ETHICS AND NEEDS

The relationship between the various concepts of Moral Philosophy and the concept of Need.

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- SUMMARY -

This work attempts to show that moral goodness is of the same kind as other forms of goodness, and that it is typically exhibited where a moral act is performed in order to satisfy the needs of someone other than the agent, just as other instances of goodness, e.g. instrumental, plainly arise due to the capacity of something to meet our needs.

Thus, needs are claimed to be the content of ethics or morality, and morality is seen as the most general form of ethics. It is the ethics of needers, a code which enables the co-existence and mutual help of needing beings, including man, in the pursuit of their needs, the attainment of their objectives and goals.

We are thus addressing ourselves to the problem of the content of morality, as outlined so ably and eloquently by G.J. Warnock.(see Warnock, 1967.)

The context of this problem is given, and traced back to the challenge moral philosophy received from logical positivism in the early decades of this century.

We state our method and assumptions carefully. We assume that there is an additional 'level' or 'order' of morality where the content, if any, of morality is to be found. Our method then will be to attempt to discern and formalise any concomitant or correlative differences between levels, i.e. between moral language and those situations about which it is used.

An analysis of need is given, showing that it is closely associated with the preconditions of attaining objectives and goals.Its relationship to desire, purposiveness, actions and ought-statements (particularly moral ought-statements) is investigated.

Need shares many logical features with value (e.g. being a means to an end, being related to goals), and this is examined closely to show

how needs are related to rights, interests and welfare, the notion of 'rightness', and moral goodness. Moral goodness is shown to be associated, perhaps indirectly but essentially, with the satisfaction of what is called 'heteronomous' needs, which are claimed here to be the content of morality.

These needs are defined as the needs which we have for the actions of others, in either a positive or negative sense. The claim that these needs constitute the content of morality is further investigated by looking at the common conception of intrinsic value, in that moral goodness is often felt to be intrinsic, and not susceptible to an instrumental account. Intrinsic value is shown to be a form of instrumental, while the alternative transcendental view of it is shown to be unacceptable.

Utilitarianism is examined, to show that needs, rather than happiness or pleasure, provides a more satisfactory content for the moral, as well as providing us with a theoretical basis from which to account for the inadequacies of Utilitarianism.

An account of intrinsic moral goods, and an explanation of how intrinsic evaluation arises with regard to moral matters, is then given. The possibility of value-judgements, and value discourse in general, being either true or false, i.e. being indicative statements like any other, is examined: it is concluded that scepticism in this area would appear to be unfounded. The moral realism outlined seems to provide an adequate empirical basis to ground the assertion that moral judgements are as factual as any other.

Lastly, the problems remaining for moral realism were looked at: what is the nature of a moral being? What about the other features of morality, drawn attention to by G.J. Warnock, e.g. the apparently endemic indecisiveness of moral argument? Just what is the role of the moral philosopher in moral debate? These are some of the problems which must be tackled if the issue about the content of morality is resolved.

Chapter I INTRODUCTION.

1.1 The Task for Moral Philosophy.

G.J. Warnock states (Warnock, 1967 p77) that 'this is a subject in which there is still almost everything to be done' and again '... we should begin at the beginning ... and determine how we propose that the subject matter is to be identified.'.

He refers of course to moral philosophy, and while he acknowledges that considerable useful work has been done in the past, his book is, nevertheless, a frank and depressing verdict upon progress made to date.

Our main preoccupation in this work will be to attempt to prove that needs constitute the subject-matter, or content of morality. By that I mean that if something is said to be moral, then it is the relation of that thing to needs which characterises it as moral (in the allocative sense) and determines our judgement of it as either right or wrong, good or evil, moral or immoral (in the evaluative sense).

It may seem strange to an outsider that moral philosophy is still wrestling with the fundamental problem of what is its subject matter: after all, moral philosophy has been pursued formally in the western world for hundreds of years, and has surely been studied informally since time immemorial. Nevertheless, to date philosophers are not generally agreed to have got beyond the point where various interpretations of 'good ' are offered, and debated, as a small beginning towards a rigourous study of morality.

Some of this lack of progress could have been ascribed to the different interests and attitudes which moral philosophers bring to their work, thus influencing their view of what is the good: this would result in a lack of objectivity in the field of study. However, methods and

procedures in moral philosophy are more rigorous and empirical than before, yet such objectivity, and some resulting general agreement on the basics, remains a desirable but largely unattained ideal for moral philosophy.

It will be useful here to give a very brief survey of developments this century in moral philosophy, thus setting the context for our search for the content of morality.

1.2 The Historical Context.

The first impression which strikes one is that there has been an excessive, and debilitating preoccupation with language in moral philosophy, although in recent years this has seemed to decline. One repeatedly encounters discussions such as: What does 'right' mean? Can 'good' be defined? What are the rules for the use of various moral terms? How, if at all, does 'ought' follow from 'is'?

This preoccupation with linguistic analysis has circumscribed and gradually highlighted what is today the central problem, to which we have already referred, that of identifying the content or subject matter of morality.

The primary reason for this concentration upon language seems to have been the empirical revolution which occurred in the early decades of this century. This had begun earlier as a general movement towards empiricism in all branches of human enquiry: Hume's work was an early development of this, emphasising as it did the division of truths into either truths of reason, or truths of fact.

At the beginning of this century, 'logical positivism' grew to be the representative of the radical empiricist approach, aided by the work of A.J. Ayer, Wittgenstein, and, indirectly, Russell and Herbert Spencer. The high point of Logical Positivism was reached in the twenties and the thirties, when a school of thought known as the Vienna Circle propounded

the verification principle. This had various formulations, but essentially held that something could only be said to be meaningful where it could either be verified by observation, or where its truth was a matter of logic or of mathematics.

Logical Positivism was conceived against a background of previously grandiose, yet fruitless systems of human enquiry. Academics had tended to construct grand metaphysical systems from which plausible resolutions of philosophical and scientific issues could be deduced. However, the difficulty was that these systems were irrefutable in principle, using subjective and arbitrary assumptions. They seemed to be expressions of their author's fantasies, rather than attempts to explain reality.

Metaphysical philosophy, Freudian psychology, theology and Marxism were typical examples of grand, over-arching systems which were criticised by Logical Positivism as not only providing no permanent or consistent answers, but as actually embodying meaningless theories and statements, since few could be submitted to the tests of either logic or observational testing.

In contrast to this, the physical sciences were making steady and occasionally spectacular progress by following the empirical path: observation of the physical world, together with the systematisation of logic and mathematics, led to physical theories becoming ever more powerful and all-embracing.

Moral philosophy soon came under attack in this new empiricist atmosphere: intuitionism, the dominant moral theory at the turn of the century, quickly fell under the empirical guillotine. The intuitionists held that goodness, and other moral phenomena, were qualities which were apprehended by intuition: they were thus non-natural properties, and moral propositions or judgements were not verifiable in the same way as were other, factual propsitions.

This view did not, of course, meet the criteria of objective validity, of being testable by either experience or logic: it was thus

condemned as meaningless. Since, as we have said, this was the dominant view in moral philosophy at the time, then moral philosophy as a whole stood condemned: talk of right and wrong, and the formalstudy of this, was widely agreed, at least among those thinkers subscribing to the principles of verificationism, to be meaningless.

This was fortunately not accepted by all (although the legacy of this massive rejection still lingers, and has it repercussions), and Emotivism was the next school of thought to gain wide credence as a theory of morality. This concentrated on the distinctive use of moral language, i.e. that of influencing the listener's attitudes and emotions in order to bring them closer to one's own.

Thus, Emotivism was a theory about the meaning of moral terms. Since it related language to its observed uses, it appeared to be acceptable as an empirical theory. Emotivism was supported by Ayer on Logical Positivist grounds; study of the uses of moral terms was acceptable, even though terms such as 'right' and 'wrong' did not seem to refer to real, observable entities.

However, it failed to pass all of the tests of experience, for there seemed to be some moral facts for which emotivism could not account. For example, reason does sometimes seem to have a place in morality, *contra* emotivism, and moral discourse is, on occasion, not obviously a mutual attempt by its participants to influence each other. Emotivism therefore did not seem to provide the whole truth about morality; instead it seemed to correctly describe only some facts about the language of morality.

These shortcomings, in the face of experience, led to the development of Prescriptivism, primarily expounded by R.M. Hare (Hare,1963). His work is greatly influenced by Kant, and emphasises the logical form of moral language, together with its action-guiding, commendatory, and 'universalisability' aspects. Prescriptivism did allow more scope for the application of reason in morality, but was seen to be inadequate in other respects: it is unduly concerned with the form, or logic, of moral discourse, and it does not adequately characterise morality; for example,

anyone who is prepared to universally prescribe some eccentric action is held to be adopting a moral point of view.

It could be said that the shortcomings of Emotivism, Prescriptivism, and indeed of Intuitionism, rest upon their failure to identify anything outwith moral discourse as its essential subject matter: none of them provide any solid base in experience as reference for moral language, and hence can only provide part of the truth.

In contrast to these movements, where moral language seems to be virtually the only empirical data, and the primary object of study, there has been an opposing trend in moral philosophy this century. This we may call moral realism, or value realism, or cognitivism: the name is in some ways unimportant. The distinctive feature of moral realism, as I shall call it, is that its adherents delve beyond language, and consider what things are good, to what do the adjectives and nouns of moral discourse refer, what is the essential subject-matter of moral philosophy, moral discourse, and hence indirectly of moral philosophy.

Classical Utilitarians were the earliest moral realists, and there is a growing movement in recent times towards moral realism, perhaps in reaction to the barrenness of linguistic analysis as applied to moral philosophy.

G.J.Warnock, (1967), Phillippa Foot, G.E.M. Anscombe (both in Hudson,ed. 1969) were the spearheads of current thinking on the subject, which develops apace (see Finnis, 1983).

The underlying belief of this school is, as we have seen, that morality and moral language have a point, a subject-matter or content, which distinguish and characterise them. Thus, moral judgements are held to be descriptive, their truth or falsity can, in theory, be established, and language is, in a sense, peripheral to the moral.

Moral realism has not yet reached the point where there is universal acceptance that there are moral truths, nor is there universal agreement

about the content of morality. Nevertheless, there is a degree of consistency and agreement in moral realism; Warnock and Foot see needs and wants as characterising morality, Anscombe and others see 'flourishing', with its objective standards, as central: Finnis (1983 p50 ff) actually lists seven aspects of human wellbeing, derived with the aid of anthropological literature.

Logical Positivism and its empirical tenets have set the touchstone for modern moral philosophy: although Logical Positivism soon lost its unity as a philosophical movement (partly for ideological or conceptual reasons, and partly historical), nevertheless any viable philosophical theory must show itself to be able meet the verificationist criteria. Since discourse seemed the most prominent feature of morality, philosophy has,in the wake of Logical Positivism, for long concentrated on the form, effects, consequences and uses of moral language. This diversion, however, seems to be just that, a diversion which is coming happily to an end.

It is in this historical context that the present work is placed. I wish to investigate the centrality of needs in the dispute about the content of morality, while keeping within the bounds of empirical testability. This has been the *sine qua non* of any progress in moral philosophy in recent times.

In order to clarify our methodology, in the next section we shall discuss the levels of ethics. This will also highlight, I believe, the inadequacy of concentrating our philosophical efforts upon moral language.

1.3 Levels of ethics.

Under the influence of Moore, and the general preoccupation with the meaning of moral words, there came about in moral philosophy a general recognition that ethics (we shall use the term 'ethics' as interchangeable with 'moral philosophy') could be subdivided into meta-ethics, and normative ethics. Normative ethics was first-order, or first-level, moral discourse such as : 'stealing is wrong' or 'Nazism is evil'. Meta-ethics, on the other hand, was the philosophical analysis of such statements: the

attempt to distinguish their common characteristic features, the uses to which they were put, etc..

In keeping with our rejection of the non-cognitive view, which is that the domain of study stops at the level of language, I want now to suggest that there should be another level of ethics.

The normative/meta-ethics distinction still holds ground today (see e.g. Mackie, 1977 p9, Finnis 1983 p 1) Let me give three quotations from Hudson's (1969) treatment which it will be useful to discuss:

> **p13: because philosophy is second-order talk, it implies the existence of the first order talk which it is about.**
> **p1 He, qua moralist, engages in reflection, argument or discussion about what is morally right or wrong, good or evil.**
> **p1 (The) ... moral philosopher ... thinks and speaks about the ways in which moral terms, like 'right' and 'good' are used by moralists when they are delivering their moral judgements.**

If we for the moment use 'ethics' in a wide sense, then there is, I think, an implication to be drawn from these three quotations. It is that there are three levels of ethics, not the generally accepted two. This is so because as the quotations illustrate, moral philosophy is frequently about moral discourse, and moral discourse is, in its turn, about something in the world.

Hence, let us say that level 1, or first order morality, consists of 'the moral', those specific and characteristic things which moral judgements and evaluations are about: level 2 consists of moral discourse (judgements, evaluations) and level 3 or third order ethics consists of theory, debate and discourse about particular or general features of levels 2 or 1: moral philosophy would thus largely occupy level 3, and the identification of the contents of level 1 is our primary task in this work.

There may be two objections to what we have said here, which we shall look at in turn. Firstly, it may be said that we are stretching the notion of ethics to an unacceptable degree: items of levels 1 and 3 are so very different that to call them both ethical seems inappropriate.

I would defend this by saying that it is the interconnections which we seek to discover: therefore we are entitled to assume, at the outset, some correlation which will justify including both under the same description, as ethical. This correlation will require *proof*, of course.

The second objection runs: are we not here begging the main question, i.e. in postulating the existence of level 1 we are thereby asserting that morality has a content, when some philosophers would perhaps wish to deny this? For example, it would seem that we are ruling out Hare's prescriptivism, which (as I understand it) holds that moral discourse is characterised by its logical form, in that it is its prescriptivity and universalisability which identifies it as moral: therefore, to talk of the content of moral language is superfluous.

In answer to this, I would say that we are only opening the possibility of showing that there is a content of morality: it may be that there are no entities which can be shown finally to be the characteristic subject matter of moral discourse, and therefore level 1 may be empty: there may be no first order morality at all. However, this is not something which can be established *a priori* , for moral language does seem to use the same indicative, demonstrative language as in other fields of discourse. This suggests that there is something real and language independent, which is different from other things, and which characterises some discourse as moral.

Our strategy therefore is to assume that there is this extra level of ethics at which the content of morality is to be found. Then we investigate the plausibility of recent moral realist claims, by assuming needs to occupy this level and attempting to prove, or confirm this thesis.

1.4 Method of this work.

By observing parallels and concomitances between levels 1 and 2, we hope to show up the intimate relations between needs and items of moral discourse, in a wholly empirical way.

We might use an analogy from science: if optics tells us that those things called yellow have a certain refractive quality, and other things called red have a different refractive quality, then it can be claimed that the different physical bases of perceiving colours have been discovered, simply by detecting the concomitances of colour reports with the reports upon objective texture.

This is not to identify, for example, redness with a certain texture, nor is it to say what 'red' means: but it is to discover the objective correlates of colour talk, that which is there in the world when 'red' is used, as opposed to what is there when 'yellow' is used.Thus, an explanatory account of colour is given.

In the same way, we hope to show the empirical concomitants of moral discourse to be needs, and hence that the content of morality is needs. By restricting ourselves wholly to the empirical phenomena of moral discourse, such as evaluations and judgemements, and to an empirically defined notion of need, we hope to remain within the empirical strictures inherited from logical positivism.

(A note on meaning: we have said that the meaning of colour terms could not be found by observing their objective correlates, and the same holds for moral terms: however, perhaps in one sense of 'meaning' such a procedure could elucidate the meaning of moral terms. That sense is the same as occurs in a situation where, for example, a scream in the night means someone is possibly in emotional distress: or where burning the midnight oil means that a student wishes to meet his deadline. These meanings are a kind of unilateral inference about what is likely to be present on the basis of what definitely is present, and are obviously not directly or primarily intended by the people concerned: nevertheless, they

are meanings of sorts. If the reader subscribes to what is said here, then it is open later for him to draw inferences about whether we have reached conclusions about the meaning of moral terms. At all events, such conclusions are not our prime objective.)

We shall also be looking at other theories of morality, and at the various classical problems of moral philosophy. In this way, our theory will be based upon experience, and also submitted to the logical test of comparison to other theoretical solutions. This procedure should give us results which are as objective as possible.

1.5 Summary and overview.

The basic objective of this work has been stated, that of proving that needs form the content of morality, that they are its subject matter and distinguish it from other fields of discourse.

We looked at the recent history of moral philosophy, and saw that it would be plausible to say that much of its acknowledged lack of progress can be blamed upon a preoccupation with the language of morality, at the expense of considering its content. This restriction was partly an over-zealous reaction to the criticisms of logical positivism, with its salutary emphasis upon the observable.

To allow us to search for this elusive content of morality, we assume the existence of three levels of morality, including the level of things or actions which are the objects of moral approvals, judgements, etc.. Our method will be to attempt to discern, and formalise, any correlation or concomitance between items of level 1 and 2, between moral language and that which it seems to be about. We shall also attempt to prove our results against the touchstones of other theories, and of the other important problems in moral philosophy.

Chapter II THE CONCEPT OF NEED.

2.1 Introduction.

Before examining the relation of needs to morality, and to moral philosophy, it is as well to be clear about what precisely a need is. In this chapter we shall attempt to analyse the concept, looking at the various ways in which the term is used, and at its various senses.

There is a regrettable dearth of academic work dealing directly with the subject of 'need' (see Wollheim, 1975 and Braybrooke, 1968). Therefore, rather than surveying the literature, we shall in the main examine the ordinary usages of 'need'.

Most usually, the word 'need' arises when discussing human, animal or plant life. There is a unique sense of need which we might call 'functional', where an inanimate object has a function and is said to need the preconditions of the performance of this function. For example, cars are said to need petrol, and wooden furniture needs polish. Such functional needs are either projective (the object 'needs' something in order to function as someone wishes it to) or they are figurative, metaphorical, as in 'the river overflowed its banks because it needed more room.'

By and large, however, need is used of animate objects. It may be used as a noun or as a verb, and may refer alternatively to an object which is said to be needed, to a state of affairs, or to a state or condition of the being which has the need. Examples of these, respectively, would be: food is a human need; there is here a need for justice; he has a great need for learning. Thus, need would seem to have

great ontological diversity, in that it could be a concrete, physical thing: it could be something as abstract as a state of affairs; or it could be a property or quality of a person.

This diversity in the applicability of the notion is best captured, I believe, by defining need as a relation, whereby three things are related: P the subject of the need (typically a person, although obviously not necessarily so), X the object of need, and Y the point, or reason for the need. X and Y may variously be objects, states of affairs, or processes. Thus a standard instance of need would be where P needs X for Y: butterflies need grassy meadows for survival, people need power stations for the production of electricity.

I think that this schema, PXY, of subject object and point of need, is required since it is always possible when needs are mentioned, to ask whose need it is, why it is needed, and exactly what is needed.

Since need is a relation, in which three disparate items figure, then we should note that nothing is a need *per se* : the establisment of a need will always be an empirical matter, depending upon the circumstances holding at the time.

In the following sections, we shall look at several distinctions or refinements in the use of 'need' as revealed in ordinary language.

2.2 Basic and adventitious need.

(a) Basic need.

Perhaps the most usual and central use of 'need' is where mention is made of some object or thing which is causally necessary for the continuation of the life of the being who figures in the need relation.

Thus, for example, people need air, food shelter and warmth: or, we could say that for people these things are needs. Without these things, and without making use of them appropriately, people die. We can call

such needs __basic__ since they are prerequisites or preconditions of life, which is the basic state of a living thing.

(Here, and in what follows, we shall use as examples the needs of people: this is purely for convenience, I do not wish it to be taken as implying that only people have needs - on the contrary, I believe it can be shown that all living things have needs, and that all we say of human needs can be extended to the needs of beings other than humans.)

It would be virtually impossible to list all of a person's basic needs, for several reasons. Firstly, people's general need for, e.g. food, would have to be translated into the individual's particular need for food, given his situation and constitution. Secondly, such a list would require some negative items for its completion, and this would make the list indefinitely long (e.g. not just air, but air which is free of e.g. asbestos dust). Thirdly our basic needs can arise circumstantially, such that they are impossible to specify in advance of their occurrence, yet nevertheless they are necessary for life. For example, we may need matches if we are stranded on a desert island, in order to survive: or our lives may be dependent, in some unforeseen situation, upon our being able to swim.

Thus our basic needs cannot be exhaustively enumerated in abstraction from particular situations. At best, we can give a general indication of the kind of thing which a person is likely to have as a basic need. There is no 'material content' to the notion of a basic need, but essential facts about the individual and his situation will determine whether something meets, or does not meet, the criteria of being life-enabling, and thus wether it is a basic need for that person at that time in that situation.

(b) Adventitious need.

David Braybrooke (1968) has drawn attention to a sense of need which seems naturally to complement the sense of need as basic which we have been discussing. We shall follow his usage by adopting the term 'adventitious'.

Something is an adventitious need when it is a causal precondition as before, but of the attainment by some individual of the ends upon which he is intent. By this I mean that it is a precondition of the existence of a desired state of affairs, which will typically consist in the successful outcome of some purposeful projects. 'Desired' may sometimes not be the correct description of the attitude to the state of affairs: it may instead be one of hope, approval, intention, anticipation, etc.. Broadly speaking, we could characterise these as 'pro-attitudes'.

