticised on three grounds. The first objection suggests that the definition of God as "that than which a greater cannot

(1) Anselm, Proslogion, II
be thought" is meaningless. Mascall points out that the
definition of infinity as the 'greatest conceivable number'
is meaningless, for either it is no conceivable number or it
is a concrete number to which one can always add one more
digit. Thus, we must ask if St. Anselm's definition is
of this nature; or, if it does have meaning then what is
it. It would appear that St. Anselm means simply that God
is 'the greatest'. Now granted, 'greatest' may be an empty
term when used by itself, but when taken as an adjective it
can be significant. Followed by any attribute with which
one might credit God, 'greatest' does have meaning. For
example, "There is no greater love or good than God." Now,
the truth of God's superlative nature might be questioned,
but the very questioning would seem to show that the state­
ment is not meaningless.

The second objection argues that St. Anselm treats
'being' as an accident of God rather than as the ground of
accidents. According to Broad,

The ontological argument professes to make a
categorical comparison between a non-existent
and an existent in respect of the presence or
absence of existence. The objection is two-
fold. (1) No comparison can be made between

(2) Mascall, E. L., He Who Is, p.33
a non-existent term and anything else except on the hypothesis that it exists. And (ii) on this hypothesis it is meaningless to compare it with anything in respect of the presence or absence of existence.\(^{(3)}\)

Thus we must ask if it is true that St. Anselm treats 'existence' as an accident of God. Does he consider God's essence to be 'greatness' or 'the greatest love or good' and 'existence' merely to be something added to the idea of God? It would appear that as regards the form of his argument St. Anselm does consider God's essence to be other than His existence, i.e. that he considers existence to be simply an accident or attribute which if not possessed by God would mean that some other 'essence' which does possess existence would be greater than God. However, in light of the purpose and conclusion of St. Anselm's argument, we may wonder if he actually does consider God's 'existence' to be accidental. If, as Professor Broad asserts, one cannot compare an existent with a non-existent, may it not be that St. Anselm implicitly holds that God's existence is not accidental but substantial, since he does make such a comparison. Certainly, we can say that the whole purpose of the argument is to show that the existence of God is the sine qua non of the conception of God.

---

(3) Ibid., p.35.
The third objection to St. Anselm's ontological argument points out a confusion between the conception of 'a necessary existent' and the actual existence of 'a necessary existent'. This objection has its classic statement in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason where it is contended that the basic error of the ontological argument is the confusion between logical and ontological necessity. It is Kant's position that, "logical necessity refers only to judgments, not to things", and he cites as an example the logical necessity of a triangle's having three angles. It is true that the conception of a triangle necessitates the idea of three angles, but this is a logical and not an ontological necessity. According to Kemp-Smith, Kant means that, "All judgements, so far as they refer to existence, as distinct from mere possibility, are hypothetical, and serve to define a reality that is only contingently given." To continue our example, if a triangle exists then it has three angles. Further, that judgements which refer to existence are hypothetical is shown by the fact that any judgement of existence can be denied in thought. "In an identical judgement it is contradictory to reject the predicate while retaining the

(4) Smith, Norman Kemp, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p.528.
(6) Smith, op. cit., p.528.
subject. But there is no contradiction if we reject subject and predicate alike." (7) Using our example again, we may say that one is mistaken to reject the notion of three angles while retaining the idea of a triangle, for there is a logical necessity between the two conceptions. However ontologically there is no such necessity, i.e. it does not necessarily follow from the concept of a triangle that a triangle actually exists. A concept has only possible being, i.e. it "represents something that may or may not exist: to determine existence we must refer to actual experience." (8)

Kant expresses this objection in another way. To say that a conception has only possible existence means that no conception carries the proof of its own existence. For example, in the statement, "God is omnipotent", two concepts are present -- 'God' and 'omnipotence'. 'Is' does not add anything to the concepts; it is merely the copula expressing the necessary relation between 'God' and 'omnipotence'. Even in the statement, "There is a God", existence is not to be considered an attribute, an addition to the concept of God; it merely posits that there is an object corresponding to the concept of God. Thus, Kant concludes:

(7) Ibid., p. 529
(8) Ibid., p. 531
(9) Ibid., pp. 529f.
Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an object may contain, we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object .... Our consciousness of all existence (whether immediately through perception, or immediately through inferences which connect something with perception) belongs exclusively to the unity of experience; any alleged existence outside this field, while not indeed such as we can declare to be absolutely impossible, is of the nature of an assumption which we can never be in a position to justify. (10)

R. P. Phillips summarizes Kant's conclusion as follows:

The fact that we conceive, and must conceive, of God in a certain way, namely as existing of himself, in no way shows that in fact there is a Being which exists of itself, but merely that if there is a Being to whose concept existence attaches necessarily, he will, if he exist at all, exist necessarily. (11)

This objection, then, places an 'if' before St. Anselm's major premise. If something real corresponds to what we believe, viz. that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, then existence attaches necessarily to such a being. Anselm's argument ultimately fails to prove the existence of God because the first premise can be denied; but the formal argument is valid, for by its use of 'existence' as an accident of God, it shows that 'existence' is necessary to a God defined as St. Anselm defines Him. By this we mean that whereas

(10) Kant, op. cit., p. 506
(11) Mascall, op. cit., p. 34.
St. Anselm's ontological argument is invalid, his ontological analysis may be true. It would appear that Kant also allows for this possibility when he says,

Thus, while for the merely speculative employment of reason the supreme being remains a mere ideal, it is yet an ideal without a flaw, a concept which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. Its objective reality cannot indeed be proved, but also cannot be disproved, by merely speculative reason. If, then, there should be a moral theology that can make good this deficiency, transcendental theology, which before was problematic only, will prove itself indispensable in determining the concept of this supreme being .... (12)

We turn to the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas for the classic presentation of the cosmological argument. He accepts (13) St. Anselm's definition of God, but considers his argument to be incapable of proving that there actually exists a being which corresponds to his conception of God. The real difference between St. Thomas and St. Anselm can be seen in their approaches. St. Anselm is an 'essentialist', i.e., he starts with an idea of God's essence and deduces from it God's existence. This deduction shows the Christian element of identifying God with being, for

(12) Kant, op. cit., p. 531.
(13) Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Vol. I, Chapter XI.
(14) Mascall, op. cit., p. 36.
So long as God was not identified with being itself, no one could hope to discover whether God exists by simply examining the concept of God, any more than we could hope to discover whether Atlantis exists by simply examining the concept of Atlantis.(16)

St. Thomas, on the other hand, is an 'existentialist'. Following Aristotle, he defines essence as form and matter in unity. However, essence or substance does not necessarily exist; it can exist. Actual beings (entia) are composed of essence and existence. Hence if one is to arrive at a God which can be shown to exist, it is by way of existents that one must proceed rather than by way of essences which have only the possibility of existence.(18)

For St. Thomas, however, noble our concept of God may be, it is totally incapable of telling us whether God exists or not; but the actual existence of the most humble and insignificant of actually existing beings is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of self-existent Being itself, ipsum esse subsistens.(19)

We have noted Kant's judgement that one arrives at the existence of something by sensible experience rather than by a priori concepts, and now we see that St. Thomas also claims to dispense with a priori arguments and to begin

(16) Ibid., p.25
(17) Ibid., pp.44-64
(18) Ibid., pp.47f.
(19) Ibid., p.51
with existence, with the world, in order to arrive at God. (20)

Now the two—namely, eternal and temporal—are related to our knowledge in this way that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of finding, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal .... (21)

St. Thomas puts forth five arguments, all of which start with worldly, sensibly perceived phenomena from which he infers the existence of God. The first three arguments (an Unmoved Mover, an efficient cause, and necessity and possibility) appear to differ only in choice of words, for all three start with the fact that things which we observe exist in an imperfect, dependent, caused, contingent manner and necessitate a self-existent, independent, uncaused, non-contingent or necessary being, as their cause. The last two arguments (degrees of being and order in the universe) argue from a lesser perfection in the world to the greater perfection which bestows degrees of being and worldly order. Hence, we may conclude that St. Thomas' approach is cosmological, i.e. founded in existence, in 'things' of the sensibly perceptible world.

(20) Gilson, Etienne, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 42.
(21) Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, Part I, No. 3, Question LXXIX, Art. 9
Since St. Thomas relies almost entirely upon his first argument and since all five arguments fall if the first is disallowed, we shall confine our remarks to the proof of the 'Unmoved Mover'. We find this argument expressed most concisely in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

Whatever is in motion is moved by another; and it is clear to the sense that something, the sun for instance, is in motion. Therefore, it is set in motion by something else moving it. Now that which moves it is itself either moved or not. If it be not moved, then the point is proved that we must needs postulate an immovable mover; and this we call God. If, however, it be moved, it is moved by another mover. Either, therefore, we must proceed to infinity, or we must come to an immovable mover. But it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Therefore it is necessary to postulate an immovable mover. (23)

It should not be supposed that by 'movement', St. Thomas means simply the transition from one place to another. Gilson, Mercier, and D'Arcy, all, say that by 'movement' St. Thomas means the transition from potency to actuality. By 'potency' is meant possibility or capability, and by 'actuality' is meant the acquisition or realization of such potential capability or possibility. Thus we see that this first argument, like the second and third, is actually concerned with existence rather than with motion. St. Thomas

(23) Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, XIII
(25) Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, XIII.
is dealing with the transition from potential to actual being. In effect, St. Thomas starts with observable existents which are not caused by themselves, and from them he infers an 'uncaused cause' or 'unmoved mover'. It will be seen that this argument is based upon St. Thomas's acceptance of the Aristotelian method, inasmuch as "For Aristotle Act always precedes Potency. The cause of a potential being coming into existence is always another being already existing in act".

St. Thomas's position that a potential being becomes actual only as caused by another actual being may be diagrammatically expressed like this:

\[ P \rightarrow A \text{from} \rightarrow P \rightarrow A \text{from} \rightarrow P \rightarrow A \text{from} \rightarrow P \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow A \]

If one should say that this series is infinite and need not end in 'A' (actual being that is not derived from potential being), then St. Thomas would reply that only by postulating an 'Unmoved Mover' (non-potential being) can one account for the intermediate movers (actual from potential beings) which we observe as effects of prior causes and causes of subsequent effects. Thus it is that St. Thomas's cosmological argument rests upon (1) the distinction between 'potential' and 'actual', (2) the assertion that potential beings come only

---

(27) Armstrong, A. H., An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, pp. 80f.
(28) Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, XIII.
from actual beings, and (3) the contention that an infinite regression cannot account for intermediate movers.

Again we turn to Kant to note the objections that are raised against the cosmological argument. These objections fall into two groups: (1) errors of inferring God from the world, and (2) the error of the ontological argument which recurs in the cosmological argument.

As regards the first group of errors, Kant contends that several false assumptions are made. First, the principle that everything has a cause can only be applied to and tested by things belonging to the realm of experience, and, as we have seen, no experience is available to ascertain whether or not 'cause and effect' applies to a non-contingent being. Secondly, "Our only notion of necessity is derived from experience, and therefore depends on those finite conditions which the argument would deny to us." Thirdly, although an infinite regression cannot be shown to be possible, neither can it be shown to be impossible.

The second group of errors is based upon the recurrence of the error of the ontological argument. It is reason that demands a first cause, and, as we have seen in Kant's criticism of the ontological argument, such 'reasonable

(29) Smith, op. cit., p. 533.
necessity' does not allow of being hypostatized. To postulate something conceptually as a result of the demand of reason in no way proves that something actually exists which corresponds to this demand.

It is evident, from what has been said, that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a concept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea the objective reality of which is very far from being proved by the fact that reason requires it. For the idea instructs us only in regard to a certain unattainable completeness, and so serves rather to limit the understanding than to extend it to new objects. (30)

Thus, we may see that the cosmological argument repeats the error of the ontological argument, i.e. it posits as actually existing a necessity or demand which is purely a necessity or demand of reason as a formal condition of thought.

The concept of necessity is only to be found in our reason, as a formal condition of thought; it does not allow of being hypostatized as a material condition of existence. (31)

Kant's criticism of the cosmological argument makes, then, a two-fold objection. On the one hand, he argues that the demand of reason points to a limit to proof rather

(30) Kant, op. cit., p. 500.
(31) Kant, op. cit., p. 518.
than proving the existence of a being who answers reason's demand, i.e. that the cosmological argument hypostatizes reason's demand for a first cause instead of proving that a first cause exists. On the other hand, he points out that even though the cosmological argument begins with sensibly perceived existents to which the 'laws' of 'cause and effect' and 'necessity' properly apply, it departs from the realm of finite existents, when it seeks to arrive at a God who transcends all worldly existents, and thereby departs from the realm wherein 'cause and effect' and 'necessity' carry the power of proof. Consequently, the cosmological argument, like the ontological argument, loses its validity as an argument.

Before leaving the theology of St. Thomas, we shall note his treatment of analogy inasmuch as it will provide us with a background for understanding both Mascall's and Tillich's consideration of the problem of knowledge and speech about God. Not only does St. Thomas attempt to arrive at the knowledge that God exists by starting with the world, but he also seeks to arrive at knowledge about God by the same method. He denies that one can have any immediate knowledge of God but affirms that a mediated knowledge is possible.
...God is not the first object of our knowledge; but rather that we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rom. 1:20) the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. But the first object of our knowledge in this life is the quiddity of a material thing, which is the proper object of our intellect.... (32)

The only road which can lead us to a knowledge of the Creator must be cut through the things of sense. The immediate access to the Cause being barred to us, it remains for us to divine it with the help of its effects. (33)

St. Thomas explains that one is able to know about God as a result of two of His gifts—reason and creation. First, we should note that reason is given by God and can never be opposed to faith. Secondly, we should note that "the act of reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another." Thus, St. Thomas concludes that God's gift of reason enables men to pass from one thing (God's effects, i.e. His creation) to another (God, the cause of creation).

The question that now arises is whether or not reason, even if it possesses the ability to pass from one thing to another, is able to pass from creation to God. Is there

(32) Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 3, LXXXVIII, 3
(33) Gilson, op.cit., p.44
(34) Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, VII.
a relation between the two? St. Thomas answers that there is a relation between God and the world - the relation of a cause to its effect; and he bases this position upon his presentation of the arguments and upon scripture. Further, St. Thomas offers an explanation of God's creative act which explains both why God created the world and why the world bears a resemblance to Him.

Every thing desires the perfection of that which it wills and loves for its own sake: because whatever we love for its own sake, we wish to be best, and even to be bettered and multiplied as much as possible. Now God wills and loves His essence for its own sake: and it cannot be increased or multiplied in itself ... and can only be multiplied in respect of its likeness which is shared by many. Therefore God wishes things to be multiplied, because He wills and loves His essence and perfection. (36)

Thus, according to St. Thomas, the resemblance of the world to God is not only the result of the relation of an effect to its cause, but is the result also of God's love and intention for good. At the same time, St. Thomas points out that the resemblance of an effect to its cause is only a likeness and not identity.

(36) Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, LXXV.
... for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom....(37)

A. M. Fairweather summarizes St. Thomas's position as follows:

God's activity in creation is at one and the same time an activity of God and a perfection of the thing it creates and constitutes. Thus, there is some kind of an identity of God with His creatures; an identity which is, however, only such as is indicated by the term "likeness". God acts to the producing of His own likeness. Hence we have the "analogia entis", in virtue of which it is possible for us to acquire some knowledge of God. (38)

As a consequence of the dissimilarity of existence between God and His creation there is a dissimilarity between speech referring to God and to the world.

For we express things by a term as we conceive them by the intellect. And our intellect, since its knowledge originates from the senses, does not surpass the mode which we find in sensible objects.... Accordingly in every term employed by us, there is imperfection as regards the mode of signification, and imperfection is unbecoming to God, although the thing signified is becoming to God in some eminent way. (39)

So it is that, according to St. Thomas, when one speaks about God in worldly terms such terms are not

---

(37) Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 3, LXXXVIII, 2.
(38) Fairweather, A. M., The Word as Truth, pp. 18f.
(39) Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, XXX
predicated univocally of Him. Yet, on the other hand, St. Thomas is insistent that such terms are not pure equivocations when applied to God.

...things predicated of God and other things are not all pure equivocation ... for in employing these common terms we consider the order of cause and effect.... If, however, it be asserted that by such like terms we only know of God what he is not, so that, to wit, He be called living because He is not in the genus of inanimate beings, and so forth, it follows at least that living when said of God and creatures agrees in the negation of inanimate being and thus it will not be a pure equivocation. (40)

Thus, St. Thomas arrives at the doctrine of analogia entis which expresses a 'likeness' between God and the world that is neither univocal nor equivocal but that is analogical. Consequently, knowledge and speech about God is of this same nature, i.e. things predicated of both God and worldly existents are predicated analogically rather than univocally or equivocally.

It follows then, from what has been said that those things which are said of God and other things are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, that is according to an order or relation to some one thing. (41)

(40) Ibid., I, XXXIII
(41) Ibid., I, XXXIV
Mascall writes as a modern Thomist. His affinity to St. Thomas and Catholic theologians is apparent, and his attempt to found his position upon the theology of St. Thomas is unmistakable. However, just how far Mascall's position is Thomistic remains to be seen.

We have already noted his liking of St. Thomas' cosmological approach, but we must see whether or not Mascall really accepts the cosmological argument.

We begin our review of Mascall's position by noting a statement by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange which Mascall quotes with acceptance. Speaking of St. Thomas' five arguments for the existence of God, Garrigou-Lagrange says:

The principle of this general proof, 'The greater cannot arise from the less', condenses in effect into one single formula the principles on which our five typical proofs rest: becoming can emerge only from determinate being; caused being only from uncaused being; the contingent only from the necessary; the imperfect, composite and multiple only from the perfect, simple and one; order only from an intelligence. The principles of the first three proofs place in relief especially the dependence of the world upon a cause, the principles of the last two insist on the superiority and perfection of this cause; all of them can be summed up in this formula: 'The greater does not arise from the less; only the higher explains the lower.' (1)

---

(1) Mascall, E. L., He Who Is, p.37
Mascall contends that all the arguments begin with existents and with the asking of them proper questions. Why do things exist? What are their causes? Considering cause in its broadest sense, Mascall notes that a finite existent is not caused by itself; it is caused by another already existing existent which is, in turn, caused by another, and so on. For example, C is caused by B; B is caused by A; etc. But can B really be considered a final cause of C? Mascall would say no, because B cannot even explain or cause itself. Hence, contingent being can never be a final cause of existents.

Thus far it would appear that Mascall completely follows St. Thomas, but the difference in Mascall's restatement emerges when we look at his answers to Kant's criticisms. Kant pointed out that the notion of necessity employed in reasoning from finite, contingent things to God, as infinite and unconditional, requires a 'jump' which is illegitimate, since such necessity is one of reason and since 'cause and effect' can only be known to apply to finite existents. Another way of expressing this point is to say that the argument, if it leads anywhere, only leads to the notion of a finite God. For example, if we proceed from C to B to A to......N (as the First Cause), then N is of the same nature as A, B, and

(2) Mascall, E. L., Existence And Analogy, pp.70-73
C, i.e. finite. It would appear, then, that the Kantian objection faces the supporters of the cosmological argument with a dilemma. Either the necessity of reason which properly applies to empirical cause and effect leads one to a finite first cause, or such reasoning from a finite effect to an infinite cause makes an illegitimate 'jump' when it seeks to arrive at a non-contingent, unconditional, transcendent being.

In no uncertain terms, Mascall rejects the first horn of the dilemma, i.e. that God is finite; and in answering this objection he considers the notion of sufficient cause. Is a finite cause sufficient to explain contingent beings? Mascall answers negatively, for 'only the higher explains the lower'; and in support of his position he again quotes Garrigou-Lagrange.

The principle of sufficient reason (principe de raison d'être) does not oblige us to terminate this series of accidental causes, but only to leave it, to rise up to a mover of another order, not itself moved, and in this sense motionless, not with the immobility of potentiality which is anterior to movement but with the immobility of the act which has no need to become because it already is (immotus in se permanens). (3)

---

(3) Mascall, He Who Is, p.44
In the same way as regards the argument to a first cause, Mascall points out that the relevant question is not 'Why does the causal chain go on?' but 'Why did it begin?' Further, he interprets St. Thomas' fourth argument to mean that the existence of finite perfections implies the existence of infinite perfection as their cause. According to Mascall, then, the whole force of the cosmological approach lies in the fact that finite existents can be accounted for only if their cause is other than themselves, i.e., non-contingent, unconditional and infinite. Thus, Mascall concludes that 'the finite implies infinitude'.

Now we must enquire about the other horn of the dilemma. Does the cosmological argument make an illegitimate 'jump' from the finite to the infinite? Is it possible to arrive at a transcendent God by starting with finite existents? Is an infinite regression of finite causes impossible? The way in which Mascall seeks to avoid and answer these questions contrasts sharply with St. Thomas' method and, indeed, transforms the cosmological argument into something less than an argument.

(4) Mascall, Existence And Analogy, pp. 73-76
(5) Mascall, He Who Is, pp. 63; 81
cf. Existence And Analogy, pp. 68; 79; 85; 123f.
Mascall seems to be aware of Kant's criticism that an infinite regress cannot be shown to be impossible, and, indeed, Mascall contends that the regress-form, which St. Thomas adopts from Aristotle's Physics, is not essential to the Thomist position. He points out that the regress-form is not used at all in St. Thomas' fourth argument and that modern exponents of St. Thomas place little emphasis upon the regress-form. What is asserted is that neither finite beings, nor a finite causal chain, nor a finite first cause in such a chain is sufficient to account for finitude. Hence, Mascall approves of the following conclusion of R.P. Phillips:

It is clear that any existing being which can cease to exist does not contain in itself the reason of its own existence, and must therefore derive its reason of being from something else; and, in the long run, from a being which exists of itself; for we cannot proceed to infinity in a series of beings which derive their reason of being from some other. To suppose that some contingent being, or the series of such beings, is eternal, does not in any way account for their existence, or relieve us of the necessity of demanding a necessary being as the cause of such eternal existence. Even if the series is eternal, it is eternally insufficient. (7)

Mascall likens the truth of the rejection of an infinite regression to the truth of a sign marked 'No

---

(6) Mascall, Existence And Analogy, p.77
(7) Mascall, He Who Is, pp.48f.
Thoroughfare' --- not that we cannot enter, but that if we do enter, we get no nearer our destination. So, he contends, with the cosmological argument the important point is "not that we cannot proceed to infinity, but that it does not get us any nearer the solution of our problem if we do." 

Notwithstanding this point, one is not permitted to deny the possibility of an infinite regression simply because it does not get one any nearer the solution of one's problem; and, in point of fact, Mascall does not seek to save the cosmological argument by such a denial. Indeed, the cosmological approach which he employs does not seek to prove God's existence. Mascall prefers to call the 'Five Ways' of St. Thomas a 'monstration' rather than a 'demonstration' of God's existence.

Whether we describe the cosmological approach itself as an argument depends mainly on how the word "argument" is defined. Its crux consists not in a process of logical deduction but in an apprehension, namely the apprehension of finite beings as effect implying (or, better, manifesting) a transcendent cause........(10)

The Five Ways are not so much syllogistic proofs that finite being is of this type (being whose existence is not necessitated by its essence) as discussions of finite being which may help us to apprehend that it is. Considered

(8) Mascall, Existence And Analogy, p.73
(9) Ibid., p.90
(10) Ibid., p.89
as proofs they may well seem to be circular....
It must be added that even when we have
recognized that finite being is of this type,
the process by which we go on to affirm the
existence of God is hardly to be described as
a 'proof' in the usual sense of that term.
The existence of being in which essence and
existence are really distinct does not

logically imply the existence of a being in
which essence and existence are really identical.
We can, of course, put the argument from finite
to infinite in a syllogistic form, but when we do
so we are not so much describing the process by
which we have passed from the recognition of the
finite to the affirmation of the infinite as
convincing ourselves that the transition was not
in fact unreasonable.....the primary requirement
if we are to pass from the recognition of the
finite to the affirmation of the infinite is not
that we shall be skilled in the manipulation of
Aristotelian logic but that we shall grasp in its
ontological reality the act by which finite
existents exist. (11).

We may conclude, therefore, that Mascall's cosmo-

logical approach is not so much based upon argument as
upon "the recognition that in finite beings essence and
existence are really distinct, that is, that there is
nothing in their essence that necessitates their
existence." Consequently, for Mascall, the five ways
are not "so much five demonstrations of the existence of
God as five different methods of manifesting the "radical
dependence of finite being upon God....."

Furthermore, Mascall's approach rests not so much

(11) Ibid., pp.78f.
(12) Ibid., pp.68f.
(13) Ibid., p.71
upon discursive reason as upon intuitive reason. It is his contention that when one contemplates finite beings, one finds no answer in themselves to the question of why they exist and is led to accept the existence of a Necessary Being. According to Mascall such a process is not an argument of logic but a matter of rightly comprehending finite being, i.e. a matter of recognizing finite being as 'effect-implying-cause'. In a sense, Mascall seeks to sidestep Kant's objection. Kant criticized the validity of inferential reason's arrival at God, and Mascall shifts the basis of the cosmological approach from inferential reason to 'intuitive reason'. However, in spite of this move, it would appear that one of Kant's criticisms remains, viz. that when such a shift is made, the position becomes one that can be neither proved nor disproved by appeal to reason.

In order to adequately understand and evaluate Mascall's approach we must look at his contention that man has the power of intuitive reason which enables him to arrive at God by contemplating finite existents. Mascall makes it quite clear that he considers man to have such a capability.

---

(14) Mascall, He Who Is, pp. 74; 83-93
(15) Ibid., pp. 80f.
...the human mind, just because it is a mind, is essentially adapted for the understanding of being as such...it remains true that the mind is not only able to apprehend the mere existence of finite beings and their external properties, but it is also capable in some degree of comprehending them, of entering into their inner essence and making them its own, of recognizing not only their finitude but also whereon that finitude rests. If we perceive finite beings as they actually are, we should perceive them as the creatures of God. And if we do so perceive them...we shall in perceiving them recognize the existence of the God whom we cannot perceive.(16)

However, if we ask of Mascall why or how it is that the mind can perform the act of 'intuiting' God's existence as the ground of the existence of finite beings; then he simply repeats his claim that the mind does have such power. Indeed, he contends that the basic meaning of 'intellect'--from intus legere,

...implies, not to read into its objects qualities that are not really there, as all the Kantians and quasi-Kantians teach, but to read that which is within them, to extract from them, however partially and imperfectly, their intelligible content. (17)

Mascall bases his claim upon Fr. D'Arcy's book, Nature of Belief. D'Arcy calls this intuitive reason, 'interpretation'; and he describes, though he does not explain, how it functions.

(16) Ibid., pp.73f.
(17) Ibid., p.84
Just as the object of sense presents itself to us as one whole, so too we grasp the full tale of the premises and the conclusion per modum unius, 'by a sort of intuitive perception of the legitimate conclusion in and through the premises, not by a formal juxtaposition of propositions'. (18).

What Mascall and D'Arcy are really contending is that the mind has a power ('intuitive reason' or 'interpretation') that sees in premises a conclusion that is not arrived at simply by inference or logic. Rather, the mind, in perceiving existents, 'intuits' or 'interprets' the existence of God. Further, it is contended that this operation of the mind, like other operations of the mind, is a reliable, though not infallible, instrument of knowledge. Of course, Mascall realizes that not everyone 'intuits' the existence of God, and he seeks to explain this fact by arguing that not everyone makes use of this power. Indeed, he contends that such 'intuition of God' requires of one diligence to investigate the question of being, humility to see beings and himself as finite, and courage to act upon such 'seeing' when it is acquired. Thus Mascall concludes:

(18) Ibid., pp. 86ff.
(19) Ibid., p. 86
(20) Ibid., p. 77
Provided that we put ourselves in the right frame of mind for seeing things as they really are—and this, of course, in practice involves a real effort of moral and intellectual integrity—we can grasp the fact of God's existence as the ground of the existence of the beings under our consideration with just as much certainty as we perceive the beings themselves. (21)

It would appear that one's evaluation of this approach will depend upon whether or not one accepts the ability of 'intuitive reason' to pass from finite beings to Self-subsistent Being. That a great many people do not make this transition must be admitted, and we must ask whether the mind possesses such ability since both Mascall and D'Arcy do little more than assert that the mind does have this capability. Mascall, himself, criticizes religion based upon experience as "while it may be completely convincing to those who have it, it is incommunicable to those who have not." (22) May it not be said with equal truth that the intuitive-rational approach employed by Mascall is relevant only to those who are able to use such intuitive reason? At any rate, as an argument, the method is not convincing to all people, who would claim to be reasonable, rational, and possessed of a 'mind in a healthy and vigorous state'.

(21) Ibid., p. 75
(22) Ibid., p. 29
(23) Ibid., p. 85
It would, further, appear that Mascall's cosmological method attempts to carry the force of the cosmological argument while seeking to avoid its weaknesses. Moreover, it would appear that it fails in both endeavours. Mascall admits that the chief value of his approach is not argumentative, but that its major usefulness lies in "stimulating the mind to examine finite beings with such attention and understanding that it grasps them in their true ontological nature as dependent upon God, and so grasps God's existence as their Creator." Notwithstanding this admission, Mascall contends that the act of intuitive reason is basically a reasonable act and that it is helpful to state the cosmological approach in argumentative form. Indeed, he sees a three-fold function of such a presentation.

...it can...do something to put us in the frame of mind in which the apprehension of finite beings in their dependence upon God is possible; it can convince us that such apprehension, when it has occurred, is not to be dismissed as an illusion, and it can elucidate its nature and content so far as that is possible. (25)

However, it appears to us that Mascall's approach not only relinquishes the force of a formal argument but

(24) Ibid., p.80
(25) Mascall, Existence And Analogy, p.90
that, as description, it treats a mental function which many people who honestly contemplate existents are unable to find in themselves. Thus, we may wonder if his approach's function of putting a person in the proper frame of mind to apprehend God as the ground of finite beings does not also fail. In his book, *Christ, The Christian and The Church*, Mascall stresses the need for grace to elevate nature, as well as to complete nature, in order that God's revelation might be received by men. We may ask if in his treatment of the mind's arriving at the existence of God Mascall does not neglect the importance of faith-bestowing grace which is necessary for the mind to be able to 'intuit' God. Mascall considers that a man who does not apprehend God's existence through finite being fails to do so simply because he "persists in limiting his gaze to the phenomenal surface of reality." It appears to us that this judgment does less than justice to such men's honesty and to God's grace. Thus, we conclude that as a description of finite being as seen in faith, Mascall's method may well fulfill its two functions of convincing us that faith rightly apprehends the world, and of elucidating the nature and content of this apprehension.

(27) Mascall, *Existence And Analogy*, p.90
but as an argument or as a description of the natural mind's ability to apprehend God as the ground of finite being, Mascall's cosmological approach is open to damaging objections.

We have contended that Mascall does not really follow St. Thomas' argumentative method by which to arrive at God as the ground of finite existents.
Still, both St. Thomas and Mascall affirm that the cosmological approach leads one to assert (1) that God exists, and (2) that God causes the existence of finite beings; and it is this common conclusion that accounts for Mascall's close following of St. Thomas as regards his treatment of the problem of knowledge or speech about a transcendent God. We have already noted St. Thomas' treatment of the **analogia entis**, and now we shall need to look at Mascall's consideration of analogy.

The doctrine of analogy rests upon that of creation, so we must first look at Mascall's treatment of the doctrine of creation. Here, again, we see the idea of a transcendent, Self-existent Being. According to Mascall, God created the world out of love, not out of any need. To show God's independence of the world he

---

(28) Ibid., p. 87
borrows two quasi-mathematical equations from Dr. William Temple.

God - the World = God; The World - God = 0

These equations express the fact that whereas the world is dependent on God, it is not necessary for God. Neither is God increased by the world's creation nor would He be less than He is without the world. Further, God was under no necessity to create the world, and just for this reason, God's love is most manifest in His creating and preserving the world. Again, because there is no necessity for God's creating the world, we cannot say why He did it, for if a reason could be given to the 'why' of God's willing to create the world, then God's will would no longer be entirely free. Nor are the imperfections in the world to be considered a hindrance in arriving at God as the world's creator; on the contrary, it is precisely the 'character of complete un-self-sufficiency' of finite being which leads one to a Self-sufficient cause.

We begin our consideration of Mascall's treatment of analogy proper by noting how he explains the meanings of the terms, 'univocal', 'equivocal', and 'analogue'.

(29) Mascall, He Who Is, p. 97
(30) Ibid., pp. 95-112
A word is applied univocally when, applied to two things, it bears the same sense in both applications. For example, even if Carlo is a great Dane and Fido a Pomeranian, the term 'dog' means the same when applied to either or both. A term is used equivocally when, applied to two things, it bears two different meanings. For example, the term 'mug' is applied equivocally to a drinking utensil and to the victim of a fraud. A term is employed analogically when, applied to two things, it bears a meaning that is neither wholly different nor yet wholly the same in both applications. For example, the term 'healthy' is analogically predicated of Mr. Jones because he enjoys health and of Skegness because it induces health.

The doctrine of analogy finds its greatest importance and complexity in connection with one's thought and speech concerning God. To say that Carlo and Fido are both dogs means that the qualities which distinguish them as dogs are extrinsic to caninity as such. But God, as Self-existent Being, and finite beings, alike, have existence. Being, therefore, is not a genus which may be divided into species, i.e.

(31) Mascall, Existence And Analogy, p.97
there is nothing extrinsic to being that allows one to distinguish between the being of God and the being of finite existents (such as in the genus 'canine' there are species of Pomeranians and Danes, the existence of which allows one to distinguish one type of dog from the other). This means that analogy duorum ad tertium ("the analogy that holds between two beings in consequence of the relation each of them bears to a third", e.g. the analogy between a Pomeranian and a Dane in consequence of the relation each bears to caninity) can have little or no application to God and creatures because there is no 'third' antecedent to being, nor are there any species of being. Therefore, as regards God and creation, analogy unius ad alterum (one to another) must be employed. However, when we use analogy unius ad alterum attributively, (e.g. when we attribute goodness found in man, as the prime analogate, to God, as the secondary analogate), and consider the analogy between God and finite beings due to the relation of cause and effect, we need not be saying anything more than that the perfection in the secondary analogate is a virtual one, (e.g. in such

(32) Ibid., p.99
attribution, the word 'good' applied to God need not
mean any more than that He is able to produce human
goodness).

On the other hand, analogy unius ad alterum used
'proportionally' implies that the analogue under
discussion is found formally in each of the analogates,
but in a mode that is determined by the nature of the
analogate itself. For example,

... assuming that life is an analogous and
not a univocal concept, it is asserted that
cabbages, elephants, men and God each possess
life formally (that is each of them is, quite
literally and unmetaphorically, alive), but
the cabbage possesses life in the mode proper
to a cabbage... the man in that proper to a
man, and ... God in that supreme and by us
unimaginable mode proper to self-existent
Being itself. (35)

Mascall expresses this relation in the following
quasi-mathematical form:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{life of cabbage} & \quad \text{life of man} \\
\text{essence of cabbage} & = \text{essence of man}
\end{align*}
\]

In this formula '=' means not 'is equivalent to' but
means 'as', expressing a proportion, i.e. the life of
a cabbage is to the essence of a cabbage as the life
of a man is to the essence of a man. The problem now arises that if 'is' does not mean 'is equivalent to', then is there anything common to the life of a cabbage and the life of a man. This problem is seen particularly acutely when one speaks analogically of God. In the formula,

\[
\frac{\text{life of man}}{\text{essence of man}} = \frac{\text{life of God}}{\text{essence of God}}
\]

we are still left with the question of whether there is anything common to the life of man and the life of God. The analogy of proportionality does not make this certain, so Mascall contends that analogical prediction between man and God is possible only by a combination of attributive and proportional analogy unius ad alterum. Thus, in comparing the life of God and man, we attribute life seen in man to God, but not univocally, for the life of God is in accordance with His nature as Self-existent Being, and the life of man is in accordance with man's nature as creature, i.e. as a being whose essence and existence are not necessarily the same, who may exist but who does not have to exist,

(37) Ibid., p.109
whose existence is derived.

Mascall also offers a solution to the question of how we speak analogically of the life of a cabbage and of the life of a man. Since both a cabbage and a man are analogates in an analogy of attribution unius ad alterum to God, a cabbage and a man are linked by analogy duorum ad tertium, God's relation to each constituting 'the third'. Mascall gives the following figure to illustrate his position:

\[ \text{G O D} \]
\[ \text{Cabbage} \]
\[ \text{MAN} \]

Mascall concludes,

\[ \text{Without analogy of proportionality it is very doubtful whether the attributes which we predicate of God can be ascribed to him in more than a virtual sense; without analogy of attribution it hardly seems possible to avoid agnosticism.} \]

Thus, Mascall's position combines analogy of attribution with analogy of proportionality. Analogy

---

(38) Ibid., pp.109-111
(39) Ibid., pp.112f.
(40) Ibid., p.113
of attribution seeks to save one from speaking of God equivocally, and analogy of proportionality seeks to save one from speaking of God univocally. We have seen that this is precisely what St. Thomas means by analogy.

Up to now, our consideration of Mascall's treatment of analogy has dealt with the problem of expressing the transcendent in terms of the finite; but now we must note that the method of analogy does not merely deal with concepts of essences, but, as concerns God, with existence. As Mascall expresses it, so far we have dealt with the question, "How can an infinite, necessary and immutable Being be described in terms that are derived from the finite, contingent and mutable world?". But, the anterior question is "How is the possibility of our applying to the infinite Being terms that are derived from the finite order conditioned by the fact that the finite order is dependent for its very existence on the fiat of the infinite and self-existent Being?".

In this connection, it is necessary for us to

(41) Ibid., p. 116
recall the conclusion at which Mascall arrives following his cosmological approach. Indeed, this conclusion is the same as St. Thomas' conclusion, that God is Self-existent Being, that God's essence is to exist, that in God essence and existence are one. Thus, Mascall quotes Gilson as saying:

We must observe, in fact, that in the case of God, every judgment, even if it has the appearance of a judgment of attribution, is in reality a judgment of existence. When we speak, with reference to Him, of essence or substance or goodness or wisdom, we are doing nothing more than repeating about Him; He is esse. That is why His name par excellence is Qui est. (42)

Mascall, himself, expresses this point in the following way:

Since in God essence and existence are identical, any assertion about God's essence is at the same time an assertion about existence; anything which is affirmed to be included in God's nature is at the same time affirmed to exist, and indeed to be self-existent. (43)

One last diagram may help to make this point (44) clearer.

(42) Ibid., p.117
(43) Ibid., p.119
(44) Ibid., p.120
goodness of finite being  

                  =  

fine being  

Since the fourth term of this proportion, God, is equivalent to necessary Being, this means that in asserting a concept of analogical proportion (the goodness of God is in accordance with the nature of God as the goodness of a finite being is in accordance with the nature of a finite being), one necessarily affirms the existence of divine goodness. Furthermore, analogical attribution is possible in such an analogical proportion due to the relation of finite being to God which is asserted by Mascall's cosmological approach, this relation being one of unilateral dependence.

Thus Mascall concludes:

Analogy does not enable us to conceive God's goodness as identical with his essence but to affirm it as identical with his existence. Hence, all our assertions about God are grossly inadequate in so far as they apply concepts to him, but they are thoroughly adequate in so far as they affirm perfections of him .... We cannot, in short, know God's essence by forming concepts of it, but we can know it analogically in our concepts of finite beings. (45)

(45) Ibid., pp. 120f.
In this concluding section of our survey of Mascall's thought, we shall simply state explicitly the idea of transcendence that will have been seen to be present implicitly in his method and in his treatments of creation and analogy. There is no doubt that Mascall considers God to be transcendent, and that the idea of transcendence is fundamental in his system. Furthermore, since according to Mascall, God's transcendence is ontologically founded, transcendence must necessarily affect all aspects of our consideration of God.

Putting aside the question as to whether or not Mascall's method or approach is valid, let us note how fundamentally it calls for a doctrine of God's transcendence. The whole point of the cosmological approach is that one apprehends finite being as "existent and yet not self-existent, as effect-implying-cause!" Further, it is Mascall's basic contention that the cause implied by finite beings must qualitatively transcend them.

(46) Ibid., p.122
... a God who was anything less than infinite, self-existent and self-sufficient would be altogether inadequate to give the world its existence and would moreover require an explanation for his own. To posit a finite God as the ground of the world simply leaves us with two beings whose existence clamours for explanation instead of one.... the existence of the world implies the existence of a God, and moreover the existence of a God whose existence does not imply the existence of a world.(47)

So it is that Mascall rejects the following diagram in which God is represented simply as the first cause in a causal chain.

Mascall says that St. Thomas "does indeed make it plain that the first mover, just because it is itself: unmoved, must be a radically different nature from all the other terms in the series; that it is, in fact, not merely at the beginning of the series, but outside it."(49)

Thus, Mascall represents God as being outside the causal chain.

(47) Ibid., p.125
(48) Ibid., p.74
(49) Ibid., p.74
(50) Ibid., p.74
Or, better still, since God is active not just as the creator, as the first cause, but also as the sustainer of the world, His relation may best be depicted like this:

Hence, we may conclude that Mascall's method of contemplating finite existents and of denying the answer of an infinite regress, leads him not only to affirm the existence of God, but of a God who is transcendent.

We reach the same conclusion when we observe Mascall's treatment of creation. Creation is dependent upon God, but God is under no necessity to create. If it appears that Mascall postulates God as existing, not in Himself but simply as an explanation of the world, as the Creator of the world, then it must be said that this is Mascall's approach.

(51) Ibid., p. 75
to the existence of God. However, this does not mean that Mascall posits God simply in order to account for the world or that the reality of God is exhaustively grasped when one conceives of Him as Creator.

Quoad nos, and in ordine cognoscendi, God appears primarily as the world's creator, but, in the very process by which we come to recognize him, he is manifested as existing quoad seipsum and in ordine essendi in his own right and not for our convenience. The only being who could create a world is one for whom a world is unnecessary; only a self-existent being can confer existence.(52)

Further, in a later writing, Mascall limits the application of the formula, 'God-the world-God; The world-God=0'. His final consideration is that God and the world have no common element that will allow them to form a sum. God is other than the world; God is transcendent to creation. The relation between God and the world is one of analogy not of univocity.

This last statement leads us to note how the transcendence of God occupies a prominent place in

(52) Ibid., p.89
(53) Ibid., pp.132f.
Mascall's treatment of analogy. Analogy is based upon attribution and negation, the element of negation being logically expressed by the idea of proportionality, i.e. some attribute is affirmed of God, but it is denied that it exists in God in the same manner as it exists in creatures. Indeed, any attribute of God exists in regard to God's essence; but since God's essence is Self-existent Being, and the essence of finite being is dependent being, any term properly predicated of finite beings when predicated of God must be denied while it is affirmed. Although Mascall asserts that in God's creative act existence and essence are given to creatures and that, in consequence, one can attribute perfections of creatures to God, he is even more insistent in asserting that these perfections in nature do not (54) exist merely virtually in God. Mascall, as we have seen, combines analogy of attribution with analogy of proportionality, but there is no mistaking the fact that, following Cajetan, Garrigou-Lagrange,

(54) Ibid., pp.122ff.
Penido, and Maritain, Mascall emphasizes analogy of proportionality. This emphasis upon proportional analogy amounts to an emphasis upon the difference between God and the world rather than an emphasis upon their resemblance, and this emphasis again underlines Mascall's insistence upon God's transcendence.

One cannot but be impressed by the consistency of Mascall's system. Regardless of which part of his thought or presentation one might study, one is struck by the strong assertion of God's transcendence. If we may be permitted to offer our own illustration, perhaps the unity of the three parts of Mascall's position, viz. method, creation and analogy, may be seen more clearly.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{attributes of man} & \leftarrow \text{creative act } \atop \text{being of man} & \leftarrow \text{creative act }
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{attributes of God} & \atop \text{being of God}
\end{align*}
\]

(1) Mascall's cosmological approach asserts the dependence of finite man upon the self-existent God. (2) His

(55) Ibid., pp.114f.
treatment of creation asserts that the nature and being of man is derived from God. Both of these points are represented in our figure by the lines representing God's act of creation, (creative act). (3) Mascall's treatment of analogy of proportionality asserts that the attributes predicated of God are in accordance with God's self-existent being, and that the same attributes are predicated of man in accordance with his derived being. We have sought to express this point in our figure by the equation of proportion. It would appear, then, that the key by which one may understand the inter-connections of the parts of Mascall's system, and indeed, his entire presentation, is the transcendence of God on an ontological level. God is transcendent in His very essence and existence, inasmuch as God's essence is to exist, i.e. inasmuch as God is Self-existent Being; whereas creatures have distinct essences and existences both of which are derived from God. Thus it is that Mascall seems to be asserting that God is ontologically transcendent.
Chapter 3.

THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENCE IN THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH

At first consideration, it might appear that Tillich completely disagrees with Mascall, for Tillich repeatedly criticises St. Thomas' sensory perception approach and denies the validity of any argumentative method. Indeed, far from allowing that God's existence can be proved, Tillich says that God does not exist. In spite of this, there would appear to be a great deal of similarity between the treatments of the transcendence of God by Mascall and Tillich. First, we should note that, like Mascall, Tillich is interested in ontology, which he defines as "...an analysis of those structures of being which we encounter in every meeting with reality." Secondly, again like Mascall, Tillich begins his presentation by dealing with finite existence; but whereas Mascall relies heavily upon the work of the Scholastics and modern Thomists, Tillich makes greater use of the findings of existentialist philosophy and depth psychology.

(2) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.227 cf. Tillich, Theology of Culture, p.5
(3) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.24
We shall begin our consideration of Tillich's treatment of the transcendence of God by surveying his evaluation of the arguments for God's existence. We begin this way for two reasons: (1) Tillich's treatment of the arguments shows his thought concerning finitude and self-transcendence, and (2) Tillich's interest in the arguments affords us an area of comparison and contrast with Mascall's thought.

Tillich rejects the arguments for God's existence as arguments, contending that they are neither arguments nor proof of God's existence and largely accepting Kant's criticism of them. We have seen that Kant rejected the ontological argument because it postulates a being, a God as actually existing, when such a being is necessitated only by reason. Similarly Tillich rejects the positing of an 'infinite one' simply because one 'experiences' infinity.

Infinity is a directing concept, not a constituting concept. It directs the mind to experience its own unlimited potentialities, but it does not establish the existence of an infinite being....Infinity is a demand, not a thing. This is the stringency of Kant's

(4) Ibid., p.228
solutions of the antinomies between the finite and the infinite character of time and space. Since neither time nor space is a thing, but both are forms of things, it is possible to transcend every finite time and every finite space without exception. But this does not establish an infinite thing in an infinite time and space. (5)

This criticism of the ontological argument by Tillich appears to be basically the same as that of Kant, i.e. that the demand of reason is insufficient for judgments of existence. Both Kant and Tillich judge that such a demand may direct but not constitute. Later, we shall see how much importance Tillich places upon the fact that man, in being aware of his finitude, transcends himself, but for the moment we note only that, according to Tillich, the directing concept of infinity is wrongly used as an argument for the existence of an infinite being.

If Tillich rejects the ontological argument basically for the same reason that Kant rejects it, so also Tillich follows Kant in rejecting the cosmological argument. Kant pointed out that 'cause and effect' can be shown to apply only to finitude and that, consequently, one must realise that the argument from effect to cause has no

(5) Ibid., pp.21lf.
application to things outside the realm of finitude.

Thus, the cosmological argument, at best, arrives at a finite first cause. Similarly, Tillich says:

In arguments for the existence of God the world is given and God is sought. Some characteristics of the world make the conclusion "God" necessary. God is derived from the world. This does not mean that God is dependent on the world. Thomas Aquinas is correct when he rejects an interpretation and asserts that what is first in itself may be last for our knowledge. But, if we derive God from the world, he cannot be that which transcends the world infinitely. (6).

Further, it will be remembered that Kant asserted that an infinite regress cannot be shown to be impossible. So also Tillich contends:

The question of the cause of a thing or event presupposes that it does not possess its own power of coming into being. Things and events have no aseity. This is characteristic only of God. Finite things are not self-caused; they have been "thrown" into being (Heidegger). The question "Where from?" is universal. Children as well as philosophers ask it. But it cannot be answered, for every answer, every statement, about the cause of something is open to the same question in endless regression. It cannot be stopped even by a God who is supposed to be the answer to the entire series. For this God must ask himself, "Where have I come from?" (Kant). (7)

(6) Ibid., p. 228.
(7) Ibid., pp. 217f.
However, a real difference emerges when we ask why Kant and Tillich reject the arguments. Kant seems to reject the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments because they are invalid arguments. Tillich also points to their invalidity, but his main point is that all the arguments seek to arrive at a being, and can never arrive at the ground of being. He says that in the arguments, "God ceases to be being-itself and becomes a particular being." Further, Tillich considers that Kant, himself, makes this error in his moral argument for the existence of God, for although Kant rightly perceived an unconditional element in the moral demand he was mistaken to identify this with a lawgiver, with a being. Thus, Tillich judges:

A God about whose existence or non-existence you can argue is a thing beside others within the universe of existing things. And the question is quite justified whether such a thing does exist, and the answer is equally justified that it does not exist. (10)

This rejection by Tillich of the idea of God's existence is basic to his whole conception of God and later we must see what this means for his understanding

(8) Tillich, *Theology Of Culture*, pp. 18f.
(10) Tillich, *Theology Of Culture*, p. 5
of transcendence, but at this point we note only that Tillich rejects, in the strongest possible way, the notion that God is an 'existent'.

It would be a great victory for Christian apologetics if the words "God" and "existence" were very definitely separated except in the paradox of God becoming manifest under the conditions of existence, that is, in the Christological paradox. God does not exist. (11) He is being-itself beyond essence and existence.

Yet, in spite of such a strong rejection of the arguments as arguments, Tillich sees positive value in them. He realises that many people through the years have defended them in face of repeated attacks, and judges that, "Those who attacked the arguments for the existence of God criticised their argumentative form; (12) those who defended them accepted their implicit meaning." It is Tillich's contention that the arguments are expressions of the question of God which is implied in human finitude. "The 'first cause' is a hypostasised question, not a statement about a being which initiates the causal chain." Further, Tillich asserts that "The task of a theological treatment of the traditional

(12) Ibid., p. 227
(13) Ibid., p. 228
(14) Ibid., p. 232
arguments for the existence of God is twofold: to
develop the question of God which they express and to
expose the impotency of the 'arguments,' their inability
(15) to answer the question of God."

We have already noted Tillich's rejection of the
arguments as impotent and as being unable to arrive at the
ground of all being, and now we begin our look at Tillich's
positive evaluation of the arguments by noting their value
as questions. He says:

The arguments for the existence of God analyse
the human situation in such a way that the (16)
question of God appears possible and necessary.

The truth of the ontological analysis is that the
question of God is possible, that it can be asked, and the
truth of the cosmological analysis is that the question of (17)
God is necessary, that it must be asked. Therefore, we
shall look, in turn, at the possibility and necessity of
the question of God.

One is not precisely certain of what Tillich means by
'the question of God'. He has two primary definitions of
God: (1) God as man's Ultimate Concern, and (2) God as the
ground of all being, the Power of Being, being-itself.
Now, since one can only be concerned ultimately about that

(15) Ibid., p.233.
(16) Ibid., p.228
(17) Ibid., p.228
(18) Ibid., p.231
which transcends all beings, i.e., being-itself, 'Ultimate Concern' and 'being-itself' should not be seen as two different contents of the term 'God'. Rather, 'being-itself' seeks to speak 'objectively' about God, whereas 'Ultimate Concern' speaks of God 'from man's side'.

Again, at times Tillich seems to use 'being' as meaning simply 'existing', whereas at other times 'being' refers to the "whole of reality, the structure, meaning, and aim of existence." But here again as regards 'God' we need not see any real ambiguity, for 'God' as the basis of all existents, the *prior* of all beings, is the ground of life and meaning. Hence, the question of being means 'Why is there something and not nothing?' and also 'What is the meaning of life?' Thus, by 'question of God' Tillich seems to mean the quest for ultimate reality, the ontological question (Why is there something and not nothing?), and the search for meaning in life. In connection with the question of God, we should note quite

(19) Ibid., p. 261
    cf. Tillich, Paul, Biblical Religion And The Search For Ultimate Reality, pp. 63-84
(20) cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 235-238
(21) cf. Ibid., pp. 5-16
(22) Ibid., p. 17
(23) Ibid., pp. 207; 181
(24) Tillich, Theology Of Culture, pp. 76-111
definitely that Tillich insists that only the question comes from man, that the answer cannot be derived from the question any more than can the question be derived from the answer. Man's asking the ontological question of God is the quest of reason for revelation.

What, then, does Tillich mean by saying that the ontological analysis shows that the question of God is possible?. We can begin our answer by looking at the nature of a question.

One can say that man is the being who is able to ask questions. Let us think for a moment what it means to ask a question. It implies, first, that we do not have that for which we ask. If we had it, we would not ask for it. But, in order to be able to ask for something, we must have it partially; otherwise it could not be the object of a question. He who asks has and has not at the same time.(26)

But, the question of Ultimate Concern is the question of God, and to ask this question is to show that, in some sense, one already 'has' God.

The question of God is possible because an awareness of God is present in the question of God. This awareness precedes the question. It is not the result of the argument but its presupposition...The so-called ontological argument points to the ontological structure of finitude. It shows that an awareness of the infinite is included in man's awareness of finitude.(27)

(26) Tillich, Biblical Religion And The Search For Ultimate Reality, p.11
(27) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.228
If we doubt that man does have an awareness of God which is the presupposition of the question of God, or if we ask Tillich why or how man has this awareness, then Tillich asks us to consider the idea of finitude and its relation to the ground of being, i.e. to consider the ontological structure of finitude. Finitude is defined as "Being limited by non-being," and is marked by an element of 'not yet' and 'no more', i.e. "It is in the process of coming from and going towards non-being." Finitude has the characteristic of participating in Being and in non-being. It 'has' and 'has not'. Speaking of man as finite, Tillich says:

Man knows that he is finite, that he is excluded from infinity which nevertheless belongs to him. He is aware of his potential infinity while being aware of his actual finitude. If he were what he essentially is, if his potentiality were identical with his actuality, the question of the infinite would not arise.... Man must ask about the infinite from which he is estranged, although it belongs to him; he must ask about that which gives him the courage to take his anxiety upon himself. And he can ask this double question because the awareness of his potential infinity is included in his awareness of his finitude.... The ontological argument in its various forms gives a description of the way in which potential infinity is present in actual finitude. As far as description goes, that is as far as it is analysis and not argument, it is valid. (29)

(28) Ibid., pp. 210f.
(29) Ibid., pp. 228f.
Tillich reaches this same conclusion, perhaps more clearly, in his treatment of the idea of self-transcendence. The world is self-transcendent in that it points beyond itself, and man is that being which is aware of his self-transcendence.

