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**THE NON-COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR
OF THE SMALL STATES OF SOUTH ASIA:
NEPAL AND BANGLADESH IN RELATION TO INDIA**

by

Shaheen Afroze

**A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
to the Department of Politics
University of Glasgow**

October 1994

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a story of a particular type of behaviour of small states in their relations with a big state. The small states in this study are Nepal and Bangladesh while the big state is India and the behaviour examined is non-compliance. The non-compliant behaviours of Nepal and Bangladesh in their relations with India reveals an anomaly of power prediction based on the notion of power as universal, monolithic, quantifiable and highly fungible entity that can be acquired, possessed, accumulated, measured and used irrespective of time and contexts. Departing from such an explanation of power, which can only predict compliant and dependent behaviour of the small states, this study seeks to place its emphasis on a contextual explanation. An understanding of non-compliance, using a contextual explanation, requires focusing both on small state's '*Motivation to Defy*' and '*Capability to Resist*'. Within a contextual framework, this study explores the conditions that generate Nepal and Bangladesh's motivation to defy. These conditions include '*Vital-ness of Issues*', '*Ambition of the Ruler*', and '*Political Tilt of the Ruling Party*'. The contextual analysis implies that the non-tangible power resources show no less prospects than their tangible counterparts in aiding our understanding of non-compliance. Given policy contingency frameworks characterised by the motivational conditions, the non-tangible power resources (NTPRs) that appear to constitute Nepal and Bangladesh's 'capability to resist' include *popular pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political support and geo-political leverage*. The study concludes that, given the policy contingency frameworks, these non-tangible power resources enabled Nepal and Bangladesh to be non-compliant, but to a limited extent. The existence of non-compliance in the repertoire of the small states under study also suggests that their behaviours are not fundamentally different from that of the big states.

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To my parents

.....

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DECLARATION

No portion of the work referred to in this study has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification in this or any university or any other institution of learning.

INTRODUCTION

To a large extent, the politics of South Asia are covered by the Morgenthau paradigm: "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power."¹ Not only the three wars fought between India and Pakistan since independence, but also the continuing hostility, and rapidly heightening conventional arms race, now with its nuclear dimension, bear out Morgenthau's law in the context of South Asian politics. According to him, all states are impelled by the urge to amass, protect and manipulate power; power is the single 'national interest' of everyone². But does the foreign policy behaviour of small states pose special problems of understanding, which challenge our general conceptions of the nature of international relations? Do we find boundaries to the applicability of the Morgenthau paradigm? Do we find small states challenging the widely acknowledged "laws" of power politics? What are the most advantageous ecological niches for them? Do large states behave differently in their dealings with small states, and depart from the rigorous application of these "laws"? And if small is different, what adjustment must be made in our general conception of international relations.? These are the questions examined in this thesis, in the context of India's relations with its much smaller neighbours: Nepal and Bangladesh.

The history of war and diplomacy in South Asia since 1947 reveals a steady development of power structures. Not long after the partition of the sub-

1 Morgenthau H. J, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th edition, New York, 1967, p. 25.

2 Ibid, p. 26.

continent, Nehru proclaimed that the new India was the successor of British India and had inherited the mantle of glory that the British had worn.³ To project itself as the security manager of the region India would therefore play a great role in the world starting with South Asia. Pakistan, on the other hand was equally conscious of its role: its true position could be achieved only by attaining equality with India. For India, parity with Pakistan meant abdication of a manifest destiny.⁴ In order to enhance their power positions in South Asia both India and Pakistan jockeyed for the support of extra-regional powers; this gave rise to the competing alliance system in the region. The process started in 1954-55: Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance agreement with US and joined the US sponsored military alliances, South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).⁵ India in the face of this huge military posture by its staunch enemy looked around for allies and quickly endorsed a viable relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviet friendship delivered India advanced military hardware, a process accelerated following India's rupture with China over conflicting border claims in 1962. India, around the same time at Bandung in 1955 took the initiative of grouping the Third World countries under the banner of

3 Quoted in Akram A. I., 'Security and Stability in South Asia', in Cohen Stephen Philip (ed.), The Security of South Asia: South Asian and American Perspectives, 1987, p.166.

4 Gupta Bhabani Sen, 'Changing Patterns of Conflict in South Asia', Asian Perspective, Vol.9, No.2, Fall-Winter, 1985,p. 221.

5 Ahmed Imtiaz, 'The Superpowers Strategy in the Third World: The 1971 South Asian Crisis' in Emajuddin Ahamed, (ed), Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State's Imperative, Dhaka, 1984, pp. 113-114. See also, Burke S. M. and Ziring L., Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Karachi, 1991.

Panchsheel (Five Principles)⁶ thereby isolating Pakistan even more and increasing its own trade and cultural relationship with the underdeveloped areas of the world. The Bangladesh liberation struggle and Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 revealed a yet new alignment pattern in South Asia. To counter the Sino-US-Pakistan collaboration, India did not hesitate to sign a 20 year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union thus abandoning its old stance of not entering into alliance with any of the power blocs. In reality, however, it did not make much difference to India's posture as one of the proponents of non alignment because even in the heyday of non alignment, Nehru was said to be non aligned in favour of the Soviet Union. Although since 1971, relations between India and Pakistan have not broken into open hostility, they narrowly escaped war in the winter of 1986-87 and the spring of 1990. Moreover, for the last 10 years, their armies have waged almost daily artillery duels on the 6,000-m-high glaciers of Kashmir's Karakoram mountain range.

Since its own independence in 1947, India has invaded, annexed or militarily occupied more of its neighbours than any other country in the world. Indian occupation of the major portion of Kashmir in 1947-49 despite the fact that the majority of the population were Muslims who wanted to be with Pakistan, its forceful annexation of Hyderabad⁷ and Junagad⁸, its seizure of a reluctant Goa and Pondecherry in 1962 disregarding the democratic wishes of the local people, its approach to the McMahon line, its unilateral decision to put Nepal in its security orbit, all

6 The five principles are (1).Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,(2).Mutual non-aggression, (3). Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4). Equality and mutual benefit. (5). Peaceful co-existence.

7 The Nizam of Hyderabad wanted to maintain a separate dominion status.

8 The Nawab of Junagad desired to accede to Pakistan.

undoubtedly confirm India's pre-occupation with power politics. India did not stop here but went on to assert its own version of big state chauvinism by annexing the princely protectorate of Sikkim in 1975, which it called voluntary merger. Even the Hindustan Times, one of India's leading dailies editorialized, "If it is not outright annexation it comes close to it". By 1977, India's indigenous armament industry was the largest in the Third World non-Communist states in value, volume, diversity of manufacture, and R&D facilities.⁹ During the past decade, India's defence budget has doubled in real terms.¹⁰ The country possesses a nuclear capability and conducted its first nuclear explosion *Agni* in May, 1974. Following the establishment of the Integrated Missile Programme in 1983, India has also been able to research and develop an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile and an Intermediate Range Missile, tested in 1988 and 1989 respectively.¹¹ During the past few years, India has become the world's biggest importer of arms. Its army is the fourth largest in the world, numbering over one million men in 1990.¹² Its airforce is impressive and its deep water navy is growing rapidly. Nor has India been hesitant to exercise its growing power. It went to the extent of occupying disputed territories on the borders of China and Pakistan in 1962 and 1965 respectively. It also intervened in Sri Lanka and the Maldives in 1988-89, explaining that its actions were intended to help the governments of those countries. But was India's action dictated by altruism alone? In helping those governments, India

9 Marwah O., and Ziring L., (eds.), The Subcontinent in World Politics, New York, 1978, p. 35.

10 Independent (ed.), 10 April, 1989. For details see Prakash S., 'Indian Defense: A Conscious Attempt at Pragmatism', Defense and Foreign Affairs, April 1990.

11 Bradnock R. W., India's Foreign Policy since 1971, London, 1990, p. 27.

12 Hewitt V. M., The International Politics of South Asia, Manchester and New York, 1992, p. 17. See also Appendix 1 for the actual size of her military strength.

confirmed its desire and capacity to be the regional super power. "India is, in short, coming of age as a regional power, and is doing so at a time in which such nations are able to exercise greater sway than would have been the case a decade ago."¹³

Pakistan in its struggle for power did not lag behind India. Pakistan, which boasts American and Chinese friendship and holds the northwestern part of divided Kashmir, also did some consolidating of its own by swallowing up the little Himalayan principality of Hunza. Pakistan also ranks among the top eight importers of major weapons. While it has never been within its means to match India's military might, it has not abandoned its ambition to enhance its defence and deterrence capability and bring it closer to India. Like India, Pakistan has major nuclear programmes and has intensified and tested its own ballistic missile *Hatf*.

But have the weaker states in this system (Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka) behaved only according to the power paradigm? After all, the struggle for power has very little to offer them.¹⁴ To evade some of the disagreeable consequences of power politics, have they developed other modes of behaviour, modes which may be part of a wider repertoire of small state behaviour?

Annette Baker Fox observed that, "a traditional great power stereotype of the small state was that of a helpless pawn in world politics. The great states were perceived as cynical manipulators of power and the small states as

13 Independent, Op. Cit.

14 See Appendix 1 for the actual size of Bangladesh's and Nepal's military strength.

virtuous law-abiding countries."¹⁵ As Thucydides formulated in the Athenians message to the Melians: "The strong do what they will; the weak do what they must". Yet, on closer examination, there appears to be no easy answers to questions such as why do the smaller states behave the way they do?

The question is whether small state behaviour always conforms to the power politics paradigm. There is no denying the fact that power dictates terms which makes the weak compliant: being at the receiving end of the coercive power system, small states do sometimes yield to the will of their bigger neighbour. However, small states have not always turned out to be as compliant as they are expected to be. They are not always pawns in the game of power politics among the great powers. There is something else besides compliance in their foreign policy which inhibits the operation of power. The sense of weaknesses and limits to their policy choices did not hinder them from embarking on policies arising out of the need to preserve independent stances in their behavioural repertoire. The various efforts of the small states of South Asia to come out of India's orbit are the cases worth considering, when they have not conformed to the norms of the power system. It would therefore be useful if we could observe other modes in the behaviour of small states, who have little to gain from the struggle for power, (because they have none of the attributes of power in usable forms), and offer some explanation of these non-compliant behaviours.

Although it is true that in the centre-periphery frame of international politics the small states are peripheries of the periphery, nevertheless they are not without political significance in the present day multipolar and

15 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States : Diplomacy in World War II, Chicago, 1959, pp.1-2.

interdependent world. First, they add up arithmetically as a force in the United Nations and other bodies. Second, in the specific geo-political and subsystemic frame in which they are located, they possess geostrategic values often irrespective of their size. Third, as observed by Erling Bjøl, "the small states are constantly sources of tensions and conflicts that dominate the international scene. Not only have some of them been able to play prominent parts in international dramas, but often they have been able to defend successfully their interests, even against great powers."¹⁶ It is this last aspect that is recognised but yet not fully explored. "The study of the weak states has been sorely neglected", admits Michael Handel.¹⁷ And Neils Armstrup complains that "although more research effort has now been directed towards this problem, the confusion seems greater today than say, ten years ago."¹⁸ Commenting on the status of international relations research in the mid 1970s, Kenneth Waltz deplored that , "nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism."¹⁹ "Studies of the Third World foreign policies are in an even worse state and can still be called the underdeveloped study of the underdeveloped countries"²⁰ moaned Bahgat Korany in the 1980s. My own literature review in the 1990s substantiates some of these views.

16 Bjøl E., 'The Power of the Weak', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 3, 1968, pp. 157- 167.

17 Handel M., Weak States in the International System, England, 1981, p. 3.

18 Amstrup N., 'The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts', Cooperation and Conflict, XI, 1976, p.178.

19 Waltz K., 'Theory of International Relations', in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, VIII, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975, p. 1-2.

20 Korany B., 'The Take-Off of the Third World Studies?' in World Politics, Vol. XXXV, April 1983, p. 465.

The study is an exploratory research. Historical narration is avoided except in so far as it is necessary to enrich understanding of particular events which are the focus of analysis. Nor do I attempt to establish a precise definition of what may constitute a small state. The conceptual problems involved in finding a satisfactory definition of small states are quite distinct which is evidenced by the many contradictory and diverse attempts to establish rigorous definition that can be accepted and agreed upon by all, attempts which abound in the literature on small states.²¹ The seminar on the small territories run by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies 1962-1964 concluded that 'it proved impossible for the seminar to decide what "smallness" means with any precision. It is a comparative and not an absolute idea. Whatever scales of magnitude are employed seem arbitrary and it is difficult to pick out on them where smallness begins or ends'.²² Nevertheless, several scholars of international relations have attempted to define small states. For instance, David Vital defines a small state on the basis of population. To him a small state is the one who has a population of 10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries; and a population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries. Vital's definition of a small state is 'frankly subjective if not arbitrary'²³ as he himself admits and concludes that 'these definitions are put forward to make clear the identity of the subject of this study, not with a view to the

21 An excellent review of the literature on the problems of the definitions of the small states is provided in Amstrup, N., Op. Cit., p. 163-182.

22 Benedict B., (ed.), Problems of Smaller Territories, London, 1967, p. 29.

23 Vital D., The Inequality of States. A Study of the Small Power in International Politics, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 7. A population size of under 10 million has recently been proposed as the most important criterion by Henderson J., 'New Zealand and the Foreign Policy of the Small State', in Kennaway R., and Henderson J., (eds.), Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, Auckland, 1991, p. 5.

creation of a precise concept for manipulative analytical purposes'.²⁴ Robert Rothstein gives a psychological as well as a material dimension of the definition of a small state. To him a small state is a one "which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so".²⁵ If we accept his definition then all states in the current international system except the United States of America come under the heading of small states. Robert Keohane regards Rothstein's definition as anachronistic because 'it serves well only for those periods in the past in which obtaining "security primarily by use of its [a state's] own capabilities" was a live option for five to ten states in a system of limited scope. When only two or three states qualify for great-power status, with 130-from West Germany (or atleast Italy) to Lesotho- categorized as "small", the definition becomes useless for analysis'.²⁶ As such Robert Keohane has developed a definition of his own. To him a small state appears to be one 'whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system'.²⁷ Although all the scholars have struggled at length to define small states, none has reached an unequivocal operative definition of the subject.²⁸ As such the problem remains: which

24 Vital, Ibid, p. 9.

25 Rothstein R, Alliances and Small Power, New York and London, 1968, p. 29.

26 Keohane R, 'Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics', International Organization, Vol. XXIII, 1969, p. 293.

27 Ibid, p. 296.

28 It certainly does not render the small states 'too broad a category for purposes of analysis' as held by Baehr P. R., in his Review Article, 'Small States: A Tool for Analysis?', World Politics, Vol. XXVII, April 1975, p. 456-466; See also, Thakur R., 'The Elusive Essence of Size: Australia, New Zealand and Small States in International Relations', in Higgott R., and Richardson, J., (eds.), International Relations: Global and Australian Perspectives on an Evolving Discipline, Canberra, 1991, p. 240-87, where he has challenged the utility of the small state concept in International Relations.

criteria are to be adopted?. Should one take size of population or size of territory? Or should the criteria be economic²⁹ or military strength? There may be states that may have a large population, for example, Bangladesh, or a large territory, for example, Brazil, yet be militarily and economically less powerful than states with a smaller population or territory.

I therefore follow a common sense division³⁰. The countries examined are obviously 'smaller' than the big power that is involved in the region: India.³¹ Although it is true that neither Bangladesh nor Nepal is a small country in the strictest sense of the term because compared with the 179 United Nations member countries, more than a hundred countries are smaller than Bangladesh in terms of population and nearly seventy of them are smaller in size than Bangladesh or Nepal. Nevertheless, because of the sheer gigantic size of their common neighbour India and the power capabilities which it commands, both Bangladesh and Nepal obviously appear to be small states no matter how big they are in size or population compared with other smaller countries in the international system. Likewise although India is treated as one of the middle rank powers of the world, it is nevertheless big in all respects in comparison with the other states of South Asia.

29 As suggested by Deutsch K, W, The Analysis of International Relations, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968, p. 31.


30 This idea has been borrowed from Charles Edward Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival, New York, 1979.

31 Although Maniruzzaman used conventional war capability (expressed in terms of GNP and military budget) as absolute criterion in defining smallness, the treatment of smallness as a relative term can also be observed in his definition. He defines a small state as 'a state with a very low conventional war capability, not only in absolute global comparative terms ... but also vis-a-vis the Large Powers in its region.' (emphasis added). See Maniruzzaman T., The Security of Small States in the Third World, Australia, 1988, p. 14.

The aim of this study is to provide some key to the understanding of the behavioural repertoire of weaker states locked by the compulsions of geography into a constant relationship with a far bigger and more powerful neighbour.

Chapter one looks at the differing perception of relationship between the small states under investigation and their bigger neighbour. Chapter two reviews the literature on small state foreign policy and tries to uncover what is wrong with the existing literature. Chapter three seeks to understand new and expanded ways of explaining the foreign policy behaviour of the small states. Chapter Four and Chapter Five deal with the particularized study of small state behaviour (Nepal and Bangladesh) vis-a-vis the big neighbour (India) and discovers the behaviours which do not fit the power model. Chapter Six shows the response of the big state and the extent of such behaviour of the small states. The Conclusion draws together the threads of the discussion and gives a summary of the findings.

MAP OF SOUTH ASIA



CHAPTER 1

DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF RELATIONSHIP

Western analysts have treated small states as little big states, and this has led them to see compliance as the main mode of small state behaviour, and to treat non compliant behaviour as at best odd, at worst irrational. To achieve a better understanding of small state behaviour, we should start by observing it, and by listening to the accounts given by small state practitioners. So before we go to look for the factors that appear to be associated with Non-Compliance, "the perspective of the actor that perceives, understands and reacts to the perception and behaviour of the other actor needs to be taken into consideration"¹ since perceptions mould behaviour to a large extent. More importantly, the smaller states in question perceive their relations quite differently from the big power. And it is these big-small perceptual differences and interests gap that are very much responsible for their respective behaviour towards each other. It is a commonplace that perceptions shape a state's behaviours and perceptual differences are inevitable between interacting states in matters of external relations. Therefore, an understanding of the differences in perceptions of the interacting states is likely to provide insights into the ways in which they behave in relation to the other. With this point in mind, this chapter explores the perceptual differences between India and its smaller neighbours to see how the two clusters of perception mould


1 Khan Abdur Rob, 'Post-Indira India and her Neighbours', BIISS Papers No. 3, 1985.

their behaviour.² The perceptual differences are discussed under four headings : *Self Image* ; *Foreign Policy focus* ; *Ways of settling disputes* ; and *Security Issues*.

PERCEPTION OF SELF-IMAGE

One of the factors that underline the behaviour or policy of a state is the perception of self-image. Such perception, as shown in fig-1, could take the form of one's own perception of self-image or others' perception of one's self-image. In this section attempts are made to explore the differences between these two forms of perception with respect to India vis-a-vis its neighbours.

FIGURE 1.1 : THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF PERCEPTION



NOTE: The arrows indicate the perception of 'Self-Image'

India's perception of its own self-image: Indian self-image as described by its elites is one of pre-eminence; this has developed from its urge to play a pivotal role in the region in particular and an active role in

2 The main source for this chapter is interviews with academicians and policy makers of the countries under study conducted during field work in those countries as a part of the study.

the third world and the world at large. A number of factors have contributed to the generation of this self-image. These include its size, population, economic resource base and growth potential, quantum of its foreign trade,³ military strength and finally viability of constitutional, political and administrative structures. India commands 77 percent of South Asian population, 72 percent of the total area of the region, and 78 percent of her GNP.⁴ India has recorded spectacular growth in agriculture in terms of boosting food production; in health in terms of raising life expectancy by more than 20 years; in education in terms of doubling the literacy rate. Besides, India has earned the respect of the world community for the preservation of a democratic system to whatever extent in a highly pluralistic society. Nehru asserted,

*A free India with her vast resources, can be a great service to the world and humanity. India will always make a difference to the world; fate has marked us for big things. Leaving the (se) three big countries, the United States, The Soviet Union and China aside for the moment, look at the world. There are many advanced, highly cultured countries. But if you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong, wars and the like, the obvious fourth country in the world is India.*⁵

3 See Appendix 2 for bilateral and overall trade figures of India, Nepal and Bangladesh.

4 Dieter Braun, 'India's Relations with Indian Ocean States', in Ian Clark and Lawry W. Bowman (eds.), The Indian Ocean in Global Politics, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, p. 27.

5 Quoted in Iftekharuzzaman, 'India Doctrine: Relevance for Bangladesh', in Kabir and Hassan (ed). Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy, Bangladesh Society for International Studies, 1987, p. 21.

This thinking of Nehru has been carefully injected into the minds of the present day politico-strategic thinkers of India. It is not at all surprising therefore that scholars make claims which are resonant to the theme of the preceding paragraph. For example, Subramanyam states that,

India is within the top 12 industrial producers of the world, has the fourth largest armed forces, is a nuclear power, has launched satellites and has the world's second largest population. ⁶

Given these factors, the pre-eminence of India has been stressed by another Indian scholar who writes, "India is far superior to any one of her neighbours, or even to all of them put together"⁷. Such superiority and power potential constitute only a part of its self-image. If only the enormous character of Indian power potential mattered then there might not have been a substantive perceptual difference (rather perceptual conflict) between India and its neighbours. India's self-image, more importantly, is constituted by the projection of power and such power projections transcends Indian borders involving interaction with other states. Fundamentally, as we shall see later, Indian self-image, which is a product of the realization of its own potential, creates a substantive perceptual difference between itself and its neighbours.

With all this power potential, India perceives itself to have a world mission which, as a matter of fact, boils down to the projection of power. As Kreisberg writes,

6 Subramanyam K, 'India's Image as a Major Power', Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 March, 1982.

7 Muni S. D., 'South Asia' in Ayoob M., (ed.), Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, London, 1980 p. 39

*India's perceived role in the international system has two related strands: a strong, stable nation and a world mission commensurate to its size, population, resources and power capabilities- military, political and economic.*⁸

A more formalistic projection of its self-image took the form of its active involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement⁹ as early as in 1950s although the smaller states hold that non aligned movement which India set out to lead turned out to be neither nonaligned nor a movement. As Peter Willetts observed,

*... the Panchsheel were only a tool of Indian diplomacy and not the basis of policy, the real basis of policy was the claim to be a special type of Great Power ...*¹⁰

However, a more recent and ambitious aspiration of India's power projection is evident from the following expression made by one of the Indian elites,

India constitutes one-sixth of humanity, is among the leading industrial and agricultural producers, major military power and a R & D power. India has to look at

8 Kreisberg P. H, 'India after Indira', Foreign Affairs Vol. 3, Spring, 1985, p. 876.

9 For India and her involvement in Non-Aligned Movement, see, Willets P., The Non-Aligned Movement, London, 1978; Nair N. P., 'History, Ideology, Prospects' and Devdutt, 'India, National Interest', in Karunakaran K. P., (ed.), Outside the Contest, New Delhi, 1963, Muni S. D., 'Nonalignment in Asia: Recent Trends and Future Prospects', IDSJ Journal, Vol.XV, No. 1, July-September, 1982.

10 Willetts, Ibid, p. 8.

international relations in terms of its interaction with China, the Soviet Union, USA and West Europe. ¹¹

A further variant of the theme of its power projection is India's lamentation which has been expressed in the following statement- "The priority which China compels on the foreign policy agenda of the Super powers has never been India's."¹² India thus resents that the world powers are "still unable to fix for India a place in strategic schema of the planet which would respond to India's national pride and aspiration and reflect its considerable achievements"¹³. A more pragmatic view is expressed by an eminent Indian scholar thus,

A major obstacle is that because of the given realities and the history of this region and even more the perceptions of these realities and history which prevail among India's neighbours, India's size and power potential become an obstacle instead of being the asset they could be to the region as a whole and to her individual countries. India is suspected to harbour hegemonistic ambitions. The obverse of this and equally an obstacle, is the suspicion which often arises in India that some forms of regional cooperation which are proposed from time to time are

11. Subramanyam K, 'India's Pre-eminence', World Focus, November-December, 1985, p. 12.

12 Gupta Bhabani Sen, 'India, and the Super Powers', in Rajan M. S. and Ganguly Shivaji (eds.), Great Powers, World Order and the Third World New Delhi, 1981, p.131.

13 Ibid, p.131.

only attempts to bring India into frameworks in which her neighbours can gang up against her.¹⁴

Neighbours' perception of Indian self-image: While India perceives its self-image as one of pre-eminence, the neighbours perceives Indian self-image as one of pre-dominance. India is seen as a hegemonic power with a Big Brotherly attitude (a proverbial expression with all its negative connotation). They see India as an 'expansionist' power bullying its smaller neighbours and seeking the status of a sub-superpower in the region. India's self-image as put by an Indian scholar,

generates legitimate and understandable, although often exaggerated apprehensions among India's neighbours vis-a-vis New Delhi. It makes the former feel insecure and uncomfortable in the company of such a giant neighbour.¹⁵

Commenting on India's view of itself as almost unchallengeable a Nepali scholar (during the author's interview with him) sarcastically endorsed a report in the Economist which referred to India's unchallengeable role:

Britain and the rest of the world often forget India's claims to greatness. India is seen as a poor and faraway corner of a lost empire. Indians abroad are the people

14 Chopra Pran, 'South Asia Conflict and Divergence' in Gupta Bhabani Sen (ed.), Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia, New Delhi, 1986, p. 64.

15. Muni, Op.Cit., p. 39.

*who run late-night grocery shops; at home they are the object of Oxfam charity.*¹⁶

The smaller states feel also that India preaches one thing and does something else. It claims itself to be democratic and talk of equality but in actual terms the situation is different. Basically, Indian politics operate from a power position.

*India found no fault in negating its own principle of non-interference and in critically challenging the Nepalis concept of independence in the process of 'legitimizing' its security interests in the country.*¹⁷

One Nepali scholar summed up the Indian attitude towards its neighbours thus: "What is ours is ours, what is yours is negotiable."¹⁸

Nevertheless the smaller states feel that the mistrust and misgivings stemming from asymmetry in military and economic strength can be overcome if the use of the superior power is informed by enlightened national interest and moderated by due regard to the legitimate interests of the neighbours. India's neighbours are not averse to acknowledging its pre-eminence in the region. But the continuing suspicions are rooted in India's failure to convince them that it does not intend to convert this pre-eminence into pre-dominance.

16 Economist, London, 27 March 1982, p. 28.

17 Author's interview with a Nepali scholar (Unpublished). The names of the respondents of this study, being confidential, could not be specified.

18 Author's Interview with a Nepali scholar. (Unpublished)

The present gap between India's vastly superior and rapidly growing power- military and economic and its capacity to manage this power in furthering its enlightened self-interests without detriment to those of its neighbours is reflected in festering bilateral problems and tends to breed misgivings and mistrust.¹⁹

If the purpose of India's enhanced regional role is to maintain stability, protect democracy, and preserve national unity and generally shelter the area from superpower rivalry, it can be appreciated. Such policemen perform a necessary international function. But there is a fine line between help and interference, between leadership and dominance.

If India thinks it is big, it has to act like that: it has to be more generous and should remember that there is no harm in becoming a leader but that leadership has to be well accepted by others.²⁰

Neighbour's perception of their self-image: The small states of South Asia are independent and sovereign states, which came into being with their own vision of identity (at least in political terms). This vision provides the impetus for necessary growth, development and progress. Given the independent political identity among the nations of the world, these states feel that they have, quite justifiably, the right to choose whatever course of action they feel appropriate and act in whatever ways are necessary for their national growth and development. But whatever

19 Haque Shamsul, South Asia in a Changing World, a lecture paper delivered on the Thirty - Ninth Foundation Day Lecture of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 3 January, 1991, p.7.

20 Author's interview with a Bangladeshi academician. (Unpublished).

the national aspirations of the South Asian small states, their self-image is characterised by fear and apprehensions vis-a-vis India. Such fear and apprehension emanates from three sources: India's power capabilities and power projection as has been discussed earlier; their own vulnerability in terms of economic, socio-cultural, political, strategic and military factors; and the legacies of the past.

The small states are psychologically boxed in. Their feelings about themselves are that their history, economy, geographical position and previous relationship with India cast shadows on the present independence and self-assertion of their countries as independent nations.²¹

As one Nepali political scientist puts it,

The problem is the gap in the psychology, gap in terms of power and gap in terms of discrimination between India and its smaller neighbours.²²

Basically, what is happening is that just as within each society, people and groups are asking for more economic, political and social rights, and so realizing their ownselves, the small states feel that they as nations are not getting what they should get in full measure. They expect India to be as magnanimous at heart as it is in size. They expect India to be constructive and rational and to initiate rather than react. As one former editor of a Pakistani newspaper advocated on behalf of the smaller states of South Asia in a seminar paper,

21 Author's interview with a Bangladeshi official. (Unpublished).

22 Author's interview with a Nepali academician. (Unpublished).

*India has to be large hearted and broad minded in her dealings with neighbours rather than being petty and niggardly, literally counting every paisa and penny, as her track record has shown so far. For instance, such pettiness extends to such areas including whether it is the Tin Bigha Island issue with Bangladesh or Nepal's purchase of arms from China.*²³

A former foreign minister of Bangladesh told the author in an interview,

*Curiously enough, the easing of tension between the two power blocs and growing cooperation between them did not produce a correspondingly favourable impact on the South Asia political environment. On the contrary, the structural change in the power pyramid boosting the pre-eminence of regional powers has aggravated the situation.*²⁴

He further assessed that,

this dialectical tension is due to the conflict in the conservative and progressive interpretation of pre-eminence, the former equating pre-eminence with 'predominance' with a hegemonic undertone, and the latter with a 'higher level of development' which is fully compatible with achieving a balance in interstate relations

23 Hussain M., 'South Asian Security: Perspective from Pakistan', paper presented at the International Seminar on South Asia's Security in the 1990s: Primacy of its Internal Dimension, organized by BIIS Dhaka, 5-7 Jan 1992.

24 Author's interview (unpublished).

*and developing regional cooperation mutually beneficial to all peoples of the region.*²⁵

India's perception of neighbours' self-image: India perceives the South Asian small states as its backyard. The small states, in the minds of India, are incapable of maintaining an independent course. Therefore, they have to remain within India's direct sphere of influence. An Indian diplomat asserts,

*India's relations with its smaller neighbours are not purely an adversarial relationship like Pakistan and China. It is more a paternal relationship which to some extent the countries have accepted as part of their own interests.*²⁶

Accordingly, India assumes the role of a regional police man without considering whether it is acceptable to the smaller states. India expects the small states to confirm its policies in every aspect of state functioning. India looks upon itself as the heir to all the glory of Indian history: Mughal, British and all. Therefore, Indians feel that they have made great concessions by acceding to the plan for partition when Pakistan came into being, withdrawing troops from Bangladesh immediately after its liberation without being asked for it, allowing Nepal and Bhutan independence; and that all these acts of generosity have proved their credentials. Consequently, they feel that their neighbours ought to be grateful and show understanding of India's genuine security and other requirements; instead they see their neighbours being nasty to them.

25 Author's interview (unpublished).

26 Author's interview with a former Indian diplomat. (unpublished).

Instead of trying to help India in its security concerns, they have been bringing people from outside (Americans, Chinese and others) and creating problems for them.

Such Indian view can be substantiated by the remarks made by Gupta who states that South Asian neighbours "do not understand and recognize the sensibilities of India as the largest nation in South Asia".²⁷ India thinks that neighbouring states attempt to exploit India by keeping a high profile internationally; that they create problems deliberately with its to get better leverages elsewhere; and that they need to perceive an enemy to define their identity.

Finally, India perceives that neighbours should come to an agreement on its terms, that neighbours should not indulge in arms build-up, that neighbours should not speak ill of its (while it may do so), that neighbours should have no right to talk of its internal affairs (while it frequently talks of democratic rights in the neighbouring countries). India does not see anything wrong in the patron-like behaviour which it justifies as being necessary to assert the undeniable and accepted fact of India's primacy in the region.


PERCEPTION OF FOREIGN POLICY FOCUS

The ways in which a particular state perceives itself and other states (including its neighbours) are manifested, among other things, by the focus of its foreign policy. One can observe stark differences in perception

27 Gupta Bhabani Sen, 'Regionalism in South Asia: Roles and Behaviour' in Gupta Bhabani Sen (ed.) Regional Cooperation and Development: Perceptual, Military and Nuclear Arms Race Problem, Vol. 1. New Delhi, 1986, p. 23.

between India and its neighbours in terms of their respective foreign policy focus. Stated simply, as shown in fig 2, while India perceives its principal foreign policy focus to be concentrating attention on the world politics at large, India's smaller neighbours perceive their relations with India as a single overriding concern.

FIGURE 1.2 : FOREIGN POLICY FOCUS OF INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS



NOTE: The direction of the arrows indicate the direction of the focus and the darker the arrows the more the degree of focus

To quote one Indian scholar,

India's foreign and security policy has tended to operate in three concentric circles, namely the Super Power, the Third World and the Neighbours. The outer most circle received the most attention while the closest ones received the least. (emphasis added)²⁸.

²⁸ Singh Baljit, Indian Foreign Policy: An Analysis, New York, 1976, p. 82. See also Dutt, V. P., India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1984.

His judgement is confirmed by a former diplomat who avers,

*India had never really evolved a foreign policy vis-a-vis its neighbours. The reason basically was after India's independence under the leadership of Nehru we kept thinking of larger global issues, war and peace and so on, and evolved a concept of non-alignment.*²⁹

The Nehruvian model of Indian foreign policy concentrated so much on Asia and Africa in general that the sub-continent, a small region, got lost and sunk into oblivion. Given India's overall foreign policy orientation relations with the South Asian states appear to be insignificant and tangential in the Indian perspective. Indian foreign policy aspirations led its to evolve a global perspective and consequently the matters concerning the immediate neighbourhood are taken for granted. Indeed, India's attention to its South Asian neighbours has been drawn only when the latter had some trouble-making value or when matters impinged on its security.

On the other hand, if we examine South Asian smaller states' foreign policy content, we find that for them relations with India fill the horizon. Among other things, the physical contiguity and unfavourable power differential might help explain Indian pre-eminence in the minds of the small states of South Asia. First, South Asia is basically Indo-centric not only in geographical terms but also in terms of history, culture, politics and economy. In geographical terms, all the South Asian states are physically contiguous to India but none of them is contiguous to one another. Consequently, the concern about India surfaces more strongly in

²⁹ Author's interview with an Indian diplomat (Unpublished).

their minds than about any other state. Besides, India is so close to each one of them in terms of shared history and inheritance and a shared culture (with all the pride of success, follies and misgivings) that one cannot help but recognize her overwhelming influence. For them, to divorce the past which all these countries shared with the present India is to cut themselves off from their roots. Similarly, the over-powering Indian presence in their politico-economic system can hardly be over emphasized.

Again, given the power profile of the states in question, none of the small states matches the Indian power capabilities with respect to any of the attributes of power. The power differential is so enormous that no small state can either singly or collectively encounter the Indian pressures and threats. Therefore, both militarily and strategically the states are extremely vulnerable vis-a-vis India. All these issues bear out the fact that India, a single overwhelming factor, looms very large in the minds of the small states of South Asia when matters not only of external relations but also of domestic importance are considered. India, therefore is very important in their foreign policy calculus. Difference in power is not the only significant difference between India and its neighbours: they are also aware that India matters more to them than they do to India. Their perception of India's self-image is not simply that India sees itself as big; they believe that India sees itself as unaffected by relations with the neighbours. They see themselves as mice in the presence of an elephant which is indifferent to their presence and cares less of their interests and feelings. To quote a Nepali scholar, "India's overall goal is not survival but primacy, whereas ours is survival, and so we naturally

consider India as pre-dominant."³⁰ For example, the water issue in Bangladesh or the trade and transit issue with Nepal are not crucial in the minds of the policy makers in New Delhi and hence get little attention there. But for smaller neighbours with little capacity for absorbing stress, with heavy burden of population and fragile socio-economic base, the issues are vital and substantive, at times putting their socio-economic survival at stake. Moreover, the emotional aspects never matter in Indian minds because these are peripheral to them and peripheries never trigger emotions. But since the issues are vital to the survival of the small states there is a risk that a lot of emotions can be triggered. In the words of a former foreign minister of Bangladesh,

*India's pre-eminence in the military and economic power should not be seen as predominance and it should not let India to seek predominance but this pre-eminence should be matched by a re-adjustment of the relations with its neighbours in such a manner that it serves its own enlightened national interest.*³¹

WAYS OF SETTLING OUTSTANDING ISSUES

Perceptual differences regarding modes of settling outstanding issues can also be observed in the relations between India and its neighbours. India operates from a strong power position while India's neighbours operate from a weak power position. Consequently, India perceives that it can get the most out of a conflict situation if the mode of settlement is bilateral

30 Author's interview with a Nepali scholar. (Unpublished).

31 Author's interview with a former foreign minister of Bangladesh. (Unpublished).

while the smaller neighbours perceive that they can extract the most out of India by creating pressures from third parties which is only possible if the mode of settlement is multilateral.

Though never officially defined as bilateralism, India's policy sought the dual and interrelated goals of first clearing the subcontinent of all external power influences and then elevating India to her rightful regional position by subordinating India's smaller neighbours to New Delhi through exclusively bilateral relations.³²

India abhors promoting multilateralism because it fears it might degenerate into an anti-Indian forum. Instead it favours bilateralism for it gives India the power to influence the policies of its neighbours at the same time as protecting its own security and freedom of action. Through bilateral relationships India seeks to tie the smaller states of South Asia to Indian authority. India has attempted to implement bilateralism in order to achieve regional primacy. As such it suspects all multilateral proposals and negotiations as aimed at reducing its stature. One Bangladeshi official remarks,

India is being ambivalent in its policy. It always advocates collective approach in international forums, particularly on matters of its own national interest but when dealing with its smaller neighbours it always insists on bilateralism. ³³

32 Krol Ronald J. van de, Bilateralism in the "Old" and "New" Subcontinents: Indian Diplomacy and the Farakka Barrage Dispute, D. Litt thesis (Unpublished), Oxford University, 1981.

33 Author's interview with a Bangladeshi official. (Unpublished).

Although India failed to drive out foreign influences from the subcontinent and established governments in South Asia similar to its own, its determination to implement bilateralism never faded. Because India knows that if it succeeds in doing so, Indo-centric bilateralism would give India maximum regional control at a minimal political price. That India continued to reject multilateralism in the subcontinent is reflected in various disputes with its neighbours. The Farakka barrage dispute with Bangladesh is one such case. The Farakka bickering between India and Bangladesh has not been settled by strict bilateralism because disagreement over bilateralism itself lies at the heart of the Farakka controversy and the various proposals advanced for its solution.

Just as India reasoned that bilateralism was a necessary reaction to India's perilous infancy in a hostile world and region, so the smaller states of South Asia have always sought diversified ties to attract foreign aid and guarantee that their giant neighbour does not encroach upon them economically and militarily.

It is in fact the power perception of India that led to its highhanded dealings with its neighbours, specifically emphasizing diplomacy on a bilateral basis only, so that India might be able to exert an inevitable hegemonic posture without the interference of a third party, and thus avoid an equal relationship in negotiations with neighbours.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY ISSUES

Another substantive area of perceptual difference between India and its neighbours concerns security issues, where the states have diametrically opposite concerns.

India's perception of neighbours is framed through security optics. India has adopted the legacy of the British strategic view and as such perceives itself as an 'inheritor' state despite the fact that the political reality of the sub-continent went through dramatic changes i.e., from the political unity of the British period to multiple national entities. The small states of South Asia see India's self-image as inheritors of the legacy of the Raj as an historical hangover.

The doctrine of strategic unity of South Asia, a colonial legacy, continues to dominate the security perceptions and strategic planning in India. Technological developments in the weapons system with advances in nuclear and space sciences have radically changed the military strategy in recent times. Buffer states have ceased to be a meaningful shield even in a conventional warfare.³⁴

Indian aspiration for the strategic unity of the region have been reflected in official Indian policy, which "came to assert India's interest in the integrity and territorial inviolability of India's smaller neighbours as a variant of the policy of integration with India".³⁵ India, therefore, does not see anything wrong in trying to bring all the smaller neighbours especially the Himalayan ones under its own security umbrella and make

34 The former foreign minister of Bangladesh Prof. Shamsul Haque during an interview with the author quoted this from his lecture paper on South Asia in a Changing World, which he delivered on the Thirty - Ninth Foundation Day Lecture of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.

35 Kodikara Shelton, 'Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia', Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 19, Canberra, 1979, p. 17. For a detailed discussion on India's regional aspirations and the obstacles on her way see, Ayoob M., 'India in South Asia: The Quest for Regional Predominance', World Policy Journal, Winter 1989-90, p. 107-33. See also, Ayoob M., 'India as Regional Hegemon: External Opportunities and Internal Constraints', International Journal, Vol. 46, Summer 1991, p. 420-448.

them feel like a client state. It accordingly went on to assert its own version of big nation chauvinism by annexing Hyderabad, Goa and Sikkim without any hesitation. For India, it was not annexation but a question of boundary settlement.

In more recent years the Indian security posture, as succinctly expressed by the Indian elites, came to be known as 'Indian Doctrine'. Gupta expounded the doctrine thus,

India has no intention of intervening in the internal conflicts of a South Asian country and it strongly opposes intervention by any country in the internal affairs of any other. India will not tolerate external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country if the intervention has any implicit or explicit anti-Indian implication. No South Asian government must therefore ask for external military assistance with an anti-Indian bias from any country. If a South Asian country genuinely needs external assistance to deal with a serious internal conflict situation or with an intolerable threat to a government legitimately established, it should ask help from a number of neighbouring countries including India. The exclusion of India from such a contingency will be considered to be an anti-Indian move on the part of the government concerned.³⁶

36 Gupta Bhabani Sen, 'Regional Security: The India Doctrine', India Today, 31 August 1983, p. 20

Interestingly, the paradox is while India considers its neighbours as integral to the security of India, India's neighbours regard India itself as a source of threat to their security. To substantiate the point one can cite Kodikara,

*One of the biggest dilemmas of South Asian politics is that India conceives of its neighbouring countries as lying within the defence perimeter and being integral to the security of India, while India's neighbours themselves regard India itself as the source of their insecurity against whom it is necessary to organize their own security interests, sometimes on an extra-regional basis.*³⁷

While India acquires huge armed forces, with the latest in combat aircraft, tanks and guns, a vast industrial establishment, a nuclear capability, and even a nuclear powered submarine, which its defence needs can hardly justify; and insists on showing the world how big and strong it is, the smaller countries of South Asia cannot help but watch it with a high degree of nervousness. This nervousness is heightened when India takes a one sided view of security and interprets it in ways which are not acceptable to the smaller states. This nervousness was expressed by a Nepali when he said,

*How can we forget what India did in Goa and Sikkim.
That's why we have always had a deep distrust of Indian*

37 Kodikara S. U, 'Regional Roles and Behaviour in South Asia: A Theoretical Framework of Regional Cooperation' in Gupta Bhabani Sen(ed.) Op.Cit., p. 9-10.

*ambitions. We are an independent country, but the Indians seem to think we are just a bit more of India.*³⁸

India's threat to its neighbours is seen as a combination of a hegemonic design related to its security concept, an unwillingness to make accommodations and resolve outstanding problems lest compromise is perceived as weakness and its readiness to interfere and threaten destabilisation because of a desire to have compatible regimes all round.

The smaller states assert that if India's concern is its security sensitivity, theirs are their national independence and economic welfare. All of India's neighbours see that most of their problem of security is related one way or other to India's policy pursuits. In sum, neighbours find in India's behaviour a great deal of unneighbourliness. India, on the other hand perceives anti-Indianism in its neighbours' behaviour. The assertion of Hedley Bull that "the deepest fears of the smaller units are in fact of their larger neighbours"³⁹ thus becomes true of India's neighbours.

38 Author's interview with a Nepali academician.(Unpublished).

39 Bull Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Orders in World Politics, London, 1977, p. 310.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE SURVEY

Existing literature on the foreign policy of small states contains generalized observations about the problems, prospects and dynamics whereby small states fend off, acquire resources from or somehow manage to cope with their external environment.¹ "Focusing on size per se, measured in terms of population, GNP or defence expenditure involves making arbitrary cut offs and yields little of great significance beyond the obvious regarding the characteristic behaviour of those states which happen to fall within the specified parameters."² These studies are, no doubt, helpful in many ways but in one important respect they are unsatisfying. They are more concerned with describing the 'what' of state behaviour. The 'why' and 'how' remains unexplained and is consequently easily overlooked in their analysis. Some believe that 'although the "why" questions are fundamentally most important of all ... they cannot be answered without establishing before hand exactly what phenomena need to be explained'.³ But since we are talking about countries which are 'under developed',

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- 1 Some of these are: Mathisen T., The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers, Oslo, 1971; Singer M., Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships, New York, 1972; Sveics V. V., Small Nation Survival: Political Defence in Unequal Conflicts, New York, 1969; Barston R. P., (ed.), The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States, London, 1973, Handel M., Weak States in the International System, London, 1981, Calvert P. The Foreign Policy of New States, Dorset, 1986.
 - 2 Sharp Paul, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, England, 1990, p. 22.
 - 3 Hill C., 'Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries', in Clapham C., (ed.), Foreign Policy Making in Developing States, Farnborough, 1979, pp 1-2.

'peripheries of the periphery', 'dominated' or 'dependent', should we not explore how and why they behave the way they do?

Annette Baker Fox -- the 'God Mother' of small states led the way on small state's study. In her study of the power of small states⁴ Annette Baker Fox analyzed the position of six small states during the second world war to explain the circumstances in which the power of small states -- as measured by their ability to resist the demands of great powers -- can be maximized. She argued that a situation of heavy external pressure was suited for the study of small states behaviour. In this way, the power of each of the small states at each particular moment of the crisis could be assessed and then a more generalized picture of the great power-small power confrontation could be attempted. Analysis of war time events led Fox to suggest that diplomacy is the field within which small states should concentrate their efforts and that much of small states' influence was due to skilful diplomacy. She argued that although not all the small states had equal opportunities for diplomatic manoeuvre, the small states which she examined (i.e. Turkey, Finland, Sweden and Spain.) did escape submission at the hands of the big power in some cases. Not only did Finland and Norway emerge from the war as totally independent entities but the others also survived without devastation of war with increased military strength. But as one of the critics⁵ of her work pointed out that this was possible because none of them was surrounded by hated or hostile neighbours. Each one of them possessed geographical advantages giving it some chance to remain non-belligerent through self-defence. Moreover, the possession of

4 Fox A. B, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II Chicago, 1959.

5 Anglin D. G , 'Review Article', International Journal, Autumn 1960, Vol. XV, No.4, p. 364.

the scarce resources of critical importance to the conduct of the war- such as chrome (Turkey), nickel (Finland), iron ore (Sweden), wolfran (Spain) and shipping (Norway) strengthened each country's bargaining position. Otherwise in a world that is characterized by the interplay of sheer interest, diplomacy alone has very little role to play unless a state has something in possession to create, enhance and sustain the interest of the other party. Although there is no doubt that the above work by Fox is a pioneer work of immense interest it does not explain why and how the small states behave the way they do. To Fox, small nations appeared to be but appendages of the spheres of great power influence, helpless fragments likely to be swallowed by the giants at will. And as such she had a missionary approach, revealing to the small states how they ought to behave (diplomatically, peacefully, and nicely) and encouraged them to think of themselves as morally special.

David Vital dealt generally with how small states could defend their existence and independence despite the great disparity between their strength and that of the military giants and how they could counteract dangers. He described three paradigms: the classic case of Czechoslovakia in 1938; the contemporary paradigm of Israel; and the paradigm he took for the future was Finland.⁶ In the first case the author provided the evidence that this well armed power might have been able successfully to stand up to the threatening great power if only its leaders and friends had had the nerves to match, but concludes that this example of intrinsic military capacity can no longer be followed. In the Israeli case, he concluded that a conflict in a grey area like the Middle East will end either with a stalemate confirming the irreversible division of the minor powers between the major contenders or

6 Vital D., The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict, London, 1971.

with the isolation of the minor state 'alone in the ring with its great opponent'. He attributed Finland's relative freedom in the previous two decades to the internal stability of northern Europe and to the well recognized strength of Russia's opponents in the general area.

In an earlier work the essence of Vital's⁷ analysis was that small states could best protect themselves and enhance their power and influence by maximizing strength. He therefore asserted that small isolated states that were threatened by a great state should maximize their intrinsic military potential, determinedly and carefully use their diplomatic and military capabilities to show the high cost of conflict and judiciously exploit all contingent attributes, political as well as strategic, in order to exercise the greatest possible external counter pressure on the big power. He analysed the disabilities and possibilities of small states and generated three broad policies or strategies: Passive, Active and Defensive⁸ - from the perspective of the amount of strength a small state may possess. The Passive Policy is the policy of renunciation: ie, doing nothing and hoping for the best. The state gives up its effort to maintain its freedom of choice. The lack of ability to withstand conflict does not matter to the state any more because either it perceives no conflict; or it lacks confidence in its ability to create a national safe base (total national pool of economic and military, human and material resources); or the social and economic cost of the conflict could not be justified when other social ends are taken into account. This is a policy of total submission on the part of the small state. Under the Active strategy a small state strives to alter its external environment to its advantage either

7 Vital D., The Inequality of States, Oxford, 1967.

8 Ibid. p. 121.

by minimizing the discrepancies in strength that are important between itself and the big power, or by widening the limits of freedom of political choice and maneuverability, or by increasing the total resources of the state and thereby strengthening the safe base. In other words, an Active strategy attempts to exploit contingencies in the international system. Defensive Strategy is in effect a strategy of building up one's internal strength. Although Vital admired the active strategy, he recommended the defensive approach.

Vital's conceptualization of a small state in relation to a bigger one essentially emphasized a power-politics view of weakness and strength. Handel has argued that the concern should not be with small states but with the conduct of weak or weaker states in conflict with the stronger ones.⁹ One advantage as Sharp remarks is that such a comparative conceptualization shifts one away from the endless debate of what constitutes a small state ie. whether one can bracket a host of countries (which are apparently small) into the category of 'small state'.¹⁰ Although the present study adopts Vital's line of thinking and considers the states in question as small states in terms of comparative size and strength, it nevertheless cannot identify itself with the said work because of certain limitations of the study

The principal thrust of Vital's work is to evolve strategies that a small state might adopt. There is a significant difficulty in using strategies for the purpose of the study in question. Strategies are prescriptive and in Vital's sense they provide ways in which a particular country can strengthen its

9 Handel M., Op. Cit. 1981, p. 11.

10 Sharp, Op.Cit., p. 22-23.

'safe base'; thereby augmenting its power profile. Strategies help one achieve what ought to be or should be; but they do not explain why something is the way it is ; they have little value in trying to understand a particular behaviour of states.

If one accepts Vital's strategies as the only available models of small state behaviour one would be inclined to conclude that since most small states do not possess any of the power attributes that would enable them to respond to any military-political threat, they are all to be grouped as countries which pursue a passive policy.¹¹ The countries which pursue a passive policy, according to Vital are unable to respond to external threats. Therefore, accepting Vital's categorization would imply that the states in question cannot and do not respond at all. This seems to be rather unrealistic. Although the problem concerns the behaviour of states who have little to gain from the struggle for power, because they have none of the attributes of power in usable form, they nonetheless have developed certain other modes of behaviour. Thus, there ought to be something other than power attributes which is worth examination.

Rothstein in his study "Alliances and Small Powers"¹² mainly contended with the problem of defining small states and dealt extensively on the functions of different kind of alliances. Rothstein argued that small states could be analyzed in terms of certain behaviour patterns and discounted comparison of relative power in terms of socio-economic, military, or population data. He took the traditional approach classifying all small states as 'nothing more than or different from Great Powers writ small'.

11 Although few small states can pursue his 'active' strategy.

12 Rothstein R. L, Alliances and Small Powers, New York and London ,1968.

But in the area of small states foreign policy analysis this has not been the case in recent years. He therefore developed a definition with a perceptual dimension arguing that there is a psychological, as well as material, distinction between great and small powers. Thus "a Small Power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics". Rothstein, like Vital, aimed at prescription.

He examined the advantages and disadvantages of several types of alliance relative to small powers. Rothstein argued that from the point of view of Small Powers, "alliances have increasingly become instruments designed to achieve nonmilitary goals" In his opinion three different alliances seem possible for the small states. The first one is the bilateral alliance with one great power, the second one is the alliance with other small powers and the third is an alliance with great as well as small powers ie. a mixed multilateral alliance. The best solution for the small state in his opinion was the third type. "Small Powers ought to prefer mixed, multilateral alliances. They provide the most benefits in terms of security and political influence. If unavailable, they probably should choose a small Power alliance in preference to an unequal, bilateral alliance, particularly if the Small Powers do not fear an immediate threat to their security, and if their goals in allying are primarily political. An alliance with a single Great Power ought to be chosen only if all the other alternatives are proscribed, and if the Small Powers fear an imminent attack-- and even then only in hopes of improving their deterrent stance."

Central to his analysis was the idea that both large and small powers ally for similar reasons but each tends to perceive relevant options in a different light. He discussed these differences as reflected in a dual problem of choosing allies as well as the kind of alliance to be created. Rothstein only studied the alliance behaviour of small states before the second world war. He regarded their alliance behaviour as nearly exclusively determined by the demand for security of the small state instead of seeing the same behaviour as part of the foreign policy of small states.

These studies were written from a great power perspective: small state behaviour is treated as deviant from the norm of power politics, even when it attempts to be imitative. The main problem with these kind of studies lies in the fact that they are so preoccupied with explaining one variable, i.e., the smallness of the Small State, that they neglected the possibility that there was another important variable ie. their Behaviour. They were naturally interested in how the new states of the Third World would behave but they tended to believe that "small" would determine behaviour. To what extent was their use of the term 'small' code for less flattering ideas: poor, silly, a nuisance, unreliable?. Fox (being a quaker and a great peace and law campaigner) stressed the morality of the small powers. Vital (being an Israeli) was more concerned about the survival of the small state of Israel. He over- emphasized the weaknesses of small states largely by considering their worst possible situations and as such prescribed survival strategies. Rothstein recommended policy options. But 'if Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant'.¹³

13 Keohane R. O, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics', International Organization, 1969, p. 310.

Another significant study focusing on small state behaviour was conducted by Maurice A. East , 'Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models'.¹⁴ East abstracted the conventional model of small states' behaviour in foreign affairs from the literature on foreign policy. He began his work with the conventional definitional characteristics of small states¹⁵ and observed the behavioural patterns that were traditionally attributed to small states. These behavioural patterns included--

- a. Low levels of overall participation in world affairs.
- b. High levels of activity in international organizations (IGO's).
- c. High levels of support for international legal norms.
- d. Avoidance to the use of force as a technique of states craft.
- e. Avoidance of behaviours and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful state in the system.
- f. A narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities.
- g. Frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues.

He argued that the major implicit assumption underlying this attributed behavioural pattern is that the small state behaviours are the result of the same general processes of decision making that are found in large states. He observed that these patterns correspond quite closely to the outcomes of the application of a 'rational' model of foreign policy in which a small state's

14 East M. A, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models', World Politics, Vol.25, 1972-73.

15 East mentioned that small states are traditionally defined to possess one or more of the following characteristics: *small land area, small total population, small total GNP (or other measures of total productive capacity) and a low level of military capability*

behaviour is governed by its limited resources and a limited international potential. Consequently, he argued that all behavioural expressions mentioned above indicated a low-profile course of action in which small states minimize their perceived risk and their consumption of scarce resources such as manpower, military capabilities and hard currency. The assumption espoused by the conventional model in the literature, according to East is that the small states' actions "are the results of the decisions arrived at by a decisional unit which has been monitoring world affairs closely, has an *adequate information base* from which to operate and has a long range policy perspective."¹⁶ Essentially the point East emphasized is that the conventional model assumes that the small states, like their larger counterparts, evaluate 'all possible' alternatives and then make a 'rational' choice. This is precisely the point where he appears to disagree with the conventional model and its assumption of 'rationality'.

East accordingly developed an 'alternative model'. In his discussion of the alternative model East made an opposite assumption i.e. the foreign policy processes of large and small states are fundamentally different. Similarly to the discussion of the conventional model, he began with the definitional characteristics of small states and constructed the said model on the premise that the small states are constrained in terms of resources. He maintained that since the small states have a smaller proportion of an already small resource base to devote to international affairs, the organizational size and capacity of a small state's foreign office is also likely to be small. He argued that this implied that there would be fewer persons involved in monitoring international events and executing foreign policy decisions. As

16 East, Op.Cit p. 558.

a consequence, he stated that small states are unable to deal adequately with the total range of international issues facing them. Small states have to be selective and prioritize their involvement in terms of functional and geographic areas. Another consequence of smaller capacity to monitor the system, he argued, is that the small states are likely to be slow in perceiving international event and developments. This inability to gather early signals implies that small states are likely to get fewer opportunities and alternatives to influence the situation. Consequently, he maintained that by the time a small state receives a signal it is likely to be too late for negotiation or ambiguous behaviour (including softer low-risk alternatives such as verbal response) to be effective. Hence, contrary to the predictions of the conventional model the small states, at this stage, are more likely to adopt a definite, unambiguous and high-risk behaviour.

East then tested the assumptions of both the models on 32 countries (large and small, developed and developing) generated by the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project and finds the assumptions of his alternative model sufficiently validated. But on a closer examination it appears that the assumptions of the alternative model seem not only surprising but little convincing.¹⁷ It appears rather simplistic to assume reliable linkages between size and capacity of foreign office of a small state and the degree of ability to perceive early signals and finally the manifestation of high-risk behaviour. The author did not provide any empirical evidence. Perhaps the size and capacity of a small states foreign office is adequate for perceiving early signals in the *limited and narrow range of areas* that concern the small state. This assumption seems to be

17 For a detailed critique, See, Afroze S., 'Do Small States Behave Differently from Big States? A Critique of Maurice East's Alternative Model', BISS Journal, Vol. 2, 1993.

convincing if we consider the aspect of rationality. It can be argued that the areas of interest for a small state are prioritized in such a way that more resources (from what is available) are committed to those areas that are most important; so that the foreign office can function best in such areas and is capable to perceive early signals that are needed most. Then using the author's argument, the small states will not be required to exhibit high-risk behaviour.

Accepting the definitional characteristics of small states, it may be argued that as a result of a narrow resource base small states have *less international aspirations*, consequently they have *fewer stakes* in their relations with other countries. This implies that they have *less need for early signals* hence they have less risky behavioural expressions. Unlike some of the larger states, small states (for example) are barely concerned with 'star war' nor have burning goestrategic concerns or desperate need to amass sophisticated military hardware (including nuclear capabilities) nor do they need to maintain regional and global sphere of influence. The importance and need for early signals appears to be crucial in these and other similar areas. Such need and importance seem to be much depreciated in the area of small state's primary concern i.e., economic growth and development. The diminished need for importance of early signals in the area of economic growth and development implies that there will be fewer surprises for the small states in an evolving situation. In influencing such a situation the small states are not likely to exhibit high-risk behaviour. However, instances of high risk behaviour in such situation may be found. It, therefore, appears that the understanding of high-risk behaviour in terms of the lack of early signals does not take us far.

Finally, a crucial contradiction may be observed in East's formulation. East asserted that as a result of resource constraints, the size and capacity of a small state's foreign office will be small; thereby such state will be unable to perceive the early signals and this ultimately would lead to the demonstration of high-risk behaviour. It may be argued that the same resource constraint which East maintained as the premise for his argument of small states' high-risk behaviour is likely to prohibit such states in adopting such behaviour. This is because high-risk behaviour frequently involves commitment of resources which is significantly scarce in case of small states.

It also appears that the study might have been biased by the *a priori* categories and the structure of the data set upon which the study was wholly dependent. In a description of CREON, its own originators which includes East too, recognized that the 'validity of any findings from the CREON data set are dependent upon more certain knowledge of what kinds of bias may be inherent in the data source'.¹⁸ Further, despite the impression of imperviousness conveyed by the use of statistics the study remained 'vulnerable' to subjectivity. Certainly the decision about which event will fall in which category in the data set is a matter of opinion and judgement. As Amstrup observed, 'the description of the data set seems to indicate a distortion of data on small states compared to large states, and having such possible, and yet not investigated, distortions in mind, results

18 East M., (ed.), Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, London, 1978.

derived from CREON data on small states should perhaps not be taken too seriously.'¹⁹

Peterson tried to address the question in a limited sense in understanding the specific problem of the small states. In an attempt to explain foreign policy behaviour, Peterson proposed a model²⁰ using the concepts of 'influence capability' and 'stress sensitivity'. This model was developed on Rosenau's adaptation theory and also Hansen's revision of it. According to Hansen, influence capability refers to a country's ability to control and manipulate its external environment and to structure it according to its values, while stress sensitivity refers to the degree to which societal structures and the distribution of societal values are affected by changes in and demands emanating from the external environment. Peterson posited that the degree of 'Influence Capability' and 'Stress Sensitivity' determines the foreign policy behaviour of a given country, because these two variables determine the extent to which a given state can further its interests in the international system and also the extent to which it has to accept external influences on the functioning of its essential structures eg. physical, political, economic and social. Depending on these two variables he specifies four patterns of overall foreign policy behaviour- dominance, balance, acquiescence and quiescence.

