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**THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR
AND
RUSSO-BRITISH RIVALRY IN THE FAR EAST,
1876-1905**

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**Submitted
for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**To
Glasgow University
Department of Modern History
Faculty of Arts**

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Dedication

I wish to dedicate this dissertation to God, who instilled in me the determination to complete the task I had begun, and to my parents, who have made my academic career intellectually and financially possible, even though they live over nine-thousand miles away.

Also, I wish to dedicate it to my first child Dong-kyu, who is born in December 1988.

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Abstract

DURING the late eighteenth century, Britain, as a country of mercantile capitalism, was mainly interested in world-wide markets. At the same time, Russia was conscious of the restrictions which her existing territory placed on commerce during the winter. Therefore, she was especially interested in an ice-free port for trade and as an outpost from which to extend her power and influence to southward regions.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Near Eastern Question might be defined as the relations between Russia and Turkey. However, from the early nineteenth century, it involved growing rivalry between Britain and Russia because of an inevitable conflict of their interests in the region. While Anglo-Russian interest in and advance towards the Far East were also proceeding with the same above-mentioned ideas.(CHAPTER I)

In the late nineteenth century, Korea's ownership of Gōmun (Port Hamilton) Island involved her initially in the struggle of these Powers which wanted to obtain rights in Korea, and she soon became the centre of international rivalry.(CHAPTER II) While Great Britain was also interested in Korea as a market, Russia tried to get an ice-free port in the peninsula. Therefore, for both strategic and economic reasons, it was natural that Korea would be a battle-field for Anglo-Russian rivalry sooner or later.(CHAPTER III)

In the Middle East, a new phase of Anglo-Russian rivalry

opened with the Afghan border crisis in March 1885. The crisis brought about the possibility of war between them. This possibility of war induced Britain's occupation of Port Hamilton as a preparatory step to war with Russia in the Far East. A few months after the occupation of Port Hamilton in May 1885, Britain and Russia fortunately solved the Afghan border problem without war. However, the solution of the Afghan problem meant that Britain lost her justification for occupying Port Hamilton. Consequently, in the face of protests by neighbouring Powers, Britain had to reconsider the grounds for retaining possession of Port Hamilton. In the process, Britain found stronger reasons for withdrawal from Port Hamilton, and she carried it out in February 1887. This situation seemed to show the end of Anglo-Russian conflict in the Far East.(CHAPTER IV, V & VI)

On the other hand, events, after the British withdrawal from Port Hamilton, in the Far East (the Sino-Japanese war and Russia's influence in Korea and Manchuria) led to a resumption of rivalry between Britain and Russia in the region.(CHAPTER VII) After the Russo-Japanese war whose outbreak and outcome partly depended on the effects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Russia's scheme for aggrandizement in the Far East was frustrated, and this meant the end of Anglo-Russian rivalry in East Asia.(CHAPTER VIII)

Subsequently, this chapter of a rivalry so central to much of nineteenth century international politics was closed with the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. With a re-evaluation of Anglo-Russian rivalry, in the conclusion, I identified Port Hamilton's position and influence in this period of world history. (CHAPTER IX)

Abbreviations

A d m : Admiralty Manuscript in the Public Record Office, London.

B.D: British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914, ed, G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, 11 vols. London, 1926-38.

B.D.F.A: British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential print.

D.D.F: France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents diplomatique français (1871-1941), 14 vols. Paris, 1930-55.

F.O: The Foreign Office Archives in the Public Record Office, London.

K.A: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Central Archive, Krasnyi Arkhiv (Red Archive), 106 issues in 73 vols. Moscow, 1921-1941.

N.G.B: Dai Nippon Gaiko Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents).

* Canton Tael (Tls) 3 = £ 1 (6s. 8d).
Shanghai Tael = 10 % less than Canton Tael.

** Korean, Chinese and Japanese names have rendered with the Surname or Family name preceding the personal name in accordance with normal their practice.

*** Russian dates are new style under otherwise stated.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.

IN the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Anglo-Russian rivalry was rife in the Near, Middle and Far East. On 30 March 1885, local Russian authorities broke their pledge to refrain from further advances on the Afghan frontier until the joint Anglo-Russian commission should have determined the northern frontier of Afghanistan. Roused to a high pitch of excitement, Britain prepared for war. Among other measures, Britain chose to follow a traditional strategic plan-to attack Russia with her fleet at some weak point in Russia's far-flung possessions. With Vladivostock as the objective, consequently, the British Admiralty decided to occupy two Korean islands at the southern extremity of the peninsula, which enclosed a safe anchorage known as Port Hamilton.

On 26 April 1885, simultaneously with an announcement to China, Korea, and Japan, Admiral Sir William Dowell occupied Port Hamilton with a British squadron. Although the Anglo-Russian war crisis over the Middle East had been relieved by Gladstone's arbitration proposal of May 1885, the British squadron remained in occupation of Port Hamilton. The Japanese and Korean Governments formally protested against the occupation, and the British Government attempted to end the protests by offering to purchase or lease the islands from Korea. This indication of a more prolonged occupation aroused the opposition of China also.

On the other hand, Russia made no countermove during the

occupation of the Port Hamilton; and it is claimed that she had no intention of making any forward move at the time. Indeed Russia gave China an undertaking that, if Britain were induced to leave Port Hamilton, she would guarantee not to occupy any Korean territory. When Britain received this undertaking from Korea and the suzerain power, China, she withdrew from Port Hamilton in February 1887.

The rise and early stages of the Anglo-Russian rivalry

Early Anglo-Russian relations were almost wholly commercial, and, since the needs of the two countries were complementary, conducive to friendship. Rivalry started in the eighteenth century, when Russia under Peter the Great(1689-1725) and Catherine II the Great(1762-96) emerged as a great Continental Power and, what concerned Britain more closely, a respectable naval Power.

The Near Eastern Question became one of the great diplomatic preoccupations of modern centuries, and, in particular, it induced a long struggle between Britain and Russia. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Near Eastern Question might be defined as the relations of Russia and Turkey. From the days of Peter the Great to those of Alexander I (1801-25), Europe acquiesced in the assumption that Russia would claim a preponderant interest in the settlement of the Near Eastern Question.

For some two hundred years British merchants had been keenly alive to the commercial value of the Levant. The

politicians, however, were curiously but characteristically tardy in awakening to the fact that the development of events in the Ottoman Empire possessed any political significance for Britain. The statesmen of the eighteenth century observed with equal unconcern the decrepitude of the Turks and the advance of the Russians.

The first statesman to sound a warning note on the matter of Russia was William Pitt in 1791. The capture by Russia of Ochakov from Turkey seemed to him to herald Russian control of both Turkey and Poland. He was ready to fight Russia to preserve the balance of power in the Black Sea-Ukraine area; but his Cabinet colleagues, his whig opponents, the newspapers, even the navy were unenthusiastic, not to say hostile. When the Prussians refused to act as allies, Pitt had to climb down and withdraw his ultimatum.

By 1821, the role of Britain in the Near Eastern Question was becoming rather clearer. Turkey's survival did not seem to damage British interests and might well be of positive value. The British did not threaten to take large stretches of Turkish territory-as did Russia, Austria and even France.

However, the Greek rising in 1821 was in a wholly different category. When Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, a member of one of the greatest Phanariot families and himself a General in the Russian army, unfurled the flag of Greek independence in Moldavia, still more when the insurrection spread to the Morea and the islands of the Aegean archipelago, it meant that a new force was manifesting itself in European politics, and that an old problem was entering upon a new phase. The Greek rising was an

appeal to the sentiment of nationality: Pan-Hellenism-the achievement of Hellenic unity and the realization of Hellenic identity-was the motto inscribed upon their banner. Plainly, a new factor had entered into the complex problem of the Near East. But the nationality factor was not the only one disclosed to Europe by the Greek insurrection.

The very nature of the Greek rebellion invited Russian intervention. In the first place, the prospect of an Orthodox Christian people struggling against Moslem Turks was bound to excite Russia's sympathy; and in any case the Greeks confidently expected Russian support. Their ultimate aim was a revived Byzantine empire based on Constantinople; and this had been Russia's aim for over three hundred years now. Secondly, Greek merchants had founded the Philike Hetairia (the Friendly Society) on Russian soil at Odessa in 1814. (The head of this society from 1820 was Ypsilanti.) And when Ypsilanti began the insurrection in 1821, he did so by marching an army from Russian-controlled Bessarabia into Moldavia and Wallachia. Thirdly, one of two joint Russian foreign secretaries from 1816 to 1822 was John Capodistrias, a Greek born in Corfu, who was a powerful influence on Alexander I until he left the Tsar's service in 1822. And Russia's ambassador at Constantinople, Count Stroganov, while he officially condemned Ypsilanti's revolt, at the same time gave open encouragement to the Greeks. Fourthly, the Greek war intensified existing disputes between Russia and Turkey which in themselves were already sufficient material for fresh Russo-Turkish conflict. From 1821, the Turks almost completely stopped the passage through the Straits of Greek ships carrying wheat exports from Odessa. Russia was once again made acutely

aware of the importance of the Straits to her economic development. And since 1812, the Russians and Turks had not ceased to quarrel over the terms of the treaty of Bucharest,¹ particularly those concerning the Caucasus region. Until then, the Near Eastern Question had meant the growth or the decline of Ottoman power. However, it had now centred in the rivalry between the Sultan and the Tsar. From here, therefore, it was recognized, primarily through the action of Russia and the newly aroused sympathies of Britain, as an international question.

In Britain, Canning, the foreign secretary, was fully alive to the significance of the Hellenic movement, alike in its primary aspect and in its secondary reaction upon the general diplomatic situation. And behind the statesmen there was for the first time in Britain a strong public opinion in favour of determined action in the Near East. At the time, Canning's new policy of acting with Russia in order to control her was therefore largely forced on him by the policy of the new Russian Tsar. Tsar Nicholas I (1825-55) did have some of the brooding, mystical attachment to autocracy which his brother had felt; he had no special liking for Greeks or for rebels in general; but he was more than willing to use the Greek situation to Russia's advantage, and to act while the Greek rebellion was still alive. Canning sensed the probability that, unless restrained, Nicholas might make war on Turkey, partly to save the Greeks from Ibrahim, but more particularly to advance Russia's boundaries and influence in the Balkans and Caucasus regions. If Russia declared war, Canning felt, "she would gobble up Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at the next."²

The consequence of Canning's endeavouring to control this

diplomatic situation was the Russo-Turkish treaty of Akkerman signed in October 1826. The Turks gave way at every point. They promised to carry out the Bucharest terms relating to Serbia and the Principalities, and to recognize Russian gains on the threatened shores of the Black Sea and in the Caucasus region.

In this, at any rate, Canning was temporarily successful. But Turkey's unwillingness to carry out the Akkerman agreement led directly to her war of 1828-9 with Russia, a war which largely destroyed Canning's hopes.

The treaty of Adrianople which concluded the war of 1828-29, was a major advance for Russia, though it had been harder won than observers realized and Russia was quite ready for a lengthy breathing-space afterwards. Indeed, Russia was by no means the irresistible and overwhelming force that she seemed to be for much of the nineteenth century; and Turkey had not been quite so near collapse in 1829. Nevertheless, the terms of the Adrianople treaty gave Russia complete control of the Danube delta and also extensive gains to the east of the Black Sea. In particular, Georgia was fully absorbed and Russia claimed control of Circassia- a claim which, five years later and again nearer the Crimean War, aroused British concern. Moldavia and Wallachia also became autonomous and were placed under a virtual Russian protectorate. Russian merchants and merchant ships had renewed rights through the Sultan's territories. And finally, the Sultan was made to accept the 1827 treaty of London as the further step to the independence of Greece; that is, it was independent Russian military action, rather than Canning's pressure which in the end forced Turkey to make peace with the

Greeks; and which also made possible the establishment of an autonomous, or even totally independent, Greek state.

After the treaty of Adrianople, therefore, Great Britain was able to influence the final settlement of the Hellenic question, but the Greeks owed most to Russia's successful war against the Sultan in 1828-29. By the Treaty of London (1832), Greece was established as an independent kingdom, under the protection of Great Britain, Russia, and France.

Two decades after the Greeks' independence, another Russo-Turkish war began in 1853 because the Sultan refused a Russian demand to have permanent protective right over his twelve million Christian subjects. This demand was itself the outcome of two preceding episodes; the Holy Places' dispute between Russia and France, and a successful Austrian intervention against Turkey in Montenegro. In none of these affairs did Britain have any direct concern. Truly, the Russo-Turkish war made it clear that neither Lord Aberdeen, the British Prime minister, 1852-5, nor Napoleon III, nor Nicholas I wanted a great power war; but the outcome of the war-the pattern of thrust and counter-thrust which developed between them-produced a situation in which considerations of prestige made a military solution the only possible one. Palmerston, inheriting the diplomatic traditions of Pitt and Canning, was quite open in his criticism of the British Government's behaviour-'Russia was led on step by step by the apparent timidity of the government of Britain'. Had Aberdeen imposed anything like unity on his Cabinet, had he made clear to the Russians Britain's intention to maintain Turkish independence by force if necessary, had even British and French ministers been fully open with each other, it was possible

that war might still have been avoided. But all parties indulged in displays of military strength to give weight to their diplomatic moves and, once the fleets and armies were in position, retreat was difficult.

The situation was now extremely confused. Although the British press was outspokenly hostile to Russia, Nicholas I still believed that Aberdeen would not go to war. On the eve of the Crimean War, the Tsar made specific informal proposals based on the Russo-British understanding of 1844³ to Sir Hamilton Seymour, then British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The overture was based upon the assumption that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, and that it was the duty, as well as the obvious interest, of the European Powers most closely concerned to come to an understanding as to the disposition of the estate. British statesmen refused to admit the accuracy of the Tsar's diagnosis, and questioned the propriety of the treatment prescribed.⁴

However distasteful the Tsar's proposals might have been to the moral sense or the political prejudices of British statesmen, it could not be denied that they were of high intrinsic significance because Russia would have become virtually supreme in the Balkans and over the Straits, while Britain would have established herself in Egypt and Crete. Nevertheless, the refusal of the British Government even to consider such suggestions led to the Crimean War (1854-56).

The Crimean War was fought ostensibly to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That principle received its consecration in the Treaty of Paris.⁵ The supreme

purpose which inspired the Western Powers in the treaty was to repudiate the claims of Russia to an exclusive protectorate over Christian subjects of the Porte, and to arrest her progress in the Black Sea and the Straits.⁶ Consequently, the war registered a definite set-back to the policy of Russia in the Near East. Furthermore, for the moment it was sufficient to observe that the Crimean War did at any rate give the Sultan an opportunity to put his country in order, had he desired to do so. The events proved that the Sultan's zeal for reform was in direct ratio to his anxiety for self-preservation.

In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the Balkan peoples began to take matters into their own hands. Crete had been in a state of perpetual revolt ever since it had been placed again, in 1840, under the direct government of the Sultan. In 1875 the unrest spread to the whole Balkan area. It was first manifested among the mountaineers of the Herzegovina; from there it spread to their kinsmen in Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro. The insurrection among the southern Slavs in the west found an echo among the Bulgars in the east. The Sultan then let loose his Bashi-Bazouks among the Bulgarian peasantry. The European Powers could not stand aside and let the Turk work his will upon his Christian subjects, but mutual jealousy prevented joint action, and in 1877 Russia was compelled to act alone.⁷

On 24 April 1877, claiming to be acting on behalf of Europe, Tsar Alexander II (1855-81) declared war on Turkey. Balkan Christians, and Bulgarians in particular, were about to be rescued. Britain, meanwhile, remained neutral. If the Turks expected solid support on the Crimean War pattern, they were

disappointed British public opinion was not ready for that yet, nor was the Cabinet. The Russians also assured all and sundry of their good intentions. In particular, they promised to respect the existing status of Constantinople and the Straits, and to make no move that might threaten Egypt and the Suez Canal. But it remained to be seen what sort of terms the Russians would press upon Turkey, and Britain therefore wanted no slackening of effort. At the beginning of February 1878, Parliament accordingly agreed to grant £ 6 million for military preparations, and on 12 February, Admiral Hornby at last received orders to take the British fleet up to Constantinople.⁸

For two months, thereafter, there was a clear likelihood of war between Britain and Russia. Much hinged on the outcome of the Russo-Turkish negotiations and on the Russian troop movements in the neighborhood of Constantinople. So far, the Russians had hesitated, in the face of certain British and probable European-wide opposition, to storm the city. But it was very difficult to calculate accurately the aims of Russian policy at this juncture.

Consequently, the response was to send 10,000 troops to the town of San Stefano, on the coast of the Sea of Marmora, about eight miles from Constantinople. Here, on 3 March, the peace treaty between Russia and Turkey was signed.⁹ The terms of that famous Treaty were highly displeasing, not only to Austria and Great Britain, but to the Greeks and Serbians, whose ambitions in Macedonia were frustrated by the creation of a Greater Bulgaria. Great Britain, therefore, demanded that the Treaty should be submitted to a European Congress. Russia, after considerable demur, assented. Bismarck undertook to act as the

"honest broker" between the parties, and terms were ultimately arranged under his presidency at Berlin in 1878.¹⁰

The Berlin Congress was the last of the splendid diplomatic festivals held by the great powers. It was the great powers who made all the decisions; no representatives of Serbia, Montenegro or Rumania were allowed to attend and even the Bulgarians were entirely represented by Russia. In this way, quick and straightforward solutions were arrived at and imposed on the Balkan nationalities; but this left a fund of resentment in the Balkans which in the end meant that the Berlin settlement could not be final one. However, for the time being, the great powers held sway.¹¹

The Berlin Congress ushered in a fresh phase in the evolution of the Near Eastern Question and Anglo-Russian rivalry. In the Congress of Berlin, once again the Russians had been frustrated in their scheme to advance their bases in the Balkans as far as the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, by a change of policy which was an outcome of the Crimean defeat, Russia had already since the 1860s pursued systematic aggrandisement in the Middle and Far East because she seemed to believe that her international position would be restored when her expansionist policy in Asia had put the British on the defensive.

India and the Anglo-Russian rivalry

The real beginning of British India's involvement in the Turkish question dates back to the 1830s. By this time India had become a major imperial base from which British political and commercial

activities could be extended westward into Turkish dominions, through which passed their shorter routes to India. But their interests seemed threatened by the activities of their imperial rival-Russia- in the Near and Middle East. Russia had penetrated far into Persia and Turkey, approaching the natural lines of communication to India, and even her physical frontiers.¹

The independence of Greece in the early 1830s had not only made a serious inroad upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, but had precipitated a disastrous conflict with Russia. Muhammad Ali, the brilliant Albanian adventurer, who had made himself Pasha of Egypt, would have restored Greece to the Sultan Mahmud II. The island of Crete seemed to the vassal an inadequate reward for the service rendered to his Suzerain. But Ali had an ambition to independent rule in Egypt; to the pashalik of Syria; perhaps to the lordship of Constantinople itself.

In November 1831, Ali declared war on Sultan Mahmud. When the Sultan appealed to the European Powers to save him from Muhammad Ali, Russia alone responded to the appeal, and as a reward for her service imposed upon the Porte the humiliating Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833.² By the terms of that Treaty Russia became virtually mistress of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The Tsar bound himself to render unlimited assistance to the Porte by land and sea, and in return the Sultan undertook to close the Straits to the ships of war of all nations. To all intents and purposes the Sultan had become the vassal of the Tsar.³

Britain, as a whole, gave up the attitude of an onlooker to the Russian advance towards the Mediterranean because Russia

seemed to have established a military protectorate over the European dominion of the Sultan by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.

On the other hand, both the British Government and the Indian authorities at the time were aware of the numerous advantages of the Mesopotamian route. It was obvious that British political influence would considerably increase in that quarter if this route were developed under British auspices. It would substantially check the eastward progress of any European rivals of Britain. One such rival was apparently Russia. The establishment of a Russian consulate-general at Erzeroum soon after the conclusion of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi appeared as an attempt by Russia to extend her imperial influence along the line of the Euphrates. The route was likely to provide facilities for obtaining information about the power, position and political combinations of the local tribes and native powers, which would be extremely advantageous to Britain's eastern possessions, in case she were required to counteract the intrigues or hostility of any other power in Syria and Mesopotamia. Britain would possess an advantage over her antagonists by developing and controlling this route.⁴

Consequently, this situation prompted Britain to attempt to reopen and develop the alternative route to India via Mesopotamia and Syria. The British were less familiar with this route than the Egyptian and Red Sea route, but strategically it was much more important than the latter. Palmerston wanted to develop this route as the chief means of arresting the dissolution of the Turkish empire and as an additional safeguard for India against hostile Russian designs. The concrete manifestation of this aim was a scheme formulated for the exploration of the

Euphrates route and navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers.

Palmerston considered this route highly advantageous to British imperial interests. In his scheme of things Syria was to revert to Turkey sooner or later, and then the Syrian port of Alexandretta was to be linked with the Persian Gulf by rail and water communication.⁵ In his opinion the political situation in the Near East after 1833 made the Euphrates route the only feasible one, for complications seemed to threaten the safety of the Egyptian route.

Now, British policy in the 1830s revealed that Britain would not tolerate any interference with her routes to India and would actively intervene in the states flanking India like Sind, Punjab, Persia and Afghanistan if the "avenues" to her empire were threatened. It began what has been called "the stupid and hideous dream of Anglo-Indian chauvinism", the sustained nightmare of a Russian threat to India.⁶

In the second half of the nineteenth century, with India's importance to Britain increasing, and with Russian forces moving rapidly into the Middle East, it was also a matter of guarding the Indian frontiers from landward attacks which might be launched through Persia and Afghanistan. After the 1820s, naval control of the Mediterranean was not only concerned with the European balance. The development of steamships and railways meant that the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and Persian Gulf also became the chief routes to India from Britain. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 emphasized this importance. After the treaty of Berlin, statesmen in Britain were beginning to accept that Herat,⁷ in northern Afghanistan, and not Constantinople, was the new "key

to India". Moreover, British policy on the Eastern question was increasingly a matter of sealing off other powers' land routes to India by assuming responsibility for the defence of Turkish Armenia, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Especially, occupation of Egypt in 1882 was perhaps the biggest single reason for Britain's diminished concern in the fate of Constantinople. Practical control of the Suez Canal gave British forces a flexibility possessed by no other power. Consequently, there seemed far less purpose in pursuing a doubtful strategic advantage at the Straits now that such a massive one had been gained in Egypt.⁸

On the other hand, there was an obvious economic interest (in addition to political and strategic concerns) behind Britain's involvement in the Eastern Question. The routes to India were trade routes, as well as routes for warships and armies; and the expanding China trade followed the same route through the Middle East. Russia had been also pushing steadily on towards the Pacific, and after the Treaty of Berlin, finding herself diplomatically isolated by what she saw as Bismarck's defection⁹ and not yet allied with France, she had become deeply interested in China. It was not, however, until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that between Britain and Russia any serious conflict in that region developed.

Anglo-Russian Advance toward the Far East

GREAT BRITAIN

In the early nineteenth century, in China, the opium poppy had been known for at least thirteen centuries, its medical use for nine centuries, and that the medical properties lay in the capsules for six centuries; and opium, in its modern form, has been produced in China for four centuries and more; it was now used for opium-smoking, which had come into China through tobacco-smoking, by the Chinese.¹

Foreign opium was first introduced into China by the Portuguese trading from Goa and Daman in 1729. From 1729 the import of foreign opium increased, unchecked by the government, at the rate of 20 chests a year, until 1773. In that year, in order to settle conflicts constantly arising between the agents of the British, Danish, Dutch, and French East India Companies having factories in India, the British company assumed the monopoly of all the opium produced in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa; the other three companies were given the right to receive specified quantities in each year. For a few years the traffic was left to private traders, but in 1780 the British East India Company exercised its right of monopoly, and took the trade into its own hands.²

During the 1820s, the Celestial Government had forbidden opium import, but the demand was so insistent that an illicit trade developed. The East India Company had a monopoly control over all the opium produced in India, but it did not wish to endanger its equally valuable monopoly of the tea trade by engaging in smuggling, no matter how profitable. Accordingly, it

licensed private merchants, or "country traders"-the British. Parsees or Indian Jews-who bought the opium for silver, which paid for the company's tea purchases, and in turn sold it illegally and very profitably with the bought connivance of the local Chinese officials.

This system encouraged the development of aggressive and ruthless independent trading concerns, with considerable support in Britain among the many foes of the East India Company. When the Company's monopoly of the China trade ended in 1833, these independent traders came to the fore, demanding a relaxation of the Chinese restrictions on commerce. The Chinese authorities, far from yielding, precipitated a crisis by trying to suppress the opium trade.

The Opium War followed, from 1840 to 1842. It was in fact less about opium than about free trade, and its result was the annexation of Hong Kong by Britain in 1841, and the Nanking Treaty of 1842 which named Shanghai, Canton, Ningpo, Foochow and Amoy as the first treaty ports. At these treaty ports the merchants lived in special districts where they enjoyed extra-territorial rights and virtual self-government, coming under the control of their own consuls and judges; the British were the dominant group, in numbers and wealth alike.³

After the first treaty, the foreign residents of Mid-China-Shanghai and Ningpo-lived their ordinary life and enjoyed their responsible pleasures, without molestation or insult from the people of the country. In June 1856, the foreign residents at Ningpo were reminded that, while a certain temple near the city was a "place to which the public may legitimately repair

according the treaty," still they were not entitled to its exclusive use. Apart from these was no record of any acts of molestation affecting the security or the comfort of the foreign residents at these ports.⁴

On 8 October 1856, the Hong Kong-registered lorcha 'Arrow' which lay off the city of Canton, flying the British ensign at the mizzen-gaff, and the Blue-Peter at the foremast-head to indicate that she was British, was boarded by four Chinese officers and about sixty soldiers, who hauled down first the British flag, and then the Blue-Peter; and all the crew, Chinese, twelve in number, were bound and taken from the lorcha into the gun-boats. The master, Thomas Kennedy, was at the moment visiting another lorcha close by, and returned on board before the soldiers left with their prisoners; he immediately rehoisted the British flag, and protested against the arrest and removal of his crew.

During the examination of the incident, in 1857, the two nations drifted into the Second Opium War, the so-called "Arrow War".⁵ The incident of the lorcha Arrow had, in the absence of wise statesmanship by the Chinese, been seized by the British representatives as their opportunity to make other demands, in order that other and greater questions might find their settlement. These demands were formulated on the Treaty of Tien-tsin in 1858;⁶ and the murder of the French missionary Chapdelaine furnished the French Government with a ground for joining hands with Britain in the same object. The renewal of hostilities by China in 1859 resulted in the imposition of further penalties on the empire in the conventions of 1860 signed at

Peking.

The Convention of Peking in 1860 resulted in the opening of further treaty ports and of the Yangtse River, while Britain added mainland Kowloon to its colony of Hong kong. The British also gained at this time the right to recognize and to appoint the head of the Chinese Maritime Customs which for eighty years remained virtually a British preserve.⁷

Fifteen years after the Convention of Peking, in 1875, Mr. T.F. Wade, minister of Peking, learned of the attack on the mission and the murder of Mr. Margary in Yunnan on 11 March, by a telegram from the India Office in London;⁸ and he seized the opportunity provided by the incident to press for a favourable settlement of all outstanding questions between the two governments. These demands were formulated in the Chefoo Convention in 1876. The Chefoo Convention was drawn up in three sections, the first being headed "Settlement of the Yunnan case." The second section was headed "Official Intercourse." The third section related to "Trade." It has been described as the third stage in the history of relations between Britain and China, ranking next in importance to the treaties of 1842 and 1858-60; and this, the non-British view, seemed the more reasonable.⁹

In a word, Britain's China policy was in the declaration of Lord Clarendon in 1870 that "British interests in China are strictly commercial, or in all events only so far political as they may be for the protection of Commerce."¹⁰

In Japan, the American initiative, by which in 1853-54 Commodore Perry broke the long isolation imposed by the Tokugawa Shoguns, was not allowed to pass unchallenged. The British had been glad to let Perry, acting for the United States,

take the risk of opening Japan to the West and hoped to profit by the results, though Perry's success had been limited. Even at the threat of war, Japan yielded only to America's most pressing demands in the Treaty which she signed at Kanagawa 31 March 1854.¹¹

During the above-mentioned Arrow War the Palmerston Cabinet transferred plenipotentiary power in China to a special envoy, James Bruce, the eighth Earl of Elgin, in April 1857. At the time, Elgin was instructed to negotiate about the recent situation at Tien-tsin with the emissaries of the Chinese Court. In addition to this assignment, he was instructed to negotiate a commercial treaty with Japan while in the Far East.¹²

Elgin was pressed for time. He hoped at least to explore the possibilities of a treaty with Japan and then return to China within a month. Contrary to Japanese expectations, his intentions were peaceful. He deeply regretted Britain's policy in China and did not wish to repeat it in Japan. Moreover, his instruction from Clarendon, in 1857, had forbidden the use of force to obtain his ends. Even his naval escort was small: a steam frigate, H.M.S. 'Retribution', a gunboat, 'Lee', and the 'Emperor', a steam yacht to be presented to the Shogun as a gift from Queen Victoria. Elgin disregarded Japanese harbour regulations and laws at will and, insisted upon going to Yedo to open treaty negotiations. There he encountered skilful diplomats among the Bakufu and, yielding to their will, followed the pattern of the American treaty in the terms finally agreed upon between Japan and Great Britain. The treaty was signed at Yedo on 26 August 1858 by Elgin and seven of the Shogun's representatives-

without Imperial approval.¹³

The treaty of Yedo with its accompanying trade regulations provided that the opening of Nagasaki, Kanagawa, and Hakodeta to British residents and trade would take place on 1 July 1859; that Niigata or another port on the Japan Sea would be opened from 1 January 1860 and Hyogo (Kobe) from January 1863. Foreigners would be granted residence in Yedo from 1 January 1862 and in Osaka from 1 January 1863. A British diplomatic agent was permitted to live at Yedo and consuls to reside at the open ports. The ranking representatives could travel freely throughout Japan but other British subjects were restricted to limited areas around the treaty cities. The British were granted extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdiction, freedom of worship, and most-favoured-nation treatment. The Japanese further agreed to freedom of trade between private individuals and to British employment of Japanese subjects in any capacity without government interference. Arms could be sold only to the Japanese Government or to foreigners. The importation of opium was forbidden but the Japanese Government was given entire responsibility for the control of smuggling. Export and import duties were fixed but could be revised after five years.¹⁴

With Britain at its height as the world's principal financial and maritime power and Japan at one of the low points in her political and economic history, their confrontation could easily have ended as conqueror and conquered, had not each government determined to keep it otherwise. Sobered by her mistakes in China, Great Britain aimed to avoid their repetition in Japan while enforcing her unwelcome treaty to its limits and

extending her commercial frontier as far as possible with them. Japan on the other hand was equally intent upon maintaining her independence at all costs while mastering the techniques and political skills of the West. She aimed to meet its encroachments with her own weapons. Thus in the midst of Britain's profit-making and Japan's struggles for political and economic rebirth through the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the relationship between the two nations became essentially that of instructor and instructed for the benefit of both. Even before the treaties and during their early years Japanese officials and scholars had chosen Britain as their nation's model. Recognizing the similarity of Japan's geographical relation to Asia to that of Britain's to Europe, and wishing to emulate British achievements, they set about making Japan the Britain of the East.¹⁵

By the early 1880s, over twenty-five years had passed since fear of British might had forced Japan to open a few ports to Western trade. An influx of men, ideas and commodities had fired Japanese ambition to lay the foundations of a modern state. The long-standing differences between the two island empires had lessened considerably.

RUSSIA

The great Russian expansion over the Urals and across Siberia to the Pacific was accomplished before the reign of Peter the Great. Excluded from the Amur valley, Russian activity in Siberia remained of necessity limited. Moreover, the development of the Siberian lands was, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, limited by three factors: the lack of adequate communications, the bitter climate, and the difficulty of

acquiring sufficient provisions. These problems led to a consideration of the advisability of acquiring the Amur river valley, despite the treaties with China. It was hoped that communications with the Pacific could be improved and that food for future settlements could be grown. The inauguration of an energetic, aggressive policy began with the appointment of Nicholas Muraviev in 1847 as governor-general of eastern Siberia. Without consulting his government, Muraviev proceeded to establish posts along the Amur on what was legally Chinese territory. He also sent an expedition to the island of Sakhalin. His activities met with little approval in St. Petersburg. However, in moving against China at this time Russia was in fact paralleling the imperial policies of the western nations. In 1842, after the Opium War, the Chinese had been forced to open their trade to the European powers.¹

After the Crimean War the renewed conflict of the British and French with China in 1857 and 1858 allowed Russia the opportunity of legalizing and extending her conquests. In 1858 Muraviev signed the Treaty of Aigun with a local Chinese commander, who was in fact not authorized to conclude such an agreement. This treaty gave Russia territory on the north bank of the Amur and provided for a joint occupation of the Ussuri region. At the same time Admiral Putyatin negotiated the Treaty of Tientsin with the Chinese Government, which extended to Russia the same commercial privileges that had previously been extorted by the British, French, and American Governments. In 1860, N. P. Ignatiev, who was the Russian representative in Peking, used the desperate situation of the Chinese Government to gain the highly

advantageous Treaty of Peking. Here the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Aigun were confirmed and, in addition, Russia received the enormous stretch of territory between the Amur, the Ussuri, and the Pacific Ocean. New trading privileges were also granted. With the acquisition of this land the Russian Government proceeded with the construction of Vladivostock-"Ruler of the East", which, since it was frozen only from December to March, allowed them more favourable port facilities on the Pacific.²

Alexander Herzen, the great spokesman of Russian liberalism said that " the Pacific Ocean is the Mediterranean of the future. In this future the role of Siberia, as a country lying between the ocean, south Asia and Russia, is of extreme importance. It is understood that Siberia must extend down to the border of China."³ Although the Amur question was settled peacefully and to the Russian advantage because of western pressure on China, a second dispute involving another sector of the long and turbulent Russo-Chinese border, threatened to end in war between the two countries. In 1862 a revolt broke out among the Mohammedan tribes in Chinese Turkestan where the peoples were of the same racial stock as those in Russian Turkestan. Their able leader, Yakub Beg, was able to establish a regularly organized state. The British Government sent a mission to his court and his troops received training from British and Polish officers. The inability of the Chinese Government to control the situation alarmed the Russian Government because of the possible effect of the movement on its own tribesmen. The strategic importance of the area, the Ili valley, was immense, since this was the great "Gateway of the peoples" through which the early

invasions of Russia had flowed. In 1871 Russian troops entered the territory and occupied Kuldja. At the same time they assured the Chinese Government that the move was only a temporary measure. In 1877-78 Chinese troops were able to put down the rebellion, and they then requested that the Russian armies withdraw. Even though the Treaty of Livadia of 1879 was signed, which constituted a major Russian triumph, China did not accept the treaty and prepared for war.

The crisis over the Kuldja territory placed the Russian Government in a difficult position. The primary Russian interests were, as always, clearly in Europe and at the Straits. The Russo-Turkish War of 1878 had just been concluded, and again Russian military weaknesses had been exposed. Although the possession of the Kuldja territory would give Russia a welcome strategic advantage, she was not in a condition to go to war over the question. Therefore, in the negotiations that now commenced, considerations of prestige and commerce were placed first. In the final Treaty of St. Petersburg of 24 February 1881, Russia accepted a much reduced territory, but received instead as increased indemnity of 9 million roubles as well as added commercial privileges. The entire incident, despite the final Chinese victory, embittered the relations of the two nations in the following years. Moreover, the Chinese, having now apparently imposed their will upon a European power, became more confident.⁴ They had, it seemed, as the British ambassador in St. Petersburg concluded, in fact achieved much: "China had compelled Russia to do what she has never done before, disgorge territory that she had once absorbed."⁵

During the preparations for the Amur expedition, years

before China surrendered her northern territories to Russia, Captain Nevelskoy had explored the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. Little was known about even the elementary facts of their geography. The western world assumed that Sakhalin was a peninsula jutting out from the Asiatic mainland. In Japan, on the other hand, it was held that Sakhalin was a projection of the northernmost Japanese island of Yezo (Hokkaido). Japan learned the truth about Sakhalin's geography in 1808, but this knowledge was not imparted to Europe, and not until Nevelskoy circumnavigated Sakhalin in 1849 did it become known that it was separated from Asia by what later came to be called the Tartar Straits. Although only a few Japanese had settled at its southern tip, where they had engaged in fishing, Japan considered Sakhalin her own.⁶

The first dispute with Japan over Sakhalin arose when the Russian envoy, Putyatin, reached Nagasaki in 1853, soon after Perry's first visit. The arrival of Russian vessels caused considerable confusion in Tokyo. Reiterating the main Russian contention, Putyatin sent the Japanese authorities a message stating that he "was not seeking small trading advantages but was the bearer of an important dispatch." Eventually he was received in Nagasaki, but no agreement on Sakhalin was reached. The Japanese were ready to cede the northern part of the island (north of the 50th parallel) to the Russians, but Putyatin insisted that all of Sakhalin should belong to the Tsar. By a protocol signed in 1855, Putyatin obtained Japanese permission for Russian vessels to enter certain Japanese ports. This was the first Russo-Japanese treaty.⁷ However, the Sakhalin issue

meanwhile remained unsettled because not only Muraviev but the Tsar himself remained adamant.

In 1862 a Japanese mission visited St. Petersburg; it proposed the 50th parallel as the border line between Russia and Japan on Sakhalin Island; Russia, in turn, demanded the 48th parallel, which would have given her control of four-fifths of the island. Three years later Russia for the first time offered to exchange the Kurile Islands for Southern Sakhalin. The almost unpopulated Kurile Islands had been claimed by the Japanese since the eighteenth century. Only on the southernmost of the Kuriles, on Iturup, were there any Japanese settlers. A few Russians came to the same island in 1806; since 1830 the Russian-American Company had been in control of all the Kuriles except Iturup. The first Russo-Japanese treaty of 1855 recognized it as Japanese, and all the other islands of the Kuriles as Russian possessions.

Finally, in 1867, an agreement between the two countries was reached which established a condominium over Sakhalin. The island remained under joint occupation, and the subjects of Russia and Japan were alike free to move and reside in all the unsettled areas. In order to gain possession of as much land as possible the Russian authorities began to transfer to the island convicts sentenced to hard labour or exile. An exchange of Sakhalin for the Kuriles was formally agreed upon on 1875. In gaining control of Sakhalin Russia had obviously made the better bargain. However, the Japanese kept their right to fish in Sakhalin waters.⁸

After 1875 the bilateral nature of early Russo-Japanese

relations gave way to the more complex interplay of political and economic forces on an international scale and the influence of individual Russian and Japanese adventurers faded into the background.⁹ In general, at this time the relations of the two countries remained good, although limited in extent.

In linking the above-mentioned stages of Anglo-Russian rivalry to the Port Hamilton Affair, it is worth recalling Nish's remarks in his book Anglo-Japanese Alliance, on the light the affair threw on British policy in the Far East:- " It suggests that there was an irrevocable rivalry with Russia there and that Britain was much concerned with Korea. If this was true of Britain's attitude in 1885, it did not hold good for the 1890s. Partly Britain learnt the lesson of the Port Hamilton incident; partly her leaders saw the need to give Russia some latitude in the Far East. Britain had two major interests in Asia: the Indian Empire and the China trade. The first greatly outweighed the second. Both were affected by Russia's expansion in Asia; and it was thought that Britain's interests would best be served if Russia's attention were diverted from India. This could best be attained by not exaggerating Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far East. Similarly, Britain hereafter took only a secondary interest in Korea and Russia's actions there."¹⁰

ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER I

1. The Treaty of Bucharest, 28 May 1812: peace agreement that ended the Russo-Turkish War, begun in 1806, The terms of the treaty allowed Russia to annex Bessarabia but required it to return Walachia and the remainder of Moldavia, which it had occupied. The Russians also secured an amnesty and a promise of autonomy for the Serbs, who had been rebelling against Turkish rule, but Turkish garrisons were given control of the Serbian fortresses. Implementation of the treaty was forestalled by a number of disputes and Turkish troops invaded Serbia again the following year.
2. Clayton, *Britain and Eastern Question*, London, 1971, p. 49.
3. Nicholas visited England for nine days in June 1844, and he urged the need for Britain and Russia to cooperate in maintaining Turkey's empire for as long as possible and stressing the value of Anglo-Russian cooperation in the event of an unavoidable Turkish collapse.
4. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, London, 1966, pp. 110-112.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 276-281.
6. *Ibid.* pp. 141-144.
7. *Ibid.* pp. 178-198.
8. Clayton, *Britain and Eastern Question*: pp. 138-141.
9. The Treaty of San Stefano, 3 March 1878: peace settlement imposed on the Ottoman Government by Russia at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78; it provided for a new disposition of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire that would have ended any effective Turkish control over the Balkans, if its provisions had not later been modified. The treaty was opposed by Austria-Hungary because of its encouragement of Slav nationalism and by the British, who feared that the new Bulgarian state would become a Russian satellite and a threat to Istanbul. It was

subsequently modified by the terms of the treaty of Berlin signed four months later on 13 July.

10. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, pp. 210-216.
11. Clayton, *Britain and Eastern Question*, p. 146.

<India and the Anglo-Russian rivalry>

1. H.L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India*. New York, 1928, p. 146; see also F.E. Bailey, *British Policy and Turkish Reform Movement*, Cambridge(USA), 1942, p. 58.
2. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 8 July 1833: defensive alliance signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia at the village of Unkiar Skelessi, near Istanbul, by which the Ottoman Empire became a virtual protectorate of Russia; proclaimed peace and friendship between the two nations and a commitment to reach a mutual agreement on all matters relating to peace and security and to give other assistance. The real significance of the treaty, however, lay in a secret article that limited Ottoman aid to Russia to the closing of the Strait of the Dardanelles to "any foreign vessels of war".
3. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, pp. 77-87.
4. R.L. Shukla, *Britain, India and the Turkish Empire, 1853-1882*, New Delhi, 1973, p. 8.
5. Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East*, London, 1936, p. 95.
6. D.C.M. Platt, *Finance, Trade and Politics in British Foreign policy, 1815-1914*, Oxford, 1968, p. 182.
7. Britain's first interest in Herat was when she forced Persia to withdraw from a siege of Herat in 1838.
8. Clayton, *Britain and Eastern Question*, pp.17-18.

9. Bismarck saw it as Russia's defection, but the three emperors grouping quickly restored in 1881.

<Anglo-Russian Advance toward the Far East>

<Great Britain>

1. H. B. Morse , *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. I, Taipei, (1960?), pp.171-172.
2. *I bid.*, p. 174.
3. *I bid.*, pp. 256-296.
4. *I bid.*
5. *I bid.*, pp. 422-437.
6. *I bid.*, pp. 512-538.
7. *I bid.*, pp. 589-617.
- 8.. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 290-291.
- 9.. *I bid.*, pp. 301-303.
10. Edmund S. Wehrle, , *Britain, China, and the Anti-missionary Riots, 1891-1900.* Minneapolis, 1966, p. 3.
11. Hugh Borton , *Japan's Modern Century*, New York 1955, p. 37.
12. Fox, *Britain and Japan, 1858-1883*, p.16.
13. *I bid.*, pp. 42-43.
14. *I bid.*
15. *I bid.*, p. 532.

<Russia>

1. David J. Dallin, *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, Connecticut, 1971, pp.17-19.
2. Barbara Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914*, Philadelphia and New York, 1964, pp. 163-165.
3. Dallin, *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, Connecticut, p. 23.
4. Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy*, pp. 165-166.
5. Boulger Demetrius C., *The Life of Sir Halliday MacCartney*, London, 1908, p. 351.
6. Dallin, *The Rise of Russian in Asia*, pp. 25-26.
7. James Murdoch, *History of Japan*, Vol.III London, 1926, pp. 593, 612.
8. Lensen, *The Russian push toward Japan*, Florida, 1982, pp. 425-46.
9. *ibid.*, p. 471.
10. Ian H. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the diplomacy of two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, London, 1966, p. 17.

CHAPTER II: THE OPENING OF KOREA, 1876-1882.

1. KOREA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF HER OPENING.

DURING the first half of the nineteenth century, the Western Powers were to bring the Far Eastern societies into the modern world. While China and then Japan were coping with these outside forces, Korea remained a "hermit nation,"¹ maintaining relations only with China and, to an insignificant extent, with Japan. Korea's traditional "foreign relations" were characterized by tributary relations with China and restricted neighbourly relations with Japan; the Sino-Korean relationship was dominated by China, and the Korean-Japanese relationship was dominated by Korea. For Korea, the tributary relationship with China had a strong self-protective quality. It was the political side of a policy of minimal interaction with the outside world. Such a policy of national preservation was generally subsumed under the term "seclusion." This policy was also directed against Japan.

On the other hand, nineteenth century Korea, to Western eyes, was an example of a secluded, backward country with little civilization. Charles Gutzlaff, the German missionary, in the early 1830s wrote of Korea that "we cannot think the interior is as thickly inhabited as the maritime provinces of China. Their state of barbarism, cherished by the odious system of exclusion, which had nowhere, by a maritime nation, been carried further than in Korea, does not admit a numerous and flourishing population; nor do we think there are any large cities to be found."² Gutzlaff drew these conclusions after only a brief glimpse of Korea's coastal areas, but he did not and could not

evaluate the significance seclusion had for the Koreans.

Seclusion was a positive concept as far as the Koreans were concerned. It was the expression of a self sufficient system that excluded the *raison d'etre* of relations with countries outside this system, and it was instrumental in preserving the stability of the Far Eastern balance of Power. Up to the nineteenth century, seclusion was a tradition that fitted Korea's particular status within the Far Eastern world.

During the nineteenth century, Western ships appeared more frequently off Korea's shores to back up the Western demands to open trade relations. But the Koreans were not receptive. They had no reason to admit into their well-balanced world those countries that threatened to undermine the system with their "heterodox ideas." The intrusion of the West forced the Koreans to restate the principles that had guided their "foreign policy" for the past two hundred years. This restatement of the seclusion policy has become associated with the name of the Taewōn'gun, who reigned for his son, King Kojong (r.1864-1907), during the decade 1864 to 1873. His successful repulsion of the French in 1866³ and the Americans in 1871⁴ proved to the Koreans that the seclusion policy was effective and gave them a false sense of security and preparedness. The Taewōn'gun's seclusion policy preserved the peninsula's isolation and retarded Korea's response to the outside world after 1874.⁵

In the late 1860s and the early 1870s the Chinese Government was called upon to restate the nature of the Chinese-Korean relationship. The Chinese, however, failed to perceive that the Confucian concept of suzerain-state vis-a-vis vassal-state

could not be equated with state sovereignty as set forth by modern international law; the Chinese found it difficult to adapt their relations with Korea to the exigencies of the modern world. Instead, China was content to refer to the fact that Korea was subordinate to China, although Korea was solely responsible for matters such as her trade with foreign lands, the propagation of alien religions, and her own laws. Furthermore, there was no responsible government organ in Peking which specialized in Korean affairs. The traditional agency, the Board of Rites, only fulfilled the purely ceremonial function of transmitting correspondence to and from Korea. On the other hand, the Tsunqli Yamen (Chinese foreign office), although not nominally in charge of Korean affairs, came to assume the role of interpreting Chinese-Korean relations to the outside world. Since the Yamen was preoccupied with problems of more immediate concern to China, however, its pronouncements on the Korean case lacked determination and firmness. Consequently, China's inattention to the full proportions of the Korean problem irreparably damaged her influence over her vassal.⁶

In contrast to China's slow absorption of the West's new ideas concerning international relations, Japan was quick to realize the advantage international law brought to herself and to her relations with neighbouring countries. The Meiji restoration in 1868 had deeply reformed Japan's own thinking and institutions, and thus, demands to change the stagnating relationship with Korea became strong and irreversible. Under the circumstances, the daimyo of Tsushima was no longer satisfied with his traditional, virtually tributary relationship with the

Koreans and urged economic and ceremonial reforms that would improve his status vis-a-vis Korea. The most revolutionary of his proposals was that demanding the replacement of the Korean seals of authority with Japanese seals. In protest against this attempt of the daimyo of Tsushima, the Korean Government claimed that the Japanese had violated the treaty relationship by sending an "irregular envoy" through Tsushima and also protested against the abolition of the Korean seal and the use of a number of Chinese characters that were reserved only for their correspondence with China. Consequently, Korea's stubborn rejection of subsequent missions, and her refusal to acknowledge the announcement that the Japanese Foreign Office had taken charge of Korean affairs (on 8 September 1871) created a sense of frustration in Japanese Government circles that eventually gave rise to demands for "armed diplomacy."⁷ In June 1873, continued disputes and exchanges of protest climaxed in a warning issued by the prefect of Tongnae, which was located near Pusan. The prefect bluntly attacked Japan's adoption of institutions "from other countries" and called her a "land of no law." This document prompted some segments within the Japanese Government to formulate the *seikanron*, the "debate about the punishment of Korea."⁸

Korea's complete failure to communicate with Japan was an expression of the general consternation and alarm the Koreans felt about Japan's rapid westernization. The adoption of Western ways meant to many tradition-minded Koreans a breach with tradition that revealed the unstable and fickle nature of the Japanese people. The Koreans feared that Japan might conspire

with the West against Korea.⁹ During their long period of minimal contact, Korea and Japan had lost the substance of "neighbourly relations" and, thrust into the turmoil of nineteenth century international politics, they did not easily find the ways and means for a rapprochement.

When King Kojong assumed the full responsibilities of government in 1874, he inherited his father's "restored" government. Kojong thus inherited a politically and economically self-sufficient country. The king and his officials had confidence in the country's strength. The seclusion policy had been successful, and the moral superiority of the Confucian state had been demonstrated. There was no reason for Kojong to give up this inheritance when the Japanese returned to Korea in the same year with their renewed determination to open Korea to Japanese diplomacy and trade.

2. THE KOREAN-JAPANESE TREATY, 1876.

In 1876 the Meiji government of Japan, after several years of unsuccessful attempts to establish official relations with Korea, sent a formidable team of military observers to Korea commanded by Lieutenant-General Kuroda Kiyotaka. His objective was to conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce with Korea, but the treaty was only to revive Japan's attempt in post-1868 to introduce into the traditional pattern of formal communications innovations that were more in line with Western practices. For this purpose, Kuroda was to play the role of an aggrieved party demanding satisfaction for an alleged Korean attack in 1875 against the Japanese warship 'Unyokan'.¹

Kuroda's mission, if successful, was bound to bring about a basic modification in this China-centred international system and in Korea's status vis-a-vis the "Celestial Court." It was not surprising, therefore, that the Japanese Government dispatched to China, almost simultaneously with its decision to send the Kuroda expedition, an able Western-trained diplomat to obtain China's acquiescence in the new status of Sino-Korean relations. More specifically, Japan desired that China should relinquish its suzerainty over Korea.

The Sino-Japanese conversations were inconclusive at best. Li Hung-chang, the governor-General of Chihli Province, rebuffed the Japanese demand with the ready explanation that Korea, although independent in all matters relating to her government and religion, was subordinate to China. However, in the face of Japan's seeming willingness to risk a war with Korea, if necessary, to obtain a treaty, Li felt compelled to advise Korea to consider the Japanese demands in friendly manner. This was the maximum concession Li would make. ²

A combination of these three factors-Japanese determination, Chinese counsel, and a change in the Korean Government (as the Taewōn'gun yielded to the greater strength of the queen Min and the Mins who wanted to open the country) helped to produce a treaty of amity, friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Kanghai city by Sin Hōn, who had had a brilliant military career under the Taewōn'gun, for Korea and by General Kuroda for Japan on 26 February 1876. (Appendices I & II) The treaty was modelled on the Western treaties with Japan and China and provided for the exchange of diplomatic emissaries, the opening of two ports besides Pusan, and the granting of

extraterritorial rights for Japanese citizens in Korea. In other words, Japan imposed "unequal" terms on Korea that were similar in nature to the provisions of the "unequal" treaties which the Western powers had extracted from Japan only a dozen or more years before. Furthermore, the most significant statement was contained in the first article which read: " Korea being an independent state enjoys the same Sovereign rights as does Japan." The Koreans considered it mere reaffirmation of a tradition-sanctioned reality but the Japanese intended to use it as a means of isolating Korea from the Chinese tributary system.³

The Korean-Japanese treaty was the first modern treaty Korea entered into with any country. Far from having only bilateral significance, it laid the basis for more far-reaching changes in the old Far Eastern order than was realized at the time of its conclusion. The Koreans saw the treaty in a narrow perspective. They rationalized the peaceful continuation of the "three hundred year old friendship" with Japan as the natural response of a morally superior country toward the change of a neighbour that had lost all sense of propriety and etiquette by its hasty adoption of Western ways. Especially, the Koreans had no intention of altering the quality of the relationship and therefore envisaged the new agreement as one of local significance, dealing with trade and safeguarding against Western intrusion. At the time, Kojong's flexibility was directed only at a normalization of relations with Japan. On the other hand, the Korean-Japanese treaty contained neither the psychological nor the political preconditions for ending seclusion.⁴

3. CHINA'S RECONSIDERATION OF KOREA'S PROBLEM

In the Chinese view, Korea's security was guaranteed by the traditional formula of Korea's tributary relationship to the "superior country". Even after the Kangwha Treaty of 1876, China upheld this concept, although it was seriously challenged by Japan's advances in Korea. Whenever necessary, the Yamen repeated its ambiguous pronouncement that the whole world was aware of the fact that Korea was dependent on China and at the same time independent as far as her internal and external affairs were concerned.¹ Korea herself helped preserve the fragile facade of her dependent relationship by continuing, after 1876, to send to China tributary missions and detailed reports on her dealings and negotiations with Japan.

In the late 1870s, China had to reevaluate her stand on the Korea problem. Japan's ruthless annexation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1879² showed the Chinese that no region within Japanese reach was inviolable. The possibility that Japan would seek a quick military solution to the opening of additional Korean ports could not be ruled out. Moreover, Russia's presence in the Far East was of even more concern. Russian infringement upon China's territory in the Amur region, legalized by the Treaty of Peking in 1860, made a deep impression on China and changed her attitude toward Russia's eastward advance. The troubles in Chinese Turkestan in the 1870s brought China again into direct confrontation with Russian expansionism. Turkey's defeat by Russia and subsequent settlement of the Turkish problem in the late 1870s added yet another dimension to China's fear of a concentrated Russian effort in the Far East.

Above all else, however, Japan's annexation of the Ryukyu Islands shocked the Yamen into reexamining its stand on Korea and made it receptive to new ideas.³ A man whose opinions were highly respected in the Yamen was the British minister in Peking, Sir Thomas F. Wade. In the summer of 1879, Wade went to Prince Kung and expressed his fear that Korea was in immediate danger of being swallowed up by her neighbours. He emphatically repeated his view that countries like Korea could only be saved by opening themselves to all nations.⁴ Wade's viewpoint was eloquently argued on the Chinese side by the experienced Ting Jih-ch'ang, former governor of Kiangsu and Fukien and close friend of Li's. In a treatise on maritime defence, Ting wrote that Korea had been forced to conclude a treaty with Japan, and that China would be well-advised to encourage Korea to conclude treaties with the Western nations. Then, he reasoned, if Japan directed her aggressive intentions against Korea, all the countries bound to Korea by treaty would stand up in Korea's defence and expose Japan's sinister motives. Ting recommended that Korea be secretly advised to send observers abroad and yield whenever Western nations requested the conclusion of treaties. Ting's suggestion was received by the Yamen with the comment that it was indeed a timely argument.⁵

The Yamen did not hesitate to collect these suggestions and to act upon them immediately. At this point, emphasizing that the Yamen did not intend to interfere unduly with Korea's affairs, they recommended Li Hung-chang on 21 August 1879, to transmit to Korea the ideas expounded by Ting. Li carefully reviewed the problem and considerably expanded Ting's line of reasoning. To Li it seemed a proven fact that the Japanese were

Korea's principal enemy and that they were pursuing the policy of "gaining one pace, advancing one pace." Japan's recent experiment with "enriching the nation and strengthening the army" left her destitute and would force her into new adventures abroad as a means of freeing herself from her onerous debts. Therefore, a Ryukyu-like attack on Korea was not out of the question, and Russia, on Korea's northern border, seemed to be waiting for a good opportunity to push southward into Korea.⁶ This assessment of Korea's situation led Li to believe that only one strategy could lead Korea out of her isolation and give her security against stronger neighbours: the conclusion of treaties with the Western nations.

By the end of 1880, a permanent Japanese diplomatic mission was established in Seoul. Detailed agreements about trade and commerce were negotiated and signed, and the volume of trade increased rapidly. A group of promising young Koreans was sent to Japan in 1881 to study various aspects of a modern society; some of these students, upon their return from Japan, became the leaders of a movement for modernization and reform. However, a reaction to these innovations and changes soon set in while, in China, Li viewed with alarm the steady growth of Japanese influence in Korea. He had already held that the greatest danger to Korea and eventually to China would come from Japan. As countermeasures, Li proposed to Korea that <a> it should build up its military strength and should conclude treaties with the Western powers "in order to check the poison with an antidote."⁷ Of the Western powers which had shown interest in establishing official relations with Korea, Li singled

out the United States as the best partner for Korea's first treaty. In Li's estimate the United States had no territorial designs and was the most reliable of the Western nations.⁸ An imperial edict of 23 February 1881, which directed Li and the Chinese minister in Japan, Ho Ju-chang, to enlighten and guide Korea, thus relieving the tradition-bound Board of Rites in Peking of this responsibility, symbolized a change in China's policy toward Korea and was calculated to pave the way for a Korean-American treaty.

4. THE KOREAN-AMERICAN TREATY, 1882

The American negotiator was to be Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, U.S.N. Shufeldt had visited Korea twice previously (in 1867 and 1880) in unsuccessful attempts to establish a diplomatic channel of communication with the government in Seoul. Despite these failures, he was determined to be a Commodore Matthew Perry in opening Korea. Shufeldt returned to the Far East in the summer of 1881 and sought Li's friendly intercession. The American officer was now to be rewarded for his long wait.

On 25 March 1882, the formal negotiations began between Li and Shufeldt. Kim Yun-sik, the Korean envoy in China, was not present at this first session, nor was he to be at any subsequent meeting. Following the preliminary remarks, Shufeldt presented the American draft of a treaty. The main provisions were the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of equality and reciprocity, relief for the shipwrecked, the right of American nationals to reside and trade at the open ports,

extraterritoriality, tariff rates on exports and imports not exceeding 10 per cent *ad valorem*, and a most favoured-nation clause. Besides these provisions which Western nations normally included in treaties with Asian countries in the nineteenth century, Shufeldt's draft also included a ban on the opium trade. It, however, contained "no reference to China's claim to suzerainty over Korea, on the inclusion of which, it was well known, the viceroy was determined to insist."¹

In contrast, the Chinese draft which Li handed to Shufeldt in return, referring to it as a Korean draft,² contained, at the beginning of Article I, an explicit statement that "Korea is a vassal state of China, but has always enjoyed autonomy in both its internal and external affairs."³ China's claim to suzerainty was also implied in an unusual ratification procedure stipulated at the end of the draft treaty; Korea was to forward a copy of the signed treaty to the Board of Rites in Peking.⁴

Under the circumstances, the most important difference between the Chinese and the American drafts related to the question of Korea's status vis-a-vis China. Li focused his remarks at 25 March meeting on this issue and expressed his resolve that "the mistake" of the Kanghai Treaty of 1876 between Japan and Korea should be avoided. Shufeldt maintained that the question of Chinese suzerainty had no bearing upon the right of the United States to deal with Korea, a nation which was self-governing in domestic and foreign affairs. Shufeldt did not attempt to deny or challenge the Chinese claim of suzerain right; he rather argued that a statement to that effect had no place in a Korean-American treaty. Shufeldt also expressed his opposition to the last sentence of the disputed Article I which, by providing

for mutual assistance or mediation, seemed to commit the United States to the role of protector, conjointly with China, of Korea.

Unable to resolve the knotty issue of China's suzerainty claim, the negotiating parties finally worked out a compromise. This compromise enabled the two representatives to conclude the negotiations by affixing their signatures on the provisional treaty in Tientsin on 19 April. Soon after the 19 April meeting, the provisional treaty text was dispatched to Korea by a special courier aboard a Chinese warship. Accompanying the document was a letter from Li addressed to the Korean prime minister, Yi Chae-ung, that described in detail the Tientsin proceedings and informed the Koreans of the impending visit of Shufeldt to Korea. Li also commended the provisional articles for Korean acceptance and added that a separate communication acknowledging Chinese suzerainty should be issued by the Korean king in case a statement to that effect could not be included in the treaty itself.⁵ After Li had received a letter, which had shown a positive response to the possibility of Korean-American Treaty, from Yi Chae-ung, Li ordered a squadron of three Chinese warships under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang to Chemulpo(Incheon) in order to impress the Koreans with China's initiative in the Korean-American treaty negotiation and to counter any agitation against the treaty. Ma chien-chung, the Chinese foreign ministry official, also went to Korea to handle political problems. On the day following the departure of the Chinese squadron, the U.S.S. 'Swatara' left Chefoo for Korea with Shufeldt on board.⁶

The treaty of Amity and Commerce, known as the

Chemulpo Treaty of 22 May 1882, (Appendix III) was almost identical to the provisional treaty text signed by Li and Sufeldt. (The final text signed by the Koreans included, as a part of Article VIII, an additional ban on the export of grain.) As agreed upon in the Li-Shufeldt compromise, there was no explicit statement on the status of Korea vis-a-vis China in Article I. Instead, the first article merely stated that there was to be "perpetual peace and friendship" between the United States and Korea and should either party become subject to unjust or oppressive treatment by a third nation, the other party to this treaty was to exert its good offices for an amicable arrangement "thus showing their friendly feelings."⁷ Consequently, the United States chose to regard the Treaty of Chemulpo as an evidence of Korea's sovereign independence. Thus, China's internal weakness, particularly in the military sphere, and now Li's handling of the Korean-American treaty of 1882, meant a prelude to the end of Chinese influence in Korea.

Japan was not particularly pleased to see the Chinese intercession open the way for a Korean-American treaty. Tokyo's reaction to the Shufeldt treaty was a matter of some concern for Washington, and conflicting estimates were given by American diplomatic agents.⁸ It was possible that entry of the United States into the Korean scene as a potential rival especially in commerce might have given the Japanese cause for anxious watchfulness. On the other hand, Shufeldt's steadfast rejection of Chinese suzerainty over Korea was a vicarious victory for Japan which had for some years championed the cause of Korean independence. On the whole, it appeared safe to say that Japan

did not view the Shufeldt treaty with resentment.⁹

As for Korea, firstly, the Chemulpo Treaty symbolized a success for the anti-isolation policy of its leadership. Whatever selfish, ulterior motives the king might have had, he had battled since the mid-1870s to terminate Korea's hermit status. Fortunately, by letting China take the lead and carry the main burden of negotiation, the Korean leaders paid the least possible price of political commitment and maximized their defence against attacks from the powerful isolationist groups at home. Furthermore, they had shown no sign of reluctance in acknowledging Korea's dependent status in the royal communication sent to the United States. Secondly, with the coming into force of the Chemulpo Treaty, Korean history entered a new era. After the United States other Western nations followed suit. Introduction of multiple foreign influences made the already bitter partisan strife within Korea more sombre and complex. Korea took a few halting steps toward modernization without much success. Overshadowing such internal developments loomed an international power struggle that left its marks on the peninsula.¹⁰ Consequently, Korea had now emerged from her seclusion.

ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER II

<Korea's foreign relations on the Eve of Her Opening>

1. The term "hermit nation" comes from William E. Griffis Corea, the Hermit Nation, New York, 1882.
2. Charles Gutzlaff, Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, and 1833, London, 1884, P. 317.
3. By the end of March 1866, nine of the twelve French missionaries in Korea and some forty native converts had been arrested. Of the three surviving missionaries, Father Felix-Clair Ridel succeeded in fleeing the country and reported the whole affair to the French officials in China: At the end of 1866, Taewōn'gun beat off a French landing force sent to avenge French priests who had been martyred in the "persecution of 1866."
4. Taewōn'gun also repulsed an American punitive expedition dispatched in 1871 in reprisal for the burning of a heavily armed American merchantman, the '*General Sherman*', in early August 1866.
5. Choe Ching-young, The Rule of the Taewōn'gun, 1864-1873, Harvard University Press, 1972, pp. 91-93.
6. Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, London, 1977, pp. 5-6.
7. Ibid., P. 6.
8. Choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, 1864-1873, pp. 139-165; Nobutaka Ike, The beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan, Boltomore, 1950, pp. 47-59; Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910, New Jersey, 1960, PP. 34-50.
9. Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, P.6; Kim Yun-Sik, Umchongsa, pp. 79, 96.

<The Korean- Japanese Treaty, 1876>

1. According to Japanese sources, on 20 September 1875, the *Unyokan* was steaming along the shore of the military district of Ch'oji on the southern part of Kanghwa Island. With the intention of getting some fresh water, a small boat was lowered from the *Unyokan*. When it approached the coast, shore batteries fired on it in violation of the Japanese flag. Caught by the enemy attack and a rough sea, the small boat signaled for help, and the *Unyokan* began to shell the Korean batteries. After this exchange of fire the warship retreated. In the meantime, it lowered another small boat, and a group of about thirty soldiers was set ashore on Yongjong Island, south of Kang-hwa Island. The commander of the military district of Yōngjong, Yi Min-dok, fled in panic. Fighting ensued, and thirty-five Korean soldiers were killed. The Japanese attackers looted and set fire to the district town and captured large quantities of weapons and gunpowder. After this clash the *Unyokan* returned to Japan.; Inoue Yoshika's report: NGB (Dai Nippon gaiko bunsho), vol. 8, No.57, pp. 130-132.
2. C.I. Eugene Kim/ Kim Han-kyo , Korea and the politics of Imperialism 1796-1910, California, 1967, p. 17.
3. Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, p. 49.
4. Ibid. pp. 48-49.

<China's reconsideration of Korea's Problem>

1. Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, P.86.
2. The Ryukyu Islands(Japanese Nansei-shoto) extend almost 400 miles (650 km) southwest from Kyushu, southern Japan, to the northern tip of Taiwan bordering the Philippine Sea and East China Sea. The people of the islands seemed to be descendants of Japanese and Southeast Asians who migrated to the Ryukyus in prehistoric time. Culturally, the Ryukyuans have been subjected to both Japanese and Chinese influence. In ancient times the islands formed an independent kingdom. Chinese and Japanese sovereignty were successively forced

on the archipelago from the 14th to the 19th century, and in 1879 the Ryukyus became an integral part of Japan.

3. Lin T.C., *Li Hung-chang: His Korean Policies, 1870-1885*, Chinese Social and Political Science Review 19.2:218-219, (July 1935).
4. Wade's No.23, confidential, Peking, July 3, 1879, F. O. 17/809.
5. Kim Key-hiuk, *The Last phase of the East Asian world order*, London, 1980, p.284.
6. Li Hung-chang, *Memorials*, 39:37-38.
7. Li Hung-chang to Yi Yu-won, 29 August 1879, in *NGB*, XVII, 370-371.
8. *ibid.*

<The Korean-American Treaty, 1882>

1. Charles O. Paullin, *The Opening of Korea*, Political Science Quarterly, XXV, 1910, p. 489.
2. It was the draft that had been prepared by Ma Chien-chung and Tseng Tsao-ju. The Korean government accepted it as Korea's own draft and forwarded it to Tientsin when Kim Yun-sik came to China; Tsiang T. F., *Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations 1870-1894*, Chinese Social and Political Science Review, XVII, April 1933, p. 68.
3. Lin, *Li Hung-Chang: His Korean Policies, 1870-1894*, Chinese Social and Political Science Review, XIX, 1935, p. 223.
4. Takehiko Okudaira, *Negotiations on the Opening of Korea from Beginning to End*, Tokyo, 1935, pp. 103-108.
5. Li Hung-Chang: Li's *Communications*, Ch. 13, pp. 33a-34b.
6. Kim Han-Kyo, *Korea and the politics of Imperialism 1796-1910*, p. 24.

7. Henry Chung, Treaties and conventions between Korea and other Powers, New York, 1919, pp. 197-204.
8. Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895, 2 vol, California, 1932, p. II, 163, 176.
9. Eugene Kim, Korea and the politics of Imperialism 1796-1910, p. 29.
10. I bid., pp. 28-29.

Appendices to Chapter II

Appendix 1¹

*TREATY of Peace and Friendship between Japan and Corea.**
—February 26, 1876.

(Translation.)

THE Governments of Japan and Chōsen being desirous to resume the amicable relations that of yore existed between them, and to promote the friendly feelings of both nations to a still firmer basis, have for this purpose appointed their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The Government of Japan, Kuroda Kujotaka, High Commissioner Extraordinary to Chōsen, Lieutenant-General, and Member of the Privy Council, Minister of the Colonization Department, and Inouye Ka-o-ru, Associate High Commissioner Extraordinary to Chōsen, Member of the Genrō-in; and

The Government of Chōsen, Shinken, Han-choo-soo Fu Ji, and Injishō, To-so-Fu, Fuku-so-Kwan;

Who, according to the powers received from their respective Governments, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

ART. I. Chōsen, being an independent State, enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan.

In order to prove the sincerity of the friendship existing between the two nations, their intercourse shall henceforward be carried on in terms of equality and courtesy, each avoiding the giving of offence by arrogation or manifestations of suspicion.

In the first instance, all rules and precedents that are apt to obstruct friendly intercourse shall be totally abrogated, and in their stead rules liberal and in general usage fit to secure a firm and perpetual peace shall be established.

II. The Government of Japan at any time 15 months from the date of the signature of this Treaty shall have the right to send an Envoy to the capital of Chōsen, where he shall be admitted to confer with the Rei-sō-han-sho, on matters of a diplomatic nature. He may either reside at the capital or return to his country on the completion of his mission.

The Government of Chōsen in like manner shall have the right to send an Envoy to Tokio, Japan, where he shall be admitted to confer with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on matters of a diplomatic nature. He may either reside at Tokio or return home on the completion of his mission.

* Laid before Parliament with Correspondence relating thereto in 1876.

¹British and Foreign State Papers, ed Augustus H. Oakes, vol.67, pp. 530-33.

III. All official communications addressed by the Government of Japan to that of Chōsen shall be written in the Japanese language, and for a period of ten years from the present date they shall be accompanied by a Chinese translation. The Government of Chōsen will use the Chinese language.

IV. Sōrio, in Fusan, Chōsen, where an official establishment of Japan is situated, is a place originally opened for commercial intercourse with Japan, and trade shall henceforward be carried on at that place in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, whereby are abolished all former usages, such as the practice of saikensen (junks annually sent to Chōsen by the late Prince of Tausima to exchange a certain quantity of articles between each other).