In order to experience his finitude, man must look at himself from the point of view of a potential infinity. In order to be aware of moving toward death, man must look out over his finite being as a whole; he must in some way be beyond it. He must also be able to imagine infinity; and he is able to do so, although not in concrete terms, but only as an abstract possibility....All the structures of finitude force finite being to transcend itself and, just for this reason, to become aware of itself as finite.(31)

From this experience, Tillich concludes:

The power of infinite self-transcendence is an expression of man's belonging to that which is beyond non-being, namely, to being-itself. The potential presence of the infinite (as unlimited self-transcendence) is the negation of the negative element in finitude. It is the negation of non-being. The fact that man is never satisfied with any stage of his finite development, the fact that nothing finite can hold him, although finitude is his destiny, indicates the indissoluble relation of everything finite to being-itself.(32)

Thus, the arguments for God's existence are based

---

(30) Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, p.8
(31) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.211
(32) Ibid., p.212
upon the awareness in finitude of infinity. This means that finite beings are self-transcendental and that man is aware of self-transcendence. This occurrence is due to the fact that finite beings participate in being-itself. The ontological argument wrongly hypostasises this awareness of the infinite into an 'infinite one', but it is based upon a true awareness of the infinite in finitude. So it is that Tillich states the valid ontological principle as: "Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object."

If the ontological approach expresses the possibility of the question of God, then the cosmological approach expresses the necessity of the question of God.

The question of God can be asked because there is an unconditional element in every act of asking any question. The question of God must be asked because the threat of non-being, which man experiences as anxiety, drives him to the question of being conquering non-being and courage conquering anxiety. This question is the cosmological question of God.(34)

Tillich acquires his material concerning man's anxiety about the threat of non-being from the work of

---

(33) Tillich, Theology Of Culture, p.22
(34) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.231
existentialist philosophy, and he judges that the cosmological argument rightly perceives this threat of non-being to all finite beings, but that it wrongly seeks to establish an infinite being which is not threatened by non-being. Tillich says:

The "first cause" is a hypostasised question, not a statement about a being which initiates the causal chain. Such a being would itself be a part of the causal chain and would again raise the question of cause. In the same way a "necessary substance" is a hypostasised question, not a statement about a being which gives substantiality to all substances....First cause and necessary substance are symbols which express the question implied in finite being, the question of that which transcends finitude and categories...the question of God(36)....The teleological argument formulates the question of the ground of meaning, just as the cosmological argument formulates the question of the ground of being.(37)

We have seen that Kant contended that the cosmological argument stood or fell as the ontological argument stood or fell. So Tillich holds that the valid cosmological approach rests upon the validity of the ontological approach. He points out that in "concepts like contingency, insecurity, transitoriness, and their

(35) cf. Tillich, Theology Of Culture, pp.76-111
(36) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.232
(37) Ibid., p.233
-63-

psychological correlates anxiety, care, meaninglessness, a new cosmological approach has developed" and that this new approach "follows the first step of the old cosmological argument, namely, the analysis of the finitude of the finite in the light of the awareness of the Unconditioned." Thus, Tillich states the legitimate cosmological principle as: "The Unconditioned of which we have an immediate awareness, without inference, can be recognised in the cultural and natural universe."

At this point, we may raise a question. Does Tillich consistently maintain that only the question of God is expressed in ontological and cosmological analyses? Of course, Tillich has said that a question presupposes a partial possession of its answer, but does not Tillich's emphasis upon the certainty of man's awareness of the unconditional element in himself and his world amount to more than a partial possession? Is there an element of 'having not' in such certainty? Tillich asserts:

The immediate awareness of the Unconditioned has not the character of faith but of self-evidence.(40)

Again, he says that the risk of faith is "based on a foundation, which is not risk: the awareness of the

(38) Tillich, Theology Of Culture, p.26
(39) Ibid., p.26
(40) Ibid., p.27
unconditional element in ourselves and our world." (41)

Tillich does indeed speak of an element of risk and of 'having not'.

The risk of faith is based on the fact that the unconditional element can become a matter of ultimate concern only if it appears in a concrete embodiment......It is the danger of every embodiment of the unconditional element, religious and secular, that it elevates something conditioned, a symbol, an institution, a movement as such to ultimacy.(42)

Unquestionably, Tillich is right in saying that there is an element of doubt about the bearer of ultimacy, and that there is the danger of the bearer's becoming an object of idolatry; but there would appear to be, for him, no doubt or risk concerning the 'awareness of the Unconditioned', concerning being-itself. We may wish to ask if this is actually the case. Tillich may well say that thorough-going atheism has an ultimate concern, but is there not an element of doubt and 'having not' concerning the 'awareness of the Unconditioned' present in honest agnosticism? Is it true to say that in the possibility and necessity of asking the question of God, there is a certain awareness of the Unconditioned which is the presupposition of the question? If Tillich is

(41) Ibid., p.28
(42) Ibid., pp.28f.
correct, then it would appear that some people who ask the question of being are, at least, unaware of their awareness. Does Tillich take seriously people who existentially ask the question of being, of meaning, of God, and who answer negatively? Tillich may or may not be right in saying that since man participates in being-itself he must ask the question of being, but at least, he must allow for people who ask this question and who are not conscious of the awareness of the Unconditioned in finitude.

Tillich, in his definition of finitude as 'being limited by non-being', appears to emphasize being and on this emphasis to establish man's awareness of participating in being-itself. May it not be that one is equally justified in emphasizing man's limitation, his non-being, and upon this emphasis to leave man with the realisation that his experience of potential infinity is simply an unattainable wish? If this be allowed, then man's experience of 'the question' remains simply a question with an element of 'having' and 'having not'. Of course, Tillich has said that only the question can
be derived from the analysis of man's finitude, and with this position we have no quarrel; but it is not at all certain that Tillich consistently maintains that finitude merely provides the question, the quest for revelation. Statements such as those concerning the self-evident, riskless character of the awareness of the Unconditioned may cause one to doubt if Tillich's analysis of finitude does not, in fact, do more than discover the possibility and necessity of the question of God.

God, then, is Being-itsel, not a thing, according to Tillich, and we must investigate what such a conception of God means for the idea of God's transcendence. We begin this investigation, by asking two more specific questions. (1) What is the relation of finite beings and being-itsel? and (2) How can one speak significantly about that which transcends all finite existence, about being-itsel.

(43) One could compare this question of ours with the veiled answer given in George F. Thomas' query as to whether the questions seen in finitude are not affected by one's being a Christian philosopher whose reason has been 'saved' or 'fulfilled' by the revalation in Jesus the Christ. cf. The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp.102ff.
We have already seen the direction of Tillich's answer to the first question. Finite beings participate in Being-itself.

...everything finite participates in being-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it would not have the power of being. It would be swallowed by non-being, or it never would have emerged out of non-being. (44)

Further, not only does the finite participate in the infinite ground of being, but the finite can also become the vehicle of the infinite.

Holiness cannot become actual except through holy "objects." (45)

Furthermore, the holy needs to be expressed and can be expressed only through the secular, for it is through the finite alone that the infinite can express itself. (46)

Tillich, himself, asks and answers the second question.

Can a segment of finite reality become the basis for an assertion about that which is infinite? The answer is that it can, because that which is infinite is being-itself and because everything participates in being-itself. The analogia entis is not the property of a questionable natural theology which attempts to give knowledge of God by drawing conclusions about the infinite from the finite. The analogia entis gives us our only justification of speaking at all about God. It

(44) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p. 263
(45) Ibid., p. 239
(46) Ibid., p. 242
is based on the fact that God must be understood as being-itself. (47)

Tillich's understanding of the relation of finite being and being-itself means that every statement concerning God except 'God is being-itself' is a symbolic statement. (48)

...any concrete assertion about God must be symbolic, for a concrete assertion is one which uses a segment of finite experience in order to say something about him. It transcends the content of this segment, although it also includes it. The segment of finite reality which becomes the vehicle of a concrete assertion about God is affirmed and negated at the same time. It becomes a symbol, for a symbolic expression is one whose proper meaning is negated by that to which it points. And yet it is also affirmed by it, and this affirmation gives the symbolic expression an adequate basis for pointing beyond itself. (49)

In his essay, "The Nature of Religious Language", Tillich makes several points concerning symbols. Like signs, they point beyond themselves; but, unlike signs, they participate in that toward which they point. Thus, a symbol is not arbitrary or invented, but is born,

"out of a group which acknowledges, in this thing, this word, this flag or whatever it may be, its own being.... Now this implies further that in the

(47) Ibid., p.266
(48) Ibid., pp.264f.
(49) Ibid., pp.265f.
(50) Tillich, Theology Of Culture, pp.53-67
moment in which this inner situation of the human group to a symbol has ceased to exist then the symbol dies. This symbol does not "say" anything any more." (51)

Religious symbols as symbols of the Holy are of this nature, i.e. they point to the Holy and are expressive only in a certain situation. Symbols cannot be killed by criticism in terms of natural science or historical research; "symbols can only die if the situation in which they have been created has passed." Tillich cites as an example the 'passing' of the doctrine of the virginity of Mary in Protestant theological thought because of the 'passing' of the two situations which gave rise to this symbol, namely, the need for a mediator between man and an inaccessible Christ, and the glorification of virginal asceticism. (53)

As regards the truth of a symbol, Tillich says:

A symbol has truth: it is adequate to the revelation it expresses. A symbol is true: it is the expression of a true revelation. (54)

We should also note that, according to Tillich, symbols are double-edged, i.e. that "they are directed

(51) Ibid., pp. 57ff.
(52) Ibid., pp. 59-65
(53) Ibid., pp. 65ff.
(54) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p. 266
toward the infinite which they symbolize and toward the
finite through which they symbolize it. They force the
infinite down to finitude and the finite up to infinity."
Tillich gives the example of speaking symbolically of God
as 'Father'. To say that God is our Father brings God
down to the level of the human relationship of father and
child. But at the same time 'fatherhood' is elevated
into the realm of the holy, is consecrated into a pattern
of the divine-human relationship. Thus, 'Father' spoken
symbolically of God refers to 'fatherhood' in its
theonomous, sacramental depth.

Furthermore, according to Tillich, symbols have a
necessary function, for they "open up a level of reality
for which non-symbolic speaking is inadequate." He cites
the example of a landscape by Rubens. The painting has
external qualities of weight, balance of colours, etc., but
what this mediates to one can be expressed only through the
painting itself. Thus, Tillich insists that we should
never speak of 'only a symbol', because

...the literal is not more but less than symbolic.
If we speak of those dimensions of reality which

(55) Ibid, pp.266f.
(56) Tillich, Theology Of Culture, pp.56f.
we cannot approach in any other way than by symbols, then symbols are not used in terms of "only" but in terms of that which is necessary, of that which we must apply. (57) ....non-analogous or non-symbolic knowledge of God has less truth than analogous or symbolic knowledge. The use of finite materials in their ordinary sense for the knowledge of revelation destroys the meaning of revelation and deprives God of his divinity. (58)

One of Tillich's favourite symbols predicated of God is 'personal', and he explains how it is to be used in his discussion with Einstein. To say that God is personal does not mean that God is a person, for indeed the depth of Being is supra-personal and includes both the 'He element' and the 'It element'. But if the 'He element', the personal element, is left out, then the predominating 'It element' transforms the supra-personal into the sub-personal.

This is the reason that the symbol of the personal God is indispensable for living religion. It is a symbol not an object....And it is one symbol beside others indicating that our personal centre is grasped by the manifestation of the inaccessible ground and abyss of being. (60)

Now that we have surveyed Tillich's thought concerning the nature of God, man's awareness of God, and the problem of speaking about God, we must see how these matters

(57) Ibid., p.64
(58) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.146
(59) Tillich, Theology Of Culture, pp.127-132
(60) Ibid., p.132
involve, express, and preserve the idea of God's transcendence. We begin with a rather lengthy quotation.

The question whether the relation between God and the world should be expressed in terms of immanence or transcendence is usually answered by an "as well as." Such an answer, although it is correct, does not solve any problem. Immanence and transcendence are spatial symbols. God is in or above the world or both. The question is what does this mean in non-spatial terms? Certainly, God is neither in another nor in the same space as the world. He is the creative ground of the spatial structure of the world, but he is not bound to the structure, positively or negatively. The spatial symbol points to a qualitative relation: God is immanent in the world as its permanent creative ground and is transcendent to the world through freedom. Both infinite divinity and finite human freedom make the world transcendent to God and God transcendent to the world. The religious interest in the divine transcendence is not satisfied where one rightly asserts the infinite transcendence of the infinite over the finite. This transcendence does not contradict but rather confirms the coincidence of the opposites. The infinite is present in everything finite, in the stone as well as in the genius. Transcendence demanded by religious experience is the freedom-to-freedom relationship which is actual in every personal encounter. Certainly, the holy is the "quite other." But the otherness is not really conceived as otherness if it remains in the aesthetic-cognitive realm and is not experienced as the otherness of the divine "Thou", whose freedom may conflict with my freedom. The meaning of the spatial symbols for the divine transcendence is the possible conflict and the possible reconciliation of infinite and finite freedom.(61)

(61) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.292
The idea of God's immanence in the world and the idea of His transcendence to the world are both based upon Tillich's conception of God as being-itself. The notion of being-itself includes two other notions: (1) the ground of being, and (2) the abyss of being. The element of 'ground of being' indicates the creative element of being-itself. It indicates the participation of everything finite in the infinite power of being. On the other hand, the abysmal element in being-itself points to the difference between finite beings and being-itself, i.e., it points to "the fact that everything participates in the power of being in a finite way, that all beings are infinitely transcended by their creative ground." (62)

Tillich contends that supra-naturalism has an inadequate conception of God's transcendence, in that it "separates God as a being, the highest being, from all other beings, alongside and above which he has his existence." He holds that this notion of transcendence really transforms the infinite "into a finiteness which"

(62) Ibid., p. 263
which is merely an extension of the categories of finitude." For example, as regards space, God is placed in a supra-natural world alongside the natural world; as regards cause, God is made a first cause alongside other causes; as regards substance, God is made into a being above and alongside other beings.

On the other hand, naturalism also has an inadequate conception of God's transcendence, for in identifying God with the unity, harmony, and power of all being, naturalism fails to grasp the infinite distance between the whole of finite things and their infinite ground. "'God' becomes interchangeable with the term 'universe' and therefore is semantically superfluous." However, naturalism is quite correct to insist that God would not be God if He were not the creative ground of being.

Tillich's idea of transcendence is that of self-transcendence or ecstasy. By these terms Tillich means that "the finitude of the finite points to the infinity of the infinite. It goes beyond itself in order to return to itself in a new dimension."

(63) Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, p.6
(64) Ibid., p.7
(65) Ibid., p.8
(66) Ibid., p.8
In terms of immediate experience it is the encounter with the holy, an encounter which has an ecstatic character. The term "ecstatic" in the phrase "ecstatic idea of God" points to the experience of the holy as transcending ordinary experience without removing it. Ecstasy as a state of mind is the exact correlate to self-transcendence as the state of reality. (67)

Thus, Tillich's conception of God's transcendence, unlike naturalism, does not identify God and the world, but asserts that the finite world participates in God as the ground of all being. On the other hand, unlike the supra-naturalists, Tillich does not 'create' a supra-world for God, but says that God is encountered ecstatically, i.e. in and through ordinary experience while not removing it. This, then, is the idea of self-transcendence. Finitude, while asserting its own reality, goes beyond itself, i.e. it points to the infinity of the infinite while also asserting the finitude of its own being.

By now it should be quite clear what Tillich means by 'creative ground of being', by 'the participation of finite beings in being-itself'. But we must examine in more detail what it is that actually constitutes the

(67) Ibid., pp.8f.
difference between God and finite beings. We must ask, What does it mean to say that God is transcendent to the world? Naturalism sees God 'in' the world, and supranaturalism sees God 'above' the world. Both use spatial imagery to express God's transcendence or non-transcendence. But as we have observed, Tillich's concept of self-transcendence does not use spatial imagery.

The self-transcendent idea of God replaces the spatial imagery--at least for theological thought--by the concept of finite freedom. The divine transcendence is identical with the freedom of the created to turn away from the essential unity with the creative ground of its being....It is the quality of finite freedom within the created which makes pantheism impossible and not the notion of a highest being alongside the world, whether his relation to the world is described in deistic or theistic terms.(68)

Tillich bases the existence of finite freedom upon the discoveries of existential and phenomenological analyses. He explains the split in man between essence and existence in great detail in Part I of his first volume of Systematic Theology, but we need not go into such a mass of material in this paper. Suffice it here to refer to our previous treatment of man's awareness of potential

(68) Ibid., p.9
infinity and actual finitude, which, according to Tillich, shows man's finite freedom and the difference (69) between God and man. But we should be mistaken if we were to think that Tillich sees God's transcendence as only the result of man's choice in freedom. The issue is not nearly so simple, for Tillich seems to hold that the 'fall' of man is inevitable and even that there is a common point in the 'fall' and 'creation'. In other words, according to Tillich, 'to be' means 'to be fallen', to have one's essence and existence separated. Indeed, man might even be defined as 'finite freedom'. So it is that Tillich says:

God as the ground of being infinitely transcends that of which he is the ground. He stands against the world in so far as the world stands against him, and he stands for the world, thereby causing it to stand for him. This mutual freedom from each other and for each other is the only meaningful sense in which the "supra" in "supra-naturalism" can be used. Only in this sense can we speak of "transcendent" with respect to the relation of God and the world. (71)

Thus, we see how the ontological and cosmological approaches employed by Tillich establish the idea of the self-transcendence of finitude, and how the idea of self-

(69) Ibid., p.25
(71) Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, p.8
transcendence is taken up in Tillich's conception of God's transcendence. Further, we see how the idea of God, as being-itself which includes the elements of 'ground of being' and 'abyss of being', is the basis of Tillich's conception of God's immanence in the world and transcendence to the world. Now, we shall see how Tillich's method of speaking about God, i.e. symbolically, seeks to express and preserve God's transcendence.

If God as the ground of being infinitely transcends everything that is, two consequences follow: first, whatever one knows about a finite thing one knows about God, because it is rooted in him as its ground; second, anything one knows about a finite thing cannot be applied to God, because he is, as has been said, "quite other" or, as could be said, "ecstatically transcendent". The unity of these two divergent consequences is the analogous or symbolic knowledge of God. A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking of God, but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used is both affirmed and denied. Every religious symbol negates itself in literal meaning, but it affirms itself in its self-transcendent meaning.... Thus it follows that everything religion has to say about God, including his qualities, actions and manifestations, has a symbolic character and the meaning of "God" is completely missed if one takes the symbolic language literally.(72)

Symbols, then, express and preserve the transcendence

(72) Ibid., pp.9f.
of God, for symbols are terms that are not predicated univocally of finite beings and of God. In this sense, symbols speak more truly of God than do words bearing literal meaning, because the "use of finite materials in their ordinary sense for the knowledge of revelation destroys the meaning of revelation and deprives God of his divinity." Tillich contends that when we attribute love, mercy, power, etc. to God, we attribute qualities experienced in ourselves, and that they cannot be applied to God in their literal sense without leading to "an infinite amount of absurdities." So it is that "the symbolic character of these qualities must be maintained consistently. Otherwise every speaking about the divine becomes absurd."  

But there is a danger even in speaking of God symbolically.

The theologian cannot escape making God an object in the logical sense of the word, just as the lover cannot escape making the beloved an object of knowledge and action. The danger of logical objectification is that it never is merely logical. It carries ontological presuppositions and implications. If God is brought into the subject-object structure of being, he ceases to be the ground

(73) Tillich, Theology Of Culture, p.62
of being and becomes one being among others (first of all, a being beside the subject who looks at him as an object). He ceases to be the God who is really God... Theology always must remember that in speaking of God it makes an object of that which precedes the subject-object structure and that, therefore, it must include in its speaking of God the acknowledgment that it cannot make God an object.(74)

The same problem confronts us when we say that we encounter God as 'Thou', as a 'Thou'; but, according to Tillich, being and personal are not contradictory, for the "ground of being is the ground of personal being, not its negation. Religiously speaking, this means that our encounter with God who is a person includes the encounter with the God who is the ground of everything personal and as such not a person." Thus Tillich concludes:

The God who is a being is transcended by the God who is Being itself, the ground and abyss of every being. And the God who is a person is transcended by the God who is Personal-itself, the ground and abyss of every person.(76)

This point leads us to one final consideration of the problem of speaking about God. God cannot become an object because, as being-itself, He is the creative ground

---

(74) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.191
(75) Tillich, Biblical Religion And The Search For Ultimate Reality, p.83
(76) Ibid., pp.82f.
of the subject-object structure; He is 'prior to' the split between subject and object. So it is that the statement, 'God is being-itself', is not a symbolic statement. Every other statement is symbolic, and is subject to demythologisation, re-mythologisation, de-literalisation or re-symbolisation, but it would appear that, according to Tillich, God cannot be de-ontologised.

Now that we have considered separately the idea of God's transcendence as expressed by Mascall and Tillich in their approaches to finite being, in their dealings with the problem of speaking about God, and in their direct treatments of the concept of transcendence, let us make some comparisons and contrasts in their positions.

We begin by asking if there is any essential difference between the approaches of Mascall and Tillich. Mascall, as we have seen, agrees that the cosmological approach has its greatest value in contemplating finitude, and we may ask if by 'contemplation of finitude' Mascall means something other than Tillich means by 'analysis of finitude'. Further, Mascall says that the recognition
of the infinite from the finite is possible 'just because the mind as a mind' has this ability of recognition; and Tillich says that the 'cosmological recognition' of the ground of being is possible because of an immediate awareness of the Unconditioned (as expressed in the ontological approach). Thus, we may ask if the two approaches differ other than in their choice of words.

In spite of apparent similarities and sympathies, the two approaches seem to us to differ sharply. It is true that at places Tillich's analysis seems to have the force of 'proving' the infinite from the finite. It is also true that Mascall plays down the argumentative aspect of his case by relying upon 'intuitive reason' and not completely upon discursive reason. However, notwithstanding these facts, the two approaches strike one as being basically different. Which position we judge to be correct will probably depend upon whether we agree with Mascall that "finitude implies infinity" (where 'implies' has the force of saying 'leads one to assent to'), or whether we agree with Tillich that finitude expresses only the question of God. Mascall's contention is, at the very least, that the contemplation of finitude (which by asking about the cause of finite existents and finding no
answer in finitude, leads one to the certainty of the Infinite) 'monstrates' the existence of God. On the other hand, Tillich says:

Causality expresses by implication the inability of anything to rest on itself. Everything is driven beyond itself to its cause, and the cause is driven beyond itself to its cause, and so on indefinitely. Causality powerfully expresses the abyss of non-being in everything.(77)

Thus, Tillich's approach seeks to elucidate the question of being or of God which is expressed in finitude, rather than to lead one to the certainty of the existence of an infinite God.

However, the sharpest difference between Mascall and Tillich emerges in their treatments of the nature of God. It might appear that both arrive at a transcendent, infinite God, but there is a great difference in the two conceptions of God. Mascall arrives at that which Tillich says is the negation of God, i.e. a being, indeed, an infinite, highest, most powerful being, but still a being. In this respect Mascall does not significantly differ from the supra-naturalist point of view which Tillich so strongly criticises. Mascall's

(77) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.218
conception of God places Him 'above' and 'before' all other beings, and in so doing posits God as a being. Tillich, of course, is unwilling to allow this.

The being of God is being-itself. The being of God cannot be understood as the existence alongside others or above others. If God is a being, he is subject to the categories of finitude, especially to space and substance. Even if he is called the "highest being" in the sense of the "most perfect" and the "most powerful" being, this situation is not changed. When applied to God, superlatives become diminutives. They place him on the level of other beings while elevating him above all of them. A theology which does not dare to identify God as the power of being as the first step toward a doctrine of God relapses into monarchic monotheism, for if God is not being-itself he is subordinate to it.... (78)

Tillich contends that when 'the first cause' is asserted to be absolute, then it is used as a symbol of the creative and abysmal ground of being. This point can be seen in the different ways in which the term 'infinite' is used by Mascall and Tillich. Mascall sees God as 'the Infinite', but Tillich judges that "being-itself cannot be identified with infinity, that is, with the negation of finitude. It precedes the finite, and it precedes the infinite negation of the

(78) Ibid., p.261
(79) Ibid., p.264
finite." (80) We may further suggest that the reason for Mascall's arriving at what Tillich considers a symbol of being-itself, i.e. at 'the Infinite' instead of that which precedes the division of finite and infinite, is to be found in the fact that Mascall's approach is founded in finite existents and can never transcend the realm of beings. It would appear that Mascall's 'infinite' is arrived at simply by finding no answer in finitude to the question of its own being, and by hypostatisating the resulting necessity for the infinite, i.e. by negating finitude and by hypostatisising its negation. Mascall would say that the existence of God as we know Him and the existence of God as He is in Himself are different; and Tillich, too, acknowledges the difference between God as being and God as related and living. He holds that in every relation God becomes a 'Thou' for us; in every knowledge of God, God becomes an object; but the statement, 'God is being-itself', is not symbolic, not simply God as He is to us, not simply as He is for our knowledge. Rather 'God is being-itself' expresses God as He is in Himself. This clarification by Tillich seems

(80) Ibid., p.212
(81) cf. Ibid., pp.261-321
to confirm that Mascall's approach arrives only at a symbol for God, for when we speak of God as related, as a 'Thou' for us, as a being, then our speech is symbolic in relation to being-itself.

One might ask Tillich, on Mascall's behalf, if one can worship being-itself; if it is not necessary to think of God as a being not alongside but above all other beings. George F. Thomas raised this question, and Tillich replied as follows:

To Mr. Thomas's request to think of God as a being, not alongside but above the other beings, I answer that logically the "above" is one direction of the "alongside" except it mean that which is the ground and abyss of all beings. Then, however, it is hard to call it a being. Certainly in the I-Thou relationship of man and his God, God becomes a being, a person, a "thou" for us. But all this is on the ground of his character as being-itself—an insight which is important for the meaning of prayer and meditation. (83)

As regards the question of speaking about the transcendent God, Mascall and Tillich are in substantial agreement. Mascall contends that words are neither predicated univocally nor equivocally of finite beings and God. Tillich contends that a term ordinarily pre-

(82) Thomas, George F., "The Method And Structure of Tillich's Theology" in The Theology of Paul Tillich, p.104
(83) Tillich, Paul, "Reply To Interpretation and Criticisms" in The Theology of Paul Tillich, p.341
dicated of finite beings when predicated of God is both denied and affirmed by the reality to which it points. Further, Mascall makes no attempt to prove God's nature by the argument of *analogia entis*, rather he uses it as a means of speaking about God. Similarly, Tillich sees the proper use of symbols as being means of speaking about God, and he denies the validity of any theodicy based on analogy or symbolism. On one hand, both Mascall and Tillich seek to preserve the truth of symbolic language. Mascall bases the applicability of analogical terms upon the resemblance of an effect to its cause, and Tillich bases his use of symbols upon their participation in that towards which they point. On the other hand, both Mascall and Tillich seek to preserve the transcendence of God in their use of analogical predications and symbols. To this end, Mascall maintains that terms which properly apply to finite reality are not predicated univocally of finite existents and God. Similarly, Tillich maintains that symbols do not claim a literal truth, and that God transcends all symbols such as personal, loving or existing. Thus, there is, indeed, a difference between Mascall and Tillich as regards the basis of their analogical or symbolic speech about God, but in respect to motives and methods,
they largely agree concerning the problem of speaking about God.

As regards the idea of transcendence, Mascall and Tillich basically agree in motives but disagree sharply in expression. Both call attention to the fact that any speech is inadequate for proper knowledge of God. Both wish to maintain the infinite difference between God and the world, while asserting that God is the world's creator. Both assert that God's being is a se, and that the world exists ab alio. Both wish to assert that the difference between God and the world is founded in the very nature of God's being, i.e. that there is an ontological difference between God and the world. Mascall seeks to express God's transcendence in ontological terms taken from the categories of time, space and substance. God is the first cause; He is above the natural world's processes; He is the infinite, highest, most powerful being. Mascall begins with these categories and never manages to escape from them. Thus, he is open to Tillich's criticism that such an infinite God is simply the greatest extension of a God confined in

(84) cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp.145f.
and subject to finite categories. On the other hand, Tillich's ontological analysis makes use of Existential categories. He expresses God's transcendence in terms of self-transcendence, of man's awareness of the split between his essence and existence, and of man's finite freedom.

We close with one word of criticism. Tillich is right to point out that it is not sufficient to explain God's transcendence in spatial terms. But are we not justified in asking if it is sufficient to explain God's transcendence only in terms of freedom? Doubtless, the question of meaning in life and man's experience of division within himself are real. Doubtless, too, any adequate treatment of transcendence must affirm that God is beyond such division. But are there not other questions and inadequacies which are also real to men. George F. Thomas suggests that such questions as those of death and error may be relevant as well. If these are experienced as inadequacies, then it would appear that God as transcendent must be expressed in terms similar to

(85) Thomas, op. cit., p.97
'eternal' and 'perfect'. Either Tillich must show that such questions are not ultimate or he must explain how the concept of being-itself includes these expressions of God's transcendence. We are not doubting that it is helpful to express God's transcendence in terms of freedom, we simply question if this is a sufficient expression of the transcendence of God.
SECTION II

TRANSCENDENCE

IN

TWO EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHIES
Chapter 4.

THE NOTION OF TRANSCENDENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL JASPERS.

In this paper we shall look at the notion of transcendence in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers. We shall not limit our study to Jaspers' actual treatment of Transcendence, but shall enquire into what he sees as fundamental in philosophizing, viz. the awareness of the Encompassing (das Umgreifende), since Jaspers' idea of the Encompassing bears comparison with the ideas of a transcendent God presented by Mascall and Tillich.

Both Mascall and Tillich make use of an ontological approach in their treatments of the transcendence of God, but strictly speaking, Jaspers is a 'periechontologist' rather than an ontologist. Periechontology differs from the ordinary form of ontology in that whereas the latter seeks to deal with Being, to assert what it is, the former is concerned with the question of how Being can be for us. Jaspers does not ask what Being is, for the question of what already presupposes that one knows how a thing is. What asks for the distinguishing nature of a thing, for its essence. For Jaspers the prior question is How. He asks for the mode of Being. In this approach, Jaspers follows Kant's distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself. Just as it is necessary first to deal with appearance, so Jaspers sees the
first task of philosophizing to be the enquiring into
the How of Being.

Philosophical thinking of God which gains
certainty in the foundering of thought pre-
hends the 'that' not the 'what' of the god-
head. (III, 39) (2)

A second point concerning Jaspers' procedure should
be noted. Often in his philosophizing the same conclusion
arises in his treatment of different subjects. Such
'redundancy' is not accidental. On the contrary, it shows
the intentional unity of Jaspers's philosophizing. His aim
is to illuminate existence in such a manner that the aware-
ness of the Encompassing becomes a possibility in the
Existenzen of his readers. Thus, his treatment of cyphers,
of reason, of boundary situations, etc., all, aim at this
end. Jaspers makes it quite clear that this is his
intention in the foreword to his Philosophie.

(1) Knauss, Gerhard, "The Concept of The Encompassing in
Jaspers' Philosophy" in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers,
p.167.
(2) Thyssen, Johannes, "The Concept of 'Foundering' in

All page numbers in parentheses after quotations refer to
Jaspers' Philosophie. Roman numerals refer to volume number
where the source quoted was so divided. Where no volume re-
ference is given, use was made of an undivided source. Foot-
notes will refer to sources of translation, and the refer-
ences in parentheses are those given by the translators
themselves.
The meaning of philosophizing lies in a single thought, which as such is inexpressible: the awareness of Being in itself; each chapter of this work should make it accessible; each should represent the whole in smaller form, but at any given time one chapter leaves dark what will be illuminated only by the rest. (3)

Since Jaspers adopts this method of philosophizing we should not expect his work to be one extended argument, rather he presents several analyses, each directed to the same end. Consistent with his own approach, we propose, in this paper, to treat individually several of Jaspers' key concepts in order to determine his teaching concerning Transcendence, but before we do this we must attempt to give some idea of what Jaspers means by the term 'Transcendence' or 'Encompassing'. Actually it is impossible to define or even conceptualize the Encompassing, and our attempt to do so is permissible only so long as we remember that ultimately the ideas of the Encompassing are cancelled out by its 'presentness'.

We call the being that is neither only subject nor only object, that is rather on both sides of the subject-object split, das Ungreifende, the Comprehensive (Encompassing). Although it cannot be an adequate object, it is of this, and with this in mind, that we speak when we philosophize. (4)


Karl W. Deutsch gives the following example to help explain the idea of the Encompassing. From a mountain one sees many well defined objects bounded by a horizon, and one believes that there are objects in the unseen distance. As one climbs higher this expectation is fulfilled, and one sees a larger horizon. Yet, no matter how high one climbs, a limit, a horizon, remains.

You may expect to push back these boundaries time after time, but you cannot seriously hope to abolish or exhaust the vaster reality behind them—the inescapable reality that encompasses all we know and all we think. (5)

Another helpful illustration is given by William Earle.

The situation is as though we stood in a small pool of light encompassed by the vast darkness. Someone calls attention to the encompassing darkness; where is it, the others cry, turning their torches out to light up and see the darkness, but of course they see nothing but more and more illuminated areas. Nevertheless, can we not be aware of this darkness as the limits of our light? The eye cannot literally see the dark, but is it not aware of it? And, Jaspers would insist, we must be aware of that darkness if we are not to forget what light means. (6)

These illustrations serve to explain the concept of the Encompassing well enough to allow us to pursue Jaspers' basic question of how the Encompassing becomes appearance for us. Why does one believe that there is always an Encompassing

(6) Jaspers, Karl, Reason and Existenz, p.14
which one can never grasp? How is one aware of that which is beyond one's limits? Jaspers contends that one becomes aware of Being in itself by 'gliding awareness' which he describes as the thought or reason which touches all forms of Being without adhering absolutely to any of them. "I am aware of Being by not having become bound or grounded anywhere." According to Jaspers Reason is the instrument which allows 'gliding awareness', i.e. which allows one to perform transcendental thinking.

REASON

In developing his concept of reason, Jaspers makes use of the distinction in the German language between Verstand and Vernunft. Verstand is 'understanding' and refers to one's capacity to comprehend the objective world and to obtain phenomenal knowledge. Jaspers is adamant that this knowledge or understanding is genuine and that it should not be passed over lightly. Science is to be given its due. However, this understanding makes a false claim when it purports to be applicable to the whole of reality. Thus, Jaspers develops the idea of Vernunft, 'reason'. Vernunft is the thought that performs transcendental thinking.

(7) Jaspers, Karl, Truth and Symbol (from Von Der Wahrheit), p.66
(8) Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p.47
But if reason means the pre-eminence of thought in all modes of the Encompassing, then more is included than mere thinking. It is then what goes beyond all limits, the omnipresent demand of thought, that not only grasps what is universally valid and is an en rationis in the sense of being or law or principle of order of some process, but also brings to light the Other, stands before the absolutely counter-rational, touching it and bringing it, too, into being. Reason, through the pre-eminence of thought, can bring all the modes of the Encompassing to light by continually transcending limits, without itself being an Encompassing like them. (10)

But Jaspers makes even stronger claims for Reason. It is the capability which not only performs but demands transcendental thinking.

Reason can find no rest in the glory and splendour of the world nor can it even stop asking questions. (11)

We are tempted to raise to the status of the One what has developed into finality in innumerable historical facts. But Reason takes hold of the negative faculties of the intellect, which shows the limits of everything, which are able to undermine critically every finality and are even capable of disregarding everything that is. (12)

Thus, reason demands Transcendence. It is the will to absoluteness and unity.

(10) Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p.65
(11) Jaspers, Karl, Reason and Anti-Reason In Our Time, p.40
(12) Ibid., p.45.
Reason refuses to take hold of any kind of unity but seeks the real and only unity. It knows that it is lost if it clutches prematurely at a part of truth and makes it the ultimate and absolute truth. It wills the One, which is All. It must not leave out anything, must not drop anything, exclude anything. It is itself a boundless openness. (13)

Here, we may wish to ask if Jaspers' idea of Transcendence or the Encompassing is just the result of a demand of reason. Can reason establish the Encompassing? To this question, Jaspers answers fairly and negatively. Although reason is necessary to take any step towards transcendence, it is not sufficient to provide a ground for philosophizing.

If... we ask whether philosophy can ground itself upon Reason, the answer must be no, since, in all the modes of the Encompassing, through reason it grounds itself upon some other, finally essentially upon Transcendence; and also yes, since the way in which it does ground itself leads only above reason. Philosophy does not live by reason alone, yet it can take no step without it. (14)

It is not sufficient to say: be rational! but rather: be rational out of existence, or better, out of all the modes of the Encompassing. (15)

The modes of the Encompassing can be divided into two general groups: the Encompassing that I am and the Encompassing of the world, i.e. Being itself.

(13) Ibid., p.39.
(14) Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, pp.130f.
(15) Ibid., p.126.
The Encompassing appears and disappears for us in two opposed perspectives: either as Being itself, in and through which we are -- or else as the Encompassing which we ourselves are, and in which every mode of Being appears to us. (16)

The Encompassing that I am can be seen in three modes: 

empirical existence, consciousness as such, and spirit.

One can see oneself simply as a biological, sociological, psychological existent to be studied and comprehended, i.e. as empirical existence; or as a centre of consciousness, thinking and grasping, i.e. as consciousness as such; or in terms of idea and wholeness, i.e. as spirit. But reason refuses to stop here. Somehow man knows that he is more, that he encompasses himself. So it is that through these three modes, man becomes aware of the Encompassing that he is, viz. Existenz.

Further, just as Existenz encompasses one's existence, so it in turn points to an Encompassing that encompasses Existenz.

... this Encompassing which I am and know as empirical existence, consciousness as such, and spirit, is not conceivable in itself but refers beyond itself. (18)

Something in man's origin, which is not historically derivable, points to Transcendence. He knows himself created by Transcendence, not as far as his mere existence is concerned, but in his human

(16) Ibid., p. 52
(17) Ibid., pp. 54-59.
(18) Ibid., p. 59.
dignity. (19)

In a manner similar to the experience of the Encompassing of myself through the modes of my Existenz, the Encompassing as Being itself appears through the modes of the world. Reason, in its quest for unity and absoluteness, pushes things to their limits and refuses to stop short of Being itself. Knauss condenses for us Jaspers account of how reason pushes beyond the 'world' (dasein) and history.

We ask: everything is in space, but what is space in? We know, since Kant, of the dependence of our representation of space on the peculiar make-up of human consciousness. In pondering this question we ask to transcend this dependency. In a certain sense, this question is senseless, i.e., if, in using the words "what in," we are inquiring only after a new spatial dimension. But the question assumes a deeper meaning if it signifies our intention to soar, beyond all spatial limitations, into an Encompassing, which is no longer bound to our manner of representation. The world is not what we investigate, but that we investigate. (20)

... history attempts to find an encompassing bond in its inquiry into origin and goal, for the meaning of history is at the same time the meaning of man. But the actual sphere of history is, thereby, again transcended, for origin and goal themselves do not belong to history, (the beginnings are already set, the goal is still ahead of us). Yet it is out of history that the demand arises to reach beyond it into the Encompassing. Purely historical knowledge remains always unsatisfying; it is never the end. History is encompassed by a horizon in which the

(19) Knauss, op. cit., p.165.
(20) Ibid., p.162.
temporal blends into the eternal and the relative is consummated in the absolute. (21)

Thus it is that reason demands of the world and finds through the world Being itself.

This Being itself which we feel as indicated at the limits, and which therefore is the last thing we reach through questioning from our situation, is in itself first. (22)

Being itself is that which shows an immeasurable number of appearances to inquiry, but it itself always recedes and only manifests itself indirectly as that determinate empirical existence we encounter in the progress of our experiences and in the regularity of processes in all their particularity. We call it the World. (23)

**GRENZSITUATION**

We may also approach the idea of transcendental thinking by investigating another key concept of Jaspers, viz. Grenzsituation (limit, ultimate, or boundary situation). Although each of these translations of Grenze possesses some advantage in expressing a shade of meaning intended by Jaspers, we shall employ the term boundary situation in this paper because it seems to express most strongly

(21) Ibid., p. 164.
(23) Ibid., p. 60.
the positive element in a Grenzsituation.

Situations such as the fact that I am always in situations, that I cannot live without conflict and suffering, that I unavoidably incur guilt, that I must die -- these I call boundary situations. They do not change, save in their appearance; with respect to our existence they are ultimate. They can not be surveyed; in our existence we see nothing else behind them. They are like a wall we come up against and upon which we founder. They cannot be changed by us, only brought to clarity -- without our being able to explain or deduce them from anything else. They are a part of existence itself. (24)

Several points should be noted concerning a boundary situation.

1. To exist means to experience boundary situations hence their inevitability.

To experience ultimate situations and to exist is one and the same thing. (25)

2. A boundary situation has a strong negative meaning.

In such a situation,

... there is nothing firm or stable, no indubitable absolute, no enduring support for experience and thought. Everything is in flux, in the restless movement of question and answer; everything is relative, finite, split into opposites -- nothing is whole, absolute, essential. (26)

All of these ultimate situations point towards the fragmentariness and contradictoriness, not only of my existence, but of the total reality of the world. (so Latzell)(27)

(24) Jaspers, Karl, Philosophie, II 'Existenzerzettung', p.203
(26) Ibid., p.184.
(27) Ibid., p.195.
Foundering signifies the fruitlessness of all endeavours to reach, from a finite basis such as consciousness-as-such or even from self-sufficient Existenz, a satisfactory access to Being, i.e., to arrive at the absolute. (so Thyssen)(28).

3. A boundary situation has a positive meaning. Thyssen points this out when he says, "... to touch on a boundary means to touch on something else beyond that boundary," and Jaspers himself points to this positive element in his simile 'to come up against a wall'. Thus, Thyssen rightly interprets Jaspers when he speaks of, "Foundering, with its twofold function, the positive: to connect with Transcendence, the negative: to precipitate destruction ...." (30)

4. Foundering in face of a boundary situation must be real. It is not a 'technique' by which one arrives at Transcendence.

To will this foundering directly would be to admit a perversion in which being itself would be wholly darkened into nothingness. We do not find genuine revelatory foundering in just any shipwreck, nor in every annihilation, self-surrender, renunciation, or refusal. The cipher of immortalization in foundering becomes clear only when I do not will to founder and yet dare to founder. I cannot plan the reading of this cipher of foundering. I can plan only that which provides permanence and stability. The cipher does not reveal itself when I will it, but only when I do everything to avoid its reality; it reveals

(28) Thyssen, op.cit., p.312.
(29) Ibid., p.314.
(30) Ibid., p.327.
itself in the *amor fati.* But fatalism would be false, if it gave in too early and hence failed to founder. (31)

(5) The transcendence experienced in a boundary situation is distinguished from the situation itself, and this distinction allows for the fact that not every one who experiences a boundary situation also experiences Transcendence.

It is a terrifying fact that to-day, despite all the upheaval and devastation, we are still in danger of living and thinking as though nothing really important had happened. It is as though a great misfortune had merely disturbed the good life of us poor victims, but as though life might now be continued in the old way .... For the great danger is that what has happened may pass, considered as nothing but a great misfortune, without anything happening to us men as men, without our hearing the voice of transcendence, without our attaining to any insight and acting with insight. (32)

Having now some idea of the concept of foundering in face of a boundary situation, let us ask a question concerning reason's transcending of boundary situations and their founderings. Is it possible, since as a result of the distinction between Transcendence and a boundary situation, one may endure the latter without experiencing

(31) Latzel, op. cit., p.192.
the former, that ultimate foundering, the ultimate 'pushing back' by reason, may deny Transcendence? Does Jaspers really allow for ultimate foundering? The above quote concerning people who neither founder nor experience Transcendence does not really answer our question, since we are concerned with real foundering which fails to give rise to an awareness of Transcendence. Another way of asking this question is to ask just how much weight is placed upon 'philosophy' and how much upon 'faith' in Jaspers' 'philosophical faith'. Is the faith that 'sees' Transcendence in a boundary situation really faith or is Transcendence a necessary part of such a situation? Jaspers' position here is not at all clear. He seems to assert both points of view. If one takes serious the fact that a boundary divides two areas, then more weight seems to be placed on philosophy than on faith. Yet, it seems to us that this is not the case. Rather, Jaspers really takes faith seriously, i.e. the awareness of Being is not simply necessitated by reason and boundary situations. In the face of foundering one decides whether to affirm Transcendence or whether to affirm nothingness.

And in every case, the presence of gaps in the world structure, the failure of all attempts to conceive of the world as self-contained, the abortion of human planning, the futility of human designs and realization, the impossibility of fulfilling man himself bring us to the edge of the abyss, where we experience nothingness or God. (italics mine) (33)

(33) Ibid., p.35
Without wishing to oversimplify Jaspers' thought at this point, we might suggest how it is that such ambiguity can arise. Jaspers is always insistent that the world be taken seriously, and he is on guard against the charge of 'mere subjectivity'. Thus, he insists that the faith which affirms Transcendence is not simply 'wishful thinking' but that it is grounded in man's experience of boundary situations and foundering. This is in the same tenor as his insistence that reason does not 'speculate' apart from Existenz. Notwithstanding this emphasis in Jaspers' philosophizing, it seems to us that he takes equally serious the element of will in affirming Transcendence.

To be sure, Jaspers says that Existenz at its deepest

"... knows itself to be granted (geschenkt) by that surpassing Transcendence which is neither freedom nor compulsion". (34)

Further, we can agree with Latzel ("The word 'limit' expresses the idea that there is something else ...") and Thyssen ("... the 'wall' Existenz comes up against is Transcendence ....") concerning the reality of the 'Other' touched in a boundary situation; but, at the same time, we must agree

(34) Thyssen, op.cit., p.306.
(35) Latzel, op.cit., p.188.
(36) Thyssen, op.cit., p.304.
with Blackham who sees the element of faith in Jaspers' philosophizing.

Ultimate frustration is a cypher which cannot be interpreted; it is silence. There can only be faith in being-in-itself which sustains and orients the effort of being-oneself and this faith is touched and tested at the limits of achievement and failure. (37)

Blackham judges that according to Jaspers even in a boundary situation, "the encounter with Transcendence cannot be guaranteed".

The will to affirm, even in the acceptance of final frustration, is essential, although it cannot subsist on itself without the encouragement of real experiences. (38)

In this last statement, there seems to me to lie Jaspers' true position. Faith prehends Transcendence, but faith knows that Transcendence is a reality pointed to by Existenz and the world.

This same relation between faith and the prehension of reality may be seen in Jaspers' treatment of the leap that occurs when one passes from ultimate foundering, from angst, to calm. This step is in fact a 'leap of

(37) Blackham, H. J., Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 61
(38) Ibid., pp. 62f.
faith; and Jaspers calls it "the most difficult and incomprehensible" step one can make. However, having made this leap or step, one knows that Transcendence is real and that this leap was a leap not to fancy but to reality. Indeed, that man succeeds in the "enormous leap must have its reason beyond the existence of the self; his faith connects him indeterminably with the being of Transcendence". (III, 235)

**CYPHER**

Jaspers' approach and position may again be seen in his concept of cypher. According to him, Transcendence never appears directly, but always indirectly through sensuous entities.

The profoundest quality of Being must also appear and appear essentially in the sensuously concrete. In philosophizing, sensuousness is not abandoned but is endowed with meaning and soul. (40)

Jaspers terms a sensuous entity in which Being appears a 'cypher'. He calls a cypher 'the language of Transcendence', and he characterizes it as being "... neither object nor subject. It is objectivity which is permeated by subjectivity and in such a way that Being becomes present in the whole." If this definition seems to be circular,

(39) Thyssen, op. cit., p. 331
(40) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, pp. 43f.
(41) Ibid., p. 35.
if it seems simply to say that a cypher or symbol, as
that through which Being is revealed, is that through
which Being becomes present in the whole, then we must
remember that Jaspers is not so concerned with the what
of Being and cyphers as with the how of Being's being
present to us, i.e. he is a descriptive philosopher rather than
an argumentative philosopher. His concept of cypher
describes how Being may be present to us. It is not an
attempt to argue why this is so.

The cypher is listened to, not cognized ....
For this reason the character of the cypher
is only encircled but not reached if, in
metaphor, we call it speech. (42).

So it is that we must look at the nature of cyphers
and see how they make Being present to us, how they
'speak' to us.

(1) Any sensuous entity may become a cypher.

If we ask about the extent of the realm of the
cyphers then the answer is: everything objective
can be a cypher. Cyphers are not new objects,
but are merely newly consummated objects.
Whatever of Being occurs in the world, becomes
the material of the symbols. (43)

(2) A cypher points beyond itself.

(42) Ibid., p.41.
(43) Ibid., p.60.
The meaning of the symbols is that in them I encounter the essentially real. The fulness of reality is shown in them. (44)

(3) A cypher does not point to something beyond itself.

The signification of the cyphers is not such that something present signifies something absent, a here signifies a beyond, but it lies simply in a present-ness which is no longer translatable into knowledge of something. Being-a-cypher is a signification which signifies nothing else. (45)

(4) Because a cypher points to nothing beyond itself, because it has no "determined signatum to which it refers," a cypher cannot be interpreted in terms of an 'other' or in terms of explanation.

Genuine symbols cannot be interpreted; what can be interpreted through an "other" ceases to be a symbol. On the other hand, the interpretation of symbols through their self-presentation penetrates into them but does not explain them. (47)

They (cyphers) do not permit interpretations in regard to an "other", but are the presentness of their contents. (48)

(5) A cypher is an object in suspension, i.e. an objectivity in which Being is present.

... reality itself is immediately present in the symbols. (49)

(44) Ibid., p.56
(45) Ibid., p.42
(47) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, p.53.
(48) Ibid., p.55.
(49) Ibid., p.56.
But communication, essential reality, and infinity belong to the symbols only as long as they remain in the suspension of their appearance. As soon as they become definite images, fixed signs, and, thereby, things in the world, we again move with them to a beach, a beach of false corporealities, of mere images. (50)

(6) However, that which is encountered in the object in suspension, i.e. the object not as a sign but as a cypher, as an objectivity with the presentness of Being, is essentially different from the object as a sign, i.e. the object as a sensuous entity only.

... the sign and what is encountered in the sign, are essentially different, without similarity, without comparability, a mere referral ... (51)

Cyphers, then, are sensuous entities in which the philosophizing man becomes aware of Being.

Wherever the symbol-character becomes manifest, a circle is closed: out of mere presentness speaks the hidden essence; the hidden essence makes the presentness comprehensible, (52)

Jaspers further reveals the distinctive nature of cyphers by treating five ways in which man can fail to see the cypherhood of sensuous entities.

(1) Symbols may slip into empirical reality. In this situation, man only apprehends the phenomenality of the world and asserts that it is the whole of reality. He does not make use of Vernunft but stops short with Verstand.

(50) Ibid., pp.40f.
(51) Ibid., p.62
(52) Ibid., p.63
(53) Ibid., pp.58-60.
Such an attitude is termed unbelief by Jaspers.

We call unbelief any attitude which asserts absolute immanence and denies transcendence. The question then arises: what is this immanence? Unbelief says: Empirical existence -- reality -- the world. (54)

However, Jaspers sees the solution to the either/or question of transcendence or immanence in his concept of cyphers.

Transcendence and immanence were at first thought to be mutually exclusive: but in the cipher understood as immanent Transcendence we must find rather their intimate dialectic ....(793) (55)

Symbols may also slip into (2) allegory and (3) conceptualization. Both of these attitudes make the mistake of seeking to interpret cyphers. Allegory seeks to find the 'meaning' of symbols, and conceptualization seeks to exchange reality for knowledge. Allegory goes astray because,

A cypher ... does not work like a mathematical sign: for that it would have to refer to some intentional content which eventually could be isolated or deduced. The cipher, however, leaves us merely with the experience that this or that individual entity is more than itself, that it is transparent for Transcendence. (56)

Conceptualization errs inasmuch as it tries to substitute ideas of transcendence for its reality.

(54) Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p.116
(56) Thyssen, op. cit., pp.307f.
The symbol makes not only clear but real (wirklich) what would otherwise be like nothing. (57)

Further, to interpret symbols is impossible, for

in them

... Being itself, Transcendence, is present. It is nameless. If we speak of it, then we use an infinite number of names and cancel them all again. That which has significance is itself Being. (58)

In the fourth place, a symbol may slip into (4) detachment. In such an attitude one makes life into an object of aesthetic contemplation.

It becomes the impetus for the enjoyment of random emotions, or of unlimited possibilities. The play is confused with essential reality. The attenuation in detachment permits the content of the symbol to dissolve. (59)

Lastly, Symbols can slip into (5) that which is intention- ally wanted. When one attempts to create or control symbols, one comes under delusion because cypher reading is a matter of surrender and is directly opposed to a controlled 'technique'.

cyphers are not at one's command, are not means to an end, and cannot be produced, but they are accepted, found, and unconsciously experienced. I cannot control them but can only be conquered by them. (60)

(58) Ibid., p. 42.
(59) Ibid., pp. 58f.
(60) Ibid., p. 60.
In all three concepts that we have investigated, we see Jaspers' method and position. In all three the aim is to speak of how Being, Transcendence, the Encompassing, becomes present to us. In the notion of Reason, we saw how man cannot rest ultimately upon the phenomenal world but asks for Transcendence as the ground of his Existenz as well as of the world. In the treatment of Boundary situations, we saw that man must founder and that such foundering necessitates the decision for nothingness or for Transcendence. Lastly, in the notion of cyphers we saw how Transcendence can "shine through" all sensuous entities. Each concept presented three contentions.

(1) One must start with the world, must recognize its actuality and give due credit to the knowledge that grasps and shapes it.

