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**SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY  
AND  
THE REALITY OF TANZANIA**

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirement for the the awarding of  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology  
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*August 1986.*



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## SUMMARY

This sociological study deals with the historical formation of the Tanzanian socialist ideology--Ujamaa--focusing mainly on the period from 1920 to 1967. The major aspects dealt with are the systematization of the ideology of Indirect Rule or African Civilization by the colonial agents in the 1920s as a response to the forms of resistance they met; the taking over of the systematization of African Civilization by the educated Africans from the 1930s in an attempt to refute Eurocentrism and attain equality with other races; the transformation of African Civilization into Pan-Africanistic thinking; and, finally, African Socialism and the institutionalization of this ideology after the attainment of independence. The evolution of these ideas is examined within the context of social and political struggles.

It is argued that the ideology of Indirect Rule was introduced in an attempt to resolve the crisis of the "civilizing mission", given the resistance of the colonized people as a result of their lack of faith in that "mission". This ideology emerged in the context of a re-examination on the part of the colonizers of the foundations of the colonial mission as a means to break the resistance and make colonial domination effective. Consequently, they were forced to appropriate from the colonized those elements which did not contradict Westernality. In other words, they were attempting to make the colonized understand and accept the "civilizing mission" from the colonized's point of view. Thus, Indirect Rule was an expression of concrete forms of colonial capitalism, and it was a systematization of what was considered as African Civilization and African social structures.

The educated Africans, who had emerged within the colonial forms of exploitation and racial domination and had initially surrendered and adopted the colonizers' cultural forms, were also forced to rebel as a result of their rejection by the "civilization" which nurtured them. In the course of their rebellion, they set out to rediscover, restore and reassert their Africanness as a means to attain equality with the West, while at the same time refuting Eurocentism. It was the contradiction of being both black and Western which shaped their struggles and ideas. They systematized what they thought to be African Civilization, which, according to them, did not have objectives other than those of Western Civilization. They believed that this African Civilization differed from Western Civilization in terms of its social and political structures, whereby the former's were communalist. The attempt was to intermarry Western and African Civilization, and at the same time reject anything considered "communist" or "bolshevist". In content, their ideas were not different from those of Indirect Rule. These ideas were to take on socialistic and Pan-Africanist tendencies with the incorporation of developmentalist and statist British Fabian tendencies.

It is finally argued that developmentalism was the ideology of capitalism in the post-World War II period which went through various phases, and African Socialism was the particular form it took in Tanzania. The institutionalization of this ideology after independence took place within the struggles to concentrate powers in the executive arm of the state and defeat the social movements under the banner of economic development. It is also argued that, by dwelling on questions of modes of production, productive forces, economic development,

industrialization, etc., sociology of development has fallen into the trap of developmentalism and, hence, relegated to the background the questions of self-defense, self-emancipation and self-determination of the people.

## CHAPTER ONE

### General Introduction

Chapter One  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This present study is a contribution to the reappraisal of the socio-historical origins of Tanzanian' socialism (Ujamaa), a reappraisal which has become increasingly critical with the worsening of the socio-economic crisis from the late 1970s. An attempt is made to answer some fresh questions thrown up by the socio-political reality of the country, and the period covered is 1920 to 1967. The study, also attempts a reconstruction of historical processes to demonstrate the empirical reality/non-reality of the dominant theories and practices of development in third world social formations. Tanzania's political trajectory, its political ideology which was committed to the modernization of the country, and the personality of its first president, Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere "excited and fuelled hopes of many nationalists in Africa, and humanists, liberals and socialists in other parts of the world"<sup>2</sup> in the late 1960s and 1970s. It is in this sense that the study of the dominant ideology in Tanzania forms a very interesting test case for examination of established accounts on development, given that by the second half of the 1970s critiques of the policies and the ideology pursued by the country were already developing as a result of the socio-economic crisis.

The justification of this study is that, "although the past does not change the present does; each generation asks questions of the past, and finds new areas of sympathy as it relives different aspects of the predecessors."<sup>3</sup> The account and character of this study, however, makes no claim to the dignity of the scholarship and skills of professional historians. This is despite the large element of primary research



involved. The account is mainly thematic, and it is only the argument which is historiographical. This study falls under what is increasingly becoming known as historical sociology.

However, before proceeding any further, it is important briefly to survey the circumstances which have brought about this dialogue with the past.

### 1.1 *The Problem Area*

With the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration in February 1967, Tanzania committed herself to build an egalitarian socialist society. This socialism was to be built on the foundation of Tanzania's past, and on her own design without importation of "any foreign ideology" but on her "own roots" by emphasizing certain characteristics of her "traditional organization, and extending them to embrace the possibilities of modern technology and enable" Tanzanians "to meet the challenge of life in the twentieth century world."<sup>4</sup> Underlying the Declaration was the assumption that Tanzanian society mainly consisted of workers and peasants--that feudalism and capitalism had not developed to the extent of endangering socialist endeavours. In regard to the countryside, it was noted that people still had a choice to work for themselves or for others. While, therefore, it seemed unnecessary to worry about capitalist development in the countryside--whose implications would be obvious with the emergence of land shortages it was the case in the fertile and well watered areas--it was pointed out that:

...The small capitalist agriculture we now have is not really a danger; but our feet are on the wrong path, and if we continue to encourage or even help the development of agricultural capitalism, we shall never become a socialist state. On the

contrary we shall be continuing the break-up of the traditional concepts of human equality based on sharing all necessities of life and the universal obligation to work.<sup>5</sup>

Following the Arusha Declaration, some of the Government's major public policies were: curtailment of the practices among leaders to have more than one source of income and to be associated with capitalist or feudalist practices by the introduction of a leadership code; nationalization of some of the major means of production and exchange (including industries, banks, insurance companies, buildings, major trading firms, and plantations and estates); encouragement of workers' participation in the management of enterprises by 1971; encouragement of peasants to form Ujamaa (communal) villages and their villageization in 1974/75 and introduction of village governments; abolition of local governments in 1972 in favour of extension of Government control to the local levels by decentralization; and abolition of cooperative movements in 1975 in favour of the Government controlled marketing boards. This socialism emphasized rural development, under the premise that the vast majority of Tanzanians worked on the land. Socialism was viewed in terms of a developmental strategy--as the only road to development, given that the capitalist road would entail dependence on foreign capitalism.<sup>6</sup>

It was with the beginning of the socio-economic crisis in 1973/74, the quashing by the state of the workers' attempts to take over the capitalist enterprises and control them and also the fight against bureaucratic tendencies in 1970/71,<sup>7</sup> and the forcible villagization of the peasants in 1974/75,<sup>8</sup> that critiques of the policies and the ideology pursued by the country began to be generated. This criticism focused mainly on the outcomes of the socialist moves, centering on the

socio-economic crisis. The symptoms of the crisis were: a gap in the balance of payments, low utilization of industrial capacity, shortage of essential consumer goods, a fall in food produce in the market, a fall in the production of export crops, inflation, and the falling of the general living conditions of the working people.<sup>9</sup>

Broadly, most critics tended to regard the policies and the ideology pursued by the country as the root-cause of the crisis in terms of either their unscientific nature, or success in retarding the development of capitalism and hence progress and the "failure to capture the peasant" for development purposes. Those who did not criticize them contended that the crisis was a result of natural and economic factors--terms of trade in the world market, economic and technological dependence, surplus transfer to the imperialist countries, droughts, management crisis, lack of good implementation of the policies, etc.<sup>10</sup> Tied to these explanations of the crisis, the historical formation of Ujamaa ideology was regarded in terms of its being a product of: (1) a move by the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" to wrangle with the economic power dominantly in the hands of the "Asian commercial bourgeoisie", and hence its petty bourgeois nature and rejection of the proletarian ideology;<sup>11</sup> (2) Tanzania's failure to receive massive investments for industrialization and its failure to modernize the rural areas: it was a development strategy;<sup>12</sup> (3) an attempt to hoodwink the working people in order to prevent them from rising against exploitation and make them favourably disposed to the leaders for development purposes: this explains why Tanzania became more dependent internationally after the Arusha Declaration;<sup>13</sup> (4) it was a result of the union in 1964 between Tanganyika and Zanzibar as the United Republic of Tanzania. Zanzibar had

radical elements which influenced the move;<sup>14</sup> and (5) the personal initiative of Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere. It is genuine and all it lacked was committed implementors.<sup>15</sup>

The above explanations of the problems of the dominant ideology in Tanzania and its historical emergence are based on the specifics of the political programmes and their outcome before and after the Arusha Declaration or the personality of the individual: ideology is read from economics and its functional role. The underlying assumptions are that ideologies have an ability to generate or not to generate economic development, or to legitimize or not to legitimize a regime in power. In other words, it is assumed that ideologies have their independent material efficacy. In Bienen's formulation:

Elites in the new states consciously try to devise formulas by which they can bridge the gap between themselves and non-elites. Ideologies are created to legitimize rule and also to intergrate traditionally and non-traditionally oriented communities. Elites who are indeed oriented towards economic development must find formulas which act as ideology for development. When a radical transformation of society is undertaken, extraordinary claims are made on the population. The norms of the state bureaucracy are insufficient to provide an 'ideological grease' for development in a society which has intergrative problems and which must undertake a big push in order to overcome backwardness.<sup>16</sup>

In other words, what is dominant in the above explanations is the functionalist problematic.

Central to the structural functionalist problematic are concepts such as systems, sub-systems, elements and structures. Systems are governed by 'value systems'; and when the structural differentiation in a system gives rise to disequilibrium and hence dissatisfaction, this should be rectified by introduction of higher non-economic functional factors: i.e. political arrangements, superior values and even the use

of the police and the army. If all this prove futile, then more refined new ideas or institutions should be introduced so as to bring back the system to normal, and hence enhance development and productivity.<sup>17</sup> That is:

Every social system is governed by a value system which specifies the nature of the system, its goals, and the means of attaining these goals. A social system's first functional requirement is to preserve the integrity of the value system itself and assure that individual actors conform to it. This involves the socialization and educating [of] individuals, as well as providing tension-control mechanisms for handling and resolving individual disturbances relating to the values.<sup>18</sup>

### 1.2 *Significance of the Problem and the Argument*

This tendency to see the primacy of ideologies/value systems in processes has been quite widespread. Frantz Fanon, for example, saw the absence of ideology as the greatest peril facing Africa.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, one of the founders of African socialism, viewed the problems of neo-colonial balkanization and lack of unity and development in terms of a lack of a "steadying ideology".<sup>20</sup> A cult was born in the Soviet Union in the 1920s: the Party was the history maker as it was the embodiment of correct ideas, and the "superstructure" was reduced to conforming or legitimizing the "economic base".<sup>21</sup> For Gramsci, the October Revolution had opened up new possibilities theoretically: it was a revolution against Marx's *Capital* which strengthened the importance of the necessity to develop class consciousness so as to combat bourgeois culture.<sup>22</sup> Lucacs claimed, "*the strength of every society is in the last resort a spiritual strength. And from this we can be liberated by knowledge*" which is "practical critical activity".<sup>23</sup> In the last two decades Althusser came out with the conception of ideology and

Ideological State Apparatuses, and how ideologies are imposed upon their passive recipients through schools, churches, parties, trade unions, etc, so that behaviour is regulated and the productive forces and relations of production are reproduced. In sum. ideologies impose upon individuals the "imaginary relationship...to the real conditions of existence." The state produces an ideology and the masses follow it. Ideology is a certain instance of practice which becomes effective by application.<sup>24</sup>

In a nutshell, there has been a derailment of the ideologies from their material foundation historically--from the foundation which gives them their power or pertinence. The tendency has been to bow to the idealist conception of history which regards ideologies as having an independent material efficacy. With such a conception of history, it is plans, policies, ideologies; and productive forces, industrialization, modes of production, productivity, etc, which make history, rather than people in the process of transforming circumstances and themselves, a process in which people produce material goods and ideas and reproduce themselves. Logically, it has been people with scientific or 'correct' ideas/ideologies, planners, modernizing agents, entrepreneurs, cadres, professionals, prophets, bureaucrats, leaders, etc, who are the agents of that history making process. It is in this context that one of the left-wing critics of Tanzanian ideology argued:

To begin with, it should be noted that what is at issue is not scientific socialism of Marxism-Leninism, but a Fabian or evolutionary socialism or, a Gotha Program of socialism...revolution is rejected for evolution; class struggle is repudiated; there is no conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>25</sup>

This means that ideologies are examined in terms of their scientificity or lack of it, and by their coherence, consistency and ability to achieve the desired goals, i.e. economic development.

But in essence, to examine ideologies, philosophies, policies, plans, strategies, etc, is to examine people in their social and political relations as they actively produce materially, that is "the connection of the social and political structure with production" and how the social structure and the state continually evolve out of their life process, within which ideas, conceptions, forms of consciousness are produced--both correct and incorrect.<sup>26</sup> That is, ideologies cannot be read directly from the modes of production: it is people, and not modes of production who make history. Mendelsohn has correctly observed that:

It is not enough to correlate a set of ideas with one social group or class and believe therefore that a social basis has been established. Historians have to delve more deeply and recognize the historical process which lay behind the explanations of the social group itself. They must examine the activities in which this group is engaged which in turn could make use of the ideas and techniques in question. Because social imperatives are not uniform for all times, places, and groups within a society, historians must attempt to identify specific activities and imperatives.<sup>27</sup>

It is the importance of this consideration which will be demonstrated by this study.

So far, ideology in Tanzania has been highly personalized in terms of the head of state and the "governing class" in collaboration with foreign interests, or seen in terms of purely economic/development aspects and the question of legitimacy. Thus while in the numerous studies on Tanzania, the existence of some processes such as, the differentiation of the peasants, the exploitative mechanisms,

transformation of the communities by colonialism and the bureaucracy, has correctly been examined; no attempt has been made to examine the class formations in relation to the struggles, unities, alliances, and this related to the particular way in which the ideology of Ujamaa emerged. The method of studying ideologies has been objectivist: simply showing them as a product of certain antecedents, rather than examining the social and political struggles which created the circumstances which made it possible for the ideology to emerge.

While modes of production/economies, forms of exploitation, industrialization, etc, are important aspects in the examination of ideologies, one needs to transcend them and examine the struggles of the social groups, their victories, defeats, transformations into each other, alliances, etc, and how within these relationships ideas are produced, transformed and systematized as ideologies in the minds of the intelligentsia:

Modes of production define/organize economic formations of a society. Contradictions defining modes of exploitation of those formations are the motive force of their history. Modes of production specify the fundamental contradiction (forces of production vs relations of production) and the principal contradiction (the exploiting class vs the exploited class). Very briefly, class struggles, determined by modes of production, taking place through economic formations (around modes of exploitation), political formations (around forms of hegemony) are the motive forces of their history of a class divided society.<sup>28</sup>

Broadly, the evolution, the systematization and belief in the magical power of ideology in the process of development and finally, its institutionalization after independence in Tanzania, is best grasped as part of the reality of a predatory, destructive imperialist domination, which as a despotic and totalitarian phenomenon involved the economic, political, cultural and psychological subjugation of Africans; and the



struggles of Africans against it. Colonialism attempted the negation of African cultures as an expression of real material domination and Africans defended themselves within the context of material resistance.<sup>29</sup>

The colonial ideologies of national oppression which regarded Africans as a people who belonged to the "child races" of the world, devoid of history, culture or ideology were radically changed with the crisis of the "civilizing mission" after the First World War. This was due to the threats posed by the working masses in Tanzania as a result of their lack of faith in the "civilizing mission" due to the War and the sufferings it had caused, and the general disillusionment with it among some circles in Europe itself. The colonialists, as a result of this, were forced to re-examine the foundation of their mission, and in the process they appropriated from their subjects those elements which would make the civilizing mission effective, and break the resistance. This was to find its expression in the attempts to create a "good African" who would be proud of being an African and proud of his heritage, at the same time participating in the internal and external markets and acquiring a sense of individual property without losing his sense of community. This aspect culminated in the systematization of African Civilization by Europeans and the introduction of the famous Indirect Rule in the 1920s as an attempt at creating an African Civilization stimulated by European culture and example. African civilization as systematized by colonialists was essentially colonialist, and was an expression of concrete forms of colonial capitalist production, given the particular forms of resistance they had to pacify.

The African intelligentsia who emerged within the colonial forms of exploitation and oppression as a product of manual/mental division of labour, had initially surrendered and adopted the colonizers culture. The paradox is that, they were regarded even more disdainfully by Europeans than the uneducated because of their tendency to regard themselves as equal to their masters after acquiring a sense of Western culture. Thus, the African intelligentsia was an outcast: alienated from the peoples' resistance against domination and exploitation and denied a place in the civilized circles as a result of the colonial paternal relations of domination. Disillusionment set in and a journey back to the roots began. For these civilized Africans, the rediscovery, restoration and reassertion of their own selves became the only means to attain equality with the West. It was in this context that they began to question the essence of Western civilization, and in the process came to the conclusion that to be civilized was to be African and proud of the heritage. They too began to systematize what they considered to be African Civilization, the very term coined by the Europeans after the First World War. This Civilization was to be based on African social, political and economic structures, while picking the best from Western civilization, i.e. technology.

This development began in the 1930s. It was the contradiction of being both black and Western which made them become self-conscious, and inevitably critical of the West. They were not non-Western, nor enemies of the West; and in that context, they were not sympathetic to the communists who were enemies of the West. They were for racial harmony because they too believed they had something to contribute to world civilization. Their ideas were fundamentally similar to the ideas of the

colonialists on African Civilization. In other words, the civilized African had been liberated by the master's attempt to co-opt some of the cultural elements of the oppressed, and this liberation was displayed by the radical aspects of African Civilization against the West, but on the other hand it signalled the victory of the civilizing mission: the civilized African had accepted and internalized the view that his own world outlook had no other objectives than those of Western civilization.

In the 1940s, these conceptions were to be coupled with the demands for the country to be developed and modernized quickly by the government and for more education for Africans. By this time the educated had established connections with the Fabian Colonial Bureau, and were integrating the statist ideas of Fabianism in conceptions of African Civilization. By the second half of the 1940s, these ideas had acquired a Pan-Africanist character with a heavy emphasis on the modernization of the country. With independence, the educated in Tanzania defined poverty, disease and ignorance as the enemies of the people; and as bearers of the ideology of development in power, the task was to perfect the state machinery as a tool for fighting against these three enemies. The state and its institutions were taken as the instruments through which the ideology could be effected and unity among the people achieved for development purposes. African Socialism, became the name of this ideology of development; within this ideology, society had to be rescued from those conflicts, characteristic of the Western capitalist societies, if development was to be attained: and this was possible only if there was consensus; a principle embodied in the state. Accordingly, for all this to take place, it was necessary for the civil society to

lose its independence ; and hence the erosion or total control by the government of the mass and political organizations, leaving the working people defenseless vis á vis capital and the state. This is because, in reality, the state is not neutral, nor is it simply an instrument: it is a real force within social relations

Thus the struggles after independence were not merely ideological; rather they were part of real material struggles, within which the intelligentsia used state power to defeat the workers and peasants, in the earnest belief that they were trying to emancipate the whole people from backwardness and class conflicts. Socialist ideology was an integral part of those struggles in which the working people were finally defeated.

That is how matters are in the broadest terms.

NOTES

1. Unless otherwise stated, Tanzania in this study refers to the mainland of the of the country only. It was called German East Africa (with nicknames such as Bundu, Nyika and Safariland) until 1919, and was given the name Tanganyika after that. The latter was subsequently changed to Tanzania in 1964 after the union with Zanzibar.
2. Robin Cohen, in Preface to D.Bolton's *Nationalization: A Road to Socialism?* Zed Press, London, 1985. For more about this information, see Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, pp.226-7; and, B.U. Mwansasu & C. Pratt (eds), *Towards Socialism in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1979.
3. C. Hill, *The world Turned Upside down*, Penguin, Ayres Bury, 1978, p.15. In the same spirit, Michael Banton in *The idea of Race* (Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, p.3) writes: "As people can understand their history only through the concepts of their own time, it is continuously necessary to rewrite history in the light of new concerns and understandings. Equally, people interpret their own time in the light of their beliefs about the past, and if they misunderstand the past they cannot properly understand their present. In human affairs there is a continuous inter-relation between the present and the past which is reflected in all social sciences...."
4. J.K. Nyerere, Introduction to *Freedom and Socialism*, OUP, Nairobi, 1976, p.2
5. "Socialism and Rural Development", in *ibid*, p.344
6. This aspect is in the "Arusha Declaration", and also "The Rational Choice", in *ibid*.
7. For an account of these struggles, see Coulson, *op cit*; Issa Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1976; P. Mhoyo, "The struggles for Workers' control in Tanzania", *Review of African Political Economy*, No 4 pp.62-85; and W.E. Mkufya, *The Wicked Walk*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1977. (a novel).
8. See Coulson, *ibid*; Shivji, *ibid*; M.von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a social Experiment*, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1979; and C.G. Mung'ong'o, *Njozi Iliyopotea*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1980. (a novel)
9. Some of the details of the socio-economic crisis are pointed out in the concluding remarks of this work. For this aspect see: C.S.L. Chachage, "The Development of Urban Capitalism in Tanzania (With an example of Arusha Town)", M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, (unpublished); ILO, *Basic Needs in Danger: A Basic Needs Oriented Development Strategy for Tanzania*, Addis Ababa, 1982; K.S.P. Rwegasira and L.A.

Kannevorff (eds), *Inflation in Tanzania (Causes effects, and control)*, Institute of Finance and Management, Dar es Salaam, 1980; J.K. Nyerere, *Five Years of CCM Government*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam 1982; Ellen E. Hanak, "The Balance of Payments Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons for Survival Strategy", ERB, University of Dar es Salaam, Paper NO 82.1, 1982.

10. Examples of studies which have viewed the problem in terms of the unscientific nature of the ideology are: Claude Ake, "Ideology and Objective conditions", in J.D. Barkan & J.J. Okumu (eds), *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979; Issa Shivji, op cit, Issa Shivji, *The Silent Class Struggle*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1972; and A.M. Babu, *African Socialism or Socialist Africa?* TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1981. Literature on retarded capitalism is mostly based on the critique of Dependency school by Bill Warren. Most characteristic in these arguments on Tanzania is Susanne Mueller in her: "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania" (*The Socialist Register*, 1980), The historical origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class" (*Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 15(3), 1981), and "Barriers to further Development of Capitalism in Tanzania: The Case of Tobacco" (*Capital and Class*, 1982). Others, in more or less the same spirit are: J. Shao, "Theories of Underdevelopment and Imperialism: Charles Bettelheim or the Comedy of Errors", in Y.Tandon (ed), *University of Dar es Salaam Debate on Class, State & Imperialism*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1982; J.Shao, "Democracy in Africa: Problems and Prospects", Syracuse University, New York, 1982, (mimeo); and Candid Scope, "Honest to my Country," T.M.P. Tabora, 1981. Most Characteristic in the uncaptured peasant thesis is Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured peasantry in Tanzania*, Heinemann, London, 1980. Those who adhere to the position that the crisis is a result of natural and economic factors are: J.K. Nyerere, *Five Years of CCM Government*, op cit; Rwegasira & Kannevorff (ed), op cit; Pratt & Mwansasu (eds), op cit; Ahmed Mohiddin, *African socialism in Two countries*, Croom Helm, London, 1981.
11. Shivji, 1976, ibid.
12. See Ake, op cit; W.E. Clark, *Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania, 1964-1973*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1978; L. Cliffe and G.L. Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and settlement Experience in Tanzania" in L. Cliffe & J. Saul (eds), *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol 2, BAPH, Nairobi, 1973; R.Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment*, Gower Publishing Co Ltd, Hampshire, 1982; and Goran Hyden, op cit.
13. See Ake, op cit; Also L.B.Y. Mbogoni, "Self reliance as a Strategy for the Developing Countries: Problems and Prospects", History Department, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, (mimeo). On the trends of foreign aid in the 1970s, see for example, Liz Kleemeier, "Tanzanian Policy Towards Foreign Assistance in Rural

- Development: Insights Drawn from a Study of Regional Intergrated Development Programs", in *Taamuli* Vol 12, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1982.
14. See in H. Bienen, *Tanzania Party Transformation and Economic Development*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1967, pp.223-4. Also in *Kenya Weekly News*, 17th February 1967. The most known radicals from Zanzibar were by then the two Marxists: K. Hanga and A.M. Babu.
  15. For this, see Introduction to Pratt and Mwansasu (eds), op cit; J. Saul and G. Arrighi in "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", in Saul and Cliffe (eds), op cit, p.3. assert that much as Tanzania's development is charted by the evolution of President Nyerere's "own thinking" from African socialist themes to socialist "attitude of mind" in the 1962 paper "to a more subtle assessment of African realities; by and large it has not arisen from any consorted group or mass pressure. But the relatively unchallenged acceptance of certain accompanying party policies...attainment of widespread ideological conformity to novel socialist aspirations do testify, in some measure, to the 'relative autonomy and plasticity' of African leadership cadre."
  16. Bienen, op cit, p.203. As far as the centrality of policies and ideologies in the Dependency school is concerned, an example so obvious is furnished by James Mittelman's *Ideology and Politics in Uganda* (Cornell University Press, London, 1975, p.17). According to him, the fundamental dilemma in the third world countries is Dependency which is a particular form of domination and subordination whose "defining characteristic is vulnerability--the inability of a collectivity to determine its response to social forces within the world economic order. This inability limits the structure of political choice." Given the features of Dependency, the study of ideologies in Africa should emphasize the role of the "political elite". This is because "the common man provides the target for the propagation of an ideology, but the elites represent its source and present concentration." Political consciousness is not widespread, and people do not select ideology: they approve or disapprove "what the elites put forward". Thus when a modernising ideology is introduced, the nascent proletariat and the peasantry embrace or reject the leader's attempts to induce political consciousness and thereby determine the ideologies' success or failure."
  17. N.J. Smelser, *Social Change in Industrial Revolution*, London, p.180, cited by E.P. Thompson, *The poverty of Theory*, Merlin Press, London, 1980, p.269. Also see N.J. Smelser, *The Sociology of Economic Life*, Englewood Cliffs, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  18. N.J. Smelser, *Social Change....*, p.16, in *ibid*.
  19. Frantz Fanon, *Towards the African Revolution*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1967, p.186.

20. Kwame Nkrumah, "African Revolution Revisited", *African Forum* I No 3, 1966. Immanuel Wallerstein in "African Unity Reassessed", (*African Report*, VI, No 4, 1966) also expressed the worry that Africa was characterised by the absence of a coherent ideology.
21. See for example in J. Stalin, *Marxism and Linguistics*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Peking, 1968. For a criticism of this aspect see Thompson, op cit.
22. See A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1973. By Capital, Gramsci meant Marx's book and not capital in the sense of bourgeois property.
23. G. Lucacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, Merlin Press, London, 1971, p.229.
24. See in L. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy*, New Left Books, London, 1977.
25. Ake, 1979, op cit, p.123. For a similar view, see Babu, op cit.
26. For this argument, see K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, Collected Works Vol.5, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1976. The same view also is found in K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975.
27. Everett Mendelsohn, "The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge" in E. Mendelsohn, P. Weingart & R. Whitley (eds), *The Social Production of Scientific Knowledge*, D. Reidel Publishing Co. Boston, 1977, p.7.
28. E. Wamba dia Wamba, "Is there a way out of the 'Bureaucrat Corruption' Process of the Zairean Underdevelopment? An Extended Review of D.J. Gould's Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire", History Department, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, p.9. (mimeo)
29. See E. Wamba dia Wamba, "Philosophers in Africa: Challenges of the African Philosopher", History Department, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983 (mimeo)



## CHAPTER TWO

### Tanganyika Prior to British Rule

Chapter Two  
TANGANYIKA PRIOR TO BRITISH RULE

It is necessary to deal with some aspects of pre-1920 Tanganyika which have a direct bearing on what will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. The reason for this lies in the fact that the developments that took place in Tanzania after 1920 are inextricably bound up with the developments that took place in the nineteenth century pre-European colonial period and the German colonial period (1885-1916). It is the nature of the social formation found by the British in 1917 which shaped the particular forms of contradictions, struggles and the forms of colonial capitalism under British rule.

The objective in this chapter is to show generally the evolution of commodity production, the establishment of the colonial state and some of the changes that took place under German rule. The exposition commences with the evolution of commodity production, because, "for the bourgeois society, the commodity-form, of the product of labour or the value-form of the commodity, is the economic cell-form".<sup>1</sup> Given the nature of the available evidence initially the focus is mainly on trade or market formation and development of exchange in general, rather than production and this is especially the case with the pre-European colonial period. The reason is, while it is not difficult to obtain evidence about trade between the East African Coast and Asia for thousands of years, this is not the case with the facts on changing forms of production in the interior of the country. Therefore, the forms of production are designated from exchange, which is taken as an indicator. After all:

...the so-called exchange between dealers and dealers is by its very organization entirely determined by production, as well as being itself a producing activity. Exchange appears independent

of and indifferent to production only in the final phase where the product is exchanged for consumption. But (1) there is no exchange without division of labour, whether the latter is spontaneous, natural, or already a product of historical development; (2) private exchange presupposes private production; (3) the intensity of exchange, as well as its extension and its manner, are determined by the development and structure of production. For example. Exchange between town and country; exchange in the country, in towns etc. Exchange in all its moments thus appears as either directly comprised in production or determined by it.<sup>2</sup>

This recognition of the interdependence of exchange and production refutes the Eurocentric view which traced the origins of the markets in East Africa from outside through a process of diffusion.<sup>3</sup>

## 2.1 *Evolution of Commodity Production*

Literary evidence left by Arabs, Persians, Babylonians, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, Indonesians, Chinese, Indians and even the East African feudal merchants suggest that there was a wide variety of seafaring people who crossed the Indian Ocean and traded with *Rhapta* and other unidentified harbours. *Rhapta* has been variously identified as Dar es Salaam, Kilwa, Pangani, or Msasani. The records show that overseas merchants had established beach heads along the East African coast as far back as two thousand years ago. *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, written by a Greek ship pilot suggests that there was already trade between East Africa and India by the first millenium A.D.. By that time, merchant capital began to penetrate the interior of the coast through local agents, and in that process hooked up with the pre-existing Long Distance Trade in the interior. Gold from Zimbabwe had long ago reached the coast through Sofala and later on Kilwa. By the ninth and tenth century A.D. there had already emerged a Swahili society with an

identifiable culture, which utilized the Arabic script in the written forms.<sup>4</sup>

Ibn Batuta, an Arab traveller, reported in 1331 about the prosperity of the coastal towns of East Africa, and one of them was Kilwa. The East African coast prospered as a source of ivory, tortoise shell, rhino horn, coconut, gold, mangrove poles and grains. By 1505, when the Portuguese arrived in Kilwa, they found the town flourishing because of the coastal economy which rested on agriculture, fishing and commerce. There were already men of property who owned agricultural slaves and boats for trade. The villages in the outskirts of the town produced food for the town and for export. Other towns in existence by the time of the arrival of the Portuguese were Bagamoyo, Lamu, Mombasa, Sofala, Mogadishu, etc.<sup>5</sup>

Not much is reported about the interior, where most of the traded goods came from. From the scanty evidence, there was already a marked division of labour and trading patterns which made it possible for the coastal towns to flourish. For example, some recent excavations have established the production of man-made iron in Kagera region (Bukoba) dating as far back as 500 B.C.<sup>6</sup> By the eighteenth and nineteenth century, there were blacksmiths in every community in Tanzania; and according to some explorers' reports, the implements which were forged and traded throughout the regional network were "hoes, spears, assegais, arrow heads, battle axes, hatchets, knives and daggers, sickles and razors, rings and wire circlets." Bells were also manufactured for sale to pastoralists, and pipes with iron bowls and stems and all kinds of pincers or pliers.<sup>7</sup> These aspects are best summarised in a discussion on a thesis put forward in 1940 by Fröhlich:

Frühlich's thesis was built on a massive compilation of anthropological material from numerous tribes across the continent, supplemented by travellers' accounts from the same areas. To this material is now being added the emerging archeological evidence that confirms the movement of commodities over large distances as part of the cultural totality of the continent dating back to early iron age. In a review which includes a part of Tanganyika in its source material, Fagan has claimed that the demand of metallurgists and farmers led to 'contacts between communities living up to several hundred miles apart...[and] developed into complicated barter networks extending over enormous areas.'<sup>9</sup>

The forms of division of labour which existed by the end of the eighteenth century were to some extent quite elaborate, in some instances extending beyond sexual and age divisions: there were also porters, basket weavers, cotton weavers, craftsmen (and master craftsmen in guild like units protected by magic) and professional hunters. These divisions of labour and the unequal endowment and distribution of raw materials (for example, clay, iron, copper, salt, etc.) explain the emergence of the trading centres in the interior.<sup>9</sup>

Slave labour had been employed in the East African Coast for many centuries; but its demand in the market begun in the end of the eighteenth century with the establishment of sugar and coffee plantations in the Mascarene Islands in the Indian Ocean and demand for domestic slaves in Oman. This demand for slaves in the market increased further by 1800 with the establishment of clove plantations in Zanzibar. But by 1820s supply of slaves for the French and Oman demands was on the decline. This was because of the increased demand for slaves internally for the coastal economies and also the anti-slaverly campaign by Britain. Unlike in West Africa, slave trade in East Africa had begun at a time when it was on the decline on the world scale and demand for

raw materials and creation of markets was the main concern of world capitalism, as a result of the industrial revolution.

The Sultan of Oman, Seyyid Said, moved his capital and hence state structures to Zanzibar in 1832 so as to strengthen his stronghold on the East African Coast and inland. This was because of the increasing importance of the East African plantations and business centres. But more important was the fact that after the defeat of the Portuguese in the East African Coast by 1700 by the East African feudal merchants in alliance with the Omanites, the latter's colonization of the territory had not been very successful due to the resistance of the coastal Swahili ruling houses for two hundred years.<sup>10</sup> The interest of the Omanites was in the establishment of plantations, business centres, slave recruitment posts and markets for goods. All these interests were engendered by the world market, and hence the shifting of the capital by Seyyid Said "in order to consolidate 'his overseas territory' for commerce and agriculture (based on slave labour)."<sup>11</sup> Slave trade for the purpose of export was not rampant in the last century as it is often purported to have been. The 1822, 1845, 1850 and 1860 legal arrangements reflect the economic demand within East Africa, whereby:

'All concessions relating to the export of slaves outside East Africa were granted with little resistance on the part of the Sultan. The implication is that Zanzibar authorities were decreasingly interested in the foreign slave trade which was not considered worth defying the British about.'<sup>12</sup>

By the dawn of the nineteenth century, trade had expanded further in the East African towns which had been handling all the caravans of the unknown inland due to European conquest of Asia. Zanzibar and Kilwa were being transformed into metropolitan satellites, and this period was marked by more greater transformations of Tanganyika "Than any other

region of Tropical Africa at the time...."<sup>13</sup> By the second half of the nineteenth century, the major exports were: raw materials--gum, ivory, copal, wild rubber, etc; and, staple foods such as grains, cattle for meat, and sugar. Ivory which was originally exported to India for manufacturing bangles experienced a greater demand in this period due to demand in Europe for the manufacture of ivory combs, billiard balls and piano keys.<sup>14</sup>

From the coast to the interior, besides a host of lesser trade routes, there were three major ones: the Kilwa-Lake Nyasa in the south; the Bagamoyo-Nyamwezi-Sumbwa-Ujiji up to Katanga and Buganda in the centre; and, the Tanga-Pangani in the North. The complexity of nineteenth century Tanganyika consists in the fact that the bulk of the goods that were traded mostly rested on hunting and gathering of natural products. As a result of this, there was demand for: porters to carry ivory, food to feed the porters, tools to grow food and iron to make tools. Consequently, more communities were incorporated in specialization and the expansion of trade networks.

By the nineteenth century, permanent markets had already emerged in Ujiji, Amboni, Umba, Usambara, Upare, Uchagga, Uhehe, Usafwa, etc. The currencies used in exchange ranged from cowrie shells, products like salt, to coins--mainly the Austrian dollar and Indian pice. Coins were in circulation in the coastal towns and hinterland villages and some areas in the interior. For example, chief Rumanyika of Karagwe accepted notes; and the Swahili merchant Tippu Tip "secured about £1,000 in this way in Ubena in the early 1860s."<sup>15</sup> In the 1880s, Zanzibar as a major entrepot was second only to Brazil in the supply of rubber in the world market.<sup>16</sup>

Alongside the use of slave labour among the coastal *waungwana* (free gentlemen), Wasukuma, Wanyamwezi, Wagogo, Wahehe, etc, for the plantations established in some of the areas, there also had emerged entrepreneurs who were specializing in agriculture in the central caravan route, among the Wanyamwezi and Wagogo as suppliers of food. There were many families in Unyanyembe "which employed men or bought slaves to assist in grain production so that they would benefit from the soaring prices."<sup>17</sup> Some of these entrepreneurs resulted from the branching off of merchant capital into production in response to new market opportunities, and also some of them from being pushed out of trade by Asian merchant capital. The entrepreneurs of Tabora were called *wandewa*. Some of these entrepreneurs, according to Iliffe, had started introducing innovations in agricultural systems towards the dawn of the German colonial era, and one such entrepreneur in the coast was Sheikh Ramiya, an ex-slave in Bagamoyo, who was the major exporter of copra which was a purely export crop.<sup>18</sup>

Coupled with these trading activities and the new economic activities in general was the settlement of Asians in Tanganyika since the second half of the eighteenth century. Although Asians began to trade with East Africa much earlier, the earliest arrivals for permanent settlement date back only to the 1770s in Zanzibar. It was this section of the Indians which formed the nucleus around which the present mercantile Indian community developed, and their economic role which was to characterise them during the rest of the nineteenth century was more or less defined from their early time of settlement.<sup>19</sup> The Indians started displacing the Arab and Swahili traders, and turned the latter into plantation owners or forced them to the interior as caravan



owners. Indians also later expanded into plantation and caravan ownership as creditors and financiers:

.. Their commercial activities included customs collection, financing and outfitting caravans, banking and money lending, agricultural financing and marketing, real estate, shipping and exporting within the Indian ocean, and wholesale and retail trade....As European commercial interests expanded in Zanzibar, the Asian merchants assumed middlemen roles as merchants/brokers for the American, French, British and German importers, exporters and shippers.<sup>20</sup>

From 200 Asians in 1818, their number rose to 5,000 by 1860. By mid-nineteenth century Asians were scattered in the coastal areas and right up in the interior "where European explorers found 'dukas' (indian shops) set up in important points along the trade routes."<sup>21</sup> There were 230 Asians in Kilwa, 191 in Bagamoyo, 105 in Dar es Salaam, 80 in Tanga, and 2,550 in Zanzibar by 1871. The most powerful Asian capitalist in the 1860s was Taria Topan of Zanzibar, who financed the majority of the famous traders, including Tippu Tip and Rumliza. Asians also virtually controlled the technical, clerical and auditing jobs in the Sultan's colonial administration by 1880s.<sup>22</sup> Their capital was generated from business with Europeans, Arabs and Africans.

When the German chartered trading company--Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (DOAG) or the German East African Company--took over the administration of Tanganyika in 1885, it "could not compete with Arab or with Indian financiers who knew the country, relied on extensive networks of kinsmen, were willing to take high risks."<sup>23</sup> The local merchant capitalist had the upper hand in the economy in general up to 1900, and this was because all the exports were initially traditional exports, i.e. goods that had been being exported before the invasion of the country by the Germans.

As a result of the functioning of merchant capital and its branching to other activities, besides slave labour being employed, there were also some forms of wage labour, mostly paid in kind, in existence before 1880. Wage labour was being used by the entrepreneurs discussed above, traders, missionaries and European companies. The majority of these labourers were employed by the caravans, and they consisted mainly of the Wasukuma and Wanyamwezi. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 Wanyamwezi went to the coast as porters every year in the second half of the last century, and Bagamoyo had around 30,000 to 40,000 porters. Trade caravan portage was the first form of existence of migrant labour which was already widespread by 1880s as in the colonial period, and "unskilled labourers in Tanga in the late 1880s earned about thirteen shillings a month. Thirty years later they would earn roughly the same, and only a few shillings more."<sup>24</sup> Finally, there were also "masons, carpenters, secretaries--who found paid employment with chiefs."<sup>25</sup>

Two major processes took place in the economic sphere with the establishment of German colonialism: (1) The reordering of the economy into a German colonial economy within the general interests of raw material extraction, monopoly of the market and export of capital; with the former two being more dominant. (2) The taking over of some of the nineteenth century structures, for example, communication routes (the railway lines and most roads built during the colonial period followed the trade routes), the employment of migrant labour and the export of commodities which were already being produced--rubber, coffee (which was being produced in Bukoba for many years before German colonization), etc. The changes which took place under German colonialism are best

discussed under the state forms which were established, an aspect dealt with in the next section.

## *2.2 Establishment of the Colonial state*

The Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Germany granted protection to the East African Territory--Tanganyika in February 1885 after being pressurised by the merchants and industrialists who were facing stiff competition from British and French companies. Although Germany had been trading with East Africa since 1847 and her industrial revolution begun in the early 1870s, by the time of the Congo Conference (Berlin Conference) which ended up in the partition of Africa, she still believed in free trade and regarded colonies as a burden. The decision was provoked by Carl Peters and his friends who had formed a society for colonization and had obtained 12 fraudulent treaties from Tanganyika.

The objective needs of the imperialist bourgeoisie underlying the colonial ventures in the end of the nineteenth century--i.e. the exploitation of people and resources, were summed up in the following words of one of the greatest advocates and builders of the British empire, Cecil Rhodes:

I was in the East-End of London yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 'bread', 'bread', and on my way home I pondered over the same and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism....My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e. in order to serve the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and the mines. The empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war you must become an imperialist.<sup>26</sup>

As result of the partition, Tanganyika became a Germany colony for thirty years. After the First World War she fell under British rule up to 1961 when she attained independence. The centralization of capital under the imperialist stage of capitalism, an essential aspect of the existence of capital as an independent power, found its expression among the bourgeois agents in the brutalization and degradation of the people of Tanganyika manifested in the forms of domination which were to be established. But before dealing with them, a general and broad exploration of some of the ideological aspects of imperialism and their background is necessary here, so as to grasp better the various ramifications of those forms of domination.

Marx summed up the history of the so-called primitive accumulation-- i.e. the process of separation of the producers from their means of production and the accumulation of wealth in few hands, the pre-history of capital and its corresponding mode of production as, "written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire."<sup>27</sup> That is, this mode of production was characterised by brutalities from its very emergence as particular forms of domination. These brutalities extended even beyond the territories of capitalism's emergence; hence, hand in hand with this separation of the producers from their means of production and the accumulation of wealth in few hands was:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in the mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginning of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. Hard on their heels follows commercial war of European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes gigantic dimensions in England's anti-Jacobin War, and is still going on in the shape of the Opium Wars against China etc.<sup>28</sup>

It was within these processes that "race" and "civilization" became catchwords among intellectuals who were concerned with the events outside Europe. The essence of these catchwords was the justification of the increasing intervention of some 'superior' race in other countries. Essentially, the concepts of inferior/superior people, like colonization itself and even the subordination of people in general pre-dates capitalism. Early Greek and Roman literature, reflecting the institutions of slavery had wide usage of such concepts. Aristotle, for example, held that for some to rule and others to be ruled was expedient: "From the hour of birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule....some men are by nature free and others slaves...."<sup>29</sup> This was the spirit of ancient civilization whereby people were either Greeks or barbarians, slaves or free by nature.

Under feudalism and the mercantilist era, inequalities within and without European societies were explained religiously. Accordingly, it was the wish of God for some people to be reduced to servitude. This fact is demonstrated, for example, by the Bulls issued in 1455 by the Pope, who supposedly represented the wishes of God on earth. The Pope authorized Portugal to reduce to servitude all infidels.<sup>30</sup> According to C.R. Boxer:

In the fifteenth century...the average Iberian Christian--like any other--never referred to the Muslim and the Jewish without adding some injurious epithet. Hatred and intolerance, not sympathy and understanding, for alien creeds and races was a general rule. 'Moors', Jews and gentiles were alike regarded as doomed to hell fire in the next world. Consequently they were not likely to be treated with much consideration in this one.<sup>31</sup>

Religious explanations for inequalities and subjugation of people in general were not enough under bourgeoisdom. The complexity of the advent of the bourgeois era, as classically demonstrated by the French

Revolution and the American War of Independence is, the bourgeoisie conquered political power with the "pompous catalogue of the 'inalienable rights of man'"<sup>32</sup> as a protest against the inequalities manifest in the pre-bourgeois societies. But the bourgeoisie did not do away with inequalities: the process of primitive accumulation, for example, confirms not only the fact that "capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt";<sup>33</sup> it also confirms the fact that capitalism merely changed the forms of servitude. One John Wade wrote about the conditions in the industries in the United Kingdom in 1835: "The cupidity of the mill-owners whose cruelties in the pursuit of gain have been hardly exceeded by those perpetuated by the Spaniards in the conquest of America in the pursuit of gold".<sup>34</sup> It was only the name which had changed: "For slave trade, read labour market, for Kentucky and Virginia, Ireland and agricultural districts of England, Scotland and Wales, for Africa, Germany."<sup>35</sup>

The new forms of inequality were accompanied by military and technological sophistication as a result of the developments in the sciences. As far as the social sciences were concerned, these developments heralded the advent of what August Comte termed the "scientific era", whereby everything had to be explained scientifically by searching the cause of changes or problems within the things themselves. The social problems which arose with capitalism--the ruin and the impoverishment of the small producers, the misery of the working people, the inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the degrading effects of division of labour and industrialization, crises, anarchy in production, etc--had to be explained. If according to the "catalogue of 'inalienable rights of man'", all people were equal, the reasons for

the objective inequalities in the society had to be sought in people themselves. Social sciences grew up as a reflection of these inequalities and divisions in Europe and all over the world:

Anthropologists largely studied non-Europe, apart from peasant folk traditions in Europe itself...the tendency was to link the study of these complex cultures with the study of the simple Australian aborigines and the Bushmen of South Africa. Sociologists, on the other hand, studied whites--dockers in the East-End, poverty-stricken 'children of the Jago' as primitive in many respects as the nomads at the end of the earth. The great danger was the disinherited of Europe might see his image in the dispossessed of Africa or Asia....<sup>36</sup>

If the danger of the poverty stricken in Europe seeing their reflection in the dispossessed of the rest of the world was to be avoided, then the differences between them had to be established--scientifically. The hitherto existing beliefs, prejudices and stereotypes--whether religious or simply idealist--found in the works of the Germans Immanuel Kant and F.G. Hegel, the Swede Carl Finne, the Austrian Samuel G. Morton, etc. in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century were being transformed into scientific categories. As idealist or scientific, these categories were to be dominant in Eurocentric historiography and outlook in general for more than two centuries. The basic tenets of this historiography were succinctly summed up in the following words of Hegel:

Africa...is no historical part of the world; it has no movement to exhibit. Historical movement in it--that is its northern part--belongs to the Asiatic or European world.

What we properly understand by Africa is the unhistorical, undeveloped spirit, still involved in *the conditions of mere nature* and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the world's history...the history of the world travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning.<sup>37</sup>

To transform the categories that expressed inequalities, whereby within Europe, the workers and labour recruiters, for example in Britain

were called "hands" and "flesh agents" respectively, social sciences fell back to biology. Biology, in the last century was centrally concerned with the theories of "monogeny", "hybridization", and "miscengeneration" with the aim of providing the foundation of the genetic differences between "superior" and "inferior" beings.<sup>38</sup> Given such a preoccupation, civilization and race, modern and traditional, social control and social change, etc. became the major preoccupation of the nascent social sciences, as exemplified by the works of people like Morgan, Comte, Spencer and Tönnies. What was to be termed "Social Darwinism" was essentially developed by Herbert Spencer, the great expounder of the principles of evolution as applied to societies. His main interest was in the "primitive man" as an aid to the understanding of the social and cultural evolution of the modern man, and his accounts drew evidences from travellers and ethnologists. He drew an analogue between Africans and children in his account.<sup>39</sup>

This elevation of racial categories--of the superiority of the Aryans and the non-perfectability of other people--to science was to find its culmination in the writings of Robert Knox the Scottish anatomist who devoted himself to the question of race, and Arthur de Gobineau the French pseudo-scientific racist in 1850 and 1853-55 respectively.<sup>40</sup> According to them, the inferiority of other races could be explained from the point of view of psychology and intelligence and their incapacity in this respect derived from an original inequality. The views that Africans were a cursed people whose very humanity needed to be questioned, and about African barbarism, superstition, treachery, moral depravity, paganism, sexuality, cunningness, laziness, fatalism, undeveloped intellectual faculties, etc, entered the scientific arena.



In fact, these were exactly the same categories that had been used against the working people of Europe and even the pre-1917 Russian peasants. According to Doris Lessing, in the parts of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina about the land owners and peasants, where colour feelings do not arise, "...the interminable discussions about 'the peasant' are paralleled by the endless talk about 'the native'. What was said in the pre-revolutionary Russia about the peasant is word for word what was said about Africans--lazy, irresponsible, shiftless, superstitious,..."<sup>41</sup>

The elevation of these racist categories into science in mid-last century more or less coincided with the "Opium Wars" in China in the 1840s, the Indian 'mutinies' in the 1850s, the uprisings of Africans in Jamaica which were savagely repressed in 1865, and the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism marked by rivalry among the trading concerns in Africa for monopoly of the markets. Manning Nash sums up all these aspects in the following words:

For at least three hundred years, propositions on the inequality of the biological endowments of the varieties of men have been put forth in some 'scientific' guise or other...the hypotheses come and go, but they tend to cluster in time and to be associated with crises about relations of different ethnic and/or racial groups. The first bursts of contentions about the natural inferiority of a racially defined population came with the spread of the Europeans into the New World. The discovery of the American Indians, and the domination, exploitation, or extermination of them, precipitated the classic controversy Las Casas and Sepúlveda...in 1550-51....Other clusters in history turn up at the time of the French Revolution, with Gobineau and the Aristocrats decrying the inferiority of the less privileged; the controversy between the abolitionists and the pro-slavery elements in the American South prior to the Civil War; the rising howl at the flood tide of Eastern and Southern immigration to the United States;....<sup>42</sup>

The 'scientific' accounts of inequality and domination, like the "journals, newspapers, books and documents which have proved most vocal

on the issues of race" were predominantly "middle class, referring in the main not to what the masses actually thought and believed, but to the writings of the literate minority about what they thought and believed their contemporaries to feel."<sup>43</sup> In other words, it was the intellectual representatives of the bourgeoisie--the "thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of illusions of the class about itself their source of livelihood)"--creating the illusions for the "active members of the class" who had "less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves."<sup>44</sup>

It turns out that the first colonial lobbies in Germany, the first country to colonize Tanganyika after the partition of Africa, mainly consisted of highly specialized pressure groups, rather than popular response to agitation. The earliest to start were the geographical societies--the Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin (1825) and Centralverein für Handelgeographie (1863)--"which emphasized the economic value of the geographical sciences". The early explorers, such as H. Barth and Emin Pasha who previously worked for foreign governments, later on increasingly turned to their own government and provided both political and intellectual support for German expansion. Missionary societies also provided another lobby. The Catholic church in Germany was linked with the merchants and administrators in the mission field. Missionaries wanted real politics, because "they felt that the German sword should be thrown into balance against slave traders and heathen warlords". It is all these groups which later on contributed greatly to the colonization of Africa.<sup>45</sup>

The formation of Deutsche Kolonialverein in 1882 was a result of a meeting between the Frankfurt and Offenbach chambers of commerce, a few

business men and intellectuals (members of the Verein für Geographie und Statistik) who pledged to support colonial commerce, exploration and expansion. This league derived its influence from connections with high ranks of the bureaucracy, universities, municipal administration and business men in Germany. This league was to be transformed later into Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (DKG) under the leadership of Carl Peters who in 1884 travelled to Tanganyika and signed twelve "blood brotherhood" treaties for the colonization of the country.<sup>46</sup>

There were practically no industrial workers and farmers in the DKG as within the Pan-German league. This was despite the fact that it was the farmers who were supposed to be looking hardest for a living space outside the crowded Reich. The membership of the DKG was overwhelmingly derived from high school graduates with an Abitur who had served in the armed forces for one year as volunteers or commissioned officers. These were people who voted for the National Liberals and Conservatives, so as "to make their mark in the civil service, the army, the professions, or--above all--in commerce and industry." Above all, the DKG was also closely linked with finance through bankers and factory owners.<sup>47</sup>

Carl Peters, the pioneer in German colonization of Tanganyika was not a capitalist: he was an intellectual who was very outspoken as a racist and ultra patriotic with a mixture of love and hatred for Britain. When he returned to Germany after his stay in London where German nationals were employed as migrant labourers, he opined: "I got tired of being accounted among pariahs and wished to belong to the master race." This, and numerous other statements he made, typically represented the widespread sense of inferiority felt by German middle

classes with regard to Britain,<sup>48</sup> and it was these middle class elements who were to go to the colonies.

That it was mainly the middle class elements who were to go to the colonies, also applied to settlers, diggers and missionaries--besides the administrators. Crosbie Garstin, in his account on how they as settlers got to the colonies demonstrates this fact. According to him, those who went to the colonies were a mixed lot: some of them were "younger sons kicked from the paternal doorstep with a couple of thousand pounds, a first class passage (single), and instructions to go to the devil somewhere out of sight...[in]--the colonies", something which sounded "much more romantic than a son going to the devil in the local pothouse--..."; others were rebelling "at the dictates of office clocks, factory whistles, or orderly--room trumpeters" and so decided to go where such things were non-existent. And as for others, it was those who "read, marked, learned" and were hopelessly "bamboozled by those charming little land company booklets" found by tons everyday between Whitehall and Temple Bar. The booklets visioned "meadows waving with corn as golden as a chorus lady's locks, and rivers gushing a mixture of milk and honey".<sup>49</sup> There were very highly coloured pictures on the covers of these booklets. They showed:

the settler's rose-hung bungalow in the background (Mrs Settler entertaining a brace of fashionable duchesses to tea on the verandah), while the bearded settler himself sits astride his mettlesome Arab in the foreground and, with an apraised riding-whip, directs the harvesting of his crops. Above all gleams a sky as blue as the sort Mr Reckitt makes, and in the top right hand corner glows a full-featured, flame-whiskered sun, smiling and smiling away fit to tear his face in half....

'Come to the golden sunshine', the booklet implores. 'Come where the sun shines all the time. Every manly man is sunburnt'.<sup>50</sup>

Initially the colony was administered by Deutsche Ostafrika Gesellschaft (DOAG), a company which was later on transformed into a trading and investment concern after 1887 when various bankers in Germany began to finance it. Between 1884 and 1886, DOAG sent out 18 expeditions to Tanganyika to make treaties and extend the territory, and by 1888 it had already established 18 small trading and experimental stations.

This early period was marked by violent resistance by the Tanganyikans--in places such as Bagamoyo, Uzigua, Sadani, etc.,. In the latter area the resistance was led by Bwana Heri, a coastal merchant. This resistance by the Tanganyikans was taking place at a time when the boundaries of the territory had not been completely drawn: the Western boundary was drawn in 1884 with the recognition of the Congo Free State by the Germans, the Northern and Southern boundaries were drawn in 1886, and the ten miles coastal strip of the Indian Ocean was bought from the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1888. In other words, the territory, as one of the defining characteristic features of the state, was completely formed by 1888.

The resistance of the people extended further inland after 1888. This was a result of Emil Von Zelewski's (the leader in German occupation) attempt to issue decrees for the creation of a "German-style administration", imposition of taxes, orders to property owners to prove their titles, and prohibition of importation of guns and ammunition.<sup>51</sup> Abushiri, a coastal merchant and owner of plantations led resistance against this in Pangani. In Tanga, a German warship was fired and replied by the shelling of the town. In the South of the country, Germans were given an ultimatum to leave Kilwa, Lindi and Mikindani.

Bagamoyo, which was already in the hands of the Germans, was attacked by 8,000 men in 1888. The Germans responded by killing everybody at sight in the whole town.

Generally, the Southern part of the country was defeated in 1890; Moshi, Tabora, and areas around Lake Victoria were defeated in 1891; and Iringa was defeated in 1892--although the resistance continued until 1898. These rebellions against the Germans were conducted by heterogeneous sections of people. The only people who withdrew from them were the Oman Administrators and Asian merchants: "'The wealthy, the propertied families...saw their livelihood injured by the rising and therefore supported the Germans'".<sup>52</sup> Estimations are, there were at least 84 locations of early colonial wars in Tanganyika between 1888 and the Maji Maji uprising of 1905-7.<sup>53</sup> These wars were waged in order to crush the resistance of the people against colonization. The human and material destruction of these wars are unaccountable so far due to scanty information. The number of men, women and children who died in these wars is unknown; and this is besides the looting of peoples' food and livestock by the troops and the burning down of villages and towns. In some instances these colonial wars involved the killing of people in a whole village as was done in Nondoa in Dodoma Region on 28th August 1893; or Useje village on 10th August 1895.<sup>54</sup> And this is besides the cases pointed out above about what happened in Tanga and Bagamoyo. Characteristically, such massacres have not entered Western historical and moral memory like their later counterparts like Lidice in Czechoslovakia--the Nazi massacre in World War II.

As far as the manner in which the Germans conducted these wars is concerned, most characteristic is the way they dealt with the Wayao of

Southern Tanganyika in the hinterland of Lindi under chief Machemba. Three punitive expeditions against the Wayao had failed initially, because the Wayao were conducting guerilla warfare. The Germans finally decided to use "scorched-earth policies"--policies which had already been used in some of the coastal areas of Tanganyika. This method involved the systematic razing of villages, bushes, farms and animals and the depletion of all local supplies.<sup>55</sup> Many years later, Apostle Kolumba Msigala was to write in his reminiscences about what he saw in this region in 1893:

....within a few weeks I passed Kilwa on my way from Zanzibar....and I disembarked at Kilwa to see the damage to the town where it was destroyed by the German shells and to inspect where the chiefs were hanged and the gallows set up. Many people died on the hill opposite the town thinking they were out of range where as it was nothing for the artillery. There were many corpses of women and children who were killed by accident being mistaken for soldiers....[In]...Lindi [we] saw many ruins....<sup>56</sup>

The result of all this destruction was famine, previously unknown in the history of these people: these battles were "delivered with the clear aim of teaching lessons of new power relations to undecided peoples. This may have added to the degree of brutality and wantonness in the fighting...."<sup>57</sup> The net result of all this destruction was loss of manpower among the different peoples due to death and casualties, systematic destruction of homes, crops and storages and capture of livestock and total disruption of ecological control and economies.

By 1888, the DOAG had completely failed to keep the country under control. Bismarck, who at first refused to help, finally sent out Sudanese and Shangaan mercenaries comanded by Von Wissman in 1889. Tanganyika was then declared a colony and DOAG was relieved of its administrative tasks so as to be able to concentrate on the economic

sphere. As a result, the main population centres and communication lines were finally under German control by 1898: Bomas (military and administrative garrisons) had been established in the areas which were to become provincial headquarters (e.g. in Songea, Iringa, Tabora, etc.). These Bomas were manned by officials surrounded by bands of gunmen for the maintenance of authority and order. Local leaders or Swahili speaking people from the coast were picked as leaders for those areas which had no forms of organized authority before the colonial conquest, as a way to extend authority. Thus, *public power*, i.e. the bureaucracy was established by 1898.

It was only with this establishment of *public power* and *public force* separate from the community, and hence firm control of the country that the government was able to introduce *taxation*. Hut tax was introduced in 1898 (the Ordinance was issued in 1887), as a means to hasten the monetarization of the economy and force people to sell their surplus produce, sell their labour power, obey the government, and to meet the administrative expenditures of the colony. Tax collection entailed the use of force--*askaris* (soldiers)--who at times went as far as confiscating peoples' property or holding a chief as a hostage until taxes were paid. In short, tax collection and labour supply for construction of railways, settler farms, plantations and portage became the major task of the authorities--both local and central.<sup>55</sup> It is necessary at this juncture to point out certain theoretical issues in relation to the state given what has been pointed out above and what will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

The state was firmly established in Tanganyika by 1900. Its main interests were in the extraction of raw materials and the monopoly of



the market. It has been pointed out that it was with the establishment of the bureaucracy and the military that it was possible to introduce taxation, which in turn was meant to facilitate commodity production. What this means, is the fact that the officials, army, administration, judges, etc--in short the bureaucracy and the military are an inseparable part of the state. They are that section of the material ruling class--the bourgeoisie, which constitutes the committee for administering the common interests of the productive bourgeoisie. It is that group of people under whom power is concentrated; power which is used for the organization of the society and to ensure the existence or production and reproduction of conditions of production, while the productive bourgeoisie does all the accumulation and hunting for profits. The bureaucracy is that "ideological strata [stände]" which to the bourgeoisie is "flesh of its flesh".<sup>59</sup>

The state is the form which the bourgeoisie is "compelled to adopt, both for *internal* and external purposes"; it is that "separate entity, alongside and outside the civil society" (i.e. the "practical idealist" rule of the dominant class).<sup>60</sup> That the state is a form of organization, cannot be grasped adequately without its foundation which enables it to impose itself politically and socially upon society by establishing norms and regulations while at the same time remaining a part of the capitalist relations. Coercion is not the distinguishing feature of the state under capitalism, as it often emphasized; for there is coercive power in every human society. It is its externality in relation to the civil society, i.e. "a public power distinct from the mass of the people",<sup>61</sup> which differentiates the bourgeois state form.

The externality of the state rests on the three factors under capitalism:<sup>62</sup> (1) production and circulation of commodities does not automatically reproduce the most important commodity, which is external within commodity production--labour power as a commodity. Historical studies demonstrate the fundamental and central role played by the state in the process of divorcing the producer from the means of production and hence creation of the working class in the period of "primitive accumulation". This role does not disappear after this period: the state goes on instituting social policies, laws, sanctions etc after that. Social classes do not reproduce on their own or simply by economic compulsions; the conditions of wage relations are ensured by the constraining of the owner of labour power to enter into those relations. (2) Labour power, as the unique and specific commodity which is the historical condition of the existence of the capitalist mode of production is not reproduced as a capitalist commodity. This commodity is bought by the capitalist in the market, and its value is not only determined by the socially necessary labour time, but also the reproduction of this specific commodity--"the value of means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner".<sup>63</sup> Subsistence is not obtained within the production process, but in the sphere of circulation. The result of this is the biggest contradiction in capitalism; whereby the capitalists strive to reduce the value of labour power and struggle for more profits, while the workers struggle to increase it, i.e. competition between the workers and the capitalists.

The two factors above can be summed in that "the modern state is 'the creation of the middle class, first as a means to break down' the pre-capitalist relations, "then as a means to crush the emancipatory

aspirations of the producers, the working class.'"<sup>64</sup> (3)"The immanent laws of capitalist production manifest themselves in the external movement of individual capitals, assert themselves as coercive laws of competition,..." and this competition among capitals whether under competitive or monopoly stage, is nothing more than the very "inner nature of capital"<sup>65</sup> as an external necessity, because "capital exists and can only exist as many capitals, and its self-determination therefore appears as a reciprocal interaction with one another."<sup>66</sup> Given such competition the state is compelled to regulate the activities of capitals depending on the particular requirements of reproduction of the system; and this at times requires the state to control or go against certain forms of capital in favour of others.

The above theoretical considerations are important in the case of Tanganyika, because, as was pointed out earlier, Tanganyika was already intergrated in the world market before colonialism and merchant capital and some forms of slave labour were being used, also some *quasi* wage labour. What was to happen under colonialism was the restructuring of the economy in such a way that it suited the interests of the German bourgeoisie. And this aspect resulted in contradictions between different sections of capital throughout the colonial period, determined by the wider relations, those of wage labour and capital.

To restructure this economy to fit the interests of the German bourgeoisie was the task which the DOAG was to take. But the DOAG was economically too weak before 1900 to fulfil those interests. Although it had just begun to invest in various activities, it begun to reap profits after 1902. Initially, DOAG lacked both men and enough financial income to sustain itself. It could not even finance railways, and its

agricultural work was purely experimental. In trade, this company could not compete with the Arab merchants or the Indian financiers "who knew the country, relied on extensive networks of kinsmen, and were willing to operate with small profits and take high risks." And it was as a result of this situation that the DOAG had to "maintain itself by levying customs duties and imposing tolls on caravans and by confiscating land from coastal owners by dubious legal devices".<sup>67</sup>

In so far as the DOAG was not yet competent to serve the colonial interests, merchant capital played the most crucial role. This was because the new exports had not started generating enough funds. At the same time, as middlemen, Asians were very important in terms of being able to sell goods to the peasants and buying of products from them, as retail traders and even in banking processes. The consequence of this was the barring of Asians from becoming settlers by the state, and this was fuelled further by the settlers' hatred towards them. The hatred was rooted in the fact that settlers were poor and financially dependent on the state and monopoly capital, and could not compete with the Asians in every respect. There were Asians like Alidina Visram, the Ismailia Khoja "who started by buying 'country produce' and expanded until he sent more caravans along the central route than the DOAG in 1898 and employed 500 Asians ten years later."<sup>68</sup> Consequently, Asians were confined to middleman's position by the state; without them in this position the colonial state would have faced difficulties in selling goods to the peasants and buying country produce.

Besides Asians being a major source of contradictions for the settlers, peasants also posed a persistent problem for them throughout the colonial period. There were constant struggles between the peasants

and the settlers, due to the fact that they both produced the same crops and and competed for the same fertile lands--besides the fact that they both belonged to a non-monopoly category. The struggles were waged between the African peasants and the settlers with the "European farmers seeking to reduce the African to a proletarian and the African seeking to retain the maximum economic independence".<sup>69</sup> The colonial state was more interested in plantation economy--and the plantations were established by monopoly capital. The plantations were for sisal production, a crop which was not produced by settlers or peasants and was badly needed in Germany at the time. These plantations were established in dry, infertile lands which discouraged long-term settlement and hence ensured less friction with the African peasants. For the state, peasant production was cheaper than settler production in the case of Tanganyika; for peasants did not require finances from the state as was the case with the settlers.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, this peasant production posed another contradiction for the state, in the sense that it meant constant shortage of labour power for the state, the plantations and settler farms

The use of Wanyamwezi and Wasukuma workers who already had some history of participation in wage labour migration was not enough during the colonial period; for instead of getting their food supplies from the peasants (e.g. the Wabondei in Tanga or elsewhere), the migrant labourers were also settling in the areas around the plantations and estates to grow food. In this way, they too begun to employ labour. This resulted into settlers demanding the expulsion of the migrant workers:

....the Europeans continued to need workers. Economic pressure having proved inadequate, political means were employed. The area was divided into labour divisions, each attached to a plantation to which the headman had to supply workers.

Rechenberg forbade this in 1910, however, so that the 14,000 workers on European plantations in Tanga district in 1910 included only 1,200 local men, the remainder being long-distance migrants. The Bondei example shows how capitalist relations permeated a largely pre-capitalist economy, how political means were needed to bolster economic methods of obtaining labour, and how the burden came to rest on distant people rather than the Bondei, who tended to become peasants.<sup>71</sup>

Initially the Germans had even attempted importing indentured labour from the Asian continent, but had failed.<sup>72</sup>

German rule in Tanganyika was generally characterized by violence and coercion in land alienation, labour recruitment, tax collection and in export crops production among the peasants. The period before the Maji Maji uprising was described by Apostle Kolumba Msigala again in the following terms: "The Germans introduced the cultivation of cotton and sisal. The whip was continually used on the backs of the natives...."<sup>73</sup> Sometime, between 1901 and 1909 an adventurer, failed settler and merchant, Marius Fortie encountered an official who was building a big fort somewhere between Tabora and Mwanza. The official boasted to Fortie that he was doing so without costing the Government any money. His method of doing so was in the words of the official: "...I clap in chain gangs scores of *shenzi*, raw natives, with a few more skilled coast niggers, and make them work at the fort while I investigate their cases....." He showed Fortie more than twenty chain gangs of ten to twelve Africans each. "The men were padlocked iron collars through which passed a chain." There were also a few gangs of women and boys who were roped. While men and boys carried poles, sand and mortar, "women carried water, or tamped smooth the dirty floors with crude rammers".<sup>74</sup>

As a result of this violence perpetuated by the Germans, they became known as *Watu wa Hamsa Ishirini*--people who administered twenty five

lashes as a punishment.<sup>75</sup> They subjected the people of Tanganyika to corporal punishment by means of detention accompanied by forced labour, birching and the rod, and detention in chains.<sup>76</sup> Both employers and administrators flogged people, and it is estimated that 64,652 Africans were sentenced in courts to corporal punishment between 1901 and 1913.<sup>77</sup> This number does not include those who were flogged without sentences.

For the Germans, like all other European nations, Africans were uncivilized and needed--so far as this was considered possible at all--to be civilized, i.e. Europeanized. Africans were viewed as sub-species of the homo sapiens, who belonged to the "child races of the world", and were "mostly weak, mentally retarded" with a deep aversion to work. They existed "not as human beings, but for the sake of the white economy, as a commodity". Of "all the lower races, the black one was the lowest", and Europeans were pre-ordained to reign over the earth, while all the other races were destined to serve them. Africans were viewed as hopelessly deficient, in that they could never be like the Europeans, "that their capacity for development and 'culture'" was infinitesimally small, and every thing offered simply rebounded on them. And as a low race of mere malevolent children who were lazy, ill natured, mean and crafty, they had no needs besides food and fuel. This was just an extension of the conceptions about the working people in Europe held by the middle classes. J.S. Mill, for example, had doubts about the capacity of the English working to be 'made rational beings'.<sup>78</sup>

The Germans stood for the Germanization of the country, and they kept complaining about "black peril", "the horrors of miscegenation", that Africans had an "atavistic longing for alcohol, contempt for work, ... were cruel and blood thirsty", etc.<sup>79</sup> Carl Peters, the leader of

colonization of Tanganyika, believed that "the savage African" who was cunning, lazy, repulsively ugly and born a slave "needs his despot like an opium addict needs his pipe."<sup>80</sup> In essence, these descriptions were an expression of the resistance they met in the colonization of the people, i.e. it was the way they grasped in their minds the meaning of the resistance against the "civilizing mission" and how they justified their actions.

It was in the educational field that this aim to Europeanize the country was most obvious. Under German rule, education provided by both the Government and mission centres aimed "(a)To enable natives to be used in Government administration. (b)To inculcate a liking for order, cleanliness, diligence and dutifulness and a social knowledge of German customs and patriotism".<sup>81</sup> One of the founders of the German colonization Society, Count Pleil, advised a missionary congress in 1886 to concentrate on practical tasks of working for the Government, rather than on the doctrines of "brotherhood and equality," to which the congress resolved:

German missions, Evangelical and Catholic alike, should be encouraged to take part in the realization of a national colonial programme;...they should not restrict their activities to mission work but should help to establish German culture and German thought in the colonies."<sup>82</sup>

The above views were most dominant before 1907, and after that it was mostly the settlers who were more vocal about them. This slight change of attitudes among the administrators and missionaries was a result of the Maji Maji War of resistance of 1905-7; waged in resistance against forced labour recruitment, taxation and land alienation which involved the peoples of the whole of Southern Tanganyika and was unleashed by Kinjikitile. It started by the



uprooting of cotton plants by the Wamatumbi of North West Kilwa in July 1905, where there were "Five penniless Germans" who grew cotton and forced people to work "for five cents a day under harsh discipline and to the detriment of their fields...."<sup>83</sup> It is estimated that between 75,000 and 120,000 Africans died because of this war and famine which followed thereafter as a result of the "scorched earth policies" employed by the Germans against the warring people who in turn had used guerilla tactics against the Germans. In Upangwa (Iringa Region), for example, "nine-tenths of the Pangwa tribe of 30,000 had been wiped out. In 1908 there were only 70 children in all the Upangwa area".<sup>84</sup>

Some superficial reforms were introduced after 1907--due to the uprising. Forced labour and land alienation was undertaken more cautiously and the colonial state turned to what it termed "scientific colonialism". This policy, in Governor Leutwein's terms, was guided by the principle of "how to make the desired profits in the surest fashion" while taking into consideration the fact that the deprivation or non-deprivation of the original populations' "place in the sun" is determined by the profits: "the decision can not be made according to a single scheme, but must correspond to circumstances."<sup>85</sup> Even the Evangelical Mission Conference held in Dar es Salaam in 1911 demonstrated some changes in attitudes towards Africans. The new tendency was to advocate that Africans be kept in their own nationality as much as possible, and that the breeding of "black Europeans" be prevented by all means. It was argued by Martin Klamroth and Dr Bruno Gutman in this conference that the best way to combat Islam--an aspect which became an obsession of the colonial Government in the 1920s--was stabilization of the tribes.<sup>86</sup>

As a result of the Maji Maji war of resistance, it was forced upon the state that Tanganyika should remain a peasant colony rather than a settler colony. And this was not determined by the interests of the settlers, commercial capitalists, peasants, etc: rather, it was the general interests of capitalist reproduction within which the monopolist bourgeois interests were more dominant. In fact, the settlers in Tanganyika were "'reduced to a class of vassals of the DOAG', a colonialist had complained in 1907...."<sup>87</sup> They were dominated by the DOAG, a monopoly company which by 1905 was completely dominating the economy of Tanganyika. This is in spite of the fact that at the eve of the First World War there were more settlers in Tanganyika than in Kenya. The settlers viewed this new policy with hostility, as they saw it based on "negrophily", and Governor von Rechenberg who insisted upon the question of taking into consideration some of the African interests in policy making was called a "Nigger-lover" by them, for allegedly, he treated Africans and Asians with laxity.<sup>88</sup>

### 2.3 Conclusion

It is necessary to make some remarks on Tanzanian historiography with reference to the Maji Maji War of resistance, as a way to sum up the aspects which have been discussed in this chapter. This is done in order to show the relevance and connection of what has been discussed so far to the aspects dealt with in the subsequent chapters, and the particular form of interpretation of the history of post 1920 taken in this work.

There are two broad themes which recur in most literature on colonial history which has appeared since the 1960: "improvement" or

"innovation" and "resistance" themes. Both themes, together or separately, are an attempt to show how Tanzanians sought to transform the colonial situation by either improving their lives or resisting colonialism directly. This history has been produced within the attempts to transcend the paradigms set by imperialist or Eurocentric historiography which sought to unravel the historical movements from the point of view of the ruling classes. To grasp the essence of these two themes, it is imperative here to follow Dr John Iliffe's arguments, who is the leading specialist of Tanganyikan history, in which both themes are interwoven.<sup>89</sup>

In an introduction to *Modern Tanzanians*, Iliffe pointed out that "the period of Tanzania's history which seems to offer the fewest interesting personalities...is the period between Kinjikitile and Nyerere, the heart of the colonial period from 1907 to 1954"<sup>90</sup> That is the period before 1907 was marked by violent resistance against colonialism with heroes such as Mkwawa, Abushiri, Bwana Heri, Mchemba and Siki; and the period after 1954 was marked by the formation of a nationalist party and struggles for independence which ended up with the victory of Tanganyikans in 1961. Prior to the Maji Maji War, it is alleged, the rebellions were waged by people who lacked unity and who were ignorant "in the sense of technical inferiority, and their small scale" nature<sup>91</sup> and hence their defeat. The same applies to Maji Maji, whereby, while there was an attempt to solve the problems of disunity and ignorance, "the leaders of the rising tried to do this by the power of sheer faith. The Maji [water--C.S.L] promised unity on a larger scale, and it promised to overcome technical inferiority by making European weapons powerless."<sup>92</sup> Faith was able to achieve unity briefly,

but it did not overcome technical weakness. Thus after Maji Maji Tanganyikans seized upon alternative methods to combat the two problems--disunity and ignorance. The period which offers few interesting personalities belongs to that era when Africans directed their efforts to finding "answers to the problem of ignorance", and most of the solutions tried in this period "can be summarized by the word 'improvement'".<sup>93</sup>

Improvement, was an attempt to "change people and societies in such a way as, it was believed, to make them both better in themselves and also more able to face their rulers on equal terms." This process was gradual and "emphasized education, economic development and modernization of local government". While the heroes of Maji Maji were warriors and prophets, the heroes of the "age of improvement were village teachers, and shopkeepers, clerks and cotton growers." The heroes of the age of improvement were more anxious to "advance themselves within the colonial framework," an approach which made it difficult to challenge colonialism openly.<sup>94</sup>

This age of improvement, according to Iliffe, was also an age of differentiation. That is, the opportunities for improvement did not trickle down to all Africans: some had better opportunities than others, and hence, marked divisions were already in the process of formation socially, economically, politically and intellectually. Consequently, "some Tanzanians in this period, either because they were unprivileged or because they had unusual awareness, were alarmed by the divisions which improvement brought to African societies", and protested.<sup>95</sup> The paradox is that from the 1930s, the vision of improvement started to fade: the 1930s crisis "shook the British credibility in the eyes of the

educated Africans", the result of which even those who benefited from improvement started registering protest.<sup>96</sup> It is some of the members of the age of improvement who later led the nationalist movement.

Such are Iliffe's premises; such is the way historical interpretation has been undertaken in general in relation to Tanzania, much as the contents might be exceedingly varied.<sup>97</sup> Apparently, if the early forms of resistance were marked by ignorance and lack of unity and the heroes were warriors and prophets, and the "age of improvement" was marked by struggles against ignorance whose heroes were teachers, clerks, export crops growers, etc; then the underlying assumptions of the analysis are those of the modern/traditional dichotomies. This is verified by the usage of concepts such as "modern Tanzanians"--who sought to improve themselves--the implication being, those who protested against "the divisions which improvement brought to African societies" and the fact that Maji Maji was a result of faith, were traditional struggles. Because those who sought to improve themselves were the heroes of the "age of improvement", then those who protested resisted against the wheel of progress. But if one is to be consistent, the fact that the earlier forms of struggles were heroic should imply that it is those who resisted against inequalities who were similarly heroic. Let us re-examine the the interpretation of Maji Maji and establish its continuity with the struggles which took place during the "age of improvement"--aspects which are dealt with in this study from the next chapter.

According to Iliffe, Maji Maji cannot be explained in terms of colonial forms of domination or maladministration and exploitation only: important in it was the medicine--*maji*, in the mobilization of people

who in the rising transcended their tribal barriers and attempted at fighting against German rule. The cult of the ancestral spirit--Kolelo--played the major role. Logically, however intense the grievances of Africans against Germans were, there would have been no Maji Maji without this 'cult'--although the efficacy of the medicine is denied, in terms of superstition that the medicine could turn bullets into water.<sup>99</sup>

In the first instance, disunity is contradicted by the fact that tribes, as is admitted by even Iliffe himself and demonstrated by the proposal by the missionaries after 1907 above, were a colonial creation associated with racial thinking which took it that Europeans belonged to nations and Africans to tribes. Tribes, the way they appear contemporarily, were formed in the 1920s.<sup>99</sup> According to Gwassa:

Most of the peoples of the Maji Maji area were organized on small scale, usually into clans which constituted political units....Yet despite this apparent diversity and even extreme disunity, the effects of the slave trade and of the raids of the Ngoni and Yao and the constant movements of peoples had produced so complex an ethnic admixture that it became impossible to draw meaningful ethnic boundaries....the Ngindo, who played an important role in Maji Maji...were scattered over the whole area between Rufiji and Ruvuma rivers and between the coast and Lake Nyasa....

....the old view that southern Tanzanian peoples had had little in common, that they were perpetually at each other's throats, that they were so divided and weak that it was impossible for them to combine, falls away....a complex web of cultural inter-mixture, and of wide-ranging social and marital relationships had been woven by events taking place before and during the nineteenth century.<sup>100</sup>

Besides the complex web of cultural inter-mixture, and more important, the facts about the pre-colonial forms of production and exchange--including the Long Distance Trade which involved most of the Tanzanian societies--and the social relations which were in the formation, support the unity thesis of the pre-colonial societies.

According to Kjekshus and as pointed out earlier in this chapter, "The majority of the East African peoples practiced either an agricultural economy or cattle economy, neither of which had any built-in necessities for extensive warfare. Where raiding took place, it is therefore possible to understand it in limited terms"--economic. Therefore, "...the colonial literature that whole populations were constantly fighting each other was gross exaggeration..."<sup>101</sup> which emanated from the so-called "humanitarian movements" in their enterprise of advocating "Christianity and Civilization"--part and parcel of the stereotypes and Eurocentric historiography discussed above--which justified the intervention of Europe in other societies. In other words, lack of unity in the pre-1907 rebellions as an explanation underplays the "degree of early ethnic cooperation in warfare against the colonial intruder".<sup>102</sup> Because in actual reality:

Colonial battles and skirmishes were fought throughout the country from 1888 onwards often against a number of different tribes that acted in co-ordination against the foreign occupant. Armed resistance and intertribal co-operation did not commence with the Maji Maji wars, but were further expanded and brought to greater perfection in these wars than during the earliest encounters.<sup>103</sup>

Ignorance, then, as another problem which is supposed to be verified by "sheer faith" in medicine, cannot be grasped in terms of an attempt to bring unity or overcome technological inferiority; granted such premises. People who waged the Maji Maji war, as pointed out above, used guerilla tactics; and the Germans did not defeat the warring people by sheer bullets: they defeated them by employing "scorched-earth policies"--i.e. systematic razing of villages, bushes, farms and animals and the depletion of all local supplies. That is, Germans used famine as a weapon to defeat the warring people.<sup>104</sup>

The majority of people in Tanganyika were already involved in the cash economy as labourers, peasants, artisans, etc towards the First World War. This is verified by aspects such as the fact that, "By 1910 Africans had become accustomed to paying taxes in cash rather than labour in kind as they had done previously."<sup>105</sup> When this fact is added to the question of the forms of domination, obviously the content of Maji Maji is not contradictory. Maji Maji war was a resistance against settlers, plantation owners, cash crops communal forms of production under the supervision of Government agents, taxation and harsh German rule in general. It was the resistance of peasants who owned their conditions of labour and produced themselves against forced labour--i.e. proletarianization. It was a struggle of the direct producers who believed that "all Africans were one, that they were free men" who should not work without payment, suffer oppression, pay taxes, etc.<sup>106</sup> They disdained to be exploited and enrich others instead of producing for themselves. The syncretist ideas of the belief in water to bestow invulnerability against bullets, or war medicine in general was not new among these people. According to one informant:

The reason why many people believed that bullets would turn into water or that they would not enter the body, was simply because that was our established tradition. Since our ancestors...these matters were extant in Umatumbi. All hunters had dawa (medicine) and even today these still exist....<sup>107</sup>

It was because of Maji Maji war that the state began to undertake forced labour cautiously, accepted that Tanganyika should remain a peasant colony rather than a settler colony and introduced some limited political reforms. If examined from the point of view of the grievances and the reforms that took place after 1907, the belief in the medicine was not a result of "sheer faith": the medicine was the expression of



the language and ideas of the struggle in the given social reality. The leaders' claim to have acquired their will from the spirit of Kolelo was consonant with most historical experiences whereby the forms are at times borrowed from the traditions and yet posed as belonging to the present, while the zeal and intensity of the struggles was drawn from their own daily experiences--exploitation, arrogance and violence perpetuated by the colonial agents, etc. These direct producers, already producing for the colonial market took their forms from the past, because as history makers, they were making their history under circumstances given and inherited "with which they are directly confronted", at the same time:

...the tradition of the dead generations weighs like a night mare on the minds of the living. And, just when they appear to be engaged in the revolutionary transformation of themselves and their material surroundings, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help them; they borrow their names, slogans and costumes so as to stage the new world-historical scene in this venerable disguise and borrowed language.<sup>108</sup>

The discontent and grievances of the direct producers were expressed in the spirit of Kolelo and the medicine because the essence was the fact that formal control of labour by capital was in contradiction with their own interests: it contradicted and threatened their existence as independent producers, and thus their way of life as bequeathed from the dead generations. As direct producers, and already participating in the market, they were like the beginner who had not grasped the new language and was translating it in the mother tongue. They had not yet appropriated the "spirit of the new language to be able to express" themselves freely and "manipulate it without reference to the old": the original language had not yet been forgotten.<sup>109</sup> The form and content of

the rebellion are inseparable: after all, "beliefs, values, and practices of any society are a product of that society and should be seen in relation to the structure and needs of that society."<sup>10</sup>

The rebellion suffered defeat, and at the same time it scored some victories in terms of the limited reforms which were made in the areas which sparked the uprising--the colonialists' undertaking forced labour cautiously and halting of the process of land alienation. The entrepreneurs of the "age of improvement" are but to a large extent a product of this victory. At the same time, the content of the victory carried seeds of new contradictions: differentiation among the direct producers. These new contradictions, of necessity, demanded new forms of struggles and self-organizations for those who were ruined by the processes which were unleashed, and hence their continued protests.

The so-called "age of improvement" and its "heroes"--a period which is the main focus of the discussion in the next chapter--is a myth which suits best the teleological interpretations of movements: in this case, the tendency to interpret the actions of the colonized in terms of the ultimate goals--independence and development/revolution. To see the capitalist elements which were in the formation as the heroes is to view things from the point of view of imperial history, which saw those same elements as spearheaders of progress. It was during this period of the "era of improvement" that one of the initiators of German colonies remarked:

....To a small section of the [German] population the colonies were doubtless a source of profit; the merchants and planters who exploited the natural and human resources of overseas possessions, the shipping companies which received subsidies, the civil and military officials who received posts--all have every reason to support colonial enterprise.<sup>11</sup>

These heroes, as Iliffe admitted, did not seek to transcend the established arrangements; they rather sought to perfect them. In which case, they were not the history makers: the history makers were those who in Tanganyika "were alarmed by the divisions which improvement brought to African societies" and protested.