What is interesting here is that Peterson presents the two forces, influence capability and stress sensitivity, as varying independently of each other on

19 Amstrup N, 'The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XI, 1976, p. 177.

20 Peterson Nikolaj, 'International Power and Foreign Policy Behaviour: The Formulation of Danish Security Policy in the 1870-1914 period', in Kjell Goldman and Gunnar Sjostedt (ed.) Power, Capabilities, Interdependence- Problems in the Study of International Influence, London, 1979.

axes set across each other, rather than as different ends of the same dimension. So it is possible theoretically to place any state at any point in the circle. But there is doubt as to whether this is practicable, because of the difficulty of operationalizing the dimensions in the model.

Influence capability as viewed by Peterson is a function of the negative and positive sanctions a nation uses to influence others. And so he measured influence capability by size of GNP, GDP, investment, energy production and consumption, defence expenditures, economic aid given, output of steel and cement, combat aircraft and international trade. Some of these factors refer directly to the ability to manipulate the international environment; others seem to bear no necessary relationship to that.

Stress sensitivity is measured by developmental indicators like GDP per capita, GNP, contribution of agriculture to GDP, foreign trade/GDP, balance of payments, and energy consumption. It appears that these indicators of stress sensitivity are drawn from the same field as those of influence capability.

The essence of Peterson's model is that the two qualities (Influence capability and Stress sensitivity) should not lie along the same dimension and must be able to vary independently of each other. But if both are measured using the same information and criteria drawn from the same field, the model collapses : there are no axes and no circle. All we are left with is a monolinear banality: powerful states have more freedom of action than weak and small states (which may not be true in all the cases and at all time). In fact the dimensions in the paradigm seems to be of very complex nature and hence do not lend themselves easily to operationalization as a single indicator. These kind of models encourage tautologous usage; the

analyst is tempted to work back from the policy style to the attributes. This confirms the model but without testing it. Peterson's model can best be described as a miniature theory of state behaviour which takes large states and scales them down.

Other writers have dealt with small states simply by applying to them a universal theory of foreign policy behaviour.²¹ Rosenau for example, in his 'Pre-Theory'²² asserts that all foreign policy behaviour can be explained in terms of the relative influence of five sets of variables viz., idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic. The values, talents and other aspects of a decision maker that distinguish him from others are subsumed in the idiosyncratic variable cluster; behaviour that is generated irrespective of the occupants of governmental position is held to be caused by role variables; those aspects of governmental structure that limit or enhance the chances of foreign policy decision makers are defined as governmental variables; all other aspects of a society, ie. non governmental, that influence its external behaviour are classified as societal variables; and any material aspects of or action occurring in a society's external environment that influences its foreign policy behaviour are regarded as systemic variables. Rosenau tries to assess the relative influence of the variables by ranking them according to the following criteria: size of the country (large v.

21 To name a few other than the ones mentioned above, Menkhaus K. J., and Kegley C. W., 'The Compliant Foreign Policy of the Dependent State Revisited: Empirical Linkages and Lessons from the Case of Somalia', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, October, 1988; Moon B., 'The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, 1983; Herman Kegley and Rosenau (ed.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Boston, 1987; Korany B., and Dessouki A. H., The Foreign Policies of Arab States, (2nd ed.), Boulder, 1991.

22 Rosenau J. N, 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in R. Barry Farrell, (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston, 1966.

Small), state of economy (developed v. developing) and type of political system (open v. closed).

Rosenau's critics contend that most of his concepts remained ambiguous and overlap with one another and the criteria by which the variables are ranked are not sufficiently precise.²³ According to his pre-theory, idiosyncratic sources are the most important influence on foreign policy formation in an under developed country because of decreased bureaucratic constraints. He says nothing about where to go from there. He does not operationalize his own model, nor does he suggest any guidelines as to how others might do so. Another problem is posed by his assumption that all foreign policy behaviour can be explained in terms of his five sets of variables. "His choice of categories determines the nature of the ultimate theoretical product to a much greater extent than he is willing to admit."²⁴ But his categories miss some important distinctions. For example, to say that domestic political competition can be subsumed under societal variables is to bury it amid a host of other 'non governmental' factors, including historical experience, economic capability and elite attitudes. In other words, the distinction between third world actors where these issues are basic and other actors where these issues are not basic is at least blurred.²⁵ One can suspect here that the universalist assumption that the model fits all actions is not fully questioned and that the model's empirical

23 Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, 'A Framework for Research on Foreign policy Behaviour', Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII, March 1969, p. 79, and Handreider W. F, 'International and Comparative Politics ; Toward a Synthesis?' World Politics, Vol. XX April, 1968, p. 487-89.

24 Weinstein F. B, 'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries', World Politics, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, April 1972, p 360.

25 Ibid, p 360.

relevance is centred on developed polities.²⁶ The way in which explanatory variables operated might vary considerably in different types of nations. What might account for one kind of behaviour in one state might not do for another.state. As Weinstein observed, Rosenau tells us nothing about the kind of limits each set of variables can impose, or about the manner in which one set may affect another. He simply chose four conditions viz size, level of economic development, degree of political openness and extent of penetration- which he proposes to correlate with his five sets of variables. Except to the extent that his four conditions can be subsumed under one or another of his sets of variables, there is no suggestion in his framework as to how the five sets of variables interact with each other: for example, how societal variables relate to idiosyncratic ones, or role to governmental.²⁷

The framework for research that was proposed by Brecher and his associates²⁸ focuses on foreign policy behaviour of any state in general rather than any specific type of behaviour (such as non-compliance) of a small state. Hence it is only tangentially relevant to the purpose of this thesis. Despite such observation, it might be possible to gain some insights from this study which might enhance understanding non-compliant behaviour in terms of the variables mentioned and relationships emphasized.

Brecher and his associates examined different schools of foreign policy analysis such as power, decision making and input-output analysis and

26 Korany B., 'Foreign-Policy Models and their Empirical Relevance.to Third World Actors: A Critique and an Alternative', International Social Science Journal, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1974, p. 80-81.

27 Weinstein, Op. Cit. p.361.

28 Brecher et al, Op Cit. p. 75-101.

observed that the former studies conducted in these traditions "do not, for the most part, distinguish the crucial variables of the foreign policy process nor do they establish relationships among them". The researchers therefore, set out to devise a new approach that would guide systematic inquiry into cause-effect relations, as well as the search for patterns of regularity in state behaviour. This led them to formulate "a framework in which the interplay of different pressures can be *observed* and *measured* "

Theoretically, the research framework as proposed by the authors appeared to be elegant. However, it failed to overcome the concerns that the authors had set out to overcome. They wrote, "underlying this kind of enquiry is the proposition that social science models are of little value unless they are subjected to the rigorous test of empirical utility". It is the contention of the author of this thesis that despite certain degree of conceptual success (such as categorizing variables, specifying their relationships and using the idea of feedback) some of the concepts and variables used do not seem to be empirically viable if one wished to measure them. To appreciate the assertion it is first necessary to highlight the research framework itself. Having done so, we shall return to consider this point in the subsequent discussion on the difficulties associated with the research framework.

In essence, one observes two crucial constructs upon which the framework rested . First, the dichotomous view of reality ie. "reality out there" and "reality as perceived". The authors asserted that while the former exists independently and shapes our perceptions, the latter is what one thinks the reality is and not what it really is. Second, one's decisions and actions follow from what one thinks the reality is and not from the reality out there.

Based on these underlying constructs Brecher et. al. developed their framework from a system perspective. They asserted that a foreign policy systems may be viewed as a network of structures or institutions that receives certain inputs and transforms them to certain outputs (decisions) through the performance of certain functions. These outputs are in turn fed back into the system as inputs in a continuous flow of demands on policy, policy process and products of policy. They argued that from a systems view the content and interrelations of the key variables such as environment, actors, structures and processes can be explored as demands on policy or inputs and products of policy as outputs.

Operational Environment: The operational environment refers to the setting in which foreign policy decisions are taken. It represents the 'reality out there' which is constituted by a set of potentially relevant factors and conditions that affect a state's external behaviour. The variables that were identified as constituting the operational environment were categorized into two types: external and internal. External variables referred to the conditions and relationships that existed beyond the territorial boundaries of a state. These included, global, subordinate, subordinate other, bilateral and dominant bilateral. Conversely, the internal variables included military capability, economic capability, political structure, specific demands on foreign policy made by interest groups and the general demands advocated by competing elites.

According to the authors, the total web of relationships among all the actors within the international system (states, blocks, organisation) made up the global system. A subordinate system was referred to as the intermediate level of interaction between the actors within the global system. Four

categories of subordinate system were identified. The categories were-geographic, with contiguous membership; geographic, with non-contiguous membership; organizational, with contiguous membership and finally organizational, with non contiguous membership. The authors used the term 'subordinate system' to refer to the first category i. e., a regional system of which a state is a member. The term 'subordinate other' referred to the rest of the three categories, while the term 'bilateral system' was used to refer to the total pattern of interactions between any state (except for relations involving superpowers or preeminent powers within the global system). The dominant bilateral system referred to the total pattern of interaction between any state and a superpower or preeminent actor in the global system.

The authors then defined the internal variables. Military capability was defined as the ability to wage war or to deter other states from attacking. Economic capability implied the sum total of all material and human resources available to the state for external behaviour. Political structure referred in part to the political institutions and constitutional matrix in which authoritative decisions were made. It also denoted the traits of the political system which may influence the decision process in foreign policy. Examples of such traits included the type of political regime, the character of party system, civil military relations of control, and the system of continuity and stability of the authority structures in the system. Interest groups represented the different groups that convey information and/or exert pressure on the decision makers. Examples of such groups included military establishments, bureaucratic organizations, religious bodies, trade unions, business organisations, peasant associations, ethnic and civic

groups, kinship and lineage groups, regional groups, status and class groups.

The final variable in the operational environment as described by the authors was 'competing elites': it referred to those elites that vie for authority to make political decisions in the system. Further as a variable it is closely linked to interest groups both structurally and functionally.

Having described the variables, the authors asserted that the operational environment existed independently of its perception by the decision maker. However, it is likely to influence foreign policy process to the extent that it is communicated to the elite. Such communication may take place in variety of ways which included mass media, face to face contact and direct observation.

Psychological Environment: The authors contended that the psychological environment consisted of two closely related sets of data. One was designated by them as the 'attitudinal prism' while the other as 'elite image'. The attitudinal prism was referred to as the context of psychological predisposition within which a decision maker operated. It may be understood as a frame of reference comprising societal factors (such as ideology and tradition derived from cumulative historical legacy) and personality factors (such as the idiosyncratic qualities of a decision maker). The authors argued that when the variables constituting the operational environment are viewed through the attitudinal prism, they constituted a reality as perceived by the decision maker. Such a perceived reality was termed as 'elite image'. Borrowing the idea of 'cognitive behaviourism' from the Sprouts they further asserted that the decision makers act in accordance with these perceptions of reality itself. This implied that image

or reality could coincide or diverge. The authors argued that a decision made on the basis of an elite image that is divergent from what operational environment actually is, would produce unsuccessful results while decision based on an elite image that is convergent would produce successful results.

Issue Areas: In an effort to facilitate systematic analysis of state behaviour in foreign relations the authors classified various decisions into four issue areas: Military-Security, Political-Diplomatic, Economic-Developmental, and Cultural-Status. The Military-Security issue area comprised all issues which focus on questions pertaining to violence, including alliances and weaponry and those which are perceived by the foreign policy elite as constituting a security threat. The Politico-diplomatic issue area is a residual category that contain issues which are found classified in other areas. All such issues may relate to foreign policy interaction at each of the three levels of external environment such as global, subordinate and bilateral. The Economic-Developmental issue area comprised all issues that involve the acquisition and allocation of resources such as trade, aid and foreign investment. Finally, the Cultural-Status issue area contained those foreign policy issues that concerned cultural, educational and scientific exchanges.

The main problem posed by this framework is that it does not appear to be empirically viable. We shall examine this point along with other difficulties associated with the framework.

The difficulties that may be highlighted include the following. First, critics observed that although Brecher and his associates neatly integrated an array of relevant variables in a systemic model, they nevertheless failed to offer

any indication about specifically relating the variables in their systems; instead they demonstrated by example how one might discover discrete proposition from comparative case studies.²⁹ Second, given the authors' desire for measurement the framework seems to suffer from an inadequate operational expression of the variables identified. Although some indicators were mentioned for the measurement of military³⁰ and economic³¹ capability, the authors did not spell out how they measured the rest of the variables. One remains uncertain as to how one can measure the impact of interest groups and competing elites. Further as far as the external factors are concerned, measuring the 'total web of relationship' implies measuring both the tangible aspects (such as quantum of trade between two countries, amount of material aid given) and non-tangible aspects (socio-cultural legacy of conflict such as in case of India and Pakistan) of relationships. It is not clear how such grey areas of relationship could be operationalized in measurable terms. Third, it appears to be extremely difficult to know the operational environment (as discussed in the framework) 'as a reality that exists independent of one's perception'. The variables identified do not help us in such task. The knowledge of operational environment in terms of the variables mentioned (except military and economic capability) is a matter of an individual's interpretation (ie. a perceptual reality). Human interpretations cannot be dissociated from a reality theoretically designated as 'independent' of one's

29 Herman C. F and Peacock G., 'Evolution and Future of Research in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Herman, Kegley and Rosenau (ed) Op. Cit., p. 25.

30 Measured in terms of geography, level of technology, military manpower, financial resources available for defence and weaponry.

31 Measured in terms of demography, GNP, balance of payment, level of production and employment.

perception. If that is the case the theoretical distinction between operational environment (an independent reality) and elite image (perceptual reality) is not available in practical terms. Hence, there remains no basis for comparing the operational environment and elite image for ascertaining which decisions are successful and which are not. Therefore the authors cannot achieve objectivity in the way they theorized. Further, there are grounds to dispute their contention that the researcher will be more objective than the elites. If the elite's world view is a perceived reality so is the researcher's and for that matter anybody else's. Which view is more objective than the others? Also there has not been any unequivocal research method in social science that can claim complete objectivity. Furthermore, the researcher as an outsider does not have the insider view and the crucial information needed to make a more accurate assessment of operational environment than the decision maker. Fifth, the authors indicated that the purpose of their study was to guide systematic inquiry into cause-effect relations and the prediction of behaviour through the search for patterns for regularity. However, no attempt was made in the study to control extraneous variables. One remains uncertain as to how causality could be established and predictions made without the control of extraneous variables. Sixth, the introduction of the concepts of elite image and attitudinal prism were also criticised by scholars in the field. It was noted that these concepts lacked the refinement to reveal how they would act as the interface between the operational and psychological environments.³² Another critic noted that the images that are reflected in the public utterances of government officials cannot be the source of policy decisions or the product of them. One can hardly expect the statements

32 Herman and Peacock, Op. Cit., p. 25.

issued to defend a policy decision will reveal images that do not support the decision. The question is whether images taken from such materials really constitute a variable that can be distinguished from the decisions themselves.³³ Knowing the images that exist in the decision maker's mind before they decide certainly will help us understand the subsequent decision. However, to speak of predicting outcomes based on images contained in official statements is no more meaningful than to say that one who knows in advance the arguments that will be used to justify a given decision can predict that decision. Finally, the framework seems to have been based on the assumption of a free flow of information where one can get all the undistorted information about operating environment and elite image. This assumption does not seem to be realistic. As indicated above public utterances of decision makers are clearly inadequate for the purpose. Methodologically, one is likely to prefer some form of indepth interview with key officials as a principal means of data collection not the public utterances. However, because of the various stakes involved in foreign affairs one is not likely to get necessary access to undistorted view of elite image. From this perspective also the concept of elite image does not take us far in empirical terms.

Thus from the observation mentioned above, one is likely to conclude that despite the theoretical effort the framework does not offer much promise in empirical terms. As the constructs, variables and relationships do not seem to stand the empirical test, they seem not to provide encouraging insights for the purpose of this thesis. More importantly, as the framework did not

33 Weinstein, Op. Cit, p. 362.

concern itself with the small states' definite form of behaviour, the study does not seem to be of much help for this thesis.

Whatever the disappointment with some aspects of, or other, of the above discussed conceptual models, all these are no doubt impressive assemblies of variables and elements that are supposed to affect the foreign policy behaviour of the states in general. But again the point of departure is that these approaches and models are also not very much different from the previous ones: same plethora, same open endedness. They are either prescriptive or banal. And unless these theories could serve practically, they would remain only, 'elegant monuments to their author's comprehension and logic.'³⁴

Thus it is clear from the above discussion that although the existing and developing theories increase our knowledge of foreign policy behaviour, they give but very limited help in the specific problem on analyzing the behaviour of small states. The models are basically designed with power and the super powers in mind. They seem to have only minimal utility for those of most of the third world states. In short these kinds of theories are conceived from a big power perspective and hence help us to understand the policy of medium to great powers. They do not take us very far in understanding the behaviour of a particular type of small state vis-a-vis its big neighbour in a situation where both small as well as big are developing third world countries.

34 Hovde P. C., Explaining the Foreign Policy Behaviours of the National Leadership of the Small Island Democracies: An Empirical Assessment and Reconstruction of the Adaptive Theory, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kansas, 1980.

CHAPTER 3

FRAMEWORK OF INQUIRY

When small states comply with the wishes of big powers, we have no problem in understanding their behaviour. In such cases a small state's behaviour is more or less in accord with the preferences of the country that dominates it. Since the big states outweigh greatly the small states in terms of objective or tangible attributes of power, the small states' behavioural expression of compliance can usually¹ be ascribed to their lack of such power capability. The problem arises when small states exhibit non-compliance. We fail to understand why small states demonstrate such behaviour while apparently they should be complying. In this chapter we shall attempt to develop a theoretical framework that would facilitate our understanding of non-compliant behaviour of the small states under study.

At the core of the interaction between states that characterises non-compliance we have the interplay of power. The power connotation is inherent in the concept of non-compliance. As soon as we hear or read the term 'non-compliance' the meaning that starts ringing bells in our mind is 'opposition'; and opposition implies the use of force or power. Therefore the power element is a necessary condition for the concept 'non-compliance' to be as it is. For example state 'A' wants state 'B' to do something which state 'B' does not want to do or state 'B' does something not to the liking of state 'A' and state 'A' wants state 'B' stop doing it which

1 As we shall see later in this chapter objective or tangible attributes do not necessarily guarantee power to prevail.

state 'B' does not want to stop. State 'B' can only stop it by putting counter pressure on state 'A' which is making it do something that it is not inclined to perform. The behavioural expression of state B's resistance may be termed as non-compliant behaviour (NCB). It should however, be remembered that non-compliance does not necessarily mean that a state has to engage in confrontations like war.

By non-compliance we mean 'not yielding to the will or pressure of the powerful'. Non-compliance can be conceived in terms of degrees in a continuum. An extreme example of non-compliance may be a situation where the non-complying state refuses to yield to the pressure of the external power saying 'No and forever no'. A lesser degree of non-compliant behaviour may be exhibited; in such cases the non-complying state says 'no' and after considerable pressure eventually yields to 'yes'. Yet in other situations, an even lesser degree of non-compliant behaviour may be exhibited, such that the non-complying state, although initially it says 'no', eventually yields to the external power under little pressure. Finally in certain other situations the non-complying state yields to the external power since no other alternative is available to it; it would avoid it if it were possible and it would defy the external power whenever an opportune moment arrives. Corresponding to these degrees of non-compliance we have shades of examples-- ranging from strong and explicit official defiance to implicit and unofficial governmental protests. Furthermore, non-compliance may also be direct or indirect and initiative or responsive².

2 It may be noted that it is difficult to achieve clear-cut distinction between initiative and responsive non-compliance. The author of this thesis shares the Sprouts view of arbitrariness of such distinction. The Sprouts wrote that "such a distinction [between action and reaction] is arbitrary and artificial in the sense that every action is in some degree a reaction to some earlier action by some one. However, it is necessary to cut into the seamless web of events somewhere. The question, Where? is determined by the way

Given the crucial role that the idea of 'power' plays in the conceptualisation of non-compliance, it seems useful first to explore the concept of power in some detail and then examine what it implies to the conceptualisation of Nepali and Bangladeshi non-compliant behaviour.

Conceptualising Power and Non-compliance : The Policy Contingency Approach

Power is one of the most important and basic concepts in international relations. Although the use of the concept of power (and related concepts) in understanding human phenomena can be traced from the remote past, the systematic empirical study of power relations is remarkably new.³ The vast improvement in the clarity of power concepts was due to the fact that during the last several decades there were more systematic efforts to tie these concepts than the previous millennia of political thought.⁴ One could not agree more with the authorities such as Baldwin⁵, Cartwright⁶ or Dahl⁷ that conceptual sophistication, refinements, increased precision and

in which one formulates the problem to be investigated". See Sprout H. and Sprout M., Foundations of International Politics, New Jersey, 1962, p. 106.

- 3 Dahl R. A., 'The Concept of Power', Behavioural Science, Vol. II, July 1957, p. 201-215.
- 4 For instance, Dahl R. A., Modern Political Analysis, 3rd edition, New Jersey, 1976, p. 26; Riker W. H., 'Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power', The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, June 1964, p. 341-349; Bachrach P. and Baratz M., 'Two Faces of Power', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, December, 1962, p. 947-52; Nagel J. H., 'Some Questions About the Concept of Power', Behavioural Science, Vol. XIII, March 1968; Nagel J. H., The Descriptive Analysis of Power, New Haven, 1975; to name only a few.
- 5 Baldwin D. A., 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies', World Politics, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, January, 1979, p.161-194.
- 6 Cartwright D., 'Influence, Leadership, Control', in March J., (ed.) Handbook of Organisations, Chicago, 1965.
- 7 Dahl R. A., Modern Political Analysis, (2nd edition), New Jersey, 1970.

'interminable theoretical distinctions' tend to overwhelm an analyst.⁸ Admittedly, there are values in achieving precision of and theoretical distinctions among such concepts as power, influence, resistance, control etc. However, given the task of understanding the non-compliance of small states it is useful to consider power in a generic sense and focus on the essential question: Is power some thing that can be accumulated and applied over wide range of circumstances or is it context bound? In understanding small states' non-compliant behaviour, it appears to be more convincing to consider power, as a means, within a contextual framework, than to treat it as something capable of universal application and unaffected by any contextualities. Let us examine the issue. First, we shall explore the 'universal' view of power.

The 'realist school' of international politics maintains that the power of a national political community is a function primarily of its mobilizable and deployable military force.⁹ Power is viewed as a quantifiable and commensurable mass which can be measured and weighed.¹⁰ Chan in his study of Taiwan's trade relations with the US noted,

in general, structural models of international relations are apt to posit the analytic or policy importance of one or more tangible assets, to treat these assets as proprietary properties, and to assign national status on the basis of these assets. The world is seen to

8 For a discussion on the distinction between Power and Influence, see, Bell D., Power, Influence and Authority, New York, 1975; Knorr K., The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations, New York, 1975; Hassan S., 'India-Bangladesh Political Relations During the Awami League Government, 1972-75', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University, 1988.

9 See Sprout and Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, Op. Cit., p. 137.

10 Ibid., p. 137-138.

have a hierarchy and countries are somehow locked into this structure. Attention tends to be directed to the more objective or quantifiable aspects of national assets, to the domestic rather than foreign sources for generating these assets, and to the basic rigidities and asymmetries of the international relation system.¹¹

Snider asserted that the general concern of most empirical approaches to the definition and measurement of power in world politics has been with power as a strategic resource base for a very specific purpose: to index the war fighting potential of nations.¹² Researchers such as Singer et. al.¹³, Choucri and North¹⁴, Doran and Parsons¹⁵, Handel¹⁶, Cline¹⁷, Wayman¹⁸ and Stoll¹⁹ combined dimensions such as industrial, demographic and

11 Chan S., 'The Mouse that Roared: Taiwan's Management of Trade Relations with the United States', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, October, 1987, p. 251-292.

12 Snider L. W., 'Identifying the Elements of State Power: Where Do We Begin?', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, October, 1987, p. 314-356.

13 Singer J. D., Bremer, S., and Stuckey J., 'Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965', in Russett B., (ed.), Peace, War and Numbers, California, 1972.

14 Choucri N., and North R. C., Nations in Conflict, San Francisco, 1974.

15 Doran C. F., and Parsons W., 'War and the Cycle of Relative Power', American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 4, 1980.

16 Handel M., Weak States in the International System, London, 1981.

17 Cline R. S., World Power Trends and U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s, Boulder, 1981. Also Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift, Boulder, 1975. Recognising Cline's World Power Assessment as a pole opposite of contextual analysis advocated by the Sprouts and Lasswell and Kaplan, Baldwin commented that, 'if one wanted to promote the idea of power as monolithic, homogenous, unidimensional and highly fungible, it would be difficult to improve on Cline's approach. See Baldwin, 'Power Analysis and World Politics', Op. Cit., p.171-173.

18 Wayman F., Singer J. D., and Goertz G., 'Capabilities, Allocations and Success in Militarised Disputes and Wars, 1816-1976', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1983.

19 Stoll R., 'Bloc Concentration and the Balance of Power', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984.

military (or their equivalents) in constructing capability index to assess war fighting potential of nations. Snider observed that all these indices held an underlying assumption that additional increments of resources are somehow converted into additional increments of power.²⁰

Power is being treated as a quantifiable, monolithic, homogeneous and highly fungible entity, which can be acquired, possessed, accumulated, measured, compared and used irrespective of time and contexts. However, our experiences often contradict our expectations derived from the notion of power based on tangible 'power assets'. In commercial negotiations, diplomatic disputes, even military conflicts, the weaker side is sometimes able to prevail over the stronger side to obtain a more favourable settlement than its objective assets and liabilities would suggest.²¹ The observation of frequent failure of power predictions has led Baldwin to label the problem as 'the paradox of unrealised power.'²² Using this paradox Baldwin argued the usefulness of contextual analysis and the inadequacy of a monolithic, homogeneous and highly fungible conception of power. Baldwin considered two explanations of the paradox. First, he explained the paradox in terms of malfunctioning conversion process. Using the distinction between potential power and actual power, he argued that a 'weaker' state may prevail over the 'stronger' state because of the latter's inability to transform potential power into actual power. He maintained that variables such as 'lack of will' to use power or a 'lack of

20 Snider, Op. Cit. p. 317.

21 Chan, Op. Cit. Also Keohane R. and Nye J., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, 1977. and Organski A. F. K., and Kugler J., 'Davids and Goliaths: Predicting the Outcomes of International Wars', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 11, 1978, p. 141-180.

22 Baldwin, Op. Cit. 1979, p. 163,

skill' to wield it effectively could be used to account for such inability and help resolve the paradox. Second, he used the argument of infungibility of power resources. Power resources that are effective in one context can be ineffective in another.²³

Although the phrase 'paradox of unrealised power' reflected a big-power-prevailing-over-a-small-power perspective, this is essentially the same as that of a small-power-resisting-a-big-power. Both the perspectives depend on how power is conceptualised in order to explain the anomalies of power prediction (i.e., a big power failing to prevail over a small power when it is expected to be prevailing over the small power and a small power defying a big power when it is expected to be complying with the big power.) However, the significance of Baldwin's arguments is that, these arguments underscore the importance of the two constructs (i.e., the 'will of the power wielder' and the 'relative infungibility' of power resources) in facilitating a contextual conceptualisation of power and thereby help to resolve the paradox. Hence, these two constructs will now be examined in some depth. Let us first consider the mediating role of 'will' in the conversion process.

One of the most important element of social power analysis since 1950 has been the relational definition of power.²⁴ Power according to this formulation is perceived as a product of the relation between two or more actors. Such a relationship may be actual or postulated.²⁵ The Sprouts wrote that,

23 Ibid., p. 163-164.

24 Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', International Organisation, Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980, p. 496.

25 On the relational definition of power, see, Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, New Haven, 1950; Simon H., 'Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political

*Conclusions regarding the capabilities of nation are always comparative. That is to say, the capabilities of a given state are relative to the capabilities of the other states with which it is or may be involved in demand-response relationships. There is no such thing as political capabilities in the abstract or in general- in a vacuum, so to speak any more than there can be any concept of political potential that is not comparative.*²⁶

Similarly, in his critique of Knorr's formulation of 'putative' power as inherent in the things of value²⁷, Baldwin wrote,

*A relational concept of power assumes that actual or potential power is never inherent in properties of A, but rather inheres in the actual or potential relationship between A's properties and B's value system.*²⁸

What Baldwin disagrees with in Knorr is that power is not inherent in the properties of A; i.e., A does not possess power in an independent or absolute sense. However, he recognises that power can emanate from the properties of A in his relationship with B's perception, values and propensities.²⁹ Thus from a relational point of view, A's properties are just as important as B's value system; i.e., A's power is contingent upon himself just as it is contingent upon B. For example, the effectiveness or potential

Power', Journal of Politics, 15, November, 1953; Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', Op. Cit.; Cartwright, Op. Cit.; and Rosenau J., 'Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World', International Security, Fall 1976.

26 Sprout and Sprout, Op. Cit., 1962, p. 164.

27 Knorr, Op. Cit., 1975.

28 Baldwin, Op. Cit. 1979, p. 171.

29 Ibid., P. 171.

effectiveness of A's threat not only depends on whether B is a coward or a masochist, but also whether A has the motivation/willingness and power potential to make the threat. Hence, the motivation/ willingness of the power wielder can also be regarded as one significant element in the power relationship between two actors. Although Baldwin preferred the argument of relative infungibility of power over the argument of malfunctioning of conversion process,³⁰ he elaborated (within a contextual frame of reference) the mediating role of motivation in another place. He wrote that,

*The distinction between actual and potential power is essential ... Both are relational concepts in that one refers to actual social relations while the other refers to potential social relations; and both vary in scope, weight and domain. The primary difference concerns the motivation of the actual or potential power wielder. The distinction allows for the common phenomenon of unused power resources; an actor may have the ability to get B to do X but lack the desire to do so.*³¹

30 Baldwin argued that the argument of malfunctioning of conversion process encourages 'sloppy power analysis' because of the subjectivity involved in attributing such meaning as 'A lacked commitment'. (See Baldwin, Op. Cit. 1979, p.169). However, the element of subjectivity is inescapable in social science research in general and international relation in particular. For example, the Sprouts wrote, 'At best the analyst's inferences regarding his subjects' image of milieu and his orientation to it rest invariably and inescapably on more or less arbitrary decisions as to the relevance and weight to be given to various kinds of evidence perceived and filtered through the analyst's own (and usually several intermediaries') culture-biased spectacles.' Sprout H., and Sprout M., 'Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, 1957, p. 320. When subjectivity is a condition of research, no one alternative is better than the other.

31 Baldwin, Op. Cit., 1980, p. 498. (emphasis added).

Other examples of similar formulation can also be found in the literature. For example, Starr,³² Most and Starr³³, and Papadakis and Starr³⁴ considered the logical connections between variables such as willingness of the decision makers to pursue certain policies, the opportunities offered by the environment etc., to construct the basis of their environmental model. 'Willingness' (which deals with psychological goals and motivations) was conceptualised as a mediating variable between the environment and 'outcomes' of foreign policy.³⁵ Papadakis and Starr wrote,

*The environment defines the context within which a state may act, but how the state actually acts or deals with its environment depends upon number of factors: the sets of opportunities that the characteristics of the sub-environments 'objectivity' provide the state, how the state perceives its environment, its willingness to take a particular course of action, and so on.*³⁶

One can see a close parallel between this formulation and the relationships between 'actual power', 'potential power' along with the mediating role of motivation of the power wielder. The crucial suggestion which emerges

32 Starr H., " 'Opportunity' and 'Willingness' as Ordering Concepts in the Study of War", International Interactions, Vol. 4, 1978, p. 363-87.

33 Most A., and Starr H., 'Case Selection and, Conceptualisation and Basic Logic in the Study of War', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, 1982, p. 834-56; Most, A., and Starr, H., 'Conceptualising War: Consequences for Theory and Research', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, 1983, p. 137-59; Most, A., and Starr, H., 'International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and Nice Laws', World Politics, Vol. 36, 1984, p. 383-406.

34 Papadakis M., and Starr H., 'Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship between Environment and Foreign Policy', in Herman C., Kegley C., and Rosenau J., (ed.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Boston, 1987.

35 Ibid., p. 415-419.

36 Ibid., p. 416. (emphasis added).

from the foregoing discussion is that motivation of the power wielder (viewed within a contextual frame of reference) may be treated as a plausible element of the theoretical framework necessary to understand non-compliant behaviour of the small states under study. Having considered the motivation of the power wielder, let us now return to the argument of infungibility of power resources in understanding the paradox of unrealised power.

The failure of the power predictions may also result from the mistaken belief that power resources are highly fungible, i.e., those power resources that are useful in one policy-contingency framework will be equally useful in other policy-contingency frameworks. The Sprouts insisted that a discussion of capabilities should always take place within some framework of policies and operational contingencies, actual or postulated.³⁷

The policy-contingency frame of reference is important because data (for example, of physical geography, demographic condition, technological state, economic affairs etc.) have no intrinsic political significance whatsoever. Such data acquire political significance only when related to some frame of assumption as to what is to be attempted, by whom, when and where, and vis-a-vis what adversaries, associates and neutral bystanders.³⁸

³⁷ Sprout H., and Sprout M., Op.Cit. 1962, p.164.

³⁸ Ibid. p. 164.

The need for contextual specification of power relations was also highlighted by Lasswell and Kaplan³⁹, Dahl⁴⁰, Baldwin⁴¹, Nagel⁴² and Lamborn⁴³. While Baldwin offered a complete list of contextual specifications, he suggested that there is a general agreement in the social power literature that a minimum specification of a power relation must include both scope and domain⁴⁴. Emphasising the importance of specifying scope and domain Dahl wrote,

*Any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless. When one hears that A is highly influential, the proper question is: Influential over what actor with respect to what matters? The failure to insist on this simple question often leads political observers astray.*⁴⁵

A similar emphasis can also be observed in the Sprouts' work.⁴⁶ The underlying rationale for such emphasis is that the situational diversities render a particular power-resource useless across context. Baldwin⁴⁷ cited

39 Lasswell and Kaplan, Op. Cit., 1950, p. 75-76.

40 Dahl, Op. Cit., 1976, p. 29-33.

41 Baldwin, Op. Cit., 1979 and 1980.

42 Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power, Op. Cit., p. 14.

43 Lamborn A. C., The Price Of Power, Boston, 1991.

44 Baldwin, Op. Cit., 1980. The complete description of a power relation would include who is trying to get whom to do what, by what means, where, when, how, at what cost, with what degree of success and so on.

45 Dahl, Op. Cit., 1976.

46 Sprout H., and Sprout M., Op. Cit., 1962.

47 Baldwin, Op. Cit., 1979.

Schelling, who stressed that even slight changes in the context of an influence attempt can convert a power asset into a power liability; that threatening voters with nuclear attack is not merely one of the less effective ways to win a mayoral election in New Haven, it is a guarantee of defeat; that possession of nuclear weapons is not just irrelevant to securing the election of a US citizen as UN Secretary-General; it is a hindrance; that 'first strike weapons' may not only decline in effectiveness in deterrent situations, they may actually impair one's ability to deter.⁴⁸

This is because political power resources are relatively low in fungibility. However, this does not imply that some power resources are not more fungible than others. Power resources such as money, time, information etc., are most likely to be effective in most situations with regard to most people over most scopes⁴⁹ than perhaps power resources such as ethnic homogeneity of one's own constituency or elite consensus. However, as Baldwin noted, there are tendencies to exaggerate the effectiveness of military power resources and to treat military power as the ultimate measuring rod to which other forms of power should be compared. These tendencies are considered to be counter-productive in theorising about international politics.⁵⁰ Although Lasswell and Kaplan gave 'special consideration to the role of violence', they repeatedly asserted that power does not rest 'always, or even generally, on violence'; that 'power may rest on various bases'; that 'none of the forms of power is basic to all the others'; and that 'political phenomena are only obscured by the

48 Schelling T. C., The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, 1976, cited in Baldwin, Op. Cit., 1979, p. 166.

49 Baldwin, Ibid., p. 167.

50 Ibid., p. 180.

pseudosimplification attained with any unitary conception of power as being always and everywhere the same'.⁵¹ Hence, if power is treated as situation specific rather than generalised, idea of an 'ultimate' form of power does not make much sense.⁵² Finally, Baldwin asserted,

*The proposition that military force is more effective than other power resources is both ambiguous and debatable. In the absence of clearly specified or implied policy-contingency frameworks, the proposition that force is more effective than other power bases has little, if any, meaning.*⁵³

As required by the contextual perspective, we shall now focus on the situation specifics and attempt to formulate a contextual framework for understanding Nepali and Bangladeshi Non-Compliant Behaviour.

A Contextual Framework for Analysing Non-compliant Behaviour of Small States

The insistence of contextual analysis of power relations might convey an impression of atheoretical empiricism. Admittedly, a contextual perspective discourages the development of general theories, however, it is not devoid of theoretical significance. Baldwin stressed the theoretical import of a contextual analysis and mentioned that,

51 Lasswell and Kaplan, Op. Cit., p. ix, 76, 85, 92, 94.


52 Baldwin, Op. Cit., 1979.

53 Ibid., p. 181.

Emphasis on policy-contingency frameworks could improve theorizing about international politics by encouraging the development of middle-level theories and by forcing the acknowledgement of assumptions that are often left implicit ... '54

As 'middle-level theories', the models that follow shortly are context bound. Yet they are, at the same time, plausible conceptual organisers that are likely to facilitate the understanding of the specific incidents of NCB of Nepal and Bangladesh. Figure 3.1 present a schematic diagram of the contextual framework used to facilitate understanding of Nepali and Bangladeshi NCBs.

Figure 3.1 A Schematic Diagram of the Contextual Framework for Understanding NCB of Nepal and Bangladesh



54 *Ibid.*, p. 168.

In this framework the small state is engaged in a relationship with the big state which is characterised by non-compliance. However, as arrow 1 in figure 3.1 suggests, this relationship is contingent on both the states involved in the interaction. According to this framework, certain conditions are likely to generate a small state's motivation to defy a big state. The motivation to defy is generated because under these conditions the small state perceives certain moves of the big state as threats to its goals, aspirations and interests. Arrow 2 in figure 3.1 indicates such perception of real or imagined threats. *Vitalness of issues, ambition of the ruler and the political tilt of the ruling party* emerged from data⁵⁵ as conditions that constitute motivation of Nepal and Bangladesh to defy India. The conditions that generated the motivation to defy, ascribe meaning to the power resources as means to demonstrate non-compliance. To illustrate the point, let us consider an extreme situation. What could geo-political leverage, a power resource as a means to defy India, signify to a dead (hence, devoid of motivation to defy) Nepali decision maker? Perhaps nothing at all! Arrow 3 in figure 3.1 indicates an ascription of meaning (to the power resources) by the motivational conditions. The power resources which constitute capability to resist, are also contingent on the big state (i.e., the target of small state's defiance) for their effectiveness. For example, given the geographical location, geopolitical leverage for Nepal acquires its usefulness as a result of Indian security concerns. Arrow 4 in figure 3.1 reveals such a contingent relationship of the power resources. *Popular pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political*

55 Obtained through field study and review of literature and documents

support and *geo-political leverage* emerged from the data as power resources that may constitute a small state's *Capability to Resist*.⁵⁶

Finally, according to the framework, the conditions of motivation to defy offer the answer to the *why* of non-compliance while, given these conditions, the power resources offer the answer to the *how* of non-compliance of Nepal and Bangladesh. In other words, Nepal and Bangladesh demonstrated NCB because conditions such as vitalness of issues, ambition of the ruler and the political tilt of the ruling party generated the motivation for them to defy. Given the contextualities, these states demonstrated NCB with the help of power resources such as popular pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political support and geo-political leverage.

1. The Conditions Generating Motivation To Defy:

From the foregoing discussion of Power, the motivation of the power wielder emerged as a significant intermediary variable. The motivation for an outcome or goal is the need, aspiration or desire for acquiring something of value or for avoiding something of anti-value (e.g., avoidance of pain). When acquisition of valued outcome or the avoidance of anti-valued outcome are threatened by coercion or deprivation (actual or perceived) the motivation to defy may be generated in order to eliminate the threat and enable the seeking of outcomes valued or avoidance of outcomes anti-

⁵⁶ It may be noted that the conditions and resources are considered in a specific context, with specific states (i.e., Nepal, Bangladesh and India) with specific direction of resistance to demands (Nepal and Bangladesh resisting Indian demands), in a certain time-frame (specified in the analysis chapters), and over certain issues (specified in the analysis chapters).

valued. The crucial role of motivation in non-compliance was succinctly put by Puchala's respondent, who was quoted to have mentioned that, 'Nothing will move a national government that does not *want* to be moved'⁵⁷.

The contextual analysis of power demands exploring the contextual conditions that generate the motivation of the decision maker to act (or to defy). As mentioned earlier, vitalness of issues, ambition of the ruler and the political tilt of the ruling party emerged from the data as plausible conditions that generated motivation in the Nepali and Bangladeshi decision makers to defy India. These conditions bestow meaning and significance to the power resources.

1 a. Condition 1: Vital-ness of Issues

Non-compliance is not an end in itself; i.e., states which do not comply, do so not just for the sake of it, but for other compelling reasons. Non-compliance can be best viewed as a product of their pursuit of survival. According to condition 1, as the observations from the field study suggest, a perception of vital-ness of issues, as a condition for motivation to defy, may lead a small state to demonstrate NCB. Motivation to defy, however, does not follow when such issues are not viewed as vital.

An issue is vital if it is necessary (actually or potentially) to survival of people⁵⁸, state or regime-- physically, economically, and politically. To be

57 Puchala D., 'Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonization in the European Communities', World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1975, p. 510. (emphasis added)

58 Here the consideration of 'peoples' survival' does not constitute a problem of level of analysis. Such a consideration does not imply focusing on the behaviour of both the states'

more specific, survival is at *stake* when a people face death (physical); a country's trade, industry and agriculture face ruin (economic); rulers face loss of rule (political); decision-makers face loss of independence of decision making (political) or the state faces actual or potential threats to territorial independence (physical). In all such cases the issues involved are vital. On the other hand, a non-vital issue is that which is not necessary to survival. For example, as the data from this study suggest, Bangladesh has been more vocal and defiant in the case of the water issue which is considered vital for the survival of her population as compared to the 'Tin Bigha Corridor'. Also, Nepal has been more defiant over issues like Trade and Transit as compared to the ethnic balance in the Tarai Region. It appears from the foregoing that the vital issues can be spread over a range. On one side we may have something that is 'absolutely' necessary to survive, i.e., without which existence will be at stake, for example, people will face acute crisis immediately or in future. On the other side we may have something that is necessary because, although without which existence will not be at stake, but survival will mean encountering considerable difficulty.

The demonstration of non-compliance on the issues perceived as vital, can be observed in Puchala⁵⁹. He examined some cases in his study of the role of domestic politics in regional harmonisation in the EEC. These were the Belgian subsidies case, the German pharmaceuticals case, the French investment case and the Italian VAT case. In all these cases, the EC directives threatened some issues that were considered to be necessary for political or economic survival of either people or groups or even

behaviour as influenced by peoples' affairs. A similar treatment can be found in Puchala, Ibid.

59 Ibid. p. 496-520.

governments. Puchala's analysis support vitalness as a condition of motivation to defy. For example Puchala mentioned that,

*They will balk, delay, circumvent, or ignore Community regulations when they perceive compliance as being contrary to their interests, even when they are formally committed to compliance.*⁶⁰

Similarly he further added,

*When a government chooses to circumvent EEC regulations, there are usually good political reasons, and no amount of pushing from Brussels is likely to bring compliance until national political difficulties have been overcome.*⁶¹

The EC directives, in some instances, put 'existence' at stake; while in others meant encountering considerable difficulty. For example, in the Belgian subsidies and the Italian VAT cases EC directives threatened the existence of the regimes concerned. Puchala asserted,

*... no Belgian regime could remain viable if it insisted upon allocating regional subsidies in any other way than in accordance with the size of linguistic communities in Belgium.*⁶²

Similarly, in the Italian case he wrote that, '*But it [non-compliance] had a great deal to do with fears about yet another crisis for the faltering Rome*

60 *Ibid.* p.510. (emphasis added)

61 *Ibid.* p. 514. (emphasis added)

62 *Ibid.* p. 511.

regime' ⁶³ Additionally, in the Italian VAT case, various sections of the Italian population perceived that the implementation of the EC directives would mean encountering considerable difficulty.

1 b. Condition 2: Ambition of the Ruler.

Another plausible condition that appears to generate motivation to defy is the ambition of the ruler. Irrespective of ability an individual nourishes the desire to become whatever one hopes to become. Since ambition creates an urge to fulfil whatever is left unfulfilled it influences behaviours and actions. In our particular situation the ruler's dreams, aspirations to become a strong and effective ruler and to rule a strong and prosperous country are also likely to influence his decisions, actions and behaviours. It is very natural that some of these decisions, actions and behaviour will be non-compliant. Examples of such decisions, actions and behaviour in Nepal are not that rare. Hence, according to condition 2, the presence of a ruler's ambition to become strong and effective is likely to generate motivation to defy, while the absence of such ambition is not likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby enable us to understand non-compliant and compliant behaviour respectively.

63 *Ibid*, p. 511. (emphasis added).

1 c. Condition 3: The Political Tilt of a Ruling Party .⁶⁴

The previous conditions offered two possible ways of understanding the motivation to defy. Here we explore another possible condition that give rise to the motivation to defy. This focuses on the *Political tilt of the Ruling Party* in explaining such motivation of small states. According to this condition, the motivation to defy of a small state is contingent upon the political tilt of the party in power. The presence of this condition is likely to generate behaviour that could either be compliant or non-compliant. Political tilt could be a natural one or a tilt as a result of political rivalry between the political parties gaining power at successive stages. In both the cases the tilt of the ruling parties could be in the form of inclination or disinclination toward the dominant power. Let us first consider natural tilt.

Political attitudes, ideas, views and socio-cultural linkages of individuals or groups involved in the management of a country tend to influence the policies they formulate, behaviours they demonstrate and actions they take. Subscription to a political idea, attitude or view along with the kind of socio-cultural linkage (across border) that is congenial to the dominant power, sets a friendly environment (between the ruling parties of the interacting states) in which the small state might develop a tendency to accept whatever is wished by this power. This condition may be labelled as *political inclination* of the ruling party towards the dominant power. On the other hand, a subscription to a political idea, attitude or view along with the kind of socio-cultural linkage (across border) that is not congenial to the

64. The term 'ruling party' is used as a broad category to denote an individual, group or party that is in the helm of power.

dominant power, sets a different environment in which the small state might develop a tendency to reject wishes of the big power. This condition may be labelled as *political disinclination* of the ruling party toward the dominant power. The ruling party's profound adherence to certain political attitude, ideas, views or socio-cultural linkages set a predominant bias in its policy formulation. In Nepal, as well as in Bangladesh one is likely to find both tilts i.e., political inclination and disinclination towards India. A tilt towards China (as in case of Nepal) or a tilt towards the Islamic countries (as in case of Bangladesh) may be considered as a disinclination towards India. A number of compliant/non-compliant behaviours (of small states under this study) may also be explained by taking into account the political inclination/disinclination of the ruling parties. Examples of such behaviour in Nepali and Bangladeshi external relations that can be attributed to the inclination/disinclination (toward India) of the ruling party are not rare. The data suggest that, in case of both Nepal and Bangladesh, 'parties' which have an inclination towards India demonstrated compliant behaviour while 'parties' which have a disinclination towards India demonstrated non-compliant behaviour.

So far we have considered the natural dispositions of the ruling parties. These tilts are natural consequences of subscribing to certain types of ideas, views and attitudes. However, tilts may evolve not only from believing and subscribing to any set of ideas, views or attitudes but also from other sources. For instance, political rivalries among various groups often play a very strong role in deciding what sort of tilt a particular political party might adopt. The very alliance of a political party (which was in power) with the external power is a sufficient cause for a competing political party

(which later came to power) to assume an antithetical posture.⁶⁵ Thus, if the former party in power enjoyed a cordial relationship with an external power and was inclined to it then its successor would distance itself from such external power and would be disinclined to it. The successor would take up such a posture in an attempt to discredit the policy options adopted by its political rival. To sum up, this tilt is specific to conditions in which (a) two political parties or two leaders are in adversarial relationship and (b) one is inclined towards the big power and consequently the other has to be disinclined or vice versa.


Interestingly, a close parallel can be drawn between these conditions and the motivational needs postulated by Maslow in his Need Hierarchy Theory of Motivation.⁶⁶ Figure 3. 2 presents the 'conditions' and their tentatively equivalent 'needs'.

'Vital-ness of issues' (expressed in terms of something that is 'absolutely' necessary because without which existence will be at stake) appears to be equivalent to the 'physiological' need (i.e., the needs for food, water, air, sleep etc.). 'Vital-ness of issues' (expressed in terms of something that is actually or potentially necessary because without which survival will mean encountering considerable difficulty) appears to be equivalent to the 'safety' need (i.e., the necessity to ensure that the actual or potential needs for food, water, air, sleep etc. are met not only for today but also for the future). 'Political tilt' appears to be equivalent to 'relationship' need because tilt as a condition of motivation emanates from a certain type of relationship with

65. Rizvi Gowher, 'The Role of the Smaller States in the South Asian Complex', in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, (ed.) South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, London, 1986, pp. 128.

66 Maslow A., Motivation and Personality (2nd. edition), 1970, New York.

Figure 3. 2 The Conditions of Motivation to Defy and Maslow's Need Hierarchy Theory



the dominant power. 'Ambition' appears to equate with 'esteem' and 'self actualisation'. This is because, one's self esteem may be satisfied if one is able to realise ambition. Furthermore, ambition also mean becoming-what-one-can-become, i.e., actualisation of self.

2. Capability To Resist: The Non-Tangible Power Resources (NtPR)

In the previous section, we considered the conditions that generate motivation to defy. We mentioned that policy contingency frameworks characterised by the motivational conditions bestow meaning and significance to the power resources. In this section we shall focus on the '*capability to resist*' in understanding non-compliant behaviour. With this focus we are essentially concentrating on the *power resources* that tend to influence non-compliant behaviours. Readers will recall from the

preceding discussion that power may evolve from a variety of resources; both tangible and non-tangible. Hence, the 'capability to resist', which is a form of power capability, may also evolve from both types of power resources, i.e., tangible and non-tangible. Examples of tangible power resources (TPRs) include territorial size, economic wealth, productive population, advanced technology, military hardware etc., while non-tangible power resources (NTPRs) include people's support, leadership strength, external political support, geo-political leverage,⁶⁷ information-processing capabilities, elite consensus, governmental authority, bureaucratic co-ordination, negotiation skills,⁶⁸ confidence and flexibility emanating from internal political stability, domestic intellectual and cultural resources, market access, historical ties⁶⁹-etc. As mentioned earlier, policy contingency frameworks bestow meaning and significance to power resources. In other words, the usefulness of a power resource (both tangible and non-tangible) for constituting 'capability to resist' and thereby in demonstrating NCB, depends on a prevailing policy contingency framework. The implication of the contextual characteristics of power resources is that, the non-tangible power resources show no less prospects than their tangible counterparts in aiding our understanding of the phenomenon of non-compliance. In the absence of significant tangible power resources, the non-tangible power resources appear to offer plausible clues for understanding non-compliance of Nepal and Bangladesh. Given policy contingency frameworks characterised by the motivational conditions, the non-tangible power resources (NTPRs) that appear to

67 non-tangible power resources reported in this study

68 non-tangible power resources reported in Chan, Op.Cit, 1987, p.255.

69 non-tangible power resources reported in Papadakis and Starr Op.Cit, 1987, p. 426.

constitute Nepal and Bangladesh's 'capability to resist' include *popular pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political support and geo-political leverage*.

2 a. Popular Pressure and Popular Support

Popular pressure and popular support appear to be important power resources that mould the behavioural expression of small states. Popular pressure and popular support are essentially similar. Pressure works 'against' something while support works 'in favour' of something. In the context of this study 'pressure' is used to indicate people's resistance to the dominant state, and 'support' is used to imply people's endorsement of government's opposition to such state.

Popular pressure and support are regarded as non-tangible power resources because they evolve from public attitudes, feelings, and sentiments that are essentially non-material and non-physical things. The tendency to resist the preponderance of an external power is often deeply embedded in the psyche of the mass. As a result of the historical experiences of social, cultural, political or economic domination by the dominant power, the common people feel threatened and attempt to resist it. The sources of such resistance are not tangible nevertheless these non-tangible resources constitute power capability. This is because under certain policy contingency frameworks popular pressure and popular support are capable of influencing behavioural expressions of the defiant actor and the target of defiance.

The possibilities of popular pressure and popular support influencing non-compliant behaviour of an actor, can be observed in Puchala⁷⁰. Puchala cited some cases⁷¹ and stressed that domestic resistance to the EC directives led the national governments to demonstrate non-compliance. Various sections of domestic populations, such as the linguistic groups (in the Belgian subsidies case), the German 'health fraternity' (in the pharmaceuticals case), the Right and Left wing political groups, the business communities, the elite factions, the general public, the revenue officials, the municipalities etc. (in the Italian VAT case) exerted pressures on their respective government. Often a government wishing to remain in office cannot do so without showing due regard to popular sentiments. Puchala's observation also supports this. The compulsions imposed by the public, for example, on the Belgian and the Italian regimes bear the point just made.⁷² Similar examples of government actions influenced by popular pressure may be found in the countries under study. Recent instances of such influence include King Birendra's and General Ershad's stepping down from power as a result of severe public pressure against their respective governments. Apart from pressure, popular support may also enable a government to demonstrate defiance. The French Left and the French public lent their support to the government's stand on the investment case. On the French defiance, Puchala wrote that,

Pressures which were present in the French investment episode, rather than prompting the de Gaulle government to resist the

70 Puchala, *Op.Cit.*, p. 507.

71 *Ibid.*, mentioned earlier p. 508-510.

72 *Ibid.*, p. 507-509.

*EEC, simply reinforced official resolve already pointed in that direction.*⁷³

Examples of popular support, enabling decision makers to adopt a non-compliant stance, can also be observed in Nepali and Bangladeshi behaviours.

In certain policy contingency frameworks, popular pressure and popular support, as non-tangible power resources, may also have impact on the target of defiance (i.e., the big state). Public resentments and movements within a small state have the potential of attracting attention of the world community to the detriment of the prestige and image of the big state. Data from this study suggest that strong popular pressure or popular support may have contributed to the demonstration of non-compliant behaviours by Nepal and Bangladesh in their relations with India.

2 b. Leadership Strength

Developing countries are often characterised by the presence of charismatic revolutionary leaders described by Henry Kissinger as the 'Prophet'.⁷⁴ Kissinger's characterisation bears the implicit recognition that leadership strength has profound influence on the management of a country. Leadership strength can be regarded as a power resource because, under certain policy contingency frameworks, it is capable of influencing behavioural expressions of the defiant actor and the target of defiance.

73 *Ibid.*, p. 511.

74 Kissinger Henry, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy', in Wolfran A. Handreider (Ed), Comparative Foreign Policies: Theoretic Essays, New York, 1971, p. 47.

Leadership strength is considered to evolve from non-material and non-physical things such as leader's *personal attributes* and *style* , hence, it may be said to be a non-tangible power resource.

The observations made by Snider⁷⁵ offer some support that leadership strength may be considered as a power resource and that it is potentially capable of influencing the behaviour of an actor. He observed that in many developing countries, 'personalised power' operate in an informally institutionalised political system. Comparing the nature of institutionalisation of a political systems in developed and developing countries he mentioned that, 'in many developing countries, political power does not reside in the institutions where it is formally declared to rest. It is often concentrated in the hands of the chief executive based on *personal attributes* and, more often than not, his relations with the military and other politically relevant (and mobilised) groups in the society.'⁷⁶ Furthermore, his observations also indicate that personal attributes and personal relationships (based on family, tribal, ethnic and professional linkages) may enable a leader to implement political decisions. Snider wrote that,

The extent to which these governments [U.A.E., Qatar and Bahrain] have penetrated their societies is attained more through the person of the ruler via interpersonal tribal links than through state's infrastructure, which is independent of the person of the ruler. These informal patron-client networks represent a form of infrastructural power to the extent that they

75 Snider, Op. Cit., p. 322.

76 Ibid., p. 323.

*enhance the government's capacity to penetrate society and logistically implement its political decisions.*⁷⁷

If one accepts this, it is not difficult to see that, under certain policy contingency frameworks, various personality attributes and types might also influence the behavioural expressions of a government in its external relations. However, by that it is not to suggest that foreign policy is solely the function of leader's impulses and idiosyncrasies. Considering the leader as one of the actors in the foreign policy process, we cannot rule out the likelihood of personality attributes shaping behavioural expressions of small and developing states in their external affairs.

Different leadership styles may influence behavioural expressions differently. Leadership styles, such as *the assertive* and *the acquiescent*, seem particularly relevant to this study. When leadership style is assertive, the leader acts independently and imposes his 'self' by moving things his own way. In other words, the locus of control over his own affairs is within his own self. On the other hand, when the leadership style is acquiescent the leader's actions are dependent, the leader lacks the ability to impose his own 'self' in getting things moving his way and yields to whatever he is told. In other words, the locus of control over his own affairs is not within his own self. When the style is assertive the capability to resist is strong and when the style is acquiescent the capability is weak.

Leadership strength has not only a potential for influencing the actions of an actor, but also it has a potential of having some effect on the target of defiance (i.e., the big state). Leader's assertiveness has the potential of

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

divesting a big state of its control over an acquiescent leader and thereby make it difficult for the big state to pursue its intention. Besides, in certain policy contingency frameworks, leader's assertiveness may lead to a loss of prestige of the big state. Leader's assertion, at least, will mean registration of his position and this might, in turn, draw international opinion contrary to the big state's image and international standing. The data suggests that leader's assertive style may have contributed to the non-compliant behaviours by Nepal and Bangladesh in their relations with India.

2 c. External Political Support.

Another non-tangible power element found to be relevant to this study is the External Political Support (EPS). Under certain policy contingency frameworks, EPS appears to influence behavioural expressions of the defiant actor and the target of defiance. Hence, it can be regarded as a power resources. EPS may also be treated as a non-tangible power resource, because it does not involve any physical (military and/or economic) support.

A particular state may enhance its power position by seeking external political support. Membership in international organisations, political alliances, international lobbying etc., are likely to enhance the non-tangible power capability of a small state. Papadakis and Starr noted that,

From a systemic perspective small states have the ability to appeal to world opinion, and in contemporary international system there are substantial constraints on the larger powers

*themselves, for example, norms against the use of force, imperialism and interventionism.*⁷⁸

The distinction between political tilt of the ruling party and external political support may, however, be noted. While a particular ruling party may be tilted to an external power (that is a rival to the dominant power toward which the small state demonstrates non-compliance), it will not constitute a source of power unless the external power extends its support to that ruling party. Capability is enhanced only when external support is extended and not merely when a particular ruling party is tilted to the rival external power. As will be observed in the analysis chapter, data from the field suggest that strong external political support may have enabled Bangladesh and Nepal to demonstrate non-compliant behaviours in their relations with India.

2 d. Geopolitical Leverage

A state's geopolitical leverage is another important determinant of non-tangible power capability. Geopolitical leverage can be regarded as a power resources because, under certain policy contingency frameworks, it is capable of influencing behavioural expressions of the defiant actor and the target of defiance. Geopolitical leverage may be said to be a non-tangible power resource, because it emanates from the target's (big power's) *perception* of strategic importance of the small state.

The physical location of a country does not, by itself, provide any opportunity to acquire strength. A small state acquires importance only

⁷⁸ Papadakis and Starr, Op. Cit., p. 425.

when it is located at a place that is strategically important to big states. However, a small state cannot be strategically important unless there are big states with adversarial relations with other big states. Hence, small states gain leverage when there is a conflict of interest between big states. It is this conflict situation that generates a feeling of vulnerability in each big power making it suspicious about each other's intentions and actions. It becomes a matter of necessity for a big power to woo the small state so that the small state does not become an instrument for its adversary in various designs against it. It is a situation that provides the small state with a certain degree of freedom to choose one or the other to its advantage and to manipulate the weakness of each by playing off one against the other to further its goals. The small state acquires political strength as a result of the big state's need for its goodwill. The observation by Papadakis and Starr⁷⁹ also support the point that strategic location offers a small states certain leverage over the big state. The big power's need and the exploitation of it by the small state makes geopolitical leverage different from and also more effective than external political support in certain policy contingency frameworks. Data from the field study suggest that geopolitical leverage enabled Nepal to demonstrate non-compliance towards India.

A strong non-tangible power capability (i.e., popular pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political support or geopolitical leverage are strong) may enable a small state to non-compliant behaviour while weak non-tangible power capability may not. It may be stated that, depending on a policy contingency framework, a particular non-tangible power resource on its own or power resources in various combinations

79 *Ibid.*, p. 425-427.

may lead to a specific behavioural expression. However, it may be stressed that it is difficult to pin down which particular element (or set of elements) is responsible for a particular behavioural expression. What is offered here, is a number of possibilities that seem to provide equally plausible grounds for understanding the behavioural expressions.

Having considered the contextual framework, it is necessary to examine the issue of operationalization. The usefulness of any theoretical framework tends to be diminished if the concepts used to formulate the framework are not operationally workable. Therefore, it becomes necessary to show that the concepts used in this framework are operationally workable. The abstract concepts used in this study include--'vital/non-vital issues', 'ambition' (of the ruler) and 'political inclination/disinclination' (of the ruling party); popular pressure and popular support', 'leadership strength', 'external political support' and 'geo-political leverage'.

