https://theses.gla.ac.uk/

Theses Digitisation:
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis.

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given
Military aspects of the Albigensian Crusade
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Matthew Strickland for suggesting the Albigensian Crusade as a suitable area for research and for his help, advise and encouragement over the course of my studies. I would also like to thank my parents for their generosity in paying my tuition fees, Professor David Bates for making department funding available to me for my visit to France in the Summer of 1997 and Dr Andrew Roach for some helpful suggestions regarding reading materials. Most particularly I would like to thank James Munro for the personal support he has given me over the past four years, for accompanying me on my visit to France and for proof reading this dissertation.

Rachel L. Noah
Glasgow, November 1999
Abstract

Although many general narrative works exist covering the events of the Albigensian Crusade, very little has been written specifically regarding the military aspects of the war in the Languedoc. The main written source used in this study has been the *Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise*, a contemporary vernacular work which has been found to contain much that is relevant to this subject.

The recruitment and composition of crusader armies and armies in southern France is examined and comparisons made between the two. In order to establish a background for the crusading army an examination of the recruitment of royal armies in Northern France has been carried out. A study of documentary evidence reveals several mechanisms whereby armies in Northern France in this period were recruited. Such evidence is particularly important in terms of examining the use of stipendiary troops and mercenaries. This may be helpful in ascertaining the composition of the crusading army.

It is clear from examining the written sources that the type of warfare carried out during the crusade involved many types of troops in the crusading army, not just knights who dominate the written sources. Men with specialist skills as well as infantry, mounted sergeants and troops who could be utilised for general labour all had an important role to play. It is also clear that many crusaders fought for monetary reward as well in order to fulfil feudal duties and crusading vows.

An examination of the social, political and economic background in the Languedoc has been carried out in order to establish the differences which existed in the recruitment of armies in northern and southern France. It has been found that different social structures affected land holding and political power. In its turn this affected the recruitment of men who served for monetary reward rather than giving service in return for land. It is probable that mercenary troops were used more frequently in southern France in comparison with the North. This was probably as a result of the different social structures which existed. The depiction of warfare in Occitan poetry has also been covered as it has been found that differences exist in the definition of knighthood in southern France particularly in relation to military service.

Fortifications in northern and southern France have been examined and compared and an in depth survey of how such fortifications were utilised and besieged during the Albigensian Crusade has been carried out. It has been found that siege warfare
was an extremely important feature of the warfare of the Albigensian Crusade as with much other warfare of this period. It has also been found that some differences existed between fortifications in northern France and the Languedoc in the thirteenth century. This due to political, social and economic conditions as well as the topography of the area.

Other issues addressed include the possibility of the transfer of siege technology and fortification techniques between northern and southern France during the Albigensian Crusade and after. In some areas of southern France castle architecture underwent some changes due to the coming of the crusade, particularly after the royal take over of south western France. Although it is possible that technical innovation came about due to the nature of the warfare being undertaken, a technical superiority on either side has not been found.

Warfare in the field is also examined. Areas covered include an examination of the study of field warfare, particularly battles. In general, it appears that warfare in the field following much the same pattern of raids, skirmishes, and ravaging as it did in other conflicts of the period with the decision to give battle an exception rather than the rule. The battle of Muret is examined as an example of the field warfare which took place during the conflict, though it emerges that examining such isolated incidents can rarely give a true picture of warfare as a whole during the conflict.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ........................................................................................................................1
Table of contents ..........................................................................................................3
List of tables .................................................................................................................6
List of figures ...............................................................................................................6
List of plates ................................................................................................................7

Chapter 1

1.0 Introduction....................................................................................................... 8
1.1 Written sources for the Albigensian Crusade .....................................................14
  1.1.1 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise ....................................................14
  1.1.2 Historia Albigensis ....................................................................19
  1.1.3 The Chronicle of William of Puylaurens ....................................21

Chapter 2

2.0 Introduction....................................................................................................... 23
2.1 Royal armies in northern France in the late twelfth and early thirteenth
  centuries............................................................................................................ 23
2.2 The Capetians and the Albigensian Crusade .................................................... 31
2.3 The crusading army......................................................................................... 33
2.4 Armies in the Languedoc in the late twelfth and early thirteenth
  centuries............................................................................................................ 44
2.4.1 The political background and land holding in southern France .............. 45
2.4.2 Knighthood and the meaning of the word ‘knight’ in southern France ................................................................. 48
2.4.3 Infantry, mercenaries and specialist soldiers in the South .................... 53
2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 57

Chapter 3

3.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 59
3.1 The development of fortification in northern France from the early twelfth century ........................................................................................................... 59
3.2 Fortifications in the Languedoc from the eleventh to the thirteenth century and their role in the Albigensian Crusade ................................................................. 71

Chapter 4

4.0 Introduction .................................................................................................... 90
4.1 Methods of siege used by the army of Philip Augustus ................................. 91
4.2 Siege weapons in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and their use during the Albigensian Crusade ................................................................. 95
  4.2.1 Siege towers ........................................................................................ 95
  4.2.2 Mining, rams, bores and armoured roofs ........................................... 97
  4.2.3 Siege engines: missile throwing weapons .......................................... 99
4.3 Engineers ........................................................................................................ 105
4.4 The conduct of siege warfare during the Albigensian Crusade ..................... 107

Chapter 5

5.0 The study of field warfare and battles as an approach to military history ...... 114
5.1 Muret and war in the field during the Albigensian Crusade ...................... 119
5.2 The battle of Bouvines ........................................................................... 129

Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 132

Bibliography .................................................................................................... 140
Tables ................................................................................................................. 149
Figures ............................................................................................................... 150
Plates .................................................................................................................. 161
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1  Daily wages paid to stipendary troops in the army of Philip Augustus in Normandy.................................................................149

Table 2  Siege engines used in the Albigensian Crusade as depicted in the Chanson.................................................................................149

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1  Three castles of Philip Augustus .............................................150

Figure 2  Château Gaillard.....................................................................151

Figure 3  Carcassonne in 1208 .................................................................151

Figure 4  Carcassonne in 1254 .................................................................152

Figure 5  Toulouse in 1216 .....................................................................153

Figure 6  Beaucaire in 1216 ....................................................................153

Figure 7  Languedoc ................................................................................154

Figure 8  Map showing the main area effected by the Crusade .................155

Figure 9  Peyrepertuse...........................................................................156

Figure 10 Puylaurens...........................................................................156

Figure 11 Montségur...............................................................................157

Figure 12 Minerve in 1209......................................................................157

Figure 13 Termes ...................................................................................158

Figure 14 Relief carving in St. Nazaire (Viollet-le-Duc) ...........................158

Figure 15 The battle of Muret ................................................................159
LIST OF PLATES

Plate 1  Falaise castle .................................................................161
Plate 2  Roman/Visigothic tower at Carcassonne ......................162
Plate 3  Aerial view of Carcassone ..........................................163
Plate 4  Castle at Carcassonne ..................................................164
Plate 5  Beaucaire castle as seen from the town ......................165
Plate 6  Puylaurens .................................................................165
Plate 7  Peyrepertuse ..............................................................166
Plate 8  Montségur .................................................................167
Plate 9  Minerve .................................................................168
Plate 10 Termes .................................................................169
Chapter 1

1.0 Introduction

When choosing the subject of this dissertation there were a number of factors which led to the decision to take as its theme military aspects of the Albigensian Crusade. There have been several general works in both English and French written on the crusade. These have dealt mainly in a narrative way with the events of the crusade and their background. There appears, however, to have been very little written analysing its military aspects. This seemed, therefore, an appropriate area for research, not only for the specific conclusions which might be reached about warfare in the Albigensian Crusade, but also for the more general conclusions which might result from such a study, relating to warfare in the early thirteenth century as a whole. Issues covered in this study will include comparisons between the crusaders and southern armies in recruitment of men, fighting techniques and the weapons used and whether major differences in such can be perceived in the two regions on the eve of the crusade and during it.

Another question which this study hopes to cover is the possibility that military technology and methods of fortification may have been imported into the area of southern France with the coming of the crusaders. It is hoped to relate the present study to theories such as that proposed by Bartlett. Bartlett sees three main types of military technology as being typical of northern France, Germany and England during this period, these being the castle, the use of the crossbow and the use of heavy cavalry. The dissemination of such military techniques, architecture and weapons is seen as being carried out by three different methods; those of conquest, conscious imitation and as a consequence of planned political development. Castles, heavy cavalry and the use of the crossbow are certainly evident in southern France well before the start of the crusade in 1208. The Albigensian Crusade and the subsequent royal takeover of southern France, however, involved both conquest and then political assimilation, two of Bartlett’s

---

criteria for the dissemination of military technology. One of the aims of the present study, therefore will be to ascertain whether the coming of the crusaders can be linked to the introduction of new methods of siege warfare and weapons and a growing sophistication in military architecture. Bartlett’s model would seem to suggest that the south of France was a region where both ‘Mediterranean’ influences and the influence of the North met. This being the case, it will be part of the present study’s aim not only to investigate whether influences can be perceived in the field of military technology and organisation, but also where these influences came from.

The existence of a source such as the *Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise* was also a major factor in the decision to carry out research into this particular area. The *Chanson* is a contemporary, vernacular work which gives a great deal of detail about many of the military episodes which took place and which, on close examination, yields valuable insights into warfare as it was fought during the crusade. With the *Chanson* having been taken as its major primary source the present study will mainly concentrate on the years 1208-1221. It has also been necessary, however, to extend the period covered in order to be able to ascertain whether the royal takeover of southern France led to any noticeable changes within the sphere of military architecture and technology. Other narrative sources used have been Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay’s *Historia Albigensis* and William of Puylaurens’ *Chronicle*.

French royal financial records exist from this period, which can be utilised in the study of certain aspects of military service for northern France. It is hoped that study of the methods of Philip Augustus and others for recruiting and maintaining armies might be shown relevant to the composition of crusading armies. Also, methods of recruitment and composition of armies used in northern and southern France in this period might be

---

3 The edition I have used throughout this study has been *La chanson de la croisade Albigeoise*, ed. & trans. E. Martin-Chabot, 3 vols. (Paris, 1931) translated into French with the original Provencal facing, referred to hereafter as *Chanson*, cited as verse followed by line number in the Martin-Chabot text. An English translation, *The Song of the Cathar Wars*, trans. J. Shirley (Aldershot, 1996) has also been used.


compared. Few financial records of the type which survive in northern France are available from the area affected by the crusade but there are, however, many documents that exist relating to land holding which may shed some light on certain aspects of military service in the Languedoc. Some of the secondary literature regarding the *Chanson* and other sources will be covered particularly in relation to what they can reveal about the role and meaning of knighthood in southern France, the nature of military service and the different types of soldiers used in the area. Such studies will therefore be relevant to any conclusions reached regarding warfare during the Albigensian Crusade.

It will also be necessary to include some observations on the nature of southern French society, particularly in relation to land holding and military organisation. This has been the subject of a number of studies, with many authors keen to emphasise differences between northern and southern France. The nature of political authority in the South will have to be taken into consideration in order to understand the kind of defence and counter-attack the people of the Languedoc were able to mount in response to the crusaders. The relationship which existed between the Languedoc, the Mediterranean and the rest of France is also an important factor in discussing the nature of political, social and economic structures in the South. Major trade routes crossed this area helping it to develop wealth which led to the growth of prosperous urban centres. Population growth and prosperity helped the people of such cities as Toulouse

---

10 See P. Belperron, *La croisade contre Les Albigeois*, pp. 8-9. Belperron is keen to emphasise how the history of the Languedoc was greatly determined by its position, isolated as it was from the North and being part of the Mediterranean rather than northern European world.
win self government and political influence in the region. Such factors also affected the way these cities recruited and commanded armies as well as the way they defended themselves against the invading crusaders.

The wealth of the Languedoc’s cities allowed them to build and maintain strong urban fortifications. The legacy of imperial Rome and its successor Visigothic kingdoms also explains the existence of large scale urban fortifications in the Languedoc. It is important therefore to emphasise the continuity between the Roman and medieval periods in relation to fortifications in the south of France. The role these fortifications played will need to be investigated, as well as the specific problems they presented to both their attackers and defenders during the Albigensian Crusade. The Languedoc, however, was one of sharp contrasts in its landscape and wealth. These factors are important when considering the types of fortifications which were in evidence in this area in the early thirteenth century. The large and wealthy fortified cities, well defended towns of medium and smaller size and the mountain castles of the region represented different challenges for the crusaders. The number and nature of small independently built fortifications in the area and the way these fortifications were garrisoned will be considered. It has often been emphasised that the Cathar heresy was deeply rooted in many of the hill towns and outlying districts of the region where the excellent natural defences afforded by the terrain made the heretics very difficult to root out. On a purely military level, it was necessary to be able to take these fortifications in order that they should not be used as military bases from which to launch raids against the crusaders.

Archaeological evidence and secondary literature regarding castle building will be important in discussing the building and use of fortifications in both the north and south of France during this period. Such areas as the development of castle building during the mid to late twelfth century, the influences that may have come from the Near East, the functions of the castle for defence, and also as a residence will be covered. This will be related to a comparison between castles in the north and south of France built during this period and possible changes in methods of fortification in southern France bought about

---

by the coming of the crusade. Particular problems arise in the study of the development of fortifications, especially in the southern France, mainly owing to the fact that many have been destroyed, improved or replaced since the early thirteenth century. This is particularly true for many of the mountain fortresses, which were abandoned and subsequently fell into disrepair, some in the mid to late thirteenth century, others after the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659 redefined the border between France and Spain. As many fortifications underwent considerable restoration and improvement under Capetian rule, the study of such improvements may go some way to enabling conclusions to be reached regarding influences in military architecture from the North. However, the original twelfth and early thirteenth century fortifications at many sites have mostly been obscured by later additions, making it difficult to ascertain their original appearance.

Developments in fortification probably led to a growing sophistication in siege methods. The area of siege warfare must play a major role in this study, as it was an important part of warfare in the early thirteenth century and because it featured particularly heavily during the Albigensian Crusade. The subject of siege warfare during the middle ages has been, until quite recently, neglected by most military historians. The importance of the siege to the study of warfare as a whole has now been acknowledged. It is an area which yields valuable insights into the conduct of warfare in the middle ages, the use of siege as a means of military conquest being the rule rather than in exception in many cases. A number of general studies on siege warfare have been published which have mainly concentrated on Britain, northern Europe, the

---

14 For examples of such works see F. Lot, L'art militaire et les armes au moyen âge en Europe et dans la proche Orient (Paris, 1946). C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 vols. (2nd edn., London, 1924) and H. Delbruck, A History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, 4 vols (London, 1975-85). J. F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to 1340, Translated by Col. Sumner Willard, United States Military Academy & Mrs R. W. Southern (2nd edition, Woodbridge, 1997) has in many respects superseded these earlier works and contains a valuable section on the historiography of this subject in his introduction, dealing with many of the mistaken assumptions and methods of previous authors. Oman and Delbruck both acknowledge the importance of siege warfare, see Delbruck, A History of the Art of War, pp. 324 & 326, Oman devotes sections in vols. 1 and 2 of his work to the subject of siege methods and fortification, see Oman, A History of the Art of War, vol. 1, pp. 131-48 and vol. 2, pp. 43-54. All the above authors, however, concentrate mostly on field armies in their studies.
15 See B. S. Bachrach, 'Medieval Siege Warfare - A Reconnaissance', Journal of Military History, 58, (1994), pp. 119-133. Bachrach acknowledges the central role that siege warfare played in the middle ages and reviews some of the existing literature on the subject. He concludes that the study of medieval warfare should move away from the assumption that it was dominated by the mounted knight and pitched battles and should emphasise aspects such as the militarization of the population as a whole and consider the importance of siege warfare.
Mediterranean area and the Near East.\textsuperscript{16} The capture of fortifications was always one of the prime objectives of any invading army, while their defence was vitally important for the establishment of any kind of permanent power base in a region. Lordship could only be established with the possession of fortified strong points from which it was possible to police an area as well as exploit it economically and dominate it politically. The taking of fortifications during the Albigensian Crusade was therefore of paramount importance. Successful military leaders of this period such as Richard I of England, for example, needed to be able to employ siege tactics and carry out related activities effectively.\textsuperscript{17} The dominance of fortified strong points meant most military action involved a war of attrition where infantry, artillery and engineers all had an important role to play. This study will cover the role these types of soldiers had to play in the crusading army and the army of their southern opponents as well as how they were employed in northern France and the near east in the armies of the kings of France.

The effectiveness of siege warfare depended upon a number of factors including the topography of the area, the climate and season, the effective recruitment of men, the efficiency of methods of supply, the strength of the fortification and the techniques used to besiege it. All of these factors should be taken into consideration when trying to reach any general conclusions about the nature of siege warfare during the Albigensian Crusade. Different methods of attack and defence would have been used depending upon the circumstances.

Although this study intends to concentrate mainly on siege warfare, the subject of the army in the field needs to be considered. Siege warfare should not be seen in isolation as it was very much related to warfare as a whole. On several occasions during the Albigensian Crusade, Simon de Montfort took the decision to force a battle. The most celebrated occasion on which this happened was at Muret in 1213. As a number of military historians writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have written on this battle, it will be appropriate to deal with it and other field operations during the crusade in the light of this scholarship.\textsuperscript{18} By covering this area it is hoped that


\textsuperscript{18} See in particular Lot, \textit{L'Art Militaire}, vol. 1, pp. 211 - 216 and Oman, \textit{A History of the Art of War}
conclusions may be drawn regarding the nature of warfare in the field during the crusade and its relation to war in the field in northern France during this period. It will be necessary beforehand, however, to evaluate the major written sources on the Albigensian Crusade available to the historian, and in particular their usefulness to the study of military aspects of the crusade.

1.1 Written sources for the Albigensian Crusade

An evaluation of the three major written sources for the Albigensian Crusade is needed for the purposes of this study for a number of reasons. First of all there is the question of how relevant each of these sources is for the purposes of studying the military aspects of the crusade. Matters such as how well informed the authors were, the accuracy of their accounts and what their sources were all have a bearing on this. Much of what was written by these authors was derived from oral testimony. It is therefore necessary to question how well informed the authors' sources were. Oral testimonies by their nature involve the viewpoint of one individual; this limits their usefulness in trying to gain an overall picture of an event which may have involved many people and ranged over a wide area such as a battle or the siege of a large fortification. What follows is an evaluation of each written source according to these criteria.

1.1.1 La chanson de la croisade Albigeoise

The work which has become known by this title is an epic poem in the Provençal language which takes as its subject the Albigensian Crusade from the time of its inception to the campaign of Prince Louis in 1218. The work consists of two parts, generally considered to be written by two different poets. This can be mainly ascertained from the decidedly different style, language and political sympathies revealed in the two parts of the poem. The first author, William of Tudela wrote the first 2772 lines
The remainder of the work consists of 6810 lines, (83 verses) and was written by an anonymous poet. The identity of the author of the first part of the Chanson is easily ascertained as he names himself as William of Tudela in the early lines of the poem. William, who names himself as ‘master’, indicating he was a cleric, seems to have been fairly familiar with a good range of vernacular literature and biblical texts judging from the allusions made in the Chanson. He also appears to have been a jongleur who earned a living composing and reciting such works. He alludes to other celebrated epic poems such as Raoul de Cambrai and the Chanson de Roland. He also refers to the Chanson d'Antioche, another epic poem in the Provençal language, as being his major inspiration and model. It can therefore be seen that the Chanson was a work firmly rooted in a secular, vernacular tradition. The first part of the poem was probably started in or around 1210 and was finished in 1213. The last events mentioned in William’s part of the Chanson took place in or around July 1213. It is likely that the poem was composed as and when news of events reached the poet until he was interrupted for unknown reasons.

It is unclear when William took up residence in southern France. He does record that he stayed at Montauban and was present at the wedding of Raymond VI of Toulouse to Eleanor of Aragon which took place in 1199. It is probable that he left Montauban in the summer of 1211 when the crusading army was threatening the town.

---

20 Chanson, v. 1, 1-9 informs us of the author’s name, place of origin and education.
21 He praises various figures in the poem for their generosity which suggests that he sees this as the principal virtue in a good patron, for example the Viscount of Béziers (Chanson, v. 15,4.) and Lady Giraud de Lavau (Chanson, v. 68,23.)
22 Chanson, v. 2, 8.
23 For example Chanson, v. 72, 10.
25 For date and composition of the work see Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 1, p. x and Dossat ‘La Croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, p. 245.
26 Chanson, v. 131.
27 See Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 1, pp. xi-xii. Dossat, ‘La croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, p.245, however, suggests that the work was composed rapidly in the spring of 1213 and was certainly finished by February 1214 when Count Baldwin died, which may have been the reason for William stopping the composition of the work at this point.
28 Chanson, v. 15, 18.
He then sought refuge at Bruniquel with the brother of Raymond VI, Count Baldwin, who had recently defected to the side of the crusaders. William was treated well by Baldwin and became a canon in the monastery of the town of St Antonin after it had been taken by Baldwin and the crusaders. These scant details are all we know of the life of the poet of the first half of the Chanson. It possible that he was with Baldwin at Lolmie and was taken prisoner and fell into the hands of the Toulousians. As a member of the clergy William, it can be assumed, had sympathy with the religious aims of the crusade but although he condemns the doctrines of the heretics he feels a certain sympathy for them and the people of the South in general for their sufferings. William is keen to vouch for the orthodoxy of many of the leading noblemen of the area including the viscount of Béziers. He shows a certain neutrality in condemning in equal terms the excesses of the crusading army at Béziers and the peasants of Montgey who killed wounded crusaders after an attack by the count of Foix. William appears to make some effort to appear impartial, though this may be a result of his patron Count Baldwin joining the crusaders in 1211, leading to a desire to flatter Baldwin’s new allies whilst at the same time praising the local aristocracy.

William was therefore writing at the same time or very soon after the events he depicts, the narrative in some places probably being composed on a day to day basis. It is possible that he witnessed some of the events about which he wrote. It is also likely that, along with other poems of the genre, this epic work was designed for public performance. The audience hearing the poem may well have consisted of members of the aristocracy that had taken part in many of the episodes described in the poem or those that had at least good second hand knowledge of them. This would suggest that the poet, whilst intending to flatter, excite and entertain his audience would also make some effort to depict the events he described truthfully. Living in the area and being on good terms with Count Baldwin, William may have had access to information gained from figures personally involved in the events he describes. On more than one occasion he quotes individuals who could vouch for the veracity of his narrative, for example,

---
29 Dossat, 'Le croisade vue par les chroniqueurs', p. 245.
30 For example Chanson, v. 3, 15, and v. 4, 4.
31 For example in his mourning of the fate of the Lady Giraude, her brother and his knights at Lavaur (Chanson, v. 68, 14-24)
32 Chanson, v. 15, 6.
33 Chanson v. 22 & v. 23, 1-7.
34 Chanson v. 69,16-24.
Pons de Mela the envoy of the king of Navarre, who gave William details of events at the papal curia of 1208 and the bailli of Count Baldwin who gave an eye witness account of the siege of Moissac.

The chronology of the work in many places, however, lacks precision and the author often fails to give an indication of the month or day on which events took place, being content in many cases to name a season or even day of the week. In other cases the naming of a certain day as a religious festival, in common with other authors of the time, can date events quite precisely. The poet makes some errors in the sequence of events, and also exaggerates, for example, when recording the duration of the siege of Termes. Elsewhere, William's chronology and the details of his narrative appear to be very precise. Where it is possible to check against other written sources, his work appears to agree substantially with other contemporary chroniclers which allows the reader to give credence to most of the details contained within the work. In some instances the Chanson is our only source for the events it describes.

One of the major assets of William's work to the historian of military matters is that William, being a cleric, had the advantage of a literary and religious education, but unlike other contemporary writers on the crusade, wrote in the vernacular and also lived amongst the people about whom he was writing. William was therefore very much part of the culture and ethos of men such as Count Raymond and his brother Baldwin. The vernacular language can sometimes more accurately convey concepts and objects which in the Latin language can only, in certain circumstances, be approximations. Being written by a southerner and in the vernacular the Chanson could therefore be said to reflect the ethos of the southern aristocracy in an accurate manner. In this context it can

---

35 Chanson v. 5, 16.
36 Chanson v. 119, 5.
37 For example he places the Council of St Gilles after the capture of Termes (Chanson, v. 58, 1-2), on other errors see Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 1, p. xiv
38 Chanson v. 56, 31-32, here William says that the besiegers spent Ascension, Pentecost and most of the winter at Termes, he estimates the length of the siege as being 9 months. (Chanson, v. 57, 3). The siege only lasted 4 months at the most. See Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 1, p. 135, n. 5 The siege was decided upon after the taking of Minerve and therefore could not have started before the end of July 1210, see Historia, Chapter 189, which places the taking of Termes as being on the night of 22/23 November 1210.
39 For example the intervention of King Peter of Aragon at Carcassonne in 1209 (Chanson v. 26 - 29) and events in Quercy and the Agenais in the same year (Chanson v. 13-14)
40 See Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, pp. 10-14. Here the importance of the vernacular in the study of military history is emphasised, the author observing for example that Latin authors often use misleading terms for tactical units in a medieval army. This could also be said for vocabulary referring to other military terms.
be compared with a northern French work such as the *L'histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal* in its depiction of thirteenth-century warfare.\(^{41}\)

The anonymous continuator of the *Chanson* appears to have been a strong partisan of Toulouse and its Count. To judge from the language and style used the author was well educated and probably belonged to either the bourgeoisie or the clergy.\(^{42}\) The anonymous poet may have been in the count of Toulouse's retinue on certain occasions, for example at the time of the Lateran Council of November 1215.\(^{43}\) Failing this he would appear to have been otherwise able to gain very detailed first hand information about the events which took place at that time, in Rome and elsewhere. The second part of the *Chanson* concentrates mainly on a few salient events which it depicts in great detail, including the sieges of Toulouse and Beaucaire. Other events are mentioned only in passing.

The anonymous author's principal sources of information appear to have been gained first hand from the chief figures involved in the events described and other eye witnesses. The account given in the *Chanson* of the siege of Toulouse in 1217/18, for example, is extensive and elaborate in its detail.\(^{44}\) Its depiction of the reactions of the Toulousains to the destruction of the crusaders' siege engine and to the death of Simon de Montfort speaks very much of the poet or a close source being an eye witness to these events. The fanatical hatred the author has for Simon de Montfort leads to the use of literary devices which may exaggerate and obscure the realities of his character and relations between the leader of crusade, his retinue and leaders of the other crusading contingents. Simon de Montfort is portrayed as a tyrant who is often at odds with various members of his entourage. His rage and arrogance are portrayed as being a major factor in the making of foolish military decisions.\(^{45}\)

The *Chanson*, therefore, has a number of drawbacks when used as an historical source. This is an epic poem, designed to entertain and flatter an aristocratic audience, a poem which belongs to a genre and which follows many of the conventions of that genre.


\(^{42}\) See Dossat, 'La Croisade vue par les chroniqueurs', p. 250.

\(^{43}\) *Chanson*, v. 143-151.

\(^{44}\) *Chanson*, v. 172-208.

\(^{45}\) See *Chanson* v. 189, 40 - 61 and v. 190, 24 - 49. Here Alain de Roucey, one of Simon de Montfort's inner circle accuses him of pride and arrogance in his continuing efforts to take the city of Toulouse.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the *Chanson* reflects many of its intended audience's preoccupations, particularly warfare. If the Chanson does not always depict events accurately, it depicts the southern aristocracy as they would have liked to have seen themselves and reflects their attitudes. The *Chanson* can be used as a valuable tool in the study of warfare during the Albigensian Crusade, both for the detail it gives about historical events and way it depicts the major players in these events. It is difficult to know, however, how accurately the poem depicts the crusaders, both poets being more familiar with southern French society and its conventions and deriving much of their information from southern sources. By using the *Chanson* in combination with a northern source such as the *Historia Albigensis* it is hoped a balanced picture will emerge.

1.1.2 The *Historia Albigensis* of Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay

Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay was a monk of the house of Vaux-de-Cernay in the Île de France, which had close connections with the family of de Montfort. He travelled to the South with his uncle Guy, who was subsequently appointed bishop of Carcassonne. Peter appears to have spent only a limited amount of time in southern France, beginning to observe and record events in 1212 and returning to Paris in March 1213. He returned to Nevers in 1214 from where he went on to Montpellier and joined the army of Simon de Montfort and then followed it to the Agenais and the Rouergue. In that year he also accompanied Prince Louis on his expedition to the South. He was present on the crusading armies march to relieve Beaucaire and assisted in the siege operations there. His observations on the siege of Toulouse appear to come from an eye witness. Peter returned to the Île de France in 1218. It can be seen, therefore, that although only in the South for a relatively short period of time Peter did travel extensively with the crusader army. Peter’s work makes extensive use of oral testimonies. His uncle was a man who had spent time in the southern part of France, before the crusade, preaching against the Cathar heresy and from whom Peter could have derived background.

information about the politics and geography of the region as well as the chief figures involved in the crusade on both sides.\textsuperscript{48} It is certain that Peter was present at many of the events he narrates especially those involving ecclesiastical and political affairs.\textsuperscript{49}

The information he gives on military events can be extremely useful particularly regarding the conduct of siege warfare by the crusaders. On many occasions he is our only source for such details as the positioning of siege engines and troops.\textsuperscript{50} His descriptions of these events are lucid and detailed despite his tendency to attribute events to the miraculous. For example he reports the supposed miracle of a missile from a siege engine narrowly missing Simon de Montfort as he conversed with his men who were conducting mining operations at Termes. Another miracle is reported in the same passage, this involves the count narrowly escaping a crossbow bolt.\textsuperscript{51}

Limitations in the usefulness to the military historian of sources written by churchmen do exist and this should be borne in mind when reading the \textit{Historia}. Monastic authors may be ignorant of military matters and an unbiased account of a military encounter is generally not the primary objective of their writings. In many cases military matters are only of peripheral interest to the author. Clerical sources are also often biased against the knightly class, the authors exaggerating their violence and depredations they caused. They are also keen to see the hand of God in the outcome of military encounters, imposing their own explanations on events and leaving out details which do not fit in with their interpretations.\textsuperscript{52} Although Peter is open to criticism of this kind, on certain occasions this is balanced by the fact that he was an eye witness to many of the events he describes or was close to many of the leading figures involved in the crusade.\textsuperscript{53} Peter also had access to archival information. He utilised not only papal and church records dealing with the acts of Innocent III and his legates but also the charters and correspondence of figures such as Simon de Montfort.\textsuperscript{54} Some of his insights also

\textsuperscript{48} See Guébin & Lyon, \textit{Historia}, vol. 3, p. iii.
\textsuperscript{50} For example at the siege of Minerve, \textit{Historia}, 151-159.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Historia}, 190.
\textsuperscript{52} See Verbruggen, \textit{The Art of Warfare}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{53} One incident he records involves the saddle of his horse being struck by a cross-bow bolt at the siege of Moissac (\textit{Historia}, 347) indicating that he was indeed very close to some of the events he describes.
\textsuperscript{54} See Dossat, ‘La croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, p. 225
suggest that he had at least some insight into the nature of the warfare being waged. For example he points out the importance of the capture of strongholds.\footnote{Historia, 321.}

The major flaw in Peter's work from the view of the historian is his total fanaticism for the cause of the crusade and his hero worship of its leader. It is probable that Peter was only in his early twenties when the \textit{Historia} was written and his youth may suggest a certain amount of naivety in his writing rather than the cynicism of a propagandist that has been suggested by some authors.\footnote{The \textit{History of the Albigensian Crusade}, p. xxxvii}

He had no sympathy for any of the southerners and seems to have had little understanding of the aristocratic society of southern France, reflecting the values of the ecclesiastical aristocracy of the north to which he belonged. This does not mean that he was not a truthful chronicler of events in general. He does not neglect to record incidence of indiscipline in the crusading army as well as duplicity and negligence.\footnote{For example his depiction of the intense rivalry between the duke of Burgundy and count of Nevers (\textit{Historia}, 108) and criticism of the bishops of Beauvais and Chartres for leaving the crusading army at the siege of Termes after their men had served their statutory forty days. (\textit{Historia}, 184 & 186)}

In the introduction to his work Peter writes "I write what is true, nothing is here which I have not seen with my own eyes or have had confirmed to me by reliable witnesses".\footnote{Historia, 2}

There is no reason to doubt this assertion, although his interpretation of these events is often open to question. A third written source on the Albigensian crusade, the \textit{Chronicle} of William of Puylaurens also needs to be taken into consideration.