The history of colonialism is riddled with contradictions; and this is because, besides the establishment of the exploitative relations, there were the colonial and paternalistic relations--those of a whole people being dominated by another nation. The latter relations were embedded in the racist and colonial forms of domination which have been reviewed in the preceeding section. Therefore, if the very elements which were created by colonial capitalism became disillusioned and began to protest in the 1930s, this was not inconsistent with their interests as a social group. And it was their particular forms of contradictions with the colonial regime which were to shape their ideas and actions and hence, their turning to resistance. In which case, the changes which took place under colonialism (up to the stage of independence) cannot be grasped in terms of discontinuities--resistance/improvement/resistance--whose underlying assumptions are the modern/traditional dichotomies. Rather, they have to be grasped within struggles to transcend the established arrangements, and thus their essence grasped as a whole; that is, as a reality which is contradictory and the changes taking place in the social formation being shaped by the contradictions. Even the absence of rebellion in the classical sense of Maji Maji does not imply absence of struggles: there are forms of struggles--including 'apathy'--which can only be understood in terms of reactions within situations. The issue is how to grasp the content of those struggles and

the facts which demonstrate their absence or presence, an aspect which is determined by the manner in which a problem is posed. The ideology of Indirect Rule and its organizational aspects in Tanganyika was a response on the part of the British administrators, given the situation they found Tanganyika in, and the responses of the working people in the 1920s. It was a response to the problems of acquiring labour, raw materials and efficient administration of the people. The next chapter deals with these aspects.

## NOTES

1. See K. Marx, *Capital* Vol 1, Penguin, London, 1979, pp.89-90.
2. K. Marx, *Grundrisse*, Penguin, London, 1977. p.99.
3. For the explanation of this aspect, see A. Sheriff, "Tanzanian Societies at the time of the Partition" in M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed), *Tanzania under Colonial Rule*, Longman, London, 1980, p.11. H. Kjekshus in *Ecological Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of Tanganyika 1850-1950*, (Heinemann, London, 1977, p.111) quoted one B.W. Hodder as having written: "The bulk of traditional markets in Sub-Saharan Africa received their initial stimulus from external, long distance trading contacts."
4. See R. Gregory, *India and Africa: A History of Race Relations Within the British Empire 1890-1930*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, p.9; J.E.G. Sutton, *The East African Coast: An Historical and Archeological Review*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1966, pp.7-9; M. Honey, "A History of Indian Merchant Capital and Class Formation in Tanganyika", Ph D. Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1982, p.36; and M.M. Mulokozi, "Protest and Resistance in Swahili Poetry 1600-1880", Institute of Kiswahili Research, University of Dar es Salaam, (mimeo), 1984, pp.1-2.
5. See N. Chittick, "The Coast Before the Arrival Of the Portuguese", in B.A. Ogot and J.A. Kieran, *Zamani: A Survey of East African History*, Longman, Nairobi, 1968; Mulokozi, *ibid*; Jan Knappert, *Four Centuries of Swahili Verse*, Heinemann, London, 1979; For a poetical description of the East African feudal merchants, see S.A. Nasir, *Al-Inkishafi*, OUP, Nairobi, 1972 (edited by Hichens). Stanzas 34-41 read:

34. How many men of wealthy enriched hast seen,  
who in their spendour, glittered as the sun  
Strong-armed of power, strong armed of sword and gun  
treasured of gold and silver from war's gain?

• • • • •

36. Proud arms they swung; their necks were arched with  
pride;  
and serving men attended in every side  
The common held back, that they might stride  
amidst the trooping of their train.

37. Their mansions, lantern lighted, glittered bright  
with brazen lamps and lamps with crystal light  
Till light as day became their hours of night,  
and in their halls walked fame and honour twain.

• • • • •

40. The men's halls ever hummed with chatter gay;

the harem chambers rang with laughter's joy;  
With zest of slave and workman at employ,  
their merriments and pleasure waxed amain.

41. And wherewhile unto slumber they repair,  
Soft hands caress and maidens fan sweet air,  
And minstrel-singers, gay robed women, fair,  
sing lulling-songs to lingering refrain.  
[translation by the editor]

6. See Peter R. Schmidt, "A New Look at Interpretation of the Early Iron Age in East Africa", *History in Africa*, 1975, pp.127-136.
7. Kjekshus, op cit.
8. *ibid.*, p.112; Also see Sheriff, op cit.
9. *ibid.*, p.117, for an elaboration of this argument in relation to the development of the various communities and the divisions of labour and the Long Distance Trade before the colonial invasion.
10. Mulokozi, op cit, pp.1-2.
11. See C.S. Nicholls, *The Swahili Coast*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1971.
12. Quoted by Kjekshus, op cit, pp.22-23.
13. J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, CUP, London, 1979, p.40.
14. See Sheriff, op cit, p.46.
15. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.68. Most of the above arguments are based on Iliffe's findings.
16. *ibid.*
17. J. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1971, p.11.
18. *ibid*
19. Quoted by Honey, op cit p.53.
20. *ibid.*, pp.53-4
21. B. Egero, *Colonisation and Migration*, SIAS, Uppsala, 1979, p.19.
22. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.46.
23. L.H. Gann & P. Duignan, *The Rulers of German East Africa 1884-1914*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1977, p.16.

24. J. Iliffe, "Wage Labour and Urbanization", in Kaniki (ed), op cit, p.279. Also see, Iliffe, 1979, op cit, Chapter 3.
25. ibid.
26. Quoted by P. Worsley, "Colonialism and Categories", in *Race*, Penguin, London, 1964, p.100.
27. Marx, *Capital* Vol 1, op cit, p.915.
28. ibid.
29. See in Okot p'Bitek, *African Religions in Western Scholarship*, EALB, Nairobi, 1970, p.21.
30. C.R. Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion 1415-1825*, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1961, p.4.
31. ibid.
32. Marx, *Capital* Vol 1, op cit, p.416.
33. ibid, p.915.
34. ibid, p.353.
35. ibid, p.337. Also see, F. Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1968.
36. Worsley, op cit.
37. G.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, Dover Publications, New York, 1956, pp.91-2.
38. UNESCO, *Race and Colonialism*, Paris, 1980, p.70.
39. H. Spencer, "The Primitive Man-intellectual" in *Source Book for Social Origins*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967, p.vi.
40. S.L. Milbury-Steen, *European and African Stereotypes in Twentieth-Century Fiction*, MacMillan Press, London, 1980.
41. Doris Lessing, *Going Home*, Panther Books, London, 1957, p.19. P.E. Mitchell wrote in his diary after finishing reading *From South Eagle to Red Flag*: "The really intruding part from my point of view is the curious resemblance of pre-War Russia as he pictures it to the present day East Africa--resemblance in principle. I mean--the 'nobles' are the whites, and the natives are the mouziiks, 'peasants', 'the people'. (Mss Afr. r.101 Sir Philip Euen Mitchell Diaries, 17.7.1931),
42. M. Nash, "Race and Ideology of Race", (1962) in *Race*, op cit, p.111.

43. C. Bolt, *Victorian Attitudes to Race*, Routledge & Kegan, London, 1971, p.xiii.
44. K. Marx & F. Engels, *German Ideology*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1976, p.60.
45. For all the above, see Gann & Duignan, op cit, pp27-28.
46. ibid for all the above.
47. ibid.
48. ibid, and all the above.
49. Crosbie Garstin, "Sunshine and Settlers and Sutlers", *African Observer*, Bulawayo, pp.73-80, a copy of this is available in TNA 22027 "African Observer"
50. ibid.
51. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.92.
52. Quoted in ibid, p.93.
53. Kjekshus, op cit, p.149.
54. ibid, p.189.
55. ibid, p.145.
56. T.O. Ranger, "The Apostle: Kolumba Msigala", in J. Iliffe, (ed) *Modern Tanzanians*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1973, p.7.
57. ibid.
58. For details about taxation, see J. Iliffe, *Tanganyika Under German Rule 1905-1912*, CUP, London, 1969, pp.160-163.
59. See H. Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution: The State and Bureaucracy*, Part 1, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1977, pp.500-501. On p.485 he quotes Marx in relation to this question of the inseparability of the state and the bureaucracy. This relates to the point made in 1849 when Lassalle was about to be tried twice for the same speech: for advocating "arming against the sovereign power" and "forcible resistance against government officials." Marx had denounced this in the following terms: "If in a speech I 'call for arming against the sovereign power' doesn't it go without saying that I am calling for 'forcible resistance against government officials'? The existence of the sovereign power is, indeed, precisely its officials, army, administration, judges. Apart from this its body, it is a shadow, a figment of the imagination, a [mere] name. The Overthrow of the government is impossible without forcible opposition to its officials. If in a speech I call for



revolution, then it is superfluous to add 'forcibly oppose the officials.'" V.I. Lenin, (*Collected Works*, Vol 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p.396) remarked, "Every bureaucracy, by its historical origin, its contemporary source, and its purpose, is purely and exclusively bourgeois."

60. K.Marx & F.Engels, op cit, pp.90-91.
61. Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol 1, op cit: "There is coercive power in every human society; and there was one in the tribal system and in the family, but there was no state. 'An essential feature of the state' says Engels...'is public power distinct from the mass of the people,'"
62. This important point and the following one is raised by Abou T. Aumeeruddy, Bruno Lutier and Ramon G.Tortajada, "Labour power and the State", in *Capital and Class*, Vol 6, Autumn 1978, London. This article is quite an important contribution to the discussion on the state.
63. Marx, *Capital*, Vol 1, op cit, p.274.
64. Lenin, op cit, p.396.
65. Marx, *Capital*, Vol 1, op cit, p.433.
66. Marx, *Grundrisse*, op cit, pp.414 & 651. This point refutes the view which tends to see imperialism as monolithic, whereby as a result of monopoly, it is so concentrated and centralized to the extent that it can not allow the emergence or compete with other capitals--some of which are non-monopoly. Such a view of imperialism in East Africa in recent years has been propagated by Prof. D.W. Nabudere. Some of his books are: *Imperialism, the Social Sciences and the National Question* (TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1977) and *Political Economy of Imperialism* (TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1978) Imperialism in this study is regarded as a stage of capitalism which does not negate the fundamental laws of capitalism. Monopolies do not eliminate competition, they rather exist "over it and alongside of it". (V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp.104-105). The view of "monolithic" or "super" imperialism without competition was criticized by Lenin as a form of capitalism which will never exist. (See *Imperialism...* supra, pp.131-148 where he criticized Kautsky; also see V.I. Lenin, "Eighth Congress of RCP(B)", *Selected Works* Vol 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp.113-116 in which he remarked "imperialism and finance capitalism are a superstructure on the old capitalism" which when its top is destroyed, the old capitalism is exposed, and to write of a system where there are only monopolies "is to write of a system which is false and removed from reality."). Against Proudhon Marx wrote: "But look for a moment in real life. In the economic life of the present time you find not only competition and monopoly but also their synthesis, which is not a formula but a

movement. Monopoly produces competition, competition produces monopoly. But this equation, far from removing the difficulties of the present situation, as the bourgeois economists imagine it does, results in a situation still more difficult and confused. If therefore you alter the basis on which present-day economic relations rest, if you destroy the present mode of production, then you will not only destroy competition, monopoly and their antagonism, but also their unity, their synthesis, the movement which is the real equilibrium of competition and monopoly." (*Poverty of Philosophy*, International Publishers, New York, 1973, pp187-188.

67. For the quotation and the above information, see Gann & Duignan, op cit, pp.15-16.
68. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.139.
69. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change....*, op cit, p.13. Also see E.A.Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*, Heinemann, London, 1973, pp.217-234; and Iliffe, 1979, ibid, p.152.
70. Brett, ibid.
71. Gann & Duignan, op cit, p.75.
72. Iliffe, *Tanganyika Under German Rule*, op cit
73. Ranger, op cit, p.7.
74. Marius Fortie, *Black and Beautiful*, Robert Hale Ltd, London, 1938, p.39.
75. F.S. Joelson, *The Tanganyika Territory: Characteristics and Potentialities*, T.Fisher Unwin Ltd, London, 1920, p.197.
76. Gann & Duignan, op cit, p.94.
77. Iliffe, 1979, p.150.
78. For all the above see Ida Pipping-van Hulten, *An Episode of Colonial History: The German Press in 1901-1914*, SIAS, Uppsala, 1974, pp.21-22. For similar descriptions of Africans see Sir H.H.Johnston, *The Negro in The World*, London, 1910. Explanation of the view of the missionaries on Africans can be found in E.H. Berman, *African Reactions to Missionary Education*, Teachers Press, New York, 1975. On J.S. Mill see P. Corrigan & D. Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, p.150.
79. van Hulten, ibid.
80. Iliffe, 1979, p.150.

81. Quoted by K.F. Hirji, "Colonial Ideological Apparatuses in Tanganyika Under Germans", in Kaniki (ed), op cit, p.208.
82. Quoted by E.W. Smith, *The Christian Mission in Africa*, Edinburg House, London, 1926, p.99.
83. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, Also see his *Tanganyika under German Rule*; Kjekshus, op cit; G.C.K. Gwassa, "Kinjikitile and the Ideology of Maji Maji", in T.O. Ranger & I. Kimambo (eds) *The Historical Study of African Religion*, Heinemann, London, 1972; and Ebrahim Hussein, *Kinjeketile*, OUP, Nairobi, 1971. (a play).
84. This is a claim which was made by Father Büttner. It is quoted by Kjekshus, ibid, p.151.
85. Gann & Duignan, op cit, p.75.
86. For this discussion, see Marcia Wright, *German Missions in Tanganyika 1891-1914*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, p.126
87. Gann & Duignann, op cit.
88. ibid; Also van Hulten, op cit.
89. Most of his works have already been mentioned above
90. Introduction to *Modern Tanzanians*, 1973, op cit, p.vi.
91. J. Iliffe, "The Age of Improvement and Differentiation", in I.N. Kimambo & A.J.Temu (eds), *A History of Tanzania*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1969, p.123.
92. ibid.
93. ibid.
94. ibid, p.124. In English history, the term "improvement" and a connotation of bourgeois ideals. The way Iliffe uses this term, essentially, it is not different from the usage in English history. For the way this term was used in English history, see Corrigan & Sayer, op cit, Chapters 5 & 6.
95. ibid, p.125.
96. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.359.
97. One of the glaring examples of this kind of history writing more recently published is Z.E. Lawuo, *Education and Social Change in a Rural Community*, DUP, Dar es Salaam, 1983.
98. Iliffe, 1969, op cit.

99. Iliffe discussed this question of tribes being formed in the 1920s in his *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 1979, op cit pp.318-341.
100. Gwassa, op cit, p.203.
101. Kjekshus, op cit, pp.20 & 21. Also according to T.O. Ranger, "The nineteenth century in Tanzania was not the chaos of anarchy and destruction which is still pictured in many books. The tribal system was not breaking down; there was no perpetual war. In some cases political leaders had been able to build up new and stronger state systems. In some cases people had been able to take advantage of the opportunities of the long-distance trade to export foodcrops and to introduce a wide range of new goods into their societies." (*The African Churches of Tanzania*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1972, p.6.)
102. Kjekshus, ibid, p.146.
103. ibid, p.150.
104. ibid, p.145.
105. Gann & Duignan, op cit, p.202.
106. Gwassa, op cit.
107. Quoted in ibid, p.210.
108. See K. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in *Surveys from Exile*, Pelican, London, 1977,, p.146.
109. ibid.
110. Christina Larner, *The Thinking Peasant*, Pressgang, Glasgow, 1982, p.77.
111. Quoted by Walter Rodney in "The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika 1890-1930" in Kaniki, op cit,p. 139.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### British Rule and African Civilization

### Chapter Three BRITISH RULE AND AFRICAN CIVILIZATION

In the concluding remarks of the preceding chapter, it was pointed out that resistance and improvement are not alternative themes of analysis. In essence, these two themes are symptomatic of deeper processes of real transformations which were taking place in Tanganyika under imperialist hegemony--processes which were more often than not resisted by the working people. Often, the forms of resistance were contained by the use of state power as was the case of Maji Maji War of resistance and other pre-1905 wars of resistance; but also, attempts were made to dampen them by the incorporation of the elements of the colonized people which would break the resistance. Fundamental, was the question of weakening resistance, and the main issue here was the question of the reproduction of the colonial state and the relations it defended. After the Maji Maji war, the Germans had embarked upon what they termed "scientific colonialism". The guiding principle in this form of colonialism was how to make the desired profits without necessarily destroying the social economic organizations of the subjects. In other words, they already saw the possibility of the incorporation of certain elements of the colonized to make colonialism more effective. The Germans had been forced to reconsider their policies after being formidably resisted more than any other colonial power in East Africa.

The British colonial agents were quite aware of these facts. Major Orde Browne who headed the Labour Department in Tanganyika in the second half of the 1920s was to point out in 1935 that:

The Englishman is an opportunist, and, unlike the Frenchman, he does not trouble to work out a consistent and logical policy with a clear end in view. Rather he deals with difficulties as they arise, and evolves a solution which seems to meet the needs

of the moment, without much reference to the future developments or general compatibility.'

He pointed this out when he was reviewing the imperial problems; and within this context he attempted to analyse the policy of Indirect Rule, which was established in Tanganyika in the 1920s. Philip B. Mitchell, who was later to become a Secretary to Native Affairs had written to J. Oldham (one of the founder members of the East African Group and African Research Survey which included people like Sir F. Lugard, Sir D. Cameron, Julian Huxley, Lord Hailey, Lord Lothian, B. Malinowski, etc.) on the precise problems which they faced in Tanganyika which resulted into the introduction of Indirect Rule in the most succinct manner.

According to Mitchell, the problem of the empire was not merely the question of "painting the map red": it was a question of the establishment of social, political and economic contacts which would help knit together people who formed the empire, "in order that the immense civilizing forces of the Anglo-saxon race may be free to operate without international restrictions or racial jealousies." That is, it was a crisis of the "civilizing mission" itself. The solution was:

we have to turn our native from a conquered subject into a willing and loyal cooperator; we have to regulate at present the relations with the other partners in order that the present actions of selfish or shortsighted individuals may not jeopardise the future; we may have in the interests of the whole, to curtail his rights or privileges: we may have to oblige him to take a lodger, in order to protect him from eviction from his cottage, if I may speak figuratively.<sup>2</sup>

It is this "willing and loyal cooperator" who is termed the "modern" or the "improver" in the resistance/improvement theme. This crafty manner of twisting things has resulted into taking Indirect Rule as simply an adoption of the Nigerian policies with the the arrival of D.Cameron in

1925, or a coincidence between educated Africans' and Europeans' attempts to revive indigenous institutions. In Iliffe's formulation, while the "nationalists sought to create a national culture, so those who built modern tribes emphasized tribal cultures. In each case educated men took the lead". It was these ideas which coincided neatly with the European concern to revive the indigenous institutions or "adopt Christianity to indigenous societies according to *volksmission* principles".<sup>3</sup>

The fact is that Indirect Rule was an all embracing systematized ideology of African Civilization as grasped by the colonial administrators, educators, missionaries and reseachers in Tanganyika. It evolved within an attempt to resolve the crisis of the "civilizing mission", given the situation they found prevailing in Tanganyika and the responses of the working people to colonialism. It was a response on the part of the colonial agents to the problem of power and legitimacy within which central were those of acquiring labour, raw materials and efficient control of the subjects. Indirect Rule developed and acquired "implications which went far beyond the field of administration *per se*. Social and political relationships, and later economic ones, were evolved....developed into a philosophy which eventually covered most realms of African life."<sup>4</sup> It is these aspects which are dealt with in this chapter, and the circumstances which resulted in the emergence of the Indirect Rule conceptions. Also, some of the forms of resistance which the British administrators had to confront are reviewed.



### 3.1 *The Changing Nature of the Ruling Ideology After World War I*

The First World War was a period of very intense suffering for Africans in Tanganyika. This was because the campaigns of the British and Germans were mostly fought in this country more than in any other country in Africa.<sup>5</sup> It is not easy to approximate the number of porters and soldiers who died in the campaign. The Carrier Corps employed 150,000 porters by 1917, and estimations are that there were 15,000 of these men who were ill or confined to bed at any time, and "over a period of twenty-four weeks in 1917, known deaths among porters were recorded as 11,484". This was an average of more than 68 per day.<sup>6</sup> Food for the troops was forcibly requisitioned, sometimes by nocturnal raids and seizing of women and children as hostages, as a result of which famine spread in the country even in districts such as Ulanga, which used to produce a huge surplus of food. Herds of cattle were decimated in central Tanganyika, and above all, tens of thousands of Africans were killed by diseases (influenza, small pox, diarrhoea, plague and cerebro-spinal meningitis) as a result of the armies spreading them from one area to another in the country, and the worst famine ever recorded in Tanganyika occurred in 1919.<sup>7</sup>

As a result of the War, besides the above, there was an ecological havoc, peasants gave up cash crops production, settlers and missionaries abandoned their farms, plantation production came to a halt and the working class was virtually disbanded. Chaos also reigned in business, as a result of which people were compelled to use some ingenuity in manufacturing goods and medicine which were normally imported.<sup>8</sup>

Due to the chaos which ranged in business, a Bishop of Zanzibar wrote in 1918, Indians had become very unpopular among Africans because

of their misconduct. They had involved themselves in blackmarketeering, and had generally made scandalous profits during the War: "The Africans have in times of famine paid them almost their last piece, and pledged to them their hard-won crops, for the right to live."<sup>9</sup> It was this period which marked the beginning of anti-Asian sentiments in general among Africans. This was because, while they were making scandalous profits during the War, a section of the Indian bourgeoisie in Tanganyika, Kenya and Zanzibar with the support of the Aga Khan was campaigning for Tanganyika to become an Indian sub-colony. They wanted to be given Tanganyika in the manner Australia was given Samoa or South Africa was given Namibia. The struggle was mainly by the Ismailia group--the oldest immigrants in East Africa and the largest Asian community by World War I. Aga Khan quipped that Ismailia had an annual income of over £400,000 and capital worth £4 million, and that is why they needed Tanganyika as a sub-colony.<sup>10</sup>

By the end of 1918, the Indian Association in East Africa had begun co-ordinated campaigns in Britain and Tanganyika for the purpose of gaining Tanganyika as a sub-colony. Resolutions were passed in Nairobi and Zanzibar and the scheme was endorsed even in Tanganyika.<sup>11</sup> This illusion of a sub-colony was finally dispelled in 1920, when the Paris Peace Conference declared Tanganyika a Mandated Territory under British Rule. Their final pleas were made in July 1920. The matter, of course did not end there: in 1929, for example, it was reported by the *Tanganyika Times* that Indians claimed to have the right to be treated on exactly equal terms as the other British subjects in respect to franchise and political rights. This according to the European community was undesirable, because Eastern races had lower living standards and

the inevitable result would be "to push out those whose standards of living is higher". Therefore it was necessary to place barriers to their entrance as had been done in many other countries, where wherever they took roots, their tendency was to "partly if not wholly thrust out the white inhabitants".<sup>12</sup> Also, as a result of political problems in India, the Government in Tanganyika got scared that the agitation of the Indian Congress Party and Gandhi would result in a widespread sedition for a "pay no taxes" movement. The Government decided to scrutinize all the Legislative Council (LEGCO) members who supported the Congress and stop them.<sup>13</sup>

From the start, the Indian campaign was vehemently opposed by the British officials and the European community in general in the name of African interests. They even claimed that Africans wished Britain to protect them from Indian rule by citing the example of the prayers of some elders from Tanga. But in reality, the settlers and administrators opposed the Indians campaign because of their own interests which were at stake, given the competition they faced from merchant capital. The constant accusing finger and attacks against the Asian traders for their rapacity in the exploitation of the peasants during the colonial period were an expression of these struggles between them for the control of the territory. The Asians were feared because of the economic power in their hands. And throughout the colonial period the struggle against them was waged in the name of the peasants.

As far as Africans were concerned, when the British regime settled and initially retained the same German political structures, every thing was the same as before. In their comparisons, they often favoured the Germans because, "'The Germans beat us, but they paid more than the

British for agricultural products we sold them.'" which was true; then, "'With the Germans we knew where we stood, with the British who can tell?'"<sup>14</sup> In actual fact, the general "attitude of the population... was potentially dangerous since, although some Africans had been sympathetic to the British, the people at large had remained loyal to Germany during the fighting."<sup>15</sup>

When the British authorities assumed responsibility in 1917, Tanganyika had become unmanageable in almost every respect: transport networks had been destroyed and the economy and ecology ruined. More alarming was the fact that, while in 1914 Europeans used to boast of having "suppressed the constant violence of intertribal war in Africa. But by 1919 that boast seemed a little empty." this was because in the four years of World War I "more African natives had been killed or had died of disease or even starvation as a result of a white war than in forty years--perhaps a century--of the old primitive warfare of the blacks", as Huxley wrote in 1931. This experience, according to him, had resulted in a "not very pleasant" reaction "either for blacks or for white" for the "native has lost his child like belief in the white as an inherently superior being. He has become more critical and more restive;..."<sup>16</sup> This was the situation after the First World War, whereby Europeans were discredited by the War in the eyes of Africans in Tanganyika. "The war has taught the natives", wrote a German missionary in 1919, to see "the whiteman from the point which he never knew him before. the native has seen him in his hatred, his hypocrisy, brutality, dishonesty and immorality. He often could justly say 'the blacks are better men.'"<sup>17</sup>

Given the above general feeling, upon assuming responsibility in the territory the British authorities were very alarmed by the fact that Swahili language had spread almost throughout the territory by the early decades of this century and was almost smashing the so-called tribal barriers, and facilitating geographical mobility and intercommunication networks. Moreover, besides the trials of the War and its aftermath:

The situation in Tanganyika was disturbing....The diverse tribes of Tanganyika had reached different stages in their contact with Western civilization....Isolated villages were coming more and more into touch with the habits and thoughts of others, whether they were Europeans or only the tribe next door. The process of detribalization, that ambiguous term which is nevertheless indispensable, had begun, and Africans who left their home areas in search of work began to shed many of their old ways of living.<sup>1e</sup>

In a minute written in October 1917 by the Private Secretary to the East African Protectorates (Kenya) Acting Governor, the administration acknowledged that as a result of participation in the First World War, Africans had unprecedentedly enlarged their ideas because of contact with Africans of other colonies. It was feared that some Africans had become acquainted with Pan-African ideals of the Ethiopian Church, and possibly, there were more Africans who held the conception of Africa for Africans. According to this minute, the possibility was that this conception, if linked with Islamic propaganda, would be really dangerous as it would involve fanaticism. This was possible, because there was already a "tendency on the part of the natives to call themselves members of the Mohammedan nation" with propaganda being disseminated from Mecca: this "is almost sure to be of anti-European character." The minute went on:

German East Africa is common ground for Pan-Islam and Pan-Africa; many of the natives educated in German secular schools have embraced Islam, and the German administrators have confessed to a feeling of apprehension respecting an African

Jehad, i.e. a conjunction of an African political Islam against Europeans....<sup>19</sup>

This fear of some Pan-Africanist islamic renaissance persisted in the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>20</sup> In the above quoted minute, views on the best way to implement the suggestion that a "definite policy of encouraging strong and isolated tribal nationalism may be one of the most effectual barriers against a Pan-African upheaval..." were raised.<sup>21</sup> In other words, it was a question of establishing an effective local administration which would be able to deal with all the social, political and economic problems created by the War. This was to be the main preoccupation of the British administrators in the early 1920s. It was to be given impetus by the appointment of Sir Donald Cameron, formerly working in Northern Nigeria under Lord Lugard, as the Governor of the territory in 1924.

Indirect Rule or Native Authority, the policy which was to be passed under Governor Cameron in 1927, did not begin with his arrival, much as the 1927 Paper was based on Lord Lugard's Paper in Nigeria.<sup>22</sup> As early as 1920, the British administrators in Tanganyika were already contemplating the "policy of encouraging strong and isolated tribal nationalism". The first Governor, Horace Byatt was by 1921 giving priority to the establishment of native authorities in his plans. In this year, he promulgated an Ordinance to Regulate Native Authority-- Native Authority Ordinance No 16 of 1921.<sup>23</sup> In 1923, there was passed the Native Authority Ordinance No 25, which expressed the aim to set up native authorities so as to substitute the German system which utilized akidas and jumbes. As it was laid down in this Ordinance, the duty of these authorities was to maintain order and good government, and in

particular to prevent crime. These native authorities were to function as part of the Government machinery.

Several months before the arrival of Sir D. Cameron in October 1924, a conference of senior commissioners, under the Acting Governor John Scott resolved on the creation of native authorities and their organizational structures.<sup>24</sup> People like Charles Dundas, Philip Mitchell, John Scott, and Douglas Jardine who were to become Native Affairs Secretaries at different times in the country, had already drawn conclusions on Indirect rule long before 1924. Charles Dundas' wife Mrs Anne Dundas, for example, wrote in the early 1920s that what the missionaries were supposed to be doing was to educate "the native to a better understanding of his own language and customs, and giving him deeper insight into his own delightful lore, revealing to him the dignity of ancient tribal customs...." That is, the essence was to create a "good African" imbued with a sense of responsibility with a vision "of higher civilization, attainable through use and development of his latent powers--...."<sup>25</sup>

This policy had nothing to do with the influence exercised by the League of Nations under Article 22 of the Covenant, where it was stipulated that the development and well being of the native peoples was the sacred trust of civilization. The Secretary of State to Colonies, Leopold Amery openly claimed in June 1925 that Tanganyika was "permanently incorporated in the British empire", that, although there were obligations of the League of Nations, there was "not one whit less British nor" did it make their "tenure there one whit less permanent."<sup>26</sup> When summing up his six year experience as Governor of Tanganyika, Cameron later admitted that the policy he passed had nothing to do with

the Mandate position of the colony: it was a result of the British colonial policy in the "dependent countries", while the precise principles embodied in the Mandate were in accord with his views which had grown in Nigeria.<sup>27</sup>

Most colonial officers in Tanganyika admitted that the objectives set by the League of Nations did not have any practical meaning at all. Eric Reid, a District officer in the Southern Highlands, wrote a book, *Tanganyika Without Prejudice*, basing himself on his experience and personal enquiries. His major concern in this book was to refute the "mistrust; misrepresentation and calumny engendered in the minds" of his "countrymen at home by ill-informed and irresponsible writers and speakers, many of whom seem to take a perverse delight in befouling their own nests"--Tanganyika--"of these, the chief are the ridiculous fables about the insecurity of the mandate...." He set out to prove to his countrymen that in actual fact Tanganyika was a colony like any other.<sup>28</sup> In the same spirit, Judge Gilchrist Alexander remarked that to all intents and purposes, Tanganyika was a colony just like any other.<sup>29</sup>

The philosophy underlying the policy of Indirect Rule was explained in a White Paper published by the British Government in 1927. The policy aimed at dealing with "with the problems arising from what appeared to be conflict of interests of the African population and those of European enterprise,..."<sup>30</sup> Because of this conflict of interests, the Government had become convinced that there was a necessity to incorporate the natives in the government, and hence native authorities, which aimed at "making it possible [thus] to evolve in accordance with their traditions and their most deeply rooted instincts, as an organised and disciplined community within the State...."<sup>31</sup> In a Memorandum by Cameron in 1925, it



was stated that this policy was "the strongest safeguard, the surest and safest foundation" on which the Africans of Tanganyika could be built, for it enlisted "on the side of the law, order and good government all responsible elements in native society", and it aimed at preserving the society intact and protected it from disintegrating "into an undisciplined rabble of leaderless and ignorant individuals."<sup>32</sup> As soon as he arrived in Tanganyika, Cameron had written to Lord Lugard that on arriving in Tanganyika he found the country lacking in coherent administrative policy. As a result of this, matters had reached an extent where each District Officer was doing whatever he pleased. Political work had been neglected and Indirect Rule was fictitious, and consequently, "The people are out of hand because the chiefs can no longer punish them."<sup>33</sup>

It was the post-World War I despair which was the driving force behind these policies, rather than the question of copying from Nigeria or the Mandate position of the territory. Discernible from these statements is the fact that they were responding to real social and political situations which could not be expressed otherwise except as political proposals or policies. And this was especially the case because from the start, Britain had to wage propaganda war against German's claim for her colonies and Britain had to portray the best possible picture of her rule to convince international opinion. The other issue in this policy was the practical administrative advantages of the system. The German system which administered through representatives (akidas and jumbes) was found inadequate by the British authorities given that there was insufficient supervision over them "and moreover the use of the agents whose chief interest was in Islamic

culture tended to result in the disintegration of tribal customs."<sup>34</sup> It was impossible to supervise the government agents because "It is impossible for the Administrative Officer to get in touch with the whole primitive people, and it is impossible for financial reasons largely to augment that service." In other words, it was impossible to employ a sufficient number of administrative officers for the whole country.<sup>35</sup>

The financial constraint emanated from the fact that Tanganyika was completely dependent on Treasury loans in London and the country was riddled with debts. As a Mandate Territory, Tanganyika could only borrow in the London market if Parliament guaranteed the interest on the loan, "even if the loan was to be used for development purposes specifically authorized by the Mandate."<sup>36</sup> Tanganyika could not get a loan in the London market because the guarantees of the colonial stock did not apply to Mandated territories. She was able to float a loan in the London market for the first time in 1929, and she could do so again after that because by then the Colonial Development Act had been passed, although she still needed the approval of the Treasury. Cameron managed to raise two loans and a third one was raised in 1932 as an emergency measure. More loans were raised after that.<sup>37</sup> Thus, more revenues had to be generated internally, which meant an increase in taxes and exhortation to people to produce more export crops. Only native authorities could assist in this, and after all, initially chiefs were not paid by the Government: they were paid from the taxes they were able to collect. The Secretary of State to Colonies, Winston Churchill had pointed out at the time that since money would not be allowed for some time for Tanganyika, the territory would not equal the achievements under German

administration, and the only alternative for the country was to increase taxes.<sup>38</sup>

The fact that Cameron's policy was in accord with the British colonial policy in general in respect to the colonial dependencies was a result of the rise of a wave of nationalism in some of the colonies which Britain experienced in in early 1920s in Egypt, India, Ireland and other countries. Cameron was to write in 1925:

I am not satisfied with the place. The economic development of the country has been forced and little else has been thought of. The native is being detribalized and Europeanized and no thought has been given to the place that he is to fill in the political future of the country, with the result that we shall, if we continue the practice of the past, create another India or another Egypt.<sup>39</sup>

The most dangerous elements in the territory, according to the administrators, missionaries, settlers, diggers, and soldiers, were the "Europeanized Africans", and hence the necessity to use the indigenous institutions and create a "good African". For Cameron, it was the duty of the state to develop the Africans in such a way that they were not westernized and turned into a "bad imitation of a European". Accordingly, the whole educational system was to be directed towards that end: it was not necessary to destroy the "African atmosphere, the African mind, the whole foundation of his race"--a thing which could only be achieved if the tribal organizations were not swept away.<sup>40</sup>

This issue of "keeping the natives in their own nationality as much as possible;....and to prevent with all means to breed a kind of black European" had been noted even by the Evangelical Mission Conference held in Dar es Salaam in 1911, which was to be the antecedent of the 1930s Tanganyika Missionary Council. This aspect was pointed out in the preceding chapter. One of the Missionaries who talked about this

question was Dr Bruno Gutman, who was to be quite influential on Sir Charles Dundas and his friends in the 1920s. According to Dundas and Mitchell, the whole concept of Indirect Rule was mainly built up within the controversy of the forms of British rule that should be established in Tanganyika given the fact that the country was unmanageable.

Mitchell, one of the most ardent supporters of Indirect Rule, had even taken some time to go to South Africa to study the native policies there. When attending a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Closer Union of the East African Territories in 1931, Mitchell had suggested that Tanganyika be split into native and mixed areas, and in 1935, as an Acting Governor, he approved the Identification Ordinance No 13 of 1935 which he had drafted himself as soon as he became Assistant Secretary to Native Affairs in 1929.<sup>41</sup> This Ordinance was supposed to inaugurate a pass system in the country. In Lupa, for example, passes had been introduced since 1933. After his retirement from the colonial service in the 1950s, Mitchell became a settler in Kenya, although he had initially wanted to buy land in Tanganyika. Dundas had settled as a settler in South Africa.

According to Mitchell, Indirect Rule was an attempt to resolve the difficulties by adaptation of the "old tribal forms and authorities to modern needs and conditions."<sup>42</sup> Within this context, it was impossible "for example...giving Africans votes to reproduce the British constitution in Africa". It was not because of the admiration of the tribal system as such, "but because it was there, could not be ignored, and it was capable of being modernized and developed. It is of course, essentially and strongly democratic."<sup>43</sup> With native authorities, Africans:

will be making a comfortable living and be governed--as far as local government is concerned--by an extremely democratic system which will be attractive to them because it stretches back into their own past and is adequate to their needs because they will have modernized it under the guidance of British officers. It will know nothing of ballot boxes, but it will be representative and will be able to bring direct pressure to bear on him.<sup>44</sup>

Mitchell concluded, Indirect Rule was the only way to get Africans to rise "above a narrow nationalism" and be able to "look other races in the face".<sup>45</sup>

When Cameron saw the Wagogo of central Tanganyika in 1925, he pondered much about these "primitive people", and wondered what could be made of them if they were brought suddenly and sharply into contact with western civilization in the market square where they sold their cattle. As it became obvious to him and the other officers, the only answer to this social problem was Indirect Rule, because, in any event "what was the object of destroying the institutions of the natives?" given that it was impossible to govern the whole country by British officers, even if their number quadrupled. He could not foresee any future political state in which that was possible "except under a completely Europeanized system of government in which the native would express himself through the ballot box.... Why then destroy the instrument that we must use?"<sup>46</sup> It was necessary to train the African in "accordance to his environment to which he is bound in the soil, instead of being given a European veneer and outlook totally out of keeping with the conditions under which he must live in Africa." An African was to be made to feel "proud of being an African....on the basis of African civilization stimulated in the first instance" by European culture and example. To destroy the loyalty of the people to their native

institutions without creating others, was to create "political chaos and anarchy where some order had previously existed."<sup>47</sup>

The desire, as Cameron and his colleagues admitted, was not simply to "preserve and fortify the true fabric of native society" which they admitted was impossible "at this stage of development." The reason was one could not "close the doors and deny the primary products of tropical Africa to the world and its markets." Africans could participate in the internal and external markets "and thereby acquire a sense of property in the individual without destroying at the same time his conception that he is a member of the society in which he and his forbearers have nurtured." If the "untutored African" remained in the state of nature and produced only subsistence crops, he would be decimated by disease.<sup>48</sup>

The native authorities were to be part of the government machinery and they were to issue orders on subjects such as: prohibition or regulation of intoxicating liquors; prohibition of gambling and possession of weapons; prohibition of acts or conduct which might cause riot or disturbance; prohibition, restriction or requiring matters or things to be done by virtue of "native law or custom for the time being in force and not repugnant to morality or justice, or to the Statute Law." Other duties were, to make orders on matters "of vital importance to the native society" such as pollution or obstruction of water sources and cutting or destroying trees; prevention of spread of infectious or contagious diseases--to human beings and animals; caring for the sick; registration of births and deaths, regulation of movement of stock, burning of grass or bush for purposes of preventing or exterminating tse tse fly:

the requiring any African to cultivate land to such an extent and with such crops as will secure an adequate supply of food

for himself and his family...and for any other purpose which may be approved by the Governor by order, e.g. destruction of locusts, hunting of game, cultivation of poisonous plants and roots, burning of cotton plants to prevent disease, cultivation of native coffee, etc.<sup>49</sup>

There was an elaboration of a whole philosophy on this question of the creation of a "good African" and African civilization in general and the attempt to save the African from annihilating himself. This philosophy ranged from religious, educational, economic up to social structural issues. In terms of social structures, the issues revolved around the question of the collapse of the communal tribal societies which had resulted in the "remote undeveloped countries'" inability to keep its members at home because of the new economic relations, and the fact that there was need to reconcile the new and the old by the creation of African institutions which were capable of retaining people there, instead of leaving production in the hands of old men and women.<sup>50</sup>

Missionaries too contributed in the elaboration of this philosophy. Their change in attitude, from Europeanization of Africans to their re-Africanization, was due to the fact that even before Christianity had been able to scarcely establish itself against the secularizing impact of the philosophies of natural sciences and the application of scientific method to Biblical studies, as an integral part of the civilizing mission it also suffered immensely the impact of World War I:

This catastrophe shattered the faith in the moral values which it had inherited from the nineteenth century, and gravely injured the churches which had seemed to be closely connected with those values....public opinion...no longer felt that western civilisation had incalculable benefits to confer upon inferior races, and which was even being stimulated by the discoveries of social scientists to a revival of romantic cult of the noble savage.<sup>51</sup>

Besides this, missionaries were becoming aware that the spiritual future of Africa was at stake,<sup>52</sup> that there were the Africans themselves who were not a "passive clay to be moulded according to the pattern desired by the present rulers."<sup>53</sup> Western civilization which was irresistably drawing the people of Africa, by this time was, to the missionaries, a "mixture of truth and untruth"; and early missionaries had been "in the main uncritical" towards it, something which had become no longer possible to sustain. While western civilization had made real advancement in science and technology, of which Africans needed to share, there was, however, another side of this civilization: "While it brought about an immense liberation of human personality and opened vast possibilities of development," it also gave "birth to boundless egoism" which threatened to annihilate the society itself. All the bonds and social institutions which unite men--the family and other larger social-units are in the process of dissolution, and society is becoming atomized: the only bond existing is economic necessity.<sup>54</sup>

Dr Bruno Gutman, a veteran missionary in Kilimanjaro, discussed the problem of how African institutions were being affected by western civilization. He believed that Africa still possessed an organic unity, in contrast to the disastrous atomization of western societies. In Africa men remained bound to one another in mutual obligations in the life of the family, clan and tribe, and the content of the African existence was to be found in connection with his fellow men in the cultivation of common life. This, according to him was lost in the western societies, and needed to be preserved in Africa, because western civilization was doing more harm than good to them. Religion and education needed to preserve these qualities in Africa.<sup>55</sup>



Gutman regarded the state as a power whose character is determined by the use of force and its distinction from the neighbouring states "by its dealing with the organic bonds in which the life of the people finds expression, and by its success in absorbing into and developing within its structure the underlying spirit of these bonds." Accordingly, the origins of the state's consciousness of its power lay "at the point in the interlacing roots of tribal organization where the tension between associations based on kinship and those based on age brings about change of balance, and the leadership begins to pass to the latter,..."<sup>56</sup>

The above aspects of the state became even more complicated, according to him, when a superior race established a state for an inferior colonized race. Therefore, under those circumstances, it was necessary and important that the colonized race should retain its spiritual identity which was inseparably bound up with the structure of the tribe and its organic leadership. It was necessary not to allow it to disappear; and the task of every colonial government was to do everything to prevent the disintegration of the social life of the colonized races committed to its charge into a formless mass or individual households. This kind of disintegration is the shortest cut to catastrophe.<sup>57</sup> The colonial state's duty was to introduce the associations:

not only to be supervised by the state, but the state itself, on the principle of voluntary association, takes over the introduction and organization and, where possible, also leadership through an official specially for the purpose....Organizations which do not actually serve their declared objects are to be disbanded.<sup>58</sup>

Money, Gutman declared, was the most dangerous substitute for goods, because it dissolved the organic bonds. It was pitiable that

civilization was destroying the organic community groupings, indigenous educational systems, etc.. He concluded that, their task was to help the African "to preserve and strengthen the ties of kinship and the common occupation of the soil of their fathers." The native tribal spirit was built upon that structure, and it could not exist without them: "Sheltered by this stable home of his culture he will learn without great difficulty to contribute to and take part in the increasing material and intellectual wealth of the world, which is civilization."<sup>59</sup>

The belief in the essentially communal social structures of Africans led to the concentration of populations in almost the whole of Western Tanganyika from the 1920s to 1940s by the state. At first the concentrations took place under the guise of sleeping sickness eradication, and therefore, the native authorities played the central role. Later on, the justification for concentration was found in developmental reasons. People were forcibly moved, and health reasons were quoted. In reality the motives were administrative expediency, labour recruitment, efficient peasant produce collection, soil conservation and game conservation.<sup>60</sup> Mitchell, for example, had written in 1926 that the land of the tribe was normally occupied in as much as people chose to, and that occupation was "generally concentrated round the village of the chief, since concentration was necessary for safety, and, since the European occupation of the country, has tended to spread outwards from the centre...." Because the political policy of the government was based on the tribe, it was necessary, in his view that the land policy be based on the same thing.<sup>61</sup> Mitchell recorded in his diaries many incidents concerning concentrations in the late 1920s and 1930s.

When the Provincial Commissioner of Lindi, for example, proposed to concentrate the population in 1927, he gave out tse tse fly eradication as the reason.<sup>62</sup> In 1932, when the world recession had hit the country and the Government was engaged in the "Plant more Crops Campaign", it was bluntly proposed that the concentration of people would make it easier to administer them and collect the produce: "As populations concentrate it is easier to administer them and, as the produce concentrate, the surplus of production immediately takes on a practical aspect."<sup>63</sup>

In the 1940s, developmental reasons were quoted in the proposals and attempts to concentrate people. In a memorandum in 1945 by Rooke Johnston, the Provincial Commissioner of Lindi, concentrations were described as focal points for purposeful government action, services and fast economic development: "Thus concentrations were described as centres of medical aid, education, agricultural extension work, veterinary services and marketing organizations."<sup>64</sup> This scheme, it was alleged, was acceptable to Africans, because "the movement into large settlements would not be a departure from, but rather a return to tradition". He described the pre-colonial settlements as consisting of large nucleated villages which were built for defence purposes against slave raiders and tribal wars. This pattern, according to him, was broken up by European pacification. Therefore, there was need to restore the historic continuity in the form of "closer settlements", given that there was now a more enlightened breed of colonial administrators. The conclusion was:

I am convinced that the policy of closer settlement can be beneficially applied to large areas of Tanganyika and that it is indeed a condition precedent to real progress on the part of African population. I even go as far as to suggest that it

should become part of the declared policy of government, and an integral part of post-war development.<sup>65</sup>

The scheme was unanimously accepted by the provincial commissioners.

The settlements that were begun in the 1920s and 1930s, it was reported, were attempts to "save the African from himself".<sup>66</sup> People were moved to create wildgame sanctuaries, examples being such as the one at Gombe Stream in Kigoma, where 500 people were removed so as to save 50 families of monkeys and a number of chimpanzees; the case of Mbulu Game reserve in the end of the 1920s; and the gazetting of the areas surrounding Dodoma town as a game reserve in order to preserve a herd of greater Kudu in the 1930s.<sup>67</sup> Other instances took place in Mpanda(1931), Manyoni(1931), and Liwale(1940s). In the latter case, people were moved to make room for the largest game reserve in Africa--the Selous<sup>68</sup> (named after one of the major early British game hunters who also fought against the Germans in the First World War). It was reported in 1944 that the process of settling individual natives had been quite advanced by 1937 when there were approximately 224 settlements of which 171 were in Lake Province. There were also already taking place experimental settlements for "progressive farmers".<sup>69</sup>

During the Governor's Conference with Senior Administrative Officers in 1929, it was noted that there was a tendency in the country for the emergence of co-operative societies among some export crops growers. It was further noted that "in any District or Province where the time was thought to be ripe for the development of co-operative methods of agriculture and animal husbandry they should be so developed." The main stress was on the provision of staff, because experience had shown that "undue haste, injurious action, insufficient consideration of local

customs and conditions are undesirable in any attempt at establishment of a co-operative movement". It had become apparent that co-operatives were essential and needed to be established, registered and inspected.<sup>70</sup>

It was within the conceptions of Indirect Rule that the Government decided to establish the co-operative societies. In the 1920s the Government had tried to establish monopoly marketing boards--in places like Songea, for example. This attempt had completely failed.<sup>71</sup> When discussing the question of labour tax in the Government House with other officials in 1931, Mitchell had emphasized to his colleagues that "The crux of the tax position lay in crops and marketing and not in trying out experiments". He told them that while it was necessary to use the existing methods which have been well tried, it was essential that adequate marketing facilities be provided.<sup>72</sup>

The attempt to create monopoly institutions for marketing of agricultural produce was being made within the context of trying to resolve the tax problem, and this was despite the fact that the native authorities had made the problem less burdensome. Mitchell had theoretical economic reasons for this. When the Executive Committee discussed the new Trades Licencing Ordinances and the Marketing Ordinance in 1932, Mitchell entered in his diary that, the Governor felt it would cause much opposition from the "smaller Indians". But according to him the problem was:

If we do not organise and control marketing it is perfectly clear to me that we shall not be able to keep our little place in the world of economics: indeed, however much we may dislike it the days of 'free trading' are over for good. The 19th C individualist, captain of his soul, free to acquire wealth for himself alone or destroy society to suit himself is gone, I hope for ever.<sup>73</sup>

To establish them, an accusing finger was pointed at the Asian petty traders for their scandalous behaviour of adulterating crops and exploiting the peasants.<sup>74</sup> The Government undertook the task of helping the peasants to establish the co-operatives with the justification that it was trying to stabilize the prices and weights and eliminate adulteration.<sup>75</sup>

Of course, what was said about the Asian traders was true. But beyond this, there were other contradictions: especially the productivity of the peasants, as Tanganyika was the country most hit by the 1930s Great Depression in East Africa.<sup>76</sup> Besides the conflict over the question of control of the territory and suspicion of each other, the other problem was that of marketing the produce. The supporters of the co-operatives maintained that with their organization and control it would be possible to "collect native produce in bulk at a given place and at a given time and thereby attract firms with capital" who would be "able to offer a better price for the produce in bulk than petty traders could for the same amount of produce, collected in driblets over a period of time."<sup>77</sup>

The other consideration was the organization of markets that are officially known. The supporters pointed out that the formation of co-operatives would naturally concentrate exchange activities in locations that seemed most suitable for efficient tax collection. Hawkers and pedlars (the petty traders), as far as the 1920s had been viewed by the Government as undesirable compared to government controlled markets. While it was true that the petty traders paid up to 50 per cent less than the official price for the peasant goods, the official markets reduced the chances of hut and poll tax collectors' evasion, as the

"cash nexus" often became the "cash net", and this was besides the transport costs and market dues.<sup>78</sup> In other words, rather than a defence of the peasants, the struggle against the Asian traders was a struggle for tax collection.

So, like in other struggles, the whole issue was seen by the state as an attempt to introduce an African institution. Mr Stickland, who advised on the issue of co-operation, pointed out that this institution "creates a new integration, a new social fibre, new communal restraints, and is of great value to the community and the race." According to him, it was not possible to divorce the economic from the social and religious life of the African. This was because, "Every man is a human unit and a whole". Although western economists talked in the past of the economic man, they knew that this was an abstraction: "An African has, I think, some difficulty in forming abstract ideas, and will never in practice work in cooperation on purely economic lines..." Therefore, without guidance and control, the co-operatives were going to deal with other issues from the point of view of the government, because the societies not only dealt with better prices, but also credit, education and health, housing and consumer goods, improvement of material life of the community in general "by repressing litigation (arbitration societies) or for the better of the social customs (better societies)"<sup>79</sup>

The co-operatives were viewed as a return to the original African institutions, and the necessity of the co-operatives emanated from the fact that:

In a sense every Bantu village is in fact a co-operative society, for there are many farming operations in which mutual assistance is now given; the idea is neither new nor at all difficult for the natives to grasp, and this makes its mobilization in the manner suggested by no means impossible,

given adequate supervision from the right kind of European staff.<sup>80</sup>

In 1934, the Director of agriculture, Mr Harrison was to allege that the "natives are interested in cooperatives and it is in the bones of many native groups in this territory, they have maintained themselves by a form of co-operation for centuries."<sup>81</sup> The Cooperative Societies Ordinance was passed in 1932.

The conceptions of tribal institutions, concentrations, cooperatives, etc. and the state playing the central role under the guidance of enlightened European Officials lay at the heart of Indirect Rule or African civilization by Europeans. Behind this notion of Indirect Rule was the notion of the tribe, which, supposedly had been broken down by German occupation and hence resulted in undesirable forms of nationalism. This was as far as the Government was concerned, and if there was to be any success in controlling and ruling the rebelling Tanganyikans there was need to make him a "good African" who is not uprooted from the traditions, and hence obeys the authorities: it was an attempt to make Africans internalize the idea that the civilizing mission had the same objective and outlook as theirs.

In essence, all the ideas which were raised by the colonialists were simply aimed at making colonialism effective and at the same time breaking the resistance of the African masses. This resistance is quite explicit from the fears they raised and the general threat posed by the Tanganyikans. The irony is, some officials would later admit, Tanganyika "had no developed tribal system, in which, indeed, the Germans seem to have done their best to destroy such a system."<sup>82</sup> Mitchell was later to admit that even Sir D. Cameron, "surprisingly" enough lacked in



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knowledge of Africans and the forms and nature of tribal authority".<sup>83</sup> Cameron was later to admit that in some "tribes" there existed no forms of authority in the sense of paramount chiefs as heads. Societies which did not have paramount chiefs were such as the Wanyakyusa, Wachagga, Wamasai, Waluguru, Wazaramo, Wamatumbi, Wasukuma, etc.. The colonial officers had to forcibly create chiefdoms or continue using akidas and jumbes.<sup>84</sup> Some of the forms of resistance from the 1920s are reviewed in the next section.

### *3.2 Protest and Resistance in the inter War period*

The inter-War period poses many difficulties, especially when reviewing the forms of protest, because of the suppression or mutilation of some of the facts by the British colonial officers. In the 1920s, even the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations which watched over Tanganyika complained that they "could not understand the territory's financial position based on information in the official budgets...the administration would not publish certain kinds of detail for understandable reasons."<sup>85</sup> Besides the Mandate position there was the fact that Britain was trying to prove to the world that Tanganyikans were more comfortable under their administration and discredit the Germans. There raged a propaganda war in the 1920s between the British and the Germans, with the latter trying to demand their colony back on the ground that the Tanganyikans wanted them back.<sup>86</sup> In Mitchell's diaries, for example, one finds the following recordings for February 8, 1929 and June 10, 1929: "A memo from the ACPA for the S of S the usual mixture of deliberate lies and half truths, but it took me a long time to draft the covering despatch"; when in Iringa,

"I think there must be a lot of cases not recorded. Punishments are severe but the Wahehe are said to need it."<sup>87</sup>

In spite of such suppression of facts, the discussion in the preceding section demonstrates that the administration was confronted with resistance. What is discernible from the statements of the colonial officials is what they were responding to. Therefore most of what is discussed in this section is a direct continuation of the preceding section. The forms of resistance discussed here, are not simply placed exclusively within anti-colonial context as has been the tendency on most studies on Tanganyika: other forms of social struggles and struggles against arbitrariness in general are also considered.<sup>88</sup> All that is done in this section is to come forward with a broad generalization, rather than a detailed discussion of the forms of resistance, within the context of the theme dealt with in this study.

Besides what was discussed in the preceding section one of the most obvious indications of disturbances in the early 1920s is discernible in the distribution of ordinary budget of the government expenditure in those years. For example, the total expenditure for 1923-4 was £1,519,931: of this amount, £201,533 were used for education, agriculture and health; £227,003 for territorial administration (Governor, Secretariat, legal departments, district administration, etc); £291,266 for military, police and prisons; and £572,377 for public works, railroads, highways, posts and telegraphs: "The expenditure in Group III for military, police and prisons, amounting to 20 per cent of total, is considerably above the average in British colonies. This is doubtless due to necessary reorganization of the population after the disruptions of the war."<sup>89</sup> Such a high amount of expenditure for

prisons, police and the military, testify to the fact that the administration had to deal with a rebellious population.

In the first report to the League of Nations in 1920, Sir Horace Byatt pointed out that there was a highly uncertain state of the African opinion in the territory. He further noted that, "occasional individual outbreaks, involving possibly the death of some government officials, would seem inevitable".<sup>90</sup> In January 1919, for example, with the dealers selling goods at 300 and 400 per cent profit, askaris had complained to the officers that the prices are too high. The officers had told them that if the prices are too high, then they should not pay anything. As a consequence of this, Indian shops in Dar es Salaam were stormed and plundered: "Shots were fired, Englishmen were maltreated--two are supposed to have been killed, though this was not confirmed. Natives rose in a tumult, and were very embittered with the English."<sup>91</sup> It was more or less as a result of such disturbances that the Government in 1921 introduced a Collective Punishment Ordinance which "permitted the government to impose punishments on recalcitrant tribes or communities, for native cooperation was still not taken for granted".<sup>92</sup>

The early 1920s period saw a variety of people coming and going out of the country with a great many ideas; some of which were openly hostile to European rule. One of such people was Hanoc Sindano, from Mbozi in South-Western Tanganyika. Sindano had worked in South Africa, where he became familiarized with the Watch Tower Church and later became a member of the Independent Watch Tower Church. He was deported from Southern Rhodesia in 1917 because of his anti-European stance. Sindano preached that:

God made [Europeans] know [Africans] and sent them with good things and many things we see to come and give us free, and

teach about God, and when they get into the country they hide everything and teach us very little about God; they teach us how to write but they did not give us things free what God gave them to give us. They make us work very hard and give us very little for work we have done to them, and there fore if we pray very hard with all our hearts, God will hear our prayers and will clear all the Europeans back home to England and everything will be ours, and we will be as rich as they are.<sup>93</sup>

He went on preaching that, "The English have no right whatsoever in the country, they are committing injustice against the natives in pretending to have rights."<sup>94</sup>

As far as the colonizers were concerned, Sindano's preaching was not reflecting what could be considered an "African attitude": it was subversion. According to the beliefs of the Independent Watch Tower Church, "The world was in its last age; the great empires and nations were instruments of Satan; so also were the historic churches,....All these were to be overthrown in one last struggle. The world would then become the inheritance of the true believers, the witnesses of the intentions of God, irrespective of colour or race."<sup>95</sup> Religious syncretist movements were part of the opposition, just like in Maji Maji.

This issue of direct hatred to Europeans was but one among others. By the 1920s, inequalities had already emerged among Africans because of differentiation as a result of colonial capitalist development. The history of these inequalities pre-dates colonial occupation. Even in the 19th century, "the ideal golden age of communal unity, brotherhood and equality had never fully existed in Tanzania". The same century also saw the emergence of fears of witchcraft which "was a reflection of a general sense of insecurity and division". Given that in its participation in the abolition of slave trade, Christianity gave hope

for equality, brotherhood and dignity, it was hoped that it would provide "an answer to divisions *within* African societies; that Christianity could provide an answer to witchcraft". But with further increase of witchcraft fears, people felt that Christianity had failed to bring brotherhood and unity which they hoped for.<sup>96</sup>

To reinforce this aspect, missionaries had all along preached individualism. With the increase in differentiation, the protests that became widespread were those against inequality.<sup>97</sup> Thus in Rungwe, for example, one of the few areas where many independent churches became established, people looked upon Christianity as a way of "bringing peace and prosperity to a whole *community*".<sup>98</sup> In Ufipa, the tendency was for the pagans to "see christians as a divisive element opposed to traditional village comradeship and unity."<sup>99</sup> In many areas of Tanganyika, disillusionment expressed itself in a resentment against both missionaries and African converts. Very often, christians were taken as people who undermined customary communal life.

Far more important than the independency churches in Tanzania were the revival movements. These were brought from Bukoba in the end of the 1930s. "By 1946 *balokole* ('saved ones') were at work in Dodoma and during the next twenty years they influenced every protestant <sup>church</sup> ~~cxmrh~~". They demanded public confession of sins; and they were a "reaction against factors of disengagement in the church"<sup>100</sup>:

It caught fire in a church where the idea of sin had been taken too lightly, where drunkenness, heathenism, superstition, adultery, idleness, and levity flourished under the cloak of nominal christianity. One could no longer distinguish, by their behaviour, who was a christian and who was not. The church had become worldly, and the world churchly.<sup>101</sup>

What the "saved ones" did was to set the anarchy of personal experience against worldliness and institutionalization. They created communities which superseded the family and the clan in their fellowship of local cell and mass assembly, and this fellowship was open to even "Europeans who were saved and abandoned pretensions of superiority." They prided themselves on lacking organization and leaders. In places like Bukoba, they criticized the missionaries and the converts, and their movement was designatedly egalitarian. Unlike the other movements, the "saved ones" were more hostile to African cultures than the missionaries. They rejected even secular dancing, alcohol and polygamy. This movement was finally broken in the 1950s.<sup>102</sup>

Some of the independent churches which were established in the few areas in Tanganyika in the 1920s and 1930s were: Watch Tower, African National Church, African Inland Church, The Last Church of God and His Christ and the Malakite Church. When Sindano established the Watch Tower Church in Mbozi in 1919, the British officials became very afraid of this movement. Their fear was based on the possibility of this movement getting into contact with Pan-Africanism and "thereby producing a great network of anti-white controlled religious movement throughout East and Central Africa...." When the leaders of this movement began what they termed "a campaign of vilification of the recognised missionary societies, i.e. the London Missionary Society and the Roman Catholic Church" in 1923, the Government served a deportation order to 17 Watch Tower followers. These refused to go, and were finally jailed.<sup>103</sup>

The Watch Tower movement went as far as setting up villages, within an attempt to resolve the problems in the rural areas. These villages

were called Jerusalem. The members of these villages refused to share in the so-called colonial development.

By rejecting authority of the chief and the customs of the tribe and at the same time rejecting the authority of the British administration and the teachings of the missionaries, the Watch Tower believers did create new societies on small scale. Informants today comment in Ufipa upon the 'fraternal life the faithful lived in these Watch Tower villages' and upon the supposed fact that witchcraft fear does not exist there.<sup>104</sup>

On the other hand, the African National Church among the Wanyakyusa produced statements of a religious, social and political nature which stressed the importance of christianizing the whole community and attacked the elitism of missionaries. They criticized the missionaries for not imparting Christ and education in "such a way as to fit with the manners and customs of the people" and stated that they believed that "the immoralities...prevailing among" them were a direct "result of the unnatural position into which the African had been driven,..."; that they believed in the "fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man regardless of colour and creed, and that the African religion with its traditions, laws and customs was instituted by Him so that Africans may realise Him by their own observance."<sup>105</sup> This aspect of the cultural and communal aspirations was also one of the issues which the Last church of God and his Christ stressed.

Besides the African independency and religious revival movement, other movements which expressed discontent with the divisions brought about by colonial capitalism in the 1920s and 1930s were: African Islam, which expressed the views of people who did not control the Islamic establishment; and movements which were neither Moslem nor Christian, led by prophet-like figures who "promised an end to fear and social tension and inequality, and an end to withcraft".<sup>106</sup> Taken together, all



these ideas were concerned with the problems which had arisen as result of the emergence of rich people and privileged groups among Africans:

Many people regarded such groups as selfish deserters from the community. Moreover many people in the rural areas did not understand the working of the wider world; they feared that it would destroy their own community and wanted to find some means of getting back to the understandable, and more or less egalitarian, social groupings of the past.<sup>107</sup>

The latter is the same feeling which prevailed during Maji Maji when African Christians were called upon to repudiate the white ways and rejoin African societies.<sup>108</sup>

In the area where the Maji Maji war begun, there emerged a movement called Ngoja cult by around 1925. It was unleashed by Ngoja bin Kimeta, a Mngindo. It is reported that this movement almost resembled the Maji Maji affair in content. Ngoja had mobilized followers, at first claiming to smell out witches by agency of water--called *kimehe*--with magical power through a series of trials by ordeal. This developed to detecting crimes standing several years undetected. The disciples of the movement spread throughout the southern part of Tanganyika among people who participated in Maji Maji. Anybody who drank the water, it was asserted, could be invulnerable against wild beasts, poisoned arrows and spear thrusts. A colonial official wrote that this movement had a "certain amount of success among weak-minded old women, and their activity caused a degree of uneasiness."<sup>109</sup> Thus:

When the chiefs, whose former powers had been restored to them by the British system of indirect rule, awoke to the dangers of these claims, they took prompt action. Ngoja disciples were rounded up and fined heavily, their takings being confiscated. Ridicule and derision did the rest. But from the beginning to the end the progress of this movement was thoroughly known to the authorities.<sup>110</sup>

Mitchell, when visiting the Southern parts of Tanganyika in early 1929 had made an attempt to comprehend the essence of this movement. At the end of this year he recorded in his diary: "Ngoja on the go again. Lindi this time...I have an uneasy suspicion that we are being damn silly about it."<sup>111</sup>

Although the official above reported that the movement was stamped out with the help of the chiefs who were restored, the fact is that the Wangindo, like most of the communities around this area were a stateless community: the chiefs were imposed upon them. When Margery Perham visited them in 1929, the Wangindo had categorically denied their participation in Maji Maji on the pretext that they fled to the bush; and that they did the same thing during the First World War. They could not admit having participated in movements which were not approved by Europeans. In fact, the Wangindo, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter played a very central role in Maji Maji. They were not telling Perham the truth on this regard. Asked further by Perham, most of them admitted that they were non-christians and non-moslems: "Did they believe in God? No. Nor yet in devil? Pressed as to who sent rain they now admitted, obviously to please us, that there *might* be a God. But it was no devil who withheld it: it must be the same God in a difficult mood. For themselves annihilation was the end of life. No spirit survived."<sup>112</sup>

The significance of Ngoja becomes even more obvious when examined from the point of view of the next movement: Mchape. This movement was to spread in the early 1930s. It spread from Malawi, and was very "critical of the failure of christian missions and converts to bring love and end fear: it was very critical of the inequalities caused by

missions." The followers of the movement wanted to "'purge' the country and save the people by casting away all evils which have been in force for many years."<sup>113</sup> One of the Mchape leaders had asserted:

Your missionaries came in this country some 50 years ago. They tried all their best to save the people and teach you not to kill each other yet without success. But we feel sympathy with you for you have lost your dear friends, not because God took them away but by being poisoned by these wizards whom you will see today. We follow the commandment of God which says '*Thou shalt not kill.*' This commandment is being observed and fulfilled by us more than other religions. For they all fail to serve the people but we do. I know that some of you christians argue...but you must not trust christians, they are the people who are hiding in this religion and are great wizards more than anyone.'<sup>114</sup>

As for the Moslems, their struggles go way back. In 1914, there emerged arguments about having an Africanized and democratic Islam. By this year, Moslems in Tabora were objecting to the power of the ruling Arab oligarchy. They wanted Islam to acquire a character approved by the members. In the 1920s and 1930s Moslems had become divided between Left and Right. There was an argument, by this time, about the ceremony known as Zikri, in which the Left stood for drumming in the mosque and more participation of women, and in general, a more Africanist Islam. The British administrators were sympathetic to the Right, just as they were sympathetic to missionaries against independency movements. This was clearly because of the political nature of the very struggles, because it was this Left which was associated with what the Government called as Pan-Islamic influence. In 1933, Mitchell had to send a confidential circular to all provincial commissioners and commissioner of the police cautioning them on Zikri.<sup>115</sup>

In the early 1920s, many Moslems had been deported on political grounds as a result of this struggle. One of the Moslems who were

deported was Majaliwa Habibu of Tabora. He was deported under His Excellency's Order of 11th January, 1922, because he was one of the people who caused "friction among members of the Mohammedan community in 1922." D.J. Jardine, the Acting Governor in 1933 stated that Majaliwa was deported "on the grounds that he was a person conducting himself so as to be dangerous to peace and good order in the territory."<sup>116</sup>

Broadly, the above ideas of protest in the 1920s and 1930s were an expression of real struggles against the colonial forms of domination, exploitation and inequalities. Anne Dundas was to remark that, "At present day almost every political disturbance in Africa has its roots in some mischievous belief or supposed supernatural agency...."<sup>117</sup> The struggles manifested themselves in a variety of ways; hence, the British response: Indirect Rule. Following below are some of the known African responses practically, besides the movements reviewed above.

As soon as the Native Hut and Poll Tax Law was introduced in 1922 (a law which aimed at forcing Africans to turn to wage labour and also to produce raw materials, and did not count the man, but also the number of wives in terms of the huts owned) people in Songea began to build "one big house to hold all the family like the coastal houses, to lessen the burden of taxation" instead of the round conical roofed houses.<sup>118</sup> Other societies also protested, as was classically done by the Wanyakyusa in the 1920s by direct refusal to pay taxes. The tax boycott by the Wanyakyusa was led by the Amafumu--"a very powerful hereditary people whose business is to represent and protect the commoners or the peasantry" as Mitchell defined them.<sup>119</sup> The protest against taxation was a protest against proletarianization on a wider scale. Africans refused

to enter wage labour, as Mitchell and Major Orde Browne noted in those years, taxation did not seem to yield the necessary results in terms of forcing them to enter wage labour or produce export crops. As a result of this, "At other times there have been individual employers who could not get labour when they needed it urgently, or in some cases at all." The Government responded to this by an introduction of a "policy of forced labour, camouflaged as voluntary, against their advice and that of the Chief Native Commissioner...."; so wrote Mitchell. According to him, there was reluctance to "leave the home village and go out and work...certainly due in part to the bad treatment of the porters in the War and the lamentably excessive casualties among them."<sup>120</sup>

Methods which were employed to create/acquire wage labour by the British administrators were even more shrewd than those of the Germans who employed direct forced labour, given that the Mandate provisions and later on in the 1950s the International Labour Organization Convention forbade the use of compulsory labour except for "essential public works and services". The British had to constantly provide rationalizations or suppress information on the use of force. There are three main forms of forced labour they used.

The first one was the so-called 'communal' or 'tribal turn-out': This was the requisition of labour of villagers for a definite period of time--once or twice in a year. This practice began in 1919 when people were forced to work for 60 days in a year. It was given legal recognition in the Native Authority Ordinance of 1927, whereby the provision of labour was for 20 to 30 days in a year. The justification for this practice was found in the so-called extermination of tse tse fly. These 'turn-outs' were quite widespread. According to Shivji, the

Provincial Commissioner of Central Province (what is now Dodoma and Mpwapwa), for example, proposed to call 40,000 people in 1948; 24,000 in 1951 and 67,000 in 1954 to work for ten days on roads, bush clearance and dams, wells and contour banks building. The earlier figures which are not available must have been higher, as is discernible from some observations made in those years.<sup>121</sup>

When in Tanganyika in 1929/30, Margery Perham at some point accompanied a Provincial Commissioner of the Coastal Province to Rufiji, besides meeting people who were worn out "with the law's delay", and many other problems, three naked and shy Africans came to their tent to complain to the Provincial Commissioner "that by someone's orders eighty of them have been called up for a long journey to do forced labour on the road." These people did not even know whether they were going to be paid or not; and their main concern was the fact that they were being taken at the time of the year when they wanted to get back to work on their farms if they were to avoid faring badly. The Provincial Commissioner got angry about this, the reason being the fact that these people came to complain when a researcher on the colonial problems was there. He claimed that the order must have been given by an unsupervised junior, and it was unjustifiable; that the execution must have been done by an "unsupervised and unpleasant native foreman, with all the petty oppression and cheating that may mean."<sup>122</sup> The following discussion took place between Perham and the Africans who came to complain:

'Is it the custom of the Serikali (Government) to force labour for roads?'

'Yes, it is the custom.'

'Do they get paid?'

'We don't know.'

'You are ill.' (This to one man who looks ready to faint).

'Yes very ill in head and stomach.'<sup>123</sup>

According to Brett, the labour recruiters employed very rough methods in recruitment. These included beating, and other corporal punishments, bribing the chiefs and even direct cheating, "and labour in the estates was often reported to be 'unruly'".<sup>124</sup> As a result of the corruption of the Native Authorities in labour recruitment the Master and Servant Ordinance of 1923, Section No 57, tried to minimize this practice by prohibition of bribes to the Native Authorities through "gifts" or "offer of money for serving labour".<sup>125</sup> Accompanied by the above method was the requirement that "all Africans had to register themselves and move with passes indicating whether or not they had performed labour on plantations" as a way to force Africans to go and seek for wage employment.<sup>126</sup> There was also a law against "Destitute Persons", introduced in 1923, which required that all persons without "visible" or sufficient means of supporting themselves to be brought to court or detained for a month while some work was found for them.

The second method involved the so-called "Tax defaulters". According to the 1922 Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance, one could pay taxes in kind by labour in public works or pay in cash.<sup>127</sup> Between 1933 and 1942, an average of 25,000 tax defaulters were put to work annually.<sup>128</sup> Mitchell's diaries have numerous scattered entries on the fact that tax evasion was a very serious problem in the country. At some point he even commented that it was thanks to the establishment of Native authorities that the number was not as spectacular as it was in the early 1920s. In his view, tax defaulters could manage to get away because they sold their produce to Indian petty traders.<sup>129</sup> When in Njombe, towards the end of 1933, he met a case of two messengers who had been beaten up by the people when they were sent to collect tax: "The tax position is

fair,...But the default rate is much too high, and tax labour should be called out."<sup>130</sup>

The last method was labour conscription. This method became especially rampant during the Second World War, whereby Native Authorities had to supply labourers to work for 60 days. As for the other times the following figures indicate the magnitude of the usage of this method. 27,000 men were required to work under this method in 1927, and in the 1940s and 1950s an average of 9,000 men were conscripted annually. Within this policy, there was also forced military services: between 1940 and 1943, a total of 67,000 Africans were conscripted for military service by force. During the Second World War, there was no distinction between private and public works, and this was especially the case with the fall of the British allies in the East (Java, Malaya and Phillipines). East African colonies had at this time to provide food and sisal for the troops. As a result of the Compulsory Service Ordinance of 1940 (No 23), by the end of 1944 over 35 per cent of labour in rubber production and 25 percent in food production was conscripted. 60 per cent of the conscripted labour was employed by private capital. There were 86,000 workers who were conscripted between 1942 and 1945.<sup>131</sup>

Officially, forced labour was finally done away with in 1954.<sup>132</sup> But besides forced labour, there was also wide usage of female and juvenile labour. It is not easy to determine the extent of the employment of these forms of labour in the pre-World War II period, but many non-official sources indicate its existence. Mrs A. Dundas, for example, made the following observation about the early 1920s:

...side by side with the interests in the services and the augmentation of church membership (which in turn augments the offerings to the mother church) is the cultivation and marketing of output from their own plantations, in which are employed



many children and adult christians, whose labour is inexpensive. The mission schools minister also to the agricultural needs of the mission, pupils attending two or three days a week during the planting season, and working in the mission fields the remainder. Actual school terms are generally confined to the rainy season, when little coffee cultivation is possible, and when the fewest number of children can attend because of inclement weather.<sup>133</sup>

It was in 1938 that female employment in night work was for the first time legally prohibited. The Employment of Women and Young Persons Ordinance of 1940, which was amended in 1943 also proves the fact that employment of these forms of labour was widespread. While this Ordinance prohibited the employment of children, it also legalized their employment in the diamond sorting from gravel and tea industries. The essence of this Ordinance was simply to provide some limits to child and female labour rather than prohibit it.<sup>134</sup>

Enumerations conducted in the 1940s and 1950s showed that child and female labour constituted between 10 and 15 per cent of total wage force and child labour was almost  $\frac{1}{2}$  of this. Most of it was employed in agriculture--weeding and clearing, coffee picking and harvesting, picking pyrethrum flowers and kapok. Child labour was also employed in sisal estates on drying lines; in mining for breaking ore; and in ginneries in feeding gas. This was the cheapest labour compared to the other forms. In Mbagala estate, for example, women were paid shs 7/= for thirty tasks and men were paid shs 10/= for the same tasks in 1941. Women constituted  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the male counter parts in Lusanda estate. In 1933, wages for unskilled children varied from shs 2/50 to shs 3/50 including food rations, while wages for unskilled adults varied from shs 8/= to shs 10/= including food rations. In fact the colonial administration and the policies defended juvenile labour.<sup>135</sup>

The above methods of acquiring labour are an *indication* of the problems of labour acquisition which the colonial government was facing in the 1920s. This fact is confirmed by the admittance by the Labour Department in 1929 that the "Native Authorities appeared to have a beneficial effect on the flow of labour...."<sup>136</sup> In spite of this help by the Native authorities, the problem of labour recruitment still remained acute. This problem was compounded with that of contract breaking, absence without leave, refusal to work, etc.. A lot of contract breaking cases were reported in Arusha and Moshi during this period. It was also observed that as far as contracts are concerned, "The African workmen is, in fact proving distinctly shrewd and apt in acquiring knowledge of conditions of employment and, particularly, in exploiting his very strong position owing to the demand for labour being always in excess of supply."<sup>137</sup> The other cases were those of desertion. These were also very common in the 1920s, but became less in the 1930s.<sup>138</sup>

It was reported in these years that there was a problem of "certain tribes [who] definitely dislike the wage earning system and prefer to better themselves by the sale of their produce, even though this may entail more work for less result." This was especially the case among the sections of the population which were "formerly exposed to continual calls for forced labour", people like the Waluguru, Wangindo, and others. These people would not accept wage work at all "even at convenient seasons". If they took work for a while, soon they got alarmed and went home. This was a slight change compared to "some six years ago when it was virtually impossible to obtain a single labourer from these people except by a direct order from a government authority." It was concluded that there was no doubt that the "hatred of forced

labour persists, in the subconscious mind is a distaste for any kind of work for an employer even under attractive conditions."<sup>139</sup>

Even the concentration of the people in settlements and the imposition of quarantines in the 1920s and 1930s, it is reported, could not have been successful without "energetic measures which had been assisted by the police and the administration".<sup>140</sup> In these struggles, whereby the police and the administration had to be used, it was mainly the chiefs who were the most resented by the people. It was felt that, besides the privileges they had, they were nothing but government tools at the local levels. Chiefs and the native authorities in general consisted of people with official favour, and they were the ones who were involved in labour recruitment, forcing people to produce what the colonial government required, measures to eradicate tse tse fly, prevention of soil erosion, concentration of population, control of grazing, tax collection, etc. The result was that refusal to pay taxes, to become wage labourers, to be concentrated was also active opposition to the native authorities and the government itself individually or at the local level in general.

In fact, according to Major Orde Browne who headed the Labour Department towards the end of the 1920s, it was "not necessary to expect action in form of mob-violence or armed resistance" in the 1920s and 1930s. While these could occur in isolated instances, the tendency was to form other forms of organization because, according to him, the African had already seen that he could not win with 'impis'.<sup>141</sup> In 1932 he was to point out that it was "indeed almost impossible to discover any sort of governmental activity as regards the native" which did not,

hold the potentiality of serious conflict with tribal customs, and corresponding trouble; less conspicuous, but even more

important, is the unforeseen or unknown effect that may be produced on village life by the introduction of some administrative improvement, or it is believed....The creation of a detribalized mass of cynical sceptics who revere no law and respect no authority except the rule of force, is a menace to all civilised governments....'Les révolutions qui commencement sont en réalité les croyances qui finissent.'<sup>142</sup>

In other words, the government did not necessarily face another Maji Maji; instead, it was resisted in other forms, which were mostly articulated in the bills, methods used to acquire labourers and force people to produce raw materials, ordinances and policies; but passed officially unrecorded.

Way back in 1922, the Wamasai were engaged in a fierce struggle against the Veterinary Department. The relations had deteriorated "to the point of far too frequent fights with the veterinary guards." In an incident which took place at Longido, the Director of Veterinary tried as hard as he could to harangue on the value and wisdom of his department, "the duty of obedience, especially in matters of quarantine and stock movement and so on." When he finished, one of the Wamasai, an Ol Gores (elder) spoke for the rest of them after conferring briefly: "'Is it quite impossible', he said, 'to teach a European *anything* about cattle? Could you not let us have a few of your Laio--boys of nine to twelve--whom we could teach? We do really want to help you.'<sup>143</sup> In December of the same year, it was reported that "By a succession of untoward happenings, unrest among a section of the Masai tribe has culminated in an outbreak of a party of young warriors, who have taken to the forest and are defying authority...." It was suggested that the best method to suppress them was to use the Walumbwa who were the ancient enemies of the Wamasai. The editor of the *East African Standard* who reported this incident objected to the use of such a method and

suggested that it would be much better to use the Kings African Rifles. This unrest spread up to Kenya.<sup>144</sup>

Around the same time, Charles Dundas as a Provincial Commissioner in an official tour, encountered his first difficulty with the porters in the same district. It was the custom to send back to their homes each day the porters who had carried the loads from the last camp, "but not until a substantial meal has been given them and as many hours' rest as they chose to take." In Masailand, "they were unaware that the *Bwana's* orders were to be obeyed or penalties incurred." There was no meat awaiting the official's arrival, nor were there any porters for the following day's journey, and their "own men were tired and in an ugly mood."<sup>145</sup>

When a "ragged-looking Masai chief", according to Anne Dundas (The Masai had no chiefs--C.S.L.), arrived with two followers, Charles Dundas demanded to know the "meaning of this defection". No excuses were accepted, and several porters among those who were discontented were sent in "pursuit of the herd of cattle which had lately passed", and soon came back "with two or three bulls". Before the matter could be settled, there was heard a cry that a bull had escaped. A young Masai had come to rescue the bull, and no attempt had been made by the porters to stop him. Charles Dundas was very angry and ordered the confiscation of the rest of the bulls. The result of this was to make the porters who were on strike go without food, and the affair was to be dealt with the next day. In the morning, it was found that one of the bulls held at "ransom" had been strangled by the striking porters--"presumably out of revenge for deprivation of their usual feast, and to prevent the Mohammedan members of our household from enjoying any of the

meat..." New porters had to be brought from Kilimanjaro and the rebellious porters were taken as prisoners.<sup>146</sup>

In 1927, while in the same province as a Provincial Commissioner, Mitchell was to complain that the Wambugwe who lived in the south of the Wamasai who had most of the donkeys were refusing to sell them. This was in February 1927.<sup>147</sup> Four months later, when he was on his way back to Arusha from big game hunting "a hooligan threw a stone" at his car. A few days later he wrote that there were "Reported attempts to derail trains near Lembeni" in the same Province.<sup>148</sup>

As far as the agriculturalists were concerned, much of the Government efforts in the 1920s were given to location of areas which could be incorporated in export crop production, so as to hasten the post- World War I economic recovery. Some research stations for introduction of new agricultural husbandry were established in various areas, among them being Singida and Rufiji. Mr Wakefield, one of the ablest agricultural officers (according to the colonial government), established the Mpanganya Research Station in Rufiji. This station concentrated on experiments such as sowing of seeds, early weeding and spacing of cotton and rice. According to Wakefield, if these experiments and instructions were followed by the peasants, productivity could be enhanced. However, the instructions and the guidance were not followed, and Wakefield blamed this on the lack of "tribal authority" among the Warufiji. He quipped that Africans were indolent, who required firmness if they were to be developed.<sup>149</sup> The latter goes to show that all the claims about Africans being lazy, stupid, fatalistic, etc, are also an expression of the resistance the colonialists faced.

