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THE LOGIC OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS:

State Intervention During Economic Recession

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SYNOPSIS

From a review of inner city policy, Michael Heseltine proposed in September 1979 the establishment of urban development corporations (UDC's), based on the new town development corporation model, to regenerate the areas of greatest dereliction. London Docklands and the "Merseyside Dock Area" were to get UDC's and the proposal was later extended to include the East End of Glasgow. The initiative was, however, greeted with substantial opposition, particularly in London, and the Glasgow proposal was withdrawn after initial reaction from the local authorities. Nevertheless, the Government has maintained the UDC proposals for Liverpool and London Docklands despite the countervailing arguments that UDC's will not help regenerate their areas. The aim of this dissertation is to discover why the Government has steadfastly supported the UDC proposals; to determine the logic of UDC's.

Identification of an approach to understanding UDC's is sought through a review of central state intervention in inner cities. The inner city policy experience appears somewhat perverse; a catalogue of initiatives which, to the surprise of few, have not lived up to their promises. To explain the course of inner city policy, and to understand UDC's, an understanding of the role of the central state is required and the two principal positions on this are stated. One sees the state as essentially neutral whereas the other sees the state as playing a positive role which is biased toward certain groups in society. Accordingly, the two interpretations of the role of the state prescribe different approaches toward gaining an understanding of UDC's. The first suggests an explanation can be found in the nature of the problems in the inner areas while the second suggests an examination of the problems of central state intervention would be more fruitful.

Faced with two alternative approaches, the former and orthodox approach is adopted to see if it can provide an adequate explanation of UDC's. The strategies and problems of urban
regeneration in the three areas subject to a UDC proposal are examined in detail; an inner city partnership in Liverpool, an inner city partnership plus statutory joint committee in London Docklands, and the Glasgow East Area Renewal (GEAR) project. Despite many differences between the cases, common elements are identified and set out in terms of the requirements of urban regeneration. The nature of UDC's is then established and an assessment made of their likelihood of meeting these requirements better than the arrangements they would replace. It is suggested that UDC's would have only limited advantages, several disadvantages, and, further, that there existed superior alternatives available. GEAR, having been retained in preference to a UDC is looked at closely in this respect.

The search for the logic of UDC's is then led to an examination of the course of the proposal since its inception to see how it was justified by the Government in the face of opposition. It transpires that, rather than justify the UDC initiative, the Government made every effort to defend the proposal by preventing its consideration. This exploratory search provides no satisfactory rationale for UDC's; it can only suggest that UDC's are a mis-informed policy, albeit one which was defended with great commitment.

Turning to the second perspective on state intervention, the coincidence is noted between the requirements of state intervention which it suggests and the requirements for urban regeneration which were identified from the three case studies. Although this approach was not pursued, it appears to offer a greater prospect of uncovering the logic of UDC's, based on the exercising of the priorities of state intervention during economic recession. The way in which this perspective can explain the otherwise seemingly illogical and contradictory issue of UDC's is outlined.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDA - Comprehensive Development Area.
CDP - Community Development Project.
DDO - Docklands Development Organisation.
DoE - Department of the Environment.
DJC - Docklands Joint Committee.
GEAR - Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal.
GLC - Greater London Council.
JDAG - Joint Docklands Action Group.
LDDC - London Docklands Development Corporation.
MDC - Merseyside Development Corporation.
MDHC - Mersey Docks and Harbour Company.
MSC - Manpower Services Commission.
NALGO - National and Local Government Officers Association.
NCDP - National Community Development Project.
NTDC - New Town Development Corporation.
PLA - Port of London Authority.
SDA - Scottish Development Agency.
SSHA - Scottish Special Housing Association.
TGWU - Transport and General Workers Union.
TUC - Trades Union Congress.
UDA - Urban Development Area.
UDC - Urban Development Corporation.
WDA - Welsh Development Agency.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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In writing this dissertation, against all odds, thanks are due to Shiela McDonald for supervision and encouragement and to Beryl Fuller for typing.
The crisis, said Antonio Gramsci, consists precisely in that the old is dead and the new cannot be born; in the meantime a variety of morbid symptoms will occur.
CHAPTER 1

A NEW URBAN INITIATIVE FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

1.1 The Question of Urban Development Corporations

Nowhere are the manifestations of the general decline and shifts in British industry more starkly evident than in the old urban areas where the declining activities were concentrated. Extensive urban landscapes of derelict factories and warehouses, wasteland, idle wharves and motionless cranes testify to the loss of livelihoods. Unemployment figures and indices of deprivation testify to the failure of the adjusting economy to replace these livelihoods, despite a decade of urban policy directed at the old inner cities.

A radical new approach to tackling the problems in those areas of greatest dereliction was announced by Michael Heseltine, the Conservative Secretary of State for the Environment*, in September 1979; urban development corporations (UDCs) operating in designated urban development areas (UDAs) (Heseltine, 1979b). It was proposed that UDCs be set-up in the London Docklands and in the "Merseyside Dock Area". Modelled on the new town development corporations (NTDCs), UDCs represent a significant departure in several respects from the then inner city policy based on partnership arrangements between local and central government. The corporations will be run by a board appointed by the Secretary of State, will have powers to

*Further reference to Secretary of State for the Environment is abbreviated to Secretary of State.
assume many of the important functions hitherto undertaken by local authorities — housing, planning, roads, building and development control — and will be given unprecedented powers of urban land acquisition and disposal.

The aim of a UDC is specified in the enabling legislation:

"The object of an urban development corporation shall be to secure the regeneration of its area.

The object is to be achieved in particular by the following means (or by such of them as seem to the Corporation to be appropriate in the case of its area), namely, by bringing land and buildings into effective use, encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce, creating an attractive environment and ensuring that housing and social facilities are available to encourage people to live and work in the area".

(Local Government, Planning and Land Act, 1980, XVI, 136);

an ambitious but hardly contentious aim. The advent of UDCs, however, was greeted by only limited support outside the Conservative Party and the property development industry, by mild discontent on Merseyside and by wholehearted opposition in London from local authorities, community groups, trade unions, the Labour Party and voluntary organisations.

Opponents of UDCs, in general and in particular, developed a strong case which was presented to the Government during the legislative process (Figure1.1). Nevertheless, the enabling legislation was enacted with the UDC proposals scarcely altered from their original NTDC-type formulation. The parliamentary orders required to establish the London Docklands Development Corporation and the Merseyside Development Corporation were then
Michael Heseltine, in a statement on inner city policy, proposes UDCs for London Docklands and the Merseyside Dock Area. Immediate opposition, particularly in London.

Enabling legislation introduced into House of Lords as part of Local Government, Planning and Land Bill — Bill rejected.

Proposal that a UDC replace GEAR made by Scottish Office to the local authorities and SDA.

Enabling legislation reintroduced. Local Government, Planning and Land (No. 2) Bill.

Michael Heseltine announces shadow chairmen and deputy chairmen for the London and Merseyside UDCs.

UDC proposal for GEAR withdrawn by Scottish Office.


Statutory instruments to establish the London Docklands Development Corporation and Merseyside Development Corporation laid before Parliament — 14 days to petition against the Orders.

Twelve petitions lodged against London Docklands UDC Order. Single petition lodged against Merseyside UDC is later withdrawn.

Hearings before a House of Lords Select Committee of the London UDC Order begin — scheduled for two weeks.

Merseyside Development Corporation officially established. Hearings of the London UDC Order enter seventh week.
laid before Parliament. The Government had also suggested that a UDC should replace the unique arrangement between the Scottish Development Agency and the local authorities operating in the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project which had been set up in 1976, though this proposal was withdrawn after opposition from the local authorities. The Order to establish the Merseyside Development Corporation was affirmed by Parliament on 1 April 1981, however, that for the London Docklands Development Corporation was entering its sixth week of hearings before a Select Committee of the House of Lords.

Despite the yet early days of the UDC initiative, the issue is already fraught with questions demanding to be answered. Why should a UDC proposal provoke such opposition from those people in whose interests it is purportedly designed? Why does this opposition, which included much constructive criticism, appear to have had no bearing on the legislative outcome of the proposal? Yet, in the case of GEAR, the UDC suggestion was withdrawn after comparatively mild resistance! Are UDCs simply examples of uninformed policy-making as the Director of the Town and Country Planning Association has suggested?

"It is as though the Government had had no previous experience of planning and local government in this country but had emerged in a mood of vigorous naivete from some other world".

(David Hall quoted in Planning, 8 February 1980).

Where does the justification for UDCs lie?

Given identification of some justification for UDCs, it will follow to make an assessment of their implications for the areas
in which they are established and, more generally, for the future of policy for such areas. UDCs are allegedly experimental (Heseltine, 1979b, p. 3), but so is all public policy to some extent though one does not conduct experiments on such a scale and with such powers unless one has a high degree of confidence in the direction being taken. Even should the proposal for a UDC in London Docklands be rejected, an outcome which is becoming less doubtful as the House of Lords hearings continue beyond their originally scheduled two weeks, the idea of a UDC has been mooted before and will probably be mooted again. Lomas (1980) has written of "the dawn of the UDC era".

Response to the UDC proposals has been somewhat clouded by rhetoric and shrouded by uncertainty, but their appearance has generated ample material upon which to base a search for their underlying reasoning. Furthermore, an idea of the style of operation which the UDCs will adopt can be gained because shadow chairmen and deputy chairmen were appointed in February 1980 since when the embryonic bodies have taken shape with the recruitment of staff and the contracting of consultants in anticipation of parliamentary ratification of the Orders. The London Docklands case, which concerns a far greater area and number of people than that on Merseyside, having proved the more contentious also provides the greater availability of sources. Alongside these two cases, the situation of the GEAR project is studied in order to determine the nature of its relevance to the UDC issue. However, to first establish an approach to an understanding of the meaning and significance of UDCs, it is necessary to examine their practical
and theoretical context; that is, the central state's involvement in inner city policy, of which UDCs are the most recent initiative.

1.2 The Inner City Policy Experience

The recent evolution of a distinct field of inner city policy in Britain has been well documented in several places (NCDP, 1977a; Edwards and Batley, 1978; McKay and Cox, 1979). Here, the development of policy through a series of initiatives is traced only briefly, leading to a review of the state of the art at the time UDCs emerged.

The announcement of the Urban Programme by Harold Wilson in May 1968 is usually credited as the beginning of inner city policy. The awareness of urban problems in the inner cities had been steadily increasing during the 1960s, though establishment of the Programme was precipitated by the prospect of a firing of the racial tension in many inner areas and the result was a "hastily concocted policy" (Edwards and Batley, 1978) and "hardly comprehensive" (McKay and Cox, 1979). Under the Urban Programme, the Home Office provided local authorities with grants mainly for health, welfare, education and housing projects in "areas of severe social deprivation". The form of the Programme drew largely on the experience of the United States Poverty Programme and on the ideas of "positive discrimination" which had been espoused in the Plowden Report on primary education in 1966 and were later instituted in the form of Educational Priority Areas. Underlying the policy was the assumption of a "culture of poverty" explanation of urban deprivation; a belief that poor social conditions bred further deprivation in a vicious circle which could then be broken by the localised spending of extra government money on selected programmes.
Further contributions to the form of early inner city policy came from the ideas on improving the efficiency of local government in the 1968 report of the Seebohm Committee and on community participation in local government and planning in the 1969 Skeffington Report. Alongside the Urban Programme, the Home Office set up twelve Community Development Projects (CDPs), several of them in inner urban areas, aimed at "finding new ways of meeting the needs of people living in areas of high social deprivation; by bringing together the work of all the social services under the leadership of a special project team and also by tapping resources of self help and mutual help which may exist among the people in the neighbourhoods" (Home Office Press Release, 16 July 1969). The CDPs were experiments in "action research", though many of the research teams soon extended their work to challenging the very assumptions upon which the CDPs and Urban Programme were based (NCIDP, 1977a, 1977b).

The message from the CDPs was the view that urban deprivation was less a phenomenon of the inner areas themselves than a symptom of national economic difficulties and change and of the structure of capitalist society. Accordingly, they proposed radical policy changes which gained little acceptance although, on the other hand, there was growing support of the immediate criticism that small-scale area approaches could be of only marginal benefit to inner city residents, offering palliatives to symptoms while failing to tackle the causes. Indeed, problems in the inner cities were proving persistent, if not growing, and in the early 1970s a number of new initiatives were taken by both the Home Office and by the new "super-Department" of the Environment (DoE). The Home Office set up...
an Urban Deprivation Unit and instituted a few experimental Neighbourhood Schemes and Comprehensive Community Programmes, but the main developments were occurring within the DoE.

The Conservative Secretary of State, Peter Walker, announced in 1972 that the DoE would develop a "total approach to the urban environment" through studies to be undertaken by consultants in three towns and three inner city areas; the latter to examine the "environmental problems....and the possible courses of action to deal with them (to) provide lessons on the power, resources and techniques which the Department and local authorities will need to deal with the problems of our inner areas generally" (DoE Press Release, 9 June 1972). The final reports of the Inner Area Studies were published in 1977, detailing the serious industrial and housing problems, the inadequate social services and other related problems in the areas studied in Liverpool, London and Birmingham. The reports stressed, however, that the plethora of problems were fundamentally economic in origin with the decline of local economic bases the result of moves in the national economy. The findings from the Inner Area Studies provided a major input to a White Paper, Policy for the Inner Cities (HMSO, 1977), in which a long-awaited major rethink of inner city policy was set out.

The reappraisal of government policy was outlined in February 1977 at the "Save our Cities" Conference in Bristol by Peter Shore, the Labour Secretary of State:

"There is to my mind one outstanding conclusion from all the research and development work of the past few years, from the Community Development Projects,
the Urban Programme, the Comprehensive Community
Programmes and above all the Inner Area Studies,
and it is this.

If we are to make real headway in improving
the conditions of our inner city areas we must use
the main programmes of central and local government.
We cannot rely solely, or even mainly, on extra
initiatives such as the Urban Programme or Educa-
tional Priority Areas. These provide valuable
topping up, and help to ameliorate problems. But
if we are to get to grips with the underlying
economic and social forces, we must deploy the
major instruments of government policy."

(Quoted by McKay and Cox, 1979, p. 252).

The June 1977 White Paper set out the new policy, proposing three
broad areas of change which were subsequently taken up by the
Government.

The first initiative was to give national and local policies
and programmes an "inner city dimension" by gearing them to inner
areas through such means as the Rate Support Grant, education,
health, housing and transport programmes, and changing the objectives
for the granting of Industrial Development Certificates and of the
Location of Offices Bureau. Second, there was a consolidation of
the existing inner city initiatives with the Urban Programme, the
Urban Deprivation Unit and the Comprehensive Community Programmes
transferred from the Home Office to the DoE (all central government
responsibility for the highly critical CDPs had been relinquished
by 1977). The scope of the Urban Programme was extended to include
industrial, environmental and recreational projects and the total
funding under the Programme increased substantially from £30 million
in 1975/76 to £125 million by 1979/80.
Third, the White Paper recommended the creation of Inner City Partnerships between local and central government in some of the larger areas in an attempt to bring together in a coordinated strategy all public authorities and agencies whose policies were of importance to the areas. Through the Partnerships, local government action, the adjusted central government policies and programmes and the spending of the increased Urban Programme funds (£75 million of the £125 million budgeted for 1979/80 was allocated to Partnership areas) would be coordinated in Inner Area Programmes. These Programmes, modelled on the Housing Investment Programme and the Transport Policies and Programmes, were to be three-year rolling programmes submitted annually to the DoE; an attempt to attack the problems of the inner areas through a corporate plan involving several areas of government. The White Paper further proposed that design of the Programmes involve the "entire community" by working with local community and residents' groups, voluntary organisations, chambers of commerce, local firms, the Confederation of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress. The Partnerships were to be the main arm of the new policy for the inner cities.

