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“From Frege to Direct Reference: Value Assigned Logical Forms as an Explanation
of Contradictory *de re* Beliefs”

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Abstract

The primary concern of this work is the substitution of co-referring names in belief ascriptions. Before an explanation of belief ascriptions is given, the development of direct reference is considered with some advance on the character of proper names. Attention is paid to relevant philosophical developments leading to the espoused view.

Frege claimed that there is a distinction between the sense and reference proper names. This is considered as well as what Frege put forward with regards to indirect speech. Then I discuss Kripke's response to Frege, and similar theories. With the descriptive theories of naming considered inadequate, a new account of how names refer is given through Kripke's picture of reference based on reference sharing. Reference sharing is further developed in line with Gareth Evans's name-using practices.

Out of the Kripkean picture developed direct reference. Any theory of direct reference is a theory that claims that the semantic content of a directly referential term is simply its referent. David Kaplan gave an account of direct reference using indexicals and demonstratives as a paradigm. His account showed that there are two types of meaning, character and content, where character is the linguistic meaning and content is the semantic meaning of a term. It is shown that Kaplan's distinction is clear for indexicals, but his claim that character and content collapse into reference for proper names is unsatisfactory. A new and more radical account of character is then given for proper names. It is maintained that proper names are directly referential, so the content of a name is its referent, but its character is a function from name-using practice to referent. This account is developed in contrast to the view of Recanati.

Direct reference gives a natural explanation of ordinary assertions, but is often considered problematic in belief attributions. Since the semantic content of a name is its referent, co-referring names should be substitutable *salva veritate* in all sentences. In belief attributions this is counter-intuitive. Kripke's discussion of this puzzle is considered to show that this is a problem for any theory of reference. After considering the problem for a theory of names, pragmatic solutions are considered, particularly the theories of Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon. Soames's view is shown unsatisfactory as it does not explain belief toward singular propositions, and can give the intuitively wrong truth-value for some veridical propositional attitudes. Salmon claims that belief is really a ternary relation between individuals, propositions, and modes of apprehension with propositions. He then claims that speakers cannot express this ternary relation, but "fake it" through pragmatics. This view is rejected in the hope of developing an account of belief that is consistent with direct reference and psychological accounts, but does not require speakers to fake it.

In my account different ways of believing a proposition are given in value assigned logical forms. Value assigned logical forms give the metaphysics of belief as a binary relation. Substitution of co-referring terms is possible in belief attributions so long as it does not change the value assigned logical form of the belief attribution. An account is then given which explains behaviour when such contradictory beliefs are rationally held. It is also explained why there is hesitation to make substitutions in belief attributions and why it is more appropriate for speakers to use certain words over others in belief attributions.

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1. Frege's Picture

Introduction

When speakers attribute *de re* beliefs to one another it is generally done in such a way that the words used in the sentence are relevant to the belief held. If I say 'Alice believes that Martha is coming over for dinner', I attribute the belief to Alice that Martha is coming over for dinner. If Martha also goes by the name 'Eleanor' and Alice does not know this, it might be, and has been, claimed that I cannot substitute 'Eleanor' for 'Martha' in the belief attribution. Even though both names refer to the same person, for some, there is reluctance to make substitutions. In cases such as this, the intuition is to deny substitution and claim that such a substitution would make the sentence false. This intuition is one of the reasons that led to Gottlob Frege's distinction between *sense* and *reference*.

The Sense Reference Distinction

In his famous essay, "On Sense and Reference" (1892), Frege presents his theory of sense and reference for singular terms and sentences.¹ In this work, Frege set out to show why ' $a=a$ ' seems to differ from ' $a=b$ ' where ' a ' and ' b ' both refer to the same object. Frege thought that there must be a difference between statements ' $a=b$ ' and ' $a=a$ '; he claimed that ' $a=a$ ' differs in cognitive value from ' $a=b$ ', since ' $a=a$ ' is analytic and knowable *a priori* while ' $a=b$ ' seems to be an informative statement. Frege saw this problem as the question of how '=' should be analysed (p. 151).

Frege initially saw two possibilities for analysing '='. The identity sign could be understood either objectually or metalinguistically. On the objectual account, '=' is a relation between that which is designated by ' a ' and ' b ', so ' $a=b$ ' cannot differ from

¹ In Beaney (1997) under the name "On *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*"

' $a=a$ ', where ' $a=b$ ' is true, because the objects designated by both ' a ' and ' b ' are one and the same (p. 151). Here, ' $a=b$ ' would be an *a priori* truth since ' $a=a$ ' is *a priori* and ' $a=b$ ' would have the same content. Frege did not see this as possible since he claimed that it is informative and learning that a is identical to b could be valuable information not able to be gained by reflection on ' $a=a$ ' alone. An objectual interpretation does lead to identity statements being *a priori*; this is not what Frege wanted, nor is it what he thought was the intuitive way such an identity statement is taken.

Previously, Frege thought that when we see an identity statement we want to say that it expresses that ' a ' and ' b ' both designate the same object. Here, '=' stands for a relation between signs instead of objects and is metalinguistic (p. 151). Although this is the way Frege originally thought we should think of identity, it cannot be completely correct. For, if this is what is expressed by identity statements then the objects are no longer the subject matter, but it is instead the names that are under consideration (p. 152). Though this was Frege's earlier view, he felt that it could not be correct either, and completely rejects it in "On Sense and Reference" because an identity statement like 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is a statement of astronomy and says something about an astronomical object not a metalinguistic relation. This forces Frege to return to the objectual interpretation about which he had misgivings (p. 152).

Having to choose between two equally problematic interpretations of identity statements led Frege to believe that there must be a new solution.² Interpreting identity objectually led to identical cognitive values for ' $a=b$ ' and ' $a=a$ '. Frege, however, thought that there must be a difference in the cognitive value of these statements. Frege saw a difference that he thought would solve the problem:

² For discussion of, and debate regarding, Frege's view on the objectual versus metalinguistic see Caplan and Thau (2001) and Heck (2003). Caplan and Thau defend the claim that Frege never rejects the metalinguistic interpretation of identity. Richard Heck responds to that claim.

A difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of the things designated. (p. 152)

Frege made a distinction between the object designated and the mode of presentation of that object, this distinction is between the reference and sense of referring expressions.³

The reference is that which the sign designates. The sense is wherein the mode of presentation is contained (p. 152). This distinction marks Frege's philosophy and is used throughout his philosophy of language.

The relation between sense and reference is a many-one relation. For any one reference can have many senses. The same object can be presented in different ways at different times. For an individual to grasp a reference, it must be by way of some mode of presentation, which Frege claimed was a public feature of a name though two speakers might not share the same sense. He said that anyone who is familiar with the language grasps the sense of a proper name (p. 153). It must be clarified that Frege uses 'name' in such a way that it covers all singular terms, not just proper names as the term is often used. Additionally, Frege goes on to include any well-formed sentence as a singular term because it refers to a truth-value (p. 153). Frege felt that any expression referring to an object is a name for that object. For any person to use a name and understand the name she must grasp the sense of the name.

Which sense of a proper name the speaker grasps is irrelevant, so long as it determines the correct reference. With each referring expression there corresponds at least one sense. Frege gives the example of lines *a*, *b*, and *c*, each connecting the vertices of a triangle to their opposite midpoints. Lines *a*, *b*, and *c* intersect at the same point. This point can be referred to by 'the intersection of *a* and *b*' or by 'the intersection of *b* and *c*'. Both expressions refer to the same point, but refer to it in

³ 'Reference' is left untranslated in the Black translation and appears throughout as '*Bedeutung*'. I will use 'reference' throughout unless it appears within a quote.

different ways. So, there are different modes of presentation for the one point; each mode of presentation being a different sense for the same reference.

The reference of a name can appear under different senses, or modes of presentation. There is an indefinite number of senses for any given reference. As was previously stated, the relation between sense and reference is many-one. Sense determines reference, or sense will take a person to the reference, but one cannot go from the reference to the sense:

Comprehensive knowledge of the *Bedeutung* [reference] would require us to be able to say immediately whether any given sense attaches to it. To such knowledge we never attain. (p. 153)

Complete knowledge of the reference can never be obtained, so one cannot determine whether or not just any sense belongs to a given reference. One must see what reference is determined by the sense.

Sense and Reference of Declarative Sentences

With the distinction between sense and reference in place, Frege gave an analysis for proper names that he could then apply to all singular terms.

A proper name (word, sign, combination of signs, expressions) *expresses* its sense, *stands for* [*bedeutet*] or *designates* [*bezeichnet*] its *Bedeutung*. By employing a sign we express its sense and designate its *Bedeutung*. (1892, p. 156)

Since Frege saw sentences as singular terms in the same way as ordinary proper names, he goes on to apply his theory of sense and reference to declarative sentences. A sentence will express a thought, which Frege took not as the subjective content, but objective content shared by different speakers (p. 156n). The thought cannot be the reference of a sentence, for when two co-referring expressions, having different senses, are substituted in a sentence the thought changes. But the reference cannot change because the two expressions are co-referential. Since Frege saw sentences as singular

terms, by substituting one name for another in a sentence the sentence changes creating a new singular term for the reference of the sentence. The creation of a new singular term for the reference means that there will be a new sense, and because the sense of the sentence is a thought, there will be a new thought. Frege's test for such a change in thought was whether or not an individual could hold different attitudes toward the thought expressed by a sentence, and the thought expressed by a sentence differs only by substituting a co-referring name. Though substitutions can be made in a sentence and different thoughts could be expressed, such a change cannot affect the reference of the sentence. An individual can take different attitudes toward the thoughts expressed by such substitutions, and Frege tacitly assumes that one person cannot take different attitudes toward the same thought, so the substitution of terms with different senses, but same reference, changes the thought of the sentence. Because of this, Frege concludes that the thought expressed by a sentence is the sense of the sentence not its reference (p. 156). The sense of the sentence is made up of the senses of the parts of the sentence. The sense of a referring expression in a sentence is part of the sense of the sentence, i.e. its thought.

Since the sense of a sentence is the thought that sentence expresses, that means something else must be the reference. For Frege, the reference of a sentence is its truth-value. Frege comes to this by, again, considering the substitution of co-referring terms. Substitution has already resulted in different thoughts, so there must be something that remains the same when one co-referring name is substituted for another. In the sentence ' $2+1=3$ ', the numeral ' 2 ' can be replaced by ' $(1+1)$ ' since both are names for 2. Frege saw that the only thing that remained the same in such a substitution is the truth-value (1914, p. 233). Though two names may have different senses, when one name replaces the other in a sentence the truth-value remains the same. Truth is not predicated on

sentences, but is the reference of a sentence. Sentences refer to the True or to the False. The truth of a sentence depends on the references of its parts determined by the senses of the parts. In this way, the sense of the sentence determines the truth-value, but the truth-conditions depend on the references of the parts. All sentences that express true thoughts refer to the True, and all sentences expressing false thoughts refer to the False.

Within the Fregean framework, a name can be substituted for another with the same reference *salva veritate*. Two names may have different senses, but so long as the reference is the same the names can be substituted while maintaining truth-value. When this occurs the thought expressed will be altered, but since both terms refer to the same object the reference of the sentence remains the True or the False depending on the original sentence. ‘Cicero’ in the sentence ‘Cicero was an orator’ can be substituted by ‘Tully’ without a change in truth-value. ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ have different senses, but are both names for the same individual. When the truth-condition is set, it will depend on the references that are determined by the sense of each name. Since the senses for ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ both determine the same object the truth-conditions will be the same, and therefore the reference will be the same, True.

Indirect Speech

Languages do not comprise sentences that are only subjects and one place predicates. There are complex sentences with subordinate clauses that present problems for Frege’s theory as he states it. He realised that subordinate clauses present a problem for his theory, so he devoted a large portion of “On Sense and Reference” to subordinate clauses. Within many subordinate clauses, substitution of co-referring terms, or sentences, seems to fail. Consider the sentence ‘Nathan said that Cicero was an orator’. If the subordinate clause of this sentence is considered a sentence that can be substituted for another sentence with the same reference, then any sentence referring to the True

can be substituted into the subordinate clause. This is not correct. There are innumerable sentences that refer to the True that Nathan never uttered. When the subordinate clause is maintained, but the name appearing in the clause is substituted with a co-referring term, the reference of the subordinate clause is the same. But this does not express the same thought, and therefore the entire sentence is false even though a name with the same reference is substituted. As stated, something is not right with the Fregean conception for indirect speech. Aware of this, Frege makes a serious change to his system by claiming that within indirect discourse the reference to the subordinate clause is not a truth-value.

When a speaker uses indirect speech she wants to say something about a thought not a truth-value. Frege claims that within indirect speech there is a shift of reference. The words in the subordinate clause no longer have their customary reference, but have an indirect reference. The reference shifts from the customary reference to the indirect reference, which is the customary sense (1892, p. 154). Each word has a customary sense and reference and an indirect sense and reference. The customary sense is just the sense that is associated with the word, and the customary reference is the reference of the term. In indirect speech, the reference shifts to the customary sense. The new reference of a term in indirect discourse is its customary sense.

The introduction of indirect reference to subordinate clauses allows Frege's theory to handle and explain what happens in indirect speech. When a speaker ascribes an attitude to an individual, the subordinate clause does not refer to a truth-value, but instead to the sense of the clause, i.e. its thought (p. 162). In the case of belief, Frege claims that it is the thought that is believed, so the thought of the subordinate clause should be relevant to the truth-condition of the entire sentence. As we have seen, in subordinate clauses it is not permissible to substitute expressions with the same

customary reference. This is because the expression does not have its customary reference; it has its indirect reference, since the discussion is regarding thoughts instead of objects. In order to make a substitution in indirect discourse, it is not sameness of customary reference, but indirect reference, i.e. customary sense, which must be satisfied to allow substitution.

When Frege expounded on propositional attitudes, he focused on indirect reference, while neglecting indirect sense, which is important to the Fregean account. Frege did not make it clear what the indirect sense of a name is. He explains indirect reference, but stops his comments with that. As was stated above, one cannot go from reference to sense without comprehensive knowledge of the reference. Frege gives a proper explanation of the indirect reference of a name, but not the indirect sense. Because sense determines reference, and the converse is not true, there is no way to go from reference to sense. Thus, there is now no way to determine the indirect reference since there is no sense given for determining the indirect reference. Without an indirect sense it is also unclear what thought is expressed by a sentence containing indirect speech.

Dummett warns that there is a need for an indirect sense, and we come to the idea of an indirect sense because there must be something that determines the new reference (1973, p. 267-268). Though there is no way to go from reference to sense we do know that the indirect reference is the customary sense. Dummett wants to say that the indirect reference is determined by the customary sense. He claims that sense of a word does not vary but remains the same in indirect speech (1973, p. 268). Senses do not change. When a word is used in indirect speech, it maintains its customary sense, so the indirect sense of a name is the same as the customary sense. In this way, the thought expressed by the subordinate clause will be the same as if it were to appear as a single

sentence, but the reference of that thought will be a thought instead of a truth-value.

Dummett goes on saying that it is by grasping the sense of a word that someone understands the word within the sentence it appears.

Dummett's explanation of indirect sense tries to explain what is going on, but it deviates from the nature of the sense of an expression. He claims that the customary sense of name is the same as its indirect sense. This response deviates from the practice of senses set out by Frege and their use in ordinary language. It is not clear from Frege what the indirect sense of a name is. Dummett tries to make his solution fit what is going on within the context of indirect discourse, but it is not clear how this can be done. Every object will have a mode of presentation; this includes senses when senses are used as reference in indirect speech. To avoid having a regress of senses, Dummett maintains the expressions have their customary senses in indirect speech, but claiming that the indirect sense is the customary sense requires direct acquaintance with senses. Dummett makes the *ad hoc* move of claiming that we can directly refer to senses instead of those senses having senses. In order to remain consistent with Frege's view, for a sense to be the reference, it must itself have a sense. It is because senses have senses that we can talk about senses as reference and refer to them. In order for Dummett to maintain his claim, he must assume that there can be direct reference and acquaintance to senses. This is far from anything supported by Frege. If we can have direct acquaintance with senses, as objects, the idea of sense is lost. There are now some objects that require a sense and others that do not. Given Frege's view on arguments and functions, if a sense can determine a truth-value or a sense, there is nothing stopping the argument of a belief function from being a truth-value instead of a thought, returning us to the original problem. There will be no way to determine what the referent of the subordinate clause is and in turn no way to determine the truth-

condition. Even though there is initially some appeal to the claim that the reference of a subordinate clause is a thought, this Fregean conception is problematic.

2. The Kripkean Response to Descriptivism

What is Kripke Arguing Against?

Though some made alterations to the Fregean theory, some form of descriptivism, as it might be called, dominated the conception of proper names. There were some that, though trained in the Fregean tradition, were beginning to depart from that idea of proper names. Ruth Marcus (1962) was one of the first to criticise the Fregean view, but later Saul Kripke elucidated arguments against the Fregean model and is often credited with presenting defeating arguments against it. In his now famous lectures *Naming and Necessity* (1981), Kripke gave arguments against the Fregean model and presented some observations that he made regarding names and reference. Kripke was hesitant to limn his view as a theory, since most theories end up being wrong, but Kripke did present heterodox views that challenged the views of many analytical philosophers.

Though it is important to see *Naming and Necessity* as challenging Fregeanism, Kripke's arguments were not directed at any one theory, but when Kripke presents his arguments against descriptivism he focuses on cluster theories.⁴ There are some, such as Searle (1958) and Strawson (1959), which move to a cluster theory since it is not clear that all name-users associate the same description, or sense. Cluster theories claim that an object must satisfy some, or the majority, of the cluster of descriptions related to a name in order to be the referent. This allows different speakers to each have different senses, but as long as the senses are each a substantial part of the same cluster, two

⁴ Although Kripke does focus his arguments against cluster theories, he does consider them as against Frege and Russell. It is important to note that Kripke gave Frege and Russell roughly the same theory. This is not completely correct. Russell holds the view that ordinary proper names are synonymous with definite descriptions, and logically proper names are directly referential (see CH. 4). Frege's sense is not always a definite description, though in many cases it is. Even in cases where this is not so, senses and definite descriptions are functioning in the same way. This similarity allows Kripke to combine the theories.

speakers with different senses can communicate (Kripke, 1981 p. 31). The arguments that Kripke gives against descriptivism apply to Frege, Russell, and any cluster theory. Kripke focuses on the cluster theory since it seems to be a more viable option than a single description theory. It is immaterial to Kripke's argument what form of descriptivism it is presented against. For any cluster of descriptions, the arguments can focus on any one description.

The Arguments

Against descriptivism Kripke presents three arguments. He gives a semantic argument, an epistemological argument, and the most discussed of the three, the modal argument (Soames, 2002 p. 19). Each of the three arguments presents compelling evidence that the content of a name is non-descriptive. Kripke's hope is that he can support a Millian theory of names wherein names have denotation, but no connotation, i.e. names have reference, but no corresponding sense. Kripke's arguments, based on the apparent ordinary use of names, aim to show that the meaning of a name is not a description.

Semantic Argument

The semantic argument is aimed at showing that the description associated with a name may not always linguistically determine the correct reference; it shows basic descriptivist assumption to be incorrect. When a speaker uses a name, the description that is related to the name is a sufficient condition for determining the reference. For a name n , if an object satisfies the concept ϕ , which is associated with n , then that object is necessarily the referent of n . It is this assumption that gives the requirements for determining the reference of a name. For, according to descriptive theories, a name refers to an individual in virtue of the description, or sense, associated with that name.

When a speaker uses a name, the description associated with that name determines the referent, and in turn the truth-condition.

The assumption that names refer by way of a description can lead to problems for descriptivism, and this is what Kripke attacks with the semantic argument.

Descriptions that are associated with a name by a speaker or group of speakers may not uniquely pick out the correct object. When a speaker uses a name she uniquely picks out an individual, but the unique satisfier of a description may be someone other than the intended referent. In this case, a name would refer not to the person the speaker wants to say something about, but the person satisfying the description or cluster of descriptions. This is not how speakers use names. Speakers intend to pick out an individual despite the description they, or the community, associate with the name.

Kripke gives clear examples of how reference can go wrong if it depends upon satisfaction of a description. A speaker may intend a specific individual as the referent of a name, but the description associated with that name might pick out the wrong person or in some cases no one. Consider 'Gödel'. Gödel, we believe, discovered the incompleteness of mathematics, and assume this is the description associated with 'Gödel'. What if the users of 'Gödel' are mistaken and it was actually Schmidt that discovered the incompleteness of mathematics? On the description theory, now, and on all past occasions, every time 'Gödel' is used it refers not to Gödel, but instead to Schmidt because Schmidt uniquely satisfies the description 'the discoverer of the incompleteness of mathematics' (Kripke, 1981, p. 83). Moreover, this also leads to a problem in expressing 'Gödel did not discover the incompleteness of mathematics', since in this case 'Gödel' refers to Schmidt and comes out false if Gödel did not discover the incompleteness of mathematics, because this would be the same as saying

that the discoverer of the incompleteness of mathematics did not discover the incompleteness of mathematics.

The example of 'Gödel' is a hypothetical explanation of the semantic problem that could occur with descriptions as the semantic content of a name, but there are actual instances wherein the descriptions that are typically associated with a name are incorrectly attributed to the referent. Christopher Columbus is typically credited with being the first to think the Earth is round and being the first European to land in the western hemisphere. If either of these descriptions determine the reference of 'Columbus', then descriptive theorists must claim that we refer to someone other than Columbus by 'Columbus'. If the former description is associated with 'Columbus', the referent is likely to be some Greek, and if the latter then some Norseman (p. 85). What is worse is if someone associates the conjunct of the two descriptions, the term is now vacuous, because there is no unique reference. There is no unique satisfier of both descriptions so 'Columbus' has no extension, yet when speakers use 'Columbus' they do refer and say something true or false of a particular man.

There is no advantage made by appealing to a cluster theory instead of a single description theory, even though it is a stronger theory. The cluster theorist might claim that it is fine that the object does not satisfy the one description, for there are many descriptions associated with a name. So long as the referent satisfies most of the descriptions, then that object is the referent. It is easy to imagine cases where this could still go wrong. If all the information associated with an individual were wrongly attributed to that individual, then even the cluster theory would not determine the correct referent. Kripke makes a point about a case where this happened. It is thought by many scholars that the Biblical character Jonah was a real person, but most of the attributes given to him in the Biblical story are incorrect. In this case, since Jonah did

not do those things, and if no one else did either, then ‘Jonah’ does not refer to anyone on the cluster theory, but if the scholars are correct it surely does.

Someone could also go on to exploit the way we use names. It could be that by ‘Columbus’ I mean ‘the man commonly called ‘Columbus’’. In some cases, this may be how we refer, or try to refer. As will be seen later, Kripke takes this idea and uses it as a basis for explaining how we refer. Simply stated, this is a circular account of reference. It does not go anywhere. To the question, ‘Who is Columbus?’ the response could be ‘the man called ‘Columbus’’. But who is called ‘Columbus’? That is the man commonly called ‘Columbus’. Such an account could continue on. In order to develop this, there must be more than a metalinguistic account, because ‘called’ will mean the same as ‘referred to as’, so there is no explanation of reference.⁵

Epistemic Argument

The epistemic argument focuses on what is known or believed by the user of a name when a speaker uses a name. The description associated with a name should be *a priori*, in that if a particular description ‘*D*’ is the semantic content of a name ‘*n*’, then a proposition expressed by a sentence such that the property of *D* is predicated on *n* should be *a priori*. However, in contrast, what someone who uses a name ‘*n*’ in a sentence knows is different from what is known by the same person substituting a description ‘the *D*’ for ‘*n*’. A speaker can know *a priori* that ‘the *D* is *D*’ expresses a true proposition, but the same speaker will not know *a priori* the proposition expressed by ‘*n* is *D*’ even though semantically ‘*n*’ and ‘the *D*’ should be equivalent.

Equating the semantic content of ‘*n*’ and ‘the *D*’ means that knowledge of the identity should be *a priori*. In most cases, descriptive information related to a name can only be gained empirically. Predicative knowledge cannot be gained *a priori*. Kripke

⁵ As will be seen in chapter 3, Kripke gives a picture of reference that uses this idea in describing a situation of reference.

gives the example of 'Aristotle'. If 'Aristotle' meant the man who taught Alexander the Great, then 'Aristotle taught Alexander the Great' would be a tautology (1981, p. 30). Clearly this is not the case. There is no way that someone could come to the knowledge that Aristotle taught Alexander the Great without empirical data; such knowledge is *a posteriori*. The same is true of the previous example concerning 'Gödel' and the incompleteness of mathematics (p. 87). Gödel's discovery of the incompleteness of mathematics is not *a priori* for anyone, except maybe Gödel. Knowledge that an individual or object instantiates a particular property is not something that can be known *a priori*, contrary to what can be deduced from the descriptive theory.