The purpose of operationalization is to find indicators which measure or define a concept empirically. It is the means by which a concept is actually linked to the phenomenon in the real world.⁸⁰ A concept formulated at an abstract level can be seen in concrete events, actions, behaviours and responses. Looking into these empirical referents (i.e., the events, actions, behaviours and responses) it is possible to extract patterns which illustrate the meaning, or can be summarised by the concept. The crucial point is that one does not look into a single, isolated instance of such events, actions, behaviours or responses to extract their meaning; rather a series of similar expressions has to be considered before it can plausibly be recognised that

80. Phillipson Michael, 'Theory, Methodology and Conceptualisation', in Filmer et.al. New Directions in Sociological Theory, London, 1972.p. 77-116.

the expressions adequately reflect the concepts. For example, concrete incidents such as formation of Nepali Congress Party in India, participation of the Nepali Congress leaders in India's nationalist movement against the British Raj, Prime Minister Nehru's personal intervention to free the jailed Nepali Congress leader B. P. Koirala and so on demonstrate the pro-Indian inclination of Nepali Congress party. It is possible to identify other empirical referents to show that the concepts used in this study are operationally workable.

The actual task of operationalising will be undertaken in the analysis chapter. This is because the empirical referents are contextually embedded and much of their meaning will be lost if they are extracted and listed in this chapter without paying attention to the contextual aspects. Meaningful interpretation of specific empirical referents within the context of the states under study makes it possible to operationalize the abstract concepts. Once the concepts are operationalized by interpreting the empirical referents we can then interpret the relationships hypothesised in the models.

What appears from the foregoing discussion is that the entire issue of operationalization and for that matter model testing revolves round the 'meanings' ascribed by the researcher. It might then be asked -- How far can the readers trust such 'meanings'? In response, we would like to acknowledge that in social science research it is rather impossible to evolve 'objective' meaning in the sense of natural-science ideal. Since, in social science, the very data themselves contain multiple meanings, it is extremely difficult to specify any particular meaning unequivocally. This makes the problem of operationalization very acute in social science research. Phillipson emphasises that operationalization and hypothesis

testing cannot be seen as independent of the researcher's interpretations.
He writes--

Operationalization is literally the meaning of the empirical concept because it involves the observer's reasoning as an unexplicated resource at every stage. The indicators and empirical referents of a concept, which are then used in the research process of hypothesis verification, are the products of the observer's commonsense reasoning, so that the manifest "public" hypothesis he claims to be empirically investigating cannot be seen as independent of the "private" practical theories he has used in operationalizing his concepts.⁸¹

The question still remains what can be done to gain readers' confidence.
Phillipson goes on--

A methodological prerequisite ... therefore, is that the researcher develop ways of making his practical reasoning accountable and observable to the reader of his research reports; only in this way can the researcher show the links between his concepts and the social phenomena he claims to be investigating. ⁸²

In this thesis we have attempted to follow Phillipson's advise by making our reasoning (employed in operationalization and model verification) as explicit and accountable as possible.

81. *Ibid.* p.110.

82. *Ibid.* p. 110.

The Motivation To Defy, Capability To Resist And The Extent Of Non-Compliance:


In the preceding discussion we have considered 'motivation to defy' and 'capability to resist' (expressed in terms of non-tangible power resources) to understand non-compliant behaviour. We considered the non-tangible power resources because the small states under study lack traditional power and still demonstrate some non-compliant behaviour. Although they have demonstrated non-compliant behaviour, nevertheless the extent of such demonstrations was limited.

In this section we shall consider the extent of NCB demonstrated by a small state, within a policy contingency framework using the NTPRs. In other words, given a policy contingency framework, the question is, to what extent a small state can match the capability of the big state and thereby demonstrate NCB; and what are the eventual behavioural responses. The relationship between NCB and CR (based on NTPR) is graphically shown in figure 3.3.⁸³

A range of possible behavioural responses may be observed in figure 3.3. First, given a certain policy contingency framework, as awareness of 'capability to resist' increases, non-compliance may be expected to increase. This stage may be called the build-up stage. With the increase in non-compliance the small state is likely to experience increasing counter resistance from the big power. The small state has constantly to compare its awareness of its power to resist with its awareness of the big state's power

83 This graphical presentation should not be interpreted as a 'formal mathematical expression'. This form of presentation is used merely as an illustration for the sake of simplicity of expression and ease of conceptualisation.

Figure 3.3 : The Relationship between Capability to Resist (CR) and Non-compliance



to coerce. That comparison comes into sharp focus at a point designated as X. Second, as the capability to resist (based on NTPR) of the small state increases beyond that of the build up stage, it would either have no further changes in the NCB or would lead to a dramatic tilt towards compliance. In this stage we may have three possible behavioural expression-- State of Stalemate, Sullen Retreat and Compulsive Subjugation as a result of the changes in policy contingency framework. The behavioural expressions of state of stalemate and sullen retreat exhibit the limitations of capability, based on NTPRs, to produce non-compliant behaviour. Most small states tend not to defy beyond point X.

The Build up Stage: As mentioned above, with the increase of small state's capability to resist (based on NTPR), its non-compliance is likely to

increase. However, non-compliance increases up to the point referred to as X. Point 'X' may be defined as the point at which the small state becomes aware that its capability to resist just balances with the coercive capability so far used by the big state. The small state is also aware that if it crosses this point it is likely to evoke significant counter pressure from the Greater Power which it would find difficult to contain. The degree of non-compliant behaviour that most small states can demonstrate is decided at this point.

The line in the build up stage is likely to be non-linear. The hypothesis is that as capability to resist (based on NTPR) increases, leading to corresponding increases in non-compliance, every incremental change in the capability is likely to lead to increasingly smaller changes in non-compliance. This happens because the small state is aware of Point 'X', and as the curve approaches it, it is probable that most small states will likely to be increasingly concerned not to pass it.

The Second Stage: All the three possibilities, i.e., state of stalemate, sullen retreat and compulsive subjugation, generate from the point described as 'X'. We shall now consider these possibilities in relation to capability to resist (based on NTPR). For example, if the small state does not submit to the counter pressures then the increases in capability to resist (based on NTPR) beyond the level of point 'X' is likely to lead to marginal or no increases in non-compliance due to its inability to withstand further counter pressures with the help of NTPRs. However, non-compliance is not likely to decrease significantly because as just mentioned, the small state is not submitting to the existing level of counter-pressure. This implies that irrespective of further increases in capability to resist (based on

NTPR), the level of non-compliance remains unchanged, hence the curve tends to rise vertically as shown by the line A in figure 3.3. Line A represents a *state of stalemate*. This is because on one hand the small state decided not to comply, i.e., stay at a level of defiance it can maintain with the help of NTPRs; on the other hand, it cannot defy further, i.e., go beyond point X, for the fear of retribution which it cannot contain with the help of NTPRs. The big state refrains from exerting increasing counter pressure (and end stalemate) perhaps because the level of defiance, although annoying, is not damaging for the big state; or perhaps the big state is more interested to see that the small state does not defy further and that it can contain small states' level of defiance with the existing level of counter pressure; or perhaps the big state might consider that the existing level of counter pressure is distressing enough for the small state to defy further. At this stage the small state is likely to be under considerable difficulty in coping with the counter pressures as it chooses not to submit and seeks to maintain the level of non-compliance. Maintenance of a non-compliant posture at this stage is likely to result in build up of tension between the states involved. The increase in tension makes the relationship volatile. The volatility is likely to continue until a new equilibrium is restored. The volatile state is shown by the shaded area in figure 3.3.

Now for example, if the small state, finding it unbearable to contain the counter pressure, chooses to yield to it, the line, passing through a short period of volatile state, is likely to change its direction sharply and move towards compliance. In such circumstances we may have two possible behavioural expression. These are '*sullen retreat*' and '*compulsive subjugation*' represented by line B and line C respectively in figure 3.3.


In case of 'sullen retreat' the small state is likely to fall back to obeying the big state as a result of the pressures exerted on it by the big state. If the increased capability to resist (based on NTPR) of the small state that led to non-compliance is not perceived by the big state as a source of potential threat then the big state might just make the small state comply by putting on 'arrestive' counter pressure. In this situation the counter pressure exerted by the big state is not directed towards curtailing the small state's level of capability but just to reminding it of the possible consequences of being defiant. By complying the small state escapes the possibility of further loss and severe retribution.

If, however, the big state perceives the increased level of capability as a source of potential threat it is not only likely to compel compliance but also seek to reduce the level of capability to resist (based on NTPR) of the small state by exerting 'reductive' pressure. The capability of the small state may be curtailed by the big power, for example, by toppling the leader or crushing his strength, or by pacifying popular pressure through manipulating the small states' politics etc. This may, usually be done by adopting covert means. In such circumstances, we are likely to have line C which depicts the progressive reduction of capability with corresponding increase in compliance.

Conclusion

The conditions of motivation to defy and the non-tangible power resources constituting capability to resist offer a conceptual framework to understand non-compliance within the contexts of Nepal and Bangladesh's relations with India. The conditions are, 'vital-ness of issues', 'ambition of the ruler'

and 'tilt of the ruling party'. They offer various possibilities in understanding *why* Nepal and Bangladesh non-comply. In the absence of any significant tangible power resources, the non-tangible power resources, such as 'popular pressure and popular support', 'leadership strength', 'external political support' and 'geopolitical leverage' constitute the capability of the small states under study. Under certain policy contingency frameworks, these non-tangible power resources also offer some plausible explanations for understanding *how* Nepal and Bangladesh non-comply. The framework also sets out a hypothesis regarding the dynamics of the relationship between capability to resist (based on NTPR) and non-compliant behaviour and the limits to NCB. In the subsequent chapters we shall analyse data using this contextual framework. Not all the non-compliant behaviour of Nepal and Bangladesh is likely to be explained using a single condition of motivation to defy and a single power resource. We shall try to ascertain which condition of motivation to defy and non-tangible power resources best explain the non-compliant behaviours of the said states. Finally, we shall attempt to understand the extent of non-compliant behaviour that the small states have demonstrated in the past.



Chapter 4

FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR OF NEPAL WITH INDIA

With the exit of the British from the sub-continent in 1947, the rulers of independent India tried to build a security community of the Himalayan states by bringing the southern Himalayan states into their security orbit. Although India's power in the region was far less absolute than that of British India, independent India believed and still believes that it is the rightful scion to British India. Nehru often described the Himalayas as not only Indian territory but also

a part of our hearts and minds. (They have) been associated with the thinking of our race . . . for thousands of years¹

To be more precise, India's security policy is based on the assumption that Communist China is an aggressive country and the Himalayas are the natural barrier for both India and Nepal. For this reason, India assumes *it* has *de facto* responsibility for defending the natural barrier which includes Nepal. India considers *its* national security is intricately linked with that of Nepal's security and thus *it* seeks to coordinate Nepal's defense policy with With this framework in the Indian mind one is not surprised to see Nehru making statements in Parliament such as,

Apart from any kind of alliance the fact remains that we cannot tolerate any foreign invasions from foreign countries in any part of

¹ Quoted in Chatterjee, R. K., India's Land Borders: Problems and Challenges, New Delhi, 1978, p. 17.

the Indian sub-continent. Any possible invasion of Nepal would inevitably involve the security of India. ²

At the time of independence when the British were packing up to quit the sub-continent, some policy makers suggested continuing the old relationship with regard to the Himalayan states that had existed previously between India and those states. There were others who desired the complete accession of those states or to maintain them as client states. The most influential view came from Sir Olaf Caroe in a 1946 memorandum entitled, 'The Mongolian Fringe'³ where he urged that all the Himalayan states be included within the frontier of India, while at the same time they would be tied to India irrevocably through economic means. Sardar Patel, the then Deputy Premier of India, was in favour of complete accession of all 'native states' of India. But Jawaharlal Nehru wanted to have dependable allies in the form of puppet kings in those states. Nehru believed that it was not practical yet for the accession of those states in the Himalayas but maintained that India did have a *special interest* in that region.⁴ As has been observed by Srikant Dutt,

Nehru was guided by his sentiments in dealing with the Himalayan states, regarding them paternally as unblemished idyllic retreats from the world, and this led to many of the inconsistencies in his policies during the 1950's. Nehru vacillated between statements of 'big brother to little brother' relations and

2 Nehru, Jawaharlal, India, Parliamentary Debates, Part II New Delhi, Government of India Publication, March 17, 1950.

3 India Office Records, P&S Dept. Coll. 8/4364, p. 6-14.

4 Menon, V. P, The Integration of the Indian States, London, 1956.

respect for independence and his insistence that India had the right to defend the Himalayan states'.⁵

India thus pursued the idea of concluding separate bilateral treaties with each of the Himalayan states. These treaties are all patterned after the treaties which British India had concluded with each of the Himalayan Kingdoms before the independence of India. Treaties of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal, and of Trade and Commerce, were subsequently signed by the representatives of both the governments in Kathmandu on 31 July 1950.⁶ The secret 'letters of exchange' attached to the treaty which was made public only in 1959 during the high time of Sino-Indian hostilities carried the process of consultation further by asserting that,

Neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with such a threat the two governments shall consult with each other and discuss effective counter measures'.⁷

To quote a Nepali scholar,

In so doing the leaders of independent India were only stepping into the Anglo-American shoes to rid themselves from China

5 Dutt, Srikant, 'India and the Himalayan States', Asian Affairs, 1979, p. 74.

6 For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the 1950 treaty, see, Subedi, S. B., 'India-Nepal Security Relations and the 1950 Treaty: Time for New Perspectives', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, March 1994, p. 273-284.

7 Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961, New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961, p. 374.

*phobia; or to put it in other words India was suffering from a strong colonial hangover'*⁸

The key clauses in the treaty of peace and friendship are articles 2, 5, 6 and 7.

Article 2 of the treaty obliges both the Governments

to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments'.

Article 5 stated that any arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal that the Government of Nepal may import through the territory of India shall be so imported with the assistance and agreement of the Government of India. The treaty while recognizing Nepal's independence included a mutual defence article and an article regulating arms imports.

Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty obliges each of the states to extend reciprocal rights to citizens of the other with respect to participation in industrial and economic development, trade and commerce, residence, and ownership of property in each other's territory. Although this clause has been fully applied to Indian residents in Nepal, who enjoy virtually equal rights with Nepali citizens in these respects, the reverse has not been the case for Nepali resident in India.

Article 5 of the trade treaty stipulated that Nepal had to "agree to levy at rates not lower than those leviable for the time being in India customs duties on imports from and exports to countries outside India." This hindered the

8 Uprety, P. R., 'A Small Nation in South Asian Politics: The Nepali Case Study', a paper presented in a Seminar in the University of Colombo, p. 7.

possibility of an independent trade policy for Nepal. The treaty also compelled the government of Nepal to agree to levy on goods produced or manufactured in Nepal which were exported to India, export duty at rates sufficient to prevent their sale in India at prices more favourable than those of goods produced or manufactured in India which was subject to central excise duty. Again as a result of India's exporting goods directly to Tibet (previously it was through Nepal), economic stimulus from Tibet was lacking and the villages and towns along the traditional trade route suffered greatly. Nepalis traders claimed that about 80 percent of their trade with Lhasa has been lost to India⁹. The Treaty of 1950, thus, arrested Nepalis industrial development for a decade.¹⁰ The control and the handling of Nepal's foreign exchange accounts by Reserve Bank of India was another significant element in the treaty. This also meant that the necessary foreign exchange for Nepal's imports were to be issued by the government of India.

The cumbersome procedures established for the transit of goods through India under the trade treaty were detrimental to Nepal's economic survival. As soon as goods imported from third countries entered Nepal, the amount deposited with the Indian customs office equal to Indian customs tariff was allowed to be withdrawn provided a certificate regarding the physical entry of goods was presented to the same office. The existence of such a procedure locked up Nepali liquid capital which could have been utilised in a productive channel.

The treaties came under severe criticism from the very beginning and demands for the revision of the treaties were voiced almost immediately

9 Werner, L., 'Nepal in World Politics' Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXX, No.3, September 1957.

10 Rana, Pashupati Shumshere J. B, 'India and Nepal: The Political Economy of a Relationship', Asian Survey, Vol. II, No.7, July 1970, p. 648.

after their ratification. Anti-Indian feelings were expressed in various public statements by the political leaders, party resolutions, press, demonstrations and processions. The Nepalis looked upon the treaty as dictated and imposed.¹¹ Noteworthy among the various demonstrations and protests was a black flag demonstration which was staged against Nehru when he came to visit Kathmandu in June 1951. The controversy over the treaties continues till now. A survey done in Kathmandu in 1989 showed that roughly one half of the random sample of 300 people surveyed said that they knew about the treaties that were signed in 1950 and almost two fifths of them were clearly in favour of its abrogation. Today as many as seven articles of the treaty of peace and friendship serve little or no purpose or are self-defeating and help to breed animus rather than amity. Article 2 remains defunct. Article 5 is almost redundant and is a major cause of conflict. Article 6 and 7 are explicitly discriminatory against China. Article 8 is hardly relevant and Articles 9 and 10 deal with procedures to implement the diplomatic provisions.¹² Little remains except the first article that professes peace and friendship and acknowledges respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of each other. The Nepalis feel that if the treaties are not abrogated, it will influence other treaties and agreements and at the same time will keep adversely influencing both the programming and implementation of an independent and internal policy.

At the time of signing the treaties, Nepal was ruled by the Rana prime ministers. The King was only a figure-head. The Ranas traditionally

11 For comments on the trade treaty see, Shrestha, B. P., 'An Introduction to the Nepal Economy', Kathmandu, 1962; and Pathak, G. D., 'Nepal's Trade with Her Neighbour-The Trade Pact of 1950', Nepal Review, Vol. 1, No. 6, September 30, 1963.

12 Aditya, A. and Dahal, D. R., 'Crisis : Hallmark of Nepal-India Relations', The Rising Nepal, June 24, Saturday 1989.

enjoyed British support and with the departure of the British from the sub-continent they were left with no choice but to look for support from the Indian authorities. Even before the conclusion of the treaty and the exchange of the 'secret letters', the Ranas had cooperated with the Indian government by sending 10 battalions during the Hyderabad and Kashmir crisis of 1948. The main motive behind this act was to appease the Nehru government in India. The signing of treaties that were directed against the new Communist government in China was not disturbing to those who held identical views of the Communist threat. Furthermore, most of the wealth they amassed was kept in the banks in India and they were afraid that if they pursued a policy not palatable to New Delhi, the Indian government might freeze their accounts.

KING TRIBHUVAN REGIME (1951-1955)

In November 1950 there was a revolt in Nepal against the ruling Ranas with the active support of India. The King with his entire family with the exception of his 4 year old grandson Jñanendra, fled to the Indian embassy in Kathmandu on the 6th of November and asked for political asylum which was granted readily¹³. As a consequence of this revolution of 1950-51 the rule of the hereditary Rana Prime Ministers was abolished. King Tribhuvan returned to Nepal on 18th February 1951 and a British style parliamentary

13 The whole affair of giving asylum to the King was preplanned between the palace and the embassy. Erika leuctag, who was employed in the Palace between 1949 and 1950, gives a clear account of secret contacts made between the King and Indian ambassador S. S. Majitha and later his successor C. P. N. Singh in her book *Erika and the King* (New York, 1958). She also claimed that she herself established these initial contacts on behalf of the palace. She mentioned about King Tribhuvan's intention to overthrow the Rana Oligarchy and his soliciting Indian help for this purpose. She also mentioned in detailed the secret exchange of letters between the King and Nehru. This is cited in Sharma, Jagdish, Prasad, Nepal's Foreign Policy, 1947-1962, an unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968.

monarchy was adopted in Nepal under the advice of New Delhi. India played a significant role in restoring the royal authority in Nepal by bringing together the Ranas, the King and the Nepali Congress under the Delhi compromise in January 1951. The Delhi Compromise which was master minded by Nehru reshuffled the power pattern in Nepal which brought fresh vigour to Indian tutelage over Nepal. To quote Rose and Dial,

*The terms of the settlement, the so-called Delhi Compromise reflected the objectives of the Indian government much more than it did those of the revolutionary leaders.*¹⁴

The political instability which followed the 1951 political change favoured the King who became even more dependent on the government of India. The Indian government in return took full advantage of the situation and sided with the King and his party men under the disguise of peace and stability, and the immense financial assistance from India to Nepal left King Tribhuvan with no other alternative but to coordinate his country's foreign policy with that of his big neighbour. '*When the Indian government beats the drum, the Nepal government dances*'¹⁵ was the common expression in those days.

Nepal's foreign policy between 1951-55 was thus conducted within the general framework of special relationship which implied that Nepal's relations with other countries had to be contingent upon her relations with India. Nehru stated,

14 Rose, Leo E, and Dial Roger, 'Can a Mini State Find True Happiness in a World Dominated by Protagonist Powers? The Nepal Case', The Annals of the American Academy, 1969. p. 91.

15 Tiwari, Krishna, J., 'Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy in South Asia; The Case of Nepal.' in Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. X, No.3, Spring 1987, p. 68.

*What became the fundamental principle of India's frontier policy, namely, that, as far as defense is concerned, India unilaterally assumes responsibility for the security of the entire Himalayan border, even in areas where the territory of independent and autonomous states (Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan) intrudes.*¹⁶

"Nehru was so concerned about his country's security that he linked Nepal's independence and sovereignty with that of India", remarks a Nepali former diplomat.¹⁷ Despite Nepal's grumbling, most statesmen as well as policy makers in India take for granted Nepal's security, stability and economic prosperity as intricately linked with those of India, because of their extensive social, cultural, historical, geographical and economic ties.

During this 'special relation' phase the formulation of an independent foreign policy on the part of Nepal was almost impossible and at the same time superfluous. The Himalayan Kingdom was looked upon as an Indian sphere of influence. Almost all matters of importance including matters of domestic politics were communicated to New Delhi and the King's regime attached considerable value to the Indian advice. Rose wrote: *On a number of occasions, the Nepali government not only tamely followed New Delhi's guidance but actually took the initiative in seeking it.*¹⁸ One Indian Ambassador, Chandra Prasad Narayan Singh even insisted upon his being seated in the cabinet meetings despite the objection some Nepali Cabinet Ministers made about his presence.¹⁹ He is also believed to have arranged M. P. Koirala's

16 Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April, 1961.

17 Author's interview with the respondent. (Unpublished).

18 Rose, Leo E, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 195

19 Interview with a Nepali official.

appointment as Prime Minister in November 1951, instead of his half brother B. P. Koirala²⁰ who was supposed to head the first non-Rana government. He was the man who arranged for Tribhuvan's political asylum and had been influential in negotiating the settlement of the political crisis in 1950. He often intervened personally in the process of government, on one occasion even dominating the proceedings of a conference of district level officials. ²¹*It is said openly in Kathmandu that the real ruler in Nepal today is the Indian ambassador, Mr. C. P. N. Singh'.*²²

Indian advisory teams were sent to Kathmandu many times in order to advise the Nepali government on administrative reorganization. Charges were made that these teams were working towards modelling the governmental processes to suit Indian interests. Indian officials were brought directly into top positions in the Nepal Secretariat in administrative rather than advisory roles. To cite some examples, the first attorney-general of Nepal was an Indian. It was an Indian police officer who was once entrusted with the task of reorganizing the Nepali police force.²³ This kind of practice gave the impression in Nepali government circles that all the important posts in the government might soon be monopolized by the Indians. Moreover, Indian aid was channelled through the Planning Commission rather than the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi.²⁴ This was viewed a slur on Nepal's national self image, because it seemed to place Nepal on the same footing as an Indian state.

20 Rose, *Strategy for Survival*, Op.Cit., p. 196.

21 Ibid., p. 196.

22 Quoted in Patterson, George N, Peking Versus Delhi, London, 1963, p. 142.

23 Rose, *Strategy for Survival*, Op. Cit., p. 198.

24 Ibid., p. 199.

There was also a tendency among the Nepali high Government officials including King Tribhuvan and the Ministers to go to India for Indian advice whenever there was a crisis of any sort. Prime Minister M. P. Koirala was quite famous for making these kind of trips to New Delhi for which one Nepali politician remarked, '*When Nehru caught a cold, M. P. Koirala sneezed*'.²⁵ In other words, the government of India was intimately associated with practically every major political incident that occurred on the Nepali scene between 1951-55 under the pretext of special relationship.

Also with regard to the representations by the Indian missions abroad, the government of India was asked at one time to handle Nepal's relations with New Zealand and Australia. "Such a relationship with India ran counter to Nepali nationalism, the major goal of which has been to achieve a status of equality in Nepal's interaction with India. Without realizing Nepal's delicate position sandwiched between the two mighty states, India wanted to maintain special relations without fulfilling its special responsibilities towards Nepal which needed special facilities for trade, whether with India or with third countries".²⁶

The principal objects of harsh public criticisms were the various Indian advisory missions to Nepal, particularly the Indian military mission that came to Kathmandu in 1952 in order to reorganize and train the Nepali army. Probably no other act of the two governments could have struck more directly at popular sensitivity than this.²⁷ Following the Raksha Dal revolt in January 1952, an Indian team arrived in Kathmandu to discuss the future of

25 *Ibid.*, p. 199.

26 Baral, L. S., 'Nepal's Foreign Policy 1960-72: Some Basic Ingredients', *Pacific Community*, 1973-74, p. 140.

27 Author's interview with a Nepali scholar.

the Nepali army. Agreements were reached with the Indian team and on 29th February 1952, a 150 man Indian military mission, led by a major-general arrived in Kathmandu to reorganize as well as modernize the Nepali army.²⁸ At the peak of its strength, the mission consisted of about 250 officers which was gradually reduced to 43 by 1964.²⁹ The check post personnel were to train Nepali nationals and to operate wireless sets at the Sino-Nepalis border posts. They were stationed in 17 checkpoints in the northern border of Nepal and their total strength remained about 75 all the time. It was reported that the Indian military mission came to Kathmandu at Nepal's request. It is, however, not out of place to mention that India was more than willing to consider Nepal's request as it provided India an additional advantage of keeping a better watch on Chinese activities on the Nepalis border. But at a later stage the difference of perception between India and Nepal regarding the Chinese threat and India's lack of recognition of Nepal as a separate entity in relation to its security structure became the source of conflict. The conflict was further aggravated by India's insistence on maintaining its mission in Nepal.

The Indian military mission came to Nepal for a specific purpose and on completion was supposed to return to India. Originally, it was scheduled to complete its task within a year. Barely a month had passed after their arrival when Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha that the mission was to stay in Nepal for at least a period of two years. However, actually it stayed on indefinitely. India's real intention, which was the management of its security needs and not the training of Nepali forces, became apparent when with the growing

28 Rose, *Strategy for Survival*, Op. Cit. p. 197.

29 Mihaly, E. B. , Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal, Oxford University Press, London, p. 26.

Sino-Indian hostility India did not want to lose the opportunity of her military presence in Nepal and tried to interlink their presence with her security interests in Nepal. Indian military presence was regarded as a factor that jeopardized Nepal's security interests and political independence because rather than serving Nepal's interests it served Indian interests. Second, as mentioned earlier one of the stated task of the mission was the reorganization programme which involved the reduction of the army from 25,000 to 6,000 men.³⁰ "Such a drastic reduction of army personnel could hardly be reckoned as something in the best interest of Nepal's defence", remarks a Nepali scholar.³¹ Third, the control of Radio communication between the northern border and Kathmandu were assigned to the Indian technicians, because as was argued, the Nepali army lacked both the trained personnel and equipment to carry out that function efficiently. All the communications were reported directly to the Indian embassy in Kathmandu rather than to the government of Nepal, thus giving India a sort of private intelligence system within Nepal.³² The above facts demonstrate that the Indian military acted contrary to the Nepali security interests. As time passed on, the Indian military mission thus, came to be regarded as an occupation force and anti Indian feelings were expressed in public speeches.

A number of such protests were made. For example, in a public speech on 21st April 1952, Rishikesh Shaha demanded to know why the Nepalis themselves who had earned their names in history as the best soldiers in the world were not good enough to train their own army. He also took the issue with the governmental contention that there was a need for protecting the

30 Rose, *Strategy for Survival*, *Op. Cit.* p. 197.

31 Author's interview with the respondent. (Unpublished).

32 *The Economist*, London, 27 August, 1960.

'newly born democracy from internal and external dangers', and maintained that Nepal needed a democracy that could operate on its own rather than the one that had to be managed by foreign troops.³³ Tanka Prasad Acharya commented that he would not have been opposed to the idea of an Indian military mission in Nepal had it been headed by a Gurkha officer in the Indian Army.³⁴

In the 1950's India decided to control the rivers of Nepal which had constantly caused destruction through floods in Northern India. Nepal also suffered because of the floods but to a lesser extent. On 25 April 1954, the pro Indian Nepalis administration, headed by M. P. Koirala, agreed to India's proposal to build a power house and a barrage in the Kosi river near the Nepal-Bihar border by which India achieved flood protection and irrigation facilities for vast areas of its own territory. Nepal received only a minute proportion of the total irrigated land. India benefited more from the power resources developed than Nepal. Sriman Narayan wrote,

*10 million acres of India's land will be irrigated while only a few thousand acres in Nepal will be. Working on the Nepalis portion was also ignored or delayed.*³⁵

As a result of the project Nepal lost acres of fertile land and some administrative control on the projects without proper compensations. The water storage facilities ruined some of Nepal's richest agricultural lands in the eastern Tarai because of the accumulation of silt. For all practical

33 Gorkha Patra, Kathmandu, 22 April, 1952.

34 Ibid.

35 Narayan Sriman, India and Nepal: An Exercise in Open Diplomacy, Bombay, 1970, p. 57.

purposes, the land covered by the project came under the administration of the project which was controlled by India. Further, the Kosi agreement had no time limit. As Mihaly observed, '

*What India needed was flood protection and irrigation water. Nepal had neither the capital nor the skill to take an active role in harnessing the rivers. So, India, in the Indian view, did the sensible and honourable thing in agreeing to take full responsibility and give Nepal both water and power at virtually no cost at all. No consideration appears to have been given to the fact that it was taking from a sovereign state the water on which its future depended.*³⁶

The agreement aroused intense bitterness in Nepal.³⁷ Nepalis perceived the agreement a threat to their vital agricultural interests. The agriculture of Nepal mainly rested on irrigation. Nepal have only three rivers capable of yielding sufficient water for a year-round irrigation. The other smaller rivers could not provide enough water for an additional crop. But the Kosi river project yielded greater benefits to India compared to Nepal at the cost of adverse implications to Nepal's agriculture. Opponents accused the government of bartering away Nepal's future. The project was also characterized as an economic exploitation of Nepal. As Sharma noted,

A river inside the country is a national wealth. It is both deception and dishonesty on India's part to take over the river and its hydro-electric

36 Mihaly, *Op. Cit.* p. 149.

37 Rose, *Op. Cit.* p. 199.

*potential by just giving a little royalty as an imperialist country would in a similar situation.*³⁸

Indian influence in Nepal became so pervasive that Indian politicians did not hesitate to make unnecessary, legalistic statements without paying the slightest attention to Nepali nationalist sentiments. A. S. Ayangar, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, for instance, declared in 1954 that democracy in Asia would be strengthened only when the Himalayan states including Nepal were amalgamated into the Indian Union and that Nepal's border should be treated as India's border in the north.³⁹

Anti-Indian agitation in Nepal reached new dimensions when in May 1954 there was a massive demonstration on the arrival of the Indian parliamentary delegation in Kathmandu.⁴⁰ As reported, the delegation was physically attacked and serious clashes took place in Kathmandu between Nepali and Indian workers. The Nepali government at that time tried to blame the demonstrations on the opposition parties, but this could not disguise the fact that these organisations could use anti-Indian slogans to arouse substantial popular backing. This became even more apparent when a pro-communist front successfully organised an "Anti-India Interference Day" in Kathmandu, despite not having the open support of most of the major political parties.⁴¹

38 Sharma, *Op. Cit.* p. 153.

39 *Ibid.* p. 122.

40 Rose, *Strategy for Survival*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 201.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 201.

ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAVIOUR : KING TRIBHUVAN REGIME (1950-1955)

From the above observation of Nepali behaviour from 1950-55, we see that the government of Nepal complied with the wishes of its big neighbour, India. How does the motivation to defy and the capability to resist help understand the governments' compliant behaviour? The answer to this question seem to be found partly in condition 1 and partly in condition 3 , and in the lack of capability to resist in this phase.

The readers will recall from chapter 3 that according to condition 1 an issue considered as non-vital is not likely to generate motivation to defy and consequently will lead to compliance. Similarly, condition 3 states that an inclination to the dominant power is also not likely to generate motivation to defy and consequently will lead to compliance. Let us now examine the partners in the coalition in this phase in turn and explore the conditions, assumptions and contextualities (ie., policy contingencies) that led to the demonstrations of compliance.

King Tribhuvan held a very positive view of India's role as a personal friend and a close ally. It appeared nothing unnatural to him to accept Indian influence since he regained his crown with the help of India. The King reciprocated such Indian favour by aligning himself with the Indian lines. At the same time he was too dependent on India for advice on all matters of concern including how to manage the Ranas and the party politicians as he was not very much interested in politics itself. It was King Tribhuvan's appreciation of India for reinstating him at the helm of power, which kept the foreign policy of Nepal non-deviant and, therefore, subordinate to India's

foreign policy.⁴² For Tribhuvan consciousness of the help given and his sense of obligation for emancipation from the clutches of the Rana autocracy, were too heavy to override Indian interests in Nepal. To King Tribhuvan, the issues relating to the treaty of 1950, the presence of Indian military mission and Indian advisors and the Kosi agreement were not vital because far from threatening his regime, the Indian influence as a whole supported it. The considerations of issues as non-vital (ie., condition 1) failed to generate motivation to defy. The logical behavioural expression under the circumstances was therefore compliant.

King Tribhuvan's compliant behaviour may also be interpreted by his disposition of 'natural' inclination toward India. King Tribhuvan had close personal and family ties with India and with several Indian leaders. He was politically inert and avoided the complexity of politics. As such he aligned himself with India and relying on Indian advice he accepted whatever was offered to him by India. For example, King Tribhuvan's private secretary, Govinda Narayan, was an Indian civil servant who was seconded to Nepal to advise the King. He exerted a substantial influence over the King. In being subservient to India, Tribhuvan saw no threat to Nepal's independence. Rather he was very much content to get back his crown because he wanted to reign and not to rule. During his reign, both Kathmandu and New Delhi accepted the 'special relations' between the two countries as an inescapable fact. The lack of motivation of defy generated from a disposition of inclination (ie., condition 3) offer plausible explanation of King Tribhuvan's compliance.

42 Sharma, *Op. Cit.*, p. 141.

The compliant disposition of the Ranas may be understood with the help of condition 1 only. Like Tribhuvan, the Ranas did not see the issues damaging Nepal's vital interests, or as threatening their regime interests. Consequently, their behavioural expression logically was not defiant. Historically, the Rana cooperated with the British who in turn helped them to remain in power. With the departure of the British Raj, they continued the same policy with the Indian authority. The signing of the 1950 treaty may be viewed as a Rana effort to appease India to gain their support to remain in power.

After the revolution of 1950-51, the Ranas found themselves as a partner in the coalition government formed as a result of the active Indian negotiation and mediation. Although India was instrumental in putting an end to the Rana oligarchy through the revolution, the Ranas remained dependent on Indian support to maintain whatever power they still had as a partner in the coalition. Furthermore, they could not just do without India because they also needed Indian advice and guidance on how to function in the new political system totally alien to their whole understanding of politics.⁴³ For the Ranas, just as for Tribhuvan, compliance to the big power seem logical as they regarded non compliant behaviour as virtually biting the hand that was feeding them.

The Nepali National Congress had always been tilted towards India. This can be inferred from the following facts. The Nepali National Congress itself was born and brought up in India with the guidance and support of Indian socialist leaders. The Nepali Congress leaders were socialized into politics through involvement in the Indian nationalist movement and was very

43 Rose, Leo E, and Scholz John T, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, Colorado, USA, 1980, p. 44.

much interested in retaining close working relationships with their Indian mentors. The Nepali Congress secretary-general, Surya Prasad Upadhaya had shared a prison cell with the Indian Congress leader, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, during the second world war. Well-known Nepali Congress leaders, like B. P. Koirala and D. R. Regmi were even imprisoned by the British for their active involvement in the Indian freedom struggle. B. P. Koirala had once provided asylum to the Indian socialist leader, Jaya Prakash in Nepal during the second world war. Before the revolution of 1950, B. P. Koirala was arrested by the Rana government. In jail, he went on a hunger strike for twenty seven days and the rumour of his death created a sensation both in Nepal as well as in India. The Socialist Party of India observed a Nepal day all over India and staged a protest demonstration before the Nepali Embassy in Delhi. Ultimately, Nehru intervened in the release of Koirala. It is recorded that Nehru sent a telegram to Mohan Shamsheer which read something like this: *"Should anything happen to B.P. in your prison, it would surely do much harm to Indo-Nepalis relations".*⁴⁴

Apart from the personal connections of Nepali Congress Leaders with their Indian counterparts, more importantly the Nepali Congress Party subscribed to the Indian notion of security. It genuinely believed that Nepal's security could be secured only by India as Nepal lacked ability to withstand any aggression from outside. Further, economically they did not find anything awkward to see Nepal's economy as an appendage of Indian economy. They believed that Nepal's economy could only prosper by being integrated with the Indian economy. To them the issues relating to the treaty, the presence of military mission and the advisers, and the Kosi project did not constitute any threat to Nepal's interest. Therefore, a lack of motivation to defy,

44 Chatterjee, Bhola, A Study of Recent Nepalese Politics, Calcutta, 1967, p. 39.

emanated from condition 1 (i.e., perception of issues as non-vital) and condition 3 (inclination towards India), provide plausible clues for understanding the compliant stance of Nepali Congress.

According to our contextual framework, given the motivation to defy, NTPRs such as leadership strength, people's power, geo-political leverage and external political support may enable a small state to demonstrate NCB. Given the contextualities, not only that Nepal, at this phase, lacked the motivation to defy, it also did not possess the necessary potential NTPRs that might have constituted capability to resist.

King Tribhuvan was an easygoing man of frail health with excessive gratitude towards India. He was caught in the middle of the power struggle between the Ranas and the Nepali Congress. He was very reluctant to assert himself fully. Added to this was the personal disliking on the part of King Tribhuvan to participate in politics. The 'Economist' commented:

*... Pandit Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, has also had his way in securing the return of King Tribhuvan to the Nepalis throne. This was not what the King had originally wanted. He had long schemed and endeavoured to live outside Nepal, and there is little probability even now that of his own accord he desires to go back.*⁴⁵

His indifferent health held him away from the Kingdom quite often and for long intervals. All this had given rise to an aversion towards politics in him as he admitted himself. While appointing M. P. Koirala as the Prime Minister second time, in the Royal Proclamation of 15 June, 1953, he said,

⁴⁵ The Economist, 6 January 1951, pp. 27-28.

This problem (of choosing a Prime Minister) could have been solved a long back, and our burden, which has to be carried against our liking and health, lightened, only if the politicians had given up their individual and partisan outlook and adopted a national one instead.⁴⁶

Hence King Tribhuvan's personal gratitude coupled with lack of interest in politics, ill health, and lack of assertiveness indicate an absence of leadership strength as a potential NTPR.

Apart from King Tribhuvan, the Ranas and the Congress leader M. P. Koirala also lacked the kind of assertiveness and strength to defy. Besides, leadership strength, one also notices the absence of other non-tangible power resources. For example, Nepal in this phase was totally Indo-centric having almost no political linkages with any outside power (with the exception of Britain). Consequently gaining external political support was out of question. Indo-Chinese rivalry was also not so acute in this phase compared to that of the post 1960 period. Consequently, for Nepal to tap such rivalry and gain a leverage was not so feasible as it was in the post 1960 period. Hence, the absence of these potential NTPRs also help us understand Nepal's compliant posture at this phase. However, anti-Indian public pressure as a potential NTPR was present. But such public pressure did not contribute to regime defiance because the regime lacked the motivation to defy.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Muni, S. D., 'Role of Personality in the Context of Nepal's Foreign Policy,' in Varma, S. P, and Misra, K. P, (eds.), Foreign Policies in South Asia, New Delhi, 1969, p. 142.

KING MAHENDRA REGIME (1955-1959)

With the death of King Tribhuvan, Mahendra succeeded the throne on 13th March 1955. His accession to the throne was destined to alter the foreign policy of Nepal in such a significant way as to constitute a watershed in Nepal's international relations. The question before King Mahendra was how Nepal, sandwiched as it is between India and China, could maintain its independence and advance towards modernization and economic development. His determination to assert Nepal's separate national identity disposed him to follow an independent path of his own choice without caring to consult the Indian government as his father had done before him. His foreign policy of having equal friendship with all countries was in sharp contrast to the Indian objective of keeping the strategic Himalayan kingdom aloof from foreign influences.

On 14th April he announced the formation of a five-man Council of advisors and accepted the resignation of M. P. Koirala. As one Indian scholar noted,

The way King Mahendra ignored the demands of the various political parties to form a cabinet without seeking Indian advice made it clear that unlike his predecessor he would not let New Delhi guide Nepal's future political development.⁴⁷

After coming to power the first step he took was to discard the existing policy of 'special relationship' with India. As Muni states,

King Mahendra's rise to power in March 1955 marked a breakthrough in Nepal's foreign policy. Nepal moved away from

47 Jha, R. K., The Himalayan Kingdoms in Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi , 1986 p. 151.

*the policy of 'special relations' with India and evolved a certain balance of power in relations to its neighbours"*⁴⁸

On 26th July 1955, a six member Chinese delegation arrived in Kathmandu for negotiation on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. After five days of continued negotiations it was announced on 1st August that an agreement had been reached on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was agreed that the exchange of relation was to take place at an ambassadorial level⁴⁹. On the immediate effect of the treaty, the *Eastern World* wrote,

*Nepal grew in stature as an independent state- because of its being so treated by a great Asian Power.*⁵⁰

These developments were watched by India with considerable indignation. There were much resentment and annoyance in Delhi at Nepal's blunt defiance of India's established position there. India could not just let Nepal wander from its (India's) sphere of influence. Nehru, who had all along been opposed to the extension of foreign influences in Nepal, was placed in a delicate position although apparently he praised the *panch shila* (five principles) declaration. *The Hindu* wrote:-

The recent decision of Nepal and the People's Republic of China to normalize their relations and exchange diplomatic representations seems to have provided another cause for concern among a section of members of Parliament. There is speculation whether this new

48 Muni, S. D., Foreign Policy of Nepal, New Delhi, 1973, p. 98.

49 The Statesman, 15 October, 1955.

50 Eastern World, London, October 1956, p. 12.

*friendship may not result in infiltration of the Chinese into Nepal and upset the balance in the northern border on India.*⁵¹

On 14th December 1955, Nepal was admitted to the United Nations. Nepal had first applied for admission into the United Nations in 1949 but was vetoed by the USSR. Its objection had been that Nepal was not an independent country but a satellite of India and that other similarly qualified countries were not granted membership. The admission to the United Nations was thus the realization of seven years' effort and the fulfillment of a nationalist aspiration to participate in the international forum as an equal and bonafide member of the world community; it was celebrated in Nepal with a two day jubilation. An official statement characterized the event as a 'great success' in Nepal's efforts to gain 'universal recognition of her sovereignty'⁵².

On January 27, 1956, Mahendra appointed T. P. Acharya as Prime Minister. In his first Press Conference after taking office, Acharya announced that his government would pursue a policy of 'equal friendship' with all in its foreign relations and accept aid from any quarter if such aid was unconditional.⁵³ He also declared that he would seek to amend the 1950 Indo-Nepali trade treaty in order to establish direct trade relations with third countries. This announcement implied that the 'special relationship' with India was now at an end.

The Nepali public as well as the Chinese government responded quite enthusiastically. Nepal acquired new trade and aid agreements with China

51 *The Hindu*, 3 August, 1955.

52 Sharma, *Op. Cit.* p. 68.

53 Rose, *Op. Cit.* p. 209.

for the first time bringing in this new factor in Himalayan politics as a potential counter-balance to India. Both Nepal and China emphasized equality of status between the two countries, thus hitting hard at the special position enjoyed by India in its dealings with Nepal. A week later, it was announced in Kathmandu that the government would soon take up the Tibetan question with China.⁵⁴ The objective was to regularize Sino-Nepali relation in view of the changed Tibetan status. T. P. Acharya, the Prime Minister of Nepal, while addressing a news conference on 29th May 1956, said that Nepal had made an informal approach to the Government of India suggesting a revision of the 1950 treaty.⁵⁵

On 20 September 1956 China and Nepal signed a treaty which abrogated all past agreements and treaties between the two countries and remained in force for a period of eight years. The Prime Minister of Nepal described it as a '*historic event in trans-Himalayan relations*'⁵⁶ and left for China on a state visit the same day the treaty was signed. The visit was particularly significant in the sense that it publicly underscored the independent nature of Nepal's foreign policy and gave notice to New Delhi that the so-called special relationship was not acceptable to Kathmandu any longer.

In the same year, Nepal participated as one of the 29 countries at the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung. Representation at Bandung gave a greater non-aligned flavour to Nepal's foreign policy and set the stage for a more active participation in the international arena. Nepal was also granted membership in the Universal Postal Union in 1956. Until then, Nepal's

54 Asian Recorder, Vol.I.No.59, 11-17 February 1956, p. 678.

55 Ibid. p. 187.

56 The Hindu, 22.September, 1956.

postal communication with the world was conducted by India. Now that the Himalayan kingdom was officially admitted into the Universal Postal Union, Nepali postal stamps gained international recognition and from then onward Nepal conducted its own postal communication.

Nepal also sought to define its position in such bodies as the United Nations in something other than a follow-the-leader role to India. In the 1956 vote in the UN General assembly on the Hungarian question Nepal voted with the West against the Soviet bloc. This was the first major issue in the UN in which Nepal had not voted with India, thus establishing Nepal's credentials as an independent state in an international forum.

This kind of defiant behaviour in Nepali foreign policy was not a pleasant development for India. With respect to Nepal's relations with China, Nehru informed the Chinese Government that the 'signing by them of a treaty of friendship with Nepal would, from India's viewpoint, be inopportune.'⁵⁷ That India was much distressed and annoyed can be discerned from the views expressed in Indian press. Almost all leading dailies expressed this concern in their editorial sections. One such comment is given below,

Legally China has nothing more to do with Tibet than we have to do with Nepal. That being so New Delhi erred grievously in letting Peking have a locus-standi in Nepal-Tibet affairs. How would Peking relish New Delhi's direct negotiations with Lhasa?
58

57 Sarvepalli, Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. 1956-1964, Vol.3, Delhi, 1984 p. 35.

58 Organiser, 15 October, 1956.

This gives the reflection of overall Indian thinking which equates the status of Nepal with that of Tibet which was certainly detrimental to the independent status of Nepal.

Despite India's annoyance, Nepal continued to deal with Peking as intimately as before. On 25th January 1957, Chou-En-Lai paid a visit to Kathmandu on Nepal's invitation. But before he could visit Nepal, India announced her President's visit to Kathmandu. As one Nepali analyst observed, it was obvious that his visit right between Nepali Prime Minister's return from China and Chou's forthcoming trip to Kathmandu was a part of Indian response to growing intimacy in Sino-Nepali relations.⁵⁹ The Indian President Rajendra Prasad upon his visit to Kathmandu tried to remind the Nepalis of their social and cultural affinity with India, and declared that, '*I am your kin*' and stated that relation between India and Nepal was not of body but of soul.⁶⁰

On 13 July, 1957, Tanka Prasad Acharya resigned. The reason behind his resignation was the differences that had developed between him and the King over the appointment of several ministers who were either relations or favourites of the King. When the influence of the party members was seen shrinking by these appointments, Acharya forwarded his resignation.⁶¹

K. I. Singh, a vocally pro-Indian man was appointed as the prime minister of Nepal on 26 July 1957.

59 Sharma, Op.Cit. p. 68.

60 Ibid. p. 69.

61 Patterson, Op.Cit., p. 145.

In appointing pro-Chinese and pro-Indian ministers, King Mahendra, of course, was not motivated by either sentiment but rather by a determination to gain for Nepal a greater degree of flexibility and independence in dealing with both of his dangerous neighbours. ⁶²

After coming to power he announced his intention to re-establish the 'special relationship' with India and to keep Nepal's contacts with other powers to a minimum. It can be noted here that the concept of 'special relation' was not contested by the Nepali government whenever it was headed by a pro-Indian ruling party or a party leaned to India. K. I. Singh also stated that Russia and China would not be permitted to establish embassies in Kathmandu. Nepal would continue to conduct its business with overseas powers through its embassies in New Delhi and London. In August 1957, he declared:

We shall support India over the Kashmir issue. There is no doubt about this. Kashmir was and is a part of India and the people of kashmir desire to live with the Indian union. We respect their wishes. ⁶³

He denied that Nepal had ever ratified the 1956 treaty with China on the Tibet question. On the issues of Gandak river project, which the Nepalis look upon as a symbol of resistance to Indian domination, K. I. Singh accepted the draft agreement submitted by India and appointed a special committee to evaluate the proposal as the first step in the direction of an agreement.

62 Rose, Op.Cit. p. 214

63 Hindustan Times, 4 August, 1957.

But K. I. Singh lasted less than four months. He took office on 26th July 1957, and was dismissed on 14th November 1957. His dismissal was so sudden that everyone in Kathmandu, including the Cabinet Ministers, was taken by surprise. Unaware of his downfall, K. I. Singh himself contacted the Radio Station to get the text of the royal proclamation.⁶⁴ K. I. Singh was picked on the assumption that he would cooperate with the king. But when he refused to do so he was sacked. He even tried to cross the limits of his real power. For instance, he announced a complete reform of administration in the country starting with the Palace itself by removing two of the King's principal private secretaries.⁶⁵

From mid November 1957 to end May 1959, King Mahendra initiated a period of direct rule. His policy of diversification was pushed once again with fresh vigour. The most significant aspect of this period was the relatively little attention paid to New Delhi. Nepal reached agreement with the United States in January 1958 under which both government established resident embassies in each other's respective capitals. This was followed by the opening of further embassies by a number of other states including China and the Soviet Union in the face of New Delhi's annoyance. In 1958, Nepal established its own airline. The new airline, operated under Nepali governmental control, replaced the Indian Airlines Corporation which had until then been running air services in and out of Nepal.

From subservience to India in 1950 Nepal had come to a new independence. Previously, Nepal had direct diplomatic relations with only five countries-

64 Gupta, A., Politics in Nepal: A Study of Post-Rana Political Developments and Party Politics, Bombay, 1964, p. 119.

65 Mihaly, Op. Cit., p. 157.

all established before 1951; by 1959, Nepal had exchanged instruments of recognition with twenty four governments. As Leo Rose observed,

'Sleepy little Kathmandu, in which foreigners had been once a rarity, had now become a busy center with a substantial diplomatic community'.⁶⁶

ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAVIOUR : KING MAHENDRA REGIME (1955-1959)

Non-Compliance in the foreign policy behaviour of Nepal during the phase 1955-59, may be understood in terms of motivation to defy that appear to have emanated partly by condition 1, partly by condition 2 and partly by condition 3. According to condition 1, a small state is likely to acquire motivation to defy and demonstrate NCB if it considers the issues involved as vital i.e., if the issues are perceived as necessary for physical, economic or political survival of the people, state or regime. Such necessity may be 'absolute' i.e., without which existence will be at stake; or it may not be 'absolute i.e., without which existence will not be at stake but survival would mean encountering considerable difficulty. If an issue is not considered vital then a small state is not likely to have motivation to defy and consequently non-compliance is not likely to follow. According to condition 2, a ruler's ambition to become strong and effective and to transform his country to a prosperous, independent and respectable member of the international community might generate the motivation to defy and lead to NCB. According to condition 3, a ruling party's disinclination towards the dominant power might generate the motivation to defy and lead to NCB

66 Rose, *Op. Cit.* p. 268.

while an inclination towards the dominant power might not generate the motivation to defy and fail to lead NCB. A subscription to a political idea, attitude or view along with the socio-cultural linkages (across border) of the ruling party that is not congenial to the dominant power, sets an antagonistic environment in which the ruling party might develop a tendency to reject the wishes of the dominant power. This condition was defined as political disinclination of the ruling party towards the dominant power. Conversely, a subscription to political idea, attitude or view along with the kind of socio-cultural linkages (across border) of the ruling party that is congenial to the dominant power sets a friendly environment in which the ruling party might develop a tendency to accept whatever is wished by the dominant power. This condition was labelled as political inclination of the ruling party towards the dominant power. The point is that both inclination and disinclination sets a predominant bias in the formulation of policy by a ruling party.

Table 4.1 summarizes the non-compliant behaviours, their nature (i.e., initiative/responsive) along with the conditions of motivation to defy and the NTPRs used to understand these behaviours. Table 4.1 suggests that in all the instances Nepal took the initiative to defy. It also shows that out of 17 instances, 4 instances can be best understood by condition 1, 6 instances by condition 2 and the remaining 7 instances by condition 3. In 3 out of the 4 instances of NCB (that can be understood by condition 1) economic survival was at stake, while in 1 instance the issue involved were vital from the point of view of both economic and political survival. Furthermore, table 4.1 reveals that leadership strength, an NTPR constituting capability to resist, explains all the instances of NCB. In 3 instances, people's power and 2 instances, external political support, (both in addition to leadership strength)

Table 4.1 A Summary of the Instances of NCB during King Mahendra's Regime (1955-1959) along with the Conditions of Motivation to Defy and the NTPRs used to Explain Them.

INSTANCES OF NCB	NATURE OF NCB	MOTIVATION TO DEFY (The Conditions)	CAPABILITY TO RESIST (The NTPRs)
1. Discard Special Relations.	Initiative	Condition 3 (Disinclination)	LS
2. Establishment of diplomatic relation with China.	Initiative	Condition3 (Disinclination)	LS
3. Admission to United Nations	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS, EPS
4. Announcement by Acharya of the policy of equal friendship.	Initiative	Condition 3 (Disinclination)	LS
5. Acharya's announcement of the policy of accepting aid from third party.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, PP
6. Acharya declared his desire to amend 1950 trade treaty to establish direct trade relation with third country.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, PP
7. Trade and aid agreement with China.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS
8. Announcement of Nepal's intention to discuss the Tibetan question with China to regularize Sino-Nepali relations.	Initiative	Condition 3 (Disinclination)	LS
9. Acharya mentioned, Government of Nepal informally approached to India for the revision of the 1950 Treaty	Initiative	Condition1 (Survival of economic and political independence)	LS, PP
10. Nepal and China signed treaty	Initiative	Condition 3 (Disinclination)	LS

Table 4.1 Contd ...

Table 4.1 Contd ...

INSTANCES OF NCB	NATURE OF NCB	MOTIVATION TO DEFY The Conditions	CAPABILITY TO RESIST (The NTPRs)
11. Membership in Universal Postal Union	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS
12. Voted with the West on Hungarian Question against India and Soviet bloc.	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS, EPS
13. Strengthening Sino-Nepali relations Chou-en-Lai's visit to Nepal.	Initiative	Condition 3 (Disinclination)	LS
14. Diplomatic relations with the US	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS
15. Opening of embassy in China	Initiative	Condition 3 (Disinclination)	LS
16. Opening of embassies in other states including USSR	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS
17. Establishment of Airline.	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS

* The letters LS, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, people's power and external political support.

also enable us to understand NCB. Let us now examine the instances closely and explore the conditions, assumptions, contextualities etc (i.e., policy contingencies) within which these NCBs are demonstrated.

The instances of non-compliant behaviour which condition 1 best explains include announcement of the policy of accepting aid from third countries, declaration of Nepali government's intention to amend 1950 trade treaty to establish direct trade relations with third country, trade and aid agreement with China and Nepali government's informal approach to India for the revision of the 1950 treaty. Explaining these instances of NCB in terms of motivation to defy based on the ambition of the ruler (condition 2) or disinclination of the ruling party (condition 3) rather appears to be

unsatisfactory. However, for the moment we will postpone addressing the question as to why these conditions are unsatisfactory in understanding these NCB. Instead we will concentrate on condition 1 i.e., vitalness of issues. It may be recalled from the foregoing phase that the treaty obligation with India in matters of trade threatened Nepal's vital economic interests and jeopardized Nepal's survival as a viable economy. Hence the issue of favourable terms of treaty with India to ensure diversification of economic relation with other countries was perceived to be a necessary element for Nepal's economic existence. These instances of NCB highlighting Nepal's quest for diversifying economic relations, may thus be explained in terms of a motivation to defy characterized by vitalness of issue (condition 1) because the issue involved was viewed as necessary to Nepal's survival as viable economy. Now let us return to the question as to why condition 2 and condition 3 do not offer satisfactory explanations. As far as condition 2 is concerned, ambition of the ruler may be best viewed as a disposition characterized by an urge of 'becoming', 'growing' or 'developing' to the full potential, an actualization of a dream to become a strong and effective ruler of a strong country. Surely the question here is not of an actualization of a dream. It is rather a question of bare survival of economic existence.

Condition 3, on the other hand, does offer an explanation to these non-complaint behaviours. It will be observed from the subsequent analysis that both King Mahendra and his prime minister Acharya had strong disinclination towards India. From this point of view it appears logical for this regime to be non-compliant. However, economic survival is too fundamental to be interpreted in terms of their subscription of certain political views or attitudes. Hence Condition 1 (i.e. vitalness) rather than Condition 3 (i.e. disinclination) offer better explanation in these instances.

Let us now examine the instance of NCB which may be explained best by condition 2 i.e. ,ambition of the ruler. These instances include admission to the United Nations, membership in the universal postal union, voting in the United Nations on Hungarian question against Indian stand, establishment of diplomatic relations with the US, opening of embassies in various states including USSR and finally establishment of airline. Condition 1 and condition 3 do not appear to be persuasive in explaining these instances. Condition 1 does not facilitate our understanding satisfactorily because the issues involved are not necessary for physical, economic or political survival of the people, state or regime. It seems difficult to interpret the non-admission to the international bodies (the United Nations, the Universal Postal Union), or non-diversification of political relations with other states or the non-establishment of a national airline as threatening the existence of people, state or regime either physically, economically or even politically. Since the issues involved are not vital, condition 1 does not help us understand the motivation to defy and thereby the demonstration of these NCBs. Similarly, condition 3 is also deficient. Except the Hungarian issue, disinclination towards India, does not appear to play any role in these instances of NCB. Nepal's disposition of disinclination or inclination towards India does not imply that it can or cannot seek membership in the UN or in the Universal Postal Union or establish its own national airline. Further, the diversification of political relation, in these instances, suggest that Nepal had a political affinity towards these states. Logically it may be argued that political affinity towards other states does not necessarily connote Nepal's disinclination towards India. This is because it is possible to imagine that while maintaining close affinity towards other states, Nepal can still maintain an equally close affinity towards India. Hence, an affinity towards other states does not help us to understand the motivation to defy

and consequently the demonstration of these NCBs with the help of condition 3.(i.e., disinclination towards India). However, Nepal's political relations with China and Pakistan seems to be exceptions to this. As we shall see later in the analysis, King Mahendra's disinclination towards India had been as a result of Indian preponderance. For Mahendra then it was crucial to counter balance Indian influence. China and to some extent Pakistan (both adversaries of India) were the potent forces within the geographical proximity that Nepal could utilize to counter balance Indian influence. Nepal's political relations with China and Pakistan may be understood in terms of disinclination towards India (Condition 3). To the Nepalis, no other states or international organizations represent such a force. Hence, manifesting an inclination towards those states (other than China and Pakistan) or organizations cannot be understood with the help of condition 3.

However, condition 2 helps us understand these behaviours. It can be said that these behaviours emanated from King Mahendra's ambition to see Nepal as a respectable partner in the conduct of international affairs. It will be recalled from the earlier discussion that initially the USSR vetoed Nepal's admission to the UN on the ground that Nepal lacked the status of an independent state. Certainly Nepal's subsequent admission to the UN is a recognition to its independent status and a realization of Mahendra's dream to see Nepal as an equal and bonafide member in the international community. The diversification of political relations with other states may also be interpreted in terms of Mahendra's ambition to enhance Nepal's image as an independent state. Rather than being an appendage to the Indian machinery of external affairs, these measures demonstrated Mahendra's desire to enable Nepal to enter into political relationships with

other states in its own right and to conduct its business directly with those states. Voting against the Indian stand on the Hungarian question might be interpreted in terms of disinclination towards India (condition 3). However, in essence it revealed Nepal's assertion of an independent entity rather than a bias or an attitude towards India. This is because the UN (being an international forum) offers a great opportunity to a state for self-assertion. In this case, Nepal's availing of such an opportunity to assert itself overshadows the explanation of its disinclination towards India. Hence, Mahendra's ambition (to secure an independent status for Nepal) offers a better understanding of his motivation to defy and consequently the demonstration of NCB than his disinclination towards India.

The NCBs that condition 3 help us understand include discarding special relations with India, establishing diplomatic relations with China, announcement of the policy of equal friendship, efforts to regularize Sino-Nepali relations on Tibetan issue, signing of treaty with China, strengthening of Sino-Nepali relations marked by Chou-en-lai's visit to Nepal and opening of embassy in China. Apart from condition 3, condition 1 also offers an explanation for these behaviours. However, condition 2 does not offer any satisfactory explanation. We shall focus on condition 3 first and subsequently return to condition 1 and condition 2 respectively.

Essentially the behaviours cited above relate to Nepal's diplomatic relations with China. The establishment of diplomatic relations with China demonstrated Nepal's non-compliance to Indian wishes. India wanted Nepal to see China through the prism of New Delhi's strategic thinking. To this end, it naturally desired to block any type of relations developing between China and Nepal which the Indian policy makers thought adverse to their interest. Nepal refused to accept the 'Indian version' of Nepal's

foreign relations. Nepal not only established relations with China but also intensified it with great zeal.

