PHENOMENOLOGY OF MORAL DEMAND EXPERIENCE

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

In this thesis I address a seeming component of objectivity in our experience of moral demands. I try to describe that experience as accurately as possible, and in order to do so employ a phenomenological mode of presentation. I especially look to see whether such demands are taken by us as emanating from an objectively prescriptive value realm, as some moral philosophers think that we do. My contention throughout the thesis is that no such signalling is given, either in immediate experience or on reflection on the experience's impress on one. Further work on my part goes on to see whether some sense of independence of the experience from the subject is necessary for it to be had at all by her.

In the first chapter I set out the reasons for taking there to be an issue worth studying, and show how some representations of the demand experience leave open a number of interesting questions. I follow that with two methodological chapters in which the subject area is also refined and prepared: chapter 2 being concerned to elucidate the relevance of Husserl's 'formal' version of phenomenology to my area of study, and chapter 3 directed to what I call the 'informal' approach, as phenomenology is generally used in the ordinary run of Anglo-American philosophy.

In chapter 4 I describe the strength and quality of the moral demand experience as it strikes one and compare it with other, non-moral demand experiences to find out if there is anything special about the former. Chapter 5 continues that comparative approach, arguing that the experience should not be seen as of objectively prescriptive values, but that it does include some objectivity component. In chapter 6 I then identify different configurations of the experience in terms of 'self' and 'not-self' in order to check on the kind of independence felt by us to be possessed by the not-self element to the experience. And in the final chapter I cover certain reflective appraisals of putative necessary features of our moral demand experience, contending that these are not taken by us as involving an objective value realm.
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Preface to thesis

My interest in the subject matter of this thesis came about in the course of researching into issues pertaining to moral realism, its supporters and opponents. As I became acquainted with the disputes that go on in that area I began to feel that the debate was resting on certain assumptions not made fully explicit or that it was leaving aside important questions about quite what was being argued about. This feeling grew, and time and again I wondered, on looking at the reasoning about moral truth and its validating characteristics, exactly what kinds of consideration, perhaps unrevealed, motivated the debate.

A straightforward way of characterizing the genesis of the debate would be to point out the apparent realist commitments of moral language. But I thought that that was all very well - why did the language appear in that fashion? In order that I might address that question I took a step away from the linguistic current of debate and into the experiential nature of its background.

It seemed to me that where the debate got its impetus was in a certain experience or cluster of experiences which we have concerning morality. The ways in which morality often forces itself upon us as prohibiting or prescribing certain courses of action; as it signals itself by less determinate, though often piercing, sensations of unease, pressure and inescapability on the subject; and as such affects of the apprehension of a moral dimension to a state of affairs seem in some way independent of the subject who has that apprehension: - these all seemed to me the concrete ground of experience from which talk of the truth-making characteristics of moral discourse ultimately flowed. A large part of moral experience consists, that is, in feelings of constraint and pressure upon the subject as if an external reality were impinging upon her. This led my thought to the specific, albeit quite wide, area of the experience of moral demands.

It is from the apprehension of moral demands in particular that I felt the debates concerning moral realism to be taking much of their initial point. As a thesis about the meaning of moral utterances, moral realism is often represented by a
Tarski biconditional linking moral judgement with a moral state of affairs that makes it true. Now interpretation of this can vary between moral claims as they use the language of 'goodness', 'value', 'courage', 'wickedness', and so on. But the general question with which I found myself most intrigued was the way in which the right hand side of the biconditional was taken to be the truth-making characteristic (taken, that is, both by moral philosophers and allegedly by the community of moral subjects). The position of Mackie in chapter 1 of his *Ethics* struck me as a good way of entering this debate via discussion of what I call the 'phenomenology' of moral demand experience. He thinks that in experiencing moral demands we take ourselves to be apprehending the imperative force of a special objective realm of values upon us, reference to such values being part of our moral discourse. I took this to be one position of interest that also seemed to be held both by some moral realists and their anti-realist opponents when their discussions turned to the stuff of our moral experience, and a position therefore worth exploring in greater depth.

The particular issues which I felt needed further investigation included the precise nature of our experience of moral demands as they strike us, especially as they may or may not include apparent contact with some moral reality; how much their force on us varies and whether such variety is given proper attention by moral philosophers; and how later reflection by subjects on their presence in consciousness regarded them. Thus I came to look directly at this class of experience and to employ certain phenomenological procedures of inquiry into the experience and how an objectivity component could best be characterized. It is one which I soon felt had not been given all that much attention in the literature. The influence of my initial interest in moral realism became really rather vestigial in this thesis, then, though the reader will see it occasionally cropping up in the main text and in my footnote references. My prime concern now lay with this phenomenological mode of investigation.
The notion of one's being in the presence of some kind of objective value(s) is not, of course, isolated to descriptions from moral experience. Two areas which seemed to me roughly correspondent in terms of the alleged access to values through our experience are those of the religious and the aesthetic. (In the former case there being also often the claim that a special kind of person is the determinate object of religious experience). Time and again I found myself curious as to the precise nature of the experiences being presented and their content. A good example from the field of religious experience, and one which typifies the often vague claims to which I constantly refer in this thesis, occurs in these words from a religious group:

Some people will have a profound sense of awe and wonder because they know that god is present. Others...may only be able to hold onto a dim awareness that the values they experience in life point beyond themselves to a greater whole.¹

And from aesthetic experience, I have taken this passage from the American nature writer Annie Dillard to typify a certain experientially-based report. Since this overlaps with the area of the values allegedly inherent in the natural environment, it is perhaps an apposite one, given the current trend of public concern in that area. Relating how she was struck by the plummet and floated landing of a mockingbird, she says,

The fact of his free fall was like the old philosophical conundrum about the tree that falls in the forest. The answer must be, I think, that beauty and grace are performed whether or not we will or sense them. The least we can do is try to be there.²

In order to undertake a structured research into these matters I decided to follow a phenomenological mode of exposition. This itself, however, required a further decision on just what kind of phenomenological method was to be pursued, for the term 'phenomenology' and its cognates are bandied about with remarkable variety in journals and textbooks of philosophy. Seeing the attractions in the promised rigour of an Husserlian approach, but unmoved by the reality of its often cumbersome practice, I chose to adopt a *via media* in presentation of it by means of the far more accessible usage of phenomenological talk in general Anglo-American philosophy. Part of my claim to an original content to this thesis is just that I have brought together these generally separate strands of a phenomenological description of a subject matter. Taken together, I use them in the exposition to come as tools by which to lay bare the experience of the moral demand, particularly with respect to the relation that it might be held to present to an objective, prescriptive realm of values. In order best to facilitate my account I have tried to give as much space as possible to the descriptive tasks at hand - that is, the attempted accurate presentation of a certain range of experience and thought on it - and leaned heavily on the footnotes to expound positions and cite support from other writings which might otherwise clutter the main text.

In looking into the moral demand experience and possible kinds of reflection by the subject on it, I have found many times that the actual data of our experience seems not at all well captured by the ways in which one usually sees it characterized in moral philosophical texts. That is one of the specific claims I make for there being some interest and innovation in the work of this thesis. Another is that when attention is re-drawn to the nature of this experience as we do have it one finds that certain theories in moral philosophy about the relationships between experience, world and self also take on a questionable guise. My intention, then, is directed both in a negative fashion against what I believe to be inaccurate or one-sided representations of 'our' experience and its putative objects, as well as having a reformative, positive aspect in presenting the data as it actually is had, from which
further philosophical discussion can then take place. I hope to take readers along with me as I perform this work, drawing on their own awareness of that class of experience and on the validity of the descriptive exegesis I give it.

As to acknowledgements, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my supervisor at Glasgow, Paul Brownsey. Over the almost four years of this thesis I have benefited greatly from his critical eye and probing questions, and many of the ideas contained in this work have come out of our discussions. Above all, I feel privileged to have had the opportunity to learn the practices of philosophy from him.

Numerous friends have also helped me to get through the sheer hard work of research. Foremost amongst them, in no particular order, are Hugh Pyper, Tom Magill, Gordon Matheson, and Dr. John Durkan. And Sal Rebekah and Callum made it all worthwhile.
CHAPTER ONE

The civilized origin of the notion of independent existence is the tendency of sensitive people, when they experience some factor of value on its noblest side, to feel that they are enjoying some ultimate essence of the Universe, and that therefore its existence must include an absolute independence of all inferior types.
A.N.Whitehead

It is surely a strange reversal of the natural order of thought to say that our admiring an action either is, or what necessitates, its being good. We think of its goodness as what we admire in it, and as something it would have even if no one admired it, something that it has in itself.
W.D.Ross

Introduction

In this chapter the area of research is set out and analysis of it begun. The specific subject matter is a supposed experience of objectivity in the moral demand. Description of such putative experience is common in moral philosophical literature. Starting with one representation of this, and the discourse that goes with it, a series of problems are brought into focus concerning the nature of this experience. While I claim that the description of the experience in terms of a moral reality making claims on the agent may seem a quite fair one on initial survey, I also make suggestions concerning clarification of the experience and its implications. This involves both specific exploration of experiential content as well as considerations arising from agents' thought on their experience, and the position that experience occupies with respect to the prohibitions and pressures on the agent which any community
enshrines. The thread running through the discussion is that of the agent's relation to her moral experience.

Section One: Moral demands and values 'out there'

I will introduce matters by reference to some thoughts of a philosopher whose line of argument initially set up my interest in the particular area of research which this thesis represents. That philosopher is J.L. Mackie. And by the way of his presentation of a series of problems concerning the nature of moral demands and moral value I will indicate both the content of that area and the genesis of the problems it raises in the general run of moral philosophy.

1.i - Experience of the moral demand

In chapter one of his *Ethics*, Mackie considers a particular view of moral values which he believes to be both a naturally held and widely held one. It is the view that in experiencing the imperative force of a moral demand one is somehow experiencing, and responding to, objective moral values, as if from 'out there'. I will canvass more fully in section 3 the notion of objectivity to which my concern will be primarily directed, but for the time being it has the meaning here of agent-independence; of standing outside the agent's control; of a form of being in the nature of the world. Mackie thinks that we all experience this aspect of the moral demand and that it feels to us that such values are 'something in the fabric of the world'. If he is correct as to the way we do experience moral value then we would seem to be committed to a belief in an 'axiological layer to reality', where at least one kind of value - moral value - is to be found. Such values allegedly have a 'pulling power' on us: to experience them is to be moved to act on them.

1.ii - Use of moral language

So ingrained is some such belief that Mackie takes a reference to objective values to be part of the meaning of moral language. These objective values are
thought by us to guide and constrain our moral judgements. If one tries to excise this reference and replace it by a notion of choice or decision on the part of the agent, then,

It is a very natural reaction to [that kind of] analysis of ethical terms to protest that there is more to ethics than this, something more external to the maker of moral judgements, more authoritative over both him and and those of us to whom he speaks...Ethics, we are inclined to believe, is more a matter of knowledge and less a matter of decision... 8

Mackie does not inquire deeply into the relation between language and experience: whether, that is, certain moral practices have given rise to the experience in question or whether a certain experience - perhaps of constraint and awe, for instance - precedes and forms the language. But it is his contention that moral philosophy would do best to leave our language practices intact and question the metaphysics behind it.9 For the reference he discerns in the language is thought by agents to be secured through the awareness of a realm of objective values which underpins it. Hence linguistic practice and experience go together.

1.iii - Reflection on experience and practice

In the quoted passage from Mackie immediately above is to be found a consideration arising from reflection on experience and language. That is to say, support for those ongoing experiences and practices is derived from thought in the 'cool hour'10 on them. In some fashion yet to be explicated,11 the reflection that 'this cannot be the case' is taken as damaging to one way of looking at our moral demand experience. If one does try to drop the notion of objective moral value from an account of one's experience in this area, together with the practices of searching, discovery, and unwilled confrontation with value12 attendant on it, then (so this argument goes) one cannot assent to that notion at a reflective level. It strikes one as too awry to be adequate explanation of the facts of experience and practice: it cannot
be the case. Should there be only one viable alternative way of looking at these facts, it will be given added credence - both by default, in the light of the rejection of the other, and positively, if it itself finds reflective assent when considered in like manner.

This kind of position is acknowledged by Mackie both in his *Ethics* and elsewhere. In a later work, for example, he puts the matter thus. On discussing the notion of a benevolent response in agents to others as similar to the nature of pain, rather than representative of any property in the object, he says,

If we follow the subjective interpretation, we have to say that, from a reflective point of view, the moral force in favour of benevolence must be recognised as a contingent fact about ourselves (...[though] a pretty powerful fact...). But must we not admit, on reflection, that it does not *seem* to be so. We have some tendency to feel that the moral wrongness of a proposed act is an externally authoritative feature which tells us not to do this...The objectivist interpretation... has an element of truth at least as a description of what *seems* to be going on when we respond to the morally relevant features of voluntary actions: moral approval and disapproval seem to reflect objective features in a way that the feeling of pain does not.13

1.iv - Summary of points outstanding

It seems to me that the upshot of Mackie's discussion is this. He is pointing to some experience we think ourselves to have of moral values in the world which issue forth demands on one - 'out there', so to speak. Those moral values motivate one to act on them when they are apprehended. Our moral discourse makes reference to them. And the notion of an objective moral reality making demands on one is so wedded in these ways to our thought that it strikes one as unacceptable on reflection that the world not be so constituted.
At one level of description, then, the agent is presented - again, according to Mackie - in her experience with moral values as part of the 'fabric of the world'. Moral values, as one writer on the general subject puts it, 'are experienced as objects of awareness originating from outside one's own consciousness'.\textsuperscript{14} (And as to its motivational impact, in the words of Richard Price, 'The knowledge of what is right, without any approbation of it, is not conceivable or possible.'\textsuperscript{15}). Deriving from linguistic practice and reflection on the status of these moral values is another level which mirrors this kind of experience: the notion that judgements of value are similar to judgements of fact (both in the belief with which moral language is used - as being world-guided - and in that which one acquires on reflection, as being representative of, or answerable to, a value-realm). In each case of judgement in moral and factual contexts,\textsuperscript{16}

our sense of the truth of the judgement is bound up with a conception of an external locus of truth; and...just as a factual assertion and its contradiction would be equally gratuitous in the absence of this touchstone \textit{in re}, competing moral assertions are felt to require a comparable extralinguistic backstop if they are to be generally authoritative.\textsuperscript{17}

So here (that is, in the last few quotations) I have presented the reader with a series of related 'reports' from the moral consciousness of agents. I will give rein to Mackie's rejoinder to this in the next sub-section. Taken together they form a picture of people's moral experience and practice being determined on an axis travelling from the world to the agent. The world, that is, contains moral values and they make demands on one.\textsuperscript{18} Experience and reflection on it do not correspond at all well to the notion that these values are put there by oneself through either desire or volition.\textsuperscript{19}

And here are some questions which arise from that discussion:

i) How accurate in detail is the description of the agent's experience of moral demands? To answer this question one would need to study the precise nature
of the alleged apprehension of a value realm given in such experience. One could include in that investigation an attempt to uncover the degree to which such values are said to motivate the agent as part and parcel of such apprehension.

ii) Is moral language to be construed:

as making claim to an underpinning by objective moral values?

as requiring that kind of underpinning to retain certain distinctive features?

Mackie, for instance, answers in the affirmative to the first question. On the second he is equivocal: he does not think there is any such underpinning, but does suggest a need to think there are objective values if the practice is to go on. A moral philosopher such as R.M.Hare would answer negatively to both questions.

iii) Does reflection on moral demand experience give support to the notion of objective moral values? This needs careful scrutiny of the assent or denial registered with respect to certain thoughts on the nature of moral value when it is given up to reflective assay. One should also inquire into the relation between moral experience and reflection on it - the extent, that is, to which one tends to support or usurp the other. Over-arching all that is the question of the point of bringing arguments to bear from reflection; in what way some reflective failure to endorse a particular notion of moral value is taken to be relevant to investigation into the nature of such value.

iv) Is the question of objective moral values to be viewed not as a matter of what there is or is not in the world, but as one of what is or is not needed to be thought of by moral agents in order for there to be certain experiences and practices? Moreover, do they need to be experienced as special objective entities of a 'queer' sort or, minimally, as simply independent of one in some indeterminate way? The study would then be into the necessary conditions of moral experience and the nature of the moral agent. It would inquire into the 'regulative' function of the notion at hand and see whether that function met certain needs of society or
the individual agent. Mackie himself makes a point germane to this consideration. Later on in *Ethics* he talks of the possibility of the objectivity feel being a 'useful fiction'. Of course, this form of argument need not be regarded as deflationary, somehow putting into the agent what was thought to be 'out there'. To delineate necessary features if that experience is to be had at all is to present a weighty philosophical argument.

v) What is the relationship between the importance of morality in our lives and the experience of objectivity? To a great extent this question will be brought out in looking at i. and iv., but it bears separate mention. Whatever view of the nature of moral value one takes, no-one will deny the social significance of a moral system and the seriousness of failure to protect certain universal human needs. Is it likely that some experiential counterpart involving objectivity to this thought is necessarily encountered? Do moral demands coalesce with deep interests of the self, or are they peripheral or even threatening to one? There are feelings of shock and repulsion involved in much of moral experience; of the overriding urgency and importance of moral demands. And this seriousness may itself bring with it an objectivity feel - perhaps because serious matters are engendered as 'other' to the agent by moral education. Or it could lend weight to reflective thought on the experience, to the effect that the seriousness of matters cannot simply be due to personal commitment but to the way in which the world works. These are just two tentative suggestions. They indicate an area of interest which comes out of the discussion of Mackie and which stands implicit in some of the other analyses canvassed.

As for the direction of this thesis, points i. and iii. form the bulk of chapters 4, 5, and 6; point iv. and, to a lesser extent, point v., receive fullest attention in chapters 5 and 7; and point ii. is raised in various places, though it does not form the main proposed subject matter. The way in which Mackie's position has been canvassed is intended by me to show one fashion by which a particular area of interest naturally comes to the fore on considering the moral consciousness of agents. That area consists in an analysis of moral demand experience and the
presuppositions that underlie it. Chapters 2 and 3 will expand on this notion and make determinate the nature of the analysis. They will make clear the sense in which this study can be called 'phenomenological'.

1.v - Mackie's response

It is worth covering briefly one kind of reaction to the picture of objective values which seems to be given in moral demand experience. That of Mackie (and like-minded philosophers) is of interest on its own account and serves well also to bring into further relief the subject area of discussion.

The short response from Mackie is that moral values 'are not objective, are not part of the fabric of the world.' His analysis 'says what there isn't.' Something that is not objective, involving the affective nature of the agent, must be a necessary part of the input to a moral judgement. He gives a number of reasons (five in all) for adopting this position. The two he takes to be most important are 'the arguments from relativity and queerness'. The former argument takes the wide divergence in moral judgement between both agents and collectives and its 'apparent dependence on actual ways of life' to be good reason for thinking moral value to be socially created and not objective in the way experience might take it to be. Since this kind of disagreement is not unique to morals, the 'argument from queerness' is the more powerful criticism - for it states, quite straightforwardly, that,

If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.

Mackie finds especially queer the notion of a moral value with a 'to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it'. The point is put succinctly by a philosopher writing in Mackie's vein as,
Moral facts are not just unusual in the way in that facts about quarks and black holes are unusual, they are unusual in an unusual way - they demand, \(^{36}\) where the 'facts' in question are taken to refer to that realm of moral value of which experience is said to appraise one. More tersely still, Strawson thinks that the apparent metaphysics of ordinary moral language is 'a fairy-tale'.\(^{37}\) William James noted that we have 'an inevitable tendency' to 'imagine an abstract moral order in which the objective truth resides',\(^{38}\) but added that this is a 'superstitious view'.\(^{39}\) In addition, R.M.Hare does not think that the notion of objectivity here makes any sense; \(^{40}\) that it can be adequately viewed as a conceptual problem of moral language rather than about the contents of the universe; \(^{41}\) and that, even if the question made sense, no difference in our practices and experience would result no matter what answer was given.\(^{42}\)

The general position sketched above is relevant in two ways. Firstly, there is a shared image of moral experience and the presuppositions of moral language, to the effect that some kind of objective order is being claimed by agents to be signalled in them.\(^{43}\) And secondly, there is occurring a refusal to take this to be sufficient warrant to establish that there is such an order. Among other reasons for this refusal is an interesting counterpart of the kind of reflective thought mentioned earlier. The thought that something could not be the case (say, that moral value is created by desires) was represented as giving at least some fair reason for taking it not actually to be the case. Here one finds that a similar move is being worked against the thought that people experience a realm of objective values which guide and prompt them. For this thought strikes those referred to above as 'queer' or absurd or just very unlikely to be correct. The alternative thought that there are no objective values and that there are other ways of accounting for certain features of moral experience and commitments of moral language does not strike them as nearly as absurd. Properly understood, they are quite plausible, according to these authors.\(^{44}\)
Section Two: The impress of moral demands on one

2.i - Preliminary note

I take it that people are acquainted with the experience of a moral demand. This claim is based partly on personal experience and largely on knowledge of other people's reports of their experience. That there is such an experience available for research is presupposed by the literature of moral philosophy, as those writers cited previously evince. In somewhat similar manner to that which Hume employs, I invite the reader to consider whether the various claims as they are made by me in this thesis align with the experience of the demand in his/her own consciousness. These words of Gabriel Marcel at the beginning of one of his essays sum up aptly my point here:

In a study such as the one I am here undertaking there can be no question of starting from a particular definition and endeavouring to explain its content progressively; I propose rather to appeal to a special experience which it must be supposed you have.

Where divergent modes of experience do not allow a single description and appraisal, the text will indicate that that is what is happening.

2.ii - General demand experience

The experience of a demand of some sort on one is an ordinary and everyday business. Take, for instance, the demand felt to correct a painting that has been poorly hung on the wall; the demand to get the week's shopping done this afternoon; the demand to give one's time to helping a child learn some new activity. All of these are standardly recognised and referred to as demands on one. The experience of the moral demand would seem to be included in this broad category. It too tells one to think and/or do something with respect to a particular object state of affairs. Sometimes it represents itself below that determinate level and simply exerts a diffuse, apparently undirected pressure on one. Further exploration by
oneself may be required to discover the demand's object. And it arrives unannounced, like other demands, seeming to come from outside the agent's willed control. Some demands may be apprehended by one yet without appearing as demands on oneself. To that extent the general run of demand experience shares a certain exteriority by which it is signalled to consciousness.

When one comes to look more closely at this grouping, however, the question of the nature of the demandingness stands to the fore. That is to say, if moral demand experience is of objective values, other areas do not look so. If there is a realm of values 'out there' making demands on one, there is no live sense of corresponding realms concerning other kinds of demand. And reflection on the demands one experiences in daily life links them easily to the prior establishment of one's interests and desires and the expectations others have of one. This suggests at least that a similar story might be available for moral demands - and conversely that this is just to make out a special case for the nature of the moral demand and the realm it inhabits. Garner finds it 'hard to believe' in these objective moral values because,

it is hard to make sense of a demand without a demander, and hard to find a place for demands or demanders apart from human interests and conventions. We know what it is for our friends, our job, and our projects to make demands on us, but we do not know what it is for reality to do so.

While another writer on the subject thinks the converse, that,

...it is simply natural to think of... values as "objects" which make demands on us.

Hence it needs determining how similar the experience of the moral demand is to that of other demand-types, and how it diverges from them.
Chapter One

2.iii - The moral demand as signalling a presence

It will have become apparent from my discussion of Mackie that experience of the moral demand is thought - by him and others on our behalf - to point to the presence of some special kind of reality. Jung captures one aspect of this sensation when he says of conscience that it 'is a demand that asserts itself in spite of the subject, or at any rate causes him considerable difficulties...', going on to remark that, 'the *vox Dei* hypothesis is [a] subjective exclamation, whose purpose is to underline the numinous character of the moral reaction.' 52 There is, then, a sense of something exterior to the agent herself pressing on her when she experiences moral demands. And this something may or may not be identified with a realm of moral values consisting in some degree of independence of agent reactions.

The thought at large here is a quite natural one.53 Mill recognizes it as such and as a problem for his own moral theory when, in the first paragraph of Chapter Five of *Utilitarianism*, he admits that,

> In all ages of speculation, one of the strongest obstacles to the reception of the doctrine that Utility or Happiness is the criterion of right and wrong, has been drawn from the idea of Justice. The powerful sentiment, and apparently clear perception, which that word recalls with a rapidity and certainty resembling an instinct, have seemed to the majority of thinkers to point to an inherent quality in things; to show that the just must have an existence in Nature as something absolute... 54

He then continues with the thought and inquires as to the strength with which such a presumption should be held:

> Mankind are always predisposed to believe that any subjective feeling, not otherwise accounted for, is a revelation of some objective reality. Our present object is to determine whether the reality, to which the feeling of justice corresponds, is one which needs any such special revelation; whether the justice or injustice of
an action is a thing intrinsically peculiar, and distinct from all its other qualities, or only a combination of certain of those qualities, presented under a peculiar aspect. 55

Mill has his own notion concerning the genesis and grounding of such a feeling, and it is one which does away with the need for the presumption of an axiological reality. 56

Now the description of this experience varies widely. On the one hand there is Jung's use of the term 'numinous character', and Whitehead's talk of 'some ultimate essence of the Universe' at the head of this chapter; and on the other a concentration on the fashion by which a moral demand is given in terms of 'irksomeness', 57 as something which appears fundamentally 'external to us' and which 'seem[s] to constrain us'.58 One writer mixes both descriptions of the experience. Maclagan reports that in the experience of moral obligation, there is the assumption of what may be called, loosely and vaguely but still, I think, quite properly and intelligibly, an objective "order of values"...; 59 while also stating quite simply that the experience is 'like having a disagreeable time'.60 So there may be differences in the experience of moral agents between a feeling of something 'out there'; determinate description of the object; and the kind of force it exerts on her. These can conceivably be facets of a single experience; or they may represent separate strands of agents' experience (both within and between agents, that is).

2.iv - The question of motivation

Mackie thinks the notion of objective moral values queer because they demand. And demandingness is not something he can make sense of as inhering 'out there'. It is just too queer, and an explanation in terms of one's affective nature and its inculcation far more plausible an alternative to hold. This problem would seem to come under a general pair of headings in moral philosophy. If one thinks
that to apprehend a moral value - be it called property, fact or entity - is to be motivated to act in the light of it, then one is embracing internalism on the matter. And if one allows for the possibility of apprehension and motivation being separate, one is holding to an externalist approach.\textsuperscript{61} Taken in the light of the foregoing discussion of the moral demand, the following passage represents a broad characterization of how this philosophical question bears on the nature of the moral agent. In facing the question, 'Why be moral?', Graham states his belief that,

\begin{quote}
the problem involves the idea of something external which we feel may make some kind of legitimate demand on the individual. But at the same time that demand is felt in some sense irksome, since it may serve to hinder the individual in plans which he or she wishes to formulate or realize. The problem is then a motivational one. Metaphorically expressed, it is commonly seen as the problem how to get the external considerations into the agent and thus get him or her moving around in the appropriate way.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

This quoted passage illustrates the problem in a number of ways. It acknowledges the feel a moral system at times has for the agent: one of a pressure on her. It sees the main difficulty a moral system encounters as one of agent identification with certain demands: so that they motivate her. And it registers the genesis of the demand as outwith the agent: it seems to call her to court. More interestingly, there is a subtle play between the externality of the demand, its irksomeness, and the motivational force a moral system needs to instill it with for the agent. That play between the features suggests that one can be appraised of a moral value without being inclined to act in any particular way by it. Such a possibility is thought to be that of the amoralist,\textsuperscript{63} and it may even be that of most of us some of the time. It raises the further questions of the extent to which it can be said that an agent has apprehended a moral value in the absence of any motivational tendency on her part toward action as a result; together with the extent to which also any queerness has not been simply moved back onto the reasons-giving nature of moral value.
apprehension from its motivational impact.\(^{64}\) Moreover, whether moral demands arise from queer entities in queer fashion or not, the relation in experience between knowledge and action in moral states of affairs (and the possible cleavage thereof) remains itself problematic.\(^{65}\)

2.v - Seriousness of moral affairs

Lying close alongside the considerations so far considered is the matter of the quality of the experienced force of the moral demand. From the literature of moral philosophy one is presented with the notion of 'seriousness' - both by the way of an ultimate importance felt to attach to moral matters, and of an allied sense of the sheer felt severity or horror of a particular moral situation.\(^{66}\) Midgeley, for instance, thinks that, 'moral is simply the superlative of serious';\(^{67}\) another philosopher that,

> It is the peculiarity of a [moral] feeling that, while and insofar as we are feeling it, it seems to carry a more immediate sense of its own importance than any rival form of experience can boast.\(^{68}\)

These two thoughts represent a general trend in moral philosophical literature concerning description of the moral demand experience. They point to one way in which the moral demand carries with it some special experiential charge. To the notion of this seriousness I shall be arraying both descriptive analysis - whether it accompanies all moral demands, how it transpires on reflection - as well as a measure of conceptual thought, that is, in what fashion such experience and thought serves to delineate the nature of the moral.

Seriousness could be connected with the objective nature of the moral demand in the following way. If agents see moral matters in such a light that they do indeed possess for them an importance of a great or even overriding nature, then a natural tendency may be to think of matters as being that way because of an objective basis. Foot maintains that,
When we say that something "just is" right or wrong we want to give the *impression* of some kind of fact or authority standing behind our words...⁶⁹

This need involve no deliberate fiction; it can be a necessary way of taking importance to be grounded.⁷⁰ Foot herself thinks that no such foundation is providing support and that we are hence 'maintaining the trappings of objectivity [when] the substance is not there.'⁷¹ But this would be to miss the point if the objectivity-thought performs a 'regulative function'. While, on the other hand, if there are moral values 'out there' in whatever fashion, then one might expect the sense of seriousness attached to them to be present in tandem with their demandingness. A reality which incorporates 'a hidden reef of necessity in values',⁷² which one encounters experientially, would restrict the agent's freedom in such a way as naturally to give rise to a feeling of seriousness about them, whether on encounter or on reflection.

These four preceding points develop further the nature of the problems which have been arising. It is important to note that they press upon one for investigation so soon as certain assumptions concerning moral experience are entertained. My introduction by way of Mackie served to outline the particular area, but the concerns themselves - particularly about the idea of some objective, demanding sphere of moral value - are ingrained in the most cursory glance at one's experience. It is to the fixing of the putative experience of objectivity that I now turn my attention.

**Section Three: Objectivity in morals**

3.i - **General review**

'Objectivity' is used in a number of different ways in moral philosophy. These range from: the notion that there is some sphere of values 'out there' by
which the agent is guided; relatedly, that there is in the nature of things a moral order to be discerned; the formal requirement that moral judgement be couched in a certain way after certain operations have been performed; the hope that something less arbitrary than mere personal whim form the basis of moral judgement if an attempt is made to prescind from the individual or cultural or the particular. I do not intend this list to be an exhaustive one with respect to the notion of objectivity, but only to sketch out a general band of philosophical usage for the reader's consideration.

What all these positions capture is the authority of morality. They each bring to the fore a notion of the independence of morality from individual agent choosing. As one moves to the latter pair of expressions quoted under note 76 one finds a greater emphasis on the agent, but there is still also emphasized a basic fashion in which objectivity implies restriction on the agent's thought and way of going on, be it by the impact of moral values from a realm 'out there' or by the force exerted by the 'counsel of cogent reasons'. One primary sense by which the moral demand and objectivity are linked is that one mentioned above, the seeming independence of the moral demand experience from individual agent choice. This is expressed well by Hook:

Now what is the test of the independence of objects? Roughly speaking, the specific compulsions objects exercise upon us. Certain modes of behaviour are extracted from us by the very nature of the physical world and our bodily organization. In a sense ethical values also exercise a compulsion upon us. How independent from the agent and her social milieu such a compulsion might be is a matter for investigation, which involves analysis of the felt character of the moral demand as well as the logical nature of its seeming independence.
Chapter One

3.ii - Experience of objectivity

In this thesis I will be concerning myself with the experience the agent has of that 'compulsion' and independence which moral demands seem to possess with respect to her. Of especial interest is the analysis of the independence, of whether value realms or something else are taken by the agent to be responsible for it (as well as going 'behind' the feel to account for it in ways perhaps not clearly given to the agent herself in the immediate experience, but which she might discern on greater reflection on that). Between impartiality and ontology lies this independence: that is, the independence-of-agent ranges from some appeal to impersonal factors in morals through to the nature of a value reality. This range itself could exert compulsion on one as a matter of either some built-in demandingness or because of certain facts about human nature which account for a response to apprehension of the relevant moral facts. Hence one is faced again with the need to assess the nature of this demandingness in subjects' consciousness, its motivational impact, and how that concerns some perceived independence of the demand.

In order further to delineate my understanding of objectivity for this experiential analysis, the reader can view matters like this. If the agent has a feeling of a moral value 'out there' making demands on her, then the converse of this feeling is that of 'it's just me'. Feeling a demand to be put upon one can invoke the question as to whether there is some property or fact of rightness/wrongness/&c. to the matter. This is usually subject to public debate and hence there is the thought at large that the agent's perception of matters is subject to conditions extraneous to the fact of the agent's having the perception itself. That is, a public reality of some sort outwith the agent's own breast enters into the conditions for making such assertions.

Now Hare states simply that,

I do not understand what is meant by the "objectivity of values" and have not met anybody who does.81
For the purposes of research the phrase is being taken initially by me in the sense in which Mackie entertains it - as referring to agent-independent moral states of affairs which make demands on one. Such things signal themselves in experience (according to Mackie's portrayal of how matters stand with us) and retain a power over moral discourse as guiding and validating it.

3.iii - Degrees of independence

A. Inner and outer

The distinction 'out there/just me' is a very stark one. An accompanying notion of 'us' needs accommodation. And this could be attached to either pole of the distinction according to the analysis one favours. 'Us' might be thought to consist of a whole lot of 'just me's' and could thus be labelled itself 'just us'. It could remain in distinction from what is 'out there' - though it would have the extra virtue of some kind of communal agreement. On the other hand, for the 'me' that is experiencing and thinking on experience, the 'us' is quite clearly 'out there', consisting as it does in a community of others. (For certain philosophical systems also, the 'out there' is determined by the agreement of the 'us' in use of language). The experience of moral demands in which the objectivity-feel is given to the agent requires, therefore, attention with respect to the nature of the distinction being lit. A developed notion of the differences between the 'me', the 'us', and the world 'out there' in the experience in question is of fundamental interest.83

A relevant analogue of the experiential feel at large can be taken from the notion of objectivity in moral judgement, where truth-conditions can be discerned to vary in accordance with degree of agent-independence. Sayre-McCord, for instance, sums up the distinctions briefly as,

What separates objectivist, intersubjectivist [the us], and subjectivist [the me] accounts of...disputed [moral] claims is whether and how people figure in the truth-conditions for the claims. Truth-conditions are"subjectivist".. if they make essential
reference to an individual; "intersubjectivist" if they make essential reference to the capacities, conventions, or practices, of groups of people; and "objectivist" if they make no reference at all to people, their capacities, practices, or conventions. 84

Whether the definition he gives of 'objectivist' should be so cleaved from the 'intersubjectivist' one in morals is a disputed matter.85 But the quoted passage serves to highlight the experiential counterparts. They are: the experience of the moral demand as invested with its qualities by one's own decision, or by its arising from one's own breast; as being such and such a way because of one's culture and upbringing; or as being determined by the way moral reality is. These need not, of course, be entirely separate: one can experience a demand as seeming to arise externally to oneself but know its origin to lie within oneself, as it were.86 But the differences, as given in the phenomena of direct experience or rendered up to one by later reflection, are ones that I shall address in this thesis. They call for a presentation that shows how the relevant experiences are given to one as involving the self, and how they seem to be made up by that which is other to the self.

B. Experience and reflection

In using Mackie to introduce matters I made a distinction between experience and reflection on it. Such a distinction will receive greater explication in the next two chapters. I will suggest there that these represent two species of experience for analysis. For the present, however, the labelling in terms of 'experience' and 'reflection on it' will be maintained.

The distinction at hand runs this way. In experiencing a moral demand there is an alleged objectivity-feel. I proposed that that feel may be best placed (initially) in general terms under the aegis, 'out there', 'independent of me'. Now at this level any number of descriptions from agent experience might accord with that feel in terms of its object. But there is an additional - or higher 87 - level at which this experiential content is re-assessed. We do not just have experiences; we think about
our experience, in formal or informal manner; and these reflections often involve further experience which can be described. On reflection, one is presented with the content of the immediate experience (and alternatives) under the aspects 'It cannot be this way' / 'It must be this way'. This brings in a complex of reflective weighings on the tenability, credibility, and practicability (and their contraries) of taking the content of the experience to be veridical. It is a kind of assessment that need not be going on in a specially philosophical mode of thought. A reflection to the effect that a value realm is 'queer', or that the notion of desire creating value 'just doesn't chime right' are such thoughts - though they can, of course, be couched in a philosophical framework and may rely on implicit philosophical outlooks for the particular way in which they occupy one's thoughts.

Two interesting examples serve to make the point with regard to each level. One denies the independence feel, the other endorses it. Here is the first:

[M]oral judgements...are pure expressions of feeling.88

And the second is from a philosopher strongly associated with a position on moral reality akin to that of Mackie, who nevertheless gives this partial representation of the matter:

Suppose, for example, that someone were to advocate the introduction of bullfighting in this country. In opposing this proposal, I should feel, not only that I was expressing my desires, but that my desires in the matter are right, whatever that may mean.89

Lying somewhere mid-way between the analyses is this passage:

Enquire, then, first, where is that matter of fact which we here call crime; point it out; determine the time of its existence; describe its essence or nature; explain the sense or faculty to which it discovers itself.90

In this passage Hume is using reflection as a means of 'unpacking' the original experience and sorting out its contents. If one does so carefully and without
prejudice, his claim runs, then the source of any moral properties apparently 'out there' will be tracked down to oneself.91

A picture of moral experience and the reflective feel it possesses for agents will be presented, then, by the way of that dual-level analysis. This picture may not be a totally integrated one. The levels may clash. But the picture itself is worth trying to view.

**Concluding comments to chapter one**

This chapter has developed a theme taken from a particular view of moral experience and discourse. The theme derives from the objectivity-feel agents have in the experience of the moral demand. One construal of this experience is that it is involved with a realm of moral values 'out there'. This construal was introduced by following the thought of a particular philosopher (Mackie) who happens to think this an accurate description of experience. He, however, thinks also that moral experience and the commitments of moral language are misleading and fallacious - for there is nothing like a value reality out there. I made suggestions for a thoroughgoing analysis of the moral experience, together with reflective appraisal of it. And in these suggestions I also called into question the accuracy of a 'value-realm' report of moral experience. The notion of a 'regulative' function to the experience of objective moral demands with respect to self and society was also canvassed.

Taken together these considerations have an overall purpose. It is this. A particular subject matter that is of interest, thought-provoking, and somewhat under-researched in moral philosophy will be getting explored. The experience of the moral demand, thought on that experience, and the place that experience plays in the functioning of both the self and a working morality form this subject matter. And as to the method by which this can be most clearly explored, I believe it is best called 'phenomenological'. Chapters 2 and 3 explain the nature of that method and continue with concentration on the particular subject area.
CHAPTER TWO

[Phenomenology involves the description of things as one experiences them, or of one's experience of things...

M. Hammond et al.1

All phenomenology takes its start from the phenomena. A phenomenon is essentially whatever appears to someone...

H. Spiegelberg2

Introduction

In chapter two I introduce the notion of a phenomenological analysis of experience. Together with the one following it, this chapter constitutes the main expository material on the form of investigation being maintained in the thesis. I give a general account in Section 1 of the method and tasks of phenomenology. In the next section I then address the methodology of that school of thought which has taken the title 'phenomenology' to itself. That school is the one which follows the philosophical work of Edmund Husserl. Having made plain my intentions with respect to the employment of this approach, I go on to appraise those areas of Husserl's phenomenological method which I believe will aid research into the moral demand experience. Six such areas are mentioned and their criteria for adoption discussed. The penultimate sub-section acknowledges the persistence of modes of phenomenological research which I believe not to be of great utility in the investigation at hand.

The aim of this chapter is to begin to build up a unified picture of a particular philosophical tool for the performing of particular philosophical tasks. It constitutes, with the next chapter, an approach to the analysis of the moral demand experience which was highlighted in chapter 1 above. As component parts of Husserl's system of thought are discussed, their viability and applicability to this
kind of concern of investigation are also made clear according to my view of them. Some material on the philosophical genesis of Husserlian phenomenology and its assumptions is provided in the main text, detailed discussion of the nature of the methodology being kept to the footnotes.

Section 1: What is phenomenology?

I stated my belief in the previous chapter that the nature of the experience of the moral demand was something best approached through phenomenological analysis. In this chapter I shall be concerned with defining phenomenology with respect to the investigation of that experience. Areas of phenomenological research that I do not feel should be followed will also be mentioned and the specific application of the analysis to the subject matter thus made clear.

Firstly, however, I want to turn to a general appraisal of phenomenology as philosophical investigation. Phenomenology purports to be a method of describing experience and uncovering implicit or hidden elements and structures to it. 'Experience' here could be construed very widely indeed, to include anything that comes before consciousness. In one fashion this is indeed the ambit of phenomenology. It represents the attempt to explore rigorously the contents of consciousness. But one can make distinctions within this ambit of research that serve to express the different routes by which the method is applied. They run in this way. Phenomenological analysis is undertaken when one explores the data given to the subject both as she directly encounters a particular experience and as such an experience is given as the object of a more reflective datum for investigation. This latter involves the attempt to make explicit the general structure of an experience-class and the way in which it is invariantly given in consciousness. Both involve one in looking at the data of consciousness in a reflective mode. Farber, for instance, puts the point that,

The method of inquiry in pure phenomenology is reflective throughout. The descriptive analysis of the stream of consciousness
is accomplished by means of acts of reflection that also belong to the stream of experience, and these acts in turn can become objects of analysis for another level of reflection.\(^7\)

But there is a difference as reflection on experience between the attempt to return for study experience in its immediacy without subsequent interpretation of it and the reflection that goes on in a more analytical frame of mind as to essential features of the experience and how it stands in consciousness with other groups of experience. This is a distinction of which I shall make more in the next chapter. Husserl thought the former level of reflection a starting point for deeper investigation into the nature of the experience.\(^8\) For my own part, I will regard these as first and second order reflections on the experience, retaining in the next chapter a terminological distinction between 'direct' and 'reflective' ways of looking at experience in the light of this explanation, even though the former is also of a reflective nature.

The analysis begins from a particular view of consciousness. And this is of consciousness as having a defining feature of 'intentionality',\(^9\) the view that the contents of consciousness (thoughts, emotions, volitions, etc.) take objects.\(^10\) These objects (and reflections on them in which the complete conscious datum is itself then taken as object of a reflective thought)\(^11\) are available for descriptive analysis. This is something called 'phenomenological intuition',\(^12\) which is the bringing to clarity of a particular experience or class of experience. It involves no initial commitment either way as to the marking of experience as being of inner or outer objects.\(^13\) It simply describes their appearance in the consciousness of subjects. This will include phenomenological data of the seeming inner or outer reality of the object, but that is something that gets described rather than getting affirmed by the phenomenologist. Indeed, this is one of the advantages of employing phenomenological method: one can look at the appearance of intentional objects without commitment to particular philosophical views of their location in world or mind. An example here is of the description of the presented world - a landscape, say - and of the presented feeling of the agent - awe, say. Further
description and unfolding of the experience then tries to make more explicit its contents - whether, that is, landscape 'out there' and feeling 'in here' are so clearly demarcated as the original wording suggested. And whether there is such a demarcation or not, phenomenology attempts to give fully to one the characterization of the experience in question.

The higher reflective purchase on our experience is given in two fundamental ways, I believe. One is that which I represented above as the attempt to give accurate description of the experience a subject is immediately given. And there is also a phenomenological analysis of the agent's grasp of the concepts she employs in describing such presented data. This involves investigation both of her linguistic understanding and of the situation various elements occupy in the overall economy of her experience. J.L.Austin talks of a 'linguistic phenomenology' as a means of making clear one's 'awareness' of the words we use and our 'perception of [the] phenomena' the words are about. R.M.Hare makes a similar point with respect to our linguistic intuition as determining one's analysis of a particular subject-matter. This approach seems to rest on uncovering the kind of 'grasp' or 'feel' a subject has for the concepts she employs: when they fit and when they do not, when a particular way of thought applies and when it breaks down.

So if the mode of phenomenological analysis described in the previous paragraphs above gives one description of a particular experience, both as it is presented to the agent and as implicit features of it are uncovered, this approach to the experience is giving one a wider picture of its implications for the general conceptual framework by which the subject has an overall grasp of the significance of her life and experience. That is, if one application of the analysis describes experiential content, as it is given in immediacy and without further thought on it, this one explores the experience as being the content itself of the subject's higher reflective attention. In this way her own perspective on the experience is described as well as the (perhaps unnoticed) place it occupies in her general experience mapped. The two are not isolated types of research for Husserl. For he
believes the direct experience to contain suppositions and implicit data that are revealed on greater reflection and which thereby move one up to a higher mode of analysis. This process I hope to show through my discussion in section 2 of typical steps of phenomenological method as I see them to be connected.

Now such a method might be criticized for looking to be a method of subjective introspection. If phenomenology did come down to a matter of describing the inner feelings of individual subjects then it would indeed sit uneasily as philosophical investigation. It would look to be following a path akin to an empiricist theory of meaning - which is that theory which takes language to be determined for the subject by reference to certain logically private inner experiences, and to which there are compelling objections. But this is not the case. In attempting both to uncover and describe experience, phenomenological analysis is going on within a public domain in which its claims are open to confirmation (or its converse) in the light of the hold agents share on their experience. To the extent, then, that phenomenology employs introspection, it is with great care and with attention paid to the publicity of its findings. At this point I think it worthwhile to quote at length the assessment given by a phenomenologist of the method with particular respect to its application in the field of moral philosophy. Hans Reiner states that:

Of course, the supposition on which phenomenologists propose such theses, viz. that there are universal and unchanging basic contents and structures of the human consciousness, is not wholly unjustified. From our ordinary personal experience in associating intelligently with our fellow men we know of such basic contents and structures. But this gives at best some measure of probability to the phenomenologist-moral philosopher's assertions...[What happens is that] descriptions and analyses of essences through phenomenological reflection are put forward for consideration without its being asserted at once that the general validity of the
findings is certain, but merely as the first step in a sociological research procedure in which further steps follow. The rest of the procedure consists in launching, so to speak, into the world of readers and ...other scientists the descriptions and analyses which are the phenomenological researcher's results, as propositions presented to a number of others to be checked against their own (moral) consciousnesses, and then in the propositions' being either confirmed and borne out or falsified by an experienced voice's contradiction and the exhibition of different findings.\(^{19}\)

The method itself does not make any presumption to the effect that its remit is based simply on reporting the nature of the inner experience - primarily because experience does not in the main strike subjects as being 'merely' inner (see my example of the landscape-viewing as indicating the difficulty of viewing a particular experience as being presented simply as an inner phenomenon). It is in this respect that Spiegelberg notes,

There is a widespread belief that phenomenology consists essentially in a study of merely subjective or private phenomena, and that it constitutes nothing but a return to a subjective psychology, if not a relapse into introspectionism... [However,] its descriptions deal not only with the subject's side of experience,...but at least as much with...[that] which confronts him as the objects of his experience...Thus [for example] colours, melodies, and specifically those "forces" which we experience in our own lived body appear, as it were, in front of us. No particular direction, inward or outward, is prescribed by the essential nature of phenomenological intuiting.\(^{20}\)

The proper role of phenomenology is to present before one the stuff of experience. That this is generally not attended to and is left unclarified in one's everyday living is good reason to attempt accurate presentation. Philosophical problems may arise
from inadequate portrayal of experience; and apparent philosophical solutions may rest on insufficient examination of that experience. In all this, though it tries to make explicit that which is not initially apparent in experience, phenomenology is tied to description of what is there to be found in experience. For, Husserl claims, this cannot be emphasized enough - *phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing...a sense which philosophy can uncover but never alter...*.21

**Section Two: Husserlian phenomenology**

One encounters the term 'phenomenology' under slightly different guises in philosophical literature. I wish to do two things in this section and in the third chapter. One is to indicate the content and claims of two types of phenomenological method which I identify. The other is to suggest ways in which the pair can be fruitfully combined and employed.

The first kind of phenomenology on which I am now going to fix my attention is that of Edmund Husserl and the school of phenomenological method which has followed *inter alia* his notion of philosophical research. Rather than become trapped in discourse on methodology, I shall point out important areas of that research which I take to be worth following for investigation into the data of our moral consciousness. I will also point out briefly certain other areas which Husserl regarded as necessary to his project but which I feel do not require adherence for adequate analysis to be undertaken or which involve one in a problematic metaphysics. I should make plain that my purpose is to use this kind of method as I think research will be facilitated by it. My interest is in analyzing moral experience rather than in that of a particular philosophical standpoint which is then applied to a particular subject matter.

There are a number of ways in which Husserlian phenomenology can be of use.22 One writer has listed 27 points of Husserl's investigations which he thinks
stand 'as contributions to psychology and philosophy in the usual sense.'23 (And he also omits some claims which Husserl himself regarded as the most important ones arising from his work).24 As for myself, I would single out the following:-

i) Presuppositionlessness. Husserl reiterates throughout his work the need to take experience on its own terms, as it were, and to leave behind the philosophical grids which one might wish to fit over the data given by experience. This is eminently sensible and should be a postulate of all philosophical research anyway. As a kind of initial propaedeutic to exploring the moral demand experience it enjoins one not to entertain matters already convinced of a particular interpretation of, say, where moral value resides ('out there' or in one's volitional or emotive nature).

As I move through these points I will try to illustrate them in descriptive practice with a concrete example. It would seem to me the most efficient use of space to remain in the general area of experience with which our interest is lying. I shall take, then, as an example that of the phenomenon of guilt, which is one that seems to me similar to the kind of demand experience of which I have talked.

One must attempt, then, in the light of this point, to describe a subject's experience as it concerns the apprehension of this phenomenon, irrespective of whether it seems to oneself to be strange or unlikely to have objective correlates over and above the very fact of its appearing before a subject or the physical properties of the situation to which it may refer; or, conversely, irrespective of any prior disposition to deny that the experience might reside purely in the apprehension by the subject of her emotive constitution welling in consciousness. Such presuppositions one must jettison in favour of reporting the givenness of the experience to the subject. And the same must go for a report of a higher reflective view of that type of experience: one must not take it beforehand either, say, that a certain attitude of scepticism (as with Mackie) ensues in the 'cool hour' toward certain apparent features of the experience in immediacy or, say, that a subject
'needs' to think of guilt in a certain fashion (as connected with a divine law that has been transgressed, for instance) in order to have that kind of experience.

ii) Description of appearances. Following on - as I see it - from the previous point is the attempt to give accurate portrayal of the way in which experience is presented to the subject. That is to say, one does not import any theory as to what she should be experiencing or how it should affect her: one simply describes its appearing to her. And the describing of appearances is a matter of viewing the phenomena under different perspectives and degrees of clarity. The purpose of this device is to allow the experience to be described without interference from the investigator's own prior notions of its contents, as well as to draw out the variety of ways in which a particular object of experience can be given. The relevance of this point to moral philosophy is clear enough: to try to present experience as subjects actually encounter it is an important preliminary to any discussion by a philosopher of how 'we' are said to think or feel on a particular moral issue or how the categories of moral thought are understood.

To my specific example this point enjoins that the experience be given due descriptive justice as it is presented to the subject's consciousness. The phenomenon of guilt may be experienced in a fashion sharing universal features for subjects. Or it may enter consciousness by different routes and with different contents and qualitative tone as it concerns the same situation, both between subjects or at different times for the same subject. It may appear as making a specific call on the subject with respect to a particular past event or as a rather inchoate pressure on her for which she needs to give some thought if she is to discover its source. Whatever the case may be, it is important that the phenomenologist describes the appearance of the experience to consciousness in as accurate a manner as possible and with care given to capturing the precise meaning it carries for the subject. When the appearances are altered - for instance, when a subject re-encounters the experience or is presented with the phenomenon under new circumstances or when the subject merely thinks on the matter - once again the
phenomenologist tries to represent each time the shifting patterns of the experience of guilt as they play in the consciousness of subjects.

iii) *Imaginative variation.* The penultimate sentence above leads my discussion on to Husserl's principle of the imaginative altering of experiential content in search of essential elements to the experience.²⁷ Husserl claims that we can vary a particular perception 'with a completely free optionalness' and 'shift the actual perception...into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if, which supplies us with "pure" possibilities.'²⁸ To any particular intentional object one can try, that is, to subtract or add or replace various traits.²⁹ For Husserl this leads one on to a disclosure of the essence of the object - which I address in the next point below - but there is another fashion by which this process can be described. That is one familiar to analytic philosophy as the use of counter-examples to test the adequacy of one's idea of a particular concept with which one describes one's experience - this seeming to rest itself on particular experiences of satisfactoriness or unsatisfactoriness as the different possibilities are considered (a matter about which I say more in the section on 'sensefulness' in the next chapter). The way by which this is carried out is the grasp one has on the concept being tested through the variations so that what is being done is the drawing out of one's own understanding as well as a discovery of what the concept contains, its fuller content not previously having been perspicacious to one. Similarly, here, it is one's grasp on the nature of the experience and the terms with which one records it that is exploited through this kind of phenomenological procedure. Hume applies a similar technique in his moral philosophy when, in talking of justice as arising from utility, he states that,

The more we vary our views of human life, and the newer and more unusual the lights are in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced, that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory.³⁰

Concerning the phenomenon of guilt, this methodological maneouvre involves the attempt to view features of the experience as it is considered in
different lights from those in which it is ordinarily encountered. One could heighten a particular experiential trait - of its felt pressure on one, say - while excising another one - any link to an infringement of some law, for instance - and report on how such a possible experience strikes oneself as subject.

Another and highly important feature which one could test for by the use of this method is that of the link which exists in a subject's consciousness between the experience and moral states of affairs. Whether the phenomenon of guilt would be recognized as such outwith the subject's notion of the 'moral' - experiencing it, say, in circumstances as arising with respect to one's preference for a certain unhealthy food - would be a matter for investigation in this fashion.

If the resulting image no longer appears as that phenomenon which we call 'guilt' then the reflection on that experience has shown to the phenomenologist conditions under which features of it cannot be removed or replaced. This is a procedure which I will address again in the next chapter under the heading of 'reflective phenomenology'.

iv) Discovering essences. From the use of imaginative variation one is supposed to be appraised of the essential nature of a particular intentional object. Husserl discusses this part of his philosophy quite extensively. Generally, it is referred to by Husserlian phenomenologists as 'essential' or 'eidetic' intuition. It can be called the goal of his phenomenology. But it is a controversial matter, and its mode of operation not certain. Husserl thinks that one is presented with the essence of an intentional object (and essential relations with other objects) after rigorous application of imaginative variation has allowed one to be sure of essential and non-essential elements within it. That essence or 'eidos' is a universal which has ideal being. Another member of the phenomenological school which is associated with Husserl, Max Scheler, believes that essences can be reached much more directly by a special ability of essential intuition. To be sure, both routes lead to the same destination. The problem with this part of phenomenology is not so much concerning method as whether there is any such goal to be reached. For the notion
of some kind of special beholding of a universal with ideal being has seemed odd to many philosophers. Indeed, even some supporters of phenomenology have been inclined to drop this part from it, one calling it 'a phantom',35 another labelling it a 'chimera'.36

It seems to me that this part of Husserlian phenomenology can be usefully retained so long as one does not expect as much of it as is expressed above. Taken in the sense of a systematic and intensive search for the defining features of an experience class - those ways without which it ceases to be experienced as that kind of thing it is - it clearly has valid application in philosophical research.37 One is enjoined to consider a particular object in different and unusual lights in order that one's understanding of it be made explicit and deepened in the process. To that effect, it is quite proper to claim that one is investigating the essential or necessary features of the object. Hume looks to be performing a similar kind of operation in the quotation above from him, and with respect to the subject matter of this thesis one would be trying to discover whether an essential feature of the moral demand was some objectivity element and what characterization most adequately described that.

An essential feature to the experience of guilt which is often claimed to be discerned by people both within and outside of academic philosophy is an intrinsic link to a divine lawgiver. The procedure I outlined above would make clear whether that really does give itself as the case on closer inspection, in tandem with the first step above of dropping any presuppositions about the 'proper' ambit of the guilt experience. Directing one's closest attention to the experience in a particularly sharp form of reflection, one would attempt to see whether that experience discloses features without which it cannot be held as that kind of experience before one's view.

This method seems to me to rest itself on a particular experience or group of experiences with which the subject responds to the form of reflection she undertakes. It relies on a certain type of experience of dissatisfaction, unease, or
breakdown in 'making sense' of matters which ensues on considering the experience shorn of particular features or with others added. The converse experience to which the subject is party is one of satisfaction, of matters standing aright, of their 'making sense' as she fixes the experience before her reflection. This is a phenomenon to which I shall return in the next chapter, and at length in the final one.

So far as my example is concerned, this method would involve such experiences of ease and dissatisfaction as the connections of guilt with, say, a divine lawgiver, or with one's childhood conditioning, or with the survey of one's own behaviour before an apparent inner court are successively brought to mind. The essence of the phenomenon is reached through imaginative variation and in coming to a point at which the clarity and certainty with which one is placed toward the experience is at its height. One can then be said to have discerned the essential feature(s) of the phenomenon in question.

v) The horizon. Husserl discusses in a number of places the notion of the 'horizon' to a particular intention. This consists in a working postulate that experience is richer than appearances suggest and that there are implicit elements to experience available for investigation as one moves out to the implicit or unnoticed features of the intention. Husserl often uses the example of a die, claiming that the unseen faces behind the ones immediately present to one are somehow 'co-present' or 'co-intended'. 'What is actually perceived,' Husserl says, 'and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (to some extent at least), is partly pervaded, partly girt about with a dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality. I can pierce it with rays from the illuminating focus of attention with varying success.' It is easy to see how this investigation links with the discovery of essences. One explores the horizon, or implicit content, of an intention partly by heightened attentiveness to it and also through the use of imaginative variation by which features not otherwise presented to one are brought to light. In doing so one is thereby working through to an apprehension of those
features which are seen to be essential. Recalling, then, the second-noted feature of phenomenological research above concerning appearances, this move both employs the appearances - the different possible modes in which the object is directly experienced - as well as it goes beyond the appearances to elements not normally given on the surface of experience. Such features are those which the subject herself brings up to consciousness in later reflection on her experience, as elements to it unnoticed in immediacy are considered and as further reflective thought on the general nature of the experience class is entertained. It thus calls one, as with the second point above, to give attention to the business of accurate depiction of a subject's moral experience and then to move out to a deeper perspective on that experience and the network by which it is surrounded (much as, for instance, one does in finding out what factors of racial belief and its relation to upbringing stand behind a person's moral perception of events with regard to different groups).

Now this seems to me to have two rather distinct applications so far as it is directed to my particular example. The first one is this. When a subject reflects on some experience of guilt which she has had or is having she will often reveal to herself aspects of the experience which were previously either unnoticed or unacknowledged by her. At a minimum, this may involve such a realization as that it is a precise act, such as an unkind word to a friend in need, that is responsible for the particular hue of the experience by which she is assailed. And at the extreme the reflection on the experience may end up in her admitting to herself that it is not (or was not) so much guilt which she feels as a kind of crude pressure on her, an unease resulting from a fear of how her own acts might appear to others.

The second way in which this step can operate, as I see it, is as a reflection with a wider remit, as it were, on the nature of the experience in question. From this kind of reflective standpoint the subject can attempt to look into the general nature of the experience as such. By consideration of the phenomenon of guilt as a kind of experience with which she is acquainted, she can attempt to explore the general grounds on which it is founded in her experience; how it coheres with other
classes of experience; its relation to beliefs which she may hold about her nature as
an agent and about the nature of the world. This is a step which can be undertaken
both in order to discern essential features of an experience class (along with the use
of imaginative variation) as well as to lead one into a further inspection of the
experience, its constitution in consciousness, and the connections it possesses with
respect to other areas of experience and belief. For the experience of guilt in
particular one would be looking into matters such as the relation to other
experiences (shame, for instance), the degree to which it enters into notions of
responsibility, or the more basic fear of being caught and punished for one's
behaviour. At its most general, one would wish to be appraised of the kind of
background, and often implicit, experiences and beliefs with which the subject and
her community approach their world. This leads on my discussion to the final
element of Husserl's phenomenology which I take to be of use.

vi) The life-world. To explore the horizon of a particular experience
will often involve entering into not only the implicit features directly related to the
intentional object, but also into the implicit background to it. Such a background
could involve the ways in which the particular experience coheres with others and
how its place in the subject's understanding rests on certain assumptions about
herself and reality. Ultimately one is led to a general picture of the subject in the
environment (both physical and social) which forms that implicit background.
Husserl's own thought seems to have moved this way from the notion of the
horizon, and the label he gave this ultimate background was 'life-world'. It has
been called 'one of the most fertile ideas in the history of phenomenology...'.45
This kind of investigation gives one the widest interpretation of the implicit
background to experience and allows one to see its placing in the social and
historical context of a shared community existence. And although Husserl changed
the emphasis of the notion in his final works, moving from a pluralist conception
of different cultural life-worlds to one of the invariant structure of a life-world for
all subjects, one can get on with investigating this very general grounding
without committing oneself to either interpretation. An example from moral
philosophy of a similar approach is Ladd's notion of a 'ground motive', the basic
actuating belief (or set of beliefs) at the foundation of a community's moral life.\(^{48}\)
He believes this to consist in a cognitive element, namely, 'existential' beliefs about
the kind of world one inhabits. 'Insufficient attention has been paid in recent
ethics,' he claims, 'to this phenomenon of the existential ground of morality. This
ground consists of significant beliefs about life in general (a Weltanschauung) -
hence the term "existential"... [For example] the belief that the universe is put
together in a certain way cannot fail to have an influence upon which motive is to be
regarded as paramount.' \(^{49}\) While this does propose one way of viewing as
important the life-world of a community, it may be that a unitary picture will not be
given to one - many different elements enter into the matrix of fundamental beliefs
and ways of living which communities evince, some of them undoubtedly clashing
with one another in ways that are not (at least cognitively) resolved. But the point is
clear enough concerning the horizontal movement of interpretation leading to the
life-world. It is that one's investigation into moral experience should take account
of the shared and implicit assumptions and picture(s) of the world which lie at the
base of subjects' moral experience.

For the experience of guilt it seems obvious that one feature which calls for
especial attention is its putative connection with beliefs concerning a divine law or a
law that is present in the nature of the cosmos. Such a belief may form a kind of
basic view of their life and the world in which they live for some people and
groups. Historically this may well have been the case for medieval Europe. And
one interesting phenomenological investigation which can be undertaken in this area
concerns the possibility of some content to the experience of the guilt \textit{as if} related
to breach of a divine or cosmic law which is yet unaccompanied by the actual
phenomenological fact of a basic belief in or experience of a divine reality. Some
such disengagement of immediate and background experiences is held to be the case
of our own moral consciousness by the likes of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1981).

Section Three: Shaping the methodology

This completes my appraisal of what I regard as workable points of method from Husserlian phenomenology. For the sake of convenience I shall term this formal phenomenology in order to distinguish it from the stuff of the next chapter which I am calling informal phenomenology. I do not believe all that much need separate them, suitably understood, except for a certain rigour to be found in the former and a developed vocabulary of methodological steps. For the present moment, however, I shall make some brief comments on those parts of formal phenomenology which I am expressly eschewing.

My interpretation given to eidetic intuition has already been tempered in the light of problems with Husserl's placing of it (sub-section 2.iv.). Subsequently the part it will play concerns the investigation of necessary features of moral experience: to that extent one can be said to be exploring the essence of a particular area of experience, but not in the exact way in which Husserl would have stated the matter. He particularly emphasized the use of a device called 'phenomenological reduction' or 'bracketing',\textsuperscript{50} by which to arrive at essential insights and to prepare the subject matter for investigation. This involves a deliberate suspension of belief in the external world in order putatively to focus as closely as possible on the nature of the pure experience. That in itself need not cause any problem. But I think the process of attempting to drop presuppositions and to describe experience with as much justice to its appearances as possible has been adequately covered in my points i and ii above. I do not think that care to avoid prior assumptions about the nature of the moral experience requires this move - the difficulties involved in quite what realm of phenomenological fact one is thereby led into being unhelpful for this inquiry. For Husserl's seems to have regarded this 'pure experience' as bound up with the life of a 'transcendental ego' which generates the meaning of the
phenomena. This is not a form of understanding which I find helpful or germane. It is my intention to employ Husserl's methods of inquiry as I take them to be fitting routes into the data of our moral experience. Such methods enter also into areas of philosophical speculation which represent general background matters rather than ones which can be directed to the specific subject matter; over those elements of the methodology I shall, as it were, draw a veil. They would take the proposed investigation away from its object and too far into a circuitous, prolonged methodological preamble.

As for Husserl, his later thought is largely bound up with his notion of the 'transcendental ego'. For him this represents the constituting centre of all intentional acts of consciousness and that which bestows meaning on intentional objects. It is reached through the application of the phenomenological reduction to the contents of consciousness. I will not employ this notion for three reasons. Firstly, it requires metaphysical commitment to a philosophical object of a questionable sort. Secondly, there does not appear to be any need to posit it in order to conduct research into experience. And thirdly, the notion seems to me to stem from a way of viewing experience which one can best do without. This is Husserl's belief that the data of phenomenology, having been 'bracketed' and analyzed therein, are not to be thought of as a psychological matter, but as a special kind of fact (generated by the transcendental ego). I think that one can avoid this awkwardness concerning the nature of the subject matter, while retaining its impetus against taking experience as 'merely' about psychological facts. That is to say, careful attention to the phenomena of experience will lead one to description of it without prior disposition to classify it immediately into neutral world and agent reaction. But as to the idea of a special realm of phenomenological fact, I think this can be left aside.
A final note on Husserlian phenomenology and its relevance to this study

I shall now sum up my attitude to Husserl's philosophical system and say how I take it to be relevant to the subject matter at hand. It provides one, I believe, with an approach to the stuff of experience, together with more and less definite tools by which to implement that. By enjoining certain careful procedures through which to present accurate description of how experience enters subjects' consciousness and how it is subsequently viewed in the light of further kinds of reflection, it attempts to give to the researcher the best possible purchase on her own experience and the means by which to record it for the consideration of others. And through doing so, Husserlian phenomenology purports to lead one on to see the essential features which a particular class of experience must retain if it is to be that class at all.

In one respect this all sounds dauntingly technical and esoteric. And yet in another it is rather unremarkable. For what is being proposed is that an attempt be made to reveal to ourselves as fully as possible experience as we have it and as we think on it. That seems to me an extremely worthwhile philosophical project as well as a sensible personal one. I have no advance reasons for taking it to be either a simple or difficult affair to execute. In the next chapter especially I will be maintaining that this can serve a vital function in philosophical debate where different descriptions of experience are contended with one another by proponents of different theories. And it will become apparent throughout this thesis that I use this descriptive procedure particularly to direct my argument against portrayals of moral experience that are *shared* by different philosophers.

The experience to which I will be especially directing my attention is, of course, that of the moral demand. I think that, for the reasons given generally in this chapter, a phenomenological approach to the data of the experience class is as applicable to that as it is anywhere else. This is particularly so, I believe, where the precise nature of a putative apprehension of moral demands arising from demanders
or values 'out there' is concerned. The kind of phenomenological procedure I have outlined here, as it is put into practice in the light of my commentary in the next chapter, should present the reader with as accurate as possible a description of that experience. Included in that description will be the extent to which the demand is experienced as arriving in consciousness from 'out there', and how the nature of the 'out there' component is discerned by the agent, both in the thick of the immediate experience and on later, greater reflection on it.
CHAPTER THREE

In unreflected experience value appears to be in the object of value.
B.Tapper

[When we] turn round upon ourselves...man discovers that value has its seat in his feelings, that the stuff of which the idea of value is composed is his reaction, that there is no such thing as intrinsic value in the object of his thought.
D.S.Miller

Introduction

In this chapter I will represent the way in which the term 'phenomenology' and arguments using it are employed in a philosophical tradition outwith the Husserlian one. I would broadly characterize this as the Anglo-American tradition, and its general use of phenomenology is of a fashion such that I will be calling it 'informal'. That is, it does not take its lead from the strictures and rigour of that school of philosophy which identifies itself by the label 'phenomenological'; instead, its use of the term (and of phenomenological considerations) rests on a more loose understanding of it as concerned with a general analysis of experience and reflection on it. With respect to this attempt on my part to find useful rapprochement between the two brands of phenomenological approach to a subject matter, one writer on the general topic has put his view in words which sum up well my own attitude. He says this:

Our method of examination will be phenomenological, a standpoint elaborated if not discovered by Edmund Husserl. The ins and outs of this method are a matter of infinite technical discussion; I shall use of it only this: the attempt to reflect radically upon experience as that experience presents itself to the experiencer. It will be the mind
reflecting upon itself, without presupposition, in an effort to discern explicitly what the structure and content of that experience is. This reflection from first to last will try to confine itself to experience as it offers itself without presupposing from the start what reality "must" be, what the ego experiencing "must" be, notions drawn from sources external to that experience itself...Phenomenology thus understood is nothing but an attempt to make clear to oneself the phenomenon of any experience whatsoever just as it offers itself to the mind reflecting.3

I will subdivide this discussion in between two modes of 'doing' phenomenology which have already been mentioned in part in section 1 of the previous chapter. These modes are, respectively, the direct and reflective analyses of experience. It is by means of them that I will be undertaking investigation of moral experience in the chapters to follow. During this chapter and at the end of it I will indicate how I take both formal and informal phenomenology to be related and how they can be fruitfully employed in tandem.

Initial note

In this chapter and in the ones that follow I will often talk of a subject's 'feel', both for the application of terms to describe her experience and also as an awareness (more and less determinate) of what it is that is going to constitute her experience. I realize that this may sound a rather colloquial description. But I think no other one of equal brevity and general applicability captures the matters to which I wish repeatedly to direct the reader's attention.

In Section 4 of this chapter I will offer my understanding of different uses of the term 'sense' as I see it to be relevant to the study. As I do that I cover also at length how 'feel' can be construed in the thesis. Initially, I would characterize the matter in two ways. One concerns the 'feel' a subject has for expressions that fit or jar with her experience. This I take to be a kind of experience of the satisfactory or
unsatisfactory use of expressions in that way with which we are all familiar, both as we spontaneously describe our experience or as we attempt to grasp the most adequate terms for it. The other way in which I shall be using 'feel' is one which the reader will come across quite extensively. It is to give description of an awareness on the subject's part - sometimes hazy and without a specific object, sometimes clear and determinate - of what it is with which she is interacting to give her a particular experience or class of experience. In the former, rough fashion it is like that inexplicit judgement which we sometimes make of our awareness of a situation 'being dangerous' - without being able to pin down the precise factors giving rise to the awareness. And in the latter, specific circumstance a particular object - such as a prowler - is part of the awareness of the danger. It is of Mackie's alleged moral values 'out there' that I shall be asking whether such a 'feel' or apprehension on our part is vague or determinate or non-existent in the moral demand experience.

Section One: Phenomenologies of direct and reflective experience

At this point it is best to make plain a distinction to which I have alluded already in the previous chapter. It is that between descriptive reports of 'direct' and 'reflective' levels of experience. In the former case I shall be attempting to present the stuff of the moral demand experience as it is immediately given to a subject's consciousness; in the latter, it is with a more deliberate investigation into the nature of the experience by the subject that I shall be interested.

Now this distinction is a rather fluid one. Prima facie, any description of our experience is in some sense reflective. Even in describing 'immediate' experience, one is usually bringing back to mind a particular experience in order to present it for consideration. The difference lies, I believe, between the attempt to describe immediate experience as it was had and the further adumbration of it as one thinks more deeply on it. In the former case one merely describes the
experience; in the latter, one analyses it in greater depth, though attempting still to give description of the experiences that go on as one does that. As to this latter case itself, I will further distinguish my understanding of reflection and use of that term in the relevant section (section 4) of this chapter. I see that matter essentially as subdivided between reflection as serious thought on one's experience and as that which takes the self and its experiences as objects of thought. It is especially to the latter form of reflection that I believe phenomenological arguments are directed in moral philosophical literature.

Here, then, is the distinction between direct and reflective levels as I see it. In the case of direct experience one is giving a description of the experience which seeks to present or characterize that experience precisely as it was had; which is to present in words no more and no less than the experience in its original impact on the subject. And at the reflective level one is attempting an exploration of the experience as recollected, one which might disclose aspects of it not noticed at the time. Such aspects might lead one to contradict the original report of the experience. Should that be the case, then one also describes the experience of the subject as such realization strikes her; or one can describe her experience simply on thinking on the possibility of different aspects being added to or subtracted from her initial experience. And further to that, there is also a phenomenological description of her experience as the subject reflects on the experience as a general class and how it stands in her life as a whole.

I shall illustrate these distinctions with a sample experience of which phenomenological description can be made. Let us take, say, the experience of a climber suddenly reaching the summit of a mountain and beholding the scene about her. In describing the immediate impress of an experience upon her she may talk of being taken aback, standing in awe before the majesty of raw nature. She may describe only a crude feeling of astonishment filling her senses as the salient feature of her impressions at the time. On later reflection she may unpick more finely the threads of her experience: seeing that it was the particular way that the sun struck
the snow-capped peaks that primarily held her attention; how the keen air at the
summit caught her breath and enlivened her whole self; and how her own
expectations of the scene, formed from her viewing filmed images, had built into
her anticipations and final encounter. Further reflection by her might be into the role
she takes an accord with nature to play in the life of an individual; or the value of an
involved contemplation and appreciation of the wonder of the natural environment.
She may even wonder, in a more philosophical frame of mind, on the stark beauty
of the mountain range that she beheld enduring before and beyond the fact of
anyone's actually perceiving it. Her experience - if any - on inquiring in that way
can be recorded. Or she may reflect simply that she is the kind of person who
reacts in that kind of way to certain presented scenes. As to values 'out there', I
have juxtaposed in the case of the headline quotations to this chapter one putative
report from direct experience which sees value as given in that exterior fashion with
one that rejects such a report on reflection. I will, of course, be pursuing both
contentions in this thesis to see if either accurately reflects the data of our
experience.

I realise that in my mountain-summit example above the demarcation
between 'direct' and 'reflective' descriptions of experience and thought on it are not
always precise. But I think that my distinction is illustrated there. The difference
between a subject's attempt at giving only the experience as it struck her and
additional investigation into that experience and its general nature is one which I
wish to maintain. In this thesis, then, I shall be marking this difference by use of
the terms 'direct' or 'immediate' and 'reflective', understood in the ways in which I
have noted them. Sometimes also I will talk of a 'more reflective' purchase which
the subject might have or attempt to attain on her experience, meaning by this to
signal that spectrum of reflective stances which she can take with respect to her
experience and which I have discussed in the paragraphs above. At times I shall
reiterate these matters, or explain exactly what kind or degree of 'reflection' is
going on as I see it, in order that the reader might be made sure of how I take myself to be presenting the phenomenology.

**Section Two: Direct experience**

Informal phenomenology is to be found in philosophical literature in the presentation of experience as it strikes the subject. That level of experiential analysis which deals with direct experience occurs in describing a particular example from an experience-class as it occurs in immediacy. A good way of putting the matter is in the terms of 'appearing' as it occurred in the previous chapter (sub-section 2.ii.). A phenomenology of direct experience deals with the way in which an experience appears to the subject at the time of its occurrence.

