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Towards a Bourdieusian Analysis of the Disabled Body and Practice: Embodying Negative Symbolic Capitals and the Uneasy Experience of Hysteresis

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Abstract

Within the last few years, disabled people have become the target of government austerity measures through drastic cuts to welfare justified through the portrayal of benefit claimants as inactive, problem citizens who are wilfully unemployed. For all that is wrong with these cuts, they are one of many aspects of exclusion that disabled people face. Attitudes towards disability are deteriorating (Scope, 2011) and disabled people are devalued and negatively positioned in a myriad of ways, meaning that an understanding of the perceptions and positioning of disability and the power of disabling practices is critical. This thesis will examine how Bourdieu’s theoretical repertoire may be applied to the area of Disability Studies in order to discern how society produces oppressive and exclusionary systems of classification which structures the social position and perceptions of disability. The composite nature of disability and multiple forms of exclusion and inequality associated with it benefits from a multipronged approach which acknowledges personal, embodied and psychological aspects of disability alongside socio-political and cultural conceptualisations. Bourdieu’s approach is one in which the micro and macro aspects of social life are brought together through their meso interplay and provides a thorough analysis of the many aspects of disability.
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Above all, the utmost praise must go to my partner Chris who has given me a writing-up haven for the last 12 months. Thank you for your humbling forbearance and your absolute support and also for knowing when to bring me a vino.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature

Printed name        HILARY JANE STEWART
Introduction

This thesis will examine how Bourdieu’s theoretical repertoire may be applied to the area of Disability Studies in order to discern how society produces oppressive and exclusionary systems of classification which structure the social position and perceptions of disability. This thesis takes British neo-liberal society as the context for this work as a result of the ongoing assault against disability benefits as part of wider reform of the welfare state which was the focus of my Masters research. During this degree I came across Disability Studies as a result of my employment as a student support worker and the emails that were sent out from the disability service centre warning of the looming cuts to welfare. This quickly became the focus of my research project in which I explored how welfare reform was impacting upon disabled peoples’ sense of self, identity and citizenship. The research examined the problematic status of the non-working identity and how this status was resisted through narrative constructions which drew upon employment experiences as a positive identity-forming principle. However, although participants had been partly able to construct positive citizen identities, considerations of the cuts to welfare, media representation of disability benefit claimants and political rhetoric were seen to destabilise these.

Many of my participants reported feeling that their legitimacy as a disabled person was questioned and that they were often met with speculation about the authenticity of their impairment. As a result, many participants expressed their concern about the precariousness of welfare entitlement and the perceptions of their access to such benefits as well as questioning others’ and their own deservingness. Although the welfare rhetoric was undoubtedly causing distress to all participants, everyone reported on negative experiences they encountered as the result of widespread poor understanding and negative attitudes towards disability. In my interviews, I found that participants were engaged in a lot of work against negative value associated with disability as non-workers, as dependent, as benefit claimants and against the problems of invisible illness/disability and blue badge fraud.
My own interest in Bourdieu seems to fall in line with many others that use him (Abrahams and Ingram, 2013; Morrin, 2015), namely that his work helped to explain a lot of my own past experiences, specifically, my uneasy move from a “bad” high school in a poor area to a “posh” Catholic grammar school in an affluent area of Aberdeen. However, I always felt that his logic of practice assumed too much fit and was deeply reflective of the ease of practices of people with the right kind of capitals. Although I understood his work to explain social reproduction, I always wondered why he didn’t pay more attention to the embodied experiences of mismatch and unease for those of us with the wrong sorts of capitals and the consequences that these capitals have for our habitus. What about different bodies and bodies that don’t fit and what do those experiences of misfit do to our psyche? At the time of my Masters research I had wanted to use Bourdieu to unpack my data because of his focus on the body as a bearer of value and embodied power. However I felt there were too many aspects of his theory that I was not familiar enough with and which needed careful revision and development before being applied to disability and this was outside the scope of my dissertation. Much of what I had read of Bourdieu portrayed the body in highly mechanistic and reproductive ways, overstating the correspondence between bodies and social position and assuming too much bodily order. This thesis has allowed me to work through many of my quibbles with Bourdieu.

Many of Bourdieu’s defenders argue that his work remains widely misunderstood, (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Steinmetz, 2011; Swartz, 2013). There is a tendency for his work to be read in bits and pieces, but that is because his work is so vast that it is hard to find an account in which he brings all of it together. It might be argued that this is owed to “his recursive and spiralling mode of thinking [which] unfolds over time and across analytic spaces” (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 6). As well as this, Wacquant (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) has argued that there has been a tendency for people to artificially synchronise sections of Bourdieu’s work that represent very different stages of theoretical elaboration, and so people find contradictions which neglects that Bourdieu’s work was very much a work in progress. As a result, his admirers argue that he remains
partially absorbed and people misunderstand the “overall economy and internal logic” of his work (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 4). Indeed, the Anglophone world appears to have treated Bourdieu largely as a theorist of class, culture and education (Swartz, 2013) which may be one of the reasons that his potential application to disability studies is less than apparent. I confess to being a Bourdieu admirer and would argue that the strength of Bourdieu’s work surely lies in his theorising of symbolic power and its embodied logic (Swartz, 2013; Wacquant, 1993). Diane Reay (2004) has noted the tendency for people to overuse Bourdieu without thoroughly understanding his work and that it is fashionable to lay his concepts on top of research without properly dissecting their applicability. She therefore argues, citing Hey (2003), that his concept of the habitus has come to be used as an “intellectual hairspray” in order to bestow “gravitas without doing any theoretical work” (Reay, 2004: 432). Similarly, James (2015: 109) has suggested that Bourdieu is often superficially employed, especially within education research, and that there is “no such thing as a convincing ‘light’ adoption of Bourdieusian tools”. This thesis is therefore a prolegomenous attempt to properly theorise and analyse the utility of some of Bourdieu’s main ideas and their application to the field of disability.

This thesis will contend with some of the major criticisms of Bourdieu as too reproductive and determinist and suggest that these are narrow interpretations of his work. Bourdieu (1984: xii) himself advocated that his readers should work to mend his errors and that given the specificity of his research context we should look for the equivalents that occur in different social spaces. My approach when using his tools may therefore appear to be more flexible than Bourdieu was credited with and I attempt to elaborate some of his concepts where they appear under-developed. This thesis will also consider some of the perceived weaknesses within disability studies through bringing disability into discussion with Bourdieu’s work. I suggest that where the social model may be too materialist and critical disability studies (CDS) may be too discursive, or that the models of disability variously lack embodied, political, psycho-social and cultural perspectives, Bourdieu’s conceptual framework allows an analysis which incorporates these elements
as entwined with one another and helps to explain the multifaceted exclusion that disabled people face.

Chapter One will examine the current construction of the disabled figure within British neo-liberal society and the continued exclusion of disabled people from mainstream conceptualisations of citizenship. Within this chapter I will examine the development of liberalism and the welfare state, demonstrating that the social contract between disabled people and the state has always been profoundly uneasy but which has arguably been intensified in a neo-liberal age of austerity.

Chapter Two will foreground some of the main approaches to disability within disability studies, highlighting that the social model has focussed too heavily on materialist accounts of oppression at the expense of embodiment, and that although Critical disability studies has sought to address the deficiencies of the social model through a critique of the ideological construction of disability and subjectivities, their work on unsettling and performatively ruffling ideas about disability neglects the nature of embodied symbolic power. The chapter will then proceed to an account of Bourdieu’s main theoretical tools, namely, the habitus and its corollary bodily hexis to open up a discussion of embodied dispositions as a means of inclusionary/exclusionary practices. Here I will cover some of Bourdieu’s main criticisms as overly deterministic and reproductive before demonstrating how some of his thinking on the body is under-theorised or overstated. I will also show that some of Bourdieu’s thinking on practice draws from a perspective of the body as unaffected by illness and impairment and therefore exaggerates the ease and fit between bodies and social space.

Chapter Three will develop Bourdieu’s thinking on inclusion and exclusion by examining his work on symbolic power through an analysis of the symbolic system, doxa and symbolic capital. Here I will show how doxa maintains a social order reflective of non-disabled practices and which serves to imbue disability with negative symbolic capital. Significantly, I will demonstrate that Bourdieu’s under-theorised concept of negative symbolic capital
demonstrates the power invested in bodies and the psycho-social experience of embodying negative symbolic capital.

Building upon these psycho-social and affective issues, Chapter Four will focus on a reworking of the habitus to incorporate some of the more psycho-social and affective dimensions of practice. This chapter will argue that when we incorporate an understanding of the habitus with feelings (Reay, 2015), practice becomes less mechanistic. Here I will also suggest how agents’ habitus’ can become disempowered and depoliticised and the impact of social suffering on dispositions. The chapter will conclude by looking at some of the ways that disgust has been used to account for the negative positioning of disabled people before cautioning that we may attribute too much to disgust and that this risks overlooking many more processes involved in the conferral of negative status.

The final chapter will look at one of Bourdieu’s less known concepts, hysteresis in an attempt to remediate some of the accusations of determinism and reproductionism, demonstrating that the mismatches between habitus and social space provide opportunities for agents to engage in more critical and reflexive thought. Building upon my earlier analyses of doxa, I will suggest that those who regularly “come up against” doxic structures, organisation and attitudes or who have to reconcile the multiple meanings of disability may be afforded dispositions which question and critique the self-evidence of order and resist the status quo. However, these dispositions for critical thought may entail negative psychic costs.

The conclusion will then highlight the key argument of this thesis, that is, that to properly understand the societal position of disability in neo-liberal Britain we need the work of Bourdieu whilst a focus on disability also allows us to develop Bourdieu’s work, filling in some of the gaps in his approach and pushing his work forward when it seems under-developed.
Chapter 1
Disability in ‘Neo-liberal’ Britain. A ‘Classification Struggle’?

1.1 Introduction

What does it mean to be disabled in contemporary neo-liberal Britain? According to Roulstone (2011:3), we are witnessing a “concerted onslaught” against sick and disabled people through the aggressive attacks being made to welfare provision. At the time of writing, disability benefits in the UK are undergoing drastic restructuring as part of large-scale welfare reform and the disability category is being significantly narrowed and redrawn (Roulstone, 2015; Grover and Soldatic, 2013). The reclassification of disabled people under these reforms ostensibly seeks to discern the authentic disabled from the fraudulent, dividing individuals into the Poor Law binary of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, representing the latest remoralisation of the poor (Morris, 1994: 33) and tightening “disability citizenship regimes with diminishing citizenship entitlements” (Grover and Soldatic, 2013: 217).

The UN has recently announced it is to visit the UK to investigate whether the welfare reforms implemented by Iain Duncan Smith have caused “‘grave or systematic violations’ of disabled people’s human rights” (Fenton, 2015). This followed on from news published a few days prior which disclosed that between December 2011 and February 2014, 2,380 disabled people had died when they were deemed fit for work and their claim for Employment Support Allowance (ESA) was stopped following a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) used by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (Butler, 2015a; Stone, 2015a). Elsewhere, it has been reported that 590 disabled people have committed suicide whilst awaiting the outcome of their WCA and that 279,000 cases of mental ill health and 725,000 prescriptions for anti-depressants between 2010 and 2013 have been associated with the toughened WCA (Cooper, 2015; Ryan, 2015; Armstrong 2015). To add insult to injury, only a week before this news, the DWP had been forced to admit that they had created fictitious benefit claimants’ stories for leaflets which were to be distributed in order to show how benefit sanctions could have positive impacts (Rawlinson and Perraudin, 2015).
As if this was not enough, a few days later Iain Duncan Smith announced the case for further reform of the ESA through the use of Universal Credit (UC), a vision in which he foresees the ‘Fit for Work service’ “as the first line of defence when someone falls sick” (Smith, 2015). This coincided with the recent news that a group of law students at Bristol and Avon Law Centre have managed to overturn 95% of DWP decisions regarding claimants’ fitness for work and have won £1m in compensation (Stone, 2015b).

According to research carried out by Scope (2011), attitudes towards disabled people are deteriorating with 56% of disabled people revealing that they had experienced hostility, aggression or violence from a stranger based on their condition and over half reporting that they experienced discrimination on either a daily or weekly basis. Emerson and Roulstone (2014: 3095) have shown that disabled people are 2.3 times more likely to have been the victim of a violent crime and 2.6 times more likely to have been the victim of hate crime than their non-disabled peers. For Quarmby (2012; 2015), the pernicious stereotypes of disabled people as benefits scroungers which pervade the British media may account for the rise in disability hate crime. As Briant, Watson and Philo (2013) found in their analysis of newspaper articles reporting on disability, there has been a significant change in the way that disability is talked about. They note that there has been a decline in sympathetic coverage and an increase in use of pejorative words to describe disabled people and that the increased framing of disabled people in negative terms such as fraud, scrounger and undeserving points to the emergence of disabled people as a new ‘folk devil’ (Briant, Watson and Philo 2013: 887). In addition to all of this, welfare minister Lord Freud was recorded as saying that some disabled people are “not worth the full minimum wage”, suggesting that they could be paid as little as £2 an hour when questioned about how some employers might discriminate against employing a disabled person (Watt and Wintour, 2014). It is no wonder then that Hughes (2015: 992) states that disabled people “have been tipped into the abyss of counterfeit citizenship”.

This chapter will develop an understanding of how disability is dysfunctionally entwined in the social contract between citizen and state through an analysis of some of the recent reforms to disability benefits which have been taking place within the wider context of neo-liberalism. Through an analysis of the historical emergence of neo-liberalism this chapter will trace the associated policy, rhetoric and consequences for disabled people in order to develop a more complete picture of the meaning of disability within the broader, liberal UK setting. For Jensen and Tyler (2015), one of the major characteristics of welfare reform since the 1970s has been consensus that the welfare state has been in a permanent state of crisis in which toxic forms of welfare dependency has infected its citizens. By extension then, it has been argued that any major reform made to the modern welfare state has an automatic impact on conceptualisations of citizenship (Larkin, 2011). As Ong (2006: 499-500) has put forward, the “rights and entitlements once associated with all citizens are becoming linked to neoliberal criteria”.

This chapter will therefore examine the place of disability within modern British society through chronicling a development of liberalism and the emergence of neo-liberalism, the role of the citizen, and the importance of the ‘free possessive individual’ in these projects (Hall, 2011). In charting the development of liberalism in this way, this chapter will avoid treating neo-liberalism as a monolithic and over-generalised structure and instead, it is hoped, show how the current figure of disability has arrived through the many complex re-articulations of who the good citizen is within a neo-liberal state. This is achieved by focussing on the evolving ideas around citizenship, specifically, how disabled people have been precluded from full citizenship as a result of their “non-contributory” status. As such, I focus heavily on work-related disability policy and benefits due to the emphasis on employment as good citizen practice and the divisive issue of claiming state support whilst being perceived as non-contributory. This is not to dismiss the changes being made to other areas of disability policy as part of a broader neo-liberal agenda but to emphasise how ‘worker’ has become synonymous with legitimate citizen status.
The first section of this chapter will provide an analysis of the changing nature of citizenship with the introduction of the welfare state and how this has meant to provide for disabled people. Here, we will look at how Keynesian systems as well as neo-liberal systems conceive of the citizen as the able-bodied worker.

The chapter will then progress to a consideration of neo-liberalism, offering a conceptualisation of what is actually meant when we use the term neo-liberalism as well as its consequences at the level of the individual. The chapter will then discuss some of the more recent and arguably neo-liberal policies of recent governments, including New Labour’s New Deals, reform to Incapacity Benefit and Employment Support Allowance and the corresponding welfare rhetoric in order to consolidate an idea about the positioning of disabled people within contemporary neo-liberal Britain. This chapter will draw upon the work of numerous disability scholars as well as those writing more broadly around austerity measures and neo-liberal governance and policies to demonstrate the uneasy positioning of the disabled citizen. The chapter will then conclude by foregrounding how Bourdieu and his theoretical framework might be used to understand the inequalities faced by disabled people today.

1.2 Section One
1.2.1 Liberalism, Citizenship and Disability

This section of the chapter will demonstrate the problematic conciliation of disability and modern citizenship, highlighting the historical exclusion of disabled people from full citizen status and how the neo-liberal configuration of the citizen has intensified this incompatibility. Whilst it is acknowledged that forms of welfare provision and citizenship existed before the welfare state (and that these did not serve disabled people particularly well either), the focus of this chapter will be social citizenship in relation to the welfare state in consideration of its current precarity. According to Plant (2003), an understanding of citizenship and welfare provides an understanding of the terms on which individuals can become an integrated and participative
member of a modern society. For Hindess (1993: 19), citizenship is one of the central organising features of Western political discourse, and the ideas attached to it are so significant because of “the part they play in political rhetoric and political calculations of governments, non-governmental agencies and political and social movements”. The first part of this section will deal with a historical reflection on classical liberalism and the citizen before proceeding to an account of the welfare state. The chapter will then examine what we mean by neo-liberalism and the consequences of neo-liberal policies on conceptualisations of citizenship.

1.2.2 Classical Liberalism and Laissez-Faire

In seeking to explain what some scholars have called the neo-liberal turn, it is helpful to identify that neo-liberalism is the augmentation of a long liberal and Western history. With the failure of state socialism and the advancement of liberal capitalism on an international scale, it has been argued that liberalism, in its various forms, is now the global hegemony and its freedom-laden values, the only conceivable way forward in terms of social progress (Harrison and Boyd, 2003). However, due to the prevalence of liberalism as a Western ideology over the last 300 years, it has become a tricky paradigm to negotiate in terms of its once defining features making its historical development an important consideration in reaching a more nuanced conceptualisation of neo-liberalism.

In response to the sovereign control of the economy, liberalism sought to emancipate individuals from the manacles of mercantilism (Steger and Roy, 2010; Heywood, 2007). Advocating freedom and the natural rights of citizens alongside the principles of individual rationality, liberalism sought to establish a social order in which free markets managed by free men ensured a more democratic, progressive and prosperous society for all (Steger and Roy, 2010). In the classical liberal tradition, the citizen as an autonomous, independent and rationalised thinker was an integral part of the social contract in which the state played a minimal role, allowing for the maximisation of wealth through a pursuit of self-interest within the free market (Jones, 2012). According to Olssen (1996: 340), the citizen under
classical liberalism was thought of as *liberated* from the state and free to determine his own means on the basis of a “universal egoism” and the premise that what an individual identifies as beneficial for himself is also beneficial for society, reflecting the *invisible hand* theory of a self-regulating system. Minimal intervention from the state therefore enabled the laissez-faire economy and, on the supposition that state protection would foster idleness and perpetuate poverty, encouraged social Darwinist notions of struggle, competition and meritocracy (Amable, 2011). This Darwinian thinking of the time contributed to the feeling that the poor were a degenerate breed of humanity and potential burden to society whilst at the same time naturalised inequalities and added fuel to the fire of the eugenics movement (Morris, 1994). For Barnes (2012), the combination of laissez-faire liberalism, industrial change and increased medicalisation alongside social Darwinist and eugenicist beliefs contributed to and consolidated historical fears and prejudices against disabled people.

In this case we can identify how the classical liberal belief in a rationale of possessive individualism as an embedded part of our *human nature* provided the basis for political, social and economic policy (Crook, 1996; Kuper, 1996). This has been said to contribute to an understanding of liberalism, and its variants, through an observation of the relationship between individual and society but more specifically, man and the public sphere (O’Connor and Robinson, 2008). This arguably illustrates how the social order was reflective of economic order. Crucially, these assumptions worked upon a highly optimistic view of *human nature* and the belief in the enterprising citizen, promoting the notion that unfortunate social circumstance and poverty was attributable to the character of indolence rather than structural inequality, enabling the Spencerian principle of “survival of the fittest” to gain substantial political purchase (Heywood, 2007). These suppositions enabled classical liberalism to exclude *the Other* (women, non-whites and the poor) through the misrecognition of barriers in the private sphere as inherent deficiencies and legitimised the exercise of imperial rule (O’Connor and Robinson, 2008). These beliefs maintained their political foothold for much of the 19th century through the classical liberalist expositions that social
malaise as a by-product of poor economic times reflected the meddling and disruptive nature of the state (Steger and Roy, 2010). Crook (1996) has identified that, somewhat ironically, these Darwinist ideologies facilitated their own demise through inciting leftist opposition in the form of social reform. This liberal doctrine unravelled in light of the world wars, the 1930s depression and the apparent failure of self-regulation within the market (Amable, 2011), fostering a paradigm shift (within Britain) from that of individualist liberalism to collectivist (Vincent, 2003).

Prior to this shift, classical liberalism had nurtured a system in which the poor were left forsaken to the harsh and punitive domain of “less eligibility” Poor Laws and workhouses, doing little to provide care or support to vulnerable groups (Morris, 1994; Thane 2009). Indeed, the somewhat ambiguous contingency upon which support was administered relied on precarious constructions of deservingness (Stone, 1984). This was often said to subject recipients of care to feelings of stigma due to the nature of categorisation as one of defining (il)legitimate beggary and the conflation of idle vagrancy with disability and impairment (Stone, 1984). In some cases this mode of welfare inhibited the acceptance of social care and often perpetuated poverty, exclusion and poor health amongst these vulnerable groups (Thane, 2009). Social reform was thus envisaged to decriminalise and destigmatise “the badge of pauperism” (Fraser, 1984: 12).

Harvey (2005: 10) provides an account of the post-war consensus, that “the only way ahead was to construct the right blend of state, market, and democratic institutions to guarantee peace, inclusion, well-being, and stability”. To these ends, the role of the state was identifiably to concentrate upon full employment, promote growth and to ensure the welfare of its citizens through Keynesian principles so as to avoid the deplorable conditions of the 1930s depression and to reduce inter-state contentions which had contributed to the advent of war (Harvey, 2005). In principle, Turner (2010) argues that citizenship, as envisaged by T.H. Marshall was meant to mitigate the negative impact of capitalism. Marshall (1950) outlined three main components of citizenship. The civil component entailed
the rights for individual freedoms (such as the freedom of speech and the right to own property) whilst the political component signified the right to participate in the exercise of politics (such as voting). Marshall (1950) defined the social component of citizenship as “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, to the right to share in the full social heritage and to live the civilised life according to the standards prevailing in society” (Marshall, 1950: 10). For Marshall, the social element of citizenship was supposed to create a “common floor on which everybody stands”, entitlement to which was not reflective of an individual’s market value (Lister, 1990: 47). At the same time however, Marshall also emphasised the responsibility to work through his call for the public to put their “hearts into one’s job” (1949: 46 cited in Patrick, 2012: 7).

Writers on citizenship have noted then that the welfare state is the institutionalisation of the social rights of citizenship and that citizenship theory provides the moral justification for social security based on an idea about what it is to be a full member within society (Lister, 1990). Within the context of welfare provision these citizenship rights have, historically, been purported as collective aid which through Keynesian economics of redistribution, sought to protect individuals from unemployment and incapacity so as to promote equality and encourage the mobilisation of workforces hindered by unequal capitalist society (Isin and Turner, 2007). The state then played an active role within industrial policy and developed the social wage through systems of welfare in order to provide for its citizens. The new post-war liberalism that was emerging at this time preserved the classically liberal impetus of the individual and the market through collectivist strategies of social protection which created the conditions for their continued mutualism (O’Connor and Robinson, 2008).

The advance of the welfare state was said to have marked a change in attitude towards poverty and the social contingencies upon which poverty could be attributed and thus protected against by way of New Liberal social policy (Briggs, 1961). These social contingencies are perhaps most often conceived of through Beveridge’s 5 Giants of Idleness, Ignorance, Squalor,
Disability in ‘Neo-liberal’ Britain. A ‘Classification Struggle’?

Disease and Want which were to be tackled through a comprehensive system of social security which, unlike the Bismarck scheme of insurance payments, was largely tax-funded (Bosanquet, 2012). The substantial spending needed to implement this social security was met with fiscal criticism but was rebutted by William Beveridge himself who stated “it must be realised that nothing materially below the scales of benefit and pension suggested can be justified on scientific grounds as adequate for human subsistence” (cited in Bosanquet, 2012: 667). As such, the classical welfare state or what has been called the Golden Age of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990) was allegedly founded upon post-war humanitarian reflection, principled upon the notion of social rights, universality and solidarity to be achieved through institutionalised reforms (Cox, 1998; Turner, 2001). According to Cox (1998), the welfare state and increased social spending therefore had the potential to bring out the best in its citizens and improve social solidarity and a strong sense of national identity (Harvey, 2005). Brinkley (1998: 59) documents that the Keynesian economics behind this social spending was framed as a means of increasing investment and production through fusing “the welfare state to the larger vision of sustained economic growth by defining social security mechanisms as ways to distribute income and enhance purchasing power” and ultimately achieve full employment.

This mode of political-economic governance is now conceived of as embedded liberalism in which the market and business activities were administratively controlled by the state through a socio-political framework (Harvey, 2005). For Cox (1998) then, the welfare state in its former glory was an expression of social citizenship which firmly situated social rights alongside its civil and political counterparts within the new liberal political vision of the state. Replacing historical visions of laissez-faire social support and adapting the classic liberal ideal of rationalised and individualised self-interest, the classical welfare system was intended to endow individuals with citizenship through the provision of social rights. Citizenship, as entrenched within social policy, was therefore argued to offer individuals an idea of equality in treatment and in opportunity as well as a minimum standard of civilised living and subsequently provided members of society with autonomy.
through the enabling and supposedly meritocratic qualities of social rights (Rosaldo, 1994; Lister, 1998; Ellison, 2000). For O’Connor and Robinson (2008), the advent of welfare marked a shift in access to goods and services as no longer determined by class advantage but citizen status.

According to Ellison (1997: 699), Marshall’s conceptualisation of citizenship was one in which the state represented the “guarantor of social rights” under a “paternalistic, inclusive social order” and which acted as a socially cohesive force which ensured social security. However, whilst the post-war welfare state was celebrated and congratulated on its universal terms, Hampton (2013: 69) has highlighted that the classical welfare system paid little attention to the needs of the “general classes” of disabled people. Similarly, Mercer and Barnes (2004) document that the implementation of the welfare system, comprised of the NHS, more extensive education, social insurance schemes, family and child support as well as housing benefits sought to provide full employment to citizens. At first glance these provisions may seem to indicate the neutral and basic level of equality which welfare universalism was premised to bestow upon citizens. For Marshall, it was important that social protection was accompanied by “an emphasis on equality and public education, allowing even the working class to discover and enjoy the good life” (Cox, 1998: 4) However, whilst the welfare state was premised to provide education, health services and social security to all, it was most effectively utilised by the middle classes and was therefore conducive in perpetuating the already deeply embedded social inequalities (Borsay, 2005). Marshall conceded that this was a possibility and argued that “status differences can receive the stamp of legitimacy in terms of democratic citizenship provided they do not cut too deep” (1950: 75 cited in Morris, 1994: 46). For Ellison (2000), Marshallian citizenship therefore “obscured the fault-lines of difference in the name of an anodyne universalism”. It has therefore been suggested that the popularised Marshallian vision of citizenship was decidedly neglectful of the inherent political conflict and power struggles within society and as such, failed to identify that in authorising the state to promote citizenship as an inclusive and equalising force, essentially equipped the governing elite with a political
tool which disguised social divisions (Ellison, 1997). Essentially, the political-economic settlement measures were put in place to provide support to citizens so that they might become worker-citizens, but this support was designed around a specific and therefore exclusive citizen, i.e. the white, able-bodied male (Borsay 2005; Mercer and Barnes, 2004).

The political-economic welfare settlement had therefore consolidated an upshot social settlement in which social life was anticipated through a lens which depicted, as the norm, a household overseen and provided for by the breadwinning male (Mercer and Barnes, 2004). As such, married women, children, the elderly and those with impairments became classified as dependant which, in the case of those considered “handicapped”, emphasised and reinforced the idea that they required care and tending to; these “special needs” were often evoked as a justification for the external management over individuals’ lives (Mercer and Barnes, 2004). As many benefits were distributed on the basis of previous earning capacity, those individuals classified as economically inactive were accorded second class statuses and entitled to third-rate benefits (Powell, 2002). Coupled with the organisational welfare settlement in which the bureaucratisation and professionalization of services fostered the idea of neutral and rational systems of support, the vulnerable dependency of disabled people was reiterated whilst concurrently enforcing the idea that there were experts (in particular, within the NHS, but also within the field of education) who were rightly authorised with control over these lives (Mercer and Barnes, 2004).

1.2.3 Disability in the Gilded ‘Golden Age of Welfare’

Mercer and Barnes (2004) highlight the implementation of the Disabled Persons Employment Act (1944) as one of the plaintive responses to the increased numbers of disabled people returning home from war and the relative shortage in labour at the time (Oliver, 1989). Previous attempts had been made to re-engage injured soldiers with work during the inter-war years through the King’s National Roll Scheme, an “honourable obligation” to ensure that 5% of employees in companies with over 10 workers comprised disabled servicemen and which would be rewarded with the King’s Seal
(Kowalsky, 2007; Gladstone, 1985). However, Members of Parliament (MPs) while positive about the idea were reluctant to legislate, believing that no incentive was required to hire ex-servicemen or, in keeping with the thoughts of Minister of Labour John Hodge, opined that the scheme was indicative of an overbearing state (Kowalsky, 2007). Furthermore, Kowalsky (2007: 570) has documented how medical and technical advances enabled the prosthetic limbs industry to proclaim that injured workmen would soon be able to resume normal lives and jobs which concurrently led MPs to assert that “total disablement ceased to exist”. As a result, the scheme remained a voluntary enterprise with a steadily dwindling patronage until the 1940s, at which time the Tomlinson Committee Report sought to rectify this through the implementation of the mandatory quota strategy through the 1944 Act (Gladstone, 1985)1.

According to Borsay (2005), the thrust of political debate surrounding the welfare state was the emerging synonymy of worker and citizen. Bolderson (1980: 170) states that the Disabled Persons Employment Act was designed to provide employment to the “substantially handicapped” as a matter of civic entitlement and was enforced through use of a voluntary register in conjunction with sheltered employment schemes, skills-rehabilitation programmes (Employment Rehabilitation Centres, RAC) and the quota which obliged businesses with more than 20 employees to apportion at least 3% of the workforce from those accredited disabled (Hyde, 1996; Barnes, 1992). The Act also sought to apply positive discrimination within work through the designation of some occupations as exclusively reserved for the disabled,

1 Attempts to integrate disabled people have also been documented through an account of Thermega, the “industrial experiment” which, as a sheltered workplace located within hospital grounds, purported to provide employment for disabled people regardless of the severity of impairment through rehabilitative and curative measures (Danieli and Wheeler, 2006: 488). Thermega advertised themselves as a method of bolstering self-confidence whilst paving the way for disabled people into open employment. However, Danieli and Wheeler (2006) have noted that in practice, Thermega selected only the least severely impaired workers for training whilst relegating those deemed too inefficient to institutional care within the hospital, a consideration that certainly taints the assertion that Thermega was establishing a foothold within industry for disabled people. They do however credit Thermega on its location within hospital grounds stating that it went some way in removing social barriers through the proximity of living and working adjacent to appropriate medical care, a situation which they liken to the reasonable adjustments of the Disability Discrimination Act. Conversely, it might be argued that this more closely resembles Total Institutionalisation (Goffman, 1961).
namely elevator and car park attendant positions (Thornton and Lunt, 1995). The Act garnered epochal recognition as a humanitarian companion to the emerging welfare system, and during its discussion within the House of Commons was heralded as “the dawn of a new day”, leading one MP to assert that disabled people would “be able, with dignity and without their feelings being impaired by the taint of charity, to turn to the law for the full satisfaction of their rights” (Gladstone, 1985: 103).

The application of quota schemes in employment have commonsensically been perceived as encouraging means of positive discrimination through which under-represented members of society become an appointed part of the workforce, ostensibly reflecting that a “fair share” of disabled individuals are “economically active” (Thornton and Lunt, 1995). However, this system has relied upon precarious definitions of “disabled person” and “economically active” (Thornton and Lunt, 1995). It is important to acknowledge that during the time of these post-war adjustments and changes, disability was definitively situated as a medically sanctioned and individual limitation (Oliver, 1989). Moreover, Barnes (1992) has indicated that these employment adaptations were principally concerned with assisting individuals who had “recently acquired physical impairment” such as those wounded in war and therefore disregarded the needs of individuals with congenital impairments, the learning disabled or those with mental health issues.

Bolderson (1980) has documented that in response to the development of disability-related policy and the quota scheme, employers challenged the government, arguing that there were three categories of disabled people to be considered; those injured in war or through industrial accidents; those normally capable of work but who had not been injured as a result of it; and “others” - that is to say, those with congenital impairments and who had no basis in employment. This last group, known as the general class of disabled, was reasoned as outside the scope of responsibility of employers based on a belief that it would cause the workplace to become ‘overrun’ with disabled and inefficient workers, a claim which the government quashed through elucidating that those not considered efficient enough would be provided for
in sheltered work (Bolderson, 1980; Hampton, 2013). Borsay (2005) has highlighted that on these terms, disabled people were expected to gain and maintain their employment based on their own merit whilst competing in the able-bodied workspace, effectively polarising workers as efficient/inefficient. The general class of disabled people lacked the political visibility and representation accorded to ex-servicemen and the industrially injured and as such, “the provision of services was more a case of continuity than change” when compared to those under the Poor Law (Hampton, 2013: 76).

Barnes (1992) identified that the categorisation of disabled individuals as unfit to compete in open employment was historically decided by Disablement Resettlement Officers, a role for which there was no training, leading to decisions being made purely on the basis of their own experience and opinion of disability and with no consideration for the fluctuating nature of impairment. Acknowledging then that industry rejected responsibility for a particular group of disabled people alongside its expectation of those in work to self-manage clearly reinforces the belief that impairment was a private and individual matter. Moreover, this sub-classification of disabled people as either efficient or inefficient seems to interpolate a deeper level difference; that there are those who became disabled through what might be seen as honourable activity (war or labour) and who are therefore worthy of social and economic investment as a matter of rejoining normal life; and there are those who have always been disabled or inherently deficient and therefore relegated as a matter of perceived abnormality. As Kitchin (1998) has noted, through attributing disability to the individual through medicalisation or through narratives of fate, society is able to justify its ableist actions. According to Borsay (2005), the quota persisted undisputed with the Piercy Committee (1956) observing that the main objective of the quota had been a sort of campaign for public awareness between industry and its workers, effectively replacing compliance as a matter of compulsion with persuasion, resulting in large evasion with little prosecution. It might be suggested then that Marshall’s (1950) vision that social citizenship would grant full social
inclusion for all falls somewhat by the wayside when it comes to disabled citizens (Morris, 1994).

1.2.4 What then, of the ‘general classes’?

Those prevented from entering open employment were moved into segregated and sheltered workspaces. Conventionally, the introduction of segregated and sheltered workspaces was endorsed as a benevolent and philanthropic enterprise which catered for the extra needs of disabled people as a result of their functional limitations and was promoted as a potential “bridging experience” into mainstream employment (Barnes, 1991: 71; Hyde, 1996). However, it has been argued that sheltered and segregated workspaces incurred as many problems as they solved and worked upon largely negative assumptions about the productive potential of disabled people (Barnes and Mercer, 2005; Hyde, 1996). In the first instance, these workshops intensified the divide between disabled and non-disabled workers and therefore could be argued as contributing to the social exclusion experienced by disabled people (Goss et al, 2000; Barnes, 1991). Individuals placed within sheltered workspaces were not only physically separated from the rest of the working population in what have been described as “containment measures”, but were also employed in lower-skilled and manual labour whilst being paid less than their able-bodied counterparts, demonstrating the assumption that disabled people are less skilled, less productive and worth less (Thornton and Lunt, 1994: 233; Goss et al, 2000). This is further compounded when considering that sheltered workshops were regarded “a charitable concern rather than a commercial enterprise”, seemingly reinforcing that disabled people are economically unviable and as such, the skills and experience gained within sheltered employment were not substantial enough to be considered transferrable into mainstream employment (Barnes, 1991). As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the sentiment that disabled employees are less productive and should therefore be paid less than their non-disabled peers was echoed by Lord Freud some seventy years later. Even when efforts were made to integrate disabled people into mainstream employment through Employment Rehabilitation
Centres, retraining was directed only at people who had acquired impairment and who were thus expected to achieve “full recovery to physical fitness” through curative means, thereby locating the problem as medical once again (Barnes, 1991). What is more, individuals were only retrained in low-skilled occupations, further reinforcing an idea about what kind of work disabled people were suited to (Barnes, 1991; Borsay, 2005). This raises some questions with regard to how people may be classified as *economically active* without any real consideration being given to the quality of employment they are engaged in. Barnes (1992) has noted that employment is considered emblematic of *adulthood*; not only does it provide financial independence and status, it is considered an identity-forming principle which grants self-esteem, develops our social capital, skills and *creativity*, whilst giving people a distinct sense of purpose, responsibility and control (Lindsay, 2011; Andersen, 2002). To relegate disabled people to the lowest skilled and most menial work then is to *barely* recognise their status as an equal adult citizen. Bacchi and Beasley (2002: 328) have argued that to be perceived as *in control* of your body is to be considered a full, autonomous citizen whilst those who are *controlled* by their bodies are regarded as lesser citizens who must be regulated. This demarcation serves to promote a further division between citizenship as a public activity and the body as “quintessentially private”, a tension which is encapsulated in the discussion around active and passive citizenship; “the active citizen acts in public, and these actions are deliberative (i.e. rational), separate from the (dangerous) pulls of emotion and bodily ties” (Bacchi and Beasley, 2002).

As such, although the Act sought to change the way that disabled people were seen and the emphasis that was placed upon rehabilitation signified the importance of turning disabled people into taxpayers (Anderson, 2003), it did little in terms of integrating them into meaningful paid employment and civic life. Whilst the implementation of the quota may have represented positive discrimination, it was not statutorily enforced and was challenged on the grounds that some disabled people had no basis in employment (Bolderson, 1980). Sheltered employment as a response to meeting the perceived extra and special needs of disabled people can be identified as contributing to the
consolidation of the perceived deficiencies by producing exclusionary spaces (Kitchin, 1999). As such, we might identify that citizenship was therefore expected to be achieved through employment status and not through other means of inclusion such as a right to family life or relationships, demonstrating how work was assumed to lead to inclusion. According to Kitchin (1999), the creation of such spaces serves to remind disabled people that they are in or out of place by enforcing the idea that they are the deviant Other and different from everyone else. Kitchin (1999: 346) elaborates that the socio-spatial organisation of work encourages disabled people to “believe the logic of the oppression” and teaches individuals “self-blame, self-shame and self-doubt”. In light of these considerations, the belief that the Disabled Persons Employment Act neutralised the taint of stigma or charity and enabled individuals to seize their right to employment as was envisaged in the House of Commons was unduly optimistic, if not naive, with no consideration given to the importance of meaningful employment. As we shall go on to see, whilst employment department names may have changed and new organisations are charged with heading the employment services, the policy set in the 1940s survived largely unchanged (Borsay, 2005).

Although employment was desired as the principal means of welfare for disabled people because it curbed the social expense associated with non-workers and fulfilled civic criterions of self-sufficiency and independence (Hampton, 2013), Borsay (2005) has documented that for those marginalised from the workforce, financial want was targeted through the National Insurance Act (1946) and later, the National Assistance Act (1948). However, as many disabled people had no basis in employment, provision through contribution based insurance payments was inapplicable, causing individuals to rely upon an “economy of makeshifts” (Borsay, 2005: 140). With no disability-based welfare payments and little in the way of support for the severely disabled, many were left living in isolated poverty or else kept in residential homes (Barnes, 2012). According to Barnes and Mercer (2010), the 1948 National Assistance Act dissolved the antecedent Poor Law system and entrusted local authorities with the responsibility for provision of residential accommodation for disabled people considered vulnerable and in need whilst
simultaneously allowing such provision to be delegated to the voluntary sector, increasing the prominence of charities within disabled peoples’ lives. This is not so distant to the vision of David Cameron nearly sixty years later in which disability is evoked through the discourse of charity “as the Big Society advocates a shift back from rights guaranteed by the state, to a model of philanthropy” (Slater, 2015: 8; Runswick-Cole and Goodley, 2011).

The Act also purported to enhance the lives of disabled people through welfare services that would, allegedly, provide more opportunities for inclusion, improve self-esteem, broaden social capital and enable individuals to realise their potential (Barnes and Mercer, 2010). These claims enabled the institutions involved to state that whereas residential care may have once resembled prison-like hospitals, they were now more appropriately conceived of as hotels, and the residents, as guests (Barnes and Mercer, 2010). However, for those individuals residing in these care institutions, their experience has been likened to “batch living” whereby groups of individuals were enswathed as a homogenous, passive mass subject to the authority of care-home managers’ routines and regimes (Barnes and Mercer, 2010; Goffman, 1961: 11). These conditions in which residents underwent a process of “mortification”, the expropriation of previous social identity and role supplanted with that of inmate, lead to the entirety of people’s lives, their experience of “work, recreation and sleep” taking place under the one roof of the total institution (Goffman, 1961: 23). Segregated from family and community, residents were created as dependent due to the incorrect belief that they could not be charged with making decisions for themselves, a pervasive notion which challenged the extent to which they could meet the responsibilities of citizenship (Barnes, 1991; Oliver, 1989). Whilst Borsay (2005) notes that Beveridge recognised disability as a “primary cause of need”, the way in which welfare was distributed precluded meaningful integration within employment or adequate assistance through benefits, unsurprisingly given that Beveridge saw “the danger of providing benefits which are both adequate in amount and indefinite in duration, is that men as creatures who adapt themselves to circumstances, may settle down to them” (Beveridge, cited in Leaper, 1991). Having reflected on the early
development of the welfare state and its failure to include disabled people as full citizens, the chapter will now turn to the emergence of neo-liberalism and its shaping of social security and notions of citizenship.

1.2.5 Defining Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalism has become a sort of academic catchphrase (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009). The term neo-liberalism as it is often employed throughout social studies has proven to be a somewhat problematic and elusive concept, often obscured by struggling political, social and economic expressions in modern society (Mudge, 2008). Neo-liberalism is variously referred to as an intellectual and political movement, an economic and political policy paradigm, a doctrine, a thought collective, a form of governance and an ideology to name but a few formulations, making it a tricky concept to define (Davies, 2014).

Neo-liberalism has often been evoked to account for a range of social practices and processes, from the advocacy of free-market trade to techniques of public management, resulting in an incoherent conceptualisation which dilutes its potency as an abstraction for critique (Dean, 2012). Brown (2003) has indicated that the term neo-liberal takes on a pejorative and therefore ethereal quality within contemporary society owed to its perceived role in deepening poverty and inequality, precluding politicians and economists alike from self-identifying with this discourse and causing for some social theorists to argue that neo-liberalism remains a misnomer used by leftist radicals in foregrounding undesirable situations contained within their opposition (Birch and Tickell, 2010). Furthermore, the term neo-liberalism is used asymmetrically across ideological divides, employed frequently by those who are critical of free markets, but rarely assumed by those who view marketization more positively, partly because it is seen to signify “a radical form of market fundamentalism with which no one wants to be associated” (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 138). This has particularly been the case with authors such as Bourdieu and Chomsky who describe neo-liberalism pejoratively as the “lamentable spread of global capitalism and consumerism, as well as the deplorable demolition of the
proactive welfare state” (Thorsen and Lie, 2006). Moreover, the critical literature on neo-liberalism accords it an overwhelming significance whilst often leaving it undefined so that is has been easy for some to suggest that neo-liberalism is a concept used as a “generic term of deprecation describing almost any economic and political development deemed to be undesirable” (Thorsen and Lie, 2006: 9).

What perhaps makes this pejorative use of the term even more striking is that in its inception within the Freiburg school neo-liberalism was used to “to denote a philosophy that was explicitly moderate in comparison to classical liberalism, both in its rejection of laissez-faire policies and its emphasis on humanistic values” (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009). Although some may identify this as ‘ordo-liberalism’ Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) go on to say that within the Freiburg school the terms were used interchangeably although the use of ‘neo’ in neo-liberalism was seen as a positive qualifier when compared with the “paleo-liberals” who clung to traditional forms of liberalism. They expand that it was only once neo-liberalism had migrated to Latin America and was used in radical economic reform under Pinochet that it acquired its negative connotations.

Whilst acknowledging the deprecatory use of the term is an important consideration, to renounce neo-liberalism as a concept because of the unintended or inadvertent negative consequences it entails is to dismiss the political rationality that extends beyond the anticipation of the market (Brown, 2003). As Hall (2011: 706) has argued, although ‘neo-liberalism’ is an unsatisfactory term because it is reductive and neglects “internal complexities and geo-historical specificity”, there are enough common features to merit a “provisional conceptual identity” so that in naming neo-liberalism we are able to politically resist it.

According to Dean (2012: 2) neo-liberalism is, empirically speaking, “a militant movement that draws its strength and gains its frontal character from that which it opposes...Keynesian macroeconomic management and the

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2 Moreover, writers such as Hayek and Friedman had initially adopted the term neo-liberal to signify a break with classical liberalism, but subsequently dropped it (Stedman-Jones, 2014).
welfare state”. In response to the perceived failings of embedded/new liberalism, political debate became polarised with the left advocating the need for more stringent control and regulation whilst the right sought to restore the freedom of the market and business (Gamble, 2001; Harvey, 2005). Whereas embedded liberalism had sought to regulate the market through the social and political control exercised by the state, neo-liberalism sought to disembed capital from this administrative cage (Harvey, 2005).

Neo-liberalism has been recognised as a historical transformation inspired by Friedman’s monetarism, burgeoning forth from the late 1970s under, primarily, the Thatcher and Reagan governments and which rapidly, if unevenly, became the global hegemony (Harvey, 2005). In contrast to the Keynesian provision of a safety net, neo-liberalism abandoned the duty for democratic protection and instead promoted “mechanisms of debt” and cheap credit to sustain society (Harvie and Keir, 2010). What became apparent in light of the right’s success was that this revival of free-market economics signalled the return of power to a small number of elites (Harvey, 2005). Whilst Hayek’s (1960) The Constitution of Liberty had emerged in the 1960s as a critique of Keynesianism and as a call for the revival of economic/classical liberalism, it was originally, indeed primitively, dismissed as an ide(o)logical throwback by politicians and economists who identified state intervention as necessity within capitalist modernity (Gamble, 2001). According to Gamble (2001), no one could have anticipated the rise of neo-liberalism or the manner in which it hurtled forward. The speed with which neo-liberalism came to dominate political and economic arenas was undeniable, met with disbelief at the seemingly short-sighted economic policies being employed, but with no apparent alternative (Gamble, 2001; Steger and Roy, 2010). Hendrikse and Sidaway (2010) have documented this first wave of neo-liberalism as characterised by the promotion of austerity, monetarism and privatisation as central features of the rolled back state. Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) have explained that these economic adjustments were legitimated through the naturalisation of globalised relations as an economic order. Soon, neo-liberalism became “the dominant common sense, the paradigm shaping all policies” (Gamble, 2001: 129).
In this respect, Dean (2012) suggests that neo-liberalism might be considered a thought collective in which an organised group of individuals exchange ideas within a common intellectual framework, the commonality being the “desire to renovate free-market liberalism”. More recently, Dawson (2013) has typified the empirical nature of neo-liberal economies as those which increase marketization through privatisation, the proliferation and expansion of flexible markets and deregulation of business. Similarly, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) have noted various uses of the concept neo-liberalism as a response to Keynesianism. Firstly they identify its association with three kinds of economic reform policies that have come to typify neo-liberal political theory: those that liberate the market; those that reduce state control of the economy, namely through privatisation, and those that enforce austerity through budget cuts and reduced public expenditure. In the UK, Hall (2011) argues, the primary target of neo-liberalism has been the welfare state.

Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) then go on to advance neo-liberalism as an ideology which instructs us to think of ourselves as individuals and the concomitant roles that we must fill. Important in this consideration of neo-liberalism as an ideology is to acknowledge the role played by the economic and political configurations of neo-liberalism; that neo-liberalism may be manifested through reform policies and development strategies but that these are not phenomena distinct from each others’ formation, rather they are mutually constitutive and contribute to the neo-liberal ideology. Although neo-liberalism is not a single system and has many variants across different countries (Hall, 2011) it has become the hegemonic discourse, pervading so much of our thinking that it has “become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in and understand the world” (Harvey, 2005). As Bourdieu (1998a: 29) stated:

“Everywhere we hear it said, all day long - and this is what gives the dominant discourse its strength - that there is nothing to put forward in opposition to the neo-liberal view, that it has succeeded in presenting itself as self-evident, that there is no alternative”.
1.2.6 **Neo-liberalism at the level of the individual**

Having demonstrated some of the macro theorisations of neo-liberalism it is important to examine its effects at the level of individuals as Dawson (2013: 6) suggests “the strength of neoliberalism is its effect at the individual level: ‘Instability is meant to be normal, Schumpeter’s entrepreneur served up as an ideal Everyman’ (Sennett 1998:31)”. According to Harvey (2005), the success of neo-liberal theory was made possible through disseminating the message that our freedom had been jeopardised by collectivism through the restriction of private ownership and competitive markets. Thatcherism signalled the end of social solidarity through which dependency and idleness allegedly subsisted, replaced with the resuscitation of individualism, private ownership and responsibilisation of subjects; “Economics is the method; the object is to change the heart and soul” (Thatcher, 1981)\(^3\). According to Ignatieff (1989: 65) this perceived failing of the welfare state lay in the nurturing of a passive citizenship of equal entitlement which, as a measure of collectivism represented a “conspiracy against liberty” and individualism.

As we have already seen, the Beveridge Report clearly conveyed a commitment to citizenship as an *achievement* which is *earned* through contribution to the insurance-based benefits system, evidenced through the 1946 National Insurance Act, (Plant, 2003). Under this approach, the obligation was to work, which enabled the payment of insurance. Conversely, the National Assistance Act (1948) was to provide for those who could not contribute through employment and insurance and, for this reason, was means and *character*-tested (Plant, 2003). Moreover, Beveridge indicated that assistance afforded to individuals ought to be of a level which encouraged individuals to pursue employment and that schemes of assistance which distanced individuals from the pressures of “economic rewards and punishments while treating them as free citizens is inconsistent with the principles of a free community” (Beveridge, 1942: 11 cited in Plant, 2003). In light of this, we can identify how employment and insurance contributions

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\(^3\) While Reaganism in the US and Thatcherism in the UK are often identified as the first and most blatant manifestations of neo-liberalism it should be noted that similar market-orientated policies were implemented in a number of social democracies (Sweden, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) (Bell and Green, 2016).
became “the passport to citizen rights” whilst assistance schemes called into question the character of individuals observed as betraying social duty (Plant, 2003: 158). For Beveridge, the National Assistance Act was intended as a *transitional safety net* which would gradually become unnecessary (Atkinson et al., 1981). This neglected a specific problem with the security package, mainly, that through increased spending on public pensions, insurance benefit payments were significantly reduced and not sufficient enough to alleviate poverty, forcing individuals to turn to national assistance to supplement their benefits (Borsay, 2005). As a result, the numbers of people dependent upon national assistance steadily increased over the next twenty years, intensifying the prominence of benefits associated with citizenship as status and thereby blurring the important distinction between contributory and non-contributory benefits (Plant, 2003). Plant (2003) also notes that at this time, the Labour party stressed the beneficial opportunities for the whole of society which could be gained through investment in public services through general taxation. However, a strong emphasis upon work ethic and the stigma associated with means-testing needed to claim national assistance influenced many disabled people to forego their benefits, a problem that was not recognised until the “rediscovery of poverty” in Townsend’s *The Last Refuge* in which the welfare state was detailed to have failed the disabled and elderly (Hampton, 2013: 92; Borsay, 2005). Plant (2003) notes that in response to this associated stigma and the increased need for universality across benefits, the distinction between insurance and assistance was further blurred, with the replacement of *assistance* with the Supplementary Benefit and “pressure to reduce the reliance on means testing” (Borsay, 2005: 163). It could therefore be suggested that the emerging ambiguousness surrounding benefits and increased public spending at this time contributed to the belief in a citizenship conferred as status and leading to what Thatcher called “entitlement society” (Plant, 2003: 155). As Hall (2011: 707) suggests, neo-liberalism believed that the Keynesian welfare state’s “do-gooding, utopian sentimentality enervated the nation’s moral fibre, eroded personal responsibility and undermined the over-riding duty of the poor to work”. For Hall (2011) then, neo-liberalism is grounded in the idea of the “free, possessive individual”.
Clarke (2004: 31) notes that the collective identity nurtured by *welfarism* had been subverted in exchange for citizens with “individualised and economised identities as taxpayers and consumers”. In light of this, we can identify how classically liberalist traditions of freedom, citizen rights and the rational individual or Adam Smith’s *homo economicus* are now, arguably, so deeply embedded in our cultural history that their existence is largely self-evident and very much a part of social convention (Harrison and Boyd, 2003). Although the neo-liberal ethic for personhood may not be the only propagation of individualism within current discourse it does maintain hegemonic control, enforcing an idea of society as comprising independent and equal agents engaged with market forces, creating a belief that individualism is synonymous to self-sufficiency (Kingfisher, 2002). Key to understanding neo-liberalism as a new ideology is the recognition that whilst it initially seems to revive the classically liberal notions there are in fact some distinct divergences (Olssen, 1996). Firstly, while classical liberalism saw the role of the state as minimal in order to guarantee the free-market, neo-liberalism seeks to use the state to engineer conditions conducive to market success (Olssen, 1996). Secondly, although the classical tradition placed optimistic emphasis upon the liberated and rational human nature of agents engaged with the economy, neo-liberalism seeks to nurture the enterprising and competitive character (Olssen, 1996). The latter development signifies how the belief in a self-regulating, “universal egoism” which flourishes under laissez-faire conditions has been supplanted with an individualism moulded by the state and which becomes “perpetually responsive”; *homo economicus* is now more appropriately conceived of as “manipulatable man” (Olssen, 1996: 340). Olssen (1996: 340) elaborates that it is not a case of the self-interested citizen being dissolved by new neo-liberal codes but that supposed laziness encouraged by welfarism creates the belief that new methods of surveillance, control and “performance appraisal” is needed. For some, neo-liberal governance has meant that formulations of contemporary citizenship reflect and reproduce neo-liberalism through an *existential politics* in which the state becomes involved in the definition, categorisation and institution of legitimate characteristics of human nature (Raco, 2009). To this end, the state seeks to co-produce entrepreneurial
citizens through narratives and discourses on citizenship which purport to reflect the real desires and aspirations of its citizens (Raco, 2009). By redrawing citizenship boundaries through reform to rights, entitlements and responsibilities, the state thereby substantiates the relationship between it and its citizens.

Identifying that the neo-liberal agenda seeks to justify and rationalise its aggressive market tactics and to reduce public expenditure, politicians are tasked with communicating a message which portrays welfare and those that use it as morally reprehensible and indolent. This has created culture of audit in which individuals are scrutinised and made accountable (Henrikse and Sidaway, 2010). According to Gilbert (2002: 163), the welfare reforms that are unfolding are being promoted as the necessary trimming the fat in government spending in order to obscure the changing philosophy towards welfare, which, as part of a far broader ideological transition in social security, is also assisting in the redefinition of the welfare state as the provision of “public support for private responsibility”. The increasingly restrictive eligibility for disability welfare support is being supported by the rationale of workfare, supplanting the Keynesian principles of redistribution with an ethics of competition and thus transforming the quality of citizenship (Etherington and Ingold, 2012).

For Turner (2001: 189), this has taken place through the erosion of Marshallian citizenship because the “social and economic conditions that supported post-war British welfare consensus have been transformed by economic and technological change”. Ellison (2000) notes that whilst citizenship continues to be understood as a socio-legal status which entails corresponding rights and responsibilities, within late modernity citizenship is increasingly emphasised as a process predominately embedded within the complex social politics of participation and belonging. What becomes apparent when addressing the issue of disability within this framework of citizenship is that disabled people are still not served by this vision of citizenship or the protective rights it entails which other members of society benefit from. These rights are emphasised as “contributory rights, and they
correspond, more or less, to a set of duties typically expressed through work, war and parenthood”, fields which disabled people are often excluded from (Turner, 2010: 96). On this basis, disability is more favourably provided for under the discourse of human rights in which entitlement is not so connected to contribution (Turner, 2010). Of course, the social rights of citizenship do intersect with human rights, specifically when we think that “poverty mitigation is the human rights core of “social” citizenship” (Davy, 2014). As part one of Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (United Nations, 2015).

Roulstone and Emerson (2014: 3087) have similarly shown that disability is increasingly seen as a human rights issue as a result of the shift from medical model understanding to social model thinking in which disabled people’s social exclusion is now understood as “powerfully shaped by social structures and sociocultural practices” rather than the inevitable consequence of ill-health. Harris et al (2013) have stated that the inclusion of disability within the rhetoric of human rights shows an increased recognition of disabled people as citizens within liberal welfare regimes and, in theory, as entitled to the protective rights which defend marginalised groups from social exclusion (Harris et al, 2013). Unfortunately however, as we have so far seen in this chapter, incongruent notions of social citizenship contravene the practical implementation of rights-based policy for disabled people (Harris et al, 2013). In addition to this there are those that suggest that rights are inherently individualistic and separate individuals from groups and obscure the political struggle for equality (Schneider, 1986). As Pearson and Watson (2007: 119) have argued “There is the need to challenge the processes that create the inequality experienced by disabled people, and merely according them recognition as rights-bearing subjects fails to do this”. However, there are those that warn that as we witness a shift from viewing social rights as entitlements to seeing social rights framed in terms of need we see that the
state now wields significant power in defining legitimate social need, dissolving notions of universality and solidarity in favour of personal responsibility (Cox, 1998).

For Barton (1993) then, in order to understand the place of disabled people in society, it is essential to understand the neo-liberal ideology which informs state interventions within services and welfare provision and shapes the common perceptions of who counts as a full or legitimate citizen. Understanding how citizenship is theorised within the neo-liberal UK regime is therefore central to understanding how disabled people are affected and discounted by the practical implementation of policy designed around non-disabled citizens (Harris et al, 2013). This understanding is pertinent as Moore (2015: 671) argues, the “changing socio-political and cultural relations are redefining disability”.

According to Hahn (1985) disability is “founded on a realization that all aspects of the environment - including architecture, communications, and other settings that provide a context for human interactions - are fundamentally moulded by public policy” and as Stone (1984) and subsequently Roulstone (2015: 673) have both argued, “disability is exactly what a state deems it to be”. For many disability scholars then, contemporary understandings of disability and disability policy is punctuated by neo-liberal state discourse and rhetoric (Mladenov, 2015; Grover and Piggott, 2010, 2005; Grover and Soldatic, 2013). This is problematic given that policymakers within these states are so often influenced by a notion of citizenship which precludes the full inclusion of disabled people (Harris et al, 2013).

According to MacLeavy (2011), the welfare reforms currently unfolding reflect the broader financial climate in which austerity and financial diligence are purported as necessity whilst simultaneously nurturing the belief that a socio-political enterprise of self-sufficiency entwined with labour market activation is key to restoring the economy. Crucially, this emphasis upon employment as a means of active citizenry and social
Chapter 1
Disability in ‘Neo-liberal’ Britain. A ‘Classification Struggle’?

obligation has enabled the further moralisation of the long-term unemployed, effectively situating individuals as work-shy and welfare-dependant and ultimately responsible for the social malaise contributing to Broken Britain (Garthwaite, 2011; Dean, 2012).

For Barton (1993: 239) “The emphasis has been placed on the distributive justice of the market, the freedom of individuals and the centrality of choice within an enterprise culture in which there is a diversified system of provision”. Barton (1993) expands that underpinning the neo-liberal approach is a fundamental belief in merits of competition and that this competitive approach to the market will inevitably improve the quality of services. This emphasis on individualism and economic rationality is thought to produce a “leaner and fitter” economy which would compete better in the international market and has relied upon the popularised understanding of the good citizen as responsive worker (Barton, 1993). As Ellison (2000) has described, the idea of the good citizen has been manipulated by the competitive forces of the market so that social inclusion is no longer so state-regulated or protected and instead depends upon contribution in the economic and competitive work environment as a means of civic inclusion. As a result, renewed emphasis upon civic responsibilities as entwined with social rights become explicit, specifically through the exposition of paid employment and tax contributions as two main duties to be upheld and upon which social entitlement becomes contingent (Touraine, 1992; Isin and Turner, 2007). Those that rely upon welfare benefits become subjects of scrutiny positioned within a hierarchy of entitlement, subsequently creating an ideal in the good citizen against which individuals may be benchmarked (Morris, 2011; Rummery, 2006). Reliance upon the state is no longer viewed as the guarantee of inclusion but the badge of exclusion (Morris, 1994). This competitiveness has individualised social actors as self-determining entrepreneurs and, as a result of policy rhetoric, advocates the citizen as a synthesis of self-governing, responsible agency with communitarian ethics (Ellison, 2000; Morris, 2005) Individuals are thus expected to comprise specific social practices and behaviours and concurrent identities, serving to socially and politically determine the relationship between the individual, society and the state (Lister, 2007;
Yuval-Davis, 1997). This neo-liberal approach to citizenship therefore advocates a communitarian approach to civic duties through promoting individual responsibilities that contribute to the welfare of society as a means of becoming an active citizen and at the same time, delineating a citizen ideal to which individuals are expected to align to and which subsequently proffers membership to society (Morris, 2005).

Newman (2010: 713) has documented that the welfare state has become moralised through “pedagogies of the self” as a strategy of governmentality through which individualism is promoted. This has facilitated the construction of the citizen-subject as a self-regulating and self-governing agent responsible for the management of their own lifestyle and contributions to their local community, emphasising a turn away from the sentiment of entitlement to that of duty (Newman, 2010). The social and political rights attached to notions of citizenship thus become contingent upon an individual fulfilling a kind of ideological personhood (Marks, 2001) defined as active citizenship and which refers to the individual as:

“the able-bodied British citizen who is free from learning difficulties should behave in a proper and ‘socially responsible’ fashion. Simultaneously, such a citizen should, as far as possible, be economically self-supporting and not make demands on state largesse and, if temporarily incapacitated, he or she should return to work as soon as they are able” (Larkin, 2011).

Having defined what is meant when using the term neo-liberal and demonstrated how neo-liberal governance acts at the level of the individual through shaping ideas about who constitutes the good and legitimate citizen and the disabled citizen’s exclusion from this status, the chapter will now look at how the disability category is constructed within recent policy and political rhetoric.

1.3 Section Two

1.3.1 Re-drawing the Disabled Citizen in Neo-Liberal Britain

We might begin then by configuring the disability category as it has been politically constructed within the welfare state on either side of the 2008
financial crisis. The number of people claiming sickness and disability related benefits has been a concern of both Conservative and Labour governments over the last thirty years (Piggott and Grover, 2009). However, welfare retrenchment in this area has been notoriously difficult to secure. Scarbrough (2000: 250) noted that achieving welfare retrenchment is “not only extremely difficult but also an extremely slow process, relying heavily on the educative capacity of the political elites. The evidence suggests they have a very steep hill to climb”. Fifteen years later, it appears that this has been achieved.

The present crusade against welfare-dependency is argued as embedded within modern neo-liberal policies which have gradually instilled an idea of social decay as resulting from individuals being trapped by poverty, fiscal dependency and personal failure as well as the idea that these individuals constitute an immobilised workforce devoid of any work ethic or inclination (Garthwaite, 2011). This has been argued to have facilitated a moralising campaign against the long-term unemployed, and specifically, those claiming disability benefits, legitimated through propaganda that inculpates welfare-dependency as one of the main forms of social malaise contributing to Broken Britain (Dean, 2012). As such, it has been reasoned that the welfare cuts that have taken place under recent governments relies heavily upon the notion of a moral citizen as one engaged in paid work and who fulfils civic duties (Dean, 2012).

In this section, we will look briefly first to New Labour’s New Deals before assessing the reforms to Incapacity Benefit brought in by New Labour in 2008. The chapter will then look at some of the most recent cuts made to disability benefits and the accompanying political rhetoric implemented under both the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition and the subsequent Conservative government of 2015. Through examining these most recent policy initiatives and the attendant political rhetoric, we are able to conceive of how many disabled peoples’ lives are being discounted as the state constructs ever-trickier and unrealistic expectations of the disabled citizen and the role they ought to play within an age of austerity.
1.3.2 New Labour, New Deal. Neo-liberalism with a human face

New Labour’s New Deals were introduced through the discursive framework of inclusion, responsibility and equality of opportunity so that fiscal redistribution, which was now suggested to be a passive rather than active form of welfare, was no longer the primary means of tackling inequality and poverty (Lister, 1998; Levitas, 1998). Similarly, Andersen (2002) has remarked that whilst welfare policies of the past were primarily concerned with the conferral of social entitlements, they now reflected a preoccupation with employment as an integrative institution and instrumental in obtaining citizenship. According to Giddens (1998: 103), equality was now politically defined as inclusion, and that inclusion referred to “in its broadest sense to citizenship, to the civil and political rights and obligations that all members of society should have … [and] to opportunities and to involvement in public space”. Instead of traditionally redistributive initiatives, the emerging social integrationist approach heralded by New Labour advocated paid employment as the core value and first priority of the economically inactive and the principal means of improving quality of life and social inclusion (Levitas, 1998). As Powell (2000) has noted, Gordon Brown argued that the New Deals would tackle the cause of poverty rather than alleviate it with welfare benefits through redesigning the welfare state around work ethic. As such, New Labour championed that they would convert the workless culture amongst those receiving benefits and reconstruct the welfare system around employment, committing to Making work pay (Powell, 2000). This was accompanied by the Third Way’s frequent use of moral and contractual discourse (‘something for something’) through the evocation of the community and civic society in which people were encouraged to see themselves as citizens with duties, obligations and responsibilities to that community (Fairclough, 2000). Through this moral and contractual discourse, we begin to see how New Labour positions citizens within these New Deals, as individuals encouraged to generate their own inclusion and alleviate their own poverty by entering into civic contracts with individualised responsibilities and duties (Fairclough, 2000). As Dean (2010: 188) has suggested, the neo-liberal rationality contained within these policies is to
“assist” individuals in exercising their freedom in state-defined ways, that is, as active job seekers. Disabling institutional structures and organisation, the increased cost of living with impairment as well as social discrimination and negative attitudes towards disability are seemingly not an issue to inclusion so long as you are employed.

Powell (2000: 47) expands that New Labour was therefore considered to have re-written social history in order to make way for the Third Way initiative, discounting the political right’s emphasis upon civic duties and the old left’s emphasis upon redistribution and instead forging a “new” political motto of “no rights without responsibilities” (Giddens, 1998 cited in Powell). Citizenship under New Labour’s Third Way therefore seemed to move from “dutiless rights” to “conditional welfare” through which it was premised employment opportunities would be created and individuals made accountable for their engagement with such responsibilities (Powell, 2000: 47). However, if we look at the historical development of citizenship as entrenched within the welfare state, we see that rights and responsibilities have always been premised to go hand in hand, that employment has always been the expectation of the ‘good citizen’ and that social security has been intended to facilitate this. Given the barriers to employment for disabled people however and therefore their accession to good citizen status, negotiating these rights and responsibilities has been inconceivably problematic.

The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP, 1997) was introduced as an initiative which would confront the dynamics of social exclusion, enhance peoples’ awareness of disabled people’s capabilities and create more job opportunities, and which boasted social model thinking on disability (Roulstone, 2000). Contained within the New Deal were five strategies which sought to directly improve the employment rates of disabled people; “education, training and work placements; vocational advice and support services; in-work benefits; incentives for employers; and improving physical accessibility” (Bambra et al, 2009: 4). According to Newman (2010) these initiatives might be thought of as governmental strategies of a new post-
welfare state and through which we are witnessing a fundamental shift in our approach to social policy and citizenship. As we have already seen and as Newman (2010: 712) argues, this shift is what numerous commentators have alluded to as a “distinct policy turn” which seeks to activate its citizens through greater accountability and responsibilisation of subjects, indicating a state preoccupation with morally regulating individuals so as to engender the norms of a good citizen.

However, whilst the New Deal premised the increased education of employers and employment opportunities, Roulstone (2000: 432) adds that these objectives were “overturned at the point of delivery” and left the question of positive change at the feet of disabled individuals. The New Deal was voluntary and provided advice and information through a Personal Adviser as well as offering information on the barriers to employment so that disabled people were made more aware of how best to pursue job opportunities (Millar, 2000). As such, when compared with the other compulsory New Deal programmes which entailed a “menu of options” in individualised support to improve employability, the New Deal for Disabled People was less about enhancing the individual’s ‘human capital’ and therefore a more ‘work-first’ approach without addressing the multiple disadvantages faced by those who are furthest from the labour market in the first place (Millar, 2000). As Roulstone (2000) has noted, the contractual rhetoric of the New Deals, in which new job opportunities are premised as the route out of poverty and dependency, creates the idea that disabled people are being provided for through the progressive and humane reform of capitalism. This focus on the rhetoric of dependency thus eschews the multiple barriers to employment faced by disabled people and obscures that the main aim of the New Deal is to change the dependent individual (Roulstone, 2000). What is more, those that did make use of the NDDP programme tended to be disabled people who were already better placed for employment for a number of reasons:

“they were younger, better qualified, more likely to have a working partner, to have access to transport, to have had their health problems for shorter periods, to have been out of work for shorter periods, and to have had previous work experience” (Millar, 2000: 30).
Arguably then the NDDP programme did little to help those disabled people most marginalised from the labour market and seems to reinforce the idea that there is a class of disabled people unsuited to work. Problematically, Roulstone (2000) has suggested that in grouping disabled people under the New Deal alongside more notably and historically stigmatised groups such as single mothers and the young unemployed, the distinction of disabled people as ‘deserving poor’ became less clear. As Beresford (2012) has highlighted, these groups of welfare recipients face extended moralisation as those who have historically been used as neo-liberalism’s scapegoats; the underclass, single parents, asylum seekers, the long-term unemployed and youths. For Roulstone (2000), the New Deal for Disabled People had initially made clear announcements about the social factors which had hindered disabled people in entering the labour market and thus communicated the message that disabled people represented the deserving poor. However, as time went on, this distinction began to fade within New Deal rhetoric. This conflation of disability with the ‘underclass’ is further evidenced when Roulstone (2000) notes that shortly after they were elected in 1997, New Labour soon set about looking into “non-legitimate” Disability Living Allowance claims, of which 442,000 people were to be surveyed, evidencing their attempt to separate the real disabled from the spuriously disabled. This was further bolstered by New Labour’s further clampdown on those claiming Incapacity Benefit through a large-scale review of entitlement (Roulstone, 2000). This moral underclass rhetoric used to justify the shift from redistributive discourse to that of social inclusion was also further evidenced in Harriet Harman’s, then Minister of Social Security, speech on social inclusion in which she refers to benefit claimants as living in a ‘parallel world’ in which they lack the sense of order that paid employment brings (Fairclough, 2000). In developing his analysis of how New Labour discursively framed employment when compared with earlier Old Labour speeches, Fairclough (2000) notes that the right to work is barely raised, except in reference to disabled people who are portrayed as having been denied this right. Accordingly then, for

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4 This is not to dismiss the achievements of New Labour’s “Improving the Life Chances for Disabled People” report which adapted social model thinking and endorsed the development of policies to support disabled people in achieving independent living (Oliver and Barnes, 2010).
Bambra et al. (2009: 3), the welfare-to-work strategies of the 1997 New Deal for Disabled People alluded to a “rights-based approach” to employment which would challenge the rising costs associated with Incapacity Benefits whilst also tackling social exclusion and poverty, once again demonstrating how neo-liberal rationality frames work as a freedom which an individual should be encouraged to seize. Here, we see that the expectation of the disabled individual, now rhetorically imbued with ‘the right to work’, is to remediate their own poverty, dependency and exclusion through these highly individualised strategies which ignore the broader structures of exclusion in disabled peoples’ lives. Coupled with the growing expectation of disabled people to take personal responsibility for their own health through self-management we can observe how this rhetoric of empowerment and autonomy is yet another neo-liberal tool through which to locate blame at the foot of the individual (Scambler and Scambler, 2010). In this respect it could be suggested that disabled individuals are responsibilized to activate their citizenship through gaining control over their bodies (Bacchi and Beasley, 2002). As well as this, we have witnessed the increased personalisation of adult social care through direct payments, which, on the face of it, appeared to be empowering individuals to take control of their own care and design their own support (Beresford, 2008; Roulstone and Morgan, 2009). However, Ferguson (2012: 67) has argued that personalisation is dissolving state social care, shifting responsibility from the state to the individual and has therefore been co-opted by the neo-liberal agenda through the “market-driven neo-liberal notion of individualism that denies our need for social connection and reduces the service user to a simple ‘homo economicus’”. Moreover, having a personal budget for care does not necessarily translate into having choice or control and is dependent on local services and support as well as being vulnerable to the increasing cuts to local authority budgets which has already seen reductions to personal budgets (Ferguson, 2012).

It is important here to consider the framing of such initiatives within the wider context of the achievements of the British disability movement, namely the social model of disability, and the implementation of the Disability
Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) (Cameron, 2013). According to Barnes (2000), there could be little doubt that during the latter half of the 20th century, our understandings of disability and disablement had been transformed. Acknowledging the emergence and development of the international disabled people’s movement since the 1960s, Barnes argues that orthodox, individualised and medicalised views of disability have been reconfigured, or decolonised (Hughes, 2009) and given way to the socio-political account of disability widely referred to as the social model of disability. It is pertinent to note that the social model illuminates how it is society that disables people with impairments and therefore the solution is societal rather than individual-directed change (Barnes and Mercer, 2005). The social model has been the major catalyst in increased politicisation of disabled people within the UK and highlighted the institutional discrimination faced by disabled people as a result of perceived impairments (Barnes, 2000). In response to the disability movement and the social model, anti-discrimination legislation was “reluctantly” established (Pearson and Watson, 2007: 97) in the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (and subsequently, 2005, Equality 2010) and legal definitions of disablement changed to include social model thinking (Barnes, 2000).

The Disability Discrimination Act (1995) legislated against the discrimination of disabled people within employment and required that employers must make reasonable adjustments when their organisation or premises may be perceived as disadvantaging disabled people when compared with non-disabled people (Bell and Heitmüller, 2005). For many, this act represented extensive progress in protecting disabled people through the power of the law (Roulstone, 2003) and for some may have been a step towards more fully integrating people with impairments into the economic sphere which materialist and Marxist social model thinkers thought would end the social oppression of disablism (Thomas, 2007). However, Abberley (2002) has argued that the nature of some impairment means that there will always be a group of people for whom work is not an option, no matter what social

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5 The social model of disability argues that disability is produced by the organisation of society rather than by an individual’s impairment. A more in depth description of the social model is covered in the next chapter.
arrangements are made. Moreover, it might be argued that whilst the UK had made “significant progress in integrating an anti-discrimination agenda into key areas of social life, attitudinal and structural change [was] considerably slower” (Pearson and Watson, 2007: 98).

Roulstone (2003) has documented that in order for legal action to be taken in the event of disability-based discrimination, the disability must first be established as substantial or long-term which significantly problematises invisible and fluctuating conditions and simultaneously reinforces the medical model of disability in which the extent of difference must be measured, locating (in)ability within the body. Roulstone (2003) elaborates that in arguing their case in which “day-to-day problems are contested,” a disabled person is encouraged to recount the list of things they cannot do, a process which may be distressing and psychologically harmful. Crucially, the “onus” is upon the individual to challenge the broader structures of employment whereas the previous quota system, at least in theory, represented a more incorporated means of tackling exclusion (Warren, 2005: 310). As Pope and Bambra (2005) found, the implementation of the Disability Discrimination Act coincided with the political motivation to ameliorate low unemployment amongst those in receipt of disability benefits. In practice however, they found that employment rates actually decreased and were at their lowest following the implementation of the (1995) act. This may be attributed to the perceived risk of costly lawsuits and the additional cost of altering work environments which further deterred employers from selecting disabled applicants for jobs (Bell and Heitmüller, 2005). Crucially, enforcing anti-discrimination law in this reactive way was ad hoc and inefficient.

In addition to this anti-discrimination legislation, the UK government was documented as having increased the opportunities of disabled people through the Pathways to Work scheme which supplemented the New Deal program and was alleged to provide extra support and further incentivise individuals into taking on paid work (Riach and Loretto, 2009). Whilst Powell (2000) indicates that the Third Way worked upon a work-first basis, New Labour did promote some investment in education and training as a means of building
human capital through initiatives such as Pathways to Work. It has also been
documented that Pathways to Work programs incorporated, at least to some
degree, a recognition of the social model of disability in that it conceded that
there were (and aimed to work upon) social barriers beyond the
medicalisation of disability which contributed to underemployment (Grover
and Piggott, 2005). However, it is quickly countered that disabled people
continue to be conceived of in terms of a deficit model; that they are
unemployed because they are economically unproductive (Grover and
Piggott, 2005). Grover and Piggott (2005) elaborate upon the work of Barnes
et al (1998), stating that in order to make disabled individuals more
appealing to employers, they are fashioned in such a way as to advertise
them as distinct and different. As such, it is argued that similar to the
Disability Discrimination Act, the divide between disabled and non-disabled
people is intensified through this individualising of disability (Grover and
Piggott, 2005). What is more, whilst advisory services under Pathways was
sometimes welcomed as a positive experience in building motivation and self-
estee for some confident users, it remained largely ineffectual in
overcoming barriers such as “non-improving health and labour market
conditions” and neglected the heterogeneous identities of different users
(Weston, 2012). Weston (2012) also notes that in other cases, Pathways
programs channelled individuals into low-skilled, low-paid and ultimately
disappointing work, reiterating the negative employment opportunities which
have so long been connected to disabled people (Barnes, 1992).

Riach and Loretto (2009) therefore state that these policy initiatives, in
tandem with anti-discrimination legislation, perpetuated the belief that
employment exists for all those who wish to avail themselves of the
opportunity. Given that the Pathways program focuses upon the
employability of the individual rather than the broader structures of the
labour market and its diminishing size, these assumptions are therefore
potentially damaging and stigmatising to unemployed disabled people. In
light of the identified failings associated with the Pathways program, it is not
surprising that Incapacity Benefit figures did not decrease, but rather than
redressing the conditionality of benefits, New Labour resolved to increase
conditionality through the replacement of IB with Employment Support Allowance, ESA (Weston, 2012). Therefore, whilst the incorporation of the social model into government strategy suggested a breakaway from the reductionism of the individual and medical model, the efficacy of such incorporation suggests otherwise (Russell, 2002). Russell (2002) argues that legislative acts may allude to the production of equal opportunities but that when it comes to progressing disability rights, the notion of equal opportunities remains infeasible within a society so replete with inequality. In this respect many disabled people continued to be excluded from the labour market and were unable to fulfil the role of tax-paying moral citizen although this has been framed in terms of personal deficit rather than the result of deeply embedded inequalities.

Therefore, whilst Cameron (2013) remarks that the establishment of anti-discrimination legislation is one of the disability movement’s biggest achievements, he counters that “the best way to kill a movement is to give it a little of what it demands”. Identifying that the rhetoric surrounding disabled people was that they were now endowed with the “right to work” and encouraged to seize it through neo-liberal policies which avowed support, coupled with anti-discrimination legislation and the supposed changed perceptions of disability due to the social model, it is no wonder that failure to comply presents itself as the inactivity of passive citizens. The chapter will now discuss how disabled people have been increasingly negatively positioned through scathing media portrayals, moralising discourse and political rhetoric which has gathered momentum over the last decade (Grover, 2015).

1.3.3 Scroungerphobia, Folk Devils and National Abjects

Houston and Lindsay (2010) note that this process of ‘activating’ citizens through welfare-to-work strategies has emerged as a dominant area of reform within the European Union, although they highlight that in Britain, as we have already seen, these activation strategies have switched focus from those claiming unemployment benefits to those receiving disability benefits. According to Piggott and Grover (2009: 161), this need for welfare
retrenchment had to be constructed through “public communication strategies” which encouraged a fight against fraud through publicising a “scroungerphobia” discourse. As a result, disabled people would be made to compete for work on the grounds that whilst the number of Incapacity Benefit claimants increased there had “been no worsening of the health of the UK population”, essentially translating as those that are on IB are simply unemployed or represent hidden unemployment (Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 2002, p. 7 cited in Grover and Piggott, 2005). Briant, Watson and Philo (2013: 879) identify that at this point, whilst there had been some attribution of blame to disabled people for this situation, most of the news coverage focussed on the “perceived failings of government and professionals”.

Accordingly then, in 2006 New Labour outlined their plans to increase conditionality and reduce the 2.7million Incapacity Benefit (IB) figure by one million through a new benefit, the Employment Support Allowance (ESA), which was implemented in 2008 (Garthwaite, 2011, Weston, 2012). At the time of introduction of ESA, IB was portrayed as a benefit that had been too easy to access and that once claimants were on it, they remained on it for too long (Grover and Piggott, 2010). While focus was paid to the increasing numbers of people using IB and their relatively larger payments compared with Jobseeker’s Allowance, this ignored that “in reality these benefits offer a very low standard of living as a long-term income” (Barnes and Sissons, 2013: 90). Moreover, it was contended that the Incapacity Benefit was not actually targeted at the genuinely sick, but instead was a benefit that had assuaged high figures of long-term unemployment, masking a “missing workforce” (Theodore, 2007: 934). This has disseminated the message that disabled people are simply unemployed rather than living with real conditions (Grover, 2015). However, as Warren (2005: 309) has argued, over the course of the 1980s, disability became synonymous to unemployability due to the re-categorisation of the long-term unemployed as the “long-term sick” as a means of ameliorating the discouraging unemployment figures of the time for political gain. Importantly however, this has been argued to have contributed
to the emerging political identity for disabled people through which they were able to pressurise the government (Warren, 2005).

In an approach not dissimilar to that of the New Deals then, the introduction of Employment Support Allowance was therefore discursively framed as a supportive benefit that would help the sick and those with impairments into paid work and subsequently address other issues of poverty and disadvantage (Grover and Piggott, 2010). However, the emphasis upon employment as a right which disabled people missed out on was less prominent and instead, focus was directed at sorting the too-sick-to-work from the inactive but able. As Patrick (2011: 275) has argued, the rhetoric surrounding the implementation of the ESA implied that those claiming IB were passive and inactive and required “compulsion to lift them out of entrenched welfare dependency”. This entailed the reassessment of individuals in terms of their potential productivity through a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) (Grover and Piggott, 2010). This heavily medicalised categorising entailed within the WCA seemed to create a hierarchy of impairments, nurturing the idea that there was a scale of (un)deservingness in which a claimant would be located and encouraged to reassess their need (Grover and Piggott, 2010). The equivalence being made between being seen as capable of work and medical wellbeing therefore forces individuals to focus on work-related solutions to their situations and urges them to face up to their responsibilities as active citizens before asserting their social rights, rights which are premised mainly on the basis of economic contribution (Grover and Piggott, 2010).

Through this highly individualised approach to disability, the implementation of the ESA failed to acknowledge the multifaceted disadvantages faced by the disabled and instead focussed on the medical sorting of individuals (Grover and Piggott, 2010). Grover and Piggott (2010) expanded that this process was not one which viewed full employment for the disabled as an end goal, but instead aimed to collect and analyse data as part of a system of surveillance. In addition to this, Grover and Piggott (2012) indicate that the revised WCA used by the UK is, according to the Department for Work and Pensions (2006), one of the toughest assessments in the world and serves to
intensify the conditionality of welfare. Furthermore, despite the advice from welfare advisers that the WCA was inhumane and flawed, DWP ministers pressed ahead with the fit-for-work tests (Butler, 2013). As Beatty and Fothergill (2011) have argued, the WCA is the gateway to disability benefits but importantly, a gateway which has been significantly narrowed and with no indication that those who previously qualified for disability benefits are anything other than genuine claimants. Similarly Briant, Watson and Philo (2013) have more recently shown that the government is simply altering the “disability benefit benchmarks” in order to redefine formerly disabled people as no longer disabled so that the cuts to disability benefits can be implemented without fear of retribution.

In early 2012, more than 2.5million people of working age were unemployed and in receipt of disability benefits in the UK (Houston and Lindsay, 2013). Moreover, the numbers of disability benefit claimants has trebled since 1979, prompting the successive governing parties to argue that too many people spend too long on sick benefits and that this represents a social and economic crisis (Houston and Lindsay, 2013). Reform to benefits for the long-term sick and disabled within the UK have rapidly developed over the past decade, entailing increasingly restrictive eligibility criteria, greater demands of work-related activity and negative sanctions for those who do not comply as well as the reduction in value of such benefits, seemingly justified on the basis of greater provision of employment-related support (Heap, 2014).

The Conservative/Liberal-Democrat Coalition government proceeded with the ESA benefit despite the global recession and increasing job cuts and unemployment, and began reassessing 1.5 million IB recipients with a view to shifting one quarter of claimants, (those assessed as immediately fit to work) onto Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) and over 750,000 (those assessed as limited in capability) into the Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG) within ESA (Garthwaite et al, 2013; Weston, 2012). Furthermore, those receiving support through being placed within the WRAG would find their entitlement subject to their compliance with work-related activity and time-limited to one year (Weston, 2012; Patrick, 2012). Subsequently, the Conservatives announced
that the ESA WRAG weekly payment would be cut from £102 to £73 as of 2017 and suggested it provided claimants with more incentive to find work (Butler, 2015b). As well as this, they laid out the need to reform Disability Living Allowance through the introduction of Personal Independence Payment from 2013. According to the Disability Rights Partnership (2011), the replacement of DLA with PIP aimed to reduce expenditure by 20%, equating to a fiscal cut of £2.1 billion to disabled people with 750,000 DLA claimants set to lose their support whilst the justification for such drastic reform remained vague but framed within the wider principle of tackling fraud, neglecting that the level of fraud under this benefit was just 0.05%. What was most troubling in this case was that the government purported that this benefit contributed to long-term unemployment, neglecting the fact that this benefit existed in order to mitigate the extra costs incurred as a result of living with impairment and that a great number of people receiving DLA were in paid work (Spartacus, 2012; Roulstone 2015).

For Garthwaite (2011: 369) this has simply highlighted “the unacceptable cost of those receiving sickness-related benefits”. According to Garthwaite et al (2013), the Coalition’s decision to push ahead with ESA and stricter eligibility marked a paradigm shift in the categorisation of disabled people, a group who they say has historically been considered as unquestioningly deserving of welfare assistance. It would be fair to quibble with this assertion that historically disabled people have always been viewed as deserving and even the extent to which this deserving status has been helpful. However, speaking of the tendency to view the sick and disabled as deserving within more recent social history, Briant, Watson and Philo (2013: 875) also note this shift in position, stating that whilst previous Conservative and Labour governments had broached the topic of sickness benefit reforms in the 90s, “cuts to disability benefit were seen as too politically dangerous and counter to public opinion”. According to Piggott and Grover (2009), this was due to the lack of discourse which vilified sick and disabled claimants at the time, a situation which has drastically changed since then. However, what is unique about the present situation is that the cuts are actually being implemented on the back of the financial crises as though disability benefits are somehow to blame for
the collapse of the economy or that they are preventing economic recovery (Briant, Watson and Philo, 2013).

Weston (2012) raises the debate about the moral legitimacy of conditionality for disabled people stating that on the one hand there are those who conceive of this group as genuinely excluded from employment as a result of the interplay between impairment and societal attitudes (Patrick 2011, referenced in Weston, 2012). On the other side of this it is argued that this group is largely “unemployed rather than truly incapacitated”, situating the responsibility of gaining employment on the individual (Mead, cited in Weston 2012). For Mead (2011: 281 cited in Weston, 2012), disabled individuals must accept this responsibility and reciprocate social contributions if they are to be held in mutual respect and “preserve a common citizenship”. Troublingly, whilst there may be some validity to Mead’s argument that there are some disabled people who are “just” unemployed and could be in work, the concern lies in the overemphasis of gaining employment, to the detriment of other considerations such as health, meaningful employment or job cuts. This has been demonstrated in the research of Garthwaite et al (2013) in which interviews with job brokers and case workers elucidated that their only target was to get disabled people into work regardless of other factors or outcomes. Specifically, Garthwaite et al (2013) raise that Mead (2011) expects this group to remove themselves from “ghettoes of poverty” and move further afield for work, evoking Norman Tebbit’s “get on your bike” approach favoured by Ian Duncan Smith. This neglects how problematic this may be for someone who has no car/relies upon public transport and further negotiations around care, children and health as well as the psychological barriers to taking the next step (Garthwaite et al, 2013).

Additionally this approach is woefully ignorant of how the replacement of DLA with PIP is likely to impact disabled individuals. As we have already noted the introduction of PIP aimed to shrink the disability category further, even though the DLA was not an out of work benefit (Roulstone, 2015). By October 2015, the government premised that 170,000 people would have their payment stopped whilst another 160,000 would have their award reduced.
(Roulstone, 2015). This is despite the fact that the level of fraud within the DLA was, according to the DWP’s own figures, less than 0.05% (Spartacus Report, 2012). Given that these payments were intended to address the additional costs of disability the removal of this payment and even the significant delays in assessment and backlogs of payment caused by the introduction of PIP are likely to further exclude and impoverish disabled people, fundamentally ignoring the “long established link between disability and poverty and barriers to paid work” (Roulstone, 2015: 681). The increased conditionality of disability benefits has prompted much debate with many scholars and activists calling for greater recognition of the heterogeneity of applicants and the diversity of their needs (Weston, 2012). Crucially, the electorate has been severely misled about the level of benefit fraud and the supposedly easy access to disability benefits (McEnhill and Byrne, 2014).

The emphasis of these reforms has been upon the penalisation and activation of individuals who have been historically perceived as innately unproductive, constructing unemployment as the result of individual failings rather than portraying the lack of demand for disabled employees and the numerous barriers to employment that disabled people face (Garthwaite, 2011). Moreover, the way in which disability benefit claimants have been portrayed by the media is yet another barrier to overcome. This is evident in the research from Garthwaite et al (2013: 9) which found that many stakeholders working with those who had been on long-term sickness benefits reiterated the negative stereotypes portrayed in the media, referring to how they though many of their claimants had adopted a “disabled lifestyle”. Similarly, Beatty et al (2009 cited in Garthwaite et al 2013) found that stakeholders certainly believed that a dependency culture existed amongst their clients. These negative perceptions of disability benefit claimants become even more troubling when we see that recent research from Inclusion Scotland (2015) has documented that some Job Centre staff have behaved in “openly hostile” ways and referred to claimants in derogatory terms. The incident highlighted within the report was that a claimant was shown a can of air freshener because the advisers thought “the people who come in here stink” (Inclusion Scotland, 2015: 23). The report therefore raises the extent to which the UK
Government can be believed when it states that its intention is to protect the *most vulnerable*.

Beresford (2012) documents that the Coalition government, whilst purporting the thinly-veiled guise of compassion and protection for the *truly vulnerable*, became explicit in their targeting of the deserving poor through these benefit reforms and cuts to local services, a campaign which has been supported through defamatory portrayals of disabled people within the media. Social “branding” of individuals as *deserving* or *undeserving* has increasingly been adopted by the mass media leading to disability benefit recipients being variously described as *scum, feckless, work-shy, scroungers* etc (Garthwaite, 2013; Garthwaite, Bambra and Warren, 2013). As a result, dependency upon the state has become subject to a demonising process and public concern in distinguishing between the *unwilling* and the *unwell*, the *strivers vs. Skivers* is central (Garthwaite, 2013; Valentine and Harris 2014).

Iain Duncan Smith (2009: 4) has invoked the “emerging underclass” diagnosed by “intergenerational worklessness” as the justification for harsh reform arguing that these individuals must be recovered through the “recognition that the nature of the life you lead and the choices you make have a significant bearing on whether you live in poverty”. Elsewhere, he has stated that as much as 70% of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) claimants have been “allowed to fester” as a result of the current disability benefits system, costing the tax payer close to £13 billion each year (Smith, 2012). Addressing the Conservative Party Conference in 2011, Iain Duncan Smith advocated that the overhaul of the benefits systems was a means of restoring the failing economy and henceforth, welfare reform equated to the social reform of Broken Britain (The Conservative Party, 2011). The UK coalition government therefore endorsed that the welfare reform would help people get into work by way of promoting individual responsibility whilst ensuring that the most vulnerable are protected by a fairer benefits system (DWP, 2012a). The overhaul of the benefits system advocated by the UK Coalition and the successive Conservative government was therefore promoted as a means of restoring the failing economy through the eradication of mass welfare-
dependency by increasing labour market activity amongst the long-term unemployed (The Conservative Party, 2011; DWP, 2012).