Taking condition 3 into consideration, Nepal behaved this way because the ruling power at that time was disinclined towards India. King Mahendra had an anti-Indian attitude and subscribed to a political view contrary to India's predominant political view. Chatterjee wrote, "King Mahendra started his Royal career with three sharply defined attitudes: (1) contempt for democratic politics; (2) animosity toward the Nepali Congress; and (3) dislike of India"⁶⁷. While Crown Prince, Mahendra had witnessed the post-revolutionary political developments in Nepal and had developed an aversion for the role India had played in the internal as well as external affairs of Nepal.

This disinclination disposed him to follow an independent path of his own choice without caring to consult the Indian government as his father had done before him. He also did not inherit the disposition of his father and did not share the attitude and feeling of commitment towards India that his father had had. On the contrary, he considered India a hindrance in the way of Nepal's self-assertion and real independence. As such his foreign policy of having equal friendship with China was in sharp contrast to the Indian objective of keeping the strategic Himalayan kingdom aloof from foreign influences. Tanka Prasad Acharya, who was appointed as a prime minister in January 1956 by King Mahendra, had a reputation as a 'Leftist' with known anti-Indian leaning. In June 1951, he publicly led the anti-Nehru demonstration when the Prime Minister of India was on a state visit to Nepal. He had all along been opposed to India's special position in Nepal

67 Chatterjee, Bhola, Op. Cit, p. 65.

and questioned the very usefulness of the policy of 'special relationship'. Instead he advocated Nepal's equally good relations with China. Acharya believed that there was no immediate threat to Nepal from China and argued as has been reported by one of the Indian dailies,

*We fear no attack from China because China knows that to do so
will antagonize India.*⁶⁸

He agitated for the end of the special relationship with India and suggested a neutralist posture in Nepal's relation with other countries including India. He contended that Nepali neutrality should be made effective by procuring a guarantee from both India and China.

Thus both Mahendra and his preferred prime minister looked north toward their neighbour across the Himalayas much more than toward their neighbour in the south.

The high points of non-compliant behaviour in the foreign policy of Nepal can be observed during the periods when the Nepali Congress Party was not in power. When they were in power they did not see any harm in tilting towards the dominant power in their various policies and pronouncements with whom they had political as well as psychological pedigree.

As mentioned earlier, condition 1 also offer an explanation for the motivation to defy and thereby the demonstration of these NCBs. Nepal's establishment of diplomatic relations with China may be viewed as a measure to counter-balance Indian preponderance. India's pervasive political influence on Nepal in the form of special relations, meant curtailment of political freedom of the Nepali decision makers. Hence,

⁶⁸ Hindustan Times, 5 June 1952.

counter-balancing Indian preponderance was viewed as a necessary measure for the political survival of the decision makers. However, the explanation offered by condition 1 appears to be less satisfactory when compared to the explanation offered by condition 3. This is because perception of political freedom is contingent upon the values, attitudes or views held. Hence, disinclination as an orientation takes precedence over the perception of political freedom.

Let us now return to condition 2, i.e., ambition of the ruler. It was mentioned earlier that this condition does not offer satisfactory explanation for the motivation to defy and consequently the demonstration of the NCBs under consideration. Although the establishment of diplomatic relation contributed towards Nepal's self-assertion, the counter-balancing of Indian preponderance is more a fundamental concern than actualization of Mahendra's ambition (to secure for Nepal an independent and respectable place in the world). Counter balancing was a necessary measure for the survival of Nepal's political independence. Therefore the crucial point is not 'becoming the fullest potential' but 'survival of existence'. Further more, given a disinclination characterized by an attitude of aversion towards India and an ambition, it may be argued that an attitude of aversion takes precedence over ambition. This is because it seems natural first to alleviate pain and then seek gratification. From this perspective redressing an attitude of disliking (through the establishment of diplomatic relations with China) appears to be more convincing than an actualization of an ambition.

During this phase Nepal's non-compliant behaviour may be attributed to leadership strength of King Mahendra, to some extent external political support and people's power. Geo-political leverage did not play any significant part in these instances. This is because Sino-Indian rivalry was

not so acute (as it will be observed in the subsequent phase of Mahendra's reign) to enable Nepal to capitalize it. In every instance in this phase leadership strength as a factor of capability may be interpreted to have contributed to Nepal's non-compliance.

Unlike King Tribhuvan, King Mahendra demonstrated the strength of leadership. He was determined and sought power by whatever means were available. The strength of his personality as a leader and as a power seeker, can be said to have led him to defy India. In his effort to break away from India he used all possible sources of power. By diversifying Nepal's relations with other countries Nepal gained political support in its defiance to India. For example, in supporting the West in the Hungarian question Nepal obtained their support to defy the Soviet bloc including India. The presence of leadership strength and external political support during this phase explain how Nepali government was non-compliant during this phase and not in King Tribhuvan's reign. In addition to this, public pressure against India may also be said to have strengthened Mahendra's efforts to defy India.

Given these NTPRs, it may be asked how do we explain Mahendra's dismissal of Prime Minister Acharya, his appointment of prime ministers K. I. Singh and his subsequent four months compliance with the Indian wishes and finally reverting back to his pattern of defiance in November 1957. These incidents show that despite the presence of the specied motivational conditions, Nepal demonstrated compliant stance. This suggests the presence of other contextual condition(s) not explicitly specified in the contextual framework,⁶⁹ that might render the NTPRs inadequate or might

69 The inadequacy of handling these deviations reflect a weakness of the contextual framework used in this study. It is possible that similar inadequacies may prevail in some instances that might have remained beyond the researcher's awareness. The point of emphasis is that a focus on policy contingency framework enables us to

just lead to a temporary 'retreat' etc. A further detailed contextual analysis might enable us to understand these behavioural expressions. However, setting aside these deviations, the contextual framework adopted here appear to enable us to understand Nepal's predominant behavioural expressions (i.e., non-compliance) during this phase.

CONGRESS REGIME (1959-1960)

In 1959 the King granted a general election while he remained a constitutional monarch. This election was long overdue. In the settlement that ended the 1950 revolution, a general election was promised sometime in 1952-53. But because of various technical and political reasons it could not be held.⁷⁰ The elections ran from February to May and 43 percent of the voters (universal adult suffrage had been granted) voted. The election was held on the basis of single constituency majority vote. The Nepali Congress won the elections taking 74 out of 109 seats in the lower house. Gorkha Parishad won 19 seats while the Communist party got only 4 seats.⁷¹ It may be stressed here that the Nepali Congress Party has an unpopular pro-Indian image, even though its appeal for democracy has wide influence in the country.

India, who had backed the Nepali Congress, was delighted after its victory in the 1959 general elections. Nehru wrote to B. P. Koirala:

recognize the impossibility of formulating a universal framework capable of explaining all instances. Hence, this contextual framework does not claim of being capable of explaining all possible instances of NCB of both Nepal and Bangladesh.

70 Rose, Op. Cit., p. 219.

71 Mihaly, Op. Cit. p. 184.

The results of the election recently held in Nepal has naturally gladdened all those who believe in democracy and are friends and good wishers of Nepal. ⁷²

In May 1959, Nehru came to Nepal as a gesture of goodwill to the new government. The communiqué issued before his departure, the first ever made jointly by a Nepali and a foreign prime minister, stated that *there is no conflict of interests between the two countries, and they face similar problems and have common approaches.*⁷³ In other words, it affirmed that there was an identity of interest between the two countries which led them to follow similar policies.

After winning the election, B. P. Koirala rejected Chou-en-Lai's proposal of a road connecting Katmandu with Tibet.⁷⁴ None of the Chinese aided economic development projects provided in the 1956 agreement ever got under way during this period. The Nepali Congress, unlike previous Nepali governments (which had tended to dismiss any suggestions that China might be a potential threat to Nepal), attempted to underline the seriousness of the potential threat. They also attempted to counter the tendency among some Nepalis to assume that India constituted the only threat to Nepal's independence.

The Nepali congress also subscribed to the Indian version of the idea of 'non-alignment'. While there was no intention of abandoning the policy, which in Nepal was interpreted to mean primarily non alignment in the Sino-Indian dispute, the implication of some Nepali congress statements and actions

⁷² Gorkhapatra, 1 June, 1959.

⁷³ Asian Recorder, V: 27 July 4-10, 1959, pp. 2748-49.

⁷⁴ Asian Recorder, December 3-9, 1961, p. 4298.

indicated that, if a choice had to be made, Nepal could only align itself with India. Without taking into consideration the intensely emotional anti-Indian sentiments prevalent in the country, the Congress government operated with a conviction that smooth relations with India alone were in the best interests of Nepal.

In early November 1959, the Himalayas, a significant portion of which lies north of Nepal, were claimed as India's northern boundary. This claim was followed shortly afterwards by Nehru's unilateral declaration on India's responsibility over Nepal's security. During a debate in Indian Parliament in November 1959, Nehru reiterated his government's position that 'any aggression against Bhutan and Nepal would be regarded as aggression against India'.⁷⁵ This enunciation of the Nehru doctrine disregarding Nepal's independent existence evoked a nationalist uproar of such intensity in Nepal that even B. P. Koirala was constrained to explain that the Indian prime minister had merely meant "that in case of aggression against Nepal, India would send help if such help is ever asked for. It could never be taken as suggesting that India could take unilateral action"⁷⁶. Nehru affirmed that B. P. Koirala's elaboration was 'perfectly correct' but also revealed for the first time the terms of the "letters of Exchange" that had accompanied the 1950 treaty. This outraged Nepali sentiment even further, and added substantially to the outcry against India's alleged interference in Nepal which subsequently trembled the Congress government to its very foundations.

75 Statesman, November 28, 1959.

76 Asian Recorder, V: 51, December 19-25, 1959, p. 3060-61.

On 4th December 1959, Nepal signed the agreement on Gandak Project and agreed to give the necessary facilities within its territory for its execution. This agreement was signed in the face of massive demonstrations and protests in Nepal.⁷⁷ The project was characterized by Nepali critics as an economic exploitation of Nepal. But the pro-Indian government of B. P. Koirala said "India would have constructed dam in her own territory if Nepal had not given the permission. Nepal would ... thereby have been deprived of much benefit."⁷⁸ In other words, Nepal had to take what it could get.

On 11 September 1960, the Nepali Congress government and India agreed to conclude a new treaty which was signed at Kathmandu by Nepal's Industry and Commerce Minister and India's ambassador to Nepal. The treaty comprised of three parts: (1) bilateral trade (2) transit and (3) general provisions. It ran to a total of fourteen articles which was supplemented by (1)a Protocol (II)Letters of Exchange at the Ministerial level and (III) a Memorandum.⁷⁹

India granted certain rights and privileges to Nepal in the Treaty of 1960. It ended India's unilateral control over Nepal's tariff structure thereby enabling Nepal to evolve an independent trade policy. She could on a non reciprocal basis, impose protective duties or qualitative restrictions on imports from India in order to overcome the initial handicaps of newly established industries in the countries.

77 The Nepal Press Digest, June 8-14, 1960. p. 134.

78 Nepal, Publicity Dept. Release, 11 June 1960.

79 Rawat, P. C., Indo-Nepal Economic Relations, New Delhi, 1974, p. 172.

In transit Nepal was accorded freedom through India to and from third countries. Article 9 stipulated that 'traffic in transit shall be exempted from customs duties and from all transit duties or other charges for transportation and such other charges as are commensurate with the costs of services rendered for supervision of such transit'.

But India in her efforts to discourage Nepal's trade diversification imposed restrictions stating that there was a difference of view between India and Nepal on the question of service charges to be levied for supervision and handling of transit traffic at Radhikapur. The Indian Minister for trade explained that while it was true that India did not collect any charges for providing services and facilities for Nepal's transit trade through Calcutta port, small charges were collected for 'certain special types of services'. Nepal's reaction was natural. The Nepalis Minister for Commerce and Industry while talking to newsmen in an informal meeting said that,

India's refusal of transit facilities to starting trade with Pakistan via Radhikapur did really touch the sentiments of the Nepalis people. We never imagined that India could ever go beyond the treaty of 1960 and demand from Nepal such a charge when even Pakistan was not charging from her for Indo-Afghan trade through Pakistan ... The Indian delegation put forward one demand after another.⁸⁰

The Indian stand on transit facilities was detrimental to the Nepali goals of trade diversification. The signing of the Gandak agreement and Koirala's alignment of Nepal's interests with that of India led to an intense nationalist agitation against the Congress regime.

⁸⁰ Muni, Op. Cit. p. 136.

ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAVIOUR : CONGRESS REGIME (1959-1960)

The observations of Nepali behaviour during 1959-60 reveal that like King Tribhuvan's phase, the Government led by Nepali Congress was predominantly compliant. One might point out that the Trade and Transit Treaty signed by the government in 1960 as an example of their non-compliance. However, this is not so. Non-compliance by definition assumes the presence of confrontation or discord between the interacting states. No instance of Nepali Congress' defiance, protests or unhappiness with the provisions of the previous treaties was found. It may be emphasized here that the Congress government of B. P. Koirala was tilted towards India. India was contented because of their ideological and political compatibilities. Furthermore, after nearly a decade, Nepal appeared to be heading toward a stable democratic system much like that of Nehru's India. In a strategically located country like Nepal, such a stable and ideologically compatible government was important to Indian interests. With growing Sino-Indian hostility, a friendly Nepal, firmly standing by the spirit and provision of the 1950 treaty of peace and freindship would undoubtedly further Indian security interests. Taking these points into consideration, it appears more convincing to treat the provisions of 1960 Trade and Transit Treaty as short term Indian concessions (in order to gain long term goal of a common market and identical security interests) rather than Nepali defiance.

The compliant posture of the Nepali congress party may be attributed to its lack of both motivation to defy and capability to resist. Condition 1 and condition 3 offer plausible explanations for the lack of motivation to defy. According to condition 1, an issue considered as non-vital is not likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby lead to compliance. Similarly,

condition 3 states that an inclination to the dominant power is also not likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby lead to compliance. Let us now explore the conditions, assumptions, contextualities (i.e., the policy contingencies) in order to understand the behavioural expression of the Nepali Congress party.

Nepali Congress believed that Nepali economy could prosper only if it is tied to Indian economy and Nepal's security could be ensured if India took the responsibility. In governmental perception Indian security posture and *Gandak* river project did not threaten Nepal's survival politically or economically. They were non-vital issues to the government. Therefore, according to condition 1 Nepali Congress government lacked the motivation to defy. So their behaviour were compliant. Further as was observed in the analysis of King Tribhuvan's phase, Nepali Congress party had a political inclination towards India. Hence, according to condition 3 also, Nepali Congress lacked the motivaion to defy and their behaviour was compliant. In addition to the lack of motivation to defy, Nepali Congress also lacked the capability to resist. Unlike King Mahendra, Koirala lacked assertiveness and strength to defy India. Besides, Koirala's Indo-centric foreign policy implied the lack of political linkages with any outside power. Consequently, external political support was absent. Nepal's geo-political leverage at this period was very weak or almost non-existent. This was because Sino-Indian rivalry was not as acute in this phase as was in the post 1960 period. Finally, although people's power was strong, it did not contribute to governmental defiance as the regime lacked motivation to defy.

KING MAHENDRA REGIME (1960-1972)

The above phase of Nepali foreign policy was reversed following the sudden dismissal of the Nepali Congress government. King Mahendra had great reservations about the role of India in Nepal's politics, and considered the prevailing Nepali multi-party political system as an appendage of the Indian political system. In December 15, 1960, he dismissed the government, banned the multi-party system, jailing most party leaders including B. P. Koirala and took the reins of power in his own hands. The King charged the ousted government with irresponsibility in its discharge of duties and insinuated that it had acted against the national interests of the country.

... in the name of the democratic system, interests of the people and the nation were ignored and power was used for the fulfillment of personal and party needs ... anti national elements received encouragement in a large degree and it is no secret that this created an atmosphere detrimental to national unity ... as it is our ultimate responsibility to safeguard nationalism and sovereignty ... we hereby dissolve the cabinet as well as both houses of Parliament. ⁸¹

Mahendra maintained that it was the dependence of Nepal's political parties on foreign powers, particularly India, which necessitated the change. He also argued that as Nepal had never been a colony, it could not simply imitate Western democratic institutions but had to devise a system of its own. In interviews with the press, King Mahendra at one time even accused Koirala of being on the verge of merging Nepal with India. ⁸²

⁸¹ Dainik Nepal, 15 December, 1960.

⁸² Cited in Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, Op. Cit. p. 232.

Nehru called it a "set-back to democracy" and on 20 December, he made the following comments in the Rajya Sabha on the King's action.

*This is a complete reversal of the democratic process and it is not clear to me that there can be a going back to the democratic process in the foreseeable future naturally one views such a development with considerable regret.*⁸³

It was not clear whether this was a real expression of concern for genuine democracy or political rhetoric to discredit Nepali authority because, one suspects India's role which it historically maintained to suit its own needs rather than upholding principles and ideals. Mihaly observed, *Nehru had attacked the new government before it had begun to function and show its worth.*⁸⁴

On the contrary, China maintained a discreet silence on the king's action, simply reporting the event without editorial comment. The Nepal-China Joint Boundary Commission was in session at the time of the coup, and both the teams were touring the border areas and preparing reports based on their investigation. The dismissal of the Koirala ministry did not interfere with these proceedings, which concluded on schedule in mid January 1961.⁸⁵

The royal take over was indeed a set-back for India. The basis for maintaining strong influence was cut off and India was unprepared for the new development in Nepal. Nepal went on asserting with greater emphasis that like any other independent state Nepal was free to adopt any convenient

83 Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, p. 443.

84 Mihaly, Op Cit p. 109.

85 Rose, Op. Cit. p. 235.

political system for its governance that would fulfill its aspirations and interests for the attainment of progress and prosperity.

In 1961, a State trading corporation was established to encourage trade with other countries other than India and provide better organisation in Nepal's foreign trade. The importance of diversification of Nepal's foreign trade was emphasized and trade relations were established with countries other than India both formally and informally.

Apart from that, Nepal took a number of other steps to promote diversification of trade in the 1960s. One such step was the introduction of the 'bonus voucher' or the import entitlement scheme. The rationale behind this kind of incentive was to make Nepalis products more attractive as well as cheaper in the international market. This scheme provided a significant source of foreign exchange needed for national development, plus an important source of revenue from customs duties. International organizations such as IMF concurred on the effectiveness of the scheme.⁸⁶

The scheme was very much contended by India on the ground that it stimulated deflection of goods across the border. India's main concern was the loss of foreign exchange and custom revenue and therefore India wanted Nepal to abolish the bonus voucher scheme. Abolishing the scheme was considered detrimental to Nepal's economic interests.

Although India could not oppose Nepal's diversification policy in principle, in practice it gave rise to numerous conflicts. One such conflict was due to India's drive for and Nepal's opposition to, harmonization of their economic

86 Shrestha, S. B, Chinese and Indian Policies Toward Nepal: An analysis of Political, Economic and Security Issues, 1960-75, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of Kansas 1980, p. 139.

policies. India wanted to wed Nepal to the idea of a common market. India contended that harmonization is the only answer to check border smuggling. But Nepal believed that such a policy would be even more detrimental to Nepalis economic interests against the backdrop of India's relatively large and industrialized economy which might well stand as an obstacle to Nepalis' aspiration for greater self-identity and independence. Nepal argued that smuggling was not a problem only with Nepal and India; it was common also between East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and Burma and India. If India was not exerting any pressure on them to harmonize their economy with her why was she so much bothered about Nepal when she knew that Nepal was totally against such a policy. To them it appeared that India was demanding too special a price for Nepal's landlockedness. Nepal viewed her economy and trade policy as being formulated in consonance with her national interests and economic realities.

In September 1961, King Mahendra personally represented the Himalayan Kingdom at the conference of the non-aligned countries at Belgrade. Emphasis was made on non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries. In an attempt to break away from its relationship with India, Nepal also intensified relations with Pakistan. Although diplomatic relations were established formally during the Koirala ministry on 19 March 1960, no further steps were taken at that time. The King paid a seven day official visit to Pakistan in September 1961. The significance of this visit was that it gave an indication of strong unwillingness on King Mahendra's part to defer to Indian sentiments in the conduct of Nepal's foreign policy. A Pakistani embassy was set up in Kathmandu and both the countries

concluded trade and transit agreements. Also arrangements were made for an air link between Dacca and Kathmandu.⁸⁷

On September 25, 1961, the King went on a seventeen day state visit to China and Outer Mongolia. The main purpose behind his visit to Peking was the signing of a boundary agreement which came on the 5th of October. They reached agreement on their boundary in a manner favourable to Nepali interests; a protocol to the 1961 treaty, signed as an annexe to it in January 1963, laid down the alignment of the boundary in concrete terms established by the exact position of permanent boundary makers set up in 1962.⁸⁸ The Nepalis claimed that they gained a few thousand square miles as a result of the agreement. They also pointed out the application of the mountain crest principle in drawing the alignment of the border, an arrangements the Chinese have denied the Indians. Upon his return to Nepal, the King declared at a civic reception at Kathmandu on 27 October 1961,

The Boundary Treaty with China had delimited the boundary between the two countries in a definite manner, thus bringing to a happy conclusion the exchange of views and controversies which had been going on for eighteen months. ... This too has helped consolidate the friendly good relations existing between the two countries. ... By the northern boundary treaty, the Kingdom of Nepal has gained three hundred square miles, and I feel that all the Nepalis experience a sense of glory when I state that Sagarmatha, on which the eyes of the world seem to be focused, continues to be as it has been ours and within our territory. It may also be

87 Rose and Dial, Op.Cit., p. 94.

88 Asian Recorder, Vol. VII. No. 49, 3-9 December 1961, p. 4296-4297.

mentioned in connection with the border area and Sagarmatha that the northern boundary area dispute, which had been going on since the time of Bhimsen Thapa's premiership, has been solved in such a manner as to benefit Nepal. ⁸⁹

Another significant development was Nepal's acceptance of the Chinese offer to build a road from Kathmandu to Lhasa. Mahendra signed the Kathmandu-Kodari road agreement on 15th October 1961 to the great annoyance of India. The signing of this agreement, which had been refused earlier by the pro-Indian Prime Minister, B. P. Koirala, was also an expression of the reassurance of his independence in decision making. He not only cracked at domestic critics and India but also ridiculed those who interpreted the road as a conduit for prospective Chinese activities in Nepal saying "*communism does not travel in taxi cabs.*" Tulsī Giri, the foreign minister of Nepal who had accompanied King Mahendra on his China trip declared,

*Indian newspaper have not liked the idea of constructing the Kathmandu-Lhasa road. But if China does not like our road to the south, just as India does not like a road to the north, should Nepal not build any roads at all?*⁹⁰

Kathmandu-Lhasa road thus became the first to breach the Himalayan barrier. China later followed up by building another strategic road connecting Kathmandu with Pokhara, where it met an Indian built road connecting it to the important rail centre in Gorakpara. Road building, in fact, became soon a matter of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal. Hitherto, India had been the main road builder in Nepal. The Tribhuvan Rajpath, linking

⁸⁹ Shaha, Rishikesh, Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect, New Delhi, 1978, p. 123.

⁹⁰ Nepal Bhasa Patrika, 27 January, 1962.

Kathmandu with the Indian border was an Indian enterprise in the early fifties. The East-West Mahendra Rajpath too was a collaborative venture in which India was associated with the US, UK, USSR, and the United Nations. But the Chinese advent as road builders gave the Nepalis a counter weight which increased their bargaining position with India.

On 26th January 1962, the Indian Republic Day, a massive demonstration was held in front of Indian embassy in Kathmandu and a memorandum of protest was handed over to the embassy officials.⁹¹ The memorandum, as it is reported, contained demands for restrictions on Congress activities and non-interference in Nepal's internal affairs.

On April 1962, a Pakistani trade delegation came to Kathmandu to discuss trade relations between the two states and an air-link between the eastern wing of Pakistan and Kathmandu.

On April 18, 1962, Mahendra made an official trip to New Delhi. The main motive behind his trip was to persuade India to restrict the Congress activities in India. When political parties were banned in 1960, leaders and workers of the deposed ruling and other parties took shelter in India. Thereafter, they organised regular armed raids and sabotage across the border in Nepal. As the press reported, there were sharp exchanges of words in the meeting between Nehru and Mahendra.⁹² Mahendra insisted that Nepal's internal disturbances were the handiwork of the rebels taking refuge in India while Nehru argued that fundamental economic and political factors in Nepal were at the root of the disturbances. He asked Mahendra to come to a settlement with the Nepali congress which was totally

91 Rose, Op. Cit., p. 244.

92 Cited in Rose, Op.Cit., p. 245.

unacceptable to the King. Nehru also could not make any progress in his efforts to discuss Nepal's relations with China and the recently concluded agreement on Kathmandu- Kodari road.

On 29th September 1962, India imposed an economic blockade on Nepal commonly known as the 'Raxual Blockade'. The commercial traffic between the two countries came to a stand still which resulted in a sudden rise in price and panic in Kathmandu. The motive behind the Indian pressure was not economic; rather a mixture of politico-strategic concerns which India had expressed publicly and had tried to deter Nepal effectively from deviating to a course which India felt was not in consonance with its interests. It was in fact a consequence of the defiant position Nepal had taken in its foreign policy by cultivating relationship with India's staunch enemies China and Pakistan and in its domestic policy by dismissing the Koirala ministry.

In the latter half of October 1962, a large-scale border war broke out between China and India when the Chinese forces moved across the Indian border in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh. The Chinese demonstrated military superiority over the Indian. India was severely defeated and the Chinese seized a large portion of Indian territory (about 14,000 sq.miles). In this war Nepal refused to take sides. Mahendra said that Nehru had greyed his hair working for peace and he knew of the Chinese Premier Chou-en-Lai's faith in the Five Principles of Co-Existence.

On October 1962, Nepal signed a trade treaty with Pakistan-first in the series of Pakistan-Nepal trade agreement. The agreement provided for the grant of 'most favoured nation' treatment by one country to the other in matters of trade and commerce.

On December 16, 1962, King Mahendra introduced Panchayat system (a non political form of government where the members of the body were appointed by the king) despite ominous Indian threats. He inferred the Panchayat system as a transitional political system suited to the 'soil and climate' of the country and defended it as necessary to preserve the Nepali identity as a nation thereby saving the country from the distinct possibility of 'having always to play second fiddle to foreign power'.⁹³ B. P. Koirala's government had been under the influence of India which urged Nepal to adopt a political structure analogous to that of India, so that the Nepali government would be a Royal ally and uphold the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The Party-less Panchayat system of government on the other hand was characterized by a higher degree of nationalism, a vigorous movement toward self-identity and independence that weakened Indian political influence in Nepal.

On 26 January 1963, Nepal signed a transit agreement with Pakistan which provided, on a reciprocal basis, for freedom of transit of goods intended for import into or export from the territories of either country from or to a third country. The agreement also provided for exemption from customs and transit duties for traffic in transit. On 24 March 1963, air services between Dhaka and Katmandu was established.

In the same year, Nepal sought and obtained from the British and the Americans, limited quantities of military assistance-- provision of which was previously an Indian monopoly. In 1965, Nepal used non-cooperation as an approach to obtain from India a revision in the Kosi river agreement for accommodating Nepal's major grievances. Although the revised agreement

93 Naya Samaj, 22 September, 1962.

was not totally satisfying for the Nepalis, it was nevertheless more in line with Nepali interests. In 1965, Nepal signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. In the same year Nepal and Yugoslavia agreed to trade with each other on a barter basis. By the end of 1967, Nepal had established trade linkages with the UK, Poland and China.

On 25 June 1969, India reluctantly acceded to Nepal's demand that the Indian military mission in Kathmandu and the Indian manned security posts on Nepal's border with China be withdrawn.

In 1969, the Nepali Prime Minister, K. N. Bista, challenged the mutual obligations of the two countries in each other's defence under the 1950 Treaty and termed the 'theory of special relationship' with India as 'out of step with modern developments' in Nepal's external relations.

Nepal was determine to eliminate, or at least minimize the kinds of problems it had experienced for the last decade. India wanted Nepal to abandon its liberal trade incentives and to cooperate with India in harmonizing economic policies. Failing to conclude a new treaty before the 1960 treaty, which expired in September, 1970, Nepal proposed extending the existing agreement until a new one was concluded. India agreed to extend only until the end of 1970. Because of the divergence of views, further attempts to reach an agreement before the end of 1970 failed too. Public protests and demonstrations took place in front of the Indian embassy at Kathmandu and in other Nepalis towns near the border.⁹⁴ Behind the breakdown in the negotiations, there are resentments which are not strictly related. It was

94 Muni. Op. Cit. p. 167.

Nepal's tightrope act between India, China and Pakistan that irritated New Delhi.⁹⁵

During negotiations for the new treaty to replace the 1960 treaty, Nepal persisted in demands for two separate agreements; one concerning Indo-Nepalis bilateral trade and the other concerning transit facilities. Nepal's demand was based on the reality that trade with India would be subject to revision every few years while its transit requirements were of a permanent nature and that the freedom of transit for a land locked country should be removed from every day politics. India argued that transit facility was a question to be negotiated between the land locked and transit states and it could never be assumed as an undeniable right of a land locked state. Nepal, persisting that free transit was its right, took the issue to UNCTAD and the law of the Sea Conference.

The King's trip to Afghanistan in 1971, brought the establishment of an air link between Kathmandu and Kabul- the first of its kind on the subcontinent. During his meeting with Afghanistan's Zahir Shah, Mahendra emphasized "the Kabul Declaration of December 1970, particularly the implementation of the provision related to the transit rights of landlocked-countries, and those pertaining to the least developed and developing countries".⁹⁶ In securing Afghanistan's support for overland transit routes for landlocked states, Mahendra was aiming for extra backing for his demand that New Delhi concede to Nepal surface transit routes to other countries.⁹⁷

95 Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 November, 1970,p. 18.

96 Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 July, 1971, p. 15.

97 Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 July, 1971, p. 17.

Finally, in 1971, after months of prolonged preliminary discussions and repeated negotiations both the governments reached an agreement for a trade and transit treaty to end their economic uncertainties which had taken place because of an absence of any treaty. Nepal had to sign a single treaty covering both trade and transit. Nepal was given the status of 'most favoured nation' while India abandoned its harmonization scheme.

ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAVIOUR: KING MAHENDRA REGIME (1960-1972)

In this phase Nepal's non-compliant behaviour can be understood in terms of motivation to defy that emanated mainly by Condition 1. Besides condition 1, in few other instances the motivation to defy appear to have emanated from condition 2 and condition 3. The Table 4. 2 summarizes the non-compliant behaviours demonstrated during this period, their nature i.e., initiative/responsive, along with the conditions of motivation to defy and the NTPRs used to understand these non-compliant behaviour. Table 4.2 suggests that in 11 out of 17 instances of non-compliant behaviours Nepal took initiative to defy. In the remaining 6 instances its defiance was in response to Indian action, demands etc. Table 4. 2 also suggests that 13 instances of non-compliant behaviours can be explained by vitalness of issues (condition 1), 2 instances by King Mahendra's ambition (condition 2) and the remaining 2 instances his disinclination towards India (condition 3). Out of 13 instances, in 9 instances economic survival, in 2 regime survival, in 1 instance survival of political independence and in 1 instance physical survival were at stake. Furthermore, Table 4. 2 shows that given the conditions of motivation to defy, in all the instances leadership strength, in 4

**Table 4.2 A Summary of the Instances of NCB during
Mahendra Regime (1960-1972) along with the
Conditions of Motivation to Defy and the NTPRs
Used to Explain Them.**

INSTANCES OF NCB	NATURE OF NCB	MOTIVATION TO DEFY (The Conditions)	CAPABILITY TO RESIST (The NTPRs)
1. Dismissal of Nepali Congress Government.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Regime Survival)	LS
2. Introduction of Bonus Voucher and the refusal to abandon it.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS
3. Rejection of Indian demand for harmonization	Responsive	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS
4. Road building-- Kodari-Kathmandu Road Kathmandu-Pokhara Road	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, GL, PP.
5. Refusal of Indian suggestion of settlement with the rebels.	Responsive	Condition 1 (Regime survival)	LS
6. Refusal to concede to the Indian request to abandon Kodari-Kathmandu road.	Responsive	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, GL
7. Revision of Kosi agreement	Responsive	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, PP
8. Trade agreement with the USSR, Yugoslavia, the UK, Poland and China	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS
9. Withdrawal of Indian military mission	Responsive	Condition 1 (Survival of political independence)	LS, PP
10. Taking the issues of land-lockedness to UNCTAD and the Law of the sea Conference	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS

Table 4.2 Contd ...

Table 4.2 Contd ...

INSTANCES OF NCB	NATURE OF NCB	MOTIVATION TO DEFY The Conditions	CAPABILITY TO RESIST The NTPRs
11. Trade and Transit Agreement with Pakistan	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS, GL
12. Bista renounces special Relations and the 1950 treaty of Peace and Friendship	Responsive	Condition 3 (disinclination)	LS, PP
13. Establishment of trading corporation	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival))	LS
14. Diversification of diplomatic relations with Pakistan, China	Initiative	Condition 3 (disinclination)	LS, EPS, GL
15. Participation in the Non-Aligned conference at Belgrade.	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS, EPS,
16. Introduction of Panchayat	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS, EPS, GL
17. Military assistance from the UK and the USA	Initiative	Condition 1 (Physical survival)	LS

* The letters LS, GL, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, geopolitical leverage, peoples' power and finally external political support.

instances people's power in 5 instances geo-political leverage and finally in 5 instances external political support (all as NTPRs constituting capability to resist) explain the non-compliant behaviour. Finally, in 10 instances more than one NTPR explain non-compliant behaviours. Let us now explore the conditions, assumptions, contextualities etc. (ie., policy contingencies) in order to understand the instances of non-compliance demonstrated in this phase.

The non-compliant behaviours that condition 1 best explains include the ones which relate to trade and transit, Kosi river project, road building, Nepali Congress party, Indian military mission and military assistance. The

ambition of the ruler (condition 2) or disinclination of the ruling party (condition 3) do not offer satisfactory explanations. This point will be addressed later. First, let us consider condition 1. According to condition 1, the consideration of an issue as vital is likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby lead to non-compliant behaviour, while consideration of an issue as non-vital is not likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby fail to lead to NCB. An issue is considered vital if it is necessary for the survival of people, state or regime- physically, economically or politically. It may be recalled that vital issues can be spread over a range. In one extreme we may have something that is 'absolutely' necessary for survival i.e., without which very existence will be at stake. On the other extreme, we may have something that is necessary but without which existence will not be at stake, however survival would mean encountering considerable difficulty.

Having recapitulated condition 1, we shall now consider the issues involving economic survival. Nepal being a landlocked and a small country had experienced the reality of economic and trade dependence on India. More than 84 percent of Nepal's foreign trade was carried out with India; the remainder via India. India could easily throw Nepal's economy into disarray. In the 1960s, this economic claustrophobia became increasingly insufferable for Nepal. More specially after the Raxual blockade in 1962, Nepal came to know that some kind of trade diversification was necessary in order to survive. That is why Nepal sought to minimize her dependence on India through establishment and expansion of trade with countries other than India.

Another compelling reason for trade diversification was Nepal's need for goods that India could not supply, plus a market for produced goods India could not use. Nepal wanted the options of buying goods on the

competitive international market and selling products outside India. As an exporter of primary products and importer of manufactured goods, Nepal had always been facing a growing trade deficit with India. With the growth of population, per capita income and development works, Nepal's demand for manufactured goods outstripped its export of primary products. Although it is true that this trade imbalance was reduced by foreign aid to Nepal, it could not count on foreign aid forever. It was necessary for Nepal to arrest this erosion in its economy.

From this perspective, the initiative non-compliant behaviours such as the trade agreements (with the USSR, Yugoslavia, the UK, Poland, China), the trade and transit agreement with Pakistan, establishment of Trading Corporation, the taking of the issue of landlockedness to UNCTAD and law of the sea conference may be said to have been a result of the threats to Nepal's vital economic interests. In addition to these, the initiative non-compliant behaviours such as introduction of bonus voucher scheme and the Nepali government's refusal to abandon it and the responsive non-compliant behaviours such as the governments' refusal of the Indian proposal of harmonization may also be viewed as vital from the point of view of protecting the commercial interests of Nepali traders and increasing their competitiveness. Therefore, we may assert that diversification of trade, protection of Nepali traders and increasing their competitiveness are vital necessities for Nepal to survive as a viable economy and thus explains Nepal's motivation to defy and consequently its defiant stance against India.

Besides, the revision of the Kosi river agreement constitute another example of responsive non-compliant behaviour which may be explained by vitalness. Reader will recall from the discussion of the 1950-55 period that Indian control over Kosi River Project constituted threats to Nepal's

agriculture and irrigation. Hence for Nepal, gaining authority and control over the project may be considered as vital to her agricultural needs.

The various road building projects are other examples of the non-compliant behaviour of Nepal. Associated with this was the responsive non-compliant behaviour of the refusal of Indian proposal to abandon the Kathmandu-Kodari road, which connects Kathmandu to Tibet and was considered vital because it was supposed to be the back bone of Nepali economy. Nepal had long been seeking ways in which to break the strong hold India had over its economy as the necessary prerequisite for its political independence. It was hoped that it would provide Nepal with an alternative to Calcutta for her transit trade, in the process reducing the economic and political liabilities associated with Nepal's status as a landlocked country. This proved to be particularly true after the Raxual Blockade and 1989 Blockade during which people's economic sufferings were extremely severe. Nepal's decision to get on with the project with Chinese assistance, despite Indian pressure to abandon it, may thus be explained in terms of vitalness because it was viewed necessary to Nepal's survival as a viable economy.

So far we have considered the non-compliant behaviours in terms of issues that were economically vital. We will now focus on the exhibited non-compliant behaviours in terms of issues that were vital from the stand point of regime survival. Such examples include the initiative non-compliant behaviour of dismissal of Nepali Congress government by Mahendra and the responsive non-compliant behaviour of his refusal of India's suggestion that he should compromise with the Nepali Congress rebels who were attempting to destabilize his regime by means of armed raids launched from Indian soil. Let us examine them.

As a result of the 1959 general election, when the Congress government came to power it began to treat the King as only a nominal head of state. The King feared that the socialist programmes and approaches of the Nepali congress party and the growing popularity of the prime minister might lead to the eventual abolition of the monarchy. He became increasingly dissatisfied, among other things, with the depletion of his power. Resisting this threat to the monarchy was vital to the survival of Mahendra's regime. This seems to be a plausible explanation of the dismissal of the Pro-Indian government led by B. P. Koirala. We can similarly explain Mahendra's refusal of the Indian suggestion that he should strike a political settlement with the Congress rebels, who were allegedly supported by India.

Now we will consider the withdrawal of the Indian military mission, a responsive non-compliant behaviour in terms of the issues that were vital for the survival of political independence. To the Nepalis the presence of the military mission undermined their cultural identity and political independence. The Nepalis have always remained proud of the reputation of the Gurkhas as fighters and had looked upon themselves as superior to their big neighbour India in this regard. The image of a superior race of fighters forms the core of cultural identity for the Gurkhas and the Nepalis at large. They take pride in the fact that from the mid 19th century the British actively recruited the Nepalis into their imperial army. The Nepalis, as soldiers, are so valued that the Sultan of Brunei pays over £1 million a year for the upkeep of Gurkha brigades in his country.⁹⁸ That the Indian military mission came to teach the Gurkhas how to fight was an insult to Nepali self respect.

98 *Ibid.* p. 34.

It is plausible to infer that Indian influences and interferences severely restricted the independent political maneuverability of Nepali decision makers. Redressing such restriction of political maneuverability may be seen as vital to political independence and survival of Nepal.

The initiative non-compliant behaviour of securing military assistance from the UK and the USA may also be explained by condition 1. The issue involved in this behaviour was vital for Nepal's physical survival. Despite the fact that the quantum of assistance received did not enhance Nepal's military capability substantially, it may be said that Nepal's seeking of assistance was prompted by its security concern. This is because irrespective of the nature of existing relationships between a country and its neighbours, actual or potential threats to its territorial integrity is ever present in the minds of the decision-makers. Any measure, however small, towards the preservation of territorial sovereignty is a necessity for its physical survival. Nepal is no exception. Therefore, the military assistance may be considered as vital to Nepal's survival.

Having discussed condition 1 let us return to the question as to why condition 2 and condition 3 do not offer plausible explanations. According to condition 2, ambition of the ruler was defined as a disposition characterized by an urge of becoming, growing or developing to the full potential; an actualization of a dream to become a strong and effective ruler of a strong country. Condition 2 maintained that the presence of ruler's ambition might lead to NCB while its absence might not lead to defiance.

As highlighted in the foregoing analysis, Nepal's behaviour in this phase relating to trade and transit, *Kosi* river project, road building, dismissal of Nepali Congress, withdrawal of Indian military mission and military

assistance suggest Nepal's concern for bare survival. However, our general experience suggests that we endeavour to actualize our potential to the fullest extent only when our survival is ensured. Given Nepal's quest for survival, as demonstrated by these instances, an explanation with the help of condition 2 i.e., ambition of the ruler (to actualize dream to become an effective ruler of a strong country) remains rather unsatisfactory.

Let us now consider condition 3 i.e., the political tilt of the ruling party with respect to these NCBs. According to condition 3, a specific tilt (i.e. disinclination of ruling party towards the dominant power) leads to NCB while a reverse tilt (i.e., inclination of a ruling party towards the dominant power) does not lead to NCB. Disinclination was defined as a disposition in which the ruling party subscribes to a political idea, attitude or view that is not congenial to the dominant power. This disposition sets an antagonistic environment in which the ruling party develops a tendency to reject the wishes of the dominant power. Inclination was defined as an opposite disposition. The ruling party subscribe to a political idea, attitude or view that is congenial to the dominant power and does not see any harm in accepting the wishes of the dominant power. It will be recalled from the analysis of Mahendra's first phase (i.e., 1955-59) that he had a strong disinclination towards India. Despite such an observation explaining Nepal's behaviours (relating to trade and transit, *Kosi* river project, road building, dismissal of Nepali Congress, withdrawal of Indian military mission and military assistance) in terms of disinclination do not appear to be appropriate. This is because physical, economic or political survival of people, state or regime is far too fundamental to be interpreted in terms of a ruling party's subscription to a political idea, attitude or view. Hence,

Mahendra's disinclination do not appear to be as convincing as is vitalness of the issues.

The non-compliant behaviours that condition 2 i.e., ambition of the ruler, offer plausible explanation include Nepal's participation in non-aligned conference at Belgrade, Mahendra's visit to Mongolia and introduction of Panchayat. According to condition 2, a rulers ambition to become strong and effective and to transform his country to a respectable and independent member of international community might lead to NCB. An absence of ambition might not lead to NCB. Condition 1 and condition 3 do not offer persuasive explanations. Condition 1 which maintains that NCB is demonstrated when the issues involved are vital, does not work. This is because the issues underlying these instances cannot be interpreted as necessary for physical, economic or political survival of the people/state/regime. For example, it is difficult to visualize non-participation in the non-aligned conference etc. as threatening to the existence of people/state/regime either physically, economically or even politically. Furthermore, it does not appear to be satisfactory to explain the introduction of Panchayat as a measure adopted by King Mahendra to ensure the survival of his regime. The introduction of Panchayat is something more than mere survival. King Mahendra appears to have already secured the survival of his regime by dismissing the Congress government and consolidating power in his own hands. As we shall see later, through the introduction of Panchayat, Mahendra institutionalized his system of government. This institutionalization can be described more as a process of becoming of a goal or a dream (of firmly establishing a form of government) to enhance his power than his efforts to merely survive.

Like condition 1, condition 3 (political disinclination of ruling party) is also deficient. It will be recalled from the foregoing discussion that according to condition 3 political disinclination of the ruling party is likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby lead to NCB while an inclination is not likely to generate motivation to defy and fail to lead to NCB. Using similar logic as before (Mahendra's first phase), it may be stated that Nepal's disposition of inclination or disinclination towards India does not imply that it can or cannot participate in international forums such as the non-aligned conference. Further the diplomatic relation with Mongolia only suggests a political affinity towards it. As mentioned earlier, with the exception of China and Pakistan, a political affinity towards other states do not help us understand this NCB in terms of condition 3. It might be possible to explain introduction of panchayat in terms of condition 3. However, such an explanation will be less satisfactory. In this instance as we shall see later, King Mahendra's self-assertion was very conspicuous. Hence, Mahendra's ambition to see himself as a strong and effective ruler overshadows an explanation of mere subscription of certain political idea, attitude or view (i.e., disinclination towards India).

Let us return to condition 2 and examine Mahendra's ambition. It was indicated in the analysis of Nepali behaviour during the period 1955-59, that Mahendra was a man of high political ambitions. He wanted to have a free hand in shaping the political destiny of his nation. Even as Crown Prince Mahendra had demonstrated a self-assertive character and a proclivity for experimentation on different occasions. He had a passion for power and he realized that domestic affairs were closely linked with foreign affairs. He wanted to develop a new kind of relationship with India because he felt that India's extensive presence was an obstacle in his way and resented Nehru's

patronizing attitude. He was very much resentful of seeing Nepal as an Indian backwater. His ambition was to take Nepal out of the isolation and subservience and seek her place in the world on the basis of equality. Therefore, the continuing pattern of relationship with India was not in keeping with his political framework. The alacrity with which he cultivated relations with China in political and economic fields revealed both his ambition and determination to balance the Indian position by the Chinese presence in Nepal. His ambition to assert Nepal's separate national identity disposed him to follow an independent path of his own choice without caring to consult the Indian government as his father had done before him. As such his foreign policy of having equal friendship with all countries was in sharp contrast to the Indian objective of keeping the strategic Himalayan kingdom aloof from foreign influences.

The foregoing discussion seems to support the idea that the initiative non-compliant behaviours such as the participation in international forums were promoted by King Mahendra's ambition to see Nepal as an independent state in the world community. The introduction of Panchayat may also be considered as a realization of his dream of becoming a strong and effective King in Nepal.

Mahendra was one of the world's last absolute monarchs, an astute but sometimes heavy handed politician who disliked parliamentary democracy. He was totally against the idea of sharing power with anyone as is evident from the actions he took when he dismissed the government of B. P. Koirala. His ambition was to go down in history as the great modernizing King capable of dealing effectively with the country's problems in the course of its modernization. As such he introduced a new system called Panchayat democracy. *His ambition was to rule like an absolute monarch of the type common*

*in medieval times, and he made no secret of his desire to rule like them with powers completely centralized in his own hands.*⁹⁹ The King was more in favour of an alternative system that could be accepted by the people and at the same time would provide no organisation or political leader any opportunity to challenge the King's absolute power. It was therefore, understandable that the neutrality the King so enthusiastically described as constituting the cornerstone of his foreign policy became as much a necessary part of his ambition to become an effective King as of the reorganization of the political life of the nation under the Panchayat system- a system claimed to have been devised not only to accord with Nepal's genius but also assumed to be viable enough to steer clear of Indian parliamentary democracy and Chinese communism and reinforce Nepal's foreign policy posture of equi-distance between the two.¹⁰⁰ However, Mahendra was also apprehensive that New Delhi might intend to repeat the role it had played in the 1950-51 revolution. Introduction of Panchayat may be viewed as a realization of his dream of becoming an effective and independent King. Therefore, it may be held that the introduction of Panchayat was prompted by King Mahendra's ambition.

The remaining NCBs demonstrated by Nepal during this phase include renunciation of special relations with India and diversification of diplomatic relation with China and Pakistan. Except Nepal's relation with Pakistan these NCBs were considered in some details in the analysis of Nepali behaviour during 1955-1959. However, in terms of explanation of non-compliance, Nepal's relation with Pakistan is identical with the relation with China. It may be recalled from the analysis of Mahendra's former phase that

99 Baral, L. S, 'The New Order in Nepal Under King Mahendra, 1960-62: An Assessment', International Studies Vol.13 No.1, Jan-March 1974.

100 Baral, L. S., Pacific Community, Op. Cit. p. 129.

condition 3 (i.e., Mahendra's disinclination towards India) best explains these NCBs, although condition 1 (i.e., survival of political independence) offer an explanation, it is not entirely satisfactory and finally condition 2, (i.e., Mahendra's ambition) does not offer satisfactory explanation. A separate treatment of the NCBs mentioned above will mean repetition of the reasoning set forth in the analysis of the previous phase. Hence they are not elaborated further.

It may be recalled from chapter 3 that motivation to defy enables us to understand the why of non-compliance. In addition to such motivation, a state must also possess the capability to resist in order to be non-compliant. In case of the small states under study the non-tangible power resources such as leadership strength, external political support, geopolitical leverage and people's power constitute the capability to resist. According to our contextual framework given the motivation to defy, the presence of these non-tangible power resources enable a small state to non-comply while their absence does not enable it to non-comply.

The non-compliant behaviour demonstrated by Nepal in this phase may be explained by leadership strength of King Mahendra. In addition to leadership strength, external political support and people's power also help understand some NCBs. Unlike the earlier phases, geopolitical leverage also help us understand some of the NCB in this phase. Let us examine the power resources.

As shown in Table 4. 2 leadership strength of King Mahendra seems to be working in every instance of non-compliant behaviour. Mahendra's leadership strength, which was discussed earlier became more conspicuous during this phase. As such it demands greater degree of elaboration. As

indicated earlier, Mahendra was a different man from his father, Tribhuvan, both temperamentally and with regard to his views of Nepal's role in international affairs. He was a resolved man with no such personal emotions or inhibitions.¹⁰¹ Unlike his father, he was more politically assertive and manipulative. Mahendra came to the scene with great energy at his command. The most significant of Mahendra's personality trait was that he was dynamic. He exploited his constitutional position and the traditional and modern sources of power through active involvement in politics. Unlike his father he invited political and social groups to discuss the politics of the realm with him. He exercised a leverage on the cabinets, whose birth and survivals were entirely at his disposal. The assertiveness and independence of his decisions were evident from the installations and dismissals of government led by Tanka Prasad Acharya, K. I. Singh, B. P. Koirala and Tulsi Giri. Furthermore, he engineered the royal coup of 1960 without any difficulty and his act was endorsed without any protest. These qualities made him a national political force and gave him a reliable and independent source of strength. As a proud and determined personality, he seemed resolve to use all the means available to him to restore order to Nepal's political life. He worked up foreign policy to resolve the crises of legitimacy, identification and stability of his government with considerable success during the years immediately following the establishment of Panchayat democracy established by him. It was also him with whom rest the credence of instilling in his people a strong sense of national pride. Through his leadership strength, he not only raised his country's international status, but also got the most out of its big and dominating neighbour, India. He preserved and expanded his country's independence.

101 Krishnamurty, Y. G, Rebel, King and the Statesman: King Mahendra of Nepal, Calcutta, 1967.

The foregoing discussion of Mahendra's leadership strength reveals an important point; the relationship between leadership strength and NCBs. A comparison of Mahendra's strong leadership and Tribhuvan's weak leadership (the analysis of Nepali behaviour under Tribhuvan's regime) explains why Mahendra was non-compliant and Tribhuvan was not.

Apart from leadership strength, geopolitical leverage seems to have played its part in a number of instances. Nepal's location between India and China, and the "cold war" situation between these two countries at about this time, provided King Mahendra with some diplomatic strength, and this geopolitical advantage helped to create a favourable atmosphere for defiance. It appears that geopolitical leverage has contributed in Nepal's non compliant behaviours such as road building, diversification of diplomatic relations, introduction of Panchayat, and trade and transit agreement with Pakistan. It may be observed that Sino-Indian rivalry was not so acute in Tribhuvan's reign. This explains why Nepali government was not compliant during King Tribhuvan's reign.

Unlike King Tribhuvan's reign, Nepal during King Mahendra's reign came out of diplomatic isolation and gained external political support and friendship from a number of countries. External political support seems to have been contributed towards demonstrating such non compliance behaviours as the issues of landlockedness (in UNCTAD and law of the sea conference), diversification of diplomatic relationships, introduction of panchayat, participation in the non-aligned conference at Belgrade, and trade and transit agreement with Pakistan. Nepal's gaining external political support during this phase also explain why Nepal was able to demonstrate NCB during Mahendra's reign and not during Tribhuvan's reign.

Finally, it appears that popular support and popular pressure contributed in the cases of non-compliant behaviour such as revision of the *Kosi* agreement, withdrawal of military mission, and Bista's renouncing of special relation and the treaty of peace and friendship treaty.

The foregoing analysis suggest that given the motivation to defy, all the non-tangible power resources (as identified in the framework) led to Nepal's defiance during this phase.

KING BIRENDRA REGIME (1972-1990)

Nepal's efforts at demonstrating non-compliant behaviour reached new heights when King Birendra came to power. He significantly extended the repertoire of policies and strategies in intensifying Nepal's efforts at self-assertion. King Birendra, who succeeded his father in January 31, 1972, had been gradually inducted into the processes of government by his father over the last few years and thus had been reasonably well socialized into the political system and policies of Mahendra regnum. He was exposed to international intellectual cross currents, having had various educational experiences in Great Britain, United States and Japan. He had also developed personal relations with highly educated and talented Nepalis, some of whom were Ph.ds from Universities abroad. From the beginning of his reign, Birendra was surrounded by very different types of advisers and consultants from the group of older, mostly high-level government servants who had served in this capacity in the latter years of Mahendra's reign. He reinvigorated his father's efforts to establish Nepal's identity independent of India.

Soon after assuming the throne, King Birendra refused to consider his country as part of the Indian subcontinent. He declared that,

the concept like Nepal as a buffer-state has been outmoded. Nepal is not part of the South Asian Sub Continent, it is really that part of Asia which touches both China and India. ¹⁰²

This indicated a clear attempt on the part of Birendra to further dissociate his country from India.

He actively sought international recognition that his country no longer lived under India's economic or defence umbrella and asserted that Nepal would pay any price to assert its independence. In international conferences, Nepal continued to lobby for international guarantees of unrestricted transit rights to and from the sea for landlocked states. When India refused to add a more specific "freedom of transit" clause to the new Trade and Transit Treaty and insisted that transit was strictly a bilateral matter, Nepal refused to sign the Indian draft even after the 1971 treaty expired. Subsequently, Nepal's efforts at lobbying at the international conferences became even more vociferous.

On 7 September 1973, while addressing the Algiers Conference of non-aligned countries, Birendra raised the trade and transit problem by elaborating,

Being a landlocked country Nepal is painfully aware of the difficulties and frustrations the landlocked countries had to face while preparing the infrastructure for development inside and diversifying trade outside the country. ¹⁰³

¹⁰² Newsweek, September 10, 1973.

¹⁰³ Muni, S. D., 'Nepal as a Zone of Peace', Strategic Analysis, January 1984, p. 780.

He also urged the coastal countries to make specific provisions guaranteeing the right of the landlocked countries to free and unrestricted access to and from the sea.¹⁰⁴ At the United Nations, Nepal assumed the leadership of the landlocked countries for advancing their claims for unrestricted transit facilities through the coastal states.

In October 1973, Birendra along with his foreign minister and other officials visited India. Birendra talked of remodelling India-Nepal relations on a more "mature and sober basis". During the same visit he publicly raised the transit difficulties of the landlocked states.¹⁰⁵

On 25th February 1975 King Birendra for the first time forwarded the proposal of making Nepal the zone of peace , while addressing the royal guests in his coronation ceremony:

*And if today, peace is a overriding concern with us, it is only because our people genuinely desire peace in our country, in our region and everywhere in the world. It is with this earnest desire to institutionalize peace that I propose that my country Nepal be declared a zone of peace. Only under condition of peace will we be able to create a politically stable Nepal with a sound economy, which will in no way be detrimental to any other country."*¹⁰⁶

In his opinion such a proposal was necessary for security, independence and development. Birendra said,

104 Rising Nepal, 9 September 1973.

105 The Statesman, 14 October 1973.

106 Quoted in Shaha, R., 'Nepal as a Zone of Peace', in Politics in Nepal 1980-1990, Referendum, Stalemate and Triumph of People Power, 2nd edition, 1990. New Delhi.

*As a country that had never been colonized, we wish to see that our freedom and independence were not thwarted by the changing flux of time when understanding is replaced by belligerency and war.*¹⁰⁷

At the same time he was careful to emphasize that Nepal harboured no ill will towards either India or China and that the proposal was 'not prompted out of fear or threat from any quarter',¹⁰⁸ implying that there was no crisis situation and that peace would be more enduring and independent of changes in leadership if it is institutionalized. Nevertheless, it is interpreted by some analysts that the developments in Nepal's neighbourhood prompted the King to come out with this kind of proposal. The creation of Bangladesh as an independent state in the face of China's strong opposition demonstrated China's inability to contain the growing influence of India backed by the Soviet Union. Added to this was the annexation of Sikkim by India in April 1975 which became a matter of grave concern to Nepal.

In recent years the peace zone proposal has become the top priority in Nepal's foreign policy initiatives. Nepal has been reiterating the importance of the proposal whenever an opportune moment arrived. As one Nepali scholar observed,

The most important merit of the proposal lies in creating an environment that could resolve constraints of tight rope-walking in Nepal's foreign policy, contain external influence and intervention outside Nepal's boundary, bring about a planned change in traditional relationships and action patterns between Nepal and her neighbours, keep power politics out of Nepal and

107 The Times, 26 February, 1975.

108 Ibid.

*help eliminate any military and non-military threats to and from
and through Nepal to China and India. ' 109*

Through the peace zone proposal, Nepal expresses that it would be fatal for the country to establish ties in pursuance of alignment with anti-Indian posture. Nor would it be beneficial to Nepal to be closely associated with India, with all the manifest disadvantages that excessive reliance would bring to its relations with countries beyond the region. In February 1982, the then Nepali Prime minister Surya Bahadur Thapa, outlined seven points as *modus operandi* of Nepal's peace zone proposal. They are:

1. Nepal will adhere to the policy of peace, non alignment and peaceful coexistence and will constantly endeavour to develop friendly relations with all countries of the world, regardless of their social and political systems, and particularly with its neighbours, on the basis of equality and respect for each other's independence and sovereignty;
2. Nepal will not resort to the use of threat and force in any way which might endanger the peace and security of other countries;
3. Nepal will seek peaceful settlement of all disputes between it and other state or states;
4. Nepal will not interfere in the internal affairs of other states;
5. Nepal will not permit any activities on its soil that are hostile to other states supporting this proposal and in reciprocity states

109 Dhruva Kumar, Op. Cit. p. 45.

supporting this proposal will not permit any activities hostile to Nepal;

6. Nepal will continue to honour the obligations of all the existing treaties which it has concluded with other countries so long as they remain;

7. In conformity with its policy of peace and non alignment, Nepal will not enter into any military alliance nor will it allow the establishment of any foreign military base on its soil. In reciprocity, other countries supporting this proposal will not enter into military alliance nor will they allow establishment of military bases on their soil directed against Nepal.

In fact, Nepal's security strategy initiated through the zone of peace is analogous to the pilot fish behaviour which keeps 'close to the shark to avoid being eaten'.¹¹⁰

The Peace Zone proposal can be described as a product of a Nepali perception of national security which stands apart from the traditional perception of security viewed through the Indian prism. India, evaded discussion of peace zone idea because it perceived that its interests were likely to be hampered by any change in Nepal's traditional relations with it on military, political and economic affairs. The Indian foreign office maintains that India is "*committed to perpetual peace and friendship*" with Nepal, through the pre-existent treaty of 1950 and that since India poses no threat to peace and stability of that country, the need to endorse the Nepali

110 Bjøl, Erling, 'The Small States in International Politics,' in Scholu and Olav, (eds.), Small States in International Relations, Stockholm, 1971, p. 33.

proposal does not arise.¹¹¹ Secondly, as the traditional open border and affinity between the people of two countries remain, it would be difficult for India to undertake the kind of obligation Nepal is trying to impose on it through the zone of peace proposal. The point that India has taken in this context is clause 5 of the clarification under which Nepal proposes to restrict people indulging in untoward activities from any country recognizing the zone of peace. India feels the open border along with the traditional 'free press' in the country makes it almost impossible for India to be guaranteed against the activities of the Nepalis citizens residing in the Indian soil. Finally, India is also skeptical about the zone of peace which has been incorporated as a guiding principle in the Nepali Constitution. K. Subramanyam state the classic Indian view,

*It must be made clear to our neighbours what kind of concessions they can legitimately expect from their big neighbour and what they cannot. Any proposal which jeopardizes India's security should be clearly ruled out and Nepal's zone of peace and neutrality is one such proposal.*¹¹²

It is not, however, clear how the Zone of Peace proposal can pose threat to Indian security. It is almost axiomatic that Nepal, by itself, does not ever pose any threat to India. The sheer size of India's military might is enough to deter Nepal irrespective of the status of the proposal. Therefore, this possibility is rather insignificant. A more significant possibility of threat to Indian security is Nepal's alignment with its enemies. Once the proposal is endorsed and institutionalized Nepal cannot be drawn into the conflict

111 Shaha, Op. Cit. p. 56.

112 Subramanyam, K, 'Subcontinental Security' in Strategic Analysis, Vol. V., August-September, 1981, p. 253.

between any states. Therefore, Nepal cannot ally itself with China or with any other India's adversaries in the event of a conflict. The Zone of Peace proposal honours India's security concerns and also that of other countries. As China has already endorsed the Nepal's proposal, it is keen to have an endorsement of the proposal by India as well, in order to ensure that both countries keep their hands off Nepal. If Nepal can persuade both its big neighbours to act as international guarantors of peace in the country, it would further mean the elimination of dissent of whatever form in national political life in the name of peace.