In addition to the above place, the Government of Chōsen agrees to open two ports, as mentioned in Article V of this Treaty, for commercial intercourse with Japanese subjects.

In the foregoing places Japanese subjects shall be free to lease land and to erect buildings thereon, and to rent buildings, the property of subjects of Chōsen.

V. On the coast of five Provinces, viz., Keiken, Chiusei, Zenra, Keishō, and Kankiō, two ports, suitable for commercial purposes, shall be selected, and the time for opening these two ports shall be in the twentieth month from the second month of the ninth year of Meiji, corresponding with the date of Chōsen, the first moon of the year Heishi.

VI. Whenever Japanese vessels, either by stress of weather or by want of fuel and provisions, cannot reach one or the other of the open ports in Chōsen, they may enter any port or harbour either to take refuge therein or to get supplies of wood, coal, and other necessaries, or to make repairs; the expenses incurred thereby are to be defrayed by the ship's master. In such events both the officers and the people of the locality shall display their sympathy by rendering full assistance, and their liberality in supplying the necessaries required.

If any vessel of either country be at any time wrecked or stranded on the coasts of Japan or of Chōsen, the people of the vicinity shall immediately use every exertion to rescue her crew, and shall inform the local authorities of the disaster, who will either send the wrecked persons to their native country or hand them over to the officer of their country residing at the nearest port.

VII. The coasts of Chōsen, having hitherto been left unsurveyed, are very dangerous for vessels approaching them, and in order to prepare charts showing the positions of islands, rocks, and reefs, as well as the depth of the water, whereby all navigators may be enabled safely to pass between the two countries, any Japanese mariner may freely survey said coasts.

VIII. There shall be appointed by the Government of Japan an officer to reside at the open ports in Chōsen for the protection of Japanese merchants resorting there, providing that such arrangement be deemed necessary. Should any question interesting both nations arise, the said officer shall confer with the local authorities of Chōsen and settle it.

IX. Friendly relations having been established between the two Contracting Parties, their respective subjects may freely carry on their business without any interference from the officers of either Government, and neither limitation nor prohibition shall be made on trade.

In case any fraud be committed or payment of debt refused by any merchant of either country, the officers of either one or of the other Government shall do their utmost to bring the delinquent to justice and to enforce recovery of the debt.

Neither the Japanese nor the Chōsen Government shall be held responsible for the payment of such debt.

X. Should a Japanese subject residing at either of the open ports of Chōsen commit any offence against a subject of Chōsen, he shall be tried by the Japanese authorities.

Should a subject of Chōsen commit offence against a Japanese subject, he shall be tried by the authorities of Chōsen.

The offenders shall be punished according to the laws of their respective countries.

Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

XI. Friendly relations having been established between the two Contracting Parties, it is necessary to prescribe trade regulations for the benefit of the merchants of the respective countries.

Such trade regulations, together with detailed provisions, to be added to the Articles of the present Treaty, to develop its meaning and facilitate its observance, shall be agreed upon at the capital of Chōsen or at the Kok'wa-fu, in the said country, within six months from the present date, by Special Commissioners appointed by the two countries.

XII. The foregoing 11 Articles are binding from the date of the signing hereof, and shall be observed by the two Contracting Parties faithfully and invariably, whereby perpetual friendship shall be secured to the two countries.

The present Treaty is executed in duplicate, and copies will be exchanged between the two Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries of Japan and Chōsen, have affixed our seals hereunto this 26th day of the second month of the ninth year of Meiji, and the 2,536th since the accession of Zimmu Tenno, and in the era of Chōsen, the second day of the second moon of the year Heishi, and of the founding of Chōsen the 485th.

(L.S.) KURODA KUJOTAKA, *High Commissioner Extraordinary to Chōsen, Lieutenant-Général and Member of the Privy Council, Minister of the Colonization Department.*

(L.S.) INOUE KAORU, *Associate High Commissioner Extraordinary to Chōsen, Member of the Genrō-in.*

(L.S.) SHIN KEN, *Dai-Kwan, Han-Choo-Soo-Fuji of Chōsen.*

(L.S.) IN-JI-SHIO, *Fuku-Kwan, Tosofu, Fuku-So-Kwan of Chōsen.*

Appendix II2

SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY and Trade Regulations between Japan and Corea (Wrecks, &c.),—August 24, 1876.

(Translation.)

WHEREAS on the 26th day of the 2nd month of the 9th year Meiji, corresponding with the Corean date of the 2nd day of the 2nd month of the year Heishi, a Treaty of Amity and Friendship* was signed and concluded between Kuroda Kujotaka, High Commissioner Extraordinary, Lieutenant-General of H.I.J.M. Army, Member of the Privy Council, and Minister of the Colonization Department, and Inouyé Kaoru, Associate High Commissioner Extraordinary and member of the Genrô-Iu, both of whom had been directed to proceed to the city of Kokwa in Corea by the Government of Japan; and Shin-Ken, Dai Kwan, Hanchoo-soofuji, and In Ji-shihô, Fuku-Kwan, Tosofu, Fukuso Kwan, both of whom had been duly commissioned for that purpose by the Government of Corea:

Now, therefore, in pursuance of Article XI of the above Treaty, Miyamoto Okadzu, Commissioner despatched to the Capital of Corea, Daijô of the Foreign Department, and duly empowered thereto by the Government of Japan, and Cho Inki, Kôshookwan, Gisheifudôshô, duly empowered thereto by the Government of Corea, have negotiated and concluded the following Articles:—

ART. I. Agents of the Japanese Government stationed at any of the open ports shall hereafter, whenever a Japanese vessel has been stranded on the Corean coasts and has need of their presence at the spot, have the right to proceed there on their informing the local authorities of the facts.

II. Envoys or Agents of the Japanese Government shall hereafter be at full liberty to despatch letters or other communications to any place or places in Corea, either by post at their own expense, or by hiring inhabitants of the locality wherein they reside, as special couriers.

III. Japanese subjects may, at the ports of Corea open to them, lease land for the purpose of erecting residences thereon, the rent to be fixed by mutual agreement between the lessee and the owner.

Any lands belonging to the Corean Government may be rented by a Japanese on his paying the same rent thereon as a Corean subject would pay to his Government.

It is agreed that the Shumon (watch-gate) and the Shotsumon (barrier) erected by the Corean Government near the Kokwa (Japanese official establishment) in Soriokô, Fusan, shall be entirely removed, and that a new boundary line shall be established according to the limits hereinafter provided. In the other two open ports the same steps shall be taken.

²British and Foreign State Papers, vol.67, pp. 1269-74.

IV. The limits within which Japanese subjects may travel from the port of Fusan shall be comprised within a radius of ten *ri*, Korean measurement, the landing-place in that port being taken as a centre.

Japanese subjects shall be free to go where they please within the above limits, and shall be therein at full liberty either to buy articles of local production, or to sell articles of Japanese production.

The town of Torai lies outside of the above limits, but Japanese shall have the same privileges as in those places within them.

V. Japanese subjects shall, at each of the open ports of Korea, be at liberty to employ Korean subjects.

Korean subjects, on obtaining permission from their Government, may visit the Japanese Empire.

VI. In the case of the death of any Japanese subject residing at the open ports of Korea, a suitable spot of ground shall be selected wherein to inter his remains.

As to the localities to be selected for cemeteries in the two open ports other than the ports of Fusan, in determining them regard shall be had as to the distance there is to the cemetery already established at Fusan.

VII. Japanese subjects shall be at liberty to traffic in any article owned by Korean subjects, paying therefor in Japanese coin. Korean subjects, for purposes of trade, may freely circulate among themselves at the open ports of Korea such Japanese coin as they may have possession of in business transactions.

Japanese subjects shall be at liberty to use in trade or to carry away with them the copper coin of Korea.

In case any subject of either of the two countries counterfeit the coin of either of them, he shall be punished according to the laws of his own country.

VIII. Korean subjects shall have the full fruition of all and every article which they have become possessed of either by purchase or gift from Japanese subjects.

IX. In case a boat despatched by a Japanese surveying vessel to take soundings along the Korean coasts, as provided for in Article VII of the Treaty of Amity and Friendship, should be prevented from returning to the vessel, on account either of bad weather or of the ebb-tide, the headman of the locality shall accommodate the boat party in a suitable house in the neighbourhood. Articles required by them for their comfort shall be furnished to them by the local authorities, and the outlay thus incurred shall afterwards be refunded to the latter.

X. Although no relations as yet exist between Korea and foreign countries, yet Japan has, for many years back, maintained friendly relations with them; it is therefore natural that in case a vessel of any of the countries of which Japan thus cultivates the friendship should be stranded by stress of weather or otherwise on the coasts of Korea, those on board shall be treated with kindness by Korean subjects, and should such persons ask to be sent back to their homes they shall be delivered over by the Korean Government to an Agent of the Japanese Government residing at one of the open ports of Korea, requesting him to send them back to their native countries, which request the Agent shall never fail to comply with.

XI. The foregoing ten Articles, together with the Regulations for Trade annexed hereto, shall be of equal effect with the Treaty of Amity and Friendship, and therefore shall be faithfully observed by the Governments of the two countries. Should it, however, be found

that any of the above Articles actually causes embarrassment to the commercial intercourse of the two nations, and that it is necessary to modify them, then either Government, submitting its propositions to the other, shall negotiate the modification of such Articles on giving one year's previous notice of their intention.

Signed and sealed this 24th day of the 8th month of the 9th year Meiji, and 2,536th since the accession of H.M. Zimmu Tenno; and of the Corean era the 6th day of the 7th month of the year Heishi, and of the founding of Corea the 485th.

(L.S.) MIYAMOTO OKADZU, *Commissioner, and Daijō of the Foreign Department.*

(L.S.) CHO INKI, *Kōshoo Kwan, Gisheifudōshō.*

Regulations under which Japanese Trade is to be conducted in Corea.

1. Within three days after the arrival in a Corean port of a Japanese ship (Japanese men-of-war or ships exclusively used for the transportation of the Japanese mails excepted) to establish her nationality the owner or captain shall exhibit to the Corean authorities the receipt of the Agent of the Japanese Government, showing that he has deposited, as required by the Japanese regulations now in existence, all the ship's papers, the register, sea-letter, &c., in the hands of the said Agent, which documents shall remain in his custody during her stay in port; he shall then make an entry of his ship by giving a written paper, stating the name of the ship and the name of the port whence she comes, her capacity in tons or in *kokus*, the name of the captain, the names of passengers, if any, and the number of her crew, which paper shall be signed by the owner or captain; he shall at the same time deposit a written manifest of his cargo, setting forth the marks and numbers of the packages, if mentioned, and their contents, with the name of the person or persons to whom they are consigned; a list of the stores of the ship shall be added to the manifest.

The manifest and all other papers shall be written in the Japanese language, and shall not be accompanied by a Chinese translation.

2. The owner or consignees of any goods desiring to land them shall make an entry of the same at the Corean Government Office, setting forth the names of the goods, the quantity and number of packages thereof, and their original cost; on receipt of the entry, the Corean authorities shall immediately give a permit to land the goods.

3. The owner or consignee may land his goods after he has received the permit referred to in Regulation 2. The Corean authorities may examine any or all of the packages, but such examination must be made carefully without any injury to the goods.

4. All goods intended for export shall be entered at the Corean Government Office before they are placed on ship-board. The entry shall be in writing, and shall state the name of the ship by which the goods are to be exported, with the number of packages and description of their contents, as in an entry of import described in Regulation 2. On receipt of the entry, the Corean authorities shall give a permit immediately; but the owner shall not refuse, if required, to have the goods examined by the Corean authorities.

5. Ships wishing to clear shall give notice to the Corean authorities before noon of the day previous to their intended departure; on receiving notice the Corean authorities shall issue a clearance, and at the same time shall return all the papers belonging to the ship deposited in their hands.

Ships carrying the Japanese mail may clear without observation of this regulation, but shall give notice to the Korean authorities of their sailing.

6. Exportation of rice and other grain shall hereafter be allowed in any of the open ports of Corea.

7. The following tonnage duties shall be levied on Japanese ships:—

For merchant sailing-ship with more than one mast	5	yen.
For merchant-steamer	5	„
For one-masted merchant-ship of more than 500 <i>kokus</i> capacity	2	„
For ditto of less than 500 <i>kokus</i> capacity ..	1½	„

Boats attached to the vessel free from duty. Ships belonging to the Japanese Government shall pay no tonnage duties.

8. Japanese merchant-ships may be chartered by the Korean Government or by individuals for the transportation of goods to any of the non-open ports of Corea. When chartered by individuals, they shall only be employed under conditions specified in a permit to be given by the Korean Government for the purpose.

9. Japanese ships found to be engaged in smuggling or in attempting to smuggle goods into any non-open port of Corea shall be seized by the Korean local authorities, and delivered to the Agent of the Japanese Government residing at the nearest port; such goods to be confiscated by him, and handed over to the Korean authorities.

10. The sale of opium is strictly prohibited.

11. The above Regulations having been agreed upon by the two Contracting Parties shall come into effect from the present date, and may be revised, whenever it may be found necessary, by Commissioners appointed by each country.

In witness whereof the Undersigned have hereunto set their hands and seals, this 24th day of the 8th month of the 9th year of Meiji, and the 2,536th since the accession of H. M. Zimmu Tenno, and of the Korean era the 6th day of the 7th month of the year Heishi, and of the founding of Corea the 485th.

(L.S.) MIYAMOTO OKADZU, *Commissioner
and Daijō of the Foreign Department.*

(L.S.) CHO INKI, *Kōshoo Kwan, Gishiefudōshō.*

*TREATY of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
between the United States and the Kingdom of Corea (or
Chosen).—Signed at Yin-Chuen, May 22, 1882.*

[Ratifications exchanged at Seoul, May 19, 1883.]

THE United States of America and the Kingdom of Chosen, being sincerely desirous of establishing permanent relations of amity and friendship between their respective peoples, have to this end appointed, that is to say:

The President of the United States, R. W. Shufeldt, Commodore, United States' Navy, as his Commissioner Plenipotentiary; and

His Majesty the King of Chosen, Shin-Chen, President of the Royal Cabinet; Chin-Hong-Chi, Member of the Royal Cabinet, as his Commissioners Plenipotentiary;

Who, having reciprocally examined their respective full powers, which have been found to be in due form, have agreed upon the several following Articles:—

ART. I. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen, and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments.

If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.

II. After the conclusion of this Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the High Contracting Powers may each appoint Diplomatic Representatives to reside at the Court of the other, and may each appoint Consular Representatives at the ports of the other, which are open to foreign commerce, at their own convenience.

These officials shall have relations with the corresponding local authorities of equal rank upon a basis of mutual equality. The Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of the two Governments shall receive mutually all the privileges, rights, and immunities, without discrimination, which are accorded to the same classes of Representatives from the most favoured nation.

Consuls shall exercise their functions only on receipt of an exequatur from the Government to which they are accredited. Consular authorities shall be *bonâ fide* officials. No merchants shall be permitted to exercise the duties of the office, nor shall Consular officers be allowed to engage in trade. At ports to which no Consular Representatives have been appointed, the Consuls of other Powers may be invited to act, provided that no merchant shall be allowed to assume Consular functions, or the provisions of this Treaty may, in such case, be enforced by the local authorities.

³British and Foreign State papers, vol.73, pp. 586-92.

If Consular Representatives of the United States in Chosen conduct their business in an improper manner, their exequaturs may be revoked, subject to the approval, previously obtained, of the Diplomatic Representative of the United States.

III. Whenever United States' vessels, either because of stress of weather, or by want of fuel or provisions, cannot reach the nearest open port in Chosen, they may enter any port or harbour, either to take refuge therein, or to get supplies of wood, coal, and other necessaries, or to make repairs, the expenses incurred thereby being defrayed by the ship's master. In such event the officers and people of the locality shall display their sympathy by rendering full assistance, and their liberality by furnishing the necessities required.

If a United States' vessel carries on a clandestine trade at a port not open to foreign commerce, such vessel, with her cargo, shall be seized and confiscated.

If a United States' vessel be wrecked on the coast of Chosen, the local authorities, on being informed of the occurrence, shall immediately render assistance to the crew, provide for their present necessities, and take the measures necessary for the salvage of the ship and the preservation of her cargo. They shall also bring the matter to the knowledge of the nearest Consular Representative of the United States, in order that steps may be taken to send the crew home, and to save the ship and cargo. The necessary expenses shall be defrayed either by the ship's master or by the United States.

IV. All citizens of the United States of America in Chosen, peaceably attending to their own affairs, shall receive and enjoy for themselves and everything appertaining to them, the protection of the local authorities of the Government of Chosen, who shall defend them from all insult and injury of any sort. If their dwellings or property be threatened or attacked by mobs, incendiaries, or other violent or lawless persons, the local officers, on requisition of the Consul, shall immediately dispatch a military force to disperse the rioters, apprehend the guilty individuals, and punish them with the utmost rigour of the law.

Subjects of Chosen, guilty of any criminal act towards citizens of the United States, shall be punished by the authorities of Chosen, according to the laws of Chosen; and citizens of the United States, either on shore or in any merchant-vessel, who may insult, trouble, or wound the persons, or injure the property of the people of Chosen, shall be arrested and punished only by the Consul or other public functionary of the United States, thereto authorized, according to the laws of the United States.

When controversies arise in the Kingdom of Chosen between citizens of the United States and subjects of His Majesty, which need to be examined and decided by the public officers of the two nations, it is agreed between the two Governments of the United States and Chosen that such cases shall be tried by the proper official of the nationality of the defendant, according to the laws of that nation. The properly authorized official of the plaintiff's nationality shall be freely permitted to attend the trial, and shall be treated with the courtesy due to his position. He shall be granted all proper facilities for watching the proceedings in the interests of justice. If he so desires, he shall have the right to present, to examine, and to cross-examine witnesses. If he is dissatisfied with the proceedings, he shall be permitted to protest against them in detail.

It is, however, mutually agreed and understood between the High Contracting Powers, that whenever the King of Chosen shall have so far modified and reformed the Statutes and judicial procedure of his kingdom that, in the judgment of the United States, they conform to the laws and course of justice in the United States, the right of ex-territorial jurisdiction over United States' citizens in Chosen shall be abandoned, and thereafter United States' citizens, when within the limits of the Kingdom of Chosen, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the native authorities.

V. Merchants and merchant-vessels of Chosen visiting the United States for purposes of traffic shall pay duties and tonnage-dues, and all fees according to the Customs Regulations of the United States, but no higher or other rates of duties and tonnage-dues shall be exacted of them than are levied upon citizens of the United States or upon citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation.

Merchants and merchant-vessels of the United States visiting Chosen for purposes of traffic shall pay duties upon all merchandize imported and exported. The authority to levy duties is of right vested in the Government of Chosen. The Tariff of duties upon exports and imports, together with the Customs Regulations for the prevention of smuggling and other irregularities, will be fixed by the authorities of Chosen and communicated to the proper officials of the United States, to be by the latter notified to their citizens and duly observed.

It is, however, agreed in the first instance as a general measure, that the Tariff upon such imports as are articles of daily use shall not exceed an *ad valorem* duty of 10 per cent.; that the Tariff upon such imports as are luxuries, as, for instance, foreign wines, foreign tobacco, clocks and watches, shall not exceed an *ad valorem* duty of 30 per cent., and that native produce exported shall pay a duty not to exceed 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. And it is further agreed that the duty upon foreign imports shall be paid once for all at the port of entry, and that no other dues, duties, fees, taxes, or charges of any sort shall be levied upon such imports, either in the interior of Chosen or at the ports.

United States' merchant-vessels entering the ports of Chosen shall pay tonnage-dues at the rate of 5 mace per ton, payable once in three months on each vessel, according to the Chinese calendar.

VI. Subjects of Chosen who may visit the United States shall be permitted to reside, and to rent premises, purchase land, or to construct residences or warehouses in all parts of the country. They shall be freely permitted to pursue their various callings and avocations, and to traffic in all merchandize, raw and manufactured, that is not declared contraband by law. Citizens of the United States who may resort to the ports of Chosen which are open to foreign commerce shall be permitted to reside at such open ports within the limits of the concessions, and to lease buildings or land, or to construct residences or warehouses therein. They shall be freely permitted to pursue their various callings and avocations within the limits of the port, and to traffic in all merchandize, raw and manufactured, that is not declared contraband by law.

No coercion or intimidation in the acquisition of land or buildings shall be permitted, and the land rent as fixed by the authorities of Chosen shall be paid. And it is expressly agreed that land so acquired in the open ports of Chosen still remains an integral part of the kingdom, and that all rights of jurisdiction over persons and property within such areas remain vested in the authorities of Chosen, except in so far as such rights have been expressly relinquished by this Treaty.

American citizens are not permitted either to transport foreign imports to the interior for sale, or to proceed thither to purchase native produce. Nor are they permitted to transport native produce from one open port to another open port.*

Violations of this rule will subject such merchandise to confiscation, and the merchant offending will be handed over to the Consular authorities to be dealt with.

VII. The Governments of the United States and of Chosen mutually agree and undertake that subjects of Chosen shall not be permitted to import opium into any of the ports of the United States, and citizens of the United States shall not be permitted to import opium into any of the open ports of Chosen, to transport it from one open port to another open port, or to traffic in it in Chosen. This absolute prohibition, which extends to vessels owned by the citizens or subjects of either Power, to foreign vessels employed by them, and to vessels owned by the citizens or subjects of either Power, and employed by other persons for the transportation of opium, shall be enforced by appropriate legislation on the part of the United States and of Chosen, and offenders against it shall be severely punished.

VIII. Whenever the Government of Chosen shall have reason to apprehend a scarcity of food within the limits of the kingdom, His Majesty may by Decree temporarily prohibit the export of all breadstuffs, and such Decree shall be binding on all citizens of the United States in Chosen upon due notice having been given them by the authorities of Chosen through the proper officers of the United States; but it is to be understood that the exportation of rice and breadstuffs of every description is prohibited from the open port of Yin-Chuen.

Chosen having of old prohibited the exportation of red ginseng, if citizens of the United States clandestinely purchase it for export, it shall be confiscated and the offenders punished.

IX. Purchase of cannon, small arms, swords, gunpowder, shot, and all munitions of war is permitted only to officials of the Government of Chosen, and they may be imported by citizens of the United States only under a written permit from the authorities of Chosen. If these articles are clandestinely imported, they shall be confiscated, and the offending party shall be punished.

X. The officers and people of either nation residing in the other shall have the right to employ natives for all kinds of lawful work.

Should, however, subjects of Chosen, guilty of violation of the laws of the kingdom, or against whom any action has been brought,

* The Senate of the United States, by their Resolution of the 9th January, 1883, consented to the ratification of the Treaty subject to the condition following, viz. :—

"Resolved—That it is the understanding of the Senate, in agreeing to the foregoing Resolution, that the clause, 'Nor are they permitted to transport native produce from one open port to another open port,' in Article VI of said Treaty, is not intended to prohibit and does not prohibit American ships from going from one open port to another open port in Corea or Chosen to receive Corean cargo for exportation, or to discharge foreign cargo."

The Treaty was duly ratified on both parts, subject to the said condition, and the respective ratifications thereof exchanged.

'conceal themselves in the residences or warehouses of United States' citizens, or on board United States' merchant-vessels, the Consular authorities of the United States, on being notified of the fact by the local authorities, will either permit the latter to dispatch constables to make the arrests, or the persons will be arrested by the Consular authorities and handed over to the local constables.

Officials or citizens of the United States shall not harbour such persons.

XI. Students of either nationality, who may proceed to the country of the other, in order to study the language, literature, laws or arts, shall be given all possible protection and assistance in evidence of cordial goodwill.

XII. This being the first Treaty negotiated by Chosen, and hence being general and incomplete in its provisions, shall, in the first instance, be put into operation in all things stipulated herein. As to stipulations not contained herein, after an interval of five years, when the officers and people of the two Powers shall have become more familiar with each other's language, a further negotiation of commercial provisions and regulations in detail, in conformity with international law, and without unequal discriminations on either part, shall be had.

XIII. This Treaty and future official correspondence between the two Contracting Governments shall be made, on the part of Chosen, in the Chinese language.

The United States shall either use the Chinese language, or, if English be used, it shall be accompanied with a Chinese version in order to avoid misunderstanding.

XIV. The High Contracting Powers hereby agree that, should at any time the King of Chosen grant to any nation, or to the merchants or citizens of any nation, any right, privilege, or favour, connected either with navigation, commerce, political, or other intercourse, which is not conferred by this Treaty, such right, privilege, and favour shall freely inure to the benefit of the United States, its public officers, merchants and citizens; provided always, that whenever such right, privilege, or favour is accompanied by any condition, or equivalent concession granted by the other nation interested, the United States, its officers and people, shall only be entitled to the benefit of such right, privilege, or favour upon complying with the conditions or concessions connected therewith.

In faith whereof the respective Commissioners Plenipotentiary have signed and sealed the foregoing at Yin-Chuen in English and Chinese, being three originals of each text of even tenour and date, the ratifications of which shall be exchanged at Yin-Chuen within one year from the date of its execution, and immediately thereafter this Treaty shall be in all its provisions publicly proclaimed and made known by both Governments in their respective countries, in order that it may be obeyed by their citizens and subjects respectively.

Chosen, the 22nd May, A.D. 1882.

(L.S.) R. W. SHUFELDT, *Commodore, United States' Navy, Envoy of the United States to Chosen.*

(L.S.) SHIN-CHEN
(L.S.) CHIN-HONG-CHI } [In Chinese.]

CHAPTER III: STEPS INTO THE KOREAN PENINSULA :
ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY, 1882-1884.

1. THE BRITISH-KOREAN TREATIES, 1882-1884.

1.1. FROM THE BEGINNING OF RELATIONS TO THE FIRST TREATY
OF JUNE 1882.

IN 1614, Edmund Saris, who was dispatched to Korea by the East India Company, failed to open a new market for textiles. This was the first sign of British interest in Korea.

The next indication of her interest was when the British sloop 'Providence' explored the eastern coast of Korea in the hope of opening up trade in 1797.¹ The embassy to China, under Lord Amherst, left Britain in the frigate 'Alceste', commanded by Captain Murray Maxwell, C.B., on 9 February, 1816, and landed near the mouth of the Pei-ho river, in the Yellow Sea, on 11 August. Shortly afterwards the 'Alceste' and the sloop 'Lyra', which had accompanied the embassy, proceeded to the coast of Korea, at the eastern boundary of the Yellow Sea; for as these ships were not required in China before the return of the Ambassador by land to Canton, it was decided to devote the interval to an examination of some places in those seas, of which little or no precise information then existed.² This was the third sign of a British interest in Korea.

In 1832, the 'Lord Amherst' of the British East India Company in China visited the west coast of the peninsula for trade. Even though it was turned away by local authorities, who said that it was against the law to engage in foreign commerce; this was the first direct contact between Britain and Korea.³ In 1845 the British warship 'Samarang' commanded by Captain Sir

Edward Belcher, visited Cheju (Quelpart) Island and some southern Korean ports on a surveying mission. Belcher made inquiries into the possibility of trade. But he, too, was told that Korea, as a tributary of China, had neither the authority nor the desire to trade with foreign countries. Both incidents were reported to the Ch'ing Board of Rites. On the latter occasion, the Korean Government requested that the Chinese authorities "instruct" the British in Hong Kong to refrain from sending any more ships to Korea. Approving the Korean position, Peking obliged. Accordingly, Ch'i-ying, the imperial commissioner in charge of relations with Westerners at the Chinese trade ports, explained Korea's unique position to the British: "It [Korea] could not be opened to trade by China, for it was not a part of China; it could not open itself to trade, for it was not independent."⁴

The 1860s began with an event that was as shocking to the Koreans as it was to the Chinese: in October 1860, Anglo-French forces captured and pillaged the imperial capital of Peking. The incident had a powerful impact upon the Koreans, who for centuries had lived in security under the shelter of Ch'ing power. China's defeat in the Opium War and the subsequent outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion, disturbing as they were, did not unduly shake Korea's faith in the might of the Manchu dynasty. Anglo-French occupation of Tientsin, however, alarmed the Koreans. The fall of Peking and the flight of the imperial court to Jehol two years later, following close upon the resurgence of Taiping power, transformed alarm to panic. When news of the fall of Peking reached the Korean capital, government leaders were seized with fear. Some warned that, should residence in

Manchuria, the Ch'ing imperial homeland, become untenable in the face of the advancing barbarians the fleeing Ch'ing emperor might seek refuge on Korean soil. This would inevitably bring, it was feared, Chinese interference in Korean affairs and might even invite Western attacks on Korea.⁵

Indeed, this new situation did give rise to a new British initiative. In the early 1870s, E. Oppert, a merchant, was called on by several of his fellow merchants to try and open up Korea, and he laid his plan before Mr. James Whittal, the managing partner of Jardine, Matheson & Co. in China, with the proposal that the firm should join in the projected expedition and voyage of discovery. The fine steamer 'Rona', Captain James Morrison, belonging to the house, had just been chartered for a voyage to Newchwang, and it was arranged that, instead of going directly to her destination, the steamer should visit the west coast of Korea. Oppert's object was to discover and ascend the large river leading to the capital, and to enter into preliminary communication with the Korean authorities, with a view to opening up commercial and friendly relations with the country. However, after a short visit to Korea, he concluded that Korea was a forbidden land.⁶ Gradually perceiving that Korea's commercial potential for British trade was, in any case, minimal, the British abandoned for the time being any attempt to open the Korean market to British traders.

In the late 1870s, the British minister in Peking, Wade, rarely missed an opportunity to describe to the Chinese Government Korea's precarious situation between Russia and Japan. In Wade's eye Korea's predicament was primarily a challenge to Korea and China, and only secondarily did it involve

Britain. In October 1880 he told Li that Britain really did not intend to enter into relations with Korea. His country, however, would watch Russia's moves closely. This essentially unambitious line was also followed by the British minister at Tokyo, Harry S. Parkes. In 1878 he did not respond to the Japanese solicitation for Western participation in Korea. Moreover, when the Italian minister in Tokyo, Count Barbolani, suggested in the summer of 1880 that the maritime powers of Great Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and Italy should make a combined naval demonstration to induce the Koreans to conclude treaties and open the country to foreign trade, the British answer was cool. Britain, the Italian was told, considered such a demonstration unnecessary and would conclude treaties only after the successful opening of the country by others.⁷

British interest was stimulated in the early 1880s by various factors: Commodore Shufeldt's attempts to conclude a treaty with Korea; reports about the Korean Government's changing mood towards entering into treaty relationships with the West; and Japan's continued efforts to induce Britain to break the ground for Western countries in Korea. Parkes' analysis linked Korea's reported readiness to negotiate treaties to her awareness of the Russian threat to Korean territory. He recommended to London that Britain should avail herself of this favourable disposition without loss of time. Should Russia's pressure lessen, he reasoned, Korea might retreat to her old concept of seclusion.⁸

The British Government was willing to take exploratory

steps on the basis of intelligence received from Korea. It ordered Wade to probe the possibility of using China's good offices. In the British view, the conclusion of the Chinese-Russian Treaty in February 1881, and the subsequent departure of the Russian fleet greatly diminished the political advantage of opening communication with Korea. At this stage the Korean policy of the European powers was formulated on an *ad hoc* basis and thus closely followed the vicissitudes of political expediency.⁹

When Shufeldt's negotiations with Li in the early spring of 1882 finally made positive gains, the Europeans looked on with a certain amount of anxiety. Parkes was worried that the Americans, whose commercial interests in Korea were negligible, would make the first treaty with Korea. High tariffs agreed by them with the Koreans, he feared, might seriously harm the prospects of future British trade in Korea. Vice-Admiral George O. Willes of the China Station was ordered to cruise in Korean waters and observe Shufeldt's actions in Korea.¹⁰

Presumably on Wade's recommendation, Britain at last decided to seek the conclusion of a British-Korean treaty. Wade had urged a meeting upon Li to discuss sending Willes to Korea. Upon Wade's assurance that the British would use the wording of the American treaty without changing a single character, Li's initial reluctance toward the project seems to have disappeared. He gave Wade a copy of the American treaty of and a letter of introduction to Ma Chien-chung, the Chinese official who had accompanied Shufeldt to Korea. Willes had authorization to negotiate, "if necessary," with Korean authorities to secure for Britain the advantages of most-favoured-nation treatment. It

remained Wade's task to make the behind-the-scenes arrangements. He advocated using the American treaty with Korea as the basis for a British agreement. To be sure, Wade found the American-Korean treaty less liberal than the treaties between China and foreign states. He was convinced, however, that he could not obtain more favourable terms than the Americans had without resorting to arms. Furthermore, he reasoned, there was enough provision for later modification built into the treaty.¹¹

On 25 May 1882, Vice-admiral Willes sailed to Korea aboard the dispatch-boat "Vigilant", and Wade's secretary, C.T. Maude, sailed on the gunboat 'Sheldrake'. They anchored off Inchōn on the 27th. The British ships were surprised to find Ma Chien-chung and Ting Ju-ch'ang who had returned to Inchōn from a royal audience in Seoul on the evening of the same day. Maude immediately contacted the Chinese who had to postpone their departure for China. At his first meeting with Ma, Willes reportedly wanted to add a few points to the American-Korean treaty in order to refine some of the provisions, but Ma opposed even the slightest change. In the end, Ma and the two Korean negotiators, Cho Yōng-ha and Kim Hong-jip, who had been hurriedly dispatched from Seoul, agreed to three supplementary articles contained in a separate protocol: <1> the three ports of Wōnsan, Pusan, and Inchōn (Chemulpo), which were open to Japanese trade, were, although not mentioned in the treaty, opened to British trade; <2> British warships were permitted to enter any Korean harbour to buy provisions, tank fresh water, and do repair work; <3> the British navy was allowed to conduct surveys along the Korean coast to make navigation safer. After

Willes and Maude waited a few days in vain for a British interpreter to arrive at Inchōn, Willes said that he would rely on Ma's assurance that the Chinese text corresponded in all points to the British. The British-Korean treaty was signed and sealed by Willes, Cho, and Kim in a tent near the beach on the afternoon of 6 June 1882. The treaty, the text of which was identical with the American-Korean document, was supplemented by a protocol and a Communication from the King of Korea to the Queen of Britain which contained a declaration of Korea's dependency on China.¹²

1.2. RECONSIDERATION OF THE FIRST TREATY.

During a visit which the principal Korean Envoy to Japan, Pak Yōng-hyo, paid Parkes on 23 November 1882, Pak asked him whether the British Treaty had been ratified, and expressed his desire to see the people of the two countries entering into direct relationship with each other. Pak also observed that, as Great Britain was a powerful State, and possessed of wide Asiatic experience, Korea which was weak and uninformed, would count upon her for support. Pak also hoped that the British Representative in Korea would be well versed in Asiatic affairs.¹

Pak again visited Parkes on 23 December to take his leave, as he was about to return to his country. Pak once more directed the conversation to the subject of the British Treaty with Korea, and inquired if Parkes had heard anything as to its ratification. Having been answered in the negative, Pak observed that he regretted the delay as he feared that if it were to continue, Korea, owing to the high-handed course which China was adopting towards her, would sink without hope of succour.

Pak, then, was anxious to know what Parkes thought on the subject. Parkes replied that he was not surprised at the delay because he thought that the unfortunate events² which had occurred in Korea since the Treaty was made would oblige the British Government to proceed with caution, even if they approved all the conditions of the Treaty, which he also thought was doubtful. And, Parkes added, he had heard of the recent arrangements made between China and Korea at Tien-tsin,³ which he thought would place additional difficulty in the way of ratification. By these arrangements China would be able to trade with Korea on far more favourable terms than the Western Powers who had made Treaties with Korea. Japan was also placed by her Treaty in a much more advantageous position than those Powers. It would be useless, it appeared to him, for British or any other foreign merchants to endeavour to compete against the favoured treatment which Korea had accorded to those two nations. Pak then made the following observations:-

I grant that, judging from appearances, you may naturally conclude that the recent agreement between China and Korea has been made with the consent of the latter, but this is not the fact. It has been forced upon us by China, who has taken advantage of Korea's weakness to dictate it. Japan made her Treaty with Korea direct, and, therefore, it is a satisfactory one. But when Korea had to negotiate with Western Powers China intervened and drafted the Treaty, which she told us we should make with those Powers. In our ignorance of the subject, we thought that China must know what was the most proper course, and would advise us for the best. The unfavourable conditions of those Treaties were therefore adopted at her suggestion. We now perceive that, taking advantage of our inexperience, she has acted entirely with a view to her own interest and to the disadvantage of Korea, and that she now wishes to subordinate Korea completely to herself. We hoped that by entering into

Treaty relations with Western Powers we should be guarded against such a result, and we still trust that the latter will afford us their support. Korea's position is this. She has no army, as she did not need one for the government of her own people. She is, therefore, in the grasp of China, whom she cannot resist, and who can, therefore, compel Korea to do whatever she wishes. You are doubtless aware that in the draft of the Western Treaties a clause was inserted declaring Korea to be a dependency of China, but entirely independent both in her external and internal affairs. This clause was removed from the Treaties as signed, but it was transferred to the letters which the King addressed to the Sovereigns with whom he concluded those Treaties. This declaration of the independent position of the King was made with the full knowledge and approval of China. Now, however, she is interfering in every way in Korea, both internal and external matters, and is depriving the King of his rights and his government of their liberty of action. I have no words to express my indignation at the flagrant injustice of her proceedings.⁴

On returning Pak's visit on 26 December, Parkes mentioned, once again, as his personal opinion only, that the present Treaty was of no value to the British Government. On conclusion of the conversation, Pak remarked that he understood Parkes' opinion, and that if the British Government had any objections to offer to the present Treaty the Korean Government would be glad to know them.⁵

The British Government were, in fact, carefully considering representations about the proposed Treaty with Korea during this time. In the first place, on 9 January 1883, the Yokohama General Chamber of Commerce submitted to Granville the following comments upon its provisions:-

Tariff.- The Tariff, or rather the absence of a Tariff, the Chamber said, was the first conspicuous feature, for the simple

statement that a duty not exceeding 10 per cent. should be charged on articles of daily use, and not exceeding 30 per cent. on luxurie, amounts to nothing, in the absence of provision for allowing British officials a voice in the question of whether a particular article should be charged as a necessity or a luxury, and especially as it was reserved to the Korean authorities to fix all duties without reference to British officials. This of itself was a bad precedent; but when taken in conjunction with the excessive rates of duty proposed to be levied became doubly so, bearing in mind the revision of the Treaties with Japan at the time pending, and also possible future negotiations with China having the same end in view. The Chamber further mentioned that it was not clear from the Treaty whether the percentage of duty was to be estimated on the first cost at the place of production, or on the lay-down cost of the goods in Korea, as per invoice, including freight and insurance charges. It might be noted that, in their intercourse by Treaty with Korea, the Japanese paid no import duties whatever, and also, in the same connection, that, in the matter of tonnage dues those proposed to be levied on British vessels were out of all proportion to what were paid by Japanese vessels.

Leasing Land.-the Chamber mentioned that advantages were granted to Japanese by Treaty which were denied to British subjects, the most noticeable being that the former were only required to pay the same ground-rent as was charged to Koreans themselves, whereas the latter, it was stipulated, should pay whatever rent the Korean authorities might see fit to impose. The Chamber pointed out, moreover, that the British Treaty would appear to contemplate the foreign settlements being subject to

Korean municipal law, an arrangement which, judging from the accounts which had been received as to the state of Korean towns, roads, &c., it was feared would be found extremely unsatisfactory.

Coast Trade.-The Chamber commented that the stipulation closing the trade between the open ports in Korea, in native produce, to British shipping was a feature in the proposed Treaty open to several objections, besides again affording a precedent for Japan & China. The trade would not fall into the hands of Koreans, who had practically no mercantile marine, but into those of the Japanese and Chinese, who were not affected by any similar prohibition. One of the Chinese Shipping Companies was believed to have already secured exceptional privileges in this respect. In connection with the coast trade, the Chamber added that it might not be out of place to notice here that in cases of smuggling it was stipulated in the British Treaty that both vessel and cargo should be seized and confiscated, whereas the Japanese Treaty stated that cargo only should be so dealt with.

Export of Grain.-The entire prohibition of the export of grain from Inchōn, the port nearest to the capital of Korea, the Chamber asserted, seemed unnecessary in view of the preceding clause, by which the Government of Korea reserved to itself the right of temporarily suspending the trade at any or all of the ports whenever it might appear desirable to do so. The Chamber further mentioned that it should be remembered that Korea had no manufactures, and for a long time to come must pay for imported goods, as she was then doing, by agricultural produce, and any restrictions on the export of grain would therefore had a directly

injurious effect on the import trade. In the event of the exercise of this right of prohibition being contemplated, ample notice should be given beforehand to prevent the injury to trade which a sudden measure of this kind would undoubtedly cause. It might be pointed out that, according to the terms of the Japanese Treaty, the export of grain was free from all the open ports, without exception, and that no right of prohibition was reserved.

Trade Regulations.-These, it had been stipulated, should be framed in conformity with international law, but, the chamber pointed out, there was no provision that British officials should have a voice in their preparation which the comparative importance of British interests (shown by the fact that almost the whole of the imports at present were of British origin) demanded. It was also stated that these Regulations should be drawn up after an interval of five years, whereas it was patent that they should be ready when the country was opened. The Japanese Treaty of 1876 with Korea provided for the drawing up of Trade Regulations "by Special Commissioners appointed by the two countries" prior to the opening of the ports, and at a later period provision was made for revision whenever necessary "by Commissioners appointed by each country."

Treaty ports.-The Chamber asserted that the treaty did not mention what ports were to be thrown open to the British Government.

The Committee of the Chamber suggested that if Korea really desired to enter into Treaty relations with Great Britain, she should lose no time in signifying her willingness to negotiate a new Treaty on a basis similar, in regard to commercial matters,

to that of the agreement she had recently made with China.⁶

Secondly, on 17 January 1883, the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce also submitted to Granville, foreign secretary(1880-05), their observations on the proposed Treaty, and trusted that it would appear to him that the objections carried weight, and were worthy of consideration.

The Chamber's report observed that the Treaty was said to have been drawn up in the Tsung-li Yamen, and negotiated through the Chinese Government. This alone was a sufficient reason for examining carefully how far the making of concessions to the Koreans might bear upon existing Treaties with the neighbouring countries, in the event of their revision at a future time, when the waiving of certain privileges contained in the latter might be claimed on the ground that they were omitted from the former. This knowledge of the real origin of the Korean Treaty made it almost certain that it had been framed with this object, while it further appeared that the Concessions made were so hampered with restrictions as to be in many instances useless for the purposes of trade, which it was understood it was the main object of the Treaty to develop.

They, then discussed the Articles of the British Treaty with Korea *seriatim*: Article I, under the guise of general friendly feeling, disguised the fact that the real object was to hinder the carrying out of the threatened annexation of Korea by Russia, a step to be dreaded as much by the Chinese as the Koreans; Article II provided for the appointment of Consuls at the open ports, which, however, were not specified; and as merchant Consuls were prohibited, the maintenance of these officials would be rather a serious burden in a country

where the resources of the trade were not for some time likely to be very great, more especially under the restrictions contained in subsequent Articles. Article III might be passed without comment, as a necessary provision in the event of accident. Article IV dealt with the punishment of criminal offences and the settlement of differences between foreigners and natives, but it contained no provision that the judgments of the native Courts would be enforced in the event of a foreigner suing a Korean, and experience of such matters in China gave little hope that the foreign interest would have due protection without some special provision for the purpose. As for the rest of them, the Chamber made the same objections as the Yokohama Chamber.

In addition, the Chamber observed, the concluding paragraph with regard to the cessation of extritoriality so soon as the laws of Korea were assimilated to those of Great Britain was hardly likely to come into effect, and as other nationalities whose laws differed from the British laws might claim the same privilege, there might be some difficulty in compiling such a Code as would meet all the exigencies of the case. It was true that the British Government was to be the Arbiter in such a case, but the clause was likely to be claimed for insertion into treaties with neighbouring countries, and might lead to complications which at the least would be vexatious and troublesome.⁷

Thirdly, on 20 January, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce reported to Granville on the subject of the Treaty negotiated between Great Britain and the Kingdom of Korea. The Chamber had set up a Committee to express its views upon the Treaty, and to set forth the opinions of the Committee

upon the operation of the clauses which related to trade and commerce.

The Committee stated they had no doubt that the British Government, when entering into political relations with Korea, had regarded that kingdom as a State which was completely independent in respect of its domestic administration and its international responsibilities, though subject to a certain undefined suzerainty exercised by China, similar to that acknowledged by Annam and Burmah and hitherto satisfied by the rendition of an annual tribute. That such had also been the view held by China herself, was clear from the evidence furnished by the express declarations of the Yamen of Peking in 1866 and 1871 on the occasion of French and American difficulties with Korea, when the Chinese Government disclaimed all responsibility for Korean affairs, and by her acquiescence in the recognition of the complete independence of Korea which was declared in the Japanese Treaty with that country concluded in 1876.

On the other hand, the Chamber added, as the Kingdom of Korea had never been claimed to be an integral part of the Chinese dominion, it was either a mediatized State under the protection of China, in which case the authority of its King to conclude Treaties with foreign nations might hereafter be questioned, or it was an independent country, with whose autonomy the Regulations referred to were inconsistent. It would be unfortunate if the recent interference of the Chinese Executive in the internal affairs of Korea should be hereafter adduced to throw doubt upon the international validity of any of the provisions of the foreign Treaties on faith in which commercial intercourse

with Korea would have been entered upon and was to be conducted.

Furthermore, the frequent disputes which had arisen about the interpretation to be placed upon certain clauses of the Treaty of Tien-tsin showed the importance of drafting with peculiar care agreements, affecting national interests, which had to be drawn up in a language so full of obscurities, even to the most experienced Sinologue, as that of China, so as to avoid all misunderstanding when the stipulations and covenants to be observed on either side come to be made effective. The Committee could not fail to perceive that the diplomatic instrument signed by Admiral Willes at Inchōn in June 1882 had been very loosely compiled in point of form, and that many of its most important provisions had been expressed in most indefinite language, and further, that imperfections, similar to those generally recognized as existing in the Treaties with China and Japan, had been repeated and intensified in this new Treaty. Moreover, after a careful consideration of the whole scope of the document, the Chamber added that the committee was apprehensive that the limitations which some of its stipulations would impose upon foreign intercourse and trade would not only be injurious to the operation of the Treaty itself, but would seriously prejudice the position hitherto consistently maintained by the Representatives of Western nations at the Courts of Peking and Yédo in combating proposals to place similar restrictions upon trade with China and Japan.⁸

Finally, on 16 February 1883, the London Chamber of Commerce, approached Granville as to the advisability of ratifying the Treaty between Britain and Korea.

The Chamber insisted that they were particularly desirous

that every opportunity to open up and develop new markets for British manufactures be turned to the best account. Such being the general policy of this Chamber, they said, it could not but express its satisfaction at the promptitude with which Wade and Admiral Willes followed the action of the American Government in seeking to negotiate a Treaty with the King of Korea. The London Chamber would be prepared, when necessary, in the instance of new countries, to support, as a means of encouraging commercial relations with Eastern nations, the acceptance of conditions less favourable to this country, during the first years of a new Treaty, than the stipulations of the British Treaties with China. It also appeared most desirable that the British Government should obtain, through these Treaties, the right of appointing consuls, of establishing merchants, and of owning land in Korea, both as a means of competing with Japanese influence in that country, and of anticipating the commercial efforts of the American Government, but particularly with a view to securing every means of access to China, and developing Britain's influence with and upon that country with the purpose of ulterior trade extension.⁹

During a conversation of 17 February with the Korean Confidential Agent, Kim Ok-kiun, Parkes was informed that the United States had ratified their Treaty, and this act, Kim thought, would serve to test Korea's position and bring to an issue the question of her dependency on China. He wished that the test could be made more forcible by the ratification of the British Treaty. Parkes replied that he thought the British Government might think it necessary to understand the position of Korea

before ratifying a Treaty with her, and that the disadvantageous conditions of the Treaty negotiated by Admiral Willes were a further impediment in the way of its ratification. He had, therefore, pointed out to him that if Korea wanted a Treaty with Great Britain, she should lose no time in offering to negotiate one that would be acceptable. Kim then inquired whether the British Government would be disposed to ask Li whether Korea should make with Great Britain a Treaty including similar arrangements to those recently concluded between Korea and China, to which Parkes replied that the British Government would not lose sight of their own dignity in any course they might see fit to take.¹⁰

On 6 March, Granville informed Parkes that the British Government were not yet prepared, without further information on various points raised in the Treaty between Great Britain and Korea, which had been signed by Vice-Admiral Willes in June 1882, and with regard to which investigation was being made, to ratify that Treaty as it stood.¹¹ On 9 March, Parkes submitted to Granville his view that Mr. Aston should be sent to Korea at once because of the importance of timely information being received as to the views of the Korean Government in regard to the modification of Vice-Admiral Willes' Treaty, as either the ratifications of that Treaty have to be arranged, or a contrary resolution, if such should be taken by the British Government, be communicated to the Korean Government by 6 June.¹² On the same day, Parkes sent a letter to Cho Yōung-ha, the Korean Minister of Rites as follows:-

. . . Your government having studied the conditions which govern international intercourse, will now be aware that equality of treatment is the only

satisfactory footing on which relations between different States can be conducted. They will, therefore, I trust, perceive that the commercial and other arrangements which they have recently concluded with China must materially influence the consideration of the Treaty between Great Britain and Korea, and I have consequently been instructed by the British Government to apprise your Excellency that, if the Government of Korea is willing to enter into further negotiations with them on the basis of those arrangements, they would be happy to entertain proposals of that nature. Mr. Aston is accordingly authorized to receive any communication which you may wish to make to the British Government on this subject.¹³

On 21 April, Aston who had been sent to Korea as Parkes had requested, reported to him his observations about Korea's attitude to her Treaty with Britain. He stated that the Korean Government were willing to negotiate a Treaty on the most favoured-nation basis, to be retrospectively applied so as to include the conditions of the Chinese and Japanese Treaties. They considered that this basis would be in accordance with the Chinese text of the British Treaty, and that the non-retrospective character of that Treaty, which appeared in the British version (Article XIV), was due to mistranslation. They were willing to readjust satisfactorily the Jurisdiction Clauses, to omit the first part of the Opium Clause (Article VII), and to modify some other minor points (not specified in the telegram); but he added that they would resist concession respecting the Tariff Clause (Article V), interport trade (Article VI), the export of grain (Article VIII), and tonnage dues (Article VI); and, as he understood the telegram, that they intended the rate of the latter (5 mace per ton) to be Chinese and not Korean mace. This rate, he observed, would be 1 mace, or 25 per cent, higher than the rate

levied in China, and a far greater advance on the Japanese rate, which, as at present levied, was nearly nominal, though the Japanese Government desired to increase it. The Korean Government would endeavour to reduce the privileges enjoyed by China and Japan in Korea to a level with those granted to the United States and Great Britain, but they promised to administer the Treaties with the latter Powers in a liberal spirit.

Aston had also offered the suggestion that a brief preliminary Treaty embodying the first and last clauses of Admiral Willes' Treaty might be first concluded, the latter, or most favoured-nation clause, having the retrospective character mentioned above, and being combined with the provision that such a preliminary Treaty, if approved by the British Government, should admit of enforcement as soon as the consent of the latter had been communicated to the Korean Government. This suggestion was being favourably considered by the Korean Government.¹⁴

When Parkes received Aston's report on the same day, it occurred to him that, if the Korean Government were to be induced to entertain the idea of modifying the British Treaty, and to communicate to Aston their disposition to do so, it was at least necessary that that idea should be officially suggested for their consideration and that they should be informed that Aston was authorized to receive any communication on the subject which they might desire to make to the British Government.¹⁵

On the next day, unexpectedly, the question was solved. Granville informed Parkes, "the ratifications of the British Treaty with Korea shall be postponed for six months, on

the ground that further consideration is required in respect of certain portions of it. You will direct Aston to notify to the Korean Government the desire of our government to postpone the ratification of the treaty, and, if desirable, to sign declaration of such postponement."¹⁶

On 28 April, Parkes informed Granville respecting a draft of the declaration of the postponement:-

Whereas the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce concluded at Inchōn on 6 June 1882, between Vice-Admiral Willes, on the part of Great Britain and Ireland, and Isas Ling Hsia and Ching Hung Kie, members of the Royal Council, on the part of Korea, contains a stipulation that the ratifications of this Treaty shall be exchanged at Inchōn within one year from the date of its signature, and whereas the Government of Great Britain is of opinion that portions of this Treaty require further consideration, the undersigned being duly authorized by their respective governments, have agreed to declare as follows:- That the period fixed within which the ratifications should be exchanged shall be extended to 31 December 1883. In faith of which they have signed the present Declaration made in duplicate and in the British and Chinese language, and have affixed thereto their seals.¹⁷

On 15 May, Min Yōng-mok, president of the Board of Foreign Affairs of Great Korea declared that the Korean Government accepted the Declaration for extending the period stipulated for exchanging the Ratifications of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland and Korea, signed at Inchōn, 6 June 1882.¹⁸

1.3. THE SECOND TREATY OF NOVEMBER 1883 AND

ITS RATIFICATION, APRIL, 1884.

On 29 May 1883, Aston had reported to Parkes that he had taken advantage of his recent visit to Seoul to endeavour further to ascertain the views of the Korean Government as to the basis on which they would be willing to reopen Treaty negotiations. Aston had found the President of the Foreign Board in a much more reticent frame of mind than on the occasion of his previous visit. It had plainly been suggested to him, probably by Kim Ok-kiun, that the President ought not to commit himself further to any one but a duly accredited Envoy, and to Aston's inquiries his invariable reply was that he would reserve his answer until the arrival of a Plenipotentiary, and for this the President hoped he should not have long to wait.¹

On 22 June, Parkes forwarded to Granville the draft of a Treaty (Appendix I) showing the terms which he considered Britain should endeavour to obtain from Korea in place of those secured by Admiral Willes, enclosing drafts of Treaty, Regulations of Trade, and a Tariff, which composed together one instrument.

In framing them Parkes had been impressed by the desirability of adhering as closely as possible to the terms of Admiral Willes' Treaty. If what he conceived to be its deficiencies could have been remedied by Additional Articles or a Supplementary Treaty, he would greatly have preferred that course. But the alternatives he had to recommend, that in respect to jurisdiction, the conditions of residence of British subjects in Korea, the tariff, Customs Rules, and other commercial rights and privileges were so material that it would be impossible to place these in a Supplementary Treaty without practically cancelling the first one, or creating occasion for a conflict of meaning between the two which it was most desirable to avoid. He had,

however, endeavoured to observe simplicity and brevity, even at the cost of some omission, and had thus confined his draft to the same number of Articles as those of Admiral Willes' Treaty, but he had not been able to retain the same order.²

On 3 July, Kim again visited Japan and called on Parkes. In conversation, Kim expressed the anxiety of the Korean Government to establish Treaty relations with Great Britain as soon as possible. He referred to the fact that 31 December was the limit assigned to the extension of the period for ratification of the Treaty concluded by Admiral Willes, and stated that the Korean Government looked forward with interest to the appointment, before the expiration of that period, of a Minister Plenipotentiary empowered by the British Government to conclude with that of Korea the formalities of ratification, or any further negotiation that might be found necessary.

In answer to his inquiry as to the intentions of the British Government, Parkes could only tell Kim that he knew that they were indisposed to ratify Admiral Willes' Treaty as it stood, as it contained several objectionable clauses: and as the high tariff of that Treaty would prevent the development of trade between the two countries. Parkes, however, felt confident that the British Government would be guided by the consideration of what was expedient in the interests both of Korea and Great Britain, though they would naturally decline to accept a commercial Treaty containing conditions which would be prejudicial to those they had concluded with China and Japan, and which had been productive of very great benefit to both those nations. If Korea earnestly desired Treaty relations with Great Britain, she should

be willing to offer the latter sufficient inducements to enter into such relations. Such a Treaty as that which was concluded in 1882 did not contain sufficient inducements: it would entail considerable cost on the British Government, without any corresponding advantage.³

When Parkes was transferred to Peking at the end of August, he was instructed to reopen negotiations at Seoul in October without giving notice to the Chinese Government. On his way to Shanghai to board the ship to Korea, he briefly met Li at Tien-tsin. The Viceroy was angry at British audacity in bypassing him and sent a communication to the Korean Government warning that only changes in commercial arrangements would be tolerated by Peking.⁴

Meanwhile, the British Government was checking Parkes' draft for a negotiation of a new Treaty with Korea once again. The first part to be reconsidered was that respecting Opium. According to Granville's letter to Earl Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India, on 31 August, in the Parkes draft which had been sent home for the consideration of the British Government, the clause affecting opium was thus worded: The importation of opium, arms, and all munitions of war, and the exportation of red Ginseng, were prohibited, except under the express authority of the Korean Government." Parkes further suggested that an exception in favour of medical opium should be mentioned in this clause of the proposed Treaty, as well as in the Tariff to be annexed to the Treaty, where a definition should be given as to what was intended by the term "medical opium." At the same time Parkes had pointed out that the prohibition to import opium

into Korea was almost in itself a recognition of the independence of the country, inasmuch as China would claim any concession granted to a dependency.

On this point, Granville observed that the King of Korea claimed for Korea that, while it was simply a dependency of China, its internal administration and its external intercourse were entirely and in all respects within his direction and control as an independent King. Therefore, he asked Kimberley whether he saw any objection, so far as Indian interests were concerned, to the prohibition regarding the importation of opium into Korea, and the definition of "medical opium " proposed by Parkes.⁵

On 25 September, Kimberley replied to Granville that while Indian interests saw no harm in recognizing the prohibition by Korea of the importation of opium, it was feared that if the British Government undertook to prohibit its importation, the position of the Government of India in regard to the general opium question would be weakened. Kimberley also stated that Article VII of the Treaty negotiated by Vice-Admiral Willes appeared to him to be inadmissible because the British Government could not undertake to punish a British subject for any interference with this trade on their part as it would prove extremely embarrassing in negotiations with China on the opium question, especially in view of the relations of Korea with China. He further mentioned that the clause proposed by Parkes was not open to this objection, and he did not consider that the making of opium contraband in Korea need in itself be opposed from the point of view of Indian interests. But Granville would doubtless consider whether the insertion in the Treaty of such a clause as was proposed would give China any opening to claim a similar

concession. Kimberley suggested that it might be better to omit all mention of opium in the body of the Treaty, and simply to enter it as contraband in the Tariff Schedule.⁶

On 10 October, Granville instructed Parkes that, in negotiating a fresh Treaty with Korea, it was desirable that all mention of opium should be omitted in the body of the Treaty, and that it should be simply entered as contraband in the Tariff Schedule.⁷

The second part to be reconsidered was Article XII of the proposed Treaty with Korea. On 17 October, Granville instructed Parkes that in paragraphs 1 and 2 of that article after the word "participate" should be inserted before the word "unconditionally," and after the word "advantages," the words "especially in relation to import and export duties on goods and manufactures." At the end of this Article, he added, it would be desirable to make the following addition:- "This Article shall be interpreted in the most liberal sense."⁸

The third consideration was in respect of missionary activity. On behalf of the Board of Directors of the National Bible Society of Scotland, on 18 October, Lord Balfour of Burleigh sent a letter to Granville in connection with any Treaty arrangements that might be made between the British Government and the Government of Korea. He pointed out that, as Granville would be aware, provision had been made under Article VIII and IX in Lord Elgin's Treaty with China, signed at Tien-tsin in 1858, for the protection of persons, native or foreign, who might teach or profess the Christian religion, and for liberty to British subjects to travel, with passports, to all parts of the interior; while under

the most favoured-nation clause missionaries and Bible Society agents had been able to reside in any part of China to which their duty had called them. In the interests of their mission, and of possible native converts in Korea, the Directors of this Society were anxious that similar arrangements should, if practicable, be made with the consent of the Government of Korea; and they respectfully solicited Granville's powerful sympathy and aid on their behalf. He assured Granville that any agents the British Society might send to Korea would take care, as those in China had always done, to conduct themselves prudently, and with due regard to local regulations and circumstances.⁹

On 13 November, the United Presbyterian Church Foreign Mission Office also sent Granville a letter similar to that of the National Bible Society as follows:-

That the Board of Foreign Missions of the United Presbyterian Church have at present in their service a staff of upwards of seventy full qualified missionaries, besides a large number of native agents, labouring in several mission fields, whom they support at an expenditure of 37,000 L. per annum.

That of these missionaries, three ordained missionaries, one medical missionary, and a lady missionary are located in Manchuria, who make occasional journeys to the Korean border, while some of the native agents are labouring in Korea itself.

That the Board are desirous that their missionaries entering Korea should have the same protection and privileges which were secured to all missionaries in China by Article VIII and IX of the Treaty signed at Tien-tsin in 1858 and ratified at Peking in 1860.

The Board, in these circumstances, beg most respectfully that in any Treaty arrangements between the British Government and the Government of Korea, your Lordship's good offices may be used in favour of securing protection to

all persons in Korea, native or foreign, who may teach or profess the Christian religion, and of securing liberty to British subjects to travel with passports to any part of the interior.¹⁰

On 10 and 20 November, Granville replied respectively to the National Bible Society and the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland that the proposals which would be made to the Korean Government would include the concession to British subjects of the right to build schools, hospitals, and places of worship, to travel with passports in the interior, and to enjoy under a most-favoured-nation clause all the privileges and advantages that might be granted by Korea to the subjects of other Powers. If the above proposals were accepted by the Korean Government, Granville hoped that the objects which the National Bible Society of Scotland and the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland had in view would be sufficiently secured.¹¹

After sending Aston ahead for preparatory negotiations, Parkes arrived at Inchŏn on 26 October, and prepared the final treaty draft which he handed to the Foreign Office on 3 November. The negotiations, conducted on the Korean side by Kim Hong-jip, Yi Cho-Yŏn, and von Mollendorff, proceeded smoothly, and agreement was easily reached on the treaty. Opinion on the trade regulations and the tariff, however, differed considerably. Agreement was finally reached on 24 November. Two days later, on 26 November, the British-Korean treaty was signed by Parkes and Min, the president of the Foreign Office.(Appendix II)

On the occasion of consequence of the successful British-Korean Treaty, in a note of 27 November supplied by the Korean Foreign Office, the King of Korea remarked that the two countries would

henceforward be in perpetual peace and friendship one with the other, and the advantages which their respective subjects would derive from this Treaty would be entirely due to the exertions of Parkes, to whom he alluded in the most laudatory terms.¹²

After Parkes had returned to Tien-tsin, he called on Li on 5 December because Parkes found that Li was anxious to know what Parkes had done in Korea, and Parkes thought it would be polite to be frank with him on the subject, and to give him a full recital. This led, as Parkes anticipated, to a request that he would show Li the Treaty, and Parkes observed that, although Parkes would be transgressing rules in doing so, he would communicate it to Li in strict confidence, which he felt assured would not be breached. Li observed to Parkes that the French Minister had told him, shortly after Parkes had left for Korea, that the negotiations would create a false position for China in respect to Korea, but that Li had replied that he did not apprehend any result of that nature. Parkes replied that when Li read the Treaty he would see that his confidence had been fully justified. Parkes accordingly gave Li a copy of the Treaty and Trade Regulations when Li returned Parkes' visit on the following day. Li read these documents through from beginning to end, and then spontaneously expressed a hearty approval of them.¹³

Li's initial approval, however, turned into opposition in the spring of the following year. He had been severely criticized in Peking for having failed to send a Chinese official along with Parkes, a procedure which Li had considered impolitic at the time. The scapegoat in Seoul was Min Yōng-mok, the chief negotiator on the Korean side, who had to resign as president of the Foreign

Office because of Chinese pressure. Before Chinese objections to the ratification of the treaty reached Seoul, however, Parkes secured on April 14, 1884, through his secretary, W.C. Hillier, an official declaration from the Korean Government that the treaty had been ratified by the king.¹⁴

On 28 April 1884, Parkes reported to Granville that the exchange ceremony had taken place at Seoul. He added that it was appended, on the page marked "Ratification," to the original Chinese version of the said Treaty, was signed by the King, and sealed with the Korean Seal of State, and its terms were exactly conformable to those of the ratification of the Queen of Britain.

He also enclosed the certificate of the exchange of the said ratifications in British and Chinese which he executed that day in duplicate with the President of the Foreign Office of Korea.¹⁵ On 1 May 1884, Parkes and his suite were received splendidly by the King, and Parkes presented his credentials and a letter from Queen Victoria.¹⁶

The British treaty served as model for most of the later treaties Korea concluded with Western nations.

2. Pressure upon Korea from Russia and the Russo-Korean Treaty, July 1884.

Following the ratification of the Treaty of Peking of 1860, in which China ceded her territories east of the Ussuri River to Russia, Korea shared a common boundary with Russia at the mouth of Tumen River. The Czarist Government had revealed its interest in Korea as early as 1864.¹ Along the borders connecting China, Korea, and Russia, there were Russian settlements that attracted Chinese and Koreans to emigrate to Russian territory. After 1863

in particular, Korea became increasingly concerned over the flight of peasants across the border into Russian territory. Fearing collusion between these "renegade" Koreans and the Russians, the government tightened border security and ordered frontier officials not to let foreigners enter the country. During 1864-1865, however, dozens of Russians came to the border town of Kyōng-hōng of Ham-gyōng Province to demand trade. The alarmed Korean officials refused to talk with the Russians, and they arrested and executed Koreans who allegedly had aided the intruders. The Seoul government repeatedly appealed to the Chinese authorities to check Russian activities along Korea's northern border.² In January 1866, a Russian man-of-war appeared outside Wōnsan, on the east coast of the peninsula by Broughton Bay, and the Commander presented a letter to the Korean Government demanding the right of trade and residence for Russian merchants. The letter also intimated that if the demands were not satisfied, Russian troops would cross the frontier to enforce them. During the period 1866-68, the Russian Government lured many Koreans to Russian territory, and several incidents occurred between the countries at the border.³

Many Western nations, as well as China, were alerted to pressure upon Korea from Russia. In 1874, Parkes, wrote to a friend in China: "I hope Korea may not pass into [Russia's] hands some fine day." Two Chinese officials in early 1875 memorialized the Emperor, warning of the dangers arising from Russian pressures on the boundaries of China and Korea. Wade, the British diplomat, also warned Li in December, 1875, after the Kang-wha incident, that Russia had dispatched troops to the mouth of the

Amur River. The next year, when Li conferred with the Japanese Minister Mori Yurei, the latter mentioned that Russia was organizing Mongolians and Koreans who had settled on the right bank of the Ussuri River, and Japan feared that Russia would encroach on Korean territory as well as on China's own. Similar warnings made by other Japanese to the Korean Government can be found, for instance, in former loyalist Samurai, Miyamoto's conversation with Shin Hōn after the conclusion of the Kang-wha Treaty.⁴ There was even a rumour that a war was going on between Korea and Russia. All these warnings serve to illustrate the concern for Korea on the part of China, Japan, and the Western Powers that was aroused by Russia's expansionist designs. Later the Koreans, too, became aware of the pressure from Russia in the north. Yi Yoo-wōn, the King's former tutor and former second state councillor, wrote to Li early in 1879:

Russians use various methods to encroach on our northern boundary. The inhabitants there assist [the Russians] secretly, and [our government] can not enforce the ban.⁵

The Korean Government had already been alerted by Hanabusa, Assistant Japanese Foreign minister. In late 1877, when Hanabusa was in Seoul to negotiate the opening of new ports and permanent residence of a Japanese minister in Seoul, he had warned the Korean Minister of Rites, Cho Yōng-ha, that Russia might use the Russo-Turkish War, then in progress, as a pretext for seizing the Gulf of Lazareff, on the east coast of Korean peninsula.⁶ Two years later, Inouye Kaoru, the Japanese Foreign Minister, was reported to have told Parkes that "Russia had made attempts to get possession of the Port Lazareff, and would

certainly renew those attempts in the event of complications.⁷

The Chinese Minister in Japan, Ho Ju-chang, was particularly concerned about the threat posed by Russia. In April, 1880, he wrote to the Yamen:

The troubles of Korea stem not from Japan but from Russia. . . If Russia were to use force, the first step would be the Ham-gyōng Province of Korea. Judging from the relative strength, Korea would not be able to defend herself. If Korea should perish . . . How could China remain at peace? . . . That Russia has the heart of tiger and wolf is known by all under the sky.⁸

Early in 1880, China and Russia were in dispute over the Ili question. The situation became more serious when China refused to ratify the treaty, which had been fraudulently signed. It seemed likely that there would be a war, and that it would directly involve Korea. The dispatch of a Russian fleet to the East was regarded as a threat to Korea. Parkes warned Marquis Tséng Chi-tse, Chinese Minister to the Court of St. James, in February 1880, that both Japan and Russia were contemplating an invasion of Korea and that China should be prepared; the best method to defend Korea would be to advise her to enter into commercial and diplomatic relations with the Western Powers. Though at the time Tséng discounted the likelihood of such an eventuality, he wrote to the Yamen in June calling attention to the possibility of a joint action by Japan and Russia against China's dependent state, Korea. He suggested that the Chinese Government plan to amend its policy of non-intervention in Korea and advise the latter to enter into treaty relations with foreign powers.⁹ In April 1880, a Russian mission was sent to Kyōng-

hōng Prefecture in Ham-gyōng Province to negotiate a treaty of friendship and commerce between the two countries. The proposition was rejected. It is significant however that the mission was composed primarily of cavalymen. According to press accounts, the official of the group asked the Korean local officials why their country would conclude a treaty with Japan but not with Russia. The questions were not answered by the Prefect. The same account also indicates that the Russians were ready to employ force to back up their demands.

The Chinese Consul in Nagasaki wrote to Li on 14 June 1880, reporting movements of the Russian Navy that might be in preparation for an attack on the port of Wōnsan. Other sources also prove that Russia had moved toward Korea. On 23 September, Admiral Charles Duperré of the French Navy informed Li that a Russian admiral had arrived at Chefoo and was proceeding to Hun-ch'un (at the Ussuri River on the Sino-Korean-Russian borders) to attack the Korean coast. Li told Admiral Duperré that the Russians were only attempting to trade with Korea, but the Admiral answered that the northwest coast of Korea had excellent harbours, which were the real objective of the Russian Navy. To be sure, Li was troubled by the presence of Russian warships; a few days later he memorialized the Emperor:

Since the winter of 1879, as the Sino-Russian negotiations [over Ili] dragged on, there have been many rumours to the effect that about twenty Russian warships were sailing to the East while their army assembled along the coasts of Chi-lin province in places like Vladivostock, Nova-Kievaska. These places are close to Korea, and the all important Northeastern Provinces. As they use the eastern sea ports as bases, naturally they will have ambition to expand. To conquer Korea is just the same as to encroach upon the back of our Three

Eastern Provinces and will cause disturbances to China.¹⁰

In August 1880, when Kim Hong-jip went to Japan on a friendly mission, the counsellor of the Chinese Legation in Tokyo, Huang Tsun-hsien, presented a long paper entitled "Policy for Korea" to the Korean King through Kim. What interests here is that the underlying theme of the paper was the defence of Korea against Russia. Huang said:

Since Russia was deterred in the European expansion by Britain, Austria, France, and Italy, she turned to the Orient. In the last decade or so, she has obtained Sakhalin from Japan, the left bank of the Amur River from China. Now she stations troops at the mouth of the Tumen River in order to make it a point d'appui. . . Her contemplation is obviously in Asia. Korea is the frontier region and will be the center of conflict.¹¹

A few months later, the Japanese Minister in Seoul was able to obtain a copy of the record of a conversation between the Korean King and the Prime Minister, the essence of which was that the Koreans found Japan's policy vis-a-vis Korea to have changed from hostile to friendly and the major threat to Korea now to come from Russia.