(2) The world as phenomenality cannot ultimately provide meaning for itself. Reason and Existenz founder if they seek to be their own ground, if they seek to provide purpose for the whole of Reality other than that of the Encompassing to which they point by their foundering.

(3) In face of the phenomenality of the world one may adopt either an attitude of unbelief and affirm the world as the only reality, thus affirming nothingness; or one may affirm God, Transcendence, Being in itself, the Encompassing. In the case of Jaspers his philosophical faith affirms God, and
it is the purpose of all his philosophizing so to illumine Existenz as to show that such a faith, such 'gliding awareness', such 'prehending of Transcendence', such 'cypher reading' is a possibility for Existenz.

So far in our investigation we have been concerned with how Transcendence or the Encompassing becomes appearance for us, and we have not enquired into the 'nature' of Transcendence. Still, certain points concerning the character of Transcendence have emerged, and we must now draw them together and attempt to obtain a clearer and more complete idea of Jaspers' concept of Transcendence. However, we must keep in mind that when we say 'concept of Transcendence' this is not the same as to say 'Transcendence'. What we attempt here is only to try to understand Jaspers' thinking concerning Transcendence, not to understand the 'what' of Transcendence itself.

Conceptually, Transcendence seems to be completely negative.

The field, to be sure, is held by negative theology that tells us what God is not -- to wit, he is not something that stands in finite form before the eyes or the mind. (61)

Thus, we begin our understanding of Jaspers' concept

(61) Jaspers', The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p.36.
of Transcendence by saying what it does not include. (1) Transcendence is not a thing. Cyphers point to no other. Reason refuses to rest in any thing. Foundering shows the phenomenality of all existents.

The Encompassing itself, whether it be the Encompassing which we are or Being in itself, escapes from every determinate objectivity. (62)

(2) Transcendence cannot be conceptualized or conceived and much less can it be expressed. Indeed, conceptualization and expression result in a slipping of the symbol.

If I should possess all possible metaphors ... if I refer to him everything which occurs in the world; if, in addition, I add in my thinking everything which might be, I will never, in this infinite play of cyphers, reach God Himself. (63)

(3) Transcendence is other than the sign in which it becomes appearance. Although, Transcendence becomes appearance only through phenomenality, reason distinguishes between the Transcendence that is present and that which mediates it.

Two important conclusions follow from the negative character of the concept of Transcendence. First, since Transcendence or God is neither a thing in the world nor a thing pointed to by worldly entities, it is fundamentally wrong to try to prove Its existence. A proved God would

(62) Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p. 70
(63) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, p. 75.
actually be no God at all, although arguments for God's existence may serve a clarifying and awakening purpose.

But never do we gain a scientifically cogent proof. A proved God is no God. Accordingly: only he who starts from God, can seek him.
A certainty of the existence of God, however rudimentary and intangible it may be, is a premise not a result of philosophical activity. (64)

But the arguments for the existence of God do not lose their validity as ideas because they have lost their power to prove. They amount to a confirmation of faith by intellectual operations. When they are original, the thinker struck by their evidence experiences them as the profoundest event of life. When they are reflected upon with understanding, they make possible a repetition of this experience. The idea as such effects a transformation in man, it opens our eyes, in a sense. More than that, it becomes a fundament of ourselves, by enhancing our awareness of being, it becomes the source of personal depth. (65)

At this point Jaspers disagrees sharply with his Thomist critics. He sees the difference between them as resting both in the idea of God and in the idea of reason that arrives at or prehends Him. For Jaspers the Being which is God is a totally different kind from all other beings. Following Kant's distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself, he contends that "Whatever becomes object to and knowable by us is in some sense

(64) Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p.36.
(65) Ibid., pp.34f.
On the other hand, Jaspers contends "In the Thomistic position the being of finite, sensory being is as good as any other being even as the being of God ...." Thus, Jaspers concludes that the Thomists attempt only to arrive at God as a being not as Being in itself.

Furthermore, the instrument of reason as employed by the Thomists, i.e. argumentative reason, is only capable at arriving at an existing God, because "In the Thomistic position I am constantly led to the things, from the sensory object of awareness all the way to the deity...!" On the other hand, in the Kantian position, "I am led to a point where the basic operation of my thinking lifts this thinking itself to another level and only thus brings about the presuppositions of philosophizing." So it is that Jaspers' transcendental thinking (reason, Vernunft)prehends Being in itself, whereas the 'pure reason' of the Thomists only aims and arrives at a being, which is in fact not God, but only a cypher of Him.

The second conclusion arising out of the negative character of Transcendence concerns the error of nihilism. Jaspers contends that because nihilism makes the same mistake

(67) Ibid., pp.799f.
(68) Ibid., p.799
(69) Ibid., p.799.
as the Thomists, i.e. because it conceives of God as a thing, it asserts "There is no God." Nihilism "treats questions of transcendence like questions dealing with finite things in the world; and it does not even touch upon what is intended in statements about God, since it takes their content as a factual statement about something present in the world." (70)

Now let us enquire concerning a positive element in Jaspers' concept of Transcendence. Is Transcendence simply a negative idea? Is it simply the negation of Existenz and world? What can we know or say about Transcendence?

Jaspers maintains that there is certainly a positive moment in Transcendence, but that we betray and deny it when we seek to know or express it. Indeed, God is completely other, hidden, a deus obsconditus.

But the one God is distant; the completely "other" is entirely hidden. (71)

However, God is distant and hidden as regards knowledge and expression of Him. His presentness is the most positive reality of all. We have noted in connection with Jaspers' treatment of cyphers that this presentness is Being itself, the reality. The positive element in the awareness of Transcendence is the reality of Transcendence itself.

(70) Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, pp.133f.
(71) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, p.72.
Therefore, to seek to interpret this reality in terms of an other or of ideas and conceptions results in losing the reality that excels any other or any idea. In interpreting, reality is exchanged for knowledge. This means that Being's appearance is necessarily of the nature of a closed circle. If Being in itself appears, it can only be self-authenticating and self-interpreting, otherwise it would be guaranteed and explained by a lesser reality than itself.

Transcendence, thus revealed, remains indefinable; yet although it is unknowable and unthinkable, it is present in thought in the sense of (a certainty of) that it is, not what it is. Concerning this "it is" nothing can be stated other than the formal, redundant assertion, whose potential realization is impenetrable for us: it is what it is. (III, 67) (72)

Thus it is that God is nameless, imageless, and completely unknown, save that 'He is'. Any interpreting is false. It is a metaphorical act, a game, since it is Being itself, Transcendence that is present.

However, Jaspers realizes that "The thought that God is, is directly followed by speculation as to what He is. This is impossible to discover, and yet speculation on it has unfolded rich, inspiring thoughts." He further sees that it is permissible to engage in such speculation so long as the thoughts arrived at are seen to be only cyphers, so long as we do not identify our knowledge of God with God Himself.

(73) Jaspers, "The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p.36
which identification Jaspers considers to be the error of much of Theology.

Striving beyond all mediations along the road, we would like to form an image of God Himself. What we attain in this way is again always only ciphers of the Divinity. Yet God is not a cipher but reality itself. The imaging of God is called Theology. Theology never gets any further than an intellectual conception of the language of ciphers. It has truth under the condition that it preserves the tension toward the absolutely distant, the very "other" of Transcendence. Every imaging of God which believes it can grasp Him Himself other than in the vanishing mediation of ciphers falls short of the mark. We can only penetrate into phenomena and seek to discover the ground of the mystery. If we do so, we speak in ciphers. (74)

The question of the nature of Jaspers' concept of Transcendence is closely connected with his problem of communication, and a consideration of the latter may illumine the former. How does one communicate a philosophizing which has as its aim the awareness of Transcendence? There can be no doubting the fact that Jaspers is acutely aware of this question for he asserts that "... the Encompassing which is being itself exists for us only insofar as it achieves communicability by becoming speech or

(74) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, pp. 74f.
becoming utterable.

In order that we might understand Jaspers' treatment of this problem we must note another distinction which he makes — the distinction between Transcendence and the awareness of Transcendence. We have noted above that the Encompassing itself can not even be thought, much less expressed verbally. Rather, the Encompassing is mediated by cyphers which constitute its language or speech. This, then, is what it means to say that Transcendence becomes appearance, but what does it mean to say that Transcendence "achieves communicability by becoming utterable?"

First, let us again remind ourselves that Philosophy which aims at this communicability does not seek to achieve it by communicating knowledge about God, for two reasons. First, knowledge that Transcendence is, is the only knowledge that is possible.

The stillness of the being of truth in Transcendence — not by abandoning the modes of the Encompassing, but in surpassing their worlds — such is the boundary where what the Whole is beyond all division can momentarily flash out. But this illumination is transitory in the world and, although of decisive influence upon men, incommunicable; for when it is communicated it is drawn into the modes of the Encompassing where it is ever lacking. Its experience is absolutely historical, in time out beyond time. One can speak out of this experience, but not of it. The ultimate

(75) Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p. 79.
(76) Ibid., p. 79.
in thinking as in communication is silence. (77)

Second, even the knowledge that Transcendence is
cannot be bestowed; it can only be awakened. Just as
Existenz must be one's own, i.e. one must become himself
(thus a philosopher cannot really have 'followers'), so
one must become aware of Transcendence for himself. The
knowledge that Transcendence is would be false if dispensed
in the same way that phenomenal knowledge is dispensed.

Authentic reality, Being itself, must be
experienced directly by every individual;
the philosopher can only attempt to assist
others in attaining their own experience of
Being. (78)

Thus, the pertinent question is now seen to be, how
can philosophizing communicate the awareness of Transcendence
and thereby help to consummate and share its faith? To see
Jaspers' answer to this question let us refer to two
previously made points. First, philosophizing is not simply
speculation, it is reasoning out of Existenz. This means
that Philosophy can clarify one's own awareness of Transcend-
ence thereby helping to consummate and strengthen one's own
faith.

(77) Ibid., pp.105f.
(78) Latzel, op. cit., p.180
If philosophic faith has the inner act for its existential axis, then the ideas of a philosophical clarification can help to consummate such faith. (79)

Secondly, Jaspers' philosophizing has as its aim the illumination of Existenz which shows its possibilities, one of which is the possibility of philosophic faith; and, since Jaspers calls on his readers to become themselves by disclosing what is possible for Existenzen, his philosophizing may have an awakening power.

This philosophizing will have much more force to the degree that it can express its truth purely and formally. Through this it acquires an awakening power, since it remains open for achievement by new men in their historicity, but not a bestowing power which rather would only be deception. (81)

Thus, the task of communication is seen to be the task of philosophizing.

The purpose and therefore the meaning of a philosophical idea is not the cognition of an object, but rather an alteration of our consciousness of Being and of our inner attitude toward things. (82)

This method of indirect communication by philosophizing has at least two salutary features. First, it is faithful to both Transcendence and Existenz. In this presentation

(79) Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p.142.
(80) "... his (Jaspers') philosophy is existential, that is to say, an invitation to experience and a clue to experience, not a description of Being." Blackham, op. cit., p.63
(81) Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, pp.142f.
(82) Ibid., p.73.
Transcendence is not possessed and imprisoned nor is Existenz deprived of its own foundering, its freedom, or its own awareness of Being. Secondly, Jaspers' philosophizing allows the reality of Transcendence itself, rather than any system or concept of Transcendence, to alter one's attitude toward things.

It is one of the ulterior motives of Jaspers' system to make Transcendence --- and not merely the everchanging results of the process of thinking about Transcendence --- prevail in human experience. (83)

Fritz Kaufmann has criticized Jaspers' concept of the Encompassing as being so impersonal as to prohibit any communication such as exists between the covenanted God and His people. He rightly sees that according to Jaspers 'Transcendence' does not belong to God but that it is God. (85)

To Jaspers, even the sublime tautology of the Eheye asher Eheye, the Sum qui Sum ("I am that I am") is, in the use of the first person, as inadequate an expression of the All-Encompassing as is the Est quod Est (the Being qua Being) in the Greek tradition from Parmenides to Plotinus. The categories creep into this final tautology, whether it is pronounced in the mode of being as an object ("it") or in that of a subject ("I"). (III,67).... God is Being itself (ipsam esse) .... (86)

(84) Kaufmann, Fritz, "Karl Jaspers And A Philosophy of Communication" in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, p.263
(85) Ibid., p.272
(86) Ibid., pp.222f.
Jaspers' reply makes it clear that Kaufmann has read him correctly. 'Personal' is not a non-cypher assertion about the Encompassing. If Kaufmann thinks that to call 'personal' a cypher of Transcendence or of God is saying too little, then it is because he has a different conception of God from Jaspers. According to Jaspers, Transcendence is the reality not the appearance of this reality nor even the fact that it does appear. Jaspers can agree that Transcendence is personal in that it appears to men and through men, but to say that 'personal' is of the essence of God, to say that it is more than a cypher, would be to deny what is essential to the concept of the Encompassing, viz. that the Encompassing is neither object nor subject.

Reality is neither object nor subject but that which encompasses both... (88)

In this paper we have used the terms Transcendence, Encompassing, and God interchangably. This need not cause confusion or ambiguity, for when we note the context of each term used we see that all three terms refer to the same reality, viz. Being in itself which is neither object nor subject but which includes (encompasses or transcends) both. However, there is ambiguity present in our use of the terms

(87) Jaspers, "Reply to My Critics, pp. 785-790.
(88) Ibid., p. 790.
"Transcendence" and "the Encompassing", but we would contend that this ambiguity belongs initially to Jaspers' presentation and only secondarily to our treatment of his position. We thought it wiser to present Jaspers' position before investigating any suspected confusion, but now we must consider this matter in order to clarify the concept of Transcendence.

Knauss points out this ambiguity in a very condensed but pertinent paragraph in his critique of Jaspers' presentation of the idea of the Encompassing. Basically, two points are treated. First, Jaspers speaks of the 'Encompassing that I am' and of the 'Encompassing that I am not', and of the Transcendence of my empirical self (as existence, consciousness-as-such, and spirit) and the Transcendence of the world. Now, this use of the same term in two different ways need not be unduly confusing, for they may be seen simply and clearly as Transcendence arrived at by the transcending of two different modes, viz. myself and the world. Thus, there need not be any question as to whether there are two Transcendences or two Encompassings. Jaspers simply speaks of two basic modes through which one may become aware of the one Transcendence. However, the second point emerges when we note that Jaspers calls the 'Encompassing that I am' Existenz, for we must ask, if our simple explanations of two modes mediating the one Transcendence is accepted then is

(89) Knauss, op. cit., p.172.
not Transcendence and Existenz identical? Is the Encompassing of the world, i.e. Transcendence, the same as the Encompassing of myself, i.e. Existenz or are there two Encompassings? Either solution would appear to weaken the concept of Transcendence. Two Transcendences would be a logical impossibility, and yet to say that Transcendence is no more than Existenz confines Transcendence to the level of human possibilities and potentialities. Further confusion arises when we recall that Jaspers says that Existenz itself is grounded upon Transcendence and knows itself to be 'given' (not only as existence but as freedom) by Transcendence.

It (Existenz) proves its potentiality only if it knows itself grounded in Transcendence. It loses its openness for its own becoming if it takes itself for authentic Being. (III, 4.) (90)

Thus, the ambiguity comes to this — Existenz is called Transcendence, and yet, at the same time, Existenz is distinguished from Transcendence. We have noted already that Jaspers follows the Kantian distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself, and a consistent following of this distinction as regards phenomenality and Transcendence reveals the same ambiguity. Following the Kantian scheme, we can understand how Transcendence lies behind the appearance of the world. But what lies behind one's empirical existence?

Obviously Existenz. But Existenz is itself grounded upon and given by Transcendence, i.e. behind Existenz lies Transcendence. Knauss rightly points out that in this scheme the world appears twice, once as world (dasein) i.e. empirical existence, etc., and again as Existenz. Transcendence appears as the thing-in-itself of the appearance of Existenz while Existenz itself appears as the thing-in-itself of the appearance of empirical existence, etc. Thus, the critical question that concerns us here is of the realtion of Existenz and Transcendence. There would appear to be four possible relations between these two concepts.

(1) Identity. Existenz is the same as Transcendence. Indeed, passages can be found where Jaspers does seem to identify the two.

The Comprehensive is either the Being in itself that surrounds us or the Being that we are. (91)

Reason is the Comprehensive in us .... (92)

However, the suggestion of identifying Existenz and Transcendence occurs where Jaspers is least clear, and his clearest treatment does show that Existenz is dependent upon Transcendence. Further, almost all of Jaspers'

(91) Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p.17.
(92) Ibid., p.47.
interpreters reject the answer of identity and Jaspers himself says, "Because we cannot in any sense derive the world from Existenz, Existenz cannot be all there is of Being, Being as such." (I, 26.)

(2) Duality. Existence is an Encompassing beside the Encompassing that encompasses the world. This would seem to be the correct solution if one pursued the Kantian separation of appearance and the thing-in-itself, but just at this point, Jaspers does not seem to mention this distinction. Furthermore, the notion of two Encompassings is prohibited by the nature of the Encompassing which must be the One that is All.

(3) The third possible answer is that the Encompassing of myself, Existenz, is analogous to the Encompassing of the world, Transcendence. H. R. Wardlaw has asked if this is not the relation between the two notions, and Blackham has a veiled allusion which seems to reply to such a question in the affirmative.

The cipher par excellence is personal existence, for here in my finite self-determination in individual choice and decision is the conjunction of nature and history in a microcosm. My liberty realized in my life in the world is the formula by which I read from within Transcendence in the world. (italics mine) (95)

(94) Thyssen, op. cit., p.303.
(95) Blackham, op. cit., p.61.
Again, Ricoeur makes an interpretation which is not incompatible with such a reading.

Thus, Existenz is only the place from which one reads the manuscript, from which one deciphers the language which Jaspers calls "ciphers". (96).

(4) The fourth answer sees Existenz as a cypher of Transcendence. Here Transcendence encompasses the encompassing that I am, and this transcendence that I am (Existenz) is itself a mode through which one becomes aware of Transcendence.

But inquiry into Being does not stop even with the return to the basis of our own Existenz. The Encompassing which I am and which I know as existence, as consciousness-as-such, and as spirit, cannot be understood out of itself but points to something else. The Encompassing that we are is not yet Being itself, but appearance in the Encompassing of Being. (97)

This fourth answer seems to us to be truest to Jaspers' position which refuses to identify Existenz and Transcendence, and which asserts that, at its deepest, Existenz knows itself to be founded upon Transcendence. (However, it will be seen that this fourth answer does not exclude or deny our third possible answer). Accepting this fourth suggestion allows us to say with Thyssen, "... the relationship between Existenz

(96) Ricoeur, op.cit., p.620.
(97) Knauss, op.cit., p.155.
and Transcendence is twofold: (1) the immediate experience of contact with Transcendence and (2) the 'language' of Transcendence, the ciphers". 

Still, we must make quite sure to say that Existenz is only a mode (although it may be the mode par excellence and although it may provide the 'clue' that aids our cypher-reading) in which Being may become present to us. Existenz shares in common with all other ciphers the inability to prove Transcendence; nor is it, any more than other modes, a 'kind' of the 'genus of Being' by which one can know, speak of, or arrive at Being in itself. What Jaspers says concerning the necessity of transcending thought applies to Existenz no less than to other ciphers. In his reply to the critique of his concept of the Encompassing, he points out:

The Encompassing is present in the object, in the subject and in their mutual relations. (99)

The Encompassing can not be a generic concept, whose kinds are the seven modes of the Encompassing. We must not let this unavoidable way of speaking deceive us. (100)

This rather long excursus into the relation of Existenz and Transcendence was occasioned not by any disagreement with Jaspers' concept of Transcendence, but rather by a desire

(98) Thyssen, op. cit., p. 332
(99) Jaspers, "Reply to My Critics", p. 791
(100) Ibid., p. 801.
to present it in its purity, i.e. to show that Jaspers refuses to identify Transcendence with Existenz no less than with cyphers which are purely sensuous entities. Our only criticism in this respect would be to echo that of Knauss against the systematic representation which Jaspers gives his concept of Encompassing. At the same time, we can appreciate Jaspers' purpose in employing this system of presentation; for however confusing the use of the same term may be for different 'levels' of transcending, this use does serve to show that only Existenz which transcends empirical existence is able to become aware of the Transcendence which encompasses both the world and Existenzen. Moreover, our interpretation of Transcendence and its relation to the world and to Existenzen seems to be supported by Jaspers' later and more systematic work, Von der Wahrheit. There Jaspers refers to Existenz as a transcending aspect and further speaks of the "Transcendent of the Transcendent".

BARTH

In his treatment of the 'Phenomenon of the Human', Karl Barth deals with Jaspers' analyses of Existenz. Barth praises these analyses and considers that no study of man which fails to take account of this work can claim to be an adequate treatment. Indeed, from the following paragraph (101) Thyssen, op. cit., p. 304 footnote 18.
we may see that Barth himself makes use of Jaspers' investigations.

Thus, when human existence becomes unavoidable and inexplicable and totally questionable, it acquires value as a question which is worth putting and which, without ceasing to be a question, implies an answer, provided that there is unconditional trust. In it the transcendent other comes to man. To be sure, it will go again. It can never be objectified and defined. But it will not fail to greet man, to set its mark upon him, to make his self-consciousness, which in itself can only be his self-questioning, a cypher or symbol of itself and therefore of the man he seeks. (1)

However, Barth does not accept Jaspers' position entirely.

But we cannot say more of the anthropology of this (Jaspers') philosophy than that it has seen a phenomenon of the human. We cannot say that it has shown us real man. (2)

Further, Barth criticizes Jaspers' philosophy on several points, and we now turn to consider these points. First, Barth points out that not everyone who is involved in guilt, suffering, conflict or death encounters the transcendent. On the contrary, many people passed through terrible situations in World Wars I and II completely unscathed.

(1) Barth, Karl, *Church Dogmatics*, III 'The Doctrine of Creation', Part 2, p.112
(2) Ibid., p.113
Humanity is tough. It seems to have been largely capable of dealing with the confrontation of transcendence supposedly implied in these negations of existence. The Lord was not in the storm, the earthquake, or the fire (I Kings 19:11ff.). He really was not. (3)

It is just not true that specific and particularly negative situations are intrinsically bearers of the mystery of transcendence... (4)

Jaspers would agree with this point. He does not seek to identify the boundary situation with Transcendence; nor does he contend that Transcendence is present to all men in every situation of guilt, suffering, conflict or death.

According to Jaspers, philosophizing seeks to communicate itself by opening up possibilities in those Existenzen which are illuminated by such philosophizing. He believes not that it is necessary that boundary situations direct all men to Transcendence but that it is possible that for some men Transcendence becomes present in these situations.

A second criticism by Barth is presented in the form of a question. How does one know that it is God that is met in boundary situations? (5) This criticism is directed not so much at Jaspers (who simply says that what is present is Transcendence, or the Encompassing) as at Christian apologists.

(3) Ibid., pp. 114ff.
(4) Ibid., p. 115.
who seeks to identify Jaspers' idea of Transcendence with the Christian idea of God. For Jaspers, the term 'God' simply refers to Transcendence, and if Barth wishes to argue that this might equally be called the Devil, Jaspers will not be greatly concerned. Indeed, he is just as desirous as Barth that the concept of Transcendence not be confused with any 'idea' or 'nature' such as traditionally accredited to the God of the Christians. Jaspers is not simply content to say that only Transcendence is present in ciphers, but he is anxious to point out that this is all that can be said.

Barth's third and most important criticism concerns the relation of Transcendence and man's nature. He considers that Jaspers does not really allow for a Transcendence that can meet man, since it is a matter of unconditional trust and therefore the Transcendence which we supposed him to lack, to have to seek in self-transcendence, or to have to receive from without, is already within him (6) Barth argues that what Jaspers really discovers at the bottom of boundary situations is not a true rent between man and Transcendence. "On the contrary, what is disclosed is that at bottom this rent does not exist, that there is no opposition between

(6) Ibid., p. 118.
existence and transcendence ... Further, Barth concludes that in such a system the transcendent God, as distinct from man and the world and as superior to both, cannot be confronted.

Whether or not we consider this a valid criticism will depend upon what we see to be the relation of Existenz and Transcendence in Jaspers' philosophy. We have seen that this relation is not easily comprehended and that Jaspers is not as clear on this matter as we might wish. However, we argued at length that Jaspers does distinguish between transcendence as Existenz and Transcendence as that which encompasses not only the world but also the Encompassing that I am. It is in this connection that Jaspers speaks of the "Encompassing of the Encompassing" and the "Transcendent of the Transcendent". Thus, Transcendence is neither simply the Transcendence that we find in ourselves nor the world in which we live, but that which transcends them both. What Jaspers actually seems to be arguing for is that Transcendence is present only to man as Existenz, i.e., only in man's transcending of his existence.

This same answer to Barth's criticism emerges in another

(7) Ibid., p.119
(8) Ibid., p.119
(9) Thyssen, op. cit., pp.302f; cf. p.304 footnote 18
connection. Jaspers insists that the existence of God is not derived from any of the modes through which He (10) becomes appearance, yet Barth seems to think that this is what Jaspers does, i.e. that he finds Transcendence in *Existenz*. In our reading of Jaspers, we argued that *Existenz* is only a mode, only a cypher, in which Transcendence is present. Although *Existenz* is a necessary precondition for the awareness of Transcendence, there is no idea of the awareness of Transcendence being a necessary result of *Existenz*. This point connects with Jaspers' further contention that thinking does not rise from things (not even from *Existenz*) to God. Rather, following Kant, he argues that thinking itself is transformed, becomes transcendental, when it recognizes its limitations as understanding (*Verstand*).

If Barth's criticism is valid then there is, at least, an inconsistency between Jaspers' intention and his execution, for certainly the purpose of his philosophizing and of his use of the concepts of boundary situation and foundering is to point out that in the cyphers of *Existenz* and of the situations which necessarily accompany it, one is aware of the presentness of Transcendence which is totally different from the cyphers themselves.

Chapter 5.

THE NOTION OF TRANSCENDENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE.

In order that we may see the value for theism of Jaspers' distinction between *Existenz* and Transcendence, we may compare his position with that of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre well realizes that there is disagreement between Jaspers and himself. He labels Jaspers and Marcel as Catholics and calls Heidegger and himself existential atheists.

Existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheistic position.... Existentialism is not atheist in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God.(2)

In this comparison of the positions of Jaspers and Sartre we do not intend to investigate Sartre's arguments for the non-existence of God. We simply wish to note his

(1) Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Existentialism And Humanism*, p. 26
(2) Ibid., p. 56
atheism and to see its relation to his treatment of transcendence. Neither do we purpose to study Sartre's philosophy as a whole. However, we shall take account of his basic ontological study in order to show that his treatment of transcendence is consistent with and, indeed, inherent in his ontological and existential-humanistic approach. We may take as our starting point an observation by Helen Barnes, the translator of Sartre's extensive essay on 'Phenomenological Ontology'.

Sartre's whole endeavour is to explain man's predicament in human terms without postulating an existent God to guarantee anything.

It is our judgment that this is the case not only as regards Sartre's general philosophy but as regards his treatment of transcendence in particular, and in order to demonstrate this, we very briefly investigate his ontology and then his presentation of the idea of transcendence. Sartre begins his ontological analysis by noting Decartes' dictum, "I think, therefore I am". He sees this position as containing the possibility of the error of idealism, where the cogito tries to realise (make real) the phenomenal world. At the same time, he is aware of the

(3) Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being And Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology.
(4) Barnes, Hazel E., "Introduction" to Being and Nothingness, p.xxix
error of realism and materialism which affirm the phenomenal world at the cost of losing the reality of the cogito. Both errors stem from the separation of the self and the world, for once separated they cannot be united in an acceptable manner. Thus, it is that Sartre starts with man's consciousness of the world. Now, this 'consciousness' differs from Descartes' 'thought'. Actually Descartes meant by 'I think', 'I doubt', thus referring to reflection. Sartre, on the other hand, contends that consciousness involves a "pre-reflective being of percipiens." Further, according to Sartre, since "Consciousness is always consciousness of something", Descartes' openness to the charge of subjectivity is avoided in his own treatment.

There is an "ontological proof" to be derived not from the reflective cogito but from the pre-reflective being of percipiens.... All consciousness is consciousness of something. This definition of consciousness can be taken in two very distinct senses: either we understand by this that consciousness is constitutive of the being of its object, or it means that consciousness in its inmost nature is a relation to a transcendent being. But the first interpretation of the formula destroys itself: to be conscious of something is to be confronted with a concrete and full presence which is not consciousness.(6)

Thus, we see that Sartre's analysis of consciousness

(5) Blackham, op. cit., p.112
(6) Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.lx
seeks to establish the reality of the pre-reflective cogito and the object of consciousness. These are two distinct realities but they are seen to be so only in the one act of consciousness, and to start with either separately is an epistemological error. However, Sartre does pursue this distinction which he discovers in his analysis of consciousness, and we too, must look at it. We do so under the headings of Being, Being-in-itself, and Being-for-itself.

"Being is. Being is in-itself. Being is what it is." By saying "Being is", Sartre refers to the point that Being is known to be a reality in the act of consciousness. The reflective cogito reflects that the pre-reflective cogito must be conscious of something. It is the pre-reflective cogito that knows "Being is", but the reflective cogito can state that Being is in view of the pre-reflective cogito's "ontological proof". By saying that Being is in-itself, Sartre wishes to deny that Being is created by God or that it is causa sui. According to Sartre either being is dissolved in God or it is

(7) Roberts, op. cit., pp. 198f. "This distinction (between l'en-soi and le pour-soi) is announced somewhat apodictically in the opening section of Being and Nothing, but elaborated and defended throughout the rest of the book."

(8) Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. lxvi
independent of Him. As 'thought' before creation, being would be simply in God, but such an idea conceives of Being existing before itself, since if God exists then He, Himself, is Being. Further, even after creation being must either be independent of God (thus, not being creation) or it is dissolved in Him.

The theory of perpetual creation, by removing from being what the Germans call Selbständigkeit, makes it disappear in the divine subjectivity. If being exists as over against God, it is its own support; it does not preserve the least trace of divine creation. In a word, even if it had been created, being-in-itself would be inexplicable in terms of creation; for it assumes its being beyond the creation.(9) This is equivalent to saying that being is uncreated. But we need not conclude that being creates itself, which would suppose that it is prior to itself. Being cannot be causa sui in the manner of consciousness. Being is itself.(10)

Another way of characterizing Being is to say that "Being is what it is." Its existence and its essence are one and the same. Being does not become. It is what it is.

Included in this concept of Being are two other concepts -- being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Being-

---142---

(9) Ibid., lxiv
(10) Ibid., lxiv
-143-

- in-itsel f shares the characteristics that we have described of Being. "It is the Being of the phenomenon and overflows the knowledge which we have of it. It is a plentitude, and strictly speaking we can say of it only that it is." Being-in-itsel f is characterized by being static, non-potential, and un-free. Exactly what this means is to be seen only in contrast with Being-for-itsel f.

...being is what it is....We shall see that the being of for-itsel f is defined, on the contrary, as being what it is not and not being what it is. (12)

For-itsel f (pour-soi) is the 'hole' in being that becomes aware of itself in distinguishing itself from being-in-itsel f (en-soi). It knows itself as a lack, a lack of being any particular being, any 'this'. It is the consciousness that can never be identified with an object of consciousness.

"The being of consciousness... is a being such that in its being, its being is in question." This means that the being of consciousness does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence. Such equivalence, which is that of the in-itsel f, is expressed by this simple formula: being is what it is. (13)

(11) Barnes, op. cit., p.629
(12) Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.lxv
(13) Ibid., p.74
But the 'lack', the 'nothing' that is the pour-soi is known only as a not being some particular being.

...human reality as for-itself is a lack and... what it lacks is a certain coincidence with itself. Concretely, each particular for-itself (Erlebnis) lacks a certain particular and concrete reality, which if the for-itself were synthetically assimilated with it, would transform the for-itself into itself.... Thus, the lacking arises in the process of transcendence and is determined by a return toward the existing in terms of the lacked. The lacking thus defined is transcendent and complementary in relation to the existing.(14)

Sartre again makes these two points when he says,(15)

"The lack of the for-itself is a lack which it is."

First, the pour-soi is defined simply as a lack of being. "A human being is more that what he is; but he is not something more that what he is...."Consciousness does not add something but nothingness." Secondly, in saying that this nothingness is a lack of itself, the notion of particularity is emphasized.

Always the pour-soi comes into existence by separation from, that is dependence upon, some matter of fact which merely is. I am conscious of being a waiter because I am not wholly or solely a waiter, but I happen to get my existence by separation from (or trying to be) a waiter, not a journalist nor a diplomat. I am only a pour-soi by being an en-soi which I am not....(17)

(14) Ibid., p.95
(15) Ibid., p.101
(16) Champigny, Robert, Stages on Sartre's Way, p.2
(17) Blackham, op. cit., p.112
It is just this act of separating 'me' from a 'this' that leads one to effect determination in the field of 'what is'. "Before the advent of consciousness, we can say that 'there is,' and that is all. After the advent of consciousness, we can say that 'there is this or that.' (18)

The ways in which pour-soi is more than its en-soi can be seen in almost all of Sartre's concepts. We do not purpose to go into any of these in detail, but perhaps a mention of a few will make clearer the "more-nature" of the pour-soi.

First, as regards time, the pour-soi can be seen as more than its past, or present. Its past is static; the past is what it was; it is the pour-soi's facticity; (19) it is not what the pour-soi is now.

I am not the en-soi I am present to, and I am not the en-soi I leave behind...my past is my facticity...The past is the totality always growing of the en-soi which we are. But whilst we live we are never identified with it. It is not what I am but what I was....The past is...the pour-soi congealed in the en-soi. (20)

Furthermore, pour-soi is more than its environment and its body.

(18) Champigny, op. cit., p.2
(19) Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp.107-120
(20) Blackham, op. cit., pp.113f.
The body is the instrument which I am. It is my facticity of being "in-the-midst-of-the-world" in so far as I surpass this facticity toward my being-in-the-world. (21)

Contrariwise, pour-soi is possibility and freedom, the "yet-to-be" of the future. Thus, man is actually possibility rather than essence. Man's existence precedes his essence. Indeed, man makes his own essence.

Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency, that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up into the world -- and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is.... Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism. (22)

This idea of man's 'making' himself leads us to notice Sartre's conception of 'project'. Since man as pour-soi is nothing and since he is that being who first exists and then makes his own essence, he must determine

(21) Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 359
(22) Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, pp. 27f.
his future by choice. A project, which "refers to the For-itself's choice of its way of being and (which) is expressed by action in the light of a future end," points out that man is always 'becoming', always seeking to fulfill the lack that he is.

Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute the In-itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the Ens causa sui, which religions call God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion.

By this, Sartre simply means that pour-soi always projects in such a way as to seek to become its own en-soi (the notion of God as self-subsistent and free being). But is it impossible for pour-soi to become en-soi without losing itself as pour-soi, i.e. the idea of God is contradictory. In so far as man can be said to have an essence, that essence is pour-soi, which is dependent upon en-soi from which it distinguishes itself. If pour-soi ever became en-soi it would cease to be pour-soi, simply because pour-soi is the nothing realised in the act of consciousness as not being its en-soi. Thus, this

(23) Barnes, op. cit., p. 633
(24) Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 615
passion is futile.

Sartre offers an analysis of love which shows man's project to provide himself en-soi as the ground of his pour-soi. I wish to be a subject loved as an object by a beloved subject, but since the beloved can only be known by me as a subject when I am an object to the beloved as lover, love by a subject for a subject is impossible. Sartre says that nowhere is this seen so clearly as in sexual love, where one becomes an object in order that one may experience the beloved as a loving subject, whereby the 'subjectness' of the lover confirms one's 'objectness', one's en-soi which one seeks as the ground of one's pour-soi.

In loving, I demand that the one I love shall exist solely to choose me as an object, and thus be the origin of my existence for another.... The loved one only becomes lover by becoming consumed with the desire to be loved. Thus each is trying to be an object of fascination to the other and to demand that the other exist solely to found, will, and sustain him as object. To love is in its essence the project to make oneself loved. The aim is balked quite inevitably.(25)

Thus, in the particular project of love, as in all projects of the pour-soi to found itself, to be the ground of its nothingness, "man is a useless passion."

In all of these concepts we see that pour-soi is of the nature of ekstasis, i.e., it "stands out from". It stands out from its past, its present and its future. It stands out from its body and its environment. It stands out from itself as perceived by another pour-soi (even by its lover). In no case is the pour-soi to be identified with the en-soi.

Now we are in a position to see how these conclusions affect Sartre's idea of transcendence. Sartre's notion of transcendence is completely worldly. He finds no use for a transcendent universe or a transcendent Being. The process and subject of transcendence is accounted for in human terms. This may be seen in Sartre's very definition of transcendence.

We shall define transcendence as that inner and realising negation which reveals the in-itself while determining the being of the for-itself. (26)

Now we see the reason for our interest in the process of consciousness, for it coincides exactly with the process of transcendence. We need not study this again, but we may re-state two results of the analysis of consciousness. First, the in-self is revealed as a reality and becomes

(26) Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.180
determined or particularized in the process of consciousness. Secondly, the for-itself is realized, i.e. recognized as being a reality and made real, in that it distinguishes itself from the in-itself. These two discoveries, in turn, lead us to ask concerning the subject of transcendence. What transcends, and what is transcended?

Sartre gives two answers to this question. At times he speaks of being-in-itself as that which transcends the for-itself. This is so in the sense that whereas pour-soi is dependent upon en-soi, the latter can exist as the "there is" independent of the former.

Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself. (27)

On the other hand, Sartre speaks more often of the pour-soi as that which transcends its en-soi. We have noted the "ekstasis-nature" of the pour-soi in the concepts of project, temporality, freedom and love, and all of these can be seen simply as Sartre's analyses of the transcendence of the en-soi by the pour-soi.

(27) Ibid., p. lxi
...in being separation from myself (from my facticity) which falls into the past and from the world to which I am present, I am transcendence towards a form of being with which I can be identified, although as transcendence I can never be identified with any form of being. (28)

All of these analyses, then, seek to show that man is a transcendent being, that man stands out from the being that he is, that man has a transcendent aim in ever surpassing his en-soi. Barnes rightly says that according to Sartre, "Sometimes the For-itself is itself called a transcendence." (29)

However, regardless of whether we say that en-soi transcends pour-soi or that pour-soi transcends en-soi, we still speak only of an inner-worldly transcendence. Unlike Tillich, Sartre does not seek an answer to the question of why there is something instead of nothing. He simply asserts that "Being is." The en-soi that transcends pour-soi does not lead beyond itself to a 'ground' of being which may be said to transcend all en-soi's. Unlike Jaspers, Sartre does not find the Transcendent that transcends the "transcendence that I am" (Existenz or pour-soi). Heinemann draws a very

(28) Blackham, op. cit., p.129
(29) Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.634
sharp distinction between the positions of Jaspers and Sartre and contrasts their philosophies on five points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jaspers</th>
<th>Sartre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keep space open for the Comprehensive!</td>
<td>There is no Comprehensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not identify yourself with an object of your knowledge!</td>
<td>Commit yourself!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not reject any form of the Comprehensive!</td>
<td>Reject all those forms which restrict your liberty!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not accept any defamation of existence!</td>
<td>Describe reality in its ugliness, absurdity and obscenity!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not allow yourself to be cut off from the Transcendent!</td>
<td>You are cut off from the Transcendent, for it is non-existent. (30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may well be that the positions of Jaspers and Sartre are not so incompatible on all these points as Heinemann contends, but as regards the crucial issue of transcendence, it would appear that he is correct.

...he (Sartre) commits himself against the Transcendent as such. The Transcendent does not exist, and he would regard a search for it as mistaken. This does not exclude that man is here understood as someone who continually transcends himself in the direction of the future and who is open for all his future possibilities. (31) (32)

Marcel has called Sartre a materialist, and, although Sartre's emphasis upon the transcendence of the pour-soi seems to belie such nomenclature, insofar as he speaks of

---

(31) Ibid., p.131
(32) cited by Blackham, op. cit., p.144 from *The Philosophy of Existence* which contains Marcel's critique of Sartre.
en-soi as a transcendence, this charge has some justification. On the other hand, insofar as Sartre speaks of pour-soi as a transcendence, he is rightly called a humanist. This is abundantly clear in Sartre's essay, *Existentialism and Humanism*.

But there is another sense of the word (humanism), of which the fundamental meaning is this: Man is all the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and centre of his transcendence. There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) — it is this that we call existential humanism.(33)

What is at issue here is the self-enclosed transcendence of humanism and the transcendence that breaks through to allow for the possibility of transcendence that is worldly but not simply inner-worldly, and there is no doubt but that Jaspers' position is much more congenial to Theism than is the position of Sartre.

(33) Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 55
JASPERS' NOTION OF TRANSCENDENCE AND THE BIBLICAL IDEA OF GOD.

We resume our exposition of Jaspers' concept of Transcendence by investigating the similarities and differences between it and the Biblical idea of God. We begin by noting that it is Jaspers' insistence upon giving proper consideration to the concrete, historical life of men that underlies his concern with Biblical religion. In his book, The Origin and Goal of History, he treats the importance of Biblical religion for Western life. He begins by noting the period 800-200 B.C. which he calls the 'axial period' of world history.

What is new about this age, in all three areas of the world, is that man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and his own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and redemption. By consciously recognizing his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence. (1)

However, since Jaspers is concerned with the possibilities of concrete history, he does not deal with the axial period throughout the world; rather, he limits his work to the conditions under which both he and his readers...

(1) Jaspers, Karl, The Origin and Goal of History, p.2
live, viz. the Biblical religion of the West. Jaspers considers that Judaism, Christianity and Islam, all, have their beginnings in this period, and even more important, that all derive their existences as faiths from the same basis, the awareness of the One, of Transcendence.

For our roots extend beyond our historically particular origin to the one origin that comprehends us all. (2)

Further Jaspers allows that it is only right that each faith should develop according to its own nature, but he sees the basic error of all such developments to be their claims of absolution and the resulting lack of tolerance.

In contradiction to its liberty and infinite fluidity, the West now developed the opposite extreme in the shape of the claim to exclusive truth by the various Biblical religions, including Islam. It was only in the West that the totality of this claim appeared as a principle that ran without interruption through the whole further course of history. (4)

This claim by Biblical religions to exclusive truth has its foundations in what Jaspers considers to be an erroneous idea of revelation. What occurs, he contends, is that Biblical faith forgets its origin in the awareness of Transcendence and makes a particular medium of this awareness into an ultimate medium or into the Ultimate itself.

(2) Ibid., p.221
(3) Ibid., p.221
(4) Ibid., p.64
Thus, revelation ceases to be the presentness of Transcendence in cyphers, and a cypher itself is considered to be the revelation. The man, Jesus, or the Bible is wrongly identified as God's revelation, whereas each is rightly only the medium of God's presentness. Moreover, such an erroneous conception of revelation wrongly objectifies and localizes God's revelation.

In the canonic writings, in the creed and in the system of dogmas, in the sacrament of Holy Orders, in the church as corpus mysticum Christi, and in other forms, the revelation and the grace it bestows are conceived of as physically present. (5)

Ecclesiastical faith is expressed in notions, ideas, dogmas and becomes creed. It is capable of forgetting its origin, and identifying itself with these particular contents and objectifications .... (6)

However, according to Jaspers, the truth of the matter is that God is hidden.

Whatever is posited as an absolute in the world, as God's word or God's act, is in each case a human act or human word that demands that we recognize it as God's. (7)

Liberal faith (philosophic faith) refuses to arrest its movement by a revelation frozen in its definitiveness. It strives to keep itself open, ready to recognize the language of the godhead in everything that is real .... This faith therefore forbids absolute obedience to the words of a sacred text or to the authority of an ecclesiastical official .... (8)

(5) Jaspers, Myth and Christianity, p. 41
(6) Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p. 224
(7) Jaspers, Myth and Christianity, pp. 42f
(8) Ibid., p. 43
Jaspers' rejection of the claims to exclusive truth is based upon a fundamental part of his philosophizing. We have seen that it is a basic assertion of his philosophizing that anything may become a cypher. Thus Jaspers must reject any exclusiveness which makes absolute one cypher, whether it be Jesus or the Ten Commandments. Again, what is mediated through cyphers is not knowledge about God, not images of God, not dogmas or creeds, but the presentness of Being in itself. Thus, Jaspers is led to reject not only the making of one cypher definitive or absolute, but the very idea of any revelation other than the 'that' of Transcendence.

The notions of God produced by man are not God Himself.

It is interesting to note that Jaspers' stand for tolerance and his denial of exclusive truth appear prior to his experiences during the two world wars. This may be seen in his philosophical autobiography. There he recalls that Kierkegaard is reported to have replied to the query, "Why are you a Christian?", by saying, "Because my father told me." Jaspers goes on to remark, "... my father told me something quite different." Indeed, Jaspers' father

(9) Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p.219
rebelled against some of the privileges which the Church claimed, e.g. condemnation of suicide, and he left the Church when he was past seventy years of age. At the age of ninety he still expressed the fact that he did not think highly of faith. However, if Jaspers did not learn to follow any specific religion as a child, he did learn from his parents humanitarian virtues and an openness to all questions and sources of truth. Jaspers also tells of the kind of 'truth' that he was taught by the Church when he was a youth, e.g. the geography of hell, the Pope's daily entry into the Castle of Angels in order to touch the heaped up gold, that salvation resulted from the fact that Jesus was nailed to a cross. Although these facts do not explain Jaspers strong polemic against the revealed truth of Biblical religion, they may help us to understand his insistence that the exclusive truth claimed by Biblical religion is a perversion of faith.

Jaspers makes a second criticism of Biblical religion which is even more penetrating. It is his judgement that Biblical religion confuses Transcendence and the world. This criticism is especially directed against Christianity which claims that Jesus Christ is the incarnation of God.

(11) Ibid., pp. 76f.
(12) Ibid., p. 76.
For religion, in contrast to philosophy, the mode of the sensuous presence of Transcendence is characteristic. That God is tangible in the here and now -- in the man Jesus -- is a main thought of Christianity. (13)

Jaspers, of course, cannot accept this claim. For him, Transcendence is only present through cyphers. No cypher is Transcendence itself.

Jesus is, to be sure, not God in the world. No man is God. The distance between man and God is infinite. (14)

Another unacceptable conclusion which Jaspers sees as the result of asserting that God was present in the world in Jesus, is the Weltanschauung implied by such an assertion, i.e., the irruption into this world of a being from another world. Such an idea of God and such a notion of the activity of God is rejected by Jaspers whose idea of Transcendence is neither other worldly nor of an non-mediated presence in this world. Blackham points out that Jaspers rejects religion,

... because it stands for a beyond which is another world, not a beyond which is the upshot, the hidden meaning of, this world, which can only be known out of and by means of the plentitude and deficiencies of life in the world. For Jaspers, Transcendence is a total view of the world, not from the station of Sirius as a spectator of all time and all existence.

(13) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, pp. 45f.
(14) Ibid., p. 76
but by glimpses gained through participation in the life of the world by one who is eager to see and trained to look. (15)

However, we should be mistaken if we assumed that Jaspers is completely negative as regards Biblical religion. We have already noted that his philosophizing includes an element of faith and within certain limits Biblical religion is not incompatible with 'philosophic faith'. According to Jaspers what is really needed is not the abandonment of Biblical religion but its transformation.

Only in indefinite terms is it possible to say that the Bible and the classical heritage are not sufficient in the form we have known till now. Both must be transformed in a new appropriation. The vital problem for the coming age is how Biblical religion is to be metamorphosed. (italics mine). (16)

It hardly needs to be said that Jaspers' solution to this problem is to so transform Biblical religion that it comes into line with philosophic faith. Just what this transformation entails can be seen if we ascertain the basis of Biblical religion and the purpose of its myths and dogmas.

Biblical religion has in fact continually changed its appearance, as it were its clothes.

(15) Blackham, op. cit., p.62
What is the basic unchanging factor? The answer can only be given in the abstract as "the one God; the transcendence of God the Creator; man's meeting with God; God's Law of the choice between good and evil as absolutely valid for man; consciousness of historicity; the meaning and the dignity of suffering; openness to insoluble problems." (17)

Thus, one positive and correct element which Jaspers finds in Biblical religion is the fact that it arises from the awareness of the presentness of Transcendence. Furthermore, it is to the credit of Biblical religion that the Bible "embraces the great antithesis of faith". (18)

The Bible is the deposit of a thousand years of human borderline experience. Through these experiences the mind of man was illumined, he achieved certainty of God and thus of himself. And this is what creates the unique atmosphere of the Bible. (19)

Seen in this light, the Bible performs the same function as Jaspers' philosophizing -- it shows the possibility of awareness of Transcendence and bears witness to its presentness. Further, its scope of experience points to the variety of cyphers through which Transcendence is present. So long as one is faithful to the basis of Biblical religion, i.e. to the awareness of Transcendence, so long as one keeps in mind the multiplicity of media through which this awareness

(17) Ibid., p. 61.
(18) Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p. 98.
occurs, and claims for no single media (cypher) neither finality nor actual identity with Transcendence, then Biblical religion can be transformed from a claimant of exclusive truth to a witness to the presentness of Transcendence in all being. "What religion localizes in a specific place, can for philosophy be present everywhere and always," for "God speaks exclusively through no man, and what is more, His speech through every man has many meanings." This means that "We must abandon the religion of Christ, that sees God in Christ and bases the doctrine of salvation on an idea of sacrifice found in Duetero-Isaiah and applied to Christ".

On the other hand, if one ceases to claim finality for Christ and ceases to confuse him with Transcendence, then his proper nature as a cypher may be seen.

Rightly, however, there is in the Christ myth the indication that everything human has in it the possibility of relatedness to God, God-nearness, and that the way to God goes through the world and through the reality of our historically to be determined human nature, and not by-passing the world. Philosophy must guard against usurpation while recognizing at the same time a cypher truth in the claims of the usurper. (23)

Thus, Jaspers does not wish simply to be rid of the dogmas of Biblical religion, nor of the idea of God's

(20) Ibid., p. 79
(21) Ibid., p. 103
(22) Ibid., p. 103
(23) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, p. 77
presence in the world, nor of prayer, nor of the Church itself. What he wants to accomplish is the transformation of Biblical religion. Dogmas become myth which can be interpreted and used as cyphers. God's presence and activity (as in miracles) become the presentness of Transcendence in all cyphers. Prayer becomes transcending thought. The Church ceases to be authoritative, and a dispenser of exclusive truth and of Transcendence itself (as in the Mass), but simply bears witness to Transcendence, i.e. becomes the means of communication which may allow Existenz to undergo a change of attitude towards being.

The same religion which the philosopher rejects as dogmas he espouses as myth. At the same time, the cipher replaces the miracle, contemplation replaces prayer, and communication replaces the Church. (24)

He (Jaspers) rejects religion because it claims to be authoritative and undertakes to guarantee and administer the experience of Transcendence, and because it stands for a beyond which is another world ... (25)

We now ask to what extent are the criticisms which Jaspers makes of Christianity valid and where does he part company with Christianity, if, indeed, he does so at all.

(24) Ricoeur, op.cit., p.624
First, we consider his attitude towards the ecclesiastical Church. Insofar as Jaspers argues against the Church's possession of exclusive truth and its power to dispense both it and the reality of God, Himself, he makes no attack which has not frequently come from within the Church itself. Many Christians would liken the Church to the 'finger of God' which points the way to God rather than to the 'hand of God' which passes out knowledge and salvation. Indeed, Jaspers' criticism here appears to be directed more towards the Roman Catholic Church than towards the Protestant Churches. Certainly a Protestant thinker such as Tillich is not open to such criticism.

If Jaspers takes a comparatively unsympathetic, even though not strongly polemic attitude toward Christianity, the reason seems to be that he regards Christianity as myth and cult rather than as ethos and communication. But this view of Christianity seems more Catholic than Protestant, despite the fact that many Protestants share it. (26)

Secondly, much of the force of Jaspers' criticism against revelation lies in the objection to revelation conceived as truth-embodying statements. Again, this objection does not strike at the heart of Protestant

(26) In this connection, it is interesting to note that Jaspers is a church member and considers himself to be a Protestant, cf. Jaspers, Karl and Bultmann, Rudolf, Myth and Christianity, p.78; cf. pp. 114ff.

(27) Cf. Tillich's treatments of the Protestant Principle and of autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy in The Protestant Era: see especially pp.48-55.

Christianity, for a large number of Christians would equally deny that the revelation is statements. Creeds and dogmas may seek to express the truth of revelation, but, in the final analysis, they are not identified with the truth itself. Creeds are no more the reality of God's person and action than Jaspers' cyphers are, but they may help to clarify and communicate the awareness of God's presence. Is this greatly unlike Jaspers' use of cyphers, where names or images of God are surely not God Himself but may be cyphers of God.

Thirdly, Jaspers' criticism of the Weltanschauung of which the New Testament makes use to express the Incarnation need not mark a genuine parting of the way between him and Christianity. Many people within the Church also consider that the picture of the three-decker universe which allows God to irrupt from the top floor into the second is a hindrance to Christian faith. Indeed, theologians such as Bultmann and Heim certainly do not consider such a Weltanschauung to be essential to Christianity. On the contrary, they seek to dispense with this whole picture and to present the kerygma in a different manner.

Where Jaspers' position appears to be irreconcilable

(29) cf. also the positive element which Jaspers sees in an argument for the existence of God; The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, pp.34f. Jaspers' position here is quite similar to Bultmann's assertion that Jesus reveals only that he is the Revealer (Theology of The New Testament Vol. II, p.66) and to Tillich's unwillingness to allow any non-symbolic assertion to be applied to God, save that He is Being-itself.
with Christianity is in his treatment of the Incarnation itself; and even here there is a measure of agreement, for the Christian can agree with Jaspers that Jesus is a cypher. (cf. the strong theme in the Fourth Gospel that Jesus points beyond himself to the Father). However, the orthodox Christian position asserts two points which Jaspers cannot accept. First, Jesus as a cypher is definitive and final. Although, this claim does not prohibit God's action and presence in other cyphers, no other cypher can so completely show the presence of God. Further, it may be that this claim of finality means that all other cyphers have reference to the cypher of Jesus Christ. "No man cometh unto the Father but by me" (John 14:6). Jaspers, of course, cannot accept such claims. For him they smack of exclusiveness. Jesus is a cypher but not the cypher, not definitive, not final.

