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THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC AGENCIES IN
AN INTER-ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT

By

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Submitted as part of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Philosophy.
SYNOPSIS

This study focusses on three distinct yet interrelated topics: the development and growth of the public agency as an administrative form, the methods whereby the activities of public agencies might be more fully integrated with the activities of Local Authorities through inter-corporate planning, and the changes necessary in planning education to effect a role re-definition in planning to enable planners to become equipped for the inter-corporate dimension.

In response to criticism of those theories of planning which fail to take into account the macro-societal context of planners' activities, Chapter One discusses the macro-sociological perspectives of both Marxist analysis (in two of its variant forms) and Corporatist thought in an attempt to explain the particular forms that state activity may take. However, a functionalist bias dominates these schools of thought and it is suggested that in order to explain more fully the growth of public agencies and the particular administrative form they may take, it is necessary to develop more specific micro-theories of agency growth and a critical appraisal of these is developed in Chapter Two. After a further critical appraisal of attempts at taxonomy and classification of public agencies which ultimately proves somewhat unproductive, this discussion is concluded by suggesting that, although government agencies differ in a number of ways in their relationship with both Central Government and other organisations, they can be reduced to one common denominator, that is the fact that they are all organisations. This perspective is used to widen the conventionally held assumptions about agency accountability into the much more realistic view of agency discretion (a point which it is suggested could be much further developed
by future research). After suggesting a tentative classification scheme as a guide for Local Authorities, this is used as a surrogate measure to estimate the numbers of such bodies likely to interact most frequently with Local Authorities although, as is emphasised in the text, these numbers are closer to 'guestimates' due to the inadequacies of conventional definitions.

Chapter Three, after a brief discussion of the inadequacies of conventional views of central-local relations, illustrates the consequences of agency interaction in situations where inter-corporate co-ordination has been poor. In an attempt to look more deeply at the methods of co-ordination suggested by the few authors who have considered it, it is argued that one needs to discuss inter-agency interaction from the perspective of inter-organisational analysis in order to fully understand the way in which government agencies interact in a dynamic setting. Given that this literature is diffuse, the subject is approached through a consideration of the work of three authors in order to highlight the most significant points. Management techniques and Organisational Design are introduced in the last sections of this chapter.

The concepts and ideas introduced in Chapter Three are more fully applied in analysing multiple-organisation situations in the public sector in Chapter Four. After focussing briefly on corporate planning and management in order to characterise the orthodox views of public sector management and its weakness when applied inter-corporately three case examples, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme, the Passenger Transport Executives and the Scottish Regional Reports, are critically appraised in terms of their original organisational design
and the results that they were intended to achieve. Consideration of these examples serves to demonstrate the inherent conservatism in the respect of organisational autonomy in what were intended to be fully comprehensive attempts at 'planning', and specific suggestions for improvements are included.

Having emphasised that the realities of public policy-making are inter-corporate, the final concluding chapter looks at how a role re-definition of planning may be effected through changes in planning education in order to bring some order again to urban change. It is suggested that planners have developed intra-corporate techniques which could be usefully developed for the management of inter-corporate situations, although, as is pointed out, the 'urban management' debate has been unnecessarily stigmatised through the writings of Pahl. Having shown that Pahl's concerns were in fact very much narrower than the concerns of this study, concern is shifted to looking at how inter-organisational analysis can be included in planning education. Using the work of Faludi as a basis for the consideration of the role of theory in planning education, criticism is directed at his procedural/substantive distinction as a basis for the incorporation of inter-organisational analysis into planning education. The study concludes with suggestions for integration of inter-organisational sociology into planning schools' curricula and ends with the exhortation for a professional role re-definition on the basis of a changing view of the public sector.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to a tremendous number of people for their help and interest in the preparation of this study. Firstly, thanks must go to Chris Hood and Bob Mair (Department of Politics, University of Glasgow) who initially stimulated my interest in the subject; David Weir (Department of Management Studies, University of Glasgow) for his course on Organisational Sociology which equipped me to look at inter-organisational analysis; and to Rod Rhodes (Department of Government, University of Essex) for both his interest in my treatment of the subject and his suggestions on the use of his power-dependency model.

Secondly, I should like to thank three people without whose help this study would have been impossible, Brian Hogwood (Department of Politics, University of Strathclyde) for constructive advice on form and content; Doug McCallum (Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Glasgow) for patiently reading early drafts and commenting quickly and critically; and to Christine MacCallum for typing quickly and accurately in the face of unintelligible handwriting.

Finally, thanks to Dave, Sue, Sally and Linda whose patience and tolerance in my frequent moments of crisis and introspection, contributed more to this study than they will ever realise.
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INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with raising issues for examination and discussion on the roles of organisations loosely referred to as 'fringe bodies' or 'quangos', a term which, as Hogwood (1979) has pointed out, must be one of the fastest spreading academic neologisms ever. However, for reasons related to attempts at classification outlined later, the terms 'government agencies' or 'public agencies' are preferred in this work. These terms are taken to cover organisations other than central and local government departments (and the judiciary and armed forces) which carry out functions on behalf of government. This definition, although fairly broad, has the advantages of according with common sense distinction and of avoiding the traps of definition in terms of concepts which cannot be operationalised or in terms of characteristics (which, as will be seen below, is somewhat unproductive). It must be stated at the outset that this is merely a 'working definition' which has some disadvantages. Firstly, by defining in terms of 'not-departments' it begs the question of what counts as a government department. As Hood, Dunsire and Thompson (1978) have suggested recently, the distinction between what is and what is not a government department is somewhat unclear.

Secondly, at central and local government level there is also a problem of drawing a boundary round departments, for example, one might wish to question whether individual institutions such as schools or libraries, physically and indeed socially distinct from the relevant department, is a part of that department. However, the inter-organisational framework outlined later is capable of extension to the institution-headquarters dimension.
Thirdly, the working definition adopted here is open-ended in terms of the boundaries between government agencies and purely private organisations. This is a problem which pervades the literature on classification and in the short term seems unresolvable.

Certainly the term 'public agency' seems preferable to the civil service term 'fringe body' as used by Bowen (1978) in the Civil Service Department report of that name. As Bowen himself remarks, the term 'fringe body' carries the connotation that it is in some way of peripheral importance to government, an inaccurate description when one considers the numbers of such bodies.

Definitional problems notwithstanding, the study (as can be seen from the synopsis) focusses on three broad areas, public agencies as an administrative form, theories of their interaction and co-ordination and the implications of these for the professional view of planning. The subject itself was chosen as there has been a surprising lack of consideration of public agencies and their interactions with local authorities beyond the level of case study (for example, the new series of articles in The Planner on the relations between development agencies and local authority planning departments takes the case study approach (see Stanley (1979))). However, at the outset, it is important to make three general points about the form and content of the study.

Firstly, the criticism often levelled at conventional planning theories is that they fail to take into account societal development and indeed neglect the overall role of the state in contemporary society.
As Frost (1977) argues,

'... planning agencies exist in particular societies and such societies have definable social, economic and political characteristics. It could, therefore, be argued that by seeking to improve planning agencies, one wishes either to reinforce or to change the characteristics of society.'

(p.220)

Thus Chapter One by focussing explicitly on the macro-theoretical level of analysis, is a conscious attempt to counter criticisms such as those of Frost. However, as will be seen from this chapter, such macro perspectives with their almost functionalist biases, fail to fully explain the agency as a particular administrative form and indeed seem somewhat reluctant to discuss the form of the state at all.

Secondly, given the somewhat turbulent political environment that exists at present with the general election imminent, the effects of devolution for government agencies in Scotland will not be discussed in this study. However, if the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 or any other form of legislative devolution were to be implemented, it may be useful at this point to make a number of general observations on the possible effects of devolution for public agencies.

The first point to make is that devolution would constitute an important change in the operating environment of all government agencies, whether or not responsibility for some or all of their functions were formally devolved. Public policy outputs from an organisation often require clearance from other public organisations, so the operating environment of an organisation will be affected by the extent to which related or overlapping functions of other bodies are devolved or otherwise affected by devolution. In addition, the establishment of a
Scottish Assembly would result in a more politicised environment for all public bodies, whether or not they are devolved.

Secondly, following devolution, the picture would be far from a simple one of organisations located in Scotland dealing with Scottish functions and reporting to the Scottish Executive, and organisations based in London dealing with British functions and reporting to Whitehall. Some Scottish agencies would remain with the Scottish Office and London-based departments, while responsibility for some functions currently carried out by British-wide bodies would be devolved.

Thirdly, the transition to devolution would be about a move to new types of relationships involving substantial changes from the past, thus the assumption that relations operate within generally accepted 'rules of the game' as in current central-local relations, does not hold in the same way. Both the 'rules' and the 'game' might change.

Finally, the addition of new Scottish Assembly departments, and of any new government agencies established by the Scottish Assembly (even allowing for some offsetting reductions), will increase very substantially the already complex multilateral pattern of links involving public agencies, because of the increased number of links.

Thirdly, the focus in this study on inter-corporate management techniques is somewhat limited at the personal level. Although strategies whereby organisations manage their dependencies on other organisations are considered, the only individual management role considered is that of the 'reticulist'. As will be seen later, this concept has its limitations in practice and a much fuller study should
be directed towards developing management techniques at the individual level. Although it is outside the scope of this study to analyse private sector management techniques and their applicability to the public sector, a much longer study should attempt to develop these for the public sector whilst bearing in mind that their focus is much more limited.

To summarise completely the character of this dissertation would be impossible. However, one might usefully paraphrase Sweezy's (1946) introduction to 'The theory of Capitalist Development' and suggest,

'There exists no reasonably comprehensive analytical study of government agencies and their management in multiple organisation situations. This study is not intended to fill this gap. It is intended merely as a signpost with which to guide both future research and practice.'
CHAPTER 1 - SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF STATE
FORM AND FUNCTION
In a strict sense, there has never been such a thing as a 'laissez-faire' capitalist economy. The history of state intervention in the private industrial and commercial sector is not only a recent phenomenon: it is intimately linked to the development of the capitalist economy itself. Although this is obviously not the place to chart this history in detail, it should be noted that there is a clearly discernible trend to the greater interlocking of private interests and the state, from the first Factory and Companies Acts through the close relation between state and private industry in the inter-war period of crisis to the legislation on monopolies and restrictive practices of the post-war period. Moreover, discussions of this trend have not been confined to the Marxist writers of what Radice (1978) terms the 'classic age of imperialism'; Kautsky, Hilferding, Lenin and Bukharin:-- similar discussions can be found in the work of the more institutionally minded non-Marxists such as Weber, Veblen, Hobson, Schumpeter and the British Fabians. Thus Crosland (1952), writing in the context of the application of Keynesian demand-management techniques by British Government and drawing upon the theories of Bell, Burnham and Galbraith, suggested that capitalism had changed its nature and that its abolition was no longer necessary for the achievement of socialist objectives. Capitalism in Crosland's view had been replaced by 'Statism', a change which represented a major social revolution.

'With its arrival, the most characteristic features of capitalism have all disappeared: the absolute rule of private property, the subjection of the whole of economic life to market prices, the domination of the profit motive, the neutrality of government, the typical laissez-faire division of income and the ideology of individual rights. This is no minor modification: it is a major historical change.'

(Crosland, 1952, p.45)

Crosland's revisionist analysis of the overall management of the mixed economy was echoed by Shonfield (1965) almost fifteen years later.
When surveying the relatively affluent Western Liberal Democracies with their various degrees of welfare provision and their developing indicative planning systems linking and co-ordinating public and private in an informal manner, Shonfield was struck by the contrast with the depressed capitalist world of the previous generation. This contrast led Shonfield to suggest that,

"the economic order under which we now live, and the social structure that goes with it, are so different from what preceded them, that it is misleading .... to use the word 'capitalism' to describe them."

(Shonfield, 1965, p.163)

Shonfield consequently opted for the label 'modern capitalism' since the elements of continuity seemed greater than the changes.

Radice (1978) suggests that such analyses in the post-war period of capitalist 'renaissance' allowed the 'problem' of the state to be largely ignored. Analysts in an age of pragmatism could simply accept that the state customarily undertook a certain range of activities in particular forms without bothering to consider precisely why, or indeed what the state really was. Similar criticisms can be made of Marxist thought. It must be stated at the outset that the Marxist tradition has a totally different perspective on the state than that of orthodox political economy; its fundamental tenet is precisely that it is a capitalist state, a class state, and not a neutral arbiter between interests howsoever divided. But until recently, Marxism had little more to say than precisely that. The predominant view was that the state was both the instrument and reflection of capital and that its activities and its apparatus were designed to serve capitalist interests. Hence Keynesianism, for example, enshrining state intervention at the 'macro-economic' level was the last resort of capitalism in crisis: monopoly capitalism became state monopoly capitalism. However, with the gradual disintegration of the post-war boom, the international monetary system and the hegemony of Keynesianism in orthodox
economics, with all the profound changes in economic and social life since 1965, it is hardly surprising that the whole question of the role and nature of the state in society has come up for redefinition. Of particular interest is the French Marxist School whose attention, following the events of 1968 in France, has been on Urban Analysis and the role and form of the state in the Urban context. Given the focus of the present study on the forms and management of state institutions, the intention is thus to examine, albeit in a limited way, a number of the complex issues and questions posed by these writers for the study of urban planning and state intervention.

As Pahl (1977) points out, marxist analysts of the urban question in capitalist societies analyse the role of the state by fitting it into a theory of the development of the capitalist mode of production. However, within this shared overall perspective there are distinct differences of emphasis on the role and autonomy of the state. Foulantzas (1975) in 'Classes in Contemporary Capitalism' has argued that the pre-eminent role of the state in capitalism is that of maintaining the unity and cohesion of society and reproducing its class structure. Its fundamental effect is to resolve political conflict by organising dominant interests and enforcing bourgeois control. Intervention by the state through urban planning and the provision of public goods and services, is also recognised as being undertaken to counteract the falling rate of profit.

Foulantzas stresses that the state apparatus, the bureaucracy, itself has no power, that is, it is not an 'entity' as such but 'reflects' class relations. It is, moreover, not a simple tool or instrument to be
manipulated by a 'single coherent will'. Instead, the state is thought of as a 'relation, more precisely the condensation of a class relation' (p.26) and thus expresses the balance of political forces in society at any given time.

Similar themes are discussed by Castells (perhaps the best known writer of the French Urban Marxist School). His view of the state's role is presented in various writings but is made particularly explicit in a paper published in 1975. There Castells asserts that state intervention is necessary, firstly, to deal with services and sectors of the economy that are not profitable but nonetheless necessary for capitalist accumulation, and secondly, for the appeasement of social protests. Both aspects are displayed in the increasing scale of state involvement in the provision of 'collective consumption' and especially in urban facilities (roads, public transport, public housing, control of land use, urban renewal, infrastructure). Such intervention is understood as being 'functional and necessary ..... even though it is often done in opposition to some capitalist interests' (p.178), and as being integral to the reproduction of labour power. Urban planning is thus simultaneously a regulatory function and a political response to class conflict. Castells emphasises that though the state intervenes, 'it acts in the interests of the ensemble of the capitalist system and not only as a servant for a given group' (pp.180-1); the state thus does have a relative autonomy even though it tends to express ruling class interests.

Thus the Structuralist marxist perspectives of Poulantzas and Castells, in summary, see the state as the 'condensate' of political class relations, necessarily functioning in the long term interests of monopoly capital (since this is the dominant political force) while reacting in the short term to the power of other classes. State intervention on behalf of
subordinate classes is thus always limited to reformism: to reproducing the system, since its role in the social formation is structurally determined by the class relationship (which is itself determined by the economic).