Kripke does make the claim that in some very limited cases a speaker has *a priori* knowledge that a name has the same semantic content as a description. When the reference of a name is fixed by description, e.g. in the case of an initial baptism, it can be known *a priori* for the reference fixer that the referent of 'n' is D (p. 78). This will not be true for everyone, but limited to the person who fixed the reference by description. Kripke can grant that in some rare cases reference is fixed by description, instead of ostensively. However, this is not enough to support the descriptivist's claim. Situations where the referent of a name is fixed by description might be cases where the reference fixer has *a priori* knowledge that n is D, since the reference of n is fixed by the description 'the x: Dx'. If this is a case where the description associated with a name is *a priori*, then it will only be *a priori* for the reference fixer. This limits those that have *a priori* knowledge of a uniquely identifying description for a name to a limited number of cases. Moreover, the cluster theorist is also not worried by this argument. Cluster theorists would not hold that any one description is associated with a name. Since there is a cluster of descriptions associated with a name no one description, or property, will be knowable *a priori* by all the name-users, so there is no

reason to think that this leads to any *a priori* statements of predication. In these cases, Kripke does not need to be bothered, for the modal argument may defeat the descriptivist's claim.

Modal Argument

The most well known and discussed of Kripke's arguments against descriptivism is the modal argument. The modal status of names is one of the overlying themes of *Naming and Necessity*. It is because of the modal status of names that Kripke was able to show that true identity statements containing names are necessary. He showed how we should make sense of transworld identity and its implications for essentialism. Kripke showed that names and descriptions act differently in modal contexts. In counterfactual situations, names and descriptions may differ in truth-maker and in turn differ in truth-value when evaluated at different possible worlds, or within different counterfactual situations. Truth-conditions in counterfactuals employing names may differ from descriptions because of Kripke's neologism 'rigidity'.

When dealing with counterfactual situations and identity across possible worlds, descriptivists questioned how the object is to be identified. Kripke felt this question was wrongheaded because names are rigid designators, a term Kripke introduced for discussing counterfactuals. A rigid designator is a singular term that designates the same object in every possible world (Kripke, 1981, p. 48). The question of transworld identity asks, "How do we identify Nixon in a possible world?" Kripke's response is that there is no need to identify Nixon; we stipulate that the individual we are talking about is Nixon by using his name. Names are rigid designators, so when we speak counterfactually, using a name, about an individual in terms of possible worlds, the same individual is referred to in every possible world in which the individual exists.

This stipulation is not just an idiosyncratic stipulation of Kripke, but is based on the way speakers use names when speaking counterfactually. By using a name in a counterfactual scenario, the object is identified by the use of the name—the same object as when the name is used in a scenario that is not counterfactual.

When an individual is considered in different possible worlds, we use a name that is rigid, and in every case refer to the same person. Since ‘George Bush’ is a rigid designator, we can ask if it could have been the case that George Bush⁶ was not elected to a second term as US president? In doing this, George Bush is the referent of the name even if in the envisaged scenario he did not go into politics nor has any of the same distinguishing features he actually has. Perhaps he was not even called ‘George Bush’. There is no need to try to find Bush in a possible world, i.e. determine which individual is George Bush. By using his name, he is identified and it is then decided whether or not certain actual situations might not have been instantiated. It is because names are rigid designators that it makes sense to ask if an individual might not have done such-and-such, which they did not actually do. The descriptivist cannot envisage a scenario in which the individual satisfies none of the descriptive information associated with the name. But in ordinary name usage we do this. We can say, ‘Aristotle might not have been born in Stagira and might have died in infancy’. Since we can, and do, speak this way, names must be rigid designators.

Contrary to the way names are used, the descriptions cluster theorists give as the sense of names of people are typically not rigid designators. Some descriptions such as ‘the element with atomic number 79’ and ‘H₂O’ are rigid, but these descriptions use properties that are essential to the existence of the object and will be held by the object, uniquely, at every possible world where the object exists. Most descriptions associated

⁶ George W. Bush because George H. Bush was not elected to a second term.

with an object do not contain essential properties. When a description is evaluated at different possible worlds there may be different individuals satisfying the description. Consider the description 'The current prime minister of the United Kingdom'. At different times this description will pick out different individuals. At one time it denoted Winston Churchill, currently it denotes Tony Blair, and in the future it will denote someone else. So within the actual world some descriptions will be satisfied by different objects. When considered counterfactually, the same description may identify a different individual at the same time. It could have been the case that the current prime minister of the UK was Gordon Brown, and not Tony Blair. There will be counterfactual situations where the same object satisfies the description, but there will also be situations that could have been instantiated that do not denote the same person. Because of this, descriptions, such as these, are not rigid designators; descriptions can denote different objects in different counterfactual situations.

The descriptivist claims that names are synonymous with such (non-rigid) descriptions, but that cannot be the case since names are rigid designators. The referent of such a description changes in different counterfactual situations. But if names are non-rigid descriptions, then the truth-maker given by those names will differ at different possible worlds, and this is contrary to the way we use names in counterfactual contexts. For when speakers use a name in a counterfactual scenario they speak of the individual and ask whether or not that person might have been in such-and-such a situation. Assume that a description is correct at the actual world for an individual with a name '*n*', i.e. overlook any complications that may arise from the semantic argument. Extensionally the truth-value will be the same both for ' Φn ' and the description ' Φd ' in the actual situation. But when a counterfactual situation is considered, the object uniquely satisfying the description would be the relevant person, which might not be *n*

(p. 6-7). Consider Kripke's example of Aristotle, where it can be assumed that 'Aristotle' and 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' both refer to Aristotle. When 'Aristotle' is considered descriptively and 'Aristotle was fond of dogs' is evaluated at different possible worlds, it might have different truth-makers resulting in possibly different truth-values. In the actual world, Aristotle is the individual relevant to the truth-condition, but in some counterfactual situations it may be someone else that is relevant to the truth-condition, since Aristotle might not have gone into philosophy in that possible world (p. 7). Descriptions in counterfactual situations pick out who is relevant in the counterfactual scenario and that might not be the individual that the enquiry is made about.

There are many cases where the description that might be associated with a name is not instantiated by the individual in counterfactual situations. Aristotle and Hitler have very distinguishing characteristics, but they might not have had them. Aristotle's most important properties are probably his famous works, but he might never have written them. Hitler's most distinguishing property is probably his murderous political career, but he might never have gone into politics (p. 77). Since we can say that Aristotle might not have been a philosopher, or Hitler might not have ever gone into politics, names cannot be descriptions; otherwise, speaking counterfactually would result in speaking about someone else. As before, even if there is a cluster of descriptions associated with the names, the counterfactual referent might be different from the referent in the actual world. Consider all the famous deeds of Aristotle and Hitler that might be listed in a cluster theory. These might be a result of going into philosophy and politics, respectively. The envisaged scenarios, where Aristotle never went into philosophy and Hitler never went into politics, are ones in which Aristotle and Hitler do not satisfy any of the candidate descriptions. In order for names to reflect

their use in counterfactual contexts, they cannot be non-rigid descriptions, nor clusters of non-rigid descriptions.

A Possible Counter to Kripke's arguments

Those philosophers wanting to maintain a descriptive theory have tried to counter Kripke's arguments. Counterexamples can be given where a name might refer by description, as we have seen, but these are not paradigmatic cases. Instances of names that are considered synonymous with descriptions are exceptions. There are still those that try to explain the phenomena that Kripke observed within a descriptive theory. The most contested is the modal argument. Responses have been put forward against the argument, but most end up as a specious attempt to give a descriptive analysis of names.

There is a distinction between rigid and non-rigid descriptions. A description can be made rigid by indexing it to a particular world. The use of an actuality operation in a description would rigidify a description. The object uniquely satisfying 'the ϕ in the actual world' would be the object denoted in other possible worlds. In this case, the description satisfies the requirement of rigidity such that it picks out the same individual in every possible world. The object is determined in each possible world by being the object uniquely satisfying the description of being ϕ in the indexed world. This seems to allow names to be rigidified descriptions, but still does not give an analysis that is consistent with names in modal contexts. Rigidified descriptions will denote the same object in every world in which it exists; 'the x : actually Dx ' will denote an object y in a world w if and only if there is an object such that that object is the object that is D in the actual world. There will be worlds, w^* , where 'the x : actually Dx ' does not denote any object because there is no object satisfying the rigidified description. This differs from the way names are considered to refer in modal contexts. When we speak

counterfactually, a name 'n' will still refer to *n* even if *n* does not exist in that possible world (Soames 2002, p. 41). However, if names are rigidified descriptions, then no object will satisfy the description. Consider the description 'the actual inventor of bifocals' as the rigidified description for Ben Franklin. Counterfactually, 'Ben Franklin' will still refer to Ben Franklin even if the circumstance of evaluation is a world, w^* , in which Franklin does not exist, but if 'Ben Franklin' is synonymous with a rigidified description, then at w^* there is no one satisfying the relevant description. This leads to there being no referent for 'Ben Franklin', and furthermore no truth-maker. This shows that even though descriptions can be rigidified and meet Kripke's modal requirement, a rigidified description might differ from a name in reference at a world where the description is not satisfied by any object.⁷

Other attempts have been made challenging Kripke's arguments, but for an account to be given that is successful, it must respond to all three of Kripke's arguments. Attempts at refuting Kripke's arguments are usually responses to the modal argument in isolation. This is because it is the strongest argument against descriptivism, but even if the above response was a cogent response to the modal argument, there are still the semantic and epistemological arguments. A descriptivist might give an argument in response to any one of Kripke's arguments, but it is not likely that such a response will answer the aggregate of arguments. An argument that would save the descriptivist's agenda would have to handle all three arguments, not just one; additionally, three individual arguments each directed at a single Kripkean argument will not do either. A response must consistently analyse names in such a way that it answers all of Kripke's arguments. In this way, no purely descriptive analysis of names has been given, leaving descriptivism wanting.

⁷ For an analysis the World Indexed response and also the Wide Scope response (not mentioned here), see Soames (2002 p. 25-50) and Soames (1998).

3. New Account of Reference: Referring without a Description

Kripke's picture of Reference

Kripke showed that in most cases names do not refer by way of a definite description. In doing this, it was left unclear how names refer to objects if not by description. In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke presented a picture of how a name refers to an object. He saw that there was a chain of communication between speakers.⁸ He then claimed that by using names speakers refer to objects through a chain of communication connecting them to the object.

The picture begins with someone engendering a name for an individual. This is what can be called an 'initial baptism'. Typically, this occurs at or temporally close to birth where the child is given a name. The name is given to the child by ostensive definition. The parents may say, "We will call him 'Charles'." The parents assign a name to the child and refer to him by that name. Though this is common practice there are also instances where an individual acquires a second name such as a nickname. Often, those close to someone may use a nickname to refer to that individual. Charles may have the nickname 'Chuck', which is similar to 'Charles', or a nickname that differs from the original such as 'Ruddagar'. The relation to the individual's given name is immaterial; what is important is that the individual is given another name. Just as Charles's parents gave him his name at birth, his friends also gave him a name, which they use to refer to him.

Initial baptism is only the beginning of the pattern of reference. The initial baptism allows only those present when the name was assigned to Charles to use

⁸ Kripke's idea comes from a footnote in Strawson (1959, p. 182). Kripke and Strawson differ in their requirements for reference sharing. For Strawson, a speaker must know from where the term was acquired in order to use it. For Kripke, it is the actual chain of communication that matters.

'Charles' to refer to Charles. After an initial baptism, those that use the name 'Charles' are not limited to those present at the assigning of name. As with any newborn child, friends and family visit and the parents share the name with these individuals. The parents may say, "This is Charles" or "His name is 'Charles'", sharing the name with those that have come into contact with Charles. There will also be those that do not see Charles, but will interact with those that have. Through conversations the name is passed from link to link through the linguistic community. Those that have never seen Charles, but know his parents, or some other relevant individual, will acquire the name and use it to refer to Charles. Speakers acquire the term from other speakers without ever meeting Charles. Those speakers that have acquired the term can then use the name in other conversations to refer to Charles and pass the name on to others in the linguistic community creating new links in the chain of communication. The chain allows speakers far removed from Charles to refer to Charles without being able to uniquely identify him or know where the term was acquired (Kripke, 1981, p. 91). Those far removed from Charles and his family may not have any uniquely identifying information of Charles or the family, but they can still refer to Charles by 'Charles' because of the chain of communication linking their utterance containing 'Charles' to Charles.

The linguistic community is vital to maintaining reference and allowing others to acquire the term. Membership in that linguistic community where speakers passed a name from link to link creates a chain of communication linking a distant utterance of a name to the named individual (p. 91). Linguistic communities allow speakers to share reference for a name. Those outside a particular linguistic community are unable to use a name from that community to refer to the individual of the community without being initiated into the community. Those that are not members of the linguistic community

cannot refer to Charles by 'Charles'. The community forms the chain of communication linking the speaker to the referent. There is no one linguistic community for a language such as English, but many linguistic communities, wherein one speaker can be a member of any number of linguistic communities. Two speakers might be a part of the same linguistic community that uses 'Gary', but in two different linguistic communities for 'Florence', since they refer to different people when each uses the name 'Florence'.

Referring to an individual through the links in a linguistic community requires more than the existence of the links. For Kripke, a speaker can forget where she first acquired a term, but reference can still be successful regardless of whether or not she remembers from whom, where, or when the term was first acquired (p. 93). If a speaker acquires a term, it does not matter where the term was acquired, just so long as it is used correctly. The correct use of an acquired term is what gives the chain of communication its strength. Just hearing a name via a link in the chain of communication is not enough. For a speaker to be credited with acquiring a term and referring to the referent, that speaker should typically intend, when she learns the name, to continue using it with the same reference as the speaker from whom she learned it (p. 96). The speaker cannot decide to use the name in a dissimilar way and still refer to the same object. The speaker might misunderstand the way a name is being used, i.e. she might think that the name is being used as in fiction when in reality the speaker were referring to an actual person, but in such cases, her intention was not to refer to an object or person, but she can still refer because her intention was to use the name in the same way. The speaker is not required to know where she acquired the term, although at first it is likely that she will be fully aware of where the term was learned. The speaker's intention to use the name in the same way as the speaker from whom the name was learned is what secures

the reference through the linguistic community. A speaker cannot learn a name and think it a good name for someone else and be credited with being a link in the chain. By intending to not use the name as others, but instead as a name for a pet, the speaker breaks her link in the chain of communication and cannot refer to the same individual as he from whom she learned the term. It is by being part of the community, which passes on a name through a chain of communication that a speaker can intend to share reference.⁹

The picture of reference given by Kripke replaces descriptions as determining reference. In giving his picture of reference, Kripke was not giving a final theory on all forms of reference, but one, of possibly many, paradigm examples of how speakers refer by singular terms. Though some, but very few, names may refer by description, Kripke's chain of communication allows reference without identifying descriptions. The reference of a name such as 'The Big Bang' or 'Jack the Ripper' might have been fixed by description, but through the linguistic community these names can be used without knowing those identifying descriptions. After his semantic argument, Kripke needed to explain reference. By giving the chain of communication picture, he showed how names refer while maintaining that they do not have descriptive content.

Although the picture presented seems clear it is not complete. Kripke says:

At any rate more refinements need to be added to make this even begin to be a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. In that sense it's not a theory, but is supposed to give a better picture of what is actually going on. (p. 96)

Though terse, Kripke focuses on two shortcomings in his picture, its incompleteness and the difficulty of determining necessary and sufficient conditions for it. Kripke shows the picture as incomplete by the example of 'Santa Claus'. The name 'Santa Claus' has a chain of communication connecting the speaker to a historical saint, but that is not the

⁹ It will be shown in chapter 5 what is required to be a member of a linguistic community.

referent that reaches a child (p. 94). Kripke briefly says that this may be due to failure to intend to use the term to refer to the historical saint, but nevertheless, it is not explained by the theory. A more difficult problem for the picture is how to assign necessary and sufficient conditions, but it is not clear that this must be done. Kripke claims that any attempt at giving such conditions would be difficult, and if it were done, the conditions would be complicated (p. 94). Though these conditions were not available to Kripke, it does not disprove the picture that he presented. Without necessary and sufficient conditions, it still seems true that through the connection of the linguistic community, leading back to the referent, we refer to a certain individual. This could be because there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. There are numerous different mechanisms in different kinds of cases. These problems do not invalidate Kripke's picture, but they do show that it needs further development.

Beyond the shortcomings Kripke admitted, Gareth Evans (1973) saw what he felt to be greater problems. Just as in the 'Santa Claus' case, Kripke cannot explain reference shifts. For Evans, change in reference would be decisive against Kripke's picture taken as a theory, since it cannot explain it. Evans gives the actual example of 'Madagascar'. 'Madagascar' originally referred to part of the mainland of Africa, but the term became corrupted. The term now refers to an island off the coast of mainland Africa. Explorers mapping the coast of Africa took some natives on their boat to give the names of locations. Unaware of the speed at which ships could travel, the natives were taken further out to sea than they thought. Upon reaching an island the explorers asked its name. The natives thinking they were still close to land said that it is called 'Madagascar', but the way they usually used the name was to refer to the mainland. The explorers went on their way leaving the natives on the mainland. The explorers intended to use the name to refer to the same place as the natives, but there was an

unintended baptism, because the two sub-communities of the linguistic community for 'Madagascar' went their own ways each differing linguistically and epistemologically. Kripke cannot explain which location is the referent of 'Madagascar'. Is it the mainland, or is it the island? The chain of communication connects to both, so it is unclear which should be the referent. The example meets the criterion of Kripke's picture. The explorers intended to use 'Madagascar' in the same way as the natives, but refer to the island instead, because of misinformation. According to Evans, Kripke cannot explain corruptions and shifts in reference.

The problems that Evans presents for Kripke's picture show it to be inadequate, but Kripke was aware of this. Evans takes Kripke to be putting forward a theory, which Kripke would obdurately deny. Kripke claimed it was a picture of paradigm cases of reference not a complete theory. Examples such as 'Madagascar' are problematic, but it is an incomplete theory. It seems that a breakdown, or confusion, in speaker intention is responsible. Kripke does not give an answer, but one could be given if this picture was developed further. This is something that Gareth Evans decided to do (1982). He saw problems with the Kripkean picture, but saw potential in what Kripke presented.

Evans: Name-using Practices

In his chapter "Proper Names" in *Varieties of Reference* (1982), Evans presents his view on how names refer. Though Evans, in some ways, disagrees with Kripke, there is overlap in the two theories and Evans uses some of the same ideas that Kripke used. The differences that arise are in Evans's development of the theory. Evans takes the picture Kripke presented and develops it into a full theory. The advantage Evans's theory has over Kripke's is that he appeals to *name-using practices*. Evans's name-using practices are an advancement on Kripke's linguistic community; Evans uses these

practices to show how names pass from one individual to another along with information. For Evans, the life and stages of a name-using practice bring about different phenomena in the way names are used.

In the same way that Kripke began his picture of reference, Evans has to allow names to begin somewhere. Evans begins his picture, like Kripke, with an initial baptism (Evans 1982, p. 376). However, when Evans elucidates his theory, he develops it in a way that differs from Kripke. Evans differs in his description of the community of language users. Name-using practices will have different members throughout the practice. Kripke allowed speakers far removed from the named individual to use the name and refer. Beyond referring, Evans focused on the information that existed in the community. Because of this, where Kripke made no division in the linguistic community that uses a name, Evans divided the name-using practice into two groups of name-users, the *producers* and the *consumers*. This division gives different name-users access to different information.

Producers are privileged, whereas the consumers are not, due to relations to the named individual. Consider a name-using practice for 'Eve' that began with an initial baptism. When Eve was born her parents gave her the name 'Eve'. In Kripke's picture there were those that had contact with the individual. In the same way, there are those that have interactions with Eve, these individuals are the producers. The producers are a core group of speakers that are acquainted with Eve. Through their interactions with Eve they are able to re-identify her and assert, 'This is Eve'. The producers in the name-using practice typically have dealings and interactions with Eve wherein they use the name 'Eve' and know her as Eve (p. 376). They know Eve and are able to identify her. Through their interaction with Eve, the producers gain information regarding her which they can then share with others. Due to their knowledge of Eve, producers are

able to introduce new speakers into the practice by introducing them to Eve or by creating a link and sharing information with the inductee into the practice. At the earliest stages of a name-using practice all name-users are producers, since only those directly acquainted with the individual will have acquired the name (p. 377). The existence of only producers is not likely to last long; as speakers interact the name will surely be passed on to others.

Some speakers will acquire a name, but will not have any acquaintance with the individual. As producers in the 'Eve' name-using practice interact with other speakers the name is passed on to those that have not become acquainted with Eve. Though they have not been directly acquainted with Eve, these speakers can use the name and refer to Eve with 'Eve'. This second group of name-users are the consumers (p. 377). The producers in a name-using practice may introduce new speakers into the name-using practice, but this might not be a formal introduction where a formal introduction would introduce the speaker to Eve directly. Also, speakers might observe other speakers using a name, which can introduce them into the practice. The consumers in the 'Eve' name-using practice are introduced into the practice, but are not acquainted with Eve in any way other than through the information that was passed through the practice. Any knowledge of Eve that the consumers have will likely be in the form of a description, because the knowledge will be passed through conversations with other name-users. By speaking to other name-users in the practice, consumers can acquire information regarding Eve. Consumers can be introduced into the practice by producers or consumers (p. 378). Acquiring a name and becoming a member of a name-using practice requires an introduction of some form. For consumers, that introduction does not require the speaker to identify Eve in person, but can be some other form of introduction. Such an introduction allows the new member to be able to use the name in

line with the practice. As a consumer, this means that a producer or consumer can do the introduction, just so long as the inductee has an opportunity to observe the way the name is used allowing her to use the name in accordance with the relevant practice.

The consumers within a practice are in essence information gatherers. Lacking acquaintance with Eve, the consumers in the practice typically rely on others in the name-using practice to provide information regarding Eve. Generally, consumers within the practice are dependent on the producers, but there will be cases where consumers will add new information to the practice. Scientific, medical, and other advances allow consumers to introduce new information into the name-using practice. Given certain information about a historical figure, it can be inferred that he was a manic depressive, information which until recently could not be diagnosed. Most consumers will not add any new information into the practice, unless the consumer can make an inference based on information gathered from other name-users. The information that a given consumer has will typically have come from other name-users. The consumers rely on interactions with the producers where they can gather information. This information can then be passed through the practice, where consumers gather information from producers and other consumers.

By taking part in a name-using practice, whether it is at the producer or consumer level, and continuing to use the name, speakers sustain the practice. The practice depends on the speakers' use of the name. If all members of the practice stopped using a name or changed the name each time they wish to refer, the practice would stop. The name used within a name-using practice is subject to custom; the history of that custom for the practice defines that practice. The custom of using names to refer within the practice works to sustain the name-using practice. Within a name-using practice, Evans points out that there are two things that the community does that

sustain the practice. First, generally, people learn and remember names of those in whom they have a genuine interest. Second, speakers use a name when they wish to refer to an individual where the name is known. By following the customs of name-using practices, as opposed to flouting them, speakers sustain that practice (p. 378-379).

So far, name-using practices have shown how networks of name-users develop and spread. The example of 'Eve' showed how speakers can be acquainted with Eve or far removed from any contact with her, yet both types of name-users relate 'Eve' to Eve because they are part of the same name-using practice. Name-using practices explain how information regarding someone such as Eve, can spread throughout the community of speakers that use the name 'Eve'. Such explanations are only part of what name-using practices can explain. Evans's development of name-using practices built on the foundational ideas that Kripke presented. Kripke maintained the requirement that speakers must intend to use the name in the same way as the person from whom they learned the name in order to refer.