Seven Inner City Partnerships were set up in the inner areas of Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester/Salford, Newcastle/Gateshead and, in London, in Lambeth, Docklands and Hackney/Islington. The Partnership Committees, comprising leading councillors from the two tiers of local government and Ministers from the DoE and other relevant Whitehall departments with a representative from the Area Health Authority, prepared the first round of Inner Area Programmes which were submitted to the DoE through the latter part of 1978.
The first round of Inner Area Programmes have been reviewed by Nabarro (1980) who identified a failure by the Partnerships to take the opportunity to devise joint policies to tackle inner area problems. Instead, there has been a tendency for the extra funds to be used simply to supplement existing programmes, particularly capital projects which involve the least future revenue commitment. Thus, 80% of the spending in the first Programmes was devoted to economic development, environmental improvement and leisure and recreation projects with little thought of how the projects contributed to solving the problems in the area. Several weaknesses in the Partnership arrangement have also been identified by other critics (Tilley, 1979; Lawless, 1980; Hambleton, 1981 and Deakin*). The arrangements have been seen as unnecessarily bureaucratic and centralist with the corporate structure tending to push decision-making upwards to the effect that, "among equal partners, the DoE is more equal than the others". With DoE approval required for the Programmes, only projects thought likely to gain approval from central government are submitted. The Partnerships have been criticised for their lack of community involvement, excluding interests thought crucial to successful inner city regeneration such as local business, trade unions and the voluntary sector, despite the sentiments expressed in the 1977 White Paper. When the Lambeth Partnership did set up and fund a group of local interest representatives, central government was decidedly reluctant. Many

* N. Deakin, "Inner City Policy: The London Experience". Seminar given in Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Glasgow, 26 January 1981.
of the Whitehall departments have chosen to retain their autonomy and have been unwilling to "bend" mainstream programmes toward inner areas. Generally, the resources at the Partnerships' disposal were considered far from adequate in relation to the problems which the Partnerships were intended to solve and, in all, there appears a great gulf between the reality of the Partnerships and the enthusiasm with which the new policy was launched in 1977.

Nabarro claimed, however, that the greatest weakness of the Partnerships was a failure to think critically about the structural factors affecting the inner city (1980, p. 35). The main development in thinking on inner city policy since its beginnings in 1968 has been the shift in perspective from a narrow social pathology approach to one which recognises inner city problems as fundamentally due to economic forces operating on a national, if not international, scale. This structural perspective has been widely held, albeit with differing views on solutions, first by the CDPs, then by the Inner Area Studies and repeated in the 1977 White Paper. The policies proposed in the White Paper, however, demonstrated a belief by Government that the play of national economic forces could be confronted essentially by consolidating and extending the area-based and managerial "solutions" of old.

As the recession has deepened across Britain and the areas of deprivation on urban peripheries and elsewhere have been "discovered", the conditions in the inner urban areas have become less striking and have been seen more in terms of the degree to which they suffer from a far broader problem. Accordingly, the merits of an inner city
policy centred on seven selected inner urban areas have been increasingly questioned. Several writers in a recent volume (Cameron, 1980) have argued that the focus of attention should be at the level of the conurbation and the research for "The Inner City in Context" series of monographs suggested that the level of analysis would be better based on metropolitan labour markets than on the inner city, assuming the "inner city" can be defined.* Others maintain that policy needs to be pitched at the structure of the capitalist economic system (NCPD, 1977b; Conference of Socialist Planners, 1980).

The experience of inner city policy in Britain, however, has been one of a divorce between policy and thinking with the developments in policy largely resisting the changes suggested by practitioners, academic research and acknowledged by government in a curiously bi-partisan manner. While not belittling those benefits which inner city policy has brought to inner areas, the policy has never come to grips with the problems and numerous initiatives have fallen short of the expectations they had engendered. The experience was succinctly described in the title of a recent newspaper review of the Partnerships:

"The inner city programmes have survived, but can the inner cities?".

(Guardian, 1 April 1981, p. 22).

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* D. Diamond, "Is there an Inner City Problem". Seminar given in Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Glasgow, 10 February 1981.
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives on State Intervention

To understand UDCs, it is necessary to understand the nature of state intervention in inner cities. Why has inner city policy followed the course described above? Although there are numerous interpretations of the role of the state and, accordingly, explanations of the pattern of state intervention (see the various perspectives in Loney and Allen, 1979), two broad schools of thought can be identified; those which see the state as a neutral instrument and those which assign to the state an inherent bias towards certain groups in society.

The analyses of Edwards and Batley (1978) and McKay and Cox (1979) are good examples of the widely-held first category. Combining pluralist and managerialist perspectives they have, respectively, tried to explain the development of the Urban Programme and of inner city policy by reference to the actions of various groups which are seen "to shape the policy agenda"; political parties, organised professional and economic interests, protest movements, central government and local government bureaucracies. The state is seen solely as the administrative clearing house for the various and conflicting demands placed upon government. After conducting their reviews of state intervention in specific policy areas the general conclusions arrived at are that the Urban Programme and other associated initiatives were "more the children of enthusiasm than wisdom" (Edwards and Batley, 1978, p. 251) and that "the state's role in urban society has been highly variable" (McKay and Cox, 1979, p. 262).
Dunleavy (1980), however, argues that such conclusions are indicative of an inadequate framework of analysis. One needs to explain why state intervention often appears confusing or contradictory and the suggestion is that the role or roles of the state must be examined rather than ignored. An increasing amount of work is being undertaken on the basis that the state does play a specific and positive role in determining the nature of urban policy (Pickvance, 1976; Dearlove, 1979; Saunders, 1979; Dunleavy, 1980).

Within this second broad school of thought on the role of the state, the crudest interpretation is that the state in capitalist society operates solely in the interests of the capitalist class. However, the observable reality of who benefits from state intervention refutes such a simplistic assertion and increasingly attempts have been made to adapt theories of the role of the state to accommodate the apparent confusion and contradictions of reality. Despite differences in explaining how the state performs its roles, it is generally accepted within this field that the capitalist state needs to carry out two basic functions which are often mutually contradictory:

"... the state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state also must try to maintain or create the conditions of social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's surplus production capacity and the taxes drawn from this surplus".

(O'Connor, 1973, p. 6)
1.4 An Approach to Understanding Urban Development Corporations

With respect to identifying an approach to understanding UDCs, the essential difference between the two schools of thought on the nature of state intervention is that one suggests an explanation can be found primarily in the problems of inner cities, whereas the other suggests an adequate explanation can only be gained by looking at the problems inherent in state intervention. The first sees inner city policy as a somewhat separate policy area, the form of which is constrained by national interests, rather than largely determined by national interests as the second approach would suggest (McKay and Cox, 1979, p. 278).

Faced with these two possible approaches to understanding UDCs, the search for the logic of UDCs begins by adopting the orthodox, though challenged, approach of looking at the problems and policies of the areas in question in an attempt to provide an adequate explanation. That is, the assumption that UDCs are designed, as the enabling legislation states, "to secure the regeneration of their areas".
2.1 Michael Heseltine's Review of Inner City Policy

The U.D.C. proposals emerged from a review of inner city policy, specifically the partnership arrangements, conducted by the D.o.E. for Michael Heseltine after the Conservative Government came to office in May 1979. The announcement of the partnerships in 1977 had been broadly welcomed by the Conservative opposition although they would have preferred less central government subsidies and more incentives for the private sector in the strategy. Michael Heseltine, then Opposition spokesman on the environment, had suggested, "The sums of money Mr. Shore is offering are so small and so spread over the years in relation to the scale of the problem that he is giving a false impression in suggesting that there are any real solutions to the problem". (Quoted in McKay and Cox, 1979, p. 254).

Apart from the different emphasis favoured by the Conservatives within the general commitment by both major parties to redirecting resources back to inner areas, the first critical assessments of the partnerships were appearing. Peter Shore, understandably, defended the partnerships. While acknowledging the criticisms, he claimed to be persuaded by none of them and, moreover, suggested it was impossible to evaluate the innovation after just two years of practice (Shore, 1980, p. 20). There was, however, a general view that the partnerships were not living up to the promises of 1977
and a growing lack of confidence in their ability to address the problems for which they were designed (McKay and Cox, 1979, p. 253).

Michael Heseltine's review of the inner city partnerships concluded:

"We inherited from the previous Government a complex machinery for urban aid. I think Government must continue to be involved — though with the minimum of paperwork and fuss, and I intend to simplify procedures.

.....We think that the partnership approach and the inner area programmes, which the partnerships and the programme authorities produce, have served a useful role.

.....But their limited gain has been clouded by the bureaucratic scale and frequency of the procedures whereby too many people meet to discuss generalisations, often to little purpose.

Equally, the initial intention to involve the private sector has faded; and we need to emphasise again the role of voluntary organisations.

.....I believe that the existing machinery, streamlined and adjusted, will be capable of carrying developments forward in the inner cities and enable local government and the private sector to fulfil their respective roles. But for London Docklands and the Merseyside Dock Area I do not think that the present arrangements can meet the particular problems and opportunities of those two areas."

(Heseltine, 1979, pp. 2-3).

So, what were the particular problems of and opportunities in regenerating the London Docklands and the Merseyside Dock Area? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the different arrangements for coordinating government in those areas; an inner city partnership in Liverpool and a statutory joint committee of local authorities together with an inner city partnership in the London Docklands? Additionally, what was the situation with GEAR in Glasgow which first attracted then repelled a U.D.C. proposal?
2.2 Liverpool: An Inner City Partnership

The "Merseyside Dock Area" is a narrow band of docks and quaysides extending along both sides of the river and comprising parts of the City of Liverpool and the boroughs of Sefton and Wirral within the Merseyside County Council area (Figure 2.1). The port has been the traditional base of Liverpool's economy but, since the 1980s, has been in decline as the pattern of Britain's trade has shifted away from the 'deep sea markets' of Africa, Asia and the Americas towards Europe; a destination to which Liverpool as a port is ill-suited. The remaining trade is increasingly handled by capital-intensive techniques such as containerisation which have not only accelerated redundancies in the docks work force but also led to the abandonment of many old docks in favour of new installations such as the Seaforth container terminal downstream.

When the South Docks closed in 1972, great interest was generated among community groups regarding their potential for redevelopment and the City Planning Department issued guidelines designed to assist developers interested in use of the area (Amos, 1972). The guidelines were based on the principle of using the docks for development which would help provide for the needs of employment and open space in the docks' 'hinterland'. However, nothing eventuated. Private developers appeared uninterested and neither the city nor the county authority had the funds, considering the pressing needs in other parts of their areas, to undertake redevelopment themselves.
The decline of Liverpool's port function has had repercussions throughout the city's economy with the decline of associated manufacturing and service industry. Compounding these employment losses, the national recession of the 1970s has fallen heavily on Merseyside where the level of manufacturing activity is largely in the hands of a few large externally controlled concerns; most in vulnerable or non-growth sectors. The "rationalisation" of national and multi-national firms in the straitened economic climate has produced a continuing catalogue of large plant closures or contractions on Merseyside; British Leyland, Pressed Steel Fisher, Dunlop, Plessey, Tate and Lyle (documented in Merseyside in Crisis, Merseyside Socialist Research Group, 1980).

The severity of the losses to Merseyside's economic base is the context in which the 'traditional' inner city problems occur. One part of inner Liverpool, was the subject of one of the inner area studies (Wilson, et. al., 1977) which provided the basis for the 1977 White Paper on inner city policy. Subsequently, Liverpool City was announced in October 1977 as one of the seven areas in which inner city partnerships would be established. The designated area (Figure 2.1) included the south docks as well as much of the operational north docks.

The Partnership arrangements in Liverpool (Figure 2.2), consist of a Partnership Committee of representatives from central government, the City and County Councils and the area health authority operating in conjunction with Liverpool City Council and guided by an Inner Areas Sub-Committee composed of members of the City and County Councils. The expressed aims of the Partnership were
Figure 2.2 Organization for Urban Regeneration 1: Liverpool.

Central Government

Merseyside County Council

Liverpool City Council

Liverpool Inner City Partnership Committee

Chairman: Secretary of State
Members:
1. Central Government: Minister or Parliamentary Under Secretary of State from:
   - Dept. of Industry
   - Dept. of Employment
   - Dept. of Education + Science
   - Dept. of Health + Social Security
   - Home Office
2. Merseyside County Council
   - 3 Councillors
3. Liverpool City Council
   - 3 Councillors
4. Chairman of Area Health Authority

Inner Areas Sub-Committee

Policy Co-ordinating Group
to secure the economic, social and environmental regeneration of inner Liverpool and were translated into objectives of halting the population decline, reducing the selective out-migration of younger and skilled residents and preventing further job loss and unemployment (Liverpool Inner City Partnership Committee, 1978).

Within the broad aims of the Partnership and among the multifarious projects to which Partnership funds were directed, an emphasis soon occurred involving a shift away from proposals such as those connected with improving social services and leisure facilities toward those facilitating industrial development:

"Increasingly it is becoming accepted that the local authority has a role to play in the development of the local economy. In particular as a part of the Inner City Partnership, economic or, more specifically, employment related matters are assuming major importance".

(Liverpool City Planning Department, 1978).

This emphasis was repeated in the Merseyside Structure Plan, based on an urban regeneration strategy which saw local authorities as the most important agencies. (Merseyside County Council, 1980).

Both Liverpool City Council and Merseyside County Council have bodies aimed at economic development. The Liverpool Economic Development Agency markets industrial and commercial land in the City and the Merseyside County Economic Development Office promotes economic development throughout the County. The Partnership offered an opportunity, at least in the designated areas, to coordinate the efforts directed at re-establishing Liverpool's economic base. These efforts included a number of schemes: advance factory construction under the Partnership arrangements, through Department of Industry schemes and by the private sector; site preparation, particularly
in the Partnership area possibly assisted by grants from the Regional Development Fund of the European Economic Commission; financial assistance to local employers by grants, loans or guarantees from central and local government, with the highest levels payable within the Partnership area; and the designation of Industrial and Commercial Improvement Areas under the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978 with associated provision of loans and grants for environmental improvements and for the conversion, extension and improvement of buildings. Partnership funds have also been put toward establishing an 'Industrial Development Agency' which will be responsible for industrial promotion, liaison with the private sector and the processing of loans and grants.

The City Council describes its measures with an air of optimism; the City Council is

"...making every effort to encourage industry and, in particular, the Inner City Partnership arrangements with Central Government are aimed at tackling the problems of the inner areas of the City and the regeneration of the local economy. This will be of considerable benefit to the private sector. Assistance from both central and local Government sources is available to assist the establishment and/or expansion of both existing and new firms...."

(Liverpool City Planning Department, 1979a).

but to what avail? The enormity, and perhaps the futility, of the task is indicated by the fact that the Partnership's proposals for attracting new industry and commerce, if successful, would mean 5,500 new jobs by 1984/85 -- equivalent to the number of redundancies in the British Leyland and Dunlop plans in just one year.