The ongoing cuts being made to state welfare are said to be reflective of the “logic of neoliberalism”, through which increasingly restrictive eligibility is promoted and the penalisation of poverty and the principle of workfare is endorsed (Grover and Soldatic, 2013: 216; Etherington and Ingold, 2012). These cuts are legitimated through the political packaging of welfare-dependency as a main source of social decay within a broken society, inculpating individuals as morally lax and devoid of work ethic and inclination (Dean, 2012; Garthwaite, 2011). The rhetoric of welfare reform within the current socio-political and economic climate has enabled a moralising discourse to distinguish between two distinct categories of welfare recipients; the deserving and undeserving (Garthwaite, 2014; Garthwaite, Bambra and Warren, 2013; Runswick-Cole and Goodley, 2011). As we have already observed, this is said to have facilitated the campaign against an alleged work-shy and welfare-dependent nation for which the cure is labour market activation (Weston, 2012).

For Clarke (2005: 451), these “processes of ‘responsibilisation’ have increasingly shaped the ideal citizen of today” and as such, it has been reasoned that the welfare reform as proposed by the coalition government relies heavily upon the notion of there being an ethical deficit which needs to be filled by a moral citizen, that is, a citizen engaged in paid work and who fulfils civic duties (Dean, 2012). More recently, Friedli and Stearn (2015) have documented how recent workfare sanctions and conditionality of benefits functions to psychologically coerce welfare recipients through a number of interventions which seek to modify an individual’s attitudes, beliefs and personality. By locating unemployment in personal psychological deficit, unproductive and failing citizens are compelled to become “the right kind of subject” through mandatory training programmes which claim to harness psychologised traits of employability such as “confidence, optimism, self-efficacy and aspiration” (Friedli and Stearn, 2015: 42). In their interviews with welfare recipients who were involved in such workfare programmes,
Friedli and Stearn (2015) found that failure to comply with the programme was met with harsh benefit sanctions and further psychological (d)evaluation. This psychological devaluation and exclusionary rhetoric is also extended to those who are not expected to work through the constant valorisation of paid employment and work-focussed behaviours at the expense of other socially contributory practices such as caring, parenting and volunteering (Patrick, 2012). Participation in paid employment is therefore argued to be the hegemonic expectation of citizens and is reflected in rhetoric which emphasise “no rights without responsibilities” (Soldatic and Meekosha, 2012: 140).

Some have described the manufacturing of consent for harsh austerity measures in terms of a neo-liberal politics of disgust in which ‘wasted humans’ are turned into national abjects through a theory of power described as social abjectification (Tyler, 2013). In dealing with the defamatory portrayal of these subjects, the employment of affect as a means of engendering consensus is clearly readable (Leahy, 2009). Primarily, feelings of disgust are said to be mobilised in order to govern so that moralised and moralising dispositions and practices are entwined with affective bodily responses (Leahy, 2009). The portrayal of deserving and undeserving characters and the disabled benefit fraud contrasted against the moral taxpayer contributes to a “distinct ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy” in which the disabled figure is made Other (Garthwaite, 2014: 12). Significantly however, Garthwaite (2014) reports that the individualising government rhetoric and media portrayal of disabled benefit claimants has turned the sick and disabled against themselves. Within Garthwaite’s interviews many disabled people who expressed that they themselves faced stigma as a benefit claimant were quick to identify the Other and undeserving disabled in other people. Turning the poor on the poor through anti-welfare discourse is characterised in what Hoggett et al (2013) describes as the structure of feeling of resentment or what we might describe as displaced abjection (Stallybrass and White, 1986). Stallybrass and White (1986: 19) suggest that displaced abjection represents a process whereby symbolically low social groups turn against not those in authority, but those contained within even
lower social classifications. These feelings of resentment form a particular brand of feeling termed ressentiment which is described as the socially toxic form our grievances take when we are unable to discharge them and they build up as intense affective feelings (Hoggett et al, 2013). This element of disgust and its role in the social positioning of disabled people will be further developed within Chapter Four with reference to the psychosocial habitus.

1.3.4 Conclusion - An Afterthought

Within this chapter we have explored how the disabled figure has been and continues to be dys-entwined in the social contract between citizen and state. This is to say that disabled people have often seemed to be the awkward afterthought to implicitly non-disabled conceptualisations of citizenship practices. By tracing what it means to be a citizen through emerging forms of liberalism and alongside the welfare state we are able to see how an idea of the citizen as a responsible and independent worker has distilled, consolidating a vision of legitimate citizen subject and the associated lifestyle that is largely taken-for-granted.

Documenting how disabled people have been traditionally excluded from employment demonstrates how disability troubles the notion of who counts as a citizen. This is largely the result of being perceived as non-productive and non-contributory members of society but who often still rely upon contribution-based social protection as a result of their exclusion from the labour market and the extra costs of living associated with disability. As far as political discourse is concerned, this “something for nothing” arrangement is incompatible with legitimate citizenship.

No one could defensibly suggest (or at least no one would publicly voice) that disabled people who cannot work, contribute or provide for themselves should be abandoned by society, but neo-liberalism is couched in survival of the fittest rhetoric and “social neo-Darwinism” (Bourdieu: 1998a: 42). The prevailing socio-political rhetoric of the responsible, entrepreneurial and active citizen continues to re-articulate the citizen as one who is independent, self-managing, in paid employment and responsive to the
demands of market. As Bourdieu has argued (2003: 30), neo-liberal ideology\textsuperscript{6} has instituted social insecurity and precarity within the minds of the public so that a belief in the entrepreneurial citizen has become a societal norm “imposed on the dominated by the needs of the economy”. The return of individualism associated with neo-liberal doxa destroys the welfare state and our concepts of collective responsibility whilst facilitating an approach in which we blame the victim for their poor position and advocate the need for their reform (Bourdieu, 1998a: 7). Neo-liberal doxa however, is a conservative doxa which portrays itself as progressive and promotes the dismantling of the welfare state through a progressive rhetoric, seemingly advocating equality, mobility, fairness and empowerment (‘help them to help themselves’) (Bourdieu, 2003).

Increasingly, as we saw in the final section on recent neo-liberal policies, disabled people are being portrayed as wilfully unemployed ‘problem citizens’ who lack the motivations and aspirations to lead legitimate lives, constructing the inequalities and poverty they face in terms of pathologised personalities rather than as the economic and social fallout of neo-liberalism (Raco, 2012). Long precluded from participating in the field of meaningful, paid employment but now expected to find work in exclusionary environments whilst facing moralising surveillance of welfare use, disabled people are at pains to define and occupy a legitimate citizen status. Crucially, as much as these welfare cuts may be viewed as inflicting untold damage and stress upon disabled people, this is but one aspect of the systemic exclusion that disabled people face.

The remainder of this thesis suggests how we might begin to use Bourdieu to gain a comprehensive understanding of the micro, macro and meso aspects of disability. Bourdieu has rarely been read as a political sociologist or philosopher but the epicentral position of symbolic power and the concomitant significance of representation, legitimacy and bodies within his work constitute untapped concepts with which to think about politics

\textsuperscript{6} Bourdieu would avoid the term ideology in favour of doxa and symbolic domination which will be examined in Chapter Three
For Bourdieu the fundamental question of political philosophy is the problem of legitimacy (Swartz, 2013). Moreover, the centrality of the body to his social theory, specifically his focus on how power is exercised through bodies, provides a deeply embodied account of social position. In addition to this, Bourdieu provides concepts such as symbolic capital, which I will push in a new direction by developing an idea of negative symbolic capital, with which we can think about the politics of group-making. It will be suggested that whilst Bourdieu’s work is guilty of assuming a body unaffected by impairment or disablement, his theory can offer a comprehensive understanding of micro/macro aspects of disability which enables an analysis of individual, societal and institutional positioning of disability. Bourdieu’s habitus enables us to think about the position of disabled people within social space through a comprehensive understanding of capital and their relative values within this social space. In so doing, Bourdieu also provides us with a mode of understanding the point of view of those in these social spaces. The next chapter will review some of the existing work within disability studies before introducing Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and hexis and their application to disability as well as a discussion of some of his criticisms.
Chapter 2
Disability, Bourdieu and Bodies

2.1 Introduction

The first chapter has shown how disability occupies an increasingly precarious position within the context of neo-liberal Britain, evidencing the problematic conciliation of disabled people with ‘legitimate citizen’ status. For all that is wrong with the welfare cuts, they are one of many aspects of exclusion that disabled people face (Birrell, 2015). This chapter will begin by reflecting on the contemporary models of understanding disability before suggesting that the work of Bourdieu may provide useful in explaining the multifaceted exclusion that some disabled people face. It will be suggested that where other models of disability variously lack embodied, cultural or political perspectives, Bourdieu’s framework enables an account of these three elements as simultaneously entwined.

Drawing upon many of his writings, this chapter will look at Bourdieu’s work on class, embodiment, value and practice which enables a discussion of the relationship between bodies and social inequalities. Arguably Bourdieu’s most famous work, Distinction (1984) develops a theory of aesthetic judgement and stratification which demonstrates how tastes (and distastes) are related to and reflective of an individual’s classed position. At the heart of understanding how we become aesthetically differentiated is the conceptualisation of the body as “bearer of symbolic value” (Shilling 2003: 111). This chapter will address the centrality of the body to Bourdieu’s social theory and critically assess how he conceived of social action in terms of unconscious and embodied dispositions which enable unthinking ways of being in the world before addressing the impact of class on the body and habitus. For Bourdieu (1984), class, class tastes and the habitus are heavily mediated by the body and its incorporated dispositions as well as reliant upon the stability of the habitus for the social reproduction of bodies. However, in his focus on class and how class is embodied, he has sidelined other distinctions which qualify us with value, such as disability.
This chapter will therefore examine the significance of embodied differentiation and the importance of aesthetics and value through an analysis of Bourdieu’s work on (dis)taste, arguing that his work on class *taste* is not sufficient in explaining how bodies become valued or devalued and must acknowledge the wider doxic knowledge and corporeal ideologies against which bodies are measured. I will also demonstrate that although Bourdieu perceived his work as deeply embodied and thus portrays agents as both a physiological and social entity, his writing on the corporeal actually privileges cultural determinacy and bears no consideration to the instances in which impaired bodies do not comply with the ideals of cultural control.

I will then go on to show that much of what Bourdieu has to say about the deeply embodied nature of the habitus reflects and relies upon a presupposed non-disabled corporeality. In attempting to synthesise the social with the physiological, Bourdieu has overlooked the potential stickiness in this approach and at times, even overstated the biological underpinning and capacity of the habitus. I will therefore be advancing Bourdieu by bringing him into discussion with disability. This chapter ultimately intimates that the work of Bourdieu and disability studies have much to gain from one another. As Boys and Shakespeare (2009: 5) have suggested, using disability to understand the occupation of social space uncovers so much of what is “normally hidden” and in so doing, “can help minimize the symbolic violence within social relations and, in particular, within the relations of communication” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 17).

### 2.2 Understanding Disability

According to Thomas (2004: 569), within Britain there were two main domains in the sociology of disability, the first of which might be considered “‘disability studies’ proper”, an approach associated with the social model which locates disability as structured by exclusion, inequality and social oppression. The other domain is that of the medical sociology sub-genre of ‘the sociology of health and chronic illness’ in which disability is viewed in terms of illness and impairment, social suffering and disadvantage (Thomas, 2004). More recently, a *critical* disability studies has emerged, closely related
to the North American approach which has often gone by the name of *cultural* disability studies and which seeks to deconstruct and unsettle ideas about disability which permeate society (Goodley, 2012, Shakespeare, 2014, Vehmas and Watson, 2014).

Whilst the social model has its roots in 1960s and 1970s activism (associated with the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, UPIAS), up until the 1990s, disability was largely thought of in medical, curative and rehabilitative terms, highlighting the role of psychology, social work and special needs treatment in disabled peoples’ lives (Barnes, 2012; Goodley, 2012). Emphasis placed upon a person’s productivity worked to Other disabled bodies as deficient and inferior entities, serving to substantiate medical discourse as a definitive institution, legitimised in its fixing of unconventional and unproductive bodies (Abberley, 1987; Finkelstein, 1990). This medical labelling sustained the belief that disability was a private and personal tragedy which was to be overcome and portrayed the idea that the root cause of experience and disadvantage was individual impairment (Oliver, 1996; Crow, 1996). These traditional, medical and individualistic understandings of disability have gradually been replaced by the socio-political account known widely as the ‘social model’ (Barnes, 2000). This perspective has tended to focus on “materialist, neo-Marxist and structuralist perspectives” of disability which have historically excluded disabled people from the mainstream (Goodley et al, 2012: 3). As we saw in chapter one, the historical exclusion of disabled people has often been attributed to a combination of classical liberal thinking, industrial change, increased medicalisation and social Darwinist and eugenicist thinking (Barnes, 2012).

For many disability activists and scholars, the social model of disability is the only appropriate and effective definition and analysis of disability, functioning as an “ideological litmus test of disability politics”, without which it is alleged there can be no political progress or social movement of disabled people (Shakespeare and Watson, 2001: 3; Shakespeare, 2014). In identifying the dominant non-disabled values and practices which permeate society, the social model highlighted how vast sections of society were constructed as off
limits to those with impairments whilst at the same time constructing the idea that these individuals should be separated from mainstream society (Hughes and Paterson, 1997). The social model also highlights a distinction made between biologically based impairment and disability, distinguishing disability as a social situation which arises from the unnecessary exclusions, disadvantages and restrictions imposed on top of impairment by contemporary social organisation (Oliver, 1996; Shakespeare and Watson, 2001). Conceptualising impairment as separate from disability in this way lead Oliver (1996) to argue that disability was entirely social and relegated impairment as theoretically unimportant (Thomas, 2007). The social model therefore provided the political strategy of removing barriers which denied disabled people full citizenship as well as a new positive way of thinking about disability as rooted in social oppression rather than individual deficit (Shakespeare and Watson, 2001; Hughes and Paterson, 1999). For Shakespeare (2006), the social model could be said to have provided disabled people with an intra-psychic buffer against medicalised negativity which may otherwise threaten an individual’s psycho-emotional qualities of self-esteem, self-respect and self-confidence which he posits as integral to our life-project. At the same time, Shakespeare (2014) has also acknowledged that the medical model and medical sociology have become besmirched terms within disability studies, despite their increased recognition of how environmental and social factors contribute to disability. In point of fact, the sub-field of medical sociology known as the sociology of chronic illness and disability is going through a period of transition as a result of the engagement between medical sociology and disability studies (Scambler and Scambler, 2010).

The success of the social model in politicising social and physical space and in defining disability as a form of oppression imposed through problematic social organisation is widely recognised (Hughes and Paterson, 1997, Goodley, 2012). However, in constructing disability as social and political exclusion and as a matter of citizenship, the social model has relegated impairment to the biomedical domain and failed to include an embodied, subjective account of the diverse social and political experiences of impairment (Hughes and
Paterson, 1997, Hughes, 2004). Whilst impairment is the logical prerequisite of disability, the social model was said to rely entirely upon the “conceptual severing of any causal connection between impairment and disability” (Thomas, 2004: 571). As Crow (1996) has suggested, the reluctance of the social model to engage with impairment reflects an impractical denial of the body for fear that it should be perceived as broken, weak and vulnerable and thereby grant legitimacy to the prejudices against impaired bodies. Whereas the various corporealities of other civil right movement groups (such as sexuality, skin colour, sex) are not intrinsically unpleasant, difficult or problematic, impairment can constitute painful and unmanageable embodiment (Crow, 1996). This silencing of impairment within social model thinking therefore produces it as a taboo topic and denies the subjective experiences that disabled people have of their bodies (Crow, 1996). In this respect, the classical social barriers approach to disability has prioritised the experiences of disabled men (Morris, 1991) even though the experience of disability is interwoven with issues of sex, gender, race and so on (Thomas, 1999). Crow (1996) therefore suggests that changing the perceptions and interpretations of impairment is crucial to ameliorating the disabling attitudes of society but that impairment must be included as part of the experience of disability for the sake of peoples own physical and psychological well-being. Similarly, Shakespeare (1994) has recommended the re-conceptualisation of the social model to acknowledge that people with impairments are disabled by prejudice which manifests in cultural representation, language, socialization and interpersonal relations.

Thomas (2004) notes that the social model perspective arose partly from thinking from Vic Finkelstein in the 1970s when he stated that disability could be regarded in one of two ways, as either a personal tragedy or a form of social oppression and that it was imperative that disability should be seen as the latter. Finkelstein’s thinking at the time was in response to the social treatment of disabled people “in its welfarist form: residential care, minimal benefits, exclusion from employment and the educational mainstream, and blocks on access to the built environment” (Thomas, 2004: 571). Whilst Finkelstein acknowledged that living with impairment could feel like a
personal tragedy and that it could impose substantial difficulties, this should remain a private matter and personal experiences should only be discussed if it promoted wider social change (Thomas, 2004). As such, it has been suggested that the social model does not automatically preclude understandings of impairment as a source of disability and that this kind of criticism arises from the model being largely interpreted as a social barriers approach which has diluted the early social relational thinking of its proponents (Thomas, 2004). For Thomas (2004: 580), a social relational account of disability is “sorely needed within disability studies” and would provide an understanding of disability as only coming into play when “restrictions of activity experienced by people with impairment are socially imposed”, therefore acknowledging that impairments may restrict activity but that this does not automatically constitute disability. These might be better understood as impairment effects:

“Impairment effects: the direct and unavoidable impacts that ‘impairments’ (physical, sensory, intellectual, emotional) have on individuals’ embodied functioning in the social world. Impairments and impairment effects are always bio-social and culturally constructed in character, and may occur at any stage in the life course” (Thomas, 2010: 37).

Thomas (2010: 37) therefore suggests that a new sociology of disability would revolve around disablism, defined as “the social imposition of avoidable restrictions on the life activities, aspirations and psycho-emotional well-being of people categorised as ‘impaired’ by those deemed ‘normal’”. This approach would recognise that impairment is significant in the lives of disabled people but that this is not the main focus in the study of battling disability as social oppression (Thomas, 2004).

Shakespeare and Watson (2001) have pointed to understanding disability as “embodied ontology” which would argue that there is no qualitative difference between disabled and non-disabled people because “No one’s body works perfectly, or consistently, or eternally” and that as part of the human condition, we are all inherently vulnerable and frail and limited by our bodies. The task is therefore exposing how the continuum of embodiment is
translated into a dichotomy between able-bodied and disabled (Shakespeare and Watson, 2001). They raise that whilst an embodied ontology approach would highlight our universal mortality, there remains a proportion of people who face further disabling practice. Understanding these exclusionary and discriminatory practices which falsely dichotomises the continuum of embodiment is therefore key to producing an empowering disability studies (Shakespeare and Watson, 2001). However, Hughes (2007: 677) has noted that whilst in theory this approach seems to ameliorate the existential negativity associated with disability, it does so at the expense of a politicised disability identity and therefore only delivers a “hollow scholastic victory”. In appealing to frailty of the universal condition, disabled people are impelled to make a claim to humanity, a requisite not necessarily expected of those who are non-disabled (Hughes, 2007). Moreover, whilst the ontological negativity may be removed from the categories of impairment and disability, Hughes (2007) notes that negative lived experience is not so easily negated so long as the normative non-disabled body remains undisrupted within the public imaginary. As Bourdieu (2000: 65) might have argued “To grant ‘humanity’ to all, but in a purely formal way, is to exclude from it, under the appearance of humanism, all those who are deprived of the means of realizing it”. This “purely theoretical universalization leads to a fictitious universalism” which can only be sustained so long as there are no reminders of the social and economic conditions which mediates access to this universalism (Bourdieu, 2000: 65).

What is more, theorising embodiment in this way seems to “give way to a body that is over-endowed with nature and over-determined by its natural limitations” (Hughes, 2007: 677). For Hughes (2007), disability questions about ontology should therefore problematise non-disablement and reveal the forms of invalidation at the centre of disabling culture. The social model has therefore been well critiqued for the way in which it constructs the rigid dichotomy between impairment and disability, creating an unsustainable distinction in the binary of social vs. biological (Hughes and Paterson 1999; Shakespeare and Watson, 2001). Noting the “untenable separation between body and culture, impairment and disability”, Hughes and Paterson (1997),
amongst others (Morris, 1991; Crow, 1992; Shakespeare and Watson, 2001), called for the expansion of the social model to include embodied notions of disability and experiences of the social nature of impairment. In “bringing the body back in”, a dialogue between disability studies and the sociology of the body has created opportunities to further disability identity discourses. However, Hughes (2009a: 400) notes that this dialogue has been “profoundly uneasy because it threatens to undo the distinction between disability and impairment that is at the core of social model thinking”. Shakespeare (2014: 22) has noted that this distinction between biological impairment and structural disability is “conceptually and empirically very difficult to sustain”, evidencing the experience of stigma and discrimination as an area in which individual deficits and social responses become entangled and thus obscure the contribution of each factor. Moreover, impairments can cause discomfort and pain and this is a consequence of the interaction of “physiological, psychological and socio-cultural factors” and therefore can never be fully separated from the social (Shakespeare, 2014: 22). As Reeve (2006) has argued, the social model of disability has ignored anything to do with the psychological in case the individual tragedy model of disability is evoked by suggesting that disabled people may need some psychological help.

Hughes (2009a: 399) has also talked about the ventures of sociology into disability as conflating it with the ontology of human frailty or being purely descriptive when accounting for structural exclusion and as a result “tells us very little about the specific forms of invalidation experienced by disabled people”. He suggests that tropes such as wounded, monstrous and abject may tell us about the processes through which disabled people are misrecognised but do not fully explain the experiences of disabled lives.

Cultural disability studies in America is more entrenched in the liberal arts and humanities (Hughes, 2009a) and like critical disability studies (CDS), have been keen to demonstrate how disability has been ideologically constructed and therefore seeks to deconstruct and destabilise contemporary understandings of disability (Goodley, 2012). Shildrick (2012: 31) has raised that the socio-political gains and materialist understanding of disability is not
sufficient and that social model thinking has neglected subjectivity, and posits that the primary question that all those in disability studies must be concerned with is why is society “so unsettled by non-normative forms of embodiment”? To this, she adds that we “should try to understand the psychosocial dimensions which mobilise normative exclusions” (Shildrick, 2012: 35). She raises that whilst we have seen the “formal integration of disabled people into the standard rights, obligations and expectations of normative citizenship” and despite the huge variation in human bodies, to be disabled is to be exceptional and seen as not properly human. The proper attributes of personhood are elaborated as agency, autonomy, rationality, control over one’s body, and a “clear distinction between self and other” (Shildrick, 2012: 32). For Shildrick (2012: 35) we have to go beyond the formal model in which disabled people are invoked to “maximise their status of good citizens of the neo-liberal polity” and instead “must seek ways of first critiquing and then transforming the nature of those entrenched and scarcely acknowledged obstacles to fundamental change”. In order to contest the ableist values underpinning such normative functioning CDS focuses on:

“The significance of embodiment; an awareness of the workings of the cultural imaginary; a deconstruction of binary thought in favour of the fluidity of all categories; and a recognition that emotion and affect are as important as the material aspects of life”. (Shildrick, 2012: 32)

For Shildrick (2012: 35), the disabled body has the potential performative capacity to radically queer and disrupt normative embodiment and thus directly challenge the attitudes and able-bodied values of society. As Goodley (2012) suggests, when we examine disability closely the reality of the disabled or impaired body begins to break down, advocating the conceptualisation of the body as fluid and that disabled bodies can performatively and productively challenge the normative ideas of able-bodiedness. However, this neglects that to take part in these kinds of performative politics presupposes access to other forms of capital and neglects the “inextricable entwinement of material and discursive relations” (McNay, 2004: 182). For disabled people, the material and economic inequalities that so often characterize their lives can and do have alienating consequences for political agency and their investment in it. This is to say
that prolonged exposure to inequalities and social suffering can create feelings of disempowerment and resignation and therefore neglects the deeply embodied dispositions which make acting in our best political interest more challenging (McNay, 2014). To suggest that performative politics is a liberating practice that agents can adopt therefore ignores that this type of political agency falls well outside the norms of everyday life for many disabled people. Moreover, it is “naive, even dangerous to suppose and suggest that one has only to ‘deconstruct’ these social artefacts in a purely performative celebration of ‘resistance’ in order to destroy them” (Bourdieu, 2000: 108). The affirmative approach of performative politics therefore overlooks the depoliticising and disempowering effect that inequality and social suffering may exert on subjectivities (McNay, 2014). As will be further developed in the remaining chapters, the insidiousness of disabling practices draws its strength and efficacy from the deeply embodied doxic knowledge of disability and doxic structures and is not reducible to simply a matter of discourse. This is to say that a belief and commitment to the able-bodied norm and its value is not ideological (although it may be ideologically reinforced) because it does not have to be stated. Moreover, to performatively disrupt discourse does not equate to a transformation of subjectivity, practice or structure. As Bourdieu (2000: 108) states, we can “doubt the reality of a resistance which ignores the resistance of ‘reality’”.

In this respect, there are those who have questioned the political impact of CDS, suggesting that it may be more appropriate to speak of a mildly critical disability studies (Barry Barnes cited in Shakespeare, 2014: 56).

Vehmas and Watson (2016) have also noted that in reducing disability to discursive norms, these analyses fail to explore “the economic processes, the social relational and organizational life and the material interests and other non-discursive forms of power that create disability”. In this respect, CDS neglects “the complex ensembles of power where systemic forms of oppression mediate embodied identity” (McNay, 2008: 120). In addition to this, Vehmas and Watson (2016) have recently highlighted that normativity has taken on a pejorative meaning within critical disability studies due to it being conflated with ideas about what is normal or the normate and
therefore being viewed as a major source of oppression experienced by
disabled people. They point out that if we muddle the concept of normativity
with the trope of normality, we may “restrict or even prevent fruitful
evaluative discussion on important ethical and political issues that relate to
disabled people’s lives” (Vehmas and Watson, 2016: 2). Conceptualising
normativity as a broad term to cover “evaluative judgements of an ethical
sort” they note that normative thinking is concerned with what kind of
practices we should or ought to do in order to provide people with the good
life. In this respect, they argue that the ideals of normative ethics are not
the problem but the way in which they are applied and used to discriminate
against disabled people leading them to caution that “we should be careful
not to throw out the baby with the water” (Vehmas and Watson, 2016: 8).

Vehmas and Watson (2014) also highlight that CDS has attempted to show
how the binary thinking about disability and able-bodiedness deceives people
into valuing one side of this division over the other and that the solution is to
deconstruct such binary thinking so that identities can be produced “free
from the normative constraints imposed” by such a dualism. In these terms,
disability is seen to be a socially produced difference which has negative
ramifications in terms of social arrangement for those who fall into the
category. Social organisation which reifies or enforces this negative
difference are therefore morally wrong, and as such, demonstrates that CDS
“contains strong normative dimension that implies what is right or wrong as
regards social arrangements”. However, they also point out that CDS treats
impairment as though it is part of a spectrum of acceptable embodiment,
neglecting that “some forms of embodiment are preferential to others” and
that impairment effects are neither neutral nor benign and have very real
and visceral consequences for experience. This is to say that “one reason why
people generally prefer not to have impairments is ethical” (Vehmas and
Watson, 2014: 641). In this respect, while CDS demonstrate a commitment to
normative questions about what is good or bad regarding social organisation,
they fail to take on the normative dimension of living with impairment.
Williams (1999) characterises this kind of commitment to the discursive nature of the body as one which constructs the body as though it doesn’t really matter at all. This is said to reduce the body to “what is known about it” so that statements about the body are assessed in terms of the systems of knowledge we have of bodies, that is, epistemologically rather than ontologically. Vehmas (2012) suggests that an ontological discussion of disability has significant political ramifications because of the way in which our understanding of certain phenomena inevitably instructs social and institutional responses to it.

Vehmas (2012) makes the distinction between brute facts as those facts which exist independently of human beings, and institutional or social facts, those which can exist only within human institutions. Before we can agree on a social fact, we must have a physical realisation of this in the form of a brute fact, a thing upon which we can impose social functions. Vehmas (2012) expands that social facts are therefore hierarchically structured and exist atop brute facts. This leads Vehmas (2012) to the inevitable critique of the social model of disability as ontologically insufficient in that disability cannot be entirely conceptualised in terms of the institutional fact of oppression without the underlying brute fact of physical impairment. Vehmas (2012: 301) therefore states that ontological analysis must address the “physical origins of impairment and the relational nature of disability” so that we may identify, with the aim to eradicate, both the social and physiological factors of distress. This is said to afford us greater flexibility and efficiency in our aims to increase equality and well-being when we are able to identify whether people require physical or social responses, or both (Vehmas, 2012). Disability and impairment as phenomena are therefore composed of both natural and social factors; impairment refers to natural properties which, in certain situations, limit functionality although the limiting properties of the environment can be explained in terms of social facts as well (Vehmas, 2012). Vehmas (2012: 301) states that impairment therefore always involves a physical or organic basis, “a condition of some sort which is seen as undesirable regarding people’s organic or social functioning”. As Williams (1999) notes “The body in short, diseased or otherwise, is a real entity, no
matter what we call it or how we observe it”. As such, no matter how fluid you envisage embodiment and no amount of unsettling ideas about disability breaks down the visceral realities of impairment.

At this stage I would like to suggest that Bourdieu can provide some important contributions to understanding disability. Whilst the social model provides strong political purchase in its social barriers approach and rejection of medical labelling, it has been criticized as failing to fully incorporate an understanding of impairment and, as Thomas (2004) has argued, has not made best use of its social relational approach. I would argue that Bourdieu provides a relational approach which is simultaneously political, embodied and cultural. Bourdieu has refused to separate the micro and macro aspects of social life and through his conceptualization of the political economy of symbolic power, fuses together an approach to practice which is both phenomenological and structural (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

For Bourdieu, the body, conceptualized as habitus and bodily hexis, is inherently socio-political and expressive of our relation to power. Bourdieu illuminates how unequal relations of power are disguised as natural and posits that the role of the sociologist should be to “destroy the myths that cloak the exercise of power and the perpetuation of domination” through denaturalizing and defatalizing the social world (Wacquant, in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 49). This commitment to uncovering hidden exclusion allows us to identify not only the disabling material and organisational structures which exclude disabled people, but also the mental dispositions emerging from and constitutive of this exclusionary practice.

Bourdieu’s work also incorporates a phenomenological and corporeal perspective through his analysis of embodied practice and how we develop ways of being through preferences, dispositions and leanings. Based on our social position, an agent will develop a sense of ease or unease, belonging or alienation, our bodies will remind us when we are in and out of place and socially guide us through our tastes and distastes, our discomfort, and
through feeling as though we have a right to be. As well as this, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of symbolic power also enables us to think through the complex mutuality of material and symbolic relations and provides an account of how the disabling social order interacts with a psychic framework of disablism through doxa and symbolic capital which I will cover in Chapter Three. I will also suggest that although Bourdieu did not contend with normative thought within his own work, doxa provides a useful way of conceptualising how normative judgements pervade and help consolidate our practice as well as how these judgements may become negatively skewed by the symbolic power of doxa. The embodied experience of symbolic capital demonstrates Bourdieu’s sensitivity to the existential toll of symbolic struggle and opens up space in which to develop a psychosocial understanding of the habitus, disability and inequality, which I will discuss in Chapter Four. Moreover, his thinking allows us to conceptualise disability as composed of both social and organic factors.

I suggest then that a Bourdieusian approach to disability can provide complex analyses at the level of the body, psychological, cultural, social and political. Whilst recognising there are problems with some of Bourdieu’s work “we should best defend his achievements by putting his theories to work in fresh ways, yet always, of course, with a critical gaze” (Fowler, 2003: 487). The chapter will now introduce how the work of Bourdieu can contribute to disability studies, indicating some of his criticisms before developing an account of the importance of the body to his project. Integral to this account is a consideration of Bourdieu’s most powerful analytical tool, the habitus.

2.3 Bourdieu

Bourdieu’s work has been subject to an array of fierce criticisms with many of his critics arguing that his work is overly deterministic, pessimistic and displays a reproductionist bias (Crossley, 2002; Shilling, 2003; Jenkins, 1992).

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7 Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) would argue that his critics view him as in favour of a pessimistic determinism when in truth, he sees it as his job to report on the nature of things, even if he did not approve of this nature. Moreover, he envisages the habitus as having the potential to disrupt determinisms through providing socio-analysis of the self. This will be further developed in the Chapter Five.
For many, Bourdieu’s writings are notoriously verbose and have been criticised for their abstruse, often imprecise and muddied quality (Jenkins, 1992). According to Jenkins (1992), the esoteric nature of Bourdieu’s work has alienated many would-be readers and as such rendered him a theorist to be read about rather than critically engaged with and has therefore largely precluded the potential expansion of his concepts. At the same time, it is Bourdieu’s enigmatic writing style which has equipped his social theory with a certain slipperiness, granting it an equivocal status which permits multiple interpretations of his work and allows for it “to mean all things to all people” (Jenkins, 1982: 271).

Bourdieu (1984: xi) cautioned his readers that his work would strike them as “very French”, acknowledging that the French intellectual field informed his ambition to tackle Kant’s critique of judgement. Noting that his work’s focus has been the persistence of Parisian model of ‘court society’, Bourdieu (1984) suggests that his model of relationships may be more broadly applied, even when based on a system of distinctive features and social differences which varies considerably from his own research. Bourdieu (1984: xii) therefore encouraged his readers to “correct my mistakes and perhaps pursue the search for equivalents”. It is in this vein that this thesis seeks to theorise how (British, neo-liberal) society produces systems of classification which structures the position, perception and experience of disability.

Wacquant (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) has highlighted that much of Bourdieu’s work is read in bits and pieces and that this fragmented and partial reading of Bourdieu has resulted in his work being largely misinterpreted and misunderstood. At the same time, Bourdieu’s work was very much a work in progress which unfolded over a great length of time and in different analytical spaces (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) and so as might be expected, it is hard to find a concise and comprehensive account in which he brings all of his work together. Wacquant (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 5) expands that English-speaking readers of Bourdieu have tended to cluster around one of his major books (namely Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture for specialists in education and Distinction
for sociologists of culture and class), treating them in isolation to much of his other writings and thereby ignoring the substantive theoretical connections and developments which permeate his work. However, Bourdieu’s writing is so vast and abstruse that it seems unfair to expect anyone to be deeply familiar with even a moderate portion of it or that a partial understanding is somehow the fault of the reader. Two decades later, Swartz (2013) reiterates that within the United States and Britain, Bourdieu remains to be seen as a sociologist of culture, class and education or as an anthropologist, making the application of Bourdieu in disability studies seem perhaps less than obvious. Whilst his work may be primarily associated with class, culture and education, Bourdieu’s social theory has been successfully developed in various ways to advance discussions on gender and attendant notions of identity and social order, progressing understandings of gender relations and hierarchies as well as an analysis of their own self-evidence (Thorpe, 2009).

Adkins (2004) states that although Bourdieu’s social theory paid relatively little attention to gender or women\(^8\) (with the exception of his later work in *Masculine Domination*), his work has been adapted by numerous feminists to analyse problems of agency, social movements, recognition, power and embodiment.

It is important to raise that there are those who have argued that Bourdieu is in danger of treating other features of embodiment (such as sex, gender, sexuality and race) as peripheral to that of social class in terms of positioning (Lovell, 2000; Reay, 2004). As has already been noted, this could equally be said of disability and it might also be argued that this is a trait he shares with early disability studies. For Bourdieu, the habitus is acquired through socialisation and therefore will reflect the socio-economic conditions in which it exists. However, the socialisation of the habitus will also reflect values and practices not reducible to class alone; it will reflect the relational conditions we encounter in our interactions with others as well as the physical and cultural environmental conditions in which we live. In this

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\(^8\) It could be argued that Bourdieu (1977) did write quite a bit on women and gender in Kabyle society but that this is not the kind of work on gender that feminists have sought. As Reay (2004: 436) has noted, although Bourdieu’s theoretical framework allows an examination of gender domination his focus has primarily been on “gender divisions in Algeria in the 1960s”.
respect, the socialisation of the habitus' will have important bearing on the values attached to disability (as well as gender, sexuality, race).

Barton (1993) has advised that in attempting to understand the exclusion of disabled people, we need to understand material conditions (given that disabled people are often out of work, dependent upon welfare or at the bottom of the income ladder [Borsay, 2005]), social relations and ideology. This is important because “Being disabled entails social and economic hardships as well as assaults upon self-identity and emotional well-being. However, the difficulties and responses to being disabled are influenced by class, race, gender and age. These can cushion or compound the experience of discrimination and oppression” (Barton 1993: 238). I suggest that a Bourdieusian approach to disability enables us to think about the position of disabled people within social space through a comprehensive understanding of the habitus, capital and their relative values within this social space. In so doing, the habitus provides us with a mode of understanding the point of view of those in these social spaces and therefore provides us with a way of thinking of both the agent’s position and dispositions (Lovell 2002). Therefore the dispositions of the habitus will correspond not only to social class, but to intersecting features of embodiment like sex, race and disability.

Also worth noting is that Bourdieu has rarely been read as a political sociologist but the epicentral position of symbolic power and the concomitant significance of representation, legitimacy and misrecognition within his work constitute untapped concepts with which to think about politics9 (Wacquant, 2004). What perhaps makes Bourdieu so useful in thinking about disability is how he seeks to uncover the double naturalisation of the socio-political order, that is, the naturalisation of value, legitimacy and politics in things and in bodies which are themselves naturalised (Wacquant, 2004). For Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1990; 2000), bodies are inherently political. This work is interested in how Bourdieu’s theory provides an account of power as it manifests at macro, micro and meso levels, and specifically in and through

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9 Swartz (2013) has also observed that Bourdieu has been fundamentally concerned (if overlooked) with power and politics. This will be further explored within Chapter Three.
bodies. Bourdieu’s commitment to revealing power in its disguised forms as well as the significance of the body within his theory makes his analysis a potent political and embodied sociology for disability studies. As we saw in Chapter one, the inequality and exclusion that disabled people face is undoubtedly mediated by experiences of material poverty and socio-economic structure, but inequality and disabling attitudes extend much further, becoming embodied in everyday practices and thinking. The chapter will now examine the habitus and body within Bourdieu’s work in order to show the deeply embodied nature of practices and the importance of dispositions, as well as their capacity to function as means of inclusion and exclusion through (dis)tastes.

2.4 Habitus and Bodies as Bearers of Value

At the heart of Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory lies the body as a “bearer of symbolic value” (Shilling, 2003: 111). Central to this statement is an assessment of the body as a form of physical capital which is both reflective of and constituted by an individual’s social location and which possesses “power, status and distinctive symbolic forms” (Shilling, 2003: 111). In this sense, Bourdieu positions the body at the centre of understanding the social, cultural and political and as such, body management becomes integral to the process of acquiring status and distinction (Shilling, 2003). This analysis of the body illuminates the extent to which it has developed as a more nuanced form of physical capital, referring not only to the way in which physical bodies are converted as a form of labour power but how they are produced as symbolic forms of capital which possess different values in different fields (Shilling, 2003). Conceiving of the body in this way enables a richer understanding of the exercise of power through bodies as a result of the specifically classed and classifiable ways of relating to our bodies.

Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1990) stated that the various physical acts necessary for social action come to shape our bodies in very visceral ways, instilling deeply embedded corporeal dispositions and creating stable forms of bodily comportment allegorical of the classed conditions of existence of which they are a part. Bodies are therefore said to be marked by social class through
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three interrelated means; social location, the habitus and taste (Shilling, 2003). As such, it is helpful to think of the body in and through the habitus when trying to unpack the topic of embodiment within Bourdieu’s social theory.

According to Bourdieu (1990), social action should not be thought of in terms of compliance to objective rules nor as the consequences of rational thinking from free subjects but instead as embodied dispositions developed through the experiential interplay of objectivism/subjectivism, structure and agency. The social world, as perceived through our own body, inculcates a corporeal understanding or embodied sense of the wider social structures and relationships within the field and our bodily relation to it, characterised as the habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). Bourdieu (1977: 72) states that the habitus contains “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures...[it is] an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted” (1977: 95). This is to say that individuals possess a cognitive structure that internalises the external structures and conditions that they encounter in everyday life which then informs their thoughts, behaviour and actions. These subjective schemas in turn come to shape the external world through the actions and meaning that individuals exert upon it, which in turn can influence and develop the antecedent schema, demonstrating the synergistic quality of the habitus. This demonstrates how the body “is not a passive component in politics. It may well be shaped by social relationships, but it also actively contributes to the shape that they take” (Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 600).

There are those that suggest that this simply affirms the workings of the habitus as a “closed feedback loop” (Jenkins, 1992: 51). Bourdieu’s use of “structured structures” in describing cognitive dispositions certainly seems to play into the hands of his critics who argue that his theory produces automatons who cannot help but reproduce the social order (Jenkins, 1992). Similarly, Archer (2010: 123) has argued that this conceptualisation of the fit between the habitus and space is unsustainable given that “social life is an
open system” and that people’s practice can never be understood as *entirely routinised*. For Archer (2010) this apparent feedback loop between the habitus and field produces thought which is considered to be unreflexive and unconscious.

In this case I would argue that both Archer (2010) and Jenkins (1992) emphasise the durability of the habitus rather than the transposable and generative quality Bourdieu attempted to portray. Although Bourdieu certainly emphasised the long-lasting nature of dispositions he never envisaged them as permanent or impervious to change (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). For Bourdieu, it was important to understand how the habitus was interlocked with his other concepts of *capitals* and *field* so that practice was understood as the relationship between the habitus and the nature of our current circumstances (Maton, 2008). In this sense, the habitus and the field represent the “objective and subjective realisations of the same underlying social logic” which, whilst mutually forming each other are also both evolving so that the relation between the two is “ongoing, dynamic and partial” (Maton, 2008: 56). As such, the habitus and field do not necessarily match perfectly and the relationship between the two will be characterised by degrees of fit and mismatch, ease and unease (Bourdieu, 2000). Bourdieu stated that the fit between the habitus and field can range from a “perfect mutual fit”, to “out of sync” and even “radical disjunction” (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 130). Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) therefore argued that practical logic characterized through the immediate fit of the habitus to field is perhaps the most prevalent mode of practice but did not rule out reflexive practice. It might therefore be suggested that it is Jenkins who misunderstands agents as bearers of social structures whereas Bourdieu conceptualises the mediatory importance of agents in the activation of social practices, it is the agent who makes a difference (even if that difference is small) in the sequence of events (Hage, 1994).

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10 As we will see in Chapter Five, within the last decade of his life Bourdieu (2000; 2007) portrayed a more transformative side to the habitus through notions of the *habitus clive* and *destabilised habitus*. Within the remaining chapters, I will indicate that there may be more space for reflexive practice than Bourdieu acknowledged through my analysis of doxa, symbolic capital and power as well as through Bourdieu’s (1992; 2000) little used concept of hysteresis.
Bourdieu (1990; 1977: 94) stressed the unconscious and corporeal nature of this practice, indicating that “the principles embodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation”. The individual then, as a social body, arbitrates and reconciles between the subjective and objective conditions of existence, producing unthinking ways of being which enable the actor to pre-consciously comprehend the world, constituting an embodied practical sense or practical logic. This unthinking way of being is characterised by the ontological complicity or ‘sense of fit’ between the habitus and field and which allows us to practice much of daily life intuitively and in the taken-for-granted way described by Bourdieu as doxic experience\(^{11}\) (Bourdieu, 1984; 1990; 2001). Our practice is predominately experienced as pre-reflexive agreement, a second nature or as a feel for the game (Bourdieu, 1984). As Sweetman (2003) and Crossley (2003) have both observed, we do not wake up each morning and decide how we will walk, talk, eat and so on, we cannot simply reprogram the self, but depending on where we are, we might also modify these behaviours. The habitus provides us with a means of understanding how practice comes so easily to us and the relative strength and enduringness of our dispositions and preferences as well as an embodied knowledge of where and when this practice is appropriate (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

The habitus, situated within a system of social stratification, is said to reflect the composition of capital and socialisation processes of the particular social location of the individual and creates a malleable understanding of the lifestyle appropriate to this position (Bourdieu, 1985; Inglis and Hughson, 2005). As Bourdieu (1977: 87) has stated:

> “in a class society, all the products of a given agent, by an essential overdetermination, speak inseparably and simultaneously of his class - or, more precisely, his position in the social structure and his rising or falling trajectory - and of his (or her) body - or, more precisely, all the properties, always socially qualified, of which he or she is the bearer -

\(^{11}\) The unthinking aspect of the habitus and naturalised belief will be further discussed in relation to doxa in the next chapter.
sexual properties of course, but also physical properties, praised like strength or beauty, or stigmatised”.

In consideration of this, we can identify that Bourdieu treats social position as deeply embodied and that his work highlights how our physical bodies and how we use them communicate our social position through the value attached to certain physical properties. Our relational position is inscribed in the body as a “way of bearing one’s body, presenting it to others, moving it, making space for it, which gives the body its social physiognomy” (Bourdieu, 1984: 474). The habitus, as located within the body, inculcates a world-view which impacts upon our physicality to such an extent that even the most mundane of bodily actions are said to reflect our social position (Shilling, 2003). Bourdieu (1984: 190) elaborates that the way in which people treat their bodies “reveals the deepest dispositions of the habitus” so that the body becomes the most “indisputable materialisation of class taste”. For Bourdieu (1984), the classed body is shaped in various ways, the first and foremost of which is the ostensibly natural characteristics of the body such as height, weight, shape, gait etc. These physical features are said to attest to a whole range of classed behaviours towards the body, how it is cared for, fed, maintained, exercised and put to work so that our bodies and their dispositions are said to reflect our class condition (Bourdieu, 1984). This is what Bourdieu (1984; 1990) refers to as bodily hexis and constitutes a basic way of sensing our social orientation and experiencing and expressing our social value.

Bodily hexis is assumed to convey the “deep being” and the “true ‘nature’” of a person and instils practical and ‘rationalised’ knowledge whereby psychological and moral qualities are associated with certain features of embodiment. For Bourdieu (2001: 64) “this language of nature, which is supposed to reveal both what is most hidden and what is most true, is in fact a language of social identity, thereby naturalised in...what is called ‘natural distinction’”. Bodies are comprehended through the habitus’ schemes of perceptions which reflect the evaluation of the body as it is located within

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12 I will return to this claim in the final section of this chapter to provide a critique of this over-determinism.
social space and hierarchizes properties amongst the dominant and dominated (Bourdieu, 2001). Bourdieu (2001: 65) suggests that our social representation of our body is therefore acquired through applying a “social taxonomy whose principle is the same as that of the bodies to which it is applied”. This leads Bourdieu (2001: 65, my emphasis) to state that:

“The gaze is not a simple universal and abstract power to objectify, as Sartre maintained: it is a *symbolic power* whose efficacy depends on the relative position of the perceiver and the perceived and on the degree to which schemes of perception and appreciation that are brought into play are known and recognised by the person to whom they are applied”.