Thus, for example, a burglar needs a jemmy adventitiously, a painter needs a canvas and an easel, and a traveller needs his maps.

Adventitious needs are thus distinguished from basic needs by the answer to to the question: 'why does P need X?' being not 'for life itself', but 'for Y', where Y is some goal within life.

There are several points which we should note about adventitious needs.

1. Desires, intentions, etc., to which we have referred above require to be specified in behavioural or observational terms. Thus John Dewey (1939, p35ff) writes that desire is equated with the effort expended towards its realisation: otherwise desires could neither be differentiated from each other, nor from idle wishes. Dewey was writing in the tradition of logical positivism, and the preoccupation with the observable and the verifiable displayed by him remains a valuable quality of philosophical investigation today.

2. Non-human living things can also be said to have adventitious needs: in the case of the 'higher' animals, I believe this is uncontentious: beavers need wood to build their dams, an eagle needs a suitable crevice for his eyrie, etc..

Other examples are not so straightforward, indeed they might pose a challenge to our stated intention of treating needs in a wholly empirical way. What I have in mind here are 'flourishing' needs, e.g. where flowers

are said to need watering, or a child is said to need elocution lessons: such needs would seem to be not based on the desires of the subject which is said to be in need. This suggests that they are defined in terms of welfare, where this is not related to desires nor, apparently, to any other empirical item. Hence our difficulty.

The answer to this (although it requires a lengthier treatment than we can afford to give it here - see section 3.6) is that desires and goals are still held in these situations, but they are the desires and goals of the person who is making the need-statement: he is, as it were, vicariously formulating goals and holding desires *on behalf of* the subject concerned.

He does not wish to see the flowers wither, therefore he states that they need water, meaning that his goals will be satisfied if they are supplied with water. Such flourishing needs shade off into more straightforward needs, and cross the boundary of basic/adventitious need: e.g. a person in a coma will only have his basic needs satisfied if someone other than that person sets out to have these needs as desired goals.

3. The ends for which these things are adventitiously needed may also themselves be either adventitious or basic needs.

4. There is an endemic sort of vagueness about the distinction between basic and adventitious need, which we shall look at more closely in section 2.5 below. Very frequently the goal attained by the satisfaction of adventitious need will itself be something which is necessary for life. For example, food may be strongly desired, or be the precondition of the satisfaction of our desire, and thus an adventitious need, but it may also be necessary for survival, and thus be a basic need also.

Psychologically, the eater may be satisfying his hunger, but objectively he is also preserving his life. Basic and adventitious need may thus overlap and coincide, by having the same object: indeed, this is a ubiquitous phenomenon, as we do actually satisfy our basic needs by

engaging in conscious, purposive behaviour in which these basic needs figure as adventitious.

5. There is an element of defeasibility about the object of need: X may satisfy P's need for Y, but so too may X', or X". Similarly, X may not be needed by P, but needed by P' and P". This emphasises the relational nature of need. In the next section, we shall look at such differences as that between P and P', which underly the fact that one needs X and the other does not.

2.3 Need as a state.

So far, we have said that need may be a state of affairs, an object, or a quality or property of the being who has the need. Thus, we can say either that X is a need for P, or that P has a need, which is for X. This way of speaking merits further investigation, as it would seem to suggest that need can exist independently of whatever X happens to be, having its primary basis instead in the being who stands in the relation of need to X.

This is brought out by considering what we have called above (at the end of the last section) the defeasibility of the object of need, X. An individual's need for water could be satisfied by this X (=glass of water), or another, X', or yet another X".

X, X' and X" are all different objects, yet they enter into the same need. In mentioning X' or X" as needed, we seem to be talking of the same need (of P). Yet, if we talk of Q's need for X', as opposed to P's need for X', then we seem to be talking about a different need, albeit of the same kind, i.e. shared by all men in general. The identity of a given need seems to vary with the subject of the need, the individual whose need it is, rather than with the object of the need.

In recognition of this linguistic feature, I think that we should distinguish between the inner and the outer aspects , between the subject and the object of need.

In specifying a need, we may refer to facts about either the person in need P, or we may refer to facts about the object of need, X. Where a need is stated in terms of the former kinds of facts, let us call this the intension of the need, and when in terms of the latter, the extension of the need.

The intension of a need, then, consists of a condition or state of a person which signifies that he is in need, and determines what is needed. Thus, that a person is dehydrated will entail (via the subjective sensation of thirst) that he needs water. A person's hunger may serve as a subjective indicator that he has low blood-sugar levels, and thus that he is in need of food.

The extensions of these needs are water and food respectively. A need is commonly referred to by mentioning either of these aspects, and it is usually the context which will determine which one it is more relevant to mention.

The intension of the need is, in the case of people, something which is expressed or displayed in terms of a desire, intention or anticipated goal, while the extension is some object, state of afairs or process which is such as to bring about a realisation , or cessation of the intension.

Because need has this dual nature, we can derive from a statement of the intension of a need the specification of its extension. This makes it possible to discuss and investigate needs in a wholly rational, objective and scientific way. For example, the science of nutrition could be looked on as the systematic study of foods needed by man, in virtue of his physiology.

The extension of a need may be something which is not external to the being in need: for example,a person may be said to need self-control, in order to control his impulsiveness, or he may need insight into a problem: also, for most needs, actions of the needer are required before the need can be satisfied: e.g. we need not simply water, but to drink water.

This distinction between the extension and the intension of the need can occasionally appear relative and vague, as in the above examples: nevertheless,it is useful in that it captures a distinction which can be made in ways of speaking about need, and it aids us in thinking clearly about the subject.

2.4 Two further categories of need.

(a) Positive and negative needs.

So far, we have talked as though the object of need were always a positive object, state of affairs, or process. How ever, this is not always the case: for example, there is a significant difference between saying that 'X is not needed', on the one hand, and that '-X is needed',on the other. In the former case, we are simply asserting the irrelevance of X as a need: in the latter case, we are saying that X is relevant to need, in a negative way: it is a negative need, whereas we usually speak of needs in a positive sense.

For example, a person who is suffering from pneumonia could be said to be in need, he needs to get rid of the virus which is threatening his health: he will do this by taking medicine which will restore his health. Thus, having pneumonia, he could be said to be in negative need: he needs not to have the virus, in a stronger sense than we would mean if we intended to communicate its irrelevance to his needs.

This negative sense of 'need' is, perhaps surprisingly, opposed to need in the sense of a lack. Each negative need could be specified in positive terms: thus, the man with pneumonia will need the appropriate medicine in a positive sense; and a drowning man will need rescue, or a lifebelt, etc.. It is thus perhaps rather artificial to speak of negative needs, instead of referring to them positively: however, I think it is useful to draw attention to it here, since it draws attention to the positive/negative aspect apparently relevant to all needs, and it

emphasises the significance of saying that something is not needed, over and above its being simply irrelevant to a need.

(b) General and specific needs.

A statement about needs may be either general or specific, or can be described as falling somewhere between these two.

For example, ' People need to breathe' would be a very general need statement, whereas:' You need to breathe deeply and regularly' would be a more specific statement, possible addressed to an athlete during training.

This distinction, as with the others which we have noted, is relative , holding only between actual needs or need-statements. It is not an *a priori* dichotomy with which we can classify needs. It also interacts with the other distinctions, in that a general need could be either basic or adventitious, either positive or negative. For example, general adventitious needs might include: having a wide social circle of friends: attending the theatre. Specific needs seem to arise through a person's circumstances, either through his own inner condition or his outer situation.

Specific needs would seem to be the most significant of the two, as these are what we might term 'closest to reality': by that, I mean that it is only when needs are instantiated in specific circumstances that their nature becomes clear: everyone needs to eat (general need) but the need of someone who has not eaten for a week (specific need) is manifestly different, more basic than other people's needs. Also, for example, the needs of someone who suffers from diabetes is different from the general nutritional needs of people.

2.5 The distinction between our basic need and our adventitious need .

It was mentioned earlier that it is not possible to draw a sharp and clear distinction between our basic needs on the one hand, and our adventitious needs on the other. In this section I wish to consider several arguments which can be provided to support this assertion.

It is important that the vagueness of this distinction is recognised and acknowledged, as the sense of 'basic' as we have already outlined it, is sometimes taken to be a fundamental, central sense of 'need'. That is to say, an assertion of need is sometimes examined for its validity or truth on the implicit grounds of whether it is a necessary condition of the survival of some being. If this is the case, i.e. if what is said to be needed is established to be actually basically needed, then the original assertion is acknowledged to be correct, or true. On the other hand, if the need turns out to be 'merely' adventitious, then there is a tendency for it to be dismissed as not being a 'true' need.

I wish to establish in this section that using such a criterion of need is misguided, and usually mistaken. It is seldom, if ever, possible to isolate and categorise needs exclusively as belonging to either the category of basic, or that of adventitious.

If this point is made clear, then it should cast light upon an objection which is frequently made against moral realism. The allegation is made that needs and interests are falsely held to provide objective justification in morality. It is held that they are advanced as objective, in the sense of 'need' as 'basic' (as we have defined this); and as motivating, or justifying, when 'need' is interpreted as being adventitious. Thus, the realist has the best of both worlds, it is alleged: basic needs are indeed objective (in their extension), and adventitious needs have an immanent sort of motivation, in that they are linked, however indirectly, with desires and approval. This has been achieved, according to the anti-realist, at the expense of confusing the distinction between adventitious need and basic need.(See Hudson, 1970 p317ff for a similar antinaturalist point.).

I do not wish here to add to the confusion between these two senses of need: I believe the vagueness is there, in the nature of things, and I wish to advance arguments to show that it is not simply a verbal confusion.The situation is more complex than the anti-naturalists believe, and this complexity merits investigation, rather than being advanced as a point against realism. I think that there are four ways in which it can be shown that this distinction is not an absolute one, and we shall consider them in turn.

(a) Vagueness There seems to be an endemic sort of vagueness about distinguishing in practice between what is absolutely necessary for life, and what is not. There are many possible examples of this, let us consider one.

People need food, in a manifestly basic sense. However, a person's precise particular needs for food will be difficult, if not impossible to specify. Suppose that he needs X units of protein, Y units of carbohydrate, and Z vitamins. What then would be the consequences of his getting, say, X-1 units of protein on one particular day? It would seem very unlikely that he would die: and similarly for his other requirements. At most, I think that we can only specify (as nutritionists actually do) a certain level of each nutrient below which it would be dangerous for people in certain occupations, living in certain climates, of whichever sex, and age, to allow their intake to fall. And the danger of allowing it to so fall would be only probably dangerous to life, and only in the long term.

Therefore, the specification of our basic needs for food would seem to be necessarily vague and probabilistic, even assuming a very good knowledge of nutrition. Such specification is best carried out in terms of desirable goals from which people should choose, given their individual circumstances(age, occupation etc.), and even the failure to attain such goals need not be regarded as an immediate risk to life. In short, our basic needs for food can only be specified in a form which bears remarkable similarity to that of adventitious need.

Similarly for adventitious need. X being necessary for goal Y does not preclude X from being necessary for life. Indeed, there are a great deal of our needs which we satisfy in an adventitious manner (i.e. by setting desired goals consciously, and then attaining them), yet upon whose satisfaction our life is more or less dependent. For example, the need for exercise is frequently satisfied by taking up some enjoyable sport which we play 'for its own sake', yet doing so is prolonging our life , e.g. by averting the onset of heart disease.

Again, circumstances may dictate what it is which can save our life, and thus be a basic need: a bar of chocolate may be sufficient to allow one to survive in, and escape from, a car marooned in a snowdrift: yet, in other circumstances, a bar of chocolate may be a trivial adventitious need, a mere object of desire.

Therefore, the distinction between these two kinds of need seems vague and circumstantial, and since some needs can be both basic and adventitious (as we saw in the exercise example), I think it is unwise to insist upon a radical demarcation between the two: it would be better to allow circumstances and events to determine of which kind a given, pre-acknowledged need consists.

(b) The meaning of 'Life'. 'Basic' in our sense includes something more than the bare prerequisites of survival. Our basic needs are not just those things which ensure survival, but an existence something above the level of survival, as life for human beings means something more than this. Our basic needs contain a residue of conditions for psychological, social and materialwelfare, and this surpasses the conditions of bare survival.

If this were not the case, then a person connected to a life support machine could be said to be living: yet, it is generally agreed that to be permanently unconscious and inactive, although surviving, is not leading a truly human life. What this person lacks, as in any situation where only basic needs are regarded, are the conditions of a normal, typical human life: the setting of goals, attainment of objectives, social and emotional

interaction with his fellows: and all of these things fall in the area of adventitious need.

In short, we cannot specify our basic needs as conditions of (human) life without also making reference to adventitious need.(When we say typical, human life, I am presuming that it is possible to distinguish objectively, from an anthropological point of view, a typical human life from an atypical one: and this seems justified, as it is possible to distinguish e.g. the life support machine user from other human lives).

Hence, we must conclude that the preconditions of life necessarily include those things which are adventitiously needed as well as our basic needs.

(c) Life treated as a means. People can, and often do, treat their life as an adventitiious need, something which can either be foregone, or else carefully preserved, according to whether it makes possible, or prevents, some end or goal which they have adopted.

Thus, a doctor may devote his life to the practice of medicine, in the sense of serving it all of his days: or he may risk losing it, e.g. by choosing to help patients with a highly infectious, incurable illness.A person may fight for his country, or for a political or personal cause, knowing that he may lose his life.

These instances show that life is often regarded as a means , to serve some further end beyond it. Where the loss of one's life is a necessary condition of the attainment of the end, then it is sometimes willingly given.It is formally equivalent to giving up any of our other adventitious needs which threaten the satisfaction of other needs which are regarded as more important.In this respect, it shares in the feature of defeasibility, or substitutibility, drawn attention to in secs. 2(ii) and 2(iii).

Therefore, we must conclude that life itself is treated, and regarded, often as an adventitious need, and formally resembles an adventitious need. These resemblances make it difficult to draw any tenable valid distinction between the two.

(d)Life as a means Life makes possible the attainment of a wide range of goals or ends which the living being adopts: hence it actually fits our definition of adventitious need.

It might be thought that this is a trivial and only partially correct application of 'adventitious', but this is not the case. Experience bears us out, in that life is often sacrificed (by he whose life it is) in order to attain or realise some goal with whose existence its continuing is incompatible. Thus, our basic needs which make life possible serve this goal also, for which life has been sacrificed, and share in the property of adventitiousness, of being contingent, defeasible means to a contingent end. It differs from other adventitious needs in degree alone, I believe: that is to say, the set of ends which life serves is spectacularly more diverse and numerous than those enabled by any other adventitious need. Nevertheless,its status as a need remains contingent, adventitious. This universality of life as a means accounts, I believe, for the sacredness of the life of others, and for the relative rarity of its actual treatment as a means in one's own person.

We might express the conclusion here in formal terms by saying that the relation of 'being adventitious' is transitive across need: if XnY, and YnZ, then XnZ, where n signifies being needed, X is a basic need, Y is life itself, and Z is some chosen goal. XnZ then signifies that our basic needs are logically also adventitious needs with regard to some goals, Z, since they are the preconditions of the attainement of some chosen goal or goals.

(e) The renouncing of Life Life can be seen as not worthwhile, where certain of its adventitious features are denied, e.g. freedom, privacy.

For example, certain orders of oriental Buddhist monks are known to often commit suicide as an expression of protest at some feature of government policy, usually some restriction of civil liberties. They do this by burning themselves to death in public. The ritual suicide of certain Japanese is also a well known phenomenon, consequent usually upon some loss of honour.

This shows that these adventitious needs (privacy, freedom, honour) are equally as important, if not more important than, our basic needs, as they, in some instances, feature as preconditions in a negative sense,i.e. their absence makes life unacceptable. This also shows, I believe, that 'flourishing' needs, those constitutive of the good life, can be viewed as adventitious needs, subject to the free choice of the individual as to whether they are the goal of life, or whether they can be done without.

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To conclude this section then,the arguments which we have advanced show, I believe, that the distinction between basic and adventitious needs can only be used relatively and circumstantially. In a given situation, S, need X is more basic than need Y (or Y is needed more adventitiously than X): when S is carefully specified, then the distinction would be informative and have a limited usefulness (limited because, e.g. the situation may change). However, a bare assertion that,e.g., X is basically needed (by P) would be incomplete,and thus invalid.

The distinction is thus vague, contextual, and relative, and of only limited usefulness: and, *a fortiori* , the distinction does not bear the weight of being a criterion for isolating cases of 'genuine' need. We cannot say that adventitious needs are spurious, or have a subordinate status to basic needs: this would be to (a)deny those things which make life characteristically human, and thus change the sense of 'life' in the definition of basic need, and (b)to disallow as needs the means to many goals or ends which people often see as having an importance which transcends the mundane necessities of life.

I think, then, that need must be talked of, for the most part, in terms which are quite neutral between whether the need is basic or adventitious: thus, anti-naturalist or anti-realist criticisms based upon a rigid distinction in this area are unfounded.

2.6 Need and Desire.

How are needs related to desires? They are often spoken of as though they were in contrast with each other,to need one thing and to desire another instead is usually grounds for saying that the former should be pursued, rather than the latter: and where desires are followed at the expense of need, a person is said to behave irrationally, or at least foolishly. The contrast between need and desire is thus a significant and important one.

But surely our account of need would seem to belie this: the object of need is the precondition or means to an end or goal which is desired, and thus rather than being in opposition to need, desire would seem to be the point of need: to satisfy a need is a means to satisfying or attaining an end.

We are therefore faced with an apparent contradiction: needs would seem to take priority over desire, according to the generally recognised contrast between the two: precisely the opposite seems to be entailed by our account of need. We shall attempt to resolve this contradiction in this section.

To clarify this, we need to look more closely at the idea of an end. A workman will have the goal or end of good workmanship, for which the necessary means, and thus needs, are the possession and correct use of the appropriate tools for the task in hand. To be specific, a carpenter may have as an end the production of a dovetail joint, properly formed and pleasing in appearance. This will be his aim in starting his work with the needed tools; it will be his purpose, his wish, his intention,

among other possible specific psychological dispositions. Central among our choice of such descriptions of his attitudes is 'desire'.

Now some, or perhaps a range, of these pro-attitudes are necessary conditions for a person to have a goal: and there may well be other preconditions: one might hold that the attainment of the goal must be thought possible, logically and physically, by the person having a goal before we could validly say that he had indeed that goal. Accordingly, it would seem that the holding of a pro-attitude as mentioned is not sufficient in itself to define a goal: *a fortiori* it is not sufficient to determine a need, since a goal is the logically necessary precondition of a need, entering into its definition (although a need is the physical precondition of a goal).There is a straightforward reason why a pro-attitude (typically, a desire) is not sufficient to define a goal, and that is as follows..

Any given individual can be said to have many goals at a given point in time, some of them dispositional, some conditional, and some in the process of being accepted as being compatible with the set which is aready held.

Desire being a spontaneous psychological activity, it is most probable that if each desire were immediately allowed (in the psychological sense of allowed) to constitute or legitimise a goal, we would rapidly acquire a set of goals with a high degree of incompatibility between them.In that case, few goals would ever be reached or attained: in order for our goals to be attainable in general, it is logically necessary that they, or their attainment, should be compatible or consistent with each other. Non-attainable goals, as we indicated above, would not seem to be genuine goals, and (see Dewey1939 p26 and*passim*) there are arguments which say that there is no such thing as an end in itself, that each end is evaluated in the context of its realisation, its preconditions, costs, and its consequences.

Thus, calculation of compatibility, and the limitation of desire, would seem to be built into the notion of forming ends. A desire or a

wish, etc., is carefully balanced and considered with others of its kind and with their attendant ends and means, objectives and needs, consequences and preconditions, before it is even entertained as constituting a possible goal which is accepted by the individual.

It should now be clear that , even though desires are essentially involved in need, there is nonetheless the possibility of the arising of aberrant desires: those whose adoption would imperil the compatibility of an existing set of ends held by that individual, together with their needs, i.e. the conditions of, or means to, their attainment. Consistency and parsimony as a standard of goal-adoption thus become priorities.

The violation of this principle would be an example of desire being contrasted with need, while permitting us to retain the view that desire is, in a sense, the 'point' of need.

2.7 Need and purpose.

Our investigations so far allow us to show how needs are related to other central issues in moral philosophy, in addition to the topic of the content of morality. In this section we shall consider three such areas of relevance: the question of human nature; the theory of action; and the nature of ought-statements.

(a) Human Nature. Morality seems to be central to the nature of man, in the sense that it seems inconceivable that man could exist, and not be moral. Thus, philosophers through the ages have sought elucidation about moral questions by investigating human nature. Aristotle's ethical works are classic illustrations of this, and see Hudson (1970 p320 ff) for a modern example. There is a common bedrock of belief about the nature of man, which is that consciousness is a characteristic feature of man. That is to say, we can think and reason, and behave in ways according to the outcome of these processes. Humans are beings which can act

spontaneously, in response to inner conceptions of the world, past and present, rather than simply and always reacting to outer stimuli.

By discerning predictive laws and using logic, men integrate their reason, emotion and will in order to exist in ways decided by their own inner processes.Man is a purposive being, and his behaviour is to be interpreted and explained teleologically.