Two roughly analogous areas of experience with the moral one, by which to illustrate this point, are the aesthetic and the religious. (I am regarding them as analogous because there are shared questions which spontaneously arise on considering the experiences which they classify: primarily about the kind of status to be assigned to the objects of that experience). C.I.Lewis, for example, describes the concern of part of his work as being with 'what might be called the phenomenology of the aesthetic; with the nature and conditions of the aesthetic in experience.' As a sample of the employment of informal phenomenology, that of Lewis is illuminating. He uses an analysis of the direct phenomenology to see whether any elements can be discerned in the experience which might serve to differentiate it from other classes of experience with which it is congruent. Maintaining that the analysis does not provide such evidence, he states that,

Aesthetic values are not distinguished from others by any peculiar quality or givenness of the experience with which the aesthetic object greets us...there is no purely representational quality which, for example, is sufficient to distinguish genuinely aesthetic experience from the non-aesthetic satisfaction of an appetite, or the
child's satisfaction in some novel and intriguing noise, or the
writer's satisfaction in seeing his name in print.\textsuperscript{6}

Having tested a direct phenomenology and found it wanting, he turns to one's
reflective notion of the nature of the experience\textsuperscript{7} for a measure of the aesthetic,
putting matters this way:

Immediate enjoyments, though various in quality, are still too nearly
of one kind to afford any sure indication of the purely aesthetic. For
that we must have recourse to criteria which are indirect and
reflective, for example, the fact that this kind of experience is one
which can be well-maintained instead of exhausting itself soon and
leading to dissatisfaction.\textsuperscript{8}

If one wished, one could question his conclusions on the basis of
phenomenological description: that is, as to whether his dismissal of immediate
experience is based on accurate analysis both of its appearing to subjects and in
deeper analysis of unnoticed elements to it. In doing so, one would be adverting to
publicly accessible data of experience by which to represent the phenomenology. A
similar process occurs with religious experience, particularly with respect to the
(crucial) difference between description of the content as the 'numinous', say, or of
a determinate god of a particular nature.\textsuperscript{9} And one further example from the moral:
many philosophers have noted the way in which moral experience seems to be
pointing beyond itself to an agent-independent value realm (chapter one highlighted
this feature). One gives a direct phenomenological description in terms of
the insistency of spontaneous moral judgements. Such judgements
are almost impossible to ignore. Moral intuitions can be seen as hard
to disdain or write off as are perceptual sensings...\textsuperscript{10}

This is itself an interesting characterization of the experience. Phrases like
'insistency'; 'impossible to ignore'; 'hard to disdain': these are standard subject
descriptions of moral demand experience as moral philosophers represent them.
What is interesting about them is the further analysis they call for. Such phrases can
appear as marking the feel with which a seeming objective moral reality signals itself to subjects; as giving expression to the impingement on consciousness of some as yet indeterminate reality exterior to the subject; or as similar enough to the language of an inner compulsion by which to analyze matters into some complex of both outer and inner forces tugging on the subject. One writer on religious experience, for instance, talks of God 'invading' our attitudes and senses, of his 'insistent impact' on one. More involved phenomenological description of experience promises to resolve this issue of both how the moral demand appears and what its implicit elements are.

**Section Three: The philosophical relevance of this procedure**

A prime use of phenomenology can be to record a cartography of moral experience, as it were. This is of intrinsic interest. It represents part of a more general project in which philosophy is engaged: that of describing and analyzing experience, contributing to the self-understanding of persons thereby. It is also important within the canons of philosophical argument in two ways. As a form of corrective exercise directed to inadequate or inaccurate portrayal of experience it is of great utility. This kind of approach can be used as an end in itself, serving to overturn other alleged descriptions which fail to do justice to the experiential data. Or it may simply help to develop and deepen an otherwise one-sided description. An example by which to represent both points arises through the descriptive nature of moral experience as it concerns a particularist or principle-following characterization. Regarding the first point just above, some moral philosophers believe moral experience is most accurately described in terms of particularism, that is to say, as being registered under a certain moral category without mediation by rules from which to derive the appropriate moral expression. They thus oppose this description to those who see moral experience in terms of the application of moral rules to the situation before one. Other philosophers would agree with
particularism as 'first blush' description, but then go on to analyze more deeply the experience, claiming to discover behind the surface appearance the operation of moral principles serving to guide and define experience. Here one is faced, then, with two strands of a phenomenological analysis. Both are concerned to give description which is as accurate as possible of the experience, their respective uses being slightly different, the one relying on the immediate appearances as authoritative and the other undertaking further reflection on that data, claiming to overturn it as ultimate explanation of the matter when deeper reflection on those appearances is entertained.

There is another major use of a direct phenomenology in philosophical argument: which is to make claims concerning the existence and nature of the objects of experience. If one says that the truth of a matter in philosophy can best be ascertained by regarding phenomenological description as either: correct description of the nature of the experienced object; or adequate ground for taking the object of the experience to exist outwith the consciousness of the subject - then one has employed what can be called a 'phenomenological argument.' Hence the crux of the relevance to philosophy of a phenomenological account of a particular area of interest, and the import accorded to it, lies in the question: Is there ever such good reason to accept as correct the move from experiential content to independent object? If one answers: no, never; then there is no such thing as this type of phenomenological argument (though there may be phenomenological characterizations of philosophical topics and they may be of some use). On the side of taking there to be good reason for dealing with a philosophical problem by a phenomenological approach in this particular mode is the presupposition by which we generally order our lives that stands in favour of taking descriptions of experience to be (more or less) correct descriptions of the objects (including their existential status) which form the content of the experience. There are, of course, countervailing reasons that standardly operate to question such claims. But these take place against a backdrop in which it is *prima facie* rational to make such
assumptions on the basis of experience. This is a very strong postulate indeed, naturally held and affirmed in the ordinary run of life, such that experience possesses a primacy for inquiry that needs disproving at least to as great an extent as it needs shoring up.

With respect to the question of moral phenomenology at hand, the kind of consideration being presented here has this consequence. It is sometimes thought that an initial case for the objectivity of moral values (in Mackie's sense, as being stitched into the universe, or simply part of it) can be made out on just such lines. Some form of moral realism will then be supported. From people's moral consciousness it seems apparent that an independent object is signalled in their experience. And this, so the line of thought runs, is just that good reason for taking there to be independent moral values which the argument in the paragraph above puts forward.

I have already expressed the worry that quick recognition of the experience as being of objective moral values may go against the canon of phenomenological accuracy. Furthermore, even granted that that kind of content is being discerned by agents, one must disentangle another matter of phenomenological description. That is one concerning the difference between characterization of moral experience as being: of independent objects; or as of independent objects. This difference needs clarifying and its implications for a phenomenological argument exploring.

One general philosophical attempt at a justification of the kind of phenomenological position put forward here consists in the following argument. Since there is good reason to think that independent objects are likely to produce experience of independent objects, then there is good reason to think that moral experience is as it is because its (moral) objects are independent ones.

The problem with this attempt at philosophical argument, irrespective of its formal consistency, is that either: something other than an independent object has often seemed a better explanation of the phenomenology; or that something which is independent of the subject other than a specifically moral object has seemed to be
closer to the mark as giving rise to a certain phenomenology. How either form of criticism squares with the phenomenology of reflection by subjects on the moral categories they use and the overall picture of moral life they implicitly have is a consideration for the next section to begin to enlarge upon.

In addition to the comments made above, I want at this point to mention a variant of this kind of argument which tends to be overlooked by proponents of phenomenological forms of exposition. In doing so I shall enlist both direct and reflective modes of description as a way of bringing my debate on to the next section. This approach is what I shall call a 'negative phenomenological argument'. Instead of saying what there is on the basis of the phenomenological data, it will say what there is not. This may be asserted in virtue of either the absence of a putative experience or the presence of factors in the phenomenological data on closer inspection which counter the direction in which the appearances point. Such an argument is sometimes employed by opponents of theism when debate is being conducted at a phenomenological level. They either contend that, for all the religious experiences adduced by supporters of theism, there are just as many lives devoid of that experience; or that the experience itself manifests (disguised) elements of the subject's constitution (perhaps her wishes or desires) which discount the apparent phenomenological content of religious experience in its immediacy. In the former case a direct phenomenological consideration is being employed which, in tandem with questioning the actual content of alleged religious experience itself, makes for a negative argument: it is that the absence of certain experiences is good ground for asserting the absence of a certain object from the world. And in the latter an indirect argument is put forward: this takes a deeper reflective analysis of the immediate experience to question and overturn its initial seeming content.

It is particularly with the former line of argument that my concern shall rest in the next couple of chapters. In them I will present my phenomenology of the immediate experience of moral demands and make a simple, but weighty claim:
which is that the description of this part of our moral experience given by Mackie and others is wrong. Attention to the data of our actual experience shows, I believe, that the kind of apprehension of value objects 'out there' of which Mackie talks on our behalf is not an accurate phenomenological description. He, of course, does not take that putative experience to be good ground for accepting the reality of its object. My further argument is thus also with those who take that alleged experience - what I shall claim is a misdescription - to give them some warrant for belief in values 'out there'. So the negative phenomenological argument that I will be marshalling is directed to two fronts: one being the intra-phenomenological debate on the accuracy of the investigator's report of our moral demand experience; the other occurring at that point where some affirmation of, or inference from, the alleged content of the phenomenological data is made with respect to what is 'out there' impinging on one.

Further negative phenomenological arguments can be brought to bear as one delves more deeply into the phenomenological data. This is a matter of investigating the horizon of the experience and testing it by imaginative variation, as I put it in my discussion of Husserlian phenomenology and its technique (chapter 2, section 2). It seems to me that a large part of the phenomenological argument at this level consists in the subject registering a certain experience on taking the content of her immediate experience to represent real objects 'out there' or when the possibility of its being a matter more closely linked to certain personal factors is considered. This experience is one which I will cover in part in section 5 of this chapter as one of a particular experience 'making sense' or not as its possible genesis and objects are contemplated. Not only, then, can one explore the deeper reaches of the subject's experience, but one can also record a kind of experience that itself goes on at the reflective level when the subject thinks on the seeming contents of the direct experience and putative explanations of that. (To continue with the matter of religious experience, for instance, one may attempt to explore the precise nature of the alleged immediate apprehension to see whether an actual deity or, rather, a
certain charged, innervating sensation is the best way of characterizing the
experience; whether the subject discerns the influence of any elements going to
make up her experience which would cast doubt on the authenticity of its being
genuine apprehension of a religious object; and how, on deeper reflective thought,
she responds to the presentation of different possible explanations, both religious
and otherwise, for her having that kind of experience). All of this, it seems to me,
is an affair with which phenomenological investigation is quite properly concerned
and for which it is well suited. This brings my discussion on to the kind of second
order phenomenological exposition that can be drawn from a reflective level.

Section Four: Phenomenology of reflection

In tandem with the analysis of direct experience, one can entertain
phenomenological analysis of reflection on experience. This consists in two
discriminable facets. One is the probing of the original experience for unnoticed,
hidden, or suppressed elements. It assumes that one can bring the original
experience back before the view of reflection in order to study it more deeply. This
is the kind of phenomenological analysis noted in the operation of point v. of the
Husserlian method chosen in chapter 2.

There is also a phenomenological analysis of the reflective 'feel' subjects
have for the concepts they employ and the place certain notions and practices have
in their lives and thoughts. This kind of experience is as germane to
phenomenological exegesis as is the immediate registering to consciousness of
experience discussed in the previous section. Spiegelberg states that,

Experience is not restricted to so-called sense experience. There is
for the phenomenologist experience of relations, meanings, values,
requiredness, other minds, social and cultural phenomena. Any kind
of cognitive contact with particular data is an occasion for genuine
experience. 29
And in the terms of the informal phenomenology being covered here, the matter is like this. The direct experience of the moral demand, as it seems to enter the subject, say, from a value realm outwith her own conscious control, is given up to reflection and the experience described of how this picture strikes her. One thus enters into the subject's experience of taking the appearances of direct experience as being the way things are (assuming, that is, that she actually does have the kind of experience which Mackie describes). This mode of analysis bridges the formal and informal approaches. It involves further probing into the general system of moral thought and experience of the subject and the place this occupies in her social existence - what was called in the previous chapter on formal phenomenology, the exploration of the 'horizon' of the experience, leading to the 'life-world'. The reflective feel concerning the direct experience can also be tested when alternative pictures of that experience are considered. Instances with respect to the moral experience can be varied from the notion of some independent prescriptive moral objects as Mackie sees them; to some relational explanation of moral experience in terms of certain naturalistic features of the world striking a human sensibility; to that of seeing moral value as arising simply through the decisions made by subjects without reference to any external moral reality. Each time the subject's reflective experience of taking these possibilities to be constitutive of the moral demand she is acquainted with in direct experience is registered. That is a quite similar informal counterpart of formal phenomenology's use of imaginative variations. And in both cases one is led to the 'essence' of the experience, insofar as one is discerning necessary features to it which cannot be dropped or replaced without loss of sense on the subject's part toward her experience.

Section Five: Senses

The terms 'sense', 'senseful', and 'sensefulness' will reappear constantly in my discussion of reflective phenomenology. I shall thus make plain at this stage in what ways I understand them. I shall propose four uses of the term 'sense'. I am
not claiming that these senses are exhaustive, only that they represent the ones
which seem to me the most suited to the description of the reflective experiences
being covered. They are specifically directed to the subject's experience and the
terms which she employs to describe it. To illustrate the uses I shall employ an
example from moral philosophy which is close to the subject area at hand, namely,
that of a subject's experience of obligation.

Here are the four uses:

1. The first use of 'sense' which I shall describe is that which takes
it as 'linguistic meaning'. So when I talk of 'sense' in this way I shall be referring
to the linguistic meaning of the term or terms a subject uses in describing her
experience. For some people, in the case of 'obligation', the term itself is used to
mean 'What I've promised to do' or 'What God requires of me'. Though my use of
'sense' in this fashion usually concerns the subject's general and untutored grasp of
the term, as part of the ordinary language of the immediate concerns of her life, its
linguistic meaning can be explored by her from a reflective standpoint on her own
grasp of it. This involves such considerations as to whether she would use it in
what appear to be borderline cases of the experience and its putative applicability to
describing it; where its use might become ironic or deceitful or inaccurate; and to
how others seem to regard its meaning in possible contrast with that with which she
operates.

The next two uses below also involve a subject in more and less reflection
on her experience. These concern not so much linguistic meaning of terms that
describe experience as the 'meaningfulness' of the experience itself. This is a matter
which I believe is given to a subject both in a particular kind of experience in
immediacy and on reflection on her experience (similarly to that which I mentioned
in the previous chapter about the subjects' reflective assay as it seemed to me a
relevant and enlightening way of understanding Husserlian phenomenology).

2. My second use of 'sense' correlates with what I shall call 'sensefulness'.
The sensefulness of an experience or the terms used to describe it is the degree to
which it can be said, colloquially, 'to make sense' for a particular subject. This involves both the immediate use of a term to describe her experience - how it fits with her experience and how it conveys what she intends it to represent - as well as her reflection on its use. Such reflection I mentioned in the final sentence concerning the first use of 'sense' above. It concerns her own assessment of the terms she uses to convey to herself and others her experience. This seems to me to rest on some grasp or feel on the part of the subject for the terms she uses to describe her experience which itself consists in a certain kind of experience. This 'grasp' or 'feel' concerns both an ability (to varying degrees) on the part of subjects to discern correct and incorrect uses of expressions (as in the first use of 'sense' above) and a way of regarding such expressions as satisfactory or not, fitting or absurd. This latter, rather nebulous, affair I believe to be resting on a kind of experience which ultimately the subject relies upon in her use of such expressions. That is why I think it is reasonable to include it as something with which informal phenomenology is quite properly interested.

I think Kant is performing just this kind of reflection (a combination of the two uses of sense which I have so far noted) in the early stages of the 'Groundwork' where he considers particular obligations. His thought is that, taken in certain ways, not only will the practices in question break down, but so also will the sense of the notion itself. The subject's feel, that is, for an obligation in the light, say, of the institution of promise-keeping becomes awry, awkward, disturbed when considering the possibility of applying the notion under certain imagined conditions. Conversely, though it is not easy to find handy terms to describe the ordinary functioning of this sense with a concept or picture of a state of affairs, the subject has a feel of satisfactoriness or fittingness, of ease or ordinariness, when dealing with matters. (One can think here also of the way in which some novels can question and expand one's view of a particular concept, such as the nature and role of self-deception, or the dilemmas of faith and morality that literary characters are faced with).
3. The third understanding of 'sense' which I shall be displaying is that which refers to the 'meaningfulness' of an experience or experience-class. This follows on from my notion of 'sense' immediately above, and addresses the experience in a wider fashion. Here, however, such meaningfulness - as a feature of an experience that strikes a subject - need not always be given linguistic representation. This phenomenon is a somewhat rough and diffuse one to capture, but I think it can fruitfully be looked upon in this way. Take the example of love. Now the meaningfulness of this is a manifest fact for most of us: that is to say, as a phenomenon which enriches one's life, gives it depth and texture and significance, one without which a life would be dulled in the living.

Not only is this an immediately experienced feature that usually goes with the phenomenon of love, but it is also something that is affirmed and enlarged upon through reflection on it. In the case of love this involves a complex network of thoughts on the value of relationships with others, the tensions between *eros* and *agape*, basic needs of individuals, human motivation, and so on. Gradually a picture of the meaningfulness of love builds up, and one's sense of it is explored and enriched. The 'sense' here of a concept, experience, or practice lies in the way in which it is felt to be significant in the life of the subject and the conceptual apparatus by which she reflects on it.

Such a 'sense' which an experience has need not always coalesce cleanly with a subject's ability to apply descriptive terms to it. There may be moments or even prolonged periods in one's life in which meaningful experiences occur - perhaps of a religious, erotic, or emotional nature - though one is unable to pin down precisely the correct term which captures it/them. Hence a subject's apprehension of this 'sense' will not always be accompanied by her appraisal of the experience by a term which has a sense in the two fashions outlined by me above. Conversely, she may regard certain terms like, say, 'God' or 'love' or 'shame' as 'making sense' and yet either find herself at a loss as to whether they apply in a particular presented case or never find herself party to the particular
meaningful experiences by which they are often signalled to consciousness in immediacy.

So, to take Ladd's previously cited talk of a 'ground motive' (chapter 2, section 2.vi), the sense of some moral concepts will be most fully revealed as one investigates the world-picture in which they operate and by which they are thought by subjects to have their particular qualities borne. On obligation specifically, Bergson is an example of one who tries to provide an appraisal of the way in which the concept and the practices it covers play a role in the life of collectives and the minds of individual subjects. That attempt works from a social significance to obligation (its role in the life of a community) to the significance it possesses for the individual subject (the role it plays in her interaction with others and the understanding of her social existence). This kind of reflection on the 'sense' of the experience is thus one further fashion by which a subject's overall grasp on her experience is given to investigation.

4. Sense as feeling or perception. This is of a kind with what is called a 'sense of' danger, a sense of the uncanny, or, more plainly, with the five senses. It need not commit one to identifying a special faculty responsible for the sense (as the five senses do). What it adverts to is the way in which a particular experience is being characterized - that is, in a perceptual mode. Though the former three construals of 'sense' also are couched in somewhat similar fashion - as they rely on what might be called a 'feeling' of something 'making sense' - this use of 'sense' is that which brings one into contact with the phenomena as they are given in terms of forces impinging on one, and as they seem to one to be located either externally to or from within oneself. Hence Prichard's talk of the 'sense of obligation' which confronts our daily lives. And the most fertile area in which to view this usage is, of course, that represented by the moral sense school of British philosophy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. The sense of obligation here is the sensing of a particular quality which a state of affairs holds for one. It may therefore be pointing to a special moral quality constituted in the particular state of
affairs - and if so, such experience leads to thought on the lines of the three uses of 'sense' above on how that construal of experience has meaning for the subject. This is certainly how Mackie takes our experience to be working. His analysis amounts to affirming that there is alleged experience of moral value at the level of this fourth sense, and that this enters into the linguistic sense of value talk, yet pronouncing it 'queer' as he regards the possibility of real correlates to the experience not to 'make sense'. On the other hand, this kind of sense can be of the nature of a receptivity to certain naturalistic features of states of affairs without having to impute special properties to them (a sense of honour, or of shame, would seem to fall under this description, as perhaps does the sense of humour). Hutcheson claims only as much in talking of the moral sense.

This use of 'sense', then, is most likely to be occurring in direct experience, to be followed up by reflective assay of the other three. But it can also operate on reflection, when the moral consciousness is engaged by examples as they are considered. This sense of the moral demand may be either heightened by consideration of the other senses or diminished as those other senses militate against it.

Section Six: Reflective phenomenology in general moral philosophy

Having discussed the uses of 'sense' in this area of informal phenomenology - and the uses would seem to apply equally in the formal mode - I wish now to elaborate briefly on the role reflective phenomenology plays in moral philosophical argument.

Firstly, an example from moral philosophy which illustrates well how widely the term 'phenomenology' is used. One writer wishes to show that most of us change our minds on moral issues (often for the better) as time passes, and that the major ethical theories cannot readily explain this factor. He says that, 'Here I want to simply introduce two observations [the ones above], and claim that they
would be supported by a careful phenomenology. The method he is exploiting is that of reflection on moral practice and moral judgement, how these change and how change might be accounted for, and how any account squares with one's feel for the practices in which one engages and the judgements one makes. Use of the term 'phenomenology' here is thus implicitly involving the entire range of method that has been canvassed in this chapter, taking it in an informal fashion to bolster argument.

Next, a recent instance of a more determinate use which is given in an article by Lovibond (1990). She attends to a problem of moral education, that is, the training of one's pleasures and aversions under the aegis of a conception of the good. In doing so she discusses particular cases in which this practice occurs or can occur and how a subject sees the task being undertaken. As such, she announces, 'If this paper can lay claim to a "method",...its method will be phenomenological. And this means that its powers of persuasion will depend on how far I succeed, overall, in describing a recognizable cluster of moral phenomena.' In this respect her moral phenomenology mixes direct and reflective descriptions of experience - both as particular moral states of affairs strike subjects and as their grasp of the sense of them is tested, this 'sense' encompassing all four of my interpretations in the previous section.

One more example. In his work On Moral Personhood (1989), Eldridge gives his second chapter the title, 'The Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness'. In that chapter he is concerned to contrast two trends in moral philosophy, between the 'specific attachments' of culture and tradition into which one is born and raised, and the rationalist, autonomous decision-making image of the moral agent of the Kantian trend. He talks repeatedly of the 'phenomenology' of the way these 'attachments' pull on the agent as well as the 'phenomenology of deliberation' with which the 'rationalist-universalist' moral philosophy is trying to deal. His analysis consists in an attempt to discern elements in both trends which reflect the
actual working of moral concerns in the lives of persons: which is an amalgam of many of the phenomenological concerns that have been presented by me.

Section Seven: Modes of reflective phenomenology

The phenomenological method these three examples share, as it takes place in a reflective mode, is one of attempted accurate representation of experience with the subsequent use of that to overturn conflicting representations. One way in which this can be done is through the blunt claim that one's opponent has misdescribed the experiential data. This I shall call the empirical argument concerning the facts of experience. Another way is that which I shall label the modal argument from phenomenology. In this form of argument, the reflective assay on the underlying nature of the experience in question, particularly with respect to senses 2 and 3 above, operates in negative fashion: it is to the effect that certain explanations of the experience or putative descriptions of its nature strike one as not possibly being true. The result of adopting the alternative at the reflective level would be to render the experience and the concept used to describe it unintelligible or simply to transform it into some other kind of thing. That kind of phenomenological argument is associated particularly with Wiggins (1987b) and Platts (1980) who are discussed at length later. Positively characterized, the modal form of argument finds reflection on the experience to affirm that it has to be (necessarily is) thus-and-so if it is to be 'had' at all.

To return to the example of love as an experienced phenomenon in order to facilitate exposition, the following phenomenological arguments can be marshalled. I shall take as an opposing view the claim that love is 'really' lust in somewhat embroidered guise. On the 'empirical' count, such a claim fails - love just does not, on careful reflection, amount to lust. Though undoubtedly a component of love much of the time, 'lust' is not a coreferring expression for the special kind of experience or cluster of attitudes which is called love (failure of sense 1.); nor does it coalesce with thought on sense 2., for taking love to be lust-in-disguise does not
'make sense' in the light of the differences in use of the concepts - the manifest distinctions between being 'in love' and being 'in lust' with someone, or between 'loving' and 'lusting after', the former term in both cases having a sense for the subject not replaceable in terms of the latter. As to my third understanding of 'sense', lust signally does not have the same place in persons' lives and outlooks as love. Only in the case of sense 4. do matters of discrimination prove more awkward, though persons do not continually confuse the two. The senses 2. and 3. provide the basis also for the modal argument. It is, negatively, the feeling that love cannot just be lust-in-disguise. To take love to be 'really' that kind of thing is to take it to be some other thing. The concept of love is eroded and shifted. The reflective thought is not merely representing disappointment in or a refusal to countenance the possibility that love just is this other thing, but a genuine conceptual difficulty in finding sensefulness in the picture of lust picking out the same elements of one's experienced world as love does. Positively put, the modal argument enters into interestingly congruent areas of debate with the moral philosophical concern standing in the background. For the notion which I have put at large is that for love to be a part of one's experiential and conceptual repertoire certain thoughts about it seem necessary. Most strikingly, the object of love must appear under the guise of being 'meant' for one, of forcing him/herself upon one's attention and 'capturing' one's heart. One cannot, that is, simply choose to love someone. The experience of love has features that are quite similar to the demandingsness of moral experience, in particular an external call upon one's feelings and behaviour, though ordinary thought on love involves no tendency to ontologize any abstract property of 'loveness'. Moreover, while the unwilled nature of love is paramount in the experience of it, there is also a conjoined sense (sense 3.) in which what and whom one can love comes from within one's nature as a particular person, which is itself partly unchosen and partly formed by dispositions, modes of behaviour, and attitudes gelled, criticized, and maintained over an enduring emotional life. A person's loves tell us about the kind of person she is.
She is not above criticism, despite being in love as one comes 'under the thrall' of external events - the kinds of loves one enters into are (notoriously) prone to factors of personality and upbringing which, if brought to light, would not pass the muster of critical appraisal. Likewise, the comparative sense (sense 3.) of the moral demand experience also involves a bond between what seem to be opposing ways of viewing it. If exteriority of the demand is thought at this reflective level to be necessary to its nature then one is presented with an interior counterpart as well: that of the sense in which the kinds of moral demands a person experiences and the force they exert upon her reflect (and partly constitute for others) the kind of person she is and the kind of moral consciousness she possesses (for which her efforts or lack thereof to cultivate it are amenable to rational criticism). This problem - if it is one and if its poles are correctly described - will be addressed in subsequent chapters. It brings me to a final expository point concerning characterization of experience.

**Section Eight: Self and not-self**

The apparent paradox highlighted above - that some classes of experience in immediacy and at reflective levels seem both to arrive from outwith agent consciousness and yet also are seen as manifesting qualities deep in the subject's character - needs a vocabulary with which to conduct discussion. The labels I will employ for this purpose identify experiential components in terms of 'self' and 'not-self', and also 'levels' or 'degrees' of those. I mean to employ them in this way. Subjects have a sense - as in the perceptual sense (sense 4.) above\textsuperscript{46} - of how a particular experience stands in relation to the self: as, say, important or serious or engrossing, or as peripheral or indifferent, or as threatening. This sense will be active both in direct contact with experience as well as in reflection on it (where my other instances of senses will come into play). And they also have a perceptual sense of the self's involvement in the experience, that is to say, as the experience
seems to be generated by the self and its activities; or of the not-self, as the experience seems to be arriving from sources external to the self.

In this latter way, then, in any experience, the subject will have some (perceptual) sense of herself as contributor to it and of something else as going to make it up. Experiences may be characterized primarily in terms of self and not-self, though it is uncertain if any experience falls wholly on just one of these sides (and whether, indeed, one would wish to call it 'experience' if it did). Perhaps in certain extreme states of mood one finds the former engrossment, and perhaps in extreme religious states one is presented with the latter (the perceptual sense of being 'out of oneself', 'at one with the universe', particularly as it is found in Buddhism). At any rate, experience presents itself on a spectrum within these parameters; nor should the presence of both senses to an intense degree be regarded as incompatible (think of an extreme emotion of hate, which is decidedly self in one way, but often felt as powerfully alien in another).

These senses are evinced once more in the case of love. Briefly put, they are engaged in this fashion. The sense (as perception) of the experience is identified as very close to the self, as being of quite fundamental importance for it, and as being of quite proximate vicinity to the heart or core of the self. As to the sense of the space on a self/not-self axis being occupied by the experience, the previous section above has already pointed out the linked fashion by which the experience both enters one's concern from outwith one's self and yet meshes with deep aspects of it. Reflection on the lines of senses 2. and 3. affirms the sense 4. of the way in which one's loves are not subject to one's conscious control - love would not make sense, would not be love, if it was not experienced so. But alongside this reflection also runs the sense in which love reflects and makes determinate strong and abiding needs of the self and the character it possesses.

While introduction of the moral demand in Chapter 1 took place by the way of its exteriority (not-self), there is also in moral philosophy and everyday thought a concentration on an aspect of it as giving rein to the self. Signalling of the moral
demand as if it is a form of compulsion, so that a subject uses the language of 'I have to...' or 'I cannot think otherwise...', is thought also by one moral philosopher to represent the self in a certain manner. He maintains that, '...to accept an action as morally necessary or impossible for someone is to express an understanding of his life and character.' This represents one way in which the self of a moral agent is regarded by others as somehow especially or intimately revealed in her awareness of moral demands, and in which behaviour in the light of them one thereby bears the imprint of one's moral consciousness before public scrutiny. A subject can also have this sense on her own part of where experience lies with respect to her self, in terms both of nearness to it and as the contributory self and not-self elements of an experience can be discerned. One is presented for study, then, with the possible image of moral demand experience as being both objective, in that the demand has a patent exteriority for the subject, as well as the locating of that experience near to the core self, as important to the self and as manifesting its own deepest and most significant features. This I do in chapters 6 and 7. As Boyce-Gibson puts it, concerning the phenomenology of the sense (as in my senses 2., 3., and 4.) of value experience:

On the subjective side it is the enveloping fact of personality that here especially strikes us: it all has meaning and value for me, and the fact that it is my experience and that I have it is as fundamental for my experience as the conviction that there is something over against me that is not myself and has a meaning and a value of a complex objective kind, immeasurably transcending what my thought and feeling are able to assimilate.51

I will direct phenomenological analysis in subsequent chapters to the nature of this seemingly paradoxical conjunction of self and not-self in the experience of the moral demand. And just as attention must be focussed on the question of how precisely the exteriority of the demand is viewed (wherein lies the explication of the objectivity-feature), so too this sense of the demand with respect to the self calls for
critical analysis. One is returned to consideration of an imaginative variation concerning the objective prescriptivity mentioned in Chapter 1: can a subject experience the moral demand without feeling a particularly strong element of self to be involved with it? In the case both of self and not-self I propose to employ phenomenological investigation in order to detect the extent to which one or other is present in the relevant experience; the extent to which the two are mixed and the intensity of their presence; and the modal consequences of reflective attention.

Concluding comments to chapters two and three

Following on from the presentation in the first chapter of a problem area in moral philosophy, I have put forward in these two previous chapters the approach which I think best for dealing with that area. It is a phenomenological one. Chapter 2 addressed the use of this method as developed by Husserl, and delineated the fashion in which I feel that that can be fruitfully employed. In chapter 3 I then continued exposition of phenomenological method, widening out discussion from the Husserlian 'school' of phenomenology to include what I termed its 'informal' usage in general philosophical writings. The two approaches do not strike me as being essentially divergent. They seem to differ only in matters of emphasis and systematic rigour. Both attend to description of the appearances of immediate experience; both try to go beyond the appearances and uncover implicit features of the original experience. In doing so, they move towards the discovery of necessary elements of the experience. And in investigating the experience for those necessary elements, I make use of the reflective sense subjects have for the experience in question, a procedure adopted by both formal and informal phenomenology under different labels (the former with talk of imaginative variations, horizontal unfolding, and life-world; the latter largely without an explicit vocabulary, in virtue of which fact I have suggested one).
In addition, the third chapter in particular was utilized by me for the further adumbration of the precise nature of the problem area. Not only was the question raised of the kind of objectivity being perceived in the moral demand, but the overlapping of this with a sense of the not-self also led to discussion of the feel an agent has in her experience for the implication of the self. So the tenor of the discussion thus far has been that attention to the moral experience in question poses problems for descriptive analysis. Insofar as some philosophical expositions of the area are given in terms of moral values 'out there' and the engagement of self 'in here', doubt has been cast explicitly on the adequacy of such exposition. A phenomenologically-based attempt to get to the actual data is thus needed. This is what I now begin to treat in depth in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

We live in a world peopled not only with objects, given as real or merely imaginary, but also peopled with aesthetic demands that objects should in their presented form be or not be thus or thus, or with scientific demands that they should be rounded out into certain intelligible patterns of coherence and completeness, or with axiological demands that such objects should either exist or not exist...Wherever we turn we live in a...life-world...inveterately tugged or pushed in varying directions by aesthetic, scientific and axiological pulls and pressures.

J.N. Findlay.1

Introduction

In this chapter and the one following it I shall present the phenomenological data of moral demand experience in immediacy. I shall also represent the subject's reflective purchase on her experience. My presentation is weighted with a particular object in mind. It is that of seeing whether or not there actually is an experience that is as of objectively prescriptive values 'out there'. This chapter begins that task by building up a collage of demand experiences, comparing and contrasting them with the moral ones. The purpose behind doing that is essentially twofold:

- to give a preliminary placing of the moral demand in the experiential course of the demands we feel to be placed upon us, both in everyday life and from time to time in less ordinary circumstances;

- to see if certain phenomenological features often associated with the moral demand experience in moral philosophical literature are either borne out universally in that experience or are uniquely possessed by it.

I will compare the moral demand with other ones in respect of phenomenological elements such as strength of strike on consciousness, insistence,
and peculiar tone. Through such a comparison, that twofold search above is met in this and the next chapter, and in a negative fashion with respect to the second element. As for this chapter itself, I find that a more varied and complex spectrum of moral demand experience is presented by phenomenological description than is given attention in the literature. Working within the tradition of moral philosophy, then, I throw doubt on certain images of the moral demand (as being a particularly heightened form of phenomenon in consciousness; as possessing a special quality like 'magnetism' qua the good; as having for us a specially powerful kind of pull that outweighs other demands or interests). This affects both a ground-clearing process, by which the experience itself is made more lucid, as well as making way, in the latter half of the chapter and in the one that follows it, for the specific question of the experience's nature as a value disclosure in the sense of Mackie's understanding of it. This chapter begins to question and attack that phenomenological supposition which Mackie has made. And more interestingly, I go on to identify the same phenomenology - what I am taking to be a partial and inaccurate matter - held by other philosophers who hold metaethical moral theories utterly different from his and those of his near followers. The call I make throughout is for greater notice to be given to the wide panoply of moral demand experience which we are given in the varied passages of our lives. So the chapter has a positive, declarative counterpoint to the scepticism which I throw on the phenomenologies of others. I undertake a phenomenological exegesis which begins the task of building up a presentation of the moral demand consonant with the appearances it has in experience. That this clashes with some generally current images of the experience I take to be the result of returning to the data of the appearances themselves.
Section One: Ten sample demand experiences

I shall begin this chapter by looking at the moral demand in the context of other demands in direct experience. In order to do so, I should make plain an assumed postulate of my research which I first mentioned in chapter 1 (section 2, preliminary note) - that is, straightforwardly, that we are aware of some such experience identified as being of moral demands. As to the methodological injunction of presuppositionlessness (ch.2, sec.i), no initial categorization of this kind of experience in terms of forcefulness; qualitative tone; representation of a particular object; or 'venting' of an inner tension, is assumed by me. There is such an experience to investigate, and investigation relies on one being able to hold steady the experience before the mind's eye for that purpose. Following the proposed methods of research set out in chapters 2 and 3, the way in which I will bring forward the experience for analysis will be by contrast and similarity with other experienced demands, and also by exploiting one's grasp of the experience with which one is acquainted in immediacy as it is viewed in different lights (thereby enacting points ii, iii, iv, and v of the Husserlian process pinpointed in chapter 2, section 2).2

I shall take the following as examples of demand experience by which to conduct analysis:

i) A man experiences a demand on him to jump when he stands on a cliff-edge;

ii) The little baby demands affection;

iii) The last clue in the crossword demands one to fill it in;

iv) Her poor dress sense demands correction;

v) Third world famine demands one to do something;

vi) A person who slips over on the icy path demands one's immediate help;

vii) His presence demands her attention;

viii) He feels that loss of face demands redress;

ix) The beautiful forest demands respect;
x) Her kindness demands a like response.

I am referring here specifically to the experienced demand, with the exception of example vi) which is there for good purpose. Examples v, vi, and x are, I believe, the ones which we would *prima facie* identify as the moral ones. The possibility of there being some special quality to the experience such that any of the others could be experienced as moral by its addition will be canvassed later (section 5). Part of the purpose behind choosing some of these examples is to remain within the everyday and humdrum affairs and concerns of life, such as ii, iii, and iv, in particular, reflect.

By the term 'strength' of a demand, I mean the forcefulness with which it impinges on consciousness. This is a differentiating measure between and within classes of experience that gives one some idea of how the impact of a particular demand or demand-type figures in the experiential economy of a subject. It has the methodological virtue of being neutral with regard to the origin of a demand, registering simply the feel it has for a subject as pressing or engaging, transient or anchoring itself. This phenomenological element of experience is instanced, say, by the lack of forcefulness with which the penumbra of one's visual field strike consciousness; the engrossing, captivating, powerful impact of a police siren close by; and the middle-range encounters of one's everyday sense experience on performing a routine chore like gardening.

I shall also use the discussion of this 'strength' of the demand in the subject's experience to bring attention round to that of the duration and passage of the experience as it strikes consciousness and then fades from it or ebbs and flows within it. Hence I shall give the reader description of how forceful a manner in which I take certain demand experiences to strike consciousness, both under usual and less than usual circumstances of encounter, and then follow that with thought on the intensity, duration and further route taken by the demand. This itself will
lead up to greater discussion in chapter 5 of the qualities with which the experience is given in consciousness.

There are two tasks which this comparative analysis must undertake. One is to assay the kind of strength that one is likely to find exhibited in the impact of typical demands; the other is that which they may exert under less usual conditions of encounter. This latter task need not involve assumptions as to the 'proper' occasioning of a particular demand experience or any notion as to the propriety of its felt force. It exploits a descriptive vista on the direct experience of demands provided by the empirically ordinary or usual instances of them according to the course of subjects' lives. That democratic presentation of experience I take to be authoritative for research at the present stage in order that the appearances might be given their due sway.

As I approach each of the ten examples in turn, then, my attention will be given also to the non-ordinary cases. Imaginative variations of them will be pursued in later sections, and more extended reflection on such possibilities I will leave to the chapters that specifically deal with such reflection. I do not wish to dwell unduly on the non-moral examples, but some exegesis of their feel is required in order that an attempt be made to seek the comparative placing of the moral ones. That the following portrayal is quite lengthy, then, is made legitimate, I believe, by my constant reference back to them in the work that ensues.

i) To the first example. Many of us who have stood on a cliff edge or leant over the parapet of a high building will be aware of the slight tremor in consciousness, as it were, of a demand (sometimes labelled 'temptation') to fling oneself off. Usually this passes quickly and may not be easily distinguishable from the tingling sensation in one's heart and the soles of one's feet associated with vertigo. But in the less usual case the demand can 'swamp' one's whole being and necessitate a strong countervailing act of will to pull oneself back. Such an encounter can remain with one, being present in the mind (consciously or not) like a barbed arrow, to return to haunt one on appropriate occasioning instances. This
kind of phenomenological quality of some demands I will call the 'assailant' feature: for one is put upon by them, seemingly helpless as they arise.³

ii) This example may seem ambiguous between the baby's calling out for affection; going in for affection-seeking behaviour, more or less intentionally; and the fact that one experiences an emotional tug towards it. It is with the latter instance that I am concerned. In this example, then, one's response is immediately engaged in the midst of the baby in the cot or pram or in one's arms. A warm glow girts round the demand one experiences and the response (be it by soothing verbal articulation or touch) is elicited spontaneously. This, then, illustrates a case in which perception and action go together as a unified manner by which one encounters the particular situation. On the other hand, difficulties occur in trying to describe the demand as experienced but with no response ensuing, even at the level of a smile to oneself or a raising of the heart. Somehow the response which is lacking is replaced under unusual circumstances, perhaps of attentiveness to some other concern, with a registering of the demand nevertheless taking place. This can be so in times of great stress and hurry, for instance, when one might pass the child by and vaguely sense the demand yet with a correspondent response being blanketed out by the exigencies of the moment. In the first instance described, of the usual run of the experience, the strength of the demand is not particularly great, occurring as a quite light and ordinary affair, and not grabbing one's attention forcefully. And clearly in the latter kind of case the demand is being perceived at a peripheral remove of consciousness. The force of such a demand may be felt more keenly by the child's parents or its day-to-day carers, but this is more likely a routine matter, to be heightened as the depths and strengths possessed, say, by maternal love enmesh with it.

One should not omit mention here, of course, of another feature of that demand and our response to it with which we are also (though possibly less so) familiar. And that is one of irritation and anger; of the demand being an annoying and unwelcome thing. I think that this response is likeliest when one is occupied
with pressing matters or wearied by the constant attention needed by a young child, and is not an especially common phenomenon as a direct and unbounded response to the child (misanthropes excepted).

iii) This is a common enough form of demand experience, akin to those one experiences with respect to many unfinished projects of a smallscale sort like jigsaws, the arrangements for laying a table, or tidying a room. Again, the force of such a demand is not often great, being by the way of a momentary heightening of attention to the matter at hand. One simply notices the state of affairs and passes it by. But it does possess on occasion a compellingness that seems to capture one's energies, as when one is halted by the missing final element and finds oneself devoted to its solution, correction, or completion. This confrontation with a demand of the kind being described can also have a nagging, persistent call on one's attention which returns one again and again under all sorts of conditions to that problem. We all experience this phenomenon sometimes, and some people, utterly drawn by the demand to find the last item for a collection, will spend their lives in thrall to it. For the main, however, the pressure on consciousness exerted by this demand is momentary and weak.

iv) There are similarities between this example and the previous one. A dress sense that strikes one as awry, inappropriate for the occasion, too plain, or too sloppy may demand one's response, be it by way of intervention (telling her she should do something) or merely the wrinkling of one's nose. This does not normally impinge on consciousness with great force, but sometimes it may be signalled in that way. The cumulative build-up of a person's apparently willful refusal to listen to advice, and her apparent insensitivity to the way she strikes others, may lead increasingly to the sense of an overwhelming demand for confrontation and action to be taken. This sense of the demand gnawing away at one is of that 'assailant' type introduced above, that is to say, its force seems to exert itself upon one despite oneself (against one's 'better instincts', as it is sometimes said). But, like the example above, this kind of demand is most often of
a fleeting and unpressing type, registering itself in the run of experience without stopping one's attention by the direct force of its impact.\textsuperscript{5}

v) The experience of this demand cannot be adequately represented unless due account is taken of propinquity. For the difference in demand force between the presence of the starving on one's doorstep and their presence via the transmitted media in one's sitting room is marked. Indeed, at a purely phenomenological level of the strength of demand the latter may be felt (notoriously) to be no greater than that on one to buy a particular product advertised through the same medium. This I think is an empirically confirmable fact about direct moral experience, whatever its conditioning factors might be. The demand flits into one's consciousness, but at a low level of intensity, passing in and out of attention without galvanizing one's responses by the sheer force with which it lodges itself in consciousness. And it is this which I believe is one common experience of the demand when it is presented in such a way (the other being addressed just below). That is to say, the remove of the moral situation from one's geographical vicinity and from the lives of those nearest to one does seem to have a congruent remove in force from the vicinity of one's demand experience.\textsuperscript{6}

The immediate doorstep confrontation, however, is attended with the charged, piercing experience of a demand. One's attention is captured, focussed, and dragged from one by the power of the demand(s) which leaps forth into consciousness on confronting the spectacle of the starving. It seems to saturate consciousness. The strength of this demand is too great to be ignored or allayed, it possesses a tendency to reassert over time this initial force in all its vivid and luminous character (though this can fade with temporal distance, diminishing like the dull thud of a slight toothache to a mere remembered and dim glow).

Now, reversing the two scenes above, one is presented with the following possibilities: in the first instance of a greater degree of demand strength on encountering media presentation of the famine than has been described; and in the second of a far less heightened demand force when immediately coming across a
starving person or group. Concerning the first, this is frequent enough an experience to be tabled alongside the one already described above, though not as entirely frequent, I am arguing, as that one - should attention honestly be given to one's reactions in front of the television screen at such times. To be sure, the experience of the demand under such circumstances is sometimes quite great as the visual image hits home. The point I wish to emphasize is the more likely occurrence of a dim and blunt demand-registering. This is not an event which is encountered too often in the doorstep case, though there are some who experience it that way, or perhaps even not at all. It is an empirically rarer thing for the demand to be as emasculated in these instances as it is in the former. And in both cases the effect of a demand's 'taking root', so to speak, in consciousness, particularly as repeated encounter is undergone, can be of the demand gathering strength until it does indeed begin to have a nagging force on the subject, leading even to a stopping of her in her tracks, faced suddenly with the immensity of the demand. (Though it should be noted that this may not be a demand on her, but a demand that something be done which she feels). But the main run of this demand experience reads thus: an absence of forcefulness to the demand, though not infrequently heightened, as the object stands away from the immediate placing of the subject; a highly charged demand, pregnant with force, as one is put face-to-face with the moral situation, a charge lessened only infrequently.

vi) One very interesting facet to the experience of the demand in this example is that sometimes a moral response ensues so spontaneously that it is uncertain if a demand is registered at all at the level of consciousness. One just gets on with helping the person on seeing her need.7 This is not, of course, to say that, if asked later why one performed the act one would not be prepared to couch description of one's state of mind in terms of the demand put upon one by her need. But below this degree of developed thought, no such experience may be present to mind in the 'thick' of the event. It is to this feature of some practice in immediacy that I shall give the title 'moral spontaneity'. I include this example, then, because it
forms an important part of later discussion on the part a subject's reflection plays, and what interpretation one is to put upon it, in deciding that there may have been a demand which she failed to apprehend or one which she did experience but in an unnoticed way.

A lot of moral experience goes on in such a fashion that it is only identified as such by the reflection of the subject. Much of those immediate actions of a caring, helping sort, and also those of sudden violent responses to situations, are of this nature. They form part of the bedrock of moral practice that goes on without apparent conscious thought as to what one is called upon to do or how one should appropriately respond. (Their nature as specifically moral being discerned by the subject in the cool hour). Rather than a phenomenology of experiencing a moral demand force, one finds instead something else of a more crude form, a visceral impulsion to action, a drawing of the subject to the act. This is a theme I will develop in subsequent sections of this chapter and the next. For the present example, and the feature of demandingness it throws forth to the subject, this apparent suddenness of response is a major element.

As to the matter of further reflection deciding that the subject was indeed in the presence of a demand that was unnoticed or unapprehended altogether, there are two distinctions which I think should be observed. One is between her mode of expression of this fact. She may, I believe, distinguish between 'Her plight demanded...' and 'I experienced a demand to...': which are not equivalent. The latter says something about the subject, while the former says something about the situation which she happened to come across. The same thing goes for a further distinction which she might make in the light of this one: between identifying a demand to which she responded and a moral demand which she apprehended or which limned about the situation. The subject may indeed feel that a demand accrued to the situation, or that she herself experienced something which only now does she acknowledge as a demand, even a demand on her, but she may not thereby call the demand a 'moral' one. She may simply feel that the demand was the
kind of one to which one responds by 'just getting on with things' and not grant it so developed a description as being a 'moral' one.

The extent to which a demand is identifiably felt in this kind of example and similar groups, then, is not great. That something like one does impinge may be given ground by the experience of the subject thereafter - if, for instance, she failed by misfortune to act. Here it is likely a demand will assert itself in consciousness by its own force, and not just as the agent herself dwells in thought upon the affair, thereby indicating its dormant presence in that thick of the moment: as it were, by a process of backward extrapolation. Should the subject have failed to act intentionally this also may have been due to the presence of counterbalancing demands pushing her in other directions, the moral demand being in abeyance or merely very weak; or the spontaneous, propulsive tendency toward moral action simply having been lacking on her part; or the vector of forces having been resolved in the light of the moral and other demands by quick deliberation. It is in these cases where the moral demand is felt, sometimes keenly and overpoweringly, at others as a forceful pressure on consciousness that yet can be struck down as this inner tension is resolved in favour of a particular course of action. (And, of course, the demand can re-emerge subsequently to plague consciousness or stand sticking out slightly on its edges). What is to be focussed on in this respect is the ordinariness and immediacy of the connexion between demand and response in much of what goes by the way of our experience of obligation and acting in accordance with that. It is only in cases of clashing demands on one, or of personal counterbalancing forces on action arrayed against the moral one, that the moral demand is actually given fuller attention in immediacy. This is a similar point about moral experience to that made by Bergson. He highlights the naturalness and passive manner in which duty is followed, saying that it is only when a particular resistance is set up in special cases between obligations that, in his apt phrase, an 'acute consciousness of hesitation' occurs.9
vii) Of all the demands listed here this one consistently bears the most intense and charged quantum of force. The sharp impingement of the horror and shamefulness which loss of face carries with itself is matched in this case by the felt strength of a demand to do something in extirpation of it. That demand, however it may well within one in respect of origin, often possesses great strength, confronting one both in immediacy and even more strongly over time as its force generates, spreads, and filters through one's conscious and subconscious self. It 'weighs heavily' upon a person, engaging her energies like an occupying presence. And often indeed such a pressure can be exhausted by a single act or encounter in which redress is made and an imbalance righted; or it may remain hooked into one, despite attempts to deal with it, lodged like an inner shadow cast over one's attention.

Notwithstanding the comments above on the commonly powerful degree of demand force, the keennesss of the demand can also vary, not always proportionately to the degree of shame involved, from pinpricks of light strength and short duration in an oppressive grind of daily humiliation, which may have cumulative effect, through to the full-scale clattering into consciousness of that powerful demand already described. (As to the question of this demand being a moral one, or closely associated with that - as it appears to be identified in some cultures - that will be addressed later). The point about this example is that it is one of what is routinely a very strong experience of a demand. Loss of face rarely goes unattended by it.

viii) I would not say of this demand that it has quite the power of the previous one. But it is undoubtedly one with whose felt strength we are all acquainted. The magnetism of the other's presence draws one's gaze. One is forced by the demand to follow him/her with one's eyes and thoughts. The everyday frequency with which one meets this demand does nothing to diminish it, and yet also it is not one which continually harbours itself in consciousness, striking one in vivid manner (like multiple flashes on a photographic plate), but soon fading away.
It is a demand, that is, with which one is frequently presented, a force often exerted on one, but one which does not ordinarily exert a power akin to that buffetting effect which the cliff-jumping and loss of face ones seem usually to have.\textsuperscript{11}

On some occasions, of course, we are also all acquainted with the tenacity of the demand's force on oneself, directing one again and again to the thought of the other person and sometimes leading on one's behaviour in more and less consonant ways. The demand's force seems to consume and overpower one's faculties. One is 'in thrall' to a power reigning over oneself. Even when this force is not in possession of one to this extent, there is also the phenomenon of the demand's waning yet sharp presence as time passes and the object of desire ceases to be the occasioning factor of such a forceful hold. This strong demand, routinely encountered, gives one pause but not always a complete halt.

ix) In the beholding of a scene of great beauty in nature the kind of demand in this example will often fill one's consciousness, permeating it to the exclusion of other thoughts and feelings. It has a 'swamping' effect, though not in that threatening fashion with which demands i. and vii. in their intensity signal themselves. (I refer the reader to my point in footnote 3 on this matter). The demand one experiences is not piercing, bearing down forcefully on one, but by the way of a gently-toned one which engrosses the self with it, what I think is best described as a 'restrained force'. Even in those instances where the demand seems to fly forcefully into consciousness - as one reaches the summit and is 'taken aback' on facing the glorious scenery below, say - the demand is not arrayed with the kind of power with which those other two mentioned possess. Rather, the demand floods into consciousness, taking oneself with it.\textsuperscript{12} The force of this demand will probably diminish over repeated encounters with the forest, but unlike those which lose or loose their grip on consciousness and edge from it, this one can maintain a certain repeated quantum of demandingness as the object is met again and again and from different perspectives\textsuperscript{13} and the demand comes to centre itself in consciousness. As a representative comment on the kind of phenomenon to which
this example is referring, and one that perhaps points beyond the experience to a value in the environment that issues forth the demand, here is one from Charles Taylor:

I think...that there is a demand on us to respect the integrity of the wilderness areas, for example, which goes beyond the call of long-term prudence (which is urgent enough to be sure).14

x) The experience of the demand to respond, like with like, to another's action, of kindness in this case, is a familiar enough one. I will concern myself in a later section with the nature of this as a specifically moral demand. The force of the demand is not particularly great, being in the normal run of affairs a matter of an almost unregistered ripple on consciousness, an awareness of a slight pressure on one in respect of behaviour. That is, the demand - for some congruency of action in the light of that which has been directed to oneself - enters consciousness not keenly and onrushing but softly and domestically. Otherwise, in the less usual run of things, the demand can take on more pregnant force as one's failure to respond is mulled over in the mind and the weight of this takes form in the strike of the demand on one. As with example vii., such a demand-pressure on one may be vented by a single act directed toward the other or her stand-ins (family, friends, nation even), or it may take on a kind of hauntingness that does not permit of so simple a dealing, occupying a position on the unnoticed boundaries of consciousness and standing forth more centrally as occasioning factors fuel its pull on one. But to re-assert the initial point: this demand presents itself in weak manner to consciousness ordinarily, a tension ensuing through it only as action consonant with it does not take place.

Section Two: Comparative demand strength

These ten vignettes of the experience of demand experiences on one give some initial illustrative material on the ways in which the forces such demands exert variously compare and contrast. Generally speaking, one is presented with four
broad categories of demand force. They are these. Firstly, demands with intense strength that bludgeon consciousness into attending to them (meaning by 'attending' simply the directing of attention to them and not necessarily acting in the light of them). Examples i, v (partly), and viii evince this feature quite notably. And as a sub-classification of this category I am including a demand like that sketched in ix where one is also being presented with a powerful demand which does not seem to possess the feature of entering one like a hammer blow, but which nevertheless in its felt strength comes flooding into consciousness to fill it and possess it. Secondly, are a group of demands that may come to re-assert themselves with greater power than their initial tarrying with consciousness represented. These are ones such as standardly occur in cases vi and x, and less usually so - but with an especial poignancy - in vii. Examples iii and iv may also occasionally give rise to the growth of particularly strong intruder-like demands on one. Next, analysis presents simply demands with low to medium quanta of experienced force, ones that impinge on consciousness lightly, unpressingly, and/or fleetingly. Such are the main display of experiences described in examples iii, iv, partly v, and partly vii. And fourthly, a class of demands that seem not so much registered with lightness in consciousness, but which pass below that threshold altogether. This is the most usual form given by examples ii and vi. Their entitlement to inclusion as specifically demand experience rests, then, on their being unnoticed ones, discerned as an inner tension is set up in problem cases or over time as the subject fails to respond to them.

Section Three: The moral demand in this classification

It will be seen readily that the moral demand variously occupies space across the spectrum of general demand experience. The moral demand to act or forebear ranges from the sharpness and power of the first type mentioned above - a great pressure to do something in the example with the starving or, what was not put forward, the alarm-bell intensity of the demand not to steal, say; the brooding,
building, erupting force of the second type as an initially low or medium power demand takes one with its accumulated force (for instance, the possible route taken by the demand portrayed in x); to the pressure of the next type, the demand to help or the demand to stop oneself being only briefly arresting or not strong enough to rise above a certain minimal level of 'being noticed'; and through to the fourth category of presence, one which paradoxically seems to be represented by the demand's absence, as in the case of some unreflective, spontaneous acts such as the helping of the fallen person or the non-involvement in an easy opportunity to pilfer from the till, the moral demand being unrecognized at the time, but acknowledged on later reflection or as a problem occurs which halts the subject and puts her in a more thoughtful position. So one form of the consciousness of demands which a subject has is that which takes place only subsequent to the actual situation in which the demand is later felt to have been ingredient.

I wish also to state that the experience of what might be thought to be quite powerful demands of a moral nature does not usually give them as so. The general example of forebearance illustrates well how variable in nature is the force of the moral demand upon one. For in everyday living one is not struck by demands not to steal, not to lie, not to murder, & c. - these simply are absent from consciousness, or exist in unnoticed form at any rate. Only when the opportunity or temptation to perform one of these acts arises (and this itself might be characterized as a felt demand upon one) does a corresponding and counterfacing demand to refrain arise. Such demands, when they do arise, can be like mere blips on consciousness, fended off without difficulty, or they can quite often rein one in, assailed by the degree and intensity of force with which they stay one's hand.

I think that two important points can be made in the light of this:

1. **Variety of demand force** The felt force of the moral demand is not a straightforward matter, but requires attention to the subtle range of shades with which it impinges on consciousness. This is a salient characteristic of experience of moral demands and one which suggests that much of the moral
philosophical tradition through which the experience is apprehended has been one-sided. For that tradition has tended to concern its description with the more powerful elements of the experience. And that has been, broadly characterized, with the heavy impulsion on consciousness of the demand to act (that one addressed in part of my example of the starving) or what I like to call the 'alarm bell' force of the proscriptive demand. But analysis of that force makes such a picture look monochrome in its starkness. If moral demand experience were indeed of that sort, the subject herself would spend her entire moral life being buffeted to and fro by the alternate attracting and repelling forces exerted by the demands. Since that is not how our moral experience is always going on, and since the moral states of affairs in which subjects find themselves cannot be so exclusively described, I am taking these in combination to present good reason for less polarized representation of the nuances of actual moral demand experience.

This is not to deny the striking importance in the moral life of those demands of a particularly heightened force. Nor to disregard the fact that further analysis is called for in respect of possible peculiar differences of tone between these various demands that are experienced with an intense degree of strength. It is to accentuate gradation. It is especially to emphasize the routineness and unforceful nature of great tracts of moral demand experience. Far from one being struck by the weight of moral demands impelling one towards or away from certain situations, the more usual course of moral experience subsists somewhere in the region demarcated by the beholding of the famine-via-the-media example and the kind of sub-experience sketched by examples vi and x. Moral experience is to be found often in climes less strong than those occupied by the kind of demand that enters consciousness with a force like that of the sharp stab of the pain of a headache. Much of it goes on without that 'acute consciousness' of its presence which Bergson notes. And one pointer to phenomenological development of this point is the possibility of this kind of experience representing deep and important matters for the subject while yet not signalling itself with great demandingness to
consciousness. That is to say, the horizon of the experience can be explored, and the imaginative variation canvassed in which importance or centrality to self and intensity of strike on one come apart. (Such an analysis takes place partly in the next chapter, and then in the later ones).

2. Similarity of demand force. The strength of moral demands in experience has counterparts in the weighted comparison with other forms of demand experience.\textsuperscript{16} No special demand strength seems to capture the moral one apart from the others. This point, then, is partly repeating the stuff of the previous one - that the moral demand should not be looked at only as it bears a heavy imprint in its immediacy - as well as placing the complexity of the experience within the context of a finer-grained run of general demand experience. And so we have the following sharedness of strength:

- of overwhelming, powerful demand confrontation (cf. the doorstep construal of $v$ with example i);

- low to medium strike followed by a gathering of strength in consciousness by the demand (cf. the second halves of examples vi and x with the second halves of examples ii, iv and viii);

- a low-weighted skitting in and out of consciousness by the demand (cf. the first halves of examples v and x with the first halves of iii, iv and viii);

- a barely registered demand, or one that is unnoticed in the rapidity of response, that nevertheless seems to be present to consciousness in some way (cf. examples vi and almost x with example ii).

One thing this clearly suggests is this. As a criterion of simply being a moral demand, strength of experienced demand alone will not perform the task. In terms of strength, the moral demand varies too much from a single weighted characterization and possesses too much similarity to a host of other experienced demands for force to be an adequate signalling to consciousness of the impingement of a moral demand. And this is what a slightly more reflective hold on the nature of the experience would lead one to expect. The force of the demand to leap from the
cliff in example i would have to be accounted sufficient to make of it a moral demand if felt strength were to be construed criterially in this way. Cliff-leaping demands do not usually enter consciousness in that way. More notably, this pair of points which I am asserting also shows that high strength of felt demand is not a necessary condition of a moral demand being experienced, given that much moral demand experience is located outwith just this range of force - though it may represent a necessary condition of moral education, of ensuring that this kind of experience is especially efficacious with respect to behaviour, and so forth, that the experience be engendered in such heightened fashion.

Concluding note to the previous sections

This excursis into the general realm of demand experience has thrown doubt onto the notion of felt strength of the moral demand as being a unique or even specially prominent feature of it. It has also emphasized both the similarity of demand force of the moral one in inter-demand comparisons as well as the breadth of experiential strength within an intra-demand survey of moral ones, reiterating particularly the lack of felt strength in much of what commonly passes for the experience of moral demands. The purpose of going through this analysis is twofold. It has been, firstly, to begin to get a representative picture of how the moral demand stands out in the consciousness of subjects. Felt strength seems a good initial candidate for leading one into a phenomenological description of the appearances. Using a comparative overview of demand strength between moral and other ones aids research in the attempt to discover essential elements to the former which make it stand out in consciousness (towards which rather sceptical attentions have been directed so far).

Secondly, this form of analysis takes one to further questions concerning the experiences. It sets the scene for applying phenomenological research to other aspects of the demand. In this respect, two elements of these demand experiences stand out as drawing one's notice. One is the possible differentiation between the
demands by some qualitative tone differences possessed by them which serve to
delineate the nature of the demand as being of such and such a type. An example
from two comparable experiences which do not normally invoke demands on one
corns the similar strike on consciousness in terms of impact strength of, say, a
bright colour and a pungent smell. Differentiating them in terms of tone, or felt
quality, are, say, the brightness and redness of the colour and the pungency and
'garlicness' of the smell. Similarly, one might search for specific differences in
quality between the cliff-jumping demand and the demand to help the starving on
one's doorstep, though they may both sometimes possess indistinguishable levels
of power as they enter consciousness. The other element, which is intertwined with
the considerations above, and which prompts analysis on viewing the nature of
these demand experiences, is that of the degree of objectivity felt in the experience
and how this feature might be experienced. This possible feature, combined with
that element directly above of a special quality, can also be studied for necessity to
the nature of the experience. I drew partial attention to some aspects of this feature
in talking of certain demands as being experienced as 'assailant' or as flooding
consciousness and distinguishing these features also from that of an experience
arising without any seeming control on the part of the subject with respect to its
constitution in consciousness. This will form the basis of my characterization in
chapter 5 of the 'exteriority' of the demand as a crude signalling of objectivity.
Such a phenomenon will also lead on to the question of the source of the demand; a
value realm, of course, being the pertinent suggested basis for moral experience by
some moral philosophers.

Now I turn to analysis of the first of these two elements.

Section Four: Felt tone of the moral demand

A: Kinds of qualitative difference Having mentioned above the
examples of redness and pungency as representing qualitative differences in the
phenomena, I shall go on to compare moral and other demands with respect to tone
or felt quality. The kind of differences being scanned for could fall into one of two types. Difference in tone could represent qualitatively separated items in experience with strict and impermeable divisions between the classes of items. Such I take redness and pungency to be. There is no point in experience at which one merges into the other, or at which discrimination between them becomes uncertain. They are items in experience which can be isolated from one another with distinctness. To mark this quality-category, I shall introduce the term 'strict separability', meaning by this the kind of sharp division between experienced tone to which attention has been drawn. Secondly, there is the possibility of finding experiential tone to be a matter of degree within a particular scale through which the experiences themselves share essential features. A ready example of this phenomenon is given by the shades of a single colour. Maroon and crimson, for example, stand closely on the same scale, participating in the category 'redness' whilst being held apart by slight qualitative differences. It may not be easy to discern differences on a colour scale. Mistakes will commonly be made in classification. But separability of phenomena both adjacent to one another and at further distances on a scale is marked by the wealth of colour words that exist and which a certain trained attentiveness can marshall accordingly in cases of fine discrimination. More usually, one can readily identify as separate crimson from pink, say, while recognizing their shared membership of a class. This category, I am saying, is one of the 'separability of similars'. Here, then, unclarity of distinctness can occur and blending of one quality into the other give pause in addressing the tone differences being experienced. The way in which one quality tends towards and topples over into the other may also be a cause for uncertainty; or of a matter, conversely, of the evident addition or abstraction of a particular quality that makes for the difference that is marked.

B: Tone of the moral demand experience I shall inquire first of all into the presence of a special feel to the experience of moral demands that might always seem to go with it. My analysis will then go on in tandem to see if any such feel
demarcates it strictly from other areas of experience or whether it amounts to a quality that more loosely separates it from those other ones. The moral experience would then be part of a more general area of experience, being similar enough to other demand experiences to group it with them. There is, of course, a concern lying just by the side of this analysis. It is with the possible rendering of the demand experience as uniquely toned by some quality that impinges on one from an objective value realm. My search for differentiating features to moral demand experience, then, will be going on in a fashion faced toward that concern.

Initial credence to the view of a particular felt quality to the experience is given by a number of writers. Here is a representative trio of assertions to this effect.

1. Feelings of moral approval and disapproval are unique in their felt tone. They cannot accurately be reduced to some other sorts of feelings.19

2. The valuational attitude of aesthetic prizing...carries with it a feeling quite easily distinguishable, by introspection, from the feeling component of, say, the attitude of moral commendation... [T]here is...a diffuse quality of feeling-tone common to both cases (and to all other instances of approval), which takes on a more determinate form in each of these two cases of approval (and in every other).20

3. [There is a] "light" in which a valued object comes before us, as precious, as worthy of admiration, etc., a light which is often more evident to the valuing person than any attitude he may have to an object, and which can persist and haunt him even when the relevant attitude is quite in abeyance.21

I have had cause to deny any specially weighted force to the moral demand in experience as clearly differentiating it from others. What I am proposing to do now is to check these reports above with the various demand experiences to see if they
'read off' correctly from the phenomenology when the object experience they deal with is transferred specifically to the moral demand. Firstly, I shall see if any 'unique' tone can be described. I will suggest that candidate notions for this are all shared with various other demand experiences, and that no one tone - other than the experience's being felt to be a moral demand (a point on which I expand in section five below) - captures adequately the phenomenology of the moral demand experience (this being a counterpart to the claim that in terms of strength moral demands vary considerably, no one force rating being of salient descriptive accuracy). Then I will make the claim that moral experience does indeed enter consciousness as moral, but without strict demarcation from other areas of experience. I shall maintain that the experience occurs non-inferentially, but amend that assertion in the light of reflection on experience, stating that, while the experience as a moral demand often occurs with immediacy, this does not mean that criteria for its nature as moral are lacking. This analysis will have an overall shaping effect on the rough mould of the experience which is now being dealt with, and it will lead my study into throwing sceptical light on the notion of the demand experience as signalling values 'out there' to consciousness. The picture that will emerge of moral experience will be more finely-textured than the tradition ordinarily describes, while also representing the moral demand as far less determinate than has been attested to by that tradition.

To the first question. Borrowing from one of the quotations just cited, wherein does a 'unique' felt tone reside? A prima facie plausible quality is given by the phenomenological feature which I will very generally describe as a 'repulsive' demand, one that marks out the morally bad. The converse to this is the attractiveness of the good, what Stevenson calls its 'magnetism'. This characterization captures well, with respect to repulsion, those features of shock, horror, forbiddingness, forbiddenness, and untouchability which go with that moral demand which forces itself into consciousness and proscribes one's behaviour. If there is a peculiar kind of 'lighting-up' of morally worthy object states
of affairs (see the third quotation above), then no less so is there a flaring of the bad before one's gaze, so to speak. In the midst of such a phenomenon consciousness is repelled. It shrinks back. That extreme form of the bad which is called 'evil' has an especially disabling effect on one, pushing one away, compassing one's thoughts and actions. And as to the illuminating appeal of the good, the demand seems to draw one on, to clothe consciousness by an attracting force.23 There are fewer comparable terms here to describe the alighting of the good than there are for the bad.24 But this general feature of the good seems to involve a positive pull forward on one, a demand that enters consciousness with a lambent and beguiling charge.

Now these qualities capture fairly adequately a part of the range of the experience of moral demands. There are demands that seem to peal in consciousness in just those ways. The tenor of the demand to help has a particular horror appended to it on being confronted with the starving. That of the demand to refrain from some action like joining in with looting, say, pulls one back, repelling by shock, or by forbiddenness, or some mixture of these and other intense qualities of the demand in consciousness. And some moments of beholding the good demand one's assent and participation. Certainly the ideal of justice has had that tug on the energies of people. In both types of case a peculiarly heightened state of consciousness is wrought within one. The qualities being described seem to luminesce about the demand, producing an especially prominent tone to it. That this is but a segment of the run of moral demand experience, however, is plain on directing attention to the range it spans. For these demands indeed are prominent ones, with respect to a greater range below them.

The general run of the experience just is not like this. That is to say, these qualities are not evinced universally in moral demand experience as they have been described. That a demandingness is signalled need amount to no more than an irritation or shifting out of equilibrium of consciousness. This is an important point to make about the moral demand. Rather than a particular attraction or repulsion
towards particular states of affairs, one finds in its stead a more inchoate pressure that something be done or that it cease with respect to a situation. For a demand in consciousness is not thereby a demand on one. Minimally, it demands acknowledgement of a troubling factor in consciousness, a breach signalled in the ordinary passage of events in the world which requires redress. But that is not the same thing as a demand that hooks one toward or away from a particular action. The next chapter will deal at some length with the notion of the moral demand as an irksome one, a pressure hemming about the subject. For the moment, I should like to focus still on the directedness of the moral demand: that is to say, on the question of whether phenomenological analysis of the demand experience shows it to be taking a particular object. This would amount, for instance, to the demand being directed to \( x \) to do \( y \) with respect to \( z \). Demand example vi, in so far as it is registered, does just this: the apprehender of the demand is demanded to aid the fallen person. Or, taking a negative example, the demand is placed on John not to raid the till. But what of the first half of demand v? The demand seems to be simply that 'something be done': that one gives money to charity; go out to the starving as an aid worker; vote for the party which proposes to give most overseas aid; work to bring down the system that leads to maldistribution of resources; & c. Or merely that someone somewhere (a beneficent god even) get something done. And demand x? One is demanded to behave correspondingly to the person or her proxies, but this leaves open a multitude of possibilities, with those ones in which one brings it about indirectly that some ordering of events comes to gift the original benefactor. Few moral demands do seem to possess the specific directedness of a call for a certain action by the demanded subject toward a particular situation. The contours of the experience are less firm than that and the map subsequently plotted from them of far greater complexity than that which emerges if the experience is squeezed into the mould of those particular determining properties labelled above.

It is clearly the case, then, that a distinction should be noted between a demand experienced as being on me; a demand that is experienced, but not as being
on me; and one that is experienced in either of these two ways, but with no clearly specified object. In the latter instance one may have to do quite some searching to discover the source and object of the demand and even if the genesis of it were to be identified within one's own breast, that is often not a matter at all apparent in the immediacy of the demand experience.

There is not a logical connection between the mode of 'magnetism' and repulsion and the carrying of a clearly delineated object in the demand. One can be pushed and pulled about without being aware of that in the state of affairs before one which is determining the quality or that from/towards which one is specifically refraining/acting. So the point being put here is not that lack of directedness or of propulsiveness to the demand experience need entail lack of such qualities. It is the outcome of phenomenological analysis, to the effect that, as putative universally instantiated elements to the moral demand in direct experience, neither of them gives one a sure hold on that experience. Concerning the feature of directedness, this begins to give one pause in regarding the notion of value-apprehension. For the experience is arising largely without the specific signalling to consciousness of those properties of oughtness, rightness, duty & c. which are the stock-in-trade of the tradition. In place of that one finds the demand referring often more amorphously to a feel of something amiss needing redress, or a disquieting confrontation before one (and conversely of a settled, warming state before one in the case of the good). This could mean that a value realm itself is amorphous, pressing on one but without giving specific direction to action. No decisive warrant against that construal is given by the facets of experience attended to thus far. But the consideration of propulsion taken together with the lack of directedness gives further pause. Mackie thinks that ordinary moral experience is as of inherently action-guiding moral values. But ordinary moral experience is not. It is not as of that because, when phenomenological focussing takes place, moral demand experience soon breaks down from those 'peaks' represented by the shrill experiences accorded due recognition at the beginning of this section. Description
calls to notice a registering of unease with respect to certain states of affairs, or even
the bare pinprick on consciousness of the demand in the first half of example v,
which hardly amounts to a propelling force in any direction at all.

Two further rejoinders. Even to those moral demands that are particularly
intensely associated with a repulsive or magnetic quality there are plenty of non-
moral demands in direct experience marked in just the same way. Example i notably
seems to involve both. The magnetic (even hypnotic) sensation of being dragged
toward the precipice, the tempting veneer with which the jump-demand is covered,
is phenomenologically no different as magnetism. Nor is the correspondent horror
of the repulsive demand to stay oneself and draw back. A similar picture is given by
the demand in examples vii and ix. The other demands one's attention, as does the
forest, with a strong magnetic quality (famously so in the former case). If strength
and repulsive tone of the demand experience were criteria for its being a moral one
then the demand felt, say, not to wear green colours, hitting one like a shock and
acting as repelling force on one's behaviour, would have to be accounted moral.28
And subjects' experience of the moral demand does not generally signal that
demand as so. Moreover, at least as far as magnetism is concerned, the relations
between demands can become inverted: that is, as signalling the good to
consciousness magnetism is not always so linked. Evil has an allure, a magnetic
demandingness with which most of us will be familiar. In some complex fashion
the phenomenology of forces acting on the subject seems to coalesce around the
very attraction of that which is charged with a repellingness.29 (It is not that the
latter quality is simply in abeyance - one should think here of the elated sensation of
youth when first participating in some activity which one felt to be forbidden).30
Evil does have an electric potency that can lead one on despite some apparent
apprehension of a countermanding demand.31

The other sceptical note I wish to sound here concerns what I take to be a
phenomenon related to the magnetism and repulsion of some moral demands. It
seems largely concerned with a rarefied version of the good (though the effect of
contact with that may be said to give the impetus to a particularly intense response to evil). That phenomenon has been noted by various moral philosophers. Kant returns again and again to the special feeling of 'respect' for the moral law,\textsuperscript{32} one that in his works is rendered in some of the few lyrical passages he invokes. Butler regards conscience as a magisterial and awe-inspiring phenomenon.\textsuperscript{33} One recent philosopher talks of 'that tinge of "upward-looking" reverence which is one aspect inherent in every experience of value.'\textsuperscript{34} And Durkheim goes so far as to talk of some moral experience in terms of the 'sacred' for a social group.\textsuperscript{35} These ways of reflecting moral experience do present one with that special-toned feeling that goes on occasion with the moral demand, transmitting to one as if from some especially elevated value-realm or level of self.\textsuperscript{36} Consciousness is fired by what appears to be the numinous character of the demand. The subject feels herself drawn into participation with a power that both overrides other demands and asserts itself with a kind of ultimate authoritativeness.

These sorts of experience are by no means uncommon. That particular intensifying and channelling of one's energy that goes with apprehension of this hyper-demand, as it were, will be one which most people encounter at some stage in their lives. It is most plainly associated with what we call supererogatory actions. To suggest, however, as Kolnai does in the quotation above, that the feature of 'reverence' attends 'every experience of value' (which subsumes the moral demand under its ambit) is to read back into the general current of the experience what only takes place at its very peaks. The ordinary acquiescence in and acting in accordance with the moral demands one meets in everyday circumstances goes on against a backdrop almost entirely devoid of such alleged features. Most of the relevant experience and behaviour take place in a milieu in which people do things because they are the done things - and not because of the innervating charge wrought by apprehension of a particular striking-hued aura to the moral demands they meet. Many such moral demands are acknowledged with sparse attentiveness and small effect on consciousness. They come and go. Rarely is there a great 'leap' in the
subject in response to that force described by the authors cited. I think Bergson is pointing to a roughly similar split in the phenomena when he distinguishes between the 'natural obligation' of that which is socially inculcated and stands to ensure the day-to-day maintenance of a society, which he thinks acts as 'a pressure or propulsive force' on most individuals, and that 'complete and perfect morality' of humankind (often initiated and empowered by the lives of individual exemplars) which 'has the effect of an appeal' on one.  

If there are indeed moral demands that do generally have the kind of feature being challenged here, they constitute a small group. I would suggest that such a group amounts to a core largely made up of prohibitions. Murder looks to be a likely candidate: the particular horror-struck revulsion and repulsion which is experienced toward it seems to give the prohibition in it the character of the 'sacred'. Such things as incest and sexual relations with children look to be carrying a similar charge. But note that this mitigated finding of the quality has already upturned its presumed object. Far from reverence and awe for some paradigm image of the good, one is faced with that tone to a specially enlivened feeling directed toward the prohibition on evil. And as to this reverence or respect for the good, it is hard to make out quite what its object is thought to be. Kant takes it to be engendered in the striking down of 'self-conceit' by the moral law and the apprehension of the possibility of acting in accordance with it. Butler thinks that the peculiar sublimity of conscience is a matter of the natural ordering of the person and her faculties. Neither of these give an adequate phenomenology of the actual encountering by the subject of moral demands. The experience with which they are concerned is a rather strictly delineated one. Its overlapping into religious experience does not aid in maintaining it as a sign of the moral demand (unless, of course, one takes 'god' and 'the good' to be coreferring definite descriptions). There are a number of objects in religious belief and practice which demand awe, wonder, reverence &c. from the initiated without thereby being of the nature of moral demands. These are phenomena which in contemporary times one will find
especially closely associated with experience of the natural environment and attitudes toward its preservation.

