David Hume's Concept of the Self, with special reference to *A Treatise of Human Nature* Books I and II.

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Summary

The thesis investigates David Hume's concept of the self as it is presented in Book One and Two of the *Treatise of Human Nature*. The center point of the discussion is Hume's understanding of the self as the bundle of perceptions. It will be shown that such an account can maintain identity of the self as an imperfect identity. It will be argued that a distinction must be drawn between self and personhood, both are distinct but interdependent aspects of the individual. These two aspects correspond to the different topics of the two first books of the *Treatise* and are in accordance with Hume's own division of the subject expressed in Book One. The necessity of the distinction will become apparent through the discussion of the problem of self identity in the light of Hume's epistemology and ontology. Considering Hume's theory of perception and his account of the acquisition of the idea of identity it will be argued that memory has to be a criterion of self- as well as of personal identity.

A general discussion of main stream theories of self- and personal identity will provide a contemporary context to which Hume's account of identity can be allocated. It will be shown that Hume's theory of identity can accommodate the combined theory of identity, which maintains mental as well as bodily criteria of self- and personal identity. Therefore it is necessary to establish Hume as a Basic Realist. This can be achieved by firstly, a strict distinction between epistemology and ontology and secondly, by interpreting the first two books of the *Treatise* as a unity. The *Treatise* will also be placed within the context of Hume's other philosophical writings, such as the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* and the *Essays*.

After establishing Hume's account of self- and personal identity and his Basic Realism the discussion focusses on the principle of unity of perceptions. Several candidates will be investigated, by method of elimination. It will be argued that the body can serve as the principle of unity of perceptions. It will be shown that such an understanding of the body accommodates Hume's epistemology and does not contradict the fundamental claims of Hume's philosophy.

The investigation presented in this thesis will show the compatibility of Books One and Two of the *Treatise*. It will become apparent that the failure of Hume's theory of identity does not result from inconsistencies or contradictions between these two Books, but results from the theory of perception itself, which renders memory, one of the criteria of self- and personal identity, theoretically and practically impossible.

The thesis shall contribute to the current debate concerning the philosophy of David Hume. It is its main task to re-direct the criticism of his account which has, so far, concentrated on the problem of the Real Connection or on alleged inconsistencies between Book One and Two of the *Treatise*. The thesis attempts to show that such criticisms are misplaced and sometimes result from a misinterpretation of Hume's writings. Instead, criticism must be placed on Hume's strict empiricist version of perception which understands perceptions as fleeting existences. The problems resulting from such an understanding are apparent already in Book One and concern not only the concept of the self, they also render the concept of causation, one of the pillars of Hume's system, unaccountable.

Abbreviations

T.	David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
ECHU.	David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, in: David Hume, *Enquiries*, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
SOT.	David Hume, *Of the Standard of Taste*, in: *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary*, edited by Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987).
Essays	David Hume, *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary*, edited by Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987).
LECHU.	John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1979).

Contents

3. The Principle of Unity of Perceptions

Introduction

The topic of this work is a discussion of the concept and the account of the self David Hume gives in Book One and Two of the *Treatise of Human Nature*. I attempt to show that the understanding of the self underlying Hume's theory of the passions in Book Two accommodates the account of the self presented in Book One. The difficulties encountered by the solitary self of the first book can be overcome once the self is placed within a social context, once we understand ourselves not only as reasoning subjects, but as individuals amongst others, as the feeling, passionate beings we are. I will argue that self and personhood are two interdependent aspects of the individual. The difference between these two aspects is a difference of emphasis .*Personhood* or *being a person* is the social, the public aspect, whereas the *self* is the private aspect of an individual. However, both aspects are not exclusive, there is a public side of the self just as there is a private side of being a person. In my discussion I will explain how exactly I wish *privacy* to be understood and I will argue that there is epistemological privacy of experiences. I will not inquire, however, whether privacy of experiences is generally possible or not.

I will also attempt to put David Hume's account of the self into the context of the present debate concerning theories of personal identity and self identity. My discussion of contemporary theories in this field does not claim to be exhaustive. I consider theories in so far as they appear relevant to my purpose, which is the investigation of Hume's theory. Some theories, such as functionalism, will not be discussed explicitly, although I may present arguments the theory can be applied to. My choice of examples and counter examples also is selective, I have not included every such example I could think of, such as, for instance, mind-melt scenarios. If there are any challenging examples I have missed, I will be very glad to know about them.

The last chapter is, so far as I am able to judge it, the most important one. In its center stands the problem of the principle of unity of perceptions. I hope I will be able to show that the body can serve as such a principle without

contradiction to any major claims and postulates in the *Treatise*. The gravest difficulty I encountered in respect to the claim that the body can be understood as the principle of unity is the problem of the local conjunction. I became aware of the gravity of this problem through Don GARRETT's book on Hume which was published in June 1997. I have tried my best to weaken GARRETT's objection but I also know that a more thourough investigation of Hume's account concerning matter would be required to reach a conclusive verdict. Despite the fact that GARRETT's book was published just two months before I had to submit this work I wanted to include its claims into my discussion, since they are relevant to my interpretation of the *Treatise*.

If the claims I wish to make can be accepted, we would have to conclude that Hume's account of self (and personhood) is quite successful. It is my belief that Hume's account does not fail because there cannot be an impression of the self or because there is no principle of unity. It also does not fail because the self is necessarily a solitary self or because the postulates of Book One and Two of the *Treatise* contradict each other. I will attempt to establish that none of these is the case. Hume's account of the self fails because his theory of perception cannot provide for memory. Memory has to acquaint us with the succession of our perceptions, in that sense, memory is „the source of personal identity"[1]. Memory, to some extent, produces identity, but it also discovers it.[2] Hume's theory of human nature works quite nicely if we take memory for granted. However, all perceptions are fleeting existences. This makes an account of memory difficult, if not impossible. I believe it is a big irony that the philosopher who placed reason, experience and the human mind under close scrutiny and who emphasized the creativity of the mind must fail in that he renders impossible one of the most important requirements of the creative mind.

[1] T.I,IV,VI,261.
[2] compare ibid., p.262.

1. The Concept of the Self in Book One

I. Memory

I.I. Memory and Imagination

Hume gives his account of memory very early in the *Treatise*. He writes: „We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION."[3] The difference is not only one of vivacity but also one of arrangement. Imagination possesses the power of variation whilst memory does not. „The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas , but their order and position."[4] The preservation of the simple ideas themselves cannot be the main exercise of the memory because both imagination and memory 'receive' their ideas from the same pool. Neither of the two can go beyond experience as the only source of simple ideas. This account of memory produces several problems rooted in Hume's theory of perceptions. All perceptions, impressions as well as ideas, are „fleeting existences". Hume takes this into consideration by pointing out that the arrangement of ideas cannot be a sufficient criterion to distinguish memory from imagination because it is „impossible to recal the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar."[5] However, the same difficulties arise in respect to the vivacity-criterion because it requires a comparison between different degrees of vivacity.

We also cannot store past **ideas** somewhere, since firstly, the mind-independent existence of a body which could offer this possibility (with whatever theoretical difficulties) can not be exploited theoretically because there are no

[3] T.I,I,III,8-9.
[4] ibid., p.9.
[5] T.I,III,V,85.

reasonable grounds to verify any such belief.[6] Secondly, perceptions are described as fleeting existences, so how can a past perception be repeated **and** how do I know about this repetition (which would be necessary)? How can the repeated perception even **feel** familiar without even a trace of the resembling past perception recognizable by me? This seems to be one of Hume's most consequential problems resulting from his theory of ideas, not only in respect to the self and personal identity but also in respect to Hume's account of causality, which is the backbone of his theory not only in Book One. „If there are no lasting human brains to store our memories of constant conjunctions during our dreamless sleep, and during the time when we are not attending to them, then it becomes very hard to see how exactly past experience can causally operate on our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of' (T.218) Belief in unnoticed or secret causes will be ruled out if all we believe in is what we, whether individually or collectively, have kept strictly under our notice."[7] Moreover, how capable are we to attend continuously to the same perception? „'Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time; nor can it by utmost efforts ever arrive at such constancy. [...] 'Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation."[8] There are, however, links between our successive perceptions, including the passions which are also perceptions. „The rule by which they proceed, is to pass from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produc'd by it."[9] But it doesn't look as if these links by relation can be sufficient for our purpose because there are perceptions which seem to be unrelated to each other. Although ideas can be related by

[6] Though it will later be argued that Hume is a Basic Realist and also that the body can serve as the principle of unity of perceptions, the claim that the body is „storing" past perceptions is much more difficult to establish. The latter claim seems to be an ontological claim about the nature of the body and it will be shown that no such claim can reasonably be made.
[7] BAIER, A.C., *A Progress of Sentiments*, Harvard University Press, 1994, p.108.
[8] T.II,I,IV,283.
[9] ibid.

causation, resemblance and contiguity, impressions are only related by resemblance and everyone has experienced situations where non resembling impressions occurred in succession. However, that these perceptions don't seem to be related to a foregoing perception doesn't mean they aren't.[10] In respect to perceptions related to one another we could perhaps say that if I am unable to pay permanent attention to one perception because my attention is drawn to new perceptions related to my previous one by causation, resemblance and contiguity, then my previous perception is in some way, not as a recall, but as some memory or recognition, available to me by a reversed mechanism. But it seems that this also is not without problems and we have to notice that these problems occur even if we take here for granted that **all** perceptions are related, either by causality, contiguity or resemblance.[11]

If memory can be seen as the kind of recognition and familiarity we arrive at by tracing back the chain of successive perceptions the question arises: which point, or perhaps better, which element in the chain is the criterion for verification of particular memories? How do we know that we stumbled upon something that is memory and not just imagination? One might be tempted to say that every perception I had **is** a content of memory, that I really had to have this perception, otherwise it couldn't be part of the chain of perceptions. This is certainly true, and it draws a light upon a distinction we obviously have to make. This distinction reaches all the way back to the different faculties of memory and imagination and to the nature of perception. To put it into plain words: all perceptions of memory generate from perceptions which were, as we usually think, either perceptions of something real, something „out there" or of something we really thought, did or felt; or were perceptions due to imagination and don't represent something „real" in the first sense. We are usually able to verify or falsify our memories of past perceptions. They either are proper memories, that is, they refer to something which really did occur or are not

[10] For a proper discussion see Chapter *The Principle of Unity of Perceptions*.
[11] In a later chapter we will see that this is not so, i.e. that there are perceptions which cannot be related to one another by any of the principles of association and relation either of ideas and impressions. We will also find that the said principles are more or less interdependent.

memories because they have no reference to any „real" occurrence. Memory makes not only facts and past events that really did occur available for us but also **all** past perceptions we had, this includes perceptions of imagination (it doesn't really matter if we can, in fact, remember all of them, it is sufficient that we could under certain circumstances. To use the term *imagination* here so freely is somehow problematic, because Hume's concept of imagination and its function is complicated and contains more than we, in common use, ascribe to it. When I speak of perceptions of imagination here, I am referring to perceptions which do not represent any „real", external occurrences, but are only „imagined" as dreams, hallucinations, inventions etc. are. As I just said, we are able to remember not only perceptions of facts but also perceptions of imagination. It is, as anyone knows, possible to remember dreams, hallucinations and so on. We are able to imagine situations we are not experiencing and we also know that, remembering past imaginations, these were „only" imaginations. They are proper memories in the sense that these imaginations really did occur but they did occur **as** imaginations and they are remembered as such. It makes perfect sense to tell someone about my dream last night but I refer to it as a dream, not as something which did really happen.

There are, of course, memories I have which I can't label either as the memory of some fact or as a memory of an imagination. I might even have some memories of things I refer to as having happened but in fact they didn't. In the case where I have a perception of an event which really did happen and it happened in the way I remember it, in this case I have a true belief about this event. That is, I have a memory. If, however, my perception is not a perception of an event which did happen the way I believe it to have happened or didn't happen at all, then I have a false belief concerning the occurrence or the nature of this particular event. In such case we would not employ the term *memory* to label the perception. It therefore seems to be the case that to determine whether a perception is a perception of memory or of imagination I need a criterion to verify or falsify my beliefs. Simply tracking back the chain of my perceptions does not provide me with such a criterion since **all** my perceptions

are part of this chain, the perceptions of memory as well as perceptions of imagination. I need therefore a criterion to distinguish the one from the other. Hume does think that we can, in the most instances, distinguish them by their vivacity, thereby avoiding to use a rational criterion of verification.[12] Hume claims, as I stated earlier, that the perceptions of memory are generally more vivid and forceful than the ideas of imagination. Therefore, perceptions of memory can be identified as such by their greater vivacity and the force they have on our minds. However, this is not a sufficiently reliable criterion because ideas of memory can be faint and less vivid than the ideas of imagination, just as impressions can be sometimes fainter and less forceful than ideas. „Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas."[13]

We need to find a criterion which works reliably on two levels, the first I will call the **level of direct origin**, the second the **level of indirect origin**. I understand by *direct origin* present perceptions which can be identified as either perceptions of memory or perceptions of imagination. Indirect origin applies to perceptions which are presently perceptions of memory but have to be traced back to their roots, i.e. they are either proper memories or remembered perceptions of imagination. I must be able to label my present perception correctly as either one of imagination or memory, and if the latter I must also be able to identify this particular memory as a memory of an event having occurred or as a memory of a perception of imagination. Taking the first, common meaning of imagination, an example can be given as follows. I have the memory that my mother hit me when I was a child because I didn't say 'thank you' after receiving a gift from my rich and unpleasant uncle. This would be a proper

[12] I would still like to use the term *verification* here because of the common meaning of the term *memory* which Hume acknowledges somehow by talking „original order" and so on. Even if a memory must perhaps be understood rather as an image than a belief it still makes some sense to say that memory images are true images (as in true to...) of an earlier perception. This implies, however, an unorthodox (in respect to rationality) understanding of *verification*.

[13] T.I,I,I,2. (Please note also that Hume is referring here obviously to dream-sleep, and not to the kind of dreamless, seemingly perception-less sleep he discusses later on in the *Treatise*.)

memory if the described event really did occur in the way I remember it. But it would be a memory of an imagination if it didn't, if I wasn't hit or never received a gift from this person or if I did say 'thank you'[14]. The perception would not be a memory perception if only one component of this perception didn't occur in the perceived way. However, I may well not know that my perception is either a memory of an imagination or a even a completely new imagination. So, what is then a memory of imagination which I believe to be a memory of „real" events - is it what one could call with all caution a *false memory*? In Hume's account it certainly would be, for him a *false memory* must be due to imagination as he understands the latter. Memory, to be proper memory, has to maintain the **original** order of the events in question.The „right order", or the right arrangement, is the relationship all involved relata have and have had to each other. They are the elements, or components of the arrangement. Memory, as it is said, doesn't have the power to alter this order, and therefore can't alter the set of components whereas imagination has the power to do so. Both have the same pool of elements, neither of the two can receive material from beyond experience. His discussion concerning imagination and memory doesn't indicate that both are also restricted to the same set of events. Imagination can take its material from all perceptions ever experienced and can arrange them in any conceivable order. Imagination also has its rules - but within these restrictions imagination can play freely, there is no restriction which players get to be appointed to play the game. Since there is no „right order" there cannot be a „right" set of relata either.

There are ways of association which apply to the relation of ideas, some ideas are naturally related to each other, some are not. „The principles of union among ideas, I have reduc'd to three general ones, and have asserted, that the idea or impression of any object naturally introduces the idea of any other object, that is resembling, contiguous to, or connected with it. These principles I allow to be neither the infallible nor the sole causes of an union among ideas. They are not the infallible causes. For one may fix his attention during some

[14] This list is not claimed to be exhaustive.

time on any one object without looking farther. They are not the sole causes. For the thought has evidently a very irregular motion in running along its objects, and may leap from the heavens to the earth, from one end of the creation to the other, without any certain method or order. But tho' I allow this weakness in these three relations, and this irregularity in the imagination; yet I assert that the only general principles, which associate ideas, are resemblance, contiguity and causation."[15] Once more it becomes clear that memory has to work within a certain set of relata and their relations whilst imagination can be creative with all available (by experience) possible relata and relate them in any possible way. There is a distinction between perceptions of memory and perceptions of imagination which cannot be reduced to vivacity alone.

It becomes also apparent that verification would seems to be necessary in respect to a possibility of distinction between memory and imagination. To talk about the „right" set of relata and their „right" order or arrangement makes sense only if we can determine what this „right" is. Hume obviously wants to say that these two faculties of the human mind are different in their characteristic function and are also different in terms of their intrinsic mechanisms. To give the psychological account he has he would need to be able to distinguish them, generally and in particular, and most importantly, he needs to account for his conviction that mistakes can occur and can eventually be corrected. He would need to establish them as two different faculties (general distinction) and he needs also to distinguish between particular perceptions as belonging to either of the faculties (particular distinction). So far he has failed to offer one reliable criterion to do so and the question remains how he is not only able to make the distinction in respect to particular perceptions but how is he able to give an account, even to speak of two faculties at all? His epistemology, so far, cannot provide for the presence and the distinction of these faculties, it cannot provide for his psychology.

[15] T.I,III,VI,92-93.

I.II. Implications for Ontology and Epistemology

To investigate the somehow strange clash between psychology and epistemology we need to consider the problem in the context of the possibility of real existence which is clearly implied in Book Two and Three of the *Treatise*. As I have already indicated we are used to distinguishing imagination from memory, on both levels, mostly by empirical verification. At least we do this in ordinary life. Ideas which can be verified as representing events which really did occur in the way they are represented are counted as ideas of memory. Ideas which cannot be verified are counted as belonging to imagination. There exists a variety of means of verification and we use these tools regularly. The difficulty arises because we cannot apply this ordinary procedure to Hume's account. First of all, his theory of ideas is not a representational theory of ideas. Sense impressions cannot *rationally* be said to resemble their causes. Hume has to give this account because of his strict empirical approach to human nature. He claims that only perceptions, that is impressions and ideas, are available to us. They are therefore the only objects of perception. Even if they would resemble something beyond themselves, we have no possibility (at least not in the *rationale* of Book One) to know about it and cannot make any statements concerning the matter. „That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something *distinct*, or *independent*, and *external*, is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination."[16] Thus, to construct the very ideas of causation and externality for instance, we need either imagination or reason. To be strict we actually have to exclude even reason as not capable of doing the much needed job. Hume dedicates especially Part IV of Book One to the exploration of reason and its limits to provide for our most fundamental concepts, such as externality, causality and identity. Reason, turned on itself and turned towards these concepts, falls into absurdity and so does the reasoner. „For I have already

[16] T.I,IV,II,189.

shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life."[17] The consequences of a limited, alone almost powerless reason are devastating: „The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv'd of the use of every member and faculty."[18] This leaves us entirely with imagination as being the last resort. The problems concerning the distinction of memory from imagination rise here once again. Verification of beliefs in the sense suggested by me seems to require imagination but imagination to be distinguished from memory requires verification.

Hume argues that „the *belief* or *assent*, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination."[19] It is, however, not only a perception of memory (or the senses) which can be attended by the belief and can thereby be identified as a perception of memory (or the senses). „And as an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate to such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass for an idea of the memory, and counterfeit its effects on the belief and judgment."[20] Thus, in our judgment we can mistake a less vivid perception of

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[17] T.I,IV,VII,267-268.
[18] ibid., p.268-269.; A. BAIER gives a thorough and sympathetic account of these problems in the chapter *Philosophy in This Careless Manner*, in: *A Progress of Sentiments*.
[19] T.I,III,V,86.
[20] ibid.

memory for an idea of imagination and a very vivid idea of imagination for an idea of memory. Hume's entire discussion of the issue suggests that an idea of imagination mistaken for an idea of memory is still, in fact, an idea of imagination and not of memory. The judgment, influenced by the vivid appearance of the perception in the mind, is mistaken but the perception itself doesn't suddenly change it's nature. But if it is, firstly, still an idea of imagination how can it give rise to a belief (of memory) when only ideas of memory can do so? Secondly, if it cannot give rise to such a belief because it is still an idea of imagination, how can we mistake it for an impression of memory? And finally, if it can give rise to such a belief how can we then not take it to be an idea of memory?

On the other hand, if any perception is just as what we perceive it, since it is the only „real" object of perception itself, then how does it make sense to talk about a mistake? Something which appears to be an idea of memory because it is vivid and attended by the belief would be, and only could be, an idea of memory. Consequently, everything which appears to be an idea of imagination must then be an idea of imagination. A vivid idea of imagination, believed to be an idea of memory because of its force of vivacity can be nothing else than that. Within this scenario we wouldn't have any difficulties to distinguish between imagination and memory, because everything **is what it appears to be**. The difficulties with the distinction only arise because mistakes are possible, Hume allows for them. And these mistakes are possible because Hume tacitly still makes the distinction between being and appearance. If one is to believe the positivist interpretation of Hume then his empirical approach to the nature of man should not allow for such a distinction. Epistemology and ontology should have to be one, this, however, is here not the case.

The same clash occurs, in a slightly different way, but with a similar outcome, in regard to Hume's approach to the self in Book One. He talks about the concepts of self philosophers have, and these concepts are not alien to the non-philosopher either. Hume regards these concepts as being rationally unfounded: „There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment

intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. [...] Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain'd. For from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd? This question 'tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet 'tis a question, which must necessarily be answer'd, if we wou'd have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible. It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference."[21] He expresses the view that such concepts must, at least, be doubted, because they cannot be arrived at by experience and reason. Perceptions (impressions and ideas) as the objects of experience cannot account for the concept of the self put forward by those philosophers. The self **appears** to have continued existence, we **seem** to be aware of our self, but the mechanism by which we acquire these beliefs cannot be the one suggested by these philosophers, nor is it absolutely certain that the self is, indeed, what they believe it to be because experience, how Hume understands it, cannot provide for a self fitting the appearance of the self. The self is actually something else than it **appears** to be, especially, as it turns out, in regard to simplicity. The occurring clash between epistemology and ontology is of some importance. We have to note that the form of the argument here is very similar to the form of the argument concerning externality. Experience „of external objects" cannot provide for certainty concerning the mind-independent existence of the external world. It is, if Book One is taken in isolation, impossible to know, whether there exists an external world or not. However, it doesn't follow that externality doesn't exist and Hume never draws such a harsh conclusion, not even in Book One. It only follows that it might not, we simply don't know and the kind of experience Hume discusses in Book One, married to reason alone cannot provide knowledge of

[21] T.I,IV,VI,251.

that kind.[22] In the same manner, it doesn't follow from the fact that experience and reason alone cannot provide for something other than a bodyless, isolated self that the self **is** bodyless and isolated. It might be that but it also might be something else, not to speak of the question how the bundle-definition must be understood.

It seems to be the case that Hume treats, in the discussion of Book One, the relation between epistemology and ontology quite differently when it occurs within different objects of investigation. It seems to be true that Hume sometimes, in the case of externality for instance, acknowledges that such a clash can occur and that epistemology and ontology don't have to be one. The outcome of Book One is, as was said before, a highly sceptical one. The scepticism which creeps in is very disturbing and leaves the author and the reader in an almost inescapable despair, but Hume already indicates ways to overcome this kind of intellectual despair and loss. However, the possible difference between epistemology and ontology, underlying his account of externality and the distinction between memory and imagination for instance, is not allowed for when he talks about the self. Looking at the problem of real, continued existence of objects Hume's argument takes the form:

> 1. experience and reason alone cannot provide the belief in real, continued existence of objects
>
> therefore:
>
> 2. such objects may or may not exist

But in respect to the self he seems to argue:

> 1. experience and reason alone cannot provide the belief in the existence of a simple self with perfect identity
>
> therefore:
>
> 2. a simple self with perfect identity does not exist

[22] I have put it this way because the fundamental belief we do have in external existence, though it is rationally unfounded, is as a belief some kind of experience too.

The difference in treatment is not purely accidental. It springs to mind that there is a fundamental difference between the external and the internal. The latter being imagination, memory and the self which are features of the mind. It seems to be the case that internal, i.e. mental events are immediately and directly accessible to the mind whilst external, i.e. physical events and entities are not. „Mental states and processes are (or are normally) conscious states and processes, and the consciousness which irradiates them can engender no illusions and leaves the door open for no doubts. A person's present thinkings, feelings and willings, his perceivings, rememberings and imaginings are intrinsically 'phosphorescent' their existence and their nature are inevitably betrayed to their owner. The inner life is a stream of consciousness of such a sort that it would be absurd to suggest that the mind whose life is that stream might be unaware of what is passing down it."[23] If this is true and we have immediate „contact" with our own mental life, or to strengthen the claim in a Humean way - actually **are** the stream of the conscious mental events (on whatever level of consciousness) then I cannot be mistaken about their existence. We find ourselves immediately in Cartesian company because it is conceivable now how one could claim that it is possible to doubt the existence of externality but that it is inconceivable to doubt the existence of one's own mental events. Thus, our difficulties to explain the inconsistency of the theory of ideas in respect to the relation between ontology and epistemology have not decreased, instead they have become more complex. We have now an idea why Hume is making allowances, at this point of the discussion, for uncertainty concerning the existence of externality, we may also have an idea why he is positive about the self as being nothing but a bundle of perceptions, but the Cartesian twist doesn't work in respect to his account of memory and imagination. If everything which was said about the availability of the mental were true then it would be impossible to mistake memory for imagination and *vice versa*.

[23] RYLE, G. *The Concept of Mind*, The University of Chicago Press, 1984, p.13-14.

The detected inconsistency in Hume's account is important towards an assessment of his theory. Firstly, it is a mistake to think that Book One and Two of the *Treatise* rest upon fundamentally different and even contradictory premisses and that it is Book One alone which is philosophically interesting and original. BAIER argues that the philosophy of Book Two and Three has been widely underestimated and only Book One received proper philosophical attention resulting in its destruction because it has been taken in isolation. But it is also a mistake to overestimate the two later Books of the *Treatise* and to disregard the foundations of Hume's solutions set out in Book One. One doesn't have to be a Cartesian to have problems with certainty concerning externality. Hume's own theory of perception, fundamental to Book One, doesn't account for the possibility of rationally gained knowledge about external existences either. His strict empiricism, strongly connected with the theory of perceptions cannot, on its own, account for causality. To introduce the idea of necessary connection Hume has to make use of imagination. Imagination therefore is a key issue for Hume and it seems to be important to distinguish it properly from memory and from any other feature of the mind.

Secondly, Hume needs a proper account of memory to explain and to establish the concepts of externality, causality and identity. Memory and imagination play different and distinct parts in respect to these concepts. Memory alone (together, of course, with experience and reason) cannot account for the concept of externality, the idea of necessary connection and the concept of identity, neither can imagination, on its own. Hume's concept of the self as a bundle of perceptions also requires memory. We have to be able to recognize the required succession of perceptions. We will need to remember previous perceptions, perhaps not necessarily their content, but certainly that we had them. Otherwise a definition of the self as a bundle of successive perceptions is not possible. Memory in itself becomes very difficult, given Hume's theory of perceptions, because perceptions are fleeting existences. How can past perceptions be accessible to the mind? Most importantly: since each present perception, even if it is a perception of memory, is by definition an entirely new

perception how then can perceptions of memory be recognized as images of past perceptions? If the „knowledge" that I have had past perceptions would only be a construct by imagination, positive statements concerning the existence of the self cannot be made at all, not even of it's existence as a bundle of perceptions, as they cannot be made about the existence of externality either. (Hume uses imagination to establish the **concept** of externality and the **idea** of necessary connection, but he himself finds it necessary to introduce sentiment, which goes beyond imagination, to free these concepts from the impression that they are nothing but constructs of the human mind.) It becomes clear, that Hume needs a clear and reliable distinction between memory and imagination to arrive at any positive statements about externality, causality, identity and the self.

We have seen that Hume does not provide us with such a reliable criterion to make a clear distinction between memory and imagination. The implications for a positive account of the self in Book One as a bundle of perceptions are serious, even if the self and memory and imagination are interrelated. We need to establish the self as a unity but the bundle definition, so far, cannot fulfill this function, because we cannot account for the claim that there is a succession of perceptions. We would need a proper account of memory to do this. Such account can only be given if a) memory is theoretically possible and b) if it can be distinguished from imagination successfully and reliably. Neither seems to be possible.

We also face another problem the bundle definition poses, namely the problem of what it is that unites the different perceptions of the bundle. These perceptions are not only united in the sense of a unity stringent in time, i.e. succession. We also have different co-existing perceptions. When I sit and read a book I perceive the letters in the book, perceive the whiteness and paperness of the page, feel the solidity of the book I hold, feel also the solidity of the chair and so on, but at the same time I also perceive that I sit outside, that it is a bit windy and the trees smell etc. I don't have to pay any attention to these things to

perceive them. Nevertheless, these perceptions are elements of the bundle of perceptions I experience, or, in Humean terms, the bundle that I am.

I. III. The Relation of Self and Memory

Although we have seen the difficulties of Hume's theory in respect to his account of memory, I will take for granted, from now on, that memory is possible and that we do have perceptions of memory and that we are usually able to recognize them as such. It is the purpose of this chapter to establish a necessary link between memory and the self in the sense that we cannot have a self without having memory. I wish therefore to establish memory as a necessary feature of the self.

There has been , and there still is much discussion about the constituents of the self, or, in other words, about the criteria or the criterion of personal identity.[24] The discussion is mainly revolving around competing theories, one putting forward memory as being the criterion, the other favoring bodily continuity. I don't wish to make strict claims as they are needed to support one or the other of the two main stream theories. By strict claims I understand claims which maintain that memory (or the body) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the self. It will be sufficient for my present purpose to show that memory is a necessary condition, although I also hope to show that memory is not the only criterion. To establish this claim I will need to take references to the competing theories, and especially take recourse to the memory-theory. But it is my belief that the discussion of the problem of personal identity in terms of either being a matter of memory or bodily continuity or both is generally misplaced because it fails to overcome the Cartesian Real distinction, which is still lying at the heart of the matter.

Before we can start to look into existing memory-theories and the accounts they give I have to clarify what kind of memory we are here concerned with

[24] Here I treat self identity and personal identity synonymously, though we will see later on that there is a distinction between them.

because the term *memory* has its ambiguities. As I understand *memory* here it can be described as event-memory or experience-memory. These events or experiences are not only restricted to events or experiences we make with the outside world and our bodies, but include also mental events or experiences of the so called internal life. The kind of memory I wish to discuss is also exclusively human memory. We might want to draw some parallels, perhaps, to animal life or intelligent life forms other than human, but they remain momentarily outside the area I restrict for the present purpose. I am also not concerned with the kinds of memory we find in artificial intelligence, notebooks, diaries and so on.

The theory which places memory in the very centre of personal identity was initiated by John LOCKE who defines personal identity in terms of memory.[25] LOCKE writes: „For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, which makes every one to be, what he calls *self*; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal Identity, i.e.,* the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that *Person*; it is the same *self* now it was then; and 'tis by the same *self* with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done."[26] This backwards reaching consciousness is memory. For LOCKE, to think and to perceive was to be conscious, according to his theory of perception. This poses certain problems in respect to personal identity, because human beings are not permanently in a conscious state: they sleep, faint, fall into comata and come out of them again without losing their personal identity and without ceasing to perceive themselves as being themselves afterwards. LOCKE recognizes the problem and offers a solution. Although we are unconscious, *possibiliter* we **could** remember past events we had experienced. PERRY formulates LOCKE's solution like this: „A does contain or could contain a memory of an experience

[25] PERRY, J. *The Problem of Personal Identity*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) *Personal Identity*, University of California Press, 1975, p.12.
[26] LECHU.II,XXVII,9,335.

contained in B."[27] *A* and *B* are something PERRY calls *Person-stages* occurring at different times. When I go to bed Tuesdays at 11p.m. having just watched *Mulder* and *Scully* investigating another strange incident I am in person-stage *B*. I fall asleep and wake up again Wednesday at 7a.m.; now the person stage *A* can be ascribed to me. If we can connect stage *A* with stage *B*, that is if we can establish a unity of *A* and *B*, we can know that the person in *A* is the same person it was in *B*. I would be able to say that the experiences gained in *B* and the ones newly acquired in *A* are **my** experiences, I am the same person on Wednesday as I was on Tuesday. „Person-stages belong to the same person, if and only if the later could contain an experience which is a memory of a reflective awareness of an experience contained in the earlier."[28]

This solution is not without serious flaws. There are experiences we actually had but cannot remember, even if we try very hard. We all know situations where our mothers, who like to do that sort of thing especially at family gatherings, tell stories about the most awful things we did and even when we are told that we did do such and such a thing we cannot remember the described incidents at all. We even, in some cases, would deny to ever have behaved in the suggested ways. It is not only that our memory cannot recall the situations we are told about but we are also convinced, against evidence from everyone around agreeing with our mother, that the event she is getting excited about didn't really occur and she is making up a story to enjoy our embarrassment. THOMAS REID gives a counter-example to LOCKE's solution which points out these problems: „Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr Locke's doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person

[27] PERRY, J. ibid., p.16.
[28] ibid., p.15.

who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general's consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging - therefore, according to Mr Locke's doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore, the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at school..."[29]

To overcome this sort of problem and to strengthen the memory-theory QUINTON developed the person-stage account in a way where the sequence of person-stages starting with a stage *A* and finishing with a stage *B* must be understood as follows: *A* contains a memory which is contained in *A+1*, *A+1* contains a memory (it doesn't have to be the same one) which is contained in *A+2* and so on until *B*.[30] Here, person-stages and the sequence as a whole are taken to be in a chronological order, that is one stage succeeds another in the sequence as time advances. Stage *A* is at time *t1*, *A+1* at *t2* and so on until *B*. This, however, creates a new problem because our memories might not go along with a chronological order, for instance the general remembers being flogged as a schoolboy but doesn't remember taking the standard as a young officer. PERRY also points out[31] that the QUINTON-solution faces the same problems as the first account by taking only actual memories into consideration. But this problem is not very serious because we can just introduce, like we did in the first case, a „could"-condition and therefore rid ourselves of the problem. The problem of chronology is a bit more difficult to solve but GRICE offers a way out of it which is formulated by PERRY like this: „There is a sequence of person-stages (not necessarily in the order they occur in time, and not excluding repetitions), the first of which is A and the last of which is B, such that each person-stage in the sequence either (i) contains, or could contain, a memory of

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[29] REID, T. *Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man*, in: *Inquiry and Essays*, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1983, p.217-218.
[30] compare PERRY, J. ibid., p.17.
[31] ibid., p.18.

an experience contained in the next, or (ii) contains an experience of which the next person-stage contains a memory, or could contain a memory."[32]

The problems described in REID's example are overcome by the account of personal identity by unity of memory which GRICE gives, but it looks as if there are other remaining problems. One I have already mentioned. It is the problem of the „forgotten memory". This problem can also be applied to REID's officer-example. Let's say the general does not remember being flogged when a schoolboy, and though he remembers the orchard he does not remember that he stole from it. In fact, he never remembered this particular incident throughout his entire adult life. He only remembers that there was an orchard where he used to play. We now would have to answer the question: is the general identical with the boy who stole from the orchard and was consequently flogged? I think GRICE's solution can be applied to this situation as well. If the boy could still remember the stealing and the flogging a week or a day after it happened, and we usually remember things which happened a week or a day earlier, then GRICE's sequence would remain intact. In my interpretation of the account GRICE gives it wouldn't matter **what** exactly we remember, it only matters that we remember at least something. The memory of the incident is carried by the sequence through the succession of time, it might be forgotten at one point in time and is forgotten in such a way that it will never be accessible again to the individual whose memory it was, but there will be other memories which carry through the temporal succession to the present stage and reach back, directly or indirectly, to a time the individual still had access to the „forgotten memory". If my interpretation is right then personal identity remains.

Another, more fundamental and more serious problem is formulated by BUTLER and might be found also in some of the statements REID makes when talking about identity. REID writes: „There can be no memory of what is past without the conviction that we existed at the time remembered. There may be good arguments to convince me that I existed before the earliest thing I can

[32] ibid., p.19., compare also GRICE, H.P. *Personal Identity*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) *The Problem of Personal Identity*, University of California Press, 1975.

remember; but to suppose that my memory reaches a moment farther back than my belief and conviction of my existence, is a contradiction. [...] From this it is evident that we must have the conviction of our own continued existence and identity, as soon as we are capable of thinking or doing anything, on account of what we have thought, or done, or suffered before; that is, as soon as we are reasonable creatures."[33] We have to interpret the statement in the sense that the conviction of **my** existence has to take precedence, or at least, that this conviction and memory go hand in hand and we cannot have the latter without the former[34], memory provides us with the conviction that we have identity with our past and future selves. „I see evidently that identity supposes an uninterrupted continuance of existence. That which has ceased to exist cannot be the same with that which afterwards begins to exist."[35] For REID memory plays the part of a means by which we know that there is something like uninterrupted existence, memory provides us with evidence, that a permanent self exists. „How do you know - what evidence have you - that there is such a permanent self [...] ? To this I answer, that the proper evidence I have of all this is remembrance."[36]

It is clear that in REID's account memory is neither a criterion nor a constituent of self-identity, but it is, and very importantly so, an epistemological instrument that provides evidence and also carries with it assurance of the existence of our selves. It could be argued that there has to be a first memory, but it is conceivable that the first memory I have is prior to the first experience I am aware of as **my**, and no one else's, experience. However, the event I remember in my first memory would have to be of this kind of experience because otherwise, we could argue, I wouldn't remember it because I wasn't aware of this experience as being **my** experience in the first place. According to this, the kind of problem BUTLER points out, is clear to see. „But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to

[33] REID, T. ibid., p.212.
[34] This, however, would not pose a problem in my account of self identity. Only precedence is problematic.
[35] REID, T. ibid., p.213-214.
[36] ibid., p.215.

ourselves, yet, to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what we can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, THAT CONSCIOUSNESS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY PRESUPPOSES, AND THEREFORE CANNOT CONSTITUTE, PERSONAL IDENTITY[37], any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes."[38]

We might, on face value, want to agree with BUTLER, but, on second thoughts, we find weaknesses in his argument which make it difficult to see the self-evidence he claims. He seems to think that, when accepting the memory-theory, we face the problem that we can only account for self-identity as far as our memory reaches. But what kind of memory has BUTLER in mind here? I cannot, of course, remember my own birth, neither can I remember anything I experienced before I was two years old. This doesn't mean I didn't exist before I was that age, it is pretty clear that I existed before then (before I can celebrate my second birthday I had to have a first one and I had to be born). Therefore, BUTLER argues, memory cannot be even necessary for personal identity. This conclusion doesn't follow, especially not, when we take the person-stages account into consideration. That I cannot remember anything happening to the baby I was doesn't mean that I didn't remember anything when I was a baby. As soon as I accept that I have had memories when I was very small the person-stage account holds. The memories I had then are, of course, quite different from the memories I have now, not only in content but also in kind, because babies are usually considered as being not able to reflect upon their memories and the remembered experiences in the sense that they cannot conceptualize their memories or experiences of any kind because they cannot speak or understand speech.

Let us imagine the following case. There is a new born baby. (Note that the discussion can be extended into even earlier, that is, pre-natal stages.) The

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[37] my own accentuation.
[38] BUTLER, J. *Of Personal Identity*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) *Personal Identity*, ibid., p.100.

baby sleeps in its cot, quite content because it doesn't feel any pain or need. It suddenly feels a growing discomfort which adults would describe as hunger. It starts to cry because of the discomfort and keeps on crying because its pain and frustration of being in pain increases with time. Finally, someone comes along, someone with a familiar smell and a friendly voice and starts to feed the baby so its discomfort disappears. These events in their order are repeated, at least, six times in 24 hours. The baby remembers that always when it cries really desperately someone comes and feeds it or does other nice things and so it eventually starts crying with „premeditation", that is, it cries even then when there is nothing wrong just because it wants someone to be there. Every parent knows that and every parent knows also that babies **do** remember these things which makes life sometimes difficult because if the mother comes in as soon as the child just makes the faintest noise babies start to use this and no one gets any sleep. A baby of approximately six weeks of age should have learned when someone is coming and when not. Babies couldn't have learned anything of that sort if they wouldn't have the ability to remember experiences and if they wouldn't exercise this ability.

It is plain to see that GRICE's chain of person-stages holds here because a) there are memories and b) one remembers them at least for some time. It doesn't matter if one forgets them later and doesn't have access to these memories anymore. It is sufficient that these memories were contained in a person-stage which contained or could contain also memories which are contained or could be contained in the next person-stage. But the problem of the first memory still remains and therefore the objection that the memory-theory is circular because it presupposes self-identity cannot be refuted by reference to GRICE's account. BUTLER's arguments concerning the reach of memory and self-identity can be shown as not supporting his claim, but the claim of circularity itself still poses a problem for the memory-theory.

I think that circularities of this kind only occur when we suppose that either memory or self-identity has to be prior to the other, this assumes that one can have memory without self-identity in one case and in the other that one can

have self-identity without memory. The memory-theorist wants to claim that memory is a constituent of self-identity and is, as such, sufficient for self-identity. But if so, how do I know that these memories are **my** memories unless there is already self-identity? Thus, the accusation that the memory-theory presupposes self-identity seems quite reasonable. However, my claim of a **necessary** connection[39] between memory and self-identity does not imply an assumption of temporal priority and thus can avoid the circularity. The necessary connection is supposed to be one of interdependency. I claim that one cannot have self-identity without memory and *vice versa*.[40]

This raises another question concerning the underlying concept of the self. The claim that memory and self-identity are necessarily connected seems to imply that to be a self one has to know that one is a self. It is part of the concept of self underlying my claim that the self is necessarily self-conscious. Otherwise it would be possible to claim that the self is something which needs to be discovered, once the individual has discovered its self it is self-conscious. This claim implies a substantial understanding of the self.[41] This is certainly not Hume's understanding of the matter. For Hume, to have a concept of anything whatsoever means to have an idea of that something and to have an idea is to perceive an idea. This implies that we have to be conscious of this idea, on whatever level of consciousness. Hume would have to say that it doesn't make sense to talk about a self we don't know about, we don't perceive. If we do, we talk only about a *word*, not about something we would like to call *concept*.[42] Hume implies, on several occasions, that an idea has to be (consciously) conceived: „...that it is something *felt* by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination."[43]

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[39] „Necessary" is not meant in the causal sense here, since causality requires temporal priority, which I want to overcome.

[40] It seems to be the case that a similar circularity occurs in respect to at least some of the identity theories claiming the body to be the necessary and sufficient constituent of self-identity.

[41] Some have argued that the self is something innate. This claim is, at first sight, compatible with my claim. However, I will argue later on that since we are not always conscious of ourselves (we are, for instance, not self-conscious when we are very small children) we not always are a self, i.e. we have to **become** a self. Being a self is not something we are born with.

[42] compare T.I,II,II,32. and T.I,II,V,62.

[43] T. App. 629.

The self is not an external object, it is not part of what we usually call the external world which can be doubted, reasonably or otherwise, by overcautious sceptics. Since the self is internal to me, it must be accessible to me. In Humean terms this means it has to be accessible to my perception and the only thing which is, in this respect, is the **bundle** of perceptions. Hume, and this is important to realize, is not saying that the self is identical with any single one perception, but neither does he claim that there is no perception of the self. REID writes: „My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call *myself*. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers. My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every moment; they have no continued existence; but that *self*, or *I*, to which they belong, is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings which I call mine."[44] The picture of the self REID gives here understands the self very much as a substance which has powers (to think, to feel etc.) which can be exercised. HUME cannot adopt such an account of the self since he has to deny the existence of substances on empirical grounds. But HUME's own account is in certain aspects in accordance with some of REID's statements, namely in respect to the nature of perceptions, that is, impressions and ideas. HUME regards them, as I have already stated earlier, as fleeting existences. No perception is of lasting duration and there is a permanent change of the perceptions appearing on the stage of the theater of our mind. For that reason the self cannot be any one of such perceptions, but has to be, in HUME's understanding, the **bundle** of perceptions which, as such, must be perceivable[45] - but I will come to it later on.

[44] REID, T. ibid., p.214-215.

[45] Though not necessarily as a simple impression or an impression of the senses. The perception of the self, as we will see later on, must be understood as a complex perception of reflection.

II. Self-Identity

II.I. The Criteria of Identity

Compatibility of Theories

Self-identity lies at the heart of any concept of the self as there must be a criterion or criteria which a) make the self the same self over a period of time and b) make a self identifiable and re-identifiable by others. Thus, we also need to pay attention to the problem of epistemological availability of the criterion or the criteria of self-identity.

Concerning the question of the criterion or the criteria of self-identity we are faced with mainly three competing theories. The body theory claims that the necessary and sufficient criterion of self-identity is the human body, either in its entirety (non-reductionist body theory) or only as the physical brain (reductionist body-theory). The memory theory, on the other hand, claims that memory (or the mental in general) is the necessary and sufficient criterion of the identity of the self. There is, last but not least, also a theory which I wish to call the combined theory, which argues that self-identity has a bodily as well as a mental criterion. Each one of these is a necessary, but on its own not a sufficient criterion.

The claim that the body, on its own, is a sufficient criterion for self-identity is hardly compatible with Hume's account of the self especially in Book One of the *Treatise*. It is also incompatible with Hume's philosophy in general. Although it will be argued later on that Hume is, in fact, a Basic Realist, it is also clear that the bundle-definition cannot allow for the body to be the sole criterion of identity. 1.The self is the bundle of perceptions and perceptions, to be perceptions, have to be conscious. They do not only have to be in the mind, they also, so Hume, constitute the mind. Thus, the mind has an important role to play where identity of the self is concerned and the body theory seems to deny that role. 2. The body theorist could argue, in a reductionist manner, that the mind is identical with the brain and neurophysiological events which take place in the brain. Thereby setting the mind and the physical in a relation of identity. Despite

Hume's Basic Realism this is an account which cannot be argued to be Hume's. We will see, later on, that though an ontological claim concerning the existence of external body (which includes one's own) can be made claims about the nature of body cannot. The reductionist account implies, however, a claim about the nature of body, namely that particular neurophysiological events are identical with particular mental events. Such an account cannot reasonably be given within the framework of Hume's philosophy and since such an account would be necessary we can say that the body theory, for that reason, is incompatible with Hume's philosophy.

Apart from the obstacles posed by Hume's theory of perception there are other possible objections against the body-theory. I wish to give some indication of what they are. Many of these objections have been pointed out by QUINTON and SHOEMAKER. Both argue that the body-theory which claims that bodily continuity is the sole criterion of personal identity is not in accordance with our intuitions concerning personal identity which seem to place it in the sphere of memory, character and/or personality, that is, generally speaking, in the sphere of the mental rather than in the sphere of the physical i.e. the body. Both draw up cases of the following kind: There are two different persons *A* and *B*, *A* has a character and a personality of the kind *Q* whilst *B*'s personality and character are of the kind *R*. One sunny morning someone wakes up with the body of *B*. We can observe *B*'s body displaying behavior appropriate to *Q* entirely incompatible with *R*. Someone else also wakes up who's visual appearance tells us that this person must be *A* since we see the body we previously have known as *A*. Nevertheless, the body looking like *A* looked yesterday is displaying behavior entirely alien to the behavior we would expect from *Q*, but in total accordance with behavior of personalities of the kind *R*. Our reaction would be one of concern and confusion and further inquiry would reveal that the body looking like *A* has all the memories *B* had yesterday and the body looking like *B* has all the memories *A* had yesterday. Intuitively we would say that a body switch has occurred and that *A* is still *A* but has a different body, the one that was previously *B*'s. Consequently we would say about *B* that he is still *B* but has

now *A*'s previous body as his body. What we aren't likely to say is that a memory and a personality switch occurred. We don't say that *A* is now *B* and *B* is now *A*. „Now what would it be reasonable to say in these circumstances: that B and C have changed bodies (the consequence of a mental criterion), that they have switched character and memories (the consequence of a bodily criterion), or neither? It seems to me quite clear that we should not say that B and C had switched characters and memories. And if this is correct, it follows that bodily identity is not a logically complete criterion of personal identity; at best it could be a necessary condition of personal identity."[46]

We can find many examples of such cases throughout all cultures and times. It is not even necessary that the new body is a human one. The prince is still, somehow, the prince, even when he has the body of a frog. If bodily continuity would be the sole criterion of personal identity our intuitions were entirely mistaken. We would have to say that the frog is not the prince at all, that person *A* is now person *B* because our identity is defined by our bodies. If such a mistake of intuition truly occurs, it is certainly not a mistake we all are going to accept and we would subsequently want to correct it. However, the intuition seems to be so strong that we are more likely to abandon the strict form of the body-theory. Some other beliefs we employ in every day life also do not support the body-theory as QUINTON points out: „In our general relations with other human beings their bodies are for the most part intrinsically unimportant. We use them as convenient recognition devices enabling us to locate without difficulty the persisting character and memory complexes in which we are interested, which we love or like."[47] Literature and folk wisdom are full of tales about ugly or terrible bodies „hosting" a good and generous soul.