Such Structuralist approaches can be contrasted with Instrumentalist Marxist perspectives which suggest that the state functions in the interests of the dominant economic class (capital as a whole or fractions of capital) because of the power which this class enjoys in relation to the state. Thus Lojkine (1977), for example, sees the state as an instrument of monopoly capitalist interests and attempts to explain its 'relative autonomy' from these interests by arguing either that the state may act against the immediate demands of this class where it anticipates trouble from subordinate classes, or, that subordinate classes can sometimes wrest control of the state from monopoly capital (for example, through Communist victories in municipal elections in France). Lojkine further claims that the relative autonomy of the state is revealed particularly in cases of Urban planning and policy which are clearly political concessions to Working Class pressure (for example, extensions to public transport and 'social' urban renewal schemes) and also in 'political tendencies' which bear no obvious relation to either capitalist interests or working class demands.

The weakness of the Instrumentalist theory (apart from the obvious tendency towards reification) is that it fails to explain adequately those cases where state outputs are non-class specific or even specific to the interests of the working class. As can be seen in Lojkine's work above, his first 'anticipation' argument rests on an assumption of ruling class foresight which appears historically dubious, whilst his second argument
seems to take the analysis outside a marxian framework altogether and to leave few grounds for arguing that the state in capitalist society is inherently a capitalist state.

The Structuralist position on the other hand has no trouble in explaining those situations where the state appears to act against the interests of the dominant class. The problem however is that it can ostensibly account for anything the state does for it contains no contrafactual statement. When Pickvance (1976, p.204) suggests that 'The role of authorities in initiating changes is an empirical question', he may be right, but Structuralist theory does not admit of such investigation. Rather, as Saunders (1978) observes, when the state acts in the interests of monopoly capital, this is because that is the dominant class; when it does not, it is because it is relatively autonomous from that class. The theory is tautologous based upon a priori reasoning (which is justified by a claim to 'science' with reference to Althusserian epistemology:— see Pickvance (1976) for a fuller discussion of this point).

Secondly, the Structuralist perspective falls foul of the traditional functionalist problem of teleology. The causes of state policies are seen to lie in the balance of political class forces, yet it is nowhere explained how this necessarily leads to the function of such policies in reproducing the system. Indeed, Castells (1977) refers to the 'aims' or 'intentions' of the state in an attempt to resolve this problem. However, as Saunders suggests, this contradicts the central argument that the state is not a thing but a relation. Gold et al (1975) succinctly conclude that this approach therefore, fails to 'explain the social mechanisms which actually generate a class policy that is compatible with the needs of the system', (p.36).

Flynn (1978) suggests that what both Structural and Instrumental
theories of the state have in common is that their concept of the state is a reified and simplistic one; the 'state' appears to be homogeneous, all-embracing, integrated and rational. The terms used by Poulantzas in particular lead to an image of the state which is so highly abstract that Hirst (1977) argues,

'Poulantzas' conception of the 'political' and of 'class power' creates the problem that the political 'instance' is everywhere and nowhere. The specificity of the state apparatus is discounted. The 'state' cannot be defined at the level of institutions or apparatuses (they are merely forms of manifestation of class power) but can be defined only by its position......' (p.152).

As Hirst points out the state exists, it has specific institutional forms, conditions of existence and limitations on its activities. Flynn adds that these features of the state often seem to be at best regarded as peripheral and at worst neglected in the Marxist writings discussed briefly and somewhat incompletely above. Most of the studies dismiss research which is based on an institutional level of analysis (although Castells, to his credit, has attempted to apply his framework in a case study of Dunkirk) because it tends to explain decision and power in policy-making in terms of organisational dynamics and individual motives instead of understanding them as products of class relations and class power. Given the Althusserian a priori reasoning discussed above, the premise is that all state actions, including local government action are theoretically pre-defined as being in the long term interest of capitalist production relations and so must be analysed accordingly. However, this is far from being helpful in operational terms when one confronts the political or bureaucratic complexity of 'the state' at both national and local levels.

Considering very briefly some of the main characteristics of British local government, it is evident that various factors complicate a
narrowly-based class analysis. Intra-organisationally, the resources of the 'local state' are not unlimited; it operates within the constraints of central government policy and financial control, it is highly bureaucratised, organisationally complex, staffed by large numbers of professionals and semi-professionals, and subject to the changing political pressures and public demands of local and national society. Clearly, 'managerialist' considerations such as the balance of bureaucratic power, the influence of different professionals and Chief Offices, the status of committees and departments, the degree of corporate integration in management teams are all potentially important variables affecting the selection of issues for council action or non-action, options debated, 'technical' recommendations considered by councillors, and the nature of actions undertaken.

Inter-organisationally, it can be argued that 'inter-tier conflicts' can be explained in terms which are not necessarily contained within a class analysis which stresses contradictions between different fractions of capital and segments of the state apparatus. Pritchard (1978) for instance, highlights the intense argument about the dual planning structure in which 'strategic' and 'local' functions are divided between Counties or Regions and Districts. Similarly, it is evident that local authorities in providing urban facilities and services, are increasingly constrained organisationally because resource allocation and policy implementation are accomplished through a multiplicity of different public agencies. As this is the prime concern of this study, it is obviously discussed in much greater detail in succeeding chapters. At this point, however, it is crucial to state that whatever a council's political commitment and programme may be, its capacity to realise its aims will often be limited by the fact that the instruments for action reside in other external bodies.
Thus, for example, physical infrastructure like water supply and sewerage
(in England and Wales) and gas and electricity (throughout the United
Kingdom) are dealt with by very large statutory organisations or nationalised
industries whose terms of reference, planning, budgeting and management
systems as well as their operational working render them quite independent
of local government and at times only distantly related to central
government. The Regional Water Authorities in England and Wales are
critical agencies insofar as their Medium Term Plans and Capital Works
Programmes determine the feasibility of larger scale industrial and
residential development. Yet explanations of both the 'relative autonomy'
of such bodies and their inter-relationships with other organs of central
and local government are immensely complicated issues which seem to require
a degree of theoretical specification which is not yet apparent marxist
writings.

There is, however, another macro-theoretical account of modern society
which takes such inter-organisational relations as a major theme and indeed
purports also to be able to explain the growth of agencies in the macro
context. This is the Corporatist literature as expounded by Pahl and
Winkler (1974) and Winkler (1976, 1977). These authors, drawing on and
developing the work of Bell, Burnham, Galbraith and Shonfield amongst
others, suggest that Britain in particular is developing a corporatist
economic system. (Society is seen as consisting of diverse elements unified
into one body, forming one 'corpus').

The 'essence' of corporatism is concisely defined by Cawson (1977),
Corporatism is a political system in which the state directs the activities of predominantly privately owned industry in partnership with the representatives of a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated interest groups.' (p.4)

However, within this definition, certain points may be usefully highlighted. Firstly, Corporatism involves a fundamental qualitative shift in the state's role from being supportive to being directive: the state directs and controls predominantly privately owned business by prescribing or limiting the range of choice open to capitalist owners, that is, the state is involved in the internal decision making of companies. The Planning Agreements system introduced by the Labour Government in 1975 illustrates the principle admirably although the system has been much diluted from both its original intellectual and legislative conception. As originally conceived, planning agreements were to be periodic undertakings between major companies and Government covering prices, investment, productivity (including both choice of technology and employment levels), exports, import saving, industrial relations, product development, consumer protection and environmental protection. In short, a comprehensive set of targets governing all major aspects of corporate activity. However, the corporatist thesis seems seriously weakened by there having been only two of these agreements signed, one with British Leyland and the other with Chrysler and extraneous factors are arguably more important in these circumstances.

Corporatist thought, as Pahl and Winkler highlight, is not only confined to Labour Governments. The post-Selsden phase of the Heath Government from 1972-1974 turned to increasingly Corporatist solutions as is evident in statements by Peter Walker in 1974 who advocated a 'new kind of interventionism' suggesting that 'in the coming quarter of a century, the role of government in capitalist economies must go wider still' (quoted by Pahl and Winkler, p.74). Similarly, if the corporatist thesis is correct, the policies
of a Thatcher led Conservative government would begin to backtrack on neo-liberalism soon after they assumed office.

Cawson notes that the Corporatist trend towards a combination of private ownership and public control is equally visible in town planning, with, perhaps, the decisive shift from a supportive to a directive role for the state contained in the Community Land Act of 1975. In abstract terms this change would be a permanent shift from the state telling private landowners what they cannot do with their land towards the state defining in 'the public interest' what landowners must do with their land.

Secondly, this fundamental expansion of the state's role is not resisted by private capital indeed, paradoxically, it is welcomed. Cawson goes as far as to suggest that the evolution of capitalism from a market economy guaranteed by the liberal state, through liberal democracy and the welfare state, to a corporate economy regulated by a corporate state is determined by the dynamics of the combination of market allocation and private ownership, which can be taken as the defining characteristics of capitalism. Industrial concentration produces private firms which individually or in collusion, seek to regulate competition to secure stability and growth even at the expense of profit maximisation. An increasing degree of control over market conditions takes the form of forward planning, vertical integration or horizontal conglomeration (see Galbraith (1967) for a fuller discussion of this point). In order for the planning function to be successful in the private sector, corporate business increasingly seeks government intervention to help stabilise the business cycle and make the future less uncertain. Thus one of the most important indicators of the Corporatist trend is held to be the acceptance by liberal-democratic regimes of the state function of indicative planning, although in Britain, the acceptance of the principle that with respect to land, market allocation can be contrary to the public interest predated state economic
Thirdly, given such an industrial structure, the state can broadly shape aggregate performance by controlling only the oligopolies. This has the administratively very economical and apparently liberal consequence of leaving the great mass of small firms free from formal regulation. More importantly, for dealing with the limited number of dominant firms a massive administrative apparatus is unnecessary. Agreements may be worked out in private negotiations between key individuals in the state and business sectors. Similarly the principle of strategic control also applies in incomes policy. The state tries to regulate wages by making agreements with the principal unions, feeling that it can leave unorganized workers unregulated because whatever their wage movements they will not significantly affect aggregate rates. Thus, in the Corporatist view, the state uses private organisations, essentially 'functional interest groups' to administer its policies. Once the state reaches 'voluntary' agreements with a few large or representative private organisations, it then obliges them to enforce these bargains themselves to control their own members, associates, clients or supplies.

The contemporary term for this 'self-enforcement' is 'participation'. Winkler (1977) suggests that in many realms (industrial democracy, regional devolution and community action) 'participation' provides the legitimation for co-opting potential dissidents into apparent constitutions of decision-making, for defusing opposition, and, if successful, for turning them into agents for implementing state policy. He adds that if one takes the ideology at face value, what appears to be happening is a formalisation of interest group politics:— an institutionalisation of pluralism. However, as Cockburn (1977) has highlighted, within co-optive institutions
the state will still have to bargain and make compromises. Cawson (1977) extends the argument into the planning field and suggests that 'corporate' participation has replaced 'public' participation in the process of plan formulation. Further, he argues that the Sheffington recommendations on the appointment of community development offices are in effect, formalised procedures for representing unincorporated interests corporately in the planning process.

Arguments such as these raise the final and most significant point in Corporatist theory, the question of the definition of 'the state'. Winkler (1977) in discussing this point translates the question of 'what is the state' into another concerned solely with 'what does the state do' and the resulting definition is functionalist.

'The state, in Corporatist theory, is merely the administrative institutions of the corporate body, the nation. It exists simply to articulate and execute the common interest in the form of collective national goals and policies. In the corporatist vision, the state is neither separate from nor superior to the people, the state is the people organised.' (p.49)

This definition begs the whole question about the locus of power within the government itself which is precisely the issue with which the theory of corporatism is concerned. However, Winkler (1977) does attempt to relate the 'tendencies' of a corporatist state to take particular institutional forms. He asserts that, as state intervention shifts increasingly from facilitative and supportive functions to a directive role, it will increasingly resort to antinomianism, inquisitorial justice, extra-legal power, strategic rather than universal control of private industry, the use of semi-autonomous agencies to enforce and promote government policies, and the use of private, non-governmental organisations for the same reason. Thus corporatism is associated with a shift in the forms as well as the
nature of state intervention and not just with a quantitative increase therein.

In adopting this perspective, however, Winkler (1977) effectively separates the 'state' as a set of institutions from the 'people' as a group, which is precluded by his definition above. Hence corporatist theory oscillates between treating the state system blithely in crude terms as a mere agent of a functionally organised population or as a totally autonomous body towards which the accumulation of corporate power becomes trans-substantiated into dirigiste norms.

Pahl and Winkler's ideal typical notion of corporatism can be replaced by Jessop's (1978) notion of 'tripartism'. Tripartism is a hybrid form of state in which corporatist and parliamentary forms of state are combined into a contradictory unity owing to the participation in corporatist decision-making of representatives of the parliamentary executive (or government) and the participation in parliamentary decision-making and administration of corporations (for example, unions and employers' associations).

This model has the advantage of rejecting both simplistic class influence and system constraint models of the state and avoids explaining state policy and institutional form as being externally determined. Thus to fully explain policy outcomes one needs to focus on the internal structure of the state and to explain or account for the growth of public agencies as an administrative form, one needs to take a more micro view.

The next chapter is devoted to a consideration and analysis of theories of agency growth and form, whilst chapter three uses inter-organisational analysis to look at the consequences of their interaction for policy making and tentatively suggests some techniques which may be used to co-ordinate the different elements of an increasingly diverse 'state' form.
CHAPTER 2 - THE PUBLIC AGENCY AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE FORM
It is clear from the above discussion that the tendency of the 'state' to adopt a particular administrative form is touched on, although dealt with somewhat inadequately, by macro-theoretical perspectives such as Marxism and Corporatism. Writers in these schools of thought tend to view administrative form as largely functionally determined by the activities of the state, relating it to class structure and conflict or the dirigism of a corporatist state. Such functionalist explanations seem somewhat limited when one considers the diversity of institutional forms that the modern state apparatus now exists in. As early as 1936, Jennings had noted that,

'The simple dichotomy of central departments responsible to Parliament through ministers and local authorities responsible to a local electorate no longer exists. The twenty-four ministers are not leaders of columns which march behind them in regular ranks for the columns now have outsiders in their flanks and a relatively unorganised mass of camp followers trailing behind.'

(p.80)

Mackenzie and Grove's 1957 work on central departments also highlighted the presence of these administrative 'outsiders and camp followers'. Their research revealed that British central government, far from being 'centralised and unitary' as the conventional wisdom held, was in fact surrounded by a diverse semi-public, semi-independent sector difficult to both classify and explain. This 'fringe' they broadly characterised as organisations that act under the general direction of government and are provided with public funds, but are at 'arm's length' from Whitehall departments and exercise a degree of independence in their day to day actions. Far from disappearing in subsequent periods of governmental
rationalisation and re-organisation, such 'fringe bodies' or governmental agencies have been a major governmental growth sector following what Keeling (1976) terms 'the organisational equivalent of the theory of continuous creation of matter'.