Considering the extent of dereliction in inner Liverpool, it is surprising that one reason why the Partnership's proposals might
not be realised is land availability. A review of development land in the Partnership area in 1979 (Liverpool City Planning Department, 1979b) revealed 480 hectares of vacant or unused land, about one quarter of which was dockland mostly owned by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC), a combination of statutory undertaker and private company after having been bailed out of bankruptcy with government funds. The review identified the principal problem in redevelopment of the docklands to be land acquisition from the MDHC and statutory undertakers; the problem caused by disincentives to the release of such land, stemming from the methods of valuing land and calculating liability for development land tax and from the preference of some owners to retain an option on possible future use of the land and so being only prepared to grant short-term leases. In the absence of any change in the legislation and regulations which govern the holding and disposal of publicly owned land, the review predicted the Partnership's operations would be severely constrained, and concluded:

"The process of arbitration by the Secretary of State as suggested in his recent 'Statement on the Disposal of Public Sector Land' is clearly a current requirement in the context of this Partnership and needs to be instituted as quickly as possible". (Liverpool City Planning Department, 1979b, p. 6).

The City Council had attempted to arrange redevelopment of two areas of disused docks, one of them in association with the County Council, but even after years of negotiating with the MDHC and the British Transport Dock Board:

"...despite plans for bringing disused public sector land into use, with the local authorities willing to organise predevelopment and finance it from the Urban Programme or the Housing Strategies and Investment Programme, no progress is being made towards this goal".

(Liverpool City Planning Department, 1979b, p. 5).
Meanwhile, the County Council had been negotiating with the MDHC with regard to gaining an option on the leasehold of the South Docks and Wirral Council had spent some Urban Programme funds on environmental improvement of derelict docks. Nevertheless, considering the amount of vacant land elsewhere in inner Liverpool, there has been no great pressure on an early decision on the future of the disused docks.

2.3 London Docklands: A Statutory Joint Committee and Inner City Partnership

Redevelopment of London's docklands (Figure 2.3), unlike those on Merseyside, has been the subject of considerable discussion and activity for several years. Large areas of upstream dockland have become unused as development of the Port of London has moved downstream, particularly to Tilbury, to accommodate changes in cargo handling techniques. The East India Docks closed in 1967, the St. Katharine and London Docks in 1968 and the Surrey Docks in 1970. By 1980, only the Royal Docks in Beckton and the West India and Millwall Docks on the Isle of Dogs were still operational, though the Port of London Authority (PLA) had cast the future of the latter in doubt on several occasions since the early 1970s.

The docks, however, form only the heart of what is known as "Docklands"; an area of 5500 acres, the home of 50,000 people and comprising parts of the five "Dockland Boroughs" of Greenwich, Lewisham, Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets. Docklands extends about eight miles along both banks of the Thames from the London Docks, just below Tower Bridge, in the west, to Beckton in the east. A peculiar aspect of the area is the concentration of land ownership
among just a few large bodies. In 1975, 2,047 acres were owned by the PLA, 840 by the GLC, 700 by the British Gas Corporation, 528 by the Dockland Boroughs and 143 by British Rail. Supplementing the land brought into disuse by dock closures, much of the Gas Board's land holding in the area had become unused as the Board's operations had shifted toward the North Sea gas installations elsewhere in the country.

As on Merseyside, the acres of derelict land were only the most visible part of broader problems throughout the surrounding area and, insofar as the problems of Docklands can be covered in a single paragraph:

"East London, and particularly Docklands, grew up at about the same time as the older industrial areas in the Midlands and North of the country. During the last war, it was the most heavily bombed civilian target in the country. Since then, apart from the more insidious decline in population, many docks closed in quick succession. Now it has all the symptoms of decline of the older urban areas of the country, many of which have long since been recognised as needing special help towards improvement.... The signs are the overall economic, housing, transport and environmental state of Docklands and the Docklands boroughs and the rate at which things are deteriorating".

(DJC, 1976, p. 13).

When the dock closures began, various schemes to use the land were proposed (an Olympic stadium and a "Tivoli Gardens" have been perennial suggestions) and strategies to regenerate the area were also conceived on a regional scale, notably with respect to the search for a third London Airport. However, it was recognised that redevelopment of the area needed to be tackled in a comprehensive manner and, in 1971, the Secretary of State and the GLC commissioned a consultancy firm, R. Travers, Morgan & Partners, to formulate a number of options for the way redevelopment could proceed.
The consultants reported in January 1973, suggesting five possible courses for redevelopment which were referred to as "Thames Park", "East End Consolidated", "Waterside", "City New Town" and "Europa". A consultation exercise undertaken by the GLC and the Dockland Boroughs followed, from which it was clear the people of Docklands held substantial support for none of the proposals. Indeed, opposition to the Travers Morgan proposals led to the formation in 1973 of the Joint Docklands Action Group (JDAG), an umbrella group for community and trade union organisations in the Docklands, with the aim "to ensure that any redevelopment in the Docklands meets the needs, first and foremost, of local people in East London"; a consideration to which the consultants had paid little heed.

Although the Travers Morgan proposals were rejected, the study had provided much information on the problems that comprehensive redevelopment of Docklands would entail, leading to the suggestion that the then current administrative system would be inadequate. This viewpoint was accepted by the Boroughs, GLC and Secretary of State who entered into discussion on possible arrangements for some form of "special machinery to plan and implement the redevelopment of Docklands". In January 1974, the Docklands Joint Committee (DJC) was established under provisions of the Local Government Act 1972 and the Docklands area (Figure 2.3) over which the DJC would function was defined.

The DJC (Figure 2.4) consisted of 24 members; 8 from the GLC; 2 from each of the Boroughs of Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets; one each from the Boroughs of Greenwich and Lewisham; and 8 from
FIGURE 2.4 ORGANISATION FOR URBAN REGENERATION 2: LONDON DOCKLANDS.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

DOCKLANDS INNER CITY PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE

GREATER LONDON COUNCIL

DOCKLANDS JOINT COMMITTEE

DOCKLANDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION

DOCKLANDS LAND BOARD

DOCKLANDS BOROUGHS:
- GREENWICH
- LEWISHAM
- NEW HAM
- SOUTHWARK
- TOWER HAMLETS

NON-GOVERNMENT INTERESTS

DOCKLANDS FORUM

JOINT DOCKLANDS ACTION GROUP
elsewhere appointed by the local authority members but with "regard
to any nominations made for this purpose by the Secretary of State".
The Committee was vested with no powers additional to those of the
constituent local authorities and was essentially an instrument of
coordination with the local authorities responsible for implementa-
tion. The terms of reference given in the Standing Orders of the
Docklands Joint Committee include:-

- to decide on a planning brief and outline plan
  for the area;

- to coordinate the preparation by the appointing
  authorities of local plans in accord with the
  outline plan;

- to coordinate and advise on proposals for local
  authority development in the area;

- to consider and advise on proposals of any of the
  local authorities to enter into agreements with
  private developers or statutory undertakers to
  develop land, or to enter into such agreements
  itself on behalf of a local authority.

To provide for public consultation and participation at this
new level of planning, the Docklands Forum was also established in
1974, representing the voluntary sector, trades councils, chambers
of commerce, trades unions and other local groups. Two members of
the Forum sat on the DJC. The DJC have also funded a resource
centre to support JDAG which was, in turn, represented on the Forum.
A full list of organisations represented on the Forum and of members
of the DJC in 1978 is given in Appendix A.

The London Docklands Strategic Plan (DJC, 1976) was published
and approved in July 1976, setting out a strategy for the phased
redevelopment of the whole area until "1997 and the completion of
development". The overall objective of the Plan was:
"To use the opportunity provided by large areas of London's Dockland becoming available, to redress the housing, social, environmental, employment/economic and communications deficiencies of the Docklands area and the parent boroughs, and thereby, to provide the freedom for similar improvement throughout East and Inner London".


and in pursuit of this objective, the DJC identified two issues crucial to success of the Plan:

"...employment and transport infrastructure. Unless the economic base of Docklands can be recreated, all other efforts will be wasted; and that recreation depends to a very considerable extent on the provision of adequate facilities for moving people and goods".

(DJC, 1976, p. 2).

The Plan had widespread support, including that from central government, and after many years of uncertainty and dubious proposals, it appeared that redevelopment of Docklands was to be a reality.

The basic structure of coordinated planning in Docklands, with the task of guiding this redevelopment, was elaborated in three main areas since its inception in 1974. First, the constituent authorities delegated to the DJC the functions of development control and of land acquisition under the Community Land Act 1975. A Development Applications Sub-Committee of the DJC was set up to decide on all applications for planning permission in the area apart from proposals of a minor nature, and the Docklands Land Board to carry out the community land functions. The local authorities, however, considered it neither necessary nor appropriate for the Land Board to be a development agency and its powers were, therefore, limited to the acquisition, preparation, management and disposal of land and buildings.
The second development came with the designation in 1977 of Docklands as one of the inner city partnership areas, thus introducing central government directly into the planning coordination machinery. The partnership was struck between central government and the DJC; the Partnership Committee comprising the Secretary of State, other government ministers, the chairman of the DJC, the leaders of the GLC and each of the Dockland Boroughs, the leader of the GLC Opposition and a representative from the Inner London Education Authority. Unlike the other inner city partnerships, the budgeting of Urban Programme funds in Docklands is considered not in a separate document but is integrated within the DJC's Operational Programmes.

After completion of the Strategic Plan, the DJC had recognised that its work would take on two emphases; the coordination of development by the executive agencies and the promotion of Docklands as an area for industrial and commercial development. To manage the second emphasis, several courses were followed involving liaison with various bodies but this side of the operation has been consolidated within the Docklands Development Organisation (DDO), the officer support group to the DJC. The DDO's objective with regard to promoting investment was:

"...to provide, by close and effective liaison among the various agencies, a skilled and efficient service which gives industrialists and developers comprehensive help in building or renting accommodation, in housing key workers, in obtaining grants, loans and permits and indeed in any aspect of their operations where the public sector can assist the private".

(DDO evidence to Expenditure Committee: House of Commons Paper 99(ii), 1977-78, p. 33).
By 1978 then, the structure of organisations involved in the regeneration of London Docklands presented a daunting picture (Figure 2.4). Nevertheless, streamlining of operation within the structure allowed the DJC to have confidence in the working operations and in the ability of the DDO to promote development. The promotion strategy of the DDO was based on highlighting the locational advantages of Docklands with respect to existing national and international transport links, major markets and labour supply and, in particular, on outlining the progress being made under the London Docklands Strategic Plan (DDO, 1980). In 1979, the DJC undertook a review of the regeneration programme under the Plan since 1976 and concluded:

"...the implementation of Docklands development is broadly on course to reach the targets set in the Strategic Plan, despite the fact that some of the assumptions set in the Strategic Plan about the release of land for redevelopment have proved, so far, to be invalid".

(DJC, 1979, p. 35).

Although implementation may have been "broadly on course", progress was proving slower than had been expected. The basis of the 1976 Plan had been the assumption of a massive injection of both public and private resources into Docklands. Government spending cuts, however, were threatening many of the housing, transport, health and education proposals in the Plan despite the buffer provided by Urban Programme resources, and industrial investment had not proceeded as predicted. Moreover, the employment predictions, upon which the scale of the industrial strategy had been based, had been unrealistic as manufacturing industry had continued to close throughout the area.
In evidence given to the Environment Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee in December 1978 and January 1979 (House of Commons Paper, 1978/79, No. 99), the Secretary of State identified the main problem facing regeneration of the area as the failure of industrial investment on a sufficiently large scale to be attracted to the area "despite the very positive efforts which the Docklands local authorities are making" (House of Commons Paper No. 99(i), p. 4). The DJC saw this problem as fundamentally that of an "unpropitious" national economic climate in which local government was having to make greater than expected efforts to retain let alone to attract industry (House of Commons Paper No. 99(ii), p. 36).

In the difficult economic circumstances, the DJC argued that the best it could do was to build up a confidence in the future of Docklands which would involve resolving a number of uncertainties; the release of statutory undertakers' land, the future levels of public spending, the future of the project to extend the Jubilee underground line which had been a key element in the 1976 Plan with the proposed extension of the line from the City to Woolwich in the east of Docklands, and the future of the Upper Docks on the Isle of Dogs; considerations which all lay outside the control of the DJC but which bore heavily on its operations.

The DJC had encountered similar problems with the release of land held by statutory undertakers to those faced on Merseyside and "in the medium and longer-term the achievement of the Strategic Plan's employment objectives will undoubtedly be jeopardised" (House of Commons Paper No. 99(ii), p. 37). Further cuts in public spending were made in 1979, the PLA announced in June 1980
the closure of the West India and Millwall Docks, and, one month later, the GLC and Department of Transport jointly announced the cancellation of the Jubilee Line extension.

2.4 Glasgow: The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Project

In 1974, indices of deprivation calculated on the basis of 1971 Census data, had revealed that Clydeside had almost 50% of the 'worst' areas in Britain on several of the indicators. Within Clydeside, there was a further concentration of the "worst areas" in the East End of Glasgow. The rapid development of industry and housing in the area during the nineteenth century had been followed by decline during the twentieth; increasing unemployment, industrial dereliction, worsening housing conditions and accelerating outward migration. Formerly the "industrial power-house of Glasgow", the East End now contained the relics of the declining textile and heavy engineering industries and decaying tenements.

In 1957, twenty-nine Comprehensive Development Areas (CDAs) had been designated in Glasgow, many in the East End, though by 1976 only nine had been undertaken and, in the others, premature demolition before funds were available for redevelopment had often added to the dereliction and blight. In areas such as the East End, where about 60% of the land was derelict, Glasgow's urban renewal strategy of CDAs linked with peripheral development and overspill was clearly not working. The perception of the need to rethink policy in Glasgow coincided with the developments in inner city ideas occurring elsewhere in Britain, though in Glasgow an independent "solution" was devised which preceded by nine months the appearance of inner city partnerships in England.
The GEAR project was announced by the Secretary of State for Scotland in May 1978 with the objective to "bring about in a coordinated way the comprehensive social, economic and environmental regeneration of the East End, and create the conditions for the development of a balanced and thriving community" (SDD, 1978, p. 1). The basis for the project was the joint agreement of the Glasgow District Council, the Strathclyde Regional Council, the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), and the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) with the Secretary of State for Scotland to work in partnership to tackle the problems of the East End, "in association with the people of the area and with other appropriate bodies, public and private, including voluntary organisations" (SDD, 1976, p. 1). The area to be covered by the project was delineated; 4,000 acres within the single local authority of Glasgow District and with a population of 45,000.

The central coordinating mechanism of the GEAR project (Figure 2.5) is the Governing Committee consisting of members from the four initiating bodies with a Scottish Office Minister as chairman. The Governing Committee is responsible for the overall plan and programme of action for the area and is supported by a Consultative Group of senior officials, reflecting the membership of the Committee, with the task of day-to-day coordination. The other public agencies closely involved in the GEAR project are the Greater Glasgow Health Board, the Housing Corporation and the Manpower Services Commission (MSC), although these partners do not play a direct role in the formal structure of coordination.
Figure 2.5 Organisation for Urban Regeneration 3: Glasgow East End.
Where the GEAR arrangements differ notably from the attempts at coordination in Liverpool and London Docklands is in the nature of central government's involvement in the partnership which is largely through the SDA. The SDA had been set up in November 1975 with two major objectives; economic development including the provision, maintenance and safeguarding of employment, and environmental improvement especially with respect to industrial dereliction. Although "sponsored" by the Scottish Economic Planning Department of the Scottish Office, the SDA does have a certain degree of autonomy. Within GEAR, the SDA performs two roles: first, its "usual functions" of providing for and promoting industrial and commercial development, environmental improvement and land clearance; second, the SDA was assigned the function of coordination of the project, preparing overall policies and programmes which are submitted to the Governing Committee for approval with the Consultative Group attempting to ensure coordination in their implementation by the various partners.