### 1.1.3 The \textit{Chronicle} of William of Puylaurens

There has been some debate over the identity of William of Puylaurens.\footnote{He has variously been identified as a chaplain in the household of the count of Toulouse and a member of the bishop of Toulouse's staff, as he appears to have been in the confidence of Bishop Fouilque. See J. Duvernoy, \textit{ Chronicle}, pp. 1-5. Duvernoy comes down firmly on the side of the latter argument, see also Dossat 'La Croisade vue par les chroniqueurs', pp. 234-8.}

The author of the \textit{Chronicle} appears to have been a native of Toulouse as the work indicates childhood memories of events which happened in the city during the early years of the crusade, for example, the departure of the White Confraternity from the city to fight at
the siege of Lavaur in March 1210 and the despair felt within Toulouse after the southerners' defeat at Muret. It is likely that the author was in the city of Toulouse during the siege of 1217/18. William was hostile to the heresy and his work is likely to have been written some years after the beginning of the crusade, perhaps not being finished until as late as 1273. He therefore had time to reflect in hindsight on the events he was writing about. William's work is shorter and less detailed than the Chanson and the Historia, both of which he uses as a basis for some of his work, it nevertheless provides a useful supplement to them. He is also more unbiased in his views than either Peter of les Vaux de Cernay or the anonymous continuator of the Chanson.

In general, therefore, it should be possible to gain a detailed and reasonably accurate picture of military events during the Albigensian Crusade from the written sources available, taking into consideration the limitations of each. These will provide the foundations on which to build up a picture of how warfare was carried out and organised by the crusaders and their southern adversaries. In order, however, to provide a framework and context in which to work it will now be necessary to review the situation in both northern and southern France on the eve of the crusade with regard to the recruitment of armies, the types of men which fought in them and the rewards they could expect to receive.

---

60 Chronicle, 16 & 21
61 See Duvernoy, Chronicle, p.2.
62 For examples of this see William's prologue, Chronicle, pp. 23-27
63 See Duvernoy, Chronicle, pp. 8-9
Chapter 2

2.0 Introduction

In order to be able to establish a background for the crusading army which invaded the Languedoc in 1208 it will be necessary to consider the methods used to raise armies in northern France during the early thirteenth century. In this way it is hoped to show the typical composition of northern French armies of the period, compared with their southern counterparts. As most of the documentary sources which survive concern royal armies, this is the area concentrated on. The recruitment of French armies for the crusades in the Near East in this period, however, must also be considered in order to place the army of the Albigensian Crusade in its broad context.

2.1 Royal Armies in Northern France in the Late Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries

This is a period from which several important documents have survived relating to the recruitment and payment of royal armies in France.¹ Such documents can help us build up a picture of methods used by the king to recruit and maintain an army both for defensive and offensive purposes. What must be taken into account however are the reasons why such documents were originally compiled. The main sources available to us concerning the army of the king of France in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries fall into two categories. These are first, narrative sources², consisting of both French and English chronicles and poems and second, documentary sources of which the

¹ No similar or comparable documents exist for the Languedoc. Financial records do, however, exist for Catalonia from the mid to late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. These records appear to suggest that, unlike the north of France where centralisation increasingly became the dominant trend in financial administration, the rulers of Catalonia relied mainly on credit as a means of finance, revealing the existence of a decentralised form of fiscal management. See T.N. Bisson, ‘Les comptes des domaines au temps du Phillippe Auguste; essai comparative’, Medieval France and her Pyrenean Neighbours: Studies in Early Institutional History (London, 1989), pp. 265-283; see also idem, ‘The Problem of Feudal Monarchy: Aragon, Catalonia and France’, pp. 237-255 in the same volume.

² The principal narrative sources for the reign of Philip Augustus are the chronicles of Rigord and William the Breton. See Rigord, Gesta Philippi Augusti and Guillaume le Breton, Gesta, Oeuvres de Rigord et Guillaume le Breton, 2.vols, ed. H.F. Delaborde (Paris, 1882).
vast majority are royal records. Poems and chronicles can give us an impression of the types of soldiers and the frequency with which they were used in French royal armies. Official documentary sources, however, can provide us with more information on how these armies were recruited, paid and organised.

The first royal financial records extant for the kingdom of France are for the year 1202/3. These are particularly useful as a source for military expenditure as they devote separate accounts to war expenses incurred during Philip Augustus' campaigns in Normandy. Detailed accounts were rendered for soldiers' wages, the greater part of which appear to be for knights and crossbowmen, although companies of foot soldiers are also mentioned, these being paid lower wages. A few miners and engineers are also referred to. Working from these accounts it is possible to estimate the number of royal troops deployed in Normandy in 1202/3 as being 257 knights, 245 mounted sergeants, 71 mounted crossbowmen, 100 crossbowmen on foot and 1608 foot sergeants. Although this does not appear to be a very impressive number at first sight, this force was more or less a permanent army maintained by the king without resorting to the feudal levy. What is more important to the present study however is that by observing the numbers of troops that made up the various elements of Philip's army in Normandy it may be possible to ascertain the proportions of such troops that would make up an army successfully engaged in the taking and manning of fortifications in an hostile environment in the early thirteenth century.

A stipendiary force such as this would have served as the nucleus of the royal army. We can, however, only gain a rough estimate of the number of men in this army at the time as the wages of the soldiers only took up a part of all expenditure on warfare. A good deal of the money accounted for would also have gone on the repair and building of fortifications. From the accounts rendered in 1202/03 it is also possible to calculate the normal daily wage for the various types of troops in the paid army in Normandy. Table 1 shows that although knights' wages accounted for over one third of

---


4 According to these accounts a miner received a shilling and a half a day and an engineer 15 denier. See C. Petit-Dutallis, *Feudal Monarchy in France and England from the Tenth to the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1936) p. 256.


7 See below pp. 60-62.
the total paid out, foot soldiers would have made up by far the greatest number of
troops in the army, as their lower wage still made up a greater percentage of
expenditure.8

The total of 27,370 livres parisi from which these wages are calculated does
not include a further 3,290 livres paid to the mercenary leader Lambert Cadoc and his
men.9 Neither does it include payments made to individual knights which are designated
as donum (a gift) in the royal records. The royal financial records of the time were
compiled in order to keep an accurate record for the king of his expenditure. Therefore
when using such records as a tool for ascertaining the size and strength of royal armies
we have far more documentary evidence about paid troops than those drawn from the
feudal levy. From 1204 onward, however, the royal registers contain more precise
information for knight service supplied from feudal sources. Before that date we must
rely on chronicles and other narrative sources. Figures, however, are very rarely given. It
appears that on many campaigns the feudal host consisted mainly of household knights
and those from the royal domain rather than knights supplied by the king’s magnates.10

Register A contains very little information about the military obligations of the
great vassals, the sole exception being the feudal inventories for Normandy. The main
reason for the existence of these records is that they were based on a survey made in
1172 by Henry II.11 What is apparent from this inventory is that there was a large
discrepancy between the number of knights that were enfeoffed and the number of
knights that actually owed service.12 Another important discrepancy appears in the
figures for knight service owed in Normandy. This was 847, according to the survey of
knight service carried out in 1207, compared with a number of 158 for those knights
from Normandy who are known to have fought at Bouvines.13 Register A does however
give a good impression of the dominal rights the king claimed over the royal possessions,

---

8 See Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus, p. 169 and Audouin, Essai sur l’armée royale,
p. 119.
9 For use of mercenaries made by Philip Augustus see below p. 27-30.
11 An earlier example of such a survey, the Cartae Baronum, also survives from the reign of Henry II and
was made in 1166 in England; see English Historical Documents, ed. D.C. Douglas (London,
12 This is presumably due to the fact that the purpose of the inventory was to record the number of
enfeoffed knights in order that monetary equivalents for knight service could be calculated. See
rights the king was increasingly keen to enforce, particularly over church possessions and towns in the royal domain.14

Judging from documentary evidence such as the *Scripta de fœdis*, a document showing knight service owed the the king, Philip Augustus could count on several thousand knights for feudal service.15 Recruiting an army through means of the feudal levy was, however, strongly limited in the time men were willing to serve, usually no more than 40 days. Another consideration to be made when discussing the use of feudal service in the recruitment of armies is the different types of service a knight could be called upon to render in different circumstances. It appears that service in the royal host involved only customary and limited numbers. Vassals however could also be called upon to provide unlimited service when the kingdom was seriously threatened, for example by a foreign invader. A distinction should therefore be drawn between *exercitum*, that is service owed, and *bellum*, service demanded when a lord's lands were under threat from an invading force.16 One of the few examples known of the latter type of service is the call to arms issued by Philip Augustus in response to the two pronged attack launched by Emperor Otto and King John in 1214, which culminated in the battle of Bouvines.17 A muster list of troops for the battle of Bouvines exists in Register C. The feudal host at Bouvines probably totalled around 1,300 knights, another 800 fighting under Prince Louis against King John. The church in France was also subject to feudal military service. All regalian bishops owed knight service to the king for the royal host. Owing to the ecclesiastical bias of many of the narrative sources from this period we know more about the church's contribution to the feudal host than other feudal lords.18

Other important documents relating to military expenses and recruitment in France are the *Prise des Sergeants* and *Prisa Servientum*.19 Both of these documents

---

17 For numbers at the battle of Bouvines see Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, p.285 and also Lot, *L'Art Militaire*, pp. 223-28. See also Audouin, *Essai sur l'armée royale*, p. 120. Audouin's figures for Bouvines roughly agree with these other estimates. He gives a figure of 1,200 knights available to Philip, 3/5 of the total in the force commanded by him, Prince Louis commanding the other 2/5 against King John. He also estimates a force of 3,000 mounted sergeants but asserts that without doubt the most important part of Philip's force were cavalry.
19 The former was compiled in 1174 the latter in 1204, See Lot, *L'art militaire*, p. 219. Lot points out this was at the height of the conflict in Normandy and so may not be representative of regular service in
refer to the number of foot sergeants and transport wagons owed as service by each town, commune and abbey in the royal domain. This document shows that some of those towns and abbeys that owed service paid in money rather than men. A period of service of three months was expected of each man. The wage earned by a foot soldier in the royal army was 8 deniers a day. If the money collected in lieu of service is divided by the amount of a three month wage, the number of foot sergeants available to the king can be calculated as 11,683. Mounted sergeants were also becoming increasingly important in the make up of the royal army at this time.

From the above evidence it is apparent that Philip Augustus made extensive use of paid service in his army. Such men however should be distinguished from those mercenaries which are known in contemporary sources by various names such as routier, ribauld or cottereau One distinction between these men and stipendiary troops appears to be that most regular troops, serving for pay, owed an obligation to the king or their lord for service for a certain length of time. Those that were known as routiers owed no service and merely fought for gain. Stipendiary troops were recruited individually and paid a daily allowance whilst routiers appear mainly to have been recruited in bands, money then being paid to the leader of this band and distributed amongst his men. Mercenaries, as depicted in some contemporary sources, were in many cases known to be of foreign extraction, some being of Brabançon, Aragonese, Navarrese and Flemish origin. Many mercenary bands however consisted of men from many different origins and social backgrounds. Such men were normally of humble

---

20 See Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, pp. 171-172. Baldwin suggests the levy of sergeants could be in fact be adjusted according to royal needs at the time.

21 See E. Audouin, *Essai sur l'armée royale*, p. 49. Audouin notes that the comparison between the *Prisa Servientum* and the *Compte General* of 1202 reveals a striking concordance between a tax of 3 livres per sergeant and the pay given to a sergeant of foot. A sergeant paid a the rate of 8 denier a day would receive 3 livres over his 3 month period of service. It is also observed that the king would probably have preferred to have the money rather than the men as this would be a more flexible way of recruiting an army.

22 P. Contamine, 'L'armée de Philippe Auguste', *La France de Philippe Auguste - Le temps de mutations* ed. E. Bautier (Paris, 1980), pp. 577-594. Contamine observes that mounted sergeants should not however be confused with the ecuyers (squires) who accompanied and assisted knights but rather should be seen as being recruited from the general mass of the population, their social origins being very difficult to define. Also see Audouin, *Essai sur l'armée royale*, pp. 64 - 65, here it is noted that in the *compte general* there is a rough ratio of 4:1 of mounted sergeants to knights. He sees their status as being perhaps that of vassals of minor nobles for whom it was possible to be elevated to the rank of knight.
origin and were regarded by many contemporaries, particularly churchmen, as social outcasts. This is no doubt due to the fact that they were seen as operating outside the normal bounds of society as the Church perceived it. They are often considered in sources, especially those written by churchmen, to be responsible for many atrocities including indiscriminate killing, ill treatment and enslavement of prisoners and destruction and theft of church property.\(^\text{23}\) The use of mercenaries in the French royal army can be traced back at least as far as the twelfth century and appears to have expanded during some periods of the reign of Philip Augustus, although lack of documentary evidence from before this may tend to distort our view of the situation prior to the reign of Philip Augustus.\(^\text{24}\)

As mentioned above, payments for mercenaries led by Lambert Cadoc are recorded in the accounts of military expenditure for Normandy.\(^\text{25}\) Cadoc was given various important positions of responsibility by Philip Augustus over the course of his reign including being appointed the castellan of Gaillon and baili of Pont Audemer.\(^\text{26}\) He also played a major role in the taking of Château Gaillard in 1204. Cadoc was made a banneret and may have commanded a force of foot soldiers at Bouvines.\(^\text{27}\) It is estimated that in 1202 his band of mercenaries formed one ninth of the effective force of the royal army in France.\(^\text{28}\) The placing of mercenary leaders in such positions of responsibility was widely practised by the Angevin kings of England. Such men could be highly professional and disciplined in battle and proved to be a necessary tool in enforcing the will of the monarch.\(^\text{29}\)

The expansion of the use of mercenary troops by such monarchs as Henry II of England has been attributed to a number of factors.\(^\text{30}\) These include the delays involved in summoning a feudal army from his widely scattered domains and the short length of


\(^\text{24}\) For the use of mercenaries in this period see H. Géraud, \textit{'Les routiers au XIIe siècle'}, \textit{Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartres} (1841-2), pp. 125-147.


\(^\text{26}\) See Contamine, \textit{L'armée de Philippe Auguste'}, p. 585.


\(^\text{28}\) Ibid., p. 120.


service expected of such levies. Other probable factors in the growing use of mercenary soldiers were the improvement in fortifications of this period and the success mercenary soldiers had in taking and holding these fortifications quickly and efficiently as well as the fact that they could be relied upon to carry on serving a lord providing they were paid.\textsuperscript{31} It must be acknowledged however that the use of paid troops extends at least as far back as the late eleventh century in England.\textsuperscript{32}

The use of mercenary soldiers in the royal armies of France is somewhat obscured in the narrative sources because of two major factors. One is that the documents that have survived from the reign of Philip Augustus are in no way a comprehensive account of royal military expenditure.\textsuperscript{33} Although we find only 300 mercenary foot sergeants fighting in Normandy mentioned in the accounts for 1202-03 there is no reason to believe these are the only mercenary soldiers the king used, very many others could have been employed at other times and in other areas.\textsuperscript{34} Another factor is the reluctance of French chroniclers such as Rigord and William the Breton to record that the French monarch, a model of Christian kingship according to these churchmen, was involved in a practice specifically banned by the Church. It has been pointed out that Rigord even goes so far as say that the king never took mercenaries into his service.\textsuperscript{35} At Bouvines it is the English and the Flemish armies that are described as being made up of mercenary soldiers. This is taken as an indication of their impious and evil intentions. English chroniclers however do mention several instances where Philip Augustus is known to have employed mercenary soldiers.\textsuperscript{36} It is therefore a

\textsuperscript{31} See Lot, \textit{L'art militaire}, p. 220. Lot concludes that one of the main reasons for the kings of France beginning to use mercenary soldiers in ever increasing numbers was the heavy use of them made by the kings of England, such an argument, however, appears to be rather dubious.


\textsuperscript{33} See Baldwin, \textit{The Government of Philip Augustus} p. 170. Baldwin points out that in the year 1202-3 Philip was also involved in wars in Touraine and Anjou, the expenditure for which probably came out of the royal chamber rather than the royal treasury.

\textsuperscript{34} See Hallam, \textit{Capetian France}, p.163. Hallam states that mercenary soldiers were vital part of French royal army from the reign of Philip Augustus onwards, listing mercenary bands used by the king as coming from Navarre, Germany, Hainault, Flanders and Brabant.

\textsuperscript{35} See DUBY, \textit{The Legend of Bouvines}, p. 83. William the Breton does mention them in the service of Philip but more often in the employ of his enemies such as Richard I of England.

\textsuperscript{36} See Contamine, 'L'armée de Philippe Auguste', p. 587.
mistake to believe that Philip Augustus used mercenary soldiers less than any other contemporary monarchs.\textsuperscript{37}

Besides the evidence which exists for the recruitment of royal armies, information regarding the recruitment and financing of royal crusading armies in this period may also shed some light on the crusading army of the Albigensian Crusade. As can be seen below, the king levied a tithe to raise funds for his expedition to holy land in 1189. It may be possible, however, that he only received the yield from this tithe from his own demesne. The great lords who accompanied him would have been expected to finance their own contingents. One important figure which exists regarding the amount spent by the king on this expedition is the sum which he paid to Genoese sailors to transport and supply his army for eight months, a total of 5,850 marks. He is said to have contracted for the transport of 650 knights and 1300 squires. It is not known how many infantry were taken but it is likely they were present in the army in substantial numbers. Lot estimates a figure three times that of the knights and squires, this seems a reasonable estimate based on surviving evidence from the reign of Philip Augustus.\textsuperscript{38} It is evident that the crusading army of Louis IX was envisaged on a grander scale. His army has been estimated at a number of 15,000 altogether. Financial records appear to indicate that in this instance the king gave financial assistance to leaders of other French crusading contingents and that the king’s total financial outlay was in the region of 1.5 million livres. In order to be able to afford such expenditure it is evident that the king was able not only to increase revenues from traditional sources but also to institute new ones.\textsuperscript{39}

Surveying this evidence therefore it is possible to build up a picture of a royal army made up of various elements recruited as circumstances demanded using a variety of different methods. The evidence suggests that the French king was coming to rely increasingly on the use of paid troops for offensive purposes although for the needs of

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. p. 590. See also Audouin, \textit{Essai sur l’armée royale}, p.120, Audouin notes that at the beginning of his reign Philip Augustus had dismissed most of the foreign mercenaries in his service. He observes that most of the names of soldiers recorded in the \textit{Compte General} of 1202 are French and there is nothing to suppose that his mercenaries were of foreign extraction. This however may not be the case as those mentioned by name in the \textit{Compte General} are knights and captains of the sergeants of foot. There is no reason to suggest that, for example, Cadoc did not employ foreign mercenaries in his band whom he paid out of the annual wage he received.


defence he could still rely on considerable number of feudal troops supplied by his great vassals and from the royal domain. Such conclusions should therefore be borne in mind when considering the composition and recruitment of the crusading army. Our knowledge of the royal armies that Philip Augustus was able to command may in many ways fill gaps in our knowledge of this crusading army as may our knowledge of French crusading armies which served in other conflicts. What must be borne in mind is the relationship between the French monarch, the Papacy and Albigensian Crusade. The king's limited involvement in the crusade in the Languedoc in its early years means that information regarding the French royal army must be used with caution in relation to recruiting methods used during the crusade.

2.2 The Capetians and the Albigensian Crusade

Although the Albigensian Crusade had been proclaimed in 1208 by Pope Innocent III, who had appealed to the French king in person, the Papacy and the Capetian monarchy both had ambiguous attitudes to the expedition as circumstances dictated. Changing allegiances and local politics in the South, the shifting fortunes of the French king vis a vis his foreign enemies and the often stormy relationship between the Papacy and French monarchy all played their part in this. Even as early as 1204 Philip Augustus was called upon by the pope to take action against Raymond of Toulouse, over whom he was nominally feudal lord. Pope Innocent III provided as an inducement the promise that he would sanction the action and allow all Raymond's confiscated lands to go to the king.\footnote{For the French monarchy's involvement in the wars in the South see Hallam, \textit{Capetian France}, pp. 164 ff.} By 1208, when the crusade proper was proclaimed, the Pope demanded that the king take part personally. Philip Augustus, however, was reluctant to involve himself in a war he knew his resources could not stretch to at the time. His ongoing conflict with King John over Normandy precluded any commitment to other military action. The King did however claim the rights he was due as overlord of any confiscated land taken and allowed up to 500 French knights (\textit{i.e.} from the royal demense) to take up the cross.

In 1211 and 1218 the king allowed a one twentieth tax on church possessions to be levied to finance the crusade in the Languedoc. The overall organisation and control
of the expedition was, however, left to the Pope and his representatives. At this stage, therefore, it was the Pope rather than the king who led the drive to dispossess Count Raymond of his lands for tolerating heresy within them. It was also from the Church rather than the king that Simon de Montfort sought recognition of his rights after he had claimed the lands the count of Toulouse for himself.41

In 1215 Prince Louis had led a short expedition to the South in order to fulfil a crusading vow. It was, however, only after the death of Simon de Montfort in 1218 that the French king became more willing to be involved in the wars in the South. One of the major reasons for this may have been that the pope had offered the leadership of crusade to the count of Champagne, maybe knowing that this would provoke the king into action if the Papacy was shown to be favouring one of his powerful vassals. Philip saw this as a threat and placed Prince Louis in charge of the expedition in 1219, though Louis again achieved very little. In 1221 Innocent III's successor, Honorius III tried once again to involve the Capetian monarchy in the crusade by tempting Philip with a large tax on ecclesiastical wealth and a full plenary indulgence. The king once again refused to be drawn into the matter in any substantial way. When Philip's son came to the throne in 1223, as Louis VIII, the Capetians became more willing to listen to the requests of the pope. It was not until 1225, however, that Louis made any firm commitment and this only after he had persuaded the pope to pledge enormous financial backing to the venture. In 1226 a 10% tax on the church was raised to help finance the royal expedition and in the same year Amaury de Montfort ceded his rights to his lands in the South to the French king and a royal army began a successful campaign in the region.42 Louis VIII died very soon after taking Avignon and it was only during the latter part of his son's reign that royal power in the South finally began to be consolidated. The matter of the rightful ownership of the count of Toulouse's lands was finally resolved in 1271 when, Raymond VII's daughter died without issue and the French crown inherited her lands.

Looking at this sequence of events, therefore, one can see the limited involvement of the Capetian monarchy with the crusade before the mid 1220's. Care should therefore be taken in using royal documents as evidence for the composition and

41 The same is true of his claim to the Trencavel lands, whose lord was King Peter of Aragon.
42 See Petit Dutallis, *Feudal Monarchy in France and England*, p. 256. Petit-Dutallis asserts that Louis army was 'undoubtedly the biggest that a Capetian monarch had ever commanded'.

recruitment of crusading armies. They do however provide valuable information regarding these issues in relation to armies in northern France in general. From looking at the narrative sources for the Albigensian Crusade it can be seen that a large number of the kings vassals from the Île de France and a considerable proportion of the great magnates of the French kingdom were involved in the crusade from a very early stage. The duke of Burgundy and the counts of St Pol and Nevers were amongst the first to take the cross in 1209 and a good number of the French bishops, who presumably used their authority as feudal lords to recruit soldiers, also took part.

2.3 The Crusading Army

When considering the composition and recruitment of the crusading army several factors have to be taken into account. The sources used in this study have been mostly narrative and therefore present a problem when dealing with the actual institutions which lay behind the recruiting and funding of the crusading army. What can be ascertained from these sources, however, is the ebb and flow of the crusading army as its various contingents arrived and departed, and the various types of troops available to the crusaders. The numbers given by the chroniclers and poets must be considered with a good deal of circumspection. The documentary evidence available, from the reign of Philip Augustus especially, can give us a valuable insight in to the way armies in early thirteenth-century northern France were recruited and paid and of which elements they consisted. Working from the assumption that the French king, as a feudal lord, had at his disposal similar methods of recruiting armies and raising revenue to his magnates this evidence should be helpful in trying to establish the basis on which recruitment of the crusading army was carried out.

The frequency with which the normal forty day length of service, expected of the crusader, is mentioned in the narrative sources gives the impression that the majority of crusaders from northern France were recruited within a feudal framework. As time went on it became increasingly apparent that this was not sufficient in terms of the length of time served and the numbers that could be recruited. Basing the recruitment of a crusading army planning to go to the Near East on such feudal service presented
difficulties. Crusading in the Languedoc could confer many of the spiritual advantages given to those who embarked on other crusading expeditions. The length of time that it took to travel between, for example, the Île de France and the south west of France, however, was far shorter. The forty day length of service would seem to have been a feasible way in which to recruit and maintain an army if a sufficient flow of men could be maintained.43

The crusading army mustered at Lyons on 24 June 1209.44 The Chanson estimates the number gathered at Béziers, the site of the first major action, to have been some 20,000 knights and 200,000 'villeins and peasants', 'not counting the clergy and citizens'.45 It can reasonably be supposed that such numbers are greatly exaggerated, the real number may have been in the region of 20,000 altogether.46 Many of that number would have been servants and camp followers. The Chanson tells how the people of Béziers remained confident that their town would not be taken because of the sheer numbers of the crusading army. They believed the army would fall apart in less than a fortnight, the Chanson describing it as stretching for a full league when strung out along the road.47 The leaders of the expedition were to have considerable difficulty in mustering such numbers again during the course of the crusade. Numbers of soldiers recorded in the sources vary a great deal and should probably not be taken literally. For example, a force of 5000 German crusaders is recorded as being ambushed by men of the Count of Foix at Montgey and a force of a further 14,000 is said to have come to their aid.48 The figure of 15,000 men is mentioned on a number of occasions as the number of the army of the crusaders. This number is also used to estimate the size of the southern army suggesting the use of a poetic convention.49

For the ten years after 1208 the church would send bands of Cistercian monks to the North to preach and recruit men for the crusade.50 A steady supply of new recruits

43 One gains the impression, however, from narrative sources that the 40 day service began and ended when the soldier was actually fighting and did not include time for travel.
44 Historia, 82.
48 Chanson, v. 70, 7.
49 For example Alice de Montfort arrives at Moissac with a force of 15,000 reinforcements for her husband (Chanson v.116, 14) whilst the force under the Young Raymond at Beaucaire is said to have been the same number (Chanson, v. 165, 6). At Toulouse numbers as large as 60, 000 and 100,000 are said by the Chanson to have fought for the crusaders (Chanson, v. 205, 90 and v. 196, 2).
50 For preaching of the crusade in the North see Roquebert, L'Épopée cathare, vol. 1, pp. 221-231.
was gained by this method, a supply, however, that was to dwindle as time passed. Yet
the preaching of the crusade tells us very little about the actual process of recruitment.
The crusaders would come in small bands to serve for forty days and then return home
usually before the winter set in and the mountains became impassable. This created
numerous problems as it meant the leaders of the crusade could only plan a few weeks in
advance. It made the conduct of sieges particularly difficult. What is more, long, drawn
out sieges were bound to sap the enthusiasm of even the most pious of recruits. The
crusaders were extremely fortunate in the first few weeks of their campaign. Béziers fell
within a matter of hours. At Carcassonne, had the siege gone on any longer the
likelihood is that some elements would have begun to abandon the besieging army, as
indeed happened immediately after the siege had ended and Simon de Montfort had been
rewarded with the lands of the viscount of Béziers.51

The short term nature of the service expected of the recruits resulted in many
setbacks of this kind for Simon de Montfort. The count of Nevers left with his
contingent soon after the siege had ended and was soon followed by the duke of
Burgundy in September 1209.52 Between them the magnates had provided 500 knights.
The Chanson states that after these magnates left the crusading army and returned home
very few of Simon de Montfort’s army decided to stay on.53 Fourteen named lords are
mentioned as staying behind to serve under him along with others not named.54 This left
Simon de Montfort and his companions in great difficulties, leading them to come to an
agreement with the Count of Foix,55 though this pact failed in the Autumn of 1209.
Throughout the winter 1209/10 Simon de Montfort continued to lose ground56

The origins of those who took the cross, as far as can be ascertained, seem
extremely varied. On a number of occasions in the Chanson William of Tudela provides
long lists of the different contingents which made up the crusading army. Much of this
appears to serve the purpose of providing colour and variety to the poetry. For example
the crusading army that mustered in 1209 consists of men from the Auvergne, Burgundy,

51 Chanson, v. 36. 3.
52 Historia, 108.
53 Chanson, v. 36, 3-5.
54 Chanson, v. 36, 10-20, at Chanson, v. 90, 3. Simon de Montfort is described as having as group of
300 companions with him at Carcassonne. It is possible that such a force may have formed the core of
the crusading army.
55 Chanson, v. 41, 2-3.
56 Chanson, v. 42, 1-5, again in the autumn of 1210 crusaders, who had been campaigning against the
Count of Foix, leave 'when the hot weather came to an end' (Chanson, v. 84, 17).
the Île de France, the Limousin, the Rourgue, Provence, Vienne and Germany as well as Poitevins and Gascons. The anonymous author of the second part of the *Chanson* more often refers to the crusaders as merely French, this serving to emphasise the difference between the northerners and Count Raymond's troops. The anonymous poet also writes of Bretons and Flemings as being 'foreigners' and this may be to mark them out as mercenaries.

The use of mercenaries by the crusaders was mentioned numerous times, although the references are more frequent in the second part of the *Chanson*. This can be illustrated with a number of examples. Peter of Aragon, a man fighting on the side of the crusaders, is described as 'a brave mercenary commander' (*un mainader ardit*). Bishop Fouquet of Toulouse is reported as saying that he has sent preachers to the north in order to recruit men and collect money and that this will bring men, both 'crusaders' and 'mercenaries' (*mainaders*). It is clear that some crusaders who had served their 40 days stayed on to serve for pay. For example Robert of Picquigny, 'a valiant soldier', held a fief for which he was obliged to serve for 40 days. At the second siege of Toulouse he is described as serving for pay after his 40 days service has expired. In 1215 Simon de Montfort wrote to pope Innocent III complaining 'the great lords have deserted me leaving me alone with very few knights .... now I shall have to take on mercenaries who will only stay with me for a higher price than in other wars.' The use of mercenaries and paid troops was therefore common in the crusading army though it is clear that Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay tries to gloss over the fact in his *Historia*.

As well as knights and mercenaries the crusading army consisted of a number of other types of troops. Sergeants, both on foot and mounted are mentioned frequently in the sources. A force of 80 sergeants is described as being left by Simon de Montfort to guard his siege train at Carcassonne whilst he set out for Termes. At Pujol the garrison which was besieged by southern troops consisted of knights, squires and sergeants. A force of sergeants are depicted as taking hostages from amongst the population of

---

57 *Chanson*, v. 13, 5-8.
58 For examples see *Chanson*, v. 172, 100 and v. 205, 24.
59 *Chanson*, v. 34, 5.
60 *Chanson*, v. 192, 51.
62 See Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare*, p 139
63 *Chanson*, v. 55, 3.
64 *Chanson*, v. 134, 26-29.
Toulouse. Crossbowmen and archers are also mentioned as being used by the crusaders, particularly at the siege of Toulouse in 1216. There are also numerous references in the Chanson to ordinary citizens, hangers-on and servants attached to the crusading army. These are sometimes referred to as ribaults and vilans and are portrayed on some occasions as being the major protagonists in the looting and destruction of towns and surrounding farmland. Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay often refers to foot soldiers as 'pedites perigrini'. Manpower of this kind was very useful to an army for carrying out physical labour such as filling in and digging ditches, moving and operating siege engines and mining operations. When Termes was besieged in 1210 William, the archdeacon of Paris, set about organising groups of crusaders in the task of gathering wood and stone in order to construct additional siege engines and keep them supplied with ammunition. Material was also gathered which could be used to make the ground level where the machines were intended to stand. The siege lasted for over 4 months and the crusaders, as time moved on, were apparently running desperately short of money to pay workers and buy supplies. The archdeacon of Paris therefore once again intervened by setting up a religious confraternity in order to keep the machines supplied with ammunition.

The motives of those taking the cross would have been as varied as for any other crusading expedition. There would be varying degrees of enthusiasm for the expedition, many of the those who set out would presumably have had feudal obligations to their lords to fulfil. Religious motives will have encouraged some to go, not only to fight the heretical enemies of the Catholic Church but also to gain the plenary indulgence which 40 days in the service of the Church would bring them. The Chanson states that men

---

65 Chanson, v. 178, 43-44.
67 The Historia calls them servientes excercitus (Historia, 90). See Roquebert, L'Épopée cathare, p. 254. Roquebert suggests that these ribaults were in fact mercenaries and that Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay tries to disguise this fact in his description of them as servants.
68 See Historia, 188, 426 & 357.
69 See R. Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth-Century, p.61. Rogers here points out that at the siege of Jerusalem in 1099 non-combatant crusaders were essential in supporting the efforts to assault the city.
70 Historia, 175.
71 Historia, 175, here it is stated that the siege could not have been sustained without the help of William whom the author also credits with instructing the carpenters in the construction of the machines.
72 Historia, 180.
came flocking because the pardon offered to crusaders was so generous'. There would also be the prospect of gaining lands for themselves in the area of the Languedoc. In 1199 a papal decretal of Innocent III had permitted the legal confiscation of lands belonging to heretics. The prospect of monetary reward and land would have also have been attractive as a way of compensating the crusaders for any expenses incurred.

