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"John Locke, the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" presented for the degree of M. Litt., by David S. Thoms.
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INTRODUCTION

When the political theory of one man has been variously described as advocating a natural law theory, egoism, absolute subordination to majority rule, capitalism, anarchy, Hobbesianism and Calvinism, as well as the denial of natural rights and natural law, then it is obvious that the interpretation of his work is no simple matter. All the above descriptions have been applied to the writings of John Locke who has probably been interpreted in more ways than any other political philosopher. In view of this it might seem foolhardy to enter upon a further interpretation especially in the (at first sight) unlikely terms of the title of this thesis. However there is plainly a need for some attempt to resolve the contradictions in Locke, and while I do not expect to resolve all of these or to solve all the problems inherent in interpreting his theory, I hope to make some progress towards a reconciliation of some of the contrary views of Locke.

An idea of the extent of the divergence of opinion about Locke's political philosophy can be gleaned from an examination of some recent books and articles written about him. One example of what Charles Monson,1 calls a "non-traditional" interpretation of Locke is in Leo Strauss's "Natural Right and History" which gives an account of Locke which, for purposes of analysis, Monson reduces to three assertions: "First Locke is not a natural law theorist; second, he is a Hobbesian; and third, his egoism is also demonstrated by his account of property rights".2

C. B. Macpherson, Monson points out, makes out a very cogent case for treating Locke as an advocate of capitalism which is a theory close to Strauss's and also divorced from the traditional view of Locke. Monson also mentions the "non-traditional" views of Willmoore Kendall, who sees

2. ibid p. 120.
Locke as "assigning to the whole community unlimited power", and Charles E. Vaughan, who sees Locke as allowing "each person ... to dictate his will to the state." Mackpelson who, as I have mentioned, interprets Locke as being a spokesman for capitalism, also points out this divergence of opinion about his real theory. He mentions as being in the same group of interpreters as Vaughan, Leslie Stephen, Laski and Tawney. Outside this group, but still holding "non-traditional" views of Locke, there is, apart from Kendall, J. W. Gough, and of course himself. Since the publication of Macpherson's book "The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism" in 1962, and Monson's article, in 1958, there has been at least one other important new interpretation of Locke, that of John Dunn in his book "The Political Thought of John Locke." He sees Locke in yet another way, as being part of the Calvinist-Puritan tradition. This interpretation of Locke is one of the most interesting and, when taken in conjunction with Macpherson's brilliant analysis of Locke's arguments about property, depicting them as essentially pro-capitalist, suggests an interesting possible reconciliation.

Max Weber, in his famous book "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", has already tried to show that historically there was a causal link between the ethic of ascetic Protestantism and the growth of a capitalist spirit. Given that Locke has been seen by Dunn and by Macpherson as belonging to the Puritan tradition and as expounding a capitalist viewpoint respectively, some reconciliation between at least these two apparently opposed conclusions might prove to be possible. It is this possibility which I wish to explore and this explains the connection of the three elements in the title, John Locke, the Protestant ethic, and the spirit of capitalism. What then has to be shown before

3. see Willmoore Kendall "John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule" (Urbana, Illinois U.P. 1965)
it is possible to claim some success in this reconciliation? Firstly it has to be shown that the supposed relationship between Protestantism and capitalism is a valid one. That is to say, I shall have to explain Max Weber's theory and assess its validity. Before I can use his arguments about the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism I shall have to show that it is reasonable to suppose that such a relationship does exist. This I shall deal with in Chapter I which will be concerned exclusively with Max Weber's thesis and the opposition to it expressed by other writers.

Even if an acceptable "Weberian" theory can be elicited this in itself is not sufficient to justify my decision to rely on it as a framework for a study on Locke. As I suggested the connection of Locke with a Weberian theory may seem surprising, (although a recent article on Locke by Hundert does deal with elements reminiscent of Weber's thesis in relation to Locke, without however mentioning Weber himself). The connection is, I believe, a reasonable one and in Chapter 2 I shall try to show the relevance of the chosen framework to a study of Locke. Since the possible relevance of Weber's theory was suggested by the works of Macpherson and Dunn, I shall, in the chapter, deal primarily with these two writers, pointing out some inconsistencies in their work or valid objections to their views which might make a reliance on either of them alone unsatisfactory.

The central part of the thesis will naturally be an examination of the writings of John Locke and this will be begun in Chapter 3. However, in the light of the first two chapters, this examination of Locke will be conducted in a specific way. The method which I shall use will be historical in that I shall examine Locke's place in the historical development of the seventeenth century and in particular his place in the

development of religious, of economic and of political thought. His writings will be compared with those of others prior to, and contemporary with, himself. This historical study will, of course, be carried out within the framework of Weber's thesis.

Chapter 3 will undertake an examination of Locke's supposed relationship to the Protestant ethic. It will try to see to what extent Dunn's interpretation of Locke is a justifiable one. In the chapter I shall study Locke's specifically religious writings, his letters and any other relevant material with a view to constructing as accurate a picture as possible of his view of those aspects of religion, of the Church, and of human life in general which are typical of the ascetic Protestant religions which Weber deals with in his book.

In Chapter 4 I shall naturally concentrate on the other element in the possible reconciliation, the spirit of capitalism, and an attempt will be made to see whether, and to what extent, Locke's views justify Macpherson's interpretation of his theory as being essentially pro-capitalist. Here Locke's specifically economic writings will be considered along with other relevant writings and other information, in order to form an overall picture of his economic viewpoint.

If we find a justification for a Puritan interpretation of his religious ideas and a capitalistic interpretation of his economic opinions, the way will be open to attempt a reconciliation of these two elements in Locke's thought within the chosen framework of Weber's thesis. The three apparently disparate elements of the title will, it is hoped, have been brought together to form, in Chapter 5, a cogent theory.

If this project proves to be successful something will, I feel, have been achieved in the interpretation of Locke's philosophy. His writings were on many different subjects from epistemology to medicine, from religion to economics and it would be impossible to summarise all his views within one neat theory. However if some aspects of his political
philosophy can be clarified through the use of Weber's theory then some of the confusions, which at present exist about Locke's views, might be removed.
CHAPTER I

"The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism"

In this chapter I shall examine Weber's thesis and criticisms and modifications of it. I shall try to assess the validity of the criticisms made of Weber, and see whether by considering his theory and certain modifications to it, suggested by other writers, a viable "Weberian" theory of the relationship between ascetic Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism can be found.

The main exposition of Weber's thesis is to be found in "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" (which was published in the form of two articles in the "Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik" in 1904 and 1905) and in a subsequent article which appeared in 1906 under the title of "the Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism".

The central question which Weber tries to answer is, says Tawney, "simple and fundamental". It is, he says, "that of the psychological conditions which made possible the development of capitalist civilization". This, of course, raises the question of the validity of seeking any explanation of capitalist civilization in psychological terms, but I will leave aside this possible line of criticism for the moment and concentrate on those "psychological conditions" which Weber did see as being instrumental in the development of capitalist civilization.

Weber's central concern is the examination of the development of modern western capitalism which, in the sense in which Weber uses the expression, is essentially a new phenomenon. The pioneers of this new economic order were, Weber argues, parvenus who, as Tawney puts it, "elbowed their way to success in the teeth of the established aristocracy of land and commerce." The "tonic" that "braced" them for the conflict

2. ibid.
was a new conception of religion, which taught them to regard the pursuit of wealth as, "not merely an advantage but a duty."\(^3\)

This central claim, that Calvinsim and ascetic Protestantism in general, produced the psychological basis necessary for the development of capitalism, the belief that, as a pamphleteer in 1671 said, "there is a ... natural inaptness in the Popish religion to business, whereas, on the contrary, among the Reformed, the greater their zeal, the greater their inclination to trade and industry",\(^4\) is the theme that is developed in Weber's book. In talking about capitalism and the reasons for its development it is important to define exactly the way in which one is using the term. For Weber capitalism, defined in some ways, has always existed. Acquisitiveness is not something new, nor is the presence of large business undertakings involving the manipulation of large financial resources which will yield riches to those who use these resources. Speculation and money-lending are not new phenomena either. But modern western capitalism, as an economic system, is something new. An economic system which rests on the organization of legally free wage-labourers, for the purpose of financial profit, by the owner of capital, and which pervades every aspect of society is, for Weber, a modern phenomenon.

This "rational industrial organization, attuned to a regular market, and neither to political nor irrationally speculative opportunities for profit is not, however," says Weber, "the only peculiarity of Western capitalism."\(^5\) This type of organization would not have been possible without two important economic factors, the separation of business from the household and the development of rational book-keeping. The characteristic of capitalistic economic action is that it is based on the "expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange".\(^6\) This

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3. ibid. p.2.
4. ibid. p.6.
5. ibid. p.21.
6. ibid. p.17.
means that the action is of a sort which systematically uses goods or personal services as a means of acquisition in such a way that, at the close of a set business period, the assets exceed the original capital outlay. The reasons for the development of this type of economic activity, which he calls modern capitalism, are not according to Weber based on technological improvements. They are the result rather of a new ethic. It is this ethos, or spirit of capitalism which is, Weber says, exemplified in the writings of Franklin and which sees profit-making as an end in itself rather than as a means to enjoying the benefits of the profits earned, which Weber sees as the basis of the new economic order.

The best way to get a clear view of Weber's arguments is to examine what he actually says in the "Protestant Ethic" in some detail. I shall do this by dealing in turn with the main points of the theory and this will, in general, take the form of a chapter by chapter analysis although this will, at times, be forsaken if one aspect is dealt with by Weber in different parts of the book.

In Chapter 1, "Religious Affiliation and Social Stratification", Weber claims that, in general, business leaders and owners of capital are overwhelmingly Protestant. He points out that there is surprisingly little participation by Catholics in the business life of modern Germany. This he finds surprising and contrary to the normal tendency of minorities to enter into economic activity because they have little opportunity for political participation. Since Protestants both when they were the dominant class and when they were a minority had shown this tendency towards business, towards economic rationalism, the main explanation, says Weber, must lie in the "permanent, intrinsic character of their religious beliefs and not in their temporary external historic-political situations."7 It is this apparent combination of a talent for business with deep religious convictions which Weber wishes to emphasize. He cites as one example a

7. ibid. p.40.
group such as the Mennonites, who were tolerated in East Prussia, because they wore "indispensable to industry", despite their "absolute refusal to perform military service".

In Chapter 2, "The Spirit of Capitalism", Weber concentrates on providing a "provisional description of what is here meant by the spirit of capitalism". What is meant is expounded by Weber in the words of Benjamin Franklin that "time is money ... that credit is money ... that money is of the prolific generating nature". One is enjoined by Franklin to remember the saying that the "good paymaster is the lord of another man's purse". Franklin's moral principles appear to be essentially prudential. He urges honesty and condemns idleness, because the former is to one's benefit, in that it enables one to obtain credit, and because the latter is to one's detriment, in that it deprives one of making money and of increasing one's money by further dealing. Weber, however, emphasizes the fact that these views of Franklin constitute a particular ethic. He is not simply advising on matters of "business astuteness", but is laying down rules whose "infraction is not treated as foolishness but as forgetfulness of duty". To justify the morality of profit-making Franklin turns to the Bible and to the book of Proverbs. For him the dictum, "seest thou a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before kings" supplies the Biblical and moral justification.

The essential feature for capitalistic development is the acceptance of work as a duty. This is more important than the degree of economic development or the mere impulse to make money. To offer high wages to a labourer, while it offers him the opportunity to make money, does not, in itself, suffice for the needs of capitalist development. The main

8. ibid. p.44.  
9. ibid.  
11. ibid.  
13. ibid.  
14. ibid.  
15. Proverbs XXII 29.
obstacle to this development is rather a lack of dedication to work. "As every employer knows," Weber tells us, "the lack of conscienciositas\textsuperscript{16} of the labourers of such countries, for instance Italy as compared with Germany, has been ... one of the principle obstacles to their capitalistic development"\textsuperscript{17}. What was lacking was a sense of "calling", a belief that there was a moral duty to labour.

This new spirit of capitalism is one aspect of what Weber sees as the development of Western rationalism and this subject is such an important one for Weber that at this point I shall break off from the study of the chapters of the "Protestant Ethic" in chronological order, so as to be able to discuss Weber's treatment of rationalism in a unified way. The first point to make about his treatment of the subject is that he is not entirely consistent. His main statement of the "many-sided development of Western rationalism" comes in pages 13 to 26 of the introduction to the "Protestant Ethic". He concentrates on the factors which differentiate the West from other civilizations. Paragraph 2 begins; "only in the West does science exist at a stage of development which we recognize as valid",\textsuperscript{18} and later, "the Indian geometry had no rational proof",\textsuperscript{19} and "the Indian natural sciences lacked the method of experiment".\textsuperscript{20} Similarly in the field of law, "the strictly systematic forms of thought so essential to a rational jurisprudence"\textsuperscript{21} exist only in the West, and in particular in Roman Law. The same, he argues, is true of capitalism in its modern Western form. In this form it is identical with the pursuit of profit, and continually renewed profit, "by means of continuous rational capitalistic enterprise".\textsuperscript{22} Where capitalistic action is rationally pursued the action is adapted to a "systematic utilization of goods"\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} conscientiousness.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Weber op. cit. p. 57.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} ibid. p. 13.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} ibid. p. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} ibid. p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} ibid.
\end{itemize}
or personal services "for the purpose of maximizing profit".  

One distinguishing feature of rational action seems, then, to be that it is systematic and in the case of economic action, this is exemplified by the fact that all activity is geared to the achieving of a maximum profit at the end of a certain business period. Weber, at one point, then, seems to say that the West alone has developed a Rational outlook which is characterised by a reliance on the systematic method of dealing with specific problems, be they mathematical, legal, or economic. However Weber also points out that rationalisation in this sense can cover a world of different things, because one can "rationalize life from fundamentally different basic points of view, and in different directions". Clearly then any system of thought, in the East or the West, could be seen as rational from its own point of view. The fact that something is treated systematically will be no proof that it is being dealt with in a way which Weber would call rational in the Western sense. Many doctrines based on the supposed effects of magic rituals are within their own context extremely systematic.

While Weber is, then, unclear in his discussion of rationalism, we can give some picture of his general point of view. Any particular doctrine, or belief, or mode of action, can be systematic, or rational, from its own point of view. In the West, however, a specific type of rationalism has developed. Ineffective doctrines and practices, such as magical ones, have been replaced. Science and jurisprudence have been developed and are rational in the specifically Western sense of being well adapted to their end. Certainly they are systematic, but they are also effective. The methods of science, of experimentation, are well adapted to the end of science, the testing of general laws. Similarly, the methods of modern Western capitalism are well adapted to the end, the maximization of

24. ibid. p. 18.
25. ibid. p. 78.
profit. Weber's arguments are not always consistent, but it is the development of a specifically Western type of rationalism which he is generally concerned with.

In Chapter 3, Weber deals with Luther's conception of the calling, in the sense of a life-task, of a definite field in which to work. This concept brings out the central dogma of all Protestant denominations, namely that the only way of living acceptably to God is not to attempt to surpass worldly morality in a monastic life, but is rather to fulfil the obligations which are imposed by one's position in the world: that is by one's calling. For Luther, this concept of a calling remained traditionalistic. A man's calling was something he had to accept as dictated by God, and his task was to adapt himself to it. This is not the view of the calling which is to be found in Calvin, and it is with the Calvinistic religions that Weber begins his study of "ascetic Protestantism".

In Chapter 3 Weber also gives a clear indication of the range of his study, and he defines what he is trying to show and what he is not concerned to try and prove. Although he wishes to examine the connection between Calvinism and capitalism, he points out that we should not expect to find, in any of the founders of the religious movements which he is dealing with, any favourable pictures of a capitalist economy. His aim is not, he says, to show that the spirit of capitalism could only have arisen from certain effects of the Reformation, or even that capitalism as an economic system is a creation of the Reformation. "On the contrary", he says, "we only wish to ascertain whether, and to what extent, religious forces have taken part in the qualitative expansion of that spirit over the world". Weber anticipates possible criticism along the lines that

26. ibid. p. 91.
capitalism is older than the Reformation by accepting the point but stating that he is interested in the "formation of an essentially new 'spirit of capitalism' and not in isolated pre-Reformation capitalistic organizations." 27

In Chapter 4 Weber turns his attention to the different branches of ascetic Protestantism and for us the important part of the chapter is his section on Calvinism, and its doctrine of predestination, a doctrine central, Weber notes, to many branches of Puritanism, though not to the Baptists, Quakers or Methodists nor, as we shall see later, to Locke. On the doctrine of predestination Weber quotes the words of the Westminster Confession of 1647, which says in Chapter IX, "man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all ability to any spiritual good accompanying salvation. A natural man is not able by all his own strength to convert himself or to prepare himself thereunto", 28 and in Chapter III, "by the decree of God some men and angels are predestined unto everlasting life and others fore-ordained to everlasting death." 29

Milton's belief that "though I may be sent to hell for it, such a God will never command my respect", 30 reflects a changing view of the doctrine of predestination which I shall examine later in relation to Locke's views on free will. For the moment, a detailed examination can be delayed, and the doctrine of predestination treated as central to the Calvinistic religion. Those who have been elected by God are in the world solely to increase the glory of God. For Calvin, who himself felt certain of his own election, the Question of how an individual can know if he is one of the elect is not capable of a conclusive answer, except through the individual's experience of his faith. We should, in Calvin's view, be content

27. ibid.
28. ibid. p.99
29. ibid. p.100
30. ibid. p.101
with the knowledge that God has made the choice and depend further on
the implicit trust in Christ, which is the result of true faith. For
the broad mass of men this answer seemed really to be no answer at all,
and the need for "certitudo salutis" was of dominant importance. Practi-
cital pastoral work had to deal with this problem every day of the week
and, Weber says, generally two types of pastoral advice appear: It is
first of all an absolute duty for everyone to believe that he is one of
the chosen. Secondly, in order to attain this self-confidence, intense
virtuous activity in one's daily life is advocated. This can be seen,
as Weber points out in a note,31 in, for example, the conclusion of
Baxter's "Christian Directory". In Calvinism and Puritanism the most
important value lay in an active Christian life of hard work in a calling.
In Methodism too, as the name suggests, the emphasis was laid on the
methodical, systematic nature of conduct for the purpose of attaining
the "certitudo salutis".