Why this particular form of organisation structure was established for the regeneration of the East End of Glasgow remains a point of differing views with suggestions that important factors were the state of Scottish politics at the time, the availability of the recently created SDA as a lead institution, the redundancy of the development team from the abandoned Stonehouse New Town project (many of the staff went to the Urban Renewal Directorate of the SDA which was the section concerned with GEAR), and the Scottish Office not wishing to entrust the local authorities with the extra resources to be directed into inner Glasgow. The Chairman of the Governing
Committee later justified the organisation in terms suggesting uncertainty about how to tackle the problems of the GEAR area:

"While it must be acknowledged that there is no immediately available formula which will guarantee the success of the GEAR project, it is nevertheless clear that the best prospect, and perhaps the only one, will be through coordinated action in all the different areas of activity...."


Nevertheless, the 1977 White Paper on inner city policy recognised the GEAR project as an alternative to inner city partnerships, proposing support of the project through an increased allocation of Urban Programme funds to the area.

It was not until July 1978 that the Governing Committee issued a report setting out the key issues to be tackled and the possible courses of action in the GEAR project (GEAR Governing Committee, 1978). The report identified the problem of urban decline as essentially a problem of economic change with many of the forces of change operating from outside the area. Accepting these limitations on the scope of the project, the report stressed two considerations in the approach to urban regeneration; the need to promote confidence in the area and to support the existing population:

"...a primary objective must be to create a new confidence in the East End. Only in this way will the present population be retained, industry be revived and the hopes and aspirations of the next generation in the area realised". (GEAR Governing Committee, 1978, p. 2).

and,

"...above all else..... the actual process of change must be managed in a just and dignified manner which recognises the needs and the rights of the individual". (GEAR Governing Committee, 1978, p. 2).
The "key issues" document provided the basis for a consultation exercise; tenants' and residents' associations and voluntary organisations were contacted, a series of public meetings arranged and a survey of every household in the area undertaken by the SDA (SDA, 1978). The SDA also set up ten working groups among the partners, one group on each of the key issues such as employment and housing, with the task to report on a strategy for each issue which would then be brought together by the SDA in an overall strategy. The resulting GEAR Strategy and Programme (SDA, 1980a, 1980b) contained six basic objectives:

1. To increase residents' competitiveness in securing employment;

2. To arrest economic decline and realise the potential of GEAR as a major employment centre;

3. To overcome the social disadvantages experienced by residents;

4. To improve and maintain the environment;

5. To stem population decline and engender a better balanced age and social structure; and

6. To foster residents' commitment and confidence.

(SDA, 1980a, p. 8).

Within each objective, the programme detailed the work undertaken since 1977 and committed for 1980-81 by each of the GEAR participants and programme targets to 1983. Although the Strategy and Programme was only approved by the Governing Committee in May 1980, it essentially represented a formalisation of what had been happening in GEAR since the beginning of the project.
The GEAR organisation allows each of the participants to retain full statutory powers and responsibilities and, from most accounts, the participants have proceeded on this basis rather than to seriously consider joint action. Of the £60 million spent on the GEAR project from 1977 to 1980, it is unclear how much of this and what programmes can be attributed to the existence of the project rather than to the normal activities of the participants (Donald and Hutton, 1980). However, two positive features of the initiative can be identified. First, the role of the SDA as a complement to the actions of the other authorities and bodies. The work of the SDA has centred on the problem of land renewal and in the case of the Cambuslang Recovery Area, the derelict site of a former iron works, tube works and power station, has shown its capability to handle large scale land assembly and site preparation even if its promotional efforts are only marginally successful in bringing the land back into commercial and industrial use. Most of the derelict land in the GEAR area, however, required consolidation of a pattern of fragmented private ownership and, unlike Liverpool and London Docklands, the behaviour of statutory undertakers has been a far smaller problem than that of the law relating to the acquisition and demolition of pigeon houses.

The second positive feature of GEAR has been its ability to inspire confidence in, and focus attention on, an area previously characterised by an air of hopelessness. How long this confidence will prevail, though, is a moot question. Despite the visible signs of action in the area, the four years of GEAR's operation have seen unemployment increasing and Nelson (1980) suggests
public confidence in the project is not all it was made out to be. Perhaps the most telling comments on the GEAR initiative, however, are those made by the participating bodies. Interviews with officials involved in GEAR from the SDA and the Regional and District Councils revealed more cynicism than enthusiasm in an organisation which "has tended to inhibit action and promote discussion" (SDA Chief Executive quoted in Money, 1979, p. 10) and thereby failed to overcome the tendency for the individual partners to carry on in their individual ways. The view in the SDA now seems to be that, should another such venture be attempted, coordination should be based not on loose understandings of intent but on a contracting of real powers and responsibility to the machinery of coordination.

2.5 The Requirements of Urban Regeneration

The three cases of Liverpool, London Docklands and the East End of Glasgow illustrate three different approaches to tackling the problem of urban regeneration, each of which, however, involved both tiers of local government, central government and other public bodies entering into voluntary partnerships of coordination. The different arrangements in each appear to largely reflect differences in the extent of the area across one or more local authorities, the particular institutions involved such as the SDA in Glasgow, and the different local government systems with their different divisions of functions between tiers; the Metropolitan County, Greater London and Scottish systems.
The particular problems in each area also differ in many respects and, because of this and the different administrative contexts, it is difficult to make a general assessment of the relative effectiveness of the three organisation arrangements for dealing with urban regeneration. However, it is possible to see two common elements in the problem of urban regeneration, in the strategies designed to tackle it and in the difficulties encountered in this area of urban policy.

The problem of urban regeneration in areas which have experienced decline in their economic bases and social and environmental conditions comprises two distinct problems: developing the new and improving, if not maintaining, the old. With the widely acknowledged underlying importance of economic factors as the cause of urban decline, the two component problems of urban regeneration translate into two strands for policy attention:

1. The need to secure local economic development.

2. The need to tackle the problems of urban deprivation; housing, social services, transport, education and the physical environment.

The strategies adopted by the different policy-making organisations in the three cases examined all displayed a recognition of this two-fold nature of their task.

The important point about the two strands of urban regeneration strategy is that, while clearly inter-related, one does not necessarily guarantee the other. For example, attention to
improving and supporting the existing physical and social conditions may enhance the area's attraction to incoming investment but does not ensure economic development. Efforts at securing economic development, on the other hand, which increases employment in the area may serve only to encourage commuting or moving into the area of new people rather than provide employment for those in greatest need. The balance to be struck between the two emphases of urban regeneration poses a dilemma for policy makers and it is for management of this dilemma that the machineries of administrative partnership and coordination have been designed. First, there has been an attempt to bring together all the authorities and agencies involved in promoting economic development and in tackling urban deprivation. Second, coordinating bodies have been set up to determine the nature of the balance between the competing demands within the overall strategy.

When the different roles of the administrative arrangements for urban regeneration have been distinguished, it is possible to detect differences in the potential between the three cases. On the issue of promoting economic development, the SDA and the DDO appear far more suited than does the fragmented approach in Liverpool, although the Scotland-wide remit of the SDA may compromise its performance in GEAR compared to the exclusive Docklands function of the DDO. With regard to strategies to tackle urban deprivation, the design of the GEAR project and the bodies involved seems to offer the greatest prospects for formulating a concerted strategy. The success of these two roles, however, is dependent upon the performance of the instruments of coordination and, in each case,
coordination is undertaken by a body which operates with no real power of its own but on the basis of willpower. The willingness of the various bodies to work together appears to be greater within the DJC structure than within the inner city partnerships, in both Liverpool and London Docklands, and within GEAR.

The main problems which have confronted strategies of urban regeneration in all three cases have, however, come from the state of the national economy and the corresponding macro-economic policies adopted by government. The promotion of economic development has become increasingly difficult as the recession has proceeded through the 1970s and different areas of Britain have competed more intensively for the much reduced level of industrial and commercial investment. Strategies to relieve urban deprivation have been severely constrained by the public expenditure cuts which both Labour and Conservative Governments have applied since the early 1970s. Accordingly, the dilemma between the two strands of urban regeneration strategy has been sharpened as the authorities have been faced with only marginal success on both fronts.

In such difficult conditions, the problem of extensive areas of derelict land which characterises the three areas appears to be of secondary importance. However, the land is seen as an opportunity to further both arms of the urban regeneration strategy by allowing development designed to supplement the local economic bases and to redress the imbalance in the provision of social facilities in the areas. The crucial problem in returning derelict land to use has been identified as the difficulties local authorities have with statutory undertakers in agreeing on the conditions and need for disposal of the land.
From an assessment of the problems of London Docklands and the Merseyside Dock Area, Michael Heseltine concluded that a new form of organisation was required (and the proposal was later extended to GEAR):

"... there is a need for a single minded determination not possible for the local authorities concerned with their much broader responsibilities, ... To meet the challenge before us I am proposing to take general powers to enable me to set up Urban Development Corporations".

(Heseltine, 1979b, p. 3).
CHAPTER 3

URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS

3.1 Origins of the Concept

The practical adoption of UDCs emerged from the review of inner city partnerships but the idea has a longer history. When, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the emphasis of British urban policy shifted from dispersal to new and expanding towns toward a more direct concern for the older urban areas, there was a corresponding belief in some places that the organisation structures which had proved so successful with the new towns could be equally applied to the inner city context. How widely held was this belief is unknown, though there was much talk of "new towns in town". Even if the structures could not be reproduced perhaps the ideas about planning and development could be; the transfer to the GEAR project of many staff from the abandoned Stonehouse NTDC has been seen by some as having contributed to a delay in GEAR coming to terms with the nature of the problems it faced.

The 1973 Travers Morgan proposals for London's Docklands had envisaged different forms of new towns in the area and suggested an implementing agency which would work within a broad plan accepted by central and local government, progressively completing development in various parts of the area before returning the development to the relevant local authority. Despite the lack of support for the Travers Morgan proposals, during the negotiations which led to establishment of the IDJC, the Conservative Secretary of State, Geoffrey Rippon, suggested to the GLC and the Dockland Boroughs
that "a special agency of the new town type", with its ability to transcend competitive local priorities and to link planning closely with implementation, should be responsible for the massive task of Docklands redevelopment. The local authorities disagreed:

"It was felt very strongly that local government should be, and was, big enough and competent enough to undertake this responsibility and that to hive it off and place into the hands of an ad hoc body which was not publicly accountable to the local electorates would be both derogatory and dangerous to the future of London local government".

(House of Commons Paper, No. 348, 1974-75, p. 4).

The DJC was established, with the Secretary of State agreeing that a statutory joint committee offered the best immediate prospect for redevelopment and accepting that, if the DJC did prove competent, there would be no question of a special agency created by legislation (Hansard, House of Commons, 30 November 1973, Col. 233). However, when the Environment Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee took evidence and reported on "Redevelopment of the London Docklands" in early 1975 (House of Commons Paper No. 348, 1974-75), a major part of its brief was consideration of the organisation structure. The report and minutes of evidence document the first serious attempt to assess the arguments for and against the application of an organisation developed for the new town context to that of inner area problems.

The questioning by the Environment Sub-Committee referred to an agency on the lines of a new town development corporation (NTDC) as an alternative to the DJC, although several variations were
suggested by witnesses involving different powers and degrees of local representation. None of the alternative ideas, however, were highly developed — for example, a "new town commission type of thing" was favoured by the former Conservative Secretary of State, Peter Walker (p. 113) — and the Sub-Committee reported with reference to the NTDC model rather than to any variation. The Sub-Committee found support for and opposition to a development corporation in Docklands equally widespread but concluded:

"...recognising the Joint Committee has been in existence for over a year and noting the strength of feeling against the idea of a Development Corporation ... the Joint Committee should continue as the responsible authority, at any rate for the present". (p. xiv).

"New towns in town" were again considered during preparation of the 1977 Policy for the Inner Cities White Paper but were rejected in favour of the partnership arrangements:

"...the local authorities were the natural agencies to tackle inner area problems; ...they were accountable to local communities involved, ...they were best equipped, both in practical experience and in local sensitivities to deal with the problems and to reflect the wishes of the local people. And of course the inner city areas have, unlike the greenfield, sparsely inhabited areas developed by most New Town Corporations, substantial existing populations".

(Shore, 1980, p. 2).

Still, a belief that inner city problems can be handled in a similar way to those of developing a new town has persisted despite a countervailing belief that they cannot:
"Planning policies for inner cities are inherently much more difficult to forge and operate than those which have been established for new towns".

(Cullingworth, 1976, p. 214).

A good example of "new towns in town" thinking and the emotions it involves was given in a statement made by Fred Roche, the then General Manager of the Milton Keynes Development Corporation, upon his refusal of an invitation to become managing director of the Docklands Development Organisation:

"Docklands, like Milton Keynes, is one of the most exciting and challenging urban building opportunities in the world, and could be an equally dramatic success....

What I find so sad, and indeed ironical, is that whilst this country had led the world in creating effective legislation in the form of the New Towns Act to carry out projects of this nature, a model which countries all over the world are now following, we in Britain are allowing our cities to deteriorate because, I suggest, we will not grasp the nettle and change legislation effectively to carry out projects such as Docklands".

(Quoted in Planning, 19 May 1978).

A second contributory strand of thinking to ideas about new organisations for urban regeneration has come from regional policy in the form of the development board and development agency concepts. The concept of development boards, as instruments for channelling public investment, was conceived in the context of national economic planning and such institutions as the National Enterprise Board and, despite the lack of success with such policy in the 1960s, the ideas have continued to hold a wide audience:
"Development powers cannot continue to remain with the private property industry because property and building companies establish their priorities on the basis of profitability not social necessity. Even if a private company were prepared to make a financial sacrifice it is impossible to imagine that private finance could be found for it. Thus public subsidies would be necessary in any case. It is, therefore, much more sensible to spend public money in a planned and accountable way by establishing public development corporations controlled from central government, but perhaps organised on a regional basis. Again, the new towns have experimented with public corporations and though they have not always been as democratic and enlightened as they should have been, the potential is obvious."

(Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975, p. 165).

The principles and origins of the development agency concept have been discussed by Gee (1981). A development agency differs from a development board in that it is designed as an instrument to channel private, rather than public, investment. Following the establishment of the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies in 1975, Merseyside County Council unsuccessfully floated the idea of a Merseyside Development Agency; a single authority, akin to the Scottish and Welsh examples, to deal with the economic problems of Merseyside by promoting industry, and by funding and coordinating land reclamation and development. Thinking on the role of development agencies in an urban context has been further stimulated by the experience of the SDA in GEAR.

In January and February 1979 the Environment Sub-Committee again examined the redevelopment of London Docklands and, again, paid particular attention to the question of organisation structure. Much of the evidence was a reiteration of that presented four years previously although there now appeared two points of reference for considering alternatives; the NTDCs and the "experimental developments
taking place in Glasgow" (House of Commons Paper, No. 99(i), 1978–79, p. 11).

Three months later, the government changed, Michael Heseltine conducted his review of inner city policy and, from an increasing variety of possible organisational alternatives, selected the new town strain as the basis for UDCs.