Bowen (1978) suggests that governmental agencies have always been an administrative feature of British Government although their designation has changed through the years. Indeed Hanson and Walles (1970) attribute a somewhat distinguished pedigree to such bodies suggesting that there was a comparable spreading of 'irregular' administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial institutions during two previous historical periods:— the Tudor period and that of the Industrial Revolution in the early nineteenth century when agencies first became a notable feature of government. In this period, the growth of agencies occurred when the functions of government widened in response to the rapid social and economic changes of the times. Interestingly, a parallel government expansion through the use of boards and commissions to carry out particular functions and not through the extension of the role or functions of existing departments occurred in the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

As Parris (1969) has highlighted, at this time in Britain, central government functions moved back from boards and commissions and became consolidated again in Central Departments. Thus, by the time that the Haldane Committee was examining the 'machinery of government' in 1918, most functions had become the responsibility of central departments again and government agencies had virtually disappeared (with the exception of standing Royal Commissions). Despite Haldane's suspicion of what he termed 'Administrative Boards' and his recommendation that the normal form of central administrative body should be the government department,
his views did little to stem the growth of such bodies in the twentieth century. A spate of such bodies was set up in the 1920s (including such notables as the BBC, Central Electricity Generating Board and the London Passenger Transport Board). By the late 1930s after the creation of bodies such as the agricultural marketing boards, fishery support bodies and public corporations (for example BOAC), prototypes existed for most of the agencies which were set up after World War Two – including what Hague et al (1975) term the 'old-fashioned nationalisation' formulae of the 1940s and the accompanying mass of advisory, promotional trade levy and specialised banking organisations.

Many of the agencies which have most input into the activities of Local Authority Planning Departments due to either their function or their land-use requirements have birth-dates in this early post-war period. The Countryside Commission, the New Town Development Corporations and British Rail are amongst the earliest, but there has been a continuing willingness to use this form of administration until the present day with the Forestry Commission, the Highlands and Islands Development Board, the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies and the 1974 'water industry' reorganisation in England and Wales being the best known examples of this in recent times.

Clearly from this 'reputational' survey, the existence of these bodies presents a number of problems for the analyst of governmental form to explain. Firstly, one needs to examine the reasons for the growth of such bodies. Secondly, some attention must be given to refining definition and classification before one turns finally to consider the numbers of such bodies. As most of the work on explanations of agency growth has been developed by Hood (1973, 1978) it is to a brief critical appraisal of his work that attention is now turned.
At the outset, Hood (1978) suggests that there are four possible ways in which one might explain why agencies are instituted in various forms and he argues, if this problem can be explained, the reason for the general growth of the agency as an administrative form should be revealed. However, his four possible explanations, 'Roulette Wheel', 'Fashion', 'Managerial Technology' and 'Political' tend to oscillate between general and specific levels and one is never quite certain which level he is arguing at (a point exacerbated by him not defining what he means by agency 'form' at any point in the paper).

The 'Roulette Wheel' theory is directed at the specific level and acts as a 'null hypothesis' suggesting that the pattern of agency growth is random in the sense that the factors governing agency type are so complicated that it is impossible to predict agency form from any general body of theory. Explanations of form would have to be directly researched from a microscopic knowledge of the administrative history of the area and the personalities involved. As can be seen from the above discussion, at the general level there has been a clear trend to the use of the agency as an administrative form by government, although this of course does not preclude the 'roulette wheel' theory being the 'explanation' of different agency types of the specific level.

In contrast, the 'fashion theory' focusses very much on the general level seeking to explain agency growth and forms deductively from changing administrative fashion. Illustrative of this approach is the work of Wettenhall (1968) who suggests that there are 'long swings' in opinion in public administration between moods of integration (seeing the public
sector as a corporate whole) and moods of diversity (involving the creation of ad hoc specialised agencies in response to circumstance). Thus, according to Wettenhall, the pattern is determined by shifting opinion and not with clear cut differences in the actual problems or tasks faced by different agencies. Hence Hood suggests that in this view, agency type can only be predicted by reference to generation or date of birth. Apart from certain etymological problems with the notion of generation, a fashion theory seems a weak probabilistic predictor of agency growth and form because peak periods for the creation of agencies seem to coincide roughly with periods of general government expansion, such as the 1940s, 1960s, and 1970s so far (which interestingly has been the period of public sector integration through PESC, PAR and corporate decision making in government).

'Managerial Technology' theories on the other hand, take the view that it is the practicalities of different jobs which in fact determine organisational form not merely changes of items in a vacuum. The broad approach depicted here is that of classical management science which sees organisations as being built up from basic operational tasks consequently implying that the top structure which emerges will be closely related to the dictates of these basic tasks. In the context of the public sector, Hood suggests three types of managerial explanation:— that 'business' type activities will tend to be performed by agencies, (the Morrison doctrine), that all tasks requiring flexibility, discretion and innovativeness will be performed by agencies, and finally, that 'routine' activities of any kind will tend to be 'hived-off' from central departments to agencies (the Fulton doctrine).

In examining each, counter examples can be found which weaken the explanation. Not all agencies are business organisations in the sense of
conducting trading or lending operations and indeed as Jordan (1976) has highlighted, some 'Trading Fund Organisations' such as the Ordnance Survey and HMSO (where current expenditure is financed from receipts and capital expenditure is financed by borrowings from the National Loans Fund and from retained earnings) have remained within the departmental framework. Secondly, the 'innovative' argument can be countered by cases where apparently similar tasks are entrusted to different types of agencies and indeed much research is carried out intra-departmentally. Finally, the reverse 'hiving-off' argument, if put together with the 'flexibility' argument would explain that agencies could carry out any managerial task, a fairly unhelpful conclusion.

Although Hood (1978) concludes that 'managerial' considerations do go some way in explaining agency type, his conception of managerial theories is somewhat narrow. Burns and Stalker (1961) for example, argue from an 'organic structure' perspective suggesting that structural change becomes an organisational imperative where an organisation's environment is rapidly changing. Further, the more turbulent the environment, the greater the predilection for flexible or adaptive structures. Thus government agencies may be seen as a means of adapting organisational structures. This suggests a partial explanation of the periods of general agency growth in the 1940s, 1960s and 1970s and might also explain why the Scottish Office is the sponsoring department for the largest number of agencies of all United Kingdom government departments (although the multi-functional nature of the Scottish Office must also be borne in mind). In short, Hood, by focussing on the more institutionalised doctrines of administrative form, fails to take into account the potential source of relevant literature from Organisational Sociology.
It is with a consideration of 'political' theories of agency institution that Hood's explanations become almost as numerous as the bodies they are trying to explain. Broadly, such explanations focus on trying to discern a 'political' logic in agency type but within this wide characterisation, there are a number of specific strands. Firstly, a 'buffer' theory sees them as a way of protecting certain activities from political interference. Secondly, an 'escape' theory sees them as a way of escaping known weaknesses of traditional government departments. Thirdly, the 'participation' or 'pluralistic' theory sees them as a way of diffusing government power. Fourthly, the 'dirigiste' theory suggests that if government finds it cannot do the things it wants within the existing structure, new organisations are set up which makes it possible to do them. Finally, the 'too many bureaucrats' view which suggests (drawing heavily from the American experience) that if public opinion is against government expansion, one way of extending government activities without increasing the number of civil servants is to set up agencies whose employees are then not classified as civil servants.

Clearly this consideration by Hood (1978) of the reasons for agency form and growths is ultimately a somewhat unproductive exercise. As Hood himself admits, one complication is that many of the explanations he discusses are not easily separable in practice and there are a number of major categorisation problems 'at the margin' (particularly between 'managerial' and 'political' theories). However, consideration of his work has served usefully to emphasise the diversity of reasons for the growth of this heterogeneous sector and confirmed to some extent the validity of the 'Roulette Wheel' approach.
The diversity of this sector further compounds the problems of definition and taxonomy. Although the term 'agency' (defined by Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary as the 'business of one authorised or delegated to transact business for another') is useful in capturing the essence of the characteristics of such organisations, it is in some ways much too broad and imprecise being able to encompass Local Authorities who would certainly contest being termed 'agents of government'. However, there is no shortage of terms which have been used to describe such bodies. One can choose from, non-departmental organisation, non-departmental agency, public corporation, public body, interstitial organisation, ad hoc agency, statutory special purpose authority, quasi-autonomous national government organisation, administrative body, semi-autonomous authority, paragovernmental agency, parastatal agency, fringe body, quasi-non-governmental organisation (the ubiquitous 'Quango'), quasi-governmental organisation, and finally, it has been suggested that 'quasi-non-quasi governmental organisations':- Quasi-Quangos can be discerned (Hood, 1973). Many of these terms, however, originate from the most recent (and in many ways the most comprehensive) attempt at classification by Hague, Barker and Mackenzie (1975) who operate a 'distance from government' classification.

Hague et al attempt to chart the position of agencies along a continuum which moves from the State to the Private Sector, identifying four categories along this continuum:- Government (G), Quasi-Governmental (QG), Quasi Non-Governmental Organisations (QNG) and Non-Government Organisations (NG). In the introductory chapter of the book, Hague defines these terms more fully. G, he considers to be the Civil Service, the Armed forces and Diplomatic Service, and given that British central government in the
last resort can use legal means to coerce local authorities, he includes these as G also. Apart from grossly over-simplifying the literature on Central-Local relations, Hague's usage differs from that of Hood (1973) who separates Local Authorities from both Central Government and Quango's and Quango's. Although Hague acknowledges that the state and private industry interpenetrate to such an extent through contracts and the regulation and control of business (see Hood (1975) for fuller details of this) that it is difficult to define NG, he drops the discussion at this point and the category is left as vague as to be almost meaningless.

Similar confusion exists over the QG and QNG categories. The QG category is defined in terms of 'old-fashioned nationalisation' and the broadcasting medium,

'The story of 'old-fashioned nationalisation' has been told many times..... It is enough for our purpose to specify this sector as quasi-government or QG.'

(p.12)

Whereas the QNG category is defined almost as every other organisation not in the other categories,

'There are things that 'must be done' and organisations are needed to see that they are done. It is often not quite clear why the things in question need doing and there is rarely any explicit point at which a decision is taken to have them done.'

(p.12)

Sentiments which have been echoed recently in the popular press.

In Appendix III of the book where Hood and Mackenzie discuss classification, their usage of the terms differs somewhat from Hague's usage in the introduction. For instance, they suggest that,

'The distinction between governmental and quasi-governmental bodies is far from being a precise one.'

(p.411)

and their usage of the term QG corresponds more to Hague's QNG category in being a 'catch-all' category, whereas their QNG category is defined as
'government by other means' through the use of 'non-governmental agents' for secrecy or concealment of authorship. To complicate matters even further, Hood's 1973 usage of the term 'Quango' (QNG) includes bodies such as the Arts Council, whereas in the 1975 work with Mackenzie, the Arts Council is deemed to be a QG organisation.

Given the confusion and inaccurate classification which seems to permeate this work, criticism has been surprisingly limited to the micro-level, merely seeking to improve the basic linear form. Thus Keeling (1976) seeks to refine the NG category by including voluntary associations and distinguishing within this category:— private service agencies (for example the Automobile Association); industrial and commercial agencies (for example, trade associations); charities and industrial and commercial companies and partnerships with increasing distance from Government (G). Jordan (1976) suggests that Departmental Agencies (intra-departmental organisations with full ministerial responsibility and responsible to parliament even on detailed decisions but often with some relaxation in or alternative form of accounting system) should be considered as a special form of G, that is G¹.

More fundamentally Jordan echoes the criticisms above of the distinction between QG and QNG although from a different perspective. Jordan suggests that insofar as the categories have any use, regulatory QNG organisations such as the Jockey Club are not 'Quasi-non-governmental'. They are instead institutions deriving legitimacy from and acting as if they were, Government. Similarly, as Jordan further highlights, the interesting feature of the Nationalised Industries and of agencies such as the HIDB or the Scottish or Welsh Development Agencies is that they represent government attempting to act as if it was 'not Government', that is QNG — not as Hood and Mackenzie would have it — QG.
Clearly critiques such as Jordan's do little to clarify the use of the terminology and indeed ignore the basic limitations of the linear form. A more macro-critique of this terminology falls into five parts.

Firstly, the classification fails to fully detail all the formal aspects of the relationships between administrative agencies and central government. An investigation of either the annual 'Directory of Paid Public Appointments made by Ministers' or Bowen's work on 'Fringe Bodies', reveals that agencies vary in their sponsoring department, their geographical areas of responsibility, their employment and staffing characteristics and their expenditure levels. It would seem obvious that interaction between agencies and government would be structured around at least some of these characteristics.

Secondly, the classification being positional relating agencies to government in terms of perceived 'administrative distance', takes no account of the organisational structure at either end of the link and thus fails to discuss meaningfully the patterns of interaction between differently structured agencies and indeed differently structured government departments. For example, can one say that the interaction between the National Radiological Protection Board and the Department of Health is the same as the National Water Council's relationship with the Department of the Environment?

Thirdly, the classification takes no account of agency funding and finance. Does whether an agency is funded through grants-in-aid statutory levies or financed directly through the vote, structure the relationship between agencies and government differently?

Fourthly, as can be seen from Bowen's work, the methods of establishment of such agencies differ. Methods of establishment include
registration under the Companies Act, a Minister's administrative act (usually a statement in Parliament), through a Royal Charter or a Royal Prerogative or indeed by an Act of Parliament (which is the most common instrument for establishing an agency). Clearly something more sophisticated than a linnean classification is needed both to categorise and explain this diversity.

Finally, the 'distance from government classification' by focussing on the links between broad classes of agency and government fails to look at the links between agency and its environment (other agencies and its client group) which 'feed back' into the relationship between agency and government.

Criticisms of this classification thus raise a number of other issues which might be incorporated into a more comprehensive classification. Given that the various a priori classifications prove futile, the way forward in this area is to explore the nature of the relationship between government and the 'fringe'. As has been suggested above such bodies differ in their degree of dependence on central government and this might indeed act as a good basis for classification. However, it is not the purpose of the present work to focus on developing such a classification, the present concern is to look at the agency as an administrative form before analysing its interactions with both other agencies and local government.

In lieu of classification, one must look for other common denominators to which agencies may be reduced and it is useful here to take an 'organisation theory' perspective. As Harris and Scott (1974) suggest,
an organisation possesses:

'(a) A common set of goals applicable to all parts;
(b) An established means for pursuing these goals;
(c) An ultimate expression of the organisation's authority in the form of a boss or chief executive;
(d) A permanence which transcends particular tasks.'

(p.32)

Given that each agency is thus an organisation which has particular aims and objectives (or, to avoid reification, whose members have particular aims and objectives) and an institutional form for achieving this, one now has a basis for analysing the actions and interactions of agencies. Looking at agencies by way of organisation analysis serves also to usefully widen the notion of accountability.

As many commentators have noted, the most difficult problem which has arisen in connection with the government agency is how to reconcile its dual needs for independence and accountability to government. The case for an organisation's independence rests on the simple proposition that for the government to benefit fully from these organisations they must be genuinely independent (anything less and their effectiveness will be comprised). Yet as Pifer (1975) has pointed out, agencies serve public purposes and are generally financed to some extent by government. Thus agencies are in a state of some tension between the conflicting claims of independence and accountability. However, much of the discussion of agency accountability has been couched in unnecessarily narrow vertical terms as Robinson's (1971) work shows. Robinson suggests three types of accountability: 'programme' accountability (where those in an organisation are held responsible for the tasks that it performs - the objectives which it pursues); 'process' accountability (where the concern is with whether the
way the particular programme or task has been carried out is satisfactory) and finally 'fiscal' accountability (where the emphasis is on ensuring that all money has been spent on the purpose for which it was granted).

Robinson's notions of accountability seem to derive more from public fears of 'undemocratic' government as viewed in the popular press (see Edelman (1975) for an illustration of this) than any systematic consideration of agencies as organisations operating in particular environments.

Friend, Lind and Macdonald (1978) in discussing the relationships between Regional Councils and agencies suggest that it becomes important to develop some appreciation of the realities of decision-making in other fields of public sector activity, based on an understanding of where key areas of discretion lie and of the relative importance of various influences and constraints on the exercise of that discretion. The focus of their framework is on a view of the way discretion is exercised by an individual, a group or an agency empowered to take substantive decisions in relation to some area of concern. In short they argue that the use of discretion can be explained if one can understand firstly, the general guidelines that apply to the type of decision under consideration, secondly, the nature of the accountability for the decision and finally, 'structural appreciation' (the way in which those using their discretion understand the structure of the specific problem situation in which they are currently attempting to intervene).