My general emphasis thus far has been, then, to question certain traditions in moral philosophy with regard to phenomenological description of the moral demand in immediate experience. My main worry has alighted on two ways in which such description has been too narrowly circumscribed. One concerns undue attention on certain particularly striking features of the experience (strength; magnetism/repulsion; reverence) which, while granted their place, should not be interpolated throughout as if they were constant and partially defining features of the experience. The other, congruent with the first, has been to state and reiterate the variety and richness of moral demand experience, both as a category itself and as one compared with other forms of demand experience. This brought about emphasis on the 'ordinariness' of moral demand experience, on the lack of a consistently notable quality to it present throughout its variations in sheer forcefulness. In the light of this, I will attempt in the next section to discover what there is to the moral demand in direct experience that does mark it out from other demands with similar degrees of force and similar intensities of qualitative tone (a marking-out that, after all, allows examples to be employed in the first place by which to exploit the subject matter). That section will complete the chapter and lead the direction of my thought to the nature of an objectivity feature attending the moral demand.

Section Five: Demands as moral demands

In this section I will maintain that: the moral demand enters consciousness as moral in non-inferential fashion; that subjects standardly have awareness of certain demands as moral, though there are borderline cases with other types of demand in experience; that in the light of both of the previous points there are some criteria for a demand's being identified as moral, hence allowing for the admission of having been in error at the immediate level, even if the experience in immediacy
is not consciously sifted in virtue of them; and that these facts *look* to give some warrant to the notion of a value-realm 'out there', particularly as evinced in classical intuitionism, though such a warrant can and should be resisted.

- i) That a demand is a moral demand in immediate experience is not something inferred from its particular force on one, its importance or seriousness to one, or the peculiar heightened tone it might possess. The identification comes in with the experience; or rather, as the experience. This signalling, then, is going on in what I shall call, for want of a more apt label, an 'intuitive' manner. This term need not entail anything whatsoever about the origin or genesis of the demand or about a special receptive faculty: only about the way in which it appears before consciousness. And that is in a way which does not involve the subject 'reading off' from certain experiential features the presence of the moral demand.

Two analogies, from religious and aesthetic experience, will aid in clarifying the description I wish to invoke. In the first, one finds in the immediacy of experience religious description to be given rather than certain features of the experience forming the basis for some tentative theistic hypothesis. Martin Buber speaks of Israel beholding the parting of the Red Sea in the following manner:

> What is decisive with respect to the inner history of Mankind...is that the children of Israel understood this as an act of their God, as a "miracle"; which does not mean that they interpreted it as a miracle, but that they experienced it as such, that as such they perceived it...43

So here there is no move from the awesomeness, the sheer impossibility of the event, the decisive defeat of an historical oppressor force, to the conclusion that the God of Israel is present and active. The people (think that they) experience him at work on their side. Their experience straightaway is of a religious kind.

From aesthetic experience, take the apprehended beauty of a painting, one of Turner's sun-rayed sea-scenes for instance. The beauty-experience is given in consciousness as that, an originary phenomenon unwrought by prior determination
in thought of other experiences marking it out as being so. The phenomenology of the appearance of the experience in consciousness shows it unmarked to the subject by any process of its being inferred from the presence of other experiential tones on viewing the painting: ones such as the pleasure taken in it by the subject, an uplifting of one's spirit, of being 'taken aback' (though these will often be present also). The experience may come to one after much peering, moving up close to study a particular aspect and stepping back to view the whole. It may 'well' on the edge of consciousness and then strike one in its fullness (though, like much of the run of the moral demand experience, aesthetic experience is not so often as striking and moving as it sometimes seems to be regarded in the literature, more usually a quite simple noticing of the beauty of a painting or the sweep and vigour of a musical composition). But this is not attended in the consciousness of the subject by an inference from certain collated factors which gives rise to the presence of the experience itself and its identification as being thus and so.44

And this is similarly so with the moral demand: its presence being by the way of an originary impulsion in consciousness. Prichard expresses this feature in stating that,

The sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness of, an act of a particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate.45

This points to the quality of the experience which is often present in immediacy when one is not specifically in the mode of attending to a moral problem. The suddenness, unbiddenness, unexpected way in which the demand strikes consciousness as one is watching the television and the famine-scene is played, or as the front door is opened to reveal a starving person confronting one, attest to the feature Prichard describes.46 There is also that same quality to the demand which ensues when one wonders over specific courses of action in the light of the unformed demand which one experiences to the effect simply that something be done. The demand does not seem to have arrived by a process of inferring it from other elements (nor, importantly for later chapters, does it feel as if one has
wrought it by one's own choosing) - which is not to say that, counterfactually, there are not features by which it could have been inferred. This form of immediacy of the demand, its apparent arising without one's willing, can be labelled as the 'categorical' feature of it. For the demand is given as such in direct experience, as calling on one without seeming to be linked to one's own desires in its immediacy. The subject feels as if something other to herself is pressing on her. But note that she does also in those religious and aesthetic experiences described. These experiences - of the holy and of the beautiful - do not seem to arise in consciousness through one's own choosing. Even as one does choose to turn attention to that which is already thought to be within a particular milieu - to a work of art, to an iconic image, to a documentary on famine - one does not feel oneself to be choosing to have the corresponding experience.47

The fact that a particular demand is experienced as a moral demand, and that this is not based in immediacy on an inference from other elements of the experience, is neutral with respect to the question of whether there is a special tone to the experience, or a special intentional content, which one could sheer off from the experience, as it were, and investigate. One would then deal with a particular 'ringing' quality which signalled experience as moral, or with a content such as a value-realm which went to underpin description. (More will be said in point iii about this matter). For instance, Davis, who is quoted at the beginning of Section 4, contends that, of moral experience,

...man is so constituted...[as] to find certain kinds of actions, intensions and situations repugnant or disvalued in a peculiar sort of way. This repugnance, while analogous to other repugnances men feel, is unique in its experienced tone. It is as useless to attempt to describe the experienced tone as it would be to describe sweetness or colour. It has to be felt to be known, and once felt, description becomes superfluous,...the very being is in the seeming [like sweetness].48
Analysis may be unable to do anything more concrete than try to convince the reader that description is accurate as it accords with his/her own moral experience when it is called to mind, or that it leads the reader into agreement if, as Davis claims, the experience cannot be adequately described. More determinately, it can say this. That one's experience is of a religious, or aesthetic, or moral nature is, in immediacy, a matter of the overall tone and content of the experience. This implies that there is not a single unique, sortal feature to each kind of experience that can be shorn off and analysed in separation from the experience. The religious nature, the beauty, the moral nature of the experience does not appear in direct experience as a special additional tone that would allow one type of experience to topple into another type as the particular feature was added or subtracted. By 'overall' tone and content being involved in the identification I mean simply to indicate the immediacy of the experience as, say, moral, which I have stated to be non-inferential and not given characterization by the presence of some single special feature which could be rendered up for inspection in isolation from the experience.

- ii) If subjects in direct experience do not infer the experience to be that of a moral demand, it is because the experience is presented in ordinary and unproblematic manner as moral. Whether the demand force itself be minimal (the first half of example v) or quite overpowering (the second half of example v), in both cases it is routinely identified as a moral one. Or, as it was put at the beginning of point i above, the identification is part and parcel of the experience itself. This is a matter of the phenomenology of the appearances. What it does not establish is the impossibility of experience of moral demands that are not identified as such - because of inattentiveness in the heat of the moment, or because an interfering factor such as a high emotional state renders in flux the subject's consciousness of the forces weighing upon her. To say, then, that a demand impinged on a subject, but was unnoticed or not identified as such by her, or that a subject later acknowledges that she should have felt a moral demand on her or that the
demandingness which she did experience should have been experienced as moral: this need not be to say anything at all about the notion of values 'out there' which are not being fully apprehended. It is to say that, despite the usual fashion in which the experience enters one as a moral demand, in some cases there is an experience striking consciousness which, but for certain other forces tugging also on the subject, would be experienced as a moral demand.\textsuperscript{49} And sometimes also we talk of demands unnoticed, though we feel that we should have done so.

There are, of course, borderline areas. In these, either the subject is herself unaware of the nature of her experience, or others are attempting to correct it. The former case partly consists of that kind of realization presented above, that the noticing of the moral demand has been prevented. And there are those times when one discerns that what one took to be a moral demand was in fact a demand of another sort, one placed upon one by an emotional attachment or revulsion to some person or group, or one which seemed to one as moral in virtue of the effect on one of some feeling of the overriding importance of a particular matter. This corrective reflection, as it were, takes itself two modes. One is the denial of the content of the demand, though the appearance of it in consciousness remains steady. An example of this phenomenon is the way in which the moral demand in appearance retains its character with respect to certain groups of people, though one does not any longer identify oneself in terms, say, of racist beliefs. Though one is not 'really' a racist, the demand may continue to exert pressure on one and continue to do so as a felt moral demand.\textsuperscript{50} (In extreme cases, the apparent doggedness of the demand assailing one may, in virtue of the dislocation from what one takes one's 'real' attitude to be, lead to severe psychic disorder). The other is the denial of the tone of the experience as moral. In this case one may continue to regard the content of the demand as pressing, important, a matter of great moment, yet question the tone of the experience as moral in virtue of other considerations (a point expanded in iii below). Borrowing from Foot,\textsuperscript{51} a seeming demand of a moral nature directed to hedgehogs mating in the light of the moon can be questioned through thought on
what objects should be felt to place moral demands on one. This, then, tries to slough away that moral nature of the demand, even though one might continue for all sorts of other reasons ardently to consider hedgehog mating as an important matter. At a reflective level, something like a repetition of the point concerning inference might be made: that is, that the demands one experiences are not accounted moral simply in virtue of, say, the importance of the object one was engrossed by. Much the same corrective emphasis goes on also by others towards the nature of the experience one reports. Others will point out unnoticed aspects to the states of affairs one is directed toward, pinning down one's own experience and asking for more careful study of its nature. They will try to get one to see how, for instance, anger or repressed desire clouded one's awareness of the demands on one or how they lead, through their intensity and felt importance, to an illusory veneer to experience. Since this section mainly has its weight as deeper reflection on direct experience I will not pursue these thoughts, leaving them to arise again at the appropriate point in the chapters that deal with that reflection. They act as brief partial notes on the re-ordering of the experiences - or attempts by one to do so - which strike one in immediacy. One thing which I do think that this section has highlighted as an aspect of the phenomenology, however, is the range of different subject responses on looking more closely at the raw stuff of her immediate experience. A particular difference which I should like to emphasize is that between one's acknowledging that one did experience a moral demand but do not do so now; and the thought that what one experienced as a moral demand then, one realizes now was not really a moral demand.

- iii) To repeat a point made earlier: the non-inferential nature of the moral demand in direct experience is logically compatible with the presence of criteria or experiential qualities that would make an inference possible. And, even in the absence of these, the immediacy of experience may be open to an understanding in terms of the training and refining of one's perceptions through socialization and
repeated exposure to an expected response.\textsuperscript{54} To discover criteria is a matter of exploring the horizon to the experience, thereby testing subjects' grasp on the matter. One evident matter to which Foot, amongst others, has drawn attention in the articles cited is that of the almost necessary link to human benefit and harm, her point being just that without this connection we fail to make sense of a claim that the experience is a moral one (I say 'almost' since the recent proliferation of literature concerning 'deep' ecology seems to make of the demand to preserve the natural environment a moral one irrespective of human want).\textsuperscript{55} This itself does not seem to me an argument for or against the possibility of experiencing such and such a demand as moral in immediacy, but it does seem strong as one concerning our own later thought on the nature of the experience and how we should be able acceptably to convey it to others.

Ewing says of this non-inferential moral experience:

\begin{quote}
Even where intuition is not backed by any explicit process of inference...[one] is right in refusing to regard it as a quasi-miraculous flash of insight standing by itself and not essentially connected with any thought-process at all. I presuppose at least a partial analysis of the situation or a selecting of certain aspects of it, a process which presumably takes some time and may be more or less gradual, and it is certainly effected deeply by our previous experience and thought. What we see immediately may be the result of a careful survey or long experience of the whole situation or the whole system involved and yet may be incapable of deduction from definite explicit features in that situation or system.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

William James noted a similar building-up to some cases of religious experience.\textsuperscript{57} And a more recent empirical survey found respondents prepared to list a number of factors in religious experience, absence of any one of which would have led to withdrawal of its identification as so.\textsuperscript{58} Similarly, the aesthetic experience is not one that goes on for the subject in unfathomable isolation from certain factors,
particularly as a contextual matter involving what are thought to be called by others 'works of art', and/or as she is already aware of the factors to which she generally responds. (For Lewis, quoted in the early part of Chapter Three, this would necessarily have to be the case in order for direct experience to be regarded as aesthetic at all. Unlike him, I am saying that phenomenological analysis of the appearances does show that, problem cases notwithstanding, subjects are aware of experiential differences in the nature of their classifications as a matter of course). Again, these matters require a reflective assay that must be left until later with especial concern for the putative value objects involved as giving the experiences their nature. I draw attention to them at this stage only in order that the sway of appearances so far described not accumulate too greatly in a single direction such as that to which point i above inclined. The main theme is this. Recall the assertion in point i that no one isolable quality could be found to experiences of beauty and the moral demand that accounted for each one's nature and which could be removed and swapped among experiences, thereby altering them from one to another. Verification of this assertion occurs in seeing that experiences indeed do not flit from one type to another through subtraction and addition of a particular element that entirely alters the experiential compound. For example v to be of the nature of aesthetic experience, or example iii come to appear as religious, there is no experience on the part of the subject of some peculiar quality that can, all of a sudden, transfer one into the other. Only in example ix might those three be standardly conjoined in a fashion making it hard to discriminate between them; or in which the three types of experience vie for attention, one with the other.

The upshot of these considerations is that the connection between moral demand experiences and their objects - be it a logical and necessary one or a contingent though deep-seated one - does forge a link of a sort that goes intimately between the experience and general matters of human welfare. The phenomenology of appearances at the direct level does signally bring forward the non-inferential and unbidden features of the moral demand. But further analysis also brings out the
way in which their originary constitution in consciousness is taking place within a contextual frame. In this light, one writer, in addressing the issue of moral intuition - that form of description of immediate moral experience which is most similar to this analysis - says that,

Intuitions are moral because they involve seeing situations in such general terms as good and evil and, when refined, in the more concrete forms good and evil take... By good and evil I mean benefit and harm to human beings. And by moral good and evil, I mean benefit and harm to human beings produced by human agency. Thus the realm of morality comprises the many ways in which human beings may benefit or harm each other. Moral intuition, then, is to see a situation in terms of some human beings benefitting or harming other human beings...

Here, then, is one way in which experience and object are generally seen as connected, one which was mentioned earlier also. Not only does it put that forth, but it also demystifies the notion of moral intuition as specially connected with some kind of value realm.

This brings my discussion on to the last point of the four in this section and directly to the question of a value realm 'out there' being apprehended in consciousness.

- iv) Mackie states that 'the only coherent form of objectivism in ethics [is] some form of intuitionism...' These intuitions he takes to be of an order of objective non-natural moral properties which somehow (and rather vaguely) are taken to underpin our moral judgements and practices. Brandt, who, like Mackie, has no truck with such an order, also grants the force of such a notion in popular moral experience. Moral intuitions and a faculty for receiving them have been thought to answer some of the phenomenological problems raised in my chapter 1 concerning the nature of apprehension and action. As Mackie thinks, this facet to
direct moral experience looks to be pointing to an objective value realm which is out there; which is apprehended in moral intuition (this phenomenon, indeed, being that of the apprehension of a value realm); and which intrinsically motivates the perceiver.

Now intuitionism has had very weighty\textsuperscript{64} and notorious\textsuperscript{65} objections levelled against it in the course of recent moral philosophy. Even its supporters concede that that 'classical' position adopted by the British moralists of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries is no longer tenable.\textsuperscript{66} What one tends instead to be presented with by contemporary proponents is a diluted form, largely of a Rawlsian bent.\textsuperscript{67} Much of the debate on this issue is not germane to the phenomenological questions which moral intuition raises in the context of the foregoing discussion. What is of quite central relevance, however, is this. The notion of moral intuition derives credibility from the non-inferential nature of immediate moral demand experience. I have argued that analysis shows there to be no special moral quality to the experience - other than the fact that the experience is moral - which is felt at the time to account for its being so.\textsuperscript{68} Moral intuitionism is one way in which the nature of the experience is analysed as being charged by some kind of objective moral property. And thus debate is turned once again to the question of an objectivity feel to the experience and the value realm that is being thought by us (according to Mackie) to be intuited.

Section Six: The vagueness of the experience
To the objectivity feel in direct experience the next chapter is entirely devoted. For the present, the phenomenological analysis of the appearing of the moral demand leads my thought in the following manner. There is an immediate sense that something 'out there', that which simply is other to the subject herself, is working to form the experience and to support the judgement that one is apprehending a moral demand. This term 'support' is a deliberately vague one. I do not think it is the case that, pace Mackie, subjects experience moral demands in such a fashion
that they regard them as 'making true' the moral judgements they might form on the basis of the experience. At the heightened level there may sometimes be a notion at large that the very piercingness and seriousness of the experience itself is some notice of its extra-phenomenological license, but the rendering of this in terms of truth or as a knowledge claim, backed by a value realm, is not a phenomenological fact of immediate experience. Besides, as pointed out before, the general run of moral experience is not of that specially-heightened type. In direct moral experience as a whole there is simply the immediate sense of a moral requiredness, of a reality to be dealt with (not necessarily by oneself), which can be pressing to greater and lesser degrees. But there just is little experience at this level of that value realm which might make true the judgement 'Here is a moral demand'; nor is there within the experience a sense of knowledge-being-acquired in virtue of contact with objective values that act as originator of the experience and as directed content of it. There is a sense of being in touch with something that tugs on one, encircles one's attention and gnaws away at it, and this can be felt at times to be of great importance and urgency, but that is not the same thing as experience of objective moral values.

Mackie has stated that his analysis says what there is not. And what there is not is a realm of objectively prescriptive moral values. The facts of the experience of moral values, he thinks, are false for they represent to one just that realm. But what my phenomenological description has done so far is to reverse that order of thought. It has not revealed as content of the subject's moral demand experience any consistent or persistent signalling of an objective value realm. It has indicated ways in which subjects' experience on occasion touches upon matters of very great urgency and importance; it has begun to explore the way in which the moral demand is constituted in consciousness in a fashion unamenable to the subject's own volition; and it has repeatedly emphasized that feature of a pressure or force hemming about the subject which moral and other demands exercise with varying degrees of power and intensity. That none of these features, singly or in...
combination, amount to the signalling in consciousness of an objective value realm is evident.

It is logically possible that there just is such a realm which causally interacts with subjects in rather arcane ways unannounced in phenomenological analysis. A negative phenomenological argument to the effect that what is not given in experience does not have a place in the world will be possessing, therefore, only a preliminary potency. Rather, the analysis thus far questions, and finds wanting, a particular view of moral demand experience, working within a phenomenology of the appearances and describing the arising in consciousness of the demand, together with those others of a non-moral form. And the significant thing about that view is this. Both Mackie and his supporters - and their opponents - who contend different metaethical theories about the nature of morality against one another, share the same phenomenological description of the direct experience. Some are inclined to think, like Mackie, that it is merely an error and not to be taken as giving philosophical weight to any particular axiological theory; others believing it to grant initial force to some (mitigated) notion of value apprehension. What neither party does is simply to look more closely at the phenomena of the moral life. The image of values being given to consciousness in direct experience of moral demands seems an uninspected assumption, one taken for granted by all parties to various disputes. Insofar as they agree on an initial phenomenological givenness of values in experience, no matter what subsequent construal they put on that, they are all curiously adrift from the texture and content of the moral demand in immediate experience. There may, of course, be non-phenomenological reasons for taking there to be an objective value realm, and a phenomenology of reflection on it may give extra weight to that notion (later chapters are directly addressed to this latter matter). If that is the case, however, it is correspondingly not the case that these values appear as such in the direct experience.

I will bring this chapter to a close by again exploiting an analogy between the carrying of moral values in direct experience and the objects of (direct) religious
Chapter Four

and aesthetic experience. There is, I believe, a widespread tendency to think of these kinds of experience as being brought about by, and having the contentual form of, particular delineated states of affairs: namely, God and the value beauty. Phenomenological exegesis of the relevant experiences reveals, rather than the apprehension of a god, let alone a particular faith's image of that being, a far more richly-variegated congeries of experienced features - of the holy, the eerie, the awesome, the powerful, the numinous, of being 'taken out of' oneself, &c.73 God, of course, figures as the content of a fair portion of religious experience. But the greater part of it is going on outwith such a determinate and committed description of its form. Whatever independent reasons there are for theism, religious experience does not represent a consistent phenomenological window on to God as such. And so it is similarly with aesthetic experience. Rather than the value beauty being apprehended in all instances of this type of experience, one finds instead degrees of niceness, pleasantness, soothingness, of being drawn into the object and out of oneself.74 This is not to say that beauty never figures in the phenomenological scheme of aesthetic experience; but it is to say that it represents a non-universal element to it and does not constitute itself in consciousness via apprehension of a value realm in which it inheres.75 Both cases of seeing specific objects to be instantiated across the respective experience classes, then, fall short of phenomenological accuracy in describing the appearances. To that extent, and bringing to mind the experience of the moral demand, these three objects of phenomenological analysis have been seen in the claims above to be of a nature which is unsupported by attention to that phenomenology.

One writer on ethics and theology has argued that those interpretations of the call of duty on one as divine commands, given through apprehension of the will of a divine lawgiver, are both conceptually and phenomenologically suspect. He expresses cogently the worry with which this chapter has contended:

...I maintain that there is no awareness of any such relationship [to a divine being] inherent in the duty-consciousness itself, and I suggest
that those who think there is do so precisely because they are not
successfully abstracting from their independent theistic convictions.
Their moral phenomenology has, so to put it, been vitiated by
infection from beliefs at which they have arrived by a quite different
route.76

This is not an objection that one could put to the likes of Mackie, who certainly is
not, of course, arriving at the phenomenology from an independent belief in
objective moral values. It does represent, though, the problem of shifting emphasis
from certain aspects of the direct phenomena, or from reflective pronouncements on
its general course, to the viewing of it as entirely coloured in such-and-such a
fashion. What I mean to express here is the feeling on my part that attention by
moral philosophers to some heightened phenomena of the experience has led them
to take that sub-class as providing general phenomenological results. One particular
item they seem to have latched upon is that rough awareness we may have at the
heightened level of our contact with some kind of moral reality. In this chapter I
have not been at all sanguine on the matter of finding determinate moral values in
direct experience of moral demands. The two that follow will try to develop further
phenomenological description of the immediate experience and its carrying of an
objectivity feature. In them I will again be casting doubt on the notion of values 'out
there', this time concentrating on how the 'out there' figures in the experience.
Concluding comments to chapter four

Starting from the presentation of sample demand experiences, descriptive texture and context of the moral demand experience have been given sway by my exegesis. I have had repeated occasion to turn attention away from the heightened or peak form of the experience and toward the greater part of the experience which goes on below such a level in order that that peak experience not be unduly concentrated upon. I believe that the warrant for taking our moral demand experience, with Mackie, as seeming to represent to us moral values from 'out there', derives almost entirely from looking at the peak form. But I have shown that the precise nature of that kind of experience is not at all happily captured by seeing it as value intuition (except in such a non-controversial fashion as to make it simply refer to whatever we sincerely feel under the circumstances). And the features it does possess - such as intensity, overbearing importance, strength of impingement - are shared with other kinds of demand experience. In itself that is of no great import. But insofar as those features might seem to be signalling the interaction of values with us from some special realm, this being by way of an inference from or overall gloss on the experience, then the similarities throw up problems. For if analysis embraces that construal, its pursuance in the other areas leads to an absurd multitude of 'queer' entities: of the objective demand to jump in example i, for instance, and that to collect the last item in example iii.  

Deflating more seriously the image of the experience as value intuition is the straightforward intra-phenomenological finding that no such determinate data are given, either at the heightened moment or elsewhere in the broader reaches of the experience-type. The debate between Mackie and those others who are more inclined to give some credence to the value phenomenology he impugns is one about the status of the objects to which such experience refers or on which subsequent moral discourse depends. This chapter, however, has given pause to acceptance of the foundation of such a debate. What I have done is to move a step further back from the arguments about queerness and the explanatory necessity of
value entities. And taking the phenomenology as it describes the appearances of the moral demand in consciousness I have been maintaining that objectively prescriptive moral values (the ones 'out there' which Mackie discusses) are not given in our experience. Sometimes we feel ourselves as if in close contact with a rather hazy moral reality. We want to say that the demands to acknowledge Hitler's evil and Mother Theresa's goodness come from something more than descriptions of character traits on the lines, say, of irascibility, humility, or frankness. And we may feel that to be the actual case on meeting the Mother or watching film of the holocaust. But that that is not felt to be an intuition of an objective value realm is my contention via the phenomenology.

All these considerations refer to that level of the heightened experience which I chose in the prospect of finding a value intuition there, if it occurs anywhere at all. I do not think it is there. Again, mention should be made of the more ordinary run of experience which goes on outwith the heights of intensity and strike possessed by the peaks. If the evidence for objective values of the kind for which my search has been made is equivocal at best, and simply lacking otherwise, at those levels, then it is hardly given at all in the general course of moral demand experience.
CHAPTER FIVE

The purest of motives (or the basest: the law is always the same) appear as something exterior.
S.Weil

"Ought" suggests a constraint, a lack of freedom, rather than fittingness, appropriateness, suitability. We speak of being bound, of having no real choice (in the case of very stringent obligations), of being committed, etc.
H.J.McCloskey

Introduction

I am going to continue in this chapter with the themes developed in the last one. In particular I shall try to pin down those elements of our experience of the moral demand which may look to be, or could be inferred to be, giving us apprehension of objective values. And in doing so I shall analyze any such elements to see whether the phenomenology they display can accurately be taken as giving that kind of appearance to us.

The chapter begins with a discussion and description of the 'irksome' nature of the moral demand as it puts itself upon us. The ways in which this quality enters consciousness, maintains itself, increases or diminishes, are addressed and possible courses of its constitution in consciousness followed. Such a phenomenon is linked up by me to the receptivity of the subject to the demand placed upon her: that is, to her attitude towards it as important for her or not, and as it exhibits for her levels of varying nearness to her own perceived self.

I then carry phenomenological description on to the precise feel of exteriority which the moral demand has for us. I do that in order to engage study with the possible felt source of and confrontation with a value realm 'out there'.
Different degrees of this felt phenomenon are recorded and contrasted with other areas of demand experience. This *experiential* sense is made more explicit by my teasing out the dual *linguistic* sense of the notion of independence of the subject: which involves either the feature of externality or that of unnamenability to direct volition (or both for some phenomena). I argue that what sense of the former there is accompanying the moral demand for us is rather vague and inchoate and not at all readily viewed as contact with objective moral values in anything like Mackie's construal. As to the latter sense, that is touched upon in places, my main exposition of it being left to the two chapters that follow this one.

The chapter as a whole provides discussion of the phenomenological data as it may contain for us a perceived relation to some kind of (rather indeterminate) moral reality. This relation I analyze for both causal and non-causal alignments of the subject with that value realm as we apprehend it. One of the non-causal relations which receives particular attention is that one which appears from time to time in the history of moral philosophy, namely, the relation of 'fittingness' that subjects are alleged to perceive. In both cases of a putative sense of our interaction with objective moral values I find the actual phenomenology to be less than promising for any such claim.

In the overall tenor of its findings this chapter, like the previous one, is of a somewhat negative thrust. I challenge in particular the phenomenology of those areas most close to an apprehension of objective value. Taking even the level of the peak moral demand experience I deny that this is held by subjects as apprehension of a value realm from 'out there'. Applied to the moral demand experience, I show how the two quotations at the head of this chapter describe major elements of the phenomenology. I suggest ways in which the experience can be forceful, even threatening, as it strikes consciousness and trails through it, and argue that, while these may lead to confusion with the claim of an impingement of objective values on one, that is indeed a confusion and a move to be resisted.
Section One: The moral demand as irksome

There is an experiential phenomenon common to much demand experience. Prichard captures its nature when he talks of the 'irksomeness' of the moral demand. In this section I am going to concentrate further on that phenomenon. I will again view the appearances of moral and other demands in order to describe its character. In doing so I will be trying to see how it appears both across different demands and within moral demand experience.

1.1 - Pin pricks on consciousness

Many of the demands described in the last chapter share a feature which I shall call, somewhat crudely, but I believe accurately, that of 'irritatingness'. They enter consciousness in a manner similar to that of a buzzing insect which distracts one. One is temporarily forced to take note of them. Often, but not always, they prod one to do a certain thing.

This feature is present in clear fashion in the examples i, iii, iv, and vii which I presented in chapter 4. It is also to be found in the moral example v. The demands force themselves into consciousness in like fashion to the physical irritation of a pinprick. One is shaken in some degree by them, concentration halted by their presence. Concerning comparison between moral and other cases, Jung has commented on the phenomenological feel which the pang of conscience has for us. This description seems to me close enough to that of my interest in the experience of a moral demand to be worth quoting at length. He says:

In practice it is indeed very difficult to distinguish conscience from the traditional moral precepts. For this reason it is often thought that conscience is nothing more than the suggestive effect of these precepts, and that it would no longer exist if no moral laws had been invented. But the phenomenon we call "conscience" is found at every level of human culture. Whether an Eskimo has a bad conscience about skinning an animal with an iron knife instead of
the traditional flint one, or about leaving a friend in the lurch whom he ought to help, in both cases he feels an inner reproach, a "twinge of conscience", and in both cases the deviation from an inveterate habit or generally accepted rule produces something like a shock.4

In this passage he both brings to the fore a phenomenological feature of some moral demands - what he terms a 'shock' - as well as making the point that it is not a unique felt feature of just those ones. I think Jung here has a notion of that shock as bound with a feel of horror, taboo, one to the effect that 'this is not to be done.' But that is to narrow down unduly the general form this 'shock' has. The striking tone which Jung emphasizes is more basic than that, an irruption of consciousness.

The image I wish to convey is this. Those demand examples noted above arrive in immediacy with a braking effect on one. They supplant one's thoughts and demand attention. I ask the reader to cash out this image by bringing to mind those kinds of demand and seeing if she/he assents to my description of the feature. For it is my claim, after all, to be describing experience as we variously have it. And I believe it will readily be seen that this quality to certain demands is that one which is variously latched onto by descriptions of its 'irksomeness', 'shock', 'irritatingness'. (Bearing in mind my discussion of peak and non-peak demand experiences in the previous chapter, many moral demands clearly will not have a tone beyond that of a bothersome background clinging to the peripheries of consciousness).

What of the degree of irritativeness? In the next sub-section I will employ some second order reflection on how one might view ridding oneself of the irritation. That will describe how subjects are compelled by the quality to view it and thus the degree of irritation that is being exerted. As to the way in which it appears straightaway before one, that degree varies between the sharpness of a pin prick (demand example i in particular) to the (by comparison) dull thud by which the demand in the first half of example v is experienced. It is important to note that this description applies to the immediate strike of the demand on consciousness and
not to one's subsequent thought that the demand, as pressing upon one, is onerous. For in that immediacy many demands are not experienced as so. There is, to be sure, in examples ii, vi, ix, x an apprehension of a demand, but not as an irritation, as a burdensome force weighing in on consciousness. And this is sufficient to give one pause concerning blanket endorsement of Prichard's description of irksomeness either as evincing the moral demand or even specially attaching to a particular species of that demand. The moral demands in vi and x do not in immediacy possess a particular quality of irritatingness. They may exert a lively, compelling tug on one, but that is not the same thing as being irksome. These demands are experienced in jejune fashion, are dealt with routinely, and do not enter consciousness with that stabbing force with which those that irk rather keenly are signalled. Conversely, those moral demands which do possess such a feature are quite manifestly not forming a sub-group uniquely picked out by it. Examples i, iii, iv are paradigm cases of the feature in demand experience. They pierce consciousness, in the latter cases bludgeoning their way into one's notice. With the registering of them as demands comes as a piece their irksomeness.

Between moral demands themselves that are experienced in this way there are differences of degree to the quality. Those that prevent one from going on with some tempting act sometimes have this in immediacy. They assail one and put obstacles in the path of one's plans. Those which are demands not of forbearance, but for commission, need not possess corresponding degrees of force and irritatingness. I mean by this that especially powerful moral demands do not also have to be experienced as strongly irksome. I take it that this undoes a natural presupposition that those demands which strike consciousness with great strength must be experienced as particularly irritating. To give a concrete example, consider case v. In the second half of that, of the doorstep starving, I have said that the demand to help is a very strong one. Yet to call it irksome or irritating in immediacy is to add into the original experience that which may be felt only after the initial shockwave of the demand has burst upon one, or which may never be felt at all.
While the first half, which possesses in the main but a passing and weak force, is much more often accompanied by a direct, irksome quality. The demand, though it does not overwhelm one as in the doorstep instance, can nevertheless smart in consciousness as an irritation; there may be no particular action enjoined by the demand on one's part that presses upon one's resources, but the very difficulty of dealing with the situation and its farness from one may bring forth to the demand an irritatingness which, in the clamour of the doorstep-starving demand, is absent.

This quality of irksomeness, then, is widespread throughout demand experience and is not universally found among the moral ones. Most frequently one is presented with it in everyday demand experiences of a mundane sort that press upon one's time and inclinations which are otherwise determined. The demands to hang the crooked painting, wash the dishes, complete the essay on time are all standardly irksome. The demand to condemn Hitler as evil is not; nor, for instance, is the demand to give help to a person who has slipped on the ice in front of one standardly felt in this way. So the description of the moral demand as either only or always possessing the feature of irritatingness is not phenomenologically accurate. Perhaps moral demands begin to pick up this force as they maintain themselves in or below consciousness, or as the subject reflects on them. This brings me to the next sub-section.

1.ii - Irksomeness gathering

That demand which does not irk one as it arrives can grow to do so. And that which is immediately felt as an irritation may increase in strength of that quality, building up in consciousness, or merely remain with the same degree of force. The additional possibility is that of demands that diminish in irksomeness, occasionally losing the quality altogether while yet remaining as a felt demand. With all these possibilities it seems to me that one salient point calling for notice is the way in which the irking force of the demand is linked to its dragging one away from other matters with which one's attention and energies are engaged, or in
which one would rather they were engaged. The demand concerning the starving person on the doorstep might not at first be irksome just because other concerns are blown away; but it may become irksome as other concerns (for example, one recalls that one is now missing one's favourite soap on television) creep back.

Are these three all facts of experience of the moral demand? Or is there a particular route which the moral demand takes once inserted into the flow of consciousness?

Let us follow a particular moral demand through its apprehension onwards and employ a mitigated form of Husserlian imaginative variation to see if its constitution in consciousness under different descriptions meets with our recognition. If it does, then my portrayal will have succeeded in describing a series of phenomena that attach to the moral demand without any one excluding the others in the different experiential possibilities. If it does not, then some factor that is part of the moral demand, and which either prevents others from being added or which itself cannot be subtracted without our grasp on it as a moral demand failing, will have been discerned to be essential.

A - Take, then, the famine-via-the-media example. Going through the three phenomenological pathways in turn, imagine that the demand, registered but without impinging in irksome manner, then goes on to press itself upon consciousness in that way. One finds oneself brooding on the plight of the starving; the demand has come to fix itself before one's attention and refuses to go away; the sight of a well laid table excites in one the thought of their hunger; one begins to give greater notice to media items on aid policy and third world debt, &c.; one feels powerless both to completely eradicate the hunger or to expunge the demand. In short, the demand has taken on a hue which it did not possess at the moment of its arrival in consciousness, and now one indeed is put upon by it like a stabbing, irritating physical pain. It is not merely persistent, but irksome, for it diverts and disrupts one's equilibrium.
Is this a fact of the phenomenological path of certain moral demands in consciousness? I think that we do all find that this characterizes one way in which direct experience may go on to follow a pattern that brings the demand upon one with an irritating quality not found in immediacy. The demand as it were gathers about itself this quality subsequent to its initial appearance in consciousness. This can be a matter entirely outside of one's conscious approach to it, the quality beginning to emerge and increasing in its phenomenological tone despite what the subject is doing with regard to it. I think that more often than not this is just how its constituting itself before one is presented. But one can also contribute to the process in a more deliberate fashion. In coming to think that one should care about the relief of famine, that one's economic position is in some way partially based on and responsible for it, that one's superfluities could be put to good use in aid, one thereby can help to bring about the appearance of the quality. One cannot create it \textit{ex nihilo}, that is, choose to be irked. It is not possible to conjure up the quality by one's own choosing. But one can reflect that its very irritatingness now is the result \textit{inter alia} of one's subsequent assessment of the original demand experience. (Though the case is not that caring about something, taking oneself in principle obligated to act or forebear toward it, will be productive of the quality in question; only that it can be looked upon on occasion by the subject as being partially responsible for the demand's having a hold upon one).

B - As to the second case, of the demand maintaining its irksomeness, or that quality rising after the initial event in consciousness, much of that scenario has been located within the description above. We are to imagine again the heightening of this factor going with the demand as its presence in consciousness exerts on one a greater irritation than it initially possessed in immediate experience. That which at first was perceived only bluntly and partially comes to dog one in persistent manner with greater lucidity. The occasion for its irksome, pressing nature to be experienced is magnified; its presence seems consolidated in consciousness as it bears down upon one. It begins to irritate like an itch that cannot be scratched. Or,
in the case of the demand retaining its originally felt irritation, intense or weakly-exerted as that might be, that quality sustains a felt pressure on consciousness which the passing of time and the distractions of everyday life do not dislodge.

I again think that this aptly describes another fashion in which the moral demand continues on in consciousness. That pin-prick impingement on consciousness which a famine can excite as one sees it for the first time does sometimes grow to exert greater pressure. One's attention is primarily grabbed and diverted as it is re-presented before one. The demand irritates one with increasing frequency as it is encountered again and again under different circumstances (the well-laid table; the wasted food at a restaurant; the pampering of pet animals; the agricultural surpluses of the Western world, &c.). It may take on such a heightened tone that it is regarded as an assailant in consciousness, a force haunting one like a guilty memory that cannot be expunged (the next sub-section develops this aside on the experience). But note that this irksome feeling is quite consistent with the demand content not mattering much to one, or with an intention on the part of oneself not to do anything about its pull. The demand could be felt keenly and pressingly, and yet be going on alongside one's thought that, 'They're in a far-off land, it's nothing to do with me, I'm not concerned.' That is to say, though the phenomenological quality of irksomeness is present, and one cannot fail to notice the presence of the demand, its content - that something be done about an end to the famine - is not enmeshed with the irritating quality of the demand.

So here is a noteworthy experiential phenomenon. Strength of demand and the irritating quality that might be attending that strength are being experienced without one caring much for that state of affairs to which the demand is directed. Importance, severity, or seriousness of the matter presented to one by the demand is not, then, an experienced feature that goes on with the power it exerts on one. Consciously blithe indifference to the plight of the famine victims is consistent with experiencing an irritating demand. It is not a frequent form of experience, but neither is it an unheard-of thing. What seems to separate the irksome demand with
and that without concern for content, at a reflective level concerning the
phenomenological description of the experience of the demand, is one's attitude to
the quelling of the demand. In the case of the demand's irritatingness
unaccompanied by any concern about its content, one wishes only that the irritation
be lifted, that it simply disappear and not return to plague one. Whereas in the midst
of that demand's irksome force allied with a concern engaged by its content, one's
wish is not merely that the demand be removed from consciousness but that it be
dealt with by means requisite to its contentual object. One wishes, that is, for the
cessation of the famine and not - or not only - cessation of the demand as such. In
the former case, on the other hand, it is the irritating demand one wishes to see
off.\textsuperscript{8} There is a pressure on consciousness that must be exhausted in the most
effective fashion possible.\textsuperscript{9} (This is a matter I address more fully in sub-section vi).

In summary, then, common moral demand experience very often
incorporates the apprehension of an irksomeness which either can maintain itself in
felt tone or build up to greater degrees of a felt burden upon one. And the subject's
relation to this pressure differs according as she sees it or the demand content as the
primary matter to be accorded attention and action.

C - The third form which the moral demand might take from inception
onwards is in diminution of the irritation first felt in immediate experience. Take,
then, for imaginative consideration the lessening of the pressure exerted on
consciousness by the demand which one apprehended on seeing the famine
portrayed on the television screen. One finds, that is, that the irksome pressure
trickles away, and repeated exposure to the famine in media sources does nothing to
bring it back. The demand no longer holds thrall in such an impinging fashion. It
gradually falls away from being an imposition on consciousness, something
broadly akin to the pressure of a headache, either altogether or down to a duller-
hued tone. One is no longer hunted as if by some irritating insect that continually
flies about one. The demand ceases (partially or wholly) to push at one in that
manner.
This phenomenon is surely one also with which we are acquainted. The demand experienced when first viewing the famine may carry a particular irksomeness, and maintain that pressure temporarily, before that quality comes subsequently to be sloughed off. It loses its particular onerous feel. This can be associated with the complete demise of the demand in consciousness itself. But it is not always the case. At this point I want to record a facet of the experience which seems to represent the obverse side of one recorded in B above. In that context I said that positive thought on one's relation to the content could be regarded as leading, among other factors, to the arising of an irksomeness originally absent from the experienced demand. In that way the irritation could be a signal to oneself of the seriousness and concern with which one regarded the state of affairs to which the demand is directed. But I am claiming also that diminution of the irksome quality can occur while one's concern remain constant or be elevated. This is to sound a descriptive note from the phenomenology of the demand's features as they are found to be allied or separate, not to claim the complete converse of the point made in B. That would be to say that one finds that the diminution can actually indicate to the subject or an interpreter of her experience that a greater seriousness or concern at the content has come about on her part. And though that is not a particularly common phenomenon, and certainly not criterial of any such change in attitude going on in one, there is some sense that can be made out of its operation. That is, there are moral demands with which one's self comes to be identified at a deep level: such as, I think, the saints and other moral paragons, and ourselves sometimes, find in particular moral projects. I will address this matter of the self/not-self in moral demands at length in the next chapter. What it is I am describing is the way in which the moral demand becomes assimilated into oneself over time, thereby losing the irksome, intruder-like force it may have originally seemed to possess. As one's concern is directed toward the famine and one becomes involved in relief efforts, fund-raising, political issues, &c., that irksome quality by which the demand seems an alien force in consciousness, striking at one
despite one's own apparent wishes, fades away. The demand is not any longer experienced as an irritation; it is part of oneself.

With that much said in the paragraph above about the way in which the self's acknowledgement of a demand can come to remove the irritating quality, I should redress the balance by returning to the material at the head of the paragraph. For often the weakening of the irksome force on one is correspondent with straightforward fading of the demand as a presence in consciousness. The intrusion of the famine into the living room and into consciousness is followed for many of us by a drop in the keenness with which the demand is felt and of its assailing, irksome tone as it enters and remains before one. The demand no longer irritates simply because it is no longer present. Or its forcefulness has long since passed away, leaving but a slight awareness of a demand, one that does not exert pressure on consciousness. This fading of the demand, its strength and irritating tone both dropping away, is, I think, a common experience. Our moral life is in large part a succession of more or less powerful and irksome demand experiences which quickly lose their hold on our attention. They impinge and melt away like snowflakes on the ground which do not lie. The metaphor may be aptly applied also to the discussion in A and B. For the demand may filter below the level of consciousness as the water of the melted snowflake sinks into the ground, a point which I make in the light of a subject's possible reflection on the affair. It may then go on to return before one, assailing oneself, striking forth in surprising manner. This sets the scene for the next sub-section. But to return to the metaphor and the stuff of this particular discussion C, I believe that the simple diminution in an irritating quality to the demand, together with the fading of its force and very presence in consciousness, is a fact of moral experience which will be recognized by the reader. It is not a fact to which much attention is generally given in the literature.
1.iii - Intruder demands

I want now to turn to a phenomenological description which seems to fit some demands of a particularly unwelcome, alien, and irksome nature. I will stick to the moral demand here, comparing this discussion, and that above, with other demand experiences in a summing-up section to follow.

There are times when a particular moral demand (or any demand at all) can be experienced as a burdensome and trespassing force in consciousness. And there are some moral demands that might always appear so. The pressure and irritation they exert on one seems an imposition, like a physical shackle put upon one. That is why I choose to label the experience by the group of terms 'assailant', 'intruder', 'imposter.' The demand hounds one and continually signals itself, often in unexpected moments that do not seem related to its content. Such is, for instance, the way in which the famine demand returns right in the midst of some idle conversation or journey apparently having no bearing on the matter. It is experienced as an incursion into consciousness, a weight on one like a parasite, that may be felt as somehow threatening to one.

Of this phenomenological quality, one writer who has addressed the experience of shame from the standpoint of psychotherapy describes ably its impingement in these words:

More than other emotions, shame involves a quality of the unexpected; if in any way we feel it coming we are powerless to avert it. This is in part because of the difficulty we have in admitting to ourselves either shame or the circumstances that give rise to shame. Whatever part voluntary action may have in the experience of shame is swallowed up in the sense of something that overwhelms us from without and "takes us" unawares. We are taken by surprise, caught off guard, or off base, caught unawares, made a fool of.12
All of these terms seem to me to be applicable equally to the immediate experience of some moral demands, as well as to their subsequent presence in consciousness. (Shame itself is, of course, often closely associated with the experience of moral demands). In terms of the concrete example I have been using, I present for consideration the following description which I think is recognizable as one sometimes encountered. Imagine, that is, the moral demand cutting its way into the flow of one's experience as one watches the news item concerning famine. All of a sudden one is assailed by it. Without prior warning the demand is insistent, pressing upon one. The image of the wracked victims will not go away, the demandingness returns and repeats itself away from the screen image. And yet the actual state of affairs the demand refers to is not coalescent with one's interests and sympathies; the demand intrudes upon one, having the guise of an alien and uninvited interloper. (Equally well, the demand could come to take on this form after its initial apprehension. That which one performed as a matter of course, easily, voluntarily, and perhaps even happily, could suddenly turn and strike out, as it were, lodging a forceful demand pressure on consciousness for action that puts an entirely new and unwelcome light on the matter).

The appearance of the demand as intruder is similar to, but not the same as, the felt force of a compulsion (that which drives one on to drink, to gamble, to take dangerous risks, for instance). One could simply choose to do nothing about the intruder, bearing it within one like a physical irritation - an itch that cannot be scratched, as it were. The assailing pressure of the demand need not rein one in and force one's behaviour (though it will provide a *prima facie* motive for dealing with it, given that a subject will wish to have the pressure eased). As with the example B earlier, one might try to tackle the very fact of the demand's presence and pressure as an intruder - by taking a pill, for instance, if such a treatment existed. Or it might be dealt with by concentrating on its content, and trying to do something about helping the famine victims. But this would be primarily directed to the assuagement of a force on the self and not to the relief of the suffering of others (which would be
seen best to facilitate the former). Moral philosophy itself could serve a therapeutic function as one convinced oneself that no obligation was really laid upon one and directed one's thoughts to the establishment of an easy conscience. The kind of psychic fracturing involved here makes this no easy task. I think there are instances we will all recall when in all sincerity we believe that we have done nothing wrong or that we are not even partially obligated to get involved in a particular matter, and yet the intruder demand persists. The area of sexual mores and behaviour is a most obvious and striking demand to reflect on. Those brought up in a rigid code of sexual practice, often linked to religion, do find on breaking away from it the echo of its voice clamouring in them despite their manifest belief in the permissibility of, say, contraception or homosexuality. Such an echo often has this quality of an assailant force pounding at consciousness.\(^{14}\) It may not be articulated at the level of 'badness' or 'ought-not-to-be-doneness' as it strikes one about, but rather as a more nebulous sense of unease and trepidation in the presence of it. For that very reason the intruder demand is all the harder to pin down and confront. The Greeks, particularly the tragedians, often employed a device such as the furies in a way which comes close to representing this conflicting and alien force in consciousness.\(^{15}\) One is plagued by that which is outside of the concerns with which one identifies. Elaborate and ingenious propitiation will sometimes be necessary to throw off such assailing powers.

**1.iv - Comparative description**

I want briefly now to see if the claims made in preceding sub-sections about the moral demand apply wholly, partially, or not at all to experience of other demands. My basic contention is that they do apply wholly across the broad range of demands first discussed in the last chapter.

I have already said in sub-section 1.i above that irritatingness is manifested as such in the immediate experience of non-moral demands, especially examples i, iii, iv. They too exert a less than welcome, intrusive and burdensome force on one.
And some of them take on frequently an overwhelming intruder quality, particularly as the demand to jump or to acquire that last piece of the collection disturbs consciousness.

As to the different routes taken by the non-moral demands after they have entered, I think it is evident also that they share with moral ones in the variety of ways in which they then progress. The jump-demand, for instance, may go on either to loom large in consciousness, pressing especially at one at every sight of a high building or precipice, or to fade away to a mere nagging shadow on the periphery of consciousness (or it can disappear altogether). The slight apprehension of a demand for redress in the shame example (viii) is well known to us as one that can begin to take on the hue of a greater and greater irritation, building up a pressure on one until it all but dominates daily life. These examples call, as do the moral ones, for further description as they enmesh with, exhibit, or clash with concerns of the self. The jump demand almost always will appear as peculiarly, disarmingly alien and trespassing on the self, while the shame example at least carries with it a component directed toward some kind of roughly 'defensive' measure in the light of some perceived injury to the self. That is a description I will undertake in chapter 6. I want now to end this section by describing the phenomenology of reflection on the irksomeness and intrusiveness and simple presence of these demands as one thinks on how they might be handled.

1.v - Exhausting the pressure on consciousness

In the description of B in sub-section iii, and of the intruder quality in iv, I talked of the subject's relation to the demand, mixing the immediate with more reflective modes of description. In the latter sub-section I said that sometimes what is desired by the subject is just that the demand go away and stop bothering her. In the former I pointed out a relation which is the converse of that: the subject's desires are directed specifically to the content of the demand, not to the fact of a demand pressure on her consciousness. These two possibilities (there are others,
but I want to concentrate on this stark opposition) both seem to invoke a certain implication of the self. In the former, it is the disturbing, distracting, almost painful force that needs to be vented in order that the stability of the self be maintained. The other would seem to involve the more felicitous ordering of the self's concerns consonant with the content of the demand. One involves the self getting away from the demand; the other, its turning towards that which is demanded.

I am going, then, to inquire into this phenomenology, seeing if description of the moral and other demands falls on one side or other of this division, or whether it straddles both.

- A pill to end the demand pressure

In this sub-section I am going to take a crude but enlightening possibility that is directed to the cessation of the irking force of a demand. It is simply that of one envisaging the availability of a pill one could take which would put an end to that quality. Since the demand would not subsequently reproduce this pressure - that is how the pill works - then it is quite likely that the demand presence itself would be erased or pushed out to the half-noticed edge of consciousness. But it is primarily to the irritation it inflicts that the imaginative variation is directed.

I think that, with respect to some demands - especially one like the overseas famine demand where our ability to do something is strictly circumscribed - it is the case that most of us some of the time would opt for the pill. This is, of course, particularly directed to that case where the pressure exerted by the demand grows and continually follows one about. Though it is not regarded simply as being a kind of morally-charged headache, its phenomenological quality does appear in a similar guise. It becomes necessary, perhaps even with a tinge of proactive regret, to cut oneself loose from the pressure the demand inflicts. It has become too burdensome to bear. This may be due to a simple negative calculus about the degree of irritation one will put up with, or to what I think is best described as sheer exasperation in the face of the appalling disaster and the apparent impossibility of its relief (by oneself or some other agency).
There is also a host of moral demands which one meets in the course of everyday life to which a quick turning to that pill would be a likely response. Rather simple and not greatly energy-consuming demands of hospitality and charity can appear in quite wearisome manner, provoking the response 'I suppose I'd better be welcoming/helpful/&c.' In the heat of the pressing moment one might indeed opt for the pill. But, I shall say in the next sub-section, this is less likely on reflection to lead to that measure than some of the non-moral demands, assuming one stays one's hand long enough to give some reflection on the matter.

As to other demands, I think it is certain enough that those of the nature of i, iii, iv and viii are going to be expunged gratefully by taking the pill. Their binding, burning, haunting force on one is like a heavy load that needs shedding. In example iii, the demand pressure may indeed be vented and ended on gaining the missing piece or correcting the small error, but the quality of force which it is exerting is often one that we would rather choose to be rid of by the pill than by the prolonged and troublesome business of acting in accord with its content. The jump demand clearly has both a content and assailing force that we all would be relieved to see off. And the demand for redress of loss of face, coming to press more and more upon one, to take up greater space in consciousness and probably to disfigure and disorient one's relations with others as well as within oneself, is also one that a pill would be well directed toward (indeed, some manifestations of this phenomenon are dealt with in the West by therapy, which is a kind of prolonged and involved counterpart to the imagined pill).

- Dealing with the demand content

A large part of the experience of the moral life is given as one directs some reflection (cursory or at length) onto the demands one encounters. I do not refer here to that kind of reflection on whether there are values 'out there', or what precisely it is about a state of affairs that excites in one the apprehension of a moral demand. I mean that reflection that registers at a second order level one's own attitude to the elimination of, or dealing-with, the moral demand. Here, then, a
subject simply decides whether her wish is that the demand *qua* irritation be eradicated from consciousness (or its pressing force, at any rate) or whether it is its content *qua* a state of affairs calling for moral action that she wishes to be resolved. It is notable that these two attitudes may be held together by us in some instances. I said of the famine example above that one possibility is that exasperation might drive one to the pill. Yet it is not that one's attention is directed solely to the pressure of the demand, allied with an indifference to its content. One primarily wishes for the suffering to be alleviated and ended, and it is the very magnitude and apparent impossibility of this task being met that switches attention in exasperation to getting rid of the demand quality that is maintaining itself in consciousness.\textsuperscript{16}

Now I think that the moral demand does come out of this reflection somewhat differently from other ones. The ease with which a moment's reflection would call for the pill with examples i, iii, iv, viii is unmatched by a corresponding wish for the moral demand to be so erased.\textsuperscript{17} For the latter typically involves direction to matters of human suffering and amelioration that are recognized to need attention - rather than there being just some diffuse, awkward demand pressure on one. And it is this content of the demand that, I believe, most of us wish to see dealt with, not the fact that one is irked by a particular class of demand. But I think also that this point needs to be carefully placed in the wider descriptive perspective of this reflective phenomenology. Firstly, I have stated in the previous chapter that the directedness of the moral demand is often no more than a rather vague call for something to be done, or even that something happen (i.e., the demand that the famine be ended). So the content of the demand need not especially press on oneself: it is merely that oneself happens to have apprehended it. Secondly, I also noted from the descriptive phenomenology earlier in this chapter that the irritation can go with a feeling on the part of the subject that the demand content doesn't matter to her, that she does not care about it. This is a feature of immediate experience that need not be overturned in reflection. I think that, self-deception or kowtowing to convention notwithstanding,\textsuperscript{18} it is a common enough phenomenon
that one be indifferent or only slightly concerned about a particular moral problem, even though the demand it constitutes possesses an irksome force. In this light, one recent writer has also talked of those experiences which I have called 'intruder' demands, ones that threaten and do not seem part of oneself, which he terms 'It-experiences'. He points out that,

One should draw a distinction between feeling bad because one thinks that one has done something bad and feeling bad because of 'it-experiences'. People are threatened by them but don't feel responsible for them...[They] are like violent strangers that have fought their way into intimacy.

It may be a correspondingly common experience that we also feel that we should care, even though we don't, and that second order reflection brings us to care about caring (and its lack) on our part. But if sizeable areas of our moral experience present us with demands about things we find it hard to bother about, then they seem likely candidates for the pill treatment. One would use the pill to ease the pressure on consciousness - that being the thing that mattered most to oneself and not the demand content.

With that much said above as proviso, I think it accurate to go on to say that the moral demand will receive a greater comparable degree of reflective accord than other demands. The pill would not be a viable option because it is the content of the demand that matters and needs addressing, and not the brute presence of a pain-like sensation in consciousness. But this, of course, is predicated on the fact of our caring about some things to which moral demands point. Probably none of us care (except notionally) about all moral problems; many of us care a bit about some and a lot about a few; and most of us much of the time plain don't care especially strongly about these matters to anywhere near the extent that moral philosophers sometimes claim we do. Nor should it be forgotten, of course, that conversely there are contents of our non-moral demands with which our interests and care are deeply bound. The avid stamp collector may feel that the pressing demand to obtain a
particularly rare first issue is, though irksome, connected nevertheless with her abiding and affirmed passion for the hobby. The man held in the thrall by the constantly repeated pressure of the demand to redress face will sometimes also bear a similar relation to the content of the demand. He will reflect that the demand content should be attended to in place of simply taking a pressure-quelling pill. And he will be doing so because that kind of demand coalesces with something he cares about and perhaps thinks worth caring about for any other person, namely, the maintenance of his honour or good name or the need to affirm his own self in the light of injury to it. I believe that that kind of reflection on the demand content will, at least for some of us, be a recognizable phenomenon. It is certainly a common enough one in presentday cultures of the Far East and of a rather Sicilian concept of honour, and closer to experiential home, is quite likely a reflection that many of us maintain despite its generally frowned-upon exhibition in contemporary society.

The reflection that occurs, then, with respect to the content of moral demands does look to be one that more readily eschews the pill than in the case of other ones. I think that this is partially because we do care to some vague extent about moral affairs, concrete ones like miscarriages of justice and starving children or more general ones about the 'state of society', for instance. And it is also something that comes out in a similar fashion to the thought experiment sometimes employed with respect to the prospect of one's being permanently plugged in to a hedon machine. In that case, it has been claimed, though once on the machine life would be a remarkably pleasurable and painless affair, on prior reflection about it we would not choose to be plugged in. I am not so sure that it can be taken for granted that few would actually choose this option. But leaving that as a sceptical aside, the point of the thought experiment is that reflection would not wish for that possibility to be actualized as life would be rendered meaningless and just would not be worth living. Life in a hedon machine does not accord with a minimal image of a worthwhile human life being lived out. In closely analogous fashion the pill possibility seems to meet with a similar sort of resistance on brief reflection. A life
in which the moral demands one perceived were erased as one deals with headaches and toothaches would be one found wanting, emasculated or withered in crucial ways. For, irksome as some of these are, they are the stuff of a fully human life. One in which care ceases for the demand content and centres only on the fact of a pressure on consciousness is a poor and less than worthwhile life. It is that even though it would in all probability be a lot easier psychologically for many of us than the one we do lead.

For this conception of human life and the place of moral demands within it I would claim fairly widespread accord. But it is hard to know quite what it amounts to, other than the hazy presupposition that not caring about others is not only a bad thing, but a bad thing also for the person who doesn't care. To those who just don't care about others, and to those of us who care a bit but not greatly, there may be nothing more that can be said than that we should care about our lack of caring and try a bit harder. The reflection does seem to represent this general feeling that we do care, albeit nominally in many instances, and that it is worth cultivating more of it. It shows that much. It does not show that we would never opt for the pill, only that the picture of a life always involving recourse to it is not a particularly appealing one. This much will not be sufficient to delineate strictly the moral from other demand contents. For the picture of a life devoid of passionate involvement in personal projects like stamp-collecting or of a way of living that did just put up with something like loss of face without the burning need to 'get even' - at least occasionally - are also peculiarly unattractive. And the taking of a pill to rid one of the demand pressures in those cases would then also be one that reflection found itself ill at ease with. So the most that can be said is that, on initial reflection, one's relation to the content of the moral demand is felt by us to be something that inter alia goes to make up a specially human life. To take a pill for the excision of the demand from consciousness is, on the whole, not an option one would choose to be universally taken (either for ourselves or permitting it for others).
Concluding comments to the section

In this section I have concentrated on providing phenomenological description of that particular irritating, pressurising force that demands often possess. I have said that both moral and other demands share this feature. And I have explored the ways in which that appears both across moral demands and between other sorts of demand. In doing so, I have also briefly begun using description of a more reflective outlook on our attitude to demand contents. Here again I found that the constitution of moral and other demands in consciousness takes various shared routes with respect to the irking quality. The relation of oneself to the content, a relation of caring, of seeing as worthwhile and important, is a matter of similarity between demands too. The imagined availability of a pill to quell the irritation is one to which I believe we would be inclined to assent in the immediacy of the demand, but perhaps in lesser degree for the moral ones than for others. This received backing on some reflection on the demand's irritation, its content, and one's relation to that latter feature. It looks to me that we are unlikely, on that reflection, to wish for widescale use of that pill (though that does not exclude the possibility of occasional resort to it being a live option). But that also looks to me to be predicated on our caring, and caring quite deeply, about moral matters. There are, then, two caveats to that description of a reflective appraisal of our immediate experience by us. Firstly, if there are numbers of people who do not care, or if - as seems quite likely - there are a lot of moral demands about which we all do not (cannot on some readings)²⁵ care all that much, then this reflection does not universally hold. Secondly, if there are a lot of non-moral demands about whose content we also care about - and that is an absolutely certain fact about our lives - then we would not wish to be rid of their irksome force either if if meant erasing the demand itself from consciousness. And so, unless caring a lot about the content just is to render a demand a moral one - and I think that is not proven - then, once more, the moral demand is sharing a feature with other demands that does not uniquely define it experientially.
One final comment to this section. I want to emphasize that the irking feature to which I have turned attention is one that not all moral demands evince in the immediate course of experience. Some do go on to gather that quality about them (as I said in sub-section iii), but not all do. A primary part of my worry about the concentration of Prichard and others on the irksome feature is simply that it does not seem to do descriptive justice to the overall run of moral demand experience. For, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, a lot of that experience occurs either without any irritating quality and simply as a registered demand that is signalled as such in consciousness, or it is occurring as so immediately part and parcel of a spontaneous act that its very presence is a debatable matter.

Section Two: Independence of the demand

Talk of the nagging, irritating quality to the moral demand leads me to draw up the following considerations with respect to its phenomenology. Is that feature like a headache, something self-contained, a purely 'inner' phenomenon? Or is it that way because some part of external reality is felt to be tugging on one and is signalled as such within the experience? To these questions an adequate phenomenological description of that component of the demand's arrival in consciousness is, I believe, called for. And since that will be describing the arrival as it strikes the subject it will not involve - as yet - any further reflection on her part on the apparent commitments of her immediate experience. I will simply try to describe the arising in consciousness of the moral demand according to our awareness of that.

2.i - Incomingness

One phenomenological feature which is shared by moral and other demands is that which is succinctly captured, I think, by the description of its 'incomingness'. That is, the demand seems to arrive in consciousness from a source (or sources) that is (are), minimally put, outwith the subject's own bidding.
This general feature is expressed by one phenomenologist in terms that recall the content of the previous section. He says that the moral situation 'demands' action; it 'requires' it; it 'confronts' one; we 'must act'.\textsuperscript{26} This emphasis on the constraining, almost coercive, force which is exerted on occasion by the moral demand picks out the heightened form of a universal feature to that demand. That feature is one of the demand's seeming pathway into consciousness. It does not arrive as if under the guiding control of consciousness. It impinges, rather than seeming to rise up from within the resources of consciousness itself.

Now this is a salient feature of the moral demand. It would look to be giving at least an initial credence to the notion of something 'out there' pressing in on consciousness. And perhaps with a little more refinement of the phenomenology a value-realm might be associated with it. But I think it must be noted in the light of the paragraph above that such a feature requires discussion to be split between two quite separate phenomenological descriptions. One is 'incomingness', the sense of the experience entering from outside consciousness. This bare description of the experience can then go on to serve as the basis for a finer-tuned phenomenology. It will be in terms of the precise nature of that which is experienced as outside of consciousness impinging on it. The other is the seeming degree of independence of the experience from the subject's own willed control. This phenomenology describes the way in which the experience arises in consciousness and how the subject's relation to it is perceived by her, as bringing about or able to bring about the experience. So the case of a headache falls between these descriptions in the following manner. It does not have a phenomenological component as it is felt of being under one's control \textit{qua} occurrent experience. One cannot choose to begin or end it. What one can do, of course, is choose to do something that one knows will cause it to come or go - studying late into the night, for instance, or taking an aspirin. But one cannot just choose that it appear in or disappear from consciousness (as one can do, say, with an image of a house in the mind's eye). And as to its immediate presence in consciousness, I think it correct to say that it
appears as a specially inner phenomenon, requiring attention to its painful presence rather than to any externally-related content. Again, there might be some awareness of something external that has brought it about. The headache itself, though, does not in immediacy seem to have a content 'out there' - it is all and only inside. With that said, the phenomenon does have a degree of incomingness to it, as if suddenly brought on by the incursion of an external force. But care must be taken in the description not to mix cause with content of the experience. While something 'out there' may be immediately felt to be bringing about the experience, it is not the case that there are headaches felt from 'out there' to have been experienced within. So this example illustrates different ways in which concentration on different phenomenological aspects of experience come to be described.

2.ii - Demand experience and incomingness

With the exception of that demand (example vi) that barely hovers on the edge of consciousness, all the demand experiences described in the last chapter share an incoming feature. That is to say, their appearance is signalled as the impingement of an outer reality on one. The jump demand (i) seems to be assailing one as it is experienced. The moral demand in v (both halves) seems to be calling one from outside of the seat (consciousness) of its apprehension. Given that these are phenomenological descriptions, such features of the experiences are, of course, quite consonant with an absence of anything external (source) to which they refer, or even, within the phenomenology, of an absence in the experience of a sense of something specific that is doing the calling or assailing (content and its exactness). One can experience a calling without being aware of the caller, an assailing without the assailant. So far, then, incomingness is an indeterminate and vague feature to demand experiences. It is given expression in all those terms in which 'being demanded' is variously couched: required, called, obliged, forced, pressured, put upon, &c. They all reflect that sense of the demand's entrance into consciousness as if from some location other to it. Such demands put themselves upon oneself.
They seem to well in consciousness in the manner of an external reality pouring in. They do that much: signalling themselves 'in the manner of' some realm external to the subject.

2.iii - Cause and content in the experience

It is important, in this light, to reiterate the separability of putative cause and content about which I spoke in the previous sub-section. If a demand has the incoming feature then that is a basic datum of phenomenological description. It is, in the case of demand i for instance, generally unadorned by a causal factor that provides a particular given content of that which is doing the demanding. There are three possible ways by which cause and content of the demand experience interact with its incoming feature. Firstly, neither feature might be present. In that case the subject merely feels the crude pressure of some demanding force external to her. The experience she has is not given (in immediacy) with either (putative) cause signalled or specific demand content (with respect to its directedness to external reality). Such is the case of apparently objectless sensations of a demand pressure as are experienced when one's mind idles on ambling down the street and a sudden 'demandingness' is experienced, the content of which (if it has one) one may have to take some number of steps to discover. Next, is the presence of one or other of these factors but not both. So the incoming demand can be apprehended in immediacy with the co-present sense of that which is responsible for its rising. And these phenomenological elements may be pulling in opposite directions. That is, while the experience signals itself to consciousness as incoming, one might also in immediacy be aware of an 'inner' cause, of an anxiety or guilt, say, that is behind the apparent incoming phenomenon of the demand. Quite how such a possible tension is resolved is not presently in question. This is only one way in which cause and incomingness interact. In the case of an acknowledgement of an external cause contained part and parcel with the apprehension of the demand incoming no such problem arises (self-deception notwithstanding) and both phenomena go
together. And in this case, though there are two out of the three components being experienced, I am considering them with a determinate content absent. While, then, the demand incoming is experienced as being wrought by something, one's experience is not signalled with a specific state of affairs as its contentual object. (Indeed, the same can go for the cause: there are plenty of experiences we have in which some vague sense of an inner unease or some external melee of events is felt to be causally responsible for the demand without anything more concrete being discerned).

The absence of a content - at any rate, of a determinate content that can be pointed to and isolated - is a phenomenon of demand experience. Take, for instance, the experienced demand described by some people as that put on them by their god, but which seems to have no more content than just being a demandingness striking consciousness from outside. Minimally put, the content may be the bare one to acknowledge the very occurrence of an experience. The distinction which I wish the reader to bear in mind, then, is that between: contentless demands, involving the sense that there is something one ought to be doing without any idea even of the general sphere to which it links; vague and inspecific demands, involving the sense that one should do something to help the hungry in Africa, though one has no clear idea of what one might do.

Since the experience of a demand is phenomenologically attended almost universally by some content - the demand is a demand to or for something or other - then I think it better not to push a distinction between demands with and without content. Rather, and of greater utility for discussion, I believe that one between contents that do or do not possess a degree of specificity in what is being demanded or determinate object in that to which the demand points should be employed. Hence the demand in i, though generally unattended by its cause in immediacy, has a quite concrete content: jump from the cliff. This is an example, then, of the incomingness including a content, a particularly determinate one, though not having also its cause signalled correspondingly in experience. The demand experience in
vii, on the other hand, has loss of face as its cause, but not a specific demanded response other than the demand for redress which places a nagging pressure on one.\textsuperscript{29} And the demand in example iii has both cause and specific content going alongside its incoming feature to consciousness at times - cause being one's passionate and abiding interest in the hobby and the content being the highly-directed one of getting the last stamp for the collection. The fact that the experience in this instance is incoming may again represent a phenomenological tension with the manifest inner cause present simultaneously. There are also times when such demands seem to have an incomingness associated with an external cause, and not simply an inner determination of one's interests: this cause being external not in the sense of the physical externality of an object like a stamp, say, but the very demand to collect it being somehow presented as outside of the subject. Indeed, to take the example to its extreme, in the case here of an intruder demand being experienced there is often both an awareness of an inner cause in tandem with the disorienting phenomenon of an apparently outer, alien force tugging at one. Here the senses of 'just me' and 'out there' are ineliminably intertwined.

While many demand experiences have cause and content co-present with the incoming feature, it need not be the case that in immediate experience a well-defined content is signalled with an equally prominent cause. Demand i has already been mentioned. A specific demand in certain interpersonal affairs to slap someone, kiss them, avoid them, \&c. may be something of a mystery to oneself and take quite some reflection in order to unravel the route by which it impinged on consciousness. Indeed, given that that unravelling will often locate the demand source in deep or unnoticed urges or needs of oneself then it is just as much so that oneself is a mystery to oneself. I think that when one brings to mind the raw data of immediate experience, or when one tries to pay especial attention to it in its immediacy, this phenomenological description of the experiential features is relatively widely instantiated. Demands that specifically enjoin the doing of something, the refraining from something, or simply the believing of something, do
not always enter consciousness with this incomingness accompanied by a sense of that which is responsible for it. As I said earlier, they enter 'in the manner of' an external reality hemming one about, but not with that reality located in immediacy. The reality to which one is directed by the content of the demand is plain enough, but may not be the same thing as the cause (or at least be so given in the immediate experience). So, taking the demand to avoid someone as an instance, that specific demand to put one's mark on reality by doing (or not doing) something is not always tailored to the easy identification of its source. In some way it is probably felt that the particular person is source of it, of course, but that is not necessarily so even if he is its (contentual) focus. On later reflection it may transpire in a multitude of ways how it is that the demand came to strike one: the rudeness displayed by the person toward others; his domineering character; his preparedness to use unscrupulous means to get his way; one's own suppressed sexual desire for him; some not quite definable aura of danger about him that calls forth the response; his badness or wickedness; his resemblance to a part of one's own personality or a previous self-stage that one is at odds with; and so on. These make various reference to inner and outer causes. They point also to different kinds of properties which the person himself displays, from those taken straightforwardly as defects of character to the more problematic one of wickedness which may stand for the subject who is doing the reflection between a description of character used by third persons to a special kind of real property inhering in that person.

Many demands do have all three phenomena together in immediacy. They have a triadic schema in experience. The demand is apprehended by one as being: placed on someone (most usually oneself, at the limiting case apparently to no-one in particular); arising from somewhere (more or less specific); and as being for something (also including degrees of determinacy). And so the demand example iii is often experienced in just this way, as a demand on one arising from one's interests to get a particular item. That in iv can be the demand felt to be on anyone in society from the generally accepted and seemingly agelessly correct dress code to
prevent that woman from wearing red jumpers. In ix nature itself demands from oneself and everyone else to accord it respect and care. To the extent that some of these examples and others described have an incoming force as of an external reality impinging on one, and yet are readily identified on brief reflection or in immediacy itself as arising from one's own self, there is something of a paradoxical air to them. Since I take it that that just is how a lot of experience presents itself, we obviously as subjects of experience and actors do not find this awkward. What this suggests to me is this. Though the tracks by which experience travels may often be seen on later reflection to be within oneself, that is not at all how the experience directly strikes one. It simply possesses the phenomenon of entering consciousness as if from external sources. Its incomingness is an ordinary and (for the subject) largely unproblematic feature of the direct phenomenology. As to that other sense of the experience arising outwith one's own conscious control - even though it may represent the tug of a willed design of one's own - I will deal with that later. For now I want to apply this discussion more closely to the moral demand.

2.iv - Incoming moral demands

I think that where objectivity as out-thereness gets the larger part of its credence is from the phenomenon of incomingness which the moral demand experience has. This minimal sense of an outer reality impinging on consciousness does go, I believe, with the apprehension of all moral demands. It is highlighted in moral philosophical literature by both those quotations which head this chapter, that is, as hemming about the subject (like an external force) and as imparting a sense of being in contact with some reality (perhaps like a value realm) external to oneself. As one writer puts it,

The very fact that we are constrained by moral obligation appears to imply that it is independent of our attitudes and our will and that these are subject to it rather than it to them.
These two components, if they are adequate to the actual phenomenological data, need not, of course, be inseparably connected. One can feel the pressure of external reality yet choose simply to ignore it or to thwart it. And *mutatis mutandis* one can feel compelled or forced or circumscribed in one's way of thinking or doing without this being caused by, or being felt to be caused by, the strike of a reality outwith oneself. I will now go on to describe in their fullness the appearance of these phenomena in direct experience of the moral demand as (and if) they are revealed in looking at the incomingness. I will also describe the shades of variation of cause and content that are experienced with that feature.

2.v - 'In the manner of' an external reality

Here is a quotation from Williams that I would like the reader to bear in mind as this sub-section and subsequent ones are read through. He says of a certain kind of ethical theory (for instance, that of Prichard) that:

[It] takes the fact that an experience is demanding as sufficient evidence, indeed the only evidence, that it is the experience of a demand. It takes resonance to be reference, and that is certainly a mistake.32

My claims throughout the analysis to follow are going to be operating with a similar suspicion, that the demand experience, at its heightened form especially, may look like intuition of values 'out there', but that the actual content of the demand is not phenomenologically given in that manner.

Recalling, then, the use of the expression in the title of this sub-section from earlier, I wish now to determine descriptively just how much is being signalled to ourselves with the incomingness of the moral demand. Let us take example v of the perception of the starving. In the second half most especially there is likely to be something of that element of 'shock' which Jung talks of, a careering into consciousness of a forceful demand. This undoubtedly has a piercing, incoming quality. The demand impinges on consciousness with all the violence of a bright
light dazzling the eyes. It seems as if one is impelled by or tugged by or forced by
or lassoed by a reality over which one has no control and which is putting itself
upon oneself. The demand streams into consciousness with (some of) those
features reinforcing the sense of its arrival from outwith oneself. As the external
world of physical obstacles places restrictions and necessities on one's interaction
with it (both physically and in thought about it) so does it appear that one is being
similarly constrained and hemmed about. This is not an inference from the one class
of experience to the other. The inference from where there is constraint to there
there is an external reality doing it, apart from any question of the fitness of its
logical form, does not occur. There is in immediate experience the phenomenon
of the demand's incomingness as well as sometimes its constraining influence on
one's behaviour and thought (and often an irking feature too). And these
phenomenological features are not necessarily conjoined. While I believe that we
find most moral demand experience (with the possible exception of the barely
noticed ones like vi) to possess the incoming feature, it is clear that not all irk one.
The moral demand strikes with a degree of incoming force (chapter 4 pointed out
just how varied in strength that force can be) which is not universally attended by
that element of constraint and bordering of the subject. One simply apprehends a
demand as if from outside which calls for someone to do or not do something.
Even in the case of oneself being specifically demanded, I am not so sure that this
is experienced in a constraining manner. Rather, the subject is simply presented
with possibilities to be actualized.

Unless part of the sense of a demand is defined as that which constrains on
being experienced then it seems to me intelligible enough that a demand should be
experienced, and experienced as incoming, without the subject also experiencing
that other feature. What is more to the point here is whether we do in fact have
experience of this sort. And I think that there are areas of our moral experience
which do appear in just that fashion. The first half of example v seems to represent
no more than the bare acknowledgement - if that - of the presence of a demand that
flicks in and out of consciousness. The demand to refrain from pilfering the till, say, may itself not be experienced with that alarm-bell, halting quality which I noted earlier, but rather as the simple presence of a kind of negative sign hanging about one's proposed action which is apprehended but which does not include the constraining quality. It is not that here one experiences constraint but overcomes it (which is more usually the case). Nor is it that the demand signals to one that a certain prudent caution should be exercised (which is not the same as an actual constraining experience). What seems to be presented to the subject in the immediate appearance of the demand is a basic inflow of it from a location exterior to consciousness itself. The same goes for the first half of example v. Something like a call for redress issues limply forth from the famine state of affairs in that example. Neither need actually put brakes on one's behaviour, as a constraint does. Nor need they engender boundaries or channels by which one's judgement be circumscribed.