Any such broad speculation about the nature of man must be qualified by remembering that this is man as he appears to himself, as he applies his own categories and capabilities to understanding himself. Perhaps some alien intelligence would enrich our view of ourselves, were they able to communicate with us: and yet, intelligence is a human concept. We should be aware of the dangers of anthropocentrism, especially when considering the nature of man.

If to be human is to be purposive, then needs would seem to be a logical condition of human existence, since to be purposive is to have ends, or goals, and thus also to have needs. If needs are essential characteristics of man,then it would be reasonable to expect needs to have an intimate relation to morality, which seems also to be an essential characteristic.

(b) The theory of action.The notion of need is centrally relevant in this field also. Actions are usually conceived of as end-directed events, means to ends for which they are needed. All actions could therefore be described as needs which enable certain ends, perhaps themselves needed. For example: ' you need to run if you want to catch the bus', and 'It was unecessary to lock the stable door: the horse had already gone'. In these examples, an end is mentioned : the negative one of restraining the horse, in the latter, and in the former it is the catching of the bus. To the achievements of these ends, actions are prescribed as needed, a negative need in the last instance.

Thus, needs can be used to explain, elucidate and to describe actions.Conversely, in fully specifying a need we very often have to refer to an action.Thus, we need not only water, but to drink water: not only motorcars, but to drive them. We need to use these objects, in our actions, in order that the ends or purposes for which they are needed can be realised.

Again, practical reasoning is a topic in the theory of action, and I believe that this can usefully be regarded from our viewpoint as consideration of, or investigation into needs. Thus:'I want to go to America' considered in conjunction with 'Visas are needed to go to America' leads us to reach the conclusion, by practical reasoning, ' I ought to get a visa.' The conclusion is, of course, a statement of need, given that the person has the desire, or goal of going to America.

The issue of the relation between pure and practical reason is relevant here also. We also use 'need', although perhaps metaphorically, in the realm of pure reason, e.g. where we are stating the logical conditions of some given state of affairs. Less trivially, this relation (between pure and practical reason) was of course a central preoccupation of Kant in his moral philosophy.The close relationship between need and action to which we have drawn attention should allow us to comment upon reasons for action, particularly moral reasons: here again we have touched on a central problem or issue in moral philosophy.

We have not advanced the relevance of needs in all of these areas connected with action in order to permit any profound insights into the issues: rather, the similarities and equivalences between need and action , between reasoning and deciding needs, is interesting in itself, and not sufficiently recognised. It also serves to augment the plausibility of the claim that needs form the content of morality, to show that needs are indeed closely related to these other issues in moral philosophy.

(c) Ought-Statements.

- II: THE CONCEPT OF NEED -

What is needed seems to have close logical ties to ought-statements, in those cases where the object of need is an action, i.e. a means to an end. We shall investigate these relations more closely later, in Chapter V.

For the moment, let us illustrate with an example, used previously; 'given that you desire to go to America, and that visas are necessary for this, then you should apply for a visa immediately'. This hypothetical ought states an end which is desired, and of which the prescribed action is a condition: it is a means to that end, it is needed.

To say that an action is needed is *prima facie* grounds for saying that that action ought to be performed. However, there are exceptions: there may be an alternative need, which the satisfaction of the first would prevent, and thus it may not be clear what should be done: or the consequences of carrying out the action may be unacceptable for other reasons. In such circumstances, the previously prescribed action would become a negative need, grounding the negation of the previous ought-statement.

To return to our previous example: a person being told (or deciding for himself) that he ought to get a visa for the stated reason will accept that he ought to, because he needs to, which in turn is because he has certain desires. But he may remember that his American friend had promised to come to visit him during the time in question, hence he does not wish to go to America, nor does he wish to get a visa. Indeed, to do so would be wasteful, of time and resources, and therefore he decides to devote his energies instead to preparing for the visit of his friend. He now feels that he ought not to get a visa, since, apart from being unnecessary, obtaining it would hamper his achievement of his new goals. Of course, all of this is a highly artificial way of putting it, since we do not normally look for a series of reasons against a course of action once it has been acknowledged as unnecessary.

Need-statements thus over-ride one another in the same way as ought-statements do: we hope to show later that the moral ought which of course

is held to over-ride all others, can be shown to have its related need also. The similarities between need and ought which we have pointed out here serve, I believe, as further evidence in favour of our contention that needs can be shown to form the content of morality.

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Overall, in this section, we have seen that needs can be shown to have significant logical connections with matters which have traditionally been seen to have great importance in moral philosophy: human nature seems to be essentially purposive and end-directed, and thus essentially involves need: actions and needs have many similarities; and we saw that ought-statements bear a close formal resemblance to need-statements.

2.8 Summary and Overview.

In this chapter, we have seen that need is best described as a composite relation, between person P, object of the need X, and Y the state of affairs which will obtain when the need is satisfied.

We pointed to the distinction (later shown to be relative and situation-dependent) between those things which are necessary for life (called 'basic needs') and those which are needed for the attainment of some goal within life.

It is possible to distinguish between the object of the need, and the actual state of need as a property of the needer: this we referred to as the extension and the intension respectively. Two further distinctions were outlined: positive and negative needs, and the general/particular dimension of need.

Lastly, we looked at some topics closely related to need: desire, human nature, purposiveness, action and oughts. It was shown that the

concept of need is closely related to all of these areas: in particular,talk about actions, and ought-statements can be elucidated and explained by reference to associated need.

Chapter III NEEDS AND VALUE

3.1 Introduction: Morality and value.

Moral discourse seems to be thoroughly value-laden: apart from direct references to goodness, etc., moral language seems to be pervaded by terms used in ways which have some implications of various degree of evaluation:for example, virtue, vice, blame, praise, deplorable, laudable, admirable, etc..

What, then, is value? While not distinctive of morality, it does seem to stand in a position of great importance to all moral phenomena, and to all uses of moral language. If needs form the content of morality, which is the thesis we are defending, then it should be possible to demonstrate a close connection between the concepts of need and of value. This will be our task in the present chapter.

First, a minor note on terminology: we shall use the terms 'goodness' and 'value' as interchangeable (and similarly for 'badness' and 'disvalue'): no doubt distinctions could be drawn for some purposes, but our account will be kept simpler if for the present we treat them as being equivalent.

3.2 Extrinsic goodness.

One feature of value which is generally recognised is the possibilty of distinguishing those things which are good in themselves from those things which are good by virtue of something else: or, alternatively, having the property of being good in itself from being good in some other way.

This is the intrinsic/extrinsic value distinction. Our general objective here is to establish a connection between 'need' and 'value', independently of the more specific relations between need and moral value; therefore we shall defer until later a discussion of the relation between need and intrinsic, as well as moral, value.

With regard to extrinsic goodness, then, it seems to me that anything which has this property can be shown to have a purpose, or function, or an effect which is so related to the purposes , functions desires and needs of valuing beings in such a way as to allow us to thereby account for its being called good: in short, each thing which is good (extrinsically) is so, or is held to be so, because of some need or needs which it satisfies.

Another way of saying this is that the language of need can always be substituted, by virtue of shared conceptual features, for the language of extrinsic value.

To illustrate this explanatory substitutibility, and further elucidate the relations between needs and extrinsic goodness, we shall briefly survey G.H. von Wright's classification of the forms of goodness.(von Wright,1963). He gives six more or less clearly defined forms of goodness, as follows: (1) Instrumental goodness, (2) Technical goodness, (3) Medical value, (4)Utilitarian goodness, (5) Aesthetic/hedonic goodness (6) Moral goodness.

We shall consider each of these in turn.

(1) Instrumental goodness. This is possessed by an object which is used as a means to some given end. This is compatible with our conclusion regarding need, that it is the causal condition of, or means to, some end which is desired. Clearly, then, an object will be instrumentally good where it is needed, and conversely.

This is, however, a simplistic account of its goodness: it simply allows us to talk of the general value of having Xs, e.g. it is good to

have canopeners, as we often have need of them. There is a further, more complex example of instrumental goodness, reflected in such a remark as: 'That is a good canopener'. It might be thought that this goodness is not related to need, since the object would not be a canopener unless it did actually meet our need. If canopeners do meet our needs, how then are we to account for the differences between poor, adequate, and good canopeners?

This apparent difficulty is resolved if we reflect that the needs which are affected by canopeners may be many, and are not simply restricted to the opening of cans. For example, cheapness may be the criteria for a good canopener, from the point of view of the shopkeeper who is selling it: durability, ease of use, safety in use: these are a few of the many qualities which may meet our needs in using a canopener, over and above the prime need of using it to open cans. Therefore, needs are still the basis for differentiating between the goodness of items which are all of instrumental goodness, e.g. for saying that there are good and bad canopeners and such like functional objects.

We have said that needs are essentially defeasible in nature: instrumental goodness, too, shares this feature: X is good as a means to Y, and it is stated to be good only relative to this end. For example, there may be 'good' thumbscrews in the sense that they meet the ends of their users: but there are certainly alternative ends in virtue of which thumbscrews are condemned, and regarded as both instrumentally and morally bad..

(2) Technical goodness. This occurs where a person is engaged in an activity, and can do it well. It could thus be understood as proficiency. P is technically good, or proficient, at A, where he can perform the actions which are needed for A, or for the end for which A is carried out.

Thus, a doctor is technically good if he prescribes those treatments and medicines which are needed for the therapeutic goals of health and recovery from illness. It may be argued, as we saw above for instrumental

value, that a good doctor is one who does more than is needed for the goal of health: that excellence as a doctor is to be defined as something over and above meeting the needs of individual patients. However, the needs of patients are many, and it may be that some doctors are able to detect, and deal with, more than the presenting problem, such that the patient leaves in greater health than if the doctor had simply done what is required of doctors generally.

In short, there are degrees of technical goodness ranging from incompetence to excellence, and all of them are defined in terms of the needs satisfied by the activity in question.

(3) Medical goodness. Those parts of a person's body which are necessary for his physiological welfare have medical value, according to von Wright. It should be perfectly obvious that these are needed by the person, in a straightforward sense of need.

(4) Utilitarian goodness. Again, this is a form of goodness whose relation to needs is uncontentious, since von Wright sees it as being applicable to those things which are needed, wanted, or in our interests: wanting can of course, as we saw in the last section, be the intension of an adventitious need.

(5) Hedonic and aesthetic goodness. von Wright briefly mentions aesthetic goodness under the head of hedonic goodness; we shall here discuss both together.

In this category we have those things which give pleasure and which satisfy our aesthetic sensibilities. Since both of these can be the objects of strong desire, then our earlier work shows that they are related to need.

This relation consists of there being certain preconditions of the existence of the value in question, such that these are means which are needed for the end in question, be it aesthetic satisfaction, or pleasure. Also, aesthetic satisfaction and pleasure can be shown themselves to be

needs: art and music are important sections of school curricula, suggesting that they are certainly regarded as needs: furthermore, pleasure, as we shall see later, is an essential part of life, with a definite function to perform: the absence of pleasure would thus be a negative need (briefly, the role of pleasure is to signify to us that which will satisfy our needs, just as pain signifies that which is negatively needed).

However,the aesthetic experience is not of something which satisfies our needs: we are not admiring the brush-stroke techniques, nor a painter's grasp of composition, when we admire some masterpiece: we are admiring the masterpiece, the result of these things. This does not gainsay that it is, nevertheless these things which are needed for our enjoyment. What happens, I believe, is that these means are also constitutive of the end: the painting is experienced as being good in itself, intrinsically good, because the conditions of its goodness are its components, the conditions of the aesthetic experience are part of that experience. It is, however, from an objective viewpoint, possible to abstract these conditions, as needs, just as we can see such experiences as needed, and thus classify the goodness concerned as extrinsic.

In short, aesthetic and hedonic goodness are related to needs, in the sense that there are definite preconditions of the objects of such judgements of value, and these are formally and conceptually equivalent to needs.

(6) Moral value. There are extrinsic components in moral value, the last of von Wright's forms of goodness. We require to consider this in greater detail than the others, in order to show its precise relation to needs: we shall do this in the next section.

To summarise then, we have seen that a thorough, independent analysis of the varieties of extrinsic goodness can be studied, and used to show how in each instance, the variety of goodness can be analysed, and shown to have essential relations to need.

3.3 Moral goodness and Needs.

von Wright holds that moral goodness is an attribute primarily of actions and intentions (von Wright, 1963, p 18 & Chapter VI) . How can we show that moral actions are related to needs, assuming for the moment that von Wright is correct? In particular, if needs are the content of morality, then we are required to point out some unique kind of need which is characteristic of morality, and which distinguishes moral actions from other actions: this characterisation is implicit in saying that needs form the content of morality, together with the uncontentious claim that not just any need characterises its object as moral.

We have already seen that we can use the language of need to discuss and explain action. An action is usually an end-directed, goal-orientated process caused or initiated by a conscious being: it is thus a means, and can be regarded as needed however defeasible its nature is as such.

Other forms of goodness occur where something is needed, as we have seen; it is therefore plausible initially to assume that it is the need for an action which makes it a moral action. Let us assume also that the action is needed primarily by someone other than the person who acts. Thus, an action which is morally good is directed to the satisfaction of the needs of another: and more generally, we evaluate actions as moral, according to whether they satisfy the needs of people other than the agent.

Let us consider a practical example which illustrates this. Suppose that X is walking by the riverside one day, and he sees a child in distress in the water; the child is in danger of drowning, and X is a good swimmer. X throws off his coat and shoes, and rescues the child.

This would be generally recognised as a morally good action, and it is also clearly an instance of actions being performed to satisfy another's need.

Is the goodness here dependent on the needs concerned, i.e. do we judge the action good because it was needed, for the end of saving the child? Or is the converse true, that it was needed because it was good? Or are the two features, that of being good, and that of being needed, simply contingently conjoined?

I think that we can dispose of the latter option firstly: we only need to point to the wide range of possible alternative situations where such conjunctions occur, in order to realise that contingency does not apply here. If the need were abstracted from the situation, as it could be if it were contingent, then it would surely be absurd to claim that the moral goodness could remain.

The second possibility is ruled out, I think, by considering the role of the need in this situation: there is an end, the escape by the child from the desperate situation, towards which the action is directed, because needed. Thus, the conditions of goodness are already given, as in a straightforward instance of instrumental value: why then adduce an extra value in virtue of which the act was needed, over and above the instrumental value of achieving the end? The onus must surely be on the objector here to give the basis of, or to explain the nature of this extra value.

In default of this, we must assume that the first alternative is correct, i.e. that the action is a means to an end, it is thus needed, and this is the basis upon which it is generally recognised to be morally good. We said originally that we were seeking a <u>unique</u> form of need, in order that the moral may be characterised by it: the uniqueness of the need we have pointed out here is that it has as object, or extension, the action of another, the agent. The ends which the action makes possible, the intension of it as a need, are those of another person, a person other than the agent; the 'recipient' of the action. This is a distinctive feature of the action we have looked at, in that most actions are directed to the ends of the agent concerned, at least primarily. Let us call the needs towards which such action is directed 'heteronomous' needs.

If such needs were to form the content of morality, then moral goodness would be a species of instrumental goodness, where an action is a means to some end. This would seem to contravene what von Wright termed the conceptual autonomy of morals, it would make people into value-objects as means, objects of utility like any other: but morality is not like that, there are unique moral criteria, so the objection runs, by which the objects of moral goodness are judged, not the everyday standards of utility as applied, e.g. to artifacts.

This example can be accommodated, I believe, if we look at the example again. Suppose that X is in the same situation as before, and performs the same action. However, before he reaches the child he/she is swept way and is drowned. In this instance, the end has not been achieved, the need has not been satisfied, and the action was not instrumentally good. Nevertheless, it is still conceded to be morally good, despite having failed in its purpose.

The relevant difference between the two examples lies, I think, in the fortuitous failure to satisfy need, due to no fault of the agent. The similarity is that the intention to satisfy need is present in both situations, and this similarity must account for the similar moral judgements which we give in the two situations.

Thus, we are able to say that moral agents are not regarded as simple objects of utility; the conceptual autonomy of morals is preserved due to the unique nature of moral agents, as creatures of intention and purpose, reacting to others of their kind in ways which recognise their purposes, intentions, goals and needs, particularly their heteronomous needs. Moral goodness seems to occur where heteronomous needs are intentionally observed in one's actions, usually by an attempt to satisfy such needs. Similarly, a morally bad action is one where negative heteronomous needs figure in the same way

There is, of course, a host of objections to the view which we have expressed here. Let us list them, and say a little about each.

Firstly, this makes morality primarily an other-directed matter: what of the Aristotelian concept of the 'good' man, whose relationship with others would seem a peripheral concern, certainly not the basis upon which we would judge him to be good.

We shall consider this topic in greater detail below, (see section 3.5) let us say here that a good man could be defined without reference to his relations to others, yet these relations may be such as to massively over-rule the 'internal criteria' by which we judge him.

Our view of a good man is one whose goodness is 'cashed out' in terms of his relation to the needs of others. I think it is plain that where somebody grossly offends against the needs of others, he would be condemned as a bad man, however 'good' he were judged by other criteria, e.g., as a weightlifter, as a scientist, etc.. The Nietzschean superman may be a fine specimen of mankind, yet if he engages in genocide then he meets with moral disapproval on the same grounds as above, i.e. his non-observances of heteronomous need.

Secondly, it may be claimed that moral value is intrinsic, not instrumental as we seem to have implied. Again, we shall consider this in a later chapter, and I would prefer not to open this major issue here.

Thirdly, it may be said that this does not account for other instances of moral value, e.g. the exercise of principles, a morally good character, ideals, etc.. I hope to show later (in Chapter 7) that the value of all such entities proceeds from their relationship to need, to heteronomous need in particular.

Fourthly, and finally, it might be said that we have derived conclusions about what is good, or defined good,in terms which are strictly factual, and thus have violated the fact-value distinction. Well, I would refer objectors to section 1.3, where we described our methodology: we have not said that it is good to rescue drowning children, nor have we said that it is important to satisfy the needs of others. Instead, we have compared the empirical features of situations in

which moral judgements take place, to what is said about such situations. To be more precise, we have tried to isolate those features, both differences and similarities, in situations which could possibly account for our correspondingly different moral judgements.

Thus, we have not made value judgements, but have reached a working hypothesis that it is the heteronomous needs of people which form the essential content, or subject-matter of ethics. In what follows of this work, we shall follow the method of attempting to confirm our hypothesis.

3.4 Rightness and needs.

Hume, in discussing the place of reason in morality, claims that if we discern moral good and evil by reason, then the required accord or otherwise between what is judged, and our reason, would entail that moral goodness or evil would not be a matter of degree: a thing would be either morally good, or bad, and that would be that.

Agreement is an 'achievement term' as we might say today, things cannot agree by a certain amount. But moral good and evil, and the goodness of virtues, do admit of degree, so runs his argument, therefore these things cannot be determined in a purely rational way (See D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p 460 L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed., 1978).

This plausible argument holds a flaw which is relevant to our present discussion. The notion of moral rightness does seem to have this 'all or nothing' quality which Hume denied to hold of moral goodness, and of virtue. A given moral action is either right or wrong, there seems to be a mistake in claiming that it could be 'very' right, or more right.

Perhaps we should say 'either right or not', rather than 'either right or wrong', since 'wrong' does appear to admit of some quantitative variation, i.e. we can say something would be very wrong, without risking grammatical censure, whereas 'very right', or 'more right', sounds distinctly odd.

How can we account for this non-comparative, qualitative rather than quantitative property of 'right'?

Three initial remarks may clarify the situation:
1. If our claim that needs form the content of morality is correct, then we should expect the qualitative nature of right to be explicable in terms of heteronomous needs, since these are basic determinants of our moral judgements, and thus would be expected to govern the decision as to whether something has attained 'rightness' or not.

2.The qualitative nature of right would appear to be connected essentially to reason, as it is a direct counterexample to Hume's denial of reason as relevant to moral judgement.

3 Furthermore, the reason concerned is most probably practical reasoning, rather than abstract, logical investigation. This I take as axiomatic, since any other option here would be *contra* Hume, and the entire tradition which followed him.

Thus, we are seeking an account of right based on practical reasoning about heteronomous needs. The quantitative nature of'morally good' suggests that 'morally right' is a concept which is gradually approached, by the satisfaction of need, until at some point rightness is achieved, and no more goodness can be attained: this entails, if we are correct (about the relation of needs to goodness), that no more needs can be satisfied.

This conclusion would give us our basis for the qualitative nature of right. We can provisionally say that an action is right if, and only if, it satisfies (or is intended to satisfy) all possible and reasonably foreseeable heteronomous needs. Thus, an action could be morally good but not right, if only some heteronomous needs were taken into account in its performance or conception.

Let us take the example which we looked at in the last section, in order to see how this works out in practice. Moral goodness attaches

to the rescue of the non-swimmer, because of the needs concerned: but moral rightness would not be attained where some heteronomous needs were culpably not satisfied, since this would be morally bad, or wrong.

Alternatively, rightness is achieved where all heteronomous needs, as independently detectable by a reasoning, yet non-participatory observer, are intended to be satisfied. Does this work out in our example? I think that it does: it would be morally good to rescue the person, yet morally wrong, and not right, if that were all that were done, in cases where there were outstanding needs for one's actions.