3.2 Powers and Constitution

(i) The Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980

The powers and specifications of a UDC are given in the enabling legislation, that is, Part XVI and Schedules 26, 27 and 28 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. The Explanatory and Financial Memorandum to the Bill summarised the provisions:

"Part XVI provides for the creation of new corporations to regenerate urban areas. The powers of such corporations are to be modelled upon those of the new town development corporations, and the provisions will allow them to be given powers of land assembly, planning, housing and industrial promotion. Each corporation will be established by order which will specify the powers granted and designate the area in which they are exercisable. These powers may include functions of housing authorities and development control functions of local planning authorities". (p. iv).

A UDC can, therefore, be vested with broad powers although "health, social services, education, emergency services, manpower services, refuse collection, etc should remain with the existing agencies" (DoE, 1979, p. 2).

A UDC may use these powers to:
"(a) acquire, hold, manage, reclaim and dispose of land and other property;
(b) carry out building and other operations;
(c) seek to ensure the provision of water, electricity, gas, sewerage and other services;
(d) carry on any business or undertaking for the purposes of the object; and
(e) generally do anything necessary or expedient for the purposes of the object or for purposes incidental to those purposes." (Section 136, 3).

the object being "to secure the regeneration of its area".

Unlike the normal exercising of local authority functions, where the authority lies primarily in elected councillors accountable to the local electorate, the operations of a UDC will be governed by a body directly accountable to the Secretary of State. Schedule 26 of the Act specifies that a UDC will consist of a chairman, a deputy chairman and up to eleven other members, and that the members will be appointed by the Secretary of State, although "in appointing members of the corporation, the Secretary of State shall have regard to the desirability of securing the services of people having special knowledge of the locality".

Within the generality of powers which may be conferred upon a UDC, those relating to land and planning deserve elaboration. All local authority owned land and any non-operational land owned by statutory undertakers in the urban development area (UDA) can be vested in the UDC through a Parliamentary Order promoted by the Secretary of State (and the appropriate Minister in the case of a statutory undertaker's land). Furthermore, a UDC can acquire through compulsory purchase order procedures: any other land in
the UDA, "land adjacent to the area which the corporation requires for purposes connected with the discharge of the corporation's functions in the area", and "land, whether or not in or adjacent to the area, which the corporation requires for the provision of services in connection with the discharge of the corporation's functions in the area." (Section 142).

A UDC can then dispose of this land in such a manner "as it considers expedient for securing the regeneration of the corporation's area or for purposes connected with the regeneration of the area" (Section 146, 1). The powers which can be granted to a UDC allow it to proceed in its operations without regard for existing statutory plans or, even, to become the local planning authority. Moreover, there are no requirements in the Act for public consultation during the preparation of any such plans by a UDC.

The crucial power in the enabling legislation, however, is the power for the Secretary of State to set up UDCs. Unlike the new towns legislation which allows for a public inquiry into the designation, there is no such provision for UDCs. All that is required for the Secretary of State to establish a UDC and designate a corresponding UDA is the affirmative resolution by both Houses of Parliament of a statutory instrument.

(ii) Designation Orders

Orders to designate the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) and their corresponding areas were laid before Parliament on 27 November 1980; the Glasgow suggestion had been withdrawn in
May. The two Orders further specified that each UDC would have the full complement of eleven members other than the chairman and deputy chairman.

The London Docklands Development Corporation (Area and Constitution) Order 1980 defined the proposed UDA (Figure 3.1). It is based on the DJC area but with certain amendments "to concentrate on areas with more immediate development prospects" (King, 1980, p. 3). Those parts of the DJC area within Greenwich and Lewisham and the section eastward of the proposed East London River Crossing in Newham were excluded. Additions to the DJC area were sites around Tower Bridge including the completed hotel/conference centre/marina development in St. Katharine’s Dock and the Hay’s Wharf site where a controversial public inquiry into a major office development proposal was about to get under way.

The Merseyside UDA, as defined in the Merseyside Development Corporation (Area and Constitution) Order 1980 consists of three separate areas totalling 865 acres of which 60% is owned by the MDHC (Figure 3.2). In the City of Liverpool, the UDA includes all the South Docks which are mostly disused, and, in Wirral, an area of "underused" dockland also owned by the MDHC. The third area, in Sefton District, comprises land adjoining the operational North Docks which is mainly vacant but also includes a council housing estate.

Apart from defining the UDAs and designating the UDCs, however, the two Orders give no indication of the particular powers which will be vested in each UDC, nor of the way in which each UDC will operate.
3.3 Indications of Intent

Michael Heseltine had launched the UDC proposals with the assertion that the then current policies paid insufficient heed to private sector needs:

"There must be a place for individual initiative and enterprise to get on the move, and for the voluntary sector to make its own effective contribution. Government can help create the right climate: by creating opportunities which others can take up, for example, by reclaiming land to encourage private development, improving the environment so that there is a demand for homes, encouraging the voluntary sector to build up a self reliant community".

(Heseltine, 1979b, p. 1).

The appointments of shadow chairmen to the UDCs made by Michael Heseltine in February 1980 fitted the bill. The head of the shadow LDDC was announced as Nigel Broackes, the Chairman of Trafalgar House Ltd, the massive transport, publishing and engineering corporation, and on Merseyside the post went to Leslie Young, Chairman of the agricultural and industrial group, J. Bibby and Sons, Chairman of the North West Industrial Development Board and a Director of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company.

With two prominent businessmen as shadow chairmen, Heseltine then appointed prominent local politicians as shadow deputy chairmen: the Labour MP for Bermondsey, Bob Mellish, in London, and the Leader of the Merseyside County Council, Sir Kenneth Thompson, on Merseyside.

All four appointees to the controversial posts made cautious and defensive statements, stressing the role local authorities
would retain in the area (quoted in Planning, 15 February 1980), and Nigel Broackes later delivered a major speech to the Royal Town Planning Institute (Broackes, 1980) in which he presented the proposed UDC as far less draconian than its powers suggested. The UDC would use compulsory purchase powers only as a last resort, would act as a landlord only when unavoidable, would operate as a developer as infrequently as possible, would review and supplement rather than replace existing plans, and would respect local interests. So why a UDC then and what would it do? Broackes argued that the local authorities had taken regeneration of London Docklands to the stage "where a single-minded, non-political authority can take over to cause the work to be carried out" (p. 5) and he saw the role of the UDC as providing some infrastructure and development on its own account, but mainly to create an atmosphere of long-term confidence to encourage wider investment in Docklands by industrialists, financial institutions, house builders and other developers.

Shadow Chief Executives were appointed in May: Reginald Ward in London and Ronald Turton on Merseyside. Both had previously worked in local government and in NTDCs. Three weeks later, however, Turton declined the post supposedly because "he was unhappy with the terms and conditions offered" (Planning, 23 May 1980). He was replaced shortly after by Basil Bean, the General Manager of Northampton Development Corporation. "I am obviously excited by the challenge of regenerating an area of immense potential right alongside the centre of the world's greatest city", said Reg Ward on his appointment, while Basil Bean was looking forward to "cooperating with the local and public authorities in
the area which are very much involved in the task" (Planning, 9 May and 13 June 1980). There still appeared to be little idea of the nature of the task and how the UDCs would operate.

In April, the DoE had commissioned Coopers and Lybrand Associates Ltd to carry out an economic potential study of London Docklands for the proposed UDC. The broad terms of reference included:

- "form a clear picture of economic and social life in Docklands, and of its current and potential role in the wider Metropolitan area;"
- analyse the chief factors that have held back development of Docklands in the past, what have been their underlying causes, and what must be done to minimise their influence in the future;
- specify the framework in which future development of Docklands should proceed; and
- help define realistic development objectives, both short and long term for the new Corporation".  

though the emphasis was on:

- "identify the general conditions necessary to instil new confidence in the development potential of the area, particularly on the part of the financial institutions;"
- undertake an imaginative review of the potential development opportunities, identifying the most promising possibilities and indicating where these might be located;
- identify the critical constraints to successful implementation of the most promising opportunities, and what must be done to overcome them".

(Coopers and Lybrand Associates Ltd, 1980a).

Similarly, Roger Tym and Partners Consortium were commissioned to
provide for the shadow Merseyside UDC:

"... a project framework, a programme of land acquisition and reclamation, and proposals for implementation, timing and costs. These proposals should be placed in a budget framework and include targets, and should be set against an appraisal of the current economic situation in Merseyside".


The London and Liverpool consultants reported in June and October 1980, respectively, although the reports were to remain internal until each UDC was officially designated.

As the enabling legislation was passed and the Designation Orders laid before Parliament, the Government issued further statements of its intentions for the operation of UDCs. The UDCs would be granted access to all the general powers available, although it was not intended that they should become local housing authorities or exercise building control functions and the UDCs would be vested with the powers of a local planning authority except for plan-making purposes. A special development order would be made giving, by virtue, planning permission to the UDC's approved proposals (DoE, 1980; King, 1980). With regard to the London UDC:

"The Government considers that so far as is possible, the Corporation should secure the regeneration of the Docklands UDA by engaging the funds and energies of the private sector. It is recognised that at the outset the Corporation itself may have to undertake commercial and industrial development on its own account; but it is expected to make sufficient progress early on for it not to have to undertake on its own account commercial and industrial development after the first three years of life".

(DoE, 1980, p. 3).
Despite their basis on NTDCs, the shape being taken by the shadow UDCs was somewhat different. Instead of teams of in-house professionals, the UDCs intended to rely heavily on the use of external skills, especially from the private sector though also from the local authorities. In the London case at least; "The principals of such firms who are directly involved will be encouraged to operate as members of the internal management team, and their key staff integrated into the organisation's unique partnership between a public agency and the private sector" (Ward, 1980). The staff numbers of the corporations will be kept as low as possible and will revolve around a few key positions. The LDDC will have an Executive Group of the Chief Executive and two others; a Chief Development Surveyor and a Chief Architect and Planner. The corresponding positions in the MDC are a Director of Development and a Commercial Director.

The text of the shadow LDDC's advertisement for the two senior staff positions provided a good indication of the style of operation it intended to adopt (though it should be noted that the affairs of the embryonic MDC have been conducted in a far less brazen and relatively low key manner):

"THE RENAISSANCE OF LONDON DOCKLANDS

... To realise this opportunity of Urban Renaissance on such an unprecedented scale - to implement schemes and projects of genuine vision - requires the skills of two exceptional professionals.

Chief Architect and Planner

A conceptual planner and designer of the very highest originality and reputation, capable of
harnessing all the best design practices in Europe into a working partnership to match this challenge.

Chief Development Surveyor

An implementor with an outstanding track record of achievement in the construction field coupled with an ability to mobilise the Property Industry to create this great 'New London'.

Alongside the Chief Executive Designate, these two appointments will form a team to direct and inspire a small and dynamic organisation of refined skills in a closely-knit partnership with the private sector."

(Sunday Times, 19 October 1980).

The Government and members and staff of the shadow UDCs have given repeated assurances that the UDCs will work closely with the local authorities though the specific working arrangements have not been specified. Members of the Corporations, besides the chairmen and deputy chairmen and the chief executive, have not yet been announced though are apparently the subject of intense speculation. Furthermore, it is still unclear how the Urban Programme will be administered in UDAs. Nevertheless, it is possible to represent the essential structure of the UDC approach to urban regeneration (Figure 3.3) for comparison with Figures 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5. It appears that UDCs will both complement and supplant, rather than replace the entirety of, organisation structures in their areas. It remains to be seen whether such a structure, with its adopted emphases, is likely to handle the problems and dilemma of urban regeneration (and so achieve the stated object of a UDC) better than the previous organisations.
FIGURE 3.3 ORGANISATION FOR URBAN REGENERATION 4: AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.
3.4 Efficiency, Effectiveness and Accountability

Many of the pronouncements on UDCs have been conducted in general terms about the relative merits of "efficiency" and "local democracy". "Efficiency", however, is a meaningless term unless one specifies about what one is being efficient (Fay, 1975) and the dangers of appealing to the much abused concept of "democracy" are illustrated by the way in which opposing sides in the argument both evoke the term or its antithesis:

- The Leader of Tower Hamlets Borough Council:

  "This is the closest to total dictatorship any British Government has ever come..."

  (London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1980a, p. 4).

- Michael Heseltine:

  "Democracy as a system of government I will defend against all comers".

  (Heseltine, 1979a, p. 27).

To determine the meaning of UDCs with respect to their object it is necessary to look at the objective results which are likely to stem from a "unique partnership with the private sector", from disenfranchising certain people with respect to certain functions of local government and from removing statutory rights to public consultation over planning.

Undoubtedly, a UDC will have the potential for a high degree of entrepreneurial efficiency; that is, the ability to bring land into use, through the concentration of its powers of land acquisition, planning, economic promotion and implementation if need be. A UDC,
it is suggested, will speed up the process of planning, land assembly and disposal, infrastructure provision and industrial and commercial development. Besides the fragmentation of powers in the previous organisation structures, although in London Docklands an attempt had been made to overcome this through the DDO, the UDC proposals were supported by the argument that possible commercial and industrial developments were being delayed or foresaken by competition between the local authorities. Competition for development was apparent in London Docklands, with Tower Hamlets at a distinct advantage because of its proximity to the City, but, with development so scarce, the DDC could not afford to risk any possibility in the interests of balanced development throughout its area. The pattern of new private developments in Docklands seemed to reflect market forces rather than regulatory planning. The difference in entrepreneurial efficiency which a UDC might achieve may have been overestimated. Nevertheless, the design of UDCs — their structure, powers, personnel and emphases — has been geared primarily toward commercial and industrial development.

The necessary qualification to a statement of entrepreneurial efficiency is consideration of how effective any secured developments will be in meeting the object of the UDC. The kinds of development which Reginald Ward hopes to attract initially to the London UDA include:

"... 'two or three large industrial developments', as well as 'marina hotel complexes with related industry, science parks and recreational facilities' ... There are some superb sites for office development too, close to the City and with views up and down the river to Tower Bridge and Greenwich".

The extent to which such developments would directly or indirectly contribute to relieving unemployment in the area is doubtful. Attracting large scale industrial developments will probably take the form experienced by the DJC where establishment of the News International newspaper printing works in Tower Hamlets, for example, is the result of a move out of the City by both the plant and its employment. A second "Docklands success", the move of the Billingsgate Fish Market to the Isle of Dogs, is similarly limited in its impact on the problems of Docklands.

The DJC had in 1978 expressed grave reservations about the value of office developments in Docklands:

"The future economy of East London cannot be left to be decided by the current trends of declining industry and growth in office based services. Any expectation that the latter will compensate for the former must be very uncertain".

(DJC, 1976, p. 16).

The employment requirements of office developments, given realisation of the demand for office space which the current speculative boom in London assumes, do not match the skill characteristics of the unemployed in Docklands. Likewise, the service developments which Ward envisages are not those which are most desperately needed by, let alone accessible to, the established people of Docklands and will therefore not help redress the difficulties in the provision of services which public expenditure cuts have caused.

Policies of land development, if they are to be effective in tackling urban regeneration, must be related to social and employment
objectives as well as to economic development. To achieve this relation, the operations of the 'single-minded' land development body must be linked to those of authorities with broader concerns and must take heed of the needs of the people in the area. It is this aspect which appears to have been seriously neglected in the case of UDCs.