However, the second difference is even more fundamental. The Christian sees Jesus Christ as more than a cypher. A cypher has the presentness of God, i.e. a cypher points to Transcendence which is completely different from the cypher as a sensuous entity. But, the Christian sees in Jesus the presence of God. To distinguish between Jesus as man (cypher) and Jesus as God (Transcendence) results in an over-sharp separation of Christ's divinity and humanity. The Christian asserts that God was in Christ, and this claim differs from
philosophic faith which asserts that only a presentness, not
God Himself, was in Christ. Of course, Jaspers rejects the
Christian claim. For him it shows the confusion of Transcend-
ence with appearance or cyphers.

Do we have here, then, a true parting of the way between
Jaspers and Christianity? It would appear so to us. Jaspers'
rejection of the presence of God in Christ would appear to
amount to the rejection of the scandal of particularity; not
of particularity in general, for Jaspers is quite ready to
allow the possible presentness of God in all phenomena, but
rather the stumbling block of Christology which asserts a
definitive, normative revelation in the particular person of
Jesus Christ.

However, we ask a different question if we ask if Jaspers'
basic philosophic position is incompatible with Christianity.
Jaspers allows that God or Transcendence manifests Himself
in appearance, i.e., that man's search for reality is met by
God's presentness in the world, and Roberts judges that this
admission is only one step away from the Christian faith in the
Incarnation.

If Jaspers really believes that being-itself
manifests itself in history, and does not regard
commerce between man and Transcendence as a
one-way process in which man must do all the
searching and climbing alone, then he has already
asserted to what might fairly be called the
Christological principle. (30)

Further, Roberts is of the opinion that Jaspers disallows the extra step which asserts that 'God was in Christ' on arbitrary grounds.

But if he (Jaspers) believes that Being itself is manifest at all in history, why does he assume that no such manifestation can take the form of identity (God-manhood)? Here he brings 'already finished' assumptions about the nature of Transcendence and the nature of historicity to bear upon the Christological problem. (31)

He excludes God-manhood on the basis of a general notion concerning connections between Transcendence and history, which cannot be reconciled with his insistence that there is no finality. (32)

Roberts seems to judge rightly when he says that Jaspers has much to say to theologians, but that he limits his openness to Transcendence and its manifestations when he seeks to assert what Transcendence cannot become.

All our symbols and doctrines may be inadequate, just because they are ours, to express God's self-revelation in history. But it does not follow that God has not revealed Himself in History, uniquely, in Christ. (33)

Notwithstanding the truth that Jaspers accepts something like 'the Christological principle', it must be seen that Jaspers' insistence that Jesus is no more than a cypher of

(31) Ibid., p.270
(32) Ibid., p.271
(33) Ibid., p.272
Transcendence is not an arbitrary judgement, but that it follows from his basic philosophical position. For Jaspers, Transcendence is that which can only be pointed to by sensibly perceived phenomena, i.e. Transcendence can never be wholly actualized in phenomena. Such an idea is a contradiction in terms. Transcendence is manifested in cyphers, but cyphers, as sensuous entities, are never equated with Transcendence. Hence, recognizing the truth that Jesus is a cypher of Transcendence does not in any way lead Jaspers to the further assertion that Jesus is God. According to Jaspers, no man, no thing, is God, but any man, any thing may be a cypher of God.

This essential difference between Jaspers and orthodox Christianity may be seen quite clearly in his debate with (34) Rudolf Bultmann. There Jaspers emphatically and repeatedly rejects,

The belief that God manifests himself at a given place and time, that He has revealed himself directly at one place and time and only there and then, (which) makes God appear as a fixed thing, an object in the world. This objective entity is supposed not only to be revered on the basis of tradition, but also to possess the absolution of godhead. (35)

(34) Jaspers, Karl; and Bultmann, Rudolf, Myth and Christianity: An Inquiry Into The Possibility of Religion Without Myth.

(35) Ibid., p.41.
So too, Bultmann rejects any presentation that makes God an object in the world.\(^{(36)}\) To this end Bultmann contends,

What matters is that the incarnation should not be conceived of as a miracle that happened about 1950 years ago, but as an eschatological happening, which, beginning with Jesus, is always present in the words of men proclaiming it to be a human experience.\(^{(37)}\)

When the revelation is truly understood as God's revelation, it is no longer a communication of teaching, nor of ethical or historical and philosophical truths, but God speaking directly to me, assigning me each time to the place that is allotted me before God, i.e., summoning me in my humanity, which is null without God, and which is open to God only in the recognition of its nullity.\(^{(38)}\)

However, there is a sharp difference here between Bultmann and Jaspers. Bultmann denies the objective guarantee of a past event for a decision of faith in the present.\(^{(39)}\) Jaspers denies the possibility of an objective embodiment of Transcendence in the past or in the present. Jaspers cannot agree with Bultmann inasmuch as he rightly sees that in spite of Bultmann's insistence upon revelation as being in the present, as being pro me, it 'begins' with Jesus.

\(^{(36)}\) Ibid., p. 67
\(^{(37)}\) Ibid., p. 69
\(^{(38)}\) Ibid., p. 69
\(^{(39)}\) Ibid., p. 69
... it seems to me (to Jaspers) that by asserting that God's summons to decision, or the encounter, still takes place by way of that miracle of about 1950 years ago, you (Bultmann) retain the objectivity of the revelation. (40)

Yet, it is not 'revelation through objectivity' as such that Jaspers opposes, for he too sees that all revelation of Transcendence must come through material entities; rather Jaspers rebels against the claims for the revelation of Jesus Christ to be in any way final or definitive.

My premise is this: No one possesses the one truth valid for all. No one occupies a vantage point from which he can survey all truths ...(41)

Liberalism recognizes the historical sources of our spiritual life, whatever they may be. For instance, we Westerners recognize the importance of the Bible. But liberalism repudiates the idea of an exclusive truth formulated in a credo. It recognizes that the way to God is possible also without Christ, and that the Asians can find it without the Bible. (42)

This rejection by Jaspers of the claim of finality for the revelation of Jesus Christ rests upon his basic rejection of Jesus as anything more than a cypher of God;

(40) Ibid., p.77
(41) Ibid., p.82
(42) Ibid., p.46
and that this is the rejection of the 'scandal of particularity' is well recognized by Bultmann.

For Jaspers, the Christian faith's stumbling block is its claim to absoluteness. Perhaps I should be quite satisfied with the effect my attempt at demythologization has had on him. After all, the purpose of demythologization is to make the stumbling block real . . . . This claim (of the Christian faith to absoluteness) can--but also must--be raised by the believer only, not on the basis of a comparison with other modes of faith, but solely as answer to the word that is concretely addressed to me. And this answer is: "Lord to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life" (John 6:68). (43)

Moreover, Jaspers' reply shows that Bultmann rightly sees the claim of absoluteness for Christian faith, which results from the claim of absoluteness for Christ, to be a point of radical divergence between Jaspers and Christianity.

The difference between the stumbling block as you (Bultmann) understand it, and as a possible philosophy might envisage it, is this, if I am not mistaken: though you repudiate all objective fixations, you nevertheless depend upon an objective historical fact, present to us in the Word, with the result that "the claim of Christian faith to absoluteness" not only can but also must be raised by each believer, namely as "the answer to the word of God," which is the word of Christ. Whereas the philosopher, though depending unconditionally upon being given to himself in freedom through transcendence, makes no absolute claim with respect of others. (44)

(43) Ibid., p. 71
(44) Ibid., p. 80
SECTION III

TRANSCENDENCE

IN

TWO EXPERIENTIAL THEOLOGIES
The subject of Otto's study is expressed in the subtitle of his book as 'An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational'. He is concerned that studies of religion should not stop short at investigating the rational elements in religions or the social and psychological conditions which attend and affect the development of religions. He considers that religion is a well blended mixture of rational and non-rational elements and refers to it as a fabric of which these two elements are the woof and warp. However, having stressed the importance of both elements, Otto makes it quite clear that the basis of religion is the non-rational feeling element.

It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the starting point for the entire religious development in history. 'Daemons' and 'gods' alike spring from this root; and all the products of 'mythological apperception' or 'fantasy' are nothing but different modes in which it has been objectified. (2)

(1) Otto, Rudolf, The Idea of The Holy, pp. 47; 49; 120; cf. xvii.
(2) Ibid., p. 15.
It will be our intention in this paper to show how this approach to the study of religion arrives at the idea of a transcendent God, and in order to demonstrate this we shall investigate the presuppositions which lie behind such an approach as well as the description of the religious feeling itself.

Two basic presuppositions are made by Otto in regard to one's awareness of the Numinous. First, he presupposes that this awareness or this feeling is not merely a subjective emotion, but rather the response to a true presence, i.e. that the numinous feeling is the 'shadow' of the Numinous which points beyond itself and thus results in a 'knowing' of the Numinous. Harvey, Otto's English translator, summarizes his position as follows:

But of still more significance is the author's (Otto's) argument in relation to ... the question of subjectivism. Here we are shown that the religious 'feeling' properly involves a unique kind of apprehension, sui generis, not to be reduced to ordinary intellectual or rational 'knowing' with its terminology of notions and concepts, and yet - and this is the paradox of the matter - - itself a genuine 'knowing', the growing awareness of an object, deity. All the 'feelings' and emotions that recur the same through all their diversities of manifestation in different religions are shown to be just the reflection in human feeling of this awareness, as it changes and grows richer and more unmistakable; a response, so to speak, to the impact upon the human mind of 'the divine', as it reveals itself whether obscurely or clearly. The primary fact is the confrontation of the human mind with a Something, whose character is only gradually learned, but which is from the first felt as a transcendent presence, 'the beyond', even where it is also felt as 'the within' man. (3)

(3) Ibid. pp. xlv f.
Otto's desire to establish the validity of religious feeling's pointing to Something outside of man may be seen in his criticism of Schleiermacher's idea of creature-consciousness. Schleiermacher's 'feeling of dependence' rested upon the idea of createdness (Geschaffenheit) from which he rationally inferred a creator upon whom creatures depend. Otto, on the other hand, rejects such a rational, inferential approach and starts from the idea of creaturehood (Geschöpflichkeit). The idea of creaturehood, far from being the basis of one's belief in God, is really the result of one's immediate awareness of Him. Otto considers that Schleiermacher's approach results in an insistence upon the reality of oneself whereas his own approach insists upon the reality of God. In this latter position,

There is no thought ... of any causal relation between God, the creator, and the self, the creature. The point from which speculation starts is not a 'consciousness of absolute dependence' -- of myself as result and effect of a divine cause -- for that would in point of fact lead to insistence upon the reality of the self; it starts from a consciousness of the absolute superiority or supremacy of a power other than myself .... (5)

This, then, is the first presupposition that Otto

(4) Ibid., pp.20-22.
(5) Ibid., p.22.
makes concerning the religious feeling -- that the numinous feeling is the result of a Presence, a 'Something' that appears to the mind of a person. The second presupposition regards the mind's ability to receive such a presence. According to Otto, the mind has an a priori capacity to receive a 'visitation' of the Numinous because 'the holy' exists as an a priori category of man. Otto connects this idea of the holy as a category of man with the idea of an 'inborn Spirit' within man. Indeed, he goes so far as to equate the two. Furthermore, according to Otto, not to allow that man has such a capacity is to have an inadequate conception of man, for the reception of the numinous feeling is to be observed in all religions. To ignore this awareness is to establish an incomplete picture of man similar to "the attempt to frame a standard idea of the human body after having previously cut off the head".

Now we are in a position to ask how such an awareness of the Numinous takes place. Such an inquiry is legitimate insofar as we expect description rather than explanation. As we have already seen the apprehension of God in religious feeling is an apprehension sui generis, thus prohibiting any

(6) Ibid., pp. 62-64; 116-120.
(7) cf. Ibid., p. 63. "And this Spirit, this inborn capacity to receive and understand ...."
(8) Ibid., p. 37, note 2.
explanation in terms of other beings, categories, or concepts. So it is that Otto's method is deliberately and necessarily descriptive. He directs his writing to those who have known "a moment of deeply-felt religious experience" and who are willing to discuss this experience without attempting to define it. At the very beginning of The Idea Of The Holy, he advises those who are not so inclined not to bother reading this book. Otto makes use of such a method for the two reasons we have noted above. First, the Numinous is of such a nature as to be inexplicable and "must be directly experienced in one-self to be understood". Second, since the holy is an a priori capacity of the mind, it may be possible to arouse in one the awareness of the Numinous, to lead one to experience and understand it directly, by the method of descriptive analysis.

It will be our endeavour to suggest this unnamed Something to the reader as far as we may, so that he may himself feel it. There is no religion in which it does not live as the real innermost core, and without it no religion would be worthy of the name. (11)

However, what the Numinous is cannot be truly expressed, nor can the numinous feeling be truly described. What Otto seeks to do is to describe closely related or highly similar

(9) Ibid., p.8.
(10) Ibid., p.10.
(11) Ibid., p.6.
feelings in an attempt to evoke the true numinous feeling.

I shall speak then of a unique 'numinous' category of value and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied. This mental state is perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other; and therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined. There is only one way to help another to an understanding of it. He must be guided and led on by consideration and discussion of the matter through the ways of his own mind, until he reach the point at which 'the numinous' in him perforce begins to stir, to start into life and into consciousness. We can co-operate in this process by bringing before his notice all that can be found in other regions of the mind, already known and familiar, to resemble, or again to afford some special contrast to, the particular experience we wish to elucidate. Then we must add: 'This X of ours is not precisely this experience, but akin to this one and the opposite of that other. Cannot you now realize for yourself what it is?' In other words our X cannot, strictly speaking, be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes 'of the spirit' must be awakened. (12)

It is in this way, then, that Otto seeks to describe the numinous feeling. Although it cannot be described truly in other terms, concepts, or feelings, similar terms, concepts or feelings which are expressible are used to refer to this inexpressible feeling. In such a way the words and concepts he employs are more rightly called 'ideograms',

(12) Ibid., p.7.
for an ideogram differs from a concept in that the former hints at the intended import by analogy whereas the latter speaks virtually of its import.

Otto calls this association of similar feelings 'schematization', and he explains how such association works by use of the notion of 'association of ideas' as explained in the science of psychology.

It is a well-known and fundamental psychological law that ideas 'attract' one another, and that one will excite another and call it into consciousness, if it resembles it. An entirely similar law holds good with regard to feeling. A feeling, no less than an idea, can arouse its like in the mind; and the presence of the one in my consciousness may be the occasion for my entertaining the other at the same time ... But it is important here to recognize the true account of the phenomenon. What passes over--undergoes transition--is not the feeling itself. It is not that the actual feeling gradually changes in quality or 'evolves', i.e. transmutes itself into a quite different one, but rather that I pass over or make the transition from one feeling to another as my circumstances change, by the gradual decrease of the one and increase of the other.(14)

However, Otto's method of schematization seeks a closer association between a religious feeling and a non-religious feeling than that of chance connection or external analogy. Indeed, he argues that there is an inherent

(13) Ibid., p.35
(14) Ibid., pp.43f.
affinity between certain religious and non-religious feelings.

The 'Association of Ideas' does not simply cause the idea \( y \) to reappear in consciousness with the given idea \( x \), occasionally only, it also sets up under certain circumstances lasting combinations and connexions between the two. And this is no less true of the association of feelings. Accordingly, we see religious feeling in permanent connexion with other feelings which are conjoined to it in accordance with this principle of Association. It is, indeed, more accurate to say 'conjoined' than really 'connected', for such mere conjunctions or chance connexions according to laws of purely external analogy are to be distinguished from necessary connexions according to principles of a true inward affinity and cohesion. (15)

Otto gives as an example of the schematization of religious and non-religious feelings the association of the feeling responses to the 'mysterious' and the feeling response to "things which are not wholly understood, unwonted, and at the same time venerable through age". First, the latter feeling constitutes the outward analogical representation of the former. This association

(15) Ibid., p.46
(16) Ibid., pp.66-68
may be represented diagrammatically as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{feeling of the mysterious} & \text{AS} & \text{feeling of the not wholly understood} \\
\text{religio} & & \text{non-religious feeling} \\
\text{feeling of the mysterious} & \text{AS} & \text{religious feeling} \\
\text{feeling of the not wholly understood} & & \text{non-religious feeling}
\end{array}
\]

Or,

Secondly, since there is a necessary association between the feeling of the mysterious and the feeling of the not wholly understood, the latter may arouse the former in the mind by a sort of 'anamnesis' or reminder. Diagrammatically, we may express this point like this:

feeling of the not wholly understood \(\Rightarrow\) (may lead to) feeling of the mysterious

Before we go on to see what Otto says 'schematically' about the numinous feeling, let us interrupt our exposition to see what his approach and method tells us of God's transcendence. First, we note that Otto's approach seeks to arrive at a 'Something' which is felt to be completely other than anything else that one experiences. Even the

(17) Ibid., pp.26-28
numinous feeling which is itself simply the shadow of or response to this 'Something' is felt to be completely unlike any other feeling. Further, to explain either the Numinous Presence or the numinous feeling is impossible since both are irreducible, and even the attempt to describe the numinous feeling results in one's talking 'around' it, rather than of it. Indeed, it is simply because the numinous feeling can neither be explained conceptually nor described virtually that Otto seeks to employ the method of 'schematization' to arouse a 'knowing' of this inconceivable and inexpressible experience.

We have already seen that Otto begins by acknowledging the numinous feeling which he considers to be fundamental and essential to all religions, and now we must turn to note his description of this feeling and of the Something to which it is the response. Otto adopts the word 'Numinous' to express what he means by this Something, and cites as a preliminary definition of it 'the holy' minus its ethical import, which import is an acquired rather than original element in the meaning of 'the holy'.

It is true that all this moral significance is contained in the word 'holy', but it includes in addition -- as even we cannot but feel -- a clear overplus of meaning .... Nor is this merely a later or acquired meaning; rather, 'holy',
or at least its equivalent words in Latin and Greek, in Semitic and other ancient languages, denoted first and foremost only this overplus: if the ethical element was present at all, at any rate it was not original and never constituted the whole meaning of the word. (18)

Otto gives the Numinous the descriptive title of Mysterium tremendum, and we must now undertake to give some account of what is meant by it. The adjective, tremendum, refers to the feeling of being abashed in the presence of the Numinous, and just as 'tremor' is the term associated with the non-religious feeling of fear, so the term 'awe' or 'religious dread' is used by Otto to refer to the response to the religious feeling of tremendum. Awe is the feeling of 'something uncanny', 'eerie', or 'weird', and is a 'shuddering', a 'something more than natural ordinary fear'. This awe, which is referred to as the 'fear of Yahweh' or 'the orge of God', in the Old Testament, is of a devastating character and "implies that the mysterium is already beginning to loom before the mind, to touch the feeling". (19)

Tremendum also has the characteristic of majestas. By this Otto means that one experiences the element of might or power in one's numinous feeling. Here one is radically aware

(18) Ibid., pp.5f.
of the difference between himself and the Numinous. Here
one is aware of "creature-consciousness". We have already
noted this point in our consideration of the approaches of
Schleiermacher and Otto, and we need only remind ourselves
that according to Otto creature-consciousness is the result
of one's awareness of God's characteristic of tremendum,
rather than the result of a rational argument from the finite
to an infinite creator such as we have seen to be employed
by Mascall.

We may see, then, that by tremendum Otto seeks to express
God's transcendence. In the basic numinous feeling one is
aware of the Numinous as unlike the world, i.e. as uncanny,
eerie and weird, and as unlike man, i.e. as abashing might
and overpoweringness. Further, it is this awareness of the
Numinous that convinces man of the great dissimilarity between
It and himself, rather than any prior sense of man's
createdness being negated and applied to God.

Still, in spite of the pregnancy of meaning in the
term tremendum, it is only an adjective, only the synthetic
attribute of Mysterium, i.e., tremendum adds something that
may or may not be inherent in the meaning of Mysterium.
Thus, we must now see how the term Mysterium, itself, seeks

(20) Ibid., pp.20-22.
(21) Ibid., p.25.
to express the transcendent nature of the Numinous. Otto calls the Mysterium the 'wholly other', and gives as the schema of the response to the Mysterium the non-religious feeling of 'stupor', i.e. "blank wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, amazement absolute".

Taken, indeed, in its purely natural sense, 'mysterium' would first mean merely a secret or a mystery in the sense of that which is alien to us, uncomprehended and unexplained; and so far 'mysterium' is itself merely an ideogram, an analogical notion taken from the natural sphere, illustrating, but incapable of exhaustively rendering, our real meaning. Taken in the religious sense, that which is 'mysterious' is -- to give it perhaps the most striking expression -- the 'wholly other' (thateron, anyad, alienum), that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the 'canny', and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment.

As the 'wholly other', the Mysterium tremendum is unknowable -- unknowable not simply in the sense in which a problem eludes and goes beyond our understanding, but unknowable by its very nature.

The truly 'mysterious' object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently

(22) Ibid., p. 26.
'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own... (24)

Our understanding can only compass the relative. That which is in contrast absolute, though it may in a sense be thought, cannot be thought home, thought out: it is within the reach of conceiving but it is beyond the grasp of our comprehension. Now, though this does not make what is 'absolute' itself genuinely 'mysterious' ... it does make it a genuine schema of 'the mysterious'. The absolute exceeds our power to comprehend; the mysterious wholly eludes it. The absolute is that which surpasses the limits of our understanding, not through its actual qualitative character, for that is familiar to us, but through its formal character. The mysterious, on the other hand, is that which lies altogether outside what can be thought, and is, alike in form, quality, and essence, the utterly and 'wholly other'. (25)

Thus, we are led to ask if the idea of God as Mysterium tremendum is not simply a negative concept, if such a transcendent God is not simply other than the world, man, and all that can be thought or expressed. To such a question Otto answers, yes. Conceptually, the Mysterium tremendum is completely negative. However, this does not prohibit a positive element in the numinous experience, nor does it prohibit a positive 'knowing' of the Numinous.

On the side of conceptual thought ... it is obvious that the two terms in question ('supernatural' and 'transcendental') are merely negative and exclusive attributes with reference to 'nature' and the 'world'

(24) Ibid., p.28.
(25) Ibid., pp.145f.
or cosmos respectively. But on the side of the feeling-content it is otherwise; that is in very truth positive in the highest degree, though here too, as before, it cannot be rendered explicit in conceptual terms. It is through this positive feeling-content that the concepts of the 'transcendent' and 'supernatural' become forthwith designations for a unique 'wholly other' reality and quality, something of whose special character we can feel, without being able to give it clear conceptual expression. (26)

To know and to understand conceptually are two different things, and are often even mutually exclusive and contrasted. The mysterious obscurity of the numen is by no means tantamount to unknowableness .... Something may be profoundly and intimately known in feeling for the bliss it brings or the agitation it produces and yet the understanding may find no concept for it. (27)

This positive element constitutes Otto's third characteristic of the numinous experience and is called fascinans. By this he means that the Numinous has an attracting, as well as an abashing and overwhelming, power. He cites as rational concepts or 'schemata' of fascinans the notions of 'Love, Mercy, Pity, Comfort'. (28) "But important as these are for the experience of religious bliss or felicity, they do not by any means exhaust it. Otto illustrates this positive, attracting nature of the Numinous by the rapture of Nirvana.

(26) Ibid., p.30
(27) Ibid., p.139
(28) Ibid., p.31
(29) Ibid., pp.31f.
It is only conceptually that 'Nirvana' is
a negation; it is felt in consciousness as
in the strongest degree positive; it exer-
cises a 'fascination' by which its votaries
are as much carried away as are the Hindu or the
Christian by the corresponding objects of their
worship .... (Nirvana is experienced as) 'Bliss--
unspeakable'. (30)

However, according to Otto, one does not simply receive
a Numinous visitation to which the holy as an a priori
category of man responds and by which it is recognized as
the Mysterium tremendum that abashes and fascinates. Indeed,
Otto further holds that all religions see holiness manifest
in the world, in occurrences, persons, and actions.

It is one thing merely to believe in a reality beyond
the senses and another to have experience of it also;
it is one thing to have ideas of 'the holy' and
another to become consciously aware of it as an oper-
ative reality, intervening actively in the phenomenal
world. Now it is a fundamental conviction of all
religions, of religions as such, we may say, that
this latter is possible as well as the former.
Religion is convinced not only that the holy and
sacred reality is attested by the inward voice of con-
science and the religious consciousness, the 'still,
small voice' of the Spirit in the heart, by feeling,
presentiment, and longing, but also that it may be
directly encountered in particular occurrences and
events, self-revealed in persons and displayed in
actions, in a word, that beside the inner revelation
from the Spirit there is an outward revelation of
the divine nature. Religious language gives the name
of 'sign' to such demonstrative actions and manifes-
tations, in which holiness stands palpably self-
revealed. (31)

(30) Ibid., p.39
(31) Ibid., p.147.
The truth of such manifestations of holiness again rests upon two presuppositions -- that holiness actually becomes manifest and that one can genuinely cognize and recognize the holy in its appearances. This latter presupposition of Otto is termed by him the faculty of divination, and is based upon the observation that people simply do recognize holiness in specific events and persons, e.g., in certain 'holy men' of religious circles in the Mohammedan and Indian world. Again, Otto identifies this a priori capacity with the 'spirit within'.

'Impress' or 'impression' ... presupposes something capable of receiving impressions.... To be 'impressed' by some one, in the sense we use the term here, means rather to cognize and recognize in him a peculiar significance and to humble oneself before it. And we maintain that this is only possible by an element of cognition, comprehension and valuation in one's own inner consciousness, that goes out to meet the outward presented fact, i.e., by the 'spirit within'. (34)

However, Otto realizes that not every man recognizes holiness as manifest in the world. Thus, he distinguishes between the faculty of divination as existing potentially in all men, and as existing actually only in some men who share their divinations with the rest.

(32) Ibid., p.148
(33) Ibid., pp.161f.
(34) Ibid., p.164.
In point of fact it (the faculty of divination) is not universal if this means that it could be presupposed necessarily in every man of religious conviction as an actual fact .... But what is a universal potentiality of man as such is by no means to be found in actuality the universal possession of every single man; very frequently it is only disclosed as a special endowment and equipment of particular gifted individuals..... Not man in general (as rationalism holds), but only special 'divinatory' natures possess the faculty of divination in actuality; and it is these that receive impressions of the transcendent, not the undifferentiated aggregate of homogeneous individuals in mutual interplay, as held by modern social psychology. (35)

It is in this connection that Otto touches upon the question of Christology. He judges that Schleiermacher rightly saw that Jesus was such a divining person who received and passed on impressions of the transcendent. However, Schleiermacher was wrong to stop here, inasmuch as he failed to acknowledge that Jesus was also "the object of divination par excellence." (36)

For to the Christian it is a momentous question whether or no a real divination -- a direct, first-hand apprehension of holiness manifested, the 'intuition' and 'feeling' of it -- can be got from the person and life of Christ; whether, in short, 'the holy' can be independently experienced in him, making him a real revelation of it. (37)

Otto claims that an affirmative answer to this question

(35) Ibid., pp. 153f.
(36) Ibid., p. 159.
(37) Ibid., p. 159.
is precisely what the early Christians witnessed, i.e.,
they claimed to have recognized Jesus as 'the numinous
being par excellence'. (38)

Such a conclusion (that Jesus is Holiness manifest) is not the result of logical compulsion; it does not follow from clearly conceived premisses; it is an immediate, undevelopable judgement of pure recognition, and it follows a premiss that defies exposition and springs directly from an irreducible feeling of the truth. But that, as we have seen, is just the manner in which genuine divination, in the sense of an intuition of religious significance, takes place. (39)

Furthermore, people removed from the Jesus of history may also divine holiness as manifest in him. This may be seen in the experience of St. Paul who although he never saw 'Jesus in the flesh' nevertheless recognized him as the manifestation of holiness par excellence. Thus, according to Otto, even to-day one's acceptance of the numinous in Jesus is of the nature of immediate recognition rather than of logical compulsion or authoritative attestation.

Every religion which, so far from being a mere faith in traditional authority, springs from personal assurance and inward conviction (i.e. from an inward cognition of its truth) -- as Christianity does in a supreme degree -- must presuppose principles in the mind enabling it to be independently recognized as true. (41)

(38) Ibid., pp. 162-165.
(39) Ibid., p.174
(40) Ibid., p.167
(41) Ibid., p.179.
From this inward recognition of the reality of the Numinous and of its manifestation in Jesus, Otto draws two far reaching conclusions.

There can naturally be no defence of the worth and validity of such religious intuitions of pure feeling that will convince a person who is not prepared to take the religious consciousness itself for granted. On the other hand, the criticisms and confutations attempted by such a person are unsound from the start. His weapons are far too short to touch his adversary, for the assailant is always standing right outside the arena! But if these intuitions, these separate responses to the impress upon the spirit of the Gospel story and the central Person of it — if these intuitions are immune from rational criticism, they are equally unaffected by the fluctuating results of biblical exegesis and the laboured justifications of historical apologetics. For they are possible without these, springing, as they do, from first-hand personal divination. (42)

In regard to Otto's first contention, that the divination of holiness is self-authenticating for religious consciousness and that its validity can neither be defended nor attacked outside of such consciousness, we need raise no objection since it follows directly from his basic approach to theology. For him, the Numinous is not arrived at conceptually, nor by rational inference; therefore, it is not to be expected that the validity of the Numinous

(42) Ibid., pp. 177f.
and of its manifestations will be substantiated conceptually. It is 'feeling knowledge' that affirms the reality and the manifestation of the Numinous. We may wish to question Otto's presupposition that the mind has an a priori capacity to experience the Numinous, or we may accuse him of 'begging the question' of the existence of the Numinous when he presupposes that the Numinous feeling is a response to or 'shadow' of the Numinous -- if so we may reject Otto's whole case -- but if we accept his presuppositions and approach, we should not seek to have rational, conceptual confirmation of the positive existence and manifestation of a God thus reached.

However, in regard to Otto's second contention we may wish to raise an objection. The earliest followers of Christ were able to divine the numinous manifest in him inasmuch as they saw him bodily. But where are those of us who live today to derive our object of divination? Surely, from the testimony of those who recognized Jesus as the manifestation of the Numinous, i.e. from the witness of the Biblical writers. Faith is most certainly not an acceptance of authoritative positions presented in the Bible, and, indeed, we to-day must 'divine' or decide for ourselves; but surely we are called to 'divine' in or decide about just this 'central Person of the Gospel story'. Thus, we may not be willing to
agree that Biblical exegesis cannot affect our personal divination of Jesus, for, indeed, we may imagine a position where Biblical scholarship may so affect the picture that the Bible presents of Jesus as to make 'personal divination' of him more or less likely. We may be unfairly criticizing Otto here with knowledge that has arisen since he wrote (viz. in connection with the demythologizing debate), but still it would appear that this independence from Biblical criticism which Otto claims for Christian faith merits more consideration than is afforded it in his discussion. We may wish to make a distinction between faith which rests in the Bible and the possibility of faith which is present through the Bible.

We make this distinction in order to be fair to Otto. If by the independence of faith from the Bible he simply means that faith does not rest upon an authority which derives from a human source, then we have no quarrel. If, on the other hand, he means that faith has no essential need of the Biblical account, then we may wish to disagree. We can grant Otto that faith in Jesus as Holiness manifest is of the nature of a personal judgement, but such a conclusion does not prohibit a dependence upon the Bible. Indeed, it would appear to us that the witness of the Bible is necessary for faith inasmuch as through this account alone can a person
to-day derive the object about which it judges, i.e. the person of Jesus. This conclusion does not necessarily lead to faith based upon authoritative testimony, i.e. a faith that rests in the Bible; but this conclusion does show a dependence of faith upon the Biblical witness, i.e. the possibility of faith in Christ as Holiness manifest is present to us who live to-day through the Bible.

We may also wish to question the completeness of Otto's Christology. What does it mean to say that Christ is the manifestation of the Numinous par excellence? Is there a qualitative difference between Christ and other manifestations of the Numinous? This question is of extreme importance inasmuch as in every other case Otto distinguishes between the Numinous and its bearers. They are means by which the Numinous becomes present. They are not the Numinous itself.

The Numinous (i.e. knowledge of the Numinous) ... issues from the deepest foundations of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses, and, though it of course comes into being in and amid the sensory data and empirical material of the natural world and cannot anticipate or dispense with those, yet it does not arise out of them, but only by their means. They are the incitement, the stimulus, and the 'occasion' for the numinous experience to become astir, and, in so doing, to begin - at first with a naive immediacy of reaction - to be interfused and interwoven with the present world of sensuous experience, until, becoming gradually purer, it disengages itself from this and takes its stand in absolute contrast to it. (43)

Thus, we ask if Jesus is simply part of "the sensory

(43) Ibid., p.117
data and empirical material of the natural world" by means of which the Numinous is present and to which it comes to "stand in absolute contrast?" Otto's answer is not clear. He seeks to claim that "a direct, first-hand apprehension of holiness" may be got from Jesus, and this may well distinguish Jesus from other manifestations of holiness, and other sharers of divinations of the transcendent. Certainly Otto does make a distinction between Jesus and the prophets, but any final judgement must rest upon the strength of 'par excellence', upon whether this term denotes a difference of kind or of degree between Jesus and other manifestations of holiness. We choose not to judge here, but content ourselves with simply giving Otto's own Christological picture of Jesus as "... one in whom is found the Spirit in all its plenitude, and who at the same time in his person and in his performance is become most completely the object of divination, in whom Holiness is recognized apparent. Such a one is more than Prophet. He is the Son."

(44) Ibid., p.182.

It now remains for us to point out how Otto's theology arrives at and expresses the Numinous as transcendent. In his basic approach to theology Otto concerns himself with the
feeling response to the Numinous. He insists that the Numinous is a prior reality which exists independent of men but which is felt by them as an overpowering presence. Moreover, the very feeling of the Numinous points to its transcendent nature of *Mysterium tremendum*, as wholly other than the world and man. Further, the Numinous is inexplicable, incomprehensible and inexpressible. Even descriptions of the numinous feeling are not virtual descriptions but are 'ideograms' or 'schematic' analogies. Again, we saw that the Numinous, though evoked by sensory entities, is seen to be in absolute contrast to them.

Otto does not seek to deny that God is turned towards man, that man knows God as Love and Mercy, but rather he seeks to point out that in one's experience of the Numinous, as mystery, power, or wrath, one 'knows' God to be 'more' than He is as 'turned toward man'.

'Wrath' here is the 'ideogram' of a unique emotional moment in religious experience, a moment whose singularly daunting and awe-inspiring character must be gravely disturbing to those persons who will recognize nothing in the divine nature but goodness, gentleness, love and a sort of confidential intimacy, in a word, only those aspects of God which turn towards the world of men. (45)

This notion of a God which transcends not only all concepts but even 'God as He is turned towards men' emerges

clearly in Otto's treatment of God as supra-personal, as It.

It is often thought that the designations of deity in impersonal, neuter terms ("It"), rather than in terms of person and masculine pronouns ("He", "Thou"), are too poor and too pale to gain a place in our Christian thought of God. But this is not always correct. Frequently, such terms indicate the mysterious overplus of the non-rational and numinous, that cannot enter our 'concepts' because it is too great and too alien to them; and in this sense they are quite indispensable, even in hymns and prayers. It is a defect in our devotional poetry that it hardly knows any other images for the eternal mystery of the Godhead than those drawn from social intercourse and personal relationship, and so it tends to lose sight of just the mysterious transcendent aspect of deity. Assuredly God is for us "Thou" and a Person. But this personal character is that side of His nature which is turned manward... (46)

Thus, Otto, while allowing that God is turned towards men, asserts that man in his awareness of God knows that God transcends His nature as turned towards man, and in this sense God is more than 'He' or 'Thou'. God is 'It'.

However, Otto is just as concerned to stress the positive nature of God's transcendence as he is to stress the negative element of transcendence which surpasses all one can know or conceive. To this end, he argues that God in being experienced is known to exist and that this 'feeling-knowledge' is in the strongest sense positive.

(46) Ibid., pp. 208.
And so we maintain, on the one hand, following the 'via eminentiae et causalitatis', that the divine is indeed the highest, strongest, best, loveliest, and dearest that man can think of; but we assert on the other, following the 'via negationis', that God is not merely the ground and superlative of all that can be thought; He is in Himself a subject on His own account and in Himself.(47)

Otto's position, then, is that one's very experience of the Numinous points to the transcendence of God, for in the numinous experience one 'knows' God as existing positively, and at the same time 'knows' Him as the 'overplus' that transcends the world, men, all concepts and expressions, and even the nature of God as turned towards men.

(47) Ibid., p.39.
Chapter 8

THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENCE IN THE THEOLOGY OF MARTIN BUBER

Although there are certainly differences between the thought of Rudolph Otto and the thought of Martin Buber, it seems to us that enough similarities exist between them to warrant our considering their teachings in the same section. Of course, we shall be able to see these similarities only as we investigate Buber's teaching, but we may note at the beginning what appears to be the underlying basis of agreement between them.

The basis of similarity is to be found in their approaches. Both men start from 'lived experience', from individual awareness, from personal encounter. Otto so emphasizes the element of individual awareness of the Numinous that he simply undertakes to give a description of such awareness, and Buber, while not limiting himself so narrowly, concerns himself largely with God as He is in relation to man. Further, this similarity in their points of departure results in a common rejection of certain approaches to theology. Otto, we have seen, contends

(1) Buber, Martin, I And Thou, p. 134
that one's awareness of God is not a rational, inferential process, and in the same vein Buber says:

God cannot be inferred in anything - in nature, say, as its author, or in history as its master, or in the subject as the self that is thought in it. Something else is not 'given' and God elicited from it ...*(2)*

We begin our investigation of Buber's teaching concerning transcendence by noting that Buber walks what Maurice Friedman (3) calls a 'narrow ridge' between immanence and transcendence, by noting that Buber denies that God is either merely immanent or merely transcendent.

Of course God is the "wholly Other"; but He is also the wholly Same, the wholly Present. Of course He is the Mysterium Tremendum that appears and overthrows; but He is also the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than my I.*(4)*

He who refuses to limit God to the transcendent has a fuller conception of Him than he who does so limit Him. But he who confines God within the immanent means something other than Him!*(5)*

However, in spite of Buber's insistence upon the 'wholly other', it is abundantly clear that most of his work concerns

*(2)* Buber, Martin, *I And Thou*, p.80
*(4)* Buber, *I And Thou*, p.79
itself with God as present to the world, with God's meeting men, with the relation between an I and the Eternal Thou; and, in this respect, some scholars have been led to believe that Buber simply means by God the Absolute Person.

We need not give an account here of Buber's treatment of an I-Thou relation. Indeed, to summarize his teaching of this relation and to contrast it with an I-It relation would result in a reproduction of I And Thou. What we are concerned with in this paper is Buber's teaching that in concrete, historical situations men meet and are met by the Eternal Thou in a way that is similar to the I-Thou relation between two human Thous, i.e. through grace and will, through suffering and action, through being chosen and choosing; and this concern itself stems from our basic concern with the reality of the Eternal Thou and His immanence and transcendence.

In a superficial reading of Buber's works one might receive the impression that he is not very interested in faith which affirms that 'God Is', which posits God as a reality that exists independent of men. Indeed, Buber appears to be concerned only with faith as trust in God's promise to be with his people.

(6) Friedman, op.cit., pp. 227f.
'Faith', however, should not be taken in the sense given to it in the Epistle to the Hebrews, faith that God is. That has never been doubted by the soul of Jacob: When it proclaimed its faith, its emunah, then it only proclaimed that it put its trust in the everlasting God, that he would be there with it, as the patriarchs had experienced he was there with it; and that it entrusted itself to him, to him who was there with it(7).

Still, if the soul of Jacob has never doubted God's existence, modern consciousness does indeed raise such doubts, and it behooves Buber to consider the reality and existence of God. He treats this matter at great length in his debate with C. G. Jung, and we now turn to consider Buber's criticism of Jung's judgements concerning the existence of God, since such a consideration sheds light upon the question of how Buber's approach of personal encounter seeks to arrive at the reality, not only of God, but of a transcendent God.

The point at issue between Jung and Buber is whether God is merely immanent in man's psyche or whether God exists independent of man's psyche. Jung conceives of God as "an autonomous psychic content", and Buber sees such a judgement as

---

(7) Buber, Martin, Mamre: Essays in Religion, p.19
(8) Buber, Eclipse of God, pp.104-122; 171-176
a complete identification of God with a psychical content
and a denial of the reality of God to which such a psychical
content simply corresponds.

... Jung identifies himself with a view "according to
which God does not exist 'absolutely'. that is,
independent of the human subject and beyond all human
conditions". This means, in effect, that the
possibility is not left open that God ... exists
independent of as well as related to the human subject.
It is instead made clear that He does not exist apart
from man. This is indeed a statement about the trans-
cendent. It is a statement about what it is not and
just through this about what it is.\(^9\)

According to Jung, this modern consciousness now turns
itself with its 'most intimate and intense expectations'
to the soul. This cannot mean anything other than that
it will have nothing more to do with the God believed in
by religions, who is to be sure present to the soul, who
reveals Himself to it, communicates with it, but remains
transcendent to it in His being. Modern consciousness
turns instead toward the soul as the only sphere which
man can expect to harbour a divine. In short, although
the new psychology protests that it is 'no world-view
but a science', it no longer contents itself with the
rôle of an interpreter of religion. It proclaims the
new religion, the only one which can still be true, the
religion of pure psychic immanence.\(^10\)

In reply to Buber, Jung contended that he had not overstepped
the limits of scientific psychology, that he simply described

---

\(^10\) Ibid., p.111
what was in man's psyche, i.e. he simply maintained that states about God are human (and therefore psychic) state-
ments and that images of God are created by man himself. Jung considered that these truths lead necessarily to the conception of God as "an autonomous psychic content".

Buber, in replying to Jung's reply, presses a distinction which Jung continued not to recognize in his limiting God to a psychic content.

The distinction which is here in question is thus not that between psychic and non-psychic statements, but that between psychic statements to which a super-
psychic reality corresponds and psychic statements to which none corresponds. The science of psychology, however, is not authorized to make such a distinction; it presumes too much, it injures itself, if it does so.

Buber grants that images and ideas of God are man-made, just as statements about Him are human statements. However, psychology as a science is not qualified to pronounce whether or not there exists a reality outside of the psyche to which these images and ideas correspond and point.

(11) Buber, Eclipse of God, pp.172-175
(12) Ibid., p.174
... that which is essential is still the fact that they are just images. No man of faith imagines that he possesses a photograph of God or a reflection of God in a magic mirror. Each knows that he has painted it, he and others. But it was painted just as an image, a likeness. That means it was painted in the intention of faith directed towards the Imageless whom the image 'portrays', that is, means. This intention of faith directed towards an existing Being, towards One Who exists, is common to men who believe out of varied experience.

We have given this rather extended account of Buber's debate with Jung at the beginning of our paper for two main reasons. First, it shows that Buber argues adamantly that the reality of God as existing independent of men can neither be proved nor disproved, but that it is an affirmation of faith. Secondly, it introduces several key ideas which we must consider in our treatment of Buber's teaching of transcendence, viz., that God is imageless, inexpressible, eclipsed from modern consciousness, and transcendent of his relation to men. We shall return to these points later, but first let us note how Buber arrives at the notion of the reality of God whose existence he defends so passionately.

Buber's theory of knowledge differs from traditional theories

(13) Buber, Eclipse of God, pp.174f.
in that he rejects the subject-object division. On the contrary, he argues that the basic awareness that one has of his world and of himself derives not from I-It relations where a subject perceives and reflects upon an object but that man's prior relation is that of I and Thou. The I-It relation is only a secondary abstraction of this primary mode of awareness.

It is simply not the case that the child first perceives an object, then, as it were, puts himself in relation with it. But the effort to establish relation comes first - the hand of the child arched out so that what is over against him may nestle under it; second is the actual relation, a saying of Thou without words, in the state preceding the word form; the thing like the I is produced late, arising after the original experiences have been split asunder and the connected partners separated. In the beginning is relation - as category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould for the soul; it is the a priori of relation, the inborn Thou. (15)

Thus, Buber contends that man's knowledge of his world is through I-Thou relations, and that "the relations to the Thou is direct"; and, since Buber regards the relation between a human 'I' and a human 'Thou' to be the simile of the relation between a human 'I' and the 'Eternal Thou', it follows that we may say of this latter relation what we have said of the former, i.e. that it is direct knowing based upon the a priori

(14) Friedman, op. cit., pp.163ff.
(15) Buber, I And Thou, p.27
(16) Ibid., p.11
(17) Ibid., p.103
of relation and upon grace and will. Indeed, Buber speaks of God as "the Being that is directly, most nearly, and lastingly, over against us ..." in relation with whom alone an I can be consummated. (18)

However, Buber does not seek to by-pass the world in this direct relation with the Eternal Thou. Indeed, he rejects mystical approaches to God no less than rational inferences of His existence. Man only steps into relation to God in concrete, historical situations in the world. (19)

The extended lines of relations meet in the eternal Thou. Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of every particular Thou the primary word addresses the eternal Thou. (20)

For to step into pure relation is not to disregard everything but to see everything in the Thou, not to renounce the world but to establish it on its true basis. To look away from the world, or to stare at it, does not help a man to reach God; but he who sees the world in Him stands in His presence. 'Here world, there God' is the language of It; 'God in the world' is another language of It; but to eliminate or leave behind nothing at all, to include the whole world in the Thou, to give the world its due and its truth, to include nothing beside God but everything in Him - this is full and complete relation. (21)

(18) Buber, I And Thou, pp.80f.
(19) Ibid., p.75
(20) Ibid., p.75
(21) Ibid., p.79
If you explore the life of things and of conditioned being you come to the unfathomable, if you deny the life of things and of conditioned being you stand before nothingness, if you hallow this life you meet the living God. (22)

Our interest is not so much in the how of an I's relation to God as with the that of this relation, except insofar as the how speaks of God. The point we wish to make here is simply that Buber's approach of I-Thou relations results in one's knowing God. Just as in a human I-Thou relation one knows primarily and truly the reality of the other and the I, itself, so in the I-Thou relation with God, one knows God. This knowing of God rests upon two factors: First, grace since God must give Himself to men, be near them, be truly over against them; and, second, will since man must be open, ready, and willing to go out and meet God. In such a way one encounters God, and it is the truth of this meeting with the other that we have seen Buber defending in his argument with Jung. Therefore, we conclude that whatever else Buber's approach may seek to arrive at, it at least seeks to provide the certainty of 'the other' that one encounters, "the Being that is directly, most clearly and most lastingly over against me".

We must now ask what it is that one may know of the Other

(22) Buber, I And Thou, p.79
which one encounters. At first, it appears that Buber allows nothing to be known about God at all. He says that in encounters with God, "Man receives, and he receives not a specific 'content', but a Presence, a Presence as power". Nor, he says, is it "necessary to know something about God in order really to believe in Him: many true believers know how to talk to God but not about Him. If one dare to turn toward the unknown God, to go to meet Him, to call to Him, Reality is present".

Religion ... insofar as it speaks of knowledge at all, does not understand it as a noetic relation of a thinking subject to a neutral object of thought, but rather as mutual contact, as the genuinely reciprocal meeting in the fullness of life between one active existence and another. Similarly, it understands faith as the entrance into this reciprocity, as binding oneself in relationship with an undemonstrable and unprovable, yet even so, in relationship, knowable Being, from whom all meaning comes.

Thus, Buber seems to make a distinction between knowing in the sense of encountering and knowing in the sense of possessing knowledge about. In faith one knows God, i.e. encounters Him. To be sure, Buber does not seek to prove the existence of God by argument from personal encounter, for entrance into such encounter is faith itself. Nevertheless, the man of faith "knows that God

(23) Buber, I And Thou, p.110
(24) Buber, Eclipse of God, p.40
(25) Ibid., p.46
is" even if this faith is undemonstrable and unprovable. Surely, this is just the point of Buber's controversy with Jung, i.e. that the knowing of a I-Thou relation cannot be judged by categories of I-It epistemology, by an epistemology that conceives of God as either an object of perception or a subjective psychic content. Whatever else may be denied the knowing of faith, it would seem that, at least, faith knows that God is.

But does one know no more of God than that He is? We have already seen that Buber argues that God is imageless, that no man has a picture of God, that no one knows what God really is. Indeed, the reality that is present is not to be confused with any image or idea of it.

The religious reality of the meeting with the Meeter, who shines through all forms and is Himself formless, knows no image of Him, nothing comprehensible as object. It only knows the presence of the Present One. Symbols of Him, whether images or ideas, always exist first when and insofar as Thou becomes He, and that means It(26)

For the idea of God, that masterpiece of man's construction, is only the image of images, the most lofty of all the images by which man imagines the imageless God. It is essentially repugnant to man to recognize this fact and remain satisfied. For when man learns to love God, he senses an actuality which rises above the idea. Even if he makes the philosopher's great effort to sustain the

(26) Buber, Eclipse of God, p.62
object of his philosophic thought, the love itself bears witness to the existence of the Beloved.\(^27\)

However, images, ideas, and words are legitimately used insofar as they are seen to be pointers to God, insofar as they direct one beyond themselves to the Reality that shines through them, and in the use of the word 'God', Buber gives an example of how a word may properly be used as an image or expression of the Reality to which it refers.

Where might I find a word like it (the word 'God') to describe the highest? If I took the purest, most sparkling concept from the inner treasure-chamber of the philosophers, I could only capture thereby an unbinding product of thought. I could not capture the presence of Him Whom the generations of men have honoured and degraded with their awesome living and dying. I do indeed mean Him Whom the hell-tormented and heaven-storming generations of men mean. Certainly, they draw caricatures and write 'God' underneath; they murder one another and say 'in God's name'. But when all madness and delusion fall to dust, when they stand over against Him in the loneliest darkness and no longer say 'He, He', but rather sigh 'Thou', shout 'Thou', all of them the one word, and when they then add 'God', is it not the real God Whom they all implore, the One Living God, the God of the children of man? Is it not, He Who hears them? And just for this reason is not the word 'God', the word of appeal, the word which has become a name, consecrated in all human tongues for all times\(^28\)?

And God, so we may surmise, does not despise all these similarly and necessarily untrue images, but rather suffers that one look at Him through them. Yet they

---

\(^{(27)}\) Buber, Eclipse of God, p.84
\(^{(28)}\) Buber, Martin, To Hallow This Life, pp.13f.
always quickly desire to be more than they are, more than signs and pointers towards Him. It finally happens ever again that they swell themselves up and obstruct the way to Him, and He removes Himself from them.\(^{(29)}\)

However, even if we may see that according to Buber all our images and ideas do not really tell us about God, we may still wish to ask if we are not given knowledge about God in His own revelation. To this question, Buber gives a 'yes and no' answer. First, we consider his 'no' answer, and we begin by noting a summary of Buber's idea of revelation given by Will Herberg.

Revelation is the 'supreme meeting' of the people or the individual with God. It is dialogical, hence essentially divine-human. It is neither experience nor knowledge, and comes not with a specific content of any sort, but as the self-communication of 'Presence as power', which embraces the 'whole fullness of real mutual action', the 'inexpressible confirmation of meaning', and the call to confirm ('make true') this meaning 'in this life and in relation with the world'.\(^{(30)}\)

In the same tenor Friedman says:

Revelation is thus man's encounter with God's presence rather than information about His essence. Buber rejects the either/or of revelation as objective or subjective in favour of the understanding of revelation as dialogical\(^{(31)}\).

\(^{(29)}\) Buber, *Eclipse of God*, p.63
\(^{(30)}\) Buber, Martin, *The Writings of Martin Buber*, p.29
\(^{(31)}\) Friedman, *op. cit.*, p.246
Buber is quite clear that what God reveals of Himself is neither knowledge of His Being nor knowledge of His form of appearance to His people; rather He reveals Himself as "I shall be there as He who I there shall be". Buber treats this conception of 'revelation as promise' in several of his writings, but we quote here a lengthy but complete and contextually clear account from his book, Moses.

As reply to his question about the name (of God) Moses is told: Ehyeh asher ehyeh. This is usually understood to mean 'I am that I am' in the sense that YHWH describes himself as the Being One or even the Everlasting One, the one unalterably persisting in his being. But that would be abstraction of a kind which does not usually come about in periods of increasing religious vitality; while in addition the verb in the Biblical language does not carry this particular shade of meaning of pure existence. It means: happening, coming into being, being there, being present, being thus and thus; but not being in an abstract sense. 'I am that I am' could only be understood as an avoiding of the question, as a 'statement which withholds any information' .... Behind it stands the implied reply to those influenced by the magical practices of Egypt, those infected by technical magic: it is superfluous for you to wish to invoke me; in accordance with my character I again and again stand by those whom I befriend; and I would have you know indeed that I befriend you.  

(32) cf. Greta Hort's translation of 'Ich werde dasein, als der Ich dasein werde', and her reasons cited as to keep "both the meaning and the arresting quality of the original phrase", in her introduction to Mamre, p.xi.

(33) Buber, Martin, Moses, pp.51f.
This is followed in the second part by 'That I shall be present', or 'As which I shall be present' .... YHVH indeed states that he will always be present; but at any given moment as the one whom he then, in that given moment, will be present. He who promises his steady presence, his steady assistance, refuses to restrict himself to definite forms of manifestation...(34)

YHVH is 'He who will be present' or 'He who is here', he who is present here; not merely some time and some where but in every now and in every here. Now the name expresses his character and assures the faithful of the richly protective presence of their Lord(35)

This discussion points out and explains Buber's statement that "revelation does not deal with the secret of God but with (36) the life of man..."

Meeting with God does not come to man in order that he may concern himself with God, but in order that he may confirm that there is meaning in the world. All revelation is summons and sending. But again and again man brings about, instead of realisation, a reflexion to Him who reveals: he wishes to concern himself with God instead of with the world.(37)

If we ask why it is that man so concerns himself with God rather than responding to His summons and sending, then Buber replies:

Man desires to possess God. Man desires a continuity in space and time of possession of God. He is not content

(34) Buber, Martin, Moses, p.52
(35) Ibid., p.53
(36) Buber, Mamre, p.11
(37) Buber, I And Thou, p.115
with the inexpressible confirmation of meaning, but wants to see this confirmation stretched out as something that can be continually taken up and handled .... Thus God becomes an object of faith ....