Evans gives a similar but altered requirement. In a perfect language, there would be one name-using practice for each individual and that language would lack ambiguity. When name-using practices are applied to natural languages, or seen as developing from natural languages, there is not always a one-to-one correlation between individuals and name-using practices. Evans points out that there may be one practice for two individuals or two practices for one individual (p. 381).¹⁰ Any instance where two individuals are confused and given the same name, or nickname, is a situation where there is one practice and two individuals. When there is more than one name-using practice for an individual, or object, something must have caused different networks of name-users, which all relate to the same referent. There are two name-

¹⁰Evans points out these two scenarios; it is in no way limited to these two. There could be any number of name-using practices for any one object, and depending on community confusion, there may be any number of individuals relating to one practice.

using practices for one individual whenever there are two distinct networks of communication for the name (or names) within the community (p. 381). In these networks, any information can travel, but the information will not pass between networks. Though both practices may relate to the same individual, it is not necessary that the networks have the same information. The networks might have the same information, or different information. The information in each practice will depend on the information that the producers pass into the practice. Two distinct practices can originate in different ways. An individual may have two names, wherein those that use each name never meet, and the named individual never discusses her two names. Two different practices can both use the same name for an individual, but still be different practices. Two groups of speakers may both use 'Eve' to refer to Eve, but have two entirely different networks. Both relate the same name to the same individual, but the chain of communication, though linking back to the same individual, in no way connects the speakers in the two practices except at the referent. The realisation that there can be different practices with the same name, both referring to the same person, or to different people, creates some tension and requires the speaker to know more than a name when the speakers from the two practices meet.

The existence of different name-using practices involving the same speaker and the same name means that speakers must have an active role in using names. When a speaker uses a name, that name connects the utterance to an individual through the name-using practice. Strawson required that when a description passes the burden of reference to another speaker, the other speaker be known. Kripke required that the speaker intend to use the name as it was learned in order to refer, but Evans makes a different claim. Like Kripke, Evans does not require the name-user to know where the name was learned, but the speaker must know which practice she is taking part in.

Because different name-using practices exist even for the same speaker and the same name, Evans claimed that it is necessary that a speaker be able to manifest in which name-using practice she is participating in order to refer to an individual by a name (p. 384). There is no need to be able to identify the object, since this may be an impossible task for a consumer, but by knowing which practice she is participating in, she can refer. The information that is associated with the name-using practice will often assist the speaker in manifesting the practice she is using (p. 384).

Manifesting which practice a speaker is participating in shows that the speaker is aware of the name-using practice she is using and in turn can intend to refer, as others do, to a particular individual. In some cases, the referent may already be made manifest, perhaps due to context or the presence of that individual. The ability to manifest the practice is still germane to being able to refer, but salient information in context, or tacit information shared between two speakers that use 'Kris' when taking part in the same practice, allow speakers to avoid giving a full description of which practice they are participating in. Other contexts will not be as clear, and someone might say, 'Kris who?'—looking for clarification as to which practice is being used by getting information about the referent. Such manifestation is necessary to determining the referent, but the context of utterance will determine if it can be left tacit or must be explicitly stated.

The information that a speaker uses to manifest the practice she is participating in does not need to be factual information, but must be information that exists within the practice. Within a name-using practice there can be misinformation and rumours. This information may enter the name-using practice viciously or accidentally. Once the information enters the practice it becomes part of the practice just like factual information. This will often happen to consumers because they have no way of

verifying information except by other consumers. Producers have the advantage of verifying information against the named individual. Misinformation within the practice does not destroy one's ability to refer. Name-using practices are not like descriptions. They connect to the referent by a chain of communication, not by the satisfaction of the information associated with a practice. For Evans, the ability of the producers to continue identifying the referent allows the consumers to have misinformation, but not have their link undermined (p. 385).

4. Post Kripke: What is Direct Reference?

What Kripke Did

In *Naming and Necessity*, Saul Kripke changed the course of analytic philosophy, by challenging many of the accepted views. One of which was the descriptive analysis of names. No longer were descriptions considered part of the semantic account of names. But, Kripke only challenged the descriptivists. He never posited a new theory, although, it was inevitable that one would develop. That theory has been called 'Direct Reference'.

The Remaining Theory: What is Direct Reference?

Bertrand Russell held a view that without his epistemic restrictions is basically direct reference. Russell viewed logically proper names as different from descriptions. Definite descriptions have as their meaning concepts and universals, whereas logically proper names designate an individual and that individual is the meaning of the term (1919, p. 51). Russell's later theory put epistemic restrictions on what counts as a name. This resulted in Russell claiming that non-logically proper names are synonymous with definite descriptions, which was shown problematic in the previous discussion of Kripke. But names as directly referential terms can still be seen even when Russell restricts these names to the class of logically proper names. When a speaker uses a logically proper name in a sentence, the individual, or object, referred to by the name is a part of the proposition. This is essentially direct reference, but Russell restricted propositional content to those things that one can be directly acquainted with.

Thus, Russell was forced to accept that logically proper names are the only names that are directly referential.¹¹

David Kaplan was one of the first to give a significant analysis and explanation of direct reference. In “Demonstratives”, Kaplan set out how indexicals refer (1989b). Through that work, he also gave the basics of the semantics for direct reference. According to Kaplan, ‘direct reference’ is:

...theories of meaning according to which certain singular terms refer directly without the mediation of a Fregean *Sinn* as meaning. (p. 483)

Within such a theory, the singular terms that are directly referential are such that:

[t]he proposition expressed by a sentence containing such a term would involve individuals directly rather than by way of the “individual concepts” or “manners of presentation” (p. 483)

The proposition expressed by a sentence of the form ‘Fn’ containing a directly referential singular term, ‘n’, is a singular proposition. These propositions, as stated above, involve the referent instead of a concept or mode of presentation. According to Frege and Russell, the semantic content, or proposition, expressed by a sentence such that it contains ‘n’ and ‘n’ is an ordinary proper name does not have an individuals as a constituent, but instead a concept, mode of presentation, or description as the content of a name.¹² Alternatively, according to direct reference, a singular proposition for an atomic sentence involves the referent of the singular term and the property predicated on the individual in the sentence. An ordered pair represents these singular propositions. Consider the following sentence:

Jones is bald.

The proposition expressed by this sentence can be represented by the ordered pair:

<Jones, bald>.

¹¹ Though different names exist for this theory, ‘Direct reference’ will be used throughout to avoid confusion.

¹² Though Russell would agree that for logically proper names the referent is the semantic content, but for ordinary proper names Russell was committed to the content being a definite description.

Just as the proposition involves the referent and property so does the ordered pair.

Understanding what the direct reference theorist is trying to convey can be done by looking at logic. Kaplan says that the paradigm for a directly referential term is the variable (p. 484). A variable within a schema is assigned an object as its value, and in turn that value is its meaning.

In determining a semantical value for a formula containing a free variable we may be given a *value* for the variable- that is, an individual drawn from the universe over which the variable is taken to range-but nothing more. (p. 484)

A sentence, or schema, in logic with an object assigned to a variable has that object as the meaning of the variable. Just as an object is assigned to a variable in logic, something similar happens with directly referential terms. A directly referential term has as its semantic content an object; the object that is assigned to the term by linguistic rules, deictic use, or ostensive reference fixing is the semantic content of the term.

The claim that directly referential terms refer without the mediation of a Fregean sense has caused some confusion within direct reference. There are two ways that this could be taken. Directly referential terms can refer unmediated simpliciter, or they can refer unmediated by any propositional content. Kaplan was in favour of the latter and claimed that the first was implausible and contrary to linguistic and contextual rules that exist for directly referential terms like indexicals and demonstratives (p. 568-9). That still does not make it clear what Kaplan means. He explains:

the relation between the linguistic expression and the referent is not mediated by the corresponding propositional component, the content of what is said. (p. 568)

To fully understand this, it is important to again look at the Fregean picture. For Frege there were three parts to a name: the term, the sense, and the reference. When a speaker uses a name in a sentence the sense is what is expressed and is the propositional content; that sense then determines the name's contribution to the truth-condition, i.e.

the object satisfying the sense. Direct reference separates any conceptual content from the proposition. A directly referential term refers to an object and that object is part of the proposition. The truth-condition for the sentence is determined by the singular proposition; in fact, the truth-condition is the proposition because the instantiation, or un instantiation, of the ordered n -tuple will be true and false respectively. On the Fregean conception, the truth-condition is determined by the proposition, which was conceptual.

Direct reference is not claiming that a term is completely devoid of descriptive meaning. It is claiming that any descriptive or linguistic meaning a term may have is not part of the proposition and plays no direct part in determining the truth-condition. Reference must be determined in some way; it may be considered descriptive though not always in the traditional sense. Francois Recanati gives a clear statement of the thesis of direct reference:

A (directly) referential term is a term that serves simply to refer. It is devoid of descriptive content, in the sense at least that what it contributes to the proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs is not a concept, but an object. Such a sentence is used to assert *of* the object referred to that it falls under the concept expressed by the predicate expression of the sentence. Proper names and indexicals are supposed to be referential in this sense. (1993 p. 3)

Direct reference, and any variant of it, is just that any directly referential term has as its semantic content its reference, not even in part any descriptive content, but simply the referent.

Kaplan's Distinction between Semantic and Linguistic Meaning

David Kaplan not only presented the framework of the theory of direct reference, but by using indexicals and demonstratives went on to show that there are two types of meaning to an expression. By distinguishing two types of meaning,

Kaplan was able to explain how the reference is determined within a context for indexicals, while maintaining that sentences containing directly referential singular terms express singular propositions. According to Kaplan, all singular terms have *content* and *character*. This distinction is the difference between the semantic content and linguistic meaning of a singular term.

When a speaker makes an utterance, there is something that is expressed within the speaker's context. That which the speaker expresses is what Kaplan called 'content'. The content of an expression is what has been termed the 'proposition' and is the 'what is expressed' by the expression (1989b, p. 500). It is what is evaluated within a circumstance of evaluation, possible world, or counterfactual situation. If the content is a proposition, as it would be for complete declarative sentences, when it is evaluated at a circumstance its evaluation will be a truth-value. It is the proposition, which is the content of an expression that is evaluated; the truth of a sentence then depends on the proposition. As was said above, the proposition is the truth-condition, since the same proposition may have different truth-values in different circumstances of evaluation, possible worlds, or counterfactual situations depending on whether or not the ordered n -tuple is instantiated. Not only do entire sentences have content, but parts of sentences have content as well. For a directly referring singular term the content is an object. For non-directly referring expression, such as definite descriptions including rigid descriptions, the content will be a complex that has concepts and properties as its parts.

Along with content, expressions and terms have character. The character of an expression is its linguistic meaning. The character of an expression is set by linguistic convention and is used to determine the content of an utterance within a context of utterance (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 505). In this way, character is meaning in the sense that it

is what a competent language user knows. The character of an expression can be said to be descriptive, though 'descriptive' may not be the best term, since it differs from the traditional ideas of descriptivism. The character of a term determines the reference within a context. It incorporates linguistic rules and practices, which along with a context of utterance determine content. When a speaker utters a sentence in context, the character of the utterance (composed of the characters of the parts) determines the proposition. For an atomic sentence containing a directly referring term and a monadic predicate, the character will determine, depending on context, a singular proposition involving the referent and property both determined by the character of the expressions.

The character of an expression is the linguistic rule set by the conventions of a linguistic community. In order to see these rules, indexicals can be considered as giving a vivid picture of how these rules within a context determine content. When two speakers use 'I', there is a sense in which they say the same thing and a sense in which they say something very different. Two speakers can both utter 'I am bored' at time t such that the first says something true and the second something false. Both speakers uttered the same sentence, but the content of both utterances differed. Sensitivity to context makes indexicals perfect for showing the distinction between character and content.

When two speakers utter the same sentence containing an indexical, they utter the same linguistic sentence, but may express different contents. 'I' has its content, i.e. reference, within context of utterance, but also its character. The character of an indexical like 'I' takes the expression from context to content. Consider again the utterance 'I am bored'. When a speaker utters the sentence, the context along with the rules for 'I' determine the referent. In the case of 'I', the rule says that it is the speaker within the context that is the content of 'I'. The proposition expressed is then a singular

proposition involving x , the speaker, and the property of being bored. In the same way, demonstratives, such as 'this', have their referents as their content determined by their character in a context. The character for 'this' is a rule similar to saying something like 'the object demonstrated within the context of utterance.' The rules determining content when an indexical is used will usually determine different content in different contexts. Because the character will determine different content for 'I' depending on the speaker, every speaker will express different content involving his or herself.

Confusion over character can easily result in moving one from direct reference back into a descriptive theory. One could easily confuse character with content, in that the character of an expression, especially indexicals because of the descriptive-like rules, is considered part of the content, or proposition expressed. Consider again the sentence 'I am bored'. One could easily see why someone would want to combine the linguistic rules for 'I' into the proposition. Most speakers do not refer to themselves in the third person; they say 'I' to distinguish themselves from others when they speak. When a speaker utters 'I am bored' it seems as though part of what they are saying is that they are the speaker, and so it may seem that the proposition is that the speaker is bored.

Placing character in the content is wrong. Character plays no part in the propositional content of an expression. The rules and mechanisms of a language are not a component of the proposition (Kaplan, 1989 p. 569). This is not the complete denial of modes of presentation, just that such modes of presentation are not part of the proposition. When a speaker uses a demonstrative there must be a demonstration, and part of that demonstration is a mode of presentation. Pointing at a cat and saying 'That is ugly' does not say anything about the demonstration. There is no way the demonstration can be expressed, but what can be is a singular proposition involving the cat

determined by the demonstration in the context and the property of being ugly. The mode of presentation plays no part in the content; directly referential terms are, as Kaplan says, 'transparent' (p. 572). What connects the linguistic expression to its content is unseen in the content. Speakers use certain words in a context in order that the listeners can grasp a particular piece of information. The same piece of information can be expressed using any number of sentences.

Benefits of the theory

Despite complexities that arise from the distinction between character and content, direct reference provides a natural and beneficial theory. When a speaker utters the sentence 'Socrates is wise', the subject of the sentence is Socrates, and a natural interpretation is that the expression says something directly about Socrates. Direct reference also gives an account of assertions that is natural. Speakers assert something regarding Socrates the individual, not some mode of presentation of Socrates. A Fregean theory claims that the subject matter is still Socrates, but what is expressed is the mode of presentation. In ordinary contexts of utterance, the speaker wants to say something about Socrates; she asserts that Socrates is wise. In doing so, the speaker expresses a singular proposition. The information the speaker is trying to express is about the individual, who is the referent of the name, and it is that he has the property predicated on him. For all non-propositional attitude contexts, this seems to be the correct and natural explanation of utterances and assertions regarding names and indexicals.

When speakers utter different sentences using different indexical, demonstratives, or names all regarding the same person, direct reference again gives a natural explanation. Declarative sentences containing names, indexicals, and

demonstratives all express singular propositions; when the referent is the same, the same singular proposition is expressed. Any number of speakers can express the same singular proposition with different sentences in different contexts. Consider the following four sentences, which all, on the direct reference theory, allow substitution *salva veritate* and express the same proposition.

- (a) I am a philosopher (uttered by Socrates).
- (b) You are a philosopher (uttered to Socrates).
- (c) He is a philosopher (pointing at Socrates).
- (d) Socrates is a philosopher.

In each of the above sentences, the same proposition is expressed. The first three require the context to determine the content of the indexicals, but in all three, the property of being a philosopher is attributed to Socrates. The same is true in (d). Given that speakers use sentences in this way, direct reference again gives a natural account of content.

In addition to giving a natural account of sentence content and substitution, direct reference gives a straightforward solution to Kripke's arguments previously raised in chapter 2. When a speaker uses a directly referential term with a non-identity predicate, the speaker does not express something *a priori*. For some ϕ , if a speaker utters 'Mary is ϕ ' there is no reason to believe that the utterance is *a priori*. If 'Mary' had descriptive content and ' ϕ ' was the concept of the description for 'Mary', then 'Mary is ϕ ' should be knowable *a priori*. Such a sentence is not knowable *a priori*, and direct reference reflects this. It also gives an account of counterfactuals consistent with the way speakers use names and indexicals. An utterance of 'He is eating an apple' understood through a descriptive theory will be such that the sentence does not express a singular proposition, but a proposition where the content of 'he' will be descriptive. This will result in 'he' having different truth-makers in different circumstances of evaluation when derived from the same context of utterance. When speakers speak

counterfactually they talk about an individual in another circumstance, not someone who is qualitatively similar in another circumstance. The proposition expressed is singular not general. This is reflected in direct reference.

Furthermore, since direct reference is the result of Kripke's arguments, it has the benefit of not being affected by the modal argument. Because the content of a name is its referent, and the content of the name is what is evaluated in counterfactually, the same object will be considered in counterfactual situations. As directly referential terms, names act just as Kripke said that they should when considered counterfactually.

Though Kaplan's main focus is on indexicals and demonstratives, he does make mention of, and expound on, proper names, which is the primary focus here. Proper names, under the theory of direct reference, are, like indexicals, directly referential. Kaplan did not see proper names as presenting as clear a picture as indexicals in his statement of direct reference. Because indexicals and demonstratives can designate different objects, or individuals, within different contexts they illustrate the distinction between character and content better than proper names. It is because names differ from indexicals that they need to be considered apart from indexicals.

Indexicals have as their character linguistic rules determining different content in different contexts of utterance. This however, is not the case for proper names. Proper names seem to determine the same object in every context of utterance. In this way, names differ from indexicals and demonstratives. Kaplan claims that names have fixed content and fixed character; they pick out the same object in every context and circumstance of evaluation. Regardless of who uses a name, or when that name is used, it will always have the same content. It is because names have fixed content and character that Kaplan thought that the character and content distinction collapsed for proper names. For Kaplan, referent, content, and character all collapse into one for

proper names. It is the same object determined in every context, so it is the referent of a name that determines its content in a context. Because of this it is not aberrant to see proper names as having no meaning other than reference (1989b, p. 562). Kaplan does not explain how this will affect competent speakers' understanding of linguistic meaning of names.¹³

By claiming that the referent is the only meaning for names, one is then committed to claiming that any linguistically competent speaker that uses a name knows the referent, since that is what it has as its linguistic meaning. However, this is not observed in ordinary language users that are not properly acquainted with the referent, but still use a name after only hearing it once. Furthermore, now the character of a name will simply be the identity function, i.e. $f(x)=(x)$. The character of a proper name would be the function from an object to itself, e.g. from Kaplan to Kaplan. For the purpose of character, such a function is uninformative and not what a competent speaker understands.

Competent speakers can use a name to refer to its referent without knowing the referent. For Kaplan, denying that character is reference leads one to claim that names do not have a linguistic meaning. In this case, the outcome is undesirable. It is clear from the way we use names that a speaker can properly use a name without knowing the referent; a speaker can even use indexicals in some cases without any knowledge of the referent.

This can be seen with 'you'. Suppose someone overhears one side of a phone conversation not knowing who is on the other end. What is overheard is "I will meet

¹³ Kaplan did seem to have some hesitation with this claim. In "Demonstratives" (1989), after claiming that reference seemed to be the most obvious candidate for character, Kaplan says that if the character of a proper name is its reference then all co-referring proper names will have the same character and this implies that the competent speaker should know this, but does not (p. 562-563). He then mentions other possibilities, but does not defend them or give reasons for their place as character. One example Kaplan gives is causal chains, which are discussed below.

you at the corner of 11th and Race at 9 P.M.” Now, there is no way that it can be known by overhearing this sentence who the referent of ‘you’ is in this context, but the sentence can be understood by any competent English speaker. Speakers of English know that ‘you’ is context sensitive and as a rule, i.e. its character, determines its referent when a speaker uses it to address her addressee(s). Since there is a rule that linguistically competent speakers understand for indexicals the same should be true for proper names, but if the character of a name is its reference this is not so. In the next chapter, I will expound on this problem and try to include a possible solution while relying on the way in which names refer, as seen in chapter 3.

5. Names, their linguistic meaning, and how they refer

In the previous chapter, the focus was on the theory left after Kripke's arguments are considered. The remaining theory is what has been called 'direct reference'. According to direct reference, sentences containing directly referential terms, i.e. names, indexicals, and demonstratives, express singular propositions. The terms within the sentence each have character and content, which are the components of the character and content of the entire sentence. For indexicals and demonstratives, it is clear what character is, but for names character is not as clear

Determining the character of a proper name can be done by considering what the character of the term does, and by seeing what fits that criterion for names. Based on Kaplan's explanation of character for indexicals as a function leading to content and as the meaning that a competent speaker understands a criterion can be given for the character of proper names. Proper names do not refer by description, but instead through name-using practices. Though this is how names typically refer, it is neither a function nor what a competent speaker understands. But regardless of how names refer, the character of a proper name must be such that the competent speaker, at a minimum, can grasp the meaning as character of a term. How names refer and what is required to understand the terms will guide the search for the character of proper names.

Character of Proper Names

The function of character is to determine the referent in a context, or in all contexts for a name. Name-using practices showed that speakers that are members in a name-using practice can use a name to refer by intending to use the name in accordance with the name-using practice. Speakers that are not members in a practice refer in the

way Kripke explained. A speaker hears a name and intends to use it to refer in the same way as the speaker from whom it was learned. These name-users, i.e. the non-members, present a problem if it were claimed that name-using practices are the character of proper names. Character is also what competent language users know. Non-members in a name-using practice can still refer to an individual by using a name, but have no knowledge of the name-using practice. Name-using practices, alone, cannot account for the character of a proper name.

Kaplan's account of character for demonstratives was that it is a function from context to content. Though Kaplan felt that names differ from demonstratives in character, considering the role of character for demonstratives can illuminate what the character of a proper name should be. For indexicals and demonstratives, the rule that speakers understand and apply to the context gives the content. A competent speaker does not have to know the content of an indexical in order to understand another speaker's utterance containing an indexical (see above, chapter 4, p. 46).

The character of a name cannot be limited to name-using practices and will be whatever it is that a linguistically competent speaker understands when she understands the name and can use it to refer. Observations of competent speakers give a picture of what speakers can do when they understand a name, even at the most basic level. Speakers can refer when the name has only been heard once, although speakers do not know the referent when the name is first heard. Character cannot just be a name-using practice or chain of communication because to hear a name in a sentence does not introduce someone into a name-using practice. Just as in the 'you' case (CH. 4), a language user can overhear a sentence where a name is used and understand the utterance without knowing the referent of the name. A speaker may say, "Remind me to call Brian." If the addressee does not know the referent of 'Brian', she will still

understand the utterance, and will still refer to Brian when she says, “Remember, you need to call Brian.” Speakers that are unaware of reference, and the particular name-using practices involved, can still understand sentences containing the name. Since speakers can hear any name in a sentence, understand that sentence, and use the name to refer, some aspect of the character of a proper name must be common to all names.

When a speaker utters a sentence containing a name, there must be something in the meaning of the name that is common to all speakers, other than reference, that allows all competent speakers to understand the utterance without knowing the referent. When someone hears a sentence containing a name there is a fundamental aspect that must be grasped which is that the term is a name. When someone hears the words ‘Remind me to call Brian’, she does not understand the sentence if she does not know that ‘Brian’ is a name. Understanding a name within a sentence is at least to understand that it is a name. The listener may not know what the name names, i.e. whether it is a person, city, country, pet, or any object having a name, but must understand that it is a name. In order to understand that a term is a name, one must understand how names function in sentences containing them.

When a language user understands a term as a name, she grasps certain features that all names have in common. Pre-theoretically we can ask what a speaker using a name must know in order to be considered competent. Anyone that understands a name, by way of using it or understanding a sentence containing it, understands how and why names are used. I will call this ‘name*’. By grasping a name, someone understands:

Name*- that names are referential devices with a convention attached that determines a particular referent. That is, a name ‘*n*’ has a referent, and there is an *x* and a convention by which the term ‘*n*’ refers to *x* and *x* has the name, ‘*n*’, used in the utterance.

Name* is a rule that speakers follow. This information must be at least part of the character of a proper name. This is the minimum requirement that a speaker understands when she understands a name. When a speaker hears a term for the first time, and learns that it is a name, she does not know its value, but she can understand how that term should be used in a sentence, though she may never use it to utter a true sentence, or judge the truth-value of another's utterance. With name* in mind, we can ask what someone using a name without being a member of the practice does not know. The fringe name-users do not know what the referent is. How is one familiar with the referent? Through the name-using practice. So, for speakers that are not members of a name-using practice, but can still use a name to refer, there must be a name-using practice to give a referent as the value of the function. This, with name*, will all be considered in giving the character and argument for the character of a name.