Applying this model to public agencies gives an indication of the parameters of their powers and incorporates Robinson's actions of accountability. Guidelines for instance may occur in two forms, through the statutory responsibilities under the terms of the founding act or charter or through the more detailed day-to-day scrutiny of the sponsoring department, that is through both generic guidelines and specific rules.
Accountability may be requested in a number of different forms, through the publication of annual reports, to the incumbents of nominated board positions within the organisation, to other agencies with which an agency interacts or indeed demands to the clients of an agency. This leads in turn to 'structural appreciation'. Whereas guidelines emphasise certain general characteristics of entities which constitute cases for decisions and seek to impose some general classification on them, considerations of structure emphasise relationships which are unique to particular cases and thus require the use of discretion. Clearly this is a much more accurate dynamic picture of how organisations behave and indeed, if pursued, may supply the elusive basis for classification.

Before turning more fully to explore the interactions between agencies, in Chapter Three, it is important to conclude this chapter with some tentative estimates of the size of this sector of government. Given that number estimates are a function of definition which, as can be seen above is somewhat problematic, any estimate of the numbers of these bodies must be treated somewhat cautiously. Hood (1978) suggests that most studies (both official and academic) indicate a figure of between 250 and 350 organisations of a permanent nature. However, the 1978 edition of a 'Directory of Paid Public Appointments made by Ministers' lists 616 bodies although this treats subordinate organisations as distinct from their 'parent' bodies (for example, the New Town Development Corporations are counted as units in their own right and not as part of the parent body, the Commission for New Towns, which is located in London).
Although Bowen's survey reveals only 235 such organisations (as of 1975) he does exclude, amongst other bodies, both the Nationalised Industries and the National Enterprise Board. The first exclusion he justifies somewhat weakly by suggesting that there is no accepted comprehensive definition of the Nationalised Industries and no precision in the use of the term (although Hanson and Walles (1970) argue that their role in the British system of public administration has been thoroughly discussed, a view confirmed by the amount of published case studies of these organisations:— see Kelf-Cohen (1969) for further details.) Bowen's justification for excluding the National Enterprise Board:— that it is not regarded by the Department of Industry as a 'fringe body' is similarly weak, as the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies are included and they are to some extent playing the same role.

More significantly, of the 235 bodies listed by Bowen, 165 differ from the list provided in the 'Directory of Paid Public Appointments Made by Ministers'. If one allows for differences caused by the different categorisation of the relationship between subordinate and parent bodies, this still leaves up to one hundred extra bodies to be added to the list provided in the 'Directory'. Hence the number of government agencies seems closer to a figure of between 600 and 700, almost double Hood's estimate.

In the absence of a comprehensive classification scheme, in order to gauge how many bodies are likely to interact regularly with Local Authorities (beyond the usual demands that any organisation wishing to build office accommodation may have for planning permission) it is necessary to attempt some form of functional differentiation of these bodies,
although the inherent difficulty of this lies in the fact that many bodies are multi-functional and categories themselves are never unambiguous. However, if one discards temporarily the idea of the Local Authority as a corporate whole and views it instead as a discrete set of functional departments, one might suggest tentatively that those bodies which are liable to interact most with Local Authorities are those whose functional policy space corresponds most closely with that of Local Authority Departments.

Thus those bodies whose sponsoring departments are the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Department of Education and Science, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Environment and the Department of Transport, are more likely to interact with the activities of Local Authorities than are those bodies whose sponsoring departments are the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Employment, the Department of Health and Social Security, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Department of Industry, the Ministry of Overseas Development, the Department of Trade or the Treasury. Although estimating the number of bodies likely to interact regularly with the activities of Local Authorities is compounded by the multi-functional Welsh and Scottish Offices, one can tentatively suggest that 271 bodies fall into this category. If one adjusts for duplication of New Town Development Corporations, Regional Water Authorities and Tourist Boards whose area of operation is not nationwide, this still leaves just over 200 bodies whose activities share some degree of congruence with the Local Authorities.

Clearly, inter-corporate planning techniques which take account of the interactions between such bodies must now be considered in further detail.
The first task of this chapter is to analyse in greater detail the problems faced by the diversity of governmental actors in city and metropolitan areas. Given substantial variation between cases, it is clear from the analysis of Chapter Two that an important part of what is done in urban areas and how it is accomplished is dependent on factors, outside the boundaries of the formal set of Local Authority patterns that characterise the local unit and outside the local political arena. In discussing this, the 'conventional wisdom' on central-local relations is of little help. As Hartley (1971) describes, the 'conventional wisdom' is a set of views about the nature of this relationship in which a distinction is normally drawn between the agent and partnership models of central-local relations. In the agent model, local authorities implement national policies under the supervision of central departments. Local authorities have little or no discretion. In the partnership model, local authorities and central departments are co-equals under parliament and local authorities have considerable discretion to design and implement their own policies. However, this distinction which is drawn is misleading when one considers the position of government agencies. Many bodies operate on a local or regional basis, and many of the interactions among government agencies and between government agencies and local authorities take place on a local basis. In other words, the role of government agencies in localities is not simply about centre-local relations (the 'accountability' of bodies to central government) but about local-local relations.

Thus the complex interactions between centre and locality involve a large number of organisations as can be seen in figure 1. The purpose of this illustration is simple:— to show the multilateral nature of links
FIGURE 1

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN SCOTLAND - AN ILLUSTRATION

Key:

DHSS: Department of Health and Social Security
DHSS(R): Regional Offices of DHSS
AHA: Area Health Authority
SSHA: Scottish Special Housing Association
SDA: Scottish Development Agency
R.C.: Regional Council
D.C.: District Council

-----: Inter-Departmental Relations of Central Government
--------: Inter-Departmental Relations involving sub-national units of government.

Adapted from Rhodes (1976)
between public sector bodies. The general formula is that the number of links in a network will increase by the product of the number of new bodies times the number of original bodies, added to the number of links necessary among the new organisations themselves. For example, where two new bodies are added to an existing network of 4 (which would have 6 links), the number of new links would be 9 (that is, $4 \times 2 + 1$), producing a new total of 15 links, a network 150% more complex than the original one. This apparently academic formulation has important implications for the ability of organisations to cope with their environment since it emphasises how complex this can become.

It should not be thought that the links between organisations need only occur in isolated pairs. The problem of urban deprivation, for example, would probably involve every single organisation in the illustration with every other organisation. The statutory functions relevant to the problem of urban deprivation do not lie with any one organisation and for an effective solution, concerted action would be required.

The difficulty of dividing 'policy space' into exclusive units, of necessity leads to 'multiple organisational interaction' in functional areas in much the same way as happens in geographical space. Indeed authors such as Downs (1967) have offered a territorial analogy of the interaction between agencies. Each agency is pictured as occupying a policy zone which comprises of a heartland, an interior zone, a 'no-man's land' and a periphery. Agency A's heartland is its exclusive zone of operation but A's interior zone, though mainly under its control, may be a peripheral zone for other agencies. No-man's land is where agencies compete on roughly equal terms. Although Down's analogy offers a simplified version of a phenomenon which is considerably more
complex, network maps such as figure 1 suggest that the relationships are far from hypothetical, they are a necessary component of effective action by government at all levels as is emphasised by the discussion of 'ungovernability' in modern Britain.

'The growing complexity of government tends to make government overcomplex, reducing its efficiency and upon occasion, its effectiveness.

... Today, the chief policies of government depend for success upon the results of complex processes of inter­action that can be influenced but not controlled by government.'

(Rose, 1978, p.15, p.16)

The need for coordination of organisations in policy situations is nowhere better illustrated than in case studies of policy imple­mentation, a subject which Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) contend 'has been often discussed but rarely studied'. (Meyerson and Banfield's (1955) case study of the problems facing the establishment of public housing programmes in Chicago being a notable exception to this.) Pressman and Wildavsky in a serious attempt to 'grapple with the problem' offer in the form of another case study, the story of the activities of the Economic Development Agency (the EDA) in the city of Oakland. The brief of the EDA was to provide jobs for racial minorities, a goal it attempted to achieve through financial aid schemes for public works and local enterprises, a task which was perceived to be simple enough but which met with depressing outcomes. Over a period of six years (1965-1971) only twenty new jobs were created and much money spent. Yet as Hood (1976) highlights, the external conditions of what he terms 'perfect administration' were met in this case as the programme was well-funded and enjoyed strong political support. As it was a seemingly innocent programme which ran into substantial difficulties, Pressman and Wildavsky postulate that perfectly ordinary circumstances may present serious obstacles for implementation. Indeed as Jenkins (1978) somewhat caustically suggests, in many policy arenas it may be
a difficult enough task to get even the ordinary to happen.

The erratic progress of the EDA in Oakland touches on many issues similar to that of the Chicago case discussed by Meyerson and Banfield. The EDA and local interests found themselves with conflicting goals (for example, business development versus the need of the long term unemployed) while at another level different perspectives existed on the part of EDA personnel in Oakland and Washington. More destructively, it appears that while substantial agreement may have existed on the ends of the programme, participants often either opposed the means proposed by others or saw little to be gained in making any move towards action themselves. The overall result of this and related factors was that policies never mobilised sufficient support at any one time to make substantial progress; a reflection of the fact that each actor or organisation worked within its own system of constraints. Hood (1976) suggests that this basic problem is usefully described by the phrase 'Multi-Organisational sub-optimisation' which refers to situations where different parts of inter-connected systems are separately administered in such a way as to render the total administrative effect ineffective or counter productive. For Pressman and Wildavsky the process of policy implementation is therefore essentially a series of interrelated decisions involving a multiplicity of actors none of whom (in the Oakland case) had any marked degree of control over the situation. This arises in part out of the complexity (in aggregate terms) of the organisational situation and in part because implementation is (certainly in this case and most probably generally) divorced from policy.
Thus the difficulties which arose in implementing the programme were seen by Pressman and Wildavsky in terms of 'steering' the organisations contributing to the programme through a variety of 'decision paths' and 'clearance points'. Owing to the fact that probabilities combine multiplicatively and thus become smaller in combination where they are less than unity, Pressman and Wildavsky produce a model whereby programmes of comparatively small complexity will be overwhelmingly likely to be blocked, even assuming a very high propensity of all participants to agree at all the necessary 'clearance points'. The policy imperative thus emerging from the Oakland study is that the study of implementation requires the understanding that apparently simple sequences of events depend on complex chains and networks of reciprocal interaction. Hence the analysis is of value in directing one towards the organised complexity of the policy sphere in which organisations manoeuvre to control their environment and impose their definition of the situation on others.

Like Pressman and Wildavsky, Williams (1971) identifies 'a lacuna between decision and implementation' a central reason for which is seen to be the absence of an 'implementation capacity' ('the capacity of an organisation to put in place a policy decision in such a way that objectives are likely to be reached'). For Williams a theory of implementation becomes very much a theory of organisational development since it links the strands of organisational design and motivation. Roos (1974) echoes Williams and suggests that implementation theory in a normative form at least is essentially a theory of organisations and their interactions. Yep (1974) adds that coordination has been an explicit or implicit concern of most interorganisational analysis (citing Miller (1958) and Reid (1964) as examples). Thus before
focussing more sharply on the twin interrelated concerns that planners have in multi-organisation situations, the methods of co-ordination of units and the organisational design of such situations, it will be necessary to examine further the concepts and literature of 'inter-organisational' sociology.

The literature of organisational sociology has expanded at an enormous rate throughout the post-war period, and in the past decade especially, there has been a specific concern amongst organisational sociologists in focussing on the links between the organisation and its environment. The comparatively underdeveloped discipline inter-organisational sociology concentrates on one aspect of the general link, namely the link between an organisation and other organisations in its environment. Rhodes (1979) suggests that the subject tends to oscillate between the two extremes of 'grand theory' and 'abstracted empiricism', a problem compounded by the lack of paradigmatic agreement on either the most important concepts or their meaning. Given this and the volume of literature concerned, it would clearly be unwise to attempt to review the field entirely as this is not the concern of the present study. Rather, it is possible to approach inter-organisational sociology through the work of authors who have used the subject to analyse the relationships and management of public sector organisations and from these, to abstract general themes. Thus it is proposed to look at the work of Elkin (1975) on Comparative Urban Politics, the work of Crozier and Thoenig (1976) on Central-Local relations in France, Rhodes' (1979) analysis of Central-Local relations in Britain and finally the two interrelated works of Friend, Yewlett and Power (1974) on the
inter-organisational expansion of an English town and Harris and Scott's (1974) work on 'multi-organisations'. Although the latter two studies fall more properly within the field of inter-governmental relations, this approach shares many of the concepts of inter-organisational sociology.

At the outset as William Evan (1966) notes, the

'phenomena and problems at issue in this analysis of relations between organisations are part of the general class of boundary relation problems confronting all types of social systems'

(p.175)

The premise of the inter-organisational approach is that organisational processes cannot be adequately explained except for reference to the impact of actors outside the organisation, an insight common in the social sciences being central to such lines of inquiry as political integration and social conflict. The basic assumption in the literature is thus that the organisation is an 'open system'. As Emery and Trust pointed out in 1960,

'... there has been something of a tendency to continue thinking in terms of a 'closed system', that is, to regard the enterprise as sufficiently independent to allow most of its problems to be analysed with reference to its internal structure and without reference to its external environment.'

(p.281)

They argued instead for an 'open system' perspective, that is the recognition of the 'mutual permeation of an organisation and its environment', and further suggest that environmental changes are a major source of uncertainty for an organisation. However, the problem with this formulation is its high level of generality. It is difficult to disagree with the general statements that the environment permeates the organisation and that there are different types of uncertainty. From an inter-organisational perspective, it is important to know which of all possible organisations any given organisation will interact with.
In an attempt to confront this problem Elkin draws on and attempts to synthesise the work of three authors, Benson (1975), Thompson (1966, 1967) and Evan (1966). Firstly, Elkin suggests that the most useful image in capturing the 'openness' of city politics is that of a 'network' (following Benson) of governmental organisations having as its focus the local territorial unit. In Elkin's view (again following Benson) the level of interdependence is relatively high between organisations in the network as compared with that between these organisations and other actors. Secondly, Elkin argues that beyond this, one may think of each organisation as having a 'domain' (following Thompson), that is, a sphere of competence which an organisation uses to define 'needed' and 'relevant' resources for itself and which it seeks to protect and expand. If there is no 'domain consensus', that is, agreement on the goals pursued in each organisation by other organisations, conflict between organisations will occur. Elkin further suggests that each of the organisations in the network may be said to be seeking autonomy. However, they are not autonomous but in varying degrees interdependent and it is the management of this dependence on others in the network that is of central interest. Here Elkin's use of the term 'network' seems to correspond more with Evan's notion of the 'organisational set' which is defined as 'an organisation or a class of organisations and its interactions with the network of organisations in its environment', the organisation that is the point of reference being termed the 'focal organisation'.

Given Elkin's general concern to look at the focal organisation and its management of dependence of the other organisations with which it deals, Elkin shifts the focus of analysis from a characterisation of organisational environment to a discussion of inter-organisational exchange theory by focussing more fully on the concept of dependence.
The most important single statement of the concept of dependence in the context of inter-organisational analysis is that of Thompson (1967) who suggests that any given organisation is dependent upon other organisations,

'... (1) in proportion to the organisation's need for resources or performances which that element, can provide and (2) in inverse proportion to the ability of other elements to provide the same resources or performance.'