India's reluctance is a reflection of its apprehensions that, once endorsed, the proposal might render the Indo-Nepalis Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 automatically superfluous and thereby encourage Nepal to demand that it should be abrogated. India is evasive about the proposal because it does not relish the possibility of its having to surrender the political and economic leverage it enjoys in Nepal on the basis of the Indo-Nepalis Treaty of 1950. For instance, the letter exchanged between the two countries after the signing of that treaty obliges the government of Nepal to seek advance assistance and concurrence of the government of India for importing any arms, ammunition, or warlike equipment from third countries for its security. It obliges Nepal to give first preference to the government or nationals of India, as the case may be, when indenting for assistance for the development of the natural resources of Nepal or for the establishment of any industrial project in Nepal.

The expressed Indian sensitivities towards the peace zone proposal and the irritants it has developed against Nepal's formulation of its own security perceptions in the Himalayas clearly indicate that New Delhi's resolve is not concerned with transforming Nepal into a conflict free zone but rather with

keeping Nepal as an exclusive area falling within its security perimeter. It suspects the proposal as being motivated by external powers to undercut New Delhi's strategic supremacy in the region. It has also dismissed the proposal as Nepal's deceitful move to equate India with China. What piqued Indian thinking in this regard is that Nepal's intention to establish equal relations with all its neighbours (as mentioned in the first clause of the proposal) is a breach of the understanding Nepal has with India under the 1950 treaty. Hence Kathmandu's proposal is viewed in New Delhi as an attempt by its smaller neighbour to completely de-link itself from the relationships framed under the treaty, thereby threatening the Indian concept of strategic stability in the region.

It is believed by the Nepalis that institutionalizing Nepal's neutral stand can further her economic development and maintain political freedom by ensuring her security. The Zone of Peace is, therefore, considered to be a necessary tool for the survival of her territorial, political and economic identity. Any impediment towards the implementation of the proposal can be regarded as a threat to her territorial, political and economic identity. As seen in the foregoing discussion, India's strong opposition to the proposal is one of such impediment that the implementation of it remains uncertain.

India at first thought that the proposal would die of neglect. But Nepal stuck to its guns. Each success in securing endorsement of the proposal by the international community testifies to non-compliant stance adopted by Nepal. By 1986, about 75 countries including the USSR, the USA, the UK, China and France as well as Nepal's neighbours, excluding India and Bhutan, had readily endorsed the King's proposal that Nepal be declared a zone of peace

maintaining that it goes along well with the non-aligned foreign policy of the Himalayan Kingdom.¹¹³

In March 1976, Nepal signed separate trade and transit agreements with Bangladesh. India protested that it should have been consulted before the signing of the treaty because trade and transit was to be carried out through Indian territory. Dr. Tulsi Giri, the prime minister of Nepal replied that Nepal's relations with other countries were of no concern to India.

In June, the same year, Birendra became the first foreign head of the state to fly over the Himalayas when he undertook a state visit to Szechenan and Tibet. It was the first direct air passage between China and Nepal marking, as Chinese premier Hua Kua Feng said, 'the building of an air bridge of China-Nepal friendship over the roof of the world for the first time in history'.¹¹⁴

In March 1978, Nepal secured a de-linking of trade from transit. Under Nepali criticism and pressure India conceded to sign separate treaties. It may be noted here that the continued delay in the signing of a new trade and transit treaty after the old one has expired in 1976 despite several rounds of talks at both official and diplomatic levels showed India's reluctance to concede to Nepal's demand for unfettered transit facilities. India apprehended that such a concession, once granted, would set a precedent and encourage Nepal to demand corridors through Indian territories for alternative outlets to the sea. But Nepal stuck to her determination and criticized India by stating that by denying Nepal such a right, India was in

113 Shaha, *Nepali Politics*, Op. Cit. p. 165.

114 Afroze, Shaheen, 'Dilemmas in Nepalese Foreign Policy', *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1987.

fact impeding Nepal's national economic development and prosperity. After discussions held at the Prime Minister level in December 1977, both the countries agreed in a joint communique that separate trade and transit treaties should be concluded expeditiously. Finally, as a result of long negotiations, separate trade and transit treaties and a memorandum of understanding on Industrial and Economic Cooperation were signed between the two countries in March 1978. The trade treaty was signed for five years while the transit treaty was for seven years. In order to conduct trade between the two countries twenty one routes were made available, out of which thirteen routes were meant for transit traffic. The most important achievement of the treaty was that India was made to agree to provide an overland route for Nepal's trade with Bangladesh as well as with third countries through Bangladesh.

In the same year India urged King Birendra to release B. P. Koirala from prison and initiate the process of democratization in Nepal. Nepal sharply reacted to what they termed was an interference in their internal affairs. King Birendra himself asked New Delhi to desist from sermonizing to Nepal on matters of purely domestic concern of Nepal.

On 21 March 1983 the trade treaty which was signed in 1978 was subsequently renewed for another period of five years, through exchange of letters.

In April 1987, Nepal announced that establishment of 'work permits' would be required for Indian and other foreign skilled and unskilled labourers. India regarded the introduction of the work permit system as a violation of the special treaty of peace and friendship signed between the two countries in 1950. Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty provided for an open border and

reciprocal treatment of each other's citizens with respect to participation in industrial and economic development, trade, commerce, residence and ownership of property in each other's territory. It may be pointed out here that this clause was supposed to promote mutual participation in each other's economic and industrial development, but in fact it gave India an opportunity to strengthen its hold on Nepal. Clause 4 of the letters of Exchange that accompanied the treaty made it incumbent upon Nepal to give first preference to the Indian government or national if it decides to seek foreign assistance for the development of natural resources or for any industrial projects. As a result there were about 1.5 lakh Indians working in Nepal. India felt that the work permit scheme was aimed at removing these workers. Nepal said it was only a precautionary measure to check the entry of illegal immigrants into Nepal and no Indian worker has been removed or denied a job as a consequence. It further argued that the scheme would be used for the planning process in order to get a rough estimate of skilled and semi skilled workers in the country.

The trade treaty which was renewed in 1983 lapsed in 1988, but was extended twice, each time for a period of six months. The transit treaty had expired in March 1985 and been extended, ad hoc, till the end of the year and then for a period of four years till March 1989, though, according to the original provision, it could have been extended for seven years. But India unilaterally scrapped the treaty following the failure of Nepal and India to reach common ground. The Government of Nepal officially requested India to continue with the existing arrangements as interim measures until fresh treaties were signed and proposed immediate negotiations.¹¹⁵ India publicly announced termination of the treaties and turned down Nepal's

115 Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 May 1989, p. 8.

request for continuation of existing arrangements by saying that provisions of the treaties that had been terminated could not be allowed to remain in force.

India was of the opinion that the trade and transit issues were inseparable and insisted on a single unified treaty for both transit and trade - a marked departure from a position in practice for over a decade. Nepal, on the other hand, said its landlocked status involved principles quite separate from trade. In an interview with the Independent, the foreign minister of Nepal, Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya said,

We have told India that trade is a bilateral matter subject to fluctuations. You get a lot of changes in a trade relationship, but transit is more or less of a permanent relationship. You cannot trade unless you have transit rights. ¹¹⁶

As mentioned earlier behind the issue of a single or two treaties lies the Indian desire to retain her invaluable leverage over Nepal in the matter of Transit thereby creating obstacles in Nepal's policy of diversification. On the contrary Nepal always wants to remind India that it is not just a thin vulnerable line in the map of the world but an independent country having, unlike India, an unbroken glorious tradition of independence, and determined not to be subdued or to compromise its independent stance.

India wants a comprehensive trade and transit treaty, in which Nepal will restore concessions to Indian trade, in return for open access to third countries. Nepal on the other hand says that transit rights are so vital to a land locked country, that they must be guaranteed separately.

116 Independent, June 1989.

Another example of non-compliant behaviour in this period was King Birendra's purchase of several anti-air craft guns and a batch of AK-47 rifles from China. India used to be the sole supplier of weapons to Nepal. Nepal argued that they were needed for internal security, to deter possible terrorist attack.¹¹⁷ It further said that it had tendered a request to New Delhi in this connection and only subsequently turned to China's basement bargain.¹¹⁸ But India viewed these purchases as an unfriendly act on the part of Nepal even though they did not constitute a threat to India. India protested that the procurement broke the 1950 treaty of friendship and peace which does not appear to be so on a reading of the documents. The point of reference here is that while India is concerned over Nepal's acquisition of arms from China, it fails to take into account the misgivings which Nepal has over air space violations and military incursions by India. India twice violated the airspace of Nepal, once when it dropped relief supplies to northern Tamil areas in Sri Lanka and for the second time to test the Chinese capabilities along the Indo-Nepal border.¹¹⁹ On various other occasions, the Indian police have intruded into the Nepali villages on the pretext of chasing Gurkha militants.¹²⁰ During the recent India-Nepal crisis over the buying of arms from China the Indian minister of state for external affairs came to Kathmandu as an special envoy of Rajiv Gandhi carrying a letter from Gandhi asking for King Birendra's assurances that Nepal would not purchase arms again from China and that the weapons already purchased

117 The Statesman, (New Delhi), 11 April 1989.

118 India Today, May 31, 1989.

119 Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 May 1989.

120 The New Nation, 25 April, 1989.

would not be used against India.¹²¹ Birendra refused to give any such assurances, insisting that it was Nepal's right to buy weapons it considered necessary for its defence and insisting that the weapons were intended for internal security and anti-terrorism had constituted no threat to India. When the minister argued that the Himalayas were India's vital defense barrier, which it could not allow China to breach, Birendra counter argued that such thinking was out of date. According to some reports, Birendra also told the minister that Nepal planned to add two divisions to its army over the next decade, roughly doubling the size of its military.¹²²

ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAVIOUR : KING BIRENDRA REGIME (1972-1990)

The non-compliant behaviour manifested during Birendra's rule may be understood in terms of motivation to defy that emanated from condition 1, i. e., vitalness of issues. Table 4. 3 summarizes the instances of non-compliant behaviours demonstrated in this period, their nature, i. e., responsive and initiative, along with the conditions of motivation to defy and the NTPRs. It may be observed from Table 4. 3 that of the 10 instances, Nepal took initiative in 7 instances: in the remaining 3 instances Nepal's behaviours were in response to Indian actions, demands etc. Table 4. 3 also suggests that in 6 instances the underlying issues were related to economic survival, in 2 instances they were related to physical survival, in 1 instance they were related to regime survival and in another 1 instance they were related to physical, economic and political survival. Furthermore, given the

¹²¹ Hindustan Times, 29 July, 1988.

¹²² Organizer, 21 August, 1988, and the Hindu, 24 September 1988.

Table 4.3 A Summary of the Instances of NCB during King Birendra's Regime (1972-1990) along with the Conditions of Motivation to Defy and the NTPRs used to Explain Them.

INSTANCES OF NCB	NATURE OF NCB	MOTIVATION TO DEFY (The Conditions)	CAPABILITY TO RESIST (The NTPRs)
1. Raised the issue of land-lockedness in Non-aligned Conference in Algiers.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS
2. Assumed leadership of land-locked countries, advocated their rights at the UN	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS
3. Birendra publicly raised the transit difficulties of land-locked states during his visit to India	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS
4. Forwarded the Zone of Peace proposal	Initiative	Condition 1 (Physical, economic, political survival)	LS, EPS
5. Signed separate treaties for trade and transit with India	Responsive	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, PP
6. Trade and transit treaty with Bangladesh	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS
7. Rejected the Indian suggestion to release B. P. Koirala from prison and initiate democratic process	Responsive	Condition 1 (Regime survival)	LS
8. Purchased arms from China	Initiative	Condition 1 (Physical survival)	LS
9. Establishment of work permit	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, PP
10. Birendra refused Gandhi's suggestion to give assurances that Nepal would not purchase arms any further from China and use them against India.	Responsive	Condition 1 (Physical survival)	LS

*The letters LS, GL, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, geopolitical leverage, peoples' power and finally external political support.

motivation to defy, in all the instances leadership strength, in 5 instances external political support, in 2 instances people's power explain non-compliance. Geo-political leverage was absent as a power resource constituting capability to resist. Finally, in 6 instances more than one factor were responsible for non-compliance. Let us now explore the conditions, assumptions, contextualities (i.e., the policy contingencies) in order to understand the instances of NCB demonstrated in this phase.

The instances of non-compliance that condition 1 best explains include those related to Nepal's land lockedness, trade and transit treaties, work permit, zone of peace proposal and purchase of arms. As far as these instances are concerned condition 2 (ambition of the ruler) and condition 3 (disinclination of the ruling party) do not offer plausible explanation. According to condition 2 as mentioned before, the presence of the ruler's ambition is likely to generate the motivation to defy and thereby lead to non-compliance while its absence does not. Ruler's ambition was defined as a disposition characterized by an urge for actualization of a dream to become a strong and effective ruler of a strong country. However, as mentioned before, our general experience suggests that we strive to actualize our potentials (or dreams for that matter) when our survival is secured. The specific NCBs exhibit Nepal's concern for survival. Hence when survival is not secured an explanation with the help of ruler's ambition is rather weak and unsatisfactory.

According to condition 3, it will be recalled that the ruling party's disinclination towards the dominant power is likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby lead to non-compliant behaviour while its inclination to the dominant power will lead it to be compliant. Although King Birendra, like his father Mahendra was also disinclined towards India, the aspect of

physical, economic and political survival of the people/state/regime is too fundamental to be interpreted in terms of his adherence to a political idea, view, attitude or belief. Hence, Birendra's disinclination does not appear to be as convincing as is the vitalness of the issues involved.

As stated before, condition 1 maintains that consideration of an issue as vital, (i.e., it is necessary for physical, economic or political survival of the people/state/ regime) is likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby lead a small state to demonstrate NCB. Such necessity may be 'absolute' i.e., without which existence will be at stake; or it may not be 'absolute' i.e., without which existence will not be at stake but survival would mean encountering considerable difficulty. The following analysis of the specific instances is geared to show how condition 1 explains Nepal's non-compliance during this phase. Readers will recall from the analysis carried out in the period 1960-72 (i.e., Mahendra's direct rule) that the issue of land lockedness was considered as a vital necessity for Nepal to survive as a viable economy. Adopting similar line of arguments, the instances of initiative NCBs in this period such as raising the issues of land lockedness and unrestricted right of access to sea in the non-aligned conference, providing leadership in the UN on such matters, and also raising the issue during Birendra's visit to India may be considered as vital to Nepal's economic survival.

Related to the issue of land lockedness is the Nepali demand for separate trade and transit treaty. The signing of the separate treaties in March 1978 marked the realization of a persistently defiant Nepali stance. The necessity of having separate treaties (one for short term trade arrangements and the other long term and permanent transit arrangements) is vital for Nepal for its economic survival. This is because such separation of treaties and long

term transit arrangements would provide considerable protection to Nepal in terms of its vulnerability as a result of landlockedness. This would deny India its invaluable leverage over Nepal in matters of transit which literally devastated Nepali economy during Raxual Blockade (and subsequently in 1989 with far greater intensity). One can therefore strongly maintain that a separation of treaties seem to be first step towards protecting Nepal from threats to its economic survival. The signing of separate treaties which constitutes a responsive NCB, may therefore be understood in terms of vitalness which is suggested by condition 1.

It will also be recalled from the analysis of Nepali behaviour during 1960-72 that the issue of trade diversification was considered vital for Nepal's economic survival. Hence, the non-compliant behaviour (demonstrated during 1960-72) such as the trade agreements with the USSR, Yugoslavia, the UK, Poland, China and the trade and transit agreement with Pakistan were all explained in terms of condition 1. Adopting similar line of arguments the initiative non-compliant behaviour of signing trade and transit treaty with Bangladesh may also be explained in terms of condition 1.

The establishment of work permit, an initiative NCB, may also be understood in terms of vitalness. Basically, the Nepali trade, industries and jobs (eg. teaching) etc. are dominated by Indian immigrants where the Nepalis find difficult to sustain themselves. The work permit as a measure to control illegal immigrants provide some protection to the Nepali population in terms of employment. Therefore, the introduction of work permit may be seen as vital to the economic survival of the Nepalis. Hence, condition 1 provide a possible explanation to such NCB.

The peace zone proposal was vital for Nepal's physical, economic and political survival. It will be recalled from the earlier discussions that Nepal through the peace zone proposal sought guarantees from other states to treat it as a conflict free zone. It will also be recalled from earlier discussion that special relations with India and other treaty obligation produced an enormous Indian preponderance in Nepal's conduct of her affairs. Indian preponderance as mentioned before acted to the detriment of Nepal's physical, economic and political survival. To secure her survival as an independent state, it was necessary for Nepal to cast her Indian satellite status. Nepal attempted to do so by developing relations with China. Given the Sino-Indian rivalry and the physical, economic and political vulnerability of Nepal, thus meant a tight rope walking and becoming a victim of Indian wrath. Nepal needed a more positive measure so that she could at the same time free herself from Indian preponderance and steer clear of the Sino-Indian rivalry thereby securing her survival as an independent state physically, economically and politically. The Peace Zone proposal was one such measure, through the endorsement of which by China and India, Nepal could secure her survival. Hence, condition 1 (vitalness of issue) offers a plausible explanation for Nepal's behaviour of forwarding the zone of peace proposal.

Condition 1 (vitalness of issue) also explains Nepal's NCBs related to the purchase of arms from China. As a result of the acquisition of anti-aircraft guns and AK 47 rifles, the enhancement of Nepal's capability to deter external aggression was very insignificant. Despite that, the acquisition of arms may be said to have been prompted by its security concerns. Far from being secured, the threats to territorial sovereignty were persistent in the minds of the Nepali decision-makers. This is reflected in Birendra's desire to

double its military size by adding two divisions of army over the next decade. Apart from the external threats, the purchase of rifles may also be explained in terms of Nepal's internal security concerns. As mentioned earlier, the Nepali government emphasized that the purchase was necessary to deter possible terrorist attacks. This underscores a concern regarding the threats posed by the terrorist against the regime of King Birendra. Hence, from the perspective of survival of territorial independence and that of the survival of regime condition 1 (vitalness of issues) offers a plausible explanation to Nepal's NCB of purchasing arms.

Finally, King Birendra's refusal of the Indian suggestion to free the former Nepali Prime Minister, B. P. Koirala, from prison and initiate democratic process may be considered as a responsive NCB that is guided by his regime interest. In view of the popularity of B. P. Koirala, and the threat posed by democratic movement to the royal regime, it is a vital necessity for Birendra to keep B. P. Koirala immobilized by putting him in jail. Viewed as a vital issue in terms of regime survival, condition 1 seems to offer a plausible explanation for this NCB too.

In our efforts to understand Nepal's non-compliance during this phase, we have so far examined her motivation to defy. But as mentioned in Chapter 3, for a state to be non-compliant, it must also have the capability to resist. Hence, the following analysis is geared to examine Nepal's capability to resist in order to understand the NCBs demonstrated during this phase. According to our contextual framework, the non-tangible power resources that constitute capability to resist include leadership strength, external political support, geopolitical leverage and people's power. Given a motivation to defy, the presence of these non-tangible power resources lead to non-compliance while their absence does not.

Nepal's non-compliance in this phase may be explained by King Birendra's leadership strength. In addition to this, in some instances of NCB external political support and people's power seems to have played their part. However, unlike Mahendra's direct rule, geopolitical leverage in this phase did not contribute to Nepal's capability to resist. Let us examine the power resources.

As mentioned earlier, King Mahendra personally groomed Birendra to take up the leadership of his country. Birendra was gradually socialized into Mahendra's political system. He received his academic training abroad and was exposed to international intellectual cross-currents. Having studied politics under Henry Kissinger at Harvard, he is the first Nepali King to have had any prolonged exposure to the world outside India and his country's isolated valleys. This is in contrast to his father who said that his only experience of the outside world was the watering places of Nice, Cannes and Monte Carlo.

It was doubted that King Birendra would prove to be equally strong and would have the political acumen and insights like his father to maintain his country's internal and external position. In fact he was a step forward than King Mahendra. He was no less assertive than his father in his relation to China as an expression of non-compliance to India. At the same time he was meticulously cautious throughout to see that its growing amity with New Delhi did not revert back to the subservient position of the early fifties or lead to any deviation from its set policy of equidistance between its two neighbours.

Toeing his father's line, Birendra with great zeal and strong leadership re energized Nepal's efforts to establish an identity independent of India. The

vigorous pursuance of his ingenious peace zone proposal bears the testimony of his leadership strength. His leadership strength explains Nepal's assertive role in the international forums on the issue of transit right for the landlocked countries. Nepal led the landlocked countries in the UN and advocated for their right to the access to the sea. Birendra's assertiveness may be noticed in his refusal to concede to the suggestion made by Rajiv Gandhi's special envoy to provide assurances to stop purchasing arms from China. Another example is the rejection of Indian suggestion to release B. P. Koirala from prison and initiate democratic process. Following similar arguments as before the difference in leadership strength between Birendra and Tribhuvan explains why Nepal was non-compliant during this phase and failed to be non-compliant during Tribhuvan's phase.

In addition to leadership strength, external political support also contributed towards Nepal's capability to resist relating to Nepal's land lockedness and peace zone proposal. Nepal's assumption of the role of spokesperson in the UN for the landlocked countries testify that Nepal was successful in mustering political support from those countries. The political support and solidarity offered by other states on the issue provided Nepal the strength to defy. The operation of external political support is also evident in Nepal's pursuit of peace zone proposal. In essence, the key actors in materializing the ZOP are India and China. The rationale behind Nepal's attempts to secure wider recognition for the proposal is that, through the endorsement of international community Nepal could secure their commitment and support. It is reasonable to gain commitment and support because an endorsement politically binds a state as a party to the proposal. As China spontaneously accepted the proposal, the only stumbling block was India. The wide

recognition enabled Nepal to amass the political strength required to put pressure on India to accept the proposal. As mentioned before, by 1986, 75 countries including the USSR, the USA, the UK, France, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh endorsed the proposal. The wider international endorsement for the proposal shows the operation of external political support in Nepal's behaviour of non-compliance.

It may be inferred from the foregoing that King Birendra's Nepal was characterized by a foreign policy of dynamism which sought interaction and involvement with the rest of the world. In contrast, Tribhuvan's Nepal was characterized by isolationist foreign policy. A comparison of the two provides the evidence which partly supports the proposition that the presence of external political support leads to NCB while its absence does not.

Besides, leadership strength and external political support, people's power also help us understand Nepal's NCB in this phase. Popular pressure against India was evident in various demonstrations and protests that were made to effect the signing of separate trade and transit. The annexation of Sikkim by India became a matter of concern in Nepal. Several newspaper openly expressed their apprehension that India might use her dominant position to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring country- a suspicion buttressed by India's annexation of Sikkim. These developments were viewed with alarm in Kathmandu, where the elite felt a serious challenge to Nepal's independence and security. Anti Indian demonstrations in Nepal in 1974, protesting the Indian actions in Sikkim, were allegedly encouraged by officials of the Nepal government. Unlike Tribhuvan's government (which lacked the disposition to defy) Birendra's

government utilized people's power to enhance its capabilities to be non-compliant.


However, geopolitical leverage as a factor of capability to resist did not play any significant role in this phase. The emergence of Bangladesh proved that the effectiveness of Chinese influence in the region was considerably diminished. As against the Indian involvement, China could not do much to help her close ally Pakistan in preventing the creation of Bangladesh. Nepal's geopolitical leverage was thereby reduced to some extent. A further reduction of this leverage took place when India subsequently amassed huge military capabilities including nuclear power which was absent in 1960s. An Indian political scientist wrote,

India's military muscle acquired a punch which was tragically lacking in 1962. India also emerged as the world's fourth strongest military power, with a million plus strong armed force and significant armoured and air striking capabilities. With all its nuclear armour, China's conventional punch is probably less forceful today than it was in 1962. ¹²³

Sino-phobia was no longer a significant element in the Indian security calculation. Thus Nepal's geopolitical leverage, gained from India's sino-phobia, became proportionately insignificant. Nepal's geopolitical leverage whatever may have been left, was finally stripped off during the late 80s when long-standing tensions between India and China were eased through Sino-India rapprochement. Hence, given the erosion of geopolitical leverage, it cannot be said to have contributed towards Nepal's non-compliance during this phase. From the foregoing analysis we may therefore conclude

123 Gupta, Bhabani Sen, 'China as a Threat', World Focus Nov-Dec. 1989.

that given the motivation to defy (emanated from condition 1) the presence of leadership strength, external political support and people's power led Nepal to be defiant.



CHAPTER 5

FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR OF BANGLADESH WITH INDIA

With the surrender of the Pakistani Army to the Joint Indo-Bangla Command on the 16th December, 1971, Bangladesh's emergence as a sovereign country in the map of the world was complete. Until 1947, the area comprising Bangladesh used to be a part of British India. Between 1947 to 1971, it was a part of Pakistan. On 25th March 1971, the People's Republic of Bangladesh was declared which gained its independence on the 16th December 1971.

Although there is no denying the fact that India played an important role in the emergence of Bangladesh it must be remembered here that India came to Bangladesh's assistance not entirely for selfless reasons. The Director of the Indian Institute for Strategic Studies and Defence Analysis at a seminar on 2 April 1971 pointed out that,

What India must realize is the fact that the break-up of Pakistan is in our interest, an opportunity the like of which will never come again. It is the opportunity of a century (to destroy the nation's inveterate and principal enemy) ¹.

He further concluded in a newspaper article, "the speedy emergence of a Bangladesh government headed by Awami league leadership is very much

1. Quoted in Peiris, Denzil, 'Opening a Raw Wound', Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May, 1976, p. 10.

in our interest."² Even Mrs. Indira Gandhi herself, during her visit to Bangladesh (after its independence), on several occasions and more than once in the same public meeting explained why India helped the liberation movement of Bangladesh. In a public meeting she outlined how a free and independent Bangladesh added to India's strength. In terms of the regional balance of power, to free Bangladesh would be to free India from its regional constraints. Not only that but she also calculated whether the Bangladesh liberation struggle had the chance to succeed. Once she was convinced that the movement would not peter out, she plunged into political and military commitments.³

MUJIB REGIME (1972-1975)

Nevertheless, the moral and material support which India extended to Bangladesh was never lost on the sentiments of the decision makers of Bangladesh. During the euphoric stage, bonds of friendship were forged between the two countries. To none occurred that foreign policy is devoid of any kind of sentimentality and that an overweight sense of gratitude is irksome and can sometimes become unbearable. Consequently on March 19, 1972 upon Mrs. Indira Gandhi's first visit to Bangladesh, (from 16 to 19 March) both the countries signed a treaty which was titled "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace." It may be noted here that while the 12 article treaty was on the cards for the past three months, the signing of it was kept a closely guarded secret till Mrs. Gandhi herself announced about it at a

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2. Subramanyam, K., 'India's Security Linked with Bangladesh's Struggle', Assam Tribune, 12 April, 1971.
 3. Hindu, 23 March, 1972.

news conference in Dhaka. "Both Mrs. Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman played things close to their chest to the extent that even some of their closest aides who were deeply involved in the dialogue, were kept in the dark until the leaders chose to tell them of their decisions."⁴ "If the officials of India and Soviet Union had two years to prepare for a similar treaty between their countries, the Sheikh might have given us at least two months to work on our treaty", complained one of the close aides from the Bangladesh side.⁵

The treaty which was valid for 25 years, declared that India and Bangladesh would respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both sides would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other. The clauses relating to defence were couched exactly in the phraseology of the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971. Both countries declared that they would not enter into any military alliance that might be directed against the other party. They would not allow their territories to be used in any manner that would constitute a threat to their neighbour's security. The treaty stipulated that "in case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries." It may be recalled that India invoked an identical clause in the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 to deter China from coming to Pakistan's assistance. This security understanding was further sealed with the declaration that neither party should "undertake any commitment, secret or

4. Ibid.

5. Ali, S. M, After the Dark Night: Problems of Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, New Delhi, 1973, p. 144.

open, toward one or more states which may be incompatible with the present treaty".

The two countries also agreed under article 6 of the treaty to cooperate in flood control, river development, irrigation and communication. It was agreed that joint studies and actions would be undertaken in the fields of flood control, river basin development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation.

After signing the treaty, Mrs. Gandhi told a press conference:

Bangladesh needs no guarantee for its sovereignty. But if its sovereignty or security should ever be threatened India will defend it. ⁶

Bangladeshi President Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, in his address to the assembly, commended India's role in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh and described the treaty as "the practical expression" of the friendship between the two states.⁷ Likewise, Mrs. Gandhi in her statement in Indian Parliament on 20 March 1972 declared that,

the Treaty embodies the Will of the two Governments to pursue common policies in matters of interest to both countries and solemnizes the close ties of friendship between our two countries and peoples cemented through blood and sacrifice. The Treaty ...

6. Times of India, 19 March, 1972.

7. Jatiyo Sangsad Official Proceedings, 1st Session, 1st Sitting, 9 April, 1973, p. 45.

*will guide us in our journey into the future in quest of peace, good neighbourliness and the well-being of our two peoples.*⁸

The Hindu wrote:

*The Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Peace is a natural evolution and is an effective step forward in many ways from the Indo-Soviet treaty. The geographical neighbourliness of the two countries makes the treaty a more rational commitment than the arrangement between Delhi and Moscow. There is more in common between the people of India and the people of Bangladesh in matters of political, ideological, cultural background and racial affinity.*⁹

But the opposition parties in Bangladesh unanimously demanded the treaty be repudiated. It is important to note that none of the political parties in Bangladesh supported the Government in its stand on the friendship treaty¹⁰ because they saw in it the abridgment of Bangladesh's independence.¹¹ The treaty increased people's fear rather than support and strength. Some saw it as severely undermining Bangladesh's political and security options, and also as a means to stifle nationalist sentiments, while others saw it as a commitment by Mujib to accept Indian claims to predominance in the

8. Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Bangladesh Documents, Vol.II, 1972, p. 648.

9. Hindu, 19 March 1972.

10. Hassan, Shaikat, India-Bangladesh Political Relations During the Awami League Government, 1972-75, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Australian National University, 1988, p. 110.

11. Jatiyo Sangsad Official Proceedings, 1st Session, 1st Sitting, 9 and 13 April; also 2nd Session, 29th Sitting, 7 July 1973.

subcontinent, especially as its principal rival, Pakistan, had been divided.¹² In all, the opposition interpreted the treaty as an infringement of Bangladesh's sovereignty and appealed to the Assembly to reject it right away. One member of Parliament commented that the wording of the friendship treaty provided no scope to repudiate it, thereby binding Bangladesh to the Indian security arrangement in the subcontinent. He even demanded to know why Bangladesh, being an independent country, should not be given the right to negotiate for her own interests.¹³

Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, leader of the National Awami Party addressing a public meeting in observance of Anti-Repression Day at Paltan Maidan described the treaty as one of bondage and asserted that the people of Bangladesh would never accept Indian domination.¹⁴ In December 1972, he formed a 7 Party action committee whose aim was to free the country of this treaty because the treaty guaranteed India's domination and influence over the future course of Bangladesh and thereby extend and establish its own sphere of influence over the subcontinent. According to the Committee, the treaty could not serve Bangladesh's interests as claimed by the Government.¹⁵

Apart from that, Holiday, a Bangladeshi English language weekly claimed that India was playing the Big Brother role, and argued that Articles 9 and 10 'clearly give enough leeway to the Indian Government to infringe upon the

12. Baxter, Craig, Bangladesh: A New Nation In An Old Setting, Boulder and London, 1984, p. 99.

13. Jatiyo Sangsad Official Proceedings, 2nd Session, 29th Sitting, 7 July 1973, pp. 1817, 1820.

14. The Times of India, 10 October, 1972.

15. Ahmed, Moudud, Bangladesh: Era of Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, Dhaka: The University Press Ltd., 1983, p. 190.

sovereign right of the Bangladesh people' and that in fact 'Indian defence and foreign policies have now become Bangladesh's policies as well'.¹⁶

On the contrary, Indian reaction to the treaty was totally different because, as far as Indian self-interest was concerned, India would not be in a disadvantaged position for signing a friendship treaty with Bangladesh.

The treaty allowed India to realize three important regional objectives: first, India was able to convince Bangladesh that it neither require any defence arrangement with external powers, nor a strong army since India would assume the responsibility for Bangladesh's defence; second, India's influence and 'guidance' in Bangladesh's affairs were guaranteed by several treaty provisions, particularly article 4; and finally, the economic 'salvation' of eastern India was assured by the economic understanding across the 'border of peace and friendship'.¹⁷

The security arrangement in the treaty implied, as mentioned before, that Bangladesh's defence forces remain weak and dependent on India. The treaty also constrained Bangladesh to enter into defence arrangement with any country without Indian approval. Regional and world politics is far from being static. Bangladeshi people felt that there was no guarantee that in future India will honour its commitment for safeguarding Bangladesh's sovereignty or it will not take military measures against Bangladesh. In the face of regional, extra regional and global political changes and instabilities, the people of Bangladesh perceived the treaty as threatening the nation's physical survival and sovereignty, as it meant that the national defence forces will be permanently weak and dependent on India. Apart from this, the

16. Holiday, 26 March 1972.

17. Hassan, S., Op. Cit. p. 134.

people of Bangladesh also perceived the treaty as an instrument that curtailed the nation's right to survive politically as an independent entity. As mentioned before, the treaty required Bangladesh to develop security relationship with only those states that India approves. By all implications Bangladesh was tied to the Indo-Soviet axis on a long term basis. Thereby, Bangladesh's political independence to establish any form of relationship with any state, regionally, extra-regionally or globally was jeopardized by the treaty. In addition to the circumscription of political freedom as just mentioned, the treaty also imposed inflexibility in terms of Bangladesh's position on world politics. As a developing nation with a war torn economy and faced with chronic difficulties, it was an imperative for Bangladesh to have some political flexibility in order to be able to tap support from both Sino-American and Indo-Soviet axes. The long tenure of the treaty made Bangladesh's political alignment rigid thereby impossible to alter political position or remain neutral. It may not be out of place to mention here that although India is regarded as a forerunner in the non-aligned movement, the post independence events suggest that India was then more aligned with the Soviet Union than remain non-aligned. Consequently, through the treaty Bangladesh acquired alliance with the Indo-Soviet axis. Further, to the Bangladeshis, the treaty accentuated Indian influence in Bangladesh. It may be recalled from the discussion of the treaty in the preceding section that several provisions of the treaty, particularly Article 4, guaranteed India's influence and guidance in Bangladesh's affairs. The people perceived it as Indian domination and a threat to Bangladesh's survival as an independent political entity.

The treaty was also viewed by the people as a threat to Bangladesh's vital economic interests. The 'Indo-Soviet' label was seen as putting obstacle on

the way of Bangladesh's chances for getting recognition from the oil rich middle eastern countries and China. Given the precarious state of its economy, it was indispensable for Bangladesh to infuse large amount of capital for its developmental efforts. Without their recognition it was impossible for Bangladesh to secure funds from those countries. All the above points suggest that the treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace of 1972 was perceived by the people of Bangladesh as a threat to physical, political and economic survival of Bangladesh.

The political parties of Bangladesh seeing a dismantling of Bangladesh's political, economic and security options, feared 'encapsulation' by India. They not only opposed the treaty provisions but also rejected the idea of a treaty with India because they were well aware of the precedents that in all such treaty arrangements 'between a big and powerful on the one hand and small and weak on the other, the latter implicitly surrenders part of its independence in exchange for security, which is directly guaranteed by the stronger power'.¹⁸

In the economic front, the most significant feature was the trade agreement with India which was concluded on 28 March, 1972. The trade agreement accorded each other the status of most-favoured nation treatment. In addition, the agreement provided that trade in perishable commodities and articles of daily use among people living within 16 kilometers of the border would be free of customs and currency regulations. Since the 16 kilometer zone could not be distinguished, many saw this as an attempt on the part of India to achieve an economic integration of Bangladesh and India. It may be noted here that before the partition of India in 1947, Bangladesh was the

18. Sethi, J.D, 'Indo-Soviet Treaty and Non-Alignment', India Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, October-December 1971, p. 330.

agricultural hinterland for the port of Calcutta. It sent jute, fish and fresh vegetables to Calcutta and got manufactured goods in exchange. After the emergence of Bangladesh, India wanted to see the old arrangement revived if not totally, at least partially. During her election campaign speeches in West Bengal and Assam, Indira Gandhi had repeatedly emphasized the benefits that free commerce would bring to these states bordering Bangladesh.¹⁹

The trade agreement also revealed some interesting features. Against Rs. 7.5 crore²⁰ worth of jute and Rs. 9 crore worth of fish from Bangladesh the major Indian item was tobacco. But the most remarkable feature of this trade agreement between Dhaka and New Delhi was the provision for border trade. As mentioned earlier, this provision enabled trade to flow free of customs and currency regulations within 16 kilometers along the 1300 mile Indo-Bangladesh border. It was the result of an Indian initiative and proved very disastrous for Bangladesh. The 16 kilometer zone made currency and customs regulations altogether impractical and meaningless. It was impossible to ascertain whether goods were carried across the border or within the same country. Some smuggling of primary goods from Bangladesh to India was already taking place, but the loop hole in the border trade agreement provided the leeway and encouraged it on a large scale basis. Jute, fish, poultry, eggs, newsprint, food grains and even relief materials found their way across the border to India resulting in an astronomical rise of prices of daily necessities in Bangladesh. The drainage was so gigantic that foreign donors began saying that 'some day ... India is

19. Hindu, 17 March 1972.

20. One crore=10 million.

going to give a big yawn over Bangladesh's problem and when it closes its mouth Bangladesh will be inside."²¹

The Indian businessmen took advantage of Bangladesh's shattered economy to get a foothold that had been denied since 1947, when an unfriendly Pakistan was established in East Bengal. Even the coins of Pakistan days found their way to India as they reportedly contained better metal than the India ones and were used to make fountain pen nibs in India. The consumer goods that India sent were mostly of a very poor quality. In a dispatch from Dhaka, The Times of India correspondent Kirit Bhaumik wrote, "one of the political jokes current here (Dhaka) is that what India has given with one hand, it has allowed to be taken away with the other through smuggling."²²

In fact, the smuggling hurt Bangladesh more than India. Loss of the jute hit its mills, while loss of fish further drove up the local prices. Calcutta sources estimated that between 12 lakh and 14 lakh bales of jute came across the border in the year 1972. The enormity of this illegal traffic can be judged by comparing these figures with the provision of three lakh bales in the agreement reached in March.

Bangladesh wanted mutually beneficial trading relations with India with necessary checks and balances; and that there would be no going back to the trade pattern which existed in the pre-partition days when East Bengal served as the hinterland of Calcutta. But without serious considerations of how Bangladesh's already war-torn economy would be affected, India argued for the integration of the economy of Bangladesh with the economy of the eastern part of India.

21. Quoted in Dawn, 30 November, 1975.

22. Times of India, 28 June, 1972.

It was also argued that not only would India remain Bangladesh's 'chief and dominant trading partner', but that 'India is about the only country whose aid Bangladesh can require with little cost to itself and in fact at much benefit, and with whom by the same means it can balance its trade'.²³ Thus, the theme of mutual benefit through economic cooperation between the two countries was constantly invoked in certain vested quarters in India.

Furthermore, India and the Awami League Leaders persisted that the economies of Bangladesh and the neighbouring states of India were complementary when in reality they were not. Jute for instance is an item in which India and Bangladesh compete for markets. Export of jute to India meant in the first place boosting Indian jute manufacture which would again compete with similar Bangladesh products for markets abroad. Secondly, it increased India's and correspondingly decreased Bangladesh's ability to sell raw jute to international markets for hard currency. Finally, Indian rupees thus earned could be used only to buy Indian goods. The Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industries, an association of the traders and manufacturers, opposed the free border trade clause and condemned it as harmful for the country. Commenting on the agreement, the Vice-President of the chamber said, "our economy dictates that only those commodities which do not find ready market should be included in barter agreement. But jute the main foreign exchange earner of the country is being bartered against commodities which have very limited export market in terms of quality and foreign exchange earning capacity."²⁴ The official exports of jute to India were criticized in Dhaka for bringing into the country only Indian rupees

23. Chopra, Pran, Bangladesh in Search of a Role, India Quarterly, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, April-June, 1972, p. 124.

24. The Bangladesh Observer, 23 May, 1972.

instead of 'real' foreign exchange, as Sheikh Mujib had so often promised they would do. What made matter worse was the Indian answer that coal and cement from India, sold for takas, balanced this out. Can so valuable an exchange earner as jute (the golden fibre and the lifeline of Bangladesh) be equated with coal and cement?²⁵ The devaluation to bring the Bangladesh currency at par with that of India immediately after independence was also done at the dictate of India. The expected benefits from this devaluation were dissipated and put Bangladesh at great loss

The insistence on the complementary nature of their economies meant Indian intake of Bangladesh's primary commodities in return for its manufactured products. If perpetuated it meant that even as independent state, Bangladesh will be permanently geared to the economic needs of its big neighbour. Industrial growth in Bangladesh will stop and instead it will become a preserved market for Indian goods. This was certainly not the goal for which the Bangladesh people had demanded partition of the subcontinent and broken away from Pakistan.

Mohammed Toaha, leader of the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), protested that Bangladesh has become protectorate of India. He further said that the penetration of Indian money was having an adverse impact on the economy of Bangladesh, resulting in an adverse balance of trade. The middle class shuddered at the thought of having to use inferior Indian products on prohibitive prices.²⁶

The weekly "Haq Katha", in its editorial said that through the so called border trade, India is virtually robbing Bangladesh. It further said that

25. Guardian, 4 September, 1972.

26. The Times of India, 10 October, 1972.

though Bangladesh is a free and sovereign country, the politics of jute has not yet been removed from the country. The Indian jute mills on the Hoogly river have again been started in full swing with the raw jute of Bangladesh. The jute of Bangladesh is being black-marketed into India, and it is the Indian businessmen and the Indian Marwaris who are making the profits.²⁷

A commentator in the Political and Economic Weekly of Bombay noted: "For how long are we going to maintain the fiction that the rising tide of ill-will in Bangladesh towards India and Indians is exclusively the consequence of Moulana Bhashani and the handful of residual pro-Pakistani elements? Why not admit that the problem has deeper roots?".²⁸

Bangladesh also inherited after its independence the problem of sharing the waters of the Ganges- an international river that traverses through India and Bangladesh and empties into the Bay of Bengal. The dispute originated in the early 1950s and continued after Bangladesh's independence. The Ganges is one of the largest rivers in the world. Its headwaters originate from the Gangotri glaciers some 23,000 feet high in the southern slopes of the Himalayas, in the northwesterly direction from New Delhi. It changes over to a southeasterly direction over half its course and then flows in an easterly direction across northern India until it reaches the border with Bangladesh.

It is fed by a number of tributaries originating in the Himalayan slopes of Tibet, Nepal and India. Of the major tributaries, the Karnali, the Gandak and the Kosi originating in Nepal together contribute 71% of the dry season flow of the Ganges and 41% of its annual flow.

27. Haq Katha, 15 August, 1972.

28. Quoted in The Times of India, 29 September, 1972.

As the Ganges approaches the Indian state of West Bengal, the river swings southward towards the delta. A short distance before it enters Bangladesh, it splits into two channels. The smaller, known as the Bhagirathi, continues southward becoming in its lower reaches the Hoogly on which is situated the port of Calcutta. The main channel enters Bangladesh and forms the boundary between India and Bangladesh for about 130 kilometers. Then taking the name Padma, it flows southeasterly for another 110 kilometers before joining the Brahmaputra-Jamuna. Further downstream the Padma joins the Meghna and continues as the lower Meghna until it empties its waters into the Bay of Bengal.

The Farakka Barrage, which cost India about US \$ 190 million, was built ostensibly to 'save' the Calcutta port from extinction. By placing the barrage across the Ganges before it proceeds into Bangladesh, water can be diverted into the Hoogly River to flush the silt from Calcutta's port so that it can receive big ships. According to experts in Bangladesh, "Farakka was not planned as a purely economic project by India, but as a political lever. It is essentially a scheme which benefits India alone and which cannot do anything but harm to Bangladesh."²⁹ The diversion of water to the Hoogly decreases the normal flow through the Ganges in south western Bangladesh, depriving that area of sufficient water to prevent sea water intrusion and the salinations that results. It has had adverse effects on Bangladesh's agriculture during the dry months. Pamphlets circulated in Bangladesh called the barrage "a death knell to Bangladesh".³⁰

29. Author's interview with some Bangladeshi officials.

30. Begum, Khurshida, Tension over the Farakka Barrage: A Techno Political Tangle in South Asia, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1988, p. 129.

Most of the Ganges water consists of monsoonal flows that run out to sea. During the lean period of March to May, the discharge at Farakka is insufficient, less than 55,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs) in the last ten days of April. India claimed that the purpose of flushing the Calcutta port required a diversion of at least 40,000 cusecs of water, thereby leaving only a small balance for Bangladesh. The Bangladesh case was that if India extracted the above quantum, the result would spell disaster for Bangladesh.

After independence of Bangladesh, Farakka issue was taken up for discussion between the two countries. Under article 6 of the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1972 signed between the two countries, it was agreed that the two countries would cooperate in flood control, river development, irrigation and communication. It was further agreed that joint studies and actions would be undertaken in the fields of flood control, river-basin development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation. At the same time decision was also taken to establish the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission "so that the water resources of the region can be utilized on an equitable basis for the mutual benefits of the people of the two countries".³¹ But there was no particular reference to the question of sharing the Ganga water and other points relating to the dispute.

Between April 1972 (i.e., after signing the peace and friendship treaty) and May 1974 (i.e., before the Prime Minister's summit meeting) several ministerial level meetings were held but nothing significant came out except

31. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, 1971, p. 644.

that India made a commitment that "a mutually acceptable solution will be arrived at before operating the Farakka Barrage".³²

In May 1974, the two Prime Ministers, Indira Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman met in Delhi but the meeting was not the success it might have been. However, para 17 and 18 of the Indira-Mujib declaration stated,

*The two Prime Ministers took note of the fact that the Farakka Barrage Project would be commissioned before the end of 1974. They recognized that during the period of minimum flow in the Ganga, there might not be enough water to meet the needs of the Calcutta Port and the full requirements of Bangladesh, therefore, the fair weather flow of the Ganga in the lean months would have to be augmented to meet the requirements of the two countries. It was accordingly, decided that the best means of such augmentation... should be studied by the Joint Rivers Commission.*³³

As one authority observed,

*This joint declaration of the Prime Ministers of the two countries clearly indicated that instead of proceeding step by step for finding out a solution, the dispute was thrown into further discrepancies and contingencies.*³⁴

32. The Ganga Water and Bangladesh, an Unpublished Paper, p. 7, Cited in Begum, Khurshida, Op.Cit., p. 109.

33. Record of Discussions of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, Dhaka, May 1985, pp. 56.

34. Begum, K., Op. Cit., p. 110.

After this summit meeting two more ministerial level meetings were held. The first one was held in February 1975. But the meeting as usual made no headway in edging closer to a solution because of the divergence of views of the two sides on the question of the commissioning of the Farakka barrage. The second meeting was held in April 1975 in Dhaka between Bangladesh and India. On the third day of the meeting a joint press statement was issued which read: *The Indian side pointed out that while discussions regarding allocations of water are continuing, it is essential to run the feeder canal of the barrage during the current lean period.* Accordingly on 18 April, an interim agreement was signed allowing India to test the feeder canal for the period between 21 April and 31 May with discharges varying from 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs (see Table 5.1). This was a concession to the policy of 'appeasement' that Mujib government was following towards India. The agreement concerned only the test run of the feeder canal and not the commissioning of the barrage. But India continued withdrawing water even beyond the period specified in the Interim agreement of May 1975. The Indian authority did not inform Bangladesh about the continuation of the diversion of the water after the specified period. One Bangladesh official closely involved with the issue commented: *The Farakka dispute has unmistakably demonstrated that the Indian Government, in its relation with Bangladesh- as with other neighbours- is incapable of keeping good faith.*³⁵

Bangladesh, being an agrarian country, is the worst sufferer of the water dispute. Agriculture in Bangladesh constitutes 60% of GNP and provides 70% of labour force with employment. In 1971-72, the food production of the country, apart from the adversities of the war of liberation, suffered a setback by drought. The drought condition in 1972-73 was even more severe. The

35. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 April, 1976.

year 1974-75 brought extensive damage to agricultural production by a flood of unusual magnitude.

Added to these miseries was the withdrawal of a large quantity of water by India through the Farakka Barrage in violation of the ad hoc Agreement, 1975, for "test running the feeder canal". This produced harmful effects on Bangladesh. The most sensitive aspect of the diversion was its impact on the agricultural sector in Bangladesh. Insufficient flow of water on one hand made irrigation impossible and on the other hand failed to prevent the intrusion of sea water thereby increasing salinity of the soil. With the increase of salinity, soil fertility decreased proportionately. This resulted in colossal loss of agricultural crops. Besides, agriculture, inland navigability, fisheries and livestock suffered greatly due to inadequate flow in the Padma.³⁶ In sum, withdrawal of water brought ecological disaster for the people of Bangladesh. The diversion threatened an intolerable weakening of the already anaemic Bangladesh economy.

Before the independence of Bangladesh, the Awami League in their election manifesto of 1970 promised that, *every instrument of foreign policy must be immediately utilized to secure a just solution of Farakka problem*. After independence, people felt the Awami League government got an unusual opportunity to fulfill its promise. Not only was the atmosphere conducive for a settlement but actually a forum was also created so that the problem could be solved. When the two prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman met in 1974 to discuss among various things the water issue, people naturally expected that substantial progress will be made. But despite a number of concessions made to India, the Mujib government could not get

36. The Bangladesh Times, 11 April, 1976; also The Bangladesh Observer, 25 September, 1976.

what the people considered a fair share of water from the Ganges river system except for a face saving interim agreement.³⁷

Table 5.1 : Agreement To Share The Ganges As Per The Ad Hoc Agreement, 1975.

	Date of Withdrawal	Withdrawal by India	Balance left for Bangladesh
April	21-30	11,000 cusecs	44,000 cusecs
May	1-10	12,000 cusecs	44,500 cusecs
May	11-20	15,000 cusecs	44,250 cusecs
May	21-30	16,000 cusecs	40,500 cusecs

Source: Bangladesh Observer, April 19, 1975.

Another serious problem faced by Bangladesh in its relation with India was the Indian stand on the basis of delimitation of maritime boundaries and the latter's claim over the territories that Bangladesh believes belong to it. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), a coastal state is entitled to extend its territorial sea 12 nautical miles (n.m) (Article 3), its contiguous zone 24 n.m (Article 33(2)), its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 200 n.m (Article 57), and the continental shelf³⁸ upto 200 n.m (Article 76), or up to the natural prolongation measured from an appropriate baseline. The territorial sea sets the limit of the sea zone over which a coastal state may exercise its sovereignty. The EEZ and the continental shelf set the sea zones over which a coastal state may exercise

37. Maniruzzaman, 'Bangladesh in 1976; Struggle for Survival as an Independent State', Asian Survey, Vol XVII, No. 2, February 1977, p. 121.

38. The Continental Shelf of a coastal state is the sea bed and sub soil of the sub marine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.

exclusive economic rights. According to international convention a state is entitled to prescribe the conventionally accepted sea zones to their entirety. Under the Law of Sea (LOS) Convention, unilateral apportioning of sea zones is not possible if, as a result of geographical constraints, prescribing the sea zones by one coastal state means encroachment of other coastal states' sea zones. This applies when two coastal states are adjacent or opposite to each other and available breadth of the sea zone is narrow. In such cases the convention suggests that the sea zones be delimited through bilateral agreement. Every sea zone of Bay of Bengal requires to be delimited by the coastal states. To the North of the Bay lies Bangladesh and adjacent to Bangladesh are India and Burma. Indian coast lies to the west and northwest while Burmese coast to the east. Again, opposite to Bangladesh, i.e. to its south in the bay are the Indian islands of Andaman and Nicobar. The location of the neighbouring states pose considerable difficulty for Bangladesh to prescribe its sea zones. In addition to the geographic constraints, as mentioned earlier, the delimitation of Bangladesh-India borders was further complicated by the Indian stand on the principle to be adopted for the settlement of the dispute. Bangladesh inherited unresolved maritime borders from Pakistan. Although border delimitation was incomplete when Bangladesh got its independence, the Awami League government did not consider it to be important enough to initiate discussion immediately. This was reflected in the high level governmental interaction between the two states. For examples, the joint communiqués issued at the end of Mujib's visit to Calcutta in February, 1972, or Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Dhaka in March 1972 or at the end of several foreign ministerial visits in 1972 and 1973 did not mention anything about the border issues. The Awami League government perceived that Bangladesh's territorial sovereignty was secured because it was surrounded by 'friendly' India. The issues of

maritime boundary delimitation did not receive attention until 1974 when Bangladesh took the initiative to explore petroleum resources in the Bay of Bengal. Based on a report of cabinet sub committee in late 1973, Bangladesh decided to go ahead with oil exploration in its territorial waters. It then became necessary first to enact maritime legislation. On February 1974, the territorial waters and maritime zone act was enacted. This act was promulgated before the second session of the UNCLOS III. As authorized by this act, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on April 15, 1974 that the country would exercise the 12 n.m limit for the territorial sea and 200 n.m for the EEZ measuring from the baselines.³⁹ The baseline was determined by using depth method at 10 fathom line on the admiralty chart. Meanwhile, in April same year, Bangladesh approached India for talks. However, Bangladesh did not receive any response from the Indian side. On the basis of its own definition of the maritime boundaries, Bangladesh decided to proceed with the task of drawing up contracts with foreign oil companies for offshore drilling. Six Oil Companies (three American companies-Union Oil, Atlantic Richfield and Ashland; a Canadian subsidiary of an American company, Canadian superior; a Japanese Consortium, Japan Petroleum Development Corporation and a Yugoslav company) were granted contracts to explore oil on behalf of Bangladesh.⁴⁰ In November 1974, India sent a protest note against Bangladesh's enactment of legislation on territorial waters stating that Bangladesh's claim of jurisdiction over territorial waters cut into twenty-one miles of Indian territory.⁴¹ Around the same time, upon discovering that Bangladesh had already finalized contracts with the oil

39. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Circular No. LT-1/3/74, p. 1.

40. Hassan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 222.

41. *Financial Times*, 22 November 1974.

companies, India agreed to discuss the boundary issue with Bangladesh. As a result five rounds of negotiations took place between November 1974 to May 1975 and the parties failed to reach an agreement. It may be noted here that the Awami League government was removed from power through a military coup on August 1975 and could not continue further negotiations. While these negotiations were in progress the exploration work of an American company (Ashland Oil) was stopped by forceful intervention of an Indian naval ship in the area. Franda wrote,

Even while the so-called fifth round of talks looked promising, optimism evaporated when the Indian navy physically prevented an American oil company vessel from exploring on behalf of Bangladesh, a disputed area. ⁴²

The maritime boundary dispute basically involved three aspects. The first two relate to the basis of delimitation while the third involved the newly emerging island i.e. South Talpatty, in the estuary of the Haribhanga river on the border between the two countries. Bangladesh favoured 'equitable' principle while India insisted on 'equidistance' principle as a basis for delimitation of the maritime zones, i.e. Territorial Sea, EEZ and Continental Shelf. According to the equidistance formula any point on the line delimiting boundaries must be at same distance from the nearest points of the appropriate baseline on the coast. The concave nature of Bangladeshi coast implied that the equidistant line dividing the sea zones moved towards the south easterly direction from the edge of the land boundary. As the equidistance formula denied Bangladesh thousands of square miles of the sea that it might expect, it held that a line was to be drawn toward the south

42. Franda, Marcus, Bangladesh: The First Decade, New Delhi, 1982, p. 132.

from the edge of the land boundary. Thus the disputed sea zone lay within the angle formed by the south bound line (as prescribed by Bangladesh) and south east bound line (as prescribed by India). Bangladesh argued its case on the ground that the 'equidistant' formula did not take into account the specific geographic features of the bay and thereby cannot ensure equity.

The application of equidistance method under the UNCLOS III convention is far from satisfactory. One expert in the area wrote,

The 1958 Geneva Conventions are of very limited help to the parties confronting the delimitation issue (Article 12 of the convention on the Territorial sea and the Contiguous Zone ⁴³ and Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf ⁴⁴). During the Geneva Conference, delimitation was discussed in the context of narrow belt of territorial sea or of a continental shelf of 200 meters. It was from this perspective that the equidistance method was applied. But this method is not even remotely applicable to all situations, in particular when greater distances such as the 200 n.m, EEZ or Continental Shelf up to the outer edge of the continental margin are involved. The shortcomings are insignificant near the coast but can become monumental far offshore.⁴⁵

43. UN DOC. A/CONF. 13/L.52.

44. UN DOC. A/CONF 13/L.55.

45. Rahman, Habibur, 'Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries', Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, No.12, December 1984, p. 1305.

Bangladesh cited the 1969 judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf (NSCS) cases⁴⁶ involving West Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. When the North Sea delimitation agreements between the UK and the Netherlands in 1965, between the UK and Denmark in 1966 and, in particular, between the Netherlands and Denmark in 1966 were completed, West Germany emerged with a small share of the continental shelf in relation to its size, economic importance and the length of its coast line. As opposite states, the parties to each delimitation agreement apportioned the continental shelf on the basis of equidistance principle. The differences of view between the parties arose when the Netherlands and Denmark, without Germany's participation, agreed to achieve lateral delimitation of the outer area of the shelf up to the median line with UK on the basis of equidistance. The lateral delimitation as agreed by the Netherlands and Denmark was rejected by Germany. Although Germany was a signatory to the Geneva Convention, it did not ratify it. Therefore, it protested that boundaries based on equidistance principle, as prescribed by the convention could not be forced on it. Germany claimed that it was entitled to a 'just and equitable share' of the continental shelf, in proportion to the length of its coast line or sea frontage. The geographical factor, i.e., Germany's concave coast line and the flanking of the German coast by the Dutch and the Danish coasts, made the results of the equidistant rule inequitable.⁴⁷ Mason wrote,

46. Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands, ICJ, General List, Nos. 51 and 52, February 20, 1969.

47. Mason, C.M, and Birnie P.W., 'Oil and Gas: The International Regime', in Mason, C.M.,(ed.), The Effective Management of Resources: The International Politics of the North Sea, Frances Pinter Ltd. London, 1979, p. 35.

The root of the problem was the concave configuration of the long German coast line, which describes an angle of approximately 100° in the Elbe estuary area; this would mean, if equidistance was applied between each pair of the three neighbouring states, that Germany would be hemmed in (by the intersection of the equidistance lines between Germany and Denmark to the north, and Germany and the Netherlands to the south) to a sector of the North Sea shelf disproportionately small in comparison with the length of her coastline and those of her neighbours.⁴⁸

The parties failed to agree upon a common principle for the delimitation. The matter was then referred through a special agreement in February 1967 to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) so that it can decide on a principle that might be adopted by the disputants as a basis for negotiating the boundaries between them. The court held that the use of equidistant method was not obligatory. This was because West Germany had not ratified the convention or otherwise accepted it and equidistance had not become a customary rule of international law. The court further held that in reaching an agreement the concerned parties were obliged to 'meaningfully' negotiate (i.e., in conformity to the general principles of international law) and that the agreement thus reached should conform 'equitable principles' taking into account all the circumstances of the case.

To achieve equity, the court suggested that, among other things, the geographic configuration of the coast, its special or unusual features and the geological features could be taken into consideration.⁴⁹ The negotiations that

48. *Ibid*, p. 37.

49. *Ibid*, p. 37.

followed the court's decisions enabled West Germany to secure 11900 square kilometers (about 5000 square kilometers from the former Dutch claim and 7000 square kilometers from Denmark) of the continental shelf in the North Sea.

The West German case bears considerable similarity with Bangladesh's circumstances both in terms of the configuration of the coast line i.e. concave and the legal standing i.e. although Bangladesh was a signatory to the UNCLOS III it did not ratify it. Hence, to the Bangladeshi government, the NSCS cases offered strong support for their claiming in the Bay of Bengal.

The second aspect of disagreement between India and Bangladesh concerned the principle for the determination of base line. The base line delineation is a fundamental starting point for the delimitation of maritime zones. It forms the line of reference on the coast (or adjacent to it) from which the outer limits of all the sea zones i.e. Territorial Sea, EEZ and Continental Shelf are measured. According to the 1958 convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone, a 'normal' base line is normally the coast itself; more specifically, the low water line along the coast.