The registering of the demand here is a minimal fact unaccounted by such other elements. Even to talk of its 'acknowledgement', as opposed to the neutral 'impingement', is to suggest more than goes on in this kind of case. To 'acknowledge' its presence, or even (further) to acknowledge the legitimacy of the demand (though doing nothing about it), involves the subject in a degree of self-reflexive and paused behaviour that does not go on with this kind of direct apprehension of the moral demand. For the experience simply inserts into consciousness a demand. It does not halt or constrain. What it may do is create a certain unease or tension on the part of the subject. Indeed, the demand experience itself will often be best described as an unease which sometimes has a directed content. But while that may constitute a constraint it does not imply the existence of an external constraining force. I mean by this statement the following. If the subject does feel constrained by the demand, or if there is an unease, a worry, a trepidation, which itself amounts to a constraining phenomenon, this is quite clearly not the same as that sense of constraint which arises from physical obstacles. Nor
does it imply it. There is an experienced demand, and it may set up an awkward sensation in consciousness which seems to drag slightly on one. In these cases, though there is some awareness of an amorphous external reality impinging, there is not also an experience as of that reality itself being the constraint that pins one down and hems one about in the manner of values-as-obstacles. There most likely is indeed an experience of social pressure and expectation on one signalled in the demand - of the criminality of the act in the till-pilfering. And the famine case may constrain one because the suffering of others calls for attention in virtue of it not being the sort of thing one likes to see go unaided. Quite how and where value apprehension figures in these phenomena is unclear. The subject herself is not perceiving them in immediacy. She is experiencing the incoming demand and perhaps a tension with it or quickly arising from it. 'In the manner of' an external reality does not mean, and is not experienced as, that of an external value realm. In fact, it does not appear to be of a value realm tout simple, wherever that might be situated.

Since the examples given above were deliberately chosen to deflate an image of moral demand experience as a special kind of window onto a value realm, I shall now turn to the more promising area of demand experiences which have a specially heightened nature to see whether they truly introduce into oneself a value representation. Taking, then, the example of the second half of v, where the demand is at that experiential peak in the run of the general encounter with moral demands, does this have an incoming feature which signals to us the impingement of values 'out there'? Does this experience, or that on experiencing the demand of the supererogatory and ennobling, constitute itself in consciousness with the phenomenological appearance to which Whitehead took himself to be pointing in the comment which heads chapter one?
Section Three: Externality of moral demands and values

3.i - Incomingness

Certainly the kind of moral demand experience being viewed here possesses this phenomenon. So does the rest of moral demand experience, I have argued. These heightened experiences - of the second half of v; on seeing the local youth setting fire to a cat; on experiencing a great pull on one from witnessing the acts of charity workers - all enter consciousness at least as if from external sources. And this phenomenological quality is not merely pointing to that obvious sense of exteriority in which other people, other's suffering and joy, are outside of one. The description of the demand experience cannot be reduced to that bare portrayal of physical exteriority, as it were. The quality at hand is something signalled in the experience which, in immediacy, seems to be arriving from a realm outwith the subject (both outwith the location of her physico-psychic arena of existence as well as outwith her own willed control). It is not, at least in this immediacy, felt to be arising and arriving as a pattern of events and states from which the subject feels a further quality to be produced or on which she senses herself to be projecting a new and specific quality.

3.ii - Incomingness and exteriority

I have so far talked of this phenomenon of incomingness as being given to the subject's consciousness as if flowing from some rather undifferentiated external reality. But I now want to sharpen the description, in the hope of finding exactly whether and how values from 'out there' are felt to be present in the experience and making demands on the subject.

Firstly, I want to say this. The moral demand experience goes on in a fashion that can be described as incoming. That is, the data given to consciousness appear in just that mode: as given. They enter, progress, and pass through consciousness all as phenomena that present themselves before one. This is not to
view consciousness itself as a kind of passive spectator before the theatre of experience. It is to register the phenomenological description of how it is that much of experience is constituted before consciousness. And that is by the way of the bare phenomenon of incomingness, of arriving in consciousness. This refers straightforwardly to that mass of experience which seems to enter one without being wrought purely by means of the resources of consciousness itself.

Secondly, I should reiterate that the moral demand experience does possess this feature: I think universally so. Chapters 6 and 7 will approach this matter at much greater length, particularly with respect to the putative converse phenomena of choosing to be demanded or conferring value. For the time being I wish merely to emphasize this as a feature of the experience, noting as I do so, and in the light of the above paragraph, that it is not an especially striking or rare one. The moral demand enters consciousness, it presents itself, is given, impinges on it. In the form in which presently it is being considered, these features appear in specially heightened relief. Not only is the sheer forcefulness of the demand experienced, but with it also a lively sense of incomingness occurs, of its forcing itself upon one. One feels oneself held in thrall by this striking phenomenon coursing into consciousness. But this is not, of course, a feature absent from other areas of experience. That of the moral demand shares it across a wide range of experiential phenomena. And so, if it tells one something particular about the moral demand, it must do so as being experienced as incoming from somewhere particular and interesting. This brings me to the matter of exteriority and its description.

The exteriority of the demand is given as an experienced sense of its placing and route into experience. That placing is, in some way to be determined, outwith the subject; its route being from there into consciousness. The subject herself has an immediate awareness of this placing and route, even if that may only best be described loosely and without form. To illustrate this phenomenon with some examples from non-moral demand experience: in the case of the demand to correct someone's poor dress sense this can be felt (directly or on reflection) simply as the
demand of one's community, a matter of etiquette which one perceives in virtue of being a (willing) member of that group and its mores; the demand to redress loss of face as being one situated for the subject both within his own breast and as lying in a social milieu of expectation, upbringing and accepted behaviour that makes demands on him; and that of the demand to refrain from drinking too much as the (external) call of the law or society or one's god. These are examples of a sense on the part of a subject of a demand's exterior location, and they are more and less straightforwardly so. They make explicit the experientially given placing of the demand apprehended. For most of us most of the time they are the routinely delineated stuff of demand experience. And that they do on occasion come into consciousness in powerful and disorienting fashion, as if from some mysterious and transcendent realm, hard to describe except in vague terms, is a fact which should be borne in mind when looking at the moral ones. For, if these demands have ordinary construals as being placed in a social realm and travelling thus into one as a state of affairs being grounded in a particular context; and if from time to time they take on a strange-hued guise as being supernatural, oddly-placed or simply difficult to pin down and accurately place:- then so conversely might the moral demand have a less queer position in experienced social reality than the Mackie reading gives it. All of this is not to make light of the deep metaphysical troubles one courts in investigating the nature and working of society. It is, however, to sound a dissonant note to an over-ready identification of the call of a seeming externally-placed moral demand with some special realm of moral values.

Simone Weil's comment at the head of this chapter indicates the feel she takes there to be in moral experience of an intense form. In her case a theological backdrop forms the interpretative map by which it is followed. She has a notion of the self's role in moral affairs that is both complex and rather austere. While one need not follow that particular trail which she wends, her general pointing to the sense of exteriority does latch upon the particular phenomenon with which we are now concerned. Moreover, she herself seems reluctant, despite her theological
impetus, to identify the focus of the exteriority with god as it is revealed in the immediate experience. The case I wish to argue for, on the basis of phenomenological description, is similarly that the exteriority of particular moral demands in direct experience is a raw phenomenon beyond which any further pointing needs a higher reflective level of thought directed to it.

A strong and pressing demand like that to aid the starving man on the doorstep or to draw back from looting in a riot has not only the incoming feature but also is apprehended - in these cases - as if by the way of some external reality that in some special fashion imposes itself upon one. Now this may be given articulation via the medium of what god or the universe is requiring of one. But even this much, which can vary in its degree of specificity, may only be a metaphorical redaction on the immediate sense of what it is that the subject is perceiving. I shall unpack the suggestions of this previous sentence. By pointing to its varying specificity I mean to question the precise nature of such a claim. That is to say, even granted a claim that god originates the demand and that one's apprehension of it is of a demand travelling from god or a god-ordered world, one is left with much to delineate in the phenomena. There is the question of how god's demands are themselves felt: as peculiarly moral injunctions or as divinely ordained commands and thence as moral through that. And there is the precise religious nature of the experience each time it occurs: whether, that is, one is apprehending god's will directly or god's will mediately via the particular way in which he has put together creation (including the possibility of his having stitched values into it). With both god and also with a less personified notion of the demands of the universe arises further the descriptive question of the directedness and form of the demand: whether such demands are on oneself and motivate one; whether they are apprehended as demands for some state of affairs to be realized or curtailed rather than always on oneself and one's acts; whether they are perceived as principles instantiated under particular circumstances or as situation-imbedded.37 One other question which naturally occurs to me as phenomenological description is
undertaken concerns the subject's own sense of passive apprehension of the
demand, be it that of god, the universe, or of some special value realm. That is one
which attempts to clarify the precise degree of exteriority felt by the subject in the
immediate experience: whether its nature is entirely made up by the incoming,
exterior phenomena or by some indeterminately weighted interaction of a receptivity
or sensitivity on the part of the subject with some external realm.

As to that notion of demands of god or the universe being an impression
read into experience, I intend by this suggestion to emphasize subjects' own
awareness of the possibly metaphorical picture they have of their own experience.
While we all at times may feel especially enlivened and in touch with a deeper
reality than ordinary experience gives us party to in these phenomena, we do not
always have a ready vocabulary by which to express the content and feel of them.
We grasp at a sufficiently heightened description to match the power of the
phenomenological qualities apparently working through us. And in coming up with
the language of divine demands or the demands of the universe we at least locate the
experience in terms of its forcefulness, significance, and importance for us. That
need not be felt, on our part, to be locating the demand so clearly as actually
residing in the will of god or way of the universe. Some philosophers have pointed
out just this. It indicates its exteriority and straightaway gives it a kind of
italicized emphasis in the realm of public discourse. This is not to follow an
emotivist analysis of this particular area of moral expression, but to canvass the
possibility of a descriptive phenomenology of heightened moral demands, on the
one hand, in tandem with subjects' own response to it, on the other. To that effect,
my claim is that much of this identification of the demand with the call or way of
god or cosmos is fed back into the original experience, that is, into that which is of
a less determinate nature than the description gives. This redaction may occur
rapidly or even simultaneously with the reception of the experience itself. But that is
still a matter of putting a gloss on immediate experience which is not given in that
experience as it enters consciousness. Perhaps it is hard for us all, or for those of
us of a certain kind of sensibility, not to incline to ascribe experiences of this powerful, stimulating kind to an apprehension of divine or cosmic orders. And perhaps there just is no other mode of expression that adequately reflects the depth and aura of the experience than this kind. Yet this should not obscure from descriptive analysis the extent to which we are ourselves aware of the as if construal placed upon the immediate experience. It is not so much that we intend all along such renderings to be taken non-referentially; but that what location they are given serves primarily as marker of the significance of the experience. Articulation as demands of god or universe, that is, is a way in which a sub-class of demand experience can be granted due signalling in virtue of its power and vivacity.

One additional problem with the identification of this kind of demand in experience lies in its outstripping the area of the specifically moral. Indeed, religious demands are often portrayed as those which, for the apprehender of them, do not so much herald a higher moral order as supercede (or merely bypass) it altogether. Such are the demands of faith which issue in Abraham's preparedness to sacrifice his own son, or of the paradoxical righteousness of Job in refusing to link righteousness with reward. Though God relents, as it were, in both cases neither the Old Testament actors nor ourselves as readers are left with a clear notion of a higher moral order. One is simply left bemused, aghast at the apparently arbitrary testings God drops on his chosen. (This reaction, with which one should engage, possibly being the 'point' of the stories). Even the apparent reward for faith in both cases cannot be taken in any straightforward moral fashion. For both contain an unease, a sting in the tail, which is not resolved but left hanging at the culmination of the stories.39

Undoubtedly, religious demands have some moral element for the faithful. And for the faithless too some kind of intuition of a cosmic pull on her will have (or will come to have) - especially as its demand comes into conflict with other ones on her - a moral element. These kinds of demand instance a wide range of callings on their apprehenders. More often than not the response consonant with them is of a
passive acceptance and/or active worship of the divine or the universe. That they are experienced as moral demands requires inquiry equally into the nature of the moral demand as into that of the demander. Traditionally, god and universe seem to have made a vast range of demands on folk. Not all of these have been seen as moral, though they are frequently extremely powerful and felt to be significant and deep, involving the very being of the subject. Given the contextual diversity of that realm of experience identified with a special kind of demander (whatever the reality of that), it remains necessary to find adequate description of just how a divine demand is a moral demand and to delineate that from divine demands that are not so. In some fashion all divine demands might be thought *on reflection* to be moral ones - but they are not always apprehended as so in direct experience.

This gives some credence to my suggestion that it is the very forceful, enlivening, commanding aspects of some moral demands that seems to place them for ourselves in the realm of the divine/cosmic. There may be no other adequate metaphor by which oneself can grasp the nature of the experience and communicate it to others. And if these demands seem peculiarly significant, drawing from a deep level of one's self, halting and putting into question everything else in life, then it is hardly surprising that they should be couched in a form of religious or quasi-religious description. My claim, though, is that this goes on - if it goes on all that much - by way of an inference or, to remain as closely as possible to the actual feel of the experience, via the medium of an interpretative process that makes concrete the meaning and meaningfulness of the experience to oneself. This interpretation need not be a prolonged reflective matter. It can be closely allied with the experience as it enters. What I mean to indicate by distinguishing between inference and interpretation is similar to that which is operating for aesthetic experience. In that area one's immediate appraisal of an art object is usually based not on an inference from its qualities but on an overall interpretation as the experience enters oneself (one being more and less conscious of the occurrence of a process of interpretation between experiences). Hence, for both cases, the gloss put on the raw data of
experience need not be a phenomenon controlled by the subject in the light of her weighing of the experience. And for the subject herself, it need not, and almost certainly does not, feel like an added component has been 'read into' the experience in the way in which I have briefly suggested.

That an interpretation goes on, or that its past occurrence moulds the norms of expectation and experience, does not strike down the possibility of carrying out an inference from phenomenological features of a certain kind of experience to metaphysical speculation about its source. But it seems to me that that is not really how the heightened moral demand gets on occasion to be linked with divine or cosmic orders. Correspondingly, the apparent ready response of some of us (for this is not a universal feature of experience) to locate a particular moral demand in such an order need not dash the possibility of phenomenological description disentangling this feature from the data of immediate experience. That does not mean that the experience itself is given in bare, uninterpreted form - simply that a degree of reflection on the phenomenological data of immediate experience gives a description in which the original presence of that religious element or gloss about the experience is questioned. That does not, as such, rely on a deeper reflective phenomenology of the sensefulness to the subject of a moral demand's being so engendered. It is a matter of what is and what is not given up to investigation on careful unpicking of the threads binding together a particular experience when one tries to render it up in its immediacy. And the important point I have been representing concerns the extent to which many of us are aware of the interpretative-metaphorical character of this kind of location, even though it may seem to be part and parcel of the experience itself. This is not a matter of subjects in a secular age not taking seriously the apparent religious nature of the experience. It is rather that, in taking the heightened moral demand experience very seriously indeed, no other obvious candidate description offers itself as reflecting the phenomena than that of the religious-cosmic one.
Expressing the experience in terms of its great and life-engaging importance to one goes some way to highlighting the experience, and expression with the personal reference omitted goes further. So does talk of being unable to do, think, or see matters otherwise. As bringing into sharp relief, both to oneself and to others, the height of this demand experience, however, assimilation of it to the will of god or way of the cosmos performs a task for which it is particularly well-suited. If any area of human experience provides a window onto such realms, these peaks of moral demand experience seem good candidates for doing so. It is just that, given the need to mark the experience out in suitable language, and perhaps a need to have such experience located in something like the being of a supreme issuer of the demands, then it is not surprising to find both the mode of expression being used and its claim to be reflecting accurately something that does appear (though not so determinately) in the immediate experience. (By this latter need, to have the demand specifically placed in either god or cosmos, I intend to outline a point that will be made more fully in chapters 6 and 7. It is to the effect that reflection on the moral demand, together with analysis of its direct phenomenology, shows that an essential component to it is that of its otherness, the sense of its being at least partly and in a significant way made up of the not-self. I will argue that the otherness need not amount to anything more than the experiential sense of the demand not being entirely constituted by oneself. But here, with the heightened demand construed in religious terms, I am claiming that otherness, or alterity, takes on a specially personified guise, being located in the person of god, or as that cosmic order which stands before one).

Before passing on to further discussion of the heightened moral demand experience and its putative connections with an objective value realm, two general rejoinders that go with the foregoing discussion need giving their place. The first is simply to repeat the point that this form of demand experience is not one that serves to represent the claim to perceive a demander or value realm in immediacy as a whole, even though it is the one to which attention is generally, and perhaps
understandably, turned. So there remains a great mass, indeed the greater part, of moral experience below the level of this peak, enlivening class. Any results of descriptive phenomenology at this level therefore need assessing in the light of their possible absence at the less intense levels. It is, of course, logically possible that subjects should take themselves to be having an intuition of the divine or cosmic will at these lower levels of everyday demand apprehension and fulfilment. But that is something which stays, I believe, in the realm of possibility and is not borne out by the empirical measure of descriptive phenomenology. Hence my suggestion that at the higher - that is, more forceful, intense, and engaging - reaches of the demand experience, it is these features that are responsible for any overall image of the divine rather than that an apprehension of the divine will or way of the cosmos itself brings forth the described features.

The second point, which further narrows down the breadth of this range of experience within the general course of the moral demand, is addressed to the constancy of this religious interpretation of the demand as it is affixed to the particularly heightened demand experience. For the image which has been portrayed and questioned over the last few pages is not itself one that is instantiated throughout the peaks of the moral demand. That it is the case that there are such specially engaging and striking instances of moral demand experience, and given that these are not the complete and only forms of that class of experience, it is so much more the case that their religious/cosmic aspect is but a narrow phenomenon of a very much larger general area to which description is directed. Even remaining within the heightened demand experience, then, one will not get far viewing it through the categories of the theistic/cosmic. The reason for this is simple. It is that we do not, as subjects of the experience, find ourselves always alluding to such categories in order either to describe or to interpret the peak experiences. Some of us never do so, though many of us do seem inclined on particular extreme occasions to grasp at and venture forth the (roughly) religious mode of expression. That this description of experience is not universal, and that when it is employed it
is generally associated with religious experience and divine demands, rather than
being limited to moral demand experience under a religious aspect, gives pause to
any descriptive exegesis of the phenomenology in question. The religious aspect
just does not have any great constancy. It is not therefore sufficiently widespread a
phenomenon on which to base general conclusions about moral demand experience.
There may be a divine will or way of the universe which issues demands (including
moral ones) on us, and there may be ways in which we can come into contact with
them, but I doubt that religious experience itself gives all that much warrant for any
steady and universally acceptable determinate image of such things. That is another
matter. What I am saying here is that the phenomenology of moral demand
experience at the heightened level gives little material for taking it to be caused by,
reflecting, consonant with, or even entailing such divine/cosmic demands. (It can
be objected by the upholder of some version of theism that this shows not the
absence of certain demands and demanders but the blunting of our consciousness of
the moral and the divine. Secularization and scepticism have inured us, she might
argue, to what there is to feel if only we would turn our hearts with sincerity in the
right direction. That is a form of argument, based on the supposition of willful
negligence and disobedience of the divine, that is to be found throughout the
biblical stories and the religious literature of other traditions. I do not find it all that
compelling, though I can see its validity within the deliberations of a religious
mind-set. The fact starkly remains that not much of the demand experience
possesses this special kind of phenomenology for us even after reflection on it, and
that which does is problematic for study).

Tarrying with the sometime religious/cosmic nature of the heightened
demand experience has provided a background and launching-point into the subject
of the objective realm of values. There are a couple of threads from the previous
discussion that I wish to weave through that which is to come. One is a matter of
the extent of our identification of the experience as being thus and so. I will argue,
as with the religious phenomena, that the claim to be apprehending moral values
needs careful attention in order to describe its precise feel. And in that light I shall be asserting that description gives rather poor results if it is an objective value realm that is thought to be signalled at this level. The other element which I shall be employing is that of our own consciousness of the metaphorical rendering given should description of experience be couched in terms of a value realm 'out there' impinging on us. With that brought to mind via the phenomenology, my additional claim will be that what degree of alleged value intuition there is going on is frequently itself held by us in non-referential fashion.

3.iii - Value experience and experience of values

Though there is an area of our moral demand experience such that the apprehension is sometimes called value experience, this is not being claimed by us, it seems to me, to be experience of objects called values. Such a claim might best be regarded as being to the effect that the particular area represents the calling on one of values we (collectively or individually) hold. One way in which I shall flesh out this claim is by viewing the independence of the values as independent of the subject in virtue of the social context. The incomingness of the demand and its apparent exteriority are shared by whatever value apprehension is thought thereby to be present because values are not chosen by oneself and values are outwith oneself in the sense that they are social phenomena. Of this kind of understanding of the phenomenology Durkheim talks of 'the independence, the relative externality of social facts in relation to the individual', and says that,

[W]hile one might perhaps contest the statement that all social facts without exception impose themselves from without upon the individual, the doubt does not seem possible as regards religious beliefs and practices, the rules of morality and the innumerable precepts of law - that is to say, all the most characteristic manifestations of collective life. All are expressly obligatory, and this obligation is the proof that these ways of acting and thinking are
not the work of the individual but come from a moral power above him, that which the mystic calls God or which can be more scientifically conceived [as social facts].

On the other hand, the strong claim might be made that at least one objective value exists in a sense different from and higher than the one involved in its being what an individual or collective holds to be important, or would come to recognize as such. Then the incomingness and exteriority of the demand would be displayed by the value apprehension because values are not chosen by oneself and values, it would be alleged, are outwith oneself and others in virtue of subsisting in an independent, objective realm of being. And of this claim, Singer registers his dissent in these words:

Talk about a "value", which often goes along with talk about "creating" or "discovering" values, is difficult to decipher. Surely there are values, for a person's values are what that person regards as important, but this does not somehow embed in the universe or give warrant for talking of values as "there" somewhere independent of us, and such talk is either nonsense or elliptical for something sensible.

While, on the other side of such claims as to what we think and feel, Clark believes that ordinary, non-philosophical folk are 'confident' in 'versions of the Platonic Theory of Forms', to which they (we) 'submit our thought and action' for the 'objective truth' on moral affairs.

With respect to these two alternative ways of viewing the moral demand (in its heightened form especially) I shall try to employ phenomenology to discover what it is we are maintaining in our reports of experience; what it is we actually do experience if that experience should be different from our reports; whether we have an awareness, and what kind of awareness it is, of the means by which any value apprehension is brought about and how those values affect ourselves in signalling themselves. Having said above that our own reflective acknowledgement of the
metaphorical nature of value talk should be considered, I will have cause to go on to throw so much doubt on the descriptive accuracy of the latter form of experiential claim that, even as a metaphor, talk of an objective value realm is not well instanced on attending to the phenomenology.

3.iv - What there is experienced as and as if 'out there'

In the heightened demand experience one can observe a force at work pressing on the subject as if from an external locus. Is there a sense of this locus contained in the experience? Do we otherwise, as subjects ourselves, incline to ask whether for each force and demand we feel or have felt there must be a forcer or demander responsible for the pressure? Do we ask this of the moral demand?

The first thing that I believe one gleans from the phenomenology is simply the urgency of the pressing (heightened) moral demand. I have already talked of its forceful, possibly irksome tone, sometimes clamouring for attention, sometimes constraining one in various ways. The phenomenon to which I am now pointing is the sheer confusion of a badgering force hemming one about in the heat of this urgency. Such an experiential encounter, especially as it occurs with respect to the demands in negative situations of the ills that befall others, will often disorient oneself; momentarily paralyze one; the sensation of fear and pitched anticipation being wrought in one's breast. What comes through this initial glance at the experience, then, has nothing whatsoever to do with values, be they intuited from metaphysically awkward realms or not. The subject is simply swamped by the force which confronts and halts her.

An expression which approaches aptness for this kind of experience and the moral situation it is directed to is that of the 'crisis' moment. The attendant qualitative phenomena in the experience do not seem to me to differ all that much from those found generally in crisis experiences - that is, times when conflicting courses of action bear upon one; when quick decisions must be made in times of danger and uncertainty; when some part of one's very character is threatened and
the possibility of one betraying oneself and others is alive. As for the moral case, the demand of the powerful kind presently being considered immediately plunges oneself into a situation of this crisis sort. Simply ignoring the demand seems impossible when in the thrall of it. One is confronted with a state of affairs to-be-dealt-with, for sure, even if that is not at all the same thing as a value-to-be-actualized which is felt as if from 'out there'. The moral situation before one seems to be engaging with oneself in such a fashion that one's attitudes and actions toward it reflect much more than merely a passing interest in the panorama of experience crossing consciousness. One way in which this phenomenology may be brought about, or rendered explicit to oneself, is through a value conflict. (It is not only a value clash that issues in the striking experience, but it often can be). Such a conflict of values can be more and less given to the surface of consciousness. The subject herself can feel the demand as one to resolve the situation and the clash of values it brings in its train. Far from being experienced as special objects acting on her, these values are simply those ones, and felt as those ones, which are the things or general concepts held by the subject as important (either for her, for her community, or as important simpliciter). The primary descriptive phenomenon in the forefront of her consciousness in that case is the conflict of values, the crisis situation, and not any sense, however vague, of a specially located objective demander calling on her. Though there are the phenomena of incomingness and of exteriority present in the experience, or rather, seemingly bringing in the experience to oneself, these do not indicate to the subject the correspondent presence of, or sending forth of the experience by, a value realm. There is simply the sensation of a pressure on one in virtue of a certain impasse in the values held by and available to oneself. And even though the ways in which that pressure comes to exert itself, and that apparent exteriority be manifested, are not without their own degree of awkwardness for investigation, they are not being held by us, as subjects here, to be constituted in ways that make reference to an objective value realm.
That objective realm which is likely to get noted is simply the one of the world in which ills and benefits befall persons and are intentionally directed to them - which is the world of physical and social facts, but not value facts that are objective insofar as these are read off from a realm different from that world. Objective values that are felt seem objective in the sense of being independent of one's own control and choosing. Indeed, this is the working definition of 'objectivity' in this matter given by one phenomenologist of values. That says something interesting and important about value. It may prove a necessary feature of the experience, and of the very concept, that it have an independence of some sort about it. But that, of course, is something possessed by a number of experiences that have no relation to a reality of the sort indicated by their content. Singer, for instance, talks of the possible error of 'confusing objectivity with independence of one's will - a criterion on which hallucinations would be objective.' While there is a physical reality of conditions - hot sun, wearied brain, and so forth - that can be investigated as causing, say, a mirage, there is no reality to the content of the mirage-appearance, a shaded and water-filled oasis, for example. But even this analogy breaks down, I believe, for the moral demand experience. For what I am saying here is not: values appear as if 'out there' in the peak experience, but this is illusory; rather I am saying: that kind of value intuition does not even go on in the peak experience (where one could reasonably expect most likelihood of observing it). There are phenomena of incomingness and exteriority going on, and there may also be (though not always) a sense of value/values that the subject has in strange and inexplicit ways, but the two are not so intertwined that the value takes on a life of its own as if from a self-subsistent realm. Independence of value from subject choosing does not entail independence of the subjective. Nor does it carry the locational feature as arising from a realm separate from oneself and others in experience, heightened or otherwise.
3.v - What is and what is not under one's control

In this sub-section I want briefly to recapitulate a point made earlier about the independence of experience from one's choosing in order to repeat it with respect to the moral demand and value experience. The point was made initially in sub-section 2.i. It concerned the ways in which the occurrences of certain experiential states of affairs could be seen as under one's control. The example of a headache was given as one which could not simply be wrought in consciousness by willing its arrival therein, but which could be brought about by performing some action known to lead to its occurrence. Similarly, I believe that the notion of conferring moral value and demandingness on objects and events is properly viewed also in the light of that distinction. What one cannot do is simply will that one be presented with a moral demand upon oneself, or that something have value because one chooses that it be so. But what one can do is choose to perform (or omit) some act that will either bring about, or put oneself in a position to have, the requisite experience. Choosing to watch a television documentary on, say, drug-trafficking would be an instance of this kind of action if one knows it is the sort of thing that will engender a moral demand experience in one. Or a case of directly causing there to be demands on one and values of some sort instantiated would be possible simply by siring a child. One has not thereby created the demand or value, but one has brought about the circumstances under which these phenomena are said to exist (even if, rather notoriously in the case of caring for children, not always in one's own experience). This is a point to which I shall devote a section in my final chapter. If it is not possible to will the particular experience of the moral demand within one, nor is it possible to create a demand or a value with an intrinsic demandingness about it by the direct exercise of one's volition. This has two implications of interest which I explore in that later section. One matter it reveals is that the experience itself is never felt just to be or to have been brought about by one's own deliberate call. Some element of the not-self, however that be construed, is felt to be involved in the experience, with respect both to its cause and content.
The other thing it shows, I believe, is this. Wherever a demander or value that
demands may reside, and however it be effective in putting itself upon the subject,
she herself cannot just choose to bring it about. This is so again in virtue of the
involvement of the not-self in the constitution of these states of affairs - which I
shall investigate more fully as a phenomenological and conceptual affair in chapter
7. And what I shall also maintain is that these things - the experience and that object
of it which may or may be said to subsist beyond the experience itself - are
constituted crucially in some part by the not-self. Nevertheless, what I shall argue
alongside is that the not-self is decidedly not given in some special self-subsistent
realm of values 'out there'.

There are ways, then, clear and unmysterious ones, by which one can put
oneself in a position to be under a demand or to be aligned with respect to the
experienced sense of a value impinging upon one. That I do not think it possible to
do this directly - that is, by willing it be so that a demandingsness or value
straightaway exerts itself - may say something about the demand and value or about
oneself as apprehender of them or about both. What I believe it shows will be
explored in the next two chapters. In them I shall direct attention both to the ways in
which moral demandingsness and value is experienced and can be experienced, and
to the ways in which we hold onto the nature of the experience at a reflective level,
in order that essential features of them be discerned. In anticipation of that, and for
the purpose of expressing my initial opinion at this juncture, I am saying that the
demand appears in consciousness outwith the control of the subject insofar that she
cannot just immediately conjure it up by a fiat of will. (The same goes for the sense
of value/values which she has). But it would be incorrect, thereby, to see these
matters as entirely removed from the operation of the choice of the subject. Given a
likely knowledge on her part of those states of affairs which generally bring about
for her the requisite experience - or are held by her community to be the ones that
should do so - then she can decide to do a number of things that will put herself in
the corresponding position. And conversely, of course, and more commonly for
ourselves, she can choose to turn away from those states of affairs, or not participate in those activities, of which she is aware that they will put upon her some sort of moral demand. This occurs each time we turn away from the television screen or switch channels because the documentary on famine is too disturbing, and our personal capacity to help too pitiful. Or when we refuse to get involved in a project or relationship - say, joining a volunteer project to help severely disabled people - because we are aware of how burdensome the demands it would place upon us and the values it would require us to strive to maintain or promulgate. In this latter case it is, of course, not only a moral demand or moral values that are being felt would be incurred, but other ones too (a well-kept garden is a demanding project, but to most of us it is likely only to involve a moral demand if it belongs, say, to one's ageing and ailing relative to whom one has promised to look after it).

What all this points to is at least some understanding on the part of the subject of the conditions under which she is presented with a value or put under the thrall of a heightened demand (still keeping to this particular area of the experience). Hence my continuation of phenomenological description now turns it to the possible viewing of that understanding and the degree to which it is given in the immediate experience.

3.vi - Values or demanders as causing the moral demand in experience

In this sub-section I am going to look at the experience of the heightened demand to see whether there is, as the moral experience goes on, a sense on the part of the subject of a value or demander causing her experience. This causal relation between herself and some other states of affairs I take in the kind of construal of causation in experience as instanced by loud noises causing headaches and houses causing visual images of houses, when those facts are known in immediacy to the subject or only discerned on reflection. But as I address this matter I would ask the reader to keep at the back of his/her mind the fact that I will convert the discussion
in the next sub-section to that of the less rigid relations - fittingness and correspondence, in particular - between subject and putative object that might be occurrent in the experience. For now, though, I will concentrate on this causal role of values and/or demanders as experienced by the subject. 51

What I am looking for here is something like this. A person feels a demand, say, to worship a deity. This demand (as it is put upon her) she feels to be directly caused by the divine demander. There is her, the deity, and the latter issues forth the demand which strikes her in just the same causal fashion as a traffic policeman holding up his hand makes her feel she should brake the car. The event description under which the subject herself categorizes her experience is that of the deity demanding something of her. Similarly, for a moral demand or the sense of a value calling on one, the corresponding phenomenology would be given by that description on the part of the subject that straightforwardly claimed the experience as being wrought by a demander or a value.

Are there, then, instances in which this kind of description in causal terms is evinced by us? The short answer is in the affirmative. The more developed answer is not, however, one consonant with the causal relation being felt as inspired by any sort of special demander or value realm 'out there'. It seems to me, on looking as closely and carefully as possible at the phenomenology, that the demanders and values felt to be causally responsible for the relevant experiences are not of the sort that give scope for the notion of a moral reality with its own special kind of existence being the generator of that experience. What are regarded as and located as thus responsible may themselves be metaphysically intriguing and challenging entities, events, or states of affairs. But as to the Mackie reading of the 'queer' sort of values being claimed to be present, and causally so, they are not of that interesting order.

What are, on occasion, identified as causally operative in the experience? Sometimes it is the existence of specific persons who make moral demands on one. One's family and friends do so. One's head of state, trade union leader, teacher,
priest, employer can do so. Ideally, it is generally thought, humankind as such (and perhaps non-human life at a certain stage of sentience) make moral demands which one should acknowledge and try to act on appropriately. And if that conglomerate is sometimes a little too remote from our experience - or from the heightened form of it, at any rate - then it is certainly the case that the unknown other or group does make demands on one in immediacy which are felt as she falls and cries in pain or as the wracked and starving stranger asks for help. To the question, What is causing the demand? I think we as subjects discern a number of factors of more and less precise description that are responsible. These vary from one person to another and within the course of our own roughly repeatable moral experience. 'Seeing her pain'; 'The wanton cruelty'; 'His manifest kindness' - these are fairly precisely located descriptions we give of what caused our experience. More vaguely, we will recognize simply that the other's presence is causing the demand, without elaborating any further - and often without being able on much reflection to elucidate more finely those exact features which excited apprehension of the demand. 'Something about the way he treats her' comes midway between these two sketched positions.

The kinds of feature that I do not find pointed to at all often are the ones most frequently debated in moral philosophical texts, especially in recent times. They are those of 'goodness', 'rightness', 'oughtness', and their negative counterparts. I doubt that these terms are used much by the mass of us in order to register our moral experience and the qualities therein when we are engaged in the course of everyday life. But as to the matter of regarding these qualitative features as themselves causally responsible for the demand experience I think that the phenomenological picture does not bear out such a suggestion. This bodes ill for the discovery of value entities with which we feel ourselves to be causally interacting in the production of moral experience. For the nouns I have just listed are those most commonly thought to be the value terms which might figure in any such causal account. There is a debate at large about whether an epistemologically
fit moral theory involving these properties can be adequately formulated or not.\textsuperscript{54} That is a matter that goes beyond the phenomenology. With that phenomenological description, however, there is not such scope for debate as to the experienced causes of the moral phenomena pressing upon one. We do not feel properties (occult or otherwise) of goodness or rightness to be causing our experience.

The nearest we may all come to this kind of report is in the particularly acute sensation that the evil of some person is bringing about our perception of him in the corresponding fashion. But even this is not so much pointing to a special value feature instantiated in him as to a character trait or deeper infection of self in him that is manifested before one. Further reflection may, though not always, pinpoint the particular character flaw and its exercise in behaviour. One will sometimes precisely identify the particular action or personality trait that excited in one a moral experience: the callous disregard for human suffering; the easy preparedness to employ torture for political ends; the banal and routine unpleasantness to strangers. And once these reports move beyond immediacy and become reflective pronouncements on one's experience, then they look much more like assessments of the other and his behaviour than causally wrought experiential reactions. The notion of the person's evil causing one's experience and judgement of him as so soon drops out of one's own conception at that stage. Reflection determines what it is about a person and his acts which excites in one the particular moral experience. This is not the same thing as a clear and direct sensation in immediacy of one's experience being wrought by a peculiar disvalue hovering about the individual. The interesting interpretative question which remains is that of whether something called evil causes a person's evil character and acts and how that kind of explanatory device coheres within our epistemological-metaphysical framework.\textsuperscript{55} But as to a sense in our experience of goodness and rightness, badness and wrongness, playing a clear and direct causal role in the production of our experience, I think that when we cast our attention upon the stuff of the direct impingement of the moral
demand on consciousness we will not find such a sense in so recognizably distinct a form.

We feel ourselves respond, react, moved to think and do certain things in the light of coming across certain moral situations and characters (actual or imaginary). But an awareness on our part of the causal antecedents of our moral behaviour (both thought and action) does not figure with respect to demanders and values 'out there'. For most of us there seems to be as clear a causal pathway from seeing others in pain to the arrival in consciousness of a moral demand as there is between seeing that and our wincing. Similarly, the immediacy of the sensed causal route from viewing another's act, say, of helping the destitute, to the experience of a moral value being displayed or implemented is - again, for most of us - as close as that from the viewing to that sensation we call a 'warming of the heart'. So we do have a sense in the experience of something to it that brings about the moral phenomena, and brings them about in what feels like other clear-cut senses of causal manner. In this respect, while I do not think the likes of goodness and rightness are felt by us to be playing that role, there may be better chance of discerning the felt operation of the so-called 'thick' ethical concepts like courage, kindness, ingratitude, spitefulness, &c.

Once more, then, the question for phenomenological analysis is whether we do sense these kinds of things as conducting a causal relation with us in the experience. And appended to that, of course, is the question of how we are viewing these features of acts and actors. For they may themselves be felt to be the particular representations, reflections, instantiations of moral values of a specially transcendent or ideal kind. Or it might simply be that it is felt that a certain developed capacity for the spontaneous classifying under moral concepts of certain actions and characters naturally excites the relevant demand or value-feel. (This latter being a sense going on in immediacy rather than a reflection on moral education and the way in which it trains our reactions). These two possibilities merely highlight large general areas of the subject's relation to her experience. But
one other which I think especially deserves some mention is that of the subject simply not having a particularly well-defined awareness in immediacy at all of the exciting properties, though she does feel herself to be causally interacting with something other than the sheer physical state of affairs before her. This latter sense, indeterminate and inchoate as it is and may remain, is about as near as we get, I believe, to instancing the kind of value phenomenology Mackie and McDowell take us to be possessed of.

With respect to this issue, the latter philosopher holds that,

Given that Mackie is right about the phenomenology of value, an attempt to accept the appearances makes it virtually irresistible to appeal to a perceptual model.58

My appeal, then, is that such a phenomenology is eminently resistible. This is not a question of whether we ourselves model our experience on primary or secondary quality perceptual interactions. (This is the point which McDowell takes to separate himself from Mackie at the ontological level). It is the simple sense of being confronted by a reality that tugs on one. The sense itself is simple - of a call on one (or just a call which one happens to have apprehended). But that which is being sensed may not be so simple, even on reflection. And one may not be at all clear about what precisely one's reaction fixes on - in the case of the famine: the human suffering, the squandering of the world's resources, the inability of the home government to do anything - and one may need to winkle out the precise object of one's reaction of horror or sympathy or whatever. Indeed, we are acquainted ourselves with the puzzlement that some moral demands bring in their wake, as well as that nagging and unwelcome quality they can have. This takes the form of sheer surprise or bemusement that one should feel such and such a way - that, for instance, one should find oneself suddenly feeling the demand to condemn some form of behaviour like betting that one had previously not bothered about. Nor are the objects of that sense simple for the subject once she herself comes to think on the matter. It may remain to one a confusing and even unintelligible affair as to just
how and why one came to have the experience one did. More generally, the simple sense of a causal relation with the moral state of affairs confronting one is not attended by the simple awareness of just what it is about it that maintains such a relation with one. 'Another's pain' or 'The giving of money to the poor' - these are examples of the straightforward accounting for one's experience by giving the seeming cause. Yet it is important to recognize as a phenomenological fact, I believe, that the sense of being in contact with something special about the moral state of affairs (we know not what, to echo Locke's words from another context) remains unclear. Exploration of the 'horizon' to this sense and of the contextual background that girds it about might give one further shades to a picture of finer resolution. But the immediate sense which subjects have with respect to the presence and operation of peculiar moral qualities to the state of affairs before them will remain as a brute datum of the phenomenological description at that level.

One writer on the notion of moral knowledge puts the aim of his book as:

...to show that "the ordinary moral consciousness" is right in regarding itself as a consciousness, as an awareness of things that are not dependent for their existence or properties upon the fact of being apprehended.59

This seems a fair enough report of the way we do feel. The experience of an independent element at work in the moral demand experience we encounter (which may or may not be granted reflective assent) is not, however, experience of an independent moral entity that works to give the experience its particular strike and tone. Such a point needs emphasizing, both as a phenomenological finding and as a logical consideration. In the former mode it is the descriptive presentation of moral experience as being a certain way. At best it might hint at experience of an independent moral reality, particularly in the peak moments. It hints at that putative experience insofar as it gives one both senses of independence in experience: of an independence of the experience itself and its content from one's direct volition, and of a feel of something independent about the moral state of affairs in similar way to
its physical independence of one, but not being identical to its physical features. That second sense (taking 'sense' here to refer both to the linguistic meaning of 'independence' as well as to its felt operation as being distinct from consciousness) gets very close I believe to seeming to us to be disclosing a window onto a special mode of reality, that is, in its value guise.

Yet I do not think it actually gets far enough beyond the sense of something different from the physical description of the event that is either signalled in or causally responsible for our experience. Since this particular sub-section is concerned with that causal reading within the experience I shall stick to it, though the overall criticism of portrayals of our experience as signalling values 'out there' is obviously the one to which I am also directed. As to that sense on our part of the causal route by which our particular moral experience is wrought, I will try to illustrate my point with an example. In the specific case of finding oneself in the Ethiopian scrubland where thousands of homeless people are dying of malnutrition and disease I should think that one would find oneself in the thrall of a particularly strong moral demand experience directed toward cessation of such a situation. From where is that causally arising? Mirroring a point I made slightly earlier, I believe that phenomenological description will often fail to locate any kind of sense of that origin at all in the immediacy of that experience. There is a sense of urgency, of a pressing, awful, shocking state of affairs that calls to be dealt with. There is a flooding of consciousness with the sheer desperation and horror of the situation. There is an awareness of suffering on a monstrous scale. No doubt something or other among these descriptions is felt to be, at least on cursory reflection, to be causing one's experience and the response it represents. But in the thick of that original experiential state the charge it possesses and which momentarily captures one's whole being does not really seem often to have been caused by anything specific other than the general scenario confronting one. Even that use of causal language may go too far away from the indeterminacy and pressing immediacy of the direct experience. For, just as I do not think we are
usually aware of tables causing visual images of tables - we simply inhabit a milieu in which we sometimes see tables - so am I claiming that often we do not have an awareness of that which is causing our experience with respect to the moral demand in such an heightened instance. The demand simply is presented to us in more and less forceful fashion.

In the more common run of our moral experience, constituting that range which occupies the space below the peak ones, the demand is indeed very often presented to oneself, as if an object for contemplation rather than a pressing, nagging, swamping matter of moment. And in that less common but more noticeable peak level of experience, while the demand is not merely presented in neutral colours before one but engages the attention and captures viscerally one's impulses, it seems usually to be going on without containing within itself a sense also of a particular causal agent responsible. The demand is not experienced as being a purely inner correlate of an external factor exciting it. There is a more complex sense of its placing with respect to the apprehension of it and the demandingness being exercised upon us (and which, perhaps one feels, others would and should also experience if only they were suitably equipped or positioned). My detailed examination of that will take place in the next chapter. But here I want to reiterate the lack of a well-formed and consistently present sense of specific factors operating causally upon one to bring about the experience as it occurs. Not only, then, is there an evident lack of an experienced interaction with demanders or values 'out there'; but there is, furthermore, not much sense on our part of causal interplay with anything specific at all as the experience strikes oneself in all its overwhelming intensity.

Rather than the cause of one's experience being given as related to a specific value instantiated in the situation, or specific features of that situation in a wertfrei mode, one is simply drawn in by the situation itself that confronts one. Similarly, I believe, one's immediate reaction to a painting or a landscape vista is often of this undifferentiated type. The awe, wonder, and rapture with which one responds is
not always attended on its occurrence by a sense of the precise features which are causally responsible for one's reaction. They can, of course, be made apparent to one on reflection, but not always in the first blush encounter with the object. And also with one's response to a religious object: it is only when one comes to think on the experience of the seeming divine reality that questions begin to be addressed about those features of the numinous, the powerful, the holy, the strange, the creepy, the transcendent, and so forth, with which one thinks one was causally involved. In the immediacy of these experiences, and those which are the heightened moral ones, I want to say that one finds oneself too much part of the very situation before one to disentangle experience and causes as they are apparent. One is not so much a spectator as bound in with the state of affairs before one, drawn into it. Such, then, are those reports we occasionally give of a sense of losing our selves in the aesthetic or religious confrontation - and, I think also, that sense is triggered at times in the midst of the heightened moral demand. At the time of its striking itself upon consciousness, the demand not only sinks into one but also seems to plunge oneself into the situation before one. Since this can be a profoundly disturbing and unwelcome matter for us, I take it that what is occurring in that kind of moral situation is a rather more complex engagement of self than is recorded by a sense simply of an engrossment of self or entire filtration of it into the experienced domain of the moral demand. That is to say, there is some finer gradation of levels and elements of self given both in the immediate experience and for reflective analysis than an absolute portrayal might (mistakenly) be suggesting. For, while the peak moral experience certainly seems to involve a permeation of self within the confronting situation, there yet can be that part of oneself which finds such engagement frightening, unwelcome, even distasteful. And there can be also that experience which I mentioned earlier of surprise or bemusement at one's involvement; or, of course, of a deep sense of a true self being revealed and brought into play. This suggests to me that a more developed model of the self and the ways in which it (or areas of it) are taken up by moral states of affairs is at play.
for the subject herself and requires detailing for analysis itself. (Chapter 6 does this, and Chapter 7 continues with the theme).

With that much sketched above on the way in which the heightened demand sometimes coalesces with, or borders on, or makes complicit a level of the self, I will repeat the point that discussion was intended to make and partially explain with respect to the sense of the causal instigators of the moral demand experience. It is this. In the midst of this heightened form of experience there is usually not a sense at all on our part as to the precise features of the moral situation giving rise to it. This goes both for the uncontroversial features - pain, relief of suffering - and for the 'thick' moral qualities which may or may not have a more difficult ontology - kindness, courage, wickedness - through to those more controversial and metaphysically awkward moral features that possibly could be felt as values or demanders perhaps located 'out there'. The raw data of the experiences are much more crude and amorphous than the invocation of that sense would suggest. They are - quite significantly - below that certain line of conscious deliberation, and in being so are - also significantly, I believe - similar to other instances of heightened non-moral demand experience that sometimes themselves flood consciousness. By calling these descriptions of the phenomena 'significant' I mean to maintain that they give one a reading of the experience which is rarely itself told in moral philosophical literature as it encounters that heightened form of it. Slightly odd as it may sound, I am stating that not enough attention has been paid to the vagueness and to the 'swamping' nature of this experiential type. And little attention has been granted either to the ways in which the moral experience at this level appears in similar phenomenological guise to other non-moral and particularly charged demand experiences.60 For so soon as one ignores these features one naturally, it seems to me, suspects there must be some sense on the subject's part of a causal route by which her experience can be explicated. Or if the vagueness is recognized, one may tend to think again that analysis must push beyond that and that there must be some implicit apprehension by the subject of that route and its causal underpinning. But I
think that, for a certain fairly broad extent of this special range of the experience, there just is no such sense. In that light, phenomenological description corresponds with veracity to its object data simply by registering these experiential facts. And they are those of the very rough apprehension of something pressing and urgent putting itself upon oneself. In that way, I think we do have the sense of brushing against, of being in contact with or party to, a reality of some sort. Rather than that reality being experienced as the impingement on one or intuition of value entities or the will/way of a special sort of demander, however, it is signalling itself through a much less defined level of awareness. Reflection on this vague sense of tarrying with a special mode of reality logically could later view that as having been the kind of value apprehension which Mackie believes we take ourselves to be given in immediacy. Such reflection can go on also in a similar way for the aesthetic, and most especially, the religious phenomena in their heightened aspect. That course of reflection usually will connect up or try to see a connection of the experience with the subject's own course of life, beliefs, and attitudes. Whether or not a reflective affirmation of the value realm notion as given to or causally productive of the experience, which I have been criticizing at the level of immediacy, leads to or feeds back into that immediate experience is something I will address later. That issue is certainly not uni-directional from reflective assay to immediate experience: there are, after all, plenty of people who experience what they call 'ghosts', even though they 'don't really' believe in them. And there are lots of god-fearing, church-going folk whose direct religious experience is entirely lacking, or is even that of the inert indifference of the universe, whose faith is yet not (entirely) shaken (though this faith may not be labelled so clearly a 'reflective' matter for them). Whatever the outcome and ongoing influence of such reflection, I think that if the reader looks closely at the immediate experience of those peak moments, she or he will find the same description to be primarily apt, i.e., that in its pressing immediacy there is no sense other (perhaps) than of a vague reality with a moral dimension aligned with one.
3.vii - Fittingness

The final thoughts contained in the sub-section above lead me away from the sense of causal interaction with special moral values 'out there' and into that which is of the fittingness, appropriateness, or meetness of one's experience and action as it corresponds to those values or the will/way of a divine/cosmic order. As I understand these terms and their part in moral philosophical language they are taken together to refer largely to criteria for one's judgement and action as one is aware of the normative ordering of the world. One's judgement or act is fitting, then, if it is consonant with that order - which is itself open to discernment in more and less plain fashion. This is certainly the use of 'fittingness' in the classic works of Samuel Clarke and John Balguy.\textsuperscript{62} How that ordering is viewed is, of course, another matter - the latter for instance, believed it to represent the divinely intended ordering of created nature, its way being open to the light of reason. A more recent example of the use of the notion is given in a work titled \textit{The Phenomenology of Moral Experience} where the author claims that such analysis shows this relation to be the fundamental one going on in moral experience.\textsuperscript{63} The general understanding of this concept and the experiential feel its proponents seem to wish to point out is a shared one amongst its supporters. It is that of the alignment of thought and action with an independently existing way of the world. This way can itself be a moral order of some metaphysical complexity - so that fittingness is between judgement/action in the light of the moral 'ought' directly present to the agent - or a natural order to which one's thought and behaviour are morally inclined as they coalesce or fail to do so in fitting manner with the way in which natural objects develop and are potentially directed (as in natural law theories).

It is with the former notion of fittingness that I am most interested. The latter one touches on the subject area of phenomenological study, but only insofar as it becomes itself like the other in claiming that moral value is open to recognition as one follows and promotes the healthy course of the natural order. It differs from the former in that such moral value is not usually seen by its proponents as a
special kind of property exhibiting a special kind of existential status, but as being immanent to the natural order and instantiated positively or negatively as the (perhaps divinely) intended or inherent direction of that order is promoted or frustrated (both intentionally by us and not). Either way, then, we are faced with the question for descriptive survey of whether and how the subject feels herself to be aligned in a manner called 'fitting' with either moral values or a demander from 'out there', both of which would be directing her experience and the actions she proceeds to issue forth on that basis. Rather than being felt as causally bringing about the experience, the subject will be feeling that her experience is related to the objects by way of its contentual aspect. The phenomena of her experience, that is, would be signalled in terms of fittingness or appropriateness as they correspond to a value or a demander's will whose presence or operation she discerns in the situation or in general. (Such discernment itself could be through a feel of fittingness in her experience, or based on a more reflective self-analysis through which she has come to apprehend the correct moral order and with which she tests the fit of her experience).

As it concerns immediacy of the moral demand experience, I think that it is the case that, at the heightened form of it, we do have some experience of this phenomenon. Our experience does on occasion seem to be fit or appropriate, to be giving us valid information about our world and the future action that is called for in virtue of the world's ways. And as to its directly apprehended mode, I think also that the sense of fittingness here is one contained in the immediate experience, and not only a possible reflectively-wrought sense further to the original experience. This kind of experience does not seem to me particularly common, however, and I doubt if the phenomenon itself is a universal feature of (occasional) heightened moral experience (I can see that 'fittingness' may be a near-universal experiential phenomenon only insofar as it relates to a wider range of experience than the moral). It may be that some of us don't have that form of experience because we are blind to its operation, or misdescribe it, or we are just (willfully or otherwise)
closed to the value realm with which experience should cohere for its proper functioning. And it may also be that, while these experiences are not frequently in evidence, they do represent nevertheless those moments for us when we most strongly feel ourselves brushing against that moral reality which has various possible groundings in metaphysical thought about it. Such moments could hold or come on reflection to hold a prized place of importance or significance in our experiential economy and in the self-interpretation of our life and its development. So I will look at this mode of our demand/value consciousness, even though I don't really think it an especially widespread or commonly operative one, with this preliminary understanding of its possibly important role.

I think that two salient points are given by a general overview of the kind of experience. The first, which I put briefly in parentheses above, is that it is a phenomenon spread over a wide range of our experience. Most, if not all, of us are acquainted with that particular tinge and hue of a feeling that matters are aligned just right in our life, or in the universe as a whole, if only during the felt moment. There appears to be no set pattern to the coming into consciousness of such an experience. No doubt it is most strongly associated for us with such things as religious ceremony; gazing out at a wilderness landscape or up to the firmament; with lovemaking or flying or artistic contemplation or drug-taking. It has a habit, though, of arriving unannounced, if not always unexpected, and may occur in the most mundane and everyday situations. Staring out of the window on a short bus journey, one might find oneself all of a sudden in such an elevated state. Now this experiential phenomenon is not itself captured only in terms of fittingness, but part of it often is and sometimes that might be the best available description of the experience one can grasp for. The particular diffuse tone it possesses is manifested in a sense of heightened awareness, of something being consonant with a more or less determinate order of things. This 'something' ranges from the particular nature of the actions or states of affairs one is momentarily engaged in through to a deeper sense of one's very being resting side by side at ease with that
order. And as to the order itself, again this is very often a rather shapeless matter. If a sense of the causally operative order is not always particularly well-defined, as I argued in the previous sub-section, this phenomenon is even less susceptible of a sensed determinate object toward which one is experiencing the fitting relation. So far as the immediate experience is concerned, I think that - odd as it sounds - a sense of fittingness is described as such by us without the corresponding object. That is to say, we do in these moments have this sense, which we record in terms of fittingness and similar words, but not an immediate consciousness of exactly what it is with which we have entered into this relation. This contention I believe to apply equally to moral and non-moral instances of the experience. And this is the second point. For, while the phenomenon runs across a broad band of experience classes, it also shares this feature across them, of an inchoate, uncertain object with which one feels oneself to be enjoying the relation of fittingness. I do not think this experiential sense causes us, as subjects of it, much trouble by its very vagueness. We do use this class of description - to the extent, of course, that we actually do have the experience - without inquiring into the nature of the fitting relation or being all that concerned by its evident lack of clarity. This note I append simply in order to point out the degree of indeterminacy we can put up with in our experience, even while a philosophical mode of thought would press for greater explication of the matter.

With these two major points having been presented, I would like to draw out their place in the reading of the experience to which I seek to give phenomenological description. Firstly, I should state that the fact that a particular tone or strength of an experience class, such as that of the moral demand in its immediate strike on consciousness, is shared with other classes of greater and lesser analogous purport, need not itself be of any signal importance for analysis. So the repeated cause I have had in this and the previous chapter to draw out similarities of the moral experience with other areas of our experience need not *prima facie* be viewed in sceptical light. What is required is that for each proffered
instance of an analogy-drawing or of a shared feature highlighted its specific significance be made clear. And the one which I wish to elicit here is this. The degree to which this experience forms a part of a wider purchase on a fittingness-type of experience, suggests to me that its importance for the picture of that moral experience should be carefully circumscribed. I take this to be a straightforward application of the Husserlian steps of presuppositionlessness and of permitting the appearances to have an initial sway for one's assessment of the descriptive presentation. The first simply enjoins in this specific case that one not move too quickly from a particular viewed slice of experience to conclusions about its genesis or entire nature based on the questionable importance and claims made concerning the fitting relation. The other turns the description on its head entirely. For paying close attention to the appearances rests that felt quality of fittingness in a wider placing within the experience of the moral demand, one which sees it in quite restricted contextual space. Since this is a matter of recording immediate appearances as the phenomena of our moral experience are constituted in consciousness, it may omit the deeper significance of that narrow band of experience as its horizon is uncovered for analysis. Nevertheless, the fact that its occurrence is far from frequent or universal (as fittingness in moral states of affairs) at least suggests that a greater recognition should be given on the part of philosophy to the wider panoply of moral experience from which it stands out. Since this band is not given generally in the mode of fittingness, or at a heightened awareness of value entities interacting with the subject, I believe that a view of the moral demand in experience as appraising one of and putting one into contact with a special kind of value realm is seen to be tenuous as a phenomenological claim if it is pursued via the fittingness relation.

This would not itself be so damaging a point to make if such value intuition did go on in the heightened experience. There is no reason _a priori_ why any kind of value realm and apprehension of it should be widespread and available in absolutely clear ways to description. That is why I have devoted so much attention to the
heightened form of experience, on the supposition that it is reasonable to expect that kind of intuition to be given there if it is given anywhere. The problem, of course, is not just that the general range of the experience goes on at a level of strength and intensity below the standard examples of moral philosophical literature, and does not appear to be signalling special sorts of values or demanders from 'out there' to us; it is also that the peak form of experience does not do the signalling either to any great degree or any determinate degree. I use terms more cautious here than simply saying that no such experience is marked by a value sense because, as I have said in previous sub-sections, I think there is something like this sense that does go on.

What the riders modifying the 'degree' of the data given in that sense's operation are intended by me to indicate are two facts presented by the appearances, both of which I have been in the process of discussing: the first, that the form of experience itself is not the one with which we are most often acquainted; and the second, that even at its peaks the moral demand is not the intuition of values as special external objects, but of a much more rough and vague sense of touching upon a reality that is inter alia thought of as if a morally-charged reality of some loose kind. This, then, is the second issue I wish to draw out from the points sketched above. It is that, though fittingness gives some purchase on an outer moral reality, it does not give very much. Nor does it give it very clearly. A sense of the fittingness of one's apprehension of a demand with the way of whatever, or of that relation of one's action with some way, is a weak candidate for phenomenological presentation of value ontology. Far more felicitous results would be gleaned, I believe, from the feel of fittingness which goes for us with the experience and behaviour in the light of and correspondent with the values we hold and our group avows - those commitments, needs, and treasured goods which we strive to maintain, protect, and promote. This feel, which I do not think is all that different from the one we have when we come across the right phrase or word in tackling a composition to be written, is not specially mysterious. (It can be undergone either in immediacy or later on reflection). Perhaps one tends too easily to assimilate the notion of moral
fittingness with those spiritual-religious ones with which I compared it earlier. Given the issues at stake, that might be an understandable approach. But when the comparison class is taken instead from the rather more mundane sense of fittingness that goes with the right arrangement of one's daily affairs then I think that we will find ourselves less inclined to give the moral one a special metaphysical status.

The importance and life-significance of the moral field is not impugned thereby, of course. But the tendency to assimilate its operation to a realm of external moral values with which we interact by the way of a sense of fittingness need not be followed. As a matter of the logic of the concepts, it does not follow that from the feel one can infer specific moral objects corresponding with it; nor, indeed, as the descriptive object of phenomenological exegesis does the feel exhibit itself aligned with a moral reality both clearly and distinctly given up to view. Furthermore, I do not think this sense of fittingness is all that strongly evinced to oneself when it is active. This again moves it away from the religious analogy and in doing so away from a heightened awareness of some divine demander or cosmic way toward which one's thoughts and action are fitted. While I cannot conclude from this that absolutely no value apprehension goes on at all for any of us, I do think that these considerations weigh in the balance of evidence against taking a feel of fittingness as that one which delivers us party to a special value realm. The rationale for my looking most closely at the heightened form of demand experience generally, and at its qualititative accompaniment by the fitting sense, has a coupled foundation. The most obvious reason for doing so is that I then follow the trend of moral philosophical exposition of the matter. This both puts the debate within a recognizable and established framework as well as giving me the material with which and against which to work. So a good deal of my argument stands in the experience generally given in the literature, while reacting against that also in pointing out the lack of attention it entails to the wide swathes of moral experience lying below such peak levels. The other reason for this type of examination is a little more tendentious and, while I think it reasonable, I am not able to argue much
beyond the stage of convincing a reader that it is indeed a reasonable enough assumption on which to work. And that is the one with which I have often been working, namely, that if there is an intuition of external, special moral somethings on our part, one would at least expect to find it in the heightened experience if anywhere. This carries the corresponding implication - though it is not entailed in strictly logical fashion, again I feel it to be reasonable - that failure to find it evinced at such a level means absence of it from the experience *tout court*. Looking at the phenomenology of this particular set of data, as well as the others discussed earlier, I believe that the overall panorama of the experience that comes to light is one which does contrast with much of its standard portrayal in the literature, and that, in doing so, that image which emerges is both closer to the actual working of our experience and further away from the notion of it as being of putative value entities acting on us.

Further to this form of argument from the phenomenological finding which I have repeatedly employed, I want also to make another point which I have canvassed before. I should like the reader to recall the emphasis given in my previous discussion, where I maintained that the most common form of a heightened, significant experience of the moral demand is put upon us by the way of the negative ones concerning states of affairs that are amiss, in crisis, bad, or evil. I take from this two suggestions of importance for the critical project being expedited. The first is simply that which was made before, that concentration of moral philosophical discussion on 'the good' distorts, ignores, or at least leaves on one side unnoticed, the more poignant, powerful, and common form of moral experience: this form being of quite the opposite. (This point is directed, of course, to a matter of phenomenological exposition and the objects of our moral experience, rather than to any kind of impugning of the philosophically-aided search for the good in life). If I have had cause in preceding sections to cast doubt on the alleged presence in our experience of 'the good' as it seems to inhere in or radiate from a divine will or cosmic ordering or special value realm; and given my continued
emphasis on the haziness and indeterminacy of the objects of our moral experience:-
then it is in the compass of evil that I think we are likelier to encounter the more
piercing and clarified apprehension of disvalue. Fittingness here fades into a
background presence as the grinding, arresting, assailing sense of the very
unfittiness of certain states of affairs leaps into sharp relief. This is, I believe, the
phenomenon with which we are the more familiar and through which our moral
consciousness is most commonly and strongly engaged. As to its degree of
determinacy, while I believe it to be a more clearly delineated form of experience
than its obverse - as I said just above - it too requires care when attending to what
turn out to be the multifarious ways in which subjects brush against this area.

An initial remark that certainly calls to be noted is, straightforwardly
enough, that we ourselves hardly ever use a form of identification or expression
for our moral experience which makes play of such terms as 'fittingness' and its
opposite. Though there is an experiential sense of these relations occasionally at
large, much less often for the former than for the latter I believe, they do not form
part of the ordinary moral discourse of our community, either between or within
ourselves. And further to this point, I wish to make another one which is directed
both to the substance of this sub-section as well as to the general understanding of
the nature of the bad or evil in our moral experience. It is one that attempts to give
more phenomenological depth to the description of the negatively toned experience
than is captured under the aegis of 'evil'. What I think captures these phenomena
more aptly than that philosophically weighted notion is a congeries of descriptions
invoking the following modes of an experiential sense: the shocking, horrifying
nature of the situation before one; the jarring, disturbing sensation in
consciousness and sense of the situation as possessing those properties; the
awareness of crisis, of matters out of kilter, a sense which veers towards that of
chaos at its extreme. This shift of emphasis from evil to the sense of things severely
amiss constitutes the second suggestion of importance to which I think this
phenomenology gives rise. It is a more lucid phenomenon in consciousness at the
heightened level of the moral demand than any corresponding sense of 'the good' being presented or tugging on one. Taking the doorstep-starving as an example, the unfittingness of the situation is a far clearer, more striking experience than is the sense of fittingness wrought in one's possible further action of rendering aid. Insofar as a heightened form of experience is sometimes with one in the first half of example v - the famine on the television - I think that these phenomena again differ with respect to determinacy of content. For the unfittingness or clashing, crisis-borne sensation which is directed to the famine has a fairly lucid content, that is, the suffering and the need for its immediate cessation. The fittingness of one's reaction of horror, and/or dismay, and/or anger may also be a felt phenomenon, though not very often in immediacy. But as to the fittingness of one's action or of any action at all by any means or agency, insofar as that goes beyond the simple eradication of the crisis, that is generally like the presented demand itself, a rather open-ended and unsure matter. Unfittingness is a more common phenomenon than fittingness, then, if these general areas of experience should be described by subjects in such terms. But that relation represents itself only as a small segment of the ways in which we experience and express such negative phenomena.

With this much having been said, the often greater and sharper intensity of the apprehension of unfittingness seems to me, though closer-looking to an external value disclosure than the good and fittingness, ultimately not to be doing so either. To be sure, in these especially charged instances we do come near to a kind of negative value intuition. Our everyday moral language easily lends itself to that reading. For many of us, in the teeth of some situation that fills us with horror and indignation, the natural, philosophically untutored response makes reference to a global or transcendent evil over and beyond the descriptive epithet of particular acts and characters as being so. The sense of unfittingness, of some kind of instability in the ordering of our affairs, perhaps tending even to a cosmic scale, could appear as the misalignment or sundering of moral values 'out there'. (Not that our identification of our experience or its object at such times would rest at use of the
term 'unfittingness': that would be felt to be woefully inadequate either to the tone of our experience or the severity of the situation it is directed toward). Now I think that these types of experience, encountered with respect both to largescale issues like the actions of certain repressive regimes toward their populace and on a personal, local level like seeing some kids setting fire to a cat, seem to us to be particularly close to instantiating a value like 'evil'. If there is some sense on our part approaching that of a sense of this value somehow at large, then it is not so much of the unfittingness of matters, nor of the value causally bringing about one's experience and subsequent action, but rather of the awesome, dreadful fashion in which the situation is presented to one and, for most of us, in which it is thought it will be presented to any other who comes across it. And this, I think, is not well analyzed either as intuition of a value quality or as expressing the tone only of the experience itself. It neither ascribes a (totally) independent property to the situation nor is it contained only within the experiential datum; yet it does contain some sense of the independence of the experience's object and it does express also the strike this makes on the self. Something more complex than, say, either the sense of horrifyingness 'out there' or the purely 'inner' phenomenon of being horrified, is given through our moral experience. Fittingness is thus a good illustration of this matter. For, as an experiential phenomenon, its apprehension consists in the felt interaction both of an external order with which one is in proper relationship and the right ordering of self which is capable of entering into such alignment.

My talk of the senses (both linguistic and as a feel on the subject's part for her experience) of 'independence' and of 'self' ingredient in the experience of the moral demand requires further descriptive work to make clear their contribution to that experience and marriage within it. What I am inclined to take away from the phenomenological analysis of the chapter is this. Presentation of the experience as specifically and universally directed toward special objective moral entities or properties or, conversely, as simply a subjective reaction lacking any reference to independent states of affairs, is incorrect. That much is evident to a quite quick
phenomenological glance. But further to that, I believe that the phenomenology shows the experience to be not at all readily bifurcated in this fashion, such that one could resolve its constituents down onto the sides 'objective/subjective' or 'outer/inner' without a complex remainder. Some further kind of vocabulary needs to be employed to give adequate descriptive record of the feel this experience has for us. And in order to expedite a more felicitous form of analysis I believe the categories of self/not-self should be used. Such investigation promises to bring out the extent of independence of self being experienced with regard to the moral demand, figuring both in the way of independence-as-exteriority and of independence-as-unwilled/unwillable. It will act also as a development of reflective thought on the constitution of direct experience which takes it through to those more specially reflective modes of consideration on the experience which were pointed out in the latter half of chapter 3.
Concluding comments to chapter five

I have tried in this chapter to wrestle with a number of different moral philosophical themes that, through the moral demand experience and representations of it, point to moral values and/or demanders 'out there'. In each case I believe that I have shown the opponent view to rest on an inaccurate or misleading phenomenology. Summarising the route taken and results gained, the following general positions have emerged:

- i) Some moral demands irk, that is to say, appear in consciousness as unwelcome, irritating, and even alien. But not all do and some that may be irritating need not also be felt as alien, threatening presences. The complicity of the self and its identified concerns seems the determining factor in this matter.

This exposition led me to look at the experiential sense of the demand's independence of the subject:

- ii) Moral demands all possess the feature of 'incomingness', that is, of seeming to arise from sources either outwith consciousness or independently of one's conscious control. The former phenomenon I call 'exteriority'; the latter I have generally labelled as being unwilled/unwillable.

Hence I was brought to look at the exteriority of the demand, looking specifically for moral values 'out there' contained in the phenomenological data. This task I approached through the media of both the contentual and causal elements to the experience. In both analyses I am maintaining that either:

- there just is no sense of any outer moral reality interacting with oneself for each moral demand experience;

or:

- when there may look to be such a sense, as I believe there fairly often to be at the heightened experiential level, it is loose and indeterminate. Moral values 'out there' are not taken as object. Something like a morally-tinged reality may be felt sometimes to be at large and at work, but only in rough and imprecise way. Nor, pace Mackie, do we make much use of reference to such things in our
everyday moral discourse. To be sure, moral matters are felt to be very important and pressing, matters on which we can't just beg to differ. But that isn't the same thing as perception of, or a claim to be perceiving, a value realm.

I think that the particular hue which the peak demand has in consciousness resembles that of an obsession. One is forced, one cannot ignore the demand. And yet there are ' obsessions' which are intimately conjoined with the self and aligned with its concerns - such as engage themselves in hobbies, political beliefs, and friendships. The moral demand seems to me to display both alien and close relations to the self for us as different individuals and for a single individual at different times. In the light of this consideration, the next chapter goes on to look at the independence-as-unwilled, and to try to unravel the degree of self/not-self felt to be working in the experience.

As a kind of postface to this chapter and the previous one I want to say this. The tenor of the discussion in both may look rather negative in places. I have often attacked certain ways in which the moral demand experience is represented in moral philosophy. From its presentation as a particular charged experience giving a window onto a determinate value realm, my phenomenological exposition has gone instead to a description that sees those phenomena as far less widely exhibited and far more vaguely so. As I said in the introduction to chapter 4, though this is a negative critique, it has also a positive drive to it. The analysis attacks those portrayals of the experience in the process of and in order to formulate a phenomenology more closely reporting our actual experience.

My claim is that part of the interesting and original nature of this is founded in the way in which accurate phenomenological description counters the one given by parties who are divided by different metaethical theories but who share a value phenomenology. This obviously gives rise to the question of how it is that certain phenomenological elements of the experience should be so shared across moral philosophical theories and traditions. It especially raises the question of how and why they should have employed inaccurate, errant phenomenologies. As to the
practice of phenomenological description in this thesis, these questions are not germane. But it would not be right to say nothing on the matter. So I will voice my suspicion. It is that a concern with metaethical problems and preoccupation with procedural rules of moral debate has resulted in a neglect of the everyday workings of the moral consciousness as it comes across moral demands. Moral philosophers have tended, therefore, to take quick and superficial assay of such experience when they have thought it necessary to mention it; it being rather unsurprising therefore that they should have latched upon certain notable features of the heightened level of experience. I think the notion of a consciousness of values 'out there' making demands on one has arisen through disregard of the complexity and composition of the experience - which I have tried to render more representatively. I hope that these claims on my part do not appear too inflated, given that I claim to be dispatching as inaccurate a number of views of the experience. I believe them to be based on a sober and careful analysis which will be borne out by the reader as you think on the data provided by your own moral consciousness.
CHAPTER SIX

Is...valuation primarily a stance that we, as agents, or experients, take up to objects or states which come before us, or is it primarily a "light" in which objects or states appear before us, much as they come before us as being about to do this or that, or as having this or that bearing on one another, etc. In other words, is valuation primarily an attitudinal or phenomenological matter, a matter of how someone stands to some content or a matter of the way in which that content comes up or appears before him? Or is there both an attitudinal and a phenomenological side to the matter, and is there perhaps some deep relation between them?

J.N. Findlay¹

Neither object-directed nor subject-confined, the moral experience resides in a tertium quid.

A.-T. Tymieniecka²
Chapter Six

Extended introduction

The guiding thread that ran through the previous chapter continues through this one. In that chapter I had cause repeatedly to emphasize that the subject-independence of the moral demand experience need not, and should not, be seen by the way of special independent moral values 'out there'. How the experience should be seen instead is as involving some external reality and as independent of the subject's directly willed control. This contention was made by means of phenomenological presentation of the experience. In it moral values or demanders of a specific nature and location were not found themselves to be present as if 'out there'; but the independence of the experience from the subject of it was discerned. The point of the argument in the two preceding chapters, and that which I maintain also in this one, is summed up admirably in the following quotation. In the context of criticizing the value ontology of Max Scheler, one writer comments that:

[Some notion of objectivity seems to arise] from the psychological observation that our liking, approval and admiration (or reverse) seem very often to be elicited from us by the thought or perception of an object, and are not simply conferred or projected upon objects at our own arbitrary pleasure. But mere impressions of this kind are a slender foundation on which to build an ontology, nor does it in the least follow from these facts that the act of approval has to be construed as a sort of perception (or response to perception) of a non-natural property lurking in or behind the object approved of.3

The stuff of this quotation obviously goes beyond my specific areas of discussion. So I am going to restrict the thought contained in it for my purposes to the phenomenological investigation of the moral demand experience. Having found wanting descriptions of this experience as containing special value objects, then, I will now undertake inquiry into how the experience seems to the subject to be located. In order to do this, I have chosen to adopt the terms 'self' and 'not-self' to
capture the admixture of constituents which the subject feels to be responsible for the experience.

The description of the experience's constitution will show, I believe, that certain distinctions current in moral philosophy fall on different sides of the self/not-self division according as the subject has some awareness of the experience's placing on a band bridging degrees of the self and the not-self. Such distinctions include the following:

- subjective/objective
- interior/exterior
- under one's control/independent of the will
- constituted by the self/constituted by the not-self
- near the core self/away from the core self.

I think that there is a natural supposition at large in moral philosophy that in our experience all the left hand sides of the distinctions above align with each other, and that so too do all the right hand sides. I shall question whether that really is the case in this chapter and show ways in which the alignments are more subtle.

For the purposes of this descriptive work I shall be maintaining, then, a twin usage of the terms 'self' and 'not-self'. One will be referring to that perceptual sense which we have (however determinate it may be) of the degree to which the self and that which is other to it make up a particular experience. And the other will be utilising another kind of identification which we sometimes have in more and less clear fashion regarding an experience: the degree of nearness to a core self which the experience displays. An apposite way in which the reader might view these distinctions is by taking a particularly powerful experience of an emotion like hate. While this is usually held by us clearly to be composed by the self, it can also (either in immediacy or on later reflection) be identified as far from the core self, perhaps even as alien or threatening. It is not something with which one identifies oneself, even though one is the logical 'owner' of the experience. It is, to that extent, perceived as the 'not-self'.
The purpose of such an analysis has two chief strands to it. One consists in executing further phenomenological description of the moral demand experience, giving a fuller account of its appearance in the consciousness of the subject and her later reflection on it. In doing so, I will try to address the content of the two quotations that head this chapter as suitably directed by me to the relevant subject area. Concerning the Findlay comment, I shall show that some experiences of the moral demand may indeed be resolved within the kind of distinction about which he is inquiring; that is, as matters of self and not-self face one another and interact. But I will also point to a range of demand experience which cannot be so easily captured descriptively in that way and which require instead more careful representation. One form of alignment of the self and not-self which I believe deserves greater attention is that of a porous and indeterminate admixture of them such as might be called a tertium quid in the way of the other headline quotation for the chapter.

The other element to the chapter will ferry discussion to further and higher reflective levels at which the subject can address the experience. This will involve both the degree of the self’s commitment to moral and non-moral matters and how demandingness figures in those schema, and also a more reflective appraisal by the subject of the possible nature and source of the demand. So this chapter will present a description of the experience that can be seen both as self-contained as well as straddling the earlier phenomenological exegesis and that to come.
Section One: What is and what is not the self in experience

I shall present my description by means of a few examples of the type, discussing the approach they represent, and then applying it as I go along to the moral demand experience. I will later put to use once more the analogous areas of aesthetic and religious experience, which seem to me especially meet ones in virtue of the similar questions that naturally arise with respect to the constitution of experience discerned by the subject in them.