The majority of the men who embarked on such an expedition would have been expected to arm and equip themselves. Most of those who travelled on crusade and pilgrimage to the Holy Land were privately financed and there is little reason to believe that this expedition differed dramatically. The first resource available to those who held land or property was to sell or mortgage it. Usurers, relations and lords as well as the church were involved in the lending of money for this purpose. Religious institutions in this period often acted as sources of credit and would accept lands, rights and services in return for money. Both the church and secular lords provided ways of aiding crusaders financially. The papal bull *Quantum Predecessores* of 1145 allowed for property to be pledged to the church in return for loans as well as freeing crusaders from paying loans on existing debts. A decree of Philip Augustus which accompanied the levy of a tithe in 1188 provided the precedent for the granting of a two year moratorium on the repayment of loans.

When the Albigensian Crusade was launched in 1208, therefore, the right of crusaders to raise money through selling and pledging property was established in both canon and civil law. The Church's role in financing the crusade also involved the levying of taxes. As early as 1199 the papacy had resorted to taxation of the clergy, to raise money for the crusade in the Holy Land. A second tax had been imposed to support the Fifth Crusade in 1215. Innocent III in these cases had claimed one fortieth of the clergy's income. In 1208 the French clergy were encouraged to mortgage their incomes for the next two years to help finance the Albigensian Crusade whilst bishops and nobles were asked to donate one tenth of their income. It is not easy to ascertain how much was collected from this tithe. Although the contribution of the laity was voluntary,

---

74 *Chanson* v. 13, 13.
constraint was used in collecting this money from the church even to the point of issuing ecclesiastical sanctions. In 1221 after Honorius III had proclaimed a fresh crusade in the south of France, a new method of collection of the levy began to be used under the supervision of three of France’s archbishops. This would be in the form of a triennial twentieth on all church income in France. Unfortunately, little is known about the collection of the tax except where local disputes merited papal intervention. Bishops who took the cross against the heretics claimed exemption from the tax but were instead required to devote a similar amount for hiring mercenaries. In 1222 the pope told the archbishops in charge of collecting the tax to borrow money on the strength of the anticipated receipts in order to pay more mercenaries. It took as long as 10 years for all due tax to be paid and collected following the complications of local disputes and claims of exemption. Early attempts at papal taxation as a method of financing the crusade, therefore, proved to be far from successful owing to the haphazard way it was collected. It is therefore likely that previous attempts at the collection of contributions to the crusade were also flawed.

The question of finance became increasingly important as the crusade progressed. More and more money was needed to pay mercenaries. The resources Simon de Montfort gained from his title of Viscount of Carcassonne could not cover all these expenses. Simon de Montfort established, on behalf of the papacy, an annual contribution from all his lands of 300 deniers per fief, a tax on excommunicants and also personally promised to pay the sum of 1000 marks of silver a year to aid the crusade. A prominent merchant of Montpellier named in the Chanson as Raymond of Salvanhac (or Cahors) gave considerable financial backing to Simon de Montfort, particularly around the time of the siege of Minerve for which has was rewarded with lands and titles. According to the Chanson he was also given all of the spoils of the capture of Lavaur. It is probable that Raymond was also helped by other merchants from Montpellier. At Toulouse in 1216 Simon de Montfort ordered the confiscation of the wealth of leading

---


80 See Dossat, ‘Simon de Montfort’ p. 288.

81 Chanson, v. 72,1-8.

82 See Dossat, ‘Simon de Montfort’, p.290.
citizens of Toulouse in order to pay his troops. In the *Chanson* he complains that his companions are threatening to leave him because he has nothing to reward them with suggesting that he no longer had the resources to do so.

When the crusading army was on the offensive, a regular supply of those willing to take the cross and serve for 40 days provided a satisfactory method of recruitment in many circumstances. On some occasions the arrival of fresh recruits tipped the balance in favour of the crusaders. As the war progressed, however, and the crusaders found their fortunes reversed the arrival of new recruits often only matched in number the recruits that were flocking to the side of Count Raymond VI of Toulouse. Simon de Montfort, by the end of the winter of 1217/18, was extremely short of money and the paid troops he had under him were threatening to desert him. In May and June 1218 reinforcements arrived for the crusaders, however these new forces were soon cancelled out by the arrival of recruits for Count Raymond's army as well as the arrival of the army of the Young Count Raymond, his son.

However, the short term service of troops did not prove helpful in the conduct of lengthy sieges. This was one of the major factors in insufficient numbers of men being available to invest large cities such as Carcassonne and Toulouse. At Penne d'Agenais the crusaders were forced to allow the garrison to surrender on extremely favourable terms because many of the crusaders had completed their 40 days service. At Moissac, until the crusaders were reinforced halfway through the siege, they were unable to surround the town: this was to be a recurring problem for the crusaders. The garrison of Moissac exploited this by occupying a hill to the west of the town from which they were able to launch raids on the crusaders' camp.

---

83 *Chanson*, v. 179.
84 *Chanson*, v. 199, 66-57.
86 For example in the Spring of 1212 de Montfort was able to re-conquer many of the fortifications that had been lost the previous winter owing to the arrival of fresh recruits, see *Chanson*, v. 111-126.
87 In May the bishop of Toulouse and Alice de Montfort arrived with reinforcements (*Chanson*, v. 196, 36-40) as did the count of Soissons in June (*Chanson*, v. 200, 103)
88 *Chanson*, v. 201, 70, it is said here that he arrived with a force of over 5000 knights.
89 *Historia*, 334.
90 *Historia*, 344, the bishop of Toul bought a band of reinforcements for the crusaders which allowed them finally to surround the town, they were still however unable to take it by storm owing to the strength of the walls.
91 *Chanson*, v. 120, 1-4.
The conduct of the siege at Termes provides a good example of the kind of difficulties face by the crusaders. Simon de Montfort was unable to surround the walls, due to lack of men and the delay in the arrival of his siege train. For some time after he arrived in July 1210 the castle garrison were able to come and go relatively unmolested by the crusaders.\textsuperscript{92} The longer Simon de Montfort delayed the more troops he lost. Although there was a steady supply of new recruits, as soon as their 40 days of service were complete they drifted away again.\textsuperscript{93} Added to this was the threat of raiding parties from Cabaret sweeping down and making the roads north of Termes treacherous. Later in the month of August the siege train eventually arrived along with a contingent of Bretons.\textsuperscript{94} These were soon followed by a large party from Île de France.\textsuperscript{95} The crusaders were now able to cut off access to the castle but most of this force left before the harsh weather of Autumn set in. Heavy rain, snow and icy winds plagued the small force of crusaders that had decided to stay either out of personal loyalty to Simon de Montfort or because they had not completed their 40 days service. \textsuperscript{96} In mid October a party of crusaders unexpectedly arrived from Lorraine and once again Simon de Montfort's force was large enough to surround the castle.\textsuperscript{97}

This sequence of events illustrates very well why some of the sieges during the crusade were so prolonged and how inadequate the crusaders' methods of recruitment could be. A combination of this, inaccessible fortifications and extremely good natural defences sometimes succeeded in delaying the crusaders, for months on end. Once established in the South those northerners who had decided to remain were rewarded with confiscated lands, although establishing their authority became increasingly difficult. Spread over a wide area, most northerners were split up into small groups and left to garrison many small towns in the region. For example, Bouchard de Marly is recorded as garrisoning the castle at Saissac with a force of 50 men consisting of horse, foot and

\textsuperscript{92} Historia, 173.
\textsuperscript{93} The Chanson mentions that the crusading force at Termes was made up of men from Germany, Normandy, Bavaria, Frisia, Saxony, Anjou and Brittany. It also says that when the men had served their 40 days they would leave to be replaced by newly arrived recruits. (\textit{Chanson}, v. 56, 20ff.).
\textsuperscript{94} Historia, 169.
\textsuperscript{95} Historia, 174., this force was led by the bishops of Chartres and Beauvais.
\textsuperscript{96} Historia, 187.
\textsuperscript{97} Historia, 188.
archers. This number seems fairly typical of the numbers mentioned as making up a crusader garrison.98

Such small numbers of crusaders could not succeed for long in attempting to hold areas of hostile territory. In the spring of 1216 when the Young Count Raymond returned and started his counter offensive against the northerners, the garrison at Beaucaire were, according to the Chanson forced to wait 4 months before reinforcements could be mustered. In contrast Raymond’s force received abundant supplies of men, the Chanson twice mentions the arrival of troops for Raymond’s army99 and in one passage estimates that the strength of his force was 15,000 men.100 When Raymond took Beaucaire, Simon de Montfort was 400 miles away in the north receiving official confirmation of his southern lands and titles from the king.101 A similar situation arose in September 1217 when Count Raymond entered Toulouse, taking the crusaders by surprise. Simon de Montfort was away from the city at the time. It was not until 3 weeks after the entrance of Raymond VI into Toulouse that Simon de Montfort returned after he had received word from his wife Alice who had only a skeleton garrison with her.102 She could, therefore, do little except retreat to within the Château Narbonnais and wait for reinforcements from Carcassonne, 60 miles away.103

Such a situation did not bode well for the establishment of any form of permanent authority for the northerners. Prior to the dispossession of Count Raymond in 1215 some in the south had been prepared to aid the crusaders militarily. The crusading army on various occasions was aided by troops from the south for a number of reasons, mainly concerning political expediency and local rivalries. For example, at Minerve Simon de Montfort’s besieging army consisted of a force of French and German volunteers and well as a contingent of Gascons and levies from Narbonne who had volunteered on account of the damage the town of Minerve was doing to their trade.104

---

98 Chanson, v. 41, 24. A number of ‘no more than 60’ is taken by William de Contres to garrison Verdun (Chanson, v. 127, 23.) and the crusaders garrison at Beaucaire is recorded as consisting of 50 men (Chanson, v. 166, 45.)
99 Chanson, v. 163, 63. and v.162, 96 ff.
100 Chanson, v. 165, 6.
101 Historia, 573.
102 De Montfort had been away fighting in Bigorre and Provence, having left the city in September 1216 he campaigned for the whole of the summer of 1217 in these areas, see Chanson, v. 180.
103 Chanson, v. 183, 15.
104 Historia, 152, for Simon de Montfort’s relationship with Narbonne see Dossat ‘Simon de Montfort’ pp. 293-96.
Simon de Montfort, as viscount of Carcassonne, also claimed the right to feudal service from the knights and other men of his lands. The Statutes of Pamiers, issued in December 1212, had established northern French practices in the confiscated lands held by the crusaders, just as institutions had been imported by the crusaders into the Latin East. Of the 46 articles several deal with the issue of land holding in relation to military service. Northern crusaders who had become land holders were required to give Simon de Montfort the unlimited service or their knights in proportion to the size of their possessions, with the threat of severe penalties for any who refused. No castles were to be built without the express permission of Simon de Montfort and those that were held by crusaders were required to be given up to their lord as and when required.\footnote{See Roquebert, \textit{L'Épopée cathare}, pp. 502 - 505} Several references are made in the \textit{Chanson} to the summoning of levies of troops from his southern lands by Simon de Montfort. For example, in one passage Simon de Montfort summons men from his southern fiefs and is depicted as saying ‘no one, sergeant or peasant must stay behind’, suggesting that levies of foot soldiers as well as knights were expected to undertake military service for their lord.\footnote{\textit{Chanson}, v. 171, 12.}

Although the papacy encouraged the recruiting of crusaders to go and fight in the Languedoc, on several occasions during years between 1208 and 1226 the papacy's official stance worked against the military success of Simon de Montfort and his followers. Despite his launching of the crusade in 1208, the policy of Innocent III toward the expedition changed according to circumstances. In 1212 a crusade had been launched against the Moslems in Spain and Arnauld Amaury, the abbot of Cîteaux, who had been one of the Albigensian Crusade's staunchest supporters and leaders, left the region in order to lead the expedition. In 1213 Innocent III put a stop to the crusade in southern France and instead encouraged the knighthood of Christendom to go and fight in the Holy Land after Peter of Aragon complained to the Holy See that the crusade was being turned into an instrument of Simon de Montfort’s personal ambition.\footnote{Historia, 399 - 411. For Innocent III's involvement in the Albigensian Crusade see R. Foreville, "Innocent III et la croisade Albigeois, Paix de Dieu et guerre sainte en Languedoc au XIIIème siècle, \textit{Cahiers de Fanjeaux} 4, ed. E. Privat (Toulouse, 1969), pp. 184-217.} When Innocent III died in July 1216, his successor Honorius III declared it as his ambition to reclaims the holy places of Palestine by means of a fresh crusade. After the failure of this,
the Fifth Crusade in 1221, the crusade in southern France was blamed as being a major cause of deflecting recruits away from the 'true crusade'.

From the evidence available from the narrative sources for the crusade several conclusions can be drawn. It appears that crusaders found the customary period of forty days service just as restricting in the conduct of major offensive campaigns as the Capetian and Angevin monarchs did. Although large number of troops could be recruited by the appeal of the Crusade, this method of recruitment lacked continuity. Such methods of recruitment were seasonal, unreliable and did not lend themselves to such necessities as the garrisoning of fortifications and the swift movement of reinforcements in times of crisis as well as the taking of fortifications. The evidence suggests that mercenaries were employed by the crusaders from a very early stage of the Crusade and that those who owed feudal service also served for pay. The crusading army was composed of the same elements that one finds in the royal French army of the time. Infantry and non-combatants becoming increasingly important for the role they could play in the taking and garrisoning of fortifications. The military situation in the Languedoc on the eve of the crusade must now be established in order to be able to better understand the nature of the conflict which followed and to draw comparisons between the crusading army and their southern opponents.

2.4 Armies in the Languedoc in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.

When the crusading army invaded the Languedoc in 1208 they were entering a region with its own distinct identity, language, political structures and traditions which had developed very much independently from those of northern France. Distinct differences from northern practice concerning land holding, service and homage amongst the aristocracy of the South can all be observed and all affected, to a greater or lesser extent, the way that armies were recruited and rewarded. It is therefore very important to consider the political and social background in the Languedoc on the eve of the crusade in order to be able to reach a better understanding of the conflict which took place.

2.4.1 The Political Background and Land Holding in Southern France

From the collapse of the Carolingian Empire onwards, institutions in the South developed separately from those of the North and although the count of Toulouse nominally held his title from the French king, no count or abbot in these lands sought royal confirmation of their title. The counts of Toulouse in the form of the house of St. Gilles became the major power in the region in the eleventh century, whilst powerful principalities also developed to the north in Aquitaine and to the south east in Catalonia. In the 1180s, when rivalries between the counts of Toulouse and the house of Barcelona developed, the effectiveness of the count of Toulouse’s powerful administration system began to fail. Although Raymond V made great efforts to assert his overlordship through the use of effective administration and the development of a chancellery, his son Raymond VI failed to maintain a grip on his increasingly independent vassals. This led to vassals such as the Trencavel viscounts of Carcassonne transferring their loyalty to the house of Barcelona.

The reason for the southern French defeat during the Albigensian Crusade is often seen as being the lack of binding feudal ties in that area. The initial success of the crusade seems to suggest that the southern nobility lacked cohesion and despite repeated rallies eventually collapsed because of disunity amongst themselves. It has also been suggested that vassalic ties were almost unknown in Languedoc prior to the Capetian invasion and this has often been cited as a cause for the eventual southern defeat. The kind of ties of allegiance that existed in southern France between lord and vassal can perhaps be seen in the behaviour of the count of Toulouse towards the Byzantine emperor during the First Crusade. Raymond of St Gilles had been one of the few leaders of the expedition who refused to swear allegiance to Alexius Comnenus. This may reflect the attitudes of those lords from southern France who took part in the crusade to the

110 For the development of the power of the counts of Toulouse in the eleventh and twelfth centuries see J. Dunbabin, France in the Making (Oxford, 1985), pp. 299 ff.
111 See Belperron, La croisade contre les Albigeois, pp. 3-40. Belperron argues the eventual defeat of the southern lords was inevitable, that Languedoc was incapable of uniting against an invader due to the decline of its decadent and decomposing civilisation and that it was the destiny of France to be united under the crown. See also A. Peal, ‘Olivier de Termes and the Occitan Nobility in the Thirteenth-Century’ Reading Medieval Studies 12, (1986), pp. 109-137.
112 See Paterson, The World of the Troubadours, p.15.
idea of ties of allegiance. Raymond instead swore a modified oath, common in southern France, which was a kind of pact of non belligerence involving no personal tie.

Documentary evidence is particularly valuable in providing clues to the type of political and personal ties which existed between a lord and his vassals in the Midi. From the lands of the Trencavels there survive over 300 extant copies of oaths of fealty given in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The form of these oaths tells us little about its social or political function. For the most part it assured the person to whom the oath was made that the oath taker would do him no bodily harm, would not betray him and would not deprive him of specific castles named in the oath. Comparison between vows of homage and fealty from the North and the South is instructive in revealing the similarities and differences which existed. Along with normal vows of homage and fealty it was common for lords in both northern and southern France to demand an additional guarantee that a vassal’s fortress would not be used against him. This could take the form of a lord insisting that he may take his vassals’ castles arbitrarily on demand (rendability) or an agreement that the castles’ use remain non-prejudicial to its owners’ immediate lord (jurability). The latter of these two practices was more common in the South. A distinction, however, should be made between rendability and homage. In northern France and the Languedoc many charters state that castles are rendable to a lord, but this does not constitute an act of homage except in the earliest of southern documents. The rendering of a fortress was something quite distinct from ordinary feudal duties. Such practices were taken extremely seriously in both areas, the ability of a lord to take unconditional possession of a castle being an important symbol of his power.

The underlying ideas behind the possession of fortifications therefore appear to have been very similar in both northern and southern France. Fundamental differences

---

113 Ibid. p. 10.
appear, however, regarding concepts of homage and service. One explanation for the weakness or possible non-existence of feudalism, according to the northern model, in the south can perhaps be seen in the form of oaths of allegiance taken. Mention of homage is late and extremely rare in the South and the fief appears to have been a foreign concept before the coming of the crusade.\(^{117}\) A possible explanation for the development of characteristically southern land holding practices could be the survival of institutions from the Carolingian era as well as different notions of public and territorial interest. Northern practices such as the levying of aids and incidents did not develop in the South.\(^{118}\) There is a large amount of evidence, therefore, to point to major differences existing in practices concerning land holding and homage in the South. Arguments have been put forward, however, to suggest that the power of southern rulers, such as the counts of Toulouse, was not necessarily weaker than that of the Capetian monarchs of France because of such practices. Bisson, for example, cites political, personal and dynastic failures, not institutional ones as the main reasons behind the weakening and eventual destruction of the rule of the house of St. Gilles.\(^{119}\) Nevertheless, in certain regions of southern France vassalic homage was viewed with hostility or simply not taken seriously. In the mid-eleventh century 90% of land in the area was allodial which may indicate that personal vassalic ties simply did not exist. By the 1190s this figure was fifty percent, but this still indicates a vast difference from the heavily feudalised North. The free fee was in wide use in southern France which meant that the only obligation a land owner had to his overlord was to hand over fortifications if it was demanded of him.

This situation would appear to have major implications regarding the question of military service in relation to land holding in the south. Many soldiers in southern France appear to have been hired on an *ad hoc* basis when a lord needed extra men. This however does not appear to indicate that they owed the lord service as such. An analysis of vocabulary used in Occitan poetry shows that lands were often seen as a lord's patrimony and castles and towns were seen as his possessions.\(^{120}\)

---

\(^{117}\) See E. Magnou - Nortier, "Fidélité et féodalité méridionales d'après le serment de fidélité (X\(^{e}\) - début XII\(^{e}\) siècle)", *Les structures sociales de L'Aquitaine, du Languedoc et de L'Espagne au premier âge féodal*, pp. 115 - 152.


\(^{119}\) Ibid., p. 263.

\(^{120}\) Paterson, *The World of the Troubadours*, p. 20.
ownership therefore appears to have been more important than personal ties. Outside the cities the physical geography of the area may have played a great part in determining political affiliations and relationships between vassals and their immediate lords. Barber has argued that lordships such as those of Minerve, Cabaret and Termes were helped in retaining their independence by the strong defensive positions the landscape afforded them. This suggests that just as the king of France's authority was more apparent than real in the southern France in this period, so it was with the count of Toulouse's in the late twelfth century.

The subject of land holding in relation to military service can also be related to the whole question of the role of the knight and the concept of knighthood. The knight was one of the most important components in any medieval army. A survey of vernacular literature from this period reveals, however, that concepts of knighthood and the ideas surrounding it many have differed dramatically in northern and southern France. Such literature can provide us with important clues as to how knights perceived themselves and how they were recruited and rewarded.

2.4.2 Knighthood and the meaning of the word “knight” in Southern France.

In southern France there appears to have been several different types of knights who fought in conjunction with other types of soldiers. The definition of a knight in this context is a question that involves the examination of their military and social role. In addition to the *Chanson* it will be of relevance to examine the role and definition of a knight in other vernacular literary works of both the lyric and epic genre from both northern and southern France. Comparing the role and status of the knight in Old French and Occitan literature should then help in determining some of the major differences in the role of these men in the army of the crusade and that of their southern adversaries. Flori, in his study of the use of the words *chevalerie* and *chevaleros* in the *Chansons de Geste* of the twelfth century, concluded that these words can have only a loose definition in this period, which has little to do with cultural values, ethics or

---

121 See Barber, ‘Catharism and the Occitan Nobility’, p. 8-10.
religion. The *chevalerie* of these works refers merely to heavy cavalry and evokes ideas of feats of physical strength in combat. During the course of the twelfth century however the word did undergo a change in meaning. He also concluded that there were various levels of knighthood. Under the direct command of the great lords there existed vassals as well as mercenary soldiers. There were also those that could be termed "companions" who worked in the permanent service of a master and lived in his household. The word *chevalier* in this context also evokes the idea of a hierarchy with knights at the top and squires and sergeants beneath.

Several comparable studies exist of the figure of the knight in southern French literature. In troubadour lyric the word *cavalier* can cover a wide range of social levels and may never have had any specific social meaning in the South. What emerges, however, is that the word does have certain connotations in distinguishing the knight from other levels of society. This included the great lords or magnates (often distinguished by the use of such terms as *senhor, baron* or *ric ome*), those warriors who are termed soudadier, the clergy and the peasantry (*villans*). Switten's conclusion that the "knights portrayed in literature reflect a reality we will never entirely recapture" is a pertinent point; however, vernacular literature of the period may be one of the best sources that we have for reflecting some of the military and social realities of twelfth and thirteenth century southern France.

As Paterson points out, the South can not be taken as whole when referring to such matters, as practices that were common in one area could be non-existent in another. Even between certain towns there are significant differences. In Toulouse for example there appears to have been no rigid social division between the citizens and the knights. In Béziers and Carcassonne they were separated into relatively stable hereditary groups. Paterson divides the connotations of the word *cavalier* into several distinct categories. The word most often relates to military service in the context of what Flori termed 'vassal knights' and those that serve for a wage. These include urban knights,

---

125 Paterson, 'Knights and the Concept of Knighthood', p. 116.
who dominated the city of Toulouse and other towns in the region. They were theoretically bound to lords through vassallic ties but they often played off multiple lords against one another to avoid any effective ties at all. In the twelfth century they were also beginning to become involved in trade from where they could earn an income and become more independent from ties to their lords. This way of life was particularly southern, and Paterson suggests that this may have offended the sensibilities of the northern invaders.\textsuperscript{126} Such prejudices may explain such acts as the expulsion of the urban knights from the city of Toulouse in September 1216.\textsuperscript{127} The anonymous poet of the \textit{Chanson} protests that this left the city with virtually no means of defending itself. Such a singling out of a particular groups may suggest that the crusaders were particularly hostile to them. It could also be argued however that this was a sensible military precaution.

The group of knights which Flori describes as 'ministerials', that is, knights who lived permanently with their lord and carried out official functions appear to be almost non-existent in Occitan literature of the twelfth century. What are found are several categories of household knight including close family members who live under the roof of their more powerful relatives and poor knights who could act as a permanent muster of troops, living in the households of the vassals of more wealthy lords.\textsuperscript{128}

It has been suggested that the more frequent use of mercenaries represents one of the main differences between the southern and northern practice. Mercenaries appear four times more frequently in Occitan texts than they do in Old French texts of the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{129} These form a loose category of knights fighting for gain in the form of cash or in kind. They would be either permanently or regularly attached to a lord or recruited for a particular campaign. These knights could be referred to by the terms \textit{soudadier} or \textit{logadier} which implied no idea of rank.\textsuperscript{130} Such mercenaries could be of noble birth or foreign extraction but the line between vassal knights and mercenaries in Occitan literature is often very blurred. The mercenaries which appear in Occitan

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. p. 121 \hfill \textsuperscript{127} Chanson v. 177, 77. \hfill \textsuperscript{128} Paterson, 'Knights and the Concept of Knighthood', p. 123. \hfill \textsuperscript{129} Ibid. p. 124. \hfill \textsuperscript{130} The term \textit{soudadier} is a problematic one. See Switten, 'The \textit{Chevalier} in Twelfth-Century French and Occitan Literature', p. 411. Switten appears to imply that in some contexts the word could convey the idea of a soldier ranked below a knight in social status and in others to imply no connotations of social status at all.}
literature are often paid in advance. It appears that vassals, if their period of service ran out, could be kept on by receiving the same pay as these mercenaries. The greater numbers of mercenaries to be found in Occitan literature could be explained by the nature of southern feudalism and a more developed monetary economy. Many knights only owed dues to a lord in kind and were therefore free to hire out their services elsewhere. The lords whom these knights served could be vassals of a greater lord but generally acted independently. There was a great variety of types of fief in southern France in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. *Honores* were held by powerful nobles, *castellanes* held by *castellanes* or *vavassors* i.e. rear vassals. It should be noted that the word vassal does not necessarily denote any idea of being a feudal vassal but merely a warrior.

The *Chanson* is a valuable source when discussing knights and knighthood in southern France. It is an excellent historical source for the detail it gives, both concerning social and military matters.\(^1\) As in much of the literature of the South it portrays no notion of an "order of chivalry" and does not seek to portray an ideal of knighthood. The anonymous poet of the second half of the work however does portray certain qualities as admirable including impetuosity, ferocity, courage and the use of good fighting technique, qualities that the Young Count Raymond is portrayed as exemplifying. The concept of *paratge* is also a dominant theme in the second half of the poem. The word can only be approximately translated into English and is linked to the concept of territorial rights and the honour of those who would regain them. It implies attachment to the land, justice and the defence of the South against an invader and concerns neither courtly ideas nor religion. Through an extension of this meaning *paratge* is also associated with honour and the virtues and qualities associated with the status of being a land holder. The anonymous poet links this also with the qualities of independence and generosity, qualities a lord cannot possess if he has been deprived of his lands. Those that have had their lands confiscated by the crusaders are reduced to the status of a *faiditz*, dependant on another's generosity and therefore not independent.\(^2\) The idea of *paratge* as portrayed in the *Chanson* therefore offers

---

\(^1\) See Paterson, 'La Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise', p. 197.
important clues to the relationship which existed between landholding and loyalty in southern France.

Words such as chevaler and adjectives related to them have a strictly functional meaning in the *Chanson* in common with other Occitan literature. It is the same with the epithets that are attached to these knights. They are praised for being efficient warriors, not because they adhere to an ethic. The notion of knighthood as portrayed in the *Chanson* therefore is essentially practical. The poem shows knights using such weapons as clubs and crossbows.\(^{133}\) It is not portrayed as being shameful to use such weapons as it sometimes is in the literature of the North of this period. The *Chanson* does not convey the idea that it is dishonourable for a knight to engage in combat with a man who is not a knight. The only thing that appears to be important is victory and survival. It is evident from the *Chanson* that those who held fiefs from the count of Toulouse did not owe him a military obligation. On the rare occasions where the word vassal does appear in the text of the *Chanson* it is not clear whether they are expected to fight without some kind of financial recompense. There is only one passage in the *Chanson* where Raymond summons his *cavalaria* which suggests a link with a feudal bond.\(^{134}\)

An analysis of the vocabulary used to describe the different types of soldiers in the *Chanson* illustrates not only the remarkable variety of combatants described, but also shows that it is the knight who dominates above all the other groups of fighters, if one takes as the major criteria the number of times they are mentioned in the text.\(^{135}\) Other types of soldiers are commonly mentioned in the *Chanson*, however, and these also played an important role in the southern army. These included mounted and foot sergeants, urban levies, archers and crossbow men and the citizens of besieged towns.

\(^{133}\) *Chanson*, v. 102, 12 and v.195, 76.  
\(^{134}\) *Chanson*, v. 199, 22-27.  
\(^{135}\) See table in Paterson, 'La Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise', p. 203, this shows that the *cavaler* is mentioned 384 times in total in the two halves of the poem, the nearest single other group being the *borzes* mentioned 92 times.
2.4.3 Infantry, Mercenaries and Specialist Soldiers in the South

The term *sergeant* is used most often to describe the infantry soldier used in the South. Another term often used is *sirven.* As well as acting as infantry they are reported as carrying out a variety of tasks including escorting siege trains and carrying out manual labour such as filling in ditches and mining in addition to keeping watch at barricades and garrisoning some castles. Citizens or burghers also played a part in defending their towns and cities and contributing to offensive military operations. In an attacking army they would often form squadrons with groups of *sergeants* and were also a valuable source of funding. Forces of citizen militia are recorded in the *Chanson* as being present at Muret although they appear to have played a limited role in the battle. Men from Toulouse also fought under the command of their count at Pujol and Toulouse.

Thriving and wealthy cities such as Carcassonne and Toulouse possessed an influential and wealthy bourgeoisie who had a large part to play in the political life of the city. These citizens guarded their political rights extremely jealously and this often led to conflict with the nobility and also the church. Citizens also had a major role to play in the organisation of military forces. The crusaders on more than one occasion had the political strength and fierce independence of the inhabitants of the cities of the South demonstrated to them. The resistance of the people of Béziers to the crusading army in 1209, though in part a consequence of their confidence in the town’s defences, was also a demonstration of how the people of the town valued their independence. The citizens of Toulouse became implacable enemies of Simon de Montfort determined to show their independence and resistance to his rule. Simon de Montfort responded to this with his increasingly harsh treatment of the city. He finally resorted to the desperate measure of attempting to gain for himself a new power base by destroying the power of the old city and proposed the building of a new town to the west of the suburb of St

---

136 In the North of France the term *sergeant* is used to refer to both foot soldiers and lightly armed cavalry. This does not appear to be the case in the south where they are referred to as *écuyer.*

137 Chanson, v.136, 19.

138 Chanson, v. 133, 6.


140 See Roquebert, *L’Épopée cathare,* vol. 1, pp 251-252. Roquebert demonstrates this by quoting Chanson, v. 17, 8-9 ‘the crusaders will not get one penny worth of our possessions or change the rule over our town’, seeing this proclamation of the independence of the people of Béziers as pivotal to understanding the nature of the war.
Cyprian which lay across the river Garonne. This he planned to populate with immigrants from the North.

The anonymous continuator of the Chanson is keen to depict the solidarity of the people of the South against the crusaders. He shows groups of women, bourgeois, municipal militia, sergeants, écuyers archers and crossbow men all taking part in the armed resistance to the crusaders. All these groups of combatants have epithets of praise attached to them. The most important element of their contribution is their efficiency as soldiers and not their social rank. Archers and crossbowmen were amongst many soldiers who used specialist weapons in southern French armies. Southern writers appear not to have been so prejudiced against the use of the bow as their northern counterparts. In the Chanson archers are clearly regarded as important support for the knights and infantry both covering their advance and playing a defensive role behind fortifications. The southern French often used the composite or Turkish bow which may have been an import from Spain via contact with the Muslim inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula. The Chanson also mentions the use of winched crossbows by both sides. Guy de Montfort is struck by a bolt from one of these weapons at the siege of Toulouse. Such weapons were often used by mercenaries of Spanish origin. Other specialist weapons are mentioned in the Chanson including a kind of light spear used by Gascon and Navarrese dardiers which could penetrate chain mail.

As stated above, judging from Occitan literature it is likely that southern armies had a higher proportion of mercenary soldiers fighting in them compared with forces recruited in the north. It is possible, however, that this could be the result of southern writers having a different attitude towards them. The term ‘mercenary’ proves to be a problematic one in this context. As has been discussed above, knights and soldiers who fought for wages in the North were distinguished from the routiers who were employed

---

141 Chanson, v. 189, 85.
142 See Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, p.145 where it is suggested communal armies of foot soldiers raised in the Northern Italian cities gained unity and solidarity from their common origins. This may also be the case with troops raised in southern French cities.
143 Squires, not the apprentice knight of northern literature but men of more humble origins whose major military role appears to have consisted of ravaging land and gathering supplies.
145 Ibid. p. 203.
146 See Paterson, The World of the Troubadours, p. 52.
147 Chanson, v. 205,119.
148 Paterson, The World of the Troubadours, p. 52.
149 Ibid., p. 53.
in bands and had an extremely dubious reputation. In the *Chanson* mercenary soldiers play an important role in the armies of both the crusaders and the southerners. They are not all necessarily hired mercenary bands of the type known as *routiers*, however, though the term is often used to describe forces used by both sides. In the first part of the *Chanson* written by William of Tudela, mercenaries are often associated with heretics and the two are frequently mentioned together. Here the use of mercenaries by the crusaders is mentioned on only a few occasions. They are more frequently seen fighting on the side of the southerners. For example, Navarrese mercenaries helped to defend Penne in 1212, whilst at the siege of Moissac in the same year the defenders of the town were aided by 300 mercenary soldiers who are recorded as being killed by the crusaders. This garrison was reinforced by troops sent by Count Raymond to aid the town against the crusaders. Raymond of Termes also reinforced his garrison with mercenary soldiers when the village of Termes was besieged by the crusaders in July 1210.