The general consent here seems to be that the bodily appearance has nothing to do, or at least not much, with what and who a person really **is**. Intuitively we lay the emphasis on memory and character to identify a person and not on their bodies. We can imagine people having identical bodies, pairs of

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[46] QUINTON, A. *The Soul*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.), ibid., p.63.
[47] ibid., p.64.

absolutely identical twins, for instance, but it is more difficult to imagine the possibility of totally identical minds, because even the bodies of identical twins cannot occupy the same space and even if all their experiences were identical they still would perceive one and the same object from a different angle which gives them a slightly different perception of the object. The position in space, however, is clearly a bodily matter, but the kind and the quality of the conscious experience isn't. In ordinary circumstances bodies are a good and easy way of identifying others because usually bodies are quite different and we can easily recognize these differences; but so are many other things, like names for instance. Nevertheless, there are situations in ordinary life where the body is not considered as a sufficient means to identify others, like in the case of identical twins or doppelgängers. Here we need to make further inquiries concerning a person's memories and character, like for instance, does the person remember events and people he or she should remember, and so on. If this person is not capable of producing the right kinds of memory, character etc. we naturally conclude that the person is quite a different person from the one we know or look for. To describe our mistake in the identity of this person we would employ sentences like: „I was deceived by the appearance of such and such." or „This man looked exactly like my grandfather but it wasn't him."

We have to realize that these arguments only suggest that bodily continuity is very unlikely to be the sole criterion of personal identity. They haven't shown that it is not one of its criteria or constituents, if there is more than one criterion or constituent. Furthermore, to say that bodily continuity is not the sole criterion of personal identity doesn't imply that memory in particular or the mental in general is the sole criterion of identity either. It seems to me more reasonable to think that personal identity has more than one criterion and that bodily continuity is one of its criteria. SIDNEY SHOEMAKER thinks that „Bodily identity is certainly a criterion of personal identity [...] But I do not think that it can be the sole criterion, and I think that there is an important sense in which memory, though certainly not the sole criterion, is one of the criteria."[48] This view is also

[48] SHOEMAKER, S. *Personal Identity and Memory*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.), ibid., p.129.

supported by theories' in psychology understanding that the particular body of a person plays a constituting role in respect to the self of that person (body-self). It must be noted, that there is, in connection to the self, a difference between someone identifying another person, that is, the finding out the identity of someone else and my own identity as it is perceived by me. We certainly can use the term *self* meaningfully in our communication with other people, but what it is to be **my** self can only be perceived by me and no one else.

Division of the Subject

If memory, which is essentially mental, were the one and only criterion of personal identity, then how can we make claims about another person's identity at all? And it is obvious that we constantly make such claims. The only identity which could be known to me is my own since I don't have access to the memory or to the mental events of other people apart from **bodily** manifestations. I think we couldn't even use the bodily means of identification as suggested by QUINTON because there aren't any grounds to assume that they were means of identification. So, if memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would, theoretically, seem to be possible to account for being able to have an identity myself and to know about it but it seems also to be the case that I could only identify others, if I can do this at all, by their bodily appearance.

One might argue that one has to distinguish between the ontological and the epistemological question. The question „What is personal identity?" asking for its criteria, is quite different from asking „How do I know?". Regarding the latter it cannot be denied that in respect to the identification of other persons (or, in fact, to any identification) memory is a necessary condition. To identify my mother as my mother is quite impossible if I cannot remember how my mother looks, what her character (the behavioral expression of her mental events) is and so on, I wouldn't even know that I have a mother at all or what a mother is in the first place. Therefore, memory is not only a necessary criterion in respect to my own personal identity and therefore to the first person statements I make but is also at least a necessary condition, in an epistemological sense, for third person identity statements.

However, all arguments resting on memory presuppose that we know what memory is and also presuppose that we hold memory usually to be reliable. (The very term contains this reliability already, a false or mistaken memory is not memory but something else.) SHOEMAKER offers an argument to show that the concept of memory presupposes a criterion of personal identity which cannot be memory. He starts his argument by claiming that one doesn't use any criteria of identity on the basis of memory when one makes statements about one's own past. That **I** was watching the *X-Files* yesterday is pretty clear to me, I remember that I watched them, I also remember having certain feelings and thoughts whilst doing so. It is not that I remember someone watching the *X-Files* yesterday and thus need a criterion based on memory or anything else to identify whether this someone was me or not. One might perhaps be justified to say that the very term *memory*, or the sentence „I remember *Z*," implies that 1. the memorized events and actions really did occur and 2. that an **I** remembers them and can only do so because it was present at the time the event or action occurred. This is even so when *Z* is something like „The chemical element Antimon is of orange colour," or „'Nur wer die Sehnsucht kennt, weiß was ich leide' is the first verse in Goethe's 'Mignon'". These things are facts and not events in the proper sense but I remember them because **I** was once made acquainted with them (and this then was an event), they were made known to **me** and not to someone I have by some criterion to identify as being me. It is even possible to infer back from our memory to the idea that we had to be a witness or had to be acquainted with it, because we know that it is impossible to remember these things if it had been otherwise: I know that my friend has a terrible secret, because she referred to it once and I remember that she did. I mention to her that I know about it and she tells that she only once in her life mentioned it and this was in the kitchen of so and so. Although I don't remember myself ever having been in the kitchen of so and so, I must have been there, otherwise I wouldn't know anything about the secret, given that her statement is true.

SHOEMAKER goes on to claim that if we don't need a criterion on the basis of memory to make statements about our own past, i.e. first-person-statements, the criterion of personal identity we employ must apply to third-person statements. „If, as I have argued, one does not use criteria of identity in making statements about one's own past on the basis of memory, the criteria of personal identity must be third person criteria. And if memory were the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves."[49] SHOEMAKER then points out that we need a criterion other than memory to make identity claims about other people. We have to establish whether the memory-claims of other people are correct or not, thus have to establish that they use the term *memory* properly and know what is meant by it. It is obvious that memory itself cannot be the criterion by which we can establish all of this. We need something else, which is bodily continuity. „...memory claims can be mistaken, and there must, accordingly, be such a thing as checking on the truth of a memory claim, i.e., establishing whether a person remembers something without taking his word for it that he does. And this, if he claims to have done a certain thing in the past, would involve establishing whether he, the person who claims this, is the same as someone who did do such an action in the past. In establishing this we could not use memory as our criterion of personal identity, and it is difficult to see what we could use if not bodily identity."[50]

SHOEMAKER's argument, suggesting two criteria, would still apply to the cases expressing our intuitions I talked about earlier in this chapter. If we know that the prince was cursed into a frog we have some continuity of a body, although it is not the same human body. We would also expect the frog to know all the things the prince did know. In the case of the frog prince the two aspects of personal identity seem to be reflected together. We expect that the prince had the body of a prince and assume that he can use the term *memory* meaningfully and correctly. The frog has also a body, seems to use the term

[49] ibid., p.127.
[50] ibid., p.128.

memory meaningfully and remembers things only the prince can remember. That the frog has had a past as a prince and the prince a past as a frog gets highlighted by the last sentences of the tale. There the faithful servant Heinrich makes identity claims by saying that his heart is now relieved from the pain he suffered when the prince was a frog: „Als Ihr noch im Brunnen saßt, als Ihr noch ein Frosch gewast." (When in the pond you liveth, when a frog you were.) In the original tale the princess doesn't know that the frog is identical with the prince and doesn't kiss him but throws the frog against the wall to kill him because she is disgusted by the appearance of the frog making claims only a good looking man is allowed to make towards her. The faithful Heinrich was not disgusted because he knew about the body transformation, most likely by observation, but it is plain in the wording Heinrich uses that, though he was aware of some bodily continuity, for him the frog was not really the prince either and he is glad that the prince is restored to his former self. Let us imagine the frog had told the princess that he is a cursed prince. She probably wouldn't have believed him, most likely also not if the frog had provided some evidence based on memory. In the latter case she would have been more inclined to believe and she also might have wanted to believe, but there would always remain some doubt. The important matter is that she wouldn't have been certain about the identity of the frog. She only would have been if she herself would have witnessed the body transformation taking place or if she would have trusted a statement of a third person which witnessed the transformation. But even in the latter case there is room for doubt because the princess couldn't be absolutely certain about the reliability of the witness.

I am inclined to follow SHOEMAKER and to claim that, even if we look at our intuitions, neither body or memory is, on its own, a sufficient criterion to base personal identity on. This doesn't endanger the claim I wish to make concerning the connection between memory and the self, because for my purposes it will be enough to be able to hold up the claim that memory is a necessary feature of the self, I don't have to say that memory is a necessary and sufficient criterion for the self. It will be sufficient for me that there has to be

a necessary connection between memory and the self of whatever kind this connection may be. This is why I can go along with SHOEMAKER when he talks about us not using a criterion of personal identity of any sort when we make statements about our own past. He acknowledges the importance of memory in this context and its importance as a necessary feature in respect to our concept of what a person is.[51] „It is, I should like to say, part of the concept of a person that persons are capable of making memory statements about their own pasts. Since it is a conceptual truth that memory statements are generally true, it is a conceptual truth that persons are capable of knowing their own pasts in a special way, a way that does not involve the use of criteria of personal identity, and it is a conceptual truth (or a logical fact) that the memory claims that a person makes can be used by others as grounds for statements about the past history of that person. This, I think, is the kernel of truth that is embodied in the view that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory.[52]

However, this account of the role of memory for personal identity is not without its problems.

1. Memory is understood as a criterion of personal identity when it comes to third person identity statements (although it is not the only criterion), but it is not a criterion of personal identity, as SHOEMAKER has pointed out, where first person identity statements are concerned. I have immediate access to my own perceptions, including internal (memory) perceptions, whereas my access to someone else's perceptions, especially in respect to his internal (memory) perceptions[53], is not immediate. Nor are my own perceptions immediately accessible to someone other than myself.

2. Hume defines the self as a bundle of perceptions. Someone else's perceptions (especially internal perceptions) are not directly accessible by me. If

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[51] We also have to note that the term *criterion* is ambiguous. SHOEMAKER uses it here in an epistemological sense (which is the proper meaning of the term) but it is also used in an ontological sense, in which I will also employ the term later on.

[52] SHOEMAKER, S. *Personal Identity and Memory*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.), ibid., p.133-134.

[53] Note that I cannot observe anybody's perceptions byt my own, even not external perceptions. I can observe somebody's head being hit by a club, but I cannot directly observe his perception of being hit by a club. I infer the perception by the external signs of perceiving certain perceptions.

I make first person identity statements I make them on the grounds of my own perceptions which I perceive in their totality (complex impression). If I make third person identity statements I make them on the grounds of my perceptions **of someone else**, which themselves are part of the bundle that I am. Here we are faced with two possibilities:

a) third person identity statements are statements about the genuine perceptions of a third person, as part of the bundle that they are, i.e. their self,

b) third person identity statements are statements stemming from my perception of the third person's behavior from which I infer this person to have certain perceptions (including memory perceptions).

It seems to be the case that option a) is not available for third person identity statements, but only to first person identity statements since I cannot penetrate someone else's bundle (not to speak of *qualia*). Option b) is available for third person identity statements but does also not penetrate someone else's bundle, i.e. his self, which can only be inferred.

I think this indicates two epistemologically, and perhaps also ontologically, different aspects of an individual's identity: an essentially (but not exclusively) private aspect and a public aspect. The private aspect I wish to refer to as *the self*, the public aspect I refer to as *personhood*.

II.II. The Concepts of Self and of Personhood

Before I start to investigate the matter I think it is necessary to clarify my position to free myself from the accusation of Cartesian dualism which could possibly be made when my former statements are misinterpreted. I said earlier, that in respect to the self and to personal identity the epistemological question „How do we know someone's (including our own) self and personal identity?", and the ontological question „What are they?", can easily be confused and have been so throughout the literature. It is also the case that the term *criterion* is used in an epistemological sense as well as in an ontological sense and

confusion takes place when we shift from „Which criterion or criteria **constitute** the self or personal identity?“ (ontological), to „**How are these criteria employed** in identification?“. These two questions are undoubtedly connected but they don't have to have necessarily the same answer.

I have treated the problem of privacy as an epistemological problem although there is undoubtedly an ontological aspect to it. I don't wish to claim, however, that my thoughts, feelings, perceptions, i.e. my mental events cannot be known at all to anyone but me. I can share them, tell about them to other people, they can observe my behavior, my face expressions and can and do make judgments about my mental states. If I say to my best friend Dagmar „I am very sad because my boy friend left me“, but my behavior doesn't display any signs of the kind of behavior we expect from someone who is sad, that is I jump around, dance and sing, don't seem to have to make an effort to be lively and jolly, my best friend would probably tell another friend, Claudia: „She says she is sad but it doesn't look like it. Can't be that bad then, she is probably not really sad.“ It is very likely that Claudia replies: „Perhaps she just hides it very well.“ Whereupon Dagmar says: „No, I have seen her doing this before and then she was frantically enjoying herself, now it's more normal, not so much over the top, no, she isn't sad really. But didn't we know that she is only interested in herself? The guy was really nice, she never loved him. That's probably why he left.“ - Dagmar makes here judgments not only about my behavior, but also about my character and my mental states. She doesn't believe that it is true what I told her. I told her that my mental state is „being sad“, but she concludes, knowing me very well and being closely acquainted with my behavior generally and in certain situations, that I cannot be sad. The point is that she doesn't **know** that I am not sad but **believes**, however strongly, that I am not sad. Let's also say that her belief is true, I am not sad, but the only person who can **know** that her belief is true is myself. Dagmar cannot be absolutely certain about my mental states because she doesn't have **direct** access to them, as I have, but only indirect access. My mental states are immediately known to me but not to Dagmar or anyone else for that matter. She needs means which she also has to

interpret. If she knows me very well and is a good observer her interpretation will be right most of the time, but not always. Even if it were right at all times, she would not have absolute certainty about my mental states for a variety of reasons.

1. If we take it that she has to know me very well and has gained her knowledge about me by experience, there is still no possibility to derive a universal law concerning the connection of certain mental states of mine having a certain physiological, observable „output". Such a law cannot be derived from experience. Therefore, if it were true of all past events in respect to my mental states and their physiological outcome that I cry only if I am sad and I am sad only if I cry, it cannot be established that this is still true tomorrow.

2. The „physiological output" of mental events (behavior and speech) is not unambiguous. It is conceivable that a certain mental state can have different „physiological outputs", as well as it is conceivable that different mental states have the same „physiological output". People cry when they are sad, or desperate, or angry, or furious, or happy, or relieved. Everyone knows that there are many different reasons why someone is crying, or laughing, or shouting, or yelling etc. I might yell at someone because I am outraged, but I might also yell because that person is not hearing very well, I might also yell at someone when I am not angry at all but would like to punish someone by yelling or shouting, a child for instance.

To interpret the external signs of mental events successfully one needs to take context into account, which includes not only the external circumstances but also the personality of the people involved, very often their biographies etc. I think it is obvious that we never have all information in respect to the entire context, even if simply for the fact that we are not the person we interpret. We don't experience this person's experiences. Therefore there will always be a possibility for error, i.e. misinterpretation. We might be justified to say that even if we were in possession of all relevant information we could not be absolutely certain that we are. To be certain that we possess all relevant data involves

judgments about what the relevant data are and also that we know them in their entirety. Thus, it remains the possibility that our judgments are erroneous.[54]

Even when we take into account that behavior is not the only observable source of information: the person who's mental states we want to know also speaks to us about them - we cannot be absolutely certain about his or her mental states either. The person might be lying or might not use proper descriptions of the mental state in question. We might, by putting together all available information be able to judge that this person is probably lying, and we therefore don't assume that statements made by this person are true, or we might believe that the person doesn't use descriptions properly, but we cannot be absolutely sure about it. Even if the belief that the person is lying turns out to be a justified belief, we still don't know the person's mental state. We only know that certain statements made by the person were not true. Factual statements of the sort: „When the crime was committed I was at the cinema and watched *Reservoir Dogs*," can be verified or falsified by finding evidence that I was indeed in the cinema at the time. The verification method rests upon the principle that one and the same body cannot be at two different places at the same time, which goes back to bodily continuity and not to any mental criteria whatsoever. But statements like „I really was sad that I had to kill my grandmother," cannot be proven true or false.

In conclusion, I think, it is clear that we do have **some** access to other people's mental states but not in terms of certainty. My own mental states can be **known** only to me, because I am the only person who experiences them directly. The access of other persons to my mental states is restricted by the necessity of mediation by behavior and speech (that is by physical means of some sort), therefore their access is indirect. Third persons are capable and

[54] I am only concerned with human beings here. The theoretical possibility that there are other beings who possess all relevant data remains, but it is irrelevant in the present context.

justified to form judgments and to hold beliefs about my mental states, but these beliefs are not knowledge when the latter is defined in terms of certainty.[55]

Now, that I have clarified my understanding of the privacy of the self we can start with the actual topic of this section, namely the distinction between, and relation of, self and personhood. When we speak of personal identity I take it that we mean the identity of person and ask the question „What makes a person the same person at different points in time?". When I talk of self identity I wish to understand it as the identity of self expressed by the question „What makes a self the same self at different points in time?". This difference is not vain because it is quite conceivable that the terms *person* and *self* don't have the same meaning and have different references. It may also be the case that they have, in fact, the same reference but refer to different aspects of this reference. If it turns out that both terms depict different aspects even of the same reference, or ontological unit, the arguments put forward to establish a necessary link between personal identity and memory cannot automatically be applied to establish a necessary link between the self and memory. This doesn't mean that there is no such link, it just means that what was said about personal identity cannot be said in exactly the same way when it comes to the self.

McCALL's concepts of Person and Self

CATHERINE McCALL writes: „...whilst there exists only one ontological entity, a biological, social, and self-conscious being, this entity is thought of and conceived in different ways. The terms person, self, and human being, when referring to the concepts of ways of conceiving of an individual, have different, distinct meanings. But although the meanings are distinct, they are interrelated. It will be argued that the terms refer to the individual, and that the difference in meaning between the terms does not emerge from the fact that they refer to different or separable entities, but rather emerges from the different modes of

[55] My knowledge about my own mental states does not have to be conceptualized knowledge. It is not necessary that I am able to label a particular mental state I experience to a) know that I am experiencing this particular mental state and b) to know what this particular mental state feels like.

conception under which individuals are understood."[56] McCALL uses the term *person* in the sense that it refers to what she calls a *public entity*. To talk about persons requires third-person-statements. „The individual, as person, is what is cognised of the individual by others. The individual, recognised as a person, is a public entity. In this sense the person is a third person entity - whatever is known, attributed, or thought of the individual constitutes that individual as a person. [...] Both what constitutes a person - personhood - and the conditions for identifying and reidentifying persons - personal identity - are to be found in the public domain. Persons are social beings, created and constituted, and found only in society."[57] I think this definition is, at least at the moment, acceptable when we look at the account of personal identity given earlier. If personal identity, that is what makes a person the same person at different times, involves as one of its criteria a bodily one, and if we consider epistemological requirements of third person identity statements, then McCALL's understanding of the concept of person can be agreed with here. I don't think that there is *prima facie* a short-coming of the memory-criterion since it has been argued that we need, when making third person statements, that is, identifying and reidentifying others, a bodily criterion to make use of the memory-criterion at all. We also need memory to make any identity statements whatsoever which McCall clearly refers to.

McCALL also offers a definition of the self and I wish to quote her here at length because, firstly, her definition contains many features of the self I find myself mainly in agreement with, for some of them I have already argued, others still need to be established. Secondly, there are also difficulties concerning her definition, some of them serious, which need to be explored.

> „...the term self refers to those aspects of an individual which constitutes self consciousness. This concept concerns the ability of individuals to reflect upon their actions, thoughts, intentions, and so on. As a second order activity, reflection upon action assumes the existence of a subject who performs the action - (if not a subject who performs the reflection) - and it is this subject which is conceptualized as the self.

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[56] McCALL, C. *Concepts of Person. An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self and Human Being*, Avebury, 1990, p.7.
[57] ibid., p.12.

> The concept of a self represents the experiential nature of the individual: the individual does not merely react to the environment, but experiences himself or herself so doing. The self is thus the location of experience, the aspect of an individual which can reflect upon experience, which „has" those experiences, but which is not identified with the experience.
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> The use of *I* as a first person indicator refers to the concept of self. In this respect the self is essentially private. Thus, for instance, the status of „privileged access" in reports of mental states such as, „I am in pain," or „I am happy," is a direct result of the experiential nature of such reports. Third person reports of the same phenomenon, such as, „He is in pain," are descriptive, and whether these reports describe behaviour or dispositions they can be challenged, evidence can be presented in favour or against the description. But first person reports differ in this respect; they do not describe a state, or bit of behaviour, or a disposition; they state an experiental fact; first person report statements cannot be contradicted by others, need not be supported by evidence.
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> The term *I* refers to the experiencing individual, not the person. The person is a public construction, and no matter what identity is attributed to the individual as person, the experiencing self remains constant."[58]

McCALL's definition of *person* is not unproblematic when we take the arguments concerning personal identity and the role of memory as they have been put forward earlier into account. We have said that memory is one, but not the sole criterion of personal identity. If this is so then memory has to be a criterion of being a person too. McCALL argues that the expression *the same person* is frequently used ambiguously, sometimes referring to the person as a physical object and sometimes referring to character, personality etc. „The phrase can refer to either the identity of a person as a persisting object - as a human being - or to the stability of the personality of that individual. The phrase, „the same person," is often used ambiguously, in which case the question is confused, and it is sometimes used ambivalently, in which case the question is avoided."[59] Although it is not apparent if one takes her definition of *person* in isolation from her other definitions, it becomes clear that McCALL's definition of *person*, the distinctions she makes and their consequences in respect to personal identity are not compatible with an account understanding memory as one of the criteria of personal identity. McCALL can only allow for a bodily

[58] ibid., p.14.
[59] ibid., p.19.

criterion and states this when she discusses memory and personal identity.[60] „Shoemaker appears to be making a case for memory as a criterion of **self** [61] identity; that is, for the particular nature of the individual as s/he experiences her/his self as a conscious being. But it is only in the sense that an individual directly experiences conscious states, whether these states are memory states or physical states, and does not need to observe them, that such a case can be made."[62] She goes on to argue that it is impossible to experience someone else's conscious states, memories or otherwise, and therefore don't need to differentiate between one's own conscious states and the ones of someone else. Therefore the question of identity doesn't arise because differentiation is neither needed nor possible. She concludes: „It would appear that physical identity, the identity of the individual as a biological entity, the human being, is, in fact, the criterion which is used when making judgements concerning **personal** identity[63]. Thus, just as an adequate analysis of the concept of person includes a description of the properties and characteristics which are typical of human beings, so an analysis of the identity of a particular person includes the identity of a particular biological organism. The general characteristics of persons are revealed in human beings and in their actions, and the particular identity of a person is instantiated in a particular body."[64]

McCALL understands SHOEMAKER's case for memory as a criterion for personal identity as failing because according to her definitions what he is actually doing is making a case for self identity and memory. The problem, so McCALL, lies in a confusion of concepts. But is this so? I think it is clear that SHOEMAKER gives bodily identity an important role to play when it comes to personal identity. I also think it is clear that SHOEMAKER's reasons for the acknowledgement of bodily continuity as one of the criteria of personal identity are to be found in the social sphere and refer to it. SHOEMAKER points out that

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[60] We have seen that SHOEMAKER, in fact, wanted to make a case for personal identity, not self identity and McCALL, extrapolating her own mistake, believes that he is not making a case for personal, but for self identity since he includes memory.
[61] my own accentuation.
[62] McCALL, C. ibid., p.136.
[63] my own accentuation.
[64] McCall, C. ibid., p.138.

third person identity statements have to be made necessarily. When he talks about the proper use of the term *memory* and refers to third person statements then it is obvious that statements and judgments of this kind require a social context: there has to be a third person or persons, there also has to be a comparison between different persons using the word *memory* and the meaning it has when they use it. If the concept of person is essentially a social one then we have also to take into account that the person I am is part of the social context just as third persons are part of it. I said earlier that it is impossible to make any identity statements about any objects or other human beings without memory, this is so because identity is identity in time and I have to identify or reidentify *X* as *X* at different points in time. Memory is, whatever it may be ontologically[65], mental. Therefore the mental has a part in third person statements as well as in first person statements, it therefore has to be part of personal identity as well, otherwise, the term *identity* could not be applied at all, because there would be no possibility to determine identity at all. Taking these reasons into account it seems to be the case that McCALL's definition of *person* is too restrictive by leaving the mental criteria out and because of this the *definiens* cannot account for the *definiendum*.

Before McCALL gives her definitions and goes on to defend them by looking at theories of identity, she states that the references of the concepts in question are all aspects of one and the same thing, that is, the individual. This indicates that these definitions are definitions of interrelated, inseparable aspects of this individual or of individuals in general. The references of these concepts are not separable, independent entities and it seems to be the case that McCALL, making irreconcilable claims, steps into a trap of the Cartesian real distinction label by treating them as separable and not intrinsically interrelated, although she says they are. There are no situations in life where an adult individual is either a person or a self, we are rather everything of this at every moment of time in our adult life. We find it difficult to comprehend that one can be a person with accountability for one's actions, with responsibility and consistency in

[65] Memory is experienced as mental, even if the materialist identity-theorists would be right.

behavior and character, without having a self. It is also inconceivable that an individual has a self but no personhood. All this is not only inconceivable but impossible by McCALL's own account. All these concepts refer to aspects of the individual and if one of the aspects were missing then we cannot talk of an individual at all. It seems to be the case that self and personhood are connected practically and ontologically inseparably with one another, that one requires the other, especially when we believe that the self is not a lonely Cartesian self but essentially social and that the concept of *person* doesn't only refer to a body but to something which we consider having a self or at least, in a wider sense, having the capacity for a self.

The consequences of McCALL's rigid definitions of the concepts in question would be something like this: Firstly, if *person* is defined in purely bodily terms we might call an automaton, looking like a human being and displaying some kind of human-like behavior a person and ascribe responsibility, accountability etc. to it.[66] Since personhood is an aspect of individuals just as being a human being is an aspect of the individual, McCALL would then have to say that the automaton is a human being. „...the object of the different modes of conception - the object of the concepts of *person, self* and *human being* - is the one being, the individual."[67] This would be wrong by McCALL's own definition because the automaton is biologically and genetically not a human being.

If, on the other hand, McCALL wants to avoid this problem then she has to say that one can be a person without having a self and/or without being a human being, therefore one wouldn't be an individual either given her definition. She would have to say that each single one of these aspects or pairs of them can occur separately and independently from the other/s but don't constitute an individual. (They still can be maintained to be aspects of an individual but only if all three of them are together. It is very much like saying that roundness and greenness are aspects of Granny Smith - apples. However, they are aspects of water melons too. There has to be at least one additional aspect to distinguish

[66] These are properties constituting personhood. Compare McCALL, C. ibid., p.12.
[67] ibid., p.9.

Granny Smith apples from any other entity. Let's say this aspect is *X*, and when it is the case that roundness + greenness + *X*, we have a Granny Smith-apple, but not a water melon. But then the philosophically interesting question is not what roundness and greenness are and how they are part of the features of objects, because they are features of many objects. But the interesting question would be what *X* is. If this is so, then McCALL could not treat *person*, *self* **and** *human being* as relatively equally important features of an individual.)

Thirdly, although McCALL wants to investigate only human beings in her discussion, her definitions are still too strict. They do not allow for the possibility that self and personhood can be ascribed to beings other than human. An automaton is certainly not a human being but this doesn't mean that he could not be a person and a self either. Being a human being is surely not a necessary condition of self and personhood.

Going back to the suggestion that these aspects can be conceived as separate, not intrinsically and necessarily interdependent and interrelated aspects, it seems that such a conception would not be in accordance with McCALL's own views concerning the interdependency of these aspects, which she acknowledges: „Just as different organs and their related functions can be conceived of as being in some sense independent and in some senses dependent upon each other, and at the same time being dependent upon their integral function within the organism as a whole, so the concepts of *person, self* and *human being* have distinct functions, whilst remaining interdependent. Neither the biological organs, nor the concepts under consideration, can exist independently.[...] Similarly, the existence of the concepts of *self, person* and *human being* depend upon the existence of the individual who is so conceived. In order to understand the concepts and their interrelationships, it is necessary to understand their relationship to the individual. Neither hearts nor persons are to be found existing independently in the natural world, but exist as parts of a whole."[68] McCALL's account is clearly contradictory.

[68] ibid., p.9-10.

It must also be noted that her definition of *person* includes features like responsibility, accountability and so on. To ascribe these features to individuals requires that we make some inferences about their mental states, which cannot be observed directly. To know if Oedipus is responsible for the patricide we take into account not only physical, directly observable evidence, like seeing Oedipus doing it or having some other hard evidence determining that he did it, but also mental states. Questions like: „Is Oedipus of a sound mind?", „Is he capable of distinguishing right from wrong?", „Was the killing premeditated?", „What are Oedipus' motives for killing his father?", „Did he know that he was his father?", must all be asked and answered, only then can we make a positive statement about Oedipus' responsibility for the crime. When we make statements about other individuals we very often presuppose that responsibility for their actions can be ascribed to them, but this is so because we usually infer that the other individual has mental abilities similar to ours and is generally of a sound mind. But there are individuals where we don't think that they are responsible for their actions or there are situations where we consider responsibilities lessened not only due to particular external circumstances but also due to whether or not certain mental events are believed to have taken place.

We have now determined that McCALL's understanding of personhood cannot be accounted for by her own definition of personhood. Her concept of personhood cannot be upheld by a bodily criterion alone. However, we still have to shed light upon the relation between personhood and self, both in terms of their distinction (as different aspects of the individual) and their interrelationship and interdependency. The ground is already prepared for a first consideration concerning the latter task, namely, that both personhood and self require a mental criterion. This criterion is, at least, an epistemological one. But we will see that it must be understood also in an ontological sense.

1. *Person* is, first of all, a social concept and it seems to be the case that, especially where third person identity statements are concerned, the epistemological and the ontological aspect are one. Recognizing someone as a person is 'making them into a person'. No one can be a person without the

recognition of others in social contexts, expressed in third person statements. Personhood is *quasi* given to the individual through bodily and social recognition by others.[69] McCALL suggests that only one criterion of personal identity is needed and that this criterion is one of bodily continuity, i.e. bodily identity. I suggested, on the other hand, that if this were the case the interrelationship and interdependency of the aspects of an individual, which are here in question, are disregarded and dismissed. Such a clear line between the social personhood and the private self[70] cannot be drawn, neither epistemologically nor ontologically. Furthermore, the social nature of personhood and the concept of person require something more than only third person perspectives (and statements). It is required that the role of the named, recognized and referred to 'individual' is something more than just being named, recognized and referred to by others. Which indicates that the self has also a social dimension, which will be explained later on.

I also suggested that no identification: for instance identifying me as me at different times, or someone identifying something or someone else being the same or of a certain kind at different times, by bodily or whatever other criteria; can take place without the partaking of some mental activities such as memory, whether they occur „in" the observer or the observed. If we accept at least that the concept of person and subsequently personhood is of a social nature and requires recognition as well as identification and re-identification, then we also must accept that some mental abilities of an intellectual nature (of whoever recognizes, identifies and re-identifies - I can perceive myself as being a person too) are required. Therefore personhood is necessarily linked up with mental or intellectual abilities.[71]

Now that we have established the necessity of mental or intellectual abilities in respect to personhood we still have to look into the matter of intellectual or mental abilities and the self. It doesn't matter here, as well as it didn't matter in

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[69] This still refers to a third person statement only.

[70] Taken for granted, of course, that the self is essentially private. But it must be noted that McCALL's definition of the self suggests clearly that she thinks it is.

[71] Please note that I wish, later on, to maintain that when I have a self I have necessarily to perceive myself as being a person too and *vice versa*.

respect to personhood or the meaning of the term *person* , what we take the mental to be ontologically. All that is needed is an admittance that mental events of an intellectual nature do exist and that human beings usually have or are capable of such mental events. If these mental events are emergent properties of matter or if they are identical with matter, i.e. identical with neurophysiological states, must not concern us here.

2. Referring back to the previous investigation concerning the privacy of the self we understand that the self is essentially of the mental kind (however it is understood ontologically). Even if the self, like all mental events and states, were nothing but physical events or physical states of the brain, i.e. if it were ontologically of a physical nature, we still experience a thought as a thought, consciousness as consciousness, a feeling of kindness or anger as a feeling of kindness or anger very similar to the way we perceive colours as red, blue, green, yellow and so on, although they are actually certain wavelengths of light which can be expressed in mathematical formulas - wavelengths *X* of light is red to the human eye, wavelength *Y* is yellow and so on. We just perceive these different wavelengths as red, yellow, green etc. So, if mental states and events were actually of a physical nature it still would be true that brain state *X* is anger, brain state *Y* is kindness and so on. The brain states as such, perhaps expressible in formulae, are not available to me, even not if a scientist uses some instruments to measure electrical charges in brains and the localities where they occur, maps them and makes them available to the public so that we all can learn that anger is, in fact, *X*, and that kindness is *Y* in the same way as we have learned that water consists of two hydrogen and one oxygen ion. The crucial point is that my feelings are directly available to me whereas the physical states described by these formulae and the concepts of these formulae are not. „One knows what one is thinking and feeling, and, normally, what one believes, desires, etc., without having to ground this knowledge on evidence, about one's behavior and bodily circumstances. And in being aware of one's own mental states one certainly is not aware of them as physical states of any

sort."[72] These phenomena have „come to be known as „qualia", and are also referred to as the „phenomenal features" of feelings, sensations, and perceptual states: the felt features of pains and itches that make them (so one wants to say) the kinds of sensations they are, the distinctive feature of a visual experience of redness that determines „what it is like" to see red and distinguishes this from what it is like to see green, blue, yellow, and so on."[73]

The main difficulty of McCALL's account, which is essentially a Cartesian one, is now very clear. When she wants to say that individuals have purely physical, in that case socially determined, features (*person*)[74] as well as purely mental ones (*self*) then these features must still be intrinsically linked with one another to account for their interdependency and interrelationship. If these features are taken separately from one another, as either purely physical or purely mental, such a link could not be established; it is, in fact, inconceivable, how such a link can exist at all. Now we are able to foresee all the possible moves to avoid the problem occurring in the first place, and hard core materialism (identity theory) is such a possible move. McCALL's set of definitions is, however, (even if they are only instrumental) entirely unsatisfactory. If *person* is only physical, just as *human being* is, how can interrelationship and interdependency be maintained? It is difficult to see where the human being-aspect and the person-aspect link up with the self-aspect of an individual. However, McCALL's problem only occurs because her account is not entirely consistent. If the account she gives is altered in the sense that a different, more materialist or behaviorist, definition of the self is given, the problem could be avoided.

On the other hand, acceptance of the strict materialist viewpoint seems to lead to abandonment of the privacy of the self because neither a special nor exclusive access to my own mental events can be maintained; the question of

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[72] SHOEMAKER, S. *The Mind-Body Problem*, in: WARNER, R./SZUBKA, T. (ed.) *The Mind-Body Problem*, Blackwell 1995, p.57.
[73] ibid.
[74] Not to speak of the *human being*-aspect, which is also physical only.

access seems to become a technological one.[75] To illustrate this, let's take up a previous idea, which is that the strict materialists have been right all along: a machine, easy to carry and to handle, is invented to „read" people's (including my own) brain states. There also exists a compendium mapping out and listing all brain states which ever have occurred and their corresponding mental outcome, that is the experience of whatever objects, including thought, images, sense perceptions etc. When we are children we all learn the data gathered in the compendium and we all learn to use the brain scan machine. The machine is even so common in society and so much an object of every day life that we carry it around so naturally as if it were a hat. This enables us to read someone else's brain states and to know what they think or feel with the same ease we have at the present time when „reading" and understanding someone's dress-code. Apart from the practical problems (we would always know when someone doesn't like us or is lying, which would be very bad for our social life), no other problems connected with the scan would occur. Does this mean the self, or my inner life, is as accessible to others as it is to me? It seems that a third person statement concerning the mental state of another person can be made with greater certainty now. And if it can be argued that this certainty is an absolute one, the epistemological argument I employed must fail. However, I believe that the required absolute certainty cannot be maintained.

First of all, the access to someone else's mental events is still not a direct one. It is an indirect access because I have to use a machine to have this high degree of certainty, whereas I don't need a machine to know with certainty my own mental events. The sources of epistemological error are mainly of two different kinds. Errors are possible in respect to the machine - the machine might be malfunctioning - and are also possible in respect to the judgments we make concerning the machine's readings. And here again we have to allow for a variety of sources of error. One might misread the data the machine gives, this

[75] Some materialists, especially functionalists, have offered accounts which aim to accommodate privileged access including the claim of infallibility about one's own mental states. Nevertheless, these accounts hold only for weaker versions of the problem. It also has been suggested, for instance by THOMAS NAGEL, that our underlying concept of the physical may be faulty. Which, if true, weakens all non-sceptical ontological, especially the materialistic, accounts generally.

would be a mistake in observation. One might also be mistaken about „correct" data of brain states, and their correspondent mental states. Errors of such kind can happen because one didn't remember correctly the contents of the map one had to learn or because one just makes spontaneous mistakes for no apparent reason, just in the same way we make spontaneous mistakes in counting every now and then. The here outlined possibilities of error can occur, even if we take for granted that the map of corresponding brain states and mental states is entirely correct and contains all possible combinations.

It becomes obvious that because of the wide variety of possible errors and gaps in information it is impossible to claim certainty of knowledge about someone else's mental states. It is also pretty clear that the very condition for certainty about the mental states of another individual, which is certainty about their brain states (always taken for granted that the identity theory is true), cannot be achieved. Claims of infallibility in respect to brain states of individuals in general, and mental states of individuals other than oneself, are absurd as long as we don't deal with self evident and *a priori*, analytical truths.

Secondly, the privileged access to one's own mental events remains untouched in a logical sense, whatever the circumstances may be, even if there were, ideally, certainty in the matters suggested. Let's say I am perfectly capable to make true statements with certainty such as, „*A* is sad now,". Although I have **some** epistemological access, I don't have full epistemological access in the experiential sense. I have no access to the „what it is like" of the other's experience[76], neither epistemologically nor ontologically. I still don't experience or know about *A*'s sadness in the same way *A* does. *A* lives the sadness, **is** sad, whilst I only make judgments about the fact that *A* is sad, or strictly materialistically, that *A*'s brain is in a physical state which is felt by *A* as sadness. Even if I stimulate my brain into the same brain state as *A*'s at the same time when I make this judgment about *A* being sad, and am consequently now sad myself, my sadness would still not be *A*'s sadness, but mine.

[76] compare: NAGEL, T. *What is it like to be a Bat?*, in: *Philosophical Review* 83, pp.435-50.

This requires some explanation, both in the context of Hume's philosophy and in the context of theories of personal and self identity in general.

a) The matter should be straightforward when it comes to Hume's account of the self as a bundle of perceptions. Here we would not talk about „simulation of brain states", but of two individuals perceiving a numerically identical perception[77] at the same time. Given my example, although my perception and *A*'s perception are supposed to be identical it is the case that *A*'s perception **as** *A*'s perception is epistemologically not fully available to me. The perception is also an element of different bundles and is part of the different complex impressions of these bundles. I can only know what it is like for myself to perceive this perception, but I do not know what it is like for *A*.

b) I wish to start a more general discussion with the following scenario: When I watch the scene in *Forrest Gump* where Forrest is bullied by other children, runs away and looses the restricting mechanisms attached to his legs, I feel very sad and start to cry. This scene triggers off my own childhood experiences and this is the reason why I react the way I do. Let us imagine that at the same time I display this behavior my friend Dagmar has her brain manipulated so that it has exactly the same neurophysiological states as my brain. Given the materialist identity theory's account she would now feel sad too. Let's also say that all the reasons which make me cry, are part of the neurophysiological state of my brain and Dagmar's brain is manipulated accordingly. Hence, it would be the case that Dagmar cries for exactly the same reasons as I do.

If we take this scenario from a logical point of view we would say that, although both experiences are qualitatively identical, they are numerically distinct, because they have different locations. One takes place in my brain, whilst the other, „identical" experience takes place in Dagmar's brain. It still is the case that only one's own (taking place in one's own brain) mental events are epistemologically directly accessible to oneself. Dagmar has direct access to her own mental events only, just as I cannot perceive her perceptions (because

[77] Whether or not this is possible is here not the issue, I propose this scenario as a thought-experiment. See for a more detailed discussion my introduction to *The Principle of Unity*.

it takes place in her brain) but only my own. The judgment that both brain states (and both perceptions) are identical cannot be made by looking at the perceptions themselves but only upon an understanding of the mechanism which makes them identical. A direct comparison of both brain states (her's and mine) is impossible.

However, our different identities seem to consist, in such situation, not in our mental events, because they are qualitatively indistinguishably alike, but in our bodily existence. It would be quite obvious, for any observer, to perceive that there are two different bodies involved (not to talk about the involvement of two brains), which cannot, firstly, occupy the same space at the same time, and therefore cannot be identical. Secondly, they are also of different appearance, both bodies exhibiting very different and distinct features.

We must look at this problem from two different angles, an outward-looking one (the observer's point of view, expressed in third person identity statements) and an inward-looking point of view (the subject's own point of view, expressed in first person identity statements). Both of these possible viewpoints have to be accommodated if a theory of identity of individuals shall be successful.

I.III. Theories of Identity

It has been said before that an observer would note that Dagmar and I have two different identities because he can observe two different bodies, occupying different spaces at the same time. This, first of all, accommodates our claim that identity has a bodily criterion. It has been argued before, however, that bodily continuity cannot be the sole criterion for personal identity, but that one of its criteria has to be memory. It has also been argued that memory is important where third person statements are concerned.[78] All these arguments apply here.

Taking bodily continuity as the sole criterion of identity in situations as described is theoretically and practically unsatisfactory because it rests upon a

[78] We must disregard here the fact that memory is a necessary condition for the very act of identification and re-identification, because this is an inward-looking argument, which shall be discussed later on.

one-sided understanding of the individual. Which is certainly not inherent in our intuitions about identity. The problem can be illustrated when we consider the following example: As before, Dagmar's mental events are manipulated to be exactly the same as my mental events. It now happens to be the case that I conceive of the plan and the subsequent decision to murder someone. However, the body which performes the murder and is observed doing so is not mine, but Dagmar's. It would, given our intuitions, be difficult to say that I didn't commit the crime, although it was Dagmar's body which was seen doing it. Intuition would hold me responsible because I had planned and decided to murder. Firstly, it would by bodily criteria alone be difficult to determine who's mind is the original one, who's mind it was which originally wanted, and decided, to kill the victim. Intuition would tend to understand the mind which is an imitation of the original one, as being nothing more than a puppet which did not initiate the wish and the decision to kill.[79]

Secondly, given the connection between body and mind to be existent, then it is impossible that only Dagmar's body could have acted out the killing. All mental events of the two bodies are supposed to be identical, this includes decisions like „I go now into the house of the victim," as well as the will to carry out these decisions, as long as there are mental states, conceptualized or not, connected with acting. Therefore our two bodies must have carried out the actual killing. There could not be just one perpetrator at the crime-scene but two, having acted in an identical manner. Thus, it seems to be the case that there are two people who are responsible for the crime. This, however, seems not to be in accordance with our intuitions, which would hold the „copy"-person not responsible. Or, if we accept the puppet scenario, but not the mind/body connection, there would only be one villain. However, we could not identify which one of the two was the villain without referring back to the original mind or perhaps better, to the original brain (if one is an identity theorist). If it turns out to be the case that the original brain doesn't belong to the acting body which was

[79] Though, due to the imitation, Dagmar's mind will then contain the wish and the decision too and will „feel" subjectively as if it were the original, initiating mind; it is, objectively, passive in the matter, because it is only a „copy".

seen at the crime scene but to the other body, we are faced with a contradiction. The criterion of bodily continuity tells us that Dagmar committed the crime, because it was she who was observed killing the victim. The same criterion tells us that it was not Dagmar, but me who really committed the crime because it was observed that her brain states were altered to be identical with mine.[80]

It could now be argued that the contradiction is not a real one because the brain is of a bodily nature and the argument favoring bodily continuity as the criterion of identity has to be restricted, in cases where humans are concerned, to the bodily continuity of the brain. Here it will also be possible, so it is argued, to use mental events, in their reduction to neurophysiological brain states (identity theory) for identity statements. The mental criterion is reduced to a bodily criterion, but it is not eliminated. This reductionist account implies that the non-reductionist arguments concerning identification and re-identification of other human beings resting on bodily criteria have to be dismissed. Someone's bodily appearance is not a reliable criterion for his identity because we have to use the bodily continuity of the brain to make third person identity statements. However, a reductionist account can still make use of the continuity of the whole body similar to the use memory theorists and the supporters of the combined theory can make of it.[81] Although the reductionist account seems to be very straightforward and simple, I believe that the account, because of its epistemological requirements and the necessary ontological claims, is more complicated than some of its competitors.

[80] So far we have considered a case without taking the body/mind connection into account. If one does, it could be argued that it is impossible that only one of the two bodies could have acted out the decision to kill. However, this does not refute my argument against the body as the sole criterion of identity. It is not necessary that the two individuals in question have identical mental events (or neurophysiological brain states). One can imagine someone manipulating someone else's brain states in a certain way without having to „copy" them from his own. Identity of mental events was just assumed for the sake of the foregoing discussion.

[81] Bodily appearance as an easy, „improvised", but not sufficient or necessary means of identification.

The Memory-Theory

A memory theorist can still regard bodily continuity as an easy instrument of identification and re-identification, although it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion of identity. A proper identification (or re-identification) can only be made by using mental criteria in general, and memory in particular. To make third person identity statements possible, the theory has to claim that there is **some** access (epistemologically incomplete access) to someone's mental events, i.e. memory, or that there has to be **full** access (epistemologically complete access) to those mental events. The problem is that the necessary and sufficient criterion of identity, memory (or mental events in general) is not necessarily fully available to any person other than the subject having them.[82] Third person identity statements rest therefore upon an epistemologically not very reliable basis. We encounter epistemological difficulties, which is theoretically not very satisfying because it was these kind of difficulties we wanted to overcome in the first place.[83]

However, even if the accessibility of the relevant data (a third person's mental events) is epistemologically incomplete, some knowledge of someone else's mental states can be acquired in a natural and necessary way (the ability to have some knowledge of another person's mental events is a natural ability of human beings and is a necessary part of their world-perception). We are therefore justified to say (taking the weakest option of epistemological incompleteness) that, although we have some epistemological difficulties to access the data we need to make well founded third person identity statements, we also have natural and necessary acquisition of them. If epistemological completeness could be maintained than we would have complete access to and also natural, necessary acquisition of the relevant data. (This is so because someone who wants to hold such a theory has to claim that there is some

[82] As I said, it depends very much upon the claims one wishes to make, and it is clear that the claim of full availability would be the claim which would support the theory most. However, this claim is difficult to defend, since humans aren't known to be telepathic.

[83] I don't think it is necessary here to investigate the matter of a possible ontological problem, but I think the matter would be problematic in that sense too, since we have no reliable epistemological means to make well founded ontological statements when it comes to third person identity statements.

natural and necessary way, be it intuition or a seventh sense, by which we are acquainted with someone else's mental states. It doesn't pose a problem within this context if it is claimed that the acquisition of the data in question is maintained by God's interference, because the nature of this interference would still be a necessary one. It would also be natural in a certain sense. It could be argued, for instance, that God made us this way.)

However, the memory theory, as it is understood here, has problems to account for a social concept of *person*, which implies a bodily criterion the memory theory cannot account for. Consequently the theory has also problems to accommodate a concept of the self containing social aspects. Although the theory can allow for at least some acquaintance with other people's memory and mental states to make some third person identity statements possible it finds it difficult to accommodate proper third person identity statements which require the social aspect. The bodily aspect is a contingent and not a necessary aspect. We can here take recourse to SHOEMAKER's argument that to know whether or not someone uses the term *memory* correctly one needs a criterion which cannot be memory itself, but is a bodily criterion.[84]

If we allow for full and immediate access to other people's memory to make third person identity statements, the difficulties would not disappear. Then we would need a criterion to distinguish one's own immediate and directly perceived memories from someone else's memories, which are also immediately and directly perceived. Such a criterion cannot be memory itself. Thus, in such a scenario memory cannot be the sole criterion of identity which it was claimed by the memory theory to be.