There is little need to point out that the other Western nations generally employed diplomatic methods in attempting to open the door to Korea. Russia, however, was in the habit of using a direct approach, often accompanied by threats in the early 1880's which, however, never did materialize. Nevertheless, the constant pressure from that country was undoubtedly one of the most important factors contributing to the opening of Korea.

In March 1882, a Korean was sent by the local Russian

authorities to the prefect of Kyōnghōng to deliver a letter which did not propose a treaty, but which was intended to resolve a few local issues. This letter was received with surprise because it was written in Korean script, *Han'gul*. Although the government in Seoul ordered the local officials to answer with "nice words," it wanted to have it made unmistakably clear that further contact was not desired. Shortly afterwards, however, the Korean Government was again confronted with a Russian request for treaty relations. The Russian minister at Peking, Eugène de Butzow, approached Chang Shu-shéng early in June with the proposal that a treaty be negotiated which would grant overland trade and settle the border between the two countries. Chang instructed Ma, who was in Korea in the second half of June, to approach Kim Hong-jip about the Russian request. At the end of the month the Russian plan was rejected by Chief State Councillor Yi Cho-ung, whose views were supported by Ma Chien-chung. Yi stated that the border area between Russia and Korea at the mouth of the Tumen River was too insignificant to render trade there feasible. It was therefore convenient, Yi insisted, "to wait for another day to conclude a treaty."¹²

The day truly came with the vice-president of the Korean Foreign Office, von Möllendorff's own ideas about Korea's diplomatic future. He doubted that China would be strong enough to keep Japan in check and therefore only Russia, he thought, would be an effective counterbalance. America was too weak militarily to play such a role, and Britain was siding with Japan against Russia. It was for this reason that von Möllendorff strongly favoured the conclusion of the treaty with Russia in the

Summer of 1884. This treaty, he was convinced, would secure for Korea a certain degree of independence from Japan as well as from China.

Consequently, on 7 July 1884, a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed between Russia and Korea. (Appendix III) By this step Russian diplomacy seems to have followed the example of the other powers. The treaty made no appreciable difference in Russo-Korean trade relations or the Russian attitude toward Korea.

Besides making the customary arrangements for mutual trade, the treaty included a provision which allowed warships of either country the right to visit any port of the other signatory country, irrespective of whether that port was an open or a closed one. This provision enabled Russian naval forces to take an active interest in the ports and harbours of Korea, which had been closed to vessels of other nations. Before the treaty was ratified and the Russians could take advantage of this provision, a crisis between Britain and Russia developed in the Far East, because the British claimed that Russia intended to seize one of these closed ports.¹³

ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER III

<From the Beginning of Relations
to the First Treaty of June 1882.>

1. William R. Broughton, *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean; Coast of Corea* (26 June 1797).
2. B. Hall, *Account of a Voyage of Discovery to the West coast of Corea and the Great Loochoo Island*, pp. 1-2.
3. Charles Gutzlaff, *Journal of three Voyages along the coast of China in 1831, 1832 and 1833*, PP. 153-155.
4. Kim Key-hiuk, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order*, p. 40.
5. *Ibid.* pp. 41-42.
6. Ernest Oppert, *A Forbidden Land: Voyages to the Corea*, pp. 178-179.
7. Wade's No.50, confidential, 31 March 1874, F.O. 17/672; Wade's No. 7, 12 January 1876, F.O. 17/719; Fraser's No.33, confidential, 10 February 1887, F.O. 17/753; Wade's No. 23, confidential, 3 July 1879, F.O. 17/809; Kennedy's No.114, confidential, 1 July 1880, F.O. 46/257.
8. Kennedy's No.90, 25 May 1880, FO. 46/257; Kennedy's No. 179, very confidential, 21 November 1880; No.180, very confidential, 22 November 1880; No.185, very conf, 26 November 1880; No.199, very confidential, 21 December 1880, F.O. 46/258; Parkes' memorandum, 11 January 1881, F.O. 46/271.
9. Granville's No.7, 20 January 1881, F.O. 17/856; Kennedy's No. 61, very confidential, 8 June 1881, F.O. 46/272; Kennedy's No.5, most confidential, 10 January 1882, F.O. 46/284.
10. Granville to Parkes, 17 April 1882, F.O. 46/283,; Parkes' No. 41, confidential, 25 March 1882, F.O. 46/284,; Parkes' No. 57, confidential, 21 April 1882, F.O. 46/285.

11. Wade to Granville, 27 May 1882, F.O. 17/897; Admiralty to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, confidential, 14 April 1882, F.O. 17/912.
12. Wade's No. 51, confidential, 6 July 1882 (it contains Maude's report to Wade), F.O. 17/897; George O Willes' report to the Secretary to the Admiralty, Nagasaki, 9 June 1882, F.O. 17/915.

< Reconsideration of the First Treaty >

1. Sir H. Parkes to Earl Granville, No. 166, 25 November 1882, F.O. 405/33, No. 2
2. The military Mutiny of 1882 (Imo Kullan); the elite corps (Pyölgigun), established in the reform of the military structure carried out earlier, had been regarded with special favour by the Korean King, and it was anticipated that before long the traditional military units would be scrapped entirely. As a result, the treatment of the old line units had worsened, and moreover it had been some thirteen months since these troops had been given their pay and rations. The eruption that ensued in consequence was the Military Mutiny of 1882; Lee Ki-baik, *A New History of Korea*, Harvard, 1984, p. 272.
3. When O Yun-jung and Yi Cho-yōn, who had been sent to negotiate with Shufeldt, reached Tien-tsin in the middle of May 1882, they delivered a royal letter in which the king pleaded for the abolition of the old rule prohibiting the use of the seaway between the two countries. It would be timely, the letter continued, to allow Chinese and Korean merchants to trade in the opened ports so that they could share the profits reaped now by the foreigners alone. This initiative immediately raised the problem of how such trade relations would affect the Koreans' tributary status. An imperial edict of 14 June ordered that Sino-Korean trade was henceforth to be handled by the Tsung-li Yamen while the regular tributary matters continued to be managed by the Board of Rites. It also ordered Li to study the feasibility of trade regulations. The issue was pushed into the background by the events of July and August 1882, but in October, when Li was back at his post, he brought it up again for discussion with the Korean

emissaries, Cho Yōng-ha, Kim Hong-jip, and O Yun-jung. He was searching for a means, other than military, of asserting China's prerogatives in Korea. He also concurred with the Korean' opinion that the Chinese-Korean trade had to be freed from inflexible traditions, and also shared their view that foreigners should not be allowed exclusive trade rights. After very brief negotiations, at which Chou Fu and Ma Chien-chung assisted, the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between Chinese and Korean Subjects were signed and sealed on 4 October 1882. *I bid.*

4. Parkes to Granville, No. 176, 29 December 1882 (rec'd 5 February 1883), F.O. 405/33, No 19.
5. *I bid.*
6. Mollison to Granville, 9 January 1883 (rec'd 20 February), F.O. 405/33, No. 28.
7. Low to Granville, 17 January 1883 (rec'd 28 February), F.O. 405/33, No. 37.
8. Johnson to Granville, private and confidential, 20 January 1883 (Rec'd 20 March), F.O. 405/33, Inclosure 2 in No. 48.
9. K. Murray to Granville, 16 February 1883 (rec'd 17 February), F.O. 405/33, No.25.
10. Parkes to Granville, No. 26. confidential, 17 February 1883 (rec'd 28 March), F.O. 405/33, No. 51.
11. Parkes to Consul Aston, confidential and separate, 6 March, 1883, F.O. 405/33, Inclosure 1 in No. 61.
12. Parkes to Granville, No. 34. confidential, 9 March, 1883 (rec'd 14 April), F.O. 405/33, No. 60.
13. Parkes to Cho Yōng-ha, Minister for Foreign Affairs fo His Majesty the King of Great Chosen, 9 March, 1883, F.O 405/33, Inclosure 3 in No. 61.

14. Parkes to Granville, No. 50, 21 April 1883 (rec'd 4 June), F.O. 405/33, No. 89.
15. Parkes to Granville, No. 60, confidential, 21 April 1883 (rec'd 4 June), F.O. 405/33, No. 90.
16. Granville to Parkes, No. 42. Ext.3. 22 April, 1883, F.O. 405/33, No. 69.
17. Declaration for extending the period stipulated for exchanging the Ratifications of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland and Chosen, signed at Inchōn, 6 June 1882, 19 June, 1883, F.O 405/33, Inclosure 2 in No.102.
18. The President of the Board of Foreign Affairs of Corea to Parkes, translation, 15 May 1883, F.O. 405/33, Inclosure in No. 118.

<The Second Treaty of November 1883,
and Its Ratification, April 1884>

1. Aston to Parkes, 29 May 1883, F.O. 405/33, Inclosure 1 in No. 121.
2. Parkes to Granville, No. 108, confidential, 22 June 1883 (rec'd 25 July), F.O. 405/33, No. 133.
3. Parkes to Granville, No. 114, confidential, 16 July 1883 (rec'd 25 August), F.O. 405/33, No. 148.
4. Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, p. 168.
5. Currie to Mallet, 31 August 1883, F.O. 405/33, No. 151.
6. Mallet to Currie, 25 September 1883 (rec'd 25 September), F.O. 405/33, No. 165.
7. Currie to Godley, 10 October 1883, F.O. 405/33, No. 174.
8. Granville to Parkes, No. 41. Ext. 27, 17 October 1883, F.O. 405/33, No. 179.

9. Lord Balfour of Burleigh to Granville, 18 October 1883, (rec'd 22 October), F.O. 405/33, No. 181.
10. Memorial of the Foreign Board of the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland, 13 November 1883, F.O. 405/33, No. 188.
11. Currie to Balfour, 10 November 1883, FO. 405/33, No. 187 & Lister to the Rev. W. Nairn, 20 November 1883, F.O. 405/33, No. 192.
12. Note of His Majesty the King of Korea on the occasion of the Audience granted to Parkes on 27 November 1883.-(Supplied by the Korean Foreign Office.), translation, F.O. 405/34, Inclosure 1 in No. 27.
13. Parkes to Granville, No. 43, 7 December 1883 (rec'd 1 February 1884), F.O. 405/34, No. 13.
14. Hillier to Parkes, 14 April 1884, F.O. 405/34, Inclosure 1 in No. 125.
15. Parkes to Granville, No.1. Treaty, Korean Mission, 28 April 1884, (rec'd 16 June.), F.O. 405/ 34, No. 130.
16. Parkes to Treasury, 1 May 1884, F.O. 405/34, No. 117.

<Pressure upon Korea from Russia and Russo-Korean Treaty>

1. Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, denies the existence of any Russian designs on Korea before 1885 and he cites Russia's apathetic attitude toward Korea as the outstanding example, pp. 14-15. However, he might have reached a different conclusion had he had access to the Oriental documents; F. Chien, The opening of Korea, p. 247.
2. Kim Key-hiuk, The last phase of the East Asian World Order, pp. 44-45.
3. Chien, The opening of Korea, p. 56.
4. Kim, The last phase of the East Asian World Order, p. 266.

5. Ibid., pp. 240-241.
6. In 1878, when a tax on Japanese trade was suddenly imposed by the Korean Government and many Japanese urged war against the Koreans, the semi-official Japanese-language newspaper, Nichi Nichi Shinbun, took an opposing view. The paper stressed the danger to Korea from Russia and advocated the adoption of a friendlier approach to that country, conducive to the maintenance of Korea's independence.
7. Parkes' dispatches to the British Foreign Office, No. 174, 10 October 1879 and No. 190, 27 October 1879, Confidential, quoted by E.V.G. Kiernan, British Diplomacy in China, 1880-1885, Cambridge, 1939, p. 75.
8. Chien, The opening of Korea, p. 58.
9. Kim, The last phase of the East Asian World Order, pp. 304-305.
10. Chien, The opening of Korea, p. 59.
11. Ibid., p. 60.
12. Martina Deuchler, Confucian. Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, London, 1977, p. 126.
13. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, p. 16.

Appendices to Chapter III

Appendix 11

Draft of Treaty.

nesses. They shall freely enjoy the same facilities for communication personally or in writing with the authorities of the country where they reside, and all other privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by Diplomatic or Consular functionaries in other countries.

2. The Diplomatic Representative, Consul-General, Consul, and Vice-Consuls of either Power, with their families and the members of their official establishments, shall have the right to travel freely in any part of the dominions of the other, and the Korean authorities shall furnish passports to such British officers travelling in Corea, and shall provide such escort for their protection as may be necessary.

3. Consul-General, Consul, or Vice-Consul shall exercise their functions on receipt of an exequatur from the Sovereign of the country where they reside, or, in the case of temporary appointments, with the sanction of the Korean Government. They shall be held *hors officium*, and shall not engage in trade.

ARTICLE III.

1. Jurisdiction over the persons and property of British subjects in Corea shall be vested exclusively in the duly authorized British judicial authorities.
2. If a Korean subject has a complaint against a British subject in Corea, the case shall be heard and decided by the British judicial authorities.
3. If a British subject in Corea has a complaint against a Korean subject, the case shall be heard and decided by the Korean authorities.
4. A British subject who commits any offence in Corea shall be tried and punished by the British judicial authorities according to the laws of Great Britain.
5. A Korean subject who commits in Corea any offence against British subjects shall be tried and punished by the Korean authorities according to the laws of Corea.
6. Any complaint against a British subject involving a penalty or confiscation by reason of any breach of the Treaty or of any Regulations made by virtue of its provisions, shall be brought before the British judicial authorities for decision, and any penalty imposed and all property confiscated in such cases shall belong to the Korean Government.
7. Goods which are seized by the Korean authorities shall be put under the

References.

Chefoo Agreement of 1876. Section 2, clause 1.

Japanese Supplementary Convention with Corea of the 30th August, 1883. Article II.

Admiral Wille's Treaty. Article II.

Admiral Wille's Treaty. Article IV. Chefoo Agreement of 1876. Section 2, clauses 2 and 3. Austro-Hungarian Treaty with Japan, 1869. Article V.

Austro-Hungarian Treaty with Japan. Article VII.

Draft of proposed Treaty with Corea.

Draft of Treaty.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the King of Corea, being sincerely desirous of establishing permanent relations of friendship and commerce between their respective dominions, have resolved to conclude a Treaty for that purpose, and have therefore named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India,

His Majesty the King of Corea,

who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, her heirs and successors, and His Majesty the King of Corea, his heirs and successors, and between their respective dominions and subjects who shall enjoy full security and protection for their persons and property within the dominions of the other.
2. In the case of differences arising between one of the High Contracting Parties and a third Power, the other High Contracting Party, if requested to do so, shall exert its good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement.

ARTICLE II.

1. The High Contracting Parties may each appoint a Diplomatic Representative or Consul-General to reside permanently or temporarily at the capital of the other, and may appoint Consuls or Vice-Consuls to reside at any or all of the ports of the other which are open to foreign com-

References.

Preamble to Admiral Wille's Treaty.

Proclamation of the 28th April, 1876, with Foreign Office Circular of the 20th May, 1876, instructing Her Majesty's Diplomatic Representatives to notify same to foreign Governments. Also Treaty with Portugal relating to Indian Possessions and draft Convention with Siam of the 11th August, 1886.

Admiral Wille's Treaty. Article I.

Treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856. British Treaty with Japan of the 26th August, 1858. Article I. British Treaty with China, Nanking, of the 26th August, 1842.

Admiral Wille's Treaty. Article I. United States' Treaty with Japan of the 29th July, 1858. Article II.

Admiral Wille's Treaty. Article II.

References.

Draft of Treaty.

cons of the Korean and the British Consular authorities, and shall be detained by the former until the British judicial authorities have given their decision. If this decision is in favour of the owner of the goods they shall be immediately placed at the Consul's disposal. In the case of perishable goods, the owner shall be allowed to receive them at once on depositing their value with the Korean authorities pending the decision of the British judicial authorities.

Admiral Willes' Treaty. Article IV.

8. In all cases, whether civil or criminal, tried either in Korean or British Courts in Korea, a properly authorized official of the nationality of the plaintiff or prosecutor shall be allowed to attend the hearing, and shall be treated with the courtesy due to his position. If or the plaintiff or the prosecutor shall be allowed to call and cross-examine witnesses, and to protest against the proceedings in case he is dissatisfied with them.

Admiral Willes' Treaty. Article X.

9. If a Korean subject who is charged with an offence against the laws of his country takes refuge on premises owned by a British subject, or on board a British merchant-ship, the British Consular authorities, on receiving an application from the Korean authorities, shall take steps to have such person arrested and handed over to them for trial.

Admiral Willes' Treaty. Article IV.

10. As soon as, in the judgment of the British Government, the Korean laws and judicial procedure have become so far modified as to obviate the objections which now exist to British jurisdiction, the right of extra-territorial jurisdiction, granted by this Treaty, shall be relinquished, and thereafter British subjects in Korea shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Korean authorities.

ARTICLE IV.

1. The ports and towns of Chemulpo, Pusan, and Wonsan, with the city of Man-yang and the town of Yang hwa eblo, or such other place on the Hangang river as may be deemed desirable, shall from the day on which this Treaty comes into operation be opened to British commerce.

2. At the above-named places British subjects shall have the right to lease or purchase land or houses, to erect dwellings, warehouses, factories, schools, hospitals, and places of worship, and to permanently reside. Land so acquired by British subjects shall be liable to the payment of the same land tax to the Korean Government as is levied on other ground in the

Admiral Willes' Protocol. June 3, 1882. Clause 1. Chinese Regulations for Trade with Korea. Article IV. Japanese Supplementary Convention with Korea of the 30th August, 1882. Clause 1. Admiral Willes' Treaty. Article VI.

All Treaties between foreign Powers and China and Japan.

References.

Draft of Treaty.

vicinity. The rent or price payable to the owner of the land shall be determined by mutual arrangement between the British Consular and Korean local authorities, when this is judged desirable, or they may leave it to the parties concerned to arrange the terms for themselves without any official interference.

Japanese Supplementary Treaty with Korea, 1876. Article III. British Treaty with Japan, 1858. Article III.

Japanese Supplementary Convention with Korea of 1892. Clause 1. British Treaty with China, Tientsin, 1858. Article IX. Chinese Regulations for Trade with Korea. Article IV.

Supplementary Treaty between Japan and Korea of the 24th August, 1876. Article VI. Practice at all open ports in Japan except Nagasaki. General practice in China and Japan.

Admiral Willes' Treaty, Article V. British Treaty with Japan, Article XIV.

ARTICLE V.

1. At each of the places open to foreign trade British subjects shall be at full liberty to import from any foreign port or any Korean open port to sell to or buy from any Korean subjects or others, and to export to any foreign or Korean open port all kinds of merchandise not pro-

References.

French Treaty with China, Tientsin, 1858, Article VII.
Draft Regulations of Trade proposed by Corea to Japan, forwarded in Sir H. Parker's despatch No. 91 of the 31st May, 1863, Article IV, clause 6.
All Treaties with China.

Draft Trade Regulations proposed by Corea to Japan. Article V, clause 2.

British Treaty with Japan of 1856, Article XVI.
Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article V.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Articles VII, VIII, and IX.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article VIII.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article V, last paragraph.
Draft Regulations of Trade proposed by Corea to Japan. Article IV, clause 1.
Japanese Regulations of Trade in Corea of the 24th August, 1876.

Rules of Trade, signed at Shanghai, 8th November, 1863, by Lord Elgin. Rule X, 2nd paragraph.

Draft of Treaty.

hibited by this Treaty on paying the duties of the Tariff annexed thereto.

They may freely transact their business with Korean subjects or others without the interference of Korean officials or other persons, and they may freely engage in any industrial occupation.

2. The owners of all goods imported from any foreign port, upon which the duty of the Tariff shall have been paid shall be entitled, on re-exporting the same to any foreign or any Korean open port at any time within twenty-four months of the date of importation, to receive a drawback certificate for the amount of such import duty. These drawback certificates shall either be paid by the Korean Customs on demand, or they shall be received in payment of duty at any Korean open port.

3. Half the duty paid on Korean goods when carried from one Korean open port to another shall be refunded on arrival at the port of destination.

4. All goods imported into Corea by British subjects, and on which the duty of the Tariff annexed to this Treaty shall have been paid, will not be subject to any additional tax, excise, or transit duty whatsoever, either at the open ports or in the interior of the kingdom.

5. The importations of opium, arms, and all munitions of war, and the exportation of silver is prohibited except under the express authority of the Korean Government.

6. Whenever the Government of Corea shall have reason to apprehend a scarcity of fuel within the kingdom, His Majesty the King of Corea may, by Decree, temporarily prohibit the exportation of grain to foreign countries from any or all of the Korean open ports, and such prohibition shall become binding on British subjects in Corea on the expiration of one month from the date on which it shall have been officially communicated by the Korean authorities to the British Consul at the port or ports concerned, but shall not remain longer in force than is absolutely necessary.

7. All British ships of more than 200 tons register shall pay tonnage dues at the rate of 20 cents (Mexican) per ton; and of 200 tons register, or under, at the rate of 10 cents (Mexican) per ton. One such payment will entitle a vessel to visit any or all of the open ports in Corea during a period of three months without further charge. All tonnage dues shall be approved for the purposes of erecting light-houses and beacons, and placing buoys on the Korean coasts, more especially at the

References.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Paragraph 2, British Treaty with Japan of 1856, Article III, paragraph 6.
Japanese Treaty with Corea of the 24th February, 1876.
Japanese Supplementary Treaty with Corea of the 24th August, 1876.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article III, paragraph 2.
Regulations of British Trade in Japan. Article II, paragraph 6.
Regulations of Japanese Trade in Corea. Article IX.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article III.
Austro-Hungarian Treaty with Japan. Article XVIII.

Trade, Shipwreck Conventions between Great Britain and other Powers.

Draft of Treaty.

approaches to the open ports, in detaching or otherwise improving the anchorage for foreign vessels and in providing facilities for the landing and shipment of cargo.

8. The Diplomatic Representative of Her Britannic Majesty's Government in Corea, in conjunction with the Korean Government, shall make such Trade, Customs, and Harbour Regulations as may be required to carry into effect and secure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty. The said Regulations may be modified from time to time by the British Diplomatic Representative in conjunction with the Korean Government.

ARTICLE VI.

Any British subject who smuggles, or attempts to smuggle, goods into any port or place not opened to foreign trade, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, with or without a fine not exceeding 1,000 dollars, or to a fine not exceeding that amount without imprisonment; and all such goods, together with the boats employed in transporting the same, shall be liable to confiscation. The Korean local authorities may seize such goods and boats, and may arrest any person concerned in such smuggling, or attempt to smuggle, and shall immediately forward the persons so arrested to the nearest British Consul, for trial by the proper British judicial authorities, and, if necessary, shall detain such goods or boats until the case shall have been finally adjudicated.

ARTICLE VII.

1. If a British ship be wrecked or stranded on the coast of Corea, the local authorities shall immediately take steps to protect the wreck and all persons on board from plunder and ill-treatment, and to render such other assistance as may be required. They shall at once inform the nearest British Consul of the occurrence, and shall furnish the shipwrecked persons, if necessary, with means of conveyance to the nearest British Consular station. The Consul shall have the right to proceed to the scene of the wreck.

2. All expenses incurred by the Government of Corea for the rescue, clothing, maintenance, and travelling of shipwrecked British subjects, for the recovery of the bodies of the drowned, for the medical treatment of the sick and injured, and for the burial of the dead, shall be repaid to the Korean Government by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty.

References.

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3. But the British Government shall not be responsible for the repayment of the expenses incurred in the recovery or preservation of a wrecked vessel or the property on board. All such expenses shall be a charge upon the property saved, and shall be paid by the parties interested therein upon receiving delivery of the same.

4. No charge shall be made by the Government of Corea for the expenses of the Government officers, police or local functionaries, who shall proceed to the wreck, for the travelling expenses of officers escorting the shipwrecked men, nor for the expenses of official correspondence. Such expenses shall be borne by the Korean Government.

5. Whenever British ships are compelled, by stress of weather or by want of fuel or provisions, to enter an unopened port in Corea, they shall be allowed to execute necessary repairs, and to obtain wood, coal, and other supplies. All such expenses shall be defrayed by the master of the vessel.

ARTICLE VIII.

The ships of war of each country respectively shall be at liberty to visit all the ports of the other. They shall enjoy every facility for procuring supplies of all kinds, or for making necessary repairs, and shall not be liable to the payment of duties or port charges of any kind.

ARTICLE IX.

The coasts of Corea, being hitherto imperfectly surveyed, are dangerous to vessels approaching them, and in order to prepare charts showing the position of islands, rocks, and reefs, as well as the depth of water, vessels of the British Government may survey the said coasts.

ARTICLE X.

Supplies of all kinds, for the use of the British navy, may be landed at the open ports of Corea, and stored in the custody of a British officer without the payment of any duty. But if any such supplies are sold, the purchaser shall pay the proper duty to the Korean authorities.

ARTICLE XI.

1. British subjects in Corea shall be allowed to employ Korean subjects as interpreters, teachers, or servants, or in

References.

and Corea of the 24th August, 1876. Article V. Austro-Hungarian Treaty with Japan. Article XV.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article XI.

Draft of Treaty.

any other lawful capacity, without interference from the Korean authorities, and no restrictions shall be placed upon the employment of British subjects by Korean subjects in any lawful capacity.

2. Subjects of either nationality who may proceed to the country of the other to study its language, literature, laws, arts, or industries shall be afforded every reasonable facility for doing so.

ARTICLE XIII.

1. It is hereby stipulated that the Government, public officers, and subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall, from the day on which this Treaty comes into operation, participate in all privileges, immunities, and advantages which shall then have been granted or may thereafter be granted by His Majesty the King of Corea to the Government, public officers, or subjects of any other Power.

2. In like manner the Government, public officers, and subjects of the King of Corea shall participate in all the privileges, immunities, and advantages which shall then or which may thereafter be granted within Her Majesty's dominions to the Government, public officers, or subjects of any other Power.

ARTICLE XIII.

This Treaty is drawn up in the English, Chinese, and Korean languages, all of which versions have the same meaning, but in order to prevent dispute as to interpretation it is hereby agreed that, as English is the European language best known in Eastern Asia, the English text shall be considered as the original.

ARTICLE XIV.

Ten years from the date on which this Treaty shall come into operation, either of the High Contracting Parties may, on giving one year's previous notice to the other, demand a revision of the Treaty or of the Tariff annexed thereto, with a view to the insertion therein by mutual consent of such modifications as experience shall prove to be desirable.

ARTICLE XV.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and by His Majesty the King of Corea, under their hands and seals. The ratifications shall be exchanged at Hanjang within months, or at

References.

and Corea of the 24th August, 1876. Article V. Austro-Hungarian Treaty with Japan. Article XV.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article XI.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article XIV. All Treaties with China and Japan.

Peruvian Treaty with China of 1874. Article XVII.

Austro-Hungarian Treaty with Japan of 1860. Article XIII.

Danish Treaty with China of 1868. Article 1.

British Treaty with China of 1868. Article 1.

Admiral Wilkes' Treaty. Article XII.

British Treaty with Japan of 1858. Article XXXII.

References.

Draft of Treaty.

soon as possible, and the Treaty, which shall be published by both Governments, shall come into operation on the day on which the exchange takes place.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done in triplicate at (Hanyang), this 1 day of _____, in the year 1888, corresponding to the _____ month of the year of the Korean era.

Draft Regulations of Treaty.

I.—Entrance and Clearance of Vessels.

WITHIN forty-eight hours (Sundays excepted) after the arrival of a British ship in a Korean port, the master or agent shall deliver to the Korean Custom-house authorities the receipt of the British Consul showing that he has deposited all the ship's papers at the British Consulate; and he shall then make an entry of his ship by handing in a written paper stating the name of the ship, of the port from which she comes, of her master, the names of her passengers, if any, her tonnage, and the number of her crew, which paper shall be certified by the master to be a true statement, and shall be signed by him. He shall at the same time deposit a written manifest of the cargo, setting forth the marks and numbers of the packages and their contents as they are described in the bills of lading, with the names of the persons to whom they are consigned, and shall sign his name to the same. When a vessel has been duly entered the Customs authorities will issue a permit to open hatches, which shall be exhibited to the Customs officer on board.

2. If any error is discovered in the manifest it may be corrected within twenty-four hours (Sundays excepted) of its being handed in without the payment of any fee, but for any alteration or past entry to the manifest made after that time a fee of 50 dollars shall be paid.

3. Any master who shall neglect to enter his vessel at the Korean Custom-house within the time fixed by this Regulation shall pay a penalty of 50 dollars for every day that he shall so neglect to enter his ship.

4. Any vessel which remains in port for less than two days (exclusive of Sundays), and does not open her hatches, also any vessel requiring only supplies or driven into port by stress of weather, shall not be required to enter or to pay tonnage dues so long as such vessel does not engage in trade.

5. The master of any vessel wishing to clear shall give twenty-four hours' notice to the Customs authorities, who shall then return to the master the Consul's receipt for the ship's papers. The Consul shall not return the ship's papers to the master of the vessel until the latter produces a clearance in due form from the Customs authorities.

6. Should any ship leave the port without clearing outwards in the manner above prescribed, the master shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding _____ dollars.

7. British mail-steamers may enter and clear on the same day, and they shall not be required to hand in a manifest except for such goods and passengers as are to be landed at that port.

II.—Landing and Shipping Cargo and Payment of Duties.

1. The importer of any goods who desires to land them shall make and sign an application to that effect at the custom-house, stating his own name, the name of the

ship in which the goods have been imported, the marks, numbers, and contents of the packages and their values. The Custom-house authorities may demand the production of the original invoices of such consignment of merchandise, and if it is not produced, or its absence is not satisfactorily accounted for, the permit to land the goods may be refused.

2. After the duties have been paid, the Custom-house authorities shall issue a permit to land the goods.

3. All goods so entered may be examined by the Custom-house officers, and for this purpose the importer shall bring them to the Customs jetty for examination. On opening the packages the Custom-house officers shall not injure the goods, nor shall they give any unnecessary annoyance. After examination they shall restore the goods to their original condition in the packages (so far as may be practicable), and such examination shall be made without unreasonable delay.

4. Should the Customs authorities consider the value of any goods paying an ad valorem duty as declared by the importer or exporter insufficient, they shall call upon the importer or exporter to pay duty on the value determined by an appraiser to be made by the Customs appraiser; but should the importer or exporter be dissatisfied with that appraisement, he shall, within twenty-four hours, state his reasons for such dissatisfaction to the Superintendent of Customs, and shall appoint an appraiser of his own to make a re-appraisement, and declare the value of the goods as determined by such re-appraisement. The Superintendent of Customs will then, at his option, either assess the duty on the value determined by this re-appraisement or will purchase the goods from the importer or exporter at the price thus determined, with the addition of 5 per cent. In the latter case the purchase-money shall be paid to the importer or exporter within ten days from the date on which he has declared the value determined by his own appraiser.

5. Upon all goods damaged on the voyage of importation, a fair reduction of duty shall be allowed proportionate to their deterioration. If any dispute arise as to the amount of such reduction, they shall be settled in the manner pointed out in the preceding clause.

6. All goods intended to be exported shall be written at the Korean custom-house before they are shipped. The entry shall be in writing, and shall state the name of the ship by which the goods are to be exported, the marks and numbers of the packages, and the quantity, description, and value of the contents. The exporter shall certify, in writing, that the entry is a true account of all the goods contained therein, and shall sign his name thereto.

7. No goods shall be landed or shipped at other places than those fixed by the Korean Customs authorities, or between the hours of sunset and sunrise, or on holidays, without the special permission of the Custom-house authorities.

8. No entry shall be required in the case of the baggage of passengers, which may be landed or shipped at any time after examination by the Customs officers.

III.—Preference of the Revenue.

1. The Korean Government shall have the right to place Custom-house officers on board any British merchant-vessel in their ports. All such Customs officers shall be treated with civility, and such reasonable accommodation shall be allotted to them as the ship affords.

2. The hatches, and all other places of entrance into that part of the ship where the cargo is stowed, may be secured by Korean officers between the hours of sunset and sunrise, and on holidays, by fixing seals, locks, or other fastenings; and if any person shall without due permission open any entrance that has been so secured, or shall break any seal, lock, or other fastening that has been affixed by the Korean Custom-house officers, not only the person so offending, but the master of the ship, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 100 dollars.

3. All goods shipped on board or discharged from a British ship, or attempted to be so shipped or discharged without having been duly entered at the custom-house in the manner above provided, shall be liable to confiscation at the discretion of the Court, or the Court may impose a fine not exceeding 500 dollars, with or without imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, upon any British subject concerned in the said offence.

4. Packages which contain goods of a different description to those described in the import or export permit-application, and packages containing prohibited goods, shall be liable to confiscation.

together with all other privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by Diplomatic or Consular functionaries in other countries.

2. The Diplomatic Representative and the Consular functionaries of each Power and the members of their official establishments shall have the right to travel freely in any part of the dominions of the other, and the Korean authorities shall furnish passports to such British officers travelling in Korea, and shall provide such escort for their protection as may be necessary.

3. The Consular officers of both countries shall exercise their functions on receipt of due authorization from the Sovereign or Government of the country in which they respectively reside, and shall not be permitted to engage in trade.

III.—1. Jurisdiction over the persons and property of British subjects in Korea shall be vested exclusively in the duly authorized British judicial authorities, who shall hear and determine all cases brought against British subjects by any British or other foreign subject or citizen without the intervention of the Korean authorities.

2. If the Korean authorities or a Korean subject make any charge or complaint against a British subject in Korea, the case shall be heard and decided by the British judicial authorities.

3. If the British authorities or a British subject make any charge or complaint against a Korean subject in Korea, the case shall be heard and decided by the Korean authorities.

4. A British subject who commits any offence in Korea shall be tried and punished by the British judicial authorities according to the laws of Great Britain.

5. A Korean subject who commits in Korea any offence against a British subject shall be tried and punished by the Korean authorities according to the laws of Korea.

6. Any complaint against a British subject involving a penalty or confiscation by reason of any breach either of this Treaty or of any Regulation annexed thereto, or of any Regulation that may hereafter be made in virtue of its provisions, shall be brought before the British judicial authorities for decision, and any penalty imposed, and all property confiscated in such cases, shall belong to the Korean Government.

7. British goods, when seized by the Korean authorities at an open port, shall be put under the seals of the Korean and the British Consular authorities, and shall be detained by the former until the British judicial authorities shall have given their decision. If this decision is in favour of the owner of the goods, they shall be immediately placed at the Consul's disposal. But the owner shall be allowed to receive them at once on depositing their value with the

TREATY of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea.—Signed at Hanyang, November 26, 1883.

[Ratifications exchanged at Hanyang, April 29, 1884.]

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the King of Korea, being sincerely desirous of establishing permanent relations of friendship and commerce between their respective dominions, have resolved to conclude a Treaty for that purpose, and have therefore named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, Sir Harry Smith Parkes, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China;

His Majesty the King of Korea, Min Yŏng-Mok, President of His Majesty's Foreign Office, a Dignitary of the First Rank, Senior Vice-President of the Council of State, Member of His Majesty's Privy Council, and Junior Guardian of the Crown Prince;

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

ART. I.—1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, her heirs and successors, and His Majesty the King of Korea, his heirs and successors, and between their respective dominions and subjects, who shall enjoy full security and protection for their persons and property within the dominions of the other.

2. In case of differences arising between one of the High Contracting Parties and a third Power, the other High Contracting Party, if requested to do so, shall exert its good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement.

II.—1. The High Contracting Parties may each appoint a Diplomatic Representative to reside permanently or temporarily at the capital of the other, and may appoint a Consul-General, Consuls, or Vice-Consuls, to reside at any or all of the ports or places of the other which are open to foreign commerce. The Diplomatic Representatives and Consular functionaries of both countries shall freely enjoy the same facilities for communication, personally or in writing, with the authorities of the country where they respectively reside,

Corean authorities pending the decision of the British judicial authorities.

8. In all cases, whether civil or criminal, tried either in Corean or British Courts in Corean, a properly authorized official of the nationality of the plaintiff or prosecutor shall be allowed to attend the hearing and shall be treated with the courtesy due to his position. He shall be allowed, whenever he thinks it necessary, to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to protest against the proceedings or decision.

9. If a Corean subject who is charged with an offence against the laws of his country takes refuge on premises occupied by a British subject, or on board a British merchant-vessel, the British Consular authorities, on receiving an application from the Corean authorities, shall take steps to have such person arrested and handed over to the latter for trial. But, without the consent of the proper British Consular authority, no Corean officer shall enter the premises of any British subject without his consent, or go on board any British ship without the consent of the officer in charge.

10. On the demand of any competent British Consular authority, the Corean authorities shall arrest and deliver to the former any British subject charged with a criminal offence, and any deserter from a British ship of war or merchant-vessel.

IV.*—1. The ports of Chemulpo (Jenchuan), Wönsan (Gensan), and Pusan (Fusan), or, if the latter port should not be approved, then such other port as may be selected in its neighbourhood, together with the city of Hanyang and of the town of Yanghwa Chin, or such other place in that neighbourhood as may be deemed desirable, shall, from the day on which this Treaty comes into operation, be opened to British commerce.

2. At the above-named places British subjects shall have the right to rent or to purchase land or houses, and to erect dwellings, warehouses, and factories. They shall be allowed the free exercise of their religion. All arrangements for the selection, determination of the limits, and laying out of the sites of the foreign Settlements, and for the sale of land at the various ports and places in Corean open to foreign trade, shall be made by the Corean authorities in conjunction with the competent foreign authorities.

3. These sites shall be purchased from the owners and prepared for occupation by the Corean Government, and the expense thus incurred shall be a first charge on the proceeds of the sale of the land. The yearly rental agreed upon by the Corean authorities in conjunction with the foreign authorities shall be paid to the former, who shall retain a fixed amount thereof as a fair equivalent for the land

tax, and the remainder, together with any balance left from the proceeds of land sales, shall belong to a municipal fund to be administered by a Council, the constitution of which shall be determined hereafter by the Corean authorities in conjunction with the competent foreign authorities.

4. British subjects may rent or purchase land or houses beyond the limits of the foreign Settlements, and within a distance of 10 Corean \mathring{a} from the same. But all land so occupied shall be subject to such conditions as to the observance of Corean local Regulations and payment of land tax as the Corean authorities may see fit to impose.

5. The Corean authorities will set apart, free of cost, at each of the places open to trade, a suitable piece of ground as a foreign cemetery, upon which no rent, land tax, or other charges shall be payable, and the management of which shall be left to the Municipal Council above mentioned.

6. British subjects shall be allowed to go where they please without passports within a distance of 100 Corean \mathring{a} from any of the ports and places open to trade, or within such limits as may be agreed upon between the competent authorities of both countries. British subjects are also authorized to travel in Corean for pleasure or for purposes of trade, to transport and sell goods of all kinds, except books and other printed matter disapproved of by the Corean Government, and to purchase native produce in all parts of the country under passports which will be issued by their Consuls and countersigned or sealed by the Corean local authorities. These passports, if demanded, must be produced for examination in the districts passed through. If the passport be not irregular, the bearer will be allowed to proceed, and he shall be at liberty to procure such means of transport as he may require. Any British subject travelling beyond the limits above named without a passport, or committing when in the interior any offence, shall be arrested and handed over to the nearest British Consul for punishment. Travelling without a passport beyond the said limits will render the offender liable to a fine not exceeding 100 Mexican dollars, with or without imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month.

7. British subjects in Corean shall be amenable to such municipal, police, and other Regulations for the maintenance of peace, order, and good government as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the two countries.

V.—1. At each of the ports or places open to foreign trade, British subjects shall be at full liberty to import from any foreign port, or from any Corean open port, to sell to, or to buy from, any Corean subjects or others, and to export to any foreign or Corean

on paying the duties of the Tariff annexed thereto. They may freely transact their business with Korean subjects or others without the intervention of Korean officials or other persons, and they may freely engage in any industrial occupation.

2. The owners or consignees of all goods imported from any foreign port upon which the duty of the aforesaid Tariff shall have been paid shall be entitled, on re-exporting the same to any foreign port at any time within 13 Korean months from the date of importation, to receive a drawback certificate for the amount of such import duty, provided that the original packages containing such goods remain intact. These drawback certificates shall either be redeemed by the Korean Customs on demand, or they shall be received in payment of duty at any Korean open port.

3. The duty paid on Korean goods, when carried from one Korean open port to another, shall be refunded at the port of shipment on production of a Customs certificate showing that the goods have arrived at the port of destination, or on satisfactory proof being produced of the loss of the goods by shipwreck.

4. All goods imported into Korea by British subjects, and on which the duty of the Tariff annexed to this Treaty shall have been paid, may be conveyed to any Korean open port free of duty, and, when transported into the interior, shall not be subject to any additional tax, excise or transit duty whatsoever in any part of the country. In like manner, full freedom shall be allowed for the transport to the open ports of all Korean commodities intended for exportation, and such commodities shall not, either at the place of production, or when being conveyed from any part of Korea to any of the open ports, be subject to the payment of any tax, excise or transit duty whatsoever.

5. The Korean Government may charter British merchant-vessels for the conveyance of goods or passengers to unopened ports in Korea, and Korean subjects shall have the same right, subject to the approval of their own authorities.

6. Whenever the Government of Korea shall have reason to apprehend a scarcity of food within the kingdom, His Majesty the King of Korea may, by Decree, temporarily prohibit the export of grain to foreign countries from any or all of the Korean open ports, and such prohibition shall become binding on British subjects in Korea on the expiration of one month from the date on which it shall have been officially communicated by the Korean authorities to the British Consul at the port concerned, but shall not remain longer in force than is absolutely necessary.

7. All British ships shall pay tonnage dues at the rate of 30 cents. (Mexican) per register ton. One such payment will entitle a vessel

months without further charge. All tonnage dues shall be appropriated for the purposes of erecting lighthouses and beacons, and placing buoys on the Korean coast, more especially at the approaches to the open ports, and in deepening or otherwise improving the anchorages. No tonnage dues shall be charged on boats employed at the open ports in landing or shipping cargo.

8. In order to carry into effect and secure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty, it is hereby agreed that the Tariff and Trade Regulations hereto annexed shall come into operation simultaneously with this Treaty. The competent authorities of the two countries may, from time to time, revise the said Regulations with a view to the insertion therein, by mutual consent, of such modifications or additions as experience shall prove to be expedient.

VI. Any British subject who smuggles, or attempts to smuggle, goods into any Korean port or place not open to foreign trade shall forfeit twice the value of such goods, and the goods shall be confiscated. The Korean local authorities may seize such goods, and may arrest any British subject concerned in such smuggling or attempt to smuggle. They shall immediately forward any person so arrested to the nearest British Consul for trial by the proper British judicial authority, and may detain such goods until the case shall have been finally adjudicated.

VII.—1. If a British ship be wrecked or stranded on the coast of Korea, the local authorities shall immediately take such steps to protect the ship and her cargo from plunder, and all the persons belonging to her from ill-treatment, and to render such other assistance as may be required. They shall at once inform the nearest British Consul of the occurrence, and shall furnish the shipwrecked persons, if necessary, with means of conveyance to the nearest open port.

2. All expenses incurred by the Government of Korea for the rescue, clothing, maintenance, and travelling of shipwrecked British subjects, for the recovery of the bodies of the drowned, for the medical treatment of the sick and injured, and for the burial of the dead, shall be repaid by the British Government to that of Korea.

3. The British Government shall not be responsible for the repayment of the expenses incurred in the recovery or preservation of a wrecked vessel, or the property belonging to her. All such expenses shall be a charge upon the property saved, and shall be paid by the parties interested therein upon receiving delivery of the same.

4. No charge shall be made by the Government of Korea for the expenses of the Government officers, local functionaries, or police who shall proceed to the wreck, for the travelling expenses of officers

correspondence. Such expenses shall be borne by the Korean Government.

5. Any British merchant-ship compelled by stress of weather or by want of fuel or provisions to enter an unopened port in Corea shall be allowed to execute repairs, and to obtain necessary supplies. All such expenses shall be defrayed by the master of the vessel.

VIII.—1. The ships of war of each country shall be at liberty to visit all the ports of the other. They shall enjoy every facility for procuring supplies of all kinds, or for making repairs, and shall not be subject to Trade or Harbour Regulations, nor be liable to the payment of duties or port charges of any kind.

2. When British ships of war visit unopened ports in Corea, the officers and men may land, but shall not proceed into the interior unless they are provided with passports.

3. Supplies of all kinds for the use of the British navy may be landed at the open ports of Corea, and stored in the custody of a British officer, without the payment of any duty. But if any such supplies are sold, the purchaser shall pay the proper duty to the Korean authorities.

4. The Korean Government will afford all the facilities in their power to ships belonging to the British Government which may be engaged in making surveys in Korean waters.

IX.—1. The British authorities and British subjects in Corea shall be allowed to employ Korean subjects as teachers, interpreters, servants, or in any other lawful capacity, without any restriction on the part of the Korean authorities; and, in like manner, no restrictions shall be placed upon the employment of British subjects by Korean authorities and subjects in any lawful capacity.

2. Subjects of either nationality who may proceed to the country or for the purpose of study its language, literature, laws, arts, or industries, shall be afforded every reasonable facility for doing so.

X. It is hereby stipulated that the Government, public officers, and subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall, from the day on which this Treaty comes into operation, participate in all privileges, immunities, and advantages, especially in relation to import or export duties on goods and manufactures, which shall then have been granted or may thereafter be granted by His Majesty the King of Corea to the Government, public officers, or subjects of any other Power.

XI. Ten years from the date on which this Treaty shall come into operation, either of the High Contracting Parties may, on giving one year's previous notice to the other, demand a revision of the Treaty or of the Tariff annexed thereto, with a view to the insertion

therein, by mutual consent, of such modifications as experience shall prove to be desirable.

XII.—1. This Treaty is drawn up in the English and Chinese languages, both of which versions have the same meaning, but it is hereby agreed that any difference which may arise as to interpretation shall be determined by reference to the English text.

2. For the present all official communications addressed by the British authorities to those of Corea shall be accompanied by a translation into Chinese.

XIII. The present Treaty shall be ratified by Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and by His Majesty the King of Corea, under their hands and seals; the ratifications shall be exchanged at Hanyang (Sŏul) as soon as possible, or at latest within one year from the date of signature, and the Treaty, which shall be published by both Governments, shall come into operation on the day on which the ratifications are exchanged.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries above named have signed the present Treaty, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done in triplicate at Hanyang, this 26th day of November in the year 1883, corresponding to the 27th day of the 10th month of the 492nd year of the Korean era, being the 9th year of the Chinese reign Kuang Hsu.

(L.S.) HARRY S. PARKES.

(L.S.) Signature in Chinese of Mrs Yŏng-Mox,
the Korean Plenipotentiary.

*REGULATIONS under which British Trade is to be conducted
in Corea.*

I.—*Entrance and Clearance of Vessels.*

1. Within 48 hours (exclusive of Sundays and holidays) after the arrival of a British ship in a Korean port, the master shall deliver to the Korean Customs authorities the receipt of the British Consul showing that he has deposited the ship's papers at the British Consulate, and he shall then make an entry of his ship by handing in a written paper stating the name of the ship, of the port from which she comes, of her master, the number, and, if required, the names of her passengers, her tonnage, and the number of her crew, which paper shall be certified by the master to be a true statement, and shall be signed by him. He shall, at the same time, deposit a written manifest of his cargo, setting forth the marks and numbers of the packages and their contents as they are described in the bills of

lading, with the names of the persons to whom they are consigned. The master shall certify that this description is correct, and shall sign his name to the same. When a vessel has been duly entered, the Customs authorities will issue a permit to open hatches, which shall be exhibited to the Customs officer on board. Breaking bulk without having obtained such permission will render the master liable to a fine not exceeding 100 Mexican dollars.

2. If any error is discovered in the manifest, it may be corrected within 24 hours (exclusive of Sundays and holidays) of its being handed in, without the payment of any fee; but for any alteration or post entry to the manifest made after that time a fee of 5 Mexican dollars shall be paid.

3. Any master who shall neglect to enter his vessel at the Korean Custom-house within the time fixed by this Regulation shall pay a penalty not exceeding 50 Mexican dollars for every 24 hours that he shall so neglect to enter his ship.

4. Any British vessel which remains in port for less than 48 hours (exclusive of Sundays and holidays) and does not open her hatches, also any vessel driven into port by stress of weather, or only in want of supplies, shall not be required to enter or to pay tonnage dues so long as such vessel does not engage in trade.

5. When the master of a vessel wishes to clear, he shall hand in to the Customs authorities an export manifest containing similar particulars to those given in the import manifest. The Customs authorities will then issue a clearance certificate and return the Consul's receipt for the ship's papers. These documents must be handed into the Consulate before the ship's papers are returned to the master.

6. Should any ship leave the port without clearing outwards in the manner above prescribed, the master shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 200 Mexican dollars.

7. British steamers may enter and clear on the same day, and they shall not be required to hand in a manifest except for such goods as are to be landed or transhipped at the port of entry.

II.—*Landing and Shipping of Cargo, and Payment of Duties.*

1. The importer of any goods who desires to land them shall make and sign an application to that effect at the Custom-house, stating his own name, the name of the ship in which the goods have been imported, the marks, numbers, and contents of the packages and their values, and declaring that this statement is correct. The Customs authorities may demand the production of the invoice of each consignment of merchandise. If it is not produced, or if its correctness is not satisfactorily accounted for, the owner shall be allowed

to land his goods on payment of double the Tariff duty, but the surplus duty so levied shall be refunded on the production of the invoice.

2. All goods so entered may be examined by the Customs officers at the places appointed for the purpose. Such examination shall be made without delay or injury to the merchandise, and the packages shall be at once restored by the Customs authorities to their original condition, in so far as may be practicable.

3. Should the Customs authorities consider the value of any goods paying an *ad valorem* duty as declared by the importer or exporter insufficient, they shall call upon him to pay duty on the value determined by an appraisement to be made by the Customs appraiser. But should the importer or exporter be dissatisfied with that appraisement, he shall, within 24 hours (exclusive of Sundays and holidays), state his reasons for such dissatisfaction to the Commissioner of Customs, and shall appoint an appraiser of his own to make a re-appraisement. He shall then declare the value of the goods as determined by such re-appraisement. The Commissioner of Customs will thereupon, at his option, either assess the duty on the value determined by this re-appraisement, or will purchase the goods from the importer or exporter at the price thus determined, with the addition of 5 per cent. In the latter case the purchase-money shall be paid to the importer or exporter within five days from the date on which he has declared the value determined by his own appraiser.

4. Upon all goods damaged on the voyage of importation a fair reduction of duty shall be allowed, proportionate to their deterioration. If any disputes arise as to the amount of such reduction, they shall be settled in the manner pointed out in the preceding clause.

5. All goods intended to be exported shall be entered at the Korean Custom-house before they are shipped. The application to ship shall be made in writing, and shall state the name of the vessel by which the goods are to be exported, the marks and number of the packages, and the quantity, description, and value of the contents. The exporter shall certify in writing that the application gives a true account of all the goods contained therein, and shall sign his name thereto.

6. No goods shall be landed or shipped at other places than those fixed by the Korean Customs authorities, or between the hours of sunset and sunrise, or on Sundays or holidays, without the special permission of the Customs authorities, who will be entitled to reasonable fees for the extra duty thus performed.

7. Claims by importers or exporters for duties paid in excess, or

paid, shall be entertained only when made within thirty days from the date of payment.

8. No entry will be required in the case of provisions for the use of British ships, their crews and passengers, nor for the baggage of the latter which may be landed or shipped at any time after examination by the Customs officers.

9. Vessels needing repairs may land their cargo for that purpose without the payment of duty. All goods so landed shall remain in charge of the Korean authorities, and all just charges for storage, labour, and supervision shall be paid by the master. But if any portion of such cargo be sold, the duties of the Tariff shall be paid on the portion so disposed of.

10. Any person desiring to tranship cargo shall obtain a permit from the Customs authorities before doing so.

III.—Protection of the Revenue.

1. The Customs authorities shall have the right to place Customs officers on board any British merchant-vessel in their ports. All such Customs officers shall have access to all parts of the ship in which cargo is stowed. They shall be treated with civility, and such reasonable accommodation shall be allotted to them as the ship affords.

2. The hatches and all other places of entrance into that part of the ship where cargo is stowed may be secured by the Korean Customs officers between the hours of sunset and sunrise, and on Sundays and holidays, by affixing seals, locks, or other fastenings; and if any person shall, without due permission, wilfully open any entrance that has been so secured, or break any seal, lock, or other fastening that has been affixed by the Korean Customs officers, not only the person so offending, but the master of the ship also, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 100 Mexican dollars.

3. Any British subject who ships, or attempts to ship, or discharges, or attempts to discharge, goods which have not been duly entered at the custom-house in the manner above provided, or packages containing goods different from those described in the import or export permit application, or prohibited goods, shall forfeit twice the value of such goods, and the goods shall be confiscated.

4. Any person signing a false declaration or certificate with the intent to defraud the revenue of Korea shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 200 Mexican dollars.

5. Any violation of any provision of these Regulations, to which no penalty is specially attached herein, may be punished by a fine not exceeding 100 Mexican dollars.

other communications addressed to the Korean Customs authorities, may be written in the English language.

(L.S.) HARRY S. PARKES.

(L.S.) Signature in Chinese of MIN YONG-MOK,
the Korean Plenipotentiary.

IMPORT TARIFF.

[Classified according to Rate of Duty.]

CLASS I.

Duty-free Goods.

Agricultural implements.
Books, maps, and charts.
Bullion, being gold and silver refined.
Coins, gold and silver.
Fire engines.
Models of inventions.
Packing bags, packing matting, tea-lead, and ropes for packing goods.
Plants, trees, and shrubs, of all kinds.
Samples in reasonable quantities.
Scientific instruments, as physical, mathematical, meteorological, and surgical instruments, and their appliances.
Travellers' baggage.
Types, new and old.

CLASS II.

Import Goods subject to an ad valorem
Duty of 5 per cent.

Alum.
Anchors and chains.
Bark for tanning.
Bamboo, split or not.
Beans, peas, and pulse, all kinds.
Bones.
Bricks and tiles.
Camphor, crude.
Coal and coke.
Cotton, raw.
Drugs and medicines, all kinds.
Fish, fresh.
Flax, hemp, and jute.
Flints.

Fruit, fresh, all kinds.
Glue.
Grain and corn, all kinds.
Guano and manures, all kinds.
Hides and skins, raw and undressed.
Horns and hoofs, all kinds not otherwise provided for.
Kerosene and petroleum and other mineral oils.
Lanterns, paper.
Lime.
Matches.
Matting, floor, Chinese and Japanese, coir, &c., common qualities.
Meat fresh.
Metals, all kinds, in pig, block, ingot, slab, bar, rod, plate, sheet, hoop, strip, band, and flat, T and angle iron, old and scrap iron.
Oil cake.
Oil, wood (*T'ung yu*).
Paper, common qualities.
Pepper, unground.
Pitch and tar.
Rattans, split or not.
Scales and balances.
Seeds, all kinds.
Soap, common qualities.
Soy, Chinese and Japanese.
Twine and thread, all kinds excepting: in silk.
Umbrellas, paper.
Vegetables, fresh, dried, and salted.
Wool, sheep's, raw.
Yarns, all kinds, in cotton, wool, hemp, &c.
All unenumerated articles, raw or unmanufactured.

CLASS III.

Import Goods subject to an ad valorem Duty of 7½ per cent.

Beverages, such as lemonade, ginger beer, soda and mineral waters.
 Blankets and rugs.
 Buttons, buckles, hooks and eyes, &c.
 Candles.
 Canvas.
 Carpets of jute, hemp, or felt, tapestry.
 Charcoal.
 Chemicals, all kinds.
 Cocoons.
 Cement, as Portland and other kinds.
 Cordage and rope, all kinds and sizes.
 Clothing and wearing apparel of all kinds, hats, boots, shoes, &c.
 Cotton manufactures, all kinds.
 Cotton and woollen mixtures, all kinds.
 Cotton and silk mixtures, all kinds.
 Dyes, colours, and paints, paint oils, and materials used for mixing paints.
 Earthenware.
 Fans.
 Feathers.
 Felt.
 Fish, dried and salted.
 Floor rugs, all kinds.
 Foil, tin, copper, and all other kinds except gold and silver.
 Fruits, dried, salted, or preserved.
 Gamboge.
 Glass, window, plain, and coloured, all qualities.
 Grass cloth, and all textiles in hemp, jute, &c.
 Hair, all kinds except human.
 Hides and skins, tanned and dressed.
 Isinglass, all kinds.
 Lamps, all kinds.
 Leather, all ordinary kinds, plain.
 Linen, linen and cotton, linen and woollen, linen and silk mixtures, grey, white, or printed.
 Matting, superior quality, Japanese "tatami," &c.

Metals, all kinds in pipe and tube, corrugated or galvanized, wire, steel, tin plates, nickel, platinum, quicksilver, German silver, tutenagnon, or white copper, yellow metal, unrefined gold and silver.
 Metal manufactures, all kinds, as nails, screws, tools, machinery, railway plant, and hardware.
 Mosquito netting not made of silk.
 Needles and pins.
 Oils, vegetable, all kinds.
 Oil and floor cloth, all kinds.
 Paper, all kinds, not otherwise provided for.
 Planks, soft wood.
 Porcelain, common quality.
 Rosin.
 Salt.
 Sapan wood.
 Sea products, as seaweed, bêche de mer, &c.
 Silk, raw, reeled, thrown floss or waste.
 Silk manufactures not otherwise provided for.
 Spectacles.
 Spirits in jars.
 Stationery and writing materials of all kinds, blank books, &c.
 Stones and slate, cut and dressed.
 Sugar (brown and white), all qualities, molasses, and syrups.
 Sulphur.
 Table stores, all kinds, and preserved provisions.
 Tallow.
 Tea.
 Umbrellas, cotton.
 Umbrella frames.
 Varnish.
 Vermicelli.
 Wax, bees' or vegetable.
 Wax cloth.
 Woods and timber, soft.
 Woollen manufactures, all kinds.
 Woollen and silk mixtures, all kinds.
 All unenumerated articles partly manufactured.

CLASS IV.

Import Goods subject to an ad valorem Duty of 10 per cent.

Beer, porter, and cider.
 Camphor, refined.
 Carmine.
 Carpets, superior qualities, as Brussels, Kidderminster, and other kinds not enumerated.
 Clocks and parts thereof.
 Clothing made wholly of silk.
 Confectioneries and sweetmeats, all kinds.
 Explosives used for mining, &c. (imported under special permit).
 Foil, gold and silver.
 Furniture of all kinds.
 Glass, plate, silvered or unsilvered, framed or unframed.
 Glassware, all kinds.
 Hair, human.
 India-rubber, manufactured or not.
 Leather, superior kinds, or stamped, figured, or coloured.
 Leather manufactures, all kinds.
 Lacquered ware, common.
 Materials for seals, &c.
 Musical boxes.
 Musical instruments, all kinds.
 Mosquito netting made of silk.
 Paper, coloured, fancy, wall and hanging.
 Photographic apparatus.
 Planks, hardwood.
 Plated ware, all kinds.
 Pictures, prints, photographs, engravings, all kinds, framed or unframed.
 Porcelain, superior quality.
 Saddlery and harness.
 Silk thread, or floss silk in skein.
 Silk manufactures, as gauze, crape, Japanese amber lustrings, satins, satin damasks, figured satins, Japanese white silk ("habutai").
 Soap, superior qualities.
 Sugar candy.
 Telescopes and binocular glasses.
 Tooth powder.
 Trunks and portmanteaux.

Vermilion.
 Watches and parts thereof in common metal, nickel, or silver.
 Wines in wood or bottle, all kinds.
 Wood or timber, hard.
 All unenumerated articles completely manufactured.

CLASS V.

Import Goods subject to an ad valorem Duty of 20 per cent.

Amber.
 Arms, fire-arms, fowling-pieces, &c., imported under special permit.
 Artificial flowers.
 Birds' nests.
 Carpets, velvet.
 Carriages.
 Cochineal.
 Coral, manufactured or not.
 Embroideries in gold, silver, or silk.
 Enamel-ware.
 Fireworks.
 Furs, superior, as sable, sea-otter, seal, otter, beaver, &c.
 Ginseng, red, white, crude, and clarified.
 Hair ornaments, gold and silver.
 Incense, sticks.
 Ivory, manufactured or not.
 Jade-ware.
 Jewellery, real or imitation.
 Lacquered ware, superior.
 Musk.
 Pearls.
 Perfumes and scents.
 Plate, gold and silver.
 Precious stones.
 Rhinoceros horns.
 Scented woods, all kinds.
 Spices, all kinds.
 Spirits and liqueurs in wood or bottle, all kinds.
 Tobacco, all forms and kinds.
 Tortoise shell, manufactured or not.
 Velvet, silk.
 Watches, and parts thereof, in gold and gilt.
 Works of art.

CLASS VI.

Prohibited Goods.

Adulterated drugs or medicines.
Arms, munitions, and implements of war, as ordnance or cannon, shot and shell, fire-arms of all kinds, cartridges, side-arms, spears, or pikes, saltpetre, gunpowder, gun-cotton, dynamite, and other explosive substances.

The Korean authorities will grant special permits for the importation

(L.S.) HARRY S. PARKES.

(L.S.) Signature in Chinese of MIN YONG-MOK,
Korean Plenipotentiary.

of arms, fire-arms, and ammunition for purposes of sport or self-defence, on satisfactory proof being furnished to them of the *bonâ fide* character of the application.

Counterfeit coins, all kinds.
Opium, except medicinal opium.

Foreign ships, when sold in Corea, will pay a duty of 25 cents per ton on sailing-vessels, and 50 cents per ton on steamers.

IMPORT TARIFF.

[Arranged alphabetically.]

No.	Article.	Ad valorem Rate of Duty.
1	Agricultural implements ..	Free
2	Alum ..	5
3	Amber ..	20
4	Apophors and chains ..	5
5	Arms, ammunition, fire-arms, fowling-pieces, or side-arms, imported under special permit of the Korean Government for sporting purposes or for self-defence.	20
6	Artificial flowers ..	20
7	Bamboo, split or not ..	5
8	Bark, for tanning ..	5
9	Beans, peas, and pulse, all kinds ..	5
10	Beer, porter, and cider ..	10
11	Beverages, such as lemonade, ginger beer, soda and mineral waters ..	7½
12	Birds' nests ..	20
13	Blankets and rugs ..	7½
14	Bones ..	5
15	Books, maps, and charts ..	Free
16	Bricks and tiles ..	5
17	Bullion, being gold or silver, refined ..	7½
18	Buttons, buckles, hooks and eyes, &c. ..	5
19	Camphor, crude ..	7½
20	Camphor, refined ..	5
21	Candles ..	10
22	Canvas ..	7½
23	Carmine ..	10
24	Carpets of jute, hemp, or felt, patent tapestry ..	7½
25	Carpets superior quality, as Brussels, Kidderminster, and other kinds not enumerated ..	10
26	Carpets, velvet ..	20
27	Carrriages ..	20

No.	Article.	Ad valorem Rate of Duty.
28	Cement, as Portland and other kinds ..	7½
29	Charcoal ..	7½
30	Chemicals, all kinds ..	7½
31	Clocks and parts thereof ..	10
32	Clothing and wearing apparel, all kinds, hats, boots and shoes, &c. ..	7½
33	Clothing and wearing apparel made wholly of silk ..	10
34	Coal and coke ..	5
35	Cochineal ..	20
36	Cocoons ..	7½
37	Coins, gold and silver ..	Free
38	Confectioneries and sweetmeats, all kinds ..	10
39	Coral, manufactured or not ..	20
40	Cordage and rope, all kinds and sizes ..	7½
41	Cotton, raw ..	5
42	Cotton manufactures, all kinds ..	7½
43	Cotton and wollen mixtures, all kinds ..	7½
44	Cotton and silk mixtures, all kinds ..	7½
45	Cutlery, all kinds ..	7½
46	Drugs, all kinds ..	5
47	Dyes, colours, and paints, paint oils, and materials used for mixing paints ..	7½
48	Earthenware ..	7½
49	Embroideries in gold, silver, or silk ..	20
50	Enamel ware ..	20
51	Explosives used for mining, &c., and imported under special permit ..	10
52	Fans, all kinds ..	7½
53	Feathers, all kinds ..	7½
54	Felt ..	7½
55	Fire-engines ..	Free
56	Fireworks ..	20
57	Fish, fresh ..	5
58	Fish, dried and salted ..	7½
59	Flax, hemp, and jute ..	5
60	Flints ..	5
61	Floor rugs, all kinds ..	7½
62	Flour and meal, all kinds ..	7½
63	Foil, gold and silver ..	10
64	Foil, tin, copper, and all other kinds ..	7½
65	Fruit, fresh, all kinds ..	5
66	Fruit, dried, salted, or preserved ..	7½
67	Furniture of all kinds ..	10
68	Furs, superior, as sable, sea otter, seal, otter, beaver, &c. ..	20
69	Gamboge ..	7½
70	Ginseng, red, white, crude, and clarified ..	20
71	Glass, window, plain and coloured, all qualities ..	7½
72	Glass, plate, silvered or unsilvered, framed or unframed.	10
73	Glassware, all kinds ..	10
74	Glue ..	5
75	Grain and corn, all kinds ..	5
76	Grass cloth, and all textiles in hemp, jute, &c. ..	7½
77	Guano and manures, all kinds ..	5
78	Hair, all kinds except human ..	7½
79	Hair, human ..	10
80	Hair ornaments, gold and silver ..	20
81	Hides and skins, raw and undressed ..	5
82	Hides and skins, tanned and dressed ..	7½
83	Horns and hoofs, all kinds not otherwise provided for ..	5

No.	Article.	Ad valorem Rate of Duty.	No.	Article.	Ad valorem Rate of Duty.
85	India-rubber, manufactured or not	Per cent. 10	134	Plated ware, all kinds	10
86	Inglass, all kinds	7½	135	Porcelain, common qualities	7½
87	Ivory, manufactured or not	20	136	Porcelain, superior qualities	10
88	Jade-ware	20	137	Precious stones, all kinds, set or unset	20
89	Jewellery, real or imitation	5	138	Rattans, split or not	5
90	Kerosene, or petroleum, and other mineral oils	10	139	Rhinoceros horns	20
91	Lacquered ware, common	20	140	Rosin	7½
92	Lacquered ware, superior	7½	141	Saddlery and harness	10
93	Lamps, all kinds	7½	142	Salt	7½
94	Lanterns, paper	5	143	Samples in reasonable quantities	Free.
95	Leather, all ordinary kinds, plain	7½	144	Sapan wood	7½
96	Leather, superior kinds, and stamped, figured, or coloured	10	145	Scales and balances	5
97	Leather manufactures, all kinds	10	146	Seated wood, all kinds	20
98	Lime	6	147	Scientific instruments, as physical, mathematical, meteorological, and surgical, and their appliances	Free.
99	Linen, linen and cotton, linen and woollen mixtures, linen and silk mixtures, all kinds	7½	148	Seals, materials for	10
100	Matches	5	149	Sea products, as seaweed, béche-de-mer, &c.	7½
101	Mattings, floor, Chinese, Japanese, coir, &c., common qualities	5	150	Seeds, all kinds	5
102	Mattings, superior qualities, Japanese tatamis, &c.	7½	151	Silk manufactures, as gauze, crape, Japanese amber lustrings, satins, satin damasks, figured satins, Japanese white silk ("habutai")	7½
103	Meat, fresh	5	152	Silk manufactures and floss silk in skein	10
104	Meat, dried and salted	7½	153	Silk manufactures not otherwise provided for	7½
105	Medicines, all kinds not otherwise provided for	5	154	Silk thread and floss silk in skein	10
106	Metals, all kinds, in pig, block, ingot, slab, bar, rod, plate, sheet, hoop, strip, band and flat, T and angle iron, old and scrap iron	5	155	Soap, common qualities	5
107	Metals, all kinds, in pipe or tube, corrugated or galvanized, wire, steel, tin-plates, quicksilver, nickel, platinum, German silver, yellow metal, tutenague, or white copper, unrefined gold and silver	7½	156	Soap, superior qualities	10
108	Metal manufactures, all kinds, as nails, screws, tools, machinery, railway plant, and hardware	7½	157	Soy, Chinese and Japanese	5
109	Models of inventions	Free.	158	Spectacles	7½
110	Mosquito netting, not made of silk	7½	159	Spices, all kinds	20
111	Mosquito netting, made of silk	10	160	Spirits, in jars	7½
112	Musical boxes	10	161	Spirits and liquors, in wood or bottle, all kinds	20
113	Musical instruments, all kinds	20	162	Stationery and writing materials, all kinds, blank books, &c.	7½
114	Musk	7½	163	Stones and slate, cut and dressed	7½
115	Needles and pins	5	164	Sugar, brown and white, all qualities, molasses and syrups	7½
116	Oil-cake	7½	165	Sugar candy	10
117	Oils, vegetable, all kinds	10	166	Sulphur	7½
118	Oil, wood (<i>Tung</i> <i>yu</i>)	7½	167	Table stores, all kinds, and preserved provisions	7½
119	Oil and floor cloth, all kinds	5	168	Tallow	7½
120	Packing bags, pecking matting, tea-lead, and ropes for packing goods	7½	169	Tea	7½
121	Paper, common qualities	Free.	170	Telescopes and binocular glasses	10
122	Paper, all kinds, not otherwise provided for	5	171	Tobacco, all kinds and forms	20
123	Paper, coloured, fancy, wall, and hanging	7½	172	Tortoise shell, manufactured or not	20
124	Pearls	10	173	Tooth powder	10
125	Pepper, unground	20	174	Travellers' baggage	Free.
126	Perfumes and scents	5	175	Trunks and portmanteaux	10
127	Photographic apparatus	10	176	Twine and thread, all kinds, excepting in silk	5
128	Pictures, prints, photographs, engravings, all kinds, framed or unframed	10	177	Types, new and old	Free.
129	Pitch and tar	10	178	Umbrellas, paper	5
130	Planks, soft	5	179	Umbrellas, cotton	7½
131	Planks, hard	7½	180	Umbrellas, silk	10
132	Plants, trees, and shrubs, all kinds	10	181	Umbrella frames	7½
133	Plate, gold and silver	Free. 80	182	Varnish	7½
			183	Vegetables, fresh, dried, and salted	5
			184	Vetret, silk	20
			185	Vermicelli	7½
			186	Vermilion	10
			187	Watches, and parts thereof, in common metal, nickel, or silver	10

as possible, and as far as may be deemed desirable, into specific rates by agreement between the competent authorities of the two countries.