Bourdieu’s work on the formation of bodily hexis will be critically assessed towards the end of this chapter with reference to the absence of impairment within his theorisation. The chapter will now look at bodily hexis as it relates to taste.

### 2.5 Taste and Differentiation

Identifying the role that the habitus plays in the formation of the bodily hexis, it is important to acknowledge the ways in which bodies correspond to the development of social taste, seen in the lifestyle choices and preferences of individuals which, whilst experienced as autonomous predilections are actually mediated by material constraints (Bourdieu, 1984; Shilling, 2003). This has led Bourdieu (1990: 69-70) to state, somewhat over-determinedly, that “bodily hexis is political mythology realised, *embodied*, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking”. Bourdieu (1984: 172) laboriously catalogued the elective affinities prescribed by different habitus’, noting that lifestyles represent the “systematic products of the habitus” which simultaneously emerge as a system of social classification as a result of agents’ misrecognition of cultural arbitraries. For Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1990), the cultural arbitrary refers to the cultural regularities and social hierarchies of the social order which appear natural and necessary but whose institutionalisation have no intrinsic basis. Rather, these regularities, hierarchies and modes of organisation appear self-evident and are recognised
because agents are socialised to anticipate them (Bourdieu, 1977; 1984; 1990).

For Bourdieu (2001; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), one of the most obviously arbitrary and misrecognised dominations is the domination of women through the naturalization of their bodies and practices as inferior. Our misrecognition is therefore that we understand the social order as self-evident and fail to realize, or rather that we are successfully socialised so as not to see, that the social order is produced and reproduced through unequal relations of domination, instead recognizing it as a natural and inevitable outcome. As Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 168) capsulised “I call misrecognition the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such”. One example from a disability perspective might be that the social model likes to highlight the arbitrary cultural structures which exclude disability, but ignores the body as a source of experience and limitation. Bourdieu however acknowledges the cultural arbitrariies which exclude but acknowledges the body’s involvement in this exclusion. One such cultural arbitrary might be that we do not teach sign language and this excludes Deaf people[^13^], but, Deafness as embodied in our habitus and hexis has its own consequences for experience which would not be mediated by universal signing. This kind of misrecognised oppression will be further developed in my discussion of the disablism contained within doxa in Chapter Three.

The reproduction of the social order is maintained through the mutual befittingness and naturalisation of practice and structure and relies heavily upon an individual’s *sense of reality* and their *sense of limits* or more precisely, the *forgetting* of these limits (Bourdieu, 1977; 1984). Emerging out of a distinct social space, the habitus is structured through specific conditions reflective of our social location and produces individual and collective practices which are congruent to this social position (Bourdieu, 1990). The habitus as an “embodied history, internalised as second nature and so forgotten as history” enables infinite potentialities for action within a space

[^13^]: Or may even produce Deaf culture through this exclusion
which is circumscribed by the socially and historically specific context in which it develops (Bourdieu, 1990: 56). For Bourdieu (1990) it is this embodied history which grants agents their relative autonomy, that is, the reactivation of their past when faced with the imminence of the present. However, it is also the paradox of the habitus as “the unchosen principle of all ‘choices’”, it is this embodied history which inclines itself to self-reinforcing and self-validating experiences and therefore protects itself against circumstances which do not fit through excluding things which are ‘not for the likes of us’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 61; 1984: 478). As such, Bourdieu (1990) states that the logic of practice verifies itself by creating a vocational appeal in an individual’s undertakings, what he has termed an amor fati or love of fate.

The various ways in which our preferences and choices become inculcated through the habitus develop as ways of being or stylisations of life, some of which represent dominated lifestyles (Bourdieu, 1984). According to Bourdieu (1984: 175), this taste is born of “a virtue made of necessity which continuously transforms necessity into virtue by inducing ‘choices’ which correspond to the condition of which it is the product” resulting in an apparent contentedness with one’s own taste. Taste then, as a classificatory scheme, becomes a “generator of practices” harmonious to the social order in which it has developed, constructing “necessities into strategies, constraints into preferences” and naturalising amor fati, “the choice of destiny” and instilling a “sense of one’s place” (Bourdieu, 1984: 172-178; 466). Importantly, it is the naturalization of the order of things which renders inequalities and injustices politically invisible, and what Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) described as the disguised soft domination of symbolic violence. This sense of place and the experience of fit are important aspects of the habitus as it interacts with capital and field. Taste becomes “a class culture, turned into nature, that is, embodied” so that we might say taste as a feel for the game represents a further form of symbolic capital achieved through the correct application in practice (Bourdieu, 1984: 190, original italics). Each habitus is instilled with different values, beliefs and capitals which provides the agent with the feel for the game and as agents
move within fields, their habitus differentially equips them with this embodied know-how. Depending upon the various compositions of the habitus, agents will feel more or less at ease within certain fields and reminded when they are out of place.

This embodied history is said to ensure appropriate action across fields and through a process of reactivation in other areas, tends to self-perpetuate within the system of practice (Bourdieu, 1977; 1990). For this reason, history is said to repeat itself and the status quo is maintained (Jenkins, 1992). The inscription of social order in bodies through the taste of necessity is said to secure the relative inertia of the habitus through its proleptic adjustment to the conditions of existence, an adaptation which Bourdieu (1984) argued was most clearly felt by the working-classes. Thus, the taste of freedom or luxury is constituted in conditions of existence which are distanced from need or urgency (Bourdieu, 1984).

Bourdieu (1984; 1992) was quick to defend against accusations of mechanism, stating that whilst our experience of the world and our various stylisations of life are cognitively appreciated, this cognition is one of misrecognition owed to the fact that the dominated classes employ schemes of perception which are informed by the embodied relation of social power and so reflect the values of the dominant. Thus, in order for the most basic and unconscious principles of the working-class identity to be realised Bourdieu (1984: 384) stated that the dominated would have to see themselves “through the eyes of the dominant class, that is, in terms of the dominant definition of the body and its uses”.

It is easy to see why Bourdieu’s work has attracted so much criticism. His work appears, at times, overly deterministic and displays a strong reproductionist bias (Adams, 2006; Shilling, 2003). It seems that for Bourdieu, “agency is still a bounded process, compromised and attenuated, via habitus, by social structure and unconsciousness” (Adams, 2006: 515). Bourdieu’s (1990) stress on the unconsciousness of our guiding cognitive schemas makes it problematic to think of agents as anything more than self-reproducing
automatons and makes it “difficult to know where to place conscious deliberation and awareness in Bourdieu’s scheme of things” (Jenkins, 1992: 77, also cited in Adams, 2006). For Lovell (2000: 15), Bourdieu often reads as a structuralist “with an ‘oversocialized’ concept of the individual” who is compelled to become what they “always already” are. Bourdieu has often written too firmly on the dominated love of fate, stressing their “resigned accommodation” and “adaptive collusion at the expense of their unhappy consciousness” (Fowler, 2003: 474-486). As such, what Bourdieu may relegate to amor fati might instead be explained as the lack of opportunities to change one’s fate rather than a fatalistic acceptance of it (Lane, 2012).

Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1990) heavily emphasised the unconscious character of the habitus and its dispositions which he premised on their nature as embodied states. This is to say that because the dispositions of the habitus operate at an affective and embodied level, they lie beneath the scope of consciousness and are therefore resistant to change and remain in a state of relative inertia (Lane, 2012). Bourdieu (2000) contends that the simple raising of consciousness is not enough to politically liberate agents and would instead require a thorough counter-training involving deliberate and reiterated exercises in order to durably transform the habitus. According to Bourdieu (2000), the motivations of the dominated habitus - a social law made into a corporeal law - cannot be suppressed by will. He then, however, goes on to state that the agent who resists his dispositions is said to feel “betrayed by his body, which recognises paralysing taboos or calls to order” (2000: 180). Whilst this highlights how Bourdieu conceived of affect as reinforcing practice it seems to suggest that the habitus is more malleable and even contestable than Bourdieu largely portrayed and as a result rather than in spite of affectivity. However, it is this deeply internalized sense of unease and discomfort that makes modifying our practice so challenging.

Lane (2012) has argued that it is therefore crucial to challenge Bourdieu’s assumption that our capacity to question our habitus is mediated by our dominated relation. Instead, Lane (2012) has said that, contrary to Bourdieu’s belief in dispositions as affective, embodied and therefore pre-reflexive and
unconscious, agents are capable of questioning and rejecting the habitus on the basis of aversive emotions such as *disgust*. The crucial point then is not a question of capabilities for conscious reflection but instead the recognition of the relative chances to realise change by differentially socially situated agents. To illustrate, disabled people are less likely to own their home and are twice as likely to be in social housing than their non-disabled peers as well as being economically worse off (Pearson and Watson, 2007; Borsay, 2005). Given the shortage of accessible social housing and the shortage of funding to make adaptations, 300,000 disabled people are living, sometimes *trapped*, in unsafe and unsuitable homes and have little choice or control when it comes to choosing a more suitable place to live (Foster, 2015). The situation is therefore not one of *misrecognition* or collusion in a dominated relation but the lack of means (power and capital) to effect change.

In this respect, Bourdieu’s theorisation of agent’s choices as *amor fati* often seems to portray agents as affectively numbed dupes, neglecting that in some cases, choices are forced through circumstances which exist externally to class and may be unpleasant and generate suffering. It is hard to conceive of how a person who regularly experiences the pain and discomfort associated with impairment, or hate crime on the basis of their disability, or the worry that their disability might reduce employment opportunities or that they might lose their benefits, might come to *love* their fate. Instead it might more accurately be thought of as adapting to their lifestyle as we all do, and *getting on with it*, whilst simultaneously reflecting on how it might be improved. I am not denying that for some disabled people, their disability is a positive feature and something that they would not want to change, but for others, it can be less than pleasant. Bourdieu’s idea that the dominated do not comprehend their dominated position as problematic overlooks our capacities as agents who are concerned about our own welfare and well-being (Sayer, 2005). This will be further discussed in the remaining chapters.

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14 Questions of the unconscious and preconscious nature of affect and emotions will be more fully developed in Chapter Four.
Lane (2012) goes on to suggest that there is no reason to think that aversive reactions such as disgust cannot play a role in the drive for social change. However, there is perhaps more to be done in terms of understanding how exclusion and inequality produce disempowered dispositions. In defence of Bourdieu's durable affective dispositions, one could point to the pain we experience in the aftermath of a break-up when sometimes we know we shouldn’t love someone but it takes, amongst other things, time and experience to weaken this disposition. Note that Bourdieu was in the middle of his doctoral research on the phenomenology and temporal structures of affective life before he was called away by the Algerian war, drastically altering his theoretical focus (Grenfell, 2008). What this critique of the exclusion of affect perhaps illuminates is that Bourdieu’s habitus would benefit from a psychosocial re-theorisation to develop our understandings of the affective nature of habitus and practice. This is the focus of Chapter Four. It might also be argued that Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of amor fati as the working classes’ collusion in their own domination is most apparent within the very distinct analytical space of Distinction (1984)\(^{15}\), which as we know, and were warned, is very French. He subsequently argued that “habitus is not the fate that some people read into it” and instead conveys the probability associated with certain social conditions (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133).

Importantly, Bourdieu appeared to adopt a more flexible theorisation of the habitus as his work progressed. Bennett (2007) has highlighted that Bourdieu’s early writings emphatically endorsed the rigidity and uniformity of the habitus which ensured the logic of reproduction. Subsequently, Bennett (2007: 203) notes, Bourdieu’s theorising of the habitus becomes more elastic, providing more “probabilistic expectations” of practice rather than deterministic forecasts. Within Weight of the World (1999) Bourdieu recognises the suffering of those experiencing hysteresis, a mismatch between habitus and field, and observes their strategies for improvement. In this respect, Bourdieu recognises that the dominant know the suffering of

\(^{15}\) And perhaps Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990).
their dominated position, but that their position means that they are left with few feasible means of improving their lot. As well as this, within one of his final books, *Pascalian Meditations* (2000) Bourdieu acknowledges the capacity for habitus to be destabilised and transformed. Here, Bourdieu (2000) concedes that the habitus is more heterogeneous and characterised by the occupation of multiple and sometimes contradictory social positions than he accounted for within his earlier writings. Likewise, within *Masculine Domination* he notes that there are more opportunities for agents to contest meaning through the “partial indeterminacy of certain objects [which] authorises antagonistic interpretations, offering the dominated a possibility of resistance to the effect of symbolic imposition” (Bourdieu, 2001: 14). As we can see, Bourdieu’s thinking developed over a long period of time and his reworking of habitus (as well as doxa) show the import he placed on these concepts. Bourdieu (2000) admitted to overstating the reproductive logic of his work but countered that it was only to underline how much we take for granted. Despite his overstressing of *amor fati*, his work on the elective affinities and embeddedness of practice attributable to different lifestyles remains an important recognition of the static nature of everyday choices and practices.

Therefore, whilst Bourdieu’s theorisation of the deeply embodied habitus could be argued as displaying a strong inclination for over-determined and reproductive practice, this thesis would like to contend that this portrays a narrow conceptualisation of this analytical tool. These deterministic and reproductive readings of Bourdieu rely upon the perfect synchronicity of habitus and field to produce a self-reinforcing doxic adherence to the social order and neglect how Bourdieu’s theory developed over his career. As we shall see in following chapters, the match between the habitus and field is not a guarantee, leading us to think about how mismatches might be theorised and their potential to generate critical and reflexive thought. Importantly, Bourdieu’s habitus enables an understanding of the agents’ world-view, practice and experience which is located within a socio-political and historical context. Applied within disability studies, the habitus would allow us to focus on structural and material factors that characterise social
position, as well as a consideration of the perspective of the agent which is deeply embodied and therefore inclusive of the experience of impairment. The corporeal nature of the habitus demonstrates that the body has significant consequences in every aspect of life so that bodies, and impairment, would never be understood as separate to practice.

The chapter will now address issues of aesthetic value and differentiation through Bourdieu’s work on taste. This is an important consideration within disability studies as Hughes (1999: 155) argues the oppression of disabled people is not reducible “to social restrictions which are the outcome of structural determinations... the oppression of disabled people is also umbilically linked to the visual constitution of impairment” and is significant when thinking of how disabled people are made to feel in interactions with non-disabled people.

2.6 Differentiation and (Dis)Tasteful Bodies

Having demonstrated the way in which the habitus and social location is deeply embodied and the impact that this was said to have on lifestyle choices, this chapter will now examine how Bourdieu (1984) conceived of taste as an embodied capacity to differentiate. In exploring how bodies were differentiated as distasteful within his work, this section highlights the importance of the body as the physical basis for social inequality (Shilling, 2003).

According to Bourdieu (1984: 175), taste constitutes the acquired ability to differentiate and appreciate and therefore “…raises the differences inscribed in the physical order of bodies to the symbolic order of significant distinctions”. He elaborated that taste is “the capacity to discern aesthetic values - [it] is social necessity made second nature, turned into muscular patterns and bodily automatisms” (Bourdieu, 1984: 474). This lead Bourdieu (1984: 49) to state that “tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes, disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance (‘sick-making’) of the tastes of others”. According to Cregan (2006: 80), every aspect, disposition and use of the body is therefore said to “betray the habitus to which one
belongs” and produces ideas about body civility to which certain forms of deportment attest. These classed ways of being become durably inscribed in the body, creating distinct bodily forms which possess different values within different fields and are therefore central to Bourdieu’s process of social reproduction (Shilling 2003).

The depiction of working-class taste is frequently portrayed as vulgar and uncouth when juxtaposed against the pure taste of the upper classes (Bourdieu, 1984). The upper and middle classes are said to more closely align with the Kantian philosophy in which the notion of pure taste is allegedly derived through a disinterested and transcendental distance to objects (Bourdieu, 1984). In contrast, lower class taste is described in terms of barbarism; as facile, visceral and primitive (Bourdieu, 1984). Moreover, working-class taste is also infantilised, as premised in the satisfaction derived from sickeningly sweet foods, and even animalised when speaking of the “quasi-animal gratifications of sexual desire”. Bourdieu (1984: 489) elaborates that the Kantian imperative of pure taste represents nothing more than disgust at the facile, that is to say, disgust for things which reduce us “to animality, corporeality, the belly and sex, that is, what is common and therefore vulgar”. It is this “common animality on which and against which moral distinction is constructed” so that culture is seen as “anti-nature” and asserts itself as a predilection based on reflection rather than the senses or sensual (Bourdieu, 1984: 489). Thus, in distinguishing “that which pleases from that which gratifies”, taste becomes a marker of cultural competence (Skeggs, 2004: 28).

According to Shilling (2003), the dominant seek to maintain their distinction through claims to legitimacy, specifically through claims to legitimate bodies, tending to distance themselves from the instrumental body through ascetic measures of reserve and control. Bourdieu (1984: 490) further argues that the Kantian ethic is established in the social relations of opposition in what is described as the “antithesis between culture and bodily pleasure (or nature)” or between the cultivated bourgeoisie and uncultivated natural. It is this opposition between nature and culture which expresses “a relationship which
is that of the body to the soul, between those who are ‘only natural’ and those whose capacity to dominate their own biological nature affirms their legitimate claim to dominate social nature” (Bourdieu, 1984: 491). Those who wish to be successful must pay for their “accession to everything which defines truly humane humans by a change of social nature, a ‘social promotion’ experienced as ontological promotion, a process of ‘civilisation’, a leap from nature to culture, from the animal to the human” (Bourdieu, 1984: 251). As such, Bourdieu (1984: 499-500) concludes that the principle underlying our sense of distinction is that of “visceral disgust at vulgarity” and which renders our taste as “an internalised social relationship, a social relationship made flesh”.

Bourdieu (1984: 192) elaborates that the body is perceived as the “the most natural expression of our innermost self” as a result of the physiognomic moral economy in which we become socially characterised. The cultural signifiers which enable the differentiation of groups based on their cultural composition or “distance from nature” legitimise some (privileged) uses of the body as morally superior when juxtaposed with the *uncultured* body (1984: 193). According to Bourdieu (1984: 192), “strictly biological differences are underlined and symbolically accentuated” through our deportment and behaviours and are said to reflect our relationship to the social world. Bodies are then said to speak of minds, specifically of whether minds are “naturally ‘natural’ or naturally ‘cultivated’”, *vulgar* or *distinguished* (Bourdieu, 1984: 193). Legitimate uses of the body are therefore said to be perceived as moral maxims, and their opposite - the natural body - as a “culpable surrender to facility” (Bourdieu, 1984: 193). Accordingly then, Bourdieu’s (1984: 193) explanation accounts for a system of embodied class distinctions which allows us “to map out a universe of class bodies, which (biological accidents apart) tends to reproduce in its specific logic the universe of the social structure”.
Whilst it is unclear what is meant by the clumsy use of “biological accidents”\(^\text{16}\) or indeed why they are not accounted for or included within the system of class and social reproduction, this statement provides a useful point of departure for unpicking the corporeal misgivings contained within Bourdieu’s work on taste. Having discerned that Bourdieu considered the body hexis as expressive of classed and classifiable behaviours, those of us interested in the body and disability are left wondering about the place of impairment. Reading Distinction (1984) we might think that there is almost an acknowledgement of impairment in his account. Bourdieu (1984) highlighted the way in which the working-classes were perceived as having a more instrumental relationship to their body and therefore, as a result of poor diet and more labour-intensive and dangerous jobs, produce bodies which are more prone to poor health, injury and disability (Shilling, 2003). Conversely, the wealthier classes were able to dedicate more time and resources to caring for their body and have less physically demanding jobs (Bourdieu, 1984). As is well known, the management and care of the body as it is mediated by our socio-economic position highlights how impairment may become more or less disabling within different social locations. Those with more economic and cultural capital are better equipped to manage or ameliorate disabling features and the exacerbation of impairment.

However, within Distinction (1984), Bourdieu seems to ultimately subsume issues of impairment under class as though the body is simply weathered and worn by class position. Elsewhere Bourdieu (2001: 65) suggests that if it weren’t for “accidents of genetics” then “bodies would have every chance of being valued strictly in accordance with the positions of their owners in social space” demonstrating how Bourdieu has sidelined other features which socially qualify us with value. Our socio-economic class has obvious important consequences for how a person copes will ill-health, impairment and

\(^{16}\) Upon first inspection this could be viewed as a poor translation of Bourdieu’s work. However, within *Masculine Domination* Bourdieu (2001: 65) appears to add clarification to what he means by this; “bodies would have every chance of being valued strictly in accordance with the positions of their owners in the social space if... accidents of genetics did not sometimes deprive the ‘great’ of the bodily attributes of their position such as beauty or height”.
disability. But what do the practices and properties of impaired bodies say about social location for Bourdieu?

It might be argued that Bourdieu’s (1984) account of taste, which he arduously portrays as deeply embodied, is actually rather disembodied. Bourdieu is primarily guilty of treating the body as though it is reducible to or analogous of class and in speaking of taste as the physically inculcated predilections of class fractions, Bourdieu appears to concede that our biology is dominated, as though class culture is written on top of or simply translated into the body as opposed to being intricately interwoven with the corporeal. It might even be suggested that Bourdieu relies upon culture to produce biology (Skeggs, 2004). Bourdieu’s account of taste relies upon the quantification and measurement of cultural units and relies upon culture to “produce gender: women are nature, men are culture, not dissimilar to the working-class having base emotions whilst the middle-class develop refinement and disinterest” (Skeggs, 2004: 28).

Moreover, when Bourdieu (1984) speaks of the control exerted over bodies, he speaks of cultural control as opposed to what might be called corporeal control. The working-classes are therefore understood as distasteful because they are perceived as being closer to nature as a result of their cultural deficit. As Bourdieu (1984: 251) has said, the nature against which culture is contrasted is simply that which is popular, low, vulgar and common. Control over bodies then, whilst conceived of in terms of distance from the more carnal and natural representations of the body only reflects, to a greater or lesser extent, a degree of cultural competency whilst an account of the more visceral dimensions of embodiment is neglected. Impairment can mean that our bodies leak in unpredictable and uncontrolled ways (Reeve, 2014). If being closer to nature is more appropriately conceived of as cultural lack, what is to be said in terms of taste when confronting the corporeal properties of the ‘natural’ body? Although Bourdieu does seem to portray the body as both a biological and social entity, he does not examine the physiological processes and functions which constitute an integral part of our embodiment. It seems that taste becomes a tricky word to negotiate when confronting
aspects of embodiment not accounted for by Bourdieu’s measured units of culture. *Taste* as predilections, preferences or appreciations imply a degree of choice, even if those choices appear subsumed in *amor fati*, but the idea of tasteful bodies becomes a problematic notion when thinking through aspects of embodiment which go beyond the prescriptions of the class habitus due to the symbolically loaded nature of the word *taste*. If the body is said to be the materialisation of class culture and taste is the *generator of practices* or an individual’s distinctive way of being, what is to be said of the instances in which impaired bodies do not fit the values inculcated in the habitus and aspects of embodied lifestyles which go beyond questions of taste? In this respect, it might be argued that applying categories of taste or distaste to bodies is in some ways dysfunctional and provides only a partial explanation for the feelings we experience in the presence of other bodies. The classification of bodies as (dis)tasteful ultimately only reflects a certain relationship to the cultural arbitrary whilst implying a degree of agentic control which neglects that there are some aspects of embodiment which cannot be controlled in this way. It might be suggested then, that his conceptualisation of the deeply embodied nature of taste therefore presupposes a corporeal standard on top of which class is written and as a result, problematises the incorporation of impaired bodies into a system of class. The qualification of value to bodies becomes more diversely understood within Bourdieu’s later work, specifically when he suggests that differentiation takes place through sexual distinction within *Masculine Domination* (2001) and his acknowledgement of the symbolic struggle for value that different ethnicities face (2000). Of course it is recognised that Bourdieu’s account is primarily of class and not the corporeal, but given the prominence of the body as a bearer of symbolic value and the body management necessary to acquire status and distinction documented within his work, it is disappointing that Bourdieu did not flesh out his account of the body.

Having shown how Bourdieu (1984) portrayed the embodiment of social inequality as a matter of class taste as located within the bodily hexis, the chapter will now examine the able-bodied bias implicit within his theorisation
on how the hexis is socio-biologically produced. As we saw earlier in the chapter, Bourdieu (1984; 1990) conceived of bodily hexis as the corporeal manifestation of the habitus which produces an embodied orientation and is expressive of our social value.

2.7 Able-body hexis

Bourdieu (1977; 1998) explained that the formation of the habitus and bodily hexis begins with an understanding of sexual identity gained through our early experience of the sexual division of labour within the family which itself relays a much wider pattern of the division of labour. The relationship between the child and the paternal and maternal body inculcates an awareness of gender practice which comes to regulate “all bodily experiences, not least sexual experiences” (Bourdieu, 1977: 93). Within his early writings, Bourdieu (1977: 87) argued that the most fundamental aspect of the habitus as a kind of practical mastery is its ability to be practically transmitted so that children do not copy models but instead acquire actions through practical mimesis; “body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic” (Bourdieu, 1977: 87). This bodily learning as an unconscious process, “without going through discourse”, is not reducible to a mechanistic understanding of the body but is instead gained through the unconscious assimilation of objective regularities already predisposed to function in a manner that is coherent to corporeal practice (Bourdieu, 1977:88). Moreover, our practice is guided and developed between processes of familiarisation or explicit transmission through the societal provision of “structural exercises tending to transmit this or that form of practical mastery” (Bourdieu, 1977: 88). Through these negotiations between the body and social space, Bourdieu (1977: 89, my emphasis) states that one can identify the paragon of “structural apprenticeship which leads to the embodying of the structures of the world, that is, the appropriating by the world of a body thus enabled to appropriate the world”.

Therefore, in order for us to understand how this spatial organisation (which is simultaneously temporally orchestrated) directs practice, it is essential
that we “grasp the dialectic of objectification and embodiment” and specifically within the context of our early experiences inside the home (Bourdieu, 1977: 90). As Bourdieu (1984: 474) has said, our social position in the world “is never more clearly expressed than in the space and time one feels entitled to take from others; more precisely, in the space one claims with one’s body in physical space”. He subsequently wrote in Masculine Domination (2001: 28) that even though women may have broken with the traditional norms and modes of restraint, they were “taught to occupy space, to walk, to adopt appropriate postures...postures which are charged with moral significance” and which ultimately represented “symbolic confinement”. Importantly, this symbolic confinement is not simply *performative* in that it does not simply portray a symbolic representation. Rather, it “culminates in a profound and durable transformation of bodies (and minds)... through a process of practical construction imposing a differentiated definition of the legitimate uses of the body” (Bourdieu, 2001: 23). Bourdieu (2001: 55) elaborates that the production of *differentiated* and *differentiating* bodies is achieved “partly through the effects of mimetic suggestion, partly through explicit injunctions and partly through the whole symbolic construction of the view of the biological body”. The social order which is inscribed within social space communicates a “dominant definition of practice” which is recognised as universal and legitimate (Bourdieu, 2001: 62). At this point I would like to argue that Bourdieu has overstated the propensity for bodily hexis to be reflective of social position. As we have seen, Bourdieu has argued for the tendency of women’s bodies to reflect their subordinate position through subservient and docile postures such as stooping, bowing, lowering their gaze and so on. Similarly, Bourdieu (2000: 169) suggests that bodily gait such as inarticulacy, clumsiness and trembling are all visible manifestations of submission to dominant judgement. However we might argue that some of these apparently subservient bodily bearings are reflective of the natural processes in ageing and impairment and therefore do not directly correspond with a person’s dispositions or status. Moreover, we would not go so far as to say that a disabled body that regularly evinces these “submissive” properties automatically occupies a dominated social position.
In this respect, Bourdieu is sociologically reductionist in his conceptualisation of the body.

“Strictly biological differences” are emphasised and become “symbolically accentuated” through the whole relationship of the body to the social world (Bourdieu, 1984: 192). The actions that take place within this symbolically mediated and spatially/temporally organised space operate as the structural exercises which inform our practical mastery and shape the bodily hexis so that it becomes “political mythology realised, embodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1977: 93-94). In this sense, an individual comes to embody the hierarchical components of the social order and their relation to it in a way that is beyond conscious awareness, as a “mnemonic form”, allowing it to gain an ineffable quality, that is, it becomes a political philosophy misrecognised through embodiment - the “best-hidden manifestation of submission to the established order” (Bourdieu, 1977: 95).

What is more, the social order is said to inscribe itself upon the body and its dispositions at the deepest level through “regulating the use of time, the temporal distribution of collective and individual activities and the appropriate rhythm with which to perform them” (Bourdieu 1990: 75).

The internalisation of the social order, its norms, structures and dominant modes of practice, precludes “lateral possibilities” through producing practice consistent with the conditions in which the habitus is formed (Bourdieu, 1977: 95). Bourdieu (1984: 172) defends against accusations of mechanism stating that whilst the social world is cognitively apprehended, “the primary cognition is misrecognition, recognition of an order which is also established in the mind”. It is no surprise then when Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 171) asserts that gender domination is the most “paradigmatic form of symbolic violence” as a result of its age-old institutionalisation. Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 171) elaborates that the immediate and harmonious fit between social structures and the habitus “inscribed in bodies and in minds”, can be explained by identifying that the dominated apply categories of perception which are
formed by the “embodiment of this relation of power” to the social world and therefore come to understand this relation through the lens of the dominant. This has lead Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 172) to describe gender domination in terms of “constraint par corps, an imprisonment effected via the body” which has enabled male sociodicy to rule through legitimating domination as a biological fact “which is itself a biologized social construction”. Agents are therefore said to be caught up within a “circular logic” where the social order is naturalised in its inscription upon the body, the cognitive effects of which are experienced as doxa and as a result, further compound the naturalisation of social inequality (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; McNay, 1999: 100).

In conceptualising the efficacy of the state as a regulator of practices, Bourdieu (1998: 53-54) highlights the extent to which the classificatory schemes of the habitus are produced through the embodiment of our group structures, instilling a “common historical transcendental” or nomos through which a commonsense view of the world is perceived. Bourdieu (1998: 54) asserts that the state creates durable dispositions through the uniform imposition of mental and corporeal disciplines, producing stable patterns of apperception which enables the “immediate orchestration of habitus”. According to Bourdieu (1990: 57 my emphasis), the extent to which institutions can be actualised is dependent upon the “body’s readiness” to incorporate the social. Crucially, Bourdieu (1990) states that the social order exploits this readiness, detailing that the body (and language) represent a kind of archive of thoughts which may be activated through re-placing the body into a position which evokes by association, thoughts, feelings and emotions, seeming to portray the body as dis-positional. Conscious of the critique of dispositional concepts, Bourdieu (2000: 136) contends that in speaking of dispositions we are merely recognising the “natural predisposition of human bodies… a conditionability in the sense of a natural capacity to acquire non-natural, arbitrary capacities”. Moreover, he argues that in refuting the existence of dispositions we “deny the existence of learning in the sense of a selective, durable transformation of the body through the reinforcement or weakening of synaptic connections” (2000: 136).
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残疾人，布尔迪厄与身体


with the order of things (Bourdieu, 1998). The recognition of *legitimacy* is therefore not a conscious reflection but is instead grounded in the pre-reflexive accord between embodied and objective structures (Bourdieu, 1998).

The normative able-body inherent within Bourdieu’s thought seems quite clear here. Bourdieu (1990) theorises the acquisition of the bodily hexis and dispositions through the unconscious assimilation of objective regularities and structural exercises which are *predisposed* to function in a way that is *coherent* to corporeal practice. This arguably neglects conceptualisations of the body which fall outside the parameters of the able-bodied norm. These objective regularities and structural exercises through which we are said to acquire a habitus which conforms to the social order are themselves created by and reflective of a social order which maintains and reproduces the non-disabled body as the norm. The self-evident coherency of practice could therefore be said to presume a homologous corporeality with which to interact. As Bourdieu (1977) has not evidenced examples of these structural exercises and regularities and how they correspond to the body, it is difficult to unpack or make explicit just how these may be problematic to impaired bodies. This emphasis upon the unconscious conciliation between the subjective body and objective structures bears no recognition that for some bodies, such encounters require far more negotiation and that this can be quite a deliberate and conscious experience.

In stating that the “body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic”, Bourdieu (1977: 87) infers the socio-biological nature of practice. Indeed, in *Pascalian Meditations* (2000: 156-7), Bourdieu’s commitment to a socio-biological conceptualisation of the body is once again evidenced:

“Because the social is also instituted in biological individuals, there is, in each biological individual, something of the collective, and therefore properties valid for a whole class of agents... Habitus understood as an individual or a socialized biological body, or as the social, biologically individuated through incarnation in a body, is collective, or transindividual - and so it is possible to construct classes of habitus”.
It might be argued that whilst this may well be the case for individuals who conform to the corporeal norm, it is made problematic when considering the impaired body. Indeed, Bourdieu (2000: 157) went on to elaborate that the “incorporated social - for example, cultural capital in its incorporated state - owes to the fact that it is linked to the biological individual and therefore dependent on the weakness and failings of the body - declining faculties, especially of memory, or the possible impairment of the heir to the throne, or death”. Whilst Bourdieu (2000) has at least acknowledged the biological tenuity upon which the collectivisation of bodies relies, he does not develop this point any further and as a result, provides only a flimsy recognition of the potential sticking points met by impaired bodies. In addition to this, the relative symbolic capital which is differentially attached to bodies may problematise the incorporation of the social in so far as a consensus of meaning, upon which symbolic capital rests, cannot be reached. This will be further discussed in Chapter Three.

I do not mean to deny that the social is physically incorporated into the habitus/hexis, but it seems that in order to make the durability and stability of the habitus stick, Bourdieu has over-relied on biological analogies without a proper address of the physiological and affective processes involved and has relied on an un-nuanced oversimplification of the corporeal. The argument then that institutions exploit the body’s readiness presupposes this readiness. It takes for granted the conditionability of bodies - that we are naturally predisposed to acquire the structures of the social and that the body can be durably transformed through repeated activity. To say that we act on “deep-rooted linguistic and muscular patterns of behaviour” and that our “arms and legs are full of numb imperatives” is a biological overstatement and bears no consideration for the impairment of functionality (Bourdieu, 1990: 69). This overstatement of the biological and innate capacities of agents is problematic in that in asserting that the body has an innate capacity to assume normatively prescribed cultural practices, Bourdieu once again privileges culture as the dominant feature of embodiment whilst implicitly equating this capacity with the able body. Moreover, in stressing this bodily readiness,
Bourdieu seems to presume that the incorporation of the social will be reflected in a normatively prescribed bodily readiness\textsuperscript{17}.

2.8 Conclusion

Bourdieu (1998: 2) was keen to remind us that his work in Distinction should be understood “as analysis of French social space in the 1970s [and] is comparative history”. Moreover, he wrote that he wished to dispel a “frequent, yet disastrous, misunderstanding” about Distinction which was that his book argued that “the driving force of all human behaviour was the search for distinction” (Bourdieu, 1998: 9). As Bourdieu felt compelled to argue almost twenty years after the original publication of Distinction:

“The very title Distinction serves as a reminder that what is commonly called distinction, that is, a certain quality of bearing and manners, most often considered innate... is nothing other than difference, a gap, a distinctive feature, in short, a relational property existing only in and through its relation with other properties” (1998:6).

Writing on social space and symbolic power within Practical Reason (1998: 6), Bourdieu seemed keen to demonstrate the more political nature of his theory, emphasising position-takings instead of taste, stating that they are the “‘choices’ made by the social agents in the most diverse domains of practice, in food or sport, music or politics, and so forth”. His work on taste therefore exemplifies how the habitus differentiates the practices and tastes of others which demonstrates its capacity to include or exclude which I will further develop in the next chapter. As Bourdieu (1998: 6) goes on to say, it is the “idea of difference, or a gap, [which] is at the basis of the very notion of space” and social positions.

\textsuperscript{17} To illustrate, we might think of Paterson’s (2012: 166) work on speech impairment and how agents are experienced as out of sync: “The ableist nature of temporal norms means that people with speech impairment find it nigh impossible to acquire and sustain the physical and cultural capital necessary to participate in social encounters” (Paterson, 2012: 166). In this instance, disrupted communication is not reflective of the person’s capacity (bodily readiness) to communicate but of the temporally organized social order of communication. Bourdieu’s theory that the social order is inscribed in bodies through the regulation of temporality and rhythm is therefore reflective of the “organisation and orchestration of time [which] is formed and informed by the carnal needs of non-disabled people” (Paterson, 2012: 168).
Bourdieu was of course not simply interested in class tastes but the way in which these lifestyle preferences “arise out of, and are mobilised in, struggles for social recognition or status” (Jenkins, 1992: 129). In this respect, his account of embodied dispositions becomes a more general model of understanding a “hierarchy of legitimacies” (Jenkins, 1992: 132). As Tobin Siebers (2003: 185) has noted “Aesthetics tracks the emotions that some bodies feel in the presence of other bodies, but aesthetic feelings of pleasure and disgust are difficult to separate from political feelings of acceptance and rejection”. Therefore, whilst Distinction (1984) draws attention to the distaste felt for the working classes in 1970s French society, his work on ‘taste’ as the embodied capacity to aesthetically differentiate provides the foundations for understanding a broader logic of inclusion/exclusion through the symbolic value attached to different bodies.

Specifically, his work highlights the symbolic struggle in being perceived as legitimate and that social inequalities continue to be perpetuated through the different value that is attached to various bodily forms which has significant consequences with respect to acquiring further capitals (Bourdieu, 1984; Shilling 2003). As we saw in Chapter One, disabled people have been persistently excluded from legitimate citizen status as a result of being perceived as unproductive, dependent and non-contributory which can have an accumulatively marginalising effect. Therefore we might extend Bourdieu’s thinking to consider the symbolic negotiations that take place in the valuing of disabled bodies in order to conceptualise the negative positioning of disability.

Within this chapter I have shown how the habitus allows us to understand the effect of social position on our dispositions, preferences and practices and how this produces an embodied know-how which is experienced as a sense of place and the ease or unease of our fit within social space. Bourdieu’s work can therefore provide an account of disability which is thoroughly embodied and at the same time has a political focus. I have noted the criticisms of Bourdieu as too deterministic and as a reproductionist but I have also highlighted that his work was one which was constantly developing and as
such, the ontological complicity between the habitus and field and the rigidity and stability which he accorded to habitus' within traditional societies was not necessarily how he would characterise the practice of habitus within modern societies. I have also criticised Bourdieu in terms of his physiological analogies and argued that he had a tendency to overstate the biological basis of habitus without thoroughly addressing corporeal realities and limits. As a result, his theory of practice has worked on the assumption of a mythic non-impaired and non-disabled body and has disregarded the disruptive potential of our bodies. Incorporating an understanding from a disability perspective therefore allows us to more fully consider the nuances of embodied practice. As well as this I have raised and disputed that Bourdieu has often treated the dominated as though they have no awareness of their position, instead suggesting that the inertia of social position stems from their inability to effect change rather than an unawareness.

Although he is guilty of sidelining other aspects of embodiment which socially characterise us and qualify us with value, the habitus as a generative matrix does provide us a way of thinking about the many different, intersecting layers of our socialisation and social positions and allows for an analysis of disability which is sophisticated and cognisant of the multiple disadvantages and overlapping inequalities that disabled people face. In this respect, his work fuses together the micro, meso and macro aspects of disability through a complex understanding of the entwinement of symbolic and material relations. As I suggested within the discussion of disability models, a theory which encompasses both personal and political accounts, the social and the organic, is much needed. Moreover, as I will go on to show in subsequent chapters, his work provides a rich explanation of how cultural understandings of disability are much more than a matter of discourse and function within a system of embodied symbolic power.

Having demonstrated the negative social positioning of disabled people within the neo-liberal context and having introduced how Bourdieu’s theoretical repertoire can provide a composite understanding of disability the next
chapter will develop an account of how the disabling social order interacts
with a psychic framework of disablism and devalues the disabled body
through the working of symbolic power and doxa.
Chapter 3
Symbolic Power, Doxa and Negative Symbolic Capital

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided an overview of some of Bourdieu’s key concepts, namely the habitus and bodily hexis and their relation to social position, highlighting that whilst some of Bourdieu’s work appears overly deterministic and displays reproductionist tendencies, his approach fuses the phenomenological with the structural and provides an account which is both political and embodied. I also argued that although ‘taste’ may accurately describe the socio-economically rooted dispositions of the habitus, it neglects an account of embodied orientations which may be otherwise hierarchically constructed and organised. As such it was suggested that applying the category of tasteful or distasteful to bodies was somewhat dysfunctional as it served only to portray a classed relationship towards culture, within which implicit assumptions about corporeal standards and capacities were contained and which therefore ignored aspects of embodiment, specifically impairment and disability, which remain external to both class and agentic control. However, the significance placed on taste as a deeply embodied capacity to differentiate through negation (and/or alignment) and as a corporeally significant experience demonstrated how Bourdieu theorized it as an embodied means of exclusion/inclusion and provides the underpinnings to further examine corporeal divisions that exist alongside and intersect with class. This allows this chapter to explore how Bourdieu’s concepts might be expanded to include an account of differentiation which contends with broader symbolic negotiations of bodies and their values. Within this chapter I intend to focus on how symbolic power mobilizes exclusions through the symbolic system of doxa and through my own development of the concept of (negative) symbolic capital.

In agreement with Wacquant (1993: 1-2), this work identifies that the principle force and purpose of Bourdieu’s work has been to illuminate the “symbolic dimension of domination” so as to generate an understanding of how symbolic power continues to obscure the relations of structured
inequality, oppression and exploitation “under the cloak of nature, benevolence and meritocracy”. Wacquant (1993: 2) contends that the work of Bourdieu is therefore primarily a “political economy of symbolic violence” or a “political sociology of symbolic forms”. As we saw in Chapter Two there has been an Anglo tendency for Bourdieu to be primarily read as a sociologist of culture and education and seldomly as a political sociologist, for which his work on symbolic power has much to offer (Swartz, 2013). In identifying the centrality of symbolic power to Bourdieu’s work, I will assess the disguised and obscured uses of symbolic capital in order to elucidate the insidious practices which contribute to the reproduction of social domination and the exclusion of disabled people (Olson, 1995). An understanding of the power of symbolic capital is crucial for knowing how power “as an abstract and relational feature of social interaction, is brought down to the level of individual bodies, habits and lives” (Olson, 1995: 23). As Bourdieu (2000: 168) would say, but perhaps does not fully explore, “the social order is merely the order of bodies”.

Pursuing the recurring themes of embodiment and value and the focus given to the body within his writings, I will combine Bourdieu’s thinking on symbolic power and the consecration of identities in order to discern an understanding of the under-theorised concept of negative symbolic capital and its potential to jeopardise a disabled person’s legitimacy and sense of worth. This chapter will begin by introducing Bourdieu’s work on symbolic power and his use of symbolic capital which, although often understated within his writings, acts as a kind of implicit meta-species of capital. I then progress to a depiction of the symbolic system and the functioning of doxa within social fields, demonstrating how a Bourdieusian account of the differentiation and evaluation of bodies must acknowledge the wider corporeal ideologies and doxic knowledge against which they are measured. Here I will show how symbolic power functions through doxa to legitimize the non-disabled body whilst excluding disabled bodies.

I will then turn to the embodied nature of symbolic capital, demonstrating the powerful potential of symbolic capital as a psychosocially significant
Chapter 3  
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*sense-making* asset. Through looking at what Bourdieu (2000) termed *sense relations* this chapter demonstrates the embodied experience which takes place through the actualisation of symbolic capital and suggests that this process may produce significant psychic consequences. In opening up discussion of the psychic effects of symbolic capital, this chapter illustrates that symbolic capital is much more than a matter of recognition and evinces the individual harm that negative symbolic capital can wield.

### 3.2 Symbolic Capital

Lebaron (2014) has observed the *fuzzy* conceptual space of symbolic capital, noting that Bourdieu flitted between recognising it as a genuine species of capital and at other times only referring to it indirectly as in his identification of *symbolic effects*, *collectively recognised credit* and even *symbolic profit*. It is worth noting that when scholars have made use of Bourdieu’s symbolic capital it is frequently downplayed as *honour* or *prestige*, often neglecting the obscure character of symbolic capital as the transmutation of other forms of capital into power when (mis)recognised as legitimate (Lawler, 1999). If symbolic capital has assumed a relatively understated position amongst the more familiar figurations of capital then Bourdieu’s idea of *negative symbolic capital* has registered even less attention. Though the import of symbolic capital is variously implicitly or explicitly coded throughout his work, Bourdieu makes scant reference to the converse concept of negative symbolic capital. This chapter seeks to address this theoretical shortcoming. As Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 112) has acknowledged, “Sometimes we must refurbish concepts - first, to be more precise, and second, to make them more alive”.

Within *The Forms of Capital* (1986), Bourdieu notes the three main capitals as economic, social and cultural. It is only in a footnote that a distinct definition of symbolic capital appears as “capital - in whatever form - insofar as it is represented, i.e., apprehended symbolically, in a relationship of knowledge or, more precisely, of misrecognition and recognition, presupposes the intervention of the habitus, as a socially constituted cognitive capacity” (1986: 91). Whilst this is the only explicit acknowledgement of symbolic
capital, the chapter is constellated with cases for the power of the symbolic and within other works, Bourdieu (1991a; 2000; 2001) does seem to more clearly identify the importance of the symbolic as a meta-species of capital. For instance, Bourdieu (2000: 242) states that “Every kind of capital (economic, cultural, social) tends (to different degrees) to function as symbolic capital (so that it might be better to speak, in rigorous terms, of *the symbolic effects of capital*) when it obtains an explicit or practical recognition”. This leads Bourdieu (2000: 242) to argue that symbolic capital is therefore “what every kind of capital becomes when it is misrecognised as capital, that is, as force, a power or capacity”. Bourdieu (2000) stressed the intermediary role of the habitus in the transfiguration of symbolic capital, that is to say, symbolic capital always requires the intervention of the habitus as it manifests through a relationship of knowledge and (mis)recognition of value. Whereas incremental units of economic or cultural capital can be objectively measured and counted (as in profits, prizes, degrees, qualifications), symbolic capital relies upon the habitus as a socialised capacity to read, absorb and interpret “distinctive signs” in order that they may be cognitively apprehended and recognised as legitimate (Bourdieu, 1998b: 9). This implies a complex relationship of power between the perceiver and the perceived and leads Bourdieu (2000: 242, my emphasis) to state that symbolic capital is “produced by the transfiguration of a power relation into a *sense relation*”, which, through giving meaning, “rescues agents from insignificance”. In this case, we can identify how symbolic capital creates a practical and corporeal knowledge of one’s social and symbolic space, “the *sense* of the social world, its present meaning and the direction in which it is going and should go”, or as Goffman (cited in Bourdieu, 2000: 184, original italics) says “*sense of placement*”.