If the presented arguments can be accepted we have to conclude that the memory theory is theoretically problematic. It seems also to be unsuitable in respect to a social understanding of the concept of person and in consequence

[84] This seems to be true for a variety, if not for all intentional expressions. If someone says: „I want to eat this cake", but doesn't eat it, then we would think that the person did either not want to eat the cake and was lying, or that the person doesn't know what *wanting something* means. The criterion by which we would make our judgement would be a bodily one, i.e. the behavior of the individual.

to a concept of the self as one of several, interdependent and interrelated aspects of the individual.

The non-reductionist body theory

The non-reductionist body-theory is a theory which claims that the sole criterion of identity is a bodily criterion, but does not reduce the body to the brain. It can be seen to be in the following position: it has to dismiss inward-looking arguments, which have to claim that memory is, at least, an inward-looking epistemological condition of identification and re-identification. It has therefore also to dismiss that memory is a condition for any third person identity statements.[85] The theory understands the body, including the brain, as a reliable and sufficient criterion (both ontologically and epistemologically) upon which identity statements (first- and third person statements) can be made.[86]

Such a theory has also to dismiss our intuitions concerning memory as an influential factor to determine someone else's identity. Since bodily continuity is the sole criterion of identity the theory has also problems to reply to counter cases involving bodily identity of different bodies without either retreating to the brain and its states as being the sole criterion (which of course would result in the abandoning of the non-reductionist position and be a retreat to a reductionist body-theory) or to have to take refuge in reducing the level of the discussion to a purely trivial one. In the latter case the distinction of two or more identical looking bodies can be maintained when one is referring to the fact that they, although they look identical, cannot occupy the same space at the same time and are, therefore, not one and the same body.

There is, of course, still the Leibnizian way to say that there don't exist two bodies which are exactly identical in their appearance[87], that is, all counter

[85] I think we can agree that a theory of identity of individuals has to account for inward- and outward-looking perspectives.
[86] I have already argued that bodily continuity as a criterion of the identity of individuals is, epistemologically, not as good a criterion as it is claimed to be.
[87] Compare Preface, 57; Book II, Chapter i, 110 and Chapter xxvii, 229-231 of LEIBNIZ, G.W. *New Essays on Human Understanding*, edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Abridged Edition, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

examples and thought experiments must be dismissed as describing actual impossibilities. But even such a scenario is not without its problems: All bodies must not only be theoretically distinguishable, but they also have to be practically distinguishable. The distinctive features of objects may only be observable by means other than the senses themselves (i.e. microscopes, telescopes, machinery of any kind) - and here we have taken for granted that we can trust our senses. Therefore the availability of distinguishing features is not necessarily direct and subsequently leaves room for mistakes of identity.

The suggested way of recognizing distinguishing features is not a necessary but a contingent one, but we are still able to understand it as a natural way (we make use of the five senses we possess naturally and it is also natural to human beings to think, to draw conclusions and to make judgments about our perceptions and their objects). However, the observation of distinguishing features of objects or of other human beings may sometimes be difficult without the mediation of aids (instruments such as microscopes or looking glasses, or markings etc.). It follows that the way of identification or re-identification is contingent because the possession of a functioning sensual apparatus and reason is a necessary but only contingently sufficient condition.

In respect to the presented concepts of *person* and *self* we can say that the non-reductionist body theory is not very successful in accommodating their mental features[88]. Since the theory allows only a bodily criterion the mental features of personhood and self have to be dismissed as not essential where identity is concerned. This applies to inward- and outward looking viewpoints and can therefore not satisfy the claims concerning the role of memory which have already been established.

The theory is quite capable, however, of accounting for *person* and *personhood* in the way suggested by McCALL, but it cannot embrace a concept of the self as long as the self is claimed to be epistemologically essentially, although not exclusively, private. If the privacy, even in the weaker form I suggested, is removed from the self, then the self as a special aspect of the

[88] Note that the non-reductionist theory is not taken here as some type of the identity theory.

individual would disappear. With the removal of epistemological privacy we are left with a version of McCALL's concept of *person.* Since the self would have disappeared as a special aspect of the individual the problems of McCALL's account in respect to the connection between self and personhood can be avoided. However, it would also be the case that all the arguments brought up in the discussion of personal identity in respect to the role of memory can be automatically applied. The discussion of SHOEMAKER's account has shown that bodily continuity cannot be the sole criterion of personal identity. Thus, the non-reductionist theory of identity, which wishes to maintain bodily continuity as the sole criterion of the identity of an individual, cannot be accepted.

We also have to pay attention to the fact that the non-reductionist theory is entirely unsuitable in respect to Hume's theory of perception. It can therefore not be used to explore the Humean claims concerning the self and identity in general. The criterion of identity the non-reductionist theory suggests is highly questionable within the context of Humean thinking because it relies on bodily criteria alone and dismisses the mental features completely. Since, for Hume, the mind (the succession of perceptions) and its operations are of vital importance for the discovery of identity, it follows that a non-reductionist theory and a Humean approach are incompatible.

The reductionist body-theory

The reductionist body-theory is a theory which claims that not the visual or otherwise perceptible continuity (and appearance) of the entire human body is the sole criterion of identity of individuals, but claims that it is the bodily continuity of the brain which is the sought after criterion. The perceptible continuity of the entire human body has a role very similar to the one it plays for the memory-theorist. It is an easy, but somehow improvised means of identification and re-identification. It is in no sense a sufficient epistemological criterion of identity (if it is also an ontological criterion, that is whether or not one is nothing but one's brain, is debatable).

Looking closely at a possible reductionist account, one cannot avoid the impression that such a theory is ambiguous and appears, metaphorically speaking, either as the reductionist version of the body-theory, or, as a hard core materialist's version of the memory-theory or the combined theory which I intend to summarize later. A possible reductionist account of the latter kind acknowledges that continuity of the human body, or the body of anything possessing a brain for that matter, is not a reliable criterion of individual identity, and therefore, is epistemologically neither a sufficient nor a necessary criterion.[89] However, focussing on the brain is focussing on the physical, because the brain consists of matter and has therefore a bodily nature. The reductionist theory claims that it can accommodate purely physical, i.e. bodily criteria, as well as „mental" criteria. Possible „mental" events or states, used as criteria, are, of course, understood to be nothing else but physical events. Mental events are identical with neurophysiological brain states. For these reasons the reductionist theory seems to be very attractive. It seems to be a very versatile theory which allows for different options in the way I suggested. It is a monistic theory and seems to account for criteria both mental and physical, because it reduces what we usually call „the mental" to the physical.

However, it is my opinion that the reductionist account despite its apparent advantages entails a variety of serious problems and intrinsic difficulties. If these problems and difficulties cannot be resolved, the theory is theoretically not very convincing. If the brain has to be understood as playing the same role in the reductionist theory as the entirety of the human body plays in the non-reductionist body theory, then it appears to be the case that the problems faced by an account of the latter kind apply to the reductionist theory also, and are even deepened, as I hope to show. The non-reductionist problems are not resolved but are rather shifted onto a different, even more complicated, level.

[89] The body as a whole is only necessary if one wishes to argue that the brain is part of a whole human body and depends upon the existence and proper functioning of all other life-maintaining and stimulating organs and bodily parts and their workings. It is easily conceivable that this claim can be altered towards any other body, such as the bodies Cardassians and Ferengies have, or towards any other life supporting and stimulating equipment. However, under these circumstances the body entire is an ontological, not an epistemological, criterion.

The force of these problems is strengthened because of an epistemological „gap" occurring between the brain states and their identical „mental outcome". The reductionist theorist would have to argue that there are mental events, but that they are identical with neurophysiological events taking place in the brain. These neurophysiological events are usually not observable, that is, unless we use a sophisticated machinery. Therefore the observation is never, even if such machinery existed, a direct one. But neither is the observation of mental events for third persons, since we can only observe language and behavior. However, mental events are directly accessible in the first person. This would evidently not be the case with neurophysiological events.

It must also be noted that whilst behavior and language, within the limits of their reliability to indicate certain mental events, are directly observable by third persons, neurophysiological events taking place in the brain are not. This means that the chain of epistemological steps necessary or required to gain proper knowledge about someone's mental state is a longer one for the reductionist theorist than it is for a non-reductionist account. Thus the amount of inferences which have to be made is greater for the former. Consequently, there is an increased amount of possible sources of error. The increase of certainty claimed to be gained by the application of the reductionist theory becomes questionable once one considers the increased possibilities for errors. The following should help to illustrate the problem:

non-reductionist theory:

mental events *A*	------>	physical „outcome" *B*
(whatever they are identical with)		(behavior, language)
		of a continuous existing body *b*

B is contained in *b* and *b* is the sole criterion of identity.
B and *b* are directly available to third persons

reductionist theory:

mental event *A*	=	neurophysiological brain state *A*
+		of a continous existing brain *a*
physical „outcome" *B*		
(behavior, language) of		
a body *b*		

A is contained in *a* and *a* is the sole criterion of identity.
A and *a* are not directly available to third persons.
B is contained in *b.*
Only *B* and *b* are directly available to third persons.
B and *b* are not the criterion of identity other than in a subordinate way.

When we apply my earlier simulation-example to the reductionist theory we become aware that a reductionist account cannot deal satisfactorily with the problems the example is trying to point out:

a) criterion of identity: neurophysiological brain states

If the neurophysiological states alone are supposed to be the sole criterion of the identity of an individual, then Dagmar and I are identical because we have identical brain states at the same time. Here a logical contradiction occurs, since my neurophysiological brain states take place in a different locus in space than Dagmar's, we are one and the same individual because of neurophysiological identity but we are not the same individual because our brain states are numerically not identical.

b) criterion of identity: the brain-body

On the other hand, if the brain as a physical entity with continued existence (that is, the brain only in respect to the fact that it is a particular lump of matter with a particular form) is supposed to be the criterion of identity, then Dagmar and I would not be identical simply for the reason that there are two lumps of organized matter which can only be found to occupy different places at the same time. If this is the case then it becomes hard to see why we should bother

with neurophysiological events and the materialist identity theory in the first place.

c) criterion of identity: the neurophysiological states **and** the brain-body

As a third possibility, the brain-body and its neurophysiological states in combination are understood as the criterion of identity. This requires that none of the factors takes precedence. If either one of them does take precedence, one of the above arguments applies. Thus, the brain-body and the neurophysiological events, each taken on its own, is a necessary, but not a sufficient criterion of identity.[90] This is, in its form, similar to the account of the combined theory, which will be dicussed next. The combined theory, however, proposes criteria of identity of an individual which allow it to get on without having to reduce the mental to the physical. The latter is the main problem of the reductionist theory. Mental events have „phenomenal features", also known as *qualia*. These cannot be reduced to neurophysiological events of some sort, since they are qualitative experiential contents which „determine 'what it is like'"[91] to have a certain experience/perception. A reductionist theory cannot account for these features of the mental.[92]

Even if the reductionist account would be accepted, it fails to accommodate the outlined concepts of *self* and *person* for exactly the same reasons as the non-reductionist account. The theory still keeps all the major problems of a purely bodily account although they are shifted onto a level of reduction of the mental to the physical.[93] The non-reductionist account simply dismisses, eliminates, the mental as a possible criterion of identity.

The claims the theory puts forward are also irreconcilable with Hume's theory of perception and his version of Basic Realism. The reductionist theory

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[90] Without this division of the combination in two necessary, but singly insufficient criteria the matter would become problematic. If the neurophysiological events and the brain-body are taken, in combination, as only one criterion we would end up with a criterion which is potentially self-contradictory. Different brains (brain-bodies) can, *ex hypothesis*, be in the same brain state (same neurophyiological events).

[91] SHOEMAKER, S. *The Mind-Body Problem*, in: WARNER, R., SZUBKA, T. (ed.), ibid., p.57.

[92] See for a discussion of the nature of reductionism: KIM, J. *The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism*, in: WARNER, R., SZUBKA, T. (ed.), ibid., p.242-257.

[93] Eliminativism is a possible consequence even of supposedly non-reductive materialism.

makes ontological claims about the nature of the brain and the nature of perceptions which can, on Humean grounds, not reasonably be made.

The combined theory

The kind of theory which I wish to call the combined theory proposes two criteria of individual identity: continued bodily existence and memory. This theory and possible supporting arguments have been discussed at the beginning of this chapter in reference to SIDNEY SHOEMAKER. Each one of the criteria, taken on its own, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for determining identity. It is clear that the arguments put forward, and the account of the combined theory given so far, take the issue from an epistemological angle. (I don't think this is very worrying when one discusses the matter from a third person's point of view, because we cannot experience someone else's bundle of perceptions as Hume points out. It is my belief that the matter is somehow different, even if only in the sense that it requires some investigation, when we look at the issue from a first person angle.)

The combined theory avoids the problems any one-sided account is facing. These problems have been pointed out throughout the literature. The arguments containing them were intended to be objections against, or supports of one of the two one-sided theories of identity of an individual. The mental criterion is certainly weaker in respect to third person identity statements than it is in first person identity statements. There it even ceases to be an epistemological criterion because of the self-evidence attached to it. „Persons, unlike other things, make statements about their own pasts, and can be said to know these statements to be true. This fact would be of little importance, as far as the problem of personal identity is concerned, if these statements were always grounded in the ways in which people's statements about the past histories of things other than themselves are grounded. But while our statements about our own pasts are sometimes based on diaries, photographs, fingerprints, and the like, normally they are not. Normally they are based on our

own memories, and the way in which one's memory provides one with knowledge concerning one's own past is quite unlike the way in which it provides one with knowledge concerning the past history of another person or thing."[94] Making statements about one's own past are first person identity statements, whilst statements about individuals or things other than oneself are second or third person identity statements[95]. If statements about individuals or objects other than oneself are not identity statements themselves, then they at least are based upon identity statements.[96]

As it has been argued before, especially in reference to SHOEMAKER's account, memory must - to be an epistemological criterion of identity - be a criterion in respect to third person identity statements. It has been suggested by SHOEMAKER that memory is not an epistemological criterion when one is making statements about one's own past. (I don't have to ask the question, „Are these memories I have mine, or are they someone else's?" , it is evident that they are mine and I don't need a criterion by which I decide whether or not they are my memories and are an image of one of my past experiences.) So, if memory is supposed to be a criterion of identity, in an epistemological sense, it must be a criterion in respect to third person identity statements about individuals other than oneself.

I have argued before that if someone looks like my grandfather and let's say, even displays the same behavior as my grandfather, uses the same style of verbal and non-verbal expression (same speech pattern and vocabulary, same body language), but doesn't have any of the memories my grandfather has, but has entirely different ones, I most certainly conclude that this person is not my grandfather, but perhaps a *doppelganger*. We just have to think of examples of espionage to realize how important memory is in respect to identification and re-identification of individuals other than oneself. If the agent *Tommy Beresford* is

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[94] SHOEMAKER, S. *Personal Identity and Memory*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) ibid., p.119.

[95] I refer to all identity statements other than first person identity statements as *third person identity statements*.

[96] Sentences like 'The stone is red', imply several identity statements: this stone, and not another one, is red; I must also, making the statement, be able to identify the colour red just as I have to be able to identify the given object firstly as an object and secondly as a stone and not as a leaf etc.

set up to be general *Canaris*' new Aid du Camp *von Hornung*, not only his appearance is altered so that he looks like the captured *von Hornung*. He also has to learn all of *von Hornung*'s relevant past experiences (memories) and has to display *von Hornung*'s character traits. General *Canaris* would become very suspicious indeed about his aid's identity, if *von Hornung* not only would not look like he is supposed to look, but would also behave differently from the way *von Hornung* is known to behave, and would not have memories *Canaris* knows *von Hornung* must have.

It could now be argued that memory cannot be seen as a proper criterion of identity, not even if it is not understood as the sole criterion. Memory is only used as a means to determine the whereabouts of the body. Therefore bodily continuity is taken as the proper criterion of identity, not memory. It is very much like the following: the real *von Hornung* went to school in *Schulpforta* and can or could recall, therefore, many memories of the school and its pupils. The fake *von Hornung* (*Beresford*) didn't go to *Schulpforta* (because he was in an English school and not in a German one) and can and could not recall all the memories which are immediately available to the real *von Hornung*. *Canaris* now gives a dinner party which is also attended by major *Bauer*, who also went to *Schulpforta*. Since talking about one's old school mates and teachers is one of *Bauer*'s favored topics he entertains his comrades in arms accordingly. *Von Hornung/Beresford* can partly join in because he learned some of the old school stories from the real *von Hornung*, but his act is not very convincing because his knowledge of *Schulpforta* and its inhabitants is not consistent with *Bauer*'s. The suspicion that *von Hornung/Beresford* is a fake arises, not because his memories (or better, the pretended memories) are inconsistent with what is known about the object of these memories, but because the inconsistency proves that this *von Hornung* was not in *Schulpforta*. We are faced with the situation that either *Canaris*' aid is *von Hornung* and *von Hornung* was, in fact, not in that school or, *von Hornung* was in that school but *Canaris*' aid then is not, and cannot be, *von Hornung*.

The underlying idea of the argument against memory is that one and the same continuously existing body was known to occupy a certain space at a certain time. If it works out that the body in question was not occupying the space it is known that it has, then the conclusion has to be drawn that we are faced with two different bodies and not with one and the same body. Memories and their expressions as far as third person identity statements are concerned are analogous to the mark we make on an object, like an egg, to distinguish it from another egg. Memory is just an instrument to trace the whereabouts of the body. The decisive and proper criterion of identity is the body and its place in space and time. It is perhaps justified to say, that the argument suggests that bodily identity is the sole criterion, epistemologically, of the identity of an individual and that memory is a necessary criterion, epistemologically (but by no means a the only one), by which one determines the bodily identity of human beings other than oneself.

chain of identification:

memory (and other, mainly bodily, criteria) ---> bodily identity ---> individual identity

First of all, such an argument implies that there is something special about human beings, that there is something which distinguishes them from other things, such as stones, carrots and even dogs. Memory, and therefore a mental faculty, has still a part to play, here in a seemingly subordinate way. It is not dismissed as having no bearing whatsoever on the problem of identity where human beings are concerned. Thus, the importance of memory in respect to identity of an individual other than oneself is acknowledged. It would indeed be strange, from an outward looking point of view, to claim that memory is a criterion for a third person identity statement about the identity of an apple tree. We don't think that an apple tree has something we would or could call *memory*. The argument also suggests that memory is an essential, distinguishing feature of human beings in general and of an individual in particular.

Here the absurdity of the argument against memory as a criterion of identity of an individual other than oneself (from an outward looking point of view) becomes clear. The presented argument contains a mental element somewhere. And it is also here, where the different aspects of an individual have to be looked at. It does not make sense to include a mental criterion (it doesn't matter whether it is a sufficient criterion or not) in the set of criteria we need to determine the identity of a body if *body* is understood in a Cartesian way or if one happens to be a hard core materialist. One must note that these criteria, including the memory-criterion, are here referred to as epistemological criteria needed to be able to make a proper identification of another individual. They are here not supposed to be criteria in an ontological sense. It could therefore be argued against my claim that being a hard core materialist or being a Cartesian doesn't have any real theoretical impact since these theories make ontological statements.

i. First of all, I would like to point out that ontology and epistemology are connected, although they don't have to be one. We probably all agree that in cases where I have no means to know whether *p* or *-p* is the case I cannot conclude that *p* is. (It might, in fact, be true that *p* is, but I have no possibility to know that it is and my ontological statements are nothing more than an educated guess.) The only thing I can say is that I don't know. If it is the case that a mental criterion is needed to determine identity (epistemologically) then it cannot be concluded that the mental is not an ontological criterion, nor can it be said that it is. Though it is my belief that an account resting on the materialist identity-theory becomes more and more difficult to accept because, within such an account, it would be epistemologically necessary to be able to exchange **statements** about a mental event (for instance a particular memory) with **statements** about a neurophysiological event *salva veritate*. I don't think this is possible. Firstly, if the previous arguments concerning the possibility of epistemological gaps (indirect availability, sources of error, etc.) in respect to the identity-theory are accepted, it seems to be true that neurophysiological events carry, epistemologically, not the same weight as memory, especially not in first

person identity statements. Secondly, the exchange *salva veritate* does not seem to be possible because of *qualia*.

ii. A Cartesian account thinks of the mental and the physical as independently existing, separate substances. The chain of identification can be accepted where first person statements are concerned or where the first person point of view is taken into account (for instance, I know that bodies exist because I have a clear and distinct idea about it). However, I wish to restrict myself only to the third person angle at the moment. This means that someone else's memories cannot be a criterion for this someone's identity if the individual is defined, merely, in bodily terms[97]. The mental is entirely distinct from the body and cannot, where the third person angle is taken, contribute, either epistemologically or ontologically, towards identity statements, not even towards statements of existence.

If these arguments are valid then it follows that the suggested chain of epistemological criteria of identity of individuals, taken from a third person angle, cannot be brought as an argument against the combined theory supporting either the identity-theory or a Cartesian account. It appears to be the case that the combined theory is a very strong theory. It can avoid the kind of identity-problems pointed out in examples and counter-examples throughout the literature. Accepting the combined theory, it can be said that if two bodies, or two brains, have identical mental events at the same time, then we still don't have two identical individuals, and this not only in a purely trivial sense. Firstly, we are here concerned with the identity of individuals, i.e. with experiencing beings which have the capacity to reflect upon their experiences and to learn (at least to some degree). It is trivial that even two identical bodies cannot „contain" two identical experiencing minds, since the bodies have to occupy un-identical spaces at the same time. They will also have **different experiences** a) resulting from their different spatial coordinates - and this goes beyond the trivial distinction and b) resulting from **different qualitative experiential contents**

[97] I cannot doubt that I think, hence I cannot doubt my own existence. I can, however, doubt the existence of my own body as well as of other bodies. The latter includes other people.

(*qualia*). The latter cannot be set into an identity relation because comparison is simply not possible.

The combined theory is very clear when it comes to examples and counter-examples of the usual kind, which we find throughout the literature intended to support one or the other one-sided theory. Since the combined theory claims that each of the criteria in question (either memory or bodily continuity) alone is a necessary but not a sufficient criterion of identity, it can avoid the problems and absurdities occurring with a one-sided approach. It is also capable of accommodating our intuitions in respect to the identity of individuals. If Mary wakes up in the morning and finds herself having the body of Ann, it cannot be said, according to the combined theory, that she **is** now Ann, since bodily continuity is not a sufficient criterion of identity. It would also be false, if we want to keep faith with the combined theory, that she still is the Mary she was yesterday, since memory alone is not a sufficient criterion of identity either. It may be true that we value intuitively the mental criterion more than the physical one, as my earlier example of the frog prince points out. Nevertheless, our intuition can accommodate the just given account. Even intuitively we would not be entirely at ease to declare the Mary of today to be identical with the Mary we knew yesterday. Our intuition sees an individual as a unity of body and mind. The absolute „same" Mary would consist of Mary's body (and not someone else's) **and** Mary's mental life, including her memory, as far as we are able to make third person statements about it. The individual having Mary's memory but Anne's body is neither Mary nor Anne, it is Marianne. In the other case, where Mary's body remains the same but „contains" Anne's memory, we would also have to say that the individual we are faced with is not Mary, but neither is it Anne. She is a new individual, Annemarie.[98]

The frog prince example expresses also intuitions of the suggested kind and can also accommodate the combined theory. Heinrich, the servant, knew about his master's body change. He still saw his master in the frog, although he

[98] The same would be true for clones having a mind transfer. Their bodies would, at least, be numerically distinct. Their mental live differs due to a) their different location in space and b) due to the different phenomenological features of their experiences.

expressed that he didn't think that they were absolutely identical. It seems to be the case that Heinrich's pain and suffering caused by the curse laid upon his master is motivated by the fact that his beloved master is changed, is not truly himself anymore, has to live in a pond and to eat flies, because his body had changed.

So it becomes clear that the combined theory can accomodate the personhood aspect of an individual, which as a social aspect cannot be understood to rest upon bodily continuity alone. The combined theory is also capable of accommodating Humean thought as well as the concept of *self* as it has been outlined, investigated and understood so far. Hume does not deny the existence of bodies, as his famous words in Section II of Book I, *Of scepticism in regard to the senses*, so clearly express: „We may well ask, *What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?* but 'tis vain to ask, *Whether there be body or not?* That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings."[99] The sceptical question which is reasonable and useful to ask is the first one, asking for the grounds upon which we form the idea of the existence of bodies, but we have to take for granted that they exist if any question we are going to raise shall be meaningful. I will show in the chapter concerning the principle of unity of perceptions that Hume is, in fact, a Basic Realist. Hume's scepticism is entirely an epistemological one and he doesn't make the mistake, at least not in regard to the existence of body and externality, to slide away onto ontological grounds.

When there are bodies, then there are people other than oneself. Third person identity statements are entirely possible and needed, especially when it comes to the passions. Hume recognizes the social aspect of identity of individuals (*person*) as well as the more private, inward looking aspect of an individual (*self*) already in Book One of the *Treatise*. When Hume talks about identity in Book One, it becomes obvious that the question of identity is twofold. It contains two distinct, although in my understanding not separate, aspects. „What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these

[99] T.I,IV,II,187.

successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives? **In order to answer this question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves**[100]. The first is our present subject."[101] The combined theory works well with a Humean account because it does not require a theory which has to necessarily make claims about the ontological nature of body (or mind) beyond the Basic Realist claim that something we refer to as *body* exists and influences our perceptions.

The second aspect of identity Hume mentions is the subject especially of Book Two and refers to *person* and *personhood.* When Hume gives his account of the passions, like pride and humility, love and hate, and when he gives his account of sympathy, he refers to this aspect without leaving out the other aspect of an individual, the *self*, as it is understood in a social context. The self as a social self, as it is here indicated, cannot und must not be reduced to the person aspect of an individual. In my account of these aspects, they are interrelated and interdependent. The self has social features: one can talk about one's perceptions, the self is needed for sympathy, we need others for the emergence of our self, etc. Nevertheless, to perceive oneself as a person implies, firstly, that one also perceives oneself as a self. Secondly, one's perception of oneself as a person has qualitative contents (*qualia*) which are only directly accessible to oneself and, as such, cannot be fully communicated. This is why the *self* cannot be reduced to *personhood* and *vice versa.* If personhood is defined by mental criteria also, since it is a social concept, it is defined by the mental criteria which are socially available. But not all mental events are socially available. So self and personhood are interdependent and interrelated because the latter requires the former, and the former requires social context and social recognition to emerge. The role of memory in a Humean account is very similar in respect to third person identity statements

[100] my own accentuation.
[101] T.I,IV,VI,253.

and first person identity statements. Without memory it is impossible to arrive at a notion of necessary connection. Since we require causation to gain an idea of the continued existence of anything (mind or body), it follows that memory is a necessary condition of any identity statements whatsoever and must therefore be also a necessary condition for third person identity statements.

In conclusion we can say that the combined theory is, so far, most suitable for our purposes and can accommodate both, the philosophy of David Hume as well as the concepts of *person* and *self* as they have been here presented.

The subject's view point and Hume's account of memory

It has already been indicated that when it comes to an inward-looking viewpoint, identity statements of any kind are not possible without the partaking of memory. This claim belongs to the group of inward looking identity statements because it is the memory of the subject itself which makes those statements possible. Statements of identity imply a comparison. To make statements such as: „Some object I have seen at time 2 is the same object I have seen at time 1", I have to compare the object I perceived earlier with the object I saw at a later time. Since I cannot compare the earlier perceived object itself with the later one, because the perception of the earlier object is in the past, I compare my memory of the object at time 1 with the object I have an experience of now, that is at time 2. Without memory the past is not available to me.[102] It doesn't matter, for the time being, what mental events and memory ontologically are, even if the identity theorists were right and memory as well as particular memories were nothing but neurophysiological brain states, memory, i.e. these particular neurophysiological events and the capacity for them to occur, are still needed to make identity statements at all.

This sounds very trivial, but we will see that it isn't, especially not when we relate it to the account of memory Hume gives in Book One of the *Treatise*. We

[102] It is not only the events of the past which would not be available without memory, but it is the very concept of the past itself which would not be available.

need to remember Hume's theory of perception to understand why it is difficult for him to account for identity statements. Memory is needed to establish the ideas of necessary connection and of externality - and these are conditions necessary for any notion of self. „As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis is to be consider'd, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person."[103]

As I pointed out in the first chapter, all perceptions (impressions and ideas) are fleeting existences. It is therefore hard to see how memory, i.e. the recall of past perceptions shall be possible. It is obvious that I cannot experience the past perception itself to compare it to the present one, but with Hume I also cannot recall a past perception because it doesn't endure over time. Hume fails to see the difficulty when he writes: „Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a **repetition of that impression**[104] in the memory."[105] Hume says here, firstly, that memory is possible and is always accompanied by beliefs because of the strong vivacity of its perceptions and secondly, that memory-perceptions are perceptions felt as repeated perceptions **in** memory. The „repeated" perception, however, is not the same perception I have a memory of, but is a new, distinct perception with a different content. (I don't have the idea that my arm **is** broken, but I have the idea that my arm **was** broken a year ago.) We have to ask the questions: 1. What is it that facilitates memory despite the fact that perceptions are fleeting existences? And 2. How do I know that it is a memory in the first place?

Hume seems to think that the second question can be answered by referring to the belief which attends such an idea. I believe that the idea I have

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[103] T.I,IV,VII,261/262.
[104] my own accentuation.
[105] T.I,III,V,86.

is an idea in memory because the idea is very vivid, and being vivid means to give immediately rise to the belief. I have already argued that such an account, at least as it is presented in the sceptical parts of Book One, is not very satisfactory since Hume allows for mistakes. I can mistake an idea of memory which happens to be less vivid for an idea of imagination. I can also mistake a vivid idea of imagination for an idea of memory. But I think we can add something more. With the possibility of mistakes the following problem arises: Hume is obviously giving an account of what imagination and memory are, but since the beliefs attending the perceptions are unreliable because of his allowance for mistakes and because it seems to be the case that these beliefs cannot be verified, how can Hume arrive at such an account and can make a proper distinction between perceptions in memory and others?

I have discussed the matter at length earlier on. When we take into consideration what Hume is saying in Book Two and Three in the *Treatise*, we will find that a possible way of verification opens up within a social context: I may have a vivid idea that I burnt my hand when a child and consequently believe that I burnt my hand. However, let's say this memory and this belief is not confirmed by anybody or anything else. My mother denies it, so does everybody who knew me at the time of the supposed accident. Additionally, all records suggest that I never burnt my hand. In short, no evidence can be found that the event I believe to remember ever did occur.

Hume argues: „Thus it appears upon the whole, that every kind of opinion or judgment, which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv'd entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind, what we call the BELIEF of the existence of any object. This force and this vivacity are most conspicious in the memory; and therefore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration."[106] This is a very interesting statement. It draws a) our attention to the problem we discussed earlier, the problem of the distinction between ontology and epistemology as it occured

[106] T.I,III,XIII,153.

when we were trying to distinguish memory from imagination; b) it raises the issue of verification of beliefs of memory.

a) According to Hume, ideas in memory are very vivid and give rise to beliefs. These beliefs, so it seems to be the case, do not amount to knowledge. It has been argued before, especially when we were discussing SHOEMAKER's account, that memory provides us in a special way with knowledge about our own pasts. It has also been said that the reasons lie in the very meaning of the term *memory*. So called „false memories", or memory-mistakes, are not memories at all but are something else. For something to be a proper memory of mine it is necessary that this something really recalls events (of whatever kind) or occurrences of my own past. „Event memory must be distinguished from factual memory, particularly from factual memory that an event occurred. Most of us remember that Columbus discovered America in 1492. We wouldn't miss that question on an exam. But no one now remembers Columbus discovering America. Most of us remember that we were born; few of us remember our birth. We can remember that events occurred which we never witnessed, and no plausible account of personal identity could be built on factual memory. But we can only have memories of events that we witnessed or in which we consciously took part."[107] It is my opinion that even factual memory of the kind PERRY describes has to have some link with event memory. I don't have to witness the events the facts are facts of but I had to be a witness to an event where I was made acquainted with these facts. Or, in plain word, I must have learned the fact somewhere. PERRY is quite right to point out that factual memory has no bearing upon individual identity in a direct way, but it certainly is important in an indirect one.

However, it will be sufficient for the present purpose to consider the relatively undisputed event memory when we talk about the term *memory* and its proper meaning. Hume's account of memory doesn't provide us with the special source of knowledge about our own past, at least not on a certain level, whereas it attempts to do exactly this on another one. If we look at the

[107] PERRY, J. *Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of Circularity*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) ibid., p.144.

epistemological level, we can say that memory cannot be used unproblematically in its proper meaning, since I can mistake a perception of imagination for a memory perception and *vice versa* (this statement itself is an ontological one) because of their degree of force and vivacity. But if memory can be properly established, both as possible despite the fleeting existence of perceptions and as reliably distinguishable from imagination, the problems occurring on an epistemological level would be resolved. On an ontological level Hume can agree with the understanding of memory as the special source of knowledge, but so far there hasn't been, epistemologically, a way to provide for a distinction between proper memory, that is, actual perceptions of memory, and perceptions of imagination.

We also have to take into account what Hume is saying about the character of the beliefs accompanying very vivid perceptions. Hume claims that our confidence in their veracity is a very big one and equals the confidence we have in the veracity of, for instance, demonstrations. If we apply the content of this statement to the example I gave earlier, we get the following picture: I believe that I burnt my hand when a child. The perceptions involved are very vivid and give rise to such a belief; but on an ontological level this 'memory' is actually nothing but a perception of imagination having an unusual force and vivacity. As I said, all my relatives disagree and no evidence of any kind can be found to confirm that I really burnt my hand. Rather the opposite is the case, there is quite a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that I never did burn my hand. The problem is that my trust in the veracity of my perception equals the trust I have in demonstration and in all the evidence presented to me. It seems therefore to be difficult to imagine how I am able to correct my belief, since I don't have more trust in the evidence or in all demonstrations than in my own belief. A situation like the one decribed seems to leave me, at best, undecided, or leaves me dismissing all evidence and demonstrations. Such a problem, if it were not resolvable, would cause serious difficulties, not only in respect to the way humans behave and reason usually, but also in respect to Hume's account of memory and imagination. It would seem to be the case that the problem

removes any foundations, even the ones of observation, on which the allowances for memory mistakes are made. It would also not acknowledge memory's special role in respect to the knowledge about one's own past.

It is the way we experience and the concept of necessary connection itself which provides a solution to the problem. Hume writes in *Of unphilosophical Probability*: „The belief, which attends our memory, is of the same nature with that, which is deriv'd from our judgments: Nor is there any difference betwixt that judgment, which is deriv'd from a constant and uniform connexion of causes and effects, and that which depends upon an uninterrupted and uncertain. 'Tis indeed evident, that in all determinations, where the mind decides from contrary experiments, 'tis first divided within itself, and has an inclination to either side in proportion to the number of experiments we have seen and remember. This contest is at last determin'd to the advantage of that side, where we observe a superior number of these experiments; but still with a diminution of force in the evidence correspondent to the number of the opposite experiments. Each possibility, of which the probability is compos'd, operates separately upon the imagination; and 'tis the larger collection of possibilities, which at last prevails, and that with a force proportionable to it's superiority."[108] This is a mechanism which provides us with a tool to correct memory-mistakes in a social context, which does include statements of witnesses other than oneself as well as evidence as it is given in representations of human knowledge, like books, diaries, pictures etc.

The possibility to spot and to correct mistakes is based on observation of a number of experiments and the forming of habit in the imagination. Hume's atomism becomes very apparent when he argues that it is the „larger collection of possibilities" which prevails with a larger force proportionate to its larger number. The account Hume gives here is not negating the trust in the veracity of our perceptions we feel (note that a belief is a perception too). If the quantities of the different experiments on both sides hold their balance, then the mind is divided „and has an inclination to either side in proportion to the number of

[108] T.I,III,XIII,154.

experiments". For instance, when I have observed very often that my memory of my childhood is correct, the result is a great trust in my own memories. When disagreements occur I am not easily convinced that I am wrong. In fact, if it is a matter of my memory against someone else's, I cannot be persuaded at all that they might be right and I might be wrong. The only evidence I regard as being stronger than my own memory is documented evidence of facts. This is because I have experienced a larger number of experiments where it was shown that factual evidence is more reliable than my memory, than there were experiments where my memory was more reliable than factual evidence.[109] It must also be observed that the acceptance of evidence of facts against one's event memory is also rooted in the absorption of social habits. On the other hand, a large number of experiments gave me the inclination to think that my factual memory (as opposed to event memory) is anything else but very reliable. In cases where my opinion stands against someone else's opinion I am inclined to believe the other opinion to be right and to mistrust my own, at least I will check the controversial facts.

In conclusion we can say that Hume's account allows for some verification, though not in the usual sense of verification. We do not check our beliefs of their correctness but are able to change them due to stronger impressions opposing the impression of the initial belief.

However, all these mechanisms do not have any proper foundation unless memory can be successfully established. The unaccountability of memory is rooted in Hume's theory of perception which is of strong eminence throughout the *Treatise*. We cannot simply make some additional assumptions and declare perceptions not to be fleeting existences. This would overthrow anything Hume wants to say about identity (internal and external) and we would arrive at an understanding of the workings of the mind alien to Hume's philosophy. If, on the other hand, memory remains unaccountable, the consequences will be devastating. Without memory the ideas of necessary connection, identity and

[109] It must also be noted that in the latter case the final evidence showing that my memory was more reliable than the known facts, is factual evidence itself.

externality cannot be accounted for. Furthermore, *imagination* itself could not be established because although imagination must be distinguished from memory, it still requires memory. The material imagination works on, is not only instanteneous sense perception material, it is also material provided by memory. Additionally, imagination makes transitions from habits, but no habit can be formed without memory.

The subject's view point and the distinction between self and personhood

There are indications that person and self are two distinct aspects of an individual from an inward looking point of view. These indications seem to have, firstly, epistemological roots anchored essentially in the privacy of the self as an epistemological concept. To start with the investigation of the problem I wish to refer to the concept of person which is presented by STRAWSON. STRAWSON writes: „...persons are essentially beings which possess abilities and dispositions of certain kinds; are self conscious, capable of ascribing to themselves certain properties; and which are capable of entering into, and find themselves entering into, certain kinds of relationships, involving mutual communication, with each other, taking each other thereby, to be creatures of the same kind as themselves."[110] There has been much discussion of the justification of STRAWSON's theory, which I do not wish to refer to unless it is necessary to do so for my own purposes. However, I think we are entitled to say that STRAWSON's account of *person* is essentially a social one and rests on considerations about communication and communicability. It therefore rests on language (including non-verbal language) and its use, both on a level of thought (which should also include non-conceptualized thought) „but also in the original speaker-hearer senses."[111]

STRAWSON's interpretation understands self-consciousness as an essential feature of *person* or personhood, but it is certainly not the only feature

[110] STRAWSON, P.F. *Reply to Mackie and Hide Ishiguro*, in: Van STRAATEN, Z. (ed.) *Philosophical Subjects*, Oxford University Press 1980, p.269.
[111] STRAWSON, P.F. *Individuals*, London: Methuan, 1959, p.87.

nor can it be set identical with *person*. It is perhaps possible to say that according to STRAWSON's interpretation, *person* is self-consciousness + experience (including social experiences of all kinds) + communication. We have to note that communication is only possible in so far as there exist social experiences and social relationships. Epistemologically, we can say that communicability is perhaps most crucial where the difference between person and self is concerned. Communication of experiences and mental events is limited by their communicability. Limitation results, firstly, from the *communicans* itself - i.e. the limits of verbal as well as non-verbal language.[112] Secondly, a more serious limitation rests with the limitation of the *communicandum*, or better, to the qualitative contents of our experiences (*qualia*), be they sensual experiences, thought or mental events of whatever kind, which seemingly cannot be communicated adequately. Epistemologically, we can argue that the communicable belongs to the realm of personhood, but most importantly, that the incommunicable belongs to the realm of the self.

I want to say that the person aspect goes only as far as communication goes. What is not communicable does not belong to the person aspect of the individual, which is understood by STRAWSON and others to be socially defined and has therefore to be accessible to other individuals. The incommunicable belongs to the aspect we call the *self*. There are qualitative contents of all experiences which are incommunicable by any means, which are, essentially and necessarily, private (*qualia*). I can, of course, infer that the individual I am communicating with has had similar experiences than those I am having now and that he can therefore comprehend what is going on inside me, that he can empathize with me and has an idea of what my experiences feel like to me. I can only make these inferences **because** I have recognized the other to be of the same kind as I am and communication, where possible, is a very important way to recognize this. McCALL seems to miss exactly this when she writes critizising STRAWSON: „...as Strawson does not put forward any other identifying conditions of persons, other than the attribution of P-Predicates, any

[112] However, it could be argued that the inadequacy of the *communicans* is purely accidental in nature.

entity to which such predicates can be (meaningfully) applied falls under the concept of „person". [...] The nature of the concept of person depends, it seems, upon how we use our language. If we can meaningfully ascribe P-Predicates, within the structure of the language as it is, the entity to which such predicates can be ascribed is understood to be a person. Yet in our language as it is, P-Predicates can be meaningfully ascribed to dogs and to computers, etc., without those entities being thought of as persons (by most people.) For instance, it can be said meaningfully that the dog is unhappy, is missing his master and wants to go out for a walk, and Artificial Intelligence programmers can make claims that they have designed programs which understand natural language. Such uses of language may be thought to be inaccurate but they are not meaningless. Yet our ordinary concept of person is surely distinct from that of animals or artifacts. Strawson's account fails to make such a distinction."[113]

The point McCALL is missing is that we may, in fact, ascribe so called P-Predicates to dogs, goldfish and computers but only because, when we do this, we treat the animal or the computer **as if** they were persons. We do not really think that the dog is happy in the same way we think human beings are happy or that the dog **wants** to go for a walk as we would want to go for a walk. We do not think either that the dog really **understands** our language nor do we think that the computer does understand it as long as we don't want to understand *understanding* to mean nothing else than „receiving a signal". We certainly do not think that dogs or computers are self-conscious. Self-consciousness is a feature of personhood and a condition for the proper assignment of P-Predicates.

My dog and I are doubtlessly able to communicate, but not on the level of communication as it usually occurs between human beings. To make a dog understand my commands I have to use methods of communication the dog can understand, human language as meaningful language is not one of them, or, to put it into plain words, I have to „speak" doggie language that the dog can understand me. When my puppy is grown into an adventurous, strong adult

[113] McCALL, C. ibid., p.52-53.

male dog and makes serious attempts to lead the pack (that is, the family he lives in, since he perceives this to be his pack) it does not make sense to reason with the dog and to tell him that since I pay the bills and do the work I am the master of the house. Instead I have to fight with him and to force him into the obedience position to show him that I am the leader of the pack and will not be challenged. The difference is that the dog cannot communicate with me on the level of human communication, but I can communicate with the dog on his level. When I communicate with my dog on his level of communication I certainly don't think that the dog is a person.

The communication between a human and an animal (taken for granted that the animal does not possess self consciousness on whatever level - if it does the matter is indeed a different one) and between a human and an artifact is of an entirely different kind, than the communication taking place between humans. This is so for two main reasons. Humans have, usually, self-consciousness. They have a self and are conscious of it (whatever that self happens to be) and infer that the other human is self-conscious too. They also recognize others as persons. Animals and artifacts are usually not self-conscious and don't refer to others or to themselves as persons. I refer to someone else as a person because I have perceived, by communication, this someone to be of the same kind as I am, i.e. being self-conscious. I perceive the other to be part of a social environment I am also a part of, which is the kind of social relationship that takes place between beings of the same kind.

If self-consciousness is a necessary feature of personhood in an outward looking way, i.e. I understand someone else to be a person if and only if the other is a self-conscious being, then this must also be true for an inward looking point of view, although the matter is then epistemologically different.[114] I myself don't have to infer that I am a self conscious being, I simply know that I am (again, it doesn't matter what that self exactly happens to be). Thereby referring to my **self**. Furthermore, to understand and to recognize myself as a **person** it

[114] The ontological claims do not differ because in both cases we make the ontological claim that the respective individual is a self-conscious being. The difference here is an epistemological one, i.e. differing by the means by which we know that I am or the other is self-conscious.

is not only required that others perceive and recognize me as a person. I have to ascribe the term *person* to myself and can only do this in so far as I am a self-conscious being. To make any first person identity statements I have to be able to use the term *I* meaningfully, something I can only do provided I am a being which is self-conscious. The term *person* is also only ascribed to self-conscious beings.

I also have to perceive myself as having social relationships and as being a being living in a social environment (again, it does not matter what this environment exactly is). I have to know that I am perceived and recognized by others as a person to perceive myself as a person. *Person* or *personhood* are social concepts and only apply in a social context. This is why personhood cannot be reduced to self-consciousness, although self-consciousness and the self are not, neither ontologically nor epistemologically, independent of social relationships. The self is closely connected to and linked up with the person, that is, with the social aspect of the individual, because of their interdependency and interrelationship. Self and personhood require each other: i) being self-conscious is a necessary feature of personhood, and ii) the self (that which is conscious of itself) requires social interaction to emerge.

I wish to claim that the self and consequently self-consciousness are ontologically not *in tempore* prior to personhood but are necessary[115] for personhood. I want to say that without a self and self-consciousness there cannot be a person or personhood. The same is true *vice versa*: without the recognition of others in a social context there cannot be a self-conscious self either. The difference between self and personhood is subtle. I am a person as far as I am myself the object of my perception and the object of perception of others. The term *person* refers to an individual as an object of recognition in a social context whilst the term *self* refers to an individual as far as it is fully subject. If I look at myself as an object, I look at myself as a person. In so far as I reflect upon myself in a communicable manner (in, for instance, conceptualized thought), I look at the public side, or the public aspect of myself,

[115] **Not** in the crude causal sense which suggests temporal antecedence.

which we refer to as *person*. This aspect is *possibiliter* communicable although I don't have actually to communicate it.

However, there is also something I am aware of - not only then when I am reflecting upon myself - which is incommunicable because it cannot be conceptualized adequately. There is a quality of content to the experience of being oneself, as well as to any other experience, which cannot be adequately expressed and therefore cannot be fully communicated. This quality is private and must remain private. We have to note that this privacy is limited: I can infer that others experience something similar to my experiences by recognizing them to be of the same kind as I am. To be aware of the incommunicability requires communication and therefore a social context in which communication takes place. I cannot know that there is something I cannot communicate as long as I cannot communicate at all.

It should be clear that the ontological claim is somehow embedded within the epistemological aspects: I have direct epistemological access to the *qualia* of my own experience, but not to the *qualia* of the experience of individuals other than myself. The claim about the existence of *qualia* is an ontological claim. However, this is still not sufficient to justify my ontological claim concerning the interdependency of self and personhood. What is established so far is an epistemological claim. Namely, that the self is *in tempore* not prior to personhood epistemologically: that I don't acquire knowledge first about being a self and then, resting on that knowledge, acquire knowledge about myself being a person. It is rather the case that the recognition of one of these aspects of my existence as an individual is intertwined with the recognition of the other. Both aspects require each other epistemologically.

To establish an ontological claim becomes perhaps easier when we take another claim into account, namely the claim that the self is necessarily self-conscious, that what we usually call self-consciousness is an essential feature of the self. This claim is in accordance with Hume's account: If there exists a perception in my mind, then this perception, as such, has ontological existence. The self is just such a perception. It is, firstly, an idea - but here ontological

claims cannot be made beyond the idea itself. However, as will be argued later on, there is also an impression of the self. This impression is a complex impression of reflection of the bundle of perceptions. Although the impression is not a simple impression, it carries with it a natural ontological claim, expressed in a belief (in Hume's understanding of belief). Since there are only perceptions, i.e. ideas and impressions, we can say that a felt perception has existence, at least as a perception. I believe this is good enough for an ontological account of the self, which is an internal perception. There can be no doubt that the internal impression of self needs to be assisted by external perceptions, such as the awareness of one's own body, perceptions necessary to distinguish between oneself and others etc. But there is also no doubt that an ontological claim can be accounted for. The necessary bodily criterion rests with what the necessary elements and the principle of unity of the bundle exactly are, but not with the possible perception of the bundle itself.

However, there are still some problems with such an account which need to be resolved. It can be argued that if the self is necessarily self-conscious it follows that in times when we are not self-conscious we are not a self. Neither are we, then, a person, because personhood and self are interdependent. This seems to be absurd. To tackle the problem we can look at two scenarios we are already familiar with: early infancy and sleep.

a) <u>early infancy</u>

If we don't find any difficulties in understanding the self as something non-static, but as something which has to develop, then we shouldn't have any difficulties to understand how and that a self comes into existence progressively. When we come into existence we are not self-conscious and consequently are not a person either. However, we are a human being. To be a human being is a sufficient condition for the expectation that we will develop a self and personhood. This expectation is held by the other members of society, our parents, for instance, who have acquired the expectation through custom.