(L.S.) HARRY S. PARKES.
 (L.S.) Signature in Chinese of MIN YONG-MOK,
 Korean Plenipotentiary.

PROTOCOL (Jurisdiction; City of Hanyang; British Colonies).—
 November 26, 1888.

The above-named Plenipotentiaries hereby make and append to this Treaty the following three declarations:—

1. With reference to Article III of this Treaty, it is hereby declared that the right of extra-territorial jurisdiction over British subjects in Corea granted by this Treaty shall be relinquished when, in the judgment of the British Government, the laws and legal procedure of Corea shall have been so far modified and reformed as to remove the objections which now exist to British subjects being placed under Corean jurisdiction, and Corean Judges shall have attained similar legal qualifications and a similar independent position to those of British Judges.

2. With reference to Article IV of this Treaty, it is hereby declared that if the Chinese Government shall hereafter surrender the right of opening commercial establishments in the city of Hanyang, which was granted last year to Chinese subjects, the same right shall not be claimed for British subjects, provided that it be not granted by the Corean Government to the subjects of any other Power.

3. It is hereby declared that the provisions of this Treaty shall apply to all British Colonies, unless any exception shall be notified by Her Majesty's Government to that of Corea within one year from the date in which the ratifications of this Treaty shall be exchanged.

And it is hereby further stipulated that this Protocol shall be laid before the High Contracting Parties simultaneously with this Treaty, and that the ratification of this Treaty shall include the confirmation of the above three declarations, for which, therefore, no separate act of ratification will be required.

In faith of which the above-named Plenipotentiaries have this day signed this Protocol, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Hanyang, this 26th day of November, in the year 1888, corresponding to the 27th day of the 10th month of the 492nd year of the Corean era, being the 9th year of the Chinese reign Kuang Hsu.

(L.S.) HARRY S. PARKES.
 (L.S.) Signature in Chinese of MIN YONG-MOK,
 Korean Plenipotentiary.

No.	Article.	Ad valorem Rate of Duty.	Per cent.
188	Watches, in gold or gilt	20
189	Wax, bees' or vegetable	7½
190	Wax cloth	7½
191	Wines, in wood or bottle, all kinds	10
192	Wood and timber, soft	7½
193	Wood and timber, hard	10
194	Wool, sheep's, raw	5
195	Woollen manufactures, all kinds	7½
196	Woollen and silk mixtures, all kinds	7½
197	Works of art	20
198	Yarns, all kinds, in cotton, wool, hemp, &c.	5
	All unenumerated articles, raw or unmanufactured	5
	All unenumerated articles, partly manufactured	7½
	All unenumerated articles, completely manufactured	10
	Foreign ships, when sold in Corea, will pay a duty of 25 cents per ton on sailing-vessels and 50 cents per ton on steamers.		

Prohibited Goods.

Adulterated drugs or medicines.
 Arms, munitions, and implements of war, as ordnance or cannon, shot and shell, fire-arms of all kinds, cartridges, side-arms, spears or pikes, saltpetre, gun-powder, gun-cotton, dynamite, and other explosive substances. The Corean authorities will grant special permits for the importation of arms, fire-arms, and ammunition for purposes of sport or self-defence, on satisfactory proof being furnished to them of the *bona fide* character of the application.
 Counterfeit coins of all kinds.
 Opium, except medicinal opium.

EXPORT TARIFF.

Class I.—Duty-free export goods—
 Bullion, being gold and silver refined; coins, gold and silver, all kinds; plants, trees, and shrubs, all kinds; samples, in reasonable quantity; travellers' baggage.
 Class II.—All other native goods or productions not enumerated in Class I will pay an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent.
 The exportation of red ginseng is prohibited.

Rules.

1. In the case of imported articles the *ad valorem* duties of this Tariff will be calculated on the actual cost of the goods at the place of production or fabrication, with the addition of freight, insurance, &c. In the case of export articles the *ad valorem* duties will be calculated on market values in Corea.
2. Duties may be paid in Mexican dollars or Japanese silver yen.
3. The above Tariff of import and export duties shall be converted, as soon

Appendix III³

*TREATY of Friendship and Commerce between Russia and
Corea.—Signed at Hanyang, ^{June 25}_{July 7}, 1884.*

[Ratifications exchanged, October 14, 1885.]

(Traduction.)

Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Autocrate de Toutes les Russies, &c., Sa Majesté le Roi de Corée; pénétrés du désir sincère d'établir entre les deux États des relations amicales et commerciales permanentes et de les consolider par un Traité, ont désigné à cet effet leurs Plénipotentiaires:—

Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Autocrate de Toutes les Russies, le Conseiller d'État Charles Weber, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint-Anne de deuxième classe; et

Sa Majesté le Roi de Corée, Kim-Peng-Si, Président du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Fonctionnaire de première classe, Président du Conseil d'État, Membre du Conseil Privé de Sa Majesté et Premier Instituteur de l'Héritier;

Les Plénipotentiaires précités, munis de pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en due forme, se sont entendus et ont conclu les Articles suivants:—

ART. I.—1. Dorénavant la paix et l'amitié seront perpétuelles entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies et Sa Majesté le Roi de Corée et entre leurs sujets respectifs, lesquels jouiront dans les territoires des deux États d'une sécurité complète et de toute la protection pour leurs personnes et pour leurs biens.

2. En cas de différend entre l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes et une troisième Puissance, l'autre Partie Contractante, sur la demande de la première, prêtera ses bons offices en vue de la solution pacifique de différend.

II.—1. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes peuvent appointer chacune un Représentant Diplomatique en résidence permanente ou temporaire dans leurs capitales respectives, ainsi que des Consuls-Généraux, Consuls, et Vice-Consuls dans quelques-uns ou dans tous les ports ouverts au commerce étranger et où sont admis à résider les Agents Consulaires des autres Puissances. Les Représentants Diplomatiques et les Agents Consulaires des deux Puissances jouiront sans exception de toutes les facilités pour les communications personnelles ou écrites avec les autorités locales, ainsi que de tous les droits et privilèges acquis aux Agents Diplomatiques ou Consulaires dans les autres pays.

2. Les Représentants Diplomatiques et les Agents Consulaires des Hautes Parties Contractantes et toutes les personnes qui leur sont attachées jouiront du droit de voyager librement dans toutes les parties de leurs territoires respectifs, et les autorités de la Corée muniront de passeports les dits fonctionnaires Russes voyageant en Corée et d'une escorte pour les défendre si besoin est.

3. Les Agents Consulaires des deux Puissances ne procéderont à l'exercice de leurs fonctions qu'après y avoir été autorisés par l'Empereur ou par le Gouvernement du pays où ils résident respectivement, mais il leur est défendu de se livrer au commerce.

III.*—1. La juridiction sur les sujets Russes en Corée et sur leur propriété appartiendra exclusivement aux Agents Consulaires Russes

* See Protocol.

³British and Foreign State Papers, vol.75, pp. 510-28.

ou aux autres fonctionnaires, munis en due forme de pleins pouvoirs à cet effet, et ils seront chargés d'examiner et de juger, sans aucune ingérence de la part des autorités Coréennes, toutes les causes intentées contre les sujets Russes par les indigènes ou par des sujets étrangers.

2. Toutes les accusations et plaintes formulées par les autorités Coréennes, ainsi que par les sujets Coréens, contre les sujets Russes établis au Corée, seront examinées et jugées par un Tribunal Russo et aux termes des lois Russes.

3. Toutes les accusations et plaintes formulées par les autorités Russes, ainsi que par les sujets Russes, contre les sujets Coréens en Corée, seront examinées et jugées par les autorités Coréennes et aux termes des lois Coréennes.

4. Tout sujet Russe qui commettra en Corée un délit ou un crime sera jugé et puni par les autorités Russes et selon les lois Russes.

5. Tout sujet Coréen qui commettra en Corée un délit ou un crime au détriment d'un sujet Russe, sera jugé et puni par les autorités Coréennes et d'après les lois Coréennes.

6. Toute plainte formulée contre un sujet Russe et l'accusant de violation du présent Traité ou des Règlements y annexés, ainsi que des Règlements qui pourront être arrêtés dans l'avenir en vertu du présent Traité, sera soumise à l'examen et à la décision du Consul de Russie; les amendes qu'il infligera et la propriété confisquée par lui appartiendront au Gouvernement Coréen.

7. Les marchandises Russes saisies en port ouvert par les autorités Coréennes seront mises sous scellés par celles-ci conjointement avec les Agents Consulaires Russes et conservées par les premiers jusqu'au moment où les autorités Russes auront prononcé leur décision. Dans le cas où cette décision sera favorable au propriétaire des marchandises, celles-ci seront immédiatement mises à la disposition du Consul; le propriétaire aura du reste le droit de recevoir ses marchandises avant que la décision n'ait été rendue, s'il verse entre les mains des autorités Coréennes le prix de ses marchandises.

8. Dans toutes les affaires criminelles et civiles jugées par les Tribunaux Russes ou Coréens en Corée, les autorités du demandeur peuvent nommer un fonctionnaire pour assister à l'audience. Le fonctionnaire nommé à cet effet aura droit à toute la courtoisie due à sa position, et sera autorisé, s'il le croit nécessaire, à convoquer des témoins, à les interroger, à les confronter, et à protester contre la procédure ou contre la sentence du Tribunal.

Dans le cas où un sujet Coréen accusé d'avoir enfreint les lois de son pays se réfugierait dans la maison ou dans un dépôt de marchandises appartenant à un sujet Russe ou sur un navire Russe, le Consul de Russie enverra en avoir été informé par les autorités

locales, prendra les mesures nécessaires en vue de son arrestation et le livrera aux dites autorités pour être jugé. Mais, sans l'autorisation du Consul de Russie, aucun fonctionnaire Coréen n'aura le droit d'entrer dans la maison d'un sujet Russe sans la permission de celui-ci ou de mettre le pied sur un navire Russe sans l'autorisation du capitaine ou de celui qui le remplace.

10. Sur la demande de l'autorité Russe compétente, les autorités Coréennes sont tenus d'arrêter et de livrer tout sujet Russe accusé d'avoir commis un crime, ainsi que tout déserteur des navires de guerre ou de commerce Russes.

IV.*—1. Les ports suivants sont ouverts au commerce Russe à partir de la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité: Tsi-ou-pou (ou Tchémoulpo), dans le district de Jenchuan, Youan-Schan (ou Gensan), Fouschan (ou Fousan), et dans le cas où ce dernier port serait incommode, quelque autre endroit à proximité de celui-ci, ainsi que les villes de Hanian (Séoul) et de Yan-hua-tsin, ou toute autre place plus commode dans ses environs.

2. Dans les localités susmentionnées, les sujets Russes sont autorisés à affermer ou à acheter des terrains et des maisons et à y construire des maisons, des entrepôts, ou des fabriques. Ils ont aussi le droit du libre exercice de leur religion. Toutes les dispositions à prendre pour le choix, la définition des limites, et l'arpentage des établissements étrangers, et pour la vente de terrains dans les différents ports et localités de la Corée ouverts au commerce étranger, doivent être prises par les autorités Coréennes d'accord avec les autorités étrangères compétentes.

3. Ces emplacements doivent être achetés à leurs propriétaires par le Gouvernement Coréen et être habitables; les dépenses faites à cet effet sont remboursées principalement par le produit de la vente du terrain. Le chiffre annuel de l'impôt foncier sera fixé par les autorités Coréennes d'accord avec les autorités étrangères, et cette somme sera versée entre les mains des premières. Une partie de ce revenu sera retenu par le Gouvernement Coréen et le reste, ainsi que le revenu net provenant de la vente du terrain et formant le surplus des dépenses occasionnées par son acquisition, devient la propriété d'un fonds municipal, dont la gestion est confiée à un Conseil, dont la fondation sera décidée plus tard par les autorités Coréennes, d'accord avec les autorités étrangères compétentes.

4. Les sujets Russes peuvent affermer ou acheter des terrains et des maisons, au delà de la ligne des établissements étrangers à la distance de 10 "ji" Coréennes. Mais tous les terrains occupés de cette manière sont soumis à toutes les dispositions locales, et l'impôt foncier qu'ils auront à payer sera fixé par les autorités Coréennes comme elles l'entendront.

5. Dans chacune des localités ouvertes au commerce, les autorités Coréennes assigneront un lot de terrain convenable, destiné à servir de cimetière pour les étrangers, qui n'auront à payer aucun fermage, aucun impôt foncier ni perception quelconque, et dont la direction sera confiée au Conseil Municipal précité.

6. Les sujets Russes peuvent voyager sans passeport où bon leur semble à la distance de 100 "li" Coréennes au delà des ports et localités ouverts au commerce étranger, ou dans les limites qui seront définies plus tard en vertu d'un accord survenu entre les autorités compétentes des deux États. Les sujets Russes ont de même le droit de voyager dans toutes les parties de la Corée pour leur plaisir ou dans un but commercial, d'acheter les produits locaux, de transporter et de vendre toute espèce de marchandises, à l'exception des livres et imprimés défendus par le Gouvernement Coréen. Les voyageurs et les marchands devront toutefois être munis de passeports délivrés par leurs Consuls et portant la signature ou le sceau des autorités Coréennes locales. Ces passeports, si demande en est faite, devront être exhibés dans les localités que traverseront les voyageurs. Si le passeport est en règle, son porteur aura le droit de continuer son voyage et de se munir des moyens de transport nécessaires. Dans le cas où un sujet Russe voyagerait sans passeport au delà des limites précitées ou commettrait à l'intérieur du pays un délit quelconque, il sera mis en état d'arrestation et amené devant le Consul de Russie le plus proche, pour être puni. Celui qui, n'ayant pas de passeport, dépassera les limites fixées, est passible d'une amende ne dépassant pas 100 dollars du Mexique, accompagnée ou non d'une condamnation à un mois d'emprisonnement au plus.

7. Les sujets Russes en Corée seront soumis à tous les règlements municipaux, de police et autres, adoptés par les autorités compétentes des États en vue de garantir l'ordre et la tranquillité.

V.—1. Dans tous les ports et localités ouverts au commerce, les sujets Russes jouiront de toute liberté de s'occuper du commerce de toute espèce de marchandises non défendues par le présent Traité, en payant des droits d'entrée d'après le Tarif annexé au Traité; ils auront le droit d'importer des marchandises provenant de tous les ports étrangers et des ports ouverts de la Corée, de les vendre aux Coréens ou aux ressortissants des autres États, de leur acheter des marchandises et de les exporter dans les autres ports étrangers ou ports ouverts de la Corée; ils peuvent en toute liberté faire des affaires avec les sujets Coréens et avec les ressortissants des autres États, sans aucune immixtion de la part des autorités Coréennes ou autres, et ils peuvent se livrer sans aucun obstacle à toute espèce

de n'importe quel port étranger et ayant payé les droits d'entrée auront la faculté, dans le cas où elles seraient réexportées à destination d'un port étranger quelconque dans le courant de 13 mois Coréens depuis leur importation, de recevoir un certificat leur donnant droit au remboursement des taxes d'entrée, mais seulement dans le cas où l'emballage de ces marchandises sera resté intact. Les certificats précités doivent être rachetés, si on l'exige, par les bureaux de Douane Coréens, ou être acceptés comme paiement de droits d'entrée dans toutes les localités de la Corée ouvertes au commerce.

3. Quand les produits Coréens seront transportés d'un port ouvert de la Corée à un autre, le droit de sortie payé au port d'exportation sera remboursé sur présentation d'un certificat de la Douane constatant l'arrivée de ces produits au port de destination, ou sur la présentation de preuves suffisantes constatant que ces marchandises se sont perdues à la suite d'un naufrage.

4. Toutes les marchandises importées en Corée par les sujets Russes, et ayant payé les droits d'entrée d'après le Tarif, peuvent être transportées librement dans tout autre port ouvert de la Corée, et, si elles sont importées à l'intérieur du pays, elles n'auront à payer aucune taxe supplémentaire, aucune accise, ni droit de transit. Cette liberté est accordée de même pour le transport dans les ports ouverts de tous les produits Coréens destinés à l'exportation, et ces produits ne doivent être soumis à aucun impôt, accise, ou droit de transit, ni sur leur lieu de production, ni pendant leur transport d'une partie quelconque de la Corée jusqu'aux ports ouverts.

5. Le Gouvernement Coréen peut fréter des navires de commerce Russes pour le transport de marchandises et de voyageurs dans les ports non ouverts de la Corée; les sujets Coréens peuvent jouir aussi de ce droit s'ils y sont autorisés par leurs autorités.

6. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Coréen sera fondé à appréhender un manque de blé en Corée, Sa Majesté le Roi de Corée peut défendre temporairement l'exportation des grains à l'étranger soit de l'un des ports, soit de tous les ports ouverts du pays; l'observation de cette défense est obligatoire pour les sujets Russes établis en Corée à partir d'un mois après sa notification officielle au Consul de Russie résidant dans les ports en question. Cette prohibition toutefois ne devra pas rester en vigueur plus longtemps qu'elle ne sera absolument nécessaire.

7. Les navires de commerce Russes paieront un droit de tonnage à raison de 30 cents du Mexique par tonne enregistrée. Ce paiement donnera au navire le droit de visiter tous les ports ouverts de la Corée pendant quatre mois révolus, sans qu'il ait à payer aucune

ports ouverts, de phares et balises, à la pose des bouées et à l'approfondissement ou autres améliorations des mouillages. Les bateaux employés dans les ports ouverts au déchargement ou au chargement des navires n'auront aucun droit de tonnage à payer.

8) Il est convenu ici même que le Tarif et les Règlements de Commerce annexés au présent Traité entreront en vigueur en même temps que cet instrument. Les autorités compétentes des deux pays pourront procéder de temps à autre à la révision de ces Règlements pour y introduire, après entente réciproque, les modifications ou additions dont l'expérience aura démontré la nécessité.

VI. Tout sujet Russe ayant importé ou tenté d'importer en contrebande des marchandises, dans un port ou toute autre localité de la Corée non ouverts au commerce, est passible d'une amende équivalente au double de la valeur des marchandises, lesquelles, en outre, seront confisquées. Les autorités Coréennes peuvent se saisir de ces marchandises et arrêter tous les sujets Russes mêlés à la contrebande ou à la tentative de s'y livrer. Les individus arrêtés en conséquence devront être immédiatement remis au Consulat de Russie le plus proche, pour y être jugés, et les marchandises saisies pourront être gardées par les autorités Coréennes jusqu'au moment où l'arrêt aura été définitivement rendu.

VII.—1. Dans le cas où un navire Russe ferait naufrage ou s'échouerait sur les côtes de la Corée, les autorités locales prendront immédiatement les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir le pillage du navire et de la cargaison, ainsi que pour la protection de son équipage, et elles lui prêteront tout le concours dont il pourra avoir besoin. Elles doivent signaler immédiatement le sinistre au Consul de Russie le plus proche, et fournir, en cas de besoin, aux naufragés les ressources nécessaires pour qu'elles puissent atteindre le port ouvert le plus rapproché.

2. Toutes les dépenses effectuées par le Gouvernement Coréen à l'effet de sauver, d'habiller, d'entretenir et d'expédier les sujets Russes victimes d'un naufrage, ainsi que celles qui auront été faites pour la recherche des cadavres, pour leur inhumation, et pour le traitement des malades et des blessés, seront remboursées au Gouvernement Coréen par le Gouvernement Russe.

3. Le Gouvernement Russe n'est pas responsable des dépenses faites pour le sauvetage et pour la conservation du navire naufragé ou de sa cargaison. Ces dépenses doivent être imputées sur la cargaison sauvée, et doivent être remboursées par les intéressés aussitôt qu'ils auront repris possession de leur propriété.

4. Le Gouvernement Coréen ne se fera pas rembourser les frais de déplacement des fonctionnaires de l'État ou des autorités de police locale qui se seront rendus sur le lieu du sinistre, ni les frais

correspondance officielle. Toutes ces dépenses doivent être supportées par le Gouvernement Coréen.

5. Les navires de commerce Russes forcés par le mauvais temps ou par le manque de vivres, de combustible ou d'eau potable, de faire relâche dans un port non ouvert de la Corée, peuvent y réparer leurs avaries, s'approvisionner du nécessaire, et le capitaine du navire payera toutes les dépenses faites à cet effet.

VIII.—1. Les navires de guerre de chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes auront le droit d'entrer dans tous les ports de l'autre. Ils jouiront de toutes les facilités pour l'achat de toute espèce d'approvisionnement et pour les réparations nécessaires, et ne seront pas soumis aux Règlements de Commerce ou de Ports. De même ils n'auront à payer aucun droit d'entrée, ni aucune taxe de port.

2. Quand un navire de guerre Russe entrera dans un port de la Corée non ouvert au commerce étranger, ses officiers et son équipage auront le droit de descendre à terre, mais ils ne pourront pas pénétrer à l'intérieur sans être munis de passeports à cet effet.

3. Les approvisionnements de toute espèce destinés aux besoins de la flotte Russe peuvent être débarqués dans les ports ouverts de la Corée et y être conservés dans des dépôts sous la surveillance d'un employé nommé par le Gouvernement Russe, sans que ces approvisionnements aient à payer aucun droit d'entrée. Mais si les dits approvisionnements étaient vendus, l'acheteur verserait aux autorités Coréennes les droits d'entrée correspondants.

4. Le Gouvernement Coréen prêtera toute espèce de concours aux navires de guerre Russes chargés de relever les côtes et de mesurer la profondeur des eaux de la Corée.

IX.—1. Le Gouvernement Coréen ne s'opposera d'aucune manière à ce que les autorités ou les sujets Russes résidant en Corée prennent à leur service des sujets Coréens en qualité de maîtres, d'interprètes, de serviteurs, ou pour toute autre occupation légale. Il ne sera fait de même aucune restriction pour l'entrée des sujets Russes au service des autorités et des sujets de la Corée en vue de toute espèce d'occupations légales.

2. Les sujets des deux États qui se rendent dans l'un ou l'autre pays pour y étudier la langue, la littérature, les lois, les arts et l'industrie, ou pour y faire des recherches scientifiques, auront droit à toute espèce de concours.

X. Il est convenu ici même qu'à partir de la date où le présent Traité entrera en vigueur les fonctionnaires et sujets de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies jouiront de tous les droits, avantages, et privilèges—pour ce qui est surtout des taxes d'importation et d'exportation—qui sont accordés ou seront accordés dans l'avenir par Sa Majesté le Roi de Corée aux fonctionnaires ou aux sujets de

XI. Après l'expiration de dix années à partir du jour où le présent Traité entrera en vigueur, chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes pourra, en prévenant l'autre partie une année à l'avance, demander la révision du Traité ou du Tarif qui lui est annexé, pour y introduire, après accord mutuel, les changements dont la nécessité aura été démontrée par l'expérience.

XII.—1. Le présent Traité a été rédigé en langue Russe et en langue Chinoise, et les deux textes sont parfaitement conformes; mais il est convenu ici même que le texte Russe sera adopté comme base pour l'interprétation du sens de tous les Articles du Traité.

2. Toutes les communications officielles transmises par les autorités Russes aux autorités Coréennes seront rédigées en langue Russe et accompagnées dans les premiers temps d'une traduction en langue Chinoise.

XIII. Le présent Traité sera ratifié par Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Autocrate de Toutes les Russies et par Sa Majesté le Roi de Corée avec apposition de leurs signatures et de leurs sceaux, et on procédera à l'échange des ratifications à Hanian (Séoul) dans le courant d'une année, ou plus tôt si les circonstances le permettent. Le Traité sera promulgué par les deux Gouvernements et sera mis en vigueur à partir de la date de l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires des deux États ont signé le présent Traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en trois exemplaires dans la ville de Hanian (Séoul) en l'an de grâce 1894, le 25^e jour de Juin (7 Juillet), correspondant au 15^e jour de la 5^e lune de l'année 498 de l'ère Coréenne ou à la 10^e année du règne de Huan-Sui, d'après l'ère Chinoise.

(L.S.) CH. WEBER.
(L.S.) KIM-PENG-SI.

RÈGLEMENTS POUR LE COMMERCE DES SUJETS RUSSES EN CORÉE.

I.—Arrivée et Départ des Navires.

1. Dans les 48 heures (à l'exception des Dimanches et jours fériés) après l'entrée d'un navire de commerce Russe dans un port de la Corée, le capitaine est tenu de présenter aux autorités de la Douane un certificat du Consul de Russie constatant que tous les papiers du bord ont été transmis au Consulat. Il doit présenter en outre une déclaration par écrit contenant : le nom du navire, du port d'où il arrive, du capitaine qui le commande, le nombre, et si on l'exige, les noms de ses passagers, le jaugeage du navire et le chiffre de son équipage. Le capitaine est tenu en outre de transmettre à la Douane une déclaration des marchandises qui composent sa cargaison en énumérant le nombre des colis et leur contenu et en citant

le nom de leurs destinataires, en apposant sa signature sous ce document pour en certifier l'exactitude. Après avoir accompli ces formalités, le capitaine reçoit de la Douane un certificat spécial lui accordant le droit de procéder au déchargement de sa cargaison, certifiant qu'il doit présenter à l'Agent Douanier désigné pour la surveillance de son navire. Le capitaine qui ouvre ses écoutes avant d'avoir reçu cette autorisation est passible d'une amende ne dépassant pas 100 dollars du Mexique.

2. Dans le cas où la déclaration précitée contiendrait une erreur elle peut être corrigée sans paiement d'aucune amende dans le délai de 24 heures (sans compter les Dimanches et jours fériés); mais pour tout changement ou annotation effectué dans la déclaration après l'expiration de ce terme, il est prélevé 5 dollars du Mexique.

3. Le capitaine qui ne fera pas les déclarations précitées dans le terme fixé par ces Règlements paiera pour chaque 24 heures de retard une amende ne dépassant pas 50 dollars du Mexique.

4. Le navire Russe qui reste dans le port moins de 48 heures sans ouvrir ses écoutes (sans compter les Dimanches et jours fériés), ou qui y a fait relâche par suite de mauvais temps ou pour s'y approvisionner, n'est pas obligé de faire les déclarations précitées et ne paiera pas de droits de tonnage une fois qu'il ne chargera ni ne déchargera aucune marchandise.

5. Le capitaine qui veut sortir du port doit présenter à la Douane une déclaration des marchandises qu'il emporte, et cette déclaration doit contenir les mêmes détails que la déclaration relative à la cargaison importée. La Douane lui délivre alors l'autorisation de prendre la mer et lui restitue le certificat du Consulat constatant la réception des papiers du bord. Ce n'est qu'après avoir remis au Consulat les documents qui précèdent que les papiers du bord sont rendus au capitaine.

6. Tout navire qui quitte le port sans avoir accompli les formalités précitées est frappé dans la personne de son capitaine d'une amende ne dépassant pas 200 dollars du Mexique.

7. Les vapeurs Russes peuvent s'inscrire à la Douane dans le courant d'une seule et même journée pour leur entrée au port ainsi que pour leur sortie; ils n'ont à faire de déclaration que pour les marchandises à débarquer ou à transborder sur un autre navire pour être expédiées dans un autre port.

II.—Déchargement et Chargement des Marchandises et Paiement des Droits d'Entrée.

1. Le destinataire des marchandises, quand il voudra les trans-

déclaration signé par lui et portant : le nom de celui qui fait la déclaration, le nom du navire qui a importé la marchandise, les marques et le nombre des colis, ainsi que le genre et les prix des marchandises qu'ils contiennent. La Douane peut exiger la présentation des factures des marchandises importées, et si elles ne sont pas présentées ou s'il n'est pas donné d'explication satisfaisante des causes de leur absence, le propriétaire peut n'être autorisé à les décharger qu'en payant un droit d'entrée double. Le surplus de droit d'entrée payé de cette manière devra être remboursé aussitôt que les factures auront été présentées.

2. Toutes les marchandises importées de cette manière peuvent être visitées par les employés de la Douane à un endroit spécialement désigné à cet effet. Après la visite, qui doit être effectuée sans retards inutiles et sans détériorer les marchandises, celles-ci sont réemballées par les employés de la Douane de façon à ce qu'elles aient autant que possible l'aspect qu'elles avaient avant la visite de la Douane.

3. Si les autorités de la Douane sont d'avis que la valeur des marchandises soumises d'après le Tarif à un droit d'entrée *ad valorem* est déclarée d'une manière insuffisante par le destinataire ou par l'expéditeur, la Douane peut proposer au destinataire de payer les droits d'entrée d'après la valeur fixée par son proposé aux estimations. Dans le cas où le propriétaire des marchandises ne consentirait pas à cette proposition, il doit informer de son refus le chef de la Douane dans le courant de 24 heures (sans compter les Dimanches et jours fériés). En même temps il est tenu de désigner un estimateur qui procède à la réestimation des marchandises et il déclare à la Douane le prix que celui-ci a fixé. Le chef de la Douane peut alors, s'il le trouve nécessaire, prélever les droits d'entrée d'après la nouvelle estimation des marchandises ou en faire acquisition d'après le prix fixé après la réestimation, en ajoutant à celui-ci 5 pour cent. Dans ce dernier cas l'argent doit être payé au marchand dans les cinq jours après la déclaration de la valeur de ses marchandises telle qu'elle a été fixée après leur réestimation.

4. Les marchandises avariées pendant le voyage qu'elles ont fait avant d'arriver au port paieront un droit d'entrée réduit en proportion de l'avarie qu'elles pourront avoir subie. En cas de malentendus au sujet du chiffre de cette réduction, on a recours au procédé précité pour les résoudre.

5. Toutes les marchandises destinées à l'exportation sont déclarées à la Douane avant d'être chargées à bord du navire. Cette déclaration doit se faire par écrit et contenir l'indication du nom du navire sur lequel les marchandises seront embarquées, du nombre des colis avec leurs marques et inscriptions, ainsi que de la quantité, de la nature, et de la valeur des objets qu'elles contiennent.

L'expéditeur certifie, en apposant sa signature sous cette déclaration, l'exactitude de son contenu.

6. Les marchandises ne doivent être déchargées des navires ou embarquées sur ceux-ci qu'à des endroits spécialement désignés à cet effet par la Douane Coréenne, ni dans le laps de temps entre le coucher et le lever du soleil, ni les Dimanches ou jours fériés, à moins que la Douane n'ait délivré une autorisation spéciale à cet effet, qui lui donne le droit d'exiger un paiement spécial pour ce surcroît de travail.

7. Les destinataires et les expéditeurs de marchandises ont droit au remboursement des droits de douane payés en surplus dans le cas seulement où ils en feront la demande dans le courant de 30 jours après les avoir versés. De même la Douane ne pourra exiger que dans le même terme le supplément de paiement si les droits de douane n'ont pas été entièrement versés.

8. Il n'est fait aucune déclaration à la Douane ni pour les approvisionnements du navire Busse, de son équipage et de ses passagers, ni pour les bagages de ceux-ci, lesquels, après avoir été visités par les employés de la Douane, peuvent être débarqués en tout temps, soit à terre, soit sur un autre navire.

9. Les navires qui ont besoin de réparations peuvent débarquer leurs marchandises sans payer de droits d'entrée. Les marchandises débarquées restent sous la garde des autorités Coréennes, et tous les frais d'entrepôt et de garde sont payés par le capitaine du navire. Dans le cas où une partie de ces marchandises viendrait à être vendue, on devra verser les droits d'entrée correspondants pour toute la marchandise vendue.

10. Le transbordement de marchandises d'un navire sur un autre ne peut avoir lieu qu'avec l'autorisation des autorités de la Douane.

III.—*Surveillance Douanière.*

1. Les autorités de la Douane ont le droit de placer des employés de la Douane à bord des navires de commerce Russes qui entrent dans les ports de la Corée. Ces employés ont accès dans toutes les parties du navire où se trouvent les marchandises; ils doivent être accueillis avec politesse et jouir, autant que possible, sur le navire, d'une installation confortable.

2. Entre le coucher et le lever du soleil, ainsi que les Dimanches et jours fériés, les employés de la Douane Coréenne peuvent sceller, fermer avec des cadenas ou autrement toutes les écoutilles et tous les passages aboutissant aux parties du navire où se trouvent les marchandises. Si quelqu'un ouvrirait de son propre chef et sans l'autorisation voulue les écoutilles et les passages ainsi fermés, et en

Conteneur, le coupable, ainsi que le capitaine du navire, seront frappés d'une amende ne dépassant pas 100 dollars du Mexique.

3. Le sujet Russe qui chargera ou déchargera des marchandises ou tentera de les charger ou de les décharger sans qu'elles aient été déclarées à la Douane, comme cela est indiqué plus haut, ainsi que celui dont les colis contiendront des objets défendus ou qui n'auront pas été indiqués dans la déclaration faite à la Douane, est passible d'une amende représentant le double de la valeur des marchandises et celles-ci seront confisquées.

4. Celui qui aura signé une déclaration inexacte en ayant l'intention de faire subir une perte aux recettes Douanières de la Corée, est passible d'une amende ne dépassant pas 200 dollars du Mexique.

5. Pour toute infraction aux Règlements précités, dont la punition n'est pas prévue ici même, les amendes à infliger ne dépasseront pas la somme de 100 dollars du Mexique.

(L.S.) CH. WEBER,
(L.S.) KIM-PENG-SI.

TARIF.

No.	Objets d'Importation.	Droits d'Entrée ad valorem.
1	Bagages de voyage	Pour cent. Sans droits d'entrée.
2	Marchandises coloniales non mentionnées spécialement et toute espèce de conserves	7½
3	Bambous fendus ou entiers	5
4	Velours de soie	20
5	Vermicelle et macaroni	7½
6	Matières explosives pour l'industrie des mines, &c., dont l'importation n'est admise que sur autorisation spéciale	10
7	Vins (de raisin) de toute espèce, en fûts et en bouteilles, et vermouth	10
8	Feutre	7½
9	Crins de toute espèce, les cheveux d'hommes exceptés.	7½
10	Cheveux d'homme	10
11	Cire d'abeilles ou cire végétale	7½
12	Toile cirée	7½
13	Broderies: en or, en argent, et en soie	20
14	Éventails	7½
15	Balances et bassins pour les balances	5
16	Poteries	7½
17	Guano et autres engrais	5
18	Gomme-gutte	7½
19	Bois odoriférants divers	20
20	Planches de bois friables	7½
21	Planches de bois dur	10
22	Pierres mélangées montées ou non	10

No.	Objets d'Importation.	Droits d'Entrée ad valorem.
23	Objets précieux, vrais ou faux	Pour cent. 20
24	Parfums	20
25	Perles	20
26	Ginseng (racine de); rouge, blanche, brute, ou nettoyée.	20
27	Instruments & icôles	Sans droits d'entrée.
28	Céréales et leurs produits	5
29	Or et argent, pur et en lingots	Sans droits d'entrée.
30	Monnaies d'or et d'argent	Sans droits d'entrée.
31	Or et argent ouvrés	20
32	Ombrelles en papier	6
33	Ombrelles en coton	7½
34	Ombrelles en soie	10
35	Poudre dentifrice	10
36	Aiguilles et épingles	7½
37	Chaux	5
38	Instruments scientifiques: pour la physique, les mathématiques, la météorologie, et la chirurgie, avec leurs accessoires	Sans droits d'entrée.
39	Pierres et ardoises taillées et plaques de mosaïque	7½
40	Campbre brut	5
41	Campbre purifié	10
42	Câbles, cordes et ficelles	7½
43	Carcasses d'ombrelles	7½
44	Carmin	10
45	Tableaux, gravures, photographies diverses, encadrées ou non	10
46	Caoutchouc, naturel ou travaillé	10
47	Alun	5
48	Pétrole et autres huiles minérales	5
49	Vermillon	10
50	Briques et tuile	5
51	Colle	5
52	Colle de poisson	7½
53	Livres, atlas, et cartes géographiques	Sans droits d'entrée.
54	Tapis: en jute, en chanvre, en feutre (ou "patent tapestry")	7½
55	Tapis supérieurs: de Bruxelles, Kidderminster, et tous ceux non mentionnés à part	10
56	Tapis de velours	20
57	Descentes de lit de toute espèce	7½
58	Peaux: tannées, ordinaires non teintées	7½
59	Peaux de qualité supérieure à dessins et teintées	10
60	Maroquineries diverses	10
61	Cocons	7½
62	Bonbons et articles de confiserie	10
63	Coraux, montés ou non	20
64	Écorces diverses et ingrédients pour les tanneries	5
65	Os	5
66	Cochonille	20
67	Ingrédients pour la teinture, couleurs à l'huile et autres et ce qui sert à les fabriquer	7½
68	Silic	5
69	Vernis	7½
70	Objets vernissés ordinaires	10

No.	Objets d'Importation.	Droits d'Entrée ad valorem.
72	Lampes diverses	Pour cent. 7½
73	Caramels	10
74	Médicaments et drogues à l'exception de celles qui sont mentionnées à part	5
75	Chanvre, lin et jute	5
76	Caractères d'imprimerie, neuf et vieux.. .. .	Sans droits d'entrée.
77	Bois de construction et autre, bois tendre	7½
78	Bois de construction et autre, bois dur	10
79	Huile d'éclairage ("Touyou")	5
80	Huiles végétales	7½
81	Résidu oléagineux	10
82	Métaux divers: en barres, en lingots, en feuilles, en branches, en cercles, de marque, &c., fer vieux et limaille de fer	5
83	Métaux: en tuyaux, recouverts de zinc, fil de fer, platine, mercure, tombac, laiton, or, et argent bruts.	5
84	Produits métalliques: clous, vis, instruments, machines, matériel de chemins de fer, &c.	7½
85	Meubles divers	7½
86	Modèles d'inventions nouvelles.. .. .	10
87	Chou maritime	Sans droits d'entrée.
88	Produits maritimes: à l'exception de ceux mentionnés à part, tels que: sèche, &c.	5
89	Instruments de musique divers.. .. .	7½
90	Boîtes à musique.. .. .	10
91	Farines diverses	5
92	Musc	20
93	Savon ordinaire	5
94	Savons fins	10
95	Viande fraîche	5
96	Viande séchée et salée	7½
97	Boissons: kvas, limonade, bière de gingembre, soda, et eaux minérales	7½
98	Boissons spiritueuses en bouteilles de grès	7½
99	Boissons spiritueuses: liqueurs en flûts ou en bouteilles.	7½
100	Produits de néphrite	20
101	Fils et filasse de toute espèce, à l'exception de la filasse de soie	5
102	Échantillon de petite dimension	Sans droits d'entrée.
103	Légumes: frais, secs, et salés	5
104	Couvertures et couvre-pieds	7½
105	Armes à feu, munitions, armes blanches, fusils de chasse importés par autorisation spéciale du Gouvernement Coreen	20
106	Lunettes	7½
107	Toiles à voiles	7½
108	Poudre en grains	5
109	Bière, porter, et cidre	10
110	Produits pyrotechniques	20
111	Papier ordinaire	5
112	Papier coloré, papier de luxe, et papier de teinture	10
113	Toute espèce de papier non mentionnée à part	7½
114	Matériel de chancellerie, cahiers, &c.	7½
115	Habits et chaussures, chapeaux, souliers, bottes, &c..	7½
116	Habillements en soie	10
117	Moustiquaires non en soie	7½

No.	Objets d'Importation.	Droits d'Entrée ad valorem.
119	Toile Sia-bou et toute espèce d'étoffes de chanvre, de jute	Pour cent. 7½
120	Objets en argent appliqué	10
121	Matière filée: coton, chanvre, laine, &c.	5
122	Épices diverses	20
123	Nids d'oiseaux	20
124*	Boutons, boucles, agrafes	7½
125	Duvet et plumes diverses	7½
126	Plantes, arbres, et arbustes	Sans droits d'entrée.
127	Banan (roseau de l'Inde), fendu et intact	5
128	Cornes et sabots divers, à l'exception de ceux qui sont mentionnés à part	5
129	Corne de rhinocéros	20
130	Pelletteries fines: zibeline, castor, &c.	20
131	Poisson frais	5
132	Poisson sec et salé	7½
133	Lard	7½
134	Coccolpinia Sapan (bois de Sapan)	7½
135	Sucres divers, cassonade, raffiné mélangé	7½
136	Bougies	7½
137	Festilles d'encens pour le service religieux des idolâtres ("joes sticks")	7½
138	Ivoire brut et produits en ivoire	20
139	Pois-résine	20
140	Goudron	7½
141	Sel	5
142	Soya Chinoise et Japonaise	5
143	Allumettes	5
144	Verres: carreaux, verres blancs et de couleurs de toute espèce	7½
145	Verre: glaces, sans étain et avec étain, encadrées ou non	10
146	Verre divers	10
147	Légumes en cosses divers: haricots, pois, &c..	5
148	Sellerie et harnachements	10
149	Graines diverses	5
150	Soufre	7½
151	Tabac de toute espèce et sous toutes les formes	20
152	Étoffes de chanvre avec ou sans coton, laine, et soie ..	7½
153	Lunettes d'approche et jumelles	10
154	Pompes à incendie	Sans droits d'entrée.
155	Charbon de terre et coke	5
156	Charbon de bois	7½
157	Ornements de tête: en or et en argent	20
158	Matériel d'emballage: sacs, sacs de tille, ficelles et feuilles de plomb pour les caisses à thé	Sans droits d'entrée.
159	Porcelaines ordinaires	7½
160	Porcelaines de qualité supérieure	10
161	Paillon d'or et d'argent	10
162	Paillon d'étain, de cuivre, &c.	7½
163	Lanternes en papier	5
164	Appareils de photographie	10
165	Fruits divers, frais	5
166	Fruits: secs, salés, ou en conserves	7½
167	Produits chimiques	7½
168	Coton brut	5
169	Coton manufacturé	7½

II.—Exportation.

1. Objets dont la sortie est libre—
 (a.) Les bagages des voyageurs;
 (b.) L'or et l'argent pur en lingots;
 (c.) Toute espèce de monnaies d'or et d'argent;
 (d.) Les échantillons de petite dimension;
 (e.) Les plantes, arbres, et arbustes.
2. Un impôt de 5 pour cent *ad valorem* est prélevé sur tous les objets exportés et non mentionnés plus haut.
3. L'exportation du ginseng rouge est prohibée.

Observations relatives au Tarif.

1. Pour déterminer la valeur des marchandises importées on prend en considération leur valeur aux lieux de production et les frais de transport, d'assurance, &c. La valeur des marchandises exportées se détermine d'après leur prix sur les marchés de la Corée.
2. Le paiement des droits d'entrée se fait en dollars du Mexique ou en *yen* d'argent du Japon.
3. Les droits d'entrée *ad valorem* du présent Tarif peuvent être transformés plus tard en droits d'entrée permanents si les autorités compétentes des deux pays s'entendent à ce sujet et si elles le trouvent désirable.
- (L.S.) CH. WEBER.
 (L.S.) KIM-PENG-SI.

PROTOCOLE SPÉCIAL.

Av moment de la signature de ce Traité d'Amitié conclu entre la Russie et la Corée, les Plénipotentiaires des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes se sont entendus et ont arrêté ce qui suit:—

Annexe à l'Article III du Traité.—Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie se désistara du droit d'extraterritorialité pour les sujets Russes établis en Corée lorsque le Gouvernement Coréen aura fait subir aux lois et à la procédure de la Corée des changements et des améliorations à la suite desquels le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie trouvera possible de soumettre ses sujets à la compétence des Tribunaux Coréens et quand les Juges de la Corée auront reçu l'instruction juridique désirable et occuperont dans le pays une situation aussi indépendante que celles des Juges en Russie.

Annexe à l'Article IV du Traité.—Il est arrêté par les présentes que dans le cas où tous les autres États ayant déjà conclu ou qui concluront des Traités avec la Corée se désisteront du droit de fonder des établissements commerciaux dans la capitale de Hanian, les sujets Russes ne pourront pas jouir non plus de ce droit.

Les Plénipotentiaires soussignés ont décidé que le présent

No.	Objets d'Importation.	Droits d'Entrée <i>ad valorem</i> .
		Four cent.
170	Étoffes de coton avec de la laine	7½
171	Étoffes de coton avec de la soie	7½
172	Produits artistiques	20
173	Fleurs artificielles	20
174	Ciment	7½
175	Nattes pour le plancher; Chinoises, Japonaises, en écorce de cocotier, &c., ordinaires	5
176	Nattes de qualité supérieure, Japonaises ("Tatami")	7½
177	Thé	7½
178	Montres et leurs différentes parties en métal ordinaire, nickel, ou argent	10
179	Montres et leurs différentes parties en or ou dorées	20
180	Pendules et leurs différentes parties: horloges, pendules de salles à manger, à sonnerie de beffroi	10
181	Valises, sacs, et caisses de voyage	10
182	Écaille ouvrée et brute	20
183	Soie: brute, dévidée et déchets de soie	7½
184	Soie: matière filée et soie forette en échevaux	10
185	Étoffes de soie, à l'exception de celles qui sont mentionnées à part.	7½
186	Étoffes de soie: mousseline, crêpe, lustrine Japonaise, satin, uni et rayé, soie blanche du Japon ("habutai")	10
187	Laine de brebis brute	5
188	Produits de laine divers	7½
189	Étoffes de laine avec de la soie	7½
190	Peaux et pelletteries non tannées	5
191	Peaux tannées et apprêtées	7½
192	Estampilles	10
193	Voitures et équipages divers	20
194	Objets en émail	20
195	Ancres et chaînes	5
196	Ambre	20
	Toute matière brute non mentionnée	5
	Toute matière à demi ouvragée et non mentionnée	7½
	Produits divers non mentionnés	10

Pour la vente de navires étrangers en Corée il est prélevé un droit de 25 cents du Mexique par tonne pour les navires à voiles, et 50 cents du Mexique par tonne pour les bateaux à vapeur.

Objets dont l'Importation est prohibée.

1. Toute espèce de fausse monnaie.
2. L'opium, à l'exception de celui qui est employé dans les médicaments.
3. Les armes à feu et leurs munitions: canons de place et de campagne, boulets, fusils, cartouches, armes blanches, piques, lances, le salpêtre, la poudre ordinaire, le fulmicoton, la dynamite, et autres matières explosives.
- Observation.*—Les autorités Coréennes accorderont une permission spéciale pour l'importation des armes défensives et armes de chasse et de leurs munitions, si l'on démontre d'une manière satisfaisante que leur importation n'a pas pour but d'enfreindre la disposition précitée.
- Les instruments énumérés

tractantes, et que dans le cas où elles ratifieraient le Traité, les Conventions contenues dans ce Protocole auraient aussi force légale.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires des deux Puissances ont signé ce Protocole spécial et y ont apposé leurs seings.

Fait dans la ville de Hanian (Séoul) en l'an de grâce 1834, le 25^e jour de Juin (7 Juillet), correspondant, d'après l'ère Coréenne, au 15^e jour de la 5^e lune de l'année 493, ou d'après l'ère Chinoise à la 10^e année du règne de Huan-Sui.

(L.S.) CH. WEBER.

(L.S.) KIM-PENG-SI.

CHAPTER IV: THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR, GRANVILLE'S TERM OF OFFICE; MARCH-JUNE, 1885.

1. THE PRELUDE TO THE AFFAIR; THE AFGHAN BORDER CRISIS OF MARCH, 1885

IN the late nineteenth century Russian expansion was partly checked by British rivalry in the Near East and Asia. At the Congress of Berlin, the Russians were frustrated in their scheme to advance their bases into the Balkans, as far as the Mediterranean. Since then the Russian Government had turned their policy again to the East; the Middle and Far East. The Russians seemed to believe that their international position would be restored when their expansionist policy in the East had put the British on the defensive.

Russian expansion in the Middle East was untroubled by wider international implications, though her movement in the general direction of the frontiers of British India was to provoke the British into military action on their northern borders. Britain's attitude towards the states on the northern borders of India was conditioned by her fear of Russian expansion in the middle East. Russia, too, feared the extension of British influence on her borders, even when those borders were hundreds of miles apart. Both Russia and Britain had their theorists of what came to be called the "forward" movement. Russian generals, no doubt, dreamed of an attack upon British India and were encouraged by politicians who had no particular desire to conquer India, but saw a method of putting pressure upon the government in London. Statesmen do not have to believe in the dreams of their soldiers, even if they do nothing to discourage them.

Considerable ignorance, both topographical and strategic, led to British actions which, in the perspective of history, appear almost ludicrous. But, at the time, Russian expansion in the Middle East did appear to menace India. British aims, therefore, were to forestall Russian domination on the periphery of northern India and to create buffer states in which British-Indian influences would be predominant.

An early British reaction to spring from her fear of Russian intentions occurred with the Afghan war of 1839-42. At this date, the Russian advance base at Orenberg was nearly 2,000 miles away from the nearest British post at Ludhiana on the frontier of the Punjab. In between lay, not only Afghanistan and other independent emirates, but the independent Sikh kingdom of the Punjab. Both militarily and politically, the war was disastrous for Britain. In 1848, however, the Punjab was annexed, bringing the frontier of British India up to that of Afghanistan, a fact which only intensified British anxiety over Russia's intentions.

A further British reaction to spring from her fear of Russian intentions occurred with the Afghan war of 1878-79. By the summer of 1877, the viceroy of India, Lord Lytton ordered military preparations to be made in India for the occupation of western Afghanistan. Lytton was mainly concerned with Britain's prestige, and he insisted that failure to act in Afghanistan might have harmful effects inside India. The secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, though not accepting the premise of a Russian attack on India, did authorize Lytton to repeat the demand for the establishment of the British representative at Kabul.

In 1878, tension between Russia and Britain had been

increased because of Russia's war with Turkey. In order to bring pressure to bear upon Russia, at the time, Disraeli ordered the occupation of the island of Cyprus and rushed Indian troops to Malta. Russia's response in Asia edged Britain towards the logical conclusion of Lytton's policy—a military expedition against Afghanistan; on 13 June, a Russian agent set off for Kabul with instructions to demand from the Ameer an arrangement very little different from that demanded by the British. From that time, the likelihood of a clash between the two empires in Afghanistan had some substance.

With this consideration of Russia's movements, the British Government decided that their troops would cross the Afghan frontier if no satisfactory reply to an ultimatum was received: when the ultimatum expired, on 21 November 1878, the invasion of Afghanistan began. In May 1879 by the Treaty of Gandamak, the Regent agreed to conduct his foreign relations only with the advice of the British. A British Resident was to be appointed to Kabul. A telegraph line between Kabul and Kurrum was agreed to. The British were to occupy Kurrum, Pishin, and Gibi, and the Khyber and Mishmi passes. But all was by no means over. In the autumn, a massacre of the new mission in Kabul, followed by renewed invasion by the British ended in a compromise settlement, reassuring to Britain without humiliating Afghanistan.

In the 1880s, Lord Ripon, Lytton's successor, wanted to reinforce the Afghan settlement by reaching a diplomatic understanding with Russia. Now that the forward policy had been abandoned, there seemed reasonable grounds for assuming that

agreement could be reached. Unfortunately, though the Russian Government was apparently amenable, Russian generals were still pushing southwards and were now only 200 miles from the Merv oasis on the northern border of Afghanistan. The Russian Government explained that the continuing advance was designed merely to impose peace, and that further military operations in the Middle East were not under consideration. But the Russian generals were determined to press on with their own ambitions, and the British Government-in spite of Russian assurances-issued a public declaration in April 1881 that it would not tolerate any interference in Afghan affairs.

Now the British cabinet was divided. One group believed that no treaty could restrain Russian ambitions. Another was equally convinced that Russia intended to continue her policy of appearing to menace British India. The prime minister and the viceroy felt that diplomacy in the Russian capital was preferable to action in Afghanistan. The consequence of these differences of opinion was that the British Government had no policy at all. In December 1882, however, Lord Kimberley became secretary of state for India. He had no faith in the value of direct negotiation with Russia, and he instructed the viceroy to promote closer relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan and to increase the annual subsidy paid to him by the British. No more pointless policy could have been devised, since Abdur Rahman, Ameer of Kabul, was still not obliged to follow British advice or even, for that matter, to ask for it. The Russian advance in the Middle East continued, and, in February 1884, the Russians occupied Merv.

There was now no purpose in having a treaty to halt Russia's advance, as her territories abutted on Afghanistan. The

British cabinet therefore decided to negotiate an agreement on the demarcation of Afghanistan's northern boundary. Russia took the initiative and proposed that the two governments should immediately define the area to be surveyed by any boundary commission. The British agreed and suggested that, as a preliminary, Russia should withdraw from Pul-i-Khatun and the Afghans from Sari Yaz. Russia rejected this proposal and demanded instead that the Afghans should withdraw from Panjdeh, which they had occupied in June 1883, on the grounds that it and Pul-i-Khatun were not Afghan territory. Both the British and Indian Governments took this demand as a sign of imminent aggression, and the Russian Government was warned that its policy might lead to war. Under the circumstances, in April 1884 the British Government declared that "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be desirable that the principal points of the boundary line should be laid down on the spot for the delimitation of the frontiers of Afghanistan from Khoja Saleh Westwards, and that a Joint Commission, including an Afghan Representative, should be appointed for that purpose, and should commence operations next autumn." But before the settlement of the Afghan frontier by the Anglo-Russian Joint Commission, the Russians had fought with Afghan troops at Panjdeh (30 March 1885).¹


When the Foreign Office received the news of the Panjdeh encounter, Gladstone proclaimed:-

. . . it was a very solemn covenant. It was a covenant involving great issues. .
. What has happened? A bloody engagement on 30 March followed the covenant of the 16th. . . The cause of that deplorable collision may be

uncertain. What is certain is that the attack was a Russian attack. What was the provocation is a matter of the utmost consequence. We only know that the attack was a Russian Attack. We know that the Afghans suffered in life, in spirit, and in repute. We know that a blow was struck at the credit and the authority of the Sovereign-our ally-our protected ally-who had committed no offence.

The pledge of the British Prime Minister to have "right done in the matter" brought his nation to the verge of war with Russia.² Fortunately, neither the British Government and their military advisers nor even the Ameer of Afghanistan thought that Penjdeh was worth a full-scale fight.³ But a few more miles to the south lay Herat-the cause of two British wars with Persia, and long regarded as the 'gate' or 'key' to India.

Herat was an ancient city, and had in the days of Tamerlane and his son been a metropolis of Muslim culture and the glory of Asia. Now it was poor and ruinous, important only for its strategic situation on 'the main highway to India'.⁴ Sir P. Lumsden, the British commissioner, when asked for a report on Herat by the Secretary of State for War, recounted the many sieges Herat had undergone, by Mongols, Uzbeks, Turkomans, and Persians. "The Herat valley", he continued, " has in past times subsisted very large bodies of men for considerable periods, and there can be no question but that under favorable circumstances the resources of the valley will again in the future be capable of producing all the food and forage required for a large army." He pointed out that in almost every invasion of India from the north, "Herat has afforded a resting place, base, and depôt of supply, whilst from its position it covers Turkestan, overawes



MAP

TO ILLUSTRATE THE ZONAL CONTROVERSY

Adapted from

P.F., 1885, Central Asia No. 3, C. 4388, Map No. 5.

Scale in English miles (approx.)



Khorassan, and threatens Afghanistan and India." Its value to an invader of India was great since "in it concentrate the highways from Persia, the Caspian, Merv, Bokhara, and Afghan Turkestan; and from it, roads lead by Hazara to Kabul, and by Furrah to Kandahar and Seistan". Herat, Lumsden concluded, "has displayed a recuperative power in recovering from blows which would have entirely obliterated any place that did not possess great advantages in natural productiveness and commercial development."⁵

Thus, in 1885 the fate of Herat was the subject of immediate and grave concern. Many statesmen feared that the Russian drive which had incorporated Penjdeh on 30 March aimed at Herat as its real objective. The British Government had for several weeks before the incident at Penjdeh begun to consider the problem of Herat. As early as 29 January Sir E. Thornton, Ambassador in St. Petersburg, told Granville, foreign secretary, privately that the military men were steadily gaining influence over the more moderate elements in the Russian Foreign Office,⁶ and on 17 February Colonel Trench, the military attaché, at St. Petersburg reported that the Russian military party talked of taking Herat.⁷ Kimberley commented:-

This is a very important Memorandum:-The suggestion that our escort should in the event of the negotiations breaking off take up its quarters in Herat appears to me to be a very good one. I will telegraph today privately to Dufferin to ask his opinion on it, and whether the Ameer might not, as Dufferin suggested to me as a possible measure, receive some money to put Herat in a state of defence against a coup-de-main.⁸

An exchange of views took place among members of the Cabinet. Later, when the viceroy Dufferin asked if it was intended to keep Herat out of Russian hands at any price, he was told at once that "An attack on Herat will mean war with Russia everywhere."⁹ Kimberley amplified this declaration in a private letter two days later:-

Both my 'secret' and 'private' telegrams of the 25th about Herat were seen and approved by the Cabinet, and expressed our inner-most' mind on the subject. Our feeling is that it is now not a mere question about a few miles more or less of Afghan territory but of our whole relations with Russia in Asia.¹⁰

Simultaneously, Thornton carried out his instructions to inform M. de Giers, Russian minister for foreign affairs, that any attempt by Russian troops to occupy Herat would be considered tantamount to a declaration of War.¹¹

On 31 March 1885, Colonel Trench sent Thornton the following information, "that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities it is contemplated by the Russian military authorities here at once to seize Penjdeh and to advance with the utmost speed with all available forces to Herat, in order to gain possession of it, if possible, before the Anglo-Indian forces can reach that city." He said, "It seems to me that, considering how much nearer the Russian forces, even at Askabad, are to Herat than the Anglo-Indian forces will be when they commence their march from the Indian frontier, that this plan of the Russians will very probably be crowned with success."¹²

On 8 April, Colonel Trench contacted Thornton again respecting Herat. Trench said, "I had reason to believe that the Russian Government was well aware of the very defenceless state

of Herat as regards efficient artillery for its defence. In view of their known intention, to which I referred in a former despatch, of endeavouring, in case of an outbreak of war, to seize Herat, I would again urge the great importance of at once endeavouring to remedy this defect by the despatch, even now, of some efficient artillery from our Indian frontier." He added, "Should measures be taken at once with this object, some efficient guns might reach Herat, even under Afghan escort, in the course of a month or six weeks from the date of their dispatch from Quetta, and there might be a reasonable hope of their arriving in time to defend the city against any attack by the Russians. The artillery with which Herat is at present provided is of the most nondescript, miscellaneous, and inefficient kind possible, and the available ammunition for these guns is of the same character."¹³

On the other hand, the Russian Government explained their position concerning the conflict with Afghan troops in Penjdeh on 30 March. The "St Petersburg Gazette," 29 March (10 April), observed the cause of the conflict on the Kushk River as follows:-

The Afghans were cautioned by the British Government, after the Agreement of the 5(17) March, that in the interests of the Ameer and of his high Protectress they ought to keep quiet, and the fault does not lie with the Russian Government if they received a severe lesson for not behaving accordingly. All that could be done on our part to preserve the peace was done by us, and even when the guns went off by accident our officers did their best to protect the lives of the British officers; if they failed in their endeavours it was because the Englishmen's horses were too fleet.

Whatever may be the consequences of this affair on the Kushk River we may wash our hands of it, but not so the British, whose warlike preparations and outcries were calculated to operate on the impressionable Asiatic friends

of the British Government. Let us hope that the lesson received by the Afghans will impress them with the necessity of more closely following the judicious advice of their protectors with greater care, and that the matter on the Kushk will serve to establish that peace which is essential for the prosecution of the work of drawing a 'scientific frontier' between Russian Turkestan and British Afghanistan.¹⁴

According to a Memorandum of 22 April by Mr. Michell, the British Consul in St. Petersburg, on the opinions of the Russian Press, the "Moscow Gazette" treated the present misunderstanding between Russia and Britain in a lofty and defiant tone, being quite convinced that Britain could not attack Russia either by land or sea, in consequence of some alleged unfavourable political combinations which would preclude the possibility of her conducting any kind of hostilities. "Germany," the "Gazette" asserted, "is in favour of closing the entrance to the Baltic against the British fleet, while Turkey will carefully guard the Straits. With reference to the encounter on the banks of the Kushk, it states that the effect of the Russian victory has been to shake the faith of the Afghans in the power of Britain. Now that Russia may at any moment occupy Penjdeh, and that all the country as far as the gates of Herat remains unprotected, the occupation of the Delimitation Commission is gone. The British must accordingly recognize accomplished facts, as the Afghans, much against their will, have already done."

According to the "Novoe Vremya," the brilliant Russian victory in the country inhabited by the Saryks had been followed by results most favourable to Russia, and the rumour of it had spread throughout Central Asia and Mussulman India. The "Svet"

newspaper in each issue strongly urged the necessity of the occupation of Herat by Russian troops, the delay of which would only occasion loss and complications, so far as Russia was concerned.

The "Russki Vedomosti," published in Moscow, was moderate in its tone, and advocated a peaceful solution of the dispute. In a recent letter from its St. Petersburg correspondent the complete apathy of the Russian public on the whole question of the Russo-Afghan boundary was forcibly depicted. It also pointed out that the idea generally entertained at St. Petersburg that peace would not be disturbed because Britain was incapable of waging war on the large scale was a most irrational one.¹⁵

With the above exception, Michell mentioned that the whole of the Russian press of St. Petersburg and Moscow might be said to be very hostile to Britain and unanimous in the advocacy of an unyielding attitude on the part of the Russian Government as regards any demands of concession that Britain might urge. Their diatribes were based on a profound belief that Great Britain was incapable of opposing Russian schemes by armed force, even if she were really inclined to do so; and it seems to be a general conviction that Britain was endeavouring by intimidation to force Russia to surrender the fruits of her military successes on the borders of Afghanistan.¹⁶

In effect, the Afghan border crisis in the Anglo-Russian rivalry aroused expectation of a war between those nations, Britain and Russia, which would not be confined to Central Asia.

2. THE NECESSITY OF TEMPORARY OCCUPATION.

2.1. POLITICAL VIEW.

IN the nineteenth century, Russia's ambitions included an ice-free port on the Pacific as the outpost from which to extend to southward regions.¹ Some writers claimed that the Russians had desired such a port since the time of count Nikolai Nikolaevich Muraviev-Amurskii (1857), governor General of Eastern Siberia.² However, there were no indications that the Russian Government was dissatisfied with the port of Vladivostock before 1885, and the tremendous expenditures for its fortification and development in 1877-1879 indicated that it was to serve as the main port of Russia in the Far East.³ Therefore, before 1885 Russia had neither the resources nor the naval strength in the Far East which would require the acquisition of an ice-free port in Korea.

On the other hand, some nations sensitively reacted to the possibility of Russia acquiring of an ice-free port in Korea. In 1876, Japanese diplomats warned Korea and China of "the Russian danger", the Japanese distrusting Russian activities on the Tumen River on the border between China, Russia and Korea which indicated an advance to the south, and fearful of the occupation of Tsushima in the impending Russo-Chinese War.⁴ In 1878, the Viceroy Li Hung-chang warned Korea that unless she did open up her ports to China "She would be isolated in case of a Russian Attack."⁵ In 1880 both Great Britain and the United States warned Korea that Russia might seize the northeastern part of her territory, including Port Lazareff, and the American Commodore, R. W. Shufeldt, who was then attempting to open Korea to American trade by treaty, warned of this threat.⁶ Finally, in

1882 a book that became extremely popular and was widely read-"Korea, the Hermit Nation"-by William Elliot Griffis gave great impetus to the spreading of the impression of Russian aggressive intention and particularly of the theory of the ice-free port.⁷

On 30 March 1885, as already related local Russian authorities broke their pledge to refrain from further advances on the Afghan frontier until the joint Anglo-Russian commission should finish the delimitation of the new northern border of Afghanistan, and precipitated an acute crisis in Anglo-Russian relation.⁸ Roused to a high pitch of excitement, Great Britain prepared for war.⁹ Consequently, the British chose to follow a traditional strategic plan-to attack Russia with her fleet in the Black Sea and at some weak point like Vladivostock in Russia's far flung possessions. Therefore, the British Government needed the occupation of Korean islands at the southern extremity of the peninsula which enclosed a safe anchorage known as Port Hamilton; as a base for the blockade of the Russian forces in the Pacific and as an advanced station to support operations against Vladivostock.¹⁰ On the other hand, to Russia Port Hamilton would also be an important depôt and and naval port because it was free from ice at all seasons, and in this respect it was far superior to Vladivostock. It possessed every qualification for a naval port and could be easily defended.¹¹

Under these circumstances, the matter of the ice-free port which involved Port Hamilton became a political aspect of Anglo-Russian rivalry; it was exceedingly probable that if the British Government did not occupy Port Hamilton the Russians would do so.¹²

2.2. COMMERCIAL VIEW.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Great Britain was interested in the trade of the Far East, and British trading interests here focused more particularly on what became known as the 'Open Door' and the territorial integrity of China. It was one reason in the 1880s why British statesmen were conscious of the growing importance of the Far East in international diplomacy: Lord Salisbury, Foreign Secretary, mentioned the 'extreme importance' of China,- " The Power that can establish the best footing in China will have the best part of the trade of the world."¹ Sir Robert Morier, the ambassador to Russia (1884-1889), also expressed the opinion that, political complications being as they were, Peking, St. Petersburg and Constantinople were likely to be the three key posts in the future; China was "just getting within touch of planetary influence-we ought to secure China."² It was also a reason at the time that British businessmen were conscious of the problems which Protection in old markets and industrial competition in old and new were creating for British trade; Sir Lowthian Bell, President of the British Iron Trade Association, pointed to the differential duties and protective barriers which were being raised against British trade in Europe; the most promising fields for future British enterprise were likely to be in newer and more distant markets, the Indian possessions, Australia, and now, China.³ British commercial supremacy, G. N. Curzon in his book 'Problems of the Far East,' argued, must be preserved not merely for the sake of British Empire but to feed Britain's own people; it was only in the East, and especially in the Far East, that Great Britain may still

hope to keep and create open markets for British manufacturers."⁴

Under the circumstances, it was natural that Port Hamilton would also be related to British commercial policy in the Far East. As a depôt for British trade, Port Hamilton might, if it were made a 'free port' under the British flag, be of the greatest possible benefit to British trade in that part of the Far East; for example, if British manufacturers hoped to force the sale of British goods on Eastern nations, they would have to look to native agents to do it or they would find themselves beaten out of the field by the Germans and other foreigners who worked at lower rates than Great Britain did. In such a case, Port Hamilton might offer a depôt for British goods, which, taken in connection with Singapore and Hong Kong would give them a control over Eastern markets with which other nations would find it difficult to compete.⁵ Some people did mention the commercial value of Port Hamilton at this time: On 4 April 1885, Evan Macgregor, the Secretary to the Admiralty, reported to Granville that the commissioners of the Admiralty fully understood the importance of Port Hamilton in relation to Russian commercial interests in China or its neighbourhood.⁶ Mr. Plunkett, the British Minister at Tokyo, urged Granville,- " Even though Korea and her neighbourhood have not yet appreciated the commercial value Port Hamilton might be , as a depôt for goods, in future years when higher Tariffs come to be enforced in China and Japan, and the Russian ports become more populated."⁷

2.3. STRATEGIC VIEW.

On 5 February 1885, Sir Edward Hertslet , the Librarian of the Foreign Office reminisced on the strategic importance of Port

Hamilton in his Memorandum as follows:-

In July 1875 it was reported that the situation around the Korean peninsula had taken a bad turn: some difficulties between Korea and Japan, further steps for an attack on Korea by Russia and Japan and a survey of the West coast of Korea by Japanese and German vessels. In view of these important events, Sir H. Parkes, the British minister in Peking in early-1885 and Admiral Ryder suggested Port Hamilton which was strategically valuable in Far East should be occupied by a British forces. Port Hamilton which is formed by a group of three small islands off the south end of Korea is a spacious and well sheltered harbour, and its position is considered to be the key to the Korean Straits.¹

Lord Derby, Foreign Secretary (1874-1878), however, had suggested that the occupation of Port Hamilton should be avoided because it was not desirable to show to other nations the example of occupying places to which Great Britain had no title. Thereafter the subject was dropped.

After ten years, the strategic importance of the islands was reconsidered: On 4 April 1885, Macgregor reported to Granville that the Commissioners of the Admiralty fully understood the strategic importance of Port Hamilton to any maritime Power such as Great Britain: First, it facilitated the presence of British ships of war necessary in the area. Even though Hong Kong was the important base in the East strategically, it was difficult to control a Far Eastern area which is located upwards of 1,000 miles, over which distance a strong monsoon is always blowing one way or the other.² Secondly, the vicinity of Port Hamilton to the Russian possessions rendered it of more value to Great Britain.³ Thirdly, its geographical formation made it suitable for occupation by a maritime Power; it was healthy, well

supplied with water, and possessed every requisite for a naval station- the configuration of the islands forming Port Hamilton was such that fortifications on a small scale ought to suffice for its defence.⁴ Fourthly, situated as Port Hamilton was within about 100 miles from Tsushima and Pusan, 160 miles from Nagasaki, and under 300 from Shanghai, the provisioning of the islands ought not to be more difficult than was that of Malta in the Mediterranean, or that of Syra in the Aegean; even if the neighbouring large Island of Quelpart did not contribute to its support.⁵ Fifthly, the argument that the money might be better employed at Hong Kong and Singapore, lost weight from the improbability that whatever might be saved, by not taking Port Hamilton, would be devoted to some other military purpose in these quarters.⁶ At that time, the Royal Commission on Defence of British Possessions was convinced that the strategic importance of Port Hamilton would greatly strengthen the British position in the Chinese seas as against Russia, and materially add to the security of Hong Kong, or to act with effect against the Russian ports.⁷

In effect, from the above-mentioned views as to its political, commercial and strategic importance, it could be guessed what the British Government would do to Port Hamilton sooner or later.

3. DECISION AND EXECUTION.

On 11 April, the British Cabinet decided upon the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton.¹ On the same day, Gladstone reported to the Queen the decision that Granville should make such arrangements with China and Japan as would render the occupation

acceptable in case of need, i.e. war with Russia.²

On 15 April, Vice-Admiral Sir William Dowell, British Naval commander in the Far East, reported to Macgregor that, by the command of the Admiralty,³ the British warships, 'Agamemnon', 'Pegasus', and 'Firebrand', had left immediately for Port Hamilton to occupy the harbour, but were not to hoist the flag until further orders unless Russian men-of-war came in.⁴ After Granville had received Dowell's report, he sent a letter on 17 April to Plunkett to inform him of the British decision to occupy Port Hamilton. In the letter, Granville directed that even though he had been informed of the British decision to occupy Port Hamilton, he should keep this decision secret until the place had been occupied by the British Squadron.⁵ On that day, he also gave to Mr. O'Connor, the charge d'affair to Peking since the death of Parkes in March, the same instruction as to the envoy in Japan.⁶ On 23 April, Granville sent a letter again to O'Connor to give the same instruction as that relating to Japan and China when communicating the news to the Korean Government.⁷

On 26 April, simultaneously with an announcement to China, Korea, and Japan, Vice-Admiral Dowell occupied Port Hamilton with the British Squadron, but still were not to hoist the flag.⁸ On 28 April, Gladstone asked Granville and Lord Northbrook, the First Lord of the Admiralty :-

" Can we answer

'Port Hamilton has not been occupied, that is to say there is no annexation, or British jurisdiction or flag. So the rest of the question falls to the ground.' May I say no? "⁹

Granville replied:-

" Would it not be sufficient to say 'no'-(The Russian Government have not

made any representation).

I will speak to Northbrook at the Cabinet, but I do not think that we can deny the occupation-

(. . . .)

Northbrook agrees with me, that "no' is the best answer to the Port Hamilton question." ¹⁰

On 11 May, the senior officer of the British ships at Port Hamilton, Captain Maclear, of the 'Flying Fish', reported to Dowell the circumstances under which he had hoisted the British flag on the islands forming the harbour, in token of the British having occupied Port Hamilton.

According to his report, on 10 May, evening, the Russian vessel 'Vladivostock' entered the port and the Russian Captain said she was from Yokohama *en route* to Vladivostock and was short of coal, that his boiler was leaky, that he wished to remain 24 hours, and he asked to land and look about him. However, Captain Maclear suspected it was the same vessel that was harbouring about a week ago, and that it might be the Russian Captain's design to hoist the Russian flag. He had, therefore, hoisted the British Union Jack on the highest hill, and on each island, in sign of occupation. Additionally, he sent word to the Russian Captain, that he wished to see him on board before he landed. The Russian Captain had also hoisted next morning the flag of the Russian Transport or Volunteer Fleet.

Respecting this visit from the Captain of the 'Vladivostock', Maclear reported:-

When visiting me the Russian Captain alluded to the British flags, and spoke of this place as an British colony, asking how long the occupation would last-

would it be permanent? I could not inform him on that point. He repeated to me that his boilers were leaky, and stated that he is in want of water. I have offered every assistance, and will help him with his watering. He asked permission to land, which I granted, but I requested him not to go to Observation Island.

Captain Maclear added that the Japanese sloop 'Seiki' arrived on 10 May en route from Shanghai to Pusan, her boilers leaky; she would probably telegraph the news of the British occupation and their proceedings here from Pusan.¹¹

In effect, with the hoisting of the British flag on 10 May, Port Hamilton had been formally occupied by the British Squadron.

4. JUSTIFICATION AND REACTION.

4.1. CHINA

In early April, neighbours interested in the Korean peninsula reacted sensitively to the news of the occupation of Port Hamilton by British forces. On 8 April, the Chinese Government sent a telegram to Marquis Tséng, their minister in London, to ask whether it was true or not. When Dr. H. Macartney, who was attached to the Chinese legation in London, called on, by direction of Tséng, the British Foreign Office, Granville told him that nothing was known at the Foreign Office of such a proceeding. At the same time Granville told him that if the occupation of Port Hamilton was undertaken by British forces, the matter could without difficulty be arranged diplomatically with China, which would prefer a British to a Russian occupation.¹ Next day, Macartney mentioned that the Chinese minister was of the opinion that it would be agreeable to his government if the British

Government planned to enter into an arrangement with China for the occupation of Port Hamilton. The reason was that the Chinese Government was very distrustful of Russia and no doubt feared that if Port Hamilton was not taken by the British it would fall into Russian hands. Subsequently, Macartney expressed his personal view that Great Britain could acquire Port Hamilton with a good title, and that, in seeking the consent of the Chinese Government, it would, in effect, be recognizing Chinese suzerainty over Korea.²

On 16 April, when Granville received the report respecting the steps taken for occupying Port Hamilton by Vice-Admiral Dowell, he sent a letter to Tséng as follows:-

The British Government find it a necessity to occupy Port Hamilton temporarily without prior agreement with China. However, this British decision does not mean we wish to do anything that will be injurious to the prestige of China, and we will prepare to come to such an agreement as will not be harmful to Chinese interests in those parts.³

On 27 April, Tséng replied to Granville that Port Hamilton's occupation could not be viewed without concern at Peking because Korea was not only conterminous with China, but was a vassal of the Chinese Empire. Therefore, before authorizing the occupation of Port Hamilton, Great Britain had to come to an understanding with the Chinese Government on the subject. There were reasonable conditions for an understanding that the occupation would only be of a temporary nature, would not be injurious to the prestige of China, and would not be hurtful to Chinese rights and interests in Port Hamilton. Therefore, Tséng

suggested to Granville that he should inform the Chinese Government as to the kind of Agreement which the British Government would propose in order to secure these objects.⁴

On 28 April, in accordance with Tséng's suggestion Granville sent Tséng a Draft Agreement between the British and Chinese Governments respecting the British occupation of Port Hamilton, which it would be prepared to sign with Tséng. In the Agreement, it was stated that Granville had met Tséng that day at the Foreign Office where an exchange of views took place with regard to the possible occupation of Port Hamilton by Great Britain. Tséng had stated that he was authorized by his government to declare that his Emperor would offer no objection to such an occupation; and, Granville having taken due notice of this declaration, it was mutually agreed that from the day on which the British Government should deem it advisable to occupy Port Hamilton it should be acknowledged by the Chinese Emperor as lawfully occupied and administered by Great Britain.

It was further agreed that the British Government should annually pay to the Korean Government the whole of the revenue that might have been received by them from Port Hamilton during the occupation, and pay to China any portion of that revenue which had hitherto been paid to China by Korea as tribute in regard to these islands. In addition, it was stated that the British occupation was not to prejudice either the rights or the privileges of the subjects of Korea inhabiting the islands. Tséng telegraphed his government the substance of that Agreement.⁵

In reply, the Yamen sent the following telegram, which Macartney was instructed by Tséng to communicate for Granville's

information.

The Chinese Government would have been much gratified had circumstances permitted their meeting the views of the British Government in the matter of the proposed occupation, but in view of the Russian Minister at Peking having given Yamen to understand that should the Chinese Government consent to a British occupation of the islands forming Port Hamilton, the Russian Government would feel it necessary to occupy some other island or portion of the Kingdom of Korea. Also, in view of the possibility of Japan following in the same course, the Chinese Government regret that, in order to avoid these inconveniences, and the possible complications which might result from them, they cannot authorize their Minister to sign the Agreement proposed by the British Government, and instruct Tséng to express the hope that the British Government will not find it necessary to occupy the islands.⁶

After O'Connor heard on 2 May of the occupation of Port Hamilton by British naval forces, he informed the Chinese Government formally on 8 May that the British Government had decided to occupy temporarily the islands. On the same day, he learned from a conversation with the Prince and ministers of the Yamen that they did not themselves object to the occupation of Port Hamilton by the British forces, as they believed it would be a temporary one.⁷ However, they said that both the Russian and Japanese ministers had been very strongly urging the Chinese Government to protest, and had threatened, if the Chinese did not do so, to take the same liberty of action with regard to some other Korean island. In order, therefore, not to injure their position vis-a-vis other powers, or to lay themselves open to reproach from other quarters of having in any way sanctioned the occupation of Port Hamilton, they thought they were called upon to

offer at least some form of objection to the British occupation.

The Prince mentioned especially that the Chinese Government could manage Japan, but Russia was more powerful, and it was necessary that their conduct towards the British should not injure their position as against Russia. He added that he would like to be able to regard the 'occupation' as consisting of making use of Port Hamilton as a temporary anchorage for British ships, and that if further questioned by the Representatives of other Powers he would explain the occupation in this way.⁸

4.2. JAPAN.

The Japanese Government also reacted sensitively to the news respecting the occupation of Port Hamilton by the British forces. On 9 April, Inouye Kaoru, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, told Plunkett that the Japanese Government had been very disturbed by the news respecting the occupation of Port Hamilton by Great Britain because it would encourage Russia to seize something in return, which would be dangerous for Japan. At that time, Plunkett replied that he had heard nothing from the Foreign Office of such a proceeding.¹ On 20 April, Mr. Yoshida, vice-minister of the Foreign Office under Inouye, asked Plunkett whether he had information respecting Port Hamilton. Yoshida said that he had been informed from a quite reliable Chinese source that Granville had confidentially told Tséng that for the purpose of defence against Russia it had become necessary for the British to temporarily occupy Port Hamilton.² Count Ito Hirobumi, Prime Minister, told the Viceroy Li on 21 April that he had heard the news on the subject from Kawase Sanataka, the Japanese Minister in London.³ Therefore, even though the fact that the

British Navy had begun to take steps for the occupation of Port Hamilton since 16 April, was not yet generally known by the public, it was already suspected by many.

On 23 April, Plunkett telegraphed Granville that the Japanese Government could not assume the attitude of an onlooker about the occupation of Port Hamilton, even though the Japanese had good relations with Great Britain. Moreover, the Japanese Government wished to know what arrangement had been made with Korea.⁴ On the same day, Granville had an interview with Kawase to justify the occupation of the island by the British forces. In the interview, Granville stated that the principal purpose of the British Government in giving discretionary orders to Dowell to occupy Port Hamilton was to prevent other nations anticipating Great Britain, especially Russia, and that the British Government had hoped Japan would have approved of this temporary precaution on their part. He further stated that in order to make an arrangement with Korea, he had instructed O'Connor to inform the Korean Government of the occupation of the islands.⁵

In the meeting with Inouye on 25 April, Plunkett mentioned unofficially the substance of the interview in London again. In the meeting Inouye had rather avoided the subject of Port Hamilton; he seemed concerned that Russia might otherwise misconstrue it into an implied approval of British proceedings;⁶ Inouye expressed great anxiety as to the difficulties which a war between the British and Russia might create for Japan, and lost no opportunity of repeating his earnest hope that some peaceful solution might still be discovered. He also expressed concern that the Goto Islands, which lie about 50 miles distant from Nagasaki

and contain an excellent harbour, but which were quite unprotected by any military forces, might fall a prey to Russia or some other ambitious power; he added that the Japanese Government had no further news of Russian designs on Korea, but believed that Russia was devoting herself to preparing Vladivostock and the Siberian coast against attack by Great Britain.⁷

In effect, Inouye hinted that the Japanese Government would react strongly against the occupation of Port Hamilton by British forces.

4.3. KOREA.

When O'Connor received Granville's instruction to inform the Korean Government in a confidential note that the British Government had found it necessary to authorize a temporary occupation of Port Hamilton, he addressed the note to Kim, Yun-sik, the President of the Korean Foreign Office on 24 April;-

Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has the honour, in accordance with instructions which he has received from Her Majesty's Government, to state to his Excellency the President of the Korean Foreign Office, for the confidential information of the Korean Government, that Her Majesty's Government have found it necessary in view of certain eventualities, to authorize the British Naval commanders to occupy temporarily Port Hamilton, a small island off the south coast of Korea.¹

Meantime, O'Connor thought that the news of the occupation of Port Hamilton would have come to the knowledge of the Korean Government, who would possibly feel some annoyance

that no intimation had been made to them on behalf of the British Government. Moreover, communication with Korea was very uncertain, and some three weeks would probably elapse before this communication reached its destination.

Therefore, he thought it desirable to send Mr. Carles, the British Acting Consul at Seoul, the telegraphic message, of which he inclosed a copy. In the telegram, O'Connor told Carles that he was not to mention it to the Korean Government until he heard the occupation had been carried out, and then only in case he deemed it necessary to allay irritation or prevent protest. O'Connor added that when the Korean Government seemed likely to make any complaint or lodge any formal objection to the occupation of the islands, Carles should be in a position to explain that the British Government had already addressed the Korean Government on the subject, and that the occupation was intended to be a temporary one.²

On 6 May, Carles met Kim at the Korean Foreign Office to introduce Mr. Parker, the Acting Vice-Consul at Chemulpo. In the conversation with him, Kim inquired what was the ground of offence between Russia and Great Britain. Carles explained that Russia had encroached on Afghanistan, with whose Ruler Great Britain was on intimate terms, and that Great Britain had resented the invasion of the territory of her friendly neighbour. Kim asked again whether Great Britain had then come forward for Afghanistan's protection, to which Carles assented.

In connection with above-mentioned conversations, Carles thought that by that time the Korean Government had not made any allusion to the presence of the British fleet in Port Hamilton, of which, however, it was aware. Carles also inferred that a member

of the Korean Foreign Office would advocate and expect that in case the British flag was flown at Port Hamilton, the Korean Government would require the instant withdrawal of the British Consular staff from Korea.³

When the British Navy hoisted the British flag on the islands on 10 May, the Korean Government dispatched officers to Port Hamilton to see whether it was true or not. On 16 May, the Senior Officer of the British ships, Captain Maclear, of the "Flying Fish", received a visit from the Korean Officers, Om Si-young, Chief Secretary of the Council of State, and Von Möllendorff, Vice-president of the Korean Foreign Office, in order to ascertain the truth of reports that the British had taken possession of these islands; On arrival, they saw the British flag was hoisted and the place in British occupation, and they requested from Maclear an explanation. Maclear, therefore, informed them that, acting under orders from Dowell, he was in military occupation of the place. The Korean Officers then said they would proceed to Nagasaki to communicate with Dowell.(Appendix I) Möllendorff informed Maclear that the Korean Officers came in the Chinese cruisers, 'Chao Yung' and 'Yung Wei' because they had no vessel of their own, and when the Chinese Admiral Ting Zu-ch'ang, placed his ships at their disposal they had felt bound to accept.⁴

The Korean Officers arrived at Nagasaki in a Chinese vessel on 18 May, and sent a letter to Dowell regarding the occupation of Port Hamilton.(Appendix II) In the letter, first they explained why they wanted to communicate with him in Nagasaki. Secondly, they requested that Dowell should inform Maclear by whose authority and on what grounds this military occupation of a

portion of the territory of a friendly power had been undertaken by the naval forces of Great Britain under Dowell's command, and that Dowell should take such immediate steps as would make it apparent to all the Treaty Powers concerned that Port Hamilton was an integral portion of the Korean king's dominions.⁵ In his reply of 19 May, Dowell stated that Port Hamilton had been occupied temporarily by the squadron under his command, in accordance with instructions received by him from the British Government, but that he would refer home.⁶

On the same day, Carles, having received O'Connor's despatch of 24 April, wrote at once to Kim asking for an interview. Mr. Scott, 2nd Class Assistant in China (1881-1886), at Carles' request, called upon Kim and delivered O'Connor's despatch to him in person. Kim received it without further remark than a question as to whether an arrangement of the difficulties between Great Britain and Russia had not been come to.⁷

On 20 May, Kim sent a letter to Carles regarding O'Connor's despatch. He stated that the Korean Government had dispatched officers to the islands to ascertain that the British had taken possession of the islands. Before, however, the return of these officers, the Korean Government had received from Carles the despatch from the British Legation in Peking, so that he believed that the rumours about Port Hamilton were not unfounded. If it was true, Great Britain should withdraw her ships at once because the islands, being Korean, could not be taken possession of by foreign powers; otherwise the Korean Government would appeal to the Treaty Powers.⁸

On the next day, when Carles called at the Korean Foreign

Office, Kim returned to the subject of Port Hamilton. Kim said that a messenger had arrived who reported that seven vessels of war were lying there, that the British flag was flying on the hill and on the beach, and that it seemed that buildings were being erected on the islands. At the same time, he asked whether such a proceeding was not a violation of international law, and whether the British occupation of Port Hamilton was not sure to involve Korea in trouble with other powers. Carles then replied that the occupation of Port Hamilton was only temporary, and suggested that Korea should wait until she heard that objection was taken to the British occupation by any other power. Kim said that no objection had been raised, but that if the British took one island, other countries would follow her example on other parts of the coast.

Carles pointed out to Kim the importance of Port Hamilton to Great Britain at this juncture, Korea's powerlessness to protect it against seizure by other Powers, and the probability of Russia occupying it the moment Great Britain left. Kim granted all these statements, urging, however, that if Russia or any other Power were to occupy Port Hamilton, Korea would appeal to Treaty Powers against such a proceeding. Consequently, Kim hoped that Great Britain would withdraw her fleet from Port Hamilton at once; if not, Korea would appeal to the Treaty Powers.⁹

In effect, the Korean Government stressing that Port Hamilton was an integral portion of the Korean king's dominions, reacted more strongly than any neighbours interested in the islands.

4.4. RUSSIA.

The British Government considered whether the occupation of Port Hamilton had previously been discussed with the Russian Government. According to a Memorandum by Hertslet of 14 May, in 1861 the British Government had objected to the Russians occupying Tsushima Island lying to the northeast of Port Hamilton, and had offered to sign a Treaty with Russia and other Powers which had engagements with Japan to make no acquisitions in the Chinese seas. At that time, however, the Russian Government insisted there was no necessity for a Treaty because they had no designs for territorial acquisitions in Japan, or on Tsushima. To judge from Hertslet's Memorandum, agreement on the occupation of Port Hamilton could only with difficulty be arranged with Russia diplomatically.¹ Consequently, the British Government reacted sensitively to whatever the Russian Government did.

The Russian Government did not react directly to Great Britain's occupation of Port Hamilton because they were in the midst of negotiations with Great Britain respecting the Afghan problem. However, they reacted indirectly through their neighbours. On 8 May, the Prince and ministers of Yamen said that the Russian Minister in Peking had been very strongly urging them to protest, and had threatened, if the Chinese Government did not do so, to take the same liberty of action with regard to some other Korean islands.²

Later on the afternoon of 20 May, the Russian iron-clad 'Vladimir Monomach' had suddenly left Yokohama, and Plunkett also received from the British Consul at Kobe, J. Enslie, a telegram,

stating that the two Russian cruisers 'Opritchnik' and 'Razboinik', had suddenly departed. Plunkett at once sent to Dowell the following Telegram:-

Russian flag-ship has suddenly left Yokohama destination unknown. The two Russian ships at Kobe have also started this afternoon; I suspect they may possibly intend to visit Port Hamilton³

Early in the morning of 21 May, Plunkett received from Dowell a telegram, asking whether he had any special reason for believing that the Russians had gone to Port Hamilton. To this Plunkett had just sent the following telegraphic reply:-

Russia is putting up China and Korea to protest against our occupation. Russian Admiral is, I believe, disgusted with his mistake here, and will certainly try to play us some trick. The sly way in which his flag-ship and the two Kobe ships started at the same time, while the two he had with him are left here, confirms my previous suspicion that he will visit Port Hamilton. If not admitted there, he might either make formal protest, or, perhaps, in view of reckless nature of Russian Commanders might try to force an entrance, on the ground that he has as much right there as Great Britain has, Korea being a neutral and independent State.⁴

Plunkett added that , since he telegraphed last night, it had been given out that the destination of the flag-ship was 'Vladivostock'.

On 23 May, Plunkett told Dowell that his argument respecting the Russian vessel's surreptitious visit to Port Hamilton had so far been disproved because the two Russian men-of-war, from Kobe had arrived at Yokohama. Plunkett, however, still suspected the Russian ships' movements at least for the time being; Japanese local papers reported that three other Russian

ships had for some time been in hiding in one of the little-visited anchorages of Japan. Plunkett also told Dowell, that "the last telegraphic accounts received here would seem to show that the danger of collision between Great Britain and Russia in the Afghan problems is averted."⁵

Even though the Russian Government had not yet reacted directly to Great Britain over the occupation of Port Hamilton by British forces, the British Government realized the need to keep watch on the possibility of direct Russian action.

5. THE FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATION

5.1. A BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR CHINESE MEDIATION.

Even though the British Government was ready to come to an arrangement with the Korean Government respecting the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton, any proposal of this kind made directly to Korea, would be likely to meet with considerable difficulty.¹

Under the circumstances, O'Connor suggested to Granville that it might be desirable to endeavour to arrange the question of Port Hamilton through the Chinese Government because the Chinese Government were not at all opposed to the British occupation, which they believed would be temporary. O'Connor added that the Chinese Government promised to use their influence with the Korean Government in the matter, and he had no doubt that they would be flattered by the British reference to them, and likely to take the British side by a wish to restore their prestige with regard to Korea.²

O'Connor explained to Granville in other words that the

Chinese term "shu pang"; could be best translated as "dependent state" or "subordinate state": It was extremely difficult to fit the traditional relations between China, during the Ch'ing Dynasty, and the small states surrounding her -Korea, Liuchiu, Burma. Indochina, etc.- into a pattern conforming to contemporary international law. Although many commentators during the 1880's or 1890's regarded these states either as vassals to the Ch'ing Dynasty or as completely independent, it seemed that neither of these two extremes quite described the actual situation. According to the legal works most widely quoted at the time, the relations between a suzerain and a vassal or a protectorate required certain obligations on the part of the suzerain power. These feudal duties included, inter alia, the management of the foreign and military affairs of the vassal state by the suzerain nation. Korea's regular payment of tributes to and acceptance of investiture from China did not suggest that she was completely independent.³

In the light of this, the British Government proposed to the Chinese Government a mediation between the British and the Korean Government.

5.2. RENT-AN-ISLAND.

Granville suggested to the Chinese Government the renting of Port Hamilton through the Draft Agreement of 28 April;-

The British Government should annually pay to the Korean Government the whole of the revenue that may have been received by them from Port Hamilton during the occupation, and pay to China any portion of that revenue

which had hitherto been paid to China by Korea as tribute in regard to these islands.¹

The Draft Agreement was, however, rejected by the Chinese Government at that time.

In early May, O'Connor mentioned the subject again: "the Korean Government may protest the occupation of Port Hamilton. It might avoid difficulty to propose to rent island from the Korean Government."² O'Connor's idea was suggested by Carles' despatch regarding the pecuniary difficulties of Korea. According to his despatch, first, the extreme poverty of Korea was revealed in its inability to meet a debt to a British firm of 8,000 taels odd, on account of its being hampered by the Japanese and the Chinese indemnity. Secondly, the Korean king declared that he was unable to find funds for half the expense of constructing an overland telegraph line from Port Arthur to Seoul. Thirdly, the President of the Foreign Office said that the Korean Government could not pay the salaries of more than one or two foreign officers to drill Korean troops, though the effectiveness of the army was a question of pressing necessity.³

On 28 May, Mr. Aston, Consul-General at Seoul, suggested once again to Granville the rental scheme through some pecuniary arrangement with the Korean Government because money was so badly needed in Korea at the time. Moreover it was important to settle this quickly, as a new Russian Consul-General in Korea was expected shortly. So far, the Korean Government denied having made any arrangement with Russia.⁴

On 29 May, Granville telegraphed O'Connor as follows:-

The British Government are prepared to pay to Korea a sum not exceeding 5,000 L. a-year as rent for Port Hamilton while it is occupied as a coaling-station by this country. You are authorized to come to an arrangement with the Korean Government on this subject, latitude being left to you to make the arrangement within the limit of the above-mentioned sum, and you should, if possible, make the offer to Korea through the Chinese Government.⁵

Subsequently, Granville instructed O'Connor that he should act on his telegram of 29 May.⁶

6. THE NECESSITY FOR PROMPT INFORMATION;

THE FIRST STAGE OF LANDING A CABLE.

To secure more prompt information between London and Port Hamilton, on 27 April Granville requested O'Connor to ask the Chinese Government's permission for the Telegraph Construction Company to land a cable, establish a cable house, at North Saddle Island, at the entrance of the Yangtze River, and lay the cable between that point and Port Hamilton for the use of the British Government.¹

In connection with Granville's telegram of 27 April, O'Connor raised the subject of landing a cable with the Prince and Ministers of the Yamen. They replied that the general direction of telegraph administration was under the superintendence of the Grand Secretary, Li Hung-Chang, to whom the proposal would be referred. They were unable, therefore, at the moment to give any promise, but if the proposed arrangement was not contrary to existing rules and regulations every endeavour would be made to comply with the request. They said that in any case an answer

would be sent with as little delay as possible. Judging from their manner, O'Connor thought that the request did not find much favour with them, opposed as they invariably were to any scheme involving a concession of this kind.²

O'Connor told Granville that in requesting the Chinese Government to allow a cable to be landed at North Saddle Island, he thought it better to refrain from mentioning that it was intended to lay the cable between that point and Port Hamilton. The reason was that the Chinese Government would most likely refuse permission on the grounds that by consenting they would possibly implicate themselves with Russia. However, O'Connor added that if the more limited request met with compliance, the Chinese Government would feel clear from any responsibility as regards Russia and would be less likely to offer any objection later on to laying the cable in the desired direction.³

On 9 May, O'Connor spoke to the Prince and Ministers of the Yamen again on the subject of landing a cable end on North Saddle Island, and inquired whether an answer had yet been received from the Viceroy. They replied that an answer had just been received from the Viceroy, and the Yamen had decided to comply as far as possible with the wishes of the British Government. They emphasized, however, the strong objections to the cable being landed for more than a temporary and special purpose. O'Connor pointed out to Yamen that the cable would be of advantage to the Chinese Government, and that even commercially it would not be without benefit to China. but, they denied that it would be of use to China in any way. Therefore, O'Connor could only suggest that if the cable was laid temporarily it might be possible to persuade them to allow it to remain for a more extended period.⁴

Consequently, O'Connor suggested to Granville that the Chinese Government would probably consent if he could assure them that cable would be landed temporarily and removed afterwards.⁵

On 11 May, Granville replied respecting O'Connor's suggestion, "You may give assurance if absolutely necessary, but endeavour to avoid pledging us more than you can help as to its being temporary or removable." He also pointed out that such conditions were unusual, and that the cable would be of great advantage to China, in affording her a means of communication with Korea: and that all the facilities would be given to the Chinese Government which were usually accorded to countries granting landing privileges.⁶

O'Connor called on the Prince and Ministers of the Yamen on 14 May, and spoke to them again about the matter. They replied that the cable might be landed temporarily at North Saddle Island to connect directly with Port Hamilton, on the understanding that it would be removed when its necessity ceased to exist. When this happened, they would give permission to establish the cable-end permanently at Woosung, and allow it to be moved again to North Saddle Island should circumstances necessitate it.

O'Connor was not inclined to attach very much importance to the refusal, at the moment, of a permanent cable, which he thought was likely to follow the temporary landing of the cable-end; if the cable should prove to be useful to the Chinese Government as a means of communication with Korea, it would strongly favour the British request for its permanent establishment on North Saddle Island. Moreover, although China still disliked the occupation of Port Hamilton, the idea of its

being taken possession of, as she feared might happen, by Russia meant that Great Britain might be able to obtain her consent both to the British occupation and to the natural result of a cable at North Saddle. On the other hand, owing to the anxiety of the Prince and Ministers as to the interpretation likely to be put on their action by the Russian Government, it was understood between them and O'Connor that his note asking permission to land the cable at the North Saddle Island be worded in the following sense:-

That, in view of the comparatively large maritime traffic which now exists between Hong Kong and different places in the China Seas, the British Government propose to lay a cable-end at North Saddle Island, and that as soon as the British maritime traffic is reduced the cable laid temporarily will be removed. I am, accordingly, requested to obtain the permission of the Chinese Government, & c.⁷

The Prince and Ministers assured O'Connor that as soon as they received this note, orders would at once be given to allow the cable-end to be landed at North Saddle Island. O'Connor pointed out to them that the fact of the British Government having a cable house at Port Hamilton would be the best protection against the future annexation of Port Hamilton by any other country. They conceded that the protection which a cable would afford against the annexation of Port Hamilton by another power and the advantage of being in direct communication with Korea were important considerations.⁸

On 16 May, Granville requested O'Connor to inform the Chinese Government that the British Government especially

wanted the connection of Port Hamilton with North Saddle Island by cable "in view of increased maritime traffic in Chinese Seas."

He accepted that the cable would be landed as a temporary measure, but its removal would be a matter for consideration at a future time because of the heavy expense entailed in laying down the cable.⁹ O'Connor questioned the wisdom of raising the latter point:-

As the Chinese Government have consented to cable being landed temporarily, to press matter further at present will certainly risk withdrawal from previous understanding. Direct communication between Saddle Island and Korea will make them less likely to insist on removal, at any rate, the danger is remote.¹⁰

In this way, the British Government successfully executed the first stage for landing a cable end on North Saddle Island.

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2. O'Connor to Granville, No. 201, 1 May 1885 (rec'd 30 June), F.O. 405/35, No. 61.
3. O'Connor to Granville, No. 204, very confidential, 3 May 1885 (rec'd 30 June), F.O. 405/35, No. 62.
4. O'Connor to Granville, No. 217, confidential, 9 May 1885 (rec'd 6 July), F.O. 405/35, No. 70.
5. O'Connor to Granville, No. 32, telegraph, 8 May 1885 (rec'd 9 May) F.O. 405/35, No. 17.
6. Granville to O'Connor, No. 19, telegraph, 11 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, No. 20.

7. O'Connor to Granville, No. 227, confidential, 15 May 1885 (rec'd 6 July) F.O. 405/35, No. 74.
8. O'Connor to Granville, F.O. 405/35. No. 74.
9. Granville to O'Connor, No. 107, Ext. 22, 16 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, No. 26.
10. O'Connor to Granville, telegraph, No. 38, 18 May 1885 (rec'd 19 May), F.O. 405/35, No. 27.

Appendices to Chapter IV

Appendix I.

Memorandum of a Conversation on board the English Gun-boat 'Flying Fish', between the Captain and Messrs, Von Möllendorff and Om.¹

(Translation.)

M. VON MÖLLENDORFF-Having heard that English vessels of war at this island, and flying the English flag, a wish had been felt to send officers here to make inquiries, and as it happened that Chinese gun-boats had come to Masoupho on a cruise, the Chinese Admiral Ting placed them at our disposal, on our Sovereign consulting him on the matter. We have just seen that it is true that the English flag is being flown, but we are not acquainted of the reason.

Captain Maclear-The flag is being flown by the Admiral's instructions, in consequence of Her Majesty's Government having learnt that Russia desired to take this island. As the relations Russia and England are strained, we have anticipated Russia's move by temporarily guarding the island as a measure of defence.

M. von Möllendorff.-Korea has a Treaty and is on friendly relations with England, and also has a Treaty and is on friendly relations with Russia. The action of English vessels in flying a Sovereign's flag on Korean soil cannot be justified. It is our duty on our return to the capital it will be our duty to communicate it

¹ Memorandum of a Conversation on the 16th May, on board the English Gun-boat "Flying Fish," between the Captain and Messrs, Von Möllendorff and Om, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 3 in No. 126.

to the foreign Representatives.

Captain Maclear-I am fully aware of the difficulties in which Korea is placed by this act, and I shall not fail to inform my government at once, but my government's intentions are not clearly expressed; I am acting, Sir, in accordance with my Admiral's instructions in lying here, and it is in your power, Sir, to discuss the matter with my Admiral at Nagasaki. the visit of a Russian vessel of war to this place on the 11th instant gave rise to considerable suspicion in England.

M. von Möllendorff-England, in flying her flag on Korean soil, has undoubtedly acted improperly. We have received instructions to come here and inquire into the matter, and it is our duty to return and report to our Sovereign. It is at the same time, Sir, your duty to consult with your Admiral on this important matter, and report it speedily to your government in order that they may take prompt action.

Captain Maclear-A telegram arrived on the 11th instant reporting that Her Majesty's government had come to an arrangement with the Russian Ambassador in London regarding the Afghan question, and on my next visit I shall doubtless bring news that war has been averted.

Appendix II.

Memorandum of Discussion with the British Admiral at Nagasaki²

(Translation.)

M. VON MÖLLENDORFF & C.-Yesterday, on our arrival at Port Hamilton, we found that eight British ships-consisting of men-of-war and merchant-vessels-had been at anchor there for some considerable time, and that the British flag had been flying on the top of the hill. What is the meaning?

Admiral Dowell.- The present military occupation of the island is by instructions of my government. According to what I understand it is only a temporary measure.

M. von Möllendorff, & c.-Seeing that your Excellency understands that the order of your government to anchor men-of-war at Port Hamilton is only a temporary measure, why this hoisting of the British colours on the hill?

Admiral Dowell.-Unless the flag was hoisted, outsiders seeing [us here] would certainly fancy that we and you, &c., had come to some definite arrangement, [thereby] involving your government in many difficulties.

M. von Möllendorff, & c.-What answer are we to give, and how are we to act if inquiries are put to us by any other Power regarding the hoisting of the British flag? Will your Excellency clearly answer this, so that we may be able to return to Korea and report?

². Memorandum of Discussion with the British Admiral at Nagasaki, May 18, 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 4 in No.126.

Admiral Dowell.-I have telegraphed to my government, and on receipt of their telegram in reply I will at once send it to your Excellencies.

M. von Möllendorff, & c.-Our best course will be to await the telegraphic reply of your government, when we can return and report.

Admiral Dowell.-This telegram having been dispatched to my government, they will require to consider the matter carefully before they can telegraph their reply. I fear, therefore, that I cannot state when this reply will arrive.

M. von Möllendorff, & c.-Your Excellency states that you cannot tell when this telegraphic reply will arrive; we have come specially instructed as regards this affair, and it will not do for us to return if the matter is left in this unsatisfactory state. We accordingly propose to address a letter to your Excellency, to which we request your consideration, and that you will, in reply, favour us with a clear statement of your view, so that we may take it back and report [to our government].

Admiral Dowell.-I shall await the arrival of your letter, when it will be my duty to give an immediate and explicit reply.

At 6:30 P.M. of the 18th May, having anchored at Nagasaki, called on the British Admiral; the following day a letter was sent on board the British man-of-war, copy of which is appended:-

Sir,

Our Sovereign heard that the eastern division of the British squadron on the Asiatic Station had, as it happened, come to Port Hamilton, belonging to our country. His Majesty had also heard that your Excellency had occupied the island. Knowing that

Admiral Ting, with two Chinese gun-boats, had arrived on a cruize at Masoupho, our Sovereign accordingly asked Admiral Ting to take with him the officers specially appointed by our government to visit the island and see what had occurred. On reaching the island we saw six British vessels of war and two merchant-ships at anchor in the port, and the British flag flying on the top of a high hill on the island. We accordingly made inquires on board Her Majesty's ship 'Flying Fish' as to the reason of this, when the Captain stated that it was done in compliance with your orders. He added that your Excellency was at present at Nagasaki. We consulted with Admiral Ting as to whether he could proceed here, and thus we have been able to meet your Excellency. The various points on which we have spoken are those prescribed by His Majesty's instructions. It is our duty to ask your Excellency to state clearly by what instructions, and for what cause, you have occupied the territory of a friendly Power, seeing that relations of friendship exist between the two countries. We respectfully beg Your Excellency to take immediate action, that all Treaty Powers may know that the island is Korean territory. We have to ask that you will give this despatch your careful consideration, and favour us with a reply.

Compliments

(Signed) OM, an Officer of the 3rd Rank in the Grand Council

Möllendorff, A Vice-President of the Foreign Office.

CHAPTER V: THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR,
SALISBURY'S TERM OF OFFICE; JUNE, 1885-FEBRUARY, 1886

1. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHAN BORDER CRISIS.

THE British Government, in spite of its fiery pronouncements and military measures, hoped to surmount the crisis without going to war; in other words, the British were anxious to avoid hostilities, and they struggled for a compromise settlement. To go to war "for Panjdeh or for any other Russo-Afghan contention short of Herat itself" would have been, as T.H. Holdich in his book, *The Gates of India, being an Historical Narrative*, rightly points out, an "extremity of foolishness". British hands at the time were too full and she could not afford a full-scale war with a European Power. Moreover, such a war might well have precipitated a European crisis.¹

On 4 May 1885, Gladstone reached an agreement with Russia to submit the Panjdeh issue to arbitration, and on 8 May, he transmitted to Staal, the Russian Ambassador, a proposal for the Afghan frontier which had been previously agreed upon with him. A draft of the proposal for the Afghan Frontier was:-

The line will start from a point on the Heri-Rud a little to the north of Zulficar, fixed so as to leave the pass of Zulficar to the Afghans. There it will pass between Akrobat and Souma-Karaz, and will run to Islim, where it will pass to the right bank of the Egri-Geuk, leaving Islim outside the Afghan territory. Thence it will follow the crests of the hills bordering the right bank of the Egri-Geuk, and leaving Chemine Beed outside the Afghan frontier, it will follow in the same manner the crests of the hills bordering the right bank of the Kushk as far as Hanzi Khan. Thence the frontier will follow

almost a straight line to a point on the Murghab a little above the Bund Nadir, which will remain to Russia.²

Staal said that he hoped the Russian Government would accept it, but that there was a certain margin as to which he was not sure. In reply to an inquiry from Granville, he said that his government agreed to the principle of a Convention on the subject, but that, in their opinion, it should not be signed until the frontier was completely settled. He proposed that the agreement should be recorded in a Protocol.³

On 12 May, M. Lessar, Russian chargé in London, stated that the Russian Government had raised some points on the draft Agreement which Staal had transmitted to St. Petersburg. With the British Government's agreement, they would be prepared to agree to the following modifications in the project drawn up with Lessar:-

1. As regards Zulfikar, "the frontier will start from the Heri-Rud a little to the north of the point marked "Zulfikar Pass", and will follow the crests of the heights bordering on the north the pass which runs from the Heri-Rud eastwards, so as to leave to Afghanistan the command of both ends of the pass in question."

2. With regard to the point at which the frontier was to cross the Murghab, the British Government were ready to agree that it should be defined as a point north of Maruchak, fixed so as to leave to Russia the lands cultivated by the Saryks and their pastures.⁴

On 25 June, Giers expressed to Salisbury, the conservative successor to Granville in the change of government on 24 June 1885, his hope that, "Your Lordship will agree to continue the negotiation on the Afghan boundary question from the point at

which it is left by the late Cabinet, and that the Emperor sincerely wishes that it may be brought to an amicable conclusion."⁵

On 21 July, Salisbury wrote to his ambassador in St. Petersburg:-

... the Russian negotiation seems as if it had arrived at an impasse. I don't think that at present they mean war-but I fear they have pledged themselves too strongly not to grant the whole pass, and that they cannot retract. Of course we cannot retract, for we are bound to the Ameer.⁶

A fortnight later, he continued:

I do not apprehend any change in Afghanistan so long as the heat continues, but I do not feel at all secure against an *incident facheux* as soon as October begins. However the defences of Herat are going forward, and barring treachery I do not believe that they will be open to a *Coup de main*.⁷

Thornton who agreed with Salisbury's opinion, did not think that the Russians intended to go to war in the immediate future, nor over the Afghan boundary.

On 10 September, indeed, the Russians did sign a preliminary protocol which defined in general terms over three hundred miles of boundary from Zulfikar on the Heri-Rud to Khwaja Salar on the Oxus.⁸

With this, the Afghan border crisis in Anglo-Russian rivalry was settled, and it meant that Britain should reconsider the necessity of retaining possession of Port Hamilton because the Port Hamilton occupation was due to the Anglo-Russian

struggle over the Afghan crisis.

2. RECONSIDERATION OF THE COMMERCIAL VIEW.

The commercial value of Port Hamilton had already been assessed by some people in April 1885, but it was not considered specially by the British Government. In early July, at the British Government's request, the Board of Trade had examined the value of Port Hamilton to the trade of Britain. During the examination, it was considered whether, supposing British trade carried on in the neighbourhood of Port Hamilton to be or likely to become in future an important branch of British commerce, the annexation and occupation of that port would afford commercial advantages.

First consideration was given to trade carried on between the United Kingdom or its dependencies with the countries in the Northern Pacific, or trade carried on by British vessels in that part of the world. In the mid-1880s, even though the British Government which backed an 'Open Door' policy and the territorial integrity of China, actively promoted trade with her, Sino-British trade was not yet enough to be measured by the available official figures as to imports and exports.¹ Moreover, the whole trade of the Russian ports on the Pacific was insignificant, so insignificant that it found no place in the Russian official volumes of statistics relating to imports and exports, shipping, and customs revenue, which the Board of Trade received regularly from the Russian statistical authorities. In addition, the trade of Korea at the time was as yet entirely undeveloped, and gave no material employment to British shipping. Consequently, only the trade of the United Kingdom with Japan, which opened the door to

western countries in the mid-1850s, and the employment of British shipping in the trade of that country could be considered in the examination. Referring to Plunkett's report of 22 July 1884, the Board of Trade reported as follows:-

From *Table 1* below it appeared that the whole imports of Japan, according to the Japanese official Returns, were about 6,000,000 L. per annum, and one-half of this was British trade. The exports of Japan again were about 7,235,000 L. annually, only one-seventh of this amount being exported to Great Britain, and Colonies. The annual tonnage of shipping entered at Japanese ports amounted to about 1,400,000 tons, of which 981,000 tons appeared to be British, the tonnage employed being of course less, as the same vessels were entered more than once. (*Table 2*) In effect, very little of the shipping trade appeared to be directly with Great Britain (except her colonies).

Return showing the Value of the Import and Export Trade of Japan during 1883. (*Table 1*)

Countries	Total Trade	
	Imports	Exports
	£	£
Great Britain and Colonies	3,184,457	1,183,060
United States	663,982	2,759,966
France	388,679	2,023,587
Germany	295,106	.
China	1,130,300	1,142,278
Other countries	164,336	126,648
Total	5,826,860	7,235,537

Return of Foreign Shipping entered at the various open Ports of Japan during 1883.(Table 2)

Country (1 Nationality)	Tonnage
Great Britain	981,200
United States	200,729
France	38,980
Germany	111,723
All other countries	76,746
Total	1,409,378

Note- NO Returns were given showing the tonnage of Vessels cleared from Japan during the year 1883.

From the trade Returns of the United Kingdom, as will be seen by reference to *Table 3* below it appeared that the imports from Japan into the United Kingdom in 1883 were 633,000 L., and the exports were 2,602,000 L., figures which corresponded fairly well with those above derived from Japanese Returns. The entries and clearances of British shipping in this trade in 1883 were: entries, 13,600 tons; clearance, 15,300 tons. (*Table 4*) The Trade was undoubtedly of some importance, though it was not one of the great branches of British foreign trade.

Statement showing the value of the Imports into and Exports from the United Kingdom from and to Japan during the year 1883 (*Table 3*)

(United Kingdom Official Returns)

	£
Total value of imports from Japan	663,092
Value of exports of British and Irish produce to Japan	2,276,573
Ditto of foreign and colonial produce	324,699
Total value of exports to Japan	2,601,272

Statement showing the Tonnage of Shipping Entered and Cleared at Ports in the United Kingdom from and to Japan during 1883. (Table 4)

	Tons
Tonnage of vessels entered from Japan with cargos and in ballast	13,604
Tonnage of vessels cleared to Japan with cargos and in ballast	15,323
Total	28,927

No other British dependency except Hong Kong appeared to do trade of any importance with Japan. With regard to Hong Kong, no official figures as to imports and exports were available. (Table 5) The entries of shipping from Japan were 185,000 tons annually, and the clearances to Japan 236,000 tons. (Table 6)

Total value of Imports into and Exports from the undermentioned Countries from and to Japan in 1883 (Table 5)

(According to the Official Returns of each country)

	Imports from Japan	Exports to Japan
	£	£
Hong Kong	*	*
New South Wales	5,900	2,976
Victoria	40,956	4
India	19,196	231,994

* There being no custom-house, it was impossible to give the information required.

Total Tonnage of vessels that Entered and Cleared with Cargoes and in Ballast from and to Japan at Ports in the undermentioned Countries in 1883. (Table 6)

	Vessels entered from Japan	Vessels cleared to Japan
	Tons	Tons
Hong Kong	185,043	236,388
New South Wales	632	3,498
Victoria	3,552	.
India	3,904	1,406

Consequently, the Board of Trade understood from all these

figures that while the British share of Japanese foreign trade and shipping was undoubtedly the largest of any country, the trade itself, though valuable, was not one of the great branches of British foreign commerce. Furthermore, the trade with Japan, though of sensible importance to British commerce, was not extensive; a country inhabited by a population like that of Japan could not develop a large foreign trade quickly because the people were mainly occupied in producing scanty supplies of food on which they lived, and they had no large surplus to exchange with foreign countries. This remark was equally true of the population of Korea, which was not very large, while the population of the Russian Pacific possessions was inconsiderable.

The second consideration was how trade would develop with China and India by the way of Japan when the Canadian Pacific Railway was constructed. However, the Board of Trade doubted whether any trade of this sort would amount to much for a long time. The trade of the United States with Japan, as appeared from *Tables 7, 8*, below employed very little shipping, and the Canadian Pacific route would only be a competitor with the railway routes then existing through the United States terminating at San Francisco.

Figures taken from "The United States" Trade Volume for the Year ended 30 June 1884 (*Table 7*)

	\$
Total value of imports into United States from Japan	3,145,602
Value of exports of domestic produce from United States to Japan	703,309
Ditto of foreign produce	114
Total value of exports	703,423

shipping (*Table 8*)

	Tons
Total tonnage of vessels entered from Japan	37,961
<u>Ditto cleared to Japan</u>	<u>64,882</u>

The shipping between the United States and China (*Table 9*) was also inconsiderable:-

shipping (Table 9)

	Tons
Total tonnage of vessels entered from China	40,650
<u>Ditto cleared to China</u>	<u>28,698</u>

The Board of Trade reported, therefore, that it was unlikely that any new trade via Japan created in the near future by opening the Canadian Pacific Railway would be very large.

The third consideration was in respect of the suggestion in Plunkett's despatch that Port Hamilton by being a free port in the vicinity of China, Japan and Korea, would be resorted to by native traders, and thereby in some way evade the apprehended high tariffs of China, Japan, and Korea.² This could hardly be so with respect to China, to which Hong Kong was more accessible, while it was also more conveniently placed with regard to the United Kingdom and its dependencies than Port Hamilton would be. But even as regards Japan and Korea, Port Hamilton would only be a depôt and as the goods would be liable to tariff duties when they came from Port Hamilton just as much as when they came from any other place, the Board of Trade failed to see any inducement whatever to traders to take goods to Port Hamilton at all for distribution in the adjacent countries. In addition, it was considered by them that even if Port Hamilton were to become, in British hands, a successful commercial depôt, the benefit of it as

a free trade port would secure as much to the British rivals, the Germans and Americans, as to themselves, whilst the expense would be theirs alone.

The last consideration was as to how Port Hamilton might be used as a coaling station. It was doubted by the Board of Trade whether it was expedient to adapt the principle that particular branches of British foreign trade of such an amount as that shown to exist in the North Pacific should all be protected by coaling-stations and naval depôts in their immediate neighbourhood. There were British dependencies and possessions scattered all over the world, so that as to many parts of British foreign trade the question did not arise; but there were various trades more important than that with Japan without the special protection of a British coaling-station and trade depôt. There was a large trade with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the northern ports of Russia, not to speak of Germany, unprotected by any 'station'. Another large trade, viz., that with Chile, Peru, and the western coast of South America, was similarly unprotected; the trade of Great Britain with Rumania and with Russian ports in the Black Sea was equally without the protection of a special station in the immediate neighbourhood of those ports.³

Under these circumstances, the Board of Trade failed to see in what manner the occupation of Port Hamilton would tend to any large extension or improvement of British trade in these regions.

3. PROTEST.

3.1. CHINA.

While the British Government had found Korea and her neighbours reacting sensitively to their occupation of Port Hamilton, they had already anticipated those nations' protests except for that of the Chinese because of a good relationship with the Chinese Government. Nevertheless, the British Government watched carefully the Chinese moves because the Chinese Admiral Ting had left Taku for Korea in order to carry a protest of the King of Korea to the British Admiral against the occupation of Port Hamilton.

O'Connor tried to find out whether Ting had formally protested against occupation of Port Hamilton. In the course of conversation with the Prince and Ministers of the Yamen, O'Connor found no intimation of any intention to protest formally against the British occupation of Port Hamilton, and from the language of the Ministers he had reason to believe that China would not herself move in the matter, though it was less certain that the Korean Government would remain passive.¹ O'Connor inquired of Dowell, therefore, whether Ting had actually handed in a formal protest to him. Dowell said that Ting merely conveyed the Korean officials to the islands, not finding him at Port Hamilton, although the protest against the British occupation of Port Hamilton came from Korea.² Therefore, O'Connor reported to London that, "Chinese Government profess ignorance of protest, and have assured me confidentially that they are not personally opposed to our temporary occupation."³

Taking this view of the putative Chinese protest, O'Connor

challenged Plunkett's view that the Chinese Government had been active in remonstrating against the occupation of Port Hamilton by Great Britain. First, what might happen in the future would be difficult to predict, especially in a country like China, but O'Connor said he felt pretty sure that unless they yielded to the pressure of foreign governments, they would not of their own accord offer opposition to the action of the British Government in this matter. Secondly, in Plunkett's despatch to Dowell of 31 May, Plunkett said that "there seems to be at present considerable friction between the Central Government at Peking and the Viceroy in connection with the French negotiations and which of these two Chinese influences it is which is now so active against Britain. I have not yet been able to discover." O'Connor said, however, that neither during his experience in Peking, nor during the longer and for more valuable experience of the late Sir Harry Parkes, the former British Minister in China, had anything tended to show that there was any considerable friction between the Viceroy and Ministers of the Yamen, either in the matter of the French negotiations or other matters. Lastly, he pointed out that the Viceroy had not been active against Great Britain. This could be assumed from the fact of his having written to the King of Korea to offer no further objection to the British occupation, and of his having sent this letter through the British Consul.⁴

However, two developments changed O'Connor's view: one was that O'Connor had received news from Korea of an Agreement between Möllendorff and the Russian Legation at Tokyo. This Agreement dated from a period certainly prior to any question of the occupation of Port Hamilton by Britain, but it put at rest the

complaint so often repeated by the Yamen that Russian activity in Korea had been instigated by the action of the British Government. The other was that the Chinese Government had very strong objection to entering into any formal agreement with a view to recognizing the occupation of Port Hamilton, unless the British Government consented to join with China in a guarantee of the integrity of Korea. These facts showed that the occupation of Port Hamilton, while bestowing advantages on Great Britain, brought trouble and difficulty for China. Moreover, the facts showed clearly that they had not dismissed the contingency of hostilities breaking out between them and Russia, either in respect of the Manchurian and Kashgarian frontiers, or of the policy of Russia in Korea.⁵ Consequently, on 8 July, O'Connor reported the Chinese protest to Salisbury, especially, the Chinese Government's strong objections to entering into any formal agreement with a view to recognizing the occupation of Port Hamilton.⁶ Subsequently, O'Connor mentioned to Salisbury the report of Mr. Colquhoun, the 'Times' correspondent at the time. Colquhoun reported China as making positive and specific overtures for an alliance with the British Government; the attitude of the Chinese Government was however extremely cautious, and the most that could be said was that there were signs that, if war broke out between Great Britain and Russia, the Chinese Government might seriously consider the advantages of an alliance with Britain against Russia. O'Connor had derived from an entirely reliable source, under date of 10 May, the following information:-

Mr.Colquhoun advised the Viceroy Li to protest against the occupation of Port Hamilton, and told him that Japan should protest too. These countries should not allow themselves to be made a cat's-paw of by Great Britain. Britain was always ready to accept substantial assistance, but when other countries were in trouble, all she had to give in return was sympathy and fine phrases.⁷

In a conversation between O'Connor and the Viceroy of 13 October, the Viceroy proposed that the British should take down their flag, remove the ostentatious military shanties which had been erected and extend the cable to Chemulpo, where it could be connected with the Korean land-line, thus rendering it useful to both governments.⁸

Hence, in spite of anticipating only a passive protest by the Chinese Government, the British Government found it to be a very active one.

3.2. JAPAN.

The British Government had already anticipated a Japanese protest because the Japanese Government had reacted strongly to the British occupation of Port Hamilton. However, the British Government was confused by contradictory reports respecting the Japanese protest from the British Ministers in China and Japan.

O'Connor's recent dispatches described that the Japanese Minister in Peking, Admiral Enomotto, as being very active in his opposition to the occupation of Port Hamilton by the British fleet; he could be taking so strong a line only on instructions from his government. On 5 July, O'Connor reported to the government again that the Viceroy had repeated his statement that the Japanese Government had been urgent in their request for China to join with

them in protesting against the British occupation and that Enomotto was still much disturbed by it. By the Viceroy's statement:-

Japanese Minister had suggested to me that Korea should be advised to apply to the Powers who had Treaties with her to summon an International Conference on the subject. I, in reply, had represented the inutility of such a step. Of the Powers having Treaties with Korea, Russia, from the nature of the case, could not be heard. The United States would not interfere. Germany had been so active in appropriating territory of late that she would find it difficult to raise her voice, and Japan's remonstrances would be of little avail.¹

And this was derived from the British consul at Tien-tsin, Mr. Brenan who had an interview on 10 July with the Viceroy. Brenan heard from the Viceroy that Enomotto had informed the Viceroy that he had come to Tien-tsin under instructions from his government to consult the Viceroy as to the possibility of joint action on the part of China and Japan in the event of Russian encroachments in Korea, or the refusal of the British Government to evacuate Port Hamilton. The Viceroy, in reply, said that while encroachment on the part of Russia would be forcibly resisted by China, it was not the intention of the Chinese Government to allow the British occupation of Port Hamilton to be an occasion for quarrel with the British Government, and that if Korea refused to give her consent to the British occupation, the action of China would be limited to friendly representations on the subject to the British Government.²

On 14 July, however, Plunkett reported to Salisbury that Count Inouye had assured him that day that he had never authorized action against Great Britain either in China or Korea,

and invoked the frequent occasions on which he had given Plunkett private information about Russian movements as proof of his good-will towards Britain. But, Inouye said, his only object was to prevent as far as possible the British temporary occupation of Port Hamilton serving as a pretext elsewhere, and he had sent Enomotto to Tien-tsin to urge the Viceroy to exercise in future a more strict and direct control over the King of Korea, and to take steps immediately to prevent him from accepting Russian officers as military instructors to the Korean forces. In Plunkett's view, nothing could be more emphatic and categorical than the denials which Inouye gave to his insinuations that fear of Russia might have made Japan work against Great Britain.³

According to O'Connor's report of 20 July, since Inouye had denied the Viceroy's statement that Enomotto had been authorized by his government, the Viceroy stated again that Enomotto had read out to him the instructions of his government. These were to the effect "that the British occupation of Port Hamilton was a source of danger to China and Japan. Enomotto was therefore to endeavour, in consultation with the Viceroy, to bring about the British evacuation of the place."⁴

In effect, British confusion respecting the Japanese protest, under these circumstances, was due to the Japanese Government's passive form of protest, in spite of British anticipation from Chinese sources of a more active protest .

3.3. KOREA.

When the Korean Government grasped the situation at Port Hamilton, they began to protest officially. On 24 May, O'Connor

received a message, through Carles, from the president of the Korean Foreign Office, for communication to the British Government, protesting against the British occupation of the Island of Port Hamilton. The message was to the following effect:-

That as Port Hamilton is an island belonging to Korea, no foreign power has a right to take possession of it. The Korean Government therefore trust that out of regard for the friendly relations that exist between the two countries the British Government will abandon their previous intention, and will at once withdraw their fleet. If this is not done, it will be impossible for Korea to remain silent, or to avoid an appeal to the Treaty Powers.¹

O'Connor thought it desirable that Mr. Aston, Consul at Seoul, should return to Korea immediately because of Aston's intimate acquaintance with the Korean language and people. At the time, owing to a serious pulmonary disease, Aston had been residing at Kobe for the benefit of his health because Kobe has a milder climate in the winter.² Consequently, O'Connor informed Aston by telegram directly that Korea had protested against the occupation of Port Hamilton, and requested him to return and use, on his return, his best efforts to prevent any further action being taken by Korea in the matter. O'Connor also suggested that if Korea remained quiet, and did not complicate the situation by any proceedings on her part, the British Government might possibly be ready to come to an agreement in respect of the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton.³ Subsequently, O'Connor telegraphed Dowell to send a ship to convey Aston directly to Chemulpo. Aston started from Kobe for Chemulpo on 28 May by 'Sapphire'.⁴ On 19 June, Aston had an interview with all the members of the Korean

Foreign Office, with the exception of Möllendorff, who was absent. From the interview, Aston felt that nothing was to be effected by open negotiations at that moment.⁵

On 27 June, Kim insisted there was no justification for the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton by Great Britain:-

On examination, I found that the Article VIII of the Treaty with Britain provided that depôts for stores, ammunition, & c. for the use of the British navy may be erected at the open ports, and be kept under the supervision of a British official. Coal is, no doubt, included under the designation of naval stores, but it is not to be stored elsewhere than at the open ports.⁶

Kim also said that Korea would maintain neutrality in the event of hostilities between foreign states, and could not lend to them its territories.

On the same day, the Korean Government had addressed the Foreign Representatives at Seoul, asking for the good offices of their governments in order to settle the difficulty arising out of the occupation of Port Hamilton, in accordance with the terms of the 1st Article of the British Treaty, which provided that: "in case of differences arising between one of the High Contracting Parties and a third Power, the other High Contracting Party, if requested to do so, shall exert its good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement."⁷

On 8 July, the British Government obtained information that the German consul in Korea, Mr. Zembsch, had reported to his government, by telegraph, that the Korean Government were preparing a protest to the Powers against the British occupation of Port Hamilton. This was delivered after the Korean

Government's request of 27 June. Under these circumstances, Salisbury instructed O'Connor that he should try at Peking and through the Consul-General to prevent the protest being sent, and that he might suggest to the Yamen that a protest such as this, made without the concurrence of China, ignored her suzerainty; and that it would, moreover, be an unfriendly act on the part of the Chinese Government, if after the communications which had taken place between Granville and the Chinese Ministers, the Chinese Government did not exert their authority to prevent a proceeding which would be embarrassing to the British Government.⁸ Salisbury also told Plunkett that the information had been obtained from the German consul in Korea, and that the British Government was very desirous of preventing the presentation of this protest, which they suspected to be the result of a Japanese intrigue.⁹

On 13 July, O'Connor telegraphed to Salisbury that the Korean protest had been withdrawn for the time being after representations by Aston.¹⁰ Even though Salisbury received O'Connor's telegram, he sent to him the instructions, fearing the question of its occupation should be revived by Korea through a protest to the Powers. According to Salisbury's instructions, O'Connor might ask the Yamen to press the King of Korea to leave the occupation alone, and not to allow his foreign advisers to push the Korean King too far.¹¹

In reporting his conversation with Kim on 12 August, Aston told O'Connor that the President's language had been much more friendly than on any previous occasions, and that he had acquiesced in the view that the occupation of Port Hamilton was

not intended as a menace to Korea, while, at the same time, he admitted the inability of his government to defend the island against other Power. Aston added that the influence of China at last seemed to be having some effect, and that the Korean Government was anxious to postpone the renewal of its appeal to the Treaty Powers. Moreover, Scott's Report of 31 August showed the friendly relations which existed between the British naval authorities and the inhabitants of Port Hamilton. (Appendix)

O'Connor reported to Salisbury as follows:-

I believe the Korean Government do not really care very much about Port Hamilton, and would prefer to getting it back to maintain the ground of complaint against Britain, which is very useful to them in replying to Russia. They know the British Government will not take any more of their territory, and generally that they have nothing to fear from Great Britain. On the other hand, they are justly alarmed at what Russia may do when she finds that Korea is unwilling to keep M. von Möllendorff's promises. Chinese influence is tolerably strong at Seoul, but she does not wish to press it too much for fear of alienating the Koreans, and possibly making them turn towards Russia.¹²

In effect, the Korean Government had changed to a passive protest, although they had begun it so actively.

MAP OF COREA.


OUTLINE TRACED FROM STANFORD'S LIBRARY MAP OF ASIA. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
TAKEN FROM OTHER SOURCES.

Annex A to Mem. of 19th Dec 1882, respecting Corea.




Korean Peninsula I

KOREA



Korean Peninsula II



UNITED STATES NAVY

NAVY DEPARTMENT

HAMILTON

PORT

1845

1845

1845

1845

1845

1845

1845

1845

1845

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


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



Port Hamilton Island II

PORT HAMILTON

*Tracing from Chart 1280 showing proposed
Depôts for Coal and Cattle and Services
sketched out.*

- ||||| = Booms
- = Obsolete Lines
marked as required
- ⊕ = E. C. Mines
- = Shore Stations and Boilers
Cone of procurable
- ⊕ = Electric Light ship
and Guard Boats



Port Hamilton Island III

3.4. RUSSIA.

Owing to their quarrel with Britain over Afghanistan, the Russian Government made an indirect protest about the British occupation of Port Hamilton; in other words, they tried to protest to Britain through their neighbours; China, Japan, and Korea. First, in late June, the Russian Minister at Peking called at the Yamen, and took them severely to task for the partiality China had shown in consenting to the occupation of Port Hamilton by Britain. The Ministers of the Yamen told him that the Chinese Government had neither consented nor given their permission for the simple reason that Port Hamilton did not belong to China but to Korea. However, the Russian Minister refused to believe their statement. O'Connor thought that the protests of the Russian Minister were the result of disappointment caused as much, perhaps, by the British occupation as by regret that the Russian Government had been forestalled by the British Government, and no doubt the Yamen knew what weight to attach to them.¹

Secondly, the secretary of the Russian legation in Tokyo, Alexis de Speyer, secretly departed from the Japanese capital and took up residence as "agent provisoire" in Seoul in the middle of June. His purpose in Korea had been to sign a contract for the employment of Russian military training officers for the Korean army, a contract he had negotiated with von Möllendorff in Japan earlier that year. This was de Speyer's idea of how to protest about the occupation of Korean territory by Great Britain. However, as the Russian found out, von Möllendorff had acted wholly without authority, and the Korean Government knew nothing about such a deal, De Speyer dramatized his "strong feelings of deep embarrassment" with the veiled threat that Russia

might force Korea to accept Russian officers. But von Möllendorff's expulsion from the Foreign Office in July, and the arrival of the Russian charge d'affairs, Karl I. Waeber, who exchanged the ratifications of the Korean-Russian treaty, cleared the air in the Korean capital to some extent.²

Thirdly, on 11 July, the Russian Minister in Japan, Davydov, had called on Inouye to stop favouring Britain, which, the Minister said, Japan was unfairly doing by allowing the British naval authorities at Port Hamilton to draw stores, labourers, etc. from Nagasaki. Inouye said that Japan had no right, in time of peace, to prevent such trade. The Russian Minister would not admit the excuse, and went away asserting that Japan was favouring the British occupation.³

In addition to these representations, the Russian Government commented on the British occupation of Port Hamilton through the "Novoe Vremya" newspaper of 8 (20) August. The newspaper made the following observations on the reported occupation of Port Hamilton by some British vessels of war:-

The meaning of this occupation is so clear, and the presence of the British at Port Hamilton is so opposed to Russian interests in the Pacific, that it is hardly possible that the Russian Government has regarded the event with indifference. As under Lord Salisbury's Ministry all ordinary diplomatic process on our side would be as waste paper, there is nothing, in our opinion, incongruous in the report of the Russian annexation of Quelpart Island. This would be the simplest and most natural answer to the occupation of Port Hamilton by Great Britain. From the point of view of international law, both occupations belong to the same category of events, and if the Island of Quelpart has really been occupied by us, the British can only obtain our withdrawal from it by retiring from Port Hamilton themselves.

As regards the alleged Protectorate of Russia over Korea, if the rumoured efforts of Lord Salisbury's Ministry to form an alliance with China with objects hostile to Russia be true, in such case the Russian Government possesses on its own part the undoubted moral right of taking measures of precaution against the consequences of such an alliance by endeavouring to strengthen its influence in Korea.

We consider that all this is simpler and more logical than the reports about the influence of our diplomatists to the occupation of Port Hamilton by the British, and the rumoured alliance between Britain and China.⁴

On 10 September, Russia signed a preliminary protocol which defined the boundary with Afghanistan. Hereby the Afghan crisis in Anglo-Russian rivalry was terminated. However, the Russian Government still maintained their protest indirectly over Port Hamilton. The President of the Korean Foreign Office paid a visit to Aston on the evening of 20 October. In the meeting, Kim requested Aston to represent to the British Government the difficulty in which the British occupation of the island had placed Korea with regard to other Powers, and stated that Waeber, on the previous day, had pressed him somewhat closely on the matter, asserting that he had learnt that a project was on foot by which Korea was to sell Port Hamilton to Great Britain. After the meeting, Aston mentioned that Kim's language was of a more or less perfunctory character, but there was no doubt that Waeber's inquiries had been in some degree disquieting to the Korean Government.⁵

It indicated that the Russian Government would avoid direct conflict with the British Government over Port Hamilton.

3.5. THE OTHERS: GERMANY & AMERICA.

The British Government observed closely the possibility of a German protest against the British occupation of Port Hamilton. The reason was that the British Government was being challenged in the mid-1880s by rising foreign competition and by a new code of foreign diplomatic behaviour, and these problems related particularly to the industrialization of Germany.¹ Moreover, Germany was as much as Great Britain interested in Korea, and she entered in the same year as Britain into a treaty of Amity and Commerce with Korea.

On 23 May 1885, Carles had a conversation with Zembsch, German consul, regarding the subject of Port Hamilton. When Carles said that Korea seemed to be more uneasy than the occasion called for regarding Port Hamilton, Zembsch spoke at some length as follows:-

I thought the Korean is a very hard case. Britain, in occupying Port Hamilton, gave Russia just the opportunity which Russia was suspected of desiring. Korea, in self-defence, had no alternative but to protest; otherwise; Japan, Russia, and other Powers would all be taking their share of the country. If Great Britain were willing to protect Korea from the consequences of the occupation, or were to offer a Treaty of Alliance against Russia, the case would be altered: but otherwise, though Korea might indeed suffer the occupation, as she had not power to resist it, it could not be upheld by any European government as just.²

Zembsch spoke thus without instructions from his government as to the course he should pursue; he acknowledged that Korea was unable to prevent Russia

occupying Port Hamilton if England left it, but if all that Britain desired was to shut Russia out, it was in the British power to obtain a guarantee from all the Powers to respect its neutrality if she withdrew. Otherwise Russia possessed a *casus belli* against Korea. Zembsch granted, however, that the strength of the British fleet at Port Hamilton was likely to prevent her making a descent on any part of the coast, and that an advance by land would be useless. He added that this was what he would tell the Korean Government, who had asked for his advice.³

On 17 June, O'Connor commented to M. von Brandt, the German Minister in China, on the unfriendly attitude assumed by Zembsch. Brandt informed him, in reply, that Zembsch had no authority to offer such advice to the Korean Government, his functions being strictly limited to a general surveillance over the commercial relations between Germany and Korea: and Brandt felt confident that his action in this instance would not be approved by the German Government. However, the Chinese Government appeared to be under the impression that Zembsch, in advising the Korean Government to remonstrate against the occupation of Port Hamilton, was acting in accordance with instructions from Berlin.⁴

On the other hand, Sir E. Malet, the British ambassador at Berlin, summarized a translation of an article which appeared in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine-Zeitung" of 14 October concerning the continued British occupation of Port Hamilton as follows:-

It says that it is intended to convert Port Hamilton into a Malta or Gibraltar, that great works are in progress there, on which thousands of Koreans and Japanese are engaged: that of the three entrances to the island two are closed, and the third barred with torpedoes: that while the great works are being energetically pushed forward, three or four powerful ships of war remain permanently at anchor, and that Admiral Dowell cruises in the neighbourhood with the 'Agamemnon' and the 'Audacious'. Finally, it states that a considerable force is on the way from Hong Kong to garrison the island, and that guns of the heaviest calibre are mounted in its harbour batteries.⁵

These facts made it clear that the British occupation of Port Hamilton could not be viewed without concern at Berlin once the Afghan crisis was over.

In the case of America, even though America had by the treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Korea of 1882 agreed that "if other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices on being informed of the case to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feeling", she did not protest against the British occupation of Port Hamilton like others.

The keynote of America foreign policy at the time was Monroeism- the Monroe Doctrine. Its principle was that America should not meddle in any diplomatic problems except those which involve the States in the Americas. However, as regards the problems of East Asia, it was difficult for America to adhere to this principle because of her own economic interests. Especially, America had taken the lead in opening Japan and Korea to the world and as a natural result of this, she could not be indifferent to the problems which arose in this area.⁶ Nevertheless, America did not extend the same degree of diplomatic protection to its

citizens in the Far East as it had done in every other country in the world because she was too preoccupied with internal affairs at the time.

The conception of the American nation as merely a frontier influence in its effect upon Great Britain, at least, up to the World War, was near enough to the truth.⁷ In the 1880's, American diplomacy in the Far East had directly and indirectly to rely upon British policy; for example, both Britain and America in 1880 warned Korea that Russia might seize the northeastern part of her territory.⁸ It was natural, therefore, America did not protest against British occupation of the island.⁹

4. THE HOSTILITY OF MÖLLENDORFF TO GREAT BRITAIN.

In January 1883, Granville received from China, rumours which had for some little time past been current that Paul Georg von Möllendorff, a German, had entered into an arrangement with the Korean Envoys, lately in China, to serve the Korean Government as a foreign adviser. These rumours had now received confirmation.

Brenan informed Granville of M. von Möllendorff's career in China, first as an employee of the Foreign Customs Service, then, after he had left that Service in 1874, as Interpreter to the German Consulate, and currently as one of the many foreign employees in the suite of Li Hung-chang. The gist of the agreement in Chinese that had been drawn up between M.von Möllendorff and the Korean Government was as follows:-

M. von Möllendorff agrees to go to Korea to assist the Government in its foreign relations. His former experience in the Chinese Customs will enable him to assist the Koreans in establishing a foreign Customs system. If the Korean Government, or any Chinese Deputy sent to assist the Korean

Government, gives him orders with regard to Customs matters or directs him to proceed to any port, he must obey. He will at first find it necessary to employ foreign subordinates, but they must only be employed from year to year, so that they may gradually make way for Koreans, as these learn the work. At first the Customs revenue will be insufficient to pay expenses, so a certain sum will be allowed from some other source to carry on the service. M. von Möllendorff must not, however, incur any expense without the sanction of the Korean Government. When the Customs revenue, after a year or two, becomes considerable, a certain sum out of this will be set aside for the purpose of these expenses. M. von Möllendorff is to receive 300 taels (80L) a-month. He will, besides, be allowed quarters. His agreement is terminable at three months notice on either side.¹

In 1884, M. von Möllendorff had been sent to Seoul by the Viceroy to further Chinese interests, and in particular, to assist them in establishing a Foreign Customs Service, but he had come to think increasingly in terms of Korea's need as the result of his service as Vice-President of the newly established Korean Foreign Office, inspector general of customs, Vice-President of the Ministry of Public Works, and member of the Privy Council; in other words, Möllendorff who was called "Mok Champan" by a Korean intrigued to secure the independence of Korea from China as well as from the other powers.²

Möllendorff thought Korea's interests could best be protected by drawing Russia into the Korean Peninsula. Even before the émeute of 1884 at Seoul,³ in which some of his friends had been butchered, Möllendorff had regarded Japan as the "natural enemy" of Korea, in spite of the fact that he had been on good personal terms with Takezoe, the Japanese Minister in Korea, whom he knew from Tien-tsin. Doubtful that China,

notwithstanding her apparent dominance, would be able to defend Korea against a serious Japanese onslaught, Möllendorff had believed from the outset of his service in Seoul that Korea would have to lean on some other power. As things stood this could be only Russia. This power had normal relations with China, was herself, since her advance to the Pacific Ocean, an opponent of Japan and thus most interested in seeing an independent Korea maintained as sort of a buffer state between herself and Japan. None of the other great powers could have undertaken this role. America might have liked to have done so, but she was too distant and not strong enough militarily; France's expansionist drive into Indo-China had brought her into opposition to China, which in 1885 led even to war. Germany did not yet play a role in world politics, and Britain as the opponent of Russia in Near Eastern questions was a natural ally of Japan.⁴

The Émeute of 1884 and the ensuing Sino-Japanese conflicts were directly responsible for the Korean King's decision to ask Russia for protection. While the Chinese troops were restoring peace and the Chinese and Japanese troops were in conflict, von Möllendorff seized the opportunity to warn the King that Korea could rely on neither China nor Japan. Korea needed to adopt a new course in international affairs, and von Möllendorff suggested that the King turn to his northern neighbour-Russia. Accordingly von Möllendorff contacted the Russian Legation in Tokyo, and Alexis de Speyer, Secretary of the Legation, was sent by Minister Davydow to Korea in the spring of 1885.⁵

On 20 May 1885, O'Connor referred to the influence of Möllendorff who had contacted the Russian Legation in Tokyo:-

When lately in Japan he was reported as being on especially intimate terms with the Russian Legation, and from various quarters I have heard that his influence is given to serving the interests of that country. The reputation which he enjoys for integrity and honesty leaves much to be desired, but makes him a more unscrupulous agent in any matter in which he can serve his own personal aims. Some short time ago I heard privately that he had suggested to the Russian Government to buy Port Hamilton from Korea, and had offered to act as intermediary in the purchase. It may well be that the occupation of the island by the British Government has deprived him of a promising business, and induced him to exert his influence in urging the Korean Government to its present action.⁶

O'Connor also learnt from the Viceroy on 7 June that Russia had already applied to the Korean Government for permission to occupy Port Lazareff. If true, O'Connor believed, it was probably the outcome of the negotiations that had been going on between the Russian Legation at Tokyo and Möllendorff.⁷ Therefore, it was natural for the British, who since the defeat of Napoleon had regarded Russia as a major possible threat to their empire, to be openly hostile to Möllendorff when he sought Russian support for Korea.

On 26 June, Carles mentioned the anti-British feeling of Möllendorff and the part taken by him in opposition to the occupation of Port Hamilton by the British fleet. When Carles discussed some business with the President and Ministers of the Korean Foreign Office on 27 May, he had thought that, they were very courteous and made no allusion to any weakening of friendly relations between Korea and Britain. At the conclusion of the discussion Carles expressed his hope that the settlement proposed, viz, an extension of a concession previously granted to

Messrs Jardine, Matheson and Co., would work favourably for both the Korean Government and the firm. Möllendorff, who had participated in the meeting, shortly afterward said that if Britain disregarded Korea's request to evacuate Port Hamilton, it would be impossible to grant British subjects a concession to work mines in Korea. On the other hand, Möllendorff had kept the President waiting for an hour and a half, though the President had sent several messengers to tell him that Carles was at the Foreign Office, and made no apology when he came for the delay in keeping his appointment. Therefore, as Carles did not, as he pointed out, accept Möllendorff as the Representative of the Korean Government in business matters, the same rule it, seemed to him should apply to political matters.⁸

During de Speyer's second trip in June 1885, he assumed unwarranted authority by conducting direct negotiations with von Möllendorff and the Korean King. The main aim that de Speyer wished to achieve was the employment of Russian military advisers by the Korean Government. In this connection he had the whole hearted support of von Möllendorff, who was said to have prepared an agreement, without consulting the Korean Foreign Office, that he had submitted to the King. Somehow, the President of the Foreign Office, Kim Yun-sik, got wind of it, and he strongly urged the King not to grant his approval. Apparently, by this time the King had again changed his mind on the matter of advisers, and turned the question of negotiations over to the Foreign office.⁹

The Korean Government did not agree to de Speyer's proposals. On 2 July, when de Speyer came to the Foreign Office, he was informed that Korea would stick to her promise to the

American Government, and that he could take any matter up with the Russian Minister, should the latter come. De Speyer, defeated and disillusioned, intimated that there would be no minister coming, and that the Korean Government should be prepared for a serious outcome. De Speyer returned to Tokyo a few days later. Von Möllendorff, sharing the same feeling, warned his superior, Kim Yun-sik, that "Ten Chinas cannot be compared with Russia. Why should you depend on the undependable, and not rely on the reliable?"¹⁰

The secret dealings between Korea and Russia were known to the Treaty Powers. Japan and Britain as well as China were worried about a Russo-Korean alliance. In particular, the hostility of Möllendorff to Britain prompted the British Government to demand his recall by China. The Chinese Foreign Office and the Viceroy themselves also viewed Möllendorff's approach to Russia with great dissatisfaction. At the beginning of July, Li sent a telegram to Chen Shu-t'ing, the Chinese Commercial Commissioner in Seoul: the secret agreements should not be ratified and von Möllendorff should be dismissed.¹¹ Furthermore, feeling ran high among Korean, Japanese, and Chinese officials in Seoul who believed that Möllendorff had acted without knowledge or authorization of the King or Government of Korea.

Towards the end of July, Möllendorff was dismissed as vice president and adviser of the Korean Foreign Office. In September, Möllendorff lost his position as vice commissioner of Korean Customs. To soften the blow to Möllendorff's ego and to forestall his search for Russian employment, the Korean Government proposed that the Viceroy who had originally sent him to Korea,

recall him for duty in China. This was done, and in December a Chinese warship carried Möllendorff back to China, where he reentered the services of Li as his private secretary.¹²

In effect, the intrigues of Möllendorff to draw Russia into Korea had not achieved the desired effect, and only provided an excuse for British inroads.

5. THE SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATION.

5.1. THE CHINESE CONSENT TO MEDIATION.

The Viceroy at Tien-tsin proposed on 27 June, through the British consul there, the following arrangement;- "that Britain should hold Port Hamilton if she undertakes never to use it against China."¹ O'Connor suggested to London that the proposal, though unofficial, deserved consideration, as the Viceroy directed Korean affairs. O'Connor had already tried to make various suggestions to the Viceroy for an arrangement regarding Port Hamilton because he believed that Korean affairs were entrusted almost entirely to the direction of the Viceroy, and that in the difference between China and Japan in respect of Korea the negotiations were confided almost exclusively into his hand.²

On the following day, Salisbury instructed O'Connor to encourage the Viceroy's proposal which he should endeavour, if possible, to have made to him by the Chinese Government at Peking.³ O'Connor replied on 30 June to Salisbury that the instruction presented one difficulty. The arguments of the Prince and Ministers at the Yamen were in effect: "do not ask us to consent officially or to acquiesce openly in any arrangement for the occupation of Port Hamilton. We are not opposed to the action

of the British Government, in fact, we are even in favour of it, but in view of the difficulties in which open acquiescence would place us vis-a-vis to other Powers, we should be obliged, if officially asked to support you, to say that we could not do so, and even perhaps, to say more."⁴

However, O'Connor learned from Tien-tsin on 17 July that the Viceroy had received orders from the Yamen to try to prevent the King of Korea from raising any further objection to the British occupation, and was told to allay his anxiety in respect to it.⁵

Consequently, Chinese mediation which was proposed by the British Government was agreed to without difficulty by the Chinese Government.

5.2. RENT, LEASE OR PURCHASE.

The British Government were prepared to pay Korea a sum not exceeding 5,000 L. a-year rent for Port Hamilton and the cession to Britain of Korea's rights of sovereignty over the island as long as it may be used by Britain as a coaling-station. However, O'Connor had another idea: the Korean Government might be tempted to comply with the British proposal if, instead of a yearly rent, they could count on receiving a round sum because they were in very great pecuniary straits, and the King of Korea was especially in want of money.¹

O'Connor asked the British Government, therefore, whether a lump sum could be substituted for yearly rent on account of the occupation of Port Hamilton, and, if so, how much it should be.² The British Government in return, asked him, what would be the amount of the lump sum which would be required to be paid to the

Korean Government on account of the occupation of Port Hamilton instead of the proposed yearly rental.³ O'Connor replied that until he heard from Aston he could not state, even approximately, the sum necessary.⁴

On 18 June, Aston reported to O'Connor that the financial difficulties of the Korean Government were very great, and that they were trying to negotiate a small loan of 38,000 dollars with a Japanese bank at Chemulpo. Therefore, the Korean Government's necessities might induce them to make or accept a pecuniary offer respecting Port Hamilton, though a lump sum would seem to be more effective than a yearly rent.⁵ In view of Aston's report, O'Connor ventured to name 50,000 L as what seemed the outside figure for a lump sum, and he added that some portion of this given direct to the King might be effective in inducing a settlement, but that delay was likely to increase the difficulties.⁶ However, on 10 July, when Aston had an opportunity of approaching the subject of lease of the islands privately with the President of the Korean Foreign Office, he heard from him that there was no other way in which the matter could be settled than withdrawal.⁷

On 26 September, Aston sent a telegram to O'Connor, "Port Hamilton may perhaps be purchased for 500,000 dollars net lodged with Jardine and Co. who can pay to Korean Government as a loan. Secrecy indispensable." O'Connor reported to Salisbury, in sending this telegram that it might be doubted whether the sum named was the lowest that would be accepted, but that it showed the disposition of Korea to negotiation.⁸

On 14 October, O'Connor reported to Salisbury that the

President Kim had never taken any notice of his suggestion for a lease of the islands. The only inducement to the Korean Government to cede them would be a sum sufficient to release them from their financial difficulties, and for this purpose the amount named as annual rental would be of little service.⁹

Consequently, under these circumstances, the British Government could not yet conclude any arrangement for renting Port Hamilton while it was occupied as a coaling-station by Great Britain on terms authorized in Granville's telegram of 29 May, or even an arrangement for lease or purchase.

6. THE SECOND STAGE OF LANDING THE CABLE.

The British Government gave O'Connor the information that a ship with the cable on board would arrive at North Saddle Island on 28 May, and requested him to use his own discretion as to informing the Chinese Government of this fact.¹ O'Connor was aware that much opposition had been raised in various quarters to the consent of the Yamen being given to landing a cable on North Saddle Island. Therefore, he took the necessary steps to deal with this situation: one was that O'Connor thought it better not to mention that the ship with cable on board would arrive there on 28 May, lest it should give rise to further discussion respecting the whole question. The other was that in order to guard against any likelihood of opposition from the natives of the island, he had asked the Inspector-General of Customs to warn the Customs officials in the North Saddle Lighthouse that the British ship would land, with the permission of the Chinese Government, a cable on the island on 28 May, and he had secured a promise that a room in the lighthouse should be temporarily placed at the disposal of the party landing

the cable.²

On 2 June, at last, the telegraph cable which the British Government had ordered the Telegraph Construction Company to lay between Saddle Island and Port Hamilton was temporarily completed and in operation.³ On the following day, according to the extract of Dowell's letter to the Secretary to the Admiralty, the two telegraphists stationed there to work the instruments were living on board the 'Merlin', which vessel was anchored close off the position chosen for landing the cable. The wooden building sent from Hong Kong as a residence and office for these gentlemen had been erected by the carpenters of the squadron, and was then nearly completed. In the meantime, the telegraphic operations were carried on in a temporary shed.⁴

O'Connor had received an official note of 3 June from the Prince and Ministers of the Yamen in respect to the cable on North Saddle Island. In the note, the Yamen employed the wording, "that as soon as there is a comparative diminution of important telegraphic communication, the cable-end must at once be removed from the place in question," in lieu of the words, "the removal would have to be considered in agreement with the Chinese Government," used in O'Connor's note.⁵ On the other hand, in replying on 6 June to the Yamen, O'Connor had put on record the official promise of the Prince and Ministers to allow the cable to be permanently established at Woosung, should its removal from the North Saddle be insisted on, and as the fulfillment of this promise would not be agreeable to the Chinese Government, the North Saddle Cable would probably not be disturbed.⁶ However, the Yamen denied any promise to allow the cable to be landed at

Woosung, should it be removed from North Saddle Island. Then, O'Connor asked if the connection to the Eastern company's cable at Woosung could be effected without the permission of the Chinese Government. This the Ministers admitted, but explained that no promise was given, and that their remarks were only intended to show how the cable might still be made use of after its removal from North Saddle Island.⁷

In effect, while the problems of removing the cable from North Saddle Island were still under review, the problem of landing the cable was completely solved.

ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER V

<The settlement of the Afghan Border Crisis>

1. Ghose, England and Afghanistan, p.199; citing Holdich, The Gate of India, p. 128.
2. Draft, 7 May 1885, Document. 61; B.D.F.A. Vol.12. pp. 180-181.
3. Granville to Thornton, No. 176. E, 8 May 1885, Document. 60; B.D.F.A. Vol. 12. p. 180.
4. Memorandum sent to M. de Staal, 22 May 1885, Document. 80; B.D.F.A. Vol. 12. pp. 213-214.
5. Thornton to Salisbury, No. 34, telegraph, 25 June 1885 (rec'd 25 June), Document.103. B.D.F.A. Vol. 12. p. 231.
6. Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892,p. 81; citing Salisbury to Thornton, 21 July 1885, bound Vol., To Austria, Belgium, China, France, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Sir H.D. Wolff, 1885-86, Pte Salisbury Papers.
7. Ibid., pp. 81-2; citing Salisbury to Thornton, 5 August 1885, Pte Salisbury Papers.
8. Protocol, confidential, printed for the use of the Foreign Office, 10 September 1885, F.O. 65/1250; cited by Greaves,Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892, p. 83.

< Reconsideration of the Commercial Value>

1. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914, p. 270.
2. Plunkett to Granville, F.O. 405/35, No 66.
3. Farrer to Pauncefote, 9 July 1885 (rec'd 9 July), F.O. 405/35, No,78.

< Protest; China>

1. O'Connor to Dowell, 19 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 4 in No. 95.
2. Dowell to O'Connor, 19 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 5 in No.95.
3. O'Connor to Granville, No.39, telegraph, 22 May 1885 (rec'd 23 May) F.O 405/35, No. 32.
4. O'Connor to Plunkett, 17 June 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure in No.145.
5. O'Connor to Salisbury, No.331, 1 July 1885 (rec'd 24 August), F.O. 405/35, No.160.
6. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 349, 8 July 1885 (rec'd 7 September), F.O. 405/35, No. 175.
7. O'Connor to Salisbury. No. 357, 18 July 1885(rec'd 21 September) F.O. 405/35, No. 185.
8. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 429, 14 October,1885 (rec'd 30 November), F.O. 405/35, No. 203.

< Japan>

1. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 339, confidential, 5 July 1885 (rec'd 7 September), F.O. 405/35, No. 172.
2. Brenan to O'Connor 10 July 1885 F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 1 in No. 177.
3. Plunkett to Salisbury , No. 182, 14 July 1885 (rec'd 25 August) F.O. 405/35, No. 162 & Memorandum shown to Inoue and approved by him. F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 1 in No. 162.
4. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 359, 20 July 1885 (rec'd 21 September), F.O. 405/35, No. 186.

< Korea >

1. O'Connor to Granville, No.240, Ext. 43. 25 May 1885 (rec'd 23 July), F.O. 405/35, No. 111.
2. O'Connor to Granville , No. 245, confidential, 25 May 1885 (rec'd, 23 July), F.O. 405/35. No. 115.
3. O'Connor to Aston, telegraph, 25 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure in No.116.
4. O'Connor to Dowell, telegraph, 24 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 1 in No. 115. & Dowell to O'Connor, telegraph, 25 May,1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 2 in No. 115.
5. Aston to O'Connor, 19 June 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 1 in No. 149. & Aston to Kim, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 2 in No. 149.
6. Korean Note, translation, 27 June, 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 2 in No. 162.
7. Kim to the Representatives of the Treaty Powers at Seoul, translation, 27 June 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 2 in No. 174. The Korean Foreign office wrote first on 25 June 1885. requesting the Foreign Representatives to give the matter their consideration, and to move their government to take action in execution of the principles of international law. This note, however, was recalled.
8. Salisbury to O'Connor, No. 39, telegraph, 10 July 1885, F.O. 405/35, No. 82.
9. Salisbury to Plunkett, No. 10, telegraph, 10 July 1885, F.O.405/35, No. 83.
10. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 53, telegraph, 13 July 1885 (rec'd 13 July), F.O. 405/35, No. 96.
11. Salisbury to O'Connor, No.175 , Ext. 40, 13 July 1885, F.O. 405/35, No. 98.

12. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 18, 25 August 1885 (rec'd 20 October), F.O. 405/35, No. 196.

< Russia >

1. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 320, confidential, 26 June 1885 (rec'd 24 August), F.O. 405/35, No. 153.
2. Deuchler , Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, p. 215.
3. Plunkett to O'Connor, 14 July 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 3 in No. 162.
4. Extract from the "Novoe Vremya" of 8 (20) August 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure in No. 161.
5. Baber to O'Connor, 23 October 1885, F.O. 405/ 35, Inclosure in No. 212.

< The others: Germany & America >

1. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914. p. 81.
2. Memorandum of conversation with Captain Zembsch, 23 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 2 in No. 108.
3. Ibid.
4. O'Connor to Granville, No. 298. Secret, 17 June 1885, (rec'd 11 August), F.O. 405/35, No. 146.
5. Sir E. Malet to Salisbury, No. 498. 15 October 1885 (rec'd 19 October), F.O. 405/35, No. 195. & Extract from the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine-Zeitung." Inclosure in No. 195.
6. Kajima Morinosuke , The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922. Vol. I. Tokyo, 1976, p. 95.
7. Richard H. Heindel, The American Impact on Great Britain, 1898-1914. University of Pennsylvania, 1940, p. 3-4.

8. In this thesis, Chapter IV, Political view, pp. 145-146.
9. These American attitudes are shown by the Carles' Memorandum of a Conversation with Lieutenant Foulk, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of U.S. Legation, regarding Port Hamilton; 22 May 1885, F.O. 405/35. Inclosure in No. 109.

<The hostility of Möllendorff to Great Britain>

1. Grosvenor to Granville, No. 140, most confidential, 25 November 1882 (rec'd 16 January 1883), F.O. 405/33, No. 3.
2. George A. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria, 1884-1899.* Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1982, 2 vol. p.31.
3. The Coup d'Etat of 1884 (Kapsin Chōngbyōn): The Korean progressives were prepared to consider taking whatever extreme steps might be necessary to put their policies into effect. In 1884, hostilities between France and China broke out over Annam, and this was viewed as an opportune time to drive the Ch'ing presence out of Korea. The Coup took place on the 17th day of 10th month 1884 (4 December by the Western Calendar). However the coup d'etat failed within three days; Lee, *A New History of Korea.* pp. 276-278.
4. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue.* p. 32.
5. Chien, *The Opening of Korea.* p. 176.
6. O'Connor to Granville, No. 235, confidential, 20 May 1885 (rec'd 13 July), F.O. 405/35, No. 95.
7. O'Connor to Granville, No. 269, Ext. 46, 7 June 1885 (rec'd 1 August), F.O. 405/35, No. 133.
8. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 314, 26 June, 1885 (rec'd 24 August), F.O. 405/35, No. 152. & Carles to O'Connor, 2 June, Inclosure 1 in No. 152.
9. Chien, *The Opening of Korea.* p. 177.

10. Ibid., p. 179.
11. Ibid., p. 180.
12. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, pp. 52-53.

<The Chinese consent to Mediation>

1. O'Connor to Granville, telegraph, No. 51, 27 June 1885 (rec'd 27 June), F.O. 405/35, No. 56.
2. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 325, confidential, 29 June 1885 (rec'd 24 August), F.O. 405/35, No. 156.
3. Salisbury to O'Connor, No. 153, Ext. 36, 28 June 1885, F.O. 405/35, No. 58.
4. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 327, 30 June 1885 (rec'd 24 August), F.O. 405/35, No. 158.
5. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 356, 17 July, 1885 (rec'd 21 September), F.O. 405/35, No. 184.

< Rent, Lease or purchase>

1. O'Connor to Granville , No. 268. 6 June 1885, (rec'd 1 August) F.O. 405/35, No. 132.
2. O'Connor to Granville telegraph, No. 48, Secret. 9 June 1885 (rec'd 9 June), F.O. 405/35, No. 49.
3. Granville to O'Connor, No. 134, Ext. 330, 11 June 1885, F.O. 405/35, No. 50.
4. O'Connor to Granville, telegraph, No. 49, 12 June 1885 (rec'd 13 June), F.O. 405/ 35, No. 51.
5. Aston to O'Connor, 8 June 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure in No. 148.
6. O'Connor to Granville, F.O. 405/35, No. 51.

7. Aston to O'Connor, 10 July 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 3 in No. 163.
8. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 61, telegraph, 4 October 1885, (rec'd 4 October), F.O. 405/35, No. 191.
9. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 430, 14 October 1885 (rec'd 30 November), F.O. 405/35, No. 204.

<The second stage of landing the cable>

1. Granville to O'Connor, No. 110, Ext. 23, 20 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, No. 30.
2. O'Connor to Granville, No. 244, Secret. 25 May 1885 (rec'd 23 July), F.O. 405/35, No. 114.
3. Dowell to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 2 June 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure in No. 4.
4. Dowell to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 3 June 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure in No.130.
5. O'Connor to the Prince and Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamen, 19 May 1885, Inclosure in No. 121.
6. The Prince and Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamen to O'Connor, translation. 3 June, Inclosure 1 in No. 140, & O'Connor to the Prince and Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamen, 6 June, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 2 in No. 141.
7. O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 323, 29 June 1885 (rec'd 24 August), F.O. 405/35, No. 155. & The Prince and Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamen to O'Connor, (Reference to Inclosure 2 in No. 141).

Appendix to Chapter V

The Report of Mr. Scott after His visit to Port Hamilton.¹

Sir,

IN obedience to your instructions, I have now the honour to submit a Report of my visit to Port Hamilton. On my arrival there on the 21st instant, I immediately reported myself, as directed, to Admiral Sir William Dowell. His Excellency recapitulated the difficulties which he had encountered owing to the absence of a competent Korean interpreter; he had, however, secured a lease of eleven plots of land on Observatory Island, at an annual rental of 124 dollars; but that two more plots, at least, were urgently required to provide a site for the erection of a hospital, &c., for 100 marines now encamped on the island. His Excellency specially desired me to ascertain the position of affairs vis-a-vis of the native inhabitants.

In execution of these instruction, I placed myself under the direction of Captain Long, of Her Majesty's ship 'Agamemnon' and early next day visited Observatory Island-known locally as "Ai-to," or "Japanese Island"-the smallest of the three forming the Nan-how Groups, and guarding and dividing the two entrances to Port Hamilton. The island consists of a rising hill some 300 feet high, with about sixty patches of cultivated land scattered over its south and west faces, owned by nearly forty difficult proprietors. These are no Koreans living on it, and at the time of

¹. Mr. J. Scott to Consul-General Aston, August 31, 1885, F.O. 405/35,
Inclosure 2 in No. 201.

the occupation only a few straw huts-supposed to belong to Japanese fishermen-were found near the landing-place. After some time and inquiry, I succeeded in collecting the land-owners or their representatives, and explaining to them Captain Long's wishes regarding renting certain plots; the owner of each field was called out, and the boundaries of his property publicly walked over in the presence of the other land-owners and village Headmen. Captain Long's object was to ascertain at what rate it was possible to obtain a lease. If necessary hereafter, of the whole of the island; and the result of that day's inquiries showed clearly that the cultivated land could be secured for about 1,000 dollars annually; the remainder is government property, and lying waste.

Two lots, Nos. 12 and 24 (according to the Admiralty plan of the island), being urgently required for a marine hospital and other purposes, a lease was at once arranged at an annual rental of 24 dollars and 26 dollars respectively. As regards the other lots, some twelve in number, the owner's name, the price, and other particulars were duly noted, and the proprietors informed that the land would be taken up from time to time as hereafter required. This decision caused some disappointment. I had been led to anticipate no small difficulty in negotiating a lease of their lands, but, contrary to my expectation, the people were exceedingly friendly, and ready to close with a good bargain.

So far my work for the first day was chiefly conducted through what the Admiral understood to be the principal Headmen of the islands; the existence or presence of any Korean official was unknown to the naval authorities. During my negotiations

with the land-owners, however, I found out, that this man was only one of the Headmen belonging to Tek-tsun ("Merlin village"), one of the four villages into which the inhabitants are divided; and that the three islands were under the jurisdiction of a Korean official of the rank of Pyl-chong, or Police Magistrate, named Kim Kil-so. Deeming it highly advisable to procure, if possible, the consent and presence of a properly constituted Korean authority to the transfer of these two lots, I called early next day upon this officer at Chang-tsun ("Pegasus Village"), only to find that he had gone to look for me on Observatory Island. The village Elders, however, received me with great courtesy and kindness. There is no official Yamen, but at each village a large tent is erected near the beach, which serves the double purpose of Hall of Assembly and Court of Justice. I left after a little, intimating that I would call again as soon as the Pyel-chong returned. Early that afternoon, however, this officer, accompanied by the village Elders, came on board Her Majesty's ship 'Swift,' and went with me to call on Captain Long of Her Majesty's ship 'Agamemnon.'

In answer to Pyel-chong's inquiries, Captain Long assured him that there was no intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to deprive the people of their land or property, or injure them in any way; and that as regards the land-tax for land already leased, or now about to be leased, it would continue to be paid as formerly by the native lessors. These assurances, and especially as regards the payment of land-tax, appeared to relieve him considerably, and in subsequent meetings with the village Elders and land-owners I explained, at his request, to the lessors, that the Korean Government taxes were to be paid to

their authorities as heretofore. This intimation did not altogether suit the Headmen of "Merlin village," but I carefully pointed out to him that the high rate which Her Majesty's Government was now giving for the lease of the land was intended to cover the payment of all dues hitherto paid to the Korean Government. It appears that this Headman looked to British protection, and wished to repudiate all liability for taxes to his own authorities. It is due to him to say that he has rendered considerable assistance to the naval authorities, both in leasing land and in procuring workmen. He has made himself useful in many ways, and deserves all support and countenance; but, under the circumstances, I felt it my duty to advise him to cooperate with the Pyel-chong and pay Korean taxes, adding that if he was molested by the authorities from the mainland, as he said he anticipated, he might rely upon English assistance against unjust exactions.

On the 24th instant the Pyel-chong, accompanied by the village Elders and the owners of lots Nos.12 and 24, again called on board Her Majesty's ship 'Agamemnon' to complete the lease of these two fields. Among the party was a Korean, whom, from his manner and speech, I took to be an outsider. The Pyel-chong showed him great deference, evidently dreading his power, and did nothing without first consulting him. I understand that he is a Yamen runner of the better class, sent over from the mainland to watch and report proceedings. In all my negotiations with the villagers he took a leading part, and I learn that on previous occasions he has proved obstructive to the naval authorities. In the present instance, however, he threw no difficulties in my way; on the contrary, he actually assisted me, and, at my request,

drew up the deeds of lease for lots. 12 and 24. These documents are in the form usually adopted for such transfers in Korea; but in order to mark the boundaries, &c. (the owners could give no measurements; all they could do was to walk over the boundaries), I succeeded in inducing him to insert a clause accepting the plan of survey drawn up by the naval authorities. Accordingly, the deeds for lease of these two lots were duly signed and executed before the Pyel-chong and the village Elders.

A request was now preferred on behalf of the lessors of the first eleven lots for duplicate deeds of lease, as in the case of these lots Nos. 12 and 24. It appears that the deeds of lease for these eleven lots were signed by the owners and handed to Captain Long, and Senior Naval Officers; but no corresponding documents had been supplied to the owners by the naval authorities. It was urged that the want of such documents might lead to difficulties in claiming payment of the annual rent.

Captain Long readily undertook to rectify this omission, and that afternoon the duplicate deeds were made out and handed, as arranged by the Pyel-chong, to the Headman of "Merlin village," for distribution among the owners.

The Pyel-chong further requested that all future leases might only be executed in his presence, and to this Captain Long at once assented; and two days after, when lot No. 25, which was required to complete lots Nos. 12 and 24, so as to admit of full access to the top of the hill on that part of the island, was being leased, the deeds were duly executed before him and village Elders.

The land now leased by the naval authorities consists of lots Nos. 1 to 12 and lots Nos. 24 and 25 (as per Admiralty survey) on

Observatory Island, measuring about 10 acres in extent, and held at an annual rental of 174 dollars.

Application was next made by the village Elders for the payment of wages in cash instead of rice. On the arrival of our fleet in April last the villagers were in a most destitute condition, their supplies of food being almost exhausted. Labour was therefore paid for in rice, 6 1 bs. being allowed to each workman. The result has been that they have now such a stock on hand that its value is fast depreciating, especially as they have no means of exporting any of it.

The settlement of this wages question was one of no little difficulty. The villagers are keen at driving a bargain, and pleaded that they deserved generous treatment, as the presence of our men-of-war in the harbour had driven away the fish on which they usually depended at this season of the year for their living. Eventually, Admiral Dowell fixed the rate at 75 Korean cash (about 6 L.) per man per day; an amount which, in my experience of Korean labour and wages, is not only ample, but liberal.

The Pyel-chong also desired to know whether Korean traders and pedlars might come and go as formerly. I assured him, and this language I reported to the Admiral that England had no wish to injure Korea or Koreans in any way, and that, so far as Korean subjects were concerned, things were to go on exactly as they had been doing previous to the arrival of our ships.

I may here add that the Pyel-chong and village Elders showed considerable knowledge of political affairs affecting Korea, and they declared that they fully understood that the presence of our

fleet in these waters was in no way directed against their country.

Captain Long next directed me to proceed to Pusan to procure Korean cash to pay the workmen now employed on Observatory Island. He also instructed me to sound the Korean authorities at that place regarding the export of cattle for the use of Her Majesty's fleet at Port Hamilton. The few hours at my disposal in Pusan prevented me from calling on the Prefect, who acts as Superintendent of Customs. He lives some 8 or 10 miles inland, but the Deputy-Superintendent assured me that there would be no difficulty or objections raised by the authorities to such export; in fact, he appeared to consider it a good thing for the people and district. Arrangements are now being discussed with the local merchants and the Mitsu-Bishi Mail Company to call twice a month with cattle, as their vessels pass Port Hamilton *en route* to Chemulpo.

So far the occupation of Port Hamilton may be said to be practically confined to Observatory Island, where 100 marines are encamped, and on which no Koreans have hitherto resided. The works in progress consist of a boat harbour, pier and praya, roadmaking, two wooden godowns, gun-cotton magazine, huts for the marines and an hospital. A small wooden shed has also been erected as a telegraph office and dwelling-house, all within the limits of land acquired by lease. On the other two islands no land has been touched beyond the erection of flagstaffs on each; one, however, of these poles has been removed and erected on Observatory Island, and the other, I understand, will shortly be taken down.

I beg to inclose copy of Admiral Sir W. Dowell's notice

regarding the payment of wages, and defining the action he intends to take in cases of that or other crimes. This document I translated, at his request, into Chinese and Korean; one copy was posted on Observatory Island, and one I left with Korean Police Magistrate.

I have, &c.

(signed) JAMES SCOTT.

CHAPTER VI: THE LAST PHASE OF THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR,
FEBRUARY 1886- FEBRUARY 1887.

1. ROSEBERY'S TERM OF OFFICE; FEBRUARY - AUGUST, 1886.

1.1. RECONSIDERATION OF THE STRATEGIC VALUE.

IN the light of recent reports including that of the late Commander-in-chief on the China Station, the Admiralty examined the strategic value of Port Hamilton from early 1886. The substance of the reports was that it was not desirable to hold Port Hamilton as a naval station, unless the island was to be a first-class fortress, and that there were considerable expenses connected with the temporary retention of Port Hamilton.

At first, the inexpediciencies of the naval station were analyzed as follows:-

1. Captain Maclear, of the 'Flying Fish', in a very able Memorandum on the defences of Port Hamilton, observed: "To defend it against the attack of two corvettes, three sloops and a gun-boat would be required." It meant the island was not easily defensible.¹

2. The Port Hamilton force at that time consisted of six vessels, three of which were always to be there. On the other hand, Hong Kong and Singapore, with their immense trade, were at the time defenceless, as far as the War Office was concerned. It meant that Port Hamilton hampered the disposal of the Eastern squadron to guard "the British ocean highway" and protect these important ports.²

3. In recommending that Port Hamilton be placed on the

same footing as Ascension, it was pointed out that this would place an additional force at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief for an attack on Vladivostock; being equally responsible for the defence of Port Hamilton, he would be sure not to unduly weaken its garrison until well assured no hostile attack was probable. As a base of operations against Vladivostock, however, it was useless on account of its distance. In the war against China in 1860, Hope Sound, about 100 miles from the mouth of the Peiho, was seized on as the rendezvous for the British transports, colliers, and victuallers. Vladivostock is 660 miles from Port Hamilton: the British gun-boats would exhaust all their coal in steaming to and fro to replenish. Moreover, the facilities of moving ships, and stores from Hong Kong would then be as great or greater to Vladivostock as it was in 1860 to Hope Sound, the distance being 1,700 miles against 1,300 then, and there were good harbours, easily defended, within a short distance of Vladivostock that could be seized on as a base, and given up when no longer of use.³

4. If the navy were to be employed doing military duty by garrisoning the island, it would be a great source of weakness to the Naval Commander-in-chief in war time, as at least six ships should have to be diverted from their proper duty of protecting commerce at sea, and the Naval Commander-in-chief, instead of devoting his sole attention to that most important duty, would find Port Hamilton a serious addition to his responsibilities.⁴

5. Port Hamilton was not a good typhoon harbour, which must be a very important consideration for a naval station; for example., two or three large vessels might find shelter in a typhoon by anchoring to the north-east of the island; but any one

going there for shelter from a typhoon would have to make up his mind to give his ship plenty of cable at once, so that with the wind in the northeast, which was probably the quarter from which typhoon winds began in this neighbourhood, she should not start her anchor, as if she did so she would be dragged out of the safe part of the anchorage, and expose herself to the wind and sea when the shift to the south-east took place.⁵

6. The want of water was a serious objection also to forming a settlement. There were many small streams of water that found their way into the sea, and several springs inland that were used by the natives, but such of these as were analyzed were all more or less impure, and the supply of water from those running into the harbour failed after two or three weeks of dry weather.⁶

Next, to fortify Port Hamilton efficiently great expense would have to be incurred, or if defended by the navy still greater. It had already cost 300,000 L. or 400,000 L., if in that sum was included, as ought to be the case, the expense of the large squadron constantly kept there to protect the ninety-five marines forming the garrison.⁷ Concretely, the expense which it would be absolutely necessary to incur if Port Hamilton was retained through another winter would be as follows:-

1. The men's huts were clean and well kept, and comfortable as long as there was fine weather : but it would not be advisable, nor would it be right, to allow either officers or men to be exposed to another winter, especially the officers, whose huts were on a higher level and consequently colder, without means being taken to make all the huts both air-tight and water-tight.

Therefore, some expense would be necessary to make the huts warm and comfortable.⁸

2. The hospital was clean and of sufficient size for the number of men, but the same applied to it as to the officers' and men's huts.⁹

3. The cooking-house was a temporary building, and a new stove large enough to cook for 100 men was required, as the present one was too small and really belonged to the telegraph operators who left it behind. Therefore, some expense would be necessary to produce a suitable stove, together with thirty of Hinx's paraffin lamps for lighting the huts, the Service lanterns being of no use.¹⁰

4. The means of supplying water were bad; a gun-boat stationed off Observatory Island had to be continually condensing it, as the water on the island, although plentiful, was condemned by the medical officers of the fleet, as unsafe for drinking purposes. Several large tanks were brought up in the 'Audacious' that time, and would be set up and filled, in case it should be necessary for the gun-boat to be withdrawn for any length of time; but the great difficulty was getting the water from the landing-place to the huts; the elevation and state of the road rendering it impossible to drag the water-cart (supplied from Hong Kong, which was much too heavy and large) up the incline. Therefore, some expense would be necessary to set up new condensers to solve this problem.¹¹

A base for the navy must be one in which they would be secure when unable, from any cause, to stay at sea which was their proper zone of activity, and to protect commerce by driving

the enemy's ships from the sea; this could not be done if the navy was condemned to be on the defensive, remaining in port, and guarding its own base. Consequently, the Admiralty told the government on 19 March, that, unless it was the intention of the British Government to fortify and garrison the island, so as to place it in a proper condition of defence to resist the attack of iron-clads, they were decidedly of the opinion that it was not advisable to retain possession of Port Hamilton. ¹²

1.2. A RENEWAL OF THE KOREAN PROTEST.

O'Connor had received a note from the President, Kim Yun-sik, respecting the subject of Port Hamilton on 23 January. In the note, Kim at first referred to previous correspondence with O'Connor in regard to Port Hamilton. In his despatch dated 21 July 1885, in reply to Kim's note demanding the withdrawal of British forces from Port Hamilton, O'Connor had said that it was unnecessary to refer to the reasons for the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton, -they had already been clearly set forth- the action was not prompted by any unfriendly feeling towards Korea, far less from any desire to injure her interests or dignity. O'Connor further stated that a request of that important character was one to which he was in no way competent to reply. O'Connor had therefore sent a copy of Kim's note to London. Some delay, O'Connor continued, would necessarily and unavoidably occur before an answer could be received, even by telegraph, and O'Connor expressed a hope that the receipt of that answer would be awaited in the expectation of some mutual arrangement between the two governments.

Kim now pointed out in his note that nine months had already

elapsed, in spite of his urgent letters and personal representations on the matter, and he stated that a new year was approaching with no prospect of a reply; the King of Korea, who valued every inch of his territory, could not permit the case to hang over unsettled into another year. He continued that in consideration of the amicable spirit of the British Government, he could not well appeal to the Powers, but the King of Korea had specially directed him to come to a speedy settlement and not incur further delay.¹

On 28 February, O'Connor, in reply, repeated to Kim that the occupation of Port Hamilton was not connected with any desire for territorial aggrandizement, or to act in a manner prejudicial to the dignity and welfare of the King or the British Government. He stated that it was difficult to understand why, under these circumstances, an arrangement was not possible which would combine and satisfy the common interests of both countries, and by a mutual understanding remove any ground of complaint on the part of the Korean Government, while tending to increase the friendly relations which it had always been the desire of the British Government to maintain with that of the King of Korea. Therefore, O'Connor stressed that the British Government continued to desire a settlement of this question which would duly respect the sovereign rights and interests of Korea, and at the same time be satisfactory to the general interests of both countries.²

On 4 July, Sō Syang-you, the new President of the Korean Foreign Office sent a note to Sir J. Walsham, O'Connor's successor, respecting the question of Port Hamilton again. Sō said that he

remained quietly awaiting a favourable reply, which had not as yet been forthcoming, although O'Connor's note of 28 February had received Kim's careful consideration. In particular, Sō pointed to three grounds on which the British Government could not claim justification and four points which he failed to comprehend, and which had caused the Korean Government great anxiety.

The three grounds on which the British Government could not claim justification were:-

First, the British Government had occupied Port Hamilton without giving any notification beforehand, and without the sanction of the Korean Government. In taking such action the British Government could not claim that it was justified. Secondly, for many centuries Korea had maintained the integrity of Port Hamilton's territory; but then, when no real emergency existed, the British Government continued to occupy (Korean soil) in violation of international law, and in complete opposition to the interests of the friendly and commercial relations existing with the Korean Government. Again the British Government could not claim that this was justified.

Thirdly, of late years, during repeated negotiations with other Powers, it had been represented that, when occasion arose, both countries should co-operate in assisting and supporting each other. That language the Korean Government fully accepted, and in the assurance of future advantages, it threw the country open, entered into reciprocal commercial relations with the British Government and other Powers, and concluded Treaties containing a stipulation that, in the case of differences arising, "the other High Contracting Party should exert its good offices to bring

about an amicable arrangement." When, therefore, before the ink of that solemn covenant had lost its freshness, a strong Power had ignored its Treaty engagements, forcibly seized an island, and continued to occupy it, the whole Korean population would protest and declare that it was the British Government which had been the first to adopt such a line of conduct. All feeling of confidence must inevitably be destroyed and injury ensue to commercial intercourse. In this action the British Government could not claim that it was justified.

The four points which the President failed to comprehend were:-

First, the question of lending or not lending the islands rested with the owner. The President said he had never heard of such a rule as occupying the place first, and agreeing to a loan of it afterwards. Secondly a previous note which the Korean Foreign Office had had the honour to receive spoke of temporary occupation. A year or more had then elapsed, that could not be considered temporary.

Thirdly, O'Connor, in his reply of 28 February had written that the occupation of Port Hamilton was not connected with any desire for territorial aggression nor founded on any intention to act in a manner prejudicial to the dignity and welfare of the Korean Government. The British Government, which hitherto had maintained amicable relations with the Korean Government, ought not on account of these insignificant islets to act so as to induce loss of self-respect on the part of both countries. The President had long been conscious of the feelings of the British Government, but in the eyes of other Treaty Powers did not that action of the British Government evince a desire for territorial aggression, and

did it not prejudice the dignity and welfare of the Korean Government?

Fourthly, O'Connor, in his reply of 28 February, had further stated that it was difficult to understand why under these circumstances no arrangement was possible which would combine and satisfy the common interests of both countries. The President enquired on what occasion had the Korean Government shown itself reluctant to enter upon any arrangement with the British Government consistent with honour; how much more then in regard to a arrangement affecting their common interests about which the Korean Government was earnestly desirous of hearing? The British Government, however, did not know what that satisfactory arrangement could be, or how it could combine their common interests. If every Power were in future to advance such pretexts, th Korean Government would be left without a plea in exculpation of itself; what benefit, then would accrue to it from an arrangement combining and satisfying common interests? Finally, the President Sō requested Walsham to lay the note before the British Government, urging a speedy and satisfactory settlement.³

With reference to the Korean Foreign Minister's criticism of the continued British occupation of Port Hamilton, Walsham reported to Rosebery, Salisbury's successor, that the President's note was more or less a counterpart of the previous protests that had been raised by the Korean Government against the British remaining at Port Hamilton in spite of the repeated declaration that the occupation was to be only temporary, and a renewal of this protest was probably due more to Russian insistence and

intrigue than to any genuine irritation on the side of the Koreans themselves. The reason was that there was unquestionably a strong Russian party in Korea, whose aspirations the Russian Agent, Waeber, was only too inclined to foster; and, although possibly neither the Chinese nor the Korean Government would, if left to themselves, treat the prolonged British occupation of Port Hamilton as a matter of serious import, they were at the time beginning to find their position in respect of Russia extremely embarrassing.

At all events, Walsham thought the moment had arrived when a definite decision should be taken by the British Government as to the occupation, and he added that it was too late then, in his opinion, to make an offer for purchasing or renting the group of islands as a preventive measure against a Russian imitation of the British proceedings, and Britain must be prepared to see Russia follow the British example, whatever might be the British plan for retaining possession of Port Hamilton.⁴

1.3. PORT LAZAREFF AND A TREATY PORT.

That the Russian Government contemplated seizing a Korean Port further south than Vladivostock had, since the British fleet had occupied Port Hamilton, been rumoured even more frequently than in past years, and Port Lazareff was generally regarded as the objective of Russian ambition. Russian interest in Port Lazareff was clarified by Hertslet's Memorandum of 4 February 1886. In his Memorandum, Hertslet reminisced that Port Lazareff had been visited among other places by Mr. Spence when he accompanied

the Duke of Genoa to Korea in 1880, and in his description of it Spence said it was one of the points which the Russians were supposed to have designs upon, as a base for operations against China; that it was one of the finest harbours in the world, perfectly land-locked, with waters as unruffled as a lake, and with a practically infinite space of good holding-ground in from 8 to 10 fathoms of water; and that, though fringed with ice round the shores, the harbour was open in winter. In the Report to Sir T. Wade, the Chief Superintendent for British Trade in China, of August 1882, Spence also said the well-known harbour of Port Lazareff was only a few miles off Gensan (Wõnsan).¹

"The Times" explained the Russians' interest in the island as follows:-

Port Lazareff, named after the Russian General who so much distinguished himself at the capture of Kars, and who died during the progress of the Turcoman campaign, is situated on the northern, or more strictly the eastern side of the peninsula of Korea. It lies in Yõng-hung or Broughton's Bay, which was discovered by Captain Broughton in 1797, and which contains, perhaps, more fine harbours than all the rest of the Korean coasts together. The bay is filled with numerous islets, of which Chotoku is considered the most important, and the flourishing port of Gensan (Wõnsan), open to external commerce in May 1880, furnishes practical evidences that the advantages claimed for the whole of this gulf or bay by navigators are not fanciful or based on insufficient information. Port Lazareff itself is situated opposite to Gensan, and is east of the Korean town of Yõng-hung. It is also near the mouth of the Dungan river and west of Virginie Bay. Navigation is open at all seasons of the year, and the depth of the water as well as highness of the tides furnishes additional facilities for making Port Lazareff, at the present moment only a geographical term, the headquarters of Russia's Pacific squadron. In many of these particulars Vladivostock could not be excelled, but its insuperable drawback is that for several of the winter months navigation is closed by the ice.²

In early 1886, Admiral Hamilton reported to London that Captain Long of the 'Agamemnon' had been told by a Russian naval official that it was not the interest or Policy of Russia to annex Port Lazareff, owing to the great difficulty of land communication between it and Russian territory, over the rugged mountain-range to the north of that port, by which it was separated from Russia. As to the difficulty of land communication, it appeared to Hamilton that the harbour of Gensan, which, like Port Lazareff, was in Broughton Bay, having been declared one of the Treaty Ports, would further embarrass Russia in the annexation of Port Lazareff. The trade there, which was nil in 1879, had increased to 225,000 L. in 1881, according to Spence.³

On 14 April, O'Connor reported to Rosebery respecting the rumour about Port Lazareff. O'Connor was inclined to think that the rumour about Port Lazareff was a mere echo of a scheme to the same effect which Möllendorff had certainly attempted to carry out a year or more ago, but which had resulted in nothing more important than his ultimate dismissal from the Korean service.⁴ O'Connor, however, was not inclined to attribute much importance to the opinion of Captain Long's informant that it was not the interest or policy of Russia to annex this place. If such annexation was not effected, it would surely be from more serious and valid objections than those given by the Russian naval officer to Captain Long, which would scarcely prevail in face of the unanimous opinion that the harbour of Port Lazareff was one

of almost unequalled value for the object Russia had in view.

O'Connor did not think China would tolerate such an act of aggression against a country which at that time she was trying to reduce further into vassalage. Very probably she would resist it by force of arms. However, a civil outbreak in Korea might alter matters and give Russia an opportunity of which she would not be slow to avail herself. Assuming that such opportunity did occur, it would be admitted that Port Lazareff in Russia hands would, in the event of war, be a nasty thorn in the British side, and that, accordingly, it was the British interest to frustrate any designs Russia might entertain in this quarter.

Under the circumstances, O'Connor suggested that if the Korean Government could be induced to declare Port Lazareff a Treaty port, the danger of its falling into Russia possession would be very much lessened, if not altogether removed. He pointed out that an opportunity for establishing the status of Port Lazareff as a Treaty port would be offered to the Korean Government by the Treaty they were about to negotiate with the French Minister, who was not unlikely to view with favour the chance of inserting in his Treaty an open port which had not been given to Britain, Germany, or the United States. But if on further consideration it should appear likely that the voluntary concession offered by Korea would create suspicion in the mind of the French Minister, the British object might still be effected in a Treaty between Belgium and Korea. It would not be difficult to suggest the advantages of such an instrument between the two countries to the President of the Korean Foreign Office, or to the Viceroy Li.⁵

Henceforth the British Government began to think of the Treaty Port as an idea to solve the problem of Port Hamilton.

1.4. THE FIRST STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL.

With reference to some reports of the Commander-in-chief on the China Station which advocated withdrawal from Port Hamilton, the British Government began to search for a way of satisfactory withdrawal in early 1886. When the British Government withdrew from the island, they would have to take steps to prevent Russia from following their example. The British Government hoped to offer some advantage to the Chinese Government because the Chinese Government were so hampered by the continuous appeals from Russian quarters, and so much in dread of what their apparent leaning towards Britain might entail, though Chinese mediation between the British and Korean Government, proposed by Britain had been agreed to without difficulty by the Chinese Government in 1885.

When the British Government asked O'Connor about the prospects, he replied to Rosebery on 6 March that it appeared that the influence of Waeber had been supported by very strong Russian remonstrances to the Viceroy against the partiality shown by China in consenting to the British occupation without demur or protest, and he also heard that the Russian consul at Tien-tsin had told the Viceroy that it was impossible for Russia to allow herself to be shut out from the China Seas by the occupation by Great Britain of islands which, in case of war, would virtually bar the passage south to her ships of war and commerce, and that if China and Korea would not insist on the evacuation of Port Hamilton, Russia would occupy Port Lazareff,

or some other station, as a counterbalance to the British occupation. The Chinese Government seemed determined to resist the execution of these threats by force of arms if necessary, but, at the same time, they were watching with considerable uneasiness the extensive build-up of armaments reported at Vladivostock. They perfectly understood and silently approved the reasons for the occupation of Port Hamilton, and in their language to him during the late Russian difficulty he had found no trace of suspicion in regard to the British action. It was even evident that they would have recognized the British occupation officially, had it not involved the risk of a serious difference with Russia.

Under the circumstances, China would not be likely to recognize in a formal manner the British occupation, except on the condition of the British Government joining her in a guarantee to protect Korean territory against any act of Russian aggression arising out of this question. She would certainly be unwilling to bear alone the responsibility of the British occupation if Russia persisted in her policy of opposition, or to involve herself in difficulties which she believed to be mainly due to the British action.¹

On 11 March, the British Government made to China a proposal respecting Port Hamilton:-

Her Majesty's Government have no desire to prolong the occupation of Port Hamilton in opposition to the wishes of the Chinese Government, but it appears to them that it would be against the interests both of China and Britain if it were to be occupied by another European Power. If the Chinese Government are prepared to guarantee that no such occupation should take place, one of the chief objects which Her Majesty's

Government had in view in taking possession of Port Hamilton would be accomplished. Should the Chinese Government be unwilling to undertake such a responsibility, Her Majesty's Government would suggest that China should propose to Russia and to the other Powers interested to enter into an international arrangement guaranteeing the integrity of Korea. If this proposal is accepted, Her Majesty's Government would be ready to become parties to the arrangement, and to retire at once from Port Hamilton on the understanding that it should be recognized as forming part of the guaranteed territory of Korea.²

On 27 March, O'Connor reported to Rosebery on the Chinese response to the proposal of 11 March. In conversation that morning, the Viceroy inquired whether the British Government had come to any decision about Port Hamilton, or fixed a time for the British occupation to cease, and he said that he had been harassed and worried in the matter by Russia, and would be again, but if he could ask Russia whether she would give a written engagement not to take Port Hamilton if the British Government abandoned the islands, he would be able to stop further annoyance. The Viceroy said, however, he could not do this, unless he was sure beforehand that on his getting the engagement from Russia Britain would give up. In any case, it was clear that if the Viceroy got the undertaking from Russia, China would have no excuse for not formally requesting Britain to leave. O'Connor thought that the Viceroy was also, no doubt, aiming at a joint guarantee for the protection and integrity of Korean territory as against Russia, and he added that the Yamen had been particularly reticent in this matter for some months.³

In effect, the British Government found a further clue to a solution for satisfactory withdrawal from the island in their

proposal by which China should propose that Russia enter into an arrangement guaranteeing the protection of Port Hamilton.

2. IDDESLEIGH'S TERM OF OFFICE; AUGUST, 1886- JANUARY, 1887

2.1. RECONSIDERATION OF THE POLITICAL VALUE.

After the British Government occupied Port Hamilton, they heard rumours more frequently than in past years respecting Russian movements in the Far East, especially in relation to Korea and in particular to the occupied islands. (Appendix)

One rumour was contained in a hint which Count Inouye gave to the British Government in early July. The mail had brought him a despatch from Hanabusa M the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg. The Russian Admiral Chestakoff had spoken to Hanabusa confidentially of his intention, when he arrived in Tokyo, of combining with the Japanese Government for joint measures to procure the removal of the British from Port Hamilton. In the announcement by the Russian Government, however, the Russian Emperor had confided to him a mission to inspect the Russian settlements on the Siberian coasts; the mission was not, in fact, a serious one, and health was the real reason for his coming.¹

In a report from the Commander-in-Chief on the China station on 15 July, the truth behind the Russian announcement became clear:-

On 3 July Admiral Chestakoff, the Russian Minister of Marine, arrived here (Port Hamilton) from Hong Kong and Europe in the transport 'Moskova' on the pretence that he could not sleep owing to the throbbing of the screw. I visited him in the forenoon, and he returned it shortly after, and then

proceeded to Observatory Island with me and visited the Marine Camp. He left again soon after noon for Vladivostock.²

A further indication was in a report by the minister in Russia, to the Foreign Secretary, Iddesleigh, on 15 August, that Tséng, then in St. Petersburg had heard that the King of Korea had requested a Protectorate over Korea by Russia. China would consider this as a first step towards annexation.³ Iddesleigh thought that the request would probably be granted by Russia.⁴

On the other hand, on 11 August, Mr. Baber, the British Acting Consul-General in Korea, to whom Walsham telegraphed in order to ascertain what amount of truth was to be attached to the rumour had replied to the following effect:-" That Mr. Danny, who, is an American and at the time legal adviser of the Korean Government, has reported by telegraph to the Viceroy that the report is untrue, and has been invented by Britain to damage Russia: On the other hand, the Chinese Commissioner in Korea, Yüan Shih-k'ai, has assured Baber that he maintains the story to be correct."⁵

Walsham reported to Iddesleigh on 25 August that he was inclined to regard the news of 15 August as being exaggerated. He said that Tséng, if not an intimate friend of the Viceroy, was known to be in constant communication with him: and Walsham did not think it at all improbable that the news about the Protectorate, which Tséng would give the impression of having obtained on the spot, was in reality sent by the Viceroy, and not procured in Russia. Walsham added that the Viceroy professed to credit the report that the King of Korea had Russian proclivities,

and might have been expressing himself in favour of the Russian Protectorate: Yüan also professed a short time ago to take a similar view of the matter, and Tséng who might have had his personal reasons for doing so, was not likely to have underrated the importance of this political movement in his communications with the Viceroy, so that it was not absolutely necessary to place implicit faith in the detailed statement made to Morier. Moreover, from information which he had received from Korea at the time, Walsham believed that although the rumour about the Protectorate scheme was not positively without foundation, there was good ground for assuming that no great importance need be attached to the plan. Although Yüan was still professing anxiety, it was probably an invention fabricated to undermine influence of certain subordinate Korean Officials, of whose influence with the King the Chinese Commissioner was jealous.⁶

On 7 September, Walsham summarized for Iddesleigh what he knew of the rumour of a Russian Protectorate over Korea as follows:-

the probability is that the King, who is supposed to be easily persuaded, may have been only too ready to listen to the advice of persons unfavourably disposed towards the Chinese commissioner in Korea, and to have looked about for some means of escape from the irritating supervision which that official has been attempting to exercise over him. The most natural quarter from which to expect aid would be Russia, and as there is a Russian party in Korea their influence would have been exerted in the direction of the King's views, and might possibly have encouraged him to take some step for ascertaining whether the Russian Government would be inclined to listen to an appeal for a Protectorate.

The Russian Agent at Seoul, M. Waeber, is credited with having expressed his

willingness to submit such an appeal to St. Petersburg if it were formally consigned to writing; and the Grand Secretary Li, who superintends the relations between China and Korea, is equally credited with having instructed the Chinese Commissioner to prevent, at all costs, the appeal to Russia being made in a written form. Now it is more than probable that the Commissioner would have only too willingly shown zeal in the execution of his orders, and this energy on his part may have had the effect of strengthening rather than weakening the King's desire to free himself from Chinese interference; or it may be that, in spite of his efforts, the King was beforehand with him, and got his letter off to St. Petersburg, in which case the Grand Secretary Li would have naturally telegraphed the circumstance to the Marquis Tséng, whom he knew to be there.⁷

On 27 September, Walsham had in his possession a copy of the letter alleged to have been addressed by these same officials to the Russian Agent at Seoul, asking for the protection of Russia, but there did not then seem to be any doubt that this document was a forgery. Under these circumstances it could scarcely be wondered that Russia might have felt irritated at the accusation brought against her Representative of having been party to a Russian Protectorate intrigue, and she might, of course, be insisting on some kind of satisfaction.⁸

On 6 October, as Walsham had anticipated, the Russian Charge d'Affaires, M. Lodyzhenskij came to Tien-tsin in accordance with instructions from his Government, and solemnly declared that Russia had neither addressed overtures to Korea nor received overtures from Korea with respect to a Russian protectorate.⁹

"Novoye Vremya" of 4 (16) August contained an

article, translated by Mr. Fairholme, which referred to the rumours of Russian designs upon Korea and to Russian Eastern policy at the moment:-

Fears are again beginning to be entertained in the west of Europe for the integrity of Korea, which is said to be threatened by Russia, and an alliance between China and Britain is suggested as the only means of averting this danger. Some of the Western Powers evidently attach importance to these rumours, and even connect the presence of Admiral Shestakoff in the Far East with the Korean question. All these rumours we may safely consign to the region of inventions, partly malicious, and partly emanating from excessive susceptibility. Nevertheless, in principle, it cannot be denied that sooner or later Russia must have a thoroughly satisfactory exit on the Pacific, none such being afforded by Nikolayevsk or Vladivostock. But this new Eastern question will not arise till we have strengthened our position in the Far East, and accordingly all rumours of intentions on our part, at the present moment deserve no attention whatever, and for the following reasons: in the first place, we have not as yet gained any footing in Korea, or established political relations at Seoul sufficiently definite to insure our designs on Port Lazareff being received with favour by the Korean Government; secondly, Korea is at the moment so weak, that the occupation of any part of it by us would certainly entail a Chinese occupation, and might bring us in conflict with the Celestials. But any such conflict, however, successful we might be, would assuredly not be in the interest of Russia.All dispassionate persons, as well in Europe as in China, must understand that we have at present no intentions whatever in the Far East, and that any aggressive action on our part would be a distinct political mistake.¹⁰

If true, the British Government would lose the political justification of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far East as grounds for occupying Port Hamilton.

2.2 THE SECOND STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL.

2.2.A. THE TREATY PORT.

In the latter half of 1886, the British Government frequently considered quitting Port Hamilton: at once, if any suitable arrangement could be made to prevent Port Hamilton passing into hostile hands.

On 5 August, Walsham reported to the British Government that he could not suggest any simpler solution of the difficulty than the one he ventured to submit of converting Port Lazareff and Port Hamilton into Treaty ports.¹ The scheme was, he argued, unpretending enough, nor had it any special merit beyond, perhaps, that of being fairly easy of execution, while it would have enabled the British Government to return some kind of definite reply to the Korean protests, and would have afforded a slightly greater if not positive security against either of the two ports being occupied by another Power after the British departure from Port Hamilton.²

On 12 August, Iddesleigh told Walsham that the British Government approved the suggestion for making Port Lazareff and Port Hamilton Treaty ports. He asked Walsham to discuss the proposal confidentially with the Yamen as the basis for an arrangement by which the occupation of Port Hamilton might be terminated. Iddesleigh added, for Walsham's confidential information, that as it appeared from the Admirals' Reports that Port Hamilton was of no value to Britain, the British Government would be willing to order its immediate evacuation if any suitable arrangement could be made which would insure that

neither it nor Port Lazareff should pass into hostile hands.³

On 27 September, Walsham reported to Iddesleigh that he had explained to the Ministers at the Yamen the plan of making Ports Hamilton and Lazareff Treaty or open ports. The Ministers seemed then disposed to look upon it with favour, but said that they would like to think over it before giving a decided opinion. Even though Walsham had not yet heard from them again, he thought it not improbable that the Ministers might be disinclined to compromise themselves by giving any very decided opinion on the merits of the projects; and so long as they did not seek to minimize the sense of their qualified approval, it would be sufficient for all Britain's purposes.⁴

According to Brenan's Report of 6 October, the Viceroy said that he understood that the object of opening two ports was merely to afford some guarantee that neither of these places should fall into the hands of Russia. As China had since obtained satisfactory assurances from Russia that she had no designs whatever on Korea, the future security of Port Lazareff and Port Hamilton was guaranteed, and there was no necessity to attain that end by other measures.⁵ In Walsham's Report of 8 October, too, the Viceroy's modified views in respect of the Treaty port scheme which he had previously favoured, arose from Russian assurances which would, he considered, effect all that such a project was intended to insure, and that, consequently, it was no longer necessary. Therefore, Walsham suggested to Iddesleigh the propriety of his withdrawing altogether the plan for opening Port Lazareff and Hamilton.⁶

2.2.B. A SECRET TREATY.

In early October, the Viceroy had expressed himself as ready to invite the Yamen to communicate with Walsham, in an official note, the assurances which had been formally given to the Viceroy by the Russian Charge'd Affaires, M. Lodyzhenskii, to the effect that, in the event of the British withdrawing their naval force from Port Hamilton, Russia would undertake not to occupy Korean territory under any circumstances. The Viceroy had, at the same time, given to Walsham to understand that he would not be able to take this step for a few days, as, with a view to obtaining from the Russian Representative something more substantial, in the shape of a guarantee, than mere verbal assurances, he was then occupied with Lodyzhenskii in drafting what he called a "Secret Treaty," in virtue of which China and Russia would pledge themselves to respect the integrity of Korea, and to protect her from aggression on the part of any other Power. As soon as these negotiations had been concluded, the Viceroy would, he said, be prepared to arrange with the Yamen about the note to Walsham.¹

On 9 October, Walsham reported to Iddesleigh that it seemed clear that the Viceroy's Plan for obtaining a written guarantee from Russia was based on the principle indicated in the Memorandum submitted to Macartney,² and that so long as what the Viceroy called a "Secret Treaty" was restricted to an engagement on the part of the two Signatories to respect the integrity of Korea, Walsham did not suppose that the British Government would see anything objectionable in this modification of their own proposals. Walsham added that he doubted very much whether the more comprehensive scheme, which would have

included other Powers besides China and Russia, could be carried out at that time. Walsham thought that one of those Powers would necessarily have been Japan, but he found that for the time being Japan could not be one of the guarantors because there was unfortunately a certain amount of unpleasantness apparent in the relations between Japan and China, due to serious occurrences at Nagasaki which originated in a squabble between some sailors from Chinese men-of-war and the Japanese police.³

The British Government told China on 12 October that they were awaiting the result of the negotiations for a Secret Treaty embodying Russian assurances of non-intervention in Korea in the event of the withdrawal of the British Government from Port Hamilton. On the following day, the Viceroy stated, in reply, that he had already sent a translation of a draft note, which mentioned the Russian and the Chinese guarantee of the integrity of Korea, to the Yamen, but he thought that it might be supplemented with a copy of the joint Agreement when the conditions had been settled. The Viceroy further mentioned that the Agreement would be in the form of an exchange of notes between himself and Lodyzhenskii, but at the time there was a slight difficulty in the way of the settlement: Lodyzhenskii had pointed out that self-respect alone would make it impossible for Russia to give a bare undertaking to keep her hands off Korea. Therefore, Lodyzhenskii said, it had been necessary to introduce other matters so that the self-denying Clause might be decently included. Finally, the Viceroy stated that it was the discussion of these other matters that caused delay about the Secret Treaty; namely., there was one point which Lodyzhenskii refused to yield, and he was awaiting

the instructions of his government.⁴

On 5 November, Walsham reported to Iddesleigh that the Viceroy was trying to obtain from Lodyzhenskii a written statement of Russia's promise to respect the integrity of Korean territory in the event of the British retiring from Port Hamilton. He stated, however, that negotiations for a Secret Treaty had terminated without any agreement having been signed, and reciprocal verbal assurances had only been given. Walsham referred to the formal letter from the Yamen which it was proposed to exchange. A note which he had received from the Ministers of the Yamen referred in courteous terms to the embarrassing position created by the British continuous occupation of Port Hamilton, and it at the same time notified the denial which had been officially given by the Russian Government of the recent rumour of a scheme for a Russian Protectorate in Korea, as well as their distinct promise that Russia would not occupy Korean territory under any circumstances after the British evacuation of Port Hamilton. The note also mentioned that the Chinese Government insisted upon the guarantee during the negotiations and that, on the strength of it, they were able, for their part, to give a guarantee to the British Government, who, it was therefore hoped, would shortly be able to arrange for the ending of the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton. Walsham said no mention had been made in the note of China having, equally with Russia, pledged herself to abstain from seizing territory belonging to Korea, but he could not help thinking that this omission would not prove disadvantageous for Britain and China in any possible

eventualities, and he doubted whether a more favourable occasion for the British withdrawal from Port Hamilton was likely to present itself.⁵

Iddesleigh informed Walsham on 19 November that he might read the following to the Yamen as the reply of the British Government to their note:-

Her Majesty's Government have learnt from your telegram of 5 November that the Chinese Government have informed you officially that they are prepared, in the event of Her Majesty's Government terminating the occupation of Port Hamilton, to guarantee that no part of the territory of Korea, including Port Hamilton, will be occupied by a foreign Power. Her Majesty's Government are prepared, on the faith of this guarantee, to comply with the wishes of the Chinese Government, which have now been officially formulated.⁶

In early December, the Japanese press criticized severely the reported British cession of Port Hamilton to China by the announcement of 19 November. They argued that Britain should return it to its rightful owner, Korea, and that the creation of a Chinese fortress there would be serious danger for Japan as well as breach of the Tien-tsin convention of 1885.⁷ According to Plunkett's Report of 18 December, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs said that if Britain abandoned it she should return it to Korea, but he would otherwise prefer to see Britain remain there, and that cession to China would cause a great outcry there, and further complicate the Chinese question. The Japanese Minister said confidentially, on the other hand, that the Russian Minister had made private advances, and suggested co-operation with Russia in case of trouble with China. This suggested that

the Minister for Foreign Affairs might be won over by Russia.⁸ On 20 December, the British Government replied to Japan that there was no question of a cession of Port Hamilton by Britain to China, and the British Government were sincerely anxious for the maintenance of a good understanding between Japan and China, which was, they were convinced, essential to the interests of both countries.⁹

2.3. THE WITHDRAWAL.

On 29 November, Walsham communicated the contents of Iddesleigh's telegram of 19 November to the President and the Ministers of the Yamen, all of whom expressed their satisfaction at learning that the British Government would be prepared to terminate the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton on the strength of the formal guarantee which the Chinese Government had been able to give officially that, in the event of such termination, neither Port Hamilton nor any other part of Korean territory would be occupied by a foreign Power. During discussion with the Yamen, Walsham asked how this decision could best be carried into effect in the interests of Britain and China, which the British Government regarded as identical in this matter, and he suggested to them that the note respecting the guarantee in the terms of its acceptance by Britain should be communicated to the Korean Government, with reference to the several notes addressed by them to the British Legation on the subject of the occupation. Thus, the exceptional circumstances which necessitated it having happily ceased to exist, the British Government would have brought the episode to a close.