(p.30)

And dependence is the obverse of power,

'... an organisation has power relative to an element of its task environment to the extent that the organisation has the capacity to satisfy needs of that element and to the extent that the organisation monopolises that capacity.'

(p.31)

The importance of the concept of dependence and the reason that it is stressed more than the concept of power lies in the fact that it admits of reciprocity. An organisation can both be dependent upon another organisation and have power over that organisation. Thus Elkin lists strategies that focal organisations use in managing dependence, strategies such as co-alition, co-optation, exchange (bargaining of resources), penetration (attempts to penetrate the organisation on which it is dependent), socialisation of conflict (attempts to widen the scope of conflict by invoking previously uninvolved parties who will alter the balance of opinion and resources), and setting up or making use of a supra-organisation. Obviously the danger exists that a new strategy can be invented to use in the analysis of individual case studies, however Elkin does attempt to relate strategies to the resource characteristics of the organisation. For example, organisations with limited resources are more likely to attempt to manage dependence
through co-alition, penetration and trying to push the problem up to an existing supra-organisation rather than through co-optation, exchange or trying to build a supra-organisation.

Although Elkin suggests that his inter-organisational perspective outlined above provides a 'language to handle some of the fundamental problems of comparative urban political inquiry' (p.183) his checklist suffers from a lack of operationalisation and indeed his use of the terms 'focal organisation', 'organisation set' and 'network' are fairly loose, (Benson's notion of 'network' seems more of an alternative to Evan's focal organisation set - not a cumulative extension of it).

Crozier and Thoenig (1976) however partly fill this gap by attempting to describe these processes of inter-organisational dependency arguing that,

'The literature has correctly pointed out that all relations of the organisation with the environment are relationships of dependence. But it has generally given a description and classification of the resources of power enjoyed in these relationships rather than a demonstration of the mechanisms of the game between the parties.'

(p.562)

Crozier's (1964) starting point for correcting this omission is with the power relations within the organisation. Although Crozier admits that there is still a problem with the definition and identification of power, for him an understanding of power distribution is crucial to an explanation of the organisation's existence and performance.
Central to this thesis is a focus on groups and the struggle between groups for resources, a struggle that creates uncertainties around them:

'Groups fight for control of the ultimate strategic sources of uncertainties and their fates in the group struggle' (Crozier, 1964, p.107).

In recent years this position has been developed further by Hickson (1971) and Child (1972) whilst still retaining Crozier's basic contention that variation in organisational output is linked with power 'games' between competing groups.

Nor is the game confined to relationships within the organisation. It can be applied to relations between organisations,

'Regulation is the basic mechanism of organisations. From that point of view, there is no difference in kind, but only a difference in degree between an organisation and an interorganisational network. Both are social and human systems, more or less stable and structured, integrating various units, regulating their behaviour, and imposing a collective game on their members.'

(Crozier and Thoenig, p.563)

Confirmation of this view can be found in the empirical application of the theory to the system of central-local relations in France. The earliest application is Worm's (1966) study of the 'game' which takes place between prefects and 'notables'. Conventionally the prefect has always been regarded as representing the interests of the 'state' and the 'notable' as defender of local interests. Yet both are interdependent; the success of one depends upon the other. The prefect is judged on his ability to 'get things done' within his department and this would be impossible without a degree of co-operation from dominant members of the local community. In turn, the notable, especially the mayor, has an interest in co-operating with the prefect. The mayor is competing with other mayors in the department for resources from the centre and his success as a mayor depends upon his ability to
secure benefits from the state. Thus both the prefects and the 'notables' are interested in complicity for the purposes of bargaining with Paris. For the notable, the prefect is the channel of access to Paris. For the prefect, his ability to claim control over local reactions to central policies gives him greater freedom of action in bargaining with Paris. Therefore the prefect and 'his notables' engage in transactions where certain 'convergences' or 'breaking of rules for mutual benefit' may be detected.

Crozier and Thoenig (1976) have extended the idea of the game to the whole structure of 'territorial administration' in France (see figure 2). At each level there exist relations of dependence around which games evolve. There are two separate channels of territorial administration, the elected channel and administrative channel with areas of common interest between members of each of the channels and within each channel. But communication is not structured vertically or horizontally. Rather the system is one of 'cross-regulation'. Each member of a channel tries to have his interests favoured by members of the other channels upon whom they are dependent. In spite of the complexity of this 'honeycomb' pattern of relations, however, the game is remarkably stable because it provides benefit to each participant. All have a vested interest in preserving the status quo.

Although Crozier and Thoenig have produced a substantial piece of research, their insistence that inter-organisational processes are merely an extension of intra-organisational processes is somewhat suspect. Although, as has been pointed out above, similar processes do occur in organisations, goal enforcement of agreed or negotiated goals tends to be less problematic. Secondly, Crozier and Thoenig only consider a unilateral link between two hierarchies. As has also been emphasised
FIGURE 2

THE SYSTEM OF REGULATION IN FRENCH INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elected Officials Channel</th>
<th>Administrative Channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President of the Republic</td>
<td>The Ministry of Finance and other central agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The members of the Parliament and influential socio-economic leaders at national level</td>
<td>The Prefects and other heads of State agencies at the level of the department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The General Councilmen and local socio-economic leaders</td>
<td>The Sub-prefects and other heads of State agencies at the level of the cantons or arrondissements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mayors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Municipal Councilmen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arrows represent lines of communication.

Source: Crozier and Thoenig (1976), p.554.
above, public policy making is a consequence of multi-lateral links between organisations. The third weakness of Crozier and Thoenig's analysis lies in their lack of consideration of resources. The empirical studies are based on the perceptions of participants of their relative power. As such the methodology has a marked affinity with the reputational methods employed in American community power studies, a methodology which has rather a large number of weaknesses including the difficulty that, at best, it is only tapping potential power, not power as exercised.

Rhodes (1979) has attempted to develop and synthesise salient points from both of these perspectives into what he terms an inter-governmental 'Power-Dependence' framework for the analysis of the relationship of public sector organisations. The framework contains five propositions:

First, any organisation occupies a complex environment which has manifold repercussions upon it because this environment is composed of other organisations which are sources of needed resources.

Secondly, in order to achieve their goals, the organisations in this network of relationships have to exchange resources.

Thirdly, although decision-making within an organisation is constrained by other organisations, the 'dominant coalition' (the dominant group within the organisation at a particular time which specifies the organisational goals) retain some discretion. The 'appreciative system' of the dominant coalition (which may be crudely interpreted as a combination of interests, expectations and ideology
structures the understanding of, and reaction to, the environment) influences which relationships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought.

Fourthly, the dominant coalition employs strategies within known rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange.

Fifthly, variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the relative power potential of interacting organisations. This 'relative power potential' is a product of the resources of each organisation, of the rules of the game and of the process of exchange between organisations.

Although Rhodes (1979) developed this framework initially for analysing central-local relations, Rhodes himself notes the need to incorporate government agencies in the analysis. Indeed, his approach will be more fruitful when applied to relations involving government agencies than central department-local authority ones, since many of the formal characteristics of a particular tier of local authority will be common to all authorities, whereas there is a wider scope for variation between government agencies because of the variety of forms which they take. The scope available to each organisation in selecting its options for dealing with other organisations will depend on the resources of different kinds which each has and those which it needs from other organisations. Different organisations will have different distributions of the resources and therefore different implied constraints on the options available to them. Hogwood (1979) suggests that the resources available to organisations will depend on a number of characteristics, which are presented in list form below. Many of the categories listed may, of course, overlap in practice.
Legal Resources
Composition and Appointment of Governing Boards and Committees
Size and Nature of Staff
Finance
Locality Factors
Nature of roles and policy tasks
Strategic sequential position (extent to which activities of the organisation have to be carried out prior to or parallel with the activities of other organisations)
Technical/professional resources
Informational resources
Political resources
Personal factors
Internal organisational integration

Clearly more research needs to be done in correlating and ranking these resource elements of government agencies. Future research might be directed at attempting to compile a 'discretion index' of government agencies using computer analysis and ranking. However, given the present state of knowledge and indeed the scope of this work it is useful merely to highlight these resource categories.

Unfortunately, the literature on inter-organisational sociology does not offer a particularly cohesive model of the interaction between organisations, a difficulty which pervades most fields of study. Focussing, as has been done above, on particular theoretical derivatives of the field largely obscures the considerable disagreement over concepts such as the nature of the environment or the organisation set us the network. However common ground does exist. Other organisations are seen to be an important aspect of the environment of any particular organisation and out of such interdependence arises the employment of strategies and a complex picture of organisations negotiating and
bargaining with one another. Given this, it is important obviously to look at management techniques and organisational design to structure these situations and it is to a consideration of this that attention is now turned, through a focus on 'Intergovernmental Relations'.

Wright (1974) in a review of Inter-Governmental Relations, identifies five features which have characterised the field. First, Inter-Governmental Relations recognises the multiplicity of relationships between all types of government. Although usually applied to federal systems, Wright argues that IGR is a much broader term covering all the relationships illustrated, for example, in figure 1. Secondly, it emphasises the interactions between individuals, especially public officials. Thirdly, IGR recognises the continuous day-to-day pattern of contracts, knowledge and evaluations of government officials and stresses informal working relationships in institutional contests. Fourthly, IGR is distinguished by its focus on all political actors, both politicians and administrators. As Wright remarks 'the increased focus on administrators as relevant IGR participants is a natural outgrowth of the increasingly important role played by public bureaucracies in government' (p.416). A fifth and final feature of IGR is its policy component. Not only does it focus on 'Who Governs?' but also looks at the political and social component of policy by asking 'Who Benefits?'. It is into this context that one can place the work of Friend et al (1974) at the Institute for Operational Research and the discussion by Harris and Scott (1974) on multi-organisation design.
As if to reinforce the earlier point that there is no agreed set of concepts for the analysis of inter-organisational and inter-governmental relations, Friend et al have developed their own vocabulary. The basic concept from which other terms are developed is that of the 'policy system' which is

'... any set of organisational and interpersonal arrangements which has to deal with some identifiable class of decision problems'

(p.24)

This policy system (loosely modelled on the stimulus-response models of cognitive psychologists) has both internal and external relations. The external relations are classified into three broad groups:— the operating environment; the set of policy values in the community which require to be 'managed' through some form of policy sounding; and contiguous policy systems, or other policy systems in which related problems can arise. Each of these features of the environment can give rise to its own type of uncertainty (a point which the authors draw from Friend and Jessop's 1969 work). As soon as the actors respond to uncertainty by broadening the context through some wider process of exploration in conjunction with other interconnected issues, they undertake a process of strategic choice. The broader the context, the more comprehensive the planning process, the greater the need for co-ordinative or connective planning across continuous policy systems which are virtually independent in that each operates through a distinctive set of policy guidelines with little or no common ground between them. In the absence of consensually based policy guidelines and the existence of a central decision-maker, the situation veers towards what Lindblom (1965) terms 'partisan mutual adjustment' and disjointed incremental action is the result. Needless to say, the tendency towards partisan mutual adjustment increases in direct proportion to the complexity of the action space.
Alternatively, the actors may form joint agencies to deal with a problem, that is what Stringer (1967) terms a 'multi-organisation' which is defined as,

'the union of parts of several organisations, each part being a subset of the interests of its own organisation.'

(p.106)

A multi-organisation could be established, for example when the various actors recognise the difficulty of working through partisan mutual adjustment. However, Friend et al (1974) further suggest that such a joint policy system may not always be very effective, especially where the actors must remain responsive to conflicting constituency interests. As in the more structured type of conflict situation analysed by writers in coalition theory, rational but partisan decision makers will only be concerned to maintain a sufficient level of co-alition to maximise their expected gains.

Finally, to cope with the complex patterns of communication which may arise between decision-makers in such circumstances, the concept of 'decision network' is introduced. This as defined by Friend (1976) describes,

'... any more flexible and adaptive arrangements for communication between a set of decision-makers directly or indirectly concerned in some identifiable class of problems, but without necessarily subscribing to any shared policy guidelines.'

(p.38)

Friend et al (1974) apply this conceptual framework to the problem of controlled dispersal of population and employment away from the Birmingham conurbation and in particular to the expansion of the small town of Droitwich to receive Birmingham overspill population. Of necessity, this required inter-agency agreement; that is, the creation of a multi organisation in the form of Droitwich Development Group
and Committee, the structure of which is shown in figure 3. The full complexity of the situation, however, does not emerge until particular decisions are analysed and the linkages between the variety of organisations involved is highlighted (as is shown in figure 4). Observation of this leads Friend et al (1974) to the conclusion already appreciated by readers of this work, that policy-making in the public sector is characterised by multiple links between organisations.

The significance of the work for the present study is their focus not only on the pattern of interactions between organisations but also on the process of planning. The thrust of their argument is essentially that inter-organisational linkages act as a constraint on a rational or planning approach to public decisions. Because complexity of action space generates bargaining and incremental adjustments, time and effort has to be devoted to managing the linkages. The decision to activate and indeed develop these links is particularly important and depends to a great extent on the 'network managing' or 'reticulist' skills of those local actors who play important 'boundary roles' at the interface between agencies. In more detail and as refined by Power (1971), the role is seen as

'initiating and cultivating a network of human relationships in such a way as to maintain access to information about changing problem situations which he expects to interact in a significant way with these particular types of decision over which he wishes to be able to exert some practical influence.'

(p.23)

Hence the reticulist sounds out opinion, identifies areas and issues for joint decision making and generally acts as a contact man or troubleshooter for his organisation in its relationships with others.
FIGURE 5
MULTI ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF DROITWICH TOWN DEVELOPMENT

FIGURE 4

NETWORK RELATIONSHIPS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER FOR
CO-ORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES IN DROITWICH

His position in an organisation may vary from a position of central corporate authority to the more peripheral positions at the edges of an organisation. It is important to note that for Friend et al (1974) policy-making is not only the design and implementation of policies, it also involves the deliberate and conscious activation of organisational networks.

Clearly Friend et al (1974) have produced a substantial piece of work which in essence suggests two approaches to the rationalising of multiple organisation interaction. The first is to create a 'multi-organisation' with mutually agreed policy guidelines, the second, the development of reticulist skills in a situation of partisan mutual adjustment. However, both of these concepts as developed by Friend et al (1974) have their weaknesses. A multi-organisation conceived of in terms of pursuing a common plan is one very specific form of an inter-organisational relationship. Organisations interact with each other without pursuing a common task. Secondly, partisan mutual adjustment defined of in terms of negotiation and bargaining does not (as has been seen above) encompass the full range of strategies open to an organisation. As has been discussed above, organisations can compete or co-operate and attempt to disrupt and manipulate as well as negotiating agreements. Given that Friend et al (1974) consider such a limited range of strategies, it is scarcely surprising to note that they offer no explanation as to why some strategies are adopted rather than others.
The concept of the 'multi-organisation' has been developed further by Harris and Scott (1974) who attempt a classification of 'multi-organisations' in relation to the individual participants: the institution set up to co-ordinate action (which they term the 'representative body'): and in relation to the amount of control which the individual participants have over the representative body. Using these factors they suggest seven states that multi-organisations exist in, all of which derive from the basic motivation of authorities in increasing their own control over systems in which their individual influence is limited. A common example of multi-organisation is 'State II', which is a consultative committee between bodies in which the individual participants retain all significant decision-making powers to themselves. In a 'State III' multi-organisation, however, significant powers are delegated to the representative body by the participants. The representatives are trusted to maintain the interests of their respective organisations although the participating bodies limit these delegated powers and retain certain key powers. Clearly the Droitwich Town Development Agreement (discussed above) established a State III multi-organisation. The more general theme to emerge in Harris and Scott's work is that different types of multi-organisation are suitable for handling different sorts of tasks, the implication being that there must be a connection between the environment and the multi-organisational state which gives greatest satisfaction to its participants.
What then can one abstract from this discussion of inter-organisational analysis? Clearly certain themes are dominant, power, bargaining, adjustment, discretion and dependence, giving an overall perspective of situations which are complex but poorly structured. Management techniques and the processes of organisational design suggested, tend to reflect this. Taken from a cybernetics perspective, communication is seen as crucially important in structuring the relations between contiguous policy systems, a point which is perhaps most evident in the conception of the reticulist role. More importantly inter-organisational analysis provides a framework with which to analyse and critically evaluate multiple organisation situations and the management techniques by which they are structured. It is to a consideration of this that attention is now turned.
CHAPTER 4 — MULTIPLE-ORGANISATION MANAGEMENT — A CONSIDERATION OF THREE EXAMPLES
It is evident from the above discussion that Local Authorities operate in an environment of complex patterns of organisational interaction and that as a consequence, public policy-making is becoming increasingly fragmented amongst various organisations, semi-autonomous agencies, central government departments and local authorities. Paradoxically, this is happening at a time when the need for coordination in public policy-making as a whole is the accepted orthodoxy. As Hood (1976) emphasises, the multi-dimensional problem of inner-city decline and the corresponding need for co-ordinated policy-making is now appreciated,

'It is well known that the general problem of urban deprivation involves a number of separately administered but highly inter-related elements. Schools, housing, transport, health care and the administration of justice are perhaps only the most obvious cases. Improving any one of these inter-connected yet separately administered elements on its own may be ineffective.'