(Nobody reasonable has a similar expectation about amoebas, dogs or carrots, for instance.) So it may well be the case that P-Predicates are not ascribable to young infants. If they are ascribed to them, they are ascribed **as if** the infants were already self-conscious. P-Predicates, if ascribed, will be ascribed because of the expectation, not because self-consciousness can be observed in its instantiations. It is not necessary that we are recognized as a person to interact socially or to be encouraged and taught to do so. It is sufficient to be recognized as a human being for the relevant expectations to be held. The criteria of being a human being are of a more bodily nature than the criteria for self and personhood. We can say that, if self-consciousness is thought to be a feature of personhood, then both have to be simultaneously acquired. However, because both self and personhood feature each other, they are irreducible to one another and cannot be said to be identical.

b) sleep[116]

To investigate this problem we have to look at the different angles under which the problem can be perceived. We have to clarify to which person stages the problem applies and which person stages we therefore have to consider. The following example shall help to illustrate the puzzle: Yesterday evening, before going to sleep, I read a crime story (person stage 1). Then I slept until 8 o'clock in the morning (person stage 2). Then I woke up and started my day with making myself a cup of coffee (person stage 3). The question arises by which of these person stages the identity of the individual shall be established. Which person stages have to be considered and have to be taken into account to establish the identity of the individual in question? The question can also take the form: 'What are the criteria by which the individual of person stage 3 is the same individual as the individual of person stage 1?'

If the question involves only person stages 1 and 3, then all the arguments presented earlier to establish memory as the criterion of personal identity apply

[116] I refer to dreamless sleep here.

to account for the self identity and the personal identity of the individual in question. Person stages 1 and 3 are stages of self consciousness. The mental criterion of self identity and personal identity is available for first person identity statements, although here not strictly as a *criterion*, and for third person identity statements (limited availability). The bodily criterion is also available.

However, the matter seems to be different when one wants to take person stage 2 seriously and includes it in one's consideration. Thus, what are the criteria (ontologically and epistemologically) by which we identify the individual of person stage 1 and 3 with the individual of person stage 2? It is clear that the problem is not only a problem of self identity, but also of personal identity. It is also a problem which concerns first person identity statements as well as third person identity statements. The problem arises because the combined theory favors not only a bodily, but also a mental criterion of personal identity and both criteria, taken separately on their own, are necessary but not sufficient criteria.

I have argued before that there have to be some perceptions even in a state of deep, dreamless sleep. If there were none it would be impossible to be woken up by alarm clocks, noises or other people. It might be the case that someone has to shake me and to shout at me for at least five minutes to wake me up. However, he eventually manages to do so. It can also be observed that the sleeper is perceiving some outside interference with his sleep because the sleeper tends, very often, to react to this interference by, for instance, grunting, turning away from the source of interference etc. Therefore, the scenario of complete absence of any perceptions in periods of sound sleep, as it is presented by Hume and also by LOCKE, does not seem to be quite true.

However, it cannot be denied that we are not conscious in times of dreamless sleep. Therefore, the memory criterion cannot be used to establish personal and self identity. The condition for personhood - consciousness - is not fulfilled. If this is true, then what are the consequences and are they serious in the sense that they invalidate or endanger the account of self identity and personal identity given by the combined theory?

I think that we are justified to say that in periods of unconsciousness of whatever kind (sleep, coma, fainting etc.) the problem of identity, so far as first person identity statements are concerned, does not arise. Nobody unconscious is capable of making first person identity statements.[117] The only identity statements which can be made at times of unconsciousness are third person identity statements made by persons other than the unconscious person. In that sense we can say that when we are unconscious the *I* does *actualiter* not exist, although we can say that the observer, according to the experienced previous experiments, expects the unconscious person to enter a person stage 3 eventually. With entry into person stage 3 memory can fulfill its function as one of the criteria of identity in the way it has been argued previously. If this can be accepted we gain an additional indication of the claim that the self has necessarily to be conscious not only of perceptions of external objects but also of the perception of itself. If the self would only be conscious of perceptions of external objects but not of itself, it could not distinguish the perception of the external objects from the perception of itself.

If we look at third person identity statements, that is statements made by others about the identity of the unconscious person, we will find that it is possible to make them in a somehow „improvised" manner. They are not always sufficiently founded but usually, even within a Humean context, good enough for every day purposes. We will also find that when we move into areas outside the usual every day experience, the insufficient founding of such third person identity statements becomes more apparent. Third person identity statements of the kind we have here to consider are entirely based upon bodily criteria and upon custom. We make identity statements about the unconscious person on purely bodily evidence.[118] When we make these statements about a sleeping person we cannot perceive, at that moment in time, anything of their mental events. Although they may speak or cry out when dreaming, we do not know the

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[117] Self-consciousness requires not only consciousness, it also requires that one perceives impressions and ideas. The self is a complex impression of reflection.

[118] This is no proof that the body theory is right, especially not when we take into consideration the fact that we make such an identity statement about someone who is not conscious at the time, just as we make identity statements about, for instance, inanimate objects.

mental context which accompanies such utterances, and very often they are not comprehensible in a communicative way. Referring back to the earlier mind transfer examples we might find ourselves, making these identity statements, in the following position: It may well be that I observe my son Niklas sleeping and make an identity statement that I see that Niklas is asleep. But what I am actually observing is his body. It may also well be that whilst my son is sleeping a mind transfer has taken place: Nicola's mind has been transferred „into" Niklas' body and Niklas' mind „into" Nicola's body. I have no possibility to know about this mind transfer because as long as both of them are sleeping I can only observe their bodies as such. I cannot observe any kind of behavior or language which is supposed to express someone's mental events to a certain extent. After Niklas has entered a person stage 3 and is displaying behavior and language I know not to be his usual kind of behavior and language, I would become aware of the discrepancy and would strongly suspect that I do not have the same child as I had yesterday. The child at person stage 1 is not identical with the child at person stage 3.

This is a scenario similar to the ones I drew up earlier to support and to establish the claim that personal identity has a mental **and** a bodily criterion. Hence all the arguments suggesting that bodily criteria are not sufficient to determine the identity of a person (even more so in respect to the self) should apply. If these arguments are accepted we are justified in concluding that in periods of unconsciousness the bodily criterion is not sufficient in respect to third person identity statements. We are theoretically not justified, although we do so all the time, to identify the person at person stages 1 and 3 with the person at person stage 2. We make these identifications because we assume, and this is usually a very reasonable assumption, that a mind transfer didn't take place just as we assume that the sleeper we see is not dead. If we would live in a society where mind transfers happen quite frequently to everybody, we would be more careful about such assumptions, in fact, we would probably not make such assumptions at all because we would have to consider the likelihood that the sleeper has just gone through such a procedure.

If these arguments can be accepted we can conclude that the absence of consciousness at times does not pose a serious problem for the identity of individuals (in the sense of personal and self identity) when we decide that we can live with the idea that identity statements at these times cannot be made as sufficiently well founded statements, neither ontologically nor epistemologically. It seems, however, that many philosophers find this difficult to accept and try to avoid the problem by either favoring the idea of a substance or by favoring one or the other type of the body theory. I don't think absence of identity (especially epistemologically) at times of unconsciousness is a problem since the combined theory in general, and an account which takes person stages into consideration in particular, provides us with good criteria to make well founded identity statements about conscious beings, whilst they are conscious.

In respect to any type of body theory I have argued that each of these types is theoretically unsatisfying for several reasons. It therefore doesn't seem to be appropriate to adopt such a theory only because it can avoid problems with identity at times of unconsciousness. If we also take into account that we search for an identity theory which is compatible with Hume's theory we have to judge the body theory, by any means, unsuitable. Theories putting forward the idea that individuals are substances are also not compatible with the Humean theory. Hume strongly rejects the idea of substance, especially DESCARTES' account of substance. "The whole system, therefore, is entirely incomprehensible..."[119] Remarking on the idea of the substance of the soul he writes: „To pronounce, then, the final decision upon the whole; the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible."[120] Even if we consider Hume's version of Basic Realism we have to conclude that the idea of substance cannot be maintained. The idea of substance entails an ontological claim concerning the nature of the *existens*. And though a claim of existence can reasonably be made, a claim maintaining a particular nature of the *existens* cannot.

[119] T.I,IV,III,222.
[120] T.I,IV,V,250.

There is, of course, a question which can reasonably be asked, namely: Given that the subject is neither self nor person in the complete sense of the word at times of unconsciousness, how is it possible to explain the transmission back to consciousness? This question is not unimportant since we must believe in such a transmission to have the expectation that it will eventually take place. We can certainly argue that we have the expectation due to the observed number of experiments. That's why we believe the transmission is possible. However, this seems to be a rather unsatisfying argument. There are more interesting ways to argue and we will find a better explanation of the process when we take the difficult notion of *capacity* into account.

II.IV. Hume's Account of Capacities

It has often been argued that Hume's theory cannot allow for any capacities at all since he seems to deny their existence explicitly. Hume writes: „There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of *power, force, energy* or *necessary connexion*."[121] He then goes on to argue: „When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion, [...] From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere dint of thought and reasoning. [...] It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover any power, which can be the original of this idea."[122] Since powers or capacities themselves cannot be observed or be perceived, whilst perception (having an impression) is necessary to give rise to a resembling idea, we cannot by experience of the perception of „external objects" arrive at the idea of power or capacity. That is, so far we have

[121] ECHU,VII,I,61-62.
[122] ibid., p.63-64.

no reasonable grounds to justify the thought that things do have powers or capacities.

Since we obviously have the idea of power or capacity Hume considers the possibility of the idea of power or capacity being gained from internal experiences. „It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of volition produces motion to our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power.“[123] Setting this up as a pretense, Hume goes on to show that we cannot gain the idea of power or capacity by reflection either. Even when we look at the operations of the mind and reflect upon them we can only perceive singular events. We cannot perceive a necessary link between our single perceptions. If I will to open my eyes and then do open my eyes, the only things observable are that firstly, I wanted to open my eyes, and secondly, that I did so. I cannot observe, so Hume, that I opened my eyes **because** I wanted it, or, in other words, that my will to open my eyes caused this particular action. If we apply this to our case concerning capacities and take also Hume's reasoning in respect to the unjustified conclusions drawn from inductive reasoning into account, we must say that although we perceive ourselves to be capable of performing an action like opening one's eyes, we cannot conclude that we have a capacity to do so. Be it just for the simple reason that the action, which is possible now, cannot be predicted with absolute certainty to be possible tomorrow. Hence, Hume draws a first conclusion in respect to motion and volition: „We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope, without temerity, though with assurance; that our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when

[123] ibid., p.64.

we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and office."[124]

He then applies the same arguments to the connection between volition and operation of the mind and points out that what can be said about the impossibility to observe a power in respect to volition and motion must also be said about any performance the faculties of the soul can give. From this it follows that the ideas of *necessary connection*, *power* or *capacity* can neither be derived from the perception of „external objects" nor from reflection. „So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected.*"[125]

Although Hume puts these arguments forward to show that the idea of necessary connection, or causality, cannot be derived simply from experience and reason alone, it is quite clear that these arguments apply also to the idea of capacity. It is impossible to observe capacity itself, all we can observe are the exercises of such a capacity and inductively we have no sufficient grounds to conclude justifiably that such a capacity exists, especially not at times of unconsciousness. However, one can still maintain that there was something like a capacity, though in a backward looking and a contemporary way which refers to past and present actions and events. I know that I opened my eyes in the morning and I could not have done so if I hadn't had the possibility to do so. The same applies to all actions one is presently performing. I think we are entirely justified to call this possibility *capacity*, but it remains a question how much we gain theoretically by such a meaning of the concept, since the most interesting part, the future orientated one, seems to be completely eradicated.

Is it therefore necessary to abandon our usual and common sense understanding of the term *capacity*? I do not think it is. Hume does not deny that capacities of the mind exist, he himself refers to the *faculties of the soul*,

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[124] ibid., p.67.
[125] ECHU,VII,II,74.

although we would find it difficult, given Hume's philosophy in Book One of the *Treatise* as a starting point, to observe any faculties themselves. Hume's question doesn't seem to be an ontological one, it is quite clearly an epistemological question.[126] Hume argues that we get our idea of necessary connection with the help of imagination, which forms the idea by making transitions from habit. „It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occurs of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we *feel* in the mind, this customary transition, of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion."[127] This can also be said for capacities. What else are capacities if not powers? To have the power to perform such and such an action is to be capable of such a performance whether that performance is actually carried out or not.

If we apply these findings to the problem of unconsciousness as in, for instance, sleep, we can say that whilst we are sleeping we still have the capacity of memory (as well as the capacity to move the limbs of our body voluntarily if we could do so before we were going to sleep, that is in person stage 1). However, the process by which we move from the capacity to remember something to the exercised capacity cannot be seen as independent of consciousness in terms of its absence or presence. Hence it depends upon the clarity and the type of perceptions we experience. Given dreamless sleep, we can say that any perceptions we have then (the ringing of an alarm clock etc.) are very faint perceptions, we are not consciously aware of them. We become,

[126] This applies also to causality and externality, for instance, although the internal workings and features of the mind have a special, ontologically much stronger status.
[127] ECHU,VII,II,75.

however, consciously aware of them once full consciousness is recovered, i.e. the mind is perceiving clear perceptions again.

Our expectation that a transmission will take place is justified in terms of probability. It is also clear that Hume can account for capacities given that they are understood in terms of probability. „...that *power* has always a reference to its *exercise*, either actual or probable, and that we consider a person as endow'd with any ability when we find from past experience, that 'tis probable, or at least possible he may exert it. [...] that power consists in the possibility or probability of any action, as discover'd by experience and the practice of the world."[128] Using the term *capacity* in this sense, reference to capacities is ontologically and epistemologically justified. It may well be that an account claiming the absence of self and personhood at times of unconsciousness is counter intuitive. But it is the only counter intuitive account we have to give here.

I believe that the arguments I have presented, together with Hume's account, if accepted, present a strong case for a rethinking of the connection between self, personhood and self-consciousness. It is possible to maintain that the self has to be necessarily conscious of itself without falling into contradictions and absurdities and without failing to give a satisfactory account of the three aspects of the individual and their interrelations in an epistemological as well as in an ontological sense. Although *personhood* and *self* are not identical, the arguments presented to establish that personal identity requires bodily as well as mental criteria are partially still applicable in respect to the identity of the self. This is so because of the close connection and interdependency between self and personhood. The difference seems to be one of contextdependent emphasis. Whilst the mental aspect steps forward in respect to the self, bodily criteria have still a role to play. The self, by its strong connection to the person aspect, needs social environment to develop and to progress. It is not sufficient to be capable of a distinction between me and non human objects of whatever kind. My perceiving myself as an individual (and the self is a necessary feature of the individual, not to say of individuality) requires

[128] T.II,I,X,313.

that I am also capable of perceiving myself as being different from other humans - being a self different from their selves, as well as being a person different from them. On the other hand, in respect to the person aspect of the individual, which focuses on the individual's social side, we can say that the emphasis is more on the bodily criteria. It also has, and must have, recourse to the mental aspect of the individual, as I have tried to show earlier.

I think we have seen that Hume's account of identity in Book One of the *Treatise* is an account of self-identity rather than an account of personal identity. It is, given that we have taken it, so far, separately from the account of Book Two, quite successful. It is compatible with the combined theory, which means that Hume's account of self identity does not contradict the arguments brought forward to support the view that bodily as well as mental criteria have a bearing upon personal identity. This is especially important because the close connection between personhood and self implies that self identity and personal identity have also to be closely connected. We can also see that Hume is not abandoning identity either epistemologically or ontologically. The main problem lies with his theory of perception, not because the theory is generally problematic, but because perceptions are understood as fleeting existences, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to allow for memory in a theoretically sound way. The theoretical impossibility of memory has grave consequences since memory has to write the script of the play staged in the theatre of the mind. However, to investigate the potential of Hume's theory it is necessary to take a successful account of memory for granted. All my arguments involving memory and imagination imply a successful account of memory. Hence they have to be taken as resting upon a condition unsatisfiable by Hume's theory of perception.

2. Hume's Concept of the Self in Book Two of the *Treatise*

III. The Passions

III.I. Pride and Humility

In this chapter I wish to argue that the concept of *self* underlying Hume's philosophy in Book Two of the *Treatise* focuses on the social side of the individual. It is a social concept of the self and is therefore much nearer to the aspect of the individual we refer to as *person* than it is to the *self* aspect as defined in the previous investigation. Attention will also be drawn to the connection between self and personhood, especially in respect to the role of sociality.

„What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves."[129] Hume dedicated the first Book of the *Treatise* to the investigation of the former, whereas Book Two is concerned with the examination of the latter. My investigation of the concept of self in Book Two of the *Treatise* begins with Hume's account of the passions, especially with the passions of pride, humility, love and hatred. Hume's treatment and understanding of these passions in particular is constantly referring to a self, being either the object or the subject of particular passions.

Impressions are either impressions of sensation or impressions of reflexion. Passions and emotions are secondary, reflective impressions. „Original impressions or impressions of sensations are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs. Secondary, or

[129] T.I,IV,VI,253.

reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them."[130] Passions are not pleasures or pains, which are primary impressions, but pleasures and pains can quite often be sources of passions.

Hume divides the passions into violent and calm passions. Calm passions are passions like the sense of beauty and deformity in action and in composition[131], whereas love, hatred, grief, joy, pride and humility are violent passions. Hume is far from claiming that his distinction is very exact. Passions considered to be calm passions can at times be felt very strongly whilst the so called violent passions can also be very faint and almost imperceptible. The distinction is a general distinction rooted in the common perception of the passions and allows for different degrees of strength of the impressions felt at particular instances. There is also no indication that the distinction is connected to the degree of vivacity of the respective passion. Hume distinguishes clearly between violent and strong passions as well as between calm and weak passions.[132]

When looking at the *causes* of passions Hume distinguishes direct and indirect passions. „By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities."[133] Pride and humility are indirect passions. Hume begins his investigation in a very straightforward way and states: „that pride and humility, tho' directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness."[134] We can already see the importance of the self in respect to the passions and especially in respect to pride and humility, but also, almost as a mirror image of

[130] T.II,I,I,275.
[131] compare ibid., p.276.
[132] compare T.II,III,IV,419.
[133] T.II,I,I,276.
[134] T.II,I,II,277.

Hume's account of pride and humility, in respect to love and hatred. The self as the object of pride and humility is what these passions are directed at. They are passions **about** the self but they are not caused by the self. „For as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause; it cou'd never produce any degree of the one passion, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both."[135] Hume argues that if the self were the cause of these contrary passions it must always cause both of the passions to the same degree at the same time; though the degree itself can differ at different times. Furthermore, it is actually impossible, so Hume, to have both passions at the same time since one can either feel proud or humble, but not both together. „'Tis impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble; and where he has different reasons for these passions, as frequently happens, the passions either take place alternately; or if they encounter, the one annihilates the other, as far as strength goes, and the remainder only of that, which is superior, continues to operate upon the mind. But in the present case neither of the passions cou'd ever become superior; because supposing it to be the view only of ourself, which excited them, that being perfectly indifferent to either, must produce both in the very same proportion; or in other words, can produce neither. To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent."[136] Hume uses a physicalist concept for his argument, namely that two equal and opposite forces cancel each other out. Hence no effect upon the object on which the forces work, is achieved. Both forces have to be necessarily equal in strength if the cause of the two forces, which occur at the same time, is the same. It follows that the self cannot be the cause of these passions. But it can be their object.

Hume goes on to argue that the set of possible causes of pride and humility contains a vast variety of subjects: almost any conceivable quality of the mind or

[135] ibid., p.278.
[136] ibid.

the body, just like any other quality we judge it valuable to be related to. „Every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions confin'd to the mind, but extend their view to the body likewise. A man may be proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mein, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and of his dexterity, in any manual business or manufacture. But this is not all. The passions looking farther, comprehend whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility."[137] The possible causes of pride and humility have to have some relation to ourselves to be able to excite the passion in question. To explain and to show the necessity of this connection Hume makes a further distinction in respect to the cause of the passion. He distinguishes between a quality the cause possesses and the subject of which the quality is a feature. To feel any passion like pride and humility, that is for the cause to produce a passion, we have to value the quality the subject possesses. There also has to be some relation between the subject and ourselves.

Hume argues that there is a causal relationship between the qualities of the subjects of pride and humility, pains and pleasures, the passions themselves and the self. The passion is derived from a „double relation of ideas and impressions".[138] The quality of the subject is more than just a feature of the subject we are indifferent to. It is a quality in a particular sense, namely that it produces agreeable (pleasures) or disagreeable (pains) feelings in us. If these qualities produce a feeling of pleasure **and** the subject possessing these qualities is related to us, then pride is produced - which leads to pleasure (the same, just in a negative sense, is said about humility). So we can say that the passions in question are produced by sensations which have themselves been produced by the subject of the passions, and the passion produces a sensation in its own right. The self has an important role in this double relation. First, the

[137] ibid., p.279.
[138] T.II,I,V,286.

cause of the passion must be related to the self which is the object of the passion. If it is not, passions like pride and humility are not prompted; just as „the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion".[139]

Secondly, the self, or perhaps better, the idea of the self underlying these arguments is two faced. A relation between cause and object of the passion is a necessary condition for the passion to be produced. It is very plausible that this should be so: Almost all humans admire beauty (it does not matter here what our idea of beauty exactly is) but for beauty to give rise to the feeling of pride within me the beauty must be the beauty of something which is related to me. I cannot feel proud that something I am not related to is beautiful. It might be that the *Loire* is a very beautiful river, and I might acknowledge this quite happily when I go there as a tourist, but I do not feel proud about its beauty since this particular river has nothing to do with me. However, I feel proud that the river *Saale* is one of the most beautiful rivers in Germany because the Saale flows through my home town. It becomes obvious, that both parts, quality and subject, are necessary components of the cause. Both have to occur in conjunction and the subject has to be related to the object of the passion to make up a cause of pride or humility in an individual.

The double role of the self appears to be not unproblematic. Hume points out that: „...we must suppose, that nature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call *pride*: To this emotion she has assign'd a certain idea, *viz.* that of *self*, which it never fails to produce."[140] Thus it looks as if the self is both cause and one of the conditions of the passion. If we accept that a passion like pride or humility does not occur unless the subject of the passion is related to the object, one can justifiably say that the self as part of the relation is part of the cause of the passion. However, it is also produced by the passion. So, how can it be both, a part of the cause and the effect, at the same time?

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[139] ibid.
[140] ibid., p.287.

To begin with, two important distinctions have to be made. One has to distinguish between the idea of the self and the impression of the self. To understand the double role of the self we need to understand that the play the passions are staging is not static. It is a process, a succession of events following each other and being related to one another. Particular relations are rooted in our nature and our ideas of them are formed by the workings of the imagination. „All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated. In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other resembling affections. 'Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation. Human nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it. [...] 'Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas; tho' with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance."[141] I will try to explain how I think this relevant and important in respect to the understanding of the self in its double role.

The passions of pride and humility produce the idea of the self naturally as their object. No reasoning is required to work out if these circumstances, these achievements, these possessions I feel humble or proud about are mine. That the passion is aroused implies that I recognize them as mine, that I recognize a relationship between the object of the passion and myself. However, because my awareness at the time when the passion is first produced is focused on the relation, the idea of the self is hardly a clear idea. It is an impression, which may be more vivid than the idea but it is not conceptualized since it is an impression. A clear idea of the self is then produced by the passion. In this sense the idea of the self is naturally and necessarily produced by the passion. Hume emphasizes that the self is the „immediate object" of the passions and states, opening his

[141] T.II,I,IV,283.

discussion of sympathy: „the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception..."[142]

Hume has offered good reasons why the self cannot be the cause of pride and humility. On its own, the self is never a sufficient cause for a passion but needs context. However, the context alone would be meaningless without a self or perhaps better, without an individual being a self and being aware of the context. The self is subject and cause (as part of the relation) because it is embedded and develops in a context. It is a self only in relation to other, animated and unanimated things. The perception of these form and develop the self, excite passions, produce responses. Just as the context requires a self to be created and to be meaningful, the self requires context for its existence also. In that sense the self is the effect of the passions. „If reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, it is not going to be able to get an adequate idea of the self, one of whose „organs" it is, if it tries to abstract from the passions, those more vital and more dominant organs of mind and person. Hume never retracts his Book One denial of a „simple", persisting self, the sort of thing of which we might have a simple impression. The self is complex, changing, dependent on others for its coming to be, for its emotional life, for its self-consciousness, for its self-evaluations."[143] The contradiction between the self being cause and effect simultaneously only occurs if the dependency between the self and its context is understood as a one-way road. Hume's philosophy would be entirely misunderstood if we think that the connection is nothing but this. It is one of the main and most interesting features of Hume's philosophy, just as it is its perhaps greatest achievement, that he takes nothing for granted: not our concepts, not our values and not the role of reason. As reason has to reflect upon itself and is consequently confronted with its limits, so the self is not set as a first principle we cannot question because every human activity stems

[142] T.II,I,XI,317.
[143] BAIER, A. ibid., p.130.

from it, be it an activity of the mind or the body. It has to be understood as a self created enriched and enhanced by its feedback provided by the passions, epistemologically as well as ontologically. I find myself here in complete agreement with ANNETTE BAIER who writes: „The chosen opening of Book Two shows us something about its relation to the books that precede and follow it, and about its author's philosophical priorities. Reflexivity, indirectness, conflict - these are the opening themes, and they are all themes that are of importance for understanding Hume's version of morality, as well as being themes that are carried over from Book One. The pride of place given to pride is not so much a case of egotism as it is of preoccupation with reflection and reflexivity."[144]

To present only Hume's account of the passions of pride and humility would be to give a one-sided picture of the passions as well as of the self and the process by which it emerges. I find it necessary and enlightening to have a look at pride and humility's „mirror image", the passions of love and hatred. Since love and hatred are more associated with persons rather than with other things (although, of course, we can love or hate a lot of things, not only people) they are *prima facie* more interesting when one is looking for the social aspect of the individual and puts the self, ontologically and epistemologically, in a social context.

III.II. Love and Hatred

Hume perceives the passions of pride and humility to be very similar to the passions of love and hatred. So, it is not surprising that Hume uses the material he has presented to explain pride and humility to serve towards an account of love and hatred. He writes: „As the immediate *object* of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the *object* of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious."[145] Hume's latter statement must not be taken literally since we can be conscious of someone else's actions and to some extent of their thoughts and sensations.

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[144] ibid., p.134.
[145] T.II,II,I,329.

However, as I have argued before, and this is the way in which, I think, Hume wants to be understood, we are not intimately and immediately conscious of actions, thoughts and sensations other than one's own.

Discussing love and hatred Hume employs arguments similar to those he has used to show that the object of pride/humility cannot be the cause of these passions. The object of the passion is not a sufficient cause to produce the passion, but is undoubtedly one of its conditions.[146] The arguments rest, again, upon the view that love and hatred are contrary passions and that if they were to be produced by their object alone, they would have to be produced simultaneously and with the same force, thereby the two opponents would cancel each other out altogether. Hume argues further that the cause of love and hatred is a compound, made up of, again, the subject and certain qualities it possesses. He thinks both components to be equally necessary to be able to arouse feelings like love and hatred. „A prince, that is possess'd of a stately palace, commands the esteem of the people upon that account; and that *first*, by the beauty of the palace, and *secondly*, by the relation of property, which connects it with him. The removal of either of these destroys the passion; which evidently proves that the cause is a compounded one."[147]

Hume wants to say that there are certain qualities which cause love or hatred. It could be argued, however, that passions, especially love and hatred, don't seem always to be caused by these qualities. Common experience tells us that we very often don't know why we love or hate someone. It must be replied that the fact that we don't know which qualities in particular cause these feelings only implies that we do not know the particular cause of the particular passion experienced. It certainly does not imply that there is no cause to the passion. It also doesn't follow that qualities of subjects cannot be such a cause.

If we look at the mechanism by which particular passions are produced we will find that Hume believes that particular passions are naturally linked to one another. The nature of these links becomes especially apparent when we look

[146] compare ibid., p.330.
[147] ibid.

at the mechanism connecting love and pride as well as hatred and humility. Hume perceives, generally, an interdependency between these passions. Exploring this interdependency will also illuminate the self in its role as the subject of love and hatred.

To begin with it is important to notice that both sets of passions are closely connected to another human being.[148] Hume says quite explicitly, referring to both sets of passions: „We may also *suppose* with some shew of probability, *that the cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being*, and *that the cause of the former* [149] *produce a separate pleasure, and of the latter* [150] *a separate uneasiness.*"[151] This is the first connection observable between the two sets: both are related to individuals. Pride and humility have the self, which obviously belongs to an individual, as their object whilst love and hatred have an individual other than oneself as their object. Hume then goes on to develop a picture of these connections and consequently of their interdependencies as follows:

Pride	<----	Impression	---->	Love
object				object
Humility	<----	Impression	---->	Hatred

Pride and Humility have the same object just as love and hatred have their common object. Hence both sets are defined by their respective objects. There is also a similarity of impression between love and pride - both are agreeable, their impressions are pleasant whilst the impressions of humility and hatred are unpleasant. These similarities signify the connection between pride and love, and humility and hatred. Reflecting upon these connections Hume claims that: „nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation,

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[148] I have mentioned before that passions of this kind can also be felt in respect to inanimate objects - one can hate Schönberg's music, spinach or nuclear power stations and love Bach, the sea and aeroplanes. However, Hume would not regard the emotions expressed in such a way as love or hatred in the proper sense. The subject of pride and humility and the object of love or hatred can only have their respective role in so far as they are related to, or are themselves, a human being.

[149] love and pride, T.L.

[150] hatred and humility, T.L.

[151] T.II,II,I,331.

viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passions itself."[152] He argues that the respective passions, connected by their impressions, never fail to attend each other. Love gives rise to pride, pride to love. The same can be said about their opposites. He then offers several experiments which shall both highlight and prove his claim. I don't wish to discuss these experiments. It is more interesting, especially regarding the role of the self, to look into the mechanism of these double relationships.

1. *From love to pride.* If I love another person then this person is the object of my passion whilst I am the subject of that passion. I recognize that this person possesses certain agreeable qualities. These qualities cause the passion of love I feel for this person. This sentiment is pleasurable in two senses: it is caused by agreeable qualities I take pleasure in perceiving, and the passion of love itself also causes pleasure. Once my attention is drawn to the other person as the object of my passion, all my perceptions of the person with all the qualities I find pleasurable and agreeable, are clear and vivid. Since a close relation to the person and a vivid perception of his admirable qualities are so established, the transition to pride can easily be made. In pride this person is the subject of the passion whilst my self is the object. The qualities which have caused my love towards this person naturally cause pride because both passions are agreeable, pleasant impressions. It is important to note that love precedes here pride and establishes thereby a close relationship between the relata (I love *A*; or, perhaps better, taking the direction of the causation into account: *A* is loved by me). It also focuses my attention on the other and not on myself. Pride then brings the situation back home to myself. It causes the idea of my self. So we can say that love refers to pride and pride refers easily to the self, which has been the starting point of love, since it is the subject of that passion.

2. *From pride to love.* „The transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility."[153] This has its main

[152] T.II,II,II,333.
[153] ibid., p.339.

reasons in the directedness of the passions, i.e. their objects and their vivacity. Whilst the object of love and hatred is another person, the object of pride and humility is the self. We are acquainted with another individual's qualities, feelings, thoughts and actions to a certain extent, but we perceive our own thoughts, feelings and actions more vividly than those of another. „'Tis evident, that as we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person. But every thing, that strikes upon us with vivacity, and appears in a full and strong light, forces itself, in a manner, into our consideration, and becomes present to the mind on the smallest hint and most trivial relation. For the same reason, when it is once present, it engages the attention, and keeps it from wandering to other objects, however strong may be their relation to our first object. The imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with difficulty from lively to obscure. In the one case the relation is aided by another principle: In the other case, 'tis oppos'd by it."[154] Once attention is focussed on the self it is more difficult to make the transition to other objects, although the transition is not impossible because it is also the nature of the mind that it cannot stay fixed upon one perception for too long and will eventually wander off to some other objects. However, the easiness of transition from love to pride follows naturally, as has been argued, whilst the transition from pride to love (or from humility to hatred respectively) is not as easy as the first. The perception of one's self is always more vivid than the perception of some other person. Hence the transition from the self to some other person becomes more difficult because it is accompanied by a loss of vivacity. Hume regards these occurring difficulties of the transition from pride to love and from humility to hatred and the easiness of transition in the opposite direction as a further proof of the connection between these sets of passions. It shows that there is a mechanism linking these passions which is rooted in causation and is influenced by vivacity.

[154] ibid.

Vivacity is certainly one of the key issues, not only in respect of conditioning the transition between the passions, but also in respect to the self and its double character as cause and effect. I have argued that the self and consequently the perception of the self is cause in a certain sense as well as it is effect. It becomes now even clearer that pride and humility produce the idea of the self in a greater vivacity than it had prior to the occurrence of the passion. The self is the object of these passions. Pride and humility are directed at the self, therefore attention is drawn upon it. The self as cause does not make as vivid an impression upon us as the self as effect. This clarifies the character of the self as a cause. It also helps us to understand how we can experience passions like love and hatred, that is passions with a person other than one self as their object, in the first place. It shows how attention can be drawn towards another person. When the wheel of the passions begins to move, the perception of the self is not as vivid as it is when a circuit is completed and we experience pride or humility.

It becomes clear that Hume's concept of the self in Book Two is socially dependent. The idea of my self is „brought home to me" by social interaction, by my passions connecting me with other persons. The place which pride, humility, love and hatred occupy, together with the easiness or difficulty of the transition between these sets, is exemplary for the social nature of the self in Book Two of the *Treatise.* If somebody happens to be an egomaniac not able to love or hate another individual nor, and perhaps more importantly, ever being loved or hated by someone else, then one would expect that this person can nevertheless experience the passions of pride and humility because the object of these passions is nothing but the self. It is my opinion that such a person is hardly able to feel even the passions of pride and humility because it is difficult to imagine that this person could be a self in the proper sense of the term. This is because, firstly, the self is predominantly a subject, it is the full subject where the passions of love and hatred are concerned. It is also, in some sense, subject when it comes to pride and humility.[155] Something which is not a subject

[155] As the bundle of perceptions, including the perception of the passions of pride and humility.

and cannot fulfill the role of a subject is by definition not a self. A subject is also a subject in relation to its object, which can differ, and can include, like in pride and humility, the self itself. The question arises how the self would be able to recognize itself **as** an object. Something which is not a subject cannot have an object, and particularly not be an object to itself (i.e. to its own reflection upon itself), because it does not fulfill the conditions of a subject/object relation in the first place.

Secondly, pride and humility stem to some extent also from comparison. Hume writes that: „*objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others.*"[156] To be proud of the beauty of my daughter involves not only an understanding of beauty but also that I am able to perceive her appearance in comparison with the appearance of other members of womankind. If everybody were beautiful in equal degrees, beauty would not be a quality one can be proud of, it might not even be recognized as a particular quality at all. If the object of my attention is nobody but myself, how am I able to make these required comparisons? Or, to see it from a different angle, we can say that to feel pride or humility demands that I have a relation to the subject of my pride or humility. I have to be able to distinguish this relation from other relations involving someone else and his subjects of pride or humility. Equally, comparisons have to be made between subjects and their qualities. Comparisons, however, require distinction.[157]

The subject of the passions of pride and humility is not myself, and whether the subject is related to me or to someone else is something I have to grasp. Hume says quite clearly: „Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing."[158] The „other object" includes the other individual. The subjects of my pride or my humility are related to me just as the subjects of another's pride and another's humility are related to them. Something which is not related to anybody cannot be subject to pride and humility. Or, as ANNETTE

[156] T.II,II,VIII,375.
[157] To avoid misunderstandings, we have to remember that the recognition of this relation needs no reasoning. I have argued in respect to first person identity statements that criteria to determine whether my thoughts and feelings are really mine and not somebody else's are not required.
[158] T.II,II,II,340.

BAIER puts it: „But once we get to Part II of Book Two, with its thesis that the object of love is of exactly the same type as the object of pride[159], and that, if our passions are not to be absurd (T.332), we must see other persons in relation to what is theirs, and ourselves in relation to what is ours, in precisely the same way [...] I must be to what is mine whatever I take you to be to what is yours, and what you take me to be to what is mine.“[160]

If we look at the way the transition from one passion to the other is made we can see how love and hatred, which imply that another individual is recognized as an individual, prepare the ground for pride and humility and subsequently for a clearer and more vivid idea of ourselves. Recognition of the other as an individual by the passions opens the door to a better and fuller perception and understanding of the self, and since in the case of the self ontology and epistemology have to stand together, it can be said that the passions of love and hatred have an important role to play in the forming, the bringing about, of the self.

Another problem we still have to explore concerns so called „unconditional love“. Hume recognizes emotions of this particular kind and discusses them together with the role of acquaintance. He writes: „...there is always requir'd a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love or hatred. But tho' this be universally true, 'tis remarkable that the passion of love be excited by only one *relation* of a different kind, *viz.* betwixt ourselves and the object; or more properly speaking, that this relation is always attended with both the others. Whoever is united to us by any connexion is always sure of a share of our love, proportion'd to the connexion, without enquiring into his other qualities.“[161] Our love for another person who is not related to us is aroused because we perceive certain qualities that the person possesses, which cause the pleasurable emotion of love within us. In the case of close relations, the possession of such agreeable qualities, whatever they happen to be, is not required; the relation to us alone is sufficient to produce the

[159] both are persons, T.L.
[160] BAIER, A. ibid., p.135-136.
[161] T.II,II,IV,351-352.

passion. Hume clearly thinks that the relation itself is a sufficient cause of the passion. We might want to add, that the passions of pride and humility cannot be far off either because of the strong pull such close relations have upon us. However, pride and humility naturally require a relationship between me and the subject of these passions as well as they require the presence of certain qualities in the subject; neither of these two conditions alone is claimed to be sufficient to cause the respective passion. Therefore I am not necessarily proud of my son only because he is my son; but I necessarily love him, if not for any other reason than **because** he is my son. Thus it is possible to love a relation of oneself and at the same time to feel humble about them.[162]

Since love can be produced by the relation alone Hume argues that the stronger the relation the greater the passion: „Thus the relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their children, and a lesser degree of the same affection, as the relation lessens."[163] Parental relationship is not the only relationship humans experience. Other kinds of relationships have also a pull upon us and can excite love, differing in degrees as the relationships differ. This is the context in which acquaintance has its full bearing, not only because it is more common for us to observe qualities within an acquaintance than it is to observe them in a stranger; but because, even if we don't observe such qualities within acquaintances, the fact that they are people we know can excite passions of love or fondness towards them and makes their company preferable over the company of people who are known to possess very valuable qualities, but are strangers to us.

The picture Hume gives, if it is applied to both passions, love and hatred, helps us to gain an explanation of the phenomena mentioned earlier, such as that it is possible to hate an entirely amiable human being and to love another who doesn't possess any agreeable qualities whatsoever. The latter is quite easily explained, because the relation alone can be a sufficient cause to excite love. If we happen to love an „unworthy" person we didn't have a previous

[162] It is quite common to express one's feelings about a relative in sentences like: 'I love my mum but I don't like her' or 'I know my child is an awful person but I can't help loving him'.
[163] T.II,II,IV,352.

relationship with, we can refer back to the qualities which are otherwise the causes of the passion and stress the point that the particular qualities which cause the passion within us don't have to be known to us. If the manners or the behavior of such a person are just abominable, the qualities which have a pull on our emotions might be some other ones.

To explore hatred it is certainly helpful to refer to relations once again, because there seem to be at least two different kinds of scenario. 1. Love changes into hatred or, in weaker terms, we start to hate a person we have some relation to, of whatever kind this relation may be. 2. We instantly hate someone we didn't have a previous relationship to.

To 1. We know that in Humean terms the relation alone can be sufficient to excite love. Love is a positive, pleasurable feeling. We can therefore say that relationships cause us pleasure: the closer the relationship the stronger the pull towards the emotion and the stronger is also the pleasure caused. It can now be argued that if we start to hate someone we had previously a positive, pleasurable relationship with, then this is a reaction to the changing nature of the relationship. The reasons for such a change are manifold and I wish only to discuss the most obvious ones to illuminate the matter. Hume writes: „'Tis obvious, that people associate together according to their particular tempers and dispositions, and that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay; as the serious bear an affection to the serious. This not only happens, where they remark this resemblance betwixt themselves and others, but also by the natural course of the disposition, and by a certain sympathy, which always arises betwixt similar characters. [...] that our natural temper gives us propensity to the same impression, which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion [...] a love or affection arises from the resemblance, we may learn that a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits, since an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common to *relation, acquaintance*, and *resemblance*."[164] Since relationships involve resemblance of the persons having the relationship, changes of a certain kind in

[164] ibid., p.354.

one or both of the persons might affect the resemblance in a detrimental way. Thus the relation itself is threatened. When the relation worsens or is destroyed pleasure cannot be derived from it. So, hatred can be understood as a reaction to the withdrawal of pleasure or can be caused by pain accompanying a process of separation. There is further indication that such an interpretation is justified: Hume classes the „ties of blood" as the strongest ties, creating the strongest relationships the human mind is capable of experiencing. The blood relationship is a relationship which will prevail in whatever way the individuals will change. In that sense a relationship by blood will always be unaffected and stable as such.

The changes of an individual are not always changes decreasing the degree of resemblance to other individuals. There can also be changes in the sense that one of the two relating individuals might want to terminate the relationship. The consequences in terms of displeasure can be the same: the relationship itself is threatened. It seems to be the case, taking the double relationship of the impressions and ideas into account, that the individual is not only interested in the other as the object of love and hatred, but is also interested in the relationship itself. If either of the two changes in a detrimental way, hatred can be the result.

To 2. Taking for granted that there is such a thing as instant hatred,[165] the obvious way to tackle the problem is to refer to the qualities, in this case to disagreeable qualities, which are perceived instantly and produce the feeling of hatred in the perceiver. There are also more indirect ways to produce hatred: Let's say I meet someone I didn't know previously, this person possesses many agreeable qualities I would like to have myself but which I have not. We need to consider the causal chain of the occurring passions and the connections between different passions to explain hatred: a) My first reaction can be a pleasurable feeling, designating the person is question as an object of love. However, the transition from love to pride is easily made and therefore my attention is drawn to myself as the object of pride. Once this has happened I

[165] There certainly exists something we would call *instant dislike*. However, such an emotion would not be identical with hatred, since every passion is a simple impression.

cannot perceive any of the agreeable qualities of the other person within me. This makes me feel humble or ashamed. This is a disagreeable feeling and the transition from humility to hatred can be made. Another way to produce hatred in situations like this is *via* envy, a disagreeable feeling, which is also connected to humility.

We also have to notice that in such cases a resemblance between the two persons is not given, which makes it more difficult for love to be excited in the first place. This seems also to prepare the ground for hostile feelings, because a resemblance cannot be perceived and a pleasurable relationship seems unobtainable. Taking the latter into consideration we find that here too is a twofold cause of hatred. The qualities of the other person in comparison (it is also conceivable that the comparison is made by people other than myself) and the perceived impossibility of a relationship in positive terms.

Hume's account of the possible causes of hatred emphasizes the importance of relationships in respect to the passions and consequently in respect to the self. Whatever the passion happens to be, it requires a relation between the individual feeling the passion and others. The passion connects us not only to individuals other than oneself but also to a variety of external surroundings (as objects like possessions or environments) and circumstances. We must understand that the relationship has not necessarily to be prior to the passion, but can also be produced by the passion itself. The passions are one instrument (imagination is another) by which we reach out into the world and to others. We create this world as we create others and ourselves as persons and individuals. Hume's concept of the self in the opening chapters of Book Two unites the aspects of the individual, self and personhood, as I have defined them before. Hume pays much attention to the social nature of the individual (person aspect) and links this aspect to the more private aspect I referred to as the self and which is entirely compatible with his bundle definition of Book One. A clear perception of the self is produced by the social passions by connecting the impression of the self to the outside world. This connection is very much needed if the idea of the self is to emerge. „I own the mind to be insufficient, of

itself, to its own entertainment, and that it naturally seeks after foreign objects, which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits. On the appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments. Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all objects, *viz.* a rational and thinking Being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind; makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions, which are caus'd by any object."[166] In interpreting this passage we must make reference to the definition of the self Hume gives in Book One of the *Treatise.* He never rejects this definition. It is the fundamentum of his explanation of the social nature of human beings.

The self is naturally seeking perceptions of „foreign objects" because these perceptions are lively and vivid. They stimulate the perceiving self. As is the case with pride and humility, attention is drawn to the self, which is the bundle of perceptions. The impression of the self becomes livelier and stronger and is able to give rise to a clear idea of the self. The strongest, and certainly the most interesting perceptions are perceptions of other human beings. They are not objects like chairs, horses and carrots, they are like **us**, they resemble us, they communicate with us as we communicate with them. We are naturally drawn towards other human beings by resemblance as well as by other relations. Our first experiences in life are experiences of others to whom we are causally related, we are the children of parents and brothers or sisters of our siblings. We also resemble them: we look like them and we experience similar expectations, we speak, walk, laugh like they do. Other people cause passions within us, bring us pleasure, sometimes pain, and thereby make us feel our own existence. „Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man: Let the sun rise and set at his command: The sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or

[166] T.II,II,IV,352-353.

agreeable to him: He will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least, with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy."[167]

We resemble each other also in the sense that we all are capable of passions, of feelings and thoughts. If I see my brother in pain I have an idea of what pain feels like because I have felt pain myself. Perception of others makes me what I am. These perceptions are part of the bundle which I am. I become aware of myself by having perceptions of a relation I am part of. I also perceive myself through the perceptions of others: they respond to me, interact with me, which, in turn, causes new and lively perceptions within me. In that sense the self is progressive and needs interaction with other human beings to emerge, not only because that interaction provides me with the perceptions I am made up of, but also because I need others to turn upon myself, to get a lively idea of myself (pride and humility) and so I need the company of others to **be** myself.

It becomes clear that in the light of this account self and personhood are closely connected, that they require and condition each other. Without relation and consequently interaction with other individuals the self cannot emerge nor can we gain a lively idea of it. Social recognition, expressed in many ways and always implying third person identity statements, is a condition of the coming about of the self. On the other hand, social interaction between me and others requires my participation, requires that I perceive the other as resembling me. It requires that I perceive the other as an individual and not as a carrot, dog or chair. In this sense the self, created in social context, is also creating social context.

It could now be argued that we are faced with a vicious circle since there cannot be a self without social context creating it as there cannot be a social context without a self creating it. Therefore there can be neither. I wish to argue that this is not so, that the circle is not a vicious one but that we face here a dialectical relationship.

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[167] T.II,II,V,363.

It is obvious that social context is not created from scratch. When we are born, social context is already there. What is needed for the emergence of the self is that we are able to recognize other individuals. This is surely a learning process. By recognizing that which is „already there" we learn to recognize ourselves. Since we cannot choose to have or not to have perceptions, perceiving the context (made up of other people, animals, inanimate objects) is inevitable. Once we have gained an idea of ourselves, brought about by our own internal and external perceptions, we will be able to understand our own social context better. We can make an inference that other individuals are subjects, whereas, at first, we took them by their differing object-characters. By recognizing others as subjects we create social context.[168]

Another argument supporting my position stems from the combined theory of identity. I believe that this argument can establish the progressive nature of the self and accommodates the Humean understanding of the self as it is presented in Book One and Two of the *Treatise.* We have to remember that identity of the self (as well as personal identity) require both, bodily and mental criteria. In respect to the self we can say that the emphasis lies more upon the mental criteria because of the essential, but not exclusive privacy of the self. We are here already in accordance with Hume who seems to agree with such a view on two accounts: He claims in Book Two that we are most intimately conscious of ourselves, which means that we are intimately conscious of our perceptions. This also accommodates the bundle definition of Book One. We are also conscious of someone else's perceptions, but not in the same way as we are conscious of our own. The perceptions of an individual other than oneself are not intimately known to us nor are they as vivid to us as our own. The self is defined as the bundle of perceptions. Without perceptions there can be no self. Passions are perceptions, and they are, in respect to social context, very important perceptions. A passion is only a passion, and only occurs, in relation to something other than oneself, whether the self is the object (love and hatred) or subject (pride and humility) of the passion. Therefore, if there were

[168] There should be no problem with such an account, especially when we take Hume to be a Basic Realist. Hume's Basic Realism will be established later on.

nothing other than myself I relate to, there would be no passion. Without the passions, however, we cannot gain the idea of the self.

This alone would be sufficient, or so it seems, to establish the necessity of social context and interaction for the coming about and the progress of the self (as well as of personhood since self and personhood are interdependent). We need to understand the self within the framework of Hume's account of human nature. Human beings to be human beings must have passions. They love, hate, feel ashamed, humble, proud, angry and so on. A being without passions, in the understanding of 18th century philosophy, cannot be a human being. The Enlightenment places man in between angels and beasts. If we accept that human beings necessarily have passions then we are compelled to find general absence of passion, which is a necessary consequence following from the absence of any social context, reason enough to say that we do not look at a human being, but on something else. This would render the quest for the self uninteresting, since it is embedded in the framework of human existence.