For Weber's purpose, and for ours at this point, the different
branches of ascetic Protestantism can be considered together. The
common central point in every branch is that "the conception of the state
of religious grace", is present, "which marks off its possessor from the
degradation of the flesh, from the world".32 It was attained differently
in different doctrines, and in Baptism, as in Methodism for example, the
gift of Salvation came through individual revelation which was available
to everyone who "waited for the spirit" and did not resist its coming.
It could not, however, be guaranteed by magical sacraments, by relief in
confession, or by isolated good works. What was demanded as evidence of
being in a state of grace was, what Weber calls, ascetic conduct, which
demanded a "rational planning of the whole of one's life in accordance
with God's will".33

31. ibid. note 47 of Ch. IV.
33. ibid.
Having decided to treat ascetic Protestantism as a whole, Weber decides further to take, as a representative of this type of Protestantism, an English Puritan, Richard Baxter, whom he uses as a focal point for his concluding arguments. Baxter will later be considered in more detail when, in Chapter 3, I shall be concerned with Locke's near contemporaries in the field of religious writing. Much of his work, and the part which Weber is chiefly concerned with, is on the subject of wealth and its inherent dangers. Its pursuit is, he says, senseless when compared with the importance of the Kingdom of God. The real danger of wealth, of excessive possession, is the possibility of idleness and of "temptations of the flesh". Wasting time is the first, and in principle the most serious, of sins. In a spiritual sense, Benjamin Franklin's dictum that time is money is anticipated in Baxter. The important biblical text for Baxter is the words of St Paul that, "he who will not work shall not eat", a dictum which holds unconditionally for everyone. Any profits which accrue from one's labour are gifts of God and should be treated as such. The acquisition of wealth is actually seen as a performance of one's duty and is only wrong if it is acquired for the wrong purpose, for later living merrily and idly. For ascetic Protestantism the parable of the talents seems to aptly express their main tenets. Man, as a trustee of the goods acquired by him through God's grace, must account to God for everything entrusted to him.

Weber sees Protestant asceticism as, in general, "acting powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of life", thereby restricting consumption, while at the same time removing the traditional objections to the acquisition of wealth and treating accumulation as not just permissible but obligatory. Given this encouragement to capital accumulation, when the acquisition of wealth is encouraged but its normal corollary,
increased consumption, is condemned, then a boost to the capitalistic economic system of investment, and re-investment, will occur. This ethical stimulus, in conjunction with certain economic changes, such as the separation of business and family spheres and the introduction of rational book-keeping, will lead to the development of "capitalistic economic man".

Weber sees an essential paradox in this analysis, and he expresses this through the words of John Wesley. "I fear", says Wesley, "that whenever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion ... religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches. Methodists in every place grow diligent and frugal; consequently they increase in goods. Hence they proportionately increase in pride, in anger .... So, although the form of religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away.35 The business man was allowed to pursue his pecuniary interests and feel he was performing a duty, and the Puritan ethic also provided him with conscientious workers who saw their labouring as a life purpose willed by God. This view of labour under the capitalist system, as a spiritual end in itself, contrasts sharply with the Marxian picture of the worker being alienated from, and by, his labour.

In the final pages of his book Weber sums up his argument: "One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that, but of all modern culture: rational conduct on the basis of the calling, was born - that is what this discussion has sought to demonstrate - from the spirit of Christian asceticism."36 Weber has used Franklin to elucidate the main elements of the attitude which he

35. from Southey "Life of Wesley" Chapter XXIX quoted in Weber ibid p. 175.
calls the spirit of capitalism and these elements, Weber says, are the same as those he has just shown to be "the content of the Puritan worldly asceticism, only without the religious basis, which by Franklin's time had died away." 37 By Franklin's time the religious content had died away, money, and the pursuit of money was seen as an end in itself, but it was still seen as a duty. It was a duty to pursue money for its own sake and not for one's own sake.

In the final paragraph Weber forestalls some possible criticisms by admitting the limitations of his intentionally restricted theory. He accepts that he has dealt with only one aspect of the problem, and that it would be "necessary to investigate how Protestant Asceticism was in turn influenced in its development ... by the totality of social conditions, especially economic". 38 He accepts, that is, that there must be a two-way process of mutual influence between religious and economic factors, a point which R. H. Tawney develops more fully, and to some extent in opposition to Weber.

I have spent some time summarizing Max Weber's work on the "Protestant Ethic" because this will form the framework for subsequent chapters, and I have dealt with Weber's central concepts, such as rationalism, the calling and predestination because they will be of considerable importance later. I shall devote the rest of this chapter to criticisms and adaptations of Weber's thesis before moving on to Locke. The reason for considering criticisms is that we wish to carry forward as a framework a viable theory of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. I shall deal basically with two sorts of criticisms. Firstly I shall deal with certain recurring objections to Weber which, if they were valid, would make our reliance on his thesis unsatisfactory. Secondly, I shall deal with criticisms which can be said to add to Weber, or

37. ibid.
38. ibid. p. 183.
improve his thesis, rather than to deny his basic arguments. As a source of destructive criticism I shall mainly rely on H. K. Robertson's "Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism" because this work contains several standard, recurring criticisms of Weber which, if valid, would refute Weber's arguments. I shall, then, now turn to Robertson's arguments.

There are in Robertson three main lines of criticism which I wish to examine. Firstly, he argues that, contrary to Weber, capitalism is nothing new, that capitalistic economic organization existed before the Reformation. Secondly, he claims that Weber has ignored non-Protestant capitalists and, more importantly, has disregarded elements in other religions such as Catholicism which would have been as favourable to capitalism as ascetic Protestantism. Thirdly, Robertson believes that it is unreasonable to consider Puritans as creating capitalism, when so many of them were openly opposed to capitalist ideas. These types of criticism are recurring ones in work on Weber, and for convenience I shall deal with them in the form in which Robertson discusses them.

On the first point, Robertson argues that "if it is true that modern capitalism is the product of a new spirit of capitalism introduced with the Reformation, it must necessarily follow that there was no capitalism before that time". This however is not quite what follows. Had he said that there could have been no modern capitalism before the Reformation he would have been correct in his logic. To say that because modern capitalism is post-Reformation, there can be no capitalism of any sort pre-Reformation is surely to miss the distinction which Weber, and Robertson, make between early capitalism and modern rational

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39. H. M. Robertson "Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism" (Cambridge 1933) part of which appears in Robert W. Green "Protestantism and Capitalism" (Boston 1959) to which pages numbers will refer.
40. ibid., p. 76.
capitalism. Weber himself rejects the claim that capitalism could only have arisen from the Reformation or that capitalism is a creation of the Reformation. He agrees that certain forms of capitalistic organization can be found in the Middle Ages. Robertson takes Sombart's definition of capitalism, as an economic system with certain characteristics: it is based on exchange, relies on two classes (the owners and the labourers), and is ruled by the principle of gain; and argues that these elements could be found in the Middle Ages. The point, however, which Weber, and Sombart, are making is that it is only in Modern Western capitalism that these elements are widespread. It is only in the post-Reformation Western world that a true propertyless wage-labouring class emerges, and it is only in modern times that the pursuit of wealth is seen as an acceptable aim. Tawney also points out this decisive break between the Middle Ages and the post-Reformation period in the attitude to money-making. He talks of the break, in Calvin's time, from the tradition of "regarding a preoccupation with economic interests 'beyond what is necessary for subsistence' as reprehensible which had stigmatized the middleman as a parasite and the usurer a thief". Robertson agrees with Sombart, and with Weber and Tawney, that there was a "rise of rational capitalism" characterised by an impersonalisation of capital, and a freedom to invest. He sees the cause of this as being scientific, the introduction of new methods, rather than religious, the result of a new ethic. However the fact that a new sort of capitalism did emerge surely substantiates, rather than denies Weber. Robertson can

41. ibid. p. 80.
43. Robertson op. cit. p. 80.
disagree about the reasons for its growth but hardly about its existence.

A large part of Robertson's work is concerned with the second criticism which I mentioned, the fact that in his view Protestantism is not particularly favourable to capitalism. His first point is not about religious doctrine but is about Weber's restricted view of capitalists. Weber, he says, "hardly considers any capitalist other than the Puritan capitalist". 44 This he says "vitiates Weber's whole argument", but a few paragraphs earlier says of this "narrowness of definition" 45 that he does not "propose to press this line of criticism very far". 46 As it stands the criticism cannot, I feel, be pressed very far, for the existence of non-Protestant capitalists is never denied by Weber who also stresses that one would not expect to find in Puritans, or Calvinists, a defence of capitalism. What Weber is concerned with is the effect of certain central doctrines of ascetic Protestantism on economic life. It is in the question of doctrine that there is a serious possible criticism of Weber. If, as Robertson claims, there is "no essential difference between the doctrine of the Catholics and the Puritans on the calling" Weber's thesis will be in serious difficulty.

Robertson quotes extracts from Catholic doctrine, including St Thomas Aquinas, in an attempt to show that the doctrine of the calling and the need for worldly asceticism are not specifically Puritan beliefs. This is, however, an important difference in the doctrine in Catholicism and in Puritansim. It may be true that there is, in Aquinas' teaching on distributive justice, a conception of a calling, when he talks of "the division of men in different occupations ... through divine providence ... and also ... from natural causes as a result of which it happens that there are different aptitudes for different occupations among different men", 47 but this is scarcely the Calvinist conception of the calling.

44. ibid. p. 66.
45. ibid. p. 67.
46. ibid.
47. ibid. p. 69.
To work in one's calling is seen as a relatively minor duty, having no such immediate connection with eternal salvation as is accorded it by Calvinism. There is, besides, a great difference between a doctrine being present in the teachings of a religious writer and it being adopted as the property of a mass movement, as happened in Puritanism. Catholicism may emphasize the importance of a worldly occupation but, as C.H. and K. George point out, it is the Protestant who must "demonstrate his quality while living in the world, and busying himself with its tasks". It is in Protestantism that a central place is given to the idea of man as a "social and total being". The Protestant's "high road to salvation ... advertises these positive aspects of the world which the Catholic tradition denies".

The Georges also point out a difference between Protestantism and Catholicism on the question of poverty, which is in the Catholic tradition "positively to be sought". This is very far removed from the Puritan view of man as having a duty to work and to accept the fruits of that work. There may be elements in Catholicism which would be conducive to work but there is a major difference in their attitude to Saint's days, to holidays and to begging from the Puritan ethic of work. The Puritan aversion to begging and the belief that all time, including Saint's days or any other days, is valuable and should not be wasted are not to be found amongst Catholics in general.

If it is true that a spirit of hard work in a calling did have a decisive influence on the growth of capitalism, then it is, I think, true that this cannot be found in any other religion than Protestantism in any great degree. It is only in ascetic Protestantism that the doctrines

49. ibid.
50. ibid.
51. ibid.
52. See Christopher Hill "Puritanism and Revolution" (London 1958).
supposedly favourable to capitalism gain universal acceptance and are rigorously applied.

Robertson's third main criticism is, I think, easily answered. He accuses Weber of portraying capitalism as "not a natural growth, but a cross construction of the Calvinist mind", and as evidence against this view he quotes Puritan literature, which is very anti-capitalist. The point is that in ascribing to Weber a view that capitalism was deliberately "constructed" by Calvinists he is misrepresenting him completely. Weber does not claim that the Calvinist mind "constructed" a capitalist form of social organization. Calvinists, as Weber says, were no champions of capitalism. Yet Robertson is clearly suggesting that this creation of capitalism is deliberate, when he chooses the term "construct", which does not refer to something which can be done accidently. His use of anti-capitalist Puritan literature is further evidence that what he is trying to refute is the view that Puritans deliberately favoured capitalism. This view was, of course, not Weber's.

The three criticisms of Robertson's can, then, I believe, be answered, although a full study of the validity of Weber's thesis is obviously the task of a book and not part of a single chapter. There is, however, I think, sufficient evidence to accept Weber's view that modern capitalism was essentially new and that it was in Puritanism that the doctrines, which he saw as favourable to capitalism, held a central place.

Before turning to Tawney, I want to mention briefly a criticism, made by M. M. Knappen, of Weber's treatment of the doctrine of predestination. This is contained in a note, taken from Knappen's "Two Puritan Diaries", which appears in M. J. Kitch's "Capitalism and the Reformation", and for all its brevity it raises an interesting point. Knappen casts doubt on Weber's claim that a large number of people had worrying doubts about whether or not they had been saved. It seems strange to Knappen that a man should be driven to "superhuman exertions to make sure of

53. Robertson op. cit. p. 84.
something which his efforts cannot affect in the slightest". The fact is, however, that concern for assurance was very definitely a central concern in, for example, Scottish Calvinism, and it is not really in the least unnatural to wish to know one's fate even if one cannot control it. However it does seem obvious that it would also be natural to wish to control one's fate, and although Weber treats predestination as central to ascetic Protestantism it is clear that there was a shift away from this in later Puritan writers, including Baxter. If it can be established that for later Puritans work in a calling was seen not only as a means of attaining assurance, but of actually attaining salvation, then, by adapting Weber's thesis, it will be strengthened rather than weakened. This shift in emphasis from work aimed at assurance, to work aimed at salvation is also dealt with by R. H. Tawney whom I shall now consider.

Tawney agrees with Weber that a change can be seen in the way in which economic transactions were viewed between medieval theorists and the writers of the post-Reformation period. As Tawney says, "the medieval theorist condemned as a sin precisely that effort to achieve a continuous and unlimited increase in material wealth which modern societies applaud as meritorious". Tawney stresses that economic changes were beginning to take place before any religious sanction for them was present. Religious thinkers were faced with a changing economic pattern, the expansion of trade, the development of foreign exchange and the charging of interest. According to Tawney the attitude which the Calvinists took to these changes was one of acceptance. "Calvinists", he says, "started from a frank recognition of the necessity of capital, credit and banking, large scale commerce and finance, and other practical facets of business life". The extent of the Calvinists' enthusiasm for business is not of course as

55. Tawney op. cit. p. 35.
unqualified as Tawney suggests here. We have already seen that Robertson is able to produce many examples of Puritan opposition to capitalism. However it is true that in general the main features of commercial civilization come to be taken for granted by religious writers. Wealth was being accumulated and had religious writers continued to attack this they would have risked losing their influence. Tawney's point is that if the accumulation of money is accepted the writers could try to legislate for its proper use. Tawney believes that certain aspects of Calvinism can be seen as a response to economic changes, and in this he would include the non-hostile attitude to accumulation.

What is the implication of this for Weber's conception of the "Protestant ethic"? In the first place, not all aspects of the "ethic" can be seen as accomodations to economic changes - the central doctrines of the calling, and frugality and hard work cannot be seen as the acceptance of a pre-existing bourgeois ethic, and this is accepted by Tawney. We can see this by looking at Luther's work which contains no acceptance of capitalist economic organization, and yet contains an ethic of hard work.

But what of the "ascetic Protestant" attitude to accumulation? I suggest that, while not itself actually enjoined by Calvin, it is clearly a development of the central duty of labour in a calling. When work in a calling is seen as a means of attaining assurance about one's salvation then the profits accrued from this labour come to be seen as important and the accumulation of profit comes to be seen as a duty and a sign that one is fulfilling one's duty to labour. If one accepts the duty to labour and to be frugal then one would seem to have a duty to accumulate.

Why, then, it may be asked, does no duty to accumulate appear in Lutheranism? The reason for this is probably to be found in the differing
attitudes to predestination in Luther and, for example, Calvin. In Calvinism, as explained above, it was through preoccupation with predestination that systematic work in a calling was connected with salvation in a way which did not occur in Lutheranism.

We can, then, I think, agree with Weber that the central doctrines of ascetic Protestantism were not simply a response to economic changes but rather developed independently and by advocating virtues which were conducive to capitalist organization, can be seen as playing a decisive role in the development of modern capitalism. It is this "Weberian" relationship between Protestantism and capitalism which I shall use as a frame of reference for future chapters.
CHAPTER 2.

"The Relevance of the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism to Locke"

Having tried to disentangle a usable framework from Weber and his critics, I would like in this chapter to explain and justify the choice of that framework. This must of necessity be a prima-facie justification, since the only full justification of any framework is that it helps our understanding of the particular subject. This cannot be claimed at this stage in the thesis but there are good grounds, in terms of existing work on Locke, for studying his philosophy in the terms chosen.

In this chapter I shall examine the writings of two conflicting theorists, John Dunn and Professor C. B. Macpherson. John Dunn, in his book "The Political Thought of John Locke", argues primarily that "it is in the traditional concept of the calling that the key to Locke's moral vision lies". In Dunn's view, Locke lies within the tradition of ascetic Protestantism, and he quotes from Locke views which are in many respects very similar to those of Richard Baxter, whom we have already seen as Weber's chosen representative of Protestant asceticism. Professor Macpherson, on the other hand, in his book "The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke", and in several articles, argues very differently. His view of Locke is, as Dunn says, as one of the "great systematizers of possessive individualism". Macpherson himself sees Locke's work as "providing a moral basis for a class state from postulates of equal individual natural rights".

Since, of the two books, Dunn's is the more recent and therefore has the advantage of being able to include criticisms of the opposing viewpoint, it will be advantageous to look firstly at Macpherson and then

2. Ibid. p. 262.
at Dunn, treating their views, for the moment, in the way Dunn himself
does, as being irreconcilably incompatible.

While the main arguments will come from Macpherson's book, mentioned
above, some of the basic assumptions on which he is working, and a large
part of the theoretical basis for his theory, can be found in articles,
one of which, "The Maximization of Democracy", is particularly useful for
clarifying his views on Locke.

In this article Macpherson discusses two "maximizing claims" for
Western or Liberal democracies, namely the "claim to maximize individual
utilities and the claim to maximize individual powers". These two dif-
ferent maximizing claims indicate two different conceptions of the essence
of man. If the maximization of utilities is seen as the ultimate just-
ification of society, man is seen as being essentially a consumer of util-
ities. On the other maximization claim, that of maximizing individual
powers, the view of the essence of man is different. He is seen, "not
as a consumer of utilities but as a doer, a creator, an enjoyer of human
attributes". The essence of man is, therefore, in one case activity,
and in the other case consumption. As to the historical distribution of
these conceptions of man, Macpherson sees the "activity concept" as
coming back as a reaction to Benthamism and as having earlier been dom-
inant from Aristotle to the seventeenth century. However, with the emer-
gence of the modern market society, "this concept of man was narrowed and
turned into almost its opposite", and the "consumption concept" became
dominant. Man became an individual appropriator to satisfy an unlimited
desire for utilities. "Man", says Macpherson, "became an infinite appro-
priator and an infinite consumer; an infinite appropriator because an

4. C. B. Macpherson "The Maximization of Democracy" in Peter Laslett and
W. G. Runciman "Philosophy, Politics and Society" (third Series) (Oxford
1967) p. 84.
5. ibid.
6. ibid. p. 85.
infinite desirer". The next line settles any doubts about where in this historical oscillation Locke might be placed. "From Locke to James Mill", he states, "this concept of man i.e. as an infinite appropriator became increasingly prevalent".

By this statement Macpherson unequivocally shows himself to be viewing Locke as an "appropriator" and not as a "doer", a view very different from Dunn's. For Dunn, who sees Locke as a Puritan with a Puritanical insistence on the necessity for labour, the essence of man must, in Locke, be activity and not appropriation. In Puritanism appropriation is acceptable but only as a result of activity and not as an end in itself. One does not become an appropriator because of an infinite desire for consumption, one becomes an appropriator rather as a result of satisfying an infinite desire for activity.

These two views of the "essence of man" form the theoretical basis for Macpherson's more detailed analysis of Locke in his "Theory of Possessive Individualism" which I shall now look at.

His detailed examination of Locke begins with an examination of Locke's argument for a natural individual right to property. "Locke begins, "according to Macpherson, "by accepting as the dictate both of natural reason and of Scripture that the earth and its fruits were originally given to mankind in common". This is not, in fact, strictly speaking Locke's starting point. In the "Second Treatise on Government", Locke's initial position is that God gave men life and the means of subsistence. The right to property is in fact a deduction from this original gift of God. This view of the earth as something given to mankind in common is, however, as Macpherson says, a traditional view which can be

7. ibid.
8. ibid.
found alike in medieval and seventeenth century Puritan theory, but which Locke accepts only to refute the conclusions normally drawn from it. Individual appropriation becomes possible by removing anything out of its natural state, by mixing one's labour with it. By mixing his labour with it, a man makes it his property "since every man has a property in his own person". 11

This is the initial position, but there are in Locke two explicit limitations to this appropriation. "As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a property in". 12 This "no waste" limitation is the primary one in Locke. Locke also holds that "there must be enough and as good left for others", 13 a condition which Macpherson seems to consider as a limitation on appropriation of equal status with the "no waste" limitation. But for Locke it is derivative from the latter. Locke is saying that, assuming that everything a man appropriates is used, and nothing is wasted, there will be enough left over for others. This stress on the avoidance of waste is in itself significant in relation to Locke's general ethos, as we shall see when we look at Dunn. There is also a third implied limitation which, Macpherson says, Locke never argued for, and that is that property must be procured by one's own labour.

These initial limitations are, however, transcended when money is introduced. Every man would have only as much as he could make use of "had not the invention of money and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it introduced (by consent) larger possessions and a right to them". 14 Obviously there is no possibility of money spoiling, although one might ask why anyone would wish to accumulate more money than they needed. Macpherson seeks the answer to this in Locke's economic policies and in

11. ibid. sec. 27.
12. ibid. sec. 31.
13. ibid. sec. 27.
14. ibid. sec. 36.
particular in his interest in trade. The accumulation of money was important in quickening and increasing trade, and the desire for more money than is immediately necessary is not the miser's desire to hoard. The main function of money is to act as capital and the purpose of capital is not to "provide a consumable income for its owners but to beget further capital by profitable investment".  

This view of Locke, however, seems to contradict what Macpherson says in the "Maximization of Democracy", where he argues that from Locke to James Mill the new concept of man as an "infinite appropriator and an infinite consumer, an infinite appropriator because an infinite desirer" becomes increasingly prevalent. Here he seems to be explicitly denying that this is Locke's view. He attributes to Locke a view of money as capital, not as something to provide a consumable income. Indeed in "Possessive Individualism" he is really aligning Locke with those who see the essence of man as activity. However Macpherson's idea appears to be that market society leads to a distortion of the kind of activity seen as man's essence, i.e. it becomes appropriation - and this because man is seen as an infinite desirer and consumer. The point is that the activity ceases to be for its own sake, it becomes a means to increasing consumption. A crucial question here is, of course, whose consumption, that of the accumulator of the capital or that of society in general? The implication of Macpherson's version of Locke is that the accumulator enables others to consume, and so the justification of his activity remains consumption even if not his own.

Macpherson omits to mention one important point about this view of Locke, namely that it is quite in keeping with seeing him in the Puritan tradition. Puritanism, as I showed in Chapter 1, not only accepted the accumulation of the fruits of labour but condemned the refusal to accept the profits from legal business enterprises since these were gifts of God.

although Macpherson might suggest that this was simply an accommodation
to market society. The objection to hoarding and the rejection of accum-
ulation simply as a means to one's own consumption which Macpherson
attributes to Locke are clearly in line with Puritan beliefs. Macpherson
in fact, at one point, places Locke very close indeed to Puritanism.
"When Locke discussed economic activity", Macpherson says, "it was gen-
erally from the point of view of the nation's rather than the individual's
wealth". If we look at this from the religious rather than from the econ-
omic point of view we can see that it is entirely consistent with Purit-
amism. If man is on earth to labour for the glorification of God; if the
fruits of that labour are to be accepted as gifts of God; if excess of
consumption is condemned, then God may best be glorified by employing the
surplus as capital, not to increase individual consumption, but to benefit
the community, a duty which is explicitly stated by, for example Calvin,
who argues that labour ought to be performed for the "advancement of the
whole community".19

It is possible that Locke was looking at the question of accumulation
from a religious, and not, as Macpherson argues, from an economic point
of view. There is in fact an essential contradiction implicit in the
Puritan point of view. While the contradiction between the acceptance of
income and the hostility to consumption can be resolved through saving
and investment this cannot be so easily done when one comes to talk of
money being used to raise the general standard of living. If one works
for the benefit of the community there seems to be no way in which they
will benefit except by an increase in consumption. There does seem to be
a certain economic naivety in a doctrine which condemns consumption, and
yet enjoins activity to raise the standard of living of the community.

18. ibid.
There is a similar contradiction in capitalism. The individual works hard, but he himself does not enjoy the benefits through consumption. The community in general is supposed to benefit, although how it can, except through consumption, is difficult to see.

This inherent inconsistency runs throughout Puritan writers and it would not be surprising to find it in Locke. Macpherson, however, does not see Locke's aim as religious, he sees it as to justify the "specifically capitalist appropriation of land and money" and also as he argues later to justify the existing class structure.

Turning then to the "sufficiency limitation", Macpherson points out that the original limitation that one must leave "enough and as good for others" is also overthrown. In a revision in the third edition of the "Two Treatises", Locke says that "he who appropriates land to himself by his labour does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind ... He that encloses land and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from ten acres than he could have from a hundred left to nature may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind". 20 That is to say that the greater productivity of appropriated land makes up for the lack of land left over for others. As Locke says, "a king of a large and fruitful territory there among several nations of the Americas feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day labourer in England". 21 There may not be enough and as good land left for others but there is as good, and indeed a better, living left for others. The right to unlimited appropriation is not restricted by any necessity to leave as much and as good land for others.

The third supposed limit on appropriation, i.e. that one may appropriate only what one has mixed one's labour with was, Macpherson argues, never put forward by Locke. This is so because, for Locke, a man's labour is so unquestionably his own property that he is perfectly free to sell it for a good wage, and labour thus sold becomes the property of the buyer. Locke, then, treats not only the existence of a commercial

20. Locke "2nd Treatise" op. cit. sec. 37.
21. ibid. sec. 41.
economy, but also the wage relationship as natural, i.e. as present in the state of nature in Locke's peculiar sense of the latter as part "historical imagination and part logical abstraction from civil society". If men are rational enough to enter civil society, then one can presume that they are rational enough to enter into a commercial and wage relationship.

For Locke a commercial economy in which all the land is appropriated implied the existence of wage-labour with a class of labourers who were forced to live from hand to mouth, but according to what he says elsewhere even they were better off than a savage king. Supporters of capitalist production of whom, in Macpherson's view, Locke was one, were he charges, not troubled by the dehumanizing effects of labour being made into a commodity. Unfortunately Macpherson blandly assumes the Marxist view that labour being treated as a commodity does have a dehumanizing and alienating effect on the labourer. He ignores the contrary view, to be found in Puritanism, that labour in a calling is the chief vehicle of a meaningful life on earth, whether this calling is the running of a large business or labouring for a set wage. Macpherson simply uses the word "capitalist" as a pejorative, forgetting that, especially in the seventeenth century, the capitalist system might have been seen by its defenders to be one of general benefit to all strata of society.

Locke's "achievement" in his discussion on property is summed up by Macpherson thus: "Locke has done what he set out to do. Starting from the traditional assumption that the earth and its fruits had originally, been given to mankind for their common use, he has turned the tables on all who derived from this assumption theories which were restrictive of capitalist appropriation. He has erased the moral disability with which unlimited capitalist appropriation had hitherto been handicapped .... He does even more than that. He also justifies as natural a class differential in
rights and rationality and by doing so he provides a positive moral basis for capitalist society".23

On the first "achievement", Macpherson's detailed analysis of Locke's arguments on property is not seriously questioned by Dunn and I shall deal more fully with it in Chapter 4. Dunn's main criticism of Macpherson is of his ascription to Locke of a theory of differential rationality based on class and here I think Macpherson's treatment is in many ways unconvincing. In support of his assertion Macpherson argues that Locke, while assuming the labouring class to be a necessary part of the nation, denies that its members are full members of the "body politic". He also assumes that the working class are incapable of living a fully rational life. Locke's proposals for the able-bodied unemployed are, says Macpherson, fairly well known, and fairly savage. Masters of work-houses were to be encouraged to make them into "sweated-labour" establishments. Locke is said to have seen unemployment as stemming, not from economic factors, but rather from moral depravity. As support for this Macpherson quotes from a report made by Locke in 1697 as a member of the "Commission on Trade". The multiplying of the unemployed was caused, says Locke, by "nothing else but the relaxation of discipline and corruption of manners"24. Macpherson's point, that Locke's treatment for the ills of unemployment was extremely severe, is perfectly valid. It is also very much in keeping with the views of someone of a strong Puritan belief who saw idleness, the failure to labour, as the principle sin. However it is not the unemployed who are relevant to Macpherson's thesis, it is the labouring class, and the two seem to have been made synonymous by Macpherson which clearly they are not.

Macpherson does say that by the term "labouring class" he means to include both the "labouring poor" and the "idle poor" because neither has any property. There is however a greater difference between these two

23. ibid. p. 221.
classes than Macpherson is willing to admit, and Locke's prescriptions for the unemployed would not necessarily be prescriptions for the propertyless wage-labourer.

However let us turn to Macpherson's arguments about the difference in rationality between the propertied and the non-propertied. In the "Reasonableness of Christianity" Locke assumes, according to Macpherson, that the members of the labouring class are incapable of a rational life. This work Macpherson dismisses as being nothing more than a plea for the returning of religion to a few simple articles of faith, which the labouring and illiterate man could understand. "The greatest part", says Locke himself, "cannot know and therefore must believe".25 This may be one plea in the work, but its main tasks are certainly entirely different. Its aim is, in fact, to show firstly that religion is reasonable, as the title might suggest, and that it is essentially simple and therefore open to all men. Its purpose is also to show why, in view of the fact that Natural Law amply demonstrates the truths of Christianity, revelation is still necessary. To dismiss it as an attempt to simplify religion to make it acceptable to the illiterate is to misunderstand its purpose and to dismiss as a piece of propaganda, a serious work on religion.

Macpherson suggests that there is a certain similarity between Locke's alleged view of the poor as being something less than full members of the Stack, and the Calvinist view of the non-elect as being in one sense members and, in another sense, non-members of the church. The non-elect, he argues, were "mainly, though not entirely, co-incident with the non-propertied".26 Macpherson does not pursue this very far but, since we are concerned very much with the question of Calvinism, his reference for his view is interesting. As justification for this view of English Puritanism he refers the reader to Christopher Hill's "Puritanism and Revolution", which in a chapter on William Perkins does cite this theory of the dual conception of the church. "The elders in the church were",

Says Hill, "overwhelmingly drawn from the propertied minority", and this, he argues in a foot-note, follows from the Calvinist definition of the elect. "They, i.e. the propertied, are the serious, educated minority, those who have sufficient leisure and learning to exercise themselves about whether they are saved or not". This however does not, as far as I can see, show that only the propertied can be members of the elect. They may indeed have the leisure and learning to exercise themselves about whether they are saved, but surely in their leisure they may learn that they are not amongst the elect. Hill concludes that some amount of property and worldly security appears to be a minimum condition without which salvation is impossible and he quotes Perkin's as arguing that beggars are, for the most part, a cursed generation. There is, as I have already said, an important difference between beggars and the employed but propertyless labouring class; but it is true that for Perkins success in the world is seen as a sign of election. In this way those who have been successful and who have accumulated property will indeed be members of the elect. This of course will not apply to inherited property. It would be very strange if any Puritan writer were to associate the mere possession of inherited property with election, when a central concern of Puritanism is the necessity of everyone, whether they have inherited riches or not, to labour. It is the labouring which has the moral worth and not the possession of property.

Macpherson sees in Locke a change in what is considered to be rational conduct. The rational and industrious man is "he who labours and appropriates". Is the essence of this rationality, however, as Macpherson claims, the appropriating or is it not perhaps the labouring? Appropriation is rational, in the moral sense of being required by the law of God or the law of Reason. This is Macpherson's interpretation of Locke's view but he fails to mention that Locke stresses that what is compelled by the law of God is not appropriation at all, but labour. As Locke says of those who have no financial need to labour: "tis yet certain that by the Law of God
they i.e. everyone are under an obligation of doing something", and this insistence that God demands work is present throughout Locke. Macpherson, however, insists on allying rationality with appropriation rather than with labouring. When they become separated, he says, full rationality goes with appropriation. Locke, he complains, has read back into man's original nature a rational propensity to unlimited accumulation. What I have tried to point out here is that although he may have sanctioned unlimited accumulation, as Macpherson says, this does not necessarily mean that he associated rationality with this accumulation. A fuller study of Locke is obviously necessary before this can be fully answered, and this will be dealt with in the succeeding chapters.

In discussing Macpherson's work I have not been attempting a full critical examination of his arguments. I have been trying to demonstrate that there is some evidence for an interpretation of Locke as exemplifying a capitalist spirit. I have also been trying to show that there are confusions in Macpherson's work and that some of the views he attributes to Locke are specifically rejected by him. I have been trying to show that, on an initial reading of Macpherson, it is reasonable to believe that Locke did exemplify a capitalist spirit, but that contrary to Macpherson it was capitalism in the Weberian rather than the Marxian sense. That is to say that it was the capitalism based on an advocacy of work, of accumulation and of investment but not of the oppression of the labouring classes nor their inferiority to the accumulating classes.

John Dunn's book "The Political Thought of John Locke" has the twofold purpose of refuting some of Macpherson's arguments and of setting up an interpretation of Locke based on the belief that Locke's philosophy should be understood through the concept of the calling, in which the key to "Locke's moral vision lies". Keeping Macpherson in mind I shall now deal with Dunn and his view of Locke.

30. See Lord King "Life of Locke" (London 1836) I p. 181.
One major difference between Dunn and Macpherson is in their analysis of rationality in Locke. There is no reason to suppose, says Dunn, that Locke believed the "life of unlimited capitalist appropriation to exemplify a greater level of moral rationality than the life of the devout peasant"; although he does at another point admit that Locke's attitude to capitalist appropriation was, in many ways, "extravagently permissive". In Puritan ethical beliefs, which, he says, Locke held, intention is of central importance. It is not so much a question of what is done (unless it is directly harmful to someone else,) but why it is done which is important. This, however, contradicts much of what Locke says. What one does is, for Locke, very important, and there is in his writings a strict utilitarianism. One must pursue a task which is beneficial to the community in general. However, in his opposition to Macpherson's view that rationality and riches are conjoined, Dunn is supported by Locke's own view that virtue and prosperity are seldom co-incident.

Dunn sees a continuing thread in Locke's writings on labour. Human life is defined by a set of duties, and our main duty is "sincerely to do our duties in our calling". As for Macpherson's arguments for differential rationality, they seem unlikely, unless one ascribes to Locke a belief that rationality and industry are necessary conditions for the inheritance of wealth, surely an unlikely position. Because Locke takes the set of social roles as given, Macpherson is led into the mistake of inferring that he must be moralizing the social structure as a whole which, Dunn says, Locke is not doing at all. There is a difference between accepting the social situation as a datum, and giving it moral approval. For Dunn, labour in Locke is to be seen as an element of the calling, a concept which he argues remains basically unchanged in Locke from earlier Puritan thought. The

32. ibid.
abandonment of the medieval ethic with its simple taboos created an
"oppressive need for the re-discovery of some palpable index of salvation."

Because of this the strains of physical labour came to have, what Dunn calls
on "apodictic quality" by which he seems to mean that labour was taken
as a means of showing that one had been elected.

Dunn accepts the point that this would obviously be very convenient
for those who had projects for extensive accumulation. It would provide
a docile and conscientious labour force, the sort of labour force which
Weber pointed out was missing in Catholic countries such as Italy. What
he denies is that Locke spent year after year trying to "rescue the intell-
ligibility of the Christian faith because he was anxious to preserve or pro-
mote the docility of the labour force". This is an essentially different
approach to that of Macpherson, who sees Locke as deliberately providing a
moral basis for capitalism. Dunn does see Locke as fighting, not for cap-
itlalism, or for the class system, or for the right of the propertied to
unlimited appropriation, but instead for "the meaning of most men's lives".
It was for this that he was fighting his "epistemological and theological
battles". He was not, on Dunn's view, embracing the present world as
morally adequate, but was trying instead to "transcend the inequalities of
this world" by using the next world. It must be said, however, that Locke's
concern was not entirely in transcending the present world, and while his
religious battles may have been for the "meaning of men's lives", he does,
in the "Second Treatise", give a fairly strong impression of someone con-
cerned to fight for the capitalistic right of unlimited appropriation.

Dunn, having explained some objections to Macpherson, and, in
passing, to Leo Strauss both of whom he accuses of seeing Locke's theories
as packaged in a sort of "religious polythene" which if ripped off reveals

34. Dunn on cit. p. 220.
35. ibid.
36. ibid.
37. ibid. p. 221.
38. ibid.
39. ibid.
the "secular contours" thinly hidden beneath, goes on to explain his own positive thesis. His aim is to show that the theology is, in Locke, not the wrapping, but the centre of his philosophy.

He begins his analysis with an explanation of the calling which, since I have discussed it before in Chapter 1, and will have cause to deal with it again, I shall not dwell on here. One point which has not been raised before, is the ambiguous role of leisure in the calling. Recreation and rest are seen as essential to enable one to fulfil one's life's task, but they are so only in so far as they are genuinely subsidiary to this main task. Physical labour for anyone, or study for those capable of it, constitute this main task, as we have seen. Idleness, as opposed to recreation, was seen as a sin and the difference between them was principally one of motive. If one rested in order to refresh oneself and prepare for future work this was seen as acceptable, whereas if one rested out of laziness this was seen as slothful and therefore sinful. In an important respect this concept of the calling was very egalitarian, although not in a secular sense, since it did not propose the destruction of existing social hierarchies. It did however reject the doctrine prevalent in medieval thought, which is called by Ernst Troeltsch the "cosmos of callings". That is to say that in the Calvinist doctrine it was not the case that one calling was higher or more worthy than another. All men were equal as Christians, and all men's responsibilities were also equal. No particular calling was sinful, what was sinful was a life, not of work, but of begging. Beggars were seen as "committing ... a sort of sacrilege in cloaking their idleness with the name of Christ". 40

In Chapter 17 of his book Dunn questions Macpherson's interpretation of part of Locke's "Reasonableness of Christianity" on which he bases his
construction of differential rationality. Macpherson's evidence is the passage where Locke talks of the convenience of the Christian revelation as a disciplinary instrument over those who "cannot know and therefore must believe." However Dunn argues that it is the "full deductive system of the Law of Nature" which they cannot know and this ignorance is not exactly unique. This inability is shared by every pre-Christian, and conceivably every Christian moral philosopher, including Locke himself. Macpherson's claim is that Locke believed that crude indoctrination was a necessary weapon in the preservation of political order in the seventeenth century in England. This Dunn refutes by pointing out that Locke's stated view was precisely the opposite and that he held that it was the ignorance of the majority which threatened political order by allowing ambitious rabble-rousers to raise revolts. Greater literacy and more study would lead to greater stability, rather than less, and to more widespread happiness.

It is easy to find in Locke, Dunn says, many instances of his "unsurprised recognition" of the very oppressive features of seventeenth century England, although, on the other hand, we can see him as a champion of liberty, in particular liberty of conscience. Locke did wish to promote an enlargement of human freedom, but not in a way which demanded any egalitarian social revolution. This was so primarily because there was nothing in his experience which made such a possibility credible.

In Chapter 18 Dunn develops his own views more fully, and tries to tie in Locke with the concept of the calling. "His analysis of the calling", he says, "takes as a datum the intructability and oppressive social sanction of the existing social structures." The freedoms for which Locke is struggling are those which are necessary for the execution of the responsibilities of the calling. No human authority was justified in encroaching

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41. Works op. cit. (1759) ii p. 580.
42. Dunn op. cit. p. 234.
43. ibid. p. 245.
on an individual's religious understanding. This however, despite what Dunn says, is not Locke's view. His toleration of religious belief stopped short at Catholics and atheists, whom he saw as inimical to the security of the country. Catholics owed their allegiance not to their own country but to Rome, and atheists did not have the same religious sanction on them to fulfil their obligations to society, which meant that neither could be tolerated with safety.

Dunn stresses that the law of reason is, for Locke, a moral law and that therefore, since unlimited appropriation is at best a morally perilous calling, it cannot be the essence of rationality. He describes two co-existent views of Locke on what could be called a capitalist economic system. Locke saw, says Dunn, that "covetousness in a money economy had accentuated many forms of human corruption", 44 which he viewed with considerable disquiet. He also saw, however, that it had "led to a rise in the Standard of living", which he viewed with considerable enthusiasm. The difficulty of squaring this enthusiasm for a rising standard of living, with a hostility to consumption has already been mentioned and, as I said earlier, it seems to be an inherent inconsistency in Puritanism. 45

On Dunn's interpretation of Locke in terms of the calling it can be seen that rather than trying to justify the structure of capitalist society, Locke was arguing that it is not one's duty to commend or to condemn the structure of the society in which one lives. One's duty is to execute "the duties of the station ... to which one is called". 46 This seems to imply a very static view of the social structure and moreover a view of the calling in line with the traditional Lutheran, rather than the Calvinistic, interpretation of it. The latter, as Weber talks of it is dynamic rather than static, in that one chooses one's calling and, although Dunn seems to be talking about something preordained, it is clear that Locke saw it as a matter of choice. 47

44. ibid. p. 248.
45. See above p. 31.
46. Dunn op. cit. p. 248.
47. See below Ch. 3 note 66.
Dunn asks what would happen to Locke's theory if the "religious polythene wrapper" were removed, if, as he says, "the religious sanction and purpose were to be removed". If this were done the purpose of human life, both individual and social, would be the maximization of utility (although it might be truer to say that this would be a by-product of labour as an end in itself). The essence of man would, on the former hypothesis (which is Dunn's subject here) be Macpherson's "maximization of individual utilities" rather than his "maximization of individual powers." It seems improbable, however, Dunn continues, to believe that Locke would have supposed the "maximization of utility" to have been generated by the existing power structure of seventeenth century England. The crucial question was that of religious equality of opportunity, which was compatible with great social inequality. This social inequality itself becomes a target when, and only when, it encroaches on the callings of individuals, which in Locke's own case was that of being a scholar.

This belief that one should be free to choose one's calling seems to demand a fairly large degree of social mobility, and equality of opportunity. In his work on education Locke does argue that training can make men fit for more responsible tasks and also, perhaps, enable them to achieve the social positions in which they can carry them out. His treatise "Some Thoughts Concerning Education" was, says, Hundert, "written for the benefit of the gentry although the tract dealt with the nature and rearing of children per se and was, thus, rightly seen to have universal application". He stresses, significantly, that industrious activity is the vehicle for character building and he argues that one has to work hard in order to learn. If this treatise is to be universal it seems that all men should have the opportunity of being educated, so that they will be able to develop their own particular qualities.

In the "Essay Concerning Human Understanding", we find Locke's view of the initial intellectual equality of men. Having rejected the possibility of innate ideas, Locke postulates the idea of the mind as being, at birth, a "tabula rasa" and he argues that its development depends upon received experience. This experience can best be made use of by "diligent application and moral restraint". Locke sees industriousness, then, as the "catalyst of human development". Early training in industriousness makes people industrious in later life, and so enables them to rise to higher positions in society as well as fitting them for these positions.

What Locke may have insufficiently considered is the fact that in the social structure of seventeenth century England very few people would be able to obtain the appropriate education and so the education of the working class, while desirable, would be impracticable. Locke was not, however, putting forward a static view of society or trying to defend the privileged position of the property owners. Moreover his view of the mind as being initially a "tabula rasa" removes any possibility of his seeing rationality as being co-existent with the ownership of property, for while property can be inherited, rationality, on this theory, clearly cannot. Far from advocating the subordination of the working-class, and their indoctrination, Locke's arguments were in favour of, and were used to support, the education of the working class.

There is however, in Locke, as Dunn says, a theory of differential rationality, but of quite a different sort. In fact there are two types of differential rationality. One is the distinction between those who laboured in their calling and thereby lived according to the law of reason, and those who, on the other hand, lived sinfully in self-indulgence. There is

50. Ibid.
no reason whatever to believe that this differential was in any way correlated with class in Locke's writings. The second form of differential rationality, is the distinction between those who are capable of sophisticated analysis in any field, and those who are not, and there is no reason to believe that the former are any more religious than the latter.

Locke is concerned, then, says Dunn, primarily with the individual's salvation and it is to this end that labour in a calling is necessary. This is the main purpose of one's life on earth although one should not always have one's mind on the future life. One needs to pursue the necessities of life on this earth, one should, as Dunn says, be concerned with "terrestrial utility" which should be pursued within the context of a calling.

Dunn's theory is, in the same way as Macpherson's, rather one-sided. Just as Macpherson deals rather shabbily with Locke's religious views, Dunn does not deal satisfactorily with Locke's treatment of property rights. He recognises the brilliance of Macpherson's arguments about Locke's treatment of property, and while he claims they are misleading, he does not refute them, and gives no satisfactory analysis of his own. He accepts that there is every reason to believe that Locke held that the relations of capitalist production and monetary exchange provided a basis for the emergence of vast, but just, differentials in the ownership of property. There is not, in Dunn's view, sufficient reason to suppose that he wished to claim the sanction of natural law for all, or even most, of the instances of property held under English law. It is true, he admits, that Locke makes property a "pure private right" but this in no way impairs the social responsibilities attaching to ownership. It is true, too, says Dunn, that Locke had a considerable income, from his position as an absentee
landlord and from his position as a stockholder in several companies, such as the slave-trading Royal Africa Company; but his theory of property as based on "the labour of man's body and the work of his hands" cannot be seen as a reflection of his own position or as a defence of it. This is the case, says Dunn, because his theory does not provide any defence to his own position. Had his concern been to defend his own position he would have constructed a theory for this purpose and not one based on the "labour of a man's body". What did drive him to his position on property was, says Dunn, a "polemical crux" with Filmer. He sees Locke as being concerned in the "Treatises" with refuting two Filmerian arguments, that allegiance is a purely natural relationship based on the right of fathers to impose duties on their children, and secondly that political obligation derives from the contingency of being born in a particular geographical area. The treatment of property in Locke seems to be seen by Dunn as part of Locke's argument against Filmer's view of political obligation. Locke's view of obligation is that it is derived from a compact in which men agree to the setting up of legislative power to protect their lives, liberty and property. This legislative authority is empowered to protect property rights, and one's obligation of obedience to it derives from this. Dunn's argument seems to be that this is the role of the arguments about property in Locke, namely that they are "an expository convenience for his arguments against Filmer rather than the vehicle for further substantive development".\(^{51}\)

Dunn's treatment of Locke's discussion of property is thus rather unsatisfactory and although he may not agree with many of Macpherson's conclusions, we must, I think, assume that he agrees with Macpherson's interpretation of Locke's arguments on property as removing the limits to appropriation, since he offers no contradictory evidence to this analysis.

\(^{51}\) Dunn \textit{op. cit.} p. 137.
I have so far tried to give some explanation of the views of Dunn and Macpherson and they leave us with several possibilities. We can accept, with Macpherson, that Locke's religion is a "polythene wrapper" best discarded to reveal the true doctrine of the rationality of unlimited desire. I have indicated that I believe that this view contains certain confusions, and, I think, serious inconsistencies with Locke's expressed opinions. We can, on the other hand, accept, with Dunn, that Locke's concern is based on a conception of rationality founded on the reality of an afterlife. I have, as with Macpherson, pointed out some problems with this theory and some instances of where it diverges from what Locke actually says. We should, I think, therefore, look for a further possibility, namely an attempt to unite the satisfactory parts of both these views. This task Dunn himself sees as impossible. "If Locke had combined the vision of the calling with a conception of human essence in terms of the moral rationality of infinite appropriation, he would have taken on a task of conceptual reconciliation of miraculous perversity". Perhaps this is so, but there may be aspects of Macpherson's view which can be reconciled with a "vision of the calling". This is what I shall try to discover.

If this reconciliation is possible, along what lines might it be achieved? The possibility which I have chosen is through the framework of Weber's thesis. If an acceptance of Puritan ideals is seen as a major cause of the growth of capitalism, may not a similar process be seen in an individual? It is surely possible that Locke's Puritan views, if he in fact held any, might have fostered in him an acceptance of capitalist principles, if we can show that he did hold such capitalist principles. One possibility is that, starting from a Puritan position, with a Puritan theology at the centre of his theory, he may have become a defender of capitalism and at the same time dropping the theological basis. This progression is eloquently described by Wesley, as we have seen, in respect to Methodists.

52. ibid. p. 265.
There are, of course, other possible connections, for example logical rather than chronological, between Puritanism and capitalism and before resolving these possibilities a careful study of Locke's life and writings is necessary. In the next chapter I shall study Locke's religious views and theological writings in the hope that they can later be meaningfully related to his economic views.
CHAPTER 3.

"Locke and the Protestant Ethic."

Chapters 1 and 2 have essentially been a preliminary to the main task of the thesis. It was essential to explain and to justify the chosen method of studying Locke. However, the preliminaries may now be dispensed with, and the central questions discussed.

In this chapter I shall deal basically with one question, the extent to which Locke, in his writings, expounds what can be called a "Protestant Ethic". I shall try to assess how far we can go in agreeing with Dunn that Locke's views are essentially Calvinist, and that "it is in the traditional concept of the calling that the key to Locke's moral vision lies".\(^1\)

In Chapter 2 I suggest two possible ways in which Locke's religious and economic views might be connected. One was that there might be a chronological progression in Locke from Calvinism to capitalism. This is only one possibility but it necessitates a study of Locke in a particular way. I shall have to examine not only what Locke's religious views are but how consistent they are. I shall have to decide not only whether Locke was a Calvinist but when he was a Calvinist. If I do find a consistency in Locke's views then obviously I shall have to look for some other hypothesis. To draw any conclusions, however, one needs evidence and this is what I hope to provide in this chapter, and in the next.

The evidence which I am looking for is, of course, the existence in Locke of signs of ascetic Protestantism. This term of Weber's is neatly summed up by David Little as being typified by "a vigorous desire for

\(^{1}\) Dunn op. cit. p. 245.
methodical systematic mastery over one's vocational life, in order to bring it in line with God's will.² In his "Sociology of Religion", Weber himself defines its unique characteristic as being "an unbroken unity integrating in systematic fashion an ethic of vocation in the world with assurance of worldly salvation",³ and later "only in the Protestant ethic of vocation does the world, despite all its creaturely imperfections, possess unique and religious significance as the object through which one fulfils his duties by rational behaviour according to the will of an absolutely transcendental God".⁴ Later in the same book he says that, "Puritanism alone created the religious motivations for seeking salvation primarily through immersion in one's worldly vocation".⁵ In talking of "seeking salvation" rather than seeking assurance of salvation, Weber seems to be contradicting his view, as expressed in the "Protestant Ethic", that predestination was a central doctrine in Puritanism. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, there was a shift away from predestination in later Puritan writers. This, as I said, does not affect the substance of Weber's argument but rather strengthens it and in the "Sociology of Religion" he obviously accepts the fact that predestination is not central to all Puritans. What is common to them all is the form of activity they advise, whether it is aimed at assurance or at salvation itself.

For Weber, John Calvin is the starting point of this ascetic Protestantism, and since it is the Calvinistic conception of the calling which Dunn considers to be central to Locke, we should, perhaps, look at Calvin's own views about the conduct of one's life.

In his discussion of St. Matthew 25:20 Calvin emphasises the utilitarian element of duty. The economic processes of labour, trading and gain, which are part of the gifts which God has committed to man, ought to be performed for "the profit or advancement of the whole company of believers

⁴. ibid.
⁵. ibid. p. 220.
in common". Calvin stresses that the "gain which Christ mentions, is general usefulness, which illustrates the glory of God." Man's purpose on earth is clearly stated. "Let each of us remember", says Calvin, that he has been created by God for the purpose of labouring and of being vigorously employed in his work. In describing the sort of life which he advises, it is noticeable that Calvin often uses economic language and imagery: "Those who employ usefully whatever God has committed to them, are said to be engaged in trading. The life of the Godly is justly compared to trading."

This brief summary of some of Calvin's views in conjunction with Weber's descriptions of ascetic Protestantism should give some indication of what I am looking for in Locke. The views of Calvin are of course not identical with those of later Puritans, such as Baxter, but, as Weber assumes and as Little says, "there is a deep coherence between Calvinism and Elizabethan Puritanism". Having outlined the background for the study of Locke I shall now turn to a discussion of his religious views.

Locke's earliest background was unquestionably Puritan. "He was," says Crenston, "born into a family of the Puritan trading class on both sides." At the time of his birth, (on the 29th of August 1632) and during his early years, there was considerable Puritan hostility in the country towards the King and within a week of Locke's tenth birthday civil war broke out. Locke's father served in this war as a captain in the parliamentary army. Locke was, as Crenston says, "brought up in a Calvinist family". John Dunn believes that this Calvinist background influenced the rest of his life and that he continued to "expound Calvinist social values and that his social and political theory is to be seen as an elaboration of

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6. See D. Little op. cit. p. 57.
7. ibid.
10. Little op. cit. p. 84.
12. ibid.
these Calvinist social values". Dunn, then, believes that there is a continuity in Locke's views, and we may later be able to agree with this conclusion. However, if Locke's views are consistently Calvinistic it is not because the only influences on his early life were Calvinistic. At school and at university he was continuously subject to other contrary influences. His master at Westminster School, for instance, was a right wing Royalist, Richard Busby. He did not, according to Cranston, make Locke a confirmed "conventional Royalist", but did, he suggests, "purge him of his unquestioning Puritan faith".

When he entered Oxford (in 1653) the Puritan conquest of Great Britain was complete and while Oxford had been staunchly Royalist, it had fallen in 1646 to the Parliamentary army. In 1653 a purge was ordered at Locke's college of all those who were not good Puritans. Locke survived this purge but, since all the students of his dean John Owen did so also, no firm conclusions about Locke's Puritanism at this date can be drawn from this. It seems that the tolerant Owen was not too concerned about his undergraduates' Puritanism and was willing to certify them all as everything they should be.

In his early years Locke was subjected to differing influences, his Calvinist background, the Royalist views of his schoolmaster Busby, the changing face of Oxford, first Royalist and then subjected to a Puritan purge. According to Cranston, Locke at this time saw two "particularly potent sources of human error". One of these errors, an unreflective adhesion to tradition, was exemplified by the Royalists. The Puritans, and dissenters in general, he saw as committing an equally great error by relying too much on enthusiasm.

15. ibid.
His condemnation of enthusiasm can be seen in his opposition to John Owen's views on toleration which, at this time, he felt he could not condone. His opposition to toleration was based on his fear that too much enthusiasm could be a danger to society. He had no time for the Quakers or their way of dressing, or their actions, and in his comments on the trial of James Nayler and other Quakers he said he could "scarce understand them" and concluded that he was "weary of the Quakers".

Locke's views in the years up to the early 1660's can be summed up as, in general, authoritarian. In these years he was opposed to religious toleration and if we look at his "Essays on the Law of Nature" we see a very authoritarian position. "In the 'Essays'," says Dunn in his somewhat pompous manner, "we see no searching investigation into substantive morality, no deep and Kierkegaardian inquiry into how men should live their lives". The moral virtues are something which Locke assumes and even the existence of a "binding morality" does not seem to demand much defence. The ground for our belief in the "Law of Nature" is simply the existence of God. On Locke's theory of knowledge, this knowledge can be neither innate nor traditional, it must be sensory or empirical. His view seems to have been, says Dunn, that "one barely needs to know what the Law of Nature prescribes, all one needs to know is whom to obey". The obligatory authority of the "Law of Nature" is conveyed to the individual through the hierarchy of worldly authorities in their roles as "kings, parents or masters". The "man of the right, the extreme authoritarian" of 1660-1661 was soon to change. Cranston sees this period as a decisive one in which Locke's views move away from authoritarianism. This view is shared by Von Leyden and Abrams, who, as Dunn points out, also see the crucial change in Locke's intellectual development as coming at some point between 1660 and 1664.

17. ibid. p. 42.
18. ibid.
20. ibid. p. 22.
21. ibid.
I think that one would be unjustified in claiming that Locke was a Puritan or held what could be called Calvinistic views before the mid 1660's. All his main works were, however, written after this period and we can, I think, consider the views expressed in them as his mature views.

Much of Locke's explicitly religious writings were on the subject of toleration and a great deal of the controversy which his works aroused was over charges of Socinianism and Latitudinarianism. I am not here concerned with the controversy over what name is to be given to Locke's views and the "bandying about" of descriptions is of no great importance. The description of Locke as a Latitudinarian might be of importance if our central question were Locke's views on toleration since the Latitudinarians were in general believers in toleration. However this is not for us the central question and Locke's views of toleration are important here insofar as they throw light on specifically Puritan aspects of Locke's religious views.

In discussing his religious views in detail I shall do so under several general headings. I shall examine his views on the Church and its role, his idea of the sort of religion which is desirable, and, finally, his views on what is an acceptable way of life. In looking at each of these aspects I shall examine how closely his views co-incide with those of Puritan writers. These elements which I have mentioned are the main elements of any religious system and they are questions which Locke was concerned with. It is my aim therefore to see whether Locke's view of these elements is essentially Puritan.

Firstly, then, I shall look at Locke's views on the church and its relation to the state. It is on this point that his writings on toleration are relevant for us. Locke's earlier views were very much opposed to the idea of toleration. However by the time he met Anthony Ashley Cooper, Locke's views had fallen into line with his and it was he who encouraged Locke to give systematic attention to the subject. Locke had, on a visit to Brandenburg in 1665, seen a society in which the Calvinist, Lutheran...
and Roman Catholic religions were all tolerated. In a letter to Edward Boyle he writes expressing his approval of this and in 1667 he responded to Cooper's promptings and wrote an "Essay on Toleration". In this Locke advances the view that, as Maclachlan says in summing up the "Essay", "all speculative opinions and religious worship have a clear title to religious toleration". Locke also makes clear the role he sees for the civil rulers. They had, he says, "nothing to do with the good of men's souls or their concernments in another life".

The "Letter on Toleration", which appeared anonymously in 1689, contains almost identical views on toleration and on the role of the magistrate. His role is as a peace-keeper and virtues and vices are the business of God and not of the ruler. Locke defines a church as "a voluntary society... worshipping ... God in a way they think acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls". He stresses that religious belief cannot be imposed by the magistrate but must be a personal thing. The reason for this is that the magistrate's belief in religious matters may be unsound and, even if it is not, it is still useless unless it is believed in by the individual himself. "If I be not thoroughly persuaded of the soundness of my opinion in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it", says Locke who also declares that "I cannot be saved by a religion I distrust, or a worship ... I abhor". "Faith only," he concludes, "and inward sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God".

The church is therefore to be separate from the state, and from the magistrate's control and his task is to preserve men's lives and liberty and not to save their souls. The church is a voluntary association, the qualification of membership being faith. On this subject of the type of church which Locke favoured, we may usefully look at a draft which he drew up of certain principles which he hoped would prevail in a proposed religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society. Around 1688 Locke drew up plans for the setting up of this religious society.
society, which he proposed to call the "Society of Pacific Christians". Although the society never in fact came into being, its principles are still informative. They were; (a) that the society was to be open to all those who received the truth revealed in the Scriptures and obeyed the light which enlightens every man, (b) that no-one should be judged from outward observances, (c) that the society would acknowledge the duty of mutual toleration among Christians, (d) that Christ would be the sole master recognised, (e) that public exhortation would be directed only to encourage one another in the duties of a good life and (f) that there should be few and plain rules to govern the procedure of assemblies.

In the "Reasonableness of Christianity", Locke reiterates point (f) when he talks of Christ as having made a necessary change in the outward forms of worship. There was beforehand a "huddle of cumberous ceremonies" when what was desirable was a "plain, spiritual and suitable worship".

The importance of voluntary as opposed to compulsory action does appear regularly in Puritan writing. On the points of the differentiation of the church and the state and the use of exhortation alone we may look at Thomas Cartwright as an example of the Puritan point of view. Cartwright (1535-1603) was, says Pearson, the leading authority on him, responsible for the "resuscitation and reformation of English Puritanism", and he is obviously a central figure in late sixteenth century Puritanism. David Little gives this explanation of some of his views; "at all costs the functions of the Church and the State must be kept distinct from each other. The Church must not use any form of coercion or corporal punishment nor must it in any way assume the form of a state". 30 "The wisdom of God," as Cartwright himself says, "did separate the ministry from the pomp which is commendable in the civil magistrate lest the efficacy and power of the simplicity of the word of God and of the ministry should be obscured." 31

30. Little op. cit. p. 98.
He warns against the possibility that "whilst the minister have the word in one hand and the sword in the other, ... men might doubt with themselves whether the fear and outward show of the minister carried some stroke with them in believing the word". 32

The elements here are essentially the same as in Locke. However the Puritans in Cartwright's time did not carry their belief in the inapplicability of force in the Church to its logical conclusion as Locke did. Locke's conclusion was that force was inapplicable in religious matters, whereas Cartwright's conclusion was that, while the Church must not use force, the State should have the role of exercising compulsion on the Church's behalf. Locke and Cartwright share the view that the Church and State should be separate, and that the Church should not use force. They do however draw different conclusions. While Locke argues that a belief is useless unless it is believed in and that the use of force by any body to enforce religious beliefs would be ineffective, Cartwright argues differently. He is "very clear on the way in which the State must employ its coercive power in the service of the Church. Atheists and disobedient people, he says are 'of and in the commonwealth ... the Church having nothing to do with such, the magistrates ought to see that they join to hear the sermons ... and if they profit not, to punish them! (Works of Whitgift I, 386)" 33 This conclusion of Cartwright's is rather in conflict with the Puritan belief that "only in voluntary consent can true order be achieved." The reason for his retention of punishment and his rejection of toleration. Cartwright felt that to tolerate atheists and those who were "disobedient" would endanger the majority of "obedient" church members. Even when he did favour toleration, Locke did of course exclude Catholics and atheists for this very reason, that they were inimical to the safety of the society. Clearly in one respect Locke's views were very different

32. ibid.
33. Little op. cit. p. 95.
from earlier Calvinistic Puritanism which was highly repressive. Dunn recognises that the stringent idea of church discipline in Calvinism is lacking in Locke who "broke down the given structure of the religious community". Yet Dunn still believes that Locke's views are essentially Calvinistic. They are so, in that they seem to be a logical development from the views of for example Cartwright. It is in the logic of Cartwright's views that he should reject force in religious matters and should accept toleration. He did not do so, but Locke, starting from the same tenets and having the experience of seeing countries in which toleration was permitted without the danger to society, which Cartwright feared, actually materialising, did not have the same reservations.

One point which Locke makes in his charter is more clearly an echo of Cartwright. Point (d) of the charter states that Christ should be the sole master recognised and we can see this view in Cartwright for whom the only "tolerable authority in the Church is the word of God made manifest in Jesus Christ". He believed, says Little, that "Christ is the exclusive head of the Church." The conclusion which Cartwright draws from this could have been written by Locke. "If Christ be only head: then that I set down that the civil magistrate is head of the Commonwealth and not of the Church".

I have tried to outline Locke's views on the Church and its role, and on toleration because much of his religious writing stresses the question of toleration and the voluntary nature of religion. It is clear that these views of Locke are far from being identical with those of all Puritans particularly the earlier Puritans. What I think is clear is that Locke's views are a logical development of, for example, Cartwright's views and that his arguments are based on the same tenets and that toleration and the inapplicability of force in religious matters is in the logic of Cartwright's position.

34. Dunn on cit. p. 257.
35. See Little on cit. p. 88.
36. ibid.
37. Cartwright in Little, ibid.
On the question of the sort of religion which Locke advocated, I have already hinted at one aspect, namely that of simplicity. There are four inter-related aspects which I wish to consider in comparing Locke's views on religion with the Puritan view. These are, firstly, the reliance on Scripture, secondly, the doctrine of justification by Faith, and then two particular aspects of this doctrine, namely the essential simplicity of religion, and the egalitarian nature of Puritanism.

In all Protestant religions, but particularly in Puritanism, the Bible is seen as being the decisive authority. This is so for Locke also, and he shared the Puritan reverence for the scriptures. "He retained," in Cragg's view, "the characteristic Puritan reverence for the inspired word of God."

Locke's own statement of his position is unequivocal. "The Holy Scripture is to me, and always will be, the constant guide of my assent and I shall always hearken to it as containing infallible truth, relating to things of the highest concernment."

In support of the contention that this reliance on Scripture is a particularly Puritan belief we can quote William Haller. "As a matter of conviction," he says, "the Puritans professed to disapprove the citation of human authors and to depend solely on Scripture." Cragg does, however, add a note of caution here and he suggests that, while Locke shared the Puritan reliance on the Bible, he did so rather more critically than most others had done. This, he argues, is one aspect of Locke's views where he is much more of a rationalist than the earlier Puritans. Thus we have here a view of Locke which is becoming familiar, a view of him as retaining many of the central elements of earlier Puritanism but questioning them and modifying them. Just as Dunn sees his "sceptical intelligence as breaking down the given structure of the religious community," so Cragg sees him

59. Locke "Letter on Toleration" op. cit.
40. William Haller "Rise of Puritanism" p. 23 (New York, 1957)
41. Dunn op. cit. p. 257.
as examining the Bible with great care to determine its precise meaning.\footnote{42}{See Cragg op. cit. p. 181.}

Turning to the doctrine of justification by faith, this, like the reliance on Scripture, was held by other Protestants but was particularly emphasised by the Puritan writers. To be converted one must have faith. "Conversion begins with a mustard seed of faith,"\footnote{43}{William Perkins "Works" (Cambridge 1812) Vol. I p. 642.} as Perkins puts it. The egalitarianism of the Puritan religion, the belief that "God before whom all men are levelled is sure, in his own time, to uplift the low and humble the great,"\footnote{44}{Haller op. cit. p. 297.} finds, says Haller, "its rationalized statement in the doctrine of justification by faith alone."\footnote{45}{ibid.} It seems unnecessary to give numerous instances of the belief in justification by faith in Puritanism. Suffice to say that, as Cragg puts it, it held a distinctive place in Protestant thought for over a century and a half. There is no doubt that we can also find a doctrine of justification by faith in Locke, but there is a question whether his insistence on the uselessness of faith without works is a contradiction of the stated Puritan view of justification being by faith alone.

"Faith only," says Locke in the Letter of Toleration," and inward sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with God."\footnote{46}{ibid.} In the "Reasonableness of Christianity", Locke deals with the "Law of Faith" and the "Law of Works". The latter which demands perfect obedience, is clearly impossible in a world where all men have sinned. The "Law of Faith" is allowed to "supply the deficit of full obedience; and so the believers are admitted to life and immortality as if they were righteous".\footnote{47}{Locke "Reasonableness of Christianity" edited Ramsey (London 1958) Sec. 22.} For Locke there is a doctrine of justification by faith, men must begin with faith but for him this is insufficient. To be of any use faith must lead to repentance and active obedience. "Faith without works, i.e. works of
sincere obedience to the law and will of Christ, is not sufficient for justification". This insistence of Locke's on faith and works seems to contradict the "official" Puritan doctrine of justification by faith alone. Cragg sees Locke's stress on repentance, which is "as absolute a condition of the covenant of grace as faith; and as necessary to be performed," as a significant change in the doctrine. At first sight this would seem to be so since the notion of justification by faith and works seems to be more in the tradition of Catholic rather than Protestant doctrine. The Catholic doctrine however differs from the doctrine of Locke in stressing simply outward works. Locke's stress on inward sincerity expressed in works is not of a Catholic nature but is, I think, in practical terms identical with the "official" Puritan doctrine.

What is more, action was always enjoined as a corollary of faith in Puritanism. One has only to look at Perkins who categorically asserts that repentance, humiliation and faith are nothing unless they lead to a "new obedience unto God in our life and conversation." This doctrine is not stating that faith alone is enough and that if one has faith this will automatically lead to a new way of life. He states that faith itself can be "nothing" if it does not lead to "new obedience". The elect he stresses time and again "must be plentiful in good works". Locke's explicit insistence on the necessity of good works may be a theoretical shift away from the Puritan doctrine of justification by faith alone. However, in practical terms, it is obvious that there is little difference, good works were always enjoined, and Locke is only making explicit something which was always implicit in the doctrine of justification by faith.

The hope of salvation is then open to everyone who believes, who has faith and who translates this faith into suitable action. Religion cannot

48. ibid. Sec. 179.
49. ibid. Sec. 167.
then be a complicated matter. Christ brought us a plain spiritual worship, says Locke. If God had meant it to be the case that only learned scribes or disputers were to be saved, religion would have been "prepared for them, filled with speculations and niceties ... But men of that expectation, ... are rather shut off from the gospel to make way for those poor, ignorant, illiterate, who heard and believed the promises of a deliverer."\(^{51}\) The "industrious and rational" are, Locke believes, to be found as much amongst the peasants as in the colleges\(^{52}\).

There is, then, a basic simplicity about religion in Locke's view. It is as amenable, if not more so, to the ill-educated as to the well-educated. There is also an essential egalitarianism about religion for him. This is not reflected in any search for social equality. Locke accepted that there was gross social inequality, but he argued for religious equality. As Dunn puts it, in his relationship with God, every man is "prised loose" from the "tangle of seventeenth century social deference." Before God all men are equal. In the "Epistles to St. Paul," his last writings, Locke repeats this theme. Jews and Gentiles, are open alike to the doctrine of justification by faith, they are "placed on the same level."

This is a typically Puritan position and as William Haller puts it, "there is a concept of egalitarianism implicit in Calvinism".\(^{53}\) This is not to say of course that the saved and the damned, the elect and the non-elect, are equal. What it does mean is that the elect are as likely to come from one social class as from another, there is no correlation of social and religious status.

Again when Haller talks of Puritan preachers there is a great similarity to Locke in his description of them. Haller also quotes St. Paul in saying that for Puritans there is "no respect of persons with God, no real difference between Jew and Gentile,"\(^{54}\) and "this spiritual egalitarianism implicit in every word the Puritan preachers spoke, seized upon

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51. Locke "Reasonableness" op. cit.
52. See Dunn, op. cit. p. 254A sec 252.
53. Haller, op. cit. p. 179.
54. ibid. p. 179.
the imaginations of men ... and thus became the central force of revolution-
ary Puritanism". 55 This spiritual equality between all men is, I think,
certainly present in Locke, as is the means whereby everyone may become
part of the "community of believers", faith and its corollary good works.

The question of what are to constitute good works raises the question
of the third heading under which I want to discuss Locke's religious views,
his view of what is a "good life". Thus far we can, I think, certainly
classify Locke's views as essentially Puritan. There are of course certain
differences and modifications apparent in Locke, as I have pointed out, but
his views can best be seen as a development from earlier Puritan principles
while still keeping the same essential view of the church and religion.
If we are to accept Dunn's view, Locke also retains the central Puritan
doctrine of the calling and thus the Puritan view of what constitutes a
"good life".

Dunn states his view of Locke quite clearly: "It was the moral
sufficiency of the calling as the definition of the terrestrial components
of human duty which Locke assumed throughout his mature writings." 56 If
we decide that Dunn is right, then, we will, I think, be able to classify
Locke as a Puritan in view of the other similarities which I have already
outlined. Our view of Locke will, then, be similar to that of Ernst
Troeltsch who sees Locke as having "formulated an essentially independent
concept of Puritanism." 57 There is, however, in what Dunn says, an impor-
tant difficulty. He does not claim that Locke uses the notion of the
calling in his writings but only that he "assumes" it. It is naturally
much more difficult to show that something is assumed than it would be to
show that it is actually stated. There are some instances, however, where

55. ibid.
56. Dunn, on. cit. p. 249.
57. Ernst Troeltsch "The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches"
Locke does make reference to the idea of a calling although these are infrequent and occur more in letters than in his published works. What I intend to do is to find some examples of the places in which he does talk of the calling. I shall also examine his general account of duty and his advice on the conduct of one's life to see whether it is in the concept of the calling, even if not stated, that "the key to Locke's moral vision lies". 58

In this part of the examination of Locke, in addition to comparing Locke's views with Puritanism in general, I want to compare them with one particular writer, namely Richard Baxter. There are several reasons for doing this. Firstly, having elected to use Weber's thesis as a framework it will be useful, in assessing Locke's ascetic Protestantism, to use the same paradigm as Weber does. This of course assumes that Weber is justified in using Baxter as a paradigm and I shall examine his views both as a comparison to Locke's and as a means to seeing whether Weber's choice of him is reasonable. There is another excellent reason for comparing Locke with Baxter, the fact that they are near contemporaries, (Baxter being slightly the older). Baxter is chosen by Weber because he "stands out above many other writers on Puritan ethics...because of the universal recognition accorded to his works". 59 If, Weber is right, it is reasonable, then, to take Baxter as a paradigm of seventeenth century English Puritanism and as such an appropriate model with which to compare Locke.

In discussing Baxter, I shall use mainly two of his works, the massive "Christian Directory" and his "Reasons for the Christian Religion". One of the first things which Baxter says in the "Christian Directory", which covers all aspects of conduct and belief and gives advice on almost every conceivable subject, sounds very similar to the views which we have seen expressed by Locke. "Take heed," Baxter warns, "of being religious only in opinion, without zeal and holy practice...see that judgment

58. Dunn op. cit. p. 245.
zeal and practice be conjoined". Locke's insistence that "faith without works" is useless makes the same point and if one were to argue that this addition of works to faith placed Locke outside the Puritan tradition then one would have to say the same about Baxter.

Let us now turn to the "holy practice" recommended. Baxter, on the one hand, frequently refers to the "calling" as the instrument for implementing the necessary action while, in Locke, references to the calling are much less frequent. Nevertheless the basis of Locke's ideas could still be, as Dunn claims, that our duty is to fulfil a calling and to think about and understand that calling which would clearly be an echo of Baxter.

The essential concept of the calling in Baxter can be seen from the "Christian Directory". "Acquaint yourself with all the talents you receive from God and what is the use to which they should be improved;" "Keep in the way of your place and calling;" "Choose that employment or calling in which you may be most serviceable to God." His conception of the calling is clearly very much the typical Puritan one, but is it shared by Locke?

Perhaps the clearest statement which Locke's makes of his belief in the importance of the notion of the calling can be seen in a letter, a part of which is published in King's "Life of John Locke". In this letter Locke states that our duties ought to be fulfilled within the context of a calling. "Our main duty," he says "is sincerely to do our duties in our calling so far as the frailty of our bodies or minds will allow us." He also emphasises, as Baxter does, that one ought to think about one's calling. "Those who have particular callings," he says, "ought to understand them ... they should think and reason aright about what is their daily employment." There is then some evidence that the concept of the calling is important for Locke, and we can see from King's "Life" that Locke felt that his own calling was to write. It might be possible, by examining every word which

61. Locke, "Reasonableness" op. cit. Sec. 179.
63. ibid. p. 132.
64. ibid. p. 135.
66. Works, IV, 155 (1765).
Locke wrote, to find further mentions of the calling but this is, I think, unnecessary. What is more fruitful is, I think, to examine his other arguments and see whether they are in line with a Puritan conception of a calling. The absence of references to the actual word "calling" may be because it is something Locke "assumes" or it may be because it is something which he does not consider to be of central importance. To decide which is the case it is necessary, not to look for isolated references to the calling, but to examine his general views on duty.

I emphasised earlier the importance of utility for Calvin and the fact that, in Puritanism in general, the profits from one's labour are to be accepted, so long as they are put to an acceptable use. This utilitarianism can also be seen in Locke but in his writings it enjoys a greater prominence. The term "utilitarian" can be used in several ways and much of what Locke says can be seen as a statement of utilitarian views in the sense of being concerned with individual utility. He argues, for example, that diversions such as hunting or theatre-going are delightful and acceptable in so far as they are useful. They are permissible if "I make use of them to refresh myself after study and business, they preserve my health, ... but if I spend all my time in them, they hinder my improvement in knowledge". It was this improvement in knowledge which Locke no doubt saw as his task, as his calling, and something which he needed to do properly. He also argues that "our being is preserved with meat, drink and clothing and other necessities which must be got with care and labour. We cannot, therefore, be all hallelujahs and perpetually in vision of the world to come." There is in Locke, as Dunn points out, a concern for utility in the sense of personal utility. There is however a further meaning of utilitarianism in the sense of a concern for social utility.

Locke stresses very strongly that it is necessary to work for the public good. "God hath, by an inseparable connection, joined virtue and

67. M.S.S. Locke c 28 ff 143-4, "Manuscript of Locke's journal in the Bodleian Library Oxford. All M.S.S. references are to the Bodleian Library.
68. See Cranston, op. cit. p. 182.
public happiness together," says Locke, and points out that this responsibility applies to everyone; every individual's calling (as Locke might have expressed it), must be for the public good. "I think," he says, that everyone, according to what way Providence has placed him in, is bound to labour for the public good as far as he is able, or...has no right to eat." 69
This seems very close to Calvin's assertion that labour ought to be performed for the profit or advancement of the whole company of believers in common." 70
It is also very close to Baxter whose words and Locke's are almost interchangeable. "Everyone that is able," says Baxter, "must be statedly and ordinarily employed in such work as is serviceable to God and the common good.... Public service is God's greatest service," 71 words which could easily be Locke's. The fact that the responsibility to undertake this life of service is incumbent on everyone is stressed by both Baxter and Locke. Baxter states that not even the rich are to be excused from labour and tells us that the consequences of being unwilling to labour should be that those who do not work should not eat. "Question: But will not wealth excuse from work? Answer: It may excuse you from some sordid sort of work, but you are not more excused from service and work of one kind or another than the poorest man." 72 If this warning is not heeded, Baxter's remedy is clear. "He that will not work must be forbidden to eat." 73

Locke not only shares Baxter's utilitarianism, he shares Baxter's condemnation of laziness, even when this laziness would have no effect on one's own standard of living, as it would in the case of those who possessed inherited wealth. If those who are left by their predecessors a plentiful fortune are "excused from having a particular calling in order to their subsistence in this life, 'tis yet," says Locke, "clear that by the Law of

69. Works, op. cit. (1768) IV p. 296.
70. Calvin Commentary on St. Matthew, op. cit. 25 120.
72. ibid.
73. ibid.
God they are under an obligation of doing something."\(^{74}\) Not even old-age and ill-health excuses a "lazy idleness".\(^{75}\) There is in Calvin, Baxter and Locke an insistence on work for the community, a social utilitarianism. The condemnation of laziness in Locke and Baxter is also to be found in Calvin. "Man is created by God for voluntary labour,"\(^{76}\) and what God curses is "laziness and loafing."\(^{77}\) The reason that labour was so important for Locke even when it was not essential for one's physical needs, was that its proper end was not the provision of wealth but, as Dunn says, "the attainment of salvation"\(^{78}\) since heaven is "our main concern".\(^{79}\)

I think that we can see in Locke a maintenance of the moral significance of work. It still remains a religious duty and not a matter of mere personal utility. This comes out very clearly in his letters to William Grenville, who had written to Locke to express the serious religious doubts which he felt. He sought Locke's advice on many matters including the place which recreation ought to have in one's life. Locke's advice to Grenville was that recreation was "a thing ordained to restore the mind or body tired with labour to its former strength and vigour". It is therefore, a functional thing, necessary for the fulfillment of one's duty to work. If rest were not a physical necessity then we should "set ourselves on work without ceasing".\(^{80}\)

We can, then, construct a picture of Locke's conception of the way one's life should be lived. One should organize one's life in such a way that one can be of maximum service. He specifies the type of recreation best suited to people of different occupations. The "best recreation for sedentary persons is bodily exercise; of those of bustling employment sedentary recreation".\(^{81}\) One's life is a service and recreation is

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74. See King, op. cit., I p. 181.
75. Works, op. cit. IV 296, 1768.
77. See Bieler "Social Humanism of John Calvin" (Richmond, U.P. 1966) p. 45.
78. Dunn, op. cit., p. 257.
79. See Fox Bourne, "Life of John Locke" I 388-90.
80. M. S. Locke, f2, p. 100.
81. Ibid.
necessary to live out the full term of that service. Locke's conception of man's role on earth is well summed up by Dunn thus; "Men are owned by God. They were sent on a voyage by him, and the duty of prudence, to which they were subject, was a duty to maintain their capacities at their fullest in order not to rob their owner of their services."\(^{82}\) Locke's argument that one should not rob God of service and that the person who does will "give a poor account of his voyage,"\(^{83}\) sounds very much like the Biblical story of the talents. This story was a favourite one for Puritans as a textual reference for their view of men as a steward, in temporary possession of those things which God had given him.

There is a simple concern with individual utility in Locke's argument that in riches "lies a great part of the usefulness and comfort of life".\(^{84}\) However Locke says more than this; "if you hug wealth 'too closely,'" he says, "you lose it and yourself too".\(^{85}\) While it is not explicit here in his view of riches, he does seem to be saying that wealth should be accepted gladly but should be used and not "hugged too closely". There is a strongly capitalistic ring about this and he could be interpreted as saying nothing more than that money ought to be re-invested, as a purely practical way of getting the maximum benefit from it. Yet the threat of losing "oneself" seems to me to have a strong moral tone to it, and seems to infer a condemnation of hoarding from a moral, rather than an economic point of view. If this is so, it is certainly in keeping with his view of every man as having a duty of public service, be he rich or poor.

We are beginning now to get a picture of Locke as being very much in the Puritan tradition, and in particular as being very close to Baxter. I want now to point out some further similarities between the two and also to show that Weber's choice of Baxter as a paradigm is a justifiable one.

\(^{82}\) Dunn, op. cit., p. 252.
\(^{83}\) M.S. Locke, f2, p. 118.
\(^{84}\) Cranston, op. cit., p. 98.
\(^{85}\) ibid.
As well as the points mentioned, the emphasis on work, the importance of the calling, their utilitarianism etc., a similarity can be seen between Locke and Baxter in their views on rationality. This can be seen, in one sense of rationality, in the fact that both Baxter and Locke are concerned to show that religious belief is reasonable. When Alexander Gordon, in his study of Baxter "as a founder of liberal non-conformity", talks of him as a precursor of Locke, the similarity he sees is in their concern for the rationality of the Christian religion. He writes of Baxter as being, "the pioneer in that whole class of studies whose object is to elucidate and demonstrate the reasonableness of Christianity, the precursor of Locke in this respect as in some others." Earlier in the same work he says that "Locke's 'Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures' (1695) owes more than its title to Baxter's 'Reasons for the Christian Religion' (1667)."

They both base the reasonableness of a belief in Christianity on the Scriptures, and rely ultimately on faith, but more interesting than this is what they have to say about rational religious action. This is, of course, a different sense of rationality but again they agree. It is unreasonable to live by the senses and appetite. Baxter in fact defines sin in terms of reason, or at least its negation. "It is," he says, "a setting up of our senses and appetite before our Reason." It is much more reasonable to seek eternal life than merely to enjoy transitory terrestrial pleasures. Baxter's definition of sin continues, "it is a preferring of an inch of hasty time before the durable life to come". The relatively much greater importance of the future life as compared to the present, and the belief that rational action lies in the pursuit of the future life, is also a great concern of Locke's.

87. Ibid. p. 31 f.
89. Ibid. p. 161.
90. On this see Aarsleff in Yolton "John Locke" (Cambridge, U.P. 1969).
In yet another sense rationality is important for both writers. The calling is a rational organized way of life. Both Baxter and Locke enjoined work, for God and for the community, on everyone. This work, however, had to be organized and this is the importance of the calling. "Content not yourself," says Baxter, "to do some good extraordinarily, on the by, or when you are urged to it, but study to do good and make it the trade or business of your life."\(^{91}\) The calling is necessary because "out of a calling a man's labours are but occasional or unconstant and so more time is spent in idleness than in labour."\(^{92}\) I have already argued that Locke's view of the calling is similar to this in its conception of regular work and planning to the extent that he even advocates planning the sort of recreation suitable for one's own particular sort of work. This notion of rational planning, of regular rather than occasional labour is of course important when we come to look at the development of a capitalist spirit. However, for the moment, its importance lies in the fact that it provides us with yet another similarity in the views of Baxter and Locke. Both believe that a belief in the Christian religion is reasonable, and are concerned to show that this is so. Both believe that it is more rational to seek eternal life than to seek earthly diversions, and both believe that the way to do this is through rational organized work in a calling. Baxter's emphasis on the rationally planned element of the calling seems to further justify Weber's use of him as a paradigm since one of the main aspects of the Protestant ethic was that it expounded one aspect of the growth of rationalism in the West.

I have, so far, largely ignored one important element of Puritan doctrine, namely the question of predestination. On this question the links between Locke and Puritanism, between Locke and Baxter, and between Baxter and other Puritans are more confused. Thus far I have tried to

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92. ibid. p. 49.
show that, in spite of some differences, Locke's views are essentially Puritan and that, moreover, they are of a Puritanism very close to that of Baxter. On the question of predestination, however, we must accept that there are not just minor differences but direct contradictions to be dealt with. Weber treats predestination as an essential feature of Calvinism, and of ascetic Protestantism in general, with the exception of Methodism and some branches of Baptism. The problem is that Locke assuredly did not believe in predestination and Baxter was certainly unhappy about it and at certain points he explicitly states that salvation can be attained.

It would seem that there is a historical progression about these views. The earlier Calvinistic view is one of strict predestinarianism, and I have discussed this view in Chapter 1, where I referred to the Westminster Confession. One cannot, on this view, affect one's election, all one can do is to seek assurance that one has been elected. This is clearly not an accurate description of Baxter's views. The title of his book "How to be Certainly Saved", although it might possibly mean how to be certain that one is saved, is more likely to be a book of advice on the attaining of salvation, and this indeed is what it is. Throughout his work he treats men as "rational free agents", 93 whom God will not prejudice. "God", he says, "cannot cast away from his love and felicity any soul which truly loveth him above all and which so repenteth of his sin as to turn to God in holiness of heart and life". 94 God, Baxter seems to be saying, is far too reasonable to condemn anyone who has made every effort to please him. He is clearly not, in any straightforward sense, a predestinarian. There does, however, seem to be a residual belief in predestination in Baxter and although his position is not entirely clear it seems that he did retain the belief that some people were predestined to salvation. Some, that is, were elected. However those who were not elected were

obviously not predestined to damnation. One could, for Baxter, attain salvation.

In Locke there is no sign of any belief, residual or otherwise, in predestination. In fact he very specifically denies it. In the "Letter on Toleration", he says that Christ has taught men how, "by faith and good works, they may obtain eternal life", 95 and again in the "Reasonableness of Christianity" he states that "they shall be put everyone upon his own trial, and receive judgement, as he is found to be righteous or not". 96 Locke's rejection of predestination is as clear as Milton's.

How important is this diversity of opinion for our case? Weber sees the doctrine of predestination as central to ascetic Protestantism in general, with the exceptions already mentioned, and yet Baxter, at least partly, rejects it. Weber, I think, should have paid more attention to this shift of view in Baxter but if we examine the consequences of the shift in practical terms, we shall find that no revision of our view is necessary. Work in a calling was advocated by predestinarians as a defence against doubts about election. Work in a calling will still be advocated by non-predestinarians as a means to attaining salvation. The typical ethic of Protestant asceticism, the ceaseless organized labour in a calling will be equally essential for Calvin, Baxter or Locke.

Further textual similarities between Locke and other Puritans could be noted, but, by now, I think that the essential similarities should be clear. I have, I think, shown that Locke's views are in essence not only Puritan, but of a Puritanism very close to Baxter's. While it is true that Baxter's views on predestination are not the same as, for instance Calvin's, a fact which Weber fails adequately to point out, his religious views in general do make him an excellent choice as a representative of ascetic Protestantism. Moreover, while Locke's views are not a "carbon-copy" of

95. Letter On Toleration on cit. p. 149.
96. Reasonableness of Christianity on cit. sec. 9.
Baxter's, and one would not expect them to be a simple copy, they are in all important respects very close.

What then is the present condition of our enquiry? In this chapter I set out to do two things. The first was to examine the extent and nature of Locke's Puritanism. On the evidence which has been assembled, it would, I think, be fair to say that Locke's views can be called Puritan, and that one could use him as exemplar of ascetic Protestantism almost in the way in which Weber uses Baxter. The second thing, which I was concerned with, was an examination of Locke's life. On this point, there can, I think, be little argument. From about 1660-1664, when his mature views developed, there is a consistency in his religious views which can be seen in his constant acceptance of toleration, his consistent belief in faith and works as the way to salvation and his continued advocacy of labour in a calling, even if he does not often use that word.

In arguing for this essential consistency in Locke's mature views, I must obviously dismiss one possible hypothesis, namely that Locke's capitalistic views stemmed from, but replaced, his Puritanism. Some other hypothesis will obviously be required. The possibility which I wish to examine is that the Baxterian type of Puritanism and doctrines favourable to capitalism are not only, not incompatible, (contrary to Dunn), but are in fact logically connected. I wish to explore the possibility that the acceptance of the sort of religious ethic embraced by Locke will lead to the acceptance of capitalistic economic principles.

In order to do this, I shall now turn to the other side of the equation. Having shown Locke's Puritanism I shall now examine his relation to capitalism.
CHAPTER 4.

"Locke and the Spirit of Capitalism"

In the previous chapter I examined Locke's religious views. In doing so, I tried to answer the question of whether John Dunn was correct in seeing Locke as being in the Calvinist tradition. My aim in this chapter will be to decide how far we can see in Locke, views which could be said to exemplify a spirit of capitalism. My method will be very similar to that employed in Chapter 3. I shall refer back to Weber's work and compare what he has to say about the spirit of capitalism with Locke's economic views. I shall examine, in particular, his views on property because it is his writings on this subject which form the basis of Macpherson's argument that Locke's main concern is a defence of capitalism. I shall, as before, look for any consistency or inconsistency in his views over time.

Let us return briefly to Weber and the "spirit of capitalism", a phrase which Weber himself calls "pretentious".¹ In Chapter 2 of the "Protestant Ethic" he gives a provisional definition of the term using a document which states it in "almost classical purity".² The document in question was written by Benjamin Franklin. I have already mentioned this statement in Chapter 1 but I should now like to examine it a little more closely. The first point which Franklin makes is that "time is money. He that can earn ten shillings a day by his labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of the day, ... has really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings".³ Not only time is money so is credit. "Remember," he says, "that money is of the prolific generating nature ... He that murders a crown destroys all it might have produced, even scores of pounds."⁴ He warns that one should "keep an exact account for some time both of your expenses and your income."⁵ The moral of the argument is

2. ibid. p. 48.
3. Benjamin Franklin, "Advice to a Young Tradesman" (1748 Sparks edition) pp 87 ff.
4. ibid.
5. ibid.
expressed by Franklin thus, "For six pounds a year you may have the use of one hundred pounds, provided you are a man of known prudence and honesty".  

Since this is seen by Weber as a clear statement of the spirit of capitalism it obviously gives us an idea of some of the features which we will be looking for in Locke's economic views. Weber asks the question, what is peculiar about this "philosophy of avarice?" His answer is that it is the "ideal of the honest man of recognised credit, and above all the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself."  

All Franklin's moral attitudes are coloured with utilitarianism, in the sense of individual utility, a concern far from alien to Locke. In Franklin the virtues are recommended because of their usefulness. Locke has also been described as prudent, Cranston in his biography says that, in his middle thirties, he was "bourgeois, prudent and self-protective." Amongst the things which Cranston quotes Locke as seeing as worth pursuing is reputation which Locke declares is, like knowledge useful. By this criterion of usefulness, a mere veneer of morality would obviously suffice if it proved useful. However, Weber points out that this is not acceptable to Franklin, who ascribes his recognition of the utility of virtue to a divine revelation which was intended to lead him in the path of righteousness. The capitalistic ethic which he proposes is obviously not felt by Franklin to invalidate a religious belief. This is not entirely surprising, since what is advocated is not a life of luxury or idle spending, but an earning of the maximum amount of money as an end in itself. If one is to ask, "why should money be made out of men"? then Franklin's answer would come from the Bible, "Seest thou a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before kings".

8. Cranston op. cit. Ch. 10.  
9. ibid.
The opposing viewpoint to this spirit of capitalism is what Weber calls traditionalism, typified, by a desire to work only as much as is necessary to satisfy one's needs. The distinction between these two ways of economic life is made by Sombart, in his discussion of the genesis of capitalism in his "Der Modern Kapitalismus". He distinguishes between the satisfaction of needs, and acquisition, as the two great leading principles in economic theory. In the former, what controls economic activity is the attainment of the goods necessary for one's personal needs, while in the latter, it is the struggle for profit, free from the limits set by needs, which is dominant. This attitude of seeking profit "rationally and systematically in the manner ... illustrated by ... Benjamin Franklin" is, says Weber, what "we provisionally use as the expression of the spirit of modern capitalism."

Aquisition as a prime goal is then the typical capitalist principle as it is seen by both Weber and Sombart and it is of course a theory of unlimited acquisition which Macpherson ascribes to Locke. If in examining Locke's writings we find a justification for Macpherson's theory we will, I think, have shown that Locke can be fitted into the "capitalist" part of our framework. In examining Locke, I shall pay particular attention to his "Second Treatise on Government" since it is his discussion of property in this book which Macpherson uses as his main evidence. I shall also look at some of the very few things which have been written about Locke's economic views, and at his own explicitly economic works, which are much scarcer than his writings on religious topics.

Firstly, however, I shall look at Macpherson's main textual support for his theory, namely the "Second Treatise". As I said in Chapter 2,

11. ibid. p. 64.
12. ibid.
Junn's view of Locke's arguments about property, is that they are polemical, and are meant simply as a device to refute Filmer on political obligation. That the whole aim and tone of the work is polemical, is undoubtedly true. However the section on property does contain a reasoned and coherent viewpoint which must be considered as a fair statement of Locke's view. What must be decided is whether Macpherson's account of it fairly represents this view. What then does Locke say and what account does Macpherson give of it?

To take Locke's own statement first, he suggests that there is a problem about how anyone could come to have a property in anything if God gave the world to mankind in common. However, he feels that this can be shown to be possible "without any express compact of all the commoners". This is possible because God, as well as giving men the world, has also given them reason to make use of it to their best advantage. A man gains advantage from the fruits of the earth by gaining exclusive rights to these "fruits". He can do this because "the labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his". Consequently, "whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property." This right is, as I said before, limited by the restriction that one can only accumulate as much as one can use before it spoils and that one must leave enough and as good for others. The same applies to land itself as to the fruits of the land and the same limitations to appropriation are implied.

It is at this point in Locke's argument that Macpherson's interest is aroused. He claims that Locke moves from this limited right to appropriation to an unlimited right and it is this which leads him to his belief

14. ibid. sec. 27.
15. ibid.
that Locke's purpose is a defence of capitalism. Macpherson is certainly right in one respect. If Locke does argue for a right to unlimited acquisition, then it would be difficult to construe his views as other than favourable to Capitalism.

The transition is first stated, says Macpherson, in section 36. After arguing that, if one included the vacant lands of America, there would still be enough land left for everyone, Locke says that he will "lay no stress"\(^\text{16}\) on this. Instead he continues; "this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would still hold in the world, without straitening anybody, since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them."\(^\text{17}\) Land will not run out in places where money has not been introduced, but this can "scarce happen amongst that part of mankind, that have consented to the use of money".\(^\text{18}\) The spoilage limitation is obviously transcended by the introduction of money, which does not spoil. This means that a man can possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving, in exchange for the surplus, gold and silver. Locke is, then, justifying the acceptance of income from land. Profit can be accepted even if it is not derived from one's own labour. This position is certainly fairly close to Franklin's and his advice that one should use one's resources to the full to increase one's money income would seem to be justified also in Locke's view.

Macpherson points out one interesting question here, and it is one which is left largely unanswered by Locke. One might wonder why anyone would want to appropriate more than he could make use of for the provision of the normal essentials for living. This question could as easily be put

\(^{16}\) ibid. sec. 36.  
\(^{17}\) ibid. underlinings mine.  
\(^{18}\) ibid. sec. 45.
to Franklin or any other proponent of capitalism since the continual drive
for more money which is always to be used to provide more money and is
not to be enjoyed is apparently irrational, as Weber points out. This
is closely parallel to the inconsistency or irrationality, which I mentioned
earlier in connection with the Puritan attitude to consumption. Locke, as
one would expect from a Puritan, is not advocating the hoarding up of
money since, as Macpherson says, he "is thinking throughout of men whose
behaviour is rational in the ordinary utilitarian sense of the word,"19
men, that is, who would see the money accumulated as something to be used.

Macpherson answers this question of the reason why Locke felt that
one would wish to accumulate more money than one needed, by reference to
what he calls Locke's mercantilism. This at first sight seems rather
strange since Macpherson is primarily concerned with showing that Locke's
views are capitalistic, and capitalism is often contrasted with rather
than associated with Mercantilism. Mercantilism is generally seen as a
pre-capitalist economic theory.

Eli F. Heckscher, in his book "Mercantilism", tries to analyse the
"real core of mercantilist theory" in a chapter called "Mercantilism as
a Monetary System". This "core" is, he argues, well expressed in the
dictum that "wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver".20 There
are, he points out, few works of a mercantilist nature which do not have
a pre-occupation with what is known in seventeenth century English as
"treasure". A "tight hold on money and the precious metals, and the
fear of losing them"21 was, then, a main feature of mercantilism. The
object of rational economic policy is to hoard up as much gold and silver
as possible within the country. This is obviously not a view which is

analogous to capitalism. The emphasis on accumulation of gold, as an end in itself, as something to be hoarded, is obviously totally opposed to capitalism.

Mercantilism is, however, a vague term, used to refer to quite various economic doctrines and Macpherson is obviously using it in a sense which is different from the "classical" one. He credits Locke with holding a mercantilist view in the sense that the accumulation of gold is seen as a proper aim, not as an end in itself, but as a means of quickening and increasing trade. Heckscher also discusses this role of money as fostering trade and (despite the contrast between mercantilism and capitalism) he sees Locke's treatment of money as capital as being "certainly mercantilist". Money, in Locke, he says, has a double value; it is capable of yielding a yearly income and also it can be a commodity. In one sense it is a "factor of production" and in the other it is a "general means of exchange". The first of these roles is a specifically capitalist one, the continuous process of investment and re-investment to provide the maximum possible "yearly income".

If we take mercantilism in the sense in which Macpherson does, and in the way in which Heckscher uses it in relation to Locke, we can see it as analogous to the spirit of capitalism at the individual level. Mercantilism can, that is, be seen as an economic policy based on the maximizing of profit in national terms. According to mercantilist theory, the prime method for obtaining stocks of gold and silver is by means of the maximum possible favourable balance of trade. This balance, in turn, is, according to Locke's type of mercantilism, to be used for investment in order to stimulate trade, thus improving the foreign balance still further, and so on.

22. ibid. p. 204.
23. ibid.
If we see capitalism on the individual level as being concerned with the accumulation of money, and by re-investment the achieving of a larger and larger profit, then we have, I think, a very close analogy between capitalism and mercantilism, in Macpherson's sense of mercantilism. Remembering that this use of the term, while not being inaccurate, as we have seen from Heckscher, is certainly not applicable to all mercantilist theory, let us return to what Macpherson has to say about Locke.

"His main concern in the 'Considerations ... on Money' is," says Macpherson, "the accumulation of a sufficient supply of money to drive trade," and hoarding obviously injured this. "The aim of mercantile policy," he adds, "and of individual economic enterprise was to Locke the employment of land and money as capital; the money to be laid out in trading stock or materials, and wages, the land to be used to produce commodities, for trade." These opinions are not stated in the "Treatise" but, just as Dunn claims that Locke's vision of the calling, though not stated, was implied, so Macpherson claims that his interpretation of Locke's intention is "suggested" in the Treatise in section 48. Let us look at this section, and at Locke's economic arguments elsewhere, to see whether Macpherson has really interpreted Locke's "suggestion" accurately. What does section 48 actually say? It comes towards the end of Locke's chapter on property and it shows that the introduction of money provides both the opportunity and the reason for a man to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, an activity which would be useless if there were not something valuable and scarce which could be stored for future use, i.e. money. The desire to have more money than is necessary is not the miser's desire to hoard. It is commerce which provides the reason for the appropriation of the excess, it is "hopes of commerce" which justify the enclosing of land and the accumulation of money. Macpherson rejects the possibility

24. ibid. p. 205.
25. ibid.
that Locke is saying that money enables those who possess it to consume more various and gratifying pleasures. Locke's concept of money, he says, rules this out. To justify his view of Locke's theory of money Macpherson has to look outside the "Second Treatise" and he turns to Locke's main work on economics "Some Considerations of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money". Although this was not published until 1692, the greater part of it was written in 1668 at the time when his interest in economics was beginning to develop.

Macpherson turns to the "Considerations" to show that Locke identifies money with capital and assimilates both with trade and at this point I want to deal with Locke's more specifically economic writings in order to elucidate more clearly Locke's views on money and to see whether his views in general lend support to, or contradict, Macpherson.

In the dedication to the "Considerations", addressed to an unnamed M.P. (identified by Cranston as Sir John Somers) Locke wrote; "You have put me upon looking out my old papers which have so long lain by and been forgotten. Upon this new survey of them, I find not my thoughts to differ from those I had near twenty years since. They have to me still the appearance of truth."\(^\text{26}\) It seems, from what Locke himself says, that his main views on economics, like his religious views, remained essentially unchanged throughout his life, or at least during the period when he produced his mature writings. The "old papers", says Cranston, put forward a plea for a new approach to the problem of interest on economic as distinct from political grounds.

While interest, in the present day economic climate, is regarded as a perfectly normal part of business life, it must be remembered that in medieval thought there was a deep-seated belief that usury of any kind was wrong. This belief had to be overthrown in the Renaissance world and

\(^\text{26. Cranston, op. cit. p. 118.}\)
usury was legalized in England in 1546 with a legal limit of ten per cent, which was progressively reduced till in 1651 it was six per cent. Although the distinction had, by that time, developed between the money-lender and the investor there was still a residual moral antipathy to the charging of interest. Baxter, in his "Christian Directory", gives some examples of legitimate and justifiable cases of lending upon usury but he carefully points out that exploitation of another man's ignorance or error is not permissible.

Locke's manuscript of 1688 was written in reply to Sir Josiah Child who, in two pamphlets, advocated a reduction of the legal rate of interest to four per cent. This Locke rejected on the grounds that it would make borrowing more difficult, would encourage perjury and would impede trade. Locke seems to be concerned here to facilitate the flow of money. His views recall Franklin's advice to remember that "money is of the prolific generating nature". It is precisely this role of money, to beget more money, which Locke is concerned to protect by encouraging the borrowing of money for profitable investment, and by removing the impediments from trade.

His concern throughout the "Considerations" is not with a justification for the charging of interest, which he simply accepts, but with the rate at which it should be charged, and this, he says, cannot be regulated by law. The skillful will be able to avoid the law, and charge higher rates, while those who most need assistance, widows and orphans, will only get from their estates the bare minimum.27 Again there is no condemnation of money being earned from inherited estates, and Locke himself was in receipt of income from such property. What is present is again a Franklinian concern for the obtaining of the maximum amount of money from one's

27. See "Works of Locke" (1823), Vol. V.
assets. If the rate of interest could be kept low, it would, says Locke, be a "considerable loss to the moneyed man"\(^{28}\) and also it would be "no advantage at all to the Kingdom"\(^{29}\) since it would be a gain to the borrowing merchant. We can see here, I think, the sort of dual capitalist-mercantilist concern, which I talked of earlier. At the individual level Locke's concern seems to be to facilitate the maximization of profits and at the national level he seems to be concerned to protect the balance of trade by condemning anything which would help foreign borrowers; a low rate of interest would have this effect since a foreign borrower, if he borrows at 4\(^\circ\) and makes 12\(^\circ\), will gain 8\(^\circ\), and the lender only 4\(^\circ\). The interest of the private man should not be sacrificed to anything except to the public good. But in this case it will be quite the opposite. The loss to "moneyed men" will prejudice trade, by tending to "discourage lending at such a disproportion to risk".\(^{30}\)

Locke's concern is, then, for the well-being of the individual and the community and his concern is for the practical policies best suited to achieving the maximum economic benefit for both. While he may believe that this aim of accumulation is a morally acceptable one, and while he may view the capitalist type of economic system as a morally desirable one, his arguments in the "Considerations" are as bereft of religious overtones as Franklin's.

Locke, in his discussion of money, specifically aligns it with land. It is subject to all the same laws of value as any other commodity and is of the "same nature with land".\(^{31}\) Land produces something new and valuable to mankind which appears to make it different from money which is a "barren thing" and produces nothing, "but by compact transfers that profit that was the reward of one man's labour into another man's pocket".\(^{32}\) That

\(^{28}\) ibid. Vol. V p. 11.
\(^{29}\) ibid, this is especially disadvantageous if the borrower is foreign and in this case the nation suffers since any benefit accrues to some foreign investor.
\(^{30}\) ibid. p. 12.
\(^{31}\) ibid. V. 36.
\(^{32}\) ibid.
which "occasions this is the unequal distribution of money; which inequality too, has the same effect upon land that it has upon money. For my having more money ... than I can ... use in buying and selling makes me able to lend: and another's want of so much money as he could employ in trade makes him willing to borrow." Why however, Locke asks, should he pay interest? "For the same reason, and upon as good consideration," he answers, "as the tenant pays rent for your land." The reason is that "my money is apt in trade to ... produce more than 6 per cent to the borrower," if he uses it industriously in the same way that land, by the labour of the tenant, will produce more fruits than the rent comes to. The usurer's profit would bring him in no income unless he lent it, and so his six per cent "may seem to be the fruit of another man's labour, yet he shares not near so much of the profit of another man's labour as he that lets land to a tenant." The man who has "skill in traffic," but not enough money to exercise it, has reason not only to borrow money but also to pay for the use of it. It follows therefore that "borrowing money upon use is not only, by the necessity of affairs, and the constitution of human society, unavoidable to some men; but that also to receive profit from the loan of money is as equitable and lawful as receiving rent for land." One could hardly come closer to the spirit of Franklin. "Money can beget money," Franklin reminds us, and Locke sees no reason why this should not be perfectly just. Franklin points out that for "six pounds a year you may have the use of one hundred pounds," an advantage which one of Locke's "skillful traffickers" would no doubt enjoy.

33. ibid.
34. ibid.
35. ibid.
36. ibid. p. 37.
37. ibid.
38. Franklin, "Necessary Hints" op. cit. p. 80.
Macpherson's recourse to the "Considerations" to justify his assertion that Locke was advocating unlimited capitalist appropriation certainly does reveal corroborating evidence. The value of money as capital is clearly seen, and accepted, by Locke; The use of interest to maximize one's store of money is never questioned, the point of debate being the level of charge of interest which would be most likely to produce the maximum profits of the individual and the country. The traditional notion that money is barren is neatly transcended by the concept of consent between unequals. The value of money as capital is, says Macpherson, created by the fact of its unequal distribution, the source of which remains unexplained other than "as a necessity of affairs." It should, however, be pointed out that money serves as capital not only when it is borrowed but when it is invested by its possessor. This investment of one's own money is more in line with the "Protestant ethic" than the use of borrowed money as capital. Since, however, the purpose of borrowing, as Locke talks of it, is for investment by the borrower, and this is why he can afford to pay interest, the use of money for this purpose is also very much in keeping with a "capitalist spirit". If money is seen as merely a medium of exchange, as a means of providing a consumable income, then this is not a sign of an advocacy of capitalism. For Locke, however, this function was subordinate to its function as capital. In his view the purpose of agriculture, industry and commerce was the accumulation of capital, and the business of capital was to beget further capital by profitable investment.

According to Schumpeter, "Locke's claim to a place in the history of economic analysis rests exclusively on his work on money" and I

would like to look at some other aspects of his work in this field. He was, as Schumpeter points out, a metallist, i.e. he held that gold and silver coinage should contain their face value of metal and his view was that to debase the coinage was to defraud. His main arguments are not in themselves very relevant, at least in their details or accuracy, but the reasons for his opposition to recoinage are of more importance. In the "Considerations", and in the "Further Considerations", he gives several reasons and I shall list some of them without giving the supporting arguments. "Constant equality of its value in the interest of every country;" Making it lighter than it should be is unjust;" "Lowering it no advantage in selling and letting of land;" "Lessening it would be a gain to money-hoarders and a loss to others;" "by making it one-fifth lighter creditors and landlords lose 20 per cent." These headings, taken from the index of volume V of Locke's works, show what his main interests are in the "Considerations" and the "Reconsiderations". They are the benefit to landlords, creditors, investors, traders etc, in short to the capitalist classes. One can also see his distaste for any measure which would benifit hoarders, who of course have no place in the capitalist spirit.

As I said, Locke's interest was very much in trade and as Cranston says he was "easily infected with ... zeal for commercial imperialism, seeing as clearly as his patron Ashley saw the possibilities it offered for individual and national enrichment". In 1688 Locke was appointed as secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina and his interest in trade remained throughout his life. In 1696 he became a Commissioner for Trade and Plantations, although he was at the time very ill, and he only resigned, in May 1700, when his health had deteriorated to such an extent

41. Cranston, op. cit. p. 119.
that it was impossible for him to continue. His concern for his own invest-
ments was also life-long, and while his attendance, in the last year in
which he sat on the Board of Trade, was irregular he continued to
draw his salary and in December 1699 he told King that he had "a thousand
pounds lying dead by him" and solicited advice from him as to how best
to invest it. In February 1700 he told King of another five or six
hundred pounds he would be "glad to have well placed out". This desire
to re-invest seems to have the essential features of the capitalist con-
cern with the continuous re-investment of capital. Locke, at that stage
in his life, was not re-investing his money to provide for a comfortable
old age. He was already an old and ill man and did not expect to live
much longer. He in fact lived until 1704, but in constant poor health,
and consequently not in a style which permitted any extravagant consumption
of his resources.

He was already ill when he undertook the post of Commissioner of
Trade, but he felt he had a duty to undertake the job even although he
knew it was no sinecure. This desire to keep working and the concern he
showed for the investing of his money, strike one as essentially expressions
of a Weberian "spirit of capitalism". After his retirement Locke did rest
but still took the opportunity to discuss a subject, as Cranston says, "very
close to the philosopher's heart - money" and after deliberating with
King, the latter invested yet another £2,000 of Locke's. Locke's journal
for 17th December 1700 reads, "my cousin King did on November 19th lend
to Sir Richard Gripps £2,000 of my money upon a mortgage." He not only
advocated investment and the charging of interest, he did so, and he not
only showed enthusiasm about the possibilities of trade, he was actively
involved in it. Indeed, as Macpherson points out, most of Locke's dis-
cussions of economic activity are in terms of trade. The same goal,

42. M.S.S. Locke, op. cit. p. 40 f. 50.
43. ibid. f.66.
44. Cranston, op. cit. p. 450.
45. See Cranston, ibid.
however, applies to both the individual and the nation, consume less than the revenue and so accumulate capital.

As I have suggested there are very few critical works on Locke's economic writings. I have already mentioned Schumpeter who, like Heckscher, deals only very briefly with Locke's economic views and who emphasises that there has been no really systematic treatment of his economic theory. One of the few people to deal with Locke as an economist is J. Bonar, in his book, "Philosophy and Political Economy", and I shall now consider this work to see whether it confirms the view of Locke as a mercantilist capitalist, which we have so far gleaned from Macpherson and Heckscher. In the "Treatise," according to Bonar, Locke seems to be saying that it is laboriousness which makes the difference between a wealthy and a poor people. It is not science which is important for progress but labour, a view which is very similar to Weber's. It is precisely the opposite point of view which Robertson takes when criticizing Weber. He sees economic progress as being dependent not on a new spirit of laboriousness but on scientific improvements. For Locke, however, the Puritan insistence on the importance of labour comes through in his economic writings. It is labour which, for Locke, adds to the intrinsic value of things and makes them useful to man. There is in this assimilation of labour to value a suggestion that Locke may have held what could be called a "labor theory of value" and this possibility is, naturally, attractive from the point of view of the present thesis.

The "labor theory of value" formed the basis of classical economics and its central principle is that the price of goods is in proportion to the amount of labour which is needed to produce them. David Ricardo's "Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" 1817 (which is the classical statement of this theory) states that commodities derive their exchangeable
value from two sources; from their scarcity, and from the quantity of
labour required to obtain them." The commodities which derive their
value from their scarcity are few, and as examples he lists rare paintings,
scarce books and wines of a particular quality. The majority of commodities
are, however, procured by labour. The estimation of the value of these
commodities is explained by Ricardo, in the words of Adam Smith: "It is
natural that what is normally the produce of two days', or two hours'
labour should be worth double of what is usually the produce of one day's,
or one hour's labour". That this is really the foundation of the exchange-
able value of all things, is says Ricardo, "a doctrine of the utmost imp-
portance in political economy." He emphasises this direct relationship
between labour and value and argues that, "if the quantity of labour
realized in commodities, regulate their exchangeable value, every increase
of the quantity of labour must augment the value of that commodity on
which it is exercised, as every diminution must lower it".
Ricardo goes
on to criticise aspects of Adam Smith's theory and to develop his own view
in great detail, but these more detailed arguments do not concern us. His
exposition of the central principle of the labour theory of value, that
the value of any commodity is in proportion to the amount of labour
needed to produce it, is sufficient for our purpose.

This theory, as one would expect from an economic theory which was
fully developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is a theory
about the operation of a capitalist economy. The belief that the relative
prices of commodities on the free market are determined by the relative
amounts of labour required to produce them clearly presupposes a capitalist
economic organization. Having explained Ricardo's theory very briefly,
I shall now look at Locke's writings on labour and its value to see

46. Ricardo in the "Works of David Ricardo" edited by P. Sraffa (Cambridge
1951 I p. 12.
48. ibid.
49. ibid.
whether, and to what extent, they constitute a "labour theory of value".

In a religious sense, value is very definitely produced by labour. It is, in Puritanism, very much the fact of labouring which gives an action value. Can this be transferred to the economic sphere? In the "Treatises on Government", Locke states that it is by labour that anything is removed from the natural state in which it is in, and that it is by mixing his labour with it that an individual makes something his property. "God gave the world to the use of the industrious and the rational," he says, "and labour was to be his title to it not to the fancy or the covetousness of the quarrelsome and the contentious." 50 He also holds that value comes from labour, "labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world." 51

Labour has, then, a dual significance: it makes natural resources useful to man, and it confers property rights. The problem is, then, how any man can rightfully own anything which is not the product of his own labour. The obvious answer is by exchange on the market, mediated by money. It might then seem natural to suppose (as it was supposed by Adam Smith) 52 that a man who has acquired property through his labour will be willing to part with it only in return for something which has cost an equally great amount of labour to produce (or for its money equivalent). Such reasoning leads on to the "labour theory of value" as expounded by Ricardo, but this is not how Locke himself reasons for it seems clear that he did not mean to put forward a theory of the determination of the value of commodities simply by the amount of labour-time involved in their production. While he certainly believes that labour does create value, nevertheless the two are not directly proportionate. The exact value of any commodity is determined by market

52. See Adam Smith, "Wealth of Nations" (Methuen paperback edition) I. pp. 34-5.
conditions, primarily supply and demand. In the technical sense, it is clear that Locke did not hold a "labour theory of value", as can be seen from the importance he places on supply and demand as a determinant of market value. He did however hold a view of labour as making things valuable which leads, through Adam Smith, to the classical labour theory of value in Ricardo. While his views on value are not exactly in line with Ricardo's there is a family resemblance between them.