However, having said that Revelation does not deal with the secret of God but with the life of men, Buber is left with the notion of revelation as direction for men, and it is in treating this matter that we find his 'yes answer' to our question whether or not one can know anything about God from His revelation. Buber's fullest treatment of this question may be found in his essay (39) *Imatatio Dei*, where he starts with the commandment of Deuteronomy 13:5, "Him your God shall ye walk after", and asks how one can follow the hidden God of Judaism. Buber considers that this problem is not nearly so difficult for Christianity since, "For the Christian the human life which established him a Christian is the standard and pattern; he does not imitate a picture he imitates a life-history".

The imitation of God is for Christianity identical with the imitation of its Founder who presents to it the Deity in a human form and in a human life, as the Gospel of John lets the Founder himself say in the words, 'he that hath seen me hath seen the Father' (41)

(38) Buber, *I And Thou*, p.113
(39) Buber, *Mamre*, pp.32-43
(40) Ibid., p.37
(41) Ibid., p.34
But Buber's problem is more difficult, for he sees that Judaism has no mediator (such as he considers Jesus to be) to imitate.

The imitation of God, of the real God, not of the wishful creation; the imitation not of a mediator in human form, but of God Himself - that is the central paradox of Judaism. (42)

Buber seeks to solve this problem by distinguishing between God's 'face' or nature, God as He is Himself, and God's 'ways' or 'name'.

Thus it was not vouchsafed to Moses to see God's 'face', but he learnt his 'ways', which God himself proclaimed, passing by before him; and this proclamation God calls the proclamation of his 'name'. (43)

Having made this distinction between God's secret and God's ways, Buber contends that the latter are revealed in order that men may imitate them.

The secret of God which stood over Job's tabernacle (Job 29:4) ... can only be fathomed by suffering, not by questioning, and man is forbidden to pry into and imitate these secret ways of God. But God's handicraft, his revealed way of working, has been laid upon us, and set up for us, as a pattern. (44)
Further, God's commandments, His *mizwoth*, are nothing else but His ways of working, His *midoth* made human.

It says: (Deut. 13:5): 'Him your God shall ye walk after' ... But it is meant in this way: follow the *midoth*, the 'attributes', still better, the ways in which God works as these are made known to man. As he clothed the nakedness of the first human beings, as he visited the sick Abraham in the grove at Mamre (according to tradition Abraham was there at the time when he was suffering after his circumcision), as he comforted Isaac with his blessing after Abraham's death, until the last act of God in the Pentateuch: As he himself buried Moses - all these are enacted *midoth*, visible patterns for man, and the *mizwoth* are *midoth* made human. 'My handicraft', as the Midrash lets God say to Abraham, 'is to do good - you have taken up my handicraft' (45).

However, we would be wrong if we believed that Buber here calls for an acceptance of revelation simply because it is contained in the Hebrew Bible. As we have seen, for Buber revelation is the encounter of an I with the Eternal Thou, which encounter gives a summons and a sending. Furthermore, according to Buber, each encounter in the signs of life is a self-authenticating revelation as may be seen in his answer to the question of who it is that speaks to us in these signs, in these encounters.

It would not avail us to give for reply the word 'God', if we did not give it out of that decisive hour of personal existence when we had to forget everything we imagined we knew of God, when we dared to keep nothing handed down or learned or self-contrived, no shred of knowledge, and were plunged into the night.

God's summons and sendings are, then, the commandments of a God of the moment, and one can never tell from the last moment's commandment what the next might be. "What occurs to me says something to me, but what it says to me cannot be revealed by any esoteric information; for it has never been said before nor is it composed of sounds that have ever been said." How, then, we may ask, can one follow commandments of such a momentary and changing nature? Buber seeks to answer this question by two means. First, God's commandments are seen to be new insofar as regards new or different concrete situations through which they come and to which they apply. Second, actually from momentary summons and sending there emerges some sort of unity or identity.

When we arise out of it (a former moment of revelation) into the new life and there begin to receive the signs, what can we know of that - of him who gives them to us?

(47)  Ibid., p.12
Only what we experience from time to time from the signs themselves. If we name the speaker of this speech God, then it is always the God of a moment, a moment God.\(^{(48)}\)

Buber seeks to illustrate this point by the example of how one comes to know about a poet in learning something of him from singular poems which he has written.

When we really understand a poem, all we know of the poet is what we learn of him in the poem ... the \(I\) which approaches us is the subject of this single poem. But when we read other poems by the poet in the same true way their subjects combine in all their multiplicity, completing and confirming one another, to form the one polyphony of the person's existence.\(^{(49)}\)

In such a way, out of the givers of signs, the speakers of the words in lived life, out of the moment Gods there arises for us with a single identity the Lord of the voice, the One.\(^{(50)}\)

Not only does some sort of identity emerge from the givers of signs, but some sort of pattern emerges in the summons and sendings themselves. That Buber believes this is so may be seen, if not in actual words, at least in implication, in his essay, 'On the Suspension of the Ethical'. Here he takes

\(^{(48)}\) Buber, Martin, *Between Man And Man*, p.15
\(^{(49)}\) Ibid., p.15
\(^{(50)}\) Ibid, p.15
\(^{(51)}\) Buber, *Eclipse of God*, pp.149-156
up Kierkegaard's interpretation of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac. Kierkegaard judges that one learns from this story that God who gives the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill' can also suspend it, and further that there may be other times in other lives when God-given ethical commands may be suspended in accordance with God's will. Buber judges that God truly did suspend the ethical command for Abraham, but that this may not necessarily be an example for all of us. Indeed, we must be very sure that the voice that commands us to suspend the ethical is really the voice of God and not of one of his apes. But how are we to distinguish between God's voice and commandments and those of his imitators? Buber here seems to suggest that just as a unity emerges in the givers of signs by which one may know the One Lord, so there emerges a standard from God's commands by which we can judge the commands that we hear as to whether they be God's or those of Moloch who imitates God's voice.

In contrast to this (the voice of Moloch) God Himself demands this of every man (not of Abraham, His chosen one, but of you and me) nothing more than justice and love, and that we 'walk humbly' with Him, with God (Micah 6:8) in other words, not much more than the fundamental ethical:

(52) cf. Fear and Trembling
(53) Buber, Eclipse of God, p.153
It would appear that Buber cannot logically hold the two positions of a self-authenticating moment of revelation and of a standard by which to judge such 'revelations'. Indeed, he does not exactly state these positions, but it would appear that he desires the certainty of the former and the safety of the latter. However, he may well be correct when he says that demands of false absolutes (apes of God) can be detected when one is thoroughly honest with oneself in regard to one's own wishes and the felt demands of God. It may well be that in personal experience this logical opposition does not hold true. It may be that if we are completely honest, if we "penetrate again and again into the false absolute with an incorruptible, probing glance", then the revelations that are seen as self-authenticating will be seen to be just those that comply with the standard based on other self-authenticating revelations, so that they, similar to the givers of signs, "combine in all their multiplicity, completing, and confirming one another, to form the one polyphony" of God's handicraft, His mizwoth and His middoth.

(54) Buber, Eclipse of God, pp.154ff.
(55) Ibid., p.156
At this point we interrupt our exposition of Buber's position in order to examine two implications of his teaching concerning one's knowledge or lack of knowledge about God. First we ask if it is true that one's encounter with God tells one nothing about Him. Does such meeting afford one knowledge of God which is of the nature of 'mutual contact' but not of 'noetic relation'? In attempting to answer these questions, we must refer to the I-Thou relation between a human 'I' and a human 'Thou' which Buber claims to be the simile of a Divine-human I-Thou relation. Since Buber asserts that in faith, by which one enters an I-Thou relation with God, one knows but does not know about God, we must ask if in a human I-Thou relation an 'I' can know, without knowing about, a 'Thou'. Now it will be seen that this question is not the same as the question whether or not one can know about a person as an 'It' without knowing him as a 'Thou', for surely this is possible; whereas, in regard to our original question, it appears to us that one does not emerge from a human I-Thou relation without knowledge about the other who was encountered. Of course, it is true that the knowledge that results from the meeting is different in character and extent from the 'knowing' that occurs in the meeting. Nevertheless, it would still appear that such
encounter does give some knowledge (though assuredly not a complete knowledge) of the other that is met.

However, there remains the important question, whether this conclusion holds true when applied to an 'I-Thou' encounter with God, or whether the human analogy breaks down at this point. One might argue that the analogy breaks down inasmuch as all human 'Thous' must become 'Its', while God is eternally Thou and can never become an 'It'. On the other hand it might appear that Buber allows a limited knowledge to result from an encounter with God inasmuch as he speaks of revelation as 'summons and sending', for when we ask whether or not such summons and sendings tell us anything of 'the One who summons and sends' it would appear that Buber must answer affirmatively since he contends that God's commandments are nothing else but His own ways of working made manifest. Thus, for Buber, there does seem to be a content to revelation which speaks about God, but just how far such revelation applies to God is the question that we must consider in our second point.

In asking this question, we must keep in mind Buber's distinction between God's secret and God's ways of working, for this distinction allows Buber to give a 'yes and no' answer to the question of whether or not revelation affords one knowledge about God - yes, revelation gives knowledge of God's ways of working
i.e. of God as He is in relation to men; no, revelation does not give knowledge of God's secret, i.e. of God as He is in Himself. However, we may wish to question the legitimacy of Buber's distinction between God's secret and God's ways. Are they so sharply separated? Does knowledge of God's handicraft tell us only of His ways of working? It would appear to us that Buber, here, draws an oversharper distinction which departmentalizes God and His revelation, and we would argue that not only are God's acts revelatory of His ways but that they are also indicative of His nature as He is in Himself. This means that God's revelation is a real revelation, i.e. that it reveals Him essentially and not simply as regards accommodation or relation. Although it may be quite legitimate to say that knowledge of God's ways is not exhaustive of knowledge of God as He is in Himself, it does not follow from such a position that God's revealed ways of working are to be separated from His essential nature. Indeed, if God's acts stem from His aseitas rather than from whim, then we should expect God's acts to be indicative of His aseitas. We cannot, therefore, follow Buber in this sharp distinction. Consequently, the content of God's revelation takes on more importance than Buber wishes to allow, for if we deny the sharp separation between God's secret and God's ways
then God's revelation will be seen to be a revelation of Himself not simply as He is in relation to men (God pro nobis) but also as He is in Himself (God a se).

Thus far we see that Buber does indeed walk a narrow ridge between immanence and transcendence. On the one hand, he holds that God is present to men in the world, that He is the other who is most truly over against men and who reveals His ways to them. On the other hand, Buber holds that God is not to be confused with the world. Religions of absorption of God in the world are to be rejected. All images and ideas are at best pointers to God. The reality that one encounters is known to be more than one can imagine, and the God that one learns to love is known to be more than the philosopher's object of thought. In all these ways Buber seeks to maintain the notion of God's transcendence. Indeed, the very notion of God as the Eternal Thou speaks of His transcendence, for it is as Eternal Thou that God can never be known in the gnostic sense of esoteric and controlling knowledge. It is as the Eternal Thou that God completely transcends all beings who of their nature must again and again become 'Its' for men. It is as the Eternal Thou that

(56) Buber, I And Thou, pp.83-95
God is inexpressible and inconceivable. Having said all this we are lead to ask if the designation 'Eternal Thou' does not speak of God's 'secret', of His 'face'? 

Buber's answer to this question again points to his teaching of transcendence. According to him the designation 'Eternal Thou' means that God enters into relation with men, thus referring only to God as He is in this relationship, whereas God, as He is in Himself, is not limited to this aspect of His being.

It is indeed legitimate to speak of the person of God within the religious relation and in its language; but in so doing we are making no statement about the Absolute which reduces it to the personal. We are rather saying that it enters into the relationship as the Absolute Person whom we call God. One may understand the personality of God as His act. It is, indeed, even permissible for the believer to believe that God became a person for love of him, because in our human mode of existence the only reciprocal relation with us that exists is a personal one.\(^{(57)}\)

Buber makes a distinction, then, between God as He is in Himself and God as He is in relation to men, between God as the Absolute Being and God as the Eternal Thou, and we may see this distinction clearly drawn in his postscript to the 1957 edition of *I And Thou.*

\(^{(57)}\) Buber, *Eclipse of God*, p.127
Of course, we speak only of what God is in his relation to a man.\(^{(58)}\)

The description of God as person is indespensible for everyone who like myself means by "God" ... him who - whatever else he may be - enters into a direct relationship with men in creative, revealing and redeeming acts, and thus makes it possible for us to enter into direct relation with him .... The concept of personal being is indeed completely incapable of disclosing what God's essential being is, but it is both permitted and necessary to say that God is also a person.\(^{(59)}\)

By this distinction Buber doubly safeguards the transcendence of God. Not only does God as Eternal Thou transcend all ideas and images; not only does God as Eternal Thou refuse to let Himself be identified with any particular manifestation; but the description 'Eternal Thou' is itself seen to be simply a symbol of God, and of God as He is in relation to men.

Thus the 'Eternal Thou' is not a symbol of God but of our relation with God. What is more, no real symbol of God is possible for we do not know Him as He is in Himself.\(^{(60)}\)

In the last point, 'symbol' is used in the sense of designation or depiction rather than in the sense which Jaspers

\(^{(58)}\) Buber, I And Thou, p.134  
\(^{(59)}\) Ibid., p.135  
\(^{(60)}\) Friedman, op.cit., p.225
or Tillich speak of a symbol, for if 'symbol' be used in the sense of a pointer to reality, i.e. as that which makes Reality present, then for Buber the symbol 'Eternal Thou' may properly be said to be a symbol of God, the Absolute Being, since Buber considers 'Eternal Thou' to point to God not only as He is in relation to men but as the God who transcends the nature of Meeter. In other words, Reality transcending personality is known, or known 'to be', through the encounter with God as Eternal Thou.

We mean by the religious in this strict sense ... the relation of the human person to the absolute, when and insofar as the person enters and remains in this relation as a whole being. This presupposes the existence of a Being who, though in Himself unlimited and unconditioned, lets other beings, limited and conditioned indeed, exist outside Himself. He even allows them to enter into a relation with Him such as seemingly can only exist between limited and conditioned beings. Thus in my definition of the religious, "the Absolute" does not mean something that the human person holds it to be, without anything being said about its existence, but the absolute reality itself, whatever the form in which it presents itself to the human person at this moment (61).

With this point we complete a circle in our study of Buber's thought. At the beginning we noted, in his controversy with Jung, that he contended that the man of faith meets a Reality

(61) Buber, Eclipse of God, pp.126f.
which cannot be proved to be of man's own making, but rather that the man of faith knows that he encounters a Reality which not only surpasses all his images and ideas but which transcends the very aspect of reality that he meets. Now we see again how the meeting of an I with the Eternal Thou presupposes not only the Eternal Thou but the reality behind any and all manifestations of itself, i.e. the Reality of God's Absolute Being behind all 'momentary Thous' encountered by an I. This again points to the essential basis of Buber's teaching of transcendence as being his very approach to theology, i.e. the I-Thou relationship, and this point may be supported still again by considering Buber's treatment of 'the eclipse of God'.

An eclipse of the sun is something that occurs between the sun and our eyes, not in the sun itself. Nor does philosophy consider us blind to God. Philosophy holds that we lack to-day only the spiritual orientation which can make possible a reappearance "of God and the gods", a new procession of sublime images. But when, as in this instance, something is taking place between heaven and earth, one misses everything when one insists on discovering within earthly thought the power that unveils the mystery. He who refuses to submit himself to the effective reality of the transcendence as such - our vis-à-vis - contributes to the human responsibility for the eclipse (62)

Assume that man has now fully brought about 'the elimination of the self-subsisting suprasensual world',

---

(62) Buber, Eclipse of God, pp. 34f.
and that the principles and the ideals which have characterized man in any way, to any extent, no longer exist. His true vis-à-vis, which, unlike principles and ideals, cannot be described as an It, but can be addressed and reached as Thou, may be eclipsed for man during the process of elimination; yet this vis-à-vis lives intact behind the wall of darkness. Man may even do away with the name 'god'... yet He who is denoted by the name lives in the light of His eternity. But we, 'the slayers', remain dwellers in darkness, consigned to death.\(^{(63)}\)

What is it we mean when we speak of an eclipse of God which is even now taking place? Through this metaphor we make the tremendous assumption that we can glance up to God with our 'mind's eye' or rather being's eye, as with our bodily eye to the sun .... That this glance of the being exists, wholly unillusory, yielding no images yet first making possible all images, no other court in the world can attest than that of faith. It is not to be proved; it is only to be experienced; man has experienced it.\(^{(64)}\)

Thus we see how Buber's approach to theology, his basis of I-Thou relationships, provides the foundation for his teaching of transcendence. In one's encounter with God, in the act of faith where an I meets and is met by the Eternal Thou, one knows God as He who, though immanent in the sense that he meets men and reveals His ways to them, transcends all images, ideas, momentary manifestations and even that aspect of His being which is in relation to men.

\(^{(63)}\) Buber, Eclipse of God, p.35
\(^{(64)}\) Ibid., p.164
Now that we have studied separately the teachings of Otto and Buber, we are able critically to compare and contrast their positions. We purpose to do this in two general areas - (1) their methods and approaches, and (2) their teachings concerning the transcendence of God.

At the beginning of our study of Buber's position we pointed out the basis of similarity between himself and Otto as being the importance each places upon personal conviction, and we have now seen that not only Otto's approach rests upon a personal awareness of the Numinous, but also that Buber's approach rests upon a personal encounter with the Eternal Thou. Now we must note the details of these approaches and examine them side by side.

Both Otto and Buber base the validity of their approaches upon some sort of a priori category within man. Otto contends that man possesses the 'holy' as an a priori category within himself which allows him to apprehend the Numinous. Further, Otto argues that there is a necessary relation between the Numinous feeling and certain non-religious feelings and that the contemplation of the latter may evoke the former in consequence of (1) man's a priori category of the 'holy' and of (2) the essential affinity between the Numinous feeling and certain non-religious feelings. These necessary connections between
religious and non-religious feelings "according to principles of a true inward affinity and cohesion" are called by Otto 'schematization'.

It would appear that Otto attempts to express his approach in the framework of Kantian philosophy when he uses terms such as 'category' and 'schematization'. It would further appear that the Kantian system is not so well suited to this task as Otto supposes. In the first place, the 'holy' is not a category of man in the same way that Kant speaks of space or time as categories of man's perception, for it is by no means certain that man must perceive certain phenomena through the a priori category of the 'holy' within him. Indeed, Otto does not make such a claim, himself, and his notion of the capability of man to receive a 'Numinous visitation' would be better understood as a power which some men possess and use rather than as a category in the Kantian sense of this term. In the second place, 'schematization' makes too strong a claim for the relationship between a religious and a non-religious feeling. Necessary relations may exist, but they may well be only one-way relations. For example, it may be true that a mysterious feeling accompanies every Numinous feeling, but it most certainly is not true that the Numinous feeling accompanies every mysterious feeling; and it is abundantly clear that 'the feeling
of the mysterious may not lead to the feeling of the Numinous'.

Our basic criticism of Otto's approach amounts to this: Otto's presentation of his position in a Kantian framework results in his departing from a strictly descriptive method. So long as Otto describes man's awareness he is on firm ground, but he is not nearly so convincing when he seeks to account for his findings in Kantian terms such as 'category' and 'schematization'. This overstepping of the boundaries of description also appears in Otto's treatment of divination where he contends that, although all men possess this power potentially, not all men possess it actually. How can Otto's avowed method of description establish the reality of a potential power that does not exist in actuality? It would appear that Otto can only legitimately say that some men possess the power of divination.

On the other hand, we may understand and appreciate Otto's descriptive approach. So long as he describes one's awareness of the Numinous and one's resulting conviction of the reality of the Numinous, he presents findings for which there are no valid defenses or confutations outside of such awareness. As description, Otto's work speaks validly of experiences and convictions which accrue to some men. Moreover, such an approach if accepted, may arrive at the reality of God.
Buber's approach similarly rests upon the claim of an *a priori* power within man - the *a priori* of relation, the inborn Thou'. However, Buber more properly restricts himself to the treatment of I-Thou relations. He does not involve himself in distinctions between potential and actual powers. He starts with the truth of the I-Thou encounter, just as Otto starts with the awareness of the Numinous. Further, just as Otto bases the reality of the Numinous upon this awareness, so Buber bases the reality of the Other upon the I-Thou meeting. Thus, two important points of comparison emerge in their approaches - both approaches are individual and both base the reality of God upon the conviction gained in 'awareness' or 'encounter'.

However, there is also an important point of contrast. Buber is insistent that the encounter of an 'I' with the Eternal Thou is not immediate. Rather, man meets God and is met by Him in the world, in human I-Thou relations. Buber disdains any by-passing of the world, any notion of 'here world, there God'. On the other hand, Otto describes an immediate awareness of the Numinous and definitely distinguishes God from the world. Further, Otto allows some sort of 'technique' by which one may become aware of the Numinous, inasmuch as 'schematization' allows meditation upon non-religious feelings
to awaken the feeling of the Numinous. Buber cannot allow such a 'technique'. For him, God is to be neither conjured up, nor handled, nor possessed. One encounters God by will and grace, by choosing and being chosen.

The approaches of Otto and Buber arrive not only at the reality of God, but also arrive at the reality of a transcendent God. According to Otto, one not only knows that 'God is' as a result of one's awareness of the Numinous; one also knows God as might, as overwhelming power, as 'wholly Other'. This awareness of the transcendent nature of God is part of one's basic awareness of the Numinous. Similarly, according to Buber, one knows that God is transcendent in one's very encounter with Him. God is known as the Eternal Thou who transcends any 'It-nature', i.e. who transcends any knowledge or expression of Him. Thus, for both men the transcendence of God follows from their approaches to the reality of God. The Other that is met is known as other than all our ideas, images and symbols. Consequently, Otto allows only the oblique references of 'ideograms' and 'schematizations' to be applied to God, and Buber (although it sometimes appears that he would prefer to prohibit all knowledge and expression of God) allows one only to know and speak of God's 'ways'. 
The positions of Otto and Buber seek to assert a strong positive knowing that God is and that He is transcendent while denying any real knowledge about God, i.e. any knowledge about God in His transcendent aspect, about God as He is in Himself. To this end, Otto calls God an 'It', meaning thereby that God as He is in Himself transcends His nature as in relation to men, i.e. God as the Absolute transcends His nature as 'Thou'; and Buber, in spite of the fact that he argues so strongly that God is not an 'It' but is eternally Thou, agrees with the purpose of Otto's designation of God as an 'It', for Buber admits that 'Thou' refers to God as He is in relation to men and that the concept of personal being is incapable of disclosing what God's essential being is. Hence, 'ideograms', 'God's ways' and 'the concept of personal being', alike, fail to disclose God in His transcendent nature, since they speak of God only as He is in relation to men. Moreover, both men assert that 'God as He is in Himself' transcends 'God as He is in relation to men', and that the latter aspect of Deity points to the former. We conclude, therefore, that as regards the transcendence of God the positions of Otto and Buber agree in three important assertions - (1) that God is, (2) that one may know something
of God as He is in relation to men although this knowledge can be expressed only obliquely by use of ideograms or symbols, and (3) that God's being as He is in relation to men is a symbol of, i.e. a pointer to, the transcendent God whose being faith affirms but whose nature is unknowable and inexpressible.
SECTION IV

A SCIENTIFIC EXPRESSION

of the

DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENCE
Chapter 9

THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENCE IN THE THEOLOGY
OF KARL HEIM

Karl Heim sees one of the greatest problems facing contemporary theologians as being the problem of meaningfully expressing the idea of God's transcendence. He contends that in times past Theists and Atheists agreed concerning the conception of God, whereas now the whole situation is radically altered in European thought.

It is not simply the reality of the God beyond that is called in question .... The whole idea of transcenden-cence, so essential for theologians and philosophers alike, has become impossible for countless people .... The new type, now increasing rapidly everywhere, is no longer the Atheist, who understands at least the meaning of the word "God" even when he declares that God is an illusion, but the Nihilist who has lost even the conception of a God beyond, and, when any one refers to it, declares it to be a conception which the mind cannot even frame(1)

"..... Heim reasserts the Christian (and Hebraic) view of God as standing above, 'beyond', and yet comprehending and (2) interpenetrating, all processes in earthly time." Thus, when

(1) Heim, Karl, God Transcendent: Foundation for a Christian Metaphysic, p.35
(2) Bevan, Edwyn, 'Introduction to the English Translation', in God Transcendent, p.x
we note the assertion of God's transcendence and the difficulty encountered by modern men to comprehend it, we see the task which Heim sets himself.

The question at issue is whether the one side is right to draw the dividing-line between the immanent world and the transcendent, or whether the other side may rightly ignore this line or obliterate it, and so bring the whole of reality on to one plane. We are first concerned with the dividing-line itself, and not yet with that which lies on this side of it or on that. Our immediate question is the validity of the demarcation... What justification is there for drawing such a line of demarcation...

So it is that Heim's intention "... is to demonstrate in a form which is intelligible to any thinking person that not only the ego but also the reality of the personal God in fact belongs to a dimension which is different from those of everything which is accessible to scientific investigation". This demonstration means "... we must examine every intramundane relation of transcendence and then determine in what manner the beyondness of the omnipresent God is different from all these".

Heim uses the concept of space as the key for understanding the intramundane relation of transcendence. His definition of space is wider than that of common usage which normally refers to space only in the sense of Euclidian, three-dimensional space or, at most, as employed in algebraic calculations. For Heim,

(3) Heim, God Transcendent, pp.26f.
(4) Heim, Karl, Christian Faith and Natural Science, p.34
(5) Heim, God Transcendent, p.45
"a space is every interterminal continuum within which a manifold of different contents may be distinguished according to the special law of its structure." "A space with a particular structure is the form in which the whole of reality, or else a part of it, presents itself to a particular subject, or else to a group of subjects, with which this reality enters into a relation." It will be seen that this definition of a space allows for spaces which are non-Euclidian and non-objective, but before we note these 'spaces' let us look at Heim's notion of space as explained geometrically.

One important point is the difference between contents and spaces. Contents are in one or more spaces, and a boundary of contents is found when there exists "a relation between two or more separate entities, both, or all of them, contents belonging to one and the same space." Heim gives the example of two squares beside each other on a chessboard. Both squares exist in the same space, viz., on a two dimensional plane, and one square limits the other; they cannot occupy the same area; one marks a boundary for the other.

The situation is different however as regards 'spaces'. The

(6) Heim, God Transcendent, p.60
(7) Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, pp.133f.
(8) Heim, God Transcendent, p.61
identity (proximity and similarity) and difference (the bounding of each other and the occupation of different areas) seen in contents are not like the identity and difference found in a space. "This dimensional identity and difference can be expressed only in paradox. We may say, There are two infinitudes, but both have to do with the same content. They represent, as we say, the same content from different angles." Heim cites the example of pictures of Milan Cathedral taken from different positions. All pictures have the same content but the arrangement of the content is different in each.

Another way of expressing this point is to say that the same content may belong to more than one infinitude. When two lines intersect, the point of intersection belongs to both lines yet is not divided between them.

Point 'O' is a content of line AB and of line CD. Again, this

(9) Heim. God Transcendent, p.65
may be seen where two infinite planes intersect.

The contents of IJKL belong entirely and equally to the infinitudes of ABCD and EFGH.

In these two illustrations both infinitudes were of the same 'space', but the relation of dimensional identity and content holds equally in regard to two different 'spaces'. Consider a cube.

A content of the square ABCD, say line AB, is also a content of the whole cube. There is identity of contents but difference of arrangement between the two spaces. In a very true sense line AB participates in a dimension (the cube) that transcends the dimension of the square ABCD in which AB also participates.

(10) Heim, God Transcendent, pp. 52ff.
Not to go beyond this world of experience, we are already aware of a boundary distinguishing one infinitude from another. Beyond one unlimited continuum there may be another continuum, equally unlimited, which has a dimensional relation of union with the first. We may call this relation an intramundane transcendence. (11)

So far all the 'spaces' we have considered have been objective spaces, but Heim's definition of space allows for other 'spaces'. Indeed, we have noted already that he purposes to demonstrate two other spaces, viz., the ego-space and the space of the personal God. First, we note the ego-space, but we only look at it briefly since our main concern is with the space to which belongs the reality of the personal God.

By a phenomenological approach Heim arrives at the existence of an ego which is not to be identified with my objective world. He follows Heidegger's category of *Dasein* and distinguishes the ego from its 'there', both the 'there' of its environment and the 'there' of its body. Indeed, the truth expressed in the doctrine of metempsychosis and reincarnation is the same truth expressed by Shakespeare in *The Taming of the Shrew*, viz., that it is conceivable that one might change bodies with someone else. This grain of truth points to the reality of the ego as distinct from the body. (12)

(11) Heim, *God Transcendent*, p.77
Yet, this ego does not exist in objective space, and consequently is not open to scientific investigation. Here Heim follows Buber in asserting the realities of I and Thou as being matters of will, as meeting only in the present, as being distinguished from anything already accomplished which, as a thing, is always in the past.

Heim also demonstrates the ideas of 'world space' (which includes 'my objective world' and 'your objective world'), 'It space' and 'Thou space'. In all of these non-objective 'spaces' one must be aware of dimensional identity and difference. For example, your objective world and my objective world may include the very same contents (thus making an identity), but the reality of 'I space' and 'Thou space' so arranges the contents that the structures of the two spaces (our objective worlds) show a difference. This is not unlike the identity and difference seen in line AB in the plane space ABCD and the same line seen in the cube ABCDEFGH.

We now ask how Heim comes to posit the reality of 'spaces'. His answer is that a space is disclosed wherever an "either/or and a third is not given" situation breaks down. For example, consider the either/or present to a two dimensional space figure when three entities are in a line, say A B C. Now A may reach

(13) Heim, God Transcendent, pp. 117; 153-160
G only by passing to the right or left of B since only two dimensional movement is possible. No third alternative is given. However, if it be the case that A does reach G in some way other than by passing to the left or right of B, i.e. by going above or below it, then a three dimensional space must be postulated. However, we must not mistakenly consider such a process to be one of mere logical necessity. Heim makes it quite clear that such an empirical third cannot cause one to 'see' another 'space'. Indeed, a two dimensional figure would either continue to assert the impossibility of the third alternative or be completely dumbfounded, if he had no insight into three dimensional space. Rather, it is man's a priori capacity to experience such 'spaces' that allows him to posit them.

From what I have said in this new edition with regard to the dimensional mode of knowledge it will be clear that I regard our insight into the structure of dimensions as precisely a case of synthetic a priori judgement, the same kind of judgement as that by which, according to Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, we become aware of the structure of Space.(15)

(14) Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, pp. 144f.
(15) Heim, God Transcendent, p.235
In other words, the ability to become aware of these 'spaces' is an a priori capacity, and although the either/or situation's breakdown may express or lead to the awareness of new spaces, this is possible only because of man's possession of this a priori judgement.

All that we have said thus far has concerned what Heim calls intramundane transcendence, and he is insistent that God is to be found neither in any of the world's spaces nor in a space which, though transcending them, is a like space.

He (God) is therefore equally transcendent above all the "spaces" which may be distinguished from one another within the world. We may not, then, make the "space" in which God exists just an additional "space" beside the "spaces" transcendentally related to one another within the world— for example, say my objective world and yours, the "I" and the "Thou"— make it a "space" related to those others in the same fashion in which they are related to each other. In any case, whatever we may say regarding His nature, God stands over against the whole "I-Thou-It" world which has hitherto confronted us, an indivisible unity, as something Wholly Other.\(^{(16)}\)

In what way, then, does the space in which God is present to us differ from the other spaces? In answering this question we must first note Heim's idea of dimensional subordination. The idea of dimensional subordination is that of a less

\(^{(16)}\) Heim, *God Transcendent*, p.187
comprehensive space being included in a more comprehensive space. We may refer again to the illustration of the cube. There we see the inclusion of the plane, (two dimensional space) in the cube (three dimensional space). In a similar way the space in which God is present to us includes all the other spaces. It is not merely 'beside' them, but it includes all the other spaces, objective and non-objective. But, we may ask, is this not the same dimensional idea that we see in the idea of 'world space' including the spaces of my objective world and your objective world? And, does not Heim contend that the space in which God is present to us is not just another 'space' transcendentally related to other spaces as we have suggested? To these questions we must answer, yes. While the idea of a dimensional boundary is helpful in expressing God's action in the world (we shall return to this point later), the idea of intramundane transcendence is not to be equated with the transcendence of the space in which God is present to us. Indeed we have already noted that it is precisely because Heim wishes to contrast the two notions of transcendence that he has treated at such length the intramundane transcendental relation of space:

How, then, does the space in which God is present to us differ from intramundane transcendental spaces? All experiences
in the world point to a polarity, according to Heim. This is true of 'I-It' and 'I-Thou' spaces.

The two members in the relation are always linked in such a way that they are mutually exclusive and yet mutually dependent. A excludes B, and yet without B there can be no A. The equilibrium of A can be maintained only with B as its counterpoise. (17)

Thus, all the worldly spaces are resolved into one general category, polar space. In polar space, a point in time exists only relatively to another point. As regards position, one point is 'placed' only relatively to the position of another point. Further, as regards the 'I-Thou' space, "I am I only by virtue of not being you or any one else." (18)

In distinction to polar space, suprapolar space (that space in which God is present to us) allows no relativity, no mutual dependence. It is in this sense that suprapolar space is not 'beside' or 'like' other transcendental spatial relations.

Heim does not attempt to prove or even demonstrate the existence of this space in which God is present to us, for

(17) Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, p.153
(18) Ibid., p.157
(19) Ibid., pp. 161-174
whenever we experience the discovery of a space, this discovery always simply falls into our laps as a gift. (20)

It is for this reason that

... we cannot lead other people to this discovery by intellectual argument or pedagogical activity if the space of God is still concealed from them. (21)

At this point, we should note that Heim most emphatically refuses to identify the suprapolar space with God. The suprapolar space is simply the space in which God is present to us.

... not God Himself but his omnipresence within the world is a space in the comprehensive sense in which we have been employing this concept throughout the book (22)

Just as the language is not the substance of the book itself, but the form in which this substance reveals itself to a certain group of readers, so too the suprapolar space, in which God is present for us, is not the reality of God itself. This ultimate reality remains that which is 'wholly other', totally incomprehensible and entirely inaccessible to our thought and observation (23)

We now turn to see the advantages of expressing God's transcendence in terms of 'spaces' and dimensions. According to

(20) Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, p. 170
(21) Ibid, p. 171
(22) Ibid, p. 174
(23) Ibid, p. 163
Heim the Bible repeatedly refers to God "who, as the Creator, is distinguished from all things by an infinite qualitative dissimilarity......", but who is "nevertheless at the same time, everywhere and at every point in the world, inescapably near". Heim goes on to argue that so long as we fail to think of God's presence and action in terms of spaces, we fail to do justice to both His transcendence and His omnipresence.

First, we treat the question of God's omnipresence. So long as men conceive of the world of God as an upper storey of the cosmic space, then it is only by a sacrificium intellectus that they cling to the belief in the activity of God, for the 'storied' cosmic view must see God's activity as "a force which effects earthly events from above" and science is so explaining 'miraculous' events that "as soon as the scientific explanation of the world has finally become the common property of all, even the last remnant of mythological thinking will disappear".

(24) Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, p.169
(25) Ibid., pp. 171f.
This is the difficulty encountered by the secularist which leads him to say that the idea of a transcendent God who acts is an unframable concept.

However, Heim attempts to remove this stumbling block, which is not the true offence of faith but only a matter of an outmoded cosmic picture, by his use of the concept of 'spaces'. According to him, the secularist's difficulty disappears

... once it has become clear that the presence of God is not an upper storey of the one cosmic space, but a separate all-embracing space by itself, so that the polar and the supra-polar worlds do not stand with respect to one another in the same relation as two floors of the same house but in the relation of two spaces. (26)

This is so because, as we have seen, in two different spaces the same reality may be "ordered simultaneously in accordance with two entirely different structural laws". Further, the all-embracing nature of the suprapolar space, as illustrated in the example of dimensional subordination and inclusion, allows for God's omnipresence as well as His activity.

As the Wholly Other, He is present at every point of all intramundane 'spaces' present as the One 'from whom and through whom and for whom are all things'.

(26) Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, p.172
(27) Ibid., p. 172.
Hence the omnipresence of God must be something which goes sheer through all the "spaces" of the world and is everywhere equally real. 28

Thus, the metaphysic which Heim offers purports to allow us to look at things in two different ways without a sacrificium intellectus, and to allow (by allowing for God's omnipresence and activity) a faith which can be effective in the struggle with our destiny.

For faith gives us the strength which we need in everyday life, not when it is sustained by miraculous occurrences breaking through the order of nature ... but only when one and the same occurrence, an occurrence of which we fully understand the natural causes, for example the course taken by a disease which leads to certain death or the fall of a bomb which destroys a house, at the same time in itself appears to us as an act of God, which we receive directly from his hands. 30

Heim's idea of 'spaces' not only seeks to safeguard and express the omnipresence and activity of God but also his transcendence. In this metaphysic God remains transcendent in three senses. First, as we have seen, the suprapolar space (the space in which God is present to us) transcends the intramundane spaces in a way that differs from their own transcendental relations.

(28) Heim, God Transcendent, p.187
(29) Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, p.173
(30) Ibid., p.173
Secondly, the idea that the suprapolar space embraces all polar spaces preserves the notion of transcendence from both Idolatry and Pantheism. For example, no longer does one need to establish one member of the series of cause and effect, as the Primum Movens (Idolatry). "On the contrary, He (God) is present alike in every member of the causal series as the One through Whom alone it exists and is from moment to moment ordained anew." Nor does one need to identify God with the whole series of causes (Pantheism). "On the contrary, He is distinct from the whole series and from every individual member of it...."

How He thus stands above both the possibilities alone open to us can never be expressed by our just taking the words which in ordinary speech we use to denote a limit or a negation and then magnifying the thing they mean to the utmost of our imagination, saying, for example, "God is the Wholly Other: between Him and the world there is an immeasurable gulf". In spite of all these passionately strained descriptions of otherness, we are still all the time moving among relations which belong to the world we know, we never get out of the region of relational sequences. What God's standing above our two alternatives means can be expressed only when we have got clear to ourselves ... the nature of transcendence as it is found within the world - that is to say, when we have seen clearly this fact: Within the world of experience, as we can survey it, there is such a thing as a boundary, not of content but of dimension.(33)

(31) Heim, God Transcendent, p.203
(32) Ibid., p.203
(33) Ibid., p.204
In the third place, Heim considers that his metaphysic safeguards God's transcendence from the perversion of the doctrine of analogia entis, and this brings us to the third and most important way in which Heim's system seeks to preserve God's transcendence, viz., the distinction between suprapolar space and God, the distinction between God's omnipresence and God Himself.

The idea that God is present for us in the suprapolar space is precisely the means of invalidating the proposition of the analogia entis. Indeed, it is the only effective bulwark capable of warding off the peril with which our religious life is threatened by that seductive proposition the analogia entis, that at first sight appears so extraordinarily convincing. How does it ward off this menace? A space, such as the three-dimensional space for example, is after all, as Kant already demonstrated in his space theory, not an ens, a being, a reality, a 'thing in itself'. It is, as was explained in our chapter entitled 'The Problem of space in modern physics', a relation into which a reality enters with respect to me, the percipient subject .... so too the suprapolar space in which God is present for us, is not the reality of God itself. This ultimate reality remains that which is 'wholly other', totally incomprehensible and entirely inaccessible to our thought and observation .... When we speak of the suprapolar space, we cannot be referring to the eternal reality of God itself, but only to one aspect, a side which is turned towards us, the only side from which God can be accessible to us, to you and me, if He is willing to disclose Himself to us at all.34)

In the summary of his argument in God Transcendent, Heim explicitly states four manners of God's transcendence which

---

34 Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, pp.163f.
will have been seen to be implicit in his whole presentation:

(1) God transcends any relation of contents such as 'this world' and 'God's world' in a cosmic system. (2) God transcends all relations of intramundane transcendence:

Is it possible to express the Beyondness of the omnipresent God in terms of such demarcations as we find in intramundane relations? Have we here a distinction of contents or a boundary of dimension? The answer is, 'Neither.' God cannot be thought of as objectively "above" or "outside" this world. In that case the world would be shut off from His presence. Neither, on the other hand, does the transcendence of God indicate a dimensional boundary, for then it would necessarily be accessible to our dimensional mode of cognition, just as the relations of Space and contact with the Thou are accessible to us. That, however, is precisely not the case when we are confronted by God. (35)

(3) God transcends the possibilities of Idolatry and Pantheism:

... the characteristic feature of the Divine Transcendence is that God stands above the opposition of the two possibilities, beyond the contrast of Idolatry and Pantheism. (36)

(4) The reality of God is not found out by our observation or thinking:

(35) Heim, God Transcendent, p.230
(36) Ibid., p.230
If God is a Reality and not to be explained away in the manner of Idolatry and Pantheism, then it is impossible for us, by any observation or any thinking of our own, to reach what He is and what He wills. We are thrown back on God's own revelation.

Any attempt to assess Heim's position finally rests upon the interpretation that is made of his idea of space. From one point of view it might appear that Heim makes the very mistake that he soundly criticizes in other systems, viz., the creation of a 'new world' in which God may exist. Indeed, one might interpret Heim's presentation in such a way that his concept of 'suprapolar' space appears simply as a new type of 'supernatural world' wherein God resides and from which He acts. This interpretation rests upon the understanding of suprapolar space as being different from polar space simply in degree rather than in kind. Such an understanding would argue that the lack of mutual dependence in suprapolar space does not distinguish it as being qualitatively different from polar space, i.e. does not distinguish it sufficiently to save suprapolar space from being little more than a new expression of God's supernatural realm.

On the other hand, it is possible for one to understand Heim's idea of space in such a way as to avoid this error. It might be argued that suprapolar space does, indeed, go beyond

(37) Heim, God Transcendent, p.231
the notion of an 'above realm', thereby avoiding the errors which attend this conception. Such an understanding would see space, not as a realm, but as a kind of 'form' or 'arrangement' of phenomena.

Now, it is clear the Heim's definition of a space is more akin to this second understanding than to the first. However, which understanding is truer to his whole position is a matter for critical judgement. It would appear to us that the second understanding is correct. We do not purpose to give an extended argument in support of this judgement, but we shall offer two pointers to this meaning. First, Heim's consideration of space in terms of dimensional content points to a spacial content as being determined by arrangement and structure rather than as being determined by the contents of an area or volume. Secondly, Heim's treatment of God's omnipresence makes use of the development of spacial structures and arrangements of events (e.g. perceiving the bombing of a house as coming from the hand of God), rather than of the idea of space as an area or plane wherein events occur (e.g. the simple fact of the house's destruction).

Thus, we would conclude that Heim's presentation of the notion of God's transcendence in terms of 'spaces' does not
seek to establish a new 'cosmic home' for God. Rather, Heim attempts to present a framework which can allow one to conceive of a God who is, at the same time, transcendent to and active in the world. As regards Heim's presentation, we have no disagreement. Nor, indeed, do we disagree with the idea of God which he seeks to express. In point of fact, Heim's notion of a transcendent God who is also active in the world appears to be taken directly from the Bible. Our only question concerns the reality of a suprapolar space; and this question is permitted by Heim, inasmuch as he does not seek to prove the existence of either suprapolar space or God. Recognition of both is a matter of faith, and is felt to be a gift rather than to be a discovery. Ultimately, then, Heim is seeking to provide a framework wherein the knowledge of faith can be meaningfully expressed, i.e. a framework in which the idea of God's transcendence and activity can be accepted without a sacrificium intellectus. To this end, Heim's apologetic system makes use of the scientific conceptions of spaces, and this system would seem to be helpful to modern man who must think scientifically.
SECTION V

THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENCE

IN

THE LOGOS CHRISTOLOGY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL
Up to this point we have approached the notion of transcendence in regard to theological and philosophical systems rather than in regard to the Christian message of faith in the Incarnation, and it may well be objected that it is not surprising, therefore, that our studies have demonstrated a strong insistence upon the nature of God as 'wholly other' and 'unknowable'. However, the objection may continue, our findings would be different if we approached the doctrine of transcendence from the position of faith in the Incarnation where God's action and revelation are taken seriously. Whether or not this conclusion of our hypothetical objector is valid remains to be seen, but at least he seems to be correct in pointing out that our investigation will show a great omission if the doctrine of transcendence is not considered in light of Christology. Thus, we now purpose to correct this omission.

It is apparent that we cannot consider the whole scope of Christology in relation to the transcendence of God. Factors of both length and scope necessitate a delimiting selection, and in making such a selection, we choose to investigate the Logos Christology as found in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. In one sense, this selection is an arbitrary choice inasmuch as it is
occasioned by the necessity of limiting our study and
inasmuch as the Logos Christology is not chosen because
we wish to arrive at certain conclusions which we may
expect to find there. Yet, in another sense, this is
not an arbitrary choice since we may expect the Logos
expression of Christology to be relevant to the subject
of transcendence inasmuch as, in speaking not only of
the Logos as revealer and saviour but as creator and
preserver, it speaks directly and by implication of the
relation of God and Christ, of Christ and the world, and
of God and the world.

We propose to approach this matter from the position
of faith, i.e. we ask not "Is the claim that Jesus is
the Incarnate Logos true?", but "What does this witness
mean?" It follows that our inquiry will be primarily
expository, for we must first ascertain the meaning of
this claim before we can attempt to judge what it tells
us of God's transcendence, i.e. before we can give an
answer to the question, "How does this claim affect the
doctrine of God's transcendence?", we must first answer
the question, "What does it mean to say that Jesus is
the Incarnate Logos?"

In attempting to determine the meaning of the Fourth
Evangelist's Logos Christology we shall make an historical
study of the meanings which may lie behind it. Three
areas of investigation will concern us-- the Jewish
background, the teachings of Greek philosophy, and the influence of Eastern religions. First, we shall look at the possible antecedents of the Fourth Gospel's Logos doctrine in connection with the Jewish notions of 'word' and 'wisdom'. Secondly, we shall see how these elements were combined with Platonic and Stoic elements in the thought of Philo Judeaus. Thirdly, we shall examine the contention that behind the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel lies the redemption mythology of a pre-Christian Gnosticism. While we are considering these background meanings we shall point out their influences upon the Fourth Gospel's Logos doctrine and also consider their effect upon the idea of God's transcendence. By considering these implications while we expound the antecedents to the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, we shall considerably lighten our task of understanding the Logos doctrine and its relation to the doctrine of transcendence when we turn to consider the Fourth Gospel, itself. In our fourth part, therefore, we shall need only to point out the meanings adopted by the author of the Fourth Gospel and to note any adaptations which he may make or any new elements which he may add, while noting also any resulting differences that thus occur in his treatment of God's transcendence.
Chapter 10.

THE 'WORD OF THE LORD'

In his book, Church and Gnosis, F. C. Burkitt contends:

What the (Fourth) Evangelist introduces us to is no new theology, but the familiar, though lofty, conception of Genesis, viz. that of the One only God producing the creation by consulting with Himself, yet bringing forth into visible form nothing without announcing His formulated intention. What had come to pass in consequence of this intention was Life. (1)

However, before we examine Burkitt's thesis that behind the Logos of the Fourth Gospel lies the 'word of the Lord' of the Old Testament, let us note the development and meaning of this idea. The account of creation in Genesis, chapter one, contains what Skinner calls 'fiat' and 'execution', i.e. God expresses His will and it is accomplished. Skinner makes the cautious suggestion that the fiat (God said) and the execution (and there was) may "point to a literary manipulation, in which the conception of creation as a series of fiat has been superimposed on another conception of it as a series of works." (2)

Von Rad also recognizes an older strain which speaks of God's creative activity and a younger strain which speaks of creation by the 'word of the Lord'. However, he doubts

(1) Burkitt, F. C., Church and Gnosis, p.95
(2) Skinner, John, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis, p.8
whether these two conceptions can be separated since the
Priestly editors of Genesis, chapter one, included both
strains in order to express a twofold theological truth.

More important is the fact that the younger has
not displaced the older, that rather both voices
in the present text receive their due: the older,
which tries to preserve the direct, effectively
applied creative working of God in the world (the
world came directly from God's hands which fashioned
it), and the younger, which, without removing this
testimony, speaks of the absolute distance between
Creator and creature. (3)

S. R. Driver expresses a two-fold significance of
God's word for creation. First, creation by God's word
shows the deliberate, intentional nature of His creative
act, and secondly, it points to the word of the Lord as
being the mediating principle or agency of creation.

And God said. So at the beginning of each work of
creation,—including the two providential words of
vv.28,29, ten times in all (hence the late Jewish
dictum, 'By ten sayings the world was created',
Aboth v.1). As Dillm. has pointed out, in the
fact that God creates by a word, there are several
important truths implicit. It is an indication not
only of the ease with which He accomplished His work,
and of His omnipotence, but also of the fact that
He works consciously and deliberately. Things do
not emanate from Him unconsciously, nor are they
produced by a mere act of thought, as in some pan­
theistic systems, but by an act of will, of which
the concrete word is the outward expression. Each
stage in His creative work is the realization of
a deliberately formed purpose, the "word" being the
mediating principle of creation, the means or agency
through which His will takes effect. (4)

(3) Rad, von Gerhard, Genesis: A Commentary, p.52
However, we should be quite clear that the 'word' as agent of creation is not considered to be a mediator who acts instead of God; rather the 'word' is the means by which God, Himself, creates.

created. The root signifies to cut...so probably the proper meaning of קָל is to fashion by cutting, to shapen. In the simple conjugation, however, it is used exclusively of God, to denote viz. the production of something fundamentally new, by the exercise of a sovereign originative power, altogether transcending that possessed by man. (5)

The verb was retained exclusively to designate the divine creative activity.... It means a creative activity, which on principle is without analogy. (6)

Nor, we should note, is there any reason that early Jewish thought should have conceived of God's word as an agent which creates independent of Him rather than as an instrument through which God, Himself, executes His own creative intention, for according to Pedersen, "...in early Israel there was not, any more than among other people, an impassible gulf between the human and the divine world."(7)

Still, this way of speaking about God's word as an agent or instrument certainly goes beyond what one normally means by a spoken word. God's word appears as a concrete entity with power exceeding that of mere expression. In Jewish thought, the uttered word possessed a power of its own as may be seen in the Genesis account of Isaac's blessing of Jacob, where the words of the blessing once

(5) Ibid., p.3
(6) Rad, von, op. cit., p.47
uttered must fulfil themselves. Isaac sees that "what he has done, though he has done it involuntarily, cannot be revoked." \(^{(8)}\) "...such an oracle once uttered is in its nature irrevocable." \(^{(9)}\) Moreover, if the word of man is seen as powerful and irrevocable, so much more so is the word of God, as may be seen in Isaiah 55:11.

...so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth; it shall not return to me empty, but shall accomplish that which I purpose, and prosper in the thing for which I sent it. (RSV)

Helmer Ringgren reaches an even stronger conclusion concerning the word of the Lord. In his careful and detailed study of the hypostatized divine qualities and functions in the ancient Near East, \(^{(10)}\) he quotes with approval Dürr, who says:

...as early as in the O.T. (we find) the divine word, emanating from the divinity, but acting independently, quietly and surely going its way, a part of the divinity, as bearer of divine power, obviously separate from God and yet belonging to him, a hypostasis in the proper sense of the word. \(^{(11)}\)

Ringgren, himself, investigates the nature of God's hypostatized word in Ps. 107, Ps. 145, and Wisdom 18 and concludes that "it is a concretion of the divine word as a breath from the mouth of God or a substance full of power." \(^{(12)}\) Ringgren further contends that the hypostatized word of the Lord can be seen in the concept of Memra, for even though the Palestine Targums used Memra as a 'buffer-word', Ringgren doubts if this term was chosen as an

\(^{8}\text{Driver, op. cit., p.259}\)
\(^{9}\text{Skinner, op. cit., p.372}\)
\(^{10}\text{Ringgren, Helmer, Word and Wisdom: Studies in the Hypostatization of Divine Qualities and Functions in the Ancient Near East}\)
\(^{11}\text{Ibid., p.157}\)
\(^{12}\text{Ibid., p.159}\)
arbitrary and empty 'buffer-word' or substitute for the divine tetragram, i.e. as a meaningless substitute such as 'x' is in a mathematical equation. Indeed, he argues that "just such a personification or hypostatization of the divine word must be the condition for its becoming a substitute for a purely personal expression like the name of God."(13)

This hypostatized 'word of the Lord' may be seen to bear resemblances to both the hypostatized Wisdom of God and the Torah. Ringgren's study shows that, like His hypostatized Wisdom, God's hypostatized Word is said to come from the Heavenly Throne and from the mouth of God, that it is called all powerful and that it is said to carry out God's orders, especially as regards creation.(14)

Similarities between God's hypostatized Word and the Torah are based upon the fact that the word of the Lord finds expression in the Torah, i.e. the Law is the totality and embodiment of God's purpose and will. The 'word' that came to Moses and the prophets and that is summed up in the Torah is simply the expression of God's power and nature. Thus, in Rabinnic Judaism the Torah is said to have been pre-existent with God from the beginning (cf. Pesahim 54a Bar), to have been with God (cf. Aboth d'R. Nathan 31 (8b)), to be the daughter of God,

(13) Ibid., pp.162f.
(14) Ibid., pp.158-162
the instrument of creation (Gen. R. 11, R. Hoshaya the elder), and to be able to make men sons of God (Pirqe Aboth iii.19). \(^{(15)}\) (cf. these claims also with those of the Logos of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel).

Thus, we conclude that in Jewish thought the word of the Lord is conceived of as the concrete agent, means or instrument by which God fulfils His purpose and will especially in creation, and as such it bears several resemblances to the hypostatized Wisdom of God and to the Torah.