As for the cotton experiments, Wakefield observed in 1928 that "the native population, apart from the resident in the western area of the district, did not undertake the planting of cotton during the year, relying upon their harvest of food stuffs to pay their taxes."<sup>150</sup> When Wakefield left Rufiji in 1934, he claimed to have made headway. But as soon as he had gone, it was reported, the Warufiji forgot everything. The Department of Agriculture was left wondering what was wrong with them. The Department finally concluded that for the time being the Warufiji "would provide a psychologist with a lifetime study".<sup>151</sup>

Like the Wamasai and the Warufiji, the people of Dodoma and Singida did not fair any better in the eyes of the colonialists. Most often the people of Dodoma refused to part with their land for agricultural purposes and preferred to pay their taxes by selling cattle, while the Government encouraged them to cultivate groundnuts. The Wanyaturu of Singida resisted a fixed percentage take-off of everyone's cattle on the basis that it would make the rich richer and the poor poorer.<sup>152</sup> In 1933 it was feared that there might be violence among the Wagogo, when they refused to accept Chief Omari Mpendu who was imposed upon them by the Government. The Government decided to coerce them to accept him, much as it was known that the Wagogo had openly said that Mpendu was not their chief.<sup>153</sup>

Even in areas where, supposedly, the idea of "improvement" had been accepted, the colonial agents did not have a smooth time in the 1920s. Writing about the irrigation system of the Wachagga in the 1920s, Anne Dundas noted that the peasants had cunningly diverted the countless streams from the rivers to the extent of causing dissention among settlers, who also needed the water for irrigation.<sup>154</sup>

In a nutshell, in the countryside in general, protests centred around questions of anti-erosion measures (compulsory tie-ridging and terracing, destocking, control of grazing, etc.); improved methods of cultivation, animal husbandry and those aimed at famine "prevention" (compulsory cultivation of crops such as cassava and groundnuts). That is, it was mostly issues which surrounded the question of land-use. The measures were mainly enforced by the native authorities under the powers given to them. The anti-erosion rules were in existence in almost all districts by 1937. During the same period, attempts were being made to regulate the cultivation methods of export crops. These were introduced in Bukoba in 1930, in Kilimanjaro in 1932, in Lake and Eastern Province in 1935. After the introduction of further rules in Bukoba--rules which provided for the inspection and enforced improvement of the quality of coffee--, there were widespread reactions which ended up in a riot against the native authorities. The same thing happened in Kilimanjaro; and such reactions were to become even more widespread after the Second World War when more agricultural schemes were introduced. These aspects will be discussed further in Chapter Five. The above is summarised in Bates formulation:

The feeling of Africanism manifested itself in one major sphere--concern for land. As population increased and settled cultivation became the rule, sensitivity about control of land increased markedly. The Chagga nearly rioted in 1933 over a suggestion that certain European species of trees be planted, believing that this might give Europeans rights in the land involved; in the 1940's alienation was felt to be a major grievance in Sukumaland, although no agricultural land in that area had ever passed to a non-African.<sup>155</sup>

Even the youths had their own grievances in those years. For example, in April 1933, there was a rebellion of youths in Musoma. The Provincial Commissioner of Musoma reported this in May 1933 to the



Secretary of Native Affairs. these disturbances took place in the chiefdom of Ikizu, where "some youthful members of the Waikizu attempted to flout the authority of their parents and elders." The youths had openly defied the native authorities and the elders and had "threatened that any attempt on the part of the messengers or headmen to arrest and bring them before the Native Court would be resisted by force." The trouble had arisen as result of the some youths being summoned to appear before the native court for hunting lions in Serengeti Complete Game Reserve. They refused , and proceeded to "blow the horns" throughout Ikizu, calling a meeting of the youths.<sup>156</sup>

When the Chief sent a clerk messenger and elders to ask them to abandon their "folly" and come to court, they "threatened them and chased them away". Some of the youths were advocating the boycott of the Native Court, also "to ignore any orders particularly those by the elders relating to cultivation of crops, hunting game, etc." The youths "(a)...resented their elders ordering them to cultivate. (b)...wanted to be allowed to hunt, particularly lions without restrictions." The district authorities had to intervene with the police. Finally, the ringleaders were collected. the elders complained bitterly that the youths were lazy and refused to help in the farms, and that the famine of 1931 was largely due to the refusal by the young generation to cultivate. The elders had been ordered to cultivate food and cash crops and the Native Authority had imposed a penalty in the form of sheep or goat for failure to cultivate. Mitchell's comment on this incident is very telling in relation to the general situation and the attitudes of the youths during this period and the part supposed to be played by Native Authorities:

The insubordination of African youths which is a result of disobedience to parental authority is beginning to make its appearance. The most difficult problem which faces African parents to-day is the disobedience of their children. Some people attribute it to slackness on the part of the parents and some to other causes. Personally I think it is due to the transitional period between primitive and advanced life (civilization). Independence of living which is brought about by the individual earning of money is at the root of the evil....The remedy lies, probably, in strict tribal and school discipline; and the Native authorities have an important part to play in this work in order to preserve not only the tribal fabric but also the peace of the country.<sup>157</sup>

These problems of the "transitional period" were not confined to the peasants only. There are unrecorded instances of strikes among the workers, such as that of the porters who worked for Dundas, and other local strikes on sisal estates and elsewhere before the 1930s. In the 1930 Department of Labour Report--a Department which was established in 1927--it was stated that one of the most unfortunate things was, in one of the estates which allegedly had a good reputation "The rising rate of mortality and sickness was concealed for sometime owing to the reprehensible failure of the manager to report deaths, which eventually amounted to seventy-eight in six months in a labour force of about 2,100".<sup>158</sup> The Labour Department took notice of this after it had reached a serious stage. This aspect is mentioned in order to show extent to which information was concealed by the employers: things were reported only when they had reached an alarming situation.

Even where labour disputes were reported, the Labour Department presented them in such a way that it was made to be understood that they were uncommon things and also repulsive. This kind of reporting is besides the falsification of information which was quite common in these years, as it has been demonstrated by Mitchell's comments about most of the reports which were quoted above. For example, it was mentioned in

the same report that due to the reductions of wages as a result of the depression, disorders were expected because of "lack of communication between various groups, and absence of any popular press...." As a result of the cuts, "the obvious corollary" was a "strike or outburst of violence". Thus:

One ugly riot occurred on an estate, where a large party of armed natives threatened the manager with violence, and began to do serious damage to trolley lines and other property; happily a labour officer arrived before the situation had become critical and he was able to pacify the majority of the crowd and persuade them to resume work. The eight ringleaders were arrested and taken for trial to the Government station, where they received sentences ranging from 9 months imprisonment downwards. *One or two other incidents of similar nature, but of minor importance, occurred,...*<sup>159</sup>

One of the so-called minor incidents which was not reported in this year, as a result of the reduction of the wages and discharging some of the workers took place in the K. Jivanjee and Company sisal estate at Mikindani. The workers in this sisal plantation went "about in a great state shouting that there is war and they are not going to pay taxes and so on."<sup>160</sup> Also in 1933, there was a strike in Dar es Salaam "of the coolies on the Golf course: very modern."<sup>161</sup> But none of these appeared in the official reports.

That is how strikes by the workers were generally regarded in those years, and hence the suppression of information. One such strike was staged by the joiners in Kwirow mission in Morogoro in 1924.<sup>162</sup> Another example of a dispute of which very little was reported took place in 1927, when the African motor drivers and mechanics in Moshi attempted to form a trade union, called the Motor Drivers' Union, and even attempted to stage a strike for higher wages. The authorities dispersed them very quickly. The Moshi workers were the first to try and organize themselves

in a trade union. As far as the Labour Department was concerned, the Moshi workers movement deserved no sympathy, after all, it was alleged, there were "reasons to believe that the whole episode was not the product of African brains alone."<sup>163</sup>

In a statement which appeared in the original report of the Labour Department in 1929, but did not surface in the final report, it was stated that the cases of workers who were injured "as a result of deliberate disobedience" on their part were not reported, because they were caused by the "natural recklessness of the African" who, according to the Department, was capable of going as far as removing "some safety arrangement that appears to him to be constructed simply to hamper his work". It was further stated that, this happened especially with the workmen with a considerable experience.<sup>164</sup> The question of breaking the tools as a form of protest, as can be observed from this statement, used to take place, but never appeared in the official reports.

In some of the Provincial reports, these protests by the workers appeared as complaints about a problem, rather than issues involving social conflicts. Thus, for example, the Provincial Commissioner of Iringa, Captain Berne, complained in 1932 that the conduct of African workers in Lupa goldfield was not so good. It was especially the semi-proletarian workers (so-called migrant workers) who gave more trouble, because of their fractiousness and bad morale.<sup>165</sup> Also, the Labour commissioner of Lindi complained that the problem of poor average turn-out of labour needed an immediate remedy, because it had been found that "on an average an estate is compelled to have about twice the number of laborers on the books in relation to the daily average turning out work."<sup>166</sup>

The Labour Department was suppressed in 1932, only to be re-established again in the end of the 1930s. Thus it is not surprising that not much information on labour disputes is available for this period. The Tanga Report of 1938 by Mr R.C. Jerrad, the Assistant District Officer, revealed that as far back as 1937 there were no doubts that the workers were discontented "with the present conditions. This discontent is not as many German planters (in ever increasing numbers) describe as communism or bolshevism, rather it can be traced to the fact that they feel they should be given an opportunity to advance and profit commensurate with their efforts".<sup>167</sup> Jerrad was called to settle 48 disputes in his district in 1937. The most serious one was staged by the 250 wharf labourers who staged a strike for two days in Tanga. In the same year, Asian skilled workers employed by the African Wharfage Company staged three strikes in Dar es Salaam. In both cases the strikes were sporadic and spontaneous without a formal organization.<sup>168</sup> The disputes were over tasks, short rations, repatriation obligations, abolition of shs 3/= premium as a result of the cuts, and bad management.<sup>169</sup>

By 1939, the Labour Inspector of the territory reported that "strikes amongst the labourers in the Territory are almost a daily occurrence". In this year, there was a strike in Moshi which involved 1,000 Africans, another in the Northern Province, also in the shipping coast from Mombasa, Tanga to Dar es Salaam. It was quiesced in Dar es Salaam, but developed into a riot in Tanga, where there were "parades, demonstrations and intimidations."<sup>170</sup> The domestic servants, under their trade union which was formed (although not registered in the same year) were also engaged in a struggle. Saleh bin Fundi their leader was

detested by the colonial regime because of the radicalism he displayed during the confrontation.<sup>171</sup> The strikes in these years were mainly conducted by the casual workers who demanded an increase in the daily wage, increase in night-shift pay, a mid-day rest, sickness and accident compensation, better treatment on the job-in general--grassroots demands. The 1940s saw a wave of strikes. Most of them will be dealt with in Chapter Five. At this point, it is important to try and recapitulate some of the important institutional changes that emerged within the state and among Africans as a result of the workers' struggles..

Compulsory registration and control of trade unions was the "key weapon in the arsenal of law...." in the colonies.<sup>172</sup> This, in general was a result of the constant fear expressed by most colonial officers concerning such organizations. Major Orde Browne was to point out in 1929, for example, that although trade unionism had not yet established itself, there was every indication of it doing so "at by no means remote date. Once the native is organized, the potentialities before him in a way of boycott or the general strike, will need no emphasis." According to him, if such movements arose in one country, "through ill-judged or misapplied laws," the trouble would spread to its neighbours even if the neighbours avoided the same mistakes.<sup>173</sup> Within this general fear, a compulsory registration of trade unions legislation was introduced in 1932, when there existed only one trade union of European journalists (National Society of Journalists). Besides the attempt by the workers in Moshi to form a trade union in 1927, there are no records which indicate the existence of movements of this kind before that.

Although there were no trade unions, there existed other forms of organization among the workers and townsmen, some of which dated as far back as 1912--such as the Pogoro Association. These were self-help associations, which it is said were based on tribal lines. Where tribal lines were smaller however, they "federated with other related groups into a multi-tribal association. Such was the Ukami Union, which brought the Kwere, Doe, Zigua, Kutu, Vidunda, Sagara, and Kami tribes 'for unity as in the past'".<sup>174</sup> Not much is known about these organizations; but in general, they were formed for the purpose of mutual help--in terms of funerals, accommodation, jobs, sickness, etc.

Some of the things pointed out by the 1938 Labour Department Report seem to indicate that the government was aware of labour disputes as far as the 1920s. In this report it was pointed out that workers had been despatching complaints to the labour officers on the conditions in the estates since 1927--the year when the Labour Department was formed.<sup>175</sup> It would seem that it was within the context of the existence of such forms of organization as those discussed above and the reality of labour disputes that the Trade Union Ordinance No 23 of 1932 was introduced. It was promulgated at the behest of the Secretary of State to Colonies, Lord Passfield, who on September 17th, 1930 had sent a Confidential Circular to all colonies arguing that governments should give attention to the question of enactment of trade union legislation.<sup>176</sup> The rationale behind this was the fact that there was a need to guide the workers organizations along proper channels by the government, because, as it had become clear in South East Asian countries and the Caribbean, workers' parties were playing a big role in establishing trade unions.<sup>177</sup>

The Ordinance provided for the compulsory registration and control of trade unions. Although the government was aware of the non-existence of trade unions, as it had shown no sympathy to such movements as classically demonstrated by the Moshi affair, the Secretary to Native Affairs, Sir P.E. Mitchell insisted that this legislation which was advocated by Mr Sidney Webb (then Secretary of State to Colonies) in 1932 be passed. According to him, the reason for passing such a legislation lay in the fact that:

it is a matter which has been under consideration in crown colonies, Protectorates and Mandated territories recently, and the time is adjudged ripe to enact this simple legislation on the principle that it is better to be prepared for movements of this sort, which are to be expected, rather than legislate subsequently when perhaps, undesirable events have occurred or some harm has resulted from absence of this legislation....<sup>178</sup>

It was because of the unrest among workers in other colonies and even Tanganyika itself that the necessity to have this legislation arose. Mitchell advanced the analogy that it was no use saying that because "my house has not yet been burned down and therefore I do not propose to insure it". Accordingly, this legislation was supposed to prevent the emergence of "bogus trade unions"--those organized "by two or three semi-educated people ostensibly to promote the benefit of subscribers but primarily to provide salaries for the organizers". This Ordinance made provision for compulsory registration of trade unions and control of their finances by the government. In this way the registered trade union would "afford information to the Government of what it is engaged upon" lest such bodies appeal to people to resist to "lawful authority and other undesirable things."<sup>179</sup>

In other words, the Ordinance drew a framework within which all trade unions were either to emerge or not to emerge, and the Labour



Department which, ironically, was closed down the same year, was to play the role of an advisory body on how to organize trade unions--so that unions which would emerge would be:

any combination, whether temporary or permanent, the principle purpose of which are under its constitution the regulation of the relations between workmen and masters, or between workmen and workmen, or masters and masters, or imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and also the provision of benefits to members; whether such a combination as aforesaid would not, if this Ordinance has been passed, have been deemed to have been unlawful combination by reason of some one or more of its purposes being restraint of trade. <sup>180</sup>

The Ordinance empowered the Registrar to refuse registration of any trade union if in his opinion it was expedient to do so. Some members of the LEGCO protested, as they felt this was an attempt to encourage the formation of trade unions--a thing which was seen as dangerous and undesirable, as it smacked of bolshevik tendencies, as some members argued. The Ordinance was passed however, and the Government was to play the most central role in the establishment of "sound trade unions" and in the prevention of the emergence of "bogus" ones. The essence of the legislation, as Mitchell pointed out, was to prevent the emergence of trade unions. <sup>181</sup>

The first trade union to be *registered* under this Ordinance was the union of shop assistants in 1933 by Asian clerks, bookkeepers, accountants and typists, with the main demand for a short working day. Then there was the Asiatic Labour Union which was formed in 1937 of both skilled and unskilled workers, which engaged in a strike within a month of its formation. <sup>182</sup> And finally, the Labour Trade Union of East Africa which began in Kenya in the mid-1930s, originally as Kenya Indian Labour Trade Union. This union was founded by Asian artisans who were numerous in Kenya and Tanganyika. It changed its name within two months of its

formation to become a non-racial organization on the advise of Makham Singh who became the general secretary. According to its Constitution, one of the duties of this Union was:

To attain a class consciousness and for the betterment of the labour class to promote such class consciousness in others and never to miss the opportunity of gaining their trust. (Class consciousness is the stage when a worker begins to feel the difference between capitalist and himself; when he comes to know that in fact he is being robbed by capitalists and when he begins to make propaganda against such robbery)<sup>183</sup>

The Union was registered in 1939. It remained mostly Asian and was almost inactive in Tanganyika. It ceased its activities during the Second World War and was removed from registration in 1947.

The 1932 Trade Union Ordinance was amended in 1941, although no African trade union was registered under it, except for the three Asian unions which were mentioned. When the amendments were introduced in the LEGCO, the reception of the members was hostile just like in 1932. If it were not for the fact that the Secretary of State to Colonies had threatened a refusal of funds if the Bill was rejected, it would not have been passed. The amendments were necessary because there were threats of strikes all over the British Empire. One of the most important issues which was introduced by the 1941 Bill was picketting. This was a direct outcome of the experiences in most colonies. In this Bill, only peaceful pickets would be considered lawful, but those aimed at intimidating and breaching the peace--such as abstaining from work--were considered as an offense, for which the participants had to be punished.<sup>184</sup> The struggles of the workers and peasants in the 1940s will be considered further in Chapter Five.

Another important indicator of resistance during this time is the use of corporal punishment, which was rampant. The information on

corporal punishment is important in terms of indicating the insubordination or rebellion of people vis à vis the authorities and employers at individual or group level. One of the settlers' ideologists in Tanganyika, F.S. Joelson was to write the following in relation to this practice: "Harshness I would not defend, leave alone advocate, but anyone with African experience knows that there are times when nothing but corporal punishment administered without loss of time will serve the ends of discipline and justice."<sup>185</sup>

The information on whipping in Tanganyika is quite scanty; and the reason for this, besides the reasons given above on most of the facts about Tanganyika, was the fact that "in British East Africa whipping was not regarded as a punishment to be inflicted by a judge, but a mere police measure which an official could administer without or with supervision"<sup>186</sup> The practice of flogging people was widespread during British rule to the extent that the High Court Judge in the 1930s Mr Gilchrist Alexander commented, "At the outset in Tanganyika it was found that statistics of flogging showed alarming approximation to statistics in German days".<sup>187</sup> Flogging was practiced by all categories of the colonial agents--settlers, diggers, administrators and missionaries. It was in 1950 that the United Nations Organization suggested the abolition of corporal punishment in Tanganyika and Cameroon. Even then Tanganyika abstained from voting.<sup>188</sup>

In native courts alone, for example in 1942, the recorded information shows that 573 people were punished by whipping only, 180 by whipping and imprisonment, and 60 by fine and whipping. These figures include adults and juvenile.<sup>189</sup> There was a desire at around the same time to increase the power of whipping by the authorities. This was a

legal punishment for offences against "Native laws and customs", under the Native Courts Order of 1929 No 5. The power of using the cane (*kiboko*) had been granted to the native courts in 1921. The authorities were demanding an increase in the power of flogging because some were of the opinion that "failure to cultivate enough land or to assist in pig drives are offences for which whipping is a legal punishment" In a letter dated 29th July 1929 to the Provincial Commissioner of Eastern Province Districts from the Administrative Officer, it was stated that "...in advocating the use of the cane or *kiboko* in all cases of hunt and disrespect to the authorities themselves" there was unanimous agreement among chiefs for the use of *kiboko*.<sup>190</sup>

There were many overt and covert brutal practices which were committed under British rule which passed unrecorded. There were instances when huts were burnt down; but as far as the colonial government was concerned, such a practice was non-existent. In 1935, the Colonial Officer, Sir William Cecil Bottomley, sent a despatch to all colonial governors inquiring on the "necessity for recourse to the burning of huts, or similar reprisals, as a means, for example, of bringing tribesmen to parley". He also inquired in regard to whether this practice had disappeared or not. In this despatch, there was also a draft proposal for which, it was hoped, it would be sent as an official one after getting suggestions for legislating on the use of this method. The officials in Tanganyika refused to have such legislation and denied the fact that this method was in existence.<sup>191</sup> The reason for the refusal was the fact that there was already in existence the Collective Punishment Ordinance of 1921 which was amended and passed by Sir Donald Cameron. This Ordinance was enacted with the aim to punish people

collectively--villages or communities in certain cases. The Governor could impose fines on all inhabitants of a village or district or community for various acts, one of them being, if the peoples' conduct "or conduct of any of them has been such as to require the bringing of soldiers or police against them for the purpose of preventing or suppressing disturbances, or enforcing lawful orders or the payment of taxes leviable under the law of the territory".<sup>192</sup>

In the 1930s an adventurer in Tanganyika wrote that "Tax defaulters, even women, were transported to forced labour hundreds of miles from their homes. The huts of defaulting indigent old people were burnt."<sup>193</sup> This adventurer saw more than that in terms of human oppression. When passing through Mahenge in Morogoro and Usangu in Mbeya in the same period, all he saw was bare land. Villages were inhabited by old people and children who were tending cotton fields but could hardly spare a basketful of millet meal: "Under compulsion, under the pressure of taxation in cash, I saw the natives raise with spasmodic success export crops: cotton, coffee, tobacco, peanuts. I did not find a single food crop, not a vegetable, not a fruit added to the village economy."<sup>194</sup> He was to summarise the mandate rule of Tanganyika in terms of the fact that, despite "the express injunctions of the mandates, despite sincere official intentions and assurances, the natives everywhere, but especially in remote districts", were at the "mercy of petty white administrators, and of native chiefs" who were only too ready "to harrass their countrymen in order to curry the whiteman's favours and rewards".

The next section explores the interests which were being defended in these forms of oppression within which the Tanganyikans resisted and sums up the various ideological and philosophical issues of Indirect Rule.

### 3.3 The "Bureaucratic Paradise"

The tendency for the British administration in Tanganyika was to harp on the policy of multiracial society in which African interests were supposedly paramount. Indirect Rule was an attempt towards this direction of multiracialism, although as a policy, multiracialism became more pronounced after the Second World War. Racism was not the official policy of British administration in Tanganyika, but nonetheless, race distinctions clearly existed: "the principle of segregation was patent, so obvious, in fact, that no explicit statement of policy or legislative restrictions was necessary".<sup>195</sup> The so-called egalitarianism which was the official policy "operated only within the framework of occupational contacts or semi-official activities."<sup>196</sup>

In Tanganyika, Europeans assumed a sense of isolation, keeping a distance from the "natives", and these race distinctions operated both residentially and in public services with the legitimation of health and sanitation. That is, desirable standards could only be maintained by isolation of Europeans in separate residential areas, prisons, schools and hospitals. The result of this was that in all towns in Tanganyika, there existed separate residential areas for Europeans, Asians and Africans.

Most towns which emerged or developed during the colonial period in Tanganyika displayed a layout and architectural diversity of social and economic divisions based upon race, religion and education.<sup>197</sup> Generally

the towns were divided into three residential areas: *Uzunguni* or European residential areas, *Uhindini* or "bazaar" areas where Asians resided, and *Uswahilini* or African residential areas. The European residential area was an area with spacious "erected fine villas, raised above ground level and mostly, double storeyed, with thick whitewashed stone walls, airy rooms and verandahs". This was a very well planned area, in which the land between the villas, "as well as empty spaces-- was treated as one botanical garden". It is reported that after the First World War, the British colonial government in Tanganyika "neglected for years the scientific and medical services" which had begun so well under German rule and instead, spent a great deal of money in "building a new Government house" to impress the population with "their superiority to Germans"<sup>199</sup>

Scientific and technological work was ignored generally during the inter-war period for the sake of such impressive structures and the building/creating what was to be known as "bureaucrats' Paradise"<sup>200</sup> as a result of the number of civil servants and government officials employed, the luxuries they indulged in, and hence the exorbitant burden of taxes and the use of compulsion on people. In fact, it was during the German period that scientific and technological advancement had of any significance had been undertaken. During this period railway lines were built and German scholars and missionaries started scientific investigations in many fields, and their greatest claim lay in the realm of medicine and hygiene. As early as 1897 the British Foreign Office admitted that the scientific work done by Germans was quite advanced.<sup>201</sup> In the medical field, Germans had made attempts to introduce both preventive and curative methods of combating diseases: "In the

prevention of Malaria, they instituted an elaborate system of source reduction and source treatment through environmental modification and oiling of mosquito breeding sites in urban areas." Germans administered quinine massively, and produced locally both quinine and small-pox vaccine, and launched limited campaigns against diseases such as trypanosomiasis and plague. They even built a laboratory in Dar es Salaam.<sup>202</sup>

This balance of curative and preventive methods was dismantled with the introduction of bismuth by the British in the 1920s and 1930s. With the British, more emphasis was placed on curative methods. Besides research in medicine, another achievement of the Germans was the establishment of the Amani Research Station in Tanga during the early 1900s. This station was founded as a biological and agricultural research station. During the First World War this station was used for manufacturing medicine and other war materials.<sup>203</sup> This station went almost derelict after the First World War. From 1927 to 1948 it was named The East African Agricultural Institute, and after 1948 it was transferred to Nairobi.

When discussing the possibility of establishing research on empire problems and making recommendations in 1925, Lord Balfour pointed out to the British government that some of the policies of the British government were not agreeable to the pride of the country. This was mainly in reference to research policies in general. On Tanganyika specifically, he pointed out that while they had been "humane on the whole", they had also been negative, "more benign than the Germans perhaps, but less creative...." He reported that a commission which was sent to Tanganyika saw Amani Station:



'for all practical purposes, lying derelict, its laboratories unoccupied, its costly apparatus dismantled, the living quarters deteriorating, the magnificent and priceless collection of books and scientific records and specimens unused. Instead of supplying the five territories in particular, and the scientific world in general, with contributions to their knowledge of tropical plants, soils, and insects...its only output at present consists of penny packets of seeds.'<sup>204</sup>

It was only after the Second World War that many agricultural research institutes were established, and this was with the aim to "find solutions to the problems facing export crops so that production of such crops could be increased."<sup>205</sup> In a review of scientific progress in 1952, for example, it was pointed out that among the most "important" researches which were being conducted in Tanganyika were the archeological excavations at Olduvai Gorge by Dr L.S.B. Leakey, to uncover the "early Chellean man. In zoology, it was the study of the birds of East Africa--a research which had been of great interest for quite sometime."<sup>206</sup> In one article which appeared in 1941 entitled "European Storks in East Africa", there was a report about "ringed" birds found dead in Lake Province. The rings were sent to the curator of the King George V Memorial Museum to prove whether the birds were European storks or not. It was proved that they were European storks. Other "important" reseaches were such as those of the possibilities of moving people to other areas and their concentration to suit colonial interests, and customs and traditions of the different communities in Tanganyika.<sup>207</sup>

Beyond these researches, which were in line with the whole colonial enterprise in Tanganyika, and in spite of the secondary contradictions within the colonial ruling class (for example between missionaries and the administrators, settlers and the administrators, missionaries and

the settlers, etc.), the European community usually maintained a "monolithic image of European solidarity". This was expressed in terms of a strong pressure among themselves to participate in "community activities such as the Saturday curry lunch, the weekend club dance, or sports tournaments." The symbol of their solidarity was the club--something which towards the end of the colonial period became "more explicitly a symbol of racial exclusivity, but even when the Europeans' status was not in jeopardy, it provided an important physical focus for community action". It was in the club that they passed their time telling tales, recounting their experiences, discussing happenings, etc.<sup>208</sup> As a result of this solidarity, by the 1920s they had already evolved a language called "kisetla" (from the word settler) which was a jargon of nine tenths English and one tenth Swahili. This language was chiefly spoken by "the *memsahibs* on the plantations and in the towns."<sup>209</sup>

When Chief Saidi of Tabora District embezzled £10,000 from the native authority in collaboration with some European officers at the end of the 1920s--a practice which was very common in most districts<sup>210</sup>--he was deported as a punishment and the whole affair was blamed on Africans' inability to manage their affairs. Alcock, one of the European officials who was also responsible in the embezzlement of funds was not punished and the only thing which happened to him was "stoppage of increment."<sup>211</sup> When one European official, Pennington, came back from Europe in 1934, Mitchell recorded the following in his diary:

I gave P. a severe wiggling over the woman shauri [case--C.S.L.], over expenditure, and Michael Alcock; embezzlement. I told him he had failed in the trust imposed in him, let me down. But I added I was not going to hurt him or take disciplinary measures and relied on him to enable me to forget the whole thing.<sup>212</sup>

These are but just some examples on European solidarity, even where corruption was involved.

A former high court judge in Tanganyika, Gilchrist Alexander, published a book in 1936 which depicted the various aspects of the lives of the administrators. In this book, the author admitted that the various aspects he avoided analysing were things such as "racial, administrative, or political problems, except in so far as they impinge upon matters of law or prove of popular interest". Besides the above, he also avoided aspects such as "red tape, statistics, and the musty records of law..." Most of all, he did not want to offer "the conventional picture--the author presented, gun in hand, with foot on the carcass of lion or elephant".<sup>213</sup> In short he avoided discussing most of those things which were part of the colonial heritage.

According to Alexander, the conditions of service offered by Tanganyika were more reasonable and generous than in most Crown colonies: the salaries were good, houses were provided free of rent, "and furnished with the main articles of furniture. One was entitled to free medical and even dental attention and medicines. Transport arrangements and allowances were adequate."<sup>214</sup> Alexander himself, for example, used to draw a salary of £200 a month, and paid no income tax, rents, taxes and repairs. This was besides the allowances he drew. According to him, there was no way that one could complain about remuneration: "In fact, one fared practically as well as, if not better than, a judge of High Court in England".<sup>215</sup>

In the big houses in which the Europeans lived were a number of house servants (house boys). Thus according to Anne Dundas, given such services, unless European women knew how to occupy "the long hours of

enforced inactivity" the situation was difficult. What the women had to do was to use the time with "good books, restful memories and happy plans for the future...conscientiously studies the language, history and customs of native races surrounding her....if she loves the blue skies that smile on her flowers, the silver stars that glisten through the night,...allows her sense of humour...."<sup>216</sup> In fact, these women did nothing, to the extent that Anne Dundas admitted: "Of course you would tell the poor thing (African) the proper way to wash her clothes when you've 'never washed as much as your handkerchief'.<sup>217</sup>

Such was also the case with even the missionaries' wives, who never lifted a hand to manual labour, because the converts offered services to the household. Otherwise, they were provided with "three or four christian 'houseboys', and a cook, at an infinitesimal wage". The woman did not have to rise "to fetch her thimble":

It is questionable if the majority of missionaries could eke out a living in any profession, as few are equipped for the modern struggle for existence and competition in business: hence the Protestant missionary in Africa is regarded as a super-fortunate individual of his class; a man of abundant leisure, with living for himself and family provided, with practically no effort on his part, and conditions of life are far superior to those he could command at home.<sup>218</sup>

As part of the attractions and amenities for Europeans, according to Reid, the cost of living was quite low. It needed some £400 in the 1920s and 1930s for a year to keep a cook, scullion, a table boy, a garden boy, a car boy and sometimes an *Ayah* for looking after children--even to "tolerate the horde of native women folk, relations, and children which these domestics brought to batten on their white master,..." In short, there was plenty of comfort.<sup>219</sup>

It was this kind of life which the colonial agents had to defend. It was within this context that Joelson explicitly admitted that, prestige was the force by which they ruled "savage Africa": it was the force which kept "millions of natives in subjugation to a few thousand Europeans." According to him, this force resulted in a mixture of respect and fear, "a feeling of devotion to the ruling race evoked by moral force" without which the foundation of the empire would collapse.<sup>220</sup> This prestige was reflected in the conceptions they held about Africans and other non-European races and the life they had to defend in the colonies.

They never hesitated to talk about the life they led in the most revering way. Anne Dundas, for example, could write in 1924 that, "For all purposes of general amusement and recreation there are practically no 'class' distinctions, save those of colour and race...."<sup>221</sup> The colonial ruling class was virtually united when it came to the identity of "them and us", otherwise, the life they led would crumble easily. Thus, she rhetorically asked: "Where else could you find a community of some twelve or fifteen men supporting a two court tennis club and a fair nine-hole golf course, reclaimed in a year from impassable bush plains? The cheapness of black labour in Africa naturally aids in the metamorphosis...."<sup>222</sup> Usually, after playing the games, small parties would "gather at various houses for the evening drink, which" was "rated as indispensable to health in the tropics...."<sup>223</sup>

The most central aspect of this life was the drink--just mentioned above as indispensable. The chief item in the "average European's expenditure" in Tanganyika was alcoholic beverages, which according to the calculations on the basis of the customs import duties done by a

Treasury official in the early 1930s, "one-third of the average man's income went on drink! The silly habit grew and grew."<sup>224</sup> In 1931 Mitchell noted that the settlers of Arusha were "boozing and throwing money just as freely as ever--£45,000 has been sunk in the Burka uselessly,..."<sup>225</sup> No wonder that Joelson, who was the founder editor of a weekly journal, *East Africa*, opens his book with a description of the harbours and the arrival of a mailship--the most important aspect in this description being the drink:

Soon the barges are alongside, and into the depths are lowered cases of whisky--pride of a place must be given to this, to many a white man in the tropics the most important 'foodstuff' sent from home!--bales of cotton, bundles of corrugated iron sheets, and hundred and one other products which the undeveloped East must needs import from advanced lands.<sup>226</sup>

Alongside this habit of drinking heavily was another "amusement"--women. When the British troops took over Bukoba in 1915 from the Germans, for example, Colonel Daniel P. Driscoll was approached by one of the commanders who requested permission for the troops to loot the town. The Colonel granted permission on the proviso that they did not indulge in drinking and violence. The result of this was "All semblance of discipline had gone" wrote Meinertzhagen, the British commander mainly concerned with spying: "drunkenness was rife and women were being violated...."<sup>227</sup> A European woman in the colonies, wrote Anne Dundas, was the "'Little bit of fluff' the negligible quantity which gives an added note of colour to the surroundings, and chiefly because of her rarity she receives a high valuation than at home." Upon this woman befell the "task of keeping alive the perception of true womanhood in all men who have left their women-folk and home ties for long periods of inhibition in the uncivilised countries...."<sup>228</sup>

As a result of this scarcity of European women, the tendency for some of the colonial agents was to obtain African women by various means--most often by force or some other shrewd means. In a letter from Kimamba, Morogoro, which appeared in *Kwetu* on 2nd August 1938, it was stated that Africans were often victims of discord of European employers in the countryside. Europeans who did not have their women-folk around, according to this letter, tended to grab women from their employees--the "boys". It was stated that, an employer would send a servant to several errands so as to keep him out of sight; and when the servant came back finally, his wife would already be in the hands of the employer. The letter cited an example of a Greek settler who framed his employee for stealing Shs 15/= so as to get the worker out of sight after having taken away his wife. It was also pointed out that very often, the workers were forced to find women for their masters--very often their own sisters--so as to avoid losing their jobs.<sup>229</sup>

Besides clubs, golf, tennis, swimming, fishing, football, gardening, drinking and amusing themselves with women, another important amusement was "big game massacres and beserk drives"<sup>230</sup> The "pursuit of 'big game' in Africa" was "one of life's greatest sports" looked forward so "eagerly by all Europeans as a crowning achievement in the way of adventure...."<sup>231</sup> The same people considered it destructive and barbaric for Africans to hunt, because according to them, they were motivated by lust for meat and they lacked "sportsmanship", while with Europeans it was the "....old fashioned safari of whiteman in Tanganyika--that is, a leisure affair of porters, tents, and chops of boxes, where one covered a dozen or fifteen miles a day for weeks at a time, starting at day break and getting under canvas by midday...."<sup>232</sup>

It was for this reason that Tanganyika was in those days famously known as Safariland. It was also this kind of attraction which drew even the famous novelist, Ernest Hemmingway, to Tanganyika in the early 1930s. He was to recount his experiences of the one month big game hunting in Tanganyika in his autobiographical novel, *The Green Hills of Africa*. In this novel, and the other short stories he wrote<sup>233</sup> Hemmingway portrayed his love for unspoiled natural beauty of this green hills of Tanganyika, the cool nights and the wonders of game hunting. In these writings, what one gets is a picture of someone deeply in love with the primitive world, a world where men who want to escape from the corrupted industrial world should go. That is contentment was to be found in Africa. In the green hills of Tanganyika one could forget the cities and their neurotic inhabitants and instead plunge into the world of greater kudu hunting, camp fires, books and a lot of booze. This love of Africa, for Hemmingway, was a symbol of masculinity and purity.

The literary productions by the Europeans on Tanganyika were dominated by such "cultural primitivistic" themes, but also on a wider scale. It was observed in these years that:

There is observable in recent literature a deepening dissatisfaction..., and a growing recognition of the impoverishment that has come to western society. The desire is becoming stronger to recreate the bonds which unite men and their fellows....It would be a tragedy if the science, the machinery and industrial organization of Europe were to reproduce in Africa the conditions from which the best minds in the west are seeking a means of escape.<sup>234</sup>

The tendency in these themes was to seek a civilization which had not been contaminated by the effects of the industrial world, and to yearn for the "glorious past". And Africa, for these writers, seemed to



possess a secret which was lost in Europe, and also, it had a certain innocence to offer to the world.

In Evelyn Waugh's *Scoop*,<sup>235</sup> for example, a novel attacking in a satirical form the colonial administrators and the whole idea of "modernization" of Africans, the ideas of the administrators were seen as having no impact on the African world outlook and only ended up benefitting the Syrian merchants (Asians). The Mandate Territory of Azania (Tanganyika was that mandate territory), in this novel, is ruled by a foolish young Oxford trained emperor who got all his ideas from Western books and destroyed himself and his country with theories. The territory did not benefit from its association with European culture, and Europeans exploited Africans senselessly. The Europeanization of Africans was viewed with outright disgust and European civilization was regarded as decadent.

Winifred Holtby, in *Mandoa Mandoa* satirized the tourist agencies and Europeans who brought decadence and amorality to Africa. An anthropologist who decried the "modernization of Africa" because it destroyed the habits of primitive people had the following to say in this novel:

If you could know how we envy you! We, who are victims of an effete intellectualism. You, who still dare to retain the--shall we say--purity of primitive sensation. You, who lose your individual consciousness in your corporate dances. My dear Talal, if you knew what anguish we suffered through the loss of our power of spontaneous and corporate ecstasy...your natural, sinless, cool, lustful completion of bodily bliss. Unself-conscious, unafraid. Your wholeness with the community! Your deep tranquil blood-unity!<sup>236</sup>

Talal is an African Prince who incorporated some of the worst features of western culture into his society and ends up paying heavily for this folly; and the hypocrisy of Europeans in Africa is rejected.

These writings are a few examples to demonstrate the nature of literary production which supplements the other writings of this period depicting the life the colonial agents lived. Thus, in a nutshell, to the chagrin of the missionary teachings, Europeans were virtually doing the very things they strove to prevent Africans from doing. An administrator, a settler, a digger, and even a missionary himself "was not averse to gambling, dancing, or other secular amusements, and certainly not averse to alcohol".<sup>237</sup> It was an inherent contradiction within this "civilization".

It was the above European interests which were being defended by the administrators and their policies. Thus Fortie, when passing in Tanganyika was to remark that taxes were extremely high under British rule, and this was despite the injunction "to consider the interests of the 5,500,000 natives paramount". According to him, "Great Britain was setting up in this primitive land costly and complicated administration for the benefit of ten thousand whites and thirty thousand Asiatics." He went on:

...a growing tendency to load the burden of a costly administration upon the illiterate, voiceless, helpless African,...using taxation to compel him to toil for aliens and buy alien trash....I saw in many directions dishonest efforts, paraded as progress and civilization, to inflict on Safariland, as already accomplished in South Africa, the industrial sweating, economic slavery, the social injustices that have become impossible and even criminal in the West.

During the next two years of Safari I saw hundreds of villages depopulated by exodus of nearly every male between the age of eighteen and forty five, gone to mine and plantations to earn tax money. Tax defaulters, even women, were transported to forced labour hundreds of miles from their homes. The huts of defaulting indigent old people were burnt.<sup>238</sup>

The next section sums up the various aspects discussed in this chapter.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Sir D. Cameron, Sir C. Dundas, P.E. Mitchell, J. Scott, Major Orde Browne, etc. were in contact with a group of people like J.H. Oldham, Lord Lugard, B. Malinowski, M. Perham, J. Huxley, Lord Hailey and others, most of whom had attempted to form an East African group with the aim of studying the problems of the empire and emulating the right imperial spirit. Olham and Lugard had formed the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, which was to be supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and Colonial Offices of several European Powers. The aim, in the formulation of the anthropologist Malinowski, was to research and study "questions of race, population, the administration and economic development of natives, as well as the adaptation of European culture to the society". It was to be a science of colonial politics whose forerunners were the pamphleteers and propagandists who defended the interests of the "colonial people" on the one hand, and those who demanded "repressive measures against the dangers of race" on the other".<sup>239</sup> Their aim was to deal with with issues concerned with economic development--"the primary motive of colonization", according to Malinowski--which could "be done either directly or by native enterprise controlled by Europeans". Accordingly, "indirect development" offered fewer difficulties. Direct exploitation which involved a substantial transfer of land was viewed as "one of the main causes of trouble on a large scale and lasting for generations", also, another source of cronic trouble in relation to direct exploitation was labour, and this was the reason why labour was recruited in the colonies by the use of the most objectionable devices, hence the need for "indirect exploitation".<sup>240</sup>

In 1926, Malinowski had written to the Rockefeller Foundation informing them that a new trend of anthropological theory had been developed in America and Europe: "The Functional School". This school, unlike the previous schools, did not involve itself with the private affairs of the Missing Link, or the reconstruction of histories at all costs. Its main concern was inquiry into the nature of human institutions and above all their functional value. The practice of condemning the "savage" religion and beliefs as something useless, wrote Malinowski, had to be abandoned:

Recently a new turn was given to the studies of primitive religion and magic. It is recognized that they possess a definite value, that they fulfil a specific and unique function, that they are at work like other aspects of culture. Magic has been shown to be a principle of order and co-ordination. It has to its credit a number of economic advantages; it provides a time sequence in those activities which it controls, such as gardening, fishing, industries; it establishes leadership; above all, it gives primitive man the moral stamina indispensable in many enterprises. Even sorcery is now regarded as a moral power, a disciplinary principle used often to terrorize, selfishly at times, but usually used for the administration of actual justice, hence important as a principle of organization in native society.<sup>241</sup>

In the new anthropological approach and colonial policy in general, besides the functional value of the institutions being an important issue, the very study of the "human factor" had also become equally important. This was the influence of the so-called "human relations school". It was stated at some point that, "Since industrial welfare became an important subject of scientific study, the discovery has been made that human nature is the dominant factor in every enterprise".<sup>242</sup> The "welfare" for the African population was dictated by utilitarian motive. Africans were regarded as the greatest "asset" of a colonial country because of their potential value as labourers: "The same

argument applies to the good treatment and good feeding of a horse or plough-ox, or the increase of stock. Even if the native be an independent producer, his value as an 'asset' is reckoned by his productive output, and his capacity to purchase imported goods."<sup>245</sup>

It was the race question which was at the heart of these changing views in Tanganyika. This was because the question created a lot of problems in East Africa. Oldham wrote to Cameron that, while West Africa was generally recognized as an African country and the problems were relatively simple there, or in South Africa where the attempt was to establish a "White Civilization"; the destiny of East Africa appeared to be in "some sense a black and white man's country". It was this aspect which determined everything.<sup>244</sup> It was pointed out that, the relations of white and black constituted one of the greatest "questions of this century" and it was hoped that this question was going to be tackled in East Africa before it was too late.<sup>245</sup>

Thus on arrival in the country, Cameron had expressed his dissatisfaction with the country because of the enforced economic development, the detribalization and Europeanization of Africans without any consideration of the political future of the country with the result that if this practice continued, there was a possibility of creating another Egypt or India.<sup>246</sup> It was expressed further, that the most important question in Tanganyika was to lay the "foundations of a state in which the natives will have a place in the machinery of administration, founded on their own traditions and customs and instincts". Such a machinery would prevent them from becoming servile and unable to express themselves "except through the ballot-box--which is unthinkable." The failure to establish such a machinery would result

in another India. "(It is interesting to read that before he died Das was advocating much that Lugard advocated in a letter to the 'Times' some few years ago, namely the administration of India on eastern and not western lines)"<sup>247</sup>

Western civilization demanded raw materials and food crops which were necessary to the living standards of the "principal nations", and Indirect Rule was concerned with such an issue; and it is this issue which constituted the empire problem, thought Mitchell. If the tropical inhabitants could not produce them for themselves, they had to be compelled to do so or give way for some other race which could. Therefore:

As a world problem,...our first care must be so to regulate matters that the weak races who we govern are able, with the least disturbance of their social structure, the least moral or physical damage, and the least hardship, to meet the calls of western civilization upon them to such an extent as to satisfy reasonable men, and to prevent the application to them of compulsion or pressures which sacrifice justice to economic necessity and will create political bitterness and race feelings in the future and so introduce into the already sufficiently difficult problem antagonisms which are at present in the main dormant.<sup>249</sup>

According to Mitchell, it was the honest and final settlement of the land questions which determined the policies, given the general feeling of insecurity which was becoming widespread, as a result of which no African believed a word the Europeans said in so far as this question was not settled.<sup>250</sup>

The settlers in the 1920s were being discouraged, not because capital in agriculture was undesirable, but rather because of fear of the emergence of a class of "poor whites": the presence of Europeans eking out a poor existence in the midst of Africans was undesirable from any standpoint as they could not support themselves financially, and

hence would become a burden.<sup>251</sup> There was, of course a place for large scale planters. Large scale agriculture was considered desirable provided it did not involve the deprivation of African occupied areas. Also settlers could be welcome, provided their activities involved a holding company which supervised them. Otherwise, the crux of the matter which was the deciding factor of the policies was the:

economic side of the thing...we have by no means a free choice of white settlement or native development. The former is conditioned by the fact that black competition will make certain types of farming impossible for white farmers and that within by no means a long period. The latter at the mercy of the market.<sup>252</sup>

Major Orde Browne was to add that at the heart of the conflicting schools about the administration of the colonies, was also the question of labour; whereby the employers simply stood for profits, the philanthropists for welfare, and the government and the scientists for welfare, profits and the future.<sup>253</sup> "[T]he importance of labour, [is] the rock upon which the conflicting European administrative methods are most likely to split". This was partly due to the fact that the workers who were 'detribalized' posed a threat, especially if they became unionized. Also there was the problem of insufficient labour supply or the resistance of Africans to becoming wage labourers; and this aspect was further complicated by the race question, and hence the big threat posed by the migrant labourer.<sup>254</sup>

In essence, underneath all these aspects were the same old dominant European racial prejudices. The aim was to keep European privileges intact, while keeping the African in his place within the hierarchies of "world civilization" as an attempt to avoid conflicts. The whole question had nothing to do with the "welfare of the natives" or the

preservation of African societies in themselves: all the Indirect Rule ideologues admitted that it was not their intention to do so. Major Orde Brown was to comment cynically about the enthusiasts of internationalism who advocated a mixed regime: "The Tower of Babel was an attempt to scale Heaven: a reproduction of its social features holds out little promise of better success in achieving an administrative paradise".<sup>255</sup> Even Mitchell was to say, the desire was not to revert to some "anachronistic tribalism" nor did they hope "to use the old fashioned savage to bottle up with the progressives": rather they aimed at giving the African time to modernize his institutions and bring them in the main current of the twentieth century, "so that with becoming civilized he may remain African, and so keep his respect and his pride if the race."<sup>256</sup>

What is clear from what has been shown in this chapter is the fact that the rebellion of the masses was a continuous process. It was due to these rebellions that the colonial state was forced to change its outlook in the 1920s. The colonial state was forced to appropriate those elements within the African societies which would help to make the Tanganyikans effectively colonizable--even though some of the conceptions may seem philanthropic. It was within this context that they reached the conclusion about the necessity of creating a "good African", who is not uprooted from his traditions, as the basis of African Civilization. It was at this time that a whole body of conceptions about Africanity was created, and most of these conceptions were based on myths, as is classically demonstrated by the beliefs in tribes. Included in these conceptions was the essentially communal nature of African societies and the cooperatives.



The struggles of the working people were waged for self defense against colonial onslaught even in the guise of "African Civilization", as is demonstrated by their resistance against native authorities, improved methods of cultivation and animal husbandry, soil conservation, etc. The masses' resistance, it can be said, unveiled the mystifications of the civilizing mission which was based on the the negation of African cultures. In an attempt to resolve the crisis of the European civilizing mission generated by the rebelling masses, the colonial state and its agents were forced to re-examine their philosophical foundations, and hence "African Civilization" became the new philosophical stance for the colonialists. It meant, a civilization based on African traditions developed and systematized by Europeans for Africans. What they were doing was was to incorporate the elements of the people who were to be civilized which were not subversive to the colonial project in their own outlook. Their main concern was the best way to make the masses accept the civilizing mission from the masses outlook: the aim was to make colonization more effective and break the resistance of the masses. "It was necessary to invest in the terrain of the enemy: to get the [African] internalize the idea that his own way of viewing the world, his own outlook has no other ultimate objective than the European *civilizing mission*. For him there is no other future history."<sup>257</sup> In other words, it was a struggle against the syncretic movements, cultural resistance, rebellion against imperialist forms of production and social and political forms of domination.

The masses' struggles were waged against domination, exploitation, hierachization, inequalities, violence, arbitrariness, etc.; in a nutshell, their struggles were an attempt to transcend the established

arrangements. The colonial masters took from the masses what they considered not dangerous elements from the point of view of imperialist arrangements. Thus it is not surprising that the labour movements were resisted so much by the colonial state. Their formation was viewed as a product of communist or bolshevik influence, as was commented on the 1927 Moshi case or in 1932 when the Trade Union Ordinance was being introduced. On the other hand, the other forms of protest, like the religious syncretic movements and other cultural movements including those against inequalities and imperialist forms of production were viewed from the point of view of Pan-Islamic/Pan-African influence or problems of transition as a result of Africans' lack of grasp of the civilizing mission.

The co-operatives were accepted by the colonial state as African institutions. In fact the co-operatives represented the interests of the middle peasants and the rich farmers who were already incorporated into colonial capitalism. They were accepted because of the state's struggles against Asian merchant capital, and the fact that initially the rich farmers and middle peasants did not contradict the colonial forms of production, because they were seen as progressive elements from the point of view of colonialism and capitalism in general. This aspect and their development will be examined in the next chapter, alongside other "improvement" elements, as Iliffe would call them. Next chapter demonstrates how the "modern Tanzanians took over the systematization of "African Civilization" from the colonizers and turned it into their own as an expression of their own contradictions with colonialism.

NOTES

1. Major Orde Browne, "A Review of Imperial Problems for the Empire Citizenship Course of Training", 3rd July 1935, p.6, in Mss Afr s. 1117 "Orde Browne Oct. 1929-1937".
2. P.E.M. Mitchell to J.H. Oldham, 15.4.1926. In Mss Brit Emp. s. 1829 "Papers of Joseph Houldsworth Oldham".
3. See J. Iliffe, *A History of Modern Tanganyika*, CUP, London, 1979, pp.334-6.
4. M. Bates, "Tanganyika under British Administration", Ph.D Thesis, Oxford University, 1957, p.81.
5. For some of the accounts on the First World War campaigns see Charles Miller, *Battle for the Bundu*, Macdonald and Jane's, London, 1974; Francis Brett Young, *Marching on Tanga*, Collins, London, 1917 ( a novel); Dr Hans Schimiedel, "Bwana Sakkarani: Captain Tom von Prince and his Times", in *Tanganyika Notes and Records* No 52, March 1959; Captain N.D. Downes, *With the Nigerians in East Africa*, Methuen, London, 1919; & Captain R.V. Dolbey, *Sketches of East African Campaign*, John Murray, London, 1980, p.143.
6. See, David F. Clyde, *History of Medical Services of Tanganyika*, Dar es Salaam, 1962, pp.51 & 59; also Walter Rodney, "The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika 1890-1930" in M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed), *Tanzania Under Colonial Rule*, Longman, London, 1980, p.143.
7. *ibid.*
8. J. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*, OUP, Nairobi, 1973, pp.115-16.
9. Martha Honey, "A History of Indian Merchant Capital and Class Formation in Tanganyika", Ph.D Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1982, p.220.
10. *ibid*, pp.225-26. Also see Aga Khan, *The India in Transition: A Study of political Evolution*, Bennet, Bombay, 1920.
11. Honey, *ibid.*
12. *Tanganyika Times*, 14.10.1929, a cutting in Mss Afr s. 1458 (3-6) S. Hawthrey, HC, "Leading Articles as Editor of East African Standard, East Africa, Mombasa Times, East Coast Herald, and Tanganyika Times"
13. Mss Afr r. 101, 1927-59, Sir Philip Euen Mitchell Diaries, 16.1.1932.
14. Judith Listowel, *Thye Making of Tanganyika*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1965, p.73.

15. Bates, 1957, op cit, p.38.
16. Julian Huxley, *African View*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1931, p.438.
17. H. Krelle, "Our Mission in Usaramo During the War", *Journal of Berlin Missionary Society*, No 6, 1919.
18. Bates, 1957, op cit, pp.40-41.
19. J. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in Tanzania", in L. Cliffe & J. Saul (eds), *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol 1, EAPH, Nairobi, 1972, pp.25-26.
20. P.E. Mitchell to J.H. Oldham, 5.9.1926, in Mss Brit Emp s.1829, op cit. In this letter, Mitchell mentioned the fear of "Moslem propagandist weapons".
21. Lonsdale, op cit.
22. Tanganyika Territory, *Tanganyika Report*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1927.
23. Tanganyika Territory, *Tanganyika Report*, Government printer, Dar es Salaam, 1922, pp.5-6.
24. Tanganyika Territory, Administrative Conference Report, 27.10.1924, p.12. Also, Native Authority Ordinance No 25 of 1923 especially sections 4 & 6.
25. Anne Dundas, *Beneath African Glacier*, H.B. & G. Witherby, London, 1924, p.110.
26. Listowel, op cit, p.72. In actual fact, the Mandate provisions were finally published in 1923 when already the administrators were considering the issue of Indirect Rule.
27. *ibid.*
28. Eric Reid, *Tanganyika Without Prejudice*, East Africa, London, 1934, See Preface to the book.
29. G. Alexander, *Tanganyika Memories: A Judge in the Red Kanzu*, Blackie and Son Ltd, Glasgow, 1936.
30. Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in British African Territories*, Colonial Office, His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1950, p.212.
31. *ibid.*
32. Cameron's Memorandum, quoted in *ibid.*

33. Cameron to Lord Lugard, 12.9.1925. Quoted by Bates, 1957, op cit, p.62.
34. Lord Hailey, op cit, p.213.
35. Sir Donald Cameron, *My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1939, p.81.
36. Listowel, op cit, p.81. Tanganyika was able to raise a loan in the London Market in 1929. On 8.11.1928 Cameron was to write to Oldham (Mss Brit Emp. s. 1829, op cit): "The education estimates for the next year are naturally swollen considerably as compared with this year, but I am raising the money for all recurrent expenditure of the Territory out of our own revenue. I trust that no wretched clerk in Whitehall will attempt to cut down my votes."
37. Bates, 1957, op cit, p.416.
38. *ibid.*
39. D. Cameron to J.H. Oldham, 1.6.1925, in Mss Brit Emp s. 1829, op cit.
40. D. Cameron, "Native Administration", 16.7.1925, A Memorandum in TNA 7777/20.
41. Bates, 1957, op cit, p.146. Mitchell recorded in his Diary on 2.3.1928 that he expounded his "White Province" theory. His views, for example, recorded on 26.1 1929 had much South African policies influence. He had also travelled to South Africa in 1924 and 1928 to study the "native policies" and how they could be applied to Tanganyika.
42. Sir P. Mitchell, *African Afterthoughts*, Hutcheson, London, 1954, p.82.
43. *ibid*, p.129.
44. *ibid*, p.130.
45. *ibid.*
46. Tanganyika Territory, *Tanganyika Reports*, Government printer, Dar es Salaam, 1925, p.8.
47. Cameron, 1939, op cit, pp.93 & 114.
48. *ibid*, pp.165-67.
49. *ibid*, pp.171-72.
50. Mitchell, 1954, op cit, p.82.

51. R. Oliver, *The Missionary factor in East Africa*, Longman, London, 1952, p.231.
52. J.H. Oldham & B.D. Gibson, *The Remaking of Man in Africa*, OUP, London, 1931, p.9.
53. *ibid*, p.12.
54. *ibid*, pp.49-50.
55. Dr Bruno Gutman's books are mostly in German. A review of the work dealt with here appeared in *International Review of Missions*, October, 1931, p.547-55.
56. Bruno Gutman, "The African Standpoint" in *Africa*, Vol VIII No 1, London, January 1935, p.1.
57. *ibid*, p.4.
58. *ibid*, p.5. This is not very different from Emile Durkheim's conceptualization of the state in terms of provision of collective representation. Durkheim defined the state as a "group of officials *sui generis*, within which representations and acts of volition involving the collectivity are worked out, although they are not the product of the collectivity. It is not accurate to say that the state embodies the collective consciousness [*conscience collective*], for that goes beyond the state at every point.... The representations that derive from the state are always more conscious of themselves, of their causes and their aims. They have been concerted in a way that is less obscure. The collective agency which plans them realizes better what is it about.... Strictly speaking, the state is the very organ of social thought. Quoted in P. Corrigan & D. Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, p.5.
59. *ibid*, p.11.
60. See H. Kjekshus (*Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History*, Heinemann, London, 1977) for a more comprehensive treatment of this issue. Also Mitchell Diaries have several entries about these concentrations.
61. Mitchell to Oldham, 15.4.1926, in Mss Brit Emp s. 1829, op cit.
62. Listowel, op cit, p.71.
63. Tanganyika Territory, *Agricultural Reports*, Dar es Salaam, 1932, p.32, in TNA 11740.
64. Kjekshus, op cit, p.179.
65. TNA31351 "Compulsory Resettlement of Africans", Memorandum to Chief Secretary, 3.5.1945.

66.     ibid.
67.     Kjekshus, op cit, p.177.
68.     TNA 11234 Vol III, District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 17.6.1931; TNA 11234 Vol II, 16.7.1931; TNA 31796 R. Johnson to Chief Secretary, 21.11.1934; and Kjekshus, ibid. See also Mitchell Diaries on some of these concentrations.
69.     Charlotte Leubscher, *Tanganyika Territory*, OUP, London, 1944, pp.46-47.
70.     TNA 19605.
71.     For the attempts to establish the monopoly marketing boards in the 1920s see D.M.P. McCarthy, *Colonial Bureaucracy and Creation of Underdevelopment 1919-1940*, Iowa University Press, Ames, 1982.
72.     Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 12.12.1931.
73.     ibid, 19.1.1932. Also 18.4.1929 on Native authorities and the increase in Tax collected.
74.     J. Saul, in *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1975.
75.     TNA 10138, Mwanza Provincial Commissioner to Legget, 23.3.1927.
76.     For this aspect see E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*, Heinemann, London, 1973; also Iliffe, 1979, op cit.
77.     TNA 19505 "Marketing of Produce of Native Reserves with Particular Reference of Cooperation", Memo by Government of Kenya, April 1932.
78.     McCarthy, op cit, p.55.
79.     TNA 19605, op cit, "Memorandum by Mr Stickland", p.5.
80.     ibid, "Memorandum by Government of Tanganyika".
81.     TNA 10138 Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, 24.9.1934.
82.     Alexander, op cit, p.203.
83.     Mitchell, 1954, op cit, p.105.
84.     ibid; Cameron, 1939, op citp; & Iliffe, 1979, op cit discuss this issue of some societies having no forms of authority in the form of chiefdoms.
85.     McCarthy, op cit, p.11.

86. Books, for example, which were published for such propaganda are such as Joelson's (op cit); H. Schnee's *German Colonization Past and Present*, (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1926); and Dr Hans Poeschal's *The Voice of German East Africa (The English in the Judgement of the Natives)*, (August Sherl, Berlin, 1919).
87. Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 8.2. 1929 & 10.6.1929.
88. Thomas Jesse Jones, *Education in East Africa*, Phelps-Stockes Fund, Edinburg House Press, London, 1924, p.176.
89. *ibid.*
90. *Tanganyika Reports*, 1920, op cit, p.4.; Also Bates, 1957, op cit, p.53.
91. Poeschal, op cit.
92. Bates, 1957, op cit, p.67.
93. T.O.Ranger, "The Movement of Ideas, 1850-1939", in Kimambo and Temu (eds), op cit, p.176.
94. *ibid.*
95. *ibid.*
96. T.O. Ranger, *The African Churches of Tanzania*, op cit, p.13.
97. *ibid*, p.6-7. Some of the aspects about differentiation will become clear with the consideration of the capitalist elements which emerged during colonialism in the next chapter.
98. *ibid.*
99. M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals of Nyakyusa*, OUP, London, 1959, Chapter XII.
100. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.364.
101. Josiah Kibirah, quoted by *ibid.*
102. Iliffe, *ibid.*
103. Ranger, *The African Churches.....*, op cit, p.16.
104. *ibid.*
105. *ibid*, p.18; Wilson, op cit.
106. Ranger, in Kimambo and Temu (eds), op cit, p.181.
107. *ibid.*



108.     ibid.
109.     Reid, 1934, op cit, p.16; TNA 12333 & 45/218 Correspondence; T.O. Ranger, "Witchcraft Eradication" and A.A. Lee, "Ngoja and Six Theories of Witchcraft Eradication", in *Ufahamu* Vol VI, 1976, pp. 101-107.
110.     Reid, ibid.
111.     See Mitchell Diaries, 14.11.1929.
112.     Margery Perham, *East African Journey*, Faber and Faber, London, 1976, p.225.
113.     Ranger in Kimambo and Temu, op cit, p.182.
114.     ibid:
115.     TNA 21863 "Majaliwa Habib--Political Deportee".
116.     SMP 15363/32 "Confidential Circular No 2 of 1933 to all Prvovincial Commissioners and Commissioner of Police" on Zikri by P.E. Mitchell, 18.12.1933.
117.     Anne Dundas, op cit, p.207.
118.     Perham, op cit, p.224.
119.     See Mitchell Diaries, 16.9.1930; Issa G. Shivji, "Development of Wage Labour and Labour Laws in Tanzania: Circa 1920-1964", Ph D Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1982.
120.     See Mitchell, 1954, op cit, pp.85-86.
121.     Shivji, 1982, op cit, p.17.
122.     Perham, op cit, p.228.
123.     ibid.
124.     Brett, op cit, p.221.
125.     In TNA 25938 there is a copy of the Master and Native Servant Ordinance of 1923.
126.     P.B. Mhyo, *Industrial Conflict and Change in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1983, p.3.
127.     TNA 24/25/1.
128.     Shivji, 1982, op cit.
129.     Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 19.9.1933.

130.     ibid.
131.     For details of all the above see Shivji, 1982, op cit.
132.     In practice forced labour continued even after that. The essence of the legal abolition was to satisfy the UN Mission which made frequent visits to the country in that period.
133.     Dundas, 1924, op cit, p.121.
134.     For details about these Ordinances, see Shivji, 1982, op cit.
135.     ibid, p.148 for more details.
136.     TNA 11725 Annual Labour Department Report, 1930, p.2.
137.     ibid. .
138.     ibid, p.21.
139.     ibid, p.7.
140.     Branagan & J.A. Hammond, "Rinderpest in Tanganyika: A Review", in *Bulletin of Epizootic Diseases in Africa*, Vol 13, 1965, p.228.
141.     Major Orde Browne, "Labour in Africa", 1929, p.29. in Mss Afr s. 1117, op cit.
142.     Major Orde Browne, "Primitive Cultures and Modern Theories", in ibid.
143.     Mitchell, 1954, op cit, pp.85-86.
144.     *East African Standard*, 19.12.1922.
145.     Dundas, 1924, op cit, p.95.
146.     ibid, pp.97-98.
147.     Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 27.2.1927.
148.     ibid, 27.10.1927.
149.     TNA 11509, Wakefield to Director of Agriculture, 3.12.1927.
150.     ibid, 29.2.1928.
151.     ibid, folio 70.
152.     See P. Rigby, *Cattle and Kinship among the Gogo*, Ithaca, 1969; and L. Cliffe, "Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial period", in Cliffe & Saul (eds), op cit.

153. Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 18.1.1933.
154. Dundas, 1924, op cit, p.138.
155. M. Bates, "Tanganyika: Changes in Life 1918-1945", in V. Harlow, EM. Chilver & A. Smith (eds), *History of East Africa* Vol II, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965, p.636. Also Lord Hailey, *An African Survey Revisited*, His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1956, OUP (1957) p.1037.
156. TNA 11725 "Disturbances among Native Tribes in Musoma District"
157. *ibid.*
158. TNA 11725, "Annual Report Labour Department" 1930, p.5
159. *ibid.*..Emphasis added.
160. Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 28.8.1930.
161. *ibid*, 3.9.1933.
162. Iliffe in Kimambo and Temu, op cit, p.149.
163. TNA 11725, 1927, op cit, para 153.
164. *ibid*, p.7.
165. Tanganyika Territory, "Major Orde Browne's Report", 1926, p.5.
166. TNA 11725, op cit, 1932, p.3.
167. *ibid*, 1938.
168. *ibid.*
169. *ibid*, p.21.
170. *ibid*, 1939, p.13.
171. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.398.
172. Jack Woddiss, *The Lion Awakes*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1961, p.196.
173. Major Orde Browne, "Labour in Africa" in Mss Afr s.1117, op cit, p.29.
174. Iliffe, in Kimambo and Temu, op cit, p.146.
175. TNA 11725, op cit, 1938, p.32.
176. TNA 19335/1 Passfield to Colonies, 17.9.1930.

177. Woddis, op cit, pp.43-46.
178. Tanganyika Territory, *Proceedings of the Legislative Council (Hansard)*, 1932, p.196.
179. *ibid.*
180. Tanganyika Territory, *Ordinances*, No 32 of 1932, p.99.
181. *Hansard*, 1932, op cit.
182. TNA 24829.
183. TNA 27259/I-II, (1939) "The Labour Trade Union of East Africa", also see Shivji, 1982, op cit, p.373.
184. *Ordinances*, op cit, 1941, p.105.
185. Joelson, op cit, p.99.
186. Schnee, 1926, op cit, p.121.
187. Alexander, op cit, p.194.
188. TNA 13420 Vol I "Whipping by Native Courts",
189. *ibid.*
190. *ibid*, for all the above explanation.
191. TNA 23190 "Political Offences and punitive Expeditions 'Hut Burning'".
192. Collective Punishment Ordinance of 1921 No 24, Amendment of.
193. Fortie, op cit, p.167.
194. *ibid*, p.209.
195. Elizabeth Hopkins, "Racial Minorities in British East Africa", in S. Diamod & G. Burke (eds), *Transformation of East Africa*, Basic Books, New York, 1966, p.94. On p.130 she states: "...the Europeans felt little pressure to legitimate the explicit barriers through which informal social contacts with other communities were avoided..."
196. *ibid*, p.137.
197. J.E.G. Sutton, "Dar es Salaam: A Sketch of a Hundred Years" in *Tanzania Notes and Records*, No 71, 1970, p.9.
198. *ibid*, p.11.
199. Huxley, op cit, p.29.

200. Schnee, op cit, p.164.
201. ibid.
202. W.L. Kilama et al, "Health Care and Delivery in Tanzania", in G. Ruhumbika, *Towards Ujamaa*, EALB, Nairobi, 1974, p.192.
203. For some of the details about the self reliance of the economy in general (and especially in terms of food) during the First World War, see Charles Miller, op cit.
204. *The Observer*, 24.5.1925, in *Mss Brit Emp s. 1829*, op cit.
205. Kilama et al, op cit, p.194.
206. J.P. Moffet, "A Review of Scientific Progress in Tanganyika During 1952", in *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, No 43, 1953.
207. See this in *Tanganyika Notes and Records* No 11, 1941, p.66. Also some other issues have reports for other years. Orde Browne for example, filled some notebooks on biological and anthropological material, as part of the study on the native labourer, to determine productivity and other things.
208. Hopkins, op cit, p.92.
209. Reid, op cit, p.209.
210. See Mitchell Diaries (op cit) in 1929 in which he recorded losses/embezzlement of Native Authority funds in almost every district he visited.
211. ibid, 12.1.1929.
212. ibid, 4.9.1934.
213. Alexander, op cit, Preface to the book.
214. ibid, p.11.
215. ibid.
216. Dundas, 1924, op cit, pp.64-65.
217. ibid, p.91.
218. ibid, pp.127-28.
219. Reid, op cit, p.70.
220. Joelson, 1920, op cit, p.97.
221. Dundas, 1924, op cit, p.56.

222.     ibid.
223.     ibid. Alexander (op cit p.34) adds more information about these evening activities after the games and sports. He explains that after purchasing a piano--a thing which was rare by then in the territory--they would sing the choruses of "Wild Wild Women" or "Coal Black Mammy", interspersing them with "Alexander's Ragtime Band" and many other jazz choruses. The piano had formerly been battered, sat upon, climbed over and generally made play with by soldiers, who had poured "libations of beer, wine and whisky and soda....'pour encourager la musique'".
224.     Reid, op cit, p.70.
225.     Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 16.3.1931.
226.     Joelson, op cit, pp.15-16. Fortie wrote that wheever he travelled, he did so with several cases of champagne which, according to him, Europeans believed was much superior to quinine in treating malaria, but more so for obtaining the good will of German officers in command of government posts along the routes. (op cit, p.37) When Huxley was in Tanganyika, among the first Europeans he met were "a bull-necked young man" who "contrasted forcibly with a Scotsman who turned up later; very much worse for liquor". This young man introduced himself to Huxley and invited him for a drink: "When he left, he had just ordered three bottles of beer to take to bed with him, explaining that 'Dar es Salaam was a thirsty place in the morning'". (Huxley, op cit).
227.     Miller, op cit, p.131.
228.     Dundas, op cit, p.53.
229.     Kwetu, 2.8.1938. There is also, for example, the question of Pennington and the African woman mentioned in Mitchell's quotation which was cited above when he was wiggling him. Then there was a certain Mr Napier in Iringa who died (authorities unclear whether it was suicide or murder). He had kicked out his wife and son--Basil--on account that the latter was a bastard. In this family, according to Mitchell, there was "also (of course) a story of incest...Poor mad woman." (Mitchell Diaries, 13.9.1933.)
230.     Reid, op cit, p.69.
231.     Dundas, op cit, p.221.
232.     Reid, op cit.
233.     Ernest Hemingway, *The Green Hills of Africa*, Charles Schribner's Sons, New York, 1935. In his *The snows of Kilimanjaro and Other Stories*, besides the title story, there are other stories such as "The Short Happy life of Francis Macombe", "Hills like

Elephants", etc, which more or less supplement the theme in the *Green Hills*....

- 234. J.H. Oldham & B.D. Gibson, op cit, p.51.
- 235. Evelyn Waugh, *Scoop*, London 1937. Earlier in 1931 he had published, *A Black Mischief*, which deals with the same themes. Waugh had visited Ethiopia for the coronation of the King before he wrote these novels as a reporter. From there he had gone to Kenya and Zanzibar. It does not seem that he visited much of Tanganyika, as it can be observed from the way he confused the location of towns like Tabora, etc, in his *Black Mischief*. Important here is the fact that he was dealing with an East African Mandate Territory.
- 236. Winfred Holtby, *Mandoa Mandoa*, London, 1933. Quoted by Martin Tucker, in *Africa in Modern Literature*, p.147.
- 237. Hopkins, op cit, p.96.
- 238. Fortie, op cit, pp.165-67.
- 239. B. Malinowski, "Memorandum on Clonial Research", December 1927, p.1, in *Mss Brit Emp s. 1829*, op cit.
- 240. *ibid*, pp.2 & 3. Also see Bronislaw Malinowski, "Practical Anthropology", Summary of a paper which was to appear in French in *Africa*, in *ibid*.
- 241. B. Malinowski, "Memorandum for the Rockefeller Foundation Written for Embree in March 1926", in *ibid*, p.3.
- 242. *Times*, 2.6.1925, in *Mss Brit Emp s. 1829*, *ibid*. This seems to have been very central in their arguments.
- 243. *Mss Brit Emp s. 1829*, *ibid*, Sir F. Lugard, "Economic Development vis á vis the well being of the Native in Mandated Territories," September 5, 1925.
- 244. *Ibid*, Oldham to Cameron, 18.9.1925.
- 245. *ibid*.
- 246. *ibid*, Cameron to Oldham, 1.6.1925.
- 247. *ibid*, Cameron to Oldham, 25.4.1926.
- 248. *ibid*, Mitchell to Oldham, 15.4.1926.
- 249. *ibid*.
- 250. *ibid*, Mitchell to Oldham, 5.9.1929.

251. D. Cameron, "Land Alienation in Certain Provinces which are mainly Native Areas", General Notice No 1054 of 1930, in *Tanganyika Gazette*, 10.10.1930. Also see Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 19.12.1931.
252. Mitchell Diaries, *ibid*, 18.6.1935.
253. Major Orde Browne, "Paper on the Legal System of African Primitive Society", n.d. in *Mss Afr s. 1117*, op cit p.3.
254. *ibid*, "The African Labourer", 1929-30.
255. *ibid*, "The Theory of colonial Trusteeship", p.5.
256. Mitchell Diaries, 23.12.1930.
257. This is a paraphrase of Ernest Wamba dia Wamba's "Philosophy in Africa: Challenges of the African Philosopher", Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, (mimeo) pp.2-3.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **The Systematization of African Civilization**

## Chapter Four THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF AFRICAN CIVILIZATION

The African "teachers and shopkeepers, clerks and cotton growers"--the very elements which were a product of colonial capitalism, have to quite some extent been documented and their role in the nationalist struggles in the 1950s is a known story.<sup>1</sup> It is the manner in which ideas about African Civilization and Africanity in general, later on to be systematized into Pan-Africanism and African Socialism, emerged which is obscure. This chapter ventures in that sphere and demonstrates the forms of contradictions which shaped their struggles and hence the ideas within the framework of colonial domination and paternalism.

The focus in this chapter is mainly on those aspects which helped to shape the ideas in the 1930s and 1940s, how those ideas were systematized by Africans, and the connection of those ideas with the ideas of Indirect Rule. The chapter commences with a general examination of the emergence of mental labour as a particular form of practice within the colonial capitalist forms of production, and the relationship of mental labour to commerce, commercial agriculture and the power structures. This is followed by an examination of the forms of struggles and the institutions created within the struggles; and, finally, an examination of some of the ideas/literature which emerged in this period in relation to the other two aspects.

### *4.1 Manual and Mental Division of Labour in Tanganyika*

Dr David Livingstone's appeal for help to Africa in the 19th century mainly concentrated on the "great social evils of African society" (slave trade, tribal wars) and the necessity of opening Africa to

commerce and civilization. Christianity was to teach the virtues of personal hard work and thrift and the integrity of enlightened christian families. As with all missionaries, with Livingstone, religion was the sole agent of civilization. Without those virtues commerce would not prosper easily.<sup>2</sup> In essence, these virtues were nothing more than an expression of the need to westernize Africans: commerce for them was the need for Africans to participate in the production of articles for sale in the world market--as a remedy for the slave trade--that "great evil".

Missionary education in Tanganyika was introduced as early as 1868.<sup>3</sup> More than a decade before German colonization of the country, the French Roman Catholic Order of the Holy Ghost established a school at Bagamoyo, North of Dar es Salaam. Shortly thereafter, this practice was emulated by the Universities Mission to Central Africa, Church Missionary Society, Lutheran Mission of Berlin and several other Roman Catholic orders.<sup>4</sup> Besides this form of non-indigenous education, there was Islamic education through Koranic schools which had established itself for centuries along the coast and was being used even by some of the rulers who employed court clerks in the interior--as far as Kilimanjaro--before colonialism.<sup>5</sup>

When the Germans took over the country, they were much more concerned with the establishment of law and order and the opening up of the country to commerce--Livingstone's second concern. But this was not going to be a possibility without an establishment of a junior "local civil service for their administrative machinery". The result of this was that "they were soon forced into creating an educational system to staff it."<sup>6</sup> Unlike the British government later on, the German

Government was not interested in the mission schools out-put; instead it set out on its own to train "clerks, tax collectors, interpreters, accountants, and artisans needed for the government service. The German Governor von Soden, who founded the government system in 1891, had very clear ideas about" the form of education he needed.<sup>7</sup> The qualifications "demanded for the first German education officer were agnosticism and a thorough knowledge of Swahili." The only people respected by von Soden were the Muslims--"he was prepared to pay Muslim teachers who visited government schools to give religious instruction". This early attempt to link Koranic schools with the government ones was defeated by the fierce missionary opposition it roused.<sup>8</sup>

The German education system was an "instrument designed to meet a narrow, strictly vocational need." At the outbreak of the First World War the Education Department had 24 European staff. There were 99 government schools by then--ten of which were principal schools and the rest elementary. There was a plan to build some 20 elementary schools in that year. In 1913 there were 2,394 and 3,706 pupils in principal and elementary schools respectively. These were besides the "108,550 children on the registers of the 1,832 schools conducted by the missionary societies."<sup>9</sup> A 1921 report to the British Parliament noted the following about the German education system:

The result of their system are today evident in the large number of Natives scattered throughout the country who are able to read and write, and it must be admitted that the degree of usefulness to the administration of the Natives of Tanganyika Territory is in advance of that which one has been accustomed to associate with British African Protectorates.<sup>10</sup>

Broadly, besides Africans being trained in new trades and crafts and as civil servants--hence being very useful to the colonial governments

as it is admitted in the above quotation--the missionary converts were taught and encouraged to participate in commercial agriculture by cultivating cash crops such as coffee, wheat, etc.. The Wachagga converts in Kilimanjaro were taught and encouraged by missionaries to grow coffee as early as 1902.<sup>11</sup> When the British colonial administrators were busy organizing Native administration and re-establishing colonial economic activities in Kilimanjaro after the First World War, "educated Chagga, mainly mission trained teachers such as Solomon Nkya, Yohanne Kimambo, Aron Lyimo, Yakobo Lyimo and Ndesariyo Moshi and a few other individuals like Joseph Merinyo, Nathaniel Mtui and Onesmo Lema who were working in the colonial administration embarked on promoting education and commercial agriculture among their own people."<sup>12</sup>

It was the missionary L. Blumer who arrived in Arusha in 1907 who taught the Waarusha how to build houses different from the traditional ones, how to cultivate coffee and develop commerce and how to use the plough. People who mostly benefited from these efforts were the Christian converts.<sup>13</sup> Among the Wameru, it was people like Matayo Leveriya Kaaya, one of the first young people from Akeri village "to be educated formally and become christian...who were among the first to introduce coffee-growing into the area, an innovation which was in time to transform the economy of the village."<sup>14</sup>

Despite the adverse impact of the First World War on the education system, by 1923 there were 5,000 pupils enrolled in 65 government schools who were taught by 135 African teachers under the direction of five Europeans. In addition to this there were 115,000 pupils in 2,200 schools taught by 2,200 African teachers under the supervision of 150 European missionaries.<sup>15</sup> Especially from the 1920s, Africans had

embarked on establishing schools on a self-help basis--mostly in those areas with developed commercial agriculture. These schools became known as Native Authority Schools. The efforts to establish these schools were a result of the fact that "[even] before the 1930s, schooling was already regarded as a necessary qualification in entering the political and socio-economic status structures of the colonial state."<sup>16</sup> The essence of the matter was:

Chiefs were now appointed to the office on the basis of their education and employers of the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association were elected on the basis of their education. The government was employing educated youths as clerks, agricultural instructors, medical workers and forestry workers. Missions were retaining educated youths to train as teachers and 'native' priests. Others were employed by the railways, post office and commercial firms on the basis of their education.<sup>17</sup>

In sum, the above discussion demonstrates that the schism between manual and mental labour in Tanganyika was associated with commodity production within the colonial forms of production. Education and the privilege of intellectual work and its importance to the colonial forms of transformation was not enshrined in its own immanence: "as commercialization developed, more and more Africans realized that schools opened the door to paid employment with the colonial administration, the missions and business".<sup>18</sup> In other words, the secret of education and the privilege of intellectual work lay in the development of colonial capitalist forms of production and exchange, given that commodities, as products of the labour of individuals working independently of each other required a society organized on the basis of division of labour--one such division being intellectual work and manual work; and intellectual work by social thinking had become absolutely essential within the forms of socio-economic organization and

their associated political/administrative structures. The interest here is the social role of these educated classes as thinkers of a class--as a strata who foster certain ideas as theoretical, ideological and philosophical expression of practical movements. The extent to which the emergence of educated elements had appeared indicates the extent of division of labour and hence colonial capitalist relations and therewith the possibility of the emergence of more or less systematized/theoretical social thinking.<sup>19</sup>

The systemization of African Civilization and defence of Africanity in general among Tanganyikans can only be comprehended within the framework of these educated elements emerging as part of the division of labour under the colonial capitalist forms of production, the history of intellectual work and social thinking becoming increasingly independent, as a systematization of social practices from the proletarianization process.<sup>20</sup> Thus, when Martin Kayamba, one of the most educated Tanganyikans who died in 1938, championed education for Africans in the 1920s and 1930s as the only means for progress, he was theoretically expressing this division of labour as the foundation of the social system which was in the process of formation. According to him, education had the most important role to play in the shaping of what was known by then as "the African contribution to civilization".<sup>21</sup>

Martin Kayamba, a tall, powerful man, elegantly dressed and well-educated, widely travelled and with fluent command of English; whose father was the first Tanganyikan to be educated in Britain before the German invasion of the country, was a model of "sophistication to which the young men aspired" in the 1920s. He was to be the head of the District Office in Tanga under Philip Mitchell in 1923 and later on

worked in the office of Secretary to Native Affairs. When in Tanga, Kayamba was part of a group of educated East Africans--most of them being a product of Kiungani school in Zanzibar.<sup>22</sup>

The educated of the other parts of East Africa were politically more advanced in the 1920s than those of Tanganyika, as Mitchell observed. According to him, the reason for this was the fact that colour questions were major issues in those countries. That is, "if the educated native" wanted "to do anything more effective than merely 'advise' (blessed word!) the Assistant District Commissioners" he was driven to do it through a political association which is an excellent thing in the hands of fairly civilized folk but dangerous with the first generation of literates--"<sup>23</sup> This was not the case with the educated in Tanganyika, who as the 1921 Report to the British Parliament noted were "useful to the administration of the Natives". According to Mitchell, the difficulties with the educated of the other parts of East Africa were absent in Tanganyika "because of the native administrations". It was not the prospects only which affected or rather influenced their situation:

but the fact that in addition to chiefs and sub-chiefs, counsellors, and so on, there is of course what really amounts to a very large civil service, which offers careers to the educated and industrious, positions in which they are actively occupied about the daily affairs of their tribe. I need not tell you how strong a pull that is with Africans.<sup>24</sup>

That is, the educated had been made effectively colonizable by being coopted in the 1920s by being turned into champions of African Civilization which ultimately had no other objective than the European civilizing mission--the very objectives of the policy of Indirect Rule in Tanganyika. These coopted elements were progressive from the imperial



point of view: they did not pose a problem as was the case with those of other parts of East Africa.

The educated of the inter-War period had varied attitudes towards African cultures and life in general<sup>25</sup> depending on their objective relationship to the colonial structures. But they generally regarded themselves as Westernized. This Westernization ranged from uncritical acceptance of Western views and values to critical acceptance; and the Westernized elements were mostly found among young people especially in the urban areas. Among those who were ageing by the 1920s were people like Ganisya who had held the view that "Africans did not want to preserve their cultures"; Peter Njau from Kilimanjaro, who at some point lamented, "I wish I could tear off this black skin of mine. We are every whit as good as the whiteman and as fit to control the country".<sup>26</sup> In the 1920s such views were to be found among people like Martin Kayamba and the educated circles in general--though with some modifications. As late as 1940s people like Dr E.F. Mwaisela, when petitioning about the incommensurable remuneration they received, based their arguments on the education status and the life situation expected from them. As a Medical Officer Mwaisela wrote in 1943:

The general outlook at present as far as my life is concerned, is very gloomy. I have been brought up to such a level in life that I can neither cope with my own peoples life, nor that of a civilized man. To get married to a girl of any reasonable standard, for instance, in order that I should maintain that standard of education I enjoyed at school, is literally to commit suicide.<sup>27</sup>

This frustration, eloquently put by Dr Mwaisela was part of the issues which fuelled the transition of the assimilated from the position of the coopted to that of rebellion from the 1930s.

The opportunities to enter the government service and other privileged positions were offered to people with a good command of English. Such education was mostly offered in the urban areas, while most elementary schools in the countryside centred on the establishment and propagation of commercial agriculture. According to the Director of Education, Mr Rivers-Smith, the policy of education in the 1920s was mainly determined by the "primitive native and the economic resources". A future development in which agriculture did not occupy the foremost position was inconceivable:

...the educationist must if he has any faith in his work at all, see in his imagination a Tanganyika of 50 or 100 years hence peopled with a type of native agriculturalists better housed, cultivating several times the acreage that he does today and by methods which he does not yet know, and growing crops which he has never heard of. Everything therefore points to agriculture as the basis of our education system in elementary stages....<sup>28</sup>

And this was within the framework of an attempt to create a "good African". In the field of education, people like J. Raum, argued that education had to prepare Africans to remain faithful to the family, the clan and the tribe; that is it had to conserve the African heritage, and hence, it was necessary to employ tribal languages as the first medium of instruction in the early years of school.<sup>29</sup> If this was to be possible, then it was necessary to have segregation in the education system: African, Asian and European with the latter two using English as the medium of instruction rather than the vernaculars.