1.i - Experience as constituted by the self and not-self

Here is an example of the registration of an experience which has been presented thoughtfully as to its exact location:

The flowers I look at in the garden, as they are for me, are as much contents of my consciousness as is my body, and even as is my most intimate selfhood, and their pleasing quality is a species of pleasure belonging out there rather than in here. It is not that I register the shape and colour of the flowers and feel an inward frisson in response, but that the flowers themselves are directly pleasurable.5

The way in which this experience is taken by its recorder as being owned/generated by/inhering in the self is detailed. And also there is a sense of the not-self going to make up the experience: that which is not part of consciousness, but given to it. The second sentence of the quotation has what at first may be a slightly 'queer' look to it. The flowers-being-pleasurable is quite a different way of seeing matters than the pleasure (self) taken in the flowers (not-self). Such a description seems to have itself placed in both camps, as it were.6 This is one state of affairs in which self and not-self seem to have been described in a mixed fashion. In this chapter I shall return to that kind of phenomenon and discuss it at greater length.
This kind of point is made also by another philosopher writing on the notion of such phenomena as the (perceptual) sense of danger and pleasure being allegedly purely matters of the self and presented to one as such. I shall quote him at length. He asks that we do this:

Take a situation that is very threatening. Imagine a tree falling down in your direction. Does it really make sense to believe that we do not perceive the danger directly but that the "neutral" tree causes a sensation in us and that the whole response of our body is produced by it?7

And he adds that:

It is a matter of immediate experience...In these situations there often is no sensation inside us. It may sound strange, but if one wanted to describe these experiences correctly, one would have to say that it is the cigarette itself that has the quality of "being-tempting" [one of his earlier examples]. And the same is true for the falling, threatening tree, for a leaf that is luxurious, for a vulnerable face, or voice that is revolting. The main pattern in all these situations is that of a presentation. One confronts ..., there is no duality of indifferent, neutral stimulus and value-quality-endowed sensation. In direct experience these qualities are not by-products. On the contrary, they "come first", their assertion is immediate, and it is they who in turn evoke effects. They are of one piece with the "given", and are encountered as integral with it.8

So here also we find another philosopher giving a representation of particular experiences in which he employs the distinction between that which appears as self and that which stands as other to it. Both authors represent elements of the direct experiences they address as being located on the other side of the self/not-self distinction from that which we are sometimes inclined philosophically to locate on the self side. The way in which the flowers are 'pleasurable' and the situation
'threatening' for each author is given as outwith the breast of the experiencing subject rather than as being an 'inner' response to an outer 'stimulus'.

As for myself, I find the two sample descriptions partly consonant with the data from the experience, but requiring greater refinement. I am not so sure, for instance, that Sprigge adequately distinguishes between pleasure, being-pleasurable, and 'pleasurableness', so that they do not end up getting rather merged together in the one experiential description. On the spectrum of self/not-self those states of affairs would seem to me on first glance to be composed differently, to involve differing degrees of the self's involvement. In the case of pleasure, one is presented apparently with a phenomenon of the self; while in that of the flowers-being-pleasurable there is a more intimate relation between the properties of that which is other to the self, that which is a disposition of the self, and their interaction in the instant. And in the case of the 'pleasurableness' of the flowers it appears that the phenomenon is placed outwith one's self: while inhering in consciousness as an experience, it is not seeming in its immediacy to be located within the self. I would express a similar point with respect to Bergmann's characterization where also, I think, being-tempted and being-tempting are not treated to sufficient description; as, too, being-dangerous and one's sense of danger seem disregarded, at least as possibly involving shades of difference. At any rate, they serve the illustrative purpose of bringing into focus a particular phenomenological form of describing experience.

One way in which I would like to refine the descriptions given above, and which I will be using later in regard to the moral demand experience, is by finding less distinct the description of self and not-self in certain areas of our experience. In the samples given above it seems to me that the authors try to show that much of the experience lies on the other side of the self/not-self distinction from that with which we are often likely to identify it. I think, however, that the distinction itself will be rendered much more fluid and indeterminate in the immediacy of some experience. That is to say, the subject will be sensing neither a clearly defined self nor a precise
focus of that which is other to the self in the experience. She will be enmeshed in
the experience such that, as it is occurring, no definite loci are felt by her to be those
which are constituting the experience.

1.ii - Experience as identified with the self or not-self

I want to employ one further direct quotation to head into my specific
approach to the moral demand experience. It gives a good summing-up of that
approach, as well as providing me with a view to explore and develop. One writer
on conceptual issues in the nature of the self has put his view in these words:

At a minimum experience may be roughly divided into two major
categories: self and not-self. That is, there is a class of experience
which the individual can identify as personal or intrinsic to his own
individual existence. This class may be distinguished from
experiences which seem extrinsic or separated from the individual.
Within the class of self-experience may be included the emotions,
iconic images, sentiments, feelings of right and wrong, sensations
of pleasure and pain, desires, both overt and covert physical
movement, memories, and so on.9

Now this characterization seems to me to express well the general ways in which
experiences are taken by the subject as part of her, as readily placed within the
general map of her own self-identification, as ones that find an easy habituation in
the concerns, interests and commitments of her own self. Such an involvement of
experience with the self may be more and less significant for the subject: as being
'personal or intrinsic to his own individual existence', as the author above puts it;
or simply as located within the vague boundaries of that which is acceptable,
comfortable to the self, generally conformable to what one is prepared to find
within those boundaries.

One point which I wish to draw out in the light of the comment above, and
about which I have talked already in the previous chapter, concerns the ways in
which the experiential play of self and not-self, as the subject identifies them in immediacy, can alter. Taking the experiences listed by Gergen, I think that they can also on occasion appear as presences other to the self, or even alien and threatening to it; they are then identified in some way as not-self, even if it is the self that 'has' the experiences. They might appear also in the paradoxical guise both of assailant to self and yet as revelatory of its own deep needs and desires: as a desire or pleasure which one regards as perverse or distasteful or foreign to one may yet reveal - either as it arises or on later reflection on it - parts of one's own shrouded self. That is, experiences can appear to different subjects and to the same subject across time as either close to and identified with the self or as facing it, simply as other or even as opposed to it.

I think that in this kind of area it is also useful to distinguish between the feeling that an experience is constituted in part by the self but is not definitive of one's true self; and the feeling that an experience belongs to one and is definitive of one's own true self. Such an identification may require epicycles on one's own part in order to track down, as it were, both the origin of a particular experience and how one ultimately regards it. And I believe in addition that a subject can operate with a general feel for the proximity of certain experiences to a core self of concerns, interests, and engrossments that have central place for her own identification. Experiences may, then, be close to the core self or penumbral; threatening to it or merely outwith its local orbit.

I have one final general commentary to present in this preliminary section. The quotation from Gergen above represents in its tenor the complexity that one's description must try to capture in the kind of divisions through which the subject matter is sorted. And the ways in which the categories of self and not-self overlap with those of the subjective and objective in the experience are not prima facie obvious, I believe. To recapitulate my work in the previous chapter, I think that objectivity in experience may be differently perceived according as its independence of the subject is felt either as exterior to her or as outwith her direct willed control. I
have already suggested that that which is part of oneself (extreme anger, for example) may also be experienced as if the assailing force of the not-self were putting itself upon one; while an independent force like that of a seeming divine call on one may also be felt as closely allied to the central currents of the self. Initially, then, I am saying that there may be differences between the different categories that describe our experience which may also prove to have a significant bearing on that of the moral demand. I now turn to that particular experience.

Section Two: Self and not-self in the constitution of the moral demand experience

To begin with, I shall try to describe the sense a subject has of the moral demand experience's placing on the scale of self/not-self as it occurs in immediacy, and then go on to mix freely both direct and more reflective modes of her grasp on the experience. I will present to the reader the moral experience both as it seems to the subject to be constituted by either self or not-self and as it is felt by her as close or far, alien or comfortable, important or peripheral, or merely other to the identity and interests of the self.

Let us look at an example taken from the literature. Take the one presented by Harman, in which a subject responds to the local adolescents setting fire to a cat. Harman is keen to portray and use this example in such a way that any so-called 'moral facts' or 'moral properties' are not seen to play any part in the explanation of one's moral reaction (be that bare horror at the kids' act or the more articulated registration of a specific value judgement). Given, however, the writ for analysis promulgated above, let us study the case and a subject's possible experience of a moral demand in terms of a phenomenological description of self and not-self.

I present here a list of possible unravellings of that description as it might describe the subject's experience in immediacy and on later reflection. I shall put the descriptions in summary form and then develop each point afterwards.
a) The subject feels the 'badness' of the act demanding that the situation be
dealt with (perhaps by herself). This is experienced by her as the impingment of the
not-self on her. Her sensing the badness and the demand, or judging that the act is
so, is the felt contribution of the self to her experience.

The same kinds of identification go also for her experience of the illegality
or forbiddenness of the act as the not-self, and her registration of shock or horror as
within the perimeters of the self.

b) The exteriority of the cat's pain and the kids' act is experienced as the
not-self, as outwith her own self. Her feeling these to be bad, her being horrified or
feeling sick at the sight, are experienced as part of her self.

c) The subject experiences feelings of horror, repulsion & c. as identified
with the not-self and which impinge by their demandingness on the self. Such
feelings seem to her as faced toward her as if from outside the central core of the
self.

d) A hazy or no distinction could be made by the subject in immediacy
between the object and her reactions. In this case the subject has no clear sense, or
none at all, of the way in which self and not-self are related in the constitution of the
experience. Later reflection may, of course, resolve the distinction more finely for
her.

2.i - Exteriority of moral demandingness as not-self

Distinction a) seems to me the primary one on which a purchase might be
gained for the notion of a special moral property 'out there' which has a
demandingness or which specifically makes demands on oneself. And insofar as it
makes reference to an apparently exterior state of affairs like 'badness', then it does
look to contain that kind of predication.

I think, however, that in this instance the element of the not-self is
experienced not as a specific property or disvalue of badness 'out there' that stands
before the response of the self as an independent reality. Rather, it is felt as a matter
arising from some kind of brute reality with which one interacts and which puts upon one the sensation of the demand that is itself outwith one's own willed control and therefore independent of one in virtue of that. The 'badness' and the demandingness, whatever their metaphysical status, are something the self knocks against. They do not lie within the self's direct sphere of action, as it were. They are not-self because the self has to deal with them in experience and not simply its own workings - the response being felt as that which pertains to self in the light of the presented independent state of affairs.

So here is one part which the not-self can play in the experience: as independent of the self, either as outwith its control or as a component in the experience not felt to be made up by the self. In this way, then, the objectivity of the demand experience is identified with the not-self. The objectivity component consists both in the apparently exterior placing of the not-self from the subject and also in its being outside of the direct control of the self.

Turning now to the second half of a) and to the sample description b), I think that the two presentations of the not-self in the experience are those ones by which we very often articulate the context of the moral demand. Indeed, they are the ones into which I believe reflection on the experience will often resolve the sometimes shapeless mass in which the initial spectrum of self and not-self appear. Rather than the quality of 'badness' or a disvalue-being-instantiated, we find here either the sheer otherness of the cat and its pain or the element of the not-self that is felt in that list of forbiddenness & c. that occurs in the description of b) and the second part of a).

The features of forbiddenness, of not-to-be-doneness, which we experience and which may put a demand upon one are salient in the experience here. They themselves are by no means neutral or unawkward with regard to their own metaphysical position, but they are the ones which I think figure more highly in our moral experience than that of seeming value qualities, to which attention is often given in the textbooks. This set of expressions, registering shock and horror as
integral to the demand experience, is the stuff of our daily moral life. The sense of an act's forbiddenness; the awesome, fearful sense of 'I wouldn't do that!'; the extreme aversion it excites in one's breast: these are the routine ways in which an act of the kind being viewed here has its correlate in the pole of the self. They are the ones in which that particular alarm and horror which one can feel at the sight of the act is given to consciousness.

As to the sense of forbiddenness & c., I think that there are different contents of these experiences for subjects which involve different metaphysical objects: from a divine prohibition to societal ones, that latter sometimes involving the background consent of the subject in a shared moral code, and sometimes not so. In particular, I want to distinguish between the apprehension of forbiddenness as falling within the domain of the self and the forbiddenness which gets apprehended as possibly being experienced as the not-self (in virtue perhaps of its arising from the independent will of society). That is, society and its codes are both ontologically independent of the subject as well as independent of her ability to choose what are and are not held by it as valued and otherwise. This is a point to which I will return later. At this stage I just want to emphasize the ways in which the not-self often seems to call on the self for a response or acknowledgement, leaving aside notions of the source or validity of that call. In this respect, the phenomenologist Spiegelberg talks of this kind of presentation to the subject in his description of approval when he says that,

...the object of approval is anything but an inert "victim" of our responses. It presents itself as demanding approval and even as deserving of approval. In this sense approving is...an answering act responding to a situation, or...a "requiredness", analogous to the way in which a question calls for an answer.15

In this section I have begun to identify the subject's sense of where an experience of a moral demand lies on the scale of self and not-self, in reply to the
question asked by Findlay in the headline quotation to this chapter. One main way in which the not-self and objectivity are experienced as the same component by the subject is in the seeming exteriority of elements in the experience, or in the independence from her direct control of the experience's arising and subsequent course, or in both.

In the next strands to my discussion I am going to show how the experience will sometimes render these overlaps and distinctions rather less clear. In particular, I shall inquire into the degree to which the not-self element to the experience can appear either as alien or threatening to the self; or as coalescent with its core composition; or as too intertwined with the self for any easy distinction to be made at all. It is in the light of a putative connection between the independence of the moral demand experience and the core self that I shall be putting forward my argument in the next chapter.

2.ii - Exteriority of the experience of moral demandingness as not-self

In this sub-section I shall address sample c) from my list above. Having said just earlier that the self is brought up before the independent matter of the demandingness, and that between the self's ambit of control and contribution to the experience and that which is outwith it there is a division, it seems to me clear enough that part of such a division can, so to speak, rest at a greater distance from what is characterized in a) as the self. That is to say, there are experiences of the moral demand which are most aptly described in the terms I have given for c).

This kind of division represents much of the stuff of my chapter 5 on the irking or threatening or alien presence of the demand in consciousness. If it is the case from a) and b) that the demandingness with which the situation presents one is the not-self counterpart to an acknowledgement and moral response identified with the self, then so is it in some cases that such a response can seem an independent kind of presence in consciousness, one to which one is faced as if to a phenomenon
other to the self. The phenomenon which I want to mark out here is that of how on some occasions that which looks to be within the locale of the self can appear on others to have shrunk away from it. To remain in a geographical metaphor, here the self seems to have shrunk compared with a), and the experience itself of the demandingness is felt as lying on the other, not-self side of some indistinct boundary. What is felt to belong to the self here, then, is simply the having of the experience.

In this case the not-self element to the experience is perceived both as part of the independence from the subject of the demandingness and also as inhering in the very apprehension of that. The experience itself strikes the subject as separate from the self, as standing faced toward it rather than being within its own perimeter. This may have a threatening or alien appearance, or it can simply be that the experience has not enmeshed with the self and so sits peculiarly divorced from it. In the former case the self has a lively experience of the not-self with which to contend; in the latter, the self takes on the role of (perhaps indifferent) spectator to its own experience.

I think that this is an accurate description of that experiential phenomenon with which we all from time to time are acquainted, one of the apparent exteriority and even strangeness of what we yet take to be a manifestation of our own inner life. The self has the experience, to be sure - but it seems that the experience is faced as other, as not-self to it. An experience like that of the demandingness issuing from the act before one can, I said, fall within the domain of the self. When it does not do so, it is as if the experience were impinging on the self without being part of its own central geography. The experience has not called forth the general concerns and interests of the self, but remains separated, either on the peripheral edges of the self or striking as an interloping force at its equilibrium.

In this sub-section I have shown another way in which a subject feels the impress of the not-self on her. In the case c), then, she takes herself to be aware of
the not-self both in the independence of the experience from her and in the particular peripheral or alien hue it has for her. That which on other occasions is sensed as pertaining to the self in its constitution is yet in this case faced to the self at a remove from it. While the self may be felt still to enter into the make-up of the experience as it is had, the experience is received as if other than and sometimes striking against the self. Compared to its placing in a) and b), the experience seems to have fallen away from the self. The not-self overlaps not only with the objectivity features of the experience - as independent of the subject - but also with the very awareness of the experience's presence to consciousness.

The significant division that is represented by this type of experience is, I believe, that between the occurrence of an experience and its location on a kind of scale of nearness and farness to the concerns, interests and identifications of the self. In this way an experience can be far from that core as a matter of but slight interest, or it could strike at that core in virtue of its threatening, trespassing quality.

If the constitution of an experience involves a geography of self and not-self as component parts, then so too is there a corresponding involvement of self and not-self as that experience finds a placing with respect to the core concerns and identifications of the self.

2.iii - An indeterminate composition of the moral demand experience

As a further species of the experience which is given to the subject, I now discuss the possibility of its being presented as constituted in unknown or straightforwardly undifferentiable manner. Rather than any strict demarcation being sensed between self and not-self in the demandingness issuing from the situation, the subject's immediate experience in d) gives to herself a much more porous and vague admixture of the categories. There seems to be either a rough conjunction of self and not-self which may resolve itself as the subject reflects on the experience;
or there is a hazy interaction between the two which remains as an indeterminate matter even on reflection.

In the case d), then, thought on the experience might be able to disentangle the initial mix of elements of the experience as it was had. What was originally experienced as a rather amorphous mass might come to be subject to a finer-grained resolution: say, as one distinguishes the particular smirk on the adolescents' faces; the cat's screech of agony; one's own jarring shock at the act. These components of what was otherwise an undifferentiated matter in immediacy will often be assigned to the poles of self and not-self. But it may be that no such unpicking of the original threads of the experience occurs on reflection and that the subject is left with a sense either of indeterminacy as concerns the overlaps between self and not-self, or of no distinction at all within the experience. It is with that possibility, and its reality in the immediate experience, that I will now engage my description.

In the case d) I believe that one is presented with the moral demand as if mid-way between the poles of self and not-self. The distinction is not submerged entirely, as it were, without distinction. But a clear and sharp distinction does not seem to the subject to be given in the exigencies of the situation. The demand does not enter consciousness and signal its composition to the subject: it is given simply as there; as a force to be dealt with; as a phenomenon that presents itself to one. Of course, the cat, its suffering, and the adolescents' behaviour can all be given as the not-self. And certain strong reactions of repugnance and horror might be experienced as constituted by and inhering in the self, subject to the qualifications which I discussed in 2.ii above. But the moral demand itself seems in immediacy to hover between those poles. The subject lives through the presentation of the demand: it being experienced as a presentation neither from self nor from the not-self, but as an experiential state of affairs in which she and the situation before her interact in some diffuse way.

What I am saying here is not incompatible, I believe, with my contentions in the last chapter concerning the incomingness of the demand. That phenomenon can
arise from sources either within or outside of the self - though at the time it need not be experienced as if arising from a particular located source. A powerful emotion can 'take' one through the same phenomenological feature of incomingness as an experience of an external object striking our consciousness, and yet be recognized on reflection as (somehow) occurring from within the depths of the self. So in this case I am describing the phenomenon of an experience in immediacy in which the demand is signalled not as lying in a precise place on the scale of self and not-self, a demand which nevertheless possesses the feature also of that incoming appearance before consciousness. This might involve for sure some hazy sense of the demand's incomingness as occurring in virtue of some kind of interaction of the not-self with one. Such an interaction might correspondingly be experienced as an encroachment or even assault on one, or perhaps as a welcome appearance before one. But the actual feel which the subject has in immediacy - and perhaps also on later reflection - provides no easier distinction than that rough one.

At times, I believe that the subject's situation is best described as being 'in' the demand, even though I realize that this form of words may not chime too readily in the ears. I mean by it to convey the subject's sense of the demand's undifferentiated nature with respect in particular to her own involvement in its constitution. The demand does not seem to be composed simply by the not-self in such a way that it is apprehended by or processed and interpreted by some inner sanctum called the self. It is not that kind of interaction that is being felt as presented. Rather, the self's involvement seems to me no more a matter of an inner experience than does the presentation of the demand occur as a purely 'outer' phenomenon. The self and not-self are inter-related in the experience in a more complex manner, one which the categories of 'inner' and 'outer' do not manage to convey.18 For the demand here is constituted in consciousness in an amorphous fashion: the subject, while being the one who has the experience, does not feel herself to be separated from the demand as observer to object, which is why I venture the expression 'in' the demand to describe her experience.
It seems to me that matters stand like this. To continue with a geographical model, the self is spread out to encompass the moral demand, and the element of the not-self which is composing that demand filtrates into the self. Experience of the moral demand in this indeterminate fashion is one into which I believe we all often stumble as moral situations bring themselves to our attention. It is hard to capture with descriptive felicity this phenomenological matter of the experience's constitution as the subject discerns it. No terminology appears to be in accepted use for this kind of experiential blend. So I am going to propose my own. To these vaguely apprehended phenomena - of a roughly apparent not-self intersecting with some process or state of the self - I shall append the expression 'relational but indeterminate'. This both indicates the dual aspects under which the experience is appearing as well as doing justice to the rough and entwined way in which they render themselves up to the subject's immediate sense of their constitutive role in the experience. The phenomenological datum here is best characterized, I believe, as one which I choose to call that of 'osmosis'. I take such a term in metaphorical form from its use in biology, where it refers to the permeability of membranes to the passage across of molecules. What I mean by it is to capture that sense on the subject's part of a dynamic, participative flow of the self and not-self in the experience. It is one which I think may not only refer to a particularly powerful case like that in the Harman example, but also to much of our moral demand experience generally - that is, to the everyday case of a demand being presented when one gives little thought over to its composition, and also to those which themselves defy further clarification.

In this sub-section I have tried to illustrate another way in which the phenomenological data of self and not-self are given to the subject in immediate experience of the moral demand as well as on later reflection on that. The kind of experience represented by d) is one as of a vague overlapping of the contour lines of self and not-self which ordinarily are given more distinctly in the experience. It is
for that reason that I have used the tertium quid quotation at the head of this chapter to indicate this general area. The fuzziness or apparent absence of strict demarcation lines between self and not-self is, of course, sometimes resolved on greater reflection. Talk of a tertium quid is licensed, I believe, both by the lack of definite location in the initial experience and by its sometimes subsequent maintenance of that appearance to further reflection. The subject is presented with neither a clear sense of how the not-self figures in the demand's constitution nor of how the self is involved in the make-up of the experience. She is party to a phenomenon which does involve self and not-self, but which involves them in an intricate, diffuse manner. Rather than a distinct sense of the experience's composition between self and not-self, her awareness of it is as of a third kind of alignment, that which has melted the two in a complex compound.

By virtue of my presentation here I have also given further descriptive data in response to Findlay's question. The case of the experience in d) is a more complicated one than the kinds of states of affairs to which his quoted comments refer. It involves a far less ready discrimination (or none at all) by the subject of the experience into its constituent parts located in subject and object. In addition, I think that this type of experience aids in the general overview of how the various categories which I listed in the introductory section align with one another. And matters stand like this. While in this case the experience is felt as independent of the subject, the degree of involvement of the not-self is not given to her: she does not have any control over the experience, but neither does the experience seem to be under a distinct influence of the not-self, or distinctly constituted by it. Moreover, the categories of 'inner' and 'outer' do not correspond to those of self and not-self, for the experience can be unsurely placed between the latter two while seemingly given purely as an inner phenomenon, that is, as an experience playing before the mind's eye. And that which the subject takes to be the cause of the experience might be straightforwardly exterior to her while the content of it is yet very obscurely combined from the self and not-self. As a further complication, I shall also point
out in section 3 ways in which these differently constituted experiences coalesce with or stand against/away from the identifying concerns of the self.

2.iv - The absence of a sense of self and not-self in the experience

Having described above the ways in which the subject's grasp of her experience sometimes blurs the distinctions between self and not-self, I now want to look briefly at the possible absence of that distinction altogether from the experience.

I think that on occasion, particularly in the peak experience of the moral demand, the subject herself does not even have a sense of self and not-self in the porous interaction that goes to constitute the experience. She simply exists in the thrall of a demand experience. Its presence in consciousness is for her a phenomenon that passes over the scale of self and not-self. Indeed, at the limiting case, I wish to say that the subject's response is more like 'Here's a demand' than 'I am the subject of a demand.'

Of this kind of experience I want to suggest two things. Firstly, it seems to be one that is especially significant at the heightened level of the moral demand experience. In the exigent, cudgelling experience of the sort a subject might encounter on seeing the kids set fire to the cat the scale as it were dissolves in the face of the demand. The subject is swamped by the demand, unable to determine what is arising in the experience from self and that which issues from the not-self. In the instant, she simply lives through the experience and is not given access to the elements going to make up the particular powerful force in which she is caught up.

The second thing I want to say is not incompatible with the content of the paragraph just above, but it does somewhat deflate its tone. It is that the scale is also bypassed in much of our ordinary, low-strike experience of moral demands. Rather than an awareness of the strands combining to make up the experience as it is had in everyday circumstances, the subject will most often not have any feel,
an experience is given, of its being located at all on the scale of self and not-self. If in the presentation of the latter paragraph the experience seems to have transcended the scale, in this one it passes as it were below the subject's consciousness of such distinctions as it impinges in light and unforceful manner on her. The subject merely registers the experience without any further elaboration of its constitution being given to her.

2.v - The absence of a sense of self in the experience

Following on from my description of the heightened experience passing over the scale of self and not-self, I want to make the rather odd-sounding claim that there are times when the only part of the distinction given to one is the sense of the not-self. Insofar as the experience impinges on the subject, striking her and taking her attention by main force, then her sense of self can dissolve in the demand. The demand's own composition as arising from and directed to the not-self is apprehended, but her own sense of self - beyond the minimal conscious level of being the one who is having the experience (and even this degree of self-reflexivity may be submerged) - is swept aside by the force of the incoming demand. Put in less harsh and threatening terms, we can say that in this case she is taken out of herself or that she 'forgets' herself as is so often associated with states of religious and aesthetic contemplation (see also my example viii from chapter 4). The tug of the demand on consciousness is felt keenly and overpoweringly, and the moral situation which cries for redress is the salient component occupying consciousness, often to the exclusion of other elements that may be discerned in the 'cool hour'. In this way it can be said that on occasion it is only the sense of the not-self with which we are acquainted in certain peak experiences.
Section Three: Self and not-self in the reception of the moral demand experience

With the various readings in hand of the ways in which the moral demand experience can appear in consciousness as differently constituted by self and not-self, I turn now to discussion of the ways in which it is received as peripheral or central, alien or welcome by the subject. What appears to me as being of signal importance for a full description of the subject's experience, in terms of self and not-self, is a kind of geography of self-identification. This matter I believe to be one of the self's ongoing notions of that which is important, of concern, of significance to it, with which and by which *inter alia* it identifies itself as the kind of entity it is.\(^{19}\) And in this respect I think that the phenomenological data of a subject's experiential life in general present us with that self by the way of a planetary model: that is, as a central core of basic, essential identifying concerns and interests surrounded by orbiting satellite clusters of other ones in experience which come and go, lodge themselves and move inward as they gain in importance to the self and as they become deep concerns of the centre, or which move out from that core to the periphery of the self.\(^{20}\)

This kind of identification of self and levels of nearness and farness to a felt core, as well as the degrees of ease and disorder with which experiences enter into the self, is of importance for the experience of objectivity in the moral demand. In example c) from my list above the moral demand experience was perceived itself like an object striking consciousness, from which the core self either shrinks back or simply holds itself as logical owner of an experience which seems at a certain remove from the self. In d), and in the sub-section 2.iv, the virtual circumventing of a determinate sense of self and not-self in the peak experience appears nevertheless to involve the subject to an intimate degree. Though she may not have this sense of where the experience is lying on the range self/not-self, I think that we may yet say that in that kind of engrossing, overpowering experience the self is brought into the midst of the moral demand from its deepest level. This might
sound paradoxical to the reader. Simone Weil expresses with great alacrity this strange facet of particularly intense moral experiences when she talks of the self shrinking before the good. This itself is a phenomenon which is figured in the thought of many of the world's great religions as the losing of a narrow and bounded self for a greater sort of self in which their belief is invested. As to the precise feel at the time, the powerful sense of the importance of the demand, of its mattering, it seems to go beyond that of mattering to the particular self living through the experience, even if that might be identified with its deep concerns on reflection. This brings me to my next point - which is also an apparently paradoxical one.

It will be evident from the last two chapters that I believe the independence from the subject of the moral demand experience to be that with which an objectivity element is to be identified (and not with an independent realm of values 'out there'). In the next chapter I am going to claim that this is an essential feature of it. Here I want only to make the point that the experience throughout the cases discussed by me, if it is felt by the subject to be important and to matter, does so as seeming both independent of the self and yet as close to its core. That this may look to be a paradox is only the case, I believe, should closeness to the self be linked necessarily to the ambit of what is controlled by the self. And I do not see there to be a warrant for taking that to be the case. Indeed, a little reflection on this should reveal to ourselves that what is experienced in that way is rarely a matter of an initial choice or as being under one's direct control (though an ongoing commitment - some kind of effort to maintain one's interest and attitudinal stance - may be felt as necessary for some affairs to continue to be concerns of oneself). Most often, the core concerns, interests and stances of the self, by which its very identity is carried for oneself and for others, are those which seem to have chosen one and not the other way around. I think that this contention goes especially for one's relationships, both friendships and long-term sexual ones; for the basic political and moral impulses one draws on; and for certain loyalties to place and
people. What is of signal importance, and which forms the basis of the discussion in the next chapter, is the appearance of the importance, worth, mattering, fascination & c. of such concerns as an independent feature of them, not possessing this only in virtue of having been chosen by the self. This does not mean that the concerns & c. are robed by certain occult qualities of 'matteringness' or value that are instantiated as if coming from a special realm 'out there'. What it does mean, rather, is this. The phenomenological turn, as it were, by which inert, peripheral matters in the experiential economy of the self come to its centre is one which has as an essential feature that of the independence - the not-self - from the very self into which they enter so intimately.

This, it seems to me, tells us something about the moral demand experience and something about the self. I will comment only briefly on the import of this matter, as I aim to cover it at much greater length in chapter 7. As to the experienced moral demand, it figures in the phenomenological description in terms of its incomingness; its independence of the subject's (direct) will; and it appears as arising from some amorphous extra-subjective reality: - these being the facets given as not-self in the constitution of the experience. If that informs us of ways in which the moral demand must appear for subjects to have experience of it, then our description is moved into the domain of the self. For these phenomenological features may prove to be necessary both to the self's interaction with its experience qua a particular band of its experience, as well as being so with respect to a conceptual analysis of how it is that a self operates with certain notions and concerns. This need not mean that, pace an extension of Taylor (1977 & 1989), experience of moral demands and deep concern for moral issues is essential to the very nature of the self, of a being that can be said to have a self. Nor does it discount that experience which we sometimes have in which something appearing as important is registered by us as yet peripheral to the core self, knocking to be let in, as it were. But it does suggest that, if a being is to experience moral demands, then that experience must be of such and such a way in order that that being can
make sense of it as being a moral demand. I will proceed in the next chapter to test whether such features of the demand phenomenology really are essential to it.

Clearly the examination here forms part of a wider aegis for study under which the moral demand experience is subsumed. That is, the contention on my part that there looks to be an essential connection between nearness to the core self of moral concerns, interests & c., and simultaneously a sense of the demand's impingement from the not-self, would seem to go also for such other concerns and demands as the projects, hobbies, loyalties, and passions one evinces, carries through and identifies oneself with in everyday life. They too put demands upon one; seem of a worth or importance or seriousness that stands independently of one's choosing; and go deeply into the self as that which one cares about and which partially constitute one's very image of self.

So here we have an interesting incongruence between the different impact of the not-self in the experience as it enters or tugs on the self. In some instances it can simply brush against the core self, so to speak, calling on it from the edges of the self's own circumference of interests and concerns. Such a call might persist and come to drown out other elements pulling on one's attention; or it might simply fade altogether from consciousness. In other instances the experience is received as if the self were already attuned to its course into consciousness; it goes deeply into the self, is readily taken by the core self as kindred and of meaning for it. And in another kind of relation between the not-self and the core self, the former seems to enter closely into the core but in a threatening or disorientating way, in the manner of an incursion from an unwelcome force that confronts the self.

Of these phenomena I want to say two further things. Looking at the possibility of the not-self interacting with the core self in a manner conformable to its concerns and interests, it seems to me that this might help account for the way in which many moral demands are experienced lightly, or barely experienced at all, and yet draw on the subject in some way, often in her actions (as in example vi of chapter 4). For it appears that the experience is received so cleanly into the core self.
as not to mark its passage by any interrupting or assailing force on one. Indeed, its very demandingness is hardly perceived unless some interfering factor prevents the subject from acting consonantly with the situation before her. This is a theme which I will pursue at greater length in chapter 7. And another one which I shall also be following in that chapter is this. To the extent that some demand experiences seem to strike at the self, and yet others simply fade away from its further edges, it looks as if one sort of demand calls strongly on the self and the other is virtually silent. In these instances the difference may be given by the fact that the threatening demand does not so much strike at the self as alien but as calling on elements already within it, and which cause the subject to be the site of an awkward conflict between different forces from within her own self tugging her in different directions. And here part of its own content seems to have been drawn from the self, to assail it as if other, not-self to it.

Much of the foregoing assumes, of course, that moral concerns of some determinate sort do hold sway with us and are to be found in the core of the self. But that may not be so for all subjects, and the relation may also be a somewhat fluctuating one for others of us. In that respect, talk of moral demands 'going deeply' into us should be qualified in the light of the finding that patently not all do so and many simply drift across the less attended reaches of consciousness. In that way, too, the demand is very much not-self, as if a stranger meandering the borders of one's self.

Section Four: Social origin of the experience as not-self

In my discussion of cases a) and b), I mentioned in passing that the element of the not-self to the demand experience might be accounted for through its representing demands of one's social group that one had apprehended. I think that this possibility is sufficiently noteworthy to stand as a separate point. What I shall do in this section is suggest ways in which the otherness (not-self) from one of society, or a part of it, may look to be the not-self which is responsible for the
particular impingement of a seeming independent moral demand upon one. But I shall also cast doubt on such an account of the phenomenology in virtue of differences between cause and content of experience: while there may be a social genesis to a certain pressurising sensation which puts itself upon one, there is not usually in the experience a content as of a demand of society upon one.

4.i - A social account of the phenomenology

Firstly, to a positive characterization of the matter. Demands arising from one's social group may have gone through a process of internalization, and any basis they may have in rule or law systems have become implicit in a sensitivity for moral matters. But ultimately the social context is as not-self, as outer, as could be - and yet at one and the same time, in the light of what is posited as to the social construction of the self, this may not be entirely at a remove from the self's concerns and ways of identifying itself, given certain basic, universal facts about social life. Society, then, or some likelier sub-group around which a subject's life basically revolves, is that which could constitute the geographical not-self, and that which might account for that vague sense of the demand's being felt to be placed in or arising from 'out there'.

This kind of phenomenological approach would be trying, then, to explore the background life-world to the experience and claiming to find an explanation for the demand's particular feel in that. So this kind of approach would not commit the crude error of making moral judgement to mean 'that which does/does not accord with the demands of society', or of taking direct moral experience always to be referring to such an object when patently neither is the case. What it does do is this. It looks at the phenomenological horizon to the experience and finds moral demands arising in contexts involving other persons whose situations and existence make demands on us. Further to that, is the mass of those demands which are more expressly laid upon one by social living: ones arising from the taboos, proscriptions, and etiquette which any society enshrines. And people, and the
society they compose, are concrete entities (albeit with a complex metaphysics when it comes to society) in ways in which moral values 'out there' are not.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, given that very vagueness of the reference to the reality from which the demand is issuing which I have found in the experience, the social reality of moral demands is one way from which that sense would seem in likely fashion to have arisen - even though the direct experience itself is not making explicit reference, or doing so regularly,\textsuperscript{26} to that reality.

This point has been expressed somewhat similarly by W.H. Urban in his work on valuation. He puts the matter this way. Concerning the kinds of objectivity of value which he upholds, one 'inner' and the other 'outer', he says of the latter:

\begin{quote}
...a value is said to be actual and objective when its object \textit{exists} - not in the physical sense, as an object of sense perception, but still in the outer sense of being the object of a demand external to and independent of the will of the subject.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

And this is so for Urban when the values of the community are apprehended by the subject:

\begin{quote}
...the assumption of existence in this case means outer existence in wills other than our own.\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

Here we find, then, a fashion by which the notion of the existence of values and demanders 'out there' is made clear by the invocation of a public setting. My quoted contention from this author is not meant to suggest that the subject simply kowtows or unthinkingly goes along with the express demands of a certain ill-defined majority, though clearly some of us do so all or some of the time, and many people would appear to think that that is how things should be.\textsuperscript{29} It does serve to show how the voice of the demand in consciousness which is often as if from some reality 'out there' can arise and constitute a tug or brake on the subject (and also how the routine social occurrence of moral situations should be attended by demands of such low-level or barely-recognised strike as that described in my example vi in chapter 4).\textsuperscript{30}
In this way of looking at the phenomenology, then, its proponent would be claiming to discern the operation of the not-self as located in the pressures put upon one by social living, and arguing that the diffuse nature of the demandingnesses which we perceive is understandable in the light of the extremely wide-ranging social reality which is its background. Moreover, such an argument might also begin to address whether the not-self element to the experience is a necessary one: perhaps in virtue of putative facts about the inculcation of a moral consciousness (as necessarily having to represent moral affairs as independent of the wishes of the individual).  

4.ii - Problems from the phenomenology for the social account

Much of what I have represented above would seem quite plausible. Some moral demands are experienced by us directly as issuing from the demands made consciously and expressly by others (individuals or collectives) on us. And some are signalled as if with a certain occult quality to them: as specially inhering in the 'nature' of the person, for instance, or as having about them a peculiar awe-inspiring call in respect of certain interpersonal contexts. Moreover, we are perhaps ourselves dimly aware of the ways in which our upbringing and social life have put in us and maintain a consciousness of moral demands, however they may appear to be located in the actual experience. The not-self which is composed by a social group might also be that with which one's own core self identifies to differing degrees.

The social setting of the moral demand should therefore be borne in mind, both as a possible explanation of the phenomenological feel of experience, and also as forming the circumambience in which the experience operates. In the case of forbiddenness, of an action being felt as 'beyond the pale', or one which the subject feels herself 'called' to do (and where these are not taken specifically to be divinely-inspired demands), we may seem to be especially close to the location of the
experience of independence as one's perception of widely-held standards. Of course, not all of the experience might reveal its social grounding as it occurs, but then that would simply mean that its origins had become obscure. Blackburn says of the phenomenology, in the light of an attempted exposition on his part of the ways in which moral experience arises in a social setting:

The precise "feel" of an ethical stance may be a function of local culture, in its scope, or some of its interactions with other pressures and other beliefs. A pressure toward action can be associated variously with pride, shame, self-respect, and there is no reason to expect a simple phenomenology to emerge. The essence lies in the practical import, but the feelings that surround that can vary considerably. There is no reason for a stance to feel much like a desire, for example...No "reduction" of an ethical stance to one of any other type is needed.35

Now all these comments just above give due acknowledgement to a possible social account for the demand experience. But I think that they involve a series of confusions that result from the rather tenuous foundation which they have in the actual phenomenology.

It is clear that cause and content of the experience should be kept in sharp distinction. If it is the case that a comprehensive history of the genesis and maintenance of this particular kind of experience can be given in terms closely explaining its social links, then it is not the case that such an origin and history are carried within the experience. Some of the experience does, as I have said, strike one as emanating from or conforming to the demands of a social group. But it is not, on the whole, signalled as arising in that way, and its content does not refer to demands of that sort.

There are a number of confusions into which I think a social account can fall in virtue of this distinction not being attended to. One problem may come simply from the fact that the causes of our experience of moral demands are not always at
all clear in immediacy or on later reflection. And when they are, they tend to relate
to the particular impact of the individual circumstances of a case before one's mind.
'Demands of society' are not usually, however, felt to cause one's experience of a
moral demand. This brings me to a second problem encountered in distinguishing
between the social strands of a causal web from which our experience is putatively
constructed. It is this. There is a great difference between a demand which relates to
society and which one apprehends, and a demand which is put upon one as being
an explicit plea or voiced expectation on one coming from society. In the former
case one takes oneself to have encountered that somewhat vague reality in which the
demand has its reference and from which it arises. And in the latter, one actually
feels that a social pressure is being put upon one to conform in what one
experiences, and perhaps in how one acts, to some more and less precise wish of
one's social group. My belief is that the phenomenology shows only that the not-
self \textit{qua} society is roughly configured in our experience as occasionally being the
reality with which we interact in our experience. And I think it shows also that
occasionally we do feel ourselves to be subject to the (sometimes explicit and
conscious) demands issuing from one's social group on oneself. These latter
demands may be felt as burdensome, threatening to the core self or as conformable
to its workings (or simply as indifferent). But in neither case is the moral demand
experience a general phenomenon. Such causes - if causes they be - of our
experience are not given as so in the phenomenology.

This brings me to a further criticism of this kind of social reading of the
demand experience. For it is not the case either that the content of our experience of
moral demands has society or some sub-group of it as content: that is to say, as the
object to which the demand refers and to which one's thought and acts are directed
in its wake. To the extent that moral demands are experienced in inter-personal
contexts, that is not the same thing as their being experienced as referring to social
instigators and contents of the experience. The not-self as relating to another person
or persons in experience is different from the not-self of a putative socially-bound
experience. In the latter case, the subject contends with an impingement on her of social codes and expectations which appear as independent of her. But in the former, in our everyday dealings with other people in situations that put moral demands upon us, the form of experience is on the lines of that expressed by the de Beauvoir characters from my quotation in footnote 30. In this kind of experience the demand has as its centre the other person, her character, situation, and acts (and herself as one who is acted upon), with the demand flowing from the other in virtue of her very existence and not as a kind of felt pressure accumulating from the organized expectations of others. In both cases, then, the demand is felt as arising in part from and referring to the not-self, but the not-self is quite differently placed in either one.

To sum up this section, I wish to emphasize the following. Social accounts of the phenomenology of moral demand experience will derive whatever interest and plausibility they have through independent research from that of the actual contents of the phenomenology itself. The not-self which contributes to the experience and to which the experience may refer for the subject is not generally felt to be composed by a general mass like society or by its own codes and demands. There is often a social context in which moral demands arise in our consciousness (i.e., as usually involving other people), but that is not the same thing as social-based demands being felt to be bearing down on one.

The truth of the statement 'What you perceive is the import of widely-held standards' is compatible, of course, with the truth of 'The moral demand experience presents itself to you as the import of widely-held standards'. But the conditions of identity for these two statements are not met in the phenomenology. The second one is straightforwardly falsified by the general run of the experience. And as to the first, its explanatory power relies on considerations lying outwith the actual data given in the experience.
What I have done in this section is try to discover whether the not-self of the experience, the contribution of which to the phenomenology I discussed in sections 2 and 3, can be more closely identified as placed in, or arising from, or referring to, society or its codes. I think that my digging into the levels of explanation and conditions for the truth of them within the phenomenology has shown that the not-self cannot simply be viewed as society or its call on one. Society is other to one, objective with respect to one's own self (as independent of that) - but (usually) not the particular object taken as not-self in one's experience. And in virtue of this, I want now to turn my attention away from society 'out there' and toward our nature 'in here', as it were, to show how the not-self might have a placing rather more close to experienced home.

**Section Five: Our nature as not-self**

Facts about human nature are facts about us, but they are ones which are independent of us. We do not choose, nor have all that much control over, that stock of needs and responses which go to make up our human nature. In that way, while the moral consciousness which apprehends demands - if such a feature were taken as part of our nature - would be seen as lying on the 'self' side of the division, as something intimately associated with the kind of being we are, it is not one which comes under the self's control or which is felt as arising simply from states of the self. Thus it can appear as something that 'happens' to one and to which one's relation can be as that to the apparent not-self.

I am not concerned here to enter the debate as to what the invariant features of human nature might be, and to what extent it is a social construction which changes across time and culture. What I do want to do is look at the possible ways in which a moral consciousness and its operations might be appearing to us, assuming for the purposes of argument that it is part of our nature. And if that were the case, then such a faculty or propensity would be outwith the subject's control in interesting ways. For its operation and the experiences it involves do not fall under
her individual choice, since her nature is not something which she has chosen. The experiences it participates in or to which it is susceptible will appear as arising outwith her to that extent (strange as that may sound, given that it is her nature that I am discussing).

I think that there are two primary ways in which demand experiences could be given to the subject in this way which bear noting. One is that her moral consciousness could be that which is susceptible to demands made by situations on her or explicitly voiced by others. Such demands are experienced both as exterior to her as well as independent of her direct volition. They are thus constituted in part by the not-self, and her own contribution to the experience might be discerned only as that of the locus into which they flow, as the one who is the seat of a particular kind of experience. The susceptibility to this experience would then be felt as part of the self, the experience itself being given as the appearance of the not-self before one. Such an interaction would be open to those kinds of dissociation of the subject from her experience as I discussed in 2.ii above and in section 3 on the way in which the participation of the core self is discerned.

Another way in which the experience might be given is as of the demands themselves being part of her nature. In this case she experiences moral demands as phenomena intimately linked to her self, perhaps as the face presented to her by what are deep needs or concerns of the self. (I do not want to delineate the self exclusively in terms of needs or concerns, but list these simply as possible sources of the demand manifestation). So it is the demand experience itself with which her nature is identified, not just the tendency to encounter the onset of such experiences. In the midst of this experience it is the nature of her own self which is revealing itself to her, and yet it does so via the medium of the apparently independent experience that has arisen before her. In that sense, we would seem to be given a Janus-like phenomenological image of the self's core nature appearing before it in the guise of that which is other to it. Again, this is a feature to which I will grant more attention in the next chapter.
Once more, then, we find that inner and outer overlap in different ways with self and not-self. If it is the case that the demand experience appears as if from outer sources with a content correspondingly pointed outwards, this yet links closely in to the self as the demand expresses part of one's nature. The self is party to the demand as if to a phenomenon other to it, but it also finds its own imprint somehow borne in the appearance of the experience. It is not just logical owner of a particular experience, but a willing site for its occurrence. And if it should be the case that sometimes the subject is repelled or threatened by the demand, then she will be put in that often disturbing position of sensing a part of her own self as wearing the guise of the alien not-self: as somehow both part of her and yet also as partitioned off from her.

In this section I have developed a further element to my presentation of the moral demand experience as located on the band self/not-self. As to the arguments immediately above, and also concerning those earlier, I believe that attention to this form of description casts further light on the ways in which the experience presents itself to the subject. In particular, I think that it shows how the query behind the Findlay quotation at the head of this chapter represents the possible poles of experience rather too starkly. If it were the case, for instance, that the experience results from a certain projective tendency on our part, or that it is one of those things that goes along with a socialized human nature, it is certainly not given to subjects as a straightforward datum from which its constituent elements can be distinguished. What does not appear to the subject at the time of the experience is that of a morally inert exterior reality (the geographical not-self) acting upon a morally sensitive inner entity (the geographical self), to produce that experience of the moral demand which is then surveyed by the self as near or far from its concerns. And it does not appear to her either that, the experience once produced, such a state of affairs is purely a phenomenon going on within her (like a headache).36 The experience she is having is characteristically given to her; it holds
her attention and sometimes causes her unease - as if it is both independent of her control and composed at least in part from outwith her self.

**Section Six: Unexperienced demands**

I want to follow up my discussions above by inquiring into the nature and extent of our recognition of demands that are/were somehow ingredient in a situation, but which we fail/failed to apprehend. This, it seems to me, is of particular interest with respect to the notion of the not-self, to which reference might be made in such an acknowledgement. For one way in which a subject might be using such a notion is to mark out the presence of a special kind of value which was 'out there', but which somehow did not send forth its demand upon one, or which one did not notice. This will permit me to get on with study while allowing for either line of argument concerning whether a value has an inherent demandingness feature or not. And one other possibility which I will also keep in mind is that of one's failing to notice or acknowledge the demand arising from one's own self: so that it is/was as if such a call fell on the concealed part of a not-self spectrum.

**6.i - Moral demands as present but not experienced**

Clearly we do employ a description of our moral experience such that, for instance, we talk on occasion of the failure to have noticed the demand to end the evil of an act (often with a reason for that failure: such as inattention; preoccupation with other matters; the crowding of one's perception by strong emotions; misinformation as to the correct act description; & c.). This, too, occurs in aesthetic experience at those times when, over-tired by work or worry, one admits that a composition was a glorious one even though one was unable to appreciate it,\(^37\) or in religious experience when a believer will admit to having been too angry to heed the call of her god. It may look as if these ways of diagnosing our own experience could give some purchase for a view of the not-self as a moral reality 'out there' with which we are not always able to maintain a steady perceptual relation.\(^38\) And I
think that this does seem to give some support to the notion of a value reality whose demands have not been recognised, insofar as it invokes alongside the phenomenology of discovery and the unwilled nature of the demand experience that of the non-appearance of ones that nevertheless are seemingly granted later to have been present. Indeed, one of the primary phenomena of the moral life is that sense which we have of the demand left unfulfilled; of the situation left undone; of the response absent through one's own insensitivity to another's need.39

Now this looks to be an affair which is spread along the axis self/not-self in interesting ways. It suggests to me that there is a relation to both notions of the involvement of self which I have used in this chapter: that is, as an experience is partly composed by the self and as it is perceived in differing degrees of proximity to the core self. What seems to be noticed by the subject is the following. A lapse in her interaction with the not-self is acknowledged by her - or is claimed by third parties to have occurred - in dual fashion: both as she seems to have failed to apprehend something that was there in the moral situation to be attended to, and also as the engagement of the concern or interest of the self was not elicited. The phenomenon of such a form of recognition - of a demand left unanswered or of a feature component to a state of affairs that was unnoticed or repressed - clearly makes reference to some part of the not-self either as it lies in the past or as it reasserts itself in the present experience.

In rather more complex fashion than that in which I have presented the case above, it may also be that in this kind of instance we sometimes re-assess our own experience as lying differently on the band self/not-self than originally we had supposed. What I mean by this claim is this. That which we may be inclined to identify outwith our own breast, 'out there' in the not-self, so to speak, may come on further reflection to be taken as the unattended call of one's self. As the initial moral situation is surveyed before the mind's eye, it may resolve itself more finely into the constituent parts which played in one's experience at the time. That phenomenon which initial reflection takes to have been a demand issuing from the
not-self, but which was unrepresented within the self at the time, may appear with more thought on the matter rather to have arisen unheeded from the self. In that way, it is acknowledged by the subject that a part of the self was either ignored or silenced in the immediate moment: so that that which has issued from one's own self takes time to filter into accepted relations with the self.

This form of recognition of a demand unexperienced at the time does not, however, make reference to a value realm 'out there' which went unacknowledged. It seems to rest on a kind of roping-in of an experience on reflection from an apparently exterior placing to an inner source. The degree to which such a demand is assimilated to the self can be more and less according as one finds it consonant with one's own image of the basic identity of the self. And that assimilation can occur both for demands later taken as arising from one's own self and for those thought as flowing into one from the not-self. In the latter case, that might involve straightforward recognition of a demand issuing from another self which went unheeded, or as one felt to be more vaguely located in an outer reality. But in either case, what happens is that a call made on one, or simply a call that one could have apprehended, is felt to have been made - even though in the moment of its issue one did not seem to be party to it. Later reflection might then determine whether the very constitution of the demand is to be sought within one's self or outwith it.

Such recognitions, as one believes them to be, are often attended by that further phenomenon with which our moral life intimately acquaints us, as of being called to court or as of being in the thrall of a force bearing upon one's account of oneself. I think that this phenomenon ranges widely in one's experience, such that often much reflection is required to pin down the precise nature of the fault for which one is being assailed and the precise tone of the sensation itself - usually that of unease, sometimes of having been caught, and often also of having been deficient in one's perception of matters. I do not want to restrict the possible scope of this phenomenon by calling it 'conscience', and thereby importing philosophical presuppositions about its nature. But obviously this is the name under which it has
generally gone in moral philosophical literature. And of that particular phenomenon it has very often been remarked that something like a sense as of the demand of the not-self, or even of the rebuke of another self, goes on within one. Kant, for instance, speaks thus:

...conscience has this peculiarity, that although its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the command of another person...hence conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of responsibility for one's needs before God.40

And John Ladd takes this kind of phenomenon to be striking enough to talk of an apparent 'split personality' account as describing the experience, saying that,

Phenomenologically it appears almost as if it were an "external compulsion" or the "voice of God".41

6.ii - Unexperienced demands as 'out there'?

I believe that this general experiential affair does not give very much purchase on the notion of a prescriptive value reality or special kind of demander 'out there'. It does make reference to the independence of the self which the moral demand has in experience. It will sometimes make concession to a model of perceptual failure. And it does make play on some sense of the continued presence or pressure maintained by the not-self in the manner of an external reality. Yet I do not think that one will find, on closer inspection, that these rather diffuse thoughts and worries which we express are laying claim to a special kind of status to the not-self which they feature. They do so no more than when, in wondering whether a joke was funny but one did not 'get it', one makes reference to a special reality of humour-demanding entities that one failed to apprehend; or when realization that one's anger blinded one to danger a special entity of danger was exerting itself upon one from outside.
Often reflection will give one a sufficient vista on one's own past experience to be able to discern adequately that element of the not-self to which the inkling of a perceptual failure dimly refers. That is to say, sometimes a straightforwardly factual account of the factors which should have excited apprehension of a demand will reveal to oneself how a demand was, as it were, 'about' the situation but unnoticed by one. Such is the case when one finds out or realizes that a joke at the expense of another hurt his feelings; or how an apparently harmless gesture was deeply offensive to a particular religious temperament; or how the barely noticed cry of distress of a fallen child called for one's help. These are the facts and events which one failed, perhaps culpably, to apprehend. Or they are the ones which one did apprehend, but in a partial manner or such that the concerns of the self either failed to be engaged or were in opposition to the demand which was laid upon one.

In addition, it looks to me that a related species of this experience concerns that of a change in one's stance to the content of a demand. In this case it is not so much that a demand is acknowledged which was not experienced at the time, but that a demand which was experienced as relating to a particular state of affairs comes to be taken as a demand on oneself. Hence the demand seems to pass from being a matter of the not-self, one which the self happened to brush against, and into the domain of the self as it is taken to be calling on one and not just as an objectless call. As I say, this is not the same thing as acknowledgement of a demand which was entirely unapprehended or unnoticed, but it is a similar affair insofar as the demand's apparent not-self location at the time impinges now on the self.

To the extent, then, that we do talk sometimes in these ways - of demands left unanswered, or simply ones which don't get experienced - we are not making reference to a special value reality with whose demands one occasionally fails to enmesh. Yet there is some sense on our part of a reality that does make demands which we can fail to encounter. And I think that such a sense cannot be reduced without remainder to the notion of unnoticed facts or interfering personal factors of
the sort which I mentioned two paragraphs above. This goes to show just how much the involvement of the not-self is taken by us to be integral to the demand experience: such that its contribution to experience can be conceived in entire separation from that of the self and taken to have 'been there' in a situation awaiting one's grasp, but for certain factors preventing adequate apprehension of it. The not-self aspect of the demand is taken not as inhering in a value reality 'out there', but in the roughly discerned independence of some external reality which is ingredient in a type of experience waiting to happen.

**Section Seven: The description extended to non-moral cases**

I now want to conclude this chapter with my standing ploy of seeing whether the descriptions of the moral demand experience here are of a special order compared with other areas of experience, particularly as they also involve demands on the subject. I shall not allow this section to take up too much space, but I do want to check on the comparative placing of the moral demand experience with others. And about this matter I should like to note that the contended descriptions of the moral demand experience - as either being the tug of some kind of external reality or as a 'mere' inner sensation sometimes confusedly appearing as if from outside in virtue of a certain efficacy of projection that goes on or has gone on - seems partially determined for some moral philosophers by the class of comparison examples chosen. My own inclination, with respect to the phenomenological features displayed by moral and non-moral demand experiences, is to concede a variety of comparative similarities which pull the force of the analogy in both directions.

Firstly, I am going to produce a short list of non-moral demand experiences that display similar shifting emphases on the band self/not-self as were observed in the moral case on the subject herself apprehending them in immediacy and on reflection. Here is the list:
- 1. McDowell talks of a critic trying to help someone to see values in works of art that 'one should find (as the phenomenology of experience tempts us to say)' or, more likely, 'to enable the audience to find for himself the value there is in it (still speaking as the phenomenology invites).'

- 2. Another philosopher puts matters this way:

In unreflected experience value appears to be in the object of value. And we may presume that a common-sense observation of a beautiful picture...will, when not further reflecting on the nature of beauty, take it for granted that the value beauty belongs to the [work]. And as a property of [the] work, it will seem to be on a level with its other properties. The value beauty appears to have a kind of reality in no way different, for instance, from the reality of the colour of the [work]. Value and colour are distinguished and determined as the objective elements in the experience with the same certainty as the subjective elements are. It is absolutely certain to this observer that it is he who sees colour and experiences the value beauty; but this is no more certain than that it is the picture which has the colour and the value which he experiences. Seeing and experiencing belong to him; colour and value belong to the picture.

- 3. The depths and mysteries of outer space sometimes evoke astonishment and awe from an astronomer.

- 4. The cliff-jumping demand from example i) of my chapter 4.

- 5. Example ii) from chapter 4, where the mother lives 'in' the demand which she feels issues from her relation to the child.

- 6. Despite an outstanding performance from the orchestra, one's misery inured one to it.

I think that these samples illustrate that wide range of varying involvement of self and not-self evinced by my reports from the Harman moral example. And they do
so with respect both to the geographical nature of each putative experience's location on the band self/not-self as well as to the placing of it relative to the core self. The salient variations which I wish to point out here are: an alleged sense of the apparently independent value (not-self) of the object (examples 1. and 2.); the strong not-self element being strikingly alien to the self (example 4.); an inner reaction (self) to an outer presented reality (not-self), with the reaction being intimately identified with oneself in virtue of its relations to the core self (example 3.); 45 a recognition of some demand or value which demands acknowledgement (not-self) barely registered in virtue of other factors (self or not-self) [example 6]; little discrimination made (example 5.).

The least tentative, though least informative, conclusion which one can draw from comparing these examples with the moral one is that the groups share certain phenomenological features. But the crucial question which issues forth so soon as one gathers the comparison classes in one's thoughts is how relevantly similar the classes are and how one's use of particular similarities determines the reflective stance one then gains on the position of the moral demand experience as it exhibits different configurations of self and not-self. The basis on which I do so is a feel or grasp on our part which I believe we are able to exercise for the phenomenological data of the moral demand experience and how our reflective judgement sees its relative placing with other non-moral demand experiences. Such a feel which I claim to be exercising here depends on being met with an answering assent from the reader on giving his/her consideration to the data her own experience gives to her. This area is a disputed one, it should be acknowledged, with the comparison classes being bandied about according, my suspicion goes, to the prior convictions of the author as to the ontology of moral value. I shall try to perform the comparison purely as I see 'shades' of phenomenological data to be participating in the one 'colour' or as they appear separate and disanalogous.

Let us consider, then, two alternative and conflicting positions which one could take from a comparative purview of the phenomenology of demand
experience and how it relates to a possible not-self value realm. One analysis holds that experiences of moral value are sufficiently similar to experiences of sameness, number, rest and motion - which 'are partially due to our nature as observers and partially due to the way the world is' - for their objects to merit a certain philosophical respect as steady and ineliminable features of the world. The author here seems to be adverting to the apparent permanence and necessity of a not-self feature in certain of our experiences to uphold the notion of an objective status in the world for that not-self feature. From the putative acceptability of an objectivity feature (as in the world) to the not-self in the other examples, he takes it that the same must be granted of the object of the moral experience.

The other position holds that, while experience of moral values and their demandingness is not classified by us in immediacy only as a species of psychological phenomena, or as projected from an inner source, and while these often appear to be 'a glow, as it were, in which the object is bathed', it is nevertheless the case that plenty of other areas of experience share these features and are plainly not thought on reflection to reside in the object in any significant way. Indeed, attention to the comparison classes could lead to absurdity (or 'queerness', as Mackie would put it) should one try to uphold the notion of value as inhering 'out there'.

Each of the views above gives to one a different answer to the Findlay question at the beginning of this chapter. Both see the value experience as a relational matter, between a subject's sensitivity and certain features of objects, but both also incline towards different readings of the status of the object, or not-self, contribution to the experience and how it is taken by us. The first one takes there to be sufficient warrant within our experience, particularly when compared to other 'respectable' areas of experience, to ascribe some (unspecified) degree of independence 'in the world' to the object of the experience. And the second takes there to be sufficient warrant within our experience, particularly when compared to other, less respectable - qua objectivity - areas of experience, to deny any
significant independence to the object of the experience. This second one need not, of course, deny that something in the object excites the value experience, but it does deny that the object should be conceived in the terms of the reaction, that is, as imbued with a value quality.

The views above also differ in their appraisal of the contribution of self to the experience. The first view is inclined to see the self's role as of a sensitivity to and receptivity to certain features of the world such as value. The second, however, will generally regard the apparent value properties of objects in the manner of Hume, as resulting from a 'tendency' or 'propensity' for the mind to 'gild' and 'stain' external objects\textsuperscript{49} - even though the self need not always recognise its own imprint on the objects of its experience.\textsuperscript{50} Some analyses may accept elements from both arguments, taking that which has been projected to be too distant from any clear link to self for it to be regarded simply as a subjective phenomenon.\textsuperscript{51} In that case, that which was projected, or part of an ongoing but unrecognised projection, would be seen by the subject as under the guise of the not-self and the value experience as guided primarily by the object and not by the shifting currents of her self.

I think that there are elements in both of these positions above which represent to us our own thoughts about our moral experience. Neither, however, strikes me as sufficiently accurate a presentation as to capture entirely the truth of the matter, \textit{qua} phenomenological description, as we ourselves are given it in the experience. Concerning the second one, I think it is quite correct to state that we do not get images of the moral demand and the values it may allegedly behove one to attend to as having a determinate signalling as of a special kind of properties or entities in the world (or as having their being in divine or cosmic demanders). It is, to that extent, right to compare unfavourably the moral experience with those non-moral ones whose objects do not have the real property of the sort putatively ascribed in the various experiences to them. The not-self of the moral experience here should not be located in a special value realm or as inhering in a special kind of
value property which flows about the object. The datum of independence from the subject falls short of that kind of being. Moreover, the comparison may weaken the moral example even more than its author suspects. For my descriptive presentation in previous chapters has shown that: rather than our misleadingly thinking there to be a value object 'out there' as content of our experience, an error which is then overturned on reflection, such a determinate object is not carried at all. Hence the moral experience may come out rather more badly from the comparison cited by Miller than he thinks.52

Having given due acknowledgement above to a deflationary account of the kind of not-self figured in the moral experience as it is considered in the light of putative comparative non-moral ones, I now want to grant some favourable attention to the other account. We do not feel, in the heightened moment, that the moral demand experience has no more claim to objectivity than experiences of humorous events or that 'temptingness' of food which appears to be located in the not-self, inhering in the object. Nor do we feel, on reflecting on the more general run of the experience, that the tug of a moral demand is to be associated with the kind of tug on our responses made by particularly appealing food or by an amusing situation. There is often felt by us to be something about the moral demand experience which makes it candidate to or even possessor of a much more enduring title to objectivity than those two experience-types which I mentioned in the previous sentence and the others quoted by Miller in his footnoted contention. That, however, may be the product of no more than the strong feeling which many of us have that matters of a very serious nature are at stake and that there must be an independent truth of the matter.53 And that in the experience which is perceived to be independent of the subject need not be underpinned by any objectively prescriptive moral reality, or even by moral properties/facts of a discernible sort given to the subject in the demand experience: the not-self has different heads, as I have discussed in this chapter, and different ways thereby of being that which makes for the independence of the subject.
Whether or not some hazy sense of an indeterminate moral reality is still necessary if subjects are to maintain interest in the issues at stake; or whether for that they must believe simply in the possibility of experience of moral demands at least in part independent of purely subjective factors: these are the questions with which I shall be engaging debate in my next chapter. But as to the stuff of this chapter, I think that my presentation has shown that no specific value object is carried as the not-self. I also believe that my presentation has shown that the ways in which self and not-self connect with one another, and with other descriptive ways of rendering the moral demand experience, are far more complex than is normally given attention in the literature. Apparently, the subject is always given the experience by the means of some aspect of the not-self; but that which is not-self need not also be appearing as if from some determinate source.

Concluding comments to chapter

The phenomenological description of the moral demand experience in terms of self and not-self has proved to be a fruitful mode of research. I have given over presentation to the manifold ways in which the two interact in the subject's experience, including ones in which her sense of their involvement is far from clear. The constitution of the experience in part by the not-self would seem to be necessary for the subject if she is to have the experience at all: a matter which I will explore further in the next chapter. But the not-self also enters into different relations with the concerns and interests of the self, such that the experience can appear to the subject as threatening or indifferent or an accepted part of her.

A good deal of descriptive produce has been given by the investigation in this chapter. Amongst that, I would single out two points of major importance which link up with the general trend of my thought in this thesis. They are:

- i) The diversity of the experience as it ranges on the axis self/not-self. Such a broad variety of the demand's constitution that is given to the subject
includes both quite sharply determinate distinctions and rather vague ones. It also encompasses an absence of any clear sense of a division at all, as well as that which appears to be entirely as of the not-self. I have repeatedly said that it is often only later reflection that will make plain - if it does at all - the actual constitution of that experience which was given but hazily in the immediate experience.

The Findlay question at the head of this chapter has been addressed in my presentation. Rather than finding the matter to be placed solely on either side of the distinction which he puts forward, I have found that the experience is made up in more subtle ways than that. In particular, I gave over some space to the phenomenon of the experience's appearing as indeterminately placed between self and not-self, suggesting that the tertium quid metaphor was an apt one by which to capture this. By granting such attention to the differing interactions between self and not-self, both as it concerns the constitution of the experience and also as it is received by the self, I have shown how the self/not-self distinction cuts across those other ones which I listed in the introduction to the chapter. In particular, that which appears as an 'inner' phenomenon can yet be as of the not-self: both as independent of the subject and as alien to her. And that which is 'objective', that is to say, 'outer' or simply independent of the subject's direct control, can also yet be held close to its core by the self.

- ii) Whether the not-self is experienced as specifically located or as a very hazy affair, it is not experienced as or as if an intrinsically demanding value reality 'out there'. Nor does reflection on the original experience lead one to thinking that to be the case. But there is a live (and sometimes lively) sense of the not-self involved with oneself. And as to this kind of phenomenon, I have suggested that many different possible sitings for it may be discerned by the subject, or none at all. In all the various cases the not-self can enter into different perceived relations with the core self depending on whether it coalesces with certain of its concerns or interests.
It seems to me that the relation of the core self to the moral demand experience is given for us both in immediacy and also especially on further reflection on how one stands to the experience. Clearly such reflection involves thought as to whether moral issues - that is to say, moral matters in general or given as certain specified ones - do matter deeply to one, or (if they do not) whether one feels that they should do so. I have said of this relation that there looks to be a connection, perhaps an essential one, between the core self and the independent (not-self) appearance of the moral demand experience, both when the latter connects up to such core concerns & c. and when it does not. The question to ask of such reflection by a subject on this matter, then, is this. Do we find that this relation is perceived as a necessary one, that is, one without which the self's grasp on its experience is loosened or wiped out? That has been the issue at the heart of my thesis, and to it I now devote entirely my final chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN

If common moral experience is rendered unintelligible or unaccountable on some theory, then the theory must be defective. Moral principles must enjoy more than merely subjective or private status alone, although they need not and apparently do not answer to the description of Platonic forms or immutable natural laws of a specified and determinate form.

G.R.Lucas.¹

Perhaps it is necessary, if it is to be rational for people to "go on", that they should believe that it is still possible for them to have things of non-instrumental value.

D.A.Lloyd Thomas.²

The suggestion that a person may be in some sense liberated through acceding to a power which is not subject to his immediate voluntary control is among the most ancient and persistent themes of our moral and religious traditions. It must surely reflect some quite fundamental structural feature of our lives.

H.Frankfurt.³
Introduction

This final chapter represents both the continuation and culmination of a number of concerns which I have allowed to rise throughout the preceding discussion. The prime stuff of this chapter is the description of a subject's higher reflective purchase on the moral demand experience. Such 'higher' reflection goes on when she reflects upon the nature of that experience as a class, beyond that reflection which she undertakes with respect to particular instances of that experience. I combine such a phenomenology with investigation into the ways in which the experience is connected with the self, both as it may manifest deep levels of the self and as it may serve in part to enter into the very constitution of a self.

One of the main concerns of this chapter, then, is with that higher reflection on the moral demand experience and putative descriptions of its nature which I have mentioned often in this thesis. It is a kind of reflection on the content of her experience as a class that a subject can undertake. And it is thought by some philosophers also to be a reflection that reveals to her necessary features of the experience with which she is already acquainted, though she may not have subjected it to close reflective inspection. I use the 'phenomenological arguments' - as they are generally called - of Wiggins (1987b) and Platts (1980), and also a recent one by Taylor, as I understand them to be relevant to my central interests, or as I think they serve as useful descriptions of the reflective phenomenology when suitably construed. Looking at such arguments as candidates for providing one with description of the essence of the moral demand experience insofar as its objectivity component is concerned, I argue the following major points. Firstly, I do not think that they say all that much about the kind of objectivity of the experience which they might believe to be necessary to it as it is held in reflective assay. Secondly, beyond a certain minimum descriptive level of that experienced objectivity - that is to say, a crude and rather diffuse sense of the experience's independence of one - any alleged
account fails to pass muster as veridical to the data. If an objectivity element is essential to the moral demand experience it is not that which is given by apprehension of moral values 'out there', as Mackie takes us to believe we have. Indeed, I go further in this chapter with my argument than that. Against Wiggins et al I contend that reflective thought on possibly subjective sources of the moral demand experience and moral values need not be so destabilising of a subject's grasp on her experience as they may think. The reflective phenomenology of subjects' thoughts on such matters looks generally to be more robust and less productive of that experience of unease and dissatisfaction than those philosophers might believe. What I do affirm with them is that moral values and the moral demand experience cannot be chosen, are not directly amenable to the subject's will.

I end the chapter, and thereby the thesis, with discussion of the relation of the experienced objectivity to the experienced core self. Having argued that experience of moral demands cannot be regarded as constitutive inter alia of a self, I then explore the interaction of the objectivity component (as not-self) with the concerns, interests and identifications of the core self. My contention is that there is no paradox in the apparently intimate relation that often exists between them. But I do acknowledge that moral demands can be experienced as irksome and as contrary to other concerns of the core self. That is because moral concerns do not always hold strong sway with us and must find room in the core self amongst a cluster of other non-moral ones.
Section One: Phenomenology of reflection

On occasion, throughout the previous three chapters, I have drawn the reader's attention to the possibility of a higher reflective phenomenology that the subject can engage in and to its possible role in her general moral experience if she does so. Here I am going to turn my analysis entirely toward that kind of reflection.

I ask the reader at this juncture to refresh his/her acquaintance with my understanding of this higher, or second order, phenomenology by reference to my third chapter. And at this juncture I want to clear a methodological point by bringing out the different approaches which the formal and informal ways of doing phenomenology take in this respect. I will illustrate the point by an example from the general moral area in which my interest lies.

In the formal phenomenological mode one's presentation of the experience is always of a reflective nature insofar as one's studies bring back to consciousness an item of experience for description. The 'higher' reflection goes on, I believe, when one moves away from the straightforward description of the appearances and tries to distinguish the 'horizon' of the particular datum and its essential features (see chapter 2 for my explanation of these terms). Thus, in the case of the experienced phenomenon of guilt, one does this. Having first described its initial appearance to consciousness and any immediate object(s) it takes, one then goes on to look into the background elements it has for the subject, such as its connection in her thought with childhood events, divine retribution, & c., and how it coheres with other attitudes and world-views which she holds (as to its propriety, say, or the kind of response she feels she should make in the light of it).4

I have tried to make clear in chapter 3 the ways in which an informal phenomenology deals with this matter. I shall repeat here that I believe it goes on in two ways; as I see it, the first being sub-divided and leading on to an understanding of the second. One way in which higher reflection is a descriptive matter for
phenomenology is that it sometimes provides different presentations of the initial appearances than were given in the direct ones. This occurs, for example, when one 'realizes' that it was not so much guilt that one felt about an event but the fear of being caught. The sub-division of this first mode of reflective phenomenology occurs at this point. For one can then go on to describe the experience which the subject undergoes on coming to such a modified understanding of the direct experience. This may be, say, one of shock on realizing one's fear of being caught was greater than, or entirely in place of, that 'proper' sense of guilt which, say, one's religious beliefs would duly underpin.

The second way in which the informal mode of reflective phenomenology takes this data similarly seems to me to rest on the registration of a particular kind of experience the subject has at this reflective level. The experience itself, on which this kind of application of phenomenology relies, is often of a rather vague sort. What that experience is, and how it comes about, I believe to be given in the following way. (For a preliminary explanation of the matter I refer the reader again to sections 1 and 4 of chapter 3). When the subject reflects in a general fashion, not about a particular instance of guilt, but about the role it occupies in her life and that of her community and how it 'makes sense' to her as an class of experience, then the phenomenological description of her reflection presents some sort of experience of satisfaction, at-ease-with, sensefulness with regard to the general phenomenon. (Or, of course, she may have the opposite kinds of experience - of unease, senselessness, & c.). To that of guilt, then, she may find an experience of its sensefulness to be that given when reflecting on its connection with the breach of some law, be that divine/natural law, or the enacted one of the state. More importantly, from the point of view of those whom I believe to be the practitioners of this method of phenomenology, is the marshalling of this reflective experience in a negative fashion. In this approach what happens is that the subject's experience is
described on reflecting on a possible general understanding of her experience which she finds she cannot endorse, which strikes her as making less sense than other construals, or no sense at all, or which she finds somehow clashes irresolubly with the apparent content of her immediate experience. This is the sort of experience which I think Anscombe (1958) must wish us to have on considering non-theistic interpretations of the phenomena of guilt. And for many others outwith her religious tradition (or any other religious tradition) one is given sample examples of this reflective phenomenology as they find it impossible or absurd or queer on thinking that guilt could be simply a brute feeling excited by desires and acts with which punishment is associated by one.

So, combining both formal and informal modes, a higher level reflective phenomenology describes both a second order reflection on experience and an experience on performing that reflection. The way in which that informal phenomenology of an experience of sensefulness or its opposite is employed by its presenter seems to me to be constituting what I called in chapter 3 a negative phenomenological argument. That is to say, these philosophers - I am thinking here of Wiggins and Taylor - take the subject's experience of the senselessness or absurdity, or of the breakdown in one's ability to maintain any feel for a particular moral concept's application to the stuff of their experience, as giving them either good or irrefutable argument against the particular opponent view. This is especially so when the proponent of this kind of argument is utilising it against an opponent view that itself makes claims of a phenomenologically testable nature and which can therefore be subjected to straightforward falsification in virtue of the incorrect phenomenology it presents. Whether or not that leaves the field open, as it were, for the particular view held by the philosopher who has disposed of a rival view dissonant with the moral phenomenology is, of course, a matter of some issue.
Section Two: Three phenomenological arguments

In this section I will consider three related 'phenomenological arguments', as they are generally known in moral philosophical literature, which seem to me to bear on the question of the moral demand's experienced objectivity. Each one is addressed to similar issues in moral philosophy and my aim is to use them as they seem to me relevant to the question at hand of this thesis. I will omit, therefore, those parts of such arguments which are not entirely germane to this study, leaving mention of them to the footnotes.

As a general introduction to the kinds of argument I am about to put under way, these comments from Mackie stand as representative of the class. Firstly, there is this. Mackie is talking of the upshot of a belief that morality is no more than a device for dealing with preference-ordering and hence of an awareness of it in a utilitarian fashion. He says:

...the practical difficulty, for someone who is for part of the time a critical moral philosopher in this utilitarian style, [is] to keep this from infecting his everyday thought and conduct. It cannot be easy for him to retain practical dispositions of honesty, justice, and loyalty if in his heart of hearts he feels that these don't really matter, and sees them merely as devices to compensate for the inability of everyone, himself included, to calculate reliably and without bias in terms of aggregate utility.5

And, in discussing a certain developed projectivist account of our moral experience, he maintains that, despite what he feels to be the plausibility of such an approach:

I think that direct attention to traditional ways of thinking about morality, in particular, will still detect such a claim [to objectivity].6

The point he is making is this. If one takes a certain explanation or alleged description of one's moral experience and practices on board, so to speak, and tries
to square it with how one actually experiences the area of morality in question, one finds oneself rejecting that explanation or description. This is particularly so when one finds oneself experiencing a breakdown both of the linguistic sense of a concept applicable to one's moral experience and of its sensefulness insofar as the experience plays an important role in a particular area of one's life or in one's life as a whole. Clearly the moral ones do occupy a position of importance in our lives for most of us. But how important, and how intrinsic to our self-understanding, they are is a matter which calls for some scrutiny.

It bears noting at this point that there are, in fact, two logically separable arguments which I have represented by the Mackie quotations above. One is the claim that some views of morality, or a part of it, are such as to destabilise one's actual commitment to morality. Thinking that morality is 'only' a social construct that serves the interests of a particular elite might have such a result to those of a Marxist frame of mind. The other is that a certain view, again, of morality or part of it can destabilise one's very grasp of the moral concepts themselves and lead to a tension between the reflection and one's direct experience of a working moral system. This possibility may be an actual fact of some persons' moral consciousness on the thought that there is no divine moral law. Either of the two results of this kind of reflective thought might follow on from the other; either need not necessarily be brought about in the light of the other, according to some of my arguments in this chapter.

Here now are the three phenomenological arguments which I mentioned, abridged by me to refer as directly as possible to the experienced objectivity of values and the moral demands by which they may exert or signal themselves.