Suppose that there are two people needing rescued from a different predicament, say from a sinking boat. The rescuer knows both people, but only likes one of them: he has a long-standing disagreement with the other. Suppose that the recuer only rescues the person whom he likes, because he likes that person, and leaves the other to perish. This would surely be not right, and would also be an instance where heteronomous need was ignored.

Any given agent either does or does not satisfy all, or as many as possible, of the heteronomous needs for his actions on specific occasions, and this 'all or nothing' feature of his actions is, I believe, the explanatory analogue of the qualitative nature of the rightness which we may or may not ascribe to such actions.

Thus, it would appear that reason has a greater part to play in moral judgement than Hume was prepared to allow it. We have not gone into this matter to score small points in the arena of Hume's philosophy: rather, our chief aim has been to show that heteronomous need can be shown to have a certain explanatory force in investigating moral matters, as we would expect of a candidate for the content of morality.

3.5 Self-sufficiency.

An objection may be made that a person who shows himself to be self-sufficient to a high degree, in that he can meet most of his own needs without the help of others, attracts our moral admiration. Moral approval here attaches to attributes which are not obviously related to the needs of others, and would thus seem a counterexample to our claims.

A good example to consider here would be Robinson Crusoe, that intriguing castaway. We admire and praise his self-sufficiency and success in living without the help of others, we feel that his attitudes and abilities are something which are morally good, something which all of us should have.Also, we have a concern for him which is moral in nature.

How are his attributes related to the needs of other people, as our viewpoint would require if they are moral goods?

Firstly, we should note that our concern for him is aroused by his situation, that of involuntary isolation from society. His heteronomous needs are thus inevitably unsatisfied, and this is a serious matter: it may be thought that this is not the case, but we only need to reflect for a moment upon the number of other people who contribute to the satisfaction of our smallest needs. For example, in eating some bread we are indirectly served by the farmer, inspectors, collecters, millers, bakers, packers, distributors. Even the least trivial of our daily actions requires the support and help of hundreds of others: society could be regarded as a machine for satisfying heteronomous needs.

Robinson Crusoe is thus in an unusual situation of need, and the moral nature of our concern is accounted for by his need being primarily heteronomous. Furthermore, that his need is unsatisfied underlies our saying that his situation is a moral evil.

Yet our concern is tempered with admiration: he is admired for overcoming the trials of life cut off from society, and constructing a reasonable way of life for himself. His self-sufficiency is regarded as a moral good.

However, this value is correlative, and is dependent upon the moral evil of isolation. If the help of others were more readily available to him, an admiration for his way of life, his continued isolation and self-sufficiency, would be less. I think that this would show that he actually needed people less than is normal, because of some of his personal attributes, thus our initial concern for him is less, and the moral component of our valuation of his life is less.

That is one argument to show that heteronomous need is indirectly at the root of our approval being moral, in cases like this.

A second way in which needs can be shown to be relevant to this instance is by considering the general disutility of dependence: in terms of everyone's needs, those who are dependent are burdens. This is not to say that such dependence is a moral evil: this would only be the case , I think, where this dependence is avoidable by the dependent (his choice to be dependent then being a negative heteronomous need) in all other cases it is of course our moral duty to recognise, and help those who are dependent, e.g. through disability, age, etc.. Independence is something which each of us needs, both in ourselves and in others. Where there is no independence, the needs of others are affected.

This could be said to underly a duty which we all have towards each other, not to be unnecessary burdens: such duties would be exercised primarily by showing care and concern for one's own self, and such duties would be moral. Therefore we can say that our view permits the possibility of moral duty towards oneself.

Robinson Crusoe exhibits this independence in a high degree: we admire him for being in possession of a moral attribute whose explicability in terms of the needs of others is beyond question.

Thirdly, there is the general argument against self-regarding virtues (see, e.g. von Wright, 1963, p153): courage may well be a virtue but its exemplification in the behaviour of a burglar disqualifies it from being a moral good. Similarly, self sufficiency may well be a moral good,

but in some circumstances it could be a moral evil: e.g. it may lead a person to isolate himself from his family, with their needs of him. Thus, the moral value of self-sufficiency would seem to rest upon its relation to heteronomous needs.

Therefore, self- sufficiency can be shown to be morally neutral within itself: it is the circumstances of this attribute, particularly its relation to heteronomous need, which determines whether it is a moral good, a moral evil, or simply a quality which is not at all a moral one.

3.6 Interests and Welfare: Needs and Flourishing.

Apart from right and wrong, and moral goodness, I think that many other moral concepts can be shown to be related to the concept of need. Examples of these would include: interest, welfare, harm, suffering etc.. For the present, we shall examine the concept of interests and welfare.

Welfare seems to be more abstact, all-inclusive concept than interest, which would seem to be more specific and material. Common usage seems to dictate that one's interests are preconditions of one's welfare, as we say for example that 'my welfare is not served by that which is not in my interests'. Bearing this in mind, we shall treat these ideas as largely equivalent.

A person's welfare then, can be related to his needs, in that if a set N is what a person needs, then the having of these things by him ensures that everything is being done which is in his interests, and his welfare is being served, or realised. A person's welfare then, is exhaustively described by enumerating that person's needs.

However, our interest in discussing this lies in the fact that interests may be thought to employ a different conception of the basis of

good, one not related to needs. Thus, it may be objected that any other approach ignores the fact-value distinction, and is therefore invalid.

The objection is based on an argument which goes something like this: talk about a person's welfare, or the things which are in his interests, is talk about a state of that person which constitutes his flourishing. This state has its preconditions, which will be among that person's needs. Such 'flourishing needs' differ from basic and adventitious needs: they are an overlay upon these, and cannot be discovered by an empirical examination of his desires, intentions and purposes. They rest upon the evaluative notion of 'flourishing', are inescapably moral in nature, and constitute the content of morality.

Thus, the needs of children for guidance, the needs of comatose and severely mentally ill people, and even those who are unaware of their need, are not related to the goals of these people as preconditions. Instead, they are dictated morally by an external conception of what would constitute flourishing for that person. Therefore, welfare is not to be construed in terms of people's expressed desires and needs, as welfare is logically prior to these things.

There are four lines of arguments against this objection, we shall look at them in turn.

Firstly, the difference between flourishing needs and others can be explicated in terms of flourishing needs being dependent on goals or ends, as with other needs, but where these goals are held on behalf of the person by another: his goals are imputed, and needs are ascribed vicariously.

These needs would still be objective, in that 'flourishing', a desired state, would be achieved where they are satisfied. Goals or ends are still specified, with their attendant needs, as underlying what is said to be good for that person, and can themselves be evaluated, when set in the context of other goals and ends. Such flourishing needs would most often be advanced where people are unable to set or to choose their

own goals, either totally or in a sufficiently consistent way to achieve the attainment of a significant number of them, e.g. with young children.

All of us pass through such a stage in our lives: for example,we have all been children, and had decisions made for us, goals and plans set on our behalf. This procedure is entirely innocuous, both from a logical and a practical point of view, if it is carried out in a hypothetical way: that is to say, if the person who decides does so by asking what the person would want, what will they in the future, or did they in the past, approve of, and of what disapprove.

In that case, the person is simply reacting to the need of the person concerned, i.e. the need which he has by virtue of which he is unable to choose his _own_ needs.

This would be a typically moral situation, (if our account of morality is correct), where a person is unable to set their own goals and requires this to be done for him: and indeed, we find this is the case: parents, nurses, the 'carers' of our society, have as a central task such dealings with vicarious needs, and their work is held to have a strongly moral content.

It may be argued then, that we have used a moral phenomenon in our argument: this is so, but it is also a factual state of affairs. If we consider the levels of ethics here, such caring and vicarious need-ascription is a fact at the first level: second-level ethics judges such behaviour to be morally worthwhile, and good: while at the third level, we look at these concomitances of fact and value. Thus, we have not secretly imported values, but considered something (caring) which, considered from another viewpoint (i.e. that of 2nd level ethics) is judged morally good.

Such flourishing needs then, have exactly the same status as other needs, as regards their logical features of means and ends: they are manifested in situations where regard for them is needed, and they are thus compatible with what we have said elsewhere about needs.

Secondly, if this is not granted, but flourishing is decided by appeal to what is good on the basis of something other than need, then we can claim that this is a confused sense of 'good': such confusion will inevitably result in incompatibility among a person's goals.

Mutually incompatible states of flourishing or welfare can be ascribed to one and the same person, with a corresponding and proportionally greater complexity and incompatibility among his needs.Witness the apparently irresoluble nature of the disagreement between the rationalist and the housewife (Hudson, 1970 p306).

This will be a result of various conceptions of what is a proper and fitting condition for a human being: man can be seen as alternatively a pleasure seeker, as God's creature, to do as He wills, or as a seeker after wisdom. All of these will inevitably issue in incompatible prescriptions as to a person's needs. Therefore, there can be no consistent prescription of need based on an idea of flourishing which is not related to ordinary, everday usual needs, such as for food, air, exercise etc., or, as we have seen above based hypothetically upon a person's wishes.

It may be argued that such inconsistency is a natural feature of normal need formation: we do actually desire and need diverse and incompatible things: however, this natural occurrence is to some degree overcome, in the formation of non-flourishing needs, by a natural process of selection and elimination. This occurs continually, and in accord with practical reason, such that attainment of needs is maximised. The amount and efficacy of such selection varies from person to person: we all take some pleasure in desiring the impossible, but this is largely voluntary, and differs considerably from the chaos of goals which would result in a situation as described above.

Thirdly, the point of talking about a person's flourishing needs can be equally well achieved by considering only objective, empirically verifiable needs, and accepting only them as contributing to the concept of welfare.

For example, it may be thought that only flourishing needs would allow us to deal with misconstrual by a person of his own welfare. He may come to desire what is bad for him, and hence have needs which are bad.

But this can be adequately dealt with by appealing to objective, empirical need. A person may come to adopt a set of untoward ends, which have unforeseen and damaging consequences for the needs of others, or his own, other needs: damaging in the sense that these ends make it unlikely that a large number of these needs will be satisfied. Therefore, such ends would produce a set of needs which are 'bad', but this badness is explicable in terms of his, or of other's, needs, and does not require appeal to the notion of flourishing.

Similarly, a criminal's needs constitute the negative needs of others, they are held to be bad, or evil needs. Nevertheless, they are 'his needs', but only in the provisional sense in which a person may come to hold, as we saw above, a set of goals which may produce inconsistent, incompatible, needs. His needs can be shown to be bad without appeal to an esoteric notion of his or anyone else's 'flourishing'.

In other cases, as we have seen, a person's needs must be vicariously decided, but doing so on a hypothetical basis means we do not require to appeal to a notion of flourishing which is independent of need. For example, if a child simply wishes to watch TV all the time, then it may be decided, and the child may say later that the right thing was done,
that the child needs to engage in some other activities, that watching TV continuously is bad, and discourages the development of the child's talents. It is thus not what she needs, where this has been decided in a vicarious, hypothetical manner.

Fourthly and lastly, we can point out that acting upon a conception of welfare and interests which lacks any, even indirect connection with needs determined by goals, is a strange, irrational, and sometimes harmful and wrong approach.

For example, suppose that it were decided that a child's future lay in music, and a great expense and effort were expended to provide musical training. Suppose that this were done in the face of a total lack of talent or interest, and of an expressed wish to follow medicine.

This would be generally agreed, I think, to be counter-productive at best, and at worst morally outrageous. It would be a negative need of the child, who expressed alternative goals more compatible with his or her abilities. This alternative goal, and its need, would ground our adverse moral judgement of this instance, and, probably, of her upbringing. Thus, there are at least some cases where independently conceived, flourishing needs, must yield to descriptive, expressed needs.

In conclusion then, we can say that a person's interest or welfare is constituted by the satisfaction of his needs, where these are the preconditions of the attainment of ends and goals which he sets for himself. We are of course speaking here descriptively, we are not advocating the satisfaction of need as being in the interests of all, but saying that the concept of the satisfaction of need seems to function as a logical equivalent to those things called our interests, thus constituting our welfare.

We provided four arguments to support this: (a) flourishing needs, the most likely alternative candidate, have equally satisfactory logical features, being carried out in cases of need where a person is unable to formulate a set of goals, or of reasonably consistent goals, for himself.
(b)Misconstrual of one's own welfare, or of the infringement of other's, can be adequately dealt with using objective, goal-related need.
(c)Alternative interpretations of flourishing produce incompatible goals, and unsatisfiable needs. (d) Use of flourishing as a notion which determines what is needed in abstraction from empirically expressed goals, can be grossly harmful.

Thus, we must conclude that welfare is best interpreted in terms of objectively-expressed needs. The 'flourishing' interpretation of welfare

is misguided and unnecessary in most cases, being at odds with our moral intuitions about the situations where it is unnecessarily applied. We have suggested that flourishing is used as a notion to determine need where the ability to formulate goals is absent, in which case only a person's mundane, everyday needs can be so considered, or other needs considered in a hypothetical way. In such cases, flourishing needs do not constitute a counterexample to what we have said earlier about need amd welfare, nor to what we have said about need and the content of morality.

3.7 Summary and Overview.

In this chapter, we showed that the language of need shares many of the logical features of the language of value, such that for all of the forms of extrinsic goodness treated by von Wright, the language of need could be substituted. To do so could help in explaining features of the concept of extrinsic value: both concepts share the means/end distinction, a relation to purposes, goals and intentions.

Then we looked at moral goodness, and saw that there were special needs which we called heteronomous needs, to which it could be shown that items of moral goodness (typically, actions and intentions) were closely related. These heteronomous needs are the needs which we all have for the actions of others, in positive or negative ways.

We then discussed the apparently either/or nature of moral rightness, and showed that this could be explicated by showing that 'right' applied in those situations, and in only those situations, where all such reasonably foreseen needs which it is possible to satisfy were satisfied.

The moral value of self-sufficiency would seem to be a counterexample to our position, therefore we spent some time showing that in those cases where it was morally good, it could be shown to be related to heteronomous need.

Lastly, interests and welfare were looked at, particularly where the state of flourishing, with its associated needs, was held to characterise our welfare. We showed that desire-related needs could do all that is required to explicate these notions, while the notion of flourishing has a very restricted application, and efforts to extend this can be overtly harmful.

ChapterIV NEEDS AND RIGHTS.

4.1 Introduction.

In this chapter, we shall consider the concept of 'moral rights', those things which include human rights, natural rights, and which have legislative counterparts in legal and civil rights.

We shall consider whether there _are_ such things, what is their nature, and what is their role in morality. Our chief interest in rights is to show their relation to needs.

4.2 The redundancy theory of rights: is there such a thing as a right?

It has quite often been asserted that to talk about rights is redundant and unnecessary: the point of doing so can be achieved by talking instead of duties, which are correlative with rights. This redundancy view is perhaps as old as the concept of a right itself: Jeremy Bentham called talk of natural rights 'nonsense on stilts', and see (Arnold, 1978) for a modern discussion.

I wish to establish in this section that we are justified in talking about rights, that we can thereby accomplish something which we cannot in talking only about duties. In a later section, we shall seek to establish the content of rights as being needs.

Firstly, a note about the correlativity of duties and rights: this correlation does not hold completely, since there are obviously duties which are based on something other than rights: for example, the general duty to be benevolent, and superogatory duties. These duties can go 'above

and beyond' the call of right, in that we may be expected to do more than the person has a right to. This suggests that rights are correlated with a distinctive subset of duties, and that to propose the redundancy of rights is to risk the concealment of an important distinction.

Apart from this quite general point, I think that there are four main reasons for retaining rights talk. These are as follows:

1. Rights are correlative with potential, as well as actual duties and obligations. They are held to inhere in the individual who has them, and to become active, or relevant, when certain situations arise.

For example, parents are held to have a moral right to the help and support of their children when this is needed later in life. Children are not taught this duty early in their life: rather the right attaches tothe parent, and is observed when appropriate. We tend to think that the duty arises on occasions because of the previously existing right, and this seems more acceptable and a more concise, economical way of speaking and thinking than talking about potential and actual duties, and the situations which govern or decide their actuality.

'Rights' can thus be seen as permanent entities with an inbuilt sense of potentiality, such that we could call them latent grounds of duties, determining when a duty becomes actual, rather than potential. 'Observe the rights of others' is an easier injunction to observe than providing an itemised list of potential duties, and the circumstances in which they become actual.

2. Rights may be foregone or exercised by their holder (with some notable exceptions, e.g. the rights to life and to liberty). However, there is no corresponding possibility of choice regarding the performance or forebearance from duty by duty holders, other than at the behest of the right holder or because of his situation. Hence, to talk only of our duties would emphasise the role of the agent, and exclude the power of potential recipients to absolve duties.

3. The rights-duty relation is somewhat vague on the duty side, while being quite explicit on the side of the right. There is thus a danger of assuming that there is no duty in some situations, due to the difficulty of ascertaining _whose_ duty it is. However, to ascribe rights to specific individuals is to lay down concomitant duties, to provide as it were a marker for them, which will ensure that the duty will not be ignored, but fall upon whomsoever circumstances dictate that it ought.

Thus, for example, a family may quarrel over whose duty it is to support their ageing parents: nevertheless, the moral right exists specifically in the parent, and the duty must fall somewhere. If the right did not exist, then in situations like this much suffering would obviously be caused where there is unclarity abut the duty. Of course, where the duty is not carried out, the right must still be observed: in this country, where the right of the elderly to receive care cannot be otherwise satisfied, then social services acknowledge this rightby providing care: they assume the duty.

4. In some cases, rights must be claimed before they can be exercised. In these cases, the holder of the right must be aware of the right, and of whose duties relate to it. This is a much more certain and energy-economical procedure than an allocation of duties: this would require the careful specification of potential beneficiaries, and the injunction to seek them out, and supply their rights.

To illustrate, medical and health care is the right of the individual, but only in exceptional cases would health authorities actively seek out and treat individuals: instead, individuals exercise their rights to health care by seeking treatment.

To conclude, then, we have seen that rights-talk is used to ensure that duties are carried out in cases of unclarity: that it would be very difficult, if not impossible otherwise to specify the extent, incumbents, beneficiaries and conditions for the performance of duties; and the difference between renouncing a right and abstaining from one's duty would be ignored.

Therefore, I think we must conclude that the language of right cannot be completely replaced without loss by the language of duty, and that therefore rights talk is distinctive and useful: for the purposes of discourse at least, we are justified in assuming that rights exist separately from duties.

4.3 Rights and needs.

If the arguments of the last section are correct, then the redundancy theory of rights is not correct: we shall therefore in this section consider the nature of rights, what it is to which we are referring when rights are mentioned.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1977, p68) says:

> **Duty and right are born of need which, when considered in connection with others, is a right, and when considered in connection with ourselves, a duty.**

In other words, my need is your duty and my right, and your need is my duty and your right. Proudhon goes on to give several examples of needs which are also rights: work, love, freedom, social exchange. He does not, however, elaborate his claim further. Here, I wish to consider this claim, using our previous analysis of need to discover whether there is such a correspondence as he indicates. We shall consider the similarities between the two notions, and in the next section investigate the differences.

(a) There is a widely held distinction among rights, whereby some are considered as claim-rights, and some as liberties. Claim rights demand the active co-operation of others in the provision of that to which a right is held, a liberty demands the forebearance or non-interference of others in the exercise of the right by its holder.

Since we are considering moral rights, then we would expect the needs corresponding to these rights to be heteronomous needs as we have defined them.

A parallel distinction can be found among needs, in that we can say that claim-rights are based on, or at least have their correlates in positive heteronomous needs, the need we all have for the positive actions of others. Likewise, liberties are similarly related to negative heteronomous needs, i.e. the need we have that others do not act in such a way as to frustrate our achieving the satisfaction of our needs, the attainment of our goals.

(b) We have already seen that rights and duties are held to be correlative, in that we can on occasion dispense with talking about the right, and mention instead its associated duty.

I think that this limited replaceability can be explained by associating it with a parallel correlativity in need: we can refer to a need as being either an object or a state, the extension or the intension of the need respectively (see section 2.3). Thus, where rights occur in instances of heteronomous need, then the action of others __is__ the extension of the need, and is the correlated duty, whereas the intension of the need would be the reason for the right.

(c) Rights frequently arise circumstantially: that is, it is the situation or circumstances of the putative right-holder which decide whether he actually has a certain right.

Thus, for example, immigrants, refugees, diplomats, certain workers, are sometimes said to have certain rights by virtue of their circumstances, and of the activities upon which they are engaged. On the other hand, there are some rights which seem relatively impervious to such circumstantial determination, e.g. to respect, to food and shelter, etc..

There is a similar distinction in need, in that adventitious need is determined circumstantially, while basic need seems to be less dependent on context (although, as we have seen, this is not an absolute, or clear-cut distinction).Our basic needs, being the preconditions of survival itself, are not usually determined by our choice of projects or of actions: this would correspond to non-circumstantial rights.

Adventitious needs arise in the course of purposive action, as preconditions of the attainment of ends and goals which can be freely adopted or rejected: these circumstantial needs would correspond to our circumstantial rights.

Admittedly, some circumstantial rights do not depend upon freely-chosen ends or goals: but similarly,we have seen that adventitious need is often related to free choice only in a very indirect way, if at all. The adventitious needs of a craftsman, for example, will make posible a good quality of finished work: one might think that this is a free choice, but it is so only very indirectly: the craftsman has given his life to his work, and it is within the context of this free commitment that he is bound to individual projects for which his needs may be adventitious, yet involuntary.