This segregation, according to Rivers-Smith, was quite healthy for political reasons: as a result of the political upheavals in India, integration would result in "political repercussions" among Africans "in the future years of the development of a closer liason between the two races." Therefore, the rivalry and growing race consciousness among

Africans and the feeling of resentment towards Asians was viewed as being healthy, because breaking it would "eventually lead [them] to make common cause for political ends...." From the point of view of administration it was necessary to retain this "very valuable asset."<sup>30</sup>

The British colonial government had established a government school in Tabora in 1922 for the sons and heirs of chiefs who were to be educated on English public school lines. This school became famous as the Eton of Tanganyika. Discipline in this school was adopted for African conditions and maintained by a tribal system. The boys were organized on tribal lines, each with a chief and sub-chiefs. In the Southern Highlands, a government school was founded at Malangali in 1927. This school attempted to use traditional forms of education to prepare the aristocracy for their position within their traditional societies. W. Brynt Mumford who was the headmaster of this school between 1928 and 1931 attempted to design the school in such a way that it complemented the ideology of Indirect Rule.<sup>31</sup> Malangali became a laboratory for assimilation by simple steps of the elements of European civilization and culture for happy inter-racial relations and the development of indigenous culture, so as to build a truly African education system.<sup>32</sup> Elders were selected as moral tutors and uniforms worn were the traditional toga-like wraps. Also, there was spear throwing, indigenous dancing and indigenous lore in lieu of other forms of entertainment; and academic courses took examples from the immediate environment. Mumford also embarked upon the possibility of basing education on initiation ceremonies, as was tried by some of the missionaries in Masasi, Southern Tanganyika.<sup>33</sup> The aim was to adopt education to "the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions of

the various people conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy elements in the fabric of their social life."<sup>34</sup>

As was pointed out in Chapter Three, Indirect rule--practically or ideologically--had nothing to do with a commitment to the actual preservation of African social structures and institutions: it was the manner in which the civilizing mission of Africans by Europeans took place in Tanganyika. Mitchell visited Malangali school in 1929. For him, Mumford had a "better idea of the sort of life" Africans "must live for as long as" they could foresee, than "most people in the Department of Native Affairs." The chiefs needed not be over-estimated in their capacity, for in several generations the institutions for progress would be coming from Europe and stimulated by Europe: "Indeed it is the capacity which the African probably lacks altogether; it is a catching complaint with which we hope to infect him, but he is not yet infected."<sup>35</sup> Mitchell was to echo the same message in 1931 when talking to chiefs from Bukoba. He advised them not to "shove their noses into high politics" which they did not understand, and instead give their attention to "fundamental things necessary to their own welfare". He warned them of the "folly of listening to racial mischief mongers": all civilization came from Europe "and all that they need in the future [could] only come from that source."<sup>36</sup>

The dilemma with this education system and the attempt to create a "good African" who was "not a bad imitation of a European...a half educated African who considered himself quite as good as, if not better than, the white man who governed him," as John Scott, the Chief Secretary defined him,<sup>37</sup> was the fact that it contradicted the aspirations of the very elements created/brought forth by colonial

transformations: the educated and rich Africans who saw education as a means to participate in the administration of the country and attain a better social status materially, which in turn demanded a sound command of English. It contradicted the aspirations of Africans who sought to participate in the colonial socio-economic and political forms, and at the same time influence the terms of their participation--whether in commerce, agriculture, industry, education or administration. For these Africans, it was necessary to gain full control of the colonial institutions so as to be able to "improve and modernize" themselves.

The "modern Tanganyikans" opposed such a system of education--education "for Africans only."<sup>39</sup> Such a policy did not fare well with people like Martin Kayamba, who became a member of the Advisory Committee on Native Education in 1929. The missionary members who believed in teaching Africans in Swahili or their own vernaculars were horrified when Kayamba told them "it was a waste of time to go beyond the teaching of reading and writing in Swahili." Kayamba, "Like most members of his generation,...had no time for this. What was the point, he asked the Committee, of teaching African school children to build African houses, when they already knew how to do it? Instead, he pressed the need for advanced literary education in English."<sup>39</sup> He was to state in his life account that those who thought literary education unsuitable for Africans ignored "the fact of its importance and indispensability to any sort of education," and therefore denied Africans the very "means of progress."<sup>40</sup> According to Kayamba, without European education there was only a narrow chance for Africans to achieve power in society.<sup>41</sup> He flared up in 1934 when it was proposed

that there should be devised a method of testing African mental capacity so as to adopt the educational techniques to it.<sup>42</sup>

The reaction of the "modern Tanganyikans" to this system in the inter-War period was to establish schools on the basis of self-help. For example, in Uchagga, there was a big struggle mounted against both missionary and government control of schools, which culminated in the Wachagga building their own schools on a self-help basis. According to them, the existing schools were not giving the children adequate training in agricultural modernization; thus, they "decided to use the same European institutions of education and commercial agriculture to bring about changes in the community. Western education was already accepted and internalized by the Chagga...." The Wahaya in West Lake, were the first people to establish schools on the basis of self-help "and used them to spread western education and christianity to their own people," and they had already done this by 1924. This practice existed in almost all the advanced areas of the country. <sup>44</sup>

The demand for better education for Africans was to be linked with the demand for African representation in the Legislative Council (LEGCO) which was established by Donald Cameron in 1926 with a European majority and some Asian members. Africans were excluded from the LEGCO and had no representation in the territorial administrative machinery, because all they needed, according to the government, was the native authorities. Chagga politicians were among those who advocated for representation at territorial level.<sup>45</sup> The government could not accept this; and it was only towards the 1950s that some degree of representation was granted to Africans. The Governor of Tanganyika said in 1933, while in Geneva, that Kayamba could not speak English well enough to be in LEGCO; that he

could be isolated and hence unable to take part in public business and so on. One Indian paper had an offensive article about this issue. This question infuriated Kayamba so much that he threatened to resign from his position in the Department of Native Affairs.<sup>46</sup> This perhaps explains why his stance politically became so much altered in the 1930s, and his decision to go back to the countryside in Tanga to farm, think and write. Even when he got his appointment within the Department in 1932 as an Assistant Secretary, the *East African Standard* had come out with a very offensive leader about it: "the real grievance being an African,.... (an) African, getting a job".<sup>47</sup>

The demand for a European type of education was an expression of the need to control the colonial processes, hence the struggles that took place within the native authorities--for control of power, education and wealth. In these struggles, tribal histories were reconstructed and tribal unions formed to oppose the native authorities; marketing co-operatives, associations etc. were also formed to oppose various arbitrary actions by the local authorities. The practical impact of Indirect Rule becomes obvious here: it succeeded in localising the grievances of the "Modern Tanganyikans"; and the above mentioned movements were formed by the wealthy and the educated. In the 1930s, there were bitter conflicts "between two wealthy groups, one with official status and the other without". In the two most capitalist developed areas of the country, Bukoba and Kilimanjaro, "[the] conflict was over which of the groups should have control of the improvement of the tribe--improvement which each group wanted, but which each thought it best qualified to carry out. It was a conflict between competing modernizers".<sup>48</sup>

The conflicts of the "modernizers" were extended further: in the commercial sphere there was a conflict with the Asian commercial bourgeoisie and the government's various restrictions on the advancement of the African commercial elements; and there were struggles of the educated for racial equality in all spheres. All these struggles were to find their expression in the writings which were to appear in the 1930s in defense of African Civilization and Africanity in general. To grasp the ideological content of African Civilization, it is imperative to explore first the other conflicts--in commerce and agriculture.

#### 4.2 *The "Modern Tanzanians" Struggles*

As pointed out in Chapter Three, the early 1920s were very difficult years for the British administrators in Tanganyika. This was not only because of the consequences of the first World War--in terms of famine, disease, economic disruptions etc; and the potential threats posed by the people. It was also due to the fact that the Territory was financially dependent on loans from the London market. Hut and Poll Tax and custom duties contributed approximately ¾ of the governments revenue; and even in custom duties nearly 40 per cent was derived from cotton goods for Africans, and the rest was from kerosine, tobacco, cigarettes and hardware--mostly for Africans.<sup>49</sup> Because of this financial difficulty under which the government was labouring, and the expansion of the bureaucracy which was taking place in the 1920s, it was necessary to increase taxation.

Therefore the government introduced the Trade Licencing and Profits Tax in 1923. This ordinance was designed to tax and licence non-African traders who were overwhelmingly Asian wholesalers and retail traders



rather than European companies. This Ordinance also compelled the Asians to put their accounts in English and not in Gujarati. This resulted in was opposition by the Asians which was spearheaded by the Indian Association. The conflict culminated in a 54 days strike, whereby all the Asian shops were closed throughout the country.<sup>50</sup> Although the European Chamber of Commerce also opposed this form of taxation, it nevertheless supported the government in its struggles with the Asians. It supported the Asians because it feared that the same form of taxation would be introduced to Europeans; but it also supported the government because of the competition which existed between Europeans and Asians. The Legislation was repealed in 1927 as a result of several years of agitation.

With the defeat of the government in this attempt, taxation for Africans was increased instead, because in Tanganyika "financial policy was made by people who assumed that taxation led Africans into paths of economic virtue by forcing them to produce cash or work for wages." As for non-Africans, it was believed they "should pay as little as decently possible in order to maximize their desire to settle or invest."<sup>51</sup> The Asian strike was called Hartal. It started on 1.4.1923 and ended on 25.5.1923. After the strike, even the demand that Asians should put their accounts in English was dropped.

There were 338 wholesale trade licences, 3,222 retail trade licences and 13,106 "native licences" by 1923. The two former were in the hands of Europeans, Indians and Arabs.<sup>52</sup> As a result of the strike by the Asians, African traders who solely depended upon purchasing commodities from Asians were hard hit. But there were also African traders who took advantage of this strike to crack down on Indian monopoly. The strike

stimulated the growth of trade among some African traders to the extent that they started encroaching on the Asian controlled business areas. In a letter by a "Native Observer" in Dar es Salaam, it was claimed that the Profits Taxation Ordinance "is the most important Ordinance ever produced by the Governor since the occupation of the territory....for it has opened ajar to us a barred door leading to natives prosperity."<sup>53</sup> The letter went on, Africans had prospered with the closing of Asian shops because they were able to apply for retail shop licences and purchase food wholesale from the market and sell it retail to their friends. They were able to help each other "until the whole town was filled with Native retail shops". African traders were very happy with the strike and did not want the Asians to open their shops again."<sup>54</sup>

African traders were eliminated from the Asian controlled areas after the strike, and the government helped in this regard by legislation which blocked the growth of a strong African commercial class which would link itself with the import/export economy. One such item of legislation was the Credit to Natives (Restriction) Ordinance of 1923. This legislation, according to the government, was supposed to protect the "natives" from the "potential incidence of undesirable Asiatic behaviour".<sup>55</sup> Mitchell, then a District Commissioner in Tanga wrote "The Credit to Natives Ordinance fills a long felt want and will do more than anything to prevent the African from selling or encumbering his land".<sup>56</sup> The land question was one of the obsessions of the colonial government in the 1920s. For Cameron, it was the fact that Africans had a sense of security in the possession of land and a place in the body-politic in the country "which he understands and appreciates (as he does) we shall be establishing the best foundations on which to build up

a prosperous and contented peasantry, aided by all that the state can give it in the way of education, agricultural and veterinary instruction, public health instruction, and so on."<sup>57</sup> Mitchell was later to write to Oldham that, without a quick settlement of the land question they would "forfeit all confidence among the natives" because he felt that a general feeling of insecurity was spreading, given what he had been told about the Wasafwa in Mbeya who feared so much for their land.<sup>58</sup>

As far as the colonial government was concerned, Africans were simply to be export crops producers and semi-proletarians. This was determined by the very conditions of the state's reproduction in Tanganyika--some of which have already been pointed out in the previous chapter. There were legal enactments such as the Identification Law which was mentioned previously, which restricted the mobility of Africans if deemed to be endangering the production of export crops production. The fact is, it was the peasant producers, who since the early colonial days, had produced the bulk of export goods. The fear of Africans selling their land, probably to Asians--the only ones who had the capital without necessarily having recourse to state assistance--was based on the assumption that this would increase insecurity among Africans and also diminish agricultural production. The latter would happen because settlers and large scale farming in general were mainly involved in the production of coffee and later tobacco--of which they never produced enough for the requirements of export; and they also had to be financed by the state or some monopolies, something which the state could not afford in the 1920s and 1930s, because Tanganyika had to generate funds internally, as was shown above.<sup>59</sup> But the peasants

produced all types of crops, except sisal which was a plantation crop introduced by DOAG.

Mitchell admitted this fact when he wrote to Oldham that:

6. Now the actual facts are that we have every kind of non-native agricultural enterprise from large sisal company to small Indian or Arab cultivator....
7. On the other hand...we have a huge block of Territory containing nearly half the native population of the country, who are capable and industrious agriculturalists and stockowners and produce probably two thirds of the total exportable crops of the Territory....Finally on the Meru and Kilimanjaro, and less acutely in the Usambara mountains we have areas densely populated by capable and hard working natives...isolated by geographical conditions and intervening areas alienated for European settlement, who have already come into economic conflict to a certain extent with their European neighbours and who are already feeling to a limited degree the need for more land.<sup>60</sup>

These policies on white settlement, land reservation etc. were determined by the reactions of the people of Tanganyika. But more than that, as Mitchell was to admit, these policies were also determined by "the economic side of the thing"--the economic was the deciding factor: "we have by no means a free choice of white settlement or native development. The former is conditioned by the fact that black competition will make certain types of farming impossible for white farmers and that within by no means a long period."<sup>61</sup> Besides that, on the relative effectiveness of large and small scale agriculture, large scale agriculture meant "machines or depressed--even serf-labour". True enough, low wages could enrich "the landlord but do the trade of the country little good and its soil and agricultural practice less."<sup>62</sup>

In a nutshell, obviously "peasant development was far easier and, if the word can be used, more 'natural' than the creation of settler economy. The latter required massive administration and economic injections on behalf of an economic structure which found it difficult

to compete effectively on world markets." Peasants required very little capital and could work for long hours with small returns.<sup>63</sup> The fact that peasants produced the bulk of export goods is demonstrated by the following table which shows that non-African agricultural production, *excluding sisal plantations* contributed the least percentage of the exports.

TABLE 1: TANGANYIKA, SOURCES OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (1923-37) (%)

YEAR	1923	1925	1927	1931	1933	1935	1937
Africans	61	55	48	42	49	49	44
Sisal	25	26	49	49	40	40	50
Other non-African	14	19	9	9	11	11	6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*, Heinemann, London, 1973, p.222.<sup>64</sup>

Restriction of credit to African traders was not enough to prevent the emergence of a strong African commercial class. In 1927 the government introduced the Itinerant Traders Ordinance which was prompted by what the Treasurer informed the Chief Secretary to be the existence of a "distinct class of native traders in the territory, far more numerous than pedlars," who travelled around districts as agents or on their own behalf "buying produce from the peasantry"<sup>65</sup> This legislation restricted African traders in their activities in favour of approved markets which could purchase peasant goods in bulk. Bulk purchase was also favourable from the point of view of the government in the sense that it made it possible for efficient taxation of the peasant, as markets could also be turned into tax nets. And the latter was a very serious problem for the colonial government, as was shown in the previous chapter. This could not be expressed otherwise and in a better form than what Mitchell recorded in his diary--that shopkeepers were

blood suckers of the community who never did a days honest work and needed to be torn off:

...the shopkeeper now rules the world and such minor persons as producers and consumers can never expect reasonable protection against his uncontrolled rapacity. The right to live like a blood sucking tick, on the community, and never do an honest days work is now firmly established for the shopkeeper as inalienable and I should be torn to pieces were I to have it: but I will have at it, if any sort of opportunity offers.<sup>66</sup>

The shopkeeper had no right to rule the world--especially if that eroded the very interests the state sought to defend--which determined all the other processes. Thus more legislation was to follow to this effect in the 1930s and 1940s.

It was not only Africans who were being pushed out of the sphere of peasant produce marketing. Asian petty traders were also being confronted by the state on the pretext that they exploited the peasants. Much as the struggle against the Asian petty traders also goes back to the 1920s, its roots being in the struggles between Asians and Europeans for the control of the colony, its nature was best formulated in 1935 when it was stated: as African producers became more literate there would be no need to protect them. This of course was not anticipated as being accomplished even in fifty years time. Meantime there was the need to safeguard them "with firmness to all parties." Traders had encouraged production "prima facie....but not in every case," as experience had shown in the Southern Highlands where they were more interested in profits than anything, and hence paid the peasants less than the official price. The traders, the government stated, were hampering production and were unable "financially to purchase the whole crop so that only a portion is sold". It was necessary to devise another scheme which would ensure direct state control.<sup>67</sup>

In the government's opinion, there were several classes of peasant produce which required collective or group marketing methods. A computation in one district had shown that "by regulating and supervising marketing of one crop an additional £5,000 at least went into the hands of the natives" of that district; a sum which was initially taken by the buyers:

For years the trader has done much as he liked and beyond the murmurings of the producers and those whose interest it is to assist and guide them, there was no particular opinion than that held by the common trader. The day was sure to dawn when the situation would be examined with at least a view to the correction of evils, even if only in the *moral interests of the indigenous inhabitants quite apart from their material interests.*<sup>69</sup> (emphasis added)

The *East African Standard* quoted this remark by the Director of Agriculture, Mr Harrison, and considered it as racially biased.<sup>69</sup> Dr the Hon K.S. Bajwa, the Indian representative in the LEGCO protested against this remark and expressed the opinion that Asian petty traders should be allowed a place in the "new economic order". And the Asian Chamber of Commerce asserted that Asians had given their best to civilize the Natives and encourage agricultural development. The Asians, broadly defended themselves as a community rather than as traders.<sup>70</sup>

As far as the colonial government was concerned, the petty traders were not essential in the "new economic order" when it came to the purchase of peasant produce. They had to be eliminated in this sphere in favour of state controlled monopolies and marketing co-operatives. The former were tried in Songea and ended in complete failure. The government had to control the marketing of crops because, it was anticipated, this would increase production and also enhance efficient

tax collection. Thus within the attempts to control marketing of peasant produce, marketing co-operatives were introduced .

The sentiments against Asian traders were to be exploited to the full by the African traders and kulaks who offered themselves as the new intermediaries between big business and the peasants.<sup>71</sup> These African traders were such as Klemens Kiiza of Bukoba and Issa bin Imangi of Mwanza. The latter, for example, wrote to Governor Sir Symes in 1932 protesting against credit restriction to Africans.<sup>72</sup> These sentiments were to be fully articulated by the Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial Association (TAWCA), which was established in 1934, with the aim of safeguarding the interests of Africans and their undertakings; to prevent cruelty among the people; and, to care for the sick.<sup>73</sup> This Association was organized by Erica Fiah, and it mainly consisted of African shop and stall keepers. The Association tried to help "Africans to meet the strong competition of Indian merchants and to deal with the government over licences and other official matters."<sup>74</sup> The bylaws of this Association stated:

Since the Africans are not represented in the Legislative Council, this Association, as the central body looking after the welfare of all Africans in Tanganyika Territory, would always watch carefully any laws proposed by the Government which may affect Africans and after proper consideration would make such representations to Government and the members of Legislative Councils as the Association consider it proper in the interests of Africans .... Every African is bound to obey the Association, whether he is contributing or not, just as he obeys the Government.<sup>75</sup>

The Association established the first independent African paper-- *Kwetu*--in 1937 as a "means whereby it may be able to spread knowledge among the sons of the soil who could read and write." It was also the first African association to own a press. Among the things it did was to



open evening classes to teach Africans to read and write and languages (Swahili and English). A debating society was also opened. According to Erica Fiah (the editor), there was no better profession in the world than commerce. Those who thought it was best to be a civil servant were wrong, because "Any country which does not know how to trade will never succeed". Foreigners would go on taking the resources out of the country if local people did not grasp this truth. He then asked: "Is there any black person with a storeyed house or a motor car?" and answered, "There is none. This is because we do not want to help each other in trade." (my translation) He emphasized the necessity of Africans buying from the shops of their fellow Africans instead of buying from shops owned by foreigners as was the practice, so as to be able to command the respect of foreigners who looked upon them contemptuously. Above all, it was necessary that Africans should establish co-operative shops--after all, these were encouraged by the government, as it supported the marketing co-operatives.<sup>76</sup>

The paper constantly attacked the colonial racial arrangements, what the editor called "the ugly colour bar", as one of the impediments in the uplift or improvement of Africans in all aspects. In 1938, *Kwetu* reproduced a letter from the *Tanganyika Herald* and *Tanganyika Opinion*, a letter which condemned the question of "stoppage of sale of sweepstake tickets to Natives because they were natives". If sweepstake was an objectionable thing, it was stated in this letter, then it was so "for all God's creatures, whites and browns and blacks, it would not have the feelings of some of the educated natives as the letter in question certainly did." In sum, the argument was:

We are tired of being treated as babies in anything. If lotteries are bad for natives, are they good for Europeans and

Indians? Or is it God's will that a man of white or brown colour alone can indulge in sweepstakes either to satisfy his gambling instincts or worship the Goddess of luck, hoping therefore to make good use of windfall if it does come.<sup>77</sup>

This letter went on that, if the government thought that "a native has to be protected against himself" then why did it allow the *pombe* (beer) market in the centre of the town. This also should have been closed then: "Let the protection begin at home before you extend it to evils flowing from Europe." What was good for the European was equally good for the African; and this denial to Africans of some of these things was "racial contempt and unnecessary discrimination intended to add insult to injury." This message broadly summed up the attitude of the educated and the wealthy in general. The conclusion was:

We black people today want to enjoy the same privileges as white people, we want good stone houses, motorcars, aeroplanes, etc., what is good for the whites is also good for the blacks: colour makes no difference. Everything in the world has got its own colour and cannot be regarded as useless on account of non-white or brown colour provided it was made by the Almighty.

Further more we want to send our sons in colleges in Europe, America and India, etc, we want to open big Dukas too....<sup>78</sup>

The motto of the Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial Association and its paper was: "Educated Africans are the agents of African Civilization." In which case, the questions of racial segregation were raised even in relation to the civil service. There was an article, for example, which denounced the practice of not giving African clerks and supervisors leaves, while at the same time granting paid leaves to Europeans and Asians. It was also pointed out that certificates that were acquired by Africans were rotting because of the failure by the government to engage Africans.<sup>79</sup>

Although, during the Second World War, the paper, like most educated people in Tanganyika, supported the Allies and attacked Nazism, the

attack on the colour bar did not cool down at all. If anything, it actually increased and was put in more categorical terms, as is exemplified by the following words from a 1940 issue:

Many people in this country do not realize that there is any colour bar at all; they think of the British Empire as one happy family, the only place in the world where men of many races live side by side in equality and freedom. In truth the British law contains few racial distinctions; in East Africa, South Africa and Rhodesia there are definite regulations depriving the African of some of his rights in order to prevent competition with white people.....<sup>80</sup>

The problems of the educated with the European community in Tanganyika started in the early 1920s. In those years, the missionaries were blamed for educating Africans perniciously. The "mission boys", a category which included "all those who had attended any mission, either scholars, inquirers or believers, and who [had] assimilated at least a superficial knowledge of elementary education" were regarded as inordinately proud and their general bearing tending "towards superciliousness".<sup>81</sup> The "mission boys", according to Europeans, were the most untrustworthy people; because they regarded themselves as equals to the Europeans. The settlers suspected and even at times criticized the government for seemingly encouraging such illusions among the educated Africans. "Prestige being vital to our tropical colonies," according to the settler mouthpiece, "anything calculated to undermine it naturally arouses the ire of the settlers, who therefore look with unfriendly eye on anyone who spreads the doctrines of equality between white and black, ruler and ruled."<sup>82</sup>

The aim of Western civilization, as has been repeatedly pointed out, was to "educate the Native into a good African and not a repellent imitation of a European". This "good African" was a person who

"discarded the dark and close-knit mesh of fear and fetishism, sorcery and superstition which enrap his *tribal consciousness*, yet [succeeded] in retaining discipline, manners and social obligations" in his family, clan and the tribe in general.<sup>83</sup> The government and the missionaries in Tanganyika were aware that the only "good African" was a christian. Although the European residents were imbued with such a belief, "after a few years of experience of Natives," they very often ended up declaring that they would never employ christians.<sup>84</sup> Julian Huxley wrote in the 1930s:

It is indeed remarkable to see how widespread (though by no means universal) and deep rooted (though often unconscious) is the feeling of white men against the europeanized, educated, or even progressive black. And the feeling is often strongest in those who have a whole hearted liking for the unsophisticated native....the assumption underlying government of black by white is that white ideas and methods are superior to black; and the aim of the control and education we thrust upon them is to give them Western ideas, skill and individual self-reliance, and, in the case of the mission education, western religious beliefs and ideals as well. Yet if they really begin to put these new ideas in practice and try to live up to the new standards Europe, in the persons of local Europeans, is hostile....There are settlers who will not engage a native if he can read, and will even dismiss their most skilled men if they are discovered guilty of this crime.<sup>85</sup>

Europeans regarded it their sacred duty to "keep the black in his place". This process consisted chiefly of "snubbing educated natives on principle". Europeans were in favour of increased efficiency of Africans; but when Africans profited by their efficiency to become economically independent, they ran the risk of being denounced as selfish.<sup>86</sup> Due to these contradictions of the colonial civilizing mission, all Huxley could comment was: "Our economic system seems to be a Frankenstein monster which may destroy its inventors;..."<sup>87</sup> Some of the assumptions which were "felt rather than thought out" among the

administrators in Tanganyika, the chief was "black men are in their nature different from white men and inferior to them." The other was, "since white men know how to do a great many things of which black men are ignorant, they therefore know what is best for black men and are entitled to lay down what they ought to do and how they ought to live."<sup>88</sup>

Eric Reid, one of the former Rungwe District Commissioners, lamented that the African who went out to seek employment, was the type of native who disdained manual labour and insisted that he can only work as an overseer, a clerk, or a superior house servant. "Such men with their cunning determination to keep their hands clean and get rich quickly by lording it over their fellow men have existed in all times and are to be found in every race and community. The religion they profess is but a veneer...."<sup>89</sup> Europeanization, according to the Europeans as pointed out in the previous chapter, alienated the African from good citizenship and undermined the belief in tribal customs and traditions. This enstrangement very often led to rebellion against the established authorities--central or local. It was held that the native christian who defied authority of the chiefs also defied the authority of the government and such an "obstreperous christian" was an undesirable citizen.<sup>90</sup> To tear down the "fabric of Africanism" was not the aim of the fatherly British government: "...to encourage the native to ape the European manner, dress or speech is equally to weaken his potentiality as a good citizen of his country."<sup>91</sup>

The alleged potential problems of the educated elements were real as far as the colonial administrators were concerned. As was cursorily stated in the previous chapter, the authorities were alarmed by the

fact that Swahili had spread almost throughout the country and geographical mobility and intercommunication networks were very much developed.<sup>92</sup> This fact was demonstrated by such things as the spread of a popular culture known as *Beni Ngoma* throughout Tanganyika by the time the British took over the administration of the territory. This dance took its name from its musical feature:

the attempt to reproduce the effect of military brass-band, the the elaboration of this attempt might vary from the provision of a full bugle, pipe, and drum detachment to the beating of a single big drum in some rural variants of Beni. The dances done to this Beni music have also varied considerably but all have been based on the idea of *military drill*. Sometimes the dance took the form of a parade, a procession, a march past; sometimes it took the form of a dance in platoon form; sometimes it took the form of circling drill step.<sup>93</sup>

It was an imitation of the ceremonial side of European military, naval and proconsular life, in which songs played an important role in the performances. The language in the songs was mostly Swahili "and they normally took the form of simple rhyming commentaries of current affairs."<sup>94</sup>

Organizationally, Beni Ngoma had an elaborate hierarchization of male and female officers, "ranks, uniforms, and titles of honour". The hierarchies of the officers had European titles--from emperor or king to generals, lieutenants, etc.. Beni societies originated in the highly literate coastal traditions of Kenya and Tanganyika in the 1890s. They involved the imitation of European dress and conduct.<sup>95</sup> In Tanganyika, Beni sprung up in Tanga and Pangani; it began to spread in the interior from Dar es Salaam; and by 1914, it had spread throughout the territory. The dominant factions of Beni in Tanganyika were *Marini* (Marine) and *Arinoti* bands which had a long rivalry between them--with Marini as the

society of the elite, the educated, the smart--no matter what their origin....*Arinoti* remained essentially the society of the

unskilled labour migrant, 'the unclean ones', even though it had its own quota of literate men with bureaucratic skills. This division between the 'posh' and the 'vulgar' one,...was present from the start in Tanganyika towns.<sup>96</sup>

Beni, whether Marini or Arinoti, had one common characteristic: it eschewed anything in the nature of *kishenzi* (savagery). Especially with those who belonged to Marini, the tendency was to regard themselves as coastal people, civilized and favoured by God as they were able to read and write and "speak the language of Europe".<sup>97</sup> After World War I Marini represented the wealthy and Arinoti was associated with the poor. The activities of these societies were co-ordinated throughout the country: the members could travel to any place in the country and receive the hospitality of the members irrespective of tribe or community. For the British authorities, Beni was a detribalizing element. According to the Censor's general report of 1919, there was a political motive behind these societies because of:

the fact that most of these societies appear to be organized by educated natives, who held posts of some little local importance under the Germans, coupled with adherence to the German system of organization and discipline, would render them valuable aid to any person who might be entrusted with the work of anti-British propaganda among native tribes.<sup>98</sup>

In sum, Beni was considered by the British to be subversive. They found it necessary to reverse the efforts of their predecessors who had worked so hard to Europeanize Africans: they were suspicious of the very elements which had been created by the civilizing mission. Beni was viewed by the administration as a symbol of defiance of European presence and not simply an attempt to ape. But the fact was, on the whole, Beni was not an oppositionist movement: it was a social and mutual aid movement which by 1920s had gone as far as accepting ideas of self-help and economic enterprise--in short "self-improvement".<sup>99</sup>

Education, commercial agriculture and commerce were organically linked. The former, besides helping the latter was also determined by the latter, as it was the possibility of being in a position which materially enabled one to send a child to school which mattered. Education was seen as a means to control and determine the colonial system for the interest of "self improvement". But given the paternalistic nature of colonialism, the educated were regarded with suspicion and even outright hostility.

It was within this background that the elite in general started to withdraw from Beni in favour of other forms of organization. In March 1922, the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association was formed in Tanga with the aim to: "...initiate fellowship of all African and Arab members" of the government; "promote a social and educational development among its members"; "...foster the welfare of its members in the various Government Departments"; "encourage its members to take active part in sports"; etc. It was partly a welfare association and partly a tiny trade union, which as it spread expressed the same energy and met the same needs previously catered for by Beni.<sup>100</sup>

This Association set up a branch in Dar es Salaam; and also stimulated the formation by the educated Bahaya of the Bukoba Bahaya Union in 1924.<sup>101</sup> The latter was an organization of the unofficial Haya elite which mainly consisted of civil servants in Bukoba, who established it in order to stimulate the development of their area. It was an organization which aimed at seeking to establish "a system for the simple way to civilization" for their "mutual advantage", i.e., "literary education, coffee, and equality of opportunity." Bukoba Bahaya Union was formed so as to oppose the British colonial government backed



privileges of the chiefs; and its members believed "literary education to be the key to equality with Europeans". As a result of this belief, the union protested in the 1930s when "the only secular post-primary school in Buhaya was transformed into a bad agricultural school during the depression".<sup>102</sup>

The leader of Bukoba Bahaya Union was Klemens Kiiza, a missionary educated aristocrat who in the 1920s founded a Native Trading company and by 1928 had a coffee-hulling business and was about to erect a coffee factory in 1931. Due to debts, he almost became bankrupt by 1934; as a result of which he got involved in a conflict with the government for its refusal to grant him a loan. He finally succeeded in erecting the factory in 1936. He also organized a Native Growers Association, "partly to supply coffee to his factory". Under his leadership, the coffee farmers were able to engage in a series of riots against coffee cultivation rules, and this led to the imprisonment of some of its members.<sup>103</sup>

The Bukoba Bahaya Union was to become more or less a branch of Tanganyika African Association (TAA), like many other tribal unions. TAA, a pan-tribal association, was founded in 1929 by the civil servants and also involved some of the other capitalist elements (e.g. traders). It was founded by people of some education under the advice of the Governor Sir Donald Cameron. TAA is the predecessor of Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the nationalist party which was to be formed in July 1954. TAA was formed at a time when the educated Africans and farmers and traders were experiencing a sharp and almost catastrophic decline in status and income in the 1920s and 1930s as a result of the world recession. It was a time when the credibility of the

British to "modernize" Tanganyika alongside Africans began to shake in the eyes of the educated Africans. The idea of Indirect Rule had began to frustrate the educated due to the loss of the vision of "improvement". In 1931, for example, promotion of African clerks in the government was suspended. There was also a marked decline in government expenditure in African education during this period. All these measures were taken as an attempt to offset the effects of the recession from ruining the economy.

If the Commercial Association which was formed in 1934 had less impact later on and was forced to collapse, it is because it expressed narrower sectional interests and was not favoured by the government as a result of its more radical stance. TAA also represented even those interests which the Commercial Association sought to defend; but unlike it, TAA had the official backing of people like Cameron and Mitchell, because of its usefulness in the East African Closer Union controversy. It was viewed as the African voice representing the people in opposition to East African closer union for fear of domination by Kenya settlers. More tribal unions affiliated themselves to TAA in the 1930s and 1940s.

The aim of TAA was to unite Africans and represent their views to the colonial government, and this was especially to do with their opposition to closer union with Kenya and Uganda. This issue of closer union was also opposed by the government and the Asians for the same reason. The composition of the members in this Association was a mixture of Tanganyikans and non-Tanganyikans; hence its initial name as simply African Association (the word Tanganyika was added in 1947 with the break off of the Zanzibar branch). Beyond that, TAA was heavily grounded

in the Beni Ngoma tradition, the Association which preceded it, in terms of the non-tribal basis, and hence the more "Africanist" rather than tribal or simply territorial thinking.<sup>104</sup> The "modern Tanganyikans" formed this Association, because Europeans and Asians had their associations and were represented in the LEGCO while Africans were not. "The leaders of business in Dar es Salaam," stated the association's constitution, 'shall have the power to open a branch of this Association in any town if they wish.'<sup>105</sup>

When a branch of this Association was opened in Dodoma in 1933, a branch which was to become the most active in the territory in the 1930s and 1940s, it was stated that, Africa being their "cow" it was lawful and right that Africans should "drink milk from [their] mother,..." In terms of the aims and objectives, the Association had strong anti-Asian sentiments, complaining about the exploitation of Asian traders, and proposed the formation of "African Cooperative Syndicate of African Association in view of aid of assisting African welfare, hospitals, education, Civilization and so on as to enable the progress of the country". TAA had become an association which incorporated other sections of the elite such as the business people, and was airing the anti-Asian sentiments of the traders.<sup>106</sup>

Thus , the Chagga kulaks, under the leadership of the educated and early coffee farmer Joseph Merinyo, founded a marketing association, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), as early as 1925. This marketing association was partly encouraged by Charles Dundas and D. Cameron, who saw it as an extension of Indirect Rule in the economic sphere. By 1931 it was discovered that Merinyo had embezzled £21 and had obtained "£121/16 from the firm of Sharif Jiwa and Co., by false

pretence." Merinyo was imprisoned for this.<sup>107</sup> The original conception by the government that KNPA was, as a cooperative for marketing, useful was called in question. KNPA was abolished by the government in 1932. In its place was formed the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU), which, according to the government was to separate economic activities from politics. What the government wanted was a *marketing association*, and not an association involved in other aspects of social, economic and political life.<sup>108</sup> The government appointed A.L.B. Bennet, an Irishman as an economic advisor of KNCU. In essence, the abolition of KNPA was not due to corruption. Around the same time Sultan Saidi, the chief of the largest native administration (Tabora), had wholesale misappropriated £10,000 from the native treasury funds in his charge. As it pointed out in the previous chapter, Saidi was deported with a light sentence; but the native authority was *not* abolished. The essence of the question was the political nature of the association, and hence the government's attempt to separate politics from economics.<sup>109</sup>

KNPA had 10,894 members by 1927. This was also the year when African traders in Moshi formed an association to defend their interests. One of the rules of KNPA forbade its members to mortgage land to non-Africans without the Association's permission; and it was such wider interests which brought KNPA into opposition first to the government and then to the chiefs. In 1928 the Association had opposed the government's attempt to register all landholdings in Kilimanjaro. Consequently, the government suggested that the Association be merged with the native treasury, which meant subordination to the chiefs. Due to the collapse of coffee prices in the world market as a result of the recession in the 1930s, and the chiefs' decision that KNCU should have a monopoly of all

coffee grown in Kilimanjaro, there were riots in some chiefdoms, which turned into angry demonstrations against chiefs. When the debates on East African Closer Union which started in 1923 were still going on in the late 1920s, KNPA, fearing almagamation with the settler dominated Kenya had asked for representation in the LEGCO which had European and Asian members only.<sup>110</sup>

KNPA was the first co-operative movement to be formed. When the Co-operative Societies Ordinance was passed in 1932, more co-operative societies for the purpose of marketing were established. According to the annual reports the progress of co-operatives up to the end of the 1940s was as follows:

TABLE 2: COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES, MEMBERSHIP AND SHARE CAPITAL (1934-1949)

YEAR	1934	1938	1943	1948	1949 <sup>a</sup>
Number of Societies	23	37	45	77	79
Total membership	16,800	33,474	44,717	58,012	60,445
Share Capital £	928	1,519	17,251	70,582	78,019
Surplus and Reserves	3,756	5,008	75,061	238,586	276,040

SOURCE: TNA 37192, "Cooperative Development--Annual Reports" Vol 1, 1949, P.3 & P. Ngezi, *Ushirika Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1976, p.14.

<sup>a</sup>By 1952 there were 152 co-operative societies, of which 2 were European, 5 Asian, 2 all races and 50 distributive.

The existence and the development of co-operatives, as has been observed, was due to the efforts of the rich peasants and the educated. The other group which was equally important in these movements was the traders. All these groups used the co-operatives as a platform in their struggles to control the colonial marketing processes. This fact is demonstrated, for example, by the case of Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions which was established in 1949 in Lake Province, and became one of the biggest marketing co-operatives in Africa in the 1950s

and early 1960s, as well as the most active union in the struggles for independence after the formation of TANU.

The beginning of the co-operatives in Usukuma was due to discontent among the farmers as a result of being exploited by Asian middlemen. The racial question was at the heart of the matter in the formation of these unions.<sup>111</sup> The founder of this Co-operative Union was Paul Bomani, a Seventh Day Adventist missionary school product who was denied a chance to join a government school because of the missionaries' campaign against him for his refusal to join the mission. According to Maguire, the organization grew out of a group of traders in Mwanza town organized into the Mwanza African Traders Co-operative Society. Chiefs and headmen were never allowed to hold responsibilities beyond those of other members in this Organization. The group which started the organization was hard pressed by the stiff competition of the Asian traders which resulted in their ventures collapsing. As a result of the establishment of this organization, the traders were able to extend their concern to the marketing of peasant produce within three years.<sup>112</sup> The co-operative movement, itself supported by the government, had brought "opportunities for self-advancement in a social situation where entrepreneurial business opportunities were blocked because of racial stratification."<sup>113</sup> Accordingly, Bomani "worked with native authorities, more often with traders and ambitious cotton farmers, and sometimes, too, with the traditional village leaders."<sup>114</sup>

By the end of the Second World War, the existence of entrepreneurs in the countryside was a normal feature. This is one of the aspects which explains the protests against inequalities in the rural areas which were discussed in Chapter Three. It is also the presence of these

entrepreneurs which explains the rapid development of the co-operative societies. By the end of the Second World War, differentiation among the rural producers had become quite marked in some areas, and production for the market among them could no longer be considered an accidental feature:

Wage labour among African employers was increasingly common in Tanganyika by 1930s. It was estimated in 1926 that some 20,000 Hangaza and Rundi labourers were employed each year by Haya coffee growers (even occasionally, to carry the employers to church on Sunday). The Bondei employed Nyamwezi immigrants to cultivate for them. Ha migrants travelled every year to cultivate rice in Luiche Delta for the townsmen from Kigoma and Ujiji. A survey made in Mbozi in 1944 suggested that 45 per cent of all Nyiha coffee growers employed labour for wages....<sup>115</sup>

Although there existed small African traders as pointed out above, generally the tendency for the government in the period in question was to attempt to prevent the African capitalist elements from entering into non-agricultural activities. It was because of this that the capitalist elements which emerged as a result of the the colonial processes of transformation found an outlet in the co-operative movements, which in turn were used as a platform for struggles against the government, the native authorities and the Asian bourgeoisie. This prevention of these elements was due to the fact that peasant production was cheaper for the state than any other form of production, and posed less contradictions for labour acquisition given that the peasants used their own labour and that of the family. The colonial state, on the other hand, struggled to control these co-operatives, but to no avail.

The Asian capitalists, despite their being the richest in local capital had to go on struggling with the African capitalists in the sphere of commerce, because they were facing obstacles on their part from the colonial government which sought to prevent them from

transforming themselves into settler capitalists or undertaking business outside specified townships and trading areas. This was besides their being prevented from participating in industrialization. Asians were not allowed to hold senior posts in the civil service and banks, import/export houses, insurances, etc., in sum, in the real reigns of the economy, which were held by European monopolies.<sup>116</sup>

By the 1930s, merchant capital was already seeking to transform itself into productive capital. But the government's attitude during the inter-War period was "to discourage industrialization unless it was an essential part of some agricultural production programme, and to discourage non-British investors, even if it meant that what they would produce had to be imported from Kenya." This move was extended even to Asians "who wanted to start factories....who were squeezed out in favour of British firms such as the Tanganyika Cotton Company in the 1930s".<sup>117</sup>

Despite this move by the government, local capital was able to establish some industries to a limited extent. The discouraging of local capital from moving into manufacturing was dictated by the colonial capitalist interests: the extraction of raw materials, export of capital and the monopoly of the market. For example, when the Tanganyika Cordage Company of Tanga begun to manufacture and export some quantities of sisal binder to Britain, the British Rope, Twine and Net Makers Federation reacted by protesting to the British government. It stated that "their home market was being menaced by the sale here by the Tanganyika Cordage Company of binder twine produced by the low-paid African labour in Tanganyika." Consequently, the British government imposed 100 percent duty on binder twine imported from colonies, and the



factory in Tanganyika was closed down within a year. Other examples include the refusal of the establishment of a match factory in 1928, and attempts to stop the importation of cheap Japanese goods in support of Lancashire cotton trade.<sup>118</sup>

It was not only the capitalists in Britain who opposed the establishment of certain branches of industries in the colonies: even trade union leaders participated in this opposition for fear of competition from other imperialists' exports which were cheaper, and competition from the colonies. "'Ought there not,'" Ernest Bevin, the prominent leader of the Trade Union Congress of Britain asked in the 1930s, "'to be some control against the development of coal mining in Tanganyika?' When it came to the pinch, what were colonies for if not to sacrifice themselves for the mother country?"<sup>119</sup>

The instances, whereby, the state backed the interests of British corporations are numerous; and the state did this either by preventing the setting up of industries or by closing down an already established industry. The state's interests in the opposition to industrial capitalism in Tanganyika were succinctly summed up by Sir William MacLean in 1935 when he pointed out that:

The suggestion, however, that colonies should actively promote industrialization is quite another matter, and requires special consideration, because it has serious limitations. It is obvious that manufacturing countries like ours could not afford to provide free or assured markets for manufactured goods in direct competition with their own. All questions of starting new industries in colonies must, therefore, be examined with on their merits. and with due regard to the welfare of the colony as a whole as a primary producer.<sup>120</sup>

Thus the Asian had to fight it hard against the African capitalist elements, and hence the antagonism between the two. S.A. Kandoro, once a member of TAA and later on a founder member of TANU and also one of the

famous nationalist poets, was later on to recall that he left the government service in 1944 on his own accord because commerce, agriculture and politics started to pre-occupy his time. When in his shop, the questions which recurred in his mind all the time were: How come that Africans lacked wealth and health; farmed and yet never got rich; and were colonized by foreigners?<sup>121</sup> In the early 1950s, he worked with the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions in connection with TAA.

The co-operatives had become organs of the rich and middle peasants, traders and the educated in their struggles against obstacles in their further development within colonialism. This was contrary to the very objectives of the colonial state in introducing the Co-operative Societies Ordinance in 1932. Their struggles later took a more political form because of the racial problem which became more threatening with the re-surfacing of the settler question towards the end of the 1930s, as a result of the introduction of the Land Bank to facilitate European settlement and the proposals for land alienation. These aspects had been under government consideration since 1932 when Governor Symes took over. And within this framework, their struggles became more or less linked with those of the workers and peasants. The dream of advancement which colonialism had promised for these elements were being dispelled by the colonial paternalistic relations.

The world recession played a crucial role in the erosion of the illusion of advancement of these elements. As a result of that, they had to fight against their own creator. In this struggle, they used one of the instruments which was purported to be African: the marketing co-operatives. It was within those struggles that they systematized

theoretically what they considered African, while at the same time making a critique of the colonial and imperialist forms of social, political and economic organization. The next section discusses the way the struggles of these capitalist elements were systematized ideologically.

#### 4.3 *Nature of some of the Literature Prior to the 1950s*

The changes of attitudes towards the colonial system among the capitalist elements essentially started in the 1930s. This was also reflected in the literature that appeared before and after that period. In the 1920s, the intellectuals wrote on the history of chiefs and chiefdoms and traditions. These were people like Martin Kayamba who wrote the history of the Washambaa and studied the customs of the Wadigo,<sup>122</sup> and Francisco Xavier Lwamugira who was an administrator, compiled the Haya traditions and the history of the Haya aristocracy. According to Lwamugira, it was a shame "to see that (if you are a young man or an adult) you know that Dr Livingstone was the first European to see the River Zambezi or that it was Moses who led the Israelites out of Egypt, and yet you fail to know Kibi of Kiziba....or how Omukama Ruhinda came to Karagwe and founded the Bahinda Empire...."<sup>123</sup> This message generally summarises the spirit of those writings, and their standpoint in general.

There was Nathaniel Mtui who was murdered in February 1927 at Marangu, Moshi. Mtui was the "greatest of Chagga authors and poets. He wrote many interesting historical books on chiefs and chiefdoms of Kilimanjaro".<sup>124</sup> Others were J.M. Kadaso of Bukwimba, Dominikus Chabruma

in Mshope, Matayo Leveriya Kaaya of Meru, and many others who "filled countless exercise books with local traditions".<sup>125</sup> According to Iliffe:

Each of their works concerned one tribe or smaller unit, unlike the larger canvas of coastal writers using the Islamic framework....tribal historians were obsessed with origins, migrations, and genealogies. Their histories were accounts of conflict between powerful individuals: migration leaders, warrior rulers, individual European officers or missionaries, great contemporary chiefs....In this, as in much else, African and European thinking converged.<sup>126</sup>

The convergence of European and African thinking was mainly due to the fact that this was the period when the colonial government was trying to implement its Indirect Rule policy. Therefore, it was within the struggles for legitimacy among the different families which contended for leadership that these histories were written. This explains even the pride which Kayamba had in prefacing the references of his descendance from Chief Kimweri in all his applications; or even the engagement of European administrators such as Charles Dundas in the reconstruction of Chagga history. This latter case shows another aspect: the encouragement of this practice by Europeans. When Kaaya wrote the history of the Meru, he was "responding to advice given to students while in training at the mission". He and the others had been urged by their pastor to write a history of their tribe, because, otherwise, "it would be very difficult to prove that the country belonged to Meru when invaded by a powerful enemy."<sup>127</sup> The powerful enemy was nothing more than another claim to rule the country by another family; in a nutshell, power struggles which would ensue between different families which had a claim on the throne.

The change of attitude is clearly evident from some of the things which were cited above from *Kwetu*, a newspaper which first appeared in

1937 and ceased publication in 1951. *Kwetu* was the first African independent paper. There were other papers such as *Mambo Leo* (affairs today) and *Mwanafunzi* (Learner) owned by the government, and also *Baraza* (Council) the Swahili weekly published by East African Standard Limited (also local ones, for example in Bukoba). People like Shaaban Robert and many other prominent writers and poets, first published their writings in *Mambo Leo*. As it happened, the articles and the poems underwent government censorship before publication.<sup>128</sup> The publisher of *Kwetu* was also the leader of the Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial Association since its establishment in 1934. This was Erica Fiah, who was born in Uganda and came to Tanganyika in 1917 as a carrier corps hospital worker. After that he worked as a sanitary inspector in Tabora, a typist, a railway clerk, and in few other jobs. He resigned as a railway clerk in 1925 because he was given a job which had originally belonged to an Asian, without the attendant remunerations. From October 1925 he worked with Smith McKenzie & Co Ltd up to 1932 when he resigned after quarrelling with the new manager and became a shopkeeper. Erica Fiah, it has been observed, was acquainted with "the pan-African writings of black Americans and West Indians like Marcus Garvey and George Padmore."<sup>129</sup>

*Kwetu's* sub-title was: "The Key to Civilization". The aim of the paper was to do "social and humanitarian work and establish a contact between natives and non-native communities".<sup>130</sup> According to one issue, the question of civilization was related to the "subject of African heritage" which had received more notice in other countries among enlightened circles than in Tanganyika:

Some people are imagining what a benumbing disappointment will meet the African child centuries hence when among the pageant of

the world personages he anxiously studies faces and skins to identify his ancestors and he finds none! This has done much to cause a revival in traditional study and advancement; to blend the new with the old and give a unique civilization singularly 'Africanistic' as a friend suggests, worthy of treasure in the heart of posterity. That is exactly what behoves the present day African to do for his progeny, if indeed he deems himself the veritable paver of the way for them.<sup>131</sup>

The paper's main focus was on general issues of racial discrimination, European control of political power and economic exploitation. Fiah and other Africans who had more radical ideas went as far as attacking some of the "men of improvement" who emphasized personal improvement rather than political and social change, for their elitist attitudes.<sup>132</sup> This was best exemplified by Fiah's attack of Martin Kayamba after his death as a "selfish African who rose to the highest rank in Government service without being of any use to his race".<sup>133</sup>

Africans know that they command no respect in the world, it was pointed out in one of the issues, but very often do not seek to know the reason for this, "especially young Africans of today". It was necessary that the young people should find ways to improve themselves and be ready to help others as a way of setting an example.<sup>134</sup> There was need to establish strong organizations like the co-operatives for commercialists, farmers and other groups, it was advocated. The problem with Africans was seen as that of an inferiority complex: "[the] white or yellow skin has come to be the pass word for social supremacy in beings susceptible to all moral aberrations found in Africans". But Africans are "physically strong and mentally robust" just like the other people of the other colours. So, were Africans to "take up arms or use sheer beastly force against" those who denigrated them? The answer was:

No! Only experiments in commerce with fair knowledge of economics will bring us to that level to which our friends have risen. What we very much require at present is solid

organisation to guard the interests of African commerce, minor associations on the lines of coffee Association of our Moshi brothers; smaller branches in the prosperous provinces of Tanganyika will do the trick....It was a trite remark of the man who suggested that colour feeling, so well known in South Africa and America and the Indian fall under the same category, can only be defeated by a personally directed colour feeling: meaning of course that if you allow a man to note that you underrate the importance of your colour, then you ask him politely to look upon you [in] a colour derision.

After World War II a new group of newspapers in other communities continued with Fiah's arguments on a territorial basis--in Dar es Salaam, Tabora, Bukoba, Mwanza, etc.. These papers went as far as spreading the thought that "Tanganyika could be an independent country with a single widely-known language, Swahili, and one leader, an African."<sup>135</sup>

Martin Kayamba's book, *African Problems*,<sup>136</sup> written in 1936-7 is the generally most systematic account of the thinking of the "modern Tanganyikans" of that time. This book, which is almost unknown today, set out to demonstrate "how fully the African, while remaining wholly African, could build towards a genuinely African future by wise study of and selection from all that the new forces of civilisation had to offer,"<sup>137</sup> Kayamba had worked with Mitchell and the other ideologues of Indirect Rule. He was well travelled within the country and East Africa in general. He went to Europe twice in the 1930s where he met with Africans from West Indies, West Africa and other parts. He had also met with people like Lord Hailey, Lady Margery Perham, Sir Hilton Young, Professor B. Malinowski, J.H. Oldham, Mr Whitely who in 1931 was a joint Secretary of the Labour Party, etc.--virtually all of them advocates of Indirect Rule who belonged to groups which were concerned with empire issues, such as the East African African Group or the

African group formed later on.<sup>138</sup> He had also contributed an article to *Africa*--a journal--on the problems of transition in Africa.<sup>139</sup> When Kayamba met a famous African merchant from Gold Coast (Ghana) in Brussels in 1936 he commented:

No wise African can be spoilt by travelling in Europe nor can he be Europeanized. An African knows quite well that he is an African and is always proud of his colour and nationality. He has a valuable place among his own people and if he can help them it is to his credit and to the benefit of the people.<sup>140</sup>

From a defender of all things that are European, and the tendency to see everything African as backward, Kayamba had tremendously changed. He was now even proud of his colour and saw pride in Dr Aggrey's wish to be blacker than he was.<sup>141</sup>

According to Kayamba, African governments in pre-Europe days were of two types: those with headmen and elders and those which were evolving towards kingship. There was no taxation; but only contribution or tributes to specific objects. Punishment was in most cases in the form of compensation. The kingship conditions pertaining in Africa then were "very different from those of real African patriarchal system of elders in council, but in pre-European days the movement away from democratic towards aristocratic and autocratic was already evident in many areas".<sup>142</sup> Leadership in those days was generally good; although there were things like burying other people--mainly women--with the king while still alive, which were not good. But there existed "African chivalry" under those systems: this "proves that there is good that can be learned even from primitive people". There is much to learn from the famous Africans whose "lives were influenced by no ulterior motives or other considerations, but pure sacrifice for those whom they served, provided they were treated well." (p.14)



African governments worked very well, and there is no doubt about that, until foreigners introduced a "different and evil form of slavery". (p.19) Even then it must be remembered that "Africans know that there was much to be praised in their earlier forms of government in the days before other people came with power in their hands". (p.19) Because of the contact of Africans with civilized peoples, the normal life of the African was being disturbed. The contact:

undermines much that is good in his life without at the same time replacing it with what is new and of similar value. Unfortunately, the two things do not run together for the simple reason that the change is so rapid and widespread that sufficient workers to replace what is good is changed in the intrinsic African life are not available. (p.20)

The evils brought about by the changes could only be rectified by education and christianity. The education which could perform this function was the one which could help Africans pick what was best from the foreigners and "dilute it with what we hold" so as to evolve a "civilisation of our own if we are going to have a separate civilisation in the future which others sometimes doubt." (p.24) Education which was imperfect and resulted in the production of semi-educated people was no good at all. The danger of such education was, it put the African in a "false mental position" which was dangerous to himself and those about him because it made him unable to select what was good and what was bad in the imported customs and habits and, so far as imitation is concerned, they imitated everything indiscriminately. (p.23) The aim of the so-called primitive education was to "produce defenders and useful members of the community....Both these objects were properly fulfilled to the undoubted advantage of the African communities". (p.61) This form of education was vanishing slowly, being replaced by foreign education.

This was wrong: education should "not be only to read and write but should teach to think deeply for the benefit of the community which it serves and raise the standard of the people. Education of the head without education of the body and the soul is of no use". (p.66) This, as can be seen, amounted to a virtual disillusionment with the civilizing mission of the Europeans given the practical reality of colonialism.

By the time he was writing this book, Kayamba had already been able to distance himself from his earlier views of the 1920s; while standing for the cause of advancement of Africans, he did not want any indulgence in politics and at times condemned politics and strikes by workers as abominable things. When he addressed an audience of 2,500 people in a missionary annual meeting at Westminster in 1931, he had, for example, said: Africans, as it is known,

are backward people, are the most backward race in the world. We are helpless, we cannot stand on our own in the present world. We want your help. I appeal to you on behalf of my brothers and sisters of Africa. We want to co-operate with you, to be friendly with you. We have our African priests, but they cannot do without you. God is working in Africa through them and you.<sup>143</sup>

But by the end of the 1930s, it was a question of Africans needing a lot of sympathy when dealing with them--and also a lot of patience, because of the artificiality of the African transitional situation and given the problems of the old and the new. It was no longer simply a question of Africans being backward and in need of European help.

African customs were changing, and some of them were good. For example the customs of initiation were the "African school of training for adult life". They taught bravery and service to the community. Whatever was bad in some of those things, "it may be that the early civilized christian pioneers were too hasty in uprooting them,

especially among christians." The transitional phase was resulting in Africans leaving what they should not leave behind and grasping imperfectly what did not fill the gap between the past and the present. One of the problems which needed to be examined was that of land tenure. "In most parts of Africa, if not all, the original land tenure was communal". But due to penetration of "aliens and in some parts through progressive growing of economic and permanent crops, this system has been and is being changed over into semi- or full individual tenure." (p.33)

Africans were by nature agriculturalists and land was the primary wealth. If Africa did not present difficult problems connected with poverty as in the other continents, this was because of the "hoe and land, which provide every one with daily bread....The simple life of an African has its origin in his subsistence living". (p.35) This life was not progressive under the new conditions because it could not raise his standards, although it saved him from world misery, "such as in other lands has reduced millionaires to penury". The simple life of the African was being undermined by civilization:

The life of these peaceful and contented peasants, living in their own world, is being subjected to prodigious industrial transformation and both families and whole communities are in consequence being disintegrated. No amount of laws, segregation or labour regulations would keep them for long. These are mere palliatives to a widespread and virulent epidemic. The effect of the elements which dislocate the life of this once undisturbed peasantry is far reaching and infinitely deleterious. It remains to be seen what nature itself will do to adjust it. But it must be obvious that the transformation forces are gigantic, rapacious and fatal to African village life. Only the African parent, so deeply affected by it, can understand its ramifications and magnitude. (p.13)

Kayamba was lamenting, and it took a man of his experience to grasp the fact that even the laws and regulations which were being instituted or

had been instituted, whether segregative, or cast in terms of labour controls and others, could not be more than simply palliatives. Capitalism was dislocating the life of the people in the countryside. This, to Kayamba, was already an established fact. Therefore, it was necessary to look for a remedy to this system which had adverse effects on Africans.

While labour in the civilized countries was protected and could defend itself, this was not the case in Africa where it was "vulnerable to exploitation". (p.37) The wages of African labourers were low and their diet bad. The transplantation of the workers away from their environment, the disintegration of families and general destruction and depopulation of communities was a lamentable thing. the moulding of the peasants into workers was a "virulent state": due to the need for labour, there was a "steady process of turning Africans in hordes from useful agricultural, productive life to a formidable mass of men in detribalized servitude" and this was becoming daily a "crying necessity". (p.37) It was "industrialisation, with the forced importance of money in the European type of life" which created the African's position: "the danger to Africa will not lessen so long as these forces exist." (p.39) The so-called civilized factors were to blame for all these problems.

Thus, capitalism and the creation of wage labour were seen as the underlying forces behind rural Africa's destruction. This was not the system which Africans were acquainted with. Africans were naturally communal and possessed great powers of cohesion: and this had existed before Europeans came with their power. This communal nature had been reduced because of "industrialisation", and their real association could

be brought about again by economic and social forces. (p.43) The disintegration of the communal aspects was reflected even in commerce where Asians monopolized trade, and Africans preferred to buy from Asians rather than Africans: "Africans are ready and quick to buy anything that is produced by their own people from their own farms or tribal industries, but hesitate to buy imported goods from the shops of their own people". (p.74)<sup>144</sup> This was very bad, because "trade makes wealth for the people". (p.73) There was a need for more African traders, and this was not necessarily nationalistic; but the "slogan, 'Buy from your own people' could rectify the matter in time." (p.73) There was also a necessity for the traders to develop co-operative trade as a means to assist their progress. It was essential, also, to establish a federation of tribes so that people could think "as Africans or nations...rather than localised thinking." (p.76)

Fundamentally, the solution for the problems in Africa lay in the attempt by Africa to establish its own civilization. Africa could evolve its own civilization. notions that civilization was only European were false: "it should not be forgotten that Africa once had Egyptian civilization to its credit; probably one of the oldest of all." (.86) There were also the "ruins" of Zimbabwe which clearly showed that Africa had its own civilization, and also the Ethiopian civilization. (p.81) European civilization had contributed in economics, medical science, etc.: "In inventions it is unique and incomparable with any of the past civilisations. And yet so many of these inventions are liable to be destructive to itself--surely this is the most pathetic part of it all." Wars, and armament in general, were not things to be proud of at all:

To me it seems that whatever happens, unless the present civilization is completely destroyed, which I think almost

impossible, the African will shape his civilization according to the model before him; like a painter who paints a landscape....When the two [civilizations--C.S.L] meet halfway, the best each has preserved of his civilization will merge, thus producing one excellent whole. It sounds utopian but it is not outside the realm of possibility. (p.81)

There was no doubt, according to Kayamba, that Africa would shape her own destiny, assisted by outside influences from which she would select that which she wished to retain. Contrary to the belief that Africans had nothing to contribute to world civilization; they had. This consisted in "their pristine life" which was communal. This life was "neither communistic nor bolshevist" although it was disintegrating into individualist patterns owing to foreign systems. (p.90) Some of the problems created by the foreign systems could be rectified by better wages, better living conditions and better service conditions. It was necessary to let Africans be free. "and economically free, to co-operate with foreign industrial activities on their own will and never under coercion or poor conditions obtaining in their own areas" and hence forcing them into detribalization as a means to satisfy their "most elementary needs and obligations placed on them by non-African rule in which they are allowed no part or share." (p.93)

The only way Africans could protect themselves against the forces of "industrialism", according to Kayamba, was by building tribal industries and agriculture in their own home areas. This could only take place through the transformation of village life by the people themselves while making use of ideas and technology from the West. Villages were to be changed in such a way that they formed the "nucleus for Africans' own civilization". The villages were to be on the following model:

a village containing 50 houses with few smaller villages dotted about it on surrounding hills. the central village of fifty houses, being the model of progress for Africans' own

civilization, should have brick houses with roof using tiles which can be locally produced by villagers. It should have in addition a church, a mosque, a dispensary with a ward, an artesian well, a spring-water pipe or irrigated water, bridges over any intersecting rivers, a school with a playground, a council house with its court and office, a small village hall for village meetings and amusements, a few shops owned entirely by Africans and a market-place in the centre of the village for the use of all surrounding villages. A small postal agency, also, in one of the shops (a very simple one) and a post office savings-bank branch. A small lock-up perhaps. Nice roads and farms surrounding the villages. Drains and public latrines. (p.77)

These, broadly, were Kayamba's conceptions. He, Erica Fiah and many others who wrote in *Kwetu* and even in *Mambo Leo*, however varied their particular views were, from the 1930s were more or less defending what they considered to be African Civilization. When the government attacked Fiah in the 1940s for what he published in *Kwetu*, Fiah defended himself and those who published in *Kwetu* in terms of the fact that they were Africans and "(not Bolsheviks, Marxists, Nazis, Anti-British Dutch in South Africa or so-called sophisticated and Europeanized Negroes of America)".<sup>145</sup>

The Second World War opened a forum for other issues for the educated Tanganyikans. In 1941 it was declared that "[the] African is awakening from his long slumber".<sup>146</sup> Besides the question of African Civilization, another dimension was added: the question of the future. On May 1, 1942 a question was posed: given that Africans were supporting the Allies and participating in the War, "will the African native be allowed a better place and a little more voice and responsibility in the administration of his country, or will he continue to remain as a clerk, last of the list, as he has always been?"<sup>147</sup> By 1947 it was being argued that "Africans should regain their former glory". Peter Mtambao wrote to *Kwetu*:

The line of progress must be planned not by the tutors alone, but by cooperation of the tutors and the taught....Civilization started in Africa long before the other countries of the world awoke, but Africa's progress was retarded by the awakening of other countries....Now she is awakening from her long siesta.<sup>149</sup>

In artistic production, Shabaan Robert is the figure who looms powerfully in this period under discussion. Shaaban Robert, from Tanga began to write poetry in 1932. By the mid-1940s, through poetry, he was arguing people to unite under TAA, so as to be in a position to fight subjection.<sup>150</sup> This was also reflected in his prose writings of around the same time--*Kusadikika*,<sup>151</sup> *Kufikirika*,<sup>152</sup> and *Utubora Mkulima*.<sup>153</sup> The novels are generally more elaborate and combine a sense of social realism and social commentary. The former two were written in a satirical form. They were about imaginary kingdoms and they satirized the injustices perpetuated under colonialism in Tanganyika and advocated the creation of an ideal society with social justice.

Broadly, *Kusadikika* stood for a society ruled by law which ensured justice and freedom; material development through social co-operation rather than individual forms and exploitation; in which friendship rather than war governed; in which the glorious heritage was valued; in which there was a unified belief, nation and one language; and above all it was a society devoid of inequalities and segregation. *Kufikirika* carried more or less the same message. Beyond that, it castigated superstitions and all forms of superstitious education, and championed an enlightened type of education and modern medicine from abroad. It stood for a type of education which combined the training of the mind and the body. This was not a renouncement of what was indigenous, rather, it was an advocacy of synthesizing what was good from the indigenous and the non-indigenous.



Shaaban Robert had written an epic poem during the Second World War in support of the Allies and in condemnation of fascism and those who supported it.<sup>153</sup> In 1946 he finished writing *Utubora Mkulima*, a novel to which the conception that farming was the most honoured work in Africa (which also appeared in *Kufikirika* and *Kayamba's African Problems*) was central. According to this novel, Africans were peasants by tradition, and they needed to preserve this tradition. This novel told the story of Utubora, who although highly paid as a merchant's clerk, decided to go back to the countryside to farm. Utubora was fed up with employment and wished to secure his freedom, "by living his life in this God's world the way his grandfather, Adam, lived."<sup>152</sup> He wanted to live the way the first man to be created lived in the Garden of Eden, by his own sweat rather than work he did not desire. Money was seen as the source of evil: it could not satisfy all the needs of man. Therefore people had to be emancipated from this evil.<sup>156</sup>

This in general, was the way the "men of improvement" systematized their ideas. This is the way they conceived African Civilization. An important development in the 1940s was the beginnings of an association between the educated Tanganyikans and the Fabian Colonial Bureau in 11 Dartmouth Street, London. The Fabian Colonial Bureau was formed in 1940, with Rita Hinden and Arthur Creech Jones as chief advisors and most responsible people. The necessity to form the Bureau arose in the 1930s as a result of the world recession. During that time there was "a spate of troubles in Britain's own dependent colonies" and demand for former colonies by Germany and Italy, which threatened the policies and demanded the reconsideration of these colonial policies: "in Africa and the Caribbean, Mauritius and Cyprus and Palestine, there were riots and

racial tensions, strikes, violence and unrest. The investigations of a series of commissions revealed conditions of poverty and disease, political neglect and administrative difficulty".<sup>157</sup>

The advisory committee had people like Julian Huxley, W.A. Arthur Lewis, Lady Margery Perham, the TUC official Andrew Dalglish, the Labour Party whip Lord Listowel, etc.--some of whom had belonged to the former East African group and were amongst the ideologues of Indirect Rule policy. The Bureau's journal, *Empire*, had been circulating in the colonies since 1938 and from 1940 it was turned into a "Socialist Commentary on Colonial Affairs." This journal was renamed *Venture* in 1949. Among the diverse issues the Bureau dealt with were "constitutional development, monopolies and restrictive practices, labour relations and conditions, housing and education, racial discrimination, land settlement".<sup>158</sup> The Bureau associated itself with national movements and political parties in general, and was renamed the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau in 1958.

The Bureau corresponded with the Tanganyika African Association, Kilimanjaro Natives Co-operative Union, Tanganyika Railway African Association, etc. and individuals such as G.P. Mkandawire who worked as a headteacher of Mwanza Medical School and established a cultural centre (Euro-African Discussion Group of Mwanza), S.M. Mtengeti who worked in the office of the Secretariat in Dar es Salaam, Tom Marealle who became a paramount chief of the Wachagga in the 1950s, Stephen Mhando who was the President of TAA before Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere took over the seat in 1953, Hamza Mwapachu who worked with the social welfare department, Chief Kidaha Makwaia, Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere, and others. This list expanded further in the 1950s.<sup>159</sup>

During the Second World War, as was pointed out above, the Tanganyikan elite had supported the Allies; and they also had high hopes for reforms within Tanganyika after the War. Their illusions were dispelled; for there was more land alienation within a short period than had ever taken place since the British first took over the country. Also the settlers had become more unified with the disappearance of the German settlers and were forming alliances with their Kenyan and South African counterparts in their struggles for a settler dominated Tanganyika. For some time, the settler interests were able to gain an upper hand in the state, and this victory of the settler interests was coupled with unprecedented forms of racial hostility and contempt of Africans. These aspects will be discussed more elaborately in Chapter Five. To the educated Africans, the settlers were seen as fascists who were "close to Nazi". The Fabian Colonial Bureau became an ally during this time because it seemingly championed more humanly interests and was concerned with the problems which affected Africans and their development by the state. True enough, the Bureau stood for some reforms in the colonies, but on a limited scale, as is demonstrated by their refusal to publish some of the more radical views of Africans.<sup>160</sup>

Evidence for these radical views is scanty, as most papers in East Africa and abroad could not publish them. One comes across some indicators which imply their existence through some of the assertions of some of the officials, or attempts by Africans themselves to dissociate themselves from anything connected with communism. Major Orde Brown in 1932 wrote: "The African is an astonishingly keen letter writer, even in a semi-educated stage,...and I have seen natives in Northern Tanganyika pouring bewilderment over the propaganda publications emanating from the

South, with symbol of harmer and sickle complete." Mitchell was to inform the members of the African Group in 1930 that there was a certain amount of Moscow activity here and there in the country: "The 'Negro Worker' for example is being sent to a few people and I occasionally see letters written by natives in a familiar strain but it does not at present amount to much."<sup>161</sup>

The fact that most papers refused to publish radical views in the 1940s is verified by some letters which were never published. One A.K. Juma wrote to the *Venture* in 1949. He was asking the "British socialists to take notice of the embarrassing situation in which the present day trend in the colonies is placing them and the Party". According to Juma, the socialists were facing a graver colonial problem than ever, because of the whole "attitude and outlook of settled Europeans" in parts like East Africa. The settlers were determined to sever Tanganyika from the United Nations Organization and halt "African political progress and blunting over political aspirations". He went on:

Outbursts of 'living space' 'the Indian menace' and 'growing Native problem' (settler problem to be correct) 'dominance of Europeans in Government' etc. are to be heard everyday. A fascist regime is growing right under our feet! What is British Socialist reaction to this challenge? If this sort of thing is to be allowed under a socialist regime what is to happen to us under a reactionary Tory one?....Socialism (in the colonies) will stand or fall by what happens in East Africa and the responsibility lies at the door of the British men and women who believe in justice and fair play.<sup>162</sup>

This letter was never published.

More scathing views, perhaps by the same author, signed W.B. Julius, were refused publication by the *Tanganyika Standard*. One long letter to the editor was titled "Moscow, Berlin or Rome?" It was castigating the projected European organization in Tanganyika. It stated that the much

talked about dangers of communism were by "no means the only dangerous 'ism' that Tanganyika" had to watch out for: "Fascism is just as bad and the East African atmosphere is just as thick with it at present." The organization projected was racist and shared the views of the "BRITISH UNION OF FASCISTS" which was a violently "un-British sort of unity." A certain Mr Anderson, whom the letter called the European community's "Poet Laureate", had overreached even the Führer. This had to be stopped, because the settlers assumed that the UNO is crazy, which most probably included "mother Britain in the crazy gang of their reference"---a thing which was stupid and totally against the interests of Africans. The letter is worth quoting in extenso:

Goebbels' Dictionary is being freely quoted from. One hears quite [a lot] now of such talk as 'future of Europeans in danger', 'who owns all the nice big cars?--The Indians.' 'The Government of Tanganyika is taking Africans seriously.' Hitler had to have a scapegoat and he started with the Jew. Jude! Jude! He then invented the myth of the racial superiority of the Germans, the Nordic people, the Aryans, the chosen race, the destined rulers of the world and died in a chancellory singing 'Deutsch-land uber alles'.

....Others are crying out KULTUR! KULTUR! and wasting so much time over 'what did your grandfather do' sort of talk instead of getting down to the many problems of the moment. No time to define culture here, but suffice it to say that African music (which America and Europe have made full use of), African stories, proverbs, folk-lore, etc. are still part of his culture. Of course you beat him flat when it comes to the atomic bomb, but then one does not know whether to be thankful or regretful of this particular portion of your material culture!

Now, if East Africa is to go ahead in peace and with the willing co-operation of all races these dangerous ideologies must be clipped early in their growth. Goebbels, Rosenberg, Streicher and all started exactly like this. Little did the World realize the harm they were doing until the World woke up in War. But the German as any rule by force is likely to fall. Tanganyika and indeed East Africa must wake up to this danger....of FASCISM for which the soil is being prepared so painstakingly well....Not only must we resist it but must argue the Government to take strong and immediate steps to put to a stop to the manœuvres which hitherto East Africa was proud of.

....

Please do not allow your settlers to run down all the European civil servants as they do on all occasions. They and the Missionaries--not settlers--have made Africa what it is.<sup>163</sup>

And so, by the end the 1940s, socialist terminology was already in circulation in Tanganyika. This was taken from the British Fabian socialists as an example of what was best from Europe--something which was acknowledged by the West, which could not be anything near communism. Central to these conceptions was the role of the *state* and *some individuals*, e.g. the socialists, in being able to prevent/not to prevent the emergence of certain processes such as fascism or dominance of the settlers in Tanganyika. This aspect will become more clear in Chapter Five where some of the developmental conceptions of these educated elements are discussed within the context of the rise of nationalism and its triumph. The above conceptions were a direct response to European accusations which saw African resistance as either pro-West or pro-Communist. British socialism, for them, was furnishing the weapons to attack the adverse forms of imperialism and capitalism in general. Kayamba had viewed his attack on colonial capitalism as based on communalist assumptions; but made it clear that these could not be equated to communism. But the social structures were those based on egalitarian principles.

The educated Tanganyikans had rejected the feeling of inferiority; reached the level of being proud of their colour; and more than that, they rejected the claims that Africans had no civilization. They took the view that Africans had contributed to civilization and world culture positively. World civilization's cradle land was Africa--in Egypt. Western civilization, although progressive materially, was essentially destructive. "Industrialism", as Kayamba pointed out, "with

the forced importance of money and the European way of life" was to blame for the problems in Africa. It was only by the creation of another civilization that Africa could be salvaged. In its worst form, Western civilization had created the atomic bomb, and produced fascistic tendencies; things which people could not be proud of at all.

With Kayamba, Shaaban Robert, Erica Fiah and the others, the lost past was rediscovered; this glorious past needed to be preserved while at the same time absorbing Western civilization critically, so that it did not destroy the distinctive African Civilization. These Tanganyikans had reached the conclusion that one could not simply take advantage of European civilization. They were Africans who had been brought up in Western civilization, yet never allowed to blend in a natural and normal way with that civilization. It was this contradiction of being both black and Western which made them become self-conscious, and inevitably critical of the West. They were not non-Western, nor enemies of the West; and in that respect, they were not pro-communists who were enemies of the West. They stood for racial harmony rather than hostility, because they too believed they had something to contribute to universal civilization. Thus, it was in this way that Tanganyikans reached Pan-Africanist conclusions. These ideas were a result of the struggles of the elite which emerged within the colonial forms of transformation. This elite had seized upon what was considered as Africa's contribution as a way to enter into social, political, economic, cultural and intellectual equality in a hierarchical world.

#### 4.4. Conclusion

Obviously, there was a fundamental continuity between the ideas of the ideologues of Indirect Rule and those of the educated Tanganyikans. This continuity is not simply terminological, e.g. in the usage of the term African Civilization: it also lies in what was considered to constitute Africanness, whether in terms of social structures or political arrangements. They all based their ideas on the Eurocentric anthropological material which was available to them. The most obvious and tempting conclusion would be to argue that the educated Tanganyikans were simply echoing or aping the Europeans; and that they, along with the ideologues of Indirect rule, were the kind of people who were keen to retard the development of capitalism because they were willing to have the peasantry without rural capitalists, the development of capitalist commodity production without its unacceptable consequences, etc.. There is a grain of truth in this; and in this sense it could be said that the educated Tanganyikans were liberated theoretically by the attempts of the masters to coopt the African elements which would make Africans effectively colonizable. But to simply conclude so would be to wish things away too easily.

Such a conclusion is a simplification which makes it difficult to grasp the different experiences of the advocates of these ideas. The Europeans' ideas were a response to the problem of making Tanganyikans colonizable, given the crisis of the civilizing mission generated by the resistance of the workers and peasants of Tanganyika; and it was not an abandonment of the colonial mission, racism or the civilizing mission in general. It was a result of the re-examination on the part of the colonialists of the "ideological foundations of the civilizing



mission"<sup>164</sup> and so, the ideas remained essentially colonialist. All that they did was to "incorporate in the philosophical foundations of the civilizing mission even the cultural elements" of the people to be civilized.<sup>165</sup> They picked from the colonized those elements which could facilitate the civilizing mission. The crisis of the civilizing mission was put in the following words in 1925:

We have little cause for complacency about our humanitarian progress and the high levels to which we seek to raise native races. Though governments make laws, it is the people who have to keep them, and it is the good will and support of the people in Africa, as in Europe and the United States, which gives life to law. Without change of heart and outlook the law has no life. We have uniformly done, not what the native peoples want, nor what they--poor, misguided 'savages'!--think right, but what we consider it best for them; unless we modify our policy in this respect we are in for a very rude awakening, for we are deliberately teaching and emancipating native races everywhere, educating them to articulate, and they are beginning to learn how to marshal their ideas, and to talk.<sup>166</sup>

That was the colonialists' experience. Added to this was the colonialists' disillusionment with some elements of their own civilization--aspects which were dealt with in Chapter Three--and the attempts to look for alternative forms of social organization in the lives of the "Noble savages".

The educated Tanganyikans, on the other hand, as products of imperialist transformations, having grasped the truth that they were rejected by the very civilization which nurtured them, began to question the edifice of Western civilization itself. "To the chagrin of the assimilated the system was recognized to be not imperfect but cruel. It had built its whole edifice on racial ideology;" it had, more than that, cheated and deified the instruments of exploitation instead of man, because for this system, man did not count: "he was exploited, tortured, discriminated against, persecuted and used to produce profit for a few

selfish men." Thus logically, it was essential to create a more humane civilization.<sup>167</sup> They turned around and looked at the African way of life, which was now viewed from a more humane and sympathetic angle, seeking for alternative forms of social and political arrangements which excluded the arbitrary forms introduced by colonialism. In the forms of African life, they sought out those aspects which would refute Eurocentrism; and at the same time they exposed those elements within Westernality which were destructive while picking out what they considered useful.

The experience which led them to the same content ideologically as the colonialist is not the same as that of the colonialist. The so-called traditional African way of life they presented depicted the peasantry from the point of view of capitalist forms of commodity production and division of labour. What they sought to present as African, was in essence represented by the peasant who produced for the market--progressive and capable of assimilating Western technology and living in modern villages. This was essentially the middle peasant, who was a favoured product of colonial capitalist transformation. For the colonialists this category of peasants could do better than settlers in the production of export crops, given the conditions pertaining in Tanganyika; and for the educated Tanganyikans it was this category which represented the ideal form of social organization, because its members did not base themselves on the exploitation of others. The ideas represented those elements which sought to "improve themselves"--the middle and rich peasants and traders, i.e. the petty bourgeoisie.

The claim, for example, that Africans lived in villages, made by both colonialists and the educated Tanganyikans, is refuted by G.

Milne's observations in the 1930s. Milne died in 1942. He was a soil scientist at Amani Station who was also versed even in the philosophical foundations of soil science. Taking the examples of Usambara West, Upare, Uchagga, Ubena, etc. and some others from Kenya and Uganda, and basing himself on some German records, he asserted:

Often enough no true villages exist because the people have no motive for being gregarious; there may be no need for the craftsman or shopkeeper or doctor or entertainer to live hard by the primary producer they serve, because, in so far as these functions are specialized at all, they are carried out part-time by the folks who are most of the time primary producers themselves, and, like the rest, live most conveniently on the pieces of land they cultivate. Thus where, there is no threat from the enemy or enclosure, habitations are scattered pretty uniformly through the cultivable lands--not, of course, as single houses, for a man may have several wives, a widowed mother, and a poor relation or two, all of whom live around the one compound, but these are hardly villages.<sup>168</sup>

These did not preclude the existence of markets. Markets existed. In Usambara, "[all] trade is done at the weekly markets held a few miles apart on different days, where you *do* see humanity being gregarious, and very picturesque and fascinating these markets are....close proximity of residence is of no particular use to anybody and they do not have it."<sup>169</sup>

What Milne was pointing out was the fact that concentration or living in close proximity in villages, the way they were pictured by his contemporaries--both colonialists and people like Martin Kayamba--was a requirement of the colonial capitalist forms of organization. It was with the establishment of mission stations, police, court, churches, schools, hospital; the settlement of shopkeepers, carpenters, "tailors and other artisans set up in business, and *you have something much more like the European village springing up*....Similarly, a district administration headquarters becomes a small township, railway station or

cotton-buying post or ginnery becomes a centre of trade or lorry transport,..." Besides the peasants who had been concentrated, large villages could be found in the mining areas and districts where there were European-owned sisal or coffee plantations: "there are large 'villages' where the (mostly immigrant detribalized) labour lives."<sup>170</sup>

The graphic model of Kayamba's village was a representation of a petty bourgeois village; a village of small scale capitalism which did not suffer from the acute contradictions of capitalism. And the colonialists' conceptions that Africans in pre-colonial Africa lived in villages were based on the same assumptions of capitalist forms of production. For them, there must have been villages, given that wars were chronic in those societies, and the villages were probably for defence purposes. Even the conception of co-operatives, whether among Africans or Europeans, was based on the operation of the market or assumptions based on exchange, and not the socialization of the means of production. In other words, both the colonialists and the educated Africans did not contradict capitalism as such; because the forms of production and division of labour they defended are the very foundations of the capitalist system.

More radical ideas were not allowed publication, as has been pointed out. Shaaban Robert was to note that some of his manuscripts were lost while with the publishers as a result of their refusal to publish them. He had written histories and essays besides his poetry and novels. This explains why he had to employ Aesopian methods in his novels and some of his poetry. Towards the end of the 1950s, Shaaban Robert was moving towards utopian socialist ideas and grounding them on the working class position.<sup>171</sup>

An example of an author who could not publish his work is the late Aniceti Kitereza of Ukerewe. Kitereza finished writing what is still the longest novel in Tanzania in 1945. Unlike the writings of his contemporaries which had the heroes and rulers--kings, chiefs, governments, etc-- as the principle characters, the community was the principle character in this novel. Kitereza had also written historical chronicles, and transcribed oral literature and proverbs, which were never published.<sup>172</sup> The novel was originally written in Kikerewe and was published in 1981 in Kiswahili. It told the story of the pre-colonial Kerewe society of the 17th or 18th century and attempted at depicting Kerewe society at its most unadulterated stage, showing the modes of production, the gods and modes of worship, aesthetics, commitment to work, ethics, forms of authority and punishment, and the roles of rulers and priests, medicinemen and rain makers; the sense of community, philosophy of life, social organization, forms of division of labour, etc. Professor Gerald Hartwig aptly remarked about Kitereza:

Unlike his contemporaries, his writing voices no protest, fights no battles, is not defensive of his heritage, nor is it aimed at a European audience. His writing is simple [and] unsophisticated, extolling the virtues of earlier values and traditions; his intended readership--the young people of his community."<sup>173</sup>

Kitereza did not criticise or glorify the pre-colonial societies; nor was he attempting an intermarriage of the pre-colonial cultures and Western civilization. He aimed at making the young grasp the nature of those societies and understand their driving force; so as to be able to grasp the kind of transformations which had taken place under colonialism. In other words, without any mystifications or apology, he was more successful in demystifying the myths of the civilizing mission than most of his contemporaries. And moreover, he wrote in the very

language of the people he wanted to address. After all, even missionaries had translated the evangelical works into vernaculars so as to make them accessible to more people. Kitereza, from the point of view of the civilizing mission, was not an authentic thinker.

The struggles of the educated and the capitalist elements in the 1930s and 1940s remained ineffective as far as the colonial arrangements were concerned. It was only when they began to utilize the struggles of the rebelling workers and peasants who struggled against anti-erosion measures, improved methods of crops and animal husbandry, arbitrary and violent forms of domination, and generally for better living conditions, that the educated were able to lead a successful nationalist struggle. They were *compelled* to support even those "traditional" aspects to which they were fundamentally opposed from their "modern" point of view, so as to wage a successful struggle. They were pushed to this position, and they too had to invest in the terrain of the workers and peasants to attain their goals. This aspects will be discussed in the next chapter which deals with the nationalist phase.

NOTES

1. J. Iliffe, "The age of Improvement and Differentiation" in I.N. Kimambo & A.J. Temu (eds), *A History of Tanzania*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1969, p.124.
2. J. Cameron & W. Dodd, *Society and Schools Progress in Tanzania*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1970, p.54.
3. Margaret Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration" Ph D Thesis, Oxford University, 1957, p.456.
4. D.R. Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa: The Tanzanian Case*, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1976, p.44.
5. For the discussion of this aspect see, Z.E. Lawuo, *Education and Social Change in a rural Community*, DUP, Dar es Salaam, 1983.
6. Cameron & Dodd, op cit, p.55.
7. ibid.
8. ibid, p.56. The alliance between the Germans and the Moslems was an attempt on the part of the Germans to buy off the Coastal people as a result of the resistance they had put up during colonial conquest. On the other hand, there was the alliance at home between Germany and some Islamic states, e.g. Turkey.
9. Quoted by T.J. Jones, *Education in East Africa*, Edinburgh House Press, London, 1924, p.178.
10. Quoted in ibid.
11. Lawuo, op cit; See also "German East Africa," Annual Report 1902/3 (translation in East Africana, University of Dar es Salaam).
12. Lawuo, ibid.
13. L. Sefania Ole Sumuley Molllel, "Habari za Waarusha: Historia, Mila na Desturi zao", Utafiti No 1, Municipal Council Library, Arusha, 1981/2, pp.89-92.
14. A.S. Mbise, "The Evangelist: Matayo Leveriya Kaaya", in J. Iliffe (ed), *Modern Tanzanians*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1971, p.27.
15. Jones, op cit, p.179.
16. Lawuo, op cit, p.84.
17. ibid.
18. Morrison, op cit, p.44.

19. On manual/mental division of labour, see Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labour: A critique of Epistemology*, Macmillan, 1978, p.78; Also H. Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution* Vol II, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1978, Chapters 16-18.
20. E. Wamba dia Wamba, "Philosophy in Africa: Challenge of the African Philosopher", Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, (mimeo).
21. H.M.T. Kayamba, *African Problems*, Lutterworth Press, London, 1948, p.87.
22. J. Iliffe, "The Spokesman: Martin Kayamba", in *Modern Tanzanians*, op cit, pp.72-3. His father Hugh Peter Kayamba, was one of the first christian converts, who was educated by the University Mission to Central Africa. He spent two and a half years at an English public school, Bloxhams, between 1883 and 1885. There were many Tanganyikans who were educated in Kiungani school during the German colonial period. It is those who were educated in Kiungani who were the first to be recruited by the British when they took over the country.
23. Vischer to Oldham, "Extract from Personal letter to Mr Vischer from P.E. Mitchell, Secretary to Native Affairs, Tanganyika Territory", n.d., in Mss Brit Emp. s. 1829, "Papers of Joseph Houldsworth Oldham"
24. *ibid.*
25. J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, CUP, London, 1979, p.334.
26. *ibid.*
27. A letter by Dr E.F. Mwaisela in Mss Brit Emp s. 365, "Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau".
28. Rivers-Smith to J. Scott, 12.9.1921, SMP 3118, Vol I.
29. J. Raum, "Education Problems in Tanganyika Territory", in *International Review of Missions*, Vol 19, 1930, pp.564-5.
30. Confidential letter from Rivers-Smith to Chief Secretary, 24.7.1925, SMP 3118.
31. See W.B. Mumford, "Native Schools in East Africa", in *Journal of African Society*, 1926-27, p.237.
32. See W.B. Mumford, "Malangali School", in *Africa* Vol III, July 1930, pp.265-292; W.B. Mumford, "Education and Social Adjustment of Primitive Peoples of Africa to European Culture", in *Africa* Vol II, April 1929, pp.138-161.



33. See Marcia Wright, *German Missions in Tanganyika*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971; and T.O. Ranger, "The Apostle: Kolumba Msigala", in *Modern Tanzanians*, op cit, for information about the Masasi experiment.
34. Great Britain, *Education Policy in British Tropical Africa*, His Majesty's Stationary Officer, London, 1925, p.4.
35. Mss Afr r. 101, Sir Philip Euen Mitchell: Diaries, 1927-1938, 12.5.1929.
36. ibid, 14.2.1931.
37. Quoted by M. Mbilinyi, "African Education During the British Colonial Period", in M.H.Y. Kaniki, *Tanzania Under Colonial Rule*, Longman, London, 1979, p.253.
38. Iliffe, "The Spokesman....", op cit, pp.75-6.
39. ibid.
40. Martin Kayamba, "The Story of Martin Kayamba Mdumi, MBE. of Bondel Tribe, Written by Himself", in Margery Perham, *Ten Africans*, North Western Press, London, 1936, pp.247-8.
41. Iliffe, "The Spokesman...." op cit, p.76.
42. Tanganyika Territory, "Advisory Committee in African Education 10th Meeting", 22/23 November 1934.
43. Lawuo, op cit, p.105.
44. ibid, p.135.
45. Iliffe, "The Spokesman..." op cit, p.79. On the denial of Africans participation James F. Scotton ("Tanganyika's African Press, 1937-1960: A Nearly Forgotten pre-Independence Forum", in *African Studies Review*, Vol XXI No 1, 1978, p.3) points out that, "The British in Tanganyika regarded African self-government as the ultimate goal under the League of Nations Mandate, but they saw no place for such radicalism in the process which would lead to that goal. [Reference here is to Erica Fiah's radicalism--C.S.L] In their view, African participation in the government should for some time be limited to his traditional institutions. The African could only for hope a direct part in national politics in the distant future." Also see B.F. Chidzero, *Tanganyika and International Trusteeship*, OUP, London, 1961, p.19.
46. Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 9.10.1933.
47. ibid, 17.1.1933.
48. Iliffe, in Kimambo & Temu (eds), op cit, p.137.

49. Martha Honey, "A History of Indian Merchant Capital and Class Formation in Tanganyika", Ph D. Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1982, p.314.
50. *ibid.*, p.313.
51. E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*, Heinemann, London, 1973, p.143.
52. TNA 7596 Memorandum from Treasurer to Chief Secretary, 19.5.1925. "Profits Tax--Question of Abolition of".
53. TNA 2712 "Letter from Native Observer", Market--Dar es Salaam 1919-1926, Trade Tax Ordinance.
54. *ibid.*
55. D.M.P. McCarthy, *Colonial Bureaucracy and Creating Underdevelopment: Tanganyika 1919-1940*, The Iowa State University, Ames, 1982, p.39. In this book there is a lengthy discussion of many of the laws which affected the various commercial groups.
56. TNA 1733/23 Tanga District Report, by P.E. Mitchell, 1923, p.1.
57. Cameron to Oldham, 12.1.1927, in Mss Brit Emp s.1829, *op cit.*
58. Mitchell to Oldham, 29.6.1929, in *ibid.*
59. The question of Tanganyika generating her own funds was pointed out in Chapter Three. As a matter of principle, Cameron, Dundas, Mitchell, Harrison, etc. were not opposed to non-African settlement. All they demanded was the settlers to have enough capital of their own or be under the auspices of a monopoly, to ensure that there was no emergence of "poor settlers". Mitchell himself had initially planned to acquire land in Usambara or Arusha for his own settlement, and there were even plans that the colonial officers should be able to get land to settle after their retirement. Charles Dundas became a settler in South Africa after retiring from colonial services.
60. Mitchell to Oldham, 15.4.1926, in Mss Brit Emp. s. 1829, *op cit.*
61. Mitchell Diaries, *op cit.*, 14.9.1930.
62. *ibid.*, 15.1.1933.
63. Brett, *op cit.*, p.217.
64. See also for example TNA 11740, Annual Reports, Agriculture Department, Dar es Salaam. These also demonstrate this aspects.
65. Ordinance No 2 of 1927: "An Ordinance to provide for Licencing of Itinerant Traders"; see also McCarthy, *op cit.*, p.27.

66. Mitchell Diaries, 28.98.1930.
67. TNA 11740, op cit, p.10.
68. ibid.
69. *East African Standard*, Nairobi, 23.8.1935.
70. TNA 11740, op cit. Also see *Legislative Council Proceedings* 10th Session, 12.11.1935.
71. See Bonaventure Swai, "Imperial Proconcul and the Marketing of Colonial Produce: the Origins of Cooperatives in Tanganyika", University of Dar es Salaam, (Mimeo), n.d.
72. Quoted by McCarthy, op cit, p.48.
73. *Kwetu*, 7.12.1937. Initially it was simply a commercial association. The welfare dimension was added in 1936.
74. Scotton, op cit, p.2.
75. Quoted by ibid, p.3.
76. *Kwetu*, 7.12.1937. This applies to all the information above. *Kwetu* means our home.
77. *Kwetu*, 2.2.1938.
78. ibid, Dukas means retail shops.
79. *Kwetu*, 22.11.1938.
80. *Kwetu*, 24.5.1940.
81. F.S. Joelson, *The Tanganyika Territory*, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1920, p.89.
82. ibid, p.97.
83. Eric Reid, *Tanganyika Without Prejudice*, East Africa, London, 1934, p.196.
84. ibid.
85. J. Huxley, *The African View*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1931, pp.440-1.
86. ibid.
87. ibid, pp.443-4.
88. ibid, p.377.

89. Reid, op cit, p.198.
90. Anne Dundas, *Beneath African Glacier*, H.F. & G. Witherby, London, 1924, pp.106-7.
91. ibid, p.112.
92. J. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of nationalism in Tanzania", in L. Cliffe & J. Saul (eds) *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol I, EAPH, Nairobi, 1972, pp.25-6.
93. For an elaborate discussion of this topic in general, see T.O. Ranger, *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa 1990-1970: The Beni Ngoma*, Heinemann, London, 1975, p.5.
94. ibid.
95. ibid. p.6.
96. ibid, p.40.
97. ibid, p.53.
98. Quoted in ibid, p.59.
99. In some rare cases protest was also carried in this movement. When the Bishop of Ufipa met Mitchell in 1929, he expressed the fact that there was a general feeling of unrest and anti-Europeanism in the country. He blamed Beni for this. He reported that, Mkulwe, the members of Beni openly sang defiance to the missions and the government. Most of the missionaries were very hot on the Beni. Mitchell also believed that there was a sense of truth of what the Bishop said. (Mitchell Diaries, 20.6.1929)
100. Martin Kayamba (President) and Alkhidhiri bin Likhidhri (Vice President) to Chief Secretary, 5.4.1922. TNA SMP 3715/1. See also Iliffe, "The Spokesman..." op cit, p.73; and Ranger, ibid, pp.92-3.
101. Iliffe, ibid, p.74.
102. Iliffe in Kimambo & Temu (eds), op cit, p.139.
103. ibid, pp.134-140.
104. Daisy Sykes Buruku, "The Townsman: Kleist Sykes", in *Modern Tanzanians*, op cit, p.101. Also see Ranger, 1975, op cit pp.94-5.
105. G.G. Hajivayanis, et al, "The Politicians: Ali Ponda and Hassan Suleiman", in *Modern Tanzanians*, op cit, p.235. See also TNA 61/385/31 "The African Association: Kanuni na Sheria za Chama cha Umoja wa Watu wa Africa", a copy, 1937.

106. Hajivayanis, *ibid*, pp.235-6.
107. TNA 26034 "Report on Prosecution Against J.P. Molloy (ex-Manager of ) Monkton and Co's Branch at Moshi and J. Merinyo (ex-President of KNPA)"
108. See S.G. Rogers, "The search for Political focus on Kilimanjaro: A History of Chagga Politics", Ph. D. Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1972.
109. Huxley, *op cit*, p.172. Pius Ngeze, *Ushirika Wetu*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1975, p.4. It is Mitchell who reveals the fact that there were some Europeans involved in this scandal. One of them was Mr Alcock. [Mitchell Diaries 12.7.1929] Also in his travels he recorded that books were faulty or money was lost in almost every district.
110. Iliffe in Kimambo & Temu, *op cit*, p.139.
111. Ngeze, *op cit*, p.139.
112. For an account of the development of the marketing co-operatives in the Lake Province, and also the role played by Paul Bomani, (who was to become a minister in the post-independence era) in the development of politics in Usukuma, see A.G. Maguire, *Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation*, CUP, Cambridge, 1969, pp.83-111; Also J. Saul, "Marketing Cooperatives in Tanzania", in Cliffe and Saul (eds) *op cit*; and L. Cliffe et al (eds), *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1975.
113. Saul, *ibid*, p.143.
114. Maguire, quoted by *ibid*, p.86.
115. J. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1971, pp.26-7. If one is looking at processes in terms of absolute categories of either/or--either capitalism or no capitalism, either workers or no workers in terms of complete separation of the producers from the means of production or being migrant or non-migrant workers, etc. then this is not capitalism. But what is forgotten in such an outlook is the fact that capitalism develops through various stages: it cannot be taken as an ideal type. This tendency see either workers or no workers, given the links with the means of production was also common among the Russian Narodniks. And Lenin remarked against them that: "This....circumstance particulaly confuses the 'friends of the people', who, as befits true metaphysicians, are accustomed to think in naked and direct contrasts: 'Yea, yea--nay, nay, and whatsoever is more than these comes from the evil one.'

If the workers have no land--there is capitalism, if they have land--there is no capitalism. And they confine themselves to this soothing philosophy, losing sight of the whole social

organisation of the economy...and forgetting the generally-known fact that ownership of land does not in the least do away with the dire poverty of these landowners, who are most shamelessly robbed by other such 'peasant' landowners.

They do not know, it seems, that capitalism--while still at a comparatively low level of development--was no whereable to separate the worker from the land...capitalism of simple co-operation and manufacture has never been connected anywhere with the worker's complete separation from the land, and yet, needless to say, it has not on that account ceased to be capitalism. ( V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1972, p.209)

116. Honey op cit.
117. A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, pp.77-8.
118. For more examples of this aspect see Honey, op cit p.460. Also her article, "Asian Industrial activities In Tanganyika", in *Tanzania Notes and Records*, no 75, 1975.
119. B. Davidson, *Africa in Modern History: A Search for New Society*, Pelican, Suffolk, 1981, p.136.
120. Brett, op cit, pp.274-5.
121. Saadani Abdu Kandoro, *Mwito wa Uhuru*, Blackstar Agencies, Dar es Salaam, 1978, p.1. This book was the first attempt by a Tanzanian to write the party history. This book was first published in 1961.
122. See Kayamba in Perham, op cit; Iliffe, "The Spokesman...." op cit.
123. I.K. Katoke & P. Rwechumbiza, "The Administrator: Francis Lwamugira", in *Modern Tanzanians*, op cit, p.61. One of his manuscripts is with TPH.
124. Kwetu, 12.3.1940. His notebooks are available in microfiche at the University of Dar es Salaam.
125. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.331.
126. *ibid*, pp.337-8.
127. *ibid*; A.S. Mbise, "The Evangelist: Matayo Reveriya Kaaya", in *Modern Tanzanians*, op cit, p.40. Charles Dundas wrote the history of Wachagga: *Kilimanjaro and its People*, Witherby, London, 1924.
128. *Mambo Leo* was a government paper for Africans. It appeared in the early 1920s. People like Shaaban Robert first published in this paper before they published their books. Most of the

material in this paper had to be approved by the government before publication. That is why the focus here is mainly on *Kwetu*. Of course, even Fiah "adopted the practice of sending at least some critical letters to the government before publishing them." (Scotton, op cit, p.6.).

129. Most of the above information is from *Kwetu*, 4.8.1940; and the question of his being acquainted with the West Indian literature has been pointed out by Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.377.
130. *Kwetu*, 7.12.1937.
131. *ibid*, 16.10.1939.
132. Scotton, op cit.
133. *Kwetu*, 29.6.1940.
134. *ibid*, 2.8.1938. Unless indicated otherwise, all the following and the quotations are from the same issue.
135. Scotton, op cit, p.2. Some of the papers which presented the African view were *Herald* and *Dunia* (Indian owned), the *African Voice*, and many more papers were to appear in the 1950s.
136. Kayamba, *African Problems*, op cit.
137. *ibid*, p.7.
138. See Martin Kayamba, *Tulivyoona na Tulivyofanya Ingereza*, Sheldon Press, London, 1932; and *An African in Europe*, Lutterwork Press, London, 1948.
139. H.M.T.Kayamba, "The Modern Life of the East African Native", in *Africa* Vol V No 1 January 1932 pp.50-60.
140. Kayamba, *An African in Europe*, op cit pp.13-14.
141. Kayamba, in Perham, op cit, p.261.
142. Kayamba, *African Problems*, op cit, pp.13-14. Unless indicated otherwise, the following summary is from the same book. The page numbers are put in brackets.
143. Kayamba, in Perham, op cit, p.261.
144. This was also Fiah's lament. For him the reason for buying from Asians rather than Africans was jealousy.
145. *Kwetu*, 12.3.1940.
146. *ibid*, 26.12.1941.
147. *ibid*, 1.5.1942.

148. Iliffe, 1979, p.379.
149. *Kwetu*, January 1948. See in Iliffe, *ibid*.
150. Shabaan Robert, "Chama cha Waafrika", in *Pambo la Lugha*, (1946) Oxford, 1966, p.10.
151. Shabaan Robert, *Kusadikika*, (1948), Nelson, London, 1951.
152. Shabaan Robert, *Kufikirika*, (1946), Oxford, 1968.
153. Shabaan Robert, *Utubora Mkulima*, (1946), Nelson, London, 1968.
154. Shabaan Robert, *Utenzi wa Vita vya Uhuru*, (1939-1945), Oxford, 1961.
155. *ibid*, p.9. My translation.
156. *ibid*, p.59.
157. Mss Brit Emp s. 365, "Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau", Introduction to the collection, pp.1-2.
158. *ibid*.p.13.
159. *ibid*, "Correspondence". Other aspects related to the Fabian Colonial Bureau will be discussed in the next Chapter.
160. The Fabian Colonial Bureau's journal, *Venture*, usually never accepted for publication articles which were considered to be too radical. Examples of such articles are cited below. The *Venture* also refused to publish Nyerere's article on racism in East Africa. This article appeared in *Freedom and Unity*, OUP, Nairobi, 1967 as the first article in the book.
161. Major Orde Browne, "Primitive Cultures and Modern Theories", 1932, p.4, in Mss Afr s. 1117 "Orde Browne Papers". A copy of a letter from Mitchell to Vischer, 2.8.1930, in Mss Bri Emp s.1829, *op cit*.
162. A.K. Juma to Editor of *Venture*, 26.10.1949, in Mss Brit Emp s.365, *op cit*.
163. W.B. Julius to Editor of *Tanganyika Standard*, 27.10.1949, in *ibid*.
164. Wamba dia Wamba, *op cit*, p.2.
165. *ibid*.
166. Frank Melland, "Our Colonial Complacency", *The Nineteenth Century*, August 1935, London, pp.3-4.



167. Masizi Kunene, "Introduction" to Aime Cesaire's *Return to Native Land*, Penguin, London, 1970, pp.20-21.
168. G. Milne, "African Village Layout", *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, Dar es Salaam, No 13, 1942. This article was published posthumously, it was originally a letter to a friend.
169. *ibid.*
170. *ibid*, p.5. Emphasis added.
171. Shabaan Robert, *Maisha Yangu na Baada ya Miaka Hamsini*, (1936 & 1960), Nelson, London, 1966, p.78.
172. I am most grateful to M.M. Mulokozi of the University of Dar es Salaam for most of the information used here. I am also grateful to Walter Bgoya, the General Manager of Tanzania Publishing House for granting me permission to go through the Project File No K. 54 of the book, *Bwana Muyombekere na Bibi Bugonoka, Ntulanwalo na Bulihwali*, (the book by Aniceti Kitereza, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1981) I have also used Mulokozi's interviews with the late Kitereza.
173. K.54, *ibid.*

## CHAPTER FIVE

### The Triumph of the Nationalists

Chapter Five  
THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIONALISTS

It was shown in the previous chapter that the defenders of African Civilization and Africanism in general, i.e. the educated and the wealthy, in essence did not refute or reject capitalism or western civilization: they rather sought to intermarry what they considered to be the best from African and Western Civilization. They rejected Western civilization in so far as it denied them equality and appropriated from African civilization what was acceptable in universalistic paradigms. The colonial agents and the African capitalist elements were virtually in agreement on the question of material development and the fact that it was the Western world which had a contribution to make in this regard.

The African capitalist elements were rejecting what was bad for them in Western civilization, and at the same time aligning with it in the rejection of communism. Writing to Creech Jones in 1946, J.K. Nyerere protested against the proposed East African Federation by the Colonial Office. He wanted Africans to decide for themselves if they wanted it or not. He went on: "...WE WANT ALL THE CHIEF RESOURCES OF THIS COUNTRY SUCH AS GOLD, COAL, DIAMOND AND TIN MINES TO BE DEVELOPED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MONEY OBTAINED TO BE USED FOR OUR EDUCATION AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENT".<sup>1</sup> This economic demand more or less sums up the aspirations of the "modern Tanganyikans" in their transformation into nationalists and, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, the post-World War II conceptions of planning by the colonial state.

The economic roots of nationalism were in the demands for the creation of modern economy.<sup>2</sup> To bring about this modern economy, it was

necessary to grapple with the political problem in terms of entry into political decision making. The efforts of the colonial state in the post World War II period were geared to the transformation of Tanganyikan economy by accelerated investments in industry, agriculture and services more than ever before. As has been observed in some studies, the nationalists' challenge to colonial rule did not result from inadequacies of the implementation of the changes by the colonial government, and even the rapid growth of nationalism in the 1950s "was not the consequence of a widespread undermining of older loyalties nor of the growth of powerful new social classes with aspirations which could not be contained within a colonial system."<sup>3</sup> Long after independence, Nyerere was to comment on Sir Edward Twining, the Governor who came to Tanganyika in 1949--under whose governorship most changes took place. Twining, he said, was one of the great governors--

to the extent that I can appreciate colonial governors. If I were to write a history of the colonial period, I would give an important place to Twining, and to Sir Donald Cameron: they were the most prominent.

Twining came at a wrong time, and he stayed too long. But you must give him credit; he had ideas. But he had a fault....He did good things. The British did little to develop this country, but to the extent that development took place, it was pushed by Cameron and Twining. The deep-water berths in the port are from Twining's time; the new Dar es Salaam airport is Twining; the tarmac road to Morogoro, the big school at Iringa, all Twining.

Politically, he didn't like anyone near the throne....But we clashed in 1954. In his vague mind, I stood for racial domination, and his party was 'multi-racial'. By 1955 he had come to realize he couldn't fight us alone, and he tried to revive the European voice--but it was too late.<sup>4</sup>

The historical view presented by Nyerere above is predominant, and it is this view which is taken by the "improvement" approach which was criticized in Chapter Two. Most studies have tended to view the political climate in the post-World War II period as largely determined

by government policies and ideas "with some small influence to be assigned to individual British settlers and very occasionally, an Indian businessman or African chief."<sup>5</sup> This period is usually seen as marked by British social-engineering--attempts at economic development and political reforms, at the end of the 1940s, by the paternal colonial government working in alliance with sympathetic settlers, businessmen, missionaries and "members of the small westernized African community". This social-engineering involved a substantial shift from the inter-war period premises about preservation of African societies: it was a period of "second colonial occupation" which was embodied in plans for development of secondary industries, expansion of cash crops production and agricultural improvement schemes, reforms of local governments, constitutional changes, and educational advancement.<sup>6</sup>

Although such were the features of "modernizing imperialism", it is acknowledged that these developments increased the control of Tanganyika by imperial forces; and this control "antagonized subjects who had often acquiesced in lighter suzerainty. Active government created grievances to stimulate political activity and provided resources to make it effective," hence the emergence of nationalist politics which involved simultaneously an internalization of "colonial values, while at another level changing relationships among men went alongside human gains over nature." The last days of colonialism in Tanganyika provide a complex history.<sup>7</sup> The victory of the independence struggles was due to TANU's success in making people understand the possibility of peaceful methods of struggle: because the failure of Maji Maji rebellion and earlier wars of resistance Tanganyikans had turned to self-improvement which in turn taught them the necessity of peaceful methods:<sup>8</sup>

Only the TAA survived the onslaught of the colonial administration in the inter-war years. And so it is of special importance to us not only because it lived to keep African politics alive and bridge the gap between the politics of the inter-war years and those of the period after World War II but in that it gave birth to the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in the fifties.<sup>9</sup>

The contradiction in this view is, even TAA itself was experiencing an organizational collapse and general political decay by the time the reforms were being introduced, according to Iliffe, due to the end of war time austerity. After the 1947 General Strike, urban wages rose and shortages were eased, economic controls disappeared and prices for exports rose. Development had started to take place, and the establishment of the trusteeship system had removed some of the doubts about the future. TAA's organizational collapse was due to the fact that after 1949 "the British government seized the political initiative in Tanganyika for the first time since Cameron's departure and channelled politics into new directions".<sup>10</sup>

The above, in the final analysis, amounts to arguing that the forms of resistance of the working people in Tanganyika had little to do with the post-World War II transformations to the point of the emergence of the nationalist politics. What was taking place in this period was an attempt to modernize Tanganyika: and it was those elements which shared this view which were making history. This chapter attempts to reconstruct the processes after 1945 and demonstrates the actual motive forces behind the transformations and how the nationalists triumphed. It demonstrates the social and economic basis of the nationalist forces and their relationship with the workers and peasants. For the sake of exposition, the chapter commences with an outline of the political-economical transformations after 1945.

### 5.1 *The post-World War II Policies and Strategies*

As correctly noted by the "modernization"/"transformation" history above, the ideology of "preservation of African societies" economically, socially and politically had become outmoded by the 1940s.<sup>11</sup> The Ten Year Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika Territory (1947-1957) was projected to cost £18 million of which £11 million was to be provided from Tanganyika resources and £7 million from the colonial development and welfare grants. The allocation of the funds were as follows in the Plan: £5 million for communication (most important here were roads, aerodromes and telecommunications); £50,000 for the establishment of social welfare centres; £5½ million for social services (public health, education, training of ex-servicemen and loans to municipalities for African housing); £2½ million for development of townships, public buildings, land settlement and land bank; and £2 million for railway and ports and road services operated by the railway.<sup>12</sup> By the end of 1945 Tanganyika had received £5,250,000 from the Colonial Office for the Ten Year Plan. The Colonial Office was putting on more pressure for the development of productive investments rather than infrastructure. Tanganyika, on the other hand, insisted on getting more money for education although she finally ended up spending less on education than most other colonies and more on infrastructure than the other colonies.<sup>13</sup>

The Trusteeship Agreement substantially modified the Open Door clauses. As a result of this, after 1945, Tanganyika was able to receive more loans from Britain than ever before. In 1948 Tanganyika was granted the right to raise money on the London Market on its own guarantee, and to raise local loans as well. Tanganyika raised a series of overseas

loans between 1951 and 1957, and there were attempts to get more such finances. Britain increasingly became Tanganyika's source of capital in the 1950s. In 1950 Tanganyika was given a loan of £1,750,000 which bore interest at the rate of 3½ per cent per annum. This loan was to be redeemed between 1970 and 1973. In 1953 Tanganyika got another loan of £4,410,000 with an interest rate of 4½ per cent per annum, to be redeemed between 1967 and 1972; and, in 1957 she was given a loan of £3 million with an interest rate of 5½ per cent per annum, to be redeemed between 1978 and 1982.<sup>14</sup>

The historical antecedents of these changes are in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. This act constituted the manifesto of "modernizing imperialism"; it also provided imperial finances for long-term colonial development plans. It was promulgated in response to the 1930s Depression which had revealed that most impoverished colonies were politically dangerous and could barely afford to buy British goods, hence preferring to buy cheap Indian or Japanese goods. The Act also aimed at countering German propaganda during the War, neutralizing American anti-imperialism, and compelling the colonies to refrain from making demands until the War was over.<sup>15</sup> The Act was a product of campaigns by Lord Hailey, Arthur Creech Jones of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, A.W. Lewis, Lady Margery Perham, and others who believed in a colonialism with a human face. Lord Hailey had called for the necessity of a political strategy in the colonies for fear that nationalism was likely to become a very powerful force after the Second World War in Africa, due to the forces both in Europe and in the colonies which pressurized for political institutions for self-government and the incorporation of the colonial subjects into them. It was necessary to



have a political strategy for the colonies, if the worst was to be avoided.<sup>16</sup>

The watershed in these policies and strategies in the case of East Africa, and Tanganyika in particular was the crisis in the British economy which became critical in 1942-3. By early 1942, the British colonies in Asia were collapsing before the Japanese troops; the Suez Canal was almost captured by the enemy forces and India was making preparations to defend herself. As a result of this situation, Britain was losing an important source of raw materials, such as jute and rubber which were produced in South East Asia and were badly needed during the War. The British government ordered the East African colonies to step up production of raw materials--e.g. sisal--and food so as to replace the resources that were falling into the hands of the Japanese.<sup>17</sup> The revival of the rubber estates at vast expense in Tanganyika is one example of the activities engendered by the crisis in the British empire.

The War conditions also forced the colonies to depend on their own resources and those of their neighbours. This was because imports from Britain or other traditional exporters to the colonies were hard to come by, as production in the metropolitan countries was by then mainly geared to War needs rather than exports to the colonies. The danger that the colonies could be cut-off from the mother country, as the Asian experience was demonstrating, was apparent. Therefore the colonies had to provide substitution of their imports. Hence the birth of the famous Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy which aimed at the provision of consumer goods for the colonies and to supply even the mother country with them if the necessity arose.

In July 1942, Sir Arthur Dame, the senior official responsible for East Africa declared that the old nineteenth century conceptions were dead. The War was increasingly demonstrating that self-government was becoming an expectation of all colonies. Britain was faced with the problem of formulating methods to reconcile the new forces and the future British interests in Africa. He rhetorically posed the question:

How are we to bind these people to us in such a way that their moral and material resources of strength will continue to be ranged on the side of Great Britain? It is to be expected that after this war this island will be much exhausted and weakened by its long ordeal. It will be natural that, when we are weak at the centre, the territories overseas which are still bound to us by the old Crown Colony relationship will seek to improve their position and to obtain a wider measure of control over their own affairs....<sup>18</sup>

As a result of the War situation and its requirements the administrative and economic structures of Tanganyika were profoundly altered: the government was forced to extend its control over the life and activities of the colonized subjects. Moreover, government control and supervision of the economy increased because of the necessity to organize production for war efforts--as supplier of Britain's needs more than ever before. During the War, the government took over the control of marketing for all commodities needed by Britain and the armies, and free market values were replaced by fixed price contracts between the producers and the government which, then, started to guarantee purchase and better returns for the producers, thereby hoping to encourage more production. The government became the broker for peasant exports and took off a considerable surplus, reserving it for development of the country after the War.<sup>19</sup>

The War had weakened Britain's position economically and financially. She was faced with a balance of payments crisis,

specifically in relation to the United States; and, she was also burdened by War indemnities. Britain's imports from United States, which included food and machines, were vastly above her exports. The difference had to be paid in dollars; and this resulted in a "dollar crisis" in Britain. For Tanganyika, this meant the reduction of dollar imports and the increase of exports to the United States directly or through Britain where they were re-exported to USA or sent to Britain as substitute for imports from the USA. Between 1937 and 1947 Tanganyika's exports to the United States increased by 850 per cent, and the control over the economy exercised during the War was extended to the peace-time period. Even the working class victory in Britain, in terms of squeezing some concessions from the bourgeoisie in the form of welfarism, could hardly be sustained without increased production in the colonies.<sup>20</sup>

In the 1940s, the Colonial Office began increasingly to give attention to the possibility of full utilization of the "ability and resources of the immigrant communities, while leaving open to the native races the opportunity to participate in the social, economical and political life" in East Africa, as G.F. Seel, the head of East African Department in the Colonial Office stated in 1943.<sup>21</sup> This is the direction which the Tanganyika administrators took after the War. They began to view European agriculture as the only means capable of fast expansion in terms of output. They argued that peasant agriculture was inefficient because of the systems of land tenure which were marked by impersonality and militated against improvement, and the systems of land use (for example, shifting cultivation and burning of areas in the process of clearing) caused reduced soil fertility and diminishing yields. As far as they were concerned, it was European methods which

were capable of sustained development, and only the immigrant communities were capable of employing them, with machines, chemicals and improved seeds.<sup>22</sup> In the meanwhile, Africans could not be left alone as anticipated by Seel in 1943: the government had to compel them to adopt new European methods of agriculture. These methods were embodied in the Land Development and Soil Conservation Schemes, and they involved the compulsion of the peasants by threats of fine or imprisonment to undertake agricultural practices which were deemed correct by the government.

There were generally six schemes which broadly covered the whole country when it came to peasant producers; and they were enforced through by-laws laid down under the 1927 Native Authority Ordinance by the chief and native courts. The largest of these schemes were: the Sukuma Development Scheme, Mbulu Development Scheme, Usambara Development Scheme, Upare Development Scheme and Iringa cattle dipping scheme. All these schemes were established under the belief in the "correctness of government technical prescriptions and military type organization". Therefore, rules were laid down about terracing in Uluguru (Morogoro) as measures to prevent soil erosion, tie-ridging in Usukuma for soil and water conservation, cattle dipping in Iringa for better animal husbandry, destocking of animals in Singida, etc., for better animal husbandry and prevention of soil erosion.<sup>23</sup>

The pretensions about the "preservation of peasant agriculture" and the fabric of African society and communal land-use which were pursued in the inter-war period, in essence had only comprised of the tip of the iceberg. Land policy before 1940s had prevented alienation for private use without consideration of the needs and interests of the indigenous

inhabitants; and the argument about land alienation or white settlement had been around this issue of interests for political, social and economic reasons as pointed out in Chapters Three and Four. But during the same period, vast areas of land had been alienated when creating the national parks and game reserves and populations had been resettled when this process was taking place. These aspects, added to those of differentiation which had already taken place among the direct producers had resulted in overcrowding.

The new settlements which were created had in most cases been established in drier areas where production could not increase except by concentrated injection of new husbandry.<sup>24</sup> This was in direct contrast to the pre-colonial settlements which had been established in fertile areas with enough rainfall.<sup>25</sup> As a result of these problems, cash crop farming among Africans had in most cases been undertaken in the same farms in which food crops were cultivated. The combination of all these aspects--the overcrowding in fertile areas and over-utilization of the thin soils in the newly established settlements--had resulted in an ecological crisis in the form of soil erosion and diminishing fertility; and hence the fall in production. Due to these problems and the threat they posed socially, economically and politically, the government lost faith in "peasant agriculture". To deal with these problems, the government had to introduce these land rules, so as to improve agricultural production.

Encouragement and facilitation of European settlement, encouragement of some forms of industrialization and enforcement of new methods of agriculture and animal husbandry were the cornerstone of the post-War II imperial policies in Tanganyika. It was the way Tanganyika could be

modernized. The 1937-8 West Indian riots, as far as the Colonial Office was concerned, had been due to the impoverished state of the colonies. To avoid the recurrence of such disorders it was necessary to develop the colonies; and this could not be undertaken otherwise than through the encouragement of private enterprise and centrally, government initiative and participation in the economy--particularly in agriculture, infrastructure and social services.<sup>26</sup> There were the political considerations which were corollary to the economic motives mentioned above.

The post-War British Labour Government brought a new impetus to the objective of development and improvement of the colonies by making Arthur Creech Jones, the founder of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, the under-Secretary and later on Secretary of State to Colonies from 1946. In this period, conceptually, development/growth/modernization was synonymous with capital formation. In the classical formulation of A.W. Lewis, who was a member of the Advisory Committee of the Fabian Colonial Bureau and also associated with the International Labour Organization:

The central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the process by which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its national income or less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at about 12 or 15 percent of national income or more. This is the central problem because the central fact of economic development is rapid accumulation (including knowledge and skills with capital)<sup>27</sup>

Development or modernization was identified with economic growth, "measured by GNP, and modernization, as found in the Western industrialized countries". The models of economic development tended to emphasize the beneficial "effect of intersectoral migration for more

efficient use of labour in the highly productive sectors." Accordingly, the colonial economies were seen as dual economies with "modern" and "traditional" sectors. In this theory, it was necessary for the former to supersede the latter because of the latter's structural underemployment and underutilization of resources. For this process to take place, capital injection mainly from the West had to be effected, and the barriers to this process were a result of the existence of the traditional subsistence economy. The whole question of development was tied up to "specific interests as was the concept of labour shortage a few years earlier."<sup>28</sup>

The practical implementation of the strategy began in 1947 when manpower and equipment started to arrive in Tanganyika for the Groundnut Scheme. This scheme and its urgency, is the best illustration of the shift in settlement policies and planning in general in Tanganyika in relation to the policy of development of the colonies and Britain's post-War crisis. Only 60 per cent of the world's pre-War period supply of oils and fats had entered the world market in 1946; and there was every indication that the shortfalls would continue for ten or twenty years. Besides this, there was the problem of the resettling of the redundant ex-soldiers. The Director of Unilever--which was one of the major producers of oils and fats--had toured Africa seeking for new supplies. Among the countries he selected for this scheme were Tanganyika and Nigeria; within Tanganyika the areas chosen were Kongwa, Nachingwea and Tabora. About one thousand men "with excellent war records and war-ingrained indifference to costs" were brought as experts and settlers in Tanganyika. The aim was to achieve goals by management of command economy engineered by the government in collaboration with

multinational corporations, given the belief in sound administration. This scheme cost £35 million; and ended up in disaster. It wound up in less than ten years. From the target of clearing up to three million acres of groundnut fields, it ended up with 50,000 acres.<sup>29</sup>

Essentially, the settler scheme and the establishment of a Land Bank had been suggested in 1930, but had floundered on the rocks of finance. A Land Bank was established after the Second World War to facilitate settlement. Thus in matters of land policy, from the paramouncy of African interests in the inter-war period there was a shift to a virtual acceptance of alienation of land for immigrant settlement after the War.<sup>30</sup> The land policy after the War was best summarized by the Secretary of State to Colonies, who in 1953 declared that the old theory of protection of African interests by prevention of alienation of large tracts of land without investigation, and the segregation of non-African farming from African farming had been abandoned. It had been accepted that the health, wealth and general interests of Africans could not be best served by leaving them in isolation in tracts of undeveloped land which may have been for their own good. The development of the territory depended on combined efforts of all communities "working and thriving in mutual interest and assistance towards a common goal of territorial prosperity."<sup>31</sup>

With the change of land policies, land alienation for the immigrant communities was undertaken on a greater scale than ever before in the history of British colonialism in Tanganyika. Between 1945 and 1955 British settlers increased their holdings from 287,635 acres of land on lease to 1,301,654; Greeks increased their holdings from 90,803 acres to 294,649 acres; and Indians increased their acreage from 68,110 to



235,715. The Overseas Food Corporation which came to establish the Groundnut scheme and aimed at clearing 3 million acres had acquired 480,000 acres leased for 35 years--and ended up clearing only 50,000 acres. By 1948, 55 per cent of the total export value was derived from sisal which was a monopoly produced crop. Also monopoly and non-monopoly capital was involved in the production of tea, tobacco and sugar plantation. Large scale enterprises were also involved in the production of staple grains for feeding the labour force. Only 5 per cent of the total land surface of the country was cultivable by the 1950s; and of this, 40 per cent was owned by capitalists--primarily Europeans but also Asians, Arabs and later Africans.<sup>32</sup>

Although the 1947 Ten Year Plan did not have a special allocation for industrialization, the non-industrialization strategy of the inter-war period was disbanded. Besides the reasons above, the agricultural policies and strategies of the post-war period also required the establishment of processing industries in order to step up exports; consumer goods industries for the fast growing immigrant sector; and workshops for servicing machinery and facilities in general. During the inter-war period, private investment in manufacturing industries from Britain was almost nil.<sup>33</sup> The biggest industry by 1945 was the beer industry, established by a German capitalist in the 1930s. Other industries listed as small or medium establishments were: 35 cotton ginneries, 126 sisal decorticators, 6 tea factories, 11 coffee-curing factories, 12 rubber processors, and 1 tannery. These were for processing agricultural goods in general. Others were: 103 grain mills, 72 oil mills and soap factories, 312 milk processing centres, 44 bakeries, 29 saw mills, and 30 furniture workshops for the local market;

and, 6 power stations, 30 ice and soda-water manufacturers, 4 cigarette or tobacco factories and 14 lime burners. This was a total of 761 establishments.<sup>34</sup>

An accelerated process of Import Substitution Industrialization began after World War II. By 1955, there were 20 power stations, British multinationals had built a can manufacturing plant (Metal Box), a paint mixing plant (Robialac) and a meat factory (Tanganyika Packers). They also had established textile and weaving factories. Industrialization was speeded up and it became even more rapid in the few years before independence. "Modernizing imperialism", according to Iliffe, was stressing industrial "development as a means of diversifying colonial economies..." After the Second World War banks were investing in local industries and by 1955 a Department of Commerce and Industry which the Secretary of State had vetoed in the 1920s was created. In a nutshell, between 1946 and 1960 the number of establishments employing 10 workers or more increased from 101 to 380.<sup>35</sup>

Within the Ten Year Plan, education was also part of the package. Over the ten years of the Plan £5,550,000 were spent on education and by 1959, about 40 per cent of African children went to school. This was partly a result of the demand of Africans themselves for a more rapid expansion of educational facilities.<sup>36</sup> This development in education was bound up to the broad aims of economic development within the post-war changes and control of the population.<sup>37</sup> While primary school enrollment increased, the proportion of primary school leavers going to middle school declined from 40 to 13 per cent between 1947 and 1957. Makerere College in Uganda which started offering degrees for the first time in

1953, had 41 Tanganyikan students in 1950. These increased to 150 in 1953. At this time, there were also some students in Britain.<sup>38</sup>

Paradoxically, while the colonial government in Tanganyika (and the East African governments in general) was quite willing to effect the economic changes, as far as the political changes suggested by the Colonial Office were concerned--e.g. the incorporation of Africans in district, provincial and government administration in general--no efforts were made towards this end in general before 1948. The Tanganyika government "ignored the recommendation that it should be responsive to the emergence of African nationalism and ready to concede to rapid constitutional advance. It was untouched by the analysis on which the recommendation was based."<sup>39</sup> The colonial government was completely unshaken in its self-assurance that it would rule for many years to come: it

anticipated a long period of colonial rule; it saw no need to Africanize the civil service; it had no confidence in educated Tanganyikans; it was willing to consider significant constitutional advancement for Africans at the level of the central government only after successful implementation of protracted and gradual conversion of the Native Authority system into a representative local government system; and it relied upon the continuing authority of the colonial regime to maintain national integration, to promote development and assure stability during the transition to independence which was to be very lengthy.<sup>40</sup>

The first unofficial members of the Executive Council were appointed in 1939. With the insistence of Creech Jones, the first Africans were appointed to the LEGCO in 1945--Chief David Makwaia and Chief Abdiel Shangali who were friendly to the colonial regime. The number of Africans increased to 4 in 1948 and there were even more in 1955. Multi-racialism was one of the issues dominating by 1947 when the word "native" was dropped from most legislation and the first measures to

abolish racially discriminating laws were introduced. But experiments on inter-racial local councils and parity racial representation began from 1949. However, it was not until 1954 that stronger measures to abolish racial discrimination were undertaken as part of multi-racial political programme.<sup>41</sup> The Secretary of State to Colonies, Creech Jones, had issued a circular for democratization of local governments in 1947; but, except for chief Tom Marealle who became the first elected paramount chief of the Wachagga in 1951, the other native authorities which had all along been regarded as part of the central government were only granted some autonomy starting from 1956.<sup>42</sup>

Most of the political changes took place under the governorship of Sir Edward Twining who replaced Governor William Battershill. Twining had been a Deputy-Director of Labour before the War in Mauritius. After the outbreak of the War he had been promoted to Director of Labour and later on Acting Governor.<sup>43</sup> Before embarking on constitutional reforms in 1949, Twining had interviewed the 14 unofficial members of the LEGCO-7 Europeans, 4 Africans and 3 Asians. He wanted to know their suggestions and views: "Each member professed to be content with colonial rule and wished for no alterations". These passive reactions were a great disappointment to the Labour Secretary of State<sup>44</sup> and despite the reactions of these members Twining decided to embark on constitutional reforms. In the same year he appointed the Attorney-General, Sir Charles Matthew, to chair a committee of unofficial members who were to examine the new constitution and recommend on the future constitutional developments so as to increase African participation.<sup>45</sup>

Economic development and constitutional reforms were the very aspects which TAA was demanding between 1939 and 1947. These demands

were also reflected in the literature which was reviewed in the previous chapter. Between 1939 and 1947, TAA held five conferences. In one of the resolutions of the 1940 Conference it was put forward that His Majesty's Government had to consider "the possibilities of forming Provincial and Inter-Provincial Boards, where Africans could represent their own country." The members claimed a voice in the government and in the LEGCO: they wanted Africans to be given a chance to speak on their own behalf.<sup>46</sup> Although figures are hard to come by, it is reported that between 1944 and 1946 TAA experienced a spectacular expansion throughout the territory and its branches were mushrooming everywhere. This was mainly due to the politics of mass rural protests in Upare, Kilimanjaro, Ukerewe, Ukena, Usambara, Usukuma and many other parts of the territory as a result of the agricultural schemes of enforced rural modernization, and the struggles against the Asian traders in the sphere of marketing of agricultural produce.<sup>47</sup>

In the mid-1930s, TAA had degenerated to no more than an elitist social club for government employees without any political pretensions, as a result of the temporary disappearance of the Closer East African Union issue which had made it active, and the pressure from the government. It became active again in 1939 and it was at this time that it began to make attempts to link itself with the mass struggles. This transformation within TAA was a result of the struggles that had taken place between TAA and Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial Association (TAWCA) between 1936 and 1938. Erica Fiah, the leader of TAWCA had joined TAA sometime in 1934 but opted out in the same year because as a businessman, it did not protect his interests nor his politics which had made him abandon employment as a protest against

racial discrimination. After leaving TAA, Fiah had formed the African Commercial Association (ACA) which consisted of shopkeepers and market sellers, with the aim of protecting African traders against Asian monopoly and government legislation through co-operation. For Fiah, TAA ignored the essentially political aspect of African improvement which required the government to change the regulations hampering the development of African traders. ACA was renamed TAWCA in 1936 with the intention of becoming a banking, co-operative, social security and political organization. The Association began to initiate discussions on sensitive issues such as the Mandate and German threat. The government never recognized this Association.

Because of its incorporation of wider functions, TAWCA began to get wider public support; and because of its claim to represent African interests it became a rival of TAA which claimed to be the true representative of Africans. Through its paper, *Kwetu*, TAWCA attacked TAA for its elitism, fear of politics and reluctance to help the bulk of the African population. It went as far as accusing the members of TAA of robbing the unskilled workers and Africans in general. Fiah attempted to amalgamate the two associations, and the chance to do so emerged in 1936 when TAA was ridden with internal disputes and the President and the Secretary were accused of constitutional contravention. Although the unity was announced, nothing was done beyond that, because of the TAA members' fear of engaging in politics and hence their fear of the political inclinations of TAWCA which threatened the positions of those who were employed by the government. There was some truce between the two associations in 1937. But within TAA, there were some members who started protesting that the Association was entirely run by government

employees. Consequently, elections were held in January 1938 and Erica Fiah was elected as Secretary alongside two of his friends as President and vice-President and the unification between TAA and TAWCA was promptly announced. With this change, TAA was not simply confined to social issues only: there was some intrusion of politics. The government employees could not tolerate this and by April 1938 a re-election was organized and Fiah and his allies were replaced. The long lasting impact of this experience was that the dissatisfied elements within TAA were rallied--those more radical elements. Although TAWCA had faded by 1942, the TAA which emerged during the Second World War was more politically conscious and until 1945 it was advocating the policies advocated by TAWCA earlier.<sup>48</sup>

During the War, TAA went as far as advocating that cultured Africans should not look down upon the uncultured; the rich should help the poor in the struggle against poverty; the politically advanced should help to awaken others who are less advanced; etc. The educated who kept themselves aloof from the masses were castigated as not representative of the people; and the Association had even recognized that it was the masses who were its backbone.<sup>49</sup>

In the 1945 Conference held in Dodoma, TAA members pressed for the politicization of the Association; the possibility of making it a popular organization by the enrollment of more members; and representation in the LEGCO and all other official bodies. Other issues raised were: expansion of education; expansion of domestic industry and trade; the problem of European immigration; and the Mandate position. Finally, they rejected the once again proposed closer union with settler dominated Kenya on the basis of the Mandate position of Tanganyika. The

demands which were sent to the government included compulsory education for Africans; stoppage of labour conscription; the continuance of the Mandate position of the territory; rejection of an East African Federation; and that the government allow in the country only those Europeans who were to be employed by the government.<sup>50</sup> It was this hostility to European settlement as typically formulated in the 1945 Conference which greatly helped in the expansion of the Association in the countryside, given that the revolts against the agricultural schemes were mostly based on the fear of land alienation.<sup>51</sup>

But from 1946, it was mainly the question of East African Federation which pre-occupied TAA more than any other issue. In a conference held in Dar es Salaam in this year, besides the routine resolutions on education, racial discrimination, etc., there was the question of constitutional advancement by means of pyramid of elected councils upwards from townships, chiefdoms, district councils to the LEGCO. The members also argued that Tanganyika should be brought under trusteeship "with Britain undertaking to develop it quickly 'until the Africans reach the point where they can manage their own affairs.'" The question of independence was raised and there was a renewal of the rejection of the East African federation, even if simply economically. A. Tibandage and J.K. Nyerere drafted the memorandum to the government for the Association.<sup>52</sup>

The radicalism of 1945 which displayed aggressive pan-Africanism had declined in the 1946 Conference. This was even the case with the drive to popular organization. Instead the conference was dominated by the defence of the territory. This retreat from radicalism continued in 1947, with the same drive towards the defence of the territory.<sup>53</sup> In



spite of the protest against closer union, the East African Higher Commission came into being in January 1948. With this move, common services (e.g. railway, harbours and telecoms) were centralized. The limit of radicalism of TAA and the intelligentsia in general after World War II was in the reading of Fabian socialist literature which was sent to individuals who corresponded with the Fabian Colonial Bureau, and appeals to the government to effect some reforms on some of the adverse aspects. Even criticism of the government was muted and there was generous praise of the new labour government in Britain and the Secretary of State to Colonies, Bwana Creech Jones, as he was then popularly known.<sup>54</sup>

TAA's activities did not have any impact on the constitutional reforms that started taking place towards the end of the 1940s; and this is especially the case given that by 1948 there was an organizational collapse of the Association. TAA was to become active again starting from 1953; and it was during this period when TAA had collapsed organizationally that the reforms took place. This organizational collapse was also coupled with the retreat from radicalism. This means only one thing: the congruence of the demands of the "modern Tanganyikans" and the social and economic reforms which were being embarked upon by the government. The other more important reason for TAA's lack of impact was the fact that TAA "tended to steer clear of activities which could be considered 'subversive' by the government--at least this was the official policy of its headquarters". This was clearly revealed by its repudiation of its Usambara branch activities in 1947. The Usambara branch's activities were labelled 'subversive' by the authorities because of its participation in the Usambara Scheme

revolts.<sup>55</sup> This means there was another force which was compelling the colonial state to effect the reforms in the political sphere; and it is this force which explains the usual acknowledgement by the nationalists that the major aspect in the 1950s was to make Tanganyikans understand that it was possible to achieve independence through peaceful means.<sup>56</sup>

## 5.2 *Working People and the Post-War Reforms*

TAA was effectively part of the struggles for "improvement", and like the capitalist elements which it represented, its struggles made it difficult to challenge colonialism openly.<sup>57</sup> The culmination of the struggles by TAA and the capitalist elements in general was in the attempts to intermarry what they considered to be African Civilization and some of the aspects of European Civilization. From the demands they made and the content of their literature, if examined from the point of view of the post-War reforms and the congruence of these reforms with what these Africans championed, clearly African Civilization was just a variant of modernization philosophy. The goals of African Civilization and the aims of "modernizing imperialism" were quite alike.

This, however, was not the case with the working people, as was shown in Chapter Three. The records of expressions of African antagonism to Europeans date from the beginning of colonialism. These manifested themselves in the rebellions, sacrifices and joy in every calamity that befell the Europeans. It can be hardly claimed that Africans ever reconciled to colonial rule:

    Their religious beliefs that sovereignty was indissolubly linked with the forefathers buried in the land made this impossible. The acquiescence of the ruling houses in the curtailment of their powers exposed them to the attack of rival claimants who asserted that they would restore the past. In retrospect the time before the whiteman came acquired the glamour of a Paradise

Lost. Adverse experiences with the occupying power, which had to put down subordination and could not prevent the excesses of the individuals, helped to keep the idea of independence alive.<sup>58</sup>

It was this spirit which prevailed throughout the colonial period, and it manifested itself in the sensitivity about the control of land and labour--hence the rebellions in some cases.

With the increased differentiation among African rural producers in the 1930s and 1940s--an aspect which was erroneously referred to as "population increase and settled cultivation" in most colonial reports--this sensitivity to land control increased more markedly. The land use rules which were introduced in the 1930s and 1940s, for reasons which were discussed in the previous section, exacerbated the fears for land alienation. People like the Wasukuma, whose land had never been alienated, reacted violently against the schemes for improved agricultural production and improved animal husbandry from 1946.<sup>59</sup> There were riots in Bukoba and Kilimanjaro in 1937 against native authorities and the co-operative unions after the imposition of coffee rules. The peasants felt that the rules would result in the poor peasants being unable to produce coffee; for they forbade the planting of coffee bushes in the shade of banana trees. As a result of these riots, several people were imprisoned.<sup>60</sup> The Wapare reacted against graduated local rate tax and improved methods of agriculture.<sup>61</sup> Similar riots took place in Usambara, Singida, Mbulu, Iringa, Uluguru, etc.. Ultimately, the effects of these riots was to undermine the position of the native authorities.<sup>62</sup>

Peasant opposition to native authorities turned to opposition to multi-racial local governments which the government proposed to establish and attempted to do so in the 1950s. They felt that multi-

racial local governments would result in land alienation. Within these struggles, the interests of the peasants coincided with those of the capitalist elements--i.e. in the struggles against native authorities, opposition to Indian traders and in the defence of land. This was the basis upon which TAA was to spread when it adopted a more radical stance in the early 1940s as a result of the internal feuds within the Association. They differed in terms of the forms of resistance--whereby very often peasant protests turned into angry riots and demonstrations, while the capitalist elements' tendency was to appeal to the higher authorities. This is why, for example, TAA abandoned the Usambara peasants struggles in 1947 for fear of the wrath of the government. But for the peasants, it was not a matter of reconciliation with the interests of European civilization; but opposition.

The culmination of the peasant struggles was the Meru Land Case. This Case attracted international attention and contributed significantly to the emergence of the nationalist movement. In 1948, the Colonial Office had approved proposals for land alienation in Meru (Northern Province) at Engare Nanyuki and Liguruki, in order to create a block of European ranching between Meru and Kilimanjaro. The Meru (Freemen) Citizens' Union had resisted this attempt up to 1951 when government forces came into the area and drove their cattle away, removed or burnt their household goods and movable property and razed to the ground their houses, cattle pens and storage sheds. The Meru people opposed the evictions passively by refusing to move out and to accept compensation. 25 people were arrested in this incident, and two died. Hostility between Africans and Europeans escalated. After collecting funds, the Meru people sent representatives to the U.N. Trusteeship

Council to petition against this incident in 1952. A protest was also sent to the Colonial Office. Kirilo Japhet and Earle Seaton went to New York as representatives. The former was a leader of the Meru Citizens Union and Secretary of TAA branch in Meru, and the latter was a West Indian lawyer. Kirilo Japhet was the first Tanganyikan to address the Trusteeship Council.<sup>63</sup>

As the Meru Case developed, TAA eventually recognized that the Meru issue was a matter of concern for all Africans in Tanganyika. In 1952, TAA was almost functionless. A year later, after Nyerere's return from Edinburgh University and election as leader of TAA, Kirilo Japhet was asked by Nyerere and Kandoro to travel throughout the country under the auspices of TAA and tell the people about the Meru evictions. This aroused a keen interest in many parts of the country. Thus in early 1954, a group of activists, including Kirilo Japhet, A.S. Kandoro, John Rupia, the three sons of Kleist Sykes, Dossa Aziz, etc. began to discuss a new constitution for TAA. Kandoro was a trader from Kigoma who got involved in the co-operative movement in Usukuma; John Rupia was one of the territory's most prosperous African entrepreneurs of his time ("and he talked as eloquently of the virtues of hard work as any Western capitalist." This is the man who used to finance TANU when it had no money.<sup>64</sup>); the Sykes were a business family; and Dossa was a business man.

The Meru Land Case marked the linking of the struggles of the champions of African Civilization who were now turning to nationalism. As far as peasant discontent was concerned, the government had all along viewed it as having resulted from the failure of the people to realize the "value and necessity for the rules which government had devised

solely in their own interests...." rather than the fact that they were caused by political considerations. For the government, the peasants' wrath was just because of the activity of a "few malcontents whose primary motive" was "personal aggrandisement and whose object" was "overthrow of established authority."<sup>65</sup> Even as late as 1948, for example, "collective violence or disorder" in the countryside was regarded as of "minor nature, of local tribal or factional origin and without significance," dealt with adequately by the local authorities.<sup>66</sup> It was the Meru Case and the fear of land alienation which mobilized African opinion against the central government more than any other single issue. This Case also provided substantial fuel for the formation of TANU.<sup>67</sup> The 1954 U.N. Mission was to point out that land and its use and tenure comprised among Africans "the outstanding political and economic issue of the day...." The Mission acknowledged that the Meru Case was very important throughout the country, as a result of the doubts which their cause had "raised as to the whole meaning and intention of non-African, especially European, settlement in the territory". Due to the Case, political fears and suspicion had been created throughout the country where political leaders had a following.<sup>68</sup>

The rural protests started having an impact at governmental level from 1954--in the sense that land policies began to be changed. The government policy up to 1955 was based on *refusal* to recognize conflict of interests between Africans and non-Africans when it came to the land issue. But by 1955 the government began to recognize this fact, and even the district councils which were democratic were to be introduced from 1955. Yet, as was pointed out above and in the previous chapter, the

race problem had become more significant than ever in the country in the 1940s and the government's political reforms of the end of that decade were geared towards a resolution of the race problem.

Sir Edward Twining who became Governor of Tanganyika in 1949 and started effecting the political changes had a previous experience of labour matters. He was very aware of the significance of industrial disputes in the colonies. Besides the importance of the land question in the formulation of policies in the colonies, the other most crucial and central issue was the labour problem. It was in the labour/capital relations that racial tensions were more pronounced throughout the colonial period--with Europeans struggling to get and control African labour and Africans resisting. Africans had to be constrained to enter wage relations not simply by economic forces, but also by political means. The same political means had to ensure the reproduction of these relations through economic and social policies, laws, sanctions, etc. In a nutshell, the state was the most central weapon in the creation and maintenance of wage/capital relations.

There was constantly an *intense* fear during the colonial period by the state, the settlers, the planters, the diggers, the missionaries, commercialists and industrialists--the employers in general-- of any possibility of a labour action being linked with political actions. Typically, for example, the *Tanganyika Standard*--the mouth piece of the settlers--saw strikes and trade unions as having political implications. These complaints were not simply fantasies: they expressed the comprehension of the state and the employers of the real significance of the threat posed by the workers. In the colonies, the major employers of labour besides the state were Europeans and Asians, and Africans were in

the main workers and peasants. The workers in Tanganyika by the 1930s were at the very heart of the colonial economy, given the share of exports by large scale production, and therefore, their objective position vis á vis the colonial economy and the state in general was crucial. It is true that the peasants and petty commodity production in general produced more export crops than the settlers, as was shown in the previous chapter, and hence the peasant interests were very important within the state when it came to the choice between settler agriculture and peasant agriculture in the 1920s. But the fact is, capitalist production in general--that is settler agriculture and plantations (mainly sisal) accounted for a higher percentage of agricultural exports than peasant agriculture from the end of the 1930s onwards. This aspect was mentioned in the previous section. (See also Table 1)

Labour was employed by this capitalist agriculture; by the state itself which was the largest employer--in public works, railway, civil service, etc.; by commerce, mining, industries, etc.; and also by some African capitalists. Therefore, besides being a confrontation of employers and workers, every strike or industrial action was a direct confrontation of races--whereby, in most cases the employers were non-Africans and the workers were Africans. It is for this reason that the employers viewed every strike or labour movement as politically motivated, because the very dominance of non-Africans and their privileges depended on the existence of wage labour.

As a response to the wave of strikes which took place in the second half of the 1930s, labour inspection was begun in 1939 and a Workmen's Compensation and Minimum Wage Ordinance was already under consideration



by 1940. The Labour Inspector of the territory reported in 1939 that "strikes amongst the labourers in the territory are almost a daily occurrence."<sup>70</sup> For example, there were 22 strikes and stoppages in Tanga Province in the second quarter of 1937 and 32 in the first nine months of 1938. Most of them were anonymous, and the most common pattern of the strikes in the sisal plantations of Tanga was for cutters to demonstrate outside the estate office, brandishing pangas (machetes) and shouting for their rights. This wave of strikes continued in the 1940s. The working class had become permanent in the 1930s, and within this came the beginning of collective action on such a large scale. By 1939, there were 6,000 male labourers in Dar es Salaam, of which 25 per cent were at any time unemployed and 60 per cent of those in employment earned less than Shs 15/= a month. Besides this, only half of the children of school age went to school and 1,000 under the age of 14 were employed. Between 20,000 to 25,000 Africans were crowded in approximately 3,200 houses.<sup>72</sup> The 1940s strikes also involved picketing. The government was forced to amend the 1932 Trade Union Ordinance in 1941 so as to include a provision on picketing.<sup>73</sup>

There was a wave of strikes in Lindi and Dar es Salaam in 1943. These strikes ended in a brutal victimization of the workers by the state, and strikes being declared illegal in war-time. Many workers were arrested and tribunals were held. Norman Pearson, who was sent to Tanganyika by the British Trade Union Congress in 1946 to help organize "healthy and desirable trade unions"<sup>74</sup> by potential trade unionists themselves, was to recollect that in his travels within the country he found that more time in those years was lost in strikes "and certainly tremendously more productive effort lost by industrial frictions which

were smouldering on, than was lost in Britain." There were no statistics available to show the figures of strikes occurrences. All the same, he got the impression that "strikes took place on many occasions in all parts of the territory." In his travels around the country, he was not only constantly hearing of strikes "but on several occasions ran into places where strikes were actually taking place."<sup>75</sup> One of the big strikes had taken place in Dar es Salaam in 1945.

Pearson was sent to Tanganyika because of the problems of post-War unrest. There were very few trade unions registered by the time he arrived in the territory, and in the minds of practically everybody--Europeans, Asians or Africans--trade unions were most often synonymous with strikes. The Europeans usually refused to negotiate with the workers; and the African workers wanted to negotiate conditions, and were ready to do so, but "with the Government officers, and the Government to impose them on the employers!"<sup>76</sup> In his account, Pearson also amply demonstrated the pervasiveness of the problem of race in all spheres--and especially in the worker/employer relations. In his investigations, he admitted, he got "sick of listening to the inordinately selfish views of people." There were grievances everywhere, and various cases were being quoted and misquoted by the workers to support their arguments. He heard "leading British socialists unblushingly misquoted in order to support the most reactionary capitalist views, and die hard-tories cited in support of policies which would make Lenin pale pink."<sup>77</sup>

That was done by the workers when they were pushing for better pay and better working conditions. Everywhere he visited in the country, racial relations in the enterprises were hostile: Africans wanted equal

treatment in jobs and in every respect. He recorded the following discussion with a group of craftsmen in 1946 as a typical attitude of African workers:

CRAFTSMEN: 'Bwana, why do our masters give so much [more] to Indians than us? We are craftsmen like they are.'

PEARSON: 'But you are not such a good craftsmen as they are.'

CRAFTSMEN: 'When it came to fighting for King George in the War we were better then and not now?'

PEARSON: 'It is the skill and the products of your skill which determines your wages, and your skill is low'.

CRAFTSMEN: 'But we are craftsmen the same as they are: what is the difference?'

PEARSON: 'The difference is mostly one of training. In Britain a man must serve at least five years lowly-paid apprenticeship before he can become a craftsman. What man among you has served such an apprenticeship?'

CRAFTSMEN: 'Bwana we are not Europeans, we are Africans. An African does not need to waste such a long time learning!'

PEARSON: 'Do you think yourselves better than Europeans?'

CRAFTSMEN: 'Well it seems so Bwana!'<sup>78</sup>

Pearson and the Labour Department's attempts to create "sound trade unions", so as to avoid industrial disputes, had virtually failed by 1947, as Pearson's account suggests. From 5th September 1947 there started a General Strike which spread like a prairie fire in many parts of the territory. It ended after one month. In Dar es Salaam alone, there had been eight strike threats in that year previous to the General Strike.<sup>79</sup> The government had been anticipating unrest in general because of commodity shortages and, high living costs. This resulted in the government raising the wages of its employees and private employers following suit.<sup>80</sup> In spite of the government's efforts to avoid unrest, the strike took place.

The strike began with the Dar es Salaam dock workers who were demanding 100 per cent rise in wages. Two days later, they were joined by the railway workers under the Railway African Association. Then the strike spread along the Central Railway Line--Morogoro, Kilosa, Dodoma,

Tabora and Kigoma. It also spread to Mwanza, Kongwa, Mpanda, Arusha, etc. The sisal plantation workers, the groundnut scheme workers, and others also joined; in Tabora, the African teachers of the two government schools joined--the only teachers to participate in the strike. When trouble began to brew among the sisal workers on the Central Railway line, the police increased force by the recruitment of the staff of other departments, and especially the Department of Agriculture--the provincial, district and farm offices staff.<sup>e1</sup> In the Eastern Province, the strike spread to all the sisal plantations (in Kilosa, Ngerengere, Ruvu, etc.). In Ngerengere, near Morogoro, the police and the agricultural workers were issued with arms and "tin hats". Their instructions "were to restore order on the estate with the minimum force. The only item missing was the magistrate to read the riot act before authorizing" them to take such action as they "deemed necessary under the circumstances." They met 400 African workers armed with sticks, who demanded a rise in wages "because all the goods they wanted to buy in the shops were so expensive that they could not save money from their wages to take back home...." In a matter of days their wages were increased.<sup>e2</sup>

In Kigoma, the strike was spearheaded by the railway workers; and in Mwanza it was the dockers. In the latter case, the dockers moved into town and called other workers to join them. They even stoned the Barclays' Bank; and then they spread to the other trading places. There was a brief stoppage in Arusha on 17th September; and the salt miners of Uvinza were on strike until 22nd September. Finally, the last workers to go on strike were the miners in Mpanda, and they went back to work on 6th October. This General Strike was Tanganyika's "most widespread

protest since the Maji maji rebellion",<sup>83</sup> and it brought about "a serious situation" all over the country.<sup>84</sup>

The way the strike was conducted in Dar es Salaam reveals the seriousness of the situation. The dockers were joined by other workers--including government workers, casual workers, unemployed and self employed in general. There were pickets throughout the town--even in the European and Asian residential areas--to stop workers, domestic or otherwise, from going to work. The strike was marked by violence and intimidation:

....we found gangs of Africans rushing about the town brandishing sticks and stones. *They considered that all Africans should join them in this grand saturnalia and show the Wazungu (Europeans) 'what was what'.* Most joined too willingly--after all, they thought, it isn't often one is able to get into the middle of a first class spree like this one-- and they found it most exhilarating.<sup>85</sup>

Those who broke the strike, especially the house servants, hid themselves in their work premises. Europeans and Asians were forced to do their work previously done by their workers. Worse still, even organized trade was grinding to a halt in the days of the strike. It was very amusing for Mr Hatcher, an officer in the Labour Department, when he came across a self-employed flower seller who was striking "against every one" and also representing "every one".<sup>86</sup>

The police were scattered all over the town, and the government became even more concerned with the maintenance of its life than ever before. It used propaganda very efficiently, including the broadcasting station--never used before--and loudspeakers to maintain law and order. The wages of the workers were increased six days after the strike by 40 to 50 per cent. The casual daily wage workers of Dar es Salaam got an increase also. The workers were also given bonus for regular work,

regular free meals and free hospital treatment. The strike had managed to paralyse the heart of the colonial economy and administration. The employers were for the first time defeated before the hitherto hostile government machinery; and during the tribunal after the strike, the dockworkers "recognized that their real negotiating partner was not employers but the government."<sup>87</sup> In a minute to the Governor, it was stated that the dockers

seem to imagine that Government has taken over this dispute and that it is Government, and not an independent Tribunal, who is going to assess the amount of award. It is significant that in the record the leader of the dockers has stated that the dockers are prepared to work for Government, but not for companies.<sup>88</sup>

Unlike the struggles of the peasants, whose wrath against enforced land usage laws and other grievances was directed against the native authorities--i.e. the chiefs, native courts, etc.--and which were localized even when the district authorities intervened; with labour disputes it was most often an intervention by the government with armed force. Colonial administrators were very suspicious that labour movements would confuse their "economic" protests with political criticism of colonialism and thereby encourage demands for independence.<sup>89</sup> The strikes by the workers in 1937, 1939, 1943 and 1945 were put down by armed force--these strikes were mainly concentrated in Tanga, Lindi and Dar es Salaam. In the 1943 Dar es Salaam dockworkers strike the Governor authorized the arrest of strikers (143 were arrested and tried) and banned strikes under defense regulations. In the 1945 Dar es Salaam strike, workers were arrested and more than 300 special constables patrolled the town.<sup>90</sup> The government had to suppress them in this way because of the fact that relations between the employers and the workers were, besides those of capital and labour, relations of race

and also relations of colonizer and colonised. Inevitably, any confrontation between the workers and the employers brought to the fore all these questions whether they were explicitly part of the demands or not, as the 1947 strike demonstrates.

Some trade unions were registered by the end of 1947. One of them was the Dockworkers and Stevedores Union, formed soon after the general strike without prior reference to the Labour Department as required.<sup>91</sup> The other trade unions were: African Cooks, Washermen and House Servants Association; Morogoro Personal Servants' Association; and the Dar es Salaam Motor Drivers' Association.<sup>92</sup> Due to the government's fear that a strong body such as the Dockers Union might come under the influence of communism, it was necessary to direct it into 'constructive' channels. The government, therefore, appointed Abdul Sykes, a son of a famous African businessman and member of TAA, as secretary of the Union.<sup>93</sup> Abdul Sykes, like the rest of the Sykes family had no links nor sympathy with the workers. He belonged to a family which believed that only wealth and business could make people uplift themselves. In 1949, leadership of the Union passed to Erica Fiah--who disliked both the government and the moderation of the African civil servants and businessmen.<sup>94</sup> Fiah held the office for two months and was removed by the workers because he opposed a projected strike. His radicalism had become too moderate for the workers by this time.<sup>95</sup>

There was a wave of strikes in almost all the regions throughout 1948. The hardest hit by these strikes were the sisal plantations, the mines and the ports.<sup>96</sup> There were 50 strikes in 1950, and most of these were in the most important industries which formed the backbone of the colonial economy--the ports, plantations, construction, etc. A one week

strike by the dockers in Dar es Salaam in 1950 resulted in the worst forms of violence the town had ever experienced before independence, as a result of the government's attempt to use blackleg labour. The most serious riot took place in the area separating the African and Asian residential zones where a police squad was surrounded and stoned by the workers. The police had to use their guns against the workers in the third day of the strike. 19 colonial police members were killed in the course of this strike; and among them was a European officer and an Asian superintendant. 145 workers altogether were charged with offences as a result of the strike. One of the strikers claimed that the strike had taken place because of oppression. Otherwise, besides this reason, nothing is known about the cause of the 1950 strike. The Labour Department had completely failed to advise and create the desired trade unions. Consequently the dockworkers union was closed down and its property confiscated after the 1950 strike.<sup>97</sup>

Way back in 1947 before the General Strike, the government had introduced The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Bill. According to the Labour Commissioner, this Bill was aimed at making provisions for settlement of trade disputes and inquiring into economic and industrial conditions in the territory, because the government anticipated a frequent occurrence of disputes as the territory "was advancing in civilization and development." This Bill was to provide a machinery for settlement of disputes. It was to help protect the essential services, and quiesce trade union militancy.<sup>98</sup> This attempt was defeated by the General Strike. And as a result of the General Strike, there was even an attempt by the government to dissolve most of the trade unions which were in existence on the pretext that Africans were not ready for



responsible and sound trade unions.<sup>99</sup> In the government's view, the frequent strikes and stoppages which were on the increase usually developed as a "means of achieving some political object...."<sup>100</sup> The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance was passed in 1950. It aimed at the formation of works committees, as a form of industrial democracy for joint consultation between workers and employers.<sup>101</sup> By 1953, the minimum wage and terms and conditions of employment were set. The terms included medical examination, adequate medical facilities, food and housing, sickness allowance, leave allowance, disturbance allowance and encouragement of provision of provident fund facilities.<sup>102</sup>

The government was not successful in the formation of works committees, and by 1953 trade unions were resurfacing again. The government's effort this time was as usual to try and prevent them from becoming politically involved. A worker of Cooper Limited Arusha, F.E. Omido, who was also a member of TAA was to write to the Fabian Colonial Bureau that there was a big drive towards the organization of trade unions, but the government's attitude towards this process was shocking:

In fact, many of them would rejoice at the suppression of Trade Union Movement in this country. The fact is that there is a serious lack of encouragement towards the formation and establishment of the Trade Union movement and yet they are there to help towards that end can speak for itself. The Dock Workers Union at Dar es Salaam to which you referred in your letter has already been strangled. I have failed to obtain the help to which I am entitled from the Department of Labour at Arusha. All I can get is the most British liked nick-name--'agitator'. However, I am quite confident that the time will come when my fellow Africans will organise themselves and constitutionally bargain for their labour, etc.<sup>103</sup>

In short, the government was extremely sensitive when it came to industrial disputes, more than to any other single issue in the 1940s and 1950s.

It was in the towns where the colonial government lost control first in Tanganyika.<sup>104</sup> The 1947 General Strike marked the climax of the colonial crisis. The nationalist movement was to emerge long after this crisis. TAA did not have a hand in the strikes which took place in the 1940s as is assumed in some studies.<sup>105</sup> In fact, the political reforms which began to take place towards the end of this period were an attempt by the colonial government to co-opt some of the Africans so as to stop the rebellions of the working people. It can be said that the emergence of the nationalist movement after the crisis was a compromise between the "modern Tanganyikans" and the colonial regime. If TAA had a hand in the strikes which took place in the 1940s, the government would have come down hard on it, the way it did when it came to the labour movements, for linking "economic" and "political issues". This did not happen.

As far as the government was concerned, the behaviour of TAA was generally good during these rebellions. The government co-operated with TAA on many issues: TAA acted as a "mediary for both dissidents and the government, TAA lacked the organizational strength either to discipline the tactics of the former or to resist being used by the latter". Most often, TAA was notified whenever there was a visit of important government officers, and it was also consulted on many issues.<sup>106</sup> When the news of the General Strike reached Mwanza, for example, the workers urged the leader of TAA to convince the government to consider their wages; otherwise they would go on strike. The workers went on strike the

same day they asked the TAA leader, Mr Chombo, to talk to the government:

In the face of this calamity, Chombo the following day agreed at the behest of the Provincial Commissioner to arrange a meeting to explain to the strikers the necessity to return to work before their demands could even be considered. By the third day, however, most workers had returned to their jobs, and the administration told Chombo to cancel the meeting.<sup>107</sup>

TAA was the only organization which survived the onslaught of the colonial administration during the inter-war period and after. After 1945, the leadership of TAA had fallen back to the civil servants. As a result of the General Strike which the civil servants had not joined "Under the fear of repression and dismissal from their jobs even after the strike, the civil servants in TAA withdrew from militant politics to concentrate on their group and so made TAA in Dar es Salaam dormant".<sup>108</sup> In other words, the crisis in TAA after 1947 was partly due to the General strike. If TAA had participated in the General Strike it would have faced its demise.

According to Pearson, it was the comparatively few educated Africans who went on working during the Strike. The teachers at the African secondary school in Dar es Salaam "very summarily sent about their business the mobs who called at the school with the view of compelling the teachers to join the strike". The educated Africans "stood out against the mob hysteria which swept the town and threats which accompanied it."<sup>109</sup> The educated had excluded themselves from the "ignorant mass"; and that is why the "bad behaviour" had taken place: if the educated Africans had advised their brethren, the General Strike would not have occurred. Therefore it became necessary to bridge the gap between the educated and the "ignorant mass". The only problem was how

to bridge it; so that the educated Africans could spread the knowledge they had acquired and show the less educated the way to progress.<sup>110</sup>

Thus, the political reforms which started taking place in the late 1940s were a result of the severe challenge posed by the working class movement. It was the workers who were at the core of the colonial economy, and it was the workers who brought to the climax the colonizing mission's crisis and forced the government to accommodate the moderate demands of the "modern Tanganyikans"--the educated and the wealthy; hence the multi-racial patterns of constitutional development and the so-called "unintended support of TANU by the government," as Pratt puts it. According to him, "[t]he first policies which served greatly to assist the emergence of TANU as a powerful movement was Twining's decision to move only slowly and cautiously with the development of representative African local government to replace Native Authorities". The government had ignored the advice by the Colonial Office to form representative local institutions so as to provide "a channel for political ambitions which would otherwise flow into national anti-colonial channels" before 1947.<sup>111</sup> The constitution which was introduced from 1948 involved the balancing of racial composition of the unofficial side of the LEGCO. The constitutional reforms introduced from 1949 involved the enlarging of the unofficial side of the LEGCO, equalling the number of African representatives to that of Asians and Europeans combined, and the question of election of Africans in the native authorities and the wish to create multi-racial provincial councils "which would provide a governmental level between the African Native Authorities and multi-racial Legislative Council" by the 1950s.<sup>112</sup>

At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s the fear of nationalism was rife among the non-Africans in Tanganyika. And this was during the period when TAA had collapsed organizationally. At this time, administrators were more concerned with the protection of the interests of the racial minorities than to prepare Africans for self-government. The Provincial Commissioners asked Twining in 1950 to "issue a public affirmation on the rights of the minority communities." In the following year:

a dozen senior members of the administrative service individually presented evidence to Constitutional Development Committee. None of these voiced the trusteeship values to which the administrative service had been profoundly committed before the war. None argued for the paramouncy of African interests. Most of these officers shared Twining's concern to apply a brake to African political advancement and to find ways to entrench safeguards within the Constitution to protect the position of the minority communities.<sup>113</sup>

This fear of nationalism was due to the actions of the workers more than any other section of the population because, as a German socialist working in Tanganyika then wrote to the Fabian Colonial Bureau in 1945: the "race--and class groupings being very marked here and often identical here...."<sup>114</sup> Hence the political reforms. The racial minorities were the employers; and the ones who posed the threat were the workers. Somehow, it was necessary to accommodate this severe challenge from below.

### 5.3 *Nationalism and the 1950s Struggles*

As it was pointed out in the previous chapter, the struggles of the educated and the wealthy in the 1940s were confined mainly in the quest for equality with the other races. Nyerere wrote a manuscript entitled "The Race problem in East Africa" in 1949 while a student at Edinburgh

University.<sup>115</sup> This article is perhaps the best summation of the struggles of the "modern Tanganyikans" at the end of the 1940s and their transition to nationalist politics which were to emerge from 1953. In this manuscript, the problem of East Africa was seen as that of the relation of the different races. These different races needed to live "together in harmony and mutual respect." Racial hatred in Tanganyika, according to him, existed among Africans, Asians and Europeans, and this hatred could not be cured by hypocrisy. Africans did not believe in the liquidation of non-Africans nor relegate them to second place: all they wanted was the right to be masters of their own fate. The minority's vested interests and their exploitation of Africans was the basis of racial discrimination. The causes of this, rather than being cultural, were political and economical. The resolution of this problem depended on the "distribution of political control...upon the acceptance by all communities concerned of the principle of social, economic and above all, political equality."<sup>116</sup>

East Africa belonged to both Africans and non-Africans. It was wrong for a minority group from outside to dominate the indigenous people and tell them that they were not people of the country. Africans were not going to tolerate any more such insults:

The day may come when someone may want to incite them. How easy it is to inflame an insulted people! I shudder when I think of the terrible possibility, but it will not be a mere possibility if our white Neighbours insist on this vulgar doctrine of the Divine Right of Europeans and refuse to live like 'ordinary sort of fellows'. Such a doctrine may have to be uprooted with all the vulgarity of a bloody revolution. I say this in perfect honesty....A day may come when people will prefer death to insult and woe to the people who will see that day! Woe to them who will make that day inevitable!<sup>117</sup>

It was by the recognition of the fact that Africans had rights, that Africa belonged to Africans that the various races in East Africa could live in harmony.

The Meru people evictions in November and December 1951 in which 1,000 men, women and children were moved; 492 huts and stone houses burnt or destroyed; and 400 cattle and 1,200 sheep impounded and removed, served as the catalyst and provided the rallying point for the nationalist forces in existence. This case provided them with cohesion and a sense of purpose. Tanganyikans were able to speak before the United Nations for the first time. Africans who were in the LEGCO by this time--Chief Kidaha Makwaia, Chief Abdiel Shangali, Chief Adam Sapi Mkwawa, Chief Tom Marealle and a few others--who were also members of TAA, were a force which the government relied upon for support because of their friendliness to the government. As a result of the Meru Case and the inability of Africans in the LEGCO and government to defend the Meru people, TAA members began to split, with the majority rallying around the radical nationalists. For example, when Kirilo Japhet, the energetic secretary of the Arusha branch of TAA, wrote to Dar es Salaam Headquarters on behalf of his proposed journey with Seaton to the UN, not much came out of this officially. This was because people like Tom Marealle did not want to take sides: "the Africans said, probably rightly, that he did not want to offend the British."<sup>118</sup> But the radical section of TAA decided to help; and this inevitably entailed the rallying of wider forces.<sup>119</sup> Kirilo Japhet and Abbas Sykes met in Dodoma and went to Mwanza and Arusha, where they met the peasants.

Even in tiny villages their meetings were attended. *Land, and the ownership of land*, struck a sympathetic chord in African peasants. many of these simple people did not have one penny, but promised to sell a calf or a goat and contribute its price

to the fund enabling the Meru people to go to far away America 'for justice'. They were as good as their word and the money raised,....<sup>120</sup>

The Meru case was regarded by the government as simply a local issue. But as a result of the split within the TAA members the issue was blown up out of all proportion to its realities. The core nationalists--outside the LEGCO and civil service consisting of people like Abbas Sykes, John Rupia and Dossa Aziz, etc. all of them being capitalists in Dar es Salaam--were the ones who went even to see the Chief Secretary to arrange for Kirilo Japhet to travel to New York. The attempt by the government to co-opt the "modern Tanganyikans" in the government had by 1952 floundered on the rock of the land question. The Meru evictions had dispelled all the hopes of multi-racialism and revealed the racial overtones which hampered the economic freedom of Africans, and the result was generalized unrest.

In other words, the nationalists were facing a sustained challenge from below--from the peasants and workers. The challenge involved bourgeois aspirations given that it involved land and racial issues; but aspirations which were also opening a way for other perspectives. It was a challenge which posed the fundamental question of land, which at the same time offered support for the demands of the "modern Tanganyikans" for racial equality and economic freedom which were systematized in the philosophy of African Civilization. The nationalist position was hardened further by the fact that the British Labour government which had seemingly supported the nationalists' demands and economic reforms at the end of the 1940s was out of power in the early 1950s. Fears had begun to mount among the educated and wealthy, especially due to



escalating literature in the local press full of settler and European interests in general.

The pressure from below as a challenge to the nationalists is also demonstrated by the activities of the Wazaramo Union in the Eastern Province which was established in 1938. The people of Uzaramo had established this Union with the object of assisting members who were in distress. By 1945, the Union was involved in petitioning for grievances and asking that the government deal directly with the Union in matters concerning the people instead of the local government representatives who were always "yes men" and were afraid "of being taken away from government service once they try to fight for their people."<sup>121</sup> In 1946, they were demanding self-administration and the right over their tribal land, and by 1948 they were demanding that the Secretary for Native Affairs should have Africans on his staff.<sup>122</sup> From the end of the same year to 1953 they were campaigning for an African Zaramo Liwali or Kadhi (judge) for the township of Dar es Salaam<sup>123</sup> rather than an Arab who knew nothing or very little about their traditions. By this time, the Union was also advocating the preservation of democracy as a form of government of the people, by the people and for the people: "a rule in which every man and woman has got a say in the running of his-her country." They went on:

This is how the democracy would be introduced in Africa. Every village, location, or town will have a communal hall....Men of every village, location, or town will choose their representatives who will be responsible to see that the village or town is provided with good drinking water, good roads, schools, dispensaries, and a pub, shop, and good hygienic houses....

I very much sympathize with the four representatives of African interests in Tanganyika Legislative Council, because they have no proper and clear way of getting information from the five and a half million backward people.<sup>124</sup>

For the first time, TAA openly supported the views of the Wazaramo Union for the replacement by Africans of the Arab judges in the territory in 1953.<sup>125</sup>

Before 1953, the nationalists' view had not reached that level. Hamza Mwapachu, one of the nationalists had written to the Fabian Colonial Bureau in 1950 that Dar es Salaam was developing very rapidly into an industrial centre; although, unfortunately, everything was concentrated in Dar es Salaam at the expense of other centres in the territory. He further stated that Africans were very optimistic and hoped that they would not be disappointed with the constitutional changes.<sup>126</sup> Mwapachu's views and optimism, perhaps, reflected the general attitude of the educated and the wealthy who hoped for co-option before the Meru Land Case came to the fore after the events of 1951. Mwapachu was the kind of a nationalist who was, as he called himself, a socialist by then.<sup>127</sup> Before the Meru Land Case, the educated Tanganyikan had been participating in suggestions about constitutional reforms; demanding that Africans be given more responsibility; in castigation of the resolutions and utterances of the minorities (for example the Capricorn Society); showing bitterness to the racial relations; wanting democracy and a common electoral role; and demanding town council, district council, provincial council, representation in LEGCO and in the executive.<sup>128</sup> The Meru Case marked the transition to overt confrontation between TAA and the government. K. Japhet and E. Seaton were faced in the U.N.O. by Governor Twining who went there to defend the government's action: "The tall imposing Governor and the young nationalist went for each other at full tilt. Some wild, unsubstantiated accusations were flung at Twining, but he was

equal to the occasion."<sup>129</sup> The government lost the case in the U.N.O.; and this was the first time that the government was defeated by the Africans.