The treatment defeated mercenaries received or at least feared they would receive at the hands of the crusaders was often very harsh. At Termes the Spanish mercenaries employed by Raymond of Termes are depicted as being anxious to conclude a negotiated surrender as quickly as possible, after several months of enduring siege. This is probably due to the fact that it was unlikely they would be given quarter if their defences were taken by storm. Such fears were often justified. At Moissac the principal condition for the surrender of the town had been the delivery of the garrison of mercenary soldiers and Toulousain troops. According to Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay they had their throats cut by the crusaders. The mercenary captain Martin Algai, who was employed by both the crusaders and Count Raymond, is also known to have been a trusted employee of King John of England. He is recorded as being at Castelnaudary with 20 of his men and is reported as fleeing the battlefield when the day goes badly for the southern allies. He was eventually hanged by the crusaders at

---

150 *Chanson*, v. 115, 5.
151 *Chanson*, v. 56, 34-37, these are described as being Brabançons, Aragonese, Catalans and men from Rousillion., also see *Historia*, 172.
154 *Historia*, 535, the *Chanson* reports that over 300 were killed here (*Chanson*, v. 124, 4).
156 *Chanson*, v. 93, 6.
Biron, where he had been placed in charge of the garrison. Various other mercenaries are named in the *Chanson* as fighting for the Southerners. A mercenary named Raymond of Perigord is depicted as fighting against the crusaders at Montferrand. The poet records that the mercenary is very much afraid because he expects death if he is captured.

The second, anonymous part of the *Chanson* frequently mentions the use of mercenaries by both sides in the crusade. They are variously referred to as *roters, companhas, Brabançons, Navarrois and Allemand*. Both authors of the *Chanson* appear to have an ambivalent attitude towards the use of mercenaries. The term *roter* is generally used in a pejorative sense. William of Tudela uses this term more often than the anonymous poet, and most frequently accuses them of looting and destruction of property. The anonymous poet attributes crusader successes to the use of mercenaries and in one passage goes so far as to emphasise that the Toulousains succeeded in repulsing the crusaders without the use of foreign troops. He treats with hostility the Flemish troops used by the crusaders. The count of Toulouse is nevertheless seen to employ mercenaries who are depicted as being efficient and courageous warriors. As suggested above, one of the main reasons suggested for the prominence of mercenary troops in southern France is that the society of the region had never developed along such militarised lines as that of the North. Land was often not held in return for military service meaning that a vassal's military obligations to his feudal superior were minimal. Such a situation could mean that the southern magnates such as the count of Toulouse became increasingly reliant on mercenary soldiers to provide them with military support. Frequent and heavy reliance on mercenary soldiers may have been a threat to the authority of the count and would also have drained much of his resources. Such a situation could have resulted in power being devolved to the more powerful of the count of Toulouse's vassals including the counts of Foix and Narbonne.

The practice of employing such mercenary soldiers had been strongly condemned by the church on numerous occasions. In 1179, at the third Lateran Council,
it was not only heretics that the faithful were encouraged to take up arms against but also mercenary soldiers (*ruterii*). One of the main charges levelled against Raymond VI in 1208, when the Albigensian Crusade had been launched was not only that he tolerated heretical practices within his lands but also that he employed mercenary soldiers, for this he had been excommunicated. One of Raymond’s most prominent mercenary captains was Hugh d’Alfaro from Navarre, who rose to become his seneschal in the Agenais. The *Chanson* mentions the raising of mercenary troops from Navarre and Catalonia by Raymond. The hiring of mercenaries did bring with it certain risks and disadvantages, however. For example, the *Chanson* refers to an incident in 1212 when the mercenary leader Savari de Mauléon kidnapped the count of Toulouse’s son and demanded a ransom of 10,000 *livres* because he had not been paid for his services in the count’s army at Castelnaudary in September of 1211. This perhaps illustrates that the count did not have the resources to maintain large numbers of mercenaries for any length of time.

### 2.5 Conclusion

Comparison of the crusading army and their southern enemies allows a number of conclusions to be formed. Because of the nature of land holding in the south the same concept of military service did not exist as it did in the North. Both in the North and the South however knights would fight for monetary reward. There is evidence to suggest, however, that in both the North and South these knights were distinguished from mercenary soldiers known as *routiers*. Documentary evidence which exists regarding mercenaries employed in the army of Philip Augustus provides a rough guide to how much these men could expect to be paid but a lack of evidence regarding the finances of southern magnates prevents us from knowing how revenue was spent on these troops. Whilst it has often been assumed that lack of feudal ties led to the existence of a disunited southern aristocracy which relied on mercenary soldiers for military support, this portrait is disingenuous. The *Chanson* suggests that dispossession of the southern

---

164 *The History of the Albigensian Crusade*, trans. W. A. & M.D. Sibley, Appendix D, p. 300
165 See Belperron, *La croisade contre les Albigeois*, p. 332.
166 *Chanson*, v. 123, 7-10, also see *Historia*, 58.
aristocracy at the hands of the crusaders was a powerful cohesive force, depicting it as more important in the recruitment of men to fight for the cause of Raymond of Toulouse than any notion of service owed to a lord.

There are some noticeable differences in the composition of the two armies. Cities such as Toulouse had the power to raise their own levies of infantry at the behest of the civic leaders and use them to their own political ends. The wealth and political autonomy of such cities allowed this and the evidence appears to suggest that cities of the Languedoc had more in common with the cities of northern Italy for example in this matter. Although large forces of infantry in the North were recruited by the king there is little evidence to suggest that the crusaders had access to such numbers, although some of the sergeants mentioned in the Chanson do appear to have been infantry. Because of the nature of the written sources available, it is perhaps inevitable that the knight appears to dominate the armies of both the crusaders and the southerners. Southern sources, in some cases, do not appear to be so prejudiced against mercenaries. The Chanson often attaches epithets of praise to them but they are also vilified. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that sources such as the Chanson describe mercenary soldiers more accurately than northern sources written by churchmen, praising them for their skills and bravery where praise is due but also acknowledging the depredations they could cause.

Because of the difference in the nature of the available evidence the task of comparing armies in northern and southern France is problematic. Little documentary evidence is available for southern France, that which is available for the North also has its limitations. The evidence from the Chanson could be deceptive as the poets portray the crusaders through southern eyes and are not perhaps aware of differences between the North and the South regarding the institutions behind military service. It is also possible however that southern authors do not have the same prejudice against for example the use of mercenaries and therefore do not attempt to hide the fact that the crusaders used them just as often as the southerners when the need arose.

Having thus established this background it is now the intention to move on and examine the type of military encounters which took place during the crusade. As siege warfare played such an important part in this, what follows is an examination of the types of fortifications which existed in the Languedoc in this period and a comparison of these with their northern counterparts.
Chapter 3

3.0 Introduction

This part of the study aims to make a comparison between fortifications used in northern France and its neighbours and those used in the area affected by the Albigensian Crusade. By making this comparison it may be possible to ascertain whether changes and improvements in fortifications in the Languedoc during the thirteenth century can be directly attributed to the coming of the crusade and the eventual union of southern France with the royal domain. The close of the twelfth century has often been seen as a time of great innovation and major change in military architecture and siege warfare techniques, the former having a great effect on the latter. As siege engines became more powerful and accurate and methods for undermining fortifications were improved and modified, improvements in the design of fortifications were also becoming increasingly necessary. Much of this innovation has traditionally been seen as taking place in northern France in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, particularly in areas associated with the conflict between the Angevin monarchs of England and the Capetian monarchs of France. During the reign of Philip Augustus in particular, building work on royal castles in northern France increased. Philip’s reign was a period in which much innovation and experimentation in castle architecture may be observed. It also spanned the years which immediately preceded the launch of the Albigensian Crusade.

3.1 Development of Fortifications in Northern France from the Early Twelfth Century.

With the close of the twelfth century major changes can be observed in castle architecture in both France and England. This has been seen as typified by several trends, notably the use of the polygonal or so called ‘transitional’ keep and the
development of keepless 'enceinte' type castles, as can be seen at Framlingham and Boulogne. One possible starting point for an analysis of castle building in northern France during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries is the programme of royal castle building carried out during the reign of Philip Augustus (1180-1223). This illustrates very well the kind of fortifications that were being constructed in northern France in the years immediately preceding the start of the Albigensian Crusade.

The conquests of the early and middle part of Philip's reign stimulated him to take stock of his fortresses and pursue a policy of castle construction during the years 1203 - 1214. There is much evidence of royal castle building in Normandy after 1204 for example at Gisors, Vernon, Rouen, Lillebonne and Falaise. These works are all extremely similar in design and construction. Using the available sources it is possible to build up a picture of types of fortification that were being built the improvements that were being made to existing structures during this period. There are several contemporary texts which refer to the location and building costs of fortifications constructed and improved by Philip Augustus. Register A (1204-1211) contains a list of royal castles which existed in 1209. The list contains the names of 113 castles and fortresses with three major concentrations in the areas around Paris, the Seine valley between Paris and Rouen and on the northern border with Normandy. Register C (1211-1220) and Register E (1220 -1270) also contain information on royal castle building. The Compte General of 1202/03 contains 18 entries concerning royal expenditure on fortifications, whilst the Actes of Philip Augustus mention the construction of royal castles at the Louvre, Dourdan, Bourges and Sully. From these original sources is possible to ascertain that work on at least 40 royal castles was carried out during the reign of Philip Augustus. The conservation of most of these works today however, is extremely poor.2

---


There are a number of castles which are similar in design and construction to works for which we have documentary evidence to indicate they were constructed during the reign of Philip Augustus. It can therefore be assumed that these fortifications are likely to be part of the same program of castle building, which took place during his reign. The ground plan of the castle at Montlhéry, for example, shows the keep to be a regular pentagon with cylindrical towers at the angles. Although mostly now in ruins it is very similar in plan to that of Dourdon, which is known to have been built during the reign of Philip Augustus owing to the fact that its construction is mentioned in the Actes\(^3\) (Figure 1). In addition to these fortifications, many other castles constructed and augmented during the reign of Philip Augustus have a number of features in common. Many share such features as an enceinte with quadrangular plan and regularly spaced flanking towers, whilst some show a marked trend towards the donjon becoming a less integrated part of the castle.\(^4\)

One of the most frequently used features is the round donjon with those at Issoudun and La Roche Guyon having a 'beaked' donjon and therefore sharing characteristics with Château Gaillard and Le Caudray Sabart.\(^5\) Each donjon had roughly similar measurements and was constructed with uniformly cut blocks of stone of comparable quality. Such features appear to point towards a unified building policy carried out, not only as a defensive measure, but also to establish visual symbols of the king's authority and suitable sites for centres of the developing royal administration. These visual symbols of the king's authority could also be interpreted as a symbol of Philip's triumph over the Angevin kings, as many of their captured strongholds were added to and improved by him, for example at Rouen and Falaise (Plate 1). The use of similar plans and materials also suggests the existence of a corps of engineers and builders working in the royal employ. In the accounts of 1202-03 several "masters" are named of whom 4 were involved in construction work for the king on various projects.\(^6\)

---

\(^3\) Chatelaine, 'Recherche sur les châteaux de Philippe Auguste' p. 117 ff, Curnow, 'Some Developments in Military Architecture', p. 47.


\(^6\) For Philip Augustus' programme of building works and the masters used in building of royal fortifications see Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus, pp. 299 - 303. See also E. Audouin, sur l'armée royale, p.100. Audouin notes that those employed in constructing and repairing fortifications were paid a wage of 15 denier a day.
Philip was able to pay for his building programme out of royal revenues greatly boosted by the consolidation of the king's conquests in Champagne, Flanders and Normandy. These increased by some 76% after Philip took Angevin lands in Normandy. 20,000 livres were raised from ransoms collected after the battle of Bouvines alone. The king was also scrupulous in his collection of royal rents and fines. His building programme cost an estimated 40,000 livres. This compares quite favourably with 50,000 Angevin livres (34,000 livres parisi) Richard I of England spent on the construction of his complex of fortifications at Chateau Gaillard.

To secure and stabilise his annexations of Normandy and the Loire valley, Philip found it necessary to consolidate his hold on the castles of those areas by treating with his vassals in order that fortifications could come into his possession. On the eve of the Albigensian Crusade, Philip Augustus controlled a large number of substantial fortifications in strategic positions throughout his realm. The defensive features which can be seen in these constructions and the style of architecture being used should be compared with that of the earlier twelfth century in order to ascertain whether significant differences and improvements can be found. Fortifications proliferated in northern France during this period and there can be little doubt that one of the most important factors in this was the rivalry between the Capetian kings of France and the Anglo-Norman kings of England. Both Henry I and Henry II of England improved or renewed nearly all of the royal castles of Normandy. The strategic placing of fortresses along a hostile border was a policy which had been employed since the time of Henry II's grandfather, Fulk Nerra, Count of Anjou and one which was continued by the kings and England and France in the twelfth century.

---

8 See Ibid, p. 300.
By the 1150s the earlier ‘motte and bailey’ style of castle was being superseded by stone fortresses with a central donjon protected by walls and sometimes a moat.\(^{14}\) It has been suggested that the square keep of the early to mid twelfth century exhibited serious design flaws regarding its defensibility\(^{15}\) Square corners in castle walls and towers have been seen as extremely vulnerable to missiles and also a favoured site from which to begin the undermining of walls. It has also been suggested that 90° corners also provided dead angles that sheltered attackers from arrows and other missiles launched by defenders. It is possible that, to remedy this flaw, keeps began to be built in polygonal form. Examples of early polygonal keeps can be seen at Gisors, Chilham and Tickhill. The argument for the polygonal keep being a defensive improvement on the square form relies mostly on the assumption that a greater resistance to assault can be achieved with a construction that had the fewest dead angles, the logical conclusion being that a curved surface and therefore a round keep provides the best possible design.\(^{16}\)

To counter this argument, however, it has been pointed out that the polygonal and round plan of keep had the advantage of using less masonry and would therefore cost less to build.\(^{17}\) Polygonal keeps have been called ‘transitional’ structures, for example in the works of Brown.\(^{18}\) This suggests a development from older and less sophisticated forms of defence. Heslop however has suggested that the polygonal shape in fact made the keep even more vulnerable to attack.\(^{19}\) His work on Orford suggests that the design of this particular castle lay more in the desire for domestic comfort and a fashion for palace architecture than any true concern for strength or defence. Heslop concludes that the idea of transition in castle architecture is based purely on hindsight which implies a ‘kind of Darwinian evolution’. Coulson is also an opponent of the view that changes in castle architecture should be seen purely in terms of defensive improvement. In several studies, he has advocated the idea that the principal purpose of

---


\(^{16}\) For changes in castle architecture designed to counter advances in siege technology see D. J. Cathcart King, *The Castle in England and Wales* (London, 1988) pp. 90 - 106


\(^{18}\) R. A. Brown, *English Medieval Castles* (London, 1954), pp. 52-3. Brown himself has pointed out that the possession of a polygonal or round keep does not necessarily point to a more advanced form of castle architecture, many castles were being built with square keeps well into the thirteenth century and some castles such as Framlingham never had keeps at all.

the castle was for accommodation and that 'social functions almost always transcended military ones' in castle architecture even as early as the late twelfth century. This, he argues, is because improvements in mechanical artillery and siege technology had reduced the castle to the role of personal protection and prestige. He has also points out that very few castles were actually capable of sustaining a siege for more than a short period of time and that 'capacity to hold out against blockade depended upon factors quite unrelated to castle architecture'.

Coulson has criticised such authors as Cathcart-King for writing of 'hypothetical advances in siege-craft being matched with putative architectural responses' and refuses to adhere to this 'traditional mechanistic hypothesis' insisting that the French custom of rendibility and the English practice of licenses to crenellate show that the castle was very rarely a threat to royal power and was therefore principally a residence. He concludes that the 'pervasive and stunting influence of the battering ram and boiling oil brigade' are largely to blame for the rigid categories in which castles have remained in the study of castellology until more recent studies which have taken different approaches'.

Coulson is quite correct in his observation that, from a very early date in the history of the castle, it is extremely difficult, in most cases, to separate developments in military and domestic architecture. It is possible, however, to take such arguments too far. Recent work on the castle in England, by authors such as Pounds have continued to advocate the view that the purpose of the castle in the twelfth and thirteenth century was still primarily military and a 'prerequisite for the physical control of the land.'

Coulson's conclusions have also been echoed in the work of French historians. Heliot has illustrated the growing trend in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries for royal and ducal fortifications in Normandy and England taking on the role of residential and administrative centres, rather than merely fulfilling a defensive role. These castles

---

are dubbed by Heliot ‘donjon palaces’, the spaces of the upper storeys of these fortifications often being used for such functions as private chapels or for providing additional living space. It could be argued that by the twelfth century the degree of comfort evident in these living quarters appears to have improved to such an extent that these fortifications underwent an abrupt change of function. There is substantial evidence, however, to suggest that earlier wooden castles and halls provided a comparable standard of physical comfort for their inhabitants. There is probably less evidence for this in the fortifications built by lesser nobles, those castles that did serve as residences tending to have living quarters away from the donjon which served as the castle’s main defence.

The castle’s function as a symbol of power and means of displaying wealth has also been emphasised along with its role as lordly residence. Brown gives the example of Orford, in his view, constructed with not only with a defensive purpose but also as an impressive display of royal power calculated to overawe the growing influence of the Bigod Earls of Suffolk. Similarly, the rebuilding of the castle of Ghent by Philip of Flanders in 1178 may have been a reaction to the growing number of aristocratic residences being erected by knights and the wealthy bourgeois within his lands. Along with its defensive and residential roles, it has recently been suggested that a change in the castle’s role can be observed in the mid eleventh century, this change being directly linked to economic changes, with castles increasingly being used as instruments for ‘controlling and milking the population’. Such changes may also be linked to changes in castle architecture, with larger areas being set aside for administrative functions.

Whatever the impetus behind these changes it can be clearly observed that developments were taking place throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By the middle of the twelfth century, keeps commonly occupied a strategic point on the castle’s

26 For example see R.A. Brown, English Castles (London, 1976), p. 36 where a description by Lambert of Ardres of the castle of Arnold of Ardres, built in c. 1117, is given. This wooden hall, as described here, shows considerable evidence of comfortable and sophisticated living quarters.
28 See Brown, English Castles, pp 220-21, see also Heslop, ‘Orford Castle’ p. 42.
29 See Barthelemy, ‘Civilising the Fortress’ p. 416
30 Bartlett, The Making of Europe, p. 305.
curtain wall Examples of this type of keep were built at La Roche Guyon, Etampes and Chatillon sur Indre. Other improvements introduced in the twelfth century included the strengthening of strategic points on the curtain wall by the building of closely spaced square towers. This became the hallmark of royal works built or improved during the reign of Henry II including Orford, Dover, Chinon and Gisors. These also show a tendency to have higher walls, flanking towers and powerful gatehouses, all with good communications between the different parts of the castle, thus indicating a change from a purely passive form of defence. This can also perhaps be observed in the rapid development of such features as arrow loops in this period. Another development can be seen in the general strengthening of mural towers which Curnow sees as an acknowledgement of their importance in providing 'more than passive defence'. Angle towers during this period also tended to become stronger and more integrated with the defences of the curtain wall. Renn suggests that the increasing tendency of the central keep of a castle to be used for domestic purposes, with rooms stacked on top of one another, together with the weakening of walls for the provision of staircases, sanitation and storage purposes meant the future of the castle, in terms of defence, lay in providing an enclosure capable of containing a fair sized garrison, with walls studded with towers. An example of such developments can be seen in the curtain walling at Eynford.

An example of new trends in castle building in France can be seen at Houdan, which was built in 1130. This was built with a keep that had circular outer walls and projecting turrets, the curve of the wall between the turrets possibly preventing full use of flanking fire. At Etampes, a royal castle built in 1140, an innovative and attractive four leaf plan was used, consisting of intersecting round towers. Once again this design also overcame the problem of flanking fire. Another innovation used at Etampes is the use of ribbed stone vaulting, in this instance, supported by a central pillar. Such designs may point to the adaptation of a 'gothic' style of architecture in castle building,

34 Curnow, 'Some Developments in Military Architecture', p. 61.
35 Ibid. p. 50.
36 Renn, *Norman Castles in Britain*, p. 71.
suggesting that the gap between secular and ecclesiastical forms of architecture was not as great as is often imagined. Another, simpler solution to the problem of flanking fire which has been suggested is the use of a cylindrical ground plan and the thickening of the wall of the keep on the exposed side with a spur. This design was used at La Roche-Guyon and Château Gaillard (Figure 2).\(^{37}\)

Gaillard, completed in 1197/8, provides an excellent example of a naturally well defended position enhanced by the construction of fortifications which, some authors have argued, appear to be markedly advanced for their date. Powicke, for example, has referred to this fortress as "a turning point in the history of Western fortification."\(^{38}\) It could be argued, however, that Gaillard, although containing some unique features in its design and impressive in its position and stature had very little part to play in the actual development of castle architecture in this period.\(^{39}\) It does, however, exemplify the type of design that some authors believe were being developed to combat improvements taking place in the efficiency of siege warfare, for example in the elimination of so called "dead angles" beneath the walls of the castle, which could prove costly in a siege situation. It has been suggested that Gaillard's large sloping base was designed so that missiles hurled from the walls of the castle would ricochet and strike the enemy, whilst deep battered plinths strengthened the lower walls. Amongst other features, Gaillard has been cited as being amongst the first castles in Western Europe to have stone machicolations.\(^{40}\) Most of its characteristic features, however, are already in evidence in earlier fortifications in northern France the most significant example being La Roche Guyon, built around 1190 by Philip Augustus. The donjon here exhibits a similar design to that of Château Gaillard but with plain instead of buttressed surfaces.\(^{41}\)

The use of such defensive features as machicolations, along with merlons, hourds, brattices, barbicans and drawbridges was becoming increasingly common in the second half of the twelfth century suggesting that castle defences were indeed becoming more sophisticated. True arrow loops began to appear in the 1190's as can be seen in the Avranches tower at Dover and at Framlingham and Carrickfergus castles.\(^{42}\)

---

42 Renn, *Norman Castles in Britain*, p. 72.
prevention of assault by scaling ladder may have been the reason behind the increasing trend in this period for curtain walls to be raised by several metres in height and the adding of a second enceinte in some castles. Increasingly, towers were being built closer together, they were also becoming higher and larger in size. In many castles, bases of walls were thickened and in some ditches were paved to inhibit sapping. The most important modification which can been seen is the contraction and concentration of the castle’s defensive elements. This resulted in a simpler, more geometric design.\(^43\) The available evidence suggests that progress in defensive technology in castle architecture advanced alongside provision for domestic comfort, increasing displays of wealth and a taste for palace style architecture. It is impossible to know what the builder of any particular castle had in mind when designing his structure, defensive capability did not necessarily preclude domestic comfort, a strongly defended castle may also have created the impression of a rich and powerful occupant dwelling behind its walls.

Heslop suggests that a Byzantine/Near Eastern influence may be detectable in castle architecture of the twelfth century, as exemplified by Orford castle.\(^44\) It has long been assumed, by some authors, that evidence exists for the introduction of innovations in castle architecture by returning crusaders. Much of the evidence for this, however, is highly ambiguous. Innovations such as the abandonment of the central donjon, the adoption of round rather than square towers and the introduction of such defensive features as stone machicolations all started appearing from the mid to late twelfth century onwards. All have been cited as evidence for the existence of middle eastern influence appearing in castle architecture in western Europe during this period.\(^45\) It appears however that no firm conclusions can be reached on this matter until a closer study has been made of the military architecture of not only the middle east but also of Spain and Italy. One of the seminal studies of this subject, T.E. Lawrence’s work on crusader castles, argues that of the castles in the middle east occupied by crusaders, many were originally of Byzantine origin. Those newly built were of a type imported from the west and on the whole no major influence in castle architecture can be seen in the west from crusader castles. Lawrence, however, overlooks the possibility of Muslim

\(^{43}\) See Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, p. 114, also see Warner, *Sieges of the Middle Ages*, pp. 13 - 23 for the development of such defensive features
\(^{44}\) Heslop, ‘Orford Castle’, p. 44.
influence. On the whole, his conclusion that there are few grounds for believing that changes in castle architecture in France in the late twelfth century can be attributed to anything other than European influence is valid. There is a much stronger case for influence on the West from the East in the thirteenth century. It is perfectly possible, however, that similar types of castle may have evolved independently in both Europe and the middle east.\footnote{For a summary and critique of Lawrence's work see the introduction by D. Pringle in T.E. Lawrence, \textit{Crusader Castles, a new edition with introduction and notes by Denys Pringle} (Oxford, 1988) pp. i - xxxix}

One argument against such a theory is the timing of the appearance of these features in western castle architecture. If direct influence did take place, which led to important changes in castle architecture, it should perhaps have manifested itself earlier in the twelfth century. Perhaps a more important factor in the development of castle architecture in this period, particularly in France north of the Loire, is the rivalry between the Capetian monarchs of France and the Angevin kings of England. The conflict between them was one in which control of fortresses played a major part. Heliot advocates this view, arguing that although Château Gaillard, for example, has been seen as a remarkably advanced piece of military architecture for its time, most of its elements are evident in many contemporary and earlier castles in Northern France and England. He also remarks that the development of professional corps of engineers and the employment of mercenary soldiers played a great part the advance of castle architecture and siege warfare at this time.

Although Heliot acknowledges the possibility of siege techniques being learnt and perfected in the Levant by crusaders and the importation of certain architectural features such as machiolations, he remains convinced that Gaillard and other castles of the period owe little of their basic conception to the influence of the East.\footnote{See P. Heliot, 'Le Château Gaillard et le fortresses de XIIe et XIIIe siècles en Europe occidental, \textit{Château Gaillard}, i (1964), pp. 53-75.} Cumow uses the example of Le Coudray Sabart in Poitou to demonstrate how castles in the 'shooting line' of the Anglo-French conflict show signs of rapid development and experimentation with fortification.\footnote{Cumow, 'Some Developments in Military Architecture', p. 44.} Typical and also more advanced features demonstrated here include a regular plan, flanking angle towers with intermediate towers on the traverse walls,
beaked towers with large thick walls and an internal gallery in the curtain wall with evidence of substantial strengthening of walls.\textsuperscript{49}

Another factor militating against the introduction of dramatic advances in castle architecture from the Near East is that castle building in western Europe varied widely according to geographical area. Crusaders journeyed to the Holy Land from all over Western Europe yet evidence, cited for the influence of crusaders' experiences on castle architecture in Western Europe mainly refers to northern France and England. The fortifications built by Frederick II in Italy, for example, do not have the round towers becoming common in Capetian France and cited as evidence of crusader influence, yet Frederick was probably one of the monarchs of Western Europe most in touch with Arabic and Byzantine influences throughout his reign.\textsuperscript{50} Large numbers of noblemen from Southern France had a major role to play in the First Crusade in particular. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that their experiences of military architecture in the Holy Land had any influence on the design and building of castles in the Languedoc. The debate regarding influence being transferred, from the Holy Land and beyond, in the sphere of both military architecture and technology provides interesting parallels with the present study. The issues involved in such a debate illustrate the difficulties faced in studying an area where many factors are almost impossible to quantify.

On the eve of the Albigensian Crusade, therefore, it can be seen that castle architecture in northern France and England had been exhibiting noticeable changes in design over a period of many decades, influenced either by an increasing demand for domestic comfort and diversification in the function of these buildings or by changing and improving techniques of siege warfare. What must now be examined is the type and function of fortifications existing in the Languedoc in the period immediately preceding the coming of the crusade and the way these fortifications were utilised during the period of the conflict. In this way it is hoped comparisons may be drawn between the form and function of fortifications in northern and southern France.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. p. 45. \\
\textsuperscript{50} Cathcart-King, \textit{The Castle in England and Wales}, p. 79.
3.2 Fortifications in the Languedoc from the Eleventh to the Thirteenth Century and their Role in the Albigensian Crusade.

The following section aims to examine the different types of fortifications which existed in the Languedoc during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries; their forms, functions and use as a means of defence against a besieging army. The aim here will be to utilise both the physical evidence which exists in the form of the remains of the fortifications and also the written evidence, obtained from contemporary sources. These describe the fortifications as they were and how they were used during the period of the Albigensian Crusade. It must be borne in mind that both archaeological and written evidence are both unsatisfactory in a number of ways. The written evidence is often impressionistic in descriptive passages and the physical remains of the fortifications are often ruined or have undergone considerable rebuilding in a later period. It is proposed to undertake this survey by dividing the fortifications into two main sections, the fortified cities and towns of the Languedoc and the smaller defences which took the form of castles and fortified villages. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the Languedoc was an area with a vast number of fortifications, ranging from small fortified villages and isolated mountain castles to walled cities. The sheer number of fortifications which existed reflects, in many ways, the political situation which existed in the region. Each type of fortification provided its own unique solution to the problem of defending its position. What must also be borne in mind, when examining how these fortifications were defended during the Albigensian Crusade, is the unique circumstances under which each were besieged. Many different factors must be taken into consideration when assessing the effectiveness of these fortifications under assault.

One of the distinguishing factors of the warfare which took place during the Albigensian Crusade was the use of large scale urban fortifications. The existence of thriving and expanding cities such as Carcassonne and Toulouse reveal a more urbanised, wealthy and politically active population than that which existed in the cities of the North in this period. It also shows a legacy of urban fortification stretching back to Visigothic and Roman times which had been maintained in various forms over many
centuries. Cities appear to have been an essential military device in stopping the progress of the crusaders and providing centres of resistance. Both Carcassonne and Toulouse provided formidable obstacles for the crusading army to overcome and will be used in this study as examples of urban fortifications utilised during the crusade.

The steep escarpment which exists above the river Aude at Carcassonne has been fortified since the sixth century BC, the inner wall of the fortifications which exist today roughly corresponding with the line of a wall erected in the fifth century AD, part of which still exists (Plate 3). The stronghold which it enclosed was occupied by the Roman and subsequently Visigothic rulers of the city.\(^1\) This curtain wall had originally consisted of two faces of masonry alternating with courses of brick, the middle portion being filled with rubble. The towers, which were cylindrical on the outside and square on the inside, rested on a cubical base and were raised above these walls (Plate 2).\(^2\) When cut off from the curtain wall it has been suggested that these could be used as independent forts.\(^3\)

The Roman/Visigothic fortifications were reinforced and repaired in 1120 and it is possible that at around the same time the castle on the western side of the city was constructed. This castle is seen by some as one of the earliest examples of so-called 'scientific fortification', that is, fortifications built employing the use of flanking towers as a means to eliminate dead angles. It has also been cited as the earliest castle built without a donjon (Plate 4).\(^4\) However, there appears to be no specific mention, in written sources, of the existence of a castle at Carcassonne until 1191. Suggestions that the castle dates from an earlier period and shows advanced defence features for its age remain doubtful. \(^5\) In the twelfth century the city wall was defended by a series of 26 towers and documentary evidence exists to suggest that in 1126 these fortifications

---

\(^1\) For the history of the fortifications at Carcassonne see J. Poux, *La Cité de Carcassonne*, 5 Vols (Toulouse, 1922-1938). For later Roman urban defences see R.M. Butler, 'Late Roman Town Walls in Gaul', *Archaeological Journal*, 116 (1959), pp.25-50


\(^5\) Ritter has suggested a date of 1130 for the comital castle at Carcassonne but his work depends on the authority of Poux who takes the 'palatium' of the Trencavels, mentioned at this early date, to mean a castle. Cathcart-King, *The Castle in England and Wales*, p. 91, points out that there are no specific references in written sources to a castle until 1191, the castle as it exists today, in its heavily restored state could even be too advanced for this date. See also P. Heliot 'L’age du château de Carcassonne' *Annales de Midi*, LXXVIII (1966), pp. 7-21 who maintains that the castle was substantially a construction of the de Montforts and Capetians.
belonged to, and were defended by, 16 different families resident within the city, showing that communal responsibility for the maintenance of the city’s defences existed from the early twelfth century onwards.\textsuperscript{56}

Written sources such as the Chanson show that Carcassonne was seen by the population of the surrounding area as a place of refuge and was indeed used as such, for example in 1208. Refugees who fled in the path of the crusading army as it advanced from Béziers through the Aude valley took refuge at Carcassonne. This worsened the situation for those already living in the city, particularly as little time had been left to them to prepare for the coming of the crusaders. The ancient city walls held out well against the assault of the crusading army: lack of water and overcrowding were the main factors in the fall of the city rather than the military superiority of the crusaders.