(d) The general/specific distinction between needs is also relevant to rights, in that the collective/individual distinction between rights (Glazer, 1978 p 87 ff) corresponds very well here: there is a tension between the rights of the individual, e.g. to privacy, and the needs of the collective, e.g. for security. This tension might reveal itself, for example, in resistance to the notion of identity cards for everyone. In exactly the same way, the needs of the individual may conflict with the needs of the group: all the compromises which those who take part in various groups (and all of us do) are forced to make,serve as indicators of the tension between the aims of the individual v. the aims of the group as a whole.

(e) Some rights have been famously declared to be 'inalienable', in that some rights persist with the individual come what may, in any country and under any law. They seem to belong to him, rather than depending upon ascription or conferral.

This alleged immanence of rights in their holders can be explained if we take need to be the basis of right.

We have seen that need arises typically in the course of human purposive behaviour, and any rudimentary account of human nature must acknowledge that man is essentially a purposive being, acting teleologically under the internal stimulus of his chosen objectives. Thus, it would seem that it is essential to man to have his needs, that needs are part of his essence: and the alleged inalienability of rights whether intended prescriptively, or. intended logically, can be given a possible basis in the origin of need being essentially in the individual.

(f) Notwithstanding the inalienability of rights, it would seem that some rights can be forfeited, overridden or renounced. A convicted prisoner can lose his right to liberty, indeed in some countries he can be deemed to have forfeited his right to life.

Needs also share this feature, we have called it 'defeasibiity': a disagreement as to what is needed is quite often settled by considering a range of provisional needs and deciding upon their suitability.

The individual's needs can be over-ridden by either (i) his other needs, (ii) the needs of others, and this over-riding may occur either with his consent or knowledge, indeed it may be decided by him, or it may be decided quite independently, of whether he is willing to abide by the decision. This would correspond to a conflict of rights.

Therefore, as regards being over-ridden, or foregone, needs and rights are closely similar.

(g) Lastly, those things which are commonly regarded as rights can be examined and shown to be actually needed also, as Proudhon does briefly. We have a right to, and needs for,such things as life, liberty, respect and privacy: there would thus seem to be a large and substantial overlap between needs and rights.

To conclude, we have seen that all of the major distinctive conceptual features of needs have corresponding similar features in the notion of a right: claim rights/liberties correspond to positive and negative needs: rights/duties correspond to intension/extension, basic/adventitious has its corresponding distinction in the circumstantial/non-circumstantial distinction: the general/specific distinction in needs corresponds to collective / individual rights; the inalienability / overridability issue in rights has obvious parallels in need, and those things which are rights actually do seem to correspond largely to those things which are needed.

The evidence seems to be overwhelming here, it is inconceivable that two concepts could share so many features yet remain unrelated. In the absence of any alternative explanation of these parallels, we must assume that our initial agreement with Proudhon is correct, that need forms the basis of both right and duty.

4.4 Needs and Morality.

Despite our conclusion that need forms the basis of right, nevertheless there are limits to the formal similarities of these concepts. Rights can exist in isolation from needs, and the presence of need does not imply the existence of a right.

For example, a multi-millionaire has a right to continue to acquire property and money from his business (providing that he pays his taxes and does not act illegally) far beyond the point at which he could be said to <u>need</u> to do so.

Again, poor people in the underdeveloped countries could be said to be in great need of the food and medical resources to which we in the developed world have access: yet it is not theirs by right. (Of course, they have a right to some basic routine help, augmented by episodic assistance in emergencies, but their needs in general for the services which _we_ receive is not usually accepted, nor advanced, as a right.

What is it which in these cases divorces right from need?

In the case of the multi-millionaire, where right subsists without need, withdrawal of the right would be unjust, a restriction of his liberty. In the second instance, where need exists without right, a common argument given as justification is that to provide food and material help in a substantial and regular way would undermine the international market, which we all need, and depend upon. (I do not wish here to justify these commonly held views, only to acknowledge that they _are_ commonly held and widely appied to these two kinds of situations.)

Thus, it would appear to be _other_ needs and rights which prevent either a need becoming associated with a right, or which prevent a right from collapsing due to the absence of need.

We could say that a right is an institutionally recognised need, since its continuance once recognised seems guaranteed regardless of changed circumstances and alternative needs, in much the same 'blind', automatic way as other institutions operate and persist.

It seems then that there is a case for saying that need is the basis upon which rights are allocated, and that it is only other rights and needs which result in an need not being a right, or a right not being a need.

This allows us to draw an inference about needs and the content of morality. Firstly, it should be noted that:

(1) to observe moral rights is to fulfill a large part, if not all, of our moral duty:

(2)to observe such rights is to take account of heteronomous need (i.e. we have argued that the 'content' of such rights is heteronomous need) therefore:

(3) to do as morality demands is to satisfy heteronomous needs.

This we can adduce as additional evidence in favour of our overall thesis, that needs form the content of morality.

4.5 Summary and overview.

We have seen that moral rights serve a unique function, not totally captured by the alternative language of duty. Most features of moral rights have their parallels in features of heteronomous needs, and most rights seem to occur in cases of need. To observe moral rights is to behave largely in the way which morality demands, therefore we can infer that to observe and act upon heteronomous need is to behave morally.

Therefore, we have an additional piece of evidence for the overall claim which we are seeking to prove, that needs form the content of morality.

Chapter V NEEDS AND OUGHT-STATEMENTS.

5.1 Introduction.

An important feature of morality is its prescriptive, normative force: it tells us what ought to be done, how things should be, and prescribes certain characters, motivations, and dispositions.

'Ought' and its cognates are thus important moral terms, and important topics in moral philosophy. It seems to me that the notions of 'need' and that of 'what ought to be done' have close logical connections, which are neither generally recognised nor fully acknowledged.

In this chapter therefore, I wish to point out and to demonstrate some of these connections beween ought-statements and need. Most relevant, of course, for our purposes is the moral ought: but we shall look at other kinds of ought-statements as well, and consider reasons for actions as including both needs and ought-statements.

5.2 Types of ought-statements.

J.L. Mackie (1977, p73) refers to epistemic ought-statements. These are related to people's expectations, given some (perhaps implicit) rational premise. For example: given certain laws of science, if a brick of a certain composition and specification is dropped from the top of a building of a certain height,it ought to reach the ground a certain number of seconds later.

This epistemic ought is non-normative in the sense that it does not prescribe actions, but it does have a certain kind of justificatory force in that it could be interpreted as prescribing, or underlying the

prescription of, certain beliefs, in a conditional manner. That is, if all relevant conditions of P have beeen considered, and no others arise, then it is in certain circumstances rational and probably correct to believe in P, or that P.

Other ought statements could be classified as hypothetical, and these do have a conditional prescriptive force upon actions. Generally, hypothetical oughts assume a certain goal or objective is held, and prescribe the conditions (usually an action) of the attainment of this goal as that which ought to be done, the object of the ought-statement, that to which it applies. For example, 'If you want to catch the train, you ought to run'.

The end assumed by the hypothetical ought may be positive or negative, (e.g. 'if you wish to avoid/reach the town centre...') and it may be either general or particular. By a general end, I mean that the speaker does not assume the end to be held by any specific individual: for example, 'To preserve health, people should have regular medical check-ups.' or 'Drain pipes ought to be kept clear of debris'.

Lastly, there is the moral ought which has been claimed, most notably by Kant, to be non-hypothetical, categorical in nature.

If we are morally obliged to do something, A, if A is our moral duty, then, it is held, A ought to be done unconditionally, come what may. The categoricality of the moral ought entails that it makes no reference, not even implicitly, to the ends or preconditions of the ends of the agent to whom the ought applies: nor indeed does it refer to any ends beyond the object of the ought-statement itself which is recommended as an end.

Thus, 'You ought to tell the truth, if you wish to gain people's trust' is a hypothetical ought, but 'You ought to tell the truth, irrespective of the beneficial or harmful effects this has for you or for anyone else': this is a moral, categorical ought: truth-telling is advocated not as a means, but as an end. We shall discuss this 'categoricality' fully in a following section; for the moment, we need only note that it is

sufficiently unique to determine a special kind of ought, the moral ought.

5.3 Oughts, needs, and reasons for action.

I think that it should be plain that the object of hypothetical ought-statements are formally equivalent to needs, where it is action which is needed. Thus, 'You ought to do X, if you wish to achieve Y' can be translated readily into : 'you need to X for Y'. For example, X could be the obtaining of a visa, and Y going to America for a holiday. Another example would be where it is said that mountaineers, in order to reachh their summits, must carefully prepare their equipment.

Where a person performs X to attain Y, then 'wanting Y' or 'to Y' is said to be the reason for the action X. We might call Y the internal reason for action X, to distinguish it from what might be called external reasons.

An external reason is something which can be interpreted, loosely, as a non-teleological cause. For example, dropping a brick is a good(!) reason, in the external sense, for hopping around on one foot, while going to the doctor to have it treated would have, as internal rason, the desire for recovery. Generally, but not always, actions done from external reasons are largely involuntary, or less voluntary in degree than those done from internal reasons - this follows from the meaning of internal reason, being ultimately the exercise of will, choice or desire. However, both kinds of reason may be advanced as explanation for some action.

How do these reasons relate to needs? An internal reason will be a desire,or an end, which will have its preconditions which we call needs: statements about these are, as we have seen, translatable into ought-statements. Thus, the reason we need a visa, and are acting so to get, and why it is said that we ought to get one, is the desire to go to America; this is our internal reason for acting,and it is the basis for

the associated need and the ought. An external reason for these things might be a previously-issued invitation from a friend: this has, in a sense, 'made' or caused us to want to go, and therefore to need certain things.

Of course, the internal and the external reasons combine, here as elsewhere: the combination consists of a gladly-accepted invitation. In the same way, internal and exernal reasons may combine to cause us to lock doors: the internal reason would be a desire for security, the prevention of burglaries, the retaining of one's property, etc.; while an external reason might be a high crime rate, a nervous disposition, or an incident of burglary in the immediate vicinity. Thus, to ask for reasons for a given act may well be answered by either internal or external reasons, or most likely, some combination of both.

Notwithstanding the translatability of needs and ought, there are several points of difference which it is useful to consider here.

Firstly, a person can be said to need, but not to 'ought': rather, 'ought' is used in statements about, or addressed, to, potential agents, by way of advice or commendation, based upon their needs. Secondly, 'You need to X' seems to imply less of a voluntary choice about whether or not to X, than does 'You ought to X': the latter implies a degree of freedom, and a lack of urgency about the matter which the former does not.

How can these differences be accounted for? I think that they rest upon the fact that the scope of 'needs' is wider than that of 'ought', since 'ought' refers to actions, and actions are only a part of what we can be said to need. Among those things which we need are many things which lie beyond our power to influence - thus 'need' acquires a sense of being involuntary, which persists even in its application to voluntary actions, while 'ought', being more usually addressed to voluntary action, differs in this respect.

5.4 The moral ought and needs.

- V: NEEDS AND OUGHT-STATEMENTS -

We have seen that what we need to do, and what we ought to do, frequently coincide and overlap, and that both concepts share logical features to such a degree that we can explain or elucidate what ought to be done by reference to what is needed.

Is this so for what _morally_ ought to be done? That is, can we say that the needs of others for our actions are the basis, or perhaps the reason, for what we morally ought to do?

Firstly, we should point out that it follows from our meta-ethical, non-normative stance (see section 1.3), that it is not our business here to provide persuasive reasons for being moral, in terms of other's needs: rather, we are engaged in a descriptive, factual investigation of how far needs can be shown to figure as reasons for moral action. We are not promoting them in a rhetorical way as reasons for moral action.

Given this general statement of intent, we can now look at needs as possible reasons for moral action. Let us apply firstly what we have already said about reasons for action: we said that there were two kinds of reasons for action, internal and external reasons, the latter functioning as a kind of cause, or precondition, the former as an inner desire or impulse towards an end or goal.

Now, it is plain that some instances of moral value can be related fairly uncontroversially to external reasons; for example, Smith is kind, courteous and a thoroughly admirable person _because_ he has been well brought up, his education and training included a substantial moral component; he inhabits a realm of moral ambience where good deeds are encouraged and applauded, vice is denigrated and shunned, and its most explicit and harmful instances are actually punished.

All of these impinge upon Smith, as reasons, to make him moral, to carry out actions which are usually not morally wrong, and quite often applaudedas morally good. Social influence, parental upbringing and education are at least part of the general reasons for his being moral.

Such reasons, however, do not serve as a wholly plausible basis for the moral ought, even though they may well bring about all that is prescribed by a moral ought-statement. What extra features are not thereby captured? Firstly, such reasons could only be said to underly an epistemic ought (see section 5.2), such that we could expect Smith to be moral, in a mechanically predictive sense of ought: but moral expectations are of something more than this (for example, we would be more than surprised if Smith did something morally wrong: we would be concerned, perhaps, or disappointed). Also, moral behaviour is something more than a response to situations which is conditioned by upbringing, education, etc.. What is morally prescribed, and valued, is behaviour which is unconditioned, and whose justification lies in the situation or context of the action itself. By unconditioned, I mean that the action is not contingent upon anything else which we might praise instead, such as education, training, or any other 'accidental' feature.

Our overall claim is, of course, that it is special needs, those which we have called heteronomous needs which are the reason for acting morally, and it is in this area which we would hope to be able to find justification, as well as the unconditionality, the 'categoricality' to use Kant's term.

How then can we find a basis for justification, and unconditionality, in such needs as reasons for moral actions?

If we return to the external reasons which we looked at above as supplying a sort of epistemic ought, it is possible to establish (if our hypothesis about heteronomous needs as being the content of morality is correct) that providing such external reasons is itself a moral action in need of justification. For example, a parent who teaches his child to be honest can be said to be concerned for the child's welfare, as well as the welfare of society as a whole (in that either he is propagating its values, or he is encouraging something, truth-telling, which is generally useful). On any rudimentary view of what morality consists of, such a parent is acting morally, while perhaps also advising the child of what is in the child's interest.

Assuming for the moment that such provision of external reasons is moral, how are both justification and categoricality to be demonstrated to hold of it in relation to heteronomous needs? Let us be clear about what we are considering. We are saying that a parent, in teaching and training his child to be honest, and virtuous in other ways, is providing his child with external reasons for being moral, and that such reasons are not wholly adequate in that they do not account for the unconditionality of moral behaviour, nor do they show how moral behaviour finds its justification in the context in which it occurs. However, we have also said that the action itself of supplying external reasons in this way is itself generally acknowledged to be a moral act, and we are now hypothesising that perhaps justification and categoricality can be sought in this indirect way.

Let us look at categoricality first of all. By this we mean that a moral action has no contingent reason (such as one's upbringing, one's present inclinations, etc.) for occurring. What *a priori* reason, then, can we find in heteronomous need (as we will need to, if we are to prove our overall claim) which underlies the moral action of training one's children in the generally accepted values of society, and other moral actions?

I believe that this categoricality can be found if we look at the point of moral training and education. These contribute to the existence of a harmonious and co-operative society of individuals who observe each other's needs: and this observance seems not a contingent matter, if we reflect further.

Man does seem to be dependent upon his fellow man, such dependence is present to a greater or lesser degree in all societies: the individual is not capable of satisfying his needs alone, both on an emotional and physical level. In today's society, industrialised and bureaucratised, it would seem that such dependence has reached an extreme degree, but it is present in all societies, and for all individuals, at the least in the trivial sense that each individual needs the forebearance of others from interfering in the satisfaction of his needs: an example of this is

truthtelling, in that accurate information from our fellows is a universal requirement.

Another simple example of this is the dependence of children upon their elders while they are very young: this mutuality of need would therefore seem to be something which is not a contingent fact about mankind.

Thus, the parent in teaching and training his child, is doing so for a reason (and an internal reason at that) which it would be difficult to imagine being otherwise: this reason is that the child will become an adult who recognises, and acts upon, the needs of others for his action. This recognition of the needs of others will of course be reciprocated by others.

The parent is also of course acting in the interests of his child, in that a child unaware of the norms and standards of society is one whose welfare is not provided for. This reason (the mutuality of need which we have for the actions of others) is independent of the inclinations or preferences of the parent, such that it would be possible to say that the reason persisted, even if the parent were not to act upon it. This is so because human nature would still be as it is, heteronomous need would still exist and impinge upon the child whether the child were taught this or not.

Therefore, we explain this categoricality of moral action as resting upon fundamental facts about moral beings, in that there seems to be an *a priori* mutuality of need which exists independently of individual actions. This mutuality is of course part of the point of the parent's training and education of his/her child, and this accounts for its categoricality.

This mutuality of need accounts for the categoricality of the child's subsequent moral behaviour, as it was the reason for the child being taught to behave in that way, and is the reason for our moral approval of such behaviour, rather than the education being directly either the reason or the object of such approval. The behaviour is good because it meets

other's needs, not because it is a product of training designed to meet other's needs.

What of the situational justification of the moral ought? We often feel that we ought to behave morally, but for immediately present reasons, not because of abstract facts about human nature, nor because we were taught to do so previously.

I think that it is at this point that internal reasons come into play. Training, social influence and education will produce a set of norms which are internalised: thus, in acting morally we will not be aware that we are fulfilling others' epistemic expectations of us, but we will be responding immediately to a situation and the needs therein: thus, the action is felt by the agent as being justified in the circumstances ('it was needed'), and there is an extraneous, categorical justification to be traced in the non-contingent nature of such need: there is also, of course, an independence by such need of the agent's immediately pre-existing wishes, inclinations, plans and objectives.

Thus, the moral ought has associated with it two kinds of need, the immediate, circumstantial need, and the *a priori* need resting upon the apparently non-contingent mutuality of need between moral beings, as realised in particular situations. In this way, there is an interplay of justification between the general and particular statements of the moral ought.

5.5 An Objection

It may be felt that the 'oughtness' of moral actions has been explained away, by our account: if morality is simply a tendency to co-operate with others in order to make social living possible, this being a common need of all individuals, then this may be held to fail to account for the force of the subjectively experienced urge, or compulsion, to act morally come what may.

This strongly experienced 'oughtness' is one of a range of moral phenomena which G.J.Warnock dubbed the psychological penumbra of morality, (Warnock, 1967 pp53 ff), and I agree with him that such items cannot be a sufficient criteria of the moral point of view.

Nevertheless, this still leaves us with the issue of whether we are able to account for the obvious presence of such feelings referred to by Warnock: can they be seen to have a place in the moral ought according to our explanation of it? I believe they can be shown to be quite consistent with our position, as they can be shown to be directly related to the needs which it is the object of morality to satisfy. If we can relate the reluctance to have these phenomena 'explained away', itself to the needs which we have claimed to characterise morality, then I think the objection will have been met.

Such a relation is quite easy to demonstrate. The subjective, experiential accompaniments of recognition of our moral duty are after all the immediate, or proximate (what we have called internal) reason for people behaving morally. Take some everyday instance of morally good behaviour: say for example, non-interference with the property of others.

I do not take my neighbour's motorcar for a joyride on a sunny afternoon: my antipathy to such an act is not based on complex reasoned out process of deliberation such as: 'Well, if I did , his need for it would be frustrated, his peace of mind would be shattered, our good relations would be at an end... etc.,all of these are negative goals of mine, things which I would rather avoid, hence I ought not. Besides, it is an instance of a kind of action which would make society an unreliable and chaotic arrangement, which would be objectionalble to all. All the more reason why I should not take his car.

Instead, I do not take his car chiefly because such an action would be abhorrent to me: if it were suggested to me, I would reject it immediately as something which I feel strongly that I ought not to do and only later perhaps appeal to his needs.

This strength of moral feeling, which may be called conscience, is admirably successful in ensuring that heteronomous needs are , by and large, satisfied. I think that it is a plausible assumption that this is the essential role of such feelings: that morality is a matter of feeling as well as of reason, that they both serve the one end, our need for mutual co-operation and non-interfernce. Feelings thus provide part of the internal reasons for moral action, and are not at all 'explained away' by our theory: rather, they have a place at the first level of morality, as motive and internal reason, while external reasons, and the rational balancing of needs, occur at the second level of morality, that of judgement and discourse.

It is an ignoring, or blurring of these two levels which leads to the present objection, which states that we have allotted reason an overly important place in the occurrence of moral action. Reason must, of course, be used to discern and to explain what occurs when a moral ought is delivered, or experienced: but this does not detract from the essential role of feelings in the execution of that which is prescribed, together with any necessary degree of immediate reasoning.

The same answer can be given where it is said that we have made the moral ought tautological, and that it is not experienced as tautological: we have said we ought to be moral because it is needed: and such a logical analysis does not yield any explanation nor justification for moral action. However, this is a misunderstanding of our position: we have not said in general that people ought to be moral: rather, given specific instances of moral oughts, it is possible to demonstrate that there are associated needs, and the general moral ought does seem to be associated with the apparently unavoidable existence of heteronomous needs, the needs both positive and negative which men have for each other's actions. Any explanation of phenomena seems tautological: e.g. objects burn because they combine with oxygen: of course, that is what burning means, so the 'because' is not an empirical, but a logical one. It is, nevertheless explanatory, even though it may not provide the kind of physical reason which a puzzled spectator at a conflagration may seek.

In the same way, moral agents act upon their sympathies and emotions, and a reasoned perception of the needs of others: their internal reasons of this kind seem at odds with the objective, explanatory reasons which we have given.