Bangladesh rejected the concept of a baseline developed in terms of low-water mark on the ground that the geographical, geological and geomorphological characteristics of the Bangladeshi coast (and its adjacent bay) do not permit the adoption of such a line. Instead, it subscribed to the logic of the judgment of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case of 1951.⁵⁰ The case provided the basis for the formulation of 'straight' base line⁵¹ which was

50. United Kingdom v. Norway, ICJ, General List, No.5, 18 December, 1951.

51. Independent of low- water marks, a straight base-line is drawn (by joining the appropriate points on the coast) where the coast is deeply indented or cut into or fringed with islands in its immediate vicinity.

later adopted by the 1958 Geneva Convention. In this case the International Court of Justice underscored that geographic realities and the local conditions were to be taken into account in determining base lines. The court gave effect to Norway's claim that the adoption of straight line method was based on considerations related to geographic conditions prevailing on the Norwegian coast and the safeguarding of the vital interests of the inhabitants of the northern most parts of the country.⁵² Most of Bangladesh constitute one integrated river basin with an area of plains. The mighty rivers, that flow from the Himalayas carry down to the Bay of Bengal a colossal discharge of silt. Heavy monsoon rainfall, cyclonic storms, and tidal surges, together with the silt, have contributed to a continuous process of erosion and shoaling both on land and in the river estuary.⁵³

Bangladesh's coast line is concave, unstable, broken and irregular. Added to these is the presence of numerous river deltas and islands in the bay. The coastline shifts constantly as a result of ongoing formations in the river estuary. As Rahman stated: The effects of erosion and shoaling have been monumental:

1. The estuary of Bangladesh is such that no stable water line or landward or seaward demarcation exists,
2. The continual process of alluvion and sedimentation forms mudbanks, and the area is so shallow only small boats can navigate it,

52. Rahman, Habibur, Op.Cit., p. 1304.

53. Ibid., p. 1306.

3. The navigable channels through the aforesaid banks continually change course and require soundings to establish these demarcations.⁵⁴

In the absence of identifiable fixed land points Bangladesh found the low tide mark as inappropriate. Taking into account the peculiar geographical, geological and geomorphological characteristics of its coastal region and the aspects of economic dependency of coastal inhabitants, Bangladesh perceived the depth method (of determining base point) as right and fitting to its local requirements.⁵⁵

Thus, Bangladesh drew its base line at ten fathoms that extended 16 to 30 miles from the coast line.⁵⁶ Table 5.2 shows the base points, fixed by Bangladesh, that were successively joint in straight lines to obtain the base line.

Table 5.2 Depth-method Baselines Drawn by Bangladesh

Baseline Points	Geographical Latitude	Coordinate Longitude
No. 1	21° 12' 00" N	89° 06' 45" E
No. 2	21° 15' 00" N	89° 16' 00" E
No. 3	21° 29' 00" N	89° 36' 00" E
No. 4	21° 21' 00" N	89° 55' 00" E
No. 5	21° 11' 00" N	89° 33' 00" E
No. 6	21° 07' 30" N	91° 06' 00" E
No. 7	21° 10' 00" N	91° 56' 00" E
No. 8	20° 21' 45" N	92° 17' 30" E

Source : Ministry of Foreign Affairs Circular No. LT-1/3/74.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 1310.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 1307

56. *The Bangladesh Observer*, (ed.), 9 May, 1977.


Disregarding Bangladesh's peculiar coastal features, India rejected the Bangladeshi formulation of the base points. Franda wrote,

By early April 1975, Dacca (Dhaka) seemed to have accepted the 'equidistant line', but talks broke down later over identification of 'base points'. International precedents on demarcation of 'base points' vary so widely that they offer little help. ⁵⁷

The third aspect of the dispute on the maritime boundary issue between Bangladesh and India relate to the ownership of a new born island in the river estuaries. The Haribhanga river, as it empties into the bay, splits in several channels. The boundary between the two countries is the mid stream of the main channel of Haribhanga river. The disputed island is in the estuary of the border river Haribhanga and the Bangladesh 's internal river Raimangal. Most probably the island was formed after the cyclone and tidal bore of 1970 and initially rising as a low-tide elevation.⁵⁸ In 1978, its approximate area at low tide was two square miles. Although the island was then uninhabited, fishermen from Bangladeshi mainland were seen during the dry season. The controversy regarding the actual flow of the main stream of Haribhanga river led to overlapping claims of ownership of the island by the two countries. The stream, which Bangladesh claimed to be main channel of the river, passed southward flowing through the west of the island, thus suggesting that the island was Bangladesh's territory. On the contrary, India claimed that the main channel flowed through the east of the

57. Franda, *Op. Cit.*, p. 132.

58. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 18 September, 1981, p. 31090.



island suggesting that the island was Indian territory⁵⁹. Although the dispute was concerned with matters of fact (which could have been ascertained by a joint survey⁶⁰ of the area) rather than of a principle, the negotiations that took place did not yield a settlement. There were wide spread public demonstrations, protests and all out strikes led by opposition parties all over the country against Indian claim of territorial waters, its display of naval power and its rejection of the plan for equitable sharing of the Bay of Bengal.

Bangladesh perceived its stand as vital to its physical and economic survival. As far as physical survival is concerned Bangladesh considered Indian claim as an infringement of Bangladesh's territorial integrity. This is because a realization of the Indian claim would deny Bangladesh its rights over the territories which it considered as belonging to it if equity in delimitation was ensured. The economic significance of the Bay of Bengal to Bangladesh can hardly be overemphasized. The bay and the river estuaries are important sources of various kind of fish. There are extensive fishing grounds in the northern zone of the bay. Fish such as 'Hilsa', a major food of the Bangladeshi people, migrate from the coastal bay to the river estuaries and the inland rivers for breeding. The people in the coastal belt sustain their lives and earn living through fishing. The country depends on its fishery resources for foreign exchange.⁶¹ The bay is the only sea approach through which Bangladesh can have access to the rest of the world. Bangladesh's

59. Rahman, Habibur, 'Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries: Some Pertinent Issues for Bangladesh', in Hassan and Kabir (ed.) Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy, Bangladesh Society for International Studies, 1987, p. 115.

60. Later in 1979, Bangladesh proposed a joint survey and India agreed. However, India subsequently began to frustrate it by adopting delaying tactics. (See Rahman).

61. FAO Trade Yearbook, 1980, p. 331.

international trade and commerce is entirely depended on the sea routes through this channel. The Bay of Bengal is also very rich in seaweed and minerals. The resource potential of the continental shelf in terms of oil and gas deposits is also very high. According to J. Morgan, 'the Bay of Bengal should be ideal places for oil reservoirs if such deposits have been preserved in ancient rocks.' ⁶² Commenting on the delimitation dispute between Bangladesh and India Franda noted: "... the disputed area could potentially have a 10 mile oil bearing belt and is likely to be rich in minerals from centuries old Bengal delta sedimentation (10-16 miles in depth) ..".⁶³ In the absence of any oil and mineral deposits in the Bangladesh's mainland, the Bay of Bengal with its resource potential is extremely important to its. Under the circumstances Bangladesh has to explore and exploit both its mineral and food resources in order to save its millions from starvation and possible extinction.

To sum up in the words of an eminent Bangladeshi political scientist,

the romantic visions of solidarity created in the Bangladesh liberation struggle of 1971 were soon replaced by the widespread fear of domination of Bangladesh by an "expansionist" India. ⁶⁴

On August 15 1975, suddenly and without prior warning, a section of Bangladesh army attacked the home of Mujib and killed him as well as all his family, with the exception of his two daughters who were out of the country at that time.

62. Cited in Shepard, Francis P. Submarine Geology, 3rd edition, New York, 1973,p. 168.

63. Franda, Op.Cit., p.133.

64. Maniruzzaman, Talukdar, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath, Bangladesh Books International Limited, Dhaka, 1980,p. 163.

ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESHI BEHAVIOUR : MUJIB REGIME **(1972-1975)**

The observation of Bangladeshi behaviour 1972-1975 show that the government led by Awami League was, in some instances compliant and in others non-compliant. The compliant behaviour of Bangladesh during this period may be understood in terms of its lack of motivation to defy which emanated from condition 2 and condition 3. Further, condition 1 also explains why the government was compliant in some instances while non-compliant in others. A summary of the instances of non-complaint behaviours their nature (ie., initiative/responsive) along with the condition of motivation to defy (i.e. condition 1) and the NTPRs constituting capability to resist is provided in Table 5.3. Of the two instances, as shown in Table 5.3 Bangladesh took the initiative to defy in one and in the other Bangladesh's non-compliance was in response to some Indian actions, demands etc. Both the instances may be best explained in terms of motivation to defy that

Table 5.3 A Summary of the Instances of NCB during Mujib Regime (1972-1975) along with the Conditions of Motivation to Defy and the NTPRs used to Explain them.

INSTANCES OF NCB		NATURE OF NCB	MOTIVATION TO DEFY (The Conditions)	CAPABILITY TO RESIST (The NTPRs)
1.	Awami League's stand on equitable distribution of Ganges Water.	Responsive	Condition 1 (Physical and Economic survival)	People's power.
2	Awami League's stand on its claim over maritime boundaries.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Physical and Economic survival)	People's power

sprung from condition 1, i.e., issues perceived vital for survival. The underlying issues in these instances were vital for physical and economic survival. Furthermore, given the motivation to defy, people's power as a constituent power resource of capability to resist offers the explanation of Bangladesh's non-compliant behaviours.

Let us explore the conditions, assumptions, contextualities etc. (i.e., policy contingencies) in order to understand the behavioural expressions of Awami League. A closer examination of the data presented in the foregoing section will reveal that during the period from 1972 to 1975, the government in power did not perceive its relations with India as harmful although it disturbed the people of Bangladesh. Mujib's government was largely compliant towards India and maintained close relations with it till the very end of his (Mujib's) regime. However, it is important to note that while the government maintained close relations with India and was largely compliant towards it, the element of euphoria in which it was initially immersed into was subsequently weaned out by its confrontation with the stark realities of survival. Although it remained largely compliant in its relations with India, some of its behavioural expressions did not fit into its usual compliant pattern. The data will show that the instances of League government's non-compliant behaviours tended to cluster towards the end of its regime. Awami League's usual lack of motivation to defy explain its overall compliant stance. However, at a later stage its motivation vacillated. This explains the instances of its governmental non-compliance at this phase relating to the sharing of the Ganges Water and Maritime Boundaries. The motivation to defy emanated from condition 1 offers best explanation for these instances of non-compliance.

Let us first examine Awami League's dispositions that led to its compliant behaviours. The predominant condition that failed to generate motivation to defy and thereby led to Awami League's compliance was its political tilt towards India. According to Condition 3, the nature of political tilt determines whether a ruling party is likely to be motivated to defy. A tilt characterized by a political inclination towards the dominant power is not likely to generate motivation to defy and as such lead to compliance. Conversely, a tilt characterized by a political disinclination towards the dominant power is likely to generate motivation to defy and as such lead to non-compliance. Political inclination was defined as a disposition in which a ruling party subscribe to a political idea, attitude or view that is congenial to dominant power. It sets a friendly environment between the two. Political disinclination, on the other hand, was defined as a disposition in which the subscribed political idea, attitude or view is not congenial to the dominant power. It sets an antagonistic environment between the ruling party of the small state and the dominant power. The following analysis will reveal Awami League's political inclination towards India thereby suggesting a plausible explanation for its compliant stance.

India was the first country to recognize Bangladesh. It may be mentioned here that between April and December 1971, the primary concern of the Indira Government and the Provisional Government of Bangladesh was how to return the Awami League to power in an independent Bangladesh so that both the governments could benefit mutually.

Even before its independence, the Provisional Government of Bangladesh which had existed in Calcutta functioned totally at the pleasure of the Indira Government and was obliged to be guided by Indian advice. In the absence

of Sheikh Mujib,⁶⁵ the Awami League Leadership was weak and submissive which helped India in establishing a complete control over the government in exile. In the course of the nine-month struggle the bond between the Awami League and the Indian government grew further and they developed a deeper understanding. The provisional government's dependence on India at the time was so complete that it had no bargaining position whatsoever. Its only value to India was the promise of a pro-Indian leadership in the future Bangladesh in return for India's favours.

The Awami League government, after independence, set up a parliamentary form of government under a document which was modelled largely on that of India. Mujib clearly admired the Indian constitution which found its expression when in 1972 he declared that Bangladesh would be built on the pillars of nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism. Mujib resembled India in all government matters. As a western observer wrote *in fact Bangladesh was less a reflection of India than a caricature of it*.⁶⁶

Despite the existence of the professional soldiers, Mujib created a new armed organization, called the *Rakkhi Bahini*, which served as a parallel and rival group pledged to Mujib rather than to the nation at large. The strength of this force was estimated at about 25,000 in January 1975. It is widely believed that Mujib created this force at the advice of India who later trained the Rakkhi Bahini. It was also dressed in the olive green battle dress of the Indian army.

65. On 25 March 1971, Mujib was arrested from his residence by the Pakistan Army and was subsequently flown to Pakistan (West Pakistan). He was detained in Pakistani jail for the entire period of the liberation war of Bangladesh.

66. Oren, Stephen, 'After the Bangladesh Coups', *The World Today*, January, 1976, p. 18.

All these bear a clear indication that the Awami League leadership subscribed to the political ideology of their Indian mentors. It not only adopted the broader political ideology held by their Indian gurus, they also subscribed to various Indian policies in the conduct of state affairs. It aligned itself with the Indo-Soviet bloc and India's friends became Bangladesh's friends as well. In addition the Awami League subscribed to the Indian view that Bangladesh did not require strong defence forces and that the Bangladeshi economy and the economies of the Indian states adjacent to Bangladesh were complementary.

Apart from inclination in terms of political ideology and views, the Awami League had a congenial attitudinal tilt towards India. Since India was instrumental in the creation of Bangladesh, Mujib's Awami League government had to content itself with an Indian presence. After its independence the attitude of the decision makers of Bangladesh towards India was one of profound gratitude. They owed a personal debt to the Indian Government for sustenance during the nine months of liberation war. They felt that the minimum Bangladesh could do in return for Indian moral and material support in the liberation war was to offer the continued and whole hearted friendship of Bangladesh. These sentiments were also present in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. While on his way back from Pakistani prison via London India offered its Air India Jet to carry him home to Bangladesh. But Mujib refused. As has been reported, Mujib said that he owed too much to India and therefore it was advisable to strive for some balance. He took a British Air Force Comet.⁶⁷

67. Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 January, 1972.

Mujib also enjoyed a personal rapport with Indira Gandhi. Their personal relations with each other may be described as most cordial and encouraging. While coming back home from the Pakistani prison, he had a brief stop over at Delhi to thank Indira Gandhi personally. There Mujib described the 'people of India' as the 'best friend of his country' and Mrs. Gandhi, as 'not only a leader of men, but also of mankind'.⁶⁸ Also during his first official visit to India in February 1972, Mujib described 'the friendship between India and Bangladesh as everlasting' and that 'no power on earth will be able to make any crack in this friendship'⁶⁹. He could not overcome his personal dilemma over India. According to one of his Private Secretaries:

*Sheikh Sahib was acutely aware of Mrs. Gandhi's all-out help for Bangladesh in those dark days. He would often recall how Mrs. Gandhi had requested many world leaders to intercede on his behalf to save him from being hanged by Yahya Khan [when Mujib was a prisoner] in Pakistan.*⁷⁰

The news of Mujib's assassination was received in the Indian political system with great shock and dismay. His tragic fall from power was indeed a political loss for India not only in the sphere of its foreign relation in Asia but also because India knew very well that in the prevailing state of affairs in Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujib was the last resort for India to retain its hold, to whatever extent, on Bangladesh. At a memorial meeting in New Delhi, after Mujib's assassination on 25 August, Mrs. Gandhi described him, "as a great

68. Bangladesh Documents, Vol.1, No.1, Dhaka: External Publicity Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972, p. 2.

69. Bangabandhu Speaks: A Collection of Speeches and Statements made by Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, Dhaka: External Publicity Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 33.

70. Quoted from Hassan, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Australian National University, Op. Cit. p. 261.

national leader and statesman whom people in India held in deep respect and affection."⁷¹

Thus to the Awami League government the Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Peace, did not constitute a threat to Bangladesh's survival physically, economically or politically. Similarly, the trade treaty was also not regarded as a threat to Bangladesh's economy because it believed that Bangladesh and its adjacent Indian economies were complimentary therefore Bangladesh could benefit from the treaty. These issues were not perceived by the Awami league as vital and as such was not regarded to be threatening to the survival of Bangladesh.

Mujib also lacked ambition, a condition that is likely to generate the motivation to defy. It appears that all his dreams and aspirations were realized with the creation of Bangladesh. His life long struggle was to set Bangladesh free from the exploitation of the Pakistani regime. This struggle culminated in the liberation war and the dream was realized on the achievement of independence. The post independence period of his life was as if a time for him to dwell in his 'dream come true' world. Mujib was no longer an ordinary party worker of his early career nor was he a political agitator of the mid sixties. To millions of Bangladeshis (including of course his party followers) he transcended the limits of his ordinariness and became one of those great leaders that time had ever produced. The nation called him 'Banga Bandhu' (Friend of Bengal) and made him the Father of the Nation. Immediately after independence, he achieved the stature of a mythical figure and a legendary character. Although his image was stained by the end of his regime, his actions and words were initially regarded as

71. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975,p. 27383.

somewhat 'divine'. People obeyed him because it was him who said or did something. At this state of saturation there was nothing for him to seek; his ambition was realized; Bangladesh was freed from the exploitation of Pakistan. He became what he wanted to become-a leader of a nation free from the clutches of the Pakistani rulers. Actually his past image carried him through but not for long. In the new circumstances i.e., after independence he lacked direction. This was reflected in the policies he adopted. For example, socialism was incorporated as a state principle in the constitution of Bangladesh but the measures taken to implement socialism was half hearted. The industries which were abandoned by the Pakistani owners were to be taken care of. So the government took the charge by nationalizing them. Nationalization was labeled as a socialistic measure, while in fact, all social, political and economic structures of pre-independence Bangladeshi society (which operated within a framework of capitalism) were retained. Market mechanism operated and land reforms in line with socialistic principles did not take place. The lack of direction also indicate Mujib's lack of ambition.

The foregoing analysis point out that Awami League was politically inclined towards India and hence, did not perceive the issues as jeopardizing Bangladesh's survival. The leadership also lacked ambition. These conditions failed to generate motivation to defy help explain Awami League Governments' usual compliant stand towards India.

Having said that, the logical question that surfaces in mind is that how can the failure to reach agreement in matters of water sharing and maritime boundary delimitation be explained. If Bangladesh Government was compliant it would have swallowed whatever India had placed on the negotiating table and the agreements could have been concluded. But as far

as the data suggest that was not the case. It may be recalled here from the preceding section that these negotiations took place between 1974-1975. The agreements had not been reached because the Awami League government was not entirely compliant at these phase. By this time there were certain changes in the policy contingencies. The post independence euphoria evaporated considerably. The earlier agreements (particularly trade) with India just after independence began taking their tolls on the economy of Bangladesh increasing the magnitude of people's suffering. The government came under intense public pressure increasingly due to anti-Indian feeling. The government started to take on board some perceptions that people considered vital for Bangladesh's survival. Once commenting on the North Sea Continental Shelf case, Mason wrote,

There is said to have been a strong undercurrent of anti-German public opinion in Denmark and the Netherlands which made it impossible for the Danish and Dutch governments to do anything which could have been construed as an unjustified concession to Germany.⁷²

Similarly, the Awami League Government was obliged not to ignore people's perception entirely in its handling of issues such as water sharing and maritime boundary delimitation. For Awami League this was a dilemma. On the one hand it was inclined towards its ally, and on the other it began to realize the issues as vital for survival. As a matter of fact, its motivation to defy vacillated between political inclination and perception of vitalness making it at times compliant and at others non-compliant.

72. Birnie and Mason, Op. Cit., p. 24

Mujib's behavioural expressions bear an interesting similarity with those of the European governments behaviours demonstrated in their relations with the EEC.⁷³ These European governments were formally committed to comply to EEC regulations just as Mujib was inclined towards India. European governments' non-compliance emanated from their population's perceptions of violation of vital interests just as Mujib's non-compliance generated from people's perception of violation of their vital interests. First let us consider the issue of water sharing.

The help and assistance extended by India in the Liberation struggle of Bangladesh, notwithstanding in pursuance of its own political interests, became a liability for the decision-makers of Bangladesh in their handling of the Ganges issue. The Awami League government's political inclination towards India is clearly evident in its handling of the water problem with India. The Ad hoc Agreement on the Ganges in 1975 is an example. Without settling the more urgent question of how to share the existing dry season flow of the river, the League government conceded to the operation of the barrage. Bangladesh Observer stated:

*The agreement will not disturb the discussions regarding the allocation of fair weather flows of the Ganges during the lean months as was envisaged in the Prime Minister's declaration of May 1974..*⁷⁴

But as one authority pointed out "in that agreement, Bangladesh lost what it had gained in previous agreements, that India should not take a unilateral

73. Puchala, D., 'Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonization in the European Communities', World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1975, p. 496-520.

74. Bangladesh Observer, 19 April, 1975.

decision to commission the Barrage. The new Agreement apparently ensured the lion's share for Bangladesh, but it was only for 41 days. After that India withdrew water from the river to the fullest capacity of the feeder canal for as many days as it needed. It was not at all a solution rather a stage was set for further complications to develop."⁷⁵

Bangladesh Awami League was long blamed for making such a flawed contract with India. It surrendered to India's pressure without exploiting its good terms with India to make it agree to some kind of sharing arrangement before commissioning the barrage. As Ben Crow in his unpublished dissertation observes, *There was a long window in Indo-Bangladesh relations between 1972 and 1974/75, but there was little progress in the dispute.*⁷⁶ A spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Bangladesh raised a resentful voice against Dr. Kamal Hossain's (who was then the foreign minister of Bangladesh) claim of credit for winning 44,000 cusecs of the Ganga and said,

*".....it has been necessary to put the records straight that on the 18th April 1975, for the first time, Bangladesh surrendered institutionally its legal and inalienable to the entire flows of the lower reaches of the Ganga. This has bound the hands of the subsequent negotiators in effectively negotiating the sharing of water of the Ganga."*⁷⁷

75. Khurshida Begum, Op. Cit. p. 112.

76. Crow, B., 'Politics and Technology of Sharing the Ganges', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1980.

77. The Bangladesh Observer, 23 August, 1984.

Despite the World Bank's readiness to assist the two countries in augmentation of the Ganges water in whatever manner possible, Mujib acquiesced in the Indian desire to keep third parties uninvolved in bilateral problems.

However, Mujib's government also perceived the water issue as vital as it threatened Bangladesh's survival physically and economically. His government was aware of the dangers to Bangladesh's agriculture from the decrease in water supply during the dry season although it stated that it was a 'technical' problem. It may be said that despite having an inclination towards India, the awareness of vitalness led it to send protest note to New Delhi for its breach of the contract. India unilaterally withdrew water from the river after the interim agreement had expired. On the question of augmentation, although Bangladesh acceded to India to keep third parties uninvolved, it did turn down Indian proposal for building link canal. Because the link canal proposal (which will be discussed in detail in the subsequent phase) was considered detrimental to Bangladesh's interests. Besides, Awami League also displayed a low level of enthusiasm at the inauguration of the Farakka project on the 21 May 1975 by cancelling the visit of Mujib's Water Resources Minister, Abdur Rab Serneabat who was invited to be present on that occasion.⁷⁸ Finally, the failure to reach long term agreement was indicative of Bangladesh's insistence of an equitable share of water which Bangladesh perceived as vital to its survival.

A similar dilemma may also be observed in the negotiations regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries. In this case too the Awami League maintained its disposition of inclination, at the same time it also considered

78. Franda, M., 'Indo-Bangladesh Relations', American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, XIX, 16 September, 1975.

the issues as vital. Its insistence of equitable principle and the 10 fathom base-line indicate the perception of vitalness. However, at a later stage, it acceded the Indian demand for delimitation on the basis of equidistance principle. It may be inferred that such acceptance resulted from its disposition of inclination.

The foregoing analysis illustrate that in the absence of conditions of motivation to defy such as disinclination of the ruling party or ambition on the part of the leadership, the perception of vitalness offers the best explanation for whatever non-compliant behaviour Awami League government demonstrated.

It will be recalled from the earlier discussions that for a state to be non-compliant, in addition to the motivation to defy, it must have the capability to resist. According to our contextual framework, non-tangible power resources such as leadership strength, external political support, geopolitical leverage and people's power constitute the capability to resist. According to the framework, capability to resist is strong non-compliance is likely to follow but when this capability is weak or non-existent non-compliance is not likely to follow. In these instances NTPRs such as leadership strength, external political support and geo political leverage did not appear to have contributed towards Awami League 's non-compliance. Sheikh Mujib was immersed with profound gratitude towards India for its help in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh and also for her efforts to free him from the Pakistani jail. His mystique as a great leader certainly suffered by his subordination to India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. It was Mujib's dependence on India that prevented him from capitalising on his extensive popularity. Therefore, the elements of assertiveness in his personality was missing when it involved India. Bangladesh during Mujib's period, was also

entirely Indo-centric, hence, Awami League failed to secure political support from the world at large. Finally, unlike Nepal, Bangladesh does not possess any leverage arising out of its geographic location. The only plausible source of non-tangible power was its people's pressure. It was mentioned before that there were strong anti-Indian feeling among the members of public on the sharing of the Ganges Water and Maritime Boundary issues. It may be interpreted that Awami League's defiance on these issues have been backed by public pressure. Hence, people's power (constituting capability to resist) seems to have worked with the perception of vitalness of issues (a condition generating motivatio to defy) to yield the governmental non-compliance in this phase.

ZIA REGIME (1975-1981)

The period from 15 August to 7 November 1975 was one of political instability and uncertainty in Bangladesh. After Mujib's assassination Martial law was declared and the new government was formed under Mushtaque Ahmed. On 3 November 1975, an abortive counter coup was staged by Brigadier Khaled Mushharaf, who was believed to be an Indian protégé. He was killed in the ensuing battle which was followed by a revolutionary mutiny. After a series of rebellions, power passed to Major General Ziaur Rahman ⁷⁹on 7 November 1975. Bangladesh's parliament

79. Ziaur Rahman was a major in the East Bengal Regiment. On March 27, 1971, Zia made the announcement of the independence of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong. During the Liberation War he formed the 'Z' forces. After independence he was supposed to be the army Chief of Staff, but Mujibur Rahman appointed Major General K. Shafiullah who was junior to Zia instead to that post. Marcus Franda points out that the main reason for not appointing Zia to the post was that on March 27 1971, Zia declared himself the President of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong. Zia's ambitious nature was not liked by Mujib

was abolished and no political parties were permitted to operate in the immediate aftermath of the counter coup. It was not until Zia established his authority did Bangladesh get any scope to interact with the outside world.

The change was definitely not pleasant for India, who looked on all these events in Bangladesh with great uneasiness. As Times of India quoted an Indian foreign ministry spokesman,

India had been watching with considerable anxiety the complicated situation which has developed in Bangladesh ... the developments in Bangladesh are its domestic affairs but India cannot remain indifferent and unconcerned about developments taking place there.⁸⁰

Colin Legum of The Observer (London) reported that since the coup that killed Mujib there were Indian military movements along the Bangladesh border.⁸¹

In general, relations with India took a turn for the worse with Mujib's death, but genuine tensions did not emerge until the Zia regime began to consolidate its power. India started providing asylum to the supporters of Sheikh Mujib including Kader Siddiqui who fled to India immediately after the August coup of 1975. India also opened camps along the border and trained and armed the Bangladeshi dissidents for guerilla warfare and subversion. These dissidents with Indian training began to launch armed raids on border post with the support of the Indian Border Security Force.⁸²

80. Times of India, 8 November 1975.

81. Cited in Chowdhury, Iftakhar Ahmed, Bangladesh's External Relations: The Strategy of a Small Power in a Subsystem, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Australian National University, 1980.

82. Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, Op.Cit., p. 201.

There were reports of skirmishes between Indian and Bangladeshi forces on their mutual frontier.

In the meantime, in order to further bolster his authority, Zia announced an amendment to the Bangladesh constitution, which shifted the country from its status as a secular nation to that describing it as an Islamic state. He declared, *Bangladesh is keen to strengthen relations with the Muslim countries of the world with which it has religious, historical and cultural ties.* The deterioration in Indo-Bangladesh relation was also advanced by the speed with which Pakistan moved to recognize the Zia government. Pakistan not only recognized the new government but also urged the other Muslim countries to do so. Islam was raised as a force drawing Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Muslim countries together. There were exchange of ambassadors between Bangladesh and Pakistan and emphasis was placed on maximizing economic cooperation without minimizing political independence. In May 1976, they signed a three year trade agreement. Zia then moved to develop close ties with the Arab Muslim world and received recognition and substantial economic assistance. Several economic and goodwill delegations were exchanged with the Muslim countries and a number of agreements were signed.

The new opening to Pakistan also brought the Chinese into Bangladesh. On 31 August, 1975 China recognized Bangladesh. A Chinese diplomatic mission was opened in Dhaka on 23 January 1976 and the Bangladeshi mission in Beijing operated on 19 January the same year well in advance of the restoration of Sino-Indian diplomatic relations. India was disturbed by the thought of a hostile Bangladesh, which in league with China and Pakistan, might exploit conditions in India's turbulent northeast quadrant. China and Bangladesh also signed a two year trade and payment agreement

envisaging a greater volume of imports and exports between the countries. China also sent a technical delegation to Bangladesh to assist it with small irrigation projects.

India was clearly unhappy with the developments in Bangladesh. In April 1976, there were renewed hostilities on the Indo-Bangladesh border. One of these incidents was on April 19, in Meghalaya in which the Director General of the Indian Border Security Force was seriously injured⁸³.

At the same time Bangladesh reopened the Farakka Barrage problem. Mujib and Indira Gandhi had arrived at a tentative agreement over the question of how to manage the distribution of the Ganges waters in 1974, but India violated it, thus further antagonizing Bangladesh. With Mujib gone and the anti-Indian sentiment rising, the issue was not only revived but it became a *cause celebre*. After 1975, the Farakka Barrage dispute became more than simply a test of Indo-Bangladeshi relations.

In November 1975, Bangladesh charged that India was again diverting water at Farakka and that, because of abnormally low water levels in 1975, Bangladesh faced serious drought, navigation and salinity problems. Far Eastern Economic Review commented that India's water diversion, coupled with unusually dry conditions in 1975, created enormous difficulties for parts of Bangladesh fed by the Ganges.⁸⁴ With the dry season approaching, decision was taken in December 1975 by the new government to send a 'note of protest' to India. And actually a series of strong protests were sent to India; one on January 15, 1976 and the second on 18 February 1976.⁸⁵ The

83. Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May, 1976, p. 9.

84. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 April, 1976, p. 35.

85. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15 October, 1976.

letter written by B. M. Abbas, President's adviser on flood control, irrigation and power stated that 'the low water levels of the Ganges in Bangladesh has been affecting river condition and causing adverse consequences in Bangladesh'.⁸⁶

But India outrightly denied the charge of unilateral withdrawal from the river after the scheduled period and said, "The April 1975 agreement was limited to the lean season of the same year There was, therefore, no question of agreeing on the withdrawal of water after the lean months which is a period of plenty and floods "

Bangladesh pointed out that "India continued with unabated unilateral withdrawal during March, April, May- a period considered by itself as 'lean' and requiring equitable apportionment ... without the consent of Bangladesh in complete disregard of its rights on the waters of the Ganges and without disclosing the quantum of such withdrawal".⁸⁷ A Delhi spokesman expressed "astonishment at the extraordinary and wholly unjustified demand that any withdrawal during any part of the year at Farakka or even further upstream, should be subject to prior approval of the Government of Bangladesh."⁸⁸

Rear Admiral M. H. Khan, Chief of the Bangladesh Navy and principal spokesman on the Ganges issue said,

if India did not take an intransigent attitude the question could be settled amicably. If almost one-third of Europe had no problem with the

86. Abbas, Op. Cit. p. 47.

87. Deadlock on the Ganges, Government of Bangladesh, p. 3.

88. The Times, 19 February, 1976.

*Danube, why should friendly countries like India and Bangladesh have any with the water of the Ganges? It was accepted international practice that an upper riparian should consult the lower riparian on intended action to interfere with the flow of water in the river.*⁸⁹

The impact of withdrawal of Ganges water in the different sectors of public economy compelled people of Bangladesh in almost all walks of life and from all professions to protest against India for its high-handed dealing with the water issue. It remained no longer confined to concerned bureaucrats' files or records or in the reports of the newspapers. Complaints and protests were lodged. Various seminars were held in the country and Farakka protest committee was formed. The Bangladesh Supreme Court Bar Association followed by protests from different association of lawyers at divisional and district level all over the country expressed their concern at India's unilateral and arbitrary withdrawal of water from the Ganges.⁹⁰ Teachers of Rajshahi University, Mymensingh agricultural University, Jahangir Nagar University and various other teacher's association expressed their anxiety and concern over the issue.⁹¹ and the students of Dhaka University as well as other Universities abstained from their classes in protest.⁹² Dhaka University Teacher's Association called upon the government to raise the issue in the international forums including the UN.⁹³ Leaders of various political parties also called upon the Government to take up the issue at the UN and before the Third World Forum to mobilize world opinion against India's violation of

89. Far Eastern Economic Review, Op. Cit., p. 35.

90. The Bangladesh Observer, 28 February, 1976.

91. The Bangladesh Observer, 28 March, 1976.

92. The Bangladesh Observer, 11 April, 1976.

93. The Bangladesh Observer, 13 March, 1976.

international norms and bilateral agreements.⁹⁴ The operation of the Farakka Barrage was termed as "an act of aggression on the economic sovereignty of Bangladesh".⁹⁵

One such agitation was initiated by the veteran politician of Bangladesh, Maulana Bhashani on May 16, 1976. He organised what has been described as the longest procession in living memory in the sub continent. The procession was 8 km long and comprised nearly 500,000 people.⁹⁶ It was a silent non-violent march to demonstrate people's demand for the rightful share of the Ganges. The long march halted at the border, approximately 25 miles from where the Ganges divide itself. According to Maulana, his intention was not to demolish the million dollar project of India but to launch public agitation for Bangladesh's rightful share.⁹⁷

When this agitation was building up, Indian premier Indira Gandhi wrote a letter to the Maulana hinting that the long march would be provocative. Bhashani in his reply pointed out that it was very much a question of survival for about 35 million people in the northern districts of the state and also reminded her that the tactic he was using was one he had learned from her forefathers and Mahatma Gandhi. He also invited her to visit Bangladesh and to see for herself the effects of diversion. Maulana Bhashani also sent telegrams to Gerald Ford, Kurt Waldheim, Mao and Kosygin stating Bangladesh's grievances against India.

94. The Bangladesh Observer, 8 March, 1976.

95. New York Times, 6 October, 1976.

96. New York Times, 17 May, 1976; Financial Times 18 May, 1976.

97. Holiday, 16 May, 1976.

Finding the attitude of India uncompromising, the Zia regime took the vital Farakka issue before multilateral forums such as the Islamic conference, the Commonwealth summit and, the United Nations to intervene diplomatically on Bangladesh's behalf. In the 7th Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference which took place in Istanbul, Turkey expressed its deep concern over the problem. At the end of the meeting on the 15th of May 1976, the Joint Communiqué referred to the economic suffering and hardship of Bangladesh caused by the withdrawal of water by India.⁹⁸

Before raising the issue to the United Nations, one final round of talks was held. Rear admiral M. H. Khan, led the Bangladesh delegation to New Delhi in September but failed to reach any agreement because of divergence of opinion. Bangladesh wanted augmentation to take place within the Ganges basin. India rejected the idea and also refused to accept that Bangladesh had a right to veto upstream withdrawals. Besides, they also differed over the length of the dry season.⁹⁹ Finding it hard to negotiate bilaterally with India, Bangladesh put the question of India's unauthorized water diversion before the September 1976 session of the UN General Assembly. "India cannot unilaterally withdraw waters from common rivers without due regard to the consequences downstream",¹⁰⁰ Bangladesh declared in the United Nations General Assembly. Over the protests of India and Soviet Union, Bangladesh did manage to add the dispute to the Special Political Committee's agenda. However, Bangladesh's efforts failed because of not getting sufficient support for its resolution calling on the IBRD and the Secretary General to associate themselves with the negotiations and reluctantly adhered to a

98. Khan, Z. A, (ed.) Basic Documents on the Farakka Conspiracy, Dacca, 1976.p. 158.

99. Holiday, 12 September, 1976.

100. New York Times,Op. Cit.

consensus statement announcing the two parties' decision to meet "urgently" in Dhaka because of the approach of another dry season.

After returning from the United Nations, talks were resumed between the two countries. The first round of talk took place in December 1976 in Dhaka with Jagjivan Ram leading the Indian team and Admiral Khan leading Bangladesh team. This meeting was adjourned because India merely repeated its earlier position that it would divert water at least 40,000 cusecs of the total Ganges water flow of 52,000-55,000 cusecs available during the dry season. The talk was resumed in January 1977 in Dhaka. Ram suggested that 50% of the total dry-season flow of the Ganges at Farakka was the most India could part with for Bangladesh. Indian proposal was not acceptable to Bangladesh because in April alone -one of the driest months- Bangladesh needs 49,000 cusecs of Ganges water just for irrigation purpose. Indian proposal "was just an attempt to hoodwink the people by rewording the old argument." Upon this Jagjivan Ram adjourned the meeting and suggested that the next meeting be held in Delhi so that it would be easier for him to talk to the Prime Minister. A month later i.e. in February, M. H. Khan led a 12-member delegation to Delhi. Yet no agreement could be reached. As Far Eastern Economic Review reports,

Before the Bangladesh delegation arrived in New Delhi for talks on sharing the Ganges water, India Premier Indira Gandhi had announced a general election. As the Bangladeshis reached Delhi she was heading for the Kumbha Mela (fair) about 500 miles away. On arrival, the delegation's leader, Navy Chief Rear Admiral M. H. Khan, met the then Agriculture Minister Jagjivan Ram in what was described as the opening of formal talks. He was told that the Indians had nothing new to offer. Khan was

flabbergasted. "What was the sense of asking us to come to Delhi then?" he asked Ram. The veteran Indian politician said he was sorry he could not reconsider the Indian position as the Premier was away from Delhi. The Bangladesh delegation had little left to do except sight seeing.

Another meeting was scheduled for the following morning, but it was cancelled unceremoniously 10 minutes before the Bangladesh delegation was due to leave the hotel for the talks. An assistant protocol officer of India's External Affairs Ministry was considered sufficiently competent to inform Khan of the cancellation. Before the Bangladesh team left for home, Ram and the head of India's Policy Planning Division, G. Parthasarathy, called on Admiral Khan to tell him 'off the record' that the Indian government could not initiate any new move on its own, and could not consider any proposal presented by Bangladesh because "such a move may have serious adverse effects on the Congress Party's election chances," especially in West Bengal.¹⁰¹

Before returning home, Khan said at Calcutta's Dum Dum airport that,

the talks had finally foundered on the rocks of Indian intransigence. It failed because of India's failure to keep pace with Bangladesh and her consistent refusal to appreciate Bangladesh's immediate problems of lack of water during the dry season.¹⁰²

101. Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 March, 1977.

102. Ibid.

In the meantime Zia paid an official visit to Peking in January 1977 where he received renewed declarations of Chinese support for Bangladesh and for the Bangladesh government's stand on Farakka. This was the first high level contact between Bangladesh and China since Bangladesh gained its independence in 1971. Bangladesh and China signed a technical cooperation agreement and an agreement to increase trade.

But India-Bangladesh relations continued to deteriorate. Deliberations on the Farakka Barrage dispute were also at an impasse. In March 1977, the internal power structure in India underwent some changes because of the election in which the Congress government was ousted. The Janata Party of India won the election.

Jagjivan Ram with the new portfolio (he became the defence minister of the Janata Government rather than the Agriculture minister of the Congress government) led the Indian delegation to Dhaka on 15 April 1977.¹⁰³ On 18 April 1977, it was declared,

*An understanding has been reached (on Farakka), details of which will be worked out at a meeting of the officials of the two governments to be held in New Delhi as soon as possible.*¹⁰⁴

In May 1977, a Bangladesh delegation led by B. M. Abbas went to Delhi. The issue of dry season flow of the Ganges was raised by Bangladesh in the discussion with the Indian team led by Jagat Mehta. The meeting was not fruitful because of the insistence of each party on its proposal of increasing the flow.

103. Hindu, 15 April, 1977.

104. The Bangladesh Times, 19 April, 1977.

In June 1977, Morarji Desai, the new Indian Prime Minister and Ziaur Rahman met for the first time at the Commonwealth Conference in London. On June 10, 1977 both leaders announced that progress had been made on all their outstanding differences. India promised to police its border and prevent Indian territory from being used as a sanctuary for guerrillas operating against the Bangladesh government.¹⁰⁵ Previously, when the Bangladesh delegation led by Admiral M. H. Khan had raised the issue of border problem with Indira Gandhi in a discussion, instead of taking a positive attitude she answered that she did not believe this. She said problems could be solved if there was desire on the part of Bangladesh. She pointed out Bangladesh's attempt to raise the water issue in the UN agenda as an unfriendly act. The Admiral asked, What is a friendly act? And after a short while the Bangladesh delegation took leave.

More discussions were held during the months of August and September 1977. Jagat Mehta went to Bangladesh and held talks with B. M. Abbas. According to the official statement, differences between the two sides were 'narrowed down.' In September, Desai sent a letter to Zia stressing the need for better understanding to settle the Farakka dispute.¹⁰⁶ Finally, in the early morning of 30 September 1977, an agreement was initialled between the two countries which was signed on November 5, 1977, by M. H. Khan and S. S. Barnala, the new Indian Minister of Agriculture.¹⁰⁷

The agreement was initially for a period of five year which could be extended by mutual understanding until a new arrangement was developed. Under

105. Hindu, 11 June, 1977.

106. Hindu, 22 September, 1977.

107. Financial Times, 7 & 8 November, 1977 and Economist (London), 8 November, 1977.

the provisions of the agreement Bangladesh was guaranteed an even flow of Ganges water during the dry months. Article II of the agreement defined the dry season from 1st January to 31st May every year when the sharing would be "based on 75 percent availability calculated from the recorded flows of the Ganga at Farakka from 1948 to 1973." Article II also guaranteed,


Provided further that if during a particular 10-day period, the Ganga flows at Farakka come down to such a level that the share of Bangladesh is lower than 10% of the value shown in column 4, the release of waters to Bangladesh during that 10-day period shall not fall below 80 percent of the value shown in column 4.


In Bangladesh there was quiet jubilation. Although the Ganges issue is never of such significance at the public level in India as it is in Bangladesh, the Desai government faced criticism from the Indian press as well as from some sections of the public in West Bengal.¹⁰⁸ The members of the Congress Party (then an opposition party in the Indian political system) described the agreement in the Rajya Sabha as "sell out" of Indian interest.¹⁰⁹

In January 1978, the fourteenth meeting of the Joint River Commission decided that the two parties should exchange their proposals for the long term solution for the augmentation of the dry season flows of the Ganges. Earlier, India had proposed building a canal to link the Brahmaputra River with the Ganges. But the canal would have both its headworks and its tail in India, while the route of the canal would take some 60 miles of Bangladeshi territory. With the barrages at both ends of the link canal lying in India, Bangladesh would have relatively little control over the canal's use. Should

108. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 8 October, 1977.

109. The Statesman, 27 July, 1977.





India decide to divert increasingly more water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges to meet its own demands, northern and central Bangladesh, which mostly depend on the Brahmaputra waters, would face the same problems as the southwest areas of Bangladesh were now facing because of Farakka Barrage. Once again Bangladesh would be in the mercy of India. The construction of the canal across northwest Bangladesh would also mean the loss of thousands of hectares of valuable agricultural land. With problems of over population and insufficient food grains already at crisis points, Bangladesh could not afford to lose any irrigable lands. Also Bangladesh maintains that it cannot resettle the population that would be displaced.

Related to the storage dam problem is the danger Bangladesh faces from annual flooding. So it has countered with a plan that includes Nepal and provides for storage dams in Nepal to regulate the flow of the northern tributaries of the Ganges. Bangladesh has refused to examine the link canal proposal until the alternative of storage reservoirs has been exhausted, and refuses to consider the second alternative exhausted until Nepal has been formally admitted to the Joint River Commission (JRC). Since, Nepal is situated within the Ganges Basin and its rivers also contribute most of the Ganges' dry season flow, Bangladesh insists that Nepal must also be made a party to the negotiation of augmentation. As far as Nepal is concerned it is also inclined to cooperate in the water resource development of the region. King Birendra of Nepal in an interview with the *Far Eastern Economic Review* said,

Nepal has made its stand clear, it is prepared to examine the development of its water-resource potential in a way which would benefit both India and Bangladesh. If both the countries make a joint proposal, my government would look into such a proposal, it

*goes without saying, from the prime consideration of Nepal's overall national interest.*¹¹⁰

As reported by the *Rising Nepal*, Nepal also favours the proposal of Bangladesh and disapproves the Ganga-Brahmaputra link canal proposal which goes against its interests too.

*... it is conceivable that the Bangla option may be preferred, if its ecological and other costs are not unaffordably high. Related also could be the future of the ambitious Karnali project, if the Brahmaputra-Ganga link canal idea is accepted, Nepal's negotiation position vis-a-vis India could weaken. Similarly, her prospect for navigational facilities could also possibly be affected.*¹¹¹

But India resists drawing Nepal into the discussions for fear that Dhaka and Kathmandu will join hands as an alliance against it and undercut the freedom that it enjoys in separate bilateral relations with its neighbours. Verghese states that India apprehends that multilateralism will slow down progress and Bangladesh and Nepal will be encouraged to raise their demands at India's cost by international forces.¹¹² Bangladesh wants to have a sort of 1960s programme that provided a solution to the waters issue in the Indus basin between India and Pakistan in the western side of the sub-continent.

110. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 March, 1983.

111. *Rising Nepal*, 6 January, 1983.

112. B.G.Verghese, *Waters of Hope*, Oxford University Press, 1990.

Zia also tried to broaden relations with other countries in the area. Zia was the only South Asian head of states to visit each of the other countries completing his journeys in 1977 with visits to Nepal, India and Pakistan. Earlier he had been to Sri Lanka also. Under Zia, Bangladesh developed close ties with the Arab Muslim world and received recognition and substantial economic assistance as a result. Bangladesh an active and respected participant in international forum, has been a member of the Security Council and was present at the Cancun summit in Mexico. Another prop in Bangladesh's pursuit to chart greater independence is its active role in international organisations and its enthusiastic support for South Asian Regional Cooperation of which it was the original proponent.

Zia was assassinated in Chittagong on May 30, 1981, by a group of disgruntled army officers. After his assassination, Vice President Abdus Sattar became Acting President until an election was held. He served less than a year. On March 24, 1982, General Ershad led a bloodless coup that displaced President Sattar and began a new period of martial law with Ershad as the chief martial law administrator. He later assumed presidency on December 11, 1983.

ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESHI BEHAVIOUR : ZIA REGIME (1975-1981)

During Zia regime (between 1975 and 1981) one gets a picture that Bangladesh increasingly tried to project a separate identity from India. His government did not blindly follow his predecessors' footsteps and hence pursued a foreign policy which was not overall characterised by compliance to India. Zia himself is reported to have claimed that *the most significant development in the field of foreign policy of Bangladesh was that Bangladesh was*

*now in a position to make its own decisions and formulate its own independent policy to serve its national interests.*¹¹³

Although condition 3 (i.e. disinclination of the ruling party) provides clues in some instances as to why Bangladesh was defiant, condition 1 (i.e. vitalness of issues) offers better explanation for motivation to defy in the instances of NCBs demonstrated by Bangladesh during Zia regime (1975-1981).

Table 5.4 summarizes the instances of NCBs demonstrated during this phase, their nature, along with the condition of motivation to defy and the NTPRs. Table 5.4 suggests that in 6 out of 8 instances Bangladesh took the initiative to be defiant while in the remaining 2 instances its defiance was in response to some measures taken or demands made by India. It may be observed from the table 5.4 that except one instance, (in case where condition 2 offers better explanation) all the instances of NCBs may best be understood with the help of condition 1. Table 5.4 further reveals that in all the instances (which condition 1 explains) economic survival was at stake and in 6 instances physical survival was at stake. Furthermore, as a power resource constituting capability to resist, leadership strength explains all the instances, people's power explains 4 instances and external political support explains 2 instances. In 5 instances more than one factor of capability were involved in demonstrating NCB.

The non-compliant behaviour which condition 1 best explains include the ones related to sharing of Ganges Water, amendment of the constitution and the establishment of relations with Pakistan and China. Condition 2 i.e.,

113. Quoted in Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, Op. Cit., p. 208.

Table 5.4 A Summary of the Instances of NCB during Zia Regime (1975-1981) along with the Conditions of Motivation to Defy and the NTPRs used to Explain them.

INSTANCES OF NCB	NATURE OF NCB	MOTIVATION TO DEFY (The Conditions)	CAPABILITY TO RESIST (The NTPRs)
1. Amendment of Bangladeshi Constitution.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS
2. Establishment of relations with Pakistan.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS
3. Establishment of relations with China.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS
4. Government's protests against unilateral withdrawal of the Ganges Water by India.	Responsive.	Condition 1 (Physical and Economic survival)	LS, PP
5. Government's internationalizing of the water issue.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Physical and Economic survival)	LS, PP & EPS
6. Rejection of India's Link Canal Proposal.	Responsive	Condition 1 (Physical and Economic survival)	LS, PP
7. Insistence to include Nepal in the JRC	Initiative	Condition 1 (Physical and Economic survival)	LS, PP
8. Creation of SAARC	Initiative	Condition 2 (Ambition)	LS, EPS.

* The letters LS, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, peoples' power, and finally external political support.

ambition of the ruler does not offer satisfactory explanation. Although condition 3 (disinclination of the ruling party) offer some clue in understanding these instances of NCB , it does not appear to be as convincing as condition 1. We shall turn to examine these conditions later. First, we shall examine these instances with condition 1. According to condition 1, if the issues involved are regarded as vital (i.e., they are

necessary for the survival of people/state/regime either physically, economically or politically) motivation to defy is likely to be generated and thereby lead to non-compliance. Further a necessity may be 'absolute' without which existence will be at stake, or it may not be 'absolute' i.e. without which existence will not be at stake but survival would mean enduring substantial difficulty. The following discussion will reveal the vitalness of the issues in explaining Bangladesh's non-compliance during Zia regime.

Water is supposed to be the life. "People pray not to water but to the life within the water".¹¹⁴ Ever since 1951, Bangladesh (at that time East Pakistan) objected to the Indian plan of diverting water apprehending adverse affects on its economy. All these years the people of Bangladesh had been experiencing what they had apprehended. After its independence in 1971, the people of Bangladesh desired in their new political system not only the political freedom but the also relief from their daily miseries and freedom from internal and external exploitation. But their hopes and aspirations remained unfulfilled because of the League government's acquiescent posture towards the dominant country.

After Zia came to power, there was a growing awareness of the situation on the part of the people. Mass demonstration and bitter resentments against India for disregarding the vital issue of life and death of the people was rampant in all section in Bangladesh. These responses were only instinctive; they were in defence of their rightful claims and survival.

114. Darian, G. Steven, The Ganges in Myth and History, The University Press of Hawaii, 1978, p. 17.

The effects of water withdrawal was highlighted in the preceding section. By this time those effect were further magnified. About 38% of the country's cultivable land dried up and crippled due to the lack of sufficient water. A thermal power station was shut down, busy steamer services were suspended, newsprint mills and other industries were halted and thousands of acres of vital land turned into desert. Agriculture, fishing, forestry, and ecology were devastated over 20,000 sq. miles on which 25 million people live. One study showed salinity in the Khulna area was up by 4,000%-closing down industries that were dependent on fresh water- and together with the falling water table threatened vegetation and fish, the biggest source of protein.¹¹⁵ The White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute, published by Government of Bangladesh in September 1976, read:

A grave crisis has arisen for Bangladesh on account of India's unilateral action in diverting the waters of the Ganges at Farakka. ... These withdrawals amount to as much as three-fourths of the dry season flow of the river Ganges. It is difficult to find a precedent in the world where such heavy amount of waters of an international river are appropriated unilaterally by a country at the cost of the vital interests of a neighbouring country. ¹¹⁶

For Bangladesh, as a lower riparian country, such large quantities of withdrawal of water by India clearly implied threats to its survival. Hence, the vitalness of the issue explains why its people demonstrated and the government protested. It also explains why contrary to India's wishes,

115. For a detailed discussion on the effects of water withdrawal, see Crow, B., Op. Cit.

116. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh: White paper on the Ganges Water Dispute, September 1976, p. 4.

Bangladesh went on internationalizing the water problem. The main purpose of this action was to gain wider diplomatic support against India. The unilateral withdrawal of water by India spelled disaster for Bangladesh. The difficulties for Bangladesh were extremely grave. It needed all the international support it could possibly get. "Bangladesh has gone to the United Nations and other world forums only out of utter desperation arising out of acute human suffering."¹¹⁷ Its rejection of India's Link canal proposal and its insistence to include Nepal in the water talks were also prompted by the question of vitalness. It will be recalled from the earlier discussion that the proposal would have aggravated the already deteriorated state. This was because the head and the tail of water works of the canal would be under Indian control thereby increasing Bangladesh's vulnerabilities. It would also mean further loss of agricultural land and displacement of inhabitants. Nepal's inclusion in the water talks, for Bangladesh, meant opportunities for a satisfactory resolution of the dispute.

In addition to the issue of sharing the Ganges water, vitalness of issues also offer plausible explanation for the amendments of the constitution and the establishment of relationship with Pakistan and China. It may be recalled here that prior to these changes i.e., during Mujib's period, Bangladesh was Indo-centric, aligning itself only with the Soviet bloc. But Bangladesh was in dire need of funds. Its social and economic development needed infusion of large amount of funds. India and the socialist countries, with whom Bangladesh allied itself were no very forthcoming in terms of providing the necessary financial support. The Western developed countries capable of providing such assistances were reluctant to come forward because of Bangladesh's avowed socialistic principles. By amending the constitution,

117. Author's interview with a Bangladeshi official.

Zia changed Bangladesh's pro-socialist, pro-Soviet and pro- Indian image. Socialism, a fundamental state principle during Mujib's period was dropped from the constitution. He also adopted policies to privatize nationalized industries to win the hearts of the western donors and secure funds so much necessary for economic survival.

He also pledged to establish links with states "who had not been friends before", referring to Pakistan and China who hurriedly recognized the new government. Pakistan was, in fact, the first state to recognize the post-Mujib regime. China's recognition of the new Bangladesh Government at the end of August and the latter's warm response to China's gesture towards renewed and wider trade relations, set nerves in New Delhi's South Block (Foreign Office) a bit on edge. He also developed close ties with Arab Muslim World. Saudi Arabia, who had previously refused to deal with Mujib, did recognize Zia. This move of Zia was considered by India as an attempt at creating a distance from her. Elsewhere in the international field, Zia changed what under Mujib had been a very close relationship with India and Soviet Union to one of correct and less cordial.

Like the constitutional amendments, establishment of relationship with Pakistan and China may also be interpreted in terms of vitalness. Pakistan acted as 'gate-keeper' in the establishment of relations between Bangladesh and China and Bangladesh and Middle Eastern countries. An absence of relation with Pakistan implied that the approaches to China and the middle east as vital sources of economic assistance were shut. Zia's establishment of relationship with Pakistan opened up channels through which Bangladesh could seek vital assistance necessary for economic survival from the middle eastern countries.

The islamization of the country helped open up those channels. Zia declared Bangladesh an Islamic Republic. Although he did not change Bangladesh's name, Zia did eventually drop secularism from the constitution and emphasized Islam at the mass level. The constitution was given a definite Islamic orientation with the insertion of 'Bismillah-hir-Rahmanir Rahim (In the name of Allah the beneficial and the merciful). He introduced the recitation from 'Holy Quran' in place of recitation from other holy books. Under him, Islamic parties which were outlawed under Mujib were legalized.

All these measures including abolishing secularism from the constitution may be said to have been taken to woo the oil rich middle eastern countries which are capable of providing Bangladesh the necessary assistance for its economic survival. Bangladeshi citizens were employed in the Middle east and their remittances generated much needed foreign exchange. From the Islamic forum, Bangladesh not only secured aid but also support in its disputes with India. At the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Istanbul in 1976, Bangladesh received all out support of the Muslim countries over its Ganges water dispute with India. The Islamic group of states in the United Nations expressed complete solidarity with Bangladesh regarding presentation of its problems in the Law of the Sea Conference that took place in New York in 1976. Having said so, we shall now consider why condition 2 and condition 3 are not as satisfactory as the one given by condition 1.

As far as condition 2 is concerned, ambition of the ruler may be best viewed as a disposition characterized by an urge of becoming, 'growing' or 'developing' to the full potential, an actualization of a dream to become a strong and effective ruler of a strong country. Surely, the question here is

not of an actualization of a dream. It is more fundamental than that. It is rather a question of bare survival of physical and economic existence.

Conversely, condition 3 appears to offer some answer as to why Bangladesh was defiant in its relation with India with regard to amending the constitution and establishing relationship with Pakistan and China. This condition attempts to understand non-compliant behaviour in terms of motivation to defy generated from a disposition of disinclination of the ruling party towards the dominant power. Disinclination and Inclination are two opposite dispositions; in case of the former, the ruling party subscribes to a political idea, attitude or view that is not congenial to the dominant power, while in the later case the subscribed political idea, attitude or view is congenial to the dominant power. Disinclination sets an antagonistic environment while inclination sets a friendly environment between the two. The ruling party's disinclination towards the dominant power could either be a natural one or as a result of political rivalry with the previous government in power. In case of Zia's regime the disposition of disinclination towards India may be understood in terms of its rivalry with Awami league.

It may be stated that Awami league government systematically disempowered the Bangladesh Army while consistently remaining acquiescent and loyal to India. The army had never forgotten that they had fought for Bangladesh's independence while Sheikh Mujib was in a Pakistani jail and the other Awami League Leaders resided in Calcutta hotel suites. After independence, the army felt neglected and duped, the more so because the Indians had been careful to remove all heavy equipment of the former Pakistan army before leaving Bangladesh. The army chafed under the close bilateral ties insisted upon by Delhi. Their main grievance was that the

Indian army reaped the glory of victory, although the Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh liberation force constituted of Bengali armed personnel, and civilians) had fought bravely for nine months on their own. General Zia, who assumed power in 1975, felt outraged that Bangladeshis had not participated in the surrender ceremony in December 1971. Zia is said to have charged that,

[after] the ceremony was turned into an all-India show, ... your intellectual and political leaders came and gave unsolicited advice and even attempted to formulate our policy. They created the impression that Bangladesh had no separate identity. ¹¹⁸

Ever since independence, Bangladesh army had been an institution without function. Mujib preferred to rely on various militias tied to the Awami League rather than on the army. India's training and backing of the Rakkhi Bahini, Mujib's paramilitary force, aroused resentment within the army, as did the failure of India to return fully the four divisions of Pakistani weapons captured in the 1971 war. As a result of Awami league's pro-Indian policies which diminished the importance of army in Bangladesh, it can be said that the army in general became disinclined towards India. As an Army General, Zia shared this orientation. Such orientation was further strengthened when Zia assumed power. After Awami league, the significant government that ruled Bangladesh was the government formed by Zia. Quite logically, Awami League blamed the army (consequently Gen. Zia) for the killings of Sheikh Mujib and his family. General Zia on the other hand blamed Awami league for mismanagement, inefficiency, corruption, lawlessness and all round sellout of Bangladesh to India. Hence, both

118. Manash Ghosh, 'Bangladesh Sheds Suspicions', Statesman, New Delhi, 15 June, 1978.

Awami league and Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party became arch rivals to each other. In the process, Zia had to abandon the path trodden by Awami League. Since Awami league was inclined towards India Zia was disinclined towards India.

It is possible to infer that wearied by Mujib's undue dependence on and identification with India, Zia inevitably tried to distance the country from India. Zia abandoned Awami league's policy of socialism in favour of privatisation, he abandoned the popular slogan '*Joy Bangla*'¹¹⁹, which bore the connotation of 'Indianism' in favour of '*Bangladesh Zindabad*' (long live Bangladesh).

From this perspective, it seems logical for this regime to be non-compliant. However, survival (economic and physical) is too fundamental to be interpreted in terms of Zia's political orientation. Hence, condition 1 (i.e., vitality) rather than condition 3 (disinclination) offers better explanations for these instances.

Let us now focus on the remaining instance from Table 5.4 i.e., the creation of SAARC. Condition 1 and condition 3 are rather not that persuasive to explain this phenomena. For Bangladesh (or any other member states) the creation of SAARC did not increase or decrease any of the existing threats to the physical, economic or political survival of the people/state/regime. SAARC as has been founded with no powers to deal with the contentious issues faced by the member states is independent of vitality. Hence, condition 1 is not appropriate for understanding its creation. Similarly, condition 3 also do not offer plausible answer. Regional cooperation without

119. 'Joy' in Bengali and Hindi means 'victory'. In Bengali it is spelled 'Joy' and in Hindi it is spelled 'Jai'. This word is widely used in India as a slogan, such as 'Jai Hind'. Again 'Bangla' may also imply Greater Bengal i.e. Bangladesh and west Bengal.

India is meaningless. Again when regional cooperation is the issue, then operating from a political orientation that is totally antithetical to India is a recipe for defecting the very purpose. Hence, disinclination cannot also explain the creation of SAARC. However, condition 2 does offer some explanation. According to condition 2, a ruler's ambition to become strong and effective and to transfer his country to a respectable and independent member of the international community might generate the motivation to defy and lead to non-compliant behaviour. It might be said that the idea of taking the initiative and the lead to create an organization (for regional cooperation) emanated from Zia's ambition; an ambition to see Bangladesh as a respectable partner in the conduct of regional and international affairs. In order to break down the previous image of Bangladesh led by Mujib regime who remained faithfully allied to India, both diplomatically and politically, Zia tried to make a real mark on international affairs. He founded the SAARC without paying attention to India's annoyance. Zia not only personally discussed the idea while visiting Pakistan, Nepal, India and Sri Lanka during 1977-80, he also sent personal letters and envoys to the heads of the six regional states. Given the political and security problems with India, Zia might have undisclosed motive to overcome India's intransigent attitude towards these problems through the goodwill he expected from regional cooperation.