In common with many of the cities and towns of the area, Carcassonne was surrounded by suburbs, the result of the city’s expansion due to its growing prosperity. (Figure 3). The bourg of St. Michael to the north was the largest of three with the Castellare to the south and the peripheral suburb of St. Vincent between the city and the river. St Vincent was unprotected and was the first part of the city to fall to the crusaders, thus effectively cutting it off from the river. Despite its strong fortifications, Carcassonne had serious weaknesses in its ability to defend itself against a besieging force. It was too far from the river to sustain a lengthy siege, the only source of water inside the citadel being wells within the city walls. The main access to the city was over a narrow wooden bridge which the city's garrison, enclosed within the city walls, would be unable to command.\textsuperscript{57} The weakest points in the city’s defences however were the suburbs to the north and the south which lay outside the main defensive wall. These were defended only with low walls and sparsely defended towers. Once the crusaders had penetrated into the suburbs of the city they were at a distinct advantage in that they could use the houses of the city for cover, gaining ground street by street.

Written evidence suggests that the existing fortifications at Carcassonne were reinforced, once news of the crusaders’ approach reached the city. Raymond Roger Trancavel, in preparation for the coming siege, ordered the demolition of the refectory of the cathedral canons so that the building stone could be utilised to reinforce the

\textsuperscript{56} Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p.21.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. p. 95.
existing fortifications. Another precaution that has been suggested was carried out at such times was the building of wooden houards atop the city and castle walls. The subsequent improvements to the fortifications at Carcassonne by Louis IX appear to address many of the problems which made the fortified city vulnerable to attack and siege, particularly in the building of the massive barbican commanding the banks of the Aude (Figure 4). Viollet-le-Duc’s restoration of the Cité has been criticised by some, for its lack of sensitivity to regional styles and the decision to restore to a single period. The defences which survive at Carcassonne in the present day, however, provide a unique insight into how the medieval walled city may have appeared in the thirteenth century. Therefore, they are a very valuable walled tool in any study of the military actions which took part in and around them during the Albigensian Crusade, in conjunction with the written sources available.

In the case of Toulouse, contemporary written sources are of even more value, as very little remains of the defences which existed in the thirteenth century. Like Carcassonne, they were based on Roman fortifications and consisted of a defensive wall with attached towers (Figure 5). The description of the siege of 1217 which is contained in the Chanson provides a good impression of the way the city’s defences could be utilised and describes some of the main defences within the city. Written evidence also suggests that these defences had suffered much damage since the arrival of the crusaders in the South and therefore may not have been as effective as they were previously. For example, during Prince Louis’ brief campaign of 1215 parts of the city walls of both Narbonne and Toulouse were demolished under his orders. In September 1216 Simon de Montfort continued the demolition at Toulouse after unrest amongst its citizens. By the beginning of the siege of 1217/18, however, much of this damage had been rapidly repaired and the walls were once again defensible. At this time the defences of Toulouse included 16 barbicans and the captains appointed by Count

---

58 Historia, 93
59 See Viollet-le-Duc, Military Architecture, pp. 58-9. Viollet-le-Duc provided the castle at Carcassonne with such wooden defences in his reconstruction began in 1844. (Plate 4)
60 See Viollet-le-Duc, Military Architecture, pp. 47-67.
64 Chanson, v. 178, 51.
Raymond to defend them during the siege are celebrated in the *Chanson*. In 1216 Count Raymond's reinforcements were able to enter the city via the Pont Neuf due to the existence of a pair of these barbicans on the banks of the river defending the bridge.

Another major feature of the defences at Toulouse was the Château Narbonnais, used by the crusaders as their headquarters. This dated back to Roman times but appears to have been not originally designed for defending or controlling the city. The Château is described in the *Chanson* as having two great towers, one at the north and the other at the south of the fortress. Both were built of baked clay and flint with lime, the whole construction was then enclosed with large stones without the use of mortar. One of these towers is called the 'Tour Ferrande' in the *Chanson* which may indicate the use of iron or lead to reinforce the stone construction. The *Chanson* describes the Château's wall as being *sarrisin*, this epithet appearing to refer to constructions of Roman origin in Occitan Literature of this period. From its position and orientation it is possible that the Château Narbonnais may have been originally intended to protect the city from an attack from the south. Its north face, described in the *Chanson* as being pierced with galleries and windows, was extremely vulnerable to attack, particularly from the siege engines of the Toulousain army.

The *Chanson* also indicates that considerable use was made, by both the crusaders and the Toulousains, of churches, religious establishments and other buildings of substantial construction for defensive purposes. In the early stages of the siege, crusaders attempted to fight their way in through the east and southern gates of the city in an attempt to occupy the fortified church of St Etienne. By October 1217 most of the major churches of the city had been utilised by the Toulousains as fortresses. De Montfort's troops occupied the Hôpital St. Jacques and launched an attack against the partially destroyed Pont Neuf from here using siege engines (*calabres*). According to the *Chanson*, during the early part of the siege in 1217, groups of crusaders, trapped by

---

67 Ibid., p. 194.
68 See Viollet-le-Duc, *Military Architecture*, p. 10. Viollet-le-Duc suggests that this stonework was held together by means of iron plates run with lead. See also Martin-Chabot, *Chanson*, vol. 3, p. 127, n.4.
72 *Chanson*, v. 198, 28 ff.
enraged citizens defended themselves from inside the bishop’s palace, the *Tour de Mascaron*\(^7\) and the town house of the count of Comminges.\(^4\)

From the description of the siege in the *Chanson* it is also evident that the Pont Neuf, spanning the Garonne to the east of the city, was protected with substantial defences. In May 1217 a heavy rainstorm led to flooding which swept away much of the bridge.\(^7\) Nevertheless, two of its masonry piles which supported tall stone towers fortified with portcullises which were designed to block passage over the bridge, remained defendable despite being isolated in the middle of the river. Toulouse was similar to Carcassonne in that it had poorly defended suburbs, the existence of which the besieging crusaders tried to exploit. They attempted to gain access to the city by way of the suburb of St Cyprian by splitting into two forces, leaving one half on the east bank of the river whilst the other half crossed over to the other bank utilising raft bridges. Once across the river an attempt was made to seal off the suburb. This was thwarted, however, by the Count of Foix who succeeded in rallying his forces and resisting the crusaders’ attack. When an attempt was made to take the suburb a second time the crusaders approached from the west bank, only to find that a deep ditch had been dug around St. Cyprian. The crusaders were therefore forced to set up camp outside the suburb until flooding filled these defensive trenches with debris and silt. The crusaders were then able to occupy the suburb by launching an amphibious assault with a fleet of boats.\(^6\) Toulouse, therefore, provided the crusaders with a considerable challenge, its sheer size eventually defeating a force which was not large enough to take and control a city of such proportions.

Smaller fortified towns such as Beaucaire also played a prominent part in the crusade and proved just as difficult as to take. Beaucaire shares some features with other smaller fortified towns, for example the castle at Beaucaire was outside the town walls, rather like those at Termes and Minerve.\(^7\) Standing on the edge of a steep cliff on the west bank of the river Rhône it provided a retreat for the crusader garrison when under

---

\(^7\) *Chanson*, v. 172, 100ff.

\(^4\) *Chanson*, v. 173, 9.

\(^7\) *Chanson*, v. 198, 13ff.

\(^6\) *Chanson*, v. 198, 13ff.

siege from the Young Count Raymond. In the thirteenth century the river covered the base of the cliff; it has since receded some distance (Figure 6). The remains of the castle which exist today date mainly from the early fourteenth century, when it was substantially rebuilt and became the centre of royal administration for the area. Its position remains the same, however, and it is still possible to trace the topography of the medieval town in relation to the castle (Plate 5). The crusaders, as well as holding the castle, had possession of a large triangular outlying tower known as the redorte which overlooked it. The detailed description of the siege of Beaucaire contained within the Chanson once again gives a clear impression of the nature of warfare within the besieged town.\(^7\) It is clear, judging from written sources, that in times of war, towns and cities such as those described here not only relied on existing fortifications but were able to reinforce these rapidly using stone, wood and other materials, blocking the narrow streets by using barricades and strengthening curtain walls.

Judging from written evidence and what remains of the defences today it is clear that towns and cities of the Languedoc besieged by the crusaders had substantial and extensive fortifications. Other fortifications, although smaller in scale, proved just as effective in slowing down the progress of the crusaders for various reasons. The sheer number of fortifications which were built in the Languedoc during the middle ages rules out an in depth survey being carried out of them within this study. Although large numbers of remains still exist there are, however, difficulties in studying these fortifications, particularly those most associated with the warfare which took place during the Albigensian Crusade. The approach taken here therefore has been to deal with a small number of the better preserved castles which I have been able to study at first hand and also those fortifications most featured in the written evidence as the location of protracted and important sieges. Modern scholarship appears to indicate that the nature and location of such fortifications was strongly associated with social, economic and political considerations, all of which need to be examined in the context of how this affected the nature of the warfare which took place during the Albigensian Crusade.

Between 1050 and 1150 an increasing number of castles and fortified towns and villages were being built in the mountainous heartland of the Languedoc. This has been seen as leading to the development of a distinct class of castellans who carved out

\(^7\) Chanson, v. 153-171.
territorial domains for themselves. Such developments have also been linked to the collapse of the authority of local viscounts and the development of a new militarism within southern French society.\(^7\) It has also, however, been argued that the notion of powerful castellans carving out territories in this area is difficult to sustain given the distribution of castles; the kind of independence that could lend itself to the creation of new domains needed both wealth and a certain degree of isolation, but a truly isolated castle may indicate a possessor who could not command a great deal of material wealth. Equally, where castles were in the midst of rich farmlands there were nearly always other castles and castellans nearby, suggesting that large territorial domains would have been difficult to build up under such circumstances.\(^8\) Such an argument suggests therefore that isolated mountain fortresses in south western France did not exist to exploit the resources of the surrounding countryside and its population as it has been suggested was the case in northern France.

By the beginning of the twelfth century, fortifications in south western France were beginning to spread into areas where hitherto fortification had been rare. Such castles were often church or allodial possessions. The possession of some of these fortifications was divided between the possessor and their allodial lord. This practice was known as holding a castle in \textit{feudo} or \textit{beneficio}.\(^9\) The spread of the authority of independent castellans has been linked to the increase of private war and violence during this period which in turn led to the rise of the Peace and Truce of God movements in an effort by the church to curb such violence.\(^2\)

The building of such fortifications may also have had an effect on the relationship between the peasantry and older aristocratic families. By imposing heavier demands on the peasantry who lived near these castles, personal dependence on the nobility increased and an important change in settlement patterns may have been the result. Peasants increasingly came to live in settlements concentrated around castles, as

\(^7\) Lewis, \textit{The Development of Southern French and Catalan Society}, p. 292.


well as around monasteries in the twelfth century. Many fortified sites in the south, therefore, were more in the nature of fortified villages and towns. Without the natural protection of the mountains many of the settlements on the plains at the beginning of the thirteenth century were enclosed towns or villages surrounded by a ditch and/or a wall. With the royal takeover of the South the practice of placing an enceinte around villages appears to have stopped. For the most part the *castra* of the plains consisted of two parts. The upper part acted as a stronghold and was usually the dwelling place of the lord whilst the lower part was occupied by the villagers and enclosed by a wall, though even within this general pattern there was a large variety of plans. In some cases a village had an upper and lower enceinte.

By 1200 old dispersed settlement patterns came to be replaced by the new type of *castra* settlements. In an area where feudal ties such as labour services were not highly developed, the residents of these *castra* became increasingly independent and in some cases self governing. Many local towns won for themselves increasing levels of political autonomy. As has been discussed above, growing urban centres, which were Roman and Visigothic in their origins, were also developing. For example Carcassonne, Toulouse, Marseilles, Narbonne and Orange. This was closely connected with the growth of external commerce with cities in Italy and Spain but was also initiated by the local nobility that had been involved in the Spanish Reconquista and the First and Second Crusades.

The main characteristics of castle fortifications built in the Languedoc during the earlier Carolingian period were the use of a rectangular tower surrounded by a polygonal enceinte without flanking towers, made of rough stone work sometimes with the inclusion of simple loop holes. In the tenth and eleventh centuries the castle in Languedoc remained a very simple construction, the main innovation of this period being the expansion of the living space within the castle enclosure. This was composed mainly of an agglomeration of buildings standing against the main ramparts. Such fortifications

---

83 Given, *State and Society in Medieval Europe*, p. 22.
85 See J. Given, *State and Society in Medieval Europe*, p. 22.
86 For urban and economic development in these areas see Lewis, ‘Patterns of Economic Development in Southern France 1050 - 1150’, pp. 60-65.
housed members of the local aristocracy who wielded fragmentary power in the immediately surrounding area. Between 1012 and 1020 Bernard d'Angers, the author of the *Miracles of St Foy de Conques*, travelled through southern France. His work provides important clues to the nature of early fortifications and lordly residences in the Languedoc. He describes the dwelling places of the local nobility as consisting of a collection of assorted buildings dominated by a *turris* which usually consisted of three levels. The bottom level appears to have been only accessible from above, whilst the second level would be the dwelling place of the lord. This level possessed the only outside access in the form of a door leading to the interior of the enclosure. The tower is usually described simply as a residence for the garrison with wives and family residing in a separate *mansio*.

The elevated sites chosen for some of these fortifications suggest that a great deal of skill and specialisation may have been needed in order to overcome such problems as transport of materials and building on extremely precipitous and uneven ground. The castles of Peyrepertuse, Quéribus, Montségur and Puylaurens are all particularly well preserved and provide good examples of the kind of fortifications that could be built on such sites. These castles all originally comprised of a simple parapet at the edge of an escarpment, sometimes with a rampart on the more vulnerable side. The living space in castles situated in such positions would have been extremely cramped. The site of such castles, however, effectively limited the number of attackers that could approach these fortifications. Suitable sites for the placing of siege engines may also have been difficult to find. It is possible that the defence of such sites would be more passive than active, meaning that it was not necessary to install large garrisons. Joumnot suggests that this could have led to military strategies that did not necessarily involve the reduction and taking of fortifications as its primary aim. This theory does not, however, appear to be borne out when the large number of sieges which took place during the Albigensian Crusade is considered.

More advanced defensive features and more elaborate designs in the castles of the Languedoc start to appear mainly as the result of the royal rebuilding and

---

89 See *St Foy de Conques* (St Leger Vauban, 1965), pp. 152 - 153, also Barthelemy, 'Civilising the Fortress' p. 404.
improvement of certain castles in the mid-thirteenth century. Castles such as those at Peyrepertuse, Quéribus, Puylaurens and Termes owed their continued use mainly to their strategic position on the French/Aragonese border after the signing of the Treaty of Corbeil in 1258, when the northern line of the Pyrenees was adopted as the border between the two kingdoms. Some of these castles continued to have royal garrisons into the seventeenth century and are therefore in a better state of repair than many others more frequently mentioned in the written sources for the Albigensian Crusade. The remains of these castles therefore provide better physical evidence and are included in this study for this reason. The extent of the rebuilding at such sites does, however, make it difficult to ascertain what the fortifications looked like in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.

Several well preserved examples show this incremental building. Work on Peyrepertuse originally began under the counts of Barcelona in the early twelfth century, the castle consisting of a curtain wall and later a rampart flanked by two semi-circular towers. In the thirteenth century the castle was improved and expanded, with a large semi-circular tower being placed against the eastern facade, a new curtain wall joining this to the apse of the chapel. This was crenellated with merlons and pierced by a postern gate. A pentagonal tower, named San Jordi, was built to the west of the second donjon and was flanked by three semi-circular towers and a high wall was built between these two donjons. (Figure 9 and Plate 7) Extensive rebuilding work also occurred at Puylaurens where three distinct periods can be distinguished in the building in the thirteenth century. Before 1258 a second enceinte was built on the original tenth-century foundations with a single entrance. After 1258, when the castle came into royal possession, two round towers, one to the north of the donjon and another to the south were built. Finally, at the end of the thirteenth century two new round towers were built (Figure 10 and Plate 6).

Analysis of such structures may suggest that the development of castle architecture in the Languedoc was rather slow in the tenth to early thirteenth centuries. After the early thirteenth century there appears to be a contrast between those castles on

---

the French side of the France/Aragon border and those of the Aragonese side. In the French area of influence some castles which continued to be used as royal fortresses show signs of a growing sophistication in their structure and design, whilst those on the other side of the border remain simpler in style. Castles in other areas also give important clues to the development of castle architecture in the south. The castle at Montségur shows a very simple, unsophisticated design and relies almost entirely upon its position for its defence (Figure 11 and Plate 8). Most of the original building work on the castle was carried out during the early part of the thirteenth century and although subsequent rebuilding went on after the castle was taken by crusaders 1244, the structure remained simple. The donjon of the earlier castle may have been situated in the centre of the main enclosure, a new donjon being added later to become an integral part of the defensive system, a feature very much more common in northern France. The castle on the whole however shows little of the elaborate additions evident in other castles of the area.

Some castle sites in other areas such as the Rouergue were effectively abandoned after the Albigensian Crusade and the take over of southern France by the Capetians. Changing political structures introduced new forms of fortification in the manner of fortified lordly residences. Debord suggests this was a process which was beginning to take place before crusade in some areas in the south, the northern invasion merely accelerating it.

The political structures which existed in the South appear to have some influence on the nature of its fortifications and the way they were used. The practice of *coseigneurie*, where rights over an individual castle were split between two or more lords is one which seems common in the Languedoc from the eleventh century onwards. For example, at Termes documentary evidence exists of an agreement being made between Raymond of Termes and his brother Guillaume in 1163 in order that ownership of the castle be split. The donjon was divided between the two brothers in the ratio of

---

93 de Pous, ‘L’architecture militaire occitaine’, p. 104.
95 debord, ‘Châteaux et société dans le Rouergue médieval (Xe-XIIIe siècle)’, Château Gaillard, XIV (1988) pp. 7-28. The eventual abandonment of some other border castles, however, did not take place until after the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 when the disputed areas of Roussillon and Cerdagne were ceded to France, see Kamen, Spain 1469-1714, pp. 209-10.
96 Histoire générale du Languedoc vol. 5, col. 1277.
1:2 stories, the highest part of the complex of fortifications being bounded by a common
wall adjacent to which each brother placed various buildings. At the foot of the castle a
new chapel was built as well as an enclosure, which may have been fortified. This
contained the dwelling places of the brothers’ knights which was divided equally
between them. 97 Another example of co-seigneury can be seen in the case of Lambert
of Montélimar, depicted in the Chanson as fighting on the side of the crusaders at the
siege of Toulouse. He was co-suzerain of Montélimar along with his cousin Gerald
Adhemar who fought for Raymond of Toulouse. 98

Perhaps the most well known example, however, of this practice in the south of
France is that of the knight-troubadour Bertram de Bom who shared his castle at
Autafort with his brother between 1159-69. 99 The practice of co-seigneury in the south
appears to be in evidence in the arrangement of some fortified towns and villages, for
example at Peyriac where the upper part of the village was split between Roger of
Béziers and his two brothers. In certain places the donjon had been replaced by a group
of buildings held by co-seigneurs and other knightly families. After the mid twelfth
century many seigneurs abandoned living in the donjon altogether. 100

The question of lordship over a castle not only involved its possessor but also his
overlord. The authority of a vassal’s immediate lord over his castle appears to have
taken two forms in southern France, that of rendability and jurability. In the South
rendering a castle to one’s lord was a fundamental duty, refusal being regarded as a
major transgression of a vassal’s duties to a lord. In the mid thirteenth century in
Catalonia the wording of documents makes it clear the no excuse will be accepted for
refusal to hand over a castle to a lord. 101 The survival of documentary evidence
regarding the holding of castles is quite rare in the areas that were ruled by the counts of
Toulouse and the viscounts of Béziers, the lands most immediately affected by the
Crusade. It may, however, be legitimate to infer that a similar situation existed in these
lands to that in Catalonia, from where a great deal more documentary evidence

97 M. Bourin-Derrau, ‘Valeur stratégique et valeur symbolique’, p. 102
99 See The Poems of the Troubadour Bertram de Bom, ed. W. Paden, T. Sonkovitch & P. Stäblien
survives. In Catalonia castles were usually granted on terms of sworn fealty, that is, a promise to restore the castle upon a ruler's command. In the twelfth century the castle became assimilated with the fief which was increasingly regarded as hereditary. Another form of agreement made over the rights to castles consisted of a promise not to use such fortifications to aid a lord's enemies or deliver the castle into their hands. Such agreements carried on well into the thirteenth century.

Documentary evidence from the domains of the Trencavel family is particularly well preserved. It appears from this evidence that very few of the fortifications in these lands were actually owned by the family. Cheyette suggests that the few castles for which oaths were given were of major strategic importance in guarding the main roads which passed through the territory. He concludes from this evidence and the castles' distribution that the Trencavels seem to have regarded castles principally as a means of controlling traffic rather than controlling population. Those that they laid claim to were mainly where the population was densest or were used to guard roads, for example on the western frontier of the Trencavel lands which faced the lands of the counts of Foix and Toulouse, clustered at strategic points. The principal purpose of many of these fortifications, therefore, may have been relatively peaceful, namely to extract tolls and dues for safe conduct, although some still retained a strategic importance. Cheyette supports his theory with the evidence of aerial photography suggesting that certain villages appear to have acted as "magnets" on the road pulling merchants, pilgrims and other travellers aside from the roman highway to pay tolls before passing on. Strategic or commercial considerations regarding their fortresses and those of their vassals may therefore have been uppermost for lords such as the Trencavels. Controlling the lords of fortified villages, where most of the wealth of the area was produced could also have been a major political aim. It was not the fortifications of the plain however that played a major role in the resistance that the crusaders met.

Despite the presence of a plethora of fortifications on the plains in the lands of the Trencavels, when the crusaders arrived, there appears to have been no major

---

102 See T.N. Bisson, 'Some Characteristics of Mediterranean Territorial Power', *Medieval France and her Pyrenean Neighbours: Studies in Early Institutional History* (London, 1989), pp. 257-264. Bisson sees the main difference between the situation in Catalonia and the lands of counts of Toulouse being that the count of Toulouse had more difficulty in maintaining control over castles in his lands. Those that he did control were not suitably distributed for this purpose.
104 Cheyette, 'Castles of the Trencavels', p. 266.
obstacles to their progress westwards towards Carcassonne. According to the *Chanson* no major military action took place until the crusaders come to Béziers, the crusaders finding that much of the population of the towns of the plains had fled.\(^{105}\) Such actions on the part of the local population may suggest that that the people had no confidence in their fortifications. The crusaders, therefore, went on to take Béziers and Carcassonne, the other towns in the region surrendering their fortifications and offering no resistance. The hundreds of fortifications which clustered around the foot of the Moure Mountains appear to have been returned to their lords once the crusaders established themselves in the area. \(^{106}\)

If these fortifications were abandoned so readily, it begs the question what sort of warfare were these constructions designed to meet? It has been suggested that the twelfth century could be seen as a period of decline in the use of the castle in southern France as a strategic fortification.\(^{107}\) A progressive abandonment of the strong central donjon or enceinte and the relative weakness of the resistance of the *castra* on the plain to the army of the crusade may lead to the conclusion that the fortified villages of the plain had lost most of their defensive value.\(^{108}\) This argument is further backed up by events during the Albigensian Crusade. The castles of the plains did not provide the main centres of resistance to the crusaders. It was the mountain fortresses such as Termes, Minerve and Cabaret which served as centres from which raids could be launched during the Crusade and would have represented a permanent threat to the crusaders established on the plains. It was therefore necessary to take them and ensure the domination of the countryside.

Judging from the time it took to besiege and take castles such as Minerve and Termes this was not an easy task. According to the written sources, it took one month to take Minerve and just under 5 months to take Termes. At Cabaret, however, which was judged by the author of the *Chanson* to be equal to them in strength, the castle was surrendered when news reached the defenders that reinforcements for the crusaders had

---

\(^{105}\) The abandonment of castles is again mentioned at *Chanson*, v. 112, 12-14 which states that this is the result of fear amongst the local population precipitated by the arrival of new reinforcements for the crusaders in 1212. This flight allowed the crusaders to garrison fortresses at La Garda and Puycelci.

\(^{106}\) Bourin-Derrau, 'Valeur stratégique et valuer symbolique', p. 103.

\(^{107}\) Ibid. pp. 105-06. Bourin-Derrau distinguishes 3 different types of fortification, identified in written sources, in the area: the *villa*, *castrum* and a larger type of fortified town, the *castra*.

\(^{108}\) Ibid. p. 102. Such an argument, however, fails to take into consideration the fact that the crusading army was much larger and more powerful than any army that these fortifications had been designed to defend against.
arrived from the North. This appears to indicate that the lords of the mountain fortresses only showed confidence in their defences when the odds were in their favour. All three major written sources for the crusade insist on the superior strength and position of the castles of Minerve, Termes and Cabaret. For example, William of Puylaurens uses the term *castra fortia* when describing all three. There is nothing however, in design, to distinguish these *castra fortia* from the other fortifications of the plains apart from their lofty position. According to the *Chanson*, Raymond of Termes considered the crusading army to be '...none of them worth a button, for no one ever saw a stronger castle than his'\(^{109}\) Castles such as these, however, do not appear to have had particularly advanced defensive features. It was the site chosen which allowed them to be defended effectively for such relatively long periods of time. The taking of Termes appears to have been such a devastating blow to the southern resistance to the crusaders that once it was taken most of the other castles of the area were abandoned or surrendered.\(^{110}\)

The decision to besiege Minerve followed repeated raids, launched from the castle, during the winter of 1210/11. Despite little remaining of the fortifications today, it is still clear from the position of their ruins that it was a remarkable natural fortress consisting not only of a castle but also a of a large fortified village (Figure 12 and Plate 9) Situated five miles north of the Aude river and sited at the confluence of two steep river gorges it was protected on three sides by ravines of up to 300 m deep.\(^{111}\) The only way to approach the village was from the north side via a narrow strip of land defended by a powerful citadel and steep fissures in the rocky ground.\(^{112}\) William of Tudela describes the fortress and the attempts of de Montfort and his crusaders to besiege it thus:

He laid siege to the place as he had planned, and set up his catapults...He smashed openings in the high walls and in the stone built hall, mortared with sand and lime; many a good penny they had cost and many a gold coin. If the king of Morocco and his Saracens had sat down all around the

\(^{109}\) Chanson, v. 56, 29.
\(^{110}\) Chanson, v. 58.
\(^{112}\) *Historia*, 152. Peter of les Vaux des Cernay here describes the fortifications, the nature of which caused de Montfort to divide his army in order carry out siege operations.
place, by St Catherine, they could have done no damage worth an Anjou half penny. ..... Minerve castle is not in a plain but stands on a high spur of rock, there is no stronger fortress this side of the Spanish passes, except Cabaret and Termes at the head of the Cerdagne. William, lord of Minerve, had shut himself into the castle with his whole troop and was taking his ease there. 113

After the taking of Minerve in July 1210, Termes remained one of the only hostile fortresses south of the Aude until November 1210 when it was taken after a siege of almost five months. The castle may have been of little strategic importance, being near neither any major roads or centres of population, but the crusaders could not afford to leave it in the hands of their enemies. 114 It dominated a narrow river valley in a region which had few roads, those which did exist were impassable for much of the winter. This was an important factor in the strength of such fortifications, exemplified by the decision of the bulk of the besieging crusader force to leave in the autumn of 1210. Termes stood on a narrow rock from which two fingers of land extended northwards towards the valley of the Orbieu. 115 One of these fingers was protected by vertical cliffs, the other by a small isolated turret called the Termenet. 116 Peter of les Vaux de Cernay’s description of the position speaks eloquently of the strength of the fortifications at Termes:

The castrum of Termes was in the territory of Narbonne, five leagues from Carcassonne. It was marvellously, indeed unbelievably, strong and in human estimation appeared to be quite impregnable. It was situated on the summit of a very high peak, overlooking a huge natural cliff, and surrounded on all sides by very deep and inaccessible ravines, with water flowing through them, surrounding the whole castrum. In turn the ravines were surrounded by huge crags, so difficult to climb down that anyone wishing to approach the walls would need first to throw himself into the ravine and then, as it were, “crawl back towards heaven” ....... So

113 Chanson, v. 48 - 49.
114 Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p.121.
115 For the defences at Termes see A. de Pous, Les Termenès (Paris, 1963) and Salch, Dictionnaire de châteaux, pp. 1162-3.
116 This is described in Historia 171 as being (of) modest (size) but strong.
situated Termes could be approached from one side only, where the rocks were lower and less inaccessible.\textsuperscript{117}

To the south of the village was a fortified suburb and a thin neck of rocky land, which offered the only access to the castle, as described above. Termes remains better preserved than many other castles in this area due to its continued use as a border fortification. The ruins of the curtain wall which still exist today show an irregular pentagonal plan, the wall being pierced by loopholes and having traces of what appears to be a wall walk. The wall is reinforced by mounds crowned with watchtowers in the north west and south east corners and a round tower stands to the north east. The highest point is occupied by the rectangular donjon, the only entrance to the castle being the north postern. The original fortifications were built by Pierre Olivier of Termes in 1084\textsuperscript{118} and important reinforcement work was almost certainly carried out on the castle at the beginning of the Albigensian Crusade, two lines of fortifications on the south side being dated to this period.\textsuperscript{119} In common with other fortified towns of the area, Termes possessed a small suburb (\textit{burgum}) that proved to be the most vulnerable part of the complex of fortifications and which was taken first during the siege of 1210. (Figure 13 and Plate 10).\textsuperscript{120}

The existence of castles such as those at Termes, Minerve and Cabaret reveals the differing nature of the fortifications of the Languedoc from those of northern France. These differences can be attributed to a number of factors. Topography obviously played an important part in the location and design of many of the fortresses of the Languedoc, particularly those in mountainous areas. Good natural defences may have led to simple forms of fortification persisting into the thirteenth century, whilst the greater numbers of castles and other fortifications in the Languedoc reveal a different political structure to that which existed in the north.

The very fact of the decline in the number of fortifications being built and used in southern France from the mid-thirteenth century onwards is revealing. The castles required by the royal administration were not the same type of fortifications which had

\textsuperscript{117} Historia, 171 (trans. W.A. & M.D. Sibley)
\textsuperscript{118} C. Salch, \textit{Dictionnaire de châteaux et des fortifications} p. 1162.
\textsuperscript{119} de Pous, 'L'architecture militaire Occitaine', p. 93-94
\textsuperscript{120} Historia, 176.
previously existed. Those mountain castles which continued being used were strategically placed to protect the borders of a kingdom, not to provide strongholds for fiercely independent minor nobles as they had done before. The coming of direct royal rule to southern France brought with it a need to display the power and wealth of the monarchy. The rebuilding and elaboration of castle and city defences in the royal period may herald the importation of more sophisticated building techniques and also reveals the wish of the Capetian monarchs to stamp their own identity on a part of France formally only nominally under royal control. Just as Philip Augustus had done in Normandy with the captured castles of the Angevins, so Louis IX and his successors did with the fortifications of the Languedoc. The strengthening and elaboration of the fortifications at Carcassonne provides a prime example of this. The Cité was established as a royal fortification and in 1247 the bastide of the lower town was begun. Carcassonne was then established as the key centre of military administration on the French/Spanish border.

The nature of the fortifications of the Languedoc at the beginning of the thirteenth century reflects a diverse region with a complex political and economic situation. Just as it is impossible to separate purely military considerations from political, social, economic and domestic factors in the design and construction of the castles of northern France, so should such factors be taken into consideration when discussing the fortifications of the south. Having thus established this background, it is now intended to show how these fortifications were defended and besieged during the Albigensian Crusade and to make comparisons with siege warfare taking place in other theatres of conflict in the same period.
Chapter 4

4.0 Introduction

The importance of sieges and the successful reduction of fortifications during the Albigensian Crusade is evident from the most cursory survey of the available written evidence. The number of sieges described in the major written sources for the Albigensian Crusade reveals them to be the most important part of the military activity which took place. An examination of these sieges must therefore play a major part in any survey of the military aspects of the Albigensian Crusade. The detail with which these events are treated in the written sources also ensures that an examination of the sieges of the Albigensian Crusade can contribute much to overall knowledge of how siege warfare was carried out during the early thirteenth century. This chapter therefore intends to examine typical siege weapons used during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and link this to the way they were utilised during the Albigensian Crusade.