The requirements espoused in regard to name* differ very little from that which is presented by Francois Recanati (1993). He starts with similar intuitions, which overlap the present view regarding name*. He claims that someone can use a name, and refer, when that person has never heard the name before. Based on this, what is required of a name-user will be minimal. It is similar to name*, since he claims that part of the linguistic meaning of a name is that it is a referential expression and that the name names its bearer, but the addition of an assumption gives Recanati's view a different nature. Recanati claims that names are like indexicals. Just as indexicals require context to determine content, so do names. Proper names, according to Recanati, have two conventions associated with them. There is a linguistic convention, which all names have in common, and a social convention, determined by context that determines the referent. I agree with Recanati that there is a common linguistic convention, but disagree on what that convention is. For Recanati, the linguistic

convention of a name goes from the name and context to the social convention; this linguistic convention is the character of a proper name and is a function, $f(c)$ =social convention, from context to social convention. The social convention, determined by the name and context, determines the link between the name and the referent. Nothing is said as to what the social convention is other than that it links the name to the referent. This leaves Recanati open to questions as to what type of convention this social convention is.

By relating names to indexicals in the way that he does, Recanati differs from what is supported here. We are in agreement that the character of all names will be the same, but differ on what the character is. Underlying Recanati's desire to make names like indexicals is an explicit assumption. He says:

[t]he conventions assigning bearers to proper names are not linguistic conventions. They are part of the context rather than part of the language. (1993, p. 138).

His claim is that it is reasonable to think that the social convention is not part of the linguistic convention because someone can understand the name without knowing the bearer. This distinction is based on linguistic competence and what a minimally competent speaker might understand. Recanati takes the same information and develops a theory that differs from what is espoused below.

In more detail, the view that Recanati puts forward is this. Names convey more than that they are referential expressions; meaning that they must have some sort of mode of presentation, i.e. character. Such a mode of presentation is that the referent of 'N' is presented as the bearer of 'N' by the linguistic convention in which proper names refer to their bearers (p. 139). This linguistic convention is the same for all proper names and coupled with the context determines the particular social convention which in turn determines the particular referent of each 'N'. The bearer of the name is

determined by a contextual, non-linguistic, matter, i.e. social convention, and for this reason Recanati claims that the reference of proper names depends on context like indexicals (p. 140). So Recanati's view is as follows:

1. Speakers that successfully use/understand a name know the character of that name.
2. Character is the same for all names, and is a function from context to social convention.
3. The various social conventions determine the referents.

For Recanati names with the same spelling are not homonyms,¹⁴ but are more like indexicals since character is the same for all names.

Accepting that name* is what all competent speakers need to understand leads to a view similar to Recanati's, but it will differ. The character of a name should determine the content of the name, but for Recanati, the function determines a social convention. There is nothing preventing the conclusion that a social convention, whatever it is, is the content of a name. This is a problem for Recanati, for if character is a function with the referent of the term as its value, the users of 'N' refer to a social convention, not to N. Recanati is deviating from what character was intended to be and making it more complex than it should be. In order to maintain direct reference, Recanati must insert another loop to get the result that a proposition <N,...> is expressed, not a proposition <Social convention,...>.

Even with this problem in mind, there is still something about this view that is appealing given the similarities in linguistic observations, i.e. name*. It seems as though there is something viable in claiming that the character of all names is the same, even though it departs from an initial inclination that names are homonyms. Just as linguistically competent speakers can use and understand indexicals without knowing the referent, so the same is true of names. As long as a speaker knows how to use a

¹⁴ For Recanati, if names were homonyms then speakers would need to know the reference in order to have a linguistically competent understanding of a name. For Recanati this could only happen if names were part of idiolects, a result he does not want to embrace. See Recanati (1993, p. 143-152).

name in general, she can be credited with understanding it. If names were homonyms, speakers would be required to understand the convention by which each name refers in order to understand that name. In this way names would then have a strongly local character (Recanati 1993, p. 146-148). Most names do not enter the usage of all members of the linguistic community. Names are local in that they are used primarily by only those that are acquainted with the referent, directly or indirectly. But due to this localness of names, speakers in general do not need to know anything about the referent of a name in order to use the name.

There is still a further problem for Recanati resulting from his claim that names are indexicals. Indexicals are such that once a speaker learns the rule for the indexical, she can use that indexical in any context and tend to make at least some true assertions.¹⁵ Linguistically competent speakers can understand utterances made by other speakers using indexicals even when it is not clear who the referent is. In the situation where someone overhears someone on the phone, there is at least a uniquely identifying description that can be inferred from hearing someone saying 'you' while on the phone, i.e. the x such that x is on the phone speaking to him [where 'him' refers demonstratively to the visible person heard speaking on the phone].

Unlike indexicals, speakers using names do not have all the same privileges once the rules of proper names, in general, are learned. Competent speakers entering new contexts can confidently use indexicals to refer to the same individual as the other speakers in the context, but names do not always allow this, i.e. the speaker could mistake the current name-using practice for another and refer to a different person. There must be something disparate between indexicals and proper names in what is known by someone using each. Suppose Jakob is a member of a name-using practice

¹⁵ I am here excluding trivial utterances such as 'you are human or you are not human' where 'you' refers to the same individual with both uses in the sentence. Anyone accepting bivalence would agree with a sentence of the form 'x is Φ or x is not- Φ '.

for 'John Smith'. Jakob and John are close friends, so there is no doubt that Jakob is a competent user of 'John Smith'. It can be assumed that if Jakob hears a sentence with a name, any name, in the sentence, he will understand it just so long as he knows the name is a name, because there is a basic understanding, i.e. name*, that all speakers have that know how to use names allowing them to use names that they have only heard once. When Jakob enters a new name-using practice, or thinks he enters a new name-using practice, he will have a basic understanding of the utterances due to his understanding of proper names.

The indexical view presented by Recanati fails when speakers unknowingly enter new name-using practices. When a speaker unknowing enters a new name-using practice, it is questionable what he says and how far he understands utterances. Rules for indexicals allow speakers to enter new contexts and avoid ambiguity. When Jakob enters a new 'John Smith' name-using practice, not knowing that it is a new practice, there will be confusion though it may not be apparent to the participants. Assume Jakob enters a pub and begins talking with a group of individuals who are talking about someone named 'John Smith'. Jakob assumes this is his close friend, but is mistaken; actually, it is someone else named 'John Smith' that Jakob has never come into contact with, and about whom he has no information or link. Jakob, not knowing that he was taking part in a different name-using practice, might make assertions that are true regarding his friend, John Smith, but false regarding the John Smith that the others are referring to by 'John Smith'. If proper names were like indexicals, there would be no confusion, but then the referent would be determined not by Jakob's intention. Again, if names were like indexicals, by knowing name*, Jakob would have known a rule that would allow him to competently use 'John Smith' in this, and every other, context, because character is simply a function from context to social convention. Jakob is

referring to a different person by 'John Smith' than the others are. If names were like indexicals and their character is a function from context to name-using practice, Jakob would have referred to the same person as everyone else due to the present context, but he still refers to his friend.

Jakob's intention to refer to his friend John Smith, along with his ability to manifest the practice he is participating in keeps him from referring to the other John Smith, although the others might not realise that he is referring to another person. He is still following the same rule for 'John Smith', but Jakob applied a different argument to the function. Recanati must conclude that somehow Jakob applied the wrong context. It is generally assumed that the context is apparent to those present, but if character is a function from context to social convention, Jakob did not know the context. For Recanati to maintain his position, he must claim that contexts are not transparent and can be misrecognised, since Jakob applied the wrong argument and overrode the function determining the social convention and in turn determined the referent on his own.

The linguistically competent speaker will at least understand how names work in sentences, but not every situation where the name applies. There are different degrees of linguistic understanding for names. All linguistically competent speakers will have a basic understanding of a name, i.e. name*, by knowing that it is a name. Recanati claimed this is all a speaker needs to understand to use any name in any context, but the example of Jakob showed that a speaker could unknowingly enter a new name-using practice and refer to someone else because he intends to use the name according to another name-using practice. So name-users can be unaware of the relevant current context. For if Jakob knew that he entered a new practice, he could have taken part in the new practice, but he did not know so he could not. What Jakob did is comparable to

using 'he', where a group of speakers use it for a referent that is salient, while Jakob used it to refer to someone from another context. No competent speaker would do this with an indexical without it being clear that he is referring to someone outside the current context, because there is no mistake over the relevant linguistic rule F , and the relevant context c .¹⁶

To avoid Recanati's complexities it can still be maintained that the character of all names is the same, but the arguments for the function will differ. There is a single function true of all names, which allows all speakers to use a name and refer regardless of whether or not they are members in the practice. All speakers knowing that a term is a name know how that term functions in the language. These speakers do not have to be part of a name-using practice to use the name, so long as the name is used with the intention that it refers to the same person as did the person from whom the term was learned. Hearing a name and using it in one conversation is not enough to initiate someone into a name-using practice. There is a boundary between membership in the overall linguistic community and membership in a particular local name-using practice. Part of Evans's criterion for sustaining a practice is that speakers learn and use the name of those in whom they have an interest. Learning a new name in a pub conversation does not make that person a member of the practice, if he walks away never to use or consider the name again. A superficial understanding of names was used to refer, utter sentences, and understand sentences. Being a member of a name-using practice differs from understanding how to use a name.¹⁷

¹⁶ There are likely some exceptions to this. If within the context of utterance and demonstration there is a carefully placed mirror, the speaker might refer to someone outside the relevant context thinking that the referent is clearly visible to the audience.

¹⁷ Kripke's account of chains of communication gives a clear account of using a name in conversations for the first time.

A Simpler View

On Recanati's view, the character of a name is a function from context to social convention. He claimed that the social convention then determines the referent. It is not clear exactly what the social convention is, but it must be something similar to a name-using practice. If this is so, then there is still more problems for Recanati's view when we consider those that are only briefly exposed to the name-using practice, i.e. those that are not members, but still use the name to refer. Here is how this will look. A new user of 'Brian' knows the function, but not the context. This seems odd, but on his account it must be so. If the social convention is, in fact, similar to name-using practices and the new user does not know which name-using practice is being invoked by the use of 'Brian', then she must be ignorant of the context. If she knew the context it would determine for her the name-using practice. The speaker has only heard the name once and is using the name, but is unaware of the name-using practice. It is not clear what that context would be.

Based on ideas, such as name* and some of Recanati's ideas, a better picture can be given. When someone hears a name for the first time, the hearer is ignorant of the relevant name-using practice. The relevant name-using practice is the context in one sense. The character of a name is the function from name-using practices to their referents. The hearer grasps this character and understands the name. The advantage of this view of character over Kaplan's, and Recanati's, is that the character of 'Brian' is now not a function from any context to the same referent (*pace* Kaplan), but a function from different contexts (different name-using practices) to different referents (*pace* Recanati). This allows name* to remain as knowledge of the character, of that common function, and this is consistent with the idea that speakers can use and understand names without being members in the relevant name-using practice. In essence, all names are synonyms, since they all have the same function, i.e. same character.

The function is a partial function from name-using practices to references. The function is partial because some name-using practices have no reference, or more than one reference, such as when two practices are accidentally combined. The rule is:

For any name-using practice p , $f(p)$ =the unique object x (if there is one) such that producers of p gather or gathered information about x .

In addition there is a social, i.e. pragmatic, partial function from context, in the Kaplan sense, of utterance to name-using practice employed: $g(c)=p$. As a pragmatic function, this is based on presuppositions of those participating in a given conversation. This function to p can be overridden. Consider again Jakob, or the introduction of a new John Smith as topic of a conversation. In the Jakob case, there is a breakdown in pragmatics, while in the latter the speakers are dictating the relevant argument.

Taking this overall line of argument I am forced to concede that names are not homonyms, but rather synonyms, but my account still differs from Recanati's indexical account. Again, like Recanati, I have two functions, but we differ on which function is the character. I claim that there are two senses of context: (1) that which is presented by Kaplan and is the argument in the pragmatic function, and (2) the name-using practice. The character of a name is the second function. For Recanati, it is the first, but there is also a difference in the second function generally. I am specific about the name-using practice and function where Recanati leaves this open. Unfortunately, seeing proper names as homonyms is more in line with the way we consider names, which leaves me with a counter-intuitive claim. Speakers intend to use a name in a particular way, and that name is associated with a single object through a name-using practice. Any speaker within a name-using practice, ignorant of any other object with the same name, would never use the name to refer to someone other than the source of the practice. It is tacitly known within a name-using practice that the members are referring to the same

individual. Though the surface structure of names may appear the same, there must be something that members of a practice can do that non-members cannot.

Earlier, with Jakob and 'John Smith', we saw that Jakob could refer to someone other than the John Smith currently under discussion. What we can see is that speakers that are members of name-using practices do not have to rely on the social (pragmatic) partial function in order to determine the name-using practice. Members know which practices they are a part of and can apply that practice accordingly, although this may cause confusion. Though we may at first want to claim that names with the same spelling are homonyms, because they refer to different individuals, this is not so. All names are synonyms, but for members in a given name-using practice, their ability to apply that practice to the function will always determine the referent they want, which gives rise to the view that names are homonyms. But the character of 'Brian' is the same as 'Kris', and the name-using practice applied for each will be different, so a particular name-using practice applied to the name function will always determine the same referent, or in the case of empty names and confused practices, no referent and multiple referents accordingly.

Now we can see the character of a name working for both members and non-members of name-using practices. When any competent speaker uses a proper name she has a degree of understanding that varies with her relation to the referent through the name-using practice. Speakers require a minimal understanding in order to use a name in some context. When a speaker joins a conversation where a name is being used for an individual unknown to the new participant, the speaker does not have to know anything other than name*. Knowing this demonstrates that the speaker is in command of the language, but not that she knows anything regarding the referent, or name-using practice, except that the referent bears the name used. Here, the name-using practice is

predetermined by the context, i.e. with the pragmatic function. Through interaction in the conversation some information can be gleaned allowing greater interaction within the conversation. When the speaker leaves the context, she must satisfy Evans's requirement of having an interest in the referent in order to continue using the name. To refer outside the first conversation the speaker must have a greater understanding than name*. She must have an interest in joining the practice, placing her at an early stage of being a consumer. Questions will be asked such as 'I was talking to so-and-so about N. Who is N?'.

What speakers understand and grasp will differ between speakers that are not part of a name-using practice, consumers, and producers. Those outside the practice know name*, which allows them to refer with a name when using it properly. When a speaker goes from being outside a practice, i.e. never hearing the name as part of the practice or only superficially exposed to the name-using practice, to being a consumer there is a vague distinction, whereas the distinction between consumer and producer is clear. Consumers and producers have information that allows them to grasp the propositions expressed by sentences containing names of which they are members of the name-using practice regarding that name. All competent speakers that understand a name understand name*, so it can be assumed that in order to be a member of a name-using practice, at the consumer and producer stages, these speakers are competent. As a consumer, the understanding that one has allows her to gather information and use the name in ways that the community of name-users see fit. This means that in most circumstances a consumer will make assertions that the members of the name-using practice believe to be true. Rumours might corrupt the information in the practice, but the members of the practice take this to be factual and this results in false information being part of the practice. Consumers are in a position that allows them to make

inferences, both deductive and inductive, regarding the referent of the name based on the information she gathered. Such inferences may be simple inferences such as Charles plays the bass guitar, Charles is a philosopher, therefore Charles plays the bass guitar and is a philosopher, or an advanced inductive inference might be made based on more complex reasoning. Since Charles loves to eat cheese steaks and pizza, and while he is on vacation tends not to worry about his diet, while he is visiting Philadelphia he will probably eat cheese steaks and pizza. Those that are not members of the name-using practice do not have the information that members do, so they cannot make such inferences. Those speakers outside a name-using practice can understand an utterance involving 'Charles', but cannot grasp the proposition expressed by that utterance.¹⁸ Non-members are not aware of the referent of a name, but only the function, so they only have linguistic understanding. So they do not know which proposition they express using 'Charles'. By uttering 'Charles is bald', they assert ⟨Charles, bald⟩, but do not know it.

Returning to Jakob, something must be said, because like Recanati, my claim that names are synonyms is subject to the same problem as his claim that names are indexicals. For Recanati, there was an ultimatum: either accept the Jakob story as a counter-example, or accept that contexts are not transparent. This is a problem for Recanati, since he claims that the Kaplan style context is the argument in the linguistic function, but for my view, Kaplan style context is the argument in the pragmatic function. The same problem arises, but it is a pragmatic problem. Context is not transparent in the sense that there are cases where we get the context wrong. Typically this does not happen. Presuppositions on behalf of the conversational participants generally pick out the right name-using practice, but similar presuppositions can lead

¹⁸ There might be something similar here to what Alice says after hearing the Jabberwocky Poem in *Through the Looking Glass*. Alice was able to recognise what the terms were doing in the sentences, but unable to grasp the proposition.

speakers astray. For this reason it is a pragmatic problem, not a linguistic problem as it is for Recanati.

The character of a proper name is more complex than was first thought. Kaplan felt that because names have the same content (i.e. its reference) in every context, its character is just its reference. My claim, like Recanati's, is more radical: all names have the same character, even though they have different references. But Recanati sees this common character as a function from contexts to different social conventions. Neither Kaplan nor Recanati supports the practical application of names in name-using practices. Speakers refer through the links of a name-using practice. Accepting Recanati's view entails claiming that the way speakers refer when using a name is not part of its character. So far as character itself is concerned, speakers using N in context refer to a social convention, not to N itself. Kaplan gave the counter intuitive result that character is just reference. Neither should be the desired result.

In general, character is important to language. It is the meaning of a term such that it is what a competent speaker understands. It also puts the speaker in a particular relation to the referent. With demonstratives and indexicals, this will often be perceptual, although not always visual. For demonstratives, there is a demonstration, and for non-demonstrative indexicals a rule that automatically determines the referent in context. Names place the speaker in relation to the referent by way of the name-using practice attached to the name. For names, there is a chain of communication relating speaker to referent. The use of a demonstration for a demonstrative will place the audience in a perceptual perspective to the referent. The acquisition of a name and placement within the name-using practice will place speakers in a relation to the referent, depending on how the term was acquired. But this might simply be a relation wherein the individual knows N is named 'N'.

6. Problems for Direct Reference

Substitution in Belief Contexts

When a speaker is attributed a belief, and that belief is *de re*, it is a belief regarding an object. To say that Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, is to say that Ralph's belief is of an object, Ortcutt, not of an aggregate of properties or concepts. Direct reference explains *de re* belief as a propositional attitude, where the propositional content of the entire belief attribution is a relation between an individual and a singular proposition. Belief, knowledge, assertion, and doubt are only a few examples of such attitudes. They are relations that individuals have with propositions based on a given attitude. The proposition of the attitude need not always be singular, but if it is not, then it is not *de re*. Direct reference claims that sentences like 'Ortcutt is a spy' express a singular proposition containing Ortcutt¹⁹ and the property of spy-hood, represented as:

⟨Ortcutt, spy-hood⟩.

When Ralph believes this proposition he believes of Ortcutt, that he is a spy. Belief of an object is what any theory of *de re* belief should explain.

The problem that arises for direct reference with regard to propositional attitudes is the substitution of co-referring terms. Direct reference claims that the propositional content of a name is its referent. No matter what name is used to refer to the object, the content remains the same, as long as the name is a name for that object. Direct reference must claim that any singular proposition believed by an individual can be expressed using any name for the object in the subordinate clause. 'Tom believes that Cicero is an orator' can be represented by the following ordered triple:

¹⁹ This example originates in a problem Quine presented for *de re* belief. He questioned the ability to quantify into belief contexts. Quine's worry was in regard to names, descriptions, and quantification. It is roughly the same problem as that which is presented below.

⟨Tom, ⟨Cicero, being-an-orator⟩, belief⟩.

The proposition comprises Tom, the belief relation, and the singular proposition comprising Cicero and the property of being an orator. Tom believes of Cicero that *he* is an orator. At first glance, this is what is wanted for *de re* belief, but it is questionable whether the truth-value of ‘Tom believes of Cicero that he is an orator’ remains the same if ‘Tully’ were to replace ‘Cicero’, where the two names are co-referential. The intuition is that the truth-value changes, since we are assuming that Tom himself would never assent to ‘Tom believes of Tully that he is an orator’. The semantic framework for direct reference maintains that both sentences express the same proposition, so there is no way the truth-value can differ when ‘Tully’ replaces ‘Cicero’. This problem can be made clear by considering the examples given by Kripke.

Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief

In his article, “A Puzzle about Belief” (1979), Kripke presents a clear picture of the problem posed for direct reference due to *de re* belief contexts. Kripke makes his assumptions clear so there can be no question regarding the relation that the individuals have toward an object, but it is because of this that the puzzle ensues. Kripke presents different situations to show that the puzzle is complex and is genuinely a puzzle. There is an inherent problem in the attribution of belief to a singular proposition. Either there are contradictions, or many speakers are irrational, it seems.

In order to get to the puzzle, Kripke makes some assumptions explicit. The *Disquotation Principle*, *Strengthened Disquotation*, and the *Principle of Translation* are all clearly stated as assumptions. Kripke is only interested in *de re* beliefs, and though

he expresses them in the form 'Tom believes that *Fa*' these are to be understood as *de re* regarding *a*.²⁰

Kripke first gives the disquotation principle as a way of justifying claims that a speaker holds a particular belief. He gives the principle as follows:

Disquotation Principle-If a normal English Speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to '*p*' then he believes that *p*. (Kripke 1979, p. 112-113)

This principle allows us to attribute beliefs to speakers. It may be debatable whether or not the principle is the best way to determine belief states; there is no clear way for anyone to be sure of the mental states of any other individual. This is an assumption. Without it, or any other similar principle, it would be impossible to make any claim that a speaker holds a particular belief.

Kripke goes on to strengthen the conditions of the disquotation principle and make it a bi-conditional. He gives it as:

Strengthened Disquotation-A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to '*p*' if and only if he believes that *p*. (p. 113)

Kripke presents strengthened disquotation as a clear assumption about belief states and as a preventative measure. The disquotational principle alone leads to the belief that *p* and the belief that $\sim p$, just so long as the speaker makes the assertions of '*p*' and ' $\sim p$ '. The requirements of the strengthened disquotational principle attribute belief and non-belief based on assent and silence respectively. As stated, these principles are limited; disquotation and strengthened disquotation, taken alone, only deal with English speakers.

In order for these principles to explain belief for non-English speakers, qualification is needed; Kripke does this by way of the principle of translation.

²⁰ This practice will be accepted here and throughout this work.

Principle of Translation-If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then any translation of it into any other language also expresses a truth (in that other language). (p. 114)

This principle is based on the assumption that two sentences in different languages can express the same proposition. Without such a principle, there would be no way to translate one language into another. With these assumptions in place, Kripke is ready to derive his puzzle.

Kripke gives a clear example, which provides insight into the ensuing problem.

Consider Pierre, who was raised in Paris and is a mono-linguistic French speaker who never left France; he sees brochures in French for the city of *Londres*. Pierre reads in French about *Londres* and makes a decision based on what he read that he could express by '*Londres est jolie*'. Pierre asserts and believes the proposition expressed by '*Londres est jolie*', so by disquotation and the principle of translation it can be inferred that Pierre believes that London is pretty. After some time, Pierre moves to London and learns English by immersion. Pierre is placed in an unattractive area of London and never leaves this area. Due to the depressed area Pierre experiences in London, he asserts "London is not pretty." Based on Kripke's translation and disquotation principles, it can be said that Pierre believes a proposition and its negation. One might say that Pierre has changed his mind, but if asked, Pierre maintains all his beliefs from when he lived in Paris. Pierre would not hesitate to assert both that London is not pretty and that *Londres est jolie*.

What can be said of Pierre's beliefs? Does Pierre believe that London is pretty or not? There is empirical evidence based on Pierre's assertions to support both the attribution of the belief that London is pretty and the attribution of the belief that London is not pretty. So is Pierre irrational? It seems that this is not what one would want to claim, but based on direct reference semantics Pierre believes a proposition and its negation. Kripke has an underlying assumption that no rational person would do

such a thing. Moreover, if it is accepted that Pierre is irrational, then given strengthened disquotation there is a contradiction for anyone asserting that Pierre believes the contradiction, since Pierre refuses to assert 'London is pretty'. Strengthened disquotation implies that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. By asserting that Pierre believes that *Londres est jolie* and that he does not believe that London is pretty, we contradict ourselves. Strengthened disquotation is strong enough to imply that from Pierre's refusal to assent to 'London is pretty' that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. This is the puzzle.

The case of Pierre and London is clear example of the inability to substitute co-referring terms even in a *de re* belief ascription. 'London' and '*Londres*' are both names for London, in English and French respectively. According to direct reference, in the sentence 'Pierre believes that London is not pretty' it is possible to substitute '*Londres*' for 'London' *salva veritate* since both names have the same import in the proposition. This claim is strengthened by the principle of translation. However, this is where the problem appears. If '*Londres*' takes the place of 'London', Pierre would never agree with such a sentence. He would likely be obstinately opposed to its assertion. Again, the question remains, does Pierre believe London is pretty or not? It seems that for Pierre, it depends on what term is used to refer to London. If that is the case, then there is a problem with the semantics of direct reference.