Now let us see whether or not this meaning of God's word lies behind the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel. Burkitt argues that by beginning his Gospel with *en arche* *en o logos* the Fourth Evangelist must have intended to carry his readers back to *Genesis*, chapter one, i.e. to the 'word' addressed by God to Himself. This 'word' should be understood as God's Intention through which everything 'came to pass' (*egeneto*), while the 'word', itself, 'was' (*en*). The difference in verbs does not refer to an ontological difference, rather the distinction between was and came to pass simply means that the 'word' is "on the stage when the curtain goes up, while 'things' are not." This word that was there at the beginning is *Genetheto phos*, 'Let there be light', and John bears witness that this divine light was coming into the world,

giving to those who receive him power that they may become children of God. Further, verse 14 of the Prologue simply repeats John's witness; indeed, the kai is resumptive and should be translated by 'I mean to say' or 'Well then, the word became flesh'. So too, verses 16-18 are "a summary in other terms of what has been already said..." (16)

It will be seen that Burkitt's interpretation of the Prologue's Logos doctrine has certain features to commend it. It gives a consistent interpretation, and finds a basis in the Old Testament idea of God's concrete, creative word. However, it would appear that Dodd is correct when he says that Burkitt's arguments concerning the interpretation of the two phrases, 'the word became flesh' and 'the word was God' are forced and unconvincing (17). Moreover, one may wonder if the idea of God's addressing Himself and thereby giving existence to the 'word' as the Genetheto phos is any more intelligible than the idea of 'intimate genetic connexion' which Burkitt rejects. (18)

Notwithstanding these rejections of Burkitt's claims, one positive connection emerges between the Old Testament concept of the word of the Lord and the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, viz. the notion of logos prophorikos, the logos as uttered and creative. The idea of the word as power and as expressive of God's will is certainly present in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, and in view

(16) Burkitt, op. cit., pp.94-97
(17) Dodd, op. cit., p.273, note 1
(18) Burkitt, op. cit., pp.94f.
of the similarity of the Prologue's beginning to that of the book of Genesis, we are most probably justified in
presuming that the appearance of the idea of the Logos
as creative and expressive of God's purpose and will is
based upon the Old Testament idea of the word of the Lord.

It is perhaps only the sense of 'word' inherent in
logos, with the suggestion of power that always at-
taches to the word in Hebraic thought, that makes
it possible for logos as a metaphysical term to
bear this dynamic meaning. (19)

As regards the relation of 'the word of the Lord' and
the idea of God's transcendence, two points emerge. (1) The
'word' is never simply equated with God. It is an hy-
postatized function or quality of God but not God in the
fullness of His Being. (2) At the same time, the 'word'
is expressive of God's intention and will.

The idea of creation by the word preserves first
of all the most radical essential distinction be-
tween Creator and creature. Creation cannot be
even remotely considered an emanation from God;
it is not somehow an overflow or reflection of his
being, i.e., of his divine nature, but is rather a
product of his personal will. (20)

Thus, we can conclude that the hypostatized word of
the Lord preserves the idea of God's transcendence by
asserting that God is greater than His 'word' which is
the means or agent for fulfilling His purpose, while at
the same time it tells us something of the God whose in-
strument it is, since as God's instrument it is expressive
of God's will and intention.

(19) Dodd, op. cit., pp.277f.
(20) Rad, von, op. cit., p.49f.
Chapter 11

THE JEWISH FIGURE OF WISDOM

The most sweeping, if not the most accepted, claims for the identification of the 'Word' of the Fourth Gospel with the Jewish figure of 'Wisdom' have been put forth by Rendell Harris. According to him the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel was originally a Syriac hymn in praise of Wisdom, and behind the Only-Begotten Son of the Fourth Gospel lies the Unique Daughter of God who is His Wisdom. We need not go into the details of Harris' argument, but we should note his general position.

First, he argues that the Greek of the Prologue is 'translation Greek', and that poor translation explains the non-Greek and difficult phrase 'the Word was with God'. This position supports the hypothesis that:

... the Logos of the Fourth Gospel is a substitute for a previously existing Sophia (which) involves (or almost involves) the consequence that the Prologue is a hymn in honour of Sophia, and that it need not be in that sense due to the same authorship as the Gospel itself.

(1) Harris, Rendell, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel.
(2) Ibid., p.13
(3) Ibid., pp.7-9
(4) Ibid., p.6
Harris investigates the Jewish Wisdom Literature and finds parallels which almost paraphrase the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. Encouraged by this, he attempts to restore the Prologue to an intermediate form wherein the praises of Wisdom are based on actual Sapiential quotations.

Prov. viii. 22ff. : The Beginning was Wisdom, Wisdom was with God,
Sap. Sol. ix. 4 : Wisdom was the assessor of God. All things were made by her; Apart from her nothing that was made came to be.
Sap. Sol. vi. 26 : With her was Light, and the Light was the Life of men. That light shone in the Darkness, And the Darkness did not overmaster it.
Sap. Sol. vi. 29 : For no evil overmasters Wisdom. Wisdom was in the World, In the World which she had made; The world did not recognise her.
Prov. i. 28 : She came to the Jews, and the Jews did not receive her.
Sir. xxxiv. 13ff. : Those that did receive her became Friends of God and prophets.
Enoch xli. lff. : She tabernacled with us, and we saw her splendour,
Sap. Sol. vii. 27 : the splendour of the Father's Only Child,
Sir. xxxiv. 6 : Full of Grace and Truth.
Sap. Sol. vii. 25 : (She declared the Grace of God among us).
Sap. Sol. iii. 9 : Ode Sol. 33 :

(5) Harris, Rendell, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel, pp.10-19
Sir. xxxv. 15 : From her pleroma we have received Grace instead of Law, For Law came by Moses,
Sap. Sol. iii. 19: Grace and Mercy came by Sophia;
Sap. Sol. ix. 26 : She is the Image of the Invisible God;
Sap. Sol. vi. 22 : She is the only Child of God, in the bosom of the Father, and has primacy.

If we ask how it came about that St. John changed the term 'wisdom' to that of 'word' when he referred to Jesus, then Harris gives a rather tenuous, but possible, answer. He contends that in the early Church Wisdom and Word were very closely connected, which connection derived from the parallel use of Wisdom and Word in the ninth chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon.

O God of our fathers and Lord of Thy mercy
Who has made all things by Thy Word,
And hast ordained man by Thy Wisdom.

Harris also points out that St. Paul referred to Jesus as the Wisdom of God, as did some of the early Church Fathers. Thus, he concludes,

(6) Harris, Rendell, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel. p.43
(7) Ibid., p.11
(8) Ibid., p.11
(9) Ibid., p.12
(10) Ibid., pp. 14-19
The substitution of Logos for Sophia in the primitive Christology was little more than the replacing of a feminine expression by a masculine one in Greek-speaking circles, and the transition was very easy.

According to Harris, the cause of this easy transition was the rise of Gnostic heresy. Since Wisdom and Knowledge were such key concepts of Gnosticism which did not always agree with Christianity, the Fourth Evangelist deliberately chose not to use the term Sophia, and substituted for it the term Logos in order to ensure that his Gospel should not be interpreted in light of non-Christian Gnosticism.

A less extreme position is that taken by O.S. Rankin, who attempts to arrive at the significance of the figure of Wisdom by investigating the influences which were formative and determinative in its development. He listens to the arguments of Meyer ("... the personification of Wisdom is a natural and independent product of Jewish thought.") and of Heinisch, ("An attribute of Yahwe has grown into an hypostasis through the

(11) Harris, Rendell, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel, p.12
(12) Ibid., p.12
(13) Rankin, O.S., Israel's Wisdom Literature: Its Bearing on Theology and the History of Religion
(14) Meyer, E., Ursprung und Anfänge d. Christentums
(15) Rankin, op. cit., p.227
urge of poetic speech to describe the divine attributes as persons, a process in which supernatural guidance was not wanting.\(^{17}\), and agrees with them that there was within Judaism a preparation for the figure of Wisdom.

That primitive Oriental thought might regard wisdom as a substance, or as a quality that might be obtained by eating a substance; that poetry could personify an attribute of God; that the idea of the transcendence of Jahve in the course of the development of monotheistic thought explains the need for intermediaries - all these factors were preparatory.

However, Rankin considers that the appearance of the figure of Wisdom in Jewish thought was too sudden to be accounted for simply by the development of religious thought within Judaism, and his position is as follows.

From the time of the exile onwards the Jews conceived of God as more and more transcendent. He is described as 'the Highest' and is pictured as an earthly monarch surrounded by his court of angels and 'holy men'. It is at this time that intermediaries arise as beings who stand between the 'Almighty' \(^{20}\) (El Shaddai) and the world.

\(^{17}\) Rankin, op. cit., p.228  
\(^{18}\) Ibid., p.239  
\(^{19}\) Ibid., pp.239f.  
\(^{20}\) Ibid., pp.222f.
Under the necessity of connecting the world of men with the God, who in majesty and nature was so far above this world, there were two courses which Judaism could take and which it took. It transformed the deities of foreign worship into angels, who, representing the functions of the Supreme Being, were more or less the equivalent of abstract ideas or divine attributes, and on the other hand it turned such abstract ideas as spirit of God ... and the word of God ... into what may be called hypostases or personifications of the divine activity and power(21)

We have already seen that Rankin agrees that poetic expression in Jewish literature tended to personify the Wisdom of God. However, he sees this as only preparation for the second course, i.e. the borrowing by Judaism of deities from other countries and the transforming of them into hypostatized functions of Jahve. In order to substantiate this thesis, Rankin makes a detailed study of the influences of Babylonian, Egyptian and Iranian religious thought upon Judaism. He approves of the work of Bultmann and Schraeder who find in Iranian mythology and religion the notion of a deity or heavenly man which appears to lie behind the Jewish figure of Wisdom. Bultmann contends that pre-Christian Iranian religious thought which is the source of the Mandaean figure, Enosh-Uthra (described as "a (or, the) Word, a son of words") is most

(21) Rankin, op. cit., pp.223f.
likely also the earliest source of the Old Testament figure of Wisdom. Schraeder follows up Bultmann's work and arrives at three conclusions: (1) The Prologue to the Fourth Gospel was originally an Aramaic hymn and behind the term Logos lies the Aramaic term Memra. (2) This late Jewish hymn identified the divine Messenger, Enosh, with the Light of the Divine world. (3) The Enosh tradition is preserved in the ninth chapter of the Book of Daniel. Rankin considers these findings important since Schraeder seeks to show definite similarities between the pre-existent man, the Memra and the Old Testament figure of Wisdom. Now if, as is generally accepted to be the case, the Jews borrowed from Persian sources the idea of the heavenly, pre-existent man for their apocalyptic writings, then it is, to say the least, possible that Persian ideas of Memra (closely connected to the notion of the pre-existent man, according to Schraeder) influenced the development of the Jewish figure of Wisdom.

It is this possibility of formative Persian influence upon the Jewish concept of Wisdom that Rankin pursues. He admits that there are definite Babylonian, Egyptian and

(22) Rankin, op. cit., p.225
(23) Ibid., pp.225f.
Hellenistic influences, but contends that the first major external influence came from Persia. To support this contention, he studies the idea of Wisdom in Proverbs, chapters one through nine. Following Sellin and Bressmann, he dates these chapters before 300 B.C., which means that the ideas found therein appeared "before the syncretic influences of the Hellenistic Period became acute ...." Rankin then provides us with a list of 'chief features of personified Wisdom' as found in Prov. 1-9.

(1) Wisdom was begotten of God before the world was created.
(2) She was appointed by God either to rule or to be an associate with Him in His rule.
(3) Wisdom was the artificer whose plans for creation were studied and approved by Jahve, Jahve Himself being the Creator.
(4) Wisdom is an associate of Jahve in whom He has constant delight.
(5) Wisdom's message and functions are particularly concerned with mankind; She reveals the way of life and righteousness.
(6) Wisdom's dwelling or house has seven pillars.
(7) She is contrasted with Folly (or 'woman' of foolishness), and what she bestows is compared with what Folly offers; the ways of Folly are death.
(8) The character of Wisdom's message is a proclamation of Truth (Emeth), Righteousness (Zedek), Knowledge (Da\textsuperscript{eth}), and Judgement, Justice, or Law (Mishpat).

(24) Rankin, op. cit., pp.229-236
(25) Ibid., p.241
(26) Ibid., p.243
Rankin goes on to investigate the similarity of such a figure with the Persian supreme God of light and truth, Ahura Mazda (so Bousset), and with the Amesha Spentas, Asha and Vohu mano, which were old Iranian deities of the elements later converted into spiritual bearers of Ahura Mazda (so Andreas and Schraeder). Rankin examines the arguments for and against these similarities and judges:

Our examination of the figure of Wisdom in Prov. 1-9 thus leads to the conclusion that Wisdom in Judaism owes its origin to Iranian thought upon the Amesha Spentas, in particular to the conception of Asha. (50)

On the other hand, the findings of Helmer Ringgren disagree with Rankin's conclusion. Ringgren notes the similarity of functions between the Amesha Spentas and the figure of Wisdom, especially as regards functions of 'consultant at creation' and 'medium of revelation', but argues that these resemblances are only superficial.

(27) Rankin, op. cit., p.243
(28) Ibid., p.244
(29) Ibid., pp.244-252
(30) Ibid., p.252
Consequently I think it is impossible to find among the Amesha Spentas a definite prototype of Wisdom. If we should have a parallel or prototype, it is above all a typological and phenomenological one, and there is nothing to indicate a higher degree of historical dependence.\(^{(32)}\)

Ringgren's own position is that the Jewish figure of Wisdom developed by the hypostatization of God's wisdom. Rankin, too, agrees, that this accounts partly for the emergence of 'Wisdom', but places greater emphasis upon the formative external influences of Eastern myths. Nor does Ringgren totally ignore such influences.

This hypostatization (of Wisdom) is in my opinion the very origin of the figure of Wisdom. But by this I have not intended to deny that foreign influence has asserted itself in the formation of Wisdom as a personal being. As a matter of fact, most of the concrete features in Wisdom can be shown to reflect mythological ideas.\(^{(33)}\)

Thus, the disagreement between Rankin and Ringgren seems to be a matter of degree and emphasis rather than one of fact and influence. At any rate, in this paper we are not so much concerned with the origin of the figure of Wisdom as with the meaning of Wisdom. We are investigating the development of the


\(^{(33)}\) Ibid., pp.132f.
idea of Wisdom in the Old Testament in order to discover what it originally meant, what it came to mean, and whether or not this meaning of Wisdom lies behind the meaning of the Logos in Philo, or the Fourth Gospel or both. It appears that Rankin makes out a studied and strong case for the meaning of Wisdom at its earliest personification in Jewish thought to be such as outlined in his eight points (see above). Further, he appears to present a sound case in arguing that this meaning is paralleled in Iranian religious myth, even if he cannot prove a definite dependence. Rankin admits that the Jewish idea of Wisdom underwent changes due to the later external influences of Hellenistic philosophy, and we may see this development at its highest in the work of Philo. However, what we are concerned with here is the nature of pre-Hellenistic Wisdom in Jewish thought, and we may summarize this teaching as follows.

Wisdom was with God before the creation of the world and is a companion in whom God constantly delights. She is an associate with God as the artificer who planned creation and as one who was appointed by God to share in His rule. Her functions are

(34) Rankin, op. cit., pp. 254f.
particularly concerned with man, her message of Righteousness, Truth, Knowledge and Judgement, and her gift of life being contrasted with the message and gift of Folly.

It is significant that all of these points, save two, are taken up and developed by Philo in his treatment of the Logos. We shall see that he expands the creative and governing functions, but does not develop the revelatory and soteriological side of Wisdom. Indeed, he does not need to do so. According to him there is no need for a special revelatory figure since knowledge is in the world inasmuch as the world was made by and after God's Reason, and inasmuch as God's law (given to Moses) is in accord with the reason of man, of the world and of God. For the same reason Philo has no need to develop the soteriological side of Wisdom (of which we see the beginning in the identification of Wisdom and life). His doctrine of creation does not allow the dualism of Persian religion which made necessary both a revelatory and soteriological figure. On these points it would appear that Philo was more faithful to Jewish traditional teaching than were (35) the Wisdom writers.

(35) cf. Bultmann, Rudolph, Essays Philosophical and Theological, pp.147-149
Whether Wisdom in the Old Testament be considered the hypostatizing of an attribute of God or the adoption of a foreign deity (or deities) as God's assistant(s), there is no idea of its being equal with God or of its being a substitute for God.

... it is sufficiently evident in the literature concerned that Wisdom is regarded as a Being dependent on God but in some sense separate from Him.\(^{(36)}\)

It is true that the tendency from the time of the exile onwards for the Jews to conceive of God as more and more transcendent gave rise to figures such as Wisdom, but this does not mean that after the exile the Jews departed from their belief in a creative, covenanting, active God. On the contrary, it is just because they retained this belief that such figures developed. What emerged, in fact, was not a new conception of God, i.e. God as remote and inactive, but a new question - the question how does God create; how does He act; and Jewish thought sought to answer this question by recourse to hypostatized functions of God such as Wisdom.

Rankin also cites the important contributions to the Jewish figure of Wisdom which derived from Hellenistic influences.

\(^{(36)}\) Rankin, op. cit., p.224
(1) Wisdom took her dwelling among Israel. (Sir. 5:5)
(2) However, Wisdom could find no dwelling place among men so she returned and took her place among the angels. (I Enoch 42: 1,2; cf. I Enoch 84:3; 94:5)
(3) Wisdom is equated with 'the book of the covenant of Most High, the law which Moses commanded'. (Sir. 24:23)
(4) Wisdom is the artificer of all things. (Sap. Sol. 7:22)
(5) Wisdom received from God the commission to create man. (II Enoch 30:8a)
(6) Wisdom passes into holy souls. (Sap. Sol. 5:27)
(7) Wisdom is the saviour of men. (Sap. Sol. 9:18)
(8) Wisdom is the revelation of God sent from the heavenly throne. (Sap. Sol. 9:10)
(9) Wisdom is the image of God's goodness. (Sap. Sol. 7:24-26)

Again, we shall see that most of these points are taken up and developed by Philo. He treats the Logos as 'dwelling with men' (points 1 and 6 above) in speaking of the immanent Logos. He closely relates the Logos of God and the world with the Law of Moses (point 3 above), and insists upon the creative function of the Logos (points 4 and 5 above). In a limited sense, Philo even speaks of the Logos as revelatory or suggestive of God's nature inasmuch as the immanent Logos reflects the Logos of God, and, as we have already suggested, just for this reason Philo's system exhibits no need for a revelatory or soteriological figure such as Wisdom (points 2, 7, 8 and 9 above). We

(37) Rankin, op. cit., pp.254f.
do not purpose to argue whether Philo borrowed directly from the Wisdom Literature or whether both Philo and the Wisdom writers were influenced by the same Jewish and Hellenistic factors. However, we do consider that a comparison of Philo's position with Sapiential writings shows a marked similarity of thought. Thus, the question of whether the author of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel leaned upon the Jewish figure of Wisdom or upon the Philonic figure of the Logos is of no great consequence, since whichever source he may have borrowed from would have yielded the same meaning in respect to the features common to both.

Further it would appear from the studies of Harris, Rankin and others, that many of the ideas found in the Logos doctrine of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel may be found, at least in their rudiments, in the Jewish idea of Wisdom. We do not need to contend for a verbal similarity or dependence, as Harris argues. Nor do we need to hold a definite dependence of Jewish Wisdom upon Iranian sources, as Rankin contends. What

(39) Harvey-Jellie, W., *The Wisdom of God and the Word of God*
Oesterley, W.O.E., *op. cit.*

---

*An Introduction to the Books of the Apocrypha*

*The Book of Proverbs*

*The Books of the Apocrypha: Their Origin, Teaching, and Contents*

*The Wisdom of Ben-Sira*
we are contending is that the meaning of Wisdom in Jewish thought, paralleled by and probably influenced by Iranian thought concerning the Amesha Spentas of Ahura Mazda, may be found in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. In order to show the closeness of thought between Sapiential Literature and the Prologue, let us refer to the following parallels of thought, if not of actual expression. We do not argue that the Fourth Evangelist was aware of verbal borrowing, but that at least he must have been affected by the ideas expressed in the following quotations, whether these ideas were transmitted as Wisdom literature, as the works of Philo, or as 'ideas in the air'.

**John 1:1-2**

In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God. The same was in the beginning with God.

**Prov. 8:23**

I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was.

**Prov. 8:22**

The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His way, before his works of old.

**Sap. Sol. 9:9a**

And with Thee is Wisdom which knoweth Thy works, Being also present (with Thee) when Thou madest the world.

(40) Text of the Authorized King James Version of the English Bible.
(41) Translation by Oesterley, op. cit.
John 1:3
All things were made by him and without him was not anything made that was made.

Sap. Sol. 7:22a
For she that is the artificer of all, (namely) Wisdom, taught me.

John 1:4
In him was life, and the life was the light of men.

Sap. Sol. 7:27b
And (though) abiding within herself she reneweth all things.

Prov. 8:35
For whoso findeth me (Wisdom) findeth life.

John 1:5
And the light shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehended (overcame) it not.

Sap. Sol. 7:29-30
For she is more beautiful than the sun, and above every constellation of the stars (in beauty), Being compared with light she is found superior; For night followeth this, Whereas evil prevaleth not over Wisdom...

John 1: 9-10a
That the true light which lighteneth every man was coming into the World. He was in the world.

Enoch 42:2a
Wisdom went forth to make her dwelling among the children of men. (42)

(42) Translation by R. H. Charles, The Book of Enoch
John 1:10b
And the world was made by him, and the world knew him not.

Sap. Sol. 7:22a
(previous page)

Enoch 42:2b
And (Wisdom) found no dwelling place. Wisdom returned to her place, And took her seat among the angels.

John 1:11
He came unto his own, and his own received him not.

Sir. 24:8
Then the Creator of all things gave me (Wisdom) commandment, And He that created me fixed my dwelling place (for me), And he said, in Jacob let thy dwelling-place be, And in Israel take up thine inheritance.(43)

Enoch 42:2
Wisdom went forth to make her dwelling among the children of men, And found no dwelling place; Wisdom returned to her place, And took her seat among the angels.

Prov. 1:30
They would none of my counsel: They despised all my reproof.

(43) Translation by Oesterley, op. cit.
John 1:12
But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.

Sap. Sol. 7:27c
And from generation to generation passing into holy souls, She maketh men friends of God and prophets.

John 1:14
... (a) and we beheld his glory, the glory as the(b) only begotten of the father (c) full of grace and truth.

(a) Sap. Sol. 7:26
For she (Wisdom) is a reflection from (the) everlasting light, And an unspotted mirror of the working of God, And the image of his goodness.

John 1:18
No man hath seen God at any time, (b) the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, (a) he hath declared him.

(b) Sap. Sol. 7:22b
For there is in her (Wisdom) a spirit of understanding, holy, sole-born . . . .

(c) Prov. 8:7a
For my (Wisdom's) mouth shall speak truth . . . .

Prov. 8:8a
All the words of my (Wisdom's) mouth are in righteousness . . . .
As regards the significance of the figure of Wisdom for God's transcendence, we turn to the findings of Ringgren who studies the relation of God and the figure of Wisdom in each of the Sapiential writings. We need not investigate all of them, but we should note the more important ones. In Proverbs, chapters one to nine, the fundamental idea is that of the pre-existence of Wisdom. Proverbs 8:22 may be read as 'the Lord possessed or created me (Wisdom) ....' The meaning of the word in question (∁∁) is "that of acquiring something not previously possessed, which may be done by buying or making it, in the case of a child by begetting it". (So Nyberg). Thus Ringgren concludes:

... how is the relation of Wisdom to God to be conceived? It is clear that the theme of the passage (8:22-30) is the great age of Wisdom and, in consequence, its great value .... In order to emphasize this the author describes how Wisdom existed before all other created things. But this does not necessarily imply that Wisdom existed from the beginning, quite independently of God. Wisdom is God's first work; it was created to be his assistant at the creation, and is thus an independent being but as originally nothing but a quality of God manifest in the creation. In other words Wisdom is a hypostasis (45)

In the book of Sirach, Ringgren finds the same relation between God and Wisdom. Wisdom is "an entity separate from God, over which he has complete control and which he disposes

(44) Ringgren, op. cit., pp.99-101
(45) Ibid., p.104
of at his pleasure, but which nevertheless is to a certain extent described as self-existent and separate from him.\(^{(46)}\)

In the book of Baruch, Wisdom is neither hypostatized nor personified, but is simply identified with the law of God, and, in the Book of Wisdom, Ringgren finds a relation between God and Wisdom similar to that found in Proverbs.\(^{(48)}\)

To sum up: we have as the origin of personal Wisdom a hypostatization of a divine function. The hypostasis has by and by developed into a personal being in adopting traits from Mesopotamian or perhaps general oriental and ancient Israelitic mythology. In the book of Sirach, written in Hellenistic Egypt, we found the influence of Isis propaganda. And in the Book of Wisdom, which claims to be more philosophic, there are traces of Greek philosophy.\(^{(49)}\)

In all of Ringgren's studies one point emerges quite strongly, viz., Wisdom is created by God, dependent upon God for its existence, and obedient to God's will. Wisdom, though separate from God, is neither equal to Him nor independent of Him. Wisdom begins as a quality of God and ends as an hypostatization which is transcended by the God who called it into being.

\(^{(46)}\) Ringgren, op. cit., p.107
\(^{(47)}\) Ibid., pp.114f.
\(^{(48)}\) Ibid., pp.115-119
\(^{(49)}\) Ibid., p.149
We have seen, then, how the development of the Jewish ideas of God's hypostatized Word and Wisdom prepared the way for the Fourth Evangelist's doctrine of the Logos. Now we turn to see how Hellenistic philosophy combined with Jewish influences to produce a syncretic Logos doctrine. The most thorough attempt to combine the Jewish ideas concerning God and creation with the philosophies of Platonism and Stoicism was made by Philo Judeaus; therefore, it is his Logos doctrine that we now investigate. We shall especially concern ourselves with the relation of the Logos to God, with the relation of the Logos to the world, and with the function of the Logos; but we begin by seeing how the idea of 'Logos' is related to the whole of Philo's philosophical system.

H. A. Wolfson, in his two volume work on Philo, contends:

The starting point of Philo's philosophy is the theory of ideas. This theory was with him a philosophic heritage from Plato, and according to his own belief ... also from Judaism. (1)

In order to see Philo's dependence upon and divergence from Platonic thought, we quote rather fully an illustration which he gives to explain his notion of 'ideas'.

When any city is founded ... then it happens at times that some man coming up who, from his education, is skilful in architecture, and he, seeing the advantageous character and beauty of the situation, first of all sketches out in his own mind nearly all the parts of the city which is about to be completed .... Then, having received in his own mind, as on a waxen tablet, the form of each building, he carries in his heart the image of a city, perceptible as yet only by the intellect, the images of which he stirs up in memory which is innate in him, and, still further, engraving them in his mind like a good workman, keeping his eyes fixed on his model, he begins to raise the city of stones and wood, making the corporeal substances to resemble each of the incorporeal ideas. Now we must form a somewhat similar opinion of God, who, having determined to found a mighty state, first of all conceived its form in his mind, according to which form he made a world perceptible only by the intellect, and then completed one visible to the external senses using the first one as a model.(2)

This illustration makes it clear that Philo is affected by Platonic philosophy, for just as Plato taught a dualism of existence, i.e. the existence not only of the world in which men actually live, but also of an intelligible world of reality of which the actual world is only a 'copy', so Philo speaks not only of the world in which we live but also of a kosmos noetos, a world of thought, a world in the mind of God.(4)

(2) Philo, 'Creation', iv
(4) Philo, 'Creation', iv, vi, vii
However, we should not assume that Philo simply takes over Plato's conception, for there are real differences in their systems. The major difference is that of the nature of the ideas, i.e. whether or not 'ideas' are co-eternal with God and self-existent. In the Timaeus, when the world was created God looked at eternal 'ideas' and created a world like them. Thus, Plato would seem to allow a considerable independence to the 'ideas'. On the other hand, Philo takes a Jewish monotheistic position. The 'ideas' are not self-existent; they are dependent upon God for their existence.

In the first place therefore, from the model of the world perceptible only by intellect, the Creator made an incorporeal heaven, and an invisible earth, and the form of air and of empty space .... Then he created the incorporeal substance of water and of air, and above all he spread light, being the seventh thing made; and this again was incorporeal, and a model of the sun, perceptible only to intellect, and of all the lightgiving stars, which are destined to stand together in heaven.(5)

The incorporeal world then was already completed, having its seat in the Divine Reason; and the world, perceptible by the external senses, was made on the model of it ...(6)

Thus, we conclude that a fundamental difference exists between the positions of Plato and Philo, inasmuch as Philo

---

(5) Philo, 'Creation', vii
(6) Ibid., x
contends that the 'ideas' are created by God and are dependent upon Him.

Philo also bases his theory of 'ideas' upon his reading of the Old Testament. The Septuagint translates Exodus 33:18 as follows: "And thou shalt make everything for me according to what I show thee on this mount, according to the pattern (paradegma) of the tabernacle and the pattern of the vessels thereof, even so shalt thou make it." Philo's commentary on this passage shows that he considered the right understanding of such Biblical statements to be not disagreeable with the Platonic notion of 'ideas'.

Therefore Moses now determined to build a tabernacle, a most holy edifice, the furniture of which he was instructed how to supply by precise commands from God, given to him while he was on the mount, contemplating with his soul the incorporeal patterns of bodies which were about to be made perfect, in due similitude to which he was bound to make the furniture, that it might be an imitation perceptible by the outward senses of an archetypal sketch and pattern, appreciable only by the intellect ...(7)

Further, Philo does not seem to be alone in making such an interpretation, for according to an old Jewish tradition an ideal tabernacle existed before the world was created (Pesahim 54a; Nedarim 39b), and an ideal sanctuary was in the thought of God prior to creation (Genesis Rabbah, 1,4). (8)

(7) Philo, 'Moses', III, iii
So it is that Philo considered his notion of 'ideas' to be founded not only on Platonic philosophy but also on Biblical exegesis.

Before we leave Philo's treatment of 'ideas' and consider their relation to the Logos, let us note Wolfson's position concerning the stages of the 'ideas'. He says that most Philonic scholars see two stages only, i.e. 'ideas' as the thought of God and as immanent. However, Wolfson argues that Philo puts forth three stages - (1) 'ideas' in God's mind as a property of God and as such are said to be uncreated and of God's essence, (2) 'ideas' made actually to exist as patterns, as the kosmos noetos, and as such are created by God, (3) 'ideas' as immanent in the world. It may be true that Wolfson fails to prove the actual existence of the second stage, but words like 'made' and 'created' referring to the incorporeal world give force to Wolfson's distinction between 'ideas' as a property of God and 'ideas' as the kosmos noetos. At any rate, since these 'stages' are more properly 'moments' of one action, there would appear to be no objection to following Wolfson's threefold division where it is helpful.

(9) Wolfson, op. cit., pp.239; 289
We have considered Philo's notion of 'ideas' not only because it is central to his system but also because he identifies 'ideas' with the Logos. This identification is quite explicit in a passage which follows his illustration of the architect's conception of the plan of a city.

And if any one were to desire to use more undisguised terms, he would not call the world, which is perceptible only to the intellect, any thing else but the reason of God, already occupied in the creation of the world; for neither is a city, while only perceptible to the intellect, any thing else but the reason of the architect, who is already designing to build one perceptible to the external senses, on the model of that which is only so to the intellect ...(10)

It is manifest also, that the archetypal seal, which we call that world which is perceptible only to the intellect, must itself be the archetypal model, the idea of ideas, the Reason of God.(11)

However, having said this, we have not explained Philo's doctrine of the Logos, for the stages of the 'ideas' and the resulting ambiguity of the term 'idea' attend the term 'logos'. Thus it is that we must now consider the relation of the Logos to God and to the world. This task is made difficult by the lack of precision with which Philo uses the term 'logos' or 'reason' or 'law' or 'word', for one is not always sure as to

(10) Philo, 'Creation', vi
(11) Ibid., vi
whether Philo is referring to the Logos as the mind of God or as the kosmos noetos, or as the immanent logos. We now purpose, therefore, to expound as clearly as possible Philo's position, considering at a later time how his Logos doctrine affects the idea of God's transcendence.

The relation of the Logos to God is, at least, twofold in the thought of Philo. In the first place, the Logos seems to be identical to the mind of God, inasmuch as the Logos is the Reason of God, just as the reason of the architect is the idea of the city, before this idea is crystalized. Thus, Wolfson concludes:

The Logos, therefore, as the mind of God and as the place of the ideas from eternity, starts on its career as something identical with the essence of God.(12)

In this sense the Logos is said to be a property of God and, in comparison with the kosmos noetos and the immanent Logos, is termed uncreated.

The second stage of, or moment in, the Logos seems to be other than the actual mind of God, other than identical with God's essence. We shall refer to this moment as the kosmos noetos, the world of ideas as actually thought by God. We

(12) Wolfson, op.cit., p.231
have already seen that Wolfson interprets Philo as holding
that these ideas actually exist, and we have noted that Philo
does speak of them as 'made' and 'created'. Now we must note
the relation of the kosmos noetos to God and to the visible
world.

But the shadow of God is his word, which he used
like an instrument when he was making the world.
And this shadow, and, as it were, model, is the
archetype of other things. For, as God is himself
the model of that image which he has now called a
shadow, so also that image is the model of other
things, as he showed when he commenced giving the
law to the Israelites and said, "And God made man
according to the image of God." (Gen. 1:26) as the
image was modeled according to God, and as man was
modeled according to the image, which thus received
the power and character of the model.\(^{(13)}\)

This passage points to the twofold relation of the kosmos
noetos: (1) Philo makes it quite clear that the Word as
kosmos noetos is not to be equated with God. Rather, it is
God's shadow, the image of God which is created by Him.

... for the word of God is over all the world, and is
the most ancient, and the most universal of all things
that are created.\(^{(14)}\)

(2) As related to the visible world, however, the
kosmos noetos is itself the model and may be termed 'uncreated'
in the sense that it does not exist as something perceptible to
the senses. It is referred to as '... the invisible, and

\(^{(13)}\) Philo, 'Allegories of the Sacred Laws', III, xxxi
\(^{(14)}\) Ibid., III, lxi
shapeless, and incorporeal world, the essence which is the model of all existing things ....'

Another expression which Philo employs to show the relation of the kosmos noetos both to God and the visible world is that of 'younger and older sons of God'.

... for this world is a younger son of God, inasmuch as it is perceptible by the outward sense; for the only son he speaks of as older than the world, is idea*, and this is not perceptible by the intellect; but having thought the other worthy of the right of primogeniture, he has decided that it shall remain with him ...

... using an incorporeal model formed as far as possible on the image of God, He (God) might then make this corporeal world, a younger likeness of the elder creation ...

We see, then, that in relation to God both the visible world and the kosmos noetos are created God, are 'sons of God'; but the kosmos noetos is the 'elder son of God', the first of all created things, or, one might say more correctly, that which was before creation since it precedes all entities visible to sensible perception.

We make a necessary transition to the third moment in the Logos when we consider the 'ideas' (which make up the kosmos noetos) as 'powers'. Further, it is in treating the

(15) Philo, 'Moses', I, xxviii

* Reading 'idea' for ouvo yd

(16) Philo, 'On the Unchangeableness of God', vi

(17) Philo, 'Creation', iv
'ideas' as 'powers' that we encounter the function of the Logos in creation and providence. The Logos as 'powers' conceives of creation not merely as being after a pattern, but somehow as the patterns themselves entering into matter. Thus, the 'ideas' are patterns but not just passive models. In a sense they 'make' visible objects.

For as all things endowed with distinctive qualities are by nature liable to origination and destruction, so those archetypal powers, which are the makers of those particular things, have received an imperishable inheritance in their turn.\(^{(18)}\)

To a certain extent the distinction we point out here corresponds to the Stoic distinction between \textit{Logos endiathetos} and \textit{logos prophorikos}. The first term refers to the thought or reason that lies behind a word; whereas the second term refers to the thought as actually expressed so that the reason behind the expression becomes manifest in it. In a similar way Philo points out the dual nature of the logos as patterns or images after which the world is created, i.e. the reason behind the world, and as 'powers' which enter into the world and by which the world is made rational, i.e. the logos as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{(18)} Philo, 'Of Cain and His Birth', xv
  \item \textbf{(19)} Dodd, C. H., \textit{The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel}, p.263
\end{itemize}
immanent and manifest in the world.

According to the physical laws followed by Philo, the universe is composed of four elements—earth, water, air and fire. So it is that creation by the Logos is conceived of as the ordering of these elements after the 'ideas' of God's Reason and by these same 'ideas'.

And the most ancient word of the living God is clothed with the word as with a garment, for it has put on earth, and water, and air, and fire, and the things which proceed from these elements.

Wolfson expresses the relation of the kosmos noetos and the immanent Logos as follows:

... with reference to the Logos in the second stage, the world is said to be an imitation (mimema) of it; with reference to its third stage, the world is said to be its raiment.

Philo's treatment of the immanent Logos marks a departure from Platonism and shows a definite affinity to Stoicism; therefore, we leave Philo's works for a moment and look at the Stoic concepts of nature and God.

(21) cf. Philo, 'On Those Who Offer Sacrifices', xiii
(22) Philo, 'On Fugitives', xx
(23) Wolfson, op. cit. p.332
... the Stoics did not think of God and the world as different beings .... The world is the sum of all real existence, and all real existence is originally contained in God, who is at once the universal matter and the creative force which fashions matter into the particular materials of which things are made .... In point of Being, God and the world are the same, the two conceptions being declared by the Stoics to be absolutely identical. (24)

The Stoics explained their identification of God and the world in their natural laws which conceived of the Primary Fire becoming 'heavy' and thus forming the world. (25) There is no difference between God and original matter, for although in becoming heavy original matter (or force, reason, fire) became the world and ceased to be God as original Being, (26) it remained God in a derivative sense. As a result of more and more original matter becoming heavy and, as it were, being consumed, at the end of the present course of things a great conflagration of the world will occur and all things which are only parts of God in a derivative sense will cease to exist and God as pure Deity or Primary Fire alone will remain. Then, the processes of creation by Primary Fire becoming heavy and of destruction by conflagration and return to pure Deity will be repeated in an endless cycle. Thus, as regards the relation of God and the world, Edwyn Bevan concludes:

(24) Zeller, E., The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, p.149
(25) Ibid., p.153
(26) Ibid., p.148
(27) Ibid., p.151
(28) Ibid., pp.155f.
(29) Ibid., pp.157f.
For him (Zeno) ... the whole Universe was only one Substance, or Physis, in various states, and that one substance was Reason, was God .... Platonism had banished God from the material world, had left it a dark mass from which the Soul must detach itself if it would find Him, and yet this is the world which encloses us on every side, with which we have primarily to do. Zeno came, as it were, to men asking where they could find God and struck his hand upon the solid earth and answered 'Here'. There was nothing which was not, in its ultimate origin, God; it was He in whom man lived and moved and had his being.30)

We should also note the Stoic idea of intermingling of materials. Whatever is real must be material, so the relation of attributes to their objects and of the soul to its body must be one of mutual intermingling. In such a process one body interpenetrates another not just in its vacant spaces but in all its parts "without however being fused into a homogeneous mass with it", i.e. every part of one body is interpenetrated by another, but this mixture does not prohibit each body retaining its own properties. This allows what Zeller calls a new form of idealism in Stoic materialism.

Plato had said, a man is just and musical when he participates in the idea of justice and music; the Stoics said, a man is virtuous when the material producing virtue is in him; musical when

(30) Bevan, Edwyn, Stoics and Sceptics, p.41
(31) Zeller, op. cit., pp.120ff.
(32) Ibid., pp.131f.
he has the material producing music\(^{(33)}\)

Thus, according to the Stoics, God and the soul are both material, and God is in the world, just as the soul is in the body, by mutual intermingling. Further, although the Stoics did not think of God and the world as different beings, they did distinguish between Pure Deity and derivative deity, i.e. everything was not equally divine. However, it is because of the idea of mutual intermingling, and, as regards Being, the identification of God and the world that Bevan can say:

... it was one of the things most insisted upon in Stoicism that the reason in the individual breast was homogeneous with, of one substance with, the Supreme Reason in the Universe\(^{(36)}\).

And again,

Every movement in the world was as much the expression of a Supreme Purpose as the voluntary movements of an animal were of its individual purpose\(^{(37)}\).

However, just as Philo's doctrine of the Logos differs from the Platonic conception of 'ideas', so too Philo's

\(^{(33)}\) Zeller, op. cit., p.125
\(^{(34)}\) Bevan, op. cit., p.43
\(^{(35)}\) Zeller, op. cit., p.149
\(^{(36)}\) Bevan, op. cit., pp.48f.
\(^{(37)}\) Ibid., p.44
teaching of the immanent Logos differs from the position of the Stoics. The Stoics were primarily concerned to affirm the rationality of the world and saw no cause to conceive of the Reason immanent in the world as being subordinate to God.

To the Stoics the eternal Reason was itself an ultimate principle, and the necessity was not felt to explain it as the reason of God. The doctrine of the Logos may, indeed, be regarded as an attempt, more or less conscious, to (38) escape from the belief in a divine Creator.

On the other hand, Philo is quite clear that God is not just another name for the rational order in the universe. Just as the 'ideas' are dependent upon God, so too the immanent logos is dependent upon God. God is the creator of both the 'older and the younger' sons, both the kosmos noetos and the immanent logos. Indeed, Philo specifically rejects the position of "...a man ... believing that every thing is created from the world, and again is dissolved into the world, but thinking that nothing has been created by God, being a follower of Heraclitus..." (39)

Philo makes it plain at the very beginning of his treatise on the Creation of the World that he considers it to be a grave error when men stop short at the rational order exhibited in the world and fail to ascribe such reason to God.

(38) Scott, op. cit., p.50
(39) Philo, 'Allegories of the Sacred Laws', III, iii
It is then a pernicious doctrine, and one for which no one should contend, to establish a system in this world, such as anarchy is in a city, so that it should have no superintendent, or regulator, or judge, by whom everything must be managed and governed.

Further, whereas the Stoics considered the Logos to be material and to be in the world by an intermingling with matter, Philo contends that the Logos is immaterial and resides in the world as the immaterial soul resides in the body. By this analogy, which is taken from Plato, Philo seeks to maintain that the Logos is not some material mixed with the four elements of air, fire, water, and earth, but that as the soul is that which orders the life of a man, so the Logos is that which orders the four physical elements.

... but he (God) created them (material things) by the agency of his incorporeal powers, of which the proper name is ideas, which he so exerted that every genus received its proper form.

Perhaps, at this point, a diagram would make clearer the relations to each other of the Logos as the thought of God, the Logos as the kosmos noetos, and the immanent logos.

---

(40) Philo, 'Creation', ii
(42) Philo, 'On Those Who Offer Sacrifices', xiii
Or, if one does not wish to follow Wolfson in contending for the actual existence of a kosmos noetos outside God's mind, then our diagram would look like this:

Now that we have some idea of the moments of the Logos and have noted their interrelations and their relations to God, let us look more closely at the functions of the Logos. There can be no doubt but that Philo saw the Logos as possessing a creative function. We have seen that the visible world is made in the likeness of and by the Logos.

But the shadow of God is His word, which he used like an instrument when he was making the world. (43)

... by means of the word of the Cause of all things, by whom the world was made. (Deut. 34:5) (44)

(43) Philo, 'The Allegories of the Sacred Laws', III, xxxi
(44) Philo, 'Sacrifices of Abel and Cain', iii
Again, it is quite clear that the Logos fulfills a sustaining function, i.e. it governs the universe. In this respect the Logos is described as 'a good governor and pilot', 'the helmsman and governor of the universe', and 'that which holds together and regulates the universe'. Indeed, Philo says quite straightforwardly that,

... he (God) regulates the nature of the heaven, and the periodical revolutions of the sun and moon, and the variations and harmonious movements of the other stars, ruling them according to law and justice; appointing as their immediate superintendent, his own right reason, his first-born son ... (48)

When we ask how the Logos governs and maintains the universe, Philo gives what appears to be an eager explanation, since he writes the same answer almost word for word more than once.

But it is the eternal law of the everlasting God which is the most supporting firm foundation of the universe. This it is which, being extended from the centre to the borders, and again from the extremities to the centre, runs through the whole unsubdued course of nature, collecting all the parts and binding them

---

(45) Philo, 'The Allegories of the Sacred Laws', III, xxv
(46) Philo, 'On the Cherubim and the Flaming Sword', xi
(47) Philo, 'Moses', III, xiv
(48) Philo, 'On the Tilling of the Earth by Noah', xii
firmly together; for the father who created them has made it the indissoluble bond of the universe. Very naturally and appropriately therefore, all earth will not be dissolved by all water ... nor will fire be extinguished by air, nor again will air be burnt up by fire, since the divine law establishes itself as a boundary to all these elements, like a vowel among consonants, so that the universe may, as it were, be harmonious in concert with the music expressed by letters; persuasion, by its own authority, putting an end to the threatening conflicts of contrary natures. (49)

What seems to be asserted here is that since God not only created the universe after the form of Reason but also by means of Reason, the rational order of the universe maintains and governs it. This mode of expression, then, gives rise to the question: According to Philo, is it God who creates and governs the world, or is the Logos an intermediary, a being who, standing between God and the world, creates and governs the world for God, instead of God? At least one writer has asserted the latter answer.

Philo's problem was of the philosophic order; God and man are infinitely distant from each other, and it is necessary to establish between them relations of action and prayer; the Logos is here the intermediary ... through it God created the world and governs it; through it also men know God and pray to Him. (De Cherub., 125) (50)

(49) Philo, 'About the Planting of Noah', ii; cf. 'On the World', ii
Such a conclusion is not without support, for some passages in Philo's writings do indeed appear to depict God as being so aloof as to be unable to deal with the world directly, especially as regards matters of evil and punishment. Consider the following instances.

Now it was a very appropriate task for God the Father of all to create by himself alone, those things which were wholly good, on account of their kindred with himself .... To create the beings of a mixed nature (of virtue and vice), was partly consistent and partly inconsistent with his dignity ...[51]

It is on this account that Moses says, at the creation of man alone God said, "Let us make man", which expression shows an assumption of other beings to himself as assistants, in order that God, the governor of all things, might have all the blameless intentions and actions of man, when he does right attributed to him; and that his other assistants might bear the imputation of his contrary actions.[52]

For it is out of that essence (matter devoid of qualities) that God created everything, without indeed touching it himself, for it was not lawful for the all-wise and all-blessed God to touch materials which were all misshapen and confused, but he created them by the agency of his incorporeal powers, of which the proper name is ideas, which he so exerted that every genus received its proper form.[53]
However, in spite of the notion of assistants who aid God in creation and thus bear the imputation of man's evil and in spite of the notion of the unlawfulness of God's touching the material world, Wolfson denies that Philo ever speaks of the Logos as an intermediary. He acknowledges that Philo is careful to maintain the goodness and incorporeality of God, but says that he never thinks of the Logos as used in place of God, in God's stead. Rather, the Logos is an instrument through which God, Himself, acts. Wolfson contends that Philo is actually pleading for reverence, rather than stating categorically that God has neither dealings with beings of a mixed nature, nor a part in punishments and evil.

Although one may consider that Wolfson overstates his case in contending that Philo never speaks of God as being in need of some sort of intermediary, one cannot help but be aware that, according to Philo, it is God who creates the world and has relations with it. Moreover, it may be seen that Philo himself speaks of punishments and evil sent directly by God.

In the first book of his treatise 'On the Life of Moses', Philo

(54) Wolfson, op. cit., p.289
(55) Ibid., pp.285-289
(56) Ibid., p.282
(57) cf. Philo, 'Creation'; 'Of Cain and His Birth', xxxv; cf. Wolfson, op. cit., p.282
lists some plagues sent by God upon the Egyptians through Moses and Aaron. Then he says that three plagues were sent directly by God, viz., those of the dogflies, the death of Egyptian cattle, and the death of Egyptian first-born children. Further, in regard to the passage quoted above where Philo says that it was not lawful for God to touch profane matter and, therefore, had 'ideas' to give form to corporeal matter, Wolfson points out that Philo is treating immanent powers and, in doing so, is not denying God's contact with the world, but is distinguishing between God and immanent 'powers'. Philo is saying, in fact, that it is the immanent 'ideas' which pervade the visible world and thereby preserve it, and that these 'ideas' are not the Logos as the property of God, but the Logos corresponding to the third stage, the immanent Logos. Thus, Wolfson interprets this passage as meaning that it is not lawful for the 'uncreated' Logos to enter matter. If we ask why God acts in this way, then Philo replies not because of a necessity caused by God's nature; but because, since God wills to teach men wisdom, He acts just as

(58) Philo, 'Moses', I, xx-xxiii
(59) Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 279; 282
(60) Ibid., p. 279
a wise man acts. Thus, just as God, being immaterial, does not defile Himself by entering into that which is profane, so men are not to defile themselves by anything unclean.

Here, then, is a crucial question. Is the Logos the instrument of God who Himself creates and preserves the universe, or is the Logos an intermediary who acts instead of God, since God as immaterial cannot Himself create and preserve a material world? Wolfson may not be correct in saying that the idea of the Logos as an intermediary is simply a 'fiction' when attributed to Philo, for there is a strain in Philo's thought which insists upon God's otherness and which would logically lead to a need of 'assistants' or 'intermediaries', e.g. the statement that "... God is utterly inaccessible to any passion whatever". Indeed, there is at least one occasion where Philo seems to attribute to the Logos the function of an interceding mediator between man and God. Philo allegorically interprets the emblem which the High Priest carries when he makes intercession on behalf of men as being the emblem "of that reason which holds together and regulates the universe". Furthermore, it is not only appropriate but indispensable that the High Priest should have this reason (which is God's son)

(61) Wolfson, op.cit. p.282
(62) Philo, 'On the Unchangeableness of God', xi
as his helper when he makes intercession.

For it was indispensable that the man who was consecrated to the Father of the world (the High Priest), should have as a paraclete, his (the Father's) son, the being most perfect in all virtue, to procure forgiveness of sins, and a supply of unlimited blessings ... (63)

However, notwithstanding these elements of Philo's thought, his most frequently and clearly asserted position seems to speak of the Logos as God's instrument.

... God was the cause not the instrument; and what was born was created indeed through the agency of some instrument, but was by all means called into existence by the great first cause; for many things must co-operate in the origination of anything; by whom, from what, by means of what, and why? Now he by whom a thing originates is the cause; that from which a thing is made is the material; that by means of which it was made is the instrument; and why is the object. (64)

So it is that we conclude that the Logos doctrine of Philo does not seek to provide an intermediary between a remote God and the world; rather the Logos is the instrument of a creating and sustaining God.

Having now expounded Philo's doctrine of the Logos, let us

---

(63) Philo, 'Moses', III, xiv
(64) Philo, 'Of Cain and His Birth', xxxv; cf. 'Moses', III, xxxi
turn to consider how this doctrine affects the transcendence of God. We may point this investigation by posing a hypothetical question. "Assuming that Philo had a doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos (though assuredly he did not have such a doctrine), would God or something/someone other than God be incarnate?" Our purpose for asking this unlikely question is that it enables us to point to the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, where it is stated that the Word did become flesh. Most New Testament scholars agree that the Fourth Evangelist writes from a Philonic background. Thus, our question anticipates another question — "If in the Fourth Gospel, the Logos doctrine were taken from Philo without modification, except for its incarnation, how would the incarnation of the Logos affect God's transcendence?" The following questions concerning Philo's Logos doctrine thus become relevant. Is the Logos in any or all of its stages to be equated with God's nature; with the whole of God's Being? Is the knowledge of the Logos exhaustive of knowledge of God? Does God transcend the Logos? Is God remote from the world?

We can immediately reply that if by Logos we mean its second and third 'moments', i.e. the kosmos noetos and the immanent Logos, then it would not be fulness of the Godhead

(65) cf. studies by Dodd, Barrett and Scott.
that becomes incarnate, for both are creations of God and have their existence outside of God's essence. Certainly, according to Philo, God is not to be identified with the immanent Logos. It is precisely here that he parts company with the Stoics. Nor is God to be equated with the Logos to which the immanent 'logoi' point. One is rightly led by the immanent Logos beyond itself to the kosmos noetos, but one should not equate this stage of the Logos with God. Philo allegorically interprets Charran as the place whereto men are led by wisdom of the world, i.e. the kosmos noetos; but this is not the place of God, for God is not the kosmos noetos. Rather, God is His own place in which is the kosmos noetos.

Tell me, now, did he who had come to the place (kosmos noetos) see it (God's place) afar off? Or perhaps it is but an identical expression for two different things, one of which is the divine world, and the other, God, who existed before the world. But he who was conducted by wisdom comes to the former place, having found that the main part and end of propitiation is the divine world, in which he who is fixed does not as yet attain to such a height as to penetrate to the essence of God, but sees him afar off or rather, I should say, he is not able even to behold him afar off, but he only discerns this fact, that God is at a distance from every creature, and that any comprehension of him is removed to a great distance from all human intellect.\(^{(66)}\)

\(^{(66)}\) Philo, 'On Dreams Being Sent From God', x
\(^{(67)}\) Ibid., xi
Again, just as Philo refuses to equate the kosmos noetos with God, so does he refuse to equate knowledge of the Logos with knowledge of God.

Who can venture to affirm of him who is the cause of all things either that he is a body, or that he is incorporeal, or that he has such and such distinctive qualities, or that he has no such qualities? or who, in short, can venture to affirm any thing positively about his essence or his character, or his constitution or his movements?... but we must be content if we are able to understand even his name, that is to say, his word, which is the interpreter of his will. For that must be God to us imperfect beings, but the first mentioned, or true God, is so only to wise and perfect men .... For it is sufficient for the creature to receive confirmation and testimony from the word of God.(68)

It is true that the 'name of God', the 'word of God' is called a 'second God', but it is designated a 'God to us imperfect Beings' and is distinguished from the 'true God'.

However, the most difficult question concerns the first stage of the Logos, i.e. the mind of God, the thought of God as the property of God. We have seen that Wolfson, speaking of this moment of the Logos, judges that the Logos begins its career being one with God's essence. Is the

(68) Philo, 'Allegories of the Sacred Laws', III, lxxiii.
Logos in this sense, then, identical with God? If this 'uncreated' Logos were to become incarnate, would God, Himself, be incarnate? Drummond would answer, 'No'.