In dealing with the *sense of place* construed by symbolic capital, we can identify that an agent, endowed with various capitals, attributes and capacities relative to his habitus, obtains his symbolic capital upon entering a *doxa*-specific field. Thus far, we have seen that the concept of symbolic capital is configured in various ways throughout Bourdieu’s work and therefore necessitates a more astute definition of symbolic capital and its
uses. The use of symbolic capital within this chapter will refer to the collectively recognised and hierarchically placed value accorded to an agent based on the respective types and volumes of capital that they possess and dispositions particular to that habitus.

Bourdieu (1991a) variously described the benefits attached to possessing large amounts of symbolic capital, noting that positively consecrated identities enjoy the privilege of being allowed to transgress boundaries as well as having *ridiculous* behaviour which might otherwise be seen as undignified excused as *eccentric*. In short, “the person who is sure of his cultural identity can play with the rules of the cultural game” (Bourdieu, 1991: 125). However, less time has been spent discussing the attribution of negative symbolic capitals. Bourdieu (2000) notes the positive “manifestations of social recognition which make up symbolic capital, all the forms of perceived being which make up a social being that is known, ‘visible’, famous, admired, invited, loved, etc” as a form of saving grace which redeems agents “from the distress of an existence without justification”. Here, he contrasts the *State nobility* who possess a *theodicy of existence* against the “stigmatised pariah... [who] bears the *curse of a negative symbolic capital*” (Bourdieu, 2000: 241, my emphasis). Bourdieu (2000: 241) states that there is “no worse dispossession, no worse privation, perhaps, than that of the losers in the symbolic struggle for recognition, for access to a socially recognised social being, in a word, to humanity”. This is the first and last use of negative symbolic capital and its consequences within *Pascalian Meditations* and it is seldom mentioned let alone unpacked within much of his other work. Elsewhere he briefly mentions the experience of North African immigrants within the education system stating that the difficulties faced in both school and the work place are exacerbated by the negative symbolic capital “linked to the external signs of their body hexis that function as stigmata” but little else is added to the concept (Bourdieu, 1999: 185)\(^\text{18}\). Whilst Bourdieu’s account provides an understanding of the

\(^{18}\) Although Bourdieu (1989; 2000) admires and draws upon Goffman he discerns the difference between stigma and negative symbolic capital in terms of the symbolic power of negative symbolic capital which exists twice, objectively in things and subjectively in minds. The strength of and struggle for symbolic power therefore does not simply take place at the
positive effect that possessing various amounts of symbolic capital can have, or that to possess less symbolic capital is and can be disadvantageous, he does not open up the concept of negative symbolic capital to any great extent.

The concept has also not been used to any great extent outside of Bourdieu’s own work, although Wacquant (2000: 383) makes passing reference to it as “as “an incarnate property perceived to make its contact degrading by virtue of... ‘negative social estimation of honor’”. Elsewhere he has fleetingly referred to it in terms of culturally and economically successful African Americans compensating “for the negative symbolic capital of blackness [with] their high-status cultural capital” (Wacquant, 2001: 99). This leaves a considerable space in which to question the consequences to those endowed with symbolic capital which is negatively received or those who are conferred a stigmatised quality instead of titles of nobility. My use of negative symbolic capital then denotes the collective recognition and social positioning of individuals with negatively valued capacities and capitals linked to the external indicators of disability in their bodily hexis. Moreover, negative symbolic capital should be seen as distinct to simply a lack of capital because it marks bearers out with negative values. Importantly, symbolic capital must be understood as it corresponds with doxa. The chapter will now examine Bourdieu’s concept of doxa before demonstrating how it consolidates non-disabled norms at both the individual and structural level.

3.3 The Symbolic System and Doxa

In order for symbolic capital to function as a recognised power, there must exist a “convergence of the social conditions” which enables the symbolic imposition of a given phenomena to be recognised as important (Bourdieu, 1991a: 72). The exertion of symbolic power through bodies is dependent upon the status of the perceiver and the perceived and the extent to which these corresponding schemes of perception and evaluation are applied, known and level of presentation of the self as this overlooks the person’s social position within social space (Bourdieu, 1989). In this respect, the micro-management of stigma in personal interactions does not challenge the macro structures of symbolic power.
recognised by the individual at whom they are directed (Bourdieu, 2001). In this sense, symbolic systems perform three explicit but interconnected functions; cognition, communication and domination (Alawattage, 2011). Bourdieu (1991a) states that the economic and social world informs us with a practical knowledge of the game throughout the life-course and that the social order exerts itself upon agents in the form of *knowledge effects* (or cognition). The objective structures and schemes of classification contained within the doxic order of things prescribes and imposes representations and an incorporated recognition of this social order. According to Bourdieu (1979) then, symbolic systems as systems of knowledge exert a structuring force insofar as knowledge is also structured. Through the various distributions and properties particular to any given social field, the social world constitutes a symbolic system which functions through the *logic of difference*, that is, *distinction* (Bourdieu, 1985: 730).

Bourdieu (1985) was keen to demonstrate that his use of the term *distinction* did not reflect a Veblen-esque pursuit of distinguished visibility but instead conveys that all practice is *distinctive* and therefore capable of carrying and communicating *distinctive signs*. As such, the symbolic power attached to these various distinctive practices has the ability to construct realities and tends to institute a *gnoseological order* (from gnosis), a kind of intuitive grasp of symbolic relations within the individual habitus (Bourdieu, 1979). Bourdieu (1979) describes this sense of order at the collective level as a consensus of meaning or doxa, that is, a kind of mutually coherent and classificatory sense of reality which, as the product of incorporation of the social, endows us with a more or less aligned capacity to interpret and adapt to subsequent experiences.

Bourdieu (1991b: 3) writes that the capacity for symbolic systems to function as a means of exclusion or inclusion, *distinction or integration*, is owed to their “systematic application of one and the same principle of division” through which the whole social and natural world is categorised into “antagonistic classes (owing to the fact that they gave birth to meaning and consensus on meaning by the logic of inclusion and exclusion)”. Here,
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the divisive power of symbolic capital seems to adhere to a rigid and fairly undifferentiated vision. Nearly thirty years later however, Bourdieu’s (2000: 139) understanding of the incorporated symbolic schemes of classification is far less prescriptive and is described as the “generally applicable principles of vision and division which, being the product of incorporation of the structures and tendencies of the world, are at least roughly adjusted to them”. Within the last decade of his life Bourdieu (2001) conceded that doxa was far less stable within modern societies and open to contestation and resistance. This increased flexibility shows not only how Bourdieu’s thinking had progressed but signified the importance of the concept of doxa to his social theory. For Bourdieu, doxa performs a political function, ensuring the relative stability of the social order through the correspondence between habitus and field. Doxa is therefore not only a system of knowledge, but a system of domination (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

Symbolic systems therefore contribute to the covert imposition of principles of perception and thinking through furnishing practices which appear to correspond with the “natural-supernatural structure of the cosmos” (Bourdieu, 1971: 5). Bourdieu (1985: 731) therefore states that all symbolic systems are predisposed to include or exclude through the functioning of “Symbolic capital – another name for distinction”, it is our symbolic capital which gives us our “distinctive value” (Bourdieu, 2004: 56). To make explicit and take his thinking one logical step further then, I would suggest that symbolic capital acts as a mechanism for inclusion whilst negative symbolic capital has the power to exclude. For Bourdieu (1991a: 73), the profit of distinction, acquired by means of this symbolic imposition, is of course derived from the relations of domination structured around and through the imposition of the (arbitrary) social order, although the most crucial component of this profit is that it “appears to be based on the qualities of the person alone”. In speaking of what constitutes the arbitrary, this work refers to the structures of social formation, that is, the positions and relations of a given field, which are, through a process of naturalisation, perceived as endowed with legitimacy and self-evidence and therefore the
dominance to impose principles of perception. The imposition of this pedagogy has cognitive effects as it becomes internalised as doxic knowledge and thus further naturalises the arbitrary quality of what is considered legitimate within a field (McNay, 1999).

Doxa describes the *natural attitude* and commonsensical understanding of the world that an agent experiences due to the sense of fit between their habitus and field. It represents the “unexamined ways of acting that are at the root of each group’s mode of being in the social world” (Inglis and Hughson, 2003: 167). This doxic knowledge which functions as a register of ‘collective expectations’ enables the collective social to apprehend, evaluate and (mis)recognise the individual as legitimate (or illegitimate as the case may be) and accords them a space within the social hierarchy specific to this field (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). Bourdieu (1998b) suggests that doxa may be understood as a *diffuse* form of symbolic capital which may have once been more explicitly esteemed but which now pervades so much of thought that it resides in our background knowledge.

At this stage I would like to make clear that my use of symbolic capital acknowledges that the diverse and intersectional nature of social life opens up spaces in which doxa and an individual habitus may not correspond exactly. As I highlighted in Chapter Two, although Bourdieu’s work certainly emphasised the reproduction of social order he did not preclude the possibility for resistance\(^{19}\), rather, whilst he did not explicitly develop a theory of change, his theoretical framework enables his work to be extended so as to account for how transformation may take place within the habitus (Swartz, 2013). Within one of his final books Bourdieu (2000) concedes that he over-emphasised this unthinking aspect of doxa but that he did so often in reference to more traditional societies and in order to demonstrate how much of social life is taken-for-granted. Although Bourdieu’s tendency to speak of either the natural attitude of doxa or the critical thought of

\(^{19}\) Bourdieu (2000: 173) acknowledged that he overplayed the doxic order, saying that he “needed to awaken people from their doxic slumber by ‘twisting the stick in the opposite direction’, this is not done... to deny the existence of strategies of resistance, individual or collective, ordinary or extraordinary”.
reflexivity seemed to polarise his conceptualisations of consciousness (Myles, 2004) his recognition that doxa is less stable within modern societies perhaps indicates that he came to acknowledge this polarity as untenable. As Myles (2004) has highlighted, Bourdieu even allows for doxais which are relative to different fields. We live in a society in which we are hierarchized through many features such as disability, class, sex, gender, sexuality, race, and religion and thus occupy multiple positions which therefore affords greater potential for differentiated dispositions and statuses and varied social interpretations (or what Bourdieu (1977) would call ‘heresies’ or ‘heterodoxy’) of what is considered legitimate within different fields. Our relation to doxa may be uneven²⁰ and agents do not relate to doxa equally, however, it remains the dominant vision to which individuals more or less align and tends to consolidate the social order as a result of the “homology of position, a resemblance within difference” (Bourdieu, 1985: 737). In this sense, social space is always contestable but characterised by enough shared understanding that we usually ‘have a feel’ for how things fit. Doxic knowledge can therefore be questioned, disrupted and challenged, especially when the order is challenged by someone perceived as outside of the social field. As Bourdieu (2001: 14) stated “The partial indeterminacy of certain objects authorises antagonistic interpretations, offering the dominated a possibility of resistance to the effect of symbolic imposition”. However, the extent to which this can be said to reorder doxic thought tends to be limited as I will go on to show.

As well as this, attributes and capitals which may manifest as positively consecrated or negatively sanctioned symbolic capital in one field do not necessarily translate into other fields, allowing for an understanding of how disability can be relationally produced. Therefore, while the doxic perception

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²⁰ Doxa “varies by the extent orthodoxy is challenged by heterodoxy, by type of society (degree of heterogeneity), and by one’s position held in society” (Swartz, 2013: 236). For Bourdieu (1977: 169), orthodoxy represents the “straight, or rather straightened opinion which aims, without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the primal innocence of doxa”. It reinforces doxa through the imposition of “orthodox discourse, the official way of speaking and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1977: 169).
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of disability might be that disability is bad, tragic, problematic, deserving of pity or constitutive of the abject (Hughes, 2009a), there are spaces in which and individuals for whom the experience of disability is less mired with negativity. For some disabled people, the rejection of the medical model and its negative implications in favour of the social model can provide a positive sense of identity, sometimes described as a process of “coming out” (Shakespeare, 1996). Shakespeare (1996) does however raise that this positive self-identification tends to take place in a collective context and may be problematic for those who are socially isolated. Moreover, even those who bear a strong and positive disability identity may harbour deeply internalized oppressions (Shakespeare, 1996), evidencing the psychosocial significance that negative symbolic capital may wield. Therefore, although the transfiguration of our various stock of capitals into symbolic capital and the subsequent sense of place it instils often takes place at a collectively aligned pre-conscious level and as such go unnoticed, there are many instances in which this process may be disrupted or more consciously felt, especially with the experience of negative symbolic capital. In such cases, the attribution of negative value may be psychologically harmful and difficult to ignore.

This malleability may seem antithetical to some of Bourdieu’s critics who, as we saw in the second chapter, perceive his habitus as a rigid and inflexible structure. However, this analysis of doxa and negative symbolic capital will emphasise the plasticity of Bourdieu’s theory. As Bourdieu (2000: 160) has noted “Habitus is not necessarily adapted to its situation nor necessarily coherent. It has degrees of integration- which correspond in particular to degrees of ‘crystallisation’ of the status occupied”. He elaborates that in instances of conflict and crises, the destabilised habitus may be identified, “torn by contradiction and internal division, generating suffering” (Bourdieu, 2000:160). In addition to this, Bourdieu (2000: 160-1) himself notes that the:

“diversity of conditions, the corresponding diversity of habitus and the multiplicity of intra- and intergenerational movements of ascent or decline mean that the habitus may, in many cases, be confronted with conditions of actualisation different from those in which they were produced”.
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The capacity for symbolic capital to instil a sense of place whilst relying upon a relationship of knowledge which can at times be contested and disputed therefore presents a precarious situation for negotiating a personal sense of value and legitimacy. However, I would argue that these situations may also afford individuals more opportunities to negotiate the meaning within these spaces and engage in critical reflection.21

The chapter will now look at how doxa as an unquestioned and taken-for-granted knowledge facilitates the functioning of symbolic power and inculcates our misrecognition of the true nature of social inequality in the context of disability (Swartz, 2013). To assess the place of impairment within the doxic order, I will show how the pedagogy of structures, practices and dispositions which construct the non-disabled body as doxic to the detriment of non-normative bodies. Using Bourdieu in this way enables an understanding of how disabled bodies become insidiously devalued and coded with negative symbolic capital against the doxic body. I would suggest that this demonstrates how exclusionary responses and practices to disability perniciously take shape through the doxic underpinning of mundane, everyday, taken-for-granted knowledge.

3.4 Doxa, Orthodoxy and the Realms of Normalcy

In order to discern the doxa of normalcy, focus must be given to the discourses and principles of thinking which legitimate certain subjectivities and practice. In conceptualising how doxa functions in social fields, it is helpful to conceive of a multi-dimensional space comprised of various coordinates of value which, according to the specific logic of that field and the differential distribution, combinations and transmutations of capital, accord agents social positions relevant to that hierarchy (Bourdieu, 1985). These coordinates of value act as guiding principles and inform those who enter the field of the rules of the game and engender an implicit knowledge of the value we possess in terms of how our capitals align with the demands and expectations of the field (Bourdieu, 1985; Shilling, 2004). The self-

21 These moments of disjuncture and their potential as spaces for more critical and reflexive thought will be more fully developed in Chapter Five.
evidence of doxa is secured through the “habitual and unquestioned consensus on the regularities of shared experience” which is continually reinforced through the quotidian interactions which take this cultural background for granted (Olsson, 1995).

Wacquant (2011: 85) suggests that understanding the field and the place of agents within it becomes a question of how we develop an embodied social competency “transmitted through a silent pedagogy of organisms in action”. The pedagogical work that takes place within a given field consolidates a doxic mode of being, a harmonious fit between habitus and field experienced as a feeling of normalcy which is realised so completely that the norms which underpin it cease to exist and instead become a self-evident base of practical knowledge (Bourdieu, 1977). We therefore might expect that someone who has little or no experience of impairment or no familiarity with disability to have a doxic conceptualisation of the body as ‘non-impaired’ whereas for someone who encounters disability and impairment as the norm, or as we age and experience our own failing bodies, the body is less taken-for-granted. Here, I would suggest that for people who experience impairment as the norm, disability forms part of their background, gnoseological thinking within the habitus and informs and shapes their relation to doxa. A doxic approach to disability might be that it is a personal tragedy and medical problem, but personal experience as a disabled person provides plethoric examples of how this is not the case. This understanding that your experience diverges from the doxic expectation highlights that there is a gap between your own knowledge and the knowledge that others have of you. I would suggest that this provides the potential for reflexive thinking as the disabled person’s social practice becomes more consciously considered and challenges the self-evidence of doxic belief. I will return to this in the final chapter.

The pedagogies specific to various fields therefore instil ideas around which practices and subjectivities are appropriate and legitimate within this social space and in so doing, largely reproduce the doxic beliefs of the field. In this respect we might suggest that the doxic knowledge we have about boxing would lead us to anticipate upright, athletic and agile bodies and that in this
social space the impaired body would appear, at least for most people, *out of place*. What I suggest here is that what remains implicit within many, if not most, social fields is a doxic conceptualisation of the corporeal as non-disabled. As I have previously shown in Chapter Two, our relationship to cultural structures nurtures assumptions about corporeal standards. The doxic assumptions which underlie our conceptualisation of the body and corporeal practices may be most saliently evidenced through *heterodoxy* or *heretics* (Bourdieu, 1977), that is, the presence of visibly impaired or *unruly bodies*. Hodge (2014: 655) has described the *unruly body* as that which comes into being “when there is a misfit between bodily expression and the imposed disciplines of a particular cultural and social environment” or as Bourdieu would say, a misfit between the habitus, expressed through bodily hexis, and the doxic demands and expectations of the field.

### 3.5 Doxic Bodies, Doxic Space

Knowing already how much our social class, gender, age and so on, shapes the taken-for-granted way we treat our bodies, if we think of our day-to-day practices and experiences, we soon realise how often the non-disabled body is re-legitimised in the diffuse symbolic capital of doxa. So much of what we do is always already imbued with an idea of what constitutes a legitimate body and legitimate forms of bodily comportment. I should add that this section may seem, true to Bourdieu’s style, to overstate the doxic body but that I do this to emphasise just how self-evident the body is taken to be. As I have already highlighted, the extent to which we relate and align to doxa is approximate if uneven.

From the very architecture of our homes, the furnishings and goods within them, the access to public spaces and technology, even our clothes and the tempo of social interaction and the expectation of social conduct and manners, transmit a doxic knowledge of what the body is, what it should do and how it should look. These are the “unspoken conventions” of what constitutes *being ordinary* (Boys and Shakespeare, 2009: 1). These are reinforced with more or less explicit messages about the *normal* body and it’s well-being through images in the media, health promotion campaigns and
dietary advice, safety regulations within the workplace, medical recommendations, hygiene expectations, fitness instructions and prenatal care and consultations. We anticipate that people should smell fresh or at least “devoid of odour” (Howson, 2013), we anticipate that people will speak at a certain speed (Paterson, 2012). We worry about cancer and about getting into accidents, we take vitamins and supplements, we try to eat well and we know we should exercise, we feel guilty (and unwell!) when we drink too much and know we should stop smoking, we check on loved ones, we worry about them travelling, we wear seatbelts and we are glad when we hear that they ‘made it there in one piece’. Many of these practices are guided by normative thinking which reflects the valid and justified concern that we have for our own and other’s health and well-being (Vehmas and Watson, 2016) and are experienced as self-evident common-sense.

The non-disabled body as metaphor for normal is ubiquitous; we ‘jump’ in the shower, tell people to ‘stand up’ for themselves, we ‘lend a hand’, ‘it’s as plain as the nose on your face’. You have a good eye if you exercise good judgement or we see eye to eye if we agree. Even the cultural use of the body as metaphor reflects the experiences of non-disabled speakers if we think of the literal thinking of some people with autism/Aspergers. Analogous to the non-impaired body as metaphor for normal, the metaphor of impairment is frequently used to denote negative, dysfunctional and abnormal situations; blind spots, fall on deaf ears, the economy is crippled, political correctness gone mad and so on.

Practically speaking, doxa can often seem remarkably like lay normativity, with many of the practices we engage in considered as facilitative of the good life (Vehmas and Watson, 2016). However, for Bourdieu (1996), doxa serves a political function through maintaining the stability of the social order. Doxa therefore works as a mechanism of domination integral to the functioning of symbolic power and the perpetuation of inequalities and must be understood in its relation to the formation of habitus. Therefore whilst we may not perfectly correspond to doxic conceptualisations, for any number of reasons (constraints of social location, deeply embedded nature of behaviour)
we still recognise and align with ideas about the non-disabled body because it is *naturalised* in so much of what we do as well as a normative want. In this respect, we can begin to see how the non-disabled body becomes imbued with negative symbolic capital through the *accumulative* effects of doxa. At the same time it demonstrates that symbolic capital is contingent upon people feeling invested in it and identifying it as important (Farrugia, 2010).

Our relationship to achieving (or as the case may be, not achieving) the doxic body is also naturalised and the extent to which we meet this expectation is not usually critically questioned so that, for example, we are more likely to blame being overweight on perceived character deficits rather than the lack of access to resources and education that encourages and embeds healthful lifestyle choices. Similarly, we might think that a wheelchair user is denied a doxic body because of the lack of accessible public space. In this case, this exclusion is naturalised because the ‘problem’ of misfit between the disabled person and social space is not perceived as the result of inaccessible space, rather, it is perceived as the result of the impaired body, highlighting how the doxic understanding of space and body collude to produce their own self-evidence. It reproduces an idea about what constitutes natural movement within a taken-for-granted space so that, for instance, observing someone with limited mobility struggle to gain access to public spaces reifies the legitimacy of the non-disabled body within this space. Here, the environment organised around the doxic body demonstrates the symbolic power carried by the *non-disabled* body which in turn reifies deficit thinking about disabled bodies and reiterates the negative value attached to them. In this case, doxa transmits the message that disability is located in the body and is not seen as the outcome of social structures and organization (Grue, 2015). As such, we might argue that the doxic order produces disabled bodies as imbued with negative symbolic capital.

It is worth noting that although our social location can mediate our relationship to doxic conceptualizations of gender and that we may reject these ideas of femininity and masculinity on the basis of our class (Skeggs, 2004), the same cannot be said of impairment. Class may certainly mediate
the extent to which impairment becomes disabling and social location may determine what we perceive to be disabling but the non-impaired body is still desirable, no matter your class. Whilst disability studies scholars have worked to show the problems of the medical model and that by quantitatively substantiating the corporeal norm the biomedical model excludes all those that fall short of this ideal, an idea of this norm already exists so repletenly within the habitus and is reiterated in the minutiae of everyday life. The biomedical model as *scientific capital* consecrated as symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2004) might certainly be said to act as the orthodoxy to doxa; it is an official discourse which consecrates and reinforces what is already a common-sense approach to our bodies. The non-disabled subject which characterises doxic knowledge might be further reinforced through the negative terms and representations of disability but our embodied dispositions already equip us with a feeling for what is normal, natural and desirable. As we saw in Chapter Two, this is a large part of the problem with performative challenges which seek to deconstruct and unsettle ideas about disability. This is not to suggest that the omnipresent picture of non-disablement is unproblematic but that it is the “trump card” (Bourdieu, 1985: 733) and constitutes doxic structures, knowledge and practice which mutually reinforce each other and is experienced as *self-evident* and as that which makes sense. In fact, taking the body for granted produces what Bourdieu (2003) would describe as an *arrogant* sociodicy which never thoroughly anticipates that what *is* could be drastically different. However, when symbolic power is institutionalized and embodied in this way, it is largely impervious to performative tactics of persuasion. In this respect he argues that “what is problematic is the fact that the established order is *not* problematic” and that the legitimacy of doxa is never questioned, except in *crisis* situations (Bourdieu, 1998b: 56).

Although I have mostly dealt with how non-impairment is naturalized as part of the social order and therefore consecrates its legitimacy in the structure of doxa, I would like to add that there are *real* reasons to reject impairment. It is worth noting that while Bourdieu often referred to the arbitrary structures of the social order so as to identify the capricious nature of what
becomes consecrated as legitimate and to demonstrate that the order could be very different if other arbitrary elements had been imposed, this does leave questions about the validity of such arbitrariness. Although Bourdieu saw doxa as reinforcing oppressive and often arbitrary social structures, pain and discomfort are not arbitrary aspects of the social order. As I have shown, much of the practices which reinforce the non-disabled body as doxic are normative and reflect a concern for our well-being that cannot be reduced to social conditioning. This is to acknowledge that impairment can be deeply unpleasant and is not a positive, neutral or irrelevant experience for many (Crow, 1996) and that medicine plays a huge role in improving the quality of our lives. As Ferrie and Watson (2015) describe, Motor Neurone Disease is a brutal condition which leads to extensive motor weakness so that affected persons cannot walk, move in bed, talk, cough, eat or breathe. The pain, tremors, numbness and weakness associated with Multiple Sclerosis, the seizures and premature death in Tay-Sachs, the agony of blistering skin in epidermolysis bullosa or harlequin ichthyosis, or the heart and lung disease and early onset arthritis of Marfan syndrome are intrinsically unpleasant. Pain, depression, fatigue and chronic illness can be a constant fact for many disabled people and may prompt worry and concern about the future with respect to the progressive and degenerative nature of some impairments (Crow, 1996, Morris, 1991). The visceral experience of impairment is not benign, and the pain, incapacity and various impairment effects which a person may face are reason enough not to want to be impaired.

I would suggest however, that it is when these deeply embodied beliefs gain commonsensical self-evidence and combine with other accumulative and unexamined ways of thinking, as they do in doxic thought, that they produce and naturalise harmful common-sense approaches to non-normative embodiment which may obscure forms of oppression that disabled people experience. The commonsensical approach to pain and incapacity would instil a deeply embodied feeling about why having a spinal injury is detrimental to well-being and to be avoided, and that may well be normative, but the embodied response to human well-being couple with doxic understandings of disability as unable and so on, has consequences for how we treat people we
perceive as in pain or incapacitated, namely, the symbolic violence of psycho-emotional disablism through expressions of pity and fear (Reeve, 2012). As such, normativity is not in and of itself the source of oppression experienced by disabled people, rather, doxa is the mechanism of oppression through which normative thinking may be skewed and accumulate with other negative thinking about disability.

The doxic conceptualisation of the non-disabled body is therefore partially determined by the collectively recognised legitimacy of the body as well and able, and consequentially, partially by the collective recognition that impairment and disability are negative, unpleasant and constitutive of illegitimate embodiment. It is the ubiquity of these common-sense approaches which tell us how things should be which frames disability and endows it with negative symbolic capital.

While we can recognise that non-doxic bodies which do not correspond to doxic thought may pose as challenges to the norm we can also question the extent to which different bodies can really resist let alone contest the legitimacy of doxa. Recently we have seen disabled fashion models such as Madeline Stuart and Jillian Mercado and actress Jamie Brewer reaching New York Fashion Week, prompting people to suggest that we are reaching a “golden age of diversity in fashion” (Marriot, 2015). Of course it is important that we see disabled models to counter the cultural invisibility of disabled people, but they remain a minority in a huge industry and often attract patronizing coverage, becoming a tokenistic “fuzzy, inspirational human interest story, aimed at a non-disabled audience” (Marriot, 2015). Moreover, these disabled models tend to align closely with dominant definitions of beauty, we are a long way off from seeing models with neurofibromatosis at fashion week for example. The presence of these models remains exceptional and could hardly be said to change a multi-billion pound global industry. For those involved, disability in the fashion industry is a vicious cycle: “Modelling agencies say they don’t have disabled models on their books because brands won’t hire them; brands blame the modelling agencies, saying there are no models with disabilities there for them to hire” (Marriot, 2015).
Similarly, the London Paralympic games were surrounded with positive rhetoric and proclamations that attitudes towards disability would never be the same again (Braye et al, 2013; Birrell, 2015; Crow, 2014). However, a survey conducted by Scope (2014) found that 58% of disabled people had not noticed any change in people’s attitudes towards them as a disabled person, and that one in five disabled people believed that attitudes had worsened. Braye et al (2013) have documented the concern surrounding how the Paralympics misrepresent what being disabled is really like for most people. Portraying inaccurate images of disability through a focus on the sporting elite ultimately pushes the reality of living with impairment further from the public imaginary. It is hard to conceive how the achievements of Paralympic athletes unsettle and change our attitudes toward disability when “eight in 10 people have never worked alongside a disabled colleague, and even fewer have had a disabled person in their house for a social occasion” (Birrell, 2013). Enjoying this sporting event might have highlighted the successful sporting careers of a disabled minority, but it has not transformed the underlying attitudes, structures, organization and understanding of disability which continues to (re)produce disabling and exclusionary doxic spaces and practices. As Bourdieu (2000) would argue, in order to challenge the legitimacy of doxic structures (and their reproduction), these institutionalized values must be seen as in a state of uncertainty or crisis although he does not really expand on what this would entail. I would suggest that whilst exposure to non-doxic bodies, meanings and practices may broaden the visibility of impairment it does so moderately. Doxic modes of thought, official discourses, structures and institutions circumscribe and reinforce the realm of normalcy so that impaired corporealities may often reaffirm the doxa of the legitimate body. As Bourdieu puts it (1992: 80):

“the dominated...can always exert a certain force, inasmuch as belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it (if only to elicit reactions of exclusion on the part of those who occupy its dominant positions)”.

What is more, although agents can actively resist the social order the issue is whether this resistance is empirical rather than conceptual “whether resistance manages to overturn existing patterns of domination or not”

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(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 80). One might also question the extent to which looking or acting non-doxic necessarily equates to resistance.

Thinking about the double naturalisation of the non-disabled body at a doxic level illustrates the efficacy of symbolic power in explaining the continuing exclusion of disabled people. The non-disabled sociodicy acquires its strength through firstly legitimizing inequality as the result of an inherent nature which is always already a socially mediated and naturalized construct (Bourdieu, 2001). It is this double naturalisation of the body that makes it so difficult to challenge and resist. The negative symbolic capital that is attributed to disability through relations of doxic knowledge therefore furthers poor understandings about disability as well as the idea of disabled people as deficient, negative and abnormal and obscures the symbolic violence done to disabled people as natural (not addressing a disabled person directly and instead talking to the person they are with or infantilizing disabled people, asking a disabled person intruding questions that you would not ask a non-disabled person22, psycho-emotional disablism and so on). In other words, our symbolic capital, that is, our distinctions, become naturalized and therefore obscure the social inequalities underlying our position.

Having shown how doxa insidiously produces negative symbolic capital by maintaining a social order in which the disabled body is overwhelmingly negatively interpreted, I would now like to turn to a few examples of the impact of negative symbolic capitals in doxic spaces and how this may shape the habitus. To experience these negative encounters as the norm is to be constantly reminded that you are different. Not only this but to have this same difference regularly realised, not accommodated and seen as problematic is to live in a state of recurring devaluation. This can be an emotional and distressing experience with an accumulative negative effect on the person’s sense of value and therefore could durably transform aspects and dispositions of the habitus, demonstrating the real suffering that can

22 In the same way that white people feel justified in asking Black or Minority Ethnic (BME) people “where are you really from?”
take place when ones legitimacy is questioned. On the other hand, Watson (2003) has shown how for some disabled people, the daily experience of oppression becomes routinely denied and downplayed through various strategies of resistance. This demonstrates how being different to the doxic expectation might allow us to develop psychological forbearance as well as critical thought. However, given the increasingly negative portrayal of disabled people as illegitimate welfare users and their precarious entitlement to benefits and citizen status amongst many more exclusionary and discriminatory practices and multiple oppressions, I would suggest that there are markedly more chances for such negative symbolic capital to take its toll. In this respect, the increasing deprivation of material and symbolic resources makes it unduly difficult for some disabled people to attach value and meaning to their lives and practices. Arguably then, there is a case that for some groups of disabled people, it is harder to deny daily experiences of oppression and inequality and this may have significant psychosocial costs.

At this point I would like to draw upon the work of Sara Ryan and Donna Reeve to further demonstrate the power of doxa and negative symbolic capital in contributing to the exclusion of disabled people from social space. Ryan (2005; 2008) has raised questions around access and exclusion in her research on the everyday use of space by learning disabled children and their mothers. Ryan (2005: 292) states that “rights to public spaces are more apparent than real. Public spaces are not egalitarian, in fact, the rights to access are hierarchically and logically arranged” so that we might say that space is characterised by a doxic arrangement. Ryan (2008: 730) posits that public spaces are “saturated with regulations of ‘proper ways’ to perform symbolic displays and self-representation. Those with more power are able to monopolise space and relegate the less desirable to less desirable environments”. Within public spaces, disabled people are seen as problematic and often made to feel like outsiders as a result of the inaccessible environment, organisation and reactions from non-impaired people, serving to remind them that they are out-of-place and do not belong (Ryan, 2005). As well as this, mothers are often attributed a devalued status through the negative and inappropriate judgements made by others about
their children’s behaviour (Ryan, 2008). More recently, a report by charity Sense (2016) found that 92% of parents with a child with multiple needs felt that they did not have the same opportunities as their non-disabled peers and 81% reported difficulties in accessing mainstream local play spaces. Of the multiple barriers faced, many parents reported that negative attitudes towards disability were the most significant barrier and that 51% of children with multiple needs had been excluded from play spaces by providers of play. Significantly, the report highlights that access to play is crucial for children’s physical, emotional and cognitive development and that early childcare settings are where most children develop social and communication skills. These play spaces are often also where parents develop support networks and expand their social circle. Exclusion from these doxic spaces therefore reduces both parents and children’s opportunities to develop social capital as well as other vitally important aspects of children’s development.

Ryan (2005: 293) has documented that learning-disabled children are increasingly regulated in terms of their behaviour in public spaces, demonstrating the illegitimacy or unworthiness of their selves which requires close monitoring to “protect the orderliness of public spaces”. Importantly for both Bourdieu’s work and for Ryan (2008: 731), the rules which govern our behaviour are implicit, “the code governing these rules is incorporated in etiquette rather than comprising of law, morality and ethics. These rules are so deeply engrained and taken-for-granted that they are taken to be ‘natural’ and it is when they are challenged they become more visible”, clearly demonstrating the doxic expectations of our social conduct and the perceived disruption that disabled bodies present. Ryan (2005: 293; 2008) expands that this becomes more of a negotiation for mothers of learning disabled children “who are not able, and may never be able, to conform to appropriate ways of behaving or using space”. In this sense, doxic spaces and attitudes continue to reproduce disability as imbued with negative symbolic capital.

Similarly, Reeve (2002, 2006, 2012) discusses how spatial barriers can contribute as a form of indirect psycho-emotional disablism, stating that encountering inaccessible social spaces can arouse hurtful emotional
responses. For Reeve (2012), exclusion happens at both the material and psycho-emotional level because the message transmitted through inaccessible environments is that the disabled person does not belong and that they are *out of place*. In some cases, this can lead to the person withdrawing from social spaces as it has a negative effect upon their self-esteem and confidence. Reeve (2012) later describes this as an example of Leder’s “dys-appearing body”, a body that is experienced as absent most of the time until an inter (occurring from interactions with the social) or intra (a reminder of the physicality of our body such as pain and discomfort) corporeal experience foregrounds it. Here, Reeve (2012) quotes Paterson and Hughes’ (1999) work on the *dys-appearing body* to further her argument that disabling spaces “produce a vivid, but unwanted, consciousness of one’s impaired body” and represents instances of socially enforced *dys-appearance* which are psychically harmful. She states that “part of the problem lies with a social and physical world which is set up to accommodate certain kinds of normate bodies” (Reeve, 2012: 84) or what we might call *doxic bodies*.

This theorisation of the psycho-emotional experience of disablism echoes much of what Bourdieu has said in terms of how the habitus directs and mediates our experience within social fields, reminding us when we are *out of place* or granting us ease within social space. As Bourdieu (1984: 474) has said, our social position in the world “is never more clearly expressed than in the space and time one feels entitled to take from others; more precisely, in the space one claims with one’s body in physical space”. Moreover, Bourdieu (2001: 39) has noted that where certain groups (in this case, women) were previously formally excluded from certain social spaces (educational, political, occupational), their subsequent official inclusion did not guarantee their presence as a result of embodied dispositions which linger on as a self-enforced and “socially imposed agoraphobia”. In this respect we can identify the strength of doxic knowledge to exclude and self-exclude due to the lasting effects and embodied nature of dispositions and their relation to power. As we saw in the first two chapters, although disabled people have been *formally* integrated into the expectations of citizenship, this by no means guarantees their inclusion.
By using Reeve’s work on the psycho-emotional to modify Bourdieu, the theorisation of the symbolic capitals attached to various bodies within certain doxic mediated spaces allows us to understand psycho-emotional disablism in terms of embodied relations of symbolic power. By seeing that psycho-emotional disablism is entwined with the structures of symbolic power we are able to develop an understanding of the psychological consequences of disability as the transfiguration of negative symbolic capital as it is realised through oppressive doxic structures. Understanding psycho-emotional disablism in this way also allows us to conceptualise how these doxic structures function as a mechanism of domination and inequality and demonstrates the negative psychological experiences which come to shape the habitus and demonstrates internalisation of oppressive structure.

Within public space, non-disabled agents may not think about what kind of bodies they expect to encounter, their expectations of what bodies will look like exists dormantly as a background knowledge and it is not until they meet a person who is visibly impaired that this taken-for-grantedness may be disputed. The congenial interaction between objectified structures and our bodies and dispositions reifies corporeal expectations and the correct way of doing things which ‘makes sense’ to us, consolidating the non-disabled body as legitimate and our doxic mode of being. The non-disabled body is written into a legitimate way of life that reaffirms itself in the most quotidian of ways. The practice of a body which fits the field in a legitimate way is therefore granted the “symbolic profit of normality” which allows the body to be experienced as self-evident and grants a sense of ease (Bourdieu, 1998b: 69). This doxic conceptualisation is doubly reinforced when we consider the absence of disabled people from mainstream social activities and practices which itself stems from the non-disabled doxa around which environments and practice is organised. This absence of disabled people in public space and the more general lack of accessibility further deepens a knowledge about space and which bodies are able to legitimately occupy space.
For Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) this creates an asymmetry of status for those who are prevented from accessing this symbolic capital and requires that they must always work harder to accumulate capital than those to which legitimacy is more readily bestowed. In this respect, I would suggest that in order for disabled people to accumulate positively consecrated symbolic capital, they are often already pitted against deficit thinking associated with their perceived negative symbolic capital. As we saw in Chapter One, the struggle to be seen as a legitimate citizen is made that much harder when we recognise how so much of it depends on having a doxic body with which to meet the expectations of neo-liberalism. In some sense, doxa, as it is entwined with symbolic capital and reinforced through orthodox discourses, might be argued to impose a kind of “invisible censorship” in that it tends to reify its own logic whilst obscuring alternatives (Bourdieu, 1977, 1999: 15).

3.6 Symbolic Capital and Sense Relations

So far I have shown how non-disablement contained in doxa as a diffuse form of symbolic capital works as a mechanism of domination which continues to reproduce insidious disabling structures, subjectivities and practices. I have also suggested how psycho-emotional disablism is entwined in these relations of symbolic power and draws its strength and efficacy from the deeply embodied doxic knowledge of disability. In this final section I want to unpick how negative symbolic capital is attributed to disability as well as the unease this may produce as a result. Bourdieu (2000: 184, my emphasis) states that the bodily knowledge gained from our sense of position:

“takes the form of emotion (the unease of someone who is out of place, or the ease that comes from being in one’s place), and it is expressed in behaviours such as avoidance or unconscious adjustments such as the correction of one’s accent”.

Here we see that emotion is central to the functioning of symbolic capital. Thus, Bourdieu (2000: 187) posits that the social world is both a product of and a stake in the symbolic struggle over knowledge and recognition, a struggle in which each actor seeks to impose “an advantageous
representation of himself or herself, with the strategies of ‘presentation of self’ so admirably analysed by Goffman”. It is perhaps the embodied sense of place instilled by symbolic capital which makes it feel so personal, loaded with affectivity and ontologically significant. Within *Pascalian Meditations*, Bourdieu (2000) makes repeated reference to the importance of symbolic capital used by players in the game and begins to depict a more ethereal target that exists alongside the more traditionally conceived and tangible profits. It is here that Bourdieu (2000: 238, original italics) recognises the existential toll of “the symbolic struggle of all against all in which what is at stake is the power of naming, or categorisation, in which everyone stakes his being, his value, the idea he has of himself”. Here he writes:

“man is and knows he is mortal, the thought that he is going to die is unbearable or impossible for him, and, condemned to death, an end... he is a being without a reason for being, haunted by the need for justification, legitimation, recognition” (Bourdieu, 2000: 239).

Further to this he adds that symbolic power can question the “legitimacy of an existence, an individual’s right to feel justified in existing as he or she exists; and this question is inseparably eschatological and sociological” (Bourdieu, 2000: 237, original italics). For Bourdieu (2000), the legitimacy attached to our existence is inextricably tied to our feelings of self and symbolic capital in relation to others. The emphasis placed on how symbolic power evokes feelings to do with our sense of being and questions our value demonstrates that the realisation of our symbolic capital can be an uneasy experience. Bourdieu (2000: 241) establishes here that the social world is essentialist and as such, creates hierarchies of “worth and unworthiness, which can never be perfectly superimposed on the hierarchy of wealth and powers”. These ontological hierarchies, ranked in terms of symbolic capital, endow agents with a social mission, “To be expected, solicited, overwhelmed with obligations and commitments is...to experience...the feeling of counting for others, being important for them, and therefore in oneself” (Bourdieu, 2000: 240). Bourdieu (2000: 240) describes some of the positive effects of consecration, that is to say the attribution of positively recognised symbolic capital, stating that “the more that agents are endowed with a consecrated social identity, that of husband, partner, etc., the more they are protected
against a questioning of the sense of their existence”. Here, Bourdieu (2000: 241) concedes the ability of symbolic capital to give meaning to life and, it would seem, to defend against the attribution of negative symbolic capitals. In this respect, embodying socially esteemed symbolic capitals is significant for our sense of worth and evidences the psychosocial import of such capitals. It is worth noting that the experience and value of capitals is mediated by the social space in which we are engaged, so that being an active participant in the Disable People’s Movement provides space in which disability is positively valued while it occupies a position of negative value elsewhere.

Given the very personal, psychosocial and affective experience of symbolic capital as one which attributes meaning and value as well as a sense of position, I would suggest that there is the potential for symbolic capital to persist in our embodied orientations as an enduring sense relation. Of course this sense relation is experienced at different intensities in different spaces but its’ significance is felt in how it shapes us overall, as it realizes itself in our practices, dispositions and character. In this respect, symbolic capital is not only a force or a power when it is recognized in us by others through relations in social space but also meaningful sense-making asset which through its perpetuation transforms the owner’s relationship to it and can become a personal, psychosocial architecture within the habitus.

If symbolic capital has the ability to attribute meaning and value to life it might equally be suggested that negative symbolic capital questions the meaning of lives and denigrates their value. This raises some interesting questions about our ability to reject and resist negative symbolic capital. Watson’s (2002; 2003) work has shown how for the majority of his research participants, despite the daily experiences of oppressive practices, impairment and the negative cultural perceptions of disability were not seen as significant to their sense of identity or self. Watson (2002: 514) shows that “For many who took this view, any difference between themselves and non-disabled people were simply the result of discrimination and prejudice”. In this respect, one participant was described as deciding what was symbolically
important to his identity. Symbolic capital in this respect is contingent upon people being invested in it so that people who reject the conventional markers of symbolic capital do not feel judged by them (Farrugia, 2010). To this extent we might argue that a disabled person is able to reject impairment and its attendant negative symbolic capital as a defining feature of identity, of course. There are disabled people who reject that their impairment or that to be disabled is negative. These are important narratives and again, negative symbolic capital is likely to be felt differently and to varying intensities within different social spaces so that although disability is negatively valued in many social spaces, it can also be a source of positive identity, especially for those aligned closely with social model politics and the Disabled People’s Movement (Shakespeare, 1996). In such situations, the social model has enabled us to identify the often arbitrary social structures and organisation which oppress and exclude disabled people and locates the problem in society rather than in the individual. In this sense, the DPM has allowed many disabled people to challenge and disrupt the status quo and the social model might therefore be considered an example of the kind of reflexive socio-analysis that Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 199-201) advocated which should seek to illuminate the “hidden principles” of our domination so that agents are able to “assume their habitus without guilt or suffering”. The social model may therefore provide a means of challenging the self-evidence of doxa and doxosophers. The social model has clearly provided many disabled people with a positive political identity which I would suggest is experienced as an enduring sense relation within the habitus so that these disabled people will continue to feel these positive associations even when outside of disability positive spaces.

Negative symbolic capital is of course mediated by time, place and context as Reeve (2012: 81) shows by drawing on evidence from her interview with a younger woman, Sue, who has MS and uses a Zimmer frame to walk and who “resists the normative gaze and manages social encounters in productive ways”. Sue uses her interactions with others to challenge how we conceptualise disabled people, saying that it is good for people to see a younger person with a Zimmer frame. Reeve (2012) notes that this way of
returning the gaze is a means of retaining control in this situation and that this is a response that not all disabled people can elicit. She remarks that it “takes a degree of self-worth and self-confidence, as well as energy, to be able to adopt this approach” (Reeve, 2012: 81). Reeve (2012) attributes Sue’s ability to negotiate social encounters in this way as likely encouraged through other aspects of her life, namely, through being in paid employment. In this sense we might think of how the value of work as a highly consecrated symbolic capital enables Sue to negate the negative symbolic capital associated with impairment. However, as we saw earlier, there is still an asymmetry of status which disabled people must work against.