Having discussed the condition of motivation to defy, we will now focus on the non-tangible power resources that contributed to the non-compliant behaviour demonstrated by Zia's regime. According to our contextual framework, non-tangible power resources such as leadership strength, external political support, people's power and geo-political leverage constitute the capability to resist. The framework also maintains that non-

compliance is likely to follow if these power resources are present and strong while non-compliance is not likely to follow if these power resources are absent or weak. Three power resources may be identified which include leadership strength of Zia, external political support and anti Indian popular pressure, all operating in concert. As Bangladesh does not enjoy any geographical advantage in its relation with India (like Nepal), geopolitical leverage did not play any part in demonstrating non-compliance. Unlike Sheikh Mujib, Zia was assertive and independent. Examples of his leadership skills, initiative and assertiveness are numerous. In one instance when the entire nation was put in a state of utter disarray and chaos by the Pakistani army crack down on 25 March 1971, Zia deserted the Pakistan Army, seized Chittagong (the port city of Bangladesh) Radio station on 26 March 1971 and called the people to unite under his leadership to launch armed struggle against the Pakistani Occupation Forces. Zia's call was a hope and a guidance for the Bangladeshi nation for its freedom and marked the beginning not only of the liberation war but also of a nation state. Zia earned a great respect for his leadership contribution in the liberation war. He was a renowned freedom fighter who believed in himself. Unlike some of the political leaders who spent their time in the luxury and safety of Calcutta hotel suites during the war of liberation , Zia was in the war front leading his soldiers in the pursuit of victory. Hence, he was not under any undue obligation to India. Once he came to power in 1975, he took measures to consolidate power in his own hands and provided a strong leadership to Bangladesh. He was not inhibited in anyway about taking an anti-Indian stance. Thus, his assertiveness and leadership strength may be regarded as one of the factors that explain his regime's non-compliance.

Besides, leadership strength, external political support also contributed to NCB. Bangladesh's political debut on the world stage substantially altered the tenor and substance of Indo-Bangladeshi relations. Bangladesh's entry into the UN made India's role of Bangladesh's advocate in world forums redundant, strengthened Bangladesh's bargaining position on economic and political issues with India, and emboldened Bangladesh to assert its independence from India. By way of internationalizing issues and actively participating in different international forums and lobbies Zia gained considerable support of the international community.

Added to these was the strong anti-Indian public pressure which contributed to strengthen the power profile of Zia's regime. Examples of public demonstrations against India were very common in Bangladesh. These non-tangible power resources seem to offer plausible explanation for non-compliant behavior.

It will be recalled that, unlike Zia regime Mujib regime lacked leadership strength and external political support. Mujib lacked assertiveness out of enormous gratitude. Bangladesh was Indo-centric and as such could not acquired external political support to defy India. A comparison of the two regimes provides the evidence which partly supports the proposition that the presence of leadership strength and external political support lead to NCB while their absence do not lead to NCB. This also explains why Zia regime was more non-compliant than Mujib.

From the foregoing analysis we may therefore conclude that given the motivation to defy generated from the conditions of vitalness of issues and the ambition of the ruler the non-tangible power resources such a leadership

strength, external political support and people's power led Bangladesh to be defiant.

ERSHAD REGIME (1982-1990)

The government of H. M. Ershad, more or less followed the footsteps of the late President Zia in the arena of foreign affairs. Like Zia, Ershad too reiterated the fact that Bangladesh should base its relationship with all other states upon the country's perceived need for foreign economic assistance rather than on ideological criteria. It was also stressed that Bangladesh should maintain particularly close economic and political links with neighbouring Asian States so as to reduce its dependence upon India. In addition, Ershad further developed the ties that Zia had established with Muslim states. In fact, the government set out on taking more aggressive measures to realize the unfinished policies of the previous government. However, in respect of some issues in Indo-Bangladesh relations, the regime substantially deviated from the principles and policies pursued by the previous regimes, if not altogether abandoned them.

Immediately after Ershad came to power, 14 Soviet diplomats were expelled from the country and the Soviet Cultural Centre was closed down in 1983. The degree of warmth in the aftermath of Bangladesh's independence between Bangladesh, India and Soviet Union was considerably reduced during the Zia regime. With the expulsion of the Soviet diplomats, the Dhaka-Delhi-Moscow relation came under severe strains.

As it moved away from the Indo-Soviet axis Dhaka's relations with Washington grew warmer. In 1983, Ershad paid an official visit to USA and became the first head of the government of Bangladesh to pay such a visit to USA. During his visit, several agreements were signed between the two countries and US agreed to provide \$ 65 million under PL-480 to Bangladesh for buying food grain and edible oil from the USA.¹²⁰ It may be mentioned here that most of the US aid focussed on population control, agricultural production, rural employment and energy resource development.

Relations with China, which had improved during Zia's period, were further cemented. China offered increased project aid to Bangladesh. In November 1982, Ershad paid a six-day official visit to China. At the conclusion of his visit he said that his mission to China had been successful in every respect. He stated, "They will be by our side through the thick and thin."¹²¹ China not only provided a sense of psychological security to Bangladesh against India, but also became a major arms supplier. It became Bangladesh's major arms supplier after the Soviet Union scrapped all military assistance to Bangladesh following the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975. On 4 November 1983, the two countries signed a five year agreement, under which they agreed to set up a joint economic commission to strengthen cooperation in trade, industry and technology. In late 1984, Bangladesh and China signed another five year trade accord of US \$ 200 million in which Bangladesh's jute, jute products, and other commodities as well as light

120. The Bangladesh Observer, 5 November, 1983.

121. Morning News, 5 December, 1982.

industrial products were agreed to be exchanged for China's coal, pig iron, hardware and industrial equipment.¹²²

Relations with Arab countries also continued to improve. In February 1983, Ershad visited most of the Islamic countries in the Middle East to strengthen relations. During this regime, Saudi Arabia came closest to Bangladesh in terms of foreign relations. In May 1983, Bangladesh signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia to set up a Saudi-Bangladesh joint investment company with an authorized capital of 60 million dollars.

But the major concern for Bangladesh foreign policy in this period remained its relationship with India, which had deteriorated steadily in the past few years because the political development of the Bangladesh military regimes and their domestic and international outlook were unpalatable to New Delhi.

After assuming power on 25 March 1982, Ershad paid his first official visit to India with a view to solving the existing Indo-Bangladesh problem. At the conclusion of the visit, Ershad said that both he and Mrs. Gandhi had directed their respective administrations to remove the points of tension. But at the same time, he remarked cautiously: "Now it will be seen if these are removed."¹²³

Ershad, who initiated a move for improved relation with India, nevertheless made it clear what it wanted. Since the Ganges agreement was supposed to expire in November, Bangladesh wanted a new understanding to be reached. Hence, in the summit meeting of October 1982 between Ershad and

122. Bertocci, P. J., 'Bangladesh in 1985: Resolute Against the Storms', Asian Survey, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, February 1986, p. 232.

123. Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 October, 1982, p. 28.

Indira Gandhi, the vital issue of Farakka topped the agenda. In this meeting, both sides agreed that the 1977 Agreement has 'not proved suitable for finding a satisfactory and durable solution of the problem of an equitable sharing of the waters and the paucity of waters available in the dry season imposed sacrifice on both countries for an amicable settlement.' It was in this meeting that the "Guarantee Clause" of the agreement was dropped and the agreement was extended for another 18 months. Under this "Memorandum of Understanding, 1982"; the two leaders reiterated again on the necessity of augmenting the Ganga and the JRC was entrusted with the task of finding the long-term solution. ¹²⁴

Thus, this Memorandum of Understanding was neither a solution nor a fresh agreement but only an extension of the period of the 1977-Agreement giving a further chance to the JRC to agree to a 'particular' scheme of augmenting.

For most of the years since Farakka was opened in 1975 for what was euphemistically described as a trial run, many thousand cubic feet of water have been diverted away from Bangladesh and down India's short Hoogly river to rinse silt out of the major port of Calcutta into the Bay of Bengal. Since 1975, India has done little to help Bangladesh, which complains that loss of Ganges water has caused major salinity problems up to 200 miles inland. As a matter of fact, the Farakka issue is viewed by India as one of the many intractable problems facing the country in its relations with Bangladesh and as such is in no great hurry to resolve them. A. Z. M. Obaidullah Khan, the Agriculture minister of Bangladesh said in an interview, *Being on the receiving end of this great river, we cannot afford to put off*

124. Government of Bangladesh, Updated Bangladesh Proposal, December, 1983, p. 1-10.

the solution every two years. For us, finding a permanent solution becomes more important as time goes by. ¹²⁵

India justified the diversion by emphasizing that 90 percent of the 1,200 mile main channel of the Ganges flows through India. Bangladesh countered that one-third of their country's population depends on the Ganges for drinking, fishery, agriculture and transport and that diversion has devastating consequences in the dry season.

In 1986, the augmentation of the flow of the River Ganges water between India and Bangladesh opened up when New Delhi accepted Nepal as a party to the scheme. Consequently, a meeting of the joint committee of experts (JCE) was held in Kathmandu.

After the expiry of the extension period of the MOU in October 1988, Bangladesh proposed a permanent treaty. This was in line with the Memorandum of Understanding between India and Bangladesh. India has always been encouraging piece-meal and temporary arrangements for nearly all outstanding issues which is not acceptable to Bangladesh. At the same time Bangladesh launched a vigorous campaign in the wake of disastrous floods in favour of a four tier approach to the solution of the problem: national, bilateral, regional and international. This was naturally not palatable to India which insists on the bilateral approach alone as against regional and international options. India views Bangladesh's approach as an attempt at mobilising international opinion against India.

In 1990, upon the Indian foreign minister's visit to Bangladesh, Bangladesh again put forward the proposal for permanent agreement. But I. K. Gujral,

125. International Herald Tribune, 26 January, 1983.

the Indian foreign minister refused to accept the proposal. As Holiday reports, *Mr. Gujral said that owing to rapid urbanisation, increased population growth and industrialisation in India, the downstream is going to get less and less water in future and so you have to go for augmentation.*¹²⁶ Although Gujral did not elaborate on his augmentation suggestion a source said, he perhaps indicated the old "link canal formula." But the link canal proposal has been firmly rejected by Bangladesh.

Also during Ershad's regime i.e. in early 1984, India's decision to move ahead with construction of a 2,145 mile-long fence along the border between Bangladesh and Assam clouded Indo-Bangladesh relations. India's decision of fencing stem from what India claims is an unrelenting flow of Bangladeshis into that state and hence the source of the grave tensions exploding there in 1983. Resistance activities of Bangladesh citizens along the border area, including efforts to undermine the fence foundations, were accompanied by clashes between the two states' border security forces in April and to exchange of diplomatic protest notes. In the face of Bangladesh's opposition in both official and public level, the project could not be carried out and at long last it appeared that the plan has been shelved if not totally abandoned.

India agreed to hand over the disputed Tin Bigha corridor to Bangladesh. The Tin Bigha corridor connects two Bangladeshi enclaves in Indian territory- Angorpota and Dohogram consisting of 12,000 inhabitants- with the mainland. According to the border agreement signed on 16 May 1974, the Berubari and the adjacent enclaves which had a majority Hindu population were given to India in exchange for the Dahagram and

126. Holiday, 17 February, 1990.

Angarpota enclaves which had majority muslims population being given to Bangladesh. India also agreed to lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres by 85 metres near 'Tin Bigha' to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza of Bangladesh.¹²⁷ Article 2 of the agreement provided that the "territories in adverse possession in areas already demarcated ... shall be exchanged within six months of the signing of the boundary strip maps by the plenipotentiaries", and Article 3 provided that "when areas are transferred, the people in these areas shall be given the right of staying where they are, as nationals of the State to which the areas are transferred". Article 5 required that the instruments of Ratification should be exchanged as early as possible.¹²⁸ Accordingly, Bangladesh handed over the Berubari enclave immediately to India but the latter has not yet transferred Tin Bigha to Bangladesh. India was also to provide the corridor to Bangladesh on lease in perpetuity but did not do it on this or that ground (court cases, difficulty in amendment of constitution for example). The terms of the lease were finalised during Ershad-Indira summit of October 1982. Yet the agreement remained unimplemented. The Calcutta High Court case had been disposed of. Land marking for the lease began and a monitoring cell was established in Calcutta for the same purpose. The basic problem was in the non-ratification of the agreement in the Parliament. "The transfer of Tin Bigha has not taken place because of the resistance from the West Bengal and the slow and tardy process of demarcating its land boundaries," writes S. D. Muni.¹²⁹ To facilitate matters in this regards, the Bangladesh Foreign

127. Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Publicity Division, Bangladesh Documents, Vol. 2, No. 4, April-June 1974, p. 15.

128. Ibid.

129. S. D. Muni, 'Friends in Need: New Realities in South Asia', Frontline, 12-25 October 1991.

Minister had a stop over in Calcutta on 19 October and had talks with Chief Minister Jyoti Basu. The Foreign Minister was, however, assured in New Delhi that the transfer process would be completed by the end of 1991.

Again Bangladesh's stand on the Kashmir issue was not liked by India. President Ershad while talking to a gathering of newsmen on March 8, 1990, said that *we are concerned at the oppression of our Muslim brothers in Kashmir. It should be stopped immediately.*¹³⁰ It may be mentioned here that Bangladesh had so long remained uncommitted to Kashmir issue under the disguise of 'neutralism'. Obviously, the Indian media embellished Bangladesh's stand; for India it is easier to sell Kashmir internationally when the world's second largest Muslim state which happens to be a subcontinental remains silent. Previously, during the visit of the Indian foreign minister to Bangladesh it was reported that he made a request to Bangladesh not to change its stand on Kashmir. As such India strongly reacted to Dhaka's policy shift on Kashmir. India has categorically stated that Dhaka's locus standi on Kashmir is totally unacceptable to them.¹³¹

ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESHI BEHAVIOUR : ERSHAD REGIME (1982-1990)

At the outset it may be said that in the arena of foreign relations, Ershad was less antagonistic to India than Zia, and considerably less pro Indian than Mujib. Bangladesh's non-compliant behaviour during this phase appeared

130. Courier, 16-22 March, 1992, p. 23.

131. Ibid.

to be more related to its economic survival. Table 5.5 summarizes the instances of NCB, their nature (ie., initiative/responsive) along with the conditions of motivation to defy and the NTPRs. The Table 5.5 suggests that in case of all the instances condition 1, i.e., vitalness of issues offer the most plausible explanation. In 4 instances, the issues were vital for economic survival and in 4 instances vital for economic and physical survival. Table 5.5 further suggests that leadership strength as a non-tangible power resources contributed towards non-compliance. Leadership strength worked in combination with either external political support or people's power which are also non-tangible power resources. The conditions, assumptions, contextualities (ie., policy contingencies) will now be explored in order to understand the NCBs demonstrated in this phase.

The non-compliant behaviour during Ershad regime related to the strengthening of Bangladesh's relation with other states including the USA, Middle East (Saudi Arabia in particular), China and the developed countries at large; Sharing of the Ganges Water and the Kashmir issue. Condition 2 and condition 3 do not offer satisfactory explanations for these NCBs. However, condition 1 does. We shall consider condition 2 and condition 3 subsequently, but first we shall focus on condition 1. Condition 1 suggests that a behaviour is non-compliant when the motivation to defy emanated from the consideration of an issue is vital to the very survival of the state/regime/people either physically, politically or economically.

Since coming to power Ershad persisted in making Bangladesh an Islamic state and moving closer to the Islamic *Ummah*.. He said, "Islam being the religion of the majority of the population will be given the highest place in the country's future constitution and Islamic provisions will be included wherever necessary." But the trend towards the Islamization of Bangladesh

Table 5.5 A Summary of the Instances of NCB during Ershad Regime (1982-1990) along with the Conditions of Motivation to Defy and the NTPRs used to Explain them.

INSTANCES OF NCB	NATURE OF NCB	MOTIVATION TO DEFY (The Conditions)	CAPABILITY TO RESIST (The NTPRs)
1. Adoption of Islamic orientation	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS
2. Strengthening of relation with USA.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS
3. Strengthening of relation with the Arab countries particularly Saudi Arabia	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS
4. Strengthening of relation with China.	Initiative	Condition 1 (Economic survival)	LS, EPS
5. Insistence for a long term treaty on water sharing	Responsive	Condition 1 (economic and physical survival)	LS, PP
6. Rejection of Link Canal proposal	Responsive	Condition 1 (economic and physical survival)	LS, PP
7. Inclusion of Nepal in the JRC	Initiative	Condition 1 (economic and physical survival)	LS, PP
8. Dhaka's stand on Kashmir.	Initiative	Condition 1 (economic and physical survival)	LS, PP

* The letters LS, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, peoples' power and finally external political support.

by Ershad government was viewed by India as unacceptable developments. Ershad declared that ninety million people of the country will continue their

relentless efforts for building a happy and prosperous Bangladesh by keeping the banner of Islam high. Ershad followed the trend (initiated by Zia) which legalised all Islamic oriented political parties that were declared illegal immediately after independence. During his regime one witnesses Bangladesh giving high priority on forging closer ties with Islamic countries and the Western countries. Although after 1975, Bangladesh has directed all its efforts to cultivate and strengthen ties with the Middle East and the West (more specially with US), Ershad's regime seemed to have taken more active stance. The various denationalization measures and new industrial policies fostering free economy with a view to attract private investment further consolidated Bangladesh's relations with the Western countries during this phase.

War torn Bangladesh inherited a staggering economy. Political instability and natural disaster never allowed its economy to recover. Added to this was the problem of unemployment. Each year thousands of qualified people enter the job market in search of jobs that do not exist. The Middle East is thus important to Bangladesh not only as a region of trade and aid but also because of employment that they provide to Bangladeshi workers. The export of manpower both skilled and unskilled to the middle eastern countries have eased the problem of unemployment of Bangladesh as well as increased foreign exchange earning of the country. Their remittances have generated much needed foreign exchange for Bangladesh and it has been recorded that these remittances amounted to \$ 617 million in 1987.¹³² Also petro dollars coming from the Middle Eastern countries became a major source of economic assistance to Bangladesh. The flow of aid from the Islamic countries, although statistically much lower than what is received

132. World Development Report, 1989, p. 198.

from western sources and the market for manpower served the vital interest of Bangladesh.

Again the generation of employment opportunities required building of an economic infrastructure that could sustain a vibrant economy, which in turn needed massive infusion of credits, technical expertise and know-how. This left Bangladesh with little option but to turn to western financial institutions and to countries capable of giving financial assistance. Floods, droughts, cyclones and the like have been hitting Bangladesh with ever-increasing intensity and frequency. It thus became necessary for Bangladesh to seek external assistance to mitigate the destruction caused by them.

In the context of ever growing stringent international economic situation and in view of seemingly passive East bloc role in that, Bangladesh's vital needs dictate strengthening its ties with USA, China, Japan and other Western donors. The same is true of its relation with the oil rich Arab countries which despite the continuing glut in the global oil market still occupy a significant position in the international financial market and with whom Bangladesh maintains close ties. Japan has in recent years become the country's leading aid donor. It is a hard fact of life that Bangladesh within the prevailing conditions cannot manage its economy without adequate aid commitments. Significantly enough, the overwhelming majority of the external resources comes from Japan, the developed capitalist countries of the west and the oil rich middle eastern countries; whereas only a very marginal portion of it comes from the socialist bloc.

As against the Indian desire, Bangladesh's stand on Kashmir was another attempt to express its solidarity towards Muslim brotherhood. The

economic significance of such solidarity was just highlighted in the foregoing paragraphs.

Bangladesh's rejection of the link canal proposal is viewed in India as its obstinacy. In 1985, Narasimha Rao, then defence minister of India said, *Bangladesh government's attitude of postponing things have been responsible for not solving the Farakka issue so far.*¹³³ But it is not a question of stubbornness or any other thing on the part of Bangladesh. Rather it is a question of the very survival of the people of the country who are affected by the Farakka dispute. India's link canal proposal is totally unacceptable to Bangladesh because the link canal proposal would unquestionably undermine Bangladesh's economy, especially its food production sector. After experiencing the dire effects of the Farakka withdrawals in more than one-third of its territory, Bangladesh is apprehensive about water diversion from its other major river, the Brahmaputra. Bangladesh fears that such diversion would have untoward effects on the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh, below the point at which water would be diverted for delivery into the link canal, which would further aggravate the existing damage and suffering inflicted by the Farakka diversion. Moreover, the excavation of such a canal would create untold trouble and repercussions in Bangladesh. It would not only cost hundreds of millions of dollars, but it would actually create a barrier between the northern part of Bangladesh and the rest of the country. It would also, pose grave engineering and hydraulic problems by intersecting various natural watercourses. And it would require thousands of acres of land, displacing innumerable poor peasants and taking an enormous quantity of fertile agricultural land out of cultivation with an inevitable adverse impact on the existing food crisis. Bangladesh estimated

133. Times of India, 4 March, 1985.

that the link canal will entail a permanent loss of 1.3 million acres of land through water logging and land acquisition, an annual loss of crops valued at US \$ 225 million, and the uprooting of 2.5 million people. It is a hard fact that each year Bangladesh is forced to import massive quantities of foodgrains to meet the needs of its ever-increasing population. Bangladesh's inability to attain self-sufficiency in foodgrains creates permanent dependence on outside sources, which curtails its international maneuverability, not to mention the severe drain that is imposed on its meagre foreign exchange reserves. Tied to all these are the environmental calamities which have undermined Bangladesh's economic well being in recent years. Aside from the massive physical destruction caused each year, the domestic production of foodgrains is also hit by the floods and droughts which have increased in frequency and intensity in recent years.

Since the expiry of the 1977 treaty in November 1982, Bangladesh had been experiencing uncertainty with every ad hoc, short term and piecemeal arrangements for the Ganges water sharing. In order to prevent such uncertainty, Bangladesh acceded to drop the guarantee clause but managed to secure an extension of 1977 treaty for only a period of 18 months. Nevertheless, Bangladesh persisted in its demand for a long term treaty and succeeded to have Nepal included in JRC to sort out long term resolution of the water problem. It has always been India's policy to keep the outside powers whether friends or adversaries out of regional affairs so that it could exert its power and influence to bear upon the countries of the region.

From the above discussion it appears that Bangladesh's non-compliant stand on the outstanding issues seems to have resulted from its need for economic survival thereby from its perception of vitalness of the issues. Having examined the instances in terms of condition 1, let us return to the point

made earlier that condition 2 and condition 3 are inappropriate in understanding these instances. According to condition 2, non-compliance may be demonstrated if the ruler is ambitious. Ambition here involves an actualization of a dream- a dream to become a strong and effective ruler of a strong country. Surely the instances here are more fundamental than development of potential. It is more a question of life and death, a question of survival. Since the elements of vitalness are more conspicuous in these instances than ambition, condition 2 does not offer better explanation. than condition 1.

Similarly, condition 3 also does not offer satisfactory explanation. condition 3 states that a political disinclination of the ruling party is likely to generate motivation to defy and lead to NCB while its inclination will not lead to NCB. Disinclination or inclination are opposite political orientations acquired by a political party through its subscription of some political ideas, views, beliefs and attitudes. In case of inclination there is a congruence of orientation between the dominant power and the small state. While in case of disinclination there is a divergence of orientation between the two. Taking condition 3 into consideration it is possible to argue that Ershad regime demonstrated non-compliance because it was politically disinclined towards India. Ershad's islamization policy do provides the indication of disinclination. There may be some truth in the assertion that political disinclination led Ershad regime to be non-compliant. However, such an explanation appears to be rather weak when compared with the explanation offered by condition 1. It is almost axiomatic that when existence is at stake utmost priority is given to attend it. From this point, survival takes precedence over the rest, including political orientation. Hence,

disinclination as an alternative explanation is not as satisfactory as is vitalness of issues.

So far, the conditions of motivation to defy were examined in understanding the instances of non-compliance during Ershad regime. According to our contextual framework, a state must also possess the capability to resist to be defiant towards its dominant neighbour. The framework suggests that leadership strength, external political support, geo political leverage and people's power as non-tangible power resources that constitute capability to resist. If these factors are present and strong, non-compliance is likely to follow; if they are weak or absent non-compliance is not likely to follow. As mentioned before Bangladesh do not possess any geo political leverage against India. As such it did not play any role aiding Bangladesh to demonstrate its NCB during the Ershad regime. Nevertheless, the other three elements did contribute towards Bangladesh's NCB during this phase.

Unlike Mujib, Ershad was not inhibited by any kind of personal gratitude or emotions towards India. Ershad's administration appeared to be more assertive in implementing policy decisions. In matters of domestic policy, Ershad's regime faced far more public pressure and criticism than the Zia regime. He disregarded opposition, asserted his position and implemented his decisions. In matters of foreign relations, his assertiveness may be observed in his adoption of bold denationalization steps and new industrial policy to pursue closer ties with the West and the Middle East and chart a path independent of Indian influence. In addition to leadership strength, external political support and people's power have also contributed towards Bangladesh's defiance stance against India. Both these power resources were elaborated earlier in the analysis of Bangladesh's behaviour during Zia's reign which seem to have been further strengthened during Ershad's rule.


CHAPTER 6

THE INDIAN RESPONSE AND THE EXTENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE OF NEPAL AND BANGLADESH

There are and always have been limits to how far the small states of South Asia can go in their resistance to Indian wishes, and if pushed too far India will not hesitate to respond. The focus of this chapter, therefore, is to understand the extent of non-compliance in the behaviour of the small states and to examine how their capability to resist (based on NTPRs) assist them to sustain the pressures exerted by the bigger state.

According to our contextual framework, given the conditions of motivation to defy, the extent of non-compliance is determined by the degree of capability to resist expressed in terms of non-tangible power resources (NtPR). The graphical presentation of the relationship between NCB and CR (based on NTPRs) is reproduced in the following page for reference. It was maintained that within certain policy contingency framework, as awareness of capability to resist increases, non-compliance is likely to increase. This stage is called the build-up stage. At this stage, with the increase of non-compliance the small state is likely to experience increasing counter resistance from the big power. Most small states may only defy upto a certain point called X. It is defined as the point at which the small state becomes aware that its capability to resist just balances with the coercive capability so far applied by the big state. The small state is also aware that if it crosses this point it is likely to evoke significant counter pressure from the big state which it finds extremely difficult to contain. Beyond point X, depending upon the changes in the policy contingency frameworks, three hypothetical behavioural responses are conceived. These responses are state of stalemate, sullen retreat and compulsive subjugation. If the small state chooses not to submit to counter

Figure 6.1 : The Relationship between Capability to Resist (CR) and Non-compliance



pressures of the big states, then the increase in capability to resist (based on NTPRs) beyond point X is likely to lead to marginal or no increase in non-compliance due to its (small states) inability to withstand further counter pressure with the help of NtPRs. Line 'A' (state of stalemate) in figure 6.1 represents this behavioural response which is characterized by a status quo in small states defiance. If the small state chooses to yield finding the counter-pressure unbearable then two possible behavioural responses might follow: sullen retreat and compulsive subjugation. They are both compliant expressions and are represented by line 'B' and line 'C' in figure 6.1 respectively. In case of sullen retreat (line B) the counter-pressure exerted by the big state on the small state is such that it only ensures small state's compliance without reducing the capability to resist (based on NTPRs). In case of compulsive subjugation, in addition to securing compliance the big state also attempts to reduce the small states' capability to resist.

It may be noted that the NTPRs appear to be effective in certain policy contingency frameworks. In other policy contingency frameworks they may only be effective to the extent of registration of grievances and not so much in influencing the stand held by the dominant power. In these policy contingency frameworks, the extent of NCB demonstrated by small states (i.e., Nepal and Bangladesh) with the NTPRs depends on how hard the dominant state (i.e., India) responds. The general trends in the behavioural expression of Nepal and Bangladesh, as emerged from this study, suggest that these states exhibited NCB (beyond registration of grievances) to the extent India allowed them to exhibit. It may, therefore, be acknowledged that the Indian motives played an important role in the extent of NCB demonstrated by Nepal and Bangladesh. Although some attempts were made to describe Indian response in general, the exploration of Indian motive in each instance of non compliance demonstrated by Nepal and Bangladesh could not be achieved.¹ With this caveat in mind, the following analysis is geared to understand the extent of this in Nepali and Bangladeshi behaviour.

EXTENT OF NEPAL'S NON-COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR

The discussion in the earlier chapter on Nepal showed that the disposition of the regime of King Tribhuvan from 1950-55 lacked the motivation to defy and accordingly the government followed a compliant foreign policy. The main non-compliance in the foreign policy of Nepal was witnessed in the Mahendra and Birendra regimes. Given their motivations to defy, both used their capabilities to resist (based on NTPRs) the dominant power, but their

1. The collection of data for such an exploration requires access to original sources (i.e., the Indian decision-makers' involvement in each instances, classified and unclassified official documents etc.). Data requiring detailed information was unavailable from secondary sources because of the lack of similar past studies. Securing such data was constrained by time, fund, access and other conditions of field setting.

capability to resist acted as a countervailing force only up to a certain limit, beyond which it did not withstand Indian pressure, and Nepal reverted to compliant stance. The compulsions (highlighting the policy contingencies) which Nepal encountered while signing the trade and transit treaties with India exemplify the extent Nepal could stand up to its big neighbour. Nepal's experiences of economic pressures from India in 1962, 1971, 1975 and 1989 are points in this case. Basically, India exercised as much economic pressure as was necessary to ensure Nepali compliance. As one Nepali scholar holds,

the motives behind the various Indian pressures had never been economic; they were a concoction of politico-strategic concerns which India had expressed publicly and tried to deter Nepal effectively from deviating to a course which India felt was not in accordance with its interests.²

From the period 1955 to 1972 (with the exception of the period of Congress government from 1959-1960), one observes Nepal's growing defiance and its will to carry on its policies independently. During this period, in the foreign policy behaviour of Nepal, both the motivation to defy and the capability to resist were present. As a consequence of which, in the initial phase of this period, Nepal's non-compliance went to the build up stage. The establishment of relation with China, voting independently without following India's footsteps in the United Nations, the establishment of relations with India's staunch enemy Pakistan, dismissing the Congress led Parliament and directly ruling the country, and above all the introduction of the Panchayat system are all instances of non-compliance in the build up stage of Nepali non-compliance. Nepal at this stage amassed all possible capabilities to back up its non-compliant stance against India. For example, during King

2. Author's interview with a Nepali Scholar.

Mahendra's rule Nepal became stronger in terms of its leadership strength, gained external political support by cultivating and diversifying its external relations with third countries, and utilized its geopolitical leverage to the most by taking advantage of Sino-Indian rivalry. In effect, as Nepal went on to increase its power profile (with the non-tangible power resources), its non-compliant stance went on building up. Although India did not take Nepal's relations with China and other developments with ease, Kathmandu went on asserting itself against India. Indo-Nepali estrangement took another turn when Kathmandu signed a road building agreement with Beijing in 1961. The agreement was dubbed as an anti-Indian move and India accused Nepal as being liable to breach the Indian security system. This was the high point of Nepal's non-compliance. As Nepal gathered momentum in its non-compliant policy, Indian counter pressures became increasingly severe.

The first steps India took to make Kathmandu comply with its wishes, were to provide asylum to the Nepali rebels and encourage a terrorist campaign that was organized by the Nepali Congress leaders in India whose aim was to dismantle the royal regime. Nepal openly accused the Indian authorities for allowing the Nepali Congress and the affiliated political groups in India to organize and direct terrorist and other disruptive incidents in Nepal. In the beginning, the Congress activities were confined to sporadic attacks on governmental installations in areas adjoining the Nepal-India border. Later on their activities increased and became a cause of concern for the government of Nepal. A Nepali newspaper commented:

the mischief mongers come from India and run back to the Indian territory after perpetrating their misdeeds. This is just like the

American training of the Cuban rebels and helping them to stage revolt in Cuba. ³

India always maintained that the trouble had its roots inside Nepal itself. The Indian embassy in Kathmandu also issued similar denial. But as one Nepali scholar points out,

the widely publicized press conferences in Calcutta, and other Indian cities by the Congress leaders, who publicly avowed for the violent overthrow of the regime in Kathmandu, and armed raids into Nepal from organisation bases across the border were indisputable evidences of the usage of Indian territory for insurgent activities. ⁴

In fact, India was openly hostile to King Mahendra's overtures to Pakistan and China and hence was not at all inclined towards restricting the activities directed against the Kathmandu regime.

Kathmandu published a number of semi-official documents vehemently criticising India's alleged complicity in Nepali Congress sponsored terrorist activities in Nepal. Nepal also demanded of India not to provide sanctuary to the rebel leaders. But it was turned down by India on the ground that their action had not violated Indian law and they could not be subjected to extradition procedures. ⁵

On January 22 during King Mahendra's tour of Janakpur, a town in eastern Nepal, an assassination attempt was made on the king by throwing a bomb at the car on which he was travelling. Tulsi Giri, the foreign minister of Nepal,

3. Quoted in Sharma, Jagdish, Prasad., Nepal's Foreign Policy. 1947-1962, an unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968.

4. Ibid., p. 110.

5. Rose, Leo, E. Nepal: Strategy for Survival, Oxford University Press, p. 221.

who was touring with the King charged India saying that the assassin had come from India. An anti-Indian demonstration took place in front of the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu on 26 January and effigies of Nehru and Congress leaders were burnt. Nepal consistently objected to the rebel use of the Indian territory for insurgent purposes. New Delhi however, refused to acknowledge the existence of such practices. Instead Nehru declared,

Nobody can guarantee an odd person not taking some guns or something of that kind (while crossing the border). But there is very little of it. Most of the trouble has been caused locally. ⁶

Nehru also advised the King rather bluntly while he was on a visit to New Delhi to open negotiation directly with the rebels. However, the tactics of armed raids with the connivance of the Indian authorities failed to repeat the success it had had against the Ranas in 1950-51. China provided the countervailing weight to the Indian support of the rebel cause. Also Mahendra had full public support which was engendered by India's paternalistic and patronising attitude towards Nepal in the aftermath of King Tribhuvan's restoration. This clearly indicated to the Indian government that the King was still not disposed to make the basic concessions demanded of him.

So far it appears that Nepal's power capability (generated from non-tangible power resources such as external political support e.g., China's support; popular pressure and popular support for King Mahendra and his leadership strength), withstood the Indian counter pressure with a certain degree of success and Nepal remained unchanged in its defiant stance. At this point Nepal's ability to maintain its defiant stance was overstretched when India added to its support for the Nepali rebels an unofficial and undeclared

6. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

economic blockade of Nepal in September 1962. This constituted a significant change in policy contingency framework. A number of minor incidents on the border were used to rationalize a total obstruction of trade transactions between the two countries. This blockade coincided with the Nepali national festival of *Dashai* and brought severe hardship for the Nepali population. Prices of daily necessities shot up overnight as a consequence of which Nepal suffered heavy damages along with a threat to its national security. This was a point described as 'Point X' in figure 6.1: a turning point of Nepali defiance towards compliance. After reaching this point, we notice a sort of sullen retreat (line B) in the behaviour of Nepal vis-a-vis India.

This blockade, usually known as the Raxual Blockade, gave a shattering blow to Nepal and conveyed the message that landlocked Nepal should toe the line. Had the blockade continued for long, it would have been an economic cataclysm for Nepal.

Nepal was handicapped by its limited capability. As such King Mahendra submitted to the Indian pressure and was compelled to alter its position of staunch defiance. Under these circumstances one would have expected a compulsive subjugation on the part of Nepal. Instead one finds Nepal only on the phase of sullen retreat. As a matter of fact, King Mahendra was on the verge of submitting to the Indian pressures had not there been instantaneous Chinese assurances of assistances. It appears that Nepal's level of capability to resist (based on popular support and popular pressure, leadership strength, external political support and geopolitical leverage) remained unchanged. However, Nepal realized that continued defiance would mean outstretching its power beyond the point at which such power capabilities would help contain Indian counter pressures. It may thus be maintained that such realization led Nepal to soften its position and comply to the Indian demands. The developments in the subsequent period appear to bear the

point. For example, Nepal agreed not to allow the Chinese to act against India's vital interests in Nepal. This was evident from King Mahendra's subsequent decisions. He acceded to New Delhi's demand not to allow the Chinese to undertake any project in the Tarai region which is contiguous to Indian territory. He cancelled the agreement with China whereby the latter had undertaken to construct a portion of Nepal's East-West highway and handed it over to India. However, as mentioned earlier, such compliance cannot be treated as 'compulsive subjugation' rather may be treated as 'sullen retreat' (both as shown respectively by the lines C and B in figure 6.1) because the capability to resist (based on NTPRs) of Nepal still remained effective to some extent. As mentioned earlier that Nepal secured external political support in the form of Chinese assurances of assistance and used the geopolitical leverage gained from the Sino-Indian rivalry (with greater effectiveness particularly after the Sino-Indian war in October 1962 in which India received a humiliating defeat). Thus, at this stage Nepal did not comply unconditionally rather it was able to derive certain concessions from India by way of employing the NTPRs just mentioned. For example, King Mahendra secured Indian assurances that the Nepali rebels would not be allowed to organize themselves and operate against its political system. He also secured India's recognition to his Panchayat democracy and his agreement with China on the construction of the Kodari-Kathmandu road. He also secured Indian aid assistances along with India financed and executed schemes for Nepal's economic development.

These developments (i.e., the concessions given to India and the concessions received from India) roughly took place in a time span between the Raxual blockade and Sino-Indian war. The Raxual blockade that lasted only for a few days was not so severe as compared to the subsequent blockades. Further, during this period India's position in terms of security was

precariously vulnerable due to the Chinese threats. Hence, for Nepal the sullen retreat was a very temporary phenomenon.

After the Sino-Indian war, China became an important factor in the foreign policy calculations of Nepal, and it started using China as a counterbalancing force to India. Besides manipulating geopolitical leverages, King Mahendra actively sought to strengthen the capability to resist (based on NTPRs) by seeking international political support, by securing public confidence in and support for him and also by asserting his self more fully. As such in the later stage we see Nepal's non-compliance building up again.

The non-compliant stance reached another peak in Nepal's demand for the withdrawal of the Indian military mission and armed personnel from checkpoints in the north along the Sino-Nepali border in 1969. Although India finally conceded Nepal's demand, it retaliated strongly by exerting pressure on Nepal by coupling the trade and transit treaty which was to expire in September, 1970, with the issue of the withdrawal of its military personnel from Nepal. The situation involving the trade and transit treaties reflected a change in policy contingencies and represented a volatile state (as shown in figure 6.1) signalling the approach of point X.

Nepal had always wanted India to concede transit rights in accordance with the UNCTAD resolution on transit trade of landlocked states. India did not refuse but made it clear that if international conventions were to replace bilateral transit arrangements, they should also apply to bilateral trade. The implications were not lost upon Nepal; it would mean drastic curbs on the existing bilateral facilities for free and unrestricted movement between both countries. Nepali business circle was alarmed at the suggestion, for they knew their foreign trade was dominated by India.

Dr. Tulsi Giri, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers in a Seminar in Tribhuvan University in August 1970, said that India and Nepal had different economic interests in spite of many common ones. Nepal could not be hoodwinked by the pretence that India had been giving Nepal all those facilities which a less developed country deserved. Why should India deny to a less developed country facilities it was itself demanding from the more developed ones? ⁷ Hence, Nepal remained defiant and pressed for its demands despite Indian pressures and a stalemate was reached.

Failing to conclude a new treaty before the expiry of the 1960 treaty in September, 1970, Nepal proposed the extension of the existing agreement until a new one was concluded. India agreed to extend the treaty only until the end of 1970. This was again another pressure tactic to force Nepal to accept India's terms for negotiation, but further attempts to reach an agreement before the end of 1970 also failed. Nepali spokesmen in Kathmandu asserted that their side made an "all out" bid to resolve mutual problems but it was India whose attitude was "unhelpful"⁸. Some veiled allegations were also made that New Delhi was inclined to destroy Nepal's economic development so that it would be perennially dependent on India.

Signs of stress began to appear in the Nepali economy. At the beginning of 1971, Nepali trade and industry were plagued by an environment of uncertainty. The Nepalis organised public protests and demonstrations in front of the Indian embassy at Kathmandu and in Nepali towns near the border. Still remaining defiant and pressing its points further, Nepal campaigned against India in international forums that New Delhi was not

7. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 19, 1970 p. 69.

8. Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July, 1970, p. 45.

providing due transit facilities for Nepal's overseas trade. However, all these efforts of the Nepali government to shift India from its position failed.

The failure of several rounds of negotiations to sort out trade and transit problems distressed Nepali trade and industry. When Prime Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista went to inaugurate the annual session of the Nepali Federation of Industry and Commerce, the federation chief complained that industry was in the dark about government measures to end the deadlock with India and said that the delay had led to a breakdown of industrial units in the private sector. The state run industries were equally hard hit by the absence of a trade treaty with India. The Soviet aided cigarette factory at Janakpur had to suspend production because raw materials failed to arrive from India. The cigarette factory was an important element in Nepal's policy of import substitution. On the strength of its production, Indian cigarettes had been pushed out of the Nepali market.⁹ The synthetic textiles industry, developed in the mid sixties on the strength of imported raw materials from Japan and Hongkong, lost its market in India as a result of the Indian embargo.¹⁰ Nepal found the economic pressure exerted by India unbearable. Once again Nepal reached point X.

Domestic pressures for resumption of normal trading relations mounted. Business circles in Nepal grew critical of the administration. They were worried because they were saddled with heavy stock piles growing heavier for want of an outlet to the Indian market. Pressure continued to build up in trading and industrial sectors at Kathmandu over the absence of a trade agreement with India. But India remained indifferent. By taking advantage of Nepal's landlockedness and its economic dependence, India exerted so

9. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 26, 1971, p. 42.

10. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 1971, p. 17.

much pressure by adopting such stalling tactics that Nepal could hardly match it with its capability to resist (based on NTPRs).

By mid- 1971, the economy and trade of Nepal were so badly hurt that on August 13, 1971, Nepal was compelled to sign a less favourable trade and transit treaty with India. Mahendra met Indira Gandhi for 40 minutes and talked of the resolutions of all problems with goodwill and understanding.¹¹ Therefore, as a result of the changes in the policy contingencies Nepal was led to comply with Indian demands. However, such compliance, as before, was also a sullen retreat (line B in figure 6.1) because it did not involve curtailment of capability to resist (based on NTPRs).

The same drama was restaged in 1975 when strains developed over Nepal's impending demand for the signing of separate trade and transit treaties which India as a transit country was not willing to concede. This was followed by Nepal's proposal to declare itself a Zone of Peace and the anti-Indian demonstration in Kathmandu organised against India's forcible annexation of Sikkim. When the Indians stepped into the Himalayan protectorate of Sikkim, the reverberations from their action shook the valley of Kathmandu also as it had shaken the rest of the world. The Nepalis filled with obvious alarm asked, "Who will be the next?" Anti Indian riots flared up in Kathmandu, and students smashed windows at the Indian embassy. India was furious. Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, warned Mr. Nagendra Prasad Rijal her counterpart, of unpleasant consequences if anti-Indian propaganda was not controlled.

The Indian Ambassador to Nepal Mr. M. K. Rasgotra immediately withdrew to New Delhi, had the trade talks stalled and threatened to seal the open border. Nepal was further told that all trade transactions would have to be

11. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 July, 1971, p. 16.

conducted in hard currency basis if Nepal persisted in its policy of equidistance and independence. The Indian counter - pressure and its effects constituted changes in the policy contingency framework and Nepal failed to resist the Indian pressure. Thus, negotiations were held on Indian terms. The dilemma for a country short of foreign exchange reserve was obvious, and this, as Mrs. Gandhi recalled in February, 1980, "soon brought the Palace to its knees."¹² Not only that but overt threat also appeared in the Indian scholarly writing such as,

The time has come to speak plainly to the King and tell him that his proposal is an unfriendly act. If he persists in it, India will close the Indo-Nepal border, put adequate forces around it, as China has on the other, repatriate all Nepali aliens back from India to Nepal, and carry out a total crack-down on smuggling. Let King Birendra make his choice after weighing the full consequence of his gimmickry."¹³

The language is reminiscent of instructions from a British Viceroy to a Resident on how he was to deal with a recalcitrant rajah. One Nepali scholar asks; is this a neighbourly reassurance or is this a declaration of war against the proposal of peace? ¹⁴

During this phase, Chinese friendship proved to be of limited utility to Kathmandu in terms of geopolitical leverage. In 1971 when India intervened militarily in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh against Pakistan, China did not do much to help its ally Pakistan except hurl some verbal abuse at India;

12. Kumar, Dhruva, "National Security and Foreign Policy of Nepal", in Malla, P Kamal, (ed.) Nepal: Perspective on Continuity and Change, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Kirtipur, Kathmandu, 1989, p. 387.

13. Mitra, N, "Meaning of Peace Zone for Nepal", Strategic Analysis, January 1982, p. 526.

14. Kumar, Dhruva, Op. Cit. p. 381.

it was clear that the China connection had lost its value to Kathmandu as well. If China refrained from offering substantive support to protect Pakistan, it was unrealistic to assume that it would come to Nepal's rescue under a similar circumstances.

However, the behavioural expression of Nepal remained unchanged during this phase and we see Nepal responding the same way as we have seen earlier. Although China was no longer a strong factor in the foreign policy calculation of Nepal as it had been in the late 1950s and early 1960s, nevertheless, other NTPRs such as popular pressure and popular support, external political support and leadership strength remained unchanged. Nepal's urge to non-comply was not totally shattered. Nepal persisted with its demand for separate trade and transit treaties.

Tension went on rising between India and Nepal over the latter's growing defiance and once again India affected an economic squeeze to bring Kathmandu round to New Delhi's point of view. As one Nepali scholar recalls,

The stringent measures that India has taken to prevail upon its weaker neighbour and bring it to the negotiation table to accept Indian terms and resolve the problem are not unusual occurrences in the history of their relationship.¹⁵

So we have the same cycle of events: Nepali non-compliance behaviour, Indian counter-pressure, change in policy contingencies, Nepal's inability to contain Indian counter pressure with its NTPRs, point X, and sullen retreat. Unlike the previous situations, sullen retreat in this case, as discussed earlier,

15. Kumar Dhruva, "Beyond 'Blockade': Some Long Term Policy Considerations For Nepal", in CNAS Forum, No. 10. October 1989, Kathmandu, p. 3.

was associated with some decline (though not significant) of Nepal's capability to resist.

In the subsequent period one observes the repetition for the fourth time of the same cycle of events; this culminated in India's imposition of economic blockade in 1989 but this resulted in compulsive subjugation in Nepal's behavioural expression.

In response to King Birendra's continued defiant stance, India once again began to exert pressure by manipulating the trade and transit vulnerability of Nepal. Indian pressure was particularly strong because of Birendra's insistence of the Zone of Peace proposal, which equated China with India and his purchase of arms for the Chinese sources.

The economic squeeze of Nepal by India in 1989 was more serious than anything that had occurred since the 1960 change over of government in Nepal and India's overt disapproval of the King's action, and surprised and alarmed Nepal. Even the most harshly-worded Indian newspaper editorials felt that the 'big brother' in the relationship was behaving badly. They were concerned at the plight of the common Nepalis as a result of the blockade and voiced the need for interim measures to lessen the difficulties while new arrangements were to be worked out. As the *Daily Telegraph* ¹⁶ quoted one of the Indian newspaper as saying, "As by far the larger of the two neighbours, it can afford to be generous". But the choice that India gave to Nepal was that they should choose either a "special" or a "normal" relation. By "special" they meant the pre-1955 relationship and "normal" meant Nepal's process of equating China with India. Acceptance of a special relationship by Nepal i.e., complying with India's wishes, would be met by India with preferential treatment in both trade and transit matters. But if Nepal desired a normal

16. Daily Telegraph, April 6, 1989.

relationship with India and wished to carry on its policies independently, Indian policy would be tailored accordingly. One Indian newspaper warned Nepal,

*If King Birendra and his advisers think the 'special relationship' can be terminated and Kathmandu can still negotiate a favourable transit treaty based only on international law and convention, they have made a serious mistake.*¹⁷

The Indian pressure on Nepal continued unabated. On the stalemate of 1989, subsequent Nepali proposal to convene a meeting of Indo-Nepal Joint Economic Commission to sort out differences and begin fresh negotiations was responded to negatively by India suggesting that the "forum is inappropriate to decide on matters related to present stalemate." When they failed to reach on an agreement by March 1, the Indian embassy in Kathmandu delivered a letter to Nepal's Minister of Commerce giving notice that the 1978 treaties would expire on March 23. India's general attitude was that if Nepal wanted a special economic relationship with India, and the generous economic treatment that implied, it would also have to accept a special security relationship.

Despite such pressure Nepal continued its defiance, thus contributing to the volatile state (as shown in figure 6.1). Kathmandu went on playing hard ball. Under the draft treaty signed in October, Nepal was to lift additional customs duties imposed on Indian goods and not extend such exemptions to any third country. Nepal said it would lift these duties only after treaties of trade and transit were signed. Kathmandu then proceeded, according to Indian press reports, to further ease customs duties on Chinese goods. Even after India gave notice in February that unless agreement on outstanding issues was

17. Indian Post, quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 May 1989, p. 24.

reached by March 1 the old treaties would expire, Kathmandu refused to back down; it requested India to reconsider its proposal for a single treaty and offered to send a team to negotiate in New Delhi.

Indian pressure tightened rapidly. On March 31, 1989, a separate agreement expired under which Nepal had purchased oil from third countries. The non renewal of this agreement was a severe blow to Nepal's fuel supply. On June 23 still another agreement, under which Nepal was allotted warehouse space in the Calcutta port, expired and was not renewed. Indian authorities also became particularly stringent in monitoring transit through the two crossing points that remained open, and they refused to supply railway wagons for the movement of goods between Nepal and Bangladesh. Under a swapping arrangement with the Indian Oil Corporation, Nepal had for many years been buying oil from third countries which was unloaded on the Indian coast, far away from the Himalayan kingdom. Because the country has limited storage facilities, it was stored in India and when it was needed, India supplied an equivalent amount to Nepal from its own oil stores close to their common border. In return India was paid storage and handling charges.

The oil agreement between the two countries was to run until the end of March. But the supplies to Nepal were stopped more than a week before its expiry. In trying to justify this action, Indian diplomats argued that, since the export of oil was not normally allowed by India, its supplies were therefore, halted as soon as the trade and transit treaties ended. The government in Kathmandu, complained that oil bought by the Kingdom was in fact being stored in India, and not allowed into Nepal.

India had closed down 13 of 15 transit points on its border with Nepal. The two major crossing points at Raxual and Jogbani were left open to permit essential goods such as medicines, baby foods, and cement to reach the

Nepali people against whom India said it held no animus. Under international law a landlocked country has a right to only one transit route to the sea, so leaving two open was a gesture of Indian magnanimity. This also allowed New Delhi to deny that it was blockading Nepal. Nonetheless, the message, according to an Indian government spokesman was : "Be prepared to reciprocate if you want special privileges."

A western diplomat in Kathmandu said, "Nepal has found it easy to have India portrayed as a bully, because it is a bully. Screwing the cordon tighter around this pitifully poor country is a reaction wildly out of proportion. But of course it fits well into the pattern of belligerent behaviour India has displayed in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and elsewhere."¹⁸

A large number of entry points scattered across the border had enabled Nepal to procure goods at convenient places in India and take them in. But now with only two entry points, Nepal was faced with the daunting task of transporting all these goods first inside the mountainous country and thereafter to the eastern and western parts. Within 72 hours of India's closure of the border points, strict rationing of petrol and kerosene was introduced throughout Nepal. Motor traffic on the road was halved. Cabinet ministers and top ranking officials were seen walking to their offices. At the peak of the tourist season, all this was particularly bad news for the Nepali economy. The government announced an immediate reduction in the price of electricity and firewood, which led to a sudden increase in the consumption of wood. A country already suffering from serious deforestation could hardly afford that. One former editor of a Pakistani newspaper commented that the attempt to "starve" Nepal " . . . is probably the most reprehensible act of domination by any bigger neighbour against a smaller neighbour in recent international

18. Quoted in The Times, June 30, 1989.

politics; far worse morally than what the Americans did in Grenada or the Russians in Afghanistan." ¹⁹

India's use of economic blockade, though less damaging than any overt military action, had nevertheless inflicted greater harm to Nepal's economy which cannot be easily quantified, and such measures in the long run create social dislocations and threaten the security interests of the country.

In the absence of the treaties, Nepal's landlocked geographical position and the distance to the nearest port in India tremendously raised the cost of trade. The discontinuity that followed, given Nepal's fragile economic base, has weakened the country's economy to the extent that a long recuperative period will be required. The economic ramifications of the crisis in relations with India have already been made clear; the growth in the national economy declined from the planned 5% to 1.5% in 1989-90.²⁰

Nepal still remained defiant. In September 1989, King Birendra met Rajiv Gandhi at the ninth Non-aligned Movement summit in Belgrade. The King urged the prime minister of India not to link security to the trade and transit issues, but Gandhi insisted on such a linkage. Meanwhile in Kathmandu, as news report confirmed, anti-Indian sentiment reached perilously close to mass hysteria.²¹ Students processions protested against India's "high-handedness". The Tribhuvan University and colleges were closed to avoid demonstrations. In Kathmandu an Indian photographer came close to being assaulted. The Nepalis consider the treaty archaic and unreasonable. A

19. Quoted in Guardian, 17 May, 1989.

20. Kumar, D., 'Managing Nepal's India Policy?' Asian Survey, Vol XXX, No. 7, July 1990, p.

21. India Today, May 15, 1989, p.49.

Nepali bureaucrat asks, "Why should we be tied to the apron strings of India and not have the liberty to get into collaborations with other countries".²²

The treatment meted out to the Lok Sabha Speaker Balram Jakhar, who had been invited to the Rastriya Panchayat (the Nepali Parliament) in 1989, showed the extent of anti-Indian feeling prevalent in Nepal. In the parliament speaker after speaker reproached India and finally a member stood up and shouted slogans against "Indian expansionism".²³ As Bista, a former prime minister of Nepal puts it,

*We no longer have a special relationship. This is a thing of the past. The Nepalis will stick to their national aspirations. They have suffered and they will suffer. But they will never give up their rights as a landlocked country.*²⁴

Nepal's Foreign Minister Shailendra Kumar Upadhyia asserted that, 'any country when it asserts its independence in a situation like this, has to suffer. In the long run, suffering can produce good results'.²⁵

In the face of persistent Indian pressure, the NTPRs such as leadership strength, geopolitical leverage, popular pressure and popular support and external political support failed to provide the required strength to match Indian response and maintain continued defiance.

In fact, as noted earlier, the effectiveness of geopolitical leverage as an NTPR had greatly diminished. When Nepal approached China during the trade treaty negotiations for Chinese assistance, nothing substantial resulted. The

22. Quoted in Ibid., p. 50.

23. Ibid., p. 52.

24. Ibid. p. 55.

25. Quoted in Independent, 30 April, 1989.

Chinese were sympathetic, however, they were in no position to offer the kind of political and economic help and assistance Nepal required to withstand India's demands, and made this clear to Nepal. Although 40% of Nepal's foreign trade is with India (down from 95% two decades ago), land-locked Nepal is still dependent on India's goodwill. The fact that Nepal's sole viable access to the world being through India and not the thousands of miles through China, left Nepal with little choice. Moreover as Bhabani Sen Gupta, a close observer of Indian sub-continental politics observed,

India's military muscle acquired a punch which was tragically lacking in 1962. India also emerged as the world's fourth strongest military power, with a million plus strong armed force and significant armoured and air striking capabilities. With all its nuclear armour, China's conventional punch is probably less forceful today than it was in 1962.²⁶

Furthermore, as Nepal's economic hardship increased, popular pressure and popular support as an NTPR started to decline and mass discontent with the King's government began to heighten. It was India's tactic to deliberately pursue the pace of a stalled trade negotiations to destabilize Nepal and then support anti-monarchy forces to bring about a radical restructuring of Nepal's political system. When the movement was launched against the King in Nepal in end 1989, Indian leaders and political parties gave their support. A section of the government controlled media in Kathmandu reported that the Indian embassy in Kathmandu had withdrawn Rs. 6 million (US\$ 387,000) from the bank on the eve of student demonstration. The implication was that

26. Bhabani Sen Gupta in 'China as a threat', World Focus Nov-Dec. 1989.

the money was used to organize protests. Whereas the embassy countered that the money was withdrawn to pay pensions to Gorkha soldiers.²⁷

When Birendra government attempted to check the crisis, both V. P. Singh and Rajiv Gandhi made statements condemning the crackdown and described the measures as state violence. Various Indian political parties also gave encouragement and reportedly, financial support to the Nepali Congress and other parties. The Indian Janata party leader Chandrashekhar (who later became the prime minister of India) in a statement at a Nepali Congress meeting which commenced in January 9 at Kathmandu promised to help the Nepalis in their struggle to overthrow the present panchayat system in Nepal.

As a result of the mass movement encouraged and supported by India, Birendra in the end had to climb down. He dissolved the National Panchayat, lifted the 30 year-old ban on political parties, and asked opposition leaders to form a multi-party coalition government. On April 1990, the Nepali Congress Party's acting President, K. P. Bhattarai, was sworn in as prime minister. All these marked changes in the policy contingencies.

The new government signed the treaty complying with the Indian demands. Nepal's compliance at this phase represent compulsive subjugation as shown by the line C in figure 6.1. The preceding analysis reveals that India not only secured compliance but was also able to reduce the level of Nepal's capability to resist. Besides diminished effectiveness of geopolitical leverage, India successfully manipulated the popular pressure as an NTPR working against it. More importantly, India successfully removed the king and his leadership strength (an NTPR) from the vital position of decision making ²⁸ Hence, given

27. Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 May 1989, p. 25.

28. The King is now only a nominal head of state

the decline in capability to resist (based on NTPRs), Nepal's compliance at this stage may only be categorized as compulsive subjugation.

The analysis in this section reveals that Nepal with the help of non-tangible power resources remain defiant only to a limited extent. It also indicates that perhaps Nepal could have remained defiant a little longer (i.e., move the point X further) if it had commanded some tangible power resources such as stronger economy, or if it had been able to mobilise wider diplomatic support. But by now the attention of the World was focussed on the collapse of Soviet power.

EXTENT OF BANGLADESH'S NON-COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR

The discussion on the previous chapter on Bangladesh showed that the Mujib government was more or less compliant to India. There was a considerable convergence of interests between the government of Bangladesh and the government of India. The Awami League government subscribed to Indian political views and ideologies which in turn led India to consider Mujib as a loyal friend and Bangladesh as a faithful ally of India and believe that Bangladesh would subscribe to India's view of the world. But unlike the Awami League government, the governments of Zia and Ershad were defiant towards India.

Given their motivations to defy, these two governments used their capabilities to resist (based on NTPRs) the dominant power. The NTPRs which constituted the capability to resist for these two governments were leadership strength, people's power and external political support. Given a certain policy contingency framework, these elements acted as a countervailing force only upto a certain limit, beyond which their effectiveness tended to

diminish. The outcome of Bangladesh's efforts to resolve the Farakka dispute (in its favour) exemplify the limit to which Bangladesh is capable of defying India with the help of its NTPR. Analysis of Bangladeshi behaviour from 1975-1990 suggests a build up stage, two consecutive sullen retreats and a state of stalemate. Let us examine the extent of Bangladesh's NCB in some detail.