On the other hand, it is possible to argue, that an actually passionless being might theoretically still be capable of passions, though it is never experiencing them because there is no „outside" stimulus to produce them. Although this being does not experience a social context and does not interact socially, it could still be a human being, since it has the required capacities but never exercises them. Such an argument accepts and supports the claim that social interaction is needed in respect to the passions, but it refutes the former argument that this alone would be sufficient to prove social context and interaction necessary for the emergence and the progress of the self. If we look, however, at perceptions other than the passions we will find a similar picture, i.e. we find that the perception of context, especially social context and interaction, is necessary for the self. Without context I find myself in solitude, isolation and despair - the position of Hume's thinker in Part IV of Book One of the *Treatise*. Any attempt to reason the world into being has ended in absurdity and obscurity, because reason alone cannot provide for it. The habits, by which imagination makes a transition to form the ideas of identity, externality and

causation are habits created by interaction with the world and other human beings. If my world consisted only of myself then these ideas could not be accounted for.

If we were to deny Hume a Basic Realist account and were to argue that the mind generates the world, including social context, the consequences would be as follows: For the self to emerge perceptions of any environment (including social environment) are still necessary. Since mind and self are set identical by Hume it follows that we cannot say positively what it is that generates the perceptions. We can only say that perceptions cannot be generated by the mind or the self, because the mind/self is the total of the perceptions. Therefore it seems to be the case that a non Basic Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy renders itself impossible. ANNETTE BAIER argues that: „Book Two's turn (or continuation of the turn) from solitary reason to sociable passions answers Book One's despairing questions [...] Book Two does not take back Book One's conclusion that a person is a system of causally linked „different existences", which „mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other" (T.261), but the system of perceptions is now seen to be inseparable from the system which is the living human body. [...] In Book Two the self is the „correlative" of all the things that belong to it, mental, physical, cultural, as the self of Book One was the correlative of its heap of perceptions."[169] The thinker of Book Two is a full blooded individual, not restricted to reason alone. However, we must not mistake Book Two's „body" to be a denial of the account of body and externality given in Book One. Both concepts of body are entirely reconcilable. Books One and Two are consistent with each other, though Hume is approaching different levels of investigation in the two books. In Book One Hume is trying to look beyond experience and the workings of the mind, especially imagination. He cannot find anything which can justifiably be said about the beyond, and therefore concludes that the mind independent existence of bodies has to be taken „for granted in all our reasonings".[170] Once this is established he goes on, in Book Two of the *Treatise*, to make his moves **on** the

[169] BAIER, A. ibid., p.142.
[170] T.I,IV,II,187.

level of the perceptions themselves. If we perceive *A*, *A* is there as it is for us, whether *A* exists mind independently or not.[171] The objects of perception are treated as if they were real existing objects, and indeed, in some way they are. This is something we have to take as a first principle, reason cannot provide proof for it, though our sentiment is naturally inclined towards their real existence.

Hume's account of the body especially in Book Two indicates accordance with the combined theory. The body serves as one of the criteria of identity, not only by its very existence (in the sense I have suggested) but also in its connection to other bodies. It is an instrument of identification and re-identification by bodily appearance and is so an instrument of contact and communication with others. Our sensual apparatus is a bodily apparatus and is directed at other human beings, makes perception of them possible and enables us to communicate.[172] It is by contact and communication that the thoughts and feelings of others become known to us, which in turn provides us with the mental criterion of identity and enables us to make third person identity statements about others as it enables them to make such statements about us.

Mental criteria are necessary criteria, therefore third person identity statements require social context. No third person identity statements can be made if there are no third persons. If there are third persons then there is social context. But is, in respect to first person identity statements, a solitary self possible? Looking at Book One of the *Treatise* one might be tempted to say that it is. However, I think that this judgment is mistaken. The self which reasons and reflects in Book One is a self which has emerged already. It questions the grounds of its existence, just to find that reason cannot pave the grounds it rests upon. To address the problem as I have presented it we have to set our attention onto the genesis of the self. We cannot take the existence of the self for granted, even if it is understood to be nothing but a bundle of perceptions. To undertake the quest for the genesis of the self and its conditions, and to

[171] We can see here quite easily why KANT thought so much of HUME and claimed that he was woken from his slumber by Hume's philosophy.
[172] At this level it does not matter whether the apparatus or the objects of perception are fictitious or not.

establish that the self is progressive and nothing given, we have to go right back to the very beginning of the *Treatise*. All our knowledge stems from perceptions, be they impressions or ideas. There is nothing but experience which could provide the material for the operations of the mind. There are only perceptions and operations of the mind. The operations of the mind are rooted in the nature of the mind. The mind has a natural disposition to carry out these operations; perceiving itself is one of them. Since there are no innate ideas (all ideas we have are derived from experience plus the operations of the mind), there can be no innate or inborn idea of the self. The operations of the mind need material to work upon, i.e. the perceptions. As long as there are no perceptions, the mind cannot operate. Furthermore, Hume claims that the mind is a theatre, furnished with perceptions. Therefore it must be observed that as long as there is no such furniture, there is no theatre, i.e. the mind itself is nothing without its perceptions. The plain conclusion is: that the idea of the self, just like any other idea, must be acquired. The acquisition, however, is natural.

We need also to remember an earlier argument concerning the relation between the idea of the self and the self. I have argued that, on Humean terms, ontology and epistemology stand together in respect to the self, since the self is an internal perception. It does not follow that the idea of the self requires a prior, resembling, simple impression of self. However, in consequence we are faced with two possibilities which need to be looked into: 1. The idea of the self is a complex idea stemming from a complex, possibly resembling impression of self. In this case the self is, ontologically speaking, a complex impression. 2. The idea of self is a complex idea and does not stem from a complex impression, but is a compound of simple ideas. Here the self will not have a resembling impression. It will suffice, for the time being, that either way the idea of the self cannot be arrived at if there are no perceptions it can be inferred or derived from.[173] Since the idea of the self requires perceptions in the first place and given the particular character of our usual understanding of the self, it is very

[173] My discussion of the passions and my account of sympathy, which will be given later on, contain, however, arguments supporting the view that there is a complex impression of the self. The idea of the self is produced by the connection between the impression of the self and the passions, aided by the principle of sympathy.

likely that the perceptions we have of other people are of special importance. To recognize myself as a self it seems to be necessary that I have perceptions of individuals other than myself in the first place. We also need to consider the role and the importance Hume gives to the principle of resemblance. A human being, totally on its own from the very beginning of its existence, has no perceptions of other human beings. Hence it cannot form the notions of human being, self or personhood, because there is nothing resembling it. Hume points out that notions of resemblance and difference cannot be derived from single instances alone.

To form an idea of a self requires passions like pride and humility, love and hatred. Thus it requires that one perceives other individuals as individuals. Furthermore, an inference has to be made concerning the other to be self-conscious, i.e. to be a self. So the perception of other selves, as far as we can perceive them, is required. We gain an idea that others have a self because they resemble us and we can experience the resemblance by interaction and communication. We even become aware of the privacy of the self by communication with others. The limits of communication are only discovered by realizing, through communication, that there is something another cannot adequately communicate to me just as I find that I cannot adequately communicate everything to someone else. We find ourselves regularly in the position to have misinterpreted someone's language or behavior or to be misinterpreted and misunderstood ourselves. We all have heard and said sentences like: „I didn't mean to...", or „You don't understand me". These sentences aren't meaningless or unintelligible, either to the speaker or the hearer. We can feel the other person's frustration just as we can feel our own frustration when we are aware of the impossibility of communicating the quality contents of experience adequately, though wanting to do so. We also perceive that communication is possible: I perceive human beings behaving towards each other, I perceive how they respond to me. Thus I discover that I am one of them, that we are of the same kind. I also perceive my own distinctiveness:

They don't do all the time what I want, they don't always share my opinions or feelings etc.

The last argument I wish to present is very similar to the one I presented in respect to the passions. It is an argument resting on the definitions of personhood, self and being a human being as referring to different aspects of the individual. Since the aspect of personhood requires social environment and interaction by definition, the self also requires these conditions. Self and personhood are interdependent and interrelated by definition. We have found plenty of indication that these definitions are very plausible and fit the combined theory of identity. Assuming that Hume is a Basic Realist we have also found that the combined theory of identity is compatible with Hume's philosophy, Hume's philosophy accommodates these definitions. This is the strength of the argument.

The weakness is that the definitions take interdependency and interrelationship for granted. I have tried to show that personhood and self are indeed dependent on each other. However, none of the arguments I was able to present proves this connection conclusively, although the arguments given so far very strongly suggest the plausibility of the definitions. It is my opinion that a conclusive proof is logically, in classical terms, impossible, since one has always to refer to one of the relata to give a foundation of the other. I tend to interpret this very fact as a further indication in favour of the plausibility of my claims. If such interdependency and interrelationship are truly the case, then any attempt to explain one of the relata without reference to the other must naturally fail.

If we employ reason alone to give a foundation of the self, we are left with the bundle of perceptions of Book One. As I hope to have established in the previous chapter, such an account is not necessarily unsuccessful, especially not when it is interpreted within the combined theory of identity. However, the combined theory contains the assumption of existence of others (mind independent or not) because of its account of the role of the body as a criterion not only of third person identity statements, but also of first person identity statements. We also have to consider, in connection to Hume's philosophy as a

whole, that if reason alone shall provide for a notion of ourselves and our identity we deceive ourselves if we think the relevant questions could be answered meaningfully. Reason alone cannot provide for the idea of identity. This idea can only be gained from the perceptions themselves worked on by imagination and memory. The role of reason is not unimportant,[174] but clearly subordinate. Part of the perceptions must be the passions. They are theoretically necessary in respect to the connection between the perceiver, the perceived and the perception itself, since the perception can be pleasurable and painful. They are also necessary for the obvious reason that human beings do have passions. And since there are passions there must also be other individuals.

So far I tried to show that Hume's concept of the self in the opening chapter of Book Two of the *Treatise* not only requires social context and interaction but also refers constantly back to them in a dialectical manner. The self to emerge needs social context just as the social context is nothing without the self, which is part of its own context. To get a clearer picture 1) of the strong connection between the self and other individuals and 2) of the relation between self and personhood, we must investigate one of the key concepts of Hume's philosophy: *sympathy*.

[174] Reason is, for instance, necessary when it comes to expectations and probability.

IV. Sympathy

IV.I. The Mechanism of Sympathy

„In general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each others emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees."[175] Hume uses images like the mirror or the echo to describe sympathy. Sympathy is one of the most important features of the human mind, or, perhaps better, of the human soul. It allows us to communicate our passions and thoughts to one another, which in itself has also an effect upon the passions. Hume introduces the concept of sympathy quite early in Book Two of the *Treatise* as part of the investigation of pride and humility. Since his introductory remarks are very notable for several reasons, it may be permitted to quote Hume at length here:

> „Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others. In order to account for this phaenomenon 'twill be necessary to take some compass, and first explain the nature of *sympathy*.
>
> No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own. This is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every opinion propos'd to them; but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions. To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation; and 'tis much more probable, that this resemblance arises from sympathy, than from any influence of the soil and climate, which, tho' they continue invariably the same, are not able to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together."[176]

[175] T.II,II,V,365.
[176] T.II,I,XI,316-317.

Let us abstract from Hume's remark about the uniformities of character found in members of the same nation and concentrate on the core of Hume's opening statement. It springs to mind that: Firstly, sympathy doesn't seem to be a passion, but a principle of communication. Secondly, it does not only serve as a principle to communicate passions and sentiments, but also thoughts and opinions. Hume himself calls sympathy a principle. The afore mentioned images he uses to describe sympathy also suggest that it cannot be understood as a passion, but must be understood as a principle by which the passions, sentiments and opinions of one person can be known to another in a special way. A special way, because they don't seem to be known to me in the same way as I know that a chair has four legs and that water is colorless, but in a way that influences our own passions, sentiments and opinions. - This becomes clear when we consider the mechanism of sympathy. Hume is explicit that the passions, sentiments and opinions of another person can not themselves be observed. Only their effects expressed in behavior and language, be it voluntary or involuntary, are observable. We perceive the behavior of others by our senses (impressions) and consequently gain an idea from which we infer the impression the other person is experiencing. This in itself causes an impression within us. „When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection."[177] Hume believes the passions to be simple impressions. Hence each passion must be distinguishable from another, that is each passion has a 'different feel' to it.

Looking at our every day experience we may want to say that we also know a **feeling** of sympathy. If, as Hume argues, sympathy is a principle and not a passion, then there cannot be a feeling we refer to as sympathy. In that sense Hume's account of sympathy seems to be counter intuitive. However, we will

[177] ibid., p.317.

find that the feeling we usually refer to as *sympathy* is, in Humean terms, mislabeled if we call it so. His name for this feeling is *benevolence*. Hume writes: „Now 'tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such."[178] Benevolence is a calm passion. The impressions of this passion have only a low vivacity - it follows that benevolence, like any other calm passion, can easily be mistaken for something else.[179] We can discover many congruencies between Hume's account of benevolence and our every day concept of sympathy, especially when we also consider one of Hume's earlier statements: „We may, therefore, infer, that benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoin'd with them, by the original constitution of the mind."[180]

Sometimes we use *sympathy* to refer to something which is perhaps more adequately described as compassion or we use it to express a certain kind of agreement. However, these common uses of the word *sympathy* are not compatible with Hume's understanding of sympathy. They don't have the same reference. Pal ARDAL points this out when he writes: „But Hume is not primarily concerned with the expression of sympathy nor with the use of the terms 'sympathy' and 'sympathize'. He is concerned with sympathizing as a kind of transference of emotions, feelings and opinions, rather than with the deliberate[181] expression of sympathy."[182] He goes on to argue: „It was made perfectly clear by him[183] that pity and compassion were different from his

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[178] T.II,III,III,417.

[179] It also seems to be the case, when looking at Hume's statement, that he is not entirely clear about the distinction between passions and desires. However, since the distinction is not the topic of the present discussion I don't think it necessary to go into it. My purpose is an investigation of the self. It is not my aim to give a full account of Hume's moral philosophy and philosophical psychology.

[180] T.II,II,VII,368.

[181] or undeliberate, T.L.

[182] ARDAL, P.S. *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise*, Edinburgh University Press, 1966, p.48.

[183] Hume, T.L.

principle of communication: they were passions, and although sympathy may [...] help to explain why pity or compassion occur, they cannot, any more than the other passions, be equated with a principle of communication of any kind."[184] We can only observe a person's feelings, emotions and opinions by their effects. The effects themselves, such as speech, body language and behavior, are not sympathy in the technical sense of the word, nor is observation. Nevertheless, sympathy as a principle, although it cannot be identified with them, requires observation and the expressions of someone's state of mind. Sympathy for Hume is the principle by which these expressions - available to us by observation - have an effect upon the observer and cause sympathetic (in the common sense of the word) impressions within the observer.

Sympathy is more than a principle of communication of feelings and emotions. It also takes an active part in the communication of opinions and beliefs. The principle is supposed to explain the influence of other people's opinions and beliefs upon our own judgments. Although we may be easily inclined to agree with the former, agreement will not as easily be obtained when it comes to the communication, even the adoption, of opinions about matters of fact. However, the matter appears in a different light when we remember that opinions or beliefs generally stem from vivacity. If a perception is vivid enough to give rise to a belief, then it is conceivable that this perception can be communicated by sympathy, and can give rise to the same belief in the one it is communicated to. Communication of an opinion by sympathy must be understood in a way which takes social context into strong consideration. Society or social context like companionship, for instance, can have an encouraging as well as a detrimental influence upon the adoption or rejection of certain opinions communicated by sympathy. „We know that certain opinions may be widely accepted in a community in such a way as to make it extremely difficult to convince a member of that community of their falsity."[185] Here it may

[184] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.51.
[185] ibid., p.47.

be helpful to discuss several scenarios[186]: *Dana Scully*'s[187] society believes in science and the laws of nature. It also believes to have found the main laws of nature. It does not believe in ghosts and alien abduction, since there is no known law of nature which could explain them. Furthermore, the laws of probability and logic render these phenomena virtually impossible. It is hard to imagine that *Scully* can be convinced of the opposite beliefs. Reports of so called eye witnesses must be mistrusted since there might have been a flaw in, or a distortion of their perception. When *Scully* finds herself having strange experiences she places distrust in her own perceptions. It is impossible for *Agent Mulder* to convince *Scully*, although she herself is investigating strange phenomena, that alien abductions and ghosts exist, because the majority of the society they both live in rejects these beliefs. *Mulder* himself is seen by others as an eccentric, to say the least. It is very difficult for *Mulder* to express his beliefs without experiencing disapproval or ridicule from other members of society. Given this scenario it is pretty obvious why *Scully* doesn't believe in ghosts and aliens. These beliefs are contrary to the set of beliefs society holds - the vast majority of the members of society share the same beliefs as *Scully.* It is more puzzling, given Hume's account, why *Mulder* holds his beliefs despite the beliefs widely held in society.

The puzzle can be solved by referring to vivacity. The opinions of others are transferable to us by sympathy. A successful transfer requires, firstly, that the beliefs another holds have a high vivacity. Secondly, these beliefs have to cause an impression in us more vivid than the vivacity of our own opposing belief. Since *Mulder*'s belief in aliens and ghosts is very strong and the impression which belongs to the belief is very vivid, the causes which would enable him to abandon his beliefs and to adopt new ones are not strong enough.

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[186] Pal ARDAL's example that horsemeat is considered poisonous in some societies doesn't seem to be very convincing. It rests upon the assumption that, although one **knows** that horsemeat can safely be eaten, one would eventually adopt the prejudice against horsemeat of this society.

[187] *The X-Files*. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1995.

If society holds a belief *A* and a person entering this society holds a contrary belief *B* then it is possible that the person abandons *B* and adopts *A* by transference of opinions by sympathy.

A(S) + B(P) may lead to *A(P)*

A(P) is caused by *A(S)*

It is equally conceivable that a person is not altering his beliefs in that manner, and it seems to be true that:

A(S) + B(P) may **NOT** lead to *A(P)*

A(P) is **NOT** caused by *A(S)*

Therefore we seem to be faced with a contradiction.

However, the contradiction only occurs when *A(S)* can be regarded as a necessary and sufficient cause. It is neither of the two. *A(S)* is not a necessary cause because a variety of other causes leading to the alteration or the change of one's beliefs is easily conceivable, such as personal experience or reasoning. GALILEO held the belief that the earth rotates around the sun not because somebody else believed it, especially not his society and the authorities of his society - the contrary was the case. He believed it because of reasoning. I believed for a long time that it only hails in winter and early spring. When I experienced a hail in the middle of the summer, I changed my belief because of this new experience. This is also entirely compatible with Hume's framework concerning the acquisition of knowledge and the role of experience, of habit and of constant conjunction.

A(S) alone is not a sufficient cause. Additional conditions, partly external to *A(S)*, have to be fulfilled. Not only must *A(S)* itself be able to make a vivid and forceful impression upon the person which shall adopt the belief. The person's particular beliefs opposing *A(S)* have to be less vivid than the impression gained from *A(S)* by sympathy.

If $V[A(S)] < V[B(P)]$ then $B(P)$,

if $V[A(S)] > V[B(P)]$ then $A(P)$.

V = vivacity
A = belief A
B = belief B; A and B are contrary beliefs
S = society
P = person

This model also accommodates Hume's account of the high degree of adoption of opinions by children. Children do not hold as many opinions and as many beliefs as adults. This is so because they haven't experienced yet the amount and the variety of experiences adults have. Far fewer matters of fact are known to children. Children had fewer opportunities to observe events in constant conjunction. Epistemological habits are not fully formed, or not formed at all yet. The latter, of course, is rooted in the fewer actual experiences which in itself has its reasons in the fact that children are younger than adults. In this sense children can be understood to be highly impressionable by the opinions and beliefs of others. It is rarely the case that children hold a contrary belief to the one held by the surrounding people. We also know that, if they do hold such a contrary belief, they will not be persuaded by anyone to change the initial belief, unless their own experience supports a new belief. It is quite difficult, if not impossible, to convince a child that there are no monsters in the wardrobe unless it has been sleepless and fearful through many nights - and nothing has happened. This can be explained by taking reference to vivacity, and in this case, also to imagination. The idea of a monster in the wardrobe, although the idea is a product of the imagination, is so lively that it is mistaken for an impression. Its vivacity gives rise to the belief that there really **is** a monster in the wardrobe.

Hume's account of sympathy in regard to the passions is highly influenced by NEWTON's physics. I think that, considering the mechanisms of sympathy

and taking for granted that my description of its workings are adequate, this can also be said about sympathy in regard to opinions and beliefs. I think we are justified in exchanging the word *passion* in ARDAL's statement for *opinion* and *contrary opinions*. „The influence of Newtonian mechanics upon Hume's thought about the passions is evident here. The passions are opposed to each other in the same way as opposing gravitational forces."[188] But although we might agree that children have an impressionable mind and may also accept that beliefs and opinions in general can be transferred by sympathy, we tend to be more sceptical when it comes to competent adults of sound and firm judgment. This matter seems to involve more than the vivacity of the opposing beliefs and opinions. The adoption of beliefs and opinions which are found in the ones closest to us or which are held generally by the kind of group we are part of, seems not to be caused by the higher degree of vivacity in the respective impression. It seems to have other causes such as the desire to conform, or the connected desire to live in harmony to others. Taking the problem from a different angle, we may want to argue that *A(S),* together with sympathy, is also not a sufficient cause of *A(P)* in an additional sense: „We must also bear in mind that sympathy may be at work, even though it does not lead to an identity of sentiment or opinion, for it may have the effect only of making it difficult for men 'to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions' (THN II, 40/316). Sympathy, in fact, admits of degrees and may succeed in creating in our minds only a certain tension. The most conspicuous example of this and perhaps the most important, would be a conflict of motives engendered in this manner."[189] This seems to strengthen my first point. It is not straightforward to think that to follow one's own reason and inclination is rendered difficult only because of sympathy and eventual opposing beliefs of others. It is, at least, accompanied by, and may even require, the additional desire to conform or to live in unspoiled harmony with others. I think it is even possible to enforce the latter statement without loosing plausibility by saying that the desire for harmony and conforming is the actual cause, that

[188] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.24.
[189] ibid., p.48.

sympathy serves as an aid towards achieving fulfillment of these desires. Hume himself certainly sees the reason why even the competent judge is not entirely independent from the opinions held by his friends and companions in the workings of sympathy. Why this should be so is not entirely clear. Hume's view in this respect is not entirely plausible and it is far from being conclusive. There are competing reasons which sound just as convincing as Hume's account.

A variety of further criticisms concerning Hume's account of sympathy and ARDAL's interpretation can reasonably be made. Firstly, ARDAL says that sympathy comes in degrees. He thinks this explains the impact, differing in degree, which other people's opinions have upon us. It seems to me that, by saying this, ARDAL makes the mistake of looking at sympathy as if it were a passion. However, it clearly is not as he himself emphasizes often enough. Sympathy is a principle and it is difficult to imagine how a principle can have degrees and occur in degrees. Surely enough, principles work under initial conditions, and these conditions can either promote the workings of a principle or be detrimental to it. In the first case transitions can be made easily, in the latter case they are more difficult. However, the working of the principle depends then on the suitability of the initial conditions. It seems to be more in accordance with the technical meaning of *sympathy* Hume employs to say that sometimes the initial conditions are favorable towards sympathy, such as close relations or a higher degree of vivacity in the impression *A(S)* makes upon us. Sometimes the initial conditions are not favorable, in which case we are far less more likely to „be impressed" by somebody else's opinion in terms of its adoption by us.

My second criticism focuses on the „mechanics" of Hume's account. It is directed at the role of vivacity. I have argued that Hume's account of the mechanics of sympathy, especially in respect to the communication of beliefs, is as follows: There are contrary beliefs *A* and *B*. Belief *A* is held by person *X*. Belief *B* held by *Y*. If sympathy is at work between *X* and *Y* and extends towards their opinions and beliefs, then *X* adopts *B* if the impression *B* makes upon *X* is more vivid than the impression connected with *A*. *Y* only adopts *A* if the impression *A* produces within *Y* has a greater vivacity than the impression

connected with *B*. If we now ask the question: 'which belief prevails?', it is answered: the one which is connected with the more vivid impression. Asking then: 'how do we know which one is connected to the more vivid impression?', the answer must be: 'by its prevailing'. This poses doubtlessly a problem because the argument is circular.

ARDAL's explanation of the alteration and adoption of beliefs favors a more gradual change of beliefs. However, I think the criticism still applies. „According to a Humean doctrine, a belief is a lively or vivid thought. Why should the conception in this case not tend to be enlivened into a belief, if the thought is closely enough related to the person? This relation is established by his repeatedly thinking of the poisonous qualities of horsemeat. He thinks of these every time he reflects upon the beliefs of others in regard to the edibility of horsemeat. The thought of their belief that horsemeat is poisonous is repeatedly raised in his mind by their talk and by their actions. His thought that the people belong to his own community further strengthens his belief. This recurrence of the thought in his mind may in time lead him to share the belief of others that horsemeat is, indeed, poisonous. This would be in perfect harmony with Hume's contention that frequent repetition tends to engender belief."[190] ARDAL explores how the transition of beliefs is possible, but again, even a gradual enlivening of the impression has to be understood in terms of vivacity. If the person living in the community had the initial belief that horsemeat is perfectly eatable, the problem of circularity occurs.[191]

ARDAL seems to take beliefs and opinions here as isolated, which partly stems from Hume's own account and his definition of beliefs: „So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION."[192] To understand Hume's

[190] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.48.
[191] As I have argued with regard to children and their impressionability: if one doesn't hold any beliefs about horsemeat, the matter is much more straightforward and the problem doesn't seem to occur.
[192] T.I,III,VII,96.

definition of belief or opinion properly we have to pay attention to the footnote he adds, considering the traditional distinction between conception, judgment and reasoning: „What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding is, that taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects. Whether we consider a single object, or several; whether we dwell on these objects, or run from them to others; and in whatever form or order we survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception; and the only remarkable difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join belief to the conception, and are perswaded of the truth of what we conceive. [...] I am at liberty to propose my hypothesis concerning it; which is, that 'tis only a strong and steady conception of any idea, and such as approaches in some measure to an immediate impression."[193] Thus, it cannot be argued that the problem the role of vivacity poses can be avoided by suggesting that I have mixed up beliefs with conception. If there is a difference then it does not matter here. The conceptions of ideas have to be strong in terms of vivacity too.

The circularity seems to be an epistemological one. The criteria Hume offers are criteria by which we **know** which belief prevails and by which we **know** which belief has the greater vivacity. Whether one accepts Hume's account depends very much upon whether we are willing to accept the role of vivacity outlined by him. It seems also to be the case that the decision, in its own turn, depends upon acceptance of the empirical foundation of his philosophy, that is his theory of perception. The difference of ideas and impressions is one of vivacity by definition. One can almost say that the higher vivacity of impressions, as opposed to the lower vivacity of ideas, is set as a first principle. This can be seen as one of the reasons why the circularity occurs and **must** occur. The circularity is, taken as a matter of definition and principle, not a vicious one.

If we agree with the latter we must conclude that the distinction between impressions and ideas by vivacity does not cause a serious problem.

[193] ibid., footnote, p.97.

Consequently the mechanical account of transference of opinions and beliefs by sympathy is not particularly problematic, at least not because of the circularity occurring in respect to vivacity. The real problem lies far deeper and is more hidden. It resembles very much the type of problem I have pointed out and discussed in the first chapter, the problem which became apparent in respect to the distinction between memory and imagination by vivacity. The seriousness of the problem is rooted in the unreliability of vivacity as a criterion when it comes to human psychology (ideas can be sometimes very vivid and impressions can be very faint). It is also rooted in Hume's inconsistency in respect to the relation between his ontological and his epistemological grounds. It is of no great comfort to understand that Hume has to be inconsistent in order to give a psychological account to explain well known phenomena, such as hallucinations. He wants to explain the fact that we all know that certain impressions are very faint and are less vivid than other impressions or ideas we have at the same time. If this weren't the case I could hardly sit here and think about Hume's philosophy. My attention would be entirely absorbed by breathing and sitting on a chair. These are impressions whereas my thoughts about Hume are ideas.

Although Hume's account of sympathy is not problematic in respect to vivacity, it is problematic in respect to the distinction between impressions and ideas. To understand the problem we have to have a further look into the mechanics of sympathy. Hume gives us the *modus operandi* of this principle of communication when he introduces *sympathy.*[194] He continues to argue later on in the *Treatise*: „The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. But this change must be produc'd with the greater ease, that our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same impression, which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight

[194] compare T.II,I,XI,317.

occasion."[195] We observe another person's behavior and can listen to what they say - every sign the other displays gives us the idea that this person is sad, for instance. The idea so gained of the other person's sadness becomes lively. It becomes converted into a real impression by the relation to ourselves and by the impression we have of ourselves. As the result of the process the observer feels sad too. „This enlivening of the idea is achieved through the operation of a related impression."[196] This related impression is the impression of the self.

Hume makes clear distinctions between ideas and impressions in his account of sympathy. The idea we gain about the state of mind and the passions or beliefs of another person has its source in an impression (or impressions). We have, at first, impressions of the external signs, which then give rise to a resembling idea. We then, by inference, form an idea of the other person's internal state. This idea is then enlivened so that it becomes a proper impression. The entire process can be understood in the following way:

Impression --1--> Idea--I--> Idea --2--> Impression

1 = impression giving rise to a resembling idea

I = Inference

2 = idea enlivened to impression by related impression

Hume argues that the idea of another person's state of mind can be enlivened to an impression within the observer. This enlivening is understood in terms of vivacity. The idea, having by definition a lower degree of vivacity than an impression, becomes an impression if the degree of vivacity increases. The increase shall be achieved through the related impression of the self. This is the account Hume gives. However, this account can only be successful if the distinction between ideas and impressions is a purely quantitative distinction by degrees of vivacity.

Hume seems, at first sight, to be very clear that the distinction between impressions and ideas is only a quantitative one. He writes at the very beginning of the *Treatise*: „The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force

[195] T.II,II,IV,354.
[196] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.43.

and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; [...]. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning;"[197] It is this distinction which would enable him to explain why an idea can be enlivened to such a degree that the idea of a passion becomes an impression, i.e. the passion itself. „It has been remark'd in the beginning of this treatise, that all ideas are borrow'd from impressions, and that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul. The component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike. The manner and order of their appearance may be the same. The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars, that distinguish them: And as this difference may be remov'd, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, 'tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by this means be so inliven'd as to become the very sentiment or passion."[198] These statements clearly support a purely quantitative distinction between impressions and ideas.

We will find, however, that Hume is not very consistent in carrying a purely quantitative distinction through. There are statements in the *Treatise* which raise more than reasonable doubt that the distinction is a purely quantitative one. Discussing the passions Pal ARDAL writes: „It is a familiar Humean doctrine that the difference between ideas and impressions is one of degree of force and liveliness only. But, in discussing benevolence and anger, Hume points out that impressions can mix with one another, whereas ideas are, as it were, impenetrable; they can form compounds and be joined, but they cannot mix. Ideas thus always retain some of their identity when conjoined with other ideas; they 'exclude' each other. But impressions, and in particular the 'reflective' impressions, are 'susceptible of an entire union' (THN II,83/366)."[199] So, if two or more ideas build compounds, a complex idea is produced. But the single compounds maintain their identity just like a brick in a wall is still the same brick.

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[197] T.I,I,I,1.
[198] T.II,I,XI,318-319.
[199] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.61.

This is different where impressions are concerned. They mix entirely and the initial impressions cease to exist and a new one emerges thereby. This process can be compared, to some extent, with the mixing of colours. When we mix Blue and Yellow we get a new colour: Green. Hume makes use of the analogy himself when he writes: „...impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole."[200] We have to keep in mind that passions are simple impressions. The new, emerging impression, being a passion, is also a simple impression.[201] The ability of impressions to mix and the lack of this ability in ideas marks a difference of quality, not of quantity. This ability to mix is a quality of impressions, ideas do not possess.

Another argument to support a qualitative distinction between impressions and ideas rests upon Hume's account of the principles of association of impressions and ideas. Hume writes: „'Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas; tho' with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance."[202] If the difference between impressions and ideas is only quantitative by different degrees of vivacity, it is hard to understand why impressions should be associated only by the principle of resemblance. Surely the principles of association of ideas should also apply to the association of impressions; perhaps even more so, since impressions are said to be more vivid than ideas. Hume's treatment of ideas and impressions suggests that there is an unacknowledged qualitative distinction between them. This and the very names he assigns to them, indicates that ideas are something „thought" whilst impressions are something „felt". This is surely a difference in quality.

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[200] T.II,II,VI,366.
[201] Complex impressions are impressions of complexities, like an impression of Paris, for instance, compare T.I,I,I,2-3.
[202] T.II,I,IV,283.

I think it is sufficient for the present purpose to notice that the distinction between impressions and ideas is not a purely quantitative one. If my interpretation of Hume's account can be accepted, we have to conclude that his theory concerning the mechanisms of sympathy is far weaker than it appears to be. His account rests very much upon a purely quantitative distinction between impressions and ideas. An idea, so Hume, can and must be enlivened until it is a proper impression to explain sympathy. At the same time the account requires a clear cut distinction between impressions and ideas generally - an impression gives rise to an idea and an idea changes into an impression. This distinction is difficult to obtain given vivacity to be the only criterion of distinction. Neither of these two conditions, therefore, can be satisfied at the same time. Hume's account of sympathy is, so it follows, incompatible with the understanding of the nature of the perceptions emerging from his philosophy.

IV.II. Sympathy and the Self

It has already been indicated that the self has an important role in Hume's account of sympathy, especially in respect to his explanation of its mechanism. The impression of the self is mainly responsible for the enlivening of the idea, changing the perception into a passion (impression) by increasing its initial vivacity.

Such an understanding of the self brings up the problem of the impression of the self. It is quite clear that Hume's account refers to and needs such an impression. „In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. This conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself. Ourself is always intimately present to us."[203] To understand fully what Hume means when he talks about ourselves being always intimately present to us we must remember his statement that: „'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not

[203] T.II,I,XI,320.

possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it."[204] I have stated earlier that the self must be understood as a complex impression. However, we need to investigate properly if the self can be claimed to be a complex impression, and, for that matter, if there is an impression of the self at all. This investigation is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, Hume seems to say in Book One of the *Treatise*, that there is no impression of the self. This seems to contradict his statements made in Book Two. Secondly, it is a common preconception amongst many philosophers that Hume cannot account for a self and that there is certainly no impression of the self to be accounted for in Hume's philosophy. Thus Book One and Two of the *Treatise* are thought to be incompatible with one another.

I have argued before that there is no simple impression of the self which can give rise to a resembling idea. But there is the possibility for a complex impression of the self, and I have expressed my belief that Hume's account of the self has to be understood in that way. To explain how such complex impression must be understood I will, later on, make reference to Hume's own example of a complex impression - that of Paris - which is given at the very beginning of Book One. We must resist the temptation to understand the complex impression of the self as an unchanging and sharply shaped impression. Such an understanding is inappropriate since it does not accommodate Hume's fundamental understanding of the self as a bundle of perceptions, an understanding he never denies or rejects throughout the *Treatise*. Pal ARDAL gives a very good description of the problem and exhibits much insight when he writes: „What entitles me to say that I am the same person now as I was a short while ago? It is in this connection that he denies any impression of a self remaining uniformly identical and underlying our various interrupted and changing experiences. The fact that we remain the same person throughout a lifetime cannot be derived from an impression of a self, for there is no such impression that remains numerically and qualitatively the same during a person's lifetime. But Hume does not deny that we can, at any time, identify a

[204] ibid., p.317.

complex set of impressions which constitutes what we call our self at that particular time."[205] There will always be a set of impressions and ideas (which themselves can give rise to reflective impressions) which I know to be mine. In the same way as I do not need any criteria whatsoever to identify a memory I have as my memory, I do not need criteria to identify an impression (or an idea) I have as my impression (or idea).

We have perceptions - impressions and ideas - at all times of consciousness. We do not only have one single perception, but an entire set of them, such as: impressions of breathing and other bodily functions, writing an essay, hitting the keyboard, seeing the keyboard and the monitor, seeing other surrounding objects, the impression that it is daytime and Tuesday, that a tobacco scent is in the air, that I am moving, have my legs crossed, and so on. I have also, of course, all the resembling ideas concerning these impressions and many, many more, like ideas of reflection, for instance. I do not only have all these perceptions at this particular moment: these perceptions open the door to the past and to the future. The keys to be turned are causality, contiguity and resemblance. Having my legs crossed now makes it inevitable to uncross them later on, that is, in the future. The smell of tobacco is caused by my smoking a cigarette earlier on, that is in the past. Every thought I have has risen from previous thoughts and will give rise to new ones. If I look at the particular bundle of perceptions I am, I find that there is always something I can call my self, provided that I am conscious of the perceptions. The contents of sense perceptions are usually taken to be representative[206] , but not all perceptual contents are representative. Passions and desires have content which can be taken to be representative, but they also have intentional content. „A number of our desires and passions are non-representative and belong to ourselves. They form part of what we refer to as our person, as distinct from what is not our person. Our impressions of sense, of course, also belong to ourselves; but we

[205] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.44.

[206] It does not matter whether they really are representative of something external to us or not. If we regard perception as an **act** we may well say that the act represents its object. However, the representation does not have to resemble the thing represented.

do take them to represent an external reality, although it may be impossible to find arguments that would justify our belief in the independent and uninterrupted existence of an external world if this belief were called in question. Yet we have this belief, and thus must in fact have a conception of ourselves as opposed to what is not to be counted as part of our person. All that Hume needs in his account of sympathy is that at any particular time, when we are conscious, there should be a complex impression we can identify as the impression of our own person. This impression need not remain unchanging, although at all times during our conscious existence there is something we can call 'self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious' (THN II, 13/286)."[207] Although ARDAL's statement is very helpful towards an understanding of Hume's account, it has to be taken with some caution due to the framework of my initial definitions of self and personhood. ARDAL seems to use the two concepts synonymously, whereas I use *personhood* to refer to the social aspect of an individual, *self* to refer to the private aspect. Although there is a strong connection and interdependency between these two aspects of the individual we must understand that ARDAL's statement is more in line with my definition of the aspect of the self than with my definition of personhood.

It is possible to compare the complex impression of the self to another complex impression Hume refers to: that of Paris. The impression is complex because it is made up of many particulars and their relations to one another. There are streets, houses - they are arranged to one another in a certain way as well as having a certain look - there are people, landmark buildings, shops, traffic, restaurants, the general atmosphere of the city. No city is ever unchanging. It is not only that people and vehicles are moving about, there is building going on as well. The city changes its face every day. There are changes in architecture and infrastructure, as well as there are changes in the weather, influencing the impression of the city. At one time the city is a monstrosity, dark, dirty and loud. The next day it is a sunny, entertaining place

[207] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.45.

full of business and enterprise, quite a lovely locality to be in. A city is a complexity and one perceives this complexity by its particulars but also, and most importantly, as a whole. It is quite easy for an experienced traveler to distinguish one big city from another without having seen the landmarks. Prague feels entirely different from London, Paris is different from Berlin. Paris will always be Paris despite the fact that the city is constantly changing. The impression of Paris is one which contains change and changeability.

The complex impression of the self can also be said to be an impression containing change and changeability. The changes are the changing perceptions staged on the theatre of the mind. These constantly changing perceptions are connected to one another by the principles of association: resemblance, causality and contiguity; in the case of impressions by resemblance alone. By these principles the sameness of the chain of perceptions can be traced backwards in time as well as it succeeds forwards into the future by every new perception. This „tracing back" emphasizes the epistemological aspect of identification and re-identification, but it must also be understood that the said principles of association are ontologically important. They contribute to the constitution of the chain, or the bundle, of perceptions.

Another such contributing factor, epistemologically as well as ontologically, is memory. Memory is a faculty. Particular memories are actual mental events. Although memory is not a principle like the principles association, it is not independent of them. The actual memory perceptions are connected to one another by the principles of association as well as memory perceptions themselves come about through the workings of these principles. When I walk through my home town and the air smells of the fragrances emitted by the coffee factory, I am immediately reminded of my childhood, when I walked by the coffee factory every day, making my way into the kindergarten. This memory never fails to attend me when this particular smell is in the air. It is brought about by the resemblance between the present and past perceptions and the contiguity of the impression of smell and the perception of going to the kindergarten. The single memory perceptions, i.e. the actual memories, are

connected to each other in a similar way. We have all experienced the phenomenon that once we draw our attention to memories we have, they bring about new ones we did not remember initially.

Memory is an epistemological as well as an ontological criterion of identity.[208] Memory is an epistemological criterion in so far as it is the case that when I have memories of certain times and places then I know that I must have existed then and there. This is an understanding of memory which is shared by Hume himself.[209] Memory takes part in constituting the chain of perceptions in its sameness (ontological aspect). Without memory we could not track the chain back into the past but would be restricted to the present alone. Without memory we would not even have a concept of the past, therefore we would not have a concept of ourselves. We must understand that even if the perceptions would, in fact, be linked together in a chain but this fact were not known by us, then it could not make sense to talk about a self. For Hume a self to be existent requires that one is aware of it.[210] „As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person."[211]

Memory does not only constitute identity in Hume's account, it also discovers it. This is not a paradox. By saying that memory also discovers the self Hume refers to the epistemological aspect as if it could be separated from the ontological one. However, it cannot be separated, firstly because of Hume's own theory of perception; secondly because the self is, ontologically, an internal impression. Hume's account here is far from being inconsistent or paradoxical. Once the knowledge that one is a self is acquired (i.e. once one is a self), it is possible to go beyond one's actual, that is recallable, memories. „But having once acquir'd this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the

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[208] Note that it is not a criterion in the sense that I have to determine whether certain memories are mine or someone else's.
[209] compare T.I,IV,VI,262.
[210] In that sense ontology and epistemology are one.
[211] T.I,IV,VI,261-262.

same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed."[212]

Hume's account of sympathy, however, entails another problem in respect to third person identity statements about different selves. Firstly, if the observer's idea of the observed's impression shall be enhanced into a proper impression, then it must be possible for the observer to distinguish between his own impression and the impression of the observed. Secondly, it is also required that a third person can distinguish between these two impressions. Otherwise Hume could not have given his account of sympathy in the first place.

It has been said on several occasions that I don't need a criterion to identify my perceptions to be mine. I can perceive in someone else the external effects of sadness and hence can form the idea that the person in question is sad. However, to have perceptions of someone else's sadness does not mean that I am sad myself. In most of the cases it is quite obvious that I am not sad. The very fact that I am not sad myself can, by itself, cause emotional responses such as guilt, uneasiness or helplessness. Even when through sympathy the idea of sadness becomes enhanced into the feeling of sadness itself in the observer, it is quite obvious that the observer didn't have to be necessarily sad himself when acquiring the idea of someone else's sadness. It is evident that the acquisition of the idea is prior in time to the enlivening of this idea. We also don't think that the observer is experiencing the same sadness as the observed. Firstly, the sadnesses have arisen from different causes. The cause of the sadness of the observer has other conditions than the sadness of the observed. Putting it in a slightly simplified way, we can say that the sadness of the observer requires additional conditions. These additional conditions are a) the presence of the observed and his sadness; b) the working of sympathy which in itself requires that the observer has a self; c) that the observer must have had a previous experience of sadness (as his own sadness) himself.

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[212] ibid., p.262.

To a): That an observer *A* should feel sad because of someone else's sadness requires clearly that someone else is present and that he and the external effects of his sadness can be observed by the observer. There are many possible cases imaginable and it is not always necessary that an observed *B* has to be present in person. We can hear or read stories about sad characters and start to feel sad ourselves. It is a well known phenomenon that people do cry about films or books. There are several ways to explain these phenomena in respect to the presence of the observed person, or character. One of them is to say that our imagination makes us forget that the characters in question are long dead, fiction, or not known to us personally. It suffices here to point out that it is a condition for the bringing about of sadness by sympathy that there must be something present which is observable and which is sad. The present treatment of the problem of identity in respect to a distinction between *B*'s and *A*'s sadness as *A*'s produced by sympathy disregards all instances where *A*'s sadness is genuinely *A*'s own. Cases where *A* is sad because his mother died or his dog was run over by a car do not apply to the framework of the problem I just have given. Regarding these cases *A* is not sad because of *B*'s sadness. *A* is sad because of events happening to *A*. Thus the problem that *A* has to distinguish his sadness from *B*'s sadness does not occur. *B*'s sadness is not related to *A*'s by sympathy. I also disregard cases where events happening to *B* remind *A* of similar events happening to *A* or where *B*'s sadness reminds *A* of *A*'s own sadness. Cases like this do not belong to Hume's account of sympathy, which is very unlike the account Adam SMITH gives and which would contain such cases.[213] Hume's understanding of sympathy does not entail the 'putting oneself in another's shoes'. „There is no suggestion that in sympathizing one imaginatively puts oneself into the other person's place, which is characteristic of Adam Smith's account."[214]

Thus, as a first conclusion we can say that if the observer's sadness is to be induced by sympathy then the presence of some other being which is sad and whose sadness is observable, is required.

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[213] SMITH, A. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1984, TMS.I,I,I,3, p.10.
[214] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.45.

To b): It is clear that for sympathy to operate there not only has to be someone who is sad originally, but that there has to be also someone who observes that feeling in the other and sympathizes with him. The former is the observed and the latter the observer. The mechanisms of sympathy necessitate the presence of an impression of the self „in" the observer. Only so can the idea of someone else's sadness (or of any passion) be enlivened into a real feeling or passion felt by the observer. There is no necessity of the presence of an observer if I want, to put it crudely, to be alone in my misery. Anyone can still feel sad or joyous without anybody witnessing it. Sympathy is the sympathy of the observer and is not the sympathy of the observed.[215] It is, however, necessary for the observer to be a self.

To c): It is also a necessary condition that the observer has previously experienced the feeling or passion from an idea of which an impression is to be produced. It is impossible, in Humean terms, to have a corresponding idea of a simple impression one has never had. Passions are simple impressions. It follows that if I was never sad myself I can never have a proper idea of someone else's sadness. „But common to Smith and Hume is the view that one can sympathize only with experiences that one has had oneself. One cannot, on Hume's account, form the idea of another person's emotion unless one has had the corresponding impression. This follows from the claim that the passions are simple impressions and that all simple ideas are copies of simple impressions."[216] We must understand that sympathizing with someone else is more than just having a belief about the other's state of mind. I can believe in a classificatory way that someone is sad because I have learned to read the effects of sadness and I can name the emotion they seem to feel. However, I cannot have a proper idea **of** this person's **sadness** if I don't know what sadness is in the first place. If I do not have an idea of sadness at all there is nothing which could be enhanced in its liveliness until it becomes the passion or the emotion itself.

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[215] Though, of course, the originally observed person can sympathize back with the original observer. Then the roles are reversed and the original observer has become the observed and *vice versa*.
[216] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.45.

These three conditions don't apply if only one unobserved person is concerned. They are additional conditions in respect to a passion produced by the principle of sympathy in an observer. Thus we can say that we have gained at least one criterion to distinguish the observer's sadness from the sadness of the observed where third person statements are concerned. Concerning the observer's sadness additional conditions have to be fulfilled. The cause of sadness is different in both cases. This applies generally to all emotions, passions and opinions in so far as they are transferred by sympathy.

1. event (external or internal) ---> 2. *B*'s impression ---> 3. *A*'s idea of *B*'s impression ---> 4. *A*'s corresponding impression

(1) and (2) can occur on their own and do not require (3) and (4). (3) and (4) cannot occur unless (1) and (2) are occurring. The cause of *B*'s impression is (1). The causes of *A*'s impression are (1) and (2) as indirect causes, (3) as a direct cause (together with the impression of the self). (2) is a necessary condition of (3). (3) is a necessary condition of (4). The causes of *A*'s impression are indirectly causes of *B*'s impression. The former require additional conditions. The difference between *A*'s and *B*'s impression is not only ontological but is also epistemological. The observer has access to the information that he doesn't feel sad, for example, because his grandmother died. It is evident that the observer is aware of the fact that it wasn't his grandmother who died. He does feel sad because the other person he is observing, and has a close relation to, is sad.