A. David Wiggins.

In his British Academy lecture, *Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life*, David Wiggins challenges a subjectivist view of value as conferred by the agent and
constituted by her ongoing commitment or interest. He proposes in its place an account of such notions as the worthwhile and the valuable, and the experiences through which they are given to us, as the objective features of the world which are responsible for the particular feel the correlative intentional states (of value, of mattering) have for us. His account has come to be called a 'phenomenological argument'. It is this. Insofar as a theorist takes value to be created by some subjective state of the agent, then he is taking a view of external reality which can be rendered up in a wertfrei description, for value is being said to originate from inside us and not from the outside. But if we take on board at the subjective level this claim - that is, see if it rings true with the phenomenological presentation value has for us - then, according to Wiggins, we find that: a particular value experience doesn't feel at the time as if it has been self-conferred; reflection on the general run of value experience makes little sense of the notion of that experience being so unrepresentative of its subjective origins; and value experience does not strike one as being that kind of thing unless it has such an objectivity feel attending it. That is to say, the subject cannot make sense of her value experiences, as they are had or as she reflects on them, when they are conceived as shorn of an objectivity feature. In Wiggins' words:

Where the non-cognitivist account essentially depends on the existence and availability of the inner view, it is a question of capital importance whether the non-cognitivist's account of the inner view makes such sense of our condition as it actually has for us from the inside.9

Wiggins believes that the subjectivist thesis is incorrect on two counts, the second being sufficient to dispatch of it. On the one hand, it gives false account at a descriptive level of the salient features of value experience. Hence it cannot rely on its alleged presentation of the data of our value consciousness to support its own
argument. And on the other, in taking value apprehension to move one because of its subjective basis and in taking this to be a necessary feature of the constitution of value, it renders itself in a practical self-contradiction. For (so Wiggins' argument goes), should an agent come to think on this contention as correct she will find at this reflective level that the direct experience to which the thought is aimed makes no sense and is threatened or even dissolved. This is because it does not seem possible for an agent to conceive that kind of cleavage between world and self - between, that is, an allegedly value-neutral world and value-conferring self - without destroying much of the elements of value experience that go to identify it. For an agent to dispense with the objectivity feature of value experience is to make its whole ambit seem arbitrary and meaningless. Wiggins puts the matter this way:

...by the non-cognitivist's lights, it must appear that whatever the will chooses to treat as a good reason to engage itself is, for the will, a good reason. But the will itself, taking the inner view, picks and chooses, deliberates and weighs, and tests its own concerns. It craves objective reasons; and often it could not go forward unless it thought it had them.¹⁰

And he states further that:

The one thing that [value] properties cannot be, at least for [the agent], is mere projections resulting from a certain kind of efficacy in the causation of satisfaction...To see itself and its object in the alien manner of the outer view, the state as experienced would have to be prepared to suppose that it, the state, could just as well have lighted on any other object (even any other kind of object), provided only that the requisite attitudes could have been induced. But in this conception of such states we are entitled to complain that nothing
remains that we can recognise, or that the inner perception will not instantly disown.\textsuperscript{11}

The consequences of embracing a subjectivist value theory look to result in a certain incoherence concerning the very experience that that theory addresses, and upon which it relies for exploiting an inner-outer distinction. Wiggins' case, then, is that a practical contradiction, between the meaningfulness of value experience and its motivating influence in our lives on the one hand and a putative non-objective basis for it on the other, is engendered. His case can be summarised in this way:

1. The phenomenology of value experience is not as of subjective constitution when
   a) in the thick of those experiences;
   b) thinking about them.

2. Against a phenomenology of choice, one of finding out.

3. Against a phenomenology of free-floating commitment, one of constraint.

Element 1.a) consists in showing the subjectivist's view of the phenomenological data of value experience simply to be incorrect. 1.b) takes that phenomenological contention up to a reflective level, at which the subjective thesis is also invalidated in virtue of a disorienting, destabilising feeling which is wrought by thinking on its possible truth. Elements 2. and 3. supplement this basic impetus of the Wiggins' line, levelling against the subjectivist view phenomenological data (of discovery, of constraint) that do not seem to him amenable to the subjectivist thrust.

From all this Wiggins wishes to argue that the phenomenological appearances, taken both at direct and reflective levels of description, give good warrant for a particular view of our moral experience and judgement as objective. One might summarize the attitude he exhibits, and upon which a phenomenological argument relies, by his terse comment that:
I object that that is not how it feels to most people.\(^{12}\)

2. Mark Platts

The phenomenologically based position put forward by Mark Platts exploits a similar move to the one above. He takes a basic antirealist contention and investigates the consequences of holding that to be correct - and believing himself to have shown that it makes for unintelligibility in the very experience with which it is dealing, he makes the further move of employing a moral realist explanation to break the impasse.

The contention which Platts examines is the application to our moral consciousness of a widely (though not universally) held tenet of philosophical psychology, that reasons for actions must make reference to the actual or potential desires of the agent. In the moral case this has led to antirealist conclusions\(^{13}\) - for in as much as motivation is held to be internal to perception of moral value, it has been thought that this relies on the presence of a requisite desire, with which the value is subsequently identified. And desires, though perhaps subject to certain logical requirements, need not be formed or directed by the norm of truth in line with the outer world.

Platts takes as correct without further question that view above concerning the role of desire as necessary to motivation. But he asks how desires motivate in this case. Exploiting a comparison with the way in which the painfulness of pain is an intrinsic motivating force for the subject of it, Platts wonders if a similar possibility in the phenomenology of desire - as sufficient \textit{qua} desire to motivate - is instantiated for the general case. He does not think that it is: that is, he does not believe that what gets a subject into action is the 'desirefulness' which a desire has, this being a matter of a description of its phenomenological force. He thinks that something else is (indeed, must be) responsible: taking this to be the experience of
worth or value or, if you will, the desirability of an object state of affairs, which is not felt to be brought about simply by the desire. Platts states his belief that:

...desires, unlike pains, have a logical content, and desires motivate an agent because of his view of the objects of his desires as desirable. But this answer would be no answer at all if that view of the object of desire was seen by the agent simply as a consequence of its being the object of his desire; for then there would be nothing to constitute the motivating force.\textsuperscript{14}

Platts does not suggest the jettisoning of desire from explanation in this light; he accepts that position from philosophy of mind. Rather, though, he believes that 'desirability is prior to desire; it is merely that recognition of desirability brings desire with it.'\textsuperscript{15} Hence, far from having the antirealist consequences that it initially seemed to exhibit, the phenomenological analysis of the matter leads to the counter-claim that acceptance of the motivational force of desire in moral experience requires the notion of an independent reality of value subject to truth conditions and responsible for the very perception which makes for the desirability in question.\textsuperscript{16}

Within this argument Platts also moots a consideration identical to the one used by Wiggins above. This is the move taken in assessing the experience at a reflective level of thinking on the possibility that value does consist in being desired. Platts maintains that reflection by an agent that, if she desired not-$p$ rather than $p$, and that that is what it is for not-$p$ to be desirable, this will lead to her finding the whole affair unintelligible and to a breakdown in her commitment to the objects of the actual desires that she has. Such thought will actually weaken the motivating force of the desire that $p$, according to Platts, so that:

For a reflective being with a nature like ours, the price of abandoning moral realism can be the end of desire.\textsuperscript{17}
His position relies, therefore, on the phenomenological description of the experience one encounters on second order reflection when considering the direct experience itself in the light of a particular view of it. This is in addition to his belief on how the direct experience actually strikes a subject when it occurs. In both cases, Platts takes himself to be convicting his opponent of holding a false picture of our experience at each level - and in the case of the reflective survey, of incoherence. For reflection fails to accommodate the experience in the manner of the antirealist explanation and cannot do so except on pain of collapsing the very experience under discussion. And what happens at a general reflective level of thought has those same effects on value experience in practice: whereas moral realism accords with the direct experience and reflection on it.

Here is a summary of Platts' position as a phenomenological argument:

1. Moral experience contains experience of the independent desirability of its object (positive phenomenological argument: this is how it feels).

2. Desire does not of itself carry a charge sufficient to motivate (negative phenomenological argument: this is how it doesn't feel).

3. The independent desirability of its object accounts for the motivational force of desire (inference drawn from the conjunction of 1. and 2.).

4. a) Reflection on the possible truth of an antirealist position leads to incoherence of the subject matter.

   b) Mutatis mutandis, moral realism doesn't.

5. The thought from 4.a) leads to the breakdown of a view of desire on its own as motivational in specific moral experience (this requires prior acceptance of 1. and 2.).

6. The phenomenology of moral value experience, as well as the phenomenological analysis of reflection - particularly reflection on antirealist
construals of moral value - lends strong support to moral realism (overall phenomenological argument).

3. Charles Taylor.

The argument put forward by Taylor (1989) crucially rests also on how one experiences one's moral life and how it gives itself to one in a reflective view as different explanations of it are entertained. The overall passage of his argument runs through various different points which are couched in terms that evoke both formal and informal modes of phenomenology as I have presented the matter. I will reconstruct below the main features of it as I see them to press most clearly on the issues at hand.

The ultimate tenet to which Taylor holds is given in these words from the very first paragraph of his work:

Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality,

turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes.18

It is from this tenet that his arguments flow and towards which he wishes them to point as confirmation. On the specific nature of such a claim I devote a later section (section 4). For the time being I note it only in order to indicate its constant presence in the background of Taylor's presentation.

He begins his argument by talking of the ways in which our moral reactions and other reactions to objects, such as olfactory ones, are similar and not. He states that they share the phenomenological feature of being 'gut reactions',19 wrought from us without our conscious direction. But then he notes that they are dissimilar in a crucial way: the objects of our moral reactions seem to be worthy or fit ones for them in a fashion which cannot be said to go also for smells and objects of nauseous reactions. This is something we are especially given on reflection on our moral reactions. In Taylor's words:
We don't acknowledge that there is something there to articulate [in the case of the non-moral examples], as we do in the moral case. Is this distinction illegitimate? A metaphysical invention? It seems to turn on this: in either case our response is to an object with a certain property. But in one case the property marks the object out as *meriting* this reaction; in the other the connection between the two is just a brute fact. Thus we argue over what and who is a fit object of moral respect, while this doesn't seem to be even possible for a reaction like nausea.20

His argument here is structurally identical to that which Wiggins and Platts make with respect to the object of our moral responses: which argument is that the response is felt to be governed by the object's meriting it. Unlike (allegedly) the case of the nauseous response, the property to which the moral response is directed is not constituted by the presence of the response itself. So Taylor is also claiming that something independent of the subject is felt to be going into the constitution of her moral response.21

Further to this description of the appearances of the moral phenomena, Taylor takes himself to be giving the reader insight into the essential 'Framework' or 'horizon' which we require in order 'to make sense of'22 our moral reactions. These frameworks, by which we explain and understand our lives, are held by Taylor to be essential to our very 'personhood'.23 Such an approach on his part seems to me sufficiently close to that of the Husserlian exploration of the 'horizon' and 'life-world', as I noted them in chapter 2, to be making points in the phenomenological vein of this thesis. In the specifically moral case, he believes, there are certain evaluative notions we have which both capture our moral experience and give us the means to articulate more fully our lives: without which
our ability to deliberate and judge would be severely circumscribed. They are 'indispensable.'

A particular argument which Taylor instances in this respect is levelled - like those of Wiggins and Platts - against those opponents of moral realism for whom the nature of our moral experience, and the language which captures it, is the stuff of their attack. It is Taylor's belief that the lack of fit between certain moral theories and the phenomenological data which we ourselves as subjects are given at direct and reflective levels is sufficiently significant to invalidate such theories. He says:

If non-realism can't be supported by moral experience, then there are no good grounds to believe it at all. The non-realist would have to get down to the detail of the moral life, and show in particular cases how a projective view made more sense of them, if he were to convince us. But...the logic of our moral language resists this sort of splitting.24

Clearly this is a phenomenological argument of the type which I have identified in chapter 3 and which bears the marks of a similar approach to that of Wiggins and Platts.

Taylor's attack on subjectivist moral philosophies takes the form, then, of drawing attention to the way in which we experience our moral life and think about it. He makes such a point at those two levels, direct and reflective, which I have already shown Wiggins and Platts to be exploiting. At the direct level he says that the way in which 'the good', should it motivate one, is experienced is as so in virtue of its own peculiar quality and not simply because of one's having the actual experience. Hence he says:

It is easy to rush in with the standard subjectivist model: the good's importance reposes just in its moving us so. But this model is false to the most salient features of our moral phenomenology. We sense
in the very experience of being moved by some higher good that we are moved by what is good in it rather than that it is valuable because of our reaction.25

And at the reflective level, he believes, a subject cannot render intelligible her life if she takes a subjectivist explanation of it to be correct. Quite the opposite is the case for Taylor: one needs to think of one's life according to some general feature of the independence from one of its moral aspect. (Though he does not elucidate precisely what feature is needed by us and what other ones might perform a similar role). Accounts which clash with our reflective moral experience 'are not construals you could actually make of your life while living it.'26

The kind of independence from one that such moral matters possess is not entirely plain from Taylor's presentation, but it does involve an experience as of the independent presence of a quality in the object meriting one's response. Such a quality, and the role it plays in one's life - especially when reflection is directed to the matter - is certainly independent of one's choosing and is also felt by the subject (according to Taylor) as involving some degree of independence from her as the apprehender of the quality.

I will summarise the essence of this further instance of a phenomenological argument:

1. For Taylor, a life which is conducted in some (indeterminate) degree according to the lights of moral experience and thought is constitutive of selfhood, or of personhood (the distinction is equivocal in his writings).

2. The objects of our value experience are not felt by us, either during the experience or on reflection on it, to be important, of worth, morally significant, & c., just because we have the particular experience.

3. The objects of our value experience are felt by us, during the experience itself and on reflection on it, to be important, of worth, morally significant, & c. in
virtue of something about them which is independent in some degree of ourselves and which merits that kind of experience.

4. The conjunction of 2. and 3. falsifies certain subjectivist phenomenologies of our moral experience. In seeing this latter to be constituted as moral experience by that response itself and not by the independent features of the object, such phenomenologies are incorrect as portrayals of our direct experience.

5. The same phenomenologies are also unable to account for the sense our moral life has for us: which crucially does rest on considerations like 3. above.

6. Because of 5. subjectivist moral phenomenologies cannot account either for the putative truth of 1. above.

7. Some form of moral realism (unspecified by Taylor), which accepts points 2. and 3. as to the independence of one of the moral object, is consonant with our direct experience and does chime with reflection on it.

I am going to refer to these as the 'WPT line', from the initials of their authors. It seems to me that these three arguments are properly called 'phenomenological'. I understand what they are trying to do in this way. One thing which they attempt is to present the subject with a kind of thought experiment, if she has not already given thought to the matter. In recording the experience she has on performing that reflection, it produces putative evidence to the effect that her general overview of a particular experience class makes certain clashing construals of that unlikely candidates for correct explanation, particularly if they themselves claim to be accurately describing the phenomenology. The other phenomenological ploy being used is that of a description of the background sensefulness of the experience which goes to make up and found the subject's own ability to use the concepts she applies to it and the way in which the experience is intelligible at all to her. This, then, is a case of describing what Husserl calls 'the
horizon' and of trying to discover the essential components without which the experience ceases to be the particular thing it is.

2.i - The arguments adumbrated and criticised

As to the three arguments above, I believe that from them two things which bear significantly on the objectivity question can be taken. I distinguish two things, though the authors themselves do not do so, it seems to me. And they are these. One, as I have said, is to discredit and show to be false certain claims about our moral experience and how generally it is and is to be viewed. This relies both on the straightforward showing of an opponent view to rest on false description of the object data and also on that sense of breakdown and unease which ensues for the subject when reflectively considering certain putative accounts of the nature of her experience.

As to this latter phenomenon noted just above, I should distinguish between the kinds of experienced breakdown to which its description can be referring, even though I do not think that WPT themselves do so. One of these breakdowns consists in that sense of unease allegedly rendered in the subject if the origins of our moral experience are considered by her as located outwith any objective framework: this kind of consideration allegedly clashing with how the experience strikes a subject and how she thinks on it. Another, which may then ensue in the light of this unease, is that of a breakdown in the meaningfulness of our moral experience generally: as threatening to dissolve that kind of phenomenon which perhaps occupies an important part in our life and our self-understanding. And further to that - but logically separate from it - is the potential breakdown in the sensefulness for the subject of her moral life and the practices that go with the experiences. At any point in these experiences of dissatisfaction, unease, or breakdown may also go the claim that the subject's very grasp of certain moral value terms might be loosed
or eradicated: so that she can no longer make linguistic sense of the terms with
which she represents her experience.

These kinds of breakdown in the sense which the experience of demands,
or of values that demand, have for a subject are different. Prima facie I wish to say
that the feeling that life (or some part of it) is rendered meaningless is not the same
as having linguistic difficulties with certain terms, and neither trouble is the same as
one's ceasing to take morality seriously. These problems may be compatible with
one another - that is, a subject may find herself in thrall to all of these difficulties at
once - but the WPT line does not show that they all entail one another, either
logically or as phenomenological facts following in the train of reflection on non-
objective accounts of the experience. Hence one is left to disentangle the precise
nature of the forces which WPT intend their arguments to exert philosophically.

All three certainly wish to argue that there is a clash of some sort between
the feel which this area of our moral experience generally has for us and
consideration of proffered non-objective accounts of its nature. I think that they do
want to hold the further thesis that reflection on those alternative accounts will lead
to the kind of breakdown for the subject which I detailed above as a sensation of
meaninglessness with respect to this part of our life (the general affect of this on our
lives as a whole being correspondent to the importance that moral affairs might hold
for us). And I think that they also want to establish that the very experiences in
question, and the practices that go with them, will be destabilised and even broken
down altogether should an agent take seriously the non-objective account as giving
her the real nature of her moral experience. Taylor, in particular, wishes to argue
also that such experience is involved with the make-up of the self to an intimate
degree, and that the kind of breakdown discussed here will therefore also strike at
the balance of the self (or an important part of it). In the debate that follows, then, I
shall inquire as to whether any of these claims are phenomenologically correct as
regards our moral experience and reflection on it. I shall also ask whether a clash between experience with a putative objectivity feature and proposed non-objective accounts of it need be so destabilising a matter for the subject if it is assumed that a clash is actually engendered in that way.

Following on from their alleged showing of an opponent view to be phenomenologically awry from the actual data of our experience, the second move these authors then try to make is to show that their own particular notion of the experience's position in our moral consciousness is the correct one. All three see this matter in terms of some kind of objectivity which the experience has and which the subject in some way needs it to have if that experience generally is to be had. They take this to chime with and adequately describe the phenomenology of our immediate experience, as well as being given reflective assent by the subject.

Now this is where my use of a distinction between the two moves comes in. For I do not see that, in disposing of a particular incorrect phenomenology, or explanation of a part of our moral experience which has fundamentally phenomenological grounds, sufficient warrant is thereby given for the adequacy of the alternative view held by these authors. And it is at the point where they offer that phenomenology which they take to be the one consonant with the data of direct moral experience and reflection on it that my worry begins. I do not believe that sufficient attention is paid by the three to the precise kind of feel which the demand experience carries for the subject. Nor do I think that sufficient care is taken actually to show that the allegedly redundant phenomenology is correctly replaced by another one that subjects do find adequate. I believe that the move which does take place after disposing of an opponent view is often only presenting one with the rough outline of something like the way in which the subject is related to her experience of moral demands. Of course, it may turn out that only a very rough relation is the one that correctly describes the matter.31 But then that should be
signalled as a phenomenological description which is given by the relevant data. Moreover, as an additional worry about the kind of argument being exploited, I wonder if the authors in question have done enough to make explicit and comprehensible the nature of the negative thrust of their argument. That is to say, I am not sure if the kind of reflective breakdown they address - that sense of unease and dissatisfaction, the inability to carry on, which a particular suggested construal of moral experience might engender - is given adequate description as a phenomenon and as counter-argument to certain ways of looking at the experience.

Exactly what is it, then, for a reflective breakdown to be experienced when thinking on such a possibility that moral value is chosen by the subject? One thing it can be, but which is not often a philosophical argument against a rival image of the experience, is a dispiriting, as it were, of the subject on taking seriously the notion that value is really nothing other than, say, projected desire or a phenomenon of the will. I think that this dispiriting is indeed a powerful feeling, one with which the post-Enlightenment western mind has continuously grappled when the thought or deep feeling of the absence of a divine or natural moral law has been in play. But, as Hume points out, such an effect of a particular metaethic being considered as valid does not pass muster as a form of philosophical debate. It could do so if it were the case that a particular moral philosopher argued that that kind of value-constitution correctly described the matter while simultaneously holding the function of morality to be socially grounded in its upholding of cohesive, conflict-resolving procedures: for which a certain decent fiction of objectivity might be necessary if people were to maintain their commitment to it. Such a moral philosopher would then be expounding an apparently contradictory system. Or, at the very least, she would have to take care that her thoughts were not made public. Mackie may fall foul of just such an objection, Williams thinking that he does
transgress his own avowed moral philosophy. Hume has also been criticized by Annette Baier on similar grounds.

This kind of experience of worry engendered by a particular moral theory need not be felt by all as breaking down the very experience, conceptual resources and practices to which it is addressed. Moreover, a subject may conceivably be led by these considerations to abandon certain moral practices and beliefs in a moral system without a correspondent breakdown in the kind of objectivity experience which has been addressed. Certainly, though, a number of writers on moral philosophy do believe those kinds of effect to be producible by such metaethical speculation. And even the chief contemporary proponent of a Humean view of morality, Blackburn, concedes that there is the strong possibility of an 'unease' on considering his view, this unease being 'located in a tension between the subjective source which projectivism gives to morality, and the objective "feel" that a properly working morality has. It is this objective feel or phenomenology which people find threatened by projectivism, and they may go on to fear the threat as one which strikes at the core of morality.'

In the context of a debate concerning that phenomenology which moral realists point to and advance as support for their metaethical theories and his own response to it, Blackburn says that:

It is, I think, particularly the side of morality associated with obligation which is felt to be subject to this threat...[Obligation] often needs to be perceived as something sufficiently external to us to act as a constraint or bound on our other sentiments and desires. The claims and shackles of obligation must come from outside us. Can anything both be felt to have this power, and yet be explained as a projection of our own sentiments? The charge will then be that projectivism falsifies this aspect of morality; it will be unable to
endorse this kind of perception of obligation, but must explain it away as a phenomenological distortion. It will be the result of an error, and realist opponents of projectivism will join with revisionists to urge that it marks a point at which [Blackburn's metaethic] fails. The realists will trust the phenomenology, and revisionists will regret it.\textsuperscript{39}

This kind of breakdown is a salient difficulty for those images of our experience of moral demands which find themselves so poorly supported by either direct or reflective phenomenological inspection. But the more explicitly philosophical difficulty which is generated by the phenomenological mode of argument is itself potentially a very strong one. I believe that the three arguments I am considering all purport to do the following. One element of this general approach is the straightforward falsifying of a particular description of the moral phenomenology. This goes on when that view of value as chosen, or value as projected desire, is seen not to capture the essence of our direct moral experience of the demands we perceive: which do not seem chosen, or projected, or created by us.\textsuperscript{40} The further element is trained on such views when they seem either to clash with that reflective experience of which I have talked and/or to be seen in the light of that as involving themselves in practical contradiction at a phenomenological level of presentation. In philosophical practice these dual aspects of the second element are intimately conjoined, the latter being the result of the former's having been shown. That is to say, an opponent subjectivist view is putatively shown to produce a contradictory relation between the place of value apprehension in our life and its claimed subjective basis once it has been established by WPT that an objectivity component is experienced by us in such apprehension. And it is when these two elements to a phenomenological argument are arrayed before the opponent view that I think all the interesting questions come into their own.
It does not seem to me an especially contestable matter that a (purely) subjectivist approach falls through and cannot begin adequately to describe our direct experience. We do not experience ourselves as choosing the demands that come upon us, or which we have experienced in the past. One of the 'interesting' questions to which I alluded above is just how much and how precise the manner of objectivity which is found in the experience and which falsifies the subjectivist one. And the same goes for the higher reflective attention which the subject gives to the general stuff of her moral experience. If she rejects the value-conferral image (either as that conferral allegedly goes on from her as an individual subject or along with her collective group) then one would wish to know just what kind of objectivity it is with which that is clashing and which is upheld at the reflective level.

To these two points I have a number of comments to make. One is simply to note that facet of moral decision-making with which we are faced by moral problems and which throws onto the subject the responsibility for careful, honest thought. That this thought goes on in the light of, and working with, the moral demands that impinge unbidden upon her should not detract from an important part of our moral experience that goes on subsequent to the consciousness of the moral demand. Such a process does give some warrant to the notion of a subject's input to her own moral experience. But it does not give it that for the immediate experience of moral demands and the values they might be felt to disclose to one; these are not experienced as under the subject's direct volition. (Though this does not discount that some ultimate personal commitment of a willed form to certain moral concerns is felt on reflection by a subject to be necessary to the particular quality which her moral demand experience has for her).

A second point which I think merits some considerable attention is this. The immediate experience is, for sure, not one given in subjective form; but is the reflective experience really so disorienting as the three have put it? I am not at all
sure that it can be taken as read that subjects do find, or would find, reflection on some possible subjective source of the demands that alight in the moral consciousness one that gives rise to a breakdown in the ability to make sense of themselves and their moral life. The likes of Russell, Ayer and Mackie all thought morality to have that subjective source and there is every evidence that their moral lives continued unabated, or even with a greater degree of involvement than the majority of us normally care to bother ourselves with. Sartre, too, campaigned tirelessly on all kinds of moral issues. These philosophers seem neither to have found their moral activity absurd or pointless in the light of their subjectivist reflections on it nor to have been in thrall to that kind of disquieting, dissolving phenomenology described partially by the arguments of WPT.

With respect to my point directly above concerning whether subjects would see any sense in going on with their moral lives if they came to believe that moral demands had no objective underpinning of the kind Mackie claims to identify, Mill has an interesting comment. It comes from the third chapter of his *Utilitarianism*, in which he discusses the experience of obligation and particularly that feeling which ensues when one takes oneself to have violated duty. While my area of interest is not confined only to that of feelings of obligation, these clearly form an important part of the moral demand experience. Mill's comments bear upon my arguments above and bring the tone of the argument generally forward to the next sub-section, in which I question more fully, via a particular philosopher's contentions, the idea that we 'need' to believe in a special kind of objective moral reality in order for the moral demands we apprehend to be meaningful or even for them to be had at all by us in experience. Mill says this:

There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that a person who sees in moral obligation a transcendental fact, an objective reality belonging to the province of "Things in themselves", is likely to be
more obedient to it than one who believes it to be entirely subjective, having its seat in human consciousness only. But whatever a person's opinion may be on this point of Ontology, the force he is really urged by is his own subjective feeling, and is exactly measured by its strength. No one's belief that duty is an objective reality is stronger than the belief that God is so; yet the belief in God, apart from the expectation of actual reward and punishment, only operates on conduct through, and in proportion to, the subjective religious feeling.42

2.ii - A specific counter-argument to that of WPT

I am going to take here a sample counter-argument which has been specifically directed by its author against the Wiggins-Platts reflective phenomenology. In the light of my comments above on the need to maintain a certain cautious reserve with respect to accepting the three phenomenological arguments that I considered, I am going to use the contention here to address that question of how much subjectivity of value one can 'take' at the reflective level with a view toward establishing how much objectivity is required in the experience of moral demands. The weight of Mill's quoted comments above will also be made apparent in the counter-argument which I describe here.

The philosopher whom I have in mind is David Zimmerman, who writes against Wiggins and Platts in the context of the debate between realists and their opponents in moral theory. To that specific debate I do not wish to grant too much attention. But the points raised by it seem to me here to weigh significantly with the issues which I am addressing in this thesis.

Firstly, Zimmerman voices his concern that the kind of argument put forward by Wiggins is 'all very well as a piece of phenomenology', but that it
'leaves all the important questions about the nature and existence of the good unanswered.' That kind of concern is, I think, partially justified insofar as Wiggins does not address the phenomenological questions of the ways in which moral demands seem independent of one in direct experience and how values are taken to stand in that experience. But Wiggins is only dealing with a particular area and does not claim to be doing any more than that. Moreover, his analysis is not to be dismissed as 'all very well' when it is itself specifically located as an argument within the phenomenological claims made by other metaethical theories.

The next move which Zimmerman makes is to grant the force of Wiggin's description of the value consciousness as one that sees itself responding to matters of worth and importance that stand as so independently of the subject. He suggests that a holder of that opponent view which Wiggins takes himself to have dispatched can accept the validity of such a description while providing an alternative account of the states of affairs that stand behind the experience. In the terms of the realist debate, he puts the contention this way:

...the antirealist ought to be the one to make the provisional concession. To get the dialectic off the ground, he ought to take very seriously the phenomena the realist cites and try to show that a nonrealist moral ontology can in fact accommodate and explain them, and that where it cannot the price to be paid is not so high as the realist fears.

I quote in these two paragraphs of mine these two approaches taken in the face of a so-called 'phenomenological argument' in order to show how a response is sometimes levelled against it: that is, as both refusal to allow much force to the argument qua a form of philosophy, and as an attempt to explain or explain away the appearances without endorsing commitment to the seeming content of those appearances. And in the latter case once again I find that particular coalescence of
descriptive purchase on the experience which I have remarked often goes on between different parties to this debate and ones close to it. Few parties - oddly enough, given the relative utility of such a move - seem to bother themselves with closer inspection of the actual data of moral experience. That investigation is one which I believe throws much doubt on the notion of a moral consciousness responding to the demands of apparently independent value objects, other than that form of independence which the experience always has in being beyond the direct call-up of the will.

Whatever the precise descriptive account of this immediate level, there is a sense of the demand's independence, of things being valuable and important outwith the subject's own choosing. This is the phenomenology which the three arguments exploit. At the reflective level, they are saying, that sense of independence is endorsed and alternative portrayals found seriously wanting, or even wanting beyond all credibility. It is at this higher order reflective level that Zimmerman's counter-contentions display a third kind of opponent view. For he takes the force of the reflective argument at face-value and denies that subjects indeed need be so appalled by, or puzzled by, or conceptually disabled by, the possibility of a subjectivist account. This is a crucial move in the context of the work of this chapter. It is made via these questions from Zimmerman:

How much contingency can a reflective person take about his own desires? Or...how much self-delusion must an antirealist about values engage in to sustain his desires? Can he experience the "pull" of values in the world while at the same time believing that he himself is the source of these values?45

What Zimmerman does next is to accept that one portrayal of the subjectivist image of our choosing value from scratch - by decree, as it were - does indeed fall foul of
the Wiggins-Platts phenomenological argument. But then he puts this concession into the service of his own form of argument, and maintains that:

If desire rooted in the cognitive, constitutional, and historical density of the person is placed at the centre of a subjectivist account of values, then Platts' dilemma can be escaped. Heartily embracing values does not force the subjectivist into some kind of self-imposed delusion; and honestly facing the implications of subjectivism does not lead to the erosion of all his (nonappetitive) desires. For it is generally just not true that one's desires could just as easily have lighted upon \( p \) as not-\( p \). Human motivation has firmer contours than that. To be sure, the only necessity here is psychological necessity, but that is the only thing required if value is to have a firm place in the world.

Now this seems to me quite a cogent response to the WPT phenomenological argument generally. It not only puts forward that alternative view which I earlier suggested - simply that we can put up with a form of subjectivist reflection - but also at the same time addresses the compatibility of that with the apparently objective nature of our direct moral demand experience. Zimmerman takes his argument to allow a subject to hold with certainty that some things just are important or valuable in themselves and not as someone happens to feel that way about it. In similar fashion to that of Blackburn (1987), this sense of the independent importance of some matter is taken as the expression of a commitment to a whole system of moral thought in which such matters are taken to be important and valuable in themselves and as not being so in virtue of, and not subject to alteration by, the subjective stances which people take. (Whether that kind of argument is good enough to account for the particular feel of our experience I shall ask just below). So the position I have been outlining via this particular moral
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philosopher takes on the WPT phenomenological argument on two fronts. One on which it is engaged is that of the putative breakdown of the subject's sense of meaning, both as a conceptual affair of the subject's language with which she gathers her own experience, and also as the meaning of her life as a moral agent and as inhabiting a particular kind of morally-populated world. It contests whether that breakdown does occur.

The other way in which it faces against the WPT argument is that of attempting to provide a phenomenologically adequate account of our direct experience of moral demands in the light of the availability of a subjectivist reflection on it. If it were the case that subjects could take a fair deal of reflective subjective thought on the source of the workings of the moral consciousness, or significant parts of it, then there is still left what, at the least, is a relation that looks to be askance between the direct and reflective descriptions of her experience. That is to say, the subject would seem to be put in the position of holding together in her thought two essentially incongruent notions of what this area of her moral experience consists in. The sort of line taken by the likes of Zimmerman and Blackburn to deal with this matter is to see the apparent objectivity of the direct experience as the product of the social inculcation of the valuational response (S. Blackburn, 1987), one important element of which must be a form of education that does not look to the subject to be dealing only with her own desires and responses. In that latter way an objectivity feature is doubly brought into play: both as the social setting of moral propriety and correctness is established, this being objective in that correctness of moral judgement and validity of value experience are answerable not to the individual subject but to the independent 'other' formed by her collective; and as those things which the subject discerns as important and of value are felt at the direct level as independently so of anyone's will, this being supported by a second order endorsement of a first order way of
response. And yet I think that one will still incline, on considering this kind of presentation, to ask whether a subject is not ultimately under some kind of delusion as to the imputed objectivity of her experience. Blackburn is certainly aware of this potential problem, as evinced in his earlier quoted comments on the nature of obligation and experience of it (p.282 of this thesis). His method of avoiding possible trouble by invoking two levels of approach to the stuff of the experience - one a direct experience of objectivity, the other a reflective endorsement of the experience's being that way - strikes me, however, as too quick an attempt at silencing the issue at hand to dispatch of it without echo. For the subject is, on this account, under the impression of experiencing something or a quality of something that is not 'out there' in the world; she is in error in taking her experience as accurately reflecting the world. I believe that, of this phenomenology, Blackburn should either 'bite the bullet', as it were, and concede that it may cause the subject some unease, but that that is not so great as to engender the kind of breakdown of which WPT talk; or he should deny that direct experience is so determinately based on a subject taking herself to be apprehending such objective values and their demands. I will continue with this thought just below.

Having said this much, I do believe that this line of counter-argument to the phenomenological one of WPT has some mitigated strength. In pointing to the more resilient nature of the grasp which we have both on our direct experience in the light of subjectivist reflection on it and on the meaning of our moral life as we perform such reflection, it provides a direct opponent view to the notion of an experience of breakdown on entering the reflective level. And in attempting to provide some account of how the apparently clashing juxtaposition of objectivity at the direct level of experience and subjective construal at that of reflection is resolvable it is also contending with the WPT line. It is my belief that this latter account is performed by means of an especially interesting ploy. For the direct phenomenology of value as
'out there' or intrinsic to certain acts and states of affairs is not only accepted as correct description but as being in some way necessary for our moral practices to go on and to carry our convictions according to the operation of a second order sensibility. The delivery of that reflective stance is that that direct experience is indeed how moral affairs should appear to be, as Blackburn sees it. On reflection, claims Blackburn on our part, we do not desire that desire should be that which goes to constitute value.

So the direct experience in this scheme both upholds and enshrines the reflective one. With respect to this subtle phenomenological legerdemain between modes of the moral consciousness I wish to say this. Firstly, it is very hard to pin down a specific admission from a specific proponent of this form of argument that value is ultimately constituted by desire or by an unrecognized projection of desire. Blackburn, for instance, tends to hedge around the issue by his talk of second order attitudes to first order reactions. This seems to me to hide that fundamental disputed ground of the phenomenology as it concerns a subject reflecting that 'Actually what value is is...' And as to that question it seems to me that opponents of the WPT line should do one of two things. Either they should show, as my chapters 4 and 5 did, that at the immediate level there can be dispute about the correct phenomenological description that captures adequately that objectivity which undoubtedly, but imprecisely, is perceived. Then the clash between levels may be avoided because it is not as stark as the WPT line portrays it. On the other hand, this opponent could stand by the contention, as Zimmerman does, that the experiential life of a subject, and the meaning of her moral life, is not usurped, broken down, radically disoriented, & c. by the recognition at a reflective level of a value source that is in manifest tension with the seeming content of the direct one. I do not believe that this is always made clear by opponents of WPT.
With the paragraph above in mind, I still wish to maintain that, whatever the merits and drawbacks of each side to the reflective debate, there is, at the very least, something odd-looking about the relation between direct experience and that subjectivist reflective image which one can entertain. As I said above, there may not be a tension as such in the subject's consciousness on considering these levels side by side, but it surely is an initially strange, incongruent affair in appearance. To take from the demand examples of chapter 4, I ask the reader to consider the 'strangeness' of a similar operation performed with respect, say, to examples i and ix. And I think that we can usefully entertain the thought of an aesthetic experience and one also of a religious nature. The strange thing in example i is that, on reflection, most of us know such a demand is not 'out there' and is only a product of oneself, and yet find it often no easier to deal with the demand or its apparent exterior, assailing force in the light of that reflection. While in example ix, it is the thought that the demand which one perceives, the value of the natural environment it enshrines, inheres not 'out there' but only apparently so in virtue of one's own projective constitution, that may engender a strangeness of relation between levels. I think that the same goes for those heightened aesthetic and religious experiences where one feels most especially in the thrall of some kind of exterior force particularly so as the latter might seem to question one's whole way of life, as in conversion experiences, where the notion of a subjective source looks quite queer in the light of one's seeming lack of involvement in the constitution of the experience. Returning to the moral case, Richard Price looks to be drawing on just this imputed strangeness when he says that our moral experience arises

\textit{from our intuition of the nature of things}...It is scarcely conceivable that any one can impartially attend to the nature of his own perceptions, and determine that, when he thinks gratitude or beneficence to be \textit{right}, he perceives nothing \textit{true} of them, and
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*understands* nothing, but only receives an impression from a

*sense.* 54

Now the overall tenor which this series of thoughts strikes is this. At a minimal level one may experience the queerness of the relation of the two levels, between direct and higher reflective purchase on one's experience; this being a different kind of queerness between examples i and ix above, and a similar kind of difficulty which may strike one between the *heightened* aesthetic and religious experiences and the moral demand one. The moral case in particular may be susceptible of a similar phenomenological deflation, with respect to the WPT line, as there is for religious and aesthetic experience in general. For the majority of us, I believe, the reflection that aesthetic and religious demands and values do have a subjective source, even though occasionally appearing at a direct level in quite other guise than that, does not cause great problems. There is no breakdown in the experience class or in the intelligibility of talk about it. This contention I make in the light of what many people in our particular age seem inclined to feel about aesthetic and religious matters, particularly the latter. I also make it as a suspicion on my part - one on which I shall enlarge in section 4 - that the kind of breakdown of the self's involvement in a particular activity made out by WPT either does not occur or goes on only in a latent form that does not result in the kind of damage they believe it to do. And my general background suspicion to this matter which I am training on WPT here is that people can and do, as a matter of fact, get on with a far greater degree of contradictory and clashing beliefs and opinions, both within and between direct and reflective levels of experience, than philosophical orthodoxy generally would like to grant credence to. At this point one often finds considerations on the 'unity of the self' being brought to bear, this being the most salient *leitmotif* of that orthodoxy. 55 But I think that simple observation of oneself and others will show that unity to be a formal condition either not met by the lives many people lead
(people, that is, who do appear to be equipped with selves) or which is a far more strict condition than the actual unity of a self requires. That is, I believe that we find from observation of our own lives that they can and do contain legion amounts of what may look to be incompatible elements which yet manage to co-habit in one's cognitive and emotive constitutions. Of course, not all of these beliefs and attitudes might have presented themselves to a subject's reflection, or she may have avoided considering them together. But I do wish to add that I think that the general tenor of my presentation in this chapter so far shows that, in the specifically moral case, explicit consideration by a subject of allegedly incompatible perspectives on her moral experience does not have such destructive results as WPT present.

2.iii - Further criticism of WPT

Having ventured the thoughts in the sub-section above, then, I want to move on with my criticism of the WPT phenomenological arguments. My overall worry above has been that that kind of argument could be phenomenologically false. The reflection on subjectivity either may simply not generate an experience of a clash, or the clash may not be so disabling as its authors take it to be. The disjunction which I believe applies to the WPT argument is this: either the argument is false as a putative description of the phenomenological data; or it is correctly describing a problem, but says nothing special about the kind of objectivity which the reflective level is thought to enshrine. It is to that second problem that I now turn.

What the three phenomenological arguments are claiming is that it is necessary, in order for a particular area of our moral experience to be as it is, that on reflection we endorse some objectivity feature to it. This necessity varies in the WPT presentation between hard logical necessity and a less rigid affair of the sort 'This experience needs to go with that one if the latter is going to be maintained,' to
put it into words on their behalf. And this objectivity is represented by all three as the seeming independent value and importance of matters which they possess and which we do not confer on them. Taylor holds the further thesis that a value consciousness is itself constitutive of a self. This is clearly a further thesis from the one that says that if a certain experience is to be had at all then certain conditions must be met. I will discuss it and criticize it later.

I will present my criticism here by highlighting a positive aspect of the WPT phenomenological argument. It is that value cannot be chosen. That is to say, a subject cannot just choose that something have value, without some sort of deliberation in the light of what already seems valuable independently of his choosing that it be so.

It is actually very difficult to find proponents of such a purely subjective view. Sartre (1973) is generally held to be the target, though even he has tried to show that that view should not be attributed to him in so stark a form. Another philosopher has put the view in these words:

> It is...not in order to ask whether value judgements are objective, in the sense of corresponding to an object...I wish to suggest that the individual, in the last analysis, must make an arbitrary selection among possible interests and principles. *Morality has as its basis, in other words, an arbitrary, underived commitment to certain of the possible guiding principles and purposes*. Faced with an assortment of a number of possible selves, one must make a choice.

Sartre's classic exposition of this position is given in his example of the young man faced with a dilemma over whether to join the resistance or to stay with his ageing mother. His portrayal of this dilemma is intended to convey both the tragic position of the man in having to choose between two equally well-recommended courses of action and the universal position of us all in having to choose in non-dilemma cases.
how to proceed in moral affairs.\textsuperscript{58} 'Doubtless he chooses without reference to any pre-established values,' Sartre claims, though he adds that, 'it is unjust to tax him with caprice.'\textsuperscript{59} And he has what looks like his own form of metaethical justification of the matter:

\begin{quote}
...I say that it is...a self-deception if I choose to declare that certain values are incumbent upon me; I am in contradiction with myself if I will these values and at the same time say they impose themselves upon me.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

Now the arguments of WPT against this position (Taylor is the one who specifically attacks Sartre) deal with the notion of \textit{choosing} value, not with Sartre's normative criterion of individual responsibility. With that, few moral philosophers have any objection. There is a difference between the putative experienced objectivity to moral demands and the mere kow-towing to the external pressure of social convention and the 'expected thing'. Of the latter phenomenon no moral philosopher has any good to say. Also, no-one would deny the tragic position of the young man. There are cases like that where one just has to choose and take the consequences of the unfollowed course. But what philosophers like Taylor point out is that such a choice already presupposes the opposite of what the portrayal itself is supposed to establish. That is to say, a dilemma is only set up precisely because the two courses of action seem equally worthwhile to the young man independently of what he happens to think and desire. If indeed his choice were that which created the conflict of values, he could end it by self-legislating for the promulgation of one and the annulment of the other.\textsuperscript{61} The kind of dilemma he is put in (as opposed to: that which he has chosen to put himself in), and the kind of torn regret which he feels for that course that he fails to take in virtue of performing only one of them, look decidedly queer if his choice is so fundamentally involved in the constitution of the matter. This is why Taylor calls the Sartre position 'deeply
incoherent"\textsuperscript{62}, another writer on the subject maintaining that, 'The idea of simply creating or recognizing a value from scratch by \textit{fiat} is preposterous."\textsuperscript{63} For not only is the phenomenology of the direct experience simply not that of the choice or conferral of value - as if by some baptismal sign we magically imbued a state of affairs with value - but it is also not one with which reflection finds itself at all able to cope when viewed in that self-legislative way. That is to say, it just does not make sense at such a reflective level why there is the direct experience of phenomena like the independent givenness of moral demands and their apparent tenacity beyond one's own willed grasp. Reflection on this matter is, I believe, likely to produce that disorienting experience of strangeness and a dissolution of one's grasp on a morally-hued existence of which WPT talk.

Before moving on to develop this argument, later following in the manner of Taylor on the self, I will reiterate the basic objection put to Sartre's views here. It is the threefold phenomenological argument to the effect that: Sartre simply misdescribes or ignores the actual nature of our moral experience; his presentation of the case is such as to produce that experience which seems to contradict the foundation of the whole matter in choice; and his subjectivist view is one which our own reflection finds incompatible with the content of the general moral experience we have. These three lines are well drawn together by Smith in his terse suggestion that a 'rather crude' but 'effective refutation' of the Sartrean view is provided by attempting actually to 'try it out.'\textsuperscript{64} We cannot, that is, get ourselves to the point of just choosing to value or disvalue something - unless in the light of considerations which already involve pre-given values. A similar thought is put by Cudworth on the impossibility of the willing of what is to be good and right by God or man.\textsuperscript{65} And as to the idea of choice which Sartre upholds as the cornerstone of his moral thought, this itself appears to be eradicated by the very way in which he takes it to be in operation. Our ordinary understanding of making choices, deciding between
alternatives that are available as live ones, takes us to be doing so in the light of at least some considerations that bear on one or other course. These considerations need not be entirely independent of oneself. For choice says something about the agent, about the sort of person it is who does choose in such and such a way; about how she chose in the light of certain considerations, how some bore heavily with her decision-making and others did not. In the Sartrean image of choice all this is wiped out: because the agent has nothing other than the fact of her committed decision to show as support for her deliberation. And that is contradictory. For Sartre wants to talk of authenticity, of responsibility for decision-making, and yet seems to cut the ground for saying this from under his own feet by his presentation of what free choice looks like. This is so because the image of the self doing the choosing is so very withered in comparison with recognizable instances of such an activity. Hence Taylor says of the young man's dilemma:

...I might ponder the two possibilities, and then I might just find myself doing one rather than another. But this brings us to the limit where choice fades into non-choice.66

Smith also complains of the apparent arbitrariness which this brings with it, one which makes of the notion of choice an absurdity.67 Hence another opponent of the Sartrean position states his belief that:

Where making a decision is just a matter of plonking for one option rather than another, with no pregiven basis of values for moral deliberation, Sartre's "terrible freedom" tends to collapse into the worst sort of slavery - the isolated self buffeted around by momentary impulses and whims.68

These criticisms all seem to me valid, cogent, and sufficient to dispatch of the view they oppose.69 It is indeed a contradictory thing to argue for the notion of value choice when the same argument seems to eradicate the basis on which choice
can occur. And if the whole notion is deeply incoherent, as Taylor believes, it
certainly is deeply incorrect as a description of our actual moral experience: which
does not go on in anything like that fashion.70

The trouble which I find with these criticisms lies along two tracks. Firstly,
I am not at all sure that the pure subjective choice model of Sartre is an especially
prevalent one to combat. There are few articles being produced in philosophical
journals that present such a model as that one which underlies our moral experience
or even our moral decision making. Hence I fear that such a notion is something of
a straw man when attacked. Much more interesting, then, is the argument the WPT
line provides at a reflective level against that of value as conferred by desire. As I
have said, the argument does provide a certain degree of force against this model.
But I tried to show by way of Zimmerman's counter-arguments that this reflection
may not excite too destabilising a degree of that experiential phenomenon to which
the WPT line points. This is where my second worry comes in. Having established
that the pure choice model is incoherent, and having given some phenomenological
presentation to suggest that one of desire is reflectively unacceptable, the WPT
argument strikes me as falling short of the crucial subsequent discussion of just
what alternative phenomenology to these models is consonant with our moral
experience. That is, they leave one only with a rough notion that some kind of
objectivity is experientially at large, both in the direct phenomenology and at a
reflective level. Moreover, this is not so much the positive side of an argument,
being itself presented in depth, but the upshot of an argument against the choice and
desire models. The basis on which that argument goes on is indeed to exploit the
objectivity feel we have in our value consciousness, without going on to develop a
richer phenomenological analysis of that feel. In short, it seems to me that what this
general line of argument does is to train against those subjectivist opponent views
some general phenomenon of objectivity without giving the reader an idea of how
exactly this appears or needs to be appearing on reflection for it to be maintaining its role in the constitution of the value experience. I believe that any appearance of independence of the subject at direct and reflective levels will be sufficient for the WPT argument to follow through. And that does not tell one very much. Unless it is made explicit that indeed it is this minimal objectivity that is found in the experience - as is the crux of my thesis - then arguments like that of WPT are left hanging rather open-ended. They take it that their presentations show some kind of objective moral reality to be figured in our experience; but they seem unable to point to any precise kind of objectivity that the experience has, or which it needs to have if it is to be experienced and if it is to move one. And where they do make determinate claims, about the kinds of breakdown which I have discussed earlier, I do not think their arguments are strong enough to carry their case.

Section Three: Moral value as independent of one

One way in which to indicate the complexity of this matter I now propose to follow. It is that which relates back to Zimmerman's argument, with my intention being to bring forward the passage of debate to the objectivity question. Firstly, one of the writers to whom I have referred above in my discussion of Sartrean choice, points out of the faculty of desire that:

...relating value to what is desired presents a picture of persons with a pre-packaged set of desires that have simply to be satisfied. Quite the contrary is the case, however. We grow in our appreciation of what is valuable in the world. The realm of value has to be explored, not fixed ab initio by our actual desires.71

This seems to me a correct account of the phenomenology of discovery with regard to moral demands and the values from which they may sometimes seem to derive. We do not generally choose how the future will stand as moral situations come to
strike themselves upon our consciousness: they come upon us without our bidding. But note how little headway is made here towards a distinct notion of objectivity that goes beyond the disputed claim of the implication of desire in our value experience. For discovery; being surprised at how one reacts; sensing the incoming force of demands on one, in which one appears not oneself to have had a hand: these are all quite compatible with the desire model which is being attacked.

One writer on moral objectivity, E.J.Bond, maintains that our cognitive constitution creates desire in discovering values, these latter themselves being created not by antecedent states of desire but by those ways in which the world captures one's interest and hence leading to desire being engendered. To this general contention I have no particular comment to make, other than to say that its plausibility need not rule out a projectivist account of the desire-value nexus (indeed, Blackburn would accept its validity as a first order description of moral experience). But I do want to marshall the thought contained in it, and the quotation from Bond that follows below, against their own author by pointing out that they both strike me as accounts of the value consciousness which can be sufficiently closely employed also for desire as to show the complexity of the issue at hand. For Bond continues in these words:

No value that is a function of desire, supposing there were such a thing (which there is not), would be an objective value. But that I like something, that it interests me, pleases me, satisfies me, occupies my talents, makes me feel good, etc., is not a product of my desires and must be discerned by me in the course of living. It is, therefore, objective relative to any pre-cognitive state of mine. It is not created from within; it is discovered in the world.

Of this matter I believe it can be said that it well describes also the way in which one's desires and that which engages them appear before one. For one's relation to
one's own desires is not one of their being chosen, but of their alighting on one at
an immediate level and (sometimes) of their reflective ordering and weighting by
one at a higher level. It is not the case that one's desires are explicitly present to
consciousness at all times such that they do not ever have that apparel of
independence of oneself by which one aspect of objectivity is signalled. Indeed, to
repeat one of the basic points of the previous chapter, one's desires are often just
those which, when made clear to consciousness, strike one most strongly as the
not-self.

I am making two points here which are clearly connected. The first is that a
rough notion of objectivity-as-unwilled with respect to the moral demand
experience permits of a number of quite different and opposing systems of moral
psychology to offer explanation of the actual genesis of the experience. And the
second is that only a tightening up of the notion of objectivity to exclude other
possible accounts will permit the proponents of views based partly or wholly on
phenomenological modes of evidence to make their particular argument
authoritative.

This might be done in two ways. Both are necessary to complete the
argument, and both taken together are sufficient conditions for the working of a
phenomenological argument within the canons of such a form of debate that I have
suggested in chapter 3. These are, of course, the ways of showing a particular
argument to be false at both direct and reflective levels, and a proposed alternative
description to be the correct one. Now ways of showing other presentations to be
false may not at the same time be ways of tightening up the notion of objectivity in
the experience. So the latter form of argument requires additional support to that
provided by the former ones. My thought is that the vague sense of objectivity at
the direct level may not get all that much backing at the reflective one as the
proponents of the WPT form of argument may think. This is because of general
considerations which I put forward via my discussion of Zimmerman's contribution to the debate. It is also in the light of my belief, which has been at the heart of my phenomenological presentation throughout this thesis, that the objectivity which the subject is afforded by her direct experience of the moral demand, that degree of it which gives her some reflective endorsement and sensefulness, is a vague and rather minimal matter. And this matter, I believe, involves a much more durable relationship of subjects to their experience and to reflective thought on that than is putatively given by WPT. It also involves them in a kind of objectivity experience - that which is independent-as-unwilled - which is compatible with a number of background explanations of the nature of the experience. This latter point especially follows through if the kind of explanation being offered does not find itself dissolving the very experience and the concepts which it addresses (i.e., of a 'moral demand', of a 'moral value' that demands, and the 'objectivity' which they might possess) when it is held before reflective court.

Here, then, is my contention. The WPT line assumes that any description which is different from the contentual data of the direct phenomenology must fall foul both of that difference and also of the reflective experience on surveying it. But I do not think that that is the case. One reason which underlies my doubt I have given already in terms of an uncertainty about the way in which our reflective experience is actually given to us. In that respect, it is my belief that reflective thought on the possible subjective source of an experience which appears at the direct level arrayed with some objectivity element does not cause ourselves the kind of awkward sensation, disconcerting experience, conceptual breakdown that WPT try to exploit. (Given the way in which I have been trying to find adequate expression for this alleged experience in the previous sentence and elsewhere it will also be evident that I do not think that that experience is very clearly decribed by WPT either). The other major reason which I am putting forward is that which
concerns the diversity of possible reflective surveys of the direct experience in the light of the actual objectivity feel presented therein. This reason is the culmination of my work in the previous three chapters on the rather rough and indeterminate sense of objectivity which goes on with the moral demand experience in immediacy.

I will give some further explanation of my thoughts here and then move on, in the light of that, to criticize Taylor's further use of his phenomenological argument to link moral concerns and their experienced objectivity with the make-up of a self. That will lead me on, in turn, to a final discussion of that apparent paradox of the relation between contents of the core self with regard to moral matters and that sense of objectivity (independence-as-unwilled) which seems to go intimately with them. I will, of course, try to explain how I distance my use of a term like 'core self' from that linkage by Taylor of moral concerns with the metaphysics of the self's constitution which I will have criticized.

3.1 - Society as independent source of values

I will begin my presentation here by quoting what I take to be a fair example of one way in which a subjectivist account of the moral demand (as I apply that kind of experience to the gist of the quoted comment) is attacked and yet the kind of objectivity to which it points is compatible with a number of different views. Its author, John Kekes, calls the idea of choosing values 'romantic nonsense'.74 He summarises his basic position in these words:

Almost everyone is a moral agent and nobody has made such a choice. The fact is that people are born into a tradition and shortly after birth their moral education begins. By adolescence, they are saturated with the moral views of their tradition. Of course a person can come to reject it, and if someone does come to reject it
eventually, it is, short of suicide, for another tradition. One cannot stop being a moral evaluator. The idea that choice or commitment lies at the foundation of morality is mistaken, because it ignores the fundamental role that tradition and education play.\textsuperscript{75}

I draw from this kind of contention a point of especial importance. The experience of the moral system that Kekes describes (and the demands it puts upon one) is going to be occurring, it seems to me, with a rough but fairly constant sense of an objectivity feature. Such a phenomenology is likely to possess both kinds of an independent datum which I have distinguished, though experienced in more and less clear ways. That is to say, the moral demand will be given to the subject as independent of her direct control: it was not her who chose that society and its moral codes should be founded in such and such a way, and it is not her who gets to choose moral values under such conditions; and the demand experience will often possess also some apparent exterior placing with respect to its content since that place from which it has arisen is indeed located outwith her own geographical self. (And in both cases this exteriority may engender disharmonious relations with the subject's perceived self as the demands appear in her consciousness as impositions, nagging pressures upon her).

I do not mean to suggest that moral demands are felt, or felt in the main, as coming from society. But I do want to cover a possibility which seems to lie at the heart of the views of, for instance, Mackie and Blackburn. Broadly speaking, that view is that the demand experience has a social genesis, even though its content will not usually be referring to social loci. Those who put forward such a view sometimes also want to make the additional point that moral education, if it is to be effective, requires that the demand experience be inculcated in subjects as if arising from outwith their breast and also not simply as arising from social codes and expectations. About the question of whether the demand experience has to possess
an incomingness - as an essential feature of it - I shall inquire further in this chapter. For the present I want to see whether any phenomenological headway can be made with such a view.

John Ladd talks in this respect of the need for a moral system, if it is to have 'operational efficacy',\textsuperscript{76} to be garnered with a veneer of 'legitimacy'\textsuperscript{77} in order to distinguish it from the many and various other demands which social life makes on individuals. One element of this he believes to be a perception by individuals of the demands having 'a foundation in reality'\textsuperscript{78} - that is, as having some existence and/or legitimacy over and above the fact of people's experiencing them. This, I think, the position of Kekes points toward. Society, its traditions and mores, are a very real presence in our experience. This kind of statement does not deny the problems of a metaphysically apt rendering of such a reality, but I ask the reader to note that they need not detain the analysis here. Minimally, the brute reality of others in human community presents a relatively straightforward metaphysic. But more important is the fact that we are dealing with a rough experiential sense of objectivity for which an equally rough sense of a social reality - or merely a reality of some sort, one that is outwith the subject - is adequately consonant.

I am not saying that moral demand experience is just one mode in which we explicitly feel ourselves under pressure from the gaze and frown of others (though that is sometimes the case, I believe). Rather, I am saying this. Some authors seem to think that there is a possible social understanding of our moral phenomenology. It might be that that one would not have to talk of moral values demanding from 'out there' in Mackie's construal of that feeling, but that it could give some grounding to that rough sense of a morally-tinged reality which sometimes goes on and to that experience (also rough) of the objectivity-as-unwilled which goes on universally in varying heights with the moral demand. Moreover, I do not think that the offering-up of such a thought for reflective hearing will produce those
experiences of unease or breakdown as it is viewed side by side with the immediate experience. Doubtless there are a small few who have reflected that moral demands really are only social impostitions on them and have then gone on to do what they pleased in the light of that. But for most of us that sort of thought does not have that sort of impact and it is not a live option for us simply to switch our entire moral lives around and block off the moral demands we experience.79 Nor need a realization at a reflective level of the social origin of such direct experience be incompatible with strong commitment to a moral system allied with a steady and enlivened sense of the importance of moral demands upon one.80

In the previous few paragraphs, then, I have offered for consideration one way in which the direct phenomenology can be understood and how it could appear at the reflective level. Now it seems to me that much of the foregoing is not greatly different from what Wiggins in particular has to say, especially in his more recent work (D.Wiggins, 1991; see also P.Grice, 1991). There, too, he talks of the social origin of the moral consciousness in tandem with the appearance of objectivity which is discerned in direct experience. Similarly, Taylor's understanding of moral objectivity is based on a social foundation which grounds subjects' lives as inhabiting a world from which moral experience and language are ineliminable, an account based in turn on his notion of requirements for a functioning self (C.Taylor, 1977 & 1989). So the point which I have been trying to put at large comes back to the phenomenological description of the objectivity in the moral demand experience. WPT have provided, I believe, fair descriptive portrayal of immediate experience. It is in terms of the valuable and the worthwhile and the demands they make on one as independent of the subject. At the reflective level they take this to be given further weight as a phenomenological argument by its endorsement as necessary to the experience and to the meaning it has in the moral life of the subject. I think that the latter condition is too stringent and that it is not
always actually met in the lives of subjects. But to the extent that it is met, I think that the kinds of reflection which I have identified in this chapter, when directed on the experience as independent of the subject's direct volition, meets it in a minimal way. The question here, of course, is whether such a minimal sense of objectivity on the subject's part is sufficient for the production of the experience in a meaningful way. I think it is. And I say this precisely because it is that rough sense that is to be found in our moral experience.

I have intentionally omitted mention in this sub-section of the criticisms which I made in chapter 6 (section 4.ii) concerning social accounts of the phenomenology. Those criticisms are, of course, germane to the presentation just above, and I therefore ask the reader to bear them in mind. My purpose in this sub-section, however, has been to show that if a social account of some sort for the phenomenology were to be a successful one, then its success would be of a mitigated sort. I said earlier that the social account would seem to be compatible with the vague and indeterminate sense which we have as of some facet of reality impinging on us in the demand experience. Yet the phenomenological data show that that indeterminacy of the experience as regards its genesis includes, but goes beyond, the social account. The diversity, as well as the vagueness, of the experience as a whole renders it compatible with other background accounts which, like the social one, might not be directly given in the phenomena themselves. Demands linked to a social origin in the experience are, then, no more the universal stuff of the experience than are explicit demands of society on one.

3.ii - The rough contours of 'independence'

My descriptive phenomenological presentation thus rests on two features of the moral demand experience, both in immediacy and on reflection, that the WPT line either does not notice or to which it does not give great attention. They are the
roughness of the objectivity feature at the immediate level, and the robustness of the reflective survey on possible accounts of it. In the light of the former, all that the latter reflection has to affirm is that the experience itself is not under the subject's control and that it has some element of an involvement of an independent reality going to constitute it. It is interesting to note how widely divergent a group of moral philosophers (with respect to their own metaethical views) seem to have produced thought which can be construed on these lines. Mackie, of course, I have quoted already on the possible necessity of an objectivity feature. Francis Hutcheson talks of the way in which the qualities he takes one's moral sense to discern seem to reside outwith one's own breast and how this is reflectively 'conceived' to be so.81 Aristotle's account of our moral experience strikes me in a similar way as presentation of the direct phenomenology and as to the way in which it comes about. And a recent philosopher has argued that the form of our moral experience, discourse and practices of justification is as of independent moral facts, and that, the nature of these matters being socially functional, the question of the real being of such states of affairs idles out of relevance.82

Greater account by its author of the way in which alleged moral facts play a part in the moral consciousness would be needed in order to assess the latter kind of claim above as to its degree of phenomenological accuracy. But the point Elder is making is germane as a general contention in the area with which I am presently concerned. His view is that some overall image of the moral life as one involving the objectivity of its contents is required in order for it to be able to hold sway over the loyalties and commitments of subjects, and that its passage from one generation to the next goes on in such a way as to render the matter of the origin of that objectivity unqueried within the moral community (indeed, a sign of the successful functioning of this inheritable system is just that that kind of question rarely crops up). Note how similar a thesis this is to that which Platts makes out for the way in
which moral value acts and must appear to be constituted in order to motivate the reflective agent. Both philosophers, that is, see moral value as that which moves a subject in varying modes of attraction and repulsion in moral situations. To do this they believe it necessary that the moral demands and values have an appearance of objectivity. Otherwise, subjects' attention lapses, their commitment drops away, and they will behave in whatsoever ways their fancy happens to take. This is the worry which Wiggins and Taylor have at the heart of their analysis.

I have to say that I am not convinced of the phenomenological validity of this kind of position: I do not think that the phenomenological path from considerations of non-objectivity to experiences of senselessness in one's moral practices is shown to be inevitable. My suspicion is wrought both by doubts about the determinacy of the matter being presented - so that it is often hard to grasp a specific point which such authors are trying to make - and about its truth as a claim from the reflective phenomenology when the stuff of moral commitment and its nature is brought before it. My doubts concern both the imprecision of the phenomenological description being put forward (such that it can be used equally to support alternative conclusions) and its probable invalidity when reconstructed in more determinate style for analysis. Concerning both, I have said already that the experience on reflection of a breakdown is not one which I find to be described adequately by those who employ its putative occurrence as a phenomenological argument. Besides, I have said also that I do not think it likely to be as destabilising as all that. Now I am saying that I find the description of a subject ceasing (or not initially acquiring) commitment to a moral way of life, unless it is seen as objectively required of her, to be an extraordinarily wide one. Firstly, if it is true then it is true as a very general claim and permits of a correspondingly wide number of understandings of that objectivity (as I pointed out earlier). Secondly, if the claim is made much more specific - say, that should it occur to a subject that there are no
moral values 'out there' in Platonic manner, she would feel anything to be permitted - then it is decidedly false. For our direct moral experience does not go in that kind of way and our reflective assay of it does not need the kind of thought to be held in order to make sense of the experience. And thirdly, the claim itself seems to rest on large background assumptions about human motivation; conceptual requirements of experience; the role of reflection in relation to direct experience; and needs of the self (both \textit{qua} a self and \textit{qua} a self that has moral experience). Not all of these matters may be clearcut - as Zimmerman argues - and none of the authors attempt to show the precise status of which ones singly or together make for the necessary and sufficient conditions of their argument following through. The next area I wish to address is in light of one of these matters, namely, the constitution of the self.

\textbf{Section Four: The self and moral objectivity}

Taylor (1977 & 1989) makes the claim that the ability to evaluate states of affairs and possible courses of action is necessary for the existence of a self.\footnote{83} He bases this claim on a general conceptual analysis of the conditions for what he thinks we would recognise to be a properly functioning self. And this leads him tentatively to argue that moral evaluation is necessary thereby for a unified self through time.\footnote{84} With this kind of analysis I shall not tarry for very long as it would seem to me to take my phenomenological description of a part of our moral experience away from its specified object, that of the moral demand. But it does bear on the discussion presented so far in this chapter, and on passages elsewhere throughout previous ones, where I have inquired into the notion of the necessity of objectivity to the moral demand experience. Since I take Taylor's form of argument to be running in the traditional line of a Kantian-type reflection on the bounds of a possible experience,\footnote{85} then a phenomenological description of the experience we
have and that which we are said necessarily to have seems to me quite proper and germane.

In the paragraph above I have deliberately mixed a number of different possible construals of Taylor's line. A salient point that I would ask the reader to bear in mind in the light of that paragraph concerns the exact claim(s) being made and its (their) validity. For I switched in the first two sentences from 'existence' to 'proper functioning' of a self. *Prima facie* there is a considerable difference between those conditions necessary for a self - a unity of a distinct consciousness across time - and those which are thought to be necessary for one that is in good order, not subject to occasional fracture, and similar to that self with which we take it that we are equipped. I think that it is at this point - concerning the differences between a bare self and a more developed conception of one - that it would be best to follow the philosophical trend of talking of the latter in terms of 'personhood' in order to maintain which kind of subject matter is being discussed. To distinguish between the two in a single sentence: we should consider the possibility of a self that functions poorly or functions merely differently from our enlarged conception of one, but which nevertheless meets the minimal conditions for its existence. With respect to the possible condition of moral evaluation, then, we face the possible difference between no self at all or a dysfunctional, withered, or merely strange-looking one should that condition not be met. And there is also a further distinction which I wish to make within the condition of evaluation for which Taylor argues. It is between evaluation as a reflective ability to choose between different options facing a self, and moral evaluation itself. Again, I think it should be borne in mind that the requirement of the former may not include that of the latter. So a self that can evaluate, but does not do so in the light of moral considerations, may be a possible one. It might be a minimal version of a self, and its possibility might give one some unease, but it would simply be incorrect thereby to refuse to acknowledge
it as a self. A different, or strange, or even an inherently unstable form of personhood would then be borne, but it would not also be correct to maintain that selfhood was not instantiated.

4.i - Taylor on the self and evaluation

Taylor's argument runs in this way. A 'simple weigher' who 'evaluates weakly' between desires and their fulfillment (that is, simply goes along with whichever one happens to gain the upper hand in his attentions) lacks 'depth' in comparison to a 'strong evaluator' who 'deploy all a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires.' The latter is 'more articulate' about his preferences in having the 'contrastive language' of, for example, the higher and the lower, the noble and the base; whereas the former must rely on just an 'inarticulate "feel"' between alternatives to guide her. The form of this argument is essentially repeated in his talk of the necessity of evaluative 'frameworks' in Part One of Taylor's *Sources of the Self*. 'Motivations or desires don't only count in virtue of the attraction of the consummations,' he states, 'but also in virtue of the kind of life and kind of subject that these desires properly belong to...Strong evaluation is not just a condition of articulacy about preferences, but also about the quality of life, the kind of beings we are or want to be. It is in this sense deeper [than the "simple weigher's" life].

Now Taylor admits that his simple weigher is able to reflect on her desires and therefore displays 'a necessary feature of what we call a self or a person.' But he wants to support the stronger thesis that that self can really only make sense to us as it involves those evaluations of a moral kind which he mentions in his article (1977) and in his book (1989). He says that:

...the capacity for strong evaluation in particular is essential to our notion of the human subject;...without it an agent would lack a kind
of depth we consider essential to humanity, without which we
would find human community impossible (the capacity for which is
another essential feature of human agency)...The question would
revolve around whether one could draw a convincing portrait of a
human subject to whom strong evaluation was quite foreign (is
Camus' Mersenne such a case?) since in fact the human beings we
are and live with are all strong evaluators.  

I believe that Taylor is giving issue here to a widespread intuition of a rough
sort among many moral philosophers. There are numerous examples of the
proponents of particular metaethical theories giving some consideration to the
relation between their claims and the unity, unhampered functioning, and
recognizable appearance of a self.  

More usually, one finds the claim consistently
made that a moral aspect to one's life is necessary for personhood.  

These two
claims, though intimately related, are not the same. To have a self need not be to
have personhood. A being with a reflexive sense of identity through time would
seem to require basic distinctions between itself and other items in the world, but
not need also to evaluate (and certainly not to evaluate morally).  

I think that where
Taylor's claims may have their force, and where they may articulate a widely-held
intuition, is in the sphere of personhood. It might be that our conception of a
'person' not only calls for a being that makes evaluative distinctions, but also
requires it to evaluate with moral ones. If it was then made out that moral evaluation
necessarily has to include experience of an objectivity component, then the
argument would have shown, in a slightly roundabout fashion, that objectivity in
the moral experience was an essential component of personhood. I shall be asking
in the discussion below if this presentation can be made out convincingly-or
whether it can only show that if a being evaluates morally then it must do so via
experiences of an objectivity component. To the notion of necessary conditions for
a self I can only, within the confines of my direction of argument, say that a lot more Kantian excavation of the conditions of a possible experience would need to be undertaken in order to show how the specific form of moral evaluation enters into that notion. I do not think it does, and I do not find that the image of a self devoid of such experience erases the very concept, even though, for many other reasons, we might like to see it built into the concept.

4.ii - Moral subjects, moral demands and objectivity

Concerning the concept of personhood, however, Taylor may be on firmer ground. Here it is that I wish to use his analysis to direct matters onto the notion of objectivity as essential to the experience of moral demands and of the independent value, importance, worthwhileness of states of affairs. We recall that his argument, and that of others, has disposed of a certain notion of value as chosen. The converse of that is the presence of some feature such as of the independence of such matters before consciousness. Now Taylor's talk of the necessity of evaluation may have looked to have concealed this. For evaluation is something one does. But the force of his argument is that this can only go on in the light of some level of developed reflective articulacy that draws on evaluative notions of the independently worthwhile and valuable. The evaluative notions we employ are those which are independent of our own choosing. That is, it is the case that: both the notions themselves are independent of our choosing, and what those notions conceptualize is independent of our choosing. (And though the moral ones may not be logically independent of us insofar as they may refer to our activity and characters, such a fact need not be before consciousness and does not imply that they were chosen by us).

It is at this point that the force of the Taylor argument, and that of Nagel (1986a & 1986b) with which I have linked it in some of the footnotes, weighs into
the debate. If these thoughts on evaluation and its moral aspect are true to our image of personhood, and if this necessarily involves some degree of independence of the subject - in virtue of these matters and the demands with which they present themselves to oneself not being and not possibly being chosen - then it will follow that the objectivity experience of moral demands does have a basic and deep grounding in the very essence of what we regard as personhood. And the Taylor/Nagel interpretation of that does not need to invoke 'queer' independent entities. It performs its account by adverting to the independence of reasons for and against evaluations and actions which are independent of the subject.

My response to this possibility is not especially sanguine. These thoughts may be correspondent with the personhood which many of us believe ourselves to have, but they are not essential features of the concept such that it would lose sense if they were to be removed. Moreover, I have to express a concern that 'personhood' in philosophical debate seems to be notoriously prone to prior definition by the proponents of various views such that a particular feature of some persons which captures their interest is made into a general defining feature of the concept. I think that there are three things which, taken together, are needed to flesh out and present that image as one that has sufficient determinate content to be of philosophical yield. Since these are not all points being made in a phenomenological mode I shall limit my comments to those elements of them which do go on in that way. Briefly, then, I have the following two doubts to raise (the third point coming after these). Firstly, correspondent with what I said on the self, it is difficult to ascertain the precise nature of the claim that personhood and moral evaluation are in necessary relation. If it is said that a certain developed notion of personhood on which a degree of agreement might be reached by sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists and philosophers alike would involve a moral element then I think that few of us would object to such a convergent image as an ideal. And yet if the
reverse contention to which that image gives rise is one whereby we refuse to call 'persons' those who appear to live without moral concerns and evaluations, I find myself philosophically - and morally - unwilling to give my assent. This, I believe, shows that our intuitions would tend to wish to build into personhood a moral element, but that that is not an essential element of the very concept as we are able to operate with it. All that can be said on this issue, I believe, is that the putative social genesis and construction of personhood may be of such a nature as to permit a plausible story to be told showing its important connection with a moral form of life, and showing our current intuitions on the matter to be holding them as intrinsically linked. But the nature of this connection being claimed is still open to dispute. A reasonable picture of personhood might include an element of the moral consciousness; but the picture is not likely, I believe, except with a great deal of conceptual underlay that is open to debate, to shore up the link with a hard logical 'must'.

My second briefly-put suspicion follows on from this first one. If some connection between a moral form of life and the individual moral consciousness and personhood is one without which persons are not produced in society, then it need not follow that the moral affairs of such persons are conducted in a priori specifically identifiable ways, especially ones coalescent with those we generally observe. There may be near-universal contents of moral codes in all times and places, and there are some moral philosophers who refuse to enter into debate with possible rival views on certain moral issues. But the conceptual work being attempted becomes ever more strained and tendentious as one moves from the connection between personhood and evaluation to the person and a particular form of moral evaluation. That is to say, if the former argument shows anything it shows only that some moral form of life is necessary to personhood. In an analogous way this forms the substance of my third, and specifically phenomenological, doubt.
I said above that the Taylor/Nagel line of argument contends that objectivity in moral affairs is that of the independence from the subject which reasons for and against evaluations and actions possess. As a matter of the phenomenological description of the moral consciousness, we should ask of the status of such reasons: do they hold one that way? And here we can answer straightforwardly in the affirmative. Reasons, and the demands put upon one as they are considered or as they strike one, do come to one as independent, unwilled. They seem, as my chapters 4 and 5 showed for demands generally, both to be independent of one's direct volition as well as to be signalled vaguely as if from some exterior reality.

A distinction similar to that which Taylor employs is made by Sokolowski, who claims that we are beings for whom the nature of the good is a question that inevitably arises and which inevitably leads us to distinguish between the apparent and the real good. It seems to me that both of these veneers in which 'the good' gives itself to consciousness can share a phenomenological feature of independence in experience, but the latter receives reflective assent and the former not, on discerning the interference of personal factors & c. Hence this point both follows the Taylor approach as well as it tries to make it fit with the phenomenology of the matter.

The way in which I take this phenomenological point to be analogous to that second one two paragraphs above runs in this way. Just as I maintained there that any link between morality and personhood could allow of a rather different moral orientation than those with which we are normally acquainted, so also I think here that any link to objectivity requires only a rough experience of independence and need not give one any strong purchase on either moral entities 'out there' or even of a particular determinant going to make up that independence. And I say this only in virtue of the weight of my previous descriptive presentation of the matter as it is given in both direct and reflective modes. Given also the doubts which I have
expressed in this chapter on the notion of a necessary linkage between morality and the self, then the claim to which I have been building up my argument is thus that the possibility of taking objectivity to be essential to the moral demand is of a very mitigated nature. For the truth of a putative conceptual link between personhood and morality, combined with that analysis which impugns moral value as chosen by the subject, would leave some objectivity component to moral value experience as necessary only in minimal form, it seems to me. That is the fundamental tenet of my thesis: that phenomenological description shows only a vague sense of objectivity as component to the moral demand experience and to the alleged experience of values of which demandingness is said to be a feature; and that this is all that is needed, if need there be, for the experience to be had and to make sense to the subject. For the objectivity component that is to be found in the experience - while it sometimes has a determinate cause and content - is of such a nature that only a general component of subject-independence is necessary for its place in the subject's experiential economy.