Thus, we accomodate such objections by ascribing an essential, but nonetheless instrumental function to these subjective aspects of morality which complements and completes an objective and possibly imbalanced emphasis upon the rational aspects of moral experience, and its philosophicaol investigation.

Reason can, after all, be an intermittent and unreliable commodity which would be inadequate as the sole stimulus to moral behaviour.

5.6 Summary and Overview.

In this chapter, we have seen that there are close logical connections between ought-statements and statements of need. We looked briefly at the different kinds of 'ought': epistemic oughts, which can be interpreted as prescribing that which it is rational to believe: hypothetical oughts, where certain actions are prescribed as being the means to certain assumed ends: and the moral ought, where certain ends are prescribed in a categorical, unconditional way.

We looked at the large area of overlap between what it is said we ought to do, and what we need to do: this is most obviously true in instances of hypothetical oughts. However, 'P is needing to X' has a more compulsive, involuntary force than has 'P ought to X': this we accounted for by showing that need is more widely applied than 'ought': ought usually refers to voluntary actions, while objects of need can be any kind of item, frequently not subject to our volutary control.

We looked at internal and external reasons for action, saying that needs and ought apply most obviously to internal reasons, as preconditions, while perhaps only an epistemic ought could be said to apply to the operation of external reasons.

Both kinds of reasons apply in moral behaviour: education and upbringing as external reasons, sympathy and other feelings as internal reasons, as we saw in the last section.

The categorical nature of the moral ought was examined, and the situational justification of moral action. Moral action occurs in situations where it is needed by others (what we have called heteronomous need), and we said that categoricality, if interpreted as meaning that the moral ought does not depend upon any contingent features, finds its basis in such needs. This is so, since it would appear to be an essential fact about mankind that he is a social being, and that the needs of the individual are satisfied through a process of interaction with his fellows.

Our needs for each other would seem to be non-contingent, a priori features of man: thus, the oughts associated with such need are equally a priori. In a similar fashion, justification for the moral ought rests in both individual instances, and the general fact of, such need, depending upon whether we are considering the moral ought as such, or particular instances of it.

Lastly, we considered the possible objection that we seem to have explained away the psychological penumbra of morality: this was answered by ascribing an essential role to such feelings and emotions, as internal reasons for moral action; in this way, the role of reason is complemented and counterbalanced.

Chapter VI UTILITARIANISM AND NEEDS.

6.1 Introduction.

Utilitarianism, in its many variants, is the most widely accepted substantive theory of morality. By a substantive theory of morality, I mean one from which it is possible to deduce a content for morality, some specific item by reference to which arguments about what is the morally good or right action can be settled, or which can be used as a basis or criterion for the choice of an action.

That content is most usually happiness or pleasure. J.S. Mill, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, have been historical advocates of some form of this hedonistic utilitrianism, while J.J.C.Smart (1973) represents a modern approach.

In this chapter, we shall be investigating the relation of needs to these various contents of Utilitarianism, and we shall try to show that accepting needs as forming the content of morality allows us to explain both the plausibilities, and the shortcomings of utilitarianism. This explanatory power will show the theoretical supremacy of a view which advocates needs, rather than happiness, as the content of morality.

6.2 Forbidden pleasures, good pains.

In this section, we shall look at some of the more obvious shortcomings of utilitarianism.

Firstly, pleasure and happiness have only a contingent correlation with that which is judged to be good, or right. It is perfectly feasible to imagine a bad or a wrong pleasure, and a pain which is good.

Examples of bad pleasures would be those of the heroin addict, and those of the sadist. The happiness or pleasure which these people derive

from pursuing their habits would not be generally accepted as good, since they are achieved at the expense of the welfare of either the person himself, or of others. The utilitarian may then say that, of course, these activities lead, on balance and in the long run, to an excess of pain over pleasure, and this is why they are wrong.

But this is not always the case: the sadist may confine his activity to one victim on one occasion, and his pleasure may vastly outweigh the pain or suffering endured by his victim. Similarly, the addict may suddenly die from an overdose, and the pleasure from his addiction may have been the brightest point in his life: in neither of these cases, where pleasure predominates over pain, would it be generally agreed that the actions were morally good, nor the pleasures good.

Similarly for pain: there are several ways in which pain can be shown to be good: for example in doing demanding, but therapeutic physical exercise the existence of pain is perhaps uncomfortable, but seems an essential concomitant of what is good; similarly, medical treatment may entail some degree of pain which will of course be minimised by anaesthesia, yet whose presence is a necessary by product of what is good; again, some degree of pain inflicted as a deterrent punishment, will be instrumentally good in bringing about the desired end of proper conduct - such discipline may be judged to be morally good, e.g. where we use the withdrawal of some privilege as part of the education or upbringing of a child, and thereby cause some degree of pain.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, pain itself in moderate degree has a useful physiological function, enabling us to avoid, or to minimise injury (by drawing away from a hot surface as soon as some pain is felt, for example).

Pain is therefore important for quite a rnge of our beneficial activities, and thus would seem, *contra* utilitarianism, to be instrumentally good.

Thus pleasure and pain cannot be said to be universally reliable indicators of that which is good or bad, since either can be instrumentally good or bad.

Similar considerations apply if it is asserted that, nevertheless, pleasure and pain are good, and evil (respectively) in themselves: we would surely not wish to say this of the pleasure of the sadist, and the biological usefulness of pain surely over-rides any alleged immanent badness, insofar as the idea of such immanent badness is coherent (see Chapter 7).

It is surely quite obvious then that pleasure and pain do not yield reliable indicators of what is good or bad. This rests upon our arguments that either may be instrumentally good or bad, or indeed morally good or bad.

But (and here we would refer the reader to section 3.2, where we demonstrated the relevance of need to instrumental goodness) these arguments rest upon the fact that pains and pleasure depend for their value upon being needed: thus we have used needs essentially to demonstrate that utilitarianism has not correctly identified the content of morality.

6.3 Utilitarianism as a first-order moral position.

This leads us on to consider a fundamental fact about Utilitarianism, which rather seems to disqualify it as a moral theory, as we are using the term, i.e. as a serious attempt to provide an explanation or understanding of what morality is. This disqualifying feature is that it consists of a first-order moral position itself, in that it prescribes actions (those which promote happiness and pleasure, and obviate pain and suffering).

Any such theory runs the risk of committing the 'naturalistic fallacy', of contravening the fact-value distinction, and there is an overwhelming amount of philosophical argument for this divide. (See Hudson, 1969).

This is no criticism of Utilitarianism, we are simply stating that it is not suitable as a theory of morality: rather, as a first-level moral position it should be material for study by a third-level theory. To test our own theory, let us apply it to the study of Utilitarianism, to demonstrate and account for both its plausibility and its shortcomings.

First, the plausibility of Utilitarianism is quite seductive: the virtual ubiquity of the search for happiness and pleasure seems to suggest that the frustration of this search must be wrong, thus Utilitarianism gains widespread acceptance.

Does its plausibility rest on any other basis? Well, it is quite often correct, that is to say, quite often what it prescribes as right actually is accepted as being so, even by non-Utilitarians. This is due to a conjunction of the properties of a moral action for example, that it is both right and produces pleasure and happiness. Why is this the case, that is, why does what is right so often concur with what produces happiness?

My explanation of this is that happiness and pleasure are related to the moral good by the linking concept of desire. Desire is inherent in both the concepts of need, and of happiness. However, the relationship of desire to happiness is rather more problematical, and will merit further investigation here.

Several schools of thought, or world-views, have been based on unique perceptions of this relationship, and have played important roles in the societies of their times.

Such world-views include: Greek Stoicism, Buddhism (and kindred asceticist or quietist philosophies): and Hedonism. Stoicism and Buddhism

hold, or held, as tenets that happiness and lasting, true moral worth could only be attained by limiting our natural desires according to the prescriptions of Reason and in accord with the demands of Nature. Hedonism, on the other hand, states that pleasure and pain are, and should be, the only aims of human action.

In all of these schools of thought, the relationship between happiness and pleasure (and, implicitly, the good) on the one hand, and desire on the other, is variously conceived. Asceticism, to be brief, claims that happiness and goodness can only be attained where desires are minimised, or selectively satisfied, and hedonism claims that happiness will be attained where all desires are satisfied.

The consistency of these apparently conflicting views reveals itself after some consideration: asceticism states that the path to happiness lies in limiting our desires in such a way that they will all be satisfied: hedonism says that all desires should be satisfied. Happiness therefore on these views results where desires are satisfied, and where no desires remain unsatisfied.

The avoidance of unsatisfied desire seems to be a common aim, and this avoidance is a general condition of happiness and of good, and thus,in the case of Utilitarianism, of the moral good.

This is quite compatible with our view. To put it simply, if X is desired, or the precondition of the satisfaction of a desire, then it is said to be needed where it is compatible with, or at least is not incompatible with an existing set of desires.

In turn, the satisfaction of the desire related to X will be good, X will be related to a certain need, and in some situations may be a moral good. Such satisfaction will usually, but contingently, produce happiness and pleasure, and its frustration will bring about displeasure, or unhappiness.

Our theory is thus quite compatible with Utilitarianism, in that the relation between desire and happiness is accepted: however, the introduction of 'need' as fundamental to both desire and happiness allows us to explain the contingent relation between happiness and goodness.

Where every desire is satisfied, then both goodness and happiness will ensue, according to Utilitarianism. And this is acceptable, for where all desires can be satisfied, then there are no conflicting desires (either conflicting among themselves, or conflicting with needs, as construed in terms of preconditions of other desires).There will thus be no conflicting needs where every desire can be satisfied, and pleasure and happiness will be produced. However, where there are conflicting needs, obviously some displeasure or unhappiness will ensue, yet the 'good' or 'right' thing will necessarily involve choosing what is needed rather than what produces happiness.

A simple example of this would be going to the dentist immediately the need arises: one does this because of immediate consideration of need, despite it being a cause of pain or displeasure. It could be said that we are thereby avoiding future pain, minimising it by experiencing some pain now, instead of more later: however, the present pain is still not desired, although needed.

Thus, Utilitarianism is plausible in that pleasure and happiness do usually ensue from the satisfaction of desire, as does goodness, even moral goodness. Moral and legal codes usually operate, at a personal level, to minimise the production of incompatible desires. Hence, Utilitarianism will be generally correct: the production of happiness and pleasure is usually concomitant with the good, and is normally a morally good action, consequent upon the satisfaction of desire.

6.4 The shortcomings of Utilitarianism.

However, we have claimed that Utilitarianism is not fundamentally correct, that happiness and pleasure are only contingently related to what is morally good. A wide range of examples can be produced to show that there are situations where the production of happiness or pleasure is not our moral duty, indeed where this can be wrong. It is our task in this section to explain why Utilitarianism cannot account for these counterexamples, and thus is not universally correct.

The counterexamples which it is difficult for Utilitarianism to explain are drawn from situations where the potential justice or injustice of an act is considered (see Smart & Williams, 1973).

Usually, it is pointed out that the overall amount of happiness or pleasure is decreased by an action which is morally good, or by the morally good omission of an act. Or, it may be shown that an action which would increase the overall amount of happiness or pleasure is shown to be, intuitively, morally wrong.

For example, consider the situation where the death of one innocent man as scapegoat will end an outbreak of serious, persistent crime: his death will end this outbreak, and hence make his society a happier and more pleasurable one. Nevertheless, most would agree that taking his life would be wrong.

Utilitarianism cannot account for this: if pleasure and happiness are the ultimate criteria of goodness, and their production is our moral duty, then Utilitarianism requires us to perform acts which are generally regarded as unjust, and morally wrong.

How does our ethical theory of need explain, or improve upon this? Let us first reiterate the general point that we will not use our theory here for moral guidance upon what should be done: this would be at the

very least presumptuous, and certainly at odds with our stated intentions of providing reasoned, empirical explanations for, rather than justifications or prescriptions of moral phenomena.

The content of morality which we have uncovered would seem to be heteronomous need, which term we have used to indicate the apparently universal need which potential agents have for each other's actions. This content is the basis of several derivatives, which we shall look at in greater depth later: among these are attitudes, and dispositions, particularly as these relate to these heteronomous needs.

In these examples which Utilitarianism cannot explain, we must, to support our theory, discover such heteronomous need. I think it is fairly clear that taking the life of an innocent man is a violation of such a need: furthermore, an attitude or disposition which would permit one to take life, even for 'the greater good' is manifestly a public danger in itself, i.e. it is something whose absence we need, as it is a threat to the security of all individuals in society.

Thus, not only the injustice of taking of life in this way, but also the disapproval of actions of such a kind can be explained by our theory. With a little more work, we could go on to explain the generally-held value of justice, and the condemnation of its opposite.

Therefore, needs of exactly the kind we have described earlier are violated in these situations which Utilitarianism cannot explain, and these underlying needs are the reason why Utilitarianism is (a) generally acceptable (since, where it is correct, these needs are satisfied) and (b) not universally correct, (since they are violated in those situations which Utilitarianism cannot explain). Therefore, we can claim that our theory which places need as the content of morality, is theoretically superior to Utilitarianism.

6.5 Two examples

Let us consider two examples which reinforce our point of view.

Situation (i)

A traveller in the jungle meets a band of outlaws who have captured half a dozen innocent prisoners. The leader of the outlaws, to celebrate the occasion, is pleased to offer the travelller the chance of choosing and killing one captive, and he will allow the other five to go free. If he does not do this, then the leader will proceed with his original plan, to kill all six.

This is a difficult dilemma, many people would find it well-nigh impossible to decide what to do in such a situation. Utilitarianism, presumably, prescribes the saving of the five by the random selection of one to die, others might think that this was unjust.

Situation (ii)

Captain Oates, on Scott's expedition to Antartica, sees that supplies are low, and that progress is dangerously slow. He decides that the chances of the surviving members of the expedition would be better if there were one member less: accordingly, he walks off into a blizzard and dies.

In situation (i), if the traveller is a Utilitarian and living by his principles, he will choose and personally kill one prisoner in order to let five go free. What do our common moral judgements tell us? Ther may be a range of judgements here, including (a) compassion for a difficultchoice, forced upon the traveller: (b) outrage at the decision imposed by the outlaw leader: (c)total condemnation of all parties to the action.

At all events, in situation (i) we feel that a moral wrong has been done: our condemnation may variously devolve upon the outlaws, their leader, the government of the country concerned, or the traveller.

In situation (ii) however, the judgement would I think be different: one person dies in the attempt to save several others, yet we feel that no wrong has been done. Rather, we tend to think in terms of moral heroism, an utterly admirable act to which we should all aspire should the circumstances require it.

What is the difference between the two situations,the relevant difference which accounts for our different moral judgement of each situation? Both involve actions taken for the intended good (in terms of happiness, pleasure or the absence of pain) of a group of others and would, in this respect, seem indistinguishable by Utilitarianism.

Our theory says that an action taken because it is needed by another is characteristic of the moral good, that such actions are the ultimately basic objects of moral judgement: if we are correct, then it must be possible to show such heteronomous need in each situation, one negative and the other positive, so as to account for the radically different judgements.

In situation (ii) such an action is taken by Oates (although regrettably unsuccessful in its outcome), and the intentions, and offer made by, the outlaw leader in situation (i) is such a negative need. No such negative (heteronomous) need can be discerned in situation (ii). That, I propose, is why we say that a moral wrong has been perpetrated in situation (i), while a morally good action is carried out in (ii). Furthermore, we have clear grounds for making this claim, while the Utilitarian, as we have seen, must approve of the courses of action taken in both situations.

6.6 Summary and overview.

In this chapter we have attempted a basic critique of classical utilitarianism, with the dual purpose of examining the limits of its applicability, and using our theory as explaining some of its shortcomings: in this way, we hope to have shown that our need-based ethical theory is logically superior, in that it can account for the instances where Utilitarianism fails, and can itself be used to explain these failures of Utilitarianism.

We saw that pleasure or pain could be either instrumentally good or bad in different circumstances, and therefore would not seem to constitute an adequate content for morality. This was demonstrated, in section 6.2, by showing that needs determined whether pleasure and pain were good or bad, and thus whether they were morally relevant, and in what way they were morally relevant. Thus, needs could be shown to be both explanatory of Utilitarianism's shortcomings here, and a more reliable 'content' for morality.

Utilitarianism was shown to be a first-order moral position, rather than an explanatory theory, and it was shown to be related to the idea of need, by the bridging concept of 'desire': thus, the apparently contingent failures of Utilitarianism are explained by seeing it as a first-order moral position only contingently related to need.

This was illustrated by considering two examples, where needs seem to account for differences in our moral judgements, yet where Utilitarianism could discern no difference.

Overall, we have tried to show here that needs, rather than happiness or pleasure is a more reliable indicator of what is good, and that a theory of morality based on this is both more explanatory(in terms of accounting more plausibly for a wider range of situations), and logically superior, in that both the limitations and strengths of Utilitarianism itself, as a first order theory, are explicable by our view.

Chapter VII Intrinsic Goodness.

7.1 Introduction.

It may be objected by some that we have provided a purely instrumental view of moral goodness, whereas this would seem to be at odds with our intuitions: what is morally good is good in itself, intrinsically good: therefore we have made a fundamental error.

Consideration of this objection in this chapter will serve two purposes: it will lead us to consider a wider range of moral phenomena (and thus be of relevance for those who would not wish to pursue such an objection): and it will, it is hoped, allow us to provide a refutation.

In this section I shall attempt to outline what I understand by the terms 'intrinsic value' and ' good in itself': in the next section we shall look at other philosophical viewpoints on the topic, and we shall then consider in what ways, and to what extent, moral goodness can be said to be intrinsic.

7.2 The notion of intrinsic goodness.

If an object is said to be good in itself, and to have intrinsic value, I understand by this that it is valued, or desired for its own sake. This is in contradistinction to being valued or desired for the sake of something other than itself, particularly (as in instrumental value) for the sake of, or because, it is needed, or serves as a means to some end.

An illustration of something valued for its own sake would be any end, goal or objective of human action; for example, Hume (Enquiries, 244, [p 293 ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 1975]) draws attention to the absence of

pain as being valued for its own sake, with the means to this being exercise. Pleasure is also held by Hume to be an intrinsic good.

Does this commit us to an ultimately subjectivist account of intrinsic value? It would appear so, since 'being valued for its own sake' is a relational property, and is dependent upon valuers: this seems to be at odds both with calling such value 'intrinsic', and with the objective, absolute, 'transcendental' connotations of 'intrinsic': intrinsic goodness can be conceived of as being immanent in its object, thus transcending both ordinary valuing (e.g. instrumental valuing) and physical reality (as exemplified in the Moorean interpretation of value as a non-natural property, which was nevertheless real).

Nevertheless, we hope to avoid the danger of subjectivism, in that we aspire to a less grandiose and ephemeral interpretation of 'intrinsic': that which is good in itself is good, or valued, as an end: it is thus a limiting case of instrumental value, and perfectly compatible with the same sort of philosophical treatment as we have already given to instrumental value.

This interpretation permits us to both hold that objective talk about intrinsic values is possible, and that intrinsic values are different from instrumental. For some purposes, and in some situations, we may wish to minimise these differences (e.g. in showing, as we shall do, that the intrinsic nature of moral goodness still permits objective discussion about it), in others the differences may be all important (e.g. in the role which intrinsic valuing has in deciding our actions).

The possibility of such objectivity rests upon two kinds of consideration: firstly, there is the objective fact of whether a person actually does, or does not , desire object X for its own sake: secondly, and perhaps less trivially, such intrinsic valuation cannot be carried on independently of instrumental valuation, which may occur in the same context.

For example, the climbing of Everest may be a goal and be intrinsically good, for the person who holds that goal. However, the holding of that goal has its reasons, and its consequences: it can itself therefore be seen as a means to various ends, or certainly as a cause of some effects which are themselves potential ends: for example, the potential climber's ambition may be condemned as being a cause of consternation for his wife and family: it may be applauded as an occasion for the person to improve or test his personal qualities, e.g. endurance, planning, etc.. Thus, the fact that something is valued in itself does not place it outwith the same sort of means-end consideration which we give to other valuations: we could say that such valuations are no less objective than are instrumental valuations.

Take another example, that raised by Hume, the absence of pain. Hume argues that no further reasons can be given for this being valued (and this forms a major plank of his argument against the place of reason in morality): the absence of pain is indeed widely valued in itself. However, (see chapter VI) the reasons behind this can be examined: physiologically, we can say that such pain-avoidance serves a useful purpose in nature, as it permits organisms, including man, to minimise trauma and damage. Thus, from the point of view of the avoider, the absence of pain is intrinsically good, while from a scientific point of view, pain occurring as a signal is instrumentally good, toward the end of allowing damage to be avoided.

Overall, then, we see that our interpretation of intrinsic value as a limiting case of instrumental value allows us to retain the possibiity of talking in an objective way about it: both kinds of value are thus epistemologically equivalent, capable of having truth-values and being open to investigation and debate.

7.3 Some criticisms of Intrinsic Value.

(a) Introduction.

There is widespread dissatisfaction today in moral philosophy with the notion of intrinsic value, i.e. the notion that there is a kind of objective, transcendental value quite independent of the process of valuation. This discontent is variously expressed in the work of individual philosophers, and in general movements in philosophy.