It has been suggested in the previous chapter that fortifications in south western France showed a marked tendency towards a growing sophistication, perhaps as a result of the political take-over of this area by the French monarchy. It would therefore seem appropriate to examine whether the crusaders had access to more sophisticated siege machinery than the southerners, owing perhaps to an ability to command the services of more skilled engineers and craftsmen. To begin with, however, it will be appropriate to examine how siege warfare was being carried out in northern France on the eve of the Albigensian Crusade, taking as examples a number of the sieges carried out under the command of the French king Philip Augustus, who, along with the kings of England in this period, had at his command some of the most skilled engineers, architects and craftsmen available.
4.1 Methods of siege used by the army of Philip Augustus

The French king in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries could command the skills of a considerable number of engineers and craftsmen in the pursuit not only of his policy of building and renewing castles but also in the sphere of siege warfare. The kind of manpower and technology that could be commanded can be demonstrated by the military career of Philip Augustus. By studying the siege warfare carried out by the king's army it is possible to detect sophisticated and innovative methods being used to overcome large fortified cities and castles alike, much the same obstacles with which crusaders in the south west of France were to find themselves challenged.

The king was also a crusader in the East and in April 1191 Philip Augustus, with Richard I of England began a lengthy siege of the city of Acre. The evidence provided by the written sources for the military operations at Acre show the considerable resources that the two monarchs could command between them along with the other participants in the crusade. Before the arrival of the two monarchs, Pisan and Genoese sailors along with the men of Henry of Champagne and the Bishop of Besançon had constructed many siege engines including siege towers protected with hides, mining engines, mangonels and a ram consisting of a ship's mast under a protective cover of iron, a combination which suggests the involvement of the Italian sailors in the design of the siege engine. These were attacked from within the city by the engines of Saladin who also employed greek fire against them. The crusaders fortified their camp by throwing up a barrier from shore to shore in front of the walls running round the city. This was reinforced with shields and timbers, a task which, no doubt, would have taken a considerable amount of manpower to perform. Philip Augustus and a large number of french nobles arrived at Acre on 20th April and remained until 1st August. He was followed very closely by Richard who offered to pay those who were taking part in the siege four besants a week, as opposed to the 3 besants being offered by Philip Augustus. This clearly indicates the rivalry which existed between the kings which may even have led to a certain amount of competition developing in the building of siege weapons.
It is clear from written sources that the French king had siege engines transported in ships to Acre whilst others may have been constructed from local materials. One of these was a petraria named Malvoisin which eventually breached part of the city wall. Other machines built by the French king included a ‘cat castle’, presumable a kind of mobile mining engine and a ‘testudo’, which was destroyed by Greek fire fuelled with brushwood. Philip’s men undermined the tower named Maledictum at one corner of the city’s defences making a cavity which was then supported by props. The Turks countermined however and cut them off. Richard also had a testudo built which was guarded by crossbow men whilst the sappers protected by it undermined the city wall. Also taking part in the siege were contingents of Hospitallers and Templars and a force led by the count of Flanders. When the count was killed Richard was given his siege engines to add to his battery, which consisted of five mangonels of varying sizes and a siege tower which was protected by wood and twisted ropes. Ambroise reports that Richard had special ‘sea stones’ for his machines bought from Messina. The siege of Acre saw the coming together of a large army consisting of men from a variety of origins. The combination of this and the situation created by besieging a strongly defenced city in hostile territory may possibly have led to technical innovation, the exchange of ideas and transfer of skills.

Large scale earthworks, such as those employed at Acre, can again be seen in use at Evreux which was besieged in 1194 by Philip Augustus. A ditch was dug around the town and reinforced with wicker hurdles. The ingenuity and skill of the king’s engineers was demonstrated once again at Gurnay in 1202 when the dyke surrounding the town’s defensive moat was pierced by a digging engine. The water of the river Epte inundated the town and demolished its defences.

All three of these examples illustrate how the besieging of towns and cities could be carried out to devastating effect with the correct amount of manpower and skill. It is the siege of Château Gaillard, however that provides us with one of the best examples of how Philip Augustus employed his resources, ingenuity and determination to take a fortress. The siege of Château Gaillard in 1204 is one of the best documented military events of the period.

---

2 *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, 72, p. 192.
3 Ibid. p. 208.
incidents in the narrative sources for the reign of Philip Augustus.\footnote{The siege of Château Gaillard is described in the *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, 121 - 129. Also see Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy*, p. 374-7 and K.Norgate, *John Lackland* (London, 1902), p. 95-100.} It therefore provides an excellent example of the techniques available to Philip Augustus and used by the king in siege warfare. This is mainly due to the detailed description of the siege provided by William the Breton in his two works the *Gesta* and *Philippiad*. He first of all describes the complex of fortifications constructed by Richard I above the Seine, noting that the town of Les Andelys, which lay within the shadow of Château Gaillard was entirely surrounded by water, on one side by the river Seine and on the other by the diversion of a stream which ran out of the river. The entrances to the town were defended by fortified bridges. The castle itself was situated above the town on high cliffs. The whole complex of fortifications on the rock was said by William to extend over 400 paces in length, the right bank of the river being entirely commanded by the castle and the walled town. In the middle of the river opposite the village was a fortified islet which contained a small garrison. It was here that Philip first attacked. Siege engines were erected on the southern bank of the river, these fired stones against the ramparts of the island fortress. The garrison of the island returned fire with missiles and arrows.

Seeing that no further advance could be made the king ordered that a flotilla of barges be brought up river. From these barges he formed a pontoon bridge. When the bridge was complete Philip had a portion of his troops go across the river by means of the pontoon bridge in order to begin besieging the town. A further encumbrance to the French troops lay in the form of a row of stakes embedded in the river bed. Philip sent divers to destroy this underwater stockade and then land on the fortified island. Once this was achieved the fortifications on the island were fired, assaulted and taken, thus overcoming a major obstacle and allowing the French to attack the town more easily. The town was taken and its inhabitants fled to the protection of the castle. The king’s troops now settled down to what they knew would be a protracted siege.

William the Breton mentions several times the impregnability of Gaillard, stating that the banks of the river were so steep and high that King Philip could not hope to take the place by storm. He therefore made plans to blockade the castle over the winter, preventing anybody entering or leaving the place. The king ordered wide ditches to be dug around the fortress which were flooded with water. 7 wooden counter forts were
constructed at equal distances from each other along this ditch. Each had a drawbridge and a garrison of its own. In the spring the siege proceeded once again in earnest. Philip had the slopes around the castle flattened and "machines and petrarias" drawn up along the now level ground. Roofs made of wood and wicker were used by those who flattened the slopes to protect them from missiles. A siege tower made of oak and wicker was drawn up to the walls and a musculus (digging machine) was also employed to undermine the foundations, the crew which operated it also being protected under a roof. The garrison of the besieged castle possessed petrariis and mangonellis (siege artillery).

The French now attacked with the musculus under a protective roof at the angle of the castle's wall where a tower joined it. A deep ditch which had only been half filled however prevented them from making further progress. By means of ladders they climbed into this ditch up the other side protecting themselves with their shields. Under the cover of these shields, they proceeded to tunnel under the foundations of the tower with picks and shovels. Staves were then inserted to support the roof of the tunnel, these were then ignited and the tower collapsed allowing the French to force themselves into the outer bailey of the castle. William the Breton notes, however, that the French found the inner bailey more difficult to take.

The castle chapel which had been added by King John had a window opening out onto one of the outer walls. Underneath this window was an outlet from a garderobe. A small band of men climbed up the latrine's outlet channel until they came out under this window. Swinging themselves through the window they entered the chapel and set fire to it, making a great noise in order to cause panic amongst the castle's garrison. In all the smoke and confusion the defenders retreated to the keep. A musculos was now employed to undermine the walls of the castle keep and a petraria named Chadabula fired rocks and masonry from the ruined walls. A breach was eventually made, large enough for the French troops to enter and the castle was taken with a garrison of 40 knights and 120 men at arms surrendering.

The description of the siege of Château Gaillard given by William the Breton demonstrates that Philip Augustus had considerable manpower and engineering expertise at his command. The military force needed to surround and blockade Gaillard for several months would be considerable. The digging of such earthworks would also
have required substantial manual labour. As well as soldiers and labourers, skilled engineers and carpenters would have been needed to construct artillery pieces, mining devices and the defensive forts. The construction of a pontoon bridge again points to the use of skilled military engineers. The mining operations also appear to have been sustained and extensive. Employing such men for long periods of time would no doubt have cost the king a considerable amount of money. Not only do their wages need to be considered but also the cost of materials for the construction of the engines.

These examples of siege warfare carried out by the army of Philip Augustus provide ample evidence for the way siege warfare was being carried out in the late twelfth century in Northern France. The crusaders who travelled to the Languedoc, whilst not necessarily possessing the resources that the king of France could command, nevertheless were presumably familiar with the type of machines and techniques described above. Using written evidence, it is possible to examine the types of weapons used by the crusaders and their opponents and to compare the methods used each of them.

4.2 Siege Weapons of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and their use during the Albigensian Crusade

As can be seen from the above examples, siege weapons of this period can be divided into three basic types, siege towers, devices used for undermining walls and affording protection for those doing so and missile throwing engines. The former two types often performed the same function. Table 2 shows the frequency with which each type of engine was used during the crusade according to the *Chanson*. Each type of engine will now be examined individually and examples given of how and when they were used during the Albigensian Crusade.

4.2.1 Siege Towers

The siege tower was a device designed to carry out two primary functions, that of covering mining operations against a wall and providing a means by which the top of the
wall might be reached. The use of the siege tower by the Romans is well documented, its use during the middle ages in Western Europe, however, does not appear to have been common until the eleventh century and early references to them are most commonly found during the First Crusade. These large mobile siege engines are variously referred to in Latin as *berfredum, castellum ligneum, castrum, turris* and *ambulatoria* and were constructed with the use of four vertical corner beams slanted inwards. Some had internal stairways to allow for the movement and protection of troops. As with other siege engines, such structures were extremely vulnerable to incendiary attack and were often covered with materials such as semi-cured animal hides soaked in water to protect against such an assault, hung in strips in order the facilitate their quick removal.

Siege towers could be armoured with layers of osier or wickerwork to absorb the shock of missiles thrown against them, some were even iron plated. They were moved by means of either wheels or rollers, this of course necessitated the smoothing of a path in order that the tower could be manoeuvred into position. Large teams of men would have been required, therefore, to level an approach, filling in ditches with any material that was readily available. The *Chanson* mentions the use of a siege tower during the Albigensian Crusade only once, this by the crusaders. Table 2 shows the frequency with which each type of siege machine was used according to the *Chanson*. The tower is referred as a *castel* and is described as being placed against the town walls of Beaucaire in an effort to relieve the crusader garrison. The use of such a device as a siege tower would have been extremely difficult bearing in mind the sites of many of the castles besieged during the crusade, placed as they were on lofty pinnacles where a smooth approach would have been very difficult to achieve.

---

8 Chanson, v. 162, 92.
4.2.2 Mining, Rams, Bores and Armoured Roofs

A second type of siege machine commonly used during the middle ages was that used to facilitate the undermining of fortifications. These consisted of two main types: machines used for excavation and boring and protective roofs used to protect engineers and workmen carrying out this work. Often the two functions would be combined. Boring machines used for undermining defences are referred to by a variety of different names in Latin and vernacular sources including mouse (*musculus*) and cat (*catus* or *gatus*, in Provençal). Such machines often consisted of a rotating beam with an iron head which would be used as a kind of drill.⁹

The cat appears to have been one of the most widely used of the siege engines employed during the Albigensian Crusade by the northern invaders. This device is mentioned in the *Chanson* as being used at the sieges of Moissac¹⁰, Beaucaire¹¹ and Toulouse¹². The anonymous continuator of the *Chanson* depicts Simon de Montfort boasting that the cat he will use at Toulouse will be able to accommodate 400 knights as well as archers and men at arms.¹³ Simon de Montfort’s carpenters are said to have spent a month building this cat.¹⁴ It is clear that this device was under constant bombardment from the missile throwing siege engines of the defenders of Toulouse. A trebuchet firing from within the city scored a direct hit upon this cat. Simon de Montfort’s men started to repair it when a sortie was launched and a major struggle ensued to save the engine, illustrating the importance placed on the engine by both the defenders and the crusaders.

At Moissac Simon de Montfort had wood transported in order that a cat could be built by his carpenters.¹⁵ These carpenters were guarded by a force of crusaders as they worked and were continually harassed by the defending garrison, who on one

---

¹⁰ *Chanson*, v. 119, 7.
¹¹ *Chanson*, v. 162, 92.
¹² *Chanson*, v. 200, 80.
¹³ *Chanson*, v. 22, 84.
¹⁴ Simon de Montfort ordered the cat to be made at the beginning of May 1218 as well as a siege tower and artillery pieces (*Chanson*, v. 196, 30)
¹⁵ *Chanson*, v. 120, 8 - v.121, 3, the machines are described in provençal as being 'peireiras', 'gata' and a 'bosson', these are presumably the same machines mentioned in *Historia*, 119, where the archdeacon of Paris was active in helping in the construction of these siege engines.
occasion succeeded in destroying the cat that was under construction, once again illustrating the major importance placed on the destruction of potentially dangerous siege engines.\footnote{Chanson, v. 121, 5ff.}

The name for a protective roof and the boring machine it protected often appear to have been interchangeable. These roofs are often referred to as a \textit{cattus}, \textit{gattus}, \textit{testuda} or \textit{vimineus}. They came in various sizes, small roofs differing very little from shields, and were used to protect labouring crews in areas within missile range. Larger roofs were also designed to protect workmen who were preparing the ground for the approach of large siege engines such as siege towers which needed a smooth approach to be able to be put in position for an assault on a wall. Such large roofs were also used for the protection of crews working rams. Large mobile protective shields were used by the crusaders at the first siege of Toulouse in June 1211 as a means of protection for men who were carrying material up to the walls of the city in an attempt to fill in the ditch that surrounded it.\footnote{Chanson, v. 80, 1-6.} A cat is one of the major features of William of Puylaurens short description of the siege operations at Toulouse. He describes it as being a machine of wood which was used as a cover in order to allow the crusaders to drag wood and earth closer to the city walls and fill in the ditches which surrounded them in order to make the ground level.\footnote{Chronicle, 28 Historia, 96}

A device described as a \textit{carrum} was used by the crusaders at Carcassonne to undermine the wall of the Castellare suburb. It is described as having four wheels and being covered in ox hides.\footnote{Chanson, v. 121, 5ff.} The sappers, who were protected by this wheeled shelter succeeded in undermining the base of the wall, the shelter, however, was then destroyed by fire. This device is described as being constantly threatened by the city's defenders hurling stones, and burning wood. The \textit{Chanson} describes the use of \textit{gatas} at Carcassonne made from tree trunks which were used after the ditches around the walls had been filled in.

Metal tipped tree trunks were often used as rams and were often integrated into a protective roof. These are variously referred to by names such as \textit{aries} or \textit{bercelleum} (\textit{bofo} or \textit{bosson} in Provençal) and were slung under a wooden frame and protected by a
covering known as a mantlet. Occasionally a two pronged fork is known to have been used to grip the end of the ram in order to over turn it.\(^{20}\) The ram was a weapon that was also used widely by the both sides during the Albigensian Crusade for example at Penne d'Agenais\(^{21}\) and Beaucaire\(^{22}\). At Beaucaire the Young Count Raymond's men constructed a battering ram to assault the castle wall.\(^{23}\) The defenders attempted to keep the ram at bay by showering the men who operated it with missiles and also by lowering over the wall, on a chain, a mixture of burning sulphur and oakum wrapped in a piece of cloth in an attempt to choke the attackers.\(^{24}\) They also used a lasso type device which briefly succeeded in snaring the end of the battering ram.

4.2.3 Siege engines:-- missiles throwing weapons

A third common type of siege engine used during this period was that designed to hurl missiles. These were used in both an offensive and defensive capacity. Terms commonly used for such engines in Latin and vernacular sources include *fundae*, *tormentum*, *tormenta*, *petraria*, *margonell*, *balistae*, *fonelval*, *springald*, *paterell*, *brigoles*, *algarradas*, *calabres*, *chaabala* and *mangana*. These terms are often interchangeable.\(^{25}\)

The usage of effective and efficient artillery very much depended on the availability of men skilled in the art of building and operating such machines. Such machines are known to have been widely used by Greek and particularly Roman armies. There are some fundamental problems with the available written evidence for the continued use into the Middle Ages of the types of torsion weapons used by both the Romans and Greeks.

Almost all our knowledge of artillery weapons of this kind is derived from narrative accounts and the terms used by most early authors are often inconsistent, confusing and almost always lacking in detailed description. It is very difficult therefore, to attempt any sort of reconstruction of these weapons using early medieval written sources. It is only in the thirteenth century that more detailed descriptions of siege engines became available.

---

\(^{20}\) Warner, *Sieges of the Middle Ages*, p.29.

\(^{21}\) Chanson, v. 114, 27.

\(^{22}\) Chanson, v. 158, 36.

\(^{23}\) Chanson, v. 164, 12. This machine is called a *bosso* and is described as being long, straight and pointed with a steel tip,

\(^{24}\) Chanson, v. 164, 123 -127.

weapons appear, owing to an emerging interest in the science of warfare and the
popularity of treatises on the subject.\(^{26}\) One of the earliest references in the Middle Ages
to the use of siege artillery is in Abbo's description of the siege of Paris in 885. \(^{27}\) This
provides a good example of the confusion caused by early descriptions of siege artillery,
the terms he uses having been variously interpreted to mean both torsion and lever
artillery. The \textit{Chanson}, in common with other written sources of the period, provides the
reader with few clues as to the nature of such machines. There is also the added
difficulty of dealing with a poetic work where the variety of vocabulary is presumably
intended to add to the effectiveness of the poetry. The reader, therefore, can never be
sure if the poet is referring to different types of machine or the same device but merely in
a different manner.

Narrative accounts of the use of siege artillery are seldom enough to provide any
cue as to the exact type of weapon being described. Latin terms such as \textit{ballista},
\textit{catapulta} and \textit{tormentum} were still commonly used during the Middle Ages, but were
gradually being replaced with other terms such as \textit{mangona}, \textit{mangonell} and \textit{petraria}.
This use of different terminology has caused much debate over the continuity in the use
of torsion weapons into the Middle Ages and the date for the introduction of counter
weight trebuchets as opposed to those using human leverage.\(^{28}\)

The traction trebuchet relied on manual leverage provided by a team of men
pulling on ropes whilst other types of trebuchet used a counterweight. There is little
evidence that the counterweight device existed before the twelfth century. The first
mention of traction trebuchet in a written source appears in a description of the siege of
Lisbon in 1147 when a battery of this type of engine was used.\(^{29}\) The traction trebuchet
was probably a light, easily handled weapon, capable of hurling only small and medium
sized missiles. It also used considerably more manpower than a counterweight device
and the operating crew would have been particularly vulnerable to attack. The counter
weight trebuchet appears to have been invented in the Mediterranean region in the
twelfth century, the first unambiguous description of one appearing in 1199 in an Italian

\(^{26}\) Rogers, \textit{Latin Siege Warfare}, p.254.
\(^{27}\) Contamine, \textit{War in the Middle Ages}, p. 105.
\(^{28}\) For a summary of the debate over torsion and lever artillery and the introduction of the traction
\(^{29}\) For the introduction of the traction trebuchet to the west see D. Hill 'Trebuchets', \textit{Viator}, 4 (1973),
pp. 99-117.
source. From here its use spread rapidly to northern Europe. It was probably far more accurate and consistent device, able to throw heavier missiles for longer distances.  

There is some evidence to suggest that a transitional device using both human traction and a counterweight existed and it is possible that such a device may have been in use during the Albigensian Crusade. A relief carving exists in the church of St. Nazaire at Carcassonne (Figure 14) which may show this type of device. The carving has often been interpreted as depicting the death of Simon de Montfort at Toulouse in 1217. De Montfort was killed by a heavy block of masonry hurled from a machine described in the *Chanson* as a *trabuquet*. The carving depicts a machine which not only appears to have a fixed counterweight but is also being pulled by a team of men and women. At the top a projectile is placed in a sling, at the bottom to the left appears to be the engineer and at the end of the shorter side of the throwing arm is what could be a counter weight. To the right can be seen figures using ropes to provide traction. A passage in the *Chanson* describes how the ropes of the trebuchets used by the Toulousains were pulled by 10,000 men, an exaggeration, but indicating a large number nevertheless. This description may offer an important clue as to the type of engine being used. The large number of men needed to provide this kind of leverage may indicated that a counterweight machine was not in use, but rather a device using human traction. The use of a trebuchet is described only three times in the *Chanson*, at Carcassonne, Castelnaudary and Toulouse. On all of these occasions they are used by troops fighting on the side of Raymond of Toulouse. This may or may not be significant. If it is true that the trebuchet was first developed in the Mediterranean region and spread north, such evidence could suggest that the southerners had access to more advanced technology. This is not certain, however, and there is evidence to suggest that such a device was in use in northern France at a similar date. For example, Prince Louis of France is described as using a trebuchet during his invasion of England in 1216.

In order to build some of the larger types of traction engine a large supply of the wood would, naturally, have been needed. The beams for these machines alone would

30 Hill, 'Trebuchets', pp. 103-5.
32 Chanson, v. 205, 124. The machine is described as being operated by a team of women and standing on a platform above the walls of the city.
have been several metres long, the longer the beam, the heavier the projectile it could throw.\textsuperscript{35} Such beams may even have required a certain type of wood which had been specially treated for the purpose.\textsuperscript{36} If this is the case, it is unlikely that such machines could have been constructed on-site using local materials. The transport of such machines must be then be considered as an option. It has been estimated that the maximum length of the beam for a large siege engine may have been in the region of 30 ft. There would have been considerable difficulties in transporting a machine as large as this.\textsuperscript{37} If one considers the terrain which exists in some areas of the south west of France and the location of some of the fortifications besieged during the Albigensian Crusade, transport of siege engines by the crusaders could have presented a major problem. The written sources for the crusade refer on several occasions to the building of siege weapons on site at certain locations.\textsuperscript{38} They also, however, refer to such weapons being transported for long distances. For example, when Simon de Montfort left Carcassonne for Termes in July 1210, he left William de Contres with instructions that his siege train was to be packed and transported to Termes as soon as possible. The machines transported are described as being \textit{'peirriers'} and \textit{'mangonneaux'}\textsuperscript{39} This siege train was delayed by the rough terrain and lack of roads in the area and took several weeks to travel the distance of approximately 15 miles.

Counterweights and ammunition for artillery machines were probably obtained locally. Problems could have arisen, however, if the local stone used for this purpose was too soft to withstand the impact when hurled from the machines against defensive walls. This appears to have been the case at Castelnaudary where Count Raymond’s army are depicted in the \textit{Chanson} as being in possession of a trebuchet. They found that they could not find suitable stones to use as missiles because the ones they found locally shattered on impact against the walls of the town.\textsuperscript{40} Fortifications which maintained siege engines permanently may very well have kept suitable ammunition on site. Shaped stone balls weighing between 41 and 97 kg have been found at Carcassonne which date

\textsuperscript{35} Rogers, \textit{Latin Siege Warfare}, p. 254.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 254.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p.271.
\textsuperscript{38} For example at Termes, Toulouse and Beaucaire.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Chanson}, v. 54, 4, 13 and 27.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Chanson}, v. 92, 13-17. As mentioned above, Richard I may well have been aware of such problems, as he is reported to have had missiles transported from Sicily to Acre to be used by his siege engines.
from the thirteenth century, implying that a battery of such engines were kept there at this time.\textsuperscript{41}

There are numerous examples of artillery weapons being used by both sides during the Albigensian Crusade. The use of *petrarie* by the crusaders is described at the siege of Carcassonne\textsuperscript{42}. The stones being launched from these engines are described as travelling in a wide arc upwards and over the wall of the Castellare suburb suggesting that the type of machine in use was either inaccurate or was being used in an anti-personel capacity. The crusaders when assaulting the city's main defences also used missile throwing engines. The *Chanson* describes the use of *peireiras* and *calabras* which were dragged up to the city walls and employed to batter it with huge boulders.\textsuperscript{43} The siege of Beaucaire provides an excellent example of how different types of siege engine could be used in concert with one another. A siege tower and cat were flanked with a catapult which operated constantly against the town gates and walls and had some success in breaking off stones from its crenellated top. This constant hail of stones was presumably intended to prevent a sustained assault on the crusaders' other engines as they worked against the wall, thus showing such machines being used in a defensive capacity.\textsuperscript{44} The Young Count Raymond also used a variety of artillery type weapons at Beaucaire, ordering the building of machines described as *mangonels* and *gousas* along with other siege engines.\textsuperscript{45} Siege engines fired from within the town by Raymond's men gradually demolished the upper parts of the keep of the castle.\textsuperscript{46}

At Moissac it is reported that the nephew of the archbishop of Rheims was captured, hacked to pieces and shot from the mangonels of the garrison inside the town.\textsuperscript{47} The crusaders' machines destroyed a large part of the town's wall. The *Chanson* records that a *peirier* assaulted the walls both night and day until a breach was

\textsuperscript{41} See Fino, *Forteresses de la France Médiévale*, p. 149
\textsuperscript{42} *Historia*, 96.
\textsuperscript{43} *Chanson*, v. 25, 4.
\textsuperscript{44} *Chanson*, v. 162, 87-96. Later on in the *Chanson*'s description of the siege (*Chanson*, v. 166, 15-17) the poet describes how a catapult of the crusading army severely damages the town walls at the Vigne gate (see plan) as well as the rampart of the castle.
\textsuperscript{45} *Chanson*, v. 159, 12. Martin-Chabot notes that this list of engines and defences is very similar to that of a passage in the work of the troubadour Rambaud de Vaqueiras (*Chanson*, Vol. 2, p125, n 4). If it is the case that the vocabulary used to describe such engines is in conscious imitation of other literary works then caution needs to be used in drawing any sort of conclusion about the exact nature of weapons being described.
\textsuperscript{46} *Chanson*, v. 164, 18.
\textsuperscript{47} *Historia*, 343.
eventually made. At Minerve the crusaders’ machines succeeded in destroying a covered passageway which led to the castle’s only water supply whilst the rest of the citadel had become badly damaged during the course of its bombardment, showing that their machines must have been reasonably accurate in their aim.

The siege of Termes provides an example of how the use of siege engines could be hampered by inaccuracy and the unsuitability of the site it was erected on. A mangonel is reported to have been erected by the crusaders, to bombard the isolated tower (Termener) which formed part of the town’s fortifications. This effectively cut off the tower and caused it to be abandoned. The crusaders however were still able to make little headway in the task of reducing the castle. The only ground suitable for setting up machines was almost out of range and the damage that the machines did to the eastern wall of the castle was soon repaired by the garrison, suggesting the machines did not hit the same point in the wall with any consistency or regularity. Each time a breach was made that was large enough for the crusaders to enter, they found their way blocked by a makeshift barricade hastily constructed from wood and debris. As fast as the wall was being destroyed from the outside it was being shored up from the inside. The defenders of Termes also had machines of their own. Peter of les Vaux de Cernay mentions the use of a mangonel. The only siege engine of the crusaders that appears to have done any great damage to the castle was a mangonel which was sited on a cliff opposite the castle walls and separated from the crusaders camp by a deep cleft in the rock. This, however was attacked and set alight by the garrison in one of their periodic sorties. It is said by Peter of les Vaux de Cernay that Simon de Montfort had 300 men guarding this one machine, an indication, perhaps, of the worth which was placed on its contribution to the siege operations. In October the crusader’s siege engines were moved closer to walls and returned to attacking them, under the supervision of the archdeacon of Paris.

It appears that a wide variety of siege engines and methods were used with varying degrees of efficiency by both sides during the Albigensian Crusade. In common

48 Chanson, v. 123, 5. It was the sight of this breach according to the Chanson which caused the towns people to panic and seek to negotiate with de Montfort, although the Historia does not mention this.
49 Historia 178.
50 Historia 190
51 Historia 179
52 Historia 179
53 Historia 188
with many other periods and conflicts, one of the major problems in studying the use of siege engines is the terminology employed in the written sources, particularly regarding siege artillery which can be extremely vague. It is often very difficult to ascertain with any certainty by which mechanism these machines were driven. What does emerge from the narrative sources however is the use of skilled engineers, miners and craftsmen by both sides to operate and build these and other machines.

4.3 Engineers

Men skilled in building and operating siege engines and undermining fortifications played an essential role in any army engaged in siege warfare. These were often the individuals who could command some of the highest wages in an army and were also key figures in the development of siege warfare. The key role that these men played is hinted at by the substantial rewards they could command for their services. Surviving English and French royal records show that some were endowed with land and pensions as a reward for their services. The period of the mid-twelfth century provides some of the earliest written evidence for specialist engineers in the employ of the monarchs of both France and England. There are many references to engineers being employed by the kings of France and England in narrative sources also. Records from Normandy show that engineers employed by Richard I and King John received a wage of around 4 shillings a day. For example, a ‘Master Urric’ is mentioned as having been endowed with land by both these kings.

The royal records of France also show that Philip Augustus retained sappers and engineers in his employ, paying them a wage of 18 deniers a day. There is also evidence for substantial expenditure on the construction of siege engines in the French royal records. A figure of 12s and 4d is noted in the Compte General of 1202 for expenditure on ropes and equipment for engines. Balistae are also mentioned as being made by one

---

54 Rodgers, *Latin Siege Warfare*, p. 82.
55 Cathcart-King, *The Castle in England and Wales*, p. 91
56 See Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy* p. 332 for engineers in the employ of the kings of England and their pay, see also Brown, ‘Royal Castle Building’, p. 35-42 for the use of teams of royal engineers and their pay.
57 See Auduion, *Essai sur l'armée royale*, p. 65, this figure is noted in the returns in the Compte General for Lyons de Forêt.
Renier de Montfort who was paid a wage of 2 shillings per day.\textsuperscript{58} Royal Register A contains a list of armaments for 1200-1202 stored in border castles in Normandy. A later inventory for the castle at Chinon records a \textit{peiriere} and 9 large \textit{chaables} whilst the castle at Falaise contained 2 \textit{peirieres}, 2 mangonels and 50 pairs of ropes (presumably used in the operation of the engines).\textsuperscript{59} Is difficult to say whether all royal castles stored such engines or whether this was a common practice at the time.

It is evident, therefore, that specialist engineers, miners, and craftsmen were in the employ of the monarchs of France and England for the purpose of carrying out siege warfare from the mid-twelfth century at least. The written sources for the Albigensian Crusade also reveal substantial use of men skilled in the arts of building and operating siege engines and undermining fortifications. At the siege of Beaucaire, for example, an engineer working for the Young Count Raymond is described filling a large pot with flaming tar and pouring it on men attempting to undermine the walls of the town.\textsuperscript{60} The same man, or another engineer working for Raymond, is also described as directing the operation of a \textit{bofo} and supervising excavations in an effort to undermine the castle wall at Beaucaire.\textsuperscript{61} Later in the \textit{Chanson}, deliberations between Raymond of Toulouse and his advisors over how best to defend Toulouse are described. Once again an engineer is present, named 'Master Bernard' by the author. He is instructed to build several siege engines, named as \textit{peirers}, \textit{calbres} and a \textit{trabuquet}, in order to demolish the Château Narbonnais.\textsuperscript{62} When the order was given by the count to begin the bombardment of the Château two other men named Master Garnier and Bernard Parayre are in charge of operations.\textsuperscript{63}

The crusaders also employed an number of engineers. At Minerve Simon de Montfort's largest machine, known as \textit{Malevoisine} and described by the \textit{Chanson} as the 'queen of the stone-throwers'\textsuperscript{64} was operated by men whose wages are said to have cost de Montfort 21 livres a day each.\textsuperscript{65} Expertise appears to have come from another

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Ibid. p.101.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} See Contamine, 'L'armée de Philippe Auguste', p. 582.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} \textit{Chanson}, v. 167,10-13.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{Chanson}, v. 164, 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} \textit{Chanson}, v. 191, 108 and v. 192, 1ff.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{Chanson}, v. 198, 1ff, Martin-Chabot contends that the title of master probably denotes a master carpenter (\textit{Chanson}, vol.3, p. 126, n.1)
  \item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Chanson}, v. 48, 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Historia, 152.
\end{itemize}
quarter, in the form of the archdeacon of Paris, described by Peter of les Vaux de Cernay as helping to design and build siege engines at the siege of Termes.

Working from the evidence contained within this survey there is little evidence to suggest that either side during the Albigensian Crusade had access to more advanced technology than the other. It is particularly difficult to come to any firm conclusions regarding types of artillery in use owing to the nature of the written evidence. No evidence appears to exist for the transfer of new technologies from one area to another. Examining the use of siege engines and the employment of engineers during the Albigensian Crusade can show us the technology and skills available to the crusaders. It is only by examining the circumstances under which siege warfare was carried out during the Albigensian Crusade that a fuller picture can be built up.