(pp.17-18)

This developing awareness of the inter-relationships between urban problems and the perceived inability of highly departmentalised local government to deal with them fuelled the arguments for the introduction of corporate planning and management techniques into Local Authorities almost ten years ago. Given the concern of the present study on the management of an increasingly organisationally diverse public sector, it is worth focussing briefly on the theory and practice of Corporate Management as not only is it the major managerial response to imposing order on rapid urban social change but it also has implications far beyond its obvious intra-organisational perspective.
The changes which have taken place in the management of local
government are not simply improvements in methods and techniques.
They are to a substantial extent, a manifestation of changing conceptions
of the role of local government. Rhodes (1978) argues that there has
been a shift from a traditional conception (wherein local government
services are provided in isolation from each other) to a federal
conception (wherein departments are merged, the committee structure
simplified and coordination improved). More significantly as Greenwood
and Stewart (1974) highlight, there has been a shift to a governmental
conception which emphasises the need to reform the 'process' of manage­
ment rather than the formal internal structure. Such reforms include
the review of activities in relation to the needs and problems in the
environment, the setting of objectives and, above all, the need for
management in local government to be directed at supporting the
development of corporate policy making rather than the limited goals of
coordination and efficiency. In sum, as Stewart (1971) emphasises,
this general philosophy of management

'... rests on the view that the local authority is
the 'primary' organ of government within the area
for which it is responsible. Within the area it
administers, individuals, families and organisations
have developed a pattern of life. This pattern
has been deeply influenced by the environment -
both the natural, physical environment and the
social economic, political and technical environ­
ment. In a very real sense, the general management of
a local authority is the management of that environment,
for the individuals, groups and organisations that
live within that environment.'

(p.17)

Turning from the philosophy of corporate management to the processes
of management associated with corporate planning, the general presumption
can be translated into a more specific form. The process of management,
it is argued, should be the basic rationalist model of identifying
needs, generating objectives in relation to these needs, choosing be­tween alternative means of achieving these objectives, putting the choice into practice and evaluating the end result with the ultimate intention of 'meeting the needs of the population to the maximum extent consistent with available resources' (Stewart, 1971, p.30).

Structurally, the organisational changes necessary to achieve this are well known, the Chief Executive, the Management Team, the Policy Committee and the Policy Planning Unit have all been discussed in detail elsewhere and need no further discussion here. However, it should be stated again that in the theory, the emphasis falls on the need for structures to suggest the new processes of management, structural change for its own sake is seen as a fruitless exercise.

Harris and Scott (1974) suggest that there is an obvious danger that the corporate planning process can become introspective and centralised and in the process, lose credibility with those departments operating programmes which overlap with the activities of other agencies. Further, they suggest that if corporate planning is to become effective it will need to recognise the inter-authority nature of public policy­making. This criticism, however, is to some extent misdirected. Part of the rationale for Redcliffe Maud's suggestions in favour of the large, new all-purpose authority was that it could relate its programmes for all services to coherent objectives for the future progress of its area considered as a whole. Indeed, the ghost of Stewart is never far away as is evident in this quotation.

'Local Government has moved a long way from the days when its task was to provide a number of isolated services. Authorities are now responsible for a great deal of the context in which the lives of citizens are lived. Control of the physical environment, economic development, collaboration with other agencies of all kinds, public and private,
as well as the provision of local services are now their business. They have a duty positively to promote the welfare of the community.'

(para 486)

Similar themes are echoed in the Bains Report. At the risk of repetition, the Report's central axium is worth noting,

'Local Government is not, in our view, limited to the narrow provision of a series of services to the local community.... It has within its purview the overall economic, cultural and physical well-being of that community.'

(para 2.10)

In keeping with this overview, the most significant aspect of the Report however concerns the broadening of the scope of corporate planning. As has been frequently noted above, the growth of public agencies has removed some of the functions from local government services in part which are integral to many other functions of the local authority. For instance, house building cannot proceed on any large scale without piped water and sewage disposal facilities. In recognition of this new situation, the horizons of local authority management broadened. If the community as a whole is to be served,

'We believe that this concept of 'community' interest must involve not only the new local authorities, but also other voluntary and public agencies....'

(Bains, para 8.4)

Corporate planning has to become concerned therefore,

'... with planning to meet the problems and needs of the community within a specified area irrespective of the particular organisation that might be involved - or whether even any organisation would be involved.'

(Stewart, 1974, p.68)

It is evident from the quotations above that the local authority
is very much regarded as the prime, focal organisation within a par­
cular area; hence the somewhat introspective concern with the internal management structure of local authorities. Thus while it is evident from the above quotations that the multiplicity of governmental organisations within the local authority area is obviously recognised, the methodology of inter-corporate decision making is not specified beyond the broad exhortation that,

'each authority be aware and take into account the interaction between the plans, policies and functions for which it is responsible and those of other agencies.'

(Bains, para 3.4)

Similarly Stewart and Eddison's (1971) notion of 'Community Planning' fails to be translated into specific processes in the way the corporate model has been. Indeed they go as far as to suggest that it is probably unattainable to be able to expect to plan the activities of other organisations.

The viability of corporate management theories to be extended inter-corporately reflects the qualitative difference between intra and inter-organisational processes. Although, as has been emphasised above, intra and inter organisational processes share some common emphases (for example, goals in both situations arise out of a bar­
gaining process) there is more scope within an organisation for internal discipline in relation to these goals than is likely in an inter-corporate situation where constituent organisations are more concerned to 'defend' organisational autonomy and thus less likely to concede policy space. As Stewart, Eddison and Bains must realise, it is difficult to specify the processes of management required in situations which may at best tend towards partisan mutual adjustment or at worst tend toward the anomic.
However, continuing analysis at this theoretical level is to ignore the existence of structured multiple organisation situations in the public sector in which organisations including both Local Authorities and government agencies do interact in order to formulate policy and carry out tasks. It is proposed to look at the organisational design and management techniques used in three of these situations using the concepts of inter-organisational sociology as discussed in chapter three. Thus the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme has been selected as it is a good example of a 'multi-organisation' which encompasses the interests of two tiers of local authority and three government agencies. Passenger Transport planning in the Passenger Transport Executive's (PTE's) has been chosen to illustrate how a local authority agency attempts to regulate the activities of central government agencies. Finally, a critical appraisal will be made of the potential of future Regional Reports in Scotland to act as inter-corporate documents on the basis of the first round of reports produced soon after the newly constituted Regional Councils took office in 1975. However, these studies are not intended to be fully comprehensive case studies of particular policy situations. Given the scope of this present work, they are merely intended to be used as examples of public policy making which illustrates the usefulness of looking at these situations from an inter-organisational perspective.

The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme

In May 1976, the new Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr Bruce Millan, announced a £120 million plan to tackle urban deprivation in the east end of Glasgow, an area which amounted to over 5 square miles and contained about 65,000 people (considerably lower than its earlier
Original hopes for the project were high as Millan revealed,

'The difference between this scheme and others produced before it, however well thought out and imaginative they were, is that this is not just a plan on paper but a plan for action which will begin to take place very soon indeed.'

(The Times, 22 May 1976)

There is a certain 'post-hoc' irony to these words. As is well known by the inhabitants of the area and indeed well documented by Malone (1979), implementation of this project has at best been partial and in some respects non-existent. It is the contention of this study that this 'administrative inertia' is a direct consequence of the poor organisational design of the project and its failure to take into account multiple-organisational interactions systematically, beyond the level of broad exhortations such as,

'It is agreed that the success of the project depends on ensuring that the planning processes are carried out on the basis of full consultation between the participants and that implementation is properly co-ordinated. This calls for maximum co-operation between officials of the participating bodies, and full use of the specialist staff and accumulated experience which each possesses.'

(Section 13 - GEAR - Working document on Organisation)

The announcement of the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) scheme should be seen in the local context of the cancellation of Stonehouse New Town and, more generally, of the switch in emphasis suggested by Strathclyde Regional Council in the Regional Report from building on green field sites to renewing urban areas along the 'corridor of deprivation'. At Central Government level, the Secretary of State for Scotland, anxious to show some action in the face of this first 'Report' published in May 1976, and influenced by the growing awareness
of the true scale of inner-city problems (both through the publication of census data analysis and through internal labour party policy documents) indicated the de-designation of Stonehouse New Town and announced the institution of the GEAR project (which was seen by some commentators as a substitute for the 'Strathclyde Economic Development Corporation' (SEDCOR) as originally suggested in the 'ad-hoc' West Central Scotland Plan (1974)).

The most important feature of the renewal programme is the multiplicity of organisations involved: the Scottish Office (organised corporately through their Urban Renewal Group of Officers), Glasgow District Council (GDC), Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC), the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA), the latter two of course being government agencies. All of these are linked inter-corporately in the creation of the GEAR multi-organisation (although, as will be obvious, other organisations not represented will need to be involved, for example, British Rail and other transport agencies).

As will be recalled from Harris and Scott's (1974) work outlined above, they identify three elements in a multi-organisation: the individual participant organisations, the representative body (to take decisions with some degree of independence from the individual participants) and in highly developed forms of multi-organisation, the agency delegated to carry out technical work in relation to its task. This framework can be developed by synthesising it with Rhodes' (1979) power dependence concept and this will be applied in analysing the structure of the GEAR organisation as detailed in the paper 'Glasgow East End Project: Working Document on Organisation' which was presented to the first meeting of the Governing Committee in August 1976.
All of the organisations involved in the project are represented on the 'Governing Committee' (in Harris and Scott's terms the 'Representative body') whose structure may be represented diagramatically thus,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{CHAIRMAN (SCOTTISH OFFICE MINISTER)} \\
\text{SDA (2)} & \quad \text{SSHA (2)} & \quad \text{SRC (3)} & \quad \text{GDC (3)} \\
\text{(CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN)}
\end{align*}
\]

The function of this organisation is to 'propose to the responsible authorities the development strategy and overall plan and programme of action for the area' (section 4: Working document). However, it remains a non-executive state II multi-organisation (Harris and Scott (1974) p.36), the individual participants still 'retain their full statutory powers and responsibilities except to the extent that they may choose to delegate them' (section 19: Working document). Thus the 'policy domain' of each organisation is guaranteed from the outset. The significance of this can be highlighted with reference to the work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). In their Oakland study, they suggested that although there may be general agreement on ends, there may also be disagreement on means. In the east end project by allowing the decision on means to remain largely at the discretion of each participating organisation, the role of the governing committee in enforcing the implementation of an inter-corporate decision is weakened.

It has been revealed to the author that there is some indication that tensions between individual participants in the multi-organisation are increasing. Of the £120 million that was allocated to the project,
the only 'new resources' committed to the area came through the budgets of the SDA and SSHA. The majority of the budget was calculated on the basis of the combined capital budget that both the local authorities were liable to spend in the area during the duration of the project 1976-1984. It has been suggested that the Regional Council feel that the District Council is receiving more Central Government aid as many of its functions are being aided financially by the activities of the outside agencies (housing being the most obvious example) whilst the Regional Council is receiving no formal financial help with the Education and Social Work budgets in the area.

In order to facilitate organisational interaction, the document stresses that 'reliance should be placed as much as possible on the ordinary day-to-day channels of interchange and communication between officials (section 12: Working document) and indeed does suggest the need for an officer in each organisation to act as reticulist and 'facilitate a corporate response in relation to the project on the part of his authority' (section 11: Working document). However, in the case of a multi-organisation such as this where organisational interaction is mandated, there seems little scope for the fullest expression of the reticulist role in the 'network-activating' sense.

The Scottish Development Agency in addition to carrying out its usual functions (providing and promoting factory development, commercial developments, environmental work and derelict land clearance) provides the co-ordinating management of the project (through the chairing of a consultative group of senior officials from each of the organisations) and prepares the overall proposals and programmes of action for the area to be submitted to the governing committee. The concession
of this co-ordinating role to a central government agency seems odd in view of the conclusions of the literature on central-local relations which highlight the intransigence of both central departments and local authorities to concede policy space to each other.

Cox (1978) in an analysis of why urban policy in Britain has taken a mainly 'exhortive' form, emphasises the unwillingness of local authorities to countenance any serious attempts by central government at over-arching coordination of services and functions. Indeed Cox goes as far as to suggest that no agency (at central, regional or local level) which attempts to look at problems 'in the round' and intervene positively is a viable possibility. However, it is suggested that the co-ordinating role in the GEAR scheme was allocated to the SDA due to the inability of both Regional and District councils to concede this co-ordinating role to each other due to their competition for policy space. Given the mechanisms to ensure and protect organisational autonomy outlined above, the SDA is in the unenviable situation of having few resources with which to manage the situation.

Members of the SDA themselves feel unhappy with the role allocated to the agency in the project for a number of specific reasons which are essentially manifestations of this general point of 'resource-deficiency'. Firstly, being established only six months before the GEAR scheme itself was announced, the agency lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the other organisations involved in the scheme. Secondly, urban renewal is not the prime function of the agency; it is a multi-functional agency established to,

'... further the economic development of Scotland with a special emphasis on providing, maintaining and safeguarding employment and improving the environment.'

(Directory of Paid Public Appointments made by Ministers, p.104)
The urban renewal directorate is merely one 'functional wing' of this organisation.

Thirdly, the SDA is ill-equipped to pursue or co-ordinate physical planning policies in the area. Glasgow District Council, as statutory authority for local planning, had already proceeded with their preparation in advance of both the project being announced and the Regional Structure Plan being produced. Thus, the Scottish Development Agency, with few resources of its own with which to manage the dependencies of other organisations, had in turn its dependency increased by its reliance on Glasgow District Council for the provision of information and material on the local plans.

The results of these organisational interactions are evident in the 'Future for GEAR' public consultation document published in July 1978, two years after the project was designated. The document details a number of courses of action which can be taken to combat the problems identified in the East End but contains no details of whether each is 'implementable' or indeed the organisational arrangements necessary for full implementation. One is tempted to ask whether these have been formulated.