We shall look at the work of three philosophers here: they express a discontent with this transcendent notion, which discontent can be traced back to the early years of the century when, as we have seen, moral philosophy was challenged by an empiricist criticism of arcane and metaphysical thinking. One of the philosophers we shall look at, John Dewey, was a pragmatist, writing under the influence and in the hey-day of logical positivism. Indeed, pragmatism had a theory of meaning and truth at its heart which was a significant precursor of logical positivism.

Our purpose is to show that the empirical approach to intrinsic value, making it dependent on, or relative to, actual valuing, is not without honourable precedent. Indeed, to provide an acceptable empirical explication of intrinsic value would be to show part of the road ahead for moral philosophy, a road which has sadly remained obscure since the emphasis shifted to experience as the criterion of meaning.

(b) Mackie's critique of objective value.

J.L. Mackie has provided a recent and thorough attack upon the notion that there are objective values, things which are good in themselves. As applied to values, it seems he uses the terms 'objective' and ' intrinsic' as equivalents (Mackie, 1977 p47).

On page 49, he provides a summary of his reasons for denying that there are objective values. He gives five main reasons, which are briefly as follows: 1. Moral diversity, 2. Metaphysical peculiarity of intrinsic value, and its relation to action. 3. The peculiarity of their consequential, supervenient relation to other natural properties. 4. Epistemological difficulties associated with (3), and 5. The manifiest possibility of explaining how an erroneous belief in the existence of such intrinsic values has arisen, as well as how such a belief could persist: objectification of values is thus understandable, but not the objectivity which it asserts.

I am in general agreement with Mackie's critique of intrinsic values, but have some reservations about his subsequent re-examination of what ethics is, and ought to be, in the light of his rejection of value-objectivity. I think that the most interesting aspect of his critique is the reference to the possibility of explaining value-objectification. By and large, the rest of the five points above bear out what we have to say elsewhere, and require no further elaboration here.

His outline of several ways of explaining why it is that people should have come to believe in the reality of intrinsic goods begins on page 42 of his book. He says that there are basically five ways in which such a belief could arise, and persist.

(i) A hypothetical imperative may become categorical by expedience, such that the condition, or purpose of the imperative acquires a secondary status.

(ii) A process may occur akin to that occurring in the Pathetic Fallacy, whereby our positive or negative attitudes become the basis for attributing properties to an object which are held to underly,or to justify, the acceptability or otherwise of the feelings which that object arouses.

(ii) More narrowly, objective desirability, or a tendency to be desired, is confused with objective goodness.

(iv) A recession in the credibility of some socially accepted moral authority (e.g. God, the state, established religions) leaves a vestigial objectivity attached to the imperatives once issued by these authorities, an illusory objectivity which is no longer underwritten by the accepted validity of these authorities.

(v) A confusion between descriptive and normative ethics, whereby elements of both are combined to produce an apparent set of objective items which are taken to be both real, and justifi ably, or normatively, good.

Mackie thus provides a largely psychological explanation, and account of intrinsic value, which permits the distinction between those items judged to be intrinsically good, and the actual process of valuation resulting in such judgements. He sees the latter, the valuing, as being the more significant, resulting in, or producing, a value which is not independent of the process which has brought it about.

(c) Blackburn's criticism of moral realism.

Blackburn has provided another strong, implicit attck upon the idea of intrinsic value (see Casey,ed.,1971, p 101ff).

He argues against moral realism, i.e. the view that moral goodness can be a real property attached to those things which are judged to be morally good. His argument can, I think, be applied to the general view that intrinsic value is a real and objective property, and against the view that there are things which are good in themselves, which have this property constantly. His argument, it seems to me, holds good whether we are considering moral value specifically as an example of intrinsic goodness, or whether we consider intrinsic goodness generally.

He takes moral realism to be the thesis that a moral proposition (judgement, imperative, etc.,) has objective truth conditions, that its truth or falsity is judged by considering whether or not a specifiable

state of affairs, to which it refers, actually obtains. Such a state of affairs, for example, might be that X is morally very good.

His argument relies upon two generally accepted theses about value:firstly, the supervenience of goodness upon certain other natural properties of that which possesses the goodness, and secondly, the no entailment thesis, that from propositions concerning matters of fact there can be no valid inference to propositions concerning value.

If moral realism is true, then it leads to some strange and unacceptable conclusions when it is taken in conjunction with these two fairly unproblematic theses.

One such unacceptable conclusion can be deduced as follows: where X is morally good, then this goodness is supervenient upon its other naturalistic properties. But, by the no-entailment thesis, this goodness does not logically follow from a description of its other properties. In that case, X's being morally good must be accepted as being contingent. If that is so, then X could very well continue to be as it is in all naturalistic respects, and yet lose the property of moral goodness. This seems to be intuitively unacceptable, and a violation of the supervenience thesis, yet it is a consequence of moral realism, a fact which the moral realist must accept.

Again, X and Y may share all of their properties in common, apart from X being morally very good, and Y not having this property. This is a perfectly feasible situation for moral realism, given the truth of the no-entailment thesis, but it is, again, a decidedly peculiar possibility.

These consequences of moral realism show, for Blacburn, that while it is not actually an inconsistent position, it is fairly implausible and unacceptable. His argument can be construed as attacking the same notion of intrinsic, objective value as considered by Mackie.

Does Blackburn's argument not hold against our position, which could be interpreted as setting up a kind of value realism? This is not the

case, I believe,since we are defining good, intrinsic good, as relational, particularly to desire: therfore, X and Y may indeed be identical in their physical properties, yet differ in value due to one being the object of desire, the other not: likewise, desire can attach or detach itself to physical objects independently of their other properties: thus, both improbable situations which Blackburn found so difficult to integrate with our intuitions are quite consistent with our viewpoint.

(d) Dewey and the empirical approach.

John Dewey (1939) argues that the very idea of an end in itself is contradictory: that an end actually only is so, because it falls at the end of a sequence of means. Furthermore, an end is only provisionally such, as each end has further consequences as well as preconditions which are relevant to the process of valuation, and frequently determine what are our ends.

Thus, for him there are no ultimate, intrinsic values inhering in such 'ends in themselves'. Instead, there are ends in view, which are means, 'envisaged ends', which are the basis of ongoing planning of action which occurs and amends itself in the light of experience. Dewey is arguing, against Aristotle (or against an interpretation of Aristotle) , that we do deliberate about ends, we choose our ends in the light of consideration of the conditions and consequences of the means thereto. He explicitly argues for a relational, desire-related theory of value, and states that this can be compatible with value being intrinsic.

We have looked at three philosophers who support our position that intrinsic value is a coherent notion only if it is accepted as being the product of valuation, of something being desired in or for itself, or for its own sake. Thus, our approach to intrinsic value means it is relative, relative to valuing individuals. We shall use this terminology to distinguish the notion from that of absolute intrinsicality, the notion that there are values which transcend ordinary instrumental valuation, or indeed which transcend empirical properties and relations involving value-objects.

7.4 The relation between intrinsic and instrumental value.

I shall take it that the 'transcendality' view of intrinsic value, which holds that it is objective and absolute, is sufficiently untenable to warrant no further discussion by us. Our objective now is to give an account of relative intrinsic value which will allow us to explain why moral value is felt to have an intrinsic status.

We therefore argue that intrinsic and instrumental value are species of the same genus, being differentiated by the attitudes of the valuer towards what is being valued: particularly, whether the object is desired either for itself, or for its more remote consequences, which may themselves be desired. In the former instance, the object is said to have intrinsic value, while in the latter the object is said to have instrumental value, while some of its consequences are valued intrinsically.

Dewey's argument, as I understand it, is that these two kinds of valuing are not different: we desire things for their own sake only after we have considered all of their costs, preconditions and consequences.

While granting this, we argue that it is appropriate to speak of the complementary qualities, present in each value object in varying degrees, of 'intrinsicality' and 'instrumentality'. Whichever of these predominate depends upon whether desire attaches to the more immediate consequences or effects of the object, producing intrinsicality of its value, or to its more remote consequences, producing instrumentality.

Also, given our position that intrinsicality is relative to valuers, then these properties are not static: any given object of judgement may come to be judged in different ways by different people at different times. This result was found by Blackburn to be puzzling, but is explicable on our account.

This lack of stasis in value results in some interesting features of value which we shall consider below. It is possible for something to acquire instrumental value through a process of either regression or progression of desire along a chain of means-ends objects which are related either consequentially or causally.

Let us provide some working definitions, then: progressive intrinsicality occurs where desire progresses to the more remote consequences of the object X. Object X then comes to be valued more instrumentally, and the end which it serves becomes valued more intrinsically. Hume draws attention to this process (p 451, L.A. Selby-Bigge,ed., 1978).

Regressive intrinsicality occurs where desire regresses along a chain of means-ends objects: in this case, where object X occurs before the regression, its value becomes more intrinsic.

These processes can be seen at work in situations where habituation, or emotional or attitudinal change is at work: one may desire a car for transport, the proverbial A to B vehicle, yet one may come to value the car for its own sake: desire has here regressed from the goal to the means, producing intrinsic value. Similarly, one may desire to live in a large house for its own sake, yet the usefulness of so doing may come to be more important if one starts a family, or begins to entertain a larger circle of friends than previously. In this instance, valuation has progressed, and what was once intrinsically valuable is now regarded as of instrumental value.

There are four other forms of instrumental value which are similarly related to intrinsic value, which we shall now look at: let us call these 'minimal', 'covert', 'arbitratory' and 'non-specific' instrumentality.

By minimal instrumentality, I mean that X is desired for its consequences, but these are so closely related to X that X appears to be desired for itself. For example, a person may look upon the climbing of a mountain as intrinsically good, something to be sought after for its own

sake. Yet there are consequences so closely associated with this which are also sufficiently valued as to justify us saying that the attainment has instrumental value also.

For example, there is the exercise of strength and skill, the feeling of elation upon completion, the success of months of preparatory work and planning. All of these things are ends which a mountaineer may have, associated with the goal of a successful climb: thus, the climb serves as a minimal means to these things, minimal in the sense of virtually constituting them, and as opposed to an object being instrumental to something which is very remote: e.g. saving for a rainy day.

By covert instrumentality I mean that the object which may be intrinsically valued actually performs a useful function, is instrumentally valuable, and that this function can be seen as the reason, or cause for the object being valued, apparently for its own sake.

For example, everyone likes food, some people develop highly cultivated preferences for particular foods, regarding certain dishes as masterpieces of preparation and presentation - these dishes come to be desired for their own sakes.

It is clear that here the instrumental value of food (i.e. maintenance of life and health) is the reason (in the sense of cause) for such a highly developed taste as that of the gourmet: intrinsic and instrumental value here are interdependent, although at first glance there appears only to be intrinsic value.

By arbitratory instrumentality I mean that several things valued for themselves may interact, or their attainment or realisation may so affect each other, such that they may either detract from, or contribute to each other in an instrumental way. Therefore, even though separately they have intrinsic value, when considered conjointly, their instrumental value (or disvalue) is more important.

Thus, eating sweet foods and having a thin figure may both be attractive, valued for their own sakes, yet seldom can both situations be realised. Rather, assuming the former as a goal leads to the improbability of attaining the latter: one goal is instrumentally disvaluable as means to the other.

Therefore the instrumental value of any given end or goal must be taken into account when deciding whether to choose that goal, i.e. whether to hold its object as being of intrinsic value. Therefore, it would seem true to say that there are instrumental and intrinsic components in each act of valuation.

Lastly, there is non-specific instrumentality, where objects of instrumental value serve purposes and needs in diverse and intermittent ways. This may result in judgements which pronounce the object to be intrinsically good, since the ends which it does, and will serve, are necessarily absent from the reasoning of the valuer when he makes his judgement.He senses the object to be good, but is unable to advance the ends as reasons for calling it instrumentally good. Therefore, the value is said to be non-instrumental (ie having no end external to itself) and hence intrinsic.

An example here would be money: obviously, money serves a useful social function, and is pursued more or less directly for its usefulness: but, for example, a person who wins the pools does not explain his elation in terms of present or future goals which his win will enable: his attitude to the money is one which is positive and direct, not mediated by consideration of ends to which the money is related as means. Thus the money is for him intrinsically good although, to look at the situation dispassionately, its intrinsic goodness depends upon its instrumental goodness.

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To conclude then, we have seen various ways in which intrinsic and instrumental value are intimately related to each other: thus, the initial

objection which we considered (that moral value was intrinsic, not instrumental as our account of it in terms of needs would suggest) seems to lose its force. It would seem to derive from a confusion derived, as (Dewey 1939 p35) puts it, '...in part from introspectionist psychology, and in part from metaphysics'.

There is ample scope for potential confusion, highlighted in various ways by the three authors which we have looked at, in the notion of intrinsic as signifying absolute, and transcendental. To circumvent this, we have made the notion of intrinsic value a relative one, that is, relative to valuers and to acts of valuation.

This means that we conceive of an instance of purely intrinsic value as a limiting case of instrumental value, and both aspects will be present in a complementary way, and in varying degrees, in each instance of valuing: this was illustrated in the latter parts of this section.

7.5 The intrinsic nature of the goodness of moral action.

In what way then is moral goodness intrinsic yet also, as we have shown, characterised by its proceeding from the satisfction of heteronomous need?

In this section we shall attempt to explicate this for the goodness of moral actions, while in the following sections we shall look at other bearers of moral goodness.

Suppose it is said that P ought to do A, and A is some moral action, let us say telling the truth. A may be prescribed because of the context, but it will be felt also that P does not have a choice in the matter: A is not prescribed because of its effects, for the sake of what it can bring about: rather,it is intrinsically good. Why is it judged to be so, when we have said that moral goodness consists of the satisfaction of heteronomous need?

Our explanation of this is that this is an instance of regressive intrinsicality: truth-telling satisfies the needs of another, but the desire in this need regresses to attach itself to the means, to truth-telling which becomes desired for its own sake. This regression is due to the fact that the ends which the action serves are external to the agent, and are not present to the consciousness of the agent.

Thus, it is not known which ends will be served by P telling the truth, although it is known that truth does serve some ends, and is therefore instrumentally good. Therefore, rather than justify the prescription of telling the truth in terms of its probable, or general usefulness, the prescription is bereft of reasons in terms of consequences, and so the prescribed act is believed to be non-consequentially good, desired for its own sake, intrinsically good.

This intrinsicality is not incompatible with the prescribed action being conceived of as instrumentally good.

7.6 The intrinsic moral worth of people.

There are three ways, it seems to me, in which moral goodness or value can attach to people.

Firstly, there is the moral worth of a person, solely because he/she is a person: secondly, there is the goodness attributed to a person because of the acts which that person performs: and thirdly there is the notion of a good person as such, a sort of ideal type which we admire when instantiated, and to which we aspire. We shall consider these in turn, to show how the apparently intrinsic nature of the value is compatible with our instrumental account of moral value.

Moral worth is something which people (or, more correctly, moral beings) are felt to have, come what may. Thus,they deserve respect and dignity even in situations where wrong is done by them: one cannot torture the torturers, nor oppress the oppressors, at least not with general moral approval. Why should it be generally felt that this is the

case, that moral beings are universally agreed to have moral worth, and to have an intrinsic desert to respect?

This moral worth is intrinsic, and we have said that intrinsic value is a limiting case of instrumental value, that it is defined by our direct attitudes to the object, rather than to the things which it can bring about as in instrumental value. Therefore, intrinsic moral worth must consist in our attitudes towards moral beings: the attitude of respect must constitute the moral worth.

This would be acceptable if it were not for the fact that the existence of attitudes seems to be a contingent affair: what I like or respect today may well be different tomorrow,yet the moral worth of people seems a permanent, invariant feature. To account for this, we must look for reasons for this intrinsic valuation of, and attitudes towards, people. As we have seen in section 7.2, it can generally be shown that intrinsic valuation has its reasons which may be examined for adequacy or explanation.

The reasons for such intrinsic valuation rest, I believe, upon a mutuality of need: moral beings, people in particular, have needs, and acting upon one's needs consists of being able to form models of the world, containing desired states, and the actions which will realise them. If there is more than one needing being, then necessarily there is a capacity to recognise other needs, since useful models of the world, necessary to formulate goals, include the actions of others according to their models.

That is to say, needing beings necessarily have the capacity to recognise other needs. How then do we get from this to an attitude of mutual repect, which we have said constitutes the moral worth which is felt to obtain of moral beings?

Obviously, to recognise other's needs remains quite neutral as between whether we actually satisfy, frustrate or ignore them. We can look at the results of each of these options: to ignore another's needs would

not be prudent, in that one would be acting upon an inaccurate picture of the world, and the individual's projects would be lesslikely to succeed: e.g. one may have needs whose satisfaction is incompatible with the needs of others, and it would be highly useful to know this. To frustrate the needs of others, if carried out generally, would be to reduce the likelihood of any project succeeding.

Therefore, we are left with the option that in a world of needing beings, each is more likely to succeed in his projects where all have a tendency not to ignore, nor to frustrate, other's needs, but where possible to satisfy them.

Thus, a world of needing beings is more likely to be the latter kind of world, where recognition is given to the needs of others, and they are satisfied as far as possible: this is a simple account of an 'ethics of needers'. How then does respect arise for people, as opposed to respect being shown for their needs?

This can be accounted for by saying that attitudes progress from needs to their source, from what people need to the people themselves. We have seen (section 7.4) that this is one way in which some object can come to have intrinsic value. The resulting attitude of respect, ensuing in worth being attributed to people, is moral (having its basis in heteronomous need) and is intrinsic since the ends involved in the needs of others have been left out of account, left behind in the attitudinal progression from needs to needers.

An explanation can be provided in this way for moral worth, and its intrinsicality, showing that its basis lies in heteronomous need.

The second kind of intrinsic moral goodness of people which we mentioned was their goodness as agents. We have already shown how it is that people can be morally good in acting so as to satisfy the needs of others: it remains for us here to explain how this goodness can be intrinsic.

We can explain this quite easily from our viewpoint: it is an example of what we called in the last section 'regressive instrumentality', where something which figures as a means and is so valued comes to be desired and valued intrinsically, for its own sake. Thus, people come to value not simply actions, but the conditions of such actions: in the case of moral actions, these conditions consist of a reasoning, compassionate being who is aware of, and will not frustrate, the needs of others.

The existence of such a being serves other needs only occasionally: it is nevertheless held to beintrinsically good because of the absence of particular ends on this or that occasion of evaluation.

Lastly, there is the notion of the good man which is not related to the two previous ways we looked at in which it can be said that people are morally good. I cannot account for this being a moral form of goodness. It seems more akin to some sort of aesthetic goodness, in that contemplation of the ideal man evokes admiration and respect and thus seems intrinsically good. It may be that the respect resembles the respect which underlies ascribing moral worth to people in the way we saw above: in that case, it is easy to see how this form of goodness could resemble, and be taken for, moral goodness. However, as we have said, this goodness cannot be accounted for in terms of heteronomous needs.

7.7 The intrinsic value of virtue, ideals principles and rules.

Virtues, ideals principles and rules are at a higher level of abstraction than the objects considered in the last two sections, i.e. moral beings and moral actions.

In this section we shall look at how the intrinsic nature of the value of these things can be shown to depend upon their relation to moral actions, whereby intrinsic evaluation has regressed from the object of evaluation to its conditions. We shall look briefly at the stated items to show how this is the case.

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By 'virtue' I understand the predisposition to perform actions which are agreed to be morally good. Thus, honesty is a predisposition to abide by the truth, and is held to be a moral good. Our explanation of it as moral lies in its satisfying the needs of others for accurate information, enabling correct and appropriate actions.

It is held to be good in itself, since such instrumental goods are made possible by it, and the desire which we have for these things (an accurate view of the world, appropriate action) becomes transferred to the conditions of these things, firstly to the honest action, usually a verbal statement. Secondarily, a person who is usually honest then tends to develop (i.e. comes to be regarded as having) an intrinsic moral goodness on account of this, and the quality of honesty also attains an intrinsic goodness. In short, desire regresses from the goodness enabled by honesty to the honesty itself.

The evaluation of honesty as such, rather than any of its instances, will be done in the absence of any particular end or goal enabled by it, yet done in the knowledge that honesty is desiredand needed: therefore, as we saw before for moral actions, the object (here, honesty) is said to be good without reference to ends, i.e. good in itself.

Similar arguments hold for other virtues, with the proviso that there may be some virtues which we would wish to deny were moral except in contingent situations, e.g. courage as exemplified in some act of prowess not at all related to others (see section 3.5). This is not generally seen as being primarily a moral trait.

The other items, stated at the outset, can be described as values, e.g. patriotism, love, 'do not steal' etc.. Some of these, while being regarded as intrinsically good, also plainly possess instrumental goodness. For example, love permits harmonious relationships between people, the rule or principle of not stealing provides security of possession, and minimises the need for defence and vigilance.

However, it could be claimed that the intrinsic value of these items tends to over-ride any instrumental considerations attaching to them. For example, patriotism is conceived of by some as a duty towards the interests of a country which should supercede all else: under no conditions, it is felt, should we refuse to serve our country. Similarly, we should respect and observe the property of others above all other considerations.

It is felt, then, that utility or expedience does not count against the mandatory observance of these values: instead, these things are felt to determine our needs, and are therefore logically _prior_ to our needs if we are considering the content of morality.