The government of Ziaur Rahman, after assuming power in 1975, had been increasingly defiant towards India. This government possessed both the motivation to defy and the capability to resist (based on NTPRs). Consequently, at the initial phase, Bangladesh's non-compliance went to the build-up stage as shown in figure 6.1. Zia's government persisted in pursuing policies which were far less receptive to Indian sentiments and concerns. The condemnation of the peace and friendship treaty concluded by the Awami league government, the amendment of the constitution which transformed the country from the status of a secular nation to that of a Islamic state and from socialism to free economy, the warming up of relationship with the Muslim countries and Pakistan, the United States and China, the internationalising of the water issue are all instances of non-compliance in the build up stage. Bangladesh at this stage amassed all possible capabilities to back up its non-compliant stances against India. As is shown in the previous chapter, Bangladesh became stronger in terms of leadership strength, gained external political support by coming out of the Indo-Soviet axis and diversifying its external relations and utilising them in its own favour. An additional resource during this stage was the presence of strong anti-Indian feeling. One notices that as Bangladesh went on increasing its power profile (of course with the non-tangible power elements), its defiance continued to increase. India, who was already apprehensive as a result of the change over of power in 1975, hardened its attitude and behaviour in response to

Bangladesh's continued defiance. India began to take measures and increasingly exerted greater pressure on Bangladesh. For example, India began to provide political asylum to the opponents of Zia regime and started to assisting and arming them so that they may undertake armed incursions across the Indo-Bangladesh border. Moreover, Indian patronage and assistance to the insurgents in Chittagong Hill Tracts despite Bangladesh's repeated protests made the country increasingly vulnerable and politically unstable. Independent reports published in 1988 also confirmed the involvement of the Indian Intelligence Agency, RAW in anti-state activities in Bangladesh.²⁹

At the same time, India also started extracting water unilaterally from the Ganges. Bangladesh protested that "India cannot unilaterally withdraw waters from common rivers without due regard to the consequences downstream."³⁰ The then foreign minister of Bangladesh Prof. Shamsul Haq expressed concerns about India's unilateral action, citing Indian Press Reports which described the Ganges as an Indian river. The new regime said that India was using the Farakka dispute to upset the country to impose a more pliant regime. Despite the pressures, Bangladesh's remained unchanged in its defiant stance. It rejected the link canal proposal of India and handed over a report to India categorically stating that the "link canal proposal is legally unjustifiable, technically impractical, economically and ecologically disastrous" and that "it is untenable and above all unnecessary."³¹ India continued to put counter pressure on Bangladesh. When Bangladesh insisted for negotiations India adopted stalling techniques and expressed apathy towards the issue. All bilateral negotiations failed. Bangladesh needed

29. Asia Year Book, 1989, p. 128.

30. New York Times, 6 October, 1976.

31. Dawn, 30 January, 1981.

something more potent to arrive at a solution acceptable to it. Despite India's dislikings, Bangladesh began to internationalize the water issue. As a result of its efforts there was a growing awareness in the international community regarding Bangladesh's water problems. Financial Times of London wrote that Bangladesh was trying to secure help to dissuade India from withdrawing large amounts of water from the Ganges.³² Dawn mentioned that India's unilateral withdrawals indicated its insistence on upper riparian country's privilege of acting arbitrarily.³³ The People's Daily stated that since the change over of power in Bangladesh, India had been disregarding the vital issue of life and death and had been putting pressure on Bangladesh through withdrawing water unilaterally.³⁴ To muster diplomatic support Bangladesh took the issue to Islamic Conference and Commonwealth summit. In addition to seeking international support, the most significant step that it took was seeking international mediation by taking the water issue to the United Nations. Bangladesh requested in the General Committee meeting of the United Nations on 23 September 1976 to include the Farakka problem in the agenda of the General Assembly and to allocate it to Special Political Committee. India opposed this by arguing that the issue was bilateral. The Soviets also took to India's side and expressed their reservations. But Bangladesh received general support from the countries of all regions and succeeded to have the issue incorporated inspite of opposition from India and Soviet Union. However, in the face of Indian counter lobbying, Bangladesh failed to get what it wanted from the special political committee i.e., international mediation to arrive at a solution acceptable to it. That Bangladesh's move was frustrated by Indian counter-lobbying may be

32. Z. A. Khan, (ed.), Basic Documents on Farakka Conspiracy, Dacca, 1977, p. 185.

33. Ibid., p. 185.

34. Ibid. p. 179.

evidenced by the statement of the then Defence Minister of India Jagjivan Ram on 10 August 1977 when he reminded Rajya Sabha that a stage had come when Bangladesh had taken the issue to the UN and that it was due to the efforts of the friends of the non-aligned nations the issue could be brought back to the bilateral negotiations.³⁵ In the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly no significant debate took place except Bangladesh's presentation of its case and India's reiteration of its position that the problem was bilateral. According to B. M. Abbas,

Most of the countries either because they were not familiar with the subject which was totally new to UN or because of their unwillingness to displease Bangladesh or India were not prepared to participate in the debate. A few countries such as Upper Volta, Syria, Paraguay, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China were prepared to participate in the general debate, but they were hesitant to speak out before ascertaining how the issue would develop and consequently were unwilling to be the first.³⁶

Bangladesh realised that although some countries might have informally appreciated its cause, in international politics being sympathetic did not imply correspondence of interests. For Bangladesh it was a sort of political lesson to be aware of the realities of its position. Being one of the poorest countries of the world and dependent heavily on foreign financial assistance it did not have any effective influence to bear upon the political interest

35. Statesman, 10 August 1977.

36. Abbas, B. M., The Ganges Water Dispute, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1984, p. 59-60.

groups in the international arena in support of its cause, genuine or otherwise.³⁷

Although external political support (EPS) failed to secure for Bangladesh what it had expected from the United Nations exercise, it did eventually help it obtain favourable terms in the 1977 Agreement on water. After the UN exercise, India realised that sympathy of the neutral observers was for Bangladesh. Jagjivan Ram's statement in the Rajya Sabha on 10 August 1977 confirms it. In his statement he told the members of the Rajya Sabha to remember that in the international forum the sympathy was for the weaker party (Bangladesh).³⁸ In addition, as India stressed on bilateralism in the UN, it was under the obligation to prove to the international community that bilateralism works. India's realization of international community's support for Bangladesh and its obligation to prove the effectiveness of bilateralism led to India's softening of its attitude to some extent. Hence, it may be inferred that as a result of Bangladesh's international exercise to gain EPS, India became relatively more responsive and willing to consider Bangladesh's position. What followed next was a process of hard and intense negotiation. Finally, Bangladesh was able to conclude a water agreement in 1977 with some favourable terms with the help of its NTPRs.

Following its success in concluding a favourable agreement, Bangladesh continued to strengthen relations with other countries particularly with the muslim countries, Pakistan and China. During this period Bangladesh forged closer cooperation with the neighbouring South Asian countries and campaigned for the creation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India had always remained apprehensive of

37. Begum, Khurshida, Tension over the Farakka Barrage: A Techno Political Tangle in South Asia, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1988, p.172.

38. Statesman, 10 August 1977.

Bangladesh's diversification of relation particularly with China and Pakistan. It viewed Bangladesh's move for the creation of SAARC with great suspicion and considered the smaller South Asian neighbours as banding together against it. India also became suspicious on Bangladesh's proposal to include Nepal in resolving water dispute. Since, bilateralism, rather than multilateralism offered India greater freedom to manoeuvre, it opposed Bangladesh's proposal. In fact all these took place within the back drop of an hardened attitude of Congress government which succeeded the Janata government.

India once again began to mount counter pressure on Bangladesh and Bangladesh proceeded towards point X. For example, Hasina Wajed, daughter of Shiekh Mujibur Rahman returned to Bangladesh from her asylum in India. It was believed by political analysts in Bangladesh that India engineered her return to destabilise Zia government.³⁹ Pressure was increased almost simultaneously. As a result of the changes in policy contingencies we have a sullen retreat in Bangladesh's behaviour. It complied temporarily perceiving itself unable to contain further Indian pressure with the help of its NTPRs.

This instance of sullen retreat is related to the ownership claims over the newly formed island of South Talpatty or as the Indians called 'New Moore' island. This small island was formed in the estuary of Haribhanga river out of silt depositions. The mainstream of the river marked the border between the two countries. As the river enters the Bay of Bengal it divides itself into several branches. The disagreement as to which branch constitutes the mainstream, gave rise to conflicting ownership claims. It may be mentioned here that the island was first noticed in 1971 by the Indian navy and its

39. Author's interview with a Bangladeshi political analyst.

position was notified to the British and American navies so that it could be included as part of India on charts of the area. Bangladesh in a white paper detailing its position said, "This was at a time when the people of Bangladesh were engaged in a life and death struggle during its war of independence." However, Bangladesh pointed out that the former Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai had agreed to a joint survey of the island. If that survey showed that the island belonged to India, one Bangladesh official indicated his country would give up its claim.⁴⁰ But the government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi questioned whether Mr. Desai ever agreed to a joint survey and instead offered data from its own survey that it said proved the island belongs to India.⁴¹

In May 1981, Indian naval ships carrying helicopters landed troops, built settlements and hoisted Indian flags on the New Moore Island. Bangladesh asked India to withdraw personnel it had landed on the island and dismantle settlements built there. In reply an Indian spokesman in New Delhi said that the question did not arise because the island was Indian territory.

Former editor of Indian newspaper *Hindustan Times*, Mr. B. G. Verghese, in an article published in India's *Mainstream* wrote: "India's procedure in New Moore (South Talpatty) Island has not merely aggravated relations with Bangladesh but must have undoubtedly alarmed Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Whatever procedure India adopted to assert its claim on the island smacked of chauvinism."⁴²

40. International Herald Tribune, 14 September 1981.

41. Ibid.

42. Quoted in Dawn, 26 July, 1981.

Bangladesh denounced this action of India as 'naked aggression'.⁴³ Prof. Shamsul Huq, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh said that if India refused to honour its agreements and not remove its armed crafts, personnel, structures, materials and flags from South Talpatty Island, Bangladesh would decide on adopting "appropriate measures as the situation warranted."⁴⁴ Leaders of various political parties of Bangladesh, labour and student's union and other organisations also denounced the Indian action and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Indians from the area. The demonstrators also burned the effigy of Indira Gandhi and raised anti-Indian slogans.

Subsequently, it was reported that Bangladesh intervened militarily. Bangladeshi gunboats evoked responses from India. But Indian naval show down was so formidable that Bangladesh immediately withdrew. As *Daily Telegraph* reported, "Bangladeshi gun boats were said to be nosing around the island to try to frighten off the Indian Army contingent based there, and finally New Delhi sent there a gun boat of its own - or, rather a warship. The Bangladeshis have faced down "Big Sister" and continue their claims."⁴⁵

Bangladesh's move to withdraw its gun boats was clearly a sullen retreat. Bangladesh here had just reached Point X (figure 6.1). Given the Indian military strength, continued military presence of Bangladesh in the island or engagement with Indian navy would have meant evoking such response from India which Bangladesh could not in anyway contain. So Bangladesh decided to retreat thereby complying temporarily. Since, following the incident, India did not attempt to size down Bangladeshi capability to resist

43. International Herald Tribune, 14 September, 1981.

44. Quoted in Dawn, 29 May, 1981.

45. Daily Telegraph, 25 May 1981.

(based on NTPRs), Bangladesh's behavioural expression cannot be labelled as compulsive subjugation.

Following this sullen retreat we have another one rather in a quick succession. This time it was related to the water dispute. Although EPS had helped Bangladesh achieve some favourable terms in the 1977 Agreement, in essence, it (along with other NTPR) did not enable it to resolve the problem permanently. As the agreement was drawn for five years, it meant that rather than solving it permanently the problem was only deferred until a later date. It will be recalled from the foregoing chapter that the Congress Party was all along very critical of the agreement. Given that the Congress Party was in power with all its strong attitudes towards Bangladesh, Bangladesh could envisage nothing but trouble after the expiry of the agreement in November, 1982. The experiences of dry season during 1975-77 terrified Bangladesh of the prospect of not having any agreement. All these marked changes in policy contingencies. The new government of Bangladesh realised that point X was about to be reached and if Bangladesh did not comply with India then it might have to pass through severe conditions of dry season again. Therefore, after the military government of Ershad came to power in March 1982, the dialogue towards normalization of the relationship between the two countries was initiated. In October 1982, Ershad paid an official visit to India and held a meeting with Indira Gandhi. In that meeting, a 'Memorandum of Understanding -1982' on the water issue was signed between the two governments in which the 80% "Guarantee Clause" of Bangladesh's share of the Ganges water in the water Agreement of 1977 was dropped. These developments indicate a softening of Bangladesh's position by way of complying with the Indian demand. Hence, this may again be described as 'sullen retreat' on the part of Bangladesh. The Indian threat of non-renewal of the 1977 agreement forced Bangladesh to comply. However, it did not curtail

Bangladesh's non-tangible power resources- leadership strength, external political support and people's power all remained unchanged. As the Indian counter-pressure did not affect the level of capability to resist (based on NTPRs), Bangladesh's behavioural response cannot be said to be compulsive subjugation (Line C in figure 6.1).

But after these two consecutive sullen retreats the subsequent developments showed that Bangladesh's non-compliance was resumed. The expulsion of the Soviet diplomats for their 'prejudicial activities' in Bangladesh, the strengthening of relationship with the muslim states, its role in the United Nations and Non-Aligned Movement, and its firm stand on Afghanistan and Kampuchea all testify to its non-compliant stance.

In 1983, Indian security forces blockaded Angarpota and Dahagram -- two Bangladeshi enclaves surrounded by Indian territory. About 12,000 people faced starvation due to this blockade. New Nation, an independent English Daily of Bangladesh in a despatch from Panbari reported that some of the Bangladeshi citizens mortgaged their land to Indian citizens to raise money for living since they could not come to the main part of Bangladesh for work.

Despite pressures Bangladesh went on asserting itself against India by diversifying its relationship with United States and the developed countries of the West. It also demanded a permanent treaty on the water issue and intensified its efforts at internationalizing the Farakka dispute. It also rejected Indian assistance during the flood by returning the Indian helicopters sent to help flood victims. Given the policy contingency framework, the events after the expiry of the MOU of 1982 in April, 1984 suggest a state of stalemate in Bangladesh's behavioural expression. If India had signed a permanent agreement; or if India had renewed the agreement according to Bangladesh's desire everytime it expired; or if Bangladesh had acceded to Indian demands

of its share of water and link canal proposal; or if Bangladesh had abandoned its proposal to incorporate Nepal in the water talks, then we could not have maintained that Bangladesh was in a state of stalemate. But none of these happened, India did not sign a permanent agreement and did not renew the agreement when Bangladesh asked for or the way Bangladesh desired it. When Bangladesh requested for an extension of the 1982 MOU after its expiry on April 1984, India remained silent on the issue. India once again adopted stalling techniques and Bangladesh once again went through a terrible dry season (1984-85). However, subsequently the MOU was again extended in 1985 for another three years term. After the expiry of the extension period of the MOU in October 1988, Bangladesh on several occasions approached India to reach a new agreement but India did not respond. In December 1988, Bangladesh also proposed a permanent treaty with terms similar to that of the MOU, but India again refused. Despite repeated efforts no agreement was reached after the expiry of the MOU in October 1988, and Bangladesh continued to pass through terrible dry seasons. These events illustrated that Bangladesh did not achieve further (than defying India by refusing to accept what India had demanded) with the help of its NTPR. Then again, Bangladesh did not comply significantly. Bangladesh consistently refused to accept India's demand for water at its expense and consistently refused to accept India's link canal proposal. Referring to the link canal proposal, Rajiv Gandhi had reportedly said once that: "We will dry and pour at our will unless you agree to the link-canal."⁴⁶ But still Bangladesh did not accede to Indian demand and continued to bear the adversities caused by India's withdrawal of water throughout several dry seasons. It may be mentioned here that although there was a change of government during 1981-82, Bangladesh's NTPRs (i.e., leadership strength, external political support and

46. Quoted in Courier, 16-22 February 1990.

people's power) during this phase (i.e., Ershad regime) remained more or less same as the earlier phase (i.e., Zia regime). In addition to NTPR, Bangladesh during Ershad's regime also had the motivation to defy.

Under the prevailing policy contingency framework, Bangladesh with its capability to resist (based on NTPRs), was only able to defy India by refusing to accept what India had demanded of it but failed to defy further by asserting its will on India and achieve its goal of an acceptable share of water on a long term basis. This revealed extent of Bangladesh's non-compliance i.e., it was only able to refuse to accept what India had demanded of it. Bangladesh's level of defiance remained constant through 1984 to 1990. It did neither comply nor did it defy further (despite its wishes) with the help of its capability to resist (based on NTPRs). This characterized a state of stalemate. India did not break the stalemate perhaps because it had nothing to lose as a result of the stalemate; in fact it was Bangladesh who had to swallow the effects of the stalemate.

CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

There is a saying in South Asia that if you live in a river with a crocodile you should not fight him, but we have seen instances where Nepal and Bangladesh have defied popular wisdom by scuffling with the crocodile. In its relationship with both Bangladesh and Nepal, India is undoubtedly powerful. Nevertheless, the disposition of the small states to non-comply the big state is not inhibited. Their smallness did not deter them from registering their grievances and carving out an independent status for themselves even to the annoyance of the big power. They have proved that they are not India's preserve. Nehru in his 'Discovery of India' had once written that the 'small nation state is doomed; it may survive as a cultural autonomous area but not as an independent political entity.' But history has proved otherwise. The small states have not only survived, they also challenge the status quo. The small states under study have been non-compliant and declined to yield to the wishes of the powerful on issues which impinged on their very survival (physically, economically and politically). The issues themselves were compelling and, as such, Nepal and Bangladesh were left with no choice but to stand up with the kind of behaviour unexpected by the big power, over trade and transit issues in the case of Nepal and, in the case of Bangladesh, water rights.

The trade and transit treaties of Nepal signed with India in 1950, 1960, 1971 and 1978 regulated Nepal's trade and transit with India and rest of the world. These treaties were a source of constant conflict between the two countries because India used these treaties to maintain its economic edge

over Nepal, while adopting various measures to negotiate for liberalizing the provisions of the treaties in its own favour.

One of the serious consequences of Nepal's landlockedness combined with the virtual imperviousness of the Himalayan range on the north, is that its trade transactions have to remain almost confined to India. These geographical determinants also mean that Nepal has to depend on India absolutely for the access to the sea needed for extending its economic relations beyond India with the rest of the world. India, therefore, enjoys an exclusive and asymmetrical economic advantage in transactions with Nepal. This Indian advantage is not only a result of Nepal's landlockedness but also a product of the sheer influence of a far stronger contiguous economy. Hence, it is not surprising to notice citations in the literature describing Nepal as an 'appendage of the broader Indian economy'. Despite, these deterministic realities, Nepal has time and again strongly defied India when the issue was vital to its survival. 'In its economic and trade policies, Nepal faces the "hallmarks of vulnerabilities" that Singer has pointed elsewhere.'¹ Thus a country, which is already vulnerable, cannot afford to yield to the big power's demands when such a demand increases its vulnerability. While the big power's intention is hegemonic, the small power's interest is economic survival. For a small land-locked country like Nepal, which is struggling to develop the fate of its people, economic relations with India is certainly an issue where the very survival of Nepal is at stake .

In addition, the small states also defied when the ruling party was disinclined towards India. The incompatibility of the political outlook of the

1 Kumar, Dhruba, 'National Security and Foreign Policy of Nepal', in Kamal. P. Malla (ed.) Nepal: Perspectives on Continuity and Change, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Kathmandu, 1989, p. 382.

ruling parties of Nepal and Bangladesh with Indian interests led them to follow independent paths and thereby defy India. Behaviours such as discarding special relations with India and the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and Pakistan were examples of disinclination determining Nepal's defiant stance. The rejection of assistance from India during the floods of 1988 when Bangladesh returned the Indian helicopters sent to help flood victims, speaks of its disinclination towards India. Further, in some instances the ambition of rulers determined the defiant stance of both Nepal and Bangladesh. The introduction of the Panchayet form of government and the participation in the international forums were instances in which Nepali defiance was determined by the ruler's ambition. A similar example in case of Bangladesh is its initiative to create SAARC.

This study also shows that Nepal and Bangladesh are not solely reactive; their behavioural repertoire is not devoid of initiative. The diversification of relationships, the introduction of the Panchayat form of government, the separation of the trade and transit treaties, the proposal to declare Nepal a zone of peace are examples of initiative non-compliant behaviour in the foreign policy of Nepal. Examples can also be cited from Bangladesh foreign policy behaviour of initiative behaviour such as diversification of its external relationships, internationalizing the water issue, and so on.

Validity of Theory

Conventionally, the behaviour of the small states have been seen from traditional power perspective. As such, it has been widely believed that the small states cannot determine their own conduct. This kind of belief stems from the notion that since they lack the traditional components of power

they are but pawns in the game of great powers. They do what they are told and compliance has been seen as the only expression of their behaviour. But this has not always been the case . We have seen that as empires disintegrate, big states crumble, more and more small states are emerging and challenging the widely recognised laws of power politics.

As a matter of fact, the 'realist' paradigm in international relations has treated non-compliance as the monopoly of the big states. This is because of the treatment of power as a universal phenomena. But it does not contribute to our understanding of why some small states prevail over their bigger counterparts when our general knowledge suggest that they be otherwise? What about the anomalies that clash with the prevailing conventional belief?

This indicates the inadequacy of an universal conception of power and the usefulness of contextual analysis of power. According to the contextual analysis of power, the motivation of the power wielder and the infungibility of the power resources offer a framework for understanding small states' non-compliance. The relationship of non-compliance of the small state with the big state is contingent on both the states involved in the interaction. According to this framework, certain conditions are likely to generate a small state's motivation to defy a big state. The motivation to defy is generated because under some conditions the small state perceives certain moves of the big state as threats to its goals, aspirations and interests. *Vitalness of issues, ambition of the ruler and the political tilt of the ruling party* were the conditions that constituted motivation of Nepal and Bangladesh to defy India. The conditions that generated the motivation to defy, ascribe meaning to the power resources as means to demonstrate non-compliance. The power resources which constituted capability to resist, were also contingent on the big state (i.e., the target of small state's defiance) for their effectiveness.

Popular pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political support and geo-political leverage were the power resources that constituted Nepal and Bangladesh's *Capability to Resist*. According to the contextual framework, the conditions of motivation to defy offer the answer to the *why* of non-compliance while, given these conditions, the power resources offer the answer to the *how* of non-compliance of Nepal and Bangladesh.

As a 'middle-level theory', a contextual framework is context bound. The theoretical significance of this framework is that, despite its contextual character, it is at the same time, a plausible conceptual organiser that facilitated the understanding of the specific incidents of NCB of Nepal and Bangladesh.

This research has demonstrated that non-compliance exists in the behavioural repertoire of the small states despite the fact that they are the weaker partner (in the conventional sense) in the international system. But, given a certain policy contingency framework, a small state with no tangible power resources can not sustain non-compliance in its interaction with a big state. Within such a policy contingency framework, the big state with all its tangible power resources, brings measures to bear upon the small state until the small state finds it can no longer resist. Hence, most small states can only go up to certain extent in demonstrating non-compliance in their behaviour.

Thus throughout the research, we have observed that under certain policy contingency frameworks, the small states behave more or less like their bigger counterparts, but their limited power capability does not take them as far as it takes the bigger states. Their non-tangible power capabilities put limits to their behaviour. Since most small states cannot sustain non-compliance for long, scholars who see the world through big power lenses

are reluctant to recognise that except for the differences in capability (within policy contingency framework), there is no essential behavioural difference between the big and small state, and thus miss an opportunity to learn more about the basic nature of world politics from studying the behaviour of small states.

It may, thus, be said that the behaviour of the small states is not fundamentally different from that of big states. To suggest that the behaviour of small states is essentially different is a mistake. Rather it is something which enable us to see more clearly how big states behave.

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APPENDIX 1

TABLE SHOWING THE DEFENCE PROFILE OF INDIA, BANGLADESH AND NEPAL.

	INDIA		BANGLADESH		NEPAL
POPULATION	778 million		104.27 million		18 million
TOTAL ARMED FORCES					
Regular	1,265,000		107,000		35,000
Terms of service	voluntary		voluntary		voluntary
Reserves	Army	200,000	Bangladesh Rifles	30,000	None Organised
	Territorial Army	40,000			
	Air Force (Regular, Air Defence, Auxiliary)	exist, strengths unknown			
ARMY	1,100,000		93,000.		34,800.
	<p>IIQ: 5 Regional Command (=Field Army), 8 Corps.</p> <p>2 armoured divisions (Type: 2 tank, 1 mechanised brigades, self propelled artillery, engineer regiments)</p> <p>1 mechanised division (Type: 3 mechanised brigades, self propelled artillery, engineer regiments)</p> <p>22 infantry divisions (Type: 3 infantry brigades [9 battalion], artillery, engineer regiments; heavy divisions may have 4 or 5 brigades)</p> <p>7 mountain divisions (Type: 3 brigades, mountain artillery, engineers)</p> <p>19 independent brigades : 7 armoured, 10 infantry, 1 mountain, 1 parachute/ commando.</p>		<p>5 infantry division IIQ.</p> <p>13 infantry brigades.</p> <p>2 armoured regiments.</p> <p>6 artillery regiments.</p> <p>6 engineer battalions.</p>		<p>1 Royal Guard Brigade: including 1 cavalry sqn, 1 garrison battalion. 5 infantry brigades: including Airborne battalion.</p> <p>1 support brigade: 1 artillery regiment, 1 engineer battalion, 1 signals regiment, 1 cavalry sqn.</p>

Appendix 1 Contd. ...

	INDIA	BANGLADESH	NEPAL
	<p>4 army artillery brigades. 4 air defence brigades 3 army engineer brigades These formations comprise: 46 tank regiments. 17 mechanised, 329 infantry battalions. 9 parachute/ commando battalions. 164 artillery regiments: 1 heavy, 5 multiple rocket launchers, 50 medium (including 5 self propelled), 69 field (including 3 self propelled), 39 mountain. 29 Anti-aircraft regiments, perhaps 10 surface to air missile group (3-5 batteries each). Avn: 29 air observation/ fire control flts.</p>		
EQUIPMENT			
Tanks:	2,790 (500 in reserve); 1,040 T-54/55 (800 to be mod), 350 T-72, 1, 250 Vijayanta. light:150 PT-76.	20 Chinese Type-59, 30 T-54/-55. Lt: 16 Scorpion (Spares are short; some equipment unserviceable)	
Armoured Fighting Vehicle:	Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle: 600 BMP-1	Reconnaissance: 2 Sultan.	Reconnaissance: 25 Ferret.
Armoured Personnel Carrier:	400 OT-62/-64, 360 BTR-60	24 Sankey AT-104	
Artillery Guns	Some 2,230 (some 90 Self Propelled); 76 mm: 200 Yugoslav M-48; 25-pounder (88mm) : 800 (retiring); 100mm: 185 M-1944; 105 mm : 340 includes 60 <i>Abbot</i> Self Propelled;	Guns/Howitzer: 105 mm: 30 Model 56 pack, 50 M-101; 122 mm: 20 Type-54.	

	INDIA	BANGLADESH	NEPAL
	130 mm : 500 M-46 (some 100 Self Propelled); 5.5-in (140 mm): 140 (retiring)		
Howitzer	1, 658 : 75 mm : 75/24 mountain; 105 mm : (including M-56 pack).		75 mm: 6 pack; 3.7-in. (94mm): 5 mountain; 105 mm: 6 pack.
Multiple Rocket Launcher	120mm : 120 BM-21	Nil.	
Mortar	81 mm; 120 mm : 500; 160 mm : 50.	81mm; 120mm: 50 Type-53. 16 81 mm.	4.2-in (107mm): 4; 120mm: 18.
Anti Tank	Recoilless launcher 57mm : M-18; 84 mm: Carl Gustav; 106 mm: M-40. gun : 6 pounder (57mm)	Recoilless launcher 106mm: 30 M-40. guns: (57mm): 18 6-pdr; 76mm: Ch Type-54.	Nil
Anti Tank Guided Weapon	SS-11-B1, milan, AT-3 Sagger.	Nil	Nil
Air Defence			
Guns	2,665 : 23mm : 180 ZSU 23-2, 50 ZSU- 23-4 Self Propelled; 40mm : 1,245 L40/60, 790 L40/70; 3.7-in. (94mm) : 500.		40mm: 2 L/60.
Surface to Air Missiles	120 SA-6, SA-7, 48 SA-8A, SA-9, 18 Tiger Cat Launchers	12 Rapier/Blindfire.	
NAVY	55, 000 including naval air force	7,500	Nil
Bases	Western Fleet: Bombay, Goa, Kerwar (building). Southern Fleet: Cochin. Eastern Fleet: Vishakapatnam, Port Blair.	Chittagong (HQ), Dhaka, Khulna, Chalna, Muara.	
Submarines	8 Soviet F- Class.	Nil	
Carriers	1 British Majestic (capacity 18 attack, 4 Anti-submarine warfare aircraft- helicopter)	Nil.	
Destroyers	3 Soviet Kashin II Guided Weapon with 4 Styx Surface to surface missiles, 2 twin SA-N-1 Surface to air missile, 1 Kamovka- 25 helicopter	Nil	

	INDIA	BANGLADESH	NEPAL
Frigates	23 : 2 Godavari (modified Leander) with 2 Styx Surface to surface missiles, 1 SA-N-4 Surface to air missile, 2 Westland-Sikorsky Sea King helicopter : 6 British Leander (4 with 2 Quad, 2 with 1 Quad Seacat Surface to air missile, 1 Alouette or Sea King); 2 British whilby with 3 Styx Surface to surface missile, 1 SA-316B Alouette helicopter; 10 Soviet Petya II; 3 British Leopard (Training)	3 British (1 Type 61, 2 Type 41)	
Corvettes	4 : 3 Soviet <i>Nanuchka</i> II with 4 SS-N-2 Surface to surface missile, 1 SA-N-4 Surface to air missile; 1 <i>Veera</i> .		
Fast Attack Craft (Gun)	14 : 6 Soviet Osa-I, 8 Osa-II with 4 Styx Surface to surface missile.	4 O-24 (Chinese <i>Hegu</i>) with 2 HY-2 SSM. 3 Waspada each with 2 Exocet MM-38 SSM. Fast Attack Craft (Patrol): 14:6 Chinese Hainan; 8 Chinese Shanghai II. Fast Attack Craft (Torpedo): 4 Type-123 K (P-A) <.	
Patrol Craft	9: 6 SDB-2, 2 Osa-I, 1 Abhay.	6 large: 2 Singapore Meghna, 2 Indian Akshay, 1 Japanese Akaki (modified); 1 Bishkali river. Patrol Boats: 5 Pabna (Kacha) river<. 6:3 <i>Perwira</i> coastal, 3 Rotork.	
MCMV	18: 8 Soviet <i>Natya</i> ocean; 4 British Ham, 6 Soviet <i>Yevgenya</i> <inshore hunters.		

	INDIA	BANGLADESH	NEPAL
Amphibious	Landing ship, tank: 1; Landing craft, tank: 7 (2 Soviet, 5 Pol Polnochny); Landing craft utility : 4.	2 Loadmaster landing craft, 24 infantry assault boats. Support: 3 23-ton utility craft. Misc: 1 training, 1 barracks, 1 logistic support ship, 1 repair vessel, 2 O-69 coastal survey craft.	
NAVAL AIR FORCE	2,000	Nil	
Combat	some 25 aircraft, 25 helicopter.		
Attack	1 squadron with 8 BAe Sea Harrier FRS Mk-51, 2T-60 training		
Anti-Submarine Warfare	1 aircraft sqn with 5 Breguet Alize 1050 (4 in carrier); 5 helicopter sqns with 5 kamov Ka-25 Hormone A (in Kashins), 9 Westland-Sikorsky Sea King, 11 SA-316 B Alouette III (in frigates).	Nil.	
Maritime Reconnaissance	2 sqns: 4 Lockheed L-1049 Super Constellation, 3 Ilyushin Il-38 May, 3 Tupolev Tu-142M Bear.	Nil.	
Communications	1 sqn with 18 BN-2 Defender (2 MR).	Nil.	
Search and Rescue	1 helicopter sqn with 10 Alouette III.	Nil.	
Training	2 sqn: 7 HAL IJT-16 Kiran, 2 BAe Sea Hawk FB-5, 10 BN-2 Islander aircraft; 4 Hughes 300 helicopter.	Nil.	
Other Air Craft includes	5 Alize 1050, 4 Sea King.		

AIR FORCE	INDIA		BANGLADESH		NEPAL	
	110,000		6,500		200	
Combat	728 aircraft; some 60 helicopter, 5 Air Commands		30 aircraft, 6 armed helicopter		Avn: aircraft: 2 Short Skyvan, 1 BAe/HIS-748. Helicopter 6 Chetak (Alouette III), 2 SA-330 Puma: 1 AS-332 Super Puma. 1 logistic brigade: including 1 transport battalion, 1 air sqn (1 aircraft, 1 helicopter flights).	
Bombers	3 sqns (1 maritime role):35 BAe Canberra B (I)58/B(I)12, 18 Sepecat Jaguar.					
Fighter, Ground Attack	11 sqns: 2 with some 24 Dassault Mirage 200 H. 2 with 50 Jaguar GR-1, 6 T-2; 1 with 18 IIAL. 11F-24 Marut (Mikoyan-Guryevich MiG-23 BN); 3 with 72 MiG-23BN Flogger H; 2 with some 24 MiG-27 Flogger D/J. (1 with some 10 BAe J hunter F-56A non-operational-exhibition aircraft only).	2 sqns with 18 Shenyang J-6. Interceptor: 1 sqn with 10 Mikoyan-Guryevich MiG-21 MF, 2 MiG-21U;				
Air Defence	20 sqns: 2 with 45 MiG-23 MF FloggerB; 14 with 259 MiG-21/FL/PFMA/- MF/bis;4 with 72 HAL Ajeet	SAM: 12 Rapier/Blindfire.				
Reconnaissance	2 sqns 1 with 8 Canberra PR-57. 4BAe/HIS-748;1 with 7 MiG-25 R, 1 MiG-25 U					
Transport	aircraft:11 sqns: 5 with 93 Antonov An-32 Sutlej; 2 with 30 An- 12B; 2 with 20 DHC-3 Otter;	1 sqn with 1 Antonov An-24, 4 An-26 (1 Yakovlev Yak-40, 1 Douglas DC-6).(Spares are short; some equipment unserviceable).				

	INDIA	BANGLADESH	NEPAL
	1 with 16 DIIC-4 Caribou; 2 with 28 IIS-748, 2 Boeing 737-248 (leased), 3 Ilyushin IL-76 Gajraj; helicopters 6 sqns with 72 Mil Mi- 8/-17.	1 sqn with 9 Bell (7 212, 2 206 L), 6 Mil. Mi-8, 4 SA-31 6C Alouette III.	
Communications	1 HQ sqn with 7 BAe/ IIS-748M.		
Liaison aircraft flights and detachments	16 HS-748, C-47 (Douglas DC-3).		
Liaison helicopter	7 sqns (army- assigned). 3 with 99 SA-316B Chetak (Alouette III); 4 with 60 SA-315B Cheetah (Lama); some with 4 AS-11B ATGW.		
Training Command	3 training and conversion sqns; 11 Canberra T-4/-13/-67, 25 Hunter T-66, 40 MiG-21/U, 13 MiG-23UM Flogger C/I; 5 Jaguar, 7 Mirage 2000 H, 60 IIT-2, 83 Kiran, 15 Marut Mk II, some 20 HAL IPT-32, 44 PZL TS-11 Iskra, 27 BAe/IIS 748 aircraft; 20 Chetak helicopter.	12 Chinese CJ-6, 6 CM-170 Magister, 4 MiG-15 UTL.	
Air-to-Air Missile	R-23R/T Apex, R-60Aphid, R-550 Magic, AA-2A toll.	AA-2 Atoll	

	INDIA	BANGLADESH	NEPAL
Air-to-Surface Missile	AS-30; AS-11B(Anti Tank Guided Weapon), AS-7Kerry(MiG 27).		
Surface-to- Air Missile	30 battalions: 280 Divina V75SM/VK (SA-2), SA-3.		
Counter Insurgency		1 sqn with 6 MBB BO- 105 gunship helicopter. Helicopter; 1 sqn with 10 Bell 212. Composite sqn: 2 SIAL- Marchetti SF-260 aircraft, 2 Bell 206A/B helicopter.	
PARAMILITARY FORCES			
National Security Force	112,000;	55,000	25,000
Border Security Force	90,000; some 90 battalions, small arms , some light artillery, transport/liaison air support.	Bangladesh Rifles 30,000 (border guard). Ansars 20,000.	Police Force (25,000).
Assam Rifles	37,000.		
Indo-Tibetan Border Police	14,000.	Armed Police 5,000.	
Coastguard	2,000; British Type 14 frigates, patrol vessels(2P-957 offshore, 2 SDP-2 fast, 19 inshore); 2 air sqns with 2 Fokker F-27, 5BN-2 Defender aircraft, 4 Chetak helicopter.		

Source: The Europa World Year Book, London, 1993.

Asia Year Book, HongKong, 1993.

IISS, Military Balance: 1990-1991. London, 1992.

APPENDIX 2
DIRECTION OF EXPORTS
Destination of Exports (Millions of US Dollars)

Country	Bangladesh		Nepal		India		Asia		World	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Bangladesh										
1972			--	--	1.86	0.71	20.20	7.70	262.30	100
1973			--	--	23.30	6.53	34.20	9.58	357.00	100
1974			--	--	.40	0.12	13.50	3.90	346.30	100
1975			--	--	5.30	1.62	17.50	5.35	327.10	100
1976			10.70	2.67	7.10	1.77	45.70	11.41	400.40	100
1977			35.20	7.25	1.10	0.22	60.90	12.55	484.90	100
1978			.10	0.02	2.30	0.44	99.40	19.36	513.20	100
1979			.10	0.01	12.10	1.59	103.30	13.64	757.30	100
1980			.50	0.06	8.00	1.01	206.30	26.10	790.20	100
1981			.20	0.02	20.20	2.55	185.20	23.40	791.30	100
1982			.10	0.01	20.30	2.64	207.90	27.07	768.00	100
1983			2.80	0.38	6.90	0.95	125.70	17.35	724.40	100
1984			14.60	1.56	28.30	3.03	180.10	19.33	931.30	100
1985			5.10	0.51	29.60	2.96	146.00	14.6	998.80	100
1986			10.10	1.13	7.70	0.86	117.10	13.17	888.90	100
1987			5.10	0.47	11.00	1.02	132.70	12.32	1,076.80	100
1988			4.60	0.35	8.70	0.67	147.50	11.42	1,291.10	100
1989			10.30	0.78	10.70	0.81	176.90	13.56	1,304.90	100
1990			7.40	0.44	21.70	1.30	168.50	10.07	1,671.80	100
1991			11.50	0.68	22.80	1.35	177.30	10.50	1,687.50	100
1992			.20	0.00	4.20	0.21	197.50	9.68	2,040.30	100

Appendix 2 contd. ...

Appendix 2 contd. ...

Country	Bangladesh		Nepal		India		Asia		World	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Nepal										
1964		-			6.60	92.95	n. a.		7.10	100
1965	-	-			21.60	94.73	n. a.		22.80	100
1966	-	-			12.80	82.21	n. a.		15.20	100
1967	-	-			20.40	75.55	n. a.		27.00	100
1968	-	-			18.20	67.15	n. a.		27.10	100
1969	-	-			-	-	n. a.		-	100
1970	-	-			12.90	62.31	13.30	64.25	20.70	100
1971	-	-			8.90	57.41	9.20	59.35	15.50	100
1972	-	-			12.80	53.11	13.80	57.26	24.10	100
1973	2.60	9.77			14.50	54.51	18.60	69.92	26.60	100
1974	.90	2.74			22.40	68.29	24.10	73.48	32.80	100
1975	n. a.				25.60	68.63	29.70	79.62	37.30	100
1976	n. a.				35.10	68.42	37.50	73.09	51.30	100
1977	n. a.				44.10	61.25	52.50	72.91	72.00	100
1978	.40	0.84			13.50	28.18	17.40	36.33	47.90	100
1979	7.90	11.60			17.30	25.40	31.00	45.52	68.10	100
1980	.90	1.42			19.00	30.06	28.40	44.94	63.20	100
1981	10.70	11.38			39.00	41.49	51.00	54.26	94.00	100
1982	.50	0.72			35.80	51.29	42.20	60.46	69.80	100
1983	n. a.				39.40	47.29	42.60	51.14	83.30	100
1984	n. a.				41.40	45.49	47.50	52.19	91.00	100
1985	n. a.				39.30	28.93	49.40	36.38	135.80	100
1986	n. a.				36.81	27.41	56.67	42.19	134.29	100
1987	.15	0.10			37.19	25.19	44.60	30.20	147.64	100
1988	.01	0.00			40.25	17.15	78.89	33.63	234.58	100
1989	.93	0.50			3.00	1.64	22.35	12.18	183.39	100

Appendix 2 contd. ...

Appendix 2 contd. ...

Country	Bangladesh		Nepal		India		Asia		World	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Year										
1990	1.40	0.65			13.73	6.35	27.43	12.68	216.31	100
1991	.12	0.05			17.45	6.78	29.84	11.60	257.31	100
1992	.33	0.10			19.19	5.78	30.13	9.08	331.86	100
India										100
1964	--		26.10	1.51			n. a.		1,731.60	100
1965	--		32.00	1.90			n. a.		1,686.10	100
1966	--		37.20	2.31			n. a.		1,607.20	100
1967	--		27.10	1.68			n. a.		1,611.40	100
1968	--		30.30	1.73			n. a.		1,748.10	100
1969	--		n. a.				n. a.		n. a.	100
1970	--		36.21	1.79			197.40	9.75	2024.40	100
1971	--		31.51	1.49			243.50	11.54	2109.77	100
1972	85.59	3.51	45.60	1.87			366.70	15.04	2438.00	100
1973	174.35	5.89	37.44	1.27			333.00	11.25	2958.40	100
1974	70.27	2.20	45.71	1.43			392.40	12.29	3192.00	100
1975	71.20	1.63	59.60	1.37			451.00	10.33	4364.10	100
1976	59.40	1.18	56.80	1.13			464.90	9.26	5020.00	100
1977	44.60	0.70	56.70	0.90			n. a.		6319.50	100
1978	61.00	0.92	70.00	1.06			821.00	12.39	6,627.00	100
1979	98.00	1.28	77.00	1.00			933.00	12.15	7,679.00	100
1980	106.00	1.26	95.00	1.13			971.00	11.50	8,441.00	100
1981	58.00	0.66	79.00	0.89			941.00	10.65	8,833.00	100
1982	39.00	0.40	72.00	0.75			1,119.00	11.60	9,639.00	100
1983	34.00	0.35	79.00	0.82			1,285.00	13.27	9,681.00	100
1984	51.00	0.50	83.00	0.81			1,286.00	12.53	10,257.00	100
1985	56.00	0.57	78.00	0.71			980.00	9.98	9,822.00	100
1986	113.00	1.24	82.00	0.90			1,029.00	11.26	9,135.00	100

Appendix 2 contd. ...

Appendix 2 contd. ...

Country	Bangladesh		Nepal		India		Asia		World	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Year										
1987	145.00	1.34	73.00	0.68			1,228.00	11.37	10,798.00	100
1988	170.00	1.31	82.00	0.63			1,534.00	11.82	12,981.00	100
1989	176.00	1.11	215.00	1.36			2,542.00	16.04	15,839.00	100
1990	297.00	1.67	40.00	0.23			2,154.00	12.14	17,741.00	100
1991	325.00	1.81	77.00	0.43			2,760.00	15.44	17,873.00	100
1992	258.00	1.25	85.00	0.41			3,398.00	16.43	20,683.00	100

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993.

n.a. = not available (form IMF Yearbooks)

DIRECTION OF IMPORTS
Source of Imports (Millions of US Dollars)

Country Year	Bangladesh		Nepal		India		Asia		World	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Bangladesh										
1972			—		94.11	26.40	121.53	34.10	356.41	100
1973			—		114.80	13.15	162.80	18.64	873.30	100
1974			—		82.00	7.47	131.50	11.98	1,097.90	100
1975			—		83.30	6.68	133.80	10.56	1,266.80	100
1976			—		58.50	6.79	95.90	11.13	861.30	100
1977			—		46.60	3.96	120.70	10.25	1,178.10	100
1978			.40	0.03	43.00	2.79	219.40	14.24	1,541.20	100
1979			8.60	0.54	40.00	2.51	290.80	18.24	1,594.00	100
1980			1.00	0.04	55.60	2.13	428.30	16.41	2,610.60	100
1981			11.80	0.45	64.00	2.41	513.40	19.36	2,651.40	100
1982			.50	0.02	43.00	1.78	382.80	15.83	2,418.50	100
1983			n. a.		37.90	1.65	368.40	16.08	2,291.10	100
1984			n. a.		56.50	2.11	703.90	26.34	2,672.80	100
1985			n. a.		61.90	2.29	764.90	28.36	2,697.10	100
1986			—		57.20	2.24	536.30	21.02	2,550.40	100
1987			.20	0.01	74.40	4.30	682.60	39.45	2,730.30	100
1988			—		90.00	2.97	754.00	24.85	3,034.10	100
1989			1.00	0.03	120.70	3.34	963.10	26.64	3,615.00	100
1990			1.50	0.04	170.30	4.66	1,242.10	33.99	3,653.80	100
1991			.10	0.00	189.50	5.53	1,146.80	33.52	3,421.00	100
1992			.40	0.01	283.90	7.61	1,465.00	39.26	3,731.50	100

Appendix 2 Contd. ...

Appendix 2 Contd. ...

Country Year	Bangladesh		Nepal		India		Asia		World	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Nepal										
1964	--				28.70	88.30	--		32.50	100
1965	--				35.20	90.48	--		38.90	100
1966	--				40.90	87.96	--		46.50	100
1967	--				29.80	78.84	--		37.80	100
1968	--				33.30	80.04	--		41.60	100
1969	--				--		--		--	
1970	--				39.50	69.00	40.30	76.18	52.90	100
1971	--				33.60	72.57	33.90	72.21	46.30	100
1972	--				49.70	66.27	52.10	69.46	75.00	100
1973	--				41.20	63.48	43.80	67.48	64.90	100
1974	--				45.00	51.31	56.90	64.88	87.70	100
1975	--				60.60	55.75	70.30	64.67	108.70	100
1976	.10	0.1			62.60	66.80	67.40	71.93	93.70	100
1977	.20	0.18			62.40	55.17	72.10	63.75	113.10	100
1978	.10	0.06			76.70	47.81	98.60	61.47	160.40	100
1979	n. a.				84.70	51.80	101.10	61.83	163.50	100
1980	.50	0.23			104.00	47.55	131.10	59.95	218.70	100
1981	.30	0.13			87.30	37.96	154.00	66.96	230.00	100
1982	.10	0.04			78.60	3.00	158.60	60.53	262.00	100
1983	3.00	1.13			86.50	32.64	166.70	62.91	265.00	100
1984	16.10	6.29			90.80	35.48	151.80	59.32	255.90	100
1985	5.60	1.96			86.30	30.20	157.30	55.03	285.80	100
1986	11.12	3.54			90.25	28.74	177.63	56.57	313.98	100
1987	5.63	1.21			80.14	17.20	213.87	45.91	465.88	100
1988	5.08	0.95			89.93	16.85	269.25	50.45	533.69	100
1989	11.37	2.67			35.57	8.36	224.13	52.69	425.37	100
1990	8.09	1.79			43.49	9.60	234.18	51.72	452.72	100

Appendix 2 Contd. ...

Appendix 2 Contd. ...

Country Year	Bangladesh		Nepal		India		Asia		World	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
1991	12.70	2.54			85.01	17.00	265.30	53.05	500.08	100
1992	.25	0.05			93.51	18.76	286.31	57.43	498.53	100
India										100
1964	--		7.30	0.25			--		2876.00	100
1965	--		23.90	0.82			--		2925.00	100
1966	--		14.20	0.50			--		2827.00	100
1967	--		22.60	0.81			--		2807.00	100
1968	--		20.20	0.81			--		2509.00	100
1969	--		--				--		--	
1970	--		14.75	0.70			55.60	2.65	2094.64	100
1971	--		10.57	0.44			67.43	2.80	2409.37	100
1972	2.01	0.09	14.67	0.66			66.46	2.97	2234.99	100
1973	22.83	0.71	16.01	0.50			102.54	3.17	3233.80	100
1974	10.40	0.21	24.10	0.48			97.80	1.93	5064.10	100
1975	5.10	0.82	28.50	0.46			137.60	2.22	6,197.80	100
1976	9.80	0.19	38.60	0.76			142.10	2.79	5,102.20	100
1977	.50	0.00	48.30	0.76			47.11	0.75	6,310.50	100
1978	3.00	0.04	15.00	0.19			566.00	7.24	7,820.00	100
1979	5.00	0.05	19.00	0.19			592.00	5.98	9,899.00	100
1980	12.00	0.08	21.00	0.14			1,325.00	8.94	14,822.00	100
1981	14.00	0.07	44.00	0.24			1,646.00	9.10	18,086.00	100
1982	22.00	0.12	39.00	0.22			1,609.00	8.89	18,099.00	100
1983	8.00	0.05	43.00	0.26			1,818.00	10.81	16,722.00	100
1984	31.00	0.18	45.00	0.26			2,771.00	15.83	17,502.00	100
1985	33.00	0.10	43.00	0.24			2,008.00	11.38	17,640.00	100
1986	8.00	0.05	40.00	0.27			1,481.00	9.83	15,051.00	100
1987	14.00	0.08	41.00	0.24			1,739.00	10.33	16,841.00	100
1988	15.00	0.08	44.00	0.23			1,996.00	10.43	19,130.00	100

Appendix 2 Contd. ...

Appendix 2 Contd. ...

Country Year	Bangladesh		Nepal		India		Asia		World	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
1989	2.00	0.00	46.00	0.23			2,729.00	13.47	20,264.00	100
1990	15.00	0.06	15.00	0.06			2,676.00	11.17	23,940.00	100
1991	6.00	0.03	19.00	0.09			1,789.00	9.17	19,509.00	100
1992	5.00	0.02	21.00	0.09			2,496.00	10.56	23,638.00	100

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993.

n.a. = not available (from IMF Yearbooks)

APPENDIX 3

Treaty of "Peace and Friendship" between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal.

The Government of India and the Government of Nepal recognising the ancient ties which have happily existed between the two countries for centuries;

Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries;

Have resolved therefore to enter into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with each other, and have, for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following person, namely, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, HIS EXCELLENCY SHRI CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH, Ambassador of India in Nepal; THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RANA, Maharaja, Prime Minister and Supreme-Commander-in-Chief of Nepal, who have examined each other's credentials and found them good and in due form have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.

ARTICLE 2

The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 3

In order to establish and maintain the relations referred to in Article 1 the two Governments agree to continue diplomatic relations with each other by means of representatives with such staff as is necessary for the due performance of their functions.

The representatives and such of their staff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are customarily granted by international law on a reciprocal basis: Provided that in no case shall these be less than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other State having diplomatic relations with either Government.

ARTICLE 4

The two Government agree to appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consul and other consular agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other places in each other's territory as may be agreed to .

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and consular agents shall be provided with exequaturs or other valid authorization of their appointment. Such exequatur or authorization is liable to be withdrawn by the country which issued it, if considered necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated wherever possible.

The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any other State.

ARTICLE 5

The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.

ARTICLE 6

each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development.

ARTICLE 7

The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and privileges of a similar nature.

ARTICLE 8

So far as matters dealt with herein are concerned, this Treaty cancels all previous treaties, agreements, engagements entered into on behalf of India between the British Government and the Government of Nepal.

ARTICLE 9

This Treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both Governments.

ARTICLE 10

The Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year's notice.

Done in duplicate at Kathmandu this 31st day of July, 1950.

(Sd.) CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD

NARAIN SINGH

For the Government of India

(Sd.) MOHUN SHAMSHER

JUNG BAHADUR RANA

For the Government of Nepal

Letter exchanged with the Treaty

KATHMANDU

Dated the 31st July 1950

EXCELLENCY,

In the course of our discussion of the Treaties of Peace and Friendship and of Trade and Commerce which have been happily concluded between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal, we agreed that certain matters of details be regulated by an exchange of letters. In pursuance of this understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments:

(1) Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat, the two Governments shall consult with each other and devise effective counter-measures.

(2) Any arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal that the Government of Nepal may import through the territory of India shall be so imported with the assistance and agreement of the Government of India. The Government of India will take steps for the smooth and expeditious transport of such arms and ammunition through India.

(3) In regard to Article 6 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship which provides for national treatment, the Government of India recognize that it may be necessary for some time to come to afford the Nepalese nationals in Nepal protection from unrestricted competition. The nature and extent to this protection will be determined as and when required by mutual agreement between the two Governments.

(4) If the Government of Nepal should decide to seek foreign assistance in regard to the development of the natural resources of, or of any industrial project in Nepal, the Government of Nepal shall give first preference to the Government or the nationals of India, as the case may be, provided that the

terms offered by the Government of India or Indian nationals, as the case may be, are not less favourable to Nepal than the terms offered by any other Foreign Government or by other foreign nationals.

Nothing in the foregoing provision shall apply to assistance that the Government of Nepal may seek from the United Nations Organisation or, any of its specialized agencies.

(5) Both Governments agree not to employ any foreigners whose activity may be prejudicial to the security of the other. Either Government may make representations to the other in this behalf, as and when occasion requires.

Please accept Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sd.) MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG
BAHADUR RANA
Maharaja, Prime Minister and
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
of Nepal

To
His Excellency
Shri Chandreshwar Prasad Narain Singh,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India
at the Court of Nepal, Indian Embassy,
Kathmandu.

APPENDIX 4

Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Peace Between India and Bangladesh

INSPIRED by common ideals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism and nationalism,

HAVING STRUGGLED together for the realization of these ideals and cemented ties of friendship through blood and sacrifices which led to the triumphant emergence of a free, sovereign and independent Bangladesh,

DETERMINED to maintain fraternal and good-neighbourly relations and transform their border into a border of eternal peace and friendship,

ADHERING firmly to the basic tenets of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence, mutual co-operation, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,

DETERMINED to safeguard peace, stability and security and to promote progress of their respective countries through all possible avenues of mutual co-operation,

DETERMINED further to expand and strengthen the existing relations of friendship between them,

CONVINCED that the further development of friendship and co-operation meets the national interests of both States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

RESOLVED to contribute to strengthening world peace and security and to make efforts to bring about a relaxation of international tension and the final elimination of vestiges of colonialism, racialism and imperialism,

CONVINCED that in the present-day world international problems can be solved only through co-operation and not through conflict or confrontation,

RE-AFFIRMING their determination to follow the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, the Republic of India, on the one hand, and the People's Republic of Bangladesh, on the other, have decided to conclude the present Treaty.

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties, inspired by the ideals for which their respective peoples struggled and made sacrifices together, solemnly declare that there shall be lasting peace and friendship between their two countries and their peoples, each side shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other side.

The High Contracting Parties shall further develop and strengthen the relations of Friendship, good-neighbourliness and all-round co-operation existing between them, on the basis of the above mentioned principles as well as the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

Article 2

Being guided by their devotion to the principles of equality of all peoples and States, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn

colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations and are determined to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate with other States in achieving these aims and support the just aspirations of peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination and for their national liberation.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties reaffirm their faith in the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence as important factors for easing tension in the world, maintaining international peace and security, and strengthening national sovereignty and independence.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both States, through meetings and exchanges of views at all levels.

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually advantageous and all-round co-operation in their economic, scientific and technical fields. The two countries shall develop mutual co-operation in the fields of trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and the most-favoured nation principle.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties further agree to make joint studies and take joint action in the fields of flood control, river basin development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties shall promote relations in the fields of art, literature, education, culture, sports and health.

Article 8

In accordance with the ties of friendship existing between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from any aggression against the other party and shall not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to or constitute a threat to the security of the other High Contracting Party.

Article 9

Each of the High Contracting parties shall refrain from giving any assistance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries.

Article 10

Each of the High Contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, toward one or more States which may be incompatible with present Treaty.

Article 11

The present Treaty is signed for the term of twenty five years and shall be subject to renewal by mutual agreement of the High Contracting Parties.

The Treaty shall come into force with immediate effect from the date of its signature.

Article 12

Any difference in interpreting any article or articles of the present Treaty that may arise between the High Contracting Parties shall be settled on a bilateral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

Done in Dacca on the nineteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

INDIRA GANDHI

SHIEKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN

Prime Minister
for the Republic of India.

Prime Minister
for the People's Republic of
Bangladesh.

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, Bangladesh Documents, Vol.11, New Delhi: Patiala House, 1972, pp.645-648.

APPENDIX 5

Trade Agreement Between India and Bangladesh

28 March 1972

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH,

CONSCIOUS of the urge of their two peoples to enlarge areas of mutual co-operation;

DESIROUS of strengthening economic relations between the two countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;

RECOGNIZING that the common people of both countries should be the beneficiaries of close co-operation between the two Governments in the fields of trade and development;

AWARE that this objective can best be secured by organizing trade between the two countries on a State-to-State basis as far as possible;

HAVE AGREED as follows:-

Article 1

The two Governments recognizing the need and requirements of each other in the context of their developing economies undertake to explore all possibilities for expansion and promotion of trade between the two countries on the basis of mutual advantage.

Article 2

The two Governments agree to an interim trade agreement as set out in Schedule 'A' attached to this Agreement.

Article 3

Imports and Exports of commodities and goods produced or manufactured in India or Bangladesh as the case may be which are not included in Schedule

'A' and, in the case of commodities and goods included in that schedule, imports and exports in excess of the values specified therein shall be permitted in accordance with the import, export and foreign exchange laws, regulations and procedure in force in either country from time to time.

Article 4

In order to meet the day to day requirements of the people living within a sixteen kilometre belt of the border between West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram on the one hand and Bangladesh on the other, and with a view to providing facilities to these people to dispose of their goods, border trade shall be allowed in specified commodities in accordance with Schedule 'B' attached to this Agreement.

Article 5

The two Governments agree to make mutually beneficial arrangements for the use of their waterways, railways and roadways for commerce between the two countries and for passage of goods between two places in one country through the territory of the other.

Article 6

Each Government shall accord to the commerce of the country of the other Government treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the commerce of any third country.

Article 7

The provisions of Article 6 shall not prevent the grant or continuance of :

- (a). privileges which are, or may be, granted by either of the two Governments in order to facilitate frontier trade,
- (b). advantages and privileges which are, or may be, granted by either of the two Governments to any of their respective neighbouring countries,
- (c). advantages resulting from a customs union, a free-trade area or similar arrangements which either of the two Governments has concluded or may conclude in the future,

(d). advantages or preferences accorded under any scheme for expansion of trade and economic co-operation among developing countries, which is open for participation by all developing countries and to which either of the two Governments is or may become a party.

Article 8

The two Governments agree to co-operate effectively with each other to prevent infringement and circumvention of the laws, rules and regulations of either country in regard to matters relating to foreign exchange and foreign trade.

Article 9

The two Governments agree to accord, subject to their respective laws and regulations, reasonable facilities for the holding of trade fairs and exhibitions and visits of business and trade delegations sponsored by the Government concerned.

Article 10

In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, the two Governments shall consult each other as and when necessary and shall review the working of the Agreement at the end of six months from the date of signature.

Article 11

This agreement shall come into force from 28 march 1972, and shall remain in force, in the first instance, for a period of one year.

L. N. MISHRA,
Minister of Foreign Trade,
Government of India.

M. R. SIDDIQUI,
Minister of Trade and Commerce,
Government of Bangladesh

Schedule 'A'

1. The two Governments agree that licences shall, where necessary, be granted in accordance with the laws, regulations and procedures in force in either country from time to time to permit the import or export of the commodities and goods in Lists I and II below, up to the value mentioned against each with a view to balanced trade in commodities of special interest.

2. For the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of paragraph 1, the Local Head Office of the State bank of India at Calcutta and the bank designated by the bank of Bangladesh, dacca, shall open special accounts with each other, to be utilized solely for the purpose of making payments to exporters in either country by the bank incorporated and resident in that country on behalf of its correspondent and resident in that country on behalf of its correspondent in that country. Subject to the laws and regulations as in force in the two countries from time to time, overdraft facilities shall be given by either bank to its correspondent in the other country. In the event of overdraft in either account being in excess of the limit stipulated by the relevant law or regulation as applicable to or in relation to that account, the Government of the country in which the account is maintained will grant a special loan to the bank concerned provided that the total amount of such loan or loans together shall not be in excess of five crores of Indian rupees or five crore of Bangladesh takas. The said loan shall be granted free of interest by the two Governments. In exceptional circumstances the two governments will agree to increase the limit of the loan in order to facilitate the continuance of trade. Such excess over rupees five crores will carry a rate of interest of six per cent. The amount outstanding on the expiry of the agreement shall be settled in Pounds Sterling or in any other manner mutually agreed upon. The Local Head Office of the State bank of India at Calcutta will, in consultation with the bank designated by the Bank of Bangladesh, dacca, finalize the details of

the banking arrangements in pursuance of the provisions of this article which would inter alia provide for adjustments of the overdrafts periodically.

3. In the event of a change in the parity rate of either the Indian rupee or the Bangladesh taka, while these arrangements are in force, the two Governments will consult each other with a view to reaching an agreed solution to the problem of adjustments.

4. Imports and Exports of the commodities and goods in lists I and II above which are in excess of the values shown against them and of commodities and goods which are not included in those lists shall, subject to import, export and foreign exchange laws, regulations and procedures in force in either country from time to time, be financed through authorized dealers in foreign exchange in either country acting through their correspondents in the other country. Subject to the provisions of the exchange regulations in force in the two countries, an authorized dealer may grant to the correspondent in the other country an overdraft to such extent and on such terms and conditions as may be permitted by the Reserve bank of India or the Bangladesh Bank as the case may be. The settlement of amount due to from an authorized dealer from or to the correspondent in accordance with these arrangements will be in Pounds Sterling. The Reserve bank of India and the Bangladesh bank will in consultation with each other endeavour to provide the maximum facilities possible for facilitating the flow of trade in accordance with the provisions of Article 3.

5. Subject to such exceptions as may be made by mutual agreement between the two Governments, commodities and goods imported into one country from the other shall not be re-exported to a third country.

Schedule 'B'

Provisions relating to border trade referred to in article 4 of the Agreement.

1. These facilities shall apply to the trade across the land customs frontiers between West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram on the one hand and Bangladesh on the other.

2. These facilities shall be available only to persons living in areas, other than municipal areas, within sixteen kilometres of the land customs frontiers and holding special permits issued by their respective competent authority.

3. Every person holding such a special permit may carry across the border in each sector only goods and commodities and in such quantities as are specified, in the annexure to this schedule, and for this purpose may cross the border only once a day and only through such routes as may be authorized in this behalf. If market conditions in a locality justify relaxation of the number of days in a week on which persons holding special permits may cross the border in that locality, the additional days shall be mutually agreed between the concerned competent authorities in the two countries.

4. The carriage of such goods shall be free from import, export and exchange control restrictions as well as customs duty and customs formalities.

5. Each person may carry in cash a sum not exceeding rupees one hundred in Bangladesh or India currency when crossing the border from either country into the other.

6. Either Government may maintain such checks and take such preventive measures including the right to search as are considered necessary to ensure that these concessions are not exceeded or abused.

7. These arrangements shall be subject to review after a period of six months to consider whether they should be extended or amended in any way. If even before the expiry of this period of six months either country feels the need to withdraw or modify the facilities under this Agreement, it would enter into

immediate consultations with the other country taking such measures as it may consider necessary.

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, New Delhi: Patiala House, 1972, pp. 648-656.