Given the tenets of this analysis, what specific recommendations can be made to improve the structure of the GEAR organisation? At the outset it should be noted that in the haste to establish the project, little systematic thought seems to have been given to organisational design so that it may be argued that any rational thought is a step forward. However, this argument notwithstanding, one might suggest that the GEAR organisation should be reconstituted on a 'state III multi-organisation' (Harris and Scott (1974) p.36) that is, significant
powers should be delegated to both the 'representative-body' (the Governing committee) and the 'agency' (the consultative group of officials) by the participants, which would obviate the need for continual referral of proposals back to the participants. This structure would not only ensure the commitment of both bodies to the project (as organisational survival would be linked to successful completion) but should also give a common appreciation of the task which, as Harris and Scott (1974) highlight, is of 'paramount importance in the formation and maintenance of the multi-organisation' (p.44).

The Passenger Transport Executives

There has been a growing awareness during the last decade of the economic, social and environmental implications for urban life of complete car orientation. In Britain, successive Conservative and Labour Governments have shown themselves reluctant to follow the logical implications of urban public transport's lack of success in competing with the car. However, as Hovell and Jones (1975) highlight through a number of policy statements published between 1967 and 1973, passenger transport planning has been subtly shifting emphasis from being reactive and regulatory to being more positive and promotional. The objectives which were largely those of rationalising (that is reducing) rail and bus operations in the major conurbations have altered to those concerned with making public transport a more attractive alternative.

Instrumental in promoting this positive approach have been the Passenger Transport Executives (PTE's) created under the 1968 Transport Act. Anticipating the Local Government reforms implemented (in England and Wales) in 1974, the Act established in 1969 four PTE's for the conurbations of Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Tyneside and the West
Midlands. Three additional PTE's were created in 1973 and 1974, Strathclyde (Greater Glasgow), West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire. The PTE's together with the much longer established London Transport, have as their overriding duty the provision of a properly integrated system of road and fixed track public transport capable of attracting passengers from private modes of transport through 'improved efficiency and convenience'.

The significance of the PTE's for the present study is two-fold. Firstly, they are semi-autonomous agencies, outwith the 'formal' control of the Local Authority. However, the policies pursued by the PTE's are obviously interrelated to the activities of both central and local government and are indeed linked to them by the participation of the PTE's in the annual Transport Policies and Programmes funding exercise. This opens up the possibility of explaining in practice the relationship between a government agency and elected organs of government.

Secondly, in pursuing an integrated transport policy, the PTE's have obviously to try to ensure the compliance of other public transport agencies, British Rail, the National Bus Company and the Scottish Transport Group.

At the outset, however, it should be noted that there is disparity between the philosophy under which the PTE's were set up and the philosophy of corporate planning discussed above. As Redcliffe-Maud stressed the magnitude and complexity of issues in the conurbation demand strong and unified control for planning, transportation and major development. Part of the reason however for the 'hiving-off' of PTE's from local authorities as boards with clearly defined
powers was that they were seen by many as business organisations to undertake rationalisation of services and to balance revenues from fares, etc. with expenditure. Indeed the 'Morrisonian' origins are further confirmed by the PTE's being required to adopt company associating systems, being able to acquire land and being obliged to publish annual reports. In many ways the situation resembles that of the Nationalised Industries although the PTE's are obviously much more restricted where and how they operate. In relation also to the scale of their activities the social obligations of the PTE's are possibly more intensive given the dependence of deprived inner city areas on public transport.

It is evident from statements in the 1968 Transport Act that the PTE's were designed to serve as focal organisations with which to manage urban public transport within organisation sets comprising of the other public transport agencies. Thus the broad obligations of the PTE's are specified as follows,

'9(3) In the case of each designated Area it shall be the general duty ... (b) of the executive so to exercise and perform their functions under this part of the Act and section 24(2) thereof with respect to the provision of a properly integrated and efficient system of public passenger transport to meet the needs of that Area with due regard to the town planning and traffic and parking policies of the councils of constituency areas.'

(Section 9)

Yet this attempt to mandate organisational interaction has failed essentially due to the failure to take into account the dynamics of an inter-organisational situation. In reality the problems of achieving this inter-corporate planning have turned the situation into
an organisational network rather than a structurally managed set. As Norton and Spencer (1974) highlight, the separatist traditions of the public transport agencies (British Rail, the National Bus Company and the Scottish Transport Group which incorporated each of the regional bus groups and the ferry operators Caledonian MacBrayne) in the local setting stand in the way of aspirations for a rational unified approach to transport policy in the large conurbations. Conflict arises for two reasons, the overlapping policy fields of each organisation and the lack of statutory power vested in the PTE's to ensure the compliance of transport agencies with their wishes. Indeed there is some evidence that the relationship between transport operators is at present somewhat strained.

One illustration of this is the 'Section 20' agreement between PTE's and British Rail on the provision of commuter rail services under the terms of the 1968 Transport Act. Under this arrangement the PTE as a body is responsible for determining overall policy on the provision of services while British Rail as agent supplies the services (this arrangement does not apply in Tyneside). Payment by the PTE's to British Rail where services are provided include all the specific operating costs, some of the infrastructure costs and underwriting incurred operating deficits. It is felt by certain PTE employees that this facilitates British Rail 'off-loading' overheads on 'Section 20' claims in the absence of PTE power to investigate specific day-to-day operating figures. Thrower (1978) remarks that the figures arrived at by the Railways Board for services provided are often large and would be unpalatable to a metropolitan authority at a time of severely restricted finance.

Similar, indeed greater, conflict exists between the PTE's and
both National and Scottish Bus Groups as would be expected since each of these organisations pursues the same objectives in the same policy space (the PTE's operate metropolitan bus services in their areas). At the operational level, each organisation could equally well carry out the tasks of the other and thus compromises such as the 'boundary rule' (whereby restrictions are placed on bus operators picking up passengers within the PTE operating area) have been evolved in an attempt to delimit policy space and establish 'domain consensus'.

The difficulties of managing situations such as these are compounded by the weaknesses of the planning provisions allocated to the PTE's with which to manage the dependencies of other agencies. Hovell and Jones' (1975) research indicates that in all cases, the bulk of managerial planning effort in the PTE's has been directed to the publication of a Transport Plan intended to prescribe a detailed infrastructure network in accordance with the demands of the Transport Act 1968 (Section 18(2)). Although this has been recently superseded by legislation on Transport Policy which obliges top-tier authorities in England and Wales to produce public passenger transport plans, it is worth focussing on the experiences under the 1968 Act as a guide to what may happen in the future. As Hovell and Jones (1975) highlight, PTE's do not seem to have seized the initiative and stated with sufficient cogency what, in their opinion, the future pattern of public transport ought to be, a response which seems conditioned by the recognition by the PTE's of the problems of 'interfering' in other agencies policy fields. Indeed, the maintenance of existing 'modal-split' (the term used to define the proportions of passengers travelling by the various transport modes, for example by car, bus and rail) has become an end in itself for Tyneside PTE who wish it maintained until the end of the
decade. Yet as the 1977 White Paper on Transport Policy (Cmnd 6836) suggested, 'modal-split' can act as a barrier to an integrated transport policy,

'the issue ... is not so much a question of fairness between one mode of transport and another, but rather how much we can and should spend as a nation on supporting public transport ... and how that support can be used most effectively.'

(para 53)

The weakness of the PTE's as organisations with which to coordinate the activities of government transport agencies is further compounded by the close relationship which the PTE's enjoy with the local authority of the area in which they act. The PTE's are responsible to the local authority as Passenger Transport Authority (PTA) for the area with a controlling and policy-watching brief which is generally exercised through the Highways and Transportation Committee of the authority. Although this has the beneficial effect of re-integrating discussion of public transport with that of Roads and Highways, it leads to some suspicion on the part of transport agencies that their organisational autonomy is being threatened in effect by the Local Authority. Thus the transport agencies prefer a direct input into the annual Transport Policies and Programmes (TPP's) funding exercise and the possibilities for developing an integrated set of public transport policies are reduced.

Using this analysis, what improvements can one suggest in the management of urban public transport by the PTE's? Obviously more consideration should have been given to detailing the processes by which the PTE's were to achieve the objectives hoped for in the 1968 Transport Act. Clearly the PTE's have few resources with which to manage the situation and there is little interdependence between the
transport agencies. If a totally comprehensive approach to urban public transport is desired by Central Government, direct executive powers should be delegated to the PTE's in order to ensure the compliance of other agencies. One might speculate what particular forms these might take. Perhaps an element of the agencies grant funding from either central government or the local authority could be used to structure the activities of these agencies (although the experience of Greater Glasgow PTE would suggest that this is fairly unsuccessful) or the PTE's planning powers could be developed and strengthened. What is certain, however, is that such changes will need to be made. Although creditable efforts have been made organisationally to protect future public transport provision, it is time now for their re-examination in the light of experience to ensure a continuing positive role for public transport in the major cities of Britain.

The Regional Reports

The Regional Reports are a feature unique to the Scottish Local Government System stemming from a recognition in the Scottish Office of the need for a corporate policy framework to be established in each region soon after the re-organisation of local government in May 1975. However, as McDonald (1977) has highlighted, their origins are somewhat mysterious although interestingly, the 'Sunderland Study' (sponsored by the Department of the Environment) in preparation at the same time recommended a management procedure based on a Community Review, a 'state of the community' report from which statements of problems and priorities would be derived.
When the new Regional and Islands Councils took office and assumed responsibilities, one of the first tasks facing them was the preparation of Regional Reports under the statutory obligations of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 (section 173). Further broad guidance on form and content was given to local authorities by the Scottish Development Department in Circular 4/75. In this circular the main purposes of the Report were seen in largely physical planning terms, it being suggested that the Reports should be used to review inherited development plans and investment commitments; to set out a strategy for preparing Structure and Local Plans; and to indicate priority areas for future investment. Thus although it is not a document which originated under planning legislation, its central concerns were very much those of Regional Council Physical Planning departments. More significantly for the present study, however, the circular also stressed the importance of involving other government agencies as appropriate. It was thus hoped that such inter-agency consultation offered the possibility that the Reports would be able to undertake an extremely wide-ranging review of problems faced in particular Regions extending well beyond those areas which the Regional or Island Councils themselves have full executive power. Although these sentiments were echoed by the Secretary of State in his formal Observations on the first Reports, he did seek to establish some sort of 'domain consensus' on organisational policy by warning that while it was appropriate for Regional or Islands Councils to draw the attention of other authorities and agencies to issues of common concern, each had its own legitimate interest and statutory responsibilities and these must be respected.
As Friend, Lind and McDonald (1978) highlighted, the concept of the Regional Report as both a corporate and an inter-corporate document emphasises the procedural recognition by Central Government that there are many key policy decisions which cannot be regarded as falling clearly within the sole discretion of particular organisations. Rather, they are to be regarded as matters of negotiation both between one level of government and another and between local authorities and government agencies through channels which encourage a more public and carefully argued justification of the positions adopted by each participant organisation. It is also clear that this concept of the Regional Report as expressed by Lyddon (1974), and SDD circular 4/75 views it as a management tool for the 'focal organisation', the Regional Council. Friend et al (1978) suggest that this choice of management design is justified as Regional Councils are influential not only through the wide range of functional responsibilities they have but also through their status as elected bodies directly accountable in electoral and financial terms to the population of their area. Further, they argue that this open accountability and the interest of elected members in the social and economic welfare of the area give the Regional Councils a clear inter-corporate concern with the activities of government agencies which comprise the 'organisation set' of the Regional Councils. With this interpretation borne in mind, attention can now be turned to looking at the techniques which Regional Councils can use in involving government agencies in the policy formulation of the Regional Report.

Surprisingly, given the volume of literature published on the first round of what was, in effect, only twelve reports (for a selection see McDonald (1977), Brown (1977) and Howat and Wilkinson (1977)),
inter-organisational relations have been touched on only tangentially. It must be stated at the outset that within the broad guidelines set by Central Government, there were certain differences in interpretation by different authorities. Although the Secretary of State had asked authorities to include a summary statement within a standard format which was designed to highlight the stated priorities and show both the resource implications of the policies adopted and the range of agencies which might be associated with the authority in implementation, most reports were developed at a coarser level of detail than was implied by the format as McDonald (1977) has shown. This perhaps reflects the differing conceptions of the reports held by different authorities. Strathclyde Regional Council, as Boyle (1978) highlights, viewed the document very much as an inter-corporate policy tool whereas Central Regional Council used the Regional Report intra-corporately as a means to developing corporate working within the authority.

In seeking statements from government agencies on their perceptions of their roles, objectives and policies within the Region, Fife Regional Council found that most had some difficulty in producing the statements and indeed the statements which were produced often provided little policy information (Fife Regional Report 1976, section A1 - introduction, para 1.8). However, when one compares the experiences of inter-agency involvement in the Gwent Structure Plan which Garvie (1977) documents, such organisational defensiveness should have been expected. The process of involving other agencies in the Gwent case was initiated through the publication of an Issues Report, Discussion Papers, Technical Notes and finally an Alternatives Report in decreasing level of abstraction. Garvie suggests that the process was fairly
unsuccessful in the initial phase of agency reaction to the Issues Report which provided a summary of the main problems facing the county. At this point, the quality of response from government agencies was more explanatory of their own responsibilities and viewpoints rather than being a critical response to the issues raised. More positive contributions were made by agencies in the latter, more concrete, policy option choice phases where the effects on agency action was most obvious. As this appears to have been perceived as a threat to organisational autonomy through the reduction of agency discretion, many more comments were received. Given that such defensiveness will always be a feature of the production of any inter-corporate document, the form of any future Regional Reports will need to be devised in such a way as to contend with this.

Friend et al (1978) suggest that future Regional Reports should be trichotomous in form with sections again moving from the general to the more specific levels. The first section they envisage as focussing on the key strategic concerns of the Regional Council; the second, they see as presenting a conspectus of the most significant policies of the Regional Council and the third, they view as proposing an agenda of priorities for further exploration and action. Sections One and Two, they suggest, should be largely intra-corporate, the first and principal section presenting a picture of a limited range of strategic concerns or key issues which the Regional Council intends to pursue over the next few years and the second pursuing the implications of these concerns in terms of adaptations to a Regional Council's policies which relate to its own fields of executive responsibility. Inter-corporate involvement is developed in the third, most specific section which is intended to allow the Regional Council to explore the
possibilities for adjustment in the policy positions of any bodies which may help in addressing the key strategic concerns expressed in the Regional Report.

Clearly this formulation, if adopted in any future round of Regional Reports requested by the Secretary of State, would seem to avoid many of the disadvantages that Garvie's experiences in Gwent revealed. However one might suggest that fuller use could be made of the Regional Report. McDonald (1977) in her early review of the Regional Reports system, expressed the hope that Financial Planning would be a constructive supplement to them. Tayside Region in developing this, have introduced a new section to their Regional Report (which they decided to update annually) which relates capital expenditure proposals to policy objectives in the Report. If some means can be found to commit government agencies to stating their proposed policies and expenditure implications through a combined Regional Report/Financial Plan system it will have fulfilled its potential as a truly inter-corporate document. That this might be perceived by Central Government as giving Local Authorities too much power is beyond doubt. However, it affords an opportunity for the development of a plan of unrivalled comprehensiveness. We may only need to wait for the next fiscal crisis for its value to be realised.

What general themes can one thus extract from these case examples? Clearly they are both very short and selective and much future research needs to be done from this perspective, but, with this qualification in mind, they do seem to raise a number of points.
Firstly, there seems to have been little thought given at the organisational design stage, to considering the likely pattern of organisational interaction and the implications of this for policy-making. This is reflected in the powers given (or indeed not given) to the 'focal organisation' with which to structure the situation.