By way of concluding this section and leading up to the next and final one, I shall repeat my explicit contentions made so far in this chapter. They centre on the subject's reflective grasp on her experience of the moral demand and how any objectivity element features in the make-up of her self, either as a basic matter of a self's existence or as one of a more developed one of a self's make-up, what I have distinguished from the former by calling it 'personhood'. I have said that the claims of WPT are either false with respect to the reflective phenomenology or serve only to make weaker points than their authors would wish. And I then maintained that an attempted extension of this argument into necessary conditions of the developed self was questionable both insofar as it imported moral requirements into the matter and as, even if evaluation were to be shown to be an essential feature of personhood, it could not claim that specifically moral evaluation was a necessary feature. My belief
in the light of all this is that if a self has experience of moral demands then it must be as of ones possessing a minimal objectivity component. That minimal degree will simply be that afforded by the rough sense of something other to the subject standing to produce the demand and determine its content. This clearly allows some involvement of the subject herself in either the constitution of the demand experience or in the impingement it makes on her (since a minimal degree of independence does not require entire independence of the subject). And if moral concerns go deeply into the self - as opposed to being constitutive (inter alia) of it - then it is an interesting thing that an objectivity feature therefore also goes deeply as it accompanies the moral demand experience. That is the matter into which my final section inquires.

Section Five: Moral concerns and the core self

It will have become evident to the reader as my phenomenological presentation progressed from chapter 4 onwards that I put some store by the reception of the moral demand experience in consciousness and its relation to the importance of moral concerns to the self or a core self. In chapter 5 (section 3.vi) and in chapter 6 (section 3) I said that this had the appearance of a paradox. For moral demand experiences possess an objectivity feature - which I have explicated in terms of independence of subject choosing - and the reception of such matters into the inner perimeter of the core self would seem to require their significance and importance to me. Now I am able to address this state of affairs more fully, with the arguments of this chapter and the previous one having been arrayed.

There are two preliminary points of salient relevance to make here. One is that which formed much of the background to my descriptive phenomenology in chapters 4 and 5, namely, that the experience of moral demands need not be of demands on oneself. They can rather be demands that such and such (where this
varies in specificity) be curtailed or expedited. So experience of moral demands may go deeply into myself and be important for me without necessarily also being demands on me. And the other is that 'paradox' is too strong a term to employ of the relationship being addressed. Of this matter I have already made comment in the previous chapter. Here I will repeat that, unless that which is of central concern to the self is that which is chosen by it or under its ongoing control, it does not follow from the appearance of the moral demand as independent of the self and yet striking deeply into that it is an affair of a queer or paradoxical sort. And nor do I think that we do find phenomenological evidence for any notion that such deep contents are chosen or subject to a form of overall control. This does not discount the possible fact that a commitment of some sort to an object may be necessary for its being one of concern or interest, but it does do enough to remove the air of paradox displaying stark opposites in a relation of tension.

One more point before I continue. I have continually used the term 'concerns' of the self when talking of the moral demand experience finding a ready place in the core self. In using this I see myself as simply following the standard fashion in which the matter is addressed in moral philosophical literature. But, of course, I have had occasion in numerous places in this thesis to complain that that tradition may be working with a distorted or one-sided perspective on such matters. And so here again I want to sound a discordant note with respect to that tradition - though I shall continue to use the language of 'concerns' in order better to locate my arguments within a general area. It seems to me that moral matters might be central to the self and yet not properly 'concerns' of it. They may be strong currents within one that tug and push one's attention, without which one cannot imagine what one's self would look like, and about which a certain fascination or amusement or beguiling aura might sometimes characterize their relation to one's core self. But they need not be thereby 'concerns' as that term relates a definite stance of the core
self towards its contents. (And as to the matter of an experience's 'coalescing' with or being at the 'core' of the self, I believe this to be something given to us either as that experience occurs or on reflection on it. In such an affair, elements that one takes to determine partly the make-up of one's individual self are either felt to be drawn upon or are discerned on later reflection to have been so and to be available for entering again into such relations with the contents of experience).

Where the work of this chapter bears on this matter is partly in virtue of my discussion of the phenomenological impossibility of seeing value as chosen by the subject and partly also of the essential component of some form of objectivity to the moral demand experience. Combining these two intimately related points, and adding to them the fact that most of us care deeply about certain general and some specific moral issues, we observe the phenomenon to which this section is directed. Much the same kind of experience of independence of the subject and coalescence with a core self seems to go on in religious experience. The response of faith to the call of god brings into relation both a deep concern or urge or longing of the self, as it is variously construed by religion, and the independent reality of a divine outreach to the human soul. To aesthetic experience also this is a particularly apt phenomenon on which to concentrate, especially with regard to the experience of the forerunners to, and the very act of, aesthetic creation. Here we find the orientation of the artist to her work wended with a sense of a call on her to produce in a more or less particular way.102

5.1 - Depth of moral concerns

I want to put forward a caveat as regards this matter, both for the purpose of circumscribing the range of my phenomenological description and for pointing to an interesting facet of that phenomenology. The point is this. Not all experience of the moral demand strikes oneself as bringing into play deep concerns of the self. It
goes on in an everyday manner, interrupted only occasionally by that heightened demand experience which may draw most evidently on the core self. This, then, is my restriction on the scope of the argument. An actual sense of one's core concerns being drawn into a moral situation may not be all that common except in especially powerful moments of the demand experience striking consciousness. But the obverse of this initial point widens the possible field of application of the phenomena at large here. In chapter 4 (end of section 3.i) I talked of the possible 'coming apart' of the strike of the demand experience and its relation to a core self. This I think does go on in two ways. One, that of heightened demands which are experienced as peripheral or alien to the core self, I have already discussed at length in chapters 5 and 6. The other, which I now mention, is that of the demand being but lightly or barely experienced while nevertheless drawing on a fund of moral concern deep in the self.

Once again it may seem that a paradox is being put forward. It might be thought that core concerns of the self would be experienced as active and as the answering response of the self to the strong call of the not-self in the demand experience. This is an assumption belied by the actual phenomena that it addresses. If core concerns need to be felt as independently worthwhile and as making demands on one that are not simply self-imposed, then it does not follow that they need to be experienced as powerful, as striking one from definite external loci, and as always also bringing about, or coalescing with, the correspondingly strongly felt currents of the core self in interaction. Indeed, in chapter 4 I was greatly concerned to emphasize, via example vi, the spontaneous nature of the reaction of such core elements to a moral situation. There I said that the example could only be included as one of experience of a moral demand insofar as later reflection by the subject surveyed it in that way. Chapter 5 continued with that thought as I employed the thought experiment of the pill that erased the demand pressure. And as for here, I
want to exploit this prior work on the matter to explain how I take it that the core self might be said to be receptive to moral demands while neither side of the relation is experienced especially strongly or even all that explicitly. For I am regarding the concerns of the core self to be those which both show themselves forth in one's direct experience on occasion as well as (and most importantly) they hold themselves up on reflection as those with which one takes oneself most intimately to be identified and from which one would not wish to be loosed (on pain of some kind of loss of self). This seems to me an unobjectionable way of talking of a core self. And, it being the case that such concerns are often only discerned on reflection, and hence that reflective acknowledgement of a vague sort does go on of having been in a situation where a moral demand was not experienced all that strongly but nevertheless deeply, the relationship to which I have attested is given grounds. Witness, thus, the reflective pronouncements of the form, 'I couldn't have thought/acted otherwise' with respect to moral situations, where the 'couldn't' represents both the signalling of some quasi-external compulsion and the need to maintain continuity of the core self, and especially those ones where the subject's thought or action was undeliberated and apparently unforced, even though any other action or thought which might have suggested themselves would have met with explicit rejection. While direct experience may not, then, be presenting one with the phenomena of strong demand and felt responsive movement of core self, reflection on that experience does show how the two are seen to be interrelated. Indeed, that which goes deeply with us, like friendship, love, and some moral concerns, is just that which most often issues in the automatic, unquestioned and everyday performance of acts and presence of dispositions which are experienced not strongly or as obligatory, but in the manner of a barely-analyzed way of living.
5.ii - Exteriorty and the core self

A very good summary of much of what I have been saying is provided in a remark of Bernard Williams. In addressing the role of the emotions in our moral life, and in facing the Kantian criticism that emotions are not rationally chosen items of moral worth, he makes the following point:

...we should not dismiss too hastily the idea that some element of passivity, some sense in which moral impulses prompt us, and courses of action are impressed on us, may itself make a vital contribution to the notion of moral convictions; and I suspect it to be true of moral, as it certainly is of factual, convictions that we cannot take very seriously a profession of them if we are given to understand that the speaker has just decided to adopt them. The idea that people decide to adopt their moral principles seems to me a myth, a psychological shadow cast by a logical distinction; and if someone did claim to have done this, I think one would be justified in doubting either the truth of what he said or the reality of those moral principles. We see a man's genuine convictions as coming from somewhere deeper to him than that; and, by what is only an apparent paradox, what we see as coming from deeper in him, he - that is, the deciding "he" - may see as coming from outside him. So it is with the emotions.

In this quotation are contained analogous elements to those in my discussion which I have been aiming to make clear. The ones which especially stand out are these. Williams talks of the 'passivity' of moral 'impulses' as making a 'vital' contribution to a particular way of looking at moral agents; I too have talked of this matter with respect to the way in which the moral demand seems independent of oneself and as essentially so in virtue of its not being chosen by one. Williams attacks the idea that
a subject could have 'just decided' to 'adopt' moral principles; I dealt with this idea and criticized it in section 2.iii above. And Williams at the end of his comment looks at the relation of the deep currents that lie within a person and the seeming externality of the appearance which these can sometimes make before his own consciousness; this being the area of interest with which chiefly I am concerned in this final section.

With my comments having been made in the previous few pages on the nature of this relation of core self and external demand, I want to point out that now it is not a 'paradox' with which we contend, but an interesting phenomenological state of affairs. Frankfurt does use the word 'paradox' of that spiritual phenomenon when, guided by the religious object, one feels most truly oneself as one is 'escaping' from oneself and having relinquished any control over the occurent situation. This indeed is a strange affair that goes on at a level often inaccessible to many of us. Religious traditions of all kinds deliberately deploy the language of paradox in order circuitously to get near such states. But in the case of the moral demand's independence coalescing with the core self, I think that the matter is slightly different. I have, after all, reiterated my belief that the relation need not be given only through the heightened experiential moment (as these religious ones tend to be). The main reason for not finding it to be a paradox is based on my phenomenological analysis in this thesis as well as on comparative analysis with other areas of experience (particularly demand experience, of course) that also have reflective endorsement given by subjects to their constitution in consciousness as independent of self while being held close to its core.

The two points in the final sentence above are really one insofar as their basic impetus is concerned. My phenomenological analysis has shown a feature as of the moral demand's independence to be essential in the experience of it. So the question concerning the core self is not whether the relation between experience of
independence (not-self) and nearness to that core is possible - since it is established as (a sometimes) phenomenological fact - but whether the relation is one necessary to the nature of the experience and to the nature of how core concerns of the self appear before one. If the independence feature of the moral demand is one strand of my argument then the other - that which I implied just above is really a development of the same argument - is that independence of subject which other commonly encountered areas of experience possess. As I said in chapter 6 (section 7), it appears to be a very deeply grounded phenomenon that our chief areas of concern - our loves, friendships, loyalties - are experienced as having just this independence feature when they make demands on us. I have tried to capture the sense\(^{109}\) of this independence by referring to the way in which we often feel ourselves to be chosen by a particular object rather than its having been chosen by us. A simple way of testing this thought is to construct suitable counter-questions, such as: Do patriots choose to love their country? Do friends choose one another? Are a person's passions with regard to sports and hobbies felt by her as chosen? The answer is in the negative in each case: both as regards the unchosenness of the feeling and as to the demands which it puts upon people. And another way in which I hope to bring this phenomenological description closer to the reader's own experience of these affairs is by talking of the sense we have of a project, relationship, or activity being worthwhile for one, being something of sufficient value to engage one's energies. This, it seems to me, is a sense which requires some independence of the object(s) to which those energies are directed, as well as some sense of the independence from one of the feelings and the demands they exert. And, if that is the case, then the general argument against the choosing of value or deliberate conferral of importance on a state of affairs which I have put in this chapter will be in operation. Hence the moral demand experience will be simply one type amongst a wider field of experiences, the constitution of which in direct experience involves an objectivity
feature and the relation of which to concerns of the core self appear (on reflection especially) as a necessary one for the object of that experience to seem important or valuable or worthy of interest.

All of this paragraph above I have written in the light of my previous phenomenological analysis of experience and reflection on it. Now, in this paragraph, I shall continue to do that, but it will present the matter in a much less positive light than that in which it appears above. For I have countered the WPT line of argument with my own phenomenological assay of reflection that shows the purchase we have on our experience, the part it plays in our life and the meaning it has for us, to be sufficiently elastic to withstand a fair deal of generally sceptical-sounding thought. I will not stray too far into these analogous areas of experience, but I do think it a noteworthy matter to draw out the degree to which the reflection both is not unduly fettered by consideration of certain sceptical thoughts110 and requires only a minimal, rough sense of objectivity for the experience to be able to subsist in experience. As I have covered much of this ground in my discussion of the moral demand in this chapter I will ask the reader to refer back to it and to apply the thoughts found therein to the material of, say, friendship, patriotism and the so-called 'meaning of life'.

To the independence of these matters from our own choosing I believe we find ourselves giving a reflective assent. Taking friendship as an example, the precise elements which have about them some degree of independence are as follows: the friendship itself; feelings of liking for one's friend; the feeling of the value or worthwhileness of this particular friendship, and perhaps also of friendship in general; the demands which one experiences in virtue of that friendship. Each of these has some degree of independence from one, though obviously it is with the demands that it exerts on oneself that my primary interest lies.111 My belief is that we are not so involved with some objectivity element that it
cannot be held as a minimal condition alongside other 'subjective' ones that
themselves minimally are not willed. The notion that our desires and interests partly
go to constitute the subject-matter of the reflection does not destabilize the entire
experience and leave one with an uncertain vacuum in its place. Indeed, we find
ourselves close to affirming the notion of 'choice' when some sense of our own
commitment to a project or state of affairs is at large. This is, to be sure, not the
same as a pure choice which creates the importance; but a sense of our personal
commitment is undoubtedly of importance to the purpose we find in carrying out a
project or holding to a set of beliefs. Unlike the kind of choice which Sartre
maintains lies (or should lie) at the heart of a valuational stance, this commitment
occurs in the light of that which has already struck one independently as being
worthy of commitment. (And to that extent choice in the light of such experience is
not the kind of pure Sartrean choice with which the WPT line contends). While
Sartre's notion of choice seems to place the subject entirely on her own as regards
the basis of her choice - it is her choice that creates the value - a commitment in the
light of the independently valuable or worthwhile (& c.) allows interaction between
factors independent of the subject and ones personal to her.

Section Six: Independence as threatening the self

The most cogent-looking form of counter-argument to the notion that the
independent demandingness of moral states of affairs is essential for the
constitution and operation of deep concerns of the self would be simply that which
reverses the putative role played by that independence. Then it would be argued that
independence of the moral demand is not merely irksome, but threatening to the
self, and that it undermines the very kind of commitment and involvement in
matters that a self must have in order to maintain harmonious relations with the
demands it apprehends.
A counter-argument of this sort is put by the likes of Williams (1976), Stocker (1976) and Railton (1988). They make it in the context of discussing the unduly onerous demands that an impartial morality (like some forms of utilitarianism and the categorical imperative) might make on an agent who has non-moral projects and passions of her own. Williams in particular thinks such a threat potentially to be so strong as to destabilise the self. What none of these writers really point out, it seems to me, is the phenomenological fact that such a tension, unease and possible fracturing of the self's integrity usually goes on not as the result of a purely external threat (analogous to that which harms the physical person of one), but in virtue of a conflict set up by the deepest impulses of the self. They are, I believe, indeed correct to point out how harsh and burdensome the expectations placed upon the agent might be within certain moral systems. For that reason their objections are not addressed to the general experience of moral demands and the subject's relation to them. I propose, therefore, to leave aside the question of the particular moral system being impugned by these writers and to see whether their arguments are latching onto a wider problem of the independence of moral demands from subjects and the possible trouble that could cause her.

As I said in chapter 5, then, it seems to me that the moral demand's independence can bring about a psychic fracture in the subject, as she is faced with conflicting demands (moral and non-moral) on her and the conflicting pressure of different concerns to which she is strongly wedded. But in saying this, and in remarking in the paragraph above on the nature of the conflict wrought, I have brought the debate into the realm of the discussion in this chapter. In chapter 5 my concern lay largely in illustration of the irking force of the moral demand as a phenomenological fact of direct experience without going too far into the horizon that girded it. I confined my comments there to the subject's possible awareness of being dragged away from other, often mundane, interests by the assailing force of
the moral demand. Here I want to say that that horizon, as it is revealed by the subject's own reflection, shows that the demand is not so much always a threatening, alien incursion but that it sets up a tension from within that which constitutes the interests, commitments and passions of the self - and which themselves can set up demands on one which will be felt as possessing an objectivity feature as independent of one's own control. Recalling that I have stated these matters to be no more the product of the subject's choice than the demand which places itself upon her, it seems to me that the subject is the site of a conflict between the contents of those commitments and passions - some of which will be moral concerns that are tugged into manifesting themselves by the incoming demand and others which involve ones of a non-moral sort. (Of course, from the fact that, corresponding to the demand, there may be some feeling whereby it 'gets to' the subject and opens the way for her to feel 'torn', it need not follow that that feeling is deep within her. My contention made earlier, along with footnote 112, is that the fracture or unease can represent a conflict within the concerns of the self - those concerns being made evident as central to the subject on reflection on them).

This conflict which is sometimes set up and which involves the various concerns of the self, and sometimes those which are core concerns, sheds more light on that relation of self and independent demand which I have addressed specifically with regard to the moral case in experience. If it is a paradox in the moral case so is it also in those other non-moral affairs of core self and its gradually more peripheral interests. And it is my belief, from phenomenological considerations of a general sort, that the degree to which most items of our experiential furniture, as it were, can be said to be chosen is really very small. As to those which seem to possess close relations to a core self - ones which I have tried to capture in using the expression 'concerns', though realizing that the matter is wider than that - it seems especially to be the case that these are experienced as
having about them a veneer as of independence of the subject. This is so whether they are moral ones or not. Since I do not think that those concerns which are close to the core self are only the moral ones - and I certainly do not think that closeness to a core self constitutes their being moral - then I take it that independence of the very self to which such matters are held close is an affair of some breadth so far as the experiences which it typifies is concerned. That which appears independent of oneself - as unchosen and/or external to one - is also often that which enters into most intimate congress with the core self.

So the phenomenon to which we are directed is this. The moral demand experience is given to consciousness with an objectivity component, understood in the light of my foregoing comments. Such is the universal stuff of the experience. And sometimes also it enters into the orbit of the core self. I ask the reader now to turn her/his thoughts back to Mackie's presentation of this feature. To the matter of the accuracy of this putative report of value realms from 'out there' moving one on apprehension I think it can be said that he does not describe the phenomena as they actually stand in our experience. We certainly feel - sometimes powerfully and movingly, often lightly and indifferently - the impact of moral demands upon ourselves in the course of our lives. But in experiencing that, we do not take ourselves to be acted upon by the apprehension of values 'out there' which radiate their demandingness onto consciousness. We certainly feel the demand to be independent of oneself in some degree, *qua* the one who apprehends it, and independent of one's volition. Yet there is not, over and above that sense and as determinate object of it, a specific picture of a moral reality figuring in our experiences and thoughts on it. If Mackie says what there isn't 'out there', I have attacked him (and other moral philosophers) in saying what there isn't in this area of our moral experience.
That the moral demand experience is presented to one with this crude objectivity element - that is to say, as independent of the self, as outwith its control, and also as often having some degree of externality - is a fact attended also by the case that (often) such an experience strikes into the core self and does so precisely because it is received there as an affair in which the interest, concern, identity of the self is \textit{(inter alia)} invested. It is important to note of this matter that the objectivity element of the experience can be called its 'not-self' aspect in one fashion and yet its reception in the inner perimeter of the self clearly involves its coalescence with the core self. This occurs once the demand arises: the core self is not experienced as \textit{constituting} the demand, though it undoubtedly is felt on reflection to affect the phenomenological tone of irksomeness or threat with which the experience can appear. Hence the not-self apparently interacts with the self in experience; though it is not the case that in either the direct or reflective mode a subject experiences such phenomena as if produced only by herself. The fact that she does not feel there to be particular values 'out there' producing her experience should be considered in tandem with the fact also that she does not feel that they are constituted by herself alone. To exploit another distinction with connected poles, I believe that the work of this chapter shows this: while a subject does not conceive of herself as entire producer of the demand experience she is not thereby unwilling to grant a certain degree of reflective credence to a certain putative degree of her involvement in the constitution of the experience. The closeness of moral demand experiences (for many of us) to a core self is linked by their appearance as of bearing an independent aura of mattering, worth, importance, significance, \& c.; but that nearness is not so fragile that a perceived subjective element in the experience - something personal to the subject - will either dissolve the experience itself or render meaningless general thought on it. Nor is the independence in the actual experience so determinate and so absolute an affair that similar dissolution should occur on its appearing, or being
thought of, in the way of a more rough and mitigated phenomenon. So that which comes from outwith the subject in her experience and that which finds inner habituation in her core self are not opposed. Nor are they, however, particularly strongly experienced in her life, at least as far as her general acquaintance with moral demands is concerned. For that which is experienced as independent of her, and that element of the core self which lies deeply within her, do not always strike themselves in her experience as matters exactly located and pressingly felt.

My contention that there is an essential link between a demand's being experienced and its being experienced as independent of the subject is one that goes across the range of different kinds of demand. Even that which apparently wells from within and bursts upon one does so with a seeming will of its own. This is a point I wished to emphasize in my chapter 6 with the discussion of the links and differences between subjective/objective and self/not-self. What is of greater interest is the phenomenological exposition I have undertaken as a corrective matter to what I believe to be the unexamined and cursory presentations of the moral demand experience by others (exploiting as I went analogous glosses that have occurred with respect to the data of religious and aesthetic experience). The upshot of my discussion here is the final (re)statement of the heart of my thesis. And it is this. Moral demands do not present values 'out there' impinging on one: yet they are independent of one. Such independence as they have coalesces often with the core self: suggesting that there are values deeply held 'within' us. But they are not to be identified with volition from 'in there': they are not chosen by us. Moreover, for some people such states of affairs are not 'within' them as matters close to the core self because they are not felt as being important, or at least as important enough to override other non-moral interests. That is the contingency of the moral demand's appearance in consciousness, even if its objectivity element, as independent of oneself, is essential. Moral demands generally do not appear as if purely from
*inside* one. They do appear as coming from outside of one's control and as from the not-self; but not as emanating from value objects from 'out there'.
Concluding comments to thesis

By way of presenting my conclusions to this thesis I should like to re-draw the reader's attention to my chapter 1. On pages 18-20 I posed a series of questions which I felt were raised in considering the nature of moral demand experience and its putative relation to moral values. It is as a summary of answers to those questions that I put forward my conclusions.

Firstly, there has been throughout my phenomenological presentation a tendency to find our experience of moral demands to be somewhat at odds with the ways in which it is often portrayed in the literature. I believe that I have shown that Mackie's account of our experience, in terms of our taking it as if given by queer prescriptive values from 'out there', is incorrect. And interestingly also, I have argued that other moral philosophers who either share or diverge from Mackie's general metaethical positions often make the same assumptions about our experience and about the kinds of commitment which we allegedly make toward it.

Secondly, and being the product of that procedure just above, I have given space to the wide diversity of the moral demand experience as it impinges on us and remains or recedes from consciousness. In doing that I have come to present the demands as ones that are not always apprehended as specifically calls on the subject herself, but as a demandingness that she has encountered. And in virtue of the questions which that raised as to the subject's perceived sense of an experience's relation to her own self and its contents I went on to maintain that moral demands do often, but not universally, represent to us deep currents of the self. I believe, however, that that conclusion must be tempered in the light of my arguments that that particular band of experience is not a necessary one for possession either of a minimal selfhood or of a developed notion of personhood.

Thirdly, my descriptive account of this facet of our moral consciousness does show that its independence from the subject is an essential element to it. I have
explicated that independence as consisting often in a minimal exteriority of the experience and universally in its being outwith the subject's direct volition. As to the 'exteriority', I have maintained that that is not felt by us to be underpinned by special value objects 'out there'. This finding was further mitigated as I considered a subject's reflective stance on her experience, arguing that her grasp on the stuff of that experience, and the practices which may go with it, are not eroded by her consideration of the experience as partly wrought by her own constitution. A certain degree of independence from the subject is essential if the experience is to be had. Yet it is apparently not essential that all subjects should have that experience; or at least, it is not essential that they should hold it close to the concerns of the self if they do encounter that kind of experience. Moreover, for those of us who are party to that band of moral experience, it is not an affair about which we think - in immediacy or on later reflection - that it is or has to be engendered by a special value realm.

I believe that a phenomenological mode of presentation has been worthwhile and productive as a means by which to conduct debate in this general area. It has acted in particular as a kind of reformative procedure against some alleged presentations of 'our' experience; while also bringing my thesis round to look at certain undeveloped areas of moral philosophical interest. There has emerged from this a deep connection between the moral demand and its being experienced as independent of oneself in some degree. To that extent, the final resting-place of this thesis is with the self and its relation to its experience.
APPENDIX

Two phenomenologists of moral value

I intend in this appendix to cover briefly and with specific regard to the work of my thesis the thought of two philosophers generally credited with applying phenomenology to the area of value apprehension. They are Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. The warrant for calling them phenomenologists may at times be rather tenuous with respect to the actual practice of their philosophical work, particularly with respect to the latter figure, but they are sufficiently widely held as phenomenologists of value for me to include some discussion of them.

The reason why I have left this discussion to an appendix and not incorporated it in the main body of the text is simple. I feel that the respective work of these two philosophers involves so much argument and invites so many questions not germane to my concerns that inclusion of them in the main text would have been to clutter and obscure unnecessarily the thrust of my thought. Nevertheless, they bear some kind of acknowledgement and coverage, and so I have opted to discuss them in an appendix.

Both Scheler and Hartmann range over extremely wide areas of philosophical and specifically moral philosophical interest in their major works on value (M.Scheler, 1973 [originally 1913-16]; N.Hartmann, 1932). I shall only try to talk of those thoughts entertained by them which I see as having a direct bearing on moral demand experience and particularly its putative reference to a value realm. Many of the avenues of thought they follow, fascinating and often bemusing as they may be, I will not therefore attempt to pursue. My prime interest in the two, aside from their intrinsic merit for a thesis on moral phenomenology, is to argue that they display some of the main phenomenological errors of attempted description which I have identified in places throughout this thesis.
Scheler and Hartmann talk often of 'values' generally, and I shall follow them in talking simply of 'values' for the main, with the understanding that such considerations refer also to the sub-group of moral values.

**Max Scheler**

Scheler's main work on moral and other values (1973) is a compendious volume of the considered and the mercurial so far as the phenomenology it enshrines is concerned. His own method of phenomenology differs from that of Husserl, involving more direct attempts to get at the essences of phenomena than the complex, staged approaches of the latter.

Scheler argues that values are given in (but decidedly not constituted by) emotion. These values, he thinks, are *a priori* and hierarchically arranged. By the former contention, he means to show (like Kant) that values do not depend on actual goods and experience for their validity; for instance, that the value of friendship remains even if no friendship is actually displayed in the world. And by the latter, he is maintaining that there are orders of rank among values that are discernible on inspection by the subject which are irrespective again of their concrete instantiation. (An example of his alleged finding here is that values pertaining to the 'holy' are higher in rank ordering than those which come within the bounds of, say, the aesthetic).

Scheler's view as to the status of the values with which we make contact in emotional acts of loving, hating and preferring includes a chief area which bears upon my area of interest. It concerns the independence of values from the subject herself and of the demands they seem to place upon her. Scheler is keen to point out that values do not depend on the relevant experiences in which we have awareness of them. Our apprehension of values and our feeling demanded to make them concrete in the world constitute neither the values themselves not the claims they make on us. Values would remain even if no value consciousness did.
As to the independence of values from the experiencing subject, Scheler reiterates at a number of points this belief. While he believes that they are given to us in feeling, he says that:

...I do not mean to imply in the least that values are created, made, or destroyed by love and hate. Values cannot be created or destroyed. They exist independently of the organization of all beings endowed with spirit.9

And he makes his contention also in these words:

...the claim that values are given in a "feeling of something" does not imply that values exist only insofar as they are felt or can be felt. For it is a phenomenological fact that in feeling a value, the value is given as distinct from its being felt...Just as we are conscious at every moment of knowing many things without knowing them in actuality at the moment, and just as we are conscious as well of many things that can be known but are conscious of our not knowing them, so also do we feel many values that we know, which belong to the world of our values, and also an infinite number of values that exist without our having felt them in the past or our feeling them in the future.10

Values are discovered by subjects, not brought into being by them.11 Our experience of values is constricted by a factor like the 'milieu' in which we live,12 but the range of values itself lies outwith the experienced life of an individual or culture.

Scheler's work is interesting, at times fascinating. My general worry with it, however, is that no clear reference back to the phenomenology of our putative value experience is put by him before the reader. His contentions are therefore hard to assess qua phenomenological descriptions; or they strike me in the main as false. The general notions which he claims to be found through our moral experience look too tied to a particular sub-class of that experience or to a questionable interpretation
of that data. My specific worry occurs with respect to his abiding theme of the independence of values from the experiencing subject: it concerns both the nature of this independence and also the relationship which Scheler believes there to exist between such independent values and the experiences of 'oughtness', or what I have generally termed 'demandingness', which allegedly they put upon us from time to time. These concerns link up with the main corpus of my presentation in this thesis. For they naturally raise questions about the status of such values and their link to the experience of demands which have been salient throughout my work: that is to say, how they stand within the experience itself and how they might be conceived by us as objects of experience.

I doubt if the fruits of his phenomenology claimed by Scheler can be sustained when one applies the method to our experience of moral demands as object. He himself was aware of the 'phenomenological controversy' that might ensue on different alleged descriptive results being presented by investigators into the same area of experience.¹³ And I believe that his own claims for the phenomenology are not borne out when one repeats the procedure with respect to the object data. Firstly, I do not think that a 'value hierarchy' of the sort which Scheler claims that we perceive is given in our immediate experience. There are times when one demand or another which we apprehend seems more important and when one course of action or another seems more recommended, but as to actually experiencing a hierarchical structure of values impinging on one, I do not think this is given by him either adequate phenomenological description or sufficient evidence to present definitively to one its general occurrence. His phenomenology generally tends to present a ready-made case before the reader. This would not be such a bad thing (and Scheler himself sincerely felt it to be a legitimate method) if it were not for the fact that the results it claims are so far from certain.¹⁴

Scheler does not make any determinate claim for the ontological status of values.¹⁵ He does not think that they are Platonic entities, and is uncommitted on the issue of whether they are to be regarded as particulars or universals. He does,
however, hold fast to the opinion that they cannot be reduced to other things or states, such as naturalistic properties or the experiences in which they are manifested to us.\textsuperscript{16} The way in which values have an independence of us is left, in the light of the above, rather uncertain. Scheler certainly seems to be presenting an alleged value phenomenology similar to that which Mackie puts forward in his \textit{Ethics} - and while I believe equally that both philosophers mis-represent this experience, Scheler is inclined also to go much further towards accepting the apparent ontological commitment than is the sceptical Mackie. Given my much emphasized belief that that kind of phenomenological description is false or typical only of a specially heightened area of a wider general class, then it will be apparent that I think too that Scheler's granting of a special independent status to such objects of our experience should be questioned and tempered.

My concern about the kind of object with which Scheler takes himself to be dealing is conjoined also with one directed to the approach Scheler takes in his phenomenology as a whole. He gives space both to the presentation of the experience of demandingness and also to thought on its occurrence and relations to a value realm.\textsuperscript{17} He maintains that the feeling of being called or demanded with respect to the instantiation of a particular value is brought about by apprehension of a value; that this value has a being of its own independent of the experiencing subject herself; and that that independence is such that it cannot be claimed that subjects infer or construct values from these kinds of feeling.\textsuperscript{18} With these claims I think Scheler inverts the basic experienced relationship of which we are generally aware: which is of demandingness, rather than of values which demand.

I believe that Scheler allows his interest in a realm of values to over-run his description of the phenomenology of demand experience. For the relationship which he perceives between demands and values seems to me to be reversed in comparison to the true nature of our experience. Our experience of moral demands starts with just that: demands. The bringing before consciousness of a pressure, a call upon one's attention, is the original experience, rather than that of a value or
values which appear to send forth the demand. The kind of independence of
ourselves which we take values to have is not as of some special realm from which
demands emanate. Moral values, to be sure, are not directly subject to one's will.
Their 'being', however, is not founded - in our experience - in a particular special
realm from which they put upon us varying forces of demand.

Where Scheler may have derived this relationship is from the pertinent fact
that often we barely experience moral demands; or sense only that some value has
been breached or that it could be implemented, though feeling no demand that that
be so. Hence it may seem that values are experienced as the primary phenomenon,
with demands issuing from them subsequently (if they do at all in some cases).
This, of course, says nothing at all about the ontological status of values, but it
does address the course of a particular region of our experience. But it might be
that, if it were thought accurately to reflect our experience then it could be taken as
part of the phenomenological evidence for the primacy and irreducibility of values
and for their being some kind of ontological species 'out there'. And I think that,
from the fact that sometimes we say that we have experienced a value but not a
demand, it cannot be inferred that there is a value realm of a special sort with which
we interact. While Scheler does not go all that distance towards locating values in
such a fashion, I think that he goes far enough beyond the actual phenomenology of
our experience of moral demands and values to misrepresent the matter.

Nicolai Hartmann

Hartmann's notions of the a priority of value and its independence from the
perceiver\(^{19}\) are essentially the same as those to which Scheler adheres. Like Scheler
he also holds to a claim of ranking between values based on the putative
phenomenology.\(^{20}\) He differs from the other philosopher in regard to the warrant
with which he is included as a phenomenologist in discussion of that school;\(^{21}\)
while going also much further than Scheler towards holding values to be Platonic
entities displaying a special mode of being.
Values are held by Hartmann to be a priori and grasped by the experiencing subject in emotion. The nature of values is 'super-temporal, super-historical'. They themselves do not alter, but 'consciousness of them shifts', and the limitation of our value experience at any one time is like a 'little circle [which] wanders about' on the ideal plane of values. As emphasizing the independence of values from the experience of them, and their independence from the subject's direct choosing, such talk is comprehensible. Hartmann sums up his point by saying:

...values have actually an existence in themselves, independent of all imagination and longing. It means that the consciousness of them does not determine values, but that values determine the consciousness of them.

And it is at this point, where the independence discerned by the subject within value experience is linked to the independence of value existence, that Hartmann's thought takes an ontological turn. It is one which Scheler eschews, though he is obviously attracted to it, and which I have argued should be resisted in the light of the actual phenomenology.

Hartmann claims that values are ideal essences discovered through the phenomenology. By this claim he means that values have being; that the being they have is ideal, not actual; and that they share in phenomenological terms with 'redness' and 'squareness' as essences. He explains himself in this way:

Values have no self-existence that is real. As principles of action they may participate in determining reality, they may even to a great degree be themselves "actualized" - but for this very reason their essence, their mode of Being, remains merely an ideal mode...[V]alues as such, in comparison with the actual, always have the character of an "Idea"...The mode of Being peculiar to values is evidently that of an ideal self-existence...[V]alues are
originally patterns of an ethically ideal sphere, of a realm with its own structures, its own laws and order.29

Such a view is also put by an interpreter of Hartmann's thought as being that:

"ideal objects" [like values] are just as much "something in themselves" as the "real" things, although their mode of being is radically different.30

It is this view which is responsible for the general labelling of Hartmann as a Platonist with respect to his value theory. The question which must arise for my discussion, then, is whether he can correctly ascribe such findings to an exploration of value experience and how he sees that in relation to experience of moral demands.

A contemporary supporter of Hartmann represents his view in these terms:

[his] value Platonism is the view that there exist entities (loosely called "values") which are "really real" (i.e., have objective existence independent of being experienced or known) and which are discovered rather than created by human individuals...31

Furthermore, this writer herself believes such a view to be founded in the phenomenology of our value experience.32 As for myself, however, I am struck by the manifest lack of correlation between Hartmann's phenomenological exposition and his value ontology. In his presentation he makes little attempt to show exactly how our experience contains directly or points toward such special entities; his consideration of how determinate the contours of our experience are puts over this area what looks to me like a preconceived template. Nor is his thought directed only to that especially heightened level of the moral demand in experience through which I have maintained a value realm might sometimes seem apparent. Hartmann's claim is that all our experience in this class is of this nature, relating to a special realm of value-objects which interact with us to produce the sensation of being tugged or demanded by them.
As with my appraisal of Scheler, I find two problems with Hartmann's work that bear concern in the context of this thesis. One is with its curious lack of concrete fit with our experience in this area: it looks as if Hartmann has determined the results of his analysis beforehand and will skip through the experience without heed to contrary data. This kind of problem I believe to be, as with Scheler, that of the paucity of actual phenomenological description on which Hartmann's conclusions are based and by which a reader, sympathetic or otherwise, might assess his work.\(^{33}\) The other trouble into which I think he falls is, straightforwardly, that his phenomenological details and the system he builds on them are false. Our experience of moral values (and of others like aesthetic and religious ones too) is not of that order; nor is it even as determinate and accessible at the peak levels of our demand experience in that fashion which Hartmann makes out as a general thesis and through which it is sometimes taken by moral philosophers that we are in contact with an objective, prescriptive value realm. One must therefore wonder whether Hartmann has not allowed a prior interest in a Platonic basis for values to channel the course of his research. Spiegelberg objects, in this light, to the one-sidedness and unreliability of Hartmann's phenomenological procedure and putative results.\(^{34}\) If there is warrant for upholding a Platonic theory of value entities, it is not given through phenomenological investigation. And if it is not given in that fashion, I am inclined to think its warrant barely tenable. Hence the concern of one commentator that:

\[\text{[Hartmann's method] hypostasizes "values", setting them so far away from the phenomena that they can never be brought into significant metaphysical correlation again.}\(^{35}\)

On the specific matter of the relation between the experience of a moral demand and its possible issue from a value entity, Hartmann is also in accord with Scheler in maintaining that its course runs from value to demand experience. He argues that the ideal being of value includes an ideal 'ought-to-be' which is 'transformed into the Ought-To-Do of the subject' as it strikes upon and is taken up
by one's moral consciousness. The human subject is the essential link between the sphere of values and the concrete world. While man is free - 'values do not coerce the subject' - it is nevertheless the case that values do 'impose...a claim upon him.' He thinks this something of a paradox: necessity attaches to moral value, but there is an 'absence of compulsion on the part of the Ought' since man is free to actualize value or not on discerning it. Concerning the phenomenological description of the demand experience, Hartmann thinks it 'relatively comprehensible and definable' while value itself is not.

It seems to me that Hartmann adheres to a cluster of related views on the phenomenologically presented nature of moral demand experience. Amongst them are ones to the effect that: values do not in and of themselves motivate on apprehension of them; values do have some kind of 'oughtness' adhering to them which is perceivable without corresponding inclination to act on the part of the experiencing subject; and values precede demand experience and are responsible for it. With the first of these claims I am in basic agreement and believe that it is given due evidence by the phenomenological data. As to the second, however, I cannot really see how it has validity as a phenomenological description: 'ideal' oughtness simply seems to mean that one should be moved by value apprehension, even if one is not, and that is not underpinned by the experience (though it may be a fair postulate of normative ethics in general). The problem with such a thesis, or putative description, lies with the incorrect phenomenology, as I see it, of Hartmann; having 'found' a value realm, he then 'discovers' that it has a special property of oughtness inhering in it, even if is not always one realized in the consciousness of the perceiver. And on the matter of values giving the demand experience to one, the truth of a claim to such a relation is not dependent on there being a special Platonic realm of values from which the demand issues.
My attitude towards the work of both Scheler and Hartmann is, then, one of quite basic disagreement. Their respective phenomenologies are not, I believe, congruent with the data provided by description of our experience of moral demands. This might be accounted for by their having granted undue attention to a particular heightened swathe of the experience. Of such a band I have claimed throughout this thesis that it is a narrow one; that it is a correspondingly unrepresentative one of the overall run of the experience type; and that, even at the heightened level, there is not access into a value realm taking place. But one naturally wonders why such undue attention should have been paid by these two philosophers and by others in contemporary moral philosophy to the notion of a special disclosure of a value reality in the demand experience. In this respect, I would conjecture that a certain bewitchment with the heightened form of the experience may be responsible. Scheler and Hartmann themselves have been criticized by other phenomenologists for just this kind of narrowness of vision. Furthermore, I suspect that they have allowed their own attempts to describe the phenomenology to be driven by the impetus of prior commitment to the notion of a special mode of being to value. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that they should have felt that they had 'discovered' just that kind of thing.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1 A.N. Whitehead, 1951, p.696.

2 W.D. Ross, 1930, p.89.

3 J.L. Mackie, 1977, sec.7.

4 Ibid., p.22.

5 J. Kekes, 1986, p.84. I am taking 'axiology' to be the general theory of value, including the exploration of what in the way of value there is or is not in the world. See J.N. Findlay, 1970, for a good review of the content and application of such an analysis. And also H.O. Eaton, 1933a and 1933b.

6 H.O. Eaton, 1933a, p.28.

7 J.L. Mackie, 1977, p.35.

8 Ibid., pp.32/3.

9 Ibid., p.35, and also p.239 (the final page) where he suggests that 'the objectification of moral values and obligations is not only a natural but also a useful fiction.'

By 'metaphysics' here I mean the study of the ultimate properties of the universe and the necessary features of that discourse which refers to them.

10 Taking the use from J. Butler, 1913, Sermon xi, paragraphs 20-21.

11 See chapter 3 for further explanation on this matter.

12 D.O. Brink, 1989, pp.7-8 gives similar examples of our ways of talking about our moral practices.

13 J.L. Mackie, 1980, p.34.

14 E.H. Cadwallader, 1980, p.239.

15 R. Price, A Review of the Principle Questions of Morals, in D.D. Raphael, 1969, Vol.II, p.194. Though this point also goes for any analysis of value and not just the kind Mackie has in mind. The 'right' from Price's quoted contention is underpinned for Mackie by our apparent interaction with moral values 'out there'.

I am not proposing a rigid fact/value distinction here, only making an illustrative point about the way in which moral discourse and thought on it seems relevantly similar to other areas of discourse, whatever the separation between them might consist in.

F.A.Olafson, 1956, p.163.

The possibility of the separation of these two phenomena - that is, apprehension of a moral value and feeling a demand upon one - will be discussed at various points in chapters 4, 5, and 6. I will also consider a third possibility, that of feeling a demand force without its being perceived as a demand on oneself.

Cf. the quotation from Ross at the head of this chapter.

J.L.Mackie, 1977, p.35. Though one could ask whether the language should not be reformed in the light of Mackie's criticisms of its apparent reference to a special (but illusory) objective kind of moral reality. Such a suggestion is made by S.Blackburn, 1985, pp.1-3.


See the previous quotation from Mackie, 1980, and also Mackie, 1977, pp.113 & 239.


Kant employs this term and explains his use of it (including the distinction with 'constitutive' uses of concepts) in the Paralogisms and the Antinomies of the first Critique. He thinks that certain concepts may be 'necessary for practical employment' and thus have 'practical utility'; in particular, that a concept such as that of a Cartesian soul may be vital for our 'consciousness of the moral law' (A365/B431). For a good summary of this notion and the distinction in Kant refer to T.E.Wilkerson, 1976, pp.154-158. And for an instance of this Kantian notion applied to the belief in a value-realm, see L.J.Russell, 1927.

J.L.Mackie, 1977, p.239.
26 This is a standard interpretation of Kant's Critical project, given by, for instance, P.Strawson, 1959 & 1975.

27 On this notion a good discussion is given in Chapter 1 of J.Kekes, 1989.


29 Ibid., p.17.

30 Ibid., pp.30 & 42-46. But, of course, that need not get rid of objective values, however they are understood. It just makes the experience a relational matter, with some part of the subject's nature (other than her actual having of the experience) necessary to its arising.

31 These are listed on p.49, ibid.

32 See secs. 8 & 9 of his first chapter. Arguments on the lines of the one from queerness are given also in J.L.Mackie, 1980, pp.22, 53, 55, 134, 146.

33 J.L.Mackie, 1977, p.49.

34 Ibid., p.38.


37 P.Strawson, 1949, p.33. In this article he, like Mackie later, does take it that moral language has certain metaphysical implications with respect to a moral reality. And though he - like Mackie - thinks these implications to be false, he does not think the language should be reformed in favour of some form of reductive analysis closer to the actual nature of the moral response, for the language as it is used has a more felicitous communicative efficacy than proposed alternatives.

38 W.James, 1903, p.194.

39 Ibid., p.195.

40 R.M.Hare, 1972a.

41 R.M.Hare, 1985.

42 R.M.Hare, 1972a.
Hare himself is inclined to permit a role for intuition in moral philosophy as a matter of expediency in moral education (this is the position he develops at length in R.M.Hare, 1981). But he does not think that such intuitions are taken by subjects to be reflecting a moral reality, stating that philosophers 'have thought that moral words connoted such objective, but at the same time prescriptive properties, and that the properties existed in rerum natura to make some of our moral judgements true,' but that, 'ordinary people, innocent of any philosophy, are [not] the whole time committing the same error' (ibid., pp.78-79).

His attitude towards intuitionism in moral philosophy is hostile - see Hare, 1952, p.165; 1971; 1972b, p.46.


For instance, in talking of the various character traits we find admirable or otherwise, Hume maintains that,

The quick sensibility, which, on this head, is so universal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient assurance, that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur any danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation: he need only enter into his own breast for a moment, and consider whether or not he should desire such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or enemy.

(1975, p.174).

He says similar things on pp.216, 230, & 254 (cf. Kant, 1969, p.12: 'It need hardly be mentioned that the sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure and good will, yet enjoying uninterrupted prosperity, can never give pleasure to a rational impartial observer.')

G.Marcel, Sketch of a Metaphysic of Hope, in G.Marcel, 1951, p.29, first line.
I say 'modes' of experience rather than 'content' of experience for it is the
general features of it which I am looking for, and within those features a plurality of
experience might prove to be possible.

For elaboration of this point see chapters 4 & 5 ahead, and also M.Mandelbaum,
1955, ch.2, sec.2.

Though a general axiological theory, in not restricting itself just to moral values,
might wish to make such claims. For example, M.Scheler, 1973, and N.Hartmann,
1932, do this, the latter placing moral values 'on the back of' the realization of other
values. J.N.Findlay, 1970, covers this matter well. (And there is also a worry that I
will canvass in forthcoming chapters, that the reflective reasons for taking there to
be moral values 'out there' - if indeed such are the contents of our direct experience
- from the experience of the demands they apparently exert on us, may additionally
apply to other kinds of experienced demands and lead to a rather absurdly over-
populated image of the 'out there'). In forthcoming chapters I shall also inquire into
the similarities between the moral demand and aesthetic and religious demands,
especially as to whether they are taken in experience by us to be issuing from
special value realms.

R.Garner, 1990, p.143. William James, 1903, also takes this view.


C.G.Jung, 1964, pp.446-448.

Many of the moral theorists of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
contained in Raphael's selection (1969) evince this quite strongly. The belief of
those who held to some form of intuitionism is thus summed up as, '...the view
that normal human beings have an immediate awareness of moral values'

J.S.Mill, 1972, p.43.

Ibid., p. 43.
56 He thinks that the idea of justice arises from law (pp.48-9), and that the particular feeling involved 'is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble instincts; the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy' (p.53; see also pp.55-56).


60 Ibid., p.52.

61 For extended discussion of this distinction see W.K.Frankena, 1958; F.Snare, 1974 & 1975; D.O.Brink, 1989, ch.3.


63 See again F.Snare, 1974, and D.O.Brink, 1989, ch.3.

64 This is the point made by R.T.Garner, 1990 - and implicitly by W.K.Frankena, 1958 (who does not, of course, address the ontological aspects in such terms).

65 J.C.MacKenzie (1984, pp.474-5) makes the point that a wedge between knowledge and action is engendered by all sides in the debate about the nature of moral values - in the light of that problem he thus thinks that it hardly matters which side is followed since practical scepticism arises simply in different places.

In the chapters to follow I shall also address the question of whether a subject can perceive a demandingness without it being a demand on herself.

66 By 'moral situation' here I simply mean the occasion on which a moral response was appropriated for the subject, with the additional implicit recognition that the norm of appropriateness may be present for the public understanding of that kind of occasion.


68 A.K.Rogers, 1930, p.16. But he goes on to say,

...once set it before the mind as an object of contemplation, and it tends to lose something of its natural compulsion. A feeling is then
likely to appear a rather specially flimsy bit of mental stuff; while as
a source of values it rests in so many instances on patently trivial
and unimpressive grounds that it is not hard to understand the low
esteem in which it has commonly been held by those who aspire to
philosophy.

(p.16).


70 This is a reference back to the Kantian form of argument which footnotes 24 and
26 mention.


73 This is Mackie's understanding of the term's usage in subjects' moral
understanding. It is also the classic Platonic view. Nicolai Hartmann, 1930, whom
I discuss in a later excursis, takes an approach of this sort.

74 Such a position is that taken by proponents of natural law (which view is best
summed up by one of its more noted followers in these words:

We both [upholders and opponents] understand by it certain
propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions
about the choice of good and the avoidance of evil, and which
impose an obligation to outward acts...What we assert, and
what...our adversaries no less clearly deny, is that some truths of
this kind are necessarily supplied by the nature of things and men,
that they are perceived and remembered by the mind so long as it
remains sound, and that therefore they exist there

p.79).

An example of which is the universalizability criterion of Kant and Hare (though, of course, what is being universalized is quite different in each case).

Nagel believes that,

We try to arrive at normative judgements, with motivational contents, from an impersonal standpoint. We cannot use a nonnormative criterion of objectivity, for if values are objective, they must be objective in their own right and not through reducibility to some other kind of objective fact. They have to be objective values, not objective something else. The claim is that there are reasons for action, that we have to discover them instead of deriving them from our preexisting motives - and that in this way we can acquire new motives superior to the old. We simply aim to reorder our motives in a direction that will make them more acceptable from an external standpoint. Instead of bringing our thoughts into accord with an external reality, we try to bring an external view into the determination of our conduct...


And in more simple fashion, Aiken maintains that,

In [the workaday] world the problem of moral objectivity is mainly a problem of piecemeal mutual adjustment of acknowledged commitments within a loose framework of precepts and practices... The only principle of objectivity in morals is... essentially a principle of reconsideration. What it demands, when a question about the objectivity of a particular judgement or principle arises, is that we consider whether such a judgement or principle, as it stands,
can be consistently upheld in the face of whatever other moral considerations might be thought, in conscience, to defeat it.

(H.D. Aiken, 1965, pp.96/7).

77 That is to say, some element is being discerned as integral to moral experience and judgement generally, and to that of the moral demand in particular, in virtue of which they are not amenable to the personal choosing of the subject herself.


79 S. Hook, 1929, p.185. Though he goes on to attack the notion that there are moral values of that nature.

80 See, for instance, D.O. Brink, 1989, ch.7.

81 R.M. Hare, 1972a, p.35.

82 This is a position especially associated with Wittgensteinian approaches to moral philosophy - such as those instanced by S. Lovibond, 1983; S. Hurley, 1985.

83 For example, McGinn points out that there is a difference between seeing that a predicate 'would not be ascribable to things in the world unless there were conscious beings with certain psychological reactions' and believing that 'the mind is in error in taking [that predicate] to be a property of things in the world'


86 D. Wiggins in particular has done much to suggest developments of the notion of objectivity in morals in the previously cited paper and in 1987a; 1987d; 1991.

86 This is the basis of the analysis of religion given in L. Feuerbach, 1957. It is part of the method employed by Freud, both in theory and in clinical practice, by which the assailing force of neurosis is begun to be dealt with as its recognition by the subject as repressed desire in the unconscious is brought on by therapy.

87 See chapter 3 ahead for explanation of my understanding of this term.
88 A.J. Ayer, 1971, p.161. But in later chapters I shall be keen to show that even this kind of experience has some objective feel, insofar as it seems often to 'hit' subjects as if from outside of them.

89 B. Russell, quoted by Mackie, 1977, p.34.

90 D. Hume, 1975, Appendix I, p.287.

91 That is, in the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation and extended sympathy through imagination. What Hume is not saying is that the moral experience is purely an individual matter, or that it can be raised simply by the individual choosing to feel a certain way about a moral concern.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO


2 H.Spiegelberg, 1975, p.75.

3 'In one sentence: phenomenology attempts to explain the nature of reflection and the nature of perception within an intentional theory of the mind.' (R.Grossmann, 1984, p.87).

4 Marvin Farber comments that:

   In its broadest sense the term "phenomenology" may apply to any type of descriptive philosophy of experience, with appropriate qualification.

   (M.Farber, 1984, p.27).


6 A point made well by P.Pettitt, 1972.

7 M.Farber, 1984, p.34/5.

8 See his Encyclopedia Britannica article, pp.22-23 (in E.Husserl, 1981). He also talks of the distinction between direct and reflective experience in 1970a, pp.814-815.

9 This notion originates in Husserl's thought from its use and development by Brentano, who states that,

   Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages called the intentional (also mental) inexistence of an object, and what we would call - although using not quite unambiguous words - relation to a content, direction upon an object (which is not to be taken as something real) or immanent object. Every such phenomenon contains within itself something as an object, although not all contain objects in the same way. In a presentation something is affirmed or denied, in hate something is hated, in desire something is desired, etc.
Husserl himself tries to eschew the 'psychologism' of this conception as he sees it (which he deals with at length in 1970a - and see also E.Pivcevic, 1970, ch.3), not wishing to see the conscious datum as a specifically inner, and therefore psychological, fact. But his employment of the notion and the impetus behind his interest in it is much the same as Brentano's. Husserl says:

How are we to understand the fact that the "in itself" of the objectivity can be thought by us and moreover "apprehended" in cognition and thus in the end yet become "subjective"; what does it mean that the object exists "in itself" and is at the same time "given" in knowledge; how does the ideality of the general expressed in a concept or a law enter the stream of real mental experiences and become part of the knowledge of the thinking subject; what does the cognitive *adequatio rei ac intellectus* mean in the various cases, according as the cognitive apprehension is directed to an individual object or something general, a fact or a law, etc.

(E.Husserl, 1970a, Investigation II. See also Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, p.23, in E.Husserl, 1981. In 1970a, Investigation V, ch.1, Husserl discusses his conception of consciousness, and in ch.2 he picks out intentionality as the criterial feature. This matter is dealt with also by H.Spiegelberg, 1976, pp.39-42 on Brentano and intentionality, and pp.107-111 on Husserl's use of it).

Husserl comes to think of this directedness of consciousness as being in virtue of acts carried out by a 'transcendental ego' (the notion is worked in Husserl, 1931, and receives its fullest use in Husserl, 1960). As the final part of this chapter claims, I think there are great difficulties with this notion of a meaning-bestowing transcendental ego. One worry expressed in the following quotation concerns the method of analysis of phenomenology in this vein as contrasted with that of
linguistic philosophy (a worry that the remainder of this chapter implicitly addresses):

Are you sure we can find and observe such things as mental acts in ourselves? What are they? Husserl thought of them somehow as arrows of consciousness directed at objects. But this is a metaphor, and the question is: how can we give an unmetaphorical account of what is meant? According to Husserl, by looking at something internally given. According to the analytic philosopher, by analysing certain uses of language. This is a real difference...

(E.Tugendhat, 1972 [Discussion section], p.294).

10 Excepting some apparently objectless mood states.

11 See R.Grossmann, 1984, pp.51-56, 144-146.

12 This is a general term used to describe the encounter by the investigator with particular data (see H.Spiegelberg, 1976, pp.117/8; pp.659-666). There is also something which Husserl calls 'essential' or 'eidetic' intuition which I discuss in point iv of the next section. For his thought on the varieties of intentionality and what intuition amounts to, refer to Husserl, 1970a, Investigation VI.

13 Using these terms in their Kantian sense. T.E.Wilkerson, 1976, p.23, states that,

Kant's expression for awareness of experiences is "inner sense",
and for awareness of external objects "outer sense".

For further unpacking of the distinction in the light of the metaphysics of 'inner' self and 'outer' world see also ibid., pp.67,82. Husserl himself discusses the notions of inner and outer phenomena, and the physical and psychical, in 1970a, Appendix.

14 J.L.Austin, 1961, p.130.

15 This is a point made explicitly by Hare in 1973, p.15.
16 Though Austin is, of course, talking about the words people use rather than the people who use them, the experience to which I am referring seems to me to be close to the point he is making.

17 A process described in detail by Husserl in 1960, p.34.

18 The classic exposition of this theory of meaning is given by Hobbes, 1968, I iv. And the classic criticism of it is given by Wittgenstein, 1953. Charles Taylor, 1959, specifically directs criticism from phenomenology to empiricist theories of perception.

19 H.Reiner, 1983, Supplementary Essay - On the Adaptation of the Phenomenological Method to, and its Refinement as a Method of, Ethics, p.257/8. (My discussion of this matter of 'essences' is coming up in the next section).


21 E.Husserl, 1960, p.151, his italics. (Although Husserl takes this to be conferred by some special sense-constituting acts of the transcendental ego).


24 In particular, those which come under the notion of 'transcendental' phenomenology.

25 Spiegelberg brings this out well in 1976, pp.684-688.

26 This idea of non-interference from prior theoretical commitments does not, of course, mean that one can claim the original data to be itself free of theory-laden components - only that one describes it trying not to impose any interpretation not apparently already present to one in the data (P.A.Schilpp, 1935, p.253 comments that 'there is no such thing as givenness which is its own untouched and unqualified and ununderstood and uninterpreted self'; C.Taylor, 1959, pp.102-104 also criticizes such a claim).
27 See C. Hartshorne, 1939.

28 E. Husserl, 1960, p. 70. In 1931 he calls these 'free fancies'.

29 A useful account of this is given in E. S. Casey, 1977.


31 In 1960, secs. 34 & 35 of Meditation IV; 1964, p. 45 with the example of redness; 1970a, Investigation II, p. 223 (again with the example of redness) & Investigation VI, ch. 6, sec. 52.

32 This sureness is termed by Husserl 'apodictic certainty' and he gives some space to its meaning and role within phenomenology in 1960, secs. 5, 6, 24, especially pp. 14-16 & 57-58.

33 The ideal being of essences is discussed by Husserl in 1931, pp. 55-59; 1960, pp. 70-71; 1970a, Investigation II, chs. 1-3 & Investigation VI, ch. 6, sec. 52.

34 This is discussed by Scheler, 1970, pp. 48-53.

35 P. Pettitt, 1972, p. 249. He attacks the notion further, maintaining that 'Husserl's eidetic experience is at best non-existent, and at worst absurd.'

36 E. Tugendhat, 1972, p. 257. A general commentary on the criticism which this part of Husserl's system has attracted is given by J. Patocka, 1977.

One general and salient worry about the notion of discovering essences (and one which extends generally to phenomenological description) is that its publicity can be obscured by the somewhat occult nature of the process. Hence M. S. Frings (the translator of Scheler's major ethical work into English) says of Scheler's form of essential intuition:

...[his] stand [is] that all a phenomenologist can ultimately do is to "point" to what he is after. To be a pointer in this sense, however, means to be silent, and not infrequently Scheler argues that language
as a means of demonstrating an essence is insufficient and misleading, and that all one can finally say is: "Look, there it is."

(M.S.Frings, 1970, p.40).

And Husserl himself manifests this awkwardness when he says that, "Seeing" does not lend itself to demonstration or deduction.' (E.Husserl, 1964, p.31).

My quotation from Reiner above should serve to allay any fears that the reader has as to the availability of phenomenological data for public discussion.

37 I am not trying to 'sanitize' Husserl's phenomenology beyond recognition, but to retain what I take to be the workable parts of it for this study while leaving aside those other parts which seem to me to lead one into methodological difficulties. One philosopher who also tries to do this is Gilbert Ryle in his paper Phenomenology, 1932 (for example, he states his belief that 'an important part of philosophy consists in the analytical investigation of types of mental functioning', and these are 'proper cases of what Husserl describes as the phenomenological method,' p.70).

C.Taylor, 1959, p.108 also tries to compare analytic with phenomenological philosophy, arguing that the exploration of essences is 'very similar' to the analytic study of concepts. And M.Hammond et al., 1991, Ch.2, Sec.4 detail what they take to be similarities between linguistic philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology.

38 In 1931, secs.27, 44, 47, 63, 69; and in 1960, sec.44.

39 For further exposition refer to H.Kuhn, 1940 and C.A.van Peursen, 1977.


41 E.Husserl, 1931, p.102. See also 1960, pp.45-46.

42 On pp.14-15 of 1960, Husserl discusses this matter and its leading on to the eidos. He makes the point also on p.15 that this horizon may extend indefinitely for investigation.

M.Scheler, 1973, addresses the coincidence of the implicit horizon with that which is given to analysis on p.51.
43 H.Spiegelberg states that:

...largely under the stimulation of William James, Husserl had always been aware of the significance of "fringes", or, as he mostly called them, "horizons" for the phenomena as essential features of their make-up...[H]e came to see that even these horizons were not merely open areas of decreasing clarity, but parts of the comprehensive horizon of a world as their encompassing frame of reference, without which any account of even a single perception would be incomplete.

Now this world in the sense of an all-encompassing horizon was clearly not the world in the sense of objective science, a cosmology, for instance. It was the world as experienced by a living subject in his particular perspective...


45 H.Spiegelberg, 1976, p.160. And A.Schutz claims that:

Phenomenological philosophy claims to be a philosophy of man in his life-world and to be able to explain the meaning of this life-world in a rigorously scientific manner.

(A.Schutz, 1940, p.166).

46 In E.Husserl, 1960, he talks of 'different surrounding worlds of culture, as concrete life-worlds in which the relatively or absolutely separate communities live their passive and active lives' (p.133), while in 1970b he prefers to concentrate on the life-world as having 'in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative.'


49 Ibid., p.166. There is an obvious affinity here with the later Wittgenstein as his thought is recorded in On Certainty, 1969. And on the relation between basic views of the universe and moral systems, particularly as there is a theological link between them, refer to the essays in R.W.Lovin & F.E.Reynolds (eds.), 1985.

50 Husserl gives considerable space to consideration of this part of his method - for instance, in 1931, chs.1 & 4 of the Second Section, and in 1960, pp.20-21.

51 See 1960, Meditation IV. This concentration seems to have gone on alongside a heightened interest in Kant on the part of Husserl. Between 1901 and 1907 he re-read Kant extensively (E.Pivcevic, 1970, p.75ff). A similarity in philosophical position between Husserl's transcendental ego and Kant's noumenal self would seem evident.

52 E.Husserl, 1960, pp.25-26 deals especially with this.

53 Husserl's attack on 'psychologism' occurs throughout 1970a. The attack continues at length also in 1970b, Part III, sec.B. For the historical background to it, as well as the conceptual impetus behind it, see E.Pivcevic, 1970, ch.3, and H.Spiegelberg, 1976, pp.149-152.

54 Husserl is at pains to point this out in pp.13-14 of his Introduction to the English language edition of Ideas, 1931, and also in 1960, pp.25-26.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1 B.Tapper, 1930, p.519.

2 D.S.Miller, 1950, p.42.

3 W.Earle, 1976, p.520/1.

4 A fellow doctoral student recently commented to me that he felt, on viewing certain striking natural vistas, that he was 'an intruder, a voyeur', that the natural beauty 'had been there all along', and that he 'merely peeped around the curtain at it.'

5 C.I.Lewis, 1946, p.457. (His spelling of 'aesthetic' altered).


7 The way in which I believe that this can be called 'reflective' phenomenology will be explained in the next sub-section.


9 For extensive investigation into this kind of religious experience, see D.Hay, 1987, ch.9.

10 W.G.Lycan, 1986, p.88. Moral intuition, and the nature of a moral sense, are discussed more fully by me as issues concerning them arise, particularly towards the end of chapter 4.


12 Bernard Williams, for instance, states that:

   There could be a way of doing moral philosophy that started from the ways in which we experience our ethical life. Such a philosophy would reflect on what we believe, feel, take for granted; the ways in which we confront obligations and recognize responsibility; the sentiments of guilt and shame. It would involve a phenomenology of the ethical life.

   (B.Williams, 1985, p.93).

13 See the example of love and lust which I employ later.
14 Take, for instance, the direction of thought on a feeling that rose in the 'heat of the moment' - one's anger at a particular instant, or even the tendency towards that emotion in specific interpersonal situations, may be seen on thought on it to include a 'tinge' or element of, say, jealously or repressed desire.

15 This debate is not exclusively concerned with characterizing moral experience; it also addresses the nature of moral judgement and the logical form of moral thinking. Here, though, my concern is exclusively with the experiential side of the debate. As to that matter, there are passages which suggest that Aristotle took both (moral) experience and its general grounds in a particularist fashion (for instance, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book IV, v. 1126b 2-4, Book VI, viii. 1142a 22-30, xi. 1143a2-1143b5).

16 Good contemporary examples of this position are J.Dancy, 1983 and D.McNaughton, 1988.

17 R.M.Hare being the chief proponent.

18 This is an approach discussed at length by Hare in his book, 1981 and in his papers of 1973 and 1982. See also M.Singer, 1958.

19 Use of this expression itself is generally restricted in moral philosophical literature to the kind of reflective moves that are made out in the next sub-section (that of D.Wiggins, 1987b is a much used example).

20 This is a position set out explicitly in R.Swinburne, 1979, pp.254-260. He suggests that:

...it is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special considerations) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that \( x \) is present, then probably \( x \) is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so.

(p.254).

21 Swinburne covers these in pp.260-271.
22 In this context the beliefs are directly formed, that is to say, non-inferential; though the formation of belief may also later take place on the basis of taking the original experience to be reflecting the real object contained therein, and hence will be inferential. It is the counter-move to this direct phenomenological argument that employs an inferential method, essentially maintaining that to take seriously the belief formed in the immediacy of experience is not viable.

23 D.O. Brink, 1989, comments that:

Our commitment to moral realism is sometimes defended on phenomenological grounds. Various writers have noted that certain phenomenological aspects of moral life reflect our belief in, or commitment to, the objectivity of ethics... Moral judgements are typically expressed in language employing the declarative mood; we engage in moral argument and deliberation; we regard people as capable both of making moral mistakes and of correcting their moral views; we often feel constrained by what we take to be moral requirements that are in some sense imposed from without and independent of us. These phenomena are held to demonstrate the realist or cognitivist character of commonsense morality; morality seems to concern matters of fact that people can and sometimes do recognize and debate about. I think that these phenomenological claims are correct and important, and are confirmed by, various philosophical presuppositions of inquiry in general, and moral inquiry in particular.

(p.24).

24 By moral realism I understand a theory which starts from the semantic thesis of cognitivism. This holds that moral judgements are not relevantly different semantically, in terms of the meaning they have, from paradigm cases of fact-stating ones. Moral realism, then, is the thesis that cognitivism is true, and that
there are some true moral statements. Giving it its formulation in Tarski truth-conditional fashion, the characterization that  

'x is good' is true iff x is good  

clearly leads to the question of what it is on the right hand side of the biconditional that makes true the moral judgement. Hence moral realism naturally gives rise to the kind of considerations to which I have directed concern so far. Good examples of this position are given in the Spindel Conference papers (ed. N.Gillespie, 1986) and by D.O.Brink, 1989.

25 R.Swinburne, 1979, makes play in ch. 13 of a distinction between 'epistemic' and 'comparative' uses of experiential verbs, the first saying what the subject is inclined to believe on the basis of the experience, the latter simply in terms of her use of the particular verb as a 'seeming', without any attendant belief in the object as a result (this distinction he gets from ch.4 of R.M.Chisholm, 1957).

26 For instance, the quotation from Hook in my chapter 1, having stated that, 'In a sense values also exercise a compulsion upon us', continues with the contention that,

But it is of an entirely different order of compulsion from that of sticks and stones, ropes or handcuffs...[E]thical compulsion follows after a fundamental Stellungnahme, after a primary assertion or act of will.

(S.Hook, 1929, p.185).

27 J.L.Mackie, 1977 & 1980; S.Blackburn, 1985 & 1987; C.L.Elder, 1987 (in which he argues that the moral experience and beliefs that Mackie talks of are socially functional inherited ones and that the question of the 'reality' behind them can be ordinarily ignored).

28 Mackie himself does not think that we are subject to a simple subjective reification in the case of prescriptive values. He notes, for instance, that, 'What is objectified [projected] is not just a feeling that happens to be there', and talks of 'a
practice' and 'approval tendency' which support one another and both of which are necessary for production of the kind of moral experience which he takes it that we seem to have. (J.L. Mackie, 1980, pp. 147-148).


One important class of such experiences of things is perception - seeing, hearing, touching, and so on. But it is by no means the only one. There are also phenomena such as believing, remembering, wishing, deciding and imagining things; feeling apprehensive, excited, or angry at things; judging and evaluating things; the experiences involved in one's bodily actions, such as lifting or pulling things; and many others.


31 I. Kant, 1978.

32 A commentator who has specifically addressed this area states that:

...it seems plain that literature does more than remind us of truths, though it certainly does that. We often say, "Yes, that's exactly what self-deception is like", when we are reading perhaps "Persuasion" or "Anna Karenina". But it also creates new truths for us to see, new possibilities of feeling and seeing and valuing. Our concept of self-deception is (partly) formed or enlarged by these works, because they allow us to admit to consciousness elements we had overlooked or repressed, and to look at them in a given shape.


33 For a good recent discussion of this matter, see F. Berenson, 1991.


35 H.A. Prichard, 1912, p. 27.

36 Refer in particular to the selections in D.D. Raphael, 1969 from Francis Hutcheson, Richard Price and Thomas Reid.
37 Part of the point which I will be making in future chapters is that, though the phenomenologies of the honourable, shameful, or funny do have components at a direct level of being as if properties 'out there' when they seem to make demands on us, there is not a corresponding tendency for subjects to take there to be such things 'out there' as Mackie believes there is for us in the moral case. In future chapters I will also ask what kind of comparison class with the moral demand is relevant.

38 F. Hutcheson, 1969, Vol. II, p. 269. ('We are not to suppose that this moral sense, more than the other senses, supposes any innate ideas, knowledge, or practical proposition: we mean by it only a determination of our minds to receive the simple ideas of approbation or condemnation from actions observed, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them...').

39 That sense of too much or too little, of appropriateness, for instance, seems often to operate in this fashion also. Cf. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book IV, v. 1126b 2-4:

...it is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may go wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon particular circumstances, and the decision lies with our perception.

40 That is, the various uses of 'sense' which I have portrayed are operative as one explores the horizon of the experience and the feel the subject has with respect to its use and its placing in her conceptual scheme that describes the experiential flow with which she is presented. This will involve the use of imaginative variation; will locate essential features of the experience; and will require exploration of the life-world which is underlying those senses as well as being itself amenable to that greater kind of reflection of the third kind above by the subject herself once it is made explicit to her.

41 R. Ackerman, 1969, p. 76.


44 This is not to confuse the form of argument as being levelled against the possible ontogenetic fact that love indeed arises from lust, either in the natural history of the human race or in the life of a developing individual (Freud's thought on this matter is summed up by him on pp. 141-142 of *Group Psychology and the Ego*, 1985). The point I am making is that the two phenomena are experienced as just that - two, not one - and that they 'mean' differently for people.

45 No doubt lust takes one in this way too. But we generally do not find those features of some apparent independent call on one from without borne up as well on reflection as such elements in the experience of love.

46 That sense is involved here in that the subject appears to perceive the experience as located on the band self/not-self. She has some sense (though not always) of where the experience comes from and how it 'strikes home', as it were. Further reflection on the precise discrimination between the two can then go on as well as that higher form of reflection on taking the upshot of this feel to be constitutive of the phenomena, together with thought on whether that feel should be supported in the light of its jarring or cohering with other parts of her experience and belief systems.

47 H. Frankfurt conducts a subtle evocation of this (to which I refer again in chapter 7) in 1988, pp. 89-91.

48 Although this is also sometimes described by those who have been in the midst of such experiences as the sense (perception) of a 'real' or 'enlarged' self.


50 Ibid., p. 115.

51 W. R. Boyce-Gibson, 1933, p. 25.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


2 In an interesting article devoted to phenomenological analysis of the differences between retribution and vengeance, Dunlop throws further light on the kind of approach one undertakes in this subject area. He states that the essences of these phenomena will be discerned not through an easy progress, but effectively by way of the cumulative consideration of examples, entertaining similarities, differences and borderline cases. He says that,

...it is important for what follows to see that retribution is essentially different from vengeance. In the end this can only be "seen", and never verbally proved, but various sorts of arguments can be used to help the reader to attain this insight. The best way of doing this is done by calling to mind situations or occasions when people are acting retributively, or feel they ought to take retribution of someone, and contrasting these with occasions or situations when people are acting vindictively, or feel they ought to avenge themselves. It can also be done by recalling the different sorts of things one would want to say in these different situations, and so on. But underlying this sort of procedure is an assumption that retribution and vengeance are "given" as distinct phenomena in the "things themselves". Another way of putting this is to say that any being whatsoever that shares man's rational and animal natures is bound in the end to "confront" these "things" as separable items in the furniture of the world.

And he sums up his project in these words:

..my argument cannot have any clear "linear" or deductive form. The general aim is to appeal to moral experience, and thus "get the reader to see what can in the end only be seen", in Scheler's words.
To this end the subject matter is approached from various angles; examples are produced in the attempt to illuminate experience from different points of view. What I try to do is produce a coherent and self-justifying picture that is not internally contradictory and that should impress itself on the unbiased contemplator of experience as broadly speaking right or correct, despite an undeniable fuzziness in some of the details.

(F.N.Dunlop, 1985, pp.185/6 & 188 respectively).

The manner in which this and the following chapters address the particular area of interest goes on in a similar vein, although each sub-section tends to follow on from the previous one in a fashion linked by the emergence of experiential contents which invite further analysis and discussion.

3 I should register the preliminary point here, of which I make much more in the chapters to follow, that I am not conflating two phenomenological facts that should be kept distinct: that is, between the experience arising outwith one's conscious control; and its being experienced as threatening or assaulting.

4 I realise that this will be based upon some initial and ongoing interest such people have in their collecting project, and that it does not only force itself upon them, but would point out that these examples simply describe the strength of demand irrespective of considerations of how it comes about and maintains itself. Further discussion of reflection by the subject on the force and sometimes alien presence it maintains in consciousness is given in the next chapter. Chapters 6 and 7 look at the notion of the 'closeness' of the demand experience to the self.

5 As to the conjunction of this demand with practices and feelings of a taboo sort concerning 'proper' dress, which borders or overlaps with the moral demand, that is a further matter, I believe, of the particular cultural life-world in which the demand has its understood setting. With respect to this particular example and its nature as a moral demand, together with other ones of a similar sort - such as
standards of speech and deportment - Wilson notes that in contemporary Western society, "Various areas of social life have become steadily "de-moralized", ceased, that is, to be matters in which social value is invested" (B.Wilson, 1988, pp.38/9).

6 An identical point is made by Hughes in these words:

If there is an air crash and a hundred people are killed, I will probably think vaguely that there may be a need for tighter regulations or something and forget the matter in a minute; if someone I know is killed, I say the matter is brought home to me, meaning that the impression on my emotions is stronger and not so soon forgettable...


7 Cf. Wittgenstein's oft-quoted comments on a belief in the other's suffering and the immediacy of one's response which is summed up by,

My attitude toward him is an attitude toward a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.

(L.Wittgenstein, 1953, Part II, Section iv).

8 I would ask the reader to think here especially of acts of heroism in war or in emergencies like a fire where the actor him/herself often replies afterwards to people that the act was performed without thought at the time - 'It just seemed the thing to do' - and often also without any awareness of its quite special, uniquely individual nature - 'Anyone else would have done the same'.


10 Lynd notes that an apparently minor loss of face can raise up in one a heavy burden of shame, the demands this exerts on one having over time a severely debilitating effect on the self - while relatively serious infringements of social codes which engender guilt can be more efficaciously handled through the social institutions of punishment, redress, &c. (H.M.Lynd, 1971).
I would add here that it may not be that in the described case one always feels a strong *demand* concerning the other so much as that one experiences the person very vividly, perhaps as having an 'aura' about her.

This example has been specifically addressed to that experience of the demand for respect and reverence which ensues with feelings of awe and wonder at the natural scene. I am not forgetting, therefore, that a response of indifference, or the mere conscious recording of a slight demand, can also be the possible case - only leaving these on the side in order to concentrate on one particular manifestation of demand experience.

H. Spiegelberg, 1975, devotes an interesting section to the ways in which attention to the differing perspectives available to one from a view or work of art can enrich the initial experience of encounter.