The UDCs will be accountable to the Secretary of State, not to the elected representatives of the area in which the UDC will operate. The inner city partnerships represented a recognition of the need for direct central government involvement but also of the importance of local authorities in urban regeneration. To draw the lines of accountability exclusively to central government is to make the tenuous assumption that the priorities of central and local government coincide. The assurances that the UDCs will consult and work closely with local authorities and the public have deservedly attracted scepticism. Any local authority members appointed to the UDC boards would be there as directors of the UDC rather than as representatives of their authorities. In September 1980 Reg Ward told the Docklands Forum that he would like to see its retention — as a "resource distribution centre" — and he later outlined the shadow LDDC's "enlightened" proposals for public consultation:

"The LDDC will aim to involve community groups and local authorities in early discussions on new proposals for the area, rather than rely on the formal consultation process. 'I find that a far more satisfactory way of working than having a series of set pieces whereby one produces a document or a set of plans, which obviously constrain the outcome in many ways'."

Such informal relations between a UDC and local authorities and the public amount to possible information channels not to any power which accountability necessarily entails.

A second point regarding the limited accountability of UDCs concerns the limitations of area approaches to urban regeneration. In both London Docklands and on Merseyside, it had been felt necessary, and an opportunity, to consider regeneration of the extensive dock areas with respect to the broader urban area. Although the docks in Liverpool have never been regarded as an integral part of the city, being walled off and largely inaccessible, one of the main attractions of their potential redevelopment has been the possibility of thereby relieving the problems of adjacent urban areas. A corresponding belief was espoused in the London Docklands Strategic Plan:

"... Docklands cannot in any respect be treated as an island unto itself. The development must blend into the surrounding urban areas physically, socially and economically ..."


Where the DJC and Liverpool Inner City Partnership structures allowed policies to be formulated with consideration of the wider urban context, the UDC structure makes no provision.

In all, the UDC approach to urban regeneration appears to show a complete unawareness of the nature of the task as revealed by the experiences in Liverpool, London Docklands and the East End of Glasgow. UDCs are focussed on just one strand of the requirements of urban regeneration, fail to make the distinction
between efficiency and effectiveness within this strand, and, further, ignore the dilemma of urban regeneration. UDCs are directed at local economic development with consideration of neither the employment implications nor the other problems of urban deprivation. To believe that a UDC can "secure the regeneration of its area" is to make unrealistic assumptions about the relationship between economic development and employment development, about the ability of the private sector to compensate for inadequate public sector developments and services and, generally, to confuse the making of quick decisions with the identification of solutions.

The strength of UDCs lies in their potential to relate closely with the private sector and, with respect to extensive derelict land, to link acquisition, assembly, planning, promotion and development. Both these aspects of urban regeneration strategy had been less developed in previous approaches. Incorporated in UDCs, however, these advantages look likely to be outweighed by the disadvantages. UDCs, though, are only one variant from the thinking on organisations for urban regeneration and might not some other alternative allow the marrying of the advantages of a UDC with the other requirements of urban regeneration?

3.5 The Best Alternative?

In face of the UDC proposal, several alternative institutions have been suggested; devised particularly with respect to the London Docklands context. The arguments for an "Industrial Development Board" which had been put forward by the trade unions and JDAG for several years were revived (JDAG, 1979b; TGWU, 1980;
TTJG, 1980). In this recognition of weaknesses in the DJC structure, it was suggested that a Board be set up with special powers to buy land and promote and undertake development. The Board would comprise representatives of employers, trade unions, statutory undertakers and community interests and "would work within the framework set by the local planning authorities ... Its task would be to encourage industrial investment from both public and private sectors" (TGWU, 1980, p. 2). This approach, it was argued, would allow "both the comprehensive planning of public and private investment and the continuing sensitivity of development to local needs and circumstances" (TUC, 1980, p. 9).

Peter Shore (1980) has suggested that a UDC should only be established with the agreement of the principal local authorities in the area — thereby, giving his tacit support to the Merseyside UDC. Otherwise, "an alternative that deserves consideration is and 'Industrial and Commercial Development Agency'" (1980, p. 25). He was no more specific than to say that such an agency would have funds and powers of its own but would act within an established plan and would be responsible to an existing inner city partnership committee.

In a contribution to the debates on an electoral manifesto for the London Labour Party in the forthcoming local government elections, a group of Fabians have proposed establishment of a "London Development Agency" (Hall, 1980). The Agency would be run by a Board drawn from the GLC and London Boroughs and would enter into partnerships with boroughs and private agencies to develop individual sites. The main object of the Agency would be to deal with the problems of wasteland in the city:
"Here a body is needed that can operate with the flexibility, resources and time span of a New Town Development Corporation, but with local project committees, and implementing planning policies that have already been approved."

(Hall, 1980, p. 5).

Coupled with a "London Enterprise Board", the group saw the two new agencies as capable of playing the role of the SDA and WDA. Furthermore, for the particular problems of extreme dereliction in Docklands, it was suggested "the local authorities could work through local development agencies, with delegated powers and resources, under the umbrella of the London Development Agency" (Hall, 1980, p. 7). The Greater London Regional Council of the Labour Party (1980) subsequently adopted the recommendation for a "Greater London Enterprise Board" with a Docklands division in its draft manifesto for the GLC elections (GLRCLP, 1980, p. 33).

The above suggestions all seem to offer, on first glance at least, practical and superior alternatives to UDCs. The most obvious and immediate alternative to a UDC, however, is GEAR. After all, the Government did make and then withdraw a proposal to replace GEAR with a UDC.

When the UDC proposals were announced in September 1979, although GEAR was not mentioned, the intended legislation applied to Scotland and the local authority participants anticipated application of the UDC proposal to GEAR. The SDD was showing an interest in the proposal and both Glasgow District Council and Strathclyde Regional Council began studying the implications. So, the local authorities were prepared when Malcolm Rifkind, the
responsible Scottish Office Minister, proposed to them at a meeting on 17 December that a UDC replace GEAR.

GEAR at that stage was passing through a hiatus as unemployment in the area increased, the effects of housing cuts began to appear and general commitment to the project was ebbing. The main concern of the 17 December meeting was the slow progress being made by GEAR. The Minister suggested that the slow progress was due to the administrative arrangements; specifically, the situation in which the Governing Committee had responsibility but no executive powers — a view shared by the SDA. From this analysis, Malcolm Rifkind suggested a UDC would be better. The local authorities, however, argued that delays were due to spending cuts and opposed the UDC suggestion. In face of this opposition, Rifkind proposed an alternative to establishing a UDC in which the Governing Committee would be equipped with executive powers and its own budget and the administration would be streamlined. Meanwhile, the Scottish Office would work up the UDC proposal in greater detail.

The response of the GEAR partners was to institute two changes in the administrative arrangements. First, a Management Group was established as a third tier in the coordination machinery. The Management Group was delegated some authority from the Consultative Group of officials and given the task of day-to-day management, meeting monthly beginning on 16 April 1980 whereas the Consultative Group met only quarterly. Second, the partners agreed to give the SDA some power to influence their budgets through the procedure of declaring priorities and preparing annual programmes; effectively
formalising what had been happening anyway. These two minor changes seem to have placated the Minister who, at the Governing Committee meeting on 29 May 1980:

"... recalled that since the last meeting there had been discussion of the possibility of replacing the GEAR machinery with an UDC but ... the Government was prepared not to pursue the proposal because of the objections of the Regional and District Councils and because, given the stage the project had already reached, it might prejudice the progress which was being made under the existing arrangements".

(Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the GEAR Governing Committee, 29 May 1980).

If such arguments were applied to the London Docklands UDC proposal with its vociferous opposition from local authorities and longer history of the DJC, that proposal would presumably be rejected in favour of a structure involving a development agency operating with the local authorities. That is, unless the real reason for withdrawal of the UDC for GEAR proposal was, as many suggest, the fact that Michael Heseltine's political clout does not extend to Scotland. Whatever the reason, the example of GEAR provides one more model which should have been considered by the Government as a favourable alternative to UDCs. It may be argued that the lead institutions for such a structure do not exist outside Scotland and Wales, but, if the Government was prepared to legislate for UDCs, surely it could legislate for less powerful bodies.

The evidence on the likely operations of UDCS and on possible alternatives raises doubts, but, still clinging to the possibility that UDC's are designed in the interests of their areas, it is necessary to look further for their justification. How has the Government supported the proposal since its inception?
CHAPTER 4
JUSTIFYING URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS

4.1 The Advent of Urban Development Corporations

The first public appearance of the UDC proposals was in the press statement on inner city policy presented by Michael Heseltine on 14 September 1979 (Heseltine, 1979b). The statement revealed that UDCs would be modelled on the NTDCs, would be set up in the London Docklands and in the "Merseyside Dock Area", and that enabling legislation would be taken in the coming Parliamentary session. The review of inner cities policy had been conducted internally within the DoE and, beyond its existence, little was known of either the direction the review was taking or of the government's intentions. By early September, the Financial Times (3rd September 1979) knew only enough to report that it was understood Heseltine had approached the Cabinet with proposals to change the status of the seven inner city partnership areas into New Town-style authorities. A week before the press statement, at a conference attended by Heseltine, the managing director of the Docklands Development Organisation (a body which a UDC would replace) was merrily detailing the DDO's operational programme for the coming years (Mawer, 1979).

Reaction to the press statement was immediate. Simultaneously, press releases opposing the proposals were issued by the leaders of the Tower Hamlets and Southwark Councils who had, together with the other three Dockland Borough leaders, been privately notified by Heseltine of his intentions. The Conservative GLC leader, Horace Cutler, was concerned lest the new agency interfere with the GLC's
strategic planning role and, in Liverpool: "Reaction....was bitter and swift. Sir Kenneth Thompson, Conservative Chairman of the Merseyside County Council, speaking also on behalf of the Labour and Liberal groups expressed 'surprise and shock'." (Observer, 16th September 1979).

Under the British system of government (Birch, 1980, p. 183), "...it is the normal practice of government departments to consult representatives of affected interests before taking decisions". In this case, it seems such a principle of responsible government was not followed. There had been no public debate on the specific issues and possible solutions, no provision for consultation, no committee of inquiry; the investigations of the Environment Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee in 1975 and 1979 examined only Docklands and alternative organisations only in general terms. The policy decision appears to have been taken on the basis of a limited consideration of the arguments. In the words of the leader of the Tower Hamlets Borough Council:

"There was no consultation. The Government took office and announced the UDC. When the borough leaders were called up, we asked why they hadn't even bothered to talk to us about it as there were elements which could have been refined in the existing machinery, and the Minister said that 'I just knew you would disagree with me. I knew you wouldn't want what I want and so I am telling you this is not up for argument, this is what you are going to do'."

(Beasley, 1980, p. 28).

Still, UDCs at this stage were no more than proposals, albeit firm proposals. Before a UDC could be established, the enabling legislation had to be justified through the procedures of
parliamentary passage and a further Designation Order would have to be affirmed by both Houses. Clearly, a parliamentary majority can dictate the outcome but parliament is supposedly a place for the consideration of legislation, for debate and amendment. So, on what grounds, if any, did the Government dismiss the opposition to UDCs and so allow the proposals to emerge barely scathed from the parliamentary process?

4.2 Mounting Opposition

A "Consultation Paper on UDCs" (DoE, 1979) followed and elaborated the press statement. Strangely, the opportunity for consultation came after the policy decision, yet the paper did purport to "...set out in more detail the issues involved so that it can form a basis for discussion with those affected" (DoE, 1979, p. 1). The tone of the paper, however, suggested a purpose not to question UDCs but rather to consider their implementation:

"The Department of the Environment intends to engage in discussions at official level with the local authorities concerned, before the introduction of legislation in the House. In particular, these discussions will need to cover the question of handling Urban Programme projects in areas to be designated for UDCs".

(DoE, 1979, p. 6).

Doubts about the genuineness of the desire for consultation were reinforced by the limited time available before the enabling legislation was introduced into Parliament, as a Part of the Local Government, Planning and Land B.71, on 3rd December 1979. Considering the time involved in preparation of a Bill — proposing
the Bill in Cabinet, drafting, Cabinet approval of the draft Bill — ,
the UDC provisions must have been written into the Bill, if not
before, then shortly after issue of the consultation paper. However,
when the Government introduced the Bill into the Lords, it was
greeted by a storm of protest as it was considered a major piece of
legislation which should first be introduced into the Commons. The
Bill was hastily withdrawn and not reintroduced until late January;
a fortuitous turn of events for those opposed to the UDC proposals,
allowing them longer to prepare their case before the parliamentary
passage began.

It had soon become clear to opponents that the Consultation
Paper was not a potentially fruitful avenue for challenging the
proposals and opposition was geared toward resisting UDCs in
parliament * . Moreover, the Consultation Paper had revealed that
there would be no public inquiry, as there is with new towns,
associated with the laying of a designation order before parliament.

The Dockland Borough Councils had, within two weeks of the
press statement, produced a report entitled Local Democracy Works.
A Partnership in London Docklands: The Case Against a New Town
(Dockland Borough Councils, 1979). The report attacked the principles
behind UDCs, disputed the need for a UDC in Docklands and argued
that, instead of the supposed benefits, a UDC would be detrimental
to the people in the area — the logic adopted by most of the

* It is not known what direct response the Consultation Paper
elicited. A request to the DoE for details drew the evasive
reply: "...there was no officially published response..."
(Correspondence from DoE, 28th August 1980).
opponents. After failing to impress their views upon Heseltine, the borough councils were involved in arranging a series of local meetings to explain to people the implications of a UDC, took their case to the London Boroughs Association and then directed their opposition, through local M.P.'s and the Opposition Spokesman on the Environment, Roy Hattersley, to the Parliamentary Labour Party. After a meeting between the Borough leaders and Roy Hattersley on 18th October, the Labour Party stated:

"Tory plans to set up an Urban Development Corporation to run London and Liverpool Docklands will be resisted by the Labour Party at every level".


The Docklands Forum passed a resolution against the UDC which was put to the DJC who condemned the lack of consultation but preferred to meet Heseltine before issuing a statement. A delegation of six DJC members went to see the Minister and he made it clear he would not change his mind. The Chairman of the Forum wrote to Heseltine in February requesting that he receive a deputation from the Forum so that the voluntary sector and local organisations could put their views. Heseltine declined them the opportunity: "I have to say ... a meeting would not change my views" (Correspondence from Heseltine to Chairman of the Docklands Forum, 2nd May 1980).

JDAG had produced by 18th September a "Draft Response to Proposals for an Urban Development Corporation for Docklands" (JDAG, 1979a), followed by a press statement of their opposition and publication of a report, Docklands in Danger (JDAG, 1979b).
A meeting was convened by JDAG on 13th November to consider possible joint action with other groups and with the borough councils. The meeting resolved that the:

"Main task is to build a local campaign since not many organisations know the arguments for and against. A local base should be built, borough by borough, using leaflets, posters, petitions and public meetings. Speakers should go to Trades Councils and other groups".

(JDAG, 1979c).

Accordingly, JDAG continued to issue press statements and leaflets, to publicise their case, to try and coordinate the opposition in the hope that it would be supported by the development of a series of local campaigns.

The union movement has had a long-standing active interest in the redevelopment of London's docklands; a TGWU National Executive member sat on the DJC and an extensive exhibition, "London's Docks and Docklands" was mounted by the TUC in September 1980. Union opposition to UDCs was channelled through a series of papers, statements and resolutions from local trades councils and the TGWU to the TUC and the Labour Party organisation. The Greater London Regional Council of the Labour Party held a special conference on UDCs in February 1980 and another, in association with the South East Region TUC in May. The May meeting ended with the agreement of a platform for a campaign against UDCs ranging from action by local trade union branches and trades councils to that of the Labour Party (GLR Labour Party/SE Region TUC, 1980).