We must ... start by conceiving of God as originally existing not only in the absolute simplicity of his being, but in perfect solitude. There is no Logos distinguishable from Himself to share his counsels or to execute his plans .... He is, accordingly, the Mind or Reason of the universe. Have we, then, discovered his essence, and when we have said that he is Reason, have we given an exhaustive description of Him? No, for pure Being is a more comprehensive conception than Reason, and includes other predicates.... Reason, therefore, is a mode of the divine essence, but not that essence itself; and, as in the case of all the powers, God exhausts and transcends it.\(^{(69)}\)

The Logos, then, is not to be equated with God in any of its stages; nor is knowledge of the Logos exhaustive of the knowledge of God. Against the Stoics, Philo refuses to identify the immanent Logos with God, for God is not simply the Logos which enters into the four elements and gives them their genus. Again, Philo likens the arrival at the \textit{kosmos noetos} through the immanent logos to 'an abiding body distinguished from a shadow', or an 'artist arrived at through his works', but this \textit{kosmos noetos} is itself only an image of the true God, and consequently even though

\(^{(69)}\) Drummond, James, \textit{Philo Judaeus: or The Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion}, Vol.II, p.183
\(^{(70)}\) cf. Philo, 'On the Ten Commandments', xii
\(^{(71)}\) Philo, 'Allegories of the Sacred Laws', III, xxxiii
\(^{(72)}\) Ibid., III, xxxii; cf. Ibid., III, lxxiii
one may arrive at knowledge of this image, such knowledge is not exhaustive of the knowledge of God.

There is also a more perfect and more highly purified kind (of person) which has been initiated into the great mysteries, and which does not distinguish the cause from the things created as it would distinguish an abiding body from a shadow; but which, having emerged from all created objects, receives a clear and manifest notion of the great uncreated, so that it comprehends him through himself, and comprehends his shadow, too, so as to understand what it is, and his reason, too, and this universal world. This kind is that Moses, who speaks thus, "Show thyself to me; let me see thee so as to know thee," for do not thou be manifested to me through the medium of the heaven, or of the earth, or of water, or of air, or, in short, of anything whatever of created things, and let me not see thy appearance in any other thing, as in a looking glass, except in thee thyself, the true God.\(^\text{(73)}\)

... "God is not as man", but neither is he as heaven, nor as the world; for these species are endued with distinctive qualities, and they come under the perception of the outward senses. But he is not even comprehensible by the intellect, except merely as to his essence; for his existence, indeed, is a fact which we do comprehend concerning him; but beyond the fact of his existence, we can understand nothing.\(^\text{(74)}\)

The Logos doctrine in Philo tells us, then, that God is transcendent, but does it not also give us an answer

\(^{(73)}\) Philo, 'Allegories of the Sacred Laws', III, xxxiii
\(^{(74)}\) Philo, 'On the Unchangeableness of God', xiii
to the question: "To what extent is God removed from and other than the world?"

According to Philo, God is not a remote God, i.e. a God who wills that world be created and governed by an intermediary, being Himself unable to have relations with it. Rather, the Logos is an instrument used by God, through which God, Himself, creates, preserves and governs the world. In spite of Philo's insistence upon the distinction between God and the world, and between God and the Logos, this distinction is not one that prohibits God's relation with the world. Indeed, there is a likeness between God and the Logos and the world, simply because the Logos is the image of God's essence, and because the world bears a likeness to that image. Man and the world, as rational, are in some sense not unlike God. This is the positive element that Philo adopts and adapts from Stoic philosophy.

... God is himself the perfection, and completion, and boundary of happiness, partaking of nothing else by which he can be rendered better, but giving to every individual thing a portion of what is suited to it, from the fountain of good, namely, from himself; for the beautiful things in the world would never have been such as they are, if they had not been made after an archetypal pattern, which was really beautiful, the uncreate, and blessed, and imperishable model of all things (75).

(75) Philo, 'Of Cain and His Birth', xxv
Every man in regard of his intellect is connected with divine reason, being an impression of, or a fragment or a ray of that blessed nature. (76)

... men ... being a kind of copy of the powers of God, a visible image of his invisible nature, a created image of an uncreated and immortal original. (77)

This same point emerges in Philo's answer to a question which he, himself, raises.

Why is it that he (Moses) speaks as if of some other god, saying that he made man after the image of God, and not that he made him after his own image?

Very appropriately and without any falsehood was this oracular sentence uttered by God, for no mortal thing could have been formed on the similitude of the Supreme Father of the universe, but only after the pattern of the second deity, who is the Word of the supreme Being; since it is fitting that the rational soul of man should bear before it the type of the divine Word; since in his first Word God is superior to the most rational possible nature. But he who is superior to the Word holds his rank in a better and most singular pre-eminence, and how could the creature possibly exhibit a likeness of him in himself? Nevertheless he also wished to intimate this fact, that God does rightly and correctly require vengeance, in order to the defence of virtuous and consistent men, because such bear in themselves a familiar acquaintance with his Word, of which the human mind is the similitude and form. (78)

To be sure, the resemblance that men and the world bear to God is 'twice removed', i.e. it is the image of an image of God's Reason. Nevertheless, this likeness shows that

(76) Philo, Creation, 11
(77) Philo, 'Moses', II, xii
(78) Philo, 'Questions and Solutions in Genises', II, 62
Philo never puts forth an unbridgeable gulf between God and the world, for the logos of men and the logos of the world are akin to God inasmuch as creation is by and after the image of the Logos of God.

Furthermore, not only the world and men, but also the Law given to Moses bears a resemblance to God inasmuch as God created the Law in accordance with the same reason which lies behind and becomes immanent in the world. Philo likens God to city builders who:

... having first of all built and established their city in accordance with reason, have then adapted to this city which they have built, that constitution which they have considered the best adapted and most akin to it, and have confirmed this constitution by the giving of laws. (79)

Thus it is that Philo contends that God's law does not resemble Himself and reflect the arrangement of the universe simply by accident; rather, both the universe and God's law are given in the likeness of their Creator. Indeed, according to Philo, Moses wrote his history of creation to show:

First, that the same being was the father and creator of the world, and likewise the lawgiver of truth; secondly, that the man who adhered to these laws, and

(79) Philo, 'Moses', II, ix
clung closely to a connection with and obedience to nature, would live in a manner corresponding to the arrangement of the universe...(80)

Nor, according to Philo, is God remote from the world in the sense of being inactive. Against the Stoics, Philo contends that God did not simply start the universe on its course and then retire from dealing with it. Indeed, it is the doctrine of the Logos as God's instrument of providence that expresses God's continual relation with the world.

The fifth lesson that Moses teaches us is, that God exerts his providence for the benefit of the world. For it follows of necessity that the Creator must always care for that which he has created, just as parents do also care for their children(82)

Even though Philo states that rest is an appropriate attribute of God alone, he does not mean by rest the inaction of a remote God, for "... that which is by its nature energetic, that which is the cause of all things, can never desist from doing what is most excellent ..." (83)

(80) Philo, 'Moses', viii
(81) cf. Philo, 'Creation', ii
(82) Philo, 'Creation', lxi
(83) Philo, 'Of Cain and His Birth', xxvi
Thus, we conclude that not only does Philo's doctrine of the Logos preserve God's transcendence but that it also saves the notion of God from being identified with remoteness. Indeed, God transcends all the moments in the Logos, and knowledge of the Logos is not exhaustive of knowledge of God; but, at least, we can say that God is not unlike His Logos. We end this study of Philo's Logos doctrine by quoting Drummond's excellent summary of it, wherein he points out that, according to Philo, the Logos 'at once suggests and veils' God.

From first to last the Logos is the Thought of God, dwelling subjectively in the infinite Mind, planted out and made objective in the universe. The cosmos is a tissue of rational force, which images the beauty, the power, the goodness of its primeval fountain. The reason of man is this same rational force entering into consciousness, and held by each in proportion to the truth and variety of his thought; and to follow it is the law of righteous living. Each form which we can differentiate as a distinct species, each rule of conduct which we can treat as an injunction of reason, is itself a Logos, one of those innumerable thoughts or laws into which the universal Thought may, through self-reflection, be resolved. Thus, wherever we turn, these Words, which are really Works, of God confront us and lift our minds to that uniting and cosmic Thought which, though comprehending them, is itself dependent and tells us of that impenetrable Being, from whose inexhaustible fulness it comes, of whose perfections it is the shadow, and whose splendours, too dazzling for all but the purified intuitions of the highest souls, it at once suggests and veils(84).

(84) Drummond, op. cit., p.273
Chapter 13.

The Logos Doctrine and Gnosticism

Rudolf Bultmann rejects the contentions that the Logos doctrine in the Fourth Gospel derives primarily from either the Old Testament or from Greek philosophy. (1) In regard to the first contention, he admits that John was probably conscious of Genesis 1.1 when he penned or adopted the Prologue, but does not agree that the Johnannine 'Logos' should be identified simply with the Old Testament 'Word of God'. He points out that in the Old Testament 'Word' is never used alone, but always as 'the Word of God'. Further, The Word of God in both the Old Testament and Rabinnic writings--

...does not mean a concrete figure (neither a person nor a cosmic power or "hypostasis"), but the manifestation of God's power in a specific instance. (2) Nor, according to Bultmann is the title 'Logos' derived from Greek philosophy in general or from Stoic philosophy in particular, for any notion of the logos as the natural orderliness of the divine cosmos is quite foreign to the Fourth Gospel. (3)

(2) Ibid., p. 64.
(3) Ibid., p. 64.
The figure of the "Logos" is derived, rather, from a tradition of cosmological mythology which also exercised an influence upon Judaism, especially upon Philo. In the literature of the Old Testament and of Judaism there is a figure "Wisdom", which is a parallel to John's "Word". Both figures, "Word" and "Wisdom", appear side by side in Philo. In Gnosticism, which also influenced Philo, the figure "Logos" has not merely cosmological but also soteriological functions. It is within this sphere that the origin of the Johannine Logos lies. (4)

Bultmann is quite explicit and insistent that the Fourth Gospel's treatment of the Logos is to be seen in light of Gnostic redemption mythology.

The author of the Fourth Gospel takes the Gnostic myth of the redeemer, which provides him with the outline for his presentation: he puts Jesus' message into the frame of the thought-world of gnostic dualism of light and darkness, truth and falsehood. ... (5)

The most thorough-going attempt to restate the redemptive work of Jesus in Gnostic terms is to be found in the Fourth Gospel. (6)

Thus it is that we must now look at the Gnostic mythology of which, according to Bultmann, the Fourth Evangelist makes use. Bultmann says that although Gnosticism varied in its practices and mythology according to place and time it may generally be called 'a redemptive

(4) Ibid., p.64.
(6) Bultmann, Rudolf, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, p.197.
religion based on dualism. He also states the following common elements of most Gnostic myths. Man's true self which is a part of the divine light is conquered by powers of darkness before all time. This light taken from men is used by the demons as cohesive magnetic powers by which a world is created out of chaos and darkness. Men are thus conscious of being in an alien world, and indeed, of being imprisoned by it. So it is that they yearn for deliverance.

Redemption comes from the heavenly world. Once more a light-person sent by the highest god, indeed the son and "image" of the most high, comes down from the light-world bringing Gnosis. He "wakes" the sparks of light who have sunk into sleep or drunkenness and "reminds" them of their heavenly home. He teaches them concerning their superiority to the world and concerning the attitude they are to adopt toward the world. He dispenses the sacraments by which they are to purify themselves and fan back to life their quenched light-power or at least strengthen its weakened state—by which, in other words, they are "reborn". He teaches them about the heavenly journey... past the demonic watchmen of the starry spheres. And going ahead he prepares the way for them, the way which he, the redeemer himself, must also take to be redeemed. For here on earth he does not appear in divine form, but appears disguised in the garment of earthly beings so as not to be recognized by the demons. In so appearing, he takes upon himself the toil and misery of earthly existence and has to endure contempt and persecution until he takes his leave and is elevated to the world of light. (8)

The Redeemer's 'own' follow him, when at death their true

(7) Ibid., pp.163f.
selves, their 'sparks of the divine', are released from the prison of their bodies. When all the sparks of light are assembled in heaven, the world will return to its original chaos. "The darkness is left to itself, and that is the judgement". (9)

Bultmann goes on to point out how Jesus is depicted in Gnostic mythological terms.

Here Jesus is the pre-existent Son of God, the Word who exists with him from all eternity. He is sent from God, sent into the world, as its light, to give sight to the blind and to blind those who see (John 9.39). He is not only the light, but also the life and the truth. As the agent of revelation, he brings all these blessings and calls to him his 'own', those who are 'of the truth'. After accomplishing his Father's mission, he is exalted from the earth and returns to heaven to prepare a way for his own, that they may join him in the heavenly mansions. Indeed, he is himself the 'way'(14.6). (10)

It must be admitted that Bultmann's contention that the Fourth Evangelist's framework of presentation came from Gnostic mythology has not been widely accepted. F. C. Burkitt denies this dependence outright and argues for a reverse dependence, i.e. that the Gnostic redemption

(9) Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, p.164.
(10) Ibid., pp.197f.
mythology, especially as present in Mandaism, leans upon (11) Christian thought. C. H. Dodd argues along the same (12) lines and largely follows the results of Burkitt's investi- (13) gation. Both Burkitt and Dodd base their arguments against Bultmann's position upon the rejection of the idea that Mandaism is a Gnostic cult reverencing John the Baptist and upon the lack of proof that Mandaism precedes the writing of the Fourth Gospel, whereas the Mandaean figure of Enosh-uthra does appear to resemble the Marcionite Jesus.

On the other hand, it seems to us that neither Burkitt nor Dodd disprove Bultmann's contention. Burkitt offers no direct refutation but merely contents himself with presenting an alternative connection between Gnosti- (14) cism and Christianity. Further, his own position appears defective inasmuch as he seems to be entirely ignorant of (or at least indifferent to) the work of form critics. Nor does Dodd really refute the contention of Bultmann, since the latter's position does not stand or fall upon the conclusions regarding the relation of Mandaism and the

(11) Burkitt, F. C., Church and Gnosis: A Study of Christian Thought in the Second Century, pp.100-120.
(13) Ibid., pp.126f.
Fourth Gospel. Even if it be granted that Mandaism is contemporary with or later than the Fourth Gospel, such an admission does not preclude the existence of earlier highly developed Gnostic redemptive myths. Indeed, it would be most surprising to discover a system such as Mandaism without a background similar to that described by Bultmann. In this connection, it is significant that Dodd argues at length and makes out a strong case concerning the dependence of Mandaism upon Christianity, but says very little about Bultmann's claim that "the kernel of Mandaism is an ancient, pre-Christian mystery and myth of Iranian origin".

In support of Bultmann's position, we are left with two pointing factors—(1) Persian dualistic mythology which certainly pre-dates the Fourth Gospel, and (2) figures with soteriological and revelatory functions which are generally accepted as having exerted an influence upon Jewish apocalyptic writings. Thus, even though the Mandaean literature may be dated well after the Fourth Gospel, this does not prove that all parts of Mandaism are of this late date. Certainly, this is no proof of the non-existence of other earlier Gnostic systems, such as appear to be highly possible if we are adequately to account for both later

(15) Dodd, op. cit., pp. 128f.
Gnosticism and earlier Persian dualism.

Indeed, Bultmann's presupposing the existence of Gnostic myths which precede the rise of post-Christian Mandaism has been borne out by the recent discoveries at Nag Hammadi. W. C. van Unnik, in his book, Newly Discovered Gnostic Writings, summarizes and quotes from the Gospel of Truth showing how this 'gospel' bears a close resemblance both to the Fourth Gospel and to the framework of Gnostic redemptive mythology as outlined by Bultmann.

What it (the Gospel of Truth) does is to meditate upon the necessity of redemption and its modus operandi. (17)

Redemption is necessitated by men's succumbing to Error which results in their being imprisoned in the world of strife and jealousy wherein they are ignorant of the Father. Thus, the redeemer comes in bodily form, confounds Error and gives men gnosis, i.e. the knowledge of their true selves and of the Father. Further, the Gospel of Truth identifies the Redeemer with the Logos, and contains a Logos hymn which speaks of the appearance and importance of the Logos Redeemer.

(17) Ibid., p. 60.
(18) Ibid., pp. 65ff.
The subject of this composition is the work of 'the redemption of those who knew not the Father' (pp. 16f.): and that is why the Logos is also called Redeemer. (19)

His (God's) Wisdom contemplates the Logos, His intent gives him expression, His knowing is made manifest, His ... is a garland upon him, His joy is mingled in him, His majesty is exalted in him, His image has he revealed, His rest has he enclosed within him, His love is embodied in him, His faithfulness has encompassed him; So goes forth the Logos (the Word) of the Father into the universe, as fruit of his heart, and expression of his will (pp. 23f.) (20)

Now, the Gospel of Truth is obviously post-Christian since it clearly contains references to Jesus even though it refers to him from a gnostic viewpoint, but it is considerably earlier than the Mandaean literature (van Unnik dates it around 140 A.D.). Thus, its significance is not that it provides an antecedent of Christianity but that it gives us a picture of a highly developed gnostic system much earlier than that of Mandaism, and this should "...make us cautious about drawing so freely on the Manichean and Mandaean sources..." (22) Further, van Unnik judges that as

(19) Ibid., pp. 64f.
(20) Ibid., p. 63
(21) Ibid., p. 20
(22) Ibid., p. 93
regards the idea of *gnosis*, upon which according to Bultmann both Paul and John leaned so heavily, we no longer need "to resort to purely hypothetical reconstruction--we have knowledge of a whole mass of relevant facts". (23)

However, another student of recently discovered Gnostic literature is not so easily disposed to defend Bultmann's position. R. McL. Wilson judges:

The 'Gnostic Redemption Myth' is, however, largely a scholar's reconstruction, and it has not been satisfactorily shown that such a myth existed in pre-Christian times. (24)

Now, it is true that recent discoveries do not show that the Redeemer-myth pre-dates Christianity (although Dorese believes that pre-Christian writings are to be found among the Nag Hammadi find), but the new finds do give some support to the contention that we must pre-suppose an early period of Gnosticism if we are to account for the later highly developed systems as in Mandaism and the Gospel of Truth. Of course, Christian theology aided the development of the Gnostic Logos-Redeemer found in the Gospel of Truth, but again it would appear that some Gnostic system independent of Christianity must be assumed to explain the

(23) Ibid., p. 92.
(25) van Unnik, op. cit., p. 20.
ences of the Gospel of Truth from the Fourth Gospel. Even Wilson admits that Gnosticism underwent a 'gradual process of growth and development'.

We may ... distinguish three main stages: a pre-gnostic, to which may be assigned the various trends of Hellenistic syncretism, including Philo and the Dead Sea Scrolls; a Gnostic proper, represented by the sects of the second century; and the later developments in Manicheism, Mandeism, and other similar movements. (27)

Thus, we conclude that, although neither Bultmann nor his critics are able to prove their claims satisfactorily, recent Gnostic research tends to support Bultmann's position rather than to repudiate it, and it would appear that Bultmann is, at least, as justified in saying:

The thought of the incarnation of the redeemer is not one which has penetrated from Christianity into gnosis, but is originally gnostic. (28)

as Burkitt is in saying:

'The Gnosis', to use the fashionable modern term, does not precede Christianity but is a new formulation of Christianity .... (29)

Although Bultmann is quite clear in contending that the

(26) Wilson, op. cit., p. 97.
(27) Ibid., pp. 97f.
(28) Bultmann, Rudolf, Das Evangelium des Johannes, p. 10
(29) Burkitt, op. cit., p. 57.
framework for presenting Jesus as the Logos was taken by the Fourth Evangelist from Gnostic mythology, he is not nearly so clear in demonstrating what the Logos means for St. John. In order to try to understand this meaning, we must take two lines of inquiry. First, we ask why the Fourth Evangelist makes use of the Gnostic redemption myth. Bultmann replies that he does so in order to historize the eschatological event, i.e. to bring the eschatological event more radically on to the plane of history.

It is easy to see why the Christian Church took over these ideas from the Gnostic redemption myth. The eschatological event was already being realized in the present. This sense of being the eschatological community, of being already raised from this world by the grace of God, of deliverance from its powers, could not be adequately conveyed to the Hellenistic world in terms of the Jewish eschatological hope, which looked for redemption in the future. The eschatological event must be understood as a process already inaugurated with the coming of Jesus, or with his death and Resurrection, and the Gnostic redemption myth lay ready to hand as vehicle for its expression. (31)

Bultmann, himself, points out the need for our second line of inquiry.

Just because John makes use of the Gnostic Redeemer-myth for his picture of the figure and

(31) Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, p.198.
activity of Jesus, a demarcation of his own position from that of Gnosticism is particularly incumbent upon him. (32)

Bultmann then goes on to explain that the main divergence of the Fourth Gospel from Gnostic mythology lies in the absence in the former of the cosmological motifs which are so prominent in the latter. This difference has its basis in the two different concepts of creation. For Gnosticism, the world is of demonic origin, is opposed to the world of light, and is the prison of man's true self. Thus, there is a cosmological dualism present in Gnosticism. So also in the Fourth Gospel, there is a dualism expressed in terms of 'darkness and light', but this division is not the result of creation; rather, it is more properly called a 'dualism of decision'. Here,

... the world is the creation of the gracious God, the Father of Jesus Christ; the creating and saving God are one and the same. That hostility we have spoken of does not have its origin in a demonic creative power, but in man's own evil will, in his rebellion against God so that now God's creation inevitably confronts him as a destructive power. (35)

However, in spite of the difference between Gnostic

(33) Ibid., p.13.
(34) Ibid., p.17.
(35) Bultmann, Essays Philosophical and Theological, pp.148f.
and Johannine dualism, they agree that man's redemption does not arise in the world but that it must come from outside of it.

In the eyes of Old Testament man, the world—like man—was God's creation, and man perceived God's gifts and God's role in the things and occurrences in the world. He felt at home in the world. (36) In the idea of redemption as total liberation from the world, the Christian faith is more akin to gnosticism than to the Old Testament. (37)

Again, as regards men and their salvation both Gnosticism and the Fourth Gospel assert a dualism. In Gnostic theory,

All men are fundamentally endowed with the divine spark. The preaching of conversion is directed to all. Yet in practice, mankind is divided into two classes, the pneumatic and the 'hylic' (sometimes we find a middle class, the 'psychic'), according as to whether they have the pneuma or spark of life alive in them or not, or whether they do have it at all. (38)

But, again Johannine dualism differs from that of Gnosticism, for in Johannine thought the division of mankind into two groups is not determined by nature (physis), but by decision.

The "blind" and the "seeing", accordingly, are not two groups that were already present and demonstrable before the light's coming. Now, and not before, the separation between them takes place in that each one is asked whether he chooses

(36) Ibid., p.147.
(37) Ibid., p.149.
(38) Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, p.170.
to belong to one group or the other -- whether he is willing to acknowledge his blindness and be freed from it or whether he wants to deny it and persist in it. (39)

Each man is, or once was, confronted with deciding for or against God; and he is confronted anew with this decision by the revelation of God in Jesus. The cosmological dualism of Gnosticism has become a dualism of decision. (40)

There is one further contrast between Gnostic and Johannine expression which we must note in our attempt to arrive at the Johannine meaning of the 'Word'. According to Gnostic redemptive myths the Redeemer instructs his own concerning the 'way', which instruction gives special importance to knowledge of the kosmos and secret passwords. However, according to Bultmann, in the Fourth Gospel the Revealer does not appear as

... a mystagogue communicating teachings, formulas, and rites as if he himself were only a means to an end who could sink into unimportance to any who had received his "Gnosis". ... he has imparted no information about God at all, any more than he has brought instruction about the origin of the world and the fate of the self. He does not communicate anything, but calls men to himself. (41)

Bultmann says that both Jesus works and his words are

(41) Ibid., p. 41.
identical to himself. By this he means that, in the Fourth Gospel, Jesus' discourses are almost exclusively concerned with his own person. He does not perform works or prove himself to be divine in order to give credence to his teaching. Rather, his words are his claims to be the Son of God. He not only claims to teach the way, the truth, and to give life; he claims to be the way and the truth and the life. One's decision is not simply whether or not to accept his teaching, but whether or not to accept Him. He is the same as His words. Thus, Bultmann exclaims,

No wonder, then, that the evangelist can confer upon him for his pre-existent period the mythological title: Word (Logos)?

Still, we may wish to ask what is revealed. To this question Bultmann answers that the Fourth Gospel differs from Gnosticism in that for John, Jesus is not a transparent human being through whom the Deity shines. On the contrary, just as Jesus' words are 'hard' and can be accepted only in faith, so Jesus Himself can be seen to be the Son of God only by faith. If we go on to ask what then does the man of faith see revealed in Jesus, Bultmann again answers that since Jesus is identical to his words, His life and words only

(42) Ibid., pp. 61-65.
(43) Ibid., pp. 63 ff.
(44) Ibid., p. 64.
(45) Ibid., p. 68.
reveal Himself.

Thus it turns out in the end that Jesus as the Revealer of God reveals nothing but that he is the Revealer. (46)

In the Gnostic myth whose language John uses as his means of expression, it suffices that the Revelation consists of nothing more than the bare fact of it (its Dass) -- i.e., the proposition that the Revealer has come and gone and has been re-exalted. For even though Gnosticism speaks at length in cosmogonic and soteriological speculations about the content of the Revelation, nevertheless the decisive thing for it is the bare fact of Revelation ... since John eliminates from the myth its cosmological presuppositions, since he does not speak of the "nature" common to the Redeemer and the redeemed or of the fate of human "selves", he appears to retain in his book only the empty fact of the Revelation ... This fact, however, does not remain empty. For the Revelation is represented as the shattering and negating of all human self-assertion and all human norms and evaluations. And, precisely by virtue of being such negation, the Revelation is the affirmation and fulfilment of human longing for life, for true reality. (47)

This, then, is what Bultmann understands by the Johannine treatment of the incarnate Logos; but what of the 'Word' that was 'in the beginning with God'? 

Jesus is not presented in literal seriousness as a pre-existent divine being who came in human form to earth to reveal unprecedented secrets. Rather,

(46) Ibid., p.66.
(47) Ibid., pp.66-68.
the mythological terminology is intended to express the absolute decisive significance of his work -- the mythological notion of pre-existence is made to serve the idea of the Revelation. His word does not arise from the sphere of human observation and thought, but comes from beyond. (48)

Let us see, then, how we can understand the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel in light of Bultmann's teaching concerning Gnostic influences. Verses 1-4, where the pre-existence of the Logos and its relation to God is treated, simply means that the Word, i.e. Jesus Himself and His teachings, are of ultimate significance for men. Verse 10 would seem to be used apologetically in order to identify the Creative Word with the person of whom John goes on to speak in terms of revelation and soteriology. Verses 5, 9, and 14 point out that this Word comes into the world. Its coming calls men to decision for or against God and establishes John's dualism of decision (verses 11, 12, and 13). The Word truly becomes flesh (verse 14). The life of Jesus is not transparent, i.e. Deity is not obvious. His glory is seen only by faith (verse 14). Those of faith are His own (verses 12 and 13), and receive no esoteric teachings but accept and overcome the scandal of the Incarnation.

(48) Ibid., p.62.
There is a sense in which Bultmann's presentation of the Fourth Evangelist's message of salvation appears as salvation by gnosis, i.e. a sense in which one is saved by knowledge, by the revelation of the Redeemer, inasmuch as this revelation shatters all of men's own positions and evaluations and calls them to decision. This shattering knowledge is not a gnosis that gives esoteric information about the way to achieve salvation, but it is a gnosis that, in shattering their security, makes men free to accept salvation. Only by being the negation of human self-assertion can such revelation be "the affirmation and fulfilment of human longing for life, for true reality".

We may further see that Bultmann's presentation of the Fourth Evangelist's logos doctrine in terms of Gnostic redemption mythology points to an element found in the Fourth Gospel which is missing in the Logos doctrine of Philo, viz. the soteriological and revelatory functions of the Logos. As we have already noted Philo concentrates primarily on the Logos as creator and preserver of the world, whereas St. John's Logos doctrine, whether or not it is as dependent upon Gnostic redemption mythology as Bultmann contends, contains clear elements of soteriology and revelation. In this respect the Fourth Gospel demonstrates a departure from Philonic influence and an affinity to Gnosticism or to the Jewish figure of Wisdom.
Bultmann's whole presentation deals with the Logos doctrine in such a way as to develop its meaning for men. He does not touch on the relation of the Logos to God. Therefore, if we ask how does Bultmann's treatment of the Logos doctrine affect the notion of God's transcendence, we are given little help. He interprets St. John's use of Gnostic myths by demythologizing them, by interpreting them in terms of human existence. For example, he is not concerned about the Word's pre-existence; he wishes only to say what this means for us -- that the Word is of absolute decisive significance.

Still, in his interpretation of St. John's Logos doctrine, Bultmann does not eliminate all mythological statements, as may be seen by posing the following questions. What does it mean to say that the Word comes from beyond? The bare fact of the revelation may well be the coming and going of the Revealer, but where does he come from and where does he go to? If this only means 'the decisive significance of the Word', then why does Bultmann use mythological speech at all? Again, he says that Christianity agrees with Gnosticism that redemption, even redemption by Gnosis, must come from outside the world and that redemption is out of the world. Does not such a view go beyond a strictly human question? Does it not imply a relation that cannot be exhausted by description in terms of human existence? Can such description do justice to the notion of a transcendent God who has relations with the
world that he transcends? All of these questions lead us to ask a more embracing question—"What is an act of God?" "Does an act of God necessarily imply something coming from 'beyond' or 'outside of the world'? We do not purpose to discuss this point here, but we may note that Bultmann's treatment of the Fourth Evangelist's Logos doctrine serves to point out the necessity of our considering the significance of the notion of an act of God for the doctrine of God's transcendence when we reach our concluding chapter.
Now that we have examined the various meanings that lie (or may lie) behind the Fourth Evangelist's Logos doctrine, we must try to see what he means to convey by it. We contend that the writer of the Fourth Gospel makes use of all four backgrounds. We have seen that an intelligible understanding can be given most of the Prologue's logos doctrine in terms of the Old Testament concept of the 'Word of the Lord', and we concluded that the Logos doctrine of the Prologue expresses this active meaning of the logos prophorikos, i.e. the idea of God's creative Word which expresses His will.

This thought (God's Logos) ... is not merely a meaning or plan visible in the universe; it is also the creative power by which the universe came into being and is sustained .... It is God's power in action as well as His thought. This is the Hebraic element in Philo's thought, and it is stronger in John's.(1)

Again, in the section dealing with the Old Testament figure of Wisdom, we saw the similarities Wisdom bears both to Philo's figure of the Logos and to that of the Fourth Evangelist. We especially noted the closeness of thought concerning the Wisdom of God as an hypostasis and the Being

(1) Dodd, C. H., The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.277
(2) Ibid., p.277
of the Logos, concerning the creative functions of Wisdom and of the Logos, and concerning the subordination of both figures to God.

We further observed in the Gnostic redemptive myth a similarity between the Gnostic 'Redeemer', and the Logos of the Fourth Gospel. Particular points of similarity involved the notions of soteriology and revelation.

However, our most detailed study concerned the teaching of Philo. This was so because Philo took over and enlarged the teachings concerning 'Wisdom' and 'the Word of the Lord', and may even have been familiar with the Gnostic mythology of redemption. Our treatment of the ideas of Wisdom, Word of the Lord, and Gnosticism have shown, then, the similarities and dissimilarities each of these three figures bears to the Logos doctrine of Philo, and what we purpose to do now is demonstrate points of connection between the Philonic Logos doctrine and that of the Fourth Gospel. We begin by noting five points of similarity which C. H. Dodd calls to our attention - (1) the existence of the Logos in the beginning, (2) the role of the Logos in creation, (3) the Logos as the mediator of prayer between man and God, (4) the Logos as the Revealer of God, and (5) the Logos as the Truth
(alethinon in St. John and 'real as distinguished from

(3) phenomenal' in Philo).

Dodd also cites Philonic parallels to the following statements of the Prologue. (1) 'In the beginning was the Word' (cf. De Opif. 17.24), (2) 'the Word was with God' (cf. Quod Deus, 31), (3) 'the Word was God' (cf. De Somn. 1.229-30), (4) 'all things were made by Him' (cf. De Cher. 127), (5) 'In Him was life' (cf. De Fuga. 97; De post 68-69), (6) 'The life was the light of men' (cf. De Somn. 1.75; De Opif. 33; De Conf. 60-63), (7) 'to all who received him he gave power to become children of God' (cf. De Conf. 145-7), (8) 'No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made Him known. (cf. De Conf. 97).

However, parallel statements do not demonstrate affinity so strongly as does similarity of meaning between the two contents, and it is in his interpretation of the Prologue that Dodd argues most convincingly that it should be read in the light of Philonic teaching. We have seen that Dodd rejects the simple explanation of the Prologue's figure of

(3) Dodd, C. H., The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, pp.71f.
(4) Ibid., pp.276f.
the Logos as based entirely upon Old Testament thought, inasmuch as Old Testament thought fails to provide an adequate preparation for the phrases - 'the Word was God' (5) and 'the Word became flesh'. As regards the Jewish idea of the 'Word of the Lord', Dodd judges:

... to think of a 'word' in anything like the Old Testament sense of the term, being incarnated, is so extremely difficult that we are justified in raising the question whether some other meaning of logos would not ease the matter. The statement that the Word was God, if 'word' be taken in its Old Testament sense is equally difficult; and even if for 'word' we understand 'Torah' (which would be legitimate) the difficulty is not greatly relieved. In a Jewish milieu, determined by reference to the Old Testament, the statement that the Torah is God could scarcely find a home. (6)

Further, even though he admits that the contributions of the Wisdom Writers "provide a kind of matrix in which the idea of incarnation might be shaped", Dodd argues that we are far from anything that could justify the assertion that the Word was God. Dodd agrees that in the ninth chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon the transition from God to Wisdom is almost imperceptible, but he adds:

At the same time, though Wisdom is the eikon of God, the apaugasma of eternal light, and so forth, (8) such a statement as Theos en o sophia is unthinkable.

(6) Ibid., p. 273
(7) Ibid., p. 275
(8) Ibid., p. 275, note 1
On the other hand, as we saw in an earlier chapter, Philo distinguishes between God's younger son, the kosmos aisthetos and God's elder son, the kosmos noetos. Further, we pointed out that, according to Philo, in the act of creation God sent out his younger son, keeping his elder one 'by Him'. Dodd argues that this 'elder son' is what John means by the Word which was 'in the beginning with God'. To call this Word Theos does make sense, Dodd contends, for "... the term Theos is properly applied to the Philonic logos, while the term o Theos is reserved for the Fons deitatis (pege tou logou)". Dodd points out that the Torah, or Word or Wisdom might be called 'divine' (Theou or Theios), but that it is most improbable that they would be termed Theos; whereas the Philonic interpretation of the first difficult phrase renders it meaningful.

Dodd admits that no definite antecedent to the second difficult phrase, 'the Word became flesh', can be found in either Jewish or Philonic teaching. He also admits that 'Wisdom' which 'passes into men's souls making them friends of God' may be a possible source, but his own opinion is that

(9) Dodd, C. H., The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.280
(10) Ibid., p.280
the Philonic Logos is as good a preparation for this assertion as any.

... it seems that the idea of a divine hypostasis, which is the very thought of God, embodying itself, as it were, in this visible world, and so in a sense 'becoming' the life which is the reality of the universe and the light of men is a fitting subject for the proposition ο λόγος sarks egeneto, which states that this same hypostasis now embodied itself in a human individual, and so 'became flesh'?[11]

Dodd's position, then, is that except for the assertion of the Word's becoming flesh, the Prologue is intelligible when the Logos therein is understood as bearing a 'meaning similar to that which it bears in Stoicism as modified by Philo'. Indeed, Dodd strongly asserts:

I conclude that the substance of a Logos-doctrine similar to that of Philo is present all through the gospel, and that the use of the actual term logos in the Prologue, in a sense corresponding to that doctrine, though it is unparalleled in the rest of the gospel, falls readily into place.[13]

This is the conclusion which we also support. Philo makes a synthesis of Jewish and Hellenistic thought. He draws upon

(11) Dodd, C. H., The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.281
(12) Ibid., p.280
(13) Ibid., p.279
the Jewish ideas of Wisdom, Word and Creation, and upon the philosophical systems of Stoicism and Platonism. Thus it is that we find present in the Prologue many of the ideas of all of these sources, but they take on their clearest understanding when interpreted in the light of the system of Philo or, at least, one very much like it.

Nothing can be more misleading than to enquire whether the Johannine Logos is the Word of the Lord familiar in the Old Testament, or the Philonic Logos, who is spoken of as a "second God"; for Philo had himself effected the combination of the Old Testament "Word" with the Stoic "Logos" (14).

Again, we need not contend for a literary dependence between the author of the Prologue and Philo. Dodd is content to argue for a Philonic influence that would be perceptible to any one influenced by the thought of Hellenistic Judaism direct or at a remove. In the same vein, William Sanday, after his investigation of the relation of Philonic ideas to those of St. John in which he noted five major points of comparison but found an absence of Philonic 'catchwords', concludes:

(14) Temple, William, Readings in St. John's Gospel, (First Series: Chapters I-XII), p.4
(15) Dodd, op. cit., p.277
(16) Sanday, William, The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel, pp.189-192
If we ask ourselves whether they (parallels between Philo and St. John) necessarily imply literary dependence, I think we should have to answer in the negative.\(^{17}\)

I believe that there is a connexion between Greek, or Hellenistic, speculation and the Fourth Gospel. But I can conceive of this best through the media of personal intercourse and controversy.\(^{18}\)

Having noted, then, the meanings which lie behind the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, let us now see what is meant by this doctrine in the Fourth Gospel itself. The Greek term *logos* has what has been called a 'fortunate ambiguity', i.e. it combines the meanings of *logos *endiathetos and *logos* prophorikos.\(^{19}\) We have seen that the *logos* endiathetos conveys the Stoic meaning of the reason that lies behind the world just as reason lies behind one's words of speech. Thus, the Prologue's Logos doctrine seeks to claim for Jesus the indentification with the reason pervading the universe and giving purpose and reality to it. At the same time, the Johannine Logos conveys the meaning attached to the notion of *logos* prophorikos, i.e. the idea of an uttered word. This,

\(^{17}\) Sanday, William, *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, p.191

\(^{18}\) Ibid., p.198

\(^{19}\) Dodd, op. cit., p.263
in cosmological thought, refers to the activity of God, the creative nature of God. R. H. Lightfoot has expressed this point as follows:

The importance of this word (Logos) for his (St. John's) purpose is that in the Greek language it means both reason, i.e. something thought, something existing in the mind, and also speech, something directed outward.

Philo most certainly attached both meanings to the term logos when he spoke of God's Logos as (1) the kosmos noetos, and as (2) the instrument of creation, as the 'maker' of particular things; and we need not doubt that St. John also attaches both meanings to his use of the term. Jesus as the Logos is the Reason behind the universe (with God in the beginning) and the instrument of creation (all things were made by Him). Here, we see St. John making use of Philo's synthesis of the Greek and Jewish elements which lie behind the term logos.

Let us now ask why the Fourth Evangelist makes use of the Logos doctrine. Is it simply an apologetic device or is there a deeper, more essential, connection between Jesus and the Logos? Lightfoot appears to see the Logos doctrine in St.

(20) Lightfoot, R. H., St. John's Gospel: A Commentary, p.51
John's Gospel as a 'point of contact' with non-Christians.

It is noticeable that St. John does not explain the word 'Logos'; clearly he assumes that his readers will understand the meaning which he wishes to convey by using it; but as a result of its diverse origin, the word would no doubt convey different shades of meaning to different readers.(21)

Such a statement might seem to mean that St. John's use of the Logos doctrine was simply to gain a hearing from people who would attach some shade of meaning to the term logos. But we may wonder if this is all that can be said for St. John's Logos doctrine. Indeed, Lightfoot himself appears to suggest a more profound connection when he says: "Rightly understood, the Lord's ministry is, as it were, the relations, written small, of the Logos with mankind." (22)

Dodd makes this same point in his discussion concerning which verses of the Prologue refer to Jesus and which refer to the pre-existent Logos. He examines each verse in regard to both possible referents and finds that the answer is not one of extension, e.g. verses 1-4 and 9-13 refer to the cosmical Logos while verses 5-8 and 14ff. refer to the incarnate Logos; rather he finds that the meaning of the Prologue is to be

---

(22) Ibid., p.81
understood in terms of depth. There are two levels to each idea, one referring to the cosmical Logos and one to the incarnate Logos.

The Logos became the sarks or human nature which He bore. The life of Jesus is the history of the Logos, as incarnate, and this life must be, upon the stage of limited time, the same thing as the history of the Logos in perpetual relations with man and the world. Thus not only verses 11-13, but the whole passage from verse 4, is at once an account of the relations of the Logos with the world, and an account of the ministry of Jesus Christ, which in every essential particular reproduces those relations .... The events of the life of Jesus are semeia, in the last resort, just because in them the Logos became flesh. The gospel is a record of a life which expresses the eternal thought of God, the meaning of the universe. (24)

Furthermore, according to both E. F. Scott and Dodd, this identification of Jesus with the Logos, is a matter of recognition and not simply of contrivance.

The logos doctrine as John accepted it was only an attempt ... to define by reason a truth which he had apprehended by faith. (25)

The fact that many scholars consider the Prologue to be of a different authorship than the body of the Fourth Gospel does

(23) Dodd, op. cit., p.283
(24) Ibid., p.284
not greatly concern us here. Nor would it matter very much if the Prologue were penned and added after the rest of the Gospel. One point that most scholars agree upon is that the ideas in the Prologue reappear in the body of the Gospel, though admittedly not under the word *logos*.

We might put it thus, that the Prologue is an account of the life of Jesus under the form of a description of the eternal Logos in its relation with the world and with man, and the rest of the Gospel an account of the Logos under the form of a record of the life of Jesus; and the proposition *o logos sarks egeneto* binds the two together, being at the same time the final relation of the Logos to man and his world, and a summary of the significance of the life of Jesus (26).

The similarity of the Prologue's Logos doctrine to the account of the life of Jesus is due to recognition rather than contrivance, we have said. The Evangelist started with Jesus and recognized in him the meaning of the whole universe, i.e. recognized that in this man was the Logos incarnate. The Evangelist says, in effect, "let us assume that the cosmos exhibits a divine meaning which constitutes its reality. I will tell you what that meaning is: it was embodied in the life of Jesus, which I will now describe". If, as may be the

(26) Dodd, op. cit., p.285
(27) Ibid., p.285
case, the Prologue, whether it be penned by the Fourth Evangelist or someone else, was added after the body of the Gospel, then the case for contending that the depiction of Jesus in terms of the Logos doctrine is a result of recognition rather than contrivance becomes even stronger, for then it would be impossible to accuse the Fourth Evangelist of deliberately colouring the life of Jesus simply for apologetic purposes. On the contrary, it would offer strong proof that he recognized in Jesus the Logos 'written small', and that he sought to share this recognition by means of the Logos doctrine.

Now, that such a recognition can only take place in faith we may grant. We may also say with Bultmann that this recognition means that Jesus is of ultimate significance for us. Indeed, as early as 1876, Godet seems to make this very point when he says:

... it is easy to understand why John has placed this prologue at the head of his narrative. Faith is not faith, that is to say, absolute or without after-thought, unless it has for its object that beyond which it is impossible to go(28)

However, does not the Fourth Evangelist say more than Bultmann when the latter allows only that Jesus reveals that he

is the revealer and that he is of ultimate significance for
men, calling them to decide for or against his claim to be the
final, full revealer? If what we have been saying is true, does
not the Fourth Evangelist say that the revealer, who is indeed
ultimate and who evokes decision, is the Logos of God? Does
he not tell us something of Jesus— that the Jesus in history
is the pre-existent Logos 'written small'? Does this not mean
that just as the life of Christ illumines the Prologue's doctrine
of the Logos, so does the Prologue shed light upon the meaning
of the life of Christ and give one the key whereby to understand
the revelation of Christ as perceived by the Fourth Evangelist,
simply because the revelation is, indeed, identical to the
revealer?

St. John's teaching is that ... He who was the agent
in creation and sustains and upholds the universe in
being (cf. Col. 1:17), by Himself becoming part of His
creation, showed what is the purpose and what are the
possibilities of this realm or order of 'flesh', which
should be but has not been subject to its Maker....
Nor is it only or chiefly a matter of showing. Through
His incarnation and its results He will Himself enable
those who, like Himself, are 'in the flesh' to realize
this purpose and these possibilities.(29)

(29) Lightfoot, op. cit., p. 84
If we answer the above questions affirmatively then what the Logos doctrine of the Prologue expresses in philosophical and cosmological terms, and what the Logos doctrine in the body of the Gospel manifests in the life of Jesus gives some content to God's self-revelation, and it is to one specific area of this content that we now turn, viz., the meaning of the Logos doctrine for the idea of God's transcendence.

We have seen that in all the antecedents to the Logos doctrine there is an insistence upon God's transcendence. The hypostatized 'Word' or 'Wisdom' is always God's Word and God's Wisdom; they are not to be considered equal to God nor a substitute for Him. Further, in Philo, the Logos is considered to be a creation of God, His son, and not the 'true God' Himself. Thus, we may conclude, quite fairly and straightforwardly, that if the Logos of the Fourth Gospel bears the meaning of its foreshadowing counterparts then God transcends the Logos. But this answer is not fully adequate, for we may well believe that the Fourth Gospel makes a new assertion, thereby giving a new content to the term Logos. Most New Testament scholars do, indeed, contend that St. John makes an unprecedented and formative assertion when he says, "the Word became flesh."
... the originality of the Evangelist consists in uniting the Christ of history with the idea of the Logos .... (Sanday)60)

That which is essential to John's Logos has no place and no meaning in Philo's - namely, its connection with the history of salvation in the Old Testament, and its revelation in the incarnation. Incarnation is an impossible thought for the Logos of Philo. (C. E. Luthardt)51)

For Philo, as for Plato, the principle of evil is matter; and hence he cannot think of making the Logos appear on the earth in a bodily form. (Godet)32)

This event (the incarnation) was the inclosing of the universal Logos in a simple divine human personality; and it was precisely this synthesis of the individual with the universal which gave to Christianity the dynamic which enabled it to overcome the world, and to win the religious allegiance of mankind. (Lightfoot)33)

(the word became flesh) ... is an entirely fresh expression for a fact ex hypothesi unprecedented and unique ...(34) (Dodd)

... it would be idle to look for any real anticipation of the Johannine doctrine of incarnation .... (Dodd)35)

(30) Sanday, op. cit., p.193
(32) Godet, op. cit., p.389
(33) Lightfoot, op. cit., p.56
(34) Dodd, op. cit., p.273
(35) Ibid., p.275
Now, it may be that the idea of incarnation does have a foreshadowing in the antecedents of Gnostic redemptive mythology, as Bultmann argues. But even if this be granted, does this change the newness of Johannine thought, i.e. that what 'came' was the Logos of God? The fact of a redeemer's coming from the heavenly world to reveal and to save may well be known prior to the writing of the Prologue, but what we are contending for here is the new content of such a soteriological and revelatory figure, i.e. the identification of the 'redeemer' with the Logos of God. What we now wish to know is whether or not the incarnation of the Logos gives a content to the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel that is not found in the teachings of Judaism and Hellenism. To such an inquiry, I think we must say yes. Certainly the Logos as God's Reason, as the kosmos noetos could never become incarnate in Philo's system. It is just for this reason that he distinguishes the immanent Logos from the Logos of the first two stages. Further, we have seen that the idea of a particular embodiment of God's Wisdom or Word is most improbable in the Jewish frame of reference. Therefore, whatever we say about St. John's Logos, we must say that it is of a nature which allows its incarnation. But does this necessitate a change in the notion of God's transcendence?
It would certainly appear to delimit God's transcendence when we regard claims that the only Son reveals the Father, that He is one with the Father, and that whoever sees Him sees the Father. However, these claims must be set beside statements where Jesus attributes to the Father a degree of greatness not possessed by himself. Therefore, in order to answer this question we refer again to the Prologue where the relations of Jesus and the Father are expressed philosophically.

The answer we give will largely depend upon our interpretation of two phrases —'the Word was with God' and 'the Word was God'. We have had occasion to note that Theos without the article means something stronger than 'divine', but something less strong than 'God in the fulness of Being'. Thus Temple says:

The term "God" is fully substantial in the first clause —pros ton Theon: it is predicative and not far from adjectival in the second —Theos en o logos. Thus from the outset we are to understand that the Word has its whole being within Deity, but that it does not exhaust the being of Deity. Or, to put it from the other side, God is essentially self-revealing; but He is first of all a Self capable of being revealed. This same Word, or Self-revelation is again said to exist in essential relationship to God.\(^36\)

\(^36\) Temple, op. cit., pp.4f.
He (Christ) does not reveal all that is meant by the word God. There ever remains the unsearchable abyss of Deity. But He reveals what it vitally concerns us to know; He reveals God as Father.

Godet seems to maintain a similar position. He contends that the expression pros ton Theon denotes the subordination of the Word and at the same time the full communion of God with Him. He says of the second phrase, Theos en o logos, that:

John does not say o Theos ... for thereby he would be ascribing to the Logos the totality of divine existence, which would identify the Logos and God, and contradict the preceding proposition. As little does he say Theios, "The Logos was divine", - an expression which would efface the boundary between God and what is not God, and contradict Monotheism. The word Theos, God, used as an attribute, simply expresses the notion of kind. It is an adjective which, while maintaining the personal distinction between God and the Logos, ascribes to the latter all the attributes of the divine essence, in opposition to every other essence which could have been assigned Him, either angelic or human.

Dodd's position is less clear, inasmuch as he does not treat directly the relation of the Logos to transcendence. However, he does briefly touch on this subject, and this may suffice.

(37) Temple, op. cit., p.18
(38) Godet, p.332
(39) Ibid., p.333
at least, to indicate his position.

Thus from another point of view the 'Logos' is God Himself as revealed; it is in a Pauline phrase, to gnoston tou Theou, that of God which is knowable; for as Philo puts it, all that man can know of ultimate Deity is His uparksis, the fact that He is; beyond that, we know Him only in His logos, His thought which is the principle of reality in the universe.(40)

Here, Dodd seems to say that the incarnation of the Logos reveals God Himself and yet, at the same time, that only the 'logos' is revealed in the incarnation. Does this mean that the Logos is identical to God? Not at all, for Dodd here follows Philo in distinguishing between God and the Logos. Only 'God as revealed' is equated with the Logos. Thus it appears that according to Dodd's interpretation of the Fourth Gospel's doctrine of the Logos, while God is revealed by the incarnation of the Logos, still He remains transcendent.

What help, then, can we receive from the Fourth Gospel when we ask to what extent is God transcendent? Is the God of the Fourth Evangelist equally transcendent as the God of Philo? More or less active? More or less known? To these questions, I think we must answer that the God of the Fourth Gospel is

(40) Dodd, op. cit., p.277
more active, more self-revealing and less transcendent.

These answers are based upon the closer relation of the Logos of the Fourth Gospel to God. According to Philo the Logos which is known by men and which is 'God to us men' is the kosmos noetos, and the relation of the kosmos noetos to God is that of a creature to its Creator. On the other hand, the Fourth Evangelist conceives of the Logos, which became incarnate, as being something like the first stage of the Logos, i.e. the Logos as the mind of God, as being one with God's essence. This closer relation between God and His Logos, as His instrument of creation, providence, salvation and revelation, means that God is more revealed, more active and less transcendent, for according to the Fourth Evangelist, there is a relation of kind between God and His Logos, whereas according to Philo, the relation between God and the kosmos noetos is that of a Creator to His creation. This expression of the relation of kind between God and the Incarnate Logos results in expressing the ideas that God, Himself, acts, that God, Himself, is revealed and that God, Himself, is the God of us men.

If we ask, what do we know of God through the Fourth
Gospel's Logos doctrine then we may answer with Lightfoot that we know of God's will and action in creation and of His will and action in redemption.

St. John's teaching is that ... He who was the agent in creation and sustains and upholds the universe in being (cf. Col. 1:17), by Himself becoming part of His creation, showed what is the purpose and what are the possibilities of this realm or order of 'flesh', which should be but has not been subject to its Maker{(41)}

Now, this teaching tells us not only of God's will and purpose, but also of His activity. We argued in an earlier chapter that Philo does not consider the Logos to be an intermediary between a remote God and His creation. Still less is the Logos of the Fourth Gospel to be considered simply an intermediary. The closer relation between the Logos and God in the Fourth Gospel only brings God closer to His creation.

Just as in Philo, so in the Fourth Gospel, there is an absolute absence of cosmological dualism. The only dualism expressed by the Fourth Evangelist is the dualism of decision which is occasioned by the incarnation of the Logos and made possible by man's endowment of freedom. Again, in the Fourth Gospel, as in Philo, it is God who acts, and God's action,

(41) Lightfoot, op. cit., p.84
through the means of the Logos, is the expression of His own will. (cf. Jesus' statements concerning 'He who sent me'). However, the God of the Fourth Gospel appears more active than Philo's God inasmuch as the former is active not only in creation and providence but also in revelation and redemption, the two latter points showing more affinity to Gnosticism than to Philo.

Further, every statement about Jesus' power, will and work, must be seen over against the statements about the power, will and work of 'He who sent me'. This dialectic of volition and mission points most emphatically to the closer relation of the Incarnate Logos to God. God's will, power and work are those of Jesus, and the will, power and work of Jesus are those of God. To be sure, there remains an element of subordination in regard to the relation of the Logos to God, but less subordination than in Philo. To be sure, God transcends the Logos, but not so much as Philo would contend. To be sure, the Logos of the Fourth Gospel is God's instrument, but it is an instrument in full communion with God, expressing in work and word the nature of God, which nature is, as Temple points out, that of a 'Father'. This is what is meant by the message and work of the Incarnate Logos of the transcendent God: that the Logos who is God's
instrument in creating and governing the universe is the same instrument who redeems the universe and reveals God as Father. The Logos points beyond itself to the transcendent God, but it points to the God whose purpose, will and nature are like its own, since there is full communion between the transcendent God and His Logos.
SECTION VI

CONCLUSIONS

In our investigations of the idea of transcendence in the thought of certain theologians and philosophers, we noted that whereas all of them defended the notion of transcendence they did not all agree concerning a doctrine of the transcendence of God. In order to see points of agreement and disagreement we now purpose to look at some questions which have arisen in the course of this study. We shall note the answers given or suggested by our selected thinkers, accepting, rejecting and modifying them as we deem proper. These questions may be grouped into three sections.

(1) How does one arrive at the notion of a transcendent God?
(2) How can a transcendent God be present to men, and how can one know and speak of a transcendent God?
(3) What does the idea of transcendence seek to express or safeguard in the nature of God?

Throughout this study we have endeavoured to see the treatments of transcendence in the context of the whole of each thinker's thought. This has not meant that we have undertaken to present the whole of each man's theology or
philosophy, but that we have noted how each man's notion of transcendence follows from his basic approach to theology or philosophy. Further, the men selected, while showing a common interest in certain questions, have employed different approaches in seeking to answer these questions. Thus it is that our first group of questions seeks to ask how each thinker arrives at his doctrine of God's transcendence.