Whilst negative symbolic capitals associated with disability may be strongly rejected or resisted by some disabled individuals and therefore does not denigrate their personal sense of value, it is arguably more difficult to challenge dominant beliefs and practices. In dealing with the symbolic power of negative symbolic capital attributed to impairment and disability, rejection of this negative value is not quite so straightforward. In speaking of how a person is attributed value through symbolic capital, Bourdieu (1990: 140) states that “It is based not only on the indices of collective judgement but also on the objective indicators of the position really occupied in the distributions, which the collective judgement already takes into account”. The symbolic power of negative symbolic capital is not confined to individuals and their personal interactions or challenges but forms part of the system of symbolic power because it exists in collective schemes of perception and in institutions and objective structures. As Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127) puts it “Social reality exists...twice, in things and in minds, in field and in habitus, outside and inside of agents”. Therefore when we begin to think through the doxic conceptualisation of disability as it exists in mind and in structures, we might expect that the natural attitude towards disability is that it is unpleasant and that the disabled person is unable, unproductive or vulnerable, that they are dependent, and require help/care or “reasonable adjustments” and perhaps that they take more sick days than a non-impaired person. Negative symbolic capital therefore may have negative consequences when a disabled person is being considered for a job
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despite this person’s personal capacity to resist such negative value, such as Sue. As a consequence of the negative symbolic capital attached to disability, the disabled applicant is turned down, perhaps more than once, and as the unemployed spell gets longer and longer, they find it harder to gain employment. This consolidates and reproduces an image of the disabled person as unemployable, furthering this exclusion and feeding back into doxic thinking, leading to a longer time spent on benefits and the accumulation of yet more negative symbolic capital through the risk of being perceived as a fraudulent claimant. Symbolic capital as part of the symbolic system is then reified in the economic system, just as it is reified through doxic space and organization. As we saw before, resistance of negative symbolic capital is often personal rather than empirical as it does not change the pattern of domination. Although I acknowledge that the responses to and feelings about disability may be diverse, I feel that Bourdieu’s social theory adds a valuable means of understanding how many social structures (reflective of a doxic order which problematises the disabled body and practice) shape the lives of disabled people. This does not dismiss the heterogeneous experience of individuals but locates them within a wider framework of symbolic power. Therefore, although not everyone will perceive disability in terms of negative symbolic capital, we live in a society which is overwhelmingly organized to disadvantage and devalue disabled bodies and practice. In this respect, it emphasises the symbolic power of structure and doxic organisation which characterizes individual lives rather than the individuals who comprise the structure.

3.7 Consecrated and Sanctioned Identities

Within Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu (1991a) talks about rites of institution which he describes as the various social acts which consecrate, sanction, sanctify and legitimate certain identities and a particular social order. He notes that the institutionalisation of symbolic capital serves to consecrate symbolic boundaries through encouraging belief in the legitimacy of these boundaries as well as legitimising the sanctioning of difference (pre-existent or not) “by making it known and recognised; it consists of making it
exist as a social difference, known and recognised as such by the agent invested and everyone else” (Bourdieu, 1991a: 119). Bourdieu (1991a: 120) goes on to note that through the institution of an identity “which can be a title of nobility, or a stigma (you’re nothing but a …)” classifications are imposed upon agents and they are attributed a social essence:

“To institute, to assign an essence, a competence, is to impose a right to be that is an obligation of being so (or to be so). It is to signify to someone what he is and how he should conduct himself as a consequence... To institute, to give a social definition, and identity, is also to impose boundaries...acting in keeping with one’s essence and nothing else” (Bourdieu, 1991a: 120 my emphasis).

Bourdieu (1991a: 72) noted that the consecration of symbolic boundaries act as a kind of benchmark and that “the weight of different agents depends on their symbolic capital, i.e. on the recognition, institutionalised or not, that they receive from a group”. He then proceeds to acknowledge that “the most unequal of all distributions, and probably, in any case, the most cruel, is the distribution of symbolic capital, that is, of social importance and of reasons for living” (Bourdieu, 2000: 241, my emphasis).

Here Bourdieu (2000) displays an acute sensitivity to the importance of legitimacy of personhood. Feelings of worth and purpose and our sense of personal value are inextricably tied to the recognition of symbolic capital. My interpretation of the significance of symbolic capital revolves primarily around the previously mentioned notion of ‘sense relations’, affording a closer look at the embodied nature of symbolic capital and the intermediary role of affect within the habitus more generally. In this respect, it is important to consider not only how the negative image of disability contained within doxa produces an idea of who counts as a disabled person, but also the embodied experience of this symbolic burden which I will return to in Chapter Four.

When considering the weight of negative symbolic capitals attached to disability and which are sustained by doxic thought we might begin by thinking about the disability stereotypes that would likely be evoked if you
were to ask someone what a disabled person looks like. They might typically say a wheelchair-user, a person with a white stick or a double amputee, for many disabled people living with invisible or less obvious impairments, “you don’t look disabled!” is a familiar exclamation (TUC, 2015). The Trade Unions Congress (2015) has recently published a good practice guide to support those with invisible impairments who are often met with similar statements of disbelief when they disclose their disability. They state that “at a national level, government messages reinforced by sections of the popular press that people claiming benefits are defrauding decent hard-working taxpayers” serve to reinforce the deserving and non-deserving binaries through disability stereotypes (TUC, 2015: 2).

The doxic conceptualisation of the disabled figure seems more stark when we consider how many disabled people have reported being the target of abuse because they are perceived as faking it, especially blue badge holders, as a result of not being visibly impaired or disabled enough (Quarmby, 2015). In such instances it might be said that doxic knowledge about who the legitimately disabled are is met with an image of disability which is unfamiliar and dissonant to the perceiver. This is even more significant when we think of how these doxic expectations may have helped facilitate the political paternalistic rhetoric of protecting the most vulnerable and the truly disabled. What do the most vulnerable and truly disabled look like? Doxic understandings of disability will tell us of the various negative symbolic capitals attached to disability, that disability is in the body, that it is a personal deficiency or abnormality and that the disabled figure is someone who is unable, needy and pitiable. Doxic belief won’t tell us about the social complexities of disability, the variability or fluctuation of impairment, the diversity of disability experiences or social model thinking. In this respect, although social model thinking may be formally co-opted in policies, it does not present a strong enough heterodox message to disrupt the self-evidence of doxa.

We saw in Chapter One that welfare spending and fraudulent claimants have been longstanding concerns and the public have been grievously misled about
the level of benefit fraud within disability benefits and the media has constructed the disabled benefit claimant as a pathologically idle fraud (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Briant et al, 2013; McEnhill, and Byrne, 2014). Disability benefit recipients, portrayed as work-shy, fraudulent claimants, are negatively compared and juxtaposed against the doxic benchmark and consecrated identity of the legitimate citizen as moral, tax-paying enterprising individual. The state acts as the “bank of symbolic capital that guarantees all acts of authority... [which] institute socially guaranteed identities (as citizen, legal resident...)” (Bourdieu, 1998c: 52). For Bourdieu (1986) this is the ability to make entities exist through producing commonsense by constantly and explicitly stating and classifying groups “the State institutes and inculcates common symbolic forms of thought, social frames of perception, understanding or memory” (Bourdieu, 2000: 175). The state, helped by the media, produces ways of seeing through neo-liberal doxa which consecrates the active citizen at the same time as it sanctions the illegitimate identity of welfare user. Through imposing ways of seeing, the state also produces the disability category through “bringing a more or less extensive part of the doxa to the level of explicit statement”, reinforcing the doxic idea of disability through the orthodox restatement of the truly vulnerable and disabled, producing disability as exceptional tragedy (Bourdieu, 2000: 184). As such, the state and media “mobilize feelings” against an already marginalized and stigmatized group and creates “phantasms, fears, and phobias, or simply false representations” leading to a profound misrecognition of the true nature of disability as either faker or tragically wounded (Bourdieu, 1998c: 20-52; Hughes, 2009a). It might be suggested that this kind of misrecognition is better described as allodoxia, a term that Bourdieu (1984; 1996; 2000) used to describe mistaken identities and misplaced beliefs as a result of a misapprehension which leads us to take one thing for another. Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) described allodoxia as the errors in perception that occur as a result of the imposition of ways of seeing which are uncertain and discontinuous. As Bourdieu (1996: 219) stated:
“The categories of perception that agents apply to the social world are the product of a prior state of this world. When structures are modified, even slightly, the structural hysteresis of the categories of perception and appreciations gives rise to diverse forms of allodoxia”.

For Bourdieu (2000: 144) the hysteresis, or mismatch between perceptions produces the mistaken identity because the habitus is primed to recognise such an identity - “allodoxia, the mistake we sometimes make when, waiting for someone, we seem to see that person in everyone who comes along, gives an accurate idea of this tension”.

In claiming to protect the most vulnerable and the truly disabled, the state has wielded significant symbolic power in redefining who can be considered the legitimately disabled and appeals to our doxic commonsense about who might counts as a disabled person. Moreover, in restricting the disability category, the state forces disabled individuals into a position where in order to qualify themselves for meagre benefits, they must conform to and reproduce doxic understandings of impairment as limiting, abnormal, deficient and dysfunctional. It seems that to portray life as a disabled person as anything less than desperately vulnerable or tragic condemns a person as fraudulent. In this respect, Bourdieu (1999: 123) argues that we never know the realities of the lives discussed in the media, only “phantasms, which feed on emotional experiences stimulated...by words and images such as those in the tabloids and by political propaganda or rumour” or what Jensen (2014) has described as poverty porn. As Wacquant (2013: 2) suggests, these ways of seeing represent a “sociosymbolic alchemy whereby a mental construct, existing abstractly in the minds of individual persons, is turned into a concrete social reality acquiring existential veracity as well as historical potency outside of and over them” (Wacquant, 2013: 2). The negative symbolic capital attached to the phantasm of fraudulent benefit claimant evokes intense responses demonstrating that anti-welfare sentiment is deeply internalized and affectively characterized, that is, symbolic manipulation has taken place at an embodied level. The disabled person who fails to meet the skewed doxic perceptions is perceived as the “false mendicant” (Hughes, 2015), endowed with negative symbolic capital which is experienced as a positional sense relation, so that feelings of resentment,
disgust or anger express the embodied misrecognition of symbolic power relations.

By looking at the cuts to welfare in terms of symbolic power we can see that the supporting political rhetoric and scathing media portrayals act to symbolically manipulate categories of perception, dismantling the category of deserving. The state as the “holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence” symbolically imposes a viewpoint (Bourdieu, 1985: 732). People who were previously considered disabled and worthy of support are now, quite arbitrarily, as Stone (1984) and Roulstone (2015) have shown, defined as illegitimate and undeserving. This constant reiteration of the deserving/undeserving category pushes realistic understandings of disability further out of doxa and renders the real suffering of disabled people an invisible oppression in that is has dropped below the “threshold of public visibility” (McNay, 2014: 87). The media has in effect, enacted a censorship through portraying increasingly negative and unrealistic news (Bourdieu, 1998c) and spends no time at all reporting the banalities of ordinary life as a disabled person, instead conflating disabled people with benefit frauds or on the other hand as objects of pity and charity or inspiration porn (Young, 2012). I would argue that this prevents disabled people being seen to have the mundane symbolic capital of being ordinary and further adds to the doxic conceptualisation of disability as exceptional, negative and unable. Through enforcing and inculcating these categories of perception, the state legitimates the symbolic domination of disabled people by constructing their experiences of inequality and poverty as the result of individual deficit, whether that deficit is disability or pathological personhood.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the use of Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic capital and doxa in understanding how disablism is consolidated at both a structural and individual level. By demonstrating that doxa functions as a diffuse form of symbolic capital which reifies the non-disabled body and devalues the disabled body, I have argued that doxa functions as mode of organization and a mechanism of domination which reproduces disabling
structures, subjectivities and practices and which takes shape through mundane and taken-for-granted knowledge. We have also seen how symbolic capital is experienced as a sense of place and position and that the transfiguration of symbolic capital is psychologically experienced as a positional sense relation. As such, practices which are positively consecrated may encourage a feeling of ease within space and thereby come more easily as this disposition is increasingly evoked and reinforced. On the other hand, we have also observed how possessing negative symbolic capital associated with disability in doxic space may devalue a person, question their legitimacy and sense of worth, thereby instigating feelings of unease or being out of place. The attribution of negative symbolic capital may therefore discourage or prohibit disabled people from accessing space as freely as their non-disabled counterparts and demonstrates the asymmetry of status which disabled people must work against.

This chapter has also shown that while there are those that may be able to individually resist the negative value attached to disability, this is harder to effect on a larger scale because of the diffuse power attached to the non-disabled body over many different levels. In this respect, while certain individuals may appear as exceptions to the rule, they do not change the rules, structures, organization, practices and organizations which characterize social space.

I have also suggested that the poor understandings of disability contained within doxa have helped facilitate a political rhetoric which seeks to absolve the government of wrongdoing by emphasizing that it will protect those who truly need it when it comes to cutting welfare. In this respect, disabled people are forced into a position in which they must conform to and reproduce the negative picture of disability in order to receive social support or else be labelled as undeserving and imbued with a negative symbolic capital of a different ilk. This may encourage individuals to reject and resist mainstream collective expectations, or it may encourage actors to emphasise other forms of capital to mitigate perceived negative attributes. At the same time however, this work suggests that the extra efforts that may be made by
individuals in a bid to ameliorate the tensions arising from negative symbolic capital can be psychically harmful. Given the embodied and psychic experience of symbolic capital, it is also suggested that symbolic capital retains a kind of psychological architecture within the habitus.

The inculcation of these symbolic categories therefore enact a symbolic violence in which the true nature of inequality experienced by disabled people is shrouded and their ordinary lives obscured. Given the current context of welfare cuts and symbolic manipulation of the disability category, disabled people are at increased risk of accumulating the negative symbolic capitals associated with fraudulent claimants which may have significant psychological consequences and which may be especially compounded by other aspects of material and symbolic deprivation. The next chapter will focus on a psychosocial development of the habitus in order to more fully explore the embodied experiences of practice as well as a closer look at how affect may characterize the habitus.
Chapter 4
The Psychosocial Habitus

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter addressed Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic power and negative symbolic capital, demonstrating the negative value which is overwhelmingly attached to disabled bodies through a critical interpretation of the substance of doxa. Having identified that doxic beliefs about the body serve to sustain and reproduce a social environment suited to the prescriptively narrow able-bodied norm, which, at best is unaccommodating, and at worst, psychologically harmful, attention was given to the highly psychosocial element of the habitus, especially associated with negative symbolic capital and the disjuncture of habitus and field. Observing the existential character that Bourdieu attached to symbolic capital and its capacity for giving meaning to social life, this chapter seeks to explore the affective and psychosocial elements of the habitus which make this possible. Given that the habitus is fundamentally experiential, it is suggested that without an understanding of the habitus as characterised by emotion/affect, theorisations of social practice can seem estranged to our own experiences and may be felt to be mechanistic and disinterested. Theorising the habitus allows us to interrogate our ways of behaving, thinking and being and by incorporating the psychic element of the habitus we can better understand the embodied feelings associated with such practice. Moreover, the theorising of a thoroughly psychosocial and affective habitus, equipped with moral dispositions and animated with feelings, enables us to further consider the complex cognitive processes which shape our dispositions and beliefs. This seems crucial to add to our understanding of how disability comes to occupy such a negatively valued space. As Bourdieu (1999: 512) suggested, if we wish to understand the dispositions of the habitus we must seek to understand how “the social order collects, channels and reinforces or counteracts psychological processes depending on whether there is a homology, redundancy, and reinforcement between the two systems or, to the contrary, contradiction and tension”.

This chapter begins by foregrounding Bourdieu’s affective, if underdeveloped, leanings before exploring the incorporation of affect and cognition within social theory in order to demonstrate how these psychological processes might be applied to our understanding of the habitus and how affect may underpin our social practice. By exploring work on the affective processes underpinning social practice, I hope to show the ongoing and dynamic nature of the habitus as a socio-biological structure and illuminate what might be described as the psychic architecture of the habitus.

As this was something left untouched by Bourdieu I will draw upon the work of other scholars who have worked to theorise a more psychosocial habitus. The chapter will then draw upon a collection of scholars who extend Bourdieu’s theory into the realms of affect and the psychosocial within their own work as well as some of the moral dimensions of the habitus (Wetherell, 2012; Reay, 2015; Bradford and Hey, 2007; Lawler 2005; Sayer 2005). I will also look at how the attribution of negative symbolic capital and experiences of disablism may come to shape the habitus and some of the nuances involved in securing anti-welfare sentiment. This chapter will finally look at the aversive reaction of disgust and how it has been used to account for the negative positioning of disability. It will be suggested that the use of disgust is not quite sufficient in accounting for the feelings we experience in the presence of disabled bodies and that instead, we might use the experience of unease to open up a discussion of hysteresis which is the subject of the final chapter.

4.2 A Psycho-sociology?

We have already seen that although Bourdieu never explicitly addressed the role of emotions, perhaps even marginalising them within his work, he did make reference to practical and symbolic processes which generate emotional capital (Reay 2004). As well as this, Bourdieu (1984; 1990; 2000) paid great attention to the corporeality of the thoroughly embodied habitus which promises “a way of thinking about emotion and affect as simultaneously social and physical” (Probyn, 2004: 334). There are also those that have used psychological capital as a means of discussing the
psychological experiences of social position. According to Bradford and Hey (2007: 600), psychological capital is “an additional resource related to, but not identical with, cultural and social capital already specified as part of Bourdieu’s theorisation of class and power”. They go on to say that psychological capital necessarily intersects with other species of capital and similarly, is differentially distributed. Moreover, psychological capital is established in “practices of self-esteem, confidence and self-belief which are generated in a range of settings (the family, communities of various types, friendships and formal institutional settings like schools and youth projects) and can be transformed into resilience and the dispositions needed to cope with the exigencies of contemporary life” (Bradford and Hey, 2007: 600). Elsewhere, Hey (2003) has stated that psychological capital is “produced by memories, desires, rage, shame, resentment and pain as well as power and pleasure”.

However, I would suggest that to talk about memories and feelings of rage or shame or pain as psychological capital makes them seem as though there were some archive of how to feel and, I would suggest, oversimplifies the psychological capacities of the habitus. Whilst it could be argued that this work on psychological capital seems to demonstrate the psychosocial element of the habitus, it appears to disaggregate affective and psychological properties from dispositions and practices. Instead, it might be more appropriate then to talk of the psychologised experiences of capital and practices rather than psychological capital. This is to say that the habitus itself is a psychologised structure which is cognitive and internalises our experiences and produces thoughts, feelings and behaviour.

Central to the concept of habitus is the notion of dispositions; the embodied inclinations, preferences, and anticipations instilled in early life through repeated social action which reflects the social practices, relations and material circumstances in which the individual is located (Sayer, 2010). It is these dispositions, reflective of the environment in which they are acquired and developed, which endows us with our “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 1990: 66). Although Bourdieu concedes that habitus can change, he is often
charged with being overly deterministic and is guilty of understating the role of reflection and reason\textsuperscript{23} at both the stages of acquiring and developing dispositions (Sayer, 2010).

I showed in Chapter Two that Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the embodied habitus has also neglected some of the very physiological and psychological limits of our bodies. Sayer (2010) has similarly noted Bourdieu’s superficial commitment to the biological nature of habitus through his use of \textit{libido} understood as a physiological drive subject to cultural shaping. Therefore although we do indeed need an understanding of what drives us to do \textit{anything}, Bourdieu has often been sociologically imperialistic in his approach, tending to ‘sociologise’ all behaviour which produces an “unexamined notion of human nature” (Sayer, 2010: 111).

In speaking of emotion and the creation of dispositions, Bourdieu has argued that we learn \textit{through} the body and that the social order is inscribed in the corporeal through the constant confrontation between the anticipative body and environment, “which may be more or less dramatic...is always largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions with the environment” (2000: 141, my emphasis). Moreover, Bourdieu (2000: 167) states that the learning of our dispositions through socialisation is “highly charged with affectivity. The child incorporates the social in the form of affects”. Emphasising the role of affect in the acquisition of dispositions, Bourdieu (2000: 140) states that it is because we are \textit{exposed} to the “risk of emotion, lesion, suffering, sometimes death, [that we are] obliged to take the world seriously, (and nothing is more serious than emotion, which touches the depths of our organic being)”. What is more, Bourdieu (2000) states that our \textit{sense of place} as well as our \textit{feel for the game} as a corporeal knowledge is informed and mediated by emotion, noting the unease experienced when \textit{out of place} which triggers unconscious adjustments. As we saw in Chapter Two, Bourdieu (1984: 474) located our socially held values in the “primary, primitive dispositions of the body, ‘visceral’ tastes and

\textsuperscript{23}Resistance and reflexivity within the habitus will be more fully developed in the next chapter.
distastes, in which the group’s most vital interests are embedded”. Whilst he may have overemphasised the automatic and unconscious nature of these responses, he certainly conceptualised dispositions and practice as affective and marked by emotion although this was never explicitly unpacked by Bourdieu. At times, his work seems to portray the disruptive quality of affect but then he also emphasises that affect plays a significant part in producing our acquiescence to dominating relations. An exploration of how affect and emotion shape and characterise our habitus and practice is essential if we want to understand the embodied and affective nature of symbolic power. As Sayer has argued, symbolic domination clearly functions in part through:

“producing feelings of inferiority or superiority in people, and hence shame or pride and low or high self-esteem, and even though these are part of the experience of inequality and matter a great deal to people, affecting their psychological and physical health, the emotional dimension is left largely unexplored and for the reader to imagine” (Sayer, 2010: 114).

Similarly, Wetherell (2012) and Reay (2005: 912; 2015) have shown that questions of exclusion and differentiation take place within the “psychic economy”. As I described in Chapter Three, the embodied experience of capital produces a positional sense relation, demonstrating how affect may configure our social relations and judgements of social value and is therefore a powerful aspect in social practice. According to Reay (2015), Bourdieu’s emphasis upon the scientific and objective obscured the role of affect and emotion in social life. In her latest work on the psychosocial, Reay (2015) says this is her second attempt at formulating an emotional conceptualisation of Bourdieu’s theory, noting that her knowledge of Bourdieu has deepened so that an understanding of the psychosocial cannot reside in emotional capital alone or even the expansive accumulation of capital but in the habitus itself and its relation to the field. Reay (2015: 10) states that the dispositions of the habitus should be more widely understood to include affective as well as cognitive aspects so that the habitus “can include a propensity to fatalism, ambivalence, resentment, certainty, entitlement or even rage, just as much as a tendency to either theatre-going or watching soap operas”.
Lizardo (2014) has noted the resistance of sociologists to adapting psychological and neuro-cognitive approaches whilst Pitts-Taylor (2014: 996) has similarly observed that the *neuro-cognitive turn* that has been identified across other disciplines in the humanities has illuminated sociology’s fervent “anti-naturalism”. There are some that view the emergent neuro-sociological approach as having *gone off the deep end*, whilst others perceive it as reductionist, eugenic and racist (Franks and Turner, 2013). Similarly, disability studies has traditionally been reluctant to engage with psychologised understandings of disability lest it be seen as validating negative attitudes towards disabled people (Reeve, 2006). This is understandable however, “given the bloody history of biological politics” which took place in the early 20th century (Fitzgerald et al, 2016: 2). However, Pitts-Taylor (2014) has suggested that this sociological reluctance to engage with biology, especially with neuro-cognitive understandings of self, now runs the risk of appearing irrelevant and outdated to 21st century understandings of humanity. She (2014: 997) argues that our traditional charges of biological determinism and reductionism may now be out-dated and poorly informed and that much of the recent research on our biology is actually compatible with social theory and supports the idea that we are biological beings which are “undetermined, dynamic and entangled with sociality and experience”. What is more, many in neuroscience “view the brain as a plastic, social organ, and depict the mind as embodied, emotional, and situated” (Pitts-Taylor, 2014: 998). Similarly, Fitzgerald et al (2016) quote an editorial called *Life Stresses* by the editors of the journal *Nature* (2012: 143) as saying that the biological sciences have “abandoned any concept of biological determinism” because we now know that “although our genes are fixed, their expression is highly dependent on what our environment throws at us”. The editorial (2012: 143, cited in Fitzgerald et al, 2016) suggests then that just as biologists need to “learn the language of sociology”, sociologists could also benefit from incorporating biological understandings.

The question is therefore not whether we should be developing a more biological and psychological approach, but *how* (Pitts-Taylor, 2014). As
Lizardo (2004: 3) has explained, our sociological intention should be “to uncover the most deeply buried structures of the different social worlds that make up the social universe, as well as the ‘mechanisms’ that tend to ensure their reproduction or transformation”. Understanding that Bourdieu’s habitus is a socio-biological structure as previously discussed in Chapter Two, we now turn to a more in depth psychosocial and affective analysis of its constitution.

4.3 What do we mean by affect?

In introducing affect, Seigworth and Gregg (2010) describe it as a visceral force that exists beneath, alongside and other than conscious knowing, a force which is beyond emotion which drives us towards action, thought or, on the other hand, may suspend and overwhelm us. Affect is variously described as an open-endedness, as generative quality, a potential, drive, bodily doing and immanence. It is an ongoing immersion of our body as a capacity to affect and to be affected (Seigworth and Gregg, 2010). For some, affect is a creative openness which provides hope and optimism through its disruptive and therefore freeing potential (Papoulias and Callard, 2010).

There are some affect theorists who think of affect as ontologically distinct to emotion and as pre-personal, characterising it as beyond consciousness and too abstract for language (Shouse, 2005). For some of the theorists who conceptualise affect in this way, affect is distinct from cognition, meaning that behaviour is determined by affective dispositions which are autonomous to conscious thought (Leys, 2011). Although this might be useful when describing the fleetingness of some affective experiences it neglects that affect can leave indelible marks and produces lasting bodily dispositions (Watkins, 2010). Significantly, there are others who argue that affect is inseparable to cognition “if for no other reason than thought is itself a body, embodied” (Seigworth and Gregg, 2010: 3). Wetherell (2012) has developed on this by saying that to conceptualise emotion and affect as functioning through fundamentally different logics and by conceiving of affect as autonomous to feelings and beyond consciousness runs the risk of artificially separating affect from cognition. Neurobiological analyses have shown that the distinction between affect and cognition is phenomenological rather than
ontological and that affect is deeply involved in our sensory processing and therefore responsible for a number of basic cognitive operations (Duncan and Barrett, 2007). To speak of affect as Shouse (2005) has, that is, as ontologically distinct and separate to other neural functions, appears to reproduce the mereological fallacy (Bennett and Hacker, 2003). This is to say that we may be attributing qualities or behaviours to a part of what makes us human when it is only makes sense to ascribe these characteristics to the whole person, that fundamentally, to attribute some aspects of a social being to a pre-social or asocial capacity make little sense (Bennett and Hacker, 2003).

In choosing affect to talk about what we might commonsensically describe as emotions I am in agreement with Wetherell (2012) and Leys (2011) who say that the way that emotions tend to be conceptualised is limiting. As I showed in Chapter Two, Bourdieu appeared to conceptualise affect and emotion as unconscious embodied aspects of the habitus and in opposition to rational, critical thought, leading to a polarised conceptualisation of practice as either doxic or reflexive (Myles, 2004). In addition to this, emotions have traditionally been viewed and categorised as between six and nine distinct zones of feeling or “affect programs” which are triggered by emotional stimulus (Leys, 2011: 438). These basic emotions include fear, anger, disgust, joy, sadness, and surprise and are viewed as universal, genetically hardwired and reflex-like (Leys, 2011: 438). As such, it has been common to talk about how culture augments these primitive emotional responses (Wetherell, 2012). However, within psychology there is now more talk about how culture actually transforms and remodels emotional responses (Wetherell, 2012). Focus in neuroscience no longer concentrates on the functioning of “whole emotions” but instead on how different aspects of emotional processes flow and pattern across our neural circuitry in combination with our bodily reactions and ongoing thoughts and evaluations (Wetherell, 2012). Emotion might be the label we give to a feeling or a way of characterising our mood, feelings and interpretation of bodily states, whilst affect might describe the embodied experience of these emotional intensities and flows. It seems that
we rarely experience just one basic emotion and our emotional states are characterised by so many other embodied, affective and cognitive processes.

Although I acknowledge that there are many interpretations and definitions of emotions and affect, especially within psychology, I am not looking to develop on these accounts but instead develop an understanding of the habitus and its bodily states or embodied experiences. In this respect the affective nature of the habitus should be understood as it relates to practice and so my use of affect reflects Wetherell’s (2012) description as “embodied meaning-making” which may be more or less recognised as human emotion. In talking about affect and emotion in this way I seek to embed them in our “corporeal being in the world” (Hughes, 2012a: 67). Through focusing upon affect, emotion and feeling, a much needed psychosocial texture (Wetherell, 2012) may be added to Bourdieu’s social theory which I hope provides a richer understanding of internalised power relations and demonstrates the impact that negative symbolic capital may have.

At this stage it is worth clarifying terms such as conscious, non-conscious, unconscious, preconscious. Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990, 1992, 2000) repeatedly made reference to the unconscious aspect of the habitus which granted agents an ‘unthinkingness’ to their actions and the ease of practical sense and which consequentially contributed to the polarisation of practice as either doxic or reflexive, unconscious or conscious (Myles, 2004). This is in spite of the fact that Husserl, (whom Bourdieu adopted the concept of doxa from) conceptualised a number of doxic modalities with varying levels of consciousness (Myles, 2004). Within the theory of affect, there are numerous references to consciousness or non-consciousness, unconscious and even preconscious, so that making any use of our sub/pre/un/consciousness can become hazy and muddled. As Wetherell (2012) shows, affect is both conscious and non-conscious and has bodily and cognitive elements which are often seamlessly entwined, illustrating that the brain is always engaged in preparing for action in emergent settings and that affect is ubiquitous. What we describe as the unconscious has come a long way since Freud’s psychoanalysis and what we call the unconscious might better be thought of
in terms of *procedural unconscious* to reflect its regulatory operations (Franks, 2012). Akram (2014) on the other hand has suggested that a more focussed understanding on what might actually be contained within the habitus’ unconscious is necessary if we are to understand how the habitus operates and that *preconscious* may be a more useful term to describe this aspect of the habitus.

Akram (2014: 385) continues by saying that the preconscious refers to “that arena of influences that affects agency below the level of conscious action”. These preconscious motivations and habits contained within the habitus inform agency, contra to those accounts which “conceptualise agency largely in terms of reflexivity, decision making and actors who are unaffected by habit or anything below consciousness” although she maintains that reflexivity and intentionality are of course a part of agency too (Akram 2014: 386). What is important here is that she insists on the significance Bourdieu attributed to the presence of one’s personal history in their everyday practice.

Quoting Bourdieu (1977 cited in Akram, 2014: 387) she states that the preconscious has a critical role in agency and biography because “in each of us, in varying proportions, there is a part of yesterday’s man... Yet we do not sense this man of the past, because he is inveterate in us, he makes up the unconscious part of ourselves”. The interaction between our past and present and the various forms of structural influence will “be the site of much overlap, reinforcement and even contradiction” so that the habitus, replete with experiences of class, gender, disability, ethnicity and sexuality as well as a commitment to roles and institutions provides the “fertile motivations” for our practice. This is significant when thinking about affect, specifically when we contend with the supposed *emancipatory potential* that some scholars attribute to affect. In such cases, some affect theorists emphasise that the biology which is observed in affective experience is essentially a “creative space” or an “inherent dynamism” which, owed to its

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24 For many readers, the *unconscious* will evoke Freudian notions of the id, ego and superego, a kind of structural model of the psyche which is counter-intuitive to the dialectical nature of the habitus (Akram, 2014).
unpredictability enables experimentation through resisting embodied habits (Papoulias and Callard, 2010: 35). However, whilst affect and biology may certainly have a disruptive or unpredictable nature, this does not necessarily guarantee resistance, reflexivity or transformation. Moreover, the optimism attached to an alleged biological productivity ignores the power of embodied dispositions. It ignores the power that the “accumulation of bodily affect [has] to shape practice” and create dispositional tendencies (Watkins, 2012: 7). This kind of thinking grants legitimacy to the idea of “social weightlessness”, a term used by Bourdieu (2000: 13-14) to describe an abstract way of thinking about the world which fails to contend with the deeply embedded and embodied realities of everyday practice, power and unequal relations (McNay, 2014).

We might therefore describe the influences that shape and characterise our practice that we aren’t consciously aware of, such as the accumulative experiences of class, gender, disability and so on, as preconscious. This does not preclude that these aspects of our embodied orientation may become more or less saliently felt and consciously experienced and instead only highlights that this embodied orientation enables us to go about our day to day lives in fairly unreflective ways.

This chapter will now proceed using the term ‘preconscious’ to describe those influences that exist before—below our radar. Therefore, whilst much of the brain activity involved in social action may be preconscious, so that, for example, we do not have to modify our accent or comportment around friends, there is always the potential to pay more attention and for these ordinarily preconscious practices to become more consciously considered, as in the experience of a job interview, where we might painstakingly concentrate on our bodily presentation, accent, manners and so on. During these more attentive moments this focus “strongly amplifies the patterns of activation, and is correlated with the experience of consciousness” (Wetherell, 2012), demonstrating how our feeling of ease and unease and the sense of place this instils facilitates reflections on the self normally taken for granted. That which remains at a preconscious level is normally the
mundane, habitual and non-significant details of social action (Wetherell, 2012). Within the previous chapter, I supported a more flexible understanding of doxa, suggesting that as we occupy various social positions, our embodied understanding of and relationship to doxa is more differentiated. This may create more gaps or mismatches between the habitus and social space which prompts us to negotiate with diverse practices and meanings which I will return to in Chapter Five. As Sweetman (2003: 537) has suggested, the habitus may be considered more flexible or reflexive as a result of “economic, social and cultural shifts, not least shifting patterns of work and employment, changing forms of community and relationship, and the impact of consumer culture, which encourages us all to constantly monitor and ‘improve’ ourselves”. That is to say that as a result of increased changes across fields, disruption between the habitus and field becomes the norm and encourages an increasingly flexible habitus (Sweetman, 2003).

Whilst acknowledging the problem in thinking about affect as beyond consciousness and pre-social, Shouse’s (2005) thinking on the experience of affect remains helpful in theorising the capacities of the habitus. Shouse (2005) elaborates that the experience of affect is “the body's way of preparing itself for action in a given circumstance by adding a quantitative dimension of intensity to the quality of an experience” (Shouse, 2005, emphasis added). These quantitative measures of intensity include the autonomic workings of our body, the responses of our muscles and organs, the changes in our blood flow and breathing and so on. He notes that at any given moment there are hundreds if not thousands of stimuli which act upon the body and that the body responds by simultaneously “infolding” them and registering them as an intensity. He states, “Affect is this intensity…it is pure potential (a measure of the body’s readiness to act in a given circumstance”). This leads Shouse (2005) to argue that the experience of affect within infants is innate, and it is only with age, experience and practice that we come to regulate and control these responses. This seems to echo Bourdieu’s (1990: 57) thinking on the capacities of the habitus for incorporation “which exploits the body’s readiness”. What is more, the way in which Shouse (2005) has described affect as a readying and preparatory
force resonates with Bourdieu’s (1990: 66) habitus as an anticipatory device which endows agents with “practical sense as a proleptic adjustment to the demands of the field”. Therefore, although Bourdieu is certainly guilty of under-theorising the corporeal and affective basis of the habitus, we might identify that affect is actually what animates the habitus and primes us for practice. Moreover, it is these affects which makes our “feelings feel” in that they determine the intensity of our feelings as well as the peripheral intensities of daily life “the half-sensed, ongoing hum of quantity/quality that we experience when we are not really attuned to any experience at all” (Shouse, 2005).

This preconscious mode becomes particularly relevant if we return to doxa and doxic practice and think about the mundane and habitual social practices which constitute our daily lives. This is to say that the ‘microstructures’ of the habitus have biological and neuro-cognitive foundations which are open to transformative processes of enculturation which come to produce different patterns of neuro-cognitive thoughts, feelings and dispositions. Doxa, as part of our internalised and embodied understanding of the world becomes laid down in neural circuits. Franks and Turner (2013) show how social values, emotions and meaning (or what Bourdieu would call the schema of the habitus) are mapped onto the neural circuitry through the interconnection of associative circuitry and body circuitry and thus produces meaningful embodied experiences. This embodied doxic knowledge endows us with the feeling of proprioception and a “sense of limits”, which, for the most part, enables us to experience the world as self-evident and undisrupted. It disposes us with knowledge that allows us to anticipate the everydayness we encounter in a fairly straightforward way and grants us the feeling of ease which Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) described as being a fish in water. However, when doxic practice is disturbed, or when the ontological complicity between the habitus and field is disrupted, there is an experience of disjuncture. This disjuncture may unsettle the patterns of neural activation in a way that prompts more consciously considered action, a reflection which Bourdieu (2000: 162) says “remains turned towards practice and not towards the agent who performs it”. As Imrie (2001) has shown,
escalators within public buildings can prove to be problematic for the visually impaired and elderly or frail who may find it more difficult to judge speed and distance. In these instances, the individual might be expected to pay far more attention to stepping onto the escalator, holding on to the side, preparing themselves to disembark and so on. However, as these disjunctions between the body and field become the norm, they are assimilated into our practice and we are granted the feeling of doxic ease. In this example, we can see how Bourdieu (2000) might have maintained that practical reflection “has nothing in common with the scholastic thinker” and is distinct to reflexivity. However, this assimilation of disjunction may not be so straightforward for those with fluctuating impairments or episodic disability (such as epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, Crohn’s, etc). Adaptations may be less routine or reliable, leaving practice feeling precarious and disrupted and therefore may require more conscious deliberations. This raises interesting considerations regarding the extra work that disabled bodies must take on in order to achieve habitual practice in a world organized around the non-disabled body. This is to say that in order for some practices to become habitual, the simple repetition of a behaviour is not sufficient and may require modifications to the environment to accommodate for doxically designed space. Disabled people who employ personal assistants (PA) to help with feeding, bathing, dressing, getting in or out of bed and going to the bathroom and so on, require the conscious effort of both individuals to achieve practice (Engman and Cranford, 2016). Although familiarity, ease and intuitiveness often develops from having the same PA for a long period of time, individuals are still said to engage in conscious mediation of limiting environments and emotional labour with the PA (Engman and Cranford, 2016).

To consider the role of affect in these situations, we might go on to think about how the visually impaired or frail person might feel self-conscious or fearful about falling over, or embarrassed if they were to fall or knock into someone. Someone with epilepsy might fear the responses of others if they were to have a seizure, highlighting the affective element involved in practice. A disabled person may feel annoyed and frustrated with the
inaccessible space, and that this frustration might build upon previous vexation committed to the preconscious of the habitus. These are not just *emotional experiences* in that we do not just feel shame or anger in these situations, but are characterised by cognition as well as affective flows so that we might identify how these disjunctures (caused by the environment organised to suit non-disabled others doxic practice) disturb our practical relation to the world and may lead us to question its organisation. In this respect, the microstructures of our habitus might be said to have shifted from a preconscious state to an actively conscious state, which, building upon our internalised history produces feelings and dispositions within the emergent context. Through acknowledging that affect and feelings of various intensities characterise our practice and build on/add to previous experiences we can see how psychosocially developing Bourdieu’s habitus accounts for practice which is far less mechanistic or disinterested.

Affect in this sense seems so vital to our sense of limits and of place. It is affect which allows us to experience the ease of doxic practice or the unease of disjunction and could be said to register our feelings of being out of place. Farrugia (2010: 75) has suggested that it is the sensuous embodied feelings which, being the result of various power relations, constitutes our subjectivity, that is to say “affect is the process by which symbolic capital comes to constitute embodied subjectivity and create feelings related to the dispositions of the habitus”.

Importantly, whilst Shouse’ (2005) work provides an interesting way of viewing the intensities we sometimes experience, his conceptualisation of affect seems to assume a linear order which in relation to the habitus, would appear to dissipate. Within Shouse’ account there is no strategy for understanding how affect is part of social practice and as such, an ongoing process in which the habitus is constantly fed back into and subsequently adapted. We might think about how a disabled person who has experienced hate crime may be subject to feelings of unease, timidity or fear, especially when revisiting the area in which the crime took place and this may discourage them from frequenting such places or to only go at certain times
of the day or when accompanied. In this respect we can see how the break in flow of practice disrupts the relationship between habitus and space and prompts strategic calculation for future practice. However, the risk is that these experiences may have an even more detrimental impact through intense avoidant responses as with agoraphobia.

Unlike Shouse, Wetherell (2012) demonstrates how affect, emotion and feelings are a more recursive and integrated process. Indeed, affect is too ephemeral to be understood in isolation and Wetherell (2012: 13) notes that in affective action:

“bits of the body (e.g. facial muscles, thalamic-amygdala pathways in the brain, heart rate, regions in the prefrontal cortex, sweat glands, etc.) get patterned together with feelings and thoughts, interaction patterns and relationships, narratives and interpretive repertoires, social relations, personal histories and ways of life”.

This focus, Wetherell (2012) argues, inevitably leads us to embodiment as “coming to terms with affect [which] implies coming to terms with the body”. In her bid to develop an interdisciplinary way of thinking through the interconnectedness of psychobiology and social analysis, Wetherell (2012) suggests that the concept of affective practice may provide the most promising and encompassing way of integrating “somatic, discursive, situated, historical, social, psychological and cultural bases of affective activity”. Through observing affective practice, Wetherell (2012) aims to focus “on the emotional as it appears in social life” so that affect might be taken to mean “embodied meaning-making” which may be more or less recognised as human emotion.

These affects, cognitions and judgements can accumulate and create lasting dispositions, emotional traits and characteristics. By focussing on affective practice we can begin to contemplate how habitus is customised through the recurrent interactions of relational histories, narratives, emotional expressions, habitual routines of the body and ways of meaning making (Wetherell, 2012). Importantly, various situations will be characterised by more or less intense feelings of affect and these embodied experiences will
be accompanied by a “qualia of subjective feelings, along with other cognitions, evaluations, images, memories and appraisals of the situation” (Wetherell, 2012). Therefore while experience is undoubtedly mediated by our feelings and bodily dynamics, emotions and affect are not the sole or primary processes taking place, and can assume a relatively subtle role. Although the experience and pressure of having too much to do might cause us to feel stressed, the primary feeling may be one of focus and concentration, our past experiences encourage us that we know we can achieve the task or that we can ask a colleague for help. Even when stress feels like the primary and overwhelming response, our affectivity can be tempered by other thoughts. To reiterate Bourdieu’s thinking, embodied experiences are reflective of our habitus as it emerges and interacts with social context and our social position.

We might also expect situations which register more intense affective feelings to have “reinforcing, inhibiting [and] orchestrating [effects on] neurobiological flows” (Wetherell, 2012). Here we can conceive of the complex affective and cognitive microstructures that underlie the habitus and work to reinforce or discourage certain practices and which creates the sense of ease or unease that a person feels within a given field. As we have seen, Bourdieu’s work has stressed the issue of fit and misfit and the embodied sense of limits and of place. In theorising the psychic operations involved in these processes, we can see how affect vitalises the habitus. Wetherell (2012) therefore argues that social value and differentiation is “turned into flesh”. Observing the affective and neuro-cognitive components of the habitus allows us to see the individual as a “physical, embodied actor, subject to development, cognitive and emotive constraints and affected by the very real physical and institutional configurations of the field” (Lizardo, 2007: 5). At this individual level, we begin to see the habitus as a cognitive-practical generative matrix (Lizardo, 2007) which becomes affectively personalised (Wetherell, 2012).

In this respect, we might think of the body as constantly monitoring, maintaining and responding and so it can be useful to think of “the body in
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social practice [as] a flow immersed in other flows” (Wetherell, 2012). Acknowledging how these states of body are in constant flux thereby rejects basic emotions hypotheses which tend to portray the experience of emotion as *triggered* and instinctual and which may portray practice as a kind of procedural recall rather than as the result of complex negotiated and emergent processes (Wetherell, 2012). Instead of seeing emotions as neatly-bundled universal experiences in response to corresponding stimuli, we might conceptualise how the body/brain “acquires routines that form distinctive dispositional body/brain shapes” and that through exposure to cultural and developmental processes acquires unique neural circuitries of emotion (Wetherell, 2012). To quote Bourdieu (2000: 165), the habitus makes us *sensitive*:

“through a whole series of imperceptible transactions, half-conscious compromises and psychological operations (projection, identification, transference, sublimation, etc.), socially encouraged, supported, channelled and even organised, [so] that these dispositions are little by little transformed into specific dispositions”.

Significantly, Wetherell (2013: 234) notes that Bourdieu’s handling of affect was typical of the “bio-cultural orthodoxies of the day” in that he seemed to conceive of affect in terms of the basic emotions and therefore as unreflective and universal responses. With this in mind, Bourdieu was evidently more interested in how this aspect of corporeality, what he appears to have termed *libido*, reinforced and reproduced certain unreflective practices rather than the inner workings of affect and the nuances of affective practice. In this regard, it is easy to see how Bourdieu may have conceived of intense emotions such as disgust and shame as encouraging “familiar routines, discouraging transgressions and reinforcing established patterns and inequities” (Wetherell, 2012). However, with the new psychobiological models of affect that are emerging, we can take accounts of social practice forward through an incorporation of affective plasticity which provides new ways of understanding embodied action (Wetherell, 2012).

In a similar vein, there are those who have suggested that although Bourdieu’s work neglects the moral capacities of agents, his
conceptualisation of the habitus is amenable to their incorporation (Lamont, 1992; Sayer, 2005; 2010; Ignatow, 2007; 2009). Sayer (2010) suggests that we learn good or ill natured dispositions, virtues or vices, through the repeated encouraging or discouraging practices and relations that we encounter in everyday life. These moral dispositions, much like and in cooperation with our emotional responses, are sometimes quite deliberate and at other times semi-conscious. Emotions such as shame, embarrassment and guilt may combine with more cognitive evaluations of what behaviour is appropriate to produce morally acceptable practice whereas feelings of contempt, anger and disgust may distinguish moral violations (Ignatow, 2009). We are, at times, barely aware that we have enacted a moral disposition, showing just how inert our behaviours can become although the strength of this response may be dependent upon the frequency with which it is evoked and our reflexive self-observation (Sayer, 2010). Therefore, while moral dispositions may reside in the preconsciousness of the habitus there is the opportunity for moral judgements and decisions to be more critically evaluated. These moral beliefs can, of course, be exploited and used to ratify social inequalities but they can also contain “notions of fairness and conceptions of the good which can prompt resistance to domination” (Sayer, 2005). The habitus is therefore a “complex matrix of cognised emotions and embodied cognitions that is a foundation for moral judgement of the self and others” (Ignatow, 2009: 108). In order to think through complex psychosocial experiences which are constantly re-forming, we should see subjectivity as an “affective intersectional” experience (Wetherell, 2012)

We might ask does this give emotion too much credit? If sociology has criticised the Kantian position which overvalues the role of reason and the rational actor, (Leys, 2011) can we also suggest that too much focus is now being given to the role of emotions? Leys (2011: 436) shows that in response to the Kantian disembodied account, affect theorists have claimed that to understand beliefs we must acknowledge the “subliminal affective intensities and resonances that so decisively influence or condition [us]”. I am by no means suggesting that emotion is the primary force or factor behind practice or that affect and emotion have “epistemological privilege” (McNay, 2008:
14) and only mean to highlight that affect as an embodied aspect of the habitus has consequences for practice which Bourdieu left previously under-developed. Affect is but one feature of the habitus as it emerges in different social settings and spaces so that the habitus remains socio-centric (McNay, 2008). Importantly however, affect and emotions significantly characterise our experiences and the visceral feelings we experience are embodied expressions of our relation to power.