In 1953, Governor Twining banned the civil servants in the junior and senior services from being members of political organizations. This was an attempt by the government to beat the waves of the rising political storm, as a result of the link which was being forged between the mass struggles and the nationalists after the Meru Case. After coming back from New York, Kirilo Japhet was asked to tour the country and tell the people about the Meru Case and what had happened in the U.N.. The civil servants quit TAA in August 1953. In April 1954, Twining introduced the Societies Bill, which made compulsory the registration of all organizations with a list of the aims and rules, organizers and their names, occupations and addresses.<sup>130</sup>

With the Meru Case, the tensions of the peasants in Kilimanjaro, Bukoba, Sukumaland, etc. began to flow into the framework of territorial politics--specifically into TAA. In Mwanza, for example, it was the co-operative organizers--people like Paul Bomani and S. Kandoro who were concerned with commercial affairs--who made it possible for the political energies of the countryside to flow into TAA. The challenge from below was so sustained, to the extent that, after Nyerere became the President of TAA, and given the growing hostility of the government towards TAA after the Meru incident, TAA began to work on the possibilities of transforming itself into a full political organization. The nationalists were by now concerned with both territorial and local issues--ranging from opposition to cattle culling, destocking, etc. and land use rules in general, to demands for elected representatives and

independence.<sup>131</sup> With this championing of local grievances, it was possible for TAA to gather wider support. Most of the impetus towards nationalism initially came from the lake regions and North Eastern Tanganyika.

In December 1953, Nyerere hastened to investigate the conflicts which were taking place in Lake Province, where TAA was locked in a conflict with the government. Already, there was a danger that the "unsophisticated militants of Lake Province might provoke disorder and thereby break TAA's unity" by acting against the leadership as had happened in Kenya where the Mau Mau struggles had broken out by then, or the incidents of Sierra Leone and Senegal; or involve TAA in an open confrontation with the government and hence complicate the nationalists' task.<sup>132</sup> In 1954, Mwapachu wrote from Ukerewe to the Fabian Colonial Bureau explaining this dilemma. He wrote that on closer investigation, African opinion revealed growing suspicion of the government and more developed consciousness than had been the case a decade earlier:

What is lacking is leadership. All potential leaders are in the civil service and the element of hazard is still great for them to leave their secured positions to offer the people their leadership. In fact a deplorable and serious situation is fast developing whereby this leadership is being snatched by an ill-informed, ill-fitted element of the community in attempts to meet the demand. *It is a challenge to all educated Africans in this territory.*<sup>133</sup>

In early 1954 the TAA activists, including Kirilo Japhet, Saadani Kandoro, John Rupia, the Sykes brothers, etc. under the leadership of J.K. Nyerere drafted a new constitution,--on the basis of the constitutions of the British Labour Party and Ghana's Convention Peoples' Party. This new constitution opened membership to any African on payment of entrance fees. It also allowed trade unions, co-operatives

and tribal associations to affiliate themselves, and tried to centralize the decision making process of the organization and increased central control.<sup>134</sup>

TAA was changed to TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) on July 7, 1954. It became a political party and it took over all the branches which had been established by TAA. The aims of TANU were: to fight for Tanganyika's self-government and independence; "to build up a united nationalism"; to struggle for "elections for all bodies of local and central government" so as to have African majorities; to fight for the establishment of small industries, artisanal training schools, fair prices for producers and consumers, assisting farming, compulsory primary education and a minimum wage. It was to fight for the encouragement of co-operatives and trade unions; to fight against "tribalism and isolationist tendencies among Africans...."; to fight against "racialism and racial discrimination", also against land alienation and foreign immigration which was detrimental to African interests and the so-called federation with the other territories--unless Africans wished so.<sup>135</sup> TAA was reorganized at a time when it was expected that elections for the new legislative council based on racial parity representation would be held. TAA prepared to organize the voters, but eventually the government announced that the LEGCO members would be nominated as was the usual practice.<sup>136</sup> In September 1954 Nyerere took the place of Chief Kidaha Makwaia in LEGCO who was then absent for a while. Writing to Nicholson of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, Nyerere informed her that it was the government and the majority of the unofficial members of the LEGCO who opposed elections. He further informed her that they had reformed TAA, a thing which resulted in gross

misinterpretation in the East African Press. Europeans accused them of practicing racial politics; of aiming at a policy which was contrary to the government's policy; of demanding independence within a period of five years; of campaigning for self-government, etc.

Our aim is certainly self-government; when to attain it the people of Tanganyika will decide. We are not racial; but I emphasized that we must aim for democracy in Tanganyika, and those who fear democracy need not remain in the Territory. But at the moment our *greatest concern is the educational and economic developemnt of our people.*<sup>137</sup>

According to him, the aim initially had been to build a "well knit organization" steadily, which would truly "serve the interests of the country" rather than satisfy their own "vanity". They were not interested in the numbers of the members.<sup>138</sup> One year after the formation of TANU, Nyerere wrote to Lady Selwyn-Clarke of the Fabian Colonial Bureau that in spite their "reluctance to let TANU swell out into a mass movement TANU is swelling out very rapidly". They had to call off mass recruitment.<sup>139</sup> TANU, as Nyerere was to recall later, had to start by "making people understand that peaceful methods of struggle for independence were possible and could succeed."<sup>140</sup> In which case, given the forms of resistance which have been demonstrated, much as TANU emerged as a response to the pressure from the mass of workers and peasants, it has been observed that the "connections between resistance and nationalism were overwhelmingly negative."<sup>141</sup> In fact, TANU remained true to Pan-Africanism in which force was not advocated as a means to achieve freedom and democracy except as a last resort; while positive action was the main slogan.<sup>142</sup>

The negative connections between TANU and resistance were not due to the belief by the working people in violent methods of struggle or non-

belief in peaceful methods; rather it was a difference in perceptions in terms of the essence of the struggles. Nyerere was later to recall that he was philosophical in his approach during the struggles. It was this aspect which "removed the bitterness from the campaigns":

I was not saying, 'Today a man was refused a beer', but just 'We must govern ourselves'. Well, politically, this is the wrong way. In the Lake region, the colonial government was saying, 'There are too many cattle.' I said we can't campaign against cattle de-stocking because we may have to de-stock when we come to power.' There was one TANU man in Iringa who campaigned against cattle dipping. He made dipping extremely unpopular. I was very angry with him! But politically, of course, you exploit every grievance.<sup>143</sup>

The TANU man in Iringa, who was a Party Secretary, was expelled from the Party because of his campaigns against cattle dipping.<sup>144</sup> There were several times when TANU reacted thus towards primary resistance.

With further growth of TANU's membership, there was more diversification of the social composition until not only one social group predominated. The main support firstly came from areas such as Usukuma, where "traders, teachers, mission employees or catechists; former government clerks, police officers or medical aides--men who had broken the bonds of rural life through education, experience, travel, study and employment" joined.<sup>145</sup> It was the members of this group who came into contact with the traders in the trading centres and fraternized with them. When they tilled their fields, the traders in turn were neighbours of the farmers. Behind the support for the nationalists in Sukumaland was the hostility to Sukuma Land Scheme and the government and chiefs who enforced it.<sup>146</sup>

The co-operative was also one of the mainstays of TANU supporters in many areas. In Mbeya, for example, to be a member of a co-operative union was also to be a member of TANU.<sup>147</sup> Support also came from the

tribal unions. Such was the case in Usambara, Uluguru, Uzaramo, Uzigua, Irangi, Umakonde, etc. where there was mobilization of agricultural grievances within the struggles against native authorities and Land Use Rules. It was the local elite with ambitions or the less privileged clans who sought to control the processes in their areas who tended to link their local grievances to national politics. Broadly, the support came from the various associations and unions which were recognized by TANU in the 1954 Constitution. While mobilization played a role in some areas, in others, it was mainly the pressure from below which formed the support.

As has already been pointed out, local grievances were not necessarily supported by TANU. A local TANU branch chairman of Usambara declared in 1957 that people did not need to obey the terracing rules, because self-government was nigh. This declaration came out after a "progressive farmer" (a rural capitalist) had been murdered during an opposition riot. The Party headquarters officially dissociated itself from this action. Looking at the peasant reactions and development of nationalism with the perspective of Tanzania in the 1970s, L. Cliffe rightly questioned the precise role of rural protests and their implications:

in the light of our more detailed knowledge today, just how far the local 'cells around which nationwide political organization could be constructed' were '*essentially rural*'. Granted there was rural protest, but how far did this lead to peasant interests being geared organizationally into the political movement? I am not sure there wasn't still (in Fanon's language) 'a separate dialectic' in the development of the 'rural' and 'urban' movements.<sup>148</sup>

In fact, although the nationalist movement fed itself on the peasant grievances, their logic was fundamentally different, given the



ideological and social composition of the nationalist movement. The nationalists were the "modern Tanganyikans" who, given their dissociation from the protests against the rules which were for "improvement of agriculture", regarded the rural people as "inherently conservative", and even tended to view this conservatism as a product of certain "cultural factors".<sup>149</sup> But it was the rural protests against the rules and the native authorities which contributed significantly to the breakdown of colonial administration.

Governor Twining--"the last of the Kipling era".<sup>150</sup>--was to admit some years later that the agricultural policies under his governorship were among the blunders he committed. These were those very policies which the peasants opposed, whose grievances the "modern Tanganyikans" utilized while dissociating from the "conservative" aspects of them. In Bates' formulation:

Government agricultural plans were not only formulated without consulting Africans, there was very little explanation of their utility or purpose. The farmer in the Southern Province who was ordered to tie-ridge to preserve water, when his major farming problem was too much rainfall and his crops rotted in the fields, not unnaturally saw the regulations as means of ruining him. Schemes were burdensome in other ways: at the height of its operation, the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme demanded that African farmers work three days a week on terracing. In 1955 grievances in Uluguru exploded into riots and demonstrations against the government administration in the area. Governor Twining admitted, some years later, that agricultural policy had been one of his major mistakes of his governorship.<sup>151</sup>

Opposition to the Land Rules and the native authorities was strong because the peasants felt that the rules hit their economic and social roots of their way of life and challenged their economic security, demanding hard work without accruing to them any benefits. The reactions were strengthened further by suspicion of the motives behind the government's actions: "Cattle destocking was, for instance, viewed as a

measure merely for the benefit of Tanganyika Packers' underutilized factories at Arusha and Mwanza."<sup>152</sup>

Nyerere was to point out on the eve of independence that, basically, the major issue which concerned all the nationalists in the 1950s was that of unity. Other issues, such as economic ones, which had bearing on particular interests were postponed until later.<sup>153</sup> In other words, the mobilization of the grievances were a means to achieve unity rather than acceptance of the content of those grievances. TANU's initial intention was not to become a mass movement; even the pressure from below, it would seem, was not enough to push TANU to become a mass organization and that is why there was an attempt to halt further enrollment of members in 1955 only to revoke that decision soon after. In the eyes of the colonial government by this time, TANU activists were hooligans, irresponsible and racialists; and the latter aspect was due to their advocacy of Tanganyika being primarily African. In 1955 Governor Twining encouraged the formation of a multi-racial party by men close to the Government House. The result was the formation of United Tanganyika Party (UTP).

The formation of UTP created a new situation for TANU which called for a new policy.<sup>154</sup> This was in relation to the LEGCO, in which only the nominated members could enter, and TANU's policy to non-Africans. TANU asked for the dissolution of LEGCO as it had formed itself into a rival party. Because UTP attacked TANU for its racialism on the grounds that it admitted only Africans, the TANU conference in 1956 made a small concession by accepting that persons of mixed African and other blood be admitted.<sup>155</sup> The formation of UTP forced TANU to re-examine its

premises--organizationally and even ideologically--while at the same time discrediting UTP. A few words on UTP are in order here.

Dr Malam, in the Union of South Africa, who outlined the theory of *apartheid* began to put it into effect in 1947 at a time when the Labour Party was in power in Britain and was advocating multi-racialism in the colonies. The administrators in Tanganyika, as was pointed out above, did not see the necessity of the creation of multi-racial organizations. It was Colonel David Stirling, who went to live in Rhodesia, who in 1949 formed the Capricorn African Society which was to incorporate Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. This society got support from people like Dr J.H. Oldham, Alan Paton the South African writer, and others who were alarmed with the development of the race relations in the colonies. The Society had members among liberals and even settlers. According to this Society, the salvation of Africa from impending disaster as a result of the bad racial relations--especially with the emergence of Dr Malam's doctrines--was to come from Africa. It was necessary to recognize that all men were born equal and that the differences between them, whether of creed or colour, were honourable differences.<sup>156</sup> The Society aimed at a self-governing East and Central African Federation under the British Crown; and the duty of "the Europeans was to develop the African continent jointly with the Africans and give them 'both incentive and opportunity to achieve a higher standard of life, and so as to make possible a true partnership between the races.'" At the same time, European guidance and leadership in the federal and territorial governments was essential. The Society also aimed at quickening Africa's development, increase in Western immigration and technological skill combined with the "latent capacity

of the African and other races". Accordingly, no European was to own land in African reserves; and no Africans were to own land in areas to be developed--except for houses in the urban areas.<sup>157</sup>

The main stress was on racial relations: it was necessary to accord the responsibility of franchise to those Africans who had the necessary social and economic background or standards. This was to be a multi-racial organization which in effect represented the settler interests. It was an invitation of the Europeans to Africans and other races to joint development of the continent. In Tanganyika, Chief Kidaha Makwaia among some other Africans joined this society. The society was widely supported by liberal circles in Britain. But within Africa--from both European and African sides, among those outside the society--matters were different. Europeans in East Africa protested against it and saw the Society as an attack on their birth rights. For most Africans, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, the Capricorn Society was nothing more than an attempt to facilitate and protect settler interests while at the same time cunningly blocking the advancement of Africans.<sup>158</sup>

The philosophy of the Capricorn Society was 'multi-racialism'. By mid-1950s, this philosophy had become a derogatory term for racialism despite its aim of setting up a "nationalism of the human race".<sup>159</sup> Although the Capricorn Society did not take deep roots in Tanganyika, some of the prominent members of this society were: R. Johnston (former District Commissioner of Kongwa, by then a settler in Kilimanjaro and representative of the Society in Tanganyika), Derek Bryceson and Susan and Michael Wood. The members were mainly Europeans who wanted to break the race barriers. While Nyerere had agreed with Stirling in 1952 on the

need for racial co-operation as the Capricorn Society advocated, he at the same time pointed out that this could not be a "generous gesture on the part of the Europeans".<sup>160</sup>

After the formation of TANU, Twining decided to use the Capricorn Society as a weapon against it. Thus from the Capricorn Society was published The Tanganyika National Society Manifesto in 1955 and UTP was formed in 1956. The manifesto was signed by 12 Europeans, 12 Asians and 8 Africans. Among the Africans were Chief Kidaha Makwala and Chief Haron Lugusha. This Party declared itself against "Colour Bar" and racial discrimination, and stood for equality of all people and the dependence of the races in Tanganyika upon each other "for their peace and happiness and prosperity, and for their upward progress towards nationhood."<sup>161</sup> The objective of the Party was to respect the established government, to expose all attempts at unconstitutional or seditious changes in the constitution, to raise the standards of living and education, to promote the utilization of resources, free enterprise and co-operative efforts, etc.. The constitution of the Party took in some aspects the model of the British Conservative Party.<sup>162</sup>

In August 1956, Nyerere came out with a critique of the Capricorn movement, specifically, the Capricorn Handbook for Speakers of 1955 and Capricorn Contract of 1956. This critique was in fact an attack of the views of UTP. Capricorn was denounced for wanting to substitute the colour bar "with a money bar plus special Capricorn political bar"; of putting proposals which "if ever adopted, put over in Tanganyika and the rest of East Africa the same old perpetuation of minority domination and special privilege which Africans everywhere" found "increasingly intolerable".<sup>163</sup> Besides castigating racial domination, Nyerere also

raised other social, political and economic issues. The land reforms proposals of the Capricorn Society which stood for recognition of individual rights and the purchase of land by all persons of all races was rejected. According to him, it was only the immigrants with the money and backing from overseas who would afford the land. Very few Africans had money to spend on land: "Our customs of land use and transfer are based not on buying and selling and speculation manipulated by those with money, but upon the actual primary needs and usage of each head of a family with his wife, children and other dependents within his clan"<sup>164</sup>

Those views on land ownership were part of TANU's economic policy. Furthermore, the talk about improving people's livelihood by attracting foreign capital for economic development, whereby foreign companies would be given subsidy and protection from competition was also rejected. The example given was that of Kilombero Valley where a sugar company from South Africa was proposing to invest. Such a policy of protection and subsidy, meant Africans paying for sugar and subsidy and inviting managerial inefficiency by removing "capital risk". It was in this way that European farmers had been able to shut off Asians while buying off Africans.<sup>165</sup>

East African Federation against the wishes of the people was rejected once again. But also, there was an affirmation of the commitment to "mature and co-operative internationalism arising from trusteeship under the United Nations." European Civilization was questioned by Nyerere in the very typical characteristic manner of the 1930s and 1940s. To quote in extenso:

We of TANU are convinced that there are indeed many values in fields of governmental and economic organization, the Common

Law tradition, the application of science and cultural and educational advantages which the people of Africa need to learn from those of Asia and Europe. We are also aware that there are glaring weaknesses and failures in the non-African civilizations that have resulted in the dragging of the whole world to the verge of mutual suicide. For many of the European peoples the supposed advantages of urban industrialized living brings a nightmare of insecurity and futility and drains the joy out of life. Africans are revolted by the uncontrollable love of power we see in the 'civilized' nations in recent times and their blind obsession with scientific mass annihilation so that it is now boasted that a single push of a button can extinguish instantly or gradually all life over an area as large as East Africa,...Our revulsion cannot be dismissed with aspersions at the petty raids and minor wars of African history before the slave trade was brought from the civilized nations of the north. It would be foolish for anybody to assume that all Africans are in a haste to abandon their relatively stable, sane and non-violent standards of civilization for integration into Europeanized culture.<sup>166</sup>

The formation of UTP and its campaign against TANU, and the fact that by 1957 two thirds of its members were Africans as a result of the divisions among the nationalists,<sup>167</sup> meant mobilization of support by TANU and also the necessity for a political base on a wider scale. It was in this context that its support from the mass movements was crucial. Some of the educated elements, as a result of this, sought to organize the labour movement nationally. Among them were M.M. Kamaliza and M. Mpangala who had been close to TAA and TANU. Their struggles culminated in the formation of Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) in October 1955 after the visit by Tom Mboya, the Kenyan trade unionist. TFL was formed after a meeting of the leaders of the African Commercial Employees Association (ACEA who were mostly clerks), Tanganyika African Government Servants Association (TAGSA), and the Railway African Union (RAU). The first president of TFL was Mr J.B.A. Ohanga from RAU, and the general secretary was Mr Rashid Kawawa who was the president of TAGSA. Trade unions were to affiliate themselves to TFL, but TFL itself was

not to be affiliated to TANU. Tom Mboya (and Henry Gay who came with him to Tanganyika) had been sent by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

The government had smashed the trade unions in 1950 after the dockers violent strike, and by 1951 there were virtually no trade unions. Despite that, trade unions were being formed again and registered as associations by 1952. Only RAU was able to register as a union. These trade unions which were formed after 1950 were localized, craft based and without a national organization to co-ordinate them. Besides the above mentioned staff associations there were localized unions in Tabora, Kilimanjaro, Kigoma-Ujiji, etc.<sup>168</sup> More unions were established in 1953 and 1954. There was a sharp increase in the number of unions in early 1955.<sup>169</sup> It was the requirement of the Labour Department that these unions remained localized and craft based, as an attempt to avoid the labour problems faced up to 1950.

The early 1950s trade unions were generally formed from below. The nationalist influence in the formation of trade unions first became apparent in Mwanza, where after the banning of all TANU activities by the government in 1954, TANU activists such as Bhoke Munanka turned to the formation of trade unions as a possible vehicle for advancement of nationalist goals.<sup>170</sup> It was within such a context that there was an attempt to register a territorial "Federation of all workers and Trade Unions".<sup>171</sup> The Labour Department refused to register it on the grounds that there had been no consultations between the organizers and the registered unions which according to the Mwanza Labour Officer, had no desire to participate in such amalgamation. From here efforts concentrated on the formation of localized craft based unions. 10 unions



had applied for registration by the end of 1954 of which 7 were registered in March 1955.<sup>172</sup>

In Dar es Salaam, the African clerks unions in private commercial firms and the civil service, which existed as counterparts of Asian and European Associations, were able to survive during the period of suppression of trade unions because they existed as no more than social clubs of the educated elite with little trade union inclinations.<sup>173</sup> Their main demand was equal treatment with Asians. The impetus for the formation of TFL came finally from the educated elites, and what they did was to attempt to almagamate the existing trade unions. 30 delegates from 11 unions attended the meeting which ended up in the formation of TFL in October 1955. Of these, two-thirds came from predominantly white-collar unions and staff associations. In spite of the opposition by the Labour Department which was in favour of small localized unions, TFL was highly successful.

As a territorial movement, TFL was formed from above--by the educated elite rather than the rank and file, and its leadership was predominantly white-collar and clerical workers. According to Friedland's study, by 1960, 83 per cent of the full-time leaders were white-collar and clerical workers--while over 70 per cent of the workforce consisted of unskilled workers.<sup>174</sup> Kawawa who became the General Secretary of TFL soon after its formation was to recount later that, while the government was opposed to the formation of TFL, it also tried to win the leadership by organizing trade union courses. The leadership attended them initially but boycotted them within no time because the government was teaching them how to keep accounts, "but not how to bargain with employers."<sup>175</sup>

Although, as in the Lake Province (Mwanza and areas around Lake Victoria) the role of the nationalists is clear in terms of their attempts to form trade unions, and TFL was formed and manned by predominantly white-collar employees, TFL did not commit itself organizationally to TANU. This was in spite of the fact that TFL endorsed TANU's goal of independence at an early stage. The two organizations were separate and distinct. In fact, "the degree to which TANU played a part in the formation and organization of TFL or any unions was minimal".<sup>176</sup> Kawawa, for example, who was the General Secretary of TFL, like all civil servants was not a member of TANU when TFL was formed. He became a member of TANU when he became a full-time leader of TFL after relinquishing his position in the government.<sup>177</sup> More than that was the fact that union leaders such as Kawawa or Michael Kamaliza who were engaged simultaneously in TANU and the trade unions raised some doubts "in the minds of union leaders as to the appropriateness of their actions".<sup>178</sup> In an annual conference held on 5th-7th October 1956, TFL resolved that:

'no Trade Union which is affiliated with TFL should affiliate itself with TANU at the moment'. Another resolution stated that, at the moment, trade union leaders should not accept positions of leadership in political organizations, and the trade union movement should be represented in the Legislative Council.<sup>179</sup>

The formation of the government sponsored UTP in 1956, which was dominated by government sponsored expatriate settlers, particularly the sisal plantation owners, was an impetus behind TFL's endorsement of TANU's main feature---a call for independence without openly supporting it by 1957. The TFL general meeting in July 1957 resolutions demanded that Africans be left to govern themselves and a date for Tanganyika's

independence be fixed. The resolutions demanded that Africans be given the right to vote so as to establish a majority government:

Workers and unions cannot keep away from government affairs because we are citizens like other people. Our unions are not political but we must be given opportunity to express our views and be heard on all issues concerning our lives and the progress of the country. Our unions must have representatives in the Legislature of the country to speak on behalf and defend the rights of workers.<sup>180</sup>

This stance was also fuelled by the government's struggle against TFL. In 1956 the government introduced "An Ordinance to Provide for the Registration and Control of Trade Unions and Matters relating Thereto", in an attempt to control and regulate the activities of TFL and the mushrooming trade unions. Mr Sanders who moved the Bill explained:

The Bill now before the House is in no wise, as has been suggested in certain quarters, intended to restrict or inhibit the proper development of trade unions, but rather designed to provide clear guidance backed by statute as the manner in which such organizations should guide their affairs in order to bring nearer to practical realization of the aim of Government policy, which is that the conclusion of freely negotiated collective agreement should be possible between organizations of workers and employers which provide for terms and conditions of employment which are acceptable to the majority of the workers in craft or industry and are also economically practicable from the point of view of the employer.<sup>181</sup>

In order to avoid general strikes, which would probably involve the workers of the whole country, the Bill emphasized the need for trade unions to maintain autonomy from TFL. TANU leaders who were in the LEGCO by then, like Paul Bomani and other Africans, neither opposed nor supported the Bill on the pretext that it was introduced without the consultation of trade union leaders for consideration; and some European members saw the Bill as a manifestation of the failure of the government to resist pressure from a Party which was in power a few years back and

the society behind it--people with "Fabian tendencies, and from a certain organization in New York."<sup>182</sup>

The object of the Bill was to deal with "undesirable" forms of trade unions. The Bill was passed, because the urgency arose from the fact that there was a wave of strikes throughout this period. For example, there were 21 strikes with 3,927 workers involved and 5,205 man days lost in 1955 in the Tanganyika Sisal Estates alone; and 22 strikes with 3,596 workers involved and 9,101 man days lost in 1956 in the same estates.<sup>183</sup> In 1956, the local government workers in Dar es Salaam threatened to strike for wages increase and a cost-of-living allowance. The deadline of the strike expired on the day that Princess Margaret was scheduled to begin a formal visit in Tanganyika in October 1956. The political manifestations of this act and the action itself angered the government very much. According to the government, this action was probably a result of the nationalist influence.<sup>184</sup> In the same year, the quarry workers of Kunduchi had gone on a strike; it was the first time that the workers went on a strike officially and won.<sup>185</sup> Soon after Princess Margaret's visit the hotel employees and domestic workers in Dar es Salaam went on strike for outstanding wage demands. When the government advised the employers to sack them, the workers in the construction, commercial and industrial activities went on strike in sympathy with the domestic workers.<sup>186</sup> Broadly, there was a sense of general strike in 1956, because, even the Dar es Salaam Dockworkers and Stevedores and Tanga Dockworkers threatened a strike in support of the striking workers by December of the year.<sup>187</sup>

Given such a situation, in the course of the introduction of the above mentioned Bill, one colonial official rightly remarked: "...at

present we are going through a difficult period....I must emphasize that at present we must exercise restraint". It was also remarked by another official that, "some of the exorbitant demands being made are to benefit nobody and illiberal increases of wages without corresponding increase in output is beyond the capacity of this territory to stand."<sup>188</sup> There was an amendemnt of the Bill in 1957, in an attempt to centralize and control TFL in terms of finances and other activities. In sum, while between 1951 and 1955 there was an average of 60 strikes per annum; between 1956 and 1960 there was an average of 146 strikes per annum with an average of 59,457 workers involved every year.<sup>189</sup>

The close alliance between TANU and TFL in 1957 was further boosted by the Dar es Salaam Motors Transport Worker's strike of March-April 1957 for wage increases. The workers went on strike, and the employer attempted to use European and Asian labour to maintain the operation of services. As a result of this, the unions called for a boycott of the buses. TANU played a significant role by "organizing the communication network [and] calling on Africans to support the boycott. Because of the success of the boycott, the strike ended after 24 days in a victory for the union."<sup>190</sup>

TANU also played a role in the beer strike of 1958 in Dar es Salaam. Early that year, the Commercial and Industrial Workers Union had demanded a minimum wage of Shs 150/= per month for its members from East African Breweries. When the employers refused to heed the demands the 270 workers went on a two days strike from 16th March. The employer was forced to negotiate, but refused to pay more than Shs 72/= to 80/= per month. In April the workers staged another strike. This time the employer used European, Asian and Somali blackleg labour and harrassed

the workers by evicting those who were staying in company houses with the assistance of the district authorities.<sup>191</sup> On the 24th April 1958 TFL came out with a statement appealing to all residents of Dar es Salaam to boycott drinking of European beer of any kind, because Asians and Somalis were breaking the strike and had ignored the call for co-operation. Blackleg labour was being paid Shs 26/= per day with food and beer. TANU supported the boycott and the strike. The boycott was very successful, and the employer was forced to negotiate.

When the workers were being evicted from Breweries Quarters, TFL in revenge campaigned for African landlords to evict Asians, Arabs and other non-African tenants from their houses. A number of landlords did this. The government became very frightened with this move, and it was forced to interfere by advising the employer against accepting the wage demands of Shs 150/= per month for fear that it would have repercussions on the government wage structure.<sup>192</sup> The strike lasted some six weeks and the boycott was effective for four weeks. The demands were finally accepted. It was finally agreed that the minimum wage should be at Shs 130/=.<sup>193</sup>

The sisal industry accounted for 46 per cent of the total industrial disputes, 75 per cent of the total number of workers involved and 77 per cent of total man days lost in 1957 and 1958.<sup>194</sup> The employers under the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association had resisted their demands: to recognize their unions and increase wages--and at times threatened to use the police to break the workers strikes as they did in Korogwe in 1958.<sup>195</sup> While most strikes took a relatively short period to end in the sisal industry, one of the strikes which took a long time was that of the workers at Mazinde. This strike started on November 25th, 1958

and lasted for 68 days. It involved 2,500 workers. The estate manager was a member of UTP who was against trade unions and TANU and went as far as repatriating the workers when they staged a strike. TFL and TANU intervened by supporting the workers. Already there were rumours that the Tanga Dock and Stevedore Workers Union was planning to boycott imports and exports from Mazinde Estates.<sup>176</sup> On the 17th December 1958, TFL called for a three year boycott of the Mazinde Estates; but the leadership of TANU surprisingly, "pointed out that the conflict was limited to the Mazinde Estate and was not a battle between all plantation workers and all employers." It backed the boycott of the Estate and called upon African workers to support the strikers with food and housing.<sup>177</sup> The removal of the workers from the estate and the refusal to enlarge the conflict beyond Mazinde, weakened the Union's bargaining power. The leader of the sisal workers was Mr Victor Mkello, who was to be at loggerheads with the independent government as a leader of TFL later on.

The labour movement was very crucial in the struggles for independence in the 1950s. Besides endorsing the demand for independence, it used its organizational "machinery to build up TANU, being specifically effective in membership recruitment. TFL's large membership and nation-wide organization provided a ready made structure for rallying political support in both urban and plantation areas especially when TANU was suffering setbacks and its branches were being closed by the government".<sup>178</sup> It was the wave of strikes--especially on the European plantations in 1956, 1957 and 1958--which had led to the tremendous strengthening of TANU in this period. There were some trade unionists who even took part in membership drive for TANU.<sup>179</sup> When TANU

threatened to "take a 'positive action' should the British government fail to grant responsible self-government in 1959", TFL was ready to call a country-wide general strike in support of TANU's demand for self-government.<sup>200</sup>

The Tabora TANU Conference of 1958 endorsed TANU's participation in the elections which were to take place in the same year and the following. In this Conference, TANU acknowledged "the services the labour organizations render in areas where Tanu was banned", and that, therefore "it suited the party to keep the two movements separate." TFL was given two seats in the central committee of TANU in the same year, and at the same time insisted that no TANU official could be an office bearer in the unions.<sup>201</sup> With the September general elections which ushered into the LEGCO 15 TANU supported candidates out of 15 seats against the UTP, there was nothing else for the British to do but to announce in October 1958 that Tanganyika would develop as an African state. "On a wider front, the years 1958-9 were the time when in all parts of Tanganyika Tanu followers were talking about *kugoma*, which is a Swahili word meaning 'to strike'". This was taken very seriously by Richard Turnbull, the new governor from 1958 who was determined to stamp out "romantic lawlessness"; and prompted the concessions to the demands which TANU put forward.<sup>202</sup>

The efforts to promote rural development through the coercion of peasants--the land usage rules of terracing, cattle culling and dipping, etc.--were abandoned by 1958 as a result of the riots in Morogoro in 1955, resistance in Usukuma from 1955, resistance in Iringa from 1957, resistance in Mbulu, Mlalo, Usambara and other areas. That is, by 1958, there was "nearly universal breakdown of the government's efforts to



secure the enforcement of these rules and orders..."<sup>203</sup> The universal breakdown was also reflected by this year in the blows the government was suffering from the working class. As a consequence of all this, the government failed completely to impose even its multi-racial policies, and in 1958, after the departure of Sir Edward Twining, the new Governor, Sir Richard Turnbull announced that Tanganyika would develop as primarily African. This announcement was made soon after TANU's victory in the 1958 elections--elections which were based on income and education, despite TANU's protest.

Nyerere was to recall later that 1958 was the turning point for the nationalists. This was after the election "results showed the irresistability of [their] overwhelming popular movement and its leadership...the British decided to co-operate." TANU's victory had confirmed the opinion that Tanganyika could govern themselves: "As a result, the formal turning point came the next year, 1959, when the direction of political power was explicitly settled."<sup>204</sup> In March 1959, Turnbull appointed five ministers from among the elected LEGCO members. Chief Fundikira, George Kahama and Solomon Eliufoo were the three Africans among the ministers. The remaining two were an Asian member and a European member, all of them members of TANU or supported by it during the elections. The two non-African ministers were supporters of TANU. In the August 1960 general elections based on the same franchise as the 1958-9 elections, TANU won 70 seats out of 71. Nyerere became the Chief minister.

The participation of TANU in the elections and the debates which had taken place in the decision to do so, to which Nyerere was committed, had resulted in the first breakaway of some members of TANU. Zuberi

Mtemvu, a one time organizing secretary of TANU decided to form the African National Congress (ANC) which held the policy of Africa for Africans only and self-government for Africans only.<sup>205</sup> Besides attracting very few members--among whom was Christopher Tumbo who was later to become a leader in TFL, F.E. Omido who in the early 1950s was trying to organize trade unions in Arusha, and a few others--the ANC was not really effective even by the time it was formed. This party was a "violent racist group" of people who did not want the idea of TANU or Africans voting for Asians and Europeans who sympathized with the nationalists.<sup>206</sup> There were Asians who as early as 1956 supported the nationalists in Tanganyika. This was also the case with some Europeans. For example, the Asian paper, *Crossroads*, of 20th August 1957 (No 2) praised the nomination of Nyerere to LEGCO in 1957 as of utmost importance, and there were Europeans such as D. Bryceson who supported TANU.<sup>207</sup> Asians who vacillated and those who looked upon the Europeans as eternal rulers were attacked by the Asian Association from 1956: "the days of sitting on the fence are gone. We have to make a decision and act."<sup>208</sup> In the same year Nyerere had made an "impassionate appeal to Europeans and Asians in Tanganyika to forget their fears of black domination to co-operate with TANU towards creation of a happy multi-racial state which could well be the wonder of Africa." He assured them that their rights and freedom would be safeguarded.<sup>209</sup>

TANU's victory in the elections in 1958 marked the beginning of "peaceful transition" to independence marked by "non-violent methods". Nyerere was to write in 1966 that "[untill] the end of the nineteen-fifties...TANU was campaigning for equality from motives of expedient self-interest. As that decade drew to a close, however, the test came.

Were those who claimed equality for themselves willing to accept the other side of the coin--the equality of others?"<sup>210</sup> Richard Turnbull, who recognized the war which had been waged all along against the administration, sought to negotiate with the nationalists and get them to accept some of the changes. By March 1959 the government was faced with either having to declare a state of emergency--given the threat of a general strike--or to set a date for responsible self-government.<sup>211</sup> There was already a state of emergency in Geita District, where people had "dismissed their chiefs and the police had tear-gassed the people in 1958".<sup>212</sup> Self-government was finally achieved in 1960; the same year when elections were to take place again on the same franchise as the previous elections. Turnbull's concern was more or less an echo of what Mr Jimmy Betts of the Fabian Colonial Bureau had written to Mr H. Beer, a conservative settler critic and totally opposed to nationalists: "Perhaps we are inclined to pay more attention than you do to the young African Nationalist leaders, because although we realise that they sometimes make regrettably extremist statements, we are also aware that the discredited leaders of today may be ministers of tomorrow."<sup>213</sup>

After the 1958 victory, TANU's major concern became that of the transition from opposition to authority and the question of Africanization of the government; unity and liberation of Africa in general (Pan-Africanism); and economic development.<sup>214</sup> From 1958 TANU stood for government ownership of land and water and opposed the leasehold system, championed the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease.<sup>215</sup> These latter issues were conjoined with the question of pressing for "full industrialization and enhancement of co-operative methods and control of the major means of production by the peoples

themselves through their democratically instituted government", as it was put in the Freedom Charter of the Peoples of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in 1958 in Mwanza<sup>216</sup> From around this time, the main concern was with the establishment of the economic base. According to TANU, it was only the efforts of Africans which would make this possible. It was necessary for the Central Committee to make efforts to establish co-operative movements; encourage traders to form co-operatives; help Tanganyika African Traders Union (TATU) which was formed in 1956; urge the government to raise the incomes of Africans, to encourage people to acquire loans for economic enterprises or building houses; and urge the government to lessen the stringent rules governing the giving of loans to Africans.<sup>217</sup>

TANU had expressed the view that while it was opposed to land alienation to individual non-Africans, it was quite willing to accept lease of land to non-African commercial corporations if beneficial to the country's economy. Otherwise, it was the peasants who had a limitless potential capacity to contribute to the economy.<sup>218</sup> Tanganyika was to build a society in which the colour of a person had no meaning: "The division of any society into 'haves' and 'have nots' is...dynamite." In Tanganyika, this division was aggravated by its identification with the racial division also. "The 'haves' here are generally the immigrant minorities; the 'have nots' are the indigenous majorities." This was considered to be very dangerous, and it was necessary to rectify the situation in as humanly way as possible.<sup>219</sup> When TANU held a meeting in Tanga in November 1959 the paramount questions were: the governing of the country--in relation to whether TANU was ready for that; and the need to formulate policies on

education, economic development, social development, etc. It was agreed that an economic expert was to be invited to Tanganyika to advise; and development was to be the major pre-occupation of the new government.<sup>220</sup> The main slogan by this time became: "Freedom and Work". The TANU leaders got economic advice from Western sources. These policies will be discussed in the next chapter.

It was in July 1960 when TANU's National Executive announced that opposition to capitalism and support for "African democratic socialism" and the co-operative model of development was to be adopted by the new government. It was accepted that where co-operative methods could not be used, the capitalists would play the role.<sup>221</sup> This announcement came out when an era of conflict between the nationalists and the trade union movement had begun. The conflicts began with TANU's refusal to support a series of protracted strikes; in some cases it even stood against the workers. These conflicts will be reviewed in the next chapter.

#### 5.4 Conclusion

What can be observed from the discussion so far is the fact that the 1950s struggles and the triumph of nationalism also carried seeds of conflict with the workers and peasants. This aspect became even more apparent with the victory of the nationalists after 1958. The conflict was inherent in the nature and logic of the struggles by the nationalists and those of the workers and peasants; given the general social conditions of the territory. During the transition, the nationalists were attempting to put into practice what they earnestly believed would result in the modernization of the country--what they had championed since 1930s and 1940s. Their victory was not a result of

individual efforts, but spontaneous, irresistible manifestations of national wants and necessities more or less comprehended, but very distinctly felt by the various classes in the territory.

What was happening, in terms of the relations between the working people and the nationalists as soon as the latter began to go into power, was not betrayal of aspirations--in so far as the nationalists were part of the "modernizing process" and they believed in the modernization of the country. Taken as a betrayal or a contradiction, then it is simply impossible to grasp the essence of the struggles which started taking place between the working masses and the nationalists during the transition, as it has already been hinted, and were to continue after independence.

The leadership of the nationalist movement was allowed to participate in the power machinery after 1958; and that was just the question. To grasp why the nationalists were taking such a cause during the transition, let us examine the state of the Tanganyikans at the eve of independence--i.e. the composition of the people who formed the groundwork of the political and social organizations behind the nationalist movement. The bourgeoisie in Tanganyika was pretty fragmented. In manufacturing, there were the massive foreign and Asian community investments especially since the post-World War II period. According to the 1961 industrial census which covered industrial establishments irrespective of size, there were 1,026 manufacturing establishments in the country. Of these, only 68 establishments or 6.6 per cent were considered as large scale--in the sense that they had an annual bill of £50,000 or more. The Asian bourgeoisie were the richest local capitalists, and were predominant in manufacturing before 1945--

"except for those industries at the two extremes--those requiring least and most capital--"<sup>222</sup> despite the tendency for the state to constrain them from entering the manufacturing sector. Their dominance received a new impetus from the post-World War II government policies which encouraged industrialization.

In the 1930s, the Chamber of Commerce section of the Indian Association had passed the resolution that it was undesirable for the colonial state to press for further development of co-operatives, since it was premature given the economic conditions of the territory. It advised the government to do so only when the territory's economy had been placed "on a basis of intensive and extensive protection and industrial development so that the trading population which might be displaced by the co-operative institutions might be suitably absorbed in other spheres of economic fabric of the territory."<sup>223</sup> Up to the 1950s, Asian industries were owned by one family or in partnership, but towards the end of this decade, "Tanganyika Asians began to finance their bigger projects by forming partnerships with foreign firms. or more often, with Asians in Kenya and Uganda."<sup>224</sup> An example of the latter is the Chande family of Tanganyika which expanded to a local monopoly position in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of being tied to the Madhvani family of Uganda through marriage arrangements.

From 1955, there commenced a vigorous movement by Asians into manufacturing, because Africans were increasingly moving into the commercial sector. By 1961, Africans who held retail trade licences numbered 34,581 as opposed to approximately 7,500 Asians--although the latter still controlled two-thirds of the trade.<sup>225</sup> Increased participation of Africans in trade was one of the major demands of the

nationalists, and the struggles of African traders against the Asian commercial capitalists and the state's action against them had started in the 1920s. In the 1958 resolutions, TANU had pledged to support the Tanganyika African Traders Union which was formed in 1956. But trade and commerce in general could not stand on its own nor be able to develop without development of productive investment--e.g. manufacturing, construction, etc.

Local manufacturing interests had become strong enough to force the unwilling government to notice them especially after the Second World War, given the necessity to establish local processing industries and Import Substitution Industrialization as a result of the crisis which gave birth to "modernizing imperialism". These manufacturing activities, local or foreign or joint, were intimately linked with imports and exports and they had little or no interest in common with the necessity of creation of a "national economy"--besides demands for protection, as was demonstrated by the example of Kilombero Valley discussed above. Certainly, the demands for industrialization of the country as championed by the nationalists were quite promising to the manufacturing bourgeoisie. The nationalists' struggles to participate in trade meant the Asian commercial bourgeoisie had to move into manufacturing and other non-agricultural activities which were quite essential to the nationalists. Thus, the support by a substantial section of the Asians for the nationalists in the 1950s was rooted in the complementarity of interests.

If anything, the Asians and foreign capital had to be defended for the sake of development of the country within the nationalist conceptions of development. What all this meant was, Africans could



enter into commerce and Asians could pursue the manufacturing interests. Asians' support of the nationalists was based on the fact that the development of their most important interests were checked by the colonial political constitution of the territory: by its racial division with conflicting tendencies and caprices; the colonial fetters upon industry and trade; and superintendence of their activities by the state. Thus the passing to nationalist opposition. This change may be dated from mid-1950s when some Asians began urging others not to stand on the fence but support the nationalists, as was pointed out above. Given the victory of the nationalists, by 1959 Asians from all over East Africa were flocking into Tanganyika, escaping the threatening situation of their interests in other countries.<sup>226</sup>

The small traders and small capitalists were exceedingly numerous in Tanganyika. This was a very important section of the population in nationalist politics because of its intermediate position between capitalists, traders, manufacturers, workers, etc. While this section aspired to become capitalists, its individual members were being hurled down to the working class position. It was this class which played a very significant role in terms of mobilization of rural grievances--those of the poor peasantry and semi-proletarians. To all these sections, national independence had advantages to offer. But these rural sections could only be organized above all in general, by the urban nationalists, given their conditions of dispersion over a great space and their diverse interests.

Let us now turn to the working class. As can be observed from the above exposition, while its movement and advanced struggles date back to the late 1930s, this movement was never independent--never exclusively

proletarian in character because of the colonial capitalist and paternalistic relations of domination. The conflicts between the employer and the employed were also conflicts between the colonizer and the colonized and Africans against the Europeans and Asians. This resulted in the working class finally tailing behind the nationalists in the late 1950s, although it still maintained its independence as a class. The working class, like other classes, had advantages to gain from independence, but unlike the other sections of the population, it had reached a position whereby it could organize itself and wage decisive battles. This is demonstrated by the 1947 General strike for example, and the struggles which followed after that--also the threat for a general strike in 1958-9. And the nationalists were aware of this power--given that the government was the largest employer besides the immigrant nationalities in general.

The political movement of the nationalists or the bourgeois elements (the educated and the wealthy), created by the colonial transformations, may be dated from the 1940s, as has been shown so far. Under the colonial forms of domination, they had reached a stage which could no longer allow them to be passive and apathetic given the pressure from both above and below. Their utter impotence in the working class upsurges between 1947-50 and their significance by their writings and particular forms of criticism of the colonial regime could not pass unnoticed by the colonial government as a sign of their importance politically. Their literature had demonstrated nothing more than the necessity to integrate European and African "Civilization" which was not contradictory to western civilization. Literary production of the intelligentsia teemed with this tendency. Their political opposition was

a mixture of ill-digested African civilization as synthesized and systematized by the missionaries, colonial administrators, anthropologists, European humanists in general and the British Fabian socialist tendencies. Behind this was the influence of "modernizing imperialism" under the post World War II British Labour government which was viewed as a supporter of the reforms in the colonies.<sup>227</sup> Lastly, the most complicated was the developmentalist/modernization tendencies--which declared development and the welfare of the colonial subjects as the ultimate goal of the civilizing mission. These were to culminate in the Pan-Africanist tendencies which embodied Africanist, socialist and modernizing themes. The Pan-Africanist socialist tendencies had become a fashion in the 1950s, they were a result of the translation of the Fabian socialists thinking since the 1940s as a synthesis for a humanistic solution to the social questions which involved class, race and colonial domination. Within these conceptions, the state acquired a centrality in effecting or not effecting processes of development and social change. It was the educated classes and those, whose position in life enabled them to gain some political information from the government or the Fabian Colonial Bureau, etc. and form opinions against the colonial system and hence oppose the slowness of the reforms, who could become the leaders of the mass of the Tanganyikan people.

By 1958 the colonial government realized that it could not continue to reign without making concessions to the popular demands of representation in the LEGCO and responsible self-government--the forgotten promise of Sir D. Cameron in the 1920s Indirect Rule doctrines. Thus the elections which ushered into the state Africans, Europeans and Asians; the former being the nationalists and the latter

their supporters. Given the crisis prevalent by 1958, it became necessary to co-opt the nationalists who had already drawn the support of the rebelling working masses.

It was the educated classes which went into office after 1958. As nationalists, they professed to hold power in trust of the whole population. With ascension to power, the classes of the society began to divide themselves and the nationalists began to turn around upon their former allies, assuming an indifferent or hostile attitude against every class or organization which contradicted the "modernization" goals, and concluded alliance with the colonial and bureaucratic interests. These aspects will become even more obvious in the next chapter where the struggles between the state and the working people are shown. The new rulers proclaimed that they embodied the essence of equality, education, development and science and were waging a war against ignorance, disease and poverty. The aspects of the struggle against the trio of enemies--poverty, disease and ignorance--in essence summed up the assumptions of modernization/development and the general thinking of the educated in general. There was no divergence from the early colonial thinking: "poverty and ignorance are always linked in English and other European languages" in which ignorance is taken to mean lack of knowledge and proper culture. While poverty can be a fact and a reality,

However, the myth that poverty somehow results from ignorance is an elitist, ethnocentric interpretation of an international problem, the roots of which lie not in reality but in prevalent middle-class attitudes originating in the North. These attitudes are espoused by professionals educated in European tradition.<sup>228</sup>

With the nationalists assuming power, another crucial dimension was added in the conceptualization of the state. Like in any bourgeois state, the new members were bequeathed with the principles of a

"rational bureaucracy" in which power and wealth had to be separated, because the government was supposed to work for the people in general without identifying itself with any group of people or class. Thus the Governor was to issue leadership rules which were prepared by the Colonial Office for the newly elected ministers in 1959. There is a striking similarity between these leadership rules and the Leadership Code which came out with the Arusha Declaration in 1967; and although it will be discussed again in the next chapter, it is worth mentioning their content here. These rules demanded that leaders should not be directors of commercial enterprises; should not be employed or in receipt of salaries from trade unions or co-operative unions; should not involve themselves in businesses which will interfere with their ministerial jobs; should not use secret information obtained within their positions for their own benefit or that of their friends; should not support any project/plan in which they hope to benefit; should not use their positions to favour people where justice is required; should not buy shares in companies; and should not announce news or write books or articles in newspapers while still ministers.<sup>229</sup>

Development/modernization as such, as shown earlier, was the ideology of the post-World War II period. It was the ideology of the bourgeoisie which saw development in terms of industrialization of the colonies and the ex-colonies and the systematic transfer of resources from the "traditional" to the "modern" sector, with capital and technology being injected from the West for development. This would result in rising standards of the people as measured by GDP. Therefore, the nationalists were not neutral, and they had consistently championed the same interests as exemplified by their attitudes towards the peasant

rebellions. Independence was to mark the beginning of the process to disarm the working population, starting with the working class which was the most organized.

NOTES

1. TNA 34905/50 J.K. Nyerere to A. Creech Jones, 1.8.1946 and Creech Jones reply on 11.12.1946
2. Nyerere's thinking, it can be said, was part and parcel of the 1940s movement. According to James N. Kariuki, "The now famous Arusha Declaration of 1967 represents Nyerere's deep concern for the masses. 'The Declaration', one commentator noted, 'proposes concrete measures which reflect moral political beliefs that have been in the back of the President's mind ever since he was a student at Makerere University College. Thus socialism, which ultimately became Nyerere's personal philosophy and the official ideology of his party, shows considerable impetus from his past experience as a student.'" (*Tanzania's Human Revolution*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University of Park and London, 1979, p.21)
3. See Cranford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968*, CUP, London, 1976, pp.20-21. By growth of a powerful class, Pratt has in mind the capitalists, because according to his analysis the workers were not all that powerful and the peasants' struggles in the 1940s and 1950s did not necessarily undermine the colonial authority.
4. W.E. Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania*, Victor Gollancz LTD, London, 1973, p.66. See also Judith Listowel, *The making of Tanganyika*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1965, pp.166-7.
5. Margaret Bates, "Social Engineering, Multi-racialism, and the Rise of TANU: The Trustee Territory of Tanganyika 1945-1961", in D.H. Low & A. Smith (eds), *History of East Africa Vol III*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, p.158.
6. J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, CUP, Cambridge, 1979, p.436. Also, *ibid*, and the historians who take the improvement view who were mentioned in Chapter Two.
7. Iliffe, *ibid*.
8. A.J. Temu, "The Rise and Triumph of Nationalism", in I.N. Kimambo & A.J. Temu (eds), *A History of Tanzania*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1969. Also J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, OUP, London, 1967, pp.1-4.
9. *ibid*.
10. Iliffe, 1979, *op cit*, p.434.
11. M. Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration", Ph D Thesis, Oxford University, 1957, p.418; Iliffe, *ibid*; Smith, *op cit*, Bates, *op cit*.

12. "Tanganyika Social Welfare and Development", 17th March 1947, in Mss Brit Emp. s 365, "Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau"
13. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.439.
14. See Colonial Office Information Department issues in Mss Brit Emp s.365, op cit. In fact by the Second World War Britain anticipated a protracted period of colonial rule in Tanganyika, and hence the period of payment of the loans. Even Nyerere in 1955 thought Tanganyika would be independent after thirty years.
15. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.437.
16. Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, Colonial Office, HMSO, London 1950, p.50.
17. CO 882/111/46705, Secretary of State for Colonies to all Governors, 23.3.1942.
18. CO 967/57/46709. Arthur Dame's Memorandum, July 1942.
19. United Kingdom, *Colonial Paper No 191*, HMSO, London, 1945; B.D. Bowles, "The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika 1939-1961", in M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed), *Tanzania Under Colonial Rule*, Longman. London, 1980.
20. Bowles, ibid; Issa Shivji, "The Silent Class Struggle", in J. Saul & L. Cliffe (eds), *Socialism in Tanzania* Vol 2, EAPH, Nairobi, 1973, p.306.
21. CO 822/108/46523, A minute by Seel, 18.5.1943.
22. *Tanganyika Standard*, 1.2.1949; Bowles, op cit, p.167.
23. For these policies, schemes and the quotation, see A. Coulson, "Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania 1946-1976", University of Bradford, Discussion Paper No 11, October 1977, (mimeo), p.5.
24. Tanganyika Territory, *Report of the Arusha-Moshi Land Commission*, Dar es Salaam, 1947.
25. For the pre-Colonial settlements see J.E.G. Sutton, "The Peopling of Tanzania", in Kimambo & Temu (eds) op cit; and H. Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History 1850-1950*, Heinemann, London, 1977.
26. D.A. Low & J.M. Lonsdale, "Introduction", in Low & Smith (eds), op cit.; J.M. Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government*, OUP, London, 1971.
27. W.A. Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1955, p.155.



28. E. Senghaas-Knobloch, "Informal Sector and Peripheral Capitalism: A Critique of a Prevailing Concept of Development", *Manpower and Employment Research*, Vol 10 No 2, p.3.
29. Listowel, op cit, Chapter 14.; Coulson, op cit; A. Wood, *The Groundnut Affair*, London, 1950. The latter is more detailed on this issue.
30. Great Britain, *Tanganyika Report for 1947*, HMSO, London, 1948, pp.79-80. On the suggestion of a Land Bank in 1930 see Tanganyika Territory, *Session Paper No 3 of 1930*, Dar es Salaam.
31. Government Circular No 4, 1953. Quoted in Bates, 1957, op cit, p.437.
32. Bates, *ibid*,; Also see files in Mss Brit Emp s.365. I owe some of the information here to Prof. Marjorie Mbilinyi's discussions with me based on data she obtained from her current research.
33. See S.H. Frankel, *Capital Formation in Africa*, OUP, London, 1938, for the analysis of industrial investments in the inter-war period.
34. A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982. p.74. Also see J. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*, OUP, Nairobi, 1973, p.112.
35. See Coulson, *ibid*, p.79; Iliffe, 1979, p.447; Bates, 1957, op cit, p.400; & United Republic of Tanzania, *Industrial Survey 1965*, Central Statistical Bureau, Dar es Salaam, 1967. According to the International Classification of Enterprises (ISIC) large scale industries are those which employ ten workers or more. One could question the validity of this criterion. Since that is the only type of data available so far one has to still use it.
36. Listowel, op cit, pp.132-3.
37. See Marjorie Mbilinyi, "African Education During the British Colonial Period 1919-1961", in Kaniki (ed), op cit, pp.265-68.
38. *ibid*; also Bates, 1976, op cit, pp.161.
39. Pratt, op cit, p.18.
40. *ibid*, p.19.
41. Bates, 1957, op cit; Bates, 1976, op cit, pp.162-3
42. See "Development of Local Governments in Tanganyika 1950-57", cited by Bates, 1976, *ibid*, p.166.
43. Listowel, op cit, p.158.
44. *ibid*, p.159.

45. *ibid*, p.160; G.A. Maguire, *Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania*, CUP, Cambridge, 1969, p.13.
46. TNA 28944/1 Resolution. Mzee Sudi and P.C. Mntambo to Young, 3.8.1940. See also Iliffe, 1979, *op cit*, pp.418-19.
47. See in G.G. Hajivayanis, A.C. Mtowa & J. Iliffe, "The Politicians: Ali Ponda and Hassan Suleiman", In J. Iliffe (ed), *Modern Tanzanians*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1973; Maguire, *op cit*, for the case of Sukumaland; Temu, *op cit*; Iliffe, 1979 *op cit*, pp.432-33. It is difficult to get the actual figures of membership for this period. This is partly because it was at around this time that even the membership cards for the association were being issued for the first time. But most of the literature dealing with this period testifies to this fact that there was a massive push for membership during this period.
48. For all that has been discussed here on Fiah and TAA see N.J. Wescott, "An East African Radical: The Life of Erica Fiah", *Journal of African History*, No 22, 1981, pp.85-101, and the 1937-9 *Kwetu* issues.
49. Iliffe, 1979, *op cit*, pp.423-4.
50. *Ibid*, p.432; also TNA 19325/II/16C Ali Ponda to Branches, 1945; and TNA 19325/II/17 Ali Ponda to Chief Secretary 15.6.1945.
51. For this see L. Cliffe, "Nationalism and the reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period", in L. Cliffe & J. Saul (eds), *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol I, EAPH, Nairobi, 1972.
52. Iliffe, 1979, *op cit*, p.432.
53. *ibid*, pp.432-3.
54. Correspondence by the Africans is found in MSS Brit Emp s. 365, *op cit*.
55. Kirilo Japhet & Earle Seaton, *The Meru Land Case*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1967, p.16.
56. See J.K. Nyerere, Introduction to *Freedom and Unity*, *op cit*.
57. See Walter Rodney, "The Political Economy of Tanganyika 1890-1930", in Kaniki (ed), *op cit*; and Iliffe, "The age of Improvement and Differentiation", in Kimambo and Temu (eds), *op cit*, p.124.
58. F.O. Raum, "German East Africa: Changes in East African Tribal Life Under German Administration 1892-1914", in *History of East Africa* Vol II, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp.206-13.
59. Maguire, *op cit*, Chapter 5.

60. Coulson, 1982, op cit, p.64.
61. See I.N. Kimambo, *Nbiru: Popular Protest in Colonial Tanganyika*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1971.
62. See Cliffe, 1972, op cit, p.20.
63. Cited by Cliffe, *ibid*.
64. Smith, 1973, op cit, p.54.
65. Great Britain, *His Majesty's Report for the League of Nations 1937*, op cit, p.11; also *1938 Report*, p.12.
66. *ibid*; also Report for 1948, p.47.
67. Cliffe, 1972, op cit, p.20.
68. cited in *ibid*.
69. E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*, Heinemann, London, 1973, p.22.
70. TNA 11725 Annual Report, Labour Department, 1939, p.13.
71. TNA 25908/1/202 R.C. Jerrard, Labour Report for the Nine Months ending in September 1938, Tanga Province.
72. See J. Iliffe, "A History of the Dockworkers of Dar es Salaam", in *Tanzania Notes and Records*, No 71, Dar es Salaam, 1970.
73. Tanganyika Territory, *Ordinances*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1941, p.105.
74. For the account of the strikes in Dar es Salaam and Lindi see Iliffe, 1970, op cit. Norman Pearson's manuscript is unpublished and is obtainable in Mss Afri s. 394, "Trade Unionist on Safari".
75. Pearson, *ibid*, pp.173-4.
76. *ibid*, p.183. Emphasis added.
77. *ibid*, pp.138-9.
78. *ibid*, pp.50-1.
79. Iliffe, 1970, op cit.
80. Pearson, op cit, p.214.
81. Mss Afri s. 1840 (1) An unpublished manuscript by A.H. Saville, entitled, "When God had one Eye Shut", p.174.

82.     ibid, p.175.
83.     Iliffe, 1970, op cit, p.133.
84.     Pearson, op cit, p.124.
85.     ibid, p.219. Emphasis added.
86.     ibid, p.220 for all the above explanation.
87.     TNA SMP 16756 R.H. Maguire to Governor, a minute, 24.9.1947.  
Also Iliffe, 1970, op cit.
88.     ibid.
89.     N.S.K. Tumbo, "Towards NUTA: the Search for Permanent Unity in  
Tanganyika's Trade Union Movement", in H. Kjekshus et al (eds),  
*Labour in Tanzania* TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1977, pp.2-3.
90.     Iliffe, 1970, op cit, p.132.
91.     ibid, p.134.
92.     Annual Reports, Labour Department, 1947, op cit.
93.     Iliffe, 1970, op cit, p.134.
94.     See Daisy Sykes Buruku, "The Townsman: Kleist Sykes", in *Modern  
Tanzanians*, op cit p.110 and Wescott, op cit, p.100.
95.     Wescott, ibid; Iliffe, 1970, op cit, p.136 suggested that Fiah  
was ousted by government intrigue. But the fact is towards the  
end of the 1940s Fiah was degenerating to a moderate position.  
He was even left behind by the nationalist movement which he had  
championed in the 1930s and early 1940s.
96.     P.B. Mihyo, *Industrial Conflict and Change in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar  
es Salaam, 1981, p.16.
97.     For the above information see *Annual Reports*, Labour  
Department, 1950, p.60, pp.19-20; Mihyo, ibid, p.16; Iliffe,  
1970, op cit, p.137; and Shivji, 1982, op cit.
98.     Tanganyika Territory, *Proceedings of the Legislative Council  
(Hansard)*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, April & August  
1947.
99.     Iliffe, 1970, op cit, p.138.
100.    *Hansard*, 24th Session 1949/50. Hon M.J.B. Molohan L.C. in "Trade  
Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Bill."
101.    ibid.

102. P. Mihyo, "Industrial Relations in Tanzania", in Ukandi G. Damachi et al (eds), *Industrial Relations in Africa*, MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1979, p.142.
103. F.E. Omido to Miss Marjorie Nicholson, 12.7.1954. in Mss Brit Emp s. 365, op cit.
104. See Iliffe, 1970, op cit, Chapter 12; Coulson, 1982, op cit, p.101ff.
105. Coulson, ibid, and Iliffe, ibid tend to link the labour movement with the African Association and the educated elements during the climax of the colonial crisis. Little evidence is provided for this assumption, and it is contrary to the facts which will be shown below. Their assertion, is more or less based on the assumptions about "improvement".
106. Maguire, op cit, pp.67-70.
107. ibid.
108. Temu, "The Triumph of Nationalism", op cit, p.199.
109. Peason, op cit, p.218.
110. ibid, p.225.
111. Pratt, op cit, pp.24-25.
112. ibid, p.30.
113. ibid.
114. R. Ollendorf to Dr Rita Hinden, 1.3.1945, in Mss Brit Emp s.365, op cit.
115. See Listowel, op cit, p. 201; *Gazette of Edinburgh University*, October 1960 pp.22-26. A shorter version of this article appears in Nyerere, 1967, op cit as the first article.
116. Listowel, ibid, p.202.
117. ibid, p.203; See also Nyerere, 1967, op cit, p.28.
118. Listowel, ibid, p.214.
119. ibid.
120. ibid.
121. TNA 26027 "The Wazaramo Union", General Secretary to Provincial Commissioner, 31.7.1946; also see Iliffe, "The Age of Improvement..." op cit.

122. TNA 26027, *ibid*, General Secretary to Secretary for African Affairs, 9.9.1948.
123. *ibid*, General Secretary to Secretary for African Affairs, 6.12.1948.
124. *ibid*, General Secretary to Provincial Commissioner, 6.3.1953.
125. *ibid*, Hon. General Secretary of TAA to Chief Secretary, 15.4.1953.
126. H. Mwapachu to Dr Rita Hinden, 16.8.1950, in Mss Brit Emp s. 365, *op cit*.
127. *ibid*, 4.12.1950.
128. See Mss Brit Emp s. 365, *ibid*, Box 123 file 6 "Tanganyika Political Parties (TANU etc 1949-1958)" for issues about TAA on the Constitutional Development.
129. Listowel, *op cit* p.215.
130. Listowel, *ibid*; J.K. Nyerere wrote to the Governor in protest of this exclusion of civil servants from TAA on 10.8.1953. (See Mss Brit Emp s.365 *op cit*) The Civil servants were banned through Circular No 5 of 1953.
131. Maguire, *op cit*, p.138; S. Kandoro, *Mwito wa Uhuru*, Black Star Agencies, Dar es Salaam, 1978, pp.2-3; and Iliffe, 1979, *op cit*, p.505.
132. Iliffe, *ibid*, p.510.
133. Mwapachu to Nicholson, 19.6.1954, in Mss Brit Emp s. 365, *op cit*. Iliffe, *ibid*, p.511. Emphasis added.
134. Iliffe, *ibid*; Listowel, *op cit*, p.223; Japhet and Seaton, *op cit*, p.62. It is Iliffe who notes the British Labour Party basis of the Party Constitution, and according to Listowel, "Nyerere modelled its constitution on that of Nkrumah's Convention Peoples' Party; the basic structure and much of the phrasing was taken over".
135. 1954 TANU Constitution, in Mss Brit Emp s. 365, *op cit*.
136. See Iliffe, 1979, *op cit*, p.512.
137. See "Tanganyika Correspondence with TANU 1954-1961", in Mss Brit Emp s. 365, *op cit*.
138. Nyerere to Nicholson, 15.9.1954, in *ibid*.
139. *ibid*, 4.7.1955.

140. Nyerere, 1967, op cit, p.2.
141. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.520.
142. See Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*, Praeger, New York, 1962, p.32.
143. Smith, op cit, p.63.
144. Cliffe, op cit, p.22.
145. Maguire, op cit, p.217.
146. ibid, pp.217-8.
147. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.524.
148. Cliffe, op cit, p.23.
149. ibid.
150. Smith, op cit, p.66.
151. Bates, 1976, op cit, p.170.
152. Cliffe, op cit.
153. Nyerere's foreword to Kathleen Stahl's *Tanganyika: Sail in the Wilderness*, Mouton & Co, s'Gravenhage, The Hague, 1961.
154. Listowel, op cit, p.280.
155. ibid.
156. ibid, p.274.
157. ibid, pp.274-5.
158. ibid.
159. ibid, p.276; J.H. Oldham's defense of multi-racialism as set out by Cameron in his Indirect Rule doctrines and the example of Tabora school education system appeared in his book, *New Hope in Africa*, London, 1956.
160. Listowel, ibid.
161. ibid, p.280.
162. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.521.
163. J.K. Nyerere, "Contra Capricorn", in Mss Afri s. 1681 "The papers of African Bureau", (Nyerere Papers and Lectures 1956 to 1964)

164.     ibid.
165.     ibid.
166.     ibid.
167.     ibid.
168.     See Tumbo, op cit; William H. Friedland, *Vuta Kamba*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, California, 1969; Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1976.
169.     Friedland, ibid, pp.48-9.
170.     TNA 215/1969/II *Quarterly Bulletin of the Labour Department*, July/September 1954; and "Annual Report", Labour Officer, Mwanza, 1954 in TNA 215/5111/VII.
171.     TNA 215/5111/VII, ibid and a letter by Bhoke Munanka to the Fabian Colonial Bureau in Mss Brit Emp s.365, op cit.
172.     TNA 215/1969/II op cit "Annual Report", Labour Department, 1955, p.15.
173.     Shivji, 1982, op cit, pp.431-2
174.     Friedland, op cit.
175.     Listowel, op cit, p.286.
176.     Friedland, op cit, p.122.
177.     ibid, p.123.
178.     ibid.
179.     ibid, p.120.
180.     Quoted by ibid.
181.     Hansard, 1956. p.793.
182.     Ibid, p.801. This was Mr Baker's point.
183.     See Jack Woddiss, *The Lion Awakes*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1961, p.123.
184.     Friedland, op cit, pp.124-5.
185.     Listowel, op cit, p.286.
186.     ibid.



187. Friedland, op cit.
188. Hansard, 1965, op cit, pp.651-2.
189. D. Jackson, *The disappearance of Strikes in Tanzania: Income Policy and Industrial Democracy*, Working Paper Series No 117, University of Aston Management Centre, November 1978, p.2.
190. Friedland, op cit, p.125.
191. Shivji, 1982, op cit, p.445.
192. ibid cited from the *Tanganyika Standard*, 10.6.1959.
193. ibid; and Friedland, op cit, p.220.
194. Shivji, ibid, p.469.
195. TNA 304/R.3/1 Korogwe District Annual Report, 1958.
196. Shivji, op cit, p.470; Friedland, op cit, pp.220-224.
197. Friedland, ibid, p.221.
198. Tumbo, op cit, pp.6-7.
199. Woddis, op cit, p.36.
200. Friedland, op cit.
201. Listowel, op cit, p.310.
202. ibid, for all the information about the strike and the question of stampeding lawlessness. Also Coulson, 1982, op cit, p.117.
203. Pratt, op cit, p.27.
204. Nyerere's Foreword to Stahl's book, op cit, p.9.
205. See Listowel, op cit, p.308. Some of the documents and manifestos are in Mss Afri s. 1681, op cit; also in Mss Brit Emp s.365 op cit.
206. ibid, p.309.
207. Derek Bryceson to *Times*, 1958 (a cutting available in Mss Brit Emp s. 365 op cit) "I enjoyed as you put it, TANU approval. But make no mistake. TANU also enjoyed my approval, since they have dropped the old idea of African nationalism embracing anyone of any race". Bryceson was among the very few Europeans who supported TANU. For an intense opposition to him, see settler reactions in the North Province as typically represented by those of Mbulu, in Mss Afr s. 1453, "Oljoro Farmers' Association".

208. This was Amir Jamal's call to his fellow Asians. Some time around this period, His Highness the Aga Khan had also called upon the Ismailia group in Tanganyika to regard themselves as Tanganyikans and start investing in industry so as to create a base for themselves. See Honey, op cit.
209. A cutting from *Drum* June 1958 in Mss Brit Emp s.365 in which available also is an article: "Some naked facts about TANU AND MULTI-RACIAL POLICY which led to the birth of ANC".
210. Nyerere, 1967, op cit, p.4.
211. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.564. Kandoro, op cit, pp105ff.
212. Maguire, op cit.
213. Jimmy Betts to H. Beer, 26.7.1956, in Mss Brit Emp s. 365, op cit.
214. Iliffe, 1979, op cit p.573.
215. See for example in Nyerere, 1967, op cit, pp.53-58 on "National Property" and p.66 on "Principles of Water and Land Ownership". The views were influenced by Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* which he was reading then.
216. See Richard Cox, *Pan Africanism in Practice*, Institute of Race Relations, London, 1964, Appendix A.
217. See Kandoro op cit, p.121.
218. Mss Brit Emp s. 332 Creech Jones Papers, "East Africa and Rhodesia--February 1958, Extracts from a Visiting Missions' Report to United Nations on Tanganyika", p.762.
219. Nyerere, 1967, op cit, p.80. A longer and original version is in Mss Brit Emp s.365.
220. Mss Brit Emp s. 365, op cit, Press Release 3rd-6th November 1956. *Mwafrika* is a paper which appeared every saturday since 1956 under the management of Paul Boman. It championed TANU's cause and reported substantially on the concern on the part of TANU for economic development, especially from 1958. See for example issues of 29.8.1959; and 19.9.1959.
221. Kandoro, op cit, p.144.
222. Central Statistical Bureau, *Industrial Census, 1961*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1964. This figure of 68 large establishments varies from the figures which take large establishment as those that employ 10 or more workers. For the quotation here see Honey, in *Tanzania Notes and Records (TNR)*, op cit, p.62.

223. Quoted by Shivji, 1976, op cit, p.67.
224. Honey in TNR, op cit p.68.
225. ibid.
226. This issue will be dealt with further in the next Chapter.
227. See Mss Brit Emp s.365 generally for the nationalists who were in contact with the Fabian Society. In 1960 Paul Bomani wrote to the Fabian Colonial Bureau asking to be sent the Labour Party Constitution so that they may refer to it in their constitutional reforms of the TANU.
228. See A. Fuglesang, "The Myth of People's Ignorance", in *Development Dialogue*, 1984: 1-2, p.45.
229. For these rules, see *Mwafrica*, 13.6.1959. It was the only source I managed to get hold of. It was the Editor who discussed this issue. The text in Kiswahili reads:

Adamu na Hawa walipoumbwa walipewa amri za kufuata ili waweze kuishi maisha mema. Katika bustani ya Eden waliambiwa wanaweza kula matunda ya mti wowote 'bali matunda ya wa katikati kamwe hamtakula. Siku mtakapoyala matunda ya mti wa katikati kufa mtakufa.' Sasa Bwana Makoloni ametoa amri ambazo Mawaziri wetu wakizivunja watang'olewa bila ngoja katika baraza la mawaziri.

Matunda ya mti wa katikati ambayo Mawaziri wetu hawana kula ni:-

1. Kusimamia kampuni yoyote ya biashara;
2. Kuajiriwa au kupokea mshahara katika vyama vya wafanyakazi au ushirika;
3. Kujiingiza katika mambo ya biashara ambayo yanaweza kuhitilafiana na kazi za uwaziri;
4. Kutumia habari za siri ambazo wanapata katika uwaziri kwa kujipatia faida wenyewe au kuwapatia faida rafiki zao;
5. Kuunga mkono mpango wowote ambamo wanatumainiwa kupata faida;
6. Kutumia vyeo vyao ili kuwapendelea watu katika haki;
7. Kupokea rushwa;
8. Kununua hisa katika biashara;
9. Kutangaza habari kwa simu ya upepo au kutunga vitabu au kuandika makala katika magazeti wakati wowote wanaposhika uwaziri.

The Editor accepted the usefulness of most of these rules, except number 8 and 9. He could not see the reason why ministers should not own shares in commercial enterprises or write articles, even if they would favour those enterprises. His argument was that such a denial was a denial of citizen rights: were they to sell the shares they already held? the Editor quipped.

## CHAPTER SIX

### Independence and the Institutionalization of Ujamaa

## Chapter Six INDEPENDENCE AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF UJAMAA

With the triumph of the nationalists in the 1958 and 1959 elections, the differences between the nationalists and the working people began to come to the fore. These differences resulted in intense struggles at the eve of independence and after. The struggles by the state against the workers were waged under the banner of development of the country and the welfare of the peasants. In the process of fighting the workers, from the very early days, questions about poverty, the sufferings of the people, universal brotherhood, education, economic development and reconciliation and welfare of all social groups were raised within the context of socialism. These struggles were to culminate in the breaking of the autonomy of the mass and social organizations. In this process it was the *democratic revolution* which was being defeated, and the state, at the same time, was being raised to a "monolithic organ epitomized in the concentration of power in the executive"

This chapter outlines the struggles which took place from around the eve of independence to the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967. At the same time, it shows the changing ideological forms within those struggles. Attempts are also made to show the way the working masses were defeated, and the particular interests which were being defended by the ideology of Ujamaa.

### 6.1 *The Nationalists, the Workers and Development*

As far back as 1957, to the nationalists, the major demands were: self-government and development of the country. This amounted to a democratic majority rule government which protected the minority rights-

-those of the Asians and Europeans--and equal and fair treatment under the law. By 1956 the Asian Association was advising its members not to subscribe to the government-formed United Tanganyika Party (UTP); that UTP's support for parity constitution amounted to entrenchment of racial differences while its franchise proposals were counter to all democratic principles. The Association had asserted:

As stated in the past, belief in non-racialism and nationhood is a matter of conviction with us, and not expediency. We take this opportunity of reiterating these principles and are prepared to join hands with others in taking practical steps to achieve the nationhood of Tanganyika, without presumptions, without reservations and without fear.<sup>2</sup>

It was not the Asian Association only which supported TANU: even among the Europeans, it was mostly the settlers who still thought in terms of domination of Africans who did not support TANU.<sup>3</sup> After 1957, many Europeans were unwilling to support every British policy in Tanganyika: they had reached a stage where they accepted a timetable for political reforms.

From being viewed as extremists in their demands in the early days of the formation of the nationalist movement, Nyerere and TANU were by 1958 being viewed as moderates. This was mainly because of TANU's attitude towards primary resistance on the one hand, and its support for the government's quest for law and order and its development programmes on the other. When protesting against the government's attempt to muzzle TANU in some areas which were rife with struggles in 1957, Nyerere admitted that the government had the right and obligation to keep order in the country: "'We preach all over the country obedience to Government and respect for authority,' he said. In one of the speeches in question,... Nyerere had attacked certain aspects of government policy,

but had exhorted his audience 'to be civilized' since it was the duty of all races to try and cooperate and live peacefully together in the country."<sup>4</sup>

In Mwanza, where TANU had built itself up by soliciting support on the basis of opposition to government's agricultural policies as a threat to people's way of life, after the 1958 TANU victory in the polls, the people took it that self-government was imminent and they increased opposition to all native authority rules. The situation had become so serious by November 1958 that Nyerere went to Mwanza to make a special appeal. In his address to a group of 10,000 people, he emphasized that law and order must be maintained: "TANU intends its members to obey the laws of the country....All other countries have laws, irrespective of the party in power". TANU's policy was not to disobey laws, and it was wrong to do so. "He added without further explanation that the 'TANU of today' was quite different from the 'TANU of yesterday.'"<sup>5</sup>

Europeans and Asians who were elected in the 1958 and 1959 polls were those who were backed by TANU. Among the successful Asian candidates were M.N. Rattansey and Amir Jamal, both leaders of the Asian Association. Amir Jamal was to become a minister. Jamal maintained and argued that the only way for Asians to live in Tanganyika was to identify themselves with the indigenous majority. As for the European candidates, the most prominent was Derek Bryceson.<sup>6</sup> The franchise qualifications in these elections were: 21 years of age or above and residence in the country of three years or more; possession of either educational training equivalent to standard VIII or higher, or an income

of more than £150 per annum, or qualifying experience. The same qualifications were used in the 1960 elections, despite TANU's protest.

By this time, it had become clear to the nationalists that for the territory to have political stability based on a rapidly expanding economy, Europeans and Asians had a major role to play. Beyond that, the last years of the 1950s also witnessed the attack by Nyerere and the nationalists on racialism whether in its scientific guise or otherwise, and urging of the immigrant nationalities to regard themselves as Tanganyikans.<sup>7</sup> To demonstrate genuineness in these respects, in the 1958 campaigns, non-Africans were even invited to address meetings of TANU supporters.<sup>8</sup> Addressing the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in September 1959, Nyerere affirmed his stance on equal rights of all citizens regardless of race in the following terms:

Here we are, building up sympathy of the outside world on the theme of human rights. We are telling the world that we are fighting for our rights as human beings. We gained the sympathy of friends all over the world--in Asia, in Europe, in America--people who recognize the justice of our demands for human rights....Are we going to turn round then, tomorrow after we have achieved independence and say, 'To hell with all this nonsense about human rights; we were only using that as a tactic to harness the sympathy of the naive'? Human nature is sometimes depraved I know but I don't believe it is depraved to that extent. I don't believe that the leaders of the people are going to behave as hypocrites to gain their ends, and turn round and do exactly the things which they have been fighting against. I say again to my friends the non-Africans in East Africa, that when we say we want to establish the rights of individuals in our countries, irrespective of race, we mean it.<sup>9</sup>

By 1959, through the *Tanganyika Standard*, some non-Africans were calling on TANU to open its membership to people of other races. The non-Africans were voicing their commitment to the nationalist leadership. To many observers, racialism had practically vanished from



the political scene by 1959; and the tendency was to regard everybody as a Tanganyikan, as a result of which Asians did not see any necessity for minority privileges politically.<sup>10</sup> TANU membership for non-Africans was opened in 1960; and two Asians and one European were named to the new executive committee of the TANU parliamentary party. In October the same year, Tanganyika was granted "responsible government" when the new LEGCO met for the first time. The new LEGCO had 81 members, of which 52 were Africans, 16 Europeans, 11 Asians, 1 Arab and 1 Goan.

This first new LEGCO was marked by a developing gap between the TANU leadership and the nationalists on the back benches, as a result of the question of Africanization of the civil service. TANU had promised to carry out a programme of Africanization as quickly as possible, but by October 1960 it was voiced that TANU believed in localization rather than Africanization, i.e. preference was for local people of any race rather than Africans only. The pressure for Africanization had begun to build up within TANU, and it had become a major issue before independence, as the 1958 TANU Conference in respect to the question of participation in the elections had shown, given the racial parity issue in the elections. This had resulted in the formation of the splinter group--African National Congress (ANC)--whose motto was "Africa for Africans". It was the TANU back benchers who were the most vociferous in the opposition with support and pressure from the white collar government and East African High Commission employees.<sup>11</sup> The opposition felt that the pace of Africanization was not rapid enough and advocated that Africans be given preference over non-Africans. At the same time, the state machinery was predominantly manned by Europeans and Asians. Africans were mostly in the low clerical posts at best: "In the civil

service Africans held 1,170 of the 4,452 senior and middle grade posts in 1961. The position in the professions was worse. In 1962 only 16 out of 184 physicians, one of 84 civil engineers, and 2 of 57 lawyers were Africans."<sup>12</sup>

The differences developed further when it came to the question of school integration in order to abolish the separate school system. This was in relation to the Education Ordinance of 1961, whereby it was proposed that the separate school system be dismantled within three years. The TANU government announced that this process of integration would take place gradually, at which C.K. Tumbo, the leader of the Railway Union declared: "I am for revolution. If we want integration, we should integrate, and we should not embark on half measures."<sup>13</sup> All these aspects were to be taken up again in 1961 when the National Assembly (formerly LEGCO) debated the government policy on Tanganyika citizenship.

The government had proposed that citizenship be granted automatically to any adult person who was born in Tanganyika, and any born of one or both parents neither of whom were born in Tanganyika was to be given two years to decide if he or she wished to become Tanganyikan citizen. The system of dual citizenship was to be ended. The opposition wanted to withhold citizenship from all non-Africans; even if their parents were Tanganyika-born they wanted them to apply on individual basis for citizenship. The opposition was profoundly suspicious of Europeans and Asians. The arguments of the opposition can be summarized in the words of one member of Parliament who was to become a regional commissioner and a parliamentary secretary:

I think 75 per cent of the non-African population still regard an African in Tanganyika as an inferior human being. Why

is it so? It is because the white population has been dominating us, both economically and politically, and their neighbours, the Asians, have been economically dominating us, we Africans....Do you think the individual African forming the vast majority of the population will agree to have equal rights with the Europeans and the Asians? My answer is no....All foreigners who are living in Tanganyika and have transferred their money to their home countries should within the period of five years bring their money back. I repeat...they must bring it back. From now on those foreigners who are rich...should contribute at least 15 per cent of their money to us, the Tanganyika National Fund.<sup>14</sup>

In fact, the Citizenship Bill provoked anti-Commonwealth and racist sentiments among those who were in the opposition.

Nyerere attacked those in the opposition as glorifiers of race just like Hitler, "the Verwoeds of South Africa", as racists who saw it as perfectly all right to discriminate against Europeans and Asians, but wrong when it was an African who was being discriminated against. According to Nyerere, the crime of the world consisted in the "oppression of man by man". It was the treatment by those in power of those without power as if they were animals and not human beings, a crime which they had been fighting against: "this government has rejected , and rejected completely any idea that citizenship with the duties and the rights of citizens of this country are going to be based upon anything except loyalty to this country."<sup>15</sup>

Underlying these debates, in essence, was the question of capital accumulation/acquisition by the government for the improvement of the economy and the question of distribution of those resources between the different sections of the population. For the government, it was absolutely imperative that the economy should expand rapidly; and this was the challenge facing the nationalists. The nationalists had been given economic advice by the World Bank, which drew up the Three Year

Plan for the Development of Tanganyika (1961-64). The Plan had recommended the country to embark upon Import Substitution Industrialization and industrialization for processing raw materials for export. Because the government had limited resources, it had been suggested that the only efforts which would yield effective results would be to encourage private investment, and this should be greater than government investment. To achieve the optimum industrial development it had been recommended that the government must:

*...maintain and enhance the presently favourable climate for private investment. This is necessary to encourage groups such as foreign investors, already established residents of 'European' and 'Asian' descent and indigenous 'African' population to risk an investment of time and funds to develop Tanganyika's industrial potential. We found no evidence of government attitudes or policies inimical to industrial development; but, with independence and the natural desire to improve the economic status of the general population, however strong political pressure may develop against profits. Specific government action may be necessary to encourage public understanding of the complex factors which make industrial enterprise attractive to those who provide capital and management, as well as those who provide labour and raw material resources. In a very real sense, Tanganyika must sell its labour in the world market in competition with other countries.*<sup>16</sup>

It was necessary for the government to offer special inducement to accelerate expansion of industrial activities with a minimum drain upon government resources, for example, by "tax reductions or exemptions; protective tariffs; tariff rebates; aid in securing sites, building, and raw materials; licencing; training grants; favourable loans; and even subsidies."<sup>17</sup> A public development corporation to attract additional capital was also proposed.

The government passed a Foreign Investment Protection Act in 1963.<sup>18</sup> The Act incorporated all the above aspects. Besides that: no industry could be nationalized without full compensation. The terms of

repatriation of earnings from Tanganyika and the protection of companies and shareholders in this Act, as pointed out in the 1967 *A Short Guide to Investors*, were in accordance with the principles of English Commercial Law.<sup>19</sup> Opening the Association of Chambers of Eastern Africa in the same year, Nyerere told the members: "There is a great deal to be done in Tanganyika, the combined resources of the government and private investment are inadequate to do all these things which need doing in the country. I repeat, therefore, that the government wishes to work with private investors for the development of Tanganyika."<sup>20</sup> Private investment, according to Nyerere, was required because of the need to improve the lives of the people of the country rather than a simple fancy for machines and "erecting complex systems of distribution and exchange" or because factories improve the scenery. The terms of the investors:

...when we say we want private investment on our own terms we do not imply a limitation on the purposes and practices of private investment in Tanganyika. Private capital cannot just 'take'; it cannot just exploit the workers or the society for the interests of the owners. Workers must have reasonable conditions, and salaries in proportion to their output in a well managed concern. And they must have respect. These two things are essential for the health of any enterprise in the new Tanganyika.<sup>21</sup>

Beyond that, "however good the conditions in a particular factory or industry," the workers could not be isolated from the rest of the society: "We are committed to a philosophy of African socialism, and basic to this is the principle of human equality. One of our concerns therefore, must be to prevent the growth of a class structure in our society..."<sup>22</sup> This meant, it was essential to bridge the gap in incomes between those who are employed and the "vast mass" of the people existing at subsistence level. It was necessary to improve the wages and

conditions at the "bottom of the economic scale, with the avowed intention of reducing the present inequalities of earnings." He concluded: "Let no one base a claim for increased income on the fact that his position has been worsened relatively to those below him--for it is our intention that it should be."<sup>23</sup> These statements were in fact an affirmation of what he wrote in December 1959 on the need for foreign investments in the earliest stages of independence so as to "raise the standards of living of the common people here in the shortest possible time."<sup>24</sup>

The arguments about reducing inequalities between the employed and the vast majority of the population working on the land were directed to the workers and their demands. So far, the discussion has laid the groundwork for a consideration of the workers struggles at the eve of independence and after.