It may be fairly said that Mascall employs a rationalistic, Thomistic approach, as his great interest in the arguments of St. Thomas Aquinas testifies. By such an approach he arrives at the notion of a God who transcends the world not simply as a creator transcends his creation, but as a self-subsistent being transcends all other beings whose natures are dependent existence. Mascall's method is rationalist inasmuch as it rests upon two basic points. First, he argues that man has an 'intuitive power' to perceive that behind all finite existents, which are simply phenomenal, lies a being which is not finite, whose existence is not given but whose nature is to exist. Secondly, he argues that there is a necessary relation between these two kinds of existents, i.e. he argues that 'the finite implies infinitude'. In regard to the first contention we expressed doubt that all

(1) Mascall, He Who Is, p.75; cf. Existence and Analogy, pp.75-87.
(2) Mascall, He Who Is, pp.73-87
(3) Ibid., pp.73f.; 84.
men are able to 'intuit' the infinite from finitude, but in regard to the second contention we reserved our judgement.

Tillich makes use of an ontological approach which in turn makes use of existentialist analyses of being. Unlike Mascall, he does not argue from finite existents to an Infinite One, to a self-subsistent being; rather he asks, "Why is there being and not nothing?" In some sense, then, he seems to affirm that beings 'imply', not an Infinite Being, but Being-itself. Now, it must be clearly noted that Tillich does not base this 'implication' upon rational argument. On the contrary, we have seen that he contends that man is immediately aware of something unconditional. In other words, Tillich does not argue from the finite to the infinite, but in his ontological and existentialist analyses, he does find that man has an awareness of infinity in finitude. It would seem, then, that there is a measure of agreement between Mascall and Tillich. Even though the term 'implies' means for Mascall more than it means for Tillich (according to Mascall finitude 'monstrates' infinity), both men seem to perceive a necessary relation between finitude and infinity.

Jaspers also makes use of an ontological approach based

(4) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 181; 207.
(6) Ibid., pp. 22; 26.
Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 211f.; 228f.
upon existential analyses, and the similarity of thought between Tillich and himself is unmistakable. In his treatments of the concepts of reason and boundary situations, Jaspers endeavours to illuminate *Existenz* so as to show that it is possible for one to affirm Transcendence. In a boundary situation reason founders, and one may affirm the ultimate nothingness of the world and of *Existenz* or one may affirm that behind them both there is Transcendence which is their very ground. According to our understanding, Jaspers' analyses do not seek to prove Transcendence but to show that *Existenz* is such that one may be led to the place where he may affirm Transcendence. This possibility of affirming Transcendence constitutes the element of faith in Jaspers' *philosophic faith*. This position agrees with Tillich's position more than with that of Mascall, although Jaspers' insistence upon faith seems to be even stronger than that of Tillich in view of Tillich's assertion concerning man's immediate awareness of the unconditional. Again, the nature of God as seen by Jaspers is remarkably similar to Tillich's position. God is no thing, even an infinite thing. He is Transcendence, or, indeed, one might more properly say that Jaspers' philosophic faith simply affirms the fact that Transcendence is.

(8) see above p.119.
Otto agrees with Tillich and Jaspers that one arrives at the reality of God neither by argument nor by contemplating oneself or the world. It is precisely on this issue that Otto disagrees with Schleiermacher. Any argument that begins with the self or with the world and infers God therefrom ultimately asserts the reality of the self or the world rather than the reality of God; whereas, according to Otto, the prior reality is that of God whom one experiences and knows without inference. Otto grants that one becomes aware of the Numinous in one's world and through the modes and experiences of one's world, but he contends that when one has become aware of the Numinous one sees that it is distinct from the world, that it is, indeed, 'wholly other' than the world. Properly speaking, moods such as 'eereness' and 'uncannyness' simply express and awaken the Numinous awareness, i.e. these non-religious experiences are 'schemata' of the Numinous awareness. Otto's approach is also similar to the approaches of Tillich and Jaspers in another respect, for just as Tillich and Jaspers make use of descriptive existentialist analyses in order to illuminate Existenz and thereby show the possibility of affirming God or

(10) Ibid., p. 117
(11) Ibid., pp. 26ff.; 66ff.
Transcendence, so Otto seeks to describe one's awareness of the Numinous, thereby disclosing the possibility of such an awareness. However, there is also a difference between their descriptive approaches; for whereas Tillich and Jaspers seek to describe man as such and his possibilities, Otto is largely, though not exclusively, concerned to describe man as 'religious' and his religious experiential possibilities. Further, Otto's approach, like those of Tillich and Jaspers, affirms a positive nature of the Numinous. Whereas Tillich allows one to say non-symbolically 'God is Being-itself', and Jaspers allows one to affirm 'There is Transcendence', so Otto allows one to know that God is although not what God is. Indeed, according to Otto, one may be aware of the Numinous for the bliss or agitation that it brings, or one may be aware of the Numinous as overwhelming might and as abashing and fascinating power, without knowing what the Numinous actually is. The positive nature of the Numinous is affirmed, then, by one's experience of the Numinous, which experience of bliss, agitation, attraction and abashment points beyond itself to the Numinous as other than the world and ourselves and of which one's awareness is but a 'shadow'.

Earlier we argued that Buber's approach shows similarities

(12) Ibid., p.8.
(13) cf. Ibid., p.139.
to that of Otto, since both approaches are basically grounded upon one's experience of God. The word 'experience' has connotations which may make it an unhappy term to apply both to the approach of Otto and to the approach of Buber. However, it has the merit of unmistakably pointing to the importance both men place upon individual conviction of God. Just as Otto speaks of 'an awareness of the Numinous', so Buber speaks of 'meeting' or 'encountering' God. We also argued that, at least, personal encounter as presented by Buber points to the fact that 'God is'. Furthermore, we argued that Buber's approach points to one fundamental assertion which he allows to be made concerning God, viz. that God's nature is such that He meets men and is met by them. We expressed a lack of clarity as regards Buber's idea of God's meeting men and being met by them in and/or through the world, but as regards his idea of a transcendent God who is, at the same time, personal, Buber's position appears to be extremely lucid.

Heim's theology is primarily directed towards expressing the notion of transcendence, and, consequently, his theological approach does not so much lead to his doctrine of Transcendence as his doctrine of transcendence calls for a theological system that can present the concept of transcendence in such a way that it may be understood without a sacrificium

(14) see above pp.210ff.
(15) see above pp.212-216.
intellectus. Notwithstanding this difference between Heim and our other selected theologians and philosophers, a consideration of their systems or methods may still show similarities and differences. In one respect, it might appear that Heim's method of arriving at a transcendent and active God is similar to that of Mascall. Heim contends that a new space (even the suprapolar space) may be disclosed when an 'either/or and a third is not given' situation breaks down. It might appear that this treatment by Heim amounts to a kind of rational exercise by which one is led to affirm the reality of the suprapolar space and of God. Such an understanding would argue that certain events in the world cannot be explained simply in worldly terms and thereby point to the reality of God's acts, i.e. that certain finite happenings imply infinitude. However, a more careful reading would seem to show that this is not Heim's position at all. For him, there is no necessity attached to 'either/or and a third is not given' situations that leads one to the affirmation of the reality of God. Rather, Heim's position is that man first of all has a capacity to experience new spaces and that when they are experienced they are felt not as a discovery but as a gift. Moreover, Heim

(16) Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science, p.34.
(17) Ibid., pp.144f.
(18) Heim, God Transcendent, p.235.
specifically contends that "... we cannot lead other people to this discovery by intellectual argument or pedagogical activity if the space of God is still concealed from them." (20)

Thus we conclude that inasmuch as Heim speaks of an a priori capacity of man to experience the reality and activity of God and inasmuch as he speaks of such an apprehension as a gift, Heim's method or approach shows a greater affinity to the approaches of Otto, Buber, and Tillich than to that of Mascall.

Lastly, we turned to the treatment of the Logos doctrine, and here our considerations were conducted from the position of faith. Accepting the fact that Jesus was the Logos of God, we asked what this doctrine seeks to tell us of God's transcendence, inasmuch as it speaks of the relation between God and the world and between God and the Logos. We concluded that it affirms a likeness between God and the Logos and a lesser likeness between God and the world; that it seeks to express God's transcendence of the world, of the instrument of creation, and of Christ as the redeemer and revealer. At the same time, it seeks to safeguard transcendence from being conceived as remoteness, by asserting a real likeness between the Logos and God, by asserting the instrumental nature of the Logos, by asserting the close communion between God and

(20) Ibid., p.171.
the Incarnate Logos, and by asserting the identity of will and purpose between them.

What position, then, are we to adopt? Does the finite imply infinitude? Is there an inherent relation between God and ourselves? It would appear that we can, at least, say that one cannot be driven logically to assent to the existence of a transcendent God. The infinite is not implied by the finite if 'to imply' or 'to demonstrate' means 'to prove conclusively'. On this issue we agree with Tillich and Jaspers rather than Mascall. Both Tillich and Jaspers follow Kant's criticism of inferential reason, and their argument poses a dilemma to any position such as that adopted by Mascall. Either inferential reason makes an illegitimate jump when it argues from the world to a transcendent God, or it lowers God to the level of the world.

In regard to the first horn of this dilemma, both Tillich and Jaspers consider that inferential reason makes an unwarranted leap when it moves into the area of transcendental thinking. The proper sphere of inferential reason is the world of sensibly perceived phenomena, and its own limits prohibit its application in a transcendental area. Both men follow Kant in saying that what is needed is not inferential thinking but transcendental thinking (Vernunft) which rises above phenomenal being. This means that reason cannot

(21) cf. Jaspers, "Reply to My Critics", in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, p.799; Reason and Existenz, p.65; see above pp.95ff.
prove the reality of God; for, on the one hand, the limits of inferential reason prohibit its arriving at God, and, on the other hand, the nature of transcendental thinking is such that it lacks the proving power possessed by inferential reason.

In regard to the second horn of the dilemma, Tillich and Jaspers argue that since inferential reason can be properly applied only to existents it can never arrive at a transcendent God but only at a god who does not differ qualitatively from worldly existents, i.e., a god who is lowered to the level of the world. This is precisely Jaspers' point when he says that according to Thomist theologians one kind of being is as good as another, i.e., that the being of God is not qualitatively different than the being of worldly existents. On the one hand, it would appear that this criticism applies to Mascall inasmuch as in his Thomistic presentation he seems to consider that all being is ultimately on a par. This may be seen in his treatment of analogy, where he says that analogy duorum ad tertium cannot be employed in regard to God and finite existents since God and finite existents, alike, are beings which possess existence.

Such a contention seems to support just the position that

---

(22) Jaspers, "Reply to My Critics", in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, pp. 799f.
"one kind of being is as good as another".

Yet, on the other hand, Mascall does distinguish between God's being, as being a se, and the being of finite existents, as being ab alio. Further, the very purpose of Mascall's approach is to arrive at a God whose nature transcends the whole order of finitude, i.e. at a God who is Self-subsistent Being, a God whose essence and existence are one.

However, both Tillich and Jaspers would argue that the distinction between God's being, as being which exists a se, and man's being, as being which exists ab alio, does not sufficiently express and safeguard God's qualitative transcendence of all existents. Both men contend that the only way to maintain God's qualitative transcendence is to distinguish Him from all existence. To this end, Jaspers contends that a proved God is not God inasmuch as a God that can be proved by inferential reason is simply a god that is of the same order of being as finite existents. Similarly, Tillich asserts that God does not exist. So it is that both Tillich and Jaspers contend that God is not a being, an existent, a thing, but Being-itself, the Ground of all being, Transcendence.

(24) Mascall, He Who Is, p. 97; see above pp. 33f.
(26) Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p. 36.
It would appear to us that Mascall is open to at least a part of this attack. In spite of his endeavour to escape the weaknesses of inferential reason's arrival at God by having recourse to 'intuitive' reason, and in spite of his distinction between God's being as a se and all other existents' beings as ab alio, Mascall still arrives at a God who is an existent, who is the Infinite One. Further, in light of Mascall's Thomistic view of all existence as ultimately being on a par, it would appear that his system fails to express and safeguard God's ontological transcendence. It may be that Tillich's judgement -- that the idea of an 'existing God' is the negation of God-- is somewhat severe upon such a position as that of Mascall, and it may be that Jaspers' judgement -- that a God arrived at by reason which seeks to prove His existence is not God-- is also too strong; but it does appear that Mascall's treatment of God's transcendence does not adequately express the difference between God's being and the being of all other existents. It would further appear that this inadequacy is the result of Mascall's Thomistic background which he does not succeed in explaining or transforming in such a way as to escape the criticism of Kant, Tillich and Jaspers.

However, can one accept the contention that 'the finite implies the infinite' if 'implies' simply seeks to speak of an inherent relation between a transcendent God and
the world? In point of fact, all the thinkers considered in our study (with the exception of Sartre who was studied primarily for purposes of contrast) seem to point to some such connection. Tillich and Jaspers speak of God as the ground of all being; Otto and Buber consider that in or through the world man can encounter God; Heim speaks of God's omnipresence and interpenetrating activity in the world; and the Logos doctrine speaks directly of creation in the likeness of God. Are we to say, then, that there is a relation between God and the world, but that this relation is not outwardly observable and may not be proved by inferential reason? It would appear so, for to conclude otherwise would seem to invalidate the affirmation of faith. To be sure, one can see the implication of infinity in finitude only by faith, but not to say that this apprehension relates to reality results in affirming either that faith apprehends an unreal reality or that faith makes its own reality.

Thus, when we ask our more embracing question of how one may become aware of a transcendent God, we need not be asking an either/or question but one of the nature of both/and. If there exists this real relation between a transcendent God and the world, then any approach may lead through the world to God. One's only criterion of judgement is whether or not the approach employed evokes, awakens or leads to the awareness of God. Such a criterion must always take account (28) Heim, God Transcendent, p.187.
of the 'otherness' of God, of the 'likeness' rather than identity between the world and God, and of the approach itself which finds its way not simply in the world but through the world of God. To neglect these considerations results in idolatry or immanence, in regarding dependent being as self-existent, in stopping short at 'cyphers' of God, in regarding as absolute the bearers of reality, in accepting the 'image' of God as the transcendent God Himself.

Now we must ask a question which is fundamental to our whole inquiry. Is the distinction between God a se and God pro nobis a valid one? Why do we believe that there is more to God than we encounter? These questions relate to the question of how one arrives at the idea of a transcendent God, and thus it is no accident that our answer follows similar lines. In all the approaches which we accepted we noted the lack of any proof of God or Transcendence. All of these approaches rested ultimately upon faith as a personal awareness or affirmation. The awareness of God must necessarily be self-authenticating. The existence of God cannot be based upon a lesser reality than God Himself. Hence, these media do not prove the reality of God. Faith, itself, is not based upon any guarantee, but is a gift, a risk. Faith, then, is a self-authenticating experience, and it is this self-authenticating experience that points to the
transcendence of God. This may be seen most strongly in Buber's position. What is encountered is not simply God, but a God that is transcendent. Man receives not a specific 'content' but a Presence, a Presence as power. The confirmation one receives in encountering God is not such as can be handled and possessed. It is the confirmation that there is a transcendent God who nevertheless meets his people. Otto likewise contends that the awareness of the Numinous carries with it the awareness of the Numinous as the 'wholly other'. So too, Tillich refers to the awareness not of a thing known and possessed, but of something Unconditional, of Being-itself which transcends all beings. In the same tenor, Jaspers concludes that it is enough that one knows that there is Transcendence and that this is all that faith can affirm. This apprehension of faith that God in His fulness transcends God pro nobis also finds expression in the doctrine of the Incarnate Logos. According to Bultmann, Jesus reveals only that he is the revealer, and, indeed, the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel vividly presents Jesus as pointing beyond himself to the Father who transcends the Incarnate Logos. Further, that element of transcendence

(29) Buber, I And Thou, p.110.
(30) Ibid., p.113.
(31) Otto, op.cit., p.117.
(33) See above, p.119.
which was present in the Incarnate Logos was not transparent, but was seen in faith. "The light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not". Thus it is that the self-authenticating affirmation of faith points not only to God but also to the transcendence of God.

II

Our second group of questions asks how a transcendent God can be present to the world and how one can know and speak of Him. Mascall's position is that God is present to man in His creation. In contemplating the world, man can intuit God as creator and self-subsistent being. So it is that Mascall can allow knowledge of God and speech about God in accordance with the doctrine of analo gia entis. We have already examined Mascall's treatment of this matter in some detail, and we need not summarize it here. Suffice it to make two points. (1) One need not accept the doctrine of analo gia entis if one reject the arguments which seek to prove the existence of God as creator. (2) It is, however, to Mascall's credit that, even though he accepts such arguments and the doctrine of analo gia entis, he emphasizes the element of proportional analogy rather than attributive analogy; thus (35) see above pp. 34-42.
refusing to speak of any virtual similarity between God and the world and thereby preserving the notion of God's transcendence.

Tillich also accepts a form of analogical speech which he presents as symbolic speech. Symbolic knowledge of God is based upon the facts that beings participate in Being-itself and that Being-itself becomes present to men only in beings. Thus, one should never say only a symbol since symbols alone can make God present to one. To seek to avoid symbols, as manifestations and expressions of God, results in lowering God to the level of things. Further, symbols have a theonomic depth that elevates them when referring to God. Thus, a symbol may make God present to men and allows one to speak relevantly, if not virtually, of Him.

Jaspers' concept of cypher is amazingly close to Tillich's concept of symbol, but there is one difference. Symbols speak of God, according to Tillich. There is a similarity, though not identity, between the symbol's earthly referent and its referent in God's nature. On the other hand, Jaspers claims for cyphers only the power to make

---

(37) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.266.
(38) Tillich, Theology of Culture, p.64; cf. Systematic Theology, I, p.146.
(39) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.146.
(40) Ibid., pp.266f.
Transcendence present. He is not concerned to speak of God, or to give content to the term, 'Transcendence'. Thus, cyphers are not means of speaking about Transcendence, but are simply the media whereby Transcendence, as the reality behind cyphers, becomes present to one.

According to Otto, a schema purports to perform two functions—-to express a feeling analogous to the religious feeling and to arouse the religious feeling. In neither case do schema refer to God, Himself. Schema are an aid to help one know God insofar as by 'to know' we mean 'to experience' or 'to become aware of'. God is present to one in one's experience of Him, and one's awareness of the Numinous carries with it the awareness of God as mysterium tremendum, but a schema bears a likeness, not to God, but to the religious awareness of the Numinous.

We have already noted that according to Buber God becomes present to men in personal relationships. One meets the External Thou in meeting human thons. Thus, God can be spoken of as personal, but properly speaking this does not speak about God at all. It tells one nothing of God's real nature; it only speaks of God's 'ways', for according to Buber, 'personal' refers to God only as he gives Himself to

(41) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, pp. 40; 43f.; 56; see above pp. 107-110.
(42) Otto, op. cit., pp. 26ff; 66ff.
men. Indeed, Buber contends that everything one may say of God speaks of Him only as He is in relation to men. (43)

Heim does not treat the question of how one can speak about a transcendent God; but he is greatly interested in the question of how a transcendent God can be present to men, and it is one of the merits of Heim's system that it presents so clearly the notions of God's omnipresence and interpenetrating activity. In Heim's presentation, suprapolar space encompasses all other spaces. Hence, God, as transcendent 'in' suprapolar space, may be active in all other subordinate spaces. Heim's idea of dimensional subordination provides the key for the expression of this point. (44) Just as the line AB may be considered as participating in the cube ABCDEFGH, so too, it may be considered as participating in the square ABCD. There is no idea of mutual exclusion. Line AB is present in both structures and is real in both. Similarly, Heim expresses God's omnipresence. God is transcendent as belonging rightly to suprapolar space, but inasmuch as suprapolar space encompasses and includes all other spaces God is also omnipresent and active in the world in an interpenetrating manner, i.e. God is not only the transcendent God of a transcendental realm, but is also what Blackham calls the 'upshot' of meaning in

(43) Buber, I And Thou, p.134.
(45) Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers, p.62.
"The Logos became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory."

There now arises a host of perplexing questions. Is Jesus Christ a symbol or cypher in which God is present and which points men beyond himself to the Father? Is Christ only a cypher or a symbol? Is there a difference of kind or simply of degree between Christ as a cypher or symbol and all other cyphers and symbols of God? Is the Incarnate Logos the incarnation of God a se or of God pro nobis? From one point of view, these questions may seem to be illegitimate. They may appear to be questions based upon a metaphysical idea of Christology (i.e., upon the idea of the divinity and humanity of Christ expressed in terms of a hypostatic union) while investigating God's transcendence in existentialist categories. From another point of view, however, it may seem that the basic questions and answers are the same in both an existentialist system and a metaphysic of substance, and that only the expressions of the questions and answers differ. It might be argued that each system asks, in its own way, about the meaning and ultimacy of Christ. In the metaphysical system the description of Christ as the Son of God seeks to show that Jesus has all the meaning and ultimacy of a prophet who makes God's will known to men and who points men to the God who differs absolutely from the prophet, while at the same time it seeks to express the fact that the Son of God is more
than a revealer of God and a pointer to God, and that there is no absolute difference between God and His Son such as there is between God and His prophet. From what we have said above and from what we shall say below, it will be seen that we consider this question and answer to be the same as asked and answered by faith in terms of symbol and cypher.

At the beginning of our answer we can say that Jesus is a symbol or cypher of God, i.e. in faith, the disciples see God in Him, and He points them beyond Himself to God. But is it sufficient simply to say that Jesus is a symbol or cypher of God. A symbol or cypher, it will be remembered, makes God present, i.e. it is not God, Himself, but the media through which God is present to one. It is tempting to explain the Logos Christology along these lines, i.e. to distinguish between Jesus, the man, and the Logos reality which lies behind and shines through him, for this presentation does indeed express a strain of the Logos doctrine that frequently occurs in the Fourth Gospel. Such an answer has the merit of clarity, but it would appear that it falls into the error of an over-sharp distinction between the two natures of Christ. In such a presentation, the Incarnate

(46) Both Tillich and Jaspers distinguish between a symbol or cypher as a sign, and the reality that appears through it. cf. Tillich, Theology of Culture, pp.28f. and Jaspers Truth and Symbol, pp.40f.; 62.
Logos is not really one being, but two. Jesus and the Logos need have no more essential relation than a flag and its country, and just as a flag ceases to be a symbol of its country when its people discard it, so Jesus and the Logos would need have no identification outside of faith. Now it is true that the presence of God in Christ may not be perceived outside of faith, but faith does not claim to create this identification; rather, faith perceives and recognizes this identity as existing independent of its perception.

Therefore, it would seem that whereas we can easily say that Jesus is a cypher or a symbol, that having said this we have not said all that the Logos doctrine seeks to say concerning Christology. This 'more' appears to be what essentially distinguishes a Christian from a Theist. Jaspers is a theistic philosopher who is willing to accept Jesus as a cypher-- even as the cypher for people of a Christian background-- but no more. On the other hand, Tillich writes as a Christian theologian who seems to distinguish between Christ and other symbols. The basic point of difference lies in Tillich's willingness to admit that in the

(47) Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, pp.76f.
mystery of the Incarnation God exists. In every other case, Tillich insists that God does not exist but is beyond and behind all existents. In contrast, Jaspers maintains all through his philosophizing that Transcendence is not an existent, and he sees the Christological assertion that God became man as being an irrational departure from the notion of Transcendence. Indeed, for him, such a Christological assertion is a confusion between Transcendence and the world.

It is not our intention to explain away the mystery of the Incarnation. What we are attempting to do is to show that the Logos doctrine's assertion that the Logos became flesh in Jesus Christ, ascribes to Him more than the nature of a

(48) "It would be a great victory for Christian apologetics if the words 'God' and 'existence' were very definitely separated except in the paradox of God becoming manifest under the conditions of existence, that is, in the Christological paradox". (Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p.227).

"Christian theology is the theology insofar as it is based on the tension between the absolutely concrete and the absolutely universal.... But it is necessary to accept the vision of early Christianity that if Jesus is called the Christ he must... be the point of identity between the absolutely concrete and the absolute universal." (Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp.19f.)

"It was not a cosmological interest (Harnack) but a matter of life and death for the early Church which led to the use of the Stoic-Philonic logos doctrine in order to express the universal meaning of the event 'Jesus the Christ'.... For this reason the Church fought desperately against the attempt of Arianism to make the Christ into one of the cosmic powers, although the highest, depriving him of both his absolute universality (he is less than God) and his absolute concreteness (he is more than man)." (Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp.20f.)
symbol or cypher, which nature is only to make present something that is not itself. The Christology of the Logos doctrine affirms not that Jesus is the symbol or cypher of the Logos, which affirmation would allow a sharp distinction between the Logos and the person Jesus, but that Jesus is the Incarnate Logos. Such an affirmation is a statement of faith, but it is a statement of faith's perception of the reality of Jesus Christ.

However, having said that Christ is not merely a symbol or cypher of God, but the very Incarnation of Him, we are still left with the question of whether the Incarnate Logos is God a se or God pro nobis. In our investigation of the background meaning of the Logos doctrine we prepared the way for our answer to this question. In both the Jewish and Hellenistic foreshadowings of the Logos doctrine, we saw that the Logos was not identified with God a se. In Jewish thought neither the Wisdom of God nor the Word of the Lord were considered to be identical with the whole of God, although both were expressive of God's nature, they were not exhaustive of it. Also in the philosophy of Platonism the Logos was not identical to God, but was the mind of God which was once removed from God's essence as the kosmos.
noetos and twice removed from God's essence as the immanent logos in creation. Further, in the synthesis of these two sources by Philo Judeans, the monotheism of Judaism emerges even more strongly than in the Wisdom literature. Thus, simply understood from its backgrounds, it would appear that the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel simply asserts the incarnation of God's Logos, not of the fulness of the Godhead.

However, we may wonder if the Fourth Evangelist's Logos doctrine does not make a departure from its Jewish and Hellenistic antecedents so as to alter such a conclusion. Our investigation seems to point out that several new ideas or new emphases arise in the Fourth Gospel. First, the whole notion of the Incarnation of the Logos is new, and we have discussed its implications in treating the idea of the Incarnate Logos as a symbol or cypher. Secondly, new (or newly emphasized) functions of the Logos appear in the Fourth Gospel, viz. functions of a soteriological and revelatory nature. Do, then, these changes affect the relation of the Logos to God? First, we must say that the changes caused by the Fourth Evangelist's treatment of the Logos doctrine do not seem strong

(50) See above pp. 295ff.; 310f.
(51) See above p. 285
(52) See above pp. 363f.
(53) See above pp. 329-348; 350
enough to invalidate the distinction between God and the Logos. Any increase in the function of the Logos and any closer communion between the Logos and God still stop short of positive identification between the Logos and the fulness of the Godhead. Although the Logos assumes a soteriological function it remains the agent or instrument of God who is, Himself, Soter. Further, the revelatory function of the Incarnate Logos is not a commission performed outside of faith, and results more in a witness to God (a revelation of God) than in a bestowed knowledge of God's being and nature (a revelation about God). Indeed, we have seen that Bultmann goes so far as to say that Jesus reveals only that he is the Revealer.

Having said this, we must now say that the Logos doctrine in the Fourth Gospel seeks to express a lessened distance between the transcendent God and His Logos, thereby seeking to express a lessened distance between the transcendent God and His world. We have already noted that pre-Christian doctrines of the Logos seek to safeguard the notion of a transcendent God from the charge of remoteness, inasmuch as they conceive of the Logos not as a substitute for God but as God's instrument, performing God's will. Further, we argued that in the Fourth Gospel there exists a closer communion between God and His Logos than is to be found in Jewish and Hellenistic systems. We pointed to the statements

(54) See above pp.268; 286; 315-318
concerning the unity of will and purpose, of power and work between the transcendent God and the Incarnate Logos, and we concluded that "the Logos of the Fourth Gospel is God's instrument, but it is an instrument in full communion with God, expressing in work and word the nature of God." (55)

In answer to our question, then, we may say that the Incarnate Logos is and reveals God pro nobis, but we can see now that although the distinction between God a se and God pro nobis may be valid, there is complete consistency in God's nature. Although we may not say that God pro nobis is exhaustive of God a se, we can say that the essential unity of these two aspects is such that what is known of God pro nobis can be said to belong essentially to God a se.

Such a conclusion must surely express a lessened distance between the transcendent God and His world, for in God's revelation of Himself pro nobis we are given a revelation of Himself as He is. This means that we cannot follow Buber's oversharpen distinction between God's face and God's ways. Nor can we follow Buber in saying that God's ways are not indicative of His face. It would appear to us that an act of God comes from God's esseitas and tells one of God's face. This is not to say that such revelation is completely understood. Man does, indeed, modify God's summons and sendings;

(55) See above p. 371
(56) Buber, Mamre, p. 43; cf. I And Thou, p. 134.
and the revelation given by God does not exhaust His nature, so that God is never 'known', 'possessed' or 'handled'. Nevertheless, God's revelation is a true revelation of God.

This conclusion may be clearly expressed in the theological presentation of Karl Heim. Heim contends that the side of God which man knows is only one aspect of God, "...a side which is turned towards us...." The ultimate reality of God, Himself, "...remains that which is 'wholly other', totally incomprehensible and entirely inaccessible to our thought and observation." Thus, Heim preserves God's transcendence by means of a distinction not unlike that of God a se and God pro nobis. At the same time, Heim's presentation allows for the reality of God's revelation, i.e. the side of God that is turned towards us is a side of God Himself. To be sure God a se transcends God pro nobis, but this does not mean that God pro nobis is a different God from God a se, that God pro nobis is simply an accommodation of God to the situation of man or that God pro nobis is simply an appearance of God which differs significantly from His reality.

The Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel points out that supremely in the act of the Incarnation, God is revealed, truly revealed although not exhaustively revealed. This act of God reveals Him as loving, as Father, as 'for us' in creation, providence and salvation. "The Logos points beyond itself to the transcendent God, but it points to the God whose purpose, will, and nature are like its own, since there is full communion between the transcendent God and His Logos." (59)

III

Lastly, we turn to consider the doctrine of transcendence in regard to what it seeks to express and safeguard in the idea of God. Traditionally this doctrine has sought to safeguard God from being identified with the world, while, at the same time, it has sought to preserve the truth of God's contact with the world. The expression of such a view has centred around the idea of creation and has been defended in controversies such as those concerning natural religion, revelation and evolution. Spatial pictures, such as the three-decker universe, have been used to express God's transcendence, and terms, such as 'supernatural', have most

(59) see above, p. 372
frequently sought to present the transcendence of God in spatial concepts. These same ideas have appeared in our studies of the Logos doctrine and, to a lesser degree, the theology of E. L. Mascall. Generally, however, we concerned ourselves with asking what such ideas really mean. To-day in view of Biblical scholarship, no less than in view of space flight, the picture of the world in terms of a three-decker universe or of nature and supernature has been destroyed. So too, for some time the idea of God the Creator, as a super, material producing artificer, has been becoming increasingly difficult to accept as a meaningful conception, if it is possible to accept it at all. If, therefore, we seem to have been unduly concerned with the world of experience in our investigation, it is because it is this world alone which now appears as an indubitable reality from which to start, and because of the consequent desirability of expressing our ideas in terms of our existence and experience (both objective and existential) in order to gain a hearing. So it is that we ask what the doctrine of the transcendence of God seeks to safeguard and express and how such objectives are to be achieved in light of present theology and philosophy.

First, the doctrine of God's transcendence seeks to
avoid any confusion between God and the world, and in order to express this point our selected thinkers use different approaches. Mascall's doctrine of transcendence presents God's nature as self-subsistent creator in comparatively orthodox terms, and we criticized his treatment on the ground that such a position tends to regard all beings as being of one order, and that consequently the idea of God as an infinite being (even an infinite being who exists a se) ultimately lowers God to the level of other beings, to the level of the world. Consequently, we judged that such a position fails to safeguard adequately God's transcendence of the world.

Tillich and Jaspers, using quite similar approaches, arrive at similar conclusions regarding the doctrine of transcendence. Both men wish to preserve God's qualitative difference from the world. To this end their ontological and existentialist analyses revealed a lack of ultimacy in the world of phenomenal appearance. Thus, they are led to the place where either nothingness or Transcendence may be affirmed. Both men affirm God or Transcendence in faith—Tillich upon the basis of a given awareness of the Unconditional and Jaspers upon the basis of a leap of faith which sees, in retrospect, that such a leap or affirmation of faith is possible only because Transcendence underlies this leap or affirmation. Both judge that God or Transcendence is not a
being, but is the ground of all being, or being-itself. For both, this is all that can be virtually said of God. Another similarity lies in the fact that whereas both Tillich and Jaspers speak of self-transcendence and world-transcendence, they also contend that such transcendences are not the same as the transcendence of God. We attempted to show this difference by introducing the idea of atheistic inter-worldly transcendence as presented by Sartre, and by contrasting it with Jaspers' theistic doctrine of transcendence. We endeavoured by such a contrast to show how a theistic doctrine of transcendence seeks to distinguish between the transcendence found within the world and a transcendence that refers beyond every inter-worldly transcendence. In this ontological study, spatial and natural expressions were ignored in favour of existentialist categories, but the purpose and result of the doctrine of God's transcendence remained the same, i.e. to safeguard God from being identified with the world or from becoming a superfluous concept.

Otto also starts from experience in his treatment of God's transcendence. He rejects any proof for God or for His transcendence, and contends that one experiences the 'otherness' of God through the world in which one lives. While it is true that Otto seems to use 'schema' as a technique to make God present, the fact that he allows for
the truth that not all men become aware of God through 'schema' points to the giveness of God's presence rather than to the control of it. Similarly, Buber arrives at the transcendent God through the world of personal experience. He is extremely clear that there is no technique by which one conjures up God, but rather that God meets men and is met by them through both action and suffering, through both will and grace. God is not simply the 'thou' whom I meet in another person, but the Eternal Thou whom I meet through another human thou.  

In the experience of God, itself, both Otto and Buber see God as being transcendent. No nature of God is given in such meetings. He remains unknown except as a Presence as power or as overwhelming might that attracts while it abashes. To express the mysterious, transcendent nature of God, Otto refers to God as 'It'. By this he means that God is more than that which is met. On the other hand, Buber seeks to express the unknown, transcendent nature of God by refusing to call God an 'It'. God is the 'Eternal Thou', and as such one only meets Him and knows that He is. One never has knowledge of God as one has of an 'it' or of a 'him'. We need find no basic disagreement between these two theologians on this particular issue, for even

(60) Buber, I And Thou, p.75.
(62) Buber, I And Thou, pp.75-120.
Buber admits that in his treatment of God as eternally Thou, he speaks only of "what God is in his relation to a man".

In the second place, however, the doctrine of God's transcendence seeks to save the notion of God from remoteness. In the Logos doctrine this safeguard is presented by affirming that God created the world by and after His likeness, His Logos. Also in the doctrine of transcendence as presented by our selected thinkers such a safeguard is intended. Mascall, again in traditional speech, affirms God's relation to the world as creator and preserver; Tillich and Jaspers see God as related to the world as its encompassing ground; Otto and Buber allow that God acts and meets men in their daily experiences; and Heim's whole presentation of God's transcendence endeavours to demonstrate God's omnipresence and interpenetrating activity.

While we are considering what each of our selected theologians and philosophers seeks to safeguard and express by his doctrine of transcendence, we should also consider how each one arrives at his particular notion of transcendence, and in order to point this inquiry we may pose the following question. Is transcendence a relation which one first apprehends in human inter-personal relations and which is later applied to God, or is transcendence first known as the transcendence of God and later expressed in terms of the human process of self-transcendence?
We may begin our answer with the clearest position, viz. that of Sartre. Sartre finds only a human process of transcendence, i.e. the process by which pour-soi differentiates itself from its en-soi. We have seen that in a similar way both Tillich and Jaspers speak of God as transcendent of all being. God is distinguished from all beings. He does not exist. He is Being-itself or Transcendence. Again, not unlike Sartre, Tillich speaks of man as self-transcendent, as being able to survey himself from outside himself; and Jaspers conceives of Existenz as a mode of self-transcendence, and his position may even be interpreted in such a way as to present man's self-transcendence as an analogy of God's transcendence. In the same vein, it might be argued that Mascall simply negates man's finitude in order to arrive at the notion of transcendence which he then applies to God.

However, the fact that Tillich, Jaspers and Mascall express their notions of God's transcendence in terms akin to human and cosmic processes of transcendence does not necessarily mean that they begin with human self-transcendence and then apply this notion to God; and notwithstanding the similarities of the notion of God's transcendence to the notion of self-transcendence or world-transcendence, it appears

(63) See above, p.151.
(64) Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp.21lf.
(65) See above, pp.129f.
to us that none of the three simply applies his ideas of self-transcendence to God. For Mascall, finitude points to God not only as its negation but as its creator; according to Tillich, one has an immediate awareness of the Unconditional, of Being-itself; and according to Jaspers, it is a venture of faith that affirms Transcendence. In all these respects the transcendence of God is not derived from the notion of self-transcendence; rather, it is the result of a faithful recognition, apprehension or venture.

However, all three notions of God’s transcendence are expressed in analogical terms whose prime analogates are each thinker’s notion of self-transcendence. Mascall’s idea of cosmological self-transcendence is the vehicle for asserting God’s transcendence of the cosmos as its creator and as its self-existent cause. Tillich’s ontological approach which expresses man’s transcendence of his finitude, i.e. which expresses man’s participation in being as well as in non-being, provides the ontological vehicle of ‘Being-itself’ for expressing God’s transcendence of all beings. So too, Jaspers’ existentialist analyses of Existenz affords him the vehicle by which his notion of Transcendence; for just as man, as Existenz, transcends his world, so God, according to Jaspers’ presentation, transcends the world, man and Existenzen.

Otto makes it abundantly clear that his approach to the transcendence of God rests upon the immediate experience of
God as 'wholly other' rather than upon the transference to God of the notion of human self-transcendence. Because of this Otto is able to do no more than speak of the notion of God's transcendence 'schematically' in such terms as 'mysterious'. Furthermore, even though Otto allows terms like 'mysterious' to be 'ideograms' of the transcendent God, he is insistent that they are not simply human ideas and notions raised to their highest and applied to God. On the contrary, the Numinous awareness points out that a term like 'mysterious' only 'hints at' the transcendent nature of God which is apprehended but not comprehended in the awareness of the Numinous.

Similarly, Buber arrives at the notion of transcendence as a result of his encounter with God. Some notion of self-transcendence is not transferred to the Eternal Thou; but the encounter itself is an encounter with a transcendent God. Again, it is true that Buber expresses God's transcendence in terms similar to those of self-transcendence, i.e. just as a human 'thou' transcends any 'it' nature, so God, as eternally Thou, is eternally transcendent as the unknown, unpossessed and unhandled God; but again we would judge that this is not a case of accrediting to God some notion of human self-transcendence, but a matter of expressing God's apprehended transcendence in terms of human self-transcendence.

From one point of view it might appear that Heim's idea
of God's transcendence is simply the negation of an essential element of finitude, viz. mutual dependence. Indeed, it might appear that Heim's notion of suprapolar space is simply the negation of polar space. However, it does not follow from this that Heim attains his notion of transcendence from the human realm and then applies it to God. On the contrary, it appears that Heim takes his doctrine of God's transcendence from an affirmation of faith and then seeks to express it in meaningful concepts. Thus, Heim more so than all our other selected thinkers is free from the charge of applying to God the notion of human transcendence, i.e. of applying to God the negation of human finitude or mutual dependence. At the same time, it will be seen that Heim does employ terms which amount to a negation of human finitude to express God's transcendence, but, again, this is a matter of expression rather than of derivation.

Thus, in regard to all of our selected theologians and philosophers (again excepting Sartre), we conclude that the notions of God's transcendence are not simply those of human self-transcendence although each man's expression of God's transcendence makes use of his treatment of human self-transcendence or world-transcendence.

While we may accept the aims and expressions of the doctrine of God's transcendence which we have examined, we must also see that they pose many difficult questions, and
we must now consider some of these which have arisen in our investigation. Is one correct in saying that God is being-itself rather than a being? Is being-itself simply an abstraction? If all we can say of God or Transcendence or the Numinous is that 'It is', in what way does God differ from nothingness? Indeed, is it possible to worship such a God?

To equate God with Being-itself does indeed safeguard Him from being lowered to the level of beings, but it might be objected that what we experience is not Transcendence or Being-itself. Indeed, philosophers, such as Sartre, contend that there are only inter-worldly transcendencies and worldly beings. To them the step from beings to Being-itself as their ground, or from inter-worldly transcendencies to Transcendence that encompasses them, is as unwarranted as the jump from finite existence to a Self-existent God who created them. Does not this notion of God, they argue, simply create a new terminology for the supernatural world of a discarded Weltanschauung? In some sense we must answer yes to this last question, since transcendence must be transcendental, but this does not necessarily mean that a new 'supernatural' world has been arrived at by abstraction. If Tillich, Jaspers, Otto or Buber simply sought to argue from the world to Being-itself, Transcendence, the Numinous or the External Thou, then their positions would differ from those of St. Thomas Aquinas and Mascall only in the starting point for their
argument. However, no such construction is undertaken by them. Each of these men seek to express the notion of God's transcendence in terms of 'beings', 'schema' or 'thous' following a faithful apprehension or prehension of God's reality. This reality is indeed expressed in terms which may appear as abstractions from worldly beings, transcendences or I-Thou relations, but they are not arrived at by mental abstraction; nor are they seen simply as abstractions from concrete instances. They are 'known' realities.

Further, it is the approach by which these men arrive at the notion of a transcendent God that distinguishes such a God from nothingness. As an abstraction there would be little, if any, difference between God and nothingness, but, as an encountered reality, there is seen to be positive reality in Being-itself, Transcendence, the Numinous and the Eternal Thou. Here, I think we must recognize a valid distinction between knowing and knowing about. These two kinds of knowledge are not mutually exclusive or even incompatible, but one may well 'know that' without 'knowing what'. Hence, Jaspers, Otto and Buber see as the most positive of all realities the fact that God is, but all three men are unwilling to say what God is.

(66) See above, p.119.
   Otto, op. cit., pp.30;39;139.
   Buber, Eclipse of God, pp.62;84.
However, can one worship such a God -- a God who simply is? In some sense, yes. One may adore that which fascinates and abashes one. One may obey that which summons and sends one. One may be thankful towards that which supports one as one's ground of being and meaning. But, can one love Being-itself, Transcendence, Presence as power and overwhelming might? Can one love such a transcendent God? Can one ever say of such a God that He is Love?

The proper direction is which to seek an answer to these questions would seem to be along the lines already suggested in our consideration of the Logos doctrine. God's acts reveal God not simply as Being-itself, as Transcendence, as Presence as Power, but as Temple suggests, as Father. God's ways, His summons and sendings are indicative of His nature of love. God's Being pro nobis is characteristic of His Being a se.

These considerations point to the inadequacy of any notion of transcendence that fails to acknowledge the reality of God's out-going and self-giving nature, and it would appear to us that the reality of God's action is denied, or at least so greatly weakened as to be tantamount to being denied, when sharp distinctions are made between God's face or God a se and God's ways or God pro nobis. Two implications arise out
this assertion. First, if God's Being pro nobis is thought of as a 'second class' mode of His Being, then it would appear that the meaning and, indeed, reality of God's revelation is denied. If God's acts are not revelatory of His essential nature, then it would appear that such revelation is not really a revelation of God, but one that applies only to God's accommodation of Himself to men. Secondly, any treatment of transcendence that fails to acknowledge the reality of God's action would appear to result in such a strong assertion of transcendence as to be open to the danger of affirming a remote God. Now, it is true that the distinction between God a se and God pro nobis is made in order to express and safeguard God's action in the world, but any distinction that sharply separates God's essential nature and His 'manward' nature actually results in asserting that not God, Himself, is active but only God's accommodating and adapting nature. Thus, when we say that our answer must be along the lines suggested by the Fourth Evangelist's Logos doctrine, we mean that in God's acts one may see the activity and revelation of God Himself. Although we may accept the distinction between God a se and God pro nobis insofar as it seeks to express the facts that God's Being is not exhausted by His activity and that one's knowledge of God's acts is not exhaustive of His nature, we cannot accept
such a distinction if it implies that there is some
difference of quality between God a se and God pro nobis.
Any such sharp distinction makes God's revelation less than
a revelation of His true Being and makes His action other
than His action.

It would appear to us that God's acts reveal God a se
no less than they reveal God pro nobis. Thus, any treat-
ment of God's transcendence in ontological terms must allow
for God's activity in personal terms. In this study we
investigated the doctrine of God in terms of ontology and
concluded that the doctrine of God's transcendence as per-
ceived by faith must be recognized and expressed as an
ontological transcendence. We also investigated the
doctrine of God in regard to God's presence and activity in
the world, in regard to His 'meeting' men and revealing
Himself to them, and concluded that faith recognizes God
Himself as present to men and active in the world, i.e. that
God Himself is pro nobis. These two areas of our study
pointed out that both aspects of Deity must be preserved by
the doctrine and expression of God's transcendence.

Thus, we conclude that any adequate treatment of
God's transcendence must allow for God's ontological
transcendence; and to this end, expressions such as
'Being-itself' or 'Transcendence' are legitimate and neces-
sary in presenting God as qualitatively transcendent of all
beings. At the same time, however, any adequate treatment of God's transcendence must allow for the reality of God's out-going and self-giving action, which the Christian sees supremely executed and revealed in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aquinas, Thomas</td>
<td>The Summa Contra Gentiles</td>
<td>Literally translated by the English Dominican Fathers from the latest Leonine Edition First Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd., 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Summa Theologia</td>
<td>Part I, Third Number (QQ. LXXV-CXIX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>London: Thomas Baker, 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baillie, D. M.</td>
<td>God Was In Christ</td>
<td>London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baillie, John</td>
<td>Our Knowledge of God</td>
<td>London: Oxford University Press, Seventh Impression 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth, Karl</td>
<td>Church Dogmatics, Vol. III, Part 2</td>
<td>Translated by Knight, Bromley, Reid and Fuller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Edinburgh: T. &amp; T. Clark, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bevan, Edwyn</td>
<td>Stoics and Sceptics</td>
<td>Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buber, Martin</td>
<td>Between Man and Man</td>
<td>Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>London: Kegan Paul, 1947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Buber, Martin:

I And Thou
Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
Second Edition 1958

Mamre: Essays In Religion
Translated by Greta Hort
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
1946

Moses
Oxford: East and West Library, 1944

The Prophetic Faith
Translated from the Hebrew by
Carlyle Witton-Davies
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949

The Writings of Martin Buber
Selected, edited and introduced by
Will Herberg

To Hallow This Life
An Anthology edited by Jacob Trapp
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958

Two Types of Faith
Translated by Norman P. Goldhawk
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.,
1951

Bultmann, Rudolf:

Das Evangelium des Johannes
Gottingen: Dondehoed and Ruprecht,
1950

Essays Philosophical and Theological

Existence and Faith
Selected, translated and introduced by
Schubert M. Ogden

Gnosis
London: Adam and Charles Black, 1952

Jesus and the Word
Translated by Louise Pettibone Smith
and Erminie Huntress Lantero
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958
Bultmann, Rudolf,

Jesus Christ and Mythology
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1960

Myth and Christianity: An Inquiry into the Possibility of Religion without Myth

Primitie Christianity in its Contemporary Setting
Southampton: The Camelot Press, 1956

London: SCM Press, 1952


Burkitt, F. C.,

Church and Gnosis: A Study of Christian Thought in the Second Century
Cambridge University Press, 1932

Champigny, Robert,

Stages on Sartre's Way
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959

Charles, R. H.,

(Translator and Editor)
The Book of Enoch
London: SPCK, 1917

D'Arcy, M. C.,

Thomas Aquinas
London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1930

Diamond, Malcolm,

Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist
New York: Oxford University Press, 1960

Dodd, C. H.,

The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel
Cambridge University Press, 1958

Driver, S. R.,

The Book of Genesis
London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1911

Drummond, James,

Philo Judaeus or the Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion, Vols. I, II
London: Williams and Norgate, 1888
London: Lutterworth Press, 1944

Fairweather, E. R., (Editor and Translator) A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham  
London: SCM Press, 1956

Friedman, M. S., Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue  
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955

Gilson, Etienne, The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas  
Translated by Rev. G. A. Elrington  
Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons Ltd., 1924

Godet, F., Commentary on the Gospel of St. John, Vol. I  
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1876

Harris, Rendell, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel  
Cambridge University Press, 1917

Harvey-Jellie, W., The Wisdom of God and the Word of God  
London: James Clark and Co., 1911

Heim, Karl, Christian Faith and Natural Science  
Translated by Neville Horton Smith  
London: SCM Press, 1953

God Transcendent  
Translated from the third edition by E. P. Dickie  
London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1935

Heim, Karl, Jesus The Lord: The Sovereign Authority of Jesus And God's Revelation In Christ  
Translated by D. H. van Daalen  
London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959
Heim, Karl, Jesus The World's Perfecter: The Atonement And The Renewal of The World
Translated by D. H. van Daalen
London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959

Heinemann, F. H., The Transformation of the Scientific World View
Translated by W. A. Whitehouse
London: SCM Press, 1953

Henderson, Ian, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament
London: Adam and Charles Black, 1953

London: SCM Press, 1952

Jaspers, Karl, The Doctrine of the Trinity
London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1943

Myth and Christianity: An Inquiry into the Possibility of Religion without Myth

Philosophie, II 'Existenzerhellung'
Berlin: Springer-Verlag OHG, 1956

Reason and Anti-Reason In Our Time
Translated by Stanley Godwin
London: SCM Press, 1952

Reason and Existenz
Translated by William Earle

The European Spirit
Translated by R. Gregor Smith
London: SCM Press, 1948

The Origin and Goal of History
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953

The Perennial Scope of Philosophy
Translated by Ralph Manheim
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950
Jaspers, Karl,  
Tragedy Is Not Enough  
Translated by Reiche, Moore and Deutsch  
London: Victor Gollanz Ltd., 1959

Kant, Immanuel,  
Truth and Symbol (from Von Der Wahrheit)  
Translated by Wilder, Klubaek and Kimmel  
London: Vision Press Ltd., 1959

Lightfoot, R. H.,  
St. John's Gospel: A Commentary  

Luthardt, C. E.,  
St. John's Gospel, Vol. I  
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1876

Macgregor, G. H. C.,  
The Gospel of John  
London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1928

McIntyre, John,  
St. Anselm And His Critics  
Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1954

Macquarrie, John,  
An Existentialist Theology  

Marx, Werner,  
The Meaning of Aristotle's 'Ontology'  
The Hague: Martinices Nijhoff, 1954

Mascall, E. L.,  
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946

Existence and Analogy  
A Sequel to "He Who Is"  
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949

He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism  
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1943
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher and Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mounier, Emmanuel</td>
<td><em>Existentialist Philosophies: An Introduction</em></td>
<td>London: Rockliff, 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translated by C. D. Yonge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rad, von Gerhard,</td>
<td>Genesis: A Commentary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translated by John H. Marks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rankin, O. S.,</td>
<td>Israel's Wisdom Literature: Its Bearing on Theology and the History of Religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edinburgh: T. &amp; T. Clark, 1936</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1926</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lund: Hakan Ohlssons Bactryckeri, 1947</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts, David E.,</td>
<td>Existentialism and Religious Belief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York: Galaxy (Oxford University Press), 1959</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanday, William,</td>
<td>The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sartre, Jean-Paul,</td>
<td>Being And Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translated by Hazel E. Barnes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1957</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existentialism And Humanism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translated by Philip Mairet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literary and Philosophical Essays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translated by Annette Michelson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London: Rider And Company, 1955</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Norman Kemp</td>
<td>A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason</td>
<td>London: Macmillan &amp; Co. Ltd., 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Vincent</td>
<td>The Names of Jesus</td>
<td>London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dynamics of Faith</td>
<td>London: George Allen &amp; Unwin Ltd., 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Courage To Be</td>
<td>London: Nisbet &amp; Co. Ltd., 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theology of Culture</td>
<td>Edited by Robert C. Kimball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Protestant Era</td>
<td>Translated and Edited by James Luther Adams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title and Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bevan, Edwyn</td>
<td>&quot;Introduction to the English Translation&quot;, God Transcendent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmet, Dorothy M.</td>
<td>&quot;Epistemology and the Idea of Revelation&quot;, The Theology of Paul Tillich,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferre, Nels F. S.</td>
<td>&quot;Tillich's View of the Church&quot;, The Theology of Paul Tillich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuchs, E.</td>
<td>&quot;Logos&quot;, Die Religion In Geschichte Und Gegenwart,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dritte Auglage, Vierte Band, Kop-0, pp.434-440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tubingen: J. G. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartshorne, Charles</td>
<td>&quot;Tillich's Doctrine of God&quot;, The Theology of Paul Tillich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoffman, Kurt</td>
<td>&quot;Basic Concepts of Jaspers' Philosophy&quot;, The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edited by Paul Arthur Schlipp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holm, Søren</td>
<td>&quot;Jaspers' Philosophy of Religion&quot;, The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edited by James Hastings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edinburgh: T. &amp; T. Clark, 1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaspers, Karl</td>
<td>&quot;Philosophical Autobiography&quot;, The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Reply to My Critics&quot;, The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kaufmann, Fritz, "Karl Jaspers And A Philosophy of Communication", The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers

Knauss, Gerhard, "The Concept of the Encompassing in Jaspers' Philosophy", The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers


Kunz, Hans, "Critique of Jaspers' Concept of Transcendence", The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers

Latzel, Edwin, "The Concept of 'Ultimate Situation' in Jaspers' Philosophy", The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers


Lichtigeld, A., "The God-Concept In Jaspers' Philosophy" The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers

Mollegen, A. T., "Christology and Biblical Criticism in Tillich", The Theology of Paul Tillich

Niebuhr, Reinhold, "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theology", The Theology of Paul Tillich

Randall, John H., Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich", The Theology of Paul Tillich

Ricoeur, Paul, "The Relation of Jaspers' Philosophy to Religion", The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers
    Edited by James Hastings
    Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1909

Thomas, George F., "The Method and Structure of Tillich's Theology",
    The Theology of Paul Tillich

Thyssen, Johannes, "The Concept of 'Foundering' in Jaspers' Philosophy",
    The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers