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ALIENATION DIALECTIC AND SPIRIT

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ALIENATION, DIALECTIC AND SPIRIT

A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION INTO CHRISTIAN DIALECTIC  
IN THE LIGHT OF HEGEL'S DIALECTIC OF LORD AND SLAVE  
AND OF HIS PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT.

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Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
University of Glasgow  
1970.

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## P R E F A C E

It is usual, in a preface, to tell the reader what the writer intends to do, and why he does not intend to do something else. So we begin with what we intend to do. In very broad terms, we intend to explore some problems of christian dialectic in the light of Hegel's dialectic of Lord and slave, his dialectical philosophy of spirit, or Geist, and some recent developments in dialectical thinking. We are not attempting a comprehensive re-interpretation of Hegel, not even of dialectic. We are not going to discuss Hegel's later work, except where a passage can throw light upon his earlier position. Consequently we shall not be discussing the Hegel of the British Idealist tradition, which is almost exclusively an interpretation of the mature Hegel. Nor do we study Hegel by way of his predecessors, as Kroner does in his 'Von Kant bis Hegel'. Apart from the fact that a work of this length could hardly offer a complete account of anything, we must recognize at the outset that the time is not yet ripe for a complete or definitive interpretation of Hegel. This is true of the dialectic as well. Hegel is rarely seriously discussed, and even more rarely understood. The dialectic is regarded with suspicion and sometimes with profound abhorrence. It is rarely comprehended. Consequently, it is high time that a sympathetic, though critical, exploration of the dialectic were undertaken. One of the most definitive, and certainly one of the most influential formulations of dialectical thinking is to be found in Hegel, and in Hegel's earlier work in particular. This/

This study is undertaken in the belief that the dialectic is of profound significance not only for social, economic and political theory, but for theological, philosophical, and psycho-analytic thinking as well. We do not attempt to follow all the paths along which dialectical thinking might lead us. Our discussion is severely confined to one important example of dialectic only; although this, of itself, leads us through philosophy to theology, sociology, psycho-analysis and other related disciplines. The dialectic of Lord and slave, together with the notion of spirit, hold our attention through much of this study, and provide us with more than enough to reflect upon.

Most of what we have to say about Hegel concerns the younger Hegel, because it is he who explored more deeply than anyone the possibilities and the limits of dialectical thinking. We are concerned with Hegel up to and including his 'Phenomenology of Spirit', that is, up to and including 1807. Consequently, we owe a great deal to numerous interpreters of Hegel's earlier work, and particularly to interpreters of the 'Phenomenology'. We must mention, in particular, Alexandre Kojève, whose 'Introduction à la lecture de Hegel' (1947) provided us with an exciting controversial impetus, and Jean Hyppolite, whose detailed commentary on the 'Phenomenology' called 'Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel' (1946) has been of considerable help. Although it is obvious how much I owe to these important interpretations of Hegel, I have not entered into more than the briefest discussion with any of Hegel's interpreters, though not for the same reasons as scholars like Findlay and Kaufmann. Because our primary concern is with the dialectic, not only in Hegel, /

Hegel, but in Feuerbach, Marx, Freud, Lukács, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as well, we cannot enter into detailed argument over the minutiae of scholarly interpretation of Hegel alone. We shall raise detailed points of interpretation only when this is essential to the argument. The primary aim of this work is to explore the structure and significance of dialectical thinking. We stay with Hegel, and the thinkers just mentioned, only for as long as is necessary to achieve a working comprehension of what they say. No-one will find this an exhaustive account even of the dialectic of Lord and slave, not to mention Hegel's philosophy.

We have achieved, here, only a tentative and incomplete contribution to the study of dialectic. We have devoted nine chapters to the meaning of such difficult encompassing conceptions as alienation (entfremdung), self-consciousness (selbstbewusstsein), truth (wahrheit), phenomenology (phänomenologie), spirit (Geist) and Notion (Begriff), not because we enjoy becoming bewitched, under Hegel's influence, by general ideas, but because these conceptions are integral to dialectical thinking. We devote nine chapters to Hegel, not because we entertain an historical interest in his ideas, but because he, above all, can throw light on the task of dialectical thinking in our own time.

Dialectical thinking, in the simplest terms, is a philosophical attempt, requiring concrete action in accordance with it, to give coherent and enduring meaning to our experience, in an age when our experience is no longer self-evidently intelligible. Dialectical thinking, whether in Heraclitus or Hegel, Lukács or Merleau-Ponty, is an attempt to restore meaning to experience. In dialectical thinking, we struggle to face up to the problem of Nóyos in an age of violent Yévecis. In an age/

age of traumatic disintegration, through war, change and social fragmentation, men begin to ask the old question of *Λόγος*, of meaning, of value, of intelligibility. We hear many saying that nothing means anything to them anymore: they work hard, but do not know to what end. Life does not seem worth living anymore. There's no purpose, no point to it all. In other words, life has become divorced from meaning, and the old meanings are no longer live options. We experience a traumatic loss of nerve, an incurable anxiety, a profound despair. Sometimes this leads us to withdraw from life into closed circles of meaning, whether of opinion, class, colour, race, religion or something else. We are willing to sacrifice life for the meaning. We need the security, and are only too happy to let life go on without us. At other times, we throw ourselves into life, forgetful of meaning, unable to remember; and consequently we are dismembered, dislocated, or destroyed. Dialectical thinking struggles to restore meaning to experience. It strives to integrate life and meaning in an enduring, though flexible, changing *Λόγος*. It does so, recognizing that the meaning truly worthy of our whole-hearted trust, in a time of violent becoming, will not be a meaning we shall comprehend in a single proposition, or even from a single point of view. No particular truth can comprehend the whole truth. What we really desire is a completeness which contains our pain, our brokenness, our despair, - holding us without absorbing and so destroying us. We desire completeness, but we do so from a position of radical incompleteness. The desire for completeness is the desire for rationality, for encompassing intelligibility. Yet the claim to have achieved this completeness in some final solution, or absolute standpoint, constitutes the extreme form of irrationality. Dialectical thinking/

thinking undertakes to go by way of the narrow path, the "path of doubt" or "highway of despair" Hegel called it, between incompleteness and completeness, between the world and God, the path which was once called the Via Negativa. It is here that humanity must seek the integrity of life and meaning for which it longs so despairingly.

We have devoted a chapter each to Feuerbach, Marx, Lukács, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, not because they alone can help us to find our way about, but because they represent both a variety and a continuity of approaches to the problems. Once again, our discussion makes no attempt to be exhaustive, but merely to deepen our explorations into certain ever-recurring issues. We give special attention to the dialectic of Lord and Slave, not only because it is of great interest on its own account, but because, through Marx, it has shaped, and will certainly continue to shape, numerous events in our time, and because, through Feuerbach it has dominated much of our most significant theological thinking. This is certainly a broad canvass. We have chosen an exploratory method, in order to cover it with some measure of continuity and consistency. We shall return again and again to the same issues, sometimes from one angle and sometimes from another. To some, our method of writing will appear repetitive. It is intentionally so. There is no question of solving the problem of life and meaning, for example, once and for all. No simple argument can lead to the kind of enduring conclusions that we seek. A philosophy of  $\Lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , or of the Begriff as Hegel calls it, must return again and again to the same age-old issues, not in order to achieve a final solution to them, so that we may shelve them once and for all, but in order to renew, in our own time/

time, and anew every day, the living struggle to comprehend the forgotten meaning, the lost coherence, which, in God, man is created to make his own. We ought not to have to offer an apology for exploratory repetition. Least of all, ought we to apologise for the broad nature of our exploration, for as Merleau-Ponty says,

"All the great philosophical ideas of the past century - the philosophies of Marx and Nietzsche, phenomenology, German existentialism and psycho-analysis - had their beginnings in Hegel: it was he who started the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded reason, which is the task of our century." (1)

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1. Merleau-Ponty: Hegel's existentialism: Sense and Nonsense  
pg: 63.

## CHAPTER I

## PHENOMENOLOGY AS THE LOGIC OF SPIRIT:

## HEGEL'S APOPHATIC METHOD.

Hegel calls "phenomenology" the "science of the experience through which consciousness passes" (1). This definition of his phenomenological method will not become clear until we have made some preliminary points concerning Hegel's apophatic method. The fundamental axiom of Hegel's philosophy, or so it seems to me, is that man is the being who above all else desires completeness. The paradox of man's being is that he remains man only as long as he fails to achieve the completeness he desires. For should he arrive at that encompassing completeness which is the *Télos* of both his thinking and his action, he would no longer desire it. Hegel calls desire the negative. He chooses phenomenology as his method because phenomenology is concerned, for him, with the experience of consciousness, which is the experience of negation, of action, or negative action. Phenomenology is necessarily dialectical, for Hegel, because, as we shall see in detail later in this study, only dialectic can "comprehend" the situational character of experience (2). In the simplest terms, we understand dialectic to be a way of speaking/

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- 1: Phenomenology of Spirit pg: 96. From here on we shall refer to the Phenomenology of Spirit as P.S.
- 2: The term comprehend in our translation of Hegel's "begreifen". Greifen means grasp, take possession of, grip, enjoy, encompass, with the added strength of the prefix. Begriff, which we sometimes translate as Notion, at others as encompassing conception, has similar meanings. Like the Hebrew yada it cannot be understood within the formal framework of a rigid subject-object dualism. To comprehend means to gather, to oneself, to grasp completely, to possess, to fulfil a desire, rather than to perceive the way things are

speaking which begins only after we have acknowledged that no single proposition can express the whole truth of our experience. Hegel calls his dialectical phenomenology a "path of doubt", or "highway of despair" (1), which is "conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge" (2). We hope to make this clear in the course of the following chapters.

Hegel's phenomenology is not concerned with immediate matters of fact, but with the task of comprehending the facts which we already know in a variety of familiar ways. He describes a "whole succession of the modes or attitudes of consciousness" (3), as just so many ways of comprehending experience. The subject-matter of phenomenology is the history of human experience; the eventual goal of phenomenological thinking is a complete awareness of what we were not conscious of when we were in the grip of experience itself (4). No single attitude, state of mind, mode of discourse, or proposition, can be wholly true, for Hegel, because truth entails a completeness which no single expression can attain. Hegel argues, for example, that no single proposition can be more than partially true, because no single proposition can express more than a part of the situational complexity we call reality. We shall discuss Hegel's notion of truth, and his attempt to distinguish truth from correctness, later on (5). Of course, we recognise that the correspondence notion of truth prevails in most contemporary philosophical discussion today, and consequently it is often difficult to give

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1: P.S. pg: 135.

2: P.S. pg. 136.

3. P.S. pg. 144.

4. P.S. pg: 144.

5. He distinguishes richtigkeit from Wahrheit cf. pg. 103f.

a fair hearing to those who think that truth as correspondence is not the only conception of truth open to us. Hegel argues that the correspondence theory of truth has an important and legitimate place in human thought and action, but it would not be legitimate to make the absolute and exclusive claim that truth as correspondence is the only kind of truth there is.

Bearing in mind, then, that we shall be using the notion of truth in a sense not immediately familiar to contemporary philosophers, though it is familiar enough in ordinary language, we continue our exploration into Hegel's phenomenological thinking.

Hegel describes his phenomenological method as a methodological scepticism directed towards the whole compass of phenomenal consciousness, a scepticism which qualifies us for the first time to test what truth is. (1) It entails a negative critique leading to a "despair regarding what are called natural views, thoughts and opinions".(2) It proceeds by way of negation. We call this procedure an "apophatic method" for this reason. It entails a despair regarding all conventional attitudes and perspectives, however well-established. For Hegel, every customary way of thinking, every deeply learned logical practice, every common sense opinion is relative to the truth of the whole. "Das Wahre ist das Ganze", "the truth is the whole", he argues.(3) Our correct opinions are partial truths, reflecting, or indicating, but not encompassing the truth of the whole. For truth is "essentially a result; only at the end is it what it is in very truth".(4).

Consequently/

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1: P.S. pg. 136

2. Ibid pg: 136.

3. German Ed. Phen. Geist pg. 21 English pg. 81

4. P.S. pg. 82.

Consequently, Hegel is arguing against our making absolute truth claims from the vantage point of our natural attitudes and conventional frames of reference. True, he seeks, like Freud, to make the unconscious conscious, so that the truth of everything we are experiencing, and have experienced, is not forgotten or left unrecognized. But every finite way of being conscious of our experience is, for Hegel, incomplete. We cannot, therefore, claim exhaustive comprehension of all that is the case; we comprehend less than we experience, and our experience itself is limited by the timeandspace of our culture and the shape of our human world. No single mode of consciousness comprehends the whole, for Hegel, yet, "consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within its experience" (1). For Hegel, no speculation beyond our experience is legitimate; the task of speculation, in Hegel's sense of the term, is to work toward an ever more adequate comprehension of experience. "The object", he continually reminds us, "appears only to be in such wise for consciousness as consciousness knows it" (2). Consciousness cannot go behind the object to test whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the real nature of the object. The thing in itself can only be the thing we experience, what it is in itself for consciousness (3). Hegel refuses to work within the noumenon-phenomenon dualism of Kant because he has chosen a phenomenological starting point. Consequently, there can be no talk, for him, of what transcends experience.

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It/

- 1: P.S. pg. 96. We shall discuss the notion of begreifen comprehend, in full later on.
- 2: P.S. pg. 141.
- 3: Ibid pg. 141,212,142, 96, etc.

It might appear that Hegel's refusing to depart from concrete experience entails the view that philosophy leaves everything as it is. But nothing could be farther from the truth. For philosophy, according to Hegel, only "wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder" (1). For philosophy, as Hegel conceived it, follows the same negative way as the Christian, from death to life, from bondage to freedom. It comes to the truth not by shrinking from Calvary, but by living it through. Philosophy is essentially a Christian philosophy for Hegel. It articulates the same revelation as the Christian tradition has always done; it shares the same *ἔσχατον* or end, namely redemption from death through death. Far from leaving everything as it is, it negates common sense, and "with it the familiar". For what is familiarly known", says Hegel, "is not properly known just for the reason that it is familiar" (2).

By way of negation, therefore, the apophantic procedure of Hegel's phenomenology points toward the transcendence of all finite limits, revealing their temporal, temporary nature. Its *τέλος* is an ever more adequate correspondence between comprehension and experience. For every individual mode of consciousness is partial, temporal and incomplete; it makes its one fatal error when it makes the absolute claim to have achieved the Truth of the Whole. Only the Spirit, the complete comprehension of all experience, is the Truth of the Whole.

God, or the spirit of God, for Hegel, is "abstract generality" when conceived as He is in himself apart from the "wealth/

1. P.S. pg. 93.

2. Ibid pg. 92

"wealth of the developed form" which is the "history of concrete experience". (1). Hegel shared Luther's mistrust of abstract speculation concerning the being of God in his transcendent asceticity. Phenomenology, as Hegel conceived it, is negative or apophatic theology, which means that it proceeds by way of negation to reconstruct concrete experience in such a way as to disclose the eschatological tension which pervades every relation of subject and object in experience. He sought to show how each partial hold on the truth of experience participates in the truth of the Whole, even though the truth of the Whole is not yet, but is essentially result (2).

Many have argued that Hegel loses the eschatological tension of his dialectic when he settled down as the established philosopher of the Prussian State. Even in his later work, however, his position remains ambivalent. In the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', we do not find more than suggestions of this later ambivalence. It has always been more difficult for the Hegelians of the right to build their position on the 'Phenomenology' than on the 'Philosophy of Right' or the 'Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences'. The left-wing Hegelians, by contrast, have made the 'Phenomenology' their happy hunting ground. As "purposive activity" (3),

reason, for the Hegel of the 'Phenomenology' at any rate, cannot be divorced from Action. Indeed, the unity of subject and object which Reason practically achieves, according to Hegel, is/

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1. P.S. pg. 81.

2. Ibid pg. 81-82.

3. P.S. pg. 83.

is obviously possible only when the subject actively penetrates objectivity, and is not possible if the subject passively observes objectivity at a distance. Reason is active, and dialectical. Kojève calls it "negative action". It is rivetted, therefore, to the hard raw material of the world, and in struggling to transform that world into a human world, Reason begins always with living experience and does not indulge in abstract speculation. Hegel's so-called rationalism encompasses both materialism and idealism, but it is not committed to a naive belief in evolutionary progress for as we have said, Hegel's Reason is dialectical Reason. It does not achieve its purpose immediately or directly, but only by way of negation. It is too cunning to be optimistic. It seeks for new life, not in life, but in death. It obeys the Way of the Cross. Reason wills life, but life is given not in life, but in death. Reason wills freedom, but freedom is given not in freedom but in slavery. Reason wills justice, goodness, beauty, trustworthiness and so on, but it is in and through injustice, evil, ugliness and faithlessness that it achieves that end, or ἔσχατον. Reason hopes in despair because it has allowed the Christian promise that freedom is given in slavery, health in the disease, life in death to become the norm and criterion of all rationality. In this way, Reason can integrate irrationality into a broader rationality. This rationality is what Hegel calls Geist, or Spirit. We shall spell out the importance of dialectical Reason when we come to the Lord-Slave dialectic later in this work. We can already see, however, why Hegel calls reason cunning.

We consider, now, in greater detail, Hegel's notion of Geist.  
or/

or Spirit. In his 'Philosophy of Religion', Hegel argues that God is μυστήριον (mystery) at the level of sense experience, perception, and understanding; but not at the level of self-consciousness. This might be mistaken for Augustine's thesis that my awareness of God is of the same order of immediacy as my self-awareness, and I am an enigma to myself to the extent that God is an enigma to me (1). Hegel's self-consciousness is not in any sense an immediate self-awareness, but is the goal of the long and labourious journey toward a complete knowledge of experience in reflection. Kojève reminds us that sense, -experience, perception and understanding are all forms of cognition in the face of an exterior world (2). God is not experienced, perceived or understood for Hegel. God is essentially in the process of thought, he tells us. In thought, we live through our living experience of the world, organising that experience in order to grasp or comprehend a creative tension between contradictory experiences, an integrated self-consciousness in and through every experience. In thought, the philosopher recognizes what is experienced (in cognition). He thinks through his experiences, and those of others, when all the facts are in one sense known, when empirical questions and logical questions have been adequately answered at the level of our natural attitudes, common sense and common usage. He lives through experience in thought in order to overcome the false, diseased polarities of subjectivism/

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1. Augustine: City of God XI 26 pp. 468-9 of Dods edition.
  2. Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: Commentary on chs. I, II and III of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit'.

subjectivism and objectivism in a new integrated totality, or Whole ( ὅλον ). God is neither Subject nor object, subjective nor objective, in the mind, in or beyond the world. For God cannot be confined to any determination. God will be who He will be (1); He is the end (ἔσχατον), the Truth of every experience and the Truth of the Whole. Thought is the recollection of experience, for Hegel, and it is in this eschatological sense, as the Truth of the Whole, that God is in thought. In thought, our experience is, as it were, born again, transformed, integrated. Spirit is experience raised up from death, from what it is as experience, raised to a new life. The Notion (Begriff), as concrete universal, is experience transformed in death to what it is, born in reflection as Spirit.

Hegel is not, therefore, working from within the Augustinian, Cartesian tradition when he equates spirit with self-consciousness. Spirit is no more present in immediate self-awareness than in immediate experience, for Hegel. He deals with the Cartesian dualism of Res Cogitans, Res extensa dialectically, and instead of refuting it, he shows its limits, its inadequacy, its inappropriateness. Spirit, for Hegel, is a new kind of awareness rather than a new Object of awareness, and it is an intersubjective rather than intrasubjective spirit, a social rather than individual spirit, because for Hegel, Spirit is born only in relation to others. It is in the mutual re-cognition of man with man that Spirit emerges. Spirit is re-cognition remaking cognition. It is only in the struggle of life and death that the intersubjective Truth of the Whole is born/

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1. Exodus 314.

born, as we shall see later in this work. For the present, we must justify our interpretation of Hegel's Geist concept as through and through Eschatological.

Kaufmann tells us that Hegel sent the first half of his manuscript of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' to his publisher in October 8th 1806 and the remainder the night of October 12th-13th, the night before Napoleon occupied the city after the battle of Jena. On September 18th 1806, Hegel completed his course on speculative philosophy with the words: "Ours is a significant epoch, a time of ferment, when the spirit has made a jerk, transcended its previous form, and is gaining a new one. The whole mass of previous notions, concepts, the bonds of the world, have dissolved and collapsed like a dream image. A new emergence of the spirit is at hand. Philosophy must above all welcome its appearance and recognize it, while others resisting it, stick to what is past" (1). We shall be discussing the notions, concepts and bonds of the world which Hegel thought were dissolved, in the course of the following chapters. The point we are making here is that Hegel clearly thought that his own time was a time of deep crisis and violent change. He~~was~~ clearly aware of the eschatological tensions as well as the new possibilities hidden within a period of widespread disintegration. Thus, he read the all-pervasive dualisms of the reformation and the enlightenment as symptoms of the dissolution of all familiar frames of mind and forms of life, and as signs that a new world <sup>at</sup> was/hand. The one-sided subjectivism and objectivism of Reason and/

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1. Kaufmann: Hegel: A Reinterpretation pg: 116-7.

and nature, God and the world, history and natural science, freedom and determinism, was symptomatic of what divided the bourgeois world to breaking point, threatening it with growing fragmentation and disintegration. Hegel tries to 'change our mind' about everything we regard familiar, by taking as his starting-point the radical temporality of man in history. We are not in full possession of ourselves, Hegel argues, because we are temporal beings. For Hegel, as for his fellow romantics, the world is a wilderness because there is no home, no stability, no security to be found in its relentless becoming.

Feuerbach had learned from Hegel that our ideas of God always correspond to our own social, cultural and political ethos. Our God is all that we are not. Max Weber has deepened our understanding of the relation between the God's and our social world in numerous studies, by showing that the God of a period corresponds to, or perhaps reflects, the needs and ideals of dominant social groups. Hegel's Geist, a conception of God formulated in a period of traumatic upheaval, instability and disintegration following the French Revolution and other widespread social and technological change, is no exception. For Hegel, God is the God of becoming, the only God that can maintain his life in the death of violent change. God is the God of the Wilderness, the God who is what he will be, the God who is always on the way. God is who He is, not by remaining what He is, as static and so empty identity. He is the God, who is who He is, only in becoming what He is not. He is the God of the nomad, of the man who lives in a desert of change, and who cannot put up his tent and settle down for fear of losing his living experience of an ever-changing world.

For/

For Hegel, Truth is the Truth of Becoming, not the truth of stable being. The truth of Being, for him, is always partial truth, one-sided, exclusive of what it is not, relative. The truth of becoming is always on the way, inclusive of what at first sight it is not, and consequently it has never arrived. The nomad never arrives, and the God of the nomad is the God of Israel even after the settlement in the promised land. The prophets struggled to keep this God alive for their own time; their God is the God who cannot be possessed, the God who elects in freedom, the God who is never contained in any social, economic, political or cultic order. It was this that Hegel sought to grasp in his idea of God as the Truth of the Whole. The truth of the Whole is the truth of becoming, open to the future, dialectical. It is open to new experiences, new frames of mind, new forms of life. A new dialectical reason must take the place of old fixed dualisms, if we are to describe and communicate the God of new and disturbing experiences. Old frames of mind with their familiar logical conventions, and old forms of life with their familiar social conventions, must pass away, if we are not to 'go out of our mind'. For unless we forsake being for becoming, we shall become chained to our past and compelled to repeat. Every dualism from Plato to Fichte, and especially those of Luther, Descartes, and Kant, threatens to tear men apart, according to Hegel. Fixed dualisms of the common understanding rend self from self, self from body, self from world, knowledge from reality, spirit from nature, and so on. There can be no adequate correspondence between being and deed, faith and works, word and action, promise and fulfilment, theory and practice in such times. Every rule and convention, everything that appears necessary because it is familiar, must dissolve./

dissolve, says Hegel, in the death of the old world. The bonds of the old world have become dreams in relation to the new. For a new spirit, a new integration, is at hand. Thus, Hegel recalls the ancient messianic hope in the midst of the existing order, the social order, from which both Hegel and his fellow romantics though perhaps in spite of themselves were becoming increasingly estranged.

There is now little doubt that Lessing's "new eternal Gospel", and his belief that men were entering the third Age of the World, the Age of the Spirit, profoundly influenced Hegel (1). Kaufmann shows that Lessing's "Education of the human race" provides the starting-point of a number of major themes in the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'. Hegel's idea of phenomenology clearly follows Lessing, for whom, "every individual man - one sooner, another later, - must travel along the very same path by which the race reaches its perfection" (2). Lessing's belief that we had entered the third age, the Age of St. John, was born in his enthusiastic appreciation of the eschatological vision and revolt of the twelfth-century abbot, Joachim of Floris (Fiore), and the Franciscan spirituals, precursors of the reformation (3). "Perhaps some enthusiasts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had caught a glimmer of this new eternal gospel, and only erred in that they predicted its arrival so near their own time ... Perhaps their 'Three Ages of the World' were not so empty a speculation after all, and assuredly they had no bad intentions when they taught that the new Covenant must become as antiquated as the old has become" (4). But for Lessing enlightenment must/

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1. Kaufmann: Hegel pgs: 67-69.
  2. Lessing's theological Writings trans. Henry Chadwick pg. 97.
  3. Lowith: Meaning in History pg. 208; A. Altmann: Studies in Religious philosophy and mysticism pg. 276-7.
  4. Lessing Theol. Writings pg. 97.

must precede the Age of the Holy Spirit, (the Age promised in the Book of Revelation Ch: 14 verse 6). Lessing reminds us of the inscrutable way of eternal providence in seeming to go backwards so as to drive men to despair. BUT "it is not true that the shortest line is always straight", an insight Hegel made into a principle of his dialectic (1). It is well-known that both Fichte and Schelling spoke of their being on the threshold of the third Age, and many since then, such as Rosenzweig, have sought to express their eschatological awareness by means of the idea. For Rosenzweig, the Christian world 'post Hegel mortum' is identical with the Johannine Church (2). Fichte had thought that a final regeneration of the world was about to take place in the form of the millennial kingdom of St. John, and Schelling, in his 36th lecture on the philosophy of revelation, speaks of Peter as the Apostle of the Age of the Father, Paul of the son, and John of the Spirit (3). The first age is that of Catholicism, the second that of protestantism, the third a new order, the Age of the Holy Spirit. The Russian Hegelian's inherited this eschatological awareness in their turn, and in the course of the nineteenth century, Khomiakov, Krasinsky, Oreshkovsky, Soloviev and others, formulated their understanding of Hegel's Geist with the term sobornost, which Soloviev describes as the "synthesis of unity and freedom in love" (4).

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1. Kaufmann Hegel pg. 68.
  2. Altmann Ibid pg. 278.
  3. Lowith: Meaning in history pg. 208
  4. N. Lossky: History of Russian Philosophy pgs. 29-41; 118 etc. For Khomiakov, Catholicism achieved unity without freedom, protestantism freedom without unity. Sobornost, a term he was the first to use, is the Synthesis of both.

In the thought of Berdyaev, we find many of these ideas set in opposition to Hegel, a paradox we come across again and again in studying so-called opponents of Hegel. The Hegel they attack is a caricature of the later Hegel, a Hegel who has little in common with the Hegel we discover in the 'Phenomenology' and earlier works.

The point we have tried to make in this exposition of Hegel's use of lessing and the eschatological awareness of Joachim of Floris, is that for him, it is in our becoming what we are not, and not in our being what we are, that we become spirit and achieve freedom. The life of spirit is born not in life but in death. This is the heart of the dialectic, Hegel's "speculative Good Friday", of the essay on "Faith and Knowledge" (1802), and his "Golgotha of Absolute Spirit" of the Phenomenology (1807). Hegel warns us that the quantitative change and disintegration with which we are familiar is about to become a qualitative change, like birth. "Our epoch is a time of birth, a period of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things hitherto prevailing and with the old ways of thinking, and is about to let them sink into the depths of the past, and to set about its own transformation" (1). As one fragment after another of the previous world disintegrates, so the new form of the world is born. Hegel draws our attention to the symptoms of the gradual crumbling, - "frivolity, ennui, an undefined foreboding of something unknown", - and he tries to bring to view the form and structure of the new world as the dawn of a new αἰών or Age. The point he is making is that the disturbing new experiences of his day were symptoms of the disintegration/

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1. P.S. pg. 75 - The growth of the child in its mother's womb is for Hegel quantitative change, birth a qualitative change. Ibid pg. 75

disintegration of the old order and of old ways of thinking. Consciousness must learn from new experience as well as from the long history of past experience. Past shapes and forms of spirit must pass away, for a new world is already present in our experience, known, though not yet comprehended. It is in this sense that the 'Phenomenology' is Hegel's "voyage of discovery", his "Itinerarium mentis ad deum" (1). Löwith calls Hegel's  $\epsilon\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ , his ambiguous conclusion and fulfilment, a "destroying reconciliation", a final step before a great turning, and break with Christianity. Writing at a time when "everything is in the throes of dissolution and struggling toward something new", (2) Hegel's  $\epsilon\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$  is the "end of the history of the Christian Logos" (3). "The philosophy which perfects itself becomes the birthplace of the spirit, which then presses on to a new real configuration" (4).

Hegel's account of the birth and death which made his time a time of crisis arises out of what Löwith calls his "fundamental estrangement from the existing order", an estrangement he shared with his friend Hölderlin (5). Hegel shares the fragmentation and disintegration of the self and of the world which is at the heart of the Romantic's experience. Yet, as early as September 1800, Hegel decided in the last sentence of his Outline of a system that a bold "agreement with the Age" was the only way he could reconcile himself with reality (6). But it was to his early estrangement that Marx, Feuerbach, Bauer and the rest of the young left-wing/

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1. R. Kroner: Early theological Writings of Hegel: Introduction pg. 44.
  2. From Hegel to Nietzsche pg. 40
  3. Ibid pg. 41.
  4. Ibid pg. 43.
  5. Ibid pg. 162.
  6. From Hegel to Nietzsche, pgs. 162-3.

left-wing Hegelians returned, and with our experience today being what it is, we cannot but follow them, if we are to comprehend the alienation which gave rise to Hegel's own philosophical struggle.

In the passage we are discussing, however, Hegel warns us against thinking that the new world, in which Spirit, Reason, and freedom, will be actual (Wirklich), is already actual (1). The new world is real enough but it is no more actual than the newly-born baby. A building is not finished when the foundation is first laid "just as little as the attainment of a general notion of a whole, is the whole itself" (2). The new world is still in its initial stages, the "outcome of a widespread revolution in manifold forms of spiritual culture". But the "crowning glory of the spiritual world...." "comes after a chequered and devious course of development, after much struggle and effort" (3). The new world is present "in general outline", as a "whole lying concealed and hidden within a bare abstraction" (4). Kaufmann reminds us that elsewhere in the preface, Hegel rejects edification as a legitimate philosophical activity; he rejects in Phenomenology what later in life he began to do. The later Hegel could write: "The insight to which philosophy should help us is that the actual world is as it ought to be .... God rules the world; the content of his government, the execution of his plan, is world history" (5). By contrast in 1795 Hegel wrote in a letter to Schelling, "Let reason and Freedom remain our watchword, and the invisible church our point of union" (6). "Philosophy has got/

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1. : P.S. pg. 75-76, Philosophy of Right (Knox) pgs. 3 and 302. Kaufmann Hegel pgs. 262, 381, 397. Kowitz: From Hegel to Nietzsche pg. 137-8; Marcuse: Reason and Revolution pg. 153. For further detailed discussion of this distinction ch. VII, Part 3, pg. 175.
  2. P.S. pg. 75.
  3. P.S. pg. 76.
  4. Kaufmann: Ibid pg. 379 and 261: P.S. pgs. 73-4.
  5. Kaufmann: Hegel pg. 260-261.
  6. Ibid pg. 301.

got to start with the Unconditional .... the alpha and the omega of all philosophy is freedom" (1), replied Schelling, a few days later

Lowith describes the motive force of Hegel's philosophy as the attempt to "discover and establish the mid-point between subject and object, between being pro se and per se, between the internal and the external" by mediation". Substance was to become subject and subject substantial" (2). Mediation transforms what is bekannt into what is erkannt ; it transforms fixed concepts into fluid notions, filled, that is with living experience (3). In this way Hegel sought to overcome alienation, the divorce between subject and object, which, for him, made man into a sick animal. Whether or not he thought that a subject-object identity was attainable within history or at its end, (and his position changed a number of times in the course of his life), he did think that the fixed dualisms of the bourgeois intellectual world, whether of the German reformation, the enlightenment or the French revolution, could be overcome in dialectical thinking. Through continual negation, nothing remains what it is; it becomes what it is not, and in becoming, co-inheres with everything else. It is the unification of form and content.

"What is contradiction in the realm of the dead, is not one in the realm of life", said Hegel, in his early essay on the 'Spirit of Christianity'(4). Hegel's first concept of the power of healing integration was Life; only later did he choose to use the concept Geist or Spirit. Hegel was, and remained, a Romantic in his yearning for the integration of all opposites, and/

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1. Ibid pg. 303.
  2. Lowith: From Hegel to Nietzsche pg. 6-7.
  3. P.S. pgs. 96 and 97.
  4. Early theological writings pg. 261.

and for the reconciliation of all contradictions. Hegel also employed the notion of Love in his early writings to express his hope that reconciliation will be achieved. But in his notion of spirit, with its broad inclusive reference, he sought to integrate the split between the Spirit of God and the Spirit of man, and he eventually decided that no other notion could do it as well. Geist refers to both life and death, death and resurrection, slavery and freedom in an inclusive way, but not so as to confuse opposites in a monistic 'One'. For Geist is a dialectical notion, employed dialectically by Hegel. Dia-lectic, Dia-legein originally meant to speak or collect or explain through division or separation; for Heraclitus, dialectic enables us to speak about reality as totality, or the Whole, in and through change, in and through contradiction. For every particular contradiction can be shown, through dialectic, to fuse with every other, but only, according to Hegel, if dialectic is a "plastic discourse", employing what Lukács called "floating concepts" (1).

The language of Spirit has always been, in the Christian tradition, the language of the new λόγος, the Logos of resurrected life. Spirit in the old testament was that which gives life, it was breath, or wind, and only later on became associated with the knowledge that gives life. Hegel's eschatological use of the concepts Life and Spirit had no immediate connection with the biological conception of life. In this Hegel may be following Wurthenberg pietism, especially J. A. Bengel and F. Otinger. Moltmann points out that when Otinger introduced the concept of Life into theology in his 'Theologia exidea vitae deducta' (1765), he was attempting to make/

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1. Hegel: Logic pg. 40, P.S. pg. 122, Zitta: George Lukacs pgs. 205-207.

make room for thinking of a comprehensive kind. His concept of life was not naturalistic but had an eschatological orientation. With it he sought to overcome the antithesis of subjectivity and objectification which prevailed in the mechanistic world picture of the natural science of the Enlightenment, and in the idealistic subjectivism that went with it. "History", he maintained, according to Moltmann, "should not be regarded as a collection of dead facts existing outside man, but should be understood as a 'stream of life' which 'organically' surrounds man" (1). Moltmann does not argue that Hegel necessarily owes this use of the concept of life to the pietists, but Hegel may have done so. In any case, the whole purpose of his work seems to lie in the same direction at this point.

If Spirit is the power of new life in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, then the concepts of life and spirit have an ancient association. Similarly, for the same tradition, the spirit makes us free, it is liberating and redemptive, it creates a new world in the death of the old, new life in death, freedom in suffering. Spirit is that which gives new life and freedom. It is that which breathes life and health into the dying, the creation of wholeness in a broken, dislocated humanity. It gathers together the fragments of the finite and joins them again, healing all dualisms, all contradictions, and all antagonism.

Hegel's philosophy synthesizes the romantic yearning with the messianic hope for the incarnation of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , of meaning, of intelligibility. It is not only a phenomenology of the Holy Spirit in the world, but is also a logic, (though not a purely formal/

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1. Moltmann: Theology of Hope pg: 72-3.

formal logic,) of meaning, of ὁ Λόγος, of the Word. However, for Hegel, Spirit is ultimate, that is eschatological, and is not therefore disclosed in immediate experience. There is no such thing as cognition of spirit in Hegel's philosophy, for Spirit is born in re-cognition, reflection and recollection. For in reflection, we represent not only what we experience in immediate sensory experience, but also how we experienced it. The subjective component of the subject-object relation in all experience must first come into view. But to reflect is not to leave the experience as it is. To include how we experience as well as what we experience into the mature philosophical self-awareness involves what Hegel called mediation. It is to add the meaning of the 'how', to the content of the 'what' of immediate experience, in negation. In this way a new coherence, a new set of integral meanings and connections emerge which transform experience into the notion (Begriff). The notion is conceptual reconstruction of experience.

Mannheim argues that the strength of the Hegelian concept of Geist or Spirit lies in its grasp of the "social dimensions of meaning" (1). Originally, Mannheim reminds us, Geist did not have its present connotation of an objectified and socialized set of meanings; it referred to what he calls a "gripping and ecstatic experience whose roots go back to early religion" (2). Hegel's Geist reflects the ambivalent double meaning of social, and in that sense objective meaning, and subjective meaning, the ecstatic experiences which give new life to old social norms and customs. It was in the course of the enlightenment that the Lutheran dualism of the freedom of faith and the bondage/

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1. Essays on the Sociology of Culture pg. 68.  
 2. Ibid pg. 61.

bondage of all men in the old order became the dualism of the freedom of reason against mechanistic determinism to natural forces (1). Spirit, in the enlightenment becomes Reason, Mind, Mens (2). For this kind of rationalism, the early "ecstatic components of the term are more and more equated with conscious reasoning" (3). In the romantic reaction to rationalism, however, the older connotations are revived, Geist is conceived as the animus of history, as a higher reasoning which involved contemplation, volition and action, as well as technical components. In Hegel's concept of Geist, we have a synthesis of the classic and the romantic view, a synthesis which included both the subjective, ecstatic elements, and the social and objective elements, in a new dialectical movement. Geist, for Hegel spans both the socially established meanings established in custom, logical conventions, norms of behaviour and so on, as well as the disturbing yet invigorating experiences of individuals which can transform the former. For many people, the use of 'total' notions in this manner can only lead to intolerable confusions. Things are what they are, and not another thing, logical rules are limits; things and meanings, facts and values, substance and form are all distinct. This objection to Hegel's dialectic, and to his use of total notions like spirit, has been made repeatedly. But it is a misunderstanding of dialectic to think that it blurs distinctions, or that it ignores contradiction in abstract conceptualisation. It serves rather to hold contradiction in creative tension, without fragmentation. It enables us to stay with contradiction without breaking. It prevents/

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1. Ibid pg. 31
  2. Ibid pg. 63.
  3. Ibid pg. 63.

prevents complete disintegration. For disintegration in perception and understanding necessarily connects with the disintegration of the self, and of the social world.

When communal values and traditional conventions radically disintegrate, we may sometimes be driven to the point where it is no longer possible to distinguish reason from unreason, sanity from insanity, dream from reality. There may come a point when our power to create new values and conventions cannot be held in creative, healthy tension with the flux of new and disturbing experience. The balance is lost, the tension broken. At such a time, and our own Age is such a time, the boundary between sanity and insanity is lost, and a whole civilisation enters a period of instability. It can become difficult to know when one is dreaming and when one is awake; reality can seem unreal, impossible, too terrible to live. Ideally, perhaps, our values and conventions should be giving way to new ones; we would be keeping pace with our experience with new forms of life, new values and new conventions. Ideally, in the field of linguistic conventions also, we should be creating new linguistic forms to describe and communicate fresh experience. Unless our logical forms and social conventions can develop in creative tension with on-going experience, something must break. What we do ought to correspond to what we are, deed with being, but this is not the case. Similarly faith has become divorced from deed, words from actions, values from facts, promise from fulfilment.

Many of us have committed intellectual if not physical suicide. We abstract ourselves from living experience, isolating ourselves from what consequently appears as a cruelly contingent world. Hegel's notion of Spirit is an attempt to prevent this by/

by coming to terms with experience in reflective organisation and re-organization of experience. It is true that many have followed Hegel's tendency to relapse into an increasingly abstract conservatism, relinquishing his hold on living experience. Hegel was well aware of the pervasive and dangerous disintegration we have been describing, and his logic of Spirit, his phenomenology, and his dialectic, are tools forged by him to use in the task of describing and communicating an integrity within disintegration. Total notions are an attempt to overcome the insane subjectivism and objectivism which characterize the age of fragmentation.

Many of us retire behind re-enforced barriers of class or persuasion, nation, colour or creed. We desperately try to prevent experience from penetrating our ideal formations, our closed and formal abstractions, and our established conceptions of what ought to be the case. Consequently, we confuse abstract possibilities with real possibilities, because we can no longer tell the difference between fantasy and reality. We seek stability anywhere but in the free command of new experience, or in a realistic description of experience; and so we fail to communicate to one another, we fail to establish new meanings in new social and linguistic forms. Within the old limits of custom and language, adequate description and so communication is no longer possible. Experience seems to be too violent and too destructive to organise. We therefore cling like children to old configurations, old patterns of experience, old logical conventions, old social forms. Hegel diagnosed our disease, and tried to find a remedy. If we could only live through our experience without recoiling and turning aside into abstraction, we/

we could then recognise (Re-Know) what we experience (Know) as the truth. But we are, he said afraid of the truth (1). We do not 'comprehend' what we 'know'.

Hegel recognised that we have lost the one really fundamental metaphysical belief in the intelligibility of things. We no longer feel it to be self-evident that our experience is essentially intelligible, nor that contradiction can be comprehended within a broader, stronger coherence. Meaning, or *Λόγος*, seems no longer self-evidently present in either nature or history. So our struggle to organize experience, to describe it, and to communicate it, in order to establish meaning in our social world, is undertaken within a violent insecurity, upheaval and conflict. Our experience of becoming is so threatening that we no longer feel safe or at home in our experience. Reality cannot be distinguished from a bad dream and consequently we no longer have any 'solid ground' over which to build our world. Instead, our politics and our technology, our economics and our culture, become perverted. They become a flight from reality, an evasion of the truth of experience. We oscillate between insane polarities, between subjectivism and objectivism, Lordship and Bondage for example, and there seems to be no way out of our despair.

Hegel shared the nostalgia of the romantic whose world is our world of violent becoming and yet who refuses to give up hope. For the romantic yearns and hopes to the point when reality either breaks his idealism, or he turns on reality with the fury of revolutionary violence. But the mystic turned revolutionary/

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1. P.S. pg. 138.

revolutionary cannot regain his lost experience, his lost reality, by struggling to realize his ideals through violence. His ideals were conceived in escape from reality in a kind of insanity; and when realized, merely reproduce the broken, dislocated mentality of his disease in man's social world. He merely externalizes his sick, broken consciousness. He may feel some relief from so doing, but the world is not transformed(1) Hegel eventually chose reality and not revolution; though his work shows the continuation of a dialectical, apophatic mysticism. He chose nevertheless the Prussian State, his home; and many make a similar move today. They regard the contradictions of left-wing Hegelianism as stages on the way to a conservative reconciliation with reality. But they do not redeem what they lost on the way. They shrink from death, unlike those who follow the Way or Spirit. For Spirit does not shrink from death, it finds life in death, freedom in bondage, hope in despair (2).

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1. I owe this point, as well as much in this study to Victor Zitta's brilliant analysis of the Hegelianism and Marxism of George Lukacs in: 'George Lukács, Marxism, alienation, and revolution' 1964.
  2. P.S. pg. 93.

## CHAPTER II

## DIALECTIC:

EXPOSITION AND ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PREFACE TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY  
OF SPIRIT.

Hegel's Logic of Spirit is a dialectical and not formal logic. It does not conform to the rules and conventions of formal logic. Consequently, neither the form nor the content of his Logic are familiar to us, for the form departs from established convention, logical as well as empirical, and the content includes every kind of living experience. His Logic of Spirit, the subject-matter of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', is a logic of human experience in general. It is dialectical in form because its content, living experience, cannot be described in any other way. The content of Hegel's philosophy, namely human experience, determines the form of his philosophy, which is a dialectical logic of spirit, just as the form pervades the content. The form of his logic is the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of the Christian tradition; indeed Hegel's philosophy is a metaphysics of the Christian  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , a philosophy of life, death and resurrection. It seeks to show how this form pervades the content of every living experience by showing how spontaneous, natural life becomes spirit and achieves freedom through death. By way of the incarnation, the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of God has entered history, so that the task of the Christian metaphysician, according to Hegel, is not only to speak of the Christ, but also to speak of the spirit, the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  hidden in man's social and historical life, as he proceeds towards his  $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ , the end which defines both the being, and the meaning of man, from the beginning.

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The main task of this chapter is to outline the philosophical, theological, sociological and psychological contradictions which are involved in Hegel's Lordship-bondage model, and in order to do this, we shall have to look closely at some passages which tell us what Hegel was trying to do in his philosophy, and how he proposed to do it. We confine ourselves in the main to the preface of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', though the Introductions and Prefaces to the 'Science of Logic' and the 'Philosophy of Right' will be relevant also.

We found in the course of the previous chapter that for Hegel, Truth is not to be found in stable Being, but in instable Becoming. Like Heraclitus, Hegel lived in an age of social revolution, and like Heraclitus, he began with the living experience of men in such a time. Hegel once claimed that he had incorporated every proposition of Heraclitus' philosophy into his own, and there is no doubt that Heraclitus greatly influenced Hegel(1). More has shown us the Aristotelian foundation of Hegel's thought, but little work has been done on his relation to Heraclitus. For both Heraclitus and Hegel, everything is in flux, nothing remains what it is, nothing stable can be relied upon. The only sure point in the flowing river of change, is the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , the common measure of all things, the coherence in all change. Heraclitus believed in the co-inherence of opposites in continual becoming. For him nothing remains what it is, nothing rests, nothing abides; yet there is identity in and through difference, there is coherence in change. We shall be returning to these ideas throughout this chapter, bearing in mind/

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1. History of Philosophy I pg. 279 (frans Haldane). "With Heraclitus the philosophic Idea is to be met with in its speculative form; the reasoning of Parmenides and Zeno is abstract understanding. Heraclitus was thus universally esteemed a deep philosopher ... Here we see land, there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic".

mind that they cannot be understood apart from the experience which gives rise to them, the experience of drift which accompanies the disintegration of stable conventions and forms of social life. Heraclitus faced the disintegration of the Greek tribal aristocracies, with their ancient conventions and well-established forms of social life, and the birth of democracy. Hegel faced the upheavals of the French Revolution, together with the widespread social and industrial revolutions that were taking place in Europe in his time. Popper speaks of the sense of drift expressed in Heraclitus' philosophy, and Talmon of the sense of "irretrievable drift" which followed the breakdown of instinctive certainties and unreflected habits in the violent social changes following 1789 (1). Both men experienced the collapse of stable relationships, together with traditional values and conventions, and consequently both came to nature through history, rather than history through nature. Both experienced the divorce between subject and object in man's socio-historic life, an experience which is out of place within the scientific frame of reference as traditionally understood. Social facts are not natural facts, for there is a unity between subject and object in the case of the former which would be out of place in observation of natural facts. Historical and social facts are not things but deeds, they may resemble natural facts in that we may appear fatalistically determined by them, but unlike physical nature, human nature has a human essence, it can in principle regain. That essence, for Hegel, is freedom. It is Geist, or Spirit.

In his 'Aesthetic Education of Man', Schiller had argued that man only makes progress toward a health or wholeness in Culture through/

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1. Popper: Open Society I ch. 2, J.L. Talmon: Political Messianism pg. 24. Romanticism and Revolt pg. 12, especially pp. 148-153. Also Popper: Conjectures and Refutations: Back to the Presocratics pgs. 153-165.

through the "fragmentation of human nature"; for the "antagonism of forces is the great instrument of culture, but also no more than an instrument. For as long as it persists, one is only on the way to culture" (1). That which furthers man in his long struggle toward the Τέλος of his existence, namely contradiction and suffering, also cripples him and makes him diseased. We recall Eliot's words 'Our only health is the disease, ... to be restored, our sickness must grow worse' (2). Schiller's critique of Kant's bifurcation of man into sense and Reason is the first principle of Hegel's Logic of Spirit (3). From Schiller, Hegel takes over the conception and terminology of "moments or stages of development", which the individual must live through to achieve freedom of spirit(4). And Schiller's dualism of 'life' and 'form', which for him ought to give way to 'living form', is reflected in Hegel's philosophy of the notion, of spirit as the integration of life and form. For Schiller the opposites are sublimated, sublated ( aufgehoben: aufheben ), that is, cancelled or negated as opposites, and saved or preserved in a new integrated whole ( ὅλον ) or Totality. Hegel employs this as one of the principle ideas of his philosophy.

In the preface to the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', Hegel argues that we should not be repelled by the contradictions which pervade philosophy; we should not be worried by the fact that philosophers never seem to achieve any significant measure of agreement. We must "recognize in what seems conflicting and inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary moments (5).

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1. Schiller, Aesthetic Education of Man, which Hegel first read at 24. Quoted Kaufmann: Hegel pgs. 48ff.
  2. T. S. Eliot: Collected Poems pp. 201-2 from East Coker.
  3. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 49
  4. Ibid pg. 51
  5. P.S. pg. 68.

For Hegel, contradiction between philosophical view-points reflects the tensions and antagonisms in experience itself, and is the sign that philosophy has not departed from living experience. "Everything is inherently contradictory.... contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, desires and acts," (1), argues Hegel, in the 'Science of Logic'. According to Heraclitus, Πόλεμος is the father of all and King of all; for it is strife and war, antagonism and opposition, which constitute perpetual becoming, making some Gods and others men, some slaves and others free (2). Homer's wish that strife might cease was really a prayer for the destruction of all things (3). For strife keeps everything in becoming, strife is the one sure point in continual change, the place where opposites gather together into a living unity. For Heraclitus, the strife that threatens to tear our world apart, disintegrating every form, convention, structure and rule, is also the Λόγος that gathers the opposites together, holding them in healthy tension without fragmentation. For Hegel, it is the Λόγος which makes wholeness, and wholesomeness, possible in the Truth of the Whole (4). For Heraclitus, War ( <sup>ν</sup> ἔρως, Πόλεμος ) or strife, is peace, and it is also just (5). Anaximander had argued that strife is injustice which requires expiation (6); whereas for Heraclitus, ἔρως is that just struggle/

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1. Logic: Miller translation pg. 439; Johnstone and Struthers Vol. II pg. 66. For Comments see Marcuse: Reason and Revolution pg. 147.
  2. Heraclitus Fragment 215 of Kirk and Raven: The Presocratic Philosophers. Burnet: Early Greek Philosophy Fr. 44, pg. 136, and 158-9.
  3. Burnet: Early Greek Philosophy pg. 159.
  4. P.S. pg. 81.
  5. Kirk and Raven: Ibid pg. 195 Fr. 214. Burnet Ibid pg. 167.
  6. Kirk and Raven Ibid pg. 117

struggle which shows that everything belongs together. It unites opposites by gathering them and holding them together, as well as maintaining the struggle which keeps things in being (1). Heidegger reminds us that Λόγος (legein, legō, legere) originally meant to gather, collect, glean, to put one thing with another, to bring together; and strife is precisely that which brings things together, albeit in conflict (2). In discussing Lukács' Marxist dialectic, Zitta reminds us that dialectic (Dia-Legain) means to gather what is separate, to bring together what is divided, to collect together what was dissociated, fragmentary, and without form or coherence (3). For Hegel, as for Heraclitus, it is the unity of opposites which is real and True, for Reality and Truth are the Whole. Thus anything which continues to have an opposite, anything which can in principle be contradicted, cannot be the Truth of the Whole. It is in Wholeness alone that the health of mankind is to be found; the Truth of the Whole is the Τέλος of the strife which maintains all being in becoming. The Logic of Spirit is the Λόγος of the Truth of the Whole.

When Hegel argues that "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as substance but as subject as well", (4), he says he means by this that "Being is Thought". Being and thought though opposites, belong together. Their opposition, writes Mure, is constituted in their coinciding, that is, in their ultimate inseparability (5). Kaufmann argues correctly that, for Hegel, the Categories of Being and Nothing are/

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1. of: Heidegger: Introduction to metaphysics pg. 102-118.
  2. Heidegger: Introduction to metaphysics pg. 105.
  3. Zitta: G. Lukacs Ibid pg. 200
  4. P.S. pg. 80.
  5. Mure: The Philosophy of Hegel pg. 8-9.

are the "poorest and most abstract Categories", and that any modern attempt to return to Parmenides would have seemed to him "utterly perverse" (1). Thus, according to Kaufmann, Heidegger's mysticism of Being is not to be confused with Hegel's Logic of Being and Nothing. Hegel's dialectic of being and thought, though terminologically similar to Parmenides' belief that Being and Thought essentially belong together, must not be confused with it. For Hegel argues that we must learn Truths of this sort by learning from the long history of human experience. "The length of the journey has to be born with", argues Hegel, "for every moment is necessary. We must halt at every stage, for each is itself a complete individual form, and is fully and finally considered only in so far as its determinate character is taken and dealt with as a rounded, concrete whole, or only in so far as the whole is looked at in the light of the special and peculiar character which this determination gives it" (2). For Heidegger, on the other hand, the long history of human experience is a "fall from grace" (3), and the task of philosophy is to forget it, and to return to the Presocratics themselves, and in particular Heraclitus and Parmenides.

Propositions such as substance is subject, (4), the Truth is the Whole (5), Being is Thought, (for thought is being and being a category of thought) (6), the actual is the Universal (7), and 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational' (8), do not for Hegel, conform to the conventions of common sense, or the common understanding. Hegel calls these conventions the conventions of dogmatism. "Dogmatism as a way of thinking, whether in ordinary knowledge or in the study of philosophy, is nothing/

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1. Kaufmann: Hegel pg. 214
  2. Hegel: P.S. pg. 90.
  3. Kaufmann, Hegel pg. 214
  4. P.S. pg. 80, 94, 113, 782-3, 750-1, 801 and 803, etc.
  5. P.S. pg. 81.
  6. P.S. pg. 113, also: Mure: Philosophy of Hegel, pg. 9
  7. P.S. pg. 121.
  8. Preface to Philosophy of Right pg. 10 of Knox translation

nothing else but the view that truth consists in a proposition, which is a fixed and final result, or again which is directly known" (1). "It is not difficult to see that the method of propounding a proposition, producing reasons for it and then refuting its opposite by reasons too, is not the form in which Truth can appear" (2). The propositions quoted a moment ago cannot be understood other than from within the Logic of Spirit which is dialectical. For Hegel, opposites belong together, for the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  holds them together, but this cannot be argued from logical principles, or from the point of view of an isolated monad. Nor is it a merely edifying belief (3). Nor can it simply be verified or falsified once and for all. We must learn it from experience. We must live through every moment or stage of the long, painful, history of human experience, regarding every moment as a necessary resting-place on the journey toward the Truth of the Whole. For every moment represents a valid though partial view-point in relation to the Whole. "Every particular individual", says Hegel, "is incomplete mind, a concrete shape in whose existence taken as a whole, one determinate characteristic predominates, while the others are found only in blurred outline" (4). Phenomenology, says Hegel, is the "science of the Experience of Consciousness", it is a "science of the experience through which consciousness passes" (5). As such Phenomenology avoids what Hegel calls the "materialized/

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1. P.S. pg. 99
  2. P.S. pg. 106
  3. P.S. pg. 73, 81, etc.
  4. P.S. pg. 89.
  5. P.S. pgs. 96 and 144.

"materialized thinking", which is absorbed in matter, and "raisonnement", (i.e. Argumentative thinking), which takes up a conceited and superior attitude to the content, detaching itself from all content in the fortuitous struggle to be free. What is needed, says Hegel, is not the arbitrary freedom which directs the content anyhow, but the freedom "to sink into and pervade the content", letting itself be directed and controlled by the particular experience in question (1). We must abstain from interrupting the immanent rhythm of the movement of conceptual thought", not because our conceptual scheme is more valuable to us than living experience, but because as conceptual construction of living experience, subject taking hold of substance, regaining itself in its own projects, needs, desires and experience, philosophical thought has a dialectical life of its own which is only interrupted by the rigid conventions of common sense and the static conceptualization of the detached understanding. Hegel describes the truth of living experience, the truth which Heraclitus, too, argued could not be expressed other than dialectically. Hegel calls it "the bacchanalian revel, where not a member is sober.... a member no sooner becomes detached than it eo ipso collapses straightway". The revel, consisting of explosive change, relentless opposition and irresistible becoming, is in the light of the  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of strife, "just as much a state of transparent unbroken calm" (1). For Hegel, as for Heraclitus, there is no rest from the instabilities and uncertainties of  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  or becoming: for both men, the trauma of social revolution, and far-reaching change, rendered all things relative and provisional. The only genuine rest, the only reliable Truth, is the Truth of precisely that which makes/

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1. P.S. pg. 105.

makes rest impossible, and every truth relative to the situation which determines it, namely the traumatic experience of deep, though widespread social change. It is the Truth of living experience, the Λόγος of becoming.

We now have some idea of Hegel's "unity of the notion", or Λόγος, in which all fixed dualisms and oppositions are integrated into a coherent tension, a tension strong enough to remain faithful to living experience without loss of self, and yet to remain true to the self-determining freedom of self without losing the reality of living experience. We have seen that the Λόγος which gathers together the fragmented elements of our world in and through πόλεμος, or the war between opposites, transforms all being into becoming, all dead abstraction into spontaneous life; Substance and subject, particular and universal, life and form, being and thought, Reason and Reality, Act and being, though opposites, co-inhere. Hegel is at one with the Church Fathers in regarding Heraclitus' doctrine of the Logos as the philosophical precursor of the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel Prologue. Heidegger asks us to forget this identification (1). But for Hegel, it is only in "recollection" that the Truth of human experience is to be revealed, not in forgetting (2). For in Recollection, we live through the necessary experience which makes us what we are. Without recollection, there can be no unity of the Λόγος notion or  Begriff. The integration of the Heraclitian and the Fourth Gospel Λόγος doctrines has had immense influence throughout the history of Western Civilization. We cannot ignore it without placing ourselves outside the life of dialectical thinking, by which we seek to learn from our experience.

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1. Introduction to Metaphysics pg. 107  
 2. P.S. pgs. 807-8.

experience.

Following Schiller, Hegel argues that the individual must learn from the history of human experience by following the "path of doubt", or "highway of despair" which reveals the "educational moments of the general spirit". (1). This discloses to him the Truth of the Whole. To put it another way: "What is most real is after all only the unrealized Notion" (2). The notion is the Truth of the Spirit which is not yet, though even now is partially revealed in every significant moment in the historical life of mankind. The individual must pass through "shapes once assumed by spirit and now laid aside" (3). We learn of these past modes of experience as "information, exercises and even pastimes for children". These bygone modes of existence and experience have become an "acquired possession of the general mind" or spirit, "which constitutes the substance of the individual". In acquiring the culture or the development of the general mind (Bildung), the individual becomes a human being; for being human consists in precisely this self-creation of man through the active transformation of the human substance, which is situationally determined, into complete self-consciousness (4).

We have begun to grasp what Hegel was trying to do in his philosophical activity: we now turn, for purposes of clarification, to what he tells us quite clearly he is not doing. For, it is in his Prefaces and Introductions that we find his best/

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1. Ibid pg. 135, and 89, of also Kaufmann Hegel pg. 51
  2. P.S. pg. 136.
  3. P.S. pg. 89
  4. P.S. pg. 90.

best philosophical polemic; though once again, he warns us that unless we have learned from the experience which each philosopher conceptually reconstructs, our philosophical work will be in vain.

It is easy to pass judgements on the solid, substantial content, says Hegel, it is far more difficult to grasp it, and to give systematic exposition to it. Men have always struggled to transcend the "unbroken immediacy of naive psychic life" by formulating and so constructing universal principles and points of view. The task of philosophy is not to pass judgements on the , not to find reasons for them, but to live through the experience which gave rise to them (1). This activity, Hegel calls Wissenschaft or Science, which means for Hegel, a developing system of experience reconstructed according to the unity of the notion, or the co-inherence of contradicting opposites in Geist or spirit. Hegel calls his Logic of Spirit science, and contrasts it with Schleiermacher's theology of intuitional awareness or feeling (2), and with the philosophical edification which philosophers in his time were being required to produce. Men were trying to restore through philosophy "that sense of solidity and substantiality" they had lost in the violent social changes which followed hard on the heels of the French Revolution of 1789 (3). There was a time, says Hegel, when "man had a heaven, decked and filled out with an endless wealth of thoughts and pictures", to which he was always looking, instead of "dwelling in the present here and now". Now man's interest is so exclusively earthly, that he again seems to require an awareness of what transcends the "mud and water of earthy existence". Philosophy, for Hegel, will not meet this need/

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1. P.S. pg. 70
  2. P.S. pg. 71
  3. P.S. pg. 72.

need. It is not edification (1).

Nor is philosophy to follow Schelling in his gathering of everything within the compass of the Absolute Idea. For that is merely to carry round an "inert abstract form", into which anything and everything is dipped. Schelling's philosophy is monotonous, for it works with an abstract absolute in which all things are one. It is an empty knowing, "the night in which, as we say, all cows are black" (2).

Hegel's Wissenschaft, on the contrary, speaks of God only after it has first spoken of the "seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labour of the negative" (3). God per se is abstract generality. Only when the "entire wealth of the developed form" is "grasped and expressed as really actual" is genuine talk of God possible. Substance must be grasped as subject. Spinoza's conception of God as the one substance, in which "self-consciousness was simply submerged and not preserved" (4), must be transformed, as spirit knowing itself as spirit, into the notion of God conscious of self in the whole substance of human history and experience. All otherness, objectification and reification must be overcome. The alienation of substance from subject, life from form, experience from consciousness, thought from being, is to be overcome in the integrating, healing power of dialectical Reason.

We recall that for Heraclitus πόλεμος is the father of all and the King of all; strife creates becoming, strife makes some Gods and others men, some slaves and others free (5). All things/

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1. P.S. pg. 73.
  2. P.S. pg. 78-9
  3. P.S. pg. 81
  4. P.S. pg. 80
  5. Kirk and Raven Ibid pg. 195.

things are changing and nothing remains what it is (  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$   $\chi\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}\iota$   $\kappa\alpha\iota$   $\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota$  ). Yet it is precisely in the contradictions of becoming that  $\rho\eta\theta\acute{o}\varsigma$  gathers everything together. The dualism of Lord and slave, constituted in the same disintegration of everything into opposites as the separation of Gods from men, is overcome in the integrating, healing power of the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . Hegel's Logic of Spirit, with his notion of dialectical reason, regains the self of man, freeing him from the external objectivity in which he was imprisoned. This is the philosophical background which gives rise to the dialectic of Lord and Slave to which we have chosen to give particular attention in this study. We would do well to bear in mind that Heraclitus' concept  $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$ , emerging from his struggle to comprehend his experiences of traumatic social change and disintegration, is of first importance to Hegel, particularly in connection with his discussion of the relation of Lord and slave.

We are beginning to understand what philosophy is not, according to Hegel's dialectic of spirit. It is not edification, for it is not concerned to substantiate the validity of an intuitive awareness of an infinite God in a finite world, nor is it concerned with preserving the divinity of God from the impurity of contingent existence. It is not a description of Categories, of that without which our world would not be as it is, nor an examination of the conditions of our experience of the world. Philosophy is notional thinking, the mediation of the immediate, for God is only what he is as result, in the end, as the Truth of the Whole (1). Philosophy is concerned with the problem of meaning (  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  ) in an age of violent becoming/

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1. P.S. pg. 82.

becoming (γένεσις). There is a sense in which Hegel is seeking to show that the Cosmos, which appears to Heraclitus, and to many in Hegel's own time of violent social change, to be "at best like a rubbish heap scattered at random" (1), is in reality ordered according to a hidden Λόγος or encompassing Notion: Begriff, which does not immediately appear. For Heraclitus "The real constitution of things is accustomed to hide itself" (2); "If one does not expect the unexpected, one will not find it out" (3), for things are not as they appear. There is, for Hegel, as for Heraclitus, a connection between opposites which does not at first appear. If we do not expect this, we shall fail to notice it. According to Hegel, Kant had noticed it in his antinomies, but failed to draw any adequate implication from it. Kant tells us that the antinomies (such as 'the world has a beginning' and 'the world has no beginning') first stirred him from his dogmatic slumbers and drove him to the critique of reason ..... in order to resolve the scandal of the apparent contradiction of reason with itself (4). But to Hegel, Kant was not radical enough. For, contrary to what may appear, Opposition brings things together, or as Heraclitus put it, that which scatters gathers. The hidden connection, for him, is stronger than the apparent one (5). Heidegger argues that the Λόγος of Heraclitus means "collected presence" (6), or "permanent gathering" (7), for the word originally mean gather, collect, glean or read, to put one thing with another, to bring together(8). For

Hegel./

1. Heraclitus: Fragment of. Popper Open Society I pg. 12 and pg. 204, Note 2.
2. Kirk and Raven: Ibid Fragment 211.
3. Ibid Fragment 213.
4. Quote from letter to C. Garve, 21st September, 1798, quoted by Popper, Conjectures and Refutations pg. 177, note 10.
5. Kirk and Raven Ibid Fragment 210.
6. Heidegger: Introduction to Metaphysics pg. 110.
7. Ibid pg. 109
8. Ibid pg. 105.

Hegel, Diag-Loectic (dia-legein) means to gather what is separate, to bring together what is divided, to integrate what is dissociated and fragmented. Heidegger quotes from Heraclitus: "Opposites move back and forth, the one to the other, from out of themselves they gather themselves" (1); a notion of dialectic which Hegel sought to articulate on almost every page he wrote.

The setting apart is also that which gathers together. For Hegel, the Cupido dominandi of all things brings them all into conflict and contradiction. But domination of one over another can never last, because there is always a hidden connection between the one and the other, a connection which tends toward becoming, a relation which threatens the stability of being, the being of the one who dominates and the one who is dominated. For Heraclitus, the goal of the dialectic of Λόγος which scatters and gathers is balance between opposites, for becoming is cyclic; whereas for Hegel, the Λόγος of becoming is the Christian Λόγος who calls a qualitatively new spirit into being, the logic of which can only be understood in an eschatological perspective. For Hegel the Λόγος which gathers in the Christ who gathers all on to himself in a new unity and a new freedom. Heidegger's shepherd of being is not the shepherd that concerned Hegel, though Hegel was interested to find, as many fathers of the Church were before him, that Heraclitus had said so much which could illuminate the thinking of the Christian concerning the Λόγος of God. Hegel's Λόγος (Begriff), too, is "collected presence", a "permanent gathering" through opposition.

It/

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1. Ibid pg. 111

It will be manifest to everyone that Hegel advocates a view of philosophy, and of Logic, which is not to be easily accepted, for it demands our forsaking much that appeared self-evident. He likens the 'Phenomenology' to a ladder which he has constructed for us, to help us achieve a way of thinking which is not natural to us (1). We are reminded of Wittgenstein's reference to the ladder which we must throw away once we have recognised his elucidating proposition as nonsensical, for certain very sensible reasons. "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (2). Hegel's ladder, on the other hand, not only silences particular ways of speaking, but leads also to a new language and a new logic, the Logic of Spirit.

A few sentences later, Hegel remarks that the "natural consciousness", far from requiring a ladder, may be attracted to his dialectical Logic, "attracted by it knows not what, to walk for once on its head" (3). In Das Kapital (1875), Marx takes up this reference, and suggests that Hegel's dialectic did indeed proceed by walking on its head; what he sought to do was to set it on its feet again. (Kaufmann remarks that Marx did not say that he had set Hegel on his head (4).

Hegel then tells us that phenomenology is a "long and laborious journey" (5); it does not begin immediately with Absolute knowledge. Phenomenology "leads the individual from his/

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1. P.S. pg. 87.
  2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6, 54 & pp. 151. cf. also Kaufmann: Hegel (pg. 399, and 415) who notes that Sextus Empiricus, as well as Wittgenstein, used the image of the ladder suggested by Jacob's dream: Genesis 28: 12.
  3. P.S. pg. 87. Kaufmann translation of Preface: Hegel pg. 398-9.
  4. Kaufmann Hegel pg. 401.
  5. P.S. pg. 88.

his uneducated standpoint to knowledge" (1). The length of the journey must be endured because nothing must be forgotten, everything is necessary; or in Goethe's words, "What from your fathers you received as heir, acquire if you would possess it" (2). The long history of human experience, what Hegel calls substance, must come to self-consciousness in us, the "in-itself which is neither raw any more, nor immersed in existence, but something recalled, needs to be transmuted into the form of the for-itself" (3). Hegel calls this the "sublimation of existence" (in Kaufmann's translation), a mode of thinking which beginning with immediate experience, transforms it to accord with the unity of the Notion. What is known in a familiar way is not truly known. We think we know that subject and object, God and nature; the understanding and sensibility are "fixed points of departure and return", "valid foundations" of knowledge (4). But this is to be illuded by appearances. There is a hidden connection between them which does not appear to sense experience, perception or the common understanding, a belonging together of these apparently separate Categories, which can be revealed only when Reason becomes truly dialectical. Logic, in this sense, is the science of the hidden connection.

Hegel then argues that the "Activity of differentiating", which is the work of the Understanding, is an essential moment. "It is only because the concrete differentiates itself and makes itself what is unactual, that it is that which moves itself" (5). Change and becoming would be impossible without strife./

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1. Kaufmann translation of Preface pg. 402 of 'Hegel'.
  2. Ibid, pg. 403.
  3. Ibid pg. 404.
  4. Ibid pg. 406.
  5. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 406.

strife, opposition, differentiation. The analysis undertaken by the Understanding cannot be omitted, its work of thinking fixed, familiar and static thoughts is the source of movement, the essential moment on the way to dialectic. But for Hegel, "Spirit alone is the actual" (1), that is, it is in the interconnectedness or co-inherence of things that a new rationality and a new Actuality comes into being. God cannot be spoken about immediately, or directly for Hegel. The Logic of Spirit is an apophatic logic, a way of negation or "mediation" (2). The unactual, which Hegel chooses to call death, is that which is fixed in a rigid stability of being what it is, and not something else. Whereas the Actual is that which is liberated from being what it is. The Actual is Spirit which does not shrink from death but looks it in the face, preserving itself in death, and is thus born to a new becoming ( $\gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ) (3). Immediacy is for Hegel, Abstract. In an essay entitled "Who thinks abstractly", Hegel argues that "this is abstract thinking: To see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this simple quality" (4). The Understanding thinks abstractly and to that extent is uneducated. People naturally think in terms of fixed determination but they are blind to lived reality. The Dialectician, on the other hand, "makes fixed thoughts fluid" (5). He sees the hidden connection which relates one fixed determination to another, he sees it in living experience. A man cannot be limited to any one of his determinations, he is a continual unrest, a continual becoming. Only the dialectician whose thinking is also a becoming can understand this (6). Kant works within a fixed

distinction/

1. F.S. pg. 86.
2. Ibid pg. 82
3. Kaufmann translation Ibid pg. 406-8
4. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 463.
5. Ibid pg. 408
6. Ibid pg. 410.

distinction between Reason and Inclination; Hegel seeks to transcend this bifurcation of man in describing the Actuality of man in a dialectical thinking "infused with spirit".

In an analysis of forms of consciousness and truth, Hegel argues that at the level of immediate consciousness, subject and object are fixed in a relation of separation. This separation is on the one hand that which keeps experience fresh and alive, and on the other hand that which tends to become fixed in one determination or another. False knowledge is, for Hegel, an inadequate relation of correspondence between subject and object, but it is not on that account irrelevant to phenomenology, the "science of the experience of Consciousness" (1). For error is an essential moment in knowing. Truth and falsity cannot be polarized into fixed opposites if we are to be true to our experience. We know from experience that the true and the false belong together. Usually, the true and the false are considered to be "determinate thoughts .... immobile separate essences, as if one stood here and the other there, without community, fixed and isolated" (2). The trouble lies in philosophy's having considered mathematical knowledge the ideal which philosophy should try to imitate. We have already noticed that for Hegel no philosophical truth can be expressed in the fixed form of a proposition (3). Philosophical truths are not, on the other hand, like the "accidental and arbitrary" truths of history (4). Philosophy's concern is with the actual; and the immobile, empty, lifeless propositions of mathematics, and the accidental and arbitrary propositions of history are unable to grasp the Actual (5).

Error/

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1. Ibid pg. 412 of. Baillie translation pg. 96.
  2. Kaufmann translation pg. 414. P.S.
  3. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ cf. Baillie translation pg. 99. P.S.
  4. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 416-7.
  5. Ibid, pg. 420.

Error is an essential moment on the way to philosophical truth, it is not so for other disciplines. We must not forget our errors; we must remember them and learn from them. The error which divorces us from living experience cannot be bypassed; because we learn from it what is true. Error divides and separates; Truth gathers together what we have learned through division and separation. Hegel is conscious that what he is saying may sound "boastful or revolutionary"; he assures us that his "tone is altogether different" (1). He is concerned to criticize formalism, all external forms of knowledge, because they have "lost hold of the living nature of concrete fact". In them "we have merely dry bones with flesh and blood all gone" (2). Hegel is concerned that philosophy is not deprived of life and spirit (3).

Hegel puts his view clearly when he argues that a schematizing formalism "always looks over the whole and stands above the individual existence of which it speaks, i.e. it merely overlooks it" .... "instead of entering into the immanent content of the material" (4). Parmenides' doctrine that thinking and being belong together is for Hegel the heart of his own undertaking. If thinking is abstracted from being, it is formal, empty and lifeless; and if being is divorced from thinking (that is dialectical thinking), it cannot be comprehended at all (5). True Philosophical knowing "is not that which handles its content as something strange, .... it is not that idealism that replaced the dogmatism of assertions with a dogmatism of assurances or a dogmatism of self-certainty" (6). The Cunning of Reason (Die List der Vernunft) consists in its appearing to abstain from activity/

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1. Ibid pg. 426
  2. Baillie translation pg. 110. Ibid
  3. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 432
  4. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 434
  5. Ibid pg. 434 also Baillie translation pg. 113.
  6. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 434.

activity whilst the strife between opposites in living experience continues, but in reality being the hidden power absorbed, though hidden, in every living contradiction. "Reasonableness", says Hegel "is a becoming, and as such, becoming, it is rationality." (1). Genuine Wissenschaft, or science in Hegel's sense, lives through the inner necessity of every moment of experience, its form is not its own, but that of the content, living experience. In this way, the fixed dualism of life and form can become a 'living form', the content is liberated from alienation and restored in its rightful place. Life is regained, repossessed by the subject from which it had become divorced. Experience is given a new integrated and coherent Λόγος or meaning. Substance has become Subject. With this the ladder of phenomenology can be taken away, for the new language, that of a Logic of Spirit, has been found.

To those accustomed to argumentative thinking, rather than the thinking that comprehends (Das Begreifende Denken), the Logic of Spirit, or of the unity of the Notion, will appear as an interruption (2). To formalism, also, the concrete actuality of Hegel's Notion will appear as a loss of freedom. To the Romantic, for whom some kind of intuitional awareness is the only way to Truth, it will appear over-dialectical, for he seeks truth in immediacy, not by way of mediation. Hegel gives special attention, however, to Argumentative thinking (das Rasonnieren). The latter is "never in the matter but always beyond it", says Hegel. "It imagines that with its claim of emptiness it is always more advanced than contentful insight". "In the thinking that comprehends, on the other hand, "the negative" - that is distinction/

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1. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 436

2. Kaufmann translation pg. 440. Ibid.

distinction, identity, contradiction etc. - "belongs to the content itself" (1). The negative is in this sense a positive moment, the only way to the Truth of the Whole.

Hegel gives as an example of the 'thinking which comprehends', a dialectical analysis of the proposition "God is being". The relation between subject and predicate in a proposition understood dialectically is not that of conventional thinking, argumentative or otherwise. Hegel argues that there is a connection between subject and predicate which does not at first appear. The real constitution of things, for Hegel, as for Heraclitus, normally hides itself. If one does not expect the unexpected, one will miss it altogether. What appears as static being is in reality becoming. There is movement, in the dialectical proposition, between the subject and the predicate. "In this movement, the resting subject perishes" (2). Subject and predicate are not fixed; nothing is fixed, everything becomes what it is apparently not. The subject "moves into the predicate and has thus been sublimated", (negated and restored in a new form). (3) Thus, "the nature of the judgment or proposition which involves distinction between subject and predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition" (4). In this floating of subject into predicate, there is a unification of the one and the other. Neither remains alienated from the other. They are integrated, made whole; and in the wholeness, the unity of the notion is constituted.

The subject of the proposition 'God is being', is God, the predicate is being. Hegel argues that the predicate is really the/

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1. Ibid pg. 440-2.
  2. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 442.
  3. Ibid pg. 444.
  4. Ibid pg. 444.

the substance of the subject, though this does not immediately appear, and never will appear unless we learn to expect it to become so. The purpose of phenomenology is to help us to expect what would otherwise remain hidden. We can substantiate the proposition: 'God is being' only if we can conceive the predicate, being, as the substance of the subject, God. The proposition is true only if what appears is not in reality the case. "God ceases to be the firm subject, in spite of his position in the sentence... the subject gets lost and thinking feels inhibited, and missing the subject is thrown back to the thought of the subject". Thinking, thus, "finds the subject in the predicate, and instead of attaining in the predicate the free position to argue, it is still absorbed in the content - or at least the demand is present that it ought to be so absorbed" (1).

We are beginning to see the way a dialectical Logic understands propositions, for in the interest of life and meaning, it sees the predicate not as something alien to the subject, but as that subject's very substance. For subject becomes substance, and substance becomes subject. In the sense of  $\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  or becoming, substance 'is' subject, and subject substance.

Similarly, when Hegel argues that the "Actual is the Universal", "the actual as subject vanishes into the predicate"(2). The Universal expresses the essence of the Actual, and "thus thinking loses the firm objective ground it had in the subject whenever the predicate throws it back to the subject, so that in the predicate it returns not to itself but to the subject of the content" (3). In other words the subject does not remain withdrawn and detached from what it is (its substance); it's self/

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1. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 446.
  2. Ibid pg. 446, Baillie pg. 121.
  3. Ibid pg. 446.

self is present in its action in a way that the conventional understanding of propositions cannot allow for. The subject can be relied upon to be fully present in and through what it is, in and through its actuality; it is not to be found elsewhere, as though it were afraid of entering into what it is. The subject is in this sense worthy of our trust, it is true to itself, it is in full possession of itself in its substantial actuality. It is what it is, not in static, or abstract identity with itself, but in its Act. It is a dependable unity. Subject is itself in its substance, it is self-conscious, self-integrated, true, in the sense of trust-worthy. It is true not in a formal sense, but true in and through its existential, experiential content, its actuality. It is true to itself, in becoming what it is apparently not. Substance is subject in becoming, and substance is subject in becoming. Becoming need not destroy integrity, it need not destroy our trust, it need not make truth impossible. Indeed, the only trustworthy truth is the truth of becoming. This can be understood, says Hegel, only if we can overcome ourselves, and enter into the living, ever-changing content, there to find, through dialectical thinking, the contrary to what at first appeared. There can be a dependable integrity, a truth worthy of all our trust, in the apparent instability and insecurity and relativity of Becoming. Only a really flexible, plastic dialectical logic can disclose this to our thought and comprehension (1).

The relation between subject and predicate in the case of a philosophical proposition is not, then, according to Hegel, that of other kinds of proposition. It is the content of the philosophical proposition, not any arbitrary choice of form, which makes philosophical method dialectical. A philosophical work

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1. P.S. (Baillie trans) pg. 122.

may appear unintelligible, or at any rate, difficult reading; but, says Hegel, one must learn "that what one supposed, was not what one is supposed to suppose" (1). Undialectical, argumentative thinking has its legitimate place, as long as we do not confuse it with dialectic. For in Hegel's philosophy, "the dialectical movement of the proposition itself" takes the place of what "proof was once supposed to accomplish" (2). Dialectic is not proof. Dialectic gathers together what appeared separate by disclosing the co-inherence of substance and subject. On the one hand it appears to stand aside, observing the connectedness of things from afar. But it is cunning. For in truth, it is itself that becoming which gathers together everything, both opposing and opposed. Reason works through the irrational, Truth through untruth, Life through death; this is the hidden connection which is far stronger than the apparent ones (3). Hegel does not pretend to prove his claims to us; he will try to show us what maybe we had missed before. For we do not always heed what we hear, nor do we always notice what we see. Our language, too, misleads us. For instance, it would be better, says Hegel, not to use the word God, if by that we intend to refer by proper name to a fixed subject which is at rest. For that would be to confine God to some fixed determination, a static, abstract being, who is not himself in the Act of his becoming. No one determination defines the One true God, for God is infinite. God can be relied upon in his infinity only because as man, He remains in full possession of Himself. No finite determination threatens Him, for He is God.

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1. Kaufmann translation Ibid pg. 446.
  2. Ibid pg. 448.
  3. cf: Heraclitus: Kirk and Raven Pr. 210 pg. 193 in the Presocratic Philosophers

As God, we can trust Him, because He is always present in his Act, in his becoming what at first He appeared not to be. His subjectivity is not imprisoned in his substantiality, it is free and alive in it. It is not lost in his Actuality, whether as man, or as genuine human community, for the Actual is Spirit just as the Spirit is Actual. God is the Universal, but He does not lose this, or become alienated from it, in his particularity as the *Λόγος* made flesh dwelling among men. Where the common understanding breaks down, dialectical comprehension must begin its work.

Argumentative thinking is not the only serious hindrance to genuine philosophical activity. Hegel assures us. "The study of philosophy is obstructed no less by a conceit that does not deign to argue", but judges and condemns on the basis of well-established truths (1). "Philosophy is often considered a merely formal knowledge, void of content, and the insight is sadly lacking that whatever content of knowledge or science is truth does not deserve this name unless it has been produced by philosophy" (2). Without philosophy, no discipline can "contain life, spirit, or truth" (3).

Hegel scorns the uneducated, who claim the "immediate revelation of the divine" to be Absolute, exclusive Truth. For him, the claim to immediate revelation is abstract, because the one who makes it could not make it without abstracting himself from the long and laborious history of human experience(4). He is abstract because he has withdrawn himself from, or forgotten, or failed to notice, "the seriousness, the suffering, the patience/

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1. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 450. Baillie pg. 124.
  2. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 450
  3. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 452
  4. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 452

patience and the labour of the negative" (1).

Similarly, Hegel scorns the way "healthy common sense has never troubled or educated itself" (2). "Flowing along in the calmer bed of healthy common sense, natural philosophizing entertains us with a rhetoric of trivial truths" (3). The truths of healthy common sense can be found in the catechism, or in popular proverbs. "It is not difficult", says Hegel "to show how indeterminate and vague, or how misleading, such truths are, or to show to consciousness how it contains diametrically opposite truths (4). On the other hand, "those who invoke feeling as their internal oracle are finished with anyone who does not agree" (5). They trample under foot the roots of humanity, according to Hegel, for it is the nature of humanity to struggle for agreement with others. It is community which constitutes the humanity of man, only the animal remains bound to the level of feeling which admits of no adequate communication at all. Genuine philosophy, however, is that educated thinking which has learned, from experience, that things are not what immediately they seem; for mediation alone, the way of negation and dialectical gathering together again, it alone can disclose the hidden truth of living experience. Without it, we fail to heed what we hear, to notice what we see, to remember what we have experienced, to comprehend what we know. For when all the facts are known, the task of philosophy in comprehending them, has not even begun. "The Owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk" (6).

Hegel/

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1. Baillie translation Ibid pg. 81
  2. Kaufmann Ibid pg. 452.
  3. Ibid pg. 452.
  4. Ibid pg. 452.
  5. Ibid pg. 454.
  6. Preface to the Philosophy of Right pg. 13.

Hegel is aware, then, that his view of philosophy and of the nature of truth differs quite radically from the conventional views, and from the views of other philosophers, logicians, social theorists and theologians (1). He tells us that in his time, "general participation in the life of the spirit" has been greatly strengthened<sup>(2)</sup>, and that the activity of any one individual in this becoming can only be small. The individual should in one sense "try to forget himself", for this reason (3). His freedom is best spent in his immersing himself in the living content of the experience of his time, in an attempt to educate himself toward that integrated self-possession which alone liberates him from alienation. "Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so, too, philosophy is its own time apprehended in thoughts" (4).

We might summarize the formulation of a dialectical logic of Spirit that we have been discussing, in Hegel's own words as follows: "What we have to do with here is philosophical 'science', and in such science content is essentially bound up with form" (5). Form is usually considered to be "something external and indifferent" to content; for even the philosophical understanding distinguishes formal from factual questions in such a way that the living unity of conceptual description and living experience in the notion is shattered. Hegel seeks to overcome the alienation which results from a false objectification and subjectification of concepts, indeed the *Τέλος* of dialectical reason is the integration of form and content in the 'living form' of/

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1. Kaufmann *Ibid* pg. 456.
  2. *Ibid* pg. 458
  3. *Ibid* pg. 458
  4. *Philosophy of Right* pg. 11
  5. *Ibid* pg. 2.

of the notion. Notional thinking is Hegel's attempt to take account of the fact that, in Eliot's words,

"There is, it seems to us,  
At best, only a limited value  
In the knowledge derived from experience.  
The knowledge imposes a pattern and falsifies,  
For the pattern is new in every moment  
And every moment is a new and shocking  
Valuation of all we have been .." (1).

For Hegel, dialectical thinking begins with living experience, but is aware that even when all the facts are known, there is still much which has not been comprehended. For the conventional forms of knowledge are not adequate to the content, living experience can never be exhaustively described. Form must renounce its rigid shapes and enter into living experience, for unless form is adequate to content it imposes a pattern and falsifies. New experience threatens all that we are and have become, unless our becoming can remain unshackled to rigid formal schemes of knowledge and organizations of past experience. For every new moment calls us in question, life challenges our established conventions of rationality and meaning. If we divorce form from content, meaning from life, then the alienation of the one from the other, man from himself, ensues. What we need, according to Hegel, is a new Logic, a new gathering together of life and meaning, content and form, which will prevent them tearing apart. We must negate what we know to remain alive to experience in the thinking which comprehends. Spirit is a new frame of mind, a new form of life, a new language. The Logic of Spirit is Hegel's attempt to find an adequate way of comprehending man's temporality, his historicity, his becoming. Man is never in full possession of himself, he is always in some measure/

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1. Eliot Collected Poems pg. 199 (East Coker).

measure out of his mind, or beside himself, in that his spontaneous living experience ~~is~~ forever transcends the descriptive form, or configurations of meaning that he gives to experience. He is always ahead of himself, always on the way, forever struggling to catch up with himself. Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to face up to the traumatic social revolution which was beginning to sweep over Western Europe after 1789; it is an attempt to grapple with the problem of meaning ( Λόγος ) in an Age of violent becoming ( γένεσις ).

The search for a method which has absorbed the time and effort of numerous philosophers in the Age of becoming, is the search for that which prevents disintegration, for a wholeness and wholesomeness of form, meaning, evaluation and language. For without it, we shall be condemned to remain outside our experience, withdrawn from our incarnate life and world, unable to enter into our own action and becoming. We must enter the contradictions of experience, despite our fear of the irrationality and incoherence which appears to prevail in it. We cannot afford to divorce form from content, how we know from what we know, how we perceive from what we perceive, unless alienation is to be accepted, and complete ontological dislocation be allowed to distort the meaning of all things. Hegel, like Freud, sought to make the unconscious conscious, in order to break out of our compulsion to repeat. He sought to overcome the form that was inadequate to its content, the meaning which fails to correspond to life. He sought to bring the unconscious to consciousness by showing to us how our partial, inadequate, insecure, rigid frames of mind, and the claims to absolute and exclusive truth which accord with them, cannot/

cannot comprehend our experience. Hegel's unconscious, however, is the long, painful, laborious history of human experience which makes us what we are, and which also, though we are not conscious of it, threatens to prevent us from entering freely into our becoming. Man is a sick animal, according to Hegel. The struggles of history are the struggles of man in search of himself. He seeks to find himself in every vain abstract determination, unaware of the hidden yearning for his original cohesion, unity, health and meaning, which should have been his inheritance.

The language of Hegel's dialectic is neither purely formal nor simply factual, it is both performative and descriptive, evaluative and critical, but cannot be confined to any one class of game, or games, as we now conventionally distinguish them. Dialectic is a language-game in one sense, namely, it has its own logical rules, one of which is that logic must not be divorced from living experience if thinking is to be wholesome, - capable that is, of comprehending the truth of the Whole. Life and meaning belong together, however much they tend apart. The main purpose of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' is to show us that there is a living connection between thought and being which cannot be broken if philosophy is to think life, spirit and truth. Hyppolite is quite right to argue in his book: "Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel" (1946), that phenomenology and logic are complementary. For Hegel, logical rules are social conventions, conventions which are situationally constituted at different periods of man's social history. Logical convention appears necessary because it is deeply/

deeply learned social practice. It is a form of life, a way of being in the world, a way of ordering reality in coherent form. To Hegel, logic ought to be the servant of philosophy, because as "scepticism directed to the whole compass of phenomenal consciousness" philosophy must evaluate critically every inherited logical form, every established social practice, if it is to be "qualified to test what truth is" (1). Hegel's argument is that if there is one rule which genuine philosophy cannot afford to break, it is that form and content cannot be divorced: they belong together.

We have deliberately confined our attention to the younger Hegel, in particular the Hegel of the "Phenomenology of Spirit", in this chapter, as throughout this study. But in case British scholars, who are accustomed to see Hegel only as he presented himself in his mature works, feel as Walsh does that "something is lost by playing down his mature philosophy" - because the paradoxical character of Hegel's philosophical enterprise as a whole cannot then be brought out (2), we conclude this chapter with a brief consideration of the Logic (1812-16).

"The forms of thought are, in the first instance", says Hegel, "displayed and stored in human language": "Into all that he (man) makes his own, language has penetrated, and everything that he has transformed into language and expressed in it contains a category .... so much so that logic is his natural element, indeed his own particular nature" (3). Normally, we separate form and content, in that we attend to content whilst we are/

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1. P.S. (Baillie) pg. 136.

2. Walsh: A survey of Work on Hegel 1945-1952 Philosophical Quarterly vol. 3/1953.

3. ~~Phenomenology~~ Logic transl. Miller pg. 31.

are unconscious of the fact that categorial forms "have us in their possession" (1). Hegel seeks to make the unconscious conscious, that is, to become aware of what we instinctively do when we use language. "The broad distinction between the instinctive act and the intelligent and free act is that the latter is performed with an awareness of what is being done (2). "When thinking is an instinctive activity, spirit is enmeshed in the bonds of its categories and is broken up into an infinitely varied material" (3). Spirit must come to know not only the relation of "What it is in itself to what it is actually, but the relation of what it knows itself to be to what it actually is" (4). Because "Truth is the declared object and aim of logic" (5), thinking which seeks to understand by distinguishing form from content, and by employing the principles of identity and contradiction, cannot be truly logical, despite all appearances to the contrary. Such thinking has its appropriate place, Hegel never tires of reminding us. But it "cannot serve higher, for example, religious truth", because generally speaking it is concerned only with "the correctness of the knowledge of facts, not with truth itself" (6). Thus Hegel comes to his main point: "The inadequacy of this way of regarding thought, which leaves truth on one side, can only be made good by including in our conception of thought not only that which is usually reckoned as belonging to the external form, but the content as well". For, "the content in its own self possesses form, in fact it is through form that it has soul and meaning". "With this introduction of the content into the logical/

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1. Ibid pg. 35.
  2. Ibid pg. 37.
  3. Ibid pg. 37.
  4. Ibid pg. 37.
  5. Ibid pg. 38.
  6. Logic (Miller) pg. 38.

logical treatment, the subject-matter is not things but their import, the Notion of them" (1). The Notion, argues Hegel, is the "logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of what we call things; it is least of all the logos which should be left outside the science of logic" (2). We have already seen that there is no doubt that for Hegel, word was made flesh, logic is incarnate, meaning cannot be divorced from experience, how we know from what we know. Genuine philosophical truth is not formal, nor is the beurriff, the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  divorced from life. It is in the broadest sense empirical, and at the same time, universal. Logic must be a "plastic discourse", demanding a "plastic receptivity and understanding on the part of the listener" (3). For if we are to comprehend what appears to us in living experience, we must remain flexible and sensitive to what appears, to content. Hegel confirms, here, what he had maintained in the Preface to his 'Phenomenology' namely that being and thought belong together, form and content are a living unity. Whilst Walsh is correct to say that for Hegel, "Existence took precedence over essence"; that "opposition and reconciliation instead of applying primarily to the abstractions of logic, were for him vividly experienced features of actual situations" (4), it would be misleading if we were not also to say that for him, content has form, it accords with the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . This may not immediately appear, and it was as far from obvious in Hegel's own day as in ours. It must be shown. This is the task of Logic. Being and thought belong together, that is, they ought to be comprehended as a living, ever-changing, dynamic/

1. Ibid pgs. 38-9

2. Ibid pg. 39.

3. Ibid pg. 40 of also P.S. pg. 122

4. Walsh Ibid pg. 353 (Phil. Quarterly Vol. 31953).

dynamic unity. Hegel is not an idealist, if by that it is meant that, for him, being is absorbed by thought; nor is he an empiricist, if by that it is meant that thought must slavishly follow being. Rather, being and thought co-inhere: they belong together. Thus "it is quite inept to say that logic abstracts from all content, that it teaches only the rules of thinking without any reference to what is thought" (1). For when logical definitions" are taken as fixed determinations and consequently in their separation from each other, and not as held together in an organic unity, then they are dead forms, and the spirit which is their living, concrete unity does not dwell in them .....

But logical reason itself is the substantial or real being which holds together within itself every abstract determination, and is their substantial, absolutely concrete unity" (2). The "dead bones of logic" must be given life by spirit, and so "become possessed of a substantial significant content" (3).

But in case these extended quotations, designed to support our view of Hegel's Logic of Spirit, appear conclusive, we retain the enormous ambiguity of Hegel's thinking, when we remember that only five pages later, he writes: "The system of Logic is the realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities freed from all sensuous concreteness" (4). Kelly is surely sensitive to this insurmountable ambiguity in Hegel when he wrote: "No single slant on Hegel is the truth about Hegel" (5). Or as Barth observed: "From page to page Hegel does in fact wrest from us the possibility to compromise for ourselves a tranquil picture of/

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1. LOGIC PG. 44

2. LOGIC PG. 48

3. LOGIC PG. 53

4. LOGIC PG. 58

5. G. A. Kelly: Idealism Politics and history pg. 303.

of his views. With him we are only to look, and look again and again, and anyone who thinks he sees stable points and lines, quantities and relationships, is not in fact seeing what Hegel is seeking to show us" (1).

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1. Karl Barth: From Rousseau to Ritschl pg. 283

## CHAPTER III

THE INTEGRATION OF SUBSTANCE AND SUBJECT, LIFE AND MEANING IN  
SELF-CONSCIOUS SPIRIT.

Self-consciousness, according to Hegel's use of the term, emerges in the event of our coming to know the long history of human experience which has made us who we are, in such a way that experience becomes our experience, consciously integrated by us into a coherent whole or Totality ( ὅλον ). The τέλος of philosophy was, for Hegel, the ἔσχατον of human history, the Truth of the Whole, God the Holy Spirit. As philosophy of history, Hegel's philosophy thinks through the long, painful history of human experience, and it is only in this active thinking that history becomes actual and rational. Hegel's dialectical Reason begins with experience, and in thinking through the history of human experience, achieves a new freedom from that history, a freedom for new historical activity. Reason is negative Action whose τέλος is freedom. Thus, Hegel seeks to overcome the dislocation which has taken place between life and meaning. The world and God have been torn asunder. Living experience has become devoid of λόγος, meaning, or intelligibility. Men have withdrawn in a multitude of ways from the disturbing, overwhelming becoming of new experience, withdrawn into some mode of being or other, in order to find stability and rest. Hegel tries to describe the relation between these various ways of being in the world as ways of being conscious of living experience, modes or forms of consciousness which have achieved a more or less, though usually less, /

less, though ~~throughout~~, adequate knowledge of living experience. Life and meaning are severed in that each mode of being in and conscious of living experience has settled down to be what it is, and not something else. Each rests in the false certainties which derive from their claim to the absolute and exclusive truth of their position. According to Hegel, the severance of life and meaning can be overcome only by way of negation and dialectic. For Truth can be achieved only in our becoming what we are not, only, that is, in our refusing to settle down to be what we are, and not something else. Truth is in Becoming, not static, stable Being. Only that Being which is Becoming can be on the way toward the New Being which is spirit. The dangerous flux of living experience is not self-evidently intelligible, for Hegel, as we have already argued (1). Meaning can be found in living experience only in death to what is, and continual rebirth; continual birth, change and becoming. Life and meaning, the world and Λόγος are integrated, according to Hegel, only in the dialectic of transformation.

We have seen that as genuine human community, Geist or Spirit is, for Hegel, the Τέλος of philosophy and the ἔσχατον of history. But since the concept self-consciousness spans both man's individual and social becoming, the one in indissoluble relation to the other, it is also the goal of each individual's personal striving, thinking, working and hoping. This goal, that of self-integration and personal wholeness, involves a correlation between subject and object which cannot be determined by us a priori, because formal determination of meaning apart from life necessarily/

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1. Immediate certainties, but not intelligibility (i.e. not the rationality, actuality, and the universality of spirit), are possible at this level of immediate living experience.

necessarily misses the concrete content, which is living experience. We cannot formally define the meaning of either individual or social wholeness, integrity, or health. Truth is essentially Result, Λόγος appears gradually in its becoming. It is the truth of the whole only in the end, (the ἔσχατον in which all our struggles to achieve it are finally consummated). That means, or ought to mean, not yet. Hegel is ambiguous on this point. Did Hegel ever believe we had achieved the truth of the Whole even now? I am unable to answer this question, not because it can be shirked, or because it lies beyond the agenda of this study, but because there is evidence that Hegel refused to make up his mind on this question. He refused for some important reasons. We shall continually return to them. Later in life, Hegel said many things which encouraged the caricature which is still, to this day, the Hegel of most histories of philosophy. Weil and Knox have each argued that Hegel is not the apologist of the Prussian State and Kaufmann has refuted Popper's shallow accusations (1). Walsh remarks in connection with Popper's chapter on Hegel in his 'Open Society and its Enemies' (2): "Of this lamentable performance, which were an otherwise serious book, the less said the better" (3). We shall return to Popper's critique of Hegel later (4). We stress, here, that our reading of Hegel leads us to the conclusion that his position remains ambiguous, an ambiguity which is due to the nature of dialectic. For on the one hand, Hegel wishes to argue that dialectic must take the place of every other/

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1. Weil: Hegel et l'état Paris 1950; T. M. Knox, Philosophy 1940, Kaufmann Phil. Review Vol. 60 1951 pg. 459 f
  2. Ch. 12 pgs 27-80 of Vol. II Open Society and its Enemies
  3. Walsh: A survey of work on Hegel 1945-1952, Phil. Quarterly Vol. 3 1953 pg. 360.
  4. cf. ch. XV pg: 343ff

other philosophical method by learning from each one of them. The long, laborious history of human attitudes, and philosophical answers to the question of the meaning of human experience, culminates, says Hegel, in that philosophy which learns from them all. That philosophy, Hegel's own philosophy, is dialectical in that it gathers all perspectives together, and shows how there is a hidden connection between even the most contradictory. Opposing attitudes inter-relate, and because they inter-relate they coalesce, although this does not immediately appear to be the case. Phenomenology, argues Kojève, transforms immediate certainties into truth, and truth for Hegel consists in the adequate correspondence between the rational and the actual in spirit. Thus, his philosophy appears to begin with an absolute claim. On the other hand, the aim of dialectic is freedom and truth, involving a genuinely new openness to fresh, living experience. Indeed, without dialectic, with its "flexible", "plastic discourse" and "floating notions", the indeterminacy or continual becoming can never be adequately described or comprehended.

Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to call in question every premature, static, conventional common-sense truth, and this entails the relativization of every claim to absolute truth. Hegel appears to be putting an end to every form of absolutism, or exclusivism, on the basis of one final absolute truth claim, namely, that the Λόγος cannot be comprehended except dialectically, according to the Logic of Spirit. For Hegel, the truth of experience is hidden at the level of immediate experience; it is only in recollection that Geist is disclosed, and this only in the integration of all opposition and contradiction./

contradiction. The ambiguity lies somewhere here.

We have argued elsewhere that for Hegel, philosophy arises only when meaning becomes divorced from life, and life from meaning, when becoming threatens to destroy the static logics of Being which we formulate in times of stability, security and rest. True philosophy is dialectical, according to Hegel. For when life is severed from meaning, and becomes alien to man, external to him, objectified; meaning becomes empty and lifeless. It becomes formal, devoid of fact. The separation of form and fact is a sign that meaning ( $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ ) is divorced from life, from becoming ( $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\iota\varsigma$ ) from the contradiction "which is the root of all movement and vitality"(1). Phenomenology is the ladder which leads beyond the silencing of diseased talk, with its fixed, rigid dualisms, to a new language, a language of Notions in which form and in fact, meaning and life, language and living experience are integrated. For Hegel, as for Heraclitus, strife is just, contradiction necessary, because it is only through it that a living integration is at all possible. For strife and struggle ensure that nothing remains what it is, that everything is becoming what it is not, and this is how things ought to be, (it is just and right) (2). Man is alienated from himself when life is divorced from meaning, fact from form, <sup>when</sup> substance has taken on an estranged, alien, external existence divorced from subject. Man cannot regain himself until he recognizes, and eventually comprehends, what is hidden to him, what does not immediately appear, namely, that there is a connection between substance and subject, fact and form, life/

1. Science of Logic, Miller, pg. 439

2. Heraclitus Fr. 214 Kirk & Raven Ibid pg. 195

life and meaning, which he had conventionally understood to be opposites. To regain himself, man must gather what had been scattered, he must join together what had separated, he must redeem his alien self from alienation. Only then can man actually become what he potentially is.

For Hegel, phenomenology negates established reality in order that man's potentiality, (what he essentially is and ought to be), can become actual, in order that what he happens to be can become rational, that existence might become essence. Man needs the education which only a dialectical phenomenology can give him, because he no longer knows who he is. He acts, but is not present in his action. He speaks, but he is unable to mean what he says. He cannot understand his own actions, for he cannot do what he wants, and does the very thing he does not want to do (1). He can will what is right but he cannot do it (2). He is not himself, nor can he become himself, however much he wills to be himself. He is 'beside himself', 'out of his mind', alienated, estranged from his essence, (namely, what he ought to be). Hegel argues that when man is in this condition, being and thought, knowledge and truth, no longer belong together; they are divorced and fall apart. They no longer interact, or coalesce, or interweave. Man is unaware of what he is, unconscious of what he truly desires. He claims that his knowledge exhausts what is the case, and that his claims to truth are well founded. But Hegel seeks to show him that his certainties are not well founded, that the way things are hides itself. There is a connection between the half-truths/

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1. Romana 715.

2. Ibid 718.

half-truths we erroneously claim to be The Truth, a connection which gathers all things together, contrary to what appeared to be the case. The way things seem is not the way things are, consciousness has no adequate correspondence with reality. It is a great mistake to think that we can reduce this problem, the problem of man, of alienation and bondage, to a problem concerning what is or is not the case. For even if all the facts were known, which they are not, we would still not necessarily comprehend what we know, notice what we see, heed what we hear, recognize what we experience. Substance has become severed from subject, though we are unaware that this is the case. Indeed, only at the end is man what he is in truth. For example, although all men are equal (essentially), there has never been a time when they have been equal. There have always been lords and slaves. Thus, we should really say, substance has always been alienated from subject, though this will not always be the case. For man is, essentially, what he is not, in fact; he is essentially self-consciousness (selbstbewusstsein), self-assured, free in his integrated self-possession, present with a whole mind in every thought, word and deed. For him to become what he essentially is, but is not in fact, man must become aware of himself in his otherness; substance must become subject (1). That is to say, what is implicit (in-itself) must become explicit (for-itself); what was hidden is to be revealed. We must learn to expect the unexpected, and to learn this requires a long educational development, both individual and social, psychological and historical. Self-other is the opposition which defines both the psychological (internal) dimension of the problem of man, and the historical (external)/

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1. P.S. pg. 80ff, 83ff, 113ff, 797, 801, 803ff.

(external) dimension of the problem of man. For Hegel, psychology and history belong together; the interaction or interplay between them is the condition of creative becoming, their separation the condition of alienation. The problem of selbstbewusstsein is both psychological and historical, it is the problem of disclosure, of the disclosure of the long history of human experience, the history which has made us what we are (both as individual men and in our social being), the history we normally fail to integrate with our conscious rationality and technical mastery of nature as raw material. Disclosure is necessarily a "path of doubt", a "highway of despair"(1), for if we are to come to expect the unexpected (2), we must die to our conventional understanding, that a new thinking and a new language be born in us. "That which is confined to a life of nature is unable of itself to go beyond its immediate existence", but we are not so confined, says Hegel (3). Our goal is the point "where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself, where it finds its own self, and the notion corresponds to the object, and the object to the notion" (4). Hegel argues that to achieve this, consciousness must be wrenched out of its natural setting of alienation, an alienation with which it is rarely anything but at ease and at home. Hegel calls this a death, the violence of which may result in consciousness struggling to preserve its life from truth at any cost.

The moment in the life of spirit regaining possession  
of/

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1. P.S. pg. 135
  2. Heraclitus Fr. 213 Kirk and Raven pg. 195 Ibid.
  3. P.S. pg. 138.
  4. P.S. pg. 137-8.

of itself in every word, thought and deed, to which we give special attention in this work, is the opposition of Lord and slave. With the help of this model, Hegel is able to focus upon man's social and psychological life and the point when his natural consciousness becomes self-consciousness. Kelly argues perceptively that Hegel was struggling to comprehend a paradox which threatened to fragment the reality of human being. The paradox which we shall look at in detail later, is that the Greeks in Antiquity had genuinely sought to understand man's self-enslavement, his alienation, yet sanctioned slavery as the very basis of their society; and the enlightenment, though it attacked slavery in its social forms in society, forgot the spiritual dimension of man's self-estrangement (1). Hegel's dialectic is his attempt to bring these two dimensions together. By means of it, he tries to integrate the internal and the external, the psychological and the historical aspects of man's alienation. This is the concrete result of his Logic of Spirit, in which formal and factual questions interact, in which life and meaning are an interwoven unity, in which form and content are not divorced.

Hegel believed that the traumatic social disturbances of his day, and in particular the growing self-awareness of men through the German Reformation and the Enlightenment, culminating in the French Revolution of 1789, were signs that the spirit was at hand, that subject was entering into substance, that man was at the point of regaining himself. The Age of disintegration was right, just, and necessary, in that through his experience of such a time, man can become aware of the truth about himself.

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1. G. A. Kelly: Notes on Hegel's Lordship and Bondage: Review of Metaphysics 1965-6 pg. 794.

He is a divided, unhappy consciousness, alienated from himself, bifurcated, truncated, severed, split. The severance of life from meaning threatens to make man's experience unintelligible, unless he is able to regain a living tension between them, a genuine coincidentia oppositorum. Hegel's philosophy of identity, so-called, is precisely this struggle to bring opposites together, so that their strife can regain a healthy tension, capable of creative becoming. It is the attempt to disclose the hidden connection which holds things together, despite all appearance to the contrary. For dialectic is designed to show us that the way things seem is not the way things are. Dualistic opposites, in spite of what appears, interconnect as moments of becoming. There is hope, legitimate hope, that in the end, (at the ἔσχατον), the dualisms which sever man from himself and condemn him to alienation and despair, will become moments of a redemptive becoming. Hegel's problem was that of formulating a logic capable of comprehending the contrary to what we ordinarily know, of noticing the contrary to what we are taught to see and of heeding the contrary to what we normally hear. For truth is in becoming, in dying and being born again; not in being.

Before we begin our exposition and critical discussion of ch. IV of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit', the chapter on self-consciousness, we shall try to show how what was said in the previous chapter concerning the living unity of form and content relates to our own particular problem, the problem of life and meaning.

We saw, in that chapter, that the notional thinking of Hegel's dialectic, is not abstract. Notions are form and content/

content united according to the logical conventions of a Logic of life, or of spirit. The notion of something is something thought in a particular way, it includes our living experience of the thing in such a way that its being (what it is) is not divorced from how it is known. The way a thing appears, its form, species, εἶδος or ἰδέα, cannot be separated from what it is, for a living thought cannot, for Hegel, remain fixed in a rigid form of conceptual expression if it is to be sensitive to, and capable of describing and communicating how a thing is experienced as well as what is experienced. Kroner tells us that Hegel's Logic "deviates from all former conceptions and schemes of logic: it moves. Thought is made mobile. Indeed, it is always mobile as long as it is living thought, and not a dead classification of terms. A stable Universe, a changeless definition, a fixed proposition, can never grasp the truth. For truth is a living truth. The new logic which penetrates into the innermost mystery of Life must be a living fluid logic" (1). Word must become flesh if it is to be living word, the Word of spirit. The Logos incarnate is Hegel's metaphysical starting point, the beginning because it is the ἕκστατον, which is the meaning of all that comes between. Only in this word made flesh is the cleavage between subject and object which results in the alienation of man, integrated. The goal of the dialectic is indeed the dissolution of alien objectivity in the subject-object identity; but this is easily misunderstood. Identity, here, does not mean a monistic confusion or absorption of one in the other, but a living interaction, or interplay, or mutuality/

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1. Kroner: Introduction on Hegel's Philosophical development in 'Early theological Writings pg. 30.

mutuality between them. Hegel's subject-object identity is not to be confused with certain forms of mysticism, though it can be related, if we so wish, to the "limitless narcissism" which Freud believed to be one of the principle aims of the human spirit (1). What Hegel sought was freedom of spirit, which he correctly associated with social and personal integrity, and this entails a community of self and environment which is analogous to the community of self and environment experienced by the child in the womb or at its mother's breast.

The passages we shall study from the 'Phenomenology' are through and through dialectical. Form and content are treated as aspects of an integral becoming, the truth of which is not disclosed until the final chapters, in which the opposition of inner and outer, psychological and historical, intrasubjective and intersubjective, are overcome in a living connection, or conjunction, which holds them together. In chapters VII and VIII of the 'Phenomenology', the content, the living history of human experience, is no longer at odds with the form, the self-becoming of spirit. The 'Phenomenology' is a series of conceptual expressions of the experience of alienation, of being sick, dis-eased, unhappy and without hope; and its form is the therapeutic, redemptive becoming which discloses the way of healing and of liberation from within the alienation of each moment in the development. This philosophy of history is not a detached philosophical reflection on history, but history transformed (mediated), by way of the experience of consciousness, into philosophy. Thus, philosophy discloses the irrationality of/

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1. of. Norman Brown: Life against Death pgs. 45-6.

of historical realities in the course of its negative way, by showing that only the actual, (namely the actualization of man's potentialities for reasonableness, goodness, freedom and justice), is rational, although the irrational reality is not to be forgotten on that account. The irrational is, after all, one of the 'moments' through which we must pass to achieve actuality, and rationality. Error is a moment of truth (1).

The facts with which we shall be dealing in this work are real enough, though Hegel will be treating them as moments, as that which appears, - not as the truth, the actual or spirit. This is not because he is some sort of abstract idealist, if by that it is meant that he attempts to deduce the world from certain formal principles of pure thought. It is because we do not immediately recognize in immediate cognition, what we learn through experience; namely, that there is a co-inherence of subject and object in every experience, which is not apparent when we are immersed in experience. The facts with which we shall be dealing are psychological, historical and social facts, not natural facts; they are deeds not things. Praxis, not observation, is constitutive of their form and content. Substance may appear to be fatalistically determined by laws beyond the control of man, and this is indeed the case. It is 'real' enough. But appearance is deceptive, for the substance which is to become subject, in the course of the phenomenological disclosure, is the human substance. Human substance, unlike natural substance, has in principle, an essence to regain. We can only speak of alienation in the case of human nature, not/

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not of physical nature.

This point is similar to that made by George Lukács, who argued that Marx shared Hegel's coherence theory of truth and knowledge, which Engels, who extends the use of dialectic to nature did not. The latter relies on a correspondence theory of knowledge and upon an epistemological realism, and this makes nonsense of the dialectic. Zitta writes that, for Lukács, "Engel's attempt to apply the dialectic to nature was a serious mistake which led to its neglect because the subject could not be identical with the object, theory could not unite with practice; .... The correspondence or reflection theory of knowledge had to be admitted which accepts the existence of an objective world that is different from and independent of the subject" (1). Lukács criticizes the subject-object dichotomy which is definitive in all thinking dominated by bourgeois objectification, and he rejects the model of observer or experimenter, who is artificially abstracted from the object, which thus appears subject to external determination like a mechanism, as the model for all epistemology (2). Engels had argued that experiment is practice capable of penetrating the thing-in-itself. To Lukács the experiment is pure contemplation in which the subject is "juxtaposed to, rather than united with, the Object" (3). Engels confuses the thing-for-us with the thing-for-itself, says Lukács. To Hegel, the opposite of the thing-in-itself is not the thing-for-us but the thing-for-itself. It is in the thing-for-itself that subject and object unite and practice/

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1. Zitta: George Lukács: Marxism, Alienation, Dialectics and Revolution pg. 123.
  2. Zitta: Ibid pg. 155.
  3. Zitta Ibid pg. 156.

practice comes to its true self. "The object one thinks of", says Lukács, "is simultaneously the consciousness of the object about itself" (1). For Hegel, every thing-in-itself is a thing-for-us, in any case. To relate this discussion to our concern with Hegel, we must recognize, according to Lukács, that dialectic is not applicable to nature, but only to "socio-historic reality" (Dilthey's term) (2), which means that the substance which he speaks of as becoming subject, is socio-historic, not that of physical nature as we observe it as natural scientists. It is man in alienation. To say, therefore, as Hegel does, that substance must become subject (3) is to say that man's human substance must become subject. In other words, what man is in-himself - which we, the philosophers, can know (4), must itself become conscious of itself; what it is implicitly, must become explicitly what it is for-itself. The unconscious must become conscious. What man is in himself as substance divorced from his hidden essence or potentiality is real enough, but man is not yet actual. To become actual, he must be what he is for himself, fully manifest to himself in assured self-awareness, or in other words, subject at home in, and in full possession of, his human substance. He must have achieved the unity of self with self which is what Hegel means, as we shall see in a moment, by self-consciousness. Thus, only on condition that notions like alienation and dialectic are used of socio-historic reality, and not of external nature, can we understand expressions like the following: "The object one thinks of, is simultaneously the consciousness of the object about itself" (5).

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1. Zitta Ibid pg. 156
  2. Zitta Ibid pg. 124
  3. P.S. pgs. 80ff, 83ff, 113ff, 797, 801, 803ff.
  4. P.S. pg. 162-3, also 86, 142-3, 192, 212, 274, 276, 613.
  5. Ibid pg. 156.

It would follow, if Lukács is right, that we must be careful to clarify the context in which we intend to speak dialectically. It would follow that we are confining dialectic to certain areas of experience, namely the social, historical and psychological; and that if we bring to these areas, or to the dialectic, an alien epistemology, we shall fail to understand the kind of language being used. If, for instance, a materialist or empiricist who rejected on principle the coherence theory of truth, and subscribed to the correspondence theory along, came to study the Lord-slave dialectic, it follows that he could hardly fail to misunderstand it. We shall bear this in mind in what follows.

## CHAPTER IV

## SELF-INTEGRATION

## PART 1: SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

"Hegel's philosophy, in its deepest intuitions, seems to have been a philosophy of time. And consequently a humanistic philosophy. And despite the effort to join time to eternity, or more exactly, thanks to the Bohemian notion of nontemporal evolution to introduce time within eternity and eternity within time" (1). So writes Koyré, who initiated the lecture course on Hegel at the 'Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes' in 1931, the course which Kojève took over in 1933, and continued until 1939. Koyré had grasped that for Hegel, the problem of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  (meaning) in time, and in history, cannot be comprehended unless temporality, 'being-in-time' is understood as becoming, as a being and not-being fused together in life. Kojève formulates the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of interconnected concepts which are integrated in Hegel's conception or notion of Geist (spirit), the all-encompassing, as follows: Work and Struggle = Freedom = Time = History = Transience = Nothing = Man. Man, says Kojève, is mortal, finite, free, historic individual" (2). Koyré extracts a marginal note from Hegel's Jena lectures of 1803-4 that says: 'Geist ist Zeit' (3). Kelly remarks: "On this frail reed the splendid theory rests" (4), because for Kelly, Geist is not Zeit, because Geist exceeds the mere measure of man and is the unifying spirit/

1. A. Koyré 'Hegel à Jena' pg. 435 of Kelly: Idealism, Politics and History pg. 313.

2. Kojève: 'Introduction à la lecture de Hegel', cf Kelly Ibid pg. 313.

3. Kelly: Idealism Politics and History pg. 314

4. Ibid pg. 314.

spirit that links him with the objective movement of the eternal" (1). Kelly quotes Hegel: "Only the natural is subjected to time, in so far as it is finite; but the true, the Idea, Geist is eternal. - The Concept of eternality must not, however, be taken negatively as the abstraction from time so that it would exist outside of it, especially not in the sense that eternity would come after time: that would make eternity into a future, a moment in time" (2). We continue this debate, as we do every debate between differing interpreters of Hegel, by directing our discussion to what Hegel himself said.

Our task, in this chapter, is to understand what Hegel meant by the term selbstbewusstsein (conscious self-awareness), in order that our exposition and discussion of the relation between self and other can be seen in its true light. We have discussed this in general terms already. We have discovered that to become self-conscious, in Hegel's sense, is to have achieved self-integration through conscious comprehension of living experience, and this encompassing comprehension is a new wholeness and wholenessness. In immediate experience, we see, touch, hear and smell; we perceive and understand what we perceive. But we do not comprehend. We are the slaves of our categorial schemas by which we understand, we are in bondage to our perspectives, our conventional attitudes, our so-called logical rules. We make premature claims to absolute truth on the basis of the relativity of our personal, or social, or cultural standpoints. For Hegel, truth is a task requiring an integrated comprehension of our experience (Vernunft thinking the Begriff). We must be willing to apply the effort of comprehension (die Anstrengung des Begriffs)

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1. Kelly: Ibid pg. 314.

2. Ibid pg. 315

if we are to achieve a resolution of the contradictions of the understanding, or to heal the brokenness of men, split by the divisive dualisms of their consciousness. Self-consciousness is the goal of philosophical comprehension, and we will achieve it only in the struggle to encompass all opposites. For opposites, says Hegel, interconnect in their conflict; they interconnect, in spite of what appears, as moments of becoming. This hidden interconnection occurs, according to Hegel, precisely at the point where we would least expect it, namely at the point where opposites conflict. That this is not immediately apparent, is obvious. We neither experience this, nor perceive it, nor understand it. This is the argument of chapters 1 to 3 of the 'Phenomenology'. But, in the emergence of self-consciousness, it is disclosed to those who are willing to make the effort to comprehend. Hegel's 'Phenomenology' is the ladder he designed to help us to do so (1). To comprehend may seem like walking on our head (2), but that is the price to be paid. It is the price of healing. "To be restored our sickness must grow worse" (3).

Unlike the dimension of consciousness, in which men achieve the apparent certainties of sense - experience, perception and understanding (chs. 1, 2, and 3 respectively), the dimension of self-consciousness is the threshold of the encompassing integration of the knowing subject and the known object and consequently, what is known and how it is known, the fact and the way it appears. Self-consciousness alone is the truth of these attitudes", says Hegel, although "it is not yet so for the consciousness immersed in the experience" (4). Or in other words, "with self-conscious-

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1. P.S. pg. 87.
  2. Ibid. pg. 87.
  3. T. S. Eliot: East Coker Part IV Collected Poems pg. 202
  4. P.S. pg. 212.

self-consciousness, we have now passed into the native land of truth, into the kingdom where it is at home" (1).

The Truth, for Hegel, is God as spirit, ~~and~~ because God is neither subject nor object, knower nor known, but that which encompasses both and integrates them. Self-consciousness as "consciousness of self in its otherness" (2), is the promised land, the end of the long journey through the wilderness of human experience. The truth of sense-experience, perception and understanding, the truth which is hidden in the life of immediacy, is that: "Consciousness of a thing is only possible for a self-consciousness" (3). Unless we learn to expect the unexpected, we would never notice it, or find it out (4). With the emergence of self-consciousness, mere certainty vanishes in favour of the truth" (5).

Consciousness distinguishes other from self, self-consciousness brings what is distinguished together again (6). For self-consciousness being 'in-itself' and 'being-for-another' are the same, for the in-itself is in this case consciousness (7). The modes of consciousness described as sense-experience, perception and understanding are now gathered together as "moments of self-consciousness", (8) and the activity of gathering what had been separated (which is, as we have seen, the purpose of the dialectical method) is called, by Hegel, "the return out of otherness" (9).

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1. Ibid pg. 219.
  2. Ibid pg. 211
  3. Ibid pg. 211.
  4. Heraclitus Fragment 213 Kirk & Raven Ibid pg. 195
  5. P.S. pg. 218.
  6. Ibid pg. 218
  7. Ibid pg. 318.
  8. Ibid pg. 219
  9. P.S. pg. 219.

In case we mistake Hegel's conception of self-consciousness for a "motionless tautology, Ego is Ego, I an I", Hegel tells us that unless self-consciousness has the "shape of being, it is not self-consciousness" (2). Was Marx right to accuse Hegel's account of the genesis of self-consciousness of being "merely formal", because "human nature itself is treated as merely abstract, thinking nature, as self-consciousness?" (2). This is a very difficult question to answer. Marx thought there was an "uncritical positivism and incritical idealism" implicit in the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', like a germ, "a potentiality and a secret" (3). Because Hegel's conception is "formal and abstract" according to Marx, the annulment of alienation becomes a confirmation of alienation" (4). But Hegel's abstractness is as ambiguous as his refusal to depart from experience. He does not say that the otherness of the object is an illusion or unreal; for "otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment" (5). If his conception of self-consciousness were rigorously idealist, he would surely have argued that the apparent externality of the object was an illusion and alienation unreal. He could then have overcome alienation by right thinking. But Hegel did not choose to do this. He emphatically retains every 'moment' of his dialectical encompassing as distinct, real, and unforgettable. The moment of consciousness in which the alienation of subject and object is a fact is not obliterated, it is retained. But the second moment, /

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1. Ibid pg. 219.
  2. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 1844 pg. 214
  3. Ibid pg. 201.
  4. Ibid pg. 214
  5. P.S. pg. 220.

moment, in which subject and object are integrated in self-consciousness, is shown to encompass the first, for it is the truth of the first. Hegel calls the former appearance and the latter truth, not because the former is unreal and the latter real, but because the former is real and the latter actual. The former is irrationally unable to fulfil its potentialities (it is existence divorced from essence), the latter is rational in that it is the fulfilment of all potentialities, (existence united with essence) (1). We shall have to return to this distinction between the real and the actual in a moment.

Marx thought that Hegel was correct to conceive "labour as man's act of self-creation (2). Hegel believed, as we have seen, that the truth of man's relation to what he does and has done, is that the product of man's labour appears as an external fact; it is in truth a deed. It appears in alienation as a thing, but the truth of the matter is contrary to what appears to be the case. The thing is a thing done; it is human substance from which the human subject is absent. Such facts are deeds. A hidden unity of subject and object distinguishes them from things. The philosopher, for Marx, is "an abstract form of alienated man, who sets himself up as the measure of the alienated world" (3). For Hegel the philosopher is the one who lets the cat out of the bag. He deliberately leaves the cave, he shows the fly the way out of the bottle (4). He discloses the truth which hides itself, the truth we were not aware of when our pre-occupation was with knowledge rather than with comprehending what we knew but/

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1. P.S. pg. 220.

2. Economic and philosophical manuscripts pg. 213.

3. IBid pg. 200.

4. of Plato: Republic; Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations.

but had not grasped.

Georg Lukács conception of selbstbewusstsein, conscious self-awareness, or the self-possessed presence of the subject in his actuality, may prove helpful in clarifying what Hegel meant by the conception. We give an extended quotation from Lukács' work 'Taktika és Ethika' 1919 (1).

"The concept of self-consciousness has first appeared and been clarified in classical German Philosophy. It signifies that specific case of knowledge when the knowing subject and the known object are in essence identical, when therefore, knowledge comes from within and not from without. (The simplest example of this is man's ethical self-awareness, his sense of responsibility for example, in the fact of his conscientiousness, in contrast to knowledge of natural science, where the known object, despite complete knowledge of it, remains for ever alien to the knowing subject). The primary significance of self-consciousness consists in the fact that a mere acquisition of this knowledge brings about a significant change in the known subject; that tendency, which has still operated in it previously, become more forceful, stronger, than it was before, in consequence of this knowledge without which it could not be. But it also signifies that in this manner every difference between subject and object ceases, and in consequence of this, the difference between theory and practice also ceases. Theory without losing a thing from its purity, its objectivity and truth, transforms itself into practice. Insofar as knowledge is the self-consciousness/

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1. of: Zitta Georg Lukács Ibid pg. 177.

self-consciousness of the known object, it gives greater force and certitude to the lawful development of the object than it would be possible without it".

When we reflect upon cognition in the face of an exterior world, the world of physical entities, material objects, or things in general, there is no sense in speaking of the need to unite subject and object. Hegel's dialectical thinking, the reasoning which achieves a conception or notion (Begriff) of living experience, is a method of comprehension which encompasses both subject and object in the living truth of the whole. We have argued in previous chapters for an interpretation of Dialectic which sees it as the kind of thinking which gathers together what it sets apart, integrates what it dissociates, and reconciles what it differentiates. What appears at the level of sense experience, perception and understanding is revealed to be untrue at the level of the Notion (Begriff), for only in the all-encompassing comprehensiveness of the Notion, or living, integrated conception, is the truth of what is the case adequately comprehended. It does not, of course, follow that what appears is illusion, or that our senses deceive us all the time. Hegel is no conventional idealist. Like Heraclitus, Hegel will neither depart from experience nor evade the task of comprehending what we experience. Heraclitus tells us that "the things of which there is seeing and hearing and perception, these do I prefer", (1), and Hegel that "consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within its experience" (2). Findlay calls this "the ineliminable element of empiricism in Hegel's philosophy" (3); no philosopher, except possibly Aristotle has produced thought with a trifle of Hegel's empirical richness" (4). Appearance is not illusion, for Hegel, nor is the external world unreal.

But our understanding of what we experience and perceive is not adequate/

1. Heraclitus Fr. 200 of Kirk & Raven Ibid pg. 189
2. ibid pg. 96
3. Findlay: Hegel - A re-examination pg. 44
4. Ibid pg. 350, cf: also pgs. 24, 82, 74-5, 81-2, 86, 213, 214.

adequate. We do not comprehend the truth, indeed our fondness for premature claims to absolute truth, and to the general validity of our categorial schemes or explanatory hypotheses, gravely hinder any comprehension of THE Truth. Thus in this connection Heraclitus can also say that we must "expect the unexpected" (1), namely that "the way things really are hides itself", that "the unapparent connection is stronger than the apparent one" (2). For contrary to what is apparently the case, it is opposition that brings things together (3), contradiction reconciles, that which scatters gathers, πόλεμος and Λόγος belong together in the Truth (4). Thus, for Hegel, in thinking through the Λόγος which is πόλεμος, "we have to think (5) pure flux, opposition within opposition itself, or contradiction" We have to think dialectically, which is not to recoil from distinction into an abstract unity, its opposite, but to enter into the brokenness of differentiation, and to achieve integration in and through the brokenness (6). Dialectic, as a truly comprehensive thinking, "only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder (7). The "truth of the whole" (8) is THE truth, and that only at the end of a long educative development, which is far from edifying, for it is the "seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative" (9).

Lukács argues, in the passage quoted, that it is in self-consciousness that we achieve this encompassing, comprehensive, integration/

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1. Heraclitus Kirk & Raven Ibid Fr. 213 pg. 195.
  2. Ibid Fragments 210 & 211 pg. 193.
  3. Burnet: Early Greek Philosophy Fr. 46 pg. 137.
  4. Heidegger: What is Metaphysics pg. 51, 105-118.
  5. P.S. pg. 206.
  6. Ibid 206ff.
  7. P.S. pg. 93.
  8. Ibid pg. 81:
  9. Ibid pg. 81:

integration of the object known with the knowing subject. The Notion of self-consciousness, which is closely related to what Hegel calls Geist or Spirit, encompasses both the individual (and so psychological aspects of man), and the social or collective man, (which embraces the history of human experience as a whole)". In self-consciousness, we are on the threshold of returning out of otherness, of redemption from alienation; for it is in the all-encompassing self-consciousness, or community of intersubjective spirit, that both persons and communities enter into a new healing, and integrating becoming. But before we try to explain the meaning of this hope, and this faith, (for it is a future in which we may believe and hope, not an actual fact, capable of being described in propositions subject to immediate verification), we must clarify the meaning of alienation, and the estranged otherness of the object under the dominion of alienation.

For Hegel, the otherness of the object at this level of experience is the alienated self of man. It is the word spoken by man, which he does not really mean. It is the act in which he is not present. It is the product he does not possess. It is the home in which he cannot live. It is the metaphysic in which he cannot think. It is the deed he did not intend to do but did, it is the deed he intended to do but could not do. It is the alien substance of man, both real and ideal. It is man's heaven and his hell. Both good and evil, as fixed ethical categories, participate in this alienation of man's substance. For every fixed dualism is a diseased fixation, a stabilization of a dislocated, unbalanced, alienated state of affairs. Every certainty, /

certainty, every exclusive truth, every act of self-assertion in this state of alienation, is one-sided; and in relation to the wholeness of the truth of the Whole, untrue (1). But only dialectical thinking can comprehend this. For only dialectical thinking can comprehend that man is on the way, that he is continually becoming what he was not, and is continually becoming what he is not. Only dialectic grasps the given as that which is living, for it alone grasps being as a 'being-in-time' or becoming. It alone notices that being and not-being belong together in becoming, for it is alone in its having learned to expect the unexpected.

The Τέλος of dialectical thinking is that substance become subject, that the alien substance of man be regained and re-entered, to the end that it become alight and alive with spirit. Alienated man is only implicitly (in-himself) what he is in truth (namely spirit), but in the redemption of his self (in his becoming for-himself what he is in-himself) he is explicitly what he is in truth, (namely spirit). Hegel believed that the first free man, the first man who as subject entered into his substance, was Jesus, the Christ. The Christian Λόγος as the ἀρχή of all things from the beginning and forever, is the truth of all things, because in him substance becomes subject, human reality actual and so rational. If we live this through, says Hegel, we shall begin to comprehend the truth which was hidden to man in alienation. We shall regain the human substance we had lost, and become what essentially we are. Only as substance is redeemed and given back to subject, is man given the freedom to do what he wills, and the freedom to be present in what he does, with a whole mind, united with his body, in/

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1. P.S. pg. 89ff.

in integrated wholeness. In Christ, there begins the long, painful history of redemption, the history of God as Spirit, the God who is present to us as he will be present, even now Immanuel, God with us, but not yet what He will be. Hegel's struggle to think God in his Act, in his actuality, as Spirit, entailed thinking God as Person, and living, - that is, as being-in-time, an integrated, self-determining Becoming, - and at the same time think God as eternal and infinite. This is the overarching framework of his phenomenology of the experience of man. For his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' is an attempt to recall some of the principle moments in the history of God as Act, as that actuality which is spirit. It is the all-encompassing rationality of spirit that Hegel seeks to comprehend in his dialectical logic of spirit. Hegel explicitly tells us he will on no account indulge in abstract speculation concerning the "undisturbed identity" of God (1). It is the Activity of God, namely as Spirit, Geist, that concerns Hegel; for only when we have conceived God through the "entire wealth of his developed form" can we "grasp and express (God) as really actual" (2).

To put this another way, Hegel's phenomenology of emerging self-consciousness, as subject regaining its alienated substance, is a description of the way given reality (the in-itself) is negated and transformed into actuality, which is rational. It is rational in that, as actuality, it is spirit, that which accords with the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . The God who is present only as He will be present, who is what he will be, and who is what he does in the long history of his activity, this God is "essentially result" (3). For until the real (substance) is rational in the fulfilment/

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1. P.S. pg. 81.
  2. P.S. pg. 81.
  3. P.S. pg. 82.

fulfilment of all potentiality (until essence and existence are united) God is implicit only, not actual. "Only in the end is it (spirit) what it is in very truth: and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development" (1). God as Alpha, in himself, is only implicitly what he will be as Omega, at the end, explicitly (for-himself). Substance must become subject (2).

We shall argue that it is only in the context of this eschatological Promise of God as  $\alpha\omega\omega$ , given in the well-known passage Exodus 3<sup>14</sup>, that we shall understand the key propositions of Hegel's dialectical thinking. God as Omega, present explicitly, for himself, is the Truth of the Whole, infinite through time, the living God comprehended in the truth of a living conception capable of encompassing both eternity and time. For when Hegel tells us that the truth is the Whole (3), that spirit alone is the Actual (4), that the Actual is the Universal (5) and that what is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational (6), we shall fail to understand him unless we comprehend that "Absolute truth must be a result" (7). If we are not to confuse the real and the Actual, (and we shall argue this in detail in Ch. VII part 3), because the Spirit alone is the actual (8), then we shall see that Hegel's proposition that whatever is rational is actual and whatever is actual is rational makes sense. He means that whatever is rational (whatever accords with the all-encompassing  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ ) is Actual (God as Act, becoming-in-time, present in what he does); and whatever is actual - or spirit/

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1. P.S. pg. 82.
  2. Ibid pgs. 80f, 83f, 113f, 797, 801, 803
  3. Ibid pg. 81
  4. Ibid pg. 86
  5. Ibid pg. 121
  6. Preface to Philosophy of Right pg. 10
  7. Science of Logic pg. 70
  8. P.S. pg. 86.

spirit - whatever is done in the Spirit of 'I am what I will be', or 'I am present only as I will be present', is rational, namely in accordance with the Λόγος, who is the ἀρχή, the Alpha, as well as the ἔσχατον, the Omega of God.

Needless to say, what appears is real enough, our senses do not deceive us most of the time; but the real is what happens to be the case. As such, it is not Actual, it does not accord with the Λόγος or Notion (Begriff). It is not rational. It is not spirit but letter, it is not Grace but nature, it is not Gospel but law. It is only implicitly, in-itself, what it ought to be, for existence is not essence. It is explicitly, for itself, what it ought to be only in the Actualization of essence, in the unity of essence and existence in a new integrated becoming, which is spirit.

We quoted Koyré's view that Hegel's philosophy was, in its deepest intuitions a philosophy of time. We can now see that Hegel's encompassing notion of Geist, or spirit, remains a conception of temporality even at the point where it negates and transcends finitude. His notions of Act, Activity and Actuality, related as they are to the those of Time, Becoming, Subject, Freedom, Universality and Integrity, cannot be comprehended with any fixed category, such as Being or not-being. Actuality both is and is not. It is not yet what it will be, nor is it now what it was. Spirit is what it does, but is not yet, for that reason, what it will be. It is becoming. This explains our enigmatic reference to the distinction between what happens to be the case (what exists, or what is real) and what is actual. Actuality is a temporal notion; it is, in becoming only what it is/

is not, and it is not now what it will be. It also explains the difficult notion of otherness. Self-consciousness is the overcoming of otherness not in its obliteration or absorption, but in its negation and transformation. It remains fact, (real, objective) as a necessary, unforgettable moment. But it is encompassed in self-consciousness. It is redeemed from alienation. Reality is real enough, it is not illusion. But it is not rational. Only the Actual, as the unity of essence and existence in becoming, is rational.

## CHAPTER IV

## SELF-INTEGRATION.

## PART 2: DESIRE

Hegel's phenomenological description of experience of the emergence of the truth of self-consciousness from the premature certainties of consciousness (as the certainties of sense - experience, perception and understanding) begins with a description of Desire (Begehrde). Brown writes: "Existentialist scholarship is discovering a more human Hegel, Hegel the psychologist, Hegel trying to transcend the traditional paranoia of philosophers and find the essence of man not in thinking but in human desires and human suffering" (1). We can be more exact, and at the same time, go further. It is in desire, the manipulation of the environment so that it meets our needs, and not in the knowledge of that environment however adequate, that self-consciousness emerges. It is in praxis, not theoria, that the genesis of self-consciousness is to be found. The classical and common-sense view that man's desire is a desire for happiness, is acceptable enough at this point, though the paradoxical fact that prior to that wholeness and wholesomeness which Hegel calls spirit, man does not really know what he desires, in that his desires are all in some measure perverted (though never completely), complicates the problem later on.

Man desires to be happy, which means he desires the satisfaction of his basic needs (food, drink, shelter, companionship, security, sexual satisfaction and so on). But reality frustrates him. It is as though reality resists his desire and opposes/

opposes him, so that a relation of conflict and struggle emerges between subject and object, self and the raw material of the natural environment. Man seeks to overcome reality, to master it and subdue it, through labour and work. For Freud, the pressure of reality, which he calls the power of the reality - principle over man, forces man to repress and subdue some of his desires to satisfy others. His repressed desires manifest themselves obliquely in dreams and neurotic symptoms. For Hegel, the Τέλος of man's struggle and work is self-consciousness, for in self-consciousness the hostile, alien appearance of reality is overcome in the redemption of substance from Otherness. But, as we have seen, that does not mean that this appearance was unreal or illusory, or that is no longer real. It lives on in a sublated form, transformed but present.

The encompassing of subject and object "breaks asunder into the opposition of self-consciousness and life" (1). For life, as continual becoming, as that being which is insecurely balanced between the no longer and the not yet, is flux, change, insecurity. Obscurely, Hegel calls it "absolutely negative or infinite unity" (2), an idea expressed later on as that infinite whose very subsistence is diremption (3). His essential point is that life is flux, and at the same time a totality which cannot be broken down into its constituents (4). Consciousness emerges from life and achieves selfhood only in the struggle between it and life. It learns from practical experience that the object is independent of it, and it learns that "certainty exists through cancelling this other" (5). But it is not, as we have seen, satisfied with/

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1. P.S. pg. 221
  2. P.S. pg. 222
  3. P.S. pg. 222
  4. P.S. pg. 224
  5. P.S. pg. 225

with this certainty, since it is not yet a certainty of self, but only of the object. For, "self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness". (1). "A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness", - this sets the scene for the drama of redemption from alienation. For self-consciousness is actual only when it has become actual, and it becomes actual only in confronting and desiring another self-consciousness. Only when the object is another subject can we speak of the "unity of itself in its Otherness" (2). This unity, when actual, is spirit. It enables the individual to say 'We' for the first time, and correlatively, for a plurality of Egos to say I (3). It is the intersubjective unity constituted in the gathering together of what was separated in the conflict and opposition of desire. Here we leave the "parti-coloured show of the sensuous immediate", as well as the "dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous", and step into the "spiritual daylight of the present". (4).

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1. Ibid pg. 226
  2. Ibid pg. 227
  3. Ibid pg. 227
  4. Ibid pg. 227.

CHAPTER IV

## SELF-INTEGRATION

## PART 3:

## INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE OF SELF CONSCIOUSNESS

The immediate existence of man, according to Hegel, is nature, not spirit. "Immediately, man is only a living being, who has the capacity to become actual spirit", but who is not yet in fact what he essentially is (1). "Man is thus not by nature this particular in which the spirit of God dwells; man is not by nature what he ought to be. The animal is by nature what it ought to be" (2); Man is not. He lives between what he is in fact, and what he ought to be, a divided consciousness, a being-in-time, self-transcending. For Hegel, the truth which raises man from nature to Grace, from being what he is, to becoming what he is not, is the Truth "that in Christ the Λόγος has become flesh" (3). In the Holy Spirit which emerges in the departure of Jesus, a new being-in-time, a new becoming (γένεσις) is constituted, which gathers being (τὸ ὄν) and not-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) together. For it is in that being which is becoming, that being which becomes what it is not, by dying to what it is, that human being as nature becomes human being as spirit (4). It is the Understanding which proceeds with fixed determinations, believing that everything is what it is and not something else. Reason, on the other hand, is flexible and subtle enough to think the living flux of change and becoming, without/

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1. Hegel: History of Philosophy (transl. Haldane) Vol. III
  2. Ibid pg. 5
  3. Ibid pg. 4-5
  4. Logic pg. 82ff, 105ff

without disintegration or fragmentation. Hegel argues that if we are ever to comprehend our own living experience, we must recognize being (Τὸ ὄν) and not-being (Τὸ μὴ ὄν) as abstractions from the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of living experience. Spirit is the truth of living experience. Grace redeems nature. Subject regains substance and takes possession of it for itself. For contrary to what appears to be the case, and contrary to the conventions of common-sense, man ought to become what he is not in such a way that his coming-to-be and his ceasing-to-be belong together. Death and resurrection belong together, united once and for all in the all-encompassing integrity of the incarnate Λόγος, and preserved in the unity of the spirit.

Our purpose in the following discussion is to clarify that *Via, Veritas, et Vita*, whereby natural life becomes spirit, and achieves freedom through death. It entails a hermeneutic of the Christian notion of Spirit as a new integrated being-in-time, in which the belonging together of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, birth and death, is comprehended. It is also, quite obviously, a thoroughly eschatological metaphysic, capable of comprehending the temporality of incarnate man without becoming dislocated or deranged by the contradictions of the 'no-longer', the 'even-now', and the 'not-yet' of Christian temporality. It is a philosophy of γένεσις, in which ζωή and θάνατος are united in the truth of the whole (ὅλον); And it must comprehend that the truth of the whole is actual (*Wirklich*) only as the coming αἰών of God. For only what is Actual, namely the Action of God, and so is the living presence of God, is rational: Only the Actual, in which God is what he is becoming, is spirit.

Selbstbestehen.

Selbstbewusstsein, as Hegel used the Concept, means the freedom to integrate what appears to be locked in irredeemable opposition. Birth and death are not the same, yet in the gathering together of all things in the all-encompassing  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , birth and death belong together. The birth of self-consciousness is a kind of death. Similarly the opposition between self and other which is an essential moment in the birth of self-consciousness, is overcome and yet preserved in the freedom to be itself in its otherness (Bei-sich-selbst-sein im Andersein(1)). We have to bear in mind that the genesis of self-consciousness as described by Hegel cannot be understood apart from the temporality of the Christian  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , in which a living unity of opposites is achieved in becoming. Kojève's failure to bear this in mind is the main reason why his interpretation of Hegel is one-sided.

Self-consciousness is a fluid or floating conception, which can be employed in both of two essential moments, both the moment of immediacy or the in-itself, in which case it is implicit, and the moment of mediation, or the for-itself, in which case it is explicit. For the natural position of self-consciousness is alienation, or self-estrangement. Both the independence and the dependence of self-consciousness suffer from estrangement or self-alienation. Both are diseased in that they seek the stable security of being, rather than the unrest of becoming, the birth and the death which together constitute the self-transcendence which distinguishes man from the animals. It is right that man should be a sick animal and a divided consciousness, because man alone is essentially self-conscious. If a man chooses to be what/

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1. Marcuse Reason & Revolution pg. 69

what he is, and not something else, if he chooses to regard what he is in fact, as what he ought to be in essence, then he is in flight from his freedom and humanity. He is mere animal. For man only truly is, when he is becoming what he ought to be but is not yet. His true being is a becoming, an existence without an essence in which he immediately inheres.

We have reached the point where something must be said about Hegel's notion of truth as true becoming, in which being and not-being belong together in living communion. It is closely related to his notion of selbstbewusstsein or self-consciousness.

First, the simple meaning of the latter conception is self-awareness, as Kaufmann points out (1). But for Hegel it has many profound and far-reaching connotations. It can mean a maturity and wholeness of personality, self-assurance, self-integration, self-possession. It denotes authentic, genuine, trustworthy human selfhood, in such a way that both the psychological and the social dimensions of healthy becoming are encompassed. It is of significance to the philosopher only because, as we have already seen, "with self-consciousness, we have passed into the native land of truth" (2). Things become clearer when we remember that Hegel distinguishes between Wahrheit, which he calls Truth, and Richtigkeit which he calls correctness. Wahrheit is that which accords with its notion or Begriff, or which is what it ought to be, a unity of essence and existence. Only that which is actual is true in this sense. Mure observes that Hegel's Wahrheit is in many respects similar in conception to Plato's ἀλήθεια, though we must add that it is impossible to understand Wahrheit except we understand it as that which accords with/

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1. Kaufmann: Hegel pg. 153  
 2. P.S. pg. 219.

with the Λόγος incarnate. Mure argues that Truth in this sense belongs to the object, and is a value, a good (1). Mure offers 'genuineness' as a preliminary translation of the concept. Self-consciousness is the truth of human life in this sense. It means authentic existence, integrated self-determination, freedom in and through becoming, and a genuine communication between self and not self, or otherness, in every thought, every intention, every deed.

Richtigkeit, (ὀρθότης), on the other hand, consists in the adaequatio, correspondentia, or conventia, between intellectus et rei. Truth as correctness, as conceived in accordance with the correspondence theory of truth, can be formulated in the traditional way. Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei. Truth consists in the agreement of proposition, conception or knowledge with its object, or with the facts. A proposition is true if it corresponds to the way things are. Our knowledge or ideas are true if they accurately reflect what is the case. Hegel is happy with this conception of truth at the level at which it is appropriate. For sense experience, perception and understanding, truth must be conceived within the framework of the dualism of subject and object. But the correspondence theory of truth cannot claim to ~~comprehend~~ comprehend the whole story, for it is essentially conservative. It conceives of man as knower as opposed to doer. It rests upon the metaphysical belief that man is the creature who must accept the way things are, and who must leave everything as it is, even if this is unconsciously presupposed. We know from experience that man is not such a creature. He changes the way things are through work/

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1. Mure: Introduction to Hegel Para 2 of Ch XIV pg. 165.

work, proceeding from judgments about the way things ought to be. Man is actively present in his active relation to the world. As Homo Agens, he actively transcends his passive existence as the detached observer who seeks to describe and explain how things are. Man is, of course, appropriately Homo patiens in certain legitimate moments of his becoming. But as homo agens, the active worker who transforms the raw material of nature into a human world, that we know him today. His technology, his industry, and his culture all speak of his activity, of his responsibility for the way things are. When Hegel tells us that substance is subject, he is telling us that we are responsible for the way things are. He is telling us that our true being is a becoming in which human reason and human freedom actively create a world, however much we may be mystified by the objectivity of our own products. Man is not homo patiens, a subject poised as mind in a world of external objects, however much this may appear to be the case. The truth is that man is responsible for that social and historic world he produces. It is his freedom which is Lord of the way things are. The facts are his deeds. There is a living unity between subject and object which comes about everywhere, whenever human praxis comes to grips with things.

Selbstbewusstsein is consciousness of self in otherness; it entails that consciousness of the active responsibility and freedom of man which is the hidden 'truth' of his products, which is disclosed only when we have learned, with the help of the phenomenological ladder (1), to expect the unexpected. Truth as the co-inherence of the object with its notion, means the/

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1. P.S. pg. 87.

the truth of that becoming in which essence and existence are united, and alienation overcome. Truth is here a value. When things are as they ought to be, they are true. Truth and goodness, untruth and evil are in this sense closely related. For Hegel, substance appears alienated from subject. (By appear, we do not mean that the appearance of substance as alienated from subject is an illusion). Substance 'is' alienated from subject. But this is only a "moment". In becoming, everything changes. Nothing can remain what it is. Everything becomes what it is not. The truth of substance is subject, substance becomes subject. Truth is born in that coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, that birth which is also death. Birth and death belong together. Together they constitute that  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  which alone actualizes truth. Christ, as the Truth, unites birth and death in death and resurrection. All things are true, for Hegel, only in so far as they accord with the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . "To Hegel", argues Mure, "knowledge of value and knowledge of self are one and the same, and error is the belief that an object experienced as alien to the subject is, as so experienced, true in the philosophic sense of 'genuine'" (1). Truth is coherence, or co-inherence of the way things are in spirit. Truth means 'self-accordance', and entails a belonging together of being and thought, in which sense-experience becomes understanding, and finally Reason. Reason thinks by integrating what is separate, by gathering what is scattered. The truth of Reason is the truth of the Whole. Das Wahre ist das Ganze (2). Merleau-Ponty's comment is relevant in this connection. It was Hegel, according to Merleau-Ponty, "who/

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1. Mure: Introduction to Hegel pg. 166.
  2. P.S. pg. 81.

"who started the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded reason, which remains the task of our century" (3). The rational is the actual, that which as truth, or the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , with God, as God, in the beginning and forever, encompasses all things. But not immediately. Hegel is no pantheist. The world is not God. Nor is man God. On the contrary, as the  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  of becoming, God is the  $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ , the Omega of all things, the God who is only in the end what He is in truth. Only as reality is transformed into the healthy, integrated becoming of actuality, or spirit (Geist) is the irrationality of reality annulled, and the truth of the whole revealed as the end toward which all things are striving. Truth as Wahrheit remains a 'beyond' as long as reality is not rational, or actual.

Merleau-Ponty continues: "He (Hegel) is the inventor of that Reason, broader than the understanding, which can respect the variety and singularity of individual consciousnesses, civilizations, ways of thinking and historical contingency, but which nevertheless does not give up the attempt to master them in order to guide them to their own truth" (1). We are now in a position to understand truth as the coming truth, as the rational and the actual. For our only truth, the only truth we can trust, is the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of God, the coming God, the God who is who he will be, the final truth of the whole. Truth is related to self-consciousness because it is not actual as long as substance is alienated from subject, and self not itself in its otherness. With this in mind, we can proceed to Hegel's description of the genesis and growth of self consciousness.

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1. Sense and Nonsense pg. 63.

## CHAPTER V

## PART I:

## THE NEED FOR RECOGNITION

"Self-consciousness exists in-itself and for-itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 'recognized'"(1).

The in-itself of human self-consciousness entails the contradiction between what we are in fact, or by nature, and what we essentially are, or ought to be. For although man is bound to a multitude of finite determinations, (he is this or that); he is also, even now, in the sight of God, a new man, what he essentially is. His essence and existence are divided, he is not by nature what he is in Grace, he is not in fact what he ought to be. His being and his self-consciousness are divided. Man is not yet what he will be, and is, even now, before God.

Hegel tells us that "this double meaning of what is distinguished lies in the nature of self-consciousness:- of its being infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness in which it is fixed" (1). When man is becoming for-himself (self-consciousness in its fulfilment) what he is in-himself, he succeeds in surpassing those finite limits which constitute his factual existence. He is in-finite, in the sense of self-transcending. Man is that being who only becomes what he essentially is, (or is in Grace), when he is dying and becoming; for/

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1. P.S. pg. 229.
  2. Ibid pg. 229.

for unlike animals and things he cannot be defined as the one who is who he is in remaining who he is. He is unlimited, and so free, in the sense that he is the one who, in uniting coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in self-transcending becoming, cannot be bound to any one of his finite determinations. Man is divided in-himself between his essence, which is to be free and in this sense, not limited to any of his finite ways of being-in-the-world; and his existence, which is a kind of enslavement. Their-itself is, therefore, self-estrangement, or self-alienation.

Hegel's striking thesis is that man can overcome alienation only through his living interaction with other men. He describes the "process of Recognition" as follows (1).

"Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness .... this has a double significance. First, it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an OTHER being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard that other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other .... Through sublation it gets back to itself, because it becomes one with itself again, through the cancelling of its otherness, but secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness .... it lets the other again go free" (2).

Hegel notes that this interaction of self-consciousness with self consciousness has been viewed from the point of view of one alone, whereas the action is taking place from the points of view of both. For just as the struggle between opposing forces discloses a hidden connection between them, so here the solipsist independence of each self-consciousness breaks down to reveal a living unity, self-consciousness as a social or intersubjective cohesion/

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1. P.S. pg. 229
  2. Ibid pg. 229-230.

cohesion between the one and the other. A living connection encompassing both self-consciousnesses emerges in what appears to be violent antagonism (1). Self becomes other, other becomes self, their opposition brings them together whilst appearing to set them apart. Their separation is real enough, it is no illusion. But opposition brings things together, despite the conventions of the understanding which would prevent us from noticing this. For contrary to what we 'know' to be the case, Hegel asks us to recognize (re-know) that "Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not another consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through which each mediates and unites itself with itself" (2). Negation, negativity, and mediation (Vermittlung) are unexpectedly the only true way to the positive, death the only way to life; for all things accord with the incarnate  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , for whom there was no resurrection except through calvary. Redemption from death is redemption through death. "It is not true", wrote Lessing, following the negative way of the Heraclitean as well as the Christian  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , "that the shortest line is always straight" (3). Influenced by Schiller, as well as Lessing, Hegel looks to the prologue of St. John's Gospel, and to the dark sayings of Heraclitus, for that dialectical thinking which alone can master the contradictions of our human experience. Where the understanding/

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1. P.S. pg. 230.

2. Ibid pg. 231.

3. Lessing: The Education of the human race para 91 pg. 97 of 'Theological Writings' transl. Henry Chadwick. This essay was well known to Hegel, as was Schiller's Aesthetic Education of man, in which, similar ideas were expressed. The latter work was published in 1795, Lessing's essay in 1780. of Kaufmann Hegel pgs. 46-58, 67-70.

understanding (verstand) breaks down, dialectical reason (vernunft) finds the unapparent connection which is strong enough to hold things together. Our living experience does not immediately come to us as integral, coherent or meaningful; nor is integration possible when subject is detached from object, isolated and withdrawn. For meaning is possible only for that consciousness which is incarnate-being-in-the-world, though it is disclosed to us not directly, nor immediately, but by way of negation (or mediation). The interdependence of self and social environment, their living interconnection, is not an immediate fact but a task, for Hegel.

We are perhaps beginning to grasp what Hegel means when he tells us that self-consciousnesses only "recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one-another"<sup>(1)</sup>. The immediate empirical self, though real enough, is not yet actual. It must become actual, and so spirit, not only through action, or its own action, but through mutual interaction also. It needs recognition to become self-consciousness. It is only by way of the moment in which the self is a stranger to itself in alienation, that alienation is revealed to be the natural position of consciousness.

We may be tempted to interpret Hegel in terms of a simple dualism of self-as-subject and self-as-object, the self as free agent, the self who acts, and the self who is the product of the conditioning of the natural and social environments. The dualism is resolved into a new synthesis, if this is a correct interpretation, when the self succeeds in making the transition from a determined to a self-determining mode of existence in the world. When the self as acted upon becomes the self who acts, self-consciousness/

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1. P.S. pg. 231.

self-consciousness as independence rather than dependence is achieved. But this interpretation misses the point of the previous study of the dialectical *γένεσις* of both independence and dependence, a dialectic which is resolved only in interdependence. Such an interpretation would be working within a fixed and abstract dualism of subject and object which is precisely the position Hegel moves beyond in dialectic.

The need for recognition teaches us that the apparently fundamental distinction between acts done out of the unfreedom of immature dependence and acts done out of independent freedom or rational choice breaks down at the point when both are revealed as abstract. The distinction between self as subject and self as object may be appropriate at the stage when the self has a low threshold of security and faces an immensely hostile environment which threatens to destroy him. It might also be appropriate in the case of an adolescent self-understanding, or in the case of certain forms of mystical or revolutionary self-understanding. It may serve to combat certain forms of scientism, psychologism or historicism in which the freedom or responsibility of man for the way things are in his world, is ignored, blurred or denied. Hegel's point, however, is that because I am placed in a situation of dependence upon the other in my struggle to become myself, the subject-object dualism which dislocates subjectivity from its inherence in the world is an abstract moment. We will notice this, says Hegel, if we learn to see the dialectical character of our living experience. Hegel's argument is that self-consciousness is the hidden condition of my consciousness of anything whatever, and interaction with other human/

human self-consciousnesses is the condition of self-consciousness. There is an unapparent connection between things which at first sight appear quite separate. In my awareness of what is not-me (other) I become aware of myself, but this only when the other is another self who in turn recognises me and is recognized by me. Abstract dependence and abstract independence break down, if we learn to comprehend our experience, into a living interdependence.

It is true that, for Hegel, things as they are exist in untruth, in the sense in which we have understood this, and that the facts appear negative in relation to man. It is true that man is born into alienation in that, as unfree homo sapiens, a negation of the negation is the only way to freedom. Alienation, in which man is being-for-other (Andersein or Sein-für-Anderes 1), is untrue being, in which neither subject (self) nor object (world) yet accord with the Notion (Begriff). But if we press the distinction between determined and self-determining, self as passively conditioned and self as arbitrarily free, we miss the intersubjective co-inherence of subject and object, subject and subject, which for Hegel, is present in living experience if we could only comprehend what we experience. For our thinking so often becomes fixated at the point of dualistic opposition, we become slaves to our own lifeless abstractions. Hegel is warning us not to hold on to these abstractions but, as we have seen, to think living experience. For it is only by entering into the content that we avoid that dislocation and derangement of thinking which occurs when we abstract from the contradictions of life and withdraw into the fixed contradictions of the categorial understanding. Both idealism and empiricism fail to comprehend/

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1. Logic pg. 157ff.

comprehend experience; both fail to encompass both subject and object in accordance with the truth of the Notion. Neither can be truly Christian, in that they fail to think divine and incarnate humanity together. Both fail to see that in authentic intersubjectivity, arising from reciprocal recognition, being and thought belong together.

Hegel expresses the epistemological dimension of the dialectic as follows: "What is, or real per se (an sich) only is, so far as it is an object for consciousness; and that what is for consciousness is also objectively real" (1). In other words, we are in contact with a real world in every experience of it, and nothing can be real unless it is in principle an object of experience. Merleau-Ponty is in agreement with Hegel when he says: "Metaphysics begins from the moment when, ceasing to live in the evidence of the object - whether it is the sensory object or the object of science, - we perceive the radical subjectivity of our all our experience as inseparable from its truth value. It means two things to say that our experience is our own: both that it is not the measure of all imaginable being in itself and that it is nonetheless co-extensive with all being of which we can form a notion. This double sense of the Cogito is the basic fact of metaphysics: I am sure that there is being - on the condition that I do not seek another sort of being than being-for-me" (2). Being and thought, the world and consciousness, subject and object belong together. All knowledge begins with, though does not derive from experience, for Hegel as for Kant. Our task is not merely/

1. P.S. pg. 274. In this truth, the consciousness of the object as objectively real, and the subjective ground of the object in its being essentially for consciousness if it is to be real, are disclosed as abstract moments.

2. Merleau-Ponty: The metaphysical in man: Sense and Nonsense pg. 93.

merely to understand our experience, (Kant), but to comprehend it (Hegel). To comprehend it requires that dialectical flexibility which alone can recognize the identity of opposites in living experience, for the latter is a relentless, ongoing coming-into-being and ceasing-to-be which will not wait, nor postpone its demand for our cognitive response. Fixated cognition, obeying rigid logical conventions, forever loses its contact with living, ongoing experience.

Our analysis of Hegel's conception of recognition thus discloses in a preliminary way, the nature of his notion of synthesis. It also reveals the intersubjective component of human subjectivity, without which neither consciousness nor the world, neither knowledge nor the known would be possible.

We take note of the fact that this notion of intersubjectivity as the sine qua non of subjectivity, and so also of objectivity, is echoed in many later thinkers, though in a multitude of very different ways. Feuerbach follows his teacher, Hegel, when he argues that "The Ego attains to consciousness of the world through consciousness of the Thou" (1). Buber tells us that Feuerbach's I-thou philosophy was his own starting point. For Buber, "Through the Thou, a man becomes I" (2). Husserl, in his famous 5th Cartesian Meditation, tries to formulate a notion of "transcendental intersubjectivity", or an "open community of monads", a "mutual being .. for one another", without which the "constitution of an objective world would not be possible" (3). Max Scheler argues that "man, the finite personal spirit, does not live a communal life with other finite personal spirits from pure accident, or only/

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1. Feuerbach: 'Essence of Christianity' pg. 83.
  2. Martin Buber 'I and Thou' pg. 28. Buber acknowledges his debt to Feuerbach in 'Between man and man' pg. 182 Fontana.
  3. 5th Cartesian Meditation pgs: 129-130, 108.

only de facto". Rather, "it is inherent in the eternal ideal nature of an intelligent person that all its existence and activity as a spirit is ab origine just as much an outward-conscious, co-responsible, communal reality, as a self-conscious, self-responsible, individual reality. The being of man is just as originally a matter of being, living, and acting 'together', as a matter of existing for himself" (1). For Marx, it is above all necessary to avoid postulating 'society' as an abstraction confronting the individual, so that the individual is abstracted from his social reality. The individual man said Marx "is the social being"(2). Amongst social psychologists, G. H. Mead confirms Hegel's conception with great penetration and insight. The self, he tells us, is something which has a development. "It is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process. "The self is reflexive, it can be both subject and object. In communication, the self can become object to itself, and the self "as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience" (3). Another example of contemporary reflection in the Hegelian tradition is R. D. Laing(4).

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1. On the Eternal in Man pg. 373
  2. Early Writings: 3rd Manuscript pg. 158.
  3. Mind, Self and Society pgs. 135-140.
  4. cf. Interpersonal perception especially pgs. 3-34;  
The divided self pg. 19; Self and Others pg. 171 to 177;  
Politics of Experience pp. 15-38.

## CHAPTER V

## PART 2:

## THROUGH INTERACTION WITH THE THOU, A MAN BECOMES I.

## HEGEL AND FICHTE.

We have just seen that for Hegel there is no I without a Thou, and that intersubjectivity is the locus of subjectivity. Before we discuss his account of the struggle for recognition (Kampf des Anerkennens), we recall that Fichte had argued, as we have seen Hegel do, that there is no human consciousness of the world which is not also self-consciousness, and there is no self-consciousness without a plurality or community of self-consciousnesses.

Fichte argues in book one of the first part of his "Science of Rights" that rational self-consciousness in man is self-determining activity (2); and "willing is the real essential character of reason" (3). According to Fichte, the many attempts to deduce the Ego in self-consciousness, as the connection of many representations, for example, have failed because they must always presuppose what they wish to deduce. For it is not intelligence alone which constitutes rationality, but intelligent practical activity (3). The Ego is Act, and there is no sense, says Fichte, in our imagining a substrate before or behind activity and calling this the Ego. The Ego is "simply Acting; it is what it acts, and when it does not act, it is not at all" (4). Through Action, the Ego makes the Object; facts are/

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1. Rights pgs. 31-33. Translated by A. E. Kroeger.
  2. Rights pg. 36
  3. Rights pg. 38
  4. Science of Rights pg. 39.

are deeds. Fichte is not interested in denying the reality of the external world, but he is attacking the conventional way in which we fail to take account of the fact that there is a unity of subject and object in Praxis. Common sense claims an independent existence for both subject and object, and claims that the world would be, though it (common sense) were not (1). The transcendental philosopher knows of the external reality of the world only as a limit to action. "The Ego", argues Fichte, "is what is in Acting; the object is what is in being" (2). The Ego is infinitely determinable as self-determining, the object, once and for all time, determined. The Ego is "incessantly becoming, and there is nothing permanent in it; the object is, as it is, forever". It is what it is and is what it will be. Act is not being - not-being, no-thing. The object is what it is, it is being. The self is act, not being; and it is free (3). The self is self-change, active becoming ( $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ); the object resists change, not actively, (by definition), but in its fixed determination of being ( $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\tau\eta$ ). We see here the emergence of the modern form of the distinction between Being and Time, Sein und Zeit. Hegel's concept of Spirit (Geist) as the actual (Wirklich) is a notion of Time and becoming, not a notion of being.

Fichte asks how self-consciousness as Act can be possible. His reply is that self-consciousness is possible "when the rational being can ascribe to itself a causality in one and the same undivided moment wherein it opposes something to this causality" (4). In other words, self-consciousness is act, not being (not-being);  
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1. Ibid pg. 41.
  2. Ibid pg. 46
  3. Ibid pg. 46
  4. Ibid pg. 49

it is negativity which must negate what is (being) precisely as it is what it is as Act, as Act which is not being. This conception is difficult to grasp only because ordinary language is too rigid and inflexible to describe Action. Its structure is adequate to the task of asserting true propositions concerning matters of fact (understood as independent object rather than deed) not true propositions concerning human Action. Act is not being, yet there is action. In the undialectical logic of conventional language, propositions expressing the action of a subject or Ego appear contradictory, or at best paradoxical, because they are expressing that which 'is' (Act), only by not being 'being' - for Act is not being, subject is not object, the knower is not the known, the doer is limited by the objectivity of resistant externality. There belongs to this enigmatic concept of the 'self-who-acts' the paradox that even when it does not act (do anything) it has chosen freely not to act, and to choose is to act. Language slithers uneasily, unable to discover a firm foothold. There is nothing stable about becoming, or the self, or act, and normally we would like to say that what we cannot say clearly better not be said at all. Fichte is not so foolish. Even nihilistic silence expresses something, for we are silent because we think language incapable of describing the 'is' and the 'is not' of active *γένησις*. Silence has ethical consequences. For in this case our silence concerns what we do, and perhaps even if what we say about doing in the language of matters of fact (being) is, from the point of view of analytical logic, very unsatisfactory, we cannot afford to be silent about something so obviously significant. It is one thing to distinguish facts and values, it is quite another thing to equate the meaningful with the factual, and to be reduced to/

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to silence concerning values.

Fichte despairs of speaking of the Act (self-consciousness) in terms of being (the object); but he does not for that reason fall silent. He chooses to speak of the Act in terms of itself, or more particularly in terms of the act of one in relation to another, or interaction. This enables him to transcend practical solipsism, and to speak of the subject only after he has first spoken of intersubjectivity. This, as we shall see, has many important logical consequences. Hegel, too, makes this important move, a move we shall have to understand if we are to grasp the game they are playing, and the rules or conventions which give it its particular form. One rule must be observed from the start. Men are not things. Language about men is not the same as language about things. Propositions concerning being ('objective' fact, that which is the case whether or not there is a speaker, a knower, a subject of experience), which if true are true in the sense of corresponding with what is the case (adaequatio or correspondentia intellectus et rei), do not have the same form as propositions concerning the Act. The way we distinguish between them is no easy task to describe. It is, in any case, one of the principle questions this study is concerned to explore. We ought also to explain that when the term 'becoming' is used in the game we are playing, it does not mean 'natural growth', from like to like, but human becoming, the form of  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  in which the paradoxical coalescence of being ( $\tau\omicron\grave{\alpha}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$ ) and not-being ( $\tau\omicron\grave{\alpha}\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$ ) must somehow be expressed. It is the becoming of self-determining freedom (or spirit), of the self-who-acts, that is/

is here being described.

Fichte begins to speak of the Act (self-consciousness) in terms of itself, in intersubjective interaction, as follows: "Man becomes man only amongst men; and since he can only be man, and would not be at all unless he were man, it follows that IF MAN IS TO BE AT ALL, THERE MUST BE MEN" (1). In spite of the non sequitur, and the obvious circularity of this statement, the single proposition: man becomes man only among men, if man is to be at all, there must be men, is full of significance. Fichte argues that this proposition is no arbitrary assumption, nor an opinion based on past experience or on other probability-reasons. It can be deduced from the conception of man. For Fichte, men must be educated to be men (2). It is in communication that man becomes man, it is as one who participates in a fundamental intersubjective interaction that he becomes active self-consciousness. Or in the words of his Wissenschaftslehre of 1801, "No free being becomes conscious of itself without at the same time becoming conscious of other similar beings" (3). The self relates to another self as an equal, yet the other is free, with the result that the equality of self and other is not necessarily, or securely assured. The other may or must restrict my freedom (4). Each treats the other as free, and so restricts his freedom. "No free being can recognize the other as such, unless both thus recognize each other; and no-one can treat the other as a free being, unless both mutually thus treat each other" (5). For Fichte, mutual recognition leads to a common consciousness, which must be expressed in terms of the Act, since "what I think, the other one/ can not know" (6). It is in interaction rather than in the/

1. Ibid pg. 60

2. Ibid pg. 61

3. Wissenschaftslehre pg. 138 quoted Kelly: Idealism, politics and history pg. 223.

4. Science of Right pgs. 65-6

5. Ibid pg. 67

6. Ibid pg. 69

the achieving of a single consciousness, which is necessarily impossible, that we achieve a common mind. But for Fichte "I must assume that all rational beings out-side of me will in all possible cases recognize me as a rational being" (1). The other is "bound or obliged to recognize me categorically", for his recognition is the condition of my self-consciousness. The uniting of opposites into one, in such a way that self and other become self-conscious, is the categorial condition of there being rational, active, self-consciousness. But why is the other obliged to recognize me?

Fichte's analysis remains abstract at this point. By contrast, Hegel gives us a concrete ontological description of an actual (rather than merely formal) struggle for recognition which is, for him, a trial by death. Hegel describes the emergence of a concrete state of affairs of a self who refuses to recognize the other (the Lord: der Herr), and of another who recognizes him, but only out of fear (the slave, der Knecht). Hegel's discussion of the relation of Lord and slave, makes the Lord-slave relation follow from the condition of unequal recognition, a condition which Fichte's notion of formal agreement (or contract) does not allow for. Hegel explores the form of self-consciousness and so of the Act (spirit, self, time, and becoming), with a penetration that Fichte fails to achieve in his thinking. For Fichte, self recognizes self as rational and free; they achieve a common consciousness and so a common law and social harmony, which finds its ultimate expression in a moral community. Fichte's ideal community, in which each individual is fulfilled in acting to achieve a common/

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1. Ibid pg. 70.



and suprasensuality; if it starts out from deed, it stands at the point which connects both worlds and from which it can with one glance comprehend them"(1). It is to Fichte that we owe the deepening of the conception of the Act and the Deed, which Kant had formulated, and which Hegel develops in his philosophy of Geist. And it is to Fichte that we must look if we wish to discover the immediate origins of Hegel's thinking on the subject of self-consciousness as act, and its related conception, the need for recognition. If Hegel avoided Fichte's abstract argument, it was because he had a more profound awareness than Fichte that the life of spirit (rational, self-conscious, negative action) "is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself undefiled by devastation, but is the life that endures and preserves itself in death" (2). If we love life more than freedom, we become, as we shall see in the following discussion of the relation of Lord and slave, the slave who seeks life in life. Reciprocal recognition is costly. It is a kind of death. This Fichte does not appear to have understood.

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1. Wissenschaftslehre quoted Zitta: Lukacs pg. 158

2. P.S. pg. 93.

## CHAPTER VI

## PART I: THE LIFE-DEATH STRUGGLE.

"Self-consciousness is primarily simple existence for self, self-identity, by exclusion of every other from itself. It takes its essential nature and absolute object to be Ego; and in this immediacy, in this bare fact of its self-existence, it is individual". But when "the other is also a self-consciousness, an individual makes its appearance in anti-thesis to an individual. Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are for each other in the manner of ordinary objects" ..... they "have not risen above the bare level of life" .... "They have not yet revealed themselves to each other as existing purely for themselves, i.e. as self-consciousness. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is still without truth". Each must aim "at the destruction and death of the other", each must risk its own life, if they are to bring the "certainty of being for themselves to the level of objective truth .... The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted that they prove themselves and each other through a life-death struggle" (1).

In this extended quotation, Hegel speaks not only of the need for recognition, which we saw in the previous sections to be the condition of assured self-consciousness, but also of what he now calls the struggle of life and death (Kampf auf leben und Tod), by which mere existence, natural existence, becomes existence for self (Fürsichsein). Natural existence is/

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1. Hegel: P.S. pg. 231-2

is a kind of living death, for without that negation of the givenness of nature which distinguishes consciousness from what it is not, there is no freedom of spirit. Man, says Kojève, interpreting Hegel, is not a being who is; he is a nothingness who negates being. The negation of being is action. Freedom of spirit is negativity, and is unactual except in activity, and that means, present only in that negative action which negates the given. Hegel calls this action a "twofold action - action on the part of the other and action on the part of itself" (1). Kojève points out that initially one seeks to be recognized without recognizing in return. For when desire (Begehrde) becomes desire for another man, the initial desire to negate his freedom by making him an object of appropriation becomes the desire for the opposite. It becomes a desire for recognition. But the double irony of the matter is that "they only recognize themselves" as "mutually recognizing one another"; (sie anerkennen sich, als gegenseitig sich anerkennend) (2). They become antagonists in a "trial by death" (3), because, paradoxically, they need one-another to become what they are not yet, but both struggle to become. Man, says Kojève, is able to negate nature, even his own empirical (animal) nature. He can will death, risk his life, for this is his negative being (4). Thus, there is for Kojève, a living interconnection between the following concepts. Work and struggle = Freedom = Time = History = Transience = Nothing = Man. (5).

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1. P.S. pg. 232.
  2. P.S. pg. 231. German ed. pg. 143.
  3. Ibid pg. 233 (english ed.)
  4. Alexandre Kojève: Introduction à la lecture de Hegel Paris 1947 (though delivered at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris between 1933 and 1939 and distributed in mimeographed form during these years). of Commentary on ch. IV of P.S. also pgs. 181, 493-4.
  5. Kelly: Idealism, religion and history pg. 313.

"There must be this struggle", says Hegel, "for they must bring their certainty of themselves, the certainty of being for themselves, to the level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the case of the other and in their own case as well". "It is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained"; (Es ist allein das Daransetzen des Lebens, wodurch die Freiheit bewährt wird), for selbstbewusstsein is not Sein, it is not being or bare existence, or itself in the immediate form in which it appears (1). For the contrary to what is apparently the case to be made manifest, the negativity and freedom of selbstbewusstsein must appear from within the life of its opposite, pure identity, animal life, natural being. "Each must aim at the death of the other, as it risks its own life thereby" (2), and in their trial by death, "cancel their consciousness which had its place in this alien element of natural existence" (3).

Thus, it is by way of conflict, antagonism, and a struggle of life and death, that recognition and affirmation between unproved, natural selves can come about. In recognition, or mutual respect (Anerkennung), a genuine interdependence could emerge, which could have overcome the dependence-independence, life-death dualism. But Hegel argues that the negativity of consciousness in these phases is abstract. The antagonists do not maintain their opposition. Thus, they fall apart. For Hegel, as for Heraclitus, it is opposition which brings things together. When opposition ceases, disintegration and fragmentation occurs. The antagonists fall back into abstract dependence/

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1. P.S. pgs. 232-233
  2. P.S. pg. 233
  3. Ibid pg. 233.

depende on and independence.

In the case of the two antagonists in question, life becomes more previous than their freedom, immediacy than spirit. They become abstract moments (abstrakte Momente). "Their Act", says Hegel, "is abstract negation", and so their active opposition is not genuinely aufgehoben (negated or cancelled, and preserved, sublated or sublimated). The essential point is that each of the antagonists becomes "aware that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness" (1). They choose to return to the stability of immediate, natural life, rather than continue becoming what they are not. They choose to remain what they are, rather than die to what they are, in becoming what they are not. They choose permanence, security, life, nature; rather than negativity, death, freedom and spirit. They "let one another go quite indifferently, like things", says Hegel, rather than continue in the struggle which alone would have driven them beyond this abstract moment toward a living, integrated reciprocity (2). They fall back into "consciousness in the form and shape of thinghood" (3). They become Lord and slave.

Hegel is arguing here that the struggle of life and death does not destroy unity, but constitutes it, a point Heidegger has since made in his discussion of Heraclitus' conceptions of  $\pi \acute{o} \lambda \epsilon \mu \omicron \varsigma$  and  $\Lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma$  in 'An Introduction to Metaphysics' (4). To the common understanding (as for common sense and ordinary language) life is life, death is death, and never the two shall meet; and similarly,  $\acute{\epsilon} \rho \iota \varsigma$  or strife is strife, and  $\Lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma$  is  $\Lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma$ . But for Hegel, as for Heraclitus, the conflict/

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1. P.S. pg. 234.

2. Ibid pg. 234

3. Ibid pg. 234

4. Introduction to Metaphysics (Doubleday Anchor) pg. 51, 105 to 115.

conflict which leads to opposition and antagonism is precisely that which brings the antagonists together. That which scatters gathers. Jesus is reported to have said 'Whoever cares for his own safety is lost; but if a man lose himself for my sake, he will find his true self' (1). To decide to choose life in immediacy, in natural existence, in mere being, is death. The direct way always fails. For true life is to be achieved not in life but in death. If we are unwilling to risk death, or to struggle with the other, we fall back into the death of natural life. We are redeemed from this death not in life but in death. This is THE truth which these two abstract modes of consciousness fail to comprehend. The life of spirit, says Hegel, does not shrink or shun death by keeping itself undefiled by devastation, but is the life that endures death and lives in death. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself dismembered, broken and torn; when it looks the negative in the face and dwells with it (2). The way of spirit is not direct, it is the Umweg, the detour. The truth of spirit is the truth of the concrete whole, not the truth of some abstraction from the whole. Thus, in the words of Marcuse, "the birth of truth requires the death of a given state of being ..... it is not a fact but a task" (3).

It is, of course, obvious that the inhuman, or prehuman existence of man, the reality of man prior to his self-actualization, is not death in the physio-biological sense. It is the death of abstract determinacy, a conditioned, finite, determined, unmovable permanence, in which there is no hope because there is no integration of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be

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1. Matthew Ch. 16, verse 25.
  2. P.S. pg. 93.
  3. Reason and Revolution pg. 26.

in becoming. Man must transcend abstract life, by forsaking being for time and becoming. 'Abstract' for Hegel, means onesided, unmediated, disconnected, finite, static being; Concrete, as its opposite, means many-sided, mediated, integrated, the truth of the Whole, and thus Wholeness and Wholesomeness. Simple existence is abstract, only the actual is truly concrete.

We must also notice, here, that strife for Hegel is beyond good and evil. For Hegel, the life-death struggle is just and right, because it alone brings all things together, and in achieving their living interconnection, coalescence and conjunction, finds the balance between them which alone is just. For Anaximander, conflict, opposition and strife are unjust, and domination must be atoned for by retribution; whereas Heraclitus deliberately contradicts this by saying 'War is common and right, or justice is strife; all things happen by strife and necessity' (1). Once again, Hegel agrees with Heraclitus.

In this discussion of the struggle of life and death, Hegel has in mind not only the division and integration which dialectic alone comprehends, but also the empirical fact of the bellum omnium contra omnes which goes hand in hand with individualistic discrimination, and which Hobbes intended to control in his conception of the Leviathan state. Hegel also has in mind the inherent solipsism of the perspectival nature of immediate experience; for we can never transcend, or reduce, or forget, that there is no experience, and so no world, without an experiencing subject or 'I'. I am always the subject of my experiences;/  
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1. Kirk & Raven: Presocratics Fr. 112 pg. 117ff, Fr. 214 pg. 195ff.

experiences, no-one experiences my experiencing for me. For even if I empathize with another, or learn from another's experience; it is always 'I' who empathize, 'I' who learn. "There is", says Merleau-Ponty "a solipsism rooted in living experience which is quite insurmountable"(1). This is, of course, the age-old problem of other minds. We cannot formulate an adequate discussion of this problem in this study. We ought therefore to say little more than that Hegel's conception of the struggle for recognition in the trial by death entails the view that the other as Ego-subject can never be experienced, for it is only the other as immediate facticity, or as object, that is in principle a possible object of experience. For Hegel, this view is aufgehoben when immediacy is overcome in mediation, for the latter has its implicit τέλος in self-consciousness. This means that solipsism is overcome if the life-death struggle is endured, and a new interdependence of antagonistic Egos, a new reciprocity is born. For in self-consciousness, which is socio-historic rather than natural, and comprehended rather than known, the alienation of the object from the subject is overcome. Substance ceases to be what it is as other than what it is not; substance becomes subject and the self regains itself in an integrated coherence of life and meaning.

We have argued that, for Hegel, all consciousness is perspectival, not because no two consciousnesses can experience the same object-environment from the same place at the same time, though this relates to our discussion, but because consciousnesses appear mutually exclusive even in the sharing of a common, intersubjective/

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1. Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perception pg. 358.

intersubjective truth. Our truth is possible only because it is, first of all, yours or mine. The truth of das absolute Wissen (absolute knowledge) is the truth of all perspectives at the point where they interconnect, the still point around which the truths of the "Bacchanalian whirl" and ecstasy revolve, and without which they would immediately dissolve or collapse (1). The point we must grasp if we are to understand Hegel is that we lose the still point, the *Λόγος* we can trust because it is what it is in a multitude of changing determinations if we lose the movement and the instability of becoming. There is much to be said for Koyré's view that Hegel's note in his Jena lectures of 1803-4 is the truth of his eschatological metaphysic. Geist ist Zeit (2). We must not confuse, as Kelly does in his critique of the Koyré-Kojève interpretation of Hegel, Hegel's notion of Zeit with the conventional category. For Hegel, finite and infinite, eternity and time belong together; they are opposites whose interaction maintains all rational becoming, or actuality (Wirklichkeit). As such, namely in their being aufheben, Zeit takes on a new meaning. It does not mean finitude, but the living unity of finite and infinite in Geist. For Kelly, Zeit has the conventional meaning, and eternal means that which is not temporal. If Hegel were using these concepts in this way, Kelly would indeed be correct to deny that Geist ist Zeit. But Hegel argues that eternity is not that which is not temporal, it is not the logical opposite of time in the sublated, or mediated sense, though of course it is in its immediate sense. Kelly quotes a passage from Hegel's Encyclopaedia which says precisely this.

The Zeit/

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1. P.S. pg. 105.

2. Koyré: Hegel à Jena pg. 449.

The Zeit which is Geist is the coalescence of time and eternity understood as opposites by the common understanding (1).

Hegel's Zeit cannot be divorced from his system of interconnecting concepts, in which every fixed - and in this sense finite, - dualism is aufgehoben, (transformed to become a part of the Whole which encompasses all things). Geist ist Zeit, because it is only at the end what it is in truth. It is not the Alpha, but the Omega of God which encompasses the meaning of our Christian conception of God as the living God.

We continue to clarify this conception of life-death struggle in the next section, by comparing Freud with Hegel on this point.

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1. of. Kelly: Idealism, politics and history:  
Sources of Hegelian Thought 1969, pg. 313ff.

HISTORY AS WHAT MAN DOES WITH DEATH: HEGEL AND FREUD

For Freud, according to Brown (1) "Every thing depends upon establishing the difference, as well as the continuity, between man and the rest of organic life". In the book "Civilisation and its discontents", Freud formulates his view on the matters we have been discussing, and in particular on the contradictions in human nature described in the Phenomenology as a Life-death struggle. Freud's later dualism of the Life-instinct, Eros, and the death-instinct, Thanatos, derives from his study of one of the most fundamental contradictions of human nature, the sado-masochistic complex. (Aggression toward others and toward self). Man both loves and hates, he both loves and seeks to destroy others; he both loves and seeks to destroy himself. Why? Freud's first theory of the instincts suggests that man is basically a loving animal forced by the reality principle to unloving behaviour. According to Brown, (2), Freud eventually rejected this liberal optimistic position that man is inherently good and peaceful, and that his aggressive behaviour is therefore the result of environmental frustrations. He began to realize that environmental frustrations, though important, do not account for man's very aggressive and destructive nature.

So Freud, seeking as always to relate the psychological to the biological, sought to explain the ambivalence between Eros and aggression on the level of instinctual human life, in relation to the fundamental dualism of life and death at the level of organic life. On the biological level, "The goal of all life is death" (3); On the human level there is the fundamental/

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1. Life against Death pg. 99. We owe this exposition of Freud to Norman Brown.
  2. Ibid pg. 98.
  3. Beyond the pleasure principle pg. 50

fundamental dualism of Eros and Thanatos, the life-instinct and the death-instinct. The sado-masochistic complex derives from the death-instinct. He therefore posited a "primary masochism" - the death-instinct, and saw extroverted aggression (sadism) as an extroverted death instinct. Freud's biological dualism is thus formulated in such a way as to explain both sadistic and masochistic aggressiveness and destructiveness; the death instinct was the principle behind both.

Freud suggests, according to Brown, that neurosis is a human privilege, because the conflicts between the life and death instincts which cause neurosis do not exist at the organic level. There is a dialectical unity of life and death at the biological level; death is a part of life, the goal of all life is death (1). Neurosis is flight from death, as well as flight from life and sexuality. Animals live with death as a part of life. It is man's flight from death that makes him man (Unamuno) (2). Man's aggression toward others is a fusion of the life and death instincts which saves man from the self-destructive power of the death-instinct. A desire to kill replaces a desire to die. It is this principle of the death-instinct which, for Brown, links psychology to history, and incidentally Freud to Hegel (3).

Brown rightly argues that Hegel tried to find the essence of man not in thinking but in human desires and human suffering. Our exposition of the Phenomenology bears this out very clearly. The first of Hegel's attempts to find the essence of man found it in Love, Eros; the second, that in the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'./

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1. Brown Ibid pg. 100
  2. Tragic Sense of Life pgs. 20 and 41.
  3. Brown Ibid pg. 101.

Spirit', in death. It was only in this second attempt that Hegel was able to grasp man as essentially a history-making creature. To have a history means to have a being whose existence is not essence; it means that history is what man does with death (1).

Freud suggests that the aggressive drive to master nature and to master man is the result of an extroverted death-instinct. The desire to die has been transformed into the desire to kill, destroy or dominate. Hegel postulates, says Brown, a transformation of the consciousness of death into a struggle to appropriate the life of another human being at the risk of one's own life. This, as we shall see in a moment, becomes the dialectic of Lord and Slave. Similarly, argues Brown, Hegel's other fundamental category of history, human work of labour is a transformation of the negativity or nothingness of death into the extroverted action of negating or changing nature. Time, for Hegel is what man makes out of death. The dialectic of history is the dialectic of time; time is negativity, and negativity is extroverted death. Brown acknowledges a large debt to Kojève's interpretation of Hegel in his 'Introduction à la lecture de Hegel' (2). Kojève argues, as we have seen elsewhere, that for Hegel, man does not have a "human nature" once and for all. Man is a nothingness which negates, as Time in spatial being. Man is not identical with himself; he is at odds with himself; he is a contradiction. Man, for Hegel, is sick. His being becomes what it is only through the negation, or transformation, of the given on the basis of a future which is not yet. The future is nothingness (project):/

1. Ibid pg. 102

1. Kojève Ibid pgs. 11-34, 364-80, 490-513, 527-73.

(project); actualized only through action (Tat), struggle (kampf) and work (Arbeit) (1).

Merleau-Ponty agrees with Kojève that freedom, in Hegel, is freedom for death, but warns us that this is not primary. Man's being, says Merleau Ponty, is a being which is not, a nothing which can deny and so become aware of things, an existence without an essence (2). But the consciousness of death which discloses this to me is really a consciousness of life (3). Domination, sadism and violence destroy themselves just as consciousness of death goes beyond itself. I become aware of death in the life-death struggle with the other, for Merleau-Ponty as for Hegel, but consciousness of self as death and nothingness are deceitful, since they both contain an affirmation of being and of life. Similarly, - and we have discussed these points in full elsewhere - the death of self as subject in the other's gaze cannot but re-affirm the subject who experiences the gaze, and my gazing at him re-affirm his subjectivity. "I live not for death but forever, not for myself alone but for other people", concludes Merleau-Ponty (4).

Brown argues that Hegel (and therefore Merleau-Ponty) needs reformulation in the light of psycho-analysis. It is not consciousness of death that is transformed into aggression, the will to live and to dominate others, it is the unconscious death-instinct (5). Eros and Thanatos, the pleasure principle and the Nirvana principle, cause a dynamic restless striving in man because man, unlike the animals, does not have a balanced equilibrium of tension and release between them.

#### Repression/

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1. Kojève ibid pg. 175 cf. also pp. 12, 30, 167, 178, 532 cf. Rabil: Merleau-Ponty pg. 78.
  2. Merleau Ponty: Sense and Nonsense pg. 66.
  3. Ibid pg. 68.
  4. Sense and Nonsense pg. 70.
  5. Brown Ibid pg. 102.

Repression causes an instinct-determined fixation to the repressed past; and so produces the effort to recover the past. Man's historicity, according to Brown's interpretation of Freud, cannot be fully understood without this idea of fixation to the past. The refusal to grow old is the point of contact between fixation to the past and repression of death. Repression produces unconscious fixation to the infantile past; both death and life instincts are forced into repression. Repression of life means that life cannot affirm death (as it does on the organic level); it must fly from death. Death can only affirm itself and life by denying life.

Brown's exposition of Freud's three forms of death, the Nirvana principle, the repetition-compulsion (fixation to the past) and the sado-masochistic complex suggests that Hegel's philosophy of death lacks integration with the organic aspects of man's nature, because for Freud it is the destruction of the biological unity of life and death which forces the Nirvana principle into the pleasure principle, the repetition compulsion into fixation to an infantile past, death instinct into aggressive negativity (1). On the other hand, Hegel does say that "the nature of finite things as such is to have the seed of passing away as their essential being: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death" (2). The question raised here is the relation between the death of the human organism and the "thought of death" which Kierkegaard understood with such penetration in his discourse on the decisiveness of death at the side of a grave (3). If Freud is right that at the biological/

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1. Brown Ibid pg. 104
  2. Hegel: Science of Logic I pg. 142 (Johnstone & Struthers translation).
  3. Kierkegaard: pg. 75-115 of Thoughts on crucial situations in human life.

biological level death is a part of life and is not opposed to it, and that this ought to be the case for man, but is not because man represses and flees from death, then what man may be yearning for is some kind of biological unity, a return to organic equilibrium. To discuss whether this is the case or not would take too long, and anyway falls outside the scope of this preliminary comment on Hegel's notion of death.

We shall return again to this question of whether a dualism of life and death, in which they are set apart as mutually exclusive opposites, or a dialectic, in which they are gathered together in Resurrection, is more in accord with the unapparent Truth (Wahrheit: ἀληθεία) of our ongoing experience of things. To answer it, our discussion appears to transcend the now sacred boundary between faith and knowledge which Kant so ably re-enforced, and which others have often uncritically and slavishly endorsed. It does so not out of blasphemous pride, but because the incarnation of the Λόγος of God entails a gathering, rather than a scattering, of what appears self-evidently divorced. Faith and knowledge come together when they accord with the Λόγος ; they become a knowing faith, and a faithful knowledge, a living harmony (ἁρμονία) in which they become the "thinking which comprehends" (Vernunft: Das begreifende denken). ὁ Λόγος brings not peace but a sword, only because it is in him that all things gather. If we are to begin with the Word made flesh, as Hegel does, then our faith must think what this means with a reasoning which accords with it, rather than with a reasoning which accords to external norms. It must also be with a reasoning which proceeds in the freedom and confidence of faith. It is true that Hegel's attempt to unite/

unite faith and knowledge in a reason which encompasses both, while retaining their creative distinction and opposition, was dissolved by almost every thinker from Marx to Kierkegaard; but does this dissolution still stand as valid? Can its consequences, such as the rigid dualism of life and death, adequately express anything more sure than our subjective opinion? It is with Truth, not opinion, that we ought to be dealing in our *fides quaerens intellectum*. If both natural life, and the desolation of death were brought together and transcended in the resurrected, all-encompassing life of the incarnate  $\Lambda\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , then the thinking which gathers these opposites together (Dialectic) is surely more in accord with the Truth. In that case, dialectic will be for us, as it was for Hegel, the most faithful and the most knowledgeable - and so the most reasonable - way of comprehending THE truth, in and through the many truths and untruths, the many correct and incorrect opinions, thoughts and attitudes with which men have sought to understand the gods, their world, and God. To deny knowledge to make room for faith may make a reasonable faith impossible. We must surely deny the ultimate validity of the opposition between faith and knowledge if we are to comprehend what we believe and what we know. Hegel was as sure as Kant that we do not reason in order to know, and as sure as Kierkegaard that we do not reason in order to believe, for our knowledge begins with experience, and our belief with the  $\Lambda\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of God. We reason, on the contrary, in order to comprehend what we know and believe. If the self both knows and believes, and nonetheless seeks to retain his integrity (the wholeness and health of an undivided self-consciousness), then he must learn to use Hegel's ladder by which he/

he may climb toward an integrated comprehension both of what he knows and of what he believes. He must surely learn the strange dialectical speech of Hegel's Logic of Geist (Spirit).

## CHAPTER VII

## PART 1:

## THE LORD-SLAVE RELATION

The struggle for recognition (Kampf des Anerkennens) becomes the relation of lordship and servitude (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft) when one of the antagonists renounces his claim for recognition, choosing natural life rather than negativity and freedom, and the other, the conqueror, refuses to recognize him, but uses him, instead, as a means to an end, the end being self-recognition, being-for-self. (Fürsichsein). The former, the slave, falls back from the psychological and social trial by death into immediate life, or purely natural, biological existence. He seeks life in and through life, rather than in death. He recoils from negativity, and loses his freedom as a result. He chooses the stable positivity of being, rather than the creative negativity of becoming. The Lord gains rightful mastery over the slave by having risked his life; his life is a life in death. The Lord achieves self-recognition and so assured self-existence in the slave's recognition of him as his Lord. He becomes for-himself (Für sich, or in French translation pour-soi) what he is in-himself (An sich - En soi)

The life-death struggle has ended. The victor and the vanquished take their place as stable modes of being, belonging to an ordered psychological or social structure. At this moment or stage in their becoming, the scene appears to be at rest. The Lord is Lord, the slave is slave. Lords are not slaves, neither are slaves Lords. Indeed, they are opposites. A = A. A is not both A and not A. Everything is what it is and not/

not another thing. We know where we are; there is order, there are facts which cannot be denied. Only the deranged confuse Lords and slaves, only the philosophers choose not to discriminate between what are so obviously dissimilar.

Common sense, speaking ordinary language according to its rules and conventions, distinguishes between Lords and slaves. In this vein, Hegel writes: The Lord (or master) is the consciousness that exists for itself (Der Herr ist das für sich seiende Bewusstsein) (1). As such he is independent. Whereas the slave is natural, unmediated, conditioned life; he is dependent, being for another (das sein für ein Anderes). Der Herr, the Lord or Master, relates to der Knecht, the slave, by way of two moments; the slave is an object of the Lord's desire, a thing; and he is the sine qua non of the Lord's self-recognition. Kojève remarks that the Lord will never be satisfied, for the slave's recognition is that of an enslaved consciousness, it is not free (2). The Lord relates himself to the slave directly, but to nature indirectly (3). He is independent (selbständig) in their immediate relation, for he has the slave in his chains. But when he sets the slave to work (Arbeit) it becomes apparent that he is dependent (unselbständig) upon him for the transformation of natural raw material (alien reality, the given) into a human world (the product of human work). The Lord holds the slave in compulsive subordination, but the slave is necessary to the Lord as the one who mediates between him and nature. But Lords are still unselbständige and slaves are slaves, they are unselbständige.

Hegel/

1. P.S. 1952 Hoffmeister edition. Baillie pg. 234.
2. Pgs. 51-64 discussion of Lord-slave, stoicism, scepticism, and unhappy consciousness Kojève: Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: delivered 1933-39, published 1947.
3. P.S. pg. 235.

Hegel is not trying to describe or explain certain social and psychological facts. His purpose is not to achieve a more adequate knowledge of the facts as they are. The Phenomenology is not a conventional investigation. It is true that Hegel begins with fact, with the facts as they are already known. It is a fact that there does not appear to have been a time when men have not enslaved one-another. The Lord-slave dualism is also an important logical category of all social theory. It is a fact that the individual is divided, that reason has been conceived both as slave of the passions (Hume) and as Lord of the passions (Kant), that a Lord-slave dualism is a psychological as well as a social fact. The Lord-slave dualism encompasses both the socio-historic and the psychological (individual) dimensions of human existence. There is an opposition between Herrschaft and Knechtschaft, Lordship and servitude, which social and psychological theory correctly describes. But Hegel is arguing that however considerable our correctness (Richtigkeit - ὀρθότης), however well our propositions accord both with the facts and with conventional usage, there are reasons for recognizing or comprehending that correctness hides as well as reveals THE Truth (Wahrheit - ἀλήθεια). Thus his intention in this dialectical account is to disclose the Truth which hides itself even in correct opinions, and correct propositions, concerning Lordship and servitude. We have learned in the course of our previous discussion that Hegel's phenomenology is not analytical but dialectical. Analysis (ἀνάλυσις), means to set apart, separate, discriminate, divide, spread out or dissolve. Analysis is the method of the common understanding, whether it be critical of the conventions of ordinary language usage or not, when/

when it achieves philosophical articulation. Dialectical reason, on the other hand, recognizes that a correct proposition may be untrue if it is asserted or expressed in such a way that it becomes clear that there is no adequate comprehension of the living connections, or common measure, or ongoing development of the Whole, of which the proposition is an integral part if it is even partially correct. Dialectic gathers, in notions like alienation (Entfremdung), or Absolute Geist (Absolute spirit) and Daseinender Geist (Existing, finite spirit), what is conventionally set apart. We see dialectic in action in the treatment of what appears to be an absolute, truncated dualism, whether of a bifurcated society, or of a divided consciousness, in the following discussion. Hegel's notions of alienation and spirit encompass both the psychological and the social or historical dimensions of human-being, the internal and the external. His psychology of development (Bildungsroman) is through and through historical. It can be understood only if we begin to think dialectically.

Hegel describes the Lord as the one who has overcome his own nature in his overcoming and enslaving the other; yet the natural world remains untouched by him, it remains alien and hostile. It is the slave who through struggle and work becomes master of the natural world, even though he is not master of his own nature. The Lord is master of his own and the slave's nature, but although, as Kojève reminds us, the Lord can die as a man, risk his life in the struggle of life and death; he lives as an animal. The Lord fights and is willing to die like a man, but consumes like an animal, without having worked to satisfy his appetites and desires. The master lives in a human, historic world, the slave in the natural world. The slave mediates, through/

through negative action and work, between nature and spirit, natural existence and history, the organic and biological and the social and psychological. The master's satisfaction is not secure, his being-for-self is one-sided, abstract. He enjoys the products of his slave's work, but his independence is quite obviously at the expense of the slave. So the Lord is dependent upon the slave. He cannot be satisfied. But his dissatisfaction is twofold. Because the slave is not free to recognize the master, but recognizes him out of fear and anxiety, the master's self-recognition is not fulfilled. "A form of recognition has arisen that is one-sided and unequal", says Hegel. "Just where the master has effectively achieved Lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent but a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. He is thus not assured of self-existence (being-for-self: Fürsichsein, être-pour-soi) as his truth; he finds that his truth is rather the unessential consciousness" (i.e. the one who is bound to nature, positivity, the slave) (1).

The slave is the truth of the Lord. What does Hegel mean? He means that the Lord is slave of the slave. Lords are not in truth what they appear to be. The facts deceive, they are not true, they are not worthy of whole-hearted trust. We may speak of the Lord with perfect correctness, but unless our correctness, and our apparent certainty is qualified in dialectical comprehension, our correctness and our certainty will become divorced from truth (Wahrheit). To assert that a particular proposition is true or correct (Richtigkeit), or to have a correct knowledge of a fact, is no guarantee that we have comprehended/

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1. P.S. pgs. 236-7.

comprehended Truth. Correct opinion does not have the freedom to "sink into and pervade the content" (1). Lord and slave are opposites; but contrary to what appears, opposites cohere, they interconnect, they fuse into one another. The content is living. It becomes. There is a living unity in the becoming ( $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ ) of ongoing experience, between coming-to-be (Hegel's dynamic reformulation of the abstraction  $\tau\omicron\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$  : being), and ceasing to be (his reformulation of the term  $\tau\omicron\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$  : not-being). If we allow our thinking to relax into the freedom of dialectical Reason, we shall notice this in the case of the relation of Lord and slave. Lords are Lords, and slaves are slaves.  $A = A$ .  $A$  is not both  $A$  and not  $A$ . This is the first moment. But knowledge is not comprehension, nor hearing heeding, nor seeing noticing, nor understanding (Verstand) Reason (Vernunft). Reason comprehends the hidden connection between the Lord and the slave, the co-inherence of the one in the other, which is missed by those who remain bound to the fixations of common sense, and to the unexamined assumptions of the conventions of ordinary language. It may be correct to say that a Lord is a Lord and not something else, and certainly not a slave. Hegel has no quarrel with correctness as such, for it has validity in its particular frames of reference. But correctness is not Truth. A correct opinion is true in so far as it is asserted with the awareness that it is not the whole Truth, but a part of the Whole. A correct opinion is untrue when it claims to be the Whole Truth, and not a part.

Hegel describes the dialectical transformation of the apparent opposition of Lord and slave as follows: We must bear in/

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1. P.S. pg. 116-7; Kaufmann transl. pgs: 440-442.

in mind that Herrschaft and Knechtschaft are not concepts ( $\nu\omicron\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ ), which are fixed and inflexible, divorced from concrete content. They are living, concrete forms ( $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$   $\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\lambda$ ), forms united with content, flexible and capable of comprehending  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ , temporality, the becoming of all being. "Just as Lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so, too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness repressed into itself, and change around into real and true independence" (1). The slave appears at first to be being-for-another, a reduced existence, void of all transcendence. The slave fell from negativity to static positivity, from spirit to nature, from transcendence to identity and immediacy, and so his consciousness appeared to have the "essential character of thinghood" (2). By choosing life in life, rather than life in death, the slave alienates himself from his essential negativity, he is a tool in the hand of his Lord, an instrument of his Lord's Will.

But, says Hegel, we have been looking at the slave only from the point of view of the Lord (3). This is a valid perspective, a partial truth, a stage or moment which must not be forgotten. But the slave is man, he is a self-consciousness. Bondage has within itself the truth of pure negativity (Allein sie hat diese Wahrheit der reinen negativität) and being-for-self (Fürsichsein). The slave fears death. It is not some particular thing he fears at a particular moment of time, but the angst of absolute nothingness. The slave, says Hegel, "has been in that experience (of the nothing of death) melted to its inmost soul, has/

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1. P.S. pg. 237.
  2. P.S. pg. 235.
  3. Ibid pg. 237.

has trembled throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within it. This complete perturbation of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its stability into fluent continuity is however the simple ultimate nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity (die absolute Negativität), pure self-referrent, self-recognizing being-for-self (das reine Fürsichsein) (1).

Anest drives the slave to work, and in work, he negates his "dependence on and attachment to natural existence" (2). In work, (Arbeit), the slave transcends his natural life, and once again grasps that life in death which is truly human. The immediacy of life in life, the undialectical immanence of organic life, is negated in him, and his natural passivity overcome. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom", because fear drives the slave to work, and "through work and labour, the consciousness of the slave comes to itself" (3). Desire, in the Lord, which is essentially unproductive, and incapable of transcending animal existence, becomes labour in the slave. "Labour", says Hegel, "shapes and fashions the thing" (4). Arbeit bildet. The slave's negative action causes the negativity of self-consciousness to pass into the form of the object, the object becomes the human product, the thing becomes a deed. The slave becomes self-conscious in work, by negating the way things are. The slave becomes himself by opposing and negating the facts. Where he had once trembled, he now labours. In contrast to what we might say of the slave from the Lord's point of view, we might say of him from his own point of view, that labour is a death in life and a life in death which transcend nature/

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1. Ibid pg. 237. Hoffmeister 148.
  2. Ibid pg. 238.
  3. P.S. pg. 238.
  4. Ibid pg. 238.

nature and gives birth to Geis (spirit). Or in the words of Simone Weil, "Manual labour is time entering the body. Through work man turns himself into matter, as Christ does through the Eucharist. Work is like death. We have to pass through death. We have to be killed - to endure the weight of the world. Work is like a death, if it is without an incentive. We have to act, renouncing the fruit of action" (1). The slave works, but the fruit of his labours, the product, belongs by right to the Lord. The slave's self-consciousness actualized in what he does, is alienated in that both he and his product belong to another. Acting is negativity, for Hegel, (2), for activity is formative (3), it opposes a given reality and shapes it in accordance with the will of the agent (*homo agens*). In his critique of capitalism and bourgeois individualism entitled 'self-conscious individuals associated as a community of animals and the deception thence arising: die sache selbst' (4), Hegel argues that "An individual cannot know what he is till he had made himself actual by action", (*Das Individuum kann daher nicht wissen, was es ist, eh es sich durch das Tun zur Wirklichkeit gebracht hat*) (5). Marx correctly observes that "Hegel conceives labour as man's act of self-creation", (6), and Kojève tirelessly stresses the notion of negative action inherent in all Hegel's interconnected concepts of Work, Reason, Spirit, Freedom and Time. "Man", says Kojève, "is not a being who is; he is nothingness which negates being. The negation of being is action" (7). As the negation of the given, freedom cannot be possessed/

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1. Gravity and Grace pg. 160.
  2. P.S. pg. 420.
  3. P.S. pg. 240.
  4. P.S. pg. 419ff.
  5. P.S. pg. 422. Hoffmeister pg. 287.
  6. Early Manuscripts pg. 213.
  7. Introduction a la lecture de Hegel 1947, pgs. 181, 493, etc.

possessed. It "is" only in action. The being of freedom is the negation of being. Jean Hyppolite's commentary on this and related passages draws heavily on Kojève's introduction, as on Jean Wahl's study of "Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel" (1929) (1). For Wahl, Hegel's uniting of the concepts of negativity, freedom, subjectivity and the process of Aufhebung, is an effort to rationalize a depth that reason does not attain. "What was there originally, at the bottom of the soul of the author of the Logic was a Christian vision of the Cross, and a Boehmian vision of the anger of God" (2). For Wahl, as for Hyppolite, the division of Lord and slave, both in society and in consciousness, is a recurring theme throughout the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'. We shall speak about its relation to Marx in another section. Herzen called Hegel's Logic the "algebra of revolution", and Marcuse remarks that Hegel's contemporaries called his philosophy a "negative philosophy" with good reason (3). Hess called Hegel's philosophy "a critique of everything that was hitherto held to be the objective truth" (4). Hegel's philosophy negates things as they are, it is Reason which contains, as Stahl said, 'the principle of revolution'. The positivists, says Marcuse, reacted against Hegel's principle of negativity and revolution. Their orientation toward matters of fact, and to experience of the facts, entails their "giving up the real potentialities of mankind for a false world", in a "world where facts do not at all present what reality can and ought to be" (5). Kojève, who had/

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1. Jean Hyppolite: Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de Hegel Paris 1946
  2. Le malheur de conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel 1929 pg. 95, note 1, and pg. 143.
  3. Reason and Revolution pgs. 26f, 325f.
  4. Ibid pg. 325.
  5. Ibid pgs. 113 and 327.

had written a dissertation of Solovyev's philosophy, stressing its philosophy of history (1), was able to revive Hegel's negative philosophy in France in the 1930's, connecting the Hegelianism of Solovyev and his predecessors among the Russian slavophiles such as Ivan Kireyevsky and Alexis Khomiakov, with that of Marx (or the young Marx of the Early Manuscripts of 1844), and synthesising these with Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger's existentialism, and psycho-analytic thinking. Kojève's was a brilliant achievement. He lectured at the École des Hautes Études in Paris between 1933 and 1939, (he took over the course began in 1931 by another Russian Alexandre Koyré, whose work, "Hegel à Iéna", we have already mentioned). Wilfred Desan tells us that "Sartre learned to study Hegel in the classes of Kojève just before world war II" (2). Rabil doubts this, as Sartre does not mention Kojève in 'Being and Nothingness' and Simone de Beauvoir says she began to read the 'Phenomenology' in July, 1940, and does not mention Kojève in her autobiography (3). However, Sartre is overwhelmingly indebted to Hegel both for the terminology and for the subject-matter of large parts of 'Being and Nothingness', and the terms he uses are those Kojève translated in the course of these introductory lectures on Hegel (4). Marcuse has argued that 'Being and Nothingness' is in large measure a restatement of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit' and Heidegger's 'Being and Time' (5), though, as we shall see, Sartre's early truncated, irredeemable dualism of Pour-soi (Hegel's für sich) en-soi (Hegel's an sich) is radically opposed to/

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1. Phenomenology and Existentialism ed. Lee and Mandelbaum: Kline's essay pg. 119.
  2. W. Desan: The Marxism of J. P. Sartre, pg. 52.
  3. Rabil: Merleau-Ponty: Philosopher of Social World pg. 79.
  4. of. Kline's essay: Rediscovery of Hegel and Marx in 'Phenomenology and Existentialism ed. Lee and Mandelbaum pg. 125.
  5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research VIII 1947-8 pg. 311.

to Hegel's dialectical synthesis of the two in An-und-fürsichsein (Être-en-soi-pour-soi). Merleau-Ponty and Hyppolyte both attended Kojève's courses, and the former had close personal contact with Kojève (1). This lively interaction between philosophical interpreters of Hegel has considerable relevance to our discussion of the Lord-slave relation. We can already see disagreement over the question of whether redemption from a fixated Lord-slave dualism, or liberation from the life-death struggle is possible in principle. For Merleau-Ponty, the dualism is overcome in every act of perception in the lived world prior to the abstract dualism of <sup>subject-object</sup> ~~subject-object~~; for the early Sartre, the Cartesian dualism is insurmountable. We have touched on this important discussion of Hegel, and especially of the Lord-slave relation at this point, recalling that in France the problems with which we have to deal here have been the heart of a lively exchange between philosophers, social and psychological theorists, and theologians.

The interpretations of Hegel inspired or influenced by Kojève have, however, recently come under attack in the English-speaking world. G. A. Kelly accused the Kojève-inspired readings of Hegel of a tendency to "distort Lordship-Bondage in the total Hegelian structure" (2). For Kelly, these readings ignore the subjective or psychological dimension of the Lord-slave relation, and they lay too much stress upon the social and historical dimension so ably taken up by Karl Marx in his early manuscripts (1844). Kelly notes that Plamenatz follows the Kojève interpretation as though it were established or self-evident (3).  
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1. Spiegelberg: The Phenomenological Movement Vol II pg. 530.
  2. Review of Metaphysics XIX 1965-6; Exploration: Notes on Lordship-Bondage pg. 780-802.
  3. Man and Society chs. 3 and 4 of Vol. II. See pgs. 129-268 and especially pp. 154-196.

Kelly believes that Kojève's repeated dictum that the future belongs with the slave is "an unwarranted and romanticized refraction of Hegel's thought" (1). For where did Hegel say that the future belongs with the slave? We shall try to avoid some of the most obvious pitfalls that lie in the way of answering this question. For we could soon find ourselves falling behind one or another opposing ideology, unable to see the living connections between them. Kelly is aware of the long history of broken communication between the so-called followers of Marx on the one hand, (the future lies with the slaves), and Nietzsche on the other, (the future lies with the Lords). Or as Fessard puts it, Marx's impoverishment of the dialectic of Hegel leads in its turn to the rise of its opposite, Fascism (2). Whilst those who know the work of Marx and Nietzsche will be aware of the tenuous relationship between them and present-day communism and fascism, Kelly's warning that the "delicate balance" between Lord and slave in the dialectic ought not to be disturbed has considerable significance for our political thinking today. Hegel's argument is surely that the Lord is the slave of the slave and the slave the Lord of the Lord, contrary to all appearances. Kelly wishes to argue that the slave and the Lord both create history, the future is shared by both of them, for the slave can only invent history after the Lord has made humanity possible (3). Marx says something very like this when he criticizes crude communism.

Another point Kelly argues is pertinent to our discussion here. He says that democracy and slavery were closely associated/

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1. Notes on Lordship-Bondage pgs. 799-802.
  2. Lichtlein: Marxism in modern France pgs: 106-7.  
of. Kelly: Idealism, Politics and History pg. 339
  3. Idealism, Politics and History pg. 338.

associated in Hegel's mind. The paradox, as Hegel saw it, (according to Kelly) was that Antiquity had genuinely sought to understand the extent and significance of man's self-alienation and enslavement, yet sanctioned slavery as an essential foundation for democracy, (there could be no 'beautiful antiquity' for Hegel); and the enlightenment had attacked social and political enslavement but failed to notice the spiritual, psychological, and philosophical dimension of self-alienation and enslavement. Kelly is suggesting that we see Hegel as one who stands where the social and historical dimensions of alienation meet the psychological dimensions of the divided consciousness. It is interesting to note that Hegel treats the believing Christian as an example of the divided consciousness, indeed the example par excellence of the two-world dislocation which alienates man, and at the same time speaks of the Christian λόγος as the one in whom alienation is overcome. The λόγος connects what is divided, whether it be social or psychological, external or internal. He is trying to show how the impasse of the former is overcome by way of the unweg or detour of spirit, and the latter in the emergence of intersubjective reason and self-integration. His dialectic has a distinctively Heraclitean ring whilst at the same time moves within the great themes of slavery, redemption and freedom which constitute the essential structure of the ongoing life of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. What the conventional Christian attitude fails to grasp, namely, that every division which leads to alienation is re-integrated in the Christian λόγος, Hegel seeks to comprehend. For beside the Truth of the λόγος, the attitudes of the Greeks and the Christians or of the Jewish and /

and the enlightenment world-views appear blind and uncomprehending. Each fails in his own way to comprehend the Λόγος or the "Bezriff".

Hegel's purpose, here, is philosophical. He is not offering formal definitions of Lordship, slavery or freedom, nor is he connecting concepts of the understanding. He is not drawing our attention to new facts either. Rather, he is trying to show us how a new account of the facts we all already know throws a new and strange light over everything, enabling us to comprehend what we had known but failed to notice, or what we had assumed but failed to examine. He is concerned neither with knowing nor proving, but with comprehending what we know and prove. To comprehend means, for Hegel, to see and to act in accordance with the Christian Λόγος.

Hegel is saying something which is deceptively simple, and which it would appear we already know. He is saying that despite all the difference between Lord and slave, despite their antagonism, both are man. Both are implicitly free, and both are inherently spirit. Indebted to Schelling and the Schlegel's, Fichte had postulated, according to Kelly, a dualism of 'normals' and 'savages' as an a priori of history. All men are not in principle equal. Kelly writes: "Since Hegel believes that the phenomena of mastery and slavery result necessarily from the struggles of awareness and recognition within the Ego, and not from the absolute opposition of racial principles embodied in discrete historical individuals, he is defending a doctrine of original equality curiously denied by Fichte" (1). For Hegel, reason alone can comprehend that in principle all men are free, in/

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1. Kelly: Idealism, Politics and History pg. 241-2 and 340.

in principle all men are spirit, for reason alone is dialectical. Dialectic, here, uncovers a common measure between the many separate distinctions and determinations which divide men from one another, and shows how it is a stronger connection than the conventional connections of like to like, and the conventional distinctions between like and unlike. But if all men are one in their common freedom, their common equality, why are some still slaves? Kant had said that "no-one is a slave, but the man who wills to be one, and only so long as he wills" (1). The slave becomes a slave, for Hegel, by choosing to give way to his fear of death, which means he chooses not to risk his life to gain respect and recognition. In the 'Philosophy of Right', Hegel argues that, "if a man is a slave, his own will is responsible for his slavery, just as it is its will which is responsible if a people is subjugated. Hence the wrong of slavery lies at the door not simply of enslavers or conquerors but of the slaves and the conquered themselves. Slavery occurs in man's transition from the state of nature to genuinely ethical conditions; it occurs in a world where a wrong is still right. At that stage wrong has validity and so is necessarily in place" (2).

Hegel is here saying that slavery is wrong, though a necessary stage in man's development from nature to spirit. He is not saying that slavery is right because it is necessary. He is not saying that because it is real it is rational. He is saying that though slavery is wrong, it was a necessary moment of becoming. He is not saying that good and evil are the same, but that goodness belongs with evil in life, which means/

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1. Kant: Religion within the limits of reason alone pg. 76
  2. Hegel: Philosophy of Right 36 Para 57, pg. 239

means that if the good is not to remain merely a pure ideal, it will become actual only in living relation with evil. This is what is 'necessary'.

Man, for Hegel, is not by nature in possession of himself. He must take possession of himself, lay hold of what he is capable of becoming, and transform what he potentially is into actuality. This is what Hegel means by begreifen, to 'comprehend'. By nature, man is external to his Begriff; which means that he is not by nature in possession of himself, or self-conscious. One can justify slavery only by regarding man as a purely natural existence (1). The argument against slavery rests, says Hegel, on the notion (Begriff) of man as spirit, as inherently free. But to argue in this way is, says Hegel, to confuse immediacy with truth. Man is not immediately, or naturally free. Freedom is his truth, and truth is his task, the  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  of his work and struggle. Slavery is a false, comparatively primitive phenomenon which befalls man when "mind is only at the level of consciousness".(2). It is a form of alienation because the slave is not in actuality what he is potentially. "Herein lies the possibility of the alienation of personality and substantive being, whether this alienation occurs unconsciously or intentionally" (3).

We have already begun to explore the notion of the alienation of substance from subject in Hegel, and with it the notion of enslavement in this chapter. Hegel gives examples of the alienation of the kind of 'substance' he calls "personality": "Slavery, serfdom, disqualification from holding property/

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1. Philosophy of Right, pg. 48. Para 57.
  2. Ibid pg. 48.
  3. Ibid, Par. 66, pg. 53.

property, encumbrances on property, etc." "Alienation of intelligence and rationality", says Hegel, or of "morality, ethical life and religion, is exemplified in superstition, in ceding to someone else full power and authority to fix and prescribe what actions are to be done" .... etc. It is clear that to comprehend (begreifen), in Hegel's sense of the word, is to become responsible for one's actions, master of one's personality, in possession of oneself in every thought and deed. Hegel tells us that to comprehend is to gain possession of being in negative action. "The Act whereby I take possession of my personality, of my substantive essence, and make myself a responsible being, capable of possessing rights and with a moral and religious life, takes away from these characteristics of mine just that externality which alone made them capable of passing into the possession of someone else" (1). Alienation, on this account, is overcome in the actualization of potentiality. This means it is overcome when subject, the intentional self, encompasses substance so that all alien externality is negated. When subject comprehends substance, it includes it in the comprehensiveness of notional reciprocity. The object as 'that which is thrown in the way', becomes that which helps me on my way, an extension of the intentional subject. In this way the uneasy opposition of subject and object in the alienation of substance from subject, is transformed into a lively reciprocal interaction and inter-connection between subject and object. This is the meaning of Hegel's notion of selbstbewusstsein.

It will be a help to see this by contrasting it with the problems/

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1. Philosophy of Right, Para 57, pg. 53

problems of isolation, which the almost solipsist individualism of so many in our time, has created. In doing this, we anticipate our treatment of the problems Hegel raises in his phenomenological description of the stoic, sceptic and Unhappy Consciousness. We have shown, in previous chapters, how what Merleau-Ponty calls the "insurmountable solipsism" of every experience is qualified for Hegel as it was for him, by the common measure (Λόγος) between man and man. We have seen that this Λόγος is both the hidden condition and the goal of the Lord-slave relation in the multitude of its phenomenal instances, and of the continuing life-death struggle by which the intentional self regains possession of its substance in self-consciousness. The true contrary of self-consciousness is not natural or animal consciousness, as might appear. It is isolation, separation and loneliness. Self-consciousness is ethical, social, and intersubjective; consciousness is pre-self-conscious rather than its contrary. In a critical essay on Dostoevsky, Lukács argues that "isolation, separation and loneliness reduces the relation among men to a struggle for superiority or inferiority". "By this solitude, by this immersion of the subject in itself, the self becomes bottomless ..... I, you, all men, disappear, turn into shadows, exist only subsumed under the 'idea'" (1). The lonely man appears completely dependent on himself, living so deeply and intensely within himself that another person remains forever an "unknown country" to him. "The other man is to (such men) a strange and menacing power which either subjugates them or becomes subject to them" (2). Here we discover that even the social relation/

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1. Lukács: Dostoevsky in Collection of Critical essays on Dostoevsky ed. by René Wellek pg. 150-151.
  2. Ibid pg. 150

relation of Lord-slave is lost, and the primitive domination - subordination of the life-death struggle returns. But it is now not a transition moment, but a permanent and desperate impasse. There is a complete incongruity between action and soul in the lonely man, according to Lukács. We shall see Hegel's account of this condition when we come to the stoic-sceptic. For Lukács this incongruity becomes a "panic fear of being ridiculous". Such men "are constantly aware of this incongruity" (1). The more extreme the individualism, the more such a man loses himself in an inner void, out off from a meaningful environment. His world has become devoid of Λόγος. Consequently, human relatedness and trust disintegrates, intelligibility and rationality lose any measure of coherence, meaning becomes divorced from life. This is the real contrary of what Hegel calls self-consciousness, which is a secure congruance between self and action.

Lukács thinks that "the self which submerges itself in itself, cannot find firm ground anymore; what seemed firm ground for a time turns out to be mere surface; everything that temporarily appeared with the claim of giving direction turns into its opposite" (2). When this individualism is complete, concrete action becomes an experiment, a psychological experiment. The problem of Dostoevsky's "experiments" is the problem of the lonely man who fails to find an Archimedean point either in current social aims or in egoistical ambition. "The experiment with oneself", says Lukács, "the execution of an action not so much for the sake of the contents and effects of the action, but in order to know oneself once and for all, in/

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1. Ibid pg. 151.

2. Ibid pg. 151.

in depth, to the very bottom, is one of the main human problems of the bourgeois and intellectual world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (1). The experimenter could not arise in a world with stable ideals, in a world where life was self-evidently meaningful - or permeated by *Λόγος*. Nor could his attitude to the Thou be that of a pure means to his own ends, if the relations between man and man were secure in their humanity. "The experiment is the desperate attempt to find firm ground within oneself, to know who one is - a desperate attempt to pull down the Chinese Wall between the I and the You, between the self and the world - a desperate attempt and always a futile attempt," writes Lukács (2). In such a time, a time when life has no meaning, when no intelligibility or *Λόγος*, significance or intrinsic value is 'given', the "better people .. are almost all mentally ill". This is because they are aware, as others, perhaps, are not, that personal health is impossible without self-integration, or a congruence between self and action, and self-integration is impossible without a social life which has meaning and value. In other words, in an age of fragmentation, disintegration, and general loss of meaning, the essential connection between *Λόγος* and the interhuman is broken, which means that man is reduced to an existence without an essence, a contingent facticity without hope. Disease becomes normal, and only those who are broken in the struggle against normality have any hope of achieving health or integrity.

For Lukács, Dostoevsky was the first, - and still unsurpassed - in drawing the mental deformations that are brought about as a social necessity by life in a modern city (3), and/

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1. Ibid pg. 149
  2. Ibid pg. 152
  3. Ibid pg. 153.

and in particular, the alienation of the individual from the life of the people. The individual's hopeless solitude, his isolation from genuine human relatedness, forces him to turn in on himself to achieve self-consciousness. But he fails because, as Hegel argued, self-consciousness emerges only in genuine human interaction. His failure, however, gives rise to a vision; his ever-recurring atheism discloses the unapparent *Λόγος* hidden in the alienation of his life from meaning. Lukács describes this vision as "genuine and harmonious relations between genuine and harmonious men" (1). This comes close to what Hegel means by *Geist*. There is, for Hegel, an integral connection between *ἁρμονία* and wholeness, between *ἁρμονία* and health, between *ἁρμονία* and *Geist*. It is by way of contrast that we see what Hegel means by *Geist*, or by self-consciousness. We have shown that true self-consciousness entails *ἁρμονία*, which in its turn entail the gathering of life and meaning together. For Hegel, as for Dostoevsky, this vision cannot be abandoned. "Dostoevsky's characters", writes Lukács, "Know that this is a dream in the present age, but they cannot and will not abandon the dream. They cannot abandon the dream even when most of their feelings sharply contradict it. This dream is the truly genuine core, the real gold of Dostoevsky's Utopias; a state of the world in which men may know and love each other, in which culture and civilisation will not be an obstacle to the development of men" (2). Dostoevsky's vision is Hegel's vision too. Is that why so many have rejected his dream? Is it that we prefer the security of normal insanity to the dream of sanity which so violently contradicts the facts?

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1. Ibid pg. 158.

2. Ibid pg. 158.

## CHAPTER VII

## PART 2:

## JEWISH DUALISM AND CHRISTIAN DIALECTIC

We have just seen that Hegel conceives his philosophical task to be to comprehend what we know, in the light of the Christian λόγος, which he calls the 'Begriff'. This entails, he thinks, our seeing the history of Israel as a history of opposition between subject and object which produced again and again a fixated form of Lord-slave dualism. In his early theological study entitled 'The Spirit of Christianity and its fate' (1798-1799), we find Hegel meditating on the Lord-slave relation as the recurring structure of Jewish life, and the Jewish state of mind. In the first paragraph of this long, and interesting essay, he introduces the idea of the spirit of Abraham in the Hebrew peoples, the structure of which appears throughout their history either as aggression or submission (1). The Hebrews are either involved in armed conflict, or submitting to an enemy who is stronger than they. War is the only alternative to fetters. They appear fixated to a rigid opposition that they cannot overcome (2). Their state of mind is split into various kinds of inflexible dualism, such as the opposition between the ideal and the real, value and fact, the people they are for God, and the people they are for themselves and for others. For the Jew the world is hostile, it will master him if he does not master it. His ideals contradict reality, spirit and nature are divorced from one another, life and meaning rarely if ever coincide. Noah builds a human world out of the raw material of his natural environment/

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1. Early theological writings: Knox translation pg. 182
  2. We are only too aware that what we call Jewish dualism - following Hegel - is a caricature of Israel's faith. It omits all understanding of Covenant theology and the notions of election and Grace. When we speak of Jewish dualism, it is Hegel's caricature that we are discussing.

environment, and so masters the natural realities of storm and flood. God is on his side against the rest of the world. The Jew struggles and works to transform what is always an alien objectivity, and as he continually fails, he calls upon his God to overcome his enemies. Nimrod struggles to master reality through force, Noah by subjecting not only the world but also himself to the one that is more powerful than he, namely God. Nimrod does not achieve mastery because he is himself a part of the reality he struggles to master. Direct mastery is impossible. The struggle to achieve Lordship directly fails, and Nimrod remains absorbed in nature, conditioned by his external environment. Noah fails because he makes himself a slave of God (1).

Abraham, on the other hand, tears himself free from nature, fatherland and family "in order to be a wholly self-subsistent, independent man, to be an overlord himself" (2). "The first act which made Abraham the progenitor of a nation is a disavowance which snaps the bonds of communal life and love" (3). Abraham does not cultivate or improve the land, because for him freedom entailed opposition to everything. "He was", says Hegel "a stranger on earth, a stranger to the soil and to men alike" (4). "The only relationship possible between hostile entities is mastery of one by the other." Because they were at home in the world neither Nimrod nor Noah achieved Lordship. Abraham achieved Lordship by simply regarding the whole world as his opposite. But his Lordship remains ideal, it is not real. Abraham stands in opposition to everyone and everything in an attempt to master the world. In this he is supported by God. But he was unable to make his mastery actual, says Hegel, it therefore/

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1. Early theological Writings pg. 184
  2. Ibid pg. 185
  3. Ibid pg. 185
  4. Ibid pg. 186.

therefore remained ceded to his Ideal. God is Lord of the world, and Abraham is his servant, this enables Abraham to be at odds with the whole world whilst being at one with God in Grace. But Abraham is not a Lord in his own right (1). Only God as God is Lord. 'There is one Lord' .....

Because it is only over death that unity hovers (2), the unity of the Israelite peoples is achieved only at the price of accounting the world outside that unity accursed, unworthy of love, with no rights, without even the right to live. The collective lordship of Israel means death to the rest of the world; but their mastery is cowardly. "The Jews vanquish, but they have not battled" (2). That is because their liberation from Egypt had been "without the soul and the spontaneous need of freedom" (3), without a "heartfelt hatred of oppression" (4). Moses merely tricked them into leaving Egypt. The Israelite's attitude was "slavelike". The Jews are repressed within an order of universal enmity, an animal existence which can be assured only at the expense of all other existence (5). Whereas for the Greeks, no-one is excluded from the holy place of the Gods, for the Hebrews, everyone is excluded. The Holy was always outside them, unseen and unfelt(6).

Hegel calls the existence of the Jewish people and their mentality "servitude"; they are slaves, maintaining their physical existence and securing it against want. He described their mode of being as a "thorough-going passivity". 'There is one God' means that the Jew is a slave to the Lord God. The Jews are dependent on God, and that on which a man depends cannot have the form of a truth. Truth is something free, which we neither/

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1. Ibid pgs. 187-8
  2. Ibid pg. 190
  3. Ibid pg. 190
  4. Ibid pg. 189
  5. Ibid pg. 191
  6. Ibid pg. 193.

neither master nor are mastered by; hence the existence of God appears to the Jews not as a truth but as a command. Truth argues Hegel, is beauty intellectually represented; the negative character of truth is freedom. This view regarding the nature of truth is as interesting as it is ancient. It is not, however, abundantly clear what Hegel means. The Jews, according to Hegel, saw no beauty in the world, so they could not know truth. They were slaves, so they could not conceive truth as freedom. How could they exercise reason and freedom, when they were either mastered or masters? he asks. The dynamics of domination and repression, which constitutes Judaism, follows from their slavery to a Lord God. God is everything for them, they themselves are reduced to nothing. We shall see Hegel take up this point in his later writings; and we find variations of it in Feuerbach, Marx and Freud.

The fate of Judaism is to remain bound to the destructive dynamics of Lord and slave. Only Christianity, as the reconciliation of Judaism with Hellenism, offers another way. As long as the Jews do not become dependent on the world and worship other Gods, they will remain slaves of a God who masters the whole world for them. On the other hand, their settling down in the world as a nation with land and law creates an irreconcilable contradiction in their existence. Thus, their history is an uneasy development back and forth between idolatry and belief, a loss of their specific identity, and enslavement to their God. But God is their own God. They are masters of their world only in so far as they are slaves of God; but God is their God. Kojève mentions the laicized form of this in capitalistic society: Man is a slave of his capital, but it is his capital (1).

1. Opus Cit. pg. 67.

The prophets tried to restore Israel to its original undivided identity, the pharisees tried to integrate the contradiction in obedience to the law. Others yearned for a messiah (1), the sadducees sought to distract themselves from their fragmented being in a variable life filled with nothing but fixed details, the Essenes in the abolition of property which separated man from man. They all struggled like men in despair, their action became the most impious fury and the wildest fanaticism (2). Hegel completes his phenomenology of the Jewish mode of being in the world with the following passage. It concludes a most vivid, though greatly onesided study of the Hebrew state of mind.

"The fate of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth who stepped out of nature itself, clung to alien Beings, and so in their service had to trample and slay everything holy in human nature, had at last to be forsaken by his Gods (since these were objects and he their slave), and be dashed to pieces on his faith itself" (3).

No-one will deny that Hegel is not fair to the Hebrew religious attitude, still less to the God of the Hebrews. Nor is there any doubt that Hegel is obliquely criticising the Kantian conception of Reason as Lord of the passions, and for that matter the Humean thesis that Reason is slave of the passions, because for Hegel, the Lord-slave opposition becomes a living synthesis in the Christ. The Λόγος is the common measure in whom opposites unite. The Ἀβυσσος is the hidden connection between Lord and slave, the connection we normally overlook. Our language and thinking proceed on their way with  
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1. Early Theological Writings pg. 203
  2. Ibid pg. 204
  3. Ibid pg. 205.

a structure of conventions and formal distinctions which hinder comprehension of the Λόγος , for we fail to notice the Lord-slave, the suffering servant who is also resurrected Lord, the one whose death is life and whose life was a faithful dying to himself, the light of the world we do not see in our familiar darkness. For Hegel, there is a living interaction between the Jewish and the Greek attitudes and traditions in the Christian Λόγος . Jesus is the Truth, the uncovering of an unapparent, though enduring relatedness, the Lord who is Lord only as a slave, and the slave who is slave out of the free decision of one who is truly Lord. We shall come to Hegel's description of three imperfect forms of Lord-slave integration when we come to the stoic, and sceptic attitudes, and to the unhappy consciousness of the orthodox Christian in Ch. VIII parts 1 and 2. For Hegel Kantian man is a slave to himself just like the Jew. His Lord is his reason, just as the Jew's Lord was his God. Both are slaves, conditioned by a rigid Lord-slave dualism. Hegel tries to break the dualism by opening it out toward a new reciprocity and relatedness. This is dialectic. For Hegel, the reconciliation of this fundamental opposition is achieved, though this is never immediately apparent, in Jesus, the Λόγος . The polarities of domination or subordination, aggression or passivity, Lordship or bondage, subjectivism or objectivism, tyranny or oppression, are all gathered together in the Λόγος , making a new world possible. The severance of man from himself, of men from men, continually issues forth into brokenness and suffering, unless there is some hope of the healing Λόγος gathering the scattered fragments of man together into a new and integrated whole. But it is essential to recognize that for Hegel the Λόγος is a temporal/

temporal  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , married to history, a living God. For it is in becoming ( $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma$ ), and above all in Time, that what appears separate, with no apparent connection, is gathered and joined. Differences are not obliterated but brought together into lively interaction. In the freedom of being-in-time, the freedom of spirit, the static abstractions of finite and infinite, temporal and eternal, are overcome. This is the meaning of incarnation. In the spirit, a freedom to become is born, making possible the healing integration of every dissociated element of our finite world. For in so far as being ( $\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\omicron}\upsilon$ ), and not-being ( $\tau\acute{o}\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\omicron}\upsilon$ ) (either this or that, either Lord or slave) are brought together in the unfettered becoming of the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , man's world is not shattered into torn, dislocated fragments, dualistic oppositions, anguished disintegration, and irredemable contradictions. It is the established convention, habit and custom ( $\acute{\epsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) to set apart, to analyse, to discriminate in such a way that the interrelatedness of things, their co-inherence in  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , is permanently obscured. We have learned to live with brokenness. Hegel's criticism of our bourgeois world and the setting apart of what ought to remain a living unity, focused here as a critique of Jewish and Kantian attitudes, depends upon his use of encompassing conceptions, such as Geist (Spirit), Vernunft (Reason), Entfremdung and selbst-entfremdung (alienation and self-alienation). We mistrust general ideas, and with them, comprehensive thinking. For Hegel's Begriff (Notion) encompasses too much, or so it seems to us. It achieves a wholeness of conception at the price of clarity. We shall return to his conception of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  and to the difficulty just raised in our final chapter.

Meanwhile, /

Meanwhile, we shall anticipate what we shall say there by saying that for Hegel, we do not comprehend the Λόγος, the Begriff in isolated singularity (against Kierkegaard); nor can we speak of God the Λόγος in single propositions which are either true or false; nor do we grasp or possess Λόγος from a single point of view alone. Faith is not a point of view. If we relate this to what Heidegger says of the Λόγος, we might say that it is not in isolated singularity, but in the "collected presence" of enduring relatedness, that we comprehend the "permanent gathering" of Λόγος .

## C H A P T E R V I I

### PART 3:

#### ACTION, ACTUALITY, AND THE SLAVE'S TRANSFORMATION OR REALITY IN WORK.

So we now analyse what is meant by the slave's transformation of reality into actuality, in an analysis of the phenomenon of work.

Hegel's philosophy has usually been called idealism, but this can be misleading. We shall illustrate this in an analysis of what Hegel means by actual, (wirklich), as opposed to real, (real), which will throw initial light on what he meant by "fact" (sache) as opposed to "thing" (Ding) (1). Knox rightly suggests that by actuality Hegel means the synthesis of Essence and existence (2). Thus, the older translation of the famous passage in the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right "Whatever is rational is real; and whatever is real is rational", is extremely misleading. This passage is not a plea for conservatism in politics (3), nor is it a form of the naturalistic fallacy, namely, the attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is", or more particularly, a complete equating of what "ought" to be with what "is". Knox suggests, and all other contemporary interpreters known to me agree with him, that the above passage ought to be translated as "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" (4).

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1. Sometimes Hegel makes the same distinction with the terms Wirklichkeit and Existenz.
  2. Philosophy of Right pg. 302, Note 27.
  3. Ibid, or, as Kaufmann puts it, a "sanctification of the status" Quo: 'Hegel' pg. 381, 397.
  4. Ibid pg. 10, similarly, Hegel's expectation of the new world's birth, like that of the baby. The new world is real, but not actual. P.S. pg. 75, also "Spirit alone is the actual" rather than "Spirit is above reality". P.S. pg. 86.

This translation is valid provided we can establish the validity of the distinction introduced above, between actual and real, fact and thing. Karl Löwith formulates the distinction in different words (or at any rate, his translator does), but his point is clearly the same as Knox's. He calls it a distinction between reality and accidental existence, between real existence (as the unity of essence and existence (1), and what is merely transitory, meaningless, accidental, ephemeral and rudimentary (2). What Löwith means by reality is what Knox means by actuality, namely the unity of essence and existence, and what Löwith calls accidental existence Knox calls reality. Findlay translates the above passage as the "rational is the actual and the actual is the rational", maintaining the distinction between what may happen to be, and what is true, rational, or actual in what exists (3). Kaufmann argues that Hegel does not believe that "the actual world is as it ought to be" unless he redefines "actual" as only what "accords with the idea". What is ordinarily called actual (Wirklich) is admittedly "rotten" (4). Marcuse argues that Hegel did not declare that reality is rational or reasonable, but reserved this attribute for a definite form of reality, namely, actuality (5). We therefore define the actual as rational, and the real as what happens to be. This gives us a starting point for a closer analysis.

Marcuse argues that for Hegel "the real field of knowledge is not the given fact (things as they are), but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form./

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1. Philosophy of Right, Sections 187, 268.
  2. K. Löwith: From Hegel to Nietzsche, pg. 138
  3. Findlay: Hegel: A re-examination pg. 209, also S. H. Hook: From Hegel to Marx pg. 20.
  4. Kaufmann: Hegel pg. 262, of. also commentary on Preface pg. 381, 397.
  5. Marcuse: Reason and Revolution pg. 153.

form. For Hegel there is an intrinsic connection between the abstract formalism of a logic which derives its method and form from mathematics or the natural sciences and an uncritical, essentially conservative positivism, which affirmed the status quo in its wholesale acquiescence to the final authority of fact. Hegel's philosophy deals with matters of fact in order to transform them, act upon them, work them into new facts. It is in this sense "negative philosophy" (1). Positivism, says Marcuse, the philosophy of common sense, appeals to the certainty of facts". But, "in a world where facts do not at all present what can and ought to be, positivism amounts to giving up the real potentialities of mankind for a false and alien world" (2). Marcuse uses the concept of "potentiality" here, and this corresponds to Hegel's concept of Essence. What does Hegel mean by Essence? We cannot discuss the concept of Essence in the Logic, or in the Phenomenology; This would take too long and cause us to depart from our subject. Briefly then, Essence for Hegel is integration, unity of being; it is dialectical movement from a pure potentiality for integrated self-identity, to alien reality as that which merely happens to be, to an integration of potentiality and reality in actuality. We can clarify this by analysing what Hegel meant when he said: "The fact (die Sache) "is" before it "exists" (3). The fact is possible before it is actual. "When all the conditions of a fact are present, it enters into existence"(4). Present facts are therefore what they are only as "moments". Every one of us assumes, or consciously decides to assume, an answer to the question as to whether things, as they/

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1. Moses Hess 1841 of. Marcuse Ibid pg. 325

2. Marcuse Reason and Revolution pg. 113

3. Science of Logic II pg. 105, or new Miller translation

pg. 477.

4. Ibid pg. 477.

they are, just are; or whether they are on the way to something else. Hegel's philosophy is from beginning to end the asking and answering of this question.

In a more concrete exposition of the synthesis of essence and existence, potentiality and reality, in actuality, Hegel argues that the absence of adequate correspondence between idea and reality is disclosed in work. Here the logical connection between Essence and negativity is concretely argued. It is in this analysis of work, which we are at present undertaking in order better to understand the logic of the slave's experience of reality as antagonistic to Essence, that we see the significance of the slave's existence.

We quoted, earlier on, the important passage which includes the following proposition: "An individual cannot know what he is till he has made himself real by action" (1). Real, here, ought to be translated as actual. It is implied that the actual is present as purpose and possibility (namely, essence), that in this sense, the fact is before it exists. It is actualized in action. But to actualize essence involves the negation of existence, because the latter resists change. It is true that "action is nothing else than negativity" (2), but this is only because "it is present as purpose, and thus opposed to given reality" (3).

Hegel, at this point, defines "Actuality (Wirklichkeit) as reality (Realität) permeated by individuality" (4). Actuality is the product of Action (Absolute Negativity) which proceeds within the opposition between work and consciousness (5). This accords/

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1. P.S. pg. 422.
  2. " Ibid pg. 420.
  3. Ibid pg. 420.
  4. Ibid pg. 420.
  5. P.S. pg. 426.

accords with our definition worked out above. He also defines "fact" as the actual, distinguishing thing from fact, "Ding" from "sache" (1). In work, says Hegel, consciousness realizes that idea does not accord with reality, that man's essence and his existence are in utter contradiction. Work is the negation of reality, and the actualization of essence as purpose. Things become facts, reality becomes actuality. It is difficult to find the right words in English to express the distinction Hegel is trying to make. Hegel argues that "a fact" is a real object for consciousness, an object born of self-consciousness as its own, without ceasing to be a free independent object in the proper sense" (2). A fact is actual whereas a thing is merely real, because the actual is the "interpenetration of individuality and objectivity".

Fact (factum) from facere, means a thing done, a deed, the product or result of active doing or making. In English, the word 'thing' originally has a similar meaning. It once meant a meeting or assembly, a legal process, a process or transaction, and thus what is done or to be done, a doing, act, deed, event, occurrence, incident. It is only much later that it acquires the sense of "that which has separate existence", a "material object". It is, however, in the latter sense alone that we are using the word 'thing', despite the fact that we ordinarily use the word in the older senses as well. We might use the word object, if it were not that the word originally meant something thrown or put in the way as an obstacle or hindrance, a meaning which aptly expresses the opposition of subject-object in this connection, but hardly enables us to separate object from subject, as if the object/

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1. Ibid pg. 431.  
2. P.S. pg. 426.

object had nothing to do with the subject. Objicere means to oppose; the object is the opposite, the other against which I am in opposition. Hegel's use of the word 'object' always has the conception of opposition connected with it. Despite our difficulty here, it is clear that Hegel is distinguishing between the kind of being which merely is, (realität) and the kind of being which through the negation of human action and work has become actuality (wirklichkeit). Actuality is permeated by time, by human temporality and negativity, it is part of a dynamic becoming, in contrast to the static being of Reality. We see, here, the now familiar distinction between act and being, this time related to the being and action of the slave.

We also take note of the fact that Hegel at no point shows any tendency to deny the external reality of the world; the world is real but not actual, real but not rational. Only the actual is rational and only the rational is actual. We can distinguish two "moments", both of which are brought together in the unity of the comprehensive notion (Begriff). At the first moment, reality is not only external, it is alien, and hostile; that which will hinder me or destruct me on my way unless I oppose and master it. I am utterly at odds with my environment at this point. If I remain, passive, it masters me; if I oppose it, I move to the second moment, at which I take up an active, negative attitude towards it. HOMO PATIENS is man at the first moment; HOMO AGENS, man at the second. Selbstbewusstsein is a category which belongs to the second but not the first moment. Hegel's phenomenology traces the transition from our passive consciousness of the opposing object, to active self-consciousness; from immediate certainties, to the Truth; from reality/

reality to actuality; from δούκμις to ἐνέργεια. The work of the slave, and the work of the struggle of self-consciousness in general, is the work of the spirit effecting this change.

We could draw a multitude of implications, philosophical, theological and sociological, from Hegel's concept of work. We shall confine ourselves to three points. First, that Hegel conceives of both Idealism and Empiricism as methodological. Empiricism is appropriate as a philosophy of the first and passive "moment" of the truth of actualization and work. Empiricism in all its forms is an attempt to understand the nature of experience in a particular categorial form of the subject-object relation. Hegel's analysis of sense-certainty, perception and understanding, in the first three chapters of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' are clear illustrations of this. In them, the presuppositions of the realist's orientation to given matters of fact, together with his passive, observational stance toward the facts, are analysed and criticized as valid but relative moments of truth. Empiricism is valid as a method, not as a philosophy. Hegel stresses the importance of a complete grasp of the given facts if they are to be realistically changed. He criticizes the stoic-sceptic for his abortive attempt to change reality in abstract thought, and stresses the futility of any flight from the real. But the reality must be changed.

Similarly, Idealism is a method, not a philosophy, for Hegel. It is transcended when the ideal is actualized through the negation and transformation of reality. Idealism corresponds to the second or active "moment" of truth, the moment when the facts are critically evaluated and changed. Marx saw this distinction/

distinction clearly when he analysed the contrasting epistemological standpoints of Feuerbach and Hegel; but he failed to grasp the empirical pole of Hegel's complete dialectic. He froze Hegel to a position of abstract, contemplative idealism which was as far from Hegel's true position as it was from his own (1). Hegel's critique of the stoic-sceptic reveals clearly that Hegel rejected the position Marx thought he held, and that idealism as a philosophy, that is as a claim to absolute truth, would be as pathologically one-sided as the opposite but equally metaphysical claim made by the realist. The two moments of truth must be held, according to Hegel, in critical, dialectical tension.

The second point concerns the relation of fact and value. Hegel clearly separates the concepts of fact and value, in the manner with which we are familiar today, in the first "moment" of truth only. Facts are logically distinct from value only at the stage when the individual passively acquiesces in face of the massive objectivity of the facts. The individual can see no connection between fact and value because reality is not rational, it merely happens to be. But in the second moment of truth, the individual actively changes the facts so that they correspond to his values. In the second "moment", therefore, a genuine integration of fact and value is achieved. The deed is an actualized value; a man acts that his values may become facts (in the original sense of something done), and his ideals actualized. As long as reality is not actuality, a separation of fact and value is methodologically, epistemologically, and logically/

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1. Theses on Feuerbach: especially Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 11. It is far from Hegel's position in the P.S., and as far as we can make out, in the Greater Logic. Hegel's position may have changed to a more one-sided conservatism after his official appointment to the Professorship in Berlin.

logically correct. For even if the actual is rational, so long as some reality is still to be transformed, there will be facts which bear no relation to value. There will be a place for work, and for negative action. We are not considering here the problem of the naturalistic fallacy. We are not concerned with arguing from facts to values, or from values to facts, but with the human praxis which connects and unites fact and value. In the first moment, of course, the premature fusion of fact and value may result either in unrestrained idealism no longer in touch with what is the case, or restrictive conservatism, openly equating what is the case with what ought to be the case. In both cases, the premature confusion of fact and value derives from a flight from freedom, from the free action which authentically unites them.

The third point concerns the relation between potential and actual. We have already seen that the opposite of 'actual' is 'potential' not 'unreal', or non-existent. The distinction Hegel makes is already familiar to us. It is the distinction between 'implicit' and 'explicit', Being-in-itself, (Ansichsein, être-en-soi), and being-for-itself, (Fürsichsein, être-pour-soi). δύναμις (potentia) and ἐνέργεια (actus, act, action, actual actuality). The transition from being-in-itself to being-for-self does not consist in any new content being introduced. "yet", says Hegel, "the difference is quite enormous" (1). "It makes all the difference". What kind of difference? We have seen the revolutionary "difference" which has been opposed by numerous positivist opponents of Hegel, the difference between passivity in the face of being, and active negation of/

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1. History of Philosophy Vol. I, pg. 21

of being. Our analysis of the slave's action and work clearly manifests the 'negative' dimension of Hegel's thinking. Hegel is saying that 'in-himself' (potentially) man is free, and rational. Even as a natural existent, he is potential spirit. Yet, in reality, there is still slavery. The only difference between the Africans and Asians on the one hand, and the Greeks, Romans, and moderns on the other, is that the latter are free 'for themselves'; the former are free 'in-themselves' but have not 'comprehended'. To comprehend means to lay hold of, overtake or attain to, to include and accomplish. To comprehend is to act. Hegel's "thinking that comprehends", (Das Begreifende Denken), is neither knowledge nor proof. He is not concerned to discover any new facts, nor deduce something from premises. For even if all the facts were known, we would not be necessarily any nearer comprehending what we know. Hegel's conception of δύναντες or potentia is usually expressed with the notion of being-in-itself, but in any case, it means the possible, the potential (posse = to be able) or that which is capable of becoming. To comprehend, for Hegel, means to lay hold of what is possible; to act is to comprehend and to comprehend is to act. The concept actual (actualis) is related to Act (Actus); for Agere is the root verb, meaning to act, actuate, to carry out, or do something, to perform, produce, execute, practice. Philosophically, the distinctions here are significant. The opposition between real and unreal (from Res: a thing) is obviously not the same as the distinction between potential and actual, and their confusion, for example in the famous mistranslation of the proposition in the 'Philosophy of Right': "Whatever is rational is real, and whatever is real is rational" makes/

makes obvious nonsense of Hegel's thinking. Hegel is not justifying the way things are, nor is he seeking to know more about the way things are: he is seeking, on the contrary, to comprehend what we already know. This entails our regaining, overtaking, laying hold of the implicit potential hidden as being-in-itself, and by way of this comprehending act, transforming it - and so reality - into actuality. We can now see, perhaps, why Hegel equates Actuality with Spirit.

## C H A P T E R VIII

## PART 1:

## THE ATTITUDE OF THE STOIC-SCEPTIC

We pass now from Hegel's phenomenological description of Herrschaft and Knechtschaft to three modes of being-in-the-world which mark the emergence of the freedom of self-consciousness (Freiheit des selbstbewusstseins) from the relation of Lord and slave. In stoicism, the Lord-slave dualism is not overcome, though a new connection between Lord and slave is comprehended. The dialectic, here, gathers the Lord and the slave together, for both the Lord (Marcus Aurelius) and the slave (Epictetus) are stoics. 'Stoizismus' (stoicism) is the attitude of "thinking consciousness in general" (1). The stoic argues as follows: "In thinking I am free, because I am not in an other, but remain simply and solely in touch with myself; and the object which is for me is my essential reality, is, in undivided unity, my self-existence; and my procedure in dealing with notions is a process within myself".

The principle of the stoic attitude and form of life is that "consciousness is essentially that which thinks" (2). Freedom is a freedom to think. Consequently, the stoic takes up a negative attitude to both Lordship and slavery. When the Lord becomes a stoic, he negates his dependence upon the slave, and seeks his truth (authentic existence) in his own freedom of thought. The slave who becomes a stoic seeks authentic selfhood not in obeying the Lord's will but in the freedom of his own thinking". The essence of this consciousness", says Hegel, "is to be free on the throne/

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1. P.S. pg. 243.  
2. Ibid pg. 244.

throne as well as in fetters" (1). But this entails what Hegel calls a "stolid lifeless unconcern which persistently withdraws from the movement of existence, from effective activity as well as from passive endurance, into the simple essentiality of thought" (2). The stoic attitude is not stubbornness, for stubbornness is the freedom of "solid singleness". The attitude of stubbornness remains an enslaved attitude. The stoic escapes from that form of enslavement into the universality of thought. Nonetheless, the stoic's freedom can "come on the scene of the world's spirit only in a time of universal fear and bondage, a time, too, when mental cultivation is universal, and has elevated culture to the level of thought" (3).

But Hegel now reveals that because the pure freedom to think lacks the "concrete filling of life", it is therefore not true freedom, but the abstract idea of freedom. The stoic's conceptual activity has lost contact with the life he is living in spite of his attitude; his notion of freedom is an abstraction "out off from the multiplicity of things". The stoic has form but no content; he has found meaning in thought divorced from life. Kojève suggests that the stoic attitude is analogous to that of the scholar or theologian. For he must continue to satisfy his desires, and so enslaves himself to his own nature and to nature in general (as opposed to freedom and spirit); he is free only in his thought. Kojève calls this a form of philosophical suicide, for the stoic thinks but does not act. He does not actively risk his life. Ultimately his attitude leads to ennui (boredom), and to a solipsist denial of the reality of the external world. The stoic does not negate nature.

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1. P.S. pg. 244.
  2. Ibid. pg. 244.
  3. Ibid pg. 245.

For Marcel, the freedom of the stoic enables him, by thinking, to transcend the order of blind necessity, and thus all naturalism (1). Thus the stoic achieves a meaning, in thought, which frees him from necessity, chance, fate, or from the fortuitousness of existence. But at this point Hegel wishes to show the contradiction in his existence, for thinking is not a real negation of nature, the stoic remains a slave to his own natural life, and his freedom is inherently abstract.

It is perhaps ironical that the stoic attitude is so similar to the attitude conventionally ascribed to Hegel himself, the abstract Idealist, especially as Hegel tirelessly criticizes the kinds of abstract or formal intellectualism which remains withdrawn from the struggle and tension of comprehending living experience. For example, Hegel criticizes the speculative theologian who speaks of the Aseity of God with the confidence of the abstract thinker, because his thinking lacks "the seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labour of the negative" (2). Another example is the formal logician whose thinking remains rigorously coherent only by keeping within the same terms. But our living experience constantly introduces new terms, upsetting the strict, but sterile logic of his formal syllogism (3). "What is purely formal without reality is an ens intellectus, or empty abstraction", says Hegel, "without the internal diremption which would be nothing else than the content" (4). To the question concerning what is good and true, the stoic gets embarrassed, because he can only give an abstract contentless thought as his answer. "The true and good are to consist in reasonableness" (5).

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1. Marcel: Metaphysical Journal pg. 89

2. P.S. pg. 81.

3. of. Lefebvre: Dialectical Materialism pg. 24

4. P.S. pg. 329.

5. P.S. pg. 246.

The stoic does not deny his own nature; consequently he fails to enter into the free self-determining becoming which is his and every man's unactualized potential. The sceptic on the other hand can and does deny what he naturally is. His is a thorough-going nihilism. The sceptic realizes what the stoic merely thinks; his solipsism is complete. He is more serious than the stoic in his detachment from the world, and reveals to us that, according to Kojève, suicide is the only logical conclusion of the stoic-sceptic (1). If either allow their existence to continue, it is a self-contradictory existence. Loewenberg stresses at this point that the transition from stoicism to scepticism is logical rather than historical. He is concerned to clarify the nature of dialectic (2). But, a distinction of this sort is difficult to maintain unless we clarify the sense in which we use the concept of 'historical'. Hegel tells us, in his 'History of Philosophy', that in stoicism, "pure thought develops into a totality", and if we make the opposite of thinking spirit into a totality - natural being or feeling, we have Epicureanism. Explicitly, they appear as two opposing systems of philosophy; implicitly, "both are identical", for scepticism is the union of these opposites. Scepticism in its turn turns out to be the annihilative attitude, whose opposite is the affirmative, "the Idea in relation to the Notion" (3). This kind of argument is neither logical (in the formal sense) nor historical (in the sense of a factual account of the relation between philosophical schools), but is the kind of reasoning which connects what we know of these philosophical attitudes in order to show their co-inherence in the total life of/

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1. Introduction à la lecture de Hegel pg. 66.
  2. Loewenberg: Hegel's Phenomenology pg. 94
  3. History of philosophy Vol. I, pg. 103.

of human thinking. Hegel's method is truly philosophical, it is neither science nor logic. It is concerned not with describing the facts correctly, nor with solving the formal, or logical puzzles that trouble us, but with comprehending the long history of human experience comprehensively.

For Hegel, both stoicism and Epicureanism are positive philosophies; the former takes thinking as the determining criterion of truth, the latter, feeling, sensuous perception and observation. Both philosophies are one-sided; their opposition is balanced by their opposite, the negative attitude of scepticism. "Scepticism is the active negation of every criterion, of all determinate principles of whatever kind they may be, whether knowledge derived from the senses, or from reflection on ordinary conceptions, or from thought" (1). Scepticism is nihilism, whose result is the "disintegration of all truth, and consequently of all content, and thus, perfect negation" (2). Scepticism, says Hegel in the 'Phenomenology', is "in itself and essentially the negative"; it's thinking "wholly annihilates the being of the world with its manifold determinateness" (3). On the one hand, "by means of this self-conscious negation, self-consciousness procures for itself the certainty of its own freedom", and on the other, it is "neither more nor less than an absolutely fortuitous embroglio, the giddy whirl of a perpetually self-creating disorder" (4). This is what constitutes the sceptic's self-contradiction.

For consciousness, Hegel argues, is a "thoroughgoing dialectical restlessness", a "mêlée of presentations derived from/

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1. Ibid Vol. II, pg. 236
  2. History of Philosophy II pg. 329
  3. P.S. pg. 246.
  4. Ibid pgs. 248 and 249.

from sense and thought, whose differences collapse into oneness, and whose identity is similarly again resolved and dissolved" (1). The sceptic is a broken consciousness, consisting of both freedom and necessity, but in such a way that self-integration is never achieved. "Contingent, animal life" exists besides "universal self-sameness"; the sceptic continually falls from self-identity to contingency and confusion. In Hegel's vivid language, the sceptic is "the aimless fickleness and instability of going to and fro, hither and thither, from one extreme of self-same self-consciousness, to the other contingent, confused and confusing consciousness. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together. It finds its freedom, at one time, in the form of elevation above all the whirling complexity and all the contingency of mere existence, and again, at another time, likewise confesses to falling back upon what is unessential, and to being taken up with that" (2). It announces the nullity of seeing, hearing, and so on, yet itself sees and hears". Its "deeds and words belie each other continually", in that it "keeps asunder the poles of contradiction within itself". But in case we reject the sceptic's neurotic condition as a worthless insanity, Hegel warns us that "in scepticism consciousness gets, in truth, to know itself as a consciousness containing contradiction within itself" (3). For a new attitude, in which the two contradictory attitudes are brought together, becomes possible when it becomes aware that "it is in fact ONE consciousness which possesses these two modes within it" (4). This new mode of consciousness, the unhappy, divided consciousness of the Christian, has learned from scepticism to negate its own/

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1. Ibid pg. 249.
  2. P.S. pg. 249.
  3. Ibid pg. 250.
  4. Ibid pg. 250.

own nature in temporal freedom, and from stoicism to pass beyond the finite determinateness of existence to the freedom of thought, but it is also aware of its self-alienation (selbst-entfremdung) and is consequently on the threshold of integrated self-consciousness (Bei-sich-selbst-sein im Anderssein).

Before we discuss the unhappy consciousness and the notion of alienation, we must try to clarify some of the paradoxes which Hegel's phenomenological descriptions of the stoic-sceptic attitudes have disclosed. We are not, here, concerned with whether Hegel's evaluation of the stoic and sceptic philosophies is correct, whether, in other words, his account of them is factually accurate. We are not interested (though others have a perfect right to be) in Hegel as an historian of ideas. We recall, first of all, that whereas the stoic was merely apathetic or resigned, the sceptic actively doubts, and so negates his own nature. Kojève remarks at this point that whereas classical philosophy had urged us to "Become what you are"; Hegel, in the light of his reflections upon the negativity of freedom, urges "Become what you are not" (1). For Hegel, "Acting is nothing else than negativity" (2). But though to doubt is to act, the sceptic's doubt leads him into a desperate withdrawal from his bodily existence and concrete being-in-the-world.

"Individuality", says Hegel, "is what its world, in the sense of its own world, is" (3), but "an individual cannot know what he is until he has made himself real (actual) by action" (4). ("Das Individuum kann daher nicht wissen, was es ist, eh es sich durch das tun zur Wirklichkeit gebracht hat"). Everybody is given the task of self-creation through negative action, and those/

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1. Introduction à la lecture de Hegel pg. 65
  2. F.S. pg. 420.
  3. Ibid pg. 336.
  4. Ibid pg. 422. German edition pg. 287.

those who flee from this task, fail to achieve conscious self-integration. The sceptic seeks to create himself in the action of doubt, but he fails to integrate his intellectual identity with his natural and bodily existence. He thus remains, for himself, nobody - a no-body; a self, with no body, with no connection with the world, no natural life. He remains alive, of course, but he is not present in his living existence. He experiences a loss of self whenever he becomes aware that he is a living body.

We have said that the stoic struggles to create himself and his world in thought, the sceptic in radical, negative doubt, and we have introduced the paradoxical idea that the self of the stoic-sceptic remains divorced from his nature, from his bodily behaviour, desires and appetites and his bodily contact with the world. The object, as that which is thrown in his way, does not exist for him, because his way is a way of thought or doubt, not action. In dealing with the stoic-sceptic mode of consciousness, we are dealing with a personal world, which as Jaspers argues, can be investigated as a cultural, historical, psychological, or psychopathological phenomenon. For the study of a personal world or "world-picture" (Weltbild) does indeed reveal, as Hegel saw, andBinswanger has confirmed, that the individual is what his own world is. For, as Jaspers argues, a personal world is a total frame of reference which grows into a world subjectively, as emotional atmospheres, feelings, states of mind, and objectively in opinions, mental content, ideas and symbols (1). The stoic-sceptic mode of consciousness is a weltbild of both subjective and objective dimensions, but the question which immediately arises is whether it is an authentic or a pseudo-solution/

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1. Karl Jaspers: General Psychopathology pg. 281.

solution to the problem of being human in the world. Merleau-Ponty argues, in this connection, that the pseudo-solutions of the neurotic are "recognisable from the fact that the being of the person never co-incides with what he says, what he thinks, or even what he does. False art, false sanctity and false love" - and we may add the false Weltbild - "give to human life only a borrowed significance, affect only an ideal transformation, a flight into transcendent ideas".(1). It is clear that Hegel conceives the stoic-sceptic mode of being to be a neurotic pseudo-solution in this sense. The stoic-sceptic's thinking self is not even present in his natural being; his behaviour appears dislocated or dissociated from his thinking or doubting. The stoic-sceptic is what Merleau-Ponty calls a fragmented life of consciousness; it is as though his real self, the thinker or doubter, is never embodied or revealed in what he is and says and does. For Hegel, "the individual human being is what the act is"(2), "the true being of a man is his act ....., individuality is real in the deed"; or in other words: "Individuality puts itself forward in action as the negative essence which only is so far as it cancels being" (3). Neither the stoic nor the sceptic negate being; they think but do not act. But since spirit is always act not being, always self-determining becoming (coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be) and not static being or not-being, the stoic-sceptic fails to achieve the new unity which is spirit. Spirit is not another kind of being, but is the temporal act which overcomes all static forms of being. The latter merely exist, unconnected, dissociated; they are gathered only in the Act which overcomes their fixed determinations, by negating and transforming/

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1. Merleau-Ponty: The Structure of Behaviour pg. 180
  2. P.S. pg. 350.
  3. Ibid pg. 349.

transforming them. Things cease to be "either-this-or-that", and become "both-this-and-that". Spirit is the integration of the fragmented in a living temporal unity, often mistakenly confused with another kind or class or category of being. The stoic-sceptic does not act in order to become; he thinks or doubts. His self is not present in what he does; he is as it were, disembodied.

Our language, in this account, is somewhat strained and paradoxical. In order to describe the contradictions of the stoic-sceptic's existence adequately, our language must become flexible, or as Hegel suggests elsewhere, "plastic" (1). The contradiction of the stoic-sceptic may be described in many ways, none of which, unfortunately perhaps, escape paradox. The stoic-sceptic may be said to have a body, rather than be embodied. He is for-himself a doubting, thinking self; but for others he is what he does, he is what he appears to be from his bodily behaviour. But the stoic-sceptic cannot afford to call his bodily behaviour 'His'; he disowns his body. He is like the Gnostic for whom the body is a prison and the world a hell. Every contact with the world appears to him to be a threat to his thinking, doubting subjectivity. He is like the divided self which Laing describes in his study of schizoid and schizophrenic ways of being in the world (2). The stoic-sceptic is a divided self, or as Hegel puts it, a "doubled contradictory consciousness" (3), and he appears to share with the schizoid personality pattern, an abhorrence of any revelation of himself in his bodily action, or behaviour, or speech. Because every action and every relationship threatens this kind of broken, divided/

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1. P.S. pg. 122; Logic pg. 40
  2. R. D. Laing; The divided self pgs. 87-88
  3. P.S. pg. 250.

divided self, with a loss of identity, the polarities of separateness and relatedness, which for Laing, accord with personal autonomy, become a violent antithesis between engulfment (a complete loss of being by absorption into the other person) and isolation (a complete separation from the other person) (1). To be understood is to be engulfed. The action of the divided self is always the product of a false self; his real self must at all cost remain ungraspable, elusive, transcendent (2). By existing for-himself with no body; he is nobody (3). He lacks any self-validating certainties, and has what Laing, following Sullivan, Hill, Fromm-Reichmann and Arieti call a "low threshold of security".

Whereas the divided self does not seek gratification in the world through his body, because he is preoccupied with preserving his ontologically insecure self from the threat of relationship, embodiment and involvement (4), the stoic-sceptic does not do so because his self consist solely in thinking or doubting. Whether or not he shares the anxiety of the divided self is another matter. There may be happy secure stoics and sceptics, but for Hegel, this does not affect the fact that their condition is unhappy. For the divided self, reality is implosive (5), and to experience the other as person is felt to be virtually suicidal. Reality will empty him or suck him dry (6), the gaze of another person threatens him. "Either", says Laing, "he turns the other person into a thing and depersonalizes or objectifies his own feelings towards this thing, or he affects indifference" (7). He withdraws into a citadel to preserve himself, but the tragic/

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| 1. | The Divided Self | pg. 44.    |
| 2. | <u>Ibid</u>      | pg. 88     |
| 3. | <u>Ibid</u>      | pg. 37.    |
| 4. | <u>Ibid</u>      | pg. 42.    |
| 5. | <u>Ibid</u>      | pg. 46-47. |
| 6. | <u>Ibid</u>      | pg. 83.    |
| 7. | <u>Ibid</u>      | pg. 76.    |

tragic paradox is that the securer his defence, the more he destroys himself. Like the stoic-sceptic, the divided consciousness withdraws in order to be free. The stoic-sceptic is either indifferent to or violently negates his Lordship or his slavery, but only at the cost of a paradoxical kind of death.

He withdrew into thought or doubt in order to achieve freedom of spirit; what he achieved was the death of the spirit, because the spirit cannot be divorced from nature, action, bodily behaviour and the concrete lived-reality of the world. The divided self is alive but does not feel alive; he is divorced from his life. His 'meanings' are isolated from life, enclosed in thinking or doubting, or in any kind of defensive withdrawal. For Hegel, this neurotic condition is of considerable significance because we learn from it the truth of the human condition as a whole. We understand the significance of sanity only by way of the lessons we learn from insanity, our own insanity, and as Wittgenstein once said: "The philosopher is the man who has to cure himself of many sicknesses of the understanding before he can arrive at the notions of the sound understanding. If in the midst of life we are in death, so in sanity we are surrounded by madness" (1). The truth we learn from the divided self-or stoic-sceptic doubled consciousness is that consciousness essentially entails contradiction, wholeness disease.

Hegel's treatment of this subject teaches us one thing above everything else, and that is that the stoic-sceptic's flight from reality, and the solipsist world into which he withdraws to preserve his tottering identity, are both the consequence of the life-death struggle and its delay in the static/

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1. L. Wittgenstein: 'Foundations of Mathematics' para 53, pg. 157.

static Lord-slave dualism, which is itself the intersubjective nexus from which spirit will emerge. The contradictions of the stoic-sceptic's condition are the sine qua non of genuine rationality, which is in its turn the sine qua non of Geist or Spirit. There are, for Hegel, many unapparent connections between health and disease, between spirit and self-alienation, all of which reveal to man the truth of his being and authentic becoming. We conventionally distinguish, both in ordinary language, and in our established forms of life, between health and disease, between sanity and insanity. Only the insanity of a schizophrenic or philosopher sees many hidden connections between the two, and only the perverse see conventional sanities as thinly disguised insanity. Hegel's dialectic militates against our taking our apparently self-evident distinctions too seriously, for we are rarely aware of how easily our distinguishing becomes discrimination, and a dehumanizing setting apart. We set things apart when we analyse; we separate, dissolve, un-loose ( ἀνά - λύειν ). No-one, least of all Hegel, will quarrel with us for doing that. But when certain kinds of analysis (or setting apart) are acted upon, and become the structure of political, social and legal action, we must look very carefully at what we have un-loosed. Sometimes we mistrust the gathering, integrating activity of dialectic ( ἡ διαλεκτική dialectica, from διά - λέγειν ) so much that we lose the integrity of personal and social life, which is the only true alternative to oppression, repression, and the myriad of diseases, injustices, sorrows and tyrannies which threaten to overwhelm us. We would do well to heed Merleau-Ponty's warning that we are judged by neither intention nor fact, but by our success in making values become facts (1). Our success depends upon our integrity/

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1. Merleau-Ponty: 'Siana' pg. 72

integrity, and our ability to hold together what tends apart,  
in integrated self-conscious action.

## C H A P T E R VIII

## PART 2:

## THE ALIENATION OF THE DIVIDED AND UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS.

"Das Unglückliche Bewusstsein", the Unhappy Consciousness, is Hegel's term for the alienated self who is conscious of its divided nature, conscious that it is a doubled and contradictory existence (1). Jean Hyppolite has called the Unhappy Consciousness the fundamental theme of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', (2), and one of the leading interpreters of Hegel in this country, G. R. G. Mure, has called it its "main theme" (2). Jean Wahl, whose outstanding study of the Unhappy Consciousness has had a profound influence upon French interpreters of Hegel, has argued that the scepticism which interested Hegel, and which we studied in the last chapter, is more akin to Pascal than Montaigne. That is, the sceptic's problem is that of the irredemable dualism of finite and infinite, existence and essence, is and ought. This brings us to the distinctively christian mode of consciousness as Hegel conceives it, for the divided consciousness of the Christian connects with the sceptic's desperate dualism. The Christian is divided by the dualism of Nature and Grace, Law and Gospel, Life and Spirit, darkness and light, and consequently shares the sceptic's dilemma. The difference between them consists in the fact that the Christian is aware of his divided, broken existence, whereas the sceptic is not. The Christian is aware that he is both nature and spirit, determinate and free. He is aware of what he is in-himself, (that is, what he is capable of becoming - potentia, δύναμις - or what he is implicitly). The sceptic is not. But the Christian is not yet/

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1. P.S. pg. 251.

2. J. Hyppolite: Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel pg. 184.  
 Mure: The Philosophy of Hegel pg. 5: 78, 4, 49-50, 78-81, 86, 94, 181.

yet for-himself (in actuality), what he is aware he is potentially. He is not yet actual, not yet rational, not yet spirit. Hegel argues that once we have reached this point - the point where christian faith reveals to man what he potentially is - no new factor is needed. Yet a vitally significant transition is still to be made. Man's potentiality must be comprehended (begriffen), that is, laid hold of, regained, gathered to himself, attained or achieved. Prior to the inclusive, comprehensive activity of comprehension, his potentiality remains external to him. The task of comprehension is the task of encompassing all externality so that it becomes internal, essence integrated with existence. ἡ διαλεκτικὴ, dialectic, is the act of gathering or bringing together, which is what we mean here when we use the word 'comprehend'. It may have other meanings when it is used loosely, but its dictionary sense of lay hold of, include, encompass, grasp with the mind, comprise, is the sense in which we are using it here. To comprehend is to gather rather than scatter, whereas to analyse is to separate, dissolve or unloose. This use of these terms ought by now to be very familiar. The unhappy consciousness is unhappy not because it is divided, but because it is aware that it is divided. It knows that its task is to integrate what is divided in an encompassing comprehension, and it seems condemned never to achieve this task. It is unhappy because between its hope and its fulfilment "there stands precisely the absolute contingency, or immovable indifference, which is involved in the very assumption of determinate shape and form, the basis and foundation of the hope" (1).

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1. P.S. pg. 255.

The unhappy consciousness is divided because it cannot think the ever-changing becoming of man in his historic world, and the unchangeable infinity of God, together. Hegel connects the contradiction of the christian's unhappy consciousness to the conception of the changeable and the unchangeable as absolute opposites (1). For the christian is again and again broken by this opposition; he is the slave of the dualist either/or, either God or the world, either God or his fellow man. Of course we misunderstand Hegel if we take him to mean that there is no real contradiction here, or that we can dissolve this opposition into a monistic One, sub specie aeternitatis, by means of reason alone. "Thought", for Hegel, according to Caird, "is always distinction; determination, the marking off of one thing from another, .... unless things are definitely what they are, and are kept to their definition, knowledge and thought become impossible ..... But thought is not only distinction, it is at the same time relation. It marks off one thing from another, it, at the same time, connects one thing with another" (2). In other words, thinking must be both a setting apart (ἀνάλυσις) and a bringing together (διαλεκτική); it must show how things stand apart from other things, and how they stand together. It must distinguish and connect. Sometimes the apparent connection must be broken and particulars set apart, in order for the hidden connection, which truly holds things together, to be exhibited to us. Sometimes a distinction or a connection is assumed in both what we do and what we say, and is consequently hidden from view until another kind of deed or speech brings it to our notice. For there is much that we know but do not comprehend, and there is much to the activity of knowing/

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1. Ibid pg. 252

2. E. Caird: Hegel pg. 134-5.

knowing that we do not comprehend. The same can be said of language.

The unhappy consciousness is aware that its existence is defined both in terms of its relation to the unchangeable God and in terms of its historical contingency and temporal becoming. But because it cannot hold these two 'worlds' together, it fails to achieve self-integration. Hegel describes the task the Unhappy consciousness struggles but fails to achieve as follows:

"Thinking, I rise above all finiteness to the Absolute, and I am infinite consciousness - and yet I am finite self-consciousness, in full accordance with all my empirical limitations. Both sides seek and flee each other. I am, and there is within me ... this antagonism and this reconciliation. I am the feeling, the perception, the notion of this resolution, and of this antagonism, and the junction of the antagonists; I am the effort of joining, and the labour of the mind to master this antagonism. I am the struggle. I am not one of the struggling, but I am both, and I am the struggle itself. I am the fire and the water which touch each other, I am the connection and the unity of those that everlastingly flee each other" (1).

This is the predicament of the Christian who struggles to think in accordance with the Truth of the Word made flesh. For the *Λόγος* is the unity of God and man, the co-inherence of the most definitive of all oppositions. In a truly Heraclitean way, Hegel speaks of the task of genuinely christological thinking, (the task which Christians unhappily fail to achieve, with their fondness for the pagan dualisms they raise to the status of absolutes), as the task of uncovering the *ἔπισ* or strife which brings things together in the relatedness of a common *Λόγος*. The unhappy consciousness is aware of what he must do, but he fails to do it. He is the "movement of an infinite yearning", condemned to hope for an unattainable beyond, condemned to despair of/

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1. Philosophy of Religion: Forward (Elockner XV pg. 80). We note, here, the words of Hegel's close friend, the poet Hölderlin: "Near and hard to grasp is the God, yet where peril lies, grows the remedy too".

of an unbearable present, condemned to repeat the same words and the same deeds which forever break his spirit. He seeks a beyond that can never be found, and so comes upon the grave of its hope. He turns instead to the world, struggling to achieve self-integration through desire and toil (1).

The unhappy consciousness is thus condemned to a "shattered certainty of itself". It does not find that work and enjoyment confirm its identity; the latter remains "tottering and insecure" (2). For the unhappy consciousness is always outside itself; with the result that every effort to achieve healing and wholeness is never more than another symptom of its disease. This is because the unhappy consciousness cannot enter into the condition of disintegration which is his disease. And since, as Freud teaches us, our disease can be healed only from within disease, the unhappy consciousness appears to have no remedy.

This doubly negative attitude of the unhappy consciousness derives, as we have seen, from a conception of God and of man's temporal world as theoretically exclusive categories, and as practically exclusive moral ends. We distinguish finite and infinite. Neither we, nor Hegel, nor any reasonable man could deny the relative validity of this distinction. But an absolute distinction would involve us in irrational self-contradiction, for it would entail our denying any relation between what was distinguished. There can be no distinction between opposites which is not also a relation or connection between them. It is the tendency to make distinctions into absolute distinctions that transforms them into irreconcilable antagonisms. In the case of the unhappy consciousness, the failure to think finite and infinite together in accordance with the logic of the christian

Λόγος .

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1. P.S. pg. 258-9.
  2. Ibid pg. 259.

Λόγος, leads to a splitting, disintegration and dissociation of consciousness. It leads to the kind of divided consciousness Hegel describes in Ch. IV B part 3 as the attitude of the Jew and mediaeval christian, or as the Kantian conflict between rational duty and natural inclination (1), or as the conflict between the individual and the universal in man's social and ethical attitudes in Ch. VB, or as the conflict inherent in the revolutionary attitude in Ch. VI B2. In all these forms of unhappy consciousness we have the alternatives of life-death struggle, or of the dominance of one opposite, and the subordination of the other.

For this reason, Jean Hyppolite has argued that the unhappy consciousness is always an interiorized Lord-slave relation. This is true, as long as we recognise that the conflict consists in a flexible not a fixed dualism. That is to say, each antagonist is becoming Agens and patiens, Lord and Slave, dominant and subordinate in turn; there is no fixed dominance of one over the other. It is important, here to note that a fluid, dynamic dualism is not yet a genuine dialectic, because no true integration of opposites is achieved. They have achieved a kind of dynamic co-existence but no qualitative transformation. Consequently, the freedom of spirit cannot emerge. Nothing which remains determined by its relation to its opposite can be said to transcend natural being. Spirit and freedom belong to the encompassing of every dualistic opposition, which means that the spirit we conceive as the opposite of nature, and the freedom we conceive as the opposite of necessity, is not the spirit or the freedom which accords with the Λόγος. The God-man is the Truth, the truth of the Whole, or the encompassing Λόγος. In Λόγος, the temporal and the eternal, the finite/

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1. of our discussion of the relation between Jewish and Kantian dualism and the Christian dialectic in connection with Hegel's essay: 'The Spirit of Christianity' 1798-1799.

finite and the infinite, the changeable and the unchangeable, the human and the divine, are gathered together in a qualitatively new relatedness. No distinction between them is dissolved or confused, for Reason does not negate but fulfils the understanding. But on the other hand, no distinction, however valid, can destroy the living co-inherence of everything that comes to be or ceases to be, in the comprehension, or inclusive integration of *Νῆγος* .

In contrast to this christological conception of Being, the conception of Being held by the unhappy consciousness is dissociated and fragmented. For instead of the health and wholeness of resurrected spirit, the unhappy consciousness takes its abstract conception of God in separation from the world and from man, and its abstract conception of the world apart from God, to be the norms and criteria of its truth. Instead of the truth of the Whole, it attaches itself to some partial truth concerning God, or concerning the world, and affirms this as ultimate. It falls from christian faith, to idolatrous faith; from Reason as the true way faith may seek comprehension, to the mutually exclusive categories of the understanding. God elects not to be the God of the unhappy consciousness, for in incarnation, death and resurrection, God gathers the whole world, both nature and history, to himself. Thus, Hegel's concern in this chapter is not to show that christian faith alienates man, but that inadequate forms of christian faith and life alienate him. Nevertheless, even in its alienated form, as the unhappy consciousness, christian faith and life is on the threshold of Reason, or that encompassing rationality which in its fulfilment, Hegel calls Geist, or spirit.

The unhappy consciousness is closely connected to Feuerbach's notion/

notion of the christian believer who is alienated from himself because he ascribes to God the perfection for which he yearns, but fails to achieve, in the world. By disclaiming "all power of self-existence (being-for-self) and ascribing this power to a gift from above (1), the unhappy consciousness, according to Hegel, is "stripped of its Ego", and reduced to "an objective external existence", like a "thing" (2). This is the idea which, as we shall see in a moment, Feuerbach takes as his starting-point. For Feuerbach, the unhappy consciousness' conception of the Lordship of God entails the enslavement and alienation of man. For Hegel, alienation is overcome in the intersubjective spirit of the religious communion, where subject achieves self-integration by regaining its own substance. (3).

In his History of philosophy, Hegel clarifies many of his obscure references to mediaeval christianity in this chapter. The church of the middle ages "exhibits itself", says Hegel, "as a manifold self-contradiction" (4). The christian believes in God as external existence and as absolute, he relates to God in worship yet the ecclesiastical authorities, not he, are in possession of the Truth, and the church claims to despise wealth and acquires enormous property (5). To the crusaders, Hegel asks, why seek the living among the dead? He is not here but is risen (6). In the crusades, the church "distorted and perverted the principle of christian freedom" (7). These references, and others, (8), to forms of mediaeval christianity are obscurely expressed in the 'Phenomenology'. We need not go into them farther/

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1. P.S. pg. 266.
  2. Ibid pg. 266.
  3. P.S. pg. 765-6.
  4. Philosophy of History Sibree translation pg. 396.
  5. Ibid pg. 397.
  6. Ibid pg. 409.
  7. Ibid pg. 411.
  8. For example, Hegel discusses sin, asceticism, confession, Latin prayers and indulgences, God as judge and so on. His point is that the mediaeval christian is alienated and so unhappy.

farther here, for they are beside the main point which concerns us, namely that the christian conception of God as an eternal beyond, utterly transcendent, whose ascity is unchangeable and whose being excludes the reality of the world, alienates man from what he is capable of becoming. For Hegel, the fundamental error is the conception of God as an opposite, or as that which is not something else, and so limited to being what it is, determinate and so finite. For God as opposed to the world, or man, is not truly God. For Hegel, we ought to speak not of knowing God but of knowing in God. Hegel would agree with Marcel that Plotinus articulated this clearly when he argued that God is veritably for us only in so far as we participate in him (1). It is for this reason that Hegel argues that we cannot know God, for to speak of knowing God is to reduce God to the status of a finite entity, bound to the fetters of subject-object dualism. We comprehend (begreifen) God in and through what we know; we know in and through the encompassing comprehension (Begrifflichkeit) or Notion (Begriff) we call God. We do not know God as opposed to the world, or the world as opposed to God. We know the world in God, which means that it is not in isolated singularity, but in the collected presence of enduring relatedness that we comprehend the permanent gathering of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . There is no question, here, of the dualist either/or of the mediaeval christian. To comprehend mean to encompass in accordance with the dialectical both/and of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ .

In connection with the important duality of life and meaning, discussed at length in earlier chapters, to comprehend means to lay hold of both, despite their opposition in times of disintegration/

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1. Marcel: Metaphysical Journal pg. 35.

disintegration and fragmentation, and to hold them together in a lively relatedness. "The Notion", says Stirling, "is Reciprocity" (1); in its simplest form, it is selbstbewusstsein (2). Begriff is the living, concrete integration of seyn and wesen. The unhappy consciousness fails to integrate life and meaning; for him life is unintelligible, and meaning is posited in an eternal beyond. His unhappiness is not unlike the unhappiness of the kind of revolutionary yearning of those who find the established order utterly unintelligible and who posit their meaning, their conception of the significant and the fitting, in a future which, however immanent, is radically discontinuous with the present. It is to be distinguished clearly from the happy consciousness for whom the meaningful is already actual in the sum of all that is good in man as he is. For the happy consciousness confuses the wholeness, and wholesomeness of the truth of the whole ( ὅλον ), with the sum ( πᾶν ) of what is true and good and wholesome in what man already is. Hegel's own position is eschatological, poised between the 'even-now' and the 'not-yet' of the happy and unhappy consciousnesses. He does not commit a form of the naturalistic fallacy, nor does he adopt the nihilism of a thorough-going dualism of life and meaning. His conception of Λόγος as Geist is dialectical in that it brings together what the unhappy consciousness separates, and what the happy consciousness fails to distinguish in the first place. The latter confuses what for the dialectician must be a unity in and through distinction. Dialectic does not confuse the sum with the whole, consequently it will not confuse their opposites, the parts and the fragmented, or broken.

Hegel/

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1. The Secret of Hegel, Vol. I, pg. 203ff.
  2. Ibid pg. 209.

Hegel has no quarrel with the understanding distinguishing between the parts and the sum of the parts; but he argues that the distinction between the whole and the fractured is of another order. The fractured must become whole in a way that parts can never become the sum. Wholeness is a living unity in difference; The sum, or totality of parts, is a static absorption of the former in the latter. To comprehend (Begreifen) is, for Hegel, to act by laying hold of the alien object thrown in the way, in order that the alienation of the object is transformed to enter into a new reciprocity and wholeness with the subject. To comprehend the not-I is to know in God, in the sense we used this expression a moment ago. Comprehension - or the laying hold of the alien object - is a new freedom, a qualitatively new mode of being in the world, as different from the unhappy consciousness as the latter is from the self-righteous conservatism of the happy consciousness. The one who comprehends achieves the integrity and freedom, which according to Hegel, liberates and redeems him from the dualistic strife of domination and subordination, Lordship and Bondage. Spirit has been born from the contradictions and antagonisms of nature.

Thus, although we do not comprehend the  $\Lambda\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , the Begriff, in isolated singularity, or in isolated propositions, or from a single isolated point of view, we do comprehend  $\Lambda\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  in the collected presence of enduring relatedness, into which we are permanently gathered in the community of Geist or spirit. This comprehension, is always incomplete, though it strives after completeness. Whether Hegel thought that he had achieved a completeness of comprehension is doubtful in the extreme, because he/

he always refused to allow that philosophy could comprehend the future. The future remains open. Philosophy is like the Owl of Minerva (1). Philosophy comes on the scene too late to instruct the world (2). Philosophy is not a closed solution, but an open dialectic, for Hegel. It comprehends the past, but is not, for that reason, abstract. The  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , or Begriff, is enduring co-inherence, the holding fast of an enduring integrity through the dismembering of time and the fragmentation of becoming. But  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  is certainly not that  $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha$  which recoils from  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ .  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  is the integrity of  $\tau\acute{o}$   $\acute{\omicron}\nu$  and  $\tau\acute{o}$   $\mu\grave{\eta}$   $\acute{\omicron}\nu$  which can withstand the tensions of life and death, and consequently fulfils the promise with unwavering faithfulness.

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1. Philosophy of Right, Preface, pg. 13.

2. Ibid pg. 12.

## CHAPTER IX

## GOD AS LORD, MAN AS SLAVE:

## FEUERBACH.

Feuerbach was familiar with the passages in Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit' we have been discussing. The question he was provoked to ask was: How can man become free, (being-for-himself), from God, and so from that determinate existence (being-for-another) which he necessarily has before God? The description of alienation which we have discovered in Hegel is transposed in Feuerbach to a naturalistic frame of reference. Human existence is primarily social and historical existence for Hegel, primarily natural existence for Feuerbach. The latter transcends naturalism only where he begins to formulate his philosophy of Love. Thus, his freedom from God, as the overcoming of the alienation of man is a freedom to return to a natural state of being, rather than a freedom to transform nature and change society.

The Lord, as we have seen, is being-for-self, by which is meant freedom to be oneself, freedom from self-deception; it means having a mind of one's own. This is what we meant by self as subject; and we remember that such a freedom from one's own nature and from the determinate way of being in the world involved a life-death struggle. Environmental conditioning, social and psychological determination of the self, and the apparently inviolable objectivity of the way things are, are all overcome when true being-for-self is achieved. For Hegel the Lord deceives himself if he thinks he has achieved this independence and freedom. He is the slave of the slave. Similarly./

Similarly, the slave who becomes a Lord is the slave of the slave. The dualism is not so easy to break.

If God is conceived as Lord and man as slave, then how can man become free from his reified mode of being before God? This is Feuerbach's question. Hegel was asking how man can become free in the transformation of his social and historical existence. Man's true self lies in his power to negate the given and so transform it. For Feuerbach, man becomes himself when he returns to the pure, happy natural existence which he was meant to enjoy. This can be reformulated as follows: If God is being for self, i.e. subject, and man being for another, i.e. object; how can man become free from God, and so able to be himself. Feuerbach's answer is that man should withdraw his projection of God, and realize that "in and through God, man has in view himself alone" (1). HOMO HOMINI DEUS EST: Man is the God of man (2).

Feuerbach's theory of religious faith runs as follows: "Man projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject; he thinks of himself as an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of another being than himself"(3).

Man, in other words, and not God is truly being-for-self. But man, for Feuerbach, is social man. "The essence of man is contained/

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1. Essence of Christianity, transl. George Eliot Harper pg. 30.
  2. Ibid pg. 83, 281, 159, 271, 281. In a work, recently translated, called 'The Essence of Faith according to Luther', Feuerbach substantiates this thesis in an extensive analysis of Luther's theology, and in particular of Luther's Deus pro nobis.
  3. Ibid pg. 30.

contained only in the community and unity of man with man; it is a unity, however, which rests only on the reality of the distinction between I and Thou". "Solitude is finiteness and limitation; community is freedom and infinity. Man for himself is man (in the ordinary sense); man with man, - the unity of I and Thou - is God" (1). Although Feuerbach rejects any monistic confusion of I and Thou; nonetheless man is free, for him, only in so far as he is social man. Social man is being-for-self. The unity of man with man is God (2).

Feuerbach asks us to negate the external objectivity of God; or more significantly the idea of God as subject by which we are condemned to an objective, determinate mode of being. The being of man as subject is reduced to a reified existence, a being for another which alienates him from his essence, which is to be subject i.e. free. So Feuerbach seeks to "invert the oracles of religion" (3); for the "antithesis of divine and human is altogether illusory" (4). Man creates God in his own image; man deceives himself if he believes God to have made him in his own image (5). "God is the mirror of man" (5). In externalizing God, man actively alienates himself from his own essence. Feuerbach sees his anthropology as a therapy for alienation; by withdrawing his projections and becoming aware that Homo homini deus est (Man is the God of Man) (6), man is free to become himself.

However, Feuerbach argues that his anthropology has a double significance, for in teaching the identity of the human and the divine, /

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1. Principles of the philosophy of the future: Para. 59 and 60, pg. 71.
  2. Essence of Christianity, pp. 66-7, 92, 110, 122, 155-8, 160, 167, 283.
  3. Ibid pg. 60.
  4. Ibid pg. 13, Ch. VII.
  5. Essence pg. 63, 118, etc.
  6. Ibid pg. 159.

divine, it not only reduces theology to anthropology, it exalts anthropology to theology, "very much as Christianity while lowering God into man, made man into God" (1). He seeks to persuade theology to give up metaphysics and accept an ethic of love within naturalistic frames of reference. His critique of religious language, together with his not quite positivist refutation of the believer's claim to consciousness of God, are the negative aspects of the positive thesis that a christological ethic must take the place of a metaphysical theology.

"The incarnation is nothing else than the practical, material manifestation of the human nature of God", he writes (2). He agrees with the Greek Fathers and the tradition of Orthodox theology that the deification (*Θεωσις*) of man follows from the divine *Κένωσις* (3). *Deus homo factus est, ut homo Deus fieret* (4), said Augustine, (quoted by Feuerbach). In Christ, according to Hegel, the "immediate existence of actual reality has ceased to be something alien or external to the Divine" (5). The divine being humbles itself and so renounces its "abstract nature and unreality" (6). God exists originally in essential thought, and at this moment, natural existence and the self are denied. The next moment the external reality of God is denied and existence-for-self (human freedom, and responsibility for the self and the world) is affirmed. Hegel saw the acute difficulties involved in this theological dilemma. He calls it a "fruitless struggle" (7). We recognize here the form of the long debate about the transcendence of God and the secular world in recent theology. Hegel sought to solve the problem with his notion of spirit.

Feuerbach/

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1. Essence pg. XV, Principles pg. 71.
  2. Essence of Unity pg. 50.
  3. Ibid ch. IV esp. pg. 50.
  4. Sermon ad Pop p. 371 cl. Essence pg. 51
  5. P.S. p. 775.
  6. P.S. p. 773.
  7. P.S. p. 773.

Feuerbach, on the other hand, took the second alternative, namely, the denial of God and the affirmation of man's existence for self, (which unlike Hegel he conceives to be a natural and determinate existence). The essential idea of the incarnation according to him is love. "Love determined God to the renunciation of his divinity" (1). Feuerbach wished to retain the predicate 'Love', and deny the subject: God. By withdrawing his projection of the idea of a perfect love from the external subject (God), man is freed to see that love is the beginning and end of Christian faith (2). Hegel's notion of spirit as universal self-consciousness embodied in the historic form of the religious communion, becomes Feuerbach's notion of God as the unity of man with man, I and Thou.

Love = God, says Feuerbach, so therefore the "relation of child and parent, of husband and wife, of brother and friend, in general of man to man, - in short all the moral relations are per se religious. Life as a whole is in its essential substantial relations, throughout of a divine nature" (3). The 'real' though hidden subject-matter of theology is man; anthropology, by which Feuerbach means the human sciences of sociology, psychology and so on. Faith in God becomes faith in social man, or the essence of man; and "the essence of man is contained only in the community and unity of man with man" (4). Religious faith becomes a secular, humanist ethic. For Feuerbach the unity of man with man is constituted by Love. "Love", he writes, "is objectively as well as subjectively the criterion of being, of truth and of reality. Where there is no love, there is also no truth, and only he who loves something is something; to be nothing and to love nothing are identical. The more one is the more one loves, and visa versa" (2).

Feuerbach's/

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1. Essence of Unity pg. 53.
  2. Ibid pp. 50-58, also pg. 48.
  3. Ibid pg. 271.
  4. Principles para: 59, pg. 71.
  5. Ibid Para. 35, pg. 54. Essence pg. 48.

Feuerbach's 'Essence of Christianity' and his 'Principles of the philosophy of the future' contain many similar references to Love. His "reduction" of theology to anthropology can be clearly seen in his exegesis of the text "We love God because he first loved us" (1). (1 John 4<sup>19</sup>.) "The love of God makes me loving .... what then is it that I love in God? Love: love to man..... The divine love is only human love, made objective, affirming itself" (2). In arguing that "God is the mirror of man" ~~xxx~~, Feuerbach makes the distinction between fact and essence, between man as he actually is, and man as he ought to be, if he is to be truly himself. God is not, for Feuerbach, a mirror of man's factual being, but of his essence. God is what man ought to be, and what social man, the unity of man with man, can be. Thus, the ontological distinction between the being of God and the being of man is understood by Feuerbach to be a distinction between what can be predicated of man's factual existence and his unrealized essence. It is not a distinction between God as subject and man as subject. For that kind of distinction leads to what Feuerbach calls a "formal subordination" of man to God (3). Feuerbach agrees with the theologian who argues that God must be distinguished from nature, but the distinction between God and nature is nothing else than the distinction between man and nature. The theological debate between pantheism and personalism is a debate about the essence of man. Thus far, Feuerbach's view of the matter is fairly straight-forward.

He has employed the Lord-slave model in his analysis and method/

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1. Essence pg. 57 of: 1 John Ch. IV esp. vv 11, 19, 20, 21.
  2. Ibid pp. 55-7.
  3. Essence pg. 64.

method of reduction, but in so doing he finds that he has to define what he means by the essence of man. He is clear that if God is conceived as independent subject, then man is made formally subordinate to, and so enslaved to, a determinate mode of existence-for-another. So he argues that in denying the subjectivity of God he can detach the divine predicates, and show how they are really predicates of the essence of man. The debate between pantheism and personalism must be transposed, therefore, into a different frame of reference. The debate becomes a debate about whether what man ideally ought to be, and so ought to become, is to be conceived in naturalistic, deterministic categories or personal historical categories. It is a debate about man. What is man? Is he a natural being conditioned by his environment and determined by certain instinctive ways of being in the world? Or can he transcend his own nature, and free himself from his determinate existence? Can he at some point achieve the maturity of assured self-consciousness which will enable him to assume responsibility for the world which produced him? Does his 'essence' lie within the dimension of the former, or the latter?

On the one hand, Feuerbach argues that: "He alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of the divine being, - for example, love, wisdom, justice, - are nothing; not he to whom merely the subject of these predicates are nothing" (1). To deny the subjectivity of God (Lordship) frees man to become what he essentially is (i.e. free being-for-self, assured self-consciousness, etc.). To deny the predicates of the divine subject is to deny what man essentially is. Feuerbach tries to combine/

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1. Essence pg. 21, also 18-19.

combine this doctrine of the essence of man with an empirical naturalism. This leads him to confuse fact and essence precisely at the point where consistency demanded him to maintain it. For he equates the essence of man, (as that which man ought to be, but is not), with his nature or genus, or the nature of the human species in general, or with the aggregate of all human individuals taken collectively, with, in other words, what man already is. This involves him in a positivistic confusion of fact and essence. - An all-too-confined empiricism will not allow him to hold fact and essence in creative antithesis, but leads him to reduce the latter to the former. Thus, there is no critical negation of what is the case, no idea of 'what ought to be the case, but is not the case'. With his "sacred idea of the species" (1) Feuerbach has equated actual human nature, or what man, either individually or collectively, already is; with what man essentially ought to be, ("is" in a wholly different sense); thus he excludes that critical negation of the given natural and social realities which alone leads to their transformation.

On the other hand, Feuerbach departs from this view, when he seeks to define man's essence (as distinct from his natural existence) in terms of the divine predicates. It is true that his equation of the divine predicates with man's essence is part of a circular argument, and is, to this extent, typical of all reductionism. Its starting point and necessary condition is the metaphysical belief that the independent, transcendent reality of God is an illusion. This belief conforms to the logic of all metaphysical overstatements, for it claims indubitably to know that/

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1. Essence pg. 151.

that something does not exist because we cannot know whether it exists or not. If Feuerbach, like Kant, confined the knowable to that which can in principle be an object of sensory experience and therefore argued that God cannot be so known, then his claim to know what a priori he could not know, namely that God does not exist, (and is therefore an illusion), would be nonsensical. Leaving this point aside however, his attempt to equate the divine predicates with the predicates of man's essence introduces transcendent categories like Love, justice, etc. which are not consistent with the naturalistic reductionism outlined above. "Love", says Feuerbach "gives me consciousness that I a man ..... Love is God himself; and apart from it there is no God. Love makes man God and God man" (1).

The Category of the Other, or the Thou, is integral to this notion of Love. "In another, I first have the consciousness of humanity; through him I first learn, I first feel that I am a man: in my love for him it is first clear to me that he belongs to me and I to him, that we two cannot be without each other, that only community constitutes humanity" ..... There is, nonetheless, a "qualitative, critical distinction between the I and Thou". (2).

It is, first of all, clear that Feuerbach agrees with Hegel that there is no consciousness of the external world which is not inherently a self-consciousness, and there is no self-consciousness which is not the product of the relation of one self-consciousness with another. For Hegel being for self is possible only when being for another is negated, mediated, and finally transformed in the trial by death. For Feuerbach there is/

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1. Essence pg. 48.
  2. Ibid pg. 158.

is no I without a Thou. "The Ego", he says, "attains to consciousness of the world through conscious-ness of the Thou" (1). Feuerbach does not, however, speak of the life-death struggle. The unity of man with man is not forged in the heat of intersubjective strife, but in the loving warmth of the child's relation to its mother, or in the love of man and wife (2). But like Hegel, Feuerbach does not consider the concrete ethical problems of intersubjectivity except as a means to an end. The end for Hegel was, as we saw, spirit knowing itself as spirit (3). The end for Feuerbach is the species knowing itself as species (4). "Man and woman", he says, "are the complement of each other, and thus united they first present the species, the perfect man" (5). In the Idea of the species Feuerbach employs a category which conforms to his satisfaction with his naturalism and yet transcends the conditional, limited, imperfect existence of the individual man. "Man cannot lose the consciousness of the species, for his self-consciousness is essentially united to his consciousness of another than himself" (6). Unlike the Christian, with his "excessive transcendental subjectivity" (7), Feuerbach's man needs the other; sexuality is integral to human existence (8). "My fellow man", he concludes, "is per se the mediator between me and the sacred idea of the species" (9). This is the hidden truth of the doctrine of Christ as mediator between the individual and God.

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1. Ibid pg. 83.
  2. Essence pg. 65ff; 247ff.
  3. L.S. Ch. VIII esp.
  4. Essence pg. 156
  5. Ibid pg. 156
  6. Ibid pg. 157
  7. Essence pg. 167
  8. Ibid pgs. 92, 156-7, 167, 170 etc.
  9. Ibid pg. 159.

The species is perfect man, the *ens realissimum*, *id quo nihil majus cogitari potest*, (that than which nothing greater can be conceived). Social man, man with man, is the "essence" to which Feuerbach reduces God. The species is holy; and all interpersonal relationships are holy, because the unity of I and Thou is God. God does not transcend social man, though He transcends the individual. "The beginning, middle and end of religion is MAN" (1). Only social man is free, only social man transcends the determinate limits of individual man. The truth is disclosed in intersubjective interaction because any true way of being in the world (authentic existence) must be intersubjective. Thus, with his concept of essence, Feuerbach transcends his own naturalistic frame of reference and enters the historical world of man's social existence. Freedom is a transcendence of all 'natural existence', and cannot be understood with concepts such as *Genus*, or species, or even the universally human. For freedom negates and overcomes nature; essence contradicts the realities of human nature, the two cannot after all, be equated. This is the fundamental ambiguity of Feuerbach's "natural philosophy in the realm of mind"(2).

What light can Feuerbach throw on the problems under discussion? It is clear, first of all, that Christianity, for Feuerbach, is the symptom par excellence of man's self-alienation. Hegel had argued that certain kinds of Christian self-understanding, and certain conceptions of God, were symptoms of his self-alienation; whereas Christian faith and life, the life, speech and deed which accords with the *Λόγος*, rightly comprehended, is the remedy. But we have seen that Feuerbach's position is ambiguous./

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1. Essence pg. 184.
  2. Ibid pg. XXXIV

ambiguous. Theology is anthropology, but anthropology thereby receives the significance of theology. The meaning of God is the unity of man with man, but the unity of man with man is thereby given the ultimate significance which was once ascribed exclusively to God. Feuerbach has overcome the either/or of the unhappy consciousness in a form of humanistic monism, a metaphysic which is often confusedly ascribed to Hegel. The difference between them lies in Hegel's dealing dialectically with what Feuerbach reduces to a static monism. Feuerbach thinks he has overcome the Lord-slave dualism in its theological dimension, and he may be right. But he fails to see the wider significance of the dualism which Hegel exposes in his phenomenology of man's social and psychological alienation. Marx, on the other hand, did see its significance in man's social, economic and political life, though he was unaware of the extent to which it throws light upon man's psychological alienation. It was left to Freud to fill out this gap. Marx does succeed, however, in giving the discussion a new shape, mainly because of his insistence upon praxis as the fulfilment of Theoria. "The philosophers", he wrote, "have only interpreted the world differently, the point is to change it" (1). Ernst Bloch argues that "here primarily does Marxism distinguish itself qualitatively from all previous philosophy: hence also from Hegel's, to which it is most akin. For with one leap forward to the new as history never experienced it before, there begins through Marx a transformation of philosophy - through continuation and sublation of Hegel's - into a philosophy of world transformation" (2). Here Bloch is right to show the living/

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1. Eleventh thesis on Feuerbach
  2. Lukács': Marxism, Alienation dialectics and Revolution  
by Zitta pg. 151.

living connection between the work of Hegel and Marx, a connection which is all too often obscured by those who fail to see that thinking for Hegel is a comprehending or laying hold of alien externality which is both praxis as well as theoria. An over-intellectualist interpretation of Hegel easily obscures that. For Hegel, to reason is to act; it is to negate irrational reality. Whereas knowledge, even taking account of the synthesizing activity of the subject, entails a passive, observing attitude to the way things are; reason, for Hegel, is active, negative, transforming. It is not insignificant that Hegel's thought was called 'negative' as opposed to 'positive' in relation to established realities, nor that it was called the algebra of the revolution. It is not insignificant that the first communist revolution took place in a country where Hegelianism had been a deep and powerful intellectual force for a long time. Hegel's Geist participates in the evolutionary power which has always been present in any genuine theology of the Christian  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ .

When Marx criticizes Feuerbach, he does so with Hegelian reasoning. We see this in the following passage, quoted in full. "The chief defect of all previous materialism (including that of Feuerbach) is that things (gegenstand), reality, the sensible world, are conceived only in the form of objects (objekt) of observation, but not as human sense activity, not as practical activity, not subjectively. Hence, in opposition to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism, which of course does not know real sense activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensible objects really distinguished from objects of thought, but he does not understand human activity itself as objective/

objective (gegenständlich) activity. Consequently, in 'The Essence of Christianity', he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuine human attitude, while practical activity is apprehended only in its dirty Jewish manifestation. He therefore does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary', 'practical-critical' activity" (1). We have argued that Marx has misunderstood Hegel, if by abstract, he means that Hegel's philosophy has no place for concrete praxis. We shall leave aside the question as to whether Marx's criticism is true of the later Hegel, and concentrate on his criticism of Feuerbach.

Marx rightly sees that Feuerbach's naturalistic-humanism is not far from a positivistic preoccupation with the facts, which is, in its turn, perhaps, not so far from an absolutely reductionist scientism as is sometimes argued. Lukács convincingly argues that Marx was never a positivist in this sense, though Engels probably tended toward it in his interpretation of Marx as well as his own thinking (2). Following Lukács, Merleau-Ponty argues that "a marxist conception of human society and of economic society in particular cannot subordinate it to permanent laws like those of classical physics, because it sees society heading toward a new arrangement in which the laws of classical economics will no longer apply" (3). Scientism is a case of alienation (entfremdung), for Lukács and Merleau-Ponty. This is not to say that, for Marx, every subject-object relation is a case of alienation. Kline is correct to argue that Berdyaev and Sartre are misinterpreting Marx when they believe him/

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1. First thesis on Feuerbach. Selected Writings of Marx: Rubel and Bottomore pgs. 82-4. or also Marx and Engels 'on Religion' pgs. 69-72.
  2. Zitta: Lukács Ibid pg. 121ff.
  3. Merleau-Ponty: 'Sense and Nonsense': Marxism and Philosophy pg. 126.

him to be attacking objectification (Vergegenständlichung) when he attacks alienation (1). Marx is concerned to show, in Das Kapital, that the so-called laws of social reality are relative to a certain social structure (capitalism). To absolutize "laws", or to conform passively to the facts, is to revert to Feuerbach's mistaken epistemology. Lukács argues that Hegel's position is never, even in later life, a passive conservatism. He could not become a socialist because the economic situation in Germany was not yet ripe for socialism. He exposed the contradictions of the bourgeois world, but it was not the time for political action (2). Hyppolite agrees with Lukács that Adam Smith's 'Wealth of Nations', published in 1776, and translated into German in 1794-6, exercised a "very profound influence" upon Hegel, though Hegel goes beyond Adam Smith, and in this he anticipates Marx, when he analyses the contradictions of the established social order (3).

In conclusion, Feuerbach's thesis is that man is a slave of God in so far as he remains fettered to his projections; the purpose of his philosophy was to show us how man can be redeemed from this alienation, and allowed to regain the happy consciousness of natural existence. For Marx, as we shall see in the next chapter, man is slave to his social conditions, and his religious suffering is both an expression of, and a protest against this enslavement. Religion eases the pain of living in the cruel, unjust, inhuman world of Capitalist society. It is the drug which enables man to endure the existing order without sharing its insanity. For Hegel, religion is both an expression of the insanity./

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1. Kline: Rediscovery of Marx and Hegel in: Phenomenology and Existentialism, Ed. Lee and Mandelbaum pg. 122.
  2. G. Lukács: Das Junge Hegel 1948
  3. J. Hyppolite: Hegel et Marx pg. 85.

insanity of man's social existence, and the sanity which is born in and through insanity. It is both brokenness and wholeness, disease and health, alienation and redemption. The difference between the first form of religion and the second is the difference 'comprehension' makes to man, the difference being-for-self makes to being-in-itself, the difference self-consciousness makes to every thought, word and deed of man.

## CHAPTER X

## GOD MONEY AND THE ALIENATION OF MAN:

## MARX.

"To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself" (1). For Marx, as for socialist man, "the whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labour, and the emergence of nature for man, he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins" (2). To grasp the situational logic of human being is for Marx to grasp that man becomes what he is through labour and struggle. Marx approves Hegel's conception of labour as "man's act of self-creation" (3). Man is a product of his "self-formation through practical activity" (4). "As society itself produces man as man, so it is produced by him" (5). To grasp things by the root, we must recognize, as Feuerbach does, that man is the God of man, man is aliquid quo nihil maius nihil cogitari potest. Man is ens realissimum (6), that than which nothing greater can be conceived, man is his own highest being (7). Man is the root of things. Man is Marx's point of departure, and the thinking of the Early manuscripts revolves around the eschatological question as to whether we can legitimately hope to see the facts of our human situation changed to correspond to the values we hold most passionately. Or are the facts necessarily void of value, or unchangeable, /

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1. Early Manuscripts 1844 pg. 52.
  2. Ibid pg. 166.
  3. Ibid pg. 213.
  4. Ibid pg. 189.
  5. Ibid pg. 157.
  6. Feuerbach Essence pgs. 38-9, 83, 159, 271, 281.
  7. Ibid pg. 36, also pg. 34, 98, 198, 213.

unchangeable, and therefore hopeless?

We begin, then, with Marx's analysis of the Lord-slave dialectic, and so with the logic of the human situation. Merleau-Ponty calls the dialectic a "situational logic" (1), which in Marx's hands grasps what man is, in order to disclose the contradiction between what man is and what he ought to be. It is an attempt to understand the facts in order better to contradict them, to understand alienation in order to overcome it, to understand the negation in order to negate it. It is the "negation of the negation" because it is the negation and so transcendence of an order which alienates man, and is therefore negative in opposition to man's true being. Marxist theory is a theory of man's transformation which does not stop at theory; it is a theory which is also praxis, a philosophy of human action.

Our starting-point is a fairly long, but important, passage from the second section of the 3rd manuscript, entitled 'Private property and Communism' (2). This will introduce the categorical frame-work within which we shall be working in this part of the treatise.

"Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of human nature through and for man. It is, therefore, the return of man himself as a social ie. a really human being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development. Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism, and as a fully developed/

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1. Marxism and Philosophy in Sense and Nonsense pg. 129.  
 2. Manuscripts 1844 pgs. 152 to 167.

developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history, and knows itself to be this solution" (1).

The connection between Marx's conception of communism as the true coincidentia oppositorum, the connection ( ἄρμονία ) between the opposites - whose strife makes history both creative and destructive, - and Hegel's dialectic, will be obvious to anyone familiar with the discussion undertaken so far in this study. Marx stands firmly in the Heraclitean tradition of dialectical thinking, and it is in this context that we proceed to discuss his 'Economic and philosophical manuscripts' of 1844. We are not, here, concerned with his economic theory, but with his philosophy. Even if all Marx's economic theories were superseded, we should still have his dialectical philosophy. We will not have time to follow his arguments into Das Kapital, but will confine ourselves, for the purposes of this study, to the aspects of the Early Manuscripts which are of importance to our subject.

The passage we have just quoted summarizes some of the ideas we wish to investigate. We begin with an exposition of them. We shall then concentrate on the dialectic of Lord and slave in particular, in order to understand what light Marx throws/

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1. Manuscripts 1844 pg. 155.

throws upon our general problem of intersubjectivity.

We begin with the passage we have quoted. Marx, like Hegel and Freud, assumes a standpoint which entails some measure of freedom from the phenomena of the world and society he is trying to understand. "Let us assume man to be man, and his relation to the world to be a human one", he says. We can assume something to be the case which is not the case; the point of view we adopt rests upon our recognition that the real is not rational, that what is the case ought not to be the case if man is to become man. If we assume man is man, we can then come to see the extent to which he is not man. Man is not himself, for Marx. Man is "possessed", he does not possess himself. Both Capitalist-Lord and Slave-Worker are possessed, alienation pervades human existence.

The divine power of money, is, according to Marx, the princeps mundi; Money is the deus huius seculi. But money is also the alienated and self-alienating species-life (Gattungaleben) or species-being (Gattungwesen) of man. It is the alienated power of humanity (1). Money possesses man, though in truth man is ultimately responsible for the life-situation in which money has come to possess him (2). This can be seen only from a standpoint of critique; for like Hegel, Marx finds it necessary to establish a standpoint which transcends the realities and rationalities which are "possessed", in order to dispossess or redeem them.

So Marx asks his readers to assume something which is not the case, namely that man is man. If man is to be man, "love can only/

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1. Manuscripts 1844 pg. 192

2. "An inhuman power rules over everything" - said Marx. Everything becomes other than its true "essence" under the power of capitalist alienation. Even the Capitalist is in bondage. Manuscripts pg. 178.

only be exchanged for love, trust for trust". Man, if he is to be man, is what he is, quite apart from how much money he has (1). He cannot buy love, trust or a place in the human community. But because in reality man is not man, human values are forgotten and economic "values" put in their place. In the real socio-economic order, the more you have the more you are; without money you are nothing. Marx is therefore trying to establish a standpoint from which the "being" of human being is not confused or equated with "having" money. In the present order, everything must be bought. Nothing can be had without money. Money therefore possesses everything. That is why the Capitalist Lord very understandably, indeed necessarily, seeks to repress and exploit the Worker-Slave. He needs the money. The princeps mundi, money, possesses and determines the world of men, nature and society.

To assume that man is man, that the irrational ought not to be, that money ought not to be God, that human values are more important than economic ones, is communism. Communism values "being", and relegates "having" to second place. In this sense, therefore, communism is the abolition of human self-alienation, according to Marx. The system of private property in its alienated form is a kind of madness. It is "possession". Man cannot be himself. He is reduced to being a commodity. He does not fulfil himself in work, he denies himself. At work he is homeless (2). In his human functions, he is reduced to an animal. His activity is suffering (3). Work alienates him from the species, and so from himself, because he is a species-being/.

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1. Manuscripts pg. 193.
  2. Manuscripts pg. 125.
  3. Ibid pg. 126.

being. He is alienated from other men (1), from his own body, from external nature, his mental life and his human life. His life is "servitude to the object" (2). The worker is a "slave of the object" (3). Communism is subject regaining substance.

Thus, communism is man regaining his self-hood; it is liberation from universal bondage to the God Mammon, the princeps mundi. "Money", says Marx, "abases all the Gods of mankind and changes them into commodities. Money is the universal and self-sufficient value of all things" (4). Communism is the death of this God; and the rebirth of man as man. It is a naturalism because apart from nature, and apart from his own human nature, man is not. Similarly nature, "taken abstractly, for itself, and rigidly separated from man, is nothing for men" (5).

Communism is therefore, also, a transformation of nature into a human, historic world, in a human way, for human beings.

Communism is true community; it is the social order of communion of man with man. In this sense, then, it resolves the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. In this sense it is the true resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, because it calls man's essence into existence through "revolutionary practical-critical" action (6). Communism transcends the situational logic which necessitates the alienation of another in my self-affirmation; it transforms the world in which the life-death struggle of Hegel is the sine qua non of self-consciousness. It achieves freedom in the choice of the only "necessary" way, the way of proletarian revolution; in revolution, all past social "necessities", conceived as rigid natural/

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1. Ibid pg. 129.
  2. Ibid pg. 122.
  3. Ibid pg. 123.
  4. Ibid pg. 37.
  5. Ibid pg. 217.
  6. First thesis on Feuerbach.

natural laws, are dissolved. Finally, the individual regains his social-being as species life; his conflict with other men is mediated into peaceful, classless, co-operation, and creative intersubjective interaction. It is for these reasons, then, that Marx called communism the "solution of the riddle of history" (1). We shall discuss this notion of "solution" in relation to dialectic towards the end of this chapter, for it is of obvious and profound significance.

We have introduced some of the main themes of the early writings of 1843 and 1844; and with the help of a brief exposition of one of the most definitive statements of what Marx thought communism ought to be, we take note that Marx sought to liberate social man from egoism, society from madness, the working class from alienation and suffering, and the capitalist Lords from their legalized, state-protected killing <sup>and</sup> stealing. We must now turn with more attention to the text of the manuscripts

The outstanding achievement of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit', according to Marx, is that Hegel grasped the self-creation of man as process, as the result of his own labour. He conceives labour as the essence, the self-confirming essence, of man; but he saw only the positive side of labour. Labour, for Marx, is man's coming to be for himself within alienation, as an alienated man. Labour can be understood as a creative principle only within the framework of Hegel's "dialectic of negativity"; Marx therefore introduces the distinction between alienated and authentic labour (2).

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1. Manuscripts pg. 155.
  2. Manuscripts 1844 pgs. 202-3.

For both Hegel and Marx, the labour and struggle of self-creation, or "self-formation" (1) in practical activity, produces two kinds of human being, two ways of being human in the world. One, being-for-self, is independent, or apparently independent; the other is dependent, in that it is being-for-another. The former is the Lord, the latter the Slave. We have seen that according to Kojève, Hegel believed that man's historic future is in the hands of the slave who becomes Lord of the Lords; the slave as stoic-sceptic, or as Christian, eventually becomes the world-constituting agent responsible for the new world of the spirit. The slave is the man who works toward the eschatological fulfilment of all things for all men. For Marx, "the whole of society divides into two classes of property owners and propertyless workers", capital and labour. Capital is being for self, Lordship; labour is being for another, slavery, and so alienated labour.

According to Marx, "labour is the essence of wealth", (2), "Capital is stored up labour" (3). Thus, the apparently absolute dualism of Marx's class war between Lords and Slaves, capital and labour, is not absolute at all; it is the result of the alienation of one single phenomenon, human labour, man as labourer. Private property as subject, as "activity for itself" is labour; labour is the "subjective essence" of private property (4). Capital is alienated labour; nonetheless labour is the essence of capital. Marx argues that "the worker is the subjective manifestation of the fact that capital is man wholly lost to himself, just as capital is the objective manifestation of the fact that labour is man lost to himself" (5).

Capital/

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1. Ibid pg. 189.
  2. Manuscripts 1844, pg. 148.
  3. Ibid pg. 85.
  4. Ibid pg. 147.
  5. Ibid pg. 137.

Capital is the human reality of the worker stolen from him, it is his own being alienated from him, and so lost to him. As a worker man exists solely for the sake of capital, which is his own being alien to him as the property of someone else. The old distinction between capitalist and landowner, between slave and free worker or hireling is merely what Marx calls an "historical distinction", not one "inscribed in the nature of things" (1). "The final result", says Marx, "is that, broadly speaking, there remain only two classes in the population, the working class and the capitalist class" (2). This simple dualism of Lord and slave in man's social and economic life is the result of the complete triumph of the "aristocracy of money".

For Marx, the God of this world is money; all men are its servants. Hegel's death of God, and rebirth of God as spirit in history, is, for Marx, transposed into a vision of human reality liberated from money, the Lord of this world. The spirit of this world is Jewish, in that money has become, through the Jew, but also apart from him, a "world power" (3). "Money", wrote Marx, "is an omnipotent being" (4); "money is the highest good, and so its possessor is good" (5). Money is the "bond which binds me to human life, and society to me", it "links me with nature and man", it is the "bond of all bonds" (6). "The divine power of money" confuses and inverts all human and natural qualities, it brings about the fraternization of incompatible (7). "Money is the external universal means and power (not derived from/

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1. Ibid pgs. 113 and 140.
  2. Ibid pg. 113.
  3. Manuscripts pg. 35.
  4. Ibid pg. 189.
  5. Ibid pg. 191.
  6. Ibid pg. 191.
  7. Ibid pg. 192.

from man as man, nor from human society as society) ~~as society~~ to change representation into reality and reality into mere representation" (1). What I, as a man, am unable to do, and thus what all my individual faculties are unable to achieve, is made possible for me by money (2). Whether I am ugly, lame, detestable, dishonourable, unscrupulous or stupid is of no importance; "that which exists for me through the medium of money, that which I can pay for, that I am, the possessor of money" (3). I am presumed honest because money saves me the trouble of being dishonest.

The slave of the Lord of this world, Money, is despite his pleasure-seeking appearance, an ascetic, whose principle is the "renunciation of life and of human needs". The God money demands the renunciation of one's humanity; for everything which is taken away from men by way of their life and humanity is restored in the form of money and wealth. "The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or balls, the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc. the more you will be able to save, and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor rust will corrupt - your capital". "THE LESS YOU ARE .... THE MORE YOU HAVE". The less you express your life, the greater is your alienated life, and the greater is your saving of alienated being" (4). The morality of this ascetical ethic is gain, thrift and sobriety (5); it is the gift/

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1. Ibid pg. 193
  2. Ibid pg. 192
  3. Ibid pg. 191
  4. Manuscripts pg. 171. Compare Kierkegaard's dictum: "The more you think the less you are". Here Kierkegaard criticizes Hegel's supposed reduction of the real to thought. Marx thought that this kind of criticism did not penetrate the real problem. For intellectualism is only a symptom of the deeper alienation of all human being in the capitalist world of 'having'.
  5. Ibid pg. 173.

gift of self to the God money. The world, for Marx, is an "enslaved world", practical need, self-interest, egoism, competitive antagonism, dehumanization and suffering characterize it. The devout and politically free New Englander adores his idol mammon "not only with his lips, but with the whole force of his body and mind" (1). For him, the world is the stock exchange; and "he is convinced that he has no other destiny here below than to become richer than his neighbour". Politics, in principle superior to the power of money, in practice is its slave (2). The Capitalist Lord and the Worker-Slave are both alike slaves to Lord capital, the God who holds both captive. The dominion and power of money is the negation of man's humanity, his freedom, his nature, his essence; Communism, for Marx, is the "negation of this negation" (3). Communism is the abolition of private property, the negation of the social and economic order ruled by the God money: It is in this sense the "positive abolition of human self-alienation". It is negation, negative action, critique, because it is the "real appropriation of human nature, through and for man". Man in capitalistic society is not himself; he is ruled by another. He is possessed. He is insane. Marx's critique spreads broadly into the whole of human life; it is not confined to the homo economicus. His theory of alienation is a theory of madness, a theory of how humanity is possessed by a stranger to itself, who is at the same time itself. It is also an eschatology, a Theoria of the future. It answers the third of Kant's three questions, the three/

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1. Ibid pg. 35.

2. Ibid pg. 36.

3. Manuscripts pg. 176, 197, 215, 216, etc.

three questions which combine all the interests of Reason, speculation, metaphysics, ethics, and religion. It answers the question "What may I hope?" with a philosophy of human action. For Marx, the question "What ought I to do?" depends upon the answer given to the question about hope. It does so because Marx believed in human nature, a human nature which is not yet, but which we seek to become through labour and action(1).

We saw that because capital is stored up labour, and thus the essence of wealth, labour, is the common intersubjective reality which is the "truth" of both capital and labour in their alienation. We set beside this concrete synthesis of the class war another synthesis, which is almost a theism, namely the domination by the God Money of both capital and labour, Lords and slaves. However, before we turn to the problems raised by both these aspects of Marx's thought, we shall state the doctrine of the class war in a summary form.

Every society, according to Marx, consists of a governing class, and a class which is governed; every society knows class struggle as its own essential reality. There is always a class who dominates, and a class who is dominated, a class who exploits and a class who is exploited. The state is the tool of the dominant class. In other words, all societies consist of Lords and Slaves, and the state has always been instrumental in the exploitation and repression of the Slaves by the Lords. Only some men can be human, unfettered and free; the others must be things, instruments of the Lord's will and desire. There are only two broad classes in the population because the landowner, the Lord of immovable property is transformed into a capitalist/

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1. Kant: Critique of Pure Reason: The Canon of pure Reason, Section 2 of Chapter II, Part II, pg. 635.

capitalist or ruined; he becomes a Lord of moveable property in the same social process that causes the serf's enslavement to become that of the paid worker. In principle, the whole product of labour belongs to the man who works production. Capitalist accumulation is therefore theft. Everything is bought with labour, capital is only accumulated labour.

The cruel injustice of this legalized system of theft, with its repression of the many by the few, is for Marx the sign that money is the Lord of the world. Human rights within such a world are only the rights of self-interest, the rights of egoistic man, "man separated from other men and from the community" (1). It is man as "an isolated monad withdrawn into himself" who prescribes the rights of the circumscribed individual, the citizen. It is pre-eminently the right to own private property which, for Marx, discloses the cruel selfishness of the capitalist order. Security in such an order is merely the assurance of its egoism (2). The only bond between men in such an order is natural necessity, need, and private interest, the preservation of property and egoistic self-concern. In 1843, Marx had already formulated this fundamental critique of capitalistic society, his later work fills out the formal skeleton with the relevant body of economic facts (3). Whether this substantially changes Marx's standpoint, so that we must speak of an earlier and a later Marx, is still an open question.

Marx's formulation of what man ought to be, namely a being in community, in communication and communion with others, seems to/

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1. Manuscripts pg. 24.

2. Ibid pg. 24-26.

3. 'On the Jewish question' pgs. 3-40 of the Early Manuscripts.

to owe something to Feuerbach's notion of the "essence of man", which he calls God. It is a concept of man's essence, expressed as his "species-being" (1), or "species-life" (2). The terms Gattungswesen (species-being) and Gattungslieben (species-life) are Feuerbach's alternatives to Hegel's Geist; for Feuerbach, man contemplates his species being in contemplating God. God is man's human nature, and is not therefore alien to man, nor man alienated from God. God is man as a social, species being. The "necessary turning point of history", writes Feuerbach, "is the open confession that the consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of the species" (3). "Man can and should raise himself above the limits of his individuality, but not above the laws, the positive essential conditions, of his species". Marx follows Feuerbach in defining the true nature of man as species-consciousness, and agrees with Feuerbach that self-centred individualism is a denial of the true nature or essence of man. We are not going to discuss this difficult concept in detail at this point, though we shall return to it. Our purpose in mentioning it was to throw light upon the reality of man's social life which Marx understood to stand in sharp opposition to his essence. The reality of man's social-life is dehumanized, and has become a relation between things. Egoism has set every man against his neighbour, so that there is a war of all against all. (*Bellum omnium contra omnes* (4)). Man is separated from himself, other men, and the community; his social being, his essence as species-being, is denied./

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1. Manuscripts pg. 128.
  2. Ibid pg. 13
  3. Essence of Christianity pg. 270.
  4. Manuscripts pg. 15.

denied.

Social strife is, therefore, the fundamental datum; the dualism of Lord and Slave the inevitable impasse of the established order. The class struggle is the fundamental ontological structure of man's being as it is; but, for Marx it can and must be changed. Marx subordinates political theory, (theory of the state), to socio-economic theory (theory of society, and of man as a social being), because the class struggle precedes political structure. The state is merely a tool in the hands of the Lords in their struggle to dominate the slaves. The egoism and individualism of the Lords negates man's true social being. To change the world and to recover man's social being in a new world, the Lord-slave dualism must become dialectic. Marx is not, here, advocating a collectivism which absorbs the individual or annihilates his freedom and distinctive character; he is very critical of what he calls "crude communism". Crude communism is the result of envy and the desire to reduce ever thing to a common level. It wishes to eliminate talent by force; and the role of worker, far from being abolished, is extended to all men. Women become common property, and so pass from marriage to universal prostitution. This reveals what Marx calls the "open secret of this entirely crude and unreflective communism" (1).

Crude communism which negates the personality of man is only the crude opposite of the system of private property. "Universal envy", says Marx, "setting itself up as a power, is only a camouflaged form of cupidity, which re-establishes itself and satisfies itself in a different way" (2). Crude communism is/

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1. Manuscripts pg. 153

2. Ibid pg. 153.

is not a genuine abolition of private property, nor is it a genuine appropriation of the products of labour by labour: This is shown by its "abstract negation" of the world of culture and civilization. It is in fact a regression to the unnatural simplicity of the "poor and wantless individual who has not only not surpassed private property, but has not yet even attained to it" (1).

Man as human-being is species-being; he is a social being. Collectivism dehumanizes; man as a social being is not therefore immersed or absorbed in any universal or collective consciousness. What then does Marx mean by man's social being? Man, says Marx, is a unique individual in all his particularity, but it is precisely his individuality that reveals that he is an "individual communal being" (2). Man, for Marx, is what he is only in his association with other men. The individual as particular individual, is therefore a "manifestation of social life". "The individual is the social being" ..... "individual human life and species-life are not different things" (3). The individual is the "representation and the real mind of social existence" (4). Because man is not to be conceived as absorbed in society, because society itself is relative to the individual's social life or being, society cannot be postulated as an abstraction confronting the individual. Society, unlike the God money, does not possess man or dehumanize him. Like Hegel's Geist, society is./

1. Manuscripts pg. 154.

2. Ibid pg. 158. cf: also theses VI on Feuerbach, where Marx criticizes Feuerbach's conception of the essence of man as genus, as an "inner and mute universal quality" which unites man in a purely natural and biological manner. It is not a truly intersubjective, historical and social category in Feuerbach.

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

is, only in so far as man is a social being. Society is not a reality external to, and therefore alien to, the individual as social being. If it were, it would be another God, another form of human alienation. Only crude communism continues to dehumanize man, by collectivizing the individual.

How, in that case, did Marx conceive the way that man would regain his own essential nature as a social being? His answer to this question was that "the emancipation of society from private property, from servitude, take the political form of the emancipation of the workers: not in the sense that only the latter's emancipation is involved but because this emancipation includes the emancipation of humanity as a whole" (1). For Hegel, the slave is historic man in that he masters the natural world and so frees himself. The slave knew that he was finite, he knew it through anxiety and fear. Thus, freedom is possible for the slave, and not for the Lord. For Marx, too, the worker-slave frees the whole of humanity, just as for the early Christians, their Lord was also the suffering servant who redeems humanity. Marx argues that "a class must be formed which has radical chains" ....., "a class which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society which has a universal character because its sufferings are universal". A "total redemption of humanity" is possible only as a "total loss of humanity". The dissolution of society, as a particular class, is the proletariat (2). Only through the proletariat, the slaves, can the new order be called into being.

Unlike Marx, Hobbes and Spinoza thought that the struggle between egoistical individuals was permanent. It cannot be transformed/

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1. Manuscripts 1844, pg. 132.  
2. Ibid pg. 58.

transformed into a new social world where man could be social man. The struggle can only be held within bounds by the sovereign will of the state, that is, by law. Things cannot be fundamentally changed; but they can be checked through the enforcement of obedience to a common law. A socio-economic covenant reinforced by law is the only synthesis capable of reconciling man with man. For Hobbes, the bellum omnium contra omnes, the civil war of all against all, of individualistic society, could be controlled only if the sovereign had sufficient power to enforce peace. For Spinoza, toleration and freedom of thought were far more valuable than anything an authoritarian sovereign could produce. The laws and conventions of society alone can hold society together; and the rationality of law and society must be judged according to whether it promotes or impedes the free man's rational love and understanding of nature (1).

Marx, on the other hand, did not think that the bellum omnium contra omnes was permanent. As a fact of all past social life, it must be understood, but understood in order to be changed. Hobbes' notion of obedience led only to a re-enforcement of the status quo, and Spinoza lacked the theory of political or revolutionary action, without which a free society cannot be realized. For Marx, society does not conform to permanent laws, like those of classical physics, because he sees society as moving painfully toward a new order, where the laws of classical economics, as well as of the "nature" of social reality, will no longer apply (2). Philosophy for Marx, as for Hegel,/

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1. of. Stuart Hampshire: Spinoza pgs. 177ff. Marcuse: Reason and Revolution pg. 79f. Aron: Democracy and Totalitarianism pg. 20.
  2. of. Merleau-Ponty, Marxism and Philosophy in Sense and Nonsense pg. 126.

Hegel, is idealism to the extent that it reflects about the essence of man, the shape of the old world in relation to the new, and the means whereby man's essential nature might be called into being. German idealism had grasped the active roll of the world-creating subject in this task, and Feuerbach had grasped the material-sensual nature of the task. But idealism for Marx, was too abstract to grasp that to change the world, "human sense activity" was essential, and materialism (including Feuerbach's naturalism) is too passive, too theoretical, to grasp that far more than observation by the senses was required. "He does not grasp", Marx argues, "the significance of 'revolutionary' 'practical-critical' activity"(1). But philosophy cannot, as a consequence, work on its own. It must find its "material weapons" in the proletariat; just as the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy (2).

"When the proletariat announces the dissolution of the existing social order, it only declares the secret of its own existence, for it is the effective dissolution of this order. When the proletariat demands the negation of private property, it only lays down as a principle for society what society has already made a principle for the proletariat, and what the latter already involuntarily embodies as the negative result of society" (3).

We have now introduced enough of Marx's ideas relevant to our discussion, to begin to examine them in greater detail.

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1. Theses on Feuerbach I pg: 82 of Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy pg. 82.
  2. Manuscripts pg. 59.
  3. Ibid pgs. 58-9.

We begin with the notion of reciprocity inherent in Marx's conception of man as 'product' and 'producer'. We have seen that for Marx man is himself the product of his own self-creative activity; at the same time his "activity and mind are social in their content as well as in their origin", which means that man's being is constituted in and by his social environment. Dialectic shows the multiplicity of interconnections between these contrasting conceptions, by describing the kinds of unapparent connection between intentional self or subject and environmental structures. This is what Hegel is doing when he traces the changing structures of the one dualism of Lord-slave. Marx is speaking dialectically when he brings nature and history together in lively interaction, in conceptions such as a "realized naturalism of man", or a "realized humanism of nature" (1). Human praxis transforms nature into a human, historic world. Nature becomes what it is for man, and so historical; and history encompasses the whole of natural existence. The proposition we are going to examine with particular attention, however, is one which is of more direct interest to this discussion.

"As Society produces man as man, so it is produced by him"(2) For Marx, according to Merleau-Ponty, "Man no longer appears as a product of his environment, or as an absolute legislator, but emerges as a 'Product-Producer', the locus where necessity can turn into concrete liberty" (3). Both Hegel and Heidegger, according to Merleau-Ponty, make spirit or unity a future, and so a problem. They do not take unity for granted. Unlike Feuerbach, Marx, too, refuses to take unity for granted. Man, as/

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1. Early Manuscripts pg. 157

2. Ibid pg. 157

3. Merleau-Ponty: Sense and Nonsense pg. 134.

as product-producer, is broken; his being is dislocated and fragmented by social antagonism. For socialist man, the conventional distinctions between capitalist and worker, Lord and Slave, are felt as a violent separation of what ought to belong together. He would agree, for instance, with Hegel when the latter refuses to speak of man as selbständig (independent) or unselbständig (dependent), but speaks of man as both independent and dependent, that is, of man as interdependent. Similarly, for Hegel, men are not products or producers, but both products and producers. They are not either free or determined, because freedom and necessity belong together; necessity, in the case of human being, rests on freedom, and freedom is no less free because it has to work its purpose in accordance with necessity. Freedom and necessity, like product and producer, are illuminating and important distinctions; but for Marx, as for Hegel, they are essentially abstractions from the ambiguity of lived realities. We legitimately speak of product as distinct from producer, but at this level, we fail to comprehend the common measure or *Λόγος* which connects them. We fail to see that there is a unity here which our distinctions overlook. We do not notice that analytical separation of one thing from another in this case leads to a separation not only in thought, but in political, social, legal, economic and religious life. In any case, thought in this Hegelian context, means the kind of encompassing comprehension which will affect every aspect of human life. In this case, analytic sets apart what essentially belongs together. Man is both product and producer. As product, man is substance (substanz), as producer he stands by himself on/

on his own account, he makes up his own mind, he is self-subsistent (selbständig). Substantiality (substantialität) is thus not to be confused with self-subsistence (selbständigkeit), for otherwise we shall not notice the alienation of the former from the latter. Nevertheless, the self-subsisting subject must regain, or lay hold of, or comprehend substance, if alienation is to be overcome. The relation between product and producer is not a simple formal distinction, it is a living interconnection.

For Marx, reification (verdinglichung) comes about when, in Hegel's language, subject is forcibly reduced to mere substantiality, when, for example, the worker is reduced to the ontological status of a thing, or a tool, or a means. Here Marx reformulates, according to Marcuse, the notion of alienation (Entfremdung), which Hegel had first formulated in his early theological works (1). The concept of reification has gained wider currency in recent political and sociological writing. For Berger, for example, Durkheim's famous dictum, social facts are things, reflects a reified view of social reality. In his analysis of the social construction of reality, Berger expands the product-producer conception into three moments of an irreducible dialectic. First, society is a human product; second, society is an objective reality; third, man is a social product (2). This is another way of saying that as society, in all its apparently massive and immovable objectivity, produces man as man, so, in turn, it is produced by him. In Berger's view, any analysis of the social world which omits any one of these essential moments will be distortive./

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1. Marcuse: Reason and Revolution pg. 34-5.

2. Peter Berger: Social Construction of Reality pg. 79.

distortive. Contemporary American sociology, for Berger, is distortive reification because it does not take account of the first moment. "Despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience", writes Berger, "it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it". (1). There is a dialectical relationship, according to Berger between what Marx calls substructure (unterbau) and superstructure (ueberbau). Externalization, objectivation and internalization are different ways of looking at the network of connections between man, his knowledge, his consciousness, his attitudes, his beliefs on the one hand, and his social environment, on the other. In Kamenka's words: "there is no logical discontinuity between man and his environment" (2). Man is not either homo agens or homo patiens but indissolubly both. We shall return to this aspect of the dialectic again.

It appears, therefore, that Marx is dialectical in Berger's sense. He comprehends man in his situational being-in-the-world. But does Marx not rather bring the dialectic to rest in human labour? Does he not think communism is the final solution to all man's problems? This, surely, looks very like an undialectical absolutism. On the other hand, since labour itself is a γένεσις, a becoming, a dialectical process, then it would appear that there is still no sense in which, for Marx, man has arrived at a final solution.

It is clear from our analysis of the manuscripts that labour is the unapparent Λόγος which connects capital and labour in a common intersubjective world. This is Marx's thesis. It may, of/

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1. Berger: Social Construction of Reality pg. 78.
  2. E. Kamenka: Marxism and Ethics pg. 31.

of course, be true, even if every communist social order has not succeeded in achieving a common  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , or genuine intersubjective unity. It might, of course, be that every actual communist society has failed to achieve what Marx calls communism. Every communist regime may still be a form of what Marx calls "crude communism".(1). Marx argues, after all, that in communism, human self-alienation is overcome, and the liberation of man is achieved. Presumably the presence of alienation in a communist society would therefore mean that that society was not, or at least not yet, communist. In communism, man's existence is united with his essence, man actually becomes what he ought to be. Some would say that this kind of unity of essence and existence is in principle impossible as long as man remains a temporal being, with a future, and so radically incomplete. This may sound bourgeois, but it is dialectical. Can the communist belief in the actual possibility of uniting essence and existence in present history ever be genuinely dialectical? In communism, according to Marx, man is liberated from the God of this world, money, which, despite all appearances to the contrary, is an alienated form of his own human being. Or in other words, the order of having is shattered in order that a new order of being may take shape. This is the  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  of revolution. Can this be finally achieved, when the relation between being and having can never be an exclusive either/or but always a living interaction in which each is related to, and so relative to, the other? In other words, is it not nonsense to speak of communism as a final solution in which the dialectic comes to a triumphant conclusion? It may be that in Merleau-Ponty's words, "revolutions/  


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1. Manuscripts pg. 153.

"revolutions are true as movements and false as regimes". (1). Dialectic means that we do not possess the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\alpha\varsigma$ ; it is the meaning which stands ahead of us or behind us, never exhausted in any partial formulation, never wholly manifest in any experience. If communism is a new universal humanity, latent in the enslavement of the proletariat, then it would, as an encompassing completeness, destroy the incompleteness of our human existence if it were completely realized. It is one thing to speak of the worker ceasing to be the "slave of the object", and becoming a subject repossessed of his once alienated substance, or a subject comprehending substance. It is quite another to speak of communism as a final solution to the problem of man's incompleteness, his brokenness, his disintegration. To do so would merely be to exchange one idol for another.

Marx argues that the fixated antagonism of Lord and slave is overcome in communism. The dualistic impasse is overcome in the dialectic, and an unfettered becoming is therefore a concrete possibility for the first time. But this, again, is a long way from saying that communism is the final solution to the riddle of history. Apart from the fact that all talk of final solutions can never be truly dialectical, this kind of thinking allows the dialectical notion of the whole to become an undialectical totality, and so opens up the path to totalitarianism, as opposed to dialectical politics. We are suggesting that Marx did not have a very firm hold on the dialectic when he speaks, as he appears to do, of bringing the dialectic to a close in a final solution to the riddle of history. Despite/

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1. Les Aventures de la Dialectique pgs: 279, 281, 293  
quoted Rabil: Merleau-Ponty pg. 111.

Despite Popper, for whom all dialectic is in some way totalitarian, or in league with the upholders of a closed society, dialectic is necessarily open (1). There are no final solutions for genuinely dialectical thinking. There is no question of bringing the dialectic to a close. There is no danger of any kind of totalitarian politics, whether communist, capitalist or ecclesiastical, when the dialectic is maintained. Without dialectic, there can be no open society. With it, there can be no closed society.

Lenin did not always retain an alert dialectical awareness, but, as is well known, he loved to read Hegel. Perhaps he expresses what we are trying to say very clearly, when, just before he died, he wrote in Pravda, for 2nd March, 1923;

"The worst thing of all would be to rely on the assumption that we know anything, or on the assumption that we are well provided with the elements necessary for building a really new apparatus that would really deserve the name socialist, soviet etc.". (2). This is a genuine example of Marxist dialectic.

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1. 'The Open Society and its enemies'. Two Volumes.  
'The poverty of historicism' etc.
  2. Quoted by Nikolay Valentinov: Encounters with Lenin pg. 265.

## CHAPTER XI

## ALIENATION, DIALECTICS AND REVOLUTION

## HEGEL, MARX AND LUKACS.

According to Zitta, Lukács' thought stands somewhere at the convergence of the Marxian and the Hegelian tradition of thought (1). Lukács' main contribution to the problems under discussion was to show the extent and depth of Hegel's influence upon Marx. This led Lukács to lay great emphasis upon dialectic in Marx's thinking, and to criticize Engel's use of it. We have already touched on these matters earlier in this study. We recall that Lukács' thinks that the restriction of dialectic to socio-historic reality is very important (2). Influenced by Dilthey's study of the younger Hegel in 1902, and David Koigen's 'Ideas toward a Philosophy of Culture' 1910, and apparently also by Plenge's 'Hegel and Marx' 1911, Lukács "Hegelianized Marxism", according to Zitta. "Lukács' Hegelianization of Marxism is really the elucidation of Marx's eschatological and revolutionary component which is Hegel-inspired; Lukács did this chiefly by elaborating the conception of alienation and the dialectic" (3). Maintaining that Marx's economic theorems and hypotheses are superseded, Lukács argues that the essence of Marxism lies in the conception of alienation and dialectic. It is for this reason that Lukács' thinking is of interest to us here.

Lukács shows that Marx's thinking is always variation on the one theme, that of alienation. Zitta argues that it is with Rousseau that this concept begins to acquire its modern dominance. Some/

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1. V. Zitta: Georg Lukács: Marxism, alienation, Dialectics and Revolution pg. 119.
  2. Ibid pg. 124.
  3. Ibid pg. 129.

Some of the connected meanings associated with it are: "the experience of a certain nausea, a dis-ease and dissatisfaction with prevailing manifestations of culture and civilization, an experience of a loss of human substance and spirituality, an experience of depersonalization, tornness, inadequacy, which are often defined with a variety of terms such as 'anomie', 'deraciné', 'reification', 'objectification', 'externalization' etc." (1).

In his 'Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein' (1923), Lukács quotes the passage which we have already recognized as central to Hegel's philosophical standpoint. "When the power of unification disappears from man's lives", writes Hegel, "and contradictions lose their lively mutuality and relation, and obtain independence, then the need for philosophy arises". (2). For Lukács, as for Novalis, philosophy arises with a feeling of homesickness; it is the drive to be at home everywhere. Lukács writes in 1914, "Happy times have no philosophy; then, there is not yet an inner life of the spirit, for there is not yet an external world confronting man" (3). Philosophy is called upon, says Zitta, to overcome the cleavage between man and his environment (Plato's "lie in the soul") and is prompted by the experience of alienation.

Lukács himself defines alienation as an awareness "that man's self-created environment is no longer his home but his dungeon" (4). When the world man constructs is a home, there is no alienation, when it becomes an "estranged complex of meanings which cannot anymore awaken inwardness", then self-alienation/

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1. Zitta ibid pg. 146.
  2. Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein pg. 154 Zitta pg. 148.
  3. Zitta pgs. 148-9.
  4. Zitta pg. 149.

alienation occurs. Dialectic for both Marx and Lukács amounts to a way of salvation from alienation (1).

For Lukács, bourgeois thought is condemned to alienation and objectification (Verdinglichung), the Lord's counterpart to the slave's reification, or reduction to the status of a commodity. For Lukács, the question is "whether the facts of reality ..... in their factualness, have to be accepted as given, or whether their 'givenness' can dissolve into forms of reason and can therefore be thought of as being produced by our reason" (2). Bourgeois thought views what it produces as a second nature; it forgets that this second nature is a product of human reason. It applies the methods of the natural sciences to its understanding of society, so that the latter appears to it to be an inhuman, fatalistically necessary, unchangeable reality. It is German Idealism that begins to discover the role of action or praxis, but it failed to overcome objectification when it came upon the insurmountable barrier of the thing-in-itself. (3). Kant had tried to show how ethical praxis overcomes this barrier, and Fichte that a new integration could be achieved when the deed, and practical activity become the centre of philosophy (4). It was Marx, however, who grasped how objectification might be overcome, and, for Lukács, it is with Marx that we must come to terms if the fragmentation and meaninglessness of our experience is to be overcome. Thus, for Lukács, "history does not any more appear as a puzzling process which occurs to men and things, which can be explained through the intervention of transcendent forces, clarified and made meaningful through historically transcendent/

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1. Zitta Ibid pg. 150.

2. History and class consciousness pg. 128. Zitta pg. 153.

3. Zitta Ibid pg. 157.

4. Zitta pg. 158.

transcendent values. History is, on the one hand, .... a product of the activity of human beings themselves, on the other hand, the continuity of a process in which the forms of this activity, these relationships of man to himself, (to nature and to other men) undergo a transformation. History is precisely the history of uninterrupted transformations of objectifications which ultimately constitute human existence" (1). Man, for Lukács as for Marx, is the  $\Lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  without whom nothing can come to be that comes to be, man is the meaning of history. Man, here, is social man, or more particularly, the redemptive community who in redeeming itself from alienation, redeems all men.

For Lukács, the proletariat is both the redeemer and the redeemed (2). The proletariat is the class of slaves, men reduced to things, reified, dehumanized. Reification occurs, for Lukács, when "a relationship between persons receives the character of thingness, and in this manner, a 'ghostly objectness' which eliminates - in its harsh and apparently closed-in rational regularity - all traces of human relationships" (3). This is the condition we have seen Marx call "Fetichism". The commodity structure of capitalism reifies the worker, and so splits his personality into a double existence as person and thing. He overcomes this bifurcation of his nature in self-consciousness". The essence of Hegel's magnificent world system", writes Lukács, "consists in the fact that he perceived in nature and history a great and unified development based upon an ever increasing self-consciousness of the same entity (which he called spirit)". (4). Marx's "sober profundity has saved him from applying/

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1. Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein pg. 203, quoted Zitta pg. 164.
  2. Zitta Ibid pg. 170.
  3. Zitta Ibid pg. 171. Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, pg. 94.
  4. Quoted Zitta ibid pg. 176.

applying this method to the investigation of nature" (1). Marx sees the proletariat as the redeemer and the redeemed in whom Hegel's spirit is actual. The coming-to-awareness of the proletariat is metaphysically important because the truth of the whole is hidden in its total reification. The proletariat is the class with radical chains, the slaves whose suffering becomes redemptive in and through their growing self-consciousness. When the slave gains possession of himself, he transforms not only himself but all reality. As intentional subject, he comprehends his substance, which means, appropriates his alien existence from reified externality. He actualizes his essence, so that the cleavage between his essence and his existence is overcome. He achieves the wholeness of self-integration through revolutionary action by which he regains possession of his freedom and becomes self-subsistent.

We can see, here, the integral connection between this conception of Marxism and the Christian conception of redemption. Prior to successful revolution, the revolutionary shares the unhappy, divided consciousness of the Christian, and the latter's belief that new life is given only in death. For both the Christian and the revolutionary, the present is an agony of estrangement, disintegration and fragmentation; their only hope lies in a redemptive future. This leads in both cases, to a two-world dualism which will remain a dominant frame of reference until redemption is decisively and finally achieved.

Zitta argues that Lukács' conception of dialectic rests upon three central categories, 'floating concepts', 'totality', and/

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1. Ibid pg. 176

and 'mediation'. "We require dialectic", says Lukács, "in order not to succumb to social phenomena.... in order to enable ourselves to perceive behind their appearance to the essence"(1). The essence, for Lukács, as for Feuerbach and Marx, is man, or the relation between man and man. "The determinative aspect of the Marxist method is: to reduce all phenomena of economics and 'sociology' to the mutual social relationships of men" (2).

Floating concepts (Fliegende Begriffe) are indispensable to Lukács' dialectic, argues Zitta; they are the stuff of his 'practice' or activity (3). Kant had noted the need to resort to floating concepts because they seemed to him the "only way to incorporate 'being' as the ultimately given into the definition of a thing" (4). Because reality always transcends what the concepts employed to comprehend it denote, our conceptions must be allowed to float. Thought is not a final replica of reality, says Lukács. To float or alternate concepts can help us to approximate to reality in a practical manner. We saw that, for Hegel, life transcends meaning; which means that our meaning structures must be kept as open and flexible as possible. Hegel argues the case for a "plastic discourse", whose logic must be dialectical if it is to distinguish the connections we normally overlook, and to connect what we assume to be self-evidently distinct. Lukács writes:

"The essence of this (the dialectic) method, the significance of which is that it has revolutionized science, consists in the fact that according to it concepts are not/

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1. Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein pg. 18. Zitta pg. 203.
  2. Zitta pg. 203.
  3. Zitta pg. 205.
  4. Zitta pg. 160-161.

not inflexible pigeon-holes which - once determined - do not anymore change their meaning; concepts are not isolated from one another, constructs of the mind which can be grasped abstractly only, but they are a lively reality which brings about a process characterized by a continuous amalgamation and interfusion. Concepts thus conceived bring about such a process in which singular concepts plunge into the opposite of their original formulation, into their self-repudiation, then into the very opposite of this, to unite there in a higher union of a negation of the negation, and so on ad infinitum" (1).

This conception of dialectic is, of course, Hegel's, and seems in turn to owe much to Heraclitus. We shall be examining it again in the course of our concluding chapter.

The second category of Lukács' Hegelian-Marxist dialectic is the Category of 'totality'. It is connected to the Greek conception of  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\nu$ , and to Hegel's Ganze, (Das Wahre ist das Ganze). For Lukács, and this is a point of major importance, "the dissolution of the perspective of totality dissolves the unity of theory and practice" (2). "The essence of the dialectic method consists .... in the fact that in every dialectically correctly grasped moment, the entire totality is comprehended"(3). The concept of totality is closely related to the concept, or notion/

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1. Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein pg. 38, 178, Zitta pg. 206.  
 2. " " " " pg. 51 quoted Zitta pg. 207.  
 3. " " " " pg. 181 " Zitta pg. 207.

notion (Begriff), of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , as we have used it in this discussion. We shall be returning to it later on. For the time being, we take note of another passage, in which Lukács contrasts this category with the individualism and the fragmentation of bourgeois thinking. "The standpoint of totality determines not only the object but also the subject of knowledge. Bourgeois science considers the appearance of society - consciously or unconsciously, naively or in a sublimated fashion - always from the standpoint of the individual. And from the standpoint of the individual no totality can arise .... The totality of the object can only then be posited when the positing subject is itself a totality; when in order to think itself, it is compelled to think of the object as a totality" (1). Totality in the sense Hegel and Marx use the concept, is not static being, but temporal becoming; it is not a sum of a number of entities, all of which participate in One Being, or totality. Totality, in the sense we use it here, is a category of time and becoming. Social reality can be comprehended in no other way than dialectically, because it is unrestrained becoming, and a living totality. When we objectivize, we isolate moments of this total becoming into 'facts', and thereby lose the connection with lived experience of social realities.

The third category of Lukács' dialectic is mediation (vermittlung). For Zitta, Lukács uses the category of mediation as a functional concept, its function being that of connecting or relating. For Hegel, all actualization is mediation, for mediation is the unity or relatedness of being and not-being in coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. Geist is mediate not immediate, because/

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1. Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein pg. 40 quoted Zitta pg. 208.

because Geist is not the isolated or individual but the Whole, and because Geist cannot be said either to be or not to be, but only that which is coming to be and ceasing to be. It is closely related to the conception of negating and transforming rendered, usually, in Hegel by the words aufheben, aufgehoben, and terms related to these. To comprehend (begreifen), for Hegel, is to mediate; it is to connect in such a way that apparent connections and distinctions are negated and preserved in a new form, as elements in a new and lively connectedness, or relatedness.

For Lukács, mediation is essential to comprehension of any and every given fact, event or object (1). In mediation, we can comprehend the "immanent meaning" which is neither apprehended nor reflected in bourgeois society. But for Lukács, mediation cannot get beyond social reality, which is, for him, the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . Mediation is the act of transcending empirical immediacy in order that the immediately unapparent  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  might be comprehended. It is the act which exhibits the intentional self in its indissoluble connection with the social environment. It is the act which unconceals the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  from the meaningless flux of contingent facticity.

We are greatly indebted to Zitta's exposition of ~~and~~ Lukács' 'Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein', though we shall not be able to evaluate his powerful critique in this study. To anyone familiar with Zitta's work, it will be obvious that we disagree profoundly with his treatment of the matters there discussed. Our conception of alienation and dialectic and of the philosophies of Hegel, Marx and Lukács is very far from Zitta's, though it will not/

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1. Zitta Ibid pg. 211.

not be difficult to show that many arguments in this study are directed against Zitta's negative critique of Lukács', albeit implicitly; just as there is some measure of agreement between us on matters of communist praxis.

We shall be raising all the principle questions arising from our exposition of Lukács in the final chapter, in a more general exploration into the dialectic of Hegel.

## CHAPTER XII

## HEGEL AND SARTRE.

We pass now to Sartre's view of the Lord-slave dialectic, which he discusses in Part III, Ch. 1, entitled 'The existence of others', of 'L'Être et le Néant'. In the first two parts of this major work, Sartre outlines his philosophy of the being of man in an analysis of the cogito, consciousness as nothingness, and the structure of the For-itself. "Consciousness", he says in the introduction, "is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself" (1). In the course of his examination of the question of the being of consciousness, Sartre argues that through angst (anguish or dread) man becomes conscious of his freedom, and thus his negativity in relation to being. The nothingness of the pour-soi is the ground of negation, negation of being, and in particular of its own past being (2). Thus he formulates a second proposition which defines the questionability of the being of consciousness. "Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being" (3). Human being can deny all or part of the world because it is a 'nothing' which separates its present from its past. (4).

My consciousness arises in the world as a "not". I can not only negate the world, in whole or in part; I can also negate my own self. A thing is what it is and is not something else./

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| 1. | <u>Being and Nothingness</u> | pg. LXII |
| 2. | <u>Ibid</u>                  | pg. 28.  |
| 3. | <u>Ibid</u>                  | pg. 47.  |
| 4. | <u>Ibid</u>                  | pg. 28.  |

else. The being of a thing is never anything but what it is. Consciousness of being, on the other hand, is 'outside' being; it is a nothingness in relation to being. Descartes, following the Stoics, calls this nothingness freedom. Man can detach himself from the world in questioning, in systematic doubt, in sceptical doubt, in the ἐποχή, on the basis of this freedom from himself as a part of the world. For Hegel, man is free only in so far as he is mediation, i.e. the Negative. In his immediate existence man is a passive bundle of sensations, a being acted upon, determinate, unfree. But since his essence contradicts the reality of his being, because man is essentially free, his essence is to be that nothing which can negate, and so be conscious of the world.

"It is as a Not", says Sartre, "that the slave first apprehends the Master" (1). It is as a not that man becomes conscious of his freedom. It is as a not that he can separate himself from the being of the world in order to become conscious of it. But this negation of the world cannot escape the being of the world, it is a negation which discloses the world to consciousness. "Consciousness of being is the being of consciousness" (2). Consciousness is always "intentional"; it is always consciousness of something. "Perceiving is the perceiving of something, judging the judging of a certain matter, valuation the valuing of a value, wish the wish for the content wished and so on". Each single perceptual act occurs within a potential field of perception so that consciousness is always a consciousness of being even if it involves a negation of being (3).  
Sartre/

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1. Ibid pg. 47.
  2. Ibid pg. 31 and elsewhere.
  3. Husserl: Ideas pgs. 242-3.

Sartre quotes part of this passage from Husserl with approval. "Consciousness", he says, "is thus a positional consciousness of the world" (1). Consciousness always transcends itself toward the world.

Consciousness is nonetheless not the world; for it is only from the emptiness of nothing that the being of the world can be experienced. For Sartre, as for Hegel, this negativity of consciousness is disclosed not only in the structure of the for-itself, but also in my being-for-another. It is here that the problem of the body in relation to consciousness arises, for the body is "essentially that which is known by the other" (2).

Being-for-others (Être-pour-autrui) is an essential structure in being-for-self, according to Sartre. The other is defined as "the one who excludes me by being himself, the one whom I exclude by being myself" (3). We cannot discuss why Sartre thinks that Hegel makes significant progress over Husserl and Kant at this point; we can state only that for Hegel, and so for Sartre, the appearance of the other is the *sine qua non* of my consciousness as self-consciousness. The "moment" of my being-for-another is a necessary stage of the development of self-consciousness. As I appear to the other so I am. I am only what the other recognizes me to be. Thus I must make the other recognize me as I need to be recognized; and risk my own life in the event. "To risk one's life is to reveal oneself as not-bound to the objective form or to any determined existence - as not bound to life" (4). In spite of the fact that I pursue the death of the other, it is in my own death, in my risking being-for-another, in my venturing beyond the safety of a solipsist universe, that I achieve certainty of self.

Sartre/

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1. Being and Nothingness pg. LI
  2. Ibid pg. 218.
  3. Ibid pg. 236.
  4. Ibid pg. 237.

Sartre points to the solipsism involved in all positivist attempts to remain within the solid ground of my own sense-experience, and describes Watson's behaviourism as a psychology which, in trying to be exact and objective, is only solipsism as a working hypothesis (1). Neither traditional realism nor traditional idealism can truly take account of the other, according to Sartre. Whilst Hegel's formulations do overcome (2) solipsism, they are nevertheless formulated in terms of knowledge. Sartre's own formulations are, he thinks, ontological. We are dealing here, he says, with a being which nihilates itself in its being and which seeks in vain to dissolve into itself as a self (3). Hegel's I am I, or Me = Me, which is his equivalent of self-consciousness, is abstract for Sartre, and Kierkegaard's opposition to Hegel was therefore justified.

Sartre marshals what he calls a "twofold charge of optimism" against Hegel, both of which follow from his identification of being and knowledge (4). The first is a charge of epistemological optimism, the second of ontological optimism.

Before we turn to Sartre's critique of Hegel, however, we shall consider an interesting point made by Hartmann in his study of Sartre and Hegel. It amounts to a criticism of Sartre's position by Hegel (5).

Sartre is, of course indebted to Hegel for concepts such as being-in-itself, being-for-itself, negation, being-in-and-for-itself. Klaus Hartmann in his study of the relation between Sartre/

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1. Ibid pg. 229

2. Ibid pg. 238

3. Ibid pg. 239

4. Ibid pg. 240

5. In 'Sartre's Ontology': Klaus Hartmann.

Sartre and Hegel defines the likenesses and differences between the two with brave clarity (1). In an appendix, Hartmann argues that Sartre's views were anticipated at a number of points by Solger, a philosopher of the early nineteenth century considerably influenced by Hegel, whom Hegel once commented upon in a commemorative article (2). Both Solger and Sartre conceived the subject as the negation of being, and thus the contradiction of the in itself and the for itself. Hegel comments: "Contradiction" (for Solger) "is arrested in all its harshness, so that it appears as something that has come to stay rather than as something essentially involving its immediate disappearance and dissolution, which alone makes it tolerable to the imagination and to thought" (3). Hartmann adds that to Hegel, Solger's position is abstract, "unsuited", says Hegel, "to the richness of the notions". He has failed to grasp the true nature of dialectic. Hegel notes the "emptiness of the abstract determinations" applied to concrete content, the "static contradiction", and the "absence of any necessary development" of thought toward the notion. Solger starts with a "presupposed dualism" (4). Hartmann is not arguing that Sartre owes anything to Solger. But Solger's key notion of irony, or the insistence on negative subjective freedom against rationalism, is obviously much closer to the existentialist revolt against Hegel stemming from Kierkegaard, and so to Sartre, than to Hegel himself.

We now turn to Sartre's critique of Hegel, in 'Being and Nothingness./

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1. Sartre's Ontology: Study of Being and Nothingness in the light of Hegel's Logic.
  2. Ibid pg. 149.
  3. Ibid pg. 152.
  4. Ibid pg. 153.

Nothingness.'

Sartre argues that Hegel equates being and knowing and so is guilty of epistemological optimism.<sup>(1)</sup> According to Sartre, Hegel thought that an objective agreement, a true reciprocity can be realized between consciousnesses. Through the other's recognition of me and my recognition of the other a universality of self-consciousness is achieved. This intersubjective unity, which Hegel calls spirit, is the truth of self-consciousness. Hegel agrees with Sartre that this unity, or homogeneity, does not exist in the beginning, and that the relation of a Lord and slave is not reciprocal. But the correct statement of the problem of others renders this passage to the universal impossible, for Sartre (2).

Sartre's argument rests upon what he calls the "ontological separation" of the for-itself and the in-itself. Is 'to appear as an object for a consciousness' still 'to be consciousness?' Sartre answers that it is not. The being of consciousness is defined as a being which exists in so far as it is not what it is, and is what it is not. Consciousness is the radical exclusion of all objectivity (3). The drama of reflection consists in the fact that the being who reflects cannot be an object for himself. The being of consciousness is in question, it is a nothing in absolute contradiction to being, it is freedom.

In the life-death struggle, self and other are each in turn pure, abstract self-consciousness and then bound to an objective form as determined existence or life. Sartre's main argument is/

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1. Being and Nothingness pp. 240-243.
  2. Ibid pg. 240.
  3. Ibid pp. 241, 301, etc.

is that between the other-as-object and Me-as-subject there is no common measure, anymore than there is between self-consciousness and consciousness of the other. Hegel wishes to say that the other is object, and that I apprehend myself as an object in the other. This, argues Sartre, is contradictory. I do not appear to myself as I am for the other: I am always subject, never object. His point, therefore, is that I am never an object for myself; and thus there can be no dialectic, only an absolute dualism. Hegel's optimism rests upon a dialectic of subject-object within the order of self-consciousness, as well as between self-consciousnesses.

Sartre supports his point by accusing Hegel of confusing "being-an-object" and "life" (1). Hegel equates consciousness immersed in the being of life with a mode of existence as a determinate object. Sartre argues for their analytical separation. The direction of his argument is not at all clear, but we take him to mean that whilst I can know that my own consciousness is immersed in life, I cannot know myself as a subject. Consciousness is what it is not, and is not what it is, not least because it is embodied, a part of the world as well as a free subject capable of assuming responsibility for the world. The fact of my existence, in all its determinations, must not be confused with my free and negative essence.

For Hegel, I am open to the other as subject in<sup>a</sup>/way I can never be for Sartre. Hegel's understanding of the relation between being-in-itself, being-for-itself and being-for-another does not become a rigid dualism as it does in Sartre (at least in the Sartre of 'Being and Nothingness'). Hegel's understanding is/  


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1. Ibid pg. 240.

is dialectical and so opens out onto a broader intersubjective synthesis, Reason, and finally after farther contradictions are overcome or reconciled, spirit.

Sartre's first criticism of Hegel, then, is that I cannot know myself as object through the subjectivity of another because I can never apprehend the other in his subjectivity. Consequently no universal knowledge can be derived from the relation of consciousnesses (1).

We turn now to Sartre's criticism of what he calls Hegel's ontological optimism.

As we have seen, truth for Hegel is the Truth of the Whole. Hegel places himself, says Sartre, at the vantage point of truth, i.e. of the Whole, to consider the problem of the other. He considers the consciousness of others from the point of view of the absolute, rather than from within his own particular consciousness. Hegel has forgotten his own consciousness but we, argues Sartre, cannot forget Hegel. Since Hegel is the Whole, he easily resolves the problem of consciousnesses, and he does so only because it was never a real problem for him. Sartre's own exposition of the problem on the other hand proceeds from within the cogito - i.e. the problem of the other is posited solely in terms of my being.

Sartre grants that I can undoubtedly transcend myself toward a whole but I cannot establish myself in this whole in order to contemplate myself and the other, because the multiplicity of consciousnesses is in principle unsurpassable. Ontology cannot overcome the scandal of the plurality of consciousnesses, it can only describe it, it can only "found it in the very nature of being" (2). Sartre's phenomenological analysis/

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1. Ibid pg. 243.

2. Ibid pg. 244.

analysis of the "Look" is his own answer to the problem. He makes it clear that although his phenomenological description of the presence of the other to me may seem to make the other necessary to my own being; it is not an "ontological necessity", but a "contingent necessity". It does not belong with those "conditions of the possibility of our experience"; it is a factual necessity (1).

Sartre means by this contingent or factual necessity a pre-ontological awareness of the other which is present in the immanence of the Cogito. It would probably have been wiser to avoid the word necessity here. I have always been aware that the other existed, and this comprehension is surer and deeper than all the theories that have been built around it (2).

Sartre is undoubtedly correct to point to a primary awareness of the other which precedes all theory, but we cannot in that case afford to forget an equally primary awareness of a lived synthesis of the conflict and contradiction which exists between myself and the other.

Hegel thought that 'even now' we may speak of a genuine reconciliation of man with man through mutual recognition, though this new relation of man with man is 'not yet' a present reality. It is true that Hegel's standpoint is that of the "even now"; but there are, as we have seen, a number of passages which show that he was aware of the "not yet". The truth of the Whole was for him even now on the threshold of disclosure, so that a phenomenological description of past modes of being and consciousness seemed to him an important task/

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1. Ibid pg. 250.
  2. Ibid pg. 251.

task prior to the "sunrise" which "brings to view the form and structure of the new world" (1). It is, however, essential to bear in mind, Hegel warns, that the new world is no more perfectly realized than the new-born child (2). It makes its appearance in general outline, a whole lying concealed and hidden within a bare abstraction, whilst the wealth of bygone life (the subject matter of the Phenomenology) is still consciously present in recollection (3).

Sartre may be right to criticise Hegel's later work which seems to take for granted what the phenomenology looks forward toward; but he is wrong to ignore our lived experience of new reconciled modes of relation with others on that account. It is true that these moments of truth may be few and far between, and that secure systems cannot be built upon them. But it is foolish to deny that our being with and for others does not at times open out toward a new transformed reality, a truly intersubjective spirit. But, as Hegel rightly reminds us, such a spirit is the result of a "chequered and devious course of development", and is achieved only after "much struggle and effort" (4). It is this new human reality which Hegel calls spirit. He refuses anything but a concrete God; the idea of God as love, when understood as a perfect aseity in undisturbed identity above and beyond the world, is for him "abstract generality" (5). Sartre does not appear to see that Hegel's synthesis is a concrete, embodied synthesis, a human and worldly reality, at least in the Phenomenology of Spirit. He calls all abstract, supra-historical, supra-mundane ideas of God "mere edification" which sinks/

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1. P.S. pg. 75.
  2. Ibid
  3. Ibid pg. 76.
  4. Ibid pg. 76.
  5. Ibid pg. 81.

sink into insipidity", if they lack "the seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labour of the negative" (1). Hegel's synthesis is not achieved easily; it is only in death that spirit and freedom and mutual recognition of man by man are found. Death is the truth of human life.

We cannot at this point discuss Sartre's alternative view to Hegel's; it rests upon a description of the Look which discloses the Other to the Cogito, as "not being me" (2). At no point can we adopt the point of view of the whole, and so no "totalitarian and unifying synthesis of Other's is possible" (3). In the look I encounter the other concretely, and it is through my immediate consciousness of the other (the Cogito) rather than through my knowledge of him that a fundamental connection between myself and the other is manifested (4). Nonetheless, we cannot "surpass" the other toward an inter-monad totality; "so long as consciousnesses exist, the separation and conflict of consciousnesses will remain" (5).

Sartre, finally, seems unaware that Hegel launches a formidable critique against formalism in the Preface to the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', in which he criticizes those who always make a "survey of the Whole", assuming a "position above the particular existence about which they are speaking", "instead of making their way into the inherent content of the matter in hand" (6). Hegel is as anxious as Sartre not to lose "hold of the living nature of concrete fact" (7). Whilst Hegel explicitly rejects the totalitarian and unifying synthesis of which Sartre accuses/

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1. Ibid pg. 81.
  2. Being & Nothingness pgs. 252-302.
  3. Ibid pg. 252.
  4. Ibid pg. 253.
  5. Ibid pg. 244.
  6. P.S. pg. 112.
  7. P.S. pg. 110.

accuses him, he nonetheless creates the theoretical conditions for a social philosophy such as the communist philosophy of the Party, or a philosophy of the church, or of the nation (Volk) (1), rather than of the individual, as in Sartre's existentialism. Merleau-Ponty makes this point in his essay on Hegel's existentialism. It is to him that we now turn for further clarification of Hegel's dialectic of intersubjectivity.

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1. P.S. pg. 467 ff; 519ff.

## CHAPTER XIII

## HEGEL AND MERLEAU-PONTY

Merleau-Ponty interprets the life-death struggle as a phenomenological description of the only experience which can bring us to an authentic awareness of death. If our awareness of life is to be sharpened we must integrate death into our consciousness of ourselves and the world. Consciousness, for Merleau Ponty as for Hegel, implies the ability to step back from any given thing and to deny it. Life is revealed only to a consciousness of life which can and does deny life. "An absence of being would have to come into the world, a nothingness from which being would be visible", if life is to become a true consciousness of life. Absolute knowledge for Hegel is achieved when consciousness at last becomes equal with its spontaneous life and regains its self-possession. According to Merleau-Ponty Hegel's Phenomenology describes man's efforts to re-appropriate himself, to regain his own self which had existed in an alienated determinate mode of existence. "Man", writes Merleau-Ponty "as opposed to the pebble which is what it is, is defined as a place of unrest (unruhe), a constant effort to get back to himself, and consequently (is defined) by his refusal to limit himself to one or another of his determinations" (1).

The only experience which forces me to confront rather than flee an authentic awareness of death is my experience of the other. I become conscious of life, and of myself as living, through consciousness of death, and I become conscious of death through my experience of the life-death struggle in which "each consciousness seeks the death of the other, which it feels dispossesses it of its constitutive nothingness" (2). I am a

1. Merleau-Ponty: Hegel's Existentialism in Sense and Nonsense pp.66-68.
2. Ibid pg. 68.

piece of the world under the other's gaze, nevertheless the presence of another does not threaten me unless "I remain aware of my subjectivity at the very moment his gaze is reducing me to an object" (1). A consciousness of death is disclosed to me in my being for this other, in that the other limits me to a determinate mode of existence for him. I am only what I am for him. This I deny. I am not what I am for him, I am not a thing; I am a being which is not this or that, a being which can and must deny its own given state of existence and the other who tries to determine me. I am not ..... It is this, my negative being, which discloses to me that I am not in fact what I essentially am, that gives me no rest. This is the source of my unrest and anxiety (2). I am not what I am. I am negation.

This is revealed to me as the "immanent logic" of my experience of the other. My experience of the other is pregnant with meaning; and I cannot understand this until I forsake the traditional opposition of subject and object. Both Empiricists and Idealists share this opposition; the Hegel of the Phenomenology, and Merleau-Ponty following him, did not. However, Merleau-Ponty calls Hegel a classical philosopher because he believed that the ultimate meaningfulness of all reality is always assured, even if the achievement of meaning was possible only through death. According to Merleau-Ponty the Hegel of 1807 did not seek to reduce event to idea, in the attempt to reduce history to a system of logic, as the later Hegel did. Kierkegaard's protest is relevant to the later Hegel alone (3). On the contrary, in the Phenomenology, Hegel "does/

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1. Ibid pg. 68.
  2. of. P.S. pg. 138.
  3. Sense and Nonsense pg. 64.

does not propose to connect concepts but to reveal the immanent logic of human experience in all its sectors" (1).

"Experience" for Hegel, Merleau-Ponty reminds us, is no longer limited to an "entirely contemplative contact with the sensible world as it did in Kant; the word reassumes the tragic resonance it has in ordinary language when a man speaks of what he has lived through. It is no longer a laboratory test, but a trial of life" (2). Kant sought to discover what conditions make scientific experience possible. Hegel sought to describe man's fundamental situation in the face of the world and other men, and so to understand religions, ethics, works of art, economic and legal systems, as just so many ways for man to flee or to confront the difficulties of his condition (3).

Thus, the phenomenological method employed by Hegel does not accept the opposition between subject and object, between the logic of meaning, and sense-experience devoid of meaning, because for him every experience has a meaning, and there is no meaning apart from experience. Thus my experience of the other in this sense "means" that death without which I would not become conscious either of the world or of myself. My consciousness of the other in the trial by death is the condition of all experience in Hegel's sense of the word. One of the questions we have discussed in some detail is whether my experience of the other is the condition of all experience, and more particularly whether my experience of the other as understood with the help of the Lord-slave model is the condition of experience.

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1. Ibid pg. 65.
  2. Ibid pg. 65.
  3. Ibid pg. 65.

The life-death struggle discloses to me my being toward death; for it alone reveals the negativity of my being in relation to myself. I am other than myself; I can define who I am only by way of negations, I am not any of the determinations to which the other tries to confine me, I am not a determinate being at all, I am self-determining. Thus, I transcend what I am (my factual existence) when I seek to become what I ought to be (my essence); and I achieve this essence, according to Hegel, only if I freely choose to negate my own nature, deny what I am. A thing is what it is and nothing else. A philosophy which models itself upon our experience of things in the object-world can proudly claim that everything is what it is and not another thing (G. E. Moore). Man, on the other hand, is what he is not; his essence contradicts his existence. A philosophy of man must not confuse or equate fact and essence; nor must it try to speak of man's essence as a thing. Man's essence, according to Hegel, is his negativity, his power to deny his own given nature, as well as the given realities of the external world. We can define man's being only by defining what he is not; (an extension of Spinoza's proposition: Omnis determinatio est negatio). Man's selfhood (selbsteit) is nothingness because he is the being who becomes what he is (essence), by denying what he is (fact).

However, just as consciousness of death reveals my own living selfhood to me, and through the negation of self enables me to become my self, so nothingness reveals being through negation. The pure identity of immediate existence is mediated and so transformed into a new and free way of life. But transformed existence is not achieved when consciousness is commensurate/

commensurate with the real; rather it is achieved when reality itself is changed to conform to essence. Thus, it is not an intellectual change, but an actual change; and mediation is not so much a logical passing from one stage to another as a substantive one. Self-conscious action (Praxis or negative action), rather than a change of attitude is what Hegel means by being becoming transformed being (spirit) through death. Self-consciousness is not just self-knowledge for Hegel, although it of course includes this. It is assured self-existence which is only assured, and self-existent, in so far as it consciously assumes responsibility for the world by negating the way things are, and by struggling to transform them. It does this through conscious negative action (1).

We come now to one of the most important points raised by Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Hegel. It is that both consciousness of death and the struggle with the other are for Hegel, paradoxically, a renewed consciousness of life and a new intersubjective, historical reconciliation of men with men. The other does not threaten me unless I am aware of myself as a subject at the very moment his gaze reduces me to an object; I do not reduce him to slavery unless he continues to be present to me as consciousness and freedom precisely when he is an object in my eyes.

"We cannot be aware of conflict unless we are aware of our reciprocal relationship and our common humanity. We do not (2), deny each other except by mutual recognition of our consciousness"  
Merleau-Ponty/

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1. In Ch. VI of the P.S., Hegel turns from the passive attitude of Reason's enjoyment, observation and analysis of the natural world (Ch.V) to man's active creation of a social world. It is in the latter that the spirit's developing self-consciousness finds fulfilment.
  2. Sense and Nonsense pg. 68.

Merleau-Ponty does not emphasize, as others have done, notably Koyré and Wahl, that Hegel's theological orientation shapes his description of the genesis of selfhood. But he does observe, as we have noted elsewhere, that a phenomenology of spirit makes possible a communist philosophy of the party or a philosophy of the church, rather than a philosophy of the individual such as existentialism. Hegel's notion of spirit, with its transcendence of the conflict of subject with subject, takes us beyond existentialism to broader intersubjective fields. In accepting death, I decide to live, and so get a "new grip on our fortuitous existence" (1); and this new style of life goes beyond my fear of the other, and my attempt to dominate him, to a new form of trustful co-existence. Merleau-Ponty does not himself use the word trust, here, nor does he, like Feuerbach, decide to reflect upon love as a transformed mode of relation to the other. But the ideal of the mutual co-existence and co-operation of man with man is very much what Feuerbach meant by God, and Merleau-Ponty by the notion of a common intersubjective world.

Merleau-Ponty expresses this new unity of man with man in his own words as follows:

"So I live not for death but forever, and likewise not for myself alone but with other people.

A more complete definition of what is called existentialism than we get from talking about anxiety and the contradictions of the human condition might be found in the idea of a universality which men affirm or imply by the mere fact of their being and at the very moment/

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1. Ibid., pg. 69.

moment of their opposition to each other, in the idea of a reason immanent in unreason, of a freedom which comes into being in the act of accepting limits and to which the least perception, the slightest movement of the body, the smallest action, bear incontestible witness" (1).

This passage is a reply to, and criticism of, Sartre's philosophy, and in particular his philosophy of absolute freedom and the dependence of all value upon freedom, his pre-occupation with the Individual, and above all his rigidly polar dualism of the Pour-soi and the En-soi. In the passage just quoted Merleau-Ponty suggests that the synthesis of consciousness and being, which for Sartre is a contradiction in terms, is everywhere disclosed in our être-au-monde, our being-within-the-world. According to Merleau-Ponty Hegel moves from the individual to history through struggle and death, whereas for Sartre "there can be no remedy for the contradictions of the for-itself and the for-others, with the result that his dialectic is truncated" (2). For Sartre, in other words, there is no possibility of transcending the Lord-slave struggle between consciousnesses; unlike Hegel, he can have no philosophy of spirit. Sartre meant by God the synthesis of the pour-soi and the en-soi, a contradictory notion which must be rejected. For Merleau-Ponty, this Cartesian dualism must be overcome, and is overcome in our lived experience of the body and the world.

Spiegelberg quotes two sets of brief formulas which illustrate/

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1. Sense and Nonsense pg. 70.
  2. Sense and Nonsense pg. 69.



my view of myself and the other's view of me, the antithesis of the for-itself and the in-itself often seem to be alternatives instead of being described as the living bond and communication between one term and the other" (1). Dreyfus quotes Sartre's response. "It was Merleau-Ponty who converted me .... he taught me concerning that action which since Hegel and Marx has been called Praxis" (2).

Thus, Sartre tries to transcend his original dualism in his later neo-Marxist phase, and in particular, in the 'Critique of dialectical Reason'. He chooses the path which Merleau-Ponty had suggested he might take, namely a communist philosophy. For Merleau-Ponty there was another alternative: a philosophy of the church.

But Merleau-Ponty's criticism of Sartre is consistent with a broad measure of agreement between them. To say that 'Hell is other people' is not, says Merleau-Ponty, to say that 'Heaven is me'. If other people are the instruments of our torture, it is because they are essential to our salvation. In his criticism of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty stands very close indeed to Hegel's position. Both are reflecting upon the dynamics of intersubjectivity rather than subjectivity, and both speak of a genuine synthesis of the contradictions between the in-itself and the for-itself. For both, every contradiction is relative to a certain identity, and for both, contradiction and unity are historical (3). For both, the "social is not collective consciousness, but intersubjectivity, a living relationship and tension among individuals" (4). The Cogito, says Merleau-Ponty  
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1. Sense and Nonsense Intro. p. XX

2. Ibid.

3. Both points are discussed in relation to formal logic by Lefebure: Dialectical Materialism pgs. 38-39.

4. Merleau-Ponty: Sense and Nonsense pg. 90.

is false only in that it shatters our inherence in the world. The only way to do away with it is to fulfil it, that is, to show that it is eminently contained in interpersonal relations. Hegel is not wrong, he is true from end to end, but he is abstract (1). Hegel's logic is, as someone has said, "the algebra of the revolution", and Marx's Das Kapital a concrete Phenomenology of Spirit.

Similarly, Merleau-Ponty's understanding of consciousness owes much to Hegel. He describes the experience of being a conscious subject as follows. It is worth our while quoting him at length.

"There is a perpetual uneasiness in the state of being conscious. At the moment I perceive a thing, I feel that it was there before me, outside my field of vision" .... Yet "it is I who bring into being this world which seemed to exist without me, to surround and surpass me. I am therefore a consciousness, immediately present to the world and nothing can claim to exist without somehow being caught in the web of my experience. I am not this particular person or face, this finite being: I am a pure witness, placeless and ageless, equal in power to the world's infinity" (2). The metaphysical idea here expressed is that whilst on the one hand my experience is not commensurate with all reality - there may be kinds of fact which I cannot at this time and place conceive - ; on the other hand reality as far as I am concerned is co-extensive with the totality of my experience. We have discovered this epistemological paradox in Hegel.

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1. Ibid pg. 133.

2. Paper on Metaphysics and the novel: Sense and Nonsense pgs. 28-9.

In the same paper as the passage quoted above, Merleau-Ponty discusses the experience of the other. "Amongst Kantian consciousnesses", he says "harmony can always be taken for granted" (1). The Kantian Cogito is assured a priori of being identical to every other possible Cogito (2). Hegel's philosophy succeeds in grasping and describing "inherent individuality", the self as subject which must, because it is subject, seek the death of the other (3). Kant had asked how the physical nature of Newtonian physics (in which he implicitly believed but realized could not be derived from observations) was possible. His philosophy in the 'Critique of Pure Reason' is a philosophy of natural science, not a philosophy of nature. All knowledge begins with experience, though for him there were some kinds of knowledge which cannot be derived from experience. Kant's notion of experience, and so his formulation of the conditions of this experience, remain confined to the Newtonian physicist's experience of the natural world, and does not pretend to grapple with that same physicist's experience of other persons, or of the social world. Hegel had asked how our experience of ourselves and the world we live in changes as we change; his philosophy is a phenomenology of ways of experiencing the world and other people. It is also a philosophy of human action, for Hegel describes how man works upon and transforms nature, and so how men interact with one another in their social life./

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1. Ibid pg. 32. In John Oman's terminology: Kant's problem is that of the Individual - i.e. what belongs to man as man; Hegel's that of Individuality - what is distinctive and personal in each man. Natural and supernatural, pg. 152.
  2. Ibid pg. 93.
  3. Ibid pg. 32.

life. Merleau-Ponty is asking Hegel's questions when he finds the experience of the other a problem (1).

"We easily escape from transcendence as long as we are dealing only with things" (2). If the other is consciousness, then I am for him (though not necessarily for myself) only a finite object, determinate, visible at a certain place in the world. If he is consciousness then it seems I must cease to be myself. But I cannot deny that most certain and immediate awareness of myself which is the condition of my experiencing anything whatever. The truth that Merleau-Ponty seeks to persuade us to comprehend, is that "our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world ... My thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric" (3). Before any voluntary adoption of a position, we are all of us already situated in an intersubjective world. For the struggle between consciousnesses, each seeking the death of the other, ever to begin, they "must necessarily have some common ground and be mindful of their peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood" (4). "Solitude and communication cannot be the two horns of a dilemma, but two moments of one phenomenon, since in fact other people do exist for me" (5). This deeply Hegelian formulation of the dialectic of intersubjectivity will not be discussed farther here, since we are about to discuss the same dialectic in Hegel. Merleau-Ponty is probably the finest example/

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1. Similarly Karl Popper, in his 'Open Society and its enemies' sides with the Kantian a priori identity of every Cogito when he seeks to refute Hegel's "pathological" philosophy of intersubjectivity. Popper's rationalism has a kind of naive insensitivity to the problems of social conflict and alienation.
  2. Phenomenology of Perception pg. 354.
  3. Ibid pg. 355.
  4. Ibid pg. 359.

example, however, of a thinker who has grasped the spirit of Hegel's philosophy, and who undertakes his own philosophical activity in the same spirit, without repeating the outworn slogans, or the tortuous style of the 'dead letter' of Hegelianism.

## CHAPTER XIV

## GEIST: HEGEL.

Geist ist Zeit, for Hegel, in that Geist encompasses the fixed and abstract opposition between finite and infinite in the Act of its self-disclosure, as a living integrated temporality, in which all human being-in-time participates in so far as it participates in THE truth. In Geist, finite and infinite, being and not-being are united in such a way that the need for a deceitful belief in a life beyond life and a time beyond time is overcome. For Geist is death, but not the death that ends our life, the 'not-being anymore' we dread so much. Geist is death in life and life in death, a being-in-time for which life and death are one. THE truth, for Hegel, is to be found in time, and in history, as that integrated self-becoming which is present in every Act, secure in its self-consciousness in every Act of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. The Act is the Truth. The Act is neither revealer nor revealed, nor the one by whom the act of revelation is received. It is the act of revealing itself, whose content is united with form, and so in radical discontinuity from all being. As Act, Geist is not being, it is not-being. Some have said that all being is becoming. We must warn that Geist's self-becoming, the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of the self-determining subject in and through the substance of being's infinite determinations, this all-encompassing becoming cannot be understood in terms of the natural, continuous growth from like to like which corresponds, before we choose to displace the metaphor, to the becoming of natural being. Natural growth is not self-becoming; neither

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is nature spirit. The Act is not being, nor is the self a part of the world. Self-becoming does not have the kind of continuity which makes it predictable. Spirit is not nature. Reason is not being, it is negative action. The spirit alone is the actual, and only the rational is actual, and nothing which is not actual is rational. Reason is action - though not every action is rational even if we believe, with Freud, that much that appears irrational has an unapparent rationality of its own. Hegel believed this too. For him, it was all too often our confined and one-sided conceptions of the rational which were irrational, though along with their arbitrary use of the concept irrational, they too can be comprehended if reason becomes dialectical.

For Hegel, we normally do not comprehend what we know, or notice what we see, or heed what we hear. We fail to recognize the truth (wahrheit ἀλήθεια) even though the vast body of our correct opinions (truth as correctness, richtigkeit ὁρθότης) continues to grow at an enormous pace. Hegel's distinction between comprehension (which is dialectical) and knowledge which accords with conventional categorial structures (which is analytical) is like and yet not like the distinction between conscious knowledge and immediate experience. There may be such a thing as subliminal awareness, or experience which is not directly known to consciousness, but the distinction between this and knowledge is not like the one Hegel is making between knowledge and comprehension. We shall return to this point, and argue it in detail, when we come to our final discussion of dialectical thinking. Philosophy begins with experience, immediacy is a necessary 'moment', for Hegel. Philosophy is both concrete and universal./

universal. The science of the experience of consciousness does not speculate concerning realities that are not normally experienced, not to speak of the self-contradictory entities which are not, in principle, experienceable. The highway of despair does not despair of experience, but incorporates it, as a moment in the self-becoming act of spirit. Absolute knowledge is the dialectical gathering of the many opinions which together belong, each as an essential, unforgettable moment, to the truth of the Whole.

We have seen that for Hegel genuine human intersubjectivity is actual only as act, or praxis, not as ideal synthesis, nor as a static concept of being. We have seen Sartre argue that we cannot surpass the other towards an intersubjective totality, though by way of Merleau-Ponty's influence, he later began to appreciate the Hegelian notion of negative action or praxis, which so profoundly influenced Marx. Feuerbach has no conception of praxis, and consequently, his social philosophy cannot transcend abstract ideas of universal love, or essence of the species. Marx returns to Hegel's notion of the active transformation of reality (realität) into rational actuality (wirklichkeit), through negative action, or work. This enables Marx to found his later economic theory on a concrete philosophy of man's socio-historic life, giving his work a strength that has stood it in good stead ever since. Hegel's "concrete universal", or "community of the spirit or notion" becomes in Marx, a revolutionary vision of a new and genuinely human community. Marx is taking an essentially Christian notion of transformation when he employs Hegel's notions of alienation and negative action, and the relation of Lord and slave; though, of/

of course, his economic theory is of a different logical order altogether. But it is not Marxist economics that concerns us in this study. Our concern is, rather, with the great theological and philosophical themes of liberation, redemption and healing, because for Hegel, as for Plato or Wittgenstein, the philosophical task, though differently conceived, is nonetheless a liberation, a kind of redemption or healing. It is difficult to determine how such metaphors are to be understood, and fortunately, our task here is not so large. We are committed here to discussing only the issues which our analysis of Hegel raises in connection with them. So we return now for a final look at Hegel's notion of Entfremdung (alienation) and his notion of redemption and liberation in Geist (spirit). We are widening the discussion to include the cultural, literary, religious, and linguistic dimensions of alienation which Hegel discusses, but which Marx subordinates to his conception of die entfremdete arbeit, or alienated work.

In his early essay on 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate' we discover Hegel in process of formulating his notion of the hidden connection between the divine and the human in Geist. For Hegel, the Λόγος which connects the opposing contraries of human existence is Geist or spirit. Hegel speaks of the reality of man's social and historical life in the light of a harmony (ἁρμονία) of opposites, but never of a static identity of opposites; ἁρμονία, for Hegel, is always a living, dynamic γένεσις. This harmony is Geist. It is not being but act, not identity but temporal disintegration and reintegration. Consequently, it cannot be defined in terms of any exclusive either/or. It is neither subjective nor objective, neither knowledge nor being, neither thought nor reality, but is the coinherence/

coherence of all these.

We have already discussed the first part of this early essay, and we found that, for Hegel, Israel's faith is condemned to a form of religious repression and alienation not unlike the alienation Feuerbach ascribed to Christianity. Neither Hegel nor Feuerbach have grasped the dialectic of the Judaeo-Christian tradition at this point, nevertheless, their critique is a helpful analysis of degenerate forms of Jewish and Christian faith. Hegel's conception of the Jew is of a man condemned to be a slave in relation to his Lord God. The fate of Judaism, according to Hegel, was to remain fixatedly bound to the destructive dynamics of a Lord-slave dualism. Jesus was the victim of the cruelty, repression and rigidity of this dualism. The dialectic we learn from the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus is that "opposition is the possibility of reunification, and the extent to which in affliction life is felt as an opposite is also the extent of the possibility of resuming it again..... The trespass which issues from life reveals the whole, but as divided, and the hostile parts can coalesce again into the whole" (1). Jesus confirms "our endeavour to unify the discords necessitated by our development and our attempt to exhibit the unification in the 'ideal' as full 'existent', as no longer (2). opposed to reality, and thus to express and confirm it in a deed". The deed is the connection which integrates the 'ought' and the 'is'. Jesus is broken by the fractured dualism which in its many forms (reflected in Jewish faith as well as the contradictions of the enlightenment) threatens to dissolve all coherence and meaning ( Λόγος ) in complete disintegration and/

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1. Spirit of Xnity pg. 232.

2. Ibid pg. 206.

and fragmentation. Jesus is afflicted by the same disease, subjected to the same enslavement, condemned to the same alienation as the rest of humanity. It is only because this is so that in his resurrection, Jesus gathers broken humanity to himself, and a new, integrated, redeemed, healed humanity is born in the spirit. Hegel first expresses this notion of reconciliation in a notion of Love. In love "all one-sidedness, all exclusiveness, all restricted virtues are annulled" (1). "Only through love is the might of objectivity broken, for love upsets its whole sphere" (2). Love, says Hegel, is a harmony in which there is no abstract universality, since in harmony the particular is not in discord but in concord. "It is no universal opposed to a particular, no unity of the concept, but a unity of spirit, divinity" (3). "A living bond, a living unity, is quite different from the unity of the concept", for "it appears even in the most variegated mixture of relations, untorn, and unitary. Its external shape may be modified in infinite ways; it will never have the same shape twice" (4). This is expressed for Hegel in the Eucharist or love-feast (5). The bread and the wine are "not just an object for the intellect"<sup>(6)</sup>, for the connection which they symbolize is the spirit of a new Covenant, a new united humanity. Thus Jesus opposes the Jewish "principle of subjection", and with it the "infinite sovereign Lord of the Jews". For Jesus God is the loving Father not the Lord of slaves (7). Hegel writes: "In the moments of happy love, there/

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1. Ibid pg. 246.
  2. Ibid pg. 247.
  3. Ibid pg. 247.
  4. Ibid pg. 246.
  5. Ibid pgs. 248-252.
  6. Ibid pg. 253.
  7. Ibid pg. 253.

there is no room for objectivity; yet every reflection annuls love, restores objectivity again, and with objectivity we are once more within the territory of restrictions. What is religious, then, is *πλήρωμα* (fulfilment) of love" (1). "Man can believe in God only by being able to abstract from every deed, from everything determinate; while at the same time simply clinging fast to the soul of every deed and everything determinate" (2). The dialectic emerges clearly here, indicating the hope that the endless fixated dualism of Lord and slave is truly overcome. Jesus is the Lord, who is Lord only as the slave, and who is slave only as Lord. Here the dualism is broken open, and becomes dialectic. Redemption is possible.

Hegel draws many interesting conclusions concerning Christian life and language from the dialectic. "Since the divine is pure life, everything and anything said of it must be free from any (implication of) opposition". "Hence, it is only in inspired terms that the divine can be spoken about" (3). Because God is not one of two or more related terms but relatedness itself, no ordinary language can comprehend him. A language incapable of connecting subject and object in a living relation of unity in difference will be incapable of any speech concerning God. Hegel criticizes the church for falling away from speech expressing God as love to the false objectivity of creeds and dogmas and so, once again, to the pagan subject-object dualism.

Hegel argues, for example, that "faith in Jesus means more than knowing his real personality, feeling one's own reality as inferior to his in might and strength, and being his servant.

Faith/

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1. Ibid pg. 253.
  2. Ibid pg. 254.
  3. Ibid pg. 255.

Faith is a knowledge of spirit through spirit" (1). Here Hegel, in facing up to the consequences of historical criticism for Christian ontology, sets the scene for our own discussion concerning the historical Jesus initiated by Kierkegaard. He sees only too well, and in this anticipates many theologians in our own time, that a fixated subject-object dualism, employed in historical research, is of a logically different order from the coinherence of subject and object in man's concrete historical existence, the logical order to which the language of faith indissolubly belongs. Hegel argues that "to consider the resurrection of Jesus as an event is to adopt the outlook of the historian, and this has nothing to do with religion. Belief or disbelief in the resurrection as a mere fact deprived of its religious interest is a matter for the intellect whose occupation (the fixation of objectivity) is just the death of religion, and to have recourse to the intellect means to abstract from religion" (2).

In his discussion of the nature of theological language, and in particular of the language of the Fourth Gospel prologue, Hegel argues that "nowhere more than in the communication of the divine is it necessary for the recipient to grasp the communication with the depths of his own spirit. Nowhere is it less possible to learn, to assimilate passively, because everything expressed about the divine in the language of reflection is eo ipso contradictory .... This always objective language hence attains sense and weight only in the spirit of the reader and to an extent which differs with the degree to which/

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1. Ibid pg. 239.

2. Ibid pg. 292.

which the relationships of life, and the opposition of life and death, have come into his consciousness" (1). The Jewish principle of opposing thought to reality, reason to sense, involves the rending of life and what Hegel calls "a lifeless connection between God and the world" (2). "What is a contradiction in the realm of the dead is not one in the realm of life"<sup>(3)</sup>.

It is Hegel's belief that it is only by God that God is known, that faith is a living comprehension of spirit by spirit. Geist is a living relatedness between what even conventional Christian thinking opposes and separates. There are echoes of Luther in some of what Hegel is saying, and of Boehme in much else. But our interest, here, is not with the thinkers who may or may not have influenced Hegel's thinking. There remain six brief points that deserve to be stressed before proceeding further.

We shall formulate them in propositional form in the interests of clarity.

1. Development necessitates contradiction (or as Hegel himself formulated this in his Greater Logic: "Everything is inherently contradictory", this is "the truth and the essential nature of things", "contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality", "only when terms have been driven to the point of contradiction do they become active and lively towards one another, receiving in contradiction the negativity which is the indwelling pulsation of self-movement and spontaneous activity" etc. (4).

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1. Ibid pg. 256-7.
  2. Ibid pg. 259.
  3. Ibid pg. 260-261.
  4. Science of Logic pgs. 439-442.

2. The common measure between subject and object is self-mediation, (the negative activity of Geist). (Mediation: Vermittlung, is that which defines the nature of subject as subject as well as that which makes the real subject into an actual subject. It is action, (negation) which transforms the real as given, into essence, into actuality. Action is negativity, is mediation, is the way to freedom and spirit).
3. The Jew (and the Kantian man) is a slave under the law, subjected to an alienated, repressed mode of existence by his sovereign Lord, God. (1). (or Reason for Kant).
4. All men are slaves, like the Jews, as long as they do not transcend their determinate existence. (i.e. natural existence, immediacy, what is the case, the established order) (2).
5. The meaning of Jesus is the meaning of his life, death and resurrection which in principle integrates all contradiction, heals all illness, making all things whole.
6. Faith is a knowledge of spirit through spirit, and as such overcomes the antagonism between subject and object, and so between Lord and slave. The concepts of subject and object are abstractions from the living, concrete totality of Geist. God as Geist cannot be known directly, not because God is a transcendent beyond, but precisely because resurrection faith is born only and death, that is, by way of the negative detour. The Via Negativa cannot be by-passed.

We argued in Chapter One that Hegel saw his own time as a time of crisis at the dawn or birth of a new age, and that his concept/

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1. Or Reason for Kant.
  2. The Lord who has mastered his own nature and natural inclinations by Reason, has not overcome nature. This Kantian Lord (according to Hegel) is in another sense a slave to natural passions, in that he depends upon them to be Lord. of. Lord-slave dialectic.

concept of Geist has not only the general connotation of encompassing meaning and complete coherence and health, but also the specific connotation of an ecstatic awareness. The new world, and a new humanity was at hand, and the last task that was left was to comprehend and so regain the past from forgetfulness. He calls the birth of the new age a "qualitative change", whilst warning us that it is no more actualized than a newly-born child (1). In moving from his early theological (or anti-theological as some would prefer) essays to the Phenomenology, we find that the concepts of life and love have been superseded. Geist, (spirit), and Begriff (Notion or Logos) take their place, encompassing both their meanings, but bearing a broader, and in many ways more ambiguous range of interconnected meanings.

The term Geist is closely associated, in Hegel's mind with the notion of Begriff, begreifen, begrifflichkeit, (which we translate in turn as Notion, or  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , to comprehend, and comprehensive notion or conception), and with the notion of recollection. Both recollection, and comprehension, reason dialectically, by way of mediation, or the way of negation (2). For Hegel, philosophy is a kind of remembering. He calls it "recollection"; he also calls it the "Golgotha of absolute spirit" (3). Recollection (Erinnerung) is the negative way through which spirit is finally "engulfed in the night of its own self-consciousness" in order to be "born anew from the womb of knowledge as a new stage of existence, and a new world, and a new embodiment or mode of spirit" (4). These passionate passages/

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1. P.S. pg. 75.
  2. P.S. p. 82-83.
  3. Ibid pg. 808.
  4. Ibid pg. 807.

passages are very difficult to understand. It would seem, however, that he conceived philosophy to be a unifying integrating activity, undertaken in the light of the eschatological hope that a new age was at hand. Absolute knowledge is simply all experience remembered and preserved in an encompassing conception. For Hegel, "the need for philosophy arises when the unifying power (die Macht der Vereinigung) has disappeared from the life of men, when contradictions have lost inter-relation and interdependence, and assumed an independent form" (1). The philosopher thinks through the content of our living experience of the world so that experiences are comprehended in their living unity. Reflected experience is given the form of spirit in recollection, which means that alienation is overcome.

This seems to mean that for Hegel, the principle of the German Reformation and of the French Revolution, the freedom of spirit, is achievable only in the mediation of thought, only in that death with can alone transform the experiences of the past into the form of the spirit. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, a vast gallery of different ways of experiencing the world are "lived through" and so remembered in recollection. In this way thought transforms experience into a coherent whole or totality (  $\delta\lambda\omicron\nu$  ) which is truth. In this way alienation is overcome, the causes of anxiety and tension removed. Hegel believed that just as the French nation was liberated from the institutions it had outgrown, so mankind as a whole will be liberated from the fetters of the status quo, dead and devoid of spirit, in the community of spirit, which achieves freedom in the recollection of experience by dialectical Reason. He did not/

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1. Marcuse: Reason and Revolution: from Early Study of the philosophies of Schelling and Fichte.

not however seem to believe that our social world must be actively changed by us, unless we undertake be-reifen, comprehend, to mean the active regaining possession of an alienated self or substance in which case he was advocating revolutionary action. Hegel was only too aware, particularly in his earlier work, of the fundamental estrangement which necessitated a criticism of the existing order. Löwith argues that Hegel's reconciliation with "what is" itself developed out of the same thing which it gave rise to: a fundamental estrangement from the existing order" (1). Philosophy, for Hegel, is an integrating activity not least because he himself experienced the alienation and estrangement which is at the heart of the romantic yearning. According to Löwith, the young Marx of 1841 unknowingly referred back to the Hegel of 1798, just as Feuerbach's religion of love, and Bauer's criticism of Christianity go back to Hegel's early theological writings (2). Thus, for Löwith, the criticism of the young Hegelians repeated the crisis which Hegel had gone through himself before overcoming it in the integrating, unifying activity of dialectical reason. Hegel sought to make the idea of "unity of life" or "living-unity" a reality, not by changing the world but by transforming the way we comprehend the world, which is to change the world indirectly or dialectically.

Hegel therefore sought to integrate the multiplicity of our experiences into a coherent totality of experiences. Experience, in times of acute alienation and loss of meaning, appears devoid of meaning; what is, seems merely to happen to be. Hegel thought that by doing philosophy he could restore meaning to/

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1. From Hegel to Nietzsche pg. 162.

2. Ibid pg. 163.

to experience by integrating what had become disassociated and alienated. Marx thought that the same purpose would only be achieved in revolutionary Praxis. The issue remains with us to this day. Löwith draws our attention to the hidden dishonesty of Hegel's ambiguous challenge to the existing order and accommodation to it, for Hegel makes use of the fundamental ambiguity of the notion of 'what is' or 'reality', in order to pass from the notion of what happens to be (realität) to what is truly real and rational (wirklichkeit) (1). Estrangement from the former can become a reconciliation with the latter only if the former is actually changed into the latter, which it manifestly was not in Hegel's own life-time, or if the former is treated as identical to the latter. This is what many people suppose Hegel to have done in the total synthesis of his system, though as we have seen, there are passages in the system which do not confuse or identify the two, and so point in a wholly different direction.

The total view achieved in the absolute synthesis is well expressed in the famous passage toward the end of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right. According to this view, philosophy always comes on the scene too late to give instruction as to what the world ought to be. "As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is there out and dried after its process of formation has been completed". (2). Philosophy, "the owl of Minerva, spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk" (3). Here, Hegel argues that the Ideal appears over against/

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1. From Hegel to Nietzsche pg. 162-168.
  2. Philosophy of Right (or Law) pg. 12.
  3. Philosophy of Right Ibid pg. 13.

against the real only when actuality is mature, when, in other words, the real has been transformed into the rational and actual, when all deeds are done. Then philosophy recalls the experience and the worlds of the past and builds them into the shape of an intellectual realm (1). Or in the language of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', the "entire wealth of spirit" is endowed in each form of the world or way of experiencing, so that each appears with the others as a slow "procession and succession of spiritual shapes" (Geistern), like a gallery of pictures. This historical succession is the path to absolute knowledge, "Spirit knowing itself as Spirit" (2).

"Spirit alone is the actual", said Hegel, earlier in the Phenomenology (3), by which he seemed to mean that spirit is reality transformed through negation and death, so that it emerges eventually as truly rational. Thus, when he says that spirit is the "inner being of the world, that which essentially is and is per se", (4), he does not mean that spirit lies behind reality as a static thing-in-itself. Spirit is primarily a temporal and so historical category, it is only through man's transformation of nature into an historic world, into a commodity he uses or consumes, that the concept of spirit can be correlated to those of nature and space. This does not mean that spirit is immediately manifest in particular historical events, or embodied in certain historic individuals, for Hegel. For it is only "We", the philosophers, the thinkers, those who "lift the series of experiences through which consciousness passes into a scientifically/

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1. Ibid pg. 13.
  2. P.S. pgs. 807-8.
  3. P.S. pg. 86.
  4. P.S. pg. 86.

scientifically constituted sequence", who know the spirit. And since for Hegel it is only by the spirit that spirit is known (a reformulation of the proposition that God can be known only through God), We, the philosophers, are spirit knowing itself as spirit (1). "Spirit", says Hegel, "is its own Community" (2).

Hegel explains what he means by the community of the spirit in Chapter VII on Revealed Religion. Spirit is transcendence, not in the static sense of that which is always beyond and thus never directly experienced, but in the sense of a continuing dying to what is and birth of new being. For Hegel, God and the world are integrated in the incarnation, so that the transcendence of God is now to be understood as a continual dying and rising of the community of spirit. Christ becomes the religious communion, and in the power of his death, "death ceases to signify what it means directly - the non-existence of this individual, - and becomes transfigured into the universality of the spirit, which lives in its own communion, dies there daily, and daily rises again" (3).

Hegel's exposition of the Christian faith in terms of the relation between substance and subject is at once a critique of the conventional "pictorial" way of thinking, by which he means the conventional picture of Jesus as the Christ, and a critique of abstract metaphysical theology. In spite of the difficulty and ambiguity of his language, Hegel seems to be formulating a concrete theology of history in which the full implications of the incarnation are recognized. In the incarnation, he writes, "the Divine Being has come to itself in the sensuous present; the immediate/

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1. The famous "We" passages are to be found on pgs. 86, 96, 141, 2, 3, and 4, 162-3, 192, 212, etc. of P.S.
  2. P.S. pg. 778.
  3. P.S. pg. 780.

immediate existence of actual reality has ceased to be something alien or external to the Divine by being sublated, universal: this death of immediacy is therefore its rising anew as spirit"(1). For Hegel, the consciousness of the Christian "does not set out from its own inner life, nor does it start from thought, and in itself combine the thought of God with existence; rather it sets out from immediate present existence, and recognizes God in it"(2).

At first sight this chapter seems to be advocating a speculative metaphysic designed to transpose 'historical events' into 'eternal truths'. On closer examination, however, the opposite seems to be the case, although we must admit that the extreme difficulty of the text does not permit easy or straightforward interpretation. For the believer, God is present to him in Jesus, (3); but the Romans crucified Jesus, which deprived the disciples not only of their Lord, but also of their God. In the resurrection, however, God is born again as Holy Spirit, in the new community of those who have participated in his death. In this new community, the disease of mankind is healed, the contradictions of his existence integrated, so that the world is no longer broken by the split between subject and object. The self of man is at last integrated with the environment, nature has been worked into an historic, human environment, and society redeemed from alienation.

For Mure, Hegel's trinitarian solution to history dissolves the/

1. Ibid pg. 775.
2. Ibid pg. 758.
3. Ibid pg. 762.

the antinomies of the Kantian moral consciousness in a Protestant synthesis (1). However, Hegel's synthesis has in some respects more in common with Orthodox Christianity than Protestant (2). It is a philosophical eschatology of the spirit, in which God is perpetual transcendence. God transcends his abstract, static, eternal otherness by becoming concrete, living man. He suffers and dies. He rises again, and lives, thus overcoming the antinomy of suffering and doing, passivity and activity. The Christian's Lord is the suffering slave, God is nowhere more active than in the Passion, in his suffering and death. Christianity achieves the only true *coincidentia oppositorum*. Hegel saw his philosophy as the final and definitive hermeneutic of this deed, the integration of faith and praxis.

If the meaning of spirit is death to alienation, that is, the negation of the negation, then why is faith still dissociated from action, words from deeds, ideals from reality? The new creation is delayed. Is it, then, vain illusion? Hegel does not answer us. His philosophy develops from a catching mood of hope in his earlier work, (including much of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit') toward a darker pessimism later on. His early thought was undertaken at a time of urgent transition, following the French Revolution, and it shares the almost apocalyptic hopes typical of such times. The mature Hegel, determined to heal the contradictions he had known and felt in his youth, proceeded to do so in abstract ideality. Thus, Marx was right to respond to Hegel with a Yes and a No; a yes to his ideas, and a no to the abstract idealism/

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1. Mure: Philosophy of Hegel, pg. 102, 108, etc.
  2. Khomiakov's notion of sobornost has much in common with the notion of Geist outlined in this chapter. The Sobornost of the Church, according to Soloviev, consists in the synthesis of unity and freedom in the community of those who love one another in God.

idealism of his last writings

George Lukács' criticism of Hegel is essentially the same as that of Marx, outlined in 'The Holy Family' of 1845. Though Hegel had recognized that history is made through human action, he relegated the understanding of human action and its fashioning of history to the past only. The present, for Hegel, can only be grasped philosophically and contemplatively. Thus, Hegel fails, according to Lukács, to transcend objectification. He fails to achieve a true dialectic of the present as "history in the making", but relapses instead into a "conceptual mythology of the Absolute spirit" (1). "Hegel's Absolute Spirit", writes Zitta, "where-in past history culminates in his system, was a supra-historical entity, capable of being comprehended in speculative Philosophy only. Hegel expressed the dominance of the Absolute Spirit in history through the term "cunning of reason", whereby fate frequently intervenes to deflect the consequences of human actions from their original intentions". Hegel scrutinizes this cunning contemplatively by bringing his philosophy to a knowledge of absolute spirit (2).

In Chapter VIII of the "Phenomenology of Spirit", we find a general analysis of the way "self-consciousness externalizes itself" (3), in the creation of a social and historic world, the manner in which this world is alienated from self-consciousness and the negative dialectical way which alone redeems that world from alienation, re-appropriating it on behalf of self-consciousness. This philosophical eschatology puts its trust in a salvation from slavery through slavery, a liberation from death through death. This is the meaning of Hegelian dialectic.

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1. of. Zitta: G. Lukács' Marxism, Alienation, Dialectics and Revolution pg. 162.
  2. Ibid pg. 162.
  3. F.S. pg. 769.

In it, the mystic and the revolutionary meet in a common negativity, separating from one another when one chooses a negative attitude but does not act, and the other, a negative action united to negative, critical theory. Hegel's philosophy includes a description of the experience of both, for his dialectic of passivity and activity, suffering and doing, hope and deed, traces a way from one to the other with the final intention of uniting them. It is for this reason impossible to define Hegel's own position in this matter, at least as it can be inferred from the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'. He seems to be both passively contemplative and critically revolutionary at the same time. For some, he is the father of revolutionary Marxism, for others a speculative mystic, a builder of an Idealist system divorced from reality.

Perhaps Hegel is closer to Freud than is commonly recognized if for both, conscious recollection of the experiences of the past is the only way man can escape from being a prisoner or slave to his past. For both, remembering what has become dismembered is the only way slavery is overcome. Both Freud and Hegel sought to make the unconscious conscious, Freud through an analysis of the individual in the context of the communal or social neurosis, and Hegel through an analysis of the ways in which men have been neurotic. There is a sense in which both would have agreed with James Joyce that, "History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awaken" (1). If Hegel saw in philosophy a kind of therapy whereby man is freed from the domination of his past, freed for a new future, then Lukács' criticism/

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1. Ulysses pg. 35. of. Brown Life against Death pg. 15.

criticism may have missed the point. It might be that to understand the past is the only way to create history, or at any rate new history in the present. Perhaps, the present can never be free for human action without the contemplative therapeutic 'remembering'. For Freud, analysis breaks the power of the compulsion to repeat; or in Brown's words: "The function of analysis was to substitute recollection ("historical truth") for repetition in the present" (1). Philosophy for Hegel was a "long and laborious journey" (2), of recollecting every "shape" that was once assumed by mind and now laid aside" (3). It involved, as we have already seen, "a scepticism directed to the whole compass of phenomenal consciousness", "which makes mind for the first time qualified to test what truth is; since it brings about a despair regarding what are called natural views, thoughts and opinions" (4). For Hegel, these natural attitudes and ways of thinking are all under the dominion of alienation, they arise when man is imprisoned by his past, condemned to passivity like a thing. Hegel sought to transcend them in an all-embracing human way of knowing, one which overcame all reification, and so all false-consciousness. Husserl had tried to do this in a confined area, by developing the phenomenological method, a method designed to bracket the false objectification and determinism of various kinds of scientism. Marx thought that they could be overcome only when the conditions which give rise to them are overcome. Merleau-Ponty synthesized the views of all three in his phenomenological studies.

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1. Brown Ibid pg. 147.
  2. P.S. pg. 88.
  3. Ibid pg. 89.
  4. P.S. pg. 136.

If Spirit, for Hegel, is the transcendence of alienation, and Philosophy the means to this end, then it would be misleading to discuss the last chapter of the "Phenomenology of Spirit" as anything other than an eschatological vision of redemption. It is one answer to the perennial question: How is man to be redeemed? Hegel's answer is: Through the bitter Golgotha of remembering the past. The goal of the human struggle can be achieved, according to Hegel, only when every experience is consciously remembered, and so integrated into self-consciousness. Not even our worst experiences can be forgotten, for if they are, they will dominate us. We shall be compelled to repeat, even if we are unaware that we do so, unless we can redeem the experience, in all its contradiction, from compulsive forgetfulness. To disown an experience, to deny the opposition or to forget the contradiction, is to give to these things an autonomy of their own, an autonomy which destroys our freedom. In Hegelian recollection, we re-member what was dis-membered, we integrate what has become dissociated; we, as subject, enter into and repossess the alien substance. It is in remembering that we undertake the truly revolutionary theoria; it is in remembering that we become free for praxis. The emergence of self-consciousness is a recollection, in  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , the enduring collecting or gathering which is the primary meaning of the root  $\lambda\epsilon\gamma$  (leg, legem). In the gathering presence of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , or the speech which integrates what has been lost in forgetfulness, thought and being, theory and practice, word and deed, faith and action, promise and fulfilment are decisively united.

This, then is the revolutionary element in Hegel's philosophy. Comprehension is not passive contemplation; it is negative/

negative action. It is the essential partner of revolutionary action. This cannot be emphasized enough. Of course, some would say that some experiences are always too destructive of our ontological security to be comprehended, or repossessed, or remembered. Slavery is never 'acceptable'. The slave does not dare comprehend. Like the mystic or the adolescent he may be unable to act despite his negative attitude to the world. He may be in love with his enslavement. There is a sense in which he cannot help being in love with his chains. He finds that he is compelled to repeat actions which he does not intend to do, and he finds that he cannot do what he desperately wants to do. We shall return to a discussion of this compulsive bondage, described and understood so well by St. Paul and Luther, from whom Hegel learned it, when we come to discuss these issues in a broader context. We continue our analysis of some of the main themes of Chapter VIII of the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Hegel begins this chapter by recalling the "moments which compose the reconciliation of spirit with its own consciousness proper". By themselves, he says, each moment is single and isolated. "It is their spiritual unity alone which furnishes the power for the reconciliation" (1). The synthesis which for Hegel "winds up this series of embodiments of spirit" is the synthesis of "in itself and for itself" (2). This synthesis is achieved in the "form of implicit immanence" in the trinitarian beliefs of Christians; all that is required now is that it take the final "form of explicit self-existence", that is, in self-consciousness not mere consciousness. For, the figurative picturing/

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1. P.S. pg. 793.
  2. Ibid pg. 794.

picturing activity of the Christian's consciousness will not allow him to transcend the subject-object structure of consciousness. He continues to believe in Father, Son and Holy Spirit as external realities. "The unification still a-wanting", says Hegel, "is the simple unity of the notion" (1). What we must realize is that our consciousness of God is God's consciousness of himself. Consciousness of the absolute must become absolute self-consciousness through what Hegel calls the negative. Through death to both self-existence and to the lifeless self of inert universality, spirit as the simple unity of knowledge emerges. "It is through action (namely this active dying to one then another determination) that spirit is spirit so as definitely to exist"; ..... so that what for the Christian was a "way of imagining another is here the action proper of the self". (2). Hegel calls this the knowledge of subject as substance and of substance as this knowledge of its action.

"The last embodiment of spirit - spirit which at once gives its complete and true content the form of self, and thereby realizes its notion, and in doing so remains within its own notion - this is Absolute Knowledge" (3). We notice, here, that Absolute Knowledge remains an embodiment; it is not a disembodied ideality, but the integration of both abstract, empty form and concrete existence. The universal is concrete universal, concrete totality, concrete wholeness. The notion for Hegel is neither subjective nor objective but both, each transformed to form a new unity, although this unity can emerge only through mediation (vermittlung), that is, death to the subject as subject and to the object/

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1. Ibid pg. 794.
  2. P.S. pg. 797.
  3. Ibid pg. 797.

object as object. According to Hegel, we remain imprisoned within a dungeon of alienation for as long as a static opposition rather than a living interaction between subject and object remains. Freedom is possible only in the unity of subject and object, a concrete, actual unity. Geist, for Hegel, is the negation of the antagonism between subject and object, it is the concrete unification of opposites. It is the healing of the diseased splits between man and himself, between man and his environment, between man and nature, between man and God. Spirit as notion is a new Wholeness, a new Wholesomeness; it is the truth of the Whole. Our world ceases to be an alien world, reified and so hostile to us. It becomes our home. The life-death struggle which pervades our world is overcome; the Lord-slave dualism becomes a dialectic leading to a new self-conscious freedom.

Hegel reminds us that for him "nothing is known which does not fall within experience" (1). As absolute knowledge, spirit is a comprehensive redemption of self from death through death, a new relation between subject and object in experience. It does not consist of a change in the subject in order that subject may adjust to the object, nor of a change in the object, for that would leave the subject self-righteously remaining just what he is. And anyway for Hegel, the interpenetration between subject and object in every experience means that ultimately, the one cannot be divorced from the other in this way. Hegel describes this comprehensive integration of experience as a transformation of "substance into subject, of the object of consciousness into the object of self-consciousness ... i.e. into the notion" (2).  
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1. P.S. pg. 800.
  2. Ibid pg. 801.

This transformation is a cycle, he says, which presupposes its beginning, and reaches its beginning only at the end. Our original paradise, in other words, is really a vision of a new future; our original health, that from which we have fallen, is really the consummation of our eschatological hope. Originally, that is to say, in the end, there is no antagonism between substance and subject. Hegel attempts to describe, albeit dialectically, the fulness and completeness of integrity, or self-consciousness. Hegel asks the Christian to "descend from the ideal, intelligible world", and thus to give it life with "concrete selfhood". He asks everyone to return to themselves from alienation. The 'Phenomenology of Spirit' describes a multitude of ways men lose themselves in gaining this or that in the world, in order to show us how we may find ourselves again.

How then does Hegel describe this comprehensive experiencing he calls spirit knowing itself as spirit? First, he tells us what it is not. It is not the Ego "taking its stand on the form of self-consciousness in opposition to the form of substantiality and objectivity, as if it were afraid of relinquishing or externalising itself" (1). It is not, in other words any sort of subjectivism, be it intellectualistic, pietistic, mystical, or ethical. Nor is it, says Hegel, the Ego "casting distinctions back into the Abyss of the Absolute, declaring them all to mean the same there". Rather "the power of the spirit lies rather in remaining one with itself when giving up itself, and because it is self-contained and self-subsistent, in establishing as mere moments its explicit self-existence as well as its implicit inherent nature" (2). Earlier  
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1. P.S. pg. 804.

2. Ibid pg. 804.

in the Phenomenology, Hegel had described it as follows:

"The life of the spirit is not that life which shrinks from death and seeks to keep itself clear of all corruption, but rather the life which endures the presence of death within itself and preserves itself alive within death" (1). This is the meaning of Hegel's dialectic. It is the "process of releasing itself from the form of its self", and as such is freedom (2).

Tillich argues that the dialectic of life in death and death in life, and redemption from death through death, is the ultimate criterion of true revelation, a criterion which is derived from revelation itself and from nothing else. "The first and basic answer theology must give to the question of the finality of the revelation in Jesus as the Christ is the following: A revelation is final if it has the power of negating itself without losing itself" (3). This formulation comes very close to Hegel's and both derive from the belief of the first Christians that new life is given them in their dying in and with the body of their Lord. This can be seen most clearly in the Christian doctrine of baptism. For Hegel, as for Tillich, the truth of the whole is Spirit creating new life in continuing death. Both adopt as the ultimate criterion of revealed truth the apophatic negation, a negation which even God himself underwent in his death on Calvary, which alone preserves life in death, resurrection in destruction, hope in despair. And this negation includes every finite medium of revelation, including Jesus himself. Tillich spells this out in/

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1. P.S. pg. 93, translation from Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism pg. 11.
  2. P.S. pg. 806.
  3. Paul Tillich Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pg. 148.

in his concept of the demonic. "The claim of anything finite to be final in its own right is demonic" (1). God is God only by way of negation.

Of course, Hegel is trying to describe not merely a new way of experiencing, a new relation between subject and object, self and world, nor merely a new apophatic language-game with new logical conventions, though he describes all these things. He is also recommending a new form of life, a new way of being in the world, a new way of relating to others in a new kind of social world. That is why Hegel's language is so difficult to pin down. He intends us to recognize that our social conventions are diseased and require healing. He tries to show us that our logical conventions in every mode of discourse, the very language we use, are diseased. For we have forgotten that everything co-inheres with everything else, that there is a lived unity in plurality, that our perspectives interconnect. We have allowed fragmentation to get out of hand so that communication, community and communion become well nigh impossible. We need new social conventions, new logical conventions, new ways of describing and communicating. We need new forms of life. This Hegel tried to give us. That is why those who insist that existing logical conventions and common usage are normative and cannot be changed, say they do not understand Hegel. He is after all trying to establish new logical rules, and a new social order. For him, the way we use words, and the way we live our life, and the way we relate to one another, are all diseased. We all participate in a common sickness in every sector of our human world. Philosophy, for Hegel, is therefore a redemptive therapeutic/

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1. Ibid pg. 149.

therapeutic activity. It is a way of healing through death.

Hegel concludes the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' by saying that the self-abandonment of Spirit in externalization occurs in space as Nature and in Time as History. We have already approved Lukács' arguments for confining the use of the dialectic of spirit to socio-historic reality, that is, to time and history, and not to extend its use to the relation between subject and object in our observation of physical nature. For it is quite clear that Hegel sought to unite subject and object into new forms of experiential relations which would be nonsensical to undertake in the case of our cognition of the material objects of physical nature. Indeed he diagnosed our practice of treating socio-historic reality as though it were external nature as one of the symptoms of our disease. That is why he argues in the Introduction that he seeks to persuade us to "despair regarding what are called natural laws, thoughts and opinions" (1); and to reject the empty formalism of the understanding which "has lost hold of the living nature of concrete fact" (2).

Finally, Hegel reminds us that the new embodiment of spirit at the beginning of the new age is that of Recollection (Erinnerung), a slow and painful remembering of the long history of past experience. Absolute knowledge is complete knowledge of all experience, the truth of the Whole. For the history of experience is like a slow procession and succession of forms or shapes of consciousness, ways of organizing experience, forms of life./

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1. P.S. pg. 136.
  2. Ibid pg. 110.

life. It is like a gallery of pictures, "each of which", says Hegel "is endowed with the entire wealth of spirit" (1). Knowledge of this history is achieved slowly because "the self has to permeate and assimilate all this wealth of its substance" (2). Hegel calls this concentration of spirit on itself in the recollection of the history of experience, the "night of its self-consciousness", a death in which it nonetheless preserves its life, eventually to "born again from the womb of knowledge", a "new stage of existence, and a new embodiment or mode of spirit" (3). In recollection, spirit learns from its experience ready for a new world. The contemplation of past experience is undertaken in eager expectation of a new  $\alpha\iota\omega\nu$ . Phenomenology, as the science of the "ways in which knowledge appears" is "at once the recollection and the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit", the work of the evening hour prior to the dawn of a new day (4).

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1. Ibid pg. 807.
  2. P.S. pg. 807.
  3. Ibid pg. 807.
  4. P.S. pg. 808.

## CHAPTER XV

## LOGOS AND DIALECTIC

We have learned that for Hegel, dialectic is both redemptive and therapeutic. At the heart of the dialectic, we discover a critical eschatological awareness, vividly conscious of contradiction and alienation, and equally conscious of the responsibility of man in the active, practical task of transcendence and transformation. In the case of the dialectic of Lord and slave, redemption is to be a redemption from slavery through slavery. In this, the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic corresponds to the same paradoxical dynamics as does the dialectic of the Christian hope and praxis. For the Christian, redemption from death is a redemption through death. The death of the suffering slave liberates idolatrous, sinful man from himself and his world, freeing him for a new social order, the Kingdom of God. For man as he is, the old man who is both in and of this world, the slave of the powers of the old order, is dead. His death is not less a death because he is physically alive. He is redeemed from his living death through death. This second death is second birth, baptism, resurrection. In the case of the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic, the slaves are the sick who restore health to the whole, not by escaping from or evading their slavery, but through living their slavery to the death. The death of slavery, the negation of the negation, is the redemption of all. It is the birth of a new world.

In philosophy, Plato had sought to "heal the lie in the soul", for man is diseased, he is imprisoned. Philosophy, for Plato, was a healing, liberating activity. It was both redemptive and therapeutic. For Novalis, philosophy can begin only when man experiences/

experiences an acute homesickness. Consequently, it is "the drive to be at home everywhere" (1). The attempt to understand philosophy as a healing, redemptive activity is the essence of the Hegelian dialectic. But dialectic goes about the task in a paradoxical manner. Hegel learned the nature of dialectic and paradox from Luther who learned it from St. Paul. Hegel liked to think he was a good Lutheran. He was far from that. But he did learn that alienation cannot be overcome directly or easily, and he learned why this was so from Luther. For Luther, as for St. Paul, man cannot do what he intends to do, and he does what he does not want to do. For man may will life (ζωή), but all his doing end in death (θανάτος). Man is split, fractured, alienated. Man may seek to do what he knows is good (ἀγαθόν) and right (καλόν); he can and does will life. But he achieves not good but evil. Thus, for Paul, though we can delight in the law, because in keeping it we will life, we must nonetheless rejoice in our liberation from it, because the deed when done achieves death not life. The dialectic of liberation must be therefore a paradoxical double negation. Redemption can never come about directly or immediately. For Paul, it is in death that death is overcome, not in life. Life is given not in our effort to achieve it, but in death, in the death of Christ, and in our death in Christ. Thus, death is the hell from which we seek redemption, and the way by which we must go to receive it. This is the meaning of baptism and eucharist: redemption from death through death, the co-inherence of death and resurrection.

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1. I owe this quotation, as well as much of the material of this section to V. Zitta's brilliant study of Georg Lukács. Lukács': Marxism, alienation, dialectics and Revolution 1964, cf. pg. 148ff.

We have argued that the way of salvation for Hegel and Marx is essentially dialectical. It is always a way of negation. For Marx, redemption from slavery through slavery is a redemption of humanity as a whole; for Marx, as for Hegel, it is a redemptive community that achieves radical transformation of given realities through the dialectic of thought and action. Hegel does not indicate the exact nature of the redemptive community, he speaks of Geist, or Volk, but in the Phenomenology he does not commit himself to an existing social community as undialectically as Popper and others have argued he does. For Marx, the redeeming community is the proletariat, the "dissolution of all classes", the class with "radical chains" (1). This community is a radical transforming power in the world, and through it, all mankind is to be redeemed. A new world, and a new humanity, is born in the death of the Lord-slave polarisation, a death which ends the old order, and brings the new into actuality. The difference between Hegel and Marx seems to me to be one of emphasis and concretion. Marx concretizes Hegel's vision, a vision which may be concretized in many different ways, and stresses practice rather than theory. But Hegel and Marx both share the theoretical attitude of one seeking genuine human community, of communion as opposed to division between man and man. Feuerbach, too, shares this theoretical commitment, although this meant for him a return to a natural existence of loving co-existence. This original paradise would be possible after man has withdrawn his own projected essence from alienation. God, or the ideal essence of man, alienates man from man. Feuerbach concretizes theory in advocating liberation of man from God. For Marx, the God we really/

1. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts pg. 58.

really worship is Money, Lord Capital, private property, a God who alienates us from genuine human life. The destruction of this God entails the destruction of capitalism, the liberation of the slaves, and consequently of all men from alienation. We have tried to establish that none of these concretizations of Hegel's theory can be adequately understood apart from Hegel's own hope, formulated in his metaphysical eschatology, a hope that all things will be redeemed and reconciled in Geist, genuine human community, the society of ὁ Ἄβυσος.

The eschatological dimension of dialectic is essential. That is why the accusation of Popper and many others that Hegel comes to rest in an undialectical compromise with the Prussian State does not come to gripe with dialectic itself. If Hegel did argue that the Prussian State is the Kingdom of God on earth, then he is no longer speaking dialectically. Of this we can be certain.

Our method in the course of the following discussion of dialectic will be to move in a circular fashion through our subject, returning to the fundamental points of exploration a number of times in a number of different ways. This we have discovered to be the only satisfactory way of dealing with dialectic. For once we try to abstract dialectic from the subject-matter with which it is in reality united already, we have transformed it into a formal and so undialectical conceptual schema. This does not, of course, mean that dialectic is unanalysable or beyond criticism, for there is no doubt whatever that there is such a thing as an irrational use of dialectic. One of the tasks that still remains to us is the task of showing some of the criteria which would enable us to distinguish between/

between rational and irrational dialectic, even if this will itself be an activity of dialectical reasoning. The paradoxical nature of such an activity will be familiar enough to philosophers not to require further comment here.

In the simplest terms, we have understood dialectic to be a way of speaking which acknowledges that no single proposition can express the whole truth, no single attitude or point of view is the point of view of completeness, no single action can actualize the wholeness and health of spirit absolutely. The truth of the particular and the singular is a partial truth, the truth of the whole is dialectical. Dialectical thinking and speaking recognizes that whilst man desires completeness, his nature, as man, can be defined only as radical incompleteness. Man is on the way, he does not arrive. He can achieve no final solutions. Indeed the claim to have achieved the final solution is the surest sign of irrational speech, thought or action. The absolute truth-claim dismembers man, destroying what measure of self-integration he may manage to achieve; the only cure is a re-membering of the fragmented, dissociated experiences which he forgets in dis-memberment. Dialectic is therefore not only a relativization of all truth-claims; it is also a relating of these truth-claims. Dialectic speaks in accordance with a kind of situational or experiential rather than purely formal logic. This is usually attacked from the vantage point of those who make the distinction between formal and factual questions into an absolute, or ultimate distinction. Hegel argues that although this distinction is perfectly valid at the level of formal meaning, or verstand, it is not an ultimate, or fixated distinction in life. Living experience breaks the conventional/

conventional structures of formal understanding. Vernunft, or reason, is dialectical because it has resolved not to make the formal distinctions of the understanding into absolute metaphysical principles, but to follow the unstructured becoming of life. Formal and factual questions belong together in the question of spirit or Geist, because Spirit is living spirit. This is no final answer to this familiar attack, but it is along these lines that dialectical thinking defends itself.

Dialectic entails an alert eschatological awareness. In philosophy, undertaken in the mood and spirit of Hegel, we think things over, we think things through. The substantial content of our philosophical reflection is our living experience of the world. Hegel seeks, in his philosophy, to persuade us to change our minds. He is trying to show us that our comprehension of what we know is inadequate, unworthy of the trust we are accustomed to give it. He thinks we have been "out of our mind", "beside ourselves", unable to be or to become ourselves, unable to gain possession of ourselves. We are dispossessed of our humanity, insane, diseased, enslaved. Hegel's conception of philosophy reconnects us to the older Western philosophical traditions, and for that matter the tradition of the East, in that it is conceived as a way of liberation, a way of enlightenment (1). Philosophical questions are not empirical questions concerning what is the case, nor logical questions, concerning what by convention is necessarily the case, nor ethical questions, concerning what ought to be the case. The philosopher's reflection is a kind of/

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1. Hegel's connection between self-consciousness, integrity, freedom and the Spirit of God has its counterpart in the encompassing conceptions of Atman-Brahman. Tao is the dialectical way in which opposites belong together, like Hegel's Begriff, or the Western conception of Λόγος. The concept of Dharma, with the dual meaning of ought and is, is what Hegel calls a concrete universal.

of re-cognition, a kind of re-remembering. He thinks through our experience of the way things are, when all the facts are known, remembering the experience that all too easily is lost to us in compulsive forgetfulness. His reasoning is an integrating activity, and the  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  of his activity is the truth of the whole ( $\acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu$ ). Absolute Wissen, in Hegel's use of the term, is not a complete knowledge of all that is the case, but rather, is a comprehension of what we know, in limited ways, in the light of completeness. We shall explore this idea in what follows.

Dialectical thinking is a recollection of experiences in all their contradicting variety, richness and creative instability. In philosophical reflection, our thinking lives through our experience as human beings in order to transform every fragment of experience into a related part of an integral whole. The philosophical task is in this sense closely related to the task of personal integration. The notion of metaphysics being espoused here is that metaphysics is the unification of the given multiplicity of dissociated experiences which comprise our living relation to the world. Metaphysics is committed to dialectic in so far as it never completes its task, as long as our ongoing experience continues. It becomes dialectical in its determination to learn from experience. Hegel is arguing that we do not at present recognise (erkennt) what we know (bekannt), because we have not learned to think and speak with the plastic flexibility of dialectical comprehension. The term comprehend is chosen, here, because of its connotations. Comprehensibility, /

Comprehensibility, and comprehensiveness are both inherent in comprehension. We spoke, a moment ago, of comprehending the truth of the whole, (ὅλον), and we distinguished this, from knowledge of all that is the case. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between ὅλον and πᾶν, totum and compositum, which as Heidegger argues, has been familiar since the time of Plato and Aristotle (1). The term ὅλον, whole, is related to our words holy, hail, heal, health, hale, with the general meaning of wholeness, and wholesomeness, rather than sum. (2) For even if we knew all that is the case, the sum total of all that is in principle knowable, we would not necessarily be any nearer to what we mean here by comprehension, or wholeness. We cannot disown our experience without a loss of integrity or wholeness. To comprehend experience is not to discover something we did not know before but to regain what we had known but forgotten, once owned but since lost. The τέλος of our struggle to comprehend is, according to Hegel, freedom of spirit. It is in this sense that we are to understand Hegel's proposition: Das Wahre ist das Ganze (3).

Our explorations into the logic of dialectic encounter, here, the ancient Christian conception of the ἐσχατον. For we are arguing that the τέλος of philosophical dialectic is the truth "which is only at the end what it is in very truth" (4). If the truth of the whole (ὅλον) is eschatological, this is the most important reason why the philosophical searching after truth must become dialectical. If the consummatio is even now present to us as the τέλος of our struggle to comprehend our experience./

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1. Being and Time pg. 494. Division Two Chapter One note 111
  2. K. Löwith: Meaning in history pg. 225 note 1.
  3. German Ed. Phänomenologie Geist pg. 21. Baillie pg. 81.
  4. P.S. pg. 82.

experience, and yet is not actualized in full completion until the end (ἔσχατον), then there is no question of the dialectic coming to rest in a final synthesis so long as we remain men, and our incompleteness is the essence of our humanity, the sine qua non of our desire for self-transcendence. We seek freedom of spirit, personal health through social integration, and social health in personal integration. We are condemned to incompleteness for as long as we are human beings, for humanity is defined by its desire for completeness. To achieve completeness is to become a god or a stone, depending on whether we lose our power of negation (in which case we become stones) or succeed completely in negating the negation (in which case we become gods). Dialectical thinking, tended and nurtured on the tension of an eschatological awareness, speaks of man in the light of his desire for completeness, knowing full well that if man's desire were satisfied he would no longer be man, but god. The Whole cannot be exhaustively regathered, the truth remains eschatological.

We learn, however, from our Christian tradition, that the coming αἰών of God, the new world and God's new humanity, is born only in death, the death we die, when, as slaves, we die in and with the body of the slave who is our Lord. Our death in isolation from his body would be dissolution, our death in him is the end which is also a new beginning, the death which is rebirth. The destructive dynamics of every form of Lord-slave dualism is overcome, according to the tradition, by way of the dialectic of negation. The tradition speaks of the decision to settle down to be what we are as the undialectical decision for life, which ends in inevitable death. It also speaks/

speaks of the dialectical decision to die to what we are in our becoming what we are not, as the narrow way, hard and difficult to find. Our task is to sharpen our awareness, in order that we may discern the way of negation from both the undialectical way of immediacy, and the irrational dialectic in which a complete loss of meaning and coherence is experienced. There is the man who persists in deciding to be what he is and not something else. He makes Aristotle's law of contradiction, identity and the excluded middle into a metaphysical principle, a principle that governs all his life. Then there is the man who surrenders himself to death, in war or suicide. Then there is the man who surrenders himself to death to what he is, in order to become what he is not. For him death is birth, for his eschatological awareness of death in life and life in death, of the co-inherence of being and not-being in integrated self-becoming, entails a radically dialectical mode of comprehension not achieved by the first two. Hegel is trying to show us how and why it is the third man, and he alone, who is truly rational. To be rational is to think and live dialectically, that is eschatologically, or between the times. The man who thinks and lives dialectically has no continuing city here, nor one to come, if by that he means a city secure in some unattainable beyond, to which he is assured of attaining. For dialectic does not rest with absolute opposition, it involves the living tension of the interaction, or interfusion of opposites. We shall come to the notion of *coincidentia oppositorum* in a moment. All we need say at this point is that when dialectic speaks of the co-inherence of opposites, and so of coherence and meaning in becoming, it does not speak of opposites as identical.

Dialectical/

Dialectical thinking is not monistic. It is a way of living with radical dualism without total disintegration and fragmentation. It enables us to hope in not hoping in the conventional sense anymore, for hope and despair (de-sperans) are no longer opposites that mutually exclude one another, but opposites that belong together in the same dialectical attitude. The irrational expression of dialectic in this case would be the assertion that hope and despair are the same, and consequently, that it makes no difference whether we hope or despair. A rational formulation of dialectic would here argue that to fail to distinguish between hope and despair makes nonsense of both concepts, whilst at the same time, the failure to show the connections between them makes equal nonsense of them. Dialectic is neither monism nor absolute dualism.

With Eliot, we recognize that we had the experience but missed the meaning. Our task is to approach the meaning which recalls and so restores the experience in a different form. For Eliot, as for Hegel, the past experience revived in the meaning is not the experience of one life only, but of many generations<sup>(1)</sup>. The dialectic is a dialectic of remembering and forgetting. We forget what we know we know; in order to remember what we know but do not know we know. Or as Wittgenstein reminds us: "The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always before one's eyes)".<sup>(2)</sup>. We do not, incidentally, have to say we are thinking dialectically in order to think dialectically.

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1. T. S. Eliot: The Dry Salvages II: Collected poems pg. 208.
  2. Phil. Investigations 129 pg. 50.

There is meaning. There is coherence. There is Λόγος, intelligibility. That this is so is not immediately apparent. We speak of the co-inherence of birth and death, we speak of the unapparent connection between coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, the connection which is stronger than the apparent connections between like and like. This does not mean that everything is something else, but that in life, in becoming, our logic of identity and contradiction breaks down unless we learn to discern when to think analytically (by distinguishing or setting apart) and when to think dialectically (by gathering what was scattered in our distinguishing). In a world where all is becoming (πάντα ῥεῖ παρ: Heraclitus), the immediately apparent connections do not last. They are not true, or worthy of our whole-hearted trust. "An unapparent connection is stronger than an apparent one" (ἄρμονίη ἀφανῆς φανερῆς κρείπρων): Heraclitus (1). The way things really are (φύσις) loves to hide (κρύπτεσθαι φιλέει) (2). For Heraclitus, there is a connection or joining (conjunctio: ἄρμονία) by way of opposite tensions, which means that we can rely upon a genuine coherence, meaning or Λόγος in the opposing tension of contraries. We had the experience but missed the meaning. Or in Heraclitus' words: "Of the Λόγος, which is as I describe it, men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things happen according to this Λόγος, men are like people of no experience, even when they experience such words/

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1. Kirk and Raven: Presocratics Fragment 210 pg. 193.
  2. Ibid Fr 211 pg. 193.

words and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its constitution and declare how it is; but the rest of men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do when asleep" (1). The Λόγος is not known after the manner of ordinary knowledge. Λόγος is truth not opinion. It is like something we know when no-one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it (2), like yet not like. For the traumatic loss of intrinsic trust in the meaning and ultimate coherence of things (Λόγος), a loss which in our time is experienced with unprecedented anguish, means that we are farther than ever from comprehending our experience in the light of it. We spoke earlier of Hegel's fundamental problem as the problem of meaning (Λόγος) in an age of violent becoming (γένεσις). We have recognised the strong connection between the Heraclitean, stoic, early Christian and Hegelian dialectic of Λόγος, and periods of traumatic social change and the breakdown of the 'apparent connections' which our social, religious, cultural, and logical conventions would normally give us in more stable times.

In the prologue to St. John's Gospel we read that Christ is the Λόγος, through whom all things come into being (πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο). According to Heraclitus, as we have just seen, all things happen according to this Λόγος (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον). Let us reflect upon this idea in relation to dialectic. We are not, of course, able to discuss the numerous points of historical interpretation which/

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1. Kirk: The Cosmic Fragments 1(2B) pg. 33.  
Wheelwright 'Heraclitus' pg. 19.  
Kirk and Raven Ibid Fr. 197 pg. 187.
  2. cf. Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations 89 pg. 42<sup>e</sup>

which can be raised concerning the notion of *Λόγος* in Heraclitus on the one hand, and the Fourth Gospel prologue on the other. Such a study could be relevant here, but beyond the compass of our exploration at present. We have been attempting to focus our attention upon Hegel's dialectic in general and the dialectic of Lord and slave in particular. The early Christian tradition is quite clear that the *Λόγος* is both Lord and slave, the *Λόγος* in whom these contradicting opposites at least are gathered. The *Λόγος*, as redeemer, the ransom for many, is the one who came not to be served but to serve (1). The *Λόγος* becomes a servant, the suffering slave, and in so far as his church accords with his will, the greatest shall be servants, the leaders shall serve. To serve is to be free. In baptism we put on Christ, which means there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free, neither male nor female. For we are all one in Christ Jesus (2). Here, above all, we encounter the indissoluble connection between the notions of alienation in fixated dualism and of redemption through a dialectical way of negation that is the subject-matter of this study, and the notions of sin and redemption in the Christian tradition. Further attempts to establish the connection are surely unnecessary. Our discussion in this chapter takes this connection for granted, without insisting on any historical theses concerning the origins of Hegel's thinking or concerning the/

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1. Matthew 20<sup>28</sup>.

2. Galations 3<sup>27-28</sup>.

the relation between Heraclitus' notion of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  and that of the Fourth Gospel prologue (1). This said, we return to our argument.

Our philosophical concern is to speak of the  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ , the measure of all things, that which in principle, in the beginning and for all time, gathers all things into meaning, coherence, and comprehensible intelligibility. The  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of Hegel, synthesizes the Greek philosophical traditions, and in particular Heraclitus' notion of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , with the Christian theological traditions, and in particular the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  doctrine of the St. John prologue. Heidegger rejects this synthesis (2). The most important aspect of this rejection in our context is that Heidegger reinterprets the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  in an undialectical way. For Hegel, thinking and Being belong together in  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ ; and there is no sense in trying to talk of Being apart from beings, or of beings apart from Being.  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  connects beings and Being because speech concerning  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  must be dialectical. Whereas Heidegger argues that speech concerning the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  in this sense is not possible. We must think away beings, and conventional speech concerning beings (and Heidegger here appears to include the Christian notion of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ ), in order to think Being/

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1. A genuinely dialectical conception of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  cannot be categorized as either impersonal or personal, either abstract or concrete. Some Biblical Scholars have attempted to distinguish the Greek from the late Jewish notion of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  by calling the former impersonal and abstract, and the latter personal and concrete. Of course, a dialectical notion of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  is not either personal or impersonal, either abstract or concrete. Hegel's Begriff, or Logos is not one of these opposites as opposed to another, for the simple reason that the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  is God. God cannot be opposed to anything else, without becoming conditioned by it. God encompasses all opposing contraries.  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , as a concrete Universal, as the Word made flesh, gathers these opposites in himself. In this case, we would have to speak, as Hegel does, of writing the Greek and Judaeo-Christian traditions in a notion of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  which comprehended both. This was undertaken by the majority of the Greek Fathers in the early centuries.
  2. Introduction to metaphysics pg. 107.

Being. Whether Heidegger is justified in claiming he is following Heraclitus at this point, is extremely doubtful (1). By way of contrast, however, we recognize that dialectic does not proceed to speak of the ontological completeness of Being except by way of the ontological (or ontic) incompleteness of beings. Speech concerning the ἀρχή of all things, the Λόγος without whom nothing comes into being, or ceases to be, is not a direct, or itself a complete speech. It can achieve no final completeness, even though we are trying to speak of beings in the light of the encompassing completeness of this Λόγος.

Hegel speaks of our social and historical life in the light of a living harmony (ἁρμονία), or common measure, or unapparent connection, between opposing contraries, a harmony which in actuality is always instable and incomplete. His notion of ἁρμονία, or Begriff or Λόγος, is never a static solution or final state, nor is the dialectic brought to rest in an absolute synthesis, at least in his earlier thinking, if not later on. The ἁρμονία is a living γένεσις, Zeit, rather than Sein. Harmony entails a tending apart and a coming together, a stretching in both directions as in the bow or lyre, as Heraclitus puts it (2). For Heraclitus, God (ὁ Θεός) is the encompassing of all opposites (3), yet things taken together are whole and not whole (ἅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα), a tending apart and a tending together, a scattering and a gathering (4). Hegel's notion of God is similarly conceived except/

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1. For a detailed study of Heidegger in this connection of: Rosen: Nihilism ch. II.
  2. Kirk and Raven Ibid Fragment 212 pg. 193.
  3. Ibid 207 pg. 191.
  4. Ibid 206 pg. 191.

except that for him the dialectic is trinitarian through and through. The consequence of this dialectic for faith seeking comprehension is that the search for completeness can be undertaken only from the standpoint of continuing incompleteness. The Whole is not intelligible in itself, nor is the partial intelligible except in its relatedness to the Whole. The partial reflects but is not the Whole. The Whole is present in but not exhaustively comprehended in the part. There is no complete ontology. There is only the dialectical ontology of the apophatic or negative way. Ontology does not, we have argued, deal directly with Being as the Whole, or with God as the encompassing harmony of all opposing contraries. It can speak neither immediately (without mediation: vermittlung) nor completely. We can speak of relatedness in division, and of division in relatedness, but not of the one without the other. It is by way of opposition and contradiction that intelligibility is secured.

Dialectical thinking, even when it speaks of the Λόγος, must remain dialectical if it is not to become irrational nonsense. It is concerned with Reciprocity, and relatedness, but only so long as the tension, the eschatological tension, is not dissolved, and the dialectic brought to an undialectical final solution. There is no final solution. Total relatedness, which is one of the things we mean by Λόγος, cannot be totally comprehended, if only because to comprehend it totally would entail our taking up an absolute standpoint external to, and unrelated to, the totality. Despite Popper, there is no danger of dialectic becoming totalitarian as long as it remains dialectical. Man belongs to Λόγος in so far as he is rational, but the  
Λόγος /

Λόγος never belongs to him, either as of right or by nature. Λόγος is that comprehensive relatedness toward which man strives to look, and in the light of which he seeks to comprehend what he is coming to know of the world. But he can never relate to the Λόγος in direct immediacy, for Λόγος cannot be reduced to the finite status of a single term in a relation. Λόγος is relatedness itself.

We are arguing, in short, for a dialectical logic of Λόγος, a logic of spirit. On the one hand we wish to speak in the light of the completeness and the encompassing relatedness of this Λόγος, and on the other, we recognize that incompleteness and instability are essential to the dialectic, for a completed dialectic is no longer dialectic.

Consequently, we should warn, here, against conceiving the Λόγος, the unapparent connection or relatedness, as a kind of thing, or third entity lying between or beyond opposing contraries. To do so is to misuse the language of dialectical logic, and to reduce it to nonsense. In comprehending the unapparent connection we are not coming to know some new fact, or thing, or class of objects, or class of particulars; we are comprehending what we already know, in a new way. This is not to say that comprehension is subjective whilst knowing is objective, for in philosophical comprehension, we are comprehending the way things stand in the world, the way they belong with other things. The unapparent connection is no unknowable thing-in-itself, nor is it either cognitive or non-cognitive. We might follow Hegel, here, and argue that it is re-cognitive. As Wittgenstein says, we are not, as philosophers, hunting out new facts, for the essence of our/

our investigation, like his, is not to learn anything new, but to comprehend what we already knew but had not recognized, already heard but had not heeded, already seen but had not noticed (1). It is to comprehend what we do not mention, because language cannot contain it.

To speak of relatedness is to speak of the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , and to speak of the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  is to speak of God. The logic of this relatedness is no conventional logic, though it includes our logical conventions as moments in a broader dialectical logic. Not everything that ought to be said can be said clearly, and not everything that can be said clearly is worth saying. In some kinds of philosophical discussion current today, it ceases to matter whether what we say is true, as long as we say it correctly. Indeed we have even redefined the concept of truth in terms of correctness, so as to exclude what in ordinary language generations of people of every culture have meant by truth. We then equate our philosophical redefinition with ordinary usage, and thus reduce our philosophical reflection to nonsense. The  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  is true not because there is an experientable entity, or state of affairs, corresponding to it in the world, but because it is wholly worthy of our trust, wholly faithful to its promise, wholly genuine, and full of enduring integrity. This sense of the word true is of course in common use, despite the fact that it unites two of our most self-evident opposites, the "is" and the "ought", fact and value. But this is to indulge in polemic, rather than follow our argument on its way.

We spoke, a moment ago, of the connection in dialectical thinking/

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1. Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations Para 89 pg. 42<sup>o</sup>

thinking between relatedness, Λόγος, and God. There may also, however, be a connection between the kind of encompassing conceptions, (or as Lukács describes them, 'floating concepts'), which are integral to dialectical thinking, and the encompassing conceptions of totalitarian thinking, whether of Church or state. For example, contemporary fascism and contemporary communism both claim Hegel as their intellectual ancestor, although their undialectical misuse of the dialectic makes this claim tenuous in the extreme. It may be true to say that Hegel himself fell from the unrest of dialectical tension to the conservative compromise of an undialectical 'final solution', but this criticism does not begin to come to grips with Hegel when he is thinking dialectically. By way of contrast, Fessard argues that Marx impoverishes the Hegelian dialectic (of Lord and slave), by siding with the slaves against the Lords, and by making an absolute of human labour. By dissolving the state into society, he makes it impossible to understand politics. For Fessard, Marx brings the dialectic to a premature close, and so becomes undialectical. Marx makes it possible, once again, to return to a politics of domination, this time, Fascism. Fascist philosophers, obsessed with the "political struggle for domination over lower classes and conquered races", ..... "had lost sight of all human relations other than the master servant one". Lichtheim concludes: "To escape from this mortal combat between the warring sides, mankind must find a middle road, which for Fessard inevitably implied the reconciliation of social conflict in the Corpus mysticum Christi". (1).

The solution of the majority of anglo-saxon thinkers has been to distrust all encompassing conceptions altogether; with the/

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1. Lichtheim: Marxism in Modern France pg. 105ff  
 also Balthazar: Man in History pgs. 306-329.

the disastrous result that except in certain confined theological circles, true dialectical thinking was thrown out along with the undialectical versions of dialectic which we mistook for genuine dialectic. The worst example of this whole-sale misunderstanding of dialectic is to be found in Popper's 'Open Society and its enemies'. To begin with, Popper shows no sign, in this travesty of scholarship, of any adequate knowledge or understanding of Hegel. He regards his critique of Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx, as enemies of the open society, as his "war effort" (1). Popper tells us that he can only regard Hegel's philosophy with a "mixture of contempt and horror". He could not, and would not "spend unlimited time upon deep researches into the history of a philosopher whose work (he) abhors" (2). Popper argues that Hegel is "supreme only in his outstanding lack of originality .... There is nothing in Hegel's writing that has not been said better before him .... Hegel devoted these borrowed thoughts and methods with singleness of purpose, though without a trace of brilliancy, to one aim: to fight against the open society, and thus to serve his employer, Frederick William of Prussia" (3). Popper calls Hegel a "paid agent", a "servile lackey", a "charlatan", a "clown", whose works are a "farce", written in "gibberish", that is a "despicable perversion of everything decent". Anderson appears justified in saying that Popper's discussion "recalls the idiom of the third reich" .... the "paranoia was genuine, it produced its own pathological imagery" (4). Despite Kaufmann's word by word critique of Popper's chapter on Hegel (5), Popper's reading of Hegel is

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1. Open Society and its enemies Vol. II pg. 393.
2. Ibid pg. 394.
3. Ibid pg. 32.
4. Anderson: Components of the National Culture: 'Student Power' pg. 241.
5. W. Kaufmann: The Hegel Myth and its method: Philosophical Review Oct. 1951 Vol. LX 4.

frequently accepted without examination.

We shall mention one example from Popper's interpretation of Hegel, one which relates directly to the principal topic discussed earlier in this work. First, Popper fails to see that Hegel advocates a dialectic of Lord and slave, not an irredeemable dualism. He accuses Hegel of an hysterical style of speech, and suggests that he would be an excellent subject for psycho-analysis. We quote this important footnote in full.

Popper argues that he finds it difficult to "overlook an element of hysteria in (Hegel's) theory of human relations and their reduction to mastership and servitude. I hardly doubt that Hegel's method of burying his thoughts under heaps of words, which one must remove in order to get his meaning .... is one of the symptoms of his hysteria; it is a kind of escape, a way of shunning the daylight. I do not doubt that this method of his would make an excellent object for psycho-analysis as his wild dream of domination and submission ..... This theory, I assert, can be held only by the most violent enemies of civilisation" (1).

No amount of unreasoned assertion can absolve Popper from facing up to the destructive dynamics of Lord-slave conflict which has threatened the continuing history of man over and over again. Popper is asking us to forget, or deny, or repress a history of human anguish, if he is saying anything at all. Hegel does not, as we have shown only too clearly, reduce all human relations to mastery and slavery; he seeks to find a way of liberation from the exclusive either/or of this dualism. Similarly, Marx does not reduce all human relations to relations of class conflict, he seeks redemption from a class conflict which, Marx or no Marx, is/

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1. Open Society II pg. 287 note 25 to ch. 11.

is a fact of human life. It is true that some forms of Fascist and communist party politics do reduce human relations in the manner Popper indicates, but no true dialectic, however aware it is of the situational character of human existence, can be reductionist. Indeed, dialectic is the only true opponent of reductionism, for it alone can take account of the facts which lead the reductionist to speak in the way he does, without confusing a part with the whole, the incomplete with the complete (1).

We turn, now, to reflect upon the form of dialectical speech, recalling that phenomenology, as a dialectical description of experience, cannot make the separation of form and content into an ultimate. The distinction between form and content, for dialectical speech, is an "abstrakte momente" which is "aufgehoben" preserved but transcended. According to Hegel, the linguistic form employed in the course of dialectical descriptive activity is inseparable, though distinct, from the experiential content. We do not notice what we ordinarily experience, unless we can describe the experience. We do not redeem experience from forgetfulness except in speech. We had the experience but missed the meaning, so that in Heraclitus' words, we are like people of no experience, uncomprehending, unaware of what we are. We know the facts, but have not comprehended their meaning. The Λόγος, uncomprehended, passes into forgetfulness, into alienation. Life becomes divorced from meaning. Not only do we experience/

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1. Comforth's 'The Open philosophy and the open society' defends Marxism from the standpoint of Engels and Lenin (or the Lenin of the earlier period before he had studied Hegel). His critique of Popper does not really come to grips with the dialectic of Marx and Hegel, but tends towards the undialectical solutions of orthodox communism.

experience more than we can describe, and so remember, but we also never exhaust experience in what we can comprehend by way of dialectical descriptive activity. Despite this, Hegel is as sure as the linguistic philosophers that it is meaningless to try to speak about that which in principle transcends language. All we can do is to struggle to describe and communicate as much of our experience as we can. We do this not only to open up communication with others, but in order to communicate with ourselves.

Dialectical description, for Hegel, is a kind of construction of reality. We must be careful, here, to say what we do not mean. Of course, the world is there before we are; but it is present as reality, only in so far as we actively respond to its presence. In philosophy, we are concerned not with coming to know new facts, but with comprehending our experience, our erlebnis, our "living through". (The connection between Leben (life) and Erlebnis is impossible to translate into English). We are concerned with the  $\Lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\sigma$ , the meaning, not immediately or necessarily apparent, the meaning which our experience both hides and reveals. There is a sense in which philosophical comprehension through dialectical description leaves everything as it is, in that the difference between knowing and comprehending is not a difference as to the facts of our experience. In another sense, however, comprehension makes all the difference. This problematic difference is the "difference" already encountered in the difference between an sich (in-itself) and für sich (for-itself), potentiality in a confined and specific sense, and actuality. It is the difference between alienation and freedom of spirit, uncomprehending darkness or blindness, and enlightened/

enlightened, self-possessed awareness. To comprehend - after the manner of the for-itself - is not simply to achieve an integrated, self-consistent synthesis of our experiences, for this synthesis, (Kant's term is combination or conjunctio), is what we can ordinarily achieve in coherent knowledge. The difference lies in the fact that knowledge is in a broad sense immediate, whereas comprehension is dialectical. In comprehending our experience, we go by way of negation. We go by way of the detour or umweg. We go back in order to go on. The problem which above all faces comprehension is that of disintegration and discontinuity, a problem which the singular particularity of our various dimensions of knowledge tends to conceal. There can be no talk of immediate synthesis for philosophical comprehension. To comprehend is not to collect, but as Hegel says, to re-collect, not to know but to reflect, or recognise (re-know). When we undertake to comprehend our experience, what man as man lives through, we desire a wholeness or completeness which would be illogical in the case of knowledge as knowledge. When we say we desire wholeness or completeness or integration, we are not saying we desire a complete or whole knowledge of all that is the case, or of all we have experienced and are experiencing. For even if all the facts were exhaustively known (which is just about logically conceivable) we would not necessarily be one step nearer to the kind of wholeness or completeness we desire in the philosophical struggle to comprehend. We begin by recognizing that we had the experience but missed the meaning (1). In philosophy, we attend to the meaning, the meaning we have lost, and continually lose. Of course, a meaning apart from, external/

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1. cf. Eliot: Dry Salvages II: Collected Poems pg. 208.

external to, or unrelated to the experience is of no use to us. Nor is mere talk or opinion, derived from our experience, capable of bearing the weight it would have to bear to communicate the meaning. When we speak of dialectical description, we do not refer to any ordinary description of experience. We refer to the speech capable of communicating  $\Lambda\acute{\lambda}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , never exhaustively, never without paradox, but decisively nonetheless. Such a speech unites the meaning and the experience, so that the one no longer remains unrelated to the other. This, at any rate, would have to become our objective.

Every fundamental attitude, or metaphysical standpoint, is a mode of philosophical comprehension, and every mode of comprehension is a form of life entailing the kind of social and logical conventions which we overlook in unselfconscious cognition. We overlook them because they can never come into our direct view except when a fundamental 'change of mind' enables us to notice them. Then we see everything in a radically new way. For philosophical comprehension can sometimes give a wholly new meaning to what has become familiar, well-known experience; it can create a new world. Hegel argues, as we have seen, that man makes himself in his struggle to comprehend what he lives through. To comprehend is to negate, and then to negate the negation. It entails a change of mind by way of a paradoxical double negative. Man changes and transforms himself by way of dialectical thinking and dialectical speech. By describing fresh ongoing experience, or by finding new meaning in a new description of lost experience, we become aware, by negative action (Theoria and Praxis), of the extent of our brokenness and consequent self-alienation. Hegel is primarily concerned with new/

new descriptions of lost experience, but the dialectical task of finding new meaning in and through the tortuous contradictions of present experience is consistent with his fundamental method. The goal of Hegel's philosophical activity is not to achieve the point of view of the Absolute, as has sometimes been argued, not to achieve a complete knowledge of all the facts, but to comprehend our experience, as persons, and as members of a society, in the light of that  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  which leaves nothing bound over in alienation or lost in forgetfulness. Of course, if we completed this task of healing comprehension, and so overcame the eschatological tension between what is even now, and what is not yet, then we would no longer be men. We would have transcended that incompleteness which defines our being as human being. We would no longer participate in the dynamic self-becoming of spirit, which is the essence of human rationality, as well as the point where faith reaches blindly, but intelligently toward wholly new potentialities of being. If we renounced our desire for wholeness, or for the truth that is utterly worthy of our trust, we would be no longer man, but animal. If our desire were satisfied, we would be no longer man, but god. This is what makes dialectic the only rational speech.

We have noticed that there is a living unity of theory and practice, thought and action, in the dialectical struggle to achieve a wholeness of being and meaning. In times of fragmentation and loss of meaning, life becomes painfully unrelated to meaning. The task of the comprehending dialectic is to regain what was lost, and to unite life and meaning in a new reciprocity, a new relatedness. It is important that this relatedness (or  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  ) be strong enough to retain its integrity in and through/

through the violent, destructive coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of personal and social becoming ( $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ). Everything is in flux; the  $\Lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of relatedness must hold together what change tends to part, and to part what, in our pathological search for meaning beyond or unrelated to life, we struggle to join. It is also true that any speech seeking to integrate experience in the light of the  $\Lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of relatedness must be open to new language, and capable of changing our logical conventions whilst at the same time retaining the continuity essential to an integrated rationality. It is obviously true that past descriptive forms, which once enabled people to describe their experience with coherence and genuine meaning, can eventually militate against the description of new experience. New experiences threaten past organizations of meaning and evaluation, so that sometimes a wholly new way of seeing and describing things is forced upon us, if life is not to become alienated from meaning. At other times, we suddenly see our experiences in a wholly new way, through finding new ways of describing them, for we are normally made very insensitive to new experience if we refuse to discard old language forms and descriptive models. That is why we must continually experiment with language. That is why descriptive theoria is negative praxis. Conventional meanings are indispensable to rational speech, but they are not sacred. Ordinary usage can and must be changed if we are not to become isolated in closed circles of meaning, unrelated to life, or to living experience.

Critical thinking, the business of creating and discarding linguistic models, descriptive forms, and logical conventions, is an essential part of dialectical thinking. Every descriptive form, every linguistic convention or rule can become a dungeon, when/

when we allow it to become a permanent home beyond the impermanence of changing experience. We are trying to argue that it is language which connects us to ourselves, to others, and to our social and natural environment. It is by way of language that we are constituted by our environment, and by way of language that we, in turn, actively appropriate, comprehend and so transform the environment. We mentioned that, for Lukács, alienation is the awareness that our self-created environment is no longer our home but our dungeon (1). The reciprocal interweaving of language and our socio-historic existence means that all revolutionary thinking, whether Christian, Marxist or any other, must give close attention to the way we speak, as well as to the way we work, and to the way we own what we have worked to produce.

We are perpetually engaged with the world; the world is in us and around us. Our consciousness is embedded in the all-pervasive reality of the world. It is, however, with our social and historical world, that we are primarily concerned in this study. Nature relates to our discussion by way of history, and, in particular, the transformation of nature into a human world in negative action. Thus, in exploring the logic of dialectical speech and the kind of world that corresponds to it, we are exploring man's socio-historic world, rather than nature. It is for this reason that we are not going to discuss the relation between dialectic and nature.

It follows, therefore, that dialectical thinking as we are formulating it entails a disengagement of some of our natural attitudes or modes of conscious experiencing. For example, we have argued that dialectical thinking cannot proceed with a rigid/

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1. Zitta: Lukács pg. 149.

rigid subject-object dualism, owing to its situational methodology. We cannot, for instance, speak with Durkheim of social facts as things, if by that we implicitly assume the standpoint of fatalistic determinism, or at least objectivism. The living interaction and reciprocity of subject and object, severely shattered by the prevailing forms of personal and social alienation, is nonetheless the presupposition of any dialectical thinking which speaks also of alienation. To speak in this way may be to speak with a "plastic discourse", which in its turn, demands "a plastic receptivity and understanding on the part of the listener" (1), as Hegel argued. But the question is whether any other logic can retain an integrated relatedness between life and meaning, experience and speech, becoming and thought. Lukács' case for "fließende begriffe", or floating concepts, stands. Our concepts must be living, flexible, and capable of describing a lived reality which cannot be comprehended in terms of self-excluding opposites, or unconnected contraries. There is a coincidentia oppositorum, a co-inherence, or living connection between opposites, which means that our language can, with effort, approximate to living experience. Experience both hides and reveals the meaning; the contradictions of experience, and elements of continuous coherence, belong together, so that we need a logic of the understanding (verstand) and a logic of reason (vernunft) to achieve a full dialectic. This means that dialectic does not exclude but includes the analytical understanding. The thinking that gathers includes the thinking that sets apart by way of mutually exclusive distinctions. A theological dialectic, for example, will include the analytic setting apart of the concepts of God, and of/

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1. Science of Logic pg. 40.

of world; creator and created; life and death; faith and doubt; hope and despair and so on; as well as the final step which transforms ordinary thinking into dialectical thinking, namely the negation of the negation. Deus absconditus sub contrario: God is hidden in the form of his own opposite. The separation of the creator from the created entails a double brokenness, the cleavage of the original separation of man from God by God in creation, which is the gift of freedom to man, and the separation of God from man by man which is forever renewed in man's separating himself from God by sin. The double nature of this cleavage has certain important consequences for dialectical thinking, which Hegel fails to recognize. For him, the cleavage is not double, but single, so that the overcoming of man's act of separation from God is regarded as a final solution, at least in his later work. This is one point where Hegel was not sufficiently serious about the precise logic of dialectic.

The coincidentia oppositorum which is uncovered to dialectical speech is not an identity of opposites; dialectic is not monistic. Nor, of course, is it inflexibly or fixatedly dualistic. It is a third way, open to anyone seeking ultimate meaning in, rather than beyond, living experience. For dialectical thinking, experience is not self-evidently intelligible; intelligibility is a task, open to us at every moment, but never completed. We do not seek meaning in the abandonment of multiplicity or contingency; for the one ( ἓν ) is a mere abstraction apart from the many ( πάντα ). At the same time, the many remain incoherent, fragmented, and unintelligible, except as parts of a meaningful whole, or One. Being-itself is a worthless abstraction when unrelated to beings in their becoming; κὺτὸ τὸ ἓν is comprehensible/

comprehensible only in γένεσις . For Heraclitus, God (ὁ Θεός) is the unity in all opposition, the connection between apparently mutually excluding opposites, the hidden coherence which is the common measure of all things. There is a connection through tension, a new meaning through contradiction, a new integrity through the endurance of disintegration. Just as the tension in the string of bow or lyre is balanced by the tension exerted by the arms of the instrument, so there is a living ἁρμονία between every contrary. But just as when the tension in the bow-string exceeds the tension in the arms, the whole complex is destroyed (1), so when the interconnection between contraries is broken, and the ἁρμονία of the Λόγος lost, then complete disintegration and fragmentation will ensue. This dialectic has immense, though obvious, importance for social and political theory, though it would take us too far from the present discussion to deal with this in full. We notice, here, merely that the kind of analytic thinking which separates contraries into mutually exclusive opposites is the kind of thinking which is in large measure responsible for rending the human realities of self and the social and cultural worlds into torn and fragmented worlds, each dislocated and divorced from the other in a pluralistic incoherence. The purpose of dialectical thinking, whether its roots lie in mystical or revolutionary traditions or both, is to nurture that form of negative critique and negative action which can disclose the strong, but apparently hidden connection, which holds contraries together in living interaction. The contradictions of living our life between opposing contraries are contradictions which dialectic preserves; it is simply the discontinuity and destructive fragmentation it seeks/

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1. Kirk and Raven: Presocratics pg. 194.

seeks to overcome. The *τέλος* of dialectic, wholeness and completeness, is never finally achieved, and consequently a critical, eschatological awareness of the living tension between contraries is always possible. The penultimate *τέλος* of dialectical thinking becomes, therefore, the dynamic *αρμονία* or coherent tension between contraries.

The problem, today, is that without the freedom and flexibility of dialectical reason, the tension of new and disturbing experience is forever exceeding the tension in our conceptual and descriptive forms. The tension in the string exceeds the tension in the lyre. This results in a dramatic, and painful failure of comprehension, a traumatic loss of coherent meaning. The *Λόγος* is silenced. The Begriff (or notion) is broken. We no longer comprehend the relatedness of things; our experience of war, tyranny, imprisonment, and the increasingly violent contradiction between what we are and what we think we are, threatens to shatter all intelligibility, all meaning, all value. Ontology, the speech which discloses and brings to view, though never exhaustively, the relatedness, or interconnectedness of all things, has broken down. All that is left to us to say can be said without reference to the *Λόγος*. Instead of reasoning in the light of the completeness of the *Λόγος*, we either claim to have comprehended *Λόγος* completely in a particular ideology, or refuse to allow that any kind of complete speech is possible at all. Human rationality is dissolved into incoherence either way.

Hegel's philosophy is one of the very few significant attempts to face up to the problem of meaning, and the breakdown of our once well-established logic of meaning, at the same time.

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He warns us against rationalistic abstraction, and unreflecting empiricism, in the course of the same dialectical argument. He argues that logical rules are social practices, and consequently, however formal or empty they appear, they can only be adequately comprehended when regarded as socio-historic praxis, relative to particular situational contexts. Propositions do not correspond to reality in a simple, uniform way, nor do we speak in accordance with absolutely unchangeable logical rules. For Hegel, logical rules are social conventions, deeply learned, but not unchangeable. For logical conventions, like every other form of social life, not only constitute who we are and what we are to become, but are constituted by who we are, and what we are becoming. The relationship is dialectical. We create, as well as are created by, social life. We not only think and speak in accordance with rules of logical practice, we live and act in accordance with them. We connect in action what we connect in language. We do not disconnect in action what is indissolubly joined in conventional logical usage. For example, we all know there is a difference between black and white. We see the difference. When this distinction is employed in certain circumstances, it matters very much whether the distinction is acted upon or not. The white man who not only distinguishes between white men and black men, but who acts out the distinction in veiled or even open discrimination, makes a logical convention into a rigidly oppressive form of life. He argues that the law of identity and contradiction shall not be broken. Everything is what it is and not another thing. White men are white men and black men black men. Things shall remain as they are, the dialectic of relatedness must be silenced. Dualism shall be our frame/

frame of reference. Here we notice that the *Λόγος*, the common measure or essential relatedness of black and white, the common humanity, is forgotten and denied. Dialectic is silenced. The unapparent connection remains uncomprehended. Other connections are established instead, such as the connection between white, might and right. Our logical conventions constitute and are constituted by our socio-historic forms of life.

As Wittgenstein remarked, logical forms seem to have a compelling, necessary quality about them. Forms of life do too. We do not create but inherit the social conventions to which logical form has been given. We learn to think in accordance with them. Hegel's dialectic is an attempt to formulate a logic of spirit which radically contradicts our established logic, just as the freedom of spirit contradicts our prevailing bondage. Hegel is quietly trying to persuade us that it is within our power to chose, or to refuse, to give to our socio-historic forms of life and their corresponding logical rules, the status of ultimate, or normative principles. We do not create or change them at will, of course. But they can be slowly, and painfully unlearned. Language cannot be divorced from forms of human life, nor forms of life from the logical conventions which uphold them. But both can be changed. Our task is to strive towards a lasting integrity of logic and life. This demands from us an act of comprehending dialectic - encompassing the old contraries of thought and being, knowledge and reality, subject and object as well as the modern contrary logic and life. Dialectic means that both, and not only one of the contraries, must be negated and transformed. A change of mind, as well as a change of social conditions, a personal death and/

and rebirth, as well as death to the old order and a birth of a new are necessary. Both thinking and being must be transformed. No theory that halts the dialectic prematurely, where the first negation alone has been completed, is genuine dialectic. The complete act of comprehending matters more than any knowledge of what is or is not the case. It is the act by which we enter a freedom of spirit or a continuing bondage of death.

We have argued that although comprehension desires completeness, it does so from a standpoint of continuing incompleteness. This means that the Λόγος is never, in principle, exhaustively comprehended. The hidden connection retains its hiddenness even in disclosure. Disclosure is partial disclosure. Λόγος is structure, but not the completed structure; it is comprehended in, but does not comprise the history of man's struggle for completeness. It is, perhaps, important to say this, especially as Hegel remains ambiguous at this point, to his own peril. He is in danger of bringing the dialectic to a triumphant close in a prematurely 'final solution'. We speak of the Λόγος, the coherent measure in whom all things come to be and cease to be, but the speech that can contain the coherence is not yet within our grasp. We may speak of the fulness and completeness of God, (τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ) (1), but our access to such speech is not direct or immediate: It is by way of the dialectic of faith, which alone is truly rational, that we may speak. We can speak with sense, only in so far as we speak in accordance with the Λόγος common to us all. Heraclitus argues that we have to rely on this Λόγος just as the city must rely on its common law (2).

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1. Ephesians 3<sup>19</sup>
  2. Kirk: The Cosmic Fragments pg. 48. Heraclitus also rejects the claim to private understanding apart from the intersubjective Λόγος.

Of course, there are a multitude of forms the relatedness of  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  may take; our concern here is to explore the most general ones. The coincidentia oppositorum, or the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  in which all opposing contraries are gathered, can be seen in the predication of opposites to the same subject (Christ is the Lord-Slave). The same experience can be comprehended in opposing ways by different persons, or the same experience can affect different persons in opposing ways. What is good for some is not good for others. Every contrary needs its opposite to have meaning at all. Opposites are interrelated; they cease to be opposites if this relation could conceivably be broken. Opposites therefore complement one another. They co-inhere. There is no disease without health, no satisfaction without hunger, no wealth without poverty. Christ, as the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , is the health in the disease. He is the one in whom our conventional satisfactions are disclosed to be neurotic flights from death. He is the one who satisfies the hunger we are not even aware of. He is rich in his poverty. Some opposites belong together because they inevitably succeed one another, like night following day; some belong together in the integrity of God, like death and resurrection. We can see that some opposites are opposing modes of being, gathered in dialectical thinking; others are conceptual oppositions, or logical contradictions, which are reconciled in being.  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  encompasses both in bringing thought and being together.

There are times when we must stress the dissociation of contraries, and at others their unity. Wisdom consist in discerning when the one is appropriate and when the other.

Dialectic/

Dialectic is both analytic and synthetic. It brings together and sets apart. Everything is in tune and out of tune, whole and not whole, says Heraclitus (1). Whether the connection between opposites is the relativity of every contrary to its opposite, or the inevitable succession of one opposite into another, we can say that the Λόγος hides in the form of related or successive opposites, (Deus absconditus sub contrario). The dissolution of the polarities of affirmation ( the καταφατική, affirmativa) into the dialectic of negation (ἀποφατική : abnegativa) discloses that even the most sacred opinion hides as well as reveals the truth, because nothing can be ultimately relied upon to be what it seems to be, or to mean what is said. The paradox arises here; for every thing may be contrary to what immediately appears ( Παρά τῆν δόξαν), or it may hold its integrity. We can never be sure when we are dealing with the one, and when with the other. For example, we may distinguish life from death, set them apart, live life to the full and fear death. But things are not what they seem. Enduring life is to be found not in life but in death, so that there is no longer anything about death that would justify our fear. Redemption from death is not a flight into forms of life, but is a redemption in death. Things are not what they seem. Life and death co-inhere in Λόγος . Dialectic holds to the paradox by maintaining a negation of the negation. A single negation achieves dualism, the double negation the dialectic. Only dialectic comprehends the being-in-the-whole ( καθόλου ) which is both universally concrete, and concretely universal. This is the lesson we have learned from Hegel. Ζωή and θάνατος belong together in Λόγος . Even speech must die to live, undergo/

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1. Kirk: The Cosmic Fragments, pg. 168.

undergo the negative dialectic if it is to speak the truth. God is present only to the faith which refuses to confine Him to any one fixed determination, just as man is reasonable only to the extent to which he negates every fixed determination of his being-in-the-world. God and man have this common *Λόγος*, gathered in the life which is death, and the death which is life, a *Λόγος* which destroys all absolute theological dualisms. The meaning of incarnation lies somewhere here.

"The real constitution of things is accustomed to hide itself"; "if one does not expect the unexpected one will not find it out, since it is not to be searched out, and difficult to compass". (Heraclitus) (1). That *Λόγος* entails contradiction, that strife gives coherence and order to all things and so is therefore not an injustice but justice itself, these are the unexpected things we must learn to expect, according to Heraclitus. That Jesus is the Lord who serves the slaves, and the slave who is Lord of all Lords is unexpected to say the least. The *coincidentia oppositorum* shocks, but does not violate anything but a restricted rationality. For Heraclitus, *Πόλεμος* makes some gods and others men, some slaves and others free (2). *Λόγος* gathers what *Πόλεμος* scatters, but only by way of the living contradiction. *Λόγος* is logical, in its own terms, only in the endurance of contradiction, by which the irrational becomes rational. Antagonism is transformed into mutual interaction, conflict into reciprocity. *Λόγος*, for Heraclitus is like fire, forever changing, present whatever is burnt, enduring through destruction, a living catharsis. *πάντα ῥεῖ* :  
we/

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1. Fragments 211 and 213 pgs: 193 and 195 of Kirk and Raven, The Presocratics.
  2. Ibid Fragment 215 pg: 195 also Cosmic Fragments pg. 245ff.

we can never step twice into the same river: Everything must eventually cease to be, just as it has come to be, and has not always endured. Λόγος coheres through change, which means that the Λόγος, and the Λόγος alone, is worthy of our unconditional trust. When the Christian says the Λόγος became flesh, that the Λόγος came and dwelt among us, though we comprehended him not, he is saying that the meaning he can trust unconditionally is now united to the life he knows as his own. We had the experience but lost the meaning. Life and meaning belong together in the integrity of the word made flesh. Life has meaning in him. Meaning is alive in him. The two are not divorced in him. The Λόγος scatters (σχίδνησι) and gathers (συνάγει), comes together (συνίσταται) and flows away (ἀπολείπει), approaches (πρόσεται) and departs (ἄπεισι) (1). This, for Heraclitus, is the becoming of the Λόγος, whose integrity endures, not by being this or that, nor by not being this or that, but by becoming what it is not. We say the same of the Christ.

We do not have the time or the space to work out further detailed formulations of this dialectic: We have given close attention to one instance of it in particular, the dialectic of Lord and Slave. We have established its connection with the Christian tradition and with the philosophy of Heraclitus. We have argued, as an introductory thesis, that the Truth wholly worthy of our trust is neither here nor beyond, neither finite nor infinite, neither immanent nor transcendent, but eschatologically present in the form of absence. It is a truth which endures though it be radically temporal. It is an integrity achieved/

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1. Kirk: Cosmic Fragments of Heraclitus pg. 381.

achieved through the endurance of disintegration. It is the health within the disease. It is the truth of an encompassing coincidentia oppositorum, not of any fixed and so finite determination. It is a wholeness in becoming, rather than a withdrawal into either being, or not-being. It is the truth which even our correct opinions concerning what is or is not the case hide as well as reveal. We do not seek consistency and logical clarity in the determinatio which is always a negatio, and in this alone; although as an essential moment in the course of the dialectic, this kataphatic method is valid enough. But no single affirmation, no single negation, can claim to comprehend the truth. Dialectical logic, and it alone, comprehends completeness from the standpoint of radical incompleteness. Its apophatic method, entailing a double and not single negation, grasps the living movement of the coincidentia oppositorum. It allows concepts to float. It allows the unapparent connection to become manifest. It negates the negation as well as the affirmation, and so passes beyond the static abstractions of being and not-being. It speaks of the  $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  as enduring relatedness in continual becoming, not from the standpoint of absolute relatedness itself, but from the standpoint of partial relatedness. It speaks of the Wholeness and Wholesomeness of the truth of the Whole, not from a point external to the Whole, but from a point within its encompassing. Its ontology ( $\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha\text{-}\lambda\omicron\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ) is dialectical, and so dynamic, rather than static. It employs the logic of identity and contradiction in analysis, but does not leave what it has set apart, unrelated, incoherent, or without life. The meaning it discovers in the experience is not alien to the experience, but/

but belongs indissolubly to it. The life it continues to live does not become lost in compulsive forgetfulness, nor is it allowed to fragment. *Λόγος* gathers what has been scattered, joins what has been broken. It scatters what has been deceptively connected, and breaks what has been fixatedly defined.

These remarks, are, of course, only a beginning. They are an introduction, a preliminary exploration, no more. Our solution is that there is no final solution. Dialectic must never be confused with final solutions. It arrives only when it does not arrive, when it knows it does not yet arrive. Although even now it has indirect access to the truth, it does not claim that truth as its own, in completeness. It is always on the way. In order to go on, it goes back, recalling and comprehending what we had lost, though we were unaware of our loss. It teaches us that in becoming what we are not, we forsake the logic of exclusion, by which everything is or is not, and we embrace the dialectical logic of inclusion. It teaches us that inclusion is not yet achieved, that the kingdom is not yet, that here we have no enduring city. It teaches us that knowledge imposes a pattern and falsifies, and that life continually calls in questions the conventions of meaning to which we usually turn for coherence. It shows us how to live in time, and to work toward integrity at the same time. Dialectical thinking is a thorough-going-apophatic way of thinking, a thinking which unites with being through negative action. Dialectic unites theory and practice, thought and action, in the double negation which comprehends them both. It unites thought and being, or in another idiom subject and object, in a temporary, ongoing co-inherence, but it does not come/

come to rest in absolute synthesis. It shows us the unapparent  $\Lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  between man as the one who acts (homo agens) and man as the one who suffers (homo patiens). We no longer ask whether it is action or suffering that changes the world; our task, instead, is to discern when to act and when to suffer, and such a discernment demands from us a great freedom of spirit. There is no genuine either/or between Lordship and Slavery either. There is no question of our formulating an exclusive either/or between domination or submission. We know that social revolutions alone do not change men, though we do not contradict a revolutionary insistence on radical transformation. We know that we must act as well as suffer, yet we know that violence breeds violence. We may hate war, knowing that pacifism may be a passive adjustment to evil. Nonetheless, we do not ask, with the Unhappy consciousness, when will the Kingdom come? We speak, instead, of what is already present, the unapparent  $\Lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , the living coincidentia oppositorum of the Holy Spirit in our history. The presence of the Spirit of God, in whose integrity we are made whole, is even now at work in our time. This is the good news.

Perhaps Lessing's prayer will prove to mean as much to us as it undoubtedly did to Hegel.

"Go thine inscrutable way, Eternal Providence! Only let me not despair of thee because of this inscrutableness. Let me not despair of thee, even if thy steps appear to be to be going backwards. It is not true that the shortest line is always straight" (1).

Or perhaps St. Paul speaks to the heart of the matter, when/

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1. Lessing: The Education of the human race 1780. Theological Writings transl. Henry Chadwick pg. 97.

when he says:

For we know in part and we prophesy in part; but when completeness comes, the partial shall be done away (1).

Now we see only puzzling reflections in a mirror, but then we shall see face to face. My knowledge now is partial, but then I shall know in completeness even as I also am completely known (2).

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1. 1 Cor. 13 vv 9 and 10.

2. 1 Cor. 13 v 12.

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