To push this even further, Kripke makes the claim that based on Pierre's assertions we can claim that he does and does not believe London is pretty. Again, based on strengthened disquotation, Pierre's reluctance to assent to 'London is pretty' implies that he does not believe that London is pretty, but his assertion of '*Londres est jolie*' implies that he does believe that London is pretty, so there is a contradiction not just in Pierre's head. The contradiction is not only something that Pierre believes, but

can be attributed to anyone attributing both belief and non-belief to Pierre. Direct reference semantics leads to cases of clear contradictions when speakers try to make substitutions in belief contexts. It would seem, in opposition to direct reference, that there is some basis for thinking that it matters what term is used in reference.

In order to make things even more complicated, Kripke gives another example where the names do not differ. Consider Peter and Paderewski. Paderewski is both a politician and a pianist. Peter is aware of Paderewski's success as a Polish statesman, and Peter has also heard of a great Polish pianist named 'Paderewski'. Unknown to Peter, the pianist named 'Paderewski' and the statesman named 'Paderewski' are one and the same. According to Peter, there is no way that such a great pianist could also be the chief framer of the Polish Constitution. In this case, it can be said that Peter believes that Paderewski is a pianist and Peter believes Paderewski is not a pianist, along with the beliefs that Paderewski is a great statesman and that Paderewski is not a great statesman. According to the view of direct reference presented, it is clear that Peter believes contradictions, which would be reason to consider him irrational. But, it seems unintuitive to say that Peter is irrational. It is an extraordinary achievement to be both a great pianist and a great statesman. It is therefore reasonable of Peter to assume that there are two individuals both with the name 'Paderewski'. There is nothing wrong with Peter's logic. It is a legitimate assumption to believe that a great statesman is not a great musician, but this places Peter in the same situation as Pierre. Both Pierre and Peter believe of individuals respectively, that the individual has a property and does not have that property.

The Peter and Paderewski case is even more puzzling than that of Pierre and London. In this case, no substitution is made, yet it results in contradiction. Peter makes claims that seem to be obviously inconsistent. He is claiming that Paderewski is

a pianist and that Paderewski is not a pianist. When Peter makes the assertions he uses the name 'Paderewski' in both utterances.

The propositional attitudes argument against direct reference is a clear argument with some basic assumptions. According to direct reference, *de re* belief is the belief in a singular proposition. The sentences (1) and (2) express the same singular proposition just as (3) and (4) express the same proposition:

- (1) Cicero is an orator;
- (2) Tully is an orator;
- (3) Tom believes Cicero is an orator;
- (4) Tom believes Tully is an orator.

A reflective speaker, like Tom, can believe that (1) expresses something true, while (2) expresses something false. This results in the inference being made that (3) is true and (4) is false, but according to direct reference (3) and (4) express the same proposition, so they must either both be true or both false. It is assumed that if (1) and (2) express the same proposition, a reflective speaker will not believe that one is true and the other false. According to direct reference Tom believes a proposition and its negation are both true; therefore, Tom is either irrational or direct reference is incorrect. The key to the argument against direct reference is its assumption that a rational speaker would never believe a proposition and its negation. Direct reference is left in a difficult position against what seemed at first to be a clear explanation of *de re* belief.

Not Just a Problem for Direct Reference

When Kripke's "A Puzzle about Belief" is discussed, the focus is typically on the development of the puzzle. When responses are given to the puzzle, discussion is usually limited to the effect it has on direct reference theories. Kripke does more than

present a puzzle for proponents of direct reference. In many cases, it is assumed that descriptive theories can handle the problem of propositional attitudes, and therefore should be preferred to that of direct reference. The first section of “A Puzzle about Belief” gives an analysis of Frege and Russell that questions their ability to explain propositional attitudes. In many ways, what Kripke presents is a further argument against descriptivist theories placing both descriptive and direct reference theories on level ground in relation to the problem of propositional attitudes.

Descriptive theories claim to explain hesitations to substitute co-referring terms in propositional attitude ascriptions. As was seen with Frege, names cannot be validly substituted in subordinate clauses unless the terms have the same sense. Underlying this claim is the assumption that two names may have the same sense. For Russell, even if two names co-refer they will not have the same uniquely identifying definite description. Without sameness of sense, two terms cannot be substituted in embedded statements without the possibility of altering the truth-value. On descriptive theories the reluctance to substitute co-referring names in propositional attitudes is defended because in Fregean terms the thought believed will differ when the names have different senses. Believing one thought is not the same as believing another thought expressed by a sentence with a substitution instance of a co-referring term.

As was seen with Frege, there is an intuitive appeal to this view, but that appeal is lost when Frege is forced to consider indexicals and demonstratives. When indexicals and demonstratives are considered in propositional attitudes, it is worse for Frege. Consider Joe and Tim having a conversation where Joe sincerely says to Tim, “Micah is a thief.” Tim, knowing that Joe is a gossip, wants to tell Micah about the way Joe spoke about him behind his back. He later goes on to report the conversation to Micah. Tim says, “Joe believes that you are a thief” to Micah; then, to other friends he says, “Joe

believes that he [pointing at Micah] is a thief.” In doing this, Tim has substituted ‘you’ for ‘Micah’, and ‘he’ for ‘you’ or ‘Micah’. On Frege’s view, there is no way that the sense for ‘Micah’, ‘you’, or ‘he’ in the contexts of the utterances is the same, yet there is never any question as to the validity of the substitution. When speakers report the beliefs of others, they often do so by using indexicals or demonstratives. The terms substituted do not have the same sense, but are typically substituted. The sameness of sense requirement fails when indexicals and demonstratives are considered. This is a problem for descriptive explanations of propositional attitudes, but it is not the one Kripke presents. Kripke presents the puzzle in such a way that the senses become irrelevant and the puzzle is a puzzle for all theories of names.

Sameness of sense or sameness of descriptions, in attitude ascriptions is not sufficient to bolster descriptivism beyond Kripke’s earlier criticisms. Failure of co-referring terms can no longer be considered as solely due to differing senses for names (p. 110). Two names with the same sense can result in the failure to substitute co-referring terms in attitude ascriptions. Given the translation principle, ‘London’ and ‘*Londres*’ have the same sense, so if (5) and (6) do differ in truth-value, this cannot be due to different senses:

(5) Pierre believes London is pretty;

(6) Pierre croit que Londres est jolie.

Differences in sense no longer explain away the seemingly irrational nature of Pierre’s beliefs. This can also be seen with ‘Paderewski’:

(7) Peter believes Paderewski is a statesman;

(8) Peter believes Paderewski is not a statesman.

According to the description given for Peter, both (7) and (8) seem true, so Peter is ascribed contradictory beliefs. Kripke sees this as wrong, so we have this puzzle (p.

131). Descriptive theories of names do not help here, just as in the Pierre case. With Pierre, the same sense was given to 'London' and '*Londres*' through the principle of translation, while with Peter the same name is used, by *us* note. Whatever descriptive content, or other sense, 'Paderewski' is given, it is the same in both reports since it is *we* who use the same name twice in these reports. The criticism of direct reference was that there must be different senses for names in order to explain why names should not be substituted in attitude ascriptions. The examples that Kripke gave question this since his examples do not differ in sense.

A descriptivist might respond by claiming that regarding 'London' and '*Londres*' the principle of translation can be denied. In doing so, each name is considered part of a different idiolect and is untranslatable. This will only slow Kripke's puzzle since it might discredit one example. Kripke's example of 'Paderewski' requires no translation, as it only requires a single name. Any response to Kripke's puzzle must explain why the problem exists for cases where there is only one name, such as 'Paderewski', as well as cases where the names differ.

Overall, Kripke is presenting a new attack against descriptivism that differs from his previous arguments in *Naming and Necessity*. Descriptivism claims that direct reference cannot account for differences in the truth-value of (3) and (4). Descriptivists have that intuition; for otherwise, we are left asserting (3) and (3n):

(3n) Tom believes Cicero is not an orator.

It seems now that Tom should be credited with being irrational. Kripke disagrees and claims that the descriptivist's claim that the names have different senses, and therefore the sentences can have different truth-values, does not solve the problem. The problem does not arise for Tom, but only when the attributions are made. It is the attributers of belief that give 'London' and '*Londres*' the same sense, and it is for us that there is one

name 'Paderewski' with a single sense (p. 125). In Kripke's examples, the claim that there are multiple senses is not available, since it was us that used the terms, and in the language of the belief report the names 'London' and '*Londres*' are synonyms and 'Paderewski' is a single name. Avoidance of (3) and (3n) was the reason for giving different senses to 'Cicero' and 'Tully', but no such move is available in (5) and (6), or (7) and (8). Reluctance to assert (3) and (4) should not be evidence in support of descriptive theories over direct reference. Any solution given for (5) and (6), or (7) and (8), will aptly apply to (3) and (3n) making descriptivism superfluous and discrediting its motivation.

Kripke's claims do not show direct reference handles propositional attitude ascriptions any better than descriptive explanations, but do show that descriptive explanations lack any clear advantage over direct reference. What Kripke has done is shown that there is no reason to favour the Fregean account over the direct reference account in respect to propositional attitude ascriptions. An area where direct reference is often considered inferior to descriptivism is now an area where both views can be considered problematic.

Propositional attitudes present a clear problem for direct reference and a problem for descriptivism when non-ideal situations are considered. No one theory can be favoured over the other based on typical handling of propositional attitudes. In other aspects of language, direct reference presented a correct analysis of reference. A common move is to reject direct reference in favour of descriptivism because of the way each handles propositional attitude ascriptions. Since there is no reason to favour descriptivism over direct reference with regard to attitude ascriptions, other aspects of the theories should reflect which theory is favoured. Direct reference gives a clear

picture of reference in other areas, so instead of rejecting it, a solution to the attitude problem for direct reference should be sought.

Before solutions can be considered, some notes on Kripke's assumptions must be made. Based on considerations from chapters 4 and 5, the disquotation principle and principle of translation must be strengthened. The disquotation principle must be strengthened to incorporate membership in a name-using practice. If a speaker cannot grasp the proposition asserted, then her sincere assertion is not enough for belief. So the disquotation principle should be:

Disquotation Principle*-If a normal English Speaker who is the member of a name-using practice *n*, on reflection, sincerely assents to '*p*', where '*p*' is a sentence containing '*n*', then he believes that *p*.

This takes into consideration a speaker's place in the name-using practice.

Kripke's principle of translation must also be strengthened. If the principle is held as Kripke states it, then non-co-referring names could be translated because all names have the same character, and are therefore synonyms. A clear strengthening of the principle of translation that would satisfy these conditions is required, but at this point requires more development. This goes beyond the scope of this project, but it is clear that the principle cannot be stated strictly in terms of extension, since this would mean that co-extensive predicates could be translated even when there would be no reason to do so based on character.

7. Pragmatic Responses to the Problem of Propositional Attitude Ascriptions

Pragmatics

In dealing with the substitution of co-referring terms in propositional attitude ascriptions many solutions have been presented. In a view based on Quine, Graeme Forbes (1997) claims that *de re* attitude ascriptions are of the person 'so-called'. Others, such as Larson and Segal (1995), claim that the interpreted logical form of a sentence dictates that when substitutions are made there is a new truth-condition for the new sentence. Still others support descriptive analyses of attitude ascriptions.

Recently some philosophers, such as Nathan Salmon (1986) and Scott Soames (2002), have given pragmatic analyses of propositional attitude ascriptions. Their claim is that there is more information than the semantic content in an utterance. The semantics of direct reference gives the truth-conditions for statements containing directly referential terms, but there is more to an utterance than the semantics. Pragmatic responses claim that there is information, in addition to the semantic information, that is pragmatically imparted in an utterance. Pragmatic analyses, such as those given by Salmon and Soames, claim that pragmatic information is often confused with semantic information; in many cases, the information, which is pragmatic, is often wrongly considered semantic by theorists and the general body of language users.

Pragmatic responses are based on the observations put forward by H.P. Grice (1989). Grice claimed that there are often cases where more is expressed than what semantics offers. Consider the way speakers use 'and'. Truth-functionally, the connective 'and' can connect two sentences and have a value of true just so long as both conjuncts are true. Often speakers use 'and' to do something more than this. In some

instances, speakers of English use 'and' to express temporal ordering. 'P and Q' often means P happened and then Q happened, but the semantics do not require, or express, this. Semantically, 'Jack turned the key and the car started' has the same value as 'The car started and Jack turned the key'. Some speakers might refrain from uttering the latter because pragmatically speakers use 'and' to express temporal order, and that would impart information that is anachronistic.

Information that goes beyond what is semantically expressed by a sentence, or sentences, is known as an implicature. Consider the sentence 'I am David', which has the semantic content, or proposition expressed, $\langle\langle\text{object, object}\rangle, \text{identity}\rangle$, i.e. $\langle\langle\text{David, David}\rangle, \text{identity}\rangle$. This sentence can convey different information within different contexts. It can be assumed that the context is an introduction such that the speaker, introducing himself, utters 'I am David'. It is clear that what the speaker is trying to convey could be better stated as 'My name is 'David''. This is not what was semantically expressed by the sentence. The semantic content of the sentence is the same as the speaker uttering 'I am me', 'David is David', and someone else uttering 'He is he', all of which seem in the present context to be ridiculous things to say. There is a conventional implicature that takes place when the string of words 'I am David' is uttered. It may happen in this way. A participant is in a given context where she wants to learn the speaker's name. The speaker utters 'I am David'; semantically expressing that o is o relative to the assignment of David to o . The listener does some reasoning; this is probably done sub-consciously, based on the words chosen. She knows that 'I' is a way for the speaker to refer to himself. The speaker said that he is David. The listener knows that the speaker is David. 'David' was the term chosen to refer to David; the listener makes the inference that because 'David' was used to refer to the speaker, 'David' is the speaker's name. In this way, by saying 'I am David', the speaker implies

the information that could have been stated by 'My name is 'David''. The truth of the original statement along with conventions of the language brings the listener from a statement of identity to the implied attribution of a name. This is a custom of English users. The same custom may occur within other cultures, but it does not matter; this is a custom that is used by speakers of English, and is clearly a case where what is pragmatically imparted goes beyond the semantics of the terms based on inferences and conventions.

Pragmatic explanations of propositional attitude ascriptions depend on speakers conveying more information than the semantic content of an utterance. According to direct reference, the semantic content of a name is just its referent, so the semantic content of a true sentence of the form 'n₁ is n₂' is that o is o under the assignment of o to the names 'n₁' and 'n₂'. Semantically there is not much to identity statements, so pragmatics does most of the work in situations like this. An utterance of 'Cicero is Tully' conveys the information that the statement is true and that the two names are co-referential. In the same way, 'Cicero was an orator' imparts the information that someone bears the name 'Cicero'. This is not information semantically expressed.

It is instances such as those stated above, as well as common rhetorical devices such as sarcasm, metaphor, and irony, that inspired views such as those put forward by Salmon and Soames. Yet, they each have different approaches and applications of pragmatics. Salmon uses pragmatics to explain how directly referential terms carry information beyond reference. Soames uses pragmatics in line with his semantic pluralism. For Soames, utterances can express more than one proposition. With each utterance, there is a range of propositions asserted. Some of these propositions are pragmatic propositions carrying information beyond semantic content. Both pragmatic

approaches will be considered starting with Soames and then moving to Salmon, due to the appeal that the latter's view has.

Pluralistic Pragmatic Assertions

In trying to deal with co-referential names within attitude ascriptions, Soames presents a pragmatic solution to the problem. According to Soames, the semantic content of a name is simply its referent. This is where the problem of attitude ascriptions arises. Attitude ascriptions appear to be, as Quine called them, referentially opaque. A referentially opaque context does not allow the substitution of co-referring names. When we try to substitute co-referring names into a belief attribution it intuitively seems to change the truth-value, but if the semantic content of a name is simply its referent, this cannot be so. What follows will be Soames's account of attitude ascriptions that he provides in *Beyond Rigidity* (2002), in addition to some criticisms of his approach.

Soames claims that in non-metaphorical contexts the semantic proposition is expressed, i.e. singular propositions where names or demonstratives are used, but there are cases where the context is non-metaphorical and there is also a pragmatic proposition asserted and intended. Soames introduces what he calls 'partially descriptive names'. Paradigm examples of partially descriptive names are 'New York City', 'Prof. Saul Kripke', and 'Philadelphia, Pennsylvania'. Names such as these carry descriptive information that a speaker must grasp in order to understand the names. A speaker cannot be credited with competence with the name 'New York City' if she does not know that it is a city, or with 'Philadelphia Pennsylvania' if she does not know that Philadelphia is in Pennsylvania.²¹ Soames claims that partially descriptive names

²¹ 'Philadelphia, Pennsylvania' differs from 'Philadelphia'. A speaker can be competent with 'Philadelphia' and not know it is in Pennsylvania, but cannot be competent with 'Philadelphia, Pennsylvania' without knowing it is in Pennsylvania.

express information of the form ‘...the x : $Dx \ \& \ x = n...$ ’, so the semantic content for ‘Prof. Saul Kripke’ could also be expressed by ‘the x such that x is a professor, and x is Saul Kripke’ (p. 88). It is also Soames’s claim that in some non-metaphorical contexts ordinary, linguistically simple, proper names pragmatically impart information that would be the same as the semantic information if they were partially descriptive.²² Soames would claim that this information is apparent among friends or a particular group. When some philosophers use ‘Plato’ it may be in a way such that ‘Plato said that...’ is used to express ‘Plato, the greatest philosopher, said that...’. Two users of a name need not believe that the descriptive information applies, but for the hearer to grasp the pragmatic proposition, she must be aware that the speaker believes it.

Soames is not rejecting semantics for a pragmatic account of language. In most ordinary contexts it is the semantic content that is intended to be asserted. When a speaker uses a proper name along with a predicate, or two names and a two-place predicate, she simply means the object(s) and the property, or relation. The semantic proposition that is expressed is what any competent language user would understand, or express, in any non-metaphorical context. Though metaphorical contexts are common, and contexts where a pragmatic proposition is the intended proposition are also common, it can be maintained that in most contexts the primary proposition intended is the semantic proposition (p. 228).

Within contexts where it appears that the semantic proposition is the only proposition expressed, there may be a pragmatic proposition that the speaker is trying to assert. Among friends it would not be incorrect to say that particular words have an enhanced meaning, e.g. as was seen with information associated with name-using

²² Soames uses ‘linguistically simple proper name’ in contrast to ‘partially descriptive names’. A linguistically simple proper name is just a name that has its referent as its semantic content, whereas a partially descriptive name’s semantic content is partially descriptive as is seen above. While discussing Soames’s position and criticisms of his view, I will use his terminology in order to avoid confusion.

practices. Soames makes this claim with regard to names. According to Soames, in some contexts, often among friends sharing an acquaintance, speakers and hearers may associate some descriptive information D with a name ' n '. In cases such as this, an assertive utterance of a sentence that includes ' n ', i.e. ' $\dots n \dots$ ', may express the proposition expressed by ' \dots the x : $Dx \ \& \ x=n \dots$ '. However, the descriptive content of such an expression, and that which is associated with ' n ', varies over contexts, so the description is limited to a contextually defined group that happen to share that descriptive content (p. 210). Soames claims that this is what happens within many attitude ascriptions.

Soames accepts that there is a plurality of propositions asserted when a speaker makes an utterance. These propositions range over possible information asserted. Above, it was claimed that speakers make inferences from semantic content to metaphorical content, or pragmatic content. Soames claims something different. He claims that there is a range of propositions, P_1, \dots, P_n , asserted with an utterance. Speakers intend any one proposition, but all are asserted (p. 69, 215). The range of propositions is such that the speaker can intend any one of them and they must together cover any proposition that the speaker might intend. Within this range of propositions, there is an intended proposition that in the case of, for example, successful metaphor and sarcasm is generally the understood proposition. Those present still have to make inferences (probably unconsciously) that lead to the intended proposition, but nonetheless, the intended pragmatic proposition is asserted along with the semantic proposition, if different.

When we consider attitude ascriptions, as in Kripke's puzzles, our intuition tells us that the substitution of co-referring names does not maintain truth-value. Mary may believe that F_n but claims that she does not believe F_m , where ' n ' and ' m ' refer to the

same object and our intuitions say this is ok. The problem, as stated above, is that the proposition expressed by ‘Mary believes that F_n ’ and ‘Mary believes that F_m ’ are the same according to direct reference, but since we know that Mary claims that she does not believe the proposition expressed by ‘ F_m ’ there is a tendency to judge the latter belief-report as expressing something false while the former something true. The account that Soames gives, when applied to attitude ascriptions, results in maintaining these intuitions regarding truth-value. Soames claims that in some contexts there is a pragmatic proposition expressed but it would be better expressed by a sentence containing a partially descriptive name. In such a case, the pragmatic proposition is expressed along with the semantic proposition, where the pragmatic proposition may have descriptive content related to the name used. It is the pragmatic proposition that is believed by Mary, and since the pragmatic propositions may vary according to which name is used in the sentence there is no conflict, the two sentences express different pragmatic propositions: one that contains the object o and a description D_1 ; another that contains o and a description D_2 . Mary’s beliefs are such that she believes two pragmatic propositions that are not contradictory, i.e. she believes that the $x:D_1x \ \& \ x = n$ is F and does not believe that the $x:D_2x \ \& \ x = n$ is F , but it would be incorrect to express those propositions with sentences that make the original pragmatic proposition the semantic proposition of the new sentence.

This point can be illustrated further.²³ Consider three friends Tom, Dick, and Harry. These three friends all drink coffee in the same café, where it happens that Peter Hempel also drinks coffee. Though none of them are close friends with Peter Hempel they are acquainted with him to the extent that they speak to him on occasion and know that his name is ‘Peter Hempel’. Tom, Dick, and Harry all share similar descriptive

²³ This is one of the examples that Soames gives. I here condense and restate it.

information regarding Peter Hempel; they think of him as the elderly, white haired man of their acquaintance. Tom, Dick, and Harry have also read some philosophy of science materials by Carl Hempel. The three friends again share a description associated with 'Carl Hempel' such that he is a famous philosopher.

Now, one day Tom happens to read in the newspaper that the philosopher Carl Hempel died, he then reports this information to Dick. He says (1):

(1) Carl Hempel died last week.

According to direct reference, (1) expresses a proposition concerning the man, Mr. Hempel, and the property of having died last week. Since 'Peter Hempel' and 'Carl Hempel' are co-referring names, in (1) we should be able to substitute 'Peter Hempel' for 'Carl Hempel' and maintain the truth-value, since both sentences would express the same proposition.

(2) Peter Hempel died last week.

The truth-value of (1) and (2) is dependent on the object alone. We can extend the scenario a bit further. Dick, knowing that his friend Harry would care to know this, decides to tell him in the form of (3):

(3) Tom believes that Carl Hempel died last week.

If we applied the same substitution to (3), we get (4), but in this case our intuition leads us to question whether or not the truth-value can be maintained, although according to direct reference it should.

(4) Tom believes that Peter Hempel died last week.

If asked, Tom would not assent to the sentence 'Peter Hempel died last week' even though this is what he semantically asserted when he uttered (1). Soames's pragmatic analysis regarding contextually related descriptions and pragmatic propositions claims to explain why this is so.

When we consider the information that we have regarding Tom, Dick, and Harry, we know that they all share the information that Carl Hempel is a famous philosopher. Soames claims that Tom's actual belief regarding Mr. Hempel, and that he died last week, could be better expressed by (3a).

(3a) Tom believes that the famous philosopher, Carl Hempel, died last week.

The proposition expressed by (3a) is the pragmatic proposition that Tom believes. If Tom were to believe the semantic proposition embedded in (3), he would also believe the semantic proposition of (4), but Tom would never assent to a sentence like (4) because the belief that Tom would have in (4) is the belief in a pragmatic proposition that is expressed by (4a) (p. 218):

(4a) Tom believes that the elderly white haired man of our acquaintance, Peter Hempel, died last week.

Tom might also believe the semantic proposition, but it is the pragmatic proposition, which he primarily believes. Propositional attitudes should be understood as a special context. Within certain contexts, such as ones containing friends like Tom, Dick, and Harry, the friends are aware of the pragmatic propositions that are related to expressions containing names shared by individuals in the context.