Thus far the chapter has explored how the psychological underpinnings of the habitus may serve to enhance our understanding of embodied social practice. Through highlighting the affective flows and neuro-cognitive processes involved in practice, we have identified how dispositions may be formed, enhanced and encouraged so that an understanding of the experience of fit or misfit may be discerned. We have also looked at how doxic thought may come to be laid down in neural pathways and the potentiality for our doxic practice to be disrupted so that more deliberate and conscious thought is necessitated. The chapter will now turn to look at the role of affect in shaping dispositions in relation to experiences of inequality and social suffering and the lasting effects this may have on the habitus.

4.4 **Affect, Dispositions and the Habitus**

As we have seen, for Bourdieu (1984, 1990, 2000) the habitus is fundamentally about *fit*, or lack thereof (Reay, 2015). As we saw in the previous chapter, it is when Bourdieu begins to write about the *lack of fit* that we start to see the power of affect and emotions and the feelings of conflict that can arise (Reay, 2015). As Bourdieu (2000: 163) shows:

“The degree to which one can abandon oneself to the automatisms of practical sense obviously varies with the situation and the area of activity, but also with the position occupied in social space: it is likely that those who are ‘in their right place’ in the social world can abandon or entrust themselves more, and more completely, to their dispositions (this is the ‘ease’ of the well-born) than those who occupy awkward positions...the latter are more likely to bring to consciousness that which, for others, is taken for granted, because they are forced to keep watch on themselves and consciously correct the ‘first movements’ of a habitus that generates inappropriate and misplaced behaviours”.
Here we are seeing Bourdieu’s incorporation of affect and emotion into the habitus and its role in shaping dispositions and practice. In these instances of mismatch, we see how practice shifts from the habitual preconscious to more actively considered thought. It is in these awkward moments of embodied disjuncture that we see the conscious work of habitus guided by affect. Reay (2015: 12) notes that a salient example of the psychosocial workings of the habitus is evidenced in Bourdieu’s account of the development of dispositions:

“We are disposed because we are exposed. It is because the body is (to unequal degrees) exposed and endangered in the world, faced with the risk of emotion, lesion, suffering, sometimes death, and therefore obliged to take the world seriously (and nothing is more serious than emotion, which touches the depth of our organic being) that it is able to acquire dispositions that are themselves an openness to the world, that is, to the very structures of the world of which they are the incorporated form”. (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 140-141)

Once again we are seeing Bourdieu’s acknowledgement of the vulnerability of our being. Reay (2015) elaborates that she does not attribute certain emotions or affective processes to a specific kind of habitus, as we have seen emotional capital differentially attributed within her previous work (Reay 2004; 2005). Instead Reay (2015: 12) suggests that the impacts of these affective transactions can become more or less entrenched within certain habitus so that, for example, “the learning that comes through inhabiting pathologised spaces within the field often results in a predilection for shame, fear, anxiety or even righteous indignation”. As we saw in Chapter Three, many of these doxic spaces serve to pathologise impaired bodies and can have significant impact on well-being, demonstrating how symbolic power works through “emotional pathways” (Reeve, 2006: 96). Conversely, Reay (2015: 12) posits that the internalisation of social inequality from the standpoint of the privileged can create “dispositions of superiority, entitlement, disdain but also a predilection for guilt, ambivalence and discomfort”. Similarly, Lende (2012) has noted the poverty poisons the brain model within neuroscience which identifies local mediators relevant to socioeconomic status as altering the development of the internal mechanisms of affective and cognitive systems within the neurobiological system. This
The Psychosocial Habitus model relies on understandings of human development which show how early life experiences become embedded, the impact of accumulative risk as well as the impact of environment on development, leading Lende (2012: 188) to state that “inequality can get under the skin through the experience of social status”.

These are significant considerations when thinking about disability because experiences of oppression, exclusion and discrimination can have powerful psychological implications for marginalised groups of people. This is to say that social suffering is expressive of our relation to power and our experience of inequalities; it is therefore associated with certain groups of people (McNay, 2014). The psychological aspect of disability has been largely overlooked by the Disabled People’s Movement and as a result, has neglected the experiences of internalized oppression (Reeve, 2012). Understanding the psychic aspects of being disabled is essential if we are to build upon the structural analysis of disability and fully grasp the ramifications of prejudice, exclusion and discrimination (Reeve, 2002).

Reeve (2006) identifies that whilst disabling attitudes have been widely written about, a psychology of disability remains largely untouched. She adds that this is crucial to our account because “dealing with anger, self-loathing, and daily experiences of rejection and humiliation are among the hardest aspects of being a disabled person” (Shakespeare, 1996: 42-43, cited in Reeve, 2002: 493). Moreover, the disparaging, patronising and shaming actions of strangers in response to disability may be preventing disabled people from participating in society as much as structural barriers (Reeves, 2006) demonstrating that the perpetuation of negative symbolic capital may transform the habitus of disabled agents in detrimental and limiting ways.

As we saw in the previous chapter, disabled people are devalued through the quotidian power of doxa, the “most mundane everyday words or deeds that exclude or invalidate” (Hughes, 2007: 682). This invalidation can take place through the stares of strangers, through jokes about your impairment and through the thoughtless remarks from others (Reeve, 2012). Adding to this,
Reeve (2012: 80) talks of the experience of exclusion resulting from people’s avoidance of disabled people as though “disability is catching”. Reeve (2012: 80) illustrates that disabled people are often ontologically invalidated as having a worthless existential status, describing how one of her research participants, Laura, overheard someone say (of her wheelchair) “I’d rather be dead than be in one of those”. This undermines psycho-emotional wellbeing through “the hugely negative value accorded to her life as a wheelchair user” (Reeve, 2012: 80). Here, the impact of negative symbolic capital attributed to Laura on the basis of her impairment has harmful consequences which extend beyond this interaction as they become internalized within the habitus. These experiences of direct psycho-emotional disablism can have lasting effects upon a person’s wellbeing through creating an existential insecurity “associated with the uncertainty of not knowing how the next stranger will react” (Reeve, 2012: 80). Here we can observe how negative field relations may produce anxious and unconfident dispositions which can inhibit future practices and shows how the embodied experience of negative symbolic capital as a positioning sense relation has significant psychosocial consequences.

As welfare retrenchment continues to deepen inequalities, symbolically deprive and materially impoverish disabled people, pushing individuals into further isolation and dependency, there may be real and lasting consequences for the habitus. Crucially, the prolonged experience of inequalities have potentially depoliticising and disempowering effects in that they are often internalised in the habitus in a way that hinders and distorts our capacities to enact change or resistance and can produce feelings of despair and resignation and may even make suffering seem inevitable and unavoidable (McNay, 2014). This long term exposure to chronic deprivation and internalisation of inequalities can also naturalise our experiences so that we do not even identify our problems or dominated relation as political in nature (McNay, 2014). In this respect, Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 201) argues that inequality inhabits and haunts us as an internalised domination, a “presence of otherness at the very heart of subjectivity”.
Given the extensive moralisation of benefits, feelings of shame and other high emotional costs involved in accessing support as well as the precarious and ambiguous status as a disabled welfare claimant, it is no wonder that disabled people forego benefits they are eligible for and even question their deservingness of support (Reeve, 2002; Garthwaite, 2013; Grover and Piggott, 2010). The neo-liberal doxa of legitimate citizen as individualised worker has destroyed our concepts of collective responsibility and facilitated an approach in which the individual is blamed and shamed for their poor position, negatively positioning the disabled claimant as morally reprehensible. As we saw in Chapter One, those on benefits have been inculpated as a wilfully unemployed “emerging underclass” who must be recuperated through the “recognition that the nature of the life you lead and the choices you make have a significant bearing on whether you live in poverty” (Iain Duncan Smith, 2009: 4). Experiences of shame are powerful and, Sayer (2005) argues, a necessary experience of symbolic domination. Significantly though, shame is accompanied by a spectrum of accompanying feelings so that Sayer (2005: 454) describes shame as “to feel inadequate, lacking in worth, and perhaps lacking in dignity and integrity” demonstrating the complex mixture of affect, evaluative judgements and cognition involved in these experiences. The negative symbolic capital attached to disability welfare claimants is viscerally felt and serves to inhibit or dissuade disabled people from pursuing economic capital through state support which, in turn, contributes to the cyclical nature of poverty and disability and barriers to work (Roulstone, 2015). I would also argue that this may be compounded by the affective experience of negative symbolic capital associated with disability in other social spaces, deepening negative patterns of thought and dispositions. For Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), this is the experience of symbolic violence enacted through the logic of power and embodiment. Although we can “rationally” know or explain away the discrimination or negative attitudes we experience as the result of prejudice and ignorance, the experience of negative symbolic capital as a positional sense relation can be deeply affective and difficult to ignore. Moreover, if we think about disability hate crime, there is always the chance that these negative attitudes or comments may become more than hurtful words.
At this point I would like to return to something discussed earlier in the thesis. Within the second chapter, I argued that Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the submissive attitude characterised as *amor fati* was too fatalistic and treated individuals as dupes who collude in their own domination and which neglected psychosocial issues of affect. Having developed an idea of how affect characterises the habitus and its role in the creation of dispositions and practices, we can now begin to understand how experiences of domination and suffering do have significant consequences for the psyche of some marginalised groups and why resistance can be so difficult. This does not reduce individuals to passive victims with no agency, but instead acts as a barrier to what McNay (2014: 16) calls “second-order agency”, that is, the ability to “autonomously shape one’s conditions of existence”. This psychological erosion of our capacity for second-order agency can push individuals into deeper isolation and can stop us from engaging in practices that we know to be beneficial or which could improve our circumstances (McNay, 2014). Although this seems to speak to the charges of fatalism I criticised Bourdieu for in the second chapter, I would like to emphasise that psychological suffering and disempowerment are not *inevitable* and some disabled people may be in a position to resist or challenge oppressive practices, however, it remains a serious consideration for more marginalised individuals. For Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:81) then, the logic of our adjustment to social position show us how the dominated are more at risk of becoming submissive, however he adds that “there is no denying that there exist dispositions to resist; one of the tasks of sociology is precisely to examine under what conditions these dispositions are socially constituted, effectively triggered, and rendered politically efficient”. Importantly Bourdieu’s framework identifies this symbolic violence and social suffering as the result of inequalities and oppressive relations of power. As we saw in the third chapter, doxa and negative symbolic capital function as mechanisms of domination and inequality and demonstrates the negative psychological experiences which come to shape the habitus through the internalisation of oppressive structures. McNay (2014: 53) argues that this *dismantles* the defeatist psychological inevitability of “suffer-mongering” which “victimises the victim” and defends against criticisms which tend to argue that accounts
of social suffering over-exaggerate the powerlessness and distress of agents (McNay, 2014).

Understanding the affective dimension of the habitus is also important when we return to thinking about the negative symbolic capital attached to welfare claimants as well as the feelings of ressentiment described in Chapter One (Hoggett et al, 2013). As we saw earlier, the boundaries between deserving and undeserving disabled have been symbolically shifted, redrawn and obscured and disabled people are at risk of being identified as abusers of the welfare system imbued with negative agency (Hoggett et al, 2013). This has coincided with a discourse on fairness, (Hoggett, 2013) which we saw positioned disabled people as dishonest and burdensome to moral, tax-paying and legitimate citizens. The state therefore has a decisive role in attaching negative symbolic capital to disabled welfare claimants through implementing cuts and sanctions and through disseminating and reinforcing neo-liberal doxa which values and consecrates the individualist tax-paying worker as a legitimate citizen. As we saw in Chapter One, Iain Duncan Smith has alluded to the social decay of disability claimants who have been “allowed to fester” on benefits so that cuts to welfare should be understood as corrective: “These reforms are about changing those lives, to give them a chance that through work, through employment, through positive action, they can change their lives” (Smith, 2012). He therefore envisages that the ‘Fit for Work service’ implemented through Universal Credit will act “as the first line of defence when someone falls sick” (Smith, 2015) highlighting the unacceptable social cost of ill-health and those who use disability benefits (Garthwaite, 2011) as something that must be withstood and opposed. The feelings of resentment which are produced have been shown to be experienced quite intensely by people in low status groups so that it would seem that the anti-welfare rhetoric is turning the poor on the poor, the disabled against the disabled, demonstrating the divisive and affective nature of neo-liberal ideals of individualism and competition (Hoggett et al, 2013). I would suggest that for the most part, people think of themselves as sympathetic to disabled people and bear an understanding that the welfare state should provide for them even though this may reflect a paternalistic
disposition “that something must be done for the ‘wounded’...They cannot be left to die” (Hughes, 2009a: 401). Garthwaite’s (2013) research into the feelings associated with accessing sickness benefits showed that her participants understood the genuine need for the welfare state and that there are those who could not get by without it. However, she noted that the interviews were dotted with anecdotes about perceived fraudulent Others which created a distinct us against them divide. Kemp (2000) and Piggott and Grover (2009) have shown that the retrenchment of disability benefits has been especially difficult because the public have had substantial sympathy for the sick and disabled and as Garthwaite et al (2013) argued, the disability category has, until recently, been thought of as an unquestionably deserving category.

Now however, political rhetoric and media representation are symbolically manipulating categories of perception, producing ideas about disabled people as scroungers and “false mendicants” (Hughes, 2015: 992). The anti-welfare sentiment that has developed out of these insidious and slanderous practices becomes deeply internalised and affectively registered. Hoggett et al (2013) have similarly identified the distinction between traditionally conceptualised emotion and affect, allocating ressentiment to the realm of affect due to its unformed and fluid character and its capacity to come in varying waves, intensities and flows. For Hoggett et al (2013: 11), ressentiment is not a neatly boxed emotion directed at an object, but a “complex configuration of feelings, beliefs and subject positions”. This “symbolic drip-feed” of disability claimant as burden (Bourdieu, 1998: 30) slowly embeds and reinforces through affective appeals to fairness, producing enduring feelings of ressentiment in the habitus which Hoggett (2009: 16) describes as an “abiding affect [of] social suffering”. For Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 212), ressentiment is especially associated with deprivation:

“Ressentiment is for me the form par excellence of human misery; it is the worst thing that the dominant imposes on the dominated (perhaps the major privilege of the dominant, in any social universe, is to be structurally freed from ressentiment)”.
This is an important observation which shows that although ‘the poor’ might be said to be turning on one another and exerting a domination against the disabled through these feelings of ressentiment and suspicion, this is itself expressive of a dominated relation. Welfare sentiments such as resentment, contempt, anger, and disgust are “not just forms of ‘affect’ but are evaluative judgements of how people are being treated as regards what they value” (Sayer, 2005: 948) and are expressive of the inequalities they face. These feelings are forms of emotional reason which although often differentially distributed can be “partly indifferent to social divisions, for they are responsive to - and discriminate among - standards, situations and behaviours, which vary partly independently of class and other divisions” (Sayer, 2005: 948). In this instance, we can identify the affective and moral workings of the habitus which extends beyond locating influence in traditional class divisions and which allows for a broader understanding of dispositions and (dis)tastes than originally considered by Bourdieu. Therefore whilst these emotions are clearly deeply embodied, they should not be reduced to mere affect which is heuristically counter-posed to reason and instead form part of the cognitive and evaluative dimension of our intelligence (Sayer, 2010). Moreover, our affective dispositions are powerfully related to our “nature as dependent and vulnerable beings” (Sayer, 2010a: 114). As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, affect is not distinct from cognition, rather a part of complex system of neural activity. According to Sayer (2005: 950) “We derive our concerns from culture but in relation to our capacity as needy beings for being enculturated”. We have concerns for our welfare, and these concerns derive from our capacity to feel or believe that actions have consequences for our well-being. Sayer (2005: 950) therefore posits that “For this to be possible we must be the kind of beings which are capable of flourishing or suffering and of registering (albeit fallibly) how we are faring”. He elaborates that we are therefore not only economically and physically dependent upon each other, but psychologically as well, arguing that we have a psychological need to be recognised.25

25 However, in agreement with McNay (2008), the idea that the social suffering associated with misrecognition or non-recognition can be ameliorated through recognition of difference
Skeggs (2005) suggests that we should think of values as “sedimented valuations” which have become embodied in our attitudes and dispositions. These valuations combine with emotional dispositions and shape our conceptual and affective apparatus and thus informs our evaluations of things. The presence of our concerns communicates something about our well-being and the values we possess as well as the motivation that drives our practice (Sayer, 2010). What is more, Sayer (2010) argues that the shaping, reproducing and transforming of habitus is mediated by our emotional responses, evidenced in the shame we might feel if we are despised and devalued. Perhaps more saliently, he identifies how deeply embodied depression can become so that even a fortunate change of circumstance does not register with us immediately and can entail a slow process of readjustment and reduction of anxiety (Sayer, 2010). Our emotional responses to situations are therefore dependent upon the circumstances and the deeply embodied dispositions, whether they be optimistic or pessimistic, nervous or confident and so on (Sayer, 2010). In this respect we can observe how it is possible for us to strive to change the dispositions of habitus through deliberate and repeated practice but that this may require significant counter-training to achieve durable transformation of the habitus (Bourdieu, 2000; Sayer, 2010).

So far we have seen how affect is incorporated into the habitus and how values, beliefs and practices become sedimented in the microstructures of the habitus in a deeply embodied way. Having focussed on how other scholars have endeavoured to develop the affective and psychosocial underpinnings within their own work, this chapter will now turn to look at the affective experience of disgust. As we have seen from the second chapter, disgust (although more frequently referred to as distaste) has been an important tool within Bourdieu’s social theory to explain the social distance between people of different classes. More recently however, scholars have noted how disgust is mobilised to govern (Leahy, 2009) and has recently been popularly conceptualised through abjectification as a means of producing marginality.
and exclusion (Tyler, 2013). Significantly, disgust is noted as the prime emotion in maintaining the exclusionary binary between the disabled and non-disabled (Hughes, 2012b). As Reeve (2014) argues “Disgust can be revealed when a stranger avoids interacting with a disabled person on the street, within newspaper reports of disabled people as workshy benefit scroungers, and as part of disablist hate crime”.

4.5 Disgust and Aversions

This section of the chapter will now consider the way in which the specific emotion of disgust has been used to understand inequalities and tensions as well as how disgust has been employed as a means of neoliberal governance (Tyler, 2013). I will go on to suggest that this use of disgust is identified as limited when it comes to describing the aversive feelings often experienced in response to “abnormal” and disabled bodies. Instead, this chapter will consider how it is more useful to think of these responses as embodied disjunctures. In acknowledging that the responses towards disabled bodies can be a complex nexus of emotions, concerns and curiosity it seems more fruitful to discuss how they are experienced as instances of affective disjuncture.

Disgust, just like all emotions, is more than just a feeling (Miller, 1997). As we have seen from the first section of this chapter, emotions are intricately patterned and interwoven, combining the visceral, social and cultural with cognitive and practical behaviours. There are some who point to the universality of the experience of disgust but as we saw earlier, it is more common to talk of emotions as affective capacities subject to social and cultural transformation and remodelling. Miller (1997: 17) notes that even if “there are broad convergences in the content of the disgusting, that doesn’t mean there aren’t also important variations” leading him to argue that disgust is intimately related to the production of culture. Even when we experience self-disgust, our interpretations are deeply implanted in social and cultural systems of meaning (Miller, 1997). He expands that disgust is not a raw disconnected feeling but a feeling about and in response to something. Although disgust might be commonsensically perceived as instinctual or
reflexive due to its sometimes visceral qualities, an important part of disgust is the consciousness associated with being disgusted, that through its intrusive and disruptive nature we cannot help but be aware of its presence.

Miller (1997) demonstrates that disgust is necessarily accompanied by the notion of danger entailed in pollution, contamination and defilement and is therefore predictably and politically associated with certain social and cultural situations. In such instances, disgust is often politically paired with contempt in a way that works to hierarchize social order. In some settings this affective coupling is said to work to maintain hierarchies, and sometimes to construct claims to superiority and then in other settings it is seen as indicative of “one’s proper placement in the social order” (Miller, 1997: 9). Disgust is a negatively evaluative affect and as Bourdieu would suggest, maintains social distance:

“As social position embodied in bodily dispositions, habitus contributes to determining whether biological bodies come together or stay apart by inscribing between two bodies the attractions and repulsions that correspond to the relationship between the positions of which they are the embodiment” (1996: 182-3).

Drawing upon Bourdieu in her work on class disgust, Lawler (2005) has considered what expressions of disgust against the working classes tells us about middle-class identities. Importantly, Lawler (2005) highlights the slippage between underclass and working class so that the idea of a respectable working class is eroded and that the ensuant disgust against this group is culturally permissible and so ubiquitous that it forms part of our doxic understanding. She goes on to note that whilst cultural representations are open to contestation these representations rely upon a set of shared meanings and that although classes are not homogenous, there is enough of a shared understanding among the public bourgeoisie, “comprising academics, broadsheet journalists, social commentators and the like”, that to speak of the working-class is to speak to their doxic constitutions (Lawler, 2005: 231).

She elaborates that the working classes are often held to be disgusting in appearance (through the wearing of shell suits, piercings and tattoos, large
gold earrings) but that this appearance signifies their pathological inner being characterised by lack and deficit. The disgust which is expressed against the working classes is said to consolidate middle classes lifestyles as normative and normalised, demonstrating the power of disgust in the drawing of distinctions, distinctions which are laden with negative affect (Lawler, 2005). In this respect, the experience of disgust demonstrates that we are deeply invested in a norm which when violated produces a deeply embodied and visceral response (Lawler, 2005). Whilst this experience feels viscerally intimate it nevertheless appeals to our collective sentiments in that it relies upon knowing that we are not alone in this experience of the disgusting object (Lawler, 2005). Lawler (2005) writes specifically on class disgust which she goes on to elaborate draws some of its affective power from its association with that which is threatening because they represent a teeming mass. Whilst this work on disgust demonstrates its power in drawing and maintaining distinctions, it is not the same kind of disgust which is held for those with “abnormal” disabled bodies. As Miller (1997: 130) argues “We recognise a difference between the ‘social deformities’ of low-class taste and vulgarity and the bodily ugliness that bears no special connection with class once we discount for the effects of class on physical health”.

While there is relatively little written on disgust in relation to disability (Reeve, 2014) Hughes (2009; 2012a; 2012b) has written on aversive responses to disability and specifically of disgust as the prime mediating emotion between disabled and non-disabled people. He notes that emotions are a kind of pre-reflective evaluation which attach value or disvalue to objects and that the basic aversive emotions (fear, hatred, pity and disgust) unambiguously attach negative value to disabled bodies (Hughes, 2012a). These aversive emotions are said to “populate the non-disabled imaginary” and invalidate disabled people because negative affective value is said to be the emotional basis for discrimination and exclusion (Hughes, 2012a: 67-68). For Hughes (2012a: 68), the three main emotions which are the “building blocks of the emotional infrastructure of ableism” and contribute to social distance between disabled and non-disabled people are fear, pity and disgust.
Noting that the “emotional infrastructure of ableism” (2012a: 68) is a product of the civilising process, Hughes (2012b: 22-27) states that a cultural citizenship has been created premised on the idea of a body which is stable, hygienic and an instrument of will and which thereby denounces the impaired body through its pathology and “aesthetic unruliness” which comes to exemplify “what not to be”. The increasing restrictions imposed through the process of bodily refinement is said to create a “binary of bodies and minds” and a “tyranny of normalcy” through which thresholds of disgust and intolerance for difference are produced and intensified (Hughes, 2012b: 19).

Hughes (2012b: 19) elaborates that the increased control and rigorous expectations of bodies and their comportment has narrowed the “social distance between classes but creates an underclass of outsiders” which condemns those with impairment for their “‘animalic’ element of humanity”. Similarly, Soldatic (2007) argues that the emotion of disgust is a normative evaluative judgement which makes the exclusion of some bodies acceptable. She notes that there are a number of emotions that function within the public realm when it comes to dealing with disability, namely pity, shame, compassion, but that it is disgust which stands out “due to its clear association with the body and bodily processes”. Soldatic (2007: 3) elaborates that disgust and its derivatives have a biological, a psychosocial, a moral and a philosophical structure and that “the complexity of these structures is intimately related to our notions of bodily integrity, to be free from contagion, not to risk contamination” and a human concern to be seen as separate to animals. As Shakespeare (1994: 295) argues “Disabled people are seen to be ambiguous because they hover between humanity and animality, life and death, subjectivity and objectivity”.

Hughes (2012b) notes that this ableist disgust suggests an aversion to the Other but is in fact more accurately conceived of as self-aversion or the means by which we deny the corporeal basis of our own humanity and our subjection to fate. He elaborates that the non-disabled body and self has no empirical basis and is instead rooted in the myth of invulnerability and wholeness, it is a normative construct to which all aspire but none can achieve (Hughes, 2012b). The impaired body as Other therefore reminds us of
our own bodily constraints and mortality so that “People project their fear of death, their unease at their physicality and mortality, onto disabled people, who represent all these difficult aspects of human existence” (Shakespeare, 1994: 298). Disgust then, as a hierarchizing emotion, juxtaposes disabled bodies against a mythic body beautiful and acts as a “mechanism of disengagement” through which we can distance ourselves from feelings of ontological insecurity (Hughes, 2012b: 66).

As Soldatic (2007) goes on to note the one distinguishing feature that becomes apparent in multi-disciplinary work on disgust is that disgust and its derivatives are used to police the boundary between human and natural. Noting the clear association between disgust and disease, Soldatic (2007: 4) states that notions of bodily decay clearly convey messages about our human frailty and ultimately our mortality which we emotionally conceal through disgust which allows us to “actively exclude those bodies that represent our insecurity”. Disgust is therefore used to establish boundaries between that which is safe and human and that which is closer to nature with those who transgress this boundary being subject to moral debasement (Soldatic, 2007). This would seem to demonstrate the importance of disgust in structuring our world and the kind of social order it helps maintain (Miller, 1997). Moreover, it appears to show how disgust constellates our everyday moral discourse but also how “disgust ranges more widely than we may wish, for it judges ugliness and deformity to be moral offenses. It knows no distinction between the moral and the aesthetic, collapsing failures in both into an undifferentiated revulsion” (Miller, 1997: 21).

Within the non-disabled imaginary then, disability represents a “collapse in one’s human currency, the destruction of one’s social, emotional and cultural capital” (Hughes, 2012a: 72). The “discriminatory distinction” between a normative ableist body and its inferior other is secured and reproduced through aversive emotional dispositions which are “enfleshed”, experienced as a corporeal knowledge which at the same time transcends the individual in as much as they are felt across communities (Hughes, 2012a: 67-72). This echoes what Bourdieu (1990; 2000) has argued, that principles of vision and
division are inculcated as dispositions at a common transcendental level through uniformly imposing corporeal and mental disciplines upon all agents. It might then be suggested that disgust and other aversive emotions plays a role in reinforcing doxic knowledge as we saw in the previous chapter.

Within her book *Revolting Subjects*, Tyler (2013) has written that the disgust directed towards disability benefit recipients demonstrates that their “pejorative visibility has created a consensus within the British public” that most people receiving disability benefits are fraudulently claiming. Tyler (2013) uses abjection as a social *process* and a theory of power through which certain subjects are produced as the “object of the other’s violent objectifying disgust” (Tyler, 2013; 4). Through examining what it is to be made abject within specific social and political climates, Tyler (2013) demonstrates both the exclusionary *and* inclusionary power that the state yields in creating abject subjects. Whilst her work on social abjectification is not on disability specifically she does imply that disabled people are also made into objects of disgust and stigma or *national abjects*. However, it might be argued that Tyler’s account of social abjection becomes problematic when the complexities within this process, specifically regarding liminal identities and boundary making are explored further.

According to Burghardt (2013) disabled people represent a threat to social, economic and corporeal stability in that they depart from the expectations of the legitimate citizen, however, are conferred a status of vulnerability as a means of psychically ameliorating this threat. They therefore occupy a liminal space within society as a result of the complex entwinement between threat and vulnerability. The interplay of cognitive, social, affective and categorical understandings of both threat and vulnerability thus render disability as a figure of protection and of administrative control, as needy but also a social risk (Burghardt, 2013). I would suggest that this ambiguity and perceived vulnerability might mediate disgust responses towards disability claimants.
Chapter 4
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While disgust illustrates the power of affect in shaping our opinions, beliefs, relations and responses I cannot help but feel that we risk attributing too much to disgust alone. Disgust is a strong, violent, visceral response and if we attribute behaviour and practices to disgust alone, we may sideline the nuances of affective practice and experience. We saw within the first section of this chapter that emotions cannot be neatly boxed off and that they are immersed within cognitive and affective flows as well as moral evaluations. Our affective responses are mediated by context so that what registers as disgusting in one space does not necessarily do so in others, demonstrating the cognitive negotiations which take place in the presence of “disgusting objects”. Moreover, those with extremely high thresholds for disgust or who appear to be insensitive to disgusting things are often perceived as not quite human, “proto-human like children, subhuman like the mad, or suprahuman like saints” (Miller, 1997: 11). Acknowledging the versatile responses to what might ordinarily elicit disgust responses shows the complex negotiations of different habitus within different fields. Affective behaviour requires an understanding of the social space in which the practice arises, it is not sufficient to just look at the practice in isolation.

To this I would add that the relationship between disabled and non-disabled people is not necessarily mediated by the prime emotion of disgust, but feelings of unease. These feelings of unease I suggest, stem from the doxic exclusion of disabled people from both space and thought which reproduces poor understandings and unfamiliarity. This highlights that the doxic absence of disabled people feeds into psychic mechanisms which reproduce their exclusion through avoidance. Scope (2014) conducted research into non-disabled perceptions of disabled people and found that 67% of people feel uncomfortable talking to disabled people, often due to worry of saying or doing the wrong thing, and that almost half of those asked (43%) did not personally know a disabled person. Kirton and Greene (2015) report that non-disabled people tend to have very little personal contact with disabled people, serving to reinforce ignorant beliefs and perpetuate stereotypes about disability. As well as this, 66% of people said they would worry about talking about disability in front of a disabled person. One fifth of 18-34 year
olds have actually avoided a disabled person because they did not know how to interact with them and it is this age group which is most likely to have negative attitudes towards disabled people. This has been the basis for Scope’s (2014) *End the Awkward* campaign which seeks to light-heartedly address these *awkward* moments through ‘What Not To Do’ videos. The campaign draws attention to the many uneasy, awkward and cringe-worthy encounters between non-disabled and disabled people to raise awareness and provides suggestions on how to tackle these awkward situations. This is not to say that disability does not elicit disgust or that disgust does not play a role in disabled peoples’ exclusion but that we must be careful when thinking about the psychosocial mechanisms which exclude disabled people.

### 4.6 Conclusion

Within this chapter I have demonstrated the importance of incorporating affect into a psychosocial conceptualisation of the habitus. Although Bourdieu (2000) often alluded to the importance of affect in the habitus it was left relatively unexplored within his work. Through showing how our dispositions, beliefs and practices are formed, enhanced and encouraged through affective, evaluative and cognitive processes I have also demonstrated that we can go beyond talking about the emotional or psychological capitals of habitus and instead discuss the habitus as a psychologised capacity. We also covered Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of consciousness which polarised practice as either practical or reflective. Suggesting that his way of thinking was perhaps reflective of the psychological orthodoxies of the day it may now be more appropriate to think of the *unconscious* aspect of habitus as the *preconscious*. As such, I argued that what is ordinarily conceived of as beyond conscious thought may be brought into focus and may be especially associated the affective experience of disrupted doxic practice.

The chapter also looked at how experiences of inequality and social suffering may shape the habitus in psychologically harmful ways. Here I spoke of how negative symbolic capital may undermine a disabled person’s psychological wellbeing as well as reinforce limiting and unconfident, anxious dispositions,
demonstrating that the oppressive and exclusionary practices that disabled people face may have depoliticising and disempowering effects. I also suggested that affect has played a significant role in shaping peoples’ feelings about welfare, illustrating the embodied logic of symbolic power, but that these evaluations cannot be reduced to affect alone and instead demonstrate forms of cognitive, moral and emotional reason.

The chapter then moved onto a discussion of the how disgust has been used to understand inequalities and specifically how disgust has been theorised as the prime emotion in maintaining unequal relations between disabled and non-disabled people. Here I suggested that we should be careful not to attribute too much to the emotion of disgust alone and that this risks sidelining other affective, cognitive and moral evaluative processes. As such, I suggested that we might also focus on the unease produced by doxic exclusionary structures and attitudes. This focus on unease will be further unpacked within the next chapter on Bourdieu’s concept of hysteresis.
Chapter 5

Hysteresis: Theorising Breaks and Mismatches

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has discussed the psychosocial microstructures of the habitus in order to more fully understand how affect characterises social practice. The chapter highlighted that Bourdieu’s account of social practice is largely inattentive to issues of feeling even though much of his work points to the emotional turmoil of social struggle. As such, it was suggested that by understanding how the habitus is affectively constituted and experienced, we are better equipped to understand how our practice, dispositions and beliefs are affectively characterised. The chapter also suggested how doxa might become affectively and cognitively embedded and also met with the inevitable disturbance of doxic practice. It is with this in mind that this chapter now seeks to interrogate these instances of disjuncture and mismatches through an analysis of Bourdieu’s little used concept hysteresis.

Bourdieu utilised the concept of hysteresis to describe moments of ill-fit between the habitus and field and noted its potential to disrupt our feelings of ease within social space. Having suggested that the fit between doxa and habitus is less stable than originally envisioned by Bourdieu, it is important to theorise these breaks, especially given that they may also provide space for individuals to reflexively engage with these breaks. In addition to this, I highlighted that many people report feeling uncomfortable and awkward around disabled people, with some people reporting that they actually avoid disabled people for lack of knowing how to interact with them, it is pertinent that we understand how ease and unease (as expressions of fit) in social relations might be produced in different habitus. As I have already suggested in the previous chapter, these encounters should be understood as a complex mesh of affects, cognitive evaluations, moral dispositions and beliefs.

Bourdieu’s most notable and oft cited concepts might be grouped as habitus, field, capital and doxa and are all well-known and regularly used, however, hysteresis is used less. Bourdieu continues to attract criticism for his
reproductionist and determinist thinking so it makes sense to elaborate his thinking on mismatches and breaks in practice if we want to argue that his work is still useful. The chapter will begin by highlighting Bourdieu’s use of hysteresis before proceeding to an account of how hysteresis might be used to understand the embodied interactions when the fit between habitus and space is broken to theorise how (un)ease around disability may develop in different habitus’. The chapter will then examine how the hysteresis may be routinely felt in disabled bodies who regularly ‘come up against’ doxa, suggesting that this friction may push individuals to critically reflect upon their own and others’ practices. However, whilst this may afford individuals greater opportunities to be reflexive and question the status quo, there may also be a psychic cost to reconciling these tensions.

The chapter will finally look at the concept of hysteresis with reference to the cuts to disability welfare discussed in Chapter One. Here I will suggest that the drastic cuts being made to disability benefits and the redefinition of the disability category leaves many disabled individuals out-of-step within the newly configured welfare system and the neo-liberal expectations of citizens and poses significant psychosocial risk.

5.2 **Hysteresis - Lags, Mismatches, Disjunctures and Breaks**

We have seen within the previous chapters that Bourdieu is often criticised for the reproductive character attributed to the habitus and practice which is seen to be a self-reinforcing feedback loop and which downplays the capacity for agents to engage in reflexivity (Jenkins, 1992; Archer, 2010). As a result of this cyclical fit between habitus and social space, Bourdieu argues that people are granted a doxic experience of practice as self-evident and natural, allowing them to go about their lives in a taken-for-granted way. As a result of the ease of this doxic practice, agents are not considered to engage in “everyday reflexivity” (Sayer, 2010b: 108; Archer, 2010). In this respect, Bourdieu has been seen to have polarised the awareness of practice as either doxic practical sense or reflexive logic (Myles, 2004). However, as we saw in the previous chapter, this may be due to Bourdieu’s now dated way of conceptualising consciousness which limited his thinking about the
opportunities for more reflexive considerations. This conceptualisation of practice as mainly motivated by practical sense relied upon placing our dispositions, beliefs and practices within unconscious, embodied/affective thought as though they were somewhere beyond our conscious consideration. Having shown that practice is characterised by conscious as well as preconscious thought and involves a myriad of embodied and neural processes such as affect and cognition, we can argue that there are more opportunities for agents to reflect on their beliefs and practices than Bourdieu acknowledged. A more psychosocially developed conceptualisation of the habitus has shown us that practice is immersed in flows of consciousness, cognition and affectivity which may become more or less accentuated in different contexts. As such, I would like to suggest that experiences of hysteresis as those which disrupt the ease of practice can prompt more consciously deliberated thinking and can provide opportunities for individuals to engage in critical and reflexive thought.

Bourdieu (2000) was at pains to make clear that the fit between the habitus and field, which tends to ensure its own preservation through reproduction, should not be treated as a universal rule or an infallible instinct. He noted that the appropriate adjustment of the habitus to objective conditions of the field is the result of frequent and familiar encounters and is but one form of relationship between the habitus and space, a “particular case of the possible” (Bourdieu, 1990: 63). In this respect he argues that the “near-circular relationship of near-perfect reproduction” only takes place when habitus and field are homothetic (Bourdieu, 1990: 63). However, although the tacit fit between dispositions and positions is largely conceived of as stable and “quasi-miraculous”, Bourdieu (2000: 157) acknowledged that there are, at times, instances of disjuncture in which some agents are left ‘‘out on a limb’, displaced, out-of-place and ill at ease”. Indeed, Bourdieu (2000) recounts that the concept of the habitus forced itself upon him as the only way to understand the mismatches he was observing in Algeria in the 1960s in which the pre-capitalist dispositions of agents were misaligned to the imposing and imported demands of the market. In this instance, agents were negatively described as lacking rationality and as resistant to modernity
which was often attributed to their religion, Islam. This led Bourdieu (2000) to question the universality of rational economic attitudes and the cultural and economic conditions of access to these dispositions. In short, Bourdieu (2000) argued that although habitus’ are constantly adapting in response to new situations, the habitus’ of these agents were out of synch and misadjusted as a result of the sudden and drastic change in the field, leaving them with outdated and dysfunctional dispositions. This is what he called the hysteresis effect.

As a result of the mismatch between habitus and field characterised in the hysteresis effect, Bourdieu (1977: 78, my emphasis) stated that an individual’s “practices are always liable to incur negative sanctions when the environment with which they are actually confronted is too distant from that to which they are objectively fitted”. Bourdieu elaborated that during times of major change, the rules and regularities of the field are profoundly altered and leave “dispositions which are out of line with the field and with the ‘collective expectations’ which are constitutive of its normality” which he termed the Don Quixote effect (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). This is why conflicts between different habitus’ are said to occur, that is, the imposition of “different definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the probable, cause one group to experience as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable or scandalous, and vice versa” (Bourdieu, 1977: 78).

The mismatch between the habitus and the field is said to be most clearly identifiable “in the case of positions situated in zones of uncertainty in social space, such as still ill-defined occupations” (Bourdieu, 2000: 157). Bourdieu (2000: 160) goes on to state that the agreement accorded to the fit between the habitus and field should therefore not be taken as a universal rule and concedes that the habitus has “degrees of integration”. What is more, he argues that for those who occupy contradictory positions “which tend to exert structural ‘double binds’ on their occupants, there often correspond destabilised habitus, torn by contradiction and internal division” (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). Most significantly, Bourdieu (2000: 157) states that the mismatch
between habitus and social space “may be the source of a disposition towards lucidity and critique which leads them to refuse to accept [the] self-evident”. This is to say that during these instances of mismatch there may be the opportunity for agents to see through (Hey, 2006) the doxa and emphasises the reflexive potential of the habitus.

Developing upon these instances of disjuncture or mismatch, Bourdieu (2000: 162) stated that “In a more general way, habitus has its ‘blips’, critical moments when it misfires or is out of phase: the relationship of immediate adaptation is suspended”. During these blips, Bourdieu (2000: 162) suggests that we are granted a practical reflection in which we “evaluate instantly the action or posture just produced and to correct a wrong position of the body, to recover an imperfect movement”. As we have previously noted in Chapter Four, Bourdieu (2000: 163) acknowledges the consciousness involved for those who occupy awkward positions in the field and whose habitus “generates inappropriate or misplaced behaviours” but does not equate it to reflexive or critical thought but instead a practical reflection. He submits that even though dispositions may fade away or soften through lack of use or even as a result of heightened consciousness, there remains the hysteresis of habitus described as an inertia which tends to perpetuate dispositions which relate to their original conditions of production (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). However, as we will go on to see, the “conciliation of contraries”, or what might be described as the reconciling of dual experiences and meanings within social space, may allow us to conceive of how these inappropriate and misplaced practices can in fact generate critical and reflexive thought (Bourdieu, 2007: 100).

Importantly, Bourdieu attributed the disjuncture in hysteresis to the temporal lag between change in the field and the adaptation of dispositions to meet the new demands of the field, so that hysteresis is necessarily a temporally constituted phenomenon. However, other social theorists such as Brubaker (1985: 760) have focussed less on the temporality of this mismatch, instead describing these experiences of being “out of phase” as “dispositional lag” and the “structural mismatch” between expectations and opportunities.
As well as this, we have seen that Bourdieu describes the *hysteresis of habitus* as an *inertia*, that is, a tendency to stay the same (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). Elsewhere Bourdieu (1977: 83; 1990: 59) describes the hysteresis as the “structural lag between opportunities and the dispositions to grasp them”. Moreover, one of Bourdieu’s favoured metaphors for describing the fit between habitus and field was *like a fish in water*: “it does not feel the weight of the water, and it takes the world about itself for granted” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127). To extend this then, we might describe the hysteresis as a “fish out of water” experience. Wacquant (2016) therefore says that although conceived as lag, the hysteresis might also be conceived of as a *hiatus*.

So far we have seen that Bourdieu has variously referred to instances of mismatch between the habitus and field as the hysteresis effect, the Don Quixote effect, being out of sync, out-of-place, out on a limb, displaced, ill at ease and so on. As a result, it is hard to discern, for him, where exactly the hysteresis effect should be applied and what it is that they actually describe. The hysteresis effect sometimes appears to refer to the *lag*, but then it is also used to describe the *status* of the habitus itself as one of inertness. Within Bourdieu’s (2000) account of hysteresis, instances of disjuncture appear to arise when there is change to the rules, regularities and structures in the field with which agents’ habitus cannot keep up. The mismatch might also be the result of a *major upheaval* as in a change of position (2000: 150), but then Bourdieu has also referred to the poor fit of the habitus which straddles contradictory positions. It might even be suggested that the hysteresis effect occurs when an agent enters a new and unfamiliar field and has yet to develop the appropriate dispositions, practice and capitals. Failure to adapt to these new demands through the inertia of the habitus may be met with negative sanctions.

Whilst I acknowledge the temporality of practice which is inherent within these mismatches, I would suggest that in practice, these experiences of mismatch are rarely understood to be the outcomes of temporally constituted and misaligned dispositions but rather as embodied feelings about our *sense*
of place and how we fit into social space. Moreover, while dispositions may appear quixotic due to the temporal lag of the habitus, the social order of fields is often already organised around a “dominant definition of practice” (Bourdieu, 2001: 62) which has the potential to exclude those who fall outside of these parameters as is often the case with disabled people through social and environmental barriers (inaccessible transport, public buildings, working environments, disabling attitudes). As Ryan’s (2005) work has shown, learning disabled children may often act in ways which do not conform to doxic conventions of public space and can be met with negative responses such as disdainful comments and looks, staring and tutting. In this respect, the misalignment between the habitus and field is less about temporality and more to do with the habitus which does not fit the organisation of social space. As well as this, I would argue that framing hysteresis as temporal lag inherently places the onus of adaptation on the agent and presumes that agents will choose to, be able to or even want to adapt. Hysteresis is perhaps not a sufficient metaphor to describe the mismatch between the habitus and field due to its temporal connotations but it is the most apparent concept to which Bourdieu refers when addressing mismatches, gaps and ill-fit. Hardy (2008) has suggested that Bourdieu elected to use the term hysteresis because of its scientific origins in order to suspend the moralistic judgements which were associated with similar concepts like alienation and anomie although as I will go on to show, I am unconvinced by this suggestion.

Although the ill-fitting habitus can exert a force in the field, “inasmuch as belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it (if only to elicit reactions of exclusion on the part of those who occupy its dominant positions)”, (Bourdieu 1992: 80) I am mostly interested in the impact of this mismatch on the habitus. Therefore although I recognise that hysteresis is a relational concept that emerges in the misaligned relationship between the habitus and the field, I will use hysteresis to focus on the embodied experience of disrupted practice as it is felt in the habitus during these moments of misfit. This is not to locate the source of ill-fit as within the habitus but to focus on how mismatches between field and habitus are felt. As well as this, I consider that these experiences of mismatch are
more common than Bourdieu theorised and are not limited to periods of crisis but can occur when the habitus is experienced as misaligned and out-of-place. Although these embodied disjunctures may be disruptive or fraught with negative feelings, I would argue that they provide a space in which agents can achieve greater reflexivity although this is not to dismiss the negative impact that reflexive self-knowledge can have or suggest that mismatches guarantee reflexivity let alone transformative practice.

At this stage it is perhaps useful to elaborate what we mean when we talk about reflexive thought. For Bourdieu (2000), the habitus was an important way of preventing scholars from attributing their own distant rational and contemplative attitudes to the practices of most peoples’ everyday lives (Sayer, 2010). In contrast to this many scholars have argued that our lives are increasingly reflexive as society becomes more morphogenetic so that agents have “no choice but to choose” and to actively fashion their self-identity (Giddens 1991: 81 cited Sweetman, 2003; Archer, 2010). According to Archer (2007), the concept of reflexivity has historically been conceptualised in vague terms, often subsumed under consciousness or subjectivity or layman’s contemplation so that the process of reflexivity is often under-theorised. Archer (2010: 2, original italics) notes that “Human reflection is the action of a subject towards an object” in which we have the capacity to consider what constitutes appropriate responses and action towards the object, a response which we have seen the habitus obviously caters to through practical reflections. Reflexivity on the other hand is distinguished from reflection because of its self-referential quality, a mental “bending-back” upon the self so that thought takes the form of subject-object-subject (Archer, 2010: 2). At the most basic level, Archer (2007: 2) states that reflexivity “rests on the fact that all normal people talk to themselves within their own heads” so that they are engaged in what she calls “internal conversation”. Not all internal conversation is reflexive and reflexive thought tends to be characterised by questions to do with self-concern and social-engagement such as ‘what will others think of me?’ and ‘is this the best way to help

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26 I will be using Archer’s (2007; 2010) work on reflexivity because of her focus on individual reflexivity rather than the more temporally and socially situated conceptualisations of reflexivity associated with Beck.
myself?’ and ‘does this really matter to me enough?’ (Archer, 2010). Reflection and reflexivity often have “fuzzy borders” so that a reflection on what to do next in a situation (weak reflexivity) can often flow into more self-referential questions (strong reflexivity) of how able we feel to deal with it or our commitment to it at all (Archer, 2007; 2010). Weak reflexive thinking might therefore be said to be characterised by shallow contemplations of a situation whilst strong reflexive processes involve a conscious deliberation and thrashing out of thinking within the internal dialogue (Archer, 2007). These reflexive processes might be what we consider everyday reflexivity and are naturally quite different from the critical reflexivity that Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) tasked the sociologist with.