However, according to R. L. Meek, the influence of Locke's views on labour and value was "more political than economic", a point which Macpherson would, no doubt, agree with. His chapter on property was, he says, intended to set up a moral justification for the property of farmers, craftsmen and merchant manufacturers who made up the British bourgeoisie. Locke does indeed seem to clearly advocate a capitalistic accumulation of wealth which should, in a true capitalist spirit be re-invested. In other words Macpherson is right in his assertion that Locke transcends the "spoilage limitation" through the introduction of money in such a way as to encourage capital investment.

Macpherson then turns to the "sufficiency limitation" in Locke and the claim that Locke transcends the initial limitations that one must leave enough and as good for others. It is only in the third edition of the "Treatise" that he gives any specific argument for removing this limitation. In the first two editions he assumes that a commercial economy will develop on the introduction of money and that to accept money is to accept its consequences, namely the appropriating of land previously worthless. Now, instead of "enough and as good" land being left for others, a profit can be made from renting out appropriated land. In the third edition of the "Treatise", however, Locke adds a new argument to the effect

53. See R. L. Meek, "Labour Theory of Value" (London 1956)
that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to the support of human life produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land are ... ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of equal richness lying waste in common." Macpherson seems very sceptical that everyone really will benefit by the removal of this sufficiency limitation. He seems however to allow modern opposition to the idea of capitalism to cloud his views on Locke. His scepticism may be justified, but the fact that he sees capitalism as obnoxious and that he is opposed to the idea of a wage-labouring class is no reason in itself to doubt Locke's belief in the efficiency of capitalism in increasing the general standard of living. Capitalism may be an immoral system in Macpherson's view but this is no reason to suppose that Locke defended it because he wished to protect the interests of one class at the expense of another.

I have already mentioned the third, supposedly implied, limitation on appropriation, namely the appropriation of only that which one mixes one's own labour with. This, as I said earlier, is not a view which Locke actually held and he considered the wage relationship to be entirely natural. What Locke throughout assumes is a situation described by Weber as an "organization of formally free labour." This is possible for Locke because he sees labour as very much a man's property, and consequently as something which he can alienate for a set wage. The market in labour was as much a commonplace of seventeenth century thinking as the markets in commodities and capital. All were required for capitalist production and all have, I think, been shown to have been supported by Locke.

As I have made clear before, while Macpherson's analysis of Locke's

arguments on property is extremely revealing, the conclusions which he tends to draw from it are not always supported by what Locke says. One very clear example of this is his view that for Locke "the traditional view that property and labour were social functions and that the ownership of property involved social obligations is thereby undermined". This is simply nonsense and it is unfortunate that Macpherson's analysis should be spoiled by this sort of inaccuracy. Throughout Locke's religious writings he stresses that the property which one possesses is given to one as a gift of God. Locke's view of the property-owner is as a steward, and the more one possesses the greater one's social responsibilities are. To suggest, in the face of all that Locke says about one's duty to serve the community, that for Locke "social obligations" are undermined is, I think a blatant misrepresentation. I have already questioned his assertions about differential rationality, and I do not intend to consider any further objections to Macpherson since this is not the purpose of the study. His main importance arises from his analysis of Locke's arguments on property and the picture of Locke which he gives there is, as I have tried to show, a clear and accurate one.

Although Locke left no treatise on economics, his views can, I think, be fairly accurately gleaned from the "Treatise" and his other writings. The aim of this chapter has been to see how close these views come to Weber's conception of the "Spirit of Capitalism". In his life, and in his writings, he does seem to remember that, as Franklin said some decades later, "money is of the prolific generating nature". His acceptance of the wage relationship as being natural and his acceptance of the necessity of a non-property-owning labour force is the acceptance of that formally free labour force which Weber asserts to be an essential feature of the development of capitalism. His work on money reveals a treatment of it

as capital and an analysis of its value in terms of re-investment for commerce which is clearly in line with capitalist theory. The summum bonum of the capitalist ethic is, says Weber, the earning of more and more money. I have already noted that this concern for the maximization of one's money income by the individual can be found in Locke and that his view of national economic policy, described by Macpherson as mercantilist, can be seen as analogous to this.

I have, in Chapters 3 and 4, assembled the evidence necessary for a possible reconciliation of the views of Dunn and Macpherson. That is to say, I have examined Locke's religious and economic views to see how far the interpretations given of them, by Dunn and Macpherson respectively, are acceptable. I shall now in the final chapter try to reconcile these views, in the face of both Dunn and Macpherson, who would see their respective interpretations as irreconcilable. Their views, though directly opposed, are in one sense very close. They are both unwilling to treat capitalism as being compatible with a devoutly religious theory. Since Dunn sees Locke as being "religious" and Macpherson sees him as being "capitalistic" they hurriedly dismiss either the religion or the capitalism as not being Locke's true view. In the next chapter, I hope to show that this is a misconception based on a consideration of capitalism in its modern, and at least for Macpherson and possibly for Dunn, its pejorative usage, and is not based on the view of capitalism which Locke, in the seventeenth century, would be likely to hold.
CHAPTER 5.


Having sifted through the main evidence necessary for the drawing of conclusions, I should now like to begin the task of assembling that evidence into an acceptable theory. The aim of the thesis is to re-examine Locke's philosophy in terms of the relationship between capitalism and ascetic Protestantism. In this chapter I want to relate the Protestantism of Locke, which I investigated in Chapter 3, with the capitalist attitude which I have tried to discover in his life and writings in Chapter 4.

As a first step in this, I shall explain briefly how Weber relates the two concepts in the "Protestant Ethic", which I have used as a framework throughout. Weber outlines the familiar Puritan doctrine of labour, continuously pursued in a systematic methodical manner in a calling. This calling must be advantageous to the common good, and the parable of the talents shows that it is desirable to increase the gifts which God has given to one. The effect of this ethic in business terms is clear. The ascetic importance of a fixed calling provided an "ethical justification" for the modern "specialized division of labour" and the interpretation of profit-making as being providential justified the activities of the business man. The main influence which this asceticism had was in its forceful rejection of the "spontaneous enjoyment of life", and all it had to offer. It restricted consumption, especially of luxuries, and yet freed acquisition from the inhibitions of traditionalist ethics. The rational and utilitarian uses of wealth, which were willed by God for the needs of the individual and the community, were approved of. The Puritan outlook, Weber says, did two things. It offered an encouragement to capital accumulation and, more importantly, it favoured the development of a rational, bourgeois
economic life. Weber is, of course, speaking here of a historical development: what I wish to examine is a logical development in the theory of John Locke. I have already dismissed the possibility of a historical development in Locke's views, parallel to the pattern Weber described. The consistency in his religious and his economic views clearly rules out this possibility. It would no doubt have provided a very neat parallel with Weber's theory if we could have said that there was a progression in Locke from Calvinist views to capitalist views. The evidence is, however, completely against this a fact which may not be entirely surprising. While it might not be strange to find such a transformation in the beliefs and practice of self-made businessmen, in the way Wesley points out, the abandonment of carefully worked out religious views by a serious religious thinker would be considerably less likely. Possibly the "practical secularization", noted by Wesley, has to precede the "theoretical secularization" needed to produce a completely non-religious spirit of capitalism.

The evidence is not, however, against a link even if it is not a chronological succession. Let us consider Locke as holding the particular religious views of Baxterian Puritanism which I have ascribed to him and try to see the sort of economic theory which would logically be entailed by them. It is clear that Locke would firstly advocate hard work in one's task. Let us assume that this task, this calling, was that of a businessman, perhaps a merchant. This business-man has a duty to understand his calling and to undertake it as efficiently as possible. An efficient hard-working business-man is clearly going to make a large profit from his enterprises. What alternatives are open to him? He can decide that he has done enough work, and retire from his business, handing it over to someone else. This however is clearly contradictory to the doctrine we find in Locke that "he who shall not work shall not eat". One alternative, retirement, is then excluded by Locke's religious beliefs. A
further alternative is not to retire, but to go on working and making a profit which he hoards up. This, however, is equally contrary to Locke's religious beliefs. The profits which an individual accumulates are seen, by Puritans, as a gift of God and one is accountable to God for the way in which one treats his gifts. On the basis of the parable of the talents, it is unacceptable to simply retain God's gifts without losing them. One should use them and enlarge them. The business-man has therefore to keep on working and to make use of his profits. How then is he to be allowed to use them? One way in which one can use the profits from an enterprise is in an "orgy of self-gratification". One could use them to provide pleasure and a greater range of commodities and enjoyments for oneself. This too is very much against the Puritan belief that time spent in pleasure is time wasted and money spent on luxuries is money wasted. Perhaps the business-man should simply give his money away. While this is in itself not immoral it certainly does not constitute what a Puritan would see as the best use which could be made of the money. The Puritan aversion to begging would rule out the possibility of giving it to just any poor man, and the Puritan ethic is very much one of self-sufficiency and working for oneself. The parable of the talents also seems to rule out the alternative of money being used as a gift. It is given to the individual by God and it is his task to enlarge it and use it to increase the original "gift of God".

There seems then to be little alternative for the business-man. He has to continue to work, and to accept the profits from his work. He has to use these profits and account for the way in which he has used them. The only acceptable way in which he could use them would seem to be by re-investing them, thereby increasing his original amount of money and being a good steward, not just keeping his "talent" safe but multiplying it.
There would seem to be a logical necessity about the sort of economic view which Locke could advocate, given his religious theory. If one's task is to work for "God and the community", it seems that the way to do this is by a continuous attempt to maximize one's profits. This of course assumes one major point, that the capitalistic type of economy is seen as beneficial to the community at large. This Macpherson is sceptical about, but it is clear that Locke did not share this scepticism. Even a day labourer in England, living of necessity from hand to mouth is better off than a king in a savage land, according to Locke. The criterion of what is useful for the community in general runs through his economic writings and is a direct logical concomitant of the utilitarian aspect of his religious theory. It is the fact that a man's chief duty is to "God and the community" that leads Locke to see the business-man's role as that of a continual investor increasing the general sum of wealth in the community. Locke's conception of the role of money, as primarily being a means of commerce, follows from this. Its use as a means of providing consumable goods for its possessor is limited, since consumption is strictly limited to necessities. Consequently its role must be to facilitate trade and thereby increase the general wealth. By being used as capital and not as a means of providing commodities, its role is still in line with Puritan ideology.

One aspect of Locke's economic views which might seem to be opposed to a religious belief is his acceptance of interest. This and the desirability of making money might be seen as covetousness. This sort of view Baxter rejects. "Some people," he says, "are accused as covetous because they possess much - are rich. But God giveth not to all alike. To be entrusted with more than others is no sin unless they betray that trust. Others are accused as covetous because they satisfy not the covetous desires
of those they deal with. An idle beggar will accuse you of uncharitable
ness because you will maintain him not in sinful idleness. Others are
thought covetous because they are laborious in their callings and thrifty
and saving, not willing that anything should be lost."\textsuperscript{1}

If we take the Puritan ideals as primary, we can see that the virtues
which they preach, labour, asceticism, diligence, community service will,
when applied to economic activity, produce profit which in turn must be
used for the common good of society.

The sort of economic theory which Macpherson ascribes to Locke, that
of unlimited acquisition, is, I think, perfectly consistent with, and
indeed logically dependent on the Puritan religious theory which Dunn
ascribes to him. It would not be consistent with a theory of unlimited
consumption but that is not what Locke is advocating, nor what Macpherson
ascribes to him. Given one important qualification, which Macpherson
omits, the pursuit of unlimited acquisition is derivable from the Puritan
concept of ceaseless labour in a calling. This qualification concerns the
use to which the acquired wealth is to be put. Contrary to Macpherson,
a social obligation remains in Locke and this determines the way in which
profits are to be used. They must be used for commerce and not for con-
sumption. The continuous pursuit of profit, by investment and re-invest-
ment, is dictated by Locke's religious views and in particular his host-
ility to consumption, and it is in fact this sort of view of economics which
Locke held and expounded, especially in his writings on money.

Just as the virtues of asceticism, when translated into the eco-
omic sphere, produce a certain type of economic theory, so the type of
life-style in general dictated by Puritanism will similarly influence the
type of economic views held. There is, I believe, with Weber, a link
between the increasingly rationally organized life-task of the calling

\textsuperscript{1} Baxter, "Christian Directory" \textit{op. cit.} p. 257.
particular to Puritanism, and the rational organization of labour, which is typical of capitalism. The essential feature of the calling is that it demands, not isolated acts of righteousness, but a rationally planned life of service. Capitalism demands exactly the same rational organization, activity is not spasmodic but is a constant process of acquisition and investment to produce profit. In another sense Locke, and Baxter, saw the calling as rational. It was more rational to labour in a calling with a view to a future life than to give way to present transient desires. This postponement of satisfaction is seen as rational. In the economic sphere, present pleasures, which could be obtained by realising one's assets rather than re-investing them, are also deferred. In a spiritual sense gratification is eventually enjoyed, but this does not seem to be so in the economic sense. The process of re-investment does not suddenly stop and allow the investor to enjoy his profits. There is, however, a rationale for the capitalist way of life. There is a future benefit in the advantages of economic growth, an increased well-being in the future. Just as there is a spiritual rationale for deferred gratification, there is also a secular rationale. There is still of course the inherent contradiction that seeking "future well-being" would seem to be possible only in terms of consumption. However this contradiction is, as I pointed out, inherent in Puritanism and in the spirit of capitalism.

Weber warns us not to expect Puritans to be openly favourable to capitalism and Dunn finds it impossible to believe that Locke could have been imbued with the Calvinist Spirit and still advocate unlimited appropriation. However I think that Dunn is clearly mistaken and his view and Macpherson's seem to me to be reconcilable, if one removes from the word "capitalism" the stigma which Macpherson, and possibly Dunn, attaches
Wesley warns that when religion and riches go together the spirit of religion swiftly vanishes. In Franklin's case it probably had done so, despite his Biblical quotations, but in Locke, I believe, it had not. However, since Locke in his private life did grow rich, it would be foolish to claim that he did not have an increasing "love of the world in all its branches". He did, in his later years, allow himself more of the luxuries of life but his life was, for all that, very much a life of work and of service which was continued into old age in spite of ill health. I think that more then the form of religion remains in a man who spends the last years of his life studying and writing on the epistles of St. Paul. There is more also, I believe, than greed in a man who is concerned about his investments, in the way Locke was, when he knows that the profits accruing from them will be of no personal use to himself.

In the introduction I suggested that I would add one more interpretation to the many already present in works on Locke. What then precisely is this interpretation? The view I wish to give of Locke is of someone imbued with the Puritan virtues of diligence, thrift and public-spiritedness. If any key can be said to be found to a philosophy as wide-ranging as Locke's, it may be said to be a recognition that his main purpose was to provide a theory suited to the betterment of the whole society. His religious theory is in one important sense individualistic, in that each man's salvation is, Locke says, his own concern. It is, however, very much based on the spirit of co-operation, since the way to attain salvation is by doing one's job within the social context, and for the community's benefit. His economic theory, is, similarly individualist in that each individual is entitled to accumulate as much as he can, but again the overriding concern is the national rather than the individual economy. His interest in trade has often been recognised and it is trade, more.

2. Wesley quoted in Weber "Protestant Ethic" op. cit. p. 175.
than anything else, which he sees as contributing to the national economy. All his economic writings are concerned with examining the economic structure, and any proposed alterations in that structure, by the criterion of utility, of how they tend to increase or decrease the total prosperity of the community.

I said in the introduction that I did not expect to remove all the complications or reconcile all the differences in the interpretations of Locke. However if the central doctrine in Locke is seen as a utilitarianism, and in particular a Puritan utilitarianism, some clarification of his views can be attained. That there is in Locke what could be called a simple individual utilitarianism is, I think, unquestionable. His advice to Grenville, which I quoted earlier in Chapter 3, shows this quite clearly. However the main importance of utilitarianism in Locke is the belief that every individual ought to work for the good of the community. It is this which permeates all his writings and can be seen in his view of the economic order where his concern is the utility of any project to the general prosperity.

This criterion of utility can also be seen in other aspects of Locke's philosophical views. It can be seen in his conception of the political order. Political society is set up, according to Locke, by the general consent of everyone in order to protect the lives, liberties and property of each individual. One must be careful, of course, to distinguish this from a Benthamite concept of utilitarianism as the maximization of total happiness. What I am saying is that Locke's criterion, in the political order as in the economic order, is the utility of all the members of the community. The state is an artificial construct set up because of its usefulness. In relation to the state there is no theory of a divine right
to rule, the ruler's authority is a trust, just like the gifts entrusted
to any other man by God.

This same criterion can be seen in Locke's social views. As has
been pointed out, Locke in his mature years believed in religious toler-
ation. Much of his justification for this and, more importantly, his
justification for withholding toleration from Catholics and atheists is
based on utility. One of the main things which convinced him of the des-
irability of toleration was that it was beneficial to trade. The grounds
for withholding toleration from Catholics is purely utilitarian. It is not
because of their religious views, but because they owe allegiance to a
foreign power, Rome, that they are excluded. They, and atheists, are seen
as possible dangers to the society and it is this practical reason which
leads Locke to withhold toleration from them. This doctrine of utilitar-
ianism does, I think, permeate all of Locke's writings and does help to
clarify some points in his work.

The main point which I wished to examine was, of course, the quest-
ion of whether the two apparently contradictory views of Dunn and Macpherson
could be reconciled through the framework of Weber's "Protestant Ethic"
thesis. This, I believe, has been possible. I have tried to show that
Dunn's account of Locke's religious views is essentially correct and that,
given this, a view of the economic structure, which is basically capitalistic,
will follow. I have tried to show that the capitalistic theory of unlim-
ited acquisition, which Macpherson accurately expounds, is a result of
Locke's view of religious duty and that Locke's specifically capitalistic
view of the role of money as capital, is the only possible role which he
could ascribe to it within the context of his religious theory.
The main reason why Dunn and Macpherson fail to see Locke in more than one aspect is, I think, that they insufficiently appreciate that he lived very much in a transitional period. He did retain much more than a veneer of religion, he retained a specifically Puritan view of religion. He also however embraced a capitalist, or proto-capitalist, economic order as a means of increasing the general stock of the community, which was in keeping with his religious and utilitarian views. His view of capitalism may have been over-optimistic but it would surely be churlish to expect a man at the beginning of the growth of capitalism to examine in detail all its possible faults. He accepted it enthusiastically as a means of raising the general standard of living and this we must accept.

I began by saying that Locke's philosophy had been described in many ways, and I am sure it will continue to be described in many different ways. What I have tried to show is that to describe his views as "Puritan" or as "Capitalist" or as "Utilitarian" is not to give three different interpretations of Locke. Locke's theory embraces all three of these elements and they are all closely interrelated.
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