Understanding utterances of sentences ascribing propositional attitudes as contextually expressing pragmatic propositions gives the result that the objects of the attitudes will not be contradictory. Two sentences differing only by the substitution of a co-referring name, will express at least some different pragmatic propositions. Within some contexts, speakers, or groups of speakers, associate a description with a name. This description is in no way part of the meaning of the name, but may be shared by a contextually defined group of speakers. In such a case, when that group uses that name

to express a proposition, they express a descriptively enhanced pragmatic proposition that each person within that context can understand; but, an outsider might not associate the same descriptive information and therefore not apprehend the same pragmatic proposition.²⁴ Also, the pragmatic proposition does not contain only the description, but also the object. Since there is not the description alone in the proposition, but also the object, it can easily be seen how it is that those who do not share descriptions can still communicate, at least the semantic proposition.

By appealing to pragmatics, and claiming that linguistically simple proper names act as partially descriptive names in propositional attitude ascriptions, Soames has side-stepped the issue of *de re* belief as belief of a singular proposition. No longer do individuals believe singular propositions. Speakers now believe complex, pragmatically imparted propositions comprising an individual(s) and descriptive information in addition to properties or relations. There are two issues that arise from Soames analysis. The first is regarding what is left of belief regarding singular propositions; the other is the application of his analysis to contexts other than belief.

As presented, it seems as though Soames's picture gives a clean analysis of belief ascriptions. There is no contradiction in uttering 'Mary believes that F_m ' and 'Mary does not believe that F_n ', since Mary believes two disparate pragmatic propositions. There is still a question remaining: what is Mary's attitude toward the singular proposition? Is the report of the belief in the semantic proposition true or false? There is no explanation of whether or not Mary believes that o , the referent of 'm' and 'n', is F . Soames gives his analysis, but never explains what attitude the subject has toward the singular semantic proposition itself. It seems that Soames's general line is that it will always be a pragmatic proposition that is believed. Further,

²⁴ Since the descriptive content is variable across contexts and speakers, and is not part of the meaning of the term, it does not have to answer to Kripke's modal argument. The relevant aspect to Kripke's arguments is the semantic content.

since a plurality of propositions is asserted, it is unclear how the truth-value of the assertions should be evaluated, i.e. whether the assertion is true if and only if all asserted propositions are true, or if and only if the intended proposition is true.

There is a further, and more damaging problem when Soames's pragmatic account is applied to veridical propositional attitudes such as knowledge. If it is assumed that knowledge requires belief in a true proposition, there will be instances where the speaker should be credited with knowledge, but cannot be if the intended proposition is a false pragmatic proposition containing descriptive information that is false. Knowledge is veridical, so any known proposition must be true. And any analysis of knowledge will have to take into account that the individual must believe the proposition. Based on Soames's pragmatic analysis of belief ascriptions, belief is of a pragmatic proposition. The truth or falsity of these partially descriptive pragmatic propositions will not always be the same as that of the semantic proposition. The truth-value of a proposition expressed by a sentence containing a partially descriptive name will depend on the individual satisfying the description. If we want to claim that Ralph knows that Ortcutt is a spy, but he has pragmatic belief in a proposition that would be better expressed by 'Ortcutt, the man he [Ralph] saw yesterday in a brown hat, is a spy', and this is the proposition we intend when we claim that Ralph knows that Ortcutt is a spy, but Ortcutt has never worn a brown hat, then that pragmatic proposition is not true. Therefore, it seems that our claim that Ralph knows that Ortcutt is a spy is false. However, the semantic proposition expressed by 'Ralph knows Ortcutt is a spy' should be intuitively true; Ralph has justified reasons to believe that Ortcutt is a spy, and Ortcutt is a spy. Ralph has simply added a trivial piece of false information about Ortcutt. But on Soames's view, if Ralph believes the false pragmatic proposition, then

Ralph does not know that Ortcutt is a spy. Soames's explanation is specious, since it fails in some attributions of veridical propositional attitudes.²⁵

There is also reason to question whether or not descriptive information is asserted when a linguistically simple name is used. There is reason to believe that speakers associate similar information with the same name, but this is explained by information shared within a name-using practice. When a speaker invokes a name-using practice, all information known by the current users, i.e. in the current conversation, can be considered germane. There is some information that the speakers assume their audience is familiar with. Assertions are made with the hope that from this information the participants can make the correct inferences, but intuitively the speaker does not assert all possible inferences. Soames claims that speakers might utter '...David Lewis...', but intend something similar to that which is expressed by '...the philosopher David Lewis...'. He claims that if ordinary speakers were questioned, they would think this correct. All that seems correct is that speakers tend to associate information with a name in line with common information, or misinformation in the name-using practice. If questioned, the reason speakers would want that information made salient is so that it is determinate which name-using practice each is participating in, which is not to say that this information is part of what is asserted in the normal use of the practice.

Soames seems to give an account of belief ascriptions that avoids the problem of conflicting beliefs based on pragmatics, but it is questionable how far his account can go. The initial intuition that Soames has seems to be that there is more information conveyed than that which is semantic. It is questionable whether or not he applies this insight correctly. Changing belief ascriptions to ascriptions of attitudes toward

²⁵ This is not limited to knowledge. The same example could be used for all relational predicates that relate an individual with a proposition that requires the proposition to be true, such as 'saw' and 'learned that'.

pragmatic propositions, instead of semantic propositions, resulted in problems for Soames. Further, it is questionable whether Soames's claim that there is a plurality of propositions asserted with the utterance of a sentence is correct. Pragmatic information is generally conveyed through utterances, but that information is often based on inferences or customs.

Modes of Acquisition and Pragmatics

Another analysis that implements pragmatics is given by Salmon. Salmon does not use pragmatics in the same way as Soames, but it will be seen that they have common characteristics. Where Soames used pragmatics with pluralistic assertions, Salmon takes a different approach. Salmon uses pragmatics, as Soames, as an explanation of the presence of information in addition to semantic information, but does not see a plurality of propositions asserted. There is the semantic content conveyed by an utterance, but pragmatics imparts further information that is not part of semantics. Salmon does not claim that the pragmatic information is asserted as a proposition, or propositions, as Soames claims; rather, it is in some cases imparted as part of the full information that a sentence can convey. Pragmatics plays a large part in Salmon's theory, but the key to Salmon's view is what he calls 'modes of acquaintance' with, and 'modes of apprehension' of, propositions. Salmon gives a pragmatic and psychological explanation that gets closer to the root of the problem than Soames.²⁶

In *Frege's Puzzle*, Salmon (1986) sets out to reformulate Frege's puzzle of identity, or 'Frege's puzzle' as he calls it, and give a solution to it. Frege's puzzle is generally based on identity, as was seen in chapter one, but Salmon claims that it is not only a puzzle regarding identity since the puzzle can be formed with any predicate. For

²⁶ Psychological explanations are a step toward the root problem. As will be seen in the next chapter, differing mental representations for an object cause speakers to make the utterances they do and have the beliefs they do. It is wrong to look at belief attributions as simply a linguistic phenomenon and disregard brain states, term acquisition, and contexts.

this reason, it is a problem regarding information (1986, p. 12). If we assume that the Superman story is true, we can consider ‘If Superman can fly, then Clark Kent can’ and ‘If Superman can fly then Superman can’. Any instance where the latter expresses a true proposition the former does also, yet the former seems *a posteriori* and the latter *a priori*. Instances such as these led Salmon to present the puzzle as attitudes toward information.

In part, Salmon relies on the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. When speakers utter sentences they use words to encode information and express that information. Primarily, information is semantically encoded. Terms represent objects, relations, and properties. This information is expressed as the semantic content of sentences. There is also pragmatic information imparted by an utterance. Consider (5) and (6):

(5) Clark Kent is Superman;

(6) Clark Kent is Clark Kent.

Both (5) and (6) express the same semantic information, but differ syntactically and impart different pragmatic information. (5) imparts the information that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are co-referential; there is no way that (6) can impart this information. Often, speakers confuse this pragmatic information with the semantic information.

Consider (7) and (8):

(7) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is Superman;

(8) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is Clark Kent.

The truth-value of (7) and (8) depends on Lois Lane’s attitude toward the proposition expressed by (5) and (6), which is the same. So the truth-value of the proposition expressed by (7) and (8) should always be the same. It is the failure to recognise the pragmatic information as pragmatic instead of semantic that leads speakers to the

intuition that (7) and (8) differ in truth-value. The information that Clark Kent is also named 'Superman' is pragmatically imparted by (5), but not (6). Ordinary language users without any precise distinction between pragmatic and semantic content would not differentiate between the two. But, there could be those that are fully aware of the semantic and pragmatic distinction and still believe (7) is false while (8) true because knowledge of the distinction does not guarantee knowledge such as the fact that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' are co-referential.

Under a Fregean conception, a particular thought cannot be confused with another thought, since it cannot be represented in any other way. Fregean thoughts differ from singular propositions. Since singular propositions involve individual objects, and someone can fail to recognise the object, it is not incorrect to say that someone fails to recognise a singular proposition. An agent is acquainted with different objects in different ways, and, at times, with the same object in different ways. Since objects are the constituents of singular propositions the mode of acquaintance for the object will be part of the mode of acquaintance with the singular proposition; the way in which an agent is acquainted with an individual will be the way in which the proposition is grasped, or apprehended (1986, p. 108). These modes of acquaintance, resulting in modes of apprehension, are the ways by which the proposition is recognised. The appearance of an object plays a vital role in an agent's ability to recognise it. Consider the appearance, or guise, of an object at a time, t_1 , when we suppose an agent gains her only acquaintance with the object. She might at a later time, t_2 , have a thought regarding the object, wherein the cognitive value of the thought at t_2 may in part have the mode of acquaintance from t_1 as part of the appearance of the thought for the agent (p. 109). Different modes of apprehension for a proposition result in speakers failing to recognise a familiar proposition and in turn not recognising that

proposition as one that is already believed. With modes of apprehension established, Salmon can begin to explain why individuals might assent to statements expressing conflicting singular propositions. However, before he can do this, he must find a way to incorporate this into a replacement for the dyadic belief relation.

In order for Salmon to incorporate modes of apprehension into an explanation of *de re* belief, he makes a controversial claim. Salmon's claim is that ordinary speakers often incorrectly use terms such as 'believes' and 'knows'. Salmon admits that when considering language analysis it is often beneficial to consider ordinary language users, but he also claims that in some cases these speakers cannot be relied upon for application conditions for predicates like 'belief' (p. 84). According to direct reference, the proposition expressed by (7) is true because that proposition is the same proposition as that expressed by (8). Ordinary usage of 'belief' results in speakers speaking falsely. Ordinary usage is such that speakers would usually claim that (7) expresses something false while (8) expresses something true. But, regardless of how inappropriate this may seem, an utterance of (7) still expresses a true proposition. Salmon admits that the onus is on proponents of direct reference to explain why customary use, and intuition, is different from that which is presented by direct reference. Initially, his response is a reminder of the distinction between semantically encoded and pragmatically imparted information (p. 84). This distinction, and speakers' confusion with regard to, or lack of understanding of, the distinction is only part of Salmon's response.

The crux of Salmon's claim is that the dyadic predicate 'belief' is inadequate in expressing the belief in a proposition. Just as individuals fail to recognise individuals, they can fail to recognise pieces of information. As has been seen with the semantic and pragmatic distinction, sentences encode information in different ways; two sentences can encode the same piece of semantic information while imparting different

pragmatic information. Since the same semantic information can be encoded in different ways it is not impossible for an individual to fail to recognise the same piece of information encoded in a different way. The same proposition can appear under different guises. A speaker can acquire the same proposition under each of these different guises. It is Salmon's claim that propositions are not perceived through the senses, but they are encountered by grasping or apprehending them (p. 106). But, since a singular proposition comprises its parts, which are objects, properties, and relations, someone's apprehension of a singular proposition must be in some part by the means in which she is acquainted with each part of the proposition (p. 108). In this way, there are guises or appearances for singular propositions. The failure to recognise these modes of apprehension leads to inappropriate use by ordinary speakers.

By rejecting 'believes' as a dyadic predicate and replacing it with a further analysis that considers belief itself to be a ternary relation, Salmon claims that belief ascriptions are easily explained. Salmon claims that belief should be analysed as the "disposition to inward assent or agreement when taken in such-and-such a way" (p. 111). This analysis is the truth-conditions for the belief, i.e. it is the metaphysics of belief. Salmon presents this analysis of belief in the following way:

- (i) $\lceil A \text{ believes } p \rceil$ may be analyzed as $(\exists x)[A \text{ grasps } p \text{ by means of } x \ \& \ BEL(A, p, x)]$;
- (ii) A may stand in BEL to p and some x by means of which A grasps p , without standing in BEL to p and all x by means of which A grasps p .
- (iii) $\lceil A \text{ withholds belief from } p \rceil \dots$ may be analyzed as $(\exists x)[A \text{ grasps } p \text{ by means of } x \ \& \sim BEL(A, p, x)]$. (1986, p. 111)

The analysis of belief is given in terms of BEL . ' BEL ' represents a ternary relation that incorporates modes of apprehension into belief. When speakers believe a singular proposition, that proposition is believed under a mode of apprehension. BEL is the fact of the matter when they use 'believes', but by using 'believes' there is no way to

express the mode of apprehension. Salmon's (i)-(iii) is given as the analysis of the fact of '*A* believes *p*' more fully. When we say '*A* believes *p*', there is a way in which *A* grasps *p*; the way in which *A* grasps *p* is then considered as relevant in the attribution of belief, or *BEL*, of *p* to *A*. This explains why speakers are disposed to assent or dissent from an utterance. *A* believes *p* only if there is a mode of apprehension of *p* for *A* and *A* *BELs* *p* by way of the relevant mode of apprehension of *p*.

This explains speakers' attitudes, but it would be too much to change language to incorporate this ternary relation. Instead, Salmon claims that we use our words to "fake it" by using the dyadic predicate and 'that'-clauses to represent belief. 'That'-clauses specify the proposition believed, and it can be assumed that it pragmatically imparts the way that the proposition is taken by the agent to whom belief is ascribed (p. 116). This implicit way of "faking it", i.e. by using words that pragmatically impart the mode of acquaintance, enables speakers to communicate the mode of apprehension that would satisfy the existential quantifier and third argument in the *BEL* relation. Salmon puts this into practice to show how it might look. Consider the previous example of Lois Lane and Clark Kent.²⁷ Lois Lane's belief that Clark Kent is Superman can be analysed by the ternary relation *BEL* in the following way:

(9) *BEL*[Lois Lane, Clark Kent is Clark Kent, f_i (Lois Lane, 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent')];

and

(10) *BEL*[Lois Lane, Clark Kent is Superman, f_i (Lois Lane, 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent')];

but not

(11) *BEL*[Lois Lane, Clark Kent is Clark Kent, f_i (Lois Lane, 'Clark Kent is Superman')];

and not

(12) *BEL*[Lois Lane, Clark Kent is Superman, f_i (Lois Lane, 'Clark Kent is Superman')].²⁸

²⁷ Salmon (1986, p. 117) uses 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' to make this point.

²⁸ These take the same form as Salmon's (1986, p. 117) examples.

In (9)–(12), it can be seen that there are two ways that Lois is acquainted with the same proposition. (9) and (10) both represent the way by which Lois is disposed to assent to the proposition and (11) and (12) do not. The value of function, $f_i(x,S)$, is the way by which an individual, x , takes the information expressed by sentence S at a time t (1986, p. 117). Function $f_i(x,S)$ is a function from arguments x and the sentence S to, as value, one of x 's modes of apprehension of the proposition expressed by S . The arguments for the function in this case are Lois and different sentences all expressing the same proposition. In these cases, (9) and (10) are true, while (11) and (12) are false. This is in line with the original intuitions and is further explained because it gives the way Lois is acquainted with the information. Speakers pragmatically indicate the way the relevant subjects are acquainted with propositions by the sentences used to express those propositions.

When belief reports are given, these reports suggest the information by which the agent is acquainted with the proposition believed. Speakers fake *BEL* by the words used. It is inappropriate to utter (7) instead of (8) because (7) does not impart the way in which Lois is acquainted with the proposition. (7) pragmatically imparts information that is false and represented by (11) and (12). By instead uttering (8), a speaker pragmatically imparts the true information similar to (9) and (10). Both (7) and (8) are, strictly speaking, true, but pragmatically impart different information. This information becomes relevant when considering dispositions and how a person will react to utterances made by other people. Salmon's solution is not just a claim about semantics and pragmatics, but is an analysis of belief, i.e. the metaphysical state. Belief in a singular proposition is more complex than that which can be semantically expressed by 'believes'. The differences that remain between the ordinary usage of 'believes' and

Salmon's analysis can be explained by his metaphysical account of what beliefs are and by pragmatics.

The introduction of the ternary relation, *BEL*, allows Salmon to give an analysis of belief as it should be, not as speakers use it. This gives the explanation of conflicting beliefs. It seems to be left implicit in Salmon's exposition that two modes of apprehension will result in two different appearances for cognitive content. It is clear that the mode of acquaintance/apprehension will affect the appearance of the thought for the thinker, which allows failure to recognise propositions, and in the end results in two distinct arguments for the *BEL* function, wherein the individual can *BEL* and \sim *BEL* the same proposition (p. 109). Modes of apprehension have explanatory power because belief is psychological. Salmon's application of these modes of apprehension, in the ternary *BEL* relation forces him into saying that ordinary speakers are wrong in their application and use of predicates such as 'believes'. The overall picture presented by Salmon is working in the right direction. Any analysis of belief contexts will leave some explanation to pragmatics, but will not be solely pragmatic like Soames. In order to present a solution, we should see whether we can incorporate something like Salmon's metaphysical account of belief into the semantics of reports of belief, so as to eliminate, if possible, a need to 'fake it'. Ideally, an explanation should be given without making belief ternary, and give a deeper analysis than Salmon does. This is what I hope to do. Salmon raised many important issues for analysing belief ascriptions. Any analysis of belief will need to recognise these issues and incorporate them. Recognition and recognition failure for objects and propositions is the key issue in conflicting beliefs. Failure to recognise objects, individuals, and propositions leads to what is ascribed as conflicting attitudes, or conflicting beliefs. Failure to recognise an individual will result in psychological and cognitive aspects that Salmon claims are

affected and equated with modes of acquaintance and apprehension. With the psychological and cognitive aspects in mind, the semantics of belief reports should reflect not just that a proposition is believed, but also the thought that relates to the object and belief for the individual. Going beyond Salmon, it might be claimed that we typically do not “fake it”, but instead have a convention wherein we semantically impart this information and are fully aware of it.

8. Logical Form of Belief Tells it All

Beginnings of a Solution

In giving his analysis of belief, Salmon gave an explanation of the belief relation. He defined belief as a ternary relation between an agent, a proposition, and a mode of apprehension. In doing this, Salmon ended with the claim that speakers “fake it” in belief ascriptions. His analysis does not match the logical form of belief reports. Because it does not match the logical form, speakers fake belief attributions through pragmatics. However, the way Salmon presents his analysis of belief allows further development where the logical form of the belief reports do match, and thus does not require faking in the way that Salmon claims is needed.

David Braun (1998 and 2002, also Braun and Saul, 2002), a critic of pragmatic explanation of belief attributions, claims that Salmon’s ternary belief relation is counter intuitive. When we think of *de re* belief ascriptions we do not consider belief as a ternary relation (1998, p. 567). Although he disagrees with Salmon on the analysis of belief, there is an area of common ground where both appeal to psychological explanations. Braun claims that a psychological explanation should be given for belief attributions. When Braun gives his explanation, he claims that there are different ways of believing a proposition. Braun is claiming that there can be two different thoughts, or beliefs, related to the same proposition. An individual can represent the same object in two ways, in turn having a belief, *vis a vis* an object, in two different ways. When this is applied to the singular proposition (1), it might be possible that that proposition is represented in two distinct ways:

(1) ⟨Venus, being-visible-in-the-evening⟩.

Someone can have 'Hesperus'-thoughts and 'Phosphorus'-thoughts. If these thoughts are held in different ways, then that person might have two thoughts with the same content. Braun goes on to say that these two thoughts might take the form of mental sentences. In defending direct reference in belief attributions, Braun claims that an individual might have two different mental sentences with the same propositional content in her belief box. These beliefs might be 'Hesperus'-beliefs and 'Phosphorus'-belief. The two beliefs are different, even though they are beliefs regarding the same proposition or of a proposition and its negation.

The centre of Braun's claim is that there are different ways of believing a proposition. A rational person can believe a proposition and its negation so long as the beliefs are held in sufficiently different ways. What are these sufficiently different ways? Generally, a sufficient way of believing a proposition in different ways is to have more than one mental representation for that object and employ those representations in belief.

There is an intuitive appeal in the explanation given by Braun, but it seems as though much more could be said about what he calls 'ways of believing'. If Braun is simply claiming that the difference is the difference between 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', then what makes his view different from the claim that there is a 'Hesperus' mode of apprehension and a 'Phosphorus' mode of apprehension? It is not as simple as claiming that there are two modes of apprehension. The theory posited below will show this. Also, Braun does not give an explanation of demonstratives. He makes mention of an individual that only refers by demonstratives, but does not give a full explanation.

In general, Braun's approach to *de re* belief ascriptions gives a starting point for a further theory. I generally agree with Braun and his approach to belief ascriptions, but

find it insufficient. One of the core claims that Braun makes is that a rational individual can believe a singular proposition and its negation (p. 562). Braun claims that this is because beliefs can be held in different ways (p. 573). This point can be given further consideration and developed further than its current state. The use of mental sentences gives a good template that could be modified as empirical evidence is obtained. The point where I diverge from Braun is with respect to pragmatics. Braun rejects pragmatic solutions to belief ascriptions, but in giving a full analysis of belief, pragmatics will play some part, though not the part that it does for Soames or Salmon. Pragmatics will not have the primary role in the way Soames claims, but in using words to communicate, speakers have some presuppositions and intend more than what is semantically expressed.

In what follows, I will give the logical form of belief ascriptions. Using ideas such as Braun's ways of believing, and Salmon's modes of apprehension, I will give a full explanation of how individuals come to have different ways of believing a proposition, how they can be rational when they have contradictory beliefs, explain why speakers use the words they do in belief attributions, and explain behaviour in examples that make direct reference seem counterintuitive. I will begin by working through demonstratives, followed by names, and showing how in both cases the logical form of belief attributions can explain reluctance to make substitutions in belief attributions without the need to 'fake it'.

Demonstratives as a Paradigm

In many cases, demonstratives are ignored when dealing with *de re* belief attributions. If a solution were given for demonstratives and names, it would be superior to one given for names alone. Although there is a clear problem for names in belief attributions, and until this point names have been the primary focus of this work,

demonstratives get to the root of the problem. When someone comes to have contradictory beliefs where demonstratives are involved, it can be assumed that it is not due to a linguistic problem. An individual, *i*, sees an object, *o*, at time *t*₁. At a later time, *t*₂, *i* sees *o* again, but fails to recognise it. Because of situations such as this people may begin to have conflicting beliefs.

An account of belief attributions that focuses on demonstratives over names should show itself to be superior to a solution that is solely name based. It has already been shown that demonstratives and names are both directly referential terms. The content of neither is mediated by a Fregean sense. The problem of belief attributions can be engendered in both cases. Although the same is true with most names, when a demonstrative is used with a one-place predicate, a *de re* attribution is clearly made. An utterance of ‘That [pointing at an object *o*] is Φ ’ asserts a singular proposition attributing, *de re*, Φ -ness to *o*, which is picked out by the demonstrative ‘that’. So belief ascriptions made with demonstratives differ very little, if at all, from names in content.

Where demonstratives do differ from names is that when a speaker uses a demonstrative she must be acquainted with the referent in such a way that she can identify the referent, and is identifying the referent at the utterance. When a speaker uses a name, she is acquainted with the referent, but need not have the same contact as when a demonstrative is used. The nature of demonstrative reference is such that the speaker is in direct contact with the referent. Demonstratives are typically used when the speaker is in the presence of the referent. With this in mind, a solution that can explain belief attributions using demonstratives is in many ways superior to one that explains names alone. When conflicting beliefs are attributed based on demonstrative utterances, the individual was in contact with the object and failed to recognise it.

When a solution is given for situations like this, it cannot rely on some of the solutions given for names. There are no linguistically enhanced propositions that can be appealed to, which might be combined with a metalinguistic response. It is recognition failure, not the failure to realise that two names are co-referential. When demonstratives are the focus, it is clear that we are dealing with beliefs and objects, not words. When solutions are given for names they cannot always be applied to demonstratives; if a solution can be given for demonstratives, it should be easily applied to names.