5.3 (Un)Ease and Disability

In order to talk fully about the experience of hysteresis as it might be applied to disability, a closer look at practice within the field is required. This is to acknowledge that Bourdieu insisted on understanding the social space in which social phenomena occurred so that the object of investigation, in this case hysteresis of habitus, could be located within a specific historical, positional and relational context (Bourdieu, 1990, 2000). As we have seen within the previous chapters, Bourdieu (1984, 1990, 1998) theorised that each field or social space has its own logic (customs, regularities, norms, beliefs) which is experienced as the natural and largely unquestioned social order of things, i.e. doxa. As has already been elaborated within earlier chapters, the agents within these fields understand this logic in an implicit, embodied and practical way, in “the forms of mental dispositions” and in the ways “of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking”, which equips them with a feel for the game (Bourdieu, 1977: 15, 1990: 69-70). This is to say that so long as we are submerged in our harmonious doxic relation to the world we experience the “privilege of those who move in their field of activity like fish in water” (Bourdieu 1986: 257). It is this embodied aptitude which enables an agent to differentiate and classify the ongoing practices within a field, but it is also the signifier of their own classifiable
practices so that the (dis)advantage of each agent is determined by the stock of capitals and capacities they bring to the field. As Bourdieu (1998: 6) noted, the “idea of difference, or a gap, is at the basis of the very notion of space”. Bourdieu (1986) argued that in order for these capitals and capacities to be recognised as legitimate (and function as symbolic capital), they must be perceived to be embodied, as an integral part of the person, as their habitus.

Social fields are imbued with hierarchical logics which tend to have a positioning effect upon the agents within them so that each individual understands the practical logic of their status and therefore the appropriate behaviours and practices expected of this position. In this sense, we can see how the interaction of the habitus, capitals and field produces a “practical relation to the future, which governs his present practice” and is defined between the relationship of the individuals habitus and their particular universe of probabilities (Bourdieu, 1990: 64). Through repeated exposure to the regularities of certain fields, agents become instilled with approximately aligned cognitive structures of appreciation and perception (Bourdieu, 1990, 1998).

Bourdieu (1998) has shown that the learning of dispositions and perceptions which take place within the field are primarily learned through the body. Therefore, our basic embodied knowledge originates within the familial field so that our practical learning will reflect the values, norms, postures, gestures, gait, meaning and speech attached to parental (and sibling) bodies. As Skeggs (2004) has noted, Bourdieu’s work on social space has helped feminist theory explain the reproduction of sexual division of labour within the familial field, illuminating how the functioning of the normative family has secured the normalisation and naturalisation of gendered behaviour. For Bourdieu (1998), the family paradigm therefore represents a privilege which is “instituted as a universal norm” and affords those that satisfy its conditions the “symbolic profit of normality” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 69). Therefore, those who are perceived as possessing high volumes of legitimate capital tend to have the symbolic power to define what constitutes legitimate capital.
throughout the rest of the field or as Bourdieu (1998b: 102) has stated, “produces...a capital of recognition which permits him to exert symbolic effects”. As we saw in Chapter Three, implicit within most fields is an idea about the body as non-disabled. Symbolic capital is attached to able-bodiedness and is instituted as a societal norm which grants those who more or less align to this ideal the symbolic profit or ease of normality. For those of us who do not match this expectation, our presence may disrupt the taken for granted conventions of social space, demonstrating how hysteresis emerges between habitus within the field but also how this disruption to practice might be differently felt across various habitus.

Having previously highlighted that as many as 43% of people do not know a disabled person, that 67% of people feel uncomfortable talking to a disabled person, and one fifth of 18-34 year old have avoided a disabled person because they did not know how to interact with them (Scope, 2014), it is pertinent to further explore how these kinds of unease (and ease) might develop within different habitus. I would begin by suggesting that an individual who is born into a family where impairment figures quite saliently (in either a parent or sibling) is more likely than those with no firsthand experience to pragmatically understand the everydayness of impaired practice so that it constitutes an embodied knowledge. You know what that person can and cannot do, you know the aspects of the house that are a nuisance and you know how they move within it or where they might choose to spend their time, all their foibles, how they sit, how they rest, how they eat, you know where things (aids, medicine) live and you know if the person has a routine, but most importantly you do not even have to think about knowing these things.

The everyday living with a person with an impairment at a young age, when the family is your primary source of socialisation, creates an ease which is not experienced by those unacquainted with impaired bodies. Those without this experience of impaired embodiment, or indeed mental health issues or learning disabilities, will not have gained the practical knowledge of these

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27 As well as in other close family members or close friends
bodies and their accompanying routines, behaviours, gait, speech and so on. For these individuals, these types of bodies will be experienced as the unfamiliar and even the uncanny because they will not form part of their embodied knowledge or expectations. This is not to suggest that children or siblings of a disabled family member do not perceive the wider doxic interpretation of impairment as difference, or indeed, negative difference. As Stalker and Connors (2004) demonstrated within their research into children’s perceptions of their sibling’s disability, many were aware of the negative responses to disability within the general public. However, Stalker and Connors (2004: 220) have shown that “siblings are well placed to mediate difference, as they move between the outside world with its dominant views of normalcy and difference, and the family, which includes their disabled brother or sister”. Through their interviews, Stalker and Connors (2004: 225) demonstrated the ordinariness of having a disabled sibling, noting the response of one participant, “She’s different, but it’s normal for us”. In such cases, it might be suggested that their habitus’ straddle dual, even contradictory, positions of meaning and that the disparity between the primary socialisation of the habitus and wider doxic messages produces weak reflexive thinking in that disability as difference within wider social space is known and acknowledged in a conscious way but not deliberately critiqued or contemplated. This is similarly supported by Burke (2010: 1682) who states that disability becomes part of the family’s normality and that growing up with disability “instils an understanding of disability as an everyday experience”. Similarly, I would suggest that those who work closely with disabled people, for example in caring or medical roles, are likely to gain this same sense of ease through familiarity. In such instances, understandings of disability are mediated by the setting so that impairment and illness are to be expected within these social fields and as such, less likely to be met with negative sanctions or attributed negative symbolic capitals associated with poor doxic understandings.

We saw in Chapter Three that doxa at the collective social level sustains and consolidates the non-disabled body and reproduces poor understandings and negative meaning about disability but that there are varying degrees to which
individual habitus’ and their schema correspond directly to this doxic knowledge. I also showed that what is understood as negative in one social space is not necessarily the case across all fields. This demonstrates that for some people (those with experience of disability), there is a gap or mismatch between the knowledge contained within the habitus and the doxa of different social spaces. It could be argued that early interaction or the familiarity gained through regular contact with disability expands the habitus into anticipating practice which is not transmitted or reflected in doxa and is a space in which disability is not negatively understood. To use Bourdieusian terms, the strength of the orthodox message contained within doxa is resisted through the heterodoxy of the familial space and practice. In this respect, being at home with disability and impairment provides a space in which disability is negotiated and reconciled with the mainstream doxic knowledge and may take on different meaning to that which is sustained by doxa. In this case, Bourdieu (2000) would suggest that because socialisation of an individual’s primary habitus is not radically different to the logic of broader social space, these agents tend to reconcile difference in an unproblematic way. I would suggest then that our relation to doxa and the extent to which we misalign with the expectations of doxa may prompt weak reflexive thinking (‘yeah, she’s different, but so what?’).

However, when this misalignment to doxa becomes the basis of exclusions or negative sanctions, this weak reflexive thinking is likely to become more actively contemplated and the situation reflexively critiqued. In this respect, we might think about how parents of a disabled child experience hysteresis. As we saw within Chapter Three, having a child who does not conform to doxic conventions of public space creates a feeling of being out of place and devalues disabled bodies within these spaces (Ryan, 2008). For many parents of disabled children, the negative attitudes of others are the biggest barrier to inclusion; “just ‘crossing the threshold’ into a new play setting can be a very uncomfortable and worrying experience” (Sense, 2016: 18). One parent told the Sense report (2016: 20) that:

“There needs to be more mixing of disabled and non-disabled children but this is difficult as if parents don’t feel welcome when they first
access a setting, they are unlikely to go back to that setting again. When you have a disabled child it is much easier to mix with other families with disabled children who will understand the issues you are facing.”

For parents, the perceived misfit of their child and their subsequent exclusion disrupts the flow of their everyday practice, demonstrating how hysteresis is not necessarily located in the habitus of the ‘ill-fitting’ person and highlights the relational character of hysteresis. Most importantly it highlights how this mismatch between doxa/doxic space and their child is experienced as a concern for the child’s inclusion and well-being. This may prompt critical questioning from the parents (‘she’s different, but why should that mean that she can’t take part?’ Or ‘why should she have to go to a different nursery/school/play area?’). In this respect, the questions become more saliently felt as a concern about the social engagement of someone we care about, demonstrating the affective nature of these disruptions to practice. These mismatches are disruptive because they trouble and unsettle the dispositions and attachments of our habitus, they are disruptive because they impact upon people who matter to us and we are invested in this practice. We might feel angry, frustrated, annoyed or incredulous at the way doxa (in attitudes, organisation, structures) excludes this person and this pushes us to question the status quo. For some parents, these negative sanctions have pushed them to develop a “thick skin” and to explain away discriminatory practice as the result of ignorance and insensitivity so as to feel able to carry on attending exclusionary play spaces (Sense, 2016: 20). However, these feelings of unease may just as easily discourage the family from returning to certain areas, feeding back into the cyclical nature of doxic exclusion.

So far we have seen that familiarity with disability may produce an ease around disabled bodies that those with little to no experience of disability have not gained, demonstrating how disabled bodies may come to be experienced as disruptive to differently socialised habitus’. To elaborate, as we have already seen the idea of difference is at the very foundation of social space. The habitus is primed to anticipate these differences through the various interactions and experiences it encounters within diverse social
settings. This does not equate to the habitus experiencing hysteresis every
time it encounters a practice or person who is differently socialised as these
differences still fall within the realm of doxic thought. However, when this
difference is not accounted for within doxa or when this difference is
negative, an individual may feel this as a disjuncture to practice and it may
produce a sense of unease. Therefore the disabled body which is imbued with
negative symbolic capital and which comes up against the doxa can produce
the hysteresis response in able-bodied individuals. In this respect, negative
symbolic capital exerts a disruptive force within the field which may be felt
in both the habitus of the perceiver and also the perceived.

This is significant when we see how these dispositions constitute and
reinforce doxa in structure and in habitus. We have previously seen that the
non-disabled ideal which underlies our doxic thinking consolidates other
bodies, such as raced or impaired bodies, as having negative symbolic capital
and this often excludes them from the doxic entitlement and ease of access
to public social space. This exclusion consolidates itself within doxic thinking
even further because when these bodies are systematically excluded from
space, they become the unfamiliar and therefore are excluded from doxic
thought about this space. As a result, the unease that people feel around
disabled bodies is likely to deepen and as we have seen, can produce
avoidant behaviour which only serves to further intensify awkward feelings
and uneasy interactions. This demonstrates that non-disabled people may
feel the natural flow of their practice to be disrupted in encounters with
disabled people through not knowing how to act, so that their habitus may
feel out-of-step or in hysteresis. However, the non-disabled individual whose
habitus has internalised doxa (which reaffirms their own bodily legitimacy
and provides them with the embodied aptitude to classify the bodies and
practices of others on the basis of this doxic knowledge) recognises the
disabled body as being out-of-place. The unease felt in this encounter may
push individuals towards practice (avoidance, exclusion, discrimination,
condescension) which removes or dismisses the source of hysteresis from
consideration and reinforces the original feelings of unease and the disabled
person’s ill-fit. As Bourdieu (1996) noted, the experience of hysteresis can
produce confusion and disorientation within the habitus but that many agents dismiss rather than engage with this disruption to meaning. Feeling embarrassed, uneasy or awkward around a person does not incline you to engage with them and is far more likely to prompt you to avoid them. This demonstrates the cyclical strength of doxic knowledge as it is contained within the affective dispositions of the habitus and that although the hysteresis may provide a “critical window” (Akram and Hogan, 2015: 1) for reflexivity and the possibility to respond differently and therefore initiate change, the dispositional tugs of the habitus can reign us back in, making social change much harder to achieve.

Whilst both non-disabled and disabled people might experience the hysteresis through misaligned habitus’ and interruptions to practice, the disabled person is the one considered, after the Don Quixote effect, quixotic and as the one who does not fit. As such, although disabled bodies may disrupt or suspend the embodied practical logic in their non-disabled counterparts, the symbolic power of doxa is weighted in favour of non-disabled actors and therefore allows disability to be excised from doxa on the basis of negative value, demonstrating the asymmetry of power in this interaction. This is not to deny that other affective feelings (such as disgust, pity, fear, contempt, etc) and negative values may be attributed to disabled bodies within these interactions, indeed, aversive feelings and negative values may serve to reinforce these relations. Instead I wish to show the strength of embodied dispositions as they are reinforced by the symbolic system of doxa and negative symbolic capital and the asymmetry of power in these relations. In this respect, we can see how being perceived as embodying negative symbolic capital has both a distancing and reproductive effect whereby having a body that departs from the non-disabled expectation entails exclusion from space which has the secondary effect of exclusion from doxic thought which goes on to reproduce exclusionary attitudes, spaces and so on.

Whilst we have so far looked at the unease or ease that may be felt by non-disabled individuals, it is important to consider how being a body that does not fit doxa can have significant psycho-emotional effects on the habitus.
This is to say that the diffuse symbolic capital attached to non-disablement contained within doxa serves to structure fields and the practices of agents within these fields and therefore, the experience of disjuncture or ill-fit may be more routinely felt by disabled people whose bodies and practices do not align with the collective expectations of the field.

5.4 ** Routinely Felt Hysteresis and Reflexivity **

Although Bourdieu seemed to portray the hysteresis effect as one which ultimately displaced and removed out of sync agents from social space, he also acknowledged that it could provide forms of resistance; “The tendency of groups to persist in their ways...can be the source of misadaptation as well as adaptation, revolt as well as resignation” (Bourdieu, 1990: 62). Similarly he implied that the hysteresis of habitus can push people to resist owed to their “past loyalties exerting hysteresis effects” (Bourdieu, 1985: 739). Therefore while the hysteresis of the habitus often produced “utter confusion” and disorientation which frequently leads the most marginalised to “simply give up” (Bourdieu, 1996: 219), the hysteresis also enables us to question the self-evidence of doxa. In addition, while Bourdieu mostly talked of hysteresis is terms of large scale crises and drastic change to fields, Friedman (2015) has noted that he also began to examine how the hysteresis might be experienced at an individual level especially among the socially mobile working classes. As Hardy (2008: 134) observes, Bourdieu’s (1999) *The Weight of the World* is a “series of heart-rending examples of individuals’ struggles with the hysteresis effect”.

Being disabled in a society which is doxically organised around the non-disabled body can often produce moments of disjuncture in which the disabled person and their practice is confronted with their perceived ill-fit in social space. While I acknowledge that in many of these instances we simply react, adapt and adjust to these mismatches in fairly unreflective and uncalculated ways so that we are granted what Bourdieu (2000: 162) called a practical reflection which “remains turned towards practice and not towards the agent who performs it”, there are occasions in which this hysteresis is not so easily absorbed or diffused (Karsenti, 2012).
As I suggested within Chapter Three, understanding that your own experience diverges from the doxic expectation highlights that there is a gap or mismatch between your own knowledge and the knowledge that others have of you. As such, a disabled person may often have to reconcile this gap through critically engaging with doxic belief so as to dismantle the tensions it can produce. In situations such as these, a disabled person might choose to use humour to ‘break the ice’ or reassure non-disabled people and to encourage a sense of ease in interactions. Alternatively they might choose to deflect attention from their disability through accentuating other aspects of the self or reassure the non-disabled person of their ability through normalisation (Goffman, 1963). Therefore whilst a disabled person’s difference or ill-fit might be reified through the inaccessibility of the physical environment, their out-of-placeness may be more saliently felt and reinforced through the reactions and interactions of non-disabled others and the emotional labour that is involved in ameliorating sticky situations (Scully, 2008).

As Bauman (2006: 13) states:

“To be wholly or in part “out of place” everywhere, not to be completely anywhere (that is without qualifications and caveats, without some aspects of oneself “sticking out” and seen by others as looking odd) may be an upsetting, sometimes annoying experience. There is always something to explain, to apologise for, to hide or on the contrary to broadly display, to negotiate, to bid for and to bargain for; there are differences to be smoothed or glossed over, or to be on the contrary made more salient and legible”.

Within Chapter Three and Four I demonstrated the power of doxa in attributing negative symbolic capital to disabled bodies and that this negative value could have profound effects on the psycho-emotional well-being of individuals. Disabled people are patronised, avoided, abused, disrespected and undermined in myriad of ways, devalued as parents, workers and lovers, excluded from education and leisure, gawped at in the street and invalidated through jokes and careless remarks (Hughes, 2012a, Reeve, 2012). As we saw in Chapter One, disabled people become negatively positioned through the doxic conceptualisation of the legitimate citizen and the naturalised idea
that disabled people are unproductive and unable and therefore not able to meet these individualistic expectations. Although disablism can be explicit and outright, as with hate crime, much of disability discrimination takes place at the unquestioned level of doxa meaning that discriminatory attitudes and practices are naturalised to the point that they are not even recognised as such (Scully, 2010). The negative symbolic capital attached to disability creates such low expectations of disabled people that we uncritically elevate them as objects of inspiration and bravery for simply having achieved ordinary practices and that their completion of the most mundane of activities is regarded as exceptional (Silva and Howe, 2012; Young, 2012). These poor understandings of disability contained within doxa mean that disabled people are faced with negative, stereotyped and demeaning responses and expectations, more so than their non-disabled peers, and this can result in sticky interactions between the two (Scully, 2010). The full acceptance of disabled people in social interactions unmarked “by any unusual degree of awkwardness, embarrassment or hostility” is still uncommon and is often limited to small and local networks between people who are familiar to one another (Scully, 2010). This often means that disabled people are seen to be out-of-place and have to work harder to manage interactions with non-disabled people (Reeve, 2006; Scully, 2010).

With this in mind it can be argued that being disabled means that you are regularly ‘up against’ the doxa and denied the ease and sense of fit that comes with meeting the corporeal expectations of doxa, you are denied the “symbolic profit of normality” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 69). The disabled person’s body within social space organised around non-disabled bodies disrupts what is taken-for-granted in the minds of non-disabled people but this also entails that the disabled person has to negotiate and reconcile with these interruptions to practice and gaps in meaning as well as exclusionary space and organisation, once again demonstrating the asymmetry of power within this relation.

These instances of being out-of-place may push disabled people to consider the situation from the perspective of non-disabled counterparts so as to
manage the awkwardness, misapprehensions or tensions which can arise in such situations. Disabled people therefore conciliate the contraries (Bourdieu, 2004) between their experience of disability as part of their habitus and which constitutes their everyday, taken-for-granted embodied knowledge with the meanings produced by doxa in which inaccessible environments and social organisation reproduce disability as out-of-place and ill-fitting. Here I would argue that the experience of hysteresis, while envisaged by Hardy (2008) to distance itself from the moral judgements associated with alienation and anomie, is actually an expression of symbolic power. This places the onus on the individual to adapt and manage the disjuncture because their exclusion is naturalised as the result of the disabled body/practice which does not fit, rather than the result of disabling organisation/structures and serves to reinforce the negative symbolic capital associated with disability. This straddling of the dual meanings of disability might be said to produce a “double consciousness” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 113) which questions the self-evidence and taken-for-granted nature of doxa. As Bourdieu (1998b: 113) contends, negotiating these multiple meanings is “at the basis of a very great (partial) lucidity which is manifested above all in situations of crisis and among people in a precarious position, and thus out of sync with the most obvious and basic facts of doxa”. As such, we might be able to identify how this gap between a disabled individual’s habitus and space pushes agents to critically engage with the others’ perceptions of disability, it “brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation” (Bourdieu, 1977: 168). This is to say that “breaking the immediate fit between the subjective structures and the objective structures, destroys self-evidence practically” (Bourdieu, 1977: 168-169).

Importantly, although Bourdieu (1977) envisaged this break as necessary for critical thought he did not see it as enough on its own to guarantee reflexivity. As such, it could be equally argued that many disabled people absorb this mismatch, adapting and adjusting, covering and passing (Goffman, 1963) or dismissing so as to move past this disjuncture.

Although this conceptualisation of the hysteresis as one which is routinely experienced demonstrates how reflexive thought may be prompted in ill-
fitting habitus’, this constant mediation between meaning in fields can also produce a “habitus divided against itself, in constant negotiation with itself and its ambivalence, and therefore doomed to a kind of duplication, to a double perception of self, to successive allegiances and multiple identities” (Bourdieu, 1999: 511) which we have previously seen him describe as the destabilised habitus. Elsewhere Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; 2004) has described himself as possessing a cleft habitus as a result of having to reconcile the dual experiences of coming from low social origins and going on to achieve high academic success, although he notes that this class deflection can more often than not produce a great deal of unhappiness and feelings of shame. As Morrin (2015: 132-133) notes, disjunctures between habitus and field may produce unsettled feelings which can linger on in the habitus leaving individuals with further feelings of unresolvedness. As we saw in the previous chapter, these disjunctures may produce and consolidate affective responses and unsettle our practice, shifting from a preconscious state to an actively conscious state, registering our feelings of being out-of-place. But these are not just emotional experiences and are characterised by cognitive evaluations. In this respect, these disjunctures (caused by the environment organised to suit non-disabled others doxic practice) disturb our practical relation to the world and may lead us to question its organisation. Moreover, these gaps may push the person to consciously deliberate with others’ perceptions of them, which although may provide them with the ability to manage misunderstandings and uneasy interactions, also means that they are required to internalise these negative expectations, demonstrating how the experience of hysteresis and reflexivity may have psychic costs. As such, we can see why the added emotional labour entailed in reflexivity might prompt some individuals to choose to conceal disability through techniques such as passing (Goffman, 1963).

The hysteresis can produce significant embodied and psychosocial consequences, sometimes producing what Ingram (2011: 290) has described as the habitus tug in which “conflicting dispositions struggle for supremacy and the individual can at times feel pulled in different directions”. She elaborates that this can produce the destabilised habitus so that an agent no
longer has the fit of Bourdieu’s analogical *fish in water* which in turn can create division, “leaving an individual to feel alienated from the practices within a field” (Ingram, 2011: 290). Whilst the experience of hysteresis might open up spaces in which individuals can critically and reflexively engage, it must be remembered that the unequal relations of power which precede and often characterise these disjunctures may produce negative psychosocial responses within the habitus. As we saw earlier, Bourdieu (1977) envisaged that these mismatches often entailed *negative sanctions* so that the experience of hysteresis may be psychically harmful. So far we have seen how the hysteresis might emerge in a more everyday sort of context through the *gaps and mismatches* between the habitus and doxa. However, it is also important to consider the experience of hysteresis within periods of significant social change. The chapter will now turn to look at how within the current context of welfare cuts and the expectation of disabled people to move into employment, disabled people may face multiple instances of ill-fit and the psychosocial harm this may cause.

### 5.5 A Fish out of Water?

As we saw in Chapter One, while paid employment has been seen as the hegemonic expectation of ‘legitimate citizens’, disabled people have been historically excluded from participating in the labour market as a result of being perceived as unproductive and unable. That is to say that disabled bodies have been excluded from the field of work on the basis of their perceived negative symbolic capitals which make them incompatible and ill-fitting to the doxic demands of the labour market and doxic expectations of the citizen worker. To use Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) favoured metaphor, they have historically been seen within this field as a ‘fish out of water’, demonstrating how doxa and negative symbolic capital collude to socially enforce and naturalise the misfit and out-of-placeness of the disabled person within mainstream employment.

However, now that the disability category has been significantly redefined, the rules and regularities of welfare entitlement have been profoundly altered and the expectations of disabled claimants significantly changed. The
ongoing reforms to welfare represent a period of major change and have been hailed by David Cameron as the “biggest welfare revolution in over 60 years” (Randall, 2012). We might identify that during this period of welfare reform and austerity, the state has ‘moved the goal posts’ through redefining the symbolic capital attached to disability welfare claimant and drastically changing the rules of the game for disabled people. Where some disabled people once qualified for state support under the consecrated and legitimate disability category, a category which was synonymous to unemployability (Warren, 2005), they are now quite arbitrarily recast as illegitimate (Stone, 1984; Roulstone, 2015). As we saw in Chapter Three, this has been accompanied by a specific kind of misrecognition known as *allodoxia*. Here I suggested that the symbolic manipulation of the disability category enacted by the State represented a significant yet uncertain redefinition of disability, leading to a mismatch between doxic perceptions of disability and the reality of those living with impairment. The narrowing of the disability category that has taken place through the attribution of additional and diametrically positioning negative symbolic capital (as either truly vulnerable or as fraudulent scrounger) may therefore produce negative sanctions for individuals whose identities are displaced and mistakenly perceived.

Despite their long-term exclusion from the labour market and their perceived unproductivity, this group are now expected to find work in a competitive market which is doxically organised to exclude and invalidate them. This is to reiterate that despite the fact that disabled people have been persistently perceived as at odds with the “dominant definition of practice” as a result of the negative symbolic capitals that they are seen to embody, they must now move into mainstream employment (Bourdieu, 2000: 62).

These changes to welfare will therefore leave many disabled people out-of-step with the new rules and expectations of the field. They are once again a “fish out of water”. Many disabled people will face not only adapting to the impending material change in terms of losing their entitlements to social support, but also be expected to come to terms with the redefinition of their impairment as not significant enough and therefore as illegitimate. As I
showed earlier, Bourdieu (2000) theorised that the experience of hysteresis was commonplace during periods of uncertainty and when new but ill-defined identities were emerging. For those waiting to find out whether or not they still qualify for support under the new rules, this hysteresis may provoke worry, stress and anxiety. Knowing that nothing about your impairment has fundamentally changed but confronted with the message that you are no longer deserving of support forces disabled people to straddle and negotiate contradictory positions, meanings and expectations which may produce a destabilised habitus.

Just as Bourdieu conceived of the hysteresis effect in terms of the misalignment between Algerian peasants and new capitalist demands of the field and which negatively positioned them as irrational and resistant to modernity, disabled individuals are now misaligned with the neo-liberal demands of the labour market and duties of legitimate citizenship which has negatively positioned them through their apparent pathologised personhood. What the hysteresis illuminates in this situation is that the displacement of disabled individuals as a result of drastic welfare retrenchment is an expression of symbolic power. The onus has been placed on the individual to adapt, neglecting that the position of disabled people is the result of particular historical exclusionary conditions, embedded within doxa, and in so doing morally condemns “those who have already been condemned in reality to the fate of economic ‘misfits’” (Bourdieu, 2000a: 28). Rather than focussing on the multiple disabling barriers in structures, organisation and attitudes, or the lack of suitable jobs, or the very real limitations associated with having a long-term impairment or health condition, the victim is blamed for their poor position. In depicting welfare claimants as choosing to lead a fraudulent lifestyle, political rhetoric has positioned disabled people as wilfully unemployed. The rhetorical solution to this is to force them to choose the legitimate citizen lifestyle and penalise those who don’t. The practical solution is rather more complicated.

Identifying the experience of hysteresis in disability welfare claimants may therefore open up a discussion on the conditions of access to legitimate
citizenship and the obstacles faced in their anticipated move into the labour market. Many disability welfare claimants live in areas with the poorest job opportunities, meaning that unless strong employment opportunities are created, processes of activation are relatively ineffective in getting people who are workless because of poor health into work (Barnes and Sissons, 2013). Although social model thinking may have been co-opted within social policy and government thinking, it remains external to the collective sentiments of doxa. As we saw in Chapter One and Three, disabled peoples’ exclusion and negative positioning is historically and pervasively sedimented in institutions, organisation, environment and collective dispositions, it is situated deep within doxa and the structures it creates. In the eyes of potential employers, disabled people face being seen as unproductive, costly and risky (Bell and Heitmüller, 2005). Weak market conditions and increased competition for scarce jobs alongside the extra barriers that disabled people face means that many disabled welfare users are pushed to the “back of the jobs queue” (Barnes and Sissons, 2013).

Other barriers to work include an individual’s skills and qualifications, their employment history, caring responsibilities, household situation and income, transport options as well as health barriers (Barnes and Sissons, 2013). Health barriers remain a highly significant factor so that “recovery or improvement of a condition appears the best predictor of moving into work” (Barnes and Sissons, 2013: 91). Many of those who have already been found fit for work and moved onto Jobseeker’s Allowance are ill-suited to these requirements due to the ongoing management of a health condition. Whilst these health barriers alone do not necessarily preclude a person from work they often combine with other problems and produces multiple disadvantages so that interaction between various compounding factors must be recognised (Barnes and Sissons, 2013). This is not to mention the kinds of disillusioned and despondent dispositions that long-term unemployment and long-term ill health may produce. As we saw in Chapter Four, symbolic power works through emotional pathways (Reeve, 2006). The perpetuation of negative symbolic capitals associated with disability and with welfare fraud may transform the habitus of disabled agents in detrimental and limiting ways,
producing feelings of shame, embarrassment, anxiety or fear. As Barnes and Sissons (2013) report, some disability welfare claimants who had been judged fit for work felt powerless to appeal, once again demonstrating the emotional costs associated with accessing benefits and the psychosocial ramifications of hysteresis as disorientating, disempowering and depoliticising (McNay, 2014).

Those that are reclassified as fit for work will have to work against the asymmetry of status produced by the negative value and deficit thinking attached to disability as well as the negative symbolic capital attached to illegitimate welfare user. Although there will be those who can critically assess this situation for what it is, (disability activists, Disabled People Against Cuts, etc), it demonstrates the potential for the experience of hysteresis during periods of drastic change to produce feelings of disempowerment through the destabilised habitus and may be quite profound for more marginalised disabled individuals.

Importantly, Bourdieu (1990) argued that an individual’s capacity to resist and reflexively consider their position was reflective of their relation to power. In this respect, during times of crisis in which the fit between habitus and field becomes disrupted, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) conceded that rational choice may take place among individuals who are in a position to be rational, i.e. not limited or pressured by financial constraints, not faced with the threat of losing benefits or being evicted or relying on food banks. However, if we take into consideration the negative positioning of disabled people through symbolic power, we soon begin to see that the combination of both negative symbolic capitals and hysteresis can make resistance inconceivably problematic. As the welfare cuts continue to intensify inequalities, symbolically deprive and materially impoverish disabled people, suffering may seem inevitable and unavoidable (McNay, 2014).

5.6 Conclusion

Through developing upon Bourdieu’s concept of the hysteresis effect, I have demonstrated a way of theorising the mismatches between the habitus and
field and their potential to produce more critical and reflexive thinking. Contrary to what critics suggest, Bourdieu’s theoretical framework can be developed beyond his emphasis on reproduction and can provide a more flexible way of theorising the habitus and practice. Building upon the affective nature of practice and the experience of disjuncture, I have demonstrated how the hysteresis effect may produce feelings of unease around disability as a result of the negative symbolic capital attributed to disabled bodies and how this tends to reproduce through the symbolic system of doxa. As such, experiences of mismatch do not guarantee critical thought and may serve to reinforce doxic dispositions. I also showed how ease develops through familiarity with disability and how being at home with impairment socialises habitus’ to anticipate practice not accounted for within doxa.

The chapter then moved onto discuss how being disabled can often mean that you ‘come up against’ doxic space and thought. As such, disabled people may be more able to critically question the status quo of doxa as a result of reconciling the gap between their own experiences and an understanding of the doxic perceptions of disability. This demonstrates that being disabled may entail a conciliation of contraries and produce a ‘double consciousness’, granting individuals greater reflexivity. However, this increased reflexivity may come at a cost through the extra emotional labour that disabled people often engage in to manage interactions with non-disabled peers. The internalisation of negative meanings associated with disability may produce psychosocial harm in the destabilised habitus.

The chapter concluded with a look at how the current cuts to welfare may produce the experience of hysteresis for disability benefit claimants. Here I showed that disabled people have historically been perceived as ‘fish out of water’ within the labour market and this exclusion has been naturalised through the negative symbolic capital attached to disability. However, the state has now redefined the disability category and attributed additional negative symbolic capital to disabled benefit claimants through the rhetoric of fraud and accompanying cuts to welfare. Once again a ‘fish out of water’,
the hysteresis in these situations signals the individual experience of the asymmetry of symbolic power and raises questions of access to legitimate citizenship. Resistance may prove more problematic for disabled people in this situation as a result of multiple disadvantages faced, indicating that hysteresis can provide a focus on an individual's displacement of social position.
Conclusion

This thesis has explored how Bourdieu’s social theory can provide a dynamic and complex approach to understanding disability and disability inequality with a focus on the precarious positioning of disabled people within the context of neo-liberalism. At a time when attitudes towards disability are deteriorating, hate crime increasing, and disabled people are being devalued through increasingly hostile and acrimonious terms (Scope, 2011; Hughes, 2015), understanding the perceptions and positioning of disability and the power of disabling practices is critical. The composite nature of disability and multiple forms of exclusion and inequality associated with it benefits from a multipronged approach which acknowledges personal, embodied and psychological aspects of disability alongside socio-political and cultural conceptualisations. This is by no means complete, however, Bourdieu’s approach is one in which the micro and macro aspects of social life are brought together through their meso interplay and provides a thorough analysis of many aspects of disability. At the same time, I have sought to develop some of Bourdieu’s conceptual thinking through incorporating considerations from a disability perspective. This is an important contribution because there remains a tendency for Bourdieu to be read as overly reproductionist and determinist and therefore limited when it comes to questions of reflexivity.

In chapter one, I considered what it means to be disabled within contemporary neo-liberalism highlighting how the political rhetoric behind welfare reform has reclassified the disabled benefit claimant as potential fraud and called into question their entitlement to citizen status. Historically tracing the liberal belief in the individual and the competitive free-market, we observed how the liberal doctrine of possessive individualism has promoted an idea of the legitimate citizen as homo economicus who requires minimal assistance from the state. Those that failed to meet these criterion were dismissed as pathologically idle, moral failures and justified a survival of the fittest attitude which abandoned the poor and disabled to workhouses and ‘less eligibility’ Poor Laws. The advent of the welfare state was premised
as demonstrating a change in attitude towards poverty and was optimistically considered a means of ending social exclusion through the rights of social citizenship (Morris, 1994). However, the reality was quite different for disabled people.

Access to these rights were designed around the white able-bodied male and much of the benefits depended upon a previous earning capacity, relegating the non-productive disabled as second class citizens with meagre entitlements, often housed in institutions. Those with congenital disability, learning disablement and mental health issues were consigned to the group of Other disabled and classified as unproductive non-workers for whom the social rights and opportunities of citizenship were decidedly less apparent. Disabled individuals classified as such were often forced to take low-skilled, low-paid work with little consideration given to what might constitute a meaningful career for them and consequently, reproduced ideas about the poor fit of disabled people within the workforce.

Viewing the security provided by the welfare state as fostering dependency and as a hindrance to the competitive, entrepreneurial practices needed of citizens, neo-liberal governance has steadily reconfigured the legitimate citizen as the responsible and dutiful, free possessive individual who is self-regulating and unremittingly responsive to the demands of the market (Hall, 2011, Olssen, 1996). The social contract between disabled people and the state is increasingly precarious and uneasy. The implementation of various welfare-to-work and workfare strategies alongside social model politics, increasing disability rights and anti-discrimination legislation perpetuates the idea that employment exists for all those who seek it.

The incremental changes that have been made to the welfare state over the years have functioned as a “symbolic drip-feed” (Bourdieu, 1998: 30), distilling a message about the illegitimate citizens that depend on welfare as degenerate and pathologised whilst contrasted against the symbolically consecrated image of the legitimate worker citizen. The disabled figure therefore continues to be dys-entwined in the social contract between citizen
and state and has long occupied a position of deficit value, existing as an *awkward afterthought* to mainstream non-disabled conceptualisations of citizen practices.

The second chapter then was largely concerned with articulating some of the perceived gaps in both disability studies and Bourdieu’s social theory and what they might offer each other. Although the social model has afforded a great deal of political purchase for disabled people through illuminating the social barriers to inclusion and has been deeply influential in changing the way disability is viewed, it lacks an embodied perspective. I also considered some of the arguments from Critical Disability Studies (CDS). Here I contended that the CDS endorsement of *performative politics* to challenge ideological constructions and unsettle normative thinking about bodies neglected questions of access to this political agency whilst at the same time seemed to consider the disruption of discourse as producing the meaningful transformation of subjectivities, practices and structures.

This chapter also dealt with Bourdieu’s concepts of the habitus and the centrality of bodies to his social theory, demonstrating how the habitus may be used to tell us about the embodied orientations and values attached to different social positions. I also highlighted some of Bourdieu’s criticisms as overly deterministic and reproductionist, as well as some of his tenuous biological analogies and neglect of affect. However, I suggested that these may be unduly narrow interpretations of his work and that with a more flexible interpretation and application of these concepts, Bourdieu can provide composite understandings of disability through the perspective, practice and experience of agents as they are socio-politically and historically located. Used within disability studies, the habitus allows us to see how material and structural factors come to characterise the social position and dispositions of disabled people as well a consideration of the perspective of the agent which is deeply embodied and therefore inclusive of the experience of impairment.
Within Chapter Three I demonstrated that although Bourdieu focussed heavily on the social inequality of class, his work on the exclusionary power of symbolic distinctions could be extended to include the differentiation and evaluation of disabled bodies within wider corporeal ideologies and the doxic knowledge against which they are measured. Here I showed how doxic knowledge creates, sustains and consecrates the non-disabled body within space, organisation, practice and attitudes in taken-for-granted ways, demonstrating how disablism is consolidated at structural and individual levels. Through showing how the non-disabled body functions as a diffuse form of symbolic capital, I also developed Bourdieu’s lesser used conceptual adjunct negative symbolic capital to describe how disabled bodies are imbued with negative value, the exclusionary nature of this kind of capital and how this is felt as a positional sense relation through our embodied feeling of fit.

Although there were normative reasons to reject impairment, irreducible to social conditioning, I suggested that it is when these deeply embodied beliefs gain commonsensical self-evidence that they may naturalise harmful approaches to non-normative bodies. The naturalisation of negative value associated with disability therefore serves to further naturalise oppressive and unequal relations and obscures the harmful practices done to disabled people. While some disabled individuals may feel able to resist the negative symbolic capital of disability, I also showed that the power of the symbolic system is stacked against individual acts of resistance and that the repeated devaluation and invalidation which takes place through doxa act as forms of psycho-emotional disablism. Psycho-emotional disablism may therefore be thought of as the embodiment of symbolic power, the transfiguration of negative symbolic capital into a positional sense relation, showing how doxa functions as a psychic mechanism of domination. The chapter also discussed how the current welfare rhetoric has manipulated the symbolic categories of perception, producing a misrecognition more accurately described as allodoxia, or the mistaking of identities as a result of the ambiguity of categories. Here I argued that the state has wielded significant symbolic power through raising and reproducing poor understandings and ideas about
disability alongside the figure of fraud, obscuring the reality of living with disability and positioning disabled people as symbolic burden.

Building upon the psychic experiences of negative symbolic capital, Chapter Four developed how we might incorporate affect into theorisations of the habitus to produce a more psychosocial (and therefore less mechanistic) understanding of dispositions, practice and attitudes. I showed that Bourdieu had polarised doxic practice as unconscious and affective/embodied against reflexive practice which was conscious, rational and critical. Noting that these were reflective of past psychological orthodoxies, the renewed theorisation of the habitus as comprised of a preconscious was suggested in order to account for how our practice may shift from being unthinking and unreflective to more consciously considered. The chapter also showed how affect is not opposed to reason and instead forms part of a complex and recursive patterning of evaluative cognition which shape our dispositions, practices and judgements.

Developing upon doxa, I discussed how affect characterises our sense of fit within social space and how social position, inequality and the exclusionary nature of doxic spaces may produce detrimental dispositions within disabled peoples’ habitus’, highlighting how the accumulative internalisation of oppression may produce disempowered subjectivities, especially in marginalised groups of disabled people. I also looked at the role of affect in producing anti-welfare sentiment, arguing that the feelings of ressentiment that people express are reflective of embodied relations of symbolic power. Finally, I considered the role of disgust in producing unequal relations between disabled and non-disabled people, suggesting that whilst disgust plays an important role in maintaining social distance, we risk overlooking a deluge of other embodied dispositions and cognitive evaluations which mediate exclusion, specifically, feelings of unease and awkwardness.

Chapter Five developed upon this theme of unease through a discussion of Bourdieu’s concept of the hysteresis effect. Here I argued that although Bourdieu envisaged the hysteresis to relate to the mismatch between the
habitus and field in times of crisis, these mismatches may occur far more frequently and provide a space in which the status quo may be questioned and critically reflected upon. As such, although Bourdieu has previously been criticised with having a limited view of the possibilities of reflexive thought, these gaps may push us to negotiate, reconcile and conciliate the differences in meaning which occur through our varied relations to doxa. In this chapter I showed how people may develop different feelings of ease and unease around disabled bodies as well as how being a disabled person who regularly ‘comes up against’ the doxa may be able to question its self-evidence but how this may also produce a destabilised habitus through the internalisation of negative value attributed to them. The chapter concluded with looking at how the hysteresis effect might be employed to understand the displaced position and ‘fish out of water’ experience of disabled people as a result of current cuts to welfare. Although the hysteresis might open up spaces in which individuals can critically and reflexively engage, it must be remembered that the unequal relations of power which precede and often characterise these disjunctures may produce negative psychosocial responses within the habitus and make resistance that much harder.

**Contributions to Disability Studies**

I suggest that Bourdieu’s account can contribute to Disability Studies by providing a compromise between the materialist and social constructionist approaches through an analysis which is simultaneously concerned with structure, discourse and embodied lived experiences. Through the habitus, Bourdieu enables us to identify the material conditions associated with the social position of disabled agents and the impact that this has on their lives allowing us to identify the structural inequalities as well as a consideration of the perspective of the agent which is deeply embodied and therefore inclusive of the experience of impairment. The corporeal nature of the habitus demonstrates that the body has significant consequences in every aspect of life so that bodies, and impairment, would never be understood as separate to practice.
This thesis has also contributed to understanding the exclusion of disabled people through applying Bourdieu’s concepts of doxa and negative symbolic capital which explain how disablism and negative value are insidiously reproduced in structure, organisation, practice and beliefs, demonstrating how this mechanism of domination functions at the macro, meso and micro levels of society. Through showing how symbolic power works through bodies, I have demonstrated that psycho-emotional disablism may be thought of as the transfiguration of negative symbolic capital into a positional sense relation, showing how doxa functions as a psychic mechanism of domination. This framework acknowledges that although responses to and feelings about disability may be diverse, Bourdieu’s social theory provides a valuable way of understanding how multiple exclusionary social structures shape the lives of disabled people. This does not dismiss the heterogeneous experience of individuals but locates them within a wider framework of symbolic power. Therefore, although not everyone will perceive disability in terms of negative symbolic capital, we live in a society which is overwhelmingly organized to disadvantage and devalue disabled bodies and practice. In this respect, it emphasises the symbolic power of structure and doxic organisation which characterizes individual lives rather than the individuals who comprise the structure.

Through my discussion of how disablism is insidiously produced through doxa and how normative thought forms part of this doxic knowledge, I have also shown that normative thought is not in and of itself harmful or oppressive to disabled people, rather, it is when it accumulates with other (negative) doxic thought and becomes deeply embodied as self-evident and unreflected upon that it may produce harmful responses to disability. In this sense, I have shown that it is the mechanism of doxa which facilitates oppressive beliefs, rather than normative thinking.

**Contributions to Bourdieu**

Through showing that Bourdieu’s theory works upon a mythic non-impaired body, I have highlighted how a consideration of the impaired body in practice necessitates a more flexible understanding of the fit between habitus and
social space. Additionally, although much of his work alluded to the working of affect within the habitus it was something he left undeveloped. As such, I have also elaborated upon a psychosocial reworking of the habitus to show how practice is affectively characterised and may become understood as less mechanistic as well demonstrating that there are more appropriate ways to discuss the consciousness associated with habitus and practice. In this respect, I have shown how there may be something in between doxic practice and reflexive practice.

I have also developed his concept of negative symbolic capital. While Bourdieu discussed the various benefits associated with possessing symbolic capital, he spent considerably less time discussing the attribution and consequences of negative symbolic capital. This concept might be extended to further areas of study (for example with reference to raced, ageing or fat bodies). I have also elaborated upon Bourdieu’s concept of the hysteresis effect to show the experience of misfit and how the disjunctures between habitus and social space may provide the opportunity for us to question the status quo and that these are affectively characterised experiences which may build upon earlier unsettled feelings. Importantly, I have developed these concepts of negative symbolic capital and hysteresis as they relate to each other through the system of symbolic power, yielding an approach which provides a complex understanding of the position of disability as an entwinement of both material and symbolic relations.

**Future Research**

This thesis has been primarily concerned with the perceptions and positioning of disability, however, future research in this area should consider how disability intersects with other important aspects of our embodiment such as race, sexuality and gender and how these may mediate the perceptions, positioning and experiences of disability. In this respect, it is important to note the symbolic capitals which may negate or compound the negative symbolic capitals associated with disability.
Future research into the exclusion of disabled people might benefit from an approach which considers the combined effects of negative symbolic capitals associated with disability and the experience of hysteresis and how they are naturalised through the system of symbolic power. Using Bourdieu in the neo-liberal context allows us to *denaturalise* and assess the ubiquity of neo-liberal doxa which favours certain lifestyles, subjectivities and practices and produces systems of classification and structures which negatively position disability. This is to say that Bourdieu’s approach allows us to question and expose the presuppositions of value (the naturalisation of legitimate citizenship and practices which reduce life to a set of market values and economic relationships) which leads to the multifaceted exclusion of disabled people.
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