The conflicts between the nationalists and the workers began with the nationalist victory in 1958-59. It started with TANU's refusal to support the strikes by the sisal workers in Tanga, the mine workers in Mwadui and the Railway and Postal workers. The biggest strike just before internal self government was the 82 days strike by the Railway workers which followed on the heels of the postal strike which had begun on 24th December 1959 and involved 1,250 workers. Both the Railway and Postal services were under the East African High Commission. Among the issues involved in these strikes was the political inaccessibility of the High Commission and its lack of sensitivity to local pressure, as one of the problems which exacerbated the situation.<sup>25</sup> The East African Railways and Harbours was the largest service of the East African High Commission--an interterritorial body of the East African colonies

administered and controlled from Nairobi with very little regional representational powers in the constituent countries. When the Railway and Postal workers who pressed for wage demands, Africanization of jobs, housing, etc. went on strike in 1959, TANU did not support the workers as it had usually done before that.<sup>26</sup> This enraged the unionists, because they could not understand why even at "TANU's accession to power, the management of the high commission services remained politically inaccessible." This resulted in demand by trade unionists that the High Commission be ended and the services taken over by Tanganyika ministers in the government.<sup>27</sup> By June 1960, TANU was supporting the federation of East Africa and the High Commission was seen as the basis for future federation. This incident resulted in the split within TFL--between those who supported TANU (M. Kamaliza's faction) and those who were against it (K. Tumbo's faction). In the same year, the Mwadui Mine workers had called for a strike to demand high wages and improved conditions. They expected the support of a fully TANU government; instead, the TANU government stood against them.<sup>28</sup>

In the debates on Africanization TFL was part of the opposition. It believed that a direct and open policy of Africanization was the only way which could remove the racial imbalances in employment and enable African workmen to achieve progress.<sup>29</sup> This issue was to develop through a series of crises, "in which unions implicitly threatened an ultimate seizure of the railways and the sisal plantations".<sup>30</sup> There were 203 industrial disputes in 1960 which involved 89,000 workers; 101 disputes in 1961 involving 29,000 workers; and 153 disputes in 1962 involving 48,000 workers.<sup>31</sup> Thus the debates were taking place in the midst of a wave of strikes.

The threats by the workers to take over the enterprises were not empty. After engaging in a series of strikes from the end of the 1950s, the Dar es Salaam Dockworkers and Stevedores had reached a point where they were transcending a purely industrial relations consciousness. They began to look on the possibility of replacing the private ownership of the enterprise. The enterprise was controlled by the East African Common Services Organization which owned a 51 per cent interest in the landing and shipping company, and stevedoring was owned privately. According to Iliffe, the General Secretary of their Union--Mr Ngahyoma--was by early 1961 vaguely contemplating "some form of cooperative control" of the harbour:

He knew that there was a form of workers' control over ports in Israel, and during 1961 he visited Israel to study this. On his return late in 1961, Ngahyoma announced that the dockers would form a Docker Workers Welfare and Economic Investment Fund, to which each union member would contribute Shs. 500.00...This fund would finance two sorts of economic undertaking, cooperative welfare projects and the operation of the port...After discussing the proposal a general conference in June 1962 added to the union's aims those of making 'proper provision for the adequate participation of workers in the control and management of the industries' and assisting 'the formation of workers' cooperatives such as industrial cooperatives, Productive cooperatives, Consumers' cooperatives and such other cooperatives as will be deemed fit financially or otherwise thus taking the effective step towards the establishment of a truly democratic socialist state'....<sup>32</sup>

The workers finally succeeded in excluding private ownership in 1963, but the government declared that the profits of the industry were to go to the nation, and not the dockers.<sup>33</sup> The sisal workers had also threatened to take over the sisal plantations.

There were disturbing reports from the upcountry districts in 1960, for example, from Lake Province where Asian shopkeepers were being threatened. On several occasions just before independence, the Minister



for Home Affairs, George Kahama, had to warn the people against their hostile behaviour to the immigrant nationalities and urged them to treat people of other races with respect. There was a possibility of upcountry unrest, as the cases of Mbeya, Iringa and other places demonstrated--where there were reprisals and violence.<sup>34</sup> Besides the strikes which were taking place, various unions, among the teachers' and medical workers' unions, were threatening strike action.<sup>35</sup>

The government had to take a strong stance against all this. It was necessary to do so because with independence approaching, the government was already facing a financial crisis due to its dependency on British funds for development purposes. Nyerere declared that the country could not afford to meet the wage demands of the people. He threatened to dismiss all the government workers who went on strike after their demands had been considered. This statement provoked some of the most "concentrated and persistent criticism Nyerere had ever faced".<sup>36</sup>

Through a circular letter in early 1961, Nyerere had informed the trade unionists that trade unions formed a political wing of the party, and that it was absurd for them to talk about independence from the party. It was necessary for the party and the trade unions to co-operate in order to achieve the desired goals.<sup>37</sup> He was to repeat this message in June 1961 when he pointed out that TANU and TFL are the same body, and therefore inseparable:

If I try to walk from point A to B, by definition of 'walking', my legs will cooperate in taking me there; I do not even have to appeal to logic. Still less do I have to worry about whether the independence of my right or left leg is being undermined by its need to seek cooperation of the other! Either both legs are mine or they are not. If both are mine they must cooperate; to contemplate anything else is to contemplate absurdity. If, however, I may indulge in such an absurdity for a moment, the inference is obvious: if either one of my legs were to be persuaded that too close co-operation with the other would be an

infringement of independence, neither one of them would arrive anywhere at all! Similarly, either the trade unions and political organization are prongs, or 'legs' of the same nationalist movement or they are not. If they are, then the question of whether they would or should not cooperate in getting the country from point A to point B does not arise. They must cooperate.<sup>38</sup>

The workers and the trade unions were refusing to co-operate, because for them, "independence meant, among other things, independence or freedom to stage strikes" and demand higher wages and better living conditions.<sup>39</sup>

In the February 1960 Railway strike, which began in Dar es Salaam and involved all railway workers in all the towns, the workers were demanding higher wages and better working conditions. In Tanga, workers who refused to join the strike were beaten by the strikers, and passengers were threatened by the workers and people were called upon to boycott the trains and railway buses. Police patrols became necessary all over Tanga.<sup>40</sup> TFL supported the railway workers and condemned all Europeans and Asians who black-legged. The President of TFL expressed his shock at the actions of the Europeans and Asians for volunteering: "It is most unfortunate that while in Tanganyika leaders of all communities talk of how to build a country in which people of all origins and creeds shall live together in peace and as members of one nation, some elements engage themselves in perpetuating racial prejudice".<sup>41</sup> The Asian Harbours Workers' Association asked its members not to blackleg after this appeal. The secretary of the Association wrote that they should not regard themselves as Tanganyikans if they did not support their African brothers in their utmost need: "It must be understood that our African brothers are fighting for a better living and as such no Asians should stand in their way."<sup>42</sup> Finally, it was only

Europeans who went on blacklegging. This strike ended after eleven and a half weeks, and it was a great blow to the national economy.

The railway strike was immediately followed by the postal strike in June 1960. This strike began in Dar es Salaam and spread to Morogoro, Dodoma, Iringa, Mbeya, Tabora, Mwanza and Bukoba. TFL supported the strike by giving Shs. 10/= to each worker per day. The strike went on for three weeks until the postal partially authority conceded the wage demands. In all these strikes which involved essential services--the communication system--it was the government which was most hit. The TANU general meeting of 1961 vehemently condemned the strikes, and "called upon the government to take stern measures against any workers who would unlawfully indulge in strike action."<sup>43</sup>

Soon after independence, the government began to look for possibilities of restructuring the trade union movement and strengthening its links with the Ministry of Labour. Mr Michael Kamaliza, a former trade unionist, then Minister for Labour and Health suggested that TFL become part of the ministry.<sup>44</sup> By the beginning of 1962, total and unconditional Africanization had become the catchword among the trade union leaders. Some workers, for example, the Tanganyika Plantation Workers' Union, went on strike with demands for Africanization and wage increases and they called upon TANU to Africanize or face a general strike.<sup>45</sup> In most of the strikes at this period, as was openly declared by the plantation workers, the railway workers and the dockers, the workers threatened to take over the enterprises from the owners and put them into their own hands.

The workers struggles were condemned by the government--in the words of Nyerere--as "evil things", as the "law of the jungle",<sup>46</sup> although

during the breweries strike in 1958, they had been viewed by the nationalists as the last weapon of the workers.<sup>47</sup> The government was forced to increase the minimum wage in 1962, and also provide fringe benefits. At the same time, three bills were passed so as to curb industrial disputes: (1) Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act No 43, (2) Trade Union (Amendment) Act No 51, and (3) Civil Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act No 52. The right to strike was made illegal by making arbitration compulsory by the first Act mentioned. The second Act sought to create a strong TFL to which all trade unions were obliged to affiliate. TFL, in turn was to be under the control and supervision of the state through the Minister of Labour and the Registrar of Trade Unions. Thus the colonial banning of strikes in "essential services" of the 1940s and 1950s was by 1962 generalized and made applicable to all sectors. With the third Act, all civil servants earning above £702 per annum were prohibited from becoming members of trade unions.

TFL was more or less brought under government control by 1962. Introducing the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, the Labour Minister, Mr Kamaliza declared that the trade union legislation which was introduced under colonialism made it easy "for a few dissidents to set up a federation in conflict with the federation" which provided "the effective leadership of trade union movement....Nothing but harm can come out of such divisions. The government wants a united leadership in the interests of the workers and the country."<sup>48</sup> The Act empowered the Registrar of Trade Unions to suspend from office the officials he considered responsible for mismanagement in the trade union; and the government was to check over the accounts of trade unions.<sup>49</sup>

These Acts were condemned by the trade unionists. Victor Mkello, one of the trade unionists, remarked that this attempt to control the trade union movement "would destroy its independence and would take from the workers the right to determine and pursue their own policy and freely utilize their finances."<sup>50</sup> Another trade union leader was to declare: the "forcible way of treating the trade union will show how much the government is scared of well-organized bodies in the country. These proposals are a national shame--and the TFL is ashamed of the Government's desire to oppress workers".<sup>51</sup> The Tanganyika Postal Workers Union claimed that if these Acts were passed, then a "perpetual war between the Government and the workers will start--a war which will cut Tanganyika completely from foreign investment."<sup>52</sup> The Acts were viewed as an abrogation of "human rights to the working people of [the] country".<sup>53</sup> It was asserted that the bills made one conclude that "we have come out of the clutches of colonialism and are fast moving into totalitarianism", and freedom, it seemed, meant freedom for ministers to assume dictatorial powers rather than further democratization.<sup>54</sup> All the trade unions condemned the bills in the strongest terms.

The Area Commissioners, Regional Commissioners and some of the elected members of the National Assembly who supported the Trade Union bill, elaborated the arguments of the Minister for Labour and Health and emphasized that the government was a workers' government and could not possibly legislate against the workers. They argued that it was necessary for the workers to remember that they formed only a small minority and that the government had to take into consideration the interests of the vast majority of the population.

These arguments tallied with Nyerere's elaboration of the philosophy of African Socialism and the problems of development in the same year. Nyerere had pointed out that Tanganyika was a poor country where living standards of the people were shamefully low. All people were required to take up the challenge and work to the limit of their ability for the good of the whole society so as to enable Tanganyika to prosper and become self-reliant; and this prosperity was to be shared by all the people:

The true socialist may not exploit his fellows. So that if the members of any group within our society are going to argue that, because they happen to be contributing more to the national income than some other groups, they must therefore take for themselves a greater share of the profits of their own industry than they actually need; and if they insist on this in spite of the fact that it would mean reducing their group's contribution to the general income and thus slowing down the rate at which the community can benefit, then that group is exploiting (or trying to exploit) its fellow human beings. It is displaying a capitalist attitude of mind.<sup>55</sup>

In more explicit terms, the wages and better conditions demands by the workers were a display of capitalist tendencies. This was wrong and it needed to be corrected if socialism was to be built. In spite of the resistance by the trade unionists the bills were passed. Hitherto, the state's control over trade unions had been through powers of registration: with the 1962 Act (No 51) there was further consolidation of the control.

The Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act 1962 (No 43) outlawed strikes and set up conciliation and arbitration, whereby disputes could only be settled by negotiations. Lock-outs and strikes became illegal: they became offenses which were punishable by fine or imprisonment. This was an abolition of collective bargaining and the loss of independence of the trade union movement. With this legislation, the number of strikes

fell. In 1963, there were 85 strikes which involved 27,207 workers as opposed to 1962 when there were 152 strikes.<sup>56</sup> But the dispute between the government and TFL simmered on. In December 1962, the General Secretary of the Plantation Workers' Union, also president of TFL, Mr Victor Mkello, and the Organizing Secretary of TFL were rusticated to Sumbawanga--one of the most remote areas of Tanganyika--following the strikes in the sisal industry; Tumbo from the Railway Workers Union, also leader of TFL had by then been posted as a High Commissioner in the U.K. as a means to eliminate the opposition.<sup>57</sup> Tumbo returned within a few months to form an opposition party--Peoples' Democratic Party. The public attacks on the government for pressing the hated legislation, lack of Africanization and other matters continued, with the trade unionists as the most vociferous critics.<sup>58</sup>

The attacks resurfaced with more acuteness after September 1963 when the Minister for Labour, Mr Kamaliza circulated a secret proposal for reorganizing TFL as a national workers union to be integrated in the ministry.<sup>59</sup> Except for the Transport and General Workers Union and the Domestic and Hotel Workers Union, TFL and all other trade unions rejected these proposals. In January 1964, the final blow was delivered upon the trade unions. In this month, the Tanganyika Rifles (the army) mutinied, with demands for higher pay and Africanization of the officer corps. The mutiny was finally suppressed by British troops. As a result of this mutiny some 200 trade union leaders, including many members of the TFL executive committee were detained on the pretext that they had attempted to make contact with the mutineers.<sup>60</sup> With this mutiny, the previously long-hesitant government had the justification for drastically curbing both the trade union movement and the army as major

sources of opposition. Within a month of the mutiny, the government hastily passed in the parliament the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act No 18 of 1964 (NUTA), which dissolved the TFL and its member unions and established one union. NUTA was not to be a voluntary organization of the workers: membership was constituted by law. The law also gave power to the President of the Republic to dissolve it if he was satisfied that the union had failed to carry out its objectives. The General Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of the Union were to be appointed by the President of the country, and the General Secretary was to appoint the financial Secretary.<sup>61</sup> These positions were to be executive. Some of the provisional rules and objectives of NUTA were:

(1) The principle objects of the Union shall be the regulation of relations between workmen and employers and between workmen and workmen, and the provision of benefits for its members.

(2) The Union shall become affiliated to the Tanganyika African National Union and shall do everything in its power to promote policies of Tanganyika African National Union, and shall encourage its members to join the Tanganyika African National Union.<sup>62</sup>

The first Secretary General of NUTA was also the Minister for Labour. NUTA was essentially part of the state; and the autonomous trade union movement was dead.

In the same year, the government passed the Security of Employment Act No 62 of 1964, and the National Provident Fund Act of 1964. The former legislated for the formation of workers committees--something which was attempted by the colonial government in 1951--which were to be consultative organs on matters concerning workers welfare. In essence, their functions were reduced to the enforcement of discipline and



helping the employers.<sup>63</sup> The committees were to encourage industrial peace, productivity and efficiency at the factory level.<sup>64</sup>

The National Provident Fund Act (NPF) was established on the advice of the International Labour Organization (ILO). ILO had been advising the government on this matter since 1962, after it had successfully established such a Fund in Nigeria. The Fund was to be established as a social security scheme with the aim of providing benefits for old age. It entailed contribution of 5 per cent by both the employer and the employee. According to Kamaliza who introduced the bill, this scheme was introduced in view of the recognition that the workers had no comprehensive social security scheme. The colonialists had denied the workers such a scheme on the pretext that the wage earners had *shambas* (farms) in the country where they would return after the wage days were over: "What an attitude for any government to adopt in the twentieth century."<sup>65</sup> According to Kamaliza, beyond the considerations of the provision of benefits to the workers in times of need (for example, in sickness or unemployment for more than three months), it was important to legislate the Act because it did not involve government financial risks nor administrative costs. The government would benefit from this scheme, because the NPF would be investing in government securities. The existing schemes, such as the Workmen's Compensation and Severance Allowance of 1962 already invested assets in securities in Tanganyika (13.5 per cent), East Africa (38.4 per cent), England (35.5 per cent) and else where (12.6 per cent). The government was to make sure that such a situation did not arise with the NPF. NPF was to play a very important role in capital formation by investing its surplus monies in trustee within Tanganyika, as capital for further development. NPF would

become the largest institutional investor in Tanganyika, and it was expected to contribute £9 million in the First Five Year Development Plan (1964-69). NPF was to help the workers as well as the development plans. Accordingly, this scheme was the first step in the provision of a solid foundation of a "welfare state of which we, as socialists, can be proud."<sup>66</sup>

The government was quite determined to bring about development by any means. Thus from 1964 the number of strikes fell, and the few strikes which took place after that were sporadic and spontaneous and were waged without the leadership of NUTA. The structure of NUTA did "not augur well for the control of the union by its members";<sup>67</sup> and this was even revealed by the Presidential Commission which investigated NUTA in 1966. It was observed that there was no "adequate and visible means of democratic expression."<sup>68</sup>

These struggles against the workers and for development were taking place within the process of strengthening the state machinery; a process which was to condemn to political nullity even the capitalist elements alongside the other classes and raise the state as a monolithic structure which was to dominate the civil society completely and arbitrate social struggles from above. The next section deals with this process.

## *6.2 Ideological Consolidation and Institutional Changes*

The Independence Constitution was tabled in early 1961. The Constitution took the Westminster model, with a head of state (who was the Governor General by then) and a head of government (who was Prime Minister by then). The former enjoyed no real powers and the latter

wielded real authority. Sir Richard Turnbull was the first and the last Governor General acting on behalf of the Queen before Tanganyika became a Republic with a new constitution in 1962; and J.K. Nyerere who was the Prime Minister before independence continued in the same capacity before Tanganyika became a Republic. At the same time the Legislative Council was transformed to a National Assembly--as a parliamentary form.<sup>69</sup> All the institutions of the colonial state were virtually retained, as were the provisions of law from the colonial government and all the officers holding posts under previous orders. Despite the increased number of the elected members of the Parliament to 71 and its reconstitution by the introduction of the speaker, the National Assembly remained fundamentally unchanged, in that the executive's dominance remained intact. The system of government was such that the Governor and his council of ministers were not accountable to the National Assembly.<sup>70</sup>

The debates in the LEGCO on citizenship, Africanization, education, trade unions, etc. were taking place within the above power framework. At this time, TANU had constituted itself into a government: its leaders had become ministers and out of the 71 seats in the LEGCO, 70 were held by TANU members. The role of the Party and its relation to the grassroot levels significantly changed with TANU constituting itself as a government. At this time, there was no more talk about TANU representing the will of the nation or setting policies for the government to implement. It was accepted, as the members were informed by 1960, that policy was decided by the central government and not the party local representatives; that party political organizations were not the implementors or executors of policies: in Nyerere's own words, "Political parties and therefore members of the Legislative Council, can

certainly play their part by ensuring a good public reception for government policies....the responsibility for carrying out government policies lies with the civil service."<sup>71</sup> In a nutshell, the Party was seen as a conveyor belt between the government and the people.

The above move was in response to the conflict situation which existed in the LEGCO, where it was not only the trade unionists who were in the opposition, but also radical party members. Despite the strength of the executive, parliamentary democracy was already posing problems because of this rebellion among the party members. It was simply impossible to ignore the opposition, given the unrest resulting from the workers actions and the rising expectation of the people in the country at large with the approach of independence. Despite the leaders' call that there was need for greater efforts after independence, with its approach there was general disappointment in that, economically,

For the first time in recent years there was no increase in the national income, and a decrease in exports and in imports of consumer goods caused government revenue to fall. Farmers were suffering from heavy rains and depressed world prices for their goods...The government had hoped that the three-year development plan would lessen popular resentment of economic-racial division of society, but the goals of the plan seemed far off to the workers and villagers.<sup>72</sup>

Besides this, the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund had initially cut the projected funds for the first year of the Three Year Plan by more than half, while at the same time insisting that Tanganyika should pay retirement benefits to colonial officers. Although the British government finally conceded to give more, this aspect had resulted in high anti-Commonwealth sentiments in the LEGCO in 1961 and aggravated the debates on the questions of citizenship, Africanization, etc. discussed above.<sup>73</sup>

The differences in TANU in 1958 had resulted in the formation of a splinter party. There was a possibility that this could happen again by the time TANU went into government, given the situation pointed out above; and if this occurred, it could be more serious because of the possibility of mobilization of the general disaffection. Tanganyika had witnessed the extent to which people could rebel in the 1940s and 1950s, and these rebellions were still taking place. By 1960, Nyerere began to express the undesirability of democracy in the European sense in Africa--a democracy in which one party was in the government and another in the opposition. He pointed out that this was not an essential part of democracy: democracy meant government decisions were reached by discussion. Opposition parties were a mockery to democracy: in African traditions problems at the family level were discussed in order to reach agreement and find solutions. Transferred to a clan, tribe, or beyond that, the purpose of the discussion was to reach an agreement. Nyerere felt that it was wrong in Africa to impose organized opposition for the sake of opposition: this was contrary to the basic attitudes of Africans and people would not understand this at all.<sup>74</sup>

These conceptions were evolving within the framework of the objectives and aims of TANU, whereby, by 1960 Nyerere and his Party colleagues had prepared a statement which committed them to the creation of a democratic and socialist state in Tanganyika.<sup>75</sup> At the same time, these views were a continuation of the political, economic and social views which have been reviewed in the preceding chapters; only this time, they were being institutionalized in a situation where the government and those who were expected to help in the development of the country--the capitalists--were under threat as a result of the general

unrest. The state and the capitalists--mainly Europeans, Asians and some few Africans--depended on the effective control of the masses of the workers and peasants for stability if the goals of development were to be achieved as laid down in the Three Year Development Plan and later on in the First Five Year Plan (1964-69). In this respect, there was a fundamental unity between the capitalists and the state. Under the conditions of rebellion outside and inside the parliament, the very pre-conditions of existence of both the state and the capitalists were at stake.

In 1961, Nyerere was to publish an article which rejected the suggestion that a two-party system was necessary for democracy. According to him, what was necessary for democracy was "discussion, equality, and freedom" with the latter being implied in the former two. There was no doubt that Africans had the ability to discuss--and this was African and so was the sense of equality. Where there were distinct aristocratic Africans by birth (for example, among the Wahaya and Waha), these were to be traced historically to sources outside the continent. Africans, traditionally knew no 'class' and it was doubtful whether there was an equivalent for 'class' or 'caste' in African languages. African societies, whether ruled by chiefs or not, were societies of equals and business in these societies was conducted through discussion. Organized opposition was not an essential element in African societies because it was not possible to talk about classes or groups where none existed. *The establishment of a one-party state was desirable because there was no need of artificial distinction between politicians and civil servants*<sup>76</sup>:

In our traditional society the African has always been an individual, very much a member of his community, but seeing no

conflict between his own interests and those of the community. This is because the structure of his society was, in fact, a direct extension of the family. First you had the small family unity; this merged into larger 'blood' family which, in its turn, merged into the tribe. The affairs of the community....were conducted by free and equal discussion, but nevertheless *the African's mental conception of 'Government' was personal--not institutional. When the word 'Government' was mentioned, the African thought of the chief; he did not, as does the Briton, think of a grand building in which a debate was taking place.*"<sup>77</sup>

The struggle for freedom from foreign domination in the new nations, according to Nyerere, was a patriotic one which necessarily left no room for differences. The struggles for independence united all elements in the country facing a similar challenge. It was the nationalist movement which led the people; and having united and led them to independence it inevitably formed the first government of the new state: "It could hardly be expected that a united country should halt in mid-stream and voluntarily divide itself into opposing political groups just for the sake of conforming to what I have called the 'Anglo-Saxon form of democracy' at the moment of independence."<sup>78</sup>

As has been pointed out, these conceptions were a continuation of the views outlined in the earlier chapters. After resigning from his post as a teacher in 1956, Nyerere worked as a translator for the Marknoll fathers in Musoma. One of the fathers was to recall that there were times when Nyerere said that the British had romanticized the Maasai, but the Maasai would have to develop like anybody else. They would have to fall in line. Given the vicious circle of not enough food to be able to work hard and not enough money to buy food, "He said he knew that Tanganyika would have to build a strong Presidency into its constitution, and yet somehow protect the individual, a big problem."<sup>79</sup>

The reality at independence was far from merely discussions and reaching agreements, or questions of organized opposition. Organized opposition to TANU in Tanganyika whether before independence or after in the form of political parties had always been weak.<sup>e0</sup> The political parties were not the major problem; rather, besides the problem posed by the workers, the general public had taken the view that TANU's sole purpose had been to achieve independence, and thus, there was no need for any further contributions to the party funds. Such people were backed by chiefs, headmen, elders, witchdoctors, etc., people who were apprehensive of the new regime which threatened to sweep away their authority.<sup>e1</sup> Also, people had come to believe that with independence they would not be compelled to pay taxes, there would be easy jobs and higher wages, "others no further need to work at all." Then there was the drought, and the fact that although Sir Ernest Vasy, the Finance Minister, had predicted a stable regime because foreign capital would pour in to develop the country, there was no sign of this happening.<sup>e2</sup> The number of the unemployed was on the increase with independence, as a result of the young people flocking to the towns clamouring for jobs. There was also the clamour for schools, hospitals and other social services. More appalling was the fact that the average African family income remained at less than £100 a year while the average non-African family income was more than £1,000 a year--thus the class hostility which was defined racially.

Several violent attacks on non-Africans were taking place, and the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr George Kahama, was often making appeals to people to practice restraint. Kahama was at one point forced to rebuke publicly the TANU Youth League members who, "often with genuinely good



intentions and convinced that they were serving the public will but without a shred of constitutional authority, had arrested, questioned and punished people."<sup>83</sup> This contempt for authority and usurpation of the powers of the police had been manifesting itself since the end of the 1950s. When Nyerere became Chief Minister in 1960 "many Tanu members, especially Youth Leagues, were under the impression that power had fallen into their laps. They proceeded in a number of instances to take law in their own hands."<sup>84</sup> From 1960, the TANU government had to attack such elements; it also had to insist on the need to pay taxes and obey authorities. In early 1961

Kahama warned minority political groups that they must end their disrespect for the Government, or be suppressed. He and other ministers launched strong attacks on parties based on tribal or religious affiliation. In August 1961, the Meru Citizens' Union, formed ten years earlier to resist the colonial Government over the Engare Nanyuki evictions was wound up because it had gone on fighting the new central government....<sup>85</sup>

It will be recalled that the Meru Citizens' Union, and the Meru Case in general, in the early 1950s precipitated the rise of nationalist politics on a territorial scale. It was poignantly ironical that this union should be wound up by the nationalist government even before the actual attainment of independence.

A one party-system was defended on the grounds of national unity and the inability of the country to afford divisions as a result of opposition. It was held that there was no room for differences or divisions when the object was to build a nation: "Tanganyika was faced with an emergency in the war against poverty, ignorance and disease, hence opposition could not be allowed to divide the people."<sup>86</sup> The new government insisted that, in order to develop, people had to organize themselves in 'self-help' projects to construct roads, schools,

hospitals, and other projects. By 1962, people had to work for free one day a week on local self-help projects and anyone who failed to turn up was jailed.

Independence was achieved on 9th December 1961. In mid-January 1962 the TANU National Executive met when the air of disquiet and disillusionment was still prevalent. There were attacks from the radical wing of the Party on the moderate policies pursued by the government.<sup>87</sup> This was besides the open rupture which had already occurred between TANU and TFL. Nyerere explained his policies, how such policies had been able to achieve independence, and what the future plans were. He then proposed that if the National Executive did not approve what he was doing, he was going to resign and dedicate his time to the reorganization of the Party, "so as to create the unity badly needed in the difficult years ahead".<sup>88</sup> The government did not have a firm political base for the political and economic policies which it was following, as the citizenship bill and others' introduction had shown in the course of the debates discussed above. The debates in the Parliament had increased the frustrations within the Party. Most leading articles in *Uhuru*, the Party paper, were full of racist abuses of the minorities and anti-British Commonwealth sentiments.<sup>89</sup>

The early political and economic policies stood for continued close dependency upon Britain; and the Three Year Development Plan stood for the continuation of the colonial policies. The problem was, the classes which would have defended and supported such a development policies--the professionals, non-agricultural bourgeoisie and specifically the industrial bourgeoisie--were entirely non-African: "Far from providing a political base for a government pursuing this strategy, the existence of

this bourgeoisie, racially and culturally so distinct from the African majority, was itself a barrier to the general acceptance of the strategy".<sup>90</sup> That is the strategy demanded accelerated Import Substitution Industrialization which depended on foreign capital and mostly the non-African nationalities in the country. As far as the chiefs were concerned, they could not provide a political base for the strategy, because they had all along been associated with the colonial regime; and even the civil service itself was rife with the struggles for Africanization. Not even the police and the military could be relied upon because of the same problem of Africanization.<sup>91</sup> The Party was ridden with these tensions and its support had begun to erode. In short, even the very development programme which promised to raise the standards of living of the people was in danger of being undermined. The racial tensions were not simply because of the inequality in wealth distribution; in reality, many of the non-Africans still remained as arrogant as in the old colonial days. There were cases of racial arrogance and discrimination which were reported even as late as 1964.<sup>92</sup>

Nyerere resigned as Prime Minister in mid-January 1962, and Kawawa took his place as Prime Minister. Nyerere was to dedicate himself to the reorganization of the Party which would enable "people to take full and active part in the fight against poverty, ignorance and disease". Accordingly, this could only be achieved by a creation of a "strong political organization active in every village which acts like a two-way all weather road along which the purposes, plans of the government, can travel to the people the same time as ideas, desires and misunderstanding of the people can travel direct to the government." And that was to be the task of TANU, of the independent government.<sup>93</sup> It was

not necessary for Tanganyika to copy the institutions of other countries: she had to work her own pattern of democracy.<sup>94</sup>

The development of a strong party which would act as a conveyor belt and also force the mass and social organizations, such as the working peoples' movements to become part of the party; and play an effective role in the development process which it had mapped out inevitably meant the development of a one party-state. If this was to be effective, it also meant the strengthening of the whole state machinery. After his resignation, Nyerere spent his time travelling all over the country organizing the Party down to the smallest unit of the frame. Regional Commissioners and District Commissioners were appointed to replace the non-political Provincial and District Commissioners--something which was initially suggested by Nyerere in the LEGCO in 1960. The new Commissioners were TANU members who were to report directly to the Party Chairman: the Party, and not the elected members of Parliament was becoming the source of authority. By 1963, new political geographical boundaries were introduced instead of the old provinces and districts.

In June 1962, a White Paper was published spelling out the form of republic Tanganyika was to take. The principles on which the new constitution was to base itself, according to Nyerere, were: (1) Given the light of the experience, the Republic was to have an executive President; (2) The President, besides having the responsibility for actions of the government, had to have full powers to fulfil his responsibilities; (3) The sovereignty of the Parliament was to remain and this body had power to legislate laws, raise taxes, and vote money; and, (4) Freedom was to be based on the rule of law. What was taking place was the process of concentration of power in the executive and

within the executive, in the office of the President.<sup>95</sup> The 1962 Republican Constitution "made the Presidency an all-powerful institution and the President an absolute ruler who could exercise his powers without any real constitutional inhibitions."<sup>96</sup> In sum, while the role and the status of the Parliament started with a position of "grandeur and omnipotence" in 1961, "it lost its majesty in 1962 when the government ceased to be accountable to it."<sup>97</sup> The splendour of the Parliament was further reduced in 1965 with the introduction of the 1965 Interim Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania which made even the membership of Parliament co-extensive with the membership of "the party and its life became dependent upon the pleasure of the president...."<sup>98</sup>

Writing to the *London Observer* on 3rd June 1962, Nyerere admitted that at times there would be clashes in the four principles of the republic listed above. In order to prevent unnecessary conflict, it had been necessary to be clear in regard to where "the ultimate power and responsibility lie." Thus, the President, "who will be Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and will have full executive authority, will not be bound to accept the advice of his cabinet".<sup>99</sup> The President of Tanganyika was to have more sweeping powers than even the President of United States of America. Checks and balances, according to this article, were breaks on change--i.e. development--something which Tanganyika did not need at all. This was because, lack of capital resources and trained manpower and the unpredictable climatic conditions were already effective brakes to change. What Tanganyika needed were powerful accelerators to "overcome the inertia bred of poverty and the resistance inherent in all societies". Accordingly, there was no place

for "neutral administrators", and hence the proposal of "giving the President power to appoint, promote, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over civil servants and police...while judges will have complete security of tenure once they are appointed, the man who appoints them will be the President". The President was also to have powers to give instructions to the Director of Public Prosecutions. He could dismiss the Parliament, while the Parliament did not have even the power for vote of no confidence; and the President was not to be a member of Parliament, although he could address it whenever necessary.<sup>100</sup> Such was the logic of the Republican Constitution, and to complete the changes, it was announced in January 1963 that the one-party system of government would be introduced.<sup>101</sup> Under this system, only the national ethic of faith could ensue a government of the people. In other words, the whole philosophy of African democracy, African socialism and the perfection of the state and concentration of the powers in the Presidency within the executive was based on developmental reasons.

Although the need to protect human rights following the United Nations bill of rights was recognized within the preamble of the Republican Constitution as a means to protect democratic rights, this was never embodied in the text, and therefore never had the force of law. In 1962, also introduced by the executive was legislation to curtail the rights of individuals: The Preventive Detention Act of 1962 (Cap 490). Nyerere, then a private member of Parliament stated in a press conference that "*the Government was prepared to take the risk of locking up innocent people in order to prevent harm to the state*".<sup>102</sup> According to Kawawa, who was then the Prime Minister, "A Bill of Rights merely invites conflicts of luxury which we can hardly afford to

entertain."<sup>103</sup> The Preventive Detention Act aimed at nipping in the bud all the political trouble makers, opponents, those who plotted to overthrow the government, etc. In this Act people could be detained without trial for an unspecified period. Section 2(1) of the Act stipulated: the President could detain any person where it was shown to his satisfaction that the person was conducting himself so as to be "dangerous to peace and good order in any part of Tanganyika or in a manner prejudicial to the defense of Tanganyika or the security of the state" or when the President was satisfied that under this section it was necessary to "prevent any person acting in a manner prejudicial to peace and good order of Tanganyika or the security of the state." The President could order "under his hand and Public Seal direct detention of that person."<sup>104</sup>

Underlying all these "African democratic" developments, together with the question of "African socialism", whose philosophy was systematized in 1962, was the crisis of economic development which was being aggravated by the rebellion of the working masses. It was assumed that there is an "inherent resistance to change"; and this resistance could only be overcome by strong institutions and a strong individual at the top. The most significant feature of all these policies, including African Socialism was the identification with economic development. The government was to play the most central role in economic development by planning, provision of capital and guidance of the economy in general. The government was to encourage private entrepreneurs, but the process of capital accumulation was seen as primarily a responsibility of the government itself. TANU had pledged to build a democratic socialist society in which the major means of production would be in the hands of

the government.<sup>105</sup> Tanganyika became a republic and hence cut its last political links with Britain on the 9th December 1962. Nyerere became the first President of the Republic.

According to Nyerere, the major task in the transformation of the country was to change the habits of the past and try what was new. One aspect of the "traditional way of life" which needed to be changed, so as to develop agriculture was the old methods of cultivation and the old ways of living. It was necessary to begin using the plough and the tractor, but because people did not have money, and nor did the government have the ability to provide each family with a tractor, it was necessary to make a group of farmers get together and share the cost and the use of a tractor between them.<sup>106</sup> This meant people could not go on living scattered over a wide area "far apart from each other, and still haunted by the old superstitious fear of witchcraft, just as in the old days of our grandfathers". People had to begin living together in proper villages: the task of the government would be to make farmers live together in village communities in order to simplify the provision of social services and even village industries. Moreover, "the growth of village life will help us in improving our system of democratic government". He went on: "It is true that at present both the central Government and our Local government bodies are elected by democratic methods. But, although the methods may be democratic, the operation of democracy itself is not yet what it should be, nor can it be while the majority of our rural population remains so scattered..."<sup>107</sup>

The Three Year-Development Plan was to continue, and the government was to start working on another plan which would include the setting up of villages as one of the priorities, as well as projects which would



help the development of villages. In this endeavour to build a socialist society in Tanganyika, "two very important instruments we shall use for this purpose are the Government itself and the Co-operative Movement."<sup>108</sup> As for the differences which existed between races, tribes and social groups in general, it was necessary to understand the problems within the perspective of the past history, and it did not pay to blame each other instead of pooling the resources of all Tanganyika citizens together in order to build Tanganyika:

To our European and Asian citizens I say: 'I know it is true that the front-rank positions in politics have been taken by Africans. But this is no reason for you to feel yourselves rejected or despised; for on the other hand, where education and wealth are concerned, Europeans and Asians are still in the fore front'. To our African citizens I say: 'Forget the past. It is true that in education and wealth many of the Europeans are still far better off than you are--but political control is in your hands. The Europeans and Asians, even if they wished to do so, cannot use their property or education to harm you'. And to ALL OUR CITIZENS as whole, I say: 'My friends, let every one of us put all he has into the work of building a Tanganyika in which there will be no such distinctions and divisions. Those of you who are educated, make use of your education to help build Tanganyika in which everybody will have opportunity you have had to acquire....Those of you who have capital or who own property, do not try to use your wealth as a weapon with which to oppress your brothers; but use it instead like a trust fund in helping to build a prosperous Tanganyika in which there will be no more gaps between the rich and the poor, but in which the wealth of the nation will be 'family property'--the property of every member of our family. And you, my friends, who have political power do not make use of that power to oppress any of your fellow citizens, or to take revenge, but use it to build a Tanganyika in which there will not be so much as one individual citizen who is made to feel that he is a second class citizen.'<sup>109</sup>

In an earlier paper on African Socialism in the same year (1962), socialism, just like democracy, was viewed as an "attitude of mind", and not the "rigid adherence to standard political pattern" in order to ensure the care and welfare of the people. This attitude of mind had nothing to do with the possession or non-possession of wealth:

"Destitute people can be potential capitalists--exploiters of their fellow beings. A millionaire can equally be a socialist; he may value his wealth only because it can be used in the service of his fellow men."<sup>110</sup> According to this paper, a capitalist was a person who used his wealth to dominate others. Socialism was a matter of distribution and not what was produced or how production was organized. What distinguished capitalism and socialism was the way wealth was distributed rather than the methods of production. Exploiters who were castigated were landlords and the "'loiterer' or 'idler'" (the unemployed). These were called parasites and exploiters. Similarly, if even workers demanded a "fair share of the profits of their labour" which was greater than the country could afford "having to penalize some other section of the society", then it was not a fair share:

Trade union leaders and their fellows, as long as they are true socialists, will not need to be coerced by the government into keeping their demands within limits imposed by the needs of society as a whole. Only if there are potential capitalists amongst them will the socialist Government have to step in and prevent them from putting their capitalist ideas in practice!<sup>111</sup>

One of the members of Parliament, Mr Tunze, went as far as declaring that the workers were among the three enemies (poverty, ignorance and disease) the country was fighting against in 1964.<sup>112</sup> Socialism was not to be based on class war as was the case in European socialism, and there was nothing like the idea of a class or caste in African society. The foundation of African socialism was the extended family: "The true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the 'brethren' for the extermination of the 'non-brethren.'<sup>113</sup>

African socialism and democracy reflected the dilemmas of control and class formation. It was necessary to get the enthusiastic co-operation of the population for sustained economic development which would aid in capital accumulation without at the same time creating new imbalances in the distribution of national income.<sup>114</sup> As shown above, the conditions of the population were not changed after independence: unemployment was sky-rocketing with its attendant social problems, the workers were still waging war for better wages and better living conditions, and the population at large expected better conditions and exemptions from tax payments, forced labour, etc.. The peasants, specifically, expected that the end of colonial rule would bring to an end the use of compulsion for the implementation of agricultural policies.

For example, there were intense struggles among the Wambugwe of South of Lake Manyara in the early days of independence between the "young generation" and the "old generation". The young generation had no belief in ancient lore and regarded the past as a matter of history.<sup>115</sup> Mbugwe had been afflicted by famine for three years before independence. This resulted in the belief in rain makers increasing. As independence approached, all doubts were thrown aside and instead, there was only rejoicing. The Wambugwe believed that freedom meant people were to rule themselves, and this self-rule was interpreted in different ways to the extent of causing misunderstanding and quarrels. The elders were grumbling that despite the freedom:

conditions were much the same as under British. If we are really ruling ourselves, they said, should not each district have its own *msungati*. [rainmaker chiefs as opposed to the paramount chiefs imposed by the British with their forms of authority--C.S.L.] If we are now free, why do we still pay taxes? If we are supposed to be independent, then surely every man should be

allowed to do as he pleases, for example, hunt game without being required to get a licence.'''<sup>16</sup>

The younger TANU people tried to explain to the old generation what freedom meant under the new conditions, but the older generation could not accept it as something new and different to the British rule.

The Wambugwe elders held a very big meeting in 1963, at which they discussed the need to return to the traditional ways of protecting their farms. "They affirmed that the reason for rejoicing our freedom was that now the old customs would replace modern innovations as taught in school." The elders from all over Mbugwe came to this meeting, and their first resolution was: "the native medicine men must thereafter be respected, especially those who practiced shamba medicine..."; that people must follow the advice of the medicine men concerning house medicine--i.e. for "prevention of sickness from appearing in the community"; that people return to the old customs which had been neglected by the youths (e.g. sacrifice). The youths were startled by this and saw no sense in "the custom of making medicine to prevent communal sickness". Medicine was administered in that year, but the crops were destroyed by pests. The youths were accused of having spoilt the medicine. When the elders were told by the agricultural officer about agricultural practices, insecticides (DDT), etc. they were dissatisfied--after all, for the elders stated openly that it was the catholics who obstructed the traditional customs and destroyed the country. There was a considerable struggle between the "Pagans" and the Catholics, and the Catholics were accused before the TANU officials:

'Now that we are independent,' one of them said, 'we can do as we wish. Our first desire is to make our country pure so that it will again produce sufficient food. We have medicinemen who are expert at treating the crops so that they will not be destroyed.... If we are truly free, then we have the right to do

*anything that is for the good of the community. But we are obstructed in our attempt to purify this country by mission people, who refuse to participate in the mpefo ritual....Now we have decided there is only one thing to do: the mission people must live apart from us and their shambas must be separated from ours, for they do not wish to cooperate with us'''*

The Catholics complained that the Mbugwe country was being divided between "Catholics and Pagans". The reporter of all the above was a Mbugwe Catholic who in his presentation ignored the impact of the colonial experiences within the particular forms of differentiation socially, which were expressed in those politics by the elders--the very desire of the Wambugwe to do away with all forms of arbitrariness, the desire *to be free from want as a community*, and the desire to be free from the divisions brought about by colonial capitalism. The reporter was obsessed by the seemingly superstitious statements and practices, rather than these attempts to bring back the unity of the community. They rejected innovations from the point of view of the community and the desire to have prosperity of the whole community, rather than simply superstitions.

Given the general interests embodied within the development objectives which required improved and increased production, compulsion continued after independence. Compulsion was being used in many areas by local leaders and officers who also began to demand new agricultural laws for people to produce export crops. This was the case in Kigoma where people were forced to produce cotton, and by-laws were even passed to this effect; also in Ruvuma where people were prescribed a minimum of one acre tobacco production; etc.<sup>11e</sup>

By-laws were the method which was used by the colonial government to secure changes in farming habits--through Native authorities and later

District Councils. There was an extension of the by-laws after independence, and some districts had laid down minimum acre rules. For example, Law 3 of *Songea District Council (Cultivation of Agricultural Land) By-laws 1965* reads: "Every resident who holds agricultural land in accordance with the local customary law relating to land tenure shall cultivate and maintain an acre of a cash crop or cash crops and food crops." The cash crops were such as tobacco, cashewnuts, simsim, pepper, groundnuts, coconuts and coffee. The food crops were maize, rice, cassava, vegetables, potatoes and beans. By-law 7 stated: "Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of these by-laws shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding two hundred shillings or a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two months or to both such fine and imprisonment."<sup>119</sup>

The thriving capitalist agriculture, based on plantations, settler farms and an expanding African capitalist agriculture which was inherited by the nationalists at the eve of independence was not, in general, expanding substantially. This was most obvious in the sisal industry--the major export crop--where production remained static, although small scale African capitalist farmers continued to expand, with cotton at 13 per cent, coffee at 12.5 per cent and cashewnuts at 9 per cent annually. Gross Domestic Product between 1961 and 1966 grew at 4.8 per cent per annum in real terms and there were surpluses in the balance of payments.<sup>120</sup> Foreigners who owned the settler farms and plantations had begun leaving in large numbers from 1960 onwards, taking most of their capital with them--at least £3 million.<sup>121</sup> Through the Department of Community Development, the government attempted a "focal

point" or "improvement approach" which began in 1956 and was further recommended in the Three-Year Development Plan. The government undertook to supervise it, provide agricultural extension services and credit facilities to small farmers and large farmers so as to improve agriculture.

Such a move involved concentration on small selected points and to "progressive individuals"; in the hope that the benefits--in terms of methods--would trickle down to the other peasants. It also involved the establishment of rural elites with progressive attitudes. Settlement schemes on unoccupied land were created, and farmers were given land on "condition that they followed the rules and regulations that defined 'modern' agricultural techniques." There was a proposal in the First Five Year Development Plan to establish more than 60 pilot settlement schemes by 1970, and it was hoped that the number of these schemes would rise to 200 by 1980.<sup>122</sup>

This "transformation approach" was abandoned in 1966 as a result of the government's failure to create a class of capitalist farmers. The reasons for this will be highlighted below. On the other hand, the settlers, suspicious of the intentions of the new government, had started leaving the country in large numbers from 1960. With the settlers abandoning tracts of land--in the Southern Highlands, Usambara, Tabora and Arusha--some of the farms were taken over by Africans (as was the case in Tabora and Mbulu), and much of the land was to return to bush. Despite this failure by the government to create an African capitalist class in agriculture and the flight of settler capital, large scale capital in agriculture did not diminish completely after independence: there still existed plantation owners and settlers who

were "reassured by British support for peaceful transition to African rule, and by the promises of Nyerere" and also African capitalists who were emerging and expanding and "every study of peasant farming in the 1960s found that large farmers contributed a disproportionate share of marketed production."<sup>123</sup>

Examples where capitalist farming was expanding were in such areas as Ismani in Iringa where maize production had expanded rapidly by African farmers who employed mechanized methods and wage labour, and provided a large proportion of marketed maize in the country.<sup>124</sup> Other cases were those of Mbulu and Hanang in Arusha, where African farmers began to expand in the mid-1950s after the Meru case. The farmers of these areas produced a large amount of the increased wheat production in the 1960s and 1970s. These were also using mechanized methods--from ploughs to tractors. They even hired their tractors to the expanding capitalists of Maswa.<sup>125</sup> There were also the African tobacco growers of Tabora in the abandoned Urambo Groundnut Scheme. These farmers were a very powerful group of medium and large scale capitalists, who borrowed large sums of money to finance fertilizer purchase, hired labour, and even firewood collection.<sup>126</sup> Others included the rice growers of Northern shore of Lake Nyasa, the tea growers of Usambara, the famous Kilimanjaro and Bukoba coffee growers, the cashewnut growers of the coastal areas, etc.<sup>127</sup>

The increase in the marketed produce was also due to the large increases in the acreage under small owner peasants production all over the country without there necessarily being an improvement in technique. The increase among the small producers was generally because of the use of compulsion by the government. Long before 1965, it was observed that



in a situation where leaders were eager to achieve fast development they tended to resort to coercion. There were the rules which stipulated the minimum acreage of certain crops to be grown which were passed by the districts and even villages; the government ordered the farmers to plant sisal, coffee, cotton and tea because of their export value. Furthermore:

In order to increase agricultural productivity, rules have been made by district councils which prohibit the drinking or selling of alcohol beverages except on weekends...Nyerere also said, in a speech made in 1964 while on tour in Southern Tanganyika, that farmers who were lazy might go to prison where they could learn model farming techniques. Regional authorities in West Lake threatened to close the *pombe* (beer or wine made from palm trees) shops unless people started growing tea.

....In early 1965, there were reports that an area commissioner had used his detention powers to arrest community leaders in a district where government met resistance in trying to increase sisal production.<sup>128</sup>

In Kigoma, for example, where peasants were ordered to plant a minimum of one acre of cotton in 1954, an agricultural officer expressed the view that compulsory agricultural programme was bound to be unpopular, "but as the Republic's economy is at present entirely dependent upon agriculture, the Development Team must act in a responsible way to see that acreage targets are achieved."<sup>129</sup>

These coercive measures were being used as part and parcel of the other policies--expansion of co-operatives, establishment of marketing boards, extension workers schemes, community development schemes, and settlement schemes within the transformation and improvement approach. All these policies were justified by the appeal to build and modernize the country: a commitment to modernism. Given the link between class formation and education, the nationalists and the educated in general believed that "they, rather than the workers or peasants, have the

answers to the problems of development." This was demonstrated by the First Five Year Development Plan, for example, which was dominated by the view that "peasants are primitive, backward, stupid--generally inferior human beings--"<sup>130</sup>

At the same time, the co-operative movement which expanded rapidly in the 1950s, expanded even faster in the 1960s. But its expansion in the latter years was due to compulsion: the government had given a "Compulsory marketing order", whereby the co-operative became the only legal purchaser of particular crops, and most in cases, despite the smuggling of small quantities to towns or Kenya and Uganda, there were no other outlets for the crops besides the co-operatives. Food crops could not be sold to private traders or outside the district where they were grown without permission: it was considered an offence to do so, and this was despite the fact that there were times when private traders offered much higher prices than the cooperatives.<sup>131</sup>

The decision to establish co-operatives throughout the country was made in 1961, according to the government, as a means of economic control by indigenous people rather than expatriates or non-Africans. The number of co-operatives rose from 857 in 1961 to 1533 by April 1966. The Co-operative Societies Ordinance was amended in 1963 so that there was no question of refusal to register any co-operative. Most of these co-operatives were organized from "above" and that was the case even in areas where there was no demand for them.<sup>132</sup> The Presidential Special Committee which investigated the co-operative movements and marketing boards in 1965, noted that as a result of inefficiency, corruption and undemocratic nature of the co-operatives, the farmers had lost control of the movements, and they were virtually controlled from above.<sup>133</sup>

By the mid-1960s, the marketing of peasant produced export crops and many food crops was being "handled by co-operatives generally under compulsory marketing orders" which ruled out "channels for selling one's crop". Every district had at least one co-operative union and some of the well-off districts had two or three. They were supposed to be the key bodies in the development process; affecting prices, material incentives to the farmers, credit, provision and distribution of fertilizers, insecticides and other inputs.<sup>134</sup> These organizations, as a creation of the central government, were in essence an encouragement to "imaginative entrepreneurs to benefit from whatever patronage was available from the government".<sup>135</sup> And this manifested itself in inefficiency, corruption and opportunism.<sup>136</sup> In a way, it was the same move which had been attempted by the colonial government after the failure of the marketing boards in the 1920s, being effected on a wider scale in the post-colonial era.

The co-operatives were, however, just part of the general policies to control the peasants and their produce by the government. The colonial government had attempted to introduce boards to control production, cultivation, and marketing of agricultural products in the 1920s and failed. In 1949 there was introduced an African Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance no 57. This was repealed in 1962.<sup>137</sup> In this year, the Minister for Agriculture was empowered to declare an area controlled, whenever he was satisfied that the production, cultivation or marketing of any agricultural product was likely to advance and improve the area.<sup>138</sup> The responsibility of the boards was:

to give directions as to preparing the ground for the sowing, planting, harvesting, grazing, cropping, drying, storing,

processing and marketing of specified agricultural product sown, planted, and harvested, reared or grazed, as the case may be, within the area for which it is established, and as to the timing of such operations; and to give orders that any such specified agricultural product be graded, packed or marketed in such a manner as the board may direct.<sup>139</sup>

Anyone who contravened any of the orders of the Board was to be fined a maximum of Shs. 500/= or imprisoned for three months. These boards were set up in almost every region by 1963. Other boards which were set up for the whole country were such as the National Agricultural Products Board (1962) for the control and regulation of maize; Tanganyika Tobacco Board (1963); National Sugar Board (1964); National Wheat Board (1967); etc. The Act which introduced the boards empowered them to direct all producers to sell the products to them through their agencies--mainly co-operatives. They also had the discretion to determine the prices of the goods. Many people were prosecuted for contravening marketing orders.<sup>140</sup>

The essence of these moves was not to push the non-Africans or expatriates from the commercial sphere or increase African control as was stipulated by the government: they were set up as a "means of siphoning off surplus from the producer, be he peasant or capitalist farmer. The Board is an important source of funds for the state".<sup>141</sup> This fact is revealed by the Lint and Seed Board report of 1967 whose investments breakdown were as follows:

TABLE 3: PRICE ASSISTANCE FUND INVESTMENTS AS OF JUNE 30, 1967

(in Shs. T)

Tanzania Government Stock at Market Value	7,382,899
Tanzania Government 20 Years Loan (due 1974)	20,000,000
Co-operative Unions and Societies less Provision for Doubtful debts of Shs 500,000	11,352,548
Funds on Call in London	5,979
Current and Deposit Accounts at Bank	774,414
Account on Interest due	<u>155,616</u>
TOTAL	<u>39,671,456</u>

SOURCE: H.H. Binhammer, "Institutional Arrangements for supplying Credit and Finance to the Rural Sector of the Economy in Tanzania", Economic Research Bureau Paper No 68.17, University of Dar es Salaam, p.20.

As can be observed from the table the major share of the investment funds of this Board were in the government itself. According to the 1977 ILO Report on Tanzania, the barter terms of trade for the peasants fell by 22.5 per cent between 1964 and 1973 and the terms of trade for the farmers (rural capitalists) fell by 19.1 per cent in the same period.<sup>143</sup> The surplus was siphoned through price mechanisms whereby the terms of trade were turned against the producers. According to the Presidential Special Committee's estimates, the average coffee farmer in Kilimanjaro paid 64.1 per cent of his gross proceeds in production costs, 6.3 per cent export tax, 4.7 per cent in development levy, 3.8 per cent in losses, 6.9 per cent in union and society levies and 7.7 per cent in marketing board deductions.<sup>143</sup>

These inroads into marketing and commerce by means of co-operatives and boards had an advantage from the point of view of development of the economy in the sense that they were pushing the commercial bourgeoisie to move into manufacturing and other productive sectors. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, His Highness the Aga Khan had already started encouraging the Ismailia group in Tanganyika to invest in industry so as to protect their future in the country. Even without this encouragement, Asians had started moving vigorously into manufacturing since 1955, given the kind of protection the government had begun to give to the local industries--in terms of protective tariffs which were imposed in 1954, 1957, and 1961.<sup>144</sup> Asians had begun to migrate into Tanganyika *en masse* from Kenya and Uganda at the end of the 1950s. They were quoted as

saying Tanganyika was a good country with peaceful people who did not know very much about business; that there were no conflicts, and they had a good leader and the people were hard workers.<sup>145</sup> Uganda and Kenya were considered unstable, and Asians were taking their money out of them and pouring it in Tanganyika. Such were the actions of the Madhvani family which joined by marriage with the Chande family (one of the most dynamic Asian business family in Tanganyika) in 1957. The Madhvani built up grain-milling and oil-crushing interests of the Chande industries. There was the Chandaria family of Kenya who set up an aluminium factory in Tanganyika, and the first two textile factories, etc.<sup>149</sup>

Some of the large companies which were being established at this time involved settlers, trading companies, and multi-nationals working together. The beer factory was established in this way, and so were other companies such as Unga Limited (grain factories in Arusha and Iringa) which was established by Lord Delamare--a settler from Kenya. Established at this time were also a cement factory, canning factories, paint mixing industries, etc. In sum:

about three years before independence, the private sector started investing in manufacturing for local market. Within six years, nine factories had opened, plus another brewery, factories producing corrugated-iron sheets, aluminium cooking utensils, shoes, and cigarettes, three sisal spinning factories, another sugar estate and factory, and at least twelve factories that made chemical, plastic, or rubber products from imported ingredients. By 1963 seven building contractors had facilities to make pre-cast concrete articles, a reflection of the building boom that was taking place and the type of technology used in large construction projects. By 1965 a cement factory, a glass-bottle factory, and an oil refinery were under construction.<sup>147</sup>

While there were 101 large scale manufacturing units which were established before 1946 in Tanganyika, their number rose to 569 by 1965 of which 279 were established between 1946 and 1960 and 184 between 1961

and 1965.<sup>149</sup> Most of these Import Substitution Industries were established with ease at this time because the government protected them by tariffs and guaranteed compensation in case of nationalization, and provided land and other services to potential investors.<sup>149</sup>

Although there were these developments because the bourgeoisie was protected; generally, the bourgeoisie was politically disorganized at the eve of independence given the racial question and the strength of the organized workers who were at war with the nationalists because of the interests they sought to defend. After 1960, a good number of expatriate capitalists who feared the impending independence and the end of colonial rule in general started remitting their money out of the country. About Shs. 40 million left the banking system in a year and Shs. 15 million left the postal savings bank in a year before 1964.<sup>150</sup> This outflow of capital escalated in 1964 as a result of the events which were to affect Tanzania's relations with the international community: the Zanzibar revolution in January 1964, the army mutiny in Tanganyika which also swept the whole of East Africa, the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania, FRELIMO's declaration of war on Portuguese rule in Mozambique (FRELIMO was based in Tanzania), Tanzania's support of the opposition forces in Zaire, and the acceptance of refugees from Ruanda-Burundi. Other events were: China's military and financial aid which was firmly offered in 1964, breaking of diplomatic relations with Britain after Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, and Tanzania's allegation that the United States had attempted to overthrow its government.<sup>151</sup>

As a result of these events there was a capital outflow of about Shs. 290 million "as opposed to approximate equilibrium in 1963". In 1964, the gross capital formation was Shs. 603 million. This means the capital outflow was of a significant magnitude, and it increased the difficulty of financing the First Five Year Development Plan which was launched in July 1964. Therefore, it was necessary to augment the external finances which were available with a larger proportion of domestic finance. But internal borrowing was also a problem for the government because of the nature of the banking system in the country, whereby all the banks were privately owned. If the government were to resolve such problems it was necessary for it to control these economic institutions--the banking system.<sup>152</sup> And such a move entailed a conflict of interests with the banking capitalists.

The government had by then established an Agricultural Credit Agency (ACA) which took over the businesses of the Land Bank which was established during the colonial period. This was succeeded by the National Development Credit Agency (NDCA) in 1964. Besides this bank, it had established a Co-operative Bank in 1962 for financing seasonal crops. Although these banks had no major impact, they were seen as a threat to private banking given that they had direct state backing.<sup>153</sup> The government established the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) with 60 per cent government shareholding in 1965, to ensure that profits on government banking stayed in the government sector; and previous to that, it had established the National Housing Corporation for provision of 'low cost' houses by building or advancing loans, and the National Insurance Corporation for facilitation and promotion of economic development. For the private banking sector, this seemed a beginning of



replacement of private banking by government banking. The establishment of National Provident Fund in 1965 made it the single most important purchaser of government bonds. To control any further outflow of funds, the government began to exercise some direct discretion on the utilization of domestically produced surpluses in 1965 for the first time. These powers were enhanced further in 1966 with the replacement of the East African Currency Board by the Bank of Tanzania which was given powers of monetary control "subject to which it could print money and on the minimum level of foreign exchange reserves". This bank was also "empowered to call for information from other credit institutions and control the volume, direction and terms of business...."<sup>154</sup>

The government was being compelled to make inroads into the economy by direct participation through control of agricultural marketing, and hence capital accumulation, encouraging investments by protection of manufacturing, and in monetary institutions because the capitalists, who were mostly non-African did not necessarily accord to the priorities of the state. The state was compelled to struggle even against the bourgeoisie in so far as the bourgeoisie could not prove its worthiness of being defended. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand was not so nationalistic as was desired, and was moreover frightened by the socialistic pronouncements of the leaders. It was especially the latter aspect in association with the 1964-65 events which frightened some of the investors, as Nyerere was to point out in 1966, which resulted in the inability to achieve the desired goal of development. When expounding the Principles of Development in 1966, on the theme of African Socialism, Nyerere pointed out that:

The word itself may have frightened off certain specifically sensitive investors, but most who are really seriously

considering investment look at the investment guarantees legislation and institutions which have been established to help them. There is no evidence of what this commitment to human equality really costs in the way of outside private investment but it may have discouraged some wealthy businessmen and may have also affected the interest institutions like the World Bank which put a very heavy priority on private as distinct from public investment.<sup>155</sup>

It was the rule of mainly the non-agricultural bourgeoisie which was being defended politically, ideologically and economically. It was specifically the industrial bourgeoisie who was being protected as is clear from the above; for it was believed that industry was "associated with modernity and dignity", and the agrarian economy was viewed as backward.<sup>156</sup> Addressing the National Assembly during the introduction of the First Five Year Development Plan, Nyerere pointed out that it was necessary for Tanganyika to "end her absolute reliance on prices of primary commodities", that it was necessary to have "an industrial base to our economy". It was only with the achievement of this that the future of the country would be safeguarded.<sup>157</sup>

The Marxists from Zanzibar who were in the Union Government--A.M. Babu (Minister of State in the Directorate of Planning and later Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives) and K. Hanga (who became Minister for Industries, Mineral Resources and Power)--, though not necessarily defending private capital, went further to add to what Nyerere had pointed out. They argued that it was necessary to build up heavy industries as the only way to safeguard independence. Hanga pointed out that investment in industry which required a lot of capital could be financed by increased exploitation of agricultural resources by the state. There was need for strict economy and sacrifices if the iron and steel industries were to be established. Tanzania had to be

transformed from a weak, agrarian country which was dependent on other countries to a powerful industrial country, an independent and self-reliant socialist country.<sup>159</sup>

Before the discussion on how the Arusha Declaration came about, it is worth considering some of the reactions in the countryside, given the erosion of the independence of the civil society actions by the state.

### 6.3 *The Countryside and the State*

At the eve of independence, there were sections of the population which expected more fundamental changes than simply the expectation that the state was to play the central role in development processes or even providing them with everything. There were people who expected their transformation and that of their circumstances. This was the case with even with some of the groups which were mentioned in the previous sections. For example, in September 1959 a group of 90 people left Morogoro town for an unknown destination. The group was composed of peasants, unemployed, a medical worker, and an agricultural teacher. After a week it became known that they had gone to Kilombero to establish communal farming. They were able to clear 45 acres of land within a week. After learning about this, TANU volunteered to help the group, and it promised to supply them with a tractor. The Asian capitalists of Morogoro volunteered to help them in various capacities: Mr Fazal Kassam gave them a tractor, and others gave them agricultural tools.<sup>159</sup>

The era of "spontaneous settlement schemes" had begun. It is estimated that about a thousand such schemes were established between 1960 and 1963.<sup>160</sup> It is documented that about a half of that total were

established by TANU Youth League, with the aim of settling the youths on the land after the example of Kilombero. Many of those schemes grew sisal, and the members of the settlements were ex-sisal workers who had expected to take over the sisal plantations after independence, but were told instead by the government to go and produce on their own. Some of these were also established by the unemployed. The difficulties in the establishment of these settlements were immense: they ranged from problems of acquiring good land to those of obtaining food for the time when they had to wait for their first harvest. The gestation period for sisal is three years. One of the villages which was founded by the ex-sisal plantation workers was Mbambara village in Tanga, which by the end of 1965 had planted 139 acres, was largely self sufficient in food, had started building a dam for fishing and was holding literacy classes.<sup>161</sup>

Nyerere gave the Mbambara villagers a lorry in 1969. But with the 1970 drought, and as a result of the village's dependency on the government famine relief--like most of the spontaneous settlements in Tanga--it broke down by around 1972. Those who documented this village show that the village members in Mbambara had reached a stage where they understood very well the essence of communal living, the problems of leadership and the need for villagers to take their own decisions and responsibilities rather than the officials. It was observed that the government officials and experts--local and in Tanga--had often misled them. The economic situation of the village was quite low, partly due to the choice of sisal production.<sup>162</sup>

There were also some other successful villages in other parts of Tanga--some of which were established in the hope of getting possession of areas of land previously owned by settlers or demarcated forest

reserves, and others as a means to obtain government services and capital investments. That is, it is not all villages which were established for communal work in those years.<sup>163</sup> The most often cited case of successful communal villages is that of the 17 villages under the Ruvuma Development Association in Southern Tanzania.<sup>164</sup> The efforts to establish these villages began in 1960 when some 15 members of TANU Youth League started a settlement scheme at Litowa, 26 miles from Songea. These early members disappeared within three months. The village was refounded in 1961. Under the leadership of N. Millinga and the advice of Raph Abbot from Rhodesia, the various settlement schemes were registered as Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) under the Societies Ordinance with a total number of 17 villages. Except for Litowa, none of these villages had more than forty families. Although very slowly, these villages were able to make progress. While "traditional villages stagnated, and the settlement schemes of the Village Settlement Agency" which were established under close government supervision in the bid to create "progressive farmers" who were supposed to be rich in a few years "collapsed, the RDA villages became self sufficient in food, improved their health and nutrition, built a school and water supplies, and started village industries. Slowly other villages asked to join them."<sup>165</sup>

The RDA was turned into a co-operative body in 1965, and its constitution followed along those lines. The co-operative body was to be owned and controlled by its members. According to their constitution, the meetings of the village representatives (and some of these villages were a hundred miles apart) were to be held every three months. Other matters were those concerning decision making and financial control.

This constitution also incorporated what it called Social and Economic Revolutionary Army (SERA). This was a group of people within the projects who were supposed to make the members understand the idea of socialism in all the 17 villages. They were to be "soldiers of peaceful economic development helping to bring about the Social Revolution necessary to enable people to lift themselves from the clutches of the enemies."<sup>166</sup>

Most government or Party supervised settlements under organizations such as, for example, Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation, Licenced Producer Schemes, Village Settlement Pilot Schemes, World Food Programme and Village Settlement Agency, Cattle and Coconut Schemes, Co-operative Sisal Farms, and TANU Youth League Schemes, had generally collapsed by mid-1960s. These were generally set up by the government agencies with direct control and supervision exercised over the settlers. Some of these settlements were established since 1958, with capital injected into them in the hope of creating a "healthy, prosperous yeoman farmer class, firmly established on the land, appreciative of its fruits, jealous of its inherent wealth, and dedicated to maintaining the family unit on it" as a way to stabilize African community and transform it into modern society.<sup>167</sup> The attempt in the establishment of these settlements was to segregate the "progressive farmers" from the disturbing influences of the peasants who resisted the enforced agricultural changes. Behind these schemes, "Both expatriate planners and the nationalists politicians and the bureaucrats wanted a vehicle for 'modernization'. Each for different reasons, believed that the complete break with the past was necessary for real agricultural development."<sup>168</sup>

They were established with the major objective of producing cash crops, and hence to facilitate development and nation building.<sup>169</sup>

That was not the case with the villages under RDA. The RDA villages were voluntary in which co-operation was full or partial involving the pooling of resources by the participants. The participants gave up their former holdings and homes for communal living and working with a firm belief on development as "development of people and their capabilities". Their working principles were based on:

(a) That people are building not just a productive farm but a community of people; and that 'a successful community cannot be "planned" from outside'.

(b) That most of the other settlements, and other development efforts have been essentially authoritarian and, 'people are not willing to submit the whole of their lives to this type of rule.'

(c) 'That assistance is advice, and not outside management--groups (should) maintain control of their development--then they will suffer through their mistakes and benefit from their success. This is a hard method of education but the best.'<sup>169</sup>

These villages were democratic, self-reliant and socialist evolving communities which attracted the attention of many outsiders, including the President and cabinet members.

Writing about one of the villages, Matetereka, Roger Lewin<sup>170</sup> noted that the democracy practiced in these villages was quite radical and very different from what was practiced in the other villages. Unlike people who were in the supervised and controlled settlements,

people in Matetereka are never in a position of implementing plans whose purpose they do not understand or about which they have grave, if not unspoken, doubts. Whatever is proposed is explained and examined....In accordance with traditional familyhood decisions are very rarely taken by vote. Rather the people seek to reach solutions that satisfy every one so that all may work energetically to put them in practice.

In sum, the practice of palaver was undertaken to the highest level in these villages; and in this process people were able to educate themselves through ongoing examination of their own experiences.

It was within this context that the villagers in RDA were able to evolve their own pattern of education system. They established a primary school at Litowa in 1964 which, unlike the ordinary schools, did not divorce the children "from life of the community" and the tradition they were building in their communities.<sup>171</sup> Their education aimed at helping the children get accustomed on their own to think and work together and adopt revolutionary morality. Children would be sent to different villages during holidays to assist in work and also to learn from the problems by themselves "and to discover 'that often the best leaders do not come from the educated elite.'<sup>172</sup>

Among the achievements of these villages were: self-sufficiency in food supply; the buying of a maize-mill which was owned by an expatriate so as to process the food they sold; establishing their own dispensary and attempting to send a villager to learn from a local hospital; purchasing a saw-mill from a capitalist for wood processing; and attempting wool processing--washing, cording, dyeing, knitting and weaving--as a form of cottage industry while at the same time keeping sheep. These villages were attempting to integrate industry and agriculture.

Certainly, agricultural production in these villages was increasing steadily. The incomes of the villagers had not substantially increased but their life standards improved in every respect. They had some economic problems and shortcomings too. But as far as their problems



were concerned, they had developed "a simple and down-to-earth understanding of their situation". In Matetereka, for example,

What is encouraging is that they have come to see that farming better requires that they *learn*, that they seek out new sources of knowledge and experiment with new techniques..., the idea of alternatives and experimenting to choose between them seems to be taking firm root....The people at Matetereka are, as are the other villages of RDA well on the way to developing an economic consciousness more advanced than that of any group in rural society. [Development comes only when people change their ways of thinking so that they can understand the reasons for doing things in new ways and figure out how to conquer the myriad practical difficulties that they inevitably will meet as they try to do new things. This is not something that anyone can do for the people.] What makes it possible for the people of Matetereka to change themselves--and no bureaucrat should ever be allowed to obscure this fact--is their ideology and their social organization.<sup>173</sup>

The cash crop which was approved in Ruvuma Region where these villages were situated, was fire-cured tobacco. Initially, in some of the villages, for example, Litowa, tobacco was grown in several acres by 1963/64. The peasants finally realized that it required a lot of labour for very little reward, and that most often, the crop required fertilizers and other inputs which were very expensive. Due to periodic leaf-spot disease, production of this crop was declining; and also the processing factory in Songea was inefficient and was losing a lot of money. The RDA villages disliked the crop, though they still grew it to a limited acreage due to the district by-law which required this.

The by-law was introduced in 1965 by the Regional Commissioner, Mr Peter Barongo, and it required that every family should cultivate a minimum of one acre of tobacco. This law was resented by most of the peasants in the region, and the peasants in RDA articulated their discontent through their organization. This discontent fuelled further opposition against RDA by the regional officials which had begun from

1963. The officials felt that RDA would attract their potential "progressive farmers" whom they sought to settle under close supervision.

There was opposition from the Party leaders in Songea Town, who feared the democracy of the villages and the school, and the self-confidence of the villagers and school students who argued publicly against some of their policies (the compulsory growing of tobacco in particular). These fears were aggravated when the RDA achieved economic power by purchasing two or three local industries, the grain-mill and the saw-mill.<sup>174</sup>

Their grain-mill was threatening the co-operative movement in the region by paying better prices and providing the peasants with another outlet for their grain, while at the same time supplying timber for government projects. RDA was an autonomous body, independent of the government and the Party, and received even personal funds at times from abroad. It was "promoting a form of socialism which did not depend on a strong central party. If RDA organizations became the norm nationally, the professional politicians would be in a much weaker position."<sup>175</sup> On the 25th of September 1969 the Minister for Rural Development and Regional Administration announced that the RDA was dissolved. The assets of RDA were confiscated with the use of "the police, and the teaching staff of their school was transferred."<sup>176</sup>

The peasants who were sent to the supervised settlements, it has been noted by various studies, in some instances referred to themselves as "Watumwa wa Serikali (slaves of the government)". The result of this was that "they put in very little work as they could get away with and expected at least the equivalent of a minimum wage--the normal behaviour in capitalist enterprise."<sup>177</sup>

The co-operative movements which were established as a result of the state's compulsion were reported to be corrupt, dishonest and

bureaucratic as a result of being dominated by traders and businessmen and "some TANU officials, Members of Parliament, Regional Commissioners", who allowed "themselves to be used as tools by...enemies of the co-operatives, accepting directorships and financial participations in their firms, and using their influence to harm the interests" of the movement.<sup>178</sup> The Special Commission which examined the activities of the co-operatives showed that it appeared there was a failure of the movement by 1965. The co-operative societies were accumulating losses, were mismanaged, corrupt, and marked by failures, petty thievery, etc. It also noted that the peasants were discontented and had expressed their resentment of the co-operatives, most characteristically in the following terms:

'We regret that after having achieved *Uhuru* in this country' they said, 'we, the farmers, have been deprived of all blessings of *Uhuru*; our incomes have been dwindling, and what is worse, we are continually over taxed. For example, we pay two types of Development Levy: the Local Council cess and the National Development Levy. Under these circumstances, we feel ourselves to be the forgotten children, and we can see nothing better than the total ruin of this country and our children in the long run....we assure the President that we appreciate the desirability of substituting co-operatives for the private traders, so far we strongly object to the way in which this is being done.'<sup>179</sup>

The issue is not that the peasants could not come out with alternative forms of organizations, rather, it was the fact that besides the co-operatives which were being encouraged by the government and associations which were to be affiliated to the Party, most other social movements were being refused registration or prevented from emerging. This was being done under colonial legislation--the Societies Ordinance of 1954.

In Geita District, for example, many associations were refused registration between 1958 and 1964. Some of these associations were for self-help, commercial unions and production associations.<sup>180</sup> One of the associations which was refused registration, as a way of example, was the Mwanza African Mutual Aid Association. This was a self-help association with objectives such as helping those with problems, bailing out those on remand and ensuring that they got a fair trial; to ensure that the indigenous people of Tanganyika (--in towns and country) benefited and were satisfied by the government and protected by it; to consult with the central government, the various authorities and the departments on various issues; to disseminate any news in the country; to help people in their struggles against national weakness, to attain modern development, and enable them to obtain help; to inspect prisons, market places, hospitals, hotels, etc. to ensure justice and cleanliness, and to help ex-convicts to get jobs; to investigate and take measures to reduce prostitution and investigate traditional marriage; etc.<sup>181</sup>

In a nutshell, there was a general tendency by the state to restrict the formation of autonomous organizations independent of the government or Party, and political rights of opponents/critics were curtailed. TANU had won the war against the colonialists, and therefore opposition to it was easily felt as opposition to the national interests. The political leaders of TANU who had won the independence "had, themselves, long been without secure employment or regular incomes. They had now become the inheritors of the colonial regime....For many, therefore, a loss of political office would have meant eventual return to peasant farming. It

is small wonder that many TANU leaders tended to jump rather swiftly to the view that critics of TANU ought to be restrained."<sup>182</sup>

#### 6.4 *The Arusha Declaration and its Context*

Summarizing Tanzania's progress and achievements as well as the problems after ten years of independence in 1971, Nyerere pointed out that TANU's commitment to socialism was made in 1962 when the Party constitution was changed. He noted that Tanzania's early socialist developments started with the 'self-help' schemes when people built schools, dispensaries, roads, etc. on their initiative; the expansion and the development of co-operative movement in agricultural marketing and trade in general; the nationalization of land in 1962; the establishment of the Tanganyika Development Corporation in 1962 which was to be changed to National Development Corporation (NDC) in 1965 with the task of building an industrial base for the country; reform of the trade union movement in 1962 by centralizing it and later its reorganization by replacing it with NUTA as a means to prepare the labour for its "role in a socialist economy"; the reorganization of the army in 1964; and the establishment of one-party democracy in 1965. The commitment to socialism in 1967 was a reaffirmation of a principle which was already in existence: it was a further step to consolidate a process which had been on-going.<sup>183</sup>

In other words, the 1967 Arusha Declaration and its aftermath was a continuation of struggles which had already been taking place. Therefore its significance and general orientation lies in the opposition and unity: state/working people, and state/bourgeoisie, within the context of what has been discussed so far in the preceding sections. The view

that the Arusha Declaration was a result of Nyerere's disappointment over the state of the country, the state of the peasants whose conditions had changed very little since independence, and his awareness of the tendency towards corruption which was developing in the country--and hence that these influenced the move, was rejected by Nyerere himself. "'If you knew the whole truth', he told a visitor a few months later, 'it would not be so exciting.'"<sup>184</sup>

The most important aspects in the Arusha Declaration--aspects which dealt with self-reliance and development through people's own efforts for their benefits--were already contained in the 1962 pamphlet: *Ujamaa, the basis of African Socialism*.<sup>185</sup> One of the resolutions of the TANU National Executive Committee which was appended to the Arusha Declaration congratulated the "Government for the steps it [had] taken so far in the implementation of the policy of socialism", and called upon it take further steps in the implementation of this policy in terms of control of the major means of production.<sup>186</sup> And this question of control of the major means of production was already contained in the Party Constitution since the early 1960s. It was stated in the 1965 Party Constitution that one of the objectives and principle aims of the Party was: "(j) To see that the Government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country."<sup>187</sup>

What was new in the Arusha Declaration and even the Party policies in general was the Leadership Code. It will be recalled that, in the preceeding Chapter it was pointed out that the Secretary of State to Colonies had also issued leadership rules for the newly sworn-in African ministers, which prevented them from being directors of commercial

enterprises; from being employed or receiving salaries from trade unions or cooperative unions; from involvement in businesses which would interfere with their ministerial duties; from using secret information obtained within their posts for their own benefit or that of their friends; from using their positions to favour people where justice was required; from buying shares in companies; and from announcing news or writing books or articles in newspapers while still in their positions.<sup>188</sup> The 1967 Leadership Code stated that TANU or Government leaders were to be peasants or workers who had no association with capitalist or feudal practices; that leaders were not to: hold shares in companies, receive two or more salaries, or own houses for renting.<sup>189</sup> According to this resolution, leaders were: members of TANU National Executive Committee, Ministers, Members of Parliament, senior TANU and affiliated organizations officials, appointees under TANU Constitution, councillors, and civil servants of high and middle cadre.<sup>190</sup> In other words, the leadership code was an introduction in the Party of more or less the same thing which was introduced in 1959; but this time under changed conditions and with some modifications, in terms of generalizing the rules to apply to a wider category of leaders. As typically expressed by *Mwafrika* (A TANU sponsored paper) of 11th July 1959, most of the requirements were accepted by Africans, but there was a grudge against the question of buying shares and announcing news. This explains why the leadership requirements were totally forgotten to the extent that when they were introduced in 1967 they appeared as something new.

The Arusha Declaration was announced on the 5th February 1967. On the 7th February, the government nationalized all commercial banks,

eight import/export firms, eight milling firms, took total control of the National Insurance Corporation, and announced the intention to acquire compulsorily up to 60 per cent of shares in 7 firms. The list of nationalizations implied in the Arusha Declaration were completed with the nationalization of 60 per cent of the sisal industry. There was full and fair compensation for the nationalized firms, and the amount totalled £20 million.<sup>191</sup>

While nationalization was affected immediately, the Leadership Code was not brought into effect at once. It was endorsed by a TANU Special Conference in March that year, and after that it was incorporated in the civil service regulations. Compromises were made in the course of the endorsement, by allowing leaders to transfer their property ownership to a trustee or put it in the name of their children. Thus it allowed investments for the provision for the future of the leaders' children. Another compromise was in terms of a limited ban on employment of wage labour: this permitted many leaders in the countryside who were substantially rich to continue employing seasonal wage labourers.<sup>192</sup>

The leaders were given a year to 'purify' themselves, and those who had inherited property were given three months to sell it or give it away or resign. This Code affected most of the National Executive Committee (NEC) and members of Parliament. The leaders were unhappy with the rules, "even distressed" by them, although they did not have a sense of outrage that the rules were unjust or unfair.<sup>193</sup> The reception of the rules and the immediate follow-up to the Arusha Declaration was marked with unease and discontent with them: "[the] whole issue was dominated by this issue. Time and again, members expressed their unhappiness over these restrictions on their income-earning activities."<sup>194</sup> The factor



which facilitated the acceptance of the rules was the nationalizations more than any thing.<sup>195</sup> This is because the nationalizations were popular for reasons which went beyond even the socialist purposes, as had been earlier reflected soon after independence in the demands of Africanization. Nationalizations in the main affected Asians and Europeans and foreign companies in general.<sup>196</sup> It was after one week of massive nationalizations, that the government halted the process and "concentrated upon winning a real acceptance of the leadership rules".<sup>197</sup>

This issue of leadership rules had begun in December 1966 when Nyerere drafted a pamphlet on the question of stopping house building loans "made to political people like regional and area commissioners". These kind of loans had already been discontinued to civil servants because they built houses for renting. Kawawa announced in the Parliament that such loans were going to be stopped.<sup>198</sup> The problem, however, was how to present this issue to the NEC so that it was not rejected. It was felt that, they "cant merely talk about houses": they had to talk "about leadership in relation to property." Within this context, according to Nyerere, they had to talk about:

'...the responsibility of leadership in terms of property. The best way was to argue socialism, and to define socialism as lack of exploitation, and then draw up a list of what this is. So it struck me: instead of a pamphlet I issue out of the blue, this should be the theme of the meeting, and this is how it came about. No'--he grinned--'it wasn't so much out of frustration as inspiration. It was a confirmation of what we ought to be doing....'<sup>199</sup>

Socialism was the peg on which the doctrines of the leadership code were hung, and the nationalizations were corollary of the decision to present the main proposals as part of the overall move. This leadership code, of

course, had its anchorage within the struggles which have been outlined in the preceding sections.

In early 1966, Nyerere had defined again the socialist objectives and its philosophy.<sup>200</sup> He had also expressed the urgency of building communal values which were being eroded by individualism as a result of economic development. This was the main concern, although it was at a time when many government and Party policies which were associated with him "had floundered": the village schemes were halted, the Five Year Plan so far did not seem to promise a sustained and integrated development--nor to any increased flow of external aid. This was besides the problems facing the co-operative movement and the trade unions.<sup>201</sup>

The elaboration of the socialist philosophy and practice was done at the time when the "development process" as envisaged by the nationalists was in a crisis. In 1965, the Special Presidential Commission which investigated the activities of the co-operative movement had revealed losses, mismanagement, and corruption of the union officials and employees, failures, petty thievery, etc. As a consequence of this, the peasants had expressed their discontent, as already shown in the preceding section. The peasants had expressed their discontent mainly because of overtaxation and exploitation in the form of turning the terms-of-trade against the countryside, an aspect which had an impact even on rural capitalists. Most rural capitalists who had already emerged or were emerging after independence, as typically demonstrated by the case of the tobacco capitalists of Tabora, did not invest their money for further expansion of agriculture. By mid-1960s this money was being "invested in businesses, trade, bars, hotels, transport, maize-mills, or in town houses for renting...." These capitalists had

withdrawn completely from agriculture "or in some cases reduced their agricultural enterprises to a smaller scale, mostly to concentrate on their non-agricultural activities" which had higher rates of profit than the former.<sup>202</sup> The problems of the capitalists who were in the village schemes were highlighted above.