However, there are cases where the causes of the impression of different individuals are the same: *C* is sad because of *X*. At the same time, *D* is sad because of *X* too. How then can *C*'s perception be distinguished from *D*'s perception, and consequently: how can *C* be distinguished from *D* if both are, respectively, the bundles of their perceptions? If the latter is taken in a strict

sense then it seems to follow that if *C* and *D* have the same perceptions, then *C* and *D* are identical.[217]

First of all, *C* is sad (or has any other passion or opinion for that matter) because of *X*. *D* is also sad because of *X*, but not because *C* is sad. Here are no given grounds for sympathy to be the principle concerned with *D*'s sadness. „It is obvious that 'sympathy' is, for Hume, a technical term referring to a special psychological principle. The criteria for its use seem to be (a) that a person has the same feeling or opinion as x, and (b) that this feeling or opinion has come to be that person's feeling or opinion in a certain way, namely through the special enlivening of an idea into an impression through the influence of the impression of the self. This condition is absolutely necessary, for the bare fact that I and a farm worker in China both feel angry in no way indicates that sympathy is involved."[218] It follows that if the initial problem was a problem of identity of the self in connection to the mechanisms of sympathy, entailing the problem of criteria distinguishing between *C*'s and *D*'s perception, then we can say that as soon as sympathy is no longer involved in the production of *D*'s perceptions the initial problem no longer occurs. The identity problems which do occur must be classed as the same kind of problems we were discussing in the previous chapter, and thus can be treated the same way.

However, if all the perceptions of two different people are supposed to be undistinguishably alike (this likeness following from the sameness of their causes) then the problem remains that the two bundles, consisting of these two identical sets of perceptions, seem to be alike too, not to say that they seem to be identical. It could then be argued that they cannot be identical because one set of perceptions belongs to *A* and the other to *B*, but this doesn't answer the question what it is that makes *A*'s perceptions *A*'s and *B*'s perceptions *B*'s, which has been the crucial question at this point.

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[217] That is, if we set up the problem here in the way that *C*'s and *D*'s perceptions don't only have the same cause at that particular time, but that the perceptions seem to be exactly the same at all times, this includes own body perceptions.

[218] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.46.

The Circularity of the Bundle Definition

In the light of this problem and in respect to the problem of circularity posed by Hume's definition of the self as a bundle of perceptions I wish to argue that the view holding the circularity to be vicious stems from a misconception of the relationship between the perceptions making up the bundle/self. The vicious circle occurs if we understand the self **as the thing which perceives** in the first place. This is very much REID's understanding of the self when he says: „My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers. My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every moment; they have no continued, but a successive, existence; but the self, or I, to which they belong, is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings which I call mine."[219] A vicious circularity only occurs if we adopt, knowingly or unknowingly, REID's understanding that the self has to be prior to all the perceptions. If the self is then defined as being the perceptions, it seems as if this definition suggests that the perceptions have to be prior to the self, which cannot be.[220]

However, Hume is not saying that the self has the perceptions. He is not saying that the self is a perceiving, thinking, acting thing. What he is saying is that the self is the total of the perceptions, that it is the perceptions. By understanding the perceptions as constitutive elements of the self he renders REID's understanding of the self inappropriate. The viciousness of the circularity rests with the claim that the self is both: constituted (at least partly) by the perceptions themselves and carrier of the perceptions, being the „perceiving thing". Hume, however, proposes the self to be the former, but not the latter. He does not make two irreconcilable claims. The opposite is the case, he gives an account of the self as the bundle of perceptions and denies that it is anything

[219] REID, T. *Of Identity*, in: PERRY, J. (ed.) ibid., p.109.
[220] I am discussing only this particular circularity here. The problem of necessary ownership of perceptions is discussed in the chapter on the principle of unity of perceptions.

else. „The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. [...] The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind;"[221] Thus, the problem REID wishes to address is not a problem Hume's account has to suffer. REID's criticism is certainly a serious one once it is shown that it is necessary for the self to be the carrier of the perceptions. However, this is a metaphysical claim Hume clearly wants to deny. It therefore cannot be tacitly assumed by REID, or any other critic, that it is unquestionably true that the self is the „perceiving thing".

Understanding the self as a complex impression is entirely compatible with understanding it as emerging from perceptions. Basic simple impressions alone are not sufficient, though necessary, for the existence of a self. They help towards the emergence of a self by providing a stock of material for some of the complex impressions and for simple and complex ideas. Since the complex impression of the self involves the principles of association of perceptions it certainly belongs to the kind of complex impressions which needs to be provided for by simple impressions. I think that Hume's account of the self has to be interpreted in these terms: simple impressions are necessary, but are insufficient on their own. The self is not independent of the perceptions, which include the impressions as well as the ideas. It consists of perceptions but cannot be set identical with any single one of them. The self is not any single simple perception but the complex total, the chain or the bundle of all perceptions. In this sense it is emerging and progressive, both as a complex impression and as an idea.

When comparing the self of Book One and Two we cannot find a denial of the bundle definition of the first book by Book Two. What we find is a possible answer to the desparate questions of the solitary self in Book One. Book One's self has been solitary because it has been seen in isolation from the social aspect of the individual, personhood, which is explored in Book Two. The public

[221] T.I,IV,VI,253.

aspect and the aspect of the self are interrelated and interdependent. Both have to be linked and have to be seen in their relation, not in separation from one another. The main topic of Book Two is the passions, which unite and manifest this union between the two aspects of the individual in an exemplary manner. Passions and sympathy connect individual with individual. The external signs of a passion experienced are obervable, but the full impact, the qualitative content of the passion is only accessible and liveable by the individual who's passion it is.

The despair of Book One results from the isolation of reason from the passions, creating a self isolated from its fellow beings. Hume attempted to show in Book One how far reason alone can reach. Although the passions do not play a part in the investigations of Book One, it cannot be taken as a denial of the existence of passions and of the working principle of sympathy. It has to be taken as an investigation of the „powers" and possibilities of reason as a world creating „force" when seen in isolation from perceptions like passions and emotions. These perceptions have an essential part in human nature, both in an ontological as well as in an epistemological sense. We need passions and emotions to be human, they are essential to us as human beings, and human nature is Hume's explicit subject of study. They are also essential to find out about ourselves and others, the latter is necessary for the former. ANNETTE BAIER puts it quite clearly when she writes: „The „real connexion" that Book One and the „Appendix" despaired of finding is not to be found by fragmenting a person-history into separate perceptions, out of physical or social space, but by seeing persons as other persons see them, as living (really connected) bodies, with real biological connections to other persons, in a common social space, depending on them for much of our knowledge, depending on them for the sustaining of our pleasures and for comfort in our pain, depending on them also for what independence and autonomy we come to acquire."[222]

The bundle definition is never denied throughout Book Two, nor is it, as we have seen, the cause of inconsistencies or contradictions between the first two

[222] BAIER, A. ibid., p.141.

books of the *Treatise*. Hume, instead, builds his new investigations of Book Two on the foundation he has laid with his definition of the self in Book One. When we look at the principles of relation and association as they are presented in Book One, for instance, we will find that the origins of these are found in the real ties, the real relations of real human beings which are the subject of Book Two. Hume sees the blood ties of parenthood as the strongest ties and the strongest relation the human mind is capable of perceiving[223]. He allows for special conditions when it comes to love between relations. Here is no need for any agreeable qualities in the loved one. The simple fact that a child is the child of parents is cause enough to be loved by them. Hume explores at lengths the variety of relations occurring in marriages and re-marriages and the passions which occur between the child and its (step)mother and (step)father, emphasizing the importance of family in respect to one's passions and to one's perceptions in general[224].

Describing occurring transitions and the ease of the associations we make, Hume pays much attention to real people and their real relationships. Family ties, as the most important ones, are taken into special consideration. They are so important because any other kind of relationship must be compared in its strength to the ties of parenthood as the original and strongest conceivable relation, not only practically, but also theoretically. The parent-child relation contains all three principles of association of ideas: causation, resemblance and contiguity. Parents are the causes of their children, as well as they are causes of their parents as parents. They tie the family bands backwards in time just as they tie them in width by being brothers and sisters to their siblings by the same ancestry. It is also common knowledge, and it has been in Hume's time as well, that children resemble their parents, or at least someone in the family, physically and even in character. Children are also perceived in conjunction to their parents, even if the parents do not exist anymore. The association to the parents is always made. The natural relations of family, and especially of parent and child, is the origin of the philosophical relations. ANNETTE BAIER writes,

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[223] compare T.II.II,IV,352.
[224] compare ibid., p.355.

after an extended investigation: „But for Hume, I am suggesting, all other relations are „cousins-german" of „the relation of blood", aspects of it, variants of such aspects, or abstract descendants of them. The three Humean „natural relations" come together in it, and his philosophical relations are „remarkable effects" of the natural relations at work in our thought."[225]

It is also apparent that there is a strong presence of the real body in Book Two of the *Treatise*. The book's contents - the passions and sympathy - are unthinkable without the presence of human beings other than oneself. These human beings are understood by Hume as made from flesh and blood. Their bodies exhibit the effects of the internal impressions as well as they possess „external qualities" like beauty and elegance, perceivable by us. If this is the understanding of the body in Book Two then it is incompatible with the „bodyless" mind supposed to be the topic of Book One. However, the interpretation of the first book in the terms of the latter is mistaken. Book One and Two give a different account of the body, but they do not exclude each other. Book One does not deny Book Two's underlying assumptions, since the discussion in the first book is ontologically incomplete by concentrating on reason alone. There is no incompatibility to be noted once one accepts that the mind is not deprived of a body (or bodies) ontologically in Book One of the *Treatise*. It will later be argued that Hume writes as a Basic realist throughout the *Treatise*. This Basic Realism should provide the necessary framework for the interpretation of Hume's identity theory as a combined theory. My claim that Books One's and Two's accounts of the body are compatible and that both can accommodate the combined theory of identity, requires that Hume's remark in respect to the existence of the body in the first book is taken seriously. It must not be dismissed as a somehow cheap escape route away from the disastrous scepticism of Part IV, nor as a statement which is completely out of the spirit Book One exhibits.

For now we can at least accept the bundle definition. Perceptions of body are a natural part of the bundle. It has no important bearing upon the plausibility

[225] BAIER, A. ibid., p.48.

of the definition itself whether or not the perceptions are ontologically realistic. However, acceptance of the definition naturally gives rise to the question what it is that unites the different perceptions into one bundle.

3. The Principle of Unity of Perceptions

V. Interpreting the *Appendix*

V.I. The Problem

The problem of the principle of unity of the perceptions is of fundamental importance for the bundle definition of the self. The plausibility of the definition depends upon the success in accounting for a principle which unites all the different single perceptions into one bundle. To find such a principle of unity is also necessary for the account of personhood I have given in reference to Hume's theory. Personhood and self are interrelated and interdependent. A collapse of the account of the self must lead to a collapse of the account of personhood also.

One major and very common criticism of Hume's theory concerning the self as a bundle of perceptions is fuelled by the apparent absence of such a principle. Hume recognizes the problem and is clearly worried by it: „But all my hopes[226] vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought and consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head."[227] However, we have to notice that his statement is not final in admitting a definitely unresolvable problem and an inconsistency lethal to his entire theory. Hume acknowledges the antinomy we are left with but preserves the possibility to overcome it. „In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences*, and *that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.* Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that

[226] of accounting for personal identity, T.L.
[227] T.App.,635-636.

this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable."[228]

Considering Hume's statement it is perhaps not entirely vain to look for a possible principle of unity of perceptions, especially not, when the investigation focuses on the ontological aspects. As I have argued before, there is a preconception that in regard to Hume's philosophy ontology and epistemology should coincide. However, we have seen that this is not necessarily the case. We need to consider Hume's account of externality and have to take seriously his belief that the existence of the body has to be taken for granted. We must not make the mistake of dismissing it as a whim and a concession which had to be made following an attack of common sense. There are indications elsewhere in Hume's work which suggest that the existence of externality (including one's own body) is not denied as an ontological claim. He writes in his essay on taste: „The great resemblance between mental and bodily taste will easily teach us to apply this story. Though it be certain, that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in the objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings."[229] Although this passage, if taken on its own, can be interpreted in the following way: *object* means nothing but the *object as it appears in the mind*, it does not refer to an *object out there*; a thorough interpretation has to take the context of the remark into account. If it really were the case that a quality, producing the sentiment of sweetness, were in the object present only in the mind, then the mind must have given the object that quality in the first place. Hence the quality wouldn't have **to produce** the sentiment in (the same!) mind.

There are other statements earlier in the essay which suggest that Hume takes here the existence of external objects for granted. Such as: „But all determinations of the understanding are not right; because they have a reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact [...] Among

[228] ibid., p.636.
[229] SOT., p.235.

a thousand different opinions which different men may entertain of the same subject, there is one, and but one, that is just and true; and the only difficulty is to fix and ascertain it."[230] , and: „Because no sentiment represents what is really in the object. It only marks a certain conformity or relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not really exist, the sentiment could never possibly have being."[231]

It is perhaps possible to say, keeping both of Hume's doctrines alive and concentrating on the ontological side of the principle of unity, which is doubtlessly required though difficult to obtain, that we have to treat and to understand a principle of unity similarly as we have treated and understood causation and externality. This will, hopefully, provide us with a possibility to reconcile the two doctrines in question. With Hume we can hold the belief that our ideas, however fictitious, correspond to something which is really there. It is our nature which allows us only certain ways to obtain ideas (and the obtaining by imagination is one of those ways). But it is also human nature which is in accordance, because it is part of it, with the bigger nature of things. ANNETTE BAIER writes, when discussing the fictitiousness of the self: „In calling these assumptions 'fictions', Hume is saying not that they are false, but rather that they are unverifiable."[232] Since we cannot perceive the objects **of** our perceptions we do not know, by reason or these perceptions themselves, whether they are there mind-independently. If there are any objects existing mind-independently, we certainly cannot know whether our perceptions correspond to them or not[233]. Verification of any beliefs we hold about the mind-independent existence of objects is not possible. There is, nevertheless, the conviction that, firstly, there really is something out there and secondly, that the principles we are unable to perceive are themselves, or something similar to them, really there too.[234] This conviction, quite clearly, speaks out of the

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[230] ibid., p.230.
[231] ibid.
[232] BAIER, A. ibid., p.103.
[233] In this sense it is pretty clear how Hume was anticipating one of the main features of KANT's Transcendental Philosophy.
[234] G. STRAWSON argues that Hume is a Basic Realist in respect to causation.

Treatise and the *Essays*. I find myself in agreement with BAIER when she says: „...order is projected from the contemplating mind back onto the contemplated world, and, since the mind is part of that world and sensitive to it, it is no accident that what it has to project 'fits' as well as it does the facts that stimulate the projection. How else could a thinking animal persist unless its thinking were adapted to the world it thinks about?"[235] When we remember again the famous passage in Part IV of Book One we will realize that it is nature which persuades the sceptic to the existence of bodies: „Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations."[236]

In the following I wish to investigate possible candidates to determine whether they are able to carry out the function of the principle of unity within the framework of Hume's philosophy. However, before I start this discussion we need to consider alternative interpretations of Hume's problem in the *Appendix*.[237]

V.II. The Impression of the Self

GARRETT writes, giving an over view of the different interpretations of Hume's remarks on identity in the *Appendix*: „Hume's problem, Kemp Smith argues, is that Book II requires an awareness[238] of personal identity that his own theory in Book I will not allow, and his second thoughts in the Appendix are, Kemp Smith infers, a belated recognition of this fact."[239] It is certainly true that Hume refers, somehow unexpectedly, to the impression of the self in Book Two of the *Treatise*, however, it has been pointed out already that this does not imply a contradiction to his account in Book One. Hume never denies „that we have impressions of ourselves, in the sense required by Book II"[240], he only denies

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[235] BAIER, A. ibid., p.93.
[236] T.I,IV,II,187.
[237] I will refer here to the interpretations presented by GARRETT, D. in: *Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1997.
[238] Impression of the self, T.L.
[239] GARRETT, D., ibid., p.167.
[240] ibid., p.168.

the existence of a simple, unchanging and uninterrupted impression of the self which could give rise to the idea of a substantial self. The account of Book One does not deny the possibility of a perception of the self: „It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable."[241] If Hume means what he says here and let us suppose that he does, then he says, firstly, that the self is not, and cannot be, an impression which is capable of giving rise to a resembling idea[242]. He states, presenting his theory of perceptions, that the kind of impressions which give rise to resembling ideas are simple impressions. This, however, is not the only kind of impression there is. Complex impressions usually don't give rise to perfectly resembling ideas[243]. This opens up the possibility for the self to be such a complex impression. I have argued that the impression of self Hume is referring to in Book Two of the *Treatise* is, by its nature, a complex impression.[244]

Secondly, with an understanding of the self as a complex impression arises the possibility to account for change. This should be very useful considering the Humean context of ever changing perceptions. It is important to keep in mind that a complex impression of the self must not be understood in the same way as we understand simple impressions (this seems to be the common mistake made by philosophers). The complex impression of the self is just as fleeting an existence as all other perceptions. It is not permanent, is not the one stable, ever lasting impression we have throughout our entire life. But, as Pal ARDAL points out and as I have argued myself, there is always some one (complex)

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[241] T.I,IV,VI,251.

[242] The *real idea* Hume is referring to can be understood in two ways: as an idea resembling an impression and as a perfect idea. Perfect ideas are ideas which have a lesser degree of vivacity than the ideas of memory, (compare T.I,I,II,8.). However, I take it here as a resembling idea because of Hume's reference to the inconstancy and variableness of the impression which makes it impossible to give rise to a constant and invariable idea.

[243] compare T.I,I,I,2-3.

[244] How this complex impression leads to an idea of the self I have discussed when talking about the passions, in particular about pride and humility and their connection to the self.

impression we can refer to as our selves. To make myself perfectly clear I will make use of a model of explanation similar to the one used by QUINTON and GRICE. This model does not attempt a complete and conclusive explanation of how identity can be maintained. This will not be possible before a principle of unity, whatever this happens to be, is established.

I understand the complex impression of the self in the following way:

At time *t1* I am a bundle of perceptions *A* of the total sum *n*. I have a complex impression of *A* and gain an idea of *A* with the help of the passions. I am able to have a complex impression of *A* in the first place because of the workings of the principles of association of perceptions.

At time *tn* I am a bundle of perceptions *A'* of the total sum *n+1*.

At time *tn+1* I am a bundle of perceptions *An* of the total sum *n+(n+1)*.

A' is ontologically identical with *A* with the addition *+1*, only if all the perceptions which have been part of *A* are also part of *A'* and if only the perceptions which have made up *A* are also making up *A'* apart from the perception added to the bundle AFTER *t1*. *An* with the addition *n+1* is ontologically identical with *A* and all descendant stages of *A*[245], only if all perceptions which have been part of *A* and its descendant stages are also part of *An*. And if only the perceptions which have made up *A* and all its descendant stages, apart from perceptions added to the set of perceptions after *tn*, also make up *An*. *A* and *An* are ontologically identical only if *An* is a descendent stage of *A*.

If my argument is accepted, we have established ontological identity. However, we still have to establish identity epistemologically. We would need to establish how I know that the complex impression of myself I perceive at the moment is identical, with the addition of the perceptions I perceived today, with the complex impression of myself I perceived yesterday. I believe that it is impossible to establish identity of the bundle in an epistemological sense because of Hume's problem to account for memory. As mentioned earlier, SHOEMAKER has pointed out that I do not need any criterion whatsoever to

[245] The bundle is in a new stage every time a new perception is added to it.

determine whether a memory is mine or not, and, by the same token, do not need a criterion to determine whether I was the same person at person stage 1 as I am now at person stage n+1 - but whether or no one needs criteria of this sort, one needs, in any case, memory. However, I don't think it is necessary, at the moment, to deal with this particular problem. It will suffice to refer the matter again if a principle of unity of perceptions can be found.

V.III. The Principle of Unity

The second alternative interpretation of the *Appendix* is very similar to my own interpretation of Hume's statement, namely that Hume recognizes the difficulty to account for a principle (or principles) to unite the different perceptions into different, discrete, but in themselves united bundles. It becomes apparent that philosophers consider here mainly only resemblance and causation in reference to Hume's remark: „The only question, therefore, which remains, is, by what relations this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produc'd, when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person. And here 'tis evident we must confine ourselves to resemblance and causation, and must drop contiguity, which has little or no influence in the present case."[246]

In my investigation I will consider causality on its own, but I will also look at the principles of association of ideas in their entirety, this includes contiguity, for the following reasons: Hume's claim that contiguity is „unnecessary and inapplicable as a principle of union for personal identity"[247] is a claim concerning the **successive** perceptions. Contiguity as a principle is embedded in causation, and although it may be helpful to discuss the connection between contiguity and causation, we are not compelled here to treat contiguity as a principle in its own right. However, the matter is different when it comes to co-existent, i.e. not successive, perceptions. It seems to be the case that contiguity needs to be applied to these perceptions. Some have pointed out that since contiguity can be dismissed and since there are co-existent perceptions, these perceptions

[246] T.I,IV,VI,260.
[247] GARRETT, D., ibid., p.178.

cannot be united to one another. Hence, Hume faces a unresolvable problem.[248] This easy criticism can be overcome. There is no obvious reason why one would have to dismiss contiguity generally, unless one wants to say that Hume believes co-existent perceptions to be entirely non-existent or unimportant. If so, then it would indeed be very odd that he declares contiguity to be one of the principles of association of ideas instead of treating it as some sort of subserviant mechanism towards the constant conjunction.

GARRETT argues: „Hume's project in the *Treatise* I.iv.6 is precisely to explain the „wholeness" of the mind without appealing to a local spatial conjunction of all of its perceptions, and to do so by utilizing instead the relations of resemblance and causation."[249] In the present context[250] we can reply that even if the argument were successful in respect to co-existent sense perceptions, it doesn't seem to apply to co-existent „internal" impressions. Internal impressions have no obvious local spatial conjunction in the sense it is here intended. It is perfectly possible that one is in love and is sad at the same time, for instance. Therefore, contiguity in respect to co-existent perceptions cannot be dismissed generally. Contiguity is not automatically disqualified as a contributing principle for the union of our perceptions.

V.IV. Ownership of Perceptions

A third alternative interpretation GARRETT presents goes back to PEARS and seems to stem from the second interpretation stated in b). The problem in the *Appendix* supposed to be recognized by Hume is that he cannot allow for the necessary ownership of perceptions. The problem is described „as a failure of these relations[251] to do justice to the necessity of perceptions' membership in the bundles of which they are members."[252] This interpretation's difficulty is that the problem of necessary ownership, at least as it is presented by GARRETT in

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[248] compare ibid., p.172.
[249] ibid., p.178.
[250] The argument needs to be re-considered when we discuss the body as the principle of unity.
[251] Causation and resemblance, T.L.
[252] GARRETT, D., ibid., p.173.

reference to PEARS, is ambiguous. The necessity of ownership of the particular perceptions of a particular bundle can be seen in two different ways:

i. as necessity that **these, and no other, perceptions** belong to this bundle,

ii. as necessity that these perceptions belong to **this, and to no other, bundle**.

These two different ways of understanding necessary ownership are not necessarily related to one another. (i) is embedded into the problem of the principle of unity of perceptions. We only have to find a possible principle of unity which will satisfy (i). The matter is more complicated where (ii) is concerned. The complication arises when one assumes, as some have done, separate, distinct and independent existence of the perceptions themselves, „that perceptions can be conceived to exist, for parts of their duration, outside the mind in which they occur at other times"[253]. Hence, it is alleged to be possible that one and the same perception can be part of different bundles. Referring to *qualia* will not solve the problem because the term stands for the qualitative content **of** the perception. Having the „same perception" implies the „same" qualitative content. If one wants to overcome the problem one has to go back to its roots: the debate concerning the separability of perceptions.

V.V. Separability of Perceptions

GARRETT interprets the contradiction Hume claims to have discovered as a contradiction between Hume's account of the principles of connection of the perceptions and his inability to accept the consequences of such an account for the self. „Hume is not prepared to grant the existence of such connections. But he is also not prepared, if my interpretation is correct, to accept it as a logical consequence of the „true idea of the human mind" that whenever two perceivers have the same experience - whether impression of sensation, passion, or idea - at the same time, they are in fact sharing the numerically same perception."[254] The problem Hume supposedly has recognized in the *Appendix* is that „we

[253] ibid., p.174.
[254] ibid., p.183.

could not successfully represent to ourselves the existence of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct perceptions existing in the minds of different individuals at the same time"[255]. According to GARRETT the problem is caused by a) the separability of the perceptions and b), following as a consequence from a), the insufficiency of causation and resemblance to account for the unity of all perceptions.

Considering the second point it seems to be the case that GARRETT implies that causation and resemblance are the only possible candidates for the principle of unity. Furthermore, their unsuccessfulness is not believed to stem primarily from the unexplained connection between co-existent perceptions in one mind, but from the fictitiousness of these relations. This part of the argument looses its force once we have established Hume's Basic Realism. It will be sufficient to maintain Basic Realism in respect to the existence of body, if the body can be established as the principle of unity of perceptions. However, if Basic Realism can be maintained to apply to causation[256] then GARRETT's account here would be refuted in its entirety[257].

A reply to the first point is less straightforward. Our investigation must start with an interpretation of the texts from which the separability claim is mainly derived. Hume writes: „Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be consider'd as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a thinking being."[258] Hume also argues, when discussing the notion of substance: „that since all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their existence."[259] GARRETT proposes

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[255] ibid., p.185.
[256] As GALEN STRAWSON argues.
[257] It seems to me that this can only be partially extended onto the separability argument, although it has an impact upon it. Real connection of perceptions does not imply exclusiveness.
[258] T.I,IV,II,207.
[259] T.I,IV,V,233.

two connected claims supposed to stem from Hume's account: 1. Hume accounts „for the belief that our perceptions can exist unperceived by us"[260], and 2. „He allows that perceptions could exist outside any mind, and he would presumably allow that a perception could in principle be shared by more than one mind."[261]

I wish to argue that these claims cannot be derived from Hume's statements in the *Treatise*. Firstly, it seems to me that the claim of existence of unperceived perceptions rests upon an assumption Hume does not allow for, namely that the mind is the „perceiving thing". It is clear that, for Hume, the mind **is** the perceptions. Even if we grant that there are perceptions which are not part of **any** bundle, it does not follow that they exist unperceived.[262] If, however, GARRETT wants to say that a perception must not necessarily be perceived by me but is perceived by some other human being, then I cannot see how this is supposed to support the separability claim, especially not because GARRETT himself dismisses the problem of necessity of ownership of perceptions as of any concern to Hume.[263]

Secondly, Hume does not think that all perceptions exist by themselves, i.e. independently of other perceptions. This becomes clear when we consider the case of simple impressions and their resembling ideas. The idea of the taste of a pineapple requires the impression of the taste of a pineapple. If we look at the passions, which are simple impressions of reflection, we will find that they require other perceptions according to what Hume makes out to be a particular passion's cause and object. Even if we deny the real connection, we will still have to face the fact that perceptions have to be attended by other perceptions if a passion is to be produced, be the production causal or otherwise.

Finally, GARRETT, agreeing with FOGELIN, writes: „Hume needs both the logical separability *and* the unity or connectedness of the mind's perceptions"[264].

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[260] GARRETT, D., ibid., p.179.
[261] ibid., p.183.
[262] We could also ask the question if an unperceived perception would still qualify as a perception?
[263] compare GARRETT, D., ibid., p.173-174.
[264] ibid., p.179.

My own interpretation of Hume's problem in the *Appendix* is not going to dispute this. Hume, I think, recognizes the difficulty to account for a uniting principle; but he does not believe that finding one is principally impossible - this, however, is what GARRETT seems to suggest. The separability, as GARRETT rightly states here, is a logical one; but his treatment of the problem makes it apparent that he treats separability as an ontological issue. Such treatment requires some more justification than Hume's text can provide.

In accordance with my interpretation that the difficulty lies with a sufficient and reliable principle uniting all the perceptions I start my investigation with the discussion of causality.

VI. The Candidates

VI.I. Causality

Causality seems to be, in the context of Hume's philosophy, the most natural candidate of all[265]. Causality plays a paramount role in his theory of human nature. For Hume reasoning rests upon the fundamentum of causation. Causation itself is built upon the grounds of experience. „All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause and Effect*. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. [...] If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral."[266]

The relation of cause and effect which I have called here causality is not only important when it comes to reasoning about matters of fact, it is also important when it comes to the theatre of the mind itself and the way perceptions are linked to one another: „As to *causation*; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other."[267] ANNETTE BAIER writes, investigating the role of causality in respect to the connections between the perceptions making up the bundle: „The official story we are given in this section[268] is that we discern causal relations between our earlier and later perceptions, as we remember them to have been, and we assume a causal relation between our memories of past perceptions and those perceptions as they originally occurred. So we discern a complex causal system in which vivacity is transmitted, beliefs are dependent on past experience, and many of the mental effects are „copies" of their likely causes. This makes the republic analogy[269] seem apt, since there, too, the later generations of citizens

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[265] I use *natural* here in a very narrow sense, not in the sense as *in human nature* or *in nature* as a biological term. It is used in reference to Hume's philosophy and means *natural in terms of Hume's thinking*.
[266] ECHU,I,IV,22, p.26-27.
[267] T.I,IV,VI,261.
[268] T.I,IV,VI.
[269] An analogy Hume uses to describe the self, compare T.I,IV,VI,261.

depend upon earlier ones, show some resemblance to their ancestors and have the sort of complex interrelations to their contemporaries that our various coexistent perceptions have to one another."[270]

For causality to function as the principle of unity of perceptions in a satisfactory way it is required that it not only provides a link for the successive perceptions but also a link for simultaneous perceptions. We will find that the second requirement cannot be fulfilled since, according to Hume, the cause is prior to its effect. The first requirement - the link of successive perceptions - does not seem to be problematic at first sight, but we will see that problems do occur, mainly because of Hume's theory of perception and because of the distinctions he makes in respect to the principles of association of the different types of perception.

a) successive impressions

We need to remember that it is entirely possible within the framework of Hume's philosophy for the chain of successive perceptions to be traced back in time. However, in my previous discussion I was not only referring to causality as a „principle of connection" of perceptions, but was also referring to resemblance and contiguity. I took them as a triad which, as a whole, makes past perceptions traceable. Successive perceptions are linked by at least one of these three principles. These principles, therefore, seem to provide the links of the chain of perceptions in an ontological as well as in an epistemological sense.

The matter is very different when we take causality in isolation from resemblance and contiguity; especially when we look at different types of perception, namely impressions and ideas, and their respective principles of association. We will find that causality as such a principle does apply to ideas, which are related by contiguity, causation and resemblance, but not to impressions of sensation which are related only by resemblance. The difficulty is serious because these impressions are not only not related by causation, but also not by contiguity. If they were, there would be a possibility to make a

[270] BAIER, A. ibid., p.126.

transition from contiguity and resemblance to causation. This step cannot be taken because Hume only allows only for resemblance, which, without contiguity, is not sufficient to infer causation. Thus, if only ideas and impressions of reflection (*via* ideas) but not impressions of sensation are related by causation, it looks very much as if causality alone cannot be a theoretically satisfying principle of unity of the chain of all perceptions (successive or otherwise). It cannot account for the link between impressions of sensation which succeed each other. This is the first case which can be made against causality as the principle of unity.

Before I come to the discussion of the link between impressions and ideas I wish to investigate the matter of the link between impression and impression a bit further.

b) co-existent impressions

Co-existent impressions are simultaneous with one another. I think it is clear that there are impressions which are co-existent. It is not only the case that co-existent impressions cannot be linked to one another by causation, but it is also conceivable that they are not linked by resemblance. Examples of such impressions can easily be found: I am standing on top of a mountain and it is quite chilly up there. I have the impression that it is cold. I start to freeze. I have the impression that I'm freezing. We tend to judge these two different impressions as being related to one another. But at the same time as I have the related impressions of coldness and freezing, I also have the impression of birds flying by. This is seemingly an impression unrelated to the two previous ones. That it is cold or that I am freezing have nothing to do with the fact that I am seeing birds, neither in a way of resemblance nor in a way of causation. Being cold and freezing does not cause me to see birds nor does seeing birds cause the impressions of coldness and freezing. It is also quite obvious that these impressions do not resemble each other. Seeing birds and freezing as sense impressions are attributed to different senses even.

That co-existent perceptions cannot be linked to one another by causation becomes clear when we consider Humes understanding of the relation of cause and effect. „The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects, is not so universally acknowledg'd, but is liable to some controversy. 'Tis that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect."[271] Hume accepts that causes have to be prior in time to their effects, this is apparent throughout his entire discussion of causation in the *Treatise*: Effects are **produced** by their causes, and when it comes to sensation, the „priority of the impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions."[272] Hume also argues that if causes and effects would be co-existent, then there would be no succession of perceptions (or objects).[273] Thus, causation cannot provide a link between co-existent impressions. Since there are co-existent perceptions, which are part of the bundle of perceptions, causation, on its own, cannot be the principle of unity of the bundle.

Hume himself thinks that causation and contiguity cannot be the principles of association of impressions. If simple impressions of sensation would cause each other a simple impression of sensation *X* would cause the simple impression of sensation *Y*, *Y* would cause *Z* and so on. There always would be only a certain chain of impressions without escape in the same order, when *X* occurs *Y* will follow and so will *Z*. The pattern of simple impressions of sensation would be very narrow indeed. This seems not to be in accordance with human experience. There are impressions we inevitably have, like, for instance, the impression of breathing. This impression would always have to give rise to the same other impression. This impression, in its turn, gives rise to always the same other one and so forth, as long as we live. However, the impression of breathing does not always give rise to the same impression. If impressions were indeed each other's causes, the matter would even become more complicated considering not only ourselves but also others. Then the inevitability of causation would make it hard to allow for the variety of different experiences

[271] T.I,III,II,75-76.
[272] T.I,I,I,5.
[273] compare T.I,III,II,76.

and behavioral patterns. „The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause."[274] We can easily deal with the objection that the rules by which to judge causes and effects contain another rule which, when applied to the impressions, can account for variety. Hume writes: „There is another principle, which hangs upon this, *viz.* that where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them."[275] This can be replied to by pointing out that the simple impressions cannot be broken down, by their nature, into different qualities. „Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation."[276]

Moving onto an ontological level, we can say that it is vital for Hume's account of externality that impressions can be connected by resemblance only but not by causation. To understand my argument we have to bear in mind Hume's aim to explain our perceptions and the operations of the mind as well as the origins of, amongst others, our idea of externality. He also needs to explain our belief in the existence of external objects, the existence of our own bodies etc. It is entirely unimportant, at the moment, whether all these things really exist or not. It is sufficient that we believe they do and, most importantly, that we have concepts of externality and external objects, including our own body. It would be impossible to account for these concepts and beliefs if simple impressions of sensation were linked to other simple impressions of sensation by causation. If it were the case that such an impression has its cause in another such impression it would be the case that having an impression *I(z)*, I would have to ascribe this impression to its cause impression *I(y)*. In the same manner I would have to ascribe *I(y)* to *I(x)*, *I(x)* to *I(w)* and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus, I would never arrive at the belief that *I(z)* is caused by an external object *Z*. It follows that if causation were the principle of relation of impressions we would never have a concept of externality at all. Since it is obvious that we do have such a concept, however appropriate to reality it may be, causation cannot be the

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[274] T.I,III,XV,173.
[275] ibid., p.174.
[276] T.I,I,I,2.

principle of relation of impressions of sensation[277]. Though we do not know, by reason, what exactly the ultimate causes of simple impressions of sensation are, we do know, by reason, that they cannot be other impressions. „As to those *impressions*, which arise from the *senses*, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of our being."[278]

In conclusion we can say that the first case against causality as the principle of unity of perceptions is properly established. Causation cannot be the principle of relation of impressions of sensation. These impressions are perceptions. Therefore causation is not the principle uniting ALL perceptions, which it would have to be to serve as the principle we are searching for.

c) Causation between different types of perception

The next problem which has to interest us if we want to look at causality as a candidate for the principle of unity of perceptions is the problem of causality as a possible principle of connection between different types of perceptions. Hereby we have to take both directions of possible causation into account: from impressions to ideas and from ideas to impressions. Causality has to work both ways if it is supposed to be the connecting principle of these types of perception, since Hume believes that some impressions can be the result of ideas in one way or another. We will have to determine whether or not the way by which an idea is transformed into an impression is a purely causal one.

The matter is very straightforward when it comes to the direction from impressions to ideas. Hume says quite clearly at the very beginning of the *Treatise*, when introducing the concepts of *simple impression* and *simple idea*: „that any impressions either of the mind or body is constantly followed by an idea, which resembles it, and is only different in the degrees of force and

[277] Simple impression of reflection, i.e. the passions, are related by causation. Impressions of reflection arise „either from the original impressions, or from their ideas". (T.II,I,I,276.) In the case of the latter the direct cause of the impression is an idea, not an impression.
[278] T.I,III,V,84.

liveliness. The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions."[279]

Thus, it is clear that Hume considers simple impressions to be the causes of their correspondent ideas, and not *vice versa*. The matter is slightly different when it comes to complex impressions, because they don't necessarily have correspondent exactly resembling ideas, as I have pointed out earlier. However, the case for simple impressions is very straightforward and I accept Hume's account here unreservedly[280].

As I have already indicated, it is far more difficult to establish causation as a sufficient principle with respect to the connection from idea towards impression. First of all, an alteration from idea to impression is possible within the Humean philosophy. Such a process occurs in the workings of sympathy. The idea we have of someone else's impression is enlivened, by the relation of the impression of our self, into a proper impression. This process, however, cannot be ascribed to causation, though causation has a role to play in it. The role of causation is limited to the preliminaries of the enlivening of an idea into an impression. It is limited to the acquisition of the idea and plays only a minor part, by far not a sufficient one, in the enlivening itself.

When we see another person is sad, we have, first of all, an impression of the effects of that person's impression. Causation is certainly important in respect to the acquisition of the impression, very much in the same manner as it was suggested earlier in respect to the causes of impressions. The impression of the effects of someone else's impression now causes a resembling idea in me. This is sufficient and proper causation. The idea so gained is enlivened by the workings of sympathy, and especially by the partaking of my own impression

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[279] T.I,I,I,5.

[280] It is possible to make a case against Hume's account on the grounds that there is no reliable criterion to distinguish impressions from ideas in every instance. It is also not entirely clear, if impressions and ideas are supposed to be only quantitatively distinct. Here however, I don't think such an investigation is necessary, since causation is, in any case, a difficult candidate with respect to the step from idea to impression. To show the difficulties of the latter will be sufficient to support a case against causality satisfactorily.

of my self into an impression proper. Here we can already see that causation alone is not sufficient to provide for the enlivening since it is vital that there is an impression of the observer's own self. Hume himself points out that for sympathy in its proper way relations other than causation are needed too. „For besides the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinc'd of the reality of the passion, with which we sympathize; besides this, I say, we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection."[281]

However, it could be argued that Hume seems also to allow for causation alone being capable of providing for the enlivening of an idea into an impression: „And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen and inliven an idea."[282] I believe this can easily be replied to: Even if causation alone would be capable of enlivening an idea into an impression, it cannot do so without the impression of the self in the observer being present and felt. Thus, causation, taken on its own, is not sufficient for the purpose.

We must also pay attention to the fact that, firstly, the enlivening of an idea into an impression does not actually link an idea to an impression, but transforms an idea into an impression. The idea **becomes** an impression but doesn't give rise to an impression nor is it linked to an impression as a „separate entity". Secondly, we have to remember that Hume's entire account of the transition and the workings of sympathy does not rest on very firm grounds for he assumes an only quantitative distinction between impressions and ideas.[283] This assumption is not very well supported in the *Treatise.*

It is, nevertheless, worth mentioning that the *Treatise* appears to contain one exception from the rule that ideas cannot be prior to impressions. „There is

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[281] T.II,I,XI,320.
[282] ibid.
[283] A distinction by degrees of vivacity is a quantitative distinction.

however one contradictory phaenomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions."[284] Hume then goes on to explain his statement by referring to the example of colours and their different shades[285]. He claims that if one would be confronted with the entire scale of shades of a colour with one shade missing, then it would be possible for the observer to have an idea that a shade is missing. It may even be the case for the observer to have some kind of idea which particular shade is missing, altough the observer never had a simple impression of the missing shade. Hume himself does not think that this exception to the rule is particularly important or has to be taken into serious theoretical consideration. He seems to regard it rather as an oddity and concludes the Section by saying: „Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions[286], from which they are derived, and which they represent."[287] However, exceptions to the rule do not weaken the case against causation. If causation shall serve as the connecting principle in respect to the direction from ideas to impressions, it must do so generally and not only occasionally.

So far we have dealt with simple impressions and impressions of the senses but there is another kind of impressions: impressions of reflexion. „Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of SENSATION and those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion,

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[284] T.I,I,I,5.
[285] The missing shade of blue argument doesn't seem to illustrate the phenomenon how an idea of sensation is prior to its correspondent impression, it rather seems to illustrate the phenomenon how an idea of sensation can be produced without its correspondent impression having occurred prior to it.
[286] Which are impressions, T.L.
[287] T.I,I,I,7.

hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv'd from them."[288]

Considering this statement it will once more be necessary to look at the passions and emotions to find out whether or not a transition from an idea to an impression is possible by causation alone, without the additional help of other impressions or principles. Hume distinguishes the impressions of reflexion further into direct and indirect impressions. It must be noted that Hume, making this distinction, uses the terms *impression* and *passion* synonymously. In his understanding all passions are simple impressions though not all direct internal impressions, for instance, are passions. The will is a direct impression but Hume does not understand the will to be a passion[289]. „By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities."[290] Direct passions are passions like desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, despair, and security. Since the direct passions (impressions) do not seem to need mediation to arise from their supposed antecedent ideas (this is what Hume's earlier statement suggested to be the case), they seem to be the most interesting ones in the context of our investigation.

First of all, we need to understand what Hume means by direct passions arising immediately from good and evil, and from pleasure and pain. We also need to understand the mechanism of this process. *Good and evil* mean the same as *pleasure and pain* to Hume[291]. Therefore we don't need to treat them as different perceptions. It will be sufficient to take only the definitions of *pleasure* and *pain* into consideration. It is also important to know how pain and

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[288] T.I,I,II,7-8.
[289] compare T.II,III,I,399.
[290] T.II,I,I,276.
[291] compare T.II,III,IX,439.

pleasure are defined, since different kinds of perception have different principles of association. - Hume defines pleasures and pains, clearly, as impressions: „...we may observe, that there are three different kinds of impressions convey'd by the senses. The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures,".[292] If pains and pleasures are impressions of sensation and give rise to direct passions, then it seems that the mechanism by which the passions are produced cannot be one of causation but has to be one of resemblance. Impressions, so it seems, can only be linked to one another by resemblance but not by causation or contiguity. If this were undisputedly so then a problem for the case against causation would not occur and we could happily move on to the indirect passions.

Unfortunately, the matter is not straightforward at all. The impression of pleasure or pain produces the direct passion immediately without the „interposition of its idea"[293]. The question is whether the passion is produced by causation or resemblance. If we look at the direct passions we can see how both ways of explanations (one by resemblance and one by causation) are theoretically perfectly possible. Both of them, if my previous interpretation can be accepted, are able to maintain a distinction between direct and indirect passions. Although pleasure and pain are impressions of sensation and not impressions of reflection, Hume seems to think that the natural way of transition of impressions is one of resemblance. He writes, discussing the transition of ideas and the mechanisms of imagination: „As the transition of ideas is here made contrary to the natural propensity of the imagination, that faculty must be overpower'd by some stronger principle of another kind; and as there is nothing ever present to the mind but impressions and ideas, this principle must necessarily lie in the impressions. Now it has been observ'd, that impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance, and that where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions, it very naturally passes from the one to the other: As on the contrary, a repugnance in the

[292] T.I,IV,II,192.
[293] T.II,I,I,275.

dispositions produces a difficulty in the transition of the passions."[294] For Hume to make such a statement in Book Two of the *Treatise* shows that he neither abandoned nor intended to contradict his understanding of the relation and association of impressions and its application to human psychology as it was set out in Book One.

Considering these arguments I believe that Hume, in respect to the direct passions, favors the transition from one impression to another as one only by resemblance. *Direct* must then be understood to mean that the passage is taken by resemblance only. However, if it should be the case that pleasure and pain produce the direct passions by causation, the consequences for the case against causation as the principle of unity of perceptions are not too grave. There are impressions which need to be linked to one another where causation cannot provide this necessary link.

When we look at the indirect passions the case against causality as a possible principle of unity of perceptions is very straightforward. Causality alone is not sufficient to serve as such a principle. Additional conditions are required, such as the impression of the self[295] or the presence of some perceived quality in the mind. It could now be argued that this perceived quality is present in the mind as an idea and not as an impression. Therefore the condition of ideas causing impressions would remain unaltered. I think we can reply to a suggestion of this kind. An association of ideas can never produce an impression as Hume says quite clearly when he discusses the indirect passions of pride and humility: „'Tis evident, that the association of ideas operates in so silent and imperceptible a manner, that we are scarce sensible of it, and discover it more by its effects than by any immediate feeling or perception. It produces no emotion, and gives rise to no new impression of any kind, but only modifies those ideas, of which the mind was formerly possess'd, and which it cou'd recal upon occasion. From this reasoning, as well as from undoubted experience, we may conclude, that an association of ideas, however necessary,

[294] T.II,II,II,343-344.
[295] Here the transition is not made from only an idea towards an impression.

is not alone sufficient to give rise to any passion."[296] I think that it is perfectly within the framework of the Humean thought to apply the statement not only to the passions, but also to impressions in general. The justification of this extension is drawn from Hume's account of the distinction between ideas and impressions, mainly from the distinction by vivacity (quantitative distinction). Although I have questioned the consistency of the distinction and of its general application to different parts of Hume's theoretical account, we can see that all the difficulties the distinction faces throughout the *Treatise* are here of no great consequence. The possibility of a qualitative distinction does not deny the quantitative distinction Hume sometimes thinks to be the only one. It is merely suggesting that Hume himself is not very consistent in claiming that a qualitative distinction is the only one which can, and more importantly, must be made.[297]

The association of ideas is not without influence upon the production of the passion. It is necessary to facilitate the transition which may well not have occurred without the presence of the associated idea. The idea seems to be a necessary condition of the transition but it is not its sole cause: „An easy transition of ideas, which, of itself, causes no emotion, can never be necessary, or even useful to the passions, but by forwarding the transition betwixt some related impressions."[298] However, the requirement of an additional condition does not necessarily affect causality as a possible candidate for the principle of unity of perceptions *per se*. There are indications that the principle by which the transition is actually made is causation. It certainly is the case that if there would be one single sufficient principle of transition it would have to be causation because of Hume's line of argument in matters of the indirect passions, but especially in respect to pride and humility. Hume uses analogies of equal forces to explain why the self cannot be the cause of the passions of pride and

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[296] T.II,I,IX,305.

[297] Some may want to argue that if a qualitative distinction between the different kinds of perception is established then the quantitative distinction becomes obsolete if not impossible. However, it is entirely possible to say that the pile of apples in my garden is bigger than the pile of pears, just as I can say that an orange is bigger than a cherry. The criterion of quantitative distinction of qualities is some common good, just as in Hume's case the criterion is vivacity. We can also say that apples, pears, cherries and oranges are all fruit, just as Hume can say that impressions and ideas are all perceptions.

[298] T.II,I,IX,306.

humility. The underlying understanding of the mechanism of the coming about of the passions is clearly essentially causal.

Regarding the relation of different types of perception to each other we can conclude that a case in favor of causality can be made if we look at the ideas which are produced by corresponding impressions. But it is certainly clear that a case **against** causation can be established in respect to the enlivening of an idea into an impression by the workings of sympathy. Where the direction from ideas to impressions is concerned generally we can say that even if ideas can causally give rise to impressions, as it was the case with indirect passions, they cannot do so without additional conditions being fulfilled. This is the second case against causation as the principle of unity of perceptions.

At this point it is certainly true that there still is a variety of problems affecting causality as the principle of unity which are worth investigating, such as, for instance, the problem of the first perception and its cause. However, I believe that the presented two cases against causation are sufficiently strong to show that causation, on its own, is unfit to be the principle of unity of perceptions. The reasons leading to my conclusion are plainly rooted in Hume's theory of perception itself.

VI.II. The Principles of Association of Ideas

Ideas can, just as impressions, be associated with one another. They are associated by three principles: resemblance, causation and contiguity. They are unlike impressions not only in the sense that impressions can only be associated by resemblance but also in the sense that ideas always maintain their particular identities when associated, whereas impressions can mix properly, thereby giving up their original identities and melting together into a new one. Ideas can never form a total union: „Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endow'd with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each

other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture."[299]

Keeping this in mind the matter concerning the principles of association of ideas as principle of unity of perceptions seems to be pretty straightforward. Ideas are related by causation, contiguity and/or resemblance. The ideas themselves are dependent on impressions (at least where simple ideas are concerned). The impressions themselves are related and associated by resemblance, and resemblance is also a principle of association of ideas. Given any combination of perceptions it seems clear that at least one of these three principles will apply and it also seems clear that there are no cases where perceptions are related or associated by principles other than these three. Hence the principles of association of ideas seem to be most promising candidates for the purpose of uniting the different perceptions. Where one of these principles fails to provide for a link between different perceptions, one of the others steps in and produces the needed link.