The voluntary sector, heavily dependent on Urban Programme funds and particularly concerned with participation and consultation, was another early opponent of UDCs. The Southwark Council for
Voluntary Service and the Newham Voluntary Agencies Council both produced papers opposing a London UDC, the latter organised a petition throughout the Borough and requested the local M.P. take a stand on the issue in Parliament. On the other hand, the General-Secretary of the London Voluntary Service Council gave the proposal his guarded support (Lomas, 1979).

A Docklands UDC was also supported by the British Property Federation (Estates Times, 11 April 1980, p. 4), "warmly welcomed" by the Chairman of Greater London Conservative M.P.'s and, favoured with qualifications, by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI, 1979).

The professional body of the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) and the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) showed great interest in the proposals with the arrangement of conferences on UDCs and the preparation of responses to the Bill with which to lobby Parliament. The TCPA were generally opposed to the provisions in the Bill, although, since 1966, it has advocated some form of development agency for the inner cities. The RTPI appeared divided on the issue, with professional interests often seeming dominant over consideration of public interests in its debates.

Substantial opposition to UDCs, then, had been generated to encounter the proposed legislation, but mainly in London Docklands. On Merseyside, the proposed UDC had proved a "non issue" with only the Merseyside County Council voicing discontent. Any opposition to the Bill was forestalled by the Government, however, when the leader of the County Council, Sir Kenneth Thompson, accepted Michael Heseltine's invitation to become shadow deputy chairman
of the Merseyside UDC in February. Similarly, the appointment of Bob Mellish to the corresponding position in London can be seen as an attempt to drive a wedge into a consolidated front of Labour Party opposition. Both politicians defended their apparent betrayal in similar ways:

Bob Mellish - "The objections of the local authorities can be overcome by ensuring that they are represented on the Committee".

Sir Kenneth Thompson - "I believe the County Council could carry out the necessary work ... but faced with the inevitability of the UDC's establishment we must cooperate and work with it".

(Quoted in Planning, 15 February 1980).

Such statements, while partly self-fulfilling, reflect early doubts in the ability of the opposition to bear upon the Government's committed proposals.

4.3 Parliamentary Passage

The heavily revised Bill, the Local Government, Planning and Land (No. 2) Bill, was reintroduced into the House of Commons on 24 January 1980. Since its ill-fated introduction into the Lords, Cabinet objections to the amount of parliamentary time which the Bill would have required had apparently caused the Bill to go to Cabinet twice, further delaying its introduction. Conservative Whips in Commons, however, now seemed confident that the danger of revolt among backbenchers had receded (Financial Times, January 1980, p. 3). The new Bill contained 97 less sections but the UDC provisions had survived the redrafting intact.
The enabling legislation for UDCs was being sought within a Bill which also proposed tighter central government control over local government rating and capital spending programmes, reduced powers for county planning authorities and for strategic planning, the introduction of charges for planning applications and appeals, the repeal of the Community Land Act (1975) and, after the March 1980 Budget announcement, provisions for the establishment of Enterprise Zones. Passage of the UDC sections was, therefore, set in a context of many other issues and, from the outset, consideration of UDCs was dependent upon competition with those other issues within the limits of parliamentary time allocated to the Bill. The first point made by the Opposition during the Second Reading Debate was to argue that the Bill was less a coherent piece of legislation than a number of disparate proposals each justifying a Bill of its own, and the collection of so many issues together made it very difficult to debate (Roy Hattersley, Hansard, 5 February 1980, Col. 258).

The passage of a Bill through Parliament involves a lengthy procedure in each House of a First Reading, Second Reading, Committee Stage, Report Stage and Third Reading. If this procedure is not completed by the end of the Parliamentary Session, then the Bill is "lost". The First Reading of a Bill involves no debate but is simply the occasion on which the Bill is formally introduced. M.P.s then have an opportunity to study the terms of the Bill before the "debating proper" begins. In the case of UDCs, M.P.s also had the opportunity to consider two petitions, lodged on behalf of the Boroughs of Southwark and Tower Hamlets, which condensed the Boroughs' arguments against the proposals (Hansard, 25 January 1980, Cols. 795-96).
In the Second Reading Debate the main principles of a Bill are stated, attacked and defended. Although a Bill is rarely defeated on the Second Reading, the arguments aired will supposedly have some bearing on the subsequent deliberations during the Committee stage. The Second Reading Debates in both the Commons and Lords revealed no new justification for UDCs and the Parliamentary majority* carried the Bill through on principle. From this point in each House, the principles of the UDC provisions were secure, having been passed not necessarily on their own merits but on those of the legislation as a whole. Lord Bellwin summing up the Second Reading Debate in the Lords:

"If improvements are proposed that do not breach the underlying philosophies, we shall welcome them. If amendments are put forward to defeat the principles, we shall resist them".

(Hansard, 5 August 1980, Col. 1472).

Indeed, amendments affecting fundamental principles of the Bill are out of order during the Committee stage.

After the Second Reading in the Commons, the Bill passes to one of the Standing Committees, in which membership reflects the party proportions in Parliament, for consideration in detail. Each clause is put separately to the Committee and proposed amendments are accepted, rejected or withdrawn with or without debate. The Committee Stage does, however, allow the possibility of substantial

*The hereditary principle ensures a large and permanent Conservative majority in the House of Lords (Birch, 1980, p. 53).
change in legislation. Because of the fewer members involved and
the detailed nature of the work, party alignments are weakened
and the Government can be defeated on points with the cumulative
effect being to alter the nature of parts of a Bill. Although
proposed amendments are put by M.P.s, they are usually the result
of lobbying from outside interests. It was through this channel
that the opposition to UDCs was directed at the legislative process
and it is widely acknowledged that the real battles on UDCs took
place during the Committee Stages; battles involving strategies,
tactics and logistics.

In the Commons Committee, the primary concern of opponents
to UDCs was to amend the Bill to secure a public inquiry before
designation of a UDC. The Government, however, was strongly opposed
to writing in any form of consultation or safeguard prior to making
a Designation Order, arguing that any consultation would cause delay.
Furthermore, the Government suggested that because any Designation
Order would be "hybrid", there would have to be a hearing before
a Select Committee of the House of Lords. None of the amendments
proposing consultation procedures were accepted. Other amendments,
aimed at reducing the specific powers of a UDC and at inserting

*Hybridity in a Bill or in a Statutory Instrument such as a
Designation Order refers to the situation in which the legis­
lation appears to affect the private rights of particular
individuals or corporate bodies. If a Bill is declared hybrid
it is treated like a Private Bill with the opportunity of the
affected parties to lay petitions against the Bill which are
then referred to a Select Committee. In the case of a hybrid
Designation Order, petitions are invited and are considered by
the Hybrid Instruments Committee of the House of Lords which
may then refer the Order and petitions to a further inquiry
before a Select Committee of the Lords.
safeguards on its operations, were similarly unsuccessful. The Minutes of Proceedings on the Committee Stage (House of Commons Paper, No. 619, 1979/80) do not make happy reading for those opposed to UDCs; clause after clause remained unaltered, apart from technical amendments to the drafting rather than to the substance of the legislation.

The Bill continued its passage through the Commons — the Report Stage in which the Bill as amended by Committee is debated by Parliament and the formality of the Third Reading — and was sent to the Lords in July. After the Second Reading in the Lords the Bill was passed to a Committee of the Whole House. Despite the Conservative majority in the Lords, the nature of the membership is less closely tied to political parties and the Lords Committee Stage does have the potential to make amendments which were prevented in the Commons by the Government/Opposition lines. There is an air of unpredictability about the fortunes of Bills in the Lords and, as the Bill entered the Lords Committee Stage, Planning reported that no one knew what would happen.

The focus of attention in the Bill, however, was not on the UDC provisions but on the block grant proposals for the funding of local government against which all the local authority associations were ranged. It was then the beginning of October and, with the end of the Parliamentary Session in November looming, the pressure of time was beginning to tell. The Government had proposed numerous technical amendments to the Bill but decided not to press many others because of lack of time. The prospect of intensive lobbying and obstructionist amendments on both the block grant and
UDC issues posed a real threat to the entire Bill and the Government had, somehow, to limit the demands being made for consideration. Discussion of UDCs was apparently sacrificed for debate on the block grant proposals, in both the Lords and Commons Committee Stages, in a deal between the Government and Opposition whereby, if time was made available to debate the block grant proposals, then the UDC sections would be let through with the minimum of bother.*

Nevertheless, the Lords Committee Stage proved the only stage in which any change was made to the UDC provisions. Two amendments were made; first, a clause was inserted which required a UDC, on establishment, to write a Code of Consultation with the local authorities. Unlike during the Commons Committee, the Boroughs had not pressed for greater consultation before establishment of a UDC. Considering the response to these proposals in the Commons, the Boroughs considered that any concession they could realistically expect would be inadequate but could be enough for the Hybrid Instruments Committee, when it came to examine the Designation Orders, to decide that there was no need for a further hearing (London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1980c). The minor concession granted on consultation was unlikely to preclude hearings on the Orders.

The second amendment secured was a limitation on the areas in England and Wales in which the Secretary of State could establish a UDC to Metropolitan Districts and Inner London Boroughs.

*Personal interview with P. Beasley, Leader of Tower Hamlets Borough Council, 6 February 1981.
Throughout the debates on the Bill, concern had been expressed at the broad powers the enabling legislation would give the Secretary of State to set up a UDC anywhere in Britain. Michael Heseltine had affirmed that his intentions were limited to London Docklands and the Merseyside Dock Area, but many wondered why, if this was the case, had he not proposed separate Bills such as an Urban Development Corporation (London Docklands) Bill. Suggestions were made that a UDC could be used to impose a solution to the Third London Airport controversy, that uncooperative local authorities could be brought into line by a UDC, and so forth. The Conservative-controlled Association of County Councils was especially concerned, and it appears that this amendment was a concession to the shire counties who had substantial support in the Lords, as well as on the Conservative back benches in the Commons, and could well have obstructed passage of the Bill. Neither of the two amendments significantly changed the nature of the UDC proposals.

This second amendment and the inclusion of UDC legislation in a wider Bill, however, nearly back-fired on the Government when it led to an unanticipated problem which for a time threatened the entire Bill. In the Lords debate following the Committee Stage it was suggested that, because of the limited areas to which the UDC provisions now applied, the entire Bill was hybrid. If the Bill had then been declared hybrid, the more complicated procedures required would almost certainly have prevented completion of the legislative process before the end of the Parliamentary Session. The Bill, however, survived the debate; the Lords determining that only the UDC Designation Orders need be declared hybrid. All
amendments passed in the Lords were approved on reference back to
the Commons and the Royal Assent was given to the Local Government,
Planning and Land Act 1980 on 13 November, just a fortnight before
the end of the Session. It remained to be seen whether the procedures
surrounding the Designation Orders could and would redress the
failure to give UDCs any kind of adequate hearing.

4.4 Hybrid Designation Orders

The Designation Orders setting out the areas and constitutions
of the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) and the
Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) were laid before Parliament
on 27 November 1980 and declared hybrid by the Chairman of Committees
of the House of Lords on 2 December. Accordingly, there was then a
statutory period of fourteen days in which petitions against the
Orders could be lodged.

A petition has a formal structure stating the interests of the
petitioner, the part(s) of the Order with which the petitioner is
concerned, the grounds for objection and a request that the Lords
will not affirm the Order. The contents of an effective petition are
further defined by the criteria with which the Hybrid Instruments
Committee decides whether to refer the Order and petitions to a
Select Committee hearing. To do so, the Hybrid Instruments
Committee needs to determine that:-

1. the petitioners have a "locus standi"; that is, a
   right to make representations;
2. the petitioners have substantial grounds for complaint;
3. the matters complained of have not been so dealt with
   that no further inquiry is necessary; and
4. the petitioners have not failed to avail themselves of other opportunities to deal with the matters complained of.

Although the petitioner needs "substantial grounds for complaint", in the case of UDCs, the petitions were to be lodged against the Orders and not against the enabling legislation. Petitioners could not, therefore, object to UDCs in principle but needed to show reasons why the particular UDC should not be set up in the area and how the powers and privileges of the UDC would be prejudicial to the interests of the petitioner.

The opponents of the UDC proposals had been aware of the probable opportunity to petition for some months and the focus of the campaign was shifted to setting out their arguments in the petition form. The opportunity to, and method of, petitioning Parliament were publicised throughout London Docklands, notably by JDAG which also assisted in the preparation of several petitions. By 16 December, fourteen petitions had been lodged against the LDDC Order and one against the Merseyside Order by a variety of opponents representing widespread interests (Listed in Appendix B). The LDDC Order was petitioned by community groups, trades councils, tenants associations, a chamber of commerce, the Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets Borough Councils (the areas of Greenwich and Lewisham having been excluded from the proposed Urban Development Area), the GLC and, interestingly, by five companies involved in development projects in the area. The single petition against the MDC Order was lodged by the National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) who also petitioned against the LDDC Order.
The Hybrid Instruments Committee completed its consideration of the Orders and petitions on 20 January 1981, after the Christmas Recess. With regard to the LDDC Order:

"The Committee are of the opinion that the petitions disclose substantial grounds of complaint and that there has been no opportunity of having the matters complained of properly inquired into.

The Committee are, therefore, of the opinion that there ought to be a further enquiry by a Select Committee. The substantial grounds of complaint disclosed in these petitions challenge the suitability of the area specified in the Order for designation as an urban development area".


The Committee, on the other hand, decided that there should be no further inquiry into the MDC Order; the one petition against that Order having been withdrawn since the Committee began its consideration. The substance of the NALGO petition concerned the possibility of redundancies among its members due to the change in administration. However, after Government assurances that this would not be the case, NALGO withdrew its petitions against both the Merseyside and London Docklands Orders; thus enabling the MDC Order to proceed unhindered toward the affirmative resolution by both Houses on 1 April.

The procedures for petitioning and determining whether or not to hold a further inquiry appear quite reasonable until one considers the case of the Rimrose Road council housing estate in the northern section of the Merseyside Urban Development Area which had been included "for the provision of port-related industry" (King, 1980, p. 3). The prospect of demolition and rehousing by Sefton District Council which had long hung over this isolated and
neglected estate had been successfully resisted for years by the organisation of many of the seven hundred residents on the grounds that the housing was sound, the problem was a lack of services and essential maintenance, and, if demolition was to be undertaken, then the residents should be rehoused as a community.

The residents only discovered that the estate lay within the bounds of the proposed UDC when some tenants' inquiries to the Council about purchasing their houses were rebuffed. Repeated requests for an explanation of this refusal finally revealed that the reason was the consideration of the proposal for a UDC. The Residents Association of the Rimrose Road Estate were later passed confidential (unsigned) correspondence from the Shadow MDC to Sefton Council intimating the intention of the former to demolish the estate. However, when the Secretary of the Residents Association was interviewed on 10 February 1981, he was unaware that the residents could have petitioned against the MDC Designation Order. Had they been informed, the petition they would have lodged would possibly have taken the Order to a Select Committee hearing, as in the London Docklands case.

The hearings into the LDDC Order and petitions began on 10 February*. The hearings allow for the Select Committee, which

*Due to the timing of this research, details of the petitions and the course of the hearings have not been studied closely. Some petitions, however, were sighted before the inquiry and they indicated highly detailed arguments repudiating the asserted benefits of a UDC and setting out how a UDC would be detrimental with respect to particular projects, services, plans, groups of people and areas.
is constituted on non-party lines, to cross-examine both the petitioners and the proponent of the Order:

"At the Enquiry it will be for the Government to explain, through lawyers, how taking powers away from Borough Councils to a non-elected body appointed by the Secretary of State, Michael Heseltine, will speed up redevelopment..."