In April 1966, Nyerere announced that he would establish a commission to investigate the activities of NUTA--a decision which was cheered. The investigations showed that NUTA was unpopular, bureaucratic, ineffective, corrupt and had no legitimacy within the rank and file. It was revealed that there was no genuine workers participation within the structures which were closely integrated to the Party and the government. The workers had complained that they had little or no faith in NUTA; that, its officials had very close and suspicious relations with the employers. The NUTA structures, according to the Commission, did not provide "adequate and visible means of democratic expression". At the same time, despite the call by the government to the workers to practice restraint, the workers had gone on demanding higher wages, and the result of this had been the government's decision to hold wage increases to a maximum of 5 per cent per annum.<sup>203</sup>

In the meanwhile, the life style of the civil servants and politicians had become different from that of the masses of the working people. This was a result of the high salaries they received and the practices they had begun to involve themselves in since independence. They were ignoring financial regulations and purchasing luxury cars which befitted their dignity, drawing generous allowances even when their expenses were met when on trips, seeking new perquisites additional to their salaries, and seeking gratuity in addition to their

salaries as compensation for their job security. In sum, they were possessed by the spirit of acquisitiveness.<sup>204</sup> This was besides the fact that some of them had begun to take directorships in private companies and were getting more than one income, and beginning to own houses for rental which they leased to embassies, international organizations and international companies, etc. The bureaucrats by this time had become popularly known as *Wabenzi*, i.e. "the tribe of Mercedes-Benz" and the Mercedes-Benz had become a status symbol. This was especially the case after the Minister of Regional Administration had ignored a Presidential instruction and ordered 17 Mercedes-Benz for the Regional Commissioners. The term *Wabenzi* was contrasted to *Kabwela* i.e. the common man, and Mercedes-Benz at that period connoted *unyonyaji* (parasitism).<sup>205</sup>

It was under such circumstances that the re-emphasis and further elaboration of the socialist philosophy was made. The watershed of all the above was the problems posed by the University College of Dar es Salaam in October 1966. In this year, the government had introduced a National Service Scheme which required all secondary, college and university leavers to undergo a five months military training, followed by 18 months of working while receiving only 40 per cent tax-free of their salaries. The balance of their salaries were to become savings for the state for development purposes.<sup>206</sup> The introduction of this scheme resulted in bitterness among the students, and some 400 students marched in their academic gowns to the State House in October 1966 in protest at this scheme, despite the attempts by Nyerere and Kawawa to win their acceptance on several occasions.

The students were met by Nyerere, Kawawa and most of the cabinet members at the State House. The students declared that the government

was trying to throw the burden of financing an extensive scheme on them, and demanded to be paid full rights of their earnings "or else all those in high-income brackets should also be in the category which could be interpreted as a form of sacrifice rather than a form of exploitation". They declared that "unless the terms of reference and attitude" of the leaders towards the students changed, they would not accept national service in spirit, "and the battle between the political elite and the educated elite" would continue.<sup>207</sup> The placards they carried condemned the national service terms and Kawawa who was in charge of the scheme, declared that colonialism was better, and reminded the government of Indonesia where the students had been a force politically against the government.<sup>208</sup>

The educated, who regarded themselves as privileged, saw the scheme as an attempt by the politicians to marginalize them; that is why they took it as a battle. Nyerere reacted by expelling them from the university. In his reply speech to the University students, Nyerere reacted by cutting down salaries: "You are right when you talk about salaries. Our salaries are too high. You want me to cut them?....Do you want me to start with my own salary? Yes I'll slash mine. (Cries of 'No!') I'll slash the damned salaries in this country. Mine I slash by twenty per cent as from this hour...." He pointed out that it was the high salaries which built attitudes of acquisitiveness and individualism in the country among the educated:

We belong to a class of exploiters. I belong to your class. Where I think three hundred and eighty pounds a year (the minimum wage that would be paid in the National Service) is prison camp, is forced labour. We belong to this damned class on top. Is this what the country fought for?....In order to maintain a class of exploiters on top?

....Everybody in this country is demanding a pound of flesh. Everybody except the poor peasant. How can he demand it? He

doesn't know the language. Even in his language he can't speak of forced labour. *What kind of country are we building?*<sup>209</sup>

With this confrontation between the students and the government, the result was an upsurge of Nyerere's popularity with the masses. This was due to his gesture to reduce his salary and those of his ministers by 20 per cent. The whole event had created an atmosphere of crisis whereby sacrifices for the nation seemed acceptable. At the same time, the ministers were ordered to change their Mercedes-Benz for cheaper models. The popularity of Nyerere for this move was revealed by the demonstrations and the response he got during his biggest tour of the country since independence in December 1966 and January 1967. Nyerere had become the champion of the interests of the peasants and hence a hero, as a result of the confrontation with the university students. In a meeting with the University College of Dar es Salaam staff members towards the end of December 1966, Nyerere remarked that "he had the feeling that he had not fully exploited the chance which the student revolt had given him".<sup>210</sup>

Coupled with what has been pointed out so far, on the life standards and practices of the bureaucrats and politicians, the student revolt raised the fundamental issue of good leadership and the question of inculcation of relevant values among them. The Arusha Declaration pointed out that self-reliance depended upon the people, land, good policies (socialism and self-reliance) and good leadership. The question of leadership was the most central: "TANU recognizes the urgency and importance of good leadership. But we have not yet produced systematic training for our leaders". A programme was to be set up for training leaders so as to make them grasp the political and economic policies.

Leaders had to set a "good example to the rest of the people in their lives and in all activities."<sup>211</sup> Education, then, was central in the inculcation of sound attitudes, and that was the fact which was revealed by the 1966 student revolt: "The events of 1966 do suggest, however, that a more thorough examination of the education we are providing must be made...."<sup>212</sup>

Thus in March 1967, the leadership issued another policy directive: on education. The purpose of education was to transmit the accumulated knowledge of society from one generation to another and to prepare the young "for their future membership of the society and their active participation in its maintenance or development."<sup>213</sup> No thought so far had been given to the type of education which was inherited, except in terms of obtaining teachers, engineers, administrators, etc. Individually and collectively, education had been taken as a means to obtain skills required to earn high salaries in the "modern sector of the economy".<sup>214</sup> Henceforth, education would be geared to the preparation of the students for life in the villages and the countryside in general. Students were to contribute to their own upkeep, and schools were to be economic, social and educational communities. The colonial education which was inherited had "emphasized and encouraged the individualistic instincts of mankind, instead of his co-operative instincts. It led to possession of individual material wealth being the major criterion of social merit and worth". But the education provided in the country had to serve the purpose of Tanzania: it had to encourage the growth of socialist values, and encourage the "development of a proud, independent and free citizenry which relies upon its own development, and which knows the advantages and the problems of co-

operation." It had to ensure that the educated got to understand that they were part of the nation and "recognize the responsibility to give greater service the greater the opportunities they....had."<sup>216</sup>

Another major policy document was issued in September 1967: "Socialism and Rural Development". This document recommended the formation of Ujamaa villages--a form of co-operative production units that would facilitate both socialist principles and rural transformation. Unlike the supervised settlement schemes which were abandoned in 1965, these villages were to be units based on co-operation, equality and democracy; they were also to be less capital intensive and formed on a voluntary basis. It was acknowledged that the implications for a capitalist development in agriculture which was in existence was at the time not a threat--except where there were already land shortages. People still had a choice to work for themselves or for others: but if these developments were allowed and encouraged to go on taking place, then, inevitably there would emerge a "'farmers' class and labourers' class....[the latter] will become a 'rural proletariat' depending on the decisions of other men for their existence...." This was not desirable, because as a result of such developments, where "subsistence agriculture" was still practiced, the young and active men were leaving their homesteads and going to towns or seeking "elsewhere for the modern world". Such developments were breaking up the traditional concept of equality and the universal obligation to work.<sup>217</sup>

In sum, the 1967 formulations were based, as had been the case all along, on the fact that socialism was to be built on the foundation of the past without importation of any foreign ideology, while attempting to embrace modern technology. The major emphasis was on rural



development as the majority of the people still worked on the land. The Arusha Declaration had stated that it was an error to rely on money as a major instrument of development, and to emphasize industries at the initial stage of development and consequently concentrate the resources on urban development. When the country was industrialized, it would certainly be possible to say that there is development, but the mistake was to think that this development started with industries. This mistake had resulted in spending most of the money in urban areas, while it was the countryside which generated the foreign currency from the sale of exports for all the projects in the urban areas: agriculture was the basis of development and it was only fair that the countryside should benefit from development rather than being exploited by the urbanites.<sup>218</sup> This was *not* a de-emphasis of industrialization: "Industries will come and money will come but their foundation is the people and their *hard work*, especially in AGRICULTURE".<sup>219</sup>

The Arusha Declaration became immediately widely popular all over the country. Massive demonstrations by workers and peasants were held all over the country in support of the move, and there were huge marches by groups of people in many parts of the country. One of the youths, Seth Benjamin, died in a four-hundred-mile march from Arusha to Dar es Salaam in support of the Arusha Declaration and became a national hero. By September 1967, marching columns from all over the country were converging in Dar es Salaam in support of the Arusha Declaration, the President and the Party. Such scenes had never been seen since independence. Then Nyerere also went marching for eight days in October 1967 from Butiama (his birth place) to Mwanza ( a distance of 138 miles)

where a TANU Conference was held. The *Nationalist* described the arrival in Mwanza:

Heralded by peasants' war cries, strains of brass-band tunes, and a din of women's ululation, the President, beaming with revolutionary confidence, steered the Presidential column into the streets of the summit of the town hedged with crowds of cheering masses....*Mwalimu's* brisk march into the town stunned the masses who on seeing him in sound health were driven with wild admiration and excitement to borders of near frenzy. The entire town was gripped with the revolutionary fervour of the Spirit of Arusha.<sup>220</sup>

Nyerere and the Party were heroes, "the villains were the politicians and civil servants who had been growing fat at the expense of the masses ('blood suckers', 'ticks' and 'parasites', were the three words used to describe them)"<sup>221</sup> Thus despite the grudge by the leadership that the leadership requirements went too far, these requirements were incorporated into the Interim Constitution.<sup>222</sup>

The leaders had to declare their incomes and wealth, and were deprived of the luxury cars and told to take ordinary models. Those who received more than one salary had to forego their other salaries. By late August 1967, 30 parliamentarians had decided to forego their parliamentary incomes. Incomes were to be harmonized by reduction in practical terms of the top salaries even in the parastatals. And this was to be done by a Presidential Committee which was appointed in that year. From the 31st December 1967, all emoluments, for example, free housing, free car, servants, expense accounts, and other benefits which the bureaucrats and politicians enjoyed were drastically curtailed. The

private sector was also told to revise the top salaries so as to fit with the Arusha Declaration requirements.<sup>223</sup>

Within this context, the workers were also required to sacrifice and raise productivity and thereby contribute to development. By this time, given the nationalizations, the government controlled more than a half of the wage-bill. It was held that the workers gained at the expense of the peasants, given the general urban bias. This view came to a head when Professor Turner of the International Labour Organization produced a report on wages, incomes and price policy.<sup>224</sup> The main contention in this report was, the workers had managed to get wage increases at the expense of the peasants and that, general employment opportunities had fallen as a result of wage increases;--although the profits of the enterprises had increased during the period. Prof. Turner recommended that measures were to be taken to restrict wage increases. This report and the recommendations were accepted by the government as being in close accord with the principles of the Arusha Declaration.<sup>225</sup>

The acceptance of the recommendations culminated in the establishment of the Permanent Labour Tribunal (PLT) in 1967, as a means to increase the government's control over employment and wage-bill, and also to close the gap in incomes between the workers and peasants. The PLT was to implement the policy of wage restraint: it was to arbitrate all matters related to wages, and no wage increases could take place in enterprises without its final decision. Among its seven functions were:

- (a) To register all negotiated agreements and voluntary agreements between the employer and the employee and to hear and determine matters relating to such agreements;
- (b) To maintain high levels of domestic capital accumulation in the view of increasing the rate of economic growth and providing greater employment opportunities;
- (c) To develop payment by result schemes or other wage incentive structures which will induce an employee to make greater effort

and relate increases in remuneration to improvement in labour productivity.<sup>226</sup>

While with the formation of NUTA it was the autonomous existence of the trade unions which was done away with, with the PLT, collective bargaining was dealt a final death blow. To maintain the high rates of capital formation, wage increases had to be restrained. The PLT was not to allow an increase of more than 5 per cent annually. Between 1968 and 1971 the average wage increased altogether by only 8 per cent, and the minimum wage was raised only once--in 1969--from Shs. 150/= per month to Shs. 170/=.<sup>227</sup>

All the above demonstrate that there was no deviation ideologically after 1967. The major aspect of the matter remained that of development and the best ways to effect this process. As far back as 1965, Derek Bryceson, then Minister of Agriculture, had argued the creation of genuine Farmer's Unions which would speak for the interests of the peasants, separate from the Party and the government. This proposal never won much support. Paul Bomani, a Minister whose career begun with the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions fought a protracted battle to protect the co-operative movements "from being converted into control agencies through which the government extracted economic surplus from the countryside for governmental development expenditures". It was not possible to secure a policy of independence of the co-operative movement: "Not only was there a general ideological bias against it and reluctance in TANU to permit important African interests to organize autonomously of the party, but as well, the unions had become too important for the government to leave them alone."<sup>228</sup> And this is why

the government had brought all the unions into the government sponsored Co-operative Union of Tanganyika.

The reality of all these aspects demonstrated so far was in the state's interests which was essentially reflected in the various bills, laws and directives passed by the government, and found their expressions in some of the leaders' pronouncements. The most significant pronouncement by Nyerere immediately after the Arusha Declaration which accorded squarely with the interests which the state had hitherto championed within the various moves since independence was "Economic Nationalism". This was made on the 28th February 1967 when the government was announcing its intentions to secure majority ownership of Tanzania Breweries Limited (Dar es Salaam Branch). Nyerere pointed out that the decision to secure majority ownership in the industries had been taken because those industries were "key points" in the economy and therefore it was necessary that they should be under the control of Tanzania. "Our purpose was primarily a nationalist purpose;" he said, "it was an extension of the political control which the Tanzanian people secured in 1961". He went on:

Such an economic expression of nationalism is nothing new in the world although the manner of action may have been peculiarly Tanzanian, its motivation is common enough. Every country--whether it be capitalist, communist, socialist or fascist--wants to control its economy. It does not necessarily exclude foreign participation in the economic life, but it does insist as soon as it can that the major means of production, distribution and exchange are in the hands of its own nationals....<sup>229</sup>

He further insisted that "economic nationalism" had "nothing to do with the ideologies of socialism, capitalism, or communism," that, whatever the economic systems adopted by the different African countries, it was

quite certain that people would sooner or later "demand that the key positions of the economy are in their own citizens."<sup>230</sup>

The nationalizations were part of the inroads which the state had been attempting to make into the economy since independence, by the establishment of various institutions as was shown in the preceeding sections. It was necessary for the state to make such inroads because some sections of the bourgeoisie--as reflected in the flight of settlers, expatriates and capital in general which escalated from 1964--had become an impediment to the general national interests of development. This was mainly the financial capitalists, import/export capitalists and all those who did not adhere to the national ethic. Initially, the state had responded by establishing the various institutions--financial and others; and the bourgeoisie had viewed such steps as an attempt by the state to erode their positions.<sup>231</sup> Within these contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the state, it had become necessary to break further the power of the bourgeoisie so as to resolve the contradictions between the general interests of the state and those of the bourgeoisie--mainly the financial bourgeoisie who worked contrary to the general interests.

And so all the groups had to be tackled if development were to take place and the benefits to go to the people themselves, Nyerere was to comment. They could not tackle one group and another later: one could not say, "We'll tackle just the Indians. Use the African to help fight the Indian, and the African will help because he can replace the Indian. Tackle your immigrants. You could do that." But that would just postpone the problem. The socialist goals had already been set, and there was no point of allowing the exploitation of the indigenous few. And so they

had to be taken all of them together--"foreign investors, local capitalist, our own political leaders. In a sense, we tackled the masses at the same time. We took on everybody."<sup>232</sup>

That was the essence of the matter from the point of view of the state. Underlying all these moves, was the rule of the industrial or manufacturing bourgeoisie whose ideological expression was manifested in the developmental ideological positions. In December 1967, the Ministry of Commerce and Industries issued a manual with the intention to make a follow-up of the "Arusha Declaration which says that we shall continue to welcome private investments in those areas not reserved for the government." Private capital was welcomed to invest in twenty major groups of industries, and they included: textile mill products; lumber and wood products; printing, publishing and allied industries; chemical and allied products; rubber products; stone, clay, and glass products; and machinery. In these industries, companies could be formed with "100 per cent private shares or with minority shares by the national organizations."<sup>233</sup>

Another Manual was issued by the same Ministry at around the same time. This manual spelt out that investment ownership in the country fell under: purely public ownership; partnership between the government parastatal organizations and co-operatives, and local and foreign investors; and, privately owned industries by both local and foreign investors. It was pointed out that the terms of protection of foreign industries operated under the 1963 Investment and Protection Act which guaranteed full and fair compensation in case of nationalization. There were, of course, foreign exchange controls, which restricted repatriation of earnings from the country without the foreign investor

acquiring an "approved status". According to this Manual, companies and shareholders were protected in accordance with the Principles of English Commercial Law.<sup>234</sup>

The above manuals were to enable the private investor to know the field of industry in which his investment would be welcome and "receive full cooperation from the government and people in establishing a factory, as spelt out in the Arusha Declaration". It was noted further that, although these industries were "open to complete private ownership, should a potential investor wish government participation in his undertaking, he can approach the government in the normal manner through the N.D.C."<sup>235</sup>

As for the financial institutions which existed by then to help promote development, while only the National Development Credit Agency (NDCA) and the Cooperative Bank financed agricultural projects, in the industrial sector there were: (1) The Tanganyika Development Finance Company Limited which was internationally based, and was established during colonialism. It still exists up to the present. (2) Industrial Promotion Services (T) Limited which was also internationally based, sponsored by His Highness the Aga Khan mainly to help the Ismailia group in Tanzania. This also still exists. (3) The Commonwealth Development Corporation which was and still is internationally based. And (4) The Small Industries Agency which was government owned and was changed to Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) in 1973. These four major financial institutions financed industrial projects to private investors, companies, etc, and were backed or helped by the state. In 1971, Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB), which was wholly government owned



was established for the same purpose, hence adding to a total of five major institutions for financing industrial projects.<sup>236</sup>

The state had all along, even after 1967, consciously pursued a policy of industrialization. In the government owned enterprises, and even in the selection of parastatal projects the primary determining factors were national costs and benefits and foreign exchange effects; and the secondary factors were public interests in terms of employment, location, industrial linkages, budgetary impact and investible surplus. In the course of pursuing this policy the state had to accomplish the essential task of establishing its hegemony over the working people materially by effective control of the mass movements and ideologically by the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration. The latter aspect is confirmed by the initial massive response and support it evoked. It was in the wake of the declaration of the socialistic policies of 1967 that the role of the mass movements was completely wiped out. As a result of this defeat of the working people by the state, *A Manual for Investors* of 1980 which was issued for the same purpose as the 1967 manuals, acknowledged that investment rates in Tanzania had been quite high throughout the 1970s--about 20 per cent. In the section dealing with incentives for investors and promotion of private investments (specifically foreign) it was stipulated that besides the country being politically stable and pursuing consistent policies, "*labour relations are good and labour costs low*" (besides the availability of raw materials):

A national wages policy seeks to restrain wages and encourage the accumulation of domestic capital to expand local industry and create more jobs.

The regulation of Wages and Terms of Employment Ordinance prescribes minimum wages....

The Standing Committee on Parastatal Organizations (SCOPO) fixes wages and salaries for parastatal organizations.

According to the National Wages Policy, the increase in wages and fringe benefits for a year should not exceed 5 per cent of the previous year's bill.<sup>237</sup>

## 6.5 Conclusion

The immediate period before and after independence up to mid-1960s was a period of profound conflicts. These conflicts brought to the fore the social, economic and political questions in relation to the meaning of self-determination as grasped by the different classes within attempts to control processes. It was a period marked by people's struggles to control processes and determine their lives and hence, transform themselves by learning from their own experiences and shortcomings. When assessing the struggles for independence and the victory of the nationalist forces, Shabaan Robert, the prominent literary figure who died in 1962, wrote in 1960 that the transformations in relation to colonial rule were viewed from two perspectives by the people: some people saw them as outcomes of struggles against unequal distribution of wealth, profits and authority among the people of the country; and others saw them as due to an inevitability given the changes which were taking place throughout the world.<sup>238</sup> He had written a long poem in 1957-58 in defense of love among the people, and by 1960-61 he wrote a novel which was full of insights on development and welfare of the people; peoples' desires and needs which would enable them to transform their lives, given the transformations which had taken place under colonialism; on lack of faith in religion or regularities of life; on women's quest for equality and opportunity to participate in decision making; and destructions which had resulted from events and

changes in the life-style over a period of decades in the East African countries. This novel depicted the attempts by people to organize themselves in rational communities in the typical utopian socialist formulations. From African Civilization, Shabaan Robert was gravitating towards utopian socialism and taking the standpoint of the producers.<sup>239</sup>

Around the same time, Sophia Mustapha, one of the Asian supporters of TANU in the 1958/59 elections, predicted that while Tanganyika was a one-party state, there was every indication that an opposition party would arise: she would "not be surprised if it is a sort of left-wing movement".<sup>240</sup> These observations by Shabaan Robert and Sophia Mustapha, when related to the struggles of the working masses which have been shown in this chapter, demonstrate the kind of challenge which confronted the colonial regime in the 1950s and the nationalist regime after that.

The nationalists were committed to modernization, and this was a continuation of the 1940s African Civilization conceptions via Pan-Africanism in the 1950s, in the form of African Socialism in the 1960s. The ideas of African Civilization, influenced by the statist Fabian socialist tendencies of the British Labour Party which heavily emphasized the role of the government and the educated elements (or the modernized), had in fact signalled the victory of the civilizing mission in the 1940s despite the radicalism displayed by them.<sup>241</sup> Even after independence, the politicians viewed the mass of the people as ignorant, primitive, superstitious, lazy, resistant to change and backward--the very language which was used by the Europeans during the colonial period against the Africans. As can be seen from what has been observed so far, the ideas of modernization represented bourgeois interests. Thus in the

process of bringing about development it was necessary for the state to defeat the working masses by concentrating all the powers in the state, and because of the belief in the role of individuals within those conceptions the powers were concentrated in the executive and within the executive in the presidency; at the same time, it was necessary to strip off the independence of the civil society.

The state had to make inroads into the economy by direct participation in the process of development through control of agricultural production and marketing and hence capital accumulation; and the encouragement of investments by protection of manufacturing establishments and its own direct participation in investments. Within this context, it had to wage struggles against the working people in the name of nation-building and development as a form of African socialism. It was the rule of the manufacturing bourgeoisie and the non-agricultural bourgeoisie in general which was being defended by others. The bourgeoisie--mostly non-African or foreign--could not defend their own interests in Tanganyika: they had to be defended, given the racial question which was involved. In order to protect the social power of the capitalists it was necessary to break the political power of all classes--including the capitalists'--though the individual capitalists could go on exploiting the other classes and enjoy protection of property. In order for this to take place, inevitably, the power of the parliament had to be broken alongside the independent mass movements and all the autonomous regional, district, etc. entities so as to create unity and tranquility of the nation, in order to effect the process of development.

The common interests had to be detached from the civil society and made subject to government activity--from building schools, dispensaries, etc. to village communal property, trade unions, the national wealth, etc. Because all the powers were amassed in the Presidency, it seemingly became the incumbent of this office who was the best defender of the best interests of the nation and the only one who advanced and understood best the socialist ideas. The state was further strengthened by the introduction of repressive measures such as the Preventive Detention Act, by-laws for compulsory production of specified crops, etc. It was these repressive measures which enabled the victory of the state vis à vis the civil society. All this was done in the name of socialism and development and the welfare of the peasants who were the most exploited and needed to be developed. In sum, the state became monolithic. A nationalist poet, Saadani Kandoro, once a member of TAA and a founder member of TANU, who was to become an Area Commissioner after independence articulated the sentiments of the nationalists and the moves which were being taken in his eulogization of independence. In a poem, he asked the President to hold the uppermost position and protect the country: all men were awaiting for this happily and no women were to advance forward. He wrote that it was necessary to revive the law which legalized whipping because the issue at stake was that of building the nation.<sup>242</sup>

Kandoro's poem was the best summation of the essence of the nationalists' activities after independence. The ideas expressing these opposing movements, as is self-evident from what has been shown, were not simply an attribute of some individuals; they were an expression of real practical movements. Even the fall of some of those ideas and the

victory of others was an expression of the victory or defeat of those movements. The early 1960s conflicts between the working masses and government and TANU officers who enriched themselves was acute. The feelings of the ordinary people were succinctly summarized by a song which was sung throughout Sukumaland:

We Tanzanians rule ourselves  
But only some enjoy the fruits of the independent people.  
Those with high positions in the government  
Receive high salaries,  
But the cultivators shall not profit;  
Bondage remains.  
The rainy season approaches  
And we cultivate cotton:  
We shall see that the cotton price goes down.

Gents, we are enriching others,  
Making them fat and prosperous.  
Look at their wrist watches  
And the way they use handkerchiefs to wipe their noses!<sup>243</sup>

And it was within this context that the Arusha Declaration was born in 1967. As can be observed from the exposition, this move, fundamentally did not result into the overhauling of the system which prevailed; rather, it strengthened it and sounded the complete defeat of the mass movements.

NOTES

1. See in Issa Shivji, "The State of the Constitution and the Constitution of the State in Tanzania", in *Eastern African Law Review*, Vol 11-14, 1978-81, University of Dar es Salaam, p.16.
2. *Tanganyika Standard*, 2.7.1956. Also see J.C. Taylor, *Political Development of Tanganyika*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1963, p.141.
3. Taylor, *ibid*, p.147.
4. For most of the information in this paragraph see *ibid*, p.149.
5. *ibid*, p.177.
6. *Tanganyika Standard*, 25.11.1958.
7. See for example, "The Race Problem Demands Economic Action", (December 1959) and "Responsible Self Government Proposal", (December 1959) in J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, OUP, Nairobi, 1967.
8. For an account of this, see Sophia Mustapha, *The Tanganyika Way*, EALB, Dar es Salaam, 1961.
9. Quoted by C. Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968*, CUP, London, 1976, p.64. The same views are contained in Nyerere's address to LEGCO, "Responsible Government" in 1967, *op cit*.
10. Taylor, *op cit*, pp.182-3.
11. See *Tanganyika Standard*, 9.2.1962; 7.3.1962; & 10.5.1962.
12. J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, CUP, London, 1979, p.573.
13. See *Tanganyika Assembly Debates (Hansard)*, 36th Session, 5th meeting, September 17-18, 1961, Columns 303-320 & 324-374.
14. *ibid*, Columns 334-5.
15. *ibid*.
16. Arthur D. Little, Inc, "Tanganyika Industrial Development", in Hadley E. Smith (ed), *Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania*, Institute of Public Administration, University College of Dar es Salaam, 1966, pp.270-1. Emphasis added.
17. *ibid*, p.271.
18. Tanganyika Act No 40 of 1963 (September).

19. United Republic of Tanzania, *A short Guide to Investors*, Ministry of Industries and Commerce, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p.35.
20. Nyerere, 1967, op cit, p.209.
21. ibid, p.210.
22. ibid.
23. ibid, p.211.
24. ibid, p.73.
25. Issa Shivji, "Development of Wage Labour and Labour Laws in Tanzania: Circa 1920-1964" Ph D Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1982, p.471. Also W.H. Friedland, *Vuta Kamba, The Development of Trade Unions in Tanganyika*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1969, p.221.
26. A.C Tandau, *Historia ya Kuundwa kwa TFL (1955-1962) na Kuanzishwa kwa NUTA 1964*, Dar es Salaam, n.d. p.46. Also Shivji, ibid, p.474.
27. For all the above see Friedland, op cit, p.126.
28. Shivji, 1982, op cit p.474.
29. N.S.K. Tumbo, "Towards NUTA: The Search for Permanent Unity in Tanganyika's Trade Union Movement", in H. Kjekshus, N.S.K. Tumbo, et al, (contributors), TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1977.
30. ibid; Friedland, op cit, p.127.
31. See K. Guruli, "The Role of NUTA in the Struggle for Socialism and Self Reliance", in G. Ruhumbika (ed), *Towards Ujamaa*, EALB, Nairobi, 1974, p.49; and also, Issa Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1976, p.135.
32. J. Iliffe, "A History of the Dockworkers of Dar es Salaam", *Tanzania Notes and Records*, No71, 1970, Dar es Salaam, p.147.
33. ibid, p.148.
34. Taylor, op cit, p.203. See also news cuttings in Mss Afr s. 1681, "The Papers of African Bureau".
35. Taylor, ibid.
36. ibid.
37. from ibid.
38. Quoted by Guruli, in op cit, p.31.



39. P.B. Mhyo, *Industrial Conflict and Change in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1983, p.56.
40. *ibid*; also *Tanganyika Standard*, 12.2.1960.
41. *Tanganyika Standard*, 13.2.1960.
42. *ibid*, 14.2.1960.
43. Quoted by Mhyo, *op cit* p.57.
44. See *ibid*; Friedland, *op cit*; Tumbo, *op cit*; and Shivji, 1976 & 1982, *op cit*. Kamaliza suggested that TFL should become part of the Ministry of Labour.
45. Mhyo, *ibid*, p.63.
46. *Tanganyika Standard*, 23.6.1962.
47. *ibid*, 25.6.1962.
48. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, 1962, *op cit* p.1018.
49. *ibid*, p.1019.
50. *ibid*, p.1027.
51. *Tanganyika Standard*, 21.6.1962.
52. *ibid*.
53. *ibid*, 17.6.1962.
54. *ibid*.
55. See "Ujamaa, the Basis of African Socialism", in Nyerere, 1967, *op cit*.
56. D. Jackson, *The Disappearance of Strikes in Tanzania: Income Policy and Industrial Democracy*, Working Paper No 1117, University of Aston Management Centre, 1978, p.2.
57. H. Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1967, p.58.
58. Shivji, 1982, *op cit* p.550.
59. See C.W. Guilleband, *An Economic Survey of the Sisal Industry of Tanganyika*, James Nisbet, Welwyn, 1966, p.98.
60. See J. Listowel, *The Making of Tanganyika*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1965, Appendix III for the mutiny; and Friedland, *op cit*, for the rest of the information here.

61. Section 5 (1).
62. Act No 18 of 1964.
63. H. Mapolu, "The organization and Partition of Workers in Tanzania", in H. Mapolu (ed), *Workers and Management*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1976, pp.205-6.
64. Mihyo, op cit, p.84.
65. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, 1964, op cit, p.967.
66. *ibid.* For the whole debate, see pp.967-681.
67. Shivji, 1976, op cit, p.128.
68. Quoted in *ibid.*
69. B.O. Bryde & A. Blaustein, *United Republic of Tanzania* Oceana Publications Inc, New York, 1979, p.8. Also see Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council, No. 2274, 1961; and William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1967, p.188.
70. Tordoff, *ibid.*
71. J.K. Nyerere, "Chief Minister's Circular No 1" (1960) reprinted in *Journal of African Administration*, XIII, 2 (April 1951), pp.108-111. See also in Pratt, op cit, p.98. The same message is spelled out in the independence speech. See Nyerere, 1967, op cit, p.140.
72. Taylor, op cit, p.226.
73. For the discussion on anti-Commonwealth sentiments, see Pratt, op cit, pp.102; and Listowel, op cit, pp.391-98.
74. Interview on African Democracy to BBC General Overseas and North America Services, November 1960. Quoted in Listowel, *ibid*, p.408.
75. On this commitment to socialism see Pratt, op cit, p.96; and S.A. Kandoro, *Mwito wa Uhuru*, Blackstar Agencies, Dar es Salaam, 1978 (2nd edition), p.144.
76. Nyerere, 1967, op cit, pp.103-6.
77. *ibid*, p.105. Emphasis added.
78. *ibid*, p.106.
79. W.E. Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania*, Victor Gollancz Ltd, London, 1973, p.58.

80. The United Tanganyika Party had almost disappeared by 1959, The African National Congress was almost practically extinct and the All Moslem National Union of Tanganyika was under fire from all corners because it had a religious bias. Even the other minor parties which emerged thereafter could not get any support, as they mostly championed naked right wing interests.
81. Listowel, op cit, p.404.
82. ibid.
83. ibid, p.409.
84. ibid, p.380.
85. ibid, p.381.
86. ibid, p.382.
87. ibid, p.409; Taylor, op cit, p.225.
88. Listowel, ibid, p.409.
89. Pratt, op cit, p.113.
90. ibid, p.113-4. Pratt took note of only the commercial bourgeoisie and took for granted that other sections of the bourgeoisie--specifically the manufacturing bourgeoisie--were non-existent. This error was common in most of the pre-1976 studies on capitalism in Tanzania.
91. ibid.
92. Smith, op cit, p.75 shows some of the cases whereby Europeans were deported. Also Pratt, ibid, p.117.
93. *Tanganyika Standard*, 23.1.1962 for the letter of resignation; Taylor, op cit, p.227; Pratt, ibid, p.117; Listowel, op cit, p.225.
94. Listowel, ibid.
95. ibid, p.413; Also see articles by B.P. Srivastava ("The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977--Some Salient features some Riddles") and E.E. Seaton and J.S. Varioba ("The Constitution of Tanzania: An Overview") in *East African Law Review*, op cit. Nkrumah had already done this in Ghana.
96. Srivastava, ibid, p.95.
97. ibid, pp.108-9.
98. ibid.

99. Quoted by Listowel, op cit, p.413.
100. ibid. This greatly resembles the Republican Constitution of Ghana.
101. Nyerere, 1967, op cit, pp.195-203.
102. Quoted by L.T. Kalunga, "Human Rights and the Preventive Detention Act 1962 of the United Republic of Tanzania: Some Operative Aspects", in *Eastern African Law Review*, op cit, p.285. Emphasis added.
103. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, op cit, Column 1088. See also proposals of the Tanganyika Government for a Republic (Government Paper No. 1 of 1962).
104. Act 1962 (Cap 490).
105. J.K. Nyerere, "Ujamaa, the Basis of African Socialism", in 1967 op cit. It is William Friedland and Carl Rosberg Jr in their Introduction to *African Socialism*, (Stanford University Press, California, 1964) who have correctly pointed out this idea that African Socialism in Africa as an ideology was due to the crisis of the process of economic development.
106. Nyerere's innagural address on Republic Day, 9th December 1962, in 1967, op cit, p.185.
107. ibid, p.184.
108. ibid, p.185.
109. ibid, pp.181-2.
110. Nyerere's "Ujamaa, the Basis of African Socialism", in ibid, p.162. Unless indicated otherwise, all that follows below is from the same article.
111. ibid, p.169.
112. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, 1964, op cit, p.977. This was in a report by M.M. Kamaliza when discussing the National Provident Fund.
113. Nyerere, "Ujamaa...", op cit, p.170.
114. Friedland and Rosberg, op cit, p.7.
115. Gicha Mbee, "Letter From Mbugwe, Tanzania", in Irving Leonard Markovitz (ed), *African Politics and Society*, Free Press, New York, 1970, p.138.
116. ibid.

117.     ibid, p.141.
118.     A. Coulson, *Tanzania, A Political Economy*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, p.266. and Chapter 22 in general; also Dean E. McHenry, Jr. "The Utility of Compulsion in the Implementation of Agricultural Policies: A case Study from Tanzania", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol VIII No. 2, 1973, pp.303-316.
119.     Quoted by G.M. Fimbo, "Land, Socialism and Law in Tanzania", in Ruhumbika, (ed), op cit, p.257.
120.     Coulson, op cit, p.146.
121.     J. Loxley, "Structural Change in Monetary System in Tanzania", in L. Cliffe & J. Saul (eds), *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol 2, EAPH, Nairobi, 1973, p.104. Also Coulson, ibid, p.146.
122.     Coulson, ibid, p.147.
123.     ibid, p.147.
124.     See A. Awiti, "Ismani and the Rise of Capitalism", in L. Cliffe, et al, *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1975, pp.51-7; R. Fieldman, "Customs and Capitalism: A Study of Land Tenure in Ismani", ERB Paper No 71.14, University of Dar es Salaam, 1971.
125.     P. Raikes, "Wheat Production and Development of Capitalism in North Iraqw", in Cliffe, et al, (eds), 1975, pp.79-102.
126.     J. Boesen & A.T. Mohele, *The "Success Story" of Peasant Tobacco Production in Tanzania*, SIAS, Uppsala, 1979.
127.     Coulson, op cit, p.165.
128.     Bienen, op cit, pp.345 & 347 for this and the above information.
129.     See D. McHenry, Jr, op cit, p.308 for the Kigoma case. The Songea case and even the demise of the Ruvuma Development Agency, see Coulson, op cit p.166. Coulson suggests that some of the increased area under cultivation was due to people choosing to work harder, rising prices in the early years of independence and above all, because of the triumph of nationalism--whereby people expected to prosper immediately. This is true only in relation to the capitalist elements in the countryside; otherwise, it was mainly compulsion which was the force behind it.
130.     Coulson, ibid, p.161. In the 1964-69 Five Year Development Plan, for example, it was stated: "The greater part of Tanganyikan peasant agriculture continues to be characterized by primitive methods of production and inadequate equipment. Yet significant inroads have been made into conservatism of the rural population who, as they become organized into cooperatives, respond

- encouragingly both to the technical advice provided by the government staff and to cash incentives in the form of semi durable and durable consumer goods." This was typically the language of modernization, whereby the peasants were supposed to be conservative, ignorant, superstitious, etc.
131. Coulson, *ibid*, p.149.
  132. *ibid*; also United Republic of Tanzania, *Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Inquiry into Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1965, p.5
  133. *ibid*, 1965, pp.10-11.
  134. L. Cliffe & J. Saul, "The District Development Front in Tanzania", in Cliffe & Saul, (eds), 1972, *op cit*, pp.314-15.
  135. Coulson, p.152.
  136. See J. Saul, "The Reorganization of Victoria Federation of Co-operative Union", in Cliffe and Saul, Vol 2 *ibid*, 1973.
  137. Ammended as Cap 486 by acts of 1963, 39 of 1964 and 66 of 1964.
  138. Section 3(c)
  139. Section 6.
  140. Fimbo, *op cit*, p.259.
  141. *ibid*.
  142. ILO, *Towards Self Reliance in Tanzania*, Addis Ababa, pp.188-90.
  143. Presidential Committee on Co-operatives, 1965, *op cit* Appendix B p.63.
  144. Coulson, *op cit*, p.169; J. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*, OUP, Nairobi, 1973, pp.122 ff.
  145. *Mwafrika*, 29.8.1959.
  146. Martha Honey, "Asian Industrial Activities in Tanganyika", *Tanzania Notes and Records* No 75, Dar es Salaam, 1975, pp.64-9; Coulson, *op cit*, p.170.
  147. Coulson, *ibid*, p.104.
  148. See United Republic of Tanzania, *Industrial Survey 1965* Central Statistical Bureau, Dar es Salaam, 1967. They were classified as large scale industries by using International Standards of Industrial Classification (ISIC).

149. Coulson, op cit, p.173.
150. Loxley, op cit, p.104.
151. Rweyemamu, op cit, pp.43-4.
152. ibid.
153. Loxley, op cit, p.104.
154. ibid, p.105.
155. *Nationalist*, 11.6.1966.
156. See Bienen, op cit, p.220.
157. United Republic of Tanzania, *Tanganyika Five Year Development Plan for Economic Development* Vol 1, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1964, p.xv.
158. For this discussion, see Bienen, op cit, pp.221-25.
159. This aspect is reported in *Mwafrika*, 19.9.1959; 10.10.1959; and 17.10.1959. There was one woman in this group. Frederick Njilima, who was educated in USA, was the agricultural teacher.
160. Very little is known about most of these spontaneous settlements. See L. Cliffe and G.L. Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and Settlement Experience in Tanzania", in Cliffe and Saul (eds), 1973, op cit, pp.132 and 137-39.
161. B. Wisner, A. Kassami & A. Nuwagata, "Mbambara: The Long Road to Ujamaa", in Cliffe, et al, op cit, pp.370-91.
162. ibid; also Coulson, op cit, p.244.
163. M. von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of Social Experience*, Heinemann, London, 1979.
164. Cliffe and Cunningham, op cit; Coulson, op cit pp.263-71; R. Lewin, "Matetereka" in Cliffe and Saul (eds), 1973, op cit, pp.189-94.
165. Coulson, ibid, p.264.
166. This Constitution is quoted in ibid.
167. Quoted by J. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika*, EAPH, Nairobi, 1971, p.37.
168. Cliffe and Cunningham, op cit, pp.133-34.
169. ibid.

170.     ibid.
171.     Lewin, op cit, p.190.
172.     Coulson, op cit, p.268.
173.     Lewin, op cit, p.192.
174.     Coulson, op cit, p.270.
175.     ibid, p.271.
176.     ibid. Some of these studies on these villages were done by the Kivukoni Party College. It has not been possible to get the actual explanation of the government for disbanding these villages beyond what has been suggested by most of the authors on these villages.
177.     Cliffe and Cunningham, op cit, p.136.
178.     Special Committee on Co-operatives, op cit, pp.11-12.
179.     ibid, p.4.
180.     See TNA 457/A6/1 "Associations" (Geita).
181.     ibid. Constitution of Mwanza African Mutual Aid Association.
182.     Pratt, op cit, p.185.
183.     J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, OUP, Nairobi, 1973, pp.270-76.
184.     Quoted in Smith, op cit, p.174.
185.     ibid, p.175; also Pratt, op cit, p.236.
186.     J.K. Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration", in *Ujamaa, Essays on Socialism*, OUP, Nairobi, 1968, p.36.
187.     ibid, p.14; TANU Constitution of 1965 in Tordoff, op cit, p.236.
188.     *Mwafrika*, 11.7.1959.
189.     Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration", op cit, p.36.
190.     ibid.
191.     For the list of the nationalized firms see Rweyemamu, op cit, p.59; also Coulson, op cit, pp.176 ff.
192.     Pratt, op cit, p.239.
193.     ibid.



194.     ibid, p.238. See also opening speech of special March Conference of the National Executive which endorsed the Leadership Code, in United Republic of Tanzania, *Majadiliano ya Mkutano wa TANU*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1967, Cols 1-21.
195.     Pratt suggests that it was the traditional ethic, nationalizations and rhetorics about socialism which had been prevalent as championed in the *Nationalist Party Daily Paper*--the paper which coined the term Arusha Declaration, which made the leaders accept the Code. It seems, it is only the nationalizations, as a reason which can be validated. The third one, although relevant, did have an impact only in relation to nationalizations.
196.     Pratt, op cit, p.240. Also see Shivji, 1976, op cit; Rweyemamu, op cit; and Coulson, op cit.
197.     Pratt, ibid, p.238.
198.     Smith, op cit, p.175.
199.     Quoted in ibid.
200.     Introduction to Nyerere's 1967, op cit, pp.1-22 written in January 1966.
201.     See Pratt, op cit, p.230 for all these aspects.
202.     The quotations are from Boesen and Mohele, op cit, pp.41-44. See C.S.L. Chachage, "The Development of Urban Capitalism in Tanzania (With an Example of Arusha Town)", M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, pp.110-111 and G.I. Mishambi's study: "Peasants Under Imperialism: A case Study of West Lake Region Tanzania" (M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1978) which also demonstrates this tendency for the rural capitalists to invest in non-agricultural enterprises which had higher rates of profits.
203.     United Republic of Tanzania, *Report of Presidential Commission on the National Union of Tanganyika Workers*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1967, quotation is from p.8.
204.     Pratt, op cit, pp.232-33.
205.     Coulson, op cit, p.182. Also in James Kariuki, *Tanzania's Human Revolution*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, New York, 1979, p.86.
206.     See National Service (Amendment) Act 1966 (No 64 of 1966) and National Service Staff Circular No 5 of 1967.
207.     Smith, op cit, p.27.
208.     Coulson, op cit, p.225.

209. Quoted in *ibid*, pp.181-82.
210. A. Van de Laar, "Growth and Income Distribution in Tanzania Since Independence", in Cliffe and Saul (eds), 1972, *op cit*, p.113. Also in Kariuki, *op cit*, p.113.
211. Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration", in 1968, *op cit*, p.35.
212. Nyerere, "Education for Self-Reliance", in 1968, *ibid*, p.47.
213. *ibid*, p.45.
214. *ibid*, p.44.
215. *ibid*, p.47.
216. *ibid*; p.74.
217. J.K. Nyerere, in *Freedom and Socialism*, OUP, Nairobi, 1976, p.479.
218. Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration", *op cit*, pp.25-29.
219. *ibid*, p.33.
220. Quoted in Smith, *op cit*, p.180. See also pp.176-181 of this book for the above; Coulson, *op cit*, p.183; and A. Van de Laar, *op cit*, p.113.
221. Coulson, *ibid*.
222. Van de Laar, *op cit*.
223. *ibid*, p.114
224. The Interim Turner Report was circulated from 1966. Republic of Tanzania, *Turner Report*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1967. .
225. Shivji, 1976, *op cit*, p.78.
226. See Permanent Labour Tribunal Act of 1967 (No 47 of 1967).
227. ILO, *Basic Needs in Danger: A Basic Needs Oriented Development Strategy for Tanzania*, Addis Ababa, 1982, p.267.
228. Pratt, *op cit*, p.192.
229. Nyerere, 1976, *op cit*, p.263.
230. *ibid*.
231. Loxley, *op cit*, pp.104-05.

- 232. Smith, op cit.
- 233. United Republic of Tanzania, *Industries Open to Private Enterprise in Tanzania*, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p.1.
- 234. United Republic of Tanzania, *A Short Guide to Investors*, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p.35. The 1963 Act was amended in 1967. It became National Industries (Licencing and Registration) Act No 10 of 1967. Of course it did not alter the fundamental question of investments protection.
- 235. *Industries open to Private Enterprise...*, op cit. In fact, it was not said so in the Arusha Declaration.
- 236. For more information about these institutions, see C.S.L. Chachage, op cit, pp.59-62.
- 237. TISCO, *A Manual for Investors* Dar es Salaam, 1980, p.30.
- 238. S. Robert, *Maisha Yangu na Baada ya Miaka Hamsini*, Nelson, London, 1966.
- 239. S. Robert, *Mapenzi Bora* (a poem), Nelson, London, 1969. The novel was *Siku ya Watenzi Wote*, Nelson, London, 1968.
- 240. Sophia Mustapha, op cit.
- 241. At the eve of Independence, there was a discussion group to which many nationalists contributed called The Young Fabians.
- 242. Kandoro, op cit.
- 243. Quoted in G. Andrew Maguire, *Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1967, p.369.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### Some Concluding Remarks

Chapter Seven  
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has dealt with the question of the social-historical formation of an ideology: Tanzania's Ujamaa ideology. The attempt was to locate the evolution, systematization and institutionalization of the ideology in Tanzania within the broad history of social and political struggles (within material production) and demonstrate their connection with the social and political structures and how the state evolved out of them. The study has demonstrated that the history of the dominant ideology in Tanzania is intimately connected to the particular forms of capitalist relations in Tanzania, introduced as a result of imperialist and colonial invasion of the country and their development. A substantial amount of empirical verification has been done in regard to this. By way of conclusion, we return to the appraisal of the circumstances which brought about the dialogue with the past in this study--the socio-economic crisis and the theorization on development. The aim is to show the significance of the findings in this study in so far as the dominant theories and practice of development are concerned.

The socio-economic crisis in Tanzania began around 1973. Consequently most Tanzanians began to suffer a real loss of incomes. Officially, while among the wage/salary earners the average nominal wage/salary per month increased from Shs 340/= to Shs 723/= between 1969 and 1980, real wage/salary per month fell from Shs 340/= to Shs 189/= in the same period.<sup>1</sup> Estimations showed that when the nominal minimum wage was at Shs 480 in 1980/81, the minimum budget for *food only* in an average household of four persons per month at 1980 official price level was at more than Shs 600/=. The majority of the wage earners in this

year earned up to Shs 750/=. Officially, inflation rose at the rate of 26 per cent annually in the five years preceeding 1982.<sup>2</sup> As far as the peasants are concerned, the 1978 ILO report documented that the barter terms of trade for the peasants fell by 22.5 per cent between 1964 and 1973 and the terms for the rural capitalists fell by 19.1 per cent.<sup>3</sup> Other findings revealed that this decline of the terms of trade for agricultural products fell by 23.2 per cent between 1969/70 and 1978/79.<sup>4</sup> Alongside this loss in real incomes was a gap in the balance of payments for the country, low utilization of industrial capacity, shortage of essential consumer goods, food shortage, and a fall in the production of export crops.<sup>5</sup>

It is industrial low capacity utilization which resulted in the shortage of the essential consumer goods. There were very few industries which operated at above 50 per cent of optimum by 1982. There were some which operated at less than 20 per cent, and the average capacity utilization was at about 35 percent. While manufacturing accounted for 10.4 per cent of the GDP in 1977, its contribution fell to 5.8 per cent of a smaller GDP by 1981.<sup>6</sup> The fact is that by this period Tanzania was quite capable of supplying most if not all the manufactured consumer goods. This is because Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was more or less completed by the early 1970s. The verification of this is in the records which show that there was a rapid decline in consumer goods importation in the 1970s: from 30.3 per cent of the total imports in 1967 to 11.2 per cent in 1979.<sup>7</sup> (See Table 4 below) That ISI was completed by this period is further confirmed by Nyerere's opening speech to the 1969-1974 Second Five Year Development Plan. It is pointed out that::

We shall continue to expand simple manufacturing, the processing of primary commodities and the provision of basic construction materials; but we have reached the stage where we think seriously about the next and more difficult phase of industrialization...capital goods which are used only in the production of other things....such a move is essential for long term growth.<sup>8</sup>

A Twenty Year Plan for heavy industrialization was under preparation by 1972; and its implementation was to begin in 1975, only to be suspended as a result of the crisis.

Capacity underutilization was attributed to inputs shortages, inadequate transport facilities and lack of spare parts due to shortage of foreign currency as a result of the balance of payments crisis. Balance of payments crisis was caused by the fall in the volume of exports. The volume of exports fell by one-third between 1973 and 1980, i.e. from an index of 137 to 87; as a result of which export earnings had a purchasing power of only 57 per cent in 1980 of what they had in 1973. The trade gap was at over Shs 6 billion by 1980.<sup>9</sup> While officially, the tendency has been to attribute the causes of this problem to the terms of trade in the world market, the fact is, generally, the terms of trade in the world market in relation to Tanzania over this period were more or less constant. Export unit value in this period increased on an average of 11.1 percent annually while the import unit value increased on an average of 15.7 per cent annually.<sup>10</sup>

Most revealing in this period is the composition of the imports in the total import bill over these years. The figures reveal that there was a tendency for the share of capital goods to increase throughout the 1967-79 period. These consisted of machinery and equipment. Intermediary goods, in which spare parts and fuel were included, tended to remain

constant and the share of food and consumer goods tended to decline. While the government alleged that oil consumed 60 per cent of the *export earnings* which was correct given that the export volume had declined, the fact is, it accounted for 7.7 of the *total import bill* in 1967 and 15 per cent in 1979.<sup>12</sup> This aspect is revealed in Table 4:

TABLE 4: COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS, SELECTED YEARS 1967-1979  
(Tshs 'million)

	1967	(%)	1972	(%)	1979	(%)
<i>Capital goods</i>	385	(20.2)	730	(21.4)	4,171	(37.2)
Transport						
Equipment	135	(7.1)	194	(5.7)	1,752	(15.6)
<i>Intermediary goods</i>	662	(34.7)	1,320	(38.8)	3,752	(32.5)
<i>Consumer goods</i>	578	(30.3)	828	(24.3)	1,254	(11.2)
<i>Food</i>	150	(7.9)	332	(9.8)	391	(3.5)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,910</b>	<b>(100.2)</b>	<b>3,404</b>	<b>(100)</b>	<b>11,212</b>	<b>(100)</b>

SOURCE: E.E. Hanak, "The Tanzanian Balance of Payments Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons for Survival Strategy", M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1981, Table 5.

Broadly, the economic picture presented by the decade after the Arusha Declaration was the tendency for agricultural production to fall in general, coupled with a rise in investment rates in the non agricultural branches of the economy and a fall in capacity utilization in industries. The manufacturing sector grew at a rate of 7.5 per cent annually between 1965 and 1975. In terms of contribution to the GDP, the percentage share of agriculture declined from 56 per cent to 42 per cent between 1961 and 1975 and that of manufacturing went up from around 4 per cent to 11 per cent in the same period, and fell to 5.8 per cent in 1980 of a smaller GDP. In terms of value added in manufacturing, it went up from Shs 446/= million between 1965 and 1974 (at 1966 prices) with a faster growth in large scale manufacturing enterprises.<sup>13</sup> An observation was made that throughout this period, there was a very high rate of



value added, and the rate was at more than 13 per cent annually. There were exceptionally high rates in 1966 (30 per cent) and 1969 (20.4 per cent). These appeared to be "deviations from that trend; in a relatively small economy such as Tanzania's they could as well arise from some large new factories coming 'on stream' in those particular years".<sup>14</sup> In fact, the 1970s were marked by high investment and capital formation rates.

These growth rates in value added, capital formation and investment rates in manufacturing, were possible in this period, despite the beginning of the crisis, because of the actions of the National Price Commission which was introduced in 1973. This body was introduced with the task to regulate non-agricultural prices, with the following determining aspects:

- (a) The need to preserve and promote competitive position of local products;
- (b) The need to allow local firms to maintain efficiency and expand their businesses;
- (c) The need to prevent unjustified price increases having adverse impact on the incomes of peasants and workers;
- (d) The need to induce orderly development of trade
- (e) The need to generate finance for development programmes and recurrent expenditure.<sup>15</sup>

The Price Commission was endowed with the powers to fix prices at all levels--from wholesale to retail levels, from manufacturing to imported goods. In areas where the price commissioner had not fixed the prices, the Regional and District Development Directors could do so.

Thus the rates of growth in value added, capital formation and investment rates were due to the pricing mechanism, whereby, manufacturers could afford to produce less and the government allow arbitrary price increases while at the same time keeping the wages and prices of raw materials low so as to compensate for losses and ensure

accumulation. The situation in Tanzania, it has been noted in relation to the parastatals, is regrettable, because besides the subsidizations when productivity fell, "most of [the] parastatals are in a monopolistic situation in their subsectors. And the Price Commissioner is not known to have refused a request of price increase which has been a reflection of inefficient operations".<sup>16</sup> This mercantilist form of accumulation also applied to private enterprises. The Minister for Planning, Professor Kighoma Malima, explained to the National Assembly in 1984 that "Frequent price increases are...caused by underutilization of industrial capacity..." caused by raw material shortages, wage increases and devaluation of the currency. He further informed the assembly that, "High increases in commodity prices were also a reflection of a decline in efficiency and diligence in the productive sector, which had led to decreased production". The government sanctioned price increases as a "last resort after thorough scrutiny of proposals of manufacturers and other producers". One of the Members of Parliament recommended scrapping the Price Commission "because its pricing system favoured industrialists and trading companies at the expense of consumers."<sup>17</sup>

These aspects of the crisis were in essence an expression of the expansion of capitalist relations in the country after 1967. This expansion was best reflected in, among others things, the process of urbanization. Urbanization is an indication of the levels of development of exchange under capitalism: it demonstrates the separation of capital and landed property and the existence of property having its basis on the selling and buying of labour power. In 1952, only 2.75 per cent of Tanganyikans lived in the 33 gazetted townships and by 1957 urban population accounted for 4.1 per cent of the total population. More

rapid urbanization was experienced after independence: from 364,072 people in 1957 it rose to 685,547 and 2,173,816 in 1967 and 1978 respectively--i.e. from 5.7 per cent of the total population in 1967 to 12.7 in 1978.<sup>18</sup>

The process of urbanization as an indicator of expansion of capitalist relations is best grasped within the forms of differentiation in the countryside and the development of wage labour in general. Differentiation in the countryside had continued unabated after independence and even after the Arusha Declaration. The difference was, especially since 1964, large scale capitalist farmers and settlers, as was explained in Chapter Six, had continually dwindled numerically. This was due to the flight of settler capital and the tendency for capitalist farmers to invest in non-agricultural enterprises which had higher rates of profit. In the 1970s, large scale farming (state and private) occupied 15 per cent and small holder agriculture occupied 85 per cent of the area under crop production. Of the 2.5 million holdings under small holder agriculture by 1980, with an average of 1.2 hectares, 31 per cent of them were in holdings of an area less than 0.5 hectares, 27 per cent were in holdings of an area between 0.5 and 1.0 hectares, 23 per cent were in an area between 1.0 and 2.0 hectares, and 9 per cent were of an area between 2.0 and 3.0 hectares. Only 8 per cent had an area over 3.0 hectares. Hand farm implements were mostly used in farms with an area below 3.0 hectares, and mechanized farming methods of varying degrees were used in holdings of 3.0 hectares and above.<sup>19</sup> In other words, roughly 90 per cent of the small holders belonged to the category of middle and poor peasants, and 10 per cent were in the category of rural capitalists.

Most available figures for the wage earners are mainly for the so-called modern sector only: they tend to exclude those working in small enterprises or those who are employed in small holder agriculture and handicraft industries--those enterprises employing below 10 persons in International Standards of Industrial Classification. The only figures which paint a more reliable picture are the National Provident Fund figures, whose membership extended to establishments employing four or more permanent workers and excluded civil servants; although again it was mostly the urban workers only. There were 411,009 workers registered with this Fund in 1968/69. This number rose to 1,017,665 in 1977/78 and (provisionally) 1,647,930 members in 1982.<sup>20</sup> The National Provident Fund figures are a better approximation because of what is revealed by the census figures for 1967 and 1978. From the 1967 reports, out of a population of 12,313,054 with an active population of 5,678,680, people who were permanently employed were 499,826, family workers were 645,284 and the unemployed were 109,952. Employers were 28,728 and self employed were 4,125,890.<sup>21</sup> In which case, *broadly*, the working class<sup>22</sup> accounted for 1,255,062 or 26.8 per cent of the active population--i.e. the permanently employed, the family or casual workers and the unemployed. The latter under capitalism constitutes the "reserve army" of the working class or that section of the working class which is thrown out by capital or already proletarianized by it but not yet employed and ready for exploitation.<sup>23</sup> The 1978 Census did not include the category of employers and the unemployed. The latter was included in the category of the "unoccupied" (old people, disabled, young people and unemployed who accounted for 6,336,268). Out of a total population of 17,048,329 people in 1978, the active population accounted for 14,334,192 people.

The permanently employed were 602,568, the temporary employed were 232,502, the casual employees were 84,503 and family workers were 1,530,502.<sup>24</sup> In other words, broadly, the working class accounted for about 20 per cent of the active population or 2,450,140 workers. This was a relative growth by 1978, given the size of the active population as compared to 1967.

The urban growth rates, the differentiation among the producers and the growth of the working class had an association with the expansion of non-agricultural activities of the economy in general. In the construction industry for example, while there were 50 registered contractors in Dar es Salaam in 1968/69 and all of them were foreign owned; by 1979 there were 330 firms in the country and they rose to 419 by 1980. These firms were mostly dominated by millionaires--and out of the 419 firms in 1980, only 17 were foreign owned: "The number of African-owned contractors has increased tremendously compared to 1968/69 when there were none".<sup>25</sup>

More interesting was the expansion in the manufacturing sector. The 1967 nationalizations of industries had mainly affected the large scale firms which were mostly foreign and few large local ones. Otherwise, they did not alter the numerical dominance of private firms. According to the 1972 industrial survey which was able to cover 497 large establishments in ISIC terms, 43 or 8.55 per cent were wholly government owned, 49 or 9.89 per cent were joint government/private firms and 402 or 81.49 per cent were wholly private owned. Similarly, of the 524 recorded large scale firms in 1976, only 47 were government owned.<sup>26</sup> Between 1977 and 1982, 43 big state owned or jointly owned industries came into operation, and 28 were at an advanced stage of installation. These

industries were being established through loans, aids and grants or in partnership with foreign firms. Also, Swedish capital, through the state organization--Small Scale Industries Organization (SIDO)--helped entrepreneurs in the establishment of industries in this period. These on average employed 13 workers and by 1977/78 SIDO had been able to establish 3,978 units in the country.<sup>27</sup> The survey of industries in 1979 recorded that there were 1,178 industrial establishments.<sup>28</sup> In which case, by ISIC criteria, these figures taken together show that there were about 5,156 establishments by 1979.<sup>29</sup>

Besides the state being the largest owner of capital as a result of the nationalizations and foreign capital participation through it, there were already in existence private local monopolies and big capitalists, some in partnership with foreign capital. Among the local monopolies and big capitalists<sup>30</sup> were: Industrial Management Services (IMS) famous as K.J. Group (Karmali Juma). This group dealt with Isuzu trucks, tipper buses, Honda, KOMATSU, folk lifters, ITT telephone exchange systems, etc and manufactured oil, fuel and petrol filters; diesel engines for cars, tractors, pick-ups, industrial engines, etc. Their headquarters were in Dar es Salaam and they had branches in Arusha, Mbeya, Tanga, Dodoma, Iringa, Morogoro, Moshi, Lindi, Mwanza, etc, and a few in Kenya and Zambia. They had associate offices in USA, UK, Canada, Singapore, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Zambia and Kenya. This company had 42 firms by 1978.

Other monopolies and big capitalists were: the J.V Group (Juthalal Verji) which had 12 firms by 1978; the Somaia Group of Companies of Tanga which had 17 firms by 1982; the Sachak Group which had several firms and used to own sisal industries in Tanga; the Karimjee Jivanjee

Group which had several firms, incorporated foreign shares and had 2 Africans participating in it; the House of Manji (which used to own the Food Corporation of Arusha)--it had some share holders from Kenya; the Amboni Group of Companies with industries and sisal estates; Mansoor Daya which dealt with pharmaceuticals; and the Chandaria Group who were based in Nairobi and Mombasa, holding shares in big state owned industries such as Aluminium Africa, Kibo Match, etc.

After it was observed that the private sector's share in the GNP had dropped to 74 per cent in 1974 from 86 per cent 14 years earlier and that it had risen to 78.7 per cent by 1978, President Nyerere acknowledged that the private sector had a role to play in national development. He went further that, it had grown considerably after the Arusha Declaration, and its "growth was deliberately sanctioned by the government. The capitalist sector is there....we are still a dual economy. What has been lacking is proper methodology to co-ordinate the activities of the sector."<sup>31</sup> The growth in this sector was partly assisted by the politicians and the bureaucrats. The Commission which investigates the conduct of leaders in relation to the 1967 leadership code, noted in 1984 that politicians and bureaucrats were able to evade the leadership requirements by utilizing finances through various loopholes for building capitalism. It was observed that the leaders had been establishing companies under provision 212 of the Law of Tanzania which allowed people or groups (of private individuals) to establish businesses in the country. It was pointed out that, while there were 880 private business companies in 1974, these rose to 16,007 by 1984. The leaders had also facilitated capitalist expansion by providing tenders to ex-leaders in private business, for the benefit of both parties.<sup>32</sup>

All these observations and what has been demonstrated in this study point to the centrality of the state in the process of capitalist transformation historically in Tanzania. It was observed in Chapter Two that the state, under capitalism, constitutes a section of the material ruling class; that it comprises the group of people under whom power is concentrated. It was further pointed out that the foundation of the bourgeois state which enables it to impose itself socially and politically upon society by establishing norms, regulations and sanctions while at the same time remaining part and parcel of the material relations, is its externality in relation to the civil society. That is it exists as "a public power distinct from the mass of the people". This foundation rests on: (1) The fact that production and circulation of commodities does not automatically reproduce labour power as the most important commodity under capitalism, which is external to it. Hence the centrality of the state in the process of divorcing the producer from the means of production and the continuous process of instituting policies, laws, norms, sanctions etc. relevant to this. (2) The fact that labour power is not reproduced as a capitalist commodity, and hence its value being determined not only by socially necessary labour, but also by the value of the means of subsistence necessary for its maintenance. Means of subsistence are obtainable in circulation and not in production and hence the struggles between the workers and capitalists. And (3) The fact that there is competition between capitals as the fundamental logic of existence of capital.

The above amount to the fact that under capitalism, the bourgeoisie is compelled to entrust political rule to its ideological and political representatives if these relations are to be reproduced. This aspect



complicates matters in the sense that in the hands of the representatives, automatically, the first task of the state becomes its own maintenance and reproduction as an institution. Given this situation, it thus becomes necessary in some instances for the state machinery to completely dominate the civil society and strip-off its powers. This means there is always a room for conflict of interests between the state and the bourgeoisie or some of its fractions depending on the general requirements of the reproduction of the system as a whole. This conflict becomes even more obvious when the ideas of the representatives do not seem to be the ideas of the dominant class and the bureaucracy is seemingly having an autonomous power from the class.<sup>33</sup> The conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the state are on the whole non-antagonistic, because what defends the bourgeoisie under capitalism is the juridical framework which protects the free exchange of commodities--including labour power itself--; and also represses any rebellions of the working masses. But more than that is the fact<sup>3</sup> that there is a fundamental unity between the state and the bourgeoisie, in the sense that the state has to defend the reproduction of the whole system because it also lives on the surplus produced by the working people and is also threatened by them as the bourgeoisie. Thus, the fact that individual members of the state can express ideas which seem to contradict capitalism or even express quasi socialist ideologies, does not transform the state into an anti-bourgeois, or a socialist state. What is fundamental is the juridical framework which protects commodity production and property.

This study has revealed such aspects, whereby, the state has consistently legislated against the working people, protected the

interests of capitalist production, while at the same time being compelled to struggle against certain sections of capital, depending on the historical conjuncture and the particular forms of resistance it had to pacify. Thus the state was seemingly pro-African and anti-capitalist in the 1920s when it was mostly concerned with its own survival and reproduction of the social system and the privileges. This self defence of the state demanded that it limited all the forms of capital which threatened the production of raw materials and the supply of labour or those which could cause a rebellion. The Africanist ideology was a result of re-examination of the foundations of the civilizing mission, influenced by the resurgence of the cult of the "noble savage" and African studies which produced a partial knowledge related to African societies and aimed at the resolution of the crisis of the civilizing mission given the rebellion against it. For the colonialist, it was a question of how to make the African effectively civilizable; and the answer was found in the co-option of some of the elements of the people to be civilized. The Africanist ideology, had nothing to do with the commitment to the perpetuation of the "African" social, political and economic structures as such; and this was admitted by its ideologues. Rather it was a question of the particular forms in which the system had to be reproduced, and also of breaking the resistance.

The state, in the 1920s, not only struggled against settler capital which posed a big menace in relation to land and labour--aspects which were at the heart of the rebellions--but also against commercial capital in the sphere of rural produce marketing in favour of monopolistic marketing, and in the sphere of manufacturing given the general interests of capital. It also fought against African capitalist

elements in the sphere of commerce and general participation in the colonial system. The colonial paternalistic relations alienated even the very elements created by it, despite their being civilized. This was notwithstanding the revision in the civilizing mission which now acknowledged that the African was not only a human being, but also had a civilization which had the same objectives as Western civilization. The major difference was the fact that although it was true that the African had a civilization, he was incapable of systematizing it: it still had to be stimulated by European example and guidance.

The state found the justification of its existence in its alleged centrality to the process of *development* after the Second World War. This was the time when the development of the colonies began to occupy a special place in world literature. At this time, development/growth was synonymous with capital formation and industrialization. This was also the time when the state began to heed the demands of the "modern Tanganyikans" who stood for a fast tempo of development of the country by the government, although it still denied them a place in the key positions in the state because there remained were also the interests of the other sections of the bourgeoisie which had also to be taken into consideration which would be contradicted by them. The advanced capitalist countries, at this time, were heading towards the so-called post-industrial stage which favoured the industrialization of the colonies. The era of "modernization theories" had dawned. These theories argued that the development of the third world countries could be possible through further integration into the world market, which in turn would result in the injection of capital, technology and values. It was such a process which was to enable the possibility of closing the

gap between the poor and the rich and the agrarian and industrial societies. The third world countries were to follow the same stages of development as the western capitalist societies. In these theories, third world countries were characterised by two sectors: the modern and the traditional. Traditional economy was to be transformed to modern economy, and the barriers to economic development were in the traditional economy.<sup>34</sup>

The nationalists who were to take power after independence were trained in this tradition. In the 1940s and during the nationalist struggles their main concern was the development of the country through active government involvement in the economy, protection and Import Substitution Industrialization, typically in the modernization fashion. The nationalists had emerged as a result of the disenchantment with the dream of developing Tanganyika in co-operation between Europeans and civilized Africans. The inability to blend in naturally under the colonial system had pushed them to resistance and to refute Eurocentrism theoretically. For them, this entailed the rejection of European Civilization and development of the idea that to be civilized was first and foremost to be African. Indeed even the civilizing mission had acknowledged that the African was a human being with a civilization which had no other objective than that of Western civilization; he also had been able to share in the systematization of this civilization, and proved that he could share the universal views on development. He too had the right to participate in universal history in the development of his own country. Thus the nationalists views, based on partial knowledge of African societies (a knowledge which picked from African societies only those elements which were acceptable by the West) did not

contradict westernality, despite their radical denial of Western values. Injection of capital and technology and even the science of economics were accepted; as for the values, Africanism was more humane than European civilization which was seen as cruel and based on the exploitation and domination of people.

According to the modernization views, injection of capital and technology was meant to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, industrial and agrarian societies. The sewing in of the Fabian socialist tendencies was possible and even attractive during this period because, they also championed the development of colonies and were sympathetic to the nationalists. Fabians also emphasized the key role of the state. More fundamental, is the fact that socialism by this period was increasingly becoming a development strategy, demobilized politically, and was in general being transformed into an elitist ideological guideline to scientific and technological development, and hence standing in defense of the role of the state and individuals--such as the educated and bureaucrats.

What was institutionalized after independence were the African socialist ideas which were essentially modernist. The aim and most important task was to modernize the "primitive agricultural sector"; while at the same time building a base for the modern economy by acceleration of industrial investments. Such a conception could not entertain or encourage any self-activity of the common working people, the illiterate, the 'uncivilized', etc. which ran counter to development goals. It could not entertain any view that transformation of society was possible through social struggles or conflicts; because development in the modernist sense required unity, and the urgent question was that

of settling accounts with backwardness and "resistance to change". Fundamentally, society had to be rescued from conflicts characteristic of the western societies if development was to be attained. This unity was only possible through the state, an institution which was seen as an embodiment of the principle of consensus. Nyerere was to write in 1962:

Both the 'rich' and the 'poor' individual were completely secure in African society. Natural catastrophe brought famine, but it brought famine to everybody--'poor' or 'rich'. No body starved, either of food or of human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. That was socialism. That is socialism.<sup>35</sup>

The means to be used to effect development, it was argued, was the state--the bourgeois colonial state which was and remained part and parcel of the social relations of capitalism in dominance. It was within this context that the civil society had to lose its power and independence: the mass and political organizations were either abolished or brought under direct state control in so far as they were in opposition to the general interests which the state sought to defend. The outcome was to leave the working people defenceless vis à vis the state and capital in general. Alongside this process, the bourgeoisie also lost political power, although protection of their interests continued. This entailed the concentration of power within the executive arm of the state and within the executive in the presidency so as to stifle opposition from some of the sections of the bourgeoisie given the racial aspects involved within the forms of social struggles after independence. The history of post-independence Tanzania has been the history of effecting the "process of development", i.e. the further entrenchment and consolidation of capitalist relations. Within this process, the dominant ideology has been its theoretical expression in

the process of disarming the resisting masses in the name of protection of the interests of the peasants who need most to be modernized.

The criticism of orthodox and liberal economists and also orthodox Marxism by the "Dependency" theoreticians in terms of exploitation of the "periphery" by the "centre" and the impossibility of autonomous industrialization in the third world countries under the hegemony of world capitalism and hence the problems of poverty and unemployment; and the alleged impotence of the bourgeoisie in the third world countries; in essence, ended in providing a further cloak over and protecting bourgeois interests. Effectively, the socialist strategy, as a solution for the crisis in the process of development only ended up in legitimating the developmentalist conceptions which stood for industrialization and active state intervention in the economy by protectionism and creation of an industrial base. It could be said, 1967 was more or less an overthrow of orthodox modernization ideas (which believed in philanthropic imperialism to help in the process of development) given the struggles between the state and the civil society and the institutional conditions behind the production of ideas in the country. It was a nationalist solution to the crisis of development as grasped by the state. No wonder that "Dependency" theories began to lose their ground when the world crisis began.

In the examination/analysis of social formations by the "Dependency School" (broadly) the controlling paradigm or the point of departure was industrialization and its nature, relations of dependency, forms of capital, productive forces, etc.. Hence the debates vegetated around the questions of whether there is capitalism, capitalists, workers or peasants or not in the third world social formations. Orthodox Marxism

and orthodox modernization theories were challenged on the pretext that, although capitalism developed and integrated the third world countries into the world market, it also stopped them from fully entering. Socialism was taken as a strategy or technique to deal with the problems of the crisis of development. And it was these aspects which paved the way for the revival of orthodox marxism and modernization paradigms as alternative models of development. This is because, the difference had been in terms of the strategy--whereby the "Dependency School" emphasized the contradictions of capitalism while the orthodox schools did not.

The critique of "Dependency" involved questioning so-called neo-Marxism as a divergence from classical Marxist theory--an indication of the fundamental unity of the orthodox theories and the "Dependency" theories. Among those who criticized the "Dependency" theories was the late Bill Warren. Warren revived the idea of capitalism and imperialism as historically progressive.<sup>36</sup> In his conception, "imperialism was the means through which techniques, culture, and institutions that had evolved in Western Europe over centuries...sowed their revolutionary seeds in the rest of the world".<sup>37</sup> He argued that imperialism and capitalist development in the third world countries led to industrialization, and this was especially true since the Second World War. If such development did not occur the reasons had to be sought in the ideologies/strategies/policies pursued by the countries in question. As far as Warren was concerned, prospects of industrialization were quite good, and all arguments about imperialism and dependency were "reactionary petty bourgeois outlooks of Proudhon" which rejected "the progressive outlook of John Stuart Mill". For him, socialist ideologies



in the third world countries were primitive radical interventions which rejected the progressive nature of capitalism to the detriment of development.<sup>39</sup> Hence the liberal solutions of encouragement of market forces, as if they were ever constrained.

The revival of orthodox Marxism with the demise of the "Dependency School" was a response of what E.P. Thompson called "the much publicised 'revival of Marxism'...in the last two decades,..."<sup>39</sup> The critics of "Dependency" school have insisted on the necessity to base analysis on the sphere of production. As a consequence,, some of them have declared that there is a difficulty in the acceptance of the labour theory of value, and hence it is impossible to reduce history to class struggle. What has become of paramount importance and a very powerful "tool" in analysis of historical processes is the concept of mode of production. Thus, it is this concept which has been taken as the embodiment of the fundamental principle of Marxist methodology which makes it possible to grasp the dynamics of society.<sup>40</sup> Put in other words, it is the appearance and disappearance of modes of production which is the motor of history; and industrial, technological, green, etc. revolutions are the locomotives: it is the "articulation" or transformation of modes of production which constitutes the materialist conception of history.

Thus, theorization on development, whether in its crude modernization guise, or in "Dependency" theories and the critics of "Dependency", has been reduced to an ideological guideline to scientific and technological development. Hence, its focus, implicitly or explicitly, has been on the failure or success of ideologies, strategies, policies and plans pursued by the state; and, relations or modes of production which impede or accelerate the development of

"productive forces". Even sociological theorization of development has centrally viewed the problems of development/underdevelopment in the same light. It is in this context that ideology in Tanzania has been held responsible for retardation of capitalism, or for not being "scientific" or for failure to "capture the peasant" so as to effect development, and hence the socio-economic crisis. Capitalism or socialism has been reduced to productive forces and technology; and the fact that capital or commodities are not things but social relations has been suppressed. To see the crisis in that light is to completely forget the fact that crash or crisis is the "horrible, cronic disease of capitalist society, which recurs so regularly that its coming can be forecast" given its *logic*. Crises are an inevitable result of the process of subordination of social production to private appropriation; and hence, even close supervision does not "prevent the capitalists from setting up enterprises in the times of boom which must inevitably become bankrupt later on".<sup>41</sup>

What this study has been able to demonstrate is the fact that development is an aspect which is not free of class interests. Therefore, theorization about it cannot be reduced to erudite refutation of ideologies, policies, plans, and strategies, as if "erudite refutation of false theses of ideologies....of domination,...annul their material efficacy for domination". The fact is, it is "material relations of domination which give power, pertinence or force to those false theses and not the other way around."<sup>42</sup> The so-called solutions for the problems in Tanzania or Africa in general in terms of creation of a New International Economic Order, "heavy industrialization", technological transfer, application of Marxism-Leninism as if it were a

spanner, assistance from socialist countries, liberalization of the economies, aid, etc; derived from developmentalist/modernization ideologies are basically a product of such theorization. Such solutions entail the patronization of the working people by a caste of people, such as, those armed with "scientific ideology", modernizing agents (such as bureaucrats and "Modern Africans"), good politicians, good planners, etc. This is an idealistic problematic which sees the hegemony of ideas and objects in the life of people--their material world and relations among them. It is an economistic and technocratic approach which takes productive forces as the motive force of history and which embraces the elitist thesis which advocates the dictatorship of the intelligentsia. The end result has been in the legitimation and defence of capitalism, as it has been done typically by Bill Warren.

The trick in the debate on development has been to relegate to the background the question of the conditions of social struggles for self-defense, self-emancipation and self-determination of the people and hence the peoples' own weaknesses and strength. It has been a refusal to bow to the fact that it is people who make their own history in the transformation of their circumstances and themselves--a process in which productive forces, policies, ideologies, plans, etc. are grasped as its part and parcel. It is only when things have not worked out properly or gone wrong that appeal for support of ideologies or policies has been made to people whose capacity as history makers is systematically denied. The undelying reason for all this is the fact that developmentalism is the religion of capitalism since the Second World War; and central to all developmentalist/modernization perspectives is

the role of the state and individuals (bureaucrats, politicians, cadres, modernizing agents, etc) and repudiation of peoples' experiences.

To take it that people make their own history means to acknowledge the centrality of social struggles in processes, which amounts to examining/theorizing processes from the point of view of how people continually struggle and resist all forms of arbitrariness, hierarchization and the whole question of the liberation of the civil society from the oppression of the state and capital in general. A knowledge which does not reflect the social conditions of struggles through which men and women are simultaneously transforming circumstances and themselves--as, for example, the peasants of the 17 Ruvuma Development Association were attempting to do--; a knowledge which views the vast majority of people as unscientific, backward, ignorant of their own interests, superstitious, etc. even if Marxist or socialist; is fundamentally oppressive, arrogant and authoritarian, which reinforces hierarchization. It is all reminiscent of Eurocentrism and the civilizing mission in general which viewed colonized/oppressed masses in the same manner. It is an elitism which:

stands as direct successor in the old lineage: Benthamism, Coleridgean 'clerisy', Fabianism, and Leavisism of the more arrogant variety. Once again, the intellectuals--a chosen band of these--have been given the task of enlightening the people....[it is] marked by...very heavy emphasis upon the ineluctable weight of ideological modes of domination--domination which destroys every space for the initiative or creativity of the mass of the people--a domination from which only the enlightened minority of intellectuals can struggle free.<sup>43</sup>

The question in Tanzania and most of the third world countries is not that of failure or success stories of ideologies, models, plans, strategies, etc. in effecting development; rather, it is that of defeat

or victory of certain social groups.<sup>44</sup> The evolution and transformation of the dominant ideology in Tanzania has been part and parcel of the struggles of the state against social movements, such as trade unions, co-operative unions and other forms of opposition against arbitrariness, leaving the civil society defenceless against its rapaciousness and that of capital. The result has been the inability for the people to fight for better living conditions, higher wages, better remuneration for their produce; or even effectively control processes and transform or influence them.

African Civilization and African socialism was partly generated as an answer to European prejudice: it was an attempt to show the being-in-the world of the African. It was *not* an attempt on the part of the educated to become organic thinkers of the masses; but to attain universal recognition. It is in this respect that it became part of developmentalism, which like all modernization thinking looks down upon the ordinary people as incapable of their own emancipation.

NOTES

1. Calculated from, United Republic of Tanzania, *Economic Survey*, 1977-78 & 1981, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam.
2. *ibid*; See also J.M. Kulaba, *Housing, Socialism and National Development in Tanzania*, Rotterdam, 1981.
3. ILO, *Towards Self-Reliance in Tanzania*, Addis Ababa, 1978, pp.188-90.
4. Calculation by Frank Ellis in "Agricultural Pricing Policy in Tanzania 1970-1979; Implications for Agricultural Output, Rural Incomes and Crop Marketing Costs", E.R.B., University of Dar es Salaam, 1980, (mimeo), Table 7.
5. For these aspects see J.K. Nyerere, *Five Years of CCM Government*, Dar es Salaam, 1982; and ILO, *Tanzania, Basic Needs in Danger*, Addis Ababa, 1982.
6. ILO, 1978, *op cit*; ILO, 1982, *ibid*.
7. E.E. Hanak, "The Tanzanian Balance of Payments Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons for Survival Strategy", M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1981, Table 5.
8. United Republic of Tanzania, *Second Five Year Development Plan 1969-1974*, Vol 1, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1969, p.xiii.
9. ILO, 1982, *op cit*, pp.15-19.
10. *ibid*. See also Hanak, *op cit*.
11. Due to the price increases of oil, the import bill for oil import increased by 330 per cent between 1973 and 1979 and there was a slight decline in its volume. The government gave oil as one of the major causes of the crisis by pointing out that Tanzania spent 60 per cent of the export earnings on oil importation. This is true in so far as one takes the export earnings as the criteria; but the picture is radically different when one examines the import bill in relation to the *total import bill* which took into account all the imports regardless of whether they were financed by Tanzania or through aid, grant, etc. See *ibid*.
12. *ibid*, Table 6.
13. ILO, 1978, *op cit*, pp.84-5.
14. *ibid*.
15. *ibid*, p.178.

16. *Daily News*, 22.7.1983.
17. *ibid*, 29.10.1984. The *Sunday News* (7.10.1984) reported that while in Mtwara, President Nyerere told the peasants that "higher prices for clothes were unavoidable as most of the textile mills were producing under capacity and that costs of running them had to be met from the same shortfall in production."
18. United Republic of Tanzania, *1978 Population Census Reports*, Vol IV, Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, 1982
19. These figures have were produced in TISCO, *Development Plan for Metal Working Industries in Tanzania*, Prepared for NDC, Dar es Salaam, 1981, p.7:6.
20. *Economic Survey*, 1982, op cit, p.62.
21. United Republic of Tanzania, *1967 Population Census Reports*, Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, 1968.
22. The working class here is taken as a broad category, with the understanding that classes are usually thus, although internally fragmented or differentiated in concrete contexts along such dimensions as skills, experience, wealth, income, origin, position in hierarchy, and even power and authority--differentiation which can be a source of non-antagonistic contradictions within a class.
23. See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p.592. This "mass of human material always ready for exploitation", is created even at a very much lower level of the expansion of capitalism. It is not necessarily created by a high organic composition of capital only, and it does not necessarily have to be absorbed in the industries, because the existence of this section of the working class is the condition for the reproduction of capital. Capitalist development and accumulation can not take place without the existence of the "active labour army" and alongside it the "industrial reserve army". If the latter is non-existent then it is created by forcible means: "But on the other hand, as soon as (in the colonies, e.g.) adverse circumstances prevent the creation of an industrial reserve army and, with it, the absolute dependence of the working class upon the capitalist class, capital along with its common place Sancho Panza, [i.e. the law of value--C.S.L.] rebels against the 'sacred' law of supply and demand, and tries to check its convenient action by forcible means and the state interference". (pp.599-600).
24. From the 1978 population census, op cit.
25. Kulaba, op cit, p.72.

26. See in United Republic of Tanzania, *Survey of Industrial Production*, for 1972 and 1976, Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam. Also *Directory of Industries* for 1979, Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, 1982.
27. Nyerere, 1982, op cit.
28. *Directory of Industries* for 1979, op cit.
29. These aspects have been dealt with in C.S.L. Chachage, "Development of Urban Capitalism in Tanzania (With an Example of Arusha Town)", M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1982, 1983, Chapter 3.
30. For this information generally see in *ibid*; also J. Shao, "Some features of Tanzanian Manufacturing Industry", M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1978.
31. *Daily News*, 5.3.1983.
32. *Uhuru*, 31.7.1984.
33. K. Marx & F. Engels, "The German Ideology", *Collected works* Vol.5, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1976, p.60.
34. For a summary of these theories and contributors to these theories see M. Blomstrom & B. Hettne, *Development Theory in Transition*, Zed Press, London, 1984, Chapter 1.
35. J.K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa, Essays on Socialism*, OUP, Nairobi, 1968, pp.3-4.
36. See Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization", *New Left Review*, No.81, 1973; and his *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*, Verso, London, 1980.
37. Warren, 1980, *ibid*, p.136.
38. *ibid*, p.28.
39. E.P. Thompson, *Poverty of Theory*, Merlin Press, London, 1978, p.383.
40. See generally *Canadian Journal of African Studies* Vol 19, which is devoted to this question of modes of production. It is Martin A. Klein who makes openly this claim.
41. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p.90.
42. The quotations and the paraphrase are from B. Wamba dia Wamba, "Towards an Introduction to the Critique of the Sheikh Anta Diop's School of African History", Department of History, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, (mimeo), pp.1-2.



43. Thompson, op cit, p.377.
44. For these conclusions, see, Chachage, op cit; C.S.L. Chachage, "Some Observations on the Socio-Economic Crisis in Tanzania", History Department, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983; C.S.L. Chachage, "Ideologies and Strategies of Development in Africa", Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Hull, 1984; and C.S.L. Chachage, "Tanzanian Socialist Ideology: Its Past and Present", School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 1986.

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EALB: East African Literature Bureau

EAPH: East African Publishing House

ERB: Economic Research Bureau

ILO: International Labour Organization

OUP: Oxford University Press

SIAS: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies

TISCO: Tanzania Industrial Studies and Consulting Organization

TPH: Tanzania Publishing House

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