However, now that it seems as if the three principles of association of ideas together can account satisfactorily for the unity of perceptions we have to pay attention to a first problem which surfaces as a consequence of such an understanding. The problem occurs because it is not only one principle which is used here to establish proper relations between the different perceptions, but there are, in fact, three principles. The problem is most serious then when we feel some inclination to identify the principle of unity with the self, which has to be, in the common understanding, one. This problem can be easily dealt with by pointing out that, of course, the principle of unity does not have to be identical with the self. Nevertheless, it still seems to be the case that the principles of association of ideas present themselves as a plurality and not as a singularity, not as one principle. The three principles of association of ideas do not seem to have an intrinsic link to each other apart from the fact that they are principles by

[299] T.II,II,VI,366., This is of some interest in respect to the distinction between impressions and ideas. It certainly supports my claim that impressions and ideas are qualitatively distinct. However, our present interest lies not with the nature of perceptions but with the relations the perceptions, in our case ideas, have with one another, although it seems to be only fair to say that both aspects are certainly connected since a relation is not independent of its relata.

which the human mind operates, meaning that the plurality of independent principles cannot be overcome. When it comes to the principles being principles by which the mind operates, it even looks as if the role of the uniting principle is pushed back to the human mind as the „bearer" of the principles of association of ideas. Thus, we are faced with a vicious circle. On the other hand, if we were to find a new principle uniting the three principles in question would this new principle then not be the true principle of unity of the perceptions? If not, what would be its role in respect to the self?

The problem, however, does not develop its full strength if there would be an intrinsic link between the principles of association of ideas. Hume leaves no doubt that causation and contiguity are connected to one another: „We may therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as essential to that of causation."[300] It must be noted that Hume allows contiguity to be a relation which exists mind-independently and quite prior to the operations of the mind: „As to what may be said, that the operations of nature are independent of our thought and reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have observ'd, that objects bear to each other the relations of contiguity and succession; that like objects may be observ'd in several instances to have like relations; and that all this is independent of, and antecedent to the operations of the understanding."[301] Contiguity is, in a sense, observable whereas causation is not, but the latter is certainly linked to the former. I think we are right to understand contiguity to be a necessary condition of causation in an epistemological sense as well as in an ontological one: 1. We have to observe contiguity to make the inference towards causation. 2. For objects to be causally related it is necessary that they are contiguous. „I find in the first place, that whatever objects are consider'd as causes or effects, are *contiguous*; and that nothing can operate in a time or place, which is ever so little remov'd from those of its existence. Tho' distant objects may sometimes seem productive of each other, they are commonly found upon examination to be link'd by a chain of causes, which are contiguous

[300] T.I,III,II,75.
[301] T.I,III,XIV,168., compare the passages immediately following for an understanding of Hume's form of Basic Realism.

among themselves, and to the distant objects; and when in any particular instance we cannot discover this connexion, we still presume it to exist."[302]

However, the story of resemblance is a more complicated one. Whereas contiguity is important in respect to causation and the „discovery" of causality epistemologically **and** ontologically, resemblance is of importance only in the former sense and here it is strongly connected with memory. Hume states, when discussing probability: „But beside these two species of probability, which are deriv'd from an *imperfect* experience and from *contrary* causes, there is a third arising from ANALOGY, which differs from them in some material circumstances. According to the hypothesis above explain'd all kinds of reasoning from causes and effects are founded on two particulars, *viz.* the constant conjunction of any two objects in all past experience, and the resemblance of a present object to any one of them. [...] If you weaken either the union or resemblance, you weaken the principle of transition, and of consequence that belief, which arises from it."[303] To arrive at **the notion** of causation we need not only to observe that two events are contiguous, we also need to recognize their **constant conjunction.**[304] Perceiving once that a billiard ball hits another which then begins to move is not, in itself, sufficient to acquire the notion of causation. I have to perceive such an event several times and I have to know that the event I perceive today resembles the event that happened yesterday or three weeks ago. I have to know that my present perception resembles previous perceptions. In that sense resemblance is an essential requirement towards the notion of causation.

However, though resemblance is necessary to arrive at the **notions** of causation and constant conjunction, is it also necessary for causation and contiguity themselves, whether they exist mind independently or not?[305] To show a necessary ontological link between resemblance and contiguity will suffice to establish such a link between resemblance and causation. The link

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[302] T.I,III,II,75.
[303] T.I,III,XII,142.
[304] compare T.I,III,XIV,163-164.
[305] This would be necessary if one wants to claim intrinsic links between resemblance, contiguity and causation.

between contiguity and causation has already been established, in an epistemological as well as in an ontological sense and resemblance and causation can be mediated by contiguity quite easily. Whether a necessary link between resemblance and contiguity can be established or not depends largely on what we think the term *contiguity* means. Do we feel compelled to understand it, in the context given by Hume's philosophy as a whole, as the *constant conjunction*, or do we understand it as *conjunction* only? If we take the term to mean something along the lines of *constant conjunction* the matter promises to be straightforward, ie. it should be easy enough to conceive of the necessity of a link between the two principles under discussion. The very word *constant*, in the meaning Hume gives to it throughout the *Treatise*, implies resemblance because it implies repetition and repetition implies resemblance. „Causal association always depends on the force of association of resembling sequences of events - the constancy of a conjunction is a matter of the resemblance between a given conjunction and the other past conjoinings of objects resembling the first conjunct, with objects resembling the second. Causal association is always a special case of association by resemblance, and also of association by contiguity. The special feature is repetition, which is itself a matter of resemblance of pairings."[306]

It is difficult to link resemblance to contiguity, and consequently to causation, once we allow contiguity to occur only in singular cases which will never be repeated. Let's say it occurs that a unicorn dips its horn into the river and, by doing so, frees the water of all poisons. Let's also say that the detoxification of the water is caused by the unicorn's horn. In this case there exists a conjunction of the unicorn's horn and the water as well as a conjunction of the polluted water at time 1 and the clean water at time 2 (conjunction in the succession of time of cause and effect). If this particular event only occurs once and never again then we have, within the context of Humean philosophy, no possibility to develop the idea that the events in question (dipping of the horn - detoxification of water) are connected by causation, because the event is never

[306] BAIER, A. ibid., p.75.

repeated.[307] If, on the other hand, people have observed the miracles performed by this very secretive animal only once and have implied that the unicorn's horn holds magic powers because it is responsible (in terms of causation) for the cleaning of polluted fluids then we could argue, that they made an inference by using the concept of causation they had already acquired by the observation of constant conjunctions of other events. Resemblance would obviously be linked with contiguity where the latter repeated occurrences are concerned but the idea of causation cannot be gained by the observation of the unicorn itself. Thus, once contiguity is taken on its own and not as *constant conjunction* no intrinsic link can be found between resemblance and contiguity. To arrive at the needed link in respect to Hume's *Treatise* it is necessary to establish that Hume understands *contiguity* to mean nothing else but *constant conjunction.* This is, by all means, hardly conceivable. He writes: „But tho' I cannot altogether exclude the relations of resemblance and contiguity from operating on the fancy in this manner, 'tis observable that, **when single**[308], their influence is very feeble and uncertain."[309] The absence of an intrinsic connection between resemblance and contiguity becomes also clear, in an indirect manner, when we consider Hume's discussion of the idea of necessary connection: „When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other."[310] When contiguous events occur only in one single instance the idea of necessary connection can not be formed. Only if similar contiguous events occur more than once can resemblance between the events, taking place at different instances, be recognized. By doing so, we recognize their **constant** conjunction. This does not suggest an intrinsic link between

[307] It would here suffice to say that a repetition of the events has never been observed, though, in fact, it did happen.
[308] My own accentuation.
[309] T.I,III,IX,109.
[310] ECHU,VII,I,50, p.63.

contiguity and resemblance. The link which can be maintained here is one between **constant** conjunction and resemblance.

Another way to attempt to establish an intrinsic link between contiguity itself and resemblance is one which makes use of the relationship between causes and their effects. That is to argue that effects resemble their causes and are in conjunction to them. Hume argues, talking about effects and resemblance in respect to the motion of bodies: „These suppositions are all consistent and natural; and the reason, why we imagine the communication of motion to be more consistent and natural not only than those suppositions, but also than any other natural effect, is founded on the relation of *resemblance* betwixt the cause and effect, which is here united to experience, and binds the objects in the closest and most intimate manner to each other, so as to make us imagine them to be absolutely inseparable."[311] 1. However, I don't think one is justified to take this statement as a confirmation of the claim that Hume believes that effects necessarily resemble their causes. Motion is found to be caused by motion and Hume uses the found resemblance between cause and effect to explain the enforcement of the causal association. The fact that here cause and effect resemble each other makes the causal association „consistent and natural". But to allow some cases of resemblance between effects and their causes is not to maintain that effects **necessarily** have to resemble their causes. „We have remark'd, that the conclusion, which we draw from a present object to its absent cause or effect, is never founded on any qualities, which we observe in that object, consider'd in itself; or, in other words, that 'tis impossible to determine, otherwise than by experience, what will result from any phaenomenon, or what has preceded it."[312] **Resemblance between cause and effect** is also not an issue in Hume's list of rules by which we judge of causes and effects.[313] Resemblance necessary for the notion of causation is the resemblance we observe between contiguous events which take place at different instances in

[311] T.I,III,IX,111-112.
[312] T,I,III,IX,111.
[313] compare T.I,III,XV,173-175.

time. „From causes which appear *similar* we expect similar effects."[314] Hume states here that causes which resemble each other are expected to have similar effects, but he does not say that effects have to resemble their causes. Although the cause is proportionate to its effect in, at least, a quantitative way[315], it is the case that „any thing may produce any thing"[316] . So, a claim towards a general resemblance between effects and their causes cannot be made in a strong enough fashion to uphold intrinsic links between resemblance and contiguity because of Hume's account of externality and of the origin of the simple impressions. 2. Even if it were the case that all effects always resemble their causes the needed link could not be established successfully. Not all relations between perceptions are causal relations, neither are all objects which resemble each other causally related.

It seems to me that the unity of the three principles of association and relation of ideas can only be achieved by maintaining interdependency between these three principles., Causation, for instance, requires conjunction and resemblance in an epistemological sense; and requires at least conjunction, but not necessarily resemblance, in a real sense. However, interdependency as I think it necessary to account for the unity of these three relations, would have to mean that whenever two objects have a causal relationship to each other they occur in conjunction **and** they resemble each other. Furthermore, it would also have to mean that whenever two objects are in conjunction to each other they also have a causal relationship. On the other hand, if we want to maintain a necessary link between contiguity and resemblance it would be necessary that either conjoined objects/events always resemble each other or that resembling objects/events are always conjoined to one another. The latter is certainly necessary in an epistemological sense (we need to make a comparison) but the former is hardly the case. We can think of many things which are conjoined to one another but don't resemble each other or are related causally. We also can think of many things which resemble each other but are not conjoined in an

[314] ECHU,IV,II,31,p.36.
[315] compare ECHU,XI,105,p.136.
[316] T.I,III,XV,173.

ontological sense. Although we can say that causation requires conjunction and resemblance of sequences; conjunction does neither require causation nor resemblance.

One could, of course, argue that the meaning of *conjunction* has to be narrowed so that it does not apply, in its proper sense, to entirely contingent assemblies of objects or processes. So that conjunction should always be understood, properly speaking, as *necessary conjunction.* It is quite obvious, however, that in respect to matters of fact the very term *necessary* implies causality. I think that it would not be logically sound to accept *conjunction* in this sense into the present context.

If these arguments can be accepted it follows that there is no interdependency between causation, contiguity and resemblance. There is certainly dependency in the sense that causation requires contiguity, but this dependency does not work „both ways" because contiguity and resemblance do not require causation. Although resemblance requires contiguity epistemologically, it does not ontologically. Simple (not constant) contiguity does not require resemblance in any case. Thus, we are left with three principles which are not interdependent. Therefore, they cannot be understood as being a unity in themselves apart from the fact that they are principles by which the human mind operates. This is not sufficient to allow us to regard the three principles of association of ideas as **one** principle of perceptions, their union is provided by something other than the three principles themselves.

This statement brings us close to another problem which needs to be discussed. Namely, that the self of the bundle definition cannot be reduced to its principle of unity alone but that it has to include the perceptions united by the principle (or the principles) we are looking for. It seems now possible to argue that it is of no importance in terms of the creation of a proper unity, whether the principles themselves are intrinsically related to each other or not. It could be argued that it is sufficient that there are principles which unite all one's different perceptions into one bundle. I have to admit that I don't find this sufficiency to be obvious. There are also further reaching implications once one considers

that the three principles of association of ideas have to be classified as operations of the mind. This, in itself, poses a new, but already recognized problem, which is the identity of the mind. The question springs to mind if it wasn't exactly this in the first place the principles are supposed to account for?

So far we have taken for granted that the three principles - causation, resemblance and contiguity - can link all perceptions, including impressions, with one another. One or the other principle can provide a link between almost all possible combinations of perceptions, co-existent or in succession: idea to idea, impression to impression, idea to impression (when idea is prior to the impression) and impression to idea (when impression is prior to idea). However, we have to keep in mind that although all three principles can be applied to the association of ideas and causation and resemblance can be applied to the association of ideas and impressions, it is still the case that impressions of sensation can only be associated by resemblance, but not by causation and contiguity. Thus, we are still left with the problem of impressions of sensations which do not seem to be linked to one another.

This problem is very interesting in, at least, two ways: Firstly, if there are perceptions which are not linked to one another then the three principles cannot serve towards the inclusion of these perceptions into the bundle. If this is the case then the principles of association of ideas cannot be the principle of unity because they do not connect **all** perceptions with one another. Secondly, a possible negative outcome of the above consideration (i.e. the principles are not applicable to all perceptions of an individual) will give rise to the question what it is which makes these unassociated perceptions part of a particular bundle. If such a principle can then be found it will have to be understood as the true criterion of identity. If, on the other hand, we cannot find any connecting principle or category whatsoever, identity cannot be properly accounted for and this has, evidently, disastrous consequences for Hume's theory as a whole. But before we can draw any conclusion we need to look at the seemingly unassociated perceptions themselves.

Resemblance can occur between successive perceptions (*via* recall) and simultaneous perceptions. However, simultaneity of two or more perceptions does not imply resemblance between the simultaneous perceptions; neither does resemblance imply simultaneity. This poses a problem when it comes to impressions of sensation because they are related by resemblance only. I can have two or more impressions of sensation at the same time, which do not resemble each other. Thus, there seems to be no link between them. We all know such seemingly unassociated impressions. I can see a bird flying in the winter sky and, at exactly the same time, can smell the smoke in the air, can see clouds and mountains, hear the noises of traffic and can feel the cold of a December morning. All these perceptions are sense impressions and are simultaneous, but they do not resemble each other.

We have to note that Hume does not think that there is any difference between our different sense perceptions in a Lockean sense. Hume distinguishes three different kinds of sense perceptions. One of them is the pains or pleasures. He argues, as an objection to LOCKE's theory of perception, that none of the sense perceptions corresponds to any primary or secondary qualities: „Now 'tis evident, that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colours, sounds, heat and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity, and that the difference we make betwixt them in this respect, arises not from the mere perception. [...] 'Tis also evident, that colours, sounds, *&c.* are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on perception nor reason, but on the imagination. [...] Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."[317] Although sense perceptions of the three different kinds „are the same in the manner of their existence", it cannot be implied automatically that they are the same in the manner in which they appear in the senses. We cannot necessarily assume resemblance between the three different kinds of sense

[317] T.I,IV,II,192-193.

perception. Smell is different from colour and sound is different from touch. Hume himself refers to the different senses we possess when discussing space and extension: „The first notion of space and extension is deriv'd solely from the senses of sight and feeling [...] and when several sounds strike our hearing at once, custom and reflection alone make us form an idea of the degrees of the distance and contiguity of those bodies, from which they are deriv'd."[318] If it is possible, and Hume seems to think it is, to distinguish different senses (whether they exist as features of a mind-independently existing body or not will be let aside for the moment) then there must be distinguishing features of these different senses which are the criteria of the distinction. Therefore it can be said that the senses, in this respect, do not resemble each other. Given Hume's understanding of the senses and their respective perceptions, sense perceptions of different senses do not resemble each other in this respect.

It becomes already apparent that the question whether or no resemblance can always be a connecting principle of impressions, be they successive or simultaneous, is not as straightforward a matter as it seemed to be. It also becomes apparent that presence or absence of resemblance of impressions of sensation is very much a matter of the criterion of resemblance we want to allow for, and especially, Hume can allow for. It is clear that all sense perceptions resemble each other in so far as they are perceptions of the senses (whatever the sense ontologically happen to be) and they do not resemble each other in so far as they belong to different senses. Furthermore, non-resemblance of particular sense impressions can be extended towards impressions which belong to the same sense. The looks of an orange (sight) are different from the looks of a dog. We usually don't think that oranges and dogs resemble each other. We also do not think that there is a resemblance between the smell of a rose and the smell of rotting meat, Schönberg does not sound a bit like Mozart and fur feels completely different from steel. So, although the elements of these pairings resemble each other in general: they are either both looks, or smell, or noise, or touch; they do not resemble each other as particulars.

[318] T.I,IV,V,235.

We now have to determine the level of resemblance necessary for Hume's account. It is my opinion that Hume, given his theory of perception and its consequences, has to place resemblance as a principle of association of impressions not only on a general level[319] but also on a level of particulars. Since particular sensations do not always resemble each other resemblance cannot serve as the connecting principle of **all** impressions. First of all, the bundle of perceptions is a bundle of single, particular perceptions. A classification of these different perceptions is possible by reasoning and imagination, but the perceptions appear first in the mind as particular perceptions. This, I think, is also supported by the fact that Hume is an atomist. In this context we also have to remember Hume's statements in the *Appendix* of the *Treatise*, where he highlights the distinctness and separateness of our single perceptions.

Secondly, we find some more indication that resemblance would have to occur on the level of particular impressions, but sometimes does not, when we look at Hume's account of experience. Hume clearly states, on several occasions, that to know what a certain experience is like one has to have had this experience oneself. It is not sufficient that the experience is described or that a comparison is made to other experiences one has had. This applies not only to the impressions of the senses but also to the impressions of reflection, that is, the passions. Hume writes at the very beginning of the *Treatise*: „...that where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give rise to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when one is born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but also their correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where the organs of sensation are entirely destroy'd, but likewise where they have never been put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple, without having actually tasted it."[320] It is obvious that Hume refers here to the connection between impressions and ideas. However, we can clearly see that one cannot know what the

[319] This, of course is always necessary as soon as one wants to account for classifications.
[320] T.I,I,I,5.

impression of the taste of a pineapple is like without having had the impression of a pineapple. If I have never, for instance, tasted oysters and somebody tells me their taste resembles that of sea water, I still do not know, though I know what sea water tastes like, what oysters **exactly** taste like. Hume allows for different degrees of resemblance. The taste of an oyster resembles the taste of sea water more than it resembles the taste of a prawn. However, without having tasted an oyster I cannot have a „just idea" of an oyster's taste.

The same applies to impressions of reflection, such as the passions. When we remember Hume's account of sympathy we will also remember that I can only sympathize with somebody's state of mind (that is, his impression) when I have had a previous experience of such an impression myself. „...one can sympathize only with experiences that one has had oneself. One cannot, on Hume's account, form the idea of another person's emotion unless one has had the corresponding impression. This follows from the claim that the passions are simple impressions and that all simple ideas are copies of simple impressions."[321] Similarly to the examples concerning sensations we can say that I cannot know that the other person is angry if I have never been angry myself prior to the observation. I cannot form the appropriate idea of someone else's anger because I do not have any idea of anger myself, independently of the other, since I never experienced that particular passion to give me its corresponding idea in the first place. I could not, then, even read the behavioral signs appropriately because I would have no idea whatsoever that passions like anger even exist. Given this situation and also given that I do not live in a social vacuum - there will be people who tell me that the person I am observing feels anger - I still could not form an appropriate idea of it. There is nothing within me the name „anger" I have just been given could refer to.

It seems, therefore, to be the case that resemblance has to occur on a level of particular impressions. It also seems to be the case that „not all of our perceptions seem to be related by causation and resemblance - particularly not our impressions of sensation. An impression of a coffee cup [...] neither

[321] ARDAL, P. ibid., p.45.

resembles nor causes the succeeding impression of a pen."[322] The impression of a coffee cup does also not resemble or cause the impression of a pen if both impressions are simultaneous. This poses a problem when the impressions in question are not impressions of reflection. If they are impressions of reflection they will principally be derived from ideas or from impressions of pain or pleasure. Impressions which are unrelated to antecedent ideas are simple and complex impressions of sensation. Complex impressions of sensation are made up of simple impressions of sensation.

It is possible to argue that Hume does think that simple impressions, though they are different on the level of particular impressions, still resemble each other. This is not very apparent in Book One of the *Treatise*[323], but there is a passage in the *Appendix* which could be taken to support such an argument. Hume writes: „'Tis evident, that even simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance shou'd be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. *Blue* and *green* are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than *blue* and *scarlet*; tho' their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction. 'Tis the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. And of this we may be certain, even from the very abstract terms *simple idea*. They comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each other in their simplicity."[324] Here it could be argued that, since simple ideas are produced by resembling simple impressions, Hume's statement does not only apply to these simple ideas, but can also be extended towards the simple impressions. So that simple impressions, though they do not have any circumstances in common,

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[322] GARRETT, D. ibid., p.172.

[323] Apart from the Missing-shade-of-blue-argument, compare T.I,I,I,6. However, as has already been discussed: Hume argues that „the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions". He does not argue that the simple impression of the missing shade of blue can be derived from either its idea or the set of (not exactly) resembling impressions of the available shades of blue.

[324] T.App.,637.

resemble each other in their simplicity.[325] One could even go further and say that there is a basic resemblance between all perceptions, namely in so far as they all are perceptions.

This certainly is all very plausible. However, the question must be asked if resemblance in this sense is good enough to provide a uniting link between the different simple impressions. The sensations are hereby the most interesting subject because simple impressions of reflection, i.e. the passions, naturally give rise to one another by their resemblance. „Now it has been observ'd, that impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance, and that where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions, it very naturally passes from the one to the other.“[326] Simple impressions of the senses don't seem to do this. It does not really matter whether the resemblance between *blue* and *green* is greater than the resemblance between *blue* and *red*. The needed principle of unity of the perceptions requires that the impression of *green* would have to give rise naturally to the impression of *blue*. It is pretty clear that this is not so. It does not make sense to believe that the taste of a banana gives naturally rise to the taste of a pineapple or the taste of a sea water gives naturally rise to the taste of an oyster.

We have to keep in mind that the principle of unity of perceptions has to connect particular perceptions to one another. It must provide for a particular set, i.e. a particular bundle of perceptions. Resemblance as the sole principle which connects simple sense impressions with one another is not good enough for this purpose. Resemblance as a connecting principle has to work on the level of particular impressions. This is the condition of the claimed connection between different simple impressions in Hume's account of the natural association of the simple impressions of reflection. That resemblance has to be resemblance between particular perceptions is also apparent when Hume writes in the *Appendix* of the *Treatise*: „Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. All

[325] As well as they resemble each other in that they are impressions and not ideas and in that they all belong to the senses in general, and, sometimes, even to particular senses.
[326] T.II,II,II,343.

perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceiv'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity."[327] It is, however, important to note that I do not wish to argue that distinctness and separateness make resemblance impossible. Resemblance occurs between distinct and separate perceptions, but Hume's statement highlights the fact that we have to consider perceptions in their particularity. Resemblance has to occur on the level of particular impressions of sensation as a principle of association in ALL instances, and not only in some. And, following from my preceding discussion, we can say that resemblance is unable to fulfill this requirement.

If these arguments can be accepted then we can draw a first conclusion, namely that the principles of association of ideas are very unlikely to serve as the principle of unity of perceptions. Not ALL perceptions, especially in respect to the impressions, are related by at least one of these principles in a necessary way. Neither are these principles themselves necessarily linked to one another. They are not interdependent principles.

However, we still have to explore the possibility of a natural link between the three principles provided by the fact that they are principles by which the mind operates. So that the criterion of their unity would lie with, and in, the mind.[328] To begin with, we must look at Hume's understanding of the mind. Once this has been done we will become aware of the fact that the mind itself cannot provide a unifying framework, neither for the principles of association of ideas nor for the perceptions themselves. Hume is very clear in Book One of the *Treatise* and also in the *Appendix*, that the mind itself is nothing but the collection of perceptions. „It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, **that compose a mind**[329], the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other."[330] And, as Hume points out in Book One: „We

[327] T.App.,634.
[328] This would create a variety of new problems necessary to adress. These problems would occur especially in respect to a combined theory of self identity and personal identity.
[329] My own accentuation.
[330] T.App.,635.

may observe, that what we call a *mind*, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity."[331] When we look at the latter part of this definition, we find that we don't have to worry about the fact that Hume doesn't ascribe any perfect simplicity and identity to the mind. We can be perfectly at ease with the understanding of the self as a complex impression because neither perfect simplicity, as is obvious, nor **perfect** identity can be ascribed to it. There is, as we may remember, still identity, but not in a metaphysically strict and perfect sense.

My remark regarding the understanding of the self anticipates a certain understanding of the mind as it is presented in Hume's statements as they have been given so far. Hume regards the mind and the self as identical. Hume refers to mind and self synonymously in Section VI of Part IV, which is the section dedicated to personal identity. To explain the self he refers to the mind: „The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd."[332] When we also consider the passage of the *Appendix* referring to the particular problem that a uniting principle of all perceptions could not be found by Hume himself, then we must surely conclude that what was said there does not only apply to the unity of perceptions needed in respect to the self, but must also apply to the unity of perceptions needed to account for the mind itself. It does not matter here whether the mind is identical with the self or not because we can, at least, be certain that the former is required to account for the latter. What does matter is that the mind cannot provide us with a principle to unite the different perceptions and it was this we

[331] T.I,IV,II,207.
[332] T.I,IV,VI,253.

were looking for. It also follows that a mind of Hume's understanding cannot serve as a uniting principle for the principles of association of ideas. No intrinsic links suggesting interdependency between the principles of resemblance, contiguity and causation can be established, not even in the sense that these three principles have a common origin in reference to the mind. Thus a proper unity of the three principles cannot be established. This would have been necessary, however, to account for the unity of particular bundles of perceptions, i.e. the different selves.Therefore the conclusion has to be drawn that the principles of association of ideas cannot fulfill the role of a principle of unity of perceptions. The principles, although they are certainly important, if not necessary, are not sufficient to account for connections between perceptions in all conceivable cases.

VI.III. The Self

After having been unsuccessful in establishing either one of the commonly acknowledged candidates for the function of a principle of unity of perceptions, we have to look at less obvious, and even *prima facie* unlikely candidates. One of these is the self itself.

Causation and resemblance have attracted the attention of philosophers and Hume himself, and have been believed to be able to serve as the principle of unity of perceptions. If we look away from the *Appendix* of the *Treatise* where Hume expresses his doubts concerning the principle of unity of perceptions, but look at the *Treatise* itself, we will remember that Hume himself argues in favor of causation as such a principle: „As to *causation*; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other."[333] ANNETTE BAIER focuses also on causation, although she offers a relatively open account in respect to the principle of unity when she writes, using a

[333] ibid., p.261.

„Humean" definition of substance: „Such a cleaned-up version of substantial union is indeed what the thinker about personal identity, in Part IV, has found for the 'successive existence' of one mind. The contiguity is, in the nature of the case, temporal only. This loose flexible concept of what a 'substance' is allows nations also to be substances. The substantial person, like the nation, unites many perceptions at one time (the data of different senses, thoughts, pleasures, anxieties) as well as over a stretch of time. The latter union of non-coexistent 'modes' must be there, if causation is to unite the various modes of the substance, since causation is taken by Hume to imply temporal passage."[334]

Others have suggested that a possible principle of unity of perceptions could be seen in the principles of association of ideas. Although causation is closely connected to resemblance and contiguity, it is still the case, as I have argued, that resemblance and contiguity can occur independent of causation. It is for these reasons that causation alone is not sufficient to provide for every conceivable relation between different perceptions. We have seen that the principles of association of ideas can also not fulfill the purpose they are needed for. In this light, we may want to consider the self as a candidate, provided we interpret Book One's bundle-definition in a certain way: the self, which is „nothing but a bundle"[335] of perceptions is understood not only as an assembly of perceptions but the notion is also supposed to contain the union of the perceptions. If I refer to a wreath of flowers I do not refer to all the single flowers of the wreath, but I refer to the wreath which consists of flowers.

I wish to argue that the self itself cannot be understood as the principle of unity of perceptions, and this for several reasons: Firstly, because of Hume's theory of perception and the lack of intrinsic links between **all** perceptions. Secondly because I understand the self as having a progressive nature. It is of special importance to remember that it is impossible, for Hume, to have an internal perception and not to know that one has it. Thus, it makes sense to talk about a self only if there is self-awareness. If self-awareness is necessary then

[334] BAIER, A. ibid., p.127.
[335] T.I,IV,VI,252.

it is surely impossible that one can have perceptions, united by the self fulfilling the role of a principle of unity of perceptions, without knowing that one is a self. We all know, however, that there are times in our lives when we do have perceptions but don't know that we are a self - when we are very small babies, when we are asleep and when we have fainted, for instance. Furthermore, if we consider that I claim the self to be of a progressive nature and that it emerges, plainly speaking, when „enough" perceptions have occurred and the operations of the mind had a „enough" material to work on[336] then it is equally impossible that the self is existent, if only as a principle, to unite these perceptions without me knowing about it or being able to refer to it in language.[337]

It could be argued, however, that in respect to the speech of small children the matter is not as clear cut as I make it out to be. That, in fact, small children happily employ *nouns*, they say their name (they refer to themselves in the third person), say *Mummy*, employ *verbs* **but do not** employ terms like *I* and *you* and don't always employ terms like *here* and *there* meaningfully. That is to say that small children generally do not employ *indexicals* and that *I* and *you* are not different from other *indexicals*. This, it could be argued, indicates only that the child hasn't grasped the meaning of these terms yet, but no assumption can be made regarding the existence of entities or relations these terms refer to. However, I believe that small children don't have the concept of *I* for the reason that the term has, in the child's perception, no reference. If the term has no reference then the child can also not have an impression or an idea of its own self, because if it had there would be a reference and if so it would employ the word *I*. The child simply doesn't know to what the term refers, but it knows to what the term *cup* refers. By employing the term meaningfully the child shows that it can distinguish cups from spoons, cars from dogs and that it has, in Humean terms, impressions (and ideas) of cups, spoons, cars and dogs. It is also the case that small children, as anyone who had the opportunity to observe their own children will know, employ other *indexicals* like *here* and *there* quite

[336] Which accommodates the fact that children do not say *I* under the age of three.
[337] Note that children just under three have usually acquired quite considerable language skills.

often. They might not always get them right and may say *here* instead of *there* and so on, or they might not pronounce them properly, but they certainly try to make use of them and have also an idea that they usually refer to spatial coordinates. This is very apparent when one considers the German language where the word *there* is very easy to speak, the German word for *there* is *da*. Babies will often point at objects they want but cannot say the names of (because they are either unknown to them or very difficult to speak) and say *Da*. They give thereby an indication of their interest in the object and wish to have it.[338] Children are also very quick to learn the meaning of articles with changing reference. So even if the German *da* is not interpreted to mean *there* but is to mean *das* (*that*), the child would still employ a term of changing reference.

If these inductive arguments can be accepted then I think it must also be accepted that small children are capable of grasping the meaning of *indexicals* and know that they have changing references. It then seems to be the case that a changing reference does not pose a problem to the child. However, what poses a problem is that with certain *indexicals* a reference cannot be found at all, which clearly indicates that there **is** nothing (yet) the term is supposed to refer to. A toddler of speaking age does certainly have **perceptions of bodies** and consequently refers to itself and also to others without using any *indexicals*. *Mummy* is always *mummy* and never *you*. Thus, there is phenomenological support and support in the field of philosophy of language for my claim that the self is progressive also in the ontological sense, i.e. that it has to emerge and that it is not innate. We have also seen that in a Humean context it is necessary that one is aware of one's self if one is to be a self. Since these conditions would be contradicted were the self the principle of unity we have to conclude that the self itself cannot be such a principle.

[338] They could easily have pointed to the object in question and could have said *Pa* or *Ma* or just *A*.

VI.IV. Is there a Fourth Possibility?

Now that we have ruled out causation, the principles of association of ideas and the self itself as possible candidates for the principle of unity of perceptions it very much looks as if we have no candidates left and therefore have to conclude that Hume's philosophy cannot provide us with such a principle. The consequences of such conclusion would be dramatic. The conclusion would lead to an immediate collapse of the Humean philosophy as a whole: neither Book One nor Book Two can give an account of the self which doesn't fall into absurdity. Book Two especially, resting upon the existence of a self (of whatever kind this happens to be) would be completely incoherent. Hume's entire theory of the passions would rest upon an impossible assumption.

However, I think that there is a fourth possibility which must be considered. We can set up the **hypothesis that the principle of unity of perceptions is the body**. First of all, disregarding Hume's alleged ontological scepticism for the moment, we can say that this hypothesis would not run into immediate difficulties where the bundle definition is concerned. It also has no particular problems with the additional claims I have made in respect to the nature of the self and the criteria of its identity. The body can unite the perceptions in the sense that the particular sets of perceptions, making up different individuals, are united in these particular, individual sets by the particular, individual bodies they belong to. Once we can accept the body as a principle of unity of perceptions we also have no difficulties to comprehend that the body unites the seemingly unrelated perceptions. They would be naturally related to one another in so far as they are perceptions of one and the same body.

Secondly, if the body should be accepted as the uniting principle it would not follow that, therefore, the body has to be the true and only criterion of self identity and personal identity. The bundle-definition itself makes clear that the body alone is not sufficient to provide an entire bundle. It would to provide a unifying principle of the perceptions only. There cannot be a bundle without the

perceptions themselves, thus the body, taken on its own, is not enough to account for a self as it is understood by Hume. Furthermore, perceptions come in different kinds according to Hume's theory. Not all perceptions are perceptions of sensation. It follows that even if a theory can be put forward which maintains that the body alone is responsible for producing perceptions of sensation[339], it does not automatically follow that the body on its own is also able to produce perceptions of reflection, be they impressions or ideas. It is perfectly clear that something like this would be necessary if the body shall be the true and ultimate criterion of identity. It is equally clear that, regarding perceptions of reflection, the identity-theory has to be maintained if one wants to make the body the sole provider of the self.

Although it is perfectly legitimate and comprehensible to be an identity-theorist, there are also serious shortcomings of this theory which make it impossible to follow such a theory and, at the same time, keep within the framework set by Hume's philosophy. Since the latter is a declared requirement of this work the identity theory has to be dismissed as not fitting the purpose of my investigation. The only reason to discuss the identity-theory here is that it may turn out that one would have to be, necessarily, an identity theorist to maintain the body as the principle of unity of the perceptions. However, I hope that the following discussion will make perfectly clear that this is not so and that the body can be understood as the principle of unity of perceptions without contradicting Hume's basic claims.

I will attempt to establish the body as the principle of unity of the perceptions in two steps. Firstly, for the body to be acceptable as a legitimate candidate it will be necessary to argue that Hume was a Basic Realist in his ontology, and not a sceptic. If it were the case that the body's existence, ontologically, would be dependent upon the existence of a mind as a unified phenomenon, the body could not serve as a principle of unity of perceptions. For that reason the body has to be ontologically independent of the mind.

[339] Regardless of whether they have external causes also or external causes are sufficient for bringing about these perceptions of sensations.

Secondly, it must be shown that the body is not only a possible candidate in terms of the principle of unity of perceptions, but that it can also fulfill this role within Hume's philosophy. No contradictions must occur between the statements made in the *Treatise* and it's general tenor and the claims having to be made, or arising in consequence of the body being the uniting principle.

Hume's Basic Realism

Before we begin a discussion of Hume's Basic Realism it will be necessary to define what I mean by it. I will take GALEN STRAWSON's definition of Basic Realism as my starting point. Discussing whether or not Hume was a Basic Realist in respect to causation STRAWSON understands *Basic Realism* to mean the following: „It is not simply (1) that there is something 'external' or 'out there' just in the sense of being independent of, or something other than, our perceptions. For to this is added the idea (2) that this something somehow affects us, and so gives rise to our perceptions, and is the reason why they are as they are (leaving aside any contribution we may also make to their character)."[340] The context of my discussion requires two remarks concerning this definition. Firstly, I have accepted STRAWSON's version of Basic Realism for my purposes because if the body can be established and maintained as the principle of unity of perceptions we certainly have to think of the body in the way that the body affects us and our perceptions as they are. A minimalist account of such an affect will suffice to show the truth of the claim. If the body is understood as the principle of unity of the perceptions, then particular sets of perception (which are, in other words, particular individuals) will be united to these particular sets by the respective body each of these sets belongs to (each particular set belongs to a particular body, different from all other particular bodies). In accordance with Hume's basic claim in Book Two of the *Treatise* that there is an impression of the self (complex impression) it can now be said the body affects us in so far as we have a complex impressions of the bundle which makes up our own self. The perception is what it is through the particular

[340] STRAWSON, G. *The Secret Connexion - Causation, Realism and David Hume*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, p.60.

assembly of all the different perceptions making up the total. Since this assembly is guaranteed, as this particular assembly, by the body, the body has an affect upon our perception.

Secondly, the definition must not mislead us to think that the only 'external' objects it refers to are objects other than our mind AND body. Such a mistake is easily made because we intuitively assume that I am my body and my mind (in whatever relation these two stand to each other), and that 'out there' means nothing but objects I don't associate necessarily with myself, objects like tables, carrots, children, the sky and the rain. The objects the definition is referring to are the objects outside my realm of perception. These objects include my own body just as they include tables and the sky. Hume draws a first conclusion in his discussion of scepticism with regard to the senses that „as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."[341] Sense perceptions of my own body cannot be distinguished „in the manner of their existence" from sense perceptions I have of tables, dogs and carrots. Nothing in the form of the perceptions themselves justifies the belief that the body I call my own has real existence. „...'tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present."[342] However, though it is clear that the form, or the „manner of existence" of sense perceptions does not suggest that there should be any differences between perceptions of one's own body and perceptions of other objects, it is less clear that this is still the case once we have drawn our attention to the contents of our sense perceptions. There are undoubtedly sense perceptions of the content that they are perceptions of our own body and there are sense perceptions which are not.[343]

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[341] T.I,IV,II,193.
[342] ibid., p.191.
[343] The problem how identity for all those objects is established does not concern us here. Identity of those objects and of one's own body is established, epistemologically, in similar ways.

Having clarified the meaning of STRAWSON's definition, we will find that he distinguishes two versions of Basic Realism: a strict, natural version, very much in line with LOCKE's philosophy[344] and a weaker version. „According to the 'strong' version, which is also the most natural version, the objects are entirely distinct from our perceptions: our perceptions are not only not the objects, but are not even any part of what the existence of the objects consists in. 'The objects' simply names what our perceptions are perceptions of (relationally speaking). According to the weak - and far more puzzling - version, the objects are certainly not to be identified with our perceptions or their content (as in strict Idealism), because the existence of the objects essentially involves the existence of something more than our perceptions; but our perceptions are nevertheless part of what the existence of the objects consists in."[345]

Looking at STRAWSON's version of weak Basic Realism it becomes apparent that this theory can be embraced by various, quite different philosophies, reaching, perhaps as the two marking stones, from BERKELEY's strict idealism to KANT's *Transzendental Philosophie*. But whereas philosophers like Locke, Kant and Berkeley have adopted one or the other version of Basic Realism the matter is different where Hume's theory is concerned. STRAWSON argues that Hume is not committing himself, and given his theory, never could do, to a particular version of Basic Realism. Instead, he believes that one of these versions must be true but because of our epistemological position we cannot determine which one. „For it really is very implausible to reject the claim that some version of Basic Realism is true, and to claim instead that there does not in fact exist anything which (1) is other than our perceptions and which (2) affects us and which (3) is the reason why our perceptions are as they are - even if it is important to insist that we could never know which version is true (and to insist that we can never even prove the truth of Basic Realism)."[346]

To support STRAWSON's claim, which is very much like my own, we only have to look at Hume's texts with an open mind. We have to look at the first two

[344] compare LECHU, especially Book II, Chapters II - IX, pp. 119-149.
[345] STRAWSON, G. ibid., p.61.
[346] ibid., p.64-65.

Books of the *Treatise* as a union and not as if they were two completely separate outputs of an inconsistent and somewhat confused mind. It will also be helpful to give weight to the *Enquiries* and the *Essays*. The vast majority of literature concerning Hume's *Treatise* displays some hesitancy by interpreters to regard the three Books in unison. Some interpreters concern themselves only with Book One, whilst others restrict themselves to the two following Books. Each of these interpreters is more or less quick in pointing out contradictions and inconsistencies between the different Books. Some of these alleged inconsistencies also remain if Hume's work is taken as a whole, but some of them disappear once the effort is made to employ a less restricted interpretation. The majority of misconceptions, mainly the result of considering the sceptical Book of the *Treatise* only, have their roots in a misunderstanding of Hume's ontology, reducing it to the epistemology he develops. „Yet current misinterpretation - travesty - of Hume as some sort of prototypical logical positivist rests almost entirely on supposing him to restrict his view of what could exist to what his epistemology admits as knowable or directly experiencable. And so it is that the great sceptical expositor of the vast extent of human ignorance is held to believe that there is definitely nothing we cannot know about (or is at least considered as a heroic foreshadower of this view). I can think of no greater irony in the history of philosophy."[347]

If we look at the second and the third Book of the *Treatise* we will immdediately be aware of the fact that Hume writes there, clearly, as a Basic Realist. The passions are simple impressions which arise in relation to other human beings and to our surroundings in general. The introduction of sympathy as a principle of communication is only necessary if there is another human being I can communicate with. Hume also claims that our pains and pleasures[348] are not entirely independent from other persons' response to it. „We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes when enjoy'd a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and

[347] ibid., p.66-67.
[348] Pains and pleasures are not passions.

intolerable."[349] And Hume continues his statement, with regard to the passions: „Whatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor wou'd they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others."[350] In Section IV of Book Two Hume highlights the importance of company and the claim he expresses takes the existence of company very much for granted. „Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all objects, *viz.* a rational and thinking Being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind; makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions, which are caus'd by any object."[351]

This alone might not necessarily be acceptable as support for Hume's Basic Realism since it could be argued that one just imagines other persons, one's object-possessions and one's general environment. However, such an argument can hardly be in accordance with the *impetus* of Hume's statements here. If we were only imagining other people, then this fact could hardly be concealed from us. We would not only feel lonely again but we would also have no reason to make other people and society an issue in our theories, apart from wondering why we have to invent them in the first place. To investigate phenomena of the latter kind is certainly not Hume's intention. He discusses **why we believe** other people and objects to be of permanent existence and why we ascribe identity to them, but he never expresses, especially not in Book Two of the *Treatise*, any doubt whatsoever **that they really do exist**, that they exist permanently and that they possess identity. He is also adamant that we cannot observe someone else's state of mind directly, but can only observe the external signs this person is exhibiting. It is clear that the body is of great importance here and it is equally clear that Hume does not concern himself with the possibility that we only imagine it. If he would take the possibility of imagining things seriously he would certainly have to discuss the oddity why

[349] T.II,II,V,363.
[350] ibid.
[351] T.II,II,IV,353.

imagination doesn't simplify the matter and just imagines other minds instead of imagining other minds being hidden in their respective bodies.

These arguments sound, admittedly, trivial, but they appear less trivial once one considers that they highlight the absurdity of a strict idealist interpretation of Hume's account. The absurdity of some interpretations of Hume's theory becomes apparent when we look, for instance, at WAXMAN's account. He makes the claim that: „For Hume's predecessors, perceptions were thought to be dependent on and/or representative of external objects and/or the faculty-endowed mind; for Hume, neither is true."[352]

WAXMAN's statement allows several different interpretations, each of them expressing different ontological claims.

(1) perceptions depend on external objects which they represent

(2) perceptions depend on external objects but cannot be said to represent them

(3) perceptions represent external objects on which they don't depend

(4) perceptions depend on external objects which they represent and on a faculty of the mind

(5) perceptions depend on external objects which they cannot be said to represent and on a faculty of the mind

(6) perceptions depend on the mind and represent external objects on which they don't depend

(7) perceptions depend on the mind only

The possible interpretations (1) to (7) represent every possible ontological stand which could have been taken by Hume's predecessors and contemporaries. (1) to (6) are realist accounts. (1), (3), (4) and (6) belong to strict Realism and (2) and (5) belong to weak Realism, whereas (7) is not a realist, but a strict idealist version. To say that Hume believes that none of these versions is true is a serious misunderstanding of Hume's account. WAXMAN proposes a further

[352] WAXMAN, W. *Hume's Theory of Consciousness*, Cambridge University Press 1994, p.213.

version not held by Hume's predecessors and contemporaries. This version has been discussed previously.

(8) Perceptions don't depend on anything

WAXMAN wants to claim elsewhere that Hume's account of perceptions is ontologically neutral[353], that Hume was ontologically an agnostic: „...there can be no denying that the senses are responsible for verdicts on the reality of the objects immediately present to them, or that these beliefs weigh in our thoughts and actions just as surely as do those of associative imagination. *These, like all other verdicts about perceptions, must be construed as claims about their verisimilar reality, not their „absolute", or „ontological reality", regarding which Hume was necessarily agnostic (for want of any ideas to enliven).*"[354] However, to be agnostic, or to be ontologically neutral, is not compatible with making ontological statements of any kind, including negative ontological statements of the kind that none of the proposed ontologies is true. The only possible agnostic stand would be to say that one cannot know whether one of these ontologies is true and if one is true, which one it is.

WAXMAN's claim is not only incorrect in this respect. It is, for instance, debatable if „agnostic" and „ontologically neutral" really have the same meaning. One could be an agnostic as far as reason is concerned but is not bound to be ontologically neutral. Whatever the outcome of this discussion, it is quite clear that the claim that Hume writes as a Basic Realist is contrary to WAXMAN's claim. It is equally clear that the claim made by WAXMAN is not in accordance with Book Two of the *Treatise* nor is it a claim which, in my opinion, can reasonably be made: Firstly, on a minimum level, an agnostic or an ontological sceptic cannot make strong claims of the suggested kind at all. Secondly, to deny the truth of **any** ontological possibility is utter nonsense. It denies that there is **anything** which is real, whatever this „real" is thought to be. Dispute has arisen between philosophers because of disagreements in regard to the question what the „real things" really are, or, in other words, what reality really is

[353] compare ibid., p.219.
[354] ibid., p.215.

- whether or not reality is mind-independent, for instance, and if the latter, what role has fallen to the mind in creating reality or parts of it. In this context, which is the philosophical context Hume was aware of, the question whether reality exists in the first place is absurd.[355] If we agree, which indeed we must, that there is something which is real, then we must also agree that this something has to be a certain way. We may not know, and perhaps never will, **how this** something really **is**. However, we still know **that it is**. „One has to separate the notion (1) that there is, in fact, a certain way things are, from the notion (3) that it is possible to give some definitely true account of how things are. (3) does not follow from (1) - not so long as we are concerned with finite sensory-intellectual beings like ourselves, at least. [...] the supposition that reality is in fact a certain way, whatever we can manage to know or say about it - is as remarked obviously true. Some have denied it, of course. Every absurd position has its defendants..."[356]

At the moment it is perhaps advisable to leave version (7) aside. This then leaves us to consider the first six options. It appears to be the case, at least at first sight, that versions (1) - (3) can be ruled out when it comes to Hume's philosophy because of the important role Hume gives to the mind in creating beliefs, which are perceptions, about continued identity, externality, etc. However, the matter is less straightforward than it appears to be because the mind **is** the bundle of perceptions. Hence the perceptions cannot depend upon the mind but the mind has to depend upon the perceptions. Since the mind is the compound of all particular perceptions it does not make much sense to speak of a „faculty of the mind" which enables the mind to perceive in the first place. Nevertheless, it can be said that perceptions depend in some sense upon the mind, since perceptions depend to some extent on other perceptions by certain principles of relation and association. The mind, which is the compound of all previous perceptions, also contains all present ones. Now we can narrow the claim that Hume writes as a Basic Realist by saying that Hume believes that

[355] Even DESCARTES had no doubts that the reality of the thinking thing, when thinking, cannot reasonably be denied.
[356] STRAWSON, G. ibid., p.72.

either one of version (4) - (6) must be true. We can narrow the claim further to the versions (4) and (5) when we remember that impressions of sensation, although they have causes unknown, still are supposed to have causes. Hume also believes that we have no reliable means by which we are able to determine which of the two versions is the true one. Book One of the *Treatise* is certainly dedicated to establish the latter belief, but it does not deny the assumption of Basic Realism as the only plausible and the only natural option. The latter becomes especially clear when we remember that Hume, in the most sceptical Part of the most sceptical Section of Book One, is never doubting that the body, i.e. the existence of one's own body, cannot reasonably, or otherwise, be denied. „We may well ask, *What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?* but 'tis in vain to ask, *Whether there be body or not?* That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings."[357] The question of whether a body does or does not exist cannot reasonably be asked. It is simply the wrong question. Hume's question is clearly an epistemological one, there is no ontological problem here at all.[358]

Another important point concerning the causes of our perceptions has to be made. This point concerns version (7) of the ontological options. Hume writes: „By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us?"[359] And he continues: „It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be

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[357] T.I,IV,II,187.