The Secretary of State had an air of confidence before the hearings:

"He does not desire to represent that any of the Petitioners should be denied a locus standi on their Petitions and would be content to deal with any grounds of complaint alleged in the Petitions ... ".

("Representations of the Secretary of State to the Hybrid Instruments Committee", 23 December 1980, p. 6).

but this confidence must have subsided somewhat when, at the beginning of April, the hearings were entering their seventh week after having been originally scheduled for only two weeks.

4.5 The Defence of Urban Development Corporations

The handling by the Government of the controversy over UDCs since their proposal in September 1979 revealed no further attempt to justify the initiative but a series of efforts to prevent the issue being discussed. Throughout, the opponents were not met with reason but were confronted with obstructions to argument.

The "Consultation Paper" had been less a vehicle for discussion than a statement of intent; the Secretary of State stated his unwillingness to discuss the matter. Moreover, the
exact nature of the intent was far from clear and only took shape as the shadow UDCs were set up. It was not until after the enabling legislation had been passed that the precise boundaries of the Urban Development Areas were given. The boundaries given for the Merseyside UDC in the Consultation Paper had been "very provisional" and, in London, for a period of six months, the Boroughs of Greenwich and Lewisham were unsure whether they would be affected by the proposal or not. The uncertainty and speed of development of the proposal served to inhibit effective organised opposition. Nevertheless, the opponents in London Docklands managed to mount substantial campaigns and redirect the focus as the changing circumstances of the proposal demanded — but to little avail. On Merseyside, a Docklands Action Group has only been formed after the official establishment of the UDC.

The enabling legislation for UDCs was enacted on only the barest consideration of their principles, powers and specifications. Included in a major Bill with several other controversial issues, debate and examination of the UDC provisions was severely constrained by the demands for attention made by the other issues within the expedients of parliamentary time. The two changes made to the UDC proposals during the legislative process amounted to a minor concession and a largely irrelevant limitation on the extent to which the proposals could apply rather than to careful consideration of the areas in question and the possible alternative organisation arrangements. The Government showed no concern for, and made no attempt to redress, these limitations.
Instead of attempting to justify the UDC initiative, the Government has devoted its efforts to defending the proposals by refusing to enter into argument. The hearings on the LDDC Designation Order appear to be the first crack in the armour. When the UDC proposal is given a real opportunity to be challenged locally and in detail, the future of the UDC initiative suddenly appears shaky. It would be difficult, however, to expect that the report of the Select Committee will not be prejudiced by the establishment of the shadow UDC.

The course of events since the proposal of UDCs provide no new grounds forcontending that UDCs, as instruments for "re-generating their areas" are anything other than an example of misinformed public policy. What the events do reveal, however, is that, despite the exposes of many opponents, the Government has defended this "misinformed policy" with great commitment.
5.1 The National Interest

The key to understanding the logic of UDCs appears to lie in the first clause of the enabling legislation which specifies that a UDC may be set up "... if the Secretary of State is of the opinion that it is expedient in the national interest to do so, ... " (Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, XVI, 134. Author's emphasis). Attempts were made during the Committee Stage in the House of Commons to amend this clause by the insertion of "after consultation with the appropriate local authorities" and by adding "local and regional" to the national interest, but in each case the amendment was resisted and the noes had it.

Looking at UDCs in terms of the "local interest" failed to offer an explanation for their establishment beyond dismissing them as an ill-thought out initiative. When seen in terms of the "national interest", on the other hand, much about UDCs which had appeared irrational now seems logical. If the logic of UDCs lies at the level of national considerations then it is not surprising that they appear divorced from the local objective with which they have been presented. Furthermore, the Government could then not afford to allow the evaluation of UDCs with reference to local interests; hence, the defence of UDCs. However, to support this suggestion that UDCs are designed in the national rather than local interest, it is necessary to clarify two points. First, the
relationship between the priorities of UDCs and those of the central state. Second, the relative independence of these priorities from different governments.

The close parallels between the conflicting requirements of the central state (Chapter 1.3) and those of urban regeneration (Chapter 2.5) are striking. The two basic functions of the central state can be crudely reduced to the support of economic production and the provision of social services; the essentials of the "welfare state". There is much being said about the end of a consensus about the welfare state, but to suggest there has ever been a consensus about the welfare state is to ignore the fundamental conflict upon which it is based. During years of economic growth or stability, the two demands on the state may manage to co-exist to some degree in an apparent consensus. In economic recession, however, demands on the state from both sides are increased and the tension requires a readjustment of state intervention. Ultimately, this shift must favour production but one obstacle to such a shift is local government with its different priorities (Dearlove, 1979). Michael Heseltine has argued the same in defending his desire for greater control over local government spending. His reasoning was that, although local government is valuable, central government must be able to govern the nation according to its policies so local authorities, if they prove uncooperative, need to be brought into line (speaking on "Weekend World", ITV, 22 March 1981). A UDC replaces "obstructive" local authorities with a system of local government which is directly accountable to central government. The priorities of UDCs, economic development rather than social
services, coincide with those of the central state during economic recession.

In striking this particular balance between the requirements of urban regeneration, UDCs are not, however, as radical as they first appeared to be. Similar shifts in emphasis had been occurring in the other approaches to urban regeneration. Hambleton (1981) identified a growing tendency in the first and second round Inner Area Programmes for economic development to take precedence over other objectives. This tendency has been identified in the Liverpool Partnership by the Conference of Socialist Planners (1980) and JDAG (House of Commons Paper No. 99(iv), 1978-79) saw a danger of it occurring in London Docklands, particularly with regard to office development proposals. In GEAR, the emphasis of the SDA has moved toward industrial efficiency and away from employment maintenance (Gee, 1981). UDCs can, therefore, be seen as a means to facilitate the play of forces in the national economy; forces which were, however, not totally frustrated by local government.

Inner city policy has shifted over time from an emphasis on people and social services, briefly through one on people and employment to one on land and economic development. In arguing that these shifts are largely the result of forces generated by the central state during economic recession, rather than of a concern for solving the problems of inner areas, it is interesting to examine the reasons given by Peter Shore and Michael Heseltine for their Governments' intervention in inner cities. According to Peter Shore, without government involvement:
"... we shall see the acceleration of decline; the emergence of poverty traps and ethnic ghettos, physical and moral decay; alienation and violence; and the growth and multiplication of problems that will plague not only us but generations to come.

That is what is at stake; that is why there is a major national interest in success;"

(Shore, 1980, p. 25).

and to Michael Heseltine:

"The inner cities are vitally important to the health of the country. We cannot have the thriving society we are trying to achieve if we have the inner cities decaying at the heart of it. We cannot risk the waste of resources, of people and of land, represented by areas of dereliction and desolation around our city centres. We cannot risk the build up of frustration and anger to which such decay gives rise".

(Heseltine, 1979b, p. 1).

Both write in terms of a concern for the national interest, not for the people themselves in the inner areas.

5.2 The Prospects for Regeneration by Urban Development Corporation

The "single-minded" approach of UDCs is an attempt to avoid the conflict between national and local interests in urban regeneration. In doing so, the organisation structure of UDCs fails to recognise the existence of any conflict of interest in the way in which regeneration is undertaken. When asked about the future of funding for JDAG in the proposed LDDC operation, the Assistant to the shadow Chief Executive replied to the effect that: if you want to run a "slick operation" it does not help to have someone "making
a nuisance".* Any conflict, however, cannot be assumed away and will remain a real element of the situation in which the UDC must work.

By failing to provide for resolution of any conflict within the organisation, the conflict will probably re-emerge elsewhere. There are signs that this will happen. One of the points from a meeting convened by JDAG in November 1979 to consider joint action with other organisations against the UDC was:

"Even if Heseltine cannot be stopped, there is a need for a united body to resist the action of the UDC".

("Notes of Meeting", JDAG, 13 November 1979).

The platform for the campaign against UDCs announced at the joint Labour Party/TUC Conference on UDCs in May 1980 included:

"Labour Councils and trades unions in Docklands should use all means possible to defend the interests of local people in Docklands, including proposals that conflict with the aim of the Docklands Strategic Plan, which is to redress the deficiencies in the Docklands area and enhance the conditions of life in East and South East London".

(Greater London Regional Labour Party, Press Release, 8 May 1980).

It appears, however, that the tension between UDCs and local authorities may be eased as the UDCs are required to be realistic about their operating environment. Since September 1979, the

*Interview with S. Innes, Assistant to Chief Executive (Designate) of LDDC (Designate). 2 February 1980.
Government's statements on UDCs have contained more reference to the need to work with rather than against local authorities. The consultants report on the Merseyside UDC (Roger Tym and Partners Consortium, 1980) set out operating principles for the UDC based on an appraisal of how the advantages of a UDC could best be used to complement the work of other authorities and saw three main roles for the UDC: site development, commercial development and community development. How widely this view of a sensitive relationship with local authorities is held within the MDC is, however, unknown. The MDC's Director of Development sees the UDC's role in different terms:

"In twenty years they could have done the original areas and be working their way steadily through the city".

(Transcript of interview between J. H. Ritchie, MDC, and M. Parkinson, University of Liverpool, 15 January 1981).

This study casts doubt on the value of the development which a UDC might achieve, but it will be difficult to evaluate what is the result of the UDC and what would have happened otherwise, particularly in London Docklands where much work had been done on site development. One thing is certain, though, and that is that the initiation of UDCs has initially held back development in London Docklands. One of the main aims of UDCs is to inspire confidence in their areas but since September 1979 the future of Docklands has been one of uncertainty. The Isle of Dogs Local Plan (Local Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1981), published in January 1981, begins with a statement on the uncertain status of the Plan; it may
or may not become the statutory plan depending on the outcome of the UDC issue. The greatest illustration of the detrimental effect of the UDC proposal on the regeneration of London Docklands is the fact that the DJC* ceased operations on 5 April 1981 while the LDDC Designation Order was still subject to the House of Lords hearings.

5.3 Urban Regeneration in an Uncertain Environment

Even within their limited potential contribution to urban regeneration, the success of UDCs is uncertain. The UDC strategy is a gamble on the future propensity of the private sector to invest, a gamble on an upturn in the economy. Those few economic predictions which do forecast an end to the recession do so only very cautiously and there is no guarantee that any revival would not be short lived. In this uncertain economic climate, there is an uncertainty on the part of government about how to tackle urban regeneration; witness the three different approaches practised in Liverpool, London Docklands and Glasgow and, besides UDCs, the present Government has also established Enterprise Zones including one on Merseyside and one proposed for the Isle of Dogs, in which an attempt is made to encourage investment by removing government constraints.

Davies (1980) has identified two broad schools of thought on the issue. First, those who say economic development is the only goal to aim for, arguing either that there must be economic growth

*The DJC existed subject to the Secretary of State's approval and under central government legislation.
before there can be redistribution or that it is the only realistic alternative. Second, those who say that the economic policies must be tied directly to the needs and interests of those who suffer from the problems. It is argued that this can be achieved either by the careful design of policy to make sure that the unemployed and otherwise disadvantaged are effectively assisted or by creating a new sector of the economy such as one based on "community enterprise". The resolution of this choice depends on how one is prepared to distribute the costs of industrial and economic change. The economic uncertainties associated with the first school of thought, however, and the evidence of unemployment and deprivation suggest that attention should be focused on the second area of possible policy, particularly on attempts to link economic regeneration with employment and social objectives.

To make such recommendations for policy alternatives to the UDC approach appears presumptuous, however, when one considers that a great number of people have directed their efforts since September 1979 in a campaign for such alternatives — but to no avail. If one finds the conditions in areas such as London Docklands and Merseyside unacceptable and sees UDCs as an unacceptable solution, then the main conclusion from this study of UDCs is that one should look to ways of reordering the priorities of the central state.

The priorities of the state in Britain are based upon a socio-economic system in which there is a great gulf between the distribution of wealth and that of welfare. Peter Townsend's recent study of poverty in Britain (Townsend, 1979) concluded with policy recommendations directed at narrowing the gulf but he acknowledged this would be neither easy nor likely:
"The citadels of wealth and privilege are deeply entrenched and have shown tenacious capacity to withstand assaults ... Yet we have observed the elaborate hierarchy of wealth and esteem, of which poverty is an integral part. If any conclusion deserves to be picked out from this report as its central message it is this, with which, some time, the British people must come to terms."

(Townsend, 1979, p. 926).

For better policy, the first step is to recognise that the state is not neutral, that it has priorities which favour certain groups over others, for these priorities of the central state constitute the logic of UDCs.
APPENDIX A. MEMBERSHIP OF DOCKLANDS ORGANISATIONS

(a) DOCKLANDS JOINT COMMITTEE (as at 16 October 1978)

Chairman: Sir Hugh Wilson, OBE
Vice-Chairman: Cllr. J. H. O'Grady (Leader of Southwark Borough Council)

Constituent Authority Members *:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>No. of Members</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater London Council</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenwich Borough Council</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewisham Borough Council</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham Borough Council</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark Borough Council</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets Borough Council</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
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Co-opted Members:

D. C. Cross (Merchant Banker)
Sir John Cuckney (Chairman of the Port of London Authority)
K. Halpin (Chairman of the Docklands Forum)
C. A. Prendergast (Chairman of the Location of Offices Bureau)
D. Sainsbury (Retail Finance Director)
Norman Willis (TUC)
Sir Hugh Wilson, OBE (Architect and Town Planner)

*Includes leaders of each constituent authority.
(b) Docklands Forum

- Organisations represented on the Docklands Forum as at 30 August 1978.

Trades Union Council
Transport and General Workers Union (Docks)
Transport and General Workers Union (Waterways)
National Union of Teachers
Bethnal Green and Stepney Trades Council
Southwark Trades Council
West Ham Trades Council
Greenwich Trades Council
Bermondsey Trades Council
Lewisham and Deptford Trades Council
Confederation of British Industry
Newham Chamber of Commerce
London Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Joint Docklands Action Group
East End Docklands Action Group
Lewisham Docks Action Group
Isle of Dogs Action Group
Downtown Tenants Association
Bermondsey and Rotherhithe Society
Lewisham Council of Social Service (Voluntary Action Lewisham)
Canning Town Community Development Project
Age Concern
Greater London Churches Council
Newham Churches Docklands Group
Tower Hamlets Rural Deanery
Surrey Docks Ecumenical Group
London Industrial Chaplaincy
Goldsmith's College
Queen Mary College
Transport on Water
North Woolwich Tenants Association
Association of Island Communities
Allotments for the Future
Newham Voluntary Agencies Council

APPENDIX B. PETITIONS LODGED AGAINST THE DESIGNATION ORDERS FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS

A. London Docklands Development Corporation (Area and Constitution Order 1980)

1. Newham Chamber of Commerce.
4. Mrs. Anne King.
5. Bermondsey Forum;
   North Southwark Community Development Group;
   Mayflower Tenants' Association;
   Southwark Docklands' Campaign;
   Surrey Docks Child Care Project.
6. Tower Hamlets Trade Council;
   Southwark Rades Council;
   West Ham Trades Council.
7. Association of Wapping Organisations;
   Stephen and Matilda Tenants Cooparative;
   South Quay Tenants Association;
   Limehouse Development Group.
10. Association of Island Communities.
11. Proprietors of Hay's Wharf Limited;
    London Bridge Properties Limited;
    London Bridge Development Limited;
    St. Martin's Property Investments Limited.

B. Merseyside Development Corporation (Area and Constitution Order 1980)

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