4.4 The conduct of siege warfare during the Albigensian Crusade.

As can be seen in Chapter 3 the crusaders were forced to contend with a variety of fortifications from the high mountain strongholds, to the fortified towns of the plains and the centres of urban population. Each presented a new challenge to the crusaders, each needing to be dealt with in a specific way. The well fortified cities of the Languedoc were to prove one of the most difficult challenges for the crusaders. Besieging such cities bought special problems of its own. At Carcassonne and Toulouse the crusaders found it very difficult to muster enough troops to surround the fortifications which extended for several miles. In the case of Carcassonne, however, the nature of the fortified city was to prove an advantage to the crusaders as they were able to attack a weak points in the suburbs. The nature of warfare within a town or city meant besiegers could attack defenders’ positions under the cover of houses. The defenders, however, could slow down the attackers by erecting barricades in the narrow streets. At Carcassonne, after the crusaders had gained control of the Castellare suburb, they were forced to retreat by the city’s defenders. Observing the use that had been made by the crusaders of the cover of the houses in the suburb, the defenders of Carcassonne
deliberately set the buildings of the Castellare on fire, thus denying the besiegers this shelter. 66

At Beaucaire, the layout of the town allowed for the erecting of a wall between the relieving crusading army and the army of the Young Count Raymond. This effectively meant that the besiegers themselves were under siege. Barricades made of wooden beams and posts were established in the streets and these were guarded constantly by Raymond's troops. 67 Because of the arrangement of the town of Beaucaire in relation to its fortifications the crusader garrison became completely cut off once the Young Count's troops had taken the outlying redorte. As can be seen in Figure 6, with the town to the South, the redorte to the north and the river to the east, patrolling on which was a fleet of barges, 68 the garrison was completely cut off from a relieving force. The road was also closely guarded to the west. The garrison in the castle, however, held out for more than 4 months. It was not until the first week of June 1216 that Simon de Montfort reached Beaucaire with a force of men. By this time the besiegers were well established behind their lines on the hill beneath the castle and the aforementioned wall had been built stretching from the town wall to the redorte. 69 The garrison could make no sorties into the town and the crusading force was unable to get close enough to relieve them.

The siege of Toulouse provides us with another example of how siege warfare could be carried out against a large fortification. After Count Raymond had entered the city, his supporters proceeded to launch an assault on the crusaders defending the Château Narbonnais. The people of Toulouse under the wall of the Château had erected barricades and other defences including a wall, which the Chanson describes as having a covered passageway to protect against the arrows and crossbow bolts of crusaders who were stationed on the walls of the Château. 70 It is also described as having walkways and wooden houards. These defences were manned with men armed with baskets of stones, and other missiles as well and lances and hunting spears. The building of these defences is described as being a communal effort in which the highest to the lowest of

66 Historia, 95.
67 Chanson, v. 156, 36-38.
69 Chanson, v. 158, 6ff. This is described as having a platform (wall-walk?) and stone foundations and was constructed by a workforce consisting of both knights and women from the town.
70 Chanson, v. 183, 61ff, these fortifications prevented all travel along the main south-north roads into the city, see also Historia, 600 and Chronicle, XXIX for description of the these walls.
the social scale took part. The Toulousains prepared for an attack from outside the city by barricading the streets at all the entrances to the city. Guy de Montfort was repelled by the defenders of these barricades with heavy losses when he tried to attack at the Porte de Montoulieu. When Simon de Montfort arrived in the city in late September 1217, a continuous line of trenches extended from the Garonne to the cathedral and reinforcements for Raymond were coming from Spain as well the surrounding countryside. It was the people of the city themselves, however, that provided the backbone of the defence. Those who were not fighting were ordered to keep watch or dig trenches. During the winter of 1217/18 the crusaders did not succeed once in penetrating the lines of defence established by the Toulousains.

The use of amphibious assault and defence occurred on more than one occasion during the crusade. At Beaucaire Raymond's troops were kept well supplied by the river traffic from Tarascon. Simon de Montfort on the other hand, had to rely on receiving supplies from the towns of St Gilles and Nimes, and what is more, the flotilla of boats at Raymond's disposal were also preventing the relieving army from gaining access to drinking water. At Toulouse, the Pont Neuf to the south west of the city became the centre of activity during the siege of 1216/17 as described above.

Destruction of siege engines appears to have been a paramount objective of besieged defenders and many sorties and raids were undertaken with this aim. At Minerve on the night of 18 July the garrison made a sortie in an attempt to destroy the crusaders' siege engines. The machines were set on fire and the flames were fuelled with dry wood, animal fat, bales of straw and flax. The crusaders, however, were woken by the noise and the fire was put out. The Chanson records that Pierre Roger of Cabaret made a daring attack on the crusaders' machines which had been left outside the walls of Carcassonne with an escort of less than 100 men. The force from Cabaret which mounted a night-time assault on the machines and their guardians was reckoned to

---

71 For examples see Chanson, v. 172, 71 & v. 183, 65-70.
72 Chanson, v. 184.
73 Chanson, v. 185, 65ff.
74 Chanson, v. 162, 67ff, the poet tells us that Raymond's troops had all the supplies they could wish for whilst the castle garrison were running out of both food and drink rapidly (no doubt because of Raymond's unexpected arrival at Beaucaire). Also see Chronicle XXVI, where it is said they were even reduced to eating their horses.
75 Chanson, v. 162, 79.
76 Historia,153.
77 Chanson, v. 54, 4.
have numbered 300. Such raids and sorties follow a familiar pattern common in warfare in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and occurred frequently during the Albigensian Crusade.

The 'scorched earth' policy employed by southerners against the crusaders in the countryside surrounding Carcassonne is again a familiar feature of warfare of this period. The gathering in of food-stuffs and destruction of potential supplies for those besieging the city as well as the floating water-mills on the river is described in the Chanson. This policy does not appear to have been very successful in this instance, however, as the Chanson records that the crusaders traded salt for bread at very favourable prices.

Water and food supply was a deciding factor in the outcome of many of the sieges. The Chanson emphasises the suffering of the people inside Carcassonne during the siege of 1212. It had been an unusually dry summer with unbearable heat. This, coupled with the overcrowding within the city caused rapid spread of disease in cramped and unhygienic conditions. On August 14th the garrison of the city, exhausted by lack of food and water and weakened by disease, agreed to the terms of the crusaders. At Minerve it became immediately apparent that it would be very difficult to take the town by storm due to its excellent natural defences. The one weakness that Minerve had was its lack of a good water supply within the fortifications. The fortress was built on rock and the only water supply in the vicinity came from a well, situated at the edge of a ravine 250 yards above the river. This was however only 60 yards away from the besiegers who were stationed on the other side (Figure 12). The approach to the well was protected by a covered passageway. If the storage tanks in the castle were empty and this covered passageway was destroyed then the castle garrison would have no way of reaching a water supply. It were therefore opposite the covered passageway that the crusaders sited some their siege engines.

At Termes, although Simon de Montfort was unaware of the fact, by the fourth month of the siege the garrison by were desperately short of water. In October Raymond of Termes offered to surrender the castle and his lands for the duration of the winter. This was probably an attractive offer to de Montfort, most of his forces being

---

78 Chanson, v. 54, 10.
80 Chanson, v. 30, 9ff.
81 Historia, 181.
82 Peter of les Vaux de Cernay says that Raymond of Termes was determined to negotiate with de
anxious to leave before winter set in, he could expect few new recruits until the spring of the next year. Simon accepted Raymond's terms and the majority of his force prepared to depart the next day. However that night, after a long period of drought, heavy rainfall filled the cisterns within the castle leading the garrison to refuse to surrender as agreed. De Montfort could now do little as the bulk of his force had now departed in order to return to the North. The bishop of Chartres attempted to negotiate with the garrison but to no avail and when they emerged from the castle it was only with the intention of taking the opportunity to destroy the crusaders siege engines. In November, however, dysentery began to effect the men of the garrison due, no doubt, to the increasingly unsanitary conditions they had been forced to live under. It can be seen therefore that strength of fortifications and efficiency of attack were not the only factors effecting the outcome of a siege.

One particular feature of the warfare carried out during the Albigensian Crusade that is often commented on is the appalling cruelty suffered by the inhabitants of some of the fortifications taken by the crusaders, heretics and orthodox alike. The massacre of the inhabitants of Béziers carried out by the crusaders is often cited as an example of the indiscriminate punishment meted out to those who refused to surrender heretics to the crusaders. At Minerve, William of Minerve sought to surrender to the crusaders and although the garrison were allowed to leave unharmed a large number of Cathar perfects were burned on huge pyres outside the town. This was the first example of a practice that was to become a regular feature of the war in the south as it progressed. Heretics and those who abetted them were in many ways seen as operating outside the boundaries of christian society and treated accordingly.

Montfort until the night of the downpour which made him more confident that the garrison could hold out. It was originally agreed that the castle would be returned to Raymond on 3rd April the following spring. See Historia, 181. Historia, 181, the author notes that de Montfort and his wife both pleaded with the departing crusaders to stay for a few more days, perhaps suspecting duplicity on the part of Raymond; the bishop of Chartres eventually relented and agreed to stay.

84 Historia, 185.
85 Historia, 186.
86 Chanson, v. 21-22 & Historia, 91.
87 Historia, 153, the author writes that he was present during the negotiations between de Montfort and William.
88 Chanson, v. 49, 11.
It can be clearly seen that different circumstances merited different reactions from the victors of a siege. When the castle garrison at Termes made an attempt to escape, some of them succeeded in getting away whilst others were discovered and captured or killed and the castle taken. Raymond of Termes himself was captured and died a few months later in captivity, as Raymond Roger Trencavel had done after the capture of Carcassonne. Their treatment was no doubt due in some part to the breaking of their agreement with the crusaders to surrender the castle. Such harsh measures were in no way unusual in such circumstances and many examples of similar treatment can be found ranging widely in their date and geographical location. The siege of Château Gaillard provides an example of comparable behaviour on the part of Philip Augustus who left the civilian population of the town of Les Andelys to starve during a harsh winter on the slopes beneath the castle after they had been sent out of the castle by its garrison but had been prevented from passing through the barricades set up by the king’s troops.\footnote{Gesta, 126.}

On the question of the treatment of the defeated, it can be observed that although there are many examples of the crusaders carrying out acts of appalling cruelty on other occasions self-interest led them to restraint. It is possible that Carcassonne was treated relatively mildly compared to Béziers for this reason.\footnote{Evans, ‘The Albigensian Crusade’, p. 289.} It was necessary that they should be able to provision and house themselves at Carcassonne so the city and the countryside around it needed to be preserved as well as possible. This was also very much in the interest of those who hoped to profit from confiscation of lands in the South. At Moissac when the townspeople surrendered they paid 100 gold marks each to stop the crusaders pillaging their property.\footnote{Chanson, v. 124, 5.} The Southerners were sometimes guilty of acts of comparable cruelty against the crusaders, yet at Beaucaire on 24 August 1216 Simon de Montfort accepted terms of surrender and the crusader garrison was allowed to leave the castle unharmed.\footnote{Chanson, v. 170, 46ff. Also see Chronicle, XXVI, Guillaume de Puylaurens records that the surrender of the garrison and lifting of the siege at Beaucaire rallied many to the cause of Raymond and led to many southerners refusing to acknowledge the legitimate lordship of Simon de Montfort.}

It is clear, judging from the available evidence, that the crusaders although able to command the services of skilled engineers and craftsmen very often suffered from a lack of manpower. Although fortifications were eventually taken, factors other that the
attacking strength of the crusading army were at play. In many cases blockade was the only option open to the crusading army and this could only carried out effectively when suitable manpower was available. Such a situation was by no means unusual or unique to the Albigensian Crusade as can be seen in the case of Château Gaillard. Philip Augustus, however, had far greater resources at his disposal and eventually was able to take Gaillard by storm owing to the effective use of mining and siege artillery. In common with much of the warfare of this period the Albigensian Crusade was dominated by sieges although what makes the conflict important to the military historian is the sheer volume of written evidence available. Warfare in the field, however, should not be ignored and it is to this aspect of the conflict that this study will now turn.
Chapter 5

5.0 The study of field warfare and battles as an approach to military history

The question of the role of the army in the field and the importance of pitched battles is one that has, no doubt, been over emphasised by many military historians in the past. It is, however, an area which should not be ignored in the context of the present study for a number of reasons. Many battles in the middle ages were fought as the direct result of sieges, these encounters often being between a besieging army and a relieving force. Encounters in the field were therefore inextricably linked to siege warfare and this is the case with many of the armed encounters known to have taken place during the Albigensian Crusade. Nevertheless, the rarity of such encounters must be emphasised. The avoidance of battle appears to have been a common aim in the warfare of the middle ages, a full scale encounter bringing huge risks and uncertain benefits. Gillingham has observed, that 'victory in battle normally offered rewards sufficient to offset the risks involved only in those societies where the science of fortification was relatively poorly developed.'

Smail, in the same vein, emphasises that the outcome of battle was always uncertain and although success in battle nearly always gained the object of war more quickly and certainly, 'a commander who aims at victory in battle always risks defeat and its consequences'.

The decision to engage in battle was, therefore, often one of last resort, but, battle was important as a means to 'gain an end of war'. Encounters during the Albigensian Crusade can be used to illustrate how the decision to engage in battle was very often born of a desperate attempt to bring matters to a head. On the subject of battle as a means to an end of war, Duby has observed in relation to Bouvines that 'The battle is not war, I would even go as far to say that it is the reverse, the battle is a procedure of peace .... battles do matter however, they are decisive events'. Duby's observations, however, may not be relevant to all battle situations as many battles did not have decisive

---

outcomes or long lasting effects. During the Albigensian Crusade full scale encounters in
the field did sometimes prove decisive; at Muret, for example the crusaders’ victory put
paid to the threat of Aragonese intervention. In other cases the crusaders’ success in
battle gave them little more than short periods of respite. The importance of field armies
in this period, however, goes beyond their role in pitched battles. An army in the field
carried out important activities such as the destruction of the enemy’s property and
potential sources of supply as well as the gathering of supplies for one’s own army. A
mobile force capable of carrying out these functions was therefore very important to the
successful defence of fortified strongholds, as has been observed by Smail amongst
others.4

Verbruggen has made a number of valid points on the insufficiencies of
concentrating on pitched battles as a means of studying the history of war. Although he
acknowledges that a great deal can be learnt from the study of battles in terms of the
strengths and weaknesses of a knightly army, he also points to the pitfalls of such an
approach. First there is the question of taking specific unique incidents in a battle and
drawing general conclusions from them. Another problem is the concept of battle tactics.
It is often questionable whether a leader could impose any sort of planned scheme on his
manoeuvres once a body of men was committed. It is therefore very unlikely that the
outcome of the battle could be influenced except by the bringing up of reserves. Smail is
also of this opinion, observing that a commander may make a plan but once an attack was
launched he had little or no control over them, ‘the result of the battle must be left up to
morale, individual prowess and good fortune’.5

The uncritical use of sources has often presented a problem in the study of military
history, particularly in the study of battles. More recent studies have criticised earlier
military historians for their superficial and uncritical use of source material, seeing the
need to use these texts with care and critical judgement.6 In the past some authors have
taken sources quite literally when they depict battles as merely a series of single combats.
Such assumptions have more recently been challenged. It has been pointed out that
individuals depicted in a battle presumably led a force of men with them so that individual

4 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 25.
encounters should more properly be seen as encounters between groups of men under the leadership of the individual described.  

The question of the use of monastic chronicles and other sources written by churchmen has been addressed earlier in this dissertation and should again be emphasised in the context of war in the field. Churchmen describing these events were often ignorant of military matters and if not eye witness to events could misunderstand the purpose of a certain manoeuvre, even imposing their own interpretations of an army’s behaviour or movements during battle.

The emphasis placed on the pitched battle and the use of heavy cavalry by many military historians is also a reflection on the written sources they used. Monastic chronicles and poetic sources are keen to depict the feats of arms performed on the battlefield. Churchmen often attribute the victory of one side over another to the judgement of God, whilst secular poets are keen to flatter the knightly classes with descriptions of their martial prowess in a situation where the knight was dominant, perhaps with the result that the role of infantry is rarely stated. Battles involving heavy cavalry were exciting and newsworthy and so tend to be recorded by the sources. Poetic works very often concentrate on single combat in order to celebrate an individual’s courage and martial prowess. These are therefore sometimes limited in their usefulness in trying to gain an overall impression of an encounter.

Some authors such as Delbruck have dismissed completely the usefulness of medieval written sources for the study of military history particularly when they are uncorroborated. He states that ‘most medieval writers…. had no sense of recounting what really happened or what seemed credible to them…. it would perhaps be not worth their trouble to portray the real events….. the spirit of the period is whimsical and uncritical’. In many cases it is true that several different sources are needed to build up a complete picture of a military encounter. The dismissal of all uncorroborated medieval sources in such a manner however appears to be rather extreme. The question of the Latin language as a medium for describing military events also has some bearing on the usefulness of clerical sources and has been dealt with elsewhere in this study. Vernacular works such

---

8 See Gillingham ‘Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages’, p.89.
10 See above p. 20.
as the *Chanson* or the *L’histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, however do not suffer from the faults that Verbruggen and Delbruck have pointed out with Latin sources.

Older works on military history have been keen to emphasise the lack of discipline present within the ranks of knighthood and therefore the limited amount of control that would be possible over cavalry manoeuvres on the battlefield, leading to the conclusion that little can be learnt regarding military tactics from these encounters. More recently it has been argued that discipline could be a decisive factor in victory in a battle and this includes the discipline needed to draw up a line of cavalry and keep them together. Several authors have referred to the ‘feigned flight’ mentioned in contemporary sources describing the battle of Hastings. Some historians have dismissed the idea that a force of Norman knights would have the discipline and expertise to perform such manoeuvres. Other authors such Bachrach and Brown, however, see a cavalry force such as this being perfectly capable of acting as a coherent unit in order to perform such an action. Verbruggen points out that both Muret and Bouvines were won because the victorious force was more disciplined in its charge. He argues that at Bouvines in particular, the troops of the Emperor Otto advanced too quickly and unevenly and were therefore more vulnerable to attack and also less able to carry out a disciplined charge.

The role of the early tournament in training and in particular as a means of practising the shock tactics of the cavalry charge has recently been used to counter arguments regarding the undisciplined nature of the heavy cavalry charge. The early form of tournament, which featured a general mêlée, developed in northern France but seems never to have become popular in the South. The rise of the tournament in the North was related to a specific set of political and cultural circumstances, that is the banning of private warfare and a relatively peaceful and stable domestic situation which prevailed in both Northern France and England in the mid to late twelfth century. This served as a vehicle for the dissemination of chivalric ideas, a source of profit and a means

---

whereby knights could train together in the techniques employed in the heavy cavalry charge. Such a situation did not exist in southern France. The absence of the tournament in the South should not be taken as evidence that there was not ample opportunity for southern knights to practice and perfect the cavalry charge as private warfare was endemic in the area at this time.

Another assumption made by older works of military history covering the thirteenth century is the low value placed on foot soldiers, and that effective co-operation between foot soldiers, light cavalry and heavy cavalry could not have been achieved to any great extent. More recently it has been emphasised that foot soldiers had an increasingly important role to play on the battle field, particularly as mercenary soldiers. Devries has pointed out that in many battles of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the victorious side often had the support of infantry and archers as, for example at Antioch, Arsuf and Bouvines. In the fourteenth century, victories at Courtrai and Arques would prove the importance of infantry on the battlefield. In a study of battles involving Norman forces in the eleventh and twelfth centuries Bradbury points out that knights almost invariably dismounted before battle, demonstrating that knights could be used to reinforce infantry when it was required. Contamine points out, however, that the French appear not to have used such a tactic in this period.

All of these factors need to be taken into consideration when dealing with the subject of warfare in the field during the Albigensian Crusade. By observing the way field armies were used it may be possible to draw comparisons between the crusaders and their southern adversaries and so gain a deeper understanding of the way field armies were used during the thirteenth century.

---

19 Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, p. 231.
5.1 Muret and war in the field during the Albigensian Crusade.

The reason for the defeat of the southern French during the Albigensian Crusade has often been depicted as a consequence of poor leadership and more particularly the disunity of the Southern troops, stemming from a disintegrating and decadent society. Typical of such opinion is Lot’s assertion that the crusaders’ victory at Muret was a ‘great feat of arms by no means a miracle’ considering that Peter of Aragon’s army were ‘less homogeneous, and badly commanded’. Belperron typically depicts the crusading army as ‘the best type of knight in Capetian France … animated by faith, formed into a solid body, coherent, intrepid and under an energetic leader’. It may very well be the case that some contingents which took part in the crusade trained together, perhaps meeting at tournaments and may even have campaigned together previously on crusade. Belperron, however, does not take into account the many different origins of the crusaders as described, for example, in the Chanson. If this is the case then the crusaders were surely no more homogeneous in their origins than the southerners.

The crusaders success during the early years of the crusade has also been attributed to the qualities that Simon de Montfort possessed as leader. His early career certainly shows him acquitting himself well at Barletta during the Fourth Crusade and written sources depict him as distinguishing himself at the siege of Carcassonne with his initiative and courage. Peter of les Vaux de Cernay, well known for eulogising de Montfort in his writings calls him ‘wise in council, fair in judgement, wise in decisions, affable and having humility’. The Chanson paints a very different picture and although he is depicted as never listening to discouragement he is also very often not keen to take advice. Modern historians have depicted Simon de Montfort as being energetic, audacious and a decisive leader and he has often been attributed with having the gift of knowing when to attack at the most opportunistic moment.

The rarity of encounters in the field during the Albigensian Crusade between the crusaders and their southern enemies shows that the crusade was in many ways typical of the warfare of this period. The written sources show many of the common activities

---

20 Belperron, La croisade contre les Albigeois, p. 450.
21 See above p. 28.
22 See Historia, 96
23 For a full description of Simon’s qualities according to Peter see Historia, 103 - 105.
known to have been undertaken by an invading army in the field, as well as counter-measures often taken by defenders to deprive the enemy of both food and shelter. The inhabitants of Carcassonne tried their best to deprive the besieging crusaders of sustenance before the city was besieged in 1209, whilst the inhabitants of Casseneuil are described as burning down their own fortifications before fleeing from the crusaders. Peter of les Vaux de Cernay frequently describes Simon de Montfort destroying vines and crops. Raymond of Toulouse’s mercenaries are shown ravaging and plundering the country around Castelsarrasin whilst Peter of Aragon’s reason for intervening in 1213 against the crusade is said in the *Chanson* to have been ‘because it was wasting and destroying the whole country.’ Surprise raids and sallies are described in the *Chanson* on many occasions. Pierre Roger of Cabaret launched a daring night raid with the aim of destroying the crusaders’ siege engines outside the walls of Carcassonne, following this up with an ambush on a group of German crusaders near Montgey. A force from Montauban sallied out to attack a force of crusaders on the road to Cahors. At the siege of Toulouse in 1217/18 frequent skirmishes between the crusaders and the southern allies took a heavy toll on both sides. All these encounters show the way in which a mobile force of cavalry in the field could be used to intimidate and threaten an enemy, destroy his property and deprive him of means of sustenance.

Only on two or three occasions is there evidence of what could be described as a full scale pitched battle. William of Tudela depicts such an encounter at Montaudran near Toulouse as a ‘full battle’ with more than ‘180 dead on the two sides’. On this occasion Raymond of Toulouse’s son Bertrand is reported as ransoming himself for ‘1000 shillings’ as well as his armour and his horse showing that, in common with much warfare during the thirteenth century, the capture of an important prisoner could lead to large profits.

On two occasions during the crusade, it appears to have been a deliberate policy of the crusaders to force battle. In 1211, when Raymond of Toulouse launched a counter offensive against Simon de Montfort, the leader of the crusade is reported in the *Chanson*

25 *Chanson*, v. 14. On the whole, however, the crusaders were able to take over many intact fortifications when their inhabitants put up no resistance or fled.
26 See *Historia*, 144, 147, 245, 327, 423 & 434 for examples.
28 *Chanson*, v. 131, 11-12.
29 *Chanson* v. 122, 7.
30 *Chanson*, v. 78, 5.
31 *Chanson*, v. 78, 9.
as seeking advice from his companions regarding what course of action he should take in response. Hugh de Lacy's advice was for him to put his troops in his weakest fortress and bring up reinforcements in order to seek battle.32 Thus de Montfort's enemies hemmed him in at Castelnaudry and intercepted his supply column. Verbruggen sees this as one of the occasions when De Montfort attempted to bring matters to a head by seeking battle and believes that de Montfort's rush to help his men and meet the enemy put the fate of the whole crusade in jeopardy, everything depending on the outcome of this battle as it did at Muret two years later.33 It certainly true that these two engagements took place when the crusaders' fortunes were at a low ebb. Verbruggen concludes that 'Simon's energetic way of leading the successful crusade was entirely consistent with his belief in battle as the best means of conquest'.34 The question remains, however, whether we can regard de Montfort's decision to seek battle as the mark of an energetic and brilliant strategist or the response of a desperate man to a potentially disastrous situation. What is certain is that such encounters allowed him to exploit the use of his heavy cavalry to its fullest extent. The crusade, as described in the main written sources, was essentially a war of sieges. Warfare in the field, however, allowed Simon de Montfort to bring to bear his cavalry, which were recruited to serve 40 days and provided many of his reinforcements by this method of recruitment. His cavalry needed to be mobile to be of much use to him.35

As a prelude to the encounter at Castelnaudary, the supply train of the crusaders which was on its way to that town under the escort of Bouchard de Marly was attacked by the Count of Foix and his men. This led to one of the few full scale encounters besides Muret during the crusade, the Battle of St. Martin Lalande/Castelnaudary.36 The Chanson tells of the two forces charging towards each other over the plain, lances lowered. The southerners' force, divided into three, comprised heavy cavalry in the centre with light cavalry consisting of squires and sergeants on one wing with infantry consisting of crossbowmen and Spanish mercenaries on the other.37

32 Chanson v. 91, 8-10.
33 Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, p.281-82
34 Ibid. p. 282.
35 Roquebert, L'Épopée cathare, p. 439.
37 Chanson, v. 94.
The French force consisted of 100 knights under Bouchard de Marly, 20 mercenaries under Martin Algai and a force of 40 knights sent as relief by Simon de Montfort. On the Occitan side the Chanson talks of 400 men. Martin Algai is seen fleeing from this encounter, later making the excuse that he was pursuing the mercenaries in the southern army, whilst other southern forces quit the battle field once the supplies from the crusaders’ wagons had been taken. William of Tudela quotes a friend, a ‘Master Nicolas’, as being an eyewitness to this encounter. When Simon de Montfort rides out of Castelnaudary to aid the supply train William depicts his desperate plight by saying ‘he was aware that defeat would lose him both land and castle, he would be blockaded and never leave except in defeat’. Peter of les Vaux de Cernay remarks that the French recovered their strength whilst the southerners appeared to collapse with the arrival of these reinforcements. Roquebert believes this is because the majority of the southern force was composed of mercenaries who were of more value as a force for ravaging or ambush, but were impossible to discipline in a battle situation. Simon de Montfort left his infantry behind in the castle to defend it and rode out. His quick response appears to have caused panic in the ranks of the southern army who were camped nearby at Pech. The Chanson describes this force as being 200,000 strong and outnumbering the crusaders 10:1. A force led by Savary de Maulon rode out of the southerners’ camp but returned when they had learnt of the defeat of the Count of Foix.

On the question of why Count Raymond did nothing to aid the count of Foix, Roquebert sees this as being due to the faults of individuals but also as being inherent in the nature of the southern coalition. De Montfort’s force may have been, small but he was a sole commander facing a badly co-ordinated enemy. Roquebert sees the citizen militia of Toulouse as psychologically incapable of an attack against a force of heavy cavalry whilst Raymond was incapable of leading them. Defending their city was one thing, facing a group of heavily armed knights in the field was another. Belperron talks of the ‘inexplicable inertia’ of Count Raymond in a situation where it is certain that he had a great numerical superiority. He sees the conflict at Castelnaudary as reflecting perfectly the character of both Simon de Montfort and Count Raymond, Simon decisive and

38 Chanson, v. 100, 6 - 7.  
39 Historia, 274.  
40 Roquebert, L’Épopée cathare, p. 445.  
41 Chanson, v. 88, 8.  
42 Roquebert, L’Épopée cathare, p. 446.
vigorouss, Raymond hesitant and lacking in courage. Overall, however, Belperron sees the victory purely in terms of the complete superiority of the French over the southerners who were too used to hiring mercenaries to fight in their place and therefore liable to panic at the first reversal. 43 Peter of les Vaux de Cernay frequently comments on the reluctance of the southern forces to engage the crusaders. This could be interpreted as a symptom of the southerners' awareness of the general superiority of the northerners in the field, although this is by no means certain.44

The immediate effect of the southerners' defeat at Castelnaudary was their general retreat. The encounter at Castelnaudary provides a number of details worthy of note. Firstly the attack on the baggage train indicates the importance the southerners placed on the need to deprive the crusaders of supplies, secondly there is the combination of troops used by the southerners and the behaviour of the mercenaries once their primary objective had been achieved. Thirdly there is the seeming inability of Raymond of Toulouse to follow up the attack once it was learnt that the crusaders had ridden out of the town to aid the baggage train. Such a collapse of the southern army was once again to be witnessed at Muret in 1213 under different circumstances.

In September 1213 Peter of Aragon crossed the Pyrenees and entered southern France after his bitter protests to the pope regarding the unjustness of the crusade had gone unheeded.45 At this time Simon de Montfort was under increasing pressure from the southerners and had decided to withdraw all his troops west of the Garonne. The Aragonese combined forces with the counts of Comminges and Foix as well as a large group of militia from Toulouse and converged a few miles south of the city. Several authors have emphasised that such foot soldiers do not appear to have been very highly regarded.46 They did, however, bring provisions and siege engines with them in barges from Toulouse. Thus the scene was set for the encounter at Muret between this coalition of southern French and Aragonese troops and a greatly diminished crusading army. Muret has been dealt with in a number of general works covering the history of warfare during the middle ages, as well as in several more specialised studies.47 It would therefore

44 *Historia*, 140, 257, 259-2, 279.
45 *Historia*, 415.
seem opportune to deal with the battle in this present study and ascertain whether the battle merits such attention within the general context of the study of the medieval army in the field. Many, including Belperron and Delbruck, have dismissed the importance of the battle. Considering the scope and aims of the present study, however, Muret offers a rare example of an encounter between the Crusaders and a southern army in the field and should therefore not be ignored.

Roquebert has observed that one of the major reasons why Muret has attracted such attention and has been the subject of such speculation revolves around the fact that the written sources describing the battle are particularly vague and open to various interpretations. Of the three major sources for the battle, none of the authors were eyewitnesses to the event. William of Puylaurens wrote his chronicle 60 years after and relies on the eyewitness testimonies of Toulousain soldiers present and the memories of Raymond VII of Toulouse, a young man of 17 at the time. The Chanson's description of the battle contains the least detail of all and is based on descriptions of isolated incidents. One possible explanation for this is the anonymous author's desire to gloss over a spectacular defeat for the army of the southern coalition.

Peter of les Vaux de Cernay had returned to northern France after the Council of Lavaur and did not return to the Languedoc until May 1214. Although his account gives more detail than the other sources, it is incomplete and appears to rely mainly on accounts given by churchmen. The narrative certainly concentrates quite heavily on the activities of the clergy accompanying the army on and around 13 September. As a churchman Peter was less concerned with the details of the battle and his views are particularly partisan. None of the sources provide an overall view of the action and none of the accounts provide a clear idea of the topography of the battlefield or the position of the troops upon it. Gaps in our knowledge regarding the sequence of events during the battle and the position of the various contingents on the field have led to many studies speculating on these matters, and imposing their own interpretations on vague and potentially misleading references in the written sources. Different interpretations have been put forward regarding fundamental points such as the position of the allied camp and the point of

---

egress of the crusading army from the town. (Figures 15 & 16).\textsuperscript{50} A selection of different authors’ opinions on the events and outcome of the battle should be sufficient to illustrate the difficulties presented to the historian by the secondary literature on Muret.