[358] It could be argued that, in Hume's account, ontology and epistemology are necessarily one. However, it is pretty clear that this is not so, especially when we turn our attention to perceptions of memory and imagination. To understand ontology and epistemology as one, one has, at the minimum, to maintain their one-ness in respect to internal, i.e. immediately available perceptions. Hume, however, believes that we can mistake memory perceptions for perceptions of imagination and *vice versa*. If the *ontology is epistemology* - doctrine does not even apply to internal perceptions, how can it apply to „external" perceptions?

[359] ECHU,XII,I,119, p.152-153.

entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects."[360] Therefore it seems that the option expressed in (7) has to be a possible ontological option. If so, then this seems to endanger the success of the claim that Hume is a Basic Realist. I wish to show that we are not compelled to accept version (7) as Hume's ontological claim..

First of all, we have to note that Hume, in the *Enquiry*, not only shows that our sense experiences don't give us any reason to believe in the existence of external objects, whether or not our perceptions resemble them, he also argues that any other ontological possibility cannot be penetrated by experience or reason alone. This „impenetrability" is given by the way our perceptions are. The emphasis must lie with the notion of perception Hume employs. What Hume is essentially saying is that **sense perceptions**, as they are, cannot give us grounds to believe that they are caused by objects beyond the perceptions, including the human body. Thus, we are not able to make any claims, well founded on experience and reasoning, of whether or not these perceptions resemble those objects. However, statements or claims of these kinds are not necessary in terms of a Realist account. To be a Basic Realist it is only necessary to claim that objects beyond the perceptions exist, regardless of whether or not we are able to perceive them or something similar to them. There can also be the claim that the perceptions (as they are) are in some way influenced by these objects but that beliefs concerning the influence cannot be verified. The perceptions themselves don't allow verification in the usual sense. So, a belief in the existence of such objects and in their influence upon our perceptions may well exist - to hold such a belief is sufficient for Basic Realism - although this belief can never be verified due to the nature of the perceptions.

It becomes clear that with such an understanding of Basic Realism (which is certainly closer to weak Basic Realism than to the strong version) the criterion of whether one is a Basic Realist or not lies not so much with the perceptions themselves, though they are undoubtedly interesting to the philosopher,

[360] ibid., p.153.

especially if he favors strong Basic Realism, but with the acknowledgement or the denial of the existence of external objects. It must be perfectly clear that the question of Basic Realism is very much an ontological question. And though ontology and epistemology go often hand in hand, they cannot be reduced to one another. To deny Hume his Basic Realist conviction is doing exactly this. The claims: *I hold a belief in the existence of external objects*, and: *I **know** that this belief is true*, are two different claims. It is probably only fair to say that when I hold a belief I also believe that this belief is true. But this does not mean that I **know** that this belief is true when *knowing* requires the belief to be *verified*. The latter is certainly what Hume had in mind when discussing the acquisition of certain beliefs. There are beliefs we hold to be true, which are not verifiable. The belief in the existence of external objects, i.e. in something other than perceptions, is certainly one of them. It must also be noted that to say that ***we have*** nothing but perceptions is quite different from saying that there isn't anything but the perceptions. A philosopher, like Hume, who wants to hold the former is not compelled to also hold the latter.

Hume, who made it one of his main tasks to point out to us the restricted nature of our epistemological realm and who was interested in human nature would, rhetorically speaking, be the last person to claim that the world is just as restricted as we are. If he really wanted to make claims of this kind, the entire discussion in Book One of the *Treatise* would be entirely obsolete. Our limits would certainly not be of any philosophical interest whatsoever. It is because of these limits that we cannot determine what the nature of this something *out there* really is. Nature, well „aware" of our limitations, compells us to believe in exactly this something *out there*. „As a sceptic, Hume does not claim to know the correctness of any Basic realist position about the nature of objects. As he rightly says, one cannot know for sure what gives rise to one's perceptions. [...] Hume is clear that we could never decide between these various Basic Realist options. At the same time he takes it for granted that there does exist an external reality, i.e. something other than our perceptions, something which affects us and gives rise to our perceptions; and in this sense he does

positively, and crucially, adopt a Basic Realist position of some sort with regard to 'the objects'."[361]

It also has been pointed out that the body has some influence upon our perceptions, which is important if we want to understand the body as the principle of unity of the perceptions. This means we must be able to, at least, determine one influence of the body upon the perceptions. This is the influence upon the set of perceptions, perceived as my set of perceptions, which is created, as this particular set, by the body.[362] This influence, or, as we could also call it: dependency, is not a direct one. What I perceive are the perceptions only. The body is also epistemologically nothing more than a perception (of the imagination).

If we turn our attention back to Book One of the *Treatise* we will find manifold passages which strongly suggest that Hume did never seriously doubt the existence of external objects, including the human body. Hume believes, as has already been mentioned, the true nature of body or of bodies to be undiscoverable, but his remarks made on several occassions in Book One suggest that he takes the existence of the body for granted: „...that my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations. [...] I am afraid, that such an enterprize is beyond the reach of human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses."[363] And later on, when discussing causation, he writes: „The uniting principle among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects, and is not known to us any other way than by experience".[364] Furthermore, Hume's discussion of causation seems to imply the existence of external objects: „Here then it appears, that of those three relations, which depend not upon the mere ideas, the only one, that can be trac'd beyond our senses, and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel,

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[361] STRAWSON, G. ibid., p.67-68.
[362] In my hypothesis, the body alone is necessary and sufficient to unite all the different perceptions. But **the body itself is not a self without the perceptions**.
[363] T.I,II,V,64.
[364] T.I,III,XIV,169.

is *causation*."[365] Causation „informs us" about existences. It may well be that our information in their detailed content are non verifiable, Hume does not claim that they are nor is verification necessary to hold a Basic Realist account. If there were nothing beyond the senses (i.e. beyond sense perceptions) it would not make sense to employ terms like *information* at all (we would be more inclined to use terms like *invention*, for instance) nor would it be possible to have some information about this something, even if the information consists of nothing but that this something exists, whatever it happens to be.

GALEN STRAWSON, who argues that Hume is a Basic Realist in terms of the existence of causation[366] , writes: „Hume believes in Causation 'in the objects' (it never really occurs to him to doubt it) in so far as he ever adopts any Basic Realist position with respect to objects: any interpretation of 'the objects' according to which their existence involves the existence of something other than our perceptions, something which affects us and gives rise to our perceptions and is the reason why they are as they are (leaving aside any contribution we ourselves make to their character.)"[367] We may also take an enlightening passage from *Of the Standard of Taste* as additional evidence that Hume is, at heart, a Basic Realist. „Because no sentiment represents what is really in the object. It only marks a certain conformity or relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not really exist, the sentiment could never possibly have being."[368] Hume is here not merely a Basic Realist who does not venture from the assumption that there really are objects existing „out there". He expresses an even stronger conviction, which, as such, would be impossible to adopt for someone who wants to deny Basic Realism, namely: that our perceptions (sentiments) conform somehow to the true nature of the objects. This conformity is certainly just as impossible to prove as the existence of objects beyond perceptions. However, it is Hume's

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[365] T.I,III,II,74.
[366] The meaning of *existence* here is opposed to the meaning it has when thought of only as an invention, a fabrication of the imagination. STRAWSON argues that causation is a real relation between, at least, real perceptions.
[367] STRAWSON, G. ibid., p.145.
[368] SOT., p.230.

aim to show that our ontological beliefs cannot be proven in a way strict epistemological demands require. Reason has its shortcomings - and it is these shortcomings Hume wants to draw attention to.[369]

To conclude the argument for Hume's Basic Realism I wish to refer to a discussion Hume undertakes in the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.* Hume's statements here should make absolutely clear that Hume's scepticism is an epistemological one. He himself attacks ontological sceptics in the *Enquiry* as they are making unreasonable (in the very sense Hume wants to understand the role as well as the limitations of reason) and absurd claims. Strict sceptics, to sharpen up Hume's own opinion, deny theoretically not only the possibility of any philosophy but they have also no understanding, as theorists, of what it is to be a human being. Furthermore, the *Enquiry* contains a discussion of scepticism which is not directed at a distinction between ontological (strict) scepticism and epistemological (moderate) scepticism, but refers to a scepticism about the nature of our perceptions. This is scepticism towards the belief that our perceptions are the external objects themselves. This is very much the type of scepticism which is Hume's very own and belongs, in kind, to moderate scepticism. Hume starts out to argue that we cannot answer the question of whether our perceptions are the external objects themselves or representations of them. „Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they [the sceptics] say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing

[369] There will be the occasional philosopher who wants to point out that the *Essays* are not only concerned with completely different topics than the *Treatise*, but that they also stem from different assumptions. Though the former may well be true, I believe that because the *Essays* as well as the *Treatise* were written by the same man we must not only see them according to their topical differences, but also in relation to one another, both based on the same set of philosophical beliefs. Philosophers seem to have no difficulties whatsoever in taking WITTGENSTEIN's work as a whole, although he renounced his early philosophy later in life. Why should they not take the same attitude towards Hume, who didn't renounce his philosophy at all?

argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects."[370]

An interpretation of the passage has to pay attention to two points. Firstly, by suggesting that there is a natural propensity to take our perceptions (of the senses) as the external objects themselves, Hume refers to what he believes to be the view of the vulgar. „'Tis certain, that almost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence."[371] This view is not entirely consistent, not only because of the reasonable suggestion that the vulgar are far more likely to adopt a representationalist account than the naive understanding of perception Hume suggests. It is also possible to question Hume's account of the vulgar beliefs on logical grounds.[372] Secondly, though Hume is suggesting in the *Enquiry* that the question must remain undecided since experience cannot provide a completely satisfying answer either way, we can easily expand the scope of the problem towards the question whether our perceptions are representations of external objects[373] or are non-representative of the object's nature but dependent, in whatever way, on that object. This is surely the more pressing question and the crucial one in terms of Hume's Basic Realism.

A theory of perception such as Hume's can tell us that our perceptions are not the objects themselves (note that the vulgar do not have a *philosophical* notion of perception) but it cannot tell us whether these are representational or non-representational. Hume's scepticism targets any attempt to answer this question positively either way. But it doesn't raise the ontological question of whether there are such objects or not. The entire problem of a representationalist account would be a second order problem once we have doubts about the very grounds it rests on, namely that there are objects „out

[370] ECHU, XII,I,121,p.154.
[371] T.I,IV,II,206.
[372] See for a discussion STROUD, B. *Hume*, Routledge, London, 1994, esp. pp.105.
[373] This would be LOCKE's account, especially where primary qualities are concerned.

there". Hume's attack on ontological scepticism in the *Enquiry* is quite severe although it is also good-natured and carried by common sense. There can be no doubt that Hume does not question the existence of something beyond one's perceptions. „On the contrary, he [the ontological sceptic] must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle."[374] And a little later on Hume is quite hopeful for the sanity of an ontological sceptic when he writes: „When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them."[375] So it is not that we could choose, or convince ourselves by theoretical means, to be something other than Basic Realists. This is not only true of the vulgar but also of the philosopher. Though the vulgar may have misconceptions regarding the nature of the perceptions, their basic belief in the existence of external objects is shared by the philosopher who is nothing but a human being too. Thus, to deny Hume's Basic Realism is to deny one of the cornerstones of Hume's philosophy. It is to deny the very point of his scepticism concerning matters of reasoning.

A common objection to Hume reflects the difficulties we have in accepting the limitations of reason. It can be argued that although we all hold the belief that external objects exist, once we look at the way this belief is acquired we will find that it rests upon fiction. The question: „Do you believe in the existence of body?", must be answered in the affirmative (it is „vain" to ask the question). However, the question „Does the body exist?" must remain undecided or must

[374] ECHU,XII,II,128,p.160.
[375] ibid.

be answered in the negative if the question is taken to mean „Are you justified to hold the belief of yours to be true?". It is my opinion that such an argument disregards wholly the criticism of reason as an almighty tool of understanding Hume is expressing. The success of an argument such as the above implies that one sees an inconsistency between the initial belief and the „irrational" acquisition. By trusting the logic of how we come to hold such a belief one must be persuaded that the belief cannot justifiably be true.

First of all, even if this were truly so we could not abandon the initial belief, because nature didn't leave us any choice in this matter. However, it could be argued that although it may be impossible to abandon the belief in external existence on a every day level, the philosopher should see its unreasonableness. I believe, it is exactly Hume's point not to deny that the belief in external existence is unreasonable. But for Hume reason is not half as reliable and informative about matters of real existence as we usually take it to be, and as especially DESCARTES argued for. Hume sets the instinct to hold a belief that body exists as embedded in our nature and almost as a first principle which is untouchable by reason and which therefore does not require any justification in regard to its truthfulness. The fact that the belief rests upon a fiction is an epistemological, not an ontological point. This is just as enlightening about human nature as is the fact that this belief cannot be tested by reason or reasonable means.

Secondly, if we look again at Hume's remarks in the *Enquiry*, there cannot be any doubt that Hume is a Basic Realist. He says quite clearly: „...that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail."[376] The sceptic principles, however, cannot prevail. Nature is too strong for them nor does the sceptic convince us that our basic belief in the existence of body is false. We cannot prove the opposite to be true either, but the matter is not open to proof, it is simply not within the realm of reason. We must remember: the sceptical argument rests upon reason too. „That is the point of Hume's discussion of scepticism. They are intended to show that reason, as traditionally

[376] ibid.

understood, is not the dominant force in human life."[377] In the light of the criticism Hume places against reason as the ultimate supplier of true beliefs - especially the one in the existence of body - appears the claim that Hume was not a Basic Realist as what it truly is: a claim which destroys the Humean philosophy as a whole.

The body as the principle of unity of perceptions in Hume's theory

Now that it has been determined that Hume's account is ontologically a Basic Realist account it still remains to be shown that the body can be the principle of unity of the perceptions. It has to be established that the human body has not only existence beyond the perceptions (whatever its true nature happens to be) but that the body can fulfill the role given to the principle of unity without contradicting Hume's account of the body in the *Treatise*.

The body is the principle of unity of perceptions as all perceptions belonging to a particular body form a particular set of perceptions which belongs only to this particular body and to no other. It is quite clear that there is a great number of perceptions which, in kind, are common to a great number of particular bodies, given the right circumstances. *X* has the perception of a table, so do *Y* and *Z*. *X*, *Y* and *Z* may have the perception *P* at the same instant in time. They are, for instance, in the same room and all of them perceive *P* visually. It can also occur that *X*, *Y* and *Z* have the perceptions *P* at different instances in time. When my son has been to the Zoo and tells me that he has seen penguins I know that he had the perception of penguins on this day, and indeed, had similar perceptions on all previous visits to the Zoo. I also had the perception of penguins previously, but not all of them at the same time as Niklas. This gives already some indication that we use the body as a criterion of presence at a certain location (space), and since we are capable of memory and do have memories, also of presence in time. However, we will see that the body alone is not a sufficient criterion to determine **my** presence or Niklas' presence. If it were sufficient we could not hold that self identity and personal identity have a mental

[377] STROUD, B. ibid., p.116-117.

as well as a bodily criterion nor were we in accordance with Hume's theory which defines self identity as the bundle of perceptions.

Firstly, we have to note that if the body which is usually referred to as **my** body (by me and by others) were present in the Zoo, but would not perceive anything, then it would not make much sense to say that I (or that Thurid) was present. To maintain the body as the principle of unity of perceptions is not to say that the body is identical with the perceptions. The latter is a complete impossibility given Hume's account of perceptions. To say that the body is identical with perceptions is an ontological statement about the nature of the body; and, as we have seen, such statement cannot be made. Secondly, regarding the great number of similar perceptions, such as seeing a table, and their affiliation to a certain body it must be said that, first of all, each one of these perceptions may or may not belong to one particular body. We cannot say that the perception of a table at a certain time belongs only to *X*. *Y* may as well perceive a table at this particular time. However, the question of affiliation of perceptions is relatively straightforward. A particular perception *P(a)* is *X*'s perception if, and only if, it belongs to, or is affiliated to the body *X* at this particular time[378] and is therefore an element of the set of perceptions which is united by the body *X*.[379]

We must also keep in mind that the body, as an object beyond our perceptions, nevertheless influences them as it was pointed out during the discussion of Basic Realism. This means that a particular body will have some influence upon the affiliated perceptions. It does not matter that we cannot determine this influence further due to the epistemological restrictions, it is sufficient that such an influence is given to say that the perceptions of one body will be unique as far as this body is one and no other. This, of course, implies the uniqueness of the entire set of perceptions, i.e. the bundle. This uniqueness is given by the oneness of the body and by the uniqueness of the perceptions

[378] The problem of the local conjunction is discussed elsewhere. Note that ontological statements about the nature of the body, i.e. that it is extended, divisible but has no intelligent features etc., cannot reasonably be made.

[379] This expression shall prevent mistakes of believing that *X* **is** *X*'s body.

themselves in their relations to each other and to the body. The *what-it-is-like* of the perception, including the complex perception of the self, is provided for by the very nature of the perceptions themselves, harnessed in the philosophical concept of perception *per se*. Even if we allow for shared perceptions it is still the case that each particular set's impression of itself will be unique,as far as the particular set is unique. This could also account towards a certain uniqueness of every particular perception because the perceptions is in relation to a particular set. Although we cannot perceive any real connection between the perceptions it is still possible that every single perception is what it is (and is what it is perceived as) partly because of the relation it is has to its antecedent perceptions.[380]

Ontologically, it is not necessary to make any statements concerning the nature of our body. We don't have to be able to give a detailed account of the way our body influences our perceptions either. It is sufficient to believe that there exist different bodies and that one of them is mine. This basic belief is unverifiable, but it is a belief which I, like any other human being, necessarily hold. The question is not whether one can verify the belief that all perceptions which make up my self are united by one body they are affiliated to or not. The question is whether such a belief contradicts any claim Hume makes in the *Treatise* and elsewhere.

To answer this question should be relatively straightforward since Hume's statements about our idea of body are epistemologically, not ontologically, inclined. Before we can enter this discussion it is, however, necessary to investigate another important issue: It could be argued that the claim of the body as the principle of unity of perceptions makes an ontological claim about the nature of the body which cannot reasonably be made. This would, if it were true, contradict the necessary claim[381] that nothing about the nature of the object (something) beyond the perceptions can positively be known. This

[380] To look at a single perception in separation would, epistemologically, still be possible.
[381] Hume's Basic Realism must not contradict his theory of perceptions.

objection can be taken even further by arguing that to identify this something with the body is a step completely unjustified and unaccounted for.

To the latter criticism it is possible to reply that there should be no difficulty in calling this something beyond perceptions *body* as long as no further statements about, let's say, its appearance are believed to be justified. When we consider that Hume attributes the perceptions to the *mind*, or better, claims them to **be** the *mind*, we should find no difficulty in employing the term *body* in the historical context of pairing these two concepts. Our idea of one mind identical with itself is epistemologically just as fictitious as our idea of the body, so far as Hume is concerned. Both are, in this sense, beyond the perceptions themselves. Since *the mind* is an idea gained by reflection upon the permanent succession (when we are conscious) of the perceptions themselves, which in itself (the reflection) is a perception (the complex impression of reflection Hume calls *the self*) and since there is nothing in the perceptions themselves which can reach beyond them in content, we can mark out the difference between our ideas of *mind* and of *body*. The idea of *body* does not depend upon the constant succession of perceptions generally, but does only depend upon the succession of perceptions resembling each other to a certain degree. For the following arguments to be understood correctly it is important to keep in mind that I will use the term *perception* and the expressions *perception of* and *perception of X* in the Humean and not in a representational sense.

Apart from other factors, such as our propensity for constancy and coherence, the coming about of the idea of the mind rests not upon perceptions as particular perceptions (particular in terms of particular objects of perception). It only requires, firstly, that there are perceptions recognized, by reflection, to be perceptions (but not necessarily what they are perceptions of) and secondly, that they succeed one another permanently in times of consciousness. Whereas the idea of body, and especially the ideas of particular bodies, require that perceptions are recognized as what they are perceptions of, i.e. they have to be recognized in content, and not only in kind.

If we have a sequence of perceptions this sequence will not only contain perceptions of bodies like perceptions of the sun *(S)*, an apple *(A)*, my boy-friend *(J)*, a goldhamster *(G)*, my own body *(B)*, but also perception such as love *(L)*, willing *(W)*, perceptions of having an idea *(I)* or being confused *(C)*. The latter perceptions, *per se*, do not contain any bodily contents. For the acquisition of the idea of the mind it is sufficient that the sequence (or any sequence) is perceived. Further more, sequences of the form:

(1) *SSSAAABBBBBBLLLLAASSCCCCIIIIAAAAGGGGWWWW*

(2) *SSSAAAAJJJJGGGGBBBB*

(3) *LLLLWWWWIIIICCCC*

will all be able to lead to the idea of the mind. To make the matter even clearer, (1) can be reduced to containing mental *(M)* as well as bodily *(B)* perceptions, (2) contains only bodily and (3) only mental perceptions. So that we can reduce the description of these sequences to

(a) *BBBBBBBBBBBBMMMMBBBBMMMMMMMMMBBBBBBBBMMMM*

(b) *BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB*

(c) *MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM*

However, the idea of body can only be gained from sequences (1) and (2), that is, sequences (a) and (b), but not from sequence (3), i.e. (c). This is certainly an epistemologically important difference between the idea of the mind and the idea of the body.

We can extrapolate this argument onto the acquisition of the idea of one's own body as distinct from other bodies. Every perception of the senses contains a perception of one's own body: I see with my eyes[382], smell with my nose, touch with my skin etc. Since, in Hume's terms, the sun is just as 'external' and reasonably inaccessible to me as my nose, the question arises how I am able to arrive at a distinction between my nose and the sun. In more general terms: how

[382] I leave here aside thought experiments suggesting that I can perceive someone else's body parts as my own body parts.

am I able to come up with a distinction between my own body and its parts and bodies and their parts I do believe not to belong to my body.

As I have suggested, the *sequence of perceptions-argument* can be applied in answering this question satisfactorily. To begin with, we can say that to have a perception of the sun (or to have any sense perception whatsoever) it is necessary that this perception contains a perception of my own body in virtue of its parts, whereas to have a perception of my own body (as a whole or in its parts) does not require any other content. Some 'objects' are perceived as being my body or parts of it and some are not. This alone is sufficient to give rise to the belief that some perceptions are perceptions (or contain perceptions) of my own body and some don't. From this it can be inferred that there is something I call 'my own body' and that there is also something I believe to be different from it and would not call 'my own body'. Here, we have to take perceptions very much as what they are.

If we go back to our example involving the perception of the sun *(S)* and the perception of my own body *(B)* we will find that sequences of perception can have the following form:

(1) *SSSSSS*

(2) *BBBBBB*

Or, in more general terms, the sequences can be understood as sequences of perception of one's own body *(B)* and of objects other than one's own body *(O)*.

(a) *OOOOOO*

(b) *BBBBBB*

P(O) contains *P(B)* but that *P(B)* does not contain *P(O)*. Thus, it follows that to have a perception as in (a) I also have to have a perception as in (b), but I can have sequence (b) without sequence (a) having to occur or having to have had occurred. The idea of my own body can be inferred from sequence (b) alone whereas the idea of any object other than my body can only be gained by (a)

and (b) both having taken place. (a) necessarily contains (b) because (a) is a sequence of sense perceptions.

However, it could be argued that *P(b)* must necessarily imply *P(a)*, as, in our example of the sun and seeing, it is impossible to see without light, that is, without something 'external' other than my own body. It is certainly true that the sense of vision requires something else than a human body equipped with this sense, and so does, indeed, the sense of hearing. The latter requires a medium transporting sounds, such as air or water and something similar has certainly to be said about the sense of smell. But these requirements do not apply to all senses generally. And if they do not, then it cannot be said that the senses necessarily require something other than the respective human body itself. Therefore it cannot be true that own-body-perception implies the perception of something other than the body in question.

It is also my opinion that a distinction has to be made between the perception of an object other than my own body and the mediator of the perception. In the ordinary way of perceiving we are not aware of natural mediators, such as light or air. The mediator, as a mediator, does not feature strongly in the content of perception unless the circumstances of perception are difficult because of absence, distortion or turbulence of the natural mediator. In cases like this, we become aware of the mediator as the object of our perception in the strict sense, which gives it a completely different role in the perception. In any case, we are certainly more aware of our own body or the objects other than one's own body than of the mediator if we are consciously aware of the latter at all. At times when we cannot see because it is dark or cannot hear because of the wind blowing strongly in the opposite direction we are most prominently aware of the shortcomings of our own senses which are not fit to fulfill their function in such an environment. It seems to be the case that we become aware of the mediator and by doing so make it to the very object of our perception **because** of the improper function of our senses, and not *vice versa*.

Returning to the argument itself we will find that the sense of touch, and perhaps the sense of taste also, require no additional external objects or circumstances to function properly. I can touch my own body, taste my own skin and everybody who has participated in the children's experiment of stroking two fingers, one one's own and one someone else's, at the same time with the same hand will know the very strange feeling it produces because of the contrasting yet similar sensations of touching my own body and touching someone else's.

If my argument can be accepted then it follows that a general distinction between own-body-perceptions and perceptions of other objects can be made. This distinction is twofold. Firstly, own-body-perceptions are different in nature from perceptions of other bodies as the sequence argument has shown. Secondly, the experiential content of own-body-perceptions differs from perceptions of other bodies because all sense perceptions are either entirely, or in contentual parts, taken to be own-body-perceptions by the manner they present themselves to the mind. For this to be true it is not required that one already knows that there is something we call our own body. It is not necessary to have already acquired either idea: the idea of body or the idea of my own body. The occurrence of impressions of sensation (without them having produced their respective ideas) is quite sufficient to account for the distinction epistemologically.

I believe one can even go so far to claim that the idea of one's own body, apart from all additional conditions in a Humean context (working of imagination etc.), is acquired because of the felt distinction in the first place. There are perceptions and perceptual contents which feel different than others, they feel to be about something different in kind than other perceptions. Perceptions of my own body are of a different quality in what they feel like than other perceptions. „...obvious examples are acting with our bodies and feeling sensations in them. Both are unique to our relation with our own bodies, in

contrast to our relations with all other objects."[383] Seeing a tree is not just seeing a **tree** but also **seeing** a tree. It is the latter, though both can be objects of perception, which one can describe as being part of the experience one has **of something one is** rather than being the experience **of something one is not**.[384]

At this point it is perhaps necessary to address problems brought up by philosophers concerning what M.G.F.MARTIN calls the *sole-object view*. The problem, so it is claimed, occurs when one makes the thought experiment that a person could feel the sensations in another person's body. According to this such ability leads to the overstepping of the boundaries of one's own body and implies that the *one mind-one body* idea has to be abandoned. „Wittgenstein rightly claims that one can easily conceive of a case in which it feels to one as if there is pain in one's left hand and one indicates one's neighbor's hand when asked where it hurts."[385] The problem this example is supposed to generate is not only the problem of whether bodily experience of one's own body is experience of a sole object or of a multiplicity of objects. The implications reach further, because if the latter were true it could be denied „that sensation is perceptual awareness of one's body."[386] This argument has to be taken into consideration because it denies my claims to be true.

One way to refute the *multiplicity-argument* is to say that such a perception would be a hallucination or an illusion, similar in kind to illusions occurring in cases of missing limbs (pseudo-pains). This is hardly conclusive. Even if we consider „that such experiences can only be genuinely perceptual and count as the awareness of some body part, rather than as a case of illusion or

[383] EILAN, N., MARCEL, A., BERMUDEZ, J.L. *Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction*, in: BERMUDEZ, J.L., MARCEL, A., EILAN, N. (eds.) *The Body and the Self*. A Bradford Book, MIT Press 1995, p.4.

[384] I have avoided to use the term *I*, because the body is not the sole criterion of self-identity and is, on its own, not sufficient for the self to come about. However, the body is still a criterion for self-identity and it makes perfect sense that little children, who only refer to themselves in the third person, can say what they are not without being able to say that they are *I*. Niklas was not quite sure what I meant when I asked: „Are you you?", but he answered questions like „Is Niklas a cat?" immediately in the negative by pointing at our cat saying „That's cat,". Of course only then when he wasn't pretending to be a cat.

[385] MARTIN, M.G.F. *Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership*, in: BERMUDEZ, J.L., MARCEL, A., EILAN, N. (eds.) ibid., p.274.

[386] ibid., p.273.

hallucination, if the body part in question is actually part of one's own body."[387] I don't believe this is a very good argument, especially not in an empiricist context such as Hume's, because we would have to know what our own body is before we can determine whether or not a certain perception is a perceptions of one's own body. MARTIN wants to strengthen the objection by removing the hallucinatory part and writes: „To avoid any trace of illusion, we must suppose that this new area of pain does not feel to the sufferer as if it is within his own left hand. Rather, it must feel as if it is in some new part of his body, as if he had grown a new hand."[388] However, although I can understand why someone would think that scenarios such as these are problematic, I find it difficult to understand why they should necessarily pose a problem. I believe the problem only occurs if we have a certain definition of what the body (as a whole and composition of its parts) is. If it is part of the definition that the human body is one big lump of organized matter and all its parts are connected by the same matter then, of course, the *multiplicity argument* is a problem. First of all, the left hand of my neighbor is not connected to my lump of carbo-hydrates by other carbo-hydrates. If I believe, secondly, that I have suddenly grown a new hand then this contradicts the definition that humans only have two hands. If I have lost one hand and believe I have grown a new one (which is actually my neighbor's), then I know that I lost one hand just as I also know that hands don't grow back. I am faced with a conflict between my new perception and my definition of the human body, especially when we consider that, when I point out the hand I have perceptions in, it will not be a lump of carbo-hydrates attached to my other body-parts by carbo-hydrates. The latter also applies when I am not aware that I lost one hand but believe my neighbor's hand to be mine.

I believe it is clear that the problem only arises in view of a certain definition of my own body and its boundaries. If everybody would perceive one's neighbor's hand as one's own, the definition of what one's body is would be quite different. It is perfectly possible to extend the body's boundaries onto one's neighbor's hand. In that case I would not have to believe that I have

[387] ibid., p.275.
[388] ibid.

several bodies. My neighbor's hand can be easily included into what I believe my own one body. Under these circumstances I would not call my third hand „my neighbor's hand" but „my own". Even if we suppose that there could be some overlapping of ownership of body-parts, i.e. my middle hand I have perceptions in is my neighbor's right hand he has perceptions in, there is no necessity to abandon the perceptual criterion of body-awareness and ownership. In a Humean account our notion of the body, epistemologically fictitious, would simply change in its detailed contents if experiences like the above would commonly occur. Since they don't, there is no need to change the notion of our own body in its detailed contents. The notion is what it is because of the experiences of our own body we commonly do have. If we adopt a third person's view point we will find that we can perceive others as other people (in terms of identity) only in so far as we believe them to be bundles of perceptions and in so far as we can observe the external signs of their perceptions by their bodies. If so, the matter is very straightforward: if we observe that Frank cries out in pain every time Paul puts his hand into fire and we are also convinced that Frank feels the pain in Paul's hand (and is not just faking it) we may well adapt our notion of what Frank's body is accordingly.

If we look at the matter in terms of the claim that the body is the principle of unity of perceptions it is not too complicated either. There is no necessary rule which postulates that bodies cannot overlap, that is that the perception *A* cannot „belong" to body *X* and to body *Y* at the same time. This does not pose a threat to self identity and personal identity. The same perception belonging to different bodies also belongs to different sets of perceptions. *A(X)* is element of the set *BCDA(X)* because *B,C* and *D* are perceptions affiliated to *X* and occurred in this order. *A(Y)* is part of the set *EFGA(Y)* which is a set of different perceptions apart from *A*. It may also be so that *X* and *Y* belong to sets with „same" elements but they are in a different order. This suggests that these are different sets just as the sets must be different sets if they are composed of different elements. Only if two sets are entirely identical in all their elements and in the order of their elements we would have to say that these two sets are identical.

They both are then (the bundle/set **is** the self) one and the same individual. Considering the bundle-definition it is clear that two identical bundles cannot be understood as two different individuals but have to be understood as one. This does not bring us into conflict with the bodily criterion of identity, since the bundle of perceptions contains the own-body-perceptions.

This does not set the perceptions, and the body they are affiliated to, identical. If we would set them identical we would make an ontological statement about the nature of the body, and such statements cannot reasonably be made. Instead, we use the areas of perceptions perceived as a criterion to identify ownership of body. Here we seem to be confronted with a circular argument: The body shall, on the one hand, serve as a principle of unity of perception, on the other hand, we use perceptions as a criterion to determine what body belongs to which perception. I believe that this circularity is not a vicious one but does highlight the point that the body can be thought of as the principle of unity of perceptions. If the body is this principle then, and only then, can we use the perceptions themselves to determine ownership of body (whatever this body happens to be).

We have seen the epistemological difference between the idea of *mind* and the idea of *body* in terms of the perceptions and their contents. We also have seen the epistemological difference between the idea and the perception of one's own body and the ideas and perceptions of bodies other than one's own. This clear difference, together with Hume's Basic Realism, is a good basis for the claim that the body is the principle of unity of perceptions.

In reply to a possible argument: to say that the body is the principle of unity of perceptions is to make an ontological claim about the true nature of body, must be pointed out that no such ontological claim is being made. Claiming the body to be the principle of unity of perceptions is not the same as, nor does it imply, any claims about the nature of the body if *nature* is understood in the Aristotelian way. The claim in question is about the role, or the function of the body and is arrived at by Hume's very own method: observation and inductive reasoning. We arrived at the idea that the body could be the principle of unity of

perceptions by employing Hume's own scientific and naturalistic method, by looking at the perceptions, in their contents and in their relations to one another. We have looked at our basic beliefs and the role of reason as it was discussed by Hume and have, testing different candidates, employed an eliminative method. „Hume's theory sees every aspect of human life as naturalistically explicable. It places man squarely within the scientifically intelligible world of nature, and thus conflicts with the traditional conception of a detached rational subject."[389] To make statements about something's functions is to make statements about what this something **does**, not about what its nature, in terms of powers or capacities, **is**. It is true, the former suggests some understanding of the term *nature*, Hume uses it quite frequently in the *Treatise*, its title refers to human nature. However, the meaning of the term employed by Hume differs from the Aristotelian meaning. And it is the latter we usually employ when we talk about ontological claims about the nature of something. The suggested accusation employs an Aristotelian meaning of the term *nature*. The claim that the body can be understood as the principle of unity is perfectly compatible with the meaning Hume gives to the term, since we only refer to what the body **does**. The body is seen here as a principle in relation to something else, i.e. the perceptions. Such view of the body does not necessitate any knowledge about the intrinsic nature of body, the only other claim which is necessary is the claim that the body really does exist, i.e. that Hume is a Basic Realist. If this can be accepted then we can conclude that the suggested criticism can be dismissed on the grounds of a shift in meaning of terminology.

Now that it has been shown that the claim that the body is the principle of unity of perceptions is, firstly, accommodating Hume's view upon perception and secondly, is also in accordance with Hume's Basic Realism it still remains to be demonstrated that the claim in question does not contradict important parts of Hume's account. In the following I will examine the two most relevant of Hume's claims concerning the body in the *Treatise*. The first, the claim of fictitiousness of the idea of body, is commonly known and can be expected to be brought

[389] STROUD, B. ibid., p.13.

forward against my interpretation of Hume's theory almost automatically, although I believe that this claim poses no threat to my account but is perfectly compatible with it. The second claim I wish to discuss concerns the local conjunction which can serve towards a most serious objection.

1. The fictitiousness of our idea of body[390]

Fictitiousness of the idea of body and real existence of body do not exclude one another since they are maintained on different „levels" in Hume's philosophy. The fictitiousness of the **idea** of body is epistemological fictitiousness, whereas real existence is ontological real existence of the body, not of its idea. It is because of the epistemological fictitiousness that our ontological convictions are non-verifiable. Hume, however, is far from questioning these ontological convictions themselves, instead he is interested in the mechanisms of their acquisition. To understand one's own body as the principle of unity of one's perceptions does not require the idea of one's own body not to be a fiction epistemologically - it only requires real existence of body, whether or not it can be observed or demonstrated is completely irrelevant. Thus, an objection against the body as the principle of unity must show, that Hume, in fact, is not a Basic Realist. Epistemological fictitiousness of body alone will not suffice as such an objection, it can, if anything, only be instrumental towards the denial of Hume's Basic Realism. To utilize the fictitiousness of body in this way is a distortion of Hume's entire philosophy. It is to say that a) because the certainty of our senses to sense something which is real can be destroyed by reason and b) because we cannot gain the idea of body by reason, body does not exist. This is to declare reason to be the ultimate criterion of what is and what is not. Reason is supposed to have demonstrated the falsity of our belief in the existence of body. This is hardly Hume's point, it is true that reason cannot verify our belief in the existence of body, but neither can it falsify this belief. „In calling these assumptions „fictions", Hume is saying not that they are false, but

[390] The term *body* is used here in a general sense, it shall refer to one's own body and to the things we usually call *external objects*.

rather that they are unverifiable, and so unverified.[391] [...] They are indeed precisely the sort of beliefs that Kant was to dub „synthetic *a priori*." They are neither assured nor ruled out by the definitions of the terms combined in them. They do not assert merely what Hume called „relations of ideas," so they are „synthetic." They are not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, so they are „*a priori*"."[392]

The fictitiousness of the idea of body is not only compatible with the claim that the body is the principle of unity of perceptions, it is also required. It is one of Hume's postulates „*that the mind never perceives any real connexion amongst distinct existences*"[393], that is, the perceptions. The body as the principle of unity can be said to form, ontologically, a „real connexion" between the perceptions. But the connection itself must remain unperceivable. It would, however, be perceivable if the idea of body would not be a fiction.

If my arguments are accepted then we can say that the fictitiousness of the idea of body is not a problem, but rather serves the claim that the body can function ontologically as the principle of unity of perceptions.

2. The Local Conjunction

Hume writes in *Of the Immateriality of the Soul*: „*an object may exist, and yet be no where* [...] Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects, except those of the sight and feeling. [...] 'Twill not now be necessary to prove.

[391] So one may want to argue that Hume believed the opinion of the continued existence of body to be false by referring to T.I.IV.II.209, where he says: „Now upon that supposition, 'tis a false opinion that any of our objects, or perceptions, are identical; the same after an interruption: and consequently the opinion of their identity can never arise from reason, but must arise from the imagination. [...] This propension to bestow an identity on our resembling perceptions, produces the fiction of a continu'd existence: since that fiction, as well as the identity, is really false". However, the sort of fiction Hume declares here to be false is not the fiction of the continued existence of body, but it is the fiction of the vulgar of the continued existence of the perceptions. Hume uses here the terms *object* and *perception* synonymously, not because he thinks they really have the same reference (it is quite obvious throughout the *Treatise* that they do not), but because he thinks the vulgar believe them to have the same reference. Hume states this change of terminology on p. 202: „In order, therefore, to accommodate myself to their notions, I shall at first suppose; that there is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently *object* or *perception*, according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose, understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression, convey'd to him by his senses. I shall be sure to give warning, when I return to a more philosophical way of speaking and thinking."

[392] BAIER, A. ibid., p.103.

[393] T.App.,636.

that those perceptions, which are simple, and exist no where, are incapable of any conjunction in place with matter or body, which is extended and divisible"[394]. These statements seem to make it impossible even to consider the body as candidate for the principle of unity of perceptions, because perceptions (being no where) and body (being spatial) could never be affiliated to one another.

However, Hume's remarks become less forbidding, though more puzzling, once we put them into the full context of his discussion in I,IV,V of the *Treatise*. Here Hume puts the notion of substance, especially the Cartesian version, under close scrutiny. The conjunction of perceptions (mind) and matter, seems only to be ontologically, as well as epistemologically, impossible if one believes them to be substances. Epistemologically, the imagination clearly feigns „a conjunction in place, in order to strengthen the connexion"[395] between objects of perception. We face the classical Humean dilemma between imagination, which puts the smell of a rose within this rose, and reason, „which shows us the impossibility of such an union"[396]. The problem which Hume wants to make us aware of is not the problem of a never occurring conjunction of thought and motion, nor a problem of their difference, but that we believe the conjunction between them to be a local conjunction and that by doing so, we tacitly assume the substantial notions of matter and mind. I have to admit that I am uncertain whether or not Hume wants to make any ontological claims concerning the conjunction of mind and body here. In our perceptions at least, „thought and motion are different from each other, and by experience [...] are constantly united"[397]. There is a conjunction between motion (body) and thought (mind), although it is not a local conjunction, especially not because our idea of body is epistemologically fictitious. So what seems to us to be a local conjunction, must be a fiction. It can be identified as fiction because it is incompatible with our notions of mind and body.

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[394] T.I,IV,V,235-236.
[395] ibid., p.238.
[396] ibid.
[397] ibid., p.248.

However, at the end of the section Hume's strict epistemological claims are not accompanied by equally strict ontological ones. Firstly, when we apply our idea of cause and effect „to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude, that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception"[398]. Hume seems to refer here to a real connection between body and mind, but, secondly, it seems to be one which cannot be described by using the notions of them he has criticized. That he regards these notions, and especially the notion of body, as inadequate becomes clear when he states: „my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations."[399] Discussing the will, which Hume understands to be an internal impression, he argues: „I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity, which is suppos'd to lie in matter. But I ascribe to matter, that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will. I change, therefore, nothing in the receiv'd systems, with regard to the will, but only with regard to material objects."[400] Hume's denial of a local conjunction turns out to be a denial of the orthodox notions of mind and body, employing these notions cannot explain their union, but from here it does not follow that there is no such union. I believe that the body, as a principle of unity, is thus theoretically possible. The claim that the body could be the principle of unity would only state what the body operates as and not why and how it operates. Such a claim does not imply any notion of its nature or „the secret causes" of its operations.

[398] ibid.
[399] T.I,II,V,64.
[400] T.II,III,II,410.

Conclusion

If my interpretation of Books One and Two of the *Treatise* and the arguments I have presented throughout this work can be accepted then, I think, we have good reason to regard Hume's account of the self, which entails an account of personhood, as successful as such. The perceptions of particular bundles can be understood to be united by their respective body, whatever the body happens to be. This union is aided by the principles of association of impressions and ideas, connecting the successive perceptions with one another. Such an understanding is in accordance with Hume's claim that we never perceive a „real connexion" between our perceptions, since my interpretation maintains the epistemological fictitiousness of causation and of body.

Hume's assumption of the impression of the self in Book Two of the *Treatise* does not contradict his account given in Book One. The impression of the self is a complex impression without perfect identity. Thus, Book Two is not a denial of Book One's understanding of the self, but it connects the self to personhood by placing it into the social context. If self and personhood are interdependent as I have claimed, then it is only consistent that a self in isolation from its social context is difficult to maintain against the sceptical doubt. Although our idea of our self requires reason, reason is not all it requires. If reason is not accompanied by the passions, if we are devoid of others, especially of other thinking beings, then there is nothing but despair because the thinking being has reasoned itself out of its existence. So I believe that instead of denying each other Book One and Two require one another. Hume himself divided the problem of identity into two aspects. Both are necessary, and each of the two first Books of the *Treatise* deals with one of these aspects. Furthermore, Hume's task was to inquire into human nature: „Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingring method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature

itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory."[401] If we are interested in human nature, we cannot only be interested in reason. We are beings who think and feel, who reason and who love, not one of us is not amongst others. Reason and passion do not exclude each other in Hume's account, nor does the *I* exclude the *other*. Book One and Two complement each other, they refer to different, but interdependent aspects of the individual.

If my view upon the subject can be accepted then we can also see how and why Hume's account is compatible with the combined theory of identity. For this theory, both mind and body are necessary criteria of identity. But each of them, on its own, is not a sufficient criterion. This, I believe, is in accordance with Hume's own theory: the existence of body has to be taken for granted but it cannot provide for anything without the mind. The identity of the self, as well as the identity of a person, lies with the perceptions and it is the bundle of perceptions which is the mind. On the other hand, ontological scepticism leads to the perishing of all human life[402]. If human nature is our subject then we would destroy the very topic of our own investigation if we were to submit to this brand of scepticism. Whether we believe in the existence of something beyond our perceptions cannot be up to reason alone. Reason cannot verify a basic realist belief. But instead of asking us to abandon our basic belief Hume advises us to acknowledge the limitations of reason and to follow our natural instincts. Reason, on its own, „entirely subverts itself"[403] and Hume vehemently asserts himself when he says, „and whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in *any* thing possesst of *any* measures of truth and falshood: I shou'd reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of

[401] T.Introduction,XVI.
[402] compare ECHU,XII,II,128,160.
[403] T.I,IV,VII,267.

their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine"[404].

However, Hume's account of identity, although successful as such, is seriously flawed when one considers the assumptions underlying this account. Hume's understanding of identity is in accordance with his theory of perception but it is this theory of perception which does not allow for one of the most essential conditions of identity: memory. I have shown that since perceptions are fleeting existences it is impossible to a) compare a present perception with a past perception, and b) to recall a past perception. It is even impossible to recognize some familiarity with a present perception, because this implies that a past perception has, at least, left some traces of itself in the mind. The mind, however, is nothing but the perceptions, which have no duration worth considering. I have argued that it is possible to trace the chain of perceptions backwards, but to this requires a notion of causation for instance, which cannot be acquired without memory in the first place. The problem of the unaccountability of memory does also not disappear when we look at the perceptions in their division into impressions and ideas. Ideas are perceptions and are thus just as fleeting in their existence as impressions.

BAIER argues that because the perceptions are fleeting existences and since „there are no lasting human brains to store our memories of constant conjunctions"[405] Hume's theory „needs the supposition of an external world, and one that is peopled"[406]. This, however, will not solve the problem because although Hume writes as a Basic Realist it cannot be denied that all that is epistemologically available to us are the perceptions. So, even if the perception of my friend today resembles yesterday's perception of my friend and must do so because it is a perception of my real existing friend, I still need memory to know that I had a perception of my friend yesterday, not to speak of the comparison I have to make between these perceptions to know that they

[404] T.I,IV,I,183.
[405] BAIER, A. ibid., p.108.
[406] ibid.

resemble each other. I believe that the problem could be solved if we can establish some storage place for the perceptions, and it may well be that the body as the principle of unity of perceptions could present a possibility in this respect. I don't think that the problem of the local conjunction necessarily endangers such a solution, since the ontological matters do not necessarily affect epistemological availability. But it is an important question whether such perhaps possible account would still be true to Hume's philosophical intentions. However, the here indicated problem requires a thourough investigation which cannot be the purpose of this work.

I believe, despite the problem caused by the theory of perception, that Hume's philosophy has a lot to offer. The philosophy of David Hume is critical to the preconceptions of its time. But it also reaches beyond its own historical context. It is a philosophy which has as its subject human beings as they are and tries to explain people in their complexity as thinking, social and political beings. Hume wants to enquire into human nature as the nature of concrete human beings in concrete contexts. The subject of his investigation is not an abstract entity, it always retains its humane side. The despair of Book One is a real despair of a real human being of flesh and blood just as Book Two takes courage on the full and social life we usually lead. I think that philosophy, besides all its other tasks, should always keep an interest in the real experience of real people to find our place in an ever expanding universe and to aid us to use our potential for doubt constructively. Therefore it is necessary that we obtain some understanding of our own nature as human beings and as thinking and feeling individuals. So Hume, as the philosopher, was interested in Hume, the man. „I was, I say, a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, of an open, social and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions."[407]

[407] Hume, D. *My Own Life*, edited by J.C.A. Gaskin, in: *Principal Writings on Religion including **Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion** and **The Natural History of Religion***, Oxford University Press, The World's Classics,1993.

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