The Ministers unanimously approved of this suggestion, but enquired as to whether there would be any objection to acquainting the Korean Government with the fact that China had guaranteed the integrity of Korean territory once British occupation had ceased, and that the decision of the British Government had been strengthened by this pledge. Walsham said that, personally, he could see but one objection, namely, that the mention of the guarantee might entail some direct allusion to Russia, which possibly the Chinese Government would wish to avoid. The ministers considered it would be sufficient to let the Korean Government understand that the guarantee which circumstances enabled China to offer to Britain had helped to influence the British Government in their decision to withdraw from Port Hamilton.¹ Then, the Yamen proposed to Walsham that he should officially inform Korea that the British Government were prepared to terminate occupation because the circumstances which led to it were happily over, and because their decision had been strengthened by the formal guarantee given by China.²

On 4 December, Iddesleigh informed the Admiralty that the negotiations between the Chinese and Russian Governments had not led to any written Agreement on the part of Russia to respect the integrity of Korea, but the Chinese Government had on their own behalf offered the required guarantee that no part of Korea, including Port Hamilton, should be occupied by any foreign Power because they placed on record the distinct promise by Russia not to occupy Korean territory under any circumstances if the British forces were withdrawn from Port Hamilton. The British

Government had expressed their readiness, on the guarantee thus given by the Government of China, to put an end to the British occupation of Port Hamilton. Iddesleigh asked what instructions the Admiralty wished to send to Admiral Hamilton with regard to the withdrawal of the British force, so that directions could be given to Walsham to communicate with the Admiral regarding the arrangements to be made with the Korean authorities.³

On 7 December, the Admiralty sent a telegram to the Commander-in-chief on the China station:- " Her Majesty's Government has decided to withdraw from Port Hamilton. Consult with British Minister Peking, and arrange for withdrawal of garrison, stores, & c., and terminate leases. A separate communication will be made as to submarine cable."⁴

On 10 December, Iddesleigh informed Walsham that he was authorized to address an official note on the subject of Port Hamilton to the Government of Korea, but before doing so, he should obtain from the Yamen a note, suitable for publication in case of need, guaranteeing that no part of the territory of Korea would be occupied by any foreign Power.⁵ Walsham, however, thought it would be more satisfactory if, instead of merely obtaining from the Yamen a note suitable for publication in case of need, he could obtain the consent of the Ministers to the publication, if deemed necessary by the British Government in which the formal guarantee of China for the integrity of Korea was recorded. Walsham explained to the Yamen on 24 December that the British Government wished him to ascertain whether, should any necessity arise for making the correspondence public, there would be any objection to such a course on the Part of the

Chinese Government. The Ministers said that they left the matter entirely in British hands, being perfectly willing to sanction the publication should it be requisite or advisable in the opinion on the British Government.⁶

Walsham reported to Iddesleigh on 27 December that he had addressed a note to the Korean Government, which should reach its destination in about three weeks. Walsham added that he had arranged with the Admiral that he could prepare to withdraw about that date, and had asked him to notify the act itself to the Korean Government through the Consul-General.⁷ On the same day, Hamilton reported to the Admiralty, "Have communicated with British Minister at Peking, who informed me that negotiations with Government of Korea would take some time. Propose to withdraw detachment of Royal Marines and stores before winter sets in, leaving a ship till negotiations are complete, as we merely hoisted flag. Think it unlooked-for termination haul flag down and withdraw, leaving place in possession of Korea Chief."⁸ After two days, Hamilton reported again, "Submit sending 'Himalaya' Port Hamilton to bring detachment of Royal Marines and stores to Hong Kong. Would occupy her about a fortnight."⁹

On 18 January, 1887, Hamilton reported to the Admiralty as follows:-

Captain Dacres, of the 'Constance', has, in pursuance of my order, had all stores, & c., surveyed and trailed at Port Hamilton, and placed everything in perfect readiness for the immediate withdrawal of the marines, and all stores on the 'Himalaya's' arrival there. He calculates it will take three days to get the stores on board her, one day to embark the marines, and one day to take

down the huts, so that in one week after her arrival she will be able to start on her return voyage to Hong Kong. Advertisements have been entered in the Japanese papers at Nagasaki relative to the huts and logs of timber for sale at Port Hamilton. Should no reasonable offer be made, the huts and as much timber as can be stowed will be brought down to Hong Kong in the 'Himalaya', and what she cannot take the 'Constance' will ship and sell at Nagasaki for what it will fetch.¹⁰

On the other hand, in view of Britain's withdrawing from Port Hamilton, the question of parting with the cable (which was Admiralty property) to the Great Eastern Telegraph Company, as suggested by Walsham, would be a matter for future negotiation; but the interest of the Admiralty in the sites temporarily leased for naval purposes would lapse on the termination of the occupation of the island.¹¹ The Admiralty made suggestions to the Government, therefore, for the ultimate disposal of the telegraph cable to Port Hamilton.¹² On 27 December, Iddesleigh telegraphed Walsham, "Admiralty wish to sell cable to Port Hamilton for 30,000 L., being less than half its cost. Would the Chinese Government like to purchase with the view of establishing telegraphic communication with Korea?"¹³ Walsham reported on 5 January, 1887, "the Chinese Government thank the British Government for opportunity given of purchasing cable, but do not want it, having land line with Korea. This decision is taken after reference to the Viceroy Li, Superintendent of Telegraph. No allusion made to conditions on which landing of cable on Saddle Island was allowed, but I venture to call attention to correspondence during 1885, in order to prevent questions respecting its removal from Chinese territory."¹⁴

In the House of Commons, on 2 February 1887, Mr. Bryce

M.P asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it was the fact that Port Hamilton was to be shortly evacuated by the British forces, and, if so, what arrangements had been made with the Chinese or any other Government regarding its future custody. Sir J. Fergusson answered, " No arrangements have been made respecting its future custody; but it is understood that a Korean official will be present at the time of the departure of the British ships. No conditions have been made with the Korean Government, but the British Government did not determine to retire from Port Hamilton till they had received a guarantee from the Chinese Government that no part of Korea, including Port Hamilton, will be occupied by any foreign Power. The British Government acted under naval advice when they decided to leave Port Hamilton."¹⁵

In the House of Commons, 3 February 1887, Captain Colomb asked whether the government had acted upon naval advice; and if, so, what had been the expenditure from Imperial funds incurred from the date of occupation down to that time at Port Hamilton. Lord G. Hamilton answered as follows:-

Sir William Dowell, the Naval Commander-in-chief, was directed by the Admiralty to occupy Port Hamilton in May 1885. A change of government took place, and shortly afterwards a Report was received from Sir W. Dowell in which he pointed out that it was unsuitable for the purposes for which it had been temporarily occupied, and he advocated its abandonment. I was then at the Admiralty, and I found that both the Naval Members of the Board and Sir George Wills, who had preceded Sir W. Dowell were strongly of the same opinion. Admiral Hamilton, who succeeded Dowell in the autumn of 1885, was specially instructed to report upon the whole matter, and he has sent in a series of Reports to the effect that the retention of the place is a waste of

money in time of peace and a source of weakness in time of war. The main civil cost of occupation has been the laying down of a cable between Port Hamilton and Hong Kong, and a certain sum has been spent in building huts for stores and Marines. The total direct expenditure has not yet been brought to account; I cannot, therefore, state the approximate amount."¹⁶

On 28 February 1887, Hamilton reported to the Admiralty, "Flag hauled down Port Hamilton 27th. Cable under charge of Chief."¹⁷ Walsham reported to the government on 2 March that he had just received the reply of the Korean Government to his notification of withdrawal. In the reply, it recorded its belief that the British Government did not originally intend to occupy the place, and testified to their good faith and friendship in evacuating it altogether, and it held that relations between the two countries would therefore be stronger than ever, and that the action of the British Government was highly appreciated.¹⁸

Thereby, the British mission to Port Hamilton was completely over.

ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER VI

<Reconsideration of the Strategic View>

1. Vice-Admiral Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 7 December 1885, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure 1 in No. 2.
2. Ibid.
3. Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 1 June 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.45.
4. Hamilton to Macgregor, 6 August 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No. 106.
5. Report on Port Hamilton by Captain Powlett, R. N., Her Majesty's ship 'Champion', 7 April 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No. 36.
6. Ibid.
7. Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 1 June 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure 4 in No. 46.
8. Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 2 June 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure 5 in No. 46.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. The Secretary to the Admiralty to Currie, 19 March 1886, (rec'd 20 March), F.O. 405/36, No.19.

< A Renewal of the Korean Protest>

1. Kim to O'Connor, Translation. 23 January 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No. 25.

2. O'Connor to Kim, 28 February 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.27.
3. Sō Syang-you to Walsham, Translation. 4 July 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.84.
4. Walsham to Rosebery, No. 245, 1 August 1886, F.O. 405/36, No.84.

< Port Lazareff and a Treaty Port>

1. Memorandum by Hertslet, 4 February 1886, F.O. 405/36, No.9.
2. Port Lazareff, "The Times" 22 July 1886, p.6.
3. Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 14 December 1885, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.3.
4. O'Connor to Rosebery, No.148, 3 May 1886 (Rec'd 26 June), F.O. 405/36, No.41.
5. O'Connor to Rosebery, No. 125, 14 April 1886 (rec'd 14 June), F.O. 405/36, No.39.

< The first stage of withdrawal>

1. O'Connor to Rosebery, No.74, 6 March 1886 (rec'd 3 May), F.O. 405/36, No. 27.
2. Memorandum on proposed Answer to the Communication made by Sir H. Macartney on 11 March with regard to Port Hamilton. 14 April 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.23.
3. O'Connor to Rosebery, No. 109, 27 March 1886 (rec'd 17 May), F.O. 405/36, No 31.

< The Reconsideration of the Political Value>

1. Plunkett to Rosebery, No. 116 secret. 9 July 1886 (rec'd 16 August), F.O. 405/36, No 60.

2. Awdry to Currie, 11 September 1886, (rec'd 14 September), F.O. 405/36, No. 77.
3. Morier to Iddesleigh, telegraph, 15 August 1886, (rec'd 15 August), F.O. 405/36, No. 59.
4. Iddesleigh to Walsham, No. 233, Ext. 51, 16 August 1886, F.O. 405/36, No. 61.
5. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 255, 11 August 1886, (rec'd 1 October), F.O. 405/36, No. 85.
6. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 261, Ext. 58, 25 August 1886, (rec'd 19 October), F.O. 405/36, No. 99.
7. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 268, 7 September 1886 (rec'd 1 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 100.
8. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 279, Ext. 62, 27 September 1886 (rec'd 18 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 107.
9. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 284, Ext. 63, 6 October 1886 (rec'd 30 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 110.
10. Extract from the "Novoye Vremya" of 4 August(16), 1886, F.O. 405/36, inclosure in No. 70.

< The second stage of withdrawal; the Treaty Port >

1. Walsham to Rosebery, F.O. 405/36, No. 84.
2. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 287, 9 October 1886 (rec'd 30 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 113.
3. Iddesleigh to Walsham, No. 226, Ext. 49, 12 August 1886, F.O. 405/36, No. 56.
4. Walsham to Iddesleigh, F.O. 403/36, No. 107.
5. Walsham to Iddesleigh, F.O. 405/36, No. 113.

6. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 286, Ext. 64. 8 October 1886, (rec'd 30 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 112.

< A Secret Treaty >

1. Walsham to Iddesleigh, F.O. 405/36, No. 112.
2. Memorandum of proposed Answer to the Communication made by Sir H. Macartney on 11 March with regard to Port Hamilton. F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.23.
3. Walsham to Iddesleigh, F.O. 405/36, No.113.
4. Brennan to Walsham, 13 October 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.123
5. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 297, Ext. 65, 5 November 1886 (rec'd 5 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 102.
6. Iddesleigh to Walsham, No. 57, telegraph, 19 November 1886, F.O. 405/36, No. 108.
7. Plunkett to Iddesleigh, No. 21, telegraph, 17 December 1886, (rec'd 17 December), F.O. 405/36, No.125; After the defeat of the Coup of 1884, the agreement, signed on 18 April 1885, called for troops of both China and Japan in Korea to be withdrawn within four months of its signing, stipulated that neither signatory send military instructors to Korea, and provided for prior notification to the other party if troops were to be dispatched to Korea in the future; Lee, A New History of Korea. p. 279.
8. Plunkett to Iddesleigh, No. 22, telegraph, 18 December 1886, (rec'd 18 December). F.O. 405/36, No. 126.
9. Iddesleigh to Plunkett, No. 80. Ext. 21, 20 December 1886 , F.O. 405/36, No. 128.

<The Withdrawal>

1. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 307, 1 December 1886 (rec'd 28 January 1887), F.O. 405/37, No. 6.
2. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 69, telegraph, 1 December 1886, (rec'd 3 December), F.O. 405/36, No.114.
3. Currie to Macgregor, 4 December 1886, F.O. 405/36, No.116.
4. Draft Telegram to the Commander-in-chief on the China Station, 7 December 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.118.
5. Iddesleigh to Walsham, No. 318. Ext. 60, 10 December 1886, F.O. 405/36, No. 120.
6. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 319, 25 December 1886 (rec'd 21 February 1887), F.O. 405/37, No.15.
7. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 73. telegraph, 27 December 1886 (rec'd 28 December), F.O. 405/36, No. 138.
8. Hamilton to Admiralty, telegraph, 27 December 1886, F.O. 405/37, Inclosure 1 in No. 1.
9. Hamilton to Admiralty, telegraph, 29 December 1886, F.O. 405/37, Inclosure 2 in No. 1.
10. Hamilton to Admiralty, 18 January 1887, F.O. 405/37, Inclosure in No.16.
11. The secretary to the Admiralty to Currie, 18 August 1886, (rec'd 20 August), F.O. 405/36, No. 67.
12. Macgregor to Currie, 21 December 1886 (rec'd 23 December), F.O. 405/36, No. 132.
13. Iddesleigh to Walsham No. 62. telegraph, 27 December 1886, F.O. 405/36, No. 136.

14. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No.2, telegraph, 5 January 1887 (rec'd 5 January), F.O. 405/37, No.2.
15. Question asked in the House of Commons, 2 February 1887; and Answer, F.O. 405/37, No. 10..
16. Question asked in the House of Commons, 3 February 1887; and Answer, F.O. 405/37, No.11
17. Hamilton to Admiralty, telegraph, 28 February 1887, F.O. 405/37, Inclosure in No. 18. These seems to be discrepancy here:- recording Flag hauled down Port Hamilton on 23 March 1887, In *the Despatch Box Port Hamilton-Log of Senior Office: Enclose in China letter No. 200 of 1887*, Adm. 116/71, case 231, part 3.
18. Walsham to Salisbury, No. 8, telegraph, 2 March 1887, (rec'd 2 March), F.O. 405/37, No. 20.

Appendix to Chapter VI

Russian Cruizer off the North-East Coast of Korea.¹

Report by the Governor of Ham-gyōng Province.

(Translation.)

THE Governor of Ham-gyōng Province refers to the arrival on the 6th May of a vessel of peculiar construction at the Shin Po anchorage, below Puk Chhōn. He now further reports that on 20 June, about noon, a three-masted vessel, of peculiar construction, arrived off the Shin Po anchorage; that two boats crews, consisting of some twenty men, armed with rifles, landed as they chose, and went through the villages in separate parties. The Prefect, being unable to ignore such a proceeding on the sea-coast, went off to the Russian vessel, on board of which he was received by the Captain, and his Interpreter, Kim Tek-ou. Some conversation took place, and when the Captain mentioned that his vessel was returning next day, the Prefect, conscious of his duty as the host, presented them with a living pig eight fowls, and 200 eggs. Towards 4 O'clock of that afternoon the vessel left, steaming northwards.

It is very strange and suspicious that the document which the Captain said had been issued by the Korean Government has never been received at the Governor's residence. Nor does the Governor comprehend what the Captain meant when he spoke, in

¹ Extract from the Korean "Weekly Gazette" of 16 July 1886, F.O. 405/36,
Inclosure 3 in No. 84

connection with this survey work, of finding a good anchorage for vessels, in view of the strained relations between his country and England, as also his wish for the opening of a port to trade.

A copy of the interview between the Prefect and the Captain is herewith submitted for the consideration of the government and of the Home Department.

Orders have been issued by the Governor to the seaboard officials, enjoining on them to maintain a careful watch over any further movements.

Translation of Minutes of Conversation between the Prefect of Puk Chhön, on Ham-gyong Province, North-east Korea, and the Captain of the Russian man-of-war.

The Prefect.-Of what nationality is your vessel, and why have you come here?

The Captain.-My vessel is a Russian man-of-war. I suppose you know all about my previous visit to the Shin Po anchorage.

P.-Shin Po and Puk Chhön are both under my jurisdiction; they face each on the sea-side. Why have you come back?

C.-Owing to the great difference between our respective language and literature, I was, to my great regret, unable to communicate with you on the occasion of my last visit. I have now returned, accompanied with an Interpreter.

P.-Is there any Captain on board?

(He wrote on a slip of red paper the six words: "A sa teu la paik pok.")

P.-How many persons are there on board? have you had a pleasant journey during your long voyage?

C.-Some 200 persons. The voyage was unattended with any incident. How far is it from here to the capital, and have you reported our arrival to the Central Government?

P.-The sea and the hills lie between this and Seoul; the road is long and dangerous. Your arrival is first reported to the Governor of the Province, who reports to the government. In coming here with your vessel, of course you are provided with a document from the Korean Government?

C.-When in Seoul some time ago I petitioned your government for a document; it was sent, however, from Seoul to the Governor of the Province.

P.-After your vessel came to anchor, why did your men go about in boats surveying? Was this also permitted according to the terms of the documents?

C.-England and Russia being always at feud, a future naval conflict is to be apprehended. We must therefore make preparations, and ascertain the depth of the water along the sea-coast, and find out where there is any good anchoring-ground. Hence our going about surveying. What do you say to opening a port here to trade?

P.-This is an important question, but without the orders of my government I am not empowered to agree to anything.

C.-The number of your countrymen who come and settle in our territories is far from small; why is Korea so conservative and exclusive?

P.-The laws of my government are very strict; we need not discuss this.

C.-Is there much agriculture in this district?

P.-The country is hilly, very little plain, and scarcely any rich land.

C.-Is there any coal in this region? If there is any, how about disposing of it for gold or silver?

P.-There is no coal produced, so we may save ourselves discussing the question of trading in it.

C.-Where does your government get its powder and shot?

P.-Powder is manufactured; shot is cast.

C.-Why are the women of the place never seen walking about?

P.- Men and women have their respective spheres. Our law is, let women stay in and men go out. I hope you will forbid your men from landing as they like, and causing difficulties.

C.-Your wishes will be carefully attended to. Next morning I intend leaving for the north. When I come back what can I bring?

P.-Rice is what we value, but it would be well if you imported it at Wönsan.

C.-What commodities can be given in exchange?

P.-As a matter of course, a large price will be given.

CHAPTER VII: ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN THE FAR EAST AFTER THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR, 1887-1898.

1. THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1894-1895)

THE Port Hamilton Affair had a profound influence on the Russians. In terms of naval policy, the British occupation of Port Hamilton showed how easily the Russian Far Eastern squadron could be blocked in the Sea of Japan. In time of war, Russian warships would not be able to use neutral ports; the Russian squadron would therefore be forced into a defensive role for lack of coaling stations. Yet although the fleet would be useless against Britain, since it was not strong enough to defeat the China squadron of the British, the fortifications of Vladivostock and its garrison secured it against any *coup de main* that might be attempted by the British fleet. In 1887 Russia therefore, adopted a new defensive policy for her Far Eastern possessions. This depended on land forces rather than naval strength; Russia planned to build the Trans-Siberian Railway.

There seem to have been three main considerations in the Russian decision to build the railroad. Firstly, it is possible that the rise of Japan was a factor. The available documents do not indicate this to be so, but the development of Japanese sea power at that time might have influenced Russia to change her naval policy and to base the defence of the Far East on land forces supported by a continental railroad. In 1877, the Japanese navy was made up of a conglomeration of small vessels fit for little else except scouting or practice operations manned by 1,200 sailors and 260 marines. Within six years from that date the

Japanese navy underwent a remarkable transformation; modern second-class warships, designed and built in Britain, formed the nucleus of an efficient naval squadron.¹ The six years from 1883 to 1889 witnessed an even more remarkable advance of naval power in Japan. The ability to fulfil the programme in six years and to plan an even further increase of naval strength placed Japan well on the way to becoming the leading naval power in the Far East. By the late 1880's, therefore, the Japanese navy had gained the necessary numerical and technical strength to make the Russian naval position in the Sea of Japan a defensive one. By 1889 the "era of good feeling" between Russia and Japan was at an end, and Japanese public opinion showed a distrust of Russia.²

Even though the two nations had as yet had no conflict, the Japanese fleet prepared to cut off Russian naval communications to the Far East at Tsushima Strait.³

Secondly, besides being needed for countering the menace of Chinese development policy into northern Manchuria, the railroad would be needed for transportation of men and supplies in the event of a Russo-Chinese conflict over Korea.

Thirdly, in view of continued Anglo-Russian tension, the hostility of Britain was to be expected. Russia therefore could not depend primarily on her Far Eastern squadron for the defence of her Far Eastern possessions. A Trans-Siberian railroad would to some extent answer the defensive requirements of Russia's Far East- it would bring economic benefits and also settlers who would build up the internal strength of the territory.⁴

After the Port Hamilton Affair, consequently, the Far Eastern squadron was reduced to a minimum; Vladivostock

declined in importance as a naval base, and by 1888 it was reported to be almost deserted in comparison with its state during the brief period of Russian naval supremacy in the Far East in 1879-1880.⁵

During the Port Hamilton affair, a new Balkan crisis brought Britain and Russia face to face again over the question of Constantinople and its hinterland: The Bulgarian crisis of 1885-7 allowed Salisbury to adopt what was for him the agreeable role of supporter of Balkan nationalism, though at first he had assumed that he would have to support the 1878 settlement. Since Prince Alexander of Battenberg and most of the Bulgarians were now conspicuously anti-Russian and since the Turks had failed to defend their Balkan mountains frontier-which the British in 1878 had planned that they should-there need be no British opposition to a personal union of Bulgaria and East Rumelia under Prince Alexander. This was what Salisbury successfully proposed in 1886, after the two areas showed their determination to unite anyway. Salisbury was becoming convinced that the creation of stable nation-states in the Balkans would produce a far more reliable barrier to Russia's southerly expansion than the Turkish empire had done. Russia's fierce opposition to the new Bulgarian developments and the kidnapping and deposition of Alexander by Russian agents in 1886 strengthened the arguments for supporting Balkan nationalism. A big Bulgaria with anti-Russian tendencies could actually help to keep the vital Straits area in Turkish hands as well as denying Russia overland access to the Aegean. Both Britain and Russia, therefore, had swung round to adopt, on the Bulgarian issue,

attitudes entirely opposite to the ones they had pressed in 1878. Therefore, Salisbury, in encouraging a big Bulgaria, was willing to make the Mediterranean agreements in 1887.

The first agreement, signed with Italy in February and with Austria-Hungary in March 1887, involved expressions of mutual support in Egypt, Tripoli, the Aegean and the Black Sea. It was intended as a vague gesture of warning to both France and Russia. With these two powers, at that particular juncture, Britain had no specific quarrel, though there was plenty of underlying distrust. The failure in May of Drummond-Wolff's negotiations with the Sultan over an evacuation of Egypt-a failure due to Russian and French pressure- and the more ominous Russian attitude towards Bulgaria from July onwards made an extension of the first agreement increasingly desirable. In December, therefore, there was a further exchange of notes between the three powers. This second agreement, while reaffirming cooperation in the areas specified in February/March, added more precise reference to Bulgaria and Asia Minor, where the three powers undertook to preserve Turkish suzerainty from "illegal Russian enterprises". And so, as so often before, Britain was using associated powers to keep the Russians away from the Mediterranean-though Turkey was not now allowed any say even in her own preservation. The safeguarding of Bulgarian freedom was something on which all three, Britain, Italy and Austria-Hungary could agree with equal fervour, but the reference to Asia Minor was a purely British inclusion which had to be forced on the other two powers. And, from the British point of view, there was a further advantage in the agreement. The support of Austria-Hungary in her anti-Russian stand over Bulgaria contributed to

the final breakdown of that great bugbear of British foreign ministers, the grouping known as the Dreikaiserbund.

With the conclusion of the second Mediterranean agreement, the Bulgarian crisis gradually melted away. In March 1888, the Russians, supported by Germany and France, persuaded the Sultan to depose Ferdinand I. The deposition was grandly announced, and no one took any steps to put it into effect. Their pride restored, and their real objects entirely defeated, the Russians forgot Bulgaria for a time, and turned to the Far East.⁶

In 1890, the refusal of Germany to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, which was the secret supplementary protocol promising German support for Russian policies relating to the Dardanelles in 1887, placed Russia in precarious isolation. Russia, therefore, moved cautiously in international affairs. A cautious policy was even more imperative in the Far East, where Russia was handicapped both by her isolation in Europe and by the strategical weakness of her eastern possessions. Furthermore, Russian commercial interests in the Far East were lagging behind those of other European powers, and even the Russian Orthodox Church was carrying on no missionary work in China. In 1891 when an outbreak⁷ against foreigners occurred in China, aimed at missionaries and European commercial establishments in the Chinese interior, the appeal of France for joint action in September of that year did not even include Russia. However, even on this occasion, which was of little concern to Russia, the Russian Minister to China acted in accord with other European ministers in signing the Protocol of 9 September 1891, which informed their governments of the situation in China and

suggested remedial measures.

On 21 November 1891, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandre Ribot, met Giers, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Paris and in a conversation elicited Russia's reaction to the protocol. Giers suggested that the missionaries should be persuaded to remain near the coast and that China should be informed that all Europe was in accord on the Chinese crisis; Giers felt, however, that joint action would be difficult to obtain. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs again appealed for joint action, on 2 December, this time to Russia also. In view of the gradual formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance, Giers found it difficult to refuse the French appeal. He played for time, stating that he had no time to study the matter. On the other hand, Germany and other nations refused to take action, on the grounds that China was strong enough to quell the disorders-which China soon did. This resolved the crisis and removed Giers from an embarrassing position.⁸ The Franco-Russian Alliance on which depended the initiation of Russian Far Eastern policies, was eventually concluded on 4 January 1894.

In June 1894, the second Tong-Hak rebellion in Korea plunged the Far East into a new era of intensive international rivalry. The Tong-Hak Society aimed to drive out the influence of westerners in Korea; but this programme manifested itself principally in riots against the reactionary Korean administration and in acts against feudal landowners.(Appendix I) The first rebellion of 1893 aroused only slight international interest, for although American, Japanese, Chinese, British, and German warships were assembled at Chemulpo(the port for the capital,

Seoul), the Tong-Haks were crushed before foreign troops could land. But in March 1894, equipped with arms from Japan and backed by Japanese *ronin* (hired gangsters and soldiers of fortune),⁹ the Tong-Haks quickly spread through the southern Korean provinces. In May, Mr. Gardner, acting consul-general in Korea, reported to O'Connor respecting Tong-Hak movements through telegrams received by the Korean Home Office from Chulla Do, one of the southern provinces, as follows:-

May 9-The Prefect of Puan reports as follows:-

Yesterday afternoon, at 3 o'clock, more than 1,000 Tonghak rebels advanced from Wanpyen with waving of swords, firing of guns, and blowing of trumpets. They forced their way into my office and disarmed me. I was overcome with fear, and was unable to do anything.

May 10-Yesterday morning the Tong-Haks assembled in crowds on the road to Ko-fu. Our force was not strong enough to cope with them, so we waited till evening for the arrival of the troops from the capital.

May 10-the Tong-Haks, having mounted a hill and spied the Seoul contingent advancing, saw that it was but small, and continued to sorely harass our men. The Seoul men will be fatigued with their journey, and unable to fight today.

May 12.- General Hong Chieh-hun and Seoul troops have arrived.

The Tong-Haks fiercely attacked them, and although they fought valiantly, they were overcome and forced to flee, the rebels pursuing them for a distance of 20 *li* (1 *li*=2.44 mile). The Seoul men did not know the country, and were in great straits; nor did the people, although they had been ordered to obstruct the progress of the rebels.

May 12.- Telegram from Chung Ching Do.

News having arrived that the Tonghak rebels had assembled in myriads at two places, Kungju and Chioncham, 20 *li* apart, the Governor called on the soldiers and people to go out and drive them away. All the merchants except about 100 have gone over to the rebels. It is a sad business.¹⁰

In June Tong-Haks once again threatened the capital. British,¹¹ French, Japanese, and Chinese warships again assembled at Chemulpo, and even Russia belatedly sent a gunboat.¹²

On 2 June, the King of Korea made a formal request for Chinese intervention, and on 7 June the Yamen notified Komura the Japanese chargé at Peking, that China would send troops to Korea "to restore the peace of our tributary state."¹³ Japan then notified China that she also would send troops to Korea for the purpose of protecting Japanese interests there, adding that she had never recognized Korea as a tributary state of the Chinese Empire.¹⁴ China sent two thousand troops to southern Korea, the heart of the rebellion, but Japan sent her numerically superior forces to the vicinity of the capital.¹⁵

Before many units had landed, the Korean Government had the rebellion in hand; the Korean Government asked both Japan and China to withdraw their troops from Korean territory. Japan, however, had set forth a new programme on 22 June which indicated that Japanese troops would not withdraw until Korea reformed her administration.¹⁶ According to Chinese official statements made to Count A.P. Cassini, the Russian Minister to Peking, the Japanese made the Chinese several offers which would have given both China and Japan control of the Korean Government. But China refused them, faithfully adhering to the Russo-Chinese understanding of October 1886 (the Li-Lodyzhenskii Agreement).¹⁷ Consequently, both countries continued to send more troops.

On 22 June, Li appealed to Russia for mediation. In a

personal conversation, which supposedly occurred by chance, Li informed Cassini that Britain had offered to mediate, but that he had declined the offer because he felt that, on the basis of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1886, Russia, as the third party involved, had the exclusive right to be the mediator. Cassini saw in this offer an excellent opportunity to increase Russian prestige in the Far East and "to prevent the inevitable, and for us highly undesirable, open conflict in Korea."¹⁸

Cassini's view was fully supported by Giers, who also wanted to forestall British mediation. On 23 June, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed Khitrovo, the Russian Minister to Tokyo, to advise the Japanese Government to withdraw its troops from Korea simultaneously with China. In a conversation with Mutsu Munemitsu, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 25 June, Khitrovo expressed this Russian view. Mutsu, however, categorically reaffirmed that Japan would not evacuate Korea without some guarantee that new disorders would not break out as soon as Japanese troops were withdrawn. He asserted that Japan had no intention of establishing herself in Korea or of being at war with China.¹⁹

On 26 June, the Korean Government asked the ministers of the Russian, French, and American Representatives in Seoul to transmit to their governments an official request to induce a simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops.²⁰ This offered Russia an opportunity to choose either an official mediation based on the Korean request or continue in the unofficial course initiated by Li. Russia took the unofficial course. For a month, in numerous representations in St. Petersburg, Tokyo, and Seoul, Russian diplomats tried to persuade

Japan to withdraw simultaneously with China, but they encountered the same argument: *i.e.*, if the Chinese Government would propose negotiations on the basis of the independence of Korea, and a guarantee for the future good government of that country, the Japanese Government for their part would be willing to consider the withdrawal.²¹

In these circumstances, on 30 June, Kimberley, Foreign Secretary, 1894-5, sent a telegram to O'Connor in China: " Britain does not know what the Japanese Government means by her demands, but you should ask the Chinese Government whether they are willing to consider proposals for a reorganization of Korean Administration under the joint guarantee with Japan. You should state to the Yamen that Britain thinks that if China manifests a desire to enter into negotiations the Japanese Government may be disposed to come to terms, and you should impress upon them the necessity of maintaining a conciliatory attitude in order to avoid a conflict with Japan, which would involve so great a danger to the general peace. The opportunities afforded by such a conflict would probably be utilized by Russia in a manner which would not strengthen Chinese authority in Korea."²² On the following day, O'Connor reported to Kimberley , "I have received a message from Li asking whether Britain, having equally with Russia failed to persuade Japan to withdraw her troops, will compel Japan to do so by a naval demonstration. War will otherwise be declared by China, it being useless to negotiate further."²³

Even though the Chinese Government refused to negotiate until the Japanese withdrew their troops, they were ready to accept a joint guarantee of Korean integrity, and the

reorganization of its administration as a basis on which to open negotiations.²⁴ For these negotiations, Li hoped for a stronger Russian expression of mediation. Therefore, although Li had been clearly told that Russia would not interfere in Korean affairs, he suggested a joint Russo-Chinese-Japanese convention to consider reforms for Korea.²⁵ Moreover, he tried to spur Russia to activity by stating that Japan had asked Britain to mediate, and that Britain was forcing China to accept this mediation.²⁶ In an even more fantastic scheme, Li informed Cassini that the British Minister to China was urging that all Korea be given to Japan. On 3 July, Russia, consequently accepted the Chinese suggestion.

Under the circumstances, on 7 July Kimberley instructed O'Connor to state to the Chinese Government that Britain trusted that the negotiations might be begun without delay, by China and Japan, for a joint guarantee, as the British Government had every desire that the integrity of Korea might be maintained, but that if China should enter into any Agreement either with Russia alone, or with Russia and Japan together, to the exclusion of Britain, the British Government would be bound to consider in what way such an Agreement might affect their own interests, and would take such action as may be called for to secure them.²⁷ Consequently, after assuring Russia that her participation in a three-power-Russian Japanese, and Chinese-solution of the Korean problem would be the just reward for her mediation, a few days later, without informing Russia, Li appealed to Britain, France, and the United States for their mediation. Even though Li decided to do this as result of British representations, he officially said that he took it for granted that joint European mediation was forthcoming.²⁸ It did not take long, therefore, for the Russians to

discover Li's double-dealing game. Even after the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Giers wrote to Cassini:

we do not regret at all that we refused the offer made to us by Li Hung-chang, through you, to intervene directly in the question of Korean reforms, and to take upon ourselves, so to speak, an authoritative mediation in favor of the existing *status quo*, i.e., as Li Hung-chang essentially understood it, in the interest of China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly acknowledged that [the matter of] reforms served only as a pretext for the conflict between the Chinese and the Japanese, and that in consequence of our unofficial mediation we could easily have involuntarily found ourselves avowed enemies of Japan under the banner of China and the sly Viceroy of Pechili.²⁹

The fear that Britain would take a leading part in mediation was shared by both Giers and Cassini. But this fear was soon dispelled when Britain gave clear indication of her intention to organize collective mediation. The idea was broached to the Russian Government at St Petersburg by Sir Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador, on 9 July.³⁰ After being favourably received in Russia, the idea was introduced in the other European capitals by the Earl of Kimberley on 11 July. This "intervention commune" plan not only had the full approval of Russia but also the support of France, Germany, and Italy.³¹ However, it envisaged these powers as serving only in an advisory capacity. Before the powers could agree on the principles of application of the plan, war broke out.

On 19 July 1894, Otori Keisuke, the Japanese Minister to Seoul, presented to the Korean Government an ultimatum which

included a demand for the expulsion of Chinese troops from Asan (located in the mid-western region in Korea) and the abrogation of all Sino-Korean treaties. The Korean reply arrived within the set three-day limit, but it was rather vague. On 23 July, Japanese troops entered the capital and stormed the palace. A pro-Japanese minister was raised to power, and in the name of the King he abrogated all Sino-Korean treaties and formally asked Japan to drive the Chinese out of Asan.³² In last-minute preparations Li sent reinforcements by sea from Tientsin, but these were intercepted and scattered by Admiral Togo's squadron, and the leased, British-owned transport *Kowshing* was sunk, with heavy loss of life.³³ (Appendix 2) Open hostilities followed, and Japan declared on 31 July that a state of war with China existed.³⁴ China then declared war on 1 August.³⁵ (Appendix 3)

On the same day, the British Government immediately proclaimed its neutrality.³⁶ Subsequently, Kimberley instructed Lascelles to ask M. de Giers whether it would be of advantage that the British Government and the Government of Russia should invite the other Powers to join in addressing to the Governments of China and Japan a collective remonstrance protesting against a resort to war to decide a question, which was obviously susceptible of amicable settlement by other means. Kimberley added that it would be agreeable to the British Government that the most frank communications should be maintained by the British Admiral with the Russian Naval Commander with regard to the measures by which the commerce of neutral countries might be protected.³⁷ On the following day, Lascelles reported to Kimberley that Count Kapnist, Director of the Asiatic Dept. of the

Foreign Ministry, thought, personally, that a joint remonstrance would serve no useful purpose.³⁸ On 5 August, Giers said, with reference to the British squadron having gone to Chemulpo,³⁹ that the Russian Commander would be instructed to communicate freely with the British Admiral if the Emperor should decide upon reinforcing the one or two Russian dispatch-boats which at present constituted the Russian naval force in those waters. As compared with Britain, Russia had only a very slight amount of commerce with Korea. The protection of trade was, therefore, of far greater interest to Britain, whereas Russia was chiefly interested in preventing any agitation among the numerous Koreans and Chinese living in Russian territory; and the Governor of the adjacent Russian province would receive instructions which, he hoped, would be successful.⁴⁰ At the same time, Russia also proclaimed neutrality.

As soon as war broke out, once more Li appealed for international mediation and suggested that China, Japan and all the powers which had agreed to join in "advisory" mediation—Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—plan reforms for Korea in a conference to be held at either Tientsin or Peking.⁴¹ In a telegram to Cassini, Giers could only point out that Russia would continue to act in concert with Britain in an effort to restore peace.⁴² France, however, seemed ready to break away, for she said she doubted whether advice to Japan to return to the *status quo ante* would be completely impartial in view of the advantages already gained by that country in the first few days of the war.⁴³

On 6 October, Britain proposed a joint intervention by Germany, France, Russia, and the United States and a settlement

on the basis of an independent Korea and an indemnity for Japan. However, the United States refused to participate, and Germany felt that any attempt to intervene would be futile at that time.⁴⁴ Prince Kung, who at the time headed the Chinese Government, invited the ministers of these five powers to the Yamen on 3 November and formally asked them to transmit to their governments the Chinese official request for intervention on the same basis as the British *demarche*.⁴⁵ This attempt also failed.

In Tokyo, on 21 December, Mr. Trench, the British Minister in Japan, reported to Kimberley as follows:-

Since the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan the Japanese papers have steadily urged that the war should be prosecuted until China was completely humiliated, and, from the time the first decided successes were gained by the Japanese down to the present, the vernacular papers and private, though influential, Japanese will discuss the possible terms upon which peace, if sued for by China, might be made. Some of the suggestions made may be dismissed as too absurd, but three have been persistently urged. . . . All three include the payments of a very large indemnity of not less than 500,000,000 dollars, and to this is added, in some cases, the surrender to Japan of the whole Chinese naval and mercantile steam fleets-all, likewise, include the absolute withdrawal of China from Korea, and the leaving to Japan of an entirely free hand there. The first suggestion adds to these terms the permanent cession to Japan of the Island of Formosa. That this will be sternly insisted upon there seems to be no doubt. Japanese of all classes seem to be unanimous in regard to it, even responsible officials speak openly about it, and the government would hardly last a day if, unless under pressure, it assented to peace without that condition. The second suggestion adds to Formosa the cession of the whole of the Liao-tung Peninsula, including Newchang, but without any definition as to the northern boundary. The third extends the ceded territory so as to include the three northern provinces

bordering on the Pechili Gulf. This, though persistently urged in several journals, can hardly be treated seriously, as in it would be included both Peking and Mukden.⁴⁶

On 1 January 1895, Lascelles reported to Kimberley that Giers had alluded to the conflict between China and Japan, and although he had no positive information on the subject, had expressed his fear that Japan would demand very onerous conditions of peace, and if that should be so his Excellency thought that Britain and Russia, who were acting in perfect harmony on this subject, might be able to moderate the demands of Japan if they should prove to be exorbitant. Giers also said that Russia's one interest would be to secure the independence of Korea.⁴⁷

On 1 February 1895, the new Russian Tsar, Nicholas II (1894-1917), called a Special Conference of Ministers to deal with the Far Eastern crisis. The conference was apparently brought about by the dissatisfaction of the Tsar with the policy of acting in concert with European powers in unofficial mediation. The Conference reached the following conclusions:

1. To strengthen our squadron in the Pacific to such an extent that our naval forces in those waters will be superior to those of Japan....
2. To instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attempt to form an agreement with Britain and other European powers, principally France, in regard to collective action against Japan if the Government of Japan at the conclusion of the war with China should make demands which would violate our vital interests. . . The principal aim which we must pursue is the maintenance of the independence of Korea.
3. If the attempt for an agreement with Britain and other powers concerning the above conditions should not be crowned with success, and if it should be

necessary to accede to a mutual guarantee for Korean independence by foreign powers, the question of our further course of action. . . will be submitted for consideration at a new conference.⁴⁸

The decisions of the conference were put into effect. The strong and modern Russian Mediterranean squadron was sent to the Far East and was incorporated in the Far Eastern squadron, making it temporarily the most powerful naval force in the Far East.⁴⁹

Russian movements in the Far East were, on 2 February, discussed by Kimberley and the French Ambassador in London. Kimberley said that he had heard from Trench that he and the Russian Minister had made a communication to the Japanese Government, not jointly, but separately, and that the French Minister was to make a similar communication on the following day. Kimberley expressed his satisfaction that the French Government were acting on the same lines in the matter, and said he considered it most important that in this great crisis of affairs in the Far East, France, Russia, and Great Britain, who were the Powers whose interests were most immediately concerned, should act together.⁵⁰

Informed of the conversation between Kimberley and the French Ambassador, Count Kapnist on the same day told Lascelles that the Russian Government would welcome an exchange of ideas as to the line which it might be advisable to adopt in view of the changed condition of things in the Far East, and he repeated the earnest desire of his government to act in perfect harmony with Britain in this matter. He understood from Kimberley that the same applied to the French Government, who were also interested in the question, though to a less degree than Britain or Russia.

Thus in February and March conversations in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg established a general agreement that the governments of these capitals should act in concert and insist on the preservation of the territorial integrity and independence of Korea.⁵¹ Beyond that, however, nothing was done. By April Britain had veered from the agreement, influenced by public opinion favouring the Japanese, and by the growing idea in governing circles that the success of Japan and her establishment as a power in the Far East were beneficial to the British policy of checking Russia.

On receiving the Japanese proposals for peace, the Chinese Government sent on 5 March Viceroy Li to Shimonoseki as plenipotentiary for the peace negotiation with Japan.⁵² On 3 April, the conditions of peace proposed by the Japanese plenipotentiaries to their Chinese counterparts were officially communicated to the foreign Representatives as follows:-

1. Independence of Korea.
2. Formosa and Pescadores; islands under Formosa jurisdiction; islands between latitude 23° and 24° and longitude 119° and 120° to be annexed.
3. Liao-tung Peninsula, as bounded by line running to River Liao from Yu-shu-ti-hsia, descending river to latitude 41° and running thence due west to longitude 122° which it follows to the sea.
4. Indemnity payable in instalments as follows:-
100,000,000 taels within six months of ratification of Treaty;
200,000,000 at rate of 50,000,000 every half-year; in all,
300,000,000 taels.
5. Expenses of temporary occupation of Shan-tung and Sheng-king to be borne by China.⁵³

Prince A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Tsar on 6 April 1895 that, at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia must decide whether to pursue a passive or an aggressive policy. Lobanov argued that if Russia adopted a passive policy, China would be the ideal ally. Russian frontiers would be secure, and even if projected reforms were undertaken in China it would be some time before China could recover sufficiently from the war to be dangerous. But if Russia adopted an aggressive policy, the aim would be twofold: "our acquisition of an ice-free port on the Pacific and an annexation of a certain part of Manchuria necessary for a more convenient routing of the Trans-Siberian railroad." Opposite the quoted passage on the original document, the Tsar wrote the word "Exactly,"⁵⁴ and elsewhere on it: "Russia unquestionably needs an open port, free from ice all the year round. This port must be on the southeast coast in Korea and must be definitely connected with our present possessions by a strip of Land." Lobanov argued further that, "unquestionably" Russia's most dangerous enemy in Asia was Britain; and the Tsar annotated, "of course." Lobanov argued that, in spite of her recent victories, Japan would have to lean on some alliance for some time, and that her natural enemy in the Far East was Britain. Hence, though Russia might act with other powers-principally Britain-to restrain Japan at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, she must refrain from any action hostile to Japan lest she prejudice future Russo-Japanese friendship.⁵⁵ On this basis Russia made another *demarche* for collective advisory action on 8 April.

On 8 April 1895, in an attempt to have a concrete starting point for a European concert on "friendly advice" to Japan, Lobanov presented his *demarche*. He suggested that the European powers through their representatives in Tokyo state that "the annexation of Port Arthur by Japan⁵⁶ would be a lasting obstacle to the establishment of friendly relations between China and Japan and a serious threat to peace in the Far East."⁵⁷ Germany and France accepted this suggestion,⁵⁸ but, on 10 April, Britain refused to make such a statement.⁵⁹ On the same day, Li negotiating peace terms at Shimonoseki, was informed of the Russian, German, and French view.⁶⁰

The demarche was a starting point for a joint representation; it could not be considered an embodiment of Russian policy. It contradicted the above-mentioned opinion of the Tsar on the course of Russian policy and made even more necessary a new Special Conference of Ministers, which met on 11 April.⁶¹ The conference made the following decisions: <i> Russia would attempt to restore the *status quo ante* in northern China and would suggest to Japan in a friendly manner that she abandon her intentions of annexing southern Manchuria; if Japan categorically refused to abandon them, she would be notified that Russia considered herself free to act according to her interests. <ii> Russia would inform China and the European powers that she had no intentions of annexing any territory, but that she considered it vital to her own interests that Japan's hold on southern Manchuria be relinquished.⁶²

On 17 April, a Protocol as to the texts was signed at the same time as the Treaty at Shimonoseki between China and Japan.⁶³ On the same day, Lobanov officially asked Germany,

France, and Britain to support Russia's protest against the Japanese claim to Port Arthur. France agreed, with distaste, merely following the principle of solidifying the Franco-Russian Alliance.⁶⁴ Germany accepted with alacrity, and Wilhelm II ordered the German squadron in the Far East to make contact with the Russian squadron.⁶⁵ Britain did not reply immediately; she explained that she would continue her policy of noninterference. On 18 April, Cassini, at Peking, was ordered to advise the Chinese Government to delay the ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.⁶⁶ Subsequently, on 20 April, O'Connor reported to Kimberley that he had heard confidentially from Tien-tsin that the Russian, French, and German Ministers at Tokyo had been instructed to inform Japan that they could not accept the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and ask that it might be modified. The report also stated that the Chinese Government would be notified of the above step by the Russian Minister, under instructions from his government.⁶⁷

On 22 April Prince Lobanov told Lascelles that he regretted the refusal of the British Government to join with the "Triplice" (Russia, Germany, and France). Lascelles said that, great as was his regret at Prince Lobanov's disappointment, the situation would have been far worse if Britain, after joining in the friendly communication, had then been compelled to withdraw if further action had been rendered necessary by a refusal on the part of Japan.⁶⁸

On 23 April, the Triplice handed to the Japanese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs identical notes stating that "the possession of the peninsula of Liao-tung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same

time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East."⁶⁹

The Japanese Government did not reply immediately, and for a time the diplomats and admirals of the Triplice nervously expected an outbreak of hostilities. On 30 April, Mr. Kato, Japanese Minister in London, inquired whether Britain would support Japan. To this the British Government replied that they must adhere to the attitude of non-intervention which they had decided on adopting.⁷⁰ On 5 May, the Japanese General Staff realized, therefore, that Japan could not fight the combined forces of the Triplice, and Japan yielded to the demand. On May 8 the amended Treaty of Shimonoseki was ratified at Chefoo,⁷¹ and preparations were made by the Russian fleet to resist the cession of any part of Manchuria to Japan.⁷² On the following day Mr. Hayashi, Foreign Minister, informed Trench in Tokyo that China would be so gratified by the return of the Liao-tung Peninsula to her that it would be easy to obtain an increased indemnity, but he believed she would have considerable difficulty in paying a very large sum. Hayashi further mentioned that Russia would likewise claim some reward for her support of China, and he believed the strip of land she required was that stretching from her frontier to the Sungari River. This was probably all she would demand for the present, but her other ambition lay not in the direction of Korea, but in that of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and later on it was to be expected that she would attempt to acquire that territory.⁷³

On 19 July, the Japanese Government gave the following verbal message to the Representatives of the three Powers:-

In view of China's financial difficulties, and her inability to pay the full value of the Liao-tung Peninsula, Japan will demand only 50 millions of Kuping taels. When this indemnity, and also the first instalment if the regular war indemnity, have been paid, Japan undertakes to withdraw her troops within the limits of the Kinchow Province, and will altogether evacuate the peninsula when the Treaty of commerce and Navigation, referred to in the Shimonoseki Treaty, has been ratified, and the second instalment of the war indemnity received.⁷⁴

On 13 September, the Ministers of France, Russia, and Germany made a proposal to the Japanese that 30,000,000 taels should be the limit fixed for the indemnity for the retrocession of the Liao-tung, and that the question should be settled without reference to the Treaty of Peace; *i.e.*, that as soon as the above indemnity was paid the Japanese should evacuate the peninsula in the fixed date.⁷⁵ On 26 September, the Japanese Government said that they were willing to accept 30,000,000 taels for the Liao-tung Peninsula, and that the three Powers had been asked what assurance they could give for the payment of this indemnity by China.⁷⁶ On 8 November 1895, Japan formally renounced her claim to gains in Manchuria by the Declaration of the Retrocession of Liao-tung.⁷⁷

The success of the Triple Alliance was a triumph of Russian policy. Russia had won all her short-term aims. According to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Korea remained independent, and the existence of the Triple Alliance insured Japan's evacuation of Korea. The Japanese were removed from Manchuria. China defeated and still isolated, was an ideal neighbour for Russia and soon became more than willing to accept Russian financial assistance as the price of Russian political influence. However, the dormant hostility of

the Japanese toward the Russians was aroused.⁷⁸ Japan immediately began preparations to safeguard herself from any repetition of such an indignity as the Retrocession of Liao-tung.⁷⁹ After the Sino-Japanese War and the resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki and the retrocession of Liao-tung, Russia adopted a positive Far Eastern policy for the first time since 1860.

Since it had not joined the Continental powers, Britain was in 1895 identified as the Power most favourable to Japan. Equally, Japan was drawn towards co-operation with Britain which was interested in maintaining the *status quo* in China and was less blatantly ambitious there. Consequently, the Powers in the Far East became roughly divided into two groups: Russia and her ally France on the one hand, Japan and Britain on the other.

2. RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN KOREA, AND

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY, 1896-1898.

After the Sino-Japanese War, Japan especially was loath to see the appearance of Russian influence in Korea. Japanese policy, therefore, was aimed at eliminating the pro-Russian faction and the influence on the court wielded by Queen Min, and in its desperation to restore pro-Japanese forces to power Japan was prepared to resort to any means. In the end, then, on the night of 8 October 1895, Inoue's successor as Japanese minister, Miura Gorō, after consulting with his more experienced advisers at the Japanese legation, engineered a coup d'état in which a mob of Japanese *soshi*, Korean adherents and members of the *Kurentai*, Japanese soldiers, stormed the palace¹ and murdered the Queen of Korea and Members of her family whom she had brought to

power in an anti-Japanese movement.²

The coup d'état was an immediate success. The King of Korea yielded "in panic" to all Japanese demands, repealed the reforms of the previous year, published an edict degrading the Queen, and generally acted as a "tool" in the hands of the Japanese.³ The complicity of the Japanese envoy in the coup of 1895 was so obvious that the diplomatic representatives of foreign powers formed a "united front" against their Japanese colleague. They conferred mutually in the absence of Miura, befriended the refugee partisans of the Min family, and brought to Seoul small detachments of marines.⁴ Closely cooperating in this policy and assuming a leadership over the other representatives were Carl Weber, the Russian Minister to Seoul, and Dr. Horace N. Allen, a missionary and then secretary and actual chargé of the American legation, who was acting in defiance of instructions to abstain from any influence on the political events in Korea and particularly from any joint action with another power.⁵ Fearing an outcry of condemnation from abroad, therefore, Japan recalled Miura to stand trial in Japan, but in the end he was declared not guilty on grounds of insufficient evidence.⁶

The assassination of Queen Min roused the hostility of the Korean people toward Japan to a fever pitch, and guerrilla bands had risen throughout the country to harass the Japanese troops still encamped on Korean territory. By February 1896, Seoul was again in danger from the approaching rebels.⁷ Taking advantage of this turmoil, the Russian minister, Weber, brought one hundred marines to Seoul under pretext of guarding his legation on 10 February 1896.⁸ On the same day, Commander Pelly of the

British ship 'Porpoise' at Chemulpo reported to Vice-Admiral Buller of the British squadron in Chinese waters, that "the Russian ship 'Admiral Kornilov' landed a party of small-arms men this morning at 7 A.M., and sent them up to Seoul. The strength of the detachment was as follows: four officers, 100 small-arm men, and one machine-gun. Forty-two ponies were engaged to carry provisions and baggage for three weeks," and, he added, "150 Cossacks from Gensen (Port Lazareff) will meet today the detachment from Chemulpo."⁹

On the following day, the King of Korea asked Dr. Allen whether it would be safe for him to take refuge with the Russian minister.¹⁰ Allen assured him that it would be and personally aided his plan by bringing Weber in touch with the officer in charge of the King's bodyguard. On the morning of the eleventh the King of Korea, the Crown Prince, and some of their loyal attendants fled to the Russian legation, and the King remained there for more than a year.¹¹

An anti-Japanese reaction began immediately, On 11 February, the pro-Japanese ministers were massacred almost to a man, and the King performed penance for having associated with them.¹² Although Russia was placed in an extraordinarily favourable position for influencing a pro-Russian orientation of Korean affairs, Weber refused to take advantage of his position. The immediate gains were reaped by Allen; the anti-Japanese, and later anti-Russian, Korean Independence party of Philip Jaisohn, an American-educated Korean adviser to the King; and J. McLeavy Brown, the British Director of the Korean Customs, they became the leading political figures in Seoul.¹³ On the same day as the

King's flight to the Russian legation, Commander Pelly landed Lieutenant Benson and sixteen marines for guarding the British legation.¹⁴

With the recent Russian activity in Korea, on 20 February, in the House of Commons Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, M.P. asked Curzon, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the agreement entered into by the Russian Government not to occupy any port in Korea when Great Britain withdrew from Port Hamilton was still binding. Curzon answered, that "the British Government considered that the pledge by the Russian Government in 1886 not to occupy Korean territory under any circumstances whatsoever is still binding."¹⁵

On 27 February, Ashmead-Bartlett, M.P. asked Curzon again whether it was true that the Russian naval forces in the Northern Pacific were being largely increased. Curzon answered with a chart (Chart 1), "it is believed that the Russian squadron in Chinese waters has been increased by five vessels during the last year."¹⁶

(Chart 1) Russian Fleet in the China Seas.

Armour-Clads	
Battle-ship, 2nd class.	Imperator Nikolai I.
Armoured Cruisers.	Pamyat Azova. Admiral Nakhimov. Vladimir Monomakh.* Gremyashtchii. Otvajinii
Unarmoured	
Cruiser, 2nd Class, protected.	Ad. Kornilov.
Sloops.	Kreiser. Zabiyaka. Koreets. Mandjur.
Smaller vessels.	Gaidamak. Vsadnik

Bobr
Sivutch
Aleut.
Yakut.
Silatch.

* Said to be coming home; left Hong Kong 17 February 1896; and "Dmitri Donskoi" and "Groziasteki" coming out.

Subsequently, Sir Albert Rollet, M.P. asked him whether any Russian occupation of Seoul, or any other place in Korea, had taken place, or was apprehended. Curzon said that "No Russian occupation of Seoul, or of any other place in Korea, had been occupied, or, so far as we are aware, is apprehended; 150 Russian sailors are guarding the Russian legation in Seoul, where the King is still a refugee, his life being in danger from a rebellion which has broken out. There are also 500 Japanese soldiers in the Capital."¹⁷

Meanwhile, in Japan, Premier Ito Hirobumi, General Marquis Yamagata, and Count Inouye, the proponents of a moderate policy in Korea, came to the conclusion that to avert Russian ascendancy in Korea and to prevent a clash of Russian and Japanese interests there, Japan must come to an agreement with Russia. Negotiations were started in Seoul between Weber and Komura, the new Japanese Minister, which resulted in the signing on 14 May 1896, of a joint memorandum, known as the Seoul Protocol. ¹⁸

Japan then planned a broader agreement with Russia.

There was the negotiation of the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement, also known as the Moscow Protocol of 9 June 1896. It was an open secret that, in addition to the suspected Russo-Chinese

negotiations and the Russo-Japanese negotiations, the Korean envoy to the Tsar's coronation was conducting talks.¹⁹

This Korean envoy, Min Yōng-huan, who was the brother of the murdered Queen, had a private audience with the Tsar on 15 June, in which he asked for or was promised a Russian protectorate over Korea.²⁰ Consequently, the Russian reply (in point 1) did promise "protection" to the person of the King while he was in the Russian legation and after his return to his own palace. Point 2 indicated an extension of Russian influence:-

In order to solve the question of instructors [for the army] there will be sent to Seoul in the near future a high-ranking and experienced Russian officer, who will be empowered by the Russian Government to enter into negotiations with the Korean Government on this matter; the said officer will be instructed to take up, first of all, the question of creating a detachment of bodyguards for the King. An equally experienced person will be sent from Russia for the investigation of the economic condition of Korea and for the determination of necessary financial measure.²¹

Point 3 stipulated that the persons mentioned in point 2 would also act as advisers to the King of Korea under the direction of the Russian Minister to Seoul. Point 4 was equivocal and stated that a loan to Korea "would be taken into consideration as soon as the economic condition of the country and the requirements of the country are determined."²²

The first consequence of this was that, during the period of the King's remaining in the Russian legation, firstly Japanese advisers in whatever Korean ministry and Japanese military instructors all were dismissed, Russian advisers and instructors being appointed in their stead. Within a month after signing of the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement, the Russian Government was

undermining the idea of a Russo-Japanese condominium (joint sovereignty). In July, negotiations were begun to bring in Russian instructors for the army. In August, Colonel Strel'bitskil arrived at Seoul as the Russian military agent, and D.D. Pokotilov as the financial agent of the Russian General Staff arrived with three officials and ten noncommissioned officers and began the reorganization of the Korean army, starting with the palace guard.²³ According to Acting Consul-General Jordan's report in Seoul to Sir C. MacDonald, the British Minister at Peking on 14 November 1896:-

The Head of the Russian Military Mission, Colonel Poutiata, has, since his arrival here, been almost daily in conference with the Board of war respecting the reorganization of the Korean army. The army, as at present constituted, if the rabble which does duty as soldiers can be dignified by such a name, consisted of a paper estimate of some 7,500 men, 4,000 of which are supposed to be stationed in Seoul. As a matter of fact, the troops in Seoul only number about half that amount, having been drafted into the country to maintain order in the disaffected districts. About 800 of the Seoul garrison are being enrolled in a separate force to be drilled by Russian officers, and will be replaced by a fresh contingent as soon as they have attained the requisite degree of proficiency, the intention being to put the whole army through an efficient course of training.²⁴

Secondly, the actions of the Russian adviser to the Ministry of Finance gave the distinct impression that it was he, in fact, who headed the ministry, and now a variety of economic concessions were handed over to the Russians. But when Russia gained concessions the other powers too were encouraged to

demand equal favour, and so in the aftermath of the King's removal to the Russian legation a large number of such concessions fell into the hands of foreign governments and businesses.²⁵ (chart 2)

(Chart 2) The scramble among the powers for concessions

Year	Country	Concession
1896	U.S. Russia,	Building of Seoul-Chemulpo(Inchŏn) railway line Mining rights in Kyŏngwŏn and Chongsŏng counties, Hamgyŏng province Permission to establish coaling station on Wŏlmi Island, off Chemulpo Timber rights in the Yalu river basin and Ullung Island areas
1897	France	Building of Seoul-Uiju railway line
1898	Germany	Gold mining rights at Kumsŏng, Kangwŏn province
	Russia	Permission to establish coaling station on Yŏngdo, off Pusan
	U.S.	Laying of electricity and water mains in Seoul
	Russia	Authorization to establish Russo-Korean Bank
	Britain	Gold mining rights at Unsan, P'yŏngan province
	Japan	Exclusive purchase rights to coal produced at P'yŏngan Building of Seoul-Chemulpo railway (Concession bought from U.S.)

At the time the Korean people were united in their condemnation of their King's flight to a foreign legation and the continuous granting of economic concessions to foreigners. Their outrage coalesced in particular around a campaign launched by the recently inaugurated Independence Club. In response to this, in February 1897, Kojong moved out of the Russian legation to the Kyŏnggun Palace (today's Tŏksu Palace), practically next door to the legation, where Colonel Poutiata and a group of Russian officers were stationed, as commanders of the Royal Bodyguard.²⁶

The Japanese Government viewed this Russian ascendancy with considerable misgiving and inquired of Russian diplomatic

representatives in Tokyo and Seoul concerning the right of Korea to employ Russian instructors.²⁷ The enquiries did not check Russian intentions of gaining control of the Korean army. On 28 April 1897, a proposal had been submitted to the Korean Government by M. Weber for the engagement of 160 Russian officers and men in connection with the reorganization of the Korean army.²⁸ On 8 May 1897, the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs refused the offer.²⁹ In St. Petersburg, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to quiet Japanese indignation by giving assurances to Hayashi Todasu, the Japanese Minister to St. Petersburg, that Baron, R.R. Rosen, the newly appointed Russian Minister to Tokyo, would iron out the difficulties over Korean affairs.³⁰ This assurance was also treated in an equivocal manner. A fresh Russian officer and ten non-commissioned officers, who came from Vladivostock to Chemulpo in the Russian gun-boat 'Sivoutch', arrived at Seoul on 27 July.³¹

Since 1895, Germany had shown an interest in acquiring a coaling station or a naval base in the Far East; in that year William II, suggested a base in China, where the trade interests of Germany were second only to those of Great Britain. After Germany's participation in the Triple Alliance of 1895, realization of her desire seemed possible. In the spring of 1897 Admiral Alfred Von Tirpitz, the commander of the German squadron in the Far East, and Baron von Heyking, the minister to China, accepted the report of Georg Franzius, a noted German harbour expert, and agreed that the port of Kiaochow was the port most suitable for German naval requirements.³²

Before proceeding with Chinese negotiations concerning the lease of Kiaochow, Germany made inquiries about Russian interests in Kiaochow Bay. She knew that the Russian squadron had used it for a winter station. Furthermore, the so-called "Cassini Convention" stated that Russia was to have the exclusive use of the port for fifteen years. When Li passed through Berlin in June 1896, he was asked directly by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German Foreign Minister, whether Russia had any rights in Kiaochow, Li answered emphatically that she did not.³³

Despite an equivocal response by the Tsar on 7 November - "Cannot approve or disapprove your sending German squadron to Kiaochow as I have lately learned that this harbour was ours only temporarily in 1895-1896" - Admiral Diederichs entered Kiaochow Bay with the German squadron on 14 November. Four days later, Pavlov, the Russian chargé in Peking, was informed that the Russian squadron had received orders to follow the German squadron into Kiaochow Bay. Although Russia seemed to stand behind China and had unofficially advised procrastination in the German-Chinese negotiations, the fate of Kiaochow was not in doubt. On 20 November the orders to the Russian Pacific squadron were countermanded, and 23 November Muraviev, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, admitted that Kiaochow would eventually go to the Germans.³⁴

On the other hand, on 15 November, when news came to Peking that the Germans had landed at Kiaochow Li "immediately rushed to the Russian legation with an appeal for Russian assistance, and he did not leave it until he received a ciphered telegram to be sent to St. Petersburg from the Russian chargé

d'affairs." This appeal was an attempt to invoke the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 3 June 1896, against Germany. It was also a direct invitation to Russia to occupy temporarily some port in China as a countermeasure to the German occupation of Kiaochow.³⁵

In favour of this action, on 23 November 1897, Muraviev submitted a lengthy memorandum to the Tsar outlining Russia's political and naval situation in the Far East and reviewing Russian claims to Kiaochow, which had already been abandoned. Muraviev considered Kiaochow lost, but he considered the loss of no great importance, since the port was unsuitable for a Russian naval station or base because of its remoteness from spheres of Russian interest. In fact, he saw in the German occupation of Kiaochow a "favourable" turn of events which gave Russia an opportunity to acquire an ice-free port. The main problem was what ice-port to take.³⁶

On 26 November the proposed conference took place, attended by the Ministers of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs and the Director of the Navy Department. In the conference, Witte, the Minister of Finance, opposed the policy of compensation. He argued that if Russia did not need Kiaochow, the German occupation of that port could be ignored. The Minister of War, P.S. Vannovskij, had little to contribute. He deemed the acquisition of an ice-free port in the Far East necessary; consequently, if the time was opportune, Russia should take Port Arthur. But he felt that the decisive vote should rest with the Director of the Navy Department.

Admiral P.P. Tyrtov, the Director of the Navy Department, was not quite certain that Port Arthur would satisfy the needs of

the Russian squadron of the Pacific. he still considered the ports in Korea more suitable but realized that politically the time was not ripe to take them. Hence, he advised that Russia take no port at that time and that she content herself with the use of Vladivostock for two or three more years. He felt that the future would bring another opportunity for obtaining a Korean port. The final decision of the conference was not to occupy Port Arthur or any other port. The desire to obtain an ice-free port was once again made secondary to the policy of restraining other powers from a scramble for territory and spheres of influence in China and Korea.³⁷

Sometime between 26 November and 11 December 1897, Nicholas II and Muraviev, the minister of Foreign Affairs, reversed the decision of the Special Conference of 26 November. On 11 December, the Tsar notified Pavlov through the Russian Foreign Office: "In view of our acceptance [of the Chinese proposal of 15 November], a squadron of our ships, under the command of Rear Admiral Reunov, has been immediately dispatched to Port Arthur. Instructions must be given for a friendly reception of the squadron."³⁸

In Korea, on 5 December, Jordan reported to MacDonald that a Russian squadron, composed of eight vessels, under Vice-Admiral Dubaroff, reached Pusan to propose the establishment of a Russian coal depot there on 15 November, and stopped there until 19 November.³⁹ In addition, Salisbury considered Jordan's report of 2 December 1896 respecting the conversation with the German Consul, M. Krien who referred to the guarantee given in 1886, through the Chinese Government, by the Russian Chargé

d'affairs, by which Russian undertook, in the event of the evacuation of Port Hamilton by the British, not to occupy Korean territory under any circumstances. In the course of conversation, M. Krien said that some months ago, when Curzon had stated in the House of Commons that the British Government still held this guarantee to be of binding effect, M. Weber, the Russian Minister in Seoul, had informed him and several of his colleagues that the Russian Government did not recognize the understanding as pledging them in any way. M. Krien added that Weber had asserted that all that had happened was that M. Lodyzhenskii, the Russian Chargé d'affairs at Peking at the time, had told Li Hung-Chang over a glass of Champagne that he thought the Russian Government would be prepared to give such a guarantee in the event of the British occupation of Port Hamilton ceasing. Lodyzhenskii had since been dismissed from the Russian service, and the Russian Government did not consider itself bound by the declaration of a discredited Agent.⁴⁰ Moreover, Britain had already defined her position in the statement by Curzon, in this year that Britain wished to ensure that Korean territory and Korean harbours were not made the base for schemes for territorial aggrandizement so as to disturb the balance in the Far East and give to one Power a maritime supremacy in the Eastern Sea.⁴¹

On 8 December, Salisbury informed the Admiralty that it was desirable that an equal or approximately equal British naval force should be sent to Korea, with the object of preventing the Korean Government and people from assuming that Russian had any special rights in the waters of that country.⁴² On the

same day, Salisbury also told the Admiralty that he would consider it sufficient for the purpose that the squadron should remain at Chemulpo for a week or ten days, and then, unless any new incident arose, it might proceed to some other northern port.⁴³ Soon after the entrance of Russian warships into Port Arthur, on 17 December the British Government dispatched the ships in the China waters to Chemulpo, ostensibly to influence the Koreans and to add indirect opposition to the Russian attempt to oust the British Director of Korean Customs, but actually with secret orders to watch the Russian squadron and be ready for any eventuality.⁴⁴

On 6 January 1898 Jordan reported to MacDonald the arrival of the British squadron under the command of the Admiral Buller in Chemulpo; the following British ships were then in Port:- The 'Centurion,' 'Narcissus,' 'Undaunted,' 'Pique,' 'Rainbow,' 'Phoenix,' 'Algerin,' and 'Daphne.' Jordan also said that the presence of such a large number of British war-ships in Korean waters had naturally caused considerable excitement and speculation amongst the Koreans, and the King had sent him frequently messages to ascertain the reasons for such a display of force. Jordan added that the King likewise inquired if it was true that Port Hamilton had been occupied by the British Naval forces, and applied to him, through his interpreter, for information with regard to a number of other rumours crediting Britain with hostile intentions against Korea. Jordan told the King in reply, that the presence of the British squadron was doubtless intended to manifest and accentuate British interest in Korea, but that he had no reason to believe that the reports which had been

circulated correctly represented the attitude of the Commander-in-chief of the British Naval forces.⁴⁵

In January 1898, a *rapprochement* between Britain and Russia was in evidence. Muraviev in St Petersburg and Baron E.E. de Staal, the Russian Ambassador to London, complained to the British Government that the continued presence of British cruisers in Port Arthur might be interpreted as evidence of unfriendliness. Although Salisbury stressed the right of the cruisers to remain there, he ordered their withdrawal before 14 January because he could not find an obvious purpose in remaining there.⁴⁶

At the time, the Japanese fleet was concentrated at Tsushima, where it would be in a position to control the Tsushima Strait and intercept the Russian units still in Nagasaki. This naval tension continued until the beginning of February, when the decrease of diplomatic tension led to the gradual abatement of the Port Arthur "crisis".⁴⁷

The obscurity of political alignments, the numerical superiority of the Japanese army over the Russian forces in the Far East, and the delicate balance in naval forces, influenced Russia and Japan to act cautiously and pushed them toward a compromise on Korea. On 16 February 1898, the Japanese Ambassador to St. Petersburg presented to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs a project for a new agreement on Korea by which (1) Japan and Russia would guarantee the independence of Korea, (2) Russia would appoint military instructors for the Korean army, (3) Japan would appoint the financial advisers, and (4) Russia and Japan would come to a preliminary agreement

before taking any new measures in commercial and industrial matters.⁴⁸

Although Muraviev did not accept the offer of 16 February, he withheld his support from Speyer in Korea. In January, Dr. Allen reported from Seoul that Russia was losing her grip on Korea, and in March, Allen considered that Speyer's influence in Korean affairs was definitely on the decline. Early in March, Speyer made a final bid for the preservation of Russian interests in Korea. He asked the leading Korean statesmen whether they wanted Russian aid and advice, and a few days later he received an unexpectedly blunt negative answer; the reason being that, during that month, a strong anti-Russian popular agitation had been set on foot in Seoul, so that when the Korean Government was asked by the Russian Government whether they wished to retain the services of the Russian Financial Adviser and military instructors, they had in reply requested their withdrawal.⁴⁹

On 17 March 1898, Muraviev made a counterproposal in regard to Korea, in which he expressed Russia's intention to lease Port Arthur and Talienwan and to give Japan a pledge that Russia would not interfere in the internal affairs of Korea. Two days later, Marquis Ito suggested an agreement by which Russia would recognize Japan's freedom of action in Korea and in return Japan would regard Manchuria as lying outside Japanese interests. This proposal also was apparently ignored or circumvented. Instead, Russia made a withdrawal from Korea without committing herself to a definite promise of surrender of her interests.⁵⁰ On 12 April, Russian military and financial advisers resigned in a body, and the Russo-Korean Bank was liquidated after a month and

half of operation. Speyer was replaced by the more amiable and easygoing N.G. Matiunin.⁵¹

On 25 April 1898, de Rosen, and Nishi, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed a convention regarding Korea known as the Nishi-Rosen Convention.⁵² This convention stated in Article I that both signatory powers recognized the independence of Korea and pledged themselves not to interfere in her internal affairs. Article II provided for a mutual agreement "not to take any measure regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers, without having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the subject." The most important article was Article III, which stated: "In view of the great development of the commercial and industrial enterprises of Japan in Korea and also of the considerable number of Japanese subjects residing in that country, the Russian Imperial government shall not obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea."⁵³ This was Japan's compromise to proceed with economic penetration while looking ahead to an opportunity to commit overt aggression in the future. Russia too, busied with its Manchurian ventures, for the time being was willing to reach an accommodation with Japan. However, this agreement did not mean, of course, that Russia had abandoned its designs on Korea, and in fact Russian machinations continued as before.⁵⁴

At the time, Britain was interested mainly in the international implications and only in so far as her naval and commercial interests were threatened or the peace of the Far East was likely to be broken. Until then, she thought the Korean

Government to be incurably corrupt and doubted the country's capacity to retain its independence: She was not prepared to interfere actively in Korean affairs to buttress a regime which was not likely to last.⁵⁵ However, as a result of Jordan's report of 15 February 1898, the British Government had to think again. Jordan reported as follows:-

As the customs Tariff has undergone no alteration, these figures enable us to form an accurate idea of the steady progress of Korean trade. The Collection for last year- 1,113,168 dollars, or 113,635 L.- as against 691, 784 dollars (74,943L.) in 1896, is far the largest on record and is more than double of what were these figures five years ago. The total collection is still relatively small, but it must be remembered that there is no article like opium paying a heavy import duty, and that there is a considerable trade which does not fall within the control of the Foreign Custom establishment.