A somewhat similar point is made by Pincoffs in his article 'Quandary Ethics' (E. Pincoffs, 1971). It is his claim that moral philosophy has concentrated unduly on the tensions set up for the agent in circumstances of moral dilemmas, those areas of our moral lives in which seemingly incompatible but (roughly equally) demanding alternatives press upon one for resolution by action. (He is not so concerned as I am here to point out the ordinary unforcefulness of much moral demand experience, rather to try to bring moral philosophy back to an aretaic, character-centred view of the moral agent and the kind of demands which subsequently have sway over her and for her).

By this term 'weighted' I mean that we are generally able, as subjects of experience, to compare and contrast different ones and classes of experience as to their relative degrees of strength and duration.

It is, I suppose, conceivable that such a demand might be so given in immediacy if one followed a particular way of life with whose attitudes and world-view one was utterly imbued and which did indeed take some such action as demanded of
one under certain circumstances. This presumably would be the mindset of Jimmy Jones and his followers in Jamestown, Guyana, who committed mass suicide in accordance with the demands they experienced to be laid on them by certain religious convictions. But the point of using the analogy is that subject experience does not ordinarily identify that demand in such a manner, and does identify other ones as moral. And, as I maintained at the head of section 1, ordinary subject experience is being granted empirical descriptive authority at the present in order that the appearances be determined with presentational accuracy. (I give further thought on the nature of an experienced demand as a moral one in section 5 of this chapter).

Reiner, who is broadly to be placed in the phenomenological tradition in his ethical philosophy, thinks that value itself cannot be described, properly speaking, but only highlighted and marked off from other phenomena. He states his view that,

A precise description of the phenomenon of value (though desirable) is impossible, value being a primitive phenomenon (like "green", "colour", and "sound", which cannot really be described either). Instead of describing in the strict sense, two things can be done. First, the situation in which the primitive phenomena are experienced can be characterized. And, secondly, primitive phenomena can be compared with similar or related phenomena by bringing out resemblances and differences. The result is a circumscriptive exhibition rather than a description of phenomena.

My approach with regard to demand experience is thus much on these lines as a comparative one, though I do not see at this stage any need to hold that the object of study - demands and their relation to value disclosure - are constituted in such primitive or difficult-to-describe fashion as Reiner takes them.

W.H.Davis, 1979, p.117.


23 A.Sesonske claims, in this respect, that:

...a major share of the felt normative force of judgements of evaluation derives from the attraction and appeal of the goal judged to be good.

(A.Sesonske, 1957, p.66).

24 Kolnai points out that while we turn to beauty rather than to ugliness for a characterization of aesthetic experience, we attend 'primarily' to moral evil rather than to goodness: 'our primal moral experience is indignation at wrong' he states (A.Kolnai, 1977, p.206).

25 This is a matter well expressed by S.Strasser, 1977, pp.119-120, where he discusses a felt pressure or unease on one and how one then has to discover its object or a way of ridding oneself of it. A somewhat similar point is made by M.Scheler, 1973, pp.17, 18, 35. And Husserl himself has a brief note (which he does not follow up) in his *Logical Investigations* where he discusses the demanderless nature of some demands:

The original sense of "shall" or "should", which relates to a certain wish or will, a certain demand or command, is plainly too narrow, e.g., You shall listen to me, x shall come to me. As we speak in a wider sense of a demand, where there is no one who demands, and perhaps no one on whom a demand is made, so we frequently speak of a "shall" or a "should" which is independent of anyone's wishing or willing. If we say "A soldier should be brave", this does not mean that we or anyone else are wishing or willing, commanding or requiring this...

(E.Husserl, 1970a, p.82).
26 Such experiential features are especially prominent in the works of G.E. Moore (1959) and W.D. Ross (1930 & 1939).

27 From my considerations here on a lack of specified object, it does not follow that the properties of rightness, oughtness, & c. are not present; my argument is that they simply are absent as special properties when the phenomena are described, and that a lack of directed object to the demand experience also goes against traditional ways in which these properties have been conceived. (Hence one may feel that one ought to help someone, but be unsure what help would consist in, and not be taking oneself to be apprehending a special quality of 'oughtness').

28 My point here is similar to, but not the same as, that made by Foot with respect to the objects which moral judgement can logically take and the relation between that judgement and an inner feeling (P. Foot, 1954; 1958; 1959 - one of the very few criticisms of her position is made by J. Harrison in the paper which follows her 1954 one in the Aristotelian Society volume). It is my contention that the moral demand is a non-inferential affair in direct experience and that what distinguishes it from others with similar strike and tone is precisely its nature as being moral. Hence the demand is not rendered a moral one by the aggregated presence of certain factors like height, strength, and immediate importance of the demand in consciousness. Foot's point is that some kind of special inner sensation is not logically sufficient to make of its object a moral state of affairs - and that the logical link is crucially forged in particular by the relation of a state of affairs to human benefit and harm.

29 Williams' appraisal of the cognitive and emotive constitution of the sadist marshalls a similar consideration (B. Williams, 1985, p.91). His view is criticized and the picture of the wicked person re-interpreted by D. McNaughton, 1988, ch.9.

In addition, I would draw attention to another alternative phenomenology that has been thought to have gone on behind some of the most evil acts of history. Far from being moved under the allure of the evil of their deeds, Arendt believes
that many Nazis simply got on with perpetrating the Holocaust in a kind of dull, thoughtless and mundane fashion. She states her conviction thus:

Some years ago, reporting the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem, I spoke of the "banality of evil" and meant with this no theory or doctrine but something quite factual, the phenomenon of evil on a gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer, whose only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness.


30 One should not forget how much of this experience and its objects is of a sexual nature, involving both attraction and the sense of its 'forbiddenness'. Indeed, much 'criminal' behaviour in general seems to be under the thrall of a heightened phenomenology very close to that of a sexual kind.

31 This is, of course, a complex phenomenon recognised in religious tradition - one of the most famous formulations of it being that of St. Paul in Romans ch.7. An alternative baptismal confession of the Catholic Church is the rejection of the 'glamour' of evil.

32 See I.Kant, 1949, Part I, Book I, Ch.III, 'The Incentives of Pure Practical Reason', and also p.221.

33 See J.Butler, 1913, p.45.


36 William James comments that,

We inveterately think that something which we call the "validity" of the claim is what gives to it its obligatory character, and that this validity is something outside of the claim's existence as a matter of fact. It rains down upon the claim, we think, from some sublime dimension of being, which the moral law inhabits...
(W.James, 1903, p.195).

It is, of course, part of my argument that this is not a particularly accurate report of what we are claiming for our moral experience.

37 H.Bergson, 1935, pp.23/4. He talks later (pp.37/8) of the ways in which there is an interaction of guiding force between the two types, each lending its particular level of understanding to the other over time.

38 See Kant, 1949, pp.180-184 in particular.

39 J.Butler, 1913, Sermons I - III.

40 For example, the blessed sacrament and certain iconic images to Catholic and Orthodox Christians; the Koran and holy places of pilgrimage for Muslims; shrines for Hindus.

41 There logically remains the possibility that such features might manifest themselves on reflection, though I shall argue in subsequent sections and chapters that this is no more the case than it is in the immediate context.

42 I am thus following here one of the usages of the term given in the O.E.D. which I believe is philosophically neutral, viz., 'The immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of any reasoning process....Direct or immediate insight.'

43 M.Buber, 1958, p.75. With respect to the later chapters of this thesis on a more reflective mode of thought on our direct experience, I observe that of this specific example E.Fackenheim (1970, pp.42-3) notes that while this may be a correct description of immediate experience, for a secular Jew the wonder and awe which abide for Israel at this event may fade on reflection and the 'appearance' call for a different explanation. He also talks (pp.47-9) of a form of immediacy of experience after reflection on God's saving presence for those who follow after the historical event (for example, contemporary Jews at the Passover).
H.Lewis writes interestingly in the same vein that religious experience is indeed of this non-inferential type as well as giving it due accord as a kind of experience rather than an experience of a specially delineated object, viz.,

Religious experience, in essentials, is not incipient metaphysics, however important it may be for metaphysical reflection. Its peculiar significance derives from its being a distinctive experience which people undergo, as they may have a moral or aesthetic experience. This does not mean that it is always easy to recognize or delimit, as in the case, for example, of some forms of pain. But it would be quite wrong to identify it with features of experience which all can recognize, or with neutral occurrences to which some further religious significance may be ascribed. Religious experience is essentially religious, a distinct ingredient, to my mind a vital one, in an essentially religious awareness, and identifiable as such.

(H.Lewis, 1980, p.20).

44 A phenomenon with which we are sometimes familiar, and which may suggest a value-citing which locates it in the object even when not experienced, is that which goes on when we are persuaded by another, or by an 'expert', that a particular object is beautiful or a fine composition or worth attending to, even though the relevant experience is lacking. The phenomenology of this assent, being one that will sometimes include the experience, varies widely from the gradual dawning on one of the validity of the other's observations through to the sudden flash of insight following a perhaps sceptical audience on one's part to the other. What I wish to note is that the experience does not always or, indeed, hardly ever, follow as the pinnacle or signal of this assent in an experienced cumulative manner. (And as to this use of valuational language that can apparently locate value in an object as if it has a special sort of existence, I address that in chapter 6, section 6).

45 H.A.Prichard, 1912, p.27.
There is a way in which one can 'work out' that a moral demand is laid upon one, though it does not seem to involve an experiential sense and is therefore not entirely germane to this phenomenology. It is by reasoning through what one should do in the light of the information given to one by a particular situation, one's commitments, the expectations and beliefs of others, &c. in something like a complex syllogistic style - though no particular experience of the demand seems to register itself generally at the culmination of such reasoning. If an experience does end up in consciousness of the moral demand, it does not seem to one at the time that oneself is responsible by volition or inference from what went before for its arising.

Findlay continues in the passage partly quoted earlier in these words:

Philosophers may dilate on the absurdity of attributing values to things instead of connecting them with our own reactions, but the fact remains that our own reactions are not the locus where they often appear to be: they seem to inform, to pervade, to be modally attached to objects or states of affairs.

(1977, p.11).

W.H.Davis, 1979, pp.116/7. (Cf. the line taken by Reiner, quoted in footnote 18).

This is, then, a different matter from the normative point that a person should be experiencing a moral demand and involves no reference to the notions, for instance, of competence and the impartial spectator.

Cf. S.Lovibond, 1990, on the way in which one tries to train one's pleasures in the light of a conception of their proper ordering. For her this will often involve the attempt to deny that one does find something pleasurable, or at least the involvement of a higher level of the self refusing to acknowledge such pleasure, in order that the immediate experience itself be trimmed, trained, and re-directed.
This point obviously militates against the large claim made by Davis (1979, p.116) that, '...a strong feeling that I ought not to do something makes it true that I ought not to do it. The feeling is the reality. There is no such thing as an illusory ought.' Such a claim is close to the phenomenology of forcefulness with which we are sometimes assailed by the moral demand, but is not generally valid - it is a common enough experiential phenomenon that, correspondent with the incoming demand, we wonder just whether we really are demanded in such a way.


52 I am giving this example at present merely as one of how phenomenological alterations can take place with respect to a re-encounterable moral demand, and not as part of a more general metaethical theory on the logical domain of moral experience (suggestions bearing more explicitly on that matter are made in the next point).

53 As an example of what I am saying here, see this comment by Urmson on the apparent immediacy of the aesthetic reaction and its connection with criteria by which it might be discerned as aesthetic:

...I acknowledge that if we experience an emotional thrill when we look at a picture or hear a piece of music we do not normally have to examine our grounds and reasons to know that we are reacting aesthetically in a favourable way. But I do want to maintain that it is the nature of the grounds that makes our appreciation aesthetic and that if on examination of our grounds we find, as sometimes happens, that our reasons are appropriate rather to moral evaluation or are erotic, or what you will, we will, if we are honest, recognize that our reaction was not after all aesthetic.

(J.O.Urmson, 1957, p.91).

54 The thrust of Aristotle's view in the *Nichomachean Ethics* sees moral perception as educated intuition. See also W.V.O.Quine, 1978.
55 See A.Naess, 1973 and N.Smith, 1990 on this matter.

56 A.C.Ewing, 1941, pp.99/100.

57 For instance, he quotes from his pupil E.D.Starbuck on the influence of expectation on religious conversion, particularly on the 'rules' that seemed to determine conversion among revivalists:

A rule received by common consent has a very great, though to many persons an insensible influence, in forming their notions of the process of their own experience...Very often their experience at first appears like a confused chaos, but then those parts are selected which bear the nearest resemblance to such particular steps as are insisted on; and these are dwelt upon in their thoughts, and spoken of from time to time, till they grow more conspicuous in their view, and other parts which are neglected grow more and more obscure. Thus what they have experienced is insensibly strained, so as to bring it to an exact conformity to the scheme already established in their minds.

(W.James, 1960, p.204).

And a more recent investigator of religious experience makes the descriptive point that,

The precise moment of genuine religious awareness, operating within the functions it claims for its own operation, may not always be easily delimited. It may be sharp as in sudden conversion, but even in these cases there is often a period of subtle maturing in which truly religious elements come to their open and more explicit formulation. More commonly, although religious awareness and sensitivity may be clear and explicit, it has its own ebb and flow, it merges itself in other concentrations of attention, much as aesthetic awareness is not always easily delimited and isolated from the
observations and attentiveness which it takes up into itself. It is for these reasons that some may even fail to detect the moment of live religious awareness or allow it in retrospection to be lost in the media which it embraces.

(E.T.Long, 1980, p.27).

58 D.Hay, 1987, p.166: '...the criteria which people seem to use in judging whether the occasion was religious...[are] given-ness, reality, total involvement, effect on behaviour. Where one or other of these criteria was absent, the experience was not usually called religious.'

59 J.B.Brough, 1988, maintains that phenomenology can help analysis get one away from the search for some universal Platonic property shared by all works of art and take us to looking at the kind of attitudes brought to art by public, artists, collectors, and critics, together with the socio-historic life-world which is layered about the understanding of what passes for art in our culture. To summarize his view in his own words:

An essential presentational dimension of works of art is artifactuality. But things other than works of art also present themselves as artifacts. What are the presentational differences between artifacts which present themselves as works of art and those which do not?...In Husserlian terms, the answer is that the work of art appears with a unique horizon...[It] appears within the context of a particular institution. The horizon, or the institution, is what Arthur Danto has called the "artworld".

(p.35).

60 J.Kekes, 1986, p.87.


Hudson notes that, '...whether conceived as sense or reason, the moral faculty was believed by the [classical] intuitionists to fulfill all three functions: perception, approbation, and motivation.' (W.D. Hudson, 1967, p.9).

The standard and powerful criticism of intuitionism is well summed up in these words from Hare:

Intuition is supposed to be a way of knowing, or determining definitively and objectively, the truth or falsity of a given moral judgement. But suppose that two people differ on a moral question, and that both, as may well happen, claim to intuit the correctness of their own views. There is then no way left of settling the question, since each can accuse the other of being defective in intuition, and there is nothing about the intuitions themselves to settle which it is. (R.M. Hare, 1972, p.46).

On a similar tack, Snare has stated his belief that:

...I think that for many purposes our rough, intuitive, common sense notions are sufficient to tell us that the empirical diversity alleged by some anthropologists, at least, is quite sufficient to undermine serious claims about a moral sense or moral secondary qualities. (F. Snare, 1980, p.354/5).

Nielsen passes a grimly ironic comment on intuitionism. In the course of repeating Hare's role-reversal test on a fanatical Nazi, so that it becomes clear that there are no differences relevant to this difference in treatment except the properties of Jewishness or non-Jewishness, he adds,

Perhaps Jewishness is a non-natural, intuitable, toti-resultant quality supervening on all Jews and only Jews. (K. Nielsen, 1968, p.19).
66 In the same article from which I have quoted him earlier on intuitionism, Kekes circumscribes his view of the matter in stating that,

[With moral intuitions] we are not aware of having made an inference, we are not entertaining a hypothesis, so we are not in need of evidence beyond what we already have. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to talk about self-evidence. But the idea of self-evidence carries with it a historical load connoting certainty, indubitability, and the impossibility of error. And these, moral intuitions do not have. Although we unquestioningly accept our intuitions, they may be mistaken, we may come to see that they are and correct them.

(J.Kekes, 1986, p.87).

67 See R.Ackerman, 1969; B.Brody, 1979; W.H.Shaw, 1980 ('By "intuitions", philosophers today are simply referring to sincerely-held moral judgements and not the sort of thing Moore was talking about,' p.129); J.Kekes, 1989, pp.90-95.

68 I realize that, from the fact that experience is not inferential, it does not follow that there are not features (perhaps ascertainable on reflection by the individual subject herself) which can account for its being experienced as moral. That is not my argument; what is my argument is that there are not felt to be, within the immediacy of the direct experience itself, special features from which its being a moral demand experience is inferred.

69 Of course, there might logically be a sense of knowledge-being-acquired, or of moral truth, without that having to be tied to an assumed apprehension of a value realm. My point is just that, to the extent that they are often seen as going together, the phenomenological evidence is lacking.

70 See the next chapter for discussion of the nature of this interaction, be it in causal fashion or otherwise.
D.O. Brink (1989) is an example of a philosopher who upholds that metaethical theory - moral realism - which is often thought to be given some kind of support by phenomenological considerations. Having briefly canvassed such a relation (p.24), he continues (p.25), however, by maintaining that that theory can still be held even in the absence of the phenomenology or with a clashing one, viz.,

...I want to avoid a possible misunderstanding about the nature of my argument and its appeal to commonsense morality and moral thought. I do not claim that moral realism is a common belief. I am willing to admit that, about moral realism, common belief is silent, divided, or even antagonistic. My concern, however, is not with unreflective and untutored metaphysical or metaethical views. My appeal to commonsense moral thinking is not a prediction about the likely results of a Gallop poll on the issue of moral realism. Rather, my concern is with the philosophical implications or presuppositions of moral thought and practice. (Compare the way in which philosophers of science take the practices of working scientists as an important methodological constraint but largely discount scientists' philosophical views about the status of their research). I claim that cognitivism seems to be presupposed by common normative practices of moral judgement, argument, and deliberation, and that reflection on the nature of moral theorizing seems to support a realist view about these moral facts and truths. This claim may be false, but this is not shown by an appeal to common metaethical views (or lack thereof).

71 J.McDowell (1981, 1985) supports a form of moral realism and sees our alleged value intuition in terms of an analogy with secondary properties; while S.Blackburn (1981, 1985 & 1987), whose metaethic is a development of Humean projectivism, also takes the phenomenology to be as of values 'out there'.
72 One of the very few explicit disavowals of this kind of phenomenology is recorded by Sellars. He says of Moore's non-natural intuited property of goodness that,

> It is just an historical fact that most American thinkers of my generation, Perry, Pratt, Rogers, Dewey, and myself, for example, were unable to intuit Moore's quality; and they raised the old questions about self-evidence and what to do when opinion varies. (R.W. Sellars, 1968, p.3).


74 J.L. Austin, 1961, p. 131, calls for more 'field work in philosophy' based on our actual experience and linguistic expression of it. He laments that,

> How much it is to be wished that similar field work will soon be undertaken in, say, aesthetics; if only we could forget for a while about the beautiful and get down instead to the dainty and the dumpy.

75 For the varieties of expression we employ with respect to aesthetic objects and the categories employed in testing aesthetic discrimination by investigators see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, section 2.6, of G.M. Paul's PhD thesis *Aspects of Aesthetic Judgement: An Empirical Study with Special Reference to Ugliness*, 1981, Glasgow University Library thesis no. 6467 (the prime scales used are Interesting-Uninteresting; Pleasing-Displeasing; Beautiful-Ugly).

76 W.G. Maclagan, 1961, p. 75. (Though on p.54 - quoted in Chapter 1 of this thesis - he states that he believes an 'objective "order of values"' is assumed through ordinary moral experience).

77 See the quotation from D.S. Miller, 1950, p. 44 in chapter 6 (notes 47 and 48), and the discussion that goes around it.
Urmson makes a similar call to that which I have made in this chapter with respect to the need to take experience as it is given to subjects and not to centre description only on the peak matter. He comments that:

...I think that it is tempting...within the field of the aesthetic to concentrate unduly upon the most sublime and intense of our experiences; but I am convinced that it is important to ensure that our account of the aesthetic should be as applicable to toleration as to our most significant experiences.

(J.O.Urmson, 1957, p.76).
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1 S. Weil, 1952, p. 40 (her italics).
4 C. G. Jung, 1964, p. 443.

5 Indeed, they may even pull one so wholly and cleanly into a new tack that there is no point at which one's old hankerings are sufficiently clamorous as to make the new tug irksome.

6 As well as putting obstacles before one's plans in this hindering fashion, the demand to do something - akin to a temptation - can also appear as an irritation, even if, at some level of self-awareness, one would like to do the thing concerned.

7 And the same goes for ones for forbearance - the demand not to murder, for instance, being felt neither as very irksome nor even as especially present at all times (a point reflecting that made in chapter 4, section 4).

8 One way in which this might be done, though an incidental and instrumental one, is by actually trying to alleviate the plight of the famine victims. But this would be like pursuing a particular course of action (complying with the law, say) with no interest in the action other than its role in getting rid of a pressure on consciousness (say, a feeling of an act's forbiddenness that irks one).

9 Some commentators see conscience in this way. May, for instance, states his belief that,

...conscience, unlike the virtues, seems to be grounded in a concern for the self, for the self's inner harmony, rather than directed toward the proper end of human action...[I see] conscience as an egoistic concern which nonetheless leads to restraints on selfishness.

(L. May, 1983, p. 61).
And Ci follows a similar line, seeing the phenomenon essentially in terms of getting rid of unease. He quotes Hannah Arendt's contention that it 'is not primarily interested in the world where the wrong is committed or in the consequences that the wrong will have for the future course of the world', but 'trembles for the individual self and its integrity.' (J.Ci, 1991, p.49).

The overall claim being made by these authors is that the operation of conscience prevents the individual from committing those acts (or perhaps pricks him to perform those which he would not do) the imprint of which would otherwise return to haunt him and disturb his inner equilibrium.

Hare, who is, of course, disinclined generally to bother himself with the contours of moral experience, also has made this kind of comment and given his thoughts on its genesis in these words,

It is easy to see how, if we have been brought up from our earliest years in obedience to a principle, the thought of not obeying it becomes abhorrent to us. If we fail to obey it, we suffer remorse; when we do obey it, we feel at ease with ourselves. These feelings are reinforced by all those factors which psychologists have listed; and the total result is what is generally called a feeling of obligation.

It is a fact that we have this feeling of obligation - different people in different degrees, and with different contents.

(R.M.Hare, 1952, p.165).

10 This phenomenon I am describing is not the same thing as what has come to be called, in the light of much publicized calls for charitable aid, 'compassion fatigue' on the part of large sections of the public. This is apparently something which has come about through the jading of the television viewer's emotional and moral response to the plight of the various third world populations who are in need of immediate as well as long term aid. I am talking of a wider experiential route which
the demand takes, involving an easing or eradication of pressure on consciousness - in whatever manner might be responsible for it.

11 Presumably someone acquiring a Kantian holy will would experience a decrease in irk, indeed in demandingness itself, of the possibilities before her.


13 For further comment on this link, see A.O'Hear, 1977.

14 Reiner has talked of this facet of moral experience, and, in virtue of the deftness and adeptness of his phenomenological description, I shall quote him at length on the matter:

The voice of a bad conscience usually comes unbeckoned; it emerges from below or behind the conscious mind and knocks, so to speak, disquietingly at the door. Indeed the arrival of a bad conscience can be far more than a sudden knock at the door. It can be an invasion of the conscious mind, an assault almost on the previously quiet succession of one's thoughts and the whole routine of one's existence. In such a case the appearance of conscience from out of the dark background is likely to seem slightly eerie.

And this eeriness increases as its disquieting attacks on the serenity of the usual course of one's existence are repeated and accumulate. The voice of conscience can become a thorn that will accompany one, never allowing one a respite, during a whole period of one's life; so that in time one comes to fear constantly its repeated appearances, which can thus exhaust an existence and deprive it of all peace till one finally manages to extinguish the sense of guilt one's bad conscience contains.

(H.Reiner, 1983, p.120).

15 See, for example, the role of the furies in Aeschylus' Orestia and their eventual domiciling as personifications of rationally considered justice at the end of the play.
Indeed, one might stigmatise as 'neurotic' precisely that demand experience that keeps arising and goading one when one knows one is already doing all one reasonably can; for example, a parent's response to a child's illness, where one might say to him, 'Look, you've already done everything you can do.'

Which is not to say that, if it were the case that I regarded the pill as unthinkable with respect to the jump demand, that would make the experience there a moral one.

This is a rather controversial sounding point. What I am suggesting is that our response to the famine-via-the-media case, and other presented examples of what are generally taken to be urgent or important moral issues, often provoke from oneself the socially expected and acceptable semblance of a response even though the actual experience and feeling is lacking (rather like, that is, cooing and smiling over another's baby for whom one has no real interest). This seems to me particularly germane in the case of the illness and bereavement of others not intimately related to one but nevertheless acquainted in some way, where one is obliged to make the relevant concerned and sympathetic noises even though one is largely untouched by the matter (indeed, one may even feel obliged to go in for that sort of behaviour).

A friend of mine remarked recently that if he were to be reincarnated his greatest wish would be to return without a conscience.

I should emphasize that these are points arising from the descriptive phenomenology, and not normative contentions as to what one ought to be thinking or feeling.

This is a point particularly strongly associated with Bernard Williams (1976) and one which I go on to analyze more fully in the next two chapters.

By 'care for others' here I mean, of course, care for the unknown and barely acquainted other, since it is a well known fact that virtually everyone cares about
someone close to them. But I do not want to assume, as a piece of unexamined baggage, that moral demands are necessarily those that involve 'care' for others. Moreover, with respect to the point which I am making here, I would like to say something which bears more strongly on the contents of the two chapters to follow. And it is that, concerning the pill, it may not so much be the type of content of the demand (i.e., caring for others) that leads one to eschew the pill, but the supposition that there is something inauthentic, meaningless, solipsistic even about treating all demands as to be eliminated by pills. For in that case it may be that one wouldn't have any enduring projects and maybe wouldn't even have a self. This point can be made irrespective of the content of demands: it applies whether the demands are to care for others, to care for the 'environment', to observe the Sabbath, or to watch hedgehogs by moonlight. That is to say, respecting a demand as not to be eliminated by the pill would not be 'the mark of' specifically moral demands, though it may be that they do have that kind of pull on us generally.


27 In this respect, Emmett says that,

...terms like "calling", and indeed "destiny", can underpin the single-minded pursuit of an end. An absolute quality can also be attached to the notion of duty, though this is more likely to take the form of a categorical imperative in an autonomous morality than a religious or metaphysical demand. Morality may be seen as an "ultimate concern", and so may the pursuit of an end or a creative venture. The word "call" can be used of both, suggesting that here is not just a matter of choice.

(D. Emmet, 1979, p. 147).

Here also she does not try to pin down a particular caller or demander or weaver of destiny to which one feels oneself to be related.
28 Sometimes, admittedly, it does have just that. Traditionally, this has been associated with a specific supernatural being, a tempter of some sort: Luther, for example, took himself to be throwing his inkwell at the devil and not in mere pique at an irritation that happened to be in his head. But it can have a cause that is sensed as such by the subject: the collusion of a certain vertiginous fear at the cliff-edge with a particularly poignant guilty memory from childhood, for example.

29 As to this cause, it is not itself a straightforward manner of being an inner sensation of humiliation or embarrassment that is perceived to bring it about. The focus of the cause to which the demand is referred is far more diffuse and complex than that. It involves the outer reality of the public understanding and social modes under which the event occurred as well as the possible intentions and sympathies of others towards one. This presents the demand in such a way that it is appearing both as an inner phenomenon as well as an outer, other one.

30 Lest the term 'apprehension' sound as if I am making of the connection with outerness a tautology by smuggling it in, by this term I mean simply the noting of it in consciousness - which does not have to include only those entering from outwith it.


33 This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that some such inference, having been made at some time, underlies the continuing direct experience. Nor that reflective appraisal of the experience might not arrive at such a conclusion. For the time being, this is a point which I am making in the context of the direct data of the moral demand in our experience.

34 This is the example used by G.Harman (1977, ch.1).

35 Bergmann talks of various qualities, such as danger, 'pleasurableness', and moral value, that appear to us as external ones that impinge on one. He says that,
These qualities are outside, in the public world, and they themselves affect us, and they do so not mediately but quite directly, very much as if they were forces. Their influence does not stop before a "self" that surveys the scene from the calm of an "inner fortress". (F.Bergmann, 1973, p.254).

36 I discuss her view of the self at the point of the heightened moral experience in the next chapter, its implications being more extensively drawn out in chapter 7.

37 Specifically theological accounts of this particular debate can be found in J. Fletcher, 1966, and L.J.Binkley, 1975.

38 For example, Maclagan, 1961, believes that,

...the moral law is a law without a lawgiver: and to the objection that this is absurd the answer is that it is just a way of saying that to call it "law" at all is only inadequate metaphor for something that is sui generis .

(p.73).

And William James (1903) holds that demands arise from specific people in specific circumstances so that talk of divine demands should be very carefully circumscribed:

If we must talk impersonally, to be sure we can say that the "universe" requires, exacts, or makes obligatory such or such an action, whenever it expresses itself through the desires of such or such a creature. But it is better not to talk about the universe in this personified way unless we believe in a divine consciousness which actually exists.

(p.195/6).

39 Not only is Abraham left in the thrall of a god who would ask such a thing of him as the sacrifice of his son - surely food for thought - but all relations between
himself and Isaac cease after that point. The Old Testament story writer simply
draws a veil over any further contact they may have had.

As to Job, his apparent reward for holding firm is not the return of his
family and possessions, but a whole surrogate clan which god gives to him in their
place. So he is left with a 'reward' of very dubious worth - and also, we are told,
god 'blesses' Job with twice his years more in which to live out this new life and
reflect on just what it is that has happened to him.

40 The sort of experience which I am addressing here is that of the strength and
constraining power of the peak demand and the need for the subject to give this due
expression. Somewhat analogously Foot says that,

People talk about the "binding force" of morality, but it is not clear
what this means if not that we feel ourselves unable to escape.

(P.Foot, 1972, p.162).

41 I use the term 'understandably' here because the mass of moral demand
experience - as pointed out in the previous chapter - is of a rather deflating thrust
with respect to the heightened qualities studied in this one and the possible value
realm figured thereby. Hence it is 'understandable' that the particularly striking
form of the experience should receive especial attention on the part of the subject.

42 E.Durkheim, 1974, p.25. And Mill also talks of the 'halo' by which 'custom'
rings around certain of the moral demands which one apprehends (J.S.Mill, 1972,
p.28).


44 S.R.L.Clark, 1989, p.188.

45 One philosopher who writes in a phenomenological vein, Sokolowski (1985),
expresses this situation and its significance for the subject in terms of her
deliberation about possible courses of action and how her future self will appear
and the state of affairs which she has actualized will be borne before the survey of
the future self that is projected forward. He quotes Alfred Shutz's claim that, 'the
deliberating agent is tensed in the future perfect. These future perfects are his situation as it can be resolved: they are ways in which the situation possibly will have been.' (p.160). Sokolowski goes on to describe this moment in these words:

At the moment of deliberation, when the future perfect is my concern, the present also takes on a perfect tense: what I am becomes condensed and ready to enter into what I will do. What I am becomes what I have been. It becomes suddenly discrete, completed in everything except what I am about to do now; it becomes ready to be recapitulated and renewed. The present perfect and the future perfect confront one another in the elliptical double focus of the situation, and if I can manage to perform my act, if the situation does not disintegrate for me before I act, the present and future perfects coalesce as the indeterminacy of the future is resolved and I, who am all that I was, do what is to be done.

(p.161).

Despite the rather cumbersome mode of expression employed in it, this attempted phenomenological description does do some justice to those special moments of the peak experience when one's self is engrossed by the moral situation before one. (Again, however, I would draw attention to the fact that such an experience is relatively rare and by no means describes or accounts for the vastly greater mass of the experience).

46 E.H.Cadwallader, 1980, p.238/9:

To *experience* something *as* objective is to experience it *as* nonsubjective. To experience something as nonsubjective is to experience it as originating from ("or caused by") something outside one's own consciousness...By "being independent of consciousness" I follow tradition in meaning "not subject to one's
willful control, or the result of arbitrary whim, irrational desire, etc."


48 G.A. Cohen has made the point in lectures on Marx at Oxford (Hilary term, 1985) that there is a difference between a mirage and a simple illusion that sums up the difference in the approaches of Marx and Feuerbach to the notion of false consciousness. For the latter, the matter is like that of an illusion, requiring corrective thinking for its resolution. Whereas for Marx, it is nearer to that of the mirage, requiring both dealing with in objective social reality as well as in thought (for the inverted thought reflects inverted social relations). Analogously, the point in the main text here is that there are objective correlates to the valuational sense, even if they are not to be sought in a value realm of a special sort.

49 R.T. Garner, 1990 points out in a footnote that Mackie's error theory need not require wholesale revision of certain ways of thinking about and talking about our moral experience. He states his belief that:

An error theory, by the way, is not necessarily a falsity theory. It is easy enough to propose some coherentist or inter-subjectivist account of 'truth' that allows us to say that moral judgements are sometimes true, even if those who make them imply something that we must admit is an error.


50 H. Frankfurt, 1976, gives examples of certain passions and some apparently objectless emotional states such as gloom or elation which seem external to us - and though he acknowledges that this can lead to dishonesty in denying that they are ours, there is an ordinary and accepted sense in which we do think of them as external.
T. Penelhum, 1979, also talks of some seemingly external thoughts or desires being symptomatic of deeper processes in the subject and discusses the criteria and extent of the notion and sense of externality for them.

Hence this leaves open the possibility of values from 'out there' interacting with us while we are nevertheless unaware of such a relation. And since this is an experiential matter being explored, the arguments I marshal are of quite a different nature from those employed, for instance, by Harman, 1977, on the explanatory necessity of using value properties to account for one's experience.

I do not mean here the case where these authority-figures intentionally tell or cajole or pressurise one to act.

See D. Goldstick, 1988, for further thoughts on the nature of one's causal interaction with moral values.

G. Harman, 1977, thinks such explanatory devices are not necessary. Good examples of opposed views—that the best explanation of our experience and judgement does make reference to them—are given by R. Werner, 1983 and N. Sturgeon, 1985.

In an interesting and careful article, G. Sayre-McCord (1987) has criticized certain arguments in favour of the testability of realistic moral theories and the explanatory role they play, while yet maintaining that,

...certain regularities— for instance, honesty's engendering trust, or justice's commanding allegiance, or kindness' encouraging friendship—are real regularities that are identifiable and inexplicable except by appeal to moral properties. Indeed, many moral virtues (such as honesty, justice, kindness) and vices (such as greed, lechery, sadism) figure in this way in our best explanations of many natural regularities. Moral explanations allow us to isolate what it is about a person, or an action, or an institution, that leads to its having the effects it does. And these explanations rely on moral concepts.
that identify characteristics common to people, actions, and institutions that are uncapturable with finer-grained or differently structured categories.

(p.449).

While R.Miller, 1985, reviews ways in which moral facts fit in with current philosophy of science and the grounds for asserting something to be best explanatory hypothesis, arguing that,

...everyone believes that there are nasty people (just people, morally obtuse ones). And if there are nasty people, their nastiness, alas, has a causal impact on their conduct. These and similar causal attributions justify our belief in moral properties...

(p.554).

56 I do not mean that these experiences - the moral demand's arrival in consciousness and the wincing - are the same thing, or that the latter is criterial of or even always expressing the former. What I am doing here is using the latter reaction as an analogy for the swiftness of the arising of the experience of the demand.

57 For good accounts of these concepts refer to C.Geertz, 1973, ch.1 & B.Williams, 1985.


59 R.Bambrough, 1979, p.3.

60 I realise that the phenomenological point that certain classes of experience are similar gives rise to the further analytical question as to whether they are relevantly similar. At the least, what I am saying here is that features of the moral demand singled out in the literature either are not universal throughout the experience class or are shared with other ones and will thus not serve uniquely to pick out this one. An additional and stronger claim to the effect, say, that this shows one something important about the genesis and sensefulness to the subject of the moral demand
with respect to other ones will only begin to be addressed by me as the reflective issue of the experience is investigated in the next two chapters.

61 Charles Taylor puts this well in saying that,

...there are experiences in which we are carried away in rapture and may believe ourselves spoken to by angels; or less exaltedly, in which we sense for a minute the incredible fulness and intense meaning of life; or in which we feel a great surge of power and mastery over the difficulties that usually drag us down. But there is always an issue of what to make of these instants, how much illusion or mere "tripping" is involved in them, how genuinely they reflect real growth or goodness. We can only answer this kind of question by seeing how they fit into our surrounding life, that is, what part they play in a narrative of this life. We have to move forward and back to make a real assessment. (C.Taylor, 1989, p.48 - and he adds that in this kind of case we are aware that, and assess partly in the light of, the part that our 'striving' to be there plays in the experience's occurrence and meaningfulness).


63 M.Mandelbaum, 1955, pp.69-71 et passim.

64 Though the sense of 'harmony', of 'nothing amiss' would also be terms which capture what we feel in these instances.

65 I have been treating this explicitly as experiential phenomenon thus far, though I will go on in the next chapter to analyze the meaning of claims that there are moral values or moral fittingness relations which one has failed to recognize or intuit in order to explicate the dimension of the not-self involved in such a form of words.

66 William Kneale, for instance, points out that, 'So long as we regard an issue as one of morals, we cannot say "Let's agree to differ". And it is natural to suppose
that we cannot do so because we are not concerned with taste only, but with truth.'
(1950, p.151). But he goes on to add that a subjectivist can allow this and say that
it only goes to show the degree of commitment or preparedness to compromise or
need for unanimity which typifies the moral attitude.

67 Witness this description by Freud of the Rat Man's behaviour when his lady was
readying to depart from him:

On the day of her departure he knocked his foot against a stone lying
in the road, and was obliged to put it out of the way by the side of
the road, because the idea struck him that her carriage might be
driving along the same road in a few hours' time and might come to
grief against the stone. But a few minutes later it occurred to him
that this was absurd, and he was obliged to go back and replace the
stone in its original position in the middle of the road.

(Quoted by R.Wollheim, 1973; p.135/6. Freud's italics).

68 One philosopher maintains that, 'Phenomenology and metaphysics go together.
When men lose interest in the primordial data of everyday experience, metaphysics
dies.' (J.Wild, 1953, p.190). This is all very well, I think, so long as one's
analysis of the experience is not misled into quick conclusions about the latter from
a too rapid glance at the data or in virtue of one being dazzled by the phenomena of
the peak experience.

A similar, though not identical, claim is made by the author of an article
who calls for greater attention to be given to the actual contours of our moral
experience than is ordinarily given by moral philosophy. He maintains that:

Moral philosophy's customary focus on action-guiding rules and
principles, on choice and decision, on universality and impartiality,
and on obligation and right action have masked the importance of
moral perception to a full and adequate definition of moral agency.

(L.Blum, 1991, p.701).
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

3 P.Heath, 1975, p.166.
4 See H.F.Nissenbaum, 1985, chs. 1-3 for interesting discussion on the object-directedness of experience, her area being that of emotion.
6 And Sprigge adds to his description a contention that I feel deserves quoting in full:

To talk of the pleasurableness which is an inherent part of the objects around us as objectified pleasure [with Santayana in The Sense of Beauty] suggests that it was originally experienced as a sensation within the subject and then somehow projected onto the seen objects which produced that sensation. But certainly we do not at present perform any such act of projection. There is nothing on which we could even try to project the pleasure other than that which is already its locus, the objects seen around us. Nor is it reasonable to think that an act of projection occurred in infancy. It is more reasonable to think that infantile experience begins with no clear division between self and not-self, but that gradually the contents of consciousness are sorted out into what is experienced as the self, mainly one's own body, and what is experienced as not-self, mainly the experienced surround of one's own body. Pleasure and pain belong equally on both sides of the division.

(Ibid., p.144).

His ontogenetic point about the contents of experience is also discussed by G.H.Mead, 1934 and by T.Mischel, 1977.
Notes to Chapter Six

8 Ibid., p.253/4.


10 H.Reiner, 1983, pp.121-123, makes a similar point, particularly with respect to the apparent independence of certain experiential phenomena from the control of the self. This is a matter to which I shall have cause to return in the next chapter.

11 G.H.Mead, 1934, gives an example on pp.169-170 of this notion of nearness and farness to the core self.


13 There is a wide range in which this kind of sense of the forbidden works on our part, moving from the moral to what look to be sub-moral contexts. That is, from the possible sense of a prohibition on something as wicked and evil, one moves through to that feeling, with which I am sure we are all acquainted from childhood, of the 'naughty', of an act of which we used to feel and say (and perhaps still do) 'You'll get in trouble for this;' where this-utterance is not just by the way of a prudential admonition.

14 E.Durkheim, 1974, sometimes describes the experience in such a way that he takes the latter to be felt virtually like the former.


16 In one of his short stories Isaac Bashevis Singer has a character say,

   I became convinced of one thing one night - thoughts and emotions can literally materialize and become entities of some substance.


17 I mean by the term 'mid-way' to grasp for a metaphor, as opposed to a precise location on the experiential band. This allows that later reflection might shift perception of the demand experience (or elements of it) toward one pole or the other from the roughly sensed position it originally held for the subject.

18 A somewhat similar point is made with respect to general moral experience by R.Sokolowski (1985), who tries to use one of Husserl's earlier notions in support
of his presentation of moral experience as being neither of entirely outer objects nor as of an inner valuational response to an inert external reality. The idea which he takes from Husserl is that of 'categoriality' which Husserl discusses in 1970a, Investigation VI, chapter 6. In this area Husserl seems to be grappling with the problems of presenting phenomenologically the way in which certain experiences appear as given to one, but not as entirely independent of one's thinking activity in their nature. I have chosen not to follow this course in the main text because it has seemed to me that it would cause more problems than it would solve, and would especially lead me away from the meat of the discussion and into methodological wrangling of an unhelpful sort.

19 I do not intend here to present an exclusive elucidation of the self as identifying it only in terms of concerns. After all, one can identify with something which one finds admittedly trivial (the overwhelming passion for memorising football statistics, for instance). What I do mean to do is indicate ways in which experiences are held by the self as coalescent or clashing with its central interests and terms of identity, or merely as indifferent. Such a presentation thus involves any elements which are close to the self and with which it finds its identity forged, and not just concerns. In the presentation to come I shall often refer simply to the 'concerns' or 'interests' of the core self for ease of exposition, though the reader should bear in mind the fact that I acknowledge the make-up of the core self to be larger than that reference.

20 H.Reiner, 1983, pp.133/4, makes interesting comments on this notion and on that of values as appearing as objects to the self, even though of importance to it, and as not having been called up from within its own resources.

21 S.Weil, 1952, pp.40-41; p.114; and the section titled 'Necessity and Obedience'. (Relatedly to my points in the main text, she also talks on p.109 of the power of desire as a thing which the self has to endure passively while it attempts to turn its attention to the good). There is a fruitful comparison here also with Kant on
the moral law striking down self-conceit, an affair which he seems to take to be intimately connected with the reverence felt for that law (I.Kant, 1949, pp.180-182).

22 There is also the possibility here, of course, that the experience could be felt as important and as mattering to the core self precisely because that experience strikes at it in such an unwelcome fashion, and in representing such an alien and irking force naturally calls for attention, even if only to determine how to rid oneself of it.

23 I refer again here to the classic exposition of G.H.Mead, 1934.

24 I mean by such 'facts' something like that very general need of almost all people to live with others, to get on amicably with them, and to bear one's actions and beliefs before them. As Hume says (1975, p.283), even a 'selfish knave' who is wishing to exploit the moral abidance of others will need to have the esteem of someone else and is essentially involved in a self-defeating project.

25 In this respect, one writer on the related area of moral realism has made a similar point. W. Tolhurst maintains that:

There is no clear reason to suppose that the moral realist must posit the existence of controversial abstract entities of a moral sort. If entities of this sort must be posited, it will be on the basis of metaphysical considerations which are independent of the question of objectivity. Moral realism may require the existence of the things judged to be good and right, e.g., persons and actions, but this does not distinguish it from anti-realism. If talk of non-moral facts and properties can be analyzed in ways which avoid ontological commitment to these entities, then there is every reason to suppose that similar analyses can be used to avoid commitment to moral facts and properties (subjective or objective).

(W.Tolhurst, 1986, p.44).
And see also M.G. Singer, 1988, p.145, on the matter of the social context of moral value and demands.

26 Though in this regard I do not think that we should underestimate the extent to which much of our moral experience is of the order 'What will others think of me?' or 'I won't get away with this' or 'I'd better do this as it's expected of me.'


28 Ibid., p.388. While as to 'inner' objectivity, he talks of there being a 'demand which is acknowledged as objective and as a norm for the control of the fleeting subjective experiences, [which] is not [experienced as] outer', going on to add that:

> It is an inner demand that represents organised and permanent dispositions as over against temporary desires and feelings. Any form of will which has become ineradicable, any expectation, demand, or assumption which is incontestable, acquires a normative objectivity which, in contrast to the desires and feelings which it controls, makes it an existent which must be taken into account. It is, accordingly, merely this persistence, continuity, or control which is acknowledged when the predicate of existence has the meaning of inner reality.

(Ibid., p.388/9).

29 For an interesting practical discussion on this issue in the context of education, see D.C. Phillips, 1989.

30 I mean that the familiarity of the social life-world in which moral situations arise may account for the spontaneity of response and the only semi-conscious registration of demands. For a discussion of the social significance of the moral sense in that vein of what I have called 'formal' phenomenology, refer to A.-T. Tymieniecka, 1986, pp.34-37.

31 See, for instance, C.L. Elder, 1987.
32 In one of her novels Simone de Beauvoir expresses this feeling as it regards the ultimate importance of persons making demands upon others. She puts this in a way which does seem also to leave the final avowal hanging, such that one can see how easily it could take on an experiential hue of a religious or (other) metaphysically interesting sort. Here is the passage, which is referring to Marcel's behaviour toward his girlfriend, Denise:

"After all, he only asks to be left alone," said Helene. "All the same, Denise can't really expect him to act against his conscience."

"His conscience ought to tell him that Denise exists," said Madame Blomart..."It's all very well having moral anguish, but it's really too convenient if we limit it simply to what suits us."

"But why should other people have rights over us?" Helene asked.

"It's something I've been unable to understand."

"It's not a question of rights," said Jean, "they are there."

"Yes," said Madame Blomart. "One must be blind not to see them."

(S.de Beauvoir, 1964, pp.137/8).

33 This would mean both that it could account for the often close proximity of moral demands to the core self, and also that the threatening or alien or merely other nature to one of the social not-self would correlate with those other possible relations of the experience to the core self.

34 Bergson, for instance, goes so far as to say in this respect that, ...generally speaking, moral distress is a throwing-out of gear of the relations between society and the individual self.

(H.Bergson, 1935, p.8).

Relatedly, Hare has argued that for much of our moral experience it does not matter either way how we try to characterize it on the lines of inner and outer operations. He says that:

[The] activity which I have called "thinking something to be wrong" is called by the objectivist "a moral intuition". By the subjectivist it is called "an attitude of disapproval". But in so far as we can identify anything in our experience to which these two people would be alluding by means of these two expressions, it is the same thing - namely, the experience which we all have when we think that something is wrong.

(R.M.Hare, 1972, p.41).

F.Bergmann, 1973, p.261, states that:

...we often say such things as "the music really was very sad (or gay, or exciting) though I was unfortunately too tired to respond to it. I had no feelings at all during the concert." We simply could not say this if calling a piece of music sad were a circuitous way of reporting an introspection.

A similar point is made by J.McDowell, 1985, p.119 on that of our relation to fearfulness and danger.

A view held, for instance, by N.Hartmann, 1932, Vol.I, pp.88-9. For extended discussion of his views on this particular matter see E.H.Cadwallader, 1984b, pp.91-95, and also my appendix in this thesis.

Another erstwhile phenomenologist who holds this notion about our experience and reports on it is H.Reiner, 1983, p.269 (Supplementary Essay: Is Value Ethics Out of Date?, pp.263-269).

This is well summed up in the words of Teale:

There are few who cannot remember occasions when duty went unperceived, or if perceived, reluctantly or never fulfilled. For most
of us it is fitful appreciation of and faltering application to duty, rather than unfailing perception of and ready response to duty with which we are the more familiar...


43 B. Tapper, 1930, pp. 519/520. (He later, p. 521, throws doubt on these notions via a record of how he takes our own reflections on the matter to go).

44 Weil puts this point in apt terms as:

The beautiful in nature is a union of the sensible impression and the sense of necessity.


45 I should like to note in example 3. that it is not so much with a 'concern' or 'interest' that the core self is identified but in this case with a fascination, a sensation of awe and wonder - hence my earlier disclaimers from identifying the core self only in terms of concerns.

46 R. Werner, 1983, p. 653. (He refers to moral 'facts' which we perceive, but his argument is of a form sufficient to stand as representative of the one which I wish to address to the moral demand experience).

47 D. S. Miller, 1950, p. 42.

48 Miller continues by saying of the notion of moral value in the object that:

[It] must on the same ground be extended to other cases which they [objectivist moral philosophers] would not for a moment extend it. Not only to beauty, to which many of them do extend it, but to humour, for example. Our notion of a good jest or a bad jest, of a ludicrous incident or a "delicious" remark, has precisely the same objectivity and subjectivity. The comic quality appears as simply
attaching to the object-matter, but can be psychologized as the reaction of the person amused. So with the good or the bad in the taste of the food, so with the horrible, the terrible, the eerie, the sepulchral, the foul, the vile, and many other phases of perceived things. These phases have their being in feeling but they do not label themselves as feeling or as subsisting in the mind. That is an afterthought.

(Ibid., p.44).

49 Treatise, I.iii.14.

50 With respect to my description in terms both of an experience's constitution by the self and its perceived proximity to the interests and concerns of the self, it should be clear that that which has been projected by us need not be felt in immediacy, or even on later reflection, to have originated in that fashion. Moreover, that which arises 'from within' may come to take on an alien and threatening not-self guise once it has been projected or reified without - as is the alleged case of our religious temper in Feuerbach's classic analysis, 1957.

51 This is an argument put forward especially by D.Wiggins, 1991.

52 To that extent, Miller is taking our experience in the same way as Mackie, as erroneously referring to value objects of a special sort: which is a representation against which I have argued elsewhere.

53 Sartre, for instance, held that moral values were absolute without thereby thinking that they were in any way part of the nature of the universe in Mackie's sense. He explicitly comments on this as a part of a dialogue with de Beauvoir on the upshot of an absence of one kind of metaphysical basis for values, a divine demander:

S: In the moral field I've retained one single thing to do with the existence of God, and that is Good and Evil as absolutes. The usual consequence of atheism is the suppression of Good and Evil. It's a
certain relativism - for example, its regarding morals as being variable according to the point on the earth's surface at which they are seen.

dB: Or as Dostoevski says, "If God does not exist, everything is allowed." You don't think that, do you?

S: In one way I see clearly what he means, and abstractly it's true; but in another I clearly see that killing a man is wrong. Is directly, absolutely wrong; is wrong for another man...It might be said that I look upon man's morals and moral activity as an absolute in the midst of the relative.

(S.de Beauvoir, 1985, p.439).

54 Hare asks, in this respect, the following question:

Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and think of another in which those values have been annihilated. And remember that in both worlds the people in them go on being concerned about the same things - there is no difference in the subjective "concern" which people have for things, only in their "objective" value. Now, I ask, what is the difference between the states of affairs in these two worlds? Can any other answer be given except "None whatever?"

(R.M.Hare, 1972, p.47).

A similar thought experiment is put by E.H.Cadwallader, 1971, concerning our reflection on a world in which there are no good things, or in which we try to conceive ourselves as able to get by without using such an evaluative notion.

Hare's contention, of course, begs the question: it might be that the idea of people having such "concern" outwith an objective value backdrop is really not conceivable; or it might be that people need to think that there is such a backdrop to have that concern, even if no such objective underpinning really exists.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN


3 H.Frankfurt, 1988, p.89.


6 J.L.Mackie, 1980, p.75.


8 Page numbers here refer to the slightly amended reprint to be found in the collected volume D.Wiggins, 1987.

9 D.Wiggins, 1987b, p.98.

10 Ibid., p.99.

11 Ibid., p.105.

12 Ibid., p.98.


14 M.Platts, 1980, p.76/7.

15 Ibid., p.77.

16 The actual terms in which Platts puts this consists in arguing both for cognitivism in moral philosophy - the position that desires require appropriate beliefs about the independent desirability of their objects (ibid., p.80) - as well as the further notion that those beliefs are capable of being true (which is moral realism).

17 Ibid., p.79.

18 C.Taylor, 1989, p.3.
19 Ibid., p.5.

20 Ibid., p.5.

21 He puts his belief in these words:

   The whole way in which we think, reason, argue, and question ourselves about morality supposes that our moral reactions have these two sides: that they are not only "gut reactions" but also implicit acknowledgements of claims concerning these objects.

   (Ibid., p.7).

22 Ibid., p.9. And he even claims, on the same page, that those who hold to subjectivist explanations nevertheless still require, at some deeper level, to think of their own moral reactions in certain objectivist ways.

23 Ibid., p.27.

24 Ibid., p.60.

25 Ibid., p.74.

26 Ibid., p.99.

27 Other ones of relevant interest are given by R.Attfield, 1969 and by D.Lyons, 1976 (both on the upshot of taking seriously a relativist view of morality).

28 I explain later that I believe the two claims to be the same, though I distinguish them here for the purposes of clarifying the discussion.

29 On this matter of 'sensefulness' and the satisfaction or unease with which the subject surveys the concepts she uses to represent her experience I refer the reader back to section 5 of my chapter 3.

30 I use the expression 'show to be false' since these arguments can do this with regard to other ones that are couched in phenomenological terms and which do not accurately describe the relevant data.
31 I am not claiming here that presentation of a *rough outline of a relation* is the same thing as showing there to be a *rough relation*. But I am saying that the WPT line gives only a rough outline of what kind of objectivity component is 'required' for the requisite experience to be had and reflectively endorsed - and, furthermore, that my own belief is that only a rough relation is at the root of the experience when such a rough outline is explored further.

32 See A. MacIntyre, 1981 for elaboration of such a feeling on his part and the consequent moral confusion which he believes it to have wrought for us all.


34 Williams states his belief that Mackie's thesis (1977) on the subjective basis of morality, if held generally, could lead to problems with our notions of morality. His point is summed up in these words:

> It certainly cannot follow from Mackie's view that when we have come to realise what moral experience really is, we shall start to acquire our moral attitudes by self-consciously deciding on them, either individually or collectively. It is not clear that there could be such a process, and if there were, there is no reason at all to think, in the light of Mackie's theory itself, that it would be effective.

(B. Williams, 1985, p. 212/213).

Williams also criticizes what he calls 'government house utilitarianism' - that is, the need to hide from ordinary folk the true source of their moral experience - in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, 1973.

35 See A. Baier, 1985, Essay 9, p. 165.

36 For instance, one writer on the ontological commitments of moral realism expresses his attitude in this way:
A teacher of mine once remarked that the question of moral realism seemed to him to be the question whether the universe cares what we do. Since we have long since given up believing that the cosmos pays us any mind, he thought we should long since have given up moral realism. I can only say that if this were what moral realism involved, it should - with relief rather than sorrow - be let go. However,... moral values or imperatives might be objective without being cosmic. They need be grounded on nothing more transcendental than facts about man and his environment, facts about what sorts of things matter to us, and how the ways we live affect these things.


See also, for instance, A.Baier, Essay 11, pp.222/3.

37 H.J.McCloskey, 1969 (p.7), believes that,

A possible and reasonable reaction to an acceptance of the truth of a relativist, or a subjectivist metatheory could be a rejection of moral standards as unimportant...[S]ome, although by no means all, metaethical theories are such that a reasonable response to them is indifference to morality and to normative ethics.

38 S.Blackburn, 1985, p.6. And he admits on p.11 that:

There is still that nagging feeling that on this metaphysic "There are no obligations really ",

though he does believe that his own metatheory can deal adequately with such a worry. He also adds (p.9) that the thought that our moral consciousness has a certain foundation need not lead to a particular moral stance:
Rationality in itself does not force one sensibility or another on us just because we have some belief about the origin of that sensibility.

McDowell, 1985, p.119, criticizes Blackburn for being unable - as McDowell sees it - to provide adequate explanation of our sensibility in the light of the ways in which we naturally view its operation and objects.

39 S.Blackburn, 1985, p.6/7.

40 See W.C.Kneale, 1955, pp.98-99 for discussion of different meanings of 'invention' with respect particularly to our moral codes.

41 See G.J.Warnock, 1978 for general criticism of the view of value as chosen and for his assessment of the sources of such a contention. He sums up his own attitude in stating that:

Those who say that values are chosen surely do not say it because that, on reflection, is what just naturally seems to be true...Are they not, on the contrary, nearly paradigmatically, what we do not choose?

(pp. 28-29).


43 D.Zimmerman, 1985, p.81.

44 Ibid., p.91.

45 Ibid., p.93

46 In reply to his own questions, which I have quoted in the main body of the text, Zimmerman states that (p.93):

The answers to these questions depend on how the nonrealist about values conceives of the states of the subject that constitute certain states of affairs as values. If he considers the genesis of value to be a matter of radical decision, on the model of existentialists and some
noncognitivists, then I think there is a lot to Platts' depiction of the dilemma that follows the abandonment of realism.

47 Ibid., p.95.


49 This is said in the light of the generally held notion that that indeed is how moral education proceeds; that is to say, minimally, the teaching will instill something in the subject (be it new desires or respect for the moral law or whatever) which has not originated from within herself and may appear initially and also often further on as an outside force.

50 On the matter of value as intrinsic and as it being 'out there', see M.Picard, 1939.

51 And Blackburn (1987, p.371) also points out that it is incorrect to think of our reasoning in these matters as being about our moral sensibility in practical affairs. He sees the sensibility as doing the job of giving one the feel for these moral matters, as reacting to the 'perceived features of things' rather than as being directed to the review of the operation of the sensibility itself.

52 Cf. Freud's account of the difficulties of fully ridding a patient of a neurosis even after its origin had been revealed to the patient himself:

If knowledge about the unconscious were as important for the patient as people inexperienced in psycho-analysis imagine, listening to lectures or reading books would be enough to cure him. Such measures, however, have as much influence on the symptoms of
nervous illness as a distribution of menu-cards in a time of famine has upon hunger.

(Quoted by R. Wollheim, 1973, p. 151).

53 Reporting people's accounts of their religious experience, Hay notes that:

The phrase "it was more real than me talking to you now" is representative of the view of many of those we spoke to. This feeling, that the experience was more "real" than everyday reality, is very curious, given that it is normally brief in duration and unpredictable...[T]hese experiences usually have an affect [also] in altering people!s outlook on life.


55 See, for instance, Midgeley's contentions on this matter in her essay 'The Objection to Systematic Humbug', 1981, especially p. 86.

56 In his conversations with Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre responds to the question in this fashion:

dB: You said that one could be free in any situation. When did you stop believing that?

S: Quite early. There is an artless theory of freedom: one is free, one always chooses what one does, one is free with regard to the Other, the Other is free with regard to one. This theory is to be found in the very simple philosophical books, and I kept it as a convenient way of defining my freedom; but it did not correspond to what I really meant to say. What I meant was that one is responsible for oneself even if one's acts are provoked by something external...Every action includes a proportion of habit, of received ideas, of symbols;
and then again there is something that comes from our remotest depths and that is related to our primary freedom.

(S. de Beauvoir, 1985, p.352).

57 R.B.Perry, 1933, pp.133 & 138 (his italics).


60 Ibid., p.51. Cf. Kant, 1969, pp.67ff on autonomy and heteronomy:

In every case in which an object of the will must be assumed as prescribing the rule which is to determine the will, the rule is nothing else but heteronomy.

(p.71).

61 Taylor maintains that if the dilemma were brought about by the operation of radical choice on the part of the young man, then:

the nature of the predicament would dissolve, for that would mean that the young man would do away with the dilemma at any moment by simply declaring one of the rival claims dead and inoperative. Indeed, if serious moral claims were erected by radical choice, the young man could have a grievous dilemma about whether to go and get an ice cream cone, and then again he might decide not to.


62 Ibid., p.122.

63 A.D.Smith, 1985, p.102.

64 Ibid., p.102.

...it is so far from being true, that all moral good and evil, just and unjust, (if they be any thing) are made by mere will and arbitrary commands (as many conceive), that it is not possible that any command of God or man should oblige otherwise than by virtue of that which is naturally just. And though particular promises and commands be made by will, yet it is not will but nature that obligeth to the doing of things promised and commanded, or makes them such things as ought to be done. For mere will cannot change the moral nature of our actions, nor the nature of intellectual beings.

66 C.Taylor, 1977, p.120.

67 He states that:

How could we value the upshot of an arbitrary choice? For we should be clear that for the Existentialist the choice or decision involved here must be arbitrary. It would fail to be arbitrary only if we were guided by relevant considerations; but since we are dealing with matters of value, such considerations would be relevant only if already embodying prior recognition of values, which is contrary to the claim that values themselves arise in the very act of choosing. Since the choice is arbitrary, the agent knows that the question of value does not exist.

(A.D.Smith, 1985, p.102).


69 For a further attack on the notion of value as chosen, see E.Shils, 1988, p.51.

70 Cf. J.Harrison, 1954, p.116, who contends that:

Moral discernment consists in making oneself sensitive to distinctions which impinge on one from without, and he is most
sensitive who is most sensitive to these distinctions, not he who is 
most determined and vigorous in exhorting or commanding others.

72 E.J.Bond, 1983, pp.60-61 (and see pp.55-56 on his idea of value as being 
pursued by reflective desire).
73 Ibid., p.61. See also his chapter 5 for further thoughts on the status of value and 
its relation to desire.
74 J.Kekes, 1984, p.4.
75 Ibid., p.4.
76 J.Ladd, 1957, p.14/15 (and see also ch. XVIII, sec.2).
77 Ibid., ch.V, sec.4.
78 Ibid., p.102.
79 C.Taylor, 1989, believes this matter of living within 'horizons' provided by our 
moral frameworks to be 'integral' to 'human personhood' (p.27; and see also 
p.99).

D.CkBrink, 1989, thinks, on a different tack, that we as moral subjects 
ordinarily 'begin' as realists about moral claims, and generally only jettison such an 
implicit view as the result of thought on the 'apparently' queer nature of moral 
ontology or 'apparently' poor methodology of ethical thinking (p.23).

80 Cf. the commitment of atheists to moral issues, despite the inability of believers 
to make sense of such stances outwith belief in a divinely created (and/or ordered) 
universe. An example of just this kind of matter is provided by the following letter 
to a national newspaper. In reply to a contention by Lord Rees-Mogg that atheists 
either are incapable of caring morally for others or are in fact evil, the correspondent 
writes:
To be an atheist means that you do not accept the existence of any higher being or eternal life. It does not mean that you have little regard for human life. Indeed, my belief that we live for such a short space of time makes me value that time all the more.

(Letter from D. Woolmer to The Independent, September 9, 1991).

Mackie also comments that:

A man could hold strong moral views, and indeed ones whose content was thoroughly conventional, while believing that they were simply attitudes and policies with regard to conduct that he and other people held.

(J.L. Mackie, 1977, p.16).

81 He states his belief that:

The quality approved by our moral sense is conceived to reside in the person approved, and to be a perfection and dignity in him: approbation of another's virtue is not conceived as making the approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, though it is attended with some small pleasure...The admired quality is conceived as the perfection of the agent, and such an one as is distinct from the pleasure either in the agent or the approver...The perception of the approver, though attended with pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this pleasure; even as the perception of external forms is attended with pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this pleasure.


83 C.Taylor, 1977, p.112.
84 Ibid., pp.113-115. It should be noted that Nietzsche, for instance, held there to be links of a fundamental nature between moral responsibility and the self: this being, of course, part of a quite different project from that which Taylor might wish to establish (see R. Schacht, 1983, pp. 136-138).

85 As put forward in the interpretation of P.Strawson (1959 & 1975).

R.B.Perry (1931, p.457) addresses directly the issue of value as a fundamental constituent of a possible experience in these words:

Consider, for example, the view that value is a category. He who defends this view should be prepared first to exhibit the concept, as he might exhibit the concept of relation, causation, or substance; and then prove its categorial status. He may do so by showing that the concept in question belongs to the alphabet of thought, - is one of those terms in terms of which one must think if one is to think at all. Or he may do so by showing that value as specified belongs to the structure of being or object in general, so that any particular being or object must embody it.

86 C.Taylor, 1977, p.112.

87 Ibid., p.113.

88 Ibid., p.114-115.

89 Ibid., p.112.

90 Ibid., p.117.


R.B.Brandt (1986, p.243) asks, for instance, of human nature and the self, that, in the light of advances in ethical theory through further understanding of practical reason and motivation, then:
If it is shown that human nature is such that something isn't and
can't be desired at all, what would be the point of raising the
question whether it is good or fittingly desired?

While G.Held, 1990, has recently produced a femininst critique of much of
ethical theory in virtue of her belief that it is committed to a one-sided view of the
self from a male actor's perspective.

And there is also discussion of the maintenance of the self through moral
situations as one follows consistent lines of evaluative response which is given in

92 See the following comments as instances of this:

...the sphere of personhood has personal values woven into its very
nature; an appreciation of good and evil is not an optional extra for
persons.
(A.D.Smith, 1985, p.114).

...the idea of a system of values is part of the idea of a person.
(G.Nerlich, 1989, p.20).

And see also S.Scheffler, 1979.

93 I follow, in this respect, the classic exposition given by Strawson, 1959.

94 A dilute and basic version of such a thesis is given by W.D.Falk, 1965, pp.63-
64, where he talks of the essential need to which morality answers as being 'for the
sake of sane and ordered individual being' since one's 'stake in self-preservation'
ordinarily 'requires that one should be able to bear before oneself the survey of
one's actions.'

95 Nagel states that:

The belief in objectivity clearly implies a commitment to some kind
of realism - not realism about a world of values with which we
causally interact, but realism about the existence of reasons or values
which we can discover by certain processes of thought.

(T.Nagel, 1986a, p.359).

See also R.Bambrough, 1979, ch.5.

96 On this matter see A.S.Cua, 1978.

97 Refer again to G.H.Mead, 1934 & 1964.

98 As Kekes believes (J.Kekes, 1989).

99 As instanced most forcefully by G.E.M.Anscombe, 1958, p.17.

100 Sokolowski talks of the 'moral ontological difference' between the desirable
(the apparent good) and the (real) good with which we operate, seeing that as both
distinctive of human beings and generative of any moral principles. He states this
thesis in these terms:

    It is the sense that there is an issue of truth in what we do. Unless
we are - or have become - morally brutish, the issue is always there
for us, and our character shows how we have cultivated it. (p.148).

Furthermore, he claims that,

    It is not because we are [divinely] commanded to be concerned, or
because we commit ourselves to being morally concerned, that we
are moral agents; we first of all are moral agents, just as we are first
of all thoughtful beings. The difference between the desirable and
the good is there for us as a difference before there are commands,
promises, and responsibilities of any sort...We do not have to
"acquire" this difference; it is not possessed as a piece of knowledge
that could be detached from us; "we" as agents could simply not be
without this difference.

(p.157).
To take an example from my own breast: I experience a demand that the wilds of Antarctica be preserved inviolate, though there is nothing I feel able to do to answer this demand and nothing that I especially feel that I should be doing.

Marcel talks of the 'creative vow' of aesthetic creation in these words which mirror the moral and religious examples:

The [vow] only takes shape after the artist has as it were been possessed by some form of reality which is revealed less by sight than by a sort of inward touch: but reality thus apprehended appears to him at the same time (and this is a paradox and a mystery) as independent in relation to his personal will and as nevertheless subject to the act by which he makes it pass into existence. The [creative vow] is no other than the fiat by which I decide to put all my energies at the service of this possibility which is already imposing itself upon me, but only upon me, as a reality, so that I may transform it into a reality for all, that is to say into an established work. This means that the [vow], far from being reduced to a mere wish, has the character of an engagement and a decision. But this engagement or this decision is not made simply within my own being, something transcendent is involved, however indistinct my consciousness of it may as yet be.

(G. Marcel, 1951, ch.5, p.109).

L. Hertzberg, 1990, p.115 believes that

...to accept an action as morally necessary or impossible for someone is to express an understanding of his life and character.

This is not merely a matter of psychological incapacities on the part of the agent, Hertzberg maintains, such that one could demand of him that he try harder, for,
...the sort of understanding relevant here must itself be expressive of ethical concerns.

And Dilman has a most interesting way of putting matters, combining those themes of independence of the moral demand from one and its representing deep concerns of the self which I have been running. I think he is worth quoting at some length here. He says:

> Obviously the [moral] reactions must be part of a coherent outlook, one that informs a man's life and convictions - even if this outlook has not been made articulate by the man himself. Otherwise the conviction which any one of them carries for the person will not amount to anything more than a transitory feeling of conviction, it will not be something that goes deep with him. This is what the distinction between "what is merely subjective" and what is not amounts to here. I did not say "objective", for this is a dangerous word to use in this connection. It separates the object of the reaction from the sense it has for the subject in a way that is foreign to our conception of what it means to make a moral judgement. Certainly it is the moral values in which he believes which give the object of this reaction its sense, and these in turn exist independently of him. On the other hand, unless he makes them his own, so that they speak through him when he speaks for himself, this object will stand devoid of the sense he sees in it. Indeed, in such a case, the reaction is either not genuine or it is not what it purports to be. The term "objective" thus leaves the subject out of the moral beliefs he holds and makes their object into something that stands outside his life.

He goes on to say:
[A theorist is] right, then, [to want] to emphasize the independent reality of the aspect under which we see the object of our moral reactions, but suggests the wrong account of it in making "objectivity" a requirement of this independence. The reality of this aspect, the good or evil to which the subject responds, is to be found in the significance it has in the life he shares with others, in the practices that have grown around it, in the language in which it is given expression, and in the art and literature in which it is brought into focus and reflected on. This is what gives the aspect a reality independent of those who affirm it in their individual lives. (I. Dilman, 1990, pp. 195-196).

While Frankfurt believes that:

...the inability to forbear is not a simple matter of deficient capacity on the part of the agent...[but also] resemble[s] [being] driven by irresistible passion or the like - in that the agent experiences himself as having no choice but to accede to the force by which he is constrained even if he thinks it might be better not to do so.

One loses, Frankfurt thinks, 'the will' to forbear; one is prevented 'making use of [ones'] own capacities', and even if he could do differently a man cannot 'bring himself to overcome that force.' (H. Frankfurt, 1988, p. 86).

104 Frankfurt also has a comment to make on this putative affair:

Especially with respect to those we love and with respect to our ideals, we are liable to be bound by necessities which have less to do with our adherence to the principles of morality than with integrity or consistency of a more personal kind. These necessities
constrain us from betraying the things we care about most and with
which, accordingly, we are most closely identified. In a sense which
a strictly ethical analysis cannot make clear, what they keep us from
violating are not our duties or our obligations but ourselves.
(Ibid., p.91).

105 Subject, of course, to the proviso that there are selves without core moral
concerns.

106 As to this unquestioned and unreflected-on facet of our spontaneous moral and
loving reactions, a number of philosophers do make the point that the role in our
lives of things like, say, love and friendship may be breached by too much thought
on them (F.White, 1975; S.Hampshire, 1982, pp.147/8; J.L.Mackie, 1978, p.353;


109 In all the construals of that term which I put forward in section 5 of chapter 3.

110 'Sceptical', that is, with respect to the WPT line.

111 I should emphasize again here that it is not of the explicit and conscious
demands that another (in this case, one's friend) directs to oneself that I am talking.

112 I use the phrase 'deepest impulses of the self' in line with my considerations in
chapter 4 concerning what kinds of experience, and specifically demand experience,
a subject feels she can or cannot envisage removed from her experiential life. So a
'deep impulse' of the subject's self might be felt as being brought forth in
immediacy and/or it could be regarded as such by her on thinking on a possible self
shorn of this feature (in that latter respect, the way of finding out what is and is not
a deep impulse rests on a negative method: it is what the subject feels that she
cannot conceive of herself without).
NOTES TO APPENDIX

1 Scheler's main difference from Husserl consists in his belief that the essences of phenomena can be intuited directly (1973, pp.51, 65, 74). One commentator puts the matter this way:

...Scheler's phenomenology differs from Husserl's in being - at one level, anyway - an amateur's pursuit. Anybody can do it, and indeed everybody does, without training and without trying and without even knowing that they are doing it. Nothing is heard here of the painful processes whereby "essences" are supposedly to be wrung from phenomena. Schelerian values are simply intuited "eidetically" in a more or less distinctive fashion, by a process analogous to sense-perception, and one in which reason plays no part.

(P.Heath, 1975, p.165).

2 Husserl himself was reportedly not too keen on Scheler's rather individual use of phenomenological method and is said to have called the results which Scheler came up with 'fool's gold' (H.Spiegelberg, 1976, p.236).

3 M.Scheler, 1973, p.13/14, 35,


5 M.Scheler, 1973, pp.87/8 and 90-100.


7 Scheler, 1973, pp.13, 46, 186, 244.

8 Ibid., p.261.


10 Scheler, 1973, p.244 (and see p.249). This assertion is discussed well by M.E.Clarke, 1932, pp.422/3 and by A.Schutz, 1958b, pp.487 & 490/1.


12 Ibid., p.142ff.

14 Spiegelberg, ibid., p. 236, cites Moritz Geiger's worry, on Scheler's joining the phenomenological circle at Munich, that Scheler, while acknowledged as a potent phenomenologist, tended to produce results that were 'seized without proper examination.'

15 This matter is brought out by Spiegelberg, ibid., pp. 252/3 and by I. Moosa, 1991.

16 See M. S. Frings, 1965, p. 112.

17 M. Scheler, op cit., pp. 186, 192, 214, 232-238.

18 He puts the matter in these words:

...the ought is not abstracted from a factual being or happening, say, from a feeling in inner perception or a consciousness of "necessity"; it is an autonomous mode of the givenness of contents that do not have to be comprehended first in the modes of the givenness of extant being in order to be comprehended as something that ought to be or ought to be done...[V]alues do not consist in an ought-to-be, as a kind of false subjectivism maintains. Values are not "necessitations" exercised by a so-called transcendental ego or subject on an empirical ego; neither are they "voices", "calls", or "demands" which are addressed to "empirical man" from outside. Such hypotheses are constructed interpretations of simple matters of fact which favour a questionable metaphysics. Rather, all norms, imperatives, demands, etc. - if they are not to be understood as arbitrary orders - have their foundation in an autonomous being, the being of values.

(Ibid., pp. 186/7).

19 One commentator on Hartmann calls the 'crux' of his system the claim that, in value experience, 'it is the apprehension of something which is and remains

20 He points out that 'higher' values (such as the demands of universal justice) are often experienced as more strongly impinging on one than 'lower' ones (such as the demand to refrain from stealing in a particular instance), 1932, Vol.II, p.52. There is, he believes, a difference in phenomenological strength of experience between breaking a moral value and upholding one ('Evidence of strength is found in the seriousness of offence against a value, while height is known by the meritoriousness of fulfillment', ibid., Vol.II, p.451, and cf. my descriptions of the strength of demand experience in my chapters 4 and 5).

21 This is a matter discussed by Spiegelberg in his historical survey of the phenomenological school (1976, pp.358/9.

22 'Appraisement of value precedes experience,' he says (N.Hartmann, 1932, Vol.I, p.187; see also pp.104 and 170).

23 Ibid., pp.176/7.

24 Ibid., p.88.

25 Ibid., p.88.

26 Ibid., p.93. And cf. A.Meinong, 1972, secs. 4 and 5.

27 Hartmann, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.184/5 ('Values emanate neither from the things (or real relationships) nor from the percipients,' p.185).


33 H.Spiegelberg complains that Hartmann's work is often unreliable as a piece of phenomenology and that it is uncertain at times when he is actually making
phenomenologically based claims (H. Spiegelberg, 1976, pp. 358/9; 379; 385; 387/8). A similar fear about the basis of Hartmann's 'results' is also expressed by J.N. Findlay, 1970, p. 68.

34 He argues that Hartmann suffers from a tendency to present the 'ready-made results', the 'frozen products' of his investigations, which have the 'finality...of dogmatic pronouncements' (1976, p. 389).

35 R. Hazelton, 1939, p. 630.


37 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 257. Hartmann sees the human subject as bridging the ideal sphere and the actual:

He is in metaphysical connection with the world of values, he senses their ideal self-existence. And he possesses spontaneous self-activity, the capacity to direct events. The subject is the only real entity in which the positive Ought-To-Be can be transformed into a real tendency.


38 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 266.

39 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 82.

40 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 272 & 302ff. ('Single valuational materials are capable of being described, the consciousness of them can be defined in its actional character (sometimes specifically), but the valuational essence as such, which is behind, remains floating in a certain incomprehensibility.' Ibid., Vol. I, p. 272).

41 Hence his contention that, '...behind moral conflict...there always stands the opposition of value in some form...' (Ibid., Vol. II, p. 47).

42 See, for example, A.-T. Tymieniecka, 1986a, p. 40 and D. Laskey, 1986, p. 323.
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