There are other advantages to considering demonstratives over names. In many ways, demonstratives parallel Kripke's Paderewski example. When speakers use demonstratives, they use the same word to refer to different objects. In Kripke's example, Peter thinks his tokens of 'Paderewski' are each part of different name-using practices and believes he is using the name on different occasions to refer to different people. Examples such as 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are cases where there are different names. Demonstratives and 'Paderewski' cases move beyond the linguistic and focus on the deeper problem of recognition failure. By first looking at demonstratives, an analysis of belief will be given such that it allows the same solution to follow for names.

When dealing with beliefs, some assumptions must be made. We do not have direct access to belief states, so we must assume something similar to Kripke's disquotational principle. Kripke used his strengthened disquotational principle to derive the contradictions that someone such as Pierre believes that London is pretty and does not believe that London is pretty. Strengthened disquotation is absurdly strong.²⁹ In most cases, speakers will not satisfy the requirements on the left-hand side of the biconditional. Just because an individual believes a proposition, there is no reason to

²⁹ See Marcus (1981).

think that he will say so, and in most cases, failure to assent cannot support failure to believe. However, something similar to Kripke's disquotational principle needs to be assumed so that we can gain access to the mental states of individuals.

Based on the disquotational principle and utterances containing demonstratives, it is easy to see how we can go from demonstrative utterances to belief and in turn the problem. When a speaker sincerely utters 'That [pointing to Venus] is visible in the evening' in context C_1 , it can be inferred that she believes that that [Venus] is visible in the evening. Further, she believes the singular proposition \langle Venus, visible in the evening \rangle . As stated this is fine, but when the same speaker also utters 'That [pointing to Venus] is not visible in the evening' in another context, C_2 , we can infer that the speaker believes contradictory propositions. Based on the disquotational principle and what was asserted, it is generally claimed that the speaker is irrational, for it is assumed that no rational person would believe a proposition and its negation. However, our intuition is to deny that the speaker is irrational. It is easily understood how such confusion could happen, so for many the only option is a descriptive theory. The direct reference account of demonstratives seemed correct in ordinary contexts, but in belief context it is not as clear. Proponents of direct reference should be able give an account of belief attributions that can explain this. The first step in such an explanation will deal with recognition failure and explain how a rational person can believe contradictory propositions.

The basis of contradictory belief with regards to demonstratives is recognition failure, and a solution must explain this. In the above case, it can easily be seen what happens. C_1 and C_2 are different contexts with different modes of presentation. This is similar to the claim that Frege made, but Frege made a gratuitous move by making modes of presentation part of the meaning of a name or demonstrative. It can be

claimed that there are different modes of presentation without maintaining a Fregean theory. The way an object presents itself to an agent will differ from context to context. When an object is viewed in C_1 it might look fundamentally different from the way it looks in C_2 , although it might be that it is just not recognised. Direct reference can still be maintained in light of this, because modes of presentation are not part of the meaning of a term. They are simply the way the object appears at a given time.

The way an object presents itself to an agent will differ from context to context. Within an extended context, the way an object is presented can change. A building viewed before dark will appear one way. Once the sun sets, it becomes dark, and the lights are turned on inside the building, the building has a different appearance from what it had earlier. In the same way, a square building viewed from different distances can have the appearance of being round or square. The presentation of the object changes as it is approached. In all examples, the buildings can be referred to with demonstratives; each time the building has different modes of presentation, but there is no reason to see this as part of the semantic content.

Frege saw different modes of presentation as key to belief, but saw it as part of what is believed instead of the cause of the belief. When a speaker uses a demonstrative to refer to an object, and is then attributed with a belief, it can be seen what picture should be given instead of Frege's. Furthermore, when a demonstrative is used the object is typically present; the object is seen in a particular way via an often unique mode of presentation. This mode of presentation is then the cause for the mental representation, which has as its content the object. The object has a mode of presentation causing the thought to have a particular form, or have information

associated with it.³⁰ There is now a three-part distinction: the object, the mode of presentation, and the mental representation.

Different modes of presentation can result in different mental representations. In many cases, this is not so. Generally, an individual will not have multiple mental representations for the same object and the different representations will be amalgamated into one. This is because we have a fundamental capacity to recognise objects. Though a person might not be able to recall the details of a journey or a face she should be able to recognise the journey or the face from a previous experience (Evans, 1982, p. 286). Though this is generally the case, there are still many instances where recognition fails. When we fail to recognise an object, where demonstratives are concerned, it is either that the object was forgotten or the object appeared in two different ways. When an object is viewed on two occasions and a large period of time has passed, the object could have a similar mode of presentation on the second occasion as it did on the first occasion, but the lapse in time was too great for the individual to remember or for numerous other reasons she thinks this is a different object. This can be seen with works of art. As a child, Timmy sees a sculpture, thinks it is beautiful, and is always talking about it, but due to the ephemeral nature of what could be called 'mental pictures', when he returns to the museum as an adult to show his children the statue, he realises that he has manipulated the image in his mind over time to the point that he does not recognise the sculpture as the same one he remembers. In other cases, it might be that the object was viewed in disparate contexts such that each context makes the object appear fundamentally changed. Consider again a building before and after dark. If the building is a large lone standing skyscraper viewed on a clear day, it seems obvious that it is a tall building with unique architectural markings. But if the

³⁰ The form of that representation may be something like the phenomenal character of the thought, i.e. the what it is like thinking of the object.

same building were observed after dark on a cloudy night with all its lights out above the fifth floor, the viewer might not be able to reconcile the two mental images created by these fundamentally different presentations. Not everyone presented with these situations must fail to recognise the objects, but it is understandable why it might happen.

When a speaker fails to recognise an object on two occasions resulting in two mental representations for the object, the speaker has two thoughts about the same object. At this point, there is a similarity to the view presented by Braun. An individual can have two thoughts with the same content. So, two thoughts can have the same singular proposition as their content. It is not enough for him to claim that as long as the beliefs are held in sufficiently different ways we can maintain rationality. A picture should be given from demonstrative reference to the explanation of why the speaker is rational when he believes a proposition and its negation. The solution Braun supports and the solution espoused here recognise that there are different cognitive states for different beliefs, even when those beliefs are with respect to the same object and the same property. The belief that Fa and the belief that Fb might have different mental states, or brain states, even though the content of both is the same singular proposition. In order to move forward, a further explanation should be given as to how these distinct mental symbols are acquired.

First, a few preliminaries. I am considering this as a primitive template that can be expounded upon by further research in the field of mind and thought process; it is open to revision as empirical data is obtained regarding mental states. If it is discovered that the belief that P is the brain state Q , then this revision can be added to this solution. We may never purge such a theory of folk psychological terms, and we may never want to, but a correct theory of mind and mental states should give a full interpretation of this

template. I will be assuming as a basic form that the mental sentences are the vehicles of consciousness. We do not have access to the particular mental states of individuals, so normally there is no way to know an individual's mental sentence. It must be assumed that in order to develop a theory of belief we can infer what these mental sentences are from their behaviour and particularly from the disquotational principle. Also, as a preliminary it will be important to say something about mental symbols. They are the vehicles of consciousness. These symbols represent the world in the same way as sentences and words do in ordinary language. Mental sentences are composed of different mental symbols forming complete or incomplete mental sentences. Just as natural languages have grammar, syntax, and semantic interpretation, so do mental sentences.

Now, consider Scott and the way he came to acquire his mental symbols. Scott is in the habit of going for evening walks. While on his walks he likes to look up at the stars. A few nights in a row, Scott sees a celestial body in relatively the same position and realises that it was the first one visible that evening, and on the previous evenings. He points at it and says, 'That is visible in the evening'. Unbeknownst to Scott this celestial body is the planet called 'Venus'. In order for Scott to arrive at contradictory beliefs, a few things must happen. Scott must, at some point, fail to recognise the celestial body on different occasion. The first time Scott saw Venus, although he did not know this was the planet called 'Venus', a mental symbol for Venus was created. Upon seeing Venus the following nights, Scott's symbol for Venus was enhanced. He recognised it from the previous evenings. Scott thought to himself that that is the same star he saw last night. Each successive time Scott saw the planet a new mental symbol was created and tested against the previous symbol. Once Scott recognised the planet, the information he associated with the symbols was amalgamated. After time, the

mental symbols might amalgamate as well. When Scott uttered 'That [pointing to Venus] is visible in the evening' he asserted the singular proposition ⟨Venus, visible in the evening⟩. He can then be credited with having the thought (2):

(2) [_{s1} That₁ [=Venus] is visible in the evening].³¹

There is a causal link between the circumstance under which an object is viewed and the mental symbol used for that thought. When Scott saw Venus on the first occasion, C₁, he created a new mental symbol for Venus. From C₁, Scott has a mental symbol for Venus that has as its content Venus, because Venus was the referent of Scott's demonstrative utterance in C₁. Scott's symbol is linked to Venus in the same way a name is linked to an object; it is a symbol, albeit mental, that represents the object from C₁, Venus. Scott associates surrounding information from C₁ with that mental symbol. This information will help him identify Venus, although he will not know it as 'Venus', in further contexts. When Scott sees Venus in a further context C₂ and fails to recognise it, this will be due to his inability to reconcile the information associated with [That₁] and the current mode of presentation of Venus. In C₂, Scott might utter 'That [pointing to Venus] is not visible in the evening'. Scott has thought (3):

(3) [_{s2} That₂ [=Venus] is not visible in the evening].

(Where the indices 1 and 2 in 'That₁' and 'That₂' indicate the contexts 1 and 2 in which the demonstratives were used.) From his utterances, and our stipulation of his thoughts, it can be inferred that Scott believes that Venus is visible in the evening and he believes that Venus is not visible in the evening. To say that Scott has these beliefs could be to say that he has the mental sentences with the corresponding propositional contents in his belief box.

³¹ Brackets will be used to symbolise mental sentences, unless used to give the object demonstrated in a particular demonstrative reference.

The mental symbols used by an individual, having different contextual sources, can lead to contradictions although unknown to the individual. Though two mental symbols, just like words, can be anchored to the same object, the symbols can be disparate in function. Two of Scott's symbols for Venus, [That₁] and [That₂], play different roles and result in different thoughts that happen to have the same content. Since Scott mentally represents the object in at least two different ways, he believes a proposition and its negation. Just as when a name is substituted in a sentence creating a new sentence and those two sentences may have the same propositional content, two distinct thoughts can have the same content. This can lead to tension in beliefs that has often lead some to support the claim that the two thoughts have different contents, and something like a descriptive theory of content is correct. What these theories fail to take into consideration is that there can be different ways a proposition can be represented albeit the object, i.e. subject, of the belief remains the same.

The employment of different mental symbols for the same object will result in a belief being held in different ways. In the case of Scott, for each context, C₁ and C₂, there is a different mental symbol, [That₁] and [That₂] respectively. When Scott is not in a position to recognise the object from C₂ as the object from C₁, the symbols employed will have no connection to one another, and the information gleaned from each context will not be associated with the other context. Since there are different mental symbols for the same object, each caused by a different context, an individual can have different beliefs regarding the same proposition or object, since she can represent that object by different mental symbols. When *de re* belief reports are given, the speakers do not have access to the mental sentences, but they do have access to the objects of the belief. We know, because we stipulated, what the propositional content of Scott's beliefs are. The logical form of Scott's beliefs can be given as follows:

(4) Scott believes that that₁ [=Venus] is visible in the evening iff $\exists m$ [content(m) = \langle Venus, being-visible-in-the-evening \rangle & BEV(Scott, $\lceil m \rceil$)]

(4n) Scott believes that that₂ [=Venus] is not visible in the evening iff $\exists m$ [content(m) = \langle Venus, not-being-visible-in-the-evening \rangle & BEV(Scott, $\lceil m \rceil$)]

The logical form must contain variables as we cannot access the mental sentences, but do know the propositional content of the thought. Since this is known the domain of the quantifier is restricted to mental sentences; the mental sentence is then given its content. ‘BEV’ is the relation such that S having p in her belief box would be one way of instantiating ‘BEV(S, p)’. So long as Scott has different mental sentences, he can have contradictory beliefs and still be rational. But this does not give any more information than Braun’s account.

The logical form of beliefs can be given in such a way that there is a distinction made between subject and predicate. In doing this, it should be clearer that there can be different symbols for the object, related to the different contexts:

(5) Scott believes that that₁ [=Venus] is visible in the evening iff $\exists \alpha \exists \Phi$ [content(α) = Venus & content(Φ) = being visible in the evening & BEV(Scott, $\lceil \Phi \alpha \rceil$)]

(5n) Scott believes that that₂ [=Venus] is not visible in the evening iff $\exists \alpha \exists \Phi$ [content(α) = Venus & content(Φ) = not-being visible in the evening & BEV(Scott, $\lceil \Phi \alpha \rceil$)]

Again, when we make these attributions, it is only the propositional content that is known, not the symbols employed in thought. Since this is so, the domain is now restricted in such a way that ‘ α ’ ranges over mental symbols for objects, ‘ Φ ’ range over mental predicates, and ‘BEV’ is the relation such that S having p in her belief box would be one way of instantiating ‘BEV(S, p)’. Since the variables are assigned contents the logical form of Scott’s belief is a value assigned logical form. Such a

logical form gives the structure and content of the belief, but does not give the mental sentence in the BEV relation. Since the objects of quantification are mental symbols, the actual mental sentence is not given in the logical form, but is instead left open restricting only structure and content. These two beliefs have as their content contradictory propositions, but Scott does not know this. There is no *a priori* way that Scott can know that [That₁] and [That₂] are both mental symbols for Venus each related to contexts where he failed to recognise Venus as the same object in the two contexts. Two mental sentences can have the same content, but be different thoughts just so long as the employed symbols differ.

It is easy to see how Scott can believe the same proposition in different ways, but based on (5) and (5n) he can have contradictory beliefs, know it, but still not be irrational due to a minor flaw in the logical form. [$\Phi\alpha$] and [$\Psi\alpha$] are not contradictory mental sentences; based on (5) and (5n), there need be no difference in mental symbols for Venus, yet a difference is possible for the predicates. Scott believes Venus is visible in the evening and that Venus is not visible in the evening, and the symbol he employs for Venus is the same in both beliefs, but he is not irrational because his predicates differ. The semantics of belief cannot be as simple as subject and predicate. Beliefs are complex and recursive. This should be clear at the level of logical form.

Scott's thoughts are complex and have a structure to them. Scott has the ability to break his thoughts down into simpler thoughts. He can distinguish between the thought that an object is a red notebook, and that the same object is a notebook. In the way that grammar is recursive, so are Scott's thoughts. Though we can list predicates as distinct predicates, it is more correct to see them through the recursiveness of grammar as structurally more complex. Instead of seeing predicates as completely distinct, more can be added. ' $\Psi\alpha$ ' has hidden structure relevant to what is believed. So,

instead of having the predicates ‘is a man’ and ‘is a man in a blue shirt’, it can be seen recursively and can be expanded further so that ‘is a man with pink sideburns, a nose ring, and a blue shirt’ is understood through its parts maintaining compositionality and recursiveness. The same is true of thoughts. Scott also holds his thoughts in a structurally unambiguous way. Scott might try to express his structurally unambiguous thought that no one can get a cork into a particular bottle with the ambiguous sentence ‘That bottle is uncorkable’. The structure of thoughts is clear to the thinker; the difference between [un[corkable]] and [[uncork]able] is easily distinguished in thought, but not always in language, e.g. English. Scott’s beliefs are clearly delineated between his belief that the bottle will not take a cork and the belief that the cork will come out of the bottle. Scott is not confused about which he believes. Within this theoretical discussion, when Scott’s thoughts are given, and his beliefs are analysed, they should be given in a way that reflects the recursive and structurally unambiguous nature of thought.

When Scott’s beliefs are considered, they can be seen as going beyond subject and predicate, to the point showing each syntactic category. Scott’s mental sentences, e.g. (2) and (3), can be broken down further into forms such (6) and (7), which give their structure:

(2) [S₁ That₁ is visible in the evening];

(3) [S₂ That₂ is not visible in the evening];

(6) [S₁[NP[NThat₁]][VP[vis]][AP[Avisible]][PP[Pin]][NP[Detthe][Nevening]]]]];

(7) [S₂[NegIt is not the case
that][S[NP[NThat₂]][VP[vis]][AP[Avisible]][PP[Pin]][NP[Detthe][Nevening]]]]]]].³²

The mental sentences (2) and (3) are the same as (6) and (7), but (6) and (7) make explicit the structure of the thought, or belief. Instead of giving the logical form of

³² For an explanation of these structures see Appendix A.

Scott's belief as a simple subject and predicate, and by quantifying over semantic categories, the logical form of belief attributions can be given in a way that is similar to thought, i.e. compositional.

By utilising the distinctions available in (6) and (7), the full value assigned logical form for Scott's beliefs can be given in (8) and (9):

(8) Scott believes that that₁ [=Venus] is visible in the evening iff
 $\exists\alpha\exists\beta\exists\gamma\exists\delta\exists\eta\exists\mu$ (content(α)=Venus & content(β) = {_V'is'} &
 content(γ)={_A'visible'} & content(δ)={_P'in'} & content(η)={_{Det}'the'} &
 content(μ)={_N'evening'} & BEV(Scott,
 [_{S1}[_{NP}[_N α]] [_{VP}[_V β]] [_{AP}[_A γ]] [_{PP}[_P δ]] [_{NP}[_{Det} η]] [_N μ]]]]]])),

(9) Scott believes that that₂ [=Venus] is not visible in the evening iff
 $\exists v\exists\alpha\exists\beta\exists\gamma\exists\delta\exists\eta\exists\mu$ (content (v)={_{Neg}'It is not the case that'} &
 content(α)=Venus & content(β) = {_V'is'} & content(γ)={_A'visible'} &
 content(δ)={_P'in'} & content(η)={_{Det}'the'} & content(μ)={_N'evening'} &
 BEV(Scott, [_{S2}[_{Neg} v]] [_S[_{NP}[_N α]] [_{VP}[_V β]] [_{AP}[_A γ]] [_{PP}[_P δ]] [_{NP}[_{Det} η]] [_N μ]]]]]])).

Here, '{x}' signifies semantic value of the syntactic item 'x'. As before, the quantifiers range over semantic categories, but are no longer limited to singular terms and predicates. With the structural development of (5) and (5n) into (8) and (9), the structure of the belief is easily seen. We are not limited to simple subject and predicate, but can see its structure as recursive in the way an ordinary language is. The logical form of belief no longer amalgamates complex structures into monadic predicates, but is such that it can accommodate and show complex thoughts and beliefs, and so we can show the two beliefs in question are contradictory.

The logical form of Scott's beliefs was given for utterances made with demonstratives, which are assumed to be directly referential, but any directly referential term can be used in place of 'that' in (8) or (9) resulting in the same logical forms. Because the variables in (5), (5n), (8), and (9) are assigned semantic contents, these logical forms are value assigned logical forms. The content of the variables is assigned

in the logical form of the utterances. As long as this form does not change, substitutions, which preserve semantic content, can be made *salva veritate*. An utterance of ‘Scott believes that that₁ [pointing at Venus at t_1] is visible in the evening’ will have the same value assigned logical form as ‘Scott believes that that₂ [pointing at Venus at t_2] is visible in the evening’, because the content of ‘that’ in both contexts is defined as Venus.

Demonstratives were used as the paradigm example of how an individual comes to believe a proposition in different ways. Information might be kept separate, but it is all thought of the same object. Initially, our concern was co-referring names. I will move onto names and show that the account given for demonstratives has a parallel in names. The logical forms of names and demonstratives will be the same, resulting in the basis for a solution for directly referential names and demonstratives in belief ascriptions. After accounting for names, I will show how the value assigned logical forms of belief ascriptions give an account wherein contradictory beliefs, when held in the right way, do not affect rationality. With this in place, I will consider cases where substitution cannot be maintained, give an explanation of word choice in belief ascriptions, and explain behaviour of individuals with conflicting *de re* beliefs.

It Works for Names too

We previously discussed how names refer, and how speakers acquire names from the social network of language users. We have seen that speakers acquire names and refer through name-using practices. A speaker can be a member of numerous practices for the same object, or individual; in some cases, she might not know that the different practices are all related to the same individual. The acquisition of mental symbols with regards to names can be seen by the consideration, and understanding, of name-using practices.

In name-using practices, producers and consumers have different levels, and types, of acquaintance with the referent, resulting in different modes of mental symbol acquisition. Producers will be similar to the individuals considered with regards to demonstratives. They are in direct contact with the referent, so a conspicuous parallel subsists between names and demonstratives, but there are differences. When one is introduced to an individual, and presented with her name, one's mental symbol is related to the individual and the ordinary language term.³³ When the introduction is made, both mental and linguistic terms are acquired. Just as with demonstratives, because there is direct contact with the referent, there will be certain information related to the mental symbol; often, that information may come to mind when the linguistic term is used, due to the relationship between the mental and linguistic terms.

A producer, Tom, could be acquainted with Brian on two occasions and not realise that it is the same person. It may be that Brian appeared under two different guises, or two different times in the producers life, possibly as a child and then again in adulthood. As children, Tom and Brian were good friends, but as time went on the two friends were not as close, until they no longer kept in contact. Upon meeting in adulthood, neither Brian nor Tom recognised each other; they again become good friends all the while not realising they had been friends before. Both Brian and Tom still have memories of their childhood and remember the friendship that they had, but for some reason do not recognise one another. In this case, Tom has two distinct name-using practices for 'Brian'. For each, believed distinct, name-using practice for 'Brian', Tom has a mental symbol associated with 'Brian'. Tom is in a situation similar to the case of demonstratives because not only is Tom a member of the 'Brain' name-using

³³ In cases such as this, it might be that the mental symbol just is the ordinary language term and any information, e.g. mental pictures, associated with the referent are associated with the mental symbol. I am not presenting a theory as to what these mental symbols are, just that they are the vehicles of consciousness.

practice twice over, he is also associated with Brian from two extended contexts. When Tom met Brian the second time he failed to recognise Brian: he could not relate the two mental symbols he has for Brian because his observations of Brian are disparate, and the information he associates with 'Brian' from the two, assumed, name-using practice are not brought together.

Consumers differ from producers in the type of acquaintance they have with the referent, so 'recognition failure' might not be the best name for what happens when consumers have conflicting beliefs. They know the referent of a name, albeit the acquaintance is through the name-using practice and not the direct acquaintance a producer has. When a speaker becomes a member of a name-using practice, at any level, she acquires a new linguistic term; with the acquisition of a new linguistic term there is also the acquisition of a new mental symbol. The speaker associates the name with the mental symbol and both these terms with the referent. Where producers have direct acquaintance with the referent, consumers are acquainted through the name-using practice.

Consumers, even more so than producers, can show why an individual might have two mental symbols for the same individual. For consumers, it is not a failure of visual recognition, but, based on information gathered, reconciling information associated with name-using practices. Two name-using practices might have the different information coming from two different chains of communication. When there is more than one name-using practice for an individual, different names in each practice, and a speaker is a consumer in more than one practice, the difference in names and information associated with each practice might make her reluctant to think the two practices are for the same individual. If the realisation is made that the two practices have the same referent and different names, the speaker probably will not discard one

mental symbol and use only one, but is likely to use them interchangeably, or use the symbol related to the word chosen when making an assertion. In many cases, for consumers, realising two name-using practices have the same referent will be based on being told that it is the case. A consumer's place within a name-using practice is such that she might take one name-using practice to be two: this is what happened with Peter and 'Paderewski'. To become the prime minister of Poland and draft its constitution is a remarkable achievement, so is being a great concert pianist. Peter thought that it is not likely that one person could have accomplished both. As a consumer in the 'Paderewski' name-using practice, Peter considered the information associated with the practice and inferred that it must be two name-using practices. By doing this, Peter mistook one practice for two, but understandably so. Instances such as these are not limited to hypothetical examples, but occur in ordinary discourse.