Secondly, this failure at the organisational design stage has made the situation difficult, if not impossible, to manage. Consideration of the examples of the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme and the Passenger Transport Executives has shown the wide divergence between the policy objectives intended and the results actually achieved. The desire by organisations to preserve their 'domain' outweighs the ability of one organisation with few resources or powers to manage their activities. Clearly, future attempts at inter-corporate planning through perhaps future Regional Reports should include some powers on the part of one organisation to manage others.

Thirdly, consideration of the GEAR scheme shows the weakness of the reticulist concept in mandated organisational interaction situations. The concept as devised originally by Friend and Power had the dynamic aspect of the opening and closing of links between organisations which is not possible where organisational interaction is highly structured. Further, as Faludi (1973a) has suggested, there is little point in attempting positive co-ordination unless individual planning agencies surrender part of their autonomy and vest it in the strategic planning agency. Reticulism in aiding partisan mutual adjustment may not lead to a positive approach in planning.

Finally, in focussing only on organisational links, one must beware of restricting the policy focus unnecessarily. Inter-organisational
links are only one aspect of policy-making. They may, for example, explain much of the inactivity in the East End of Glasgow but would not, of course, in themselves explain something like Inner-City policies as a whole. It is not claimed that such links are the most important influence on policy, only that they are important for some policies. The over-emphasis on these links in this work is a deliberate over-compensation for a lack of emphasis in the past.
CHAPTER 5 – 'URBAN MANAGERIALISM RECONSIDERED' –
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In a complex society such as our own, it is evident a wide range of tasks exists which can only be carried out through joint working relationships amongst organisations. As has been seen above, this is particularly true of urban policy making where separate government agencies provide public services closely related to the activities of local authorities. Following from this, the thrust of the arguments in the previous chapters suggests that given the dysfunctional consequences of public agencies pursuing functional tasks independently of each other, much attention needs to be paid to the structuring of such situations either through the processes of more conscious organisational design of multiple organisation policy relationships, or through the development of management techniques with which to co-ordinate such situations. It is the contention of this final chapter that these tasks are more properly the concern of the strategic or policy planner working in the upper tier of local government and that this change in role definition must be reflected in changes in planning education.

The role definition of the task of town planners has undergone much analysis and discussion in the turbulent planning environment of the past fifteen years. Changes in practice following the development of public participation, the separation of strategic and local planning, the re-organisation of local government and the internal changes in management structures have precipitated an ongoing debate on what should be the functions and concerns of planning as a profession.
If there is a common thread in all of these changes, it is surely a general change in the conception of the role of planners from being 'negative' in the sense of constraining and restricting development through development control procedures, to being more 'positive' and promotional in developing the ideas of both local population and elected councillors and translating them into implementable policies.

Given the associated controversies surrounding this change, there is a surprising similarity in the techniques used by planners in both the negative and positive situations. The more conventional land use and development proposals by planners for example, usually entail interaction with Valuers and Treasurers over site purchase, Solicitors over legal matters, Housing Officials in relation to public housing, Technical Officers and Architects over building requirements, Highway Engineers concerning roads, etc. etc. Corporate planning as a general management process similarly involves the negotiations between local authority functional departments. Since policy planners lack direct or positive powers and rarely determine resource allocation, they are largely reliant on influence (through bargaining and exchange, usually on the basis of information control) and constructing a chain of commitment between networks of officials. Thus planning on this level ceases to be the exclusive concern of individual departments and now attends to linkages between the areas of concern between existing departments. The intra-corporate similarity with Friend et al's (1974) notion of inter-corporate links is clear.

As Faludi (1976) has highlighted, a concomitant change is the orientation of planning towards some form of overall guidance of all
the activities of government, a change reflected in the Royal Town Planning Institute's debates over educational policy. Eddison (1968) and Stewart (1969) structured the discussion initially with their interpretations of the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act which suggested the need for urban management processes, a point echoed by Amos (1969) in his discussion of the 'general planning function'. This was followed by the Centre for Environmental Studies publishing three studies (Cockburn, 1970a, b and c) and assembling a working party on objectives for planning education (Progress in Planning, 1973) with a clear commitment to a broad concept of planning. Indeed they take Urban and Regional Planning to mean 'the planning processes within and linking all agencies making policies and taking decisions about the city' (p.10) although they fail to operationalise this concept and acknowledge the lack of research in this 'meta-planning' field. However, perhaps the most positive statement of this approach was that by Amos in his presidential address of 1971,

'... the Institute's current posture concentrates attention upon the application of the planning process to physical planning at various scales to the exclusion of direct applications of the process to social and economic phenomena and to the neglect of management planning of coincident physical, social and economic factors.'

(quoted by Faludi (1976) p.124)

Given the development of Structure Plans, Regional Reports and the intellectual hegemony of corporate planning as the dominant local authority management technique, clearly there is less exclusion of such socio-economic factors in 1979 than in 1971. However, although the need for the incorporation of socio-economic factors may have been accepted, the processual aspects of management outwith the corporate realm are still poorly researched. With the growth of government
agencies as an administrative form, to achieve the aims and objectives that authors such as Eddison, Stewart and Amos obviously hoped for, new interest has to be awakened in inter-corporate public sector management techniques.

The discussion of this subject has however been made more difficult by the work of Pahl who in the early 1970s published a model of the 'Urban System' based on the activities of urban managers and proceeded not only to structure, but also to stigmatise, the subject area. Given the importance of Pahl's work, it seems fruitful to consider it in slightly more detail in relation to the topic under consideration.

Pahl (1970) develops his model from a criticism of Rex and Moore's (1967) model of housing classes which Pahl suggests presents a consumers' model of housing. This he criticises for failing to take account of the bureaucratic rules and procedures which structure the allocation of housing and indeed the other services and facilities of the urban system. From this it is a short Weberian step for Pahl to argue that in discussing the distribution of resources in the urban system, one needs to focus on bureaucratic gatekeepers', housing managers, local government officers, representatives of building societies, social workers, estate agents, etc., as these 'managers' of the urban system provide the independent variables of the subject.

In stressing the 'allocative' functions of these managers, however, Pahl leaves himself open to criticism on two broad points. Firstly, accusations have been made that he gives these managers too much autonomy and independence and in so doing, fails to view them as managers on
behalf of other (non-defined) interests. This criticism is particularly cogent as he includes both public officials and private company employees in his somewhat broad definition of managers. Secondly, critics have suggested that the term 'urban system' as used by Pahl becomes much more than a mere short-hand to emphasise a particular focus on a particular aspect of life or a particular set of services and facilities. Pahl begins to see the urban system as a system in the full sense of the term as used by Easton (1965), that is, a self-contained bounded system with its own internal logic.

In the face of these criticisms, Pahl (1975) admitted the limitations of the work and retracted many of his earlier statements. However, although the debate has served to show the limitations of viewing managers as 'authoritative allocators', the discussion takes for granted a unitary conception of urban managers based on the allocative dimension of their tasks. As Kaufman (1968) highlights, the scope of management is much broader,

'... the function of administration is to 'carry-out' or 'execute' or 'implement' policy decisions, or to co-ordinate activity in order to accomplish some common purpose, or simply to achieve co-operation in the pursuit of a shared goal.'

(p.61)

Thus the managerialist debate by focussing exclusively on the 'allocative' dimension of management tasks, fails to take into account the wider 'co-ordinative' dimension of the management role. This distinction is crucial to the understanding of the Local Authority Planners role. Although the activities of planners have significant redistributive aspects (as Hall et al (1973) have highlighted) their major managerial activity concerns the structuring of the activities of
groups and organisations within the local authority area. Clearly this broad interpretation is also used by Eddison (1972),

'Management ... is not concerned simply with an organisation in the abstract. It is concerned with the organisation in its environment.'

(p.117)

although in further discussion Eddison comes close to the 'authoritative allocator' view of Pahl. As has been argued above, organisational environment is largely comprised of other organisations and thus an understanding of the literature on inter-organisational relations is crucial in evolving management skills to organise the full range of governmental activities in the local area. Clearly, if one is to achieve this responsive and effective 'urban governance' there is, as the Centre for Environmental Studies suggest, the 'urgent need for a new appreciation of the purpose, structure and scope of planning education'. Thus it is to a consideration of how inter-organisational analysis should be incorporated into planning education that attention is now turned.

Following Bernstein (1971), Faludi (1976) presents two concepts of how planning schools' curricula may be organised: the 'integrated' code and the 'collection' code. The first refers to a curriculum where previously isolated subjects or courses have been subordinated to some relational idea which blows the boundaries between subjects, whereas the collection curriculum consists of a series of bounded and isolated subjects. Faludi views the integrated code as preferable for planning education and proposes that 'planning theory' should be
the disciplinary core around which integration should occur in planning education. From this position Faludi examines the role of Sociology in his ideal planning curriculum. A key difficulty that he identifies is that Sociologists put emphasis upon the distinctiveness of their discipline, an emphasis that runs counter to the integrated code.

Faludi raises a number of important and indeed contentious points in his paper but given the focus of the present study, it is proposed to focus only on the principal concern of the paper, the relationship between sociology and the core of the ideal curriculum 'planning theory'. As Cooke and Rees (1977) highlight, this relationship is never specified. Faludi suggests in a somewhat contradictory fashion that,

'sociology (as indeed the other social sciences) makes essential contributions to both planning theory and to our understanding of the problems in hand.'

(1976, p.129)

but also that,

'Sociology and the other social sciences, their potential notwithstanding, have failed to provide an adequate disciplinary base for those concerned with intervention in the real world.'

(1976, p.121)

Clearly as Cooke and Rees (1971) comment, one is led to a direct examination of Faludi's conception of 'planning theory' itself to discover why sociology and the other social sciences fail to provide the adequate disciplinary base.

Faludi's most succinct statements on the subject were published in 1973 (a and b). There he distinguishes between two types of possible
planning theory':— procedural (that is, 'theory of planning') and substantive (that is 'theory in planning'), the division being based upon what are regarded as two different types of problem faced by planners. The first type of problem defines the object of 'theories in planning'. These are problems of planners' 'areas of concern'. However Faludi is somewhat imprecise about the objects that are the concern of planners and consequently offers only the vague definition as being whatever planners conceive to be their raw material, 'the land-use system or people'. The second type of problem defines the object of 'theory of planning'. These are the problems which relate to 'the planner himself, the agencies in which he operates, and the procedures which he adopts' (Faludi, 1973a, p.5). Faludi argues that these problems are more basic and more general and he wishes to reserve the designation of 'planning theory' for this 'theory of planning'. Thus the object of planning theory proper is the practice of planning agencies and the aim of planning theory is to improve this practice (although it must be emphasised to avoid confusion that he defines planning agencies as planning organisations and thus does not mean merely government agencies).

The weakness of the distinction is usefully highlighted when one considers the position of inter-organisational sociology in Faludi's scheme. The attempt to understand human behaviour by means of the systematic application of some form of rational and logical methodology is pervasive throughout the whole of social scientific enquiry; it is characteristic of both 'theory in planning' (for example location theory and organisation theory to explain the behaviour of pressure groups, etc.) and 'the theory of planning' (where sociological analysis of inter-organisational relations is obviously crucial in understanding the
interactions between organisations and their consequences for policy-making). The point raised here is not whether 'substantive theory' is pre-eminent over 'procedural theory' or vice versa in any absolute sense. What is being questioned is the utility of the distinction in the present context and the way in which Faludi uses the distinction to differentiate sociology from planning theory.

McCallum (1974) takes a different approach to the subject by attempting to focus on the 'intrinsic nature' of planning in order to more fully relate it to planning theory. Having characterised planning as societal action which is one expression of a wider generic activity but whose institutionalised interest is principally urban phenomena, McCallum suggests that these three salient features give rise to three different sets of planning theories; theories of society, theories of the generic planning process and theories of urban and regional phenomena. As can be seen from the discussion of Faludi's work above, this approach replicates the distinction between procedural and substantive theories and as such, is open to the criticisms made of Faludi (although McCallum to his credit does stress that these theories are inter-related but does not specify further how they are related).

However, McCallum (1974) takes the argument one step further by suggesting that the fundamental reason for this trichotomy in planning theory is that most of the subjects currently of intellectual interest in planning have been organised around the traditional established disciplines, a structure which is clearly unsuitable for planning purposes which require these subjects to be looked at in a broader context and approached from new perspectives. Indeed, as he states,
'... this is an aspect of planning, and of planning theory, which requires a great deal of attention and work in order to free subjects from their disciplinary bounds and rework them to fit the needs of planning.'

(p.739)

With inter-organisational theory, this 're-working' is liable to be somewhat easier. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) highlight, inter-organisational theory is divorced from the narrower private sector management concerns with efficiency, motivation and leadership which characterise much intra-organisation theory. Indeed the lack of research in inter-organisation theory reflects its perceived irrelevance to any professional group. However, it is the contention of this study that it is integral to comprehensive planning in the public sector. The question thus becomes how one can integrate this body of thought into the curricula of planning schools.

The underlying logic of present Royal Town Planning Institute guidelines for education is reminiscent of the 'generalist-with-a-specialism' idea which Perloff developed in 1957. The 1973 Discussion Paper on Educational Policy(RTPI, 1973) translated this into a modular approach to curriculum design combining 'foundation' and 'applied' courses, which subsequently became official policy in 1974. Thus current educational policy sees three fields of study as being essential elements of any recognised course:-- field A - knowledge and understanding of the nature and state of the environment and the effect and potential of environmental planning, field B - the development and perception of attitudes and values, both from a student's viewpoint and to ensure that he is aware of other people's perspectives, and field C - the development of skills and practical competence for planning, making and implementation. In addition, the major integrating focus of the course is seen as its concern for the 'physical environment in relation to the needs of society'.
There are three particular criticisms of these guidelines which the Education Board in its recent policy review (RTPI, 1979) recognised as being particularly cogent. Firstly, the combination of specific requirements and general propositions had proved difficult to maintain in practice. Secondly, Visiting Boards had found difficulty in applying the guidelines consistently when seeking to validate courses, and finally, the degree of flexibility intended by the Guidelines was unclear, making it somewhat difficult to adapt to changing circumstances. Interestingly, these problems have become apparent at a time when conceptions of 'planning' are widening dramatically and indeed when graduates with a formal planning education are finding employment in other fields as the generic quality of their skills is being more widely recognised. Thus the Education Board of the Institute has recently decided that there is a strong case for change in education practice and has circulated a discussion document in which two basic alternating approaches are suggested.

The first approach - the 'characteristics' approach, is based upon the proposition that planners require certain basic abilities, skills and areas of knowledge which the Institute should define in general terms and which schools should then develop as part of an integrated course in whatever way they see fit.

The second approach - the 'core' approach is based upon the proposition that the Institute should define as precisely as is possible a compulsory 'core' of planning education, leaving schools relatively free to develop courses as they wish around this 'core' provided that the context for courses remains identifiably and directly relevant to environmental planning.
Although these summaries are somewhat crude, they serve to highlight that the 'characteristics' approach is essentially that being used at present and its adoption would not represent a significant advance in educational policy (although the Visiting Board would not be asked to evaluate 'output' directly as at present). Thus the 'core' approach would seem to offer some prospect of advance in educational thinking and indeed it can be argued that it incorporates the 'characteristics' approach as basic abilities and skills stem largely from course curricula. It is the contention of this study that inter-organisational analysis can provide a useful contribution to planning as a 'core' subject and indeed is necessary if the notions of 'urban governance' are to be developed further. As Zetter highlighted in 1973,

"In the debate on the changing nature of urban administration, this standpoint (that of the CES working group) is, at present, unique - it will probably be widely held at the end of the decade."

(p.417)

One wonders how much longer we need wait for this to be realised.

(approx. 24,000 words)
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