British trade seems to have done more than hold its own during the past year. (Table 1) The total import of cotton piece goods in 1897 was 5,062, 823 dollars (516, 829L.) as against 3,338, 545 dollars (361, 675L.) in 1896, of which over 3,000,000 L. were Manchester goods. Grey shirtings, which are all British, rose from 1,567,967, dollars (169,863L.) in 1896 to 2,120,761 dollars (216,494 L.) in 1897.⁵⁶

Moreover, with Russia's aggressive policy in Korea and even Manchuria, Britain felt that Russia would be able to have a free hand on the Far East and take her "proper place" on the shores of the Pacific. Therefore, Britain began to realize that the centre of international affairs had temporarily moved to the Far East.

(Table 1)

COMPARATIVE Total of net Dues and Duties collected for the Years 1884 to 1897.

Year.	Import Duties.				Export Duties.				Tonnage Dues.				Total.			
	Dol. c.	£	s.	d.	Dol. c.	£	s.	d.	Dol. c.	£	s.	d.	Dol. c.	£	s.	d.
1884	79,373 71	14,651 16 11			19,234 74	3,526 7 6			3,478 19	637 13 4			102,086 64	18,715 17 8		
1885	119,364 41	20,888 15 6			19,602 22	3,430 7 9			2,906 90	524 9 2			141,963 63	24,843 12 4		
1886	132,757 12	22,126 3 4			24,812 11	4,135 7 4			2,708 75	451 9 3			160,277 88	26,712 19 11		
1887	203,271 68	33,378 12 3			40,364 62	6,730 15 1			3,046 12	507 10 5			246,701 82	41,116 17 9		
1888	219,759 81	34,795 6 1			43,380 62	6,860 13 7			4,134 55	653 1 1			287,514 98	42,809 0 9		
1889	213,457 49	32,018 12 6			61,855 23	9,375 5 8			4,707 04	706 1 1			279,999 76	41,999 19 3		
1890	327,460 11	54,576 13 8			178,553 14	29,768 13 10			8,687 00	1,431 6 4			514,600 15	86,766 13 10		
1891	372,022 07	62,003 13 7			168,090 36	28,016 1 2			8,940 26	1,490 0 10			549,058 69	91,509 15 7		
1892	308,954 13	46,343 2 6			123,212 24	18,481 16 9			6,247 05	937 1 2			435,418 42	65,762 0 3		
1893	262,679 28	32,834 16 2			85,720 22	10,715 0 7			6,717 16	714 12 11			364,118 66	44,264 11 8		
1894	357,828 34	36,782 16 8			115,779 33	11,677 18 8			7,398 64	739 17 3			481,008 31	48,100 12 7		
1895	601,688 06	65,172 0 0			124,201 22	13,461 12 8			15,448 20	1,678 11 1			741,297 48	80,307 4 6		
1896	448,137 16	48,548 3 10			226,342 46	24,620 8 8			17,304 76	1,874 13 7			691,784 36	74,943 6 1		
1897	673,187 50	68,721 5 3			420,292 09	42,904 16 4			19,688 76	2,009 17 11			1,113,168 74	113,635 19 6		

ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER VII

< The Sino-Japanese War >

1. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 34 n. 130 & 131; quoting Constantin von Zepelin, Der Ferne Osten. Vol. I, pp.211-212.
2. Ibid., p. 35 n.140; quoting A.V. Eliseev. "Otchet o poezdke na Dal'nii Vostok" (Account of the Voyage to the Far East), pp. 372-373.
3. In 1885-1889 the Japanese fortified the anchorage of Tsushima and could convert it into an efficient secondary base for intercepting ships passing through the strait; Malozemoff, p. 263 n. 136.
4. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. pp. 35-36.
5. Ibid., pp. 33-4. n. 128 & 129; quoting N. G. Matiunin, "Nashi sosedi na krainem Vostoke" (our Neighbors in the Far East), Vestnik Evropy, XXII, No. 7 (July 1887), op. cit., p.82 & P. Chikhachev, "Kalifornia i Ussuriiskii krai." Vestnik Evropy XXV, No. 6 (June 1890), p. 562.
6. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question. pp. 180-183.
7. By the summer of 1891 the interests fostered by this control-commercial and missionary-were threatened by a widespread rising of the Chinese populace along the Yangze River; it was an unofficial challenge to informal empire. The Chinese authorities appeared to be helpless in the face of this near rebellion. The British were momentarily thrown back upon their own resources; Wehrle, E. Britain, China, and the anti-missionary riots, 1891-1900. p. 19.
8. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. pp. 51-52.

9. Ibid., p. 52; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dispatch, 10 March 1894, K. A, L-LI, p. 5.
10. Telegram received by Korean Home Office from Chulla Do., translation, F.O. 405/60, Inclosure 3 in No. 65.
11. Question asked in the House of Commons, 5 June 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 1.
12. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 52; quoting Kapnist to Secretary of Legation at Seoul, 8 June 1894. K. A. L-LI. p. 8.
13. O'Connor to Kimberley, No. 22, telegraph, 12 June 1894 (rec'd 16 June), F.O. 405/60, No. 6.
14. Paget to Kimberley, No 15. telegraph, 10 June 1894 (rec'd 10 June), F.O. 405/60, No. 5.
15. Kimberley to Paget, No. 59, 13 June 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 7.
16. Kimberley to Paget, No. 61, 23 June 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 15.
17. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 53; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 24 June 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 17.
18. Ibid., p. 53; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 22 June 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 16.
19. Ibid., p. 53; quoting Khitrovo to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 25 June 1894, K. A. L-LI. pp. 18-19.
20. O'Connor to Kimberley, No. 29, telegraph, 26 June 1894, (rec'd 27 June), F.O. 405/60, No. 19.
21. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 53; quoting several conversations as described in K.A., L-LI, pp. 21-52.
22. Kimberley to O'Connor, No. 44, telegraph, 30 June 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 26.

23. O'Connor to Kimberley, No. 31, confidential, telegraph, 1 July 1894, (rec'd 2 July), F.O. 405/60, No. 27.
24. O'Connor to Kimberley, No. 32, telegraph, 2 July 1894 (rec'd 2 July), F.O. 405/60, No. 28.
25. O'Connor to Kimberley, No. 36, confidential, telegraph, 6 July 1894 (rec'd 7 July), F.O. 405/60, No. 44.
26. Paget to Kimberley, No 26. Secret. telegraph, 7 July 1894, (rec'd July 8.), F.O. 405/60, No.50.
27. Kimberley to O'Connor, No. 50, telegraph, 7 July 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 46.
28. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 54; quoting Memoir of Kapnist, Director of the Asiatic Department, 30 June 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 21.
29. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 54; quoting Giers to Cassini, letter, 8 August 1894, K. A. L-LI. pp. 58-59.
30. Kimberley to Malet, No. 177, 9 July 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 57.
31. Kimberley to O'Connor No. 54, telegraph, 11 July 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 64.
32. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 54; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 23 July 1894, K. A. L-LI (1932). p. 46.
33. O'Connor to Kimberley, No. 61, telegraph, 27 July 1894 (rec'd 29 July), F.O. 405/60, No. 188.
34. Paget to Kimberley, No. 48, telegraph, 1 August 1894 (rec'd 1 August), F.O. 405/60, No. 209.
35. Copy of Reuter's telegram from Indo-China Steam Navigation Shanghai Agent to his Company, 1 August 1894, F.O. 405/60, Inclosure in No. 213.

36. Kimberley to Lascelles, No. 36, telegraph, 1 August 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 216.
37. Kimberley to Lascelles, No. 37, telegraph, 1 August 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 217.
38. Lascelles to Kimberley, No. 55, telegraph, 2 August 1894 (rec'd 2 August), F.O. 405/60, No. 232.
39. Kimberley to Lascelles, F.O. 405/60, No. 217.
40. Lascelles to Kimberley, No. 57, telegraph, 5 August 1894, (rec'd 5 August), F.O. 405/60, No. 254.
41. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 57; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 4 August 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 57.
42. Ibid., p. 57; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 9 August 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 61.
43. Ibid., p. 57; quoting Mohrenheim to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 10 August 1894, K. A. L-LI. pp. 62-63.
44. Ibid., p. 57; quoting William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902. pp. 174-175.
45. Ibid.
46. Trench to Kimberley, No. 200, confidential, 20 December 1894 (rec'd 21 January 1895), F.O. 405/62, No. 41.
47. Lascelles to Kimberley, No.4, confidential, 1 January 1895 (rec'd 7 January), F.O. 405/62, No. 19.
48. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. p. 60; quoting K.A. LII, pp.73-74.
49. Raising the strength of the squadron from 16 ships(with 241 guns) to 22 ships (360 guns); See Thomas Brassey, "Naval Progress," Naval Annual(London) for 1884-1887. pp. 52,54.

50. Kimberley to the Marquis of Dufferin, No. 53, 2 February 1895, F.O. 405/62, No. 82.
51. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, pp.60-61; quoting K.A., XLVI(1931), p. 32.
52. O'Connor to Kimberley, No. 14, telegraph, 5 March 1895 (rec'd 5 March), F.O. 405/62, No. 160.
53. O'Connor to Kimberley, No. 23, telegraph, 3 April 1895 (rec'd 4 April), 405/63, No. 24. & Trench to Kimberley, No. 33, telegraph, 4 April 1895 (rec'd 4 April), F.O. 405/63, No. 26.
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Appendices to Chapter VII

Appendix I.

Manifesto by Tong Haks¹

(Translation.)

WE have on the throne a holy and intelligent Ruler, yet the people grovel in dirt and ashes. Why is this? The cause of the people's bane is the system of Yamen credits; the cause of those credits is the covetousness of the officials; and the root of that covetousness is the greed of the Ministers of State. Ah! when confusion comes to a head, order arises; when the darkness is at the deepest, daylight dawns. We are all men acting for our country; what difference should there be between the people and the Yamen clerks? At the bottom the clerks are of the people.

Bring together all ledgers and account books showing the Yamen credits, the people's bane; there is a means of settling them. Do not fear to bring them or overpass the time. Be careful!

From the place of Righteousness.

(Seal Resembling those used by district officials.)

¹ Manifesto By Tong Haks, posted at Police Magistrate's Office at Pepsong on 8 May 1894, F.O. 405/60, Inclosure 6 in No. 65.

Appendix II.

The Report of the Captain and Chief Officer of 'Kow-Shing'²

(Telegraphic.)

THE Japanese Government have received the signed affidavits of the captain and chief officer of 'Kow-Shing,' British vessel sunk by 'Naniwa' off Yasan, and their summary is as follows:-

'Kow-Shing,' hired by the Chinese Government, left Taku on the 23rd July with 1,100 Chinese soldiers on board, bound for Yasan, for the purpose of landing troops there. 'Naniwa' signalled her to stop; she obeyed, and as 'Naniwa' was going away, she signalled, "Am I to proceed?" 'Naniwa' answered, "Heave-to or take consequences." (This signal was not meant for her, but for Chinese man-of-war flying Japanese flag and white flag.)

'Naniwa' sent officer to her to see ship's papers, and, among other questions, asked if she will follow 'Naniwa.' Captain answered, "We are in your power." Then the officer returned, but boat was again sent upon the request to communicate personally, and captain told them that Chinese generals do not allow him to follow. The officer, after listening to all what he had to say, returned to 'Naniwa,' which then signalled to captain to quit ship immediately, but captain signalled that he is not allowed to quit. Then 'Naniwa' hoisted red flag at the foremast-head, and once more hoisted signal to quit ship immediately.

² Japanese Government to Viscount Aoki, telegram, rec'd 2 August 1894, F.O. 405/60, Inclosure in No. 226.

Captain warned engineers and other foreigners to be on deck. After a while 'Naniwa' sent torpedo and fired. Then captain with several others jumped overboard, and while in water Chinese soldiers on board 'Kow-Shing' kept firing at captain and others, and eventually he was picked up by boat of 'Naniwa,' on board which every kindness was shown to him and to the chief officer, who was also picked up.

Captain says that while on board 'Kow-Shing' his life was threatened by Chinese Generals when he attempted to follow 'Naniwa' or to leave ship.

Chief officer adds that second visit of officer was in order to transfer Europeans on board of the man-of-war before firing began, but good-will was frustrated by the Chinese.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE NAVIES.—July 16, 1894.

CHINA.										JAPAN.									
Classification.	Names.	Date Lanch.	Tonn.	Max. Speed.	Armament.	Complement.	Remarks.	Classification.	Names.	Date Lanch.	Tonn.	Max. Speed.	Armament.	Complement.	Remarks.				
ARMOURD. Battleship, 3rd Class	Feng-Yuen	1881	7,400	14-7	4 20", 2 12", 2 1", 10 m.	480	Com. Yig of Admiral Jig	ARMOURD. Battleship, 3rd Class	Feng-Su	1877	2,740	13-5	4 24", 2 12", 6 1", 8 m.	386	Com. Standing Squads.				
	Her-Yuen	1882	7,400	15-4	4 20", 2 12", 2 1", 10 m.	480	Com.		Com. To go to South	Kong-Su	1877	2,820	12-5	3 27", 6 12", ...	308	Com. Cruising.			
	King-Yuen	1887	2,900	15-5	2 21", 2 12", 2 6", 1 1", 8 m.	240	Com.		Com.	Hsi-Yu	1878	2,520	13-0	3 27", 6 12", ...	308	Com. Cruising.			
	Lai-Yuen	1887	2,900	15-5	2 21", 2 12", 2 6", 1 1", 8 m.	240	Com.		Com.	Yeh-Hue	1883	4,500	31-4	4 6", 8 6", 23 m. (7) 5 7",	Com. Gunner ship.			
	Ping-Yuen	1888	2,000	11-0	1 27", 2 12", 6 m. 2 7", ...	203	Com.		Com.	Hsi-Jeh	1885	2,850	6-5	1 27", 2 10 1/2", 6 6 1/2", M.	306	Com. Gunner ship.			
UNARMOURD. Coast Defence	Tai-Yuen	1883	2,300	14-4	2 21", 1 12", 4 6", 7 m. 4 7", ...	320	Com.	UNARMOURD. Coast Defence	Hsi-Hai	1881	4,578	14-0	1 22", 11 12", 6 6", 10 m. 4 7",	Com.				
	Chih-Yuen	1886	2,310	18-3	3 21", 2 12", 10 6", 13 m. 4 7", ...	303	Com.		Hsi-Kashima	1889	4,140	16-8	1 22", 11 12", 6 6", 12 m. 4 7", ...	320	Com.				
	Ching-Yuen	1886	2,310	18-3	3 21", 2 12", 10 6", 13 m. 4 7", ...	303	Com.		Matsumura	1890	4,578	14-0	1 22", 11 12", 6 6", 12 m. 4 7",	Com.				
	Nan-Hsin	1884	2,500	13-0	2 21", 2 12", 9 m. ...	320	Com.		Atsumura	1892	5,600	19-0	1 22", 12 12", 6 m. 4 7",	Com.				
	Nan-Tsin	1883	2,500	13-0	2 21", 2 12", 9 m. ...	320	Com.		Nan-Hsin	1885	2,550	18-5	2 24", 6 12", 2 6", 12 m. 4 7", ...	365	Com. Coast to Honkulu.				
	Ching-Ching	1886	2,100	14-4	3 17", 7 40", 6 m. 2 7", ...	300	Com.		Tsai-Hsi	1885	3,650	18-5	2 24", 6 12", 2 6", 12 m. 4 7", ...	365	Com. Standing Squad.				
	Huang-Tai	1886	2,110	14-4	3 17", 7 40", 6 m. 2 7", ...	300	Com.		Chi-Yu	1890	2,410	19-0	10 12 1/2", 14 6", 3 m. 2 7", ...	300	Com. Flag.				
	Kai-Che	1883	2,110	14-4	2 21", 2 12", 6 m. ...	300	Com.		Tsai-Hsi	1888	1,774	14-0	4 12", 1 12", 6 m. 2 7", ...	230	Com. Standing Squad.				
	Hsi-An	1872	2,700	12-0	2 21", 4 12", 20 12", ...	375	Com.		Yuyama	1889	1,620	31-0	(3 24", 5 6 1/2", 9 6 m. 2 7",	Com.				
	Chao-Yung	1881	1,860	14-3	2 26", 4 12", 2 1", 1 m. ...	137	Com.		Tsai-Hsi	1883	1,517	11-5	1 17", 1 12", 4 12", ...	222	Com.				
	Yang-Wai	1881	1,380	14-2	2 26", 4 12", 2 1", 6 m. ...	137	Com.		Tsai-Hsi	1885	1,978	7-0	8 12", ...	277	Com.				
	Pao-Miu	1885	1,480	9-0	2 12", 6 12", 2 m. ...	200	Com.		Kaiteragi	1888	1,475	15-0	3 27", 6 12", 2 7", ...	212	Com. Standing Squad.				
	Xueg-Chia	1887	1,574	14-2	1 12", 6 12", 8 6", 4 m.	Com.		Yamato	1883	1,478	13-0	1 17", 7 12", 8 m. 2 7", ...	245	Com. Divis.				
	Kwang-Yi	1889	1,000	10-4	3 12", 2 6", 4 m. 4 7", (armament doubtful)	180	Com.		Mitsui	1888	1,478	13-0	3 27", 5 12", 4 m. 2 7", ...	212	Com. Drill Ship, Yokohama.				
	Kwang-Ping	1889	1,620	16-4	3 12", 2 6", 4 m. 4 7", (armament doubtful)	180	Com.		Kaimon	1888	1,318	13-0	1 27", 6 12", ...	250	Com. Drill Ship, Sasebo.				
Kuang-Ting	1889	1,000	10-4	1 12", 1 12", 2 6", 4 m. (armament doubtful)	...	Com.	Nishiu	1869	1,468	9-0	1 27", M, 6 12", ...	160	Com.						
Torpido-boats							Torpido-boats												

In addition to the above, both countries are in possession of a considerable number of gun-boats, and other small craft, of which the majority belong to China.

³F.O. 405/60, 16 July 1894, Inclosure in No.80.

CHAPTER VIII: THE END OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY
IN THE FAR EAST, 1898-1905.

1. THE LIMITATIONS OF 'SPLENDID ISOLATION' POLICY AND
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902.

THE idea that 'isolation' might be, not merely an involuntary position of weakness, but also a deliberate policy goes back in Britain at least to the eighteen-sixties. For a long time, however, 'isolation', even when referred to in this way, was still, nevertheless, a term of disparagement. It usually meant refusal to collaborate in any way with other powers. A policy of 'isolation' was something that one attributed to one's political opponents or against which one advised one's colleagues. In 1871, for example, Gladstone's government was accused in the House of Commons by Sir Robert Peel (the son of the Prime Minister Peel) of pursuing a 'policy of isolation-of selfish isolation'. In 1877 Salisbury warned Beaconsfield of the evils that would result from adopting a 'policy of isolation' in regard to the Near Eastern Question. In the eighteen-sixties and seventies, however, such usage was infrequent. It was during the press campaign of 1895-96, which reached its climax in the days that followed the Kruger telegram,¹ that to refer to Britain's 'isolation' as a matter of policy became for the first time common usage. The Contemporary Review, the Speaker, the Spectator and the Saturday Review were among the papers that set the fashion.

At about the same time it also became common to refer to this voluntary 'isolation' on the part of Britain without any of the disparaging implications that the term had usually carried with it hitherto. The outstanding example of this new fashion was a

speech to a Conservative audience at Lewes on 26 February 1896 by George Joachim Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty in Salisbury's Cabinet and the minister responsible for the creation of the 'Flying Squadron' during the days of tension that had followed the Cleveland Message. "Much has been said," Goschen rightly observed, "with regard to the isolation of Britain." He distinguished between what he called 'two kinds of isolation', observing:

There may be the isolation of those who are weak and who therefore are not counted because they can contribute nothing, and there is, on the other hand, the isolation of those who do not wish to be entangled in any complications and will hold themselves free in every respect.

Goschen then went on to declare: "Our isolation is not an isolation of weakness; it is deliberately chosen, the freedom to act as we choose in any circumstances that may arise." Thus, claimed Goschen, while other powers were "bartering favour for favour, promise for promise": "We have stood alone in that which is called isolation-our splendid isolation, as one of our colonial friends was good enough to call it."² After that, the phrase 'Splendid Isolation' policy was increasingly used to characterize British foreign policy.

Russia's policy towards the Far East was motivated by only vague ambitions at first. After making an alliance with France and after her success in forcing Japan to abandon the Liao-tung Peninsula by the Triple Intervention following the Sino-Japanese War, however, her policy underwent a complete change and became concrete and openly aggressive.

In September 1896, Russia concluded a secret treaty of alliance with China, in which she treated Japan as their hypothetical enemy. This treaty, in consideration of the role she played in the Triple Intervention, gave Russia the right to construct a railway across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. In December 1897, Russian power extended to the Liao-tung Peninsula from which Japan had earlier been driven, when the Russian fleet occupied Port Arthur and Dalny (Dairen). Later, in March 1898, Russia forced China to conclude a Treaty of Lease for the Liao-tung Peninsula; at the same time she obtained the right to construct a branch railway line from a station on the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur and Dalny.

This advance by Russia was supported, of course, by France, her ally, and with the encouragement of Germany which had already leased Kiaochow Bay from China. After Russia had leased the Liao-tung Peninsula, France leased Kwangchow Bay and Britain leased Weihaiwei³ and the Kowloon Peninsula. Previously, Britain had obtained from China a declaration not to cede any of the Yangtze River Basin provinces to any third country; Japan likewise obtained a similar declaration regarding Fukien Province.

Although Britain demanded concessions from China every time Russia, Germany, France and other Powers exacted various concessions from China, this was not necessarily Britain's real intention. Rather, Britain was obliged to do so by way of compensation, so-to-speak, for the concessions other Powers obtained. In short, Britain, unable to prevent such examples of aggression in China by Russia and the other Powers, resorted to a

so-called 'policy of compensation.'⁴

At the time, Britain's interest in China was primarily commercial. Consequently, the open door was the basic British policy which required that China's independence and territorial integrity be maintained. On the other hand, Russia's aggressive policy towards China posed a serious menace not only to Britain's commercial interests in China, but also to British prestige in the world in that Russian policy could ultimately threaten the security of India and other British colonies. Therefore, British leaders were divided as to the wisdom of persisting with Solisbury's policy of the 'free hand', currently dubbed 'splendid isolation.' Hence arose the debate over alternative courses of action in the Far East: <i> to conclude an alliance with Japan, <ii> to form an alliance with Germany, in which, so far as the Far East was concerned, Japan and, in certain circumstances, the United States should take part, or <iii> to reconcile herself with Russia. Policies <ii> and <iii> were tried first.

In January 1898, Britain initiated secret negotiations with Russia in an attempt to settle once and for all the disputes of many years' standing between the two countries. Britain took the occasion to try to bring about a 'partition of preponderance' both in China and in Turkey on condition that both sides respected the then existing treaties and the inviolability of territorial sovereignty. In the British view, this would allow Russia a preponderance in the Yellow River Basin and to the north generally with Britain enjoying preponderance in the Yangtze River Basin. Russia, however, did not respond to such a general agreement as Britain desired.

Thereupon, in March, British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain opened negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance with the German Ambassador to Britain, count von Hatzfeldt. Although the negotiations lasted until the following year, no satisfactory result was forthcoming. In these circumstances, the Colonial Secretary also suggested to Kato Takaaki, Japanese Minister to Britain, that Japan might propose an alliance to Britain. Minister Kato himself strongly recommended the alliance to his government, but the Ito Cabinet then in power could not reach any conclusion on how to respond to the suggestion.⁵ Subsequently Britain succeeded in concluding with Russia and Germany limited and specific agreements about China. In April 1899, an agreement was reached between Britain and Russia concerning the construction of railways, recognizing spheres of influence in the regions north of the Great Wall to Russia and the Yangtze River Basin to Britain.⁶

The United States, which so far had lagged behind the other Powers in taking an active role in China, started to move positively after the appointment of John Hay as Secretary of State in September 1898. The new Secretary realized that American interests in China were being considerably damaged by the aggressive policies of the other Powers and began to contemplate a new policy to re-establish America's position. Up to then, Britain had advocated the Open Door in China and a resolution was adopted in the British House of Commons to support the principle of free trade in the Chinese treaty ports. In September 1899, U.S. Secretary of State, J. Hay, anticipating British approval, issued the well-known Note proposing the principle of equal trading opportunities in China, and sent it to

Britain, Germany and Russia. The same Note was also sent to Japan, Italy and France in November.

Hay's proposal was aimed at assuring completely equal treatment with respect to trade and navigation for all countries within the spheres of influence and the interests of the Powers then existing or to be claimed in future. The replies to Hay's Note from the Powers were, however, not necessarily based on similar assumptions. Japan gave her assent to the Note provided that all the other Powers concerned accepted the same, not only finding no reason for objecting to its aims, but also noting its usefulness in eliminating to some extent the monopolization of interests in China by Russia, Germany, France and the other Powers, thus contributing to the integrity of China.

Japan thereafter firmly supported the Open Door policy of the United States, as did Britain. Consequently, so far as the problems of the Far East were concerned, the interests of the United States at that time were entirely identical with those of both Japan and Britain. The United States Government were, however, not in a position to enter into any negotiations for an alliance or entente with European Powers or with Japan out of regard for the Monroe Doctrine and in consideration of the views of the Senate.⁷

In the meantime, the Boxer Rebellion⁸ broke out in China in 1900 partly as a reaction to the race of the Powers for concessions. This finally resulted in armed intervention by the Powers. An international force was organized in which Japan formed the main strength, dispatching over twenty thousand men. The Japanese force occupied Peking after which the Chinese

Court moved to Sian. While the Powers jointly forced the Chinese to submit, Russia took advantage of the situation and arbitrarily carried out a military occupation of many important places throughout Manchuria and despatched additional troops to North China.⁹

After the Boxer Rebellion, Britain, seeing Russia advance into Manchuria and extend her activities to central China, concluded the Anglo-German Agreement concerning China(1900) to which Japan adhered, and tried to use it to check the Russian advance. However, contrary to her expectations, Britain found her interests menaced when Germany made public her view that Manchuria was outside the scope of this Agreement. On the other hand, a sense of insecurity among the Japanese people reached its peak as they realized that Russia was not only assiduously engaged in exploiting her influence in Manchuria and Korea but also was trying to obtain control of the latter. Later, both Britain and Japan lodged protests with Russia over the secret Russo-Chinese treaty in connection with the restoration of Manchuria to China.

Earlier, Britain had come to recognize Japan's real power after the Sino-Japanese War. Further, at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, Japan, in compliance with the British request, had despatched troops to help the international force of the Powers. Again, in executing its ten-year naval construction programme starting to build four battleships and other numerous auxiliary ships from 1895 onward, Japan ordered the majority of them from British shipyards. These kinds of actions created a pro-Japanese feeling among the British Government and people. In Japan also, the sentiment towards Britain had become very

favourable because Britain had observed neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War, had not joined the Triple Intervention, and had protested against Russia's aggressive moves in Manchuria and Korea.

With the gradual withdrawal from the control of foreign policy by Salisbury, moves for ending so-called splendid isolation policy took shape.¹⁰ Colonial Secretary Chamberlain in the Salisbury Cabinet, in particular, took the lead in seeking British cooperation with Germany, sounding the German Chargé d'Affaires von Eckardstein. In April 1901, in the course of an exchange of views with the Japanese Minister to Britain Hayashi Tasasu, von Eckardstein told him that Japanese participation in an Anglo-German alliance had been taken up in the Anglo-German talks and urged him to have the Japanese Government propose a tripartite alliance between Japan, Britain and Germany.

Regarding von Eckardstein's suggestion of a tripartite alliance between Japan, Britain and Germany, the Japanese Minister to China Komura Jutaro cabled his support to Foreign Minister Kato on 12 April. The Foreign Minister gave his approval and instructed Hayashi on 16 April to sound out unofficially the views of the British Government. Later, on 8 October, Foreign Minister Komura¹¹ authorized Hayashi to exchange views with the British Government on the matter. On 16 October, Hayashi asked British Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne whether or not this alliance would include Germany. Lansdowne replied that for the present this proposal should be kept between the two countries, Japan and Britain.

In those days, Japanese political circles were roughly divided into two groups, Anglophile and Russophile. The former

group maintained that since Britain desired to conclude an alliance with Japan it was most desirable to pursue proposals from London and to confront Russian aggression in the Far East; the latter contended that the Russian desire to advance into the Far East, particularly into Manchuria, was so obvious and so powerful that it was undoubtedly beyond Japan's power to prevent it and, further, that as Russia had little interest in Korea there was room for cooperation and compromise. In other words, this latter group contended that peace in the Far East could be maintained on the basis of the exchange of Manchuria and Korea as respective spheres of influence.¹² Ito proceeded to the Russia capital to negotiate with Russia for the purpose, producing the contrary result in that the Anglo-Japanese rapprochement was accelerated, culminating in the signing of the first Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance in London on 30 January 1902.¹³

The reaction to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty naturally differed in different European capitals. In Berlin there was ill-concealed annoyance mingled with a certain amount of chagrin that Germany had been left out. von Eckhardstein, for example, an experienced and relative detached observer, regretted that Germany had "missed this best and last opportunity of a firm friendship with Britain". Some Englishmen shared his regret that Germany had not been invited to become a party to the Treaty. But, according to Hayashi, the British Government, though at one time favorably inclined towards the inclusion of Germany in the alliance, became reluctantly convinced that "nothing could be done with the Kaiser and his ministers". Germany would never risk conflict with Russia for the sake of a British alliance. Italy

and Austria were cordial in their congratulations and believed that the Treaty would make for peace. So did Lord Rosebery who thought the treaty absolutely right.¹⁴

Russia, of course, was dissatisfied and uneasy over the first Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance. Although Russia outwardly assumed a calm and unperturbed air, there could be no doubt that she regarded the Alliance as an obstacle to her diplomacy, if not a diplomatic defeat.¹⁵ She tried to induce Germany and France to issue a joint declaration with her in opposition to the Alliance for the purpose of warning Japan and upholding her prestige in the eyes of the Chinese. However, as Germany declined to go along with this, Russia issued such a declaration jointly with France in March 1902. A few days later French Foreign Minister Delcassé declared in the National Assembly that on signing this Declaration he had agreed to the extension of the scope of the Franco-Russian Alliance to the Far East. However, Delcassé did not want to see France alienated thereby from Britain but wished that the Declaration would be understood in London as mere empty words.¹⁶

The effects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance soon became manifest, firstly as regards the military withdrawal of Russia from Manchuria. On 8 April 1902, two months after the announcement of the Alliance, Russia concluded an agreement with China on Manchuria.¹⁷ In that agreement, Russia promised that, if no further disturbances arose and no obstacles were caused by the actions of the other Powers, she would gradually withdraw her forces from the three Eastern Provinces of China. It provided that the strength of the Chinese army and its

movements in Manchuria during the period of the withdrawal would be decided by negotiations between the military officers of Russia and China but that after the completion of the withdrawal, the Chinese Government would have the right to increase or decrease their military forces in the Manchurian Provinces by simply informing the Russian Government.¹⁸ There was no doubt that such an abrupt concession on the part of Russia was mainly due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The second effect was the sincere and total assistance Japan gave Britain in the diplomatic negotiations held prior to the withdrawal of the various military forces from Shanghai towards the end of 1902. As a condition for the withdrawal of her forces, Germany, with the object of placing restrictions on the British exercise of her rights there, proposed that "the Peking Government and the Viceroy of the Yangtze region shall engage not to grant to any Power advantages of a political, military, maritime or economic nature nor to allow the occupation of any other points commanding the river either below or above Shanghai."¹⁹ Britain objected strongly to this proposal and was faithfully supported by Japan.²⁰ The third effect was seen when the alliance proved to be effective in strengthening the position of Japan in Korea. Now that the special interests of Japan in Korea were recognized by Britain, Japan was in position to request the recognition of such interests by Russia as well.

2. KOREAN AND MANCHURIAN PROBLEMS AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-1905)

The first withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria, prescribed in the Agreement of 8 April 1902, was carried out

completely.¹ However, Russia not only failed to implement the second military withdrawal, but brought her forces into parts of South Manchuria which she had not so far occupied and further presented the Chinese Government with a new demand consisting of seven articles. The demand included the provisions that China should not "lease," "transfer" or "sell" to any other Power any part of Manchuria, should maintain "the system of government actually existing throughout Manchuria," and should close the Manchurian provinces to foreign trade by engaging not to open new ports or towns in Manchuria. Such demands not only disregarded the two important principles of the Open Door and the territorial sovereignty of China, but also contravened the Agreement on the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Manchuria. The Chinese Government repeatedly rejected the Russian demands. Japan, Britain and United States also lodged strong protests with Russia. However, Russia showed no signs of reconsidering the situation, but presented still more serious demands.²

In April 1903, Russia notified the Korean Government that she would exploit the forest concession on the bank of the Yalu: In 1896, the Korean Government granted a Concession to the Korean Wood Company, a Russian concern, to fell timber on the banks of the Yalu and Tumen rivers, and on Dagelet Island, under a Contract, which was to remain in force for a period of twenty years, dating from 1 January 1901.³ The Russian Government succeeded in occupying Yōng-chun and Yōng-am-po, towns near the mouth of Yalu River in early May.⁴ This sudden change in the Russian attitude was the result of the increased influence of the faction advocating a military confrontation with Japan.⁵

At the council meeting convened by the Japanese Emperor on 23 June 1903, Japan decided to warn China about the danger of impairing in any way her sovereignty and territorial integrity or of granting to Russia concessions detrimental to the treaty rights and interests of other Powers in Manchuria, and at the same time to instruct Minister Kurino in Russia to start negotiations in St. Petersburg directly with Foreign Minister Lamsdorff with the object of reaching an amicable settlement of the problems between Japan and Russia relating to their respective special interests in Korea and Manchuria. The basis of the negotiations continued to be the "exchange of Manchuria for Korea".⁶

On 2 July 1903, Komura, Minister for Foreign Affairs, told Sir C. MacDonald, British Minister to Japan, of the decision of the Japanese Government that the time was ripe for concluding a definite arrangement directly with the Russian Government with regard to the maintenance of the "open door" policy in Manchuria, and the securing of equal advantages and opportunities for all nations both in China and Korea. In putting this proposal before the British Government, Komura hoped earnestly that it might meet with British approval. MacDonald reported to Lansdowne that the Japanese Government feared that, if the present unsatisfactory condition of affairs be allowed to continue, the feelings of the Russian and Japanese peoples would become excited, and so render the task of preserving the peace a very difficult one. Consequently, they were strongly of the opinion that a satisfactory arrangement should be made with Russia as soon as possible which would terminate a state of affairs which was, in their opinion, rapidly becoming dangerous to the peace of the

two countries. MacDonald added, as regards the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, that the proposed agreement would in no way run counter to its conditions but rather strengthen its object by confirming the policy of the open door and contributing towards the maintenance of peace in the Far East.⁷

On 16 July 1903, the British Government told Japan that they would certainly not criticise in an unfriendly spirit an arrangement desired by their ally, and consistent with the interests and treaty obligations of Great Britain as well as Japan. They said that they understood the proposal to be to the following effect:-

1. Russia would recognize the special interests of Japan in Korea.
2. Japan would in like manner recognize Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria.
3. Should those interests be menaced by internal disturbances, Russia and Japan would respectively recognize each other's right to send troops into Manchuria and Korea, but upon the condition that all troops so dispatched would be withdrawn so soon as their mission had been accomplished.
4. Russia and Japan would mutually undertake to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.

As to (1.) the British Government would welcome a recognition by Russia of the special interests of Japan in Korea.

They had themselves, in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, already admitted that Japan had such interests, and they considered that it would be to their advantage that the position

of Japan in that country should be strengthened.

(2.) They had themselves already recognized, in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1899, Russia's special interest in railway enterprises to the north of the Great Wall of China. Russia had by the same Agreement acknowledged that this country had corresponding interests in other parts of China. So long as Russian action in Manchuria was confined to what was legitimately required for the protection of her railways, the British Government saw no reason why Japan should object.

(3.) Seemed to require further explanation. Every nation had the right to send troops into the territory of another for an adequate national object, committing thereby what may be taken as an act of war, with the full knowledge of the consequences. The British Government assumed that what was intended in the present instance was that Japan should be content to leave to Russia the duty of restoring order in Manchuria, and would not place an embargo on such a proceeding on the understanding that Russia would not place an embargo on similar proceedings on the part of Japan in Korea.

(4.) The proposed mutual engagement of Russia and Japan to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to maintain the principle of the open door, involved the reaffirmation by these two Powers of a principle to which the British Government had repeatedly given their adhesion, and it was satisfactory to them to be assured that the Japanese Government still intended to support that policy.⁸

Both Britain and the United States felt great concern over the Manchurian situation and wished to reach

some sort of agreement with Russia.⁹ Britain advised Japan to keep in close contact with the United States also.¹⁰ But the Japanese Government, which wished to negotiate with Russia independently, replied to this advice that as it was not their plan to take joint action with other Powers and that as "its strict secrecy was of utmost importance at this juncture,"¹¹ they could see no advantage in communicating with the United States Government on the subject.¹² Komura stated to MacDonald that "the Japanese Government are anxiously striving for peace, but they think that the best and only means of obtaining it is by negotiating direct with Russia, and that any delay in doing so will provoke war."¹³

On the other hand, in Peking, Russia tried to conclude an agreement with China in order to exclude the Manchurian problem from the subjects to be negotiated with Japan.¹⁴ In Seoul, also, Russia tried hard to acquire concessions with the obvious objective of making use of them in the future. She also negotiated with Britain, wishing to have her declare that Manchuria was outside Britain's sphere of interest in exchange for her recognition of Britain's sphere of influence in the Yangtze River region. However, in all these attempts she failed. In the meantime, Japan succeeded in opening treaty ports in northern Korea and Manchuria with the support of Britain and the United States.¹⁵

On 15 September 1903, the Russian Government told the Japanese Government that Russia would like to present counter-proposals, and suggesting that these counter-proposals together with the Japanese proposals, might afford a basis for

negotiation.¹⁶ The Russian counter-proposals offered to Japan were:-

The first Article provided that both countries should undertake to respect the independence and integrity of Korea.

Secondly, in so far as was compatible with the due observation of the foregoing, Russia would recognize the preponderating influence of Japan in Korea, and admit her right to assist and advise the government of that country, with a view to the furtherance of good administration.

By Article 3, Russia undertook to throw no obstacles in the way of Japanese commercial development in Korea.

Article 4 provided that, to carry out the objects specified in Article 2, Japan should have the right to send troops to Korea, but such troops to be recalled immediately on the attainment of their purpose, and their number not to exceed that actually requisite for their object. The Japanese Government to notify the Russian Government of their dispatch.

Article 5. neither country should make any use of the peninsula or its coast for strategical purpose, nor should they construct any military works which would obstruct the navigation of the Straits of Korea.

Article 6 ran that no Japanese nor Russian troops should ever be sent to any portion of Korea north of the 39th parallel, which should be regarded as neutral zone.

Article 7. The Japanese Government should recognize that Manchuria and its littoral were altogether outside their sphere of interest.

Article 8 said that all previous Agreements were to be annulled by the present.¹⁷

On 1 November 1903, The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had officially presented to Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister in Tokyo, the following amendments to the counter-proposals of Russia:-

1st Article. A mutual agreement to be made to observe the territorial integrity and the independence of China and Korea.

The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Articles were unaltered.

5th Article. Japanese to engage not to construct any works of a military nature on the Korean coast so as to threaten freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits.

7th Article. This Article in the counter-proposals to be altered as follows: Japan to recognize Manchuria as being beyond her sphere of special interest; and Russia to recognize Korea as beyond hers.

Additionally, first, Russia's special interests in Manchuria, and Russia's right to give necessary protection to those interests, to be recognized by Japan.

Second, Japan to engage not to interfere with the rights and immunities of commerce and residence, which belong to Russia by virtue of her Treaty engagements with Korea; and Russia to make a like engagement with respect to Japan's similar rights in China.¹⁸

Consequently, the Japanese Government continued to discuss the matter with Russia in the hope of arriving at some basis constructed out of Japan's proposals and Russia's counter-proposals, on which negotiations might be carried on.

With a view to maintaining peace and settling the pending problems, the Japanese Government presented their final proposal

to Russia on 5 January 1904 with the possibility of mediation being proposed by any Power or Powers in connection with the present Russo-Japanese relations.¹⁹ However, the Russian Government not only failed to reply, offering various pretexts, but also declared to the world their peaceful intentions and spread the rumour that they were making concessions in order to gain the sympathy of the Powers to propose mediation to Japan. In short, the Russian Government, having no sincere intention of compromising with the Japanese Government, simply delayed their reply to suit their own interests and, while pretending to take an outwardly peaceful attitude, secretly strengthened their forces in Manchuria, approved the Bezobrazov group's scheme²⁰ to gain concessions in Korea, and methodically tried to occupy Korea. They attempted to deprive Japan of the sympathy of other Powers by stirring up fears of the "Yellow peril."

In view of such an extreme discrepancy between the words and actions of the Russian Government, the Japanese Government concluded that there was no hope of reaching a compromise by further negotiations and therefore terminated them on 6 February, notifying the Russian Government that Japan would take whatever action she deemed necessary for her self-defence and for the protection of her existing rights and legitimate interests.²¹

On 9 February 1904, the Japanese Admiral Uriu was notified to the effect that if the Russian cruisers 'Varyag' and 'Koreyetz' had not left Chemulpo Harbour by 4 P.M., he would be obliged to attack them there.²² On the same day, the 'Varyag' and 'Koreyetz' tried to escape about midday, and were attacked about

7 miles out by the Japanese squadron, which received them with heavy fire, and compelled them to retreat about one o'clock to Chemulpo Harbour, in an apparently damaged condition.²³ The Imperial Edicts on the start of the war were promulgated on 10 February 1904.²⁴

On the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Britain declared her strict neutrality.²⁵ Germany²⁶ and France also declared strict neutrality.²⁷ However, despite the fact that these last two countries violated their neutrality by permitting Russia's Baltic Fleet to utilize ports and bays for coaling and other purposes on its way to the Far East, Britain did not change her neutral attitude because of terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In those days, Britain did not want to see the war spread to Europe. This was her greatest fear. She tried to avoid any action that might incite Russia. This attitude stemmed from the fact that she had not abandoned her hope, though very vague at that time, of coming to an understanding with Russia.²⁸ Japan did not seem to have necessarily been opposed to this British attitude.²⁹

If the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had not been in existence at the time of the opening of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan might not have dared risk going to war because of the uncertainty of the attitudes of Britain and Germany as well as the fear of being confronted by the armies and navies of the Franco-Russian Alliance. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by guaranteeing that Japan would not be faced with another Triple Intervention, had the effect of making possible the Russo-Japanese War. Even if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance failed to maintain peace in the Far East, it could not be denied that it served to reduce the area of

fighting and limit the scope of the war. The British Government did not hesitate to give the Japanese Government the following undertaking before the outbreak of the war:

His Majesty's Government will fulfill both in letter and spirit, their obligations under the agreement which impresses upon them the duty of using their efforts in order to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against their ally.³⁰

Furthermore, Britain attempted to bring the United States into the problem of the Far East in order to approach the situation jointly. Accordingly, the United States could be counted on as a sort of spiritual ally. Lansdowne stated to the United States Ambassador "if there were any points in regard to which we were better informed than the United States Government, I would gladly place any knowledge which I possess at Your Excellency's disposal",³¹ and expressed the satisfaction with which he learned that the United States was taking a deep interest in the Far Eastern question.³² American President T. Roosevelt had already promised Japan, in January 1904, to maintain neutrality and warned Germany and France that, in the event of either one of them siding with Russia, the United States would proceed to whatever length was necessary on behalf of Japan.³³ As for France, it was clear that she had nothing to gain from the Far Eastern war, but had a lot to lose. Consequently, she did not want to join the war against Japan for the sake of Russia.³⁴ However, had it not been for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, France might have become less neutral in the war. If that had happened, Britain would have had no alternative but to rescue Japan in order to

maintain the balance of power by preventing Japan from being defeated by the combination of Russia and France.³⁵ In such case, world war would have broken out regardless of which side Germany might have aided. Consequently, a settlement was effected in the Anglo-French Entente of April 1904.³⁶

Now, the decisive turning point to a cease fire in the Russo-Japanese war was due to the Japanese naval victory: On 16 October 1904, the Russian Baltic fleet under Admiral Rozhdestvensky had left Kronstradt to sail round the world. The only fleet with enough coaling stations to do this successfully had been thought to be the British; but French ports in Madagascar and Indo-China helped the Russian ships on, and by May 1905 they were in the Pacific. Admiral Togo was sure the Russians would take the short cut to Vladivostok through the Tsushima Strait and his scouts sighted them off Quelpart Island on 27 May. By sunset of that day the fate of the Russian Baltic Fleet was sealed. The Flagship and three other battleships had been sent to the bottom, one admiral had been Killed and another wounded. The third admiral surrendered the following day. By the end of this two-day running battle in the Sea of Japan, the Russians had lost six battleships, five cruisers, and several destroyers and smaller craft. Of 18,000 sailors, only 6,000 survived. The Japanese lost 116 men killed and three torpedo boats. It was a naval victory on a colossal scale.³⁷ By this defeat, Russia was brought to the conference table by Roosevelt at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where the peace treaty was signed on 5 September 1905,³⁸ and ratified on 14 October 1905.³⁹

By this peace treaty, firstly, both Russia and Japan

evacuated Manchuria at the same time; Russia's lease on the Liaotung Peninsula from China would be taken over by Japan;⁴⁰ so would the Russian railway south of Chang-ch'un, with the mining rights that went with it; the southern half of the island of Sakhalin was to go to Japan; Japanese fishermen were granted rights in the Okhotsk and Bering Seas; both powers pledged themselves not to exploit Manchurian railways for strategic ends. All parts of occupied Manchuria were to be returned to Chinese administration, except for the leased territory, and Russia had to disavow any ambition to secure a monopoly of privileges or concessions in China. 41

Secondly, Japan's paramount interests in Korea were recognized: On 12 August 1905, the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed. As Balfour commented with respect to the new Treaty, both powers eventually approved of this arrangement for the benefits which they gained from it: Britain in India, Japan in Korea. This was complicated as Balfour explained:

Both we and Japan have interests outside the frontiers of our respective dominions, which it is as important to safeguard as the frontiers themselves. An attack on Korea would rightly be regarded by the Japanese, and an attack on Afghanistan would rightly be regarded by us, as in no essential sense to be distinguished from an attack on Japan and on India respectively.⁴²

On 5 October, the Japanese Minister passed to the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pak Che-sun, the substance of this second alliance. Even though the Korean Government protested to the British Government respecting the reference to Korea in the new Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it was already a useless one.

(Appendix I) Subsequently, the Korean Government had been forced to sign a Treaty with the Japanese Government, by which it agreed to accept a Japanese protectorate, and to leave the conduct of foreign affairs in the hands of the Japanese Government. (Appendix II) This Korean -Japanese Agreement was signed on 18 October, and published on 21 December 1905.⁴³ At last, Japan possessed herself of Korean peninsula.

The defeat of Russia in the Far East had consequences of the utmost importance. In the first place, it directed Russian thoughts and aspirations away from Asia (Spheres of influence agreement with Japan) and back again to Europe, temporarily back, that is to say, to competition with the Triple Alliance over the Balkans and Constantinople. In spite of the pro-German party at Court and in the capital, anti-German sentiment among Russians was intense, not least because it had been for generations suppressed by the policy of successive Tsars up to Alexander III(1881-1894). The Franco-Russian alliance owed its being to Slav antipathy towards the Teuton, exacerbated by a long list of material grievances against Berlin and Vienna and by jealousy and apprehension of the dazzling empire created by Bismarck. That alliance must not be lightly abandoned or endangered. The Far Eastern adventure, after all, was only a side show, and had turned out disgracefully too. While their eyes had been fixed on China, they were conveniently blind to German penetration into Turkey. And now the Kaiser and his government were making use of Russian misfortunes to threaten their French ally, the only friend they had, with the aim of forcing the Powers of the Dual Alliance into abject dependence on German good will.

Secondly, the war had vital results at home in Russia. A political and social crisis that rocked the Tsarist system and its foundations arose during the war. For a time the country was in a state of confusion and the government lost its authority. It regained control at the cost of promising constitutional reform, a promise partially redeemed. Russian liberalism was naturally sympathetic to the Western democracies and hostile to the conservative monarchies of Germany and Austria-Hungary which reinforced existing policies abroad. Russia now relied on the French even more, and badly needed a loan at the moment. Both foreign and domestic considerations therefore weighed against yielding to German blandishments and tended rather to strengthen the Dual Alliance.⁴⁴

Lastly, as for Britain, she had no more need to be afraid of Russian expansion in the Far East, and her special position in China, above all in the Yangtze River region, was secured. Taking advantage of the war, Britain was also able to strengthen, at least on paper, its position in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet by negotiating a deal with Russia which would previously have been thought unobtainable.

ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER VIII

<The Limitation of 'Splendid Isolation' policy and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance>

1. Kruger Telegram (1896): Telegram of 3 January from the Emperor William II of Germany to President Kruger of the Transvaal congratulating him on his success in defending the independence of his country against the Jameson Raid (29 December 1895). David Weigall, Britain & the World, 1815-1986, London, 1987, p. 123.
2. Christopher Howard, Splendid Isolation, London 1967, pp. 21-22.
3. Salisbury to Satow, No. 21, very confidential, 31 March 1898, F.O. 405/76, p. 247.
4. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 46-62.
5. Ibid., pp. 63-66.
6. Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and Russia with regard to their respective Railway Interests in China, 28 April 1899; BD.(British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914), i nos. 57, 59 and 61.
7. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 75-76.
8. Boxer Uprising(1900), 'Boxer' was the English name for a Chinese secret society, the 'Righteous and Harmonious Fists', which in fact consisted of several uncoordinated groups which were united in their determination to root out foreign influence in China. This outburst of native anger against foreign imperialism was also directed against those Chinese who had collaborated with foreigners. It had the connivance of the Chinese authorities and the active support of the Dowager Empress. Weigall, Britain & the World, 1815-1986, p.40.

9. Edmunds S. Wehrle, Britain, China, and the Anti-missionary Riots, 1891-1900, Minneapolis, 1966, p. 138-160.
10. Granville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: the close of the Nineteenth Century, London, 1964, pp. 321-26.
11. Komura was appointed Foreign Minister on 21 September 1901, succeeding Kato.
12. Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922, Vol. II, Tokyo, 1978 p. 33.
13. Ibid., pp. 65-67.
14. G.D.Clayton. Britain and the Eastern Question, London, 1971, pp.192-195.
15. BD 2:130-131.
16. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 238.
17. Ibid., p. 262.
18. BD, 2: 132-135.
19. Ibid., 2: 144-145.
20. Ibid., 1: 335.

<Korean and Manchurian Problems and the Russo-Japanese War>

1. Satow to Lansdowne, telegraph, 8 April 1902, F.O. 405/120, , No. 83.
2. Lansdowne to Sir M. Herbert, telegraph, 25 April 1903, F.O. 405/134, No. 117.
3. M. Stein to Mr. Hayashi, translation, 21 April 1903, F.O. 405/137, Inclosure 1 in No. 18.
4. Jordan to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 62, confidential, 25 May 1903 (rec'd 9 July), F.O. 405/138, No. 18.

5. MacDonald to Lansdowne, Most Secret, telegraph, 2 July 1903, F.O. 405/135, No. 47.
6. John A. White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 101-2.
7. Sir C. MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 47, Most Secret, 2 July 1903 (rec'd 2 July), F.O. 405/138, No. 4.
8. Memorandum communicated to Viscount Hayashi, confidential, 16 July 1903, F.O. 405/138, No. 32.
9. British Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 121:629, 789, 917 & 126:190.
10. Lansdowne to MacDonald, No. 91, Secret, 8 July 1903, F.O. 405/138, No. 17.
11. MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 56, Secret, telegraph, 17 July 1903 (rec'd 17 July), F.O. 405/138, No. 36.
12. BD. 2:207.
13. *Ibid.*: 210-211.
14. MacDonald to Lansdowne, confidential, telegraph, 6 August 1903, F.O. 405/135, No. 61.
15. White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 106.
16. MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 78, Secret, 15 September 1903 (rec'd 15 September), F.O. 405/138, No. 146.
17. MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 99, Most Secret, 7 October 1903 (rec'd 7 October) F.O. 405/139, No. 22.
18. MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 113, Secret, 1 November 1903 (rec'd 1 November), F.O. 405/139, No. 66.
19. Lansdowne to MacDonald, No. 6, Secret, 5 January 1904, F.O. 405/146, No. 18.

20. Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922, Vol. II, pp. 90-94.
21. Scott to Lansdowne, No. 26, telegraph, 6 February 1904 (rec'd 6 February), F.O. 405/146, No. 178 & Lansdowne to MacDonald, No. 34, telegraph, 6 February 1904, F.O. 405/146, No. 180.
22. Jordan to Lansdowne, No. 39, telegraph, 9 February 1904 (rec'd 10 February), F.O. 405/146, No. 212.
23. Jordan to Lansdowne, No. 41, telegraph, 9 February 1904 (rec'd 10 February), F.O. 405/146, No. 214.
24. MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 53, telegraph, 10 February 1904 (rec'd 10 February), F.O. 405/146, No. 219 & Extract from the "Official Gazette" of 28 January (10 February), 1904, translation, F.O. 405/146, Inclosure 2 in No. 246.
25. Lansdowne to Scott, No. 48, 9 February 1904, F.O. 405/146, No. 207.
26. Lascelles to Lansdowne, No. 41, 9 February 1904 (rec'd 12 February), F.O. 405/146, No. 236.
27. Sir E. Monson to Lansdowne, No. 73, 9 February, 1904, F.O. 405/146, No. 210.
28. Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922, Vol. II, p. 165.
29. BD, 2:244, 245, 257.
30. I bid., 2:244.
31. I bid., 2:223.
32. I bid., 2:228.
33. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, (New York, 1925), p. 2.

34. France wanted to maintain neutrality even if Britain participated in the war as long as the latter did not attack Russia in Europe.
35. Lansdowne stated in Parliament that obliteration of Japan by a combination of Powers would in no circumstances be tolerated.
36. White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, pp. 172-176.
37. Louis Allen, *Japan: the years of triumph*, London, 1971, pp. 61-63.
38. MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 227, very confidential, 27 August 1905 (rec'd 2 October), F.O. 405/161, No. 1.
39. MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 246, Treaty, 14 October 1905 (rec'd 14 October), F.O. 405/161, No. 14.
40. Satow to Lansdowne, No. 210, Secret, telegraph, 12 November 1905 (rec'd 12 November), F.O. 405/161, No. 39. & Lansdowne to Satow, No. 176, telegraph, 13 November 1905, F.O. 405/161, No. 40.
41. Allen, *Japan: the years of triumph*, pp. 61-63.
42. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, p. 314.
43. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey, No. 285, telegraph, 21 December 1905 (rec'd 21 December), 405/161, No. 86.
44. K. W. B. Middleton, *Britain and Russia*, pp. 86-87.

Appendices to Chapter VIII

Appendix I.

Korean Minister for Foreign Office to Sir J. Jordan.¹

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

IN the Treaty between Great Britain and Korea it is stated " in case of differences arising between one of the High Contracting Parties and a third Power, the other High Contracting Party. . . . shall exert its good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement," also that " both countries shall freely enjoy the same. . . . privileges as are enjoyed. . . . in other countries."

Ever since the ratification of this Treaty Diplomatic Representatives have resided in the countries of the Contracting Parties, and the friendly relations have daily grown closer, the Treaty has been strictly adhered to, and no friction has ensued.

But now Great Britain has signed an offensive and defensive alliance with Japan, which contains many provisions in contravention of the Articles of the Treaty between Great Britain and Korea, a matter of peculiar surprise to us. The equality of States has been the ruling principle of recent years among all the Powers, and no matter how small a country is, it enjoys the same rights and privileges in the eyes of all the Great Powers, in virtue

¹ Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs to Jordan, Translation, 15 October 1905, F.O. 405/161, Inclosure in No. 67.

of its independence, as they themselves possess. Why then should our country be made a solitary exception to this rule?

Korea has never given Great Britain cause for complaint, besides the good faith and sincerity of Great Britain are well known all the world over; how is it that so little importance is now attached to our Treaty? If any other country made an arrangement with a third Power affecting Great Britain, would Great Britain consent?

This is not what we had hoped for from Great Britain, and I cannot refrain from addressing your Excellency to request you on our behalf to ask the British Government to rescind the Treaty and to take measures to support our country, which will not only cause joy to our country but will be beneficial to the whole political situation in this quarter of the Far East.

I avail, &c.

(Signed)

PAK CHE SUN

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Appendix II.

Agreement between Japan and Korea²

THE Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have, with that object in view, agreed upon and concluded the following stipulations to serve until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Korea has attained national strength:-

² Agreement between Japan and Korea.-(Communicated by Viscount Hayashi, 22 November 1905, F.O. 405/161, No. 48.

ARTICLE I.

The Government of Japan, through the Department of Foreign Affairs in ToKyo, will, hereafter, have control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea, and the Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of Japan will have charge of the subjects and interests of Korea in foreign countries.

ARTICLE II.

The Government of Japan undertake to see to the execution of the Treaties actually existing between Korea and other Powers, and the Government of Korea engage not to conclude hereafter any act or engagement having an international character, except through the medium of the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE III.

The Government of Japan shall be represented at the Court of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea by a Resident-General, who shall reside at Seoul primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs.

He shall have the right of private and personal audience of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea.

The Japanese Government shall also have the right to station Residents at the several open ports and such other places in Korea as they may deem necessary. Such Residents shall, under the direction of the Resident-General, designate the powers and functions hitherto appertaining to Japanese Consuls in Korea, and

shall perform such duties as may be necessary in order to carry into full effect the provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV.

The stipulations of all Treaties and Agreement existing between Japan and Korea not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement shall continue in force.

ARTICLE V.

The Government of Japan undertake to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House of Korea.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their governments, have signed this Agreement and affixed their seals.

HAYASHI GONSUKE

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

PAK CHE SUN

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION.

ON 31 August 1907, the momentous convention between Britain and Russia was at last concluded. The scope of the Agreement was not nearly so comprehensive as the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, but it covered all the outstanding questions at issue between the two Powers in regions where in recent years their interests had been most evidently in conflict, namely Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia.

In regard to Tibet the parties pledged themselves to respect its integrity, to abstain from all interference in its internal affairs, to seek no concessions for railways, roads, telegraph, mines, and other rights in Tibet; not to send representatives to Lhasa, and to deal with Tibet only through the intermediary of its Suzerain, China.

As regards Afghanistan the conclusion reached was even more important. The Russian Government recognized Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence; they engaged that all their political relations with Afghanistan should be conducted through the intermediary of Great Britain, and undertook not to send any agents into Afghanistan. Britain, on its side, declared that there was no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan; that British influence would be exercised in a pacific sense, and that no steps were contemplated, or would be encouraged, against Russia. Finally there was to be complete equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan for both countries.

The agreement concerning Persia was in some respects


the most important of all. Britain and Russia engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and to keep the door open to the trade of all other nations. Persia was, however, mapped out into three spheres of influence. The Russian sphere embraced the north, including the chief cities, Tabriz, Teheran, and Ispahan. The British sphere was in the south and east; it included the Gulf of Oman and of the Indian Ocean up to the frontiers of Baluchistan. Between the two spheres of influence was interposed a neutral zone, in which both Powers were free to obtain political or commercial concessions while renouncing any such freedom in the spheres respectively assigned to them.

Even though the Anglo-Russian Agreement in 1907 did not cause it to end, it did happen to mark the end of their rivalry. Around the turn of the century, the growing power of Germany and the naval and imperial ambitions of its emperor appeared as likely to constitute in future the central threat to British security. The new political leadership in Britain after 1905 was more susceptible to such arguments, especially as they took office just when an alarmist interpretation was becoming the most obvious way of explaining quarrelsome German diplomacy at the time of rapid German naval construction. Grey, the foreign secretary, was sufficiently convinced of the latest threat from the Germans to pursue the recommended alignment with France and Russia, and even to allow precautionary staff talks with the French. The 1907 Agreement coincided, therefore, with the most radical re-formulation of British foreign policy since eighteenth-thirties. In the years that followed most British political leaders came to identify Germany, not Russia or France, as their principal

antagonist in the world at large. German ambitions in Asia, too, especially in Persia and the Ottoman Empire, began to take on a threatening aspect. And after their humiliation in 1908-9 at the hands of the German and Austrian Governments over the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russians were above all concerned to check any further extension of the central powers' influence in the Balkans and in the Ottoman Empire. Under the circumstances, Anglo-Russian rivalry had lost its central role in British and Russian policy-making; it meant that a chapter in the relations between two great empires, which for nearly a century had been almost uniformly embarrassing and painful, was closed.

In concluding my thesis, I will now bring together my analysis of Anglo-Russian rivalry and the Port Hamilton episode. Initially, I divided Anglo-Russian rivalry into three phases: Each phase took the form of "Russia's challenge-and-Britain's response."

(Diagram I)



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- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| B = the beginning | O.U = Ottoman upheavals |
| Cr = Crimean War | B.C = Berlin Congress |
| A.C = Afghan border crisis | O.P.H = Occupation of Port Hamilton |
| W.P.H = Withdrawal of Port Hamilton | S-J.W = Sino-Japanese War |
| Ru-K+M = Russian influence in Korea and Manchuria | A-J.W = Anglo-Japanese Alliance |
| R-J.W = Russo-Japanese War | A-R.A = Anglo-Russian Agreement. |
-

<Phase 1>. Britain's identification of Russia as a threat began with the climax to the Greek rising of 1821 which had centred on the relation between Turkey and Russia. With the aroused sympathies for Greece aroused in both Britain and Russia, the rising was recognized as an international question,¹ but there was a strong response of Britain against Russia when Russia's war against Turkey included substantial gains for Russia itself. From that time, as long as the Russians tried their policy to advance in the Near East, Anglo-Russian rivalry was sustained. The climax of their rivalry in the Near East was the Crimean war which registered a definite set-back to Russian expansion in the region.² The Russians were again frustrated in the great Eastern crisis of 1875-78,³ and with the Berlin Congress of 1878, the first phase of the Anglo-Russian rivalry was ended.

<Phase 2>. After the Berlin Congress, Russia turned her policy of expansion increasingly from the Near East to the Middle and the Far East because she seemed to believe that her international position would be restored when her expansionist policy in those regions, accelerated after the Crimean defeat, had put the British on the defensive. Russia's challenge there did show Britain in difficulties at the time of the Afghan crisis in March 1885. The commercial and strategic importance which Britain attached to India was threatened by the Russian conflict with Afghanistan,⁴ and Britain prepared for war in response. More particularly she responded with the occupation of Port Hamilton to assist in the waging of war against Russia in the Far East. Yet it did not come to this, and soon after Britain occupied Port Hamilton, the Afghan crisis was peacefully solved, and from

the time Russia avoided a direct conflict with the British over the islands.⁵ Britain having lost her justification to retain possession of Port Hamilton. Britain withdrew her naval squadron from Port Hamilton in February 1887 signifying the end of the second phase of Anglo-Russian rivalry.

<Phase 3>. With the Sino-Japanese War, Russia had a good chance to advance in the Far East, which she took, especially, in Korea and Manchuria. Russian involvement in those regions constituted yet another serious challenge to Britain. Britain adopted as a solution the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This facilitated war against Russia on the part of Japan (Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05), and Russia lost another chance to expand farther in the Far East. This was the end of the last phase of Anglo-Russian rivalry. After this last phase of their rivalry, Russia never had so good a chance of East Asian expansion before 1945. With the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, both Britain and Russia at last closed the long chapter of their rivalry.

Next, in my analysis about Port Hamilton, I found one direct and three indirect reasons for the British Government's decision to occupy the islands. When Britain prepared for war because of the Afghan crisis, the British chose to follow a traditional strategic plan-to attack Russia with her fleet at weak points like the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus or Vladivostock in Russia's far flung Asian possessions. Therefore, the British Government needed the occupation of Port Hamilton as a base for the blockade of the Russian forces in the Pacific and as an advanced station to support operations against Vladivostock. This is the direct reason of the occupation of Port Hamilton. Three

indirect reasons are:-

First, the Russian interest in the Far East was in an ice-free port on the Pacific. The British thought Port Hamilton would be an important depot and naval base to Russia because it was free from ice at all seasons, and it was far superior to Vladivostock. Therefore, the matter of the ice-free port which involved Port Hamilton became a political aspect of Anglo-Russian rivalry.⁶

Secondly, it was natural that Port Hamilton would be related to British commercial policy in the Far East. At the time, Britain fully understood the importance of Port Hamilton in relation to Russian commercial interests in China or its neighbourhood.⁷

Thirdly, the British were convinced that the strategic importance of Port Hamilton would greatly strengthen the British position in the Chinese seas as against Russia, and materially add to the security of Hong Kong, or to act with effect against the Russian ports.⁸

After the occupation of Port Hamilton in May 1885, Britain had to reconsider the necessity of retaining possession of Port Hamilton because the Afghan crisis as the direct reason was solved peacefully a few months later.

In the light of reports from departments concerned with Port Hamilton, the British Government also had to reconsider the indirect reasons; first, the Board of Trade failed to see in what manner the occupation of Port Hamilton would tend to any large extension or improvement of British trade in those regions.⁹ Secondly, unless it was the intention of the British Government to fortify and garrison the island, so as to place it in a proper


condition of defence to resist the attack of iron-clads, the Admiralty were decidedly of the opinion that it was not advisable to retain possession of Port Hamilton.¹⁰

Thirdly, through the Russian newspaper "Novoye Vremya", the Russian Government declared that, "We have at present no intentions whatever in the Far East, and that any aggressive action on our part would be a distinct political mistake." Therefore, the British Government lost the political justification of an imminent Russian threat in the Far East as grounds for occupying Port Hamilton.¹¹ At any rate, Britain withdrew her naval squadron from Port Hamilton in early 1887.

At the same time, I concluded that the withdrawal of Port Hamilton had induced a surprising change in the balance of power in the Far East. There were three steps:-

<Diagram 2>

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
B= Britain C= China K= Korea
 J= Japan R= Russia
 c= compromise r= restraint. t=treaty

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< Step 1>. During the second half of the nineteenth century, China and Japan always worried about the Russian southward advance policy to gain the ice-free territory. Therefore, when


Britain proposed a compromise to justify the occupation of Port Hamilton, they accepted it because they expected to restrict Russian policy in these regions. This situation made for a balance of power in the Far East; *i.e.*, four Powers (Britain, China, Japan and Russia) exercised a balance of power centred on the Korean peninsula.

<Diagram 3>



<Step 2>. With the compromise between China and Russia (the secret treaty in 1886), Britain found reasons for the withdrawal from Port Hamilton, and left the islands. From then on, Britain indirectly participated in the Far Eastern balance of power with diplomatic support to China. However, this British withdrawal from Port Hamilton induced a decisive change in the Far Eastern balance of Power: In spite of the British withdrawal, Britain with China could control Russian power in the Far East for the time being. But, they could not have expected to have to control Japan who had ambitions to advance into Korea and Manchuria at the time. Consequently, when Japan's ambition was revealed in a war with China in 1894, it meant the collapse of the balance of power in the Far East.

<Diagram 4>



M= Manchuria

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<Step 3>. After the Sino-Japanese War, China lost her power in the Far East, and Britain who had supported China also lost much of her diplomatic weight in the Far East. Now, Japan and Russia only were left as the major powers in those regions. Russia, especially, had a big chance to advance there because the power of her real enemy, Britain, was so weak in those regions at the moment. So, the Russians deeply advanced their power in Korea and Manchuria. However, Japan who had the same ambition as Russia to advance into Korea and Manchuria strongly opposed the Russian movement. Moreover, Britain, wanting to restrict Russian power in the Far East wherever it was, joined with Japan. Consequently, with the following the Russo-Japanese war, Russia lost her power there, and Japan became the dominant power in the Far East. It meant the end of Far Eastern diplomatic stability for a century, and, especially, the destiny of the Korean peninsula, the focus of the balance of power in the Far East, fell into Japanese hands.¹²

On the other hand, during my analysis of the above-mentioned three steps, I had some doubts:-

(From Step 1), Did the British Government understand the

Far Eastern balance of Power? Especially, did they clearly recognize the position in the Far East they had acquired with the occupation of Port Hamilton?

(From Step 2). At the time, it was publicly known that China was a very weak country internally, although she looked to be one of the Great Powers externally. Then, why did the British Government entrust China with full responsibility to solve the Far Eastern problem? Is it true that the British Government did not understand China's position at that time? Also, did they truly not know about Japanese ambition to advance into Korea and Manchuria at the time?

(From Step 3). When Britain withdrew from Port Hamilton, despite realizing the possibility of further Russian advance in the Far East sooner or later, why did she not prepare some more direct defensive measures against Russia in addition to the indirect way of supporting China?

Given the above-mentioned doubts, I concluded that British diplomatic policy in the Far East at the time had its limitations. Consequently, while Britain's eyes had been fixed on those Far Eastern problems mentioned above in Step 3, she was slow to appreciate the growing power of Germany and the naval and imperial ambitions of its emperor which appeared as likely to constitute in future the central threat to her security, and in the early twentieth century, both Britain and Russia suffered extensively from war with Germany, the so-called Great War.

Given this analysis of the three phases of Anglo-Russian rivalry, I concluded that the rivalry encapsulated the essence of international politics in the Far East during the nineteenth

century. Moreover, although there is a general view that the Port Hamilton affair was merely a local affair during the period of Anglo-Russian rivalry, from my analysis of the implications of British withdrawal from the islands, I also concluded that the Port Hamilton Affair was undoubtedly important enough to constitute a decisive turning point in the present era of international relations.

ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER IX

<Conclusion>

1. Chapter I of this thesis, pp. 3-7.
2. Chapter I of this thesis, pp. 8-9.
3. Chapter I of this thesis, pp. 9-11.
4. Chapter IV of this thesis, pp. 133-144.
5. Chapter IV of this thesis, pp. 164-166.
6. Chapter IV of this thesis, pp. 145-146.
7. Chapter IV of this thesis, pp. 147-148.
8. Chapter IV of this thesis, pp. 148-150.
9. Chapter V of this thesis, pp. 191-197.
10. Chapter VI of this thesis, pp. 246-250.
11. Chapter VI of this thesis, pp. 262-266.
12. Chapter VIII of this thesis, pp. 368-369.

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