The logical form of a belief, where the mental symbol is related to a name can be given in the same way as demonstratives. Consider Mary. Mary has a group of friends that she spends time with. Mary's friends have another friend, Noel, whom Mary has not personally met, but she is an active member in name-using practices relating to Noel. When Mary's friends speak of Noel they do not only use 'Noel', but also call him by his nickname 'Leon'. Mary's friends never clarified the point to Mary that 'Noel' and 'Leon' refer to the same person. The way her friends use the names it seems as though they are referring to two different people. When they use 'Noel' it is in the context of him as a serious logician, but they use 'Leon' in contexts where he is attributed with being an abysmal mathematician. Mary has noticed similarities in the person called 'Noel' and the person called 'Leon', but has no reason to think that they are one and the same. Mary is a member in the name-using practice for 'Noel' and for 'Leon'. With each name-using practice where she is a member, Mary has a mental

symbol she employs in relation to that name-using practice. Mary has the mental symbol [Noel] with its content as Noel, and she has the mental symbol [Leon] with its content as Noel.³⁴

Having two mental symbols with the same content, but not realising this places Mary in a similar situation to Scott. Mary has, and believes, her mental sentences (10) and (11):

(10) [S[NP[NNoel]][VP[vis][NP[Det_a][Nlogician]]]]

(11) [S[NegIt is not the case that][S[NLeon]][VP[vis] [NP[Det_a][Nlogician]]]]

Because [Noel] and [Leon] have the same content, Mary, just as Scott, has contradictory beliefs. The logical forms of her beliefs are seen in (12) and (13):

(12) Mary believes that Noel is a logician iff $\exists\alpha\exists\beta\exists\gamma\exists\delta(\text{content}(\alpha)=\text{Noel}$
 $\& \text{content}(\beta)=\{v \text{ 'is' }\} \& \text{content}(\gamma)=\{\text{Det 'a'}\} \& \text{content}(\delta)=\{N$
 $\text{'logician'}\} \& \text{BEV}(\text{Mary}, [S[NP[N\alpha]][VP[v\beta]][NP[Det\gamma][N\delta]]]))$

(13) Mary believes that Leon is not a logician iff
 $\exists v\exists\alpha\exists\beta\exists\gamma\exists\delta(\text{content}(v)=\{N_{\text{Neg}} \text{'It is not the case that'}\} \&$
 $\text{content}(\alpha)=\text{Noel} \& \text{content}(\beta)=\{v \text{'is'}\} \& \text{content}(\gamma)=\{\text{Det 'a'}\} \&$
 $\text{content}(\delta)=\{N \text{'logician'}\} \& \text{BEV}(\text{Mary}, [S[N_{\text{Neg}}v][S[N\alpha]][VP[v\beta]$
 $[NP[Det\gamma][N\delta]]]))$

Mary's contradictory beliefs stem from having different mental symbols for the same object. She was a consumer in two name-using practices for the same individual, but took the two practices to be for different people. Her ignorance of the information that 'Noel' and 'Leon' are co-referential prevented her from connecting the two words and in turn her mental symbols. Ignorantly being a member of two name-using practices for the same person or taking one practice as two are just some of the failures of recognition for names. The mode of acquaintance with the referent is through the name-using practice, so when disparate, or slightly different, information is associated with each practice the member might not reconcile the differences.

³⁴ Remember, in instances such as '[Noel]', '[Leon]', (10), and (11), '[']' are used to show mental symbols and sentences.

Acquisition of the relevant linguistic and mental terms for each level was accounted for, i.e. demonstratives, and producers and consumers with names. With these in place, and an account given for these mental symbols involvement in thought, it can be explained why someone can have contradictory beliefs, but still be rational.

Rational Contradictory Beliefs

Subject to the template given regarding language of thought, membership in name-using practices and demonstrative experiences can lead to the acquisition of multiple mental symbols for the same object. By unknowingly employing different mental symbols for the object an individual can have more than one thought, or belief, with the same content, or contradictory thoughts, because the mental symbols employed have the same content. Speakers such as Scott and Mary have contradictory beliefs, and the value assigned logical form of those beliefs is contradictory. It is typically assumed that a rational agent does not have contradictory beliefs. Until this point I have only shown how an agent might come to have such beliefs; I have not defined rationality, given clear account of what it is to have contradictory beliefs, or explained why an individual with contradictory beliefs might still be rational.

When the logical form was given for Mary's beliefs it was based on the interpretation for those beliefs. She believes of Noel that he is a logician and that he is not a logician. One of Mary's beliefs must be false because it cannot be the case that Noel is a logician and that he is not a logician. Since thoughts and beliefs are structured in a mental language the contradiction that Mary believes can be clarified, and it can be shown why the contradiction does not affect her rationality. There are two types of contradictions that need to be considered in regard to evaluating Mary's rationality. One has to do with Mary's mental processing and rules of inference, the other depends

on the objects of thought, or possible interpretations of mental representations. The beliefs that Mary holds are syntactically consistent, i.e. semantically satisfiable, and semantically inconsistent. Given the semantics of her beliefs, her beliefs are contradictory. Given that Mary's thoughts have syntax and semantics it can be shown that Mary is not aware that her beliefs are inconsistent under the semantic interpretation; so long as Mary's beliefs are syntactically consistent and she is partially ignorant of the actual semantic interpretation, her rationality can be maintained.

Looking at the logical form of Mary's beliefs can make this point explicit. Mary has contradictory beliefs. She has the following belief:

(14) $\exists v \exists \alpha \exists \theta \exists \beta \exists \gamma \exists \delta$ (content(v)={Neg 'It is not the case that'} & content(α)=content(θ)=Noel & content(β)={v 'is'} & content(γ)={Det 'a'} & content(δ)={N 'logician'} & BEV(Mary, [s₁[NP[N α]][VP[v β][NP[Det γ][N δ]]])) & BEV(Mary, [s₂[Neg v][s[N θ]][VP[v β][NP[Det γ][N δ]]]))))

(14) entails that at least one of Mary's BEVs is false, i.e. the second argument in one of the BEV functions represents a false proposition. Further, Mary is rational in this instance if (15):

(15) From (14), [s₁[NP[N α]][VP[v β][NP[Det γ][N δ]]]] and [s₂[Neg v][s[N θ]][VP[v β][NP[Det γ][N δ]]]] are consistent, in that there is a model in which both are true, and $\exists v \exists \alpha \exists \eta \exists \theta$ (content(α)=content(θ)=Noel & content(v)={Neg 'It is not the case that'} & content(η)={v '='} & BEV(Mary, [s₃[Neg v][s[NP[N α]][VP[v η][NP[N θ]]]])).

[s₁[NP[N α]][VP[v β][NP[Det γ][N δ]]]] and [s₂[Neg v][s[N θ]][VP[v β][NP[Det γ][N δ]]]] are not both true under the actual interpretation. Given the state of the world and the interpretation³⁵ we have been discussing, one will be true and one will be false. But since there are possible interpretations where both can be true, and given Mary does not fully know the

³⁵ Interpretations, models, or structures.

actual interpretation, she cannot be faulted in her logic. Mary does not know enough about the actual interpretation, but she knows enough for the belief to be *de re*.³⁶

The Pragmatics of Reports of Beliefs

Salmon and, especially, Soames focused on pragmatics for a solution to the problem of the apparent failure of substitutivity. Here, pragmatics is important, but not to the extent that Salmon and Soames claim. There are many cases where speakers express more information than the semantic content of a sentence. It is this pragmatic information and other presuppositions that speakers use to determine which name to use in a given context when there are possible co-referring terms to choose from.

On this account, belief reports are transparent. So substitutions can be made in sentences such as those regarding Mary, 'Noel' and 'Leon'. Mary's belief that Noel is a logician entails that she has the belief that Leon is a logician, because the belief is *de re* and 'Noel' and 'Leon' are co-referential. Further, 'Mary believes that Noel is a logician' and 'Mary believes that Leon is a logician' have the same truth-conditions because both statements have the same value assigned logical form.

So there must be some pragmatic parameters for names and demonstratives to show the difference. When considering the validity of substitution, substitutions within belief ascriptions can be made when it does not change the value assigned logical form of the belief attribution, but in some, or most, cases it is pragmatically inappropriate. The mental symbols employed by an individual, or the way an individual x represents an object o , are often related to particular words, as was previously stated. From this it should be clear that there are types of mental symbols, or representations. Mental

³⁶ This account can generalize over semantic categories. It is not limited to categories such as names and demonstratives. This can easily be seen with noun and adjective categories. Consider 'doctor' and 'physician'. A similar account, as above, could be given for an individual that does not realize that these two words have the same extension. It seems possible for this to apply to all categories, but when prepositions are considered it seems as though if someone does not grasp the proposition with its semantic value, then that person cannot be credited with understanding the utterance.

symbols represent objects and relate to ordinary language terms. [Hesperus] represents Venus and is related to 'Hesperus'. Any English speaker that can use 'Hesperus' will have a symbol of that type associated with her ordinary language term. The actual mental symbol representing an object and relating to a word for any particular speaker will differ from the symbol employed for the same purpose by another speaker, but there is a similarity between these two symbols. Both symbols are tokens of the same type.

The way two speakers mentally represent an object in relation to a term might be different, but it is fair to say that they share types. We can say there are types because two speakers relate the same object to the same word, through the same name-using practice, and with that name they associate similar information. Because two speakers are members of the same name-using practice the information that is associated with the name, and in turn the mental symbol, will be similar. For each member of a name-using practice and name there is a related mental symbol; two speakers do not share mental symbols but they are tokens of the same type. Because speakers share types, there is a presupposition that a speaker chooses the name she does in order to elicit a similar representation and communicate, pragmatically, common information. These presuppositions explain why speakers choose the words they do when giving belief reports. Word choice also relates to behaviour. The person to whom belief is attributed having contradictory, but rational, beliefs might act contrary to what is expected given the *de re* beliefs that she has. When this is reported, the words used are relevant in that they express the mental symbol type that the individual has.

Like Salmon, there is a need to appeal to pragmatics to explain the hesitation to substitute co-referring terms in belief attributions. But this hesitation is not just a hesitation in these cases; belief is an acute case of a more general hesitation to substitute

co-referring terms. For many, direct reference seems to give the correct account for reference in ordinary contexts, but in belief attributions, some want to reject it due to counter-intuitions. But there are other cases where we do not make substitutions. Nicknames are a clear example of this. When a speaker knows that her audience does not know the referent goes by a nickname, she will not use the nickname in those contexts. So in ordinary conversations, without belief attributions, there are two dimensions of terms that must be considered for communication. The speakers must consider their own mental symbols and corresponding terms, along with the audiences' array of singular terms, which might clash with, or reinforce, the term that the speaker uses. Moreover, in belief attributions, there is a third dimension, since the speaker must consider the array of referential terms that the believer has, in addition to her audiences' and her own. So the speaker must take into consideration what she wants to get across. Does the speaker want to get across, pragmatically, that Mary believes in a 'Leon' way, or does she want her audience to understand the assertion, where her audience does not know that Leon is also called 'Noel'? This third dimension brings a further burden to the conversation. The speaker must choose her terms *vis a vis* what she feels is the most pragmatically germane aspect of the assertion.

Again, like Salmon, pragmatics is relevant when giving belief attributions, but unlike Salmon, pragmatics is playing a different role. When reporting beliefs speakers do not 'fake it'. The reports are true, and BEV is a dyadic relation, we are not faking a triadic relation, BEL, by pretending it is a dyadic relation. So, where Salmon thinks that belief is a triadic, it is not. It is a dyadic relation. We do not need pragmatics in order to fake belief reports. We use pragmatics primarily in presupposition. Speakers consider the relevant dimensions in the current discourse and choose the name or demonstrative that is appropriate to that context.

Behaviour

When all of this is applied to individuals, it explains behaviour. Mental symbols are related to names and therefore name-using practices. Information is then associated with the relevant symbol due to the relation between mental symbols and names. When demonstratives are considered there is a slightly different picture. There is still the creation of a mental symbol, and still information associated with that symbol. The difference is that there is no association with a permanent word, only the mental symbol. The linguistic entity requires indexing to the particular context. So the speaker might use ‘that’ and a description as his demonstration to refer back to the relevant context, e.g. ‘That man we saw in the pub last night’.

It has already been stated that different mental symbols for the same object result in different thoughts with the same content. These different thoughts, or ways of believing, will affect behaviour. A thought with content c held in way w_1 will cause behaviour b_1 , whereas a thought with the same content held in way w_2 might cause behaviour b_2 . This can be seen as follows. Consider Philip. Philip has a mental symbol ms_1 with its content being object x ; he also has a mental symbol ms_2 having its content also as x . Philip does not realise that his mental symbols are anchored to the same object; what Philip thinks is that his thoughts represent two different people. Both of the mental symbols Philip employs are associated with different name-using practices for x . Philip’s ms_1 and ms_2 are associated with the name-using practices ‘Ian’ and ‘Martin’ respectively, so ms_1 will be [Ian] and ms_2 will be [Martin]. We will use ‘Ian’ as the primary name for x .

Ian leads a double life wherein he is a professional philosopher and hit-man. When Ian works as a hit-man, he goes by the name ‘Martin’, but goes by ‘Ian’

otherwise. Philip has had interactions with Ian as a philosopher and also as the hit-man, but he failed to recognise Ian in both contexts. Ian has been paid to kill Philip; Philip knows this, but he does not realise that the man that is trying to kill him is also his trusted colleague. Philip has the belief he would express with ‘Martin is going to kill me’ and the belief he would express with ‘Ian is not going to kill me’. Using the preferred analysis, Philip’s beliefs can be given in the following value assigned logical form:

(16) Philip believes that Martin is going to kill him iff
 $\exists\alpha\exists\beta\exists\gamma\exists\delta\exists\eta\exists\mu(\text{content}(\alpha)=\text{Ian} \ \& \ \text{content}(\beta)=\{\text{v‘is’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\gamma)=\{\text{v‘going’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\delta)=\{\text{p‘to’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\eta)=\{\text{v‘kill’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\mu)=\text{Philip} \ \& \ \text{BEV}(\text{Philip},$
 $[s[_{NP}[_{N\alpha}]][_{VP}[_{V\beta}]][_{VP}[_{V\gamma}]][_{PP}[_{P\delta}]][_{VP}[_{V\eta}]][_{NP}[_{N\mu}]]])])$

(17) Philip believes that Ian is not going to kill him iff
 $\exists v\exists\alpha\exists\beta\exists\gamma\exists\delta\exists\eta\exists\mu(\text{content}(v)=\{\text{Neg‘It is not the case that’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\alpha)=\text{Ian} \ \& \ \text{content}(\beta)=\{\text{v‘is’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\gamma)=\{\text{v‘going’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\delta)=\{\text{p‘to’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\eta)=\{\text{v‘kill’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\mu)=\text{Philip} \ \& \ \text{BEV}(\text{Philip},$
 $[s[_{\text{Neg}v}][s[_{NP}[_{N\alpha}]][_{VP}[_{V\beta}]][_{VP}[_{V\gamma}]][_{PP}[_{P\delta}]][_{VP}[_{V\eta}]][_{NP}[_{N\mu}]]])])$

As in the previous cases, Philip has contradictory beliefs, but is still rational because there are models in which both of his second BEV arguments are true. It follows from the interpretation given in the value assigned logical form that one of his BEV arguments is false, i.e. the BEV of (17). Now, Philip has contradictory beliefs, so how will he react when he is in Ian’s presence? Our first intuition is that he will act as he always does because he believes that Ian is not going to kill him, but that intuition wanes when the further consideration is made that his belief is *de re* and (18) is logically equivalent to (16).

(18) Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him iff
 $\exists\alpha\exists\beta\exists\gamma\exists\delta\exists\eta\exists\mu(\text{content}(\alpha)=\text{Ian} \ \& \ \text{content}(\beta)=\{\text{v‘is’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\gamma)=\{\text{v‘going’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\delta)=\{\text{p‘to’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\eta)=\{\text{v‘kill’}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\mu)=\text{Philip} \ \& \ \text{BEV}(\text{Philip},$
 $[s[_{NP}[_{N\alpha}]][_{VP}[_{V\beta}]][_{VP}[_{V\gamma}]][_{PP}[_{P\delta}]][_{VP}[_{V\eta}]][_{NP}[_{N\mu}]]])])$

Our first intuition then returns when the story goes on and we consider his behaviour.

Philip is in a room with Ian, but does not leave.

Philip's action leads us to want to say that he does not believe that Ian will kill him, but that contradicts (18), which again is the same value assigned logical form as (16), and (16) is true. He does believe that Ian will kill him, but he represents the thought in such a way that leads him to act in a way contrary to what we might have expected. Further, as was previously shown, Philip has contradictory beliefs, but because he is employing one mental symbol, [Ian], in this instance instead of another, [Martin], he is acting according to his belief that Ian is not going to kill him. Even though Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him, he acts to the contrary because his belief that Ian is not going to kill him is related to the mental symbol employed, the name used, and any demonstrative reference in the current context where Ian is the man in front of him. Philip acts relative to the mental symbol employed at the time. If we consider Philip's mental sentences as realised by certain brain states, each brain state will have a different causal role. Even if Ian were walking toward Philip with a knife in his hand, Philip would not run when the symbol employed is [Ian]. If at some point Philip is in the position to realise that [Martin] and [Ian] have the same content, he would then avoid Ian in all contexts. This explains why Philip might act one way when it seems contrary to his *de re* belief, but speakers discussing his situation are more complex.³⁷

When other speakers discuss Philip's situation they will use certain names pragmatically, but semantically they can use any name that is a name for Ian. If 'Philip believes that Martin is going to kill him' and 'Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him' have the same value assigned logical form, then 'Ian' can be substituted for

³⁷ This is just a sketch of the sort of thing future semantic theories might come up with, but nothing hangs on this explanation for present purposes.

'Martin' without changing the truth-value. Consider a scenario where someone is telling another, in the seminar room, that Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him. A helpful speaker will do what they can to convey the way Philip holds his beliefs. In this situation, both speakers know that Ian goes by both 'Ian' and 'Martin', and that with each name there is different information associated with these terms. When the speaker attributes belief to Philip, it would be helpful to say 'Philip believes that Martin is going to kill him', but not helpful to say 'Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him'. From a logical point of view there is nothing wrong with saying the latter, but it is pragmatically inappropriate.

Helpful speakers try to convey the way that Philip holds his belief. When belief attributions are given, and the speaker knows, or infers, that Philip employs a mental symbol of the type that relates to a particular name, she will use that name. This does not give the token mental symbol employed by Philip, but allows the listener to pragmatically infer that it is of the 'Martin' type. Generally this is helpful, but it might still be confusing when the speaker uses 'Martin' and the listener knows that 'Martin' is another name for Ian. Consider the following conversation:

- A: Philip believes that Martin is going to kill him.
B: Well, what's he still doing here?
A: He doesn't believe that Ian is Martin.

Based on B's response, A was forced to make the germane point that Philip believes that Ian is not Martin. This point results in raising another problem. According to direct reference we can substitute 'Ian' for 'Martin', but that would mean that Philip now believes that Ian is not Ian!

Beliefs about Identity

Direct reference is typically credited as even more problematic when forced to consider identity statements embedded in belief attributions. This goes back to the

problem in chapter 1 that Frege considered when names are understood objectually. If Philip believes that Ian is Ian then he believes that Ian is Martin. This is based on the belief relation as a relation between an individual and a proposition. The singular proposition that Ian is Ian is the same singular proposition that Ian is Martin. So understood, if (19) is true, then (20) must also be true. Therefore, (21) must be false because it is the negation of (20), which is the same as (19).

(19) Philip believes that Ian is Ian.

(20) Philip believes that Ian is Martin.

(21) Philip does not believe that Ian is Martin.

According to direct reference truth is based on the proposition expressed, so (19) and (20) should always have the same truth-value and (21) should have the opposite truth-value.

In line with direct reference, we stated above that substitution in belief contexts is permissible, but in many cases it might not be pragmatically appropriate. When identity statements are embedded in belief attributions, the same should hold true. However, in relation to belief, there may be a difference between belief in the proposition expressed by 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and belief in the proposition expressed by 'Venus is Venus', or 'Hesperus is Hesperus'. The difference does not have to do with the semantic content of the terms but the logical form of the clause reporting the content of the belief. This difference is the difference between the property of being identical to x and the property of self-identity. As with previous cases, by looking at the preferred analysis this difference can be seen.

Let us return to Philip and his alleged beliefs regarding Ian expressed by (19) and (20). When the metaphysics of Philip's beliefs are given, a difference can be seen between (19) and (20) that does not appear when belief is simply regarded as a relation

between an agent and proposition. Philip's alleged beliefs expressed by (19) and (20) can be given their logical form as (22) and (23) respectively.

$$(22) \exists \alpha \exists \beta (\text{content}(\alpha) = \text{Ian} \ \& \ \text{content}(\beta) = \{v'=\}' \ \& \ \text{BEV}(\text{Philip}, [s_{[NP[N\alpha]]}[VP[v\beta][C[NP[N\alpha]]]]]))$$

$$(23) \exists \alpha \exists \theta \exists \beta (\text{content}(\theta) = \text{content}(\alpha) = \text{Ian} \ \& \ \text{content}(\beta) = \{v'=\}' \ \& \ \text{BEV}(\text{Philip}, [s_{[NP[N\alpha]]}[VP[v\beta][C[NP[N\theta]]]]]))$$

Previously the criterion for substitution was that it could be maintained so long as it does not change the value assigned logical form of the belief. Previous examples allowed this, but (22) and (23) have different logical forms. Logical form is paramount in determining what Philip believes. He believes that Ian is Ian. Does he believe that Ian is Martin? These attributions have different logical forms so it will depend on the logical moves that could be made from (22) and (23). The substitution of 'Martin' for the second occurrence of 'Ian' in (19), resulting in (20), changes the logical form of Philip's belief as can be seen in (22) and (23). A further representation of Philip's beliefs is expressed by (24):

$$(24) \text{Philip believes that Ian is not Martin,}$$

which has as its logical form (25):

$$(25) \exists v \exists \alpha \exists \theta \exists \beta (\text{content}(v) = \{_{\text{Neg}} \text{'It is not the case that'}\} \ \& \ \text{content}(\alpha) = \text{content}(\theta) = \text{Ian} \ \& \ \text{content}(\beta) = \{v'=\}' \ \& \ \text{BEV}(\text{Philip}, [s_{[_{\text{Neg}}v]}[s_{[NP[N\alpha]]}[VP[v\beta][C[NP[N\theta]]]]]]]))$$

With the consideration of (25) and assuming Philip is rational, (23) will be false and (20) should not be attributed to Philip.

There is still a consideration that must be made regarding (21). According to direct reference this is typically regarded as false, but based on its logical form it may be true. (21) has the truth conditions:

$$(26) \exists \alpha \exists \theta \exists \beta (\text{content}(\theta) = \text{content}(\alpha) = \text{Ian} \ \& \ \text{content}(\beta) = \{v'=\}' \ \& \ \neg \text{BEV}(\text{Philip}, [s_{[NP[N\alpha]]}[VP[v\beta][C[NP[N\theta]]]]]))$$


(26) is true, if Philip does not have two distinct mental symbols for Ian. What matters in belief attributions is what is going on in the head of the person the belief is attributed to. It comes down to belief states and ways of representing the world in one's mind. The logical form of (26) is derived from considerations given for different mental symbols for the same object.

In light of these considerations, substitution can be made *salva veritate* so long as it does not change the value assigned logical form. Names and demonstratives are directly referential, i.e. their semantic content is their referents. However, the traditional claim of direct reference that substitution of co-referring terms can always be maintained is not correct. It depends on the logical form of the belief. Problems arise for direct reference in belief attributions because of a failure to consider what is in the head of the believer. Cognitive significance is not as important in semantics as the Fregean would assert, but it should play some part, which is something direct reference has also often failed to consider.

Appendix A

The structures previously given in text are the compact form of the tree diagrams such as (1), (3), and (5) given below. These compact forms are difficult to read. The structure can be more easily seen in a two-dimensional tree diagram, which is then condensed to the form previously given in the main body of text.

(1)




Once the structure of the thought is given through the two-dimensional tree diagram, (1) can be flattened and given in its one-dimensional compact form, (2):

(2) [S1[NP[N Hesperus]][VP[V is][AP[A visible][PP[P in][NP[Det the][N evening]]]]]]].


The same can be done for following sample tree diagrams:

(3)



(4) [S2[NP[N Phosphorus]][VP[v is][AP[A visible][PP[P in][NP[Det the][N evening]]]]]]]

(5)



(6) [_{S2n}[_{Neg} It is not the case that][_S[_{NP}[_N Phosphorus]][_{VP}[_V is][_{AP}[_A visible][_{PP}[_P in][_{NP}[_{Det} the][_N evening]]]]]]]]]

The tree diagram in (3) can be condensed to (4), and (5) to (6). These structures are based on the models put forward by Larson and Segal (1995). Their use is more for a semantic account of ordinary language statements, but here it is adapted to show the structure of mental sentences. Larson and Segal's account is in some ways incomplete. Though most semantic categories are considered, some issues are left open ended. Questions regarding predication are not given definitive answers, i.e. it is not clear whether it is purely an adjectival phrase or a noun phrase. Where instances such as this occur, I have improvised the structure. For a complete explanation of the structures used see Larson and Segal's *Knowledge of Meaning* (1995).

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