Oman has called the victory of the crusaders at Muret ‘the most remarkable triumph ever of a force entirely consisting of cavalry over an enemy using both horse and foot.’ He sees the outcome of the battle as going against ‘general military teaching and experience’ and explains the defeat of the coalition of Aragonese and southern French troops in terms of the exceptional ability of Simon de Montfort as a battlefield leader, the surprise of the southerners before they were in proper battle array and failure on the part of the southerners to combine the horse and foot elements of their army effectively. \textsuperscript{51} He characterises Muret not as a pitched battle but a sudden rout which would never have been fought but for the quick eye of Simon de Montfort in moving at an opportunistic moment. He also sees weakness in the army of Peter of Aragon as being due to a lack of enthusiasm for the campaign on the part of his Catalonian subjects. One fundamental problem with Oman’s interpretation is that the infantry of the southern army had very little role to play in the battle and so can hardly be considered part of a combination of horse and foot on the battlefield. Another flaw in Oman’s study of the battle concerns his use of the written sources. He criticises other authors for getting the topography of the battlefield wrong and yet is prepared to base his own observations on the assumption that William of Puylaurens has substituted ‘west for east and right for left, by a slip of the pen’.\textsuperscript{52}

Lot sees the battle’s main distinction as being the disproportion in the number of troops present at the battle, the crusaders being considerably less in number than their opponents. Speculation on the numbers present at Muret has played a large role in the study of the battle. Lot estimates the number of Aragonese cavalry at Muret to have been 2,400.\textsuperscript{53} The mounted contingents under the Counts of Foix, Comminges and Toulouse he judges to have been 900, whilst the whole force the allies could muster was 3,900. He considers the figure of 1000 knights attributed to Peter of Aragon to be a fantasy, this assertion being based on the fact that Philip Augustus could only muster a force of around

\textsuperscript{51} Oman, \textit{Art of War}, I, pp. 453-44.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. p. 465.
\textsuperscript{53} Lot, \textit{L ’Art militaire}, p. 214.
the same number at Bouvines in the same year. Contemporary sources give a number of
between 760 and 1000 cavalry on the side of the crusaders. Peter of les Vaux de Cernay
gives a number of 800 knights and sergeants, William of Puylaurens quotes 1000
cavalry, whilst William the Breton says 260 knights and 500 sergeants. Sumption
makes a valid point when he observes that northern chroniclers who reported on the
battle were no doubt keen to depict God’s work in the defeat of the southerners and
therefore could have overestimated the numbers in the southern army. He estimates the
Spanish cavalry to be 800 strong (with another 200 expected) whilst the contingent from
Languedoc is estimated at 600 horse. A consensus seems to be therefore that the
southern cavalry out numbered that of the crusaders 2:1.

Sumption observes that the infantry were prevented from playing an active role in
the battle ‘through snobbery and military incompetence’. Whether this was the case or
not, it was certainly true that despite their numbers they played little role in the fighting.
Lot considers Muret to have been purely a cavalry battle. The disproportion between the
crusaders and southerners was greater with the infantry than the cavalry, all the
chroniclers putting the number at 15 - 20,000. Lot considers this number to be absurd
considering that Toulouse and Mountauban put together had a population of only
120,000.

De Montfort appears to have marched on Muret with the idea of holding the town
and waiting for reinforcements from the North. The unexpected intervention of Peter of
Aragon caught the crusaders off guard as much of the crusading army had already
returned to France after a season of campaigning. The Chanson reports Peter of Aragon
as being overjoyed when he heard that Simon de Montfort was heading for Muret.
According to the Chanson Peter planned to allow the crusaders to enter into the town
and then surround it. He therefore ordered the Toulousain troops attacking Muret to
withdraw and the town was evacuated on the evening of 11 September. It is possible
that this is merely an excuse made by the partisan anonymous continuator of the Chanson

---

54 Historia, 460.
55 Chronicle, XX, p. 83.
56 William the Breton, Gesta, 177.
59 Lot, L’Art militaire, p. 215
60 Ibid, p. 216.
and that the Toulousain foot soldiers in fact fled from the town in panic thus allowing the crusaders to cross into the town with no resistance, a lack of adequate chain of command preventing the southerners from taking the opportunity to engage the crusaders. De Montfort’s decision to seek battle may have stemmed from the fact that there were only enough supplies in the town of Muret to last for another day, although this fact was unknown to the southerners.

During the night the crusaders had been reinforced by men of the viscount of Corbeil. The Aragonese king and the count of Toulouse had probably made camp on the left bank of the Garonne to the north west of the town and planned to besiege the town from the area where the Garonne and the smaller tributary river of the Longe met. According to the Chanson Raymond of Toulouse opposed Peter of Aragon’s plan to fight the crusaders. His plan to fortify the camp and wait for the crusaders to attack was dismissed as un-knightly by Peter, the poet seeming anxious to contrast the glory seeking Peter with the more cautious Raymond. Not only is Peter depicted as keen to go into battle, he also refuses to wait for reinforcements in the form of knights under the command of his captains Nuno Sanche and Guillaume of Montcade. Judging him on these actions, Oman considers Peter of Aragon as ‘no fit leader against de Montfort’, and a ‘mere knight errant’.

The count of Foix led a force of men closer to the town in order to attack via the Toulouse gate. De Montfort is said to have divided his forces into three parts, the same action taken by Philip Augustus at Bouvines. One part of the crusader army attacked at the Porte au Sales, a second at the East gate of the town, the third part removed themselves to the Fanjeaux road, crossed the Longe and arrived within sight of the enemy. According to Lot, whilst the count of Foix attacked, Peter of Aragon had ranged his forces across the favourable ground dominating the plain. He failed, however, to give them adequate instructions as to how they were to proceed. Some historians have accepted a version of events which has the crusaders making a surprise attack whilst the southerners sat down to eat. The story however does not appear in any of the three main

---

63 Chanson, v. 139
64 This force is mentioned by Peter at Chanson, v. 137, 28.
65 Oman, Art of War, p. 453.
66 See Historia,462.
One group of crusaders now rode towards the banner of the King of Aragon where they were joined by a second force of crusaders in successfully opening a breach in the line of the Aragonese troops. Simon de Montfort, seeing the confusion, is said to have now charged with his force, Lot sees this as the decisive move which won the battle.

Peter of Aragon is said to have insisted on being in the front line of battle. This choice, however, was to prove costly. Sumption calls his act ‘pointless vanity’, although Peter had chosen favourable ground at the top of a gentle rise on which to site his army. Sumption describes his army ‘a confused mass of cavalry without infantry, without orders… the result was a rout, not a battle’. It lasted scarcely twenty minutes and when the battle was over the crusaders’ small force of infantry swarmed across the plain to finish off the wounded and plunder the corpses of the dead. The turning point of the battle had been the death of Peter of Aragon which led to the collapse of his army. The risk in battle was great and the threat to Peter was certainly not unique in an age where kings led their troops into battle in person. During the battle of Bouvines, both Philip Augustus and the Emperor Otto had very narrow escapes when the enemy broke through their line. They were saved only by the quick action of their men in fighting off an attack. One only needs to look to the example of Hastings to realise the exceptional personal risk both Harold Godwinson and William of Normandy faced on that day. On such occasions the fate of a single man could decide the outcome of the battle and the death of Peter certainly appears to have had a great effect on his troops.

The southern counts now fled towards Toulouse. Not knowing of the defeat of the cavalry, the militia of Toulouse proceeded to attack the town, ‘without listening to either count or king’ These words from the Chanson could be used to illustrate the undisciplined nature of the southern army. Dieulafoy judges the crusaders’ success to have been mainly on account of Simon de Montfort’s decisive generalship and, whether his move was audacious or prudent, his instinctive knowledge of when to chose the right moment to move. He also sees de Montfort as being unlike his contemporaries or successors in that he did not approach the combat in a ‘scientific manner’. The crusaders

---

67 See Roquebert, L’Épopée cathare, p. 196.
68 Lot, L’art militaire, p. 216.
69 Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 166.
70 William the Breton, Gesta, 191.
71 Chanson, v. 140, 7.
won solely because of the death of Peter of Aragon and the united charge of the crusaders which was violent and rapid.

The southern defeat at Muret has been open to various interpretations. The counts of Toulouse and Comminges appear to have been totally inactive on the battlefield but this is mainly due to the impression given in the sources and it is impossible to know their position or activities for certain. Their inactivity could be interpreted as being due to a lack of enthusiasm for the battle, as illustrated by Raymond’s attitude at the stormy council meeting of the southern coalition leaders on the morning of the battle. Peter took an enormous risk by commanding the first echelon of southern troops, the second echelon being too weak to follow up the first. The dissent amongst the southern allies, the imprudence of Peter and the unevenness of the distribution of the southern troops may all have counteracted their numerical superiority. Belperron points to the internal divisions in the southern camp whilst emphasising the effective leadership of Simon de Montfort as supreme commander of the crusaders, concluding that discipline was the key to the victory.

The overall significance of the victory of the crusaders has certainly been over emphasised. The crusaders certainly suffered some significant reversals after Muret. As can be seen, the action at Muret on 12 September 1213 has been debated and analysed by many military historians. The Battle of Bouvines was fought less than a year later on the 27 July 1214. Given that these two battles were fought within such a relatively short period of time it therefore may be instructive to compare these two actions in order to determine whether any significant differences can be ascertained between methods employed between southern and northern armies in this period.

5.2 The battle of Bouvines

Although the only eyewitness account of the battle is that of William the Breton, Bouvines was better reported than the majority of medieval battles as can be seen from

---

73 Ibid, p.231.  
74 For example see Belperron, Le croisade contre les Albigeios, p. 282.  
75 For a detailed commentary on the battle see, Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, pp. 239-260.  
76 William the Breton, Gesta, 184 - 97.
the widespread mention it receives in contemporary chronicles. William gives no estimate of the number of French troops present and only states that the enemy were three times as strong as the French. Piecing together evidence from various other sources French forces can be estimated at around 1,200 knights, 150 light cavalry and 4-5,000 foot. The probable number of allied troops were 1,500 knights and 7,500 foot. As has been discussed in Chapter 2 Philip Augustus relied upon a variety methods for raising and maintaining troops. Bradbury has recently pointed out the troops available to Philip at Bouvines were only a part of what was available to him and the heart of his army would have consisted of troops from the lands of the royal demesne. It is likely that the hasty march of the emperor Otto’s troops from Mortagne probably contributed to their defeat. Otto positioned his troops on high ground facing west. The French were divided into three with a group of light cavalry from Soissons to the right with 180 knights from Champagne. In the centre Philip Augustus took up position with his knights, whilst the left wing consisted of various lords with their knights (Figure 17). The commander in chief of the French army was Bishop Guérin who was careful not to let the enemy outflank him. He ordered his knights to present a broad front by spreading out so that they could all fight in one line.

The French right wing were faced by Count Ferdinand of Portugal with a force of knights from Hainault and Flanders. The emperor took the centre with a force of knights and foot, with the knights probably in front. On the right wing of the emperor’s allies was the earl of Salisbury and Renaud de Dammartin. Renaud had a force of mercenaries on foot which are said to have been formed up into a crown so that some of the cavalry could withdraw into the cover of their pikes. An early attack by the light cavalry from Soissons was fought off by the Flemish knights. The count of Champagne and his knights now attacked and succeeded in putting some of the Flemish to flight as well as taking prisoners. The Flemings, however, made a counter-charge and broke through the French line. After three hours, foot soldiers from the French communes arrived and drew themselves up in front of the king’s knights in the centre. They were, however, not prepared for Otto’s attack when it came and were thrown back when Otto’s knights

---

78 For numbers at Bouvines see above p. 19-20.
79 As can be seen above one of the fundamental mistakes made by Peter of Aragon at Muret was his failure to draw up such a line.
broke through the line, followed by his foot soldiers. The French now charged the emperor's knights and the Emperor was forced to withdraw. The French right wing, however, continued to fight, the last contingent of the allied troops to hold out being the pike-men in their circular formation which was only broken when surrounded by foot soldiers.

Verbruggen sees Bouvines as being an excellent example of knightly battle in the thirteenth century. It certainly illustrates many of the strengths of the heavy cavalry used during this period as well as the way infantry could be used in combination with cavalry, though on the whole the struggle between the two elements proved to be unequal on this occasion. The actions described during the Albigensian Crusade and at Bouvines certainly illustrate the dominance of heavy cavalry on the battlefield on these occasions. The importance of the well drawn up line, the solid charge, the elements of speed, decisiveness and discipline can all be seen. On the whole, however, it is very difficult to make any solid judgements regarding the significance of these battles in terms of wider practice. It must be noted however that the battles of the twelfth century involving northern French armies showed a marked tendency to be characterised by the use of heavy cavalry in a dominant role. This compares with earlier trends in the eleventh and twelfth century for the use of dismounted knights by Anglo-Norman leaders or the growing use of successful infantry tactics in the thirteenth century illustrated by the victories at Bannockburn and Courtrai.

The lack of illustrative material allows very few judgements to be made regarding the overall superiority of northern French versus southern French troops on the battlefield. The available secondary literature appears to make far too many assumptions regarding the supposed characteristics of each army and their leaders based on evidence which can be biased, incomplete and misleading. The action at Bouvines shows that cavalry and infantry were being used together with some degree of success in the early thirteenth century. The failure of the southerners to capitalise on their numerical superiority in infantry at Muret and elsewhere appears to have stemmed mostly from a lack of discipline and leadership, rather than any inherent weakness in the use of this type of troops. Infantry did have an important role to play in the warfare of the Albigensian Crusade as a whole and to dismiss its impact would be a mistake. Approaching the warfare of the Albigensian in terms of merely studying battles appears to illustrate the insufficiencies of this approach to military history as a whole.
Conclusion

The warfare of the Albigensian Crusade followed a pattern closely resembling many other conflicts of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. It also had many unique characteristics. Ostensibly a religious war initiated at the behest of the papacy, the Albigensian Crusade was also an instrument of political ambition and an offensive war of occupation. It should, however, be considered in the wider context of the crusading movement in the thirteenth century and earlier, alongside, for example, the campaigns in the Holy Land, the Baltic and those of the Spanish Reconquista, as many of the challenges encountered on these campaigns and the Albigensian Crusade proved to be similar.¹

As with any military campaign, the way each side recruited and maintained its army is essential to understanding the nature of the warfare. Regarding this matter, and the question of comparison between the crusading army and their southern counterparts, the problems presented by the evidence available needs to be taken into account. Surviving evidence from French royal records, for example, points to the existence of what amounted to a standing army at the command of the French king in this period. Such evidence is useful in being able to show how a successful military leader might go about recruiting and maintaining an army and is therefore relevant to questions regarding the composition of the crusading army. What must be taken into consideration, however, is that more written documentary evidence exists regarding the recruitment of paid troops as opposed to the use of the feudal levy. This may, at times, distort our view of the kind of army the king of France was able to put in the field. In general, however the trend towards the use of stipendary troops is clear.

The information available to us regarding feudal military service is limited and can often be misleading. Many of the problems which arise in assessing its use in the royal French army may also hold true for the crusading army. It appears that the leaders of the crusading army were only able to call upon troops for the customary 40 days

expected of those undertaking feudal service. Further service would be undertaken voluntarily or would need to be paid for. There is very little evidence to tell us if the great lords who took part in the Albigensian Crusade used similar methods of recruiting soldiers for their expedition to that of the king. This is particularly true of the use of infantry. What is clear, however, is that both in the armies of Philip Augustus and the crusading army, the use of mercenaries was by no means unusual. Sources relating to such matters, particularly those written by northern French authors of the time, very often obscure how essential professional soldiers were in the medieval army. Mercenary and stipendary troops had played increasingly important part in the king’s army for many years, and there is no reason to suggest that this was not the case for the majority of his wealthier vassals.

There are many problems involved in trying to ascertain the size of the crusading army and the mechanisms whereby it was recruited. The initial enthusiasm for the expedition began to recede, for a variety of reasons, after the first two seasons of very successful campaigning. Just as in the East, the Crusade very often suffered from the essential problem of lack of manpower, which was only resolved when the king of France lent his support to the war in the Languedoc. The crusader kingdoms of the East had similar problems in that they could only make military advances with the backing of a crusading army with the resources of a monarch such as the king of France behind it. What is more, the crusaders of the Languedoc could not rely on the services of the Military Orders who provided a continuity and stability to the military effort in the east.

After the initial wave of crusading fervour the personal political ambitions of men such as Simon de Montfort began to come to the fore and papal support began to be channeled into other projects. What emerges from an examination of the evidence is the short term nature of service expected, the varied origins of the crusaders and the use of paid troops by the crusaders from a very early stage. The written sources can give a good impression of the variety of types of soldiers in the army of the crusaders and their southern counterparts, showing that although the knight dominated, many other combatants made essential contributions to the warfare of the Albigensian Crusade.

The type of warfare which was undertaken included lengthy sieges, for example at Toulouse, Minerve and Beaucaire. The need to reduce and man fortifications
effectively did not contribute to the success of an offensive war where only limited numbers of troops were available. The strategy of the crusaders was, out of necessity, one of maintaining small isolated garrisons in the face of a hostile population, as can be seen most acutely at Beaucaire and Toulouse. The need for mercenary troops and men with specialist skills was becoming more acute for the commanders of this period. The warfare typical of the campaigns of the Albigensian Crusade proves this to be the case. This type of offensive warfare could only be carried out with any degree of success if a commander had the financial means to provide monetary reward to a force of men capable of reducing fortresses effectively. The crusaders found immense difficulty in reducing fortresses quickly, manning effective garrisons and maintaining political control because of a lack of reliable manpower. Although the increasing need for professional soldiers and skilled engineers emerges as a recurring theme throughout this study, what is also clear is the need to focus on how the conflict involved a wide variety of participants from all parts of the social spectrum as combatants and non-combatants.

Previous examinations of the military aspects of the Albigensian Crusade have often been coloured by authors seeing the defeat of the southerners as somehow inevitable due to the nature of the society which had developed in south western France. This approach precludes study of the conflict in terms of the military capabilities of the combatants, as it has often been assumed that the southern army was inherently weaker. Comparison between the army of the crusaders and their southern French adversaries is problematic because of the nature of the evidence available. It is clear that both the nature of southern French society and political authority in the south differed in many ways to the North. The apparent lack of feudal ties and absence of land held in return for military service, however, does not necessarily mean that the cohesion of the southern army was weaker. What must be taken into account is the political situation at the time of the launch of the crusade.

The authority of the house of St. Gilles had not always been so weak and it is by no means the case that the type of internal struggles which had affected the region did not take place in northern France. It is very difficult to assess how feudal loyalty or lack of it really affected the way southern lords were able to respond to the threat of the crusade. Lack of vassallic ties could indicate that monetary reward was seen as a more important bond in southern society than land holding and homage. Material reward,
however, had always been a strong incentive to knights in the north, in addition to the compulsion to serve as part of a knight's feudal duty.

The passion of the anonymous continuator of the *Chanson* appears to indicate that the dispossession of the southern lords provided a strong cohesive force for those fighting against the crusaders. The evidence regarding this matter, however, is ambiguous. It is clear that some southern lords fought on the side of the crusaders at various stages of the crusade, and that loyalties fluctuated throughout the conflict. In many ways the difficulties Simon de Montfort faced were the same as those of Raymond of Toulouse, as he sought to maintain political control over his newly acquired and troublesome vassals. Although evidence exists to suggest that de Montfort attempted to impose northern feudal practices on both northern incomers and his southern vassals, the effects of such legislation are unclear. If one takes into consideration the activities of many of the vassals of Raymond of Toulouse prior to the start of the crusade, the idea of the solidarity of the southern *faiditz* portrayed by the anonymous continuator of the *Chanson* does not always ring true. These fiercely independent vassals of the Languedoc did not accept the yoke of authority easily from any lord.

The more frequent use of mercenaries in the south is a moot point. It may be the case that mercenaries were more widely used in the south, in so far as a wider spectrum of people could afford to employ them, perhaps as a result of the greater development of a monetary economy. For example, towns and cities could employ them as garrison soldiers, as can be seen at Moissac, while lords other than great magnates used them to assert their independence, for example Raymond of Termes. If they appear in southern literature more often than in that of the north, it may be as a result of the different attitudes and perspectives of southern authors. Lack of written evidence in the form of financial records makes determining just how much southern magnates spent on mercenaries very difficult. What is clear however, is that knights who fought for a wage were distinguished from the bands of *routiers* in both North and South.

Another important fact which emerges is that infantry, archers, mounted sergeants and other combatants are also clearly visible fighting on both sides, in the main southern source for the crusade, the *Chanson*. Their important role in the warfare of the thirteenth century is clear and this is an area which merits future investigation. The
knight continues to take centre stage, however, because of the nature of written sources available to us.

If the knight emerges from the written sources as the central figure in warfare at this time, then it is the castle that is the central structure, the essential military device, centre of a lord's power as well as his chief residence. It is clear from modern scholarship that the study of castellology has moved away from examining the castle merely as a military structure. It has been essential for this study, however, to consider the castle mainly in its defensive role as well as that of lordly residence and administrative centre.

It should be pointed out that conclusions regarding castle architecture which hold good for northern France and England are not necessarily relevant to southern France owing to differing political and social structures. The sheer number and variety of defensive structures in southern France means that a great deal more research is needed into this area. The structures and locations of some of the castles of the Languedoc appear to indicate that their principal function was defensive. That is not to say, however, that many of them did not combine the functions of residence and administrative centres. There is evidence to suggest that from the late eleventh century onwards changes were occurring in the location and function of castles in southern France. The evidence, though, is ambiguous as it is clear that mountain fortresses such as Termes, Minerve and Monsegur continued to have some importance in terms of defensive capability.

It is clear that even the most well defended fortress would eventually yield in the face of an effective blockade and besiegers who had enough resources at their disposal, or be taken by storm. The sieges of the Albigensian Crusade show that the strength of a castle's fortifications was only one factor in its successful defence. It is also important to remember that many castles, even strongly defended ones, were surrendered to crusaders with little struggle.

Even if castle architecture does not appear to be as elaborate and advanced in the South prior to the coming of the crusade as it was in the North, the castle still served as a symbol of power and prestige. Large-scale urban fortifications in southern France perhaps served just as much as symbols of power and influence as privately owned castles did in both northern and southern France. Such fortifications were not, of
course, unique to southern France, though they may perhaps represent a different concept of communal defence.

The royal takeover of the south saw many changes in its administration and rule. Some of the mountain fortresses, so much associated with the independence of the southern aristocracy, were abandoned, others became royal fortresses. Larger castles in more populous areas were turned into the centres of royal administration, for example, that of Beaucaire. The kings of France, as well as improving existing castles, also built new ones. The improvements made to Carcassonne by the French king and the building of Aigues-Mortes, begun in 1241, both point to an attempt by the monarch to stamp his mark of authority on the South. Castle architecture in the South appears to have changed with the coming of the royal takeover in terms of improvements and elaboration of castle structures. It is possible this change was bought about by a number of factors including the monetary expenditure the king could afford to devote to such projects, the use of northern architects and changing fashions in architecture. It is certainly a mistake to think of such changes purely in terms of military technology, as many changes such as the addition of private chapels or the improvement of living space are clearly not related to such considerations.

The castles of the south are inextricably linked to the warfare that took place during the Albigensian Crusade, particularly siege warfare and the technology involved. It is clear that expeditions such as that of Philip Augustus to the Holy Land involved the coming together of men with many different talents and capabilities in the field of siege warfare. This may have led to technological improvements resulting from their collaboration. Men such as Philip Augustus and Richard I could afford to command the talents of skilled men, as well as maintain an army of sufficient numbers to successfully reduce fortifications of considerable size.

The Albigensian Crusade also involved large numbers of men of diverse origins. The assembly of such an army combined with the challenges presented by the defenses of the Languedoc may have led to innovation in the field of siege warfare as has been suggested was the case in the Third Crusade. The written sources available to us limit the amount of knowledge we have regarding the technology involved, as vocabulary and lack of technical description are barriers to a full understanding of such things as the type of projectile machines that were being used. There is little evidence to suggest, however,
that one side had any technological superiority over the other. It is clear that many of the
siege techniques used, for example, by Philip Augustus were being employed in southern
France during the Albigensian Crusade. The factors that were of major importance to
success were the resources available to those besieging a fortification and to those being
besieged.

It has become clear during the course of this study that although the importance
of siege warfare is apparent, this must be linked to the army in the field. The interaction
of the two was vitally important. As has been discussed, large scale battles were rare,
owing to the fact that they were known to be costly and the risks often outweighed the
advantages to those who decided to engage in such conflicts. The evidence which exists
points to the fact that small mobile groups of men were essential to carrying small scale
raids and expeditions. Although it is clear that on at least two occasions the crusaders
were victorious against a southern army in the field during the Albigensian Crusade,
there is little real evidence to suggest that this is because the crusaders were inherently
superior as soldiers. Decisive leadership may have contributed, together with a more
cohesive compact force stemming from time spent together fighting and training in the
field. Arguments suggesting that the use of mercenaries led to a less disciplined and
committed force are very difficult to prove, as to a certain extent material reward was
very often a motivating factor for the medieval warrior. It is clear that some of the same
fighting techniques were being used by both sides with varying degrees of success. It is
also clear that the southerners were just as adept as the crusaders in the practice of small
scale raids and skirmishes. There is no firm evidence to suggest that the crusaders
adapted their fighting techniques and strategy according to such factors as the
topography of the area or the political situation. As with any military campaign though
the circumstances under which it was fought were unique and it is highly probable that
the both the crusaders and their southern enemies learnt more about each others
strengths and weaknesses as the war progressed.

Written evidence such as the *Chanson* appears to suggest that the people of the
south could act as a cohesive force to defend themselves against the crusaders,
particularly when defending their towns and cities. As the crusade progressed, however,
such cohesion was seen to be illusory and short lived. The southern nobility would
eventually be forced to submit to the will of the French king through a process of
political assimilation as well as military defeat. The nature of the southern French
aristocracy would also change as the result of the confiscation of land, the stricter
imposition of a more feudal organisation and ascendancy of the Catholic Church.

The material gathered together in the present study has suggested many further
avenues for future investigation. The nature of the fortifications of the Languedoc merit
close examination owing to the sheer variety and number which existed. Their
relationship not only to the fortifications of northern France but also to those of Spain
and Italy merit further study. As it has been often emphasized that the Languedoc
belonged very much in the 'Mediterranean' sphere of influence another area which
requires further investigation is the whole area of military practice in southern France in
comparison to its near neighbors, particularly the areas of Aragon and Catalonia. This
study has attempted to provide an objective analysis of a conflict that provoked heated,
biased and emotional reactions from its original chroniclers. It is hoped it has some
contribution to make to a reappraisal of the warfare of the Albigensian Crusade and the
study of warfare as a whole in the thirteenth century.
Bibliography

Primary Sources

La chanson de la croisade Albigeoise, ed. & trans. E. Martin-Chabot, 3 vols., (Paris, 1931)
The Song of the Cathar Wars, trans. J. Shirley (Aldershot, 1996)
Rigord, Gesta Philippi Augusti, Oeuvres de Rigord et Guillaume le Breton, 2. vols, ed. H. F. Delaborde (Paris, 1882)
William the Breton, Gesta, Oeuvres de Rigord et Guillaume le Breton, 2. vols, ed.
H. F. Delaborde (Paris, 1882)
The Poems of Bertram de Born, eds. W. Paden, T. Sonkovitch & P. Stäblien (Berkley, 1986)
Secondary Works


‘Fortification and Military Tactics, Fulk Nerra’s Strongholds around 1000’, *Technology and Culture*, 20, (1979), pp. 531-549.


‘Les comptes de domaines au temps du Philippe Auguste: essai comparatif’,


Bousquet, J., ‘Minerve’, *Congrès Archéologique*, (1973)


*The Medieval Siege* (Woodbridge, 1992)

*Philip Augustus, King of France 1180-1123*, (London, 1998)


Christiansen, E., *The Northern Crusades* (London, 1997),


War in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1984)


Deiulafoy, M.,‘La bataille de Muret’, *Institut de France, Mémoires de l’Académie de Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, XXXVI, 2nd part, (1901)

Delaruelle, E., ‘La ville de Toulouse vers 1200’, *St Dominque en Languedoc, Cahiers de Fanjeaux* I (Toulouse, 1969)


**Delpech, H.,** *La bataille de Muret et la tactique de la cavalerie au XIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1878)


**Duby, G.** *The Legend of Bouvines; War, Religion and Culture in the Middle Ages*, (Cambridge, 1990)

**Dunbabin, J,** *France in the Making* (Oxford, 1985)


**Finó J. F.,** *Fortresses de la France médiévale* (Paris, 1970)


**Given, J.**, *State and Society in Medieval Europe - Gwynedd and Languedoc under Outside Rule* (Ithaca, 1990)


**Hamilton, B.**, *The Albigensian Crusade*, (Historial Association pamphlet, 1974)


**Kennedy, H.**, *Crusader Castles* (Cambridge, 1994)


*The Development of Southern French and Catalan Society 718 - 1050* (Austin, 1965)

*Lot, F., L’art militaire et les armes au moyen age en Europe et dans la proche Orient* (Paris, 1946)


*Molinier, A.,‘La bataille de Muret d’après les chroniques contemporaines’, Histoire générale du Languedoc*, vol. VII, note XLVIII, p. 254-259

*Norgate, K., John Lackland* (London, 1902)
Richard the Lionheart (London, 1924)


The World of the Troubadours (Cambridge, 1993)


Petit-Dutallis, C., Feudal Monarchy in France and England from the Tenth to the Thirteenth-Century (London, 1936)


de Pous, A., Les Termenès (Paris, 1963)


Poux, J., La Cité de Carcassonne, 5 vols. (Toulouse, 1922-1938)


Quehen, R., La seigneurie de Peyrepertuse, son histoire, son château (Montesquieu-Volvestre, 1975)
Renn, D., *Norman Castles in Britain* (London, 1968)


Salch, C., *Dictionnaire des châteaux et des fortifications* (Strasbourg, 1979)


Verbruggen, J.F., *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to 1340*, translated by Col. Sumner Willard, United States Military Academy and Mrs R.W. Southern, (2nd edition, Woodbridge, 1997)


Tables
Table 1. Daily wages paid to stipendary troops in the army of Philip Augustus in Normandy 1202/3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Soldier</th>
<th>Daily Wage</th>
<th>Percentage of total expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knight</td>
<td>72 deniers</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounted Sergeant</td>
<td>36 deniers</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounted Crossbowman</td>
<td>48 or 54 deniers</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossbowman on foot</td>
<td>12 or 18 deniers</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Soldier</td>
<td>8 deniers</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Siege engines used in the Albigensian Crusade as depicted in the *Chanson*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Siege</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Verse</th>
<th>Engines used by Crusaders</th>
<th>Engines used by Southerners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carcassonne</td>
<td>July-Aug 1209</td>
<td>23/33</td>
<td>peireiras, calabres (v25,4) gatas (ref)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerve</td>
<td>June-July 1210</td>
<td>48/50</td>
<td>calabres (v48,6) Mala Vezina (v48,6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termes</td>
<td>July-Nov 1210</td>
<td>53/57</td>
<td>peireras (v53, 15) engeins(v 56, 14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavaur</td>
<td>March-May 1211</td>
<td>67/68</td>
<td>genhs , calabres (v67, 5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montferrand</td>
<td>May 1211</td>
<td>73/75</td>
<td>peireiras (v74, 5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>June 1211</td>
<td>79/84</td>
<td>'grandes targas bulhidas de cuir'(v80, 3)</td>
<td>trabuquet (v 88, 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carcassonne</td>
<td>July 1211</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td>trabuquet (v106, 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castelnaudry</td>
<td>Sept 1211</td>
<td>101/106</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penne d'Agenais</td>
<td>Sept 1212</td>
<td>114/115</td>
<td>mangelens, peireiras i trazon, bosson (v114, 27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moissac</td>
<td>Aug-Sept 1212</td>
<td>119/124</td>
<td>gatas, engens (v 119, 7) gata, bosson, peireiras (v121, 2-3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pujol</td>
<td>July 1213</td>
<td>132/134</td>
<td></td>
<td>peireiras, engines cargatz (v133,13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muret</td>
<td>Sept 1213</td>
<td>135/137</td>
<td></td>
<td>peirers (v137, 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauchare</td>
<td>Apr-July 1216</td>
<td>155/167</td>
<td>castel, gata (v162, 91) calabre (v162 line 94) mostela (v167 line 11)</td>
<td>bofo (v 158, 36) mangelens, gousas, engents a dobiers (v159,13) cadolph (v164, 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>Sept 1216</td>
<td>171/205</td>
<td>gata (v 200 line 81)</td>
<td>trabuquetz (v198, 6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures
Figure 1: Dourdon, Yèvre le Chatel and Montlhéry, three castles of Philip Augustus
Figure 2: Château Gaillard

Figure 3: Carcassonne in 1208
Figure 4: Carcassonne in 1254 (Viollet-le-Duc)
Figure 5: Toulouse in 1216

Figure 6: Beaucaire in 1216
Figure 8: Map showing main area affected by crusade
Figure 9: Peyrepertuse

Figure 10: Puylaurens
Figure 11: Montségur

Figure 12: Minerve in 1209
Figure 13: Termes

Figure 14: Relief carving in St Nazaire (Viollet-le-Duc)
Figure 15: The Battle of Muret

Figure 16: The battle of Muret (Oman)
Figure 17: The battle of Bouvines
Plates
Plate 2: Roman/Visigothic Tower at Carcassonne
Plate 3: Aerial View of Carcassonne
Plate 4: Castle at Carcassonne
Plate 5: Castle of Beaucaire as seen from the town

Plate 6: Puylarens
Plate 7: Peyrepertuse
Plate 8: Montségur
Plate 9: Minerve
Plate 10: Termes