However, I feel that this is not a counterexample to our theory: in real situations, our reasons for actions are seldom as clear-cut, nor as plainly guided by intrinsic considerations, as the above would suggest. The most compelling illustration of this can be seen when we look at instances of possible conflict between various of these intrinsic values. Each of these intrinsic goods cannot be unconditional, since not all of them can over-ride, or be over-ridden, by the others: (see Finnis, 1983 p91) therefore choice between them must occur. The natural basis of such choice is the instrumental value involved, in choosing. That is to say, we look at the instrumental value of the outcomes of various choices.

This is what we have referred to as 'arbitratory instrumentality', and is the stuff from which moral dilemmas are made.

For example, the duty of a son to his parents may conflict with the duty to serve one's country (Sartre, 1948, p37).

Similarly, Kant drew attention to the dilemma of whether we should reply truthfully to a potential murderer making enquiries as to the location of his intended victim: the values of truth, and the defence of life, would here seem to be in conflict.

Likewise, (Phillips and Mounce 1969 p 317-319) draw attention to the conflict between the rationalist and the housewife: the duty to provide adequately for one's family would seem to militate against the God-given duty to procreate, and conversely.

All of these situations show that intrinsic values are not alone adequate to guide choice of action, and this is compatible with what we have said earlier about there being both instrumental and intrinsic components in each valuation. Rather than values determining our needs, in some situations needs will determine which value obtains.

(This is not to say that considering needs will provide us with final and definitive answers in such cases: we wish merely to affirm the presence of needs as influencing our judgements here as part of our overall objective, to show that needs form the content of morality).

Needs and values are thus co-existent, and when we reflect, as we said at the outset, that values can be shown to be related to (although conceived as independent of) instrumental goodness, then it seems that needs may be more fundamental. This is so, since they seem to serve both to arbitrate between values, and to underly them as their basis. The intrinsic goodness of these items can still of course be preserved, in the ways which we have illustrated previously for other intrinsic moral goods.

7.8 Summary and overview.

In this chapter, we have taken 'intrinsic value' to be value constituted by an object being desired for itself, for its own sake, rather than being valued for the sake of some of its desired consequences. Thus, intrinsic value is a limiting case of instrumental value, and is quite compatible with it. This approach obviates some of the metaphysical and logical difficulties associated with viewing intrinsic value as an absolute, and transcendental property.

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We looked at other philosophies which seem to confirm our view of intrinsic value, including the work of Mackie, Blackburn, and Dewey. We then explored further the relation between the two forms of value, and looked at possible interpretations of the intrinsic nature of the value of moral actions, moral beings, and moral values.

Chapter VIII Truth and Goodness.

8.1 Introduction.

In this chapter, I wish to further defend and expand what we have said so far regarding needs and goodness. The theory put forward belongs firmly in the moral realist movement (see section 1.2), hence it is important that we give some account of the objectivity of value-judgements, and the question of truth in regard to value judgements.

For the value-realist, it is possible to make a statement of value, and then to have its truth-conditions investigated independently. One can be right or wrong when one says that something is good or bad, the statement of this will usually be either true or false.

On the other hand, for the anti-realist a statement of value does not express or indicate any real facts about the world. In particular, the statement cannot be independently investigated for its truth or falsity: the fact-value distinction is immutable. A value-judgement expresses, variously, one's feelings or sentiments (Hume); an implicit command or prescription (Hare); or a process of intuition of a non-natural property (Moore; although Moore would perhaps disagree with the non-realist label, it is arguably applicable in that he provided no empirical criteria of meaning to elucidate goodness as a non-natural property).

I hold the position that statements of value, and of moral value, are indeed factual. They can be either true or false, and can be the object of valid debate and investigation. In order to demonstrate this, we shall, in the following sections, look at (i) the structure of truth and of value, and their similarities: (ii) the relation between truth and goodness which we can deduce from this, and (iii) conclusions about the empirical validity of value-judgements and implications for the fact-value distinction.

8.2 Truth and Goodness.

We have already (in chapter 7) outlined the relationship between intrinsic and instrumental goodness. It will thus be simpler if we discuss here primarily the relationship between truth and instrumental goodness.

Firstly, in a standard instance of instrumental goodness, say where X brings about Y, there are four more or less essential or characteristic elements: 1 X and Y, which may be objects, states of affairs, or processes, but which are at any rate in the realm of fact. 2 There is the statement that X is good. 3 There is Y, the effect of X towards which there is a positive sort of mental, or psychological item, e.g. a desire, preference or intention. 4 There is also the bringing about of Y by X, and this will also usually be a process which occurs in the realm of fact.

Thus, there are three kinds of components where X is said to be good: linguistic, factual, and psychological.

In the least problematic cases, the degree of goodness of an object ('how good') depends upon the effects of the object, and the degree of difference between these effects and the state of affairs which is an object of the mental item mentioned previously. In simple terms, if X brings about its desired effects, it is good, and it is best, where all and only all of its desired or anticipated effects ensue. For example, a car which transports me quietly, comfortably, speedily and safely to my destination is a good car (and these are generally accepted criteria for the goodness of cars): it is also better than a car which lacks, or is deficient in, any of these criteria.

In an instance of truth, also, there are I believe three aspects of the same kind: linguistic, factual and psychological. The topic of truth is of course a large issue in philosophy, and I have not got the space here to do any other that state my particular view.

I believe that truth consists of a correspondence between our beliefs and the world, as mediated by language. Language arbitrates in a dual fashion: firstly, a language is formed into sentences according to the rules of syntax, in order to express a given belief (or anticipation, or expectation) about a state of the world. Secondly, there are rules of semantics which govern the way in which language is symbolically used to communicate beliefs about the world, such that words and constructions of words are held to symbolise states of affairs.

To look at an example: suppose that A sees that the cat is on the mat. A then believes this , perhaps as an essential part of seeing it. A says to B: 'The cat is on the mat', where B is in the next room, and is unable to see for himself. B then forms a belief which is substantially similar to that of A, i.e. he would expect, if he were to enter the room, to see the cat on the mat. B actually does enter the room, and sees the cat. He realises that A has spoken the truth, that the cat is on the mat, and that his beliefs, induced by A's statement, were correct and appropriate.

Belief, language and reality are thus all intimately interrelated in the existence of truth. At times, language seems to mediate between belief and reality, at other times belief mediates between language and reality. These different roles arise due to contextual differences: where language is used to communicate belief, then the belief is prior: where the language is used to bring about a belief in others, then the language is prior.

At all events, this mediation I believe rather ameliorates the usual opacity attendant upon correspondence theories of truth. How reality induces belief in its observers is not an outstanding problem in perception: how beliefs are expressed in statements is a fairly straightforward matter in the study of language: and the resulting double correspondence, equivalent to a correspondence between language and reality, is therefore easily understood.

8.3 The relationship between truth and goodness.

There are therefore great similarities between the two concepts, leading us to suspect that there is an affinity which does not bode well for the rigidity of the fact-value distinction. However, there are differences also, so we shall look at these firstly.

(a) Although both truth and value involve psychological and factual items in close relationship, it seems to be the case that the relation is opposed in direction in each case: that is, facts and states of affairs determine or decide which belief will be true, whereas whether an object is good will be determined, at least in part, by our desires and whether that object actually is a means to their realisation. Psychological items predominate in determining what is good, whereas it is factual matters which decide what is true.

(b) The category of those things which can be good seems to be much wider than that of those things which can be true. Truth usually applies to such things as beliefs, expectations, statements and propositions, while 'good' can be imagined to apply to virtually any category of object (although, of course, not applied without restriction, and careful stipulation of its conditions).

(c) We are active with regard to goodness, but passive with regard to truth. By this I mean that a change in my ends or objectives which I freely undertake will entail a change in those things which I see as good. However, a change in those things which I see as true is not so easily or often brought about by any change which I can bring about in myself.

Points of similarity between truth and goodness are as follows.

(a) Both involve, essentially, a close relationship between psychological items and the real world.

(b) Both have been held by philosophers to be indefinable: truth, by Frege and J.L. Austin: (see Pitcher, 1964), and goodness by G.E. Moore and many others.

(c)The distinction between truths which are a priori, and those which are empirically true (or false) is mirrored by the apparent distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value . Something has instrumental value where its value is contingent upon other things (typically, ends or objectives) while intrinsic value is held not to be so contingent. Similarly for truth: some statements may be only contingently true e.g. 'it is raining' while others seem true as a matter of definition., e.g. '2+2=4'.

(Of course, we have said that intrinsic value is actually contingent in various ways: to illustrate the parallelism indicated in (c) above, we would have to show that the a priori/empirical distinction is equally artificial: I believe this can be done, but space does not allow us to give it an adequate treatment here: we shall have to settle for an apparent parallelism, which could be further opened up and confirmed).

Overall, when we consider the similarities and differences, it would appear that truth and goodness are complementary ways of our dealing with the world. We shall elaborate in the next section on how it appears mistaken to deny that a statement of value, even of moral value, can have an associated truth value. And statements of truth can acquire some of the properties which are thought to characterise value-statements: e.g. we could say that a statement of truth is prescriptive upon belief, just as a statement of value can be as indicative or as demonstrative as any other.

8.4 The truth of value-judgements.

On our earlier analysis, a proposition about an instance of goodness has the following essential features:

Pv: X brings about a state of the world which approximates to a certain desired state of the world.

This does not mean that the statement that 'X is good' can be translated into Pv, because these two statements are not completely replaceable by each other in all contexts: the 'bringing about', or the 'desired state' may not be at the forefront of the speaker's mind when he asserts that 'X is good'; as a result Pv would not be, for him, an acceptable substitute.

Rather, the three aspects to which we drew attention earlier can be extracted from situations where valuation occurs, and combined concisely as in Pv. The three components are: linguistic (the statement itself); physical ('bringing about', and 'state of the world') and psychological (desire, intention, preference etc.). The three components may overlap: the state of the world, for example, may be a psychological item, a state of mind, such as being more strong-willed.

Pv is a wholly factual statement: the mentioned desires can be looked for in the situation, and the effects of X can be directly observed or inferred. Thus we can discover whether the statement 'X is good' is true or not. Of course, the goodness of X may be rather limited by some of its further consequences which may be such as to be negative objects of desire. Such limitations are normally taken into account before we make value-judgements such as the one above, so that the 'desired state of the world' is stated to be so after taking into account all of X's foreseeable, or foreseen, consequences or effects.

Nevertheless, the statement may still be false, and this would hold where it could be pointed out that X has some effect unforeseen by the speaker who asserts the goodness of X, and this effect is something whose absence is desired. In that case, an alternative statement could be issued, denying that X is good, and this opposing statement would in turn be open to investigation, could be true or false. In this way, judgements of value can be seen to have just as much factual content, and have empirical procedures for their confirmation or denial, as any other kind of judgement.

We have already examined intrinsic, and moral value, and have concluded that these forms of value are fundamentally instrumental. Therefore, it should follow that moral judgements are also statements which can be investigated for their truth or falsity,i.e. are factual in nature.

Let us look at three further value-judgements, in order to illustrate their factual nature, as follows: (a) Peace is an intrinsic good.(b) Theft is wrong (c) You ought not to be cruel to animals.

Let us firstly state that we wish only to show the possible grounds which could be advanced for either denying or confirming the judgement in question: we are not interested here in arguing for or against the judgement, as this would more properly be seen as a moral argument. We are not doing morality here , but moral philosophy.

(a) Peace is an intrinsic good. This may be interpreted as meaning that everyone desires peace, hence it is inconceivable that it could not be regarded as a good: its goodness therefore is not learned from experience of its effects, as with instrumental goodness, therefore it is intrinsic. This is consistent with what we have said previously, and seems to account for the apparent non-consequentialist nature of its value.

Being desired by most people, and serving as such a general precondition of members of society meeting their various objectives: these

signify that the goodness of peace will be virtually universally recognised.In this, it is unlike other objects of instrumental value, where the circumstances under which they are good may be much more closely restricted.

Here, then, 'intrinsic' is interpreted as being an extreme, limiting case of 'instrumental', in that the intrinsic goodness of peace is underwritten by, and dependent upon, the virtual universality of its instrumental value. I say 'virtual' since there are, of course, and on occasion, people for whom peace is anathema (terrorists, misguided soldiers, agitators, for example). Also, sometimes peace is destroyed with what would appear to be good cause. For example, peace sustained at the price of tyranny, despotism and torture is, arguably, an instrumental evil in that it facilitates and maintains an undesirable state of affairs.

Thus, we can accept the statement that peace is an intrinsic good, as a value judgement, and consider it as we would any other statement of fact, with the possibility of its being true or false, depending upon conditions which can be investigated in an entirely empirical way, needing neither introspection, emotional surrender, nor the exercise of some esoteric faculty of intuition.

(b) Theft is wrong. Again, this expresses the widely held value of respect for the property of others. What makes it true, if it is so?

The statement is moral in its tone: 'wrong' usually indicates a moral utterance, and we have said that moral goodness obtains where an agent or some of his attributes are such as to satisfy the needs of others. Similarly, a wrong obtains where such needs are violated, or frustrated. To show that theft is wrong, we are required to show that in particular instances there are desired objectives which are rendered unattainable by the action of theft.

This is easy to establish: society is structured, for good or ill, around the institution of private property. Therefore in leading our daily lives we rely upon, have need of, exclusive access to and control of

certain items: cars, houses, typewriters. Knowledge that such reliance and need will be institutionally recognised informs our planning and setting of objectives, such that theft is likely to restrict to a greater or lesser degree either the formation and diversity of objectives, if we are aware of the theft, or their attainment if we are unaware. Theft entails that we lack the preconditions for meeting our desired aims and objectives, therefore a thief is knowingly frustrating the needs of others. Therefore, according to our previous analysis, what he is doing is morally wrong.

Again, we see that we can discuss and investigate claims about moral wrong simply by investigating the facts of the case.

(c) You ought not to be cruel to animals. This judgement differs from the two previous examples in two significant ways: it uses the word 'ought', and it mentions animals, whose moral status is a matter of some doubt and dispute (see, e.g. S.R.L. Clark, 1977). Let us assume that this dispute is simply a matter of factual disagreement, in the sense of being a difference about how to interpret the facts: this would turn, on our account, on whether animals are conscious, can plan and set objectives, and thus have needs.

If this dispute were resolved, and animals accepted as moral beings, the the issue becomes one about whether cruelty frustrates need, i.e. is instrumentally bad, and how we are to explicate the 'ought-statement'.

It is plain that in some cases, but not all, need is immediately frustrated by an act of cruelty: it will in most cases impede the creature in the attainment of his objectives and plans. In other cases, the explanation is more difficult: our theory must rely, I think, upon saying that pain is a negative goal for all beings, something whose absence is desired by all. Thus, not just the results or consequences of the infliction of pain make it (instrumentally) bad, but it is itself condemned as bad immediately, as being bad in itself, intrinsically bad.

Since we have treated intrinsic value as a species of instrumental, this appearing to be the only coherent treatment to be given of it , then acts of cruelty are instrumentally disvaluable in a limited, minimal way. They directly, rather than indirectly, constitute a negative interference (with no further 'good' cause) in the goals and objectives of moral beings, and this is the basis of saying that they are morally wrong.

What then are the facts which are being referred to when we say that we ought not to be cruel to animals? 'Ought', as we have seen in Chapter V, is a term applied specifically to means, particularly where an action is required as a means to, or is needed for, some end. In moral contexts, we have seen (section 3.3) that the end or objective is held primarily by a being different from he to whom the ought applies, i.e. from he whose action is a means to that end. In the case of cruelty, we have shown that the act involves the infliction of pain, which directly constitutes a negative end for all beings. Thus, the act is a negative need of a being other than the agent, and this underlies the negative moral 'ought' which is applied to it.

How could such an 'ought' be false? It is easy to imagine such a circumstance. Suppose the injunction runs: 'You ought not deliberately inflict pain upon animals': one may well find oneself in circumstances where the deliberate infliction of pain is the only means of saving an animal further and greater suffering. For example, to save a cat which is trapped under debris in a burning building, it may be necessary for the rescuer to be less than scrupulous about pain caused, in order to prevent both being trapped by the fire. In such a case the infliction of pain is unavoidable, necessary, and part of what is seen as duty.

In such a case too, of course, what is done is not described as being cruel, so perhaps after all the injunction against cruelty cannot be false, or would require a more complex illustration of how it can be so. However, if this is not possible, then I think it only shows that, by definition of 'cruelty', injunctions against it cannot be false. But this does not show that such imperatives are not empirical: it is easy to show that the very same act, infliction of pain, can be deemed either cruel or

kind, on the basis of the circumstances and foreseen consequences of its occurrence. Therefore whether that act is morally good or bad is still strictly a factual matter.

8.5 Summary and Overview.

We have seen that the concepts of truth and of goodness have a high degree of affinity: they both incorporate essential reference to psychological items on the one hand, and to physical or factual items related to these psychological items on the other hand.

This affinity entails,I believe, that the two concepts 'shade off' into each other, since, as we have seen, truth may be stated as an imperative, something characterising those things which it would be useful and good to believe. Also, judgements of value are indicative of fact, as we have demonstrated with various examples.

What we have dicussed here has far-reaching consequences for the fact-value distinction: in essence what we have said shows, I believe, that this distinction is untenable, and that non-naturalist arguments, using the fact-value distinction against our main position, are invalid.

Our arguments here are also relevant to many of Hume's philosphical points about morality. For example, (see Ayer, 1980, pp80-82) we can now show that murder has, *contra* Hume, certain objective relational properties which it shares with other instances of moral wrongs, which are independent of the judger and his sentiments, and which are sufficiently distinct and common to other situations for us to say that it is these features which constitute, or underly, the wrongness which we judge to hold of the act. These features are, of course, in the case of murder, the gross frustration of the needs of another involved in the deliberate and wanton termination of life.

Hume therefore did not have the whole, or an important part, of the truth, when he sought the basis of moral judgement in the sentiments of

blame or of approbation in those who judge. Moral goodness is therefore more than the secondary quality which Hume averred it to be.

Similarly, Ayer (ibid, p 86) is deceived also when he states that truth-values can only be assigned to those judgements which carry the presupposition of some code, so that whether the judgement accords with the rules of measurement which the code furnishes is what will determine the truth or otherwise of the judgement.

Chapter IX Conclusions.

9.1 Overview.

In this chapter we shall try to draw together the main strands of our arguments, and see what conclusions can be drawn from them. I am conscious that we have touched upon many topics and subtopics of which our treatment was necessarily cursory: they were relevant to our main objective, and this was my reason for their introduction, yet their significance and ramifications have been, in some cases, only barely illustrated, let alone investigated. I hope, however, that for the purposes of the main arguments of this work, that the relevance of all of these topics is clear.

Our main purpose was to investigate the possibility that needs formed the content of morality, where we mean by this that it is needs which figure essentially in what is called __moral__ discourse, which characterise statements as being moral, which they are, ultimately and perhaps indirectly, about.

We saw this as being a central problem of present-day moral philosophy, one which required solution before progress could be made in other problems. We traced the development of this problem from the time when logical positivism criticised earlier metaphysical attempts to systematise and characterise morality.

This criticism was based on the introduction of a new criterion of meaning, which, although __its__ meaning and coherence seems arguable, nevertheless introduced what have proved to be lasting and salutary empirical tests for the meaning and significance of any theory. Talk about right and wrong, good and bad, have since that time, had to be 'cashed out' in terms of experience. This restriction seemed to set an obstacle which moral philosophers have not yet managed to overcome.

We classified this work as 'moral realism', in that it holds that there are real items (needs) which form the content of morality. This is as opposed to, e.g., a philosophy which states that it is our approval or attitudes which characterise the moral, or that it is the logical form of moral statements which are unique, and characterise them as moral, rather than their moral nature being derived from anything real outside or beyond them, to which they refer.

Our general approach has been empirical, rather than analytic: we have looked at situations, and tried to draw out their essential features, those which seem to vary in accordance with the moral goodness attached to those situations. This contrasts with an analytic approach, where meanings and logical features of language are analysed: our method has been modelled more upon the methods of physical science than upon the abstract, logical processes perhaps more usually associated with philosophy.

Here we should perhaps add a cautionary note. We have been concerned to identify the fundamental content of morality: but I believe this does not warrant the use of our conclusions in an inductive way; we cannot say that, now we have identified the content of morality, then e.g. this item, previously thought to be morally bad is obviously, in the light of our discoveries, morally good. To use our results in this way would render them invalid, I believe, since it would be to transgress a boundary which we were very careful to institute at the outset, that of the distinction between first and third level morality, between philosophical investigation of the moral, and the moral itself.

Moral discussion itself is value-laden, and we have avoided the ramifications of this for our philosophy by setting rigid boundaries here, between the moral, moral discourse, and moral philosophy, between first, second and third levels of ethics. To fudge such distinctions at this stage would be to destroy the validity of our conclusions. Of course, moralising can be engaged in by anyone, but the philosopher would, I believe, be well advised to leave his philosophy hat behind when he does

so, both to preserve the clarity of his arguments and the dynamics of moral discourse and interaction.

What then is the use of moral philosophy? Well, I believe it brings the satisfaction of knowing one has approached the truth, and leaves one with insights which provide the assurance that the talk is about something unique and concrete, that notions of right and good _have_ the importance and significance in the real world which we all feel them to have, and which certain philosophies would deny.

So much for our objectives, methods, and limitations of application: our main work fell into two approximate areas, which we shall consider in the two following sections: that of exposition, and of evidence.

9.2 The development of the argument: the nature and purpose of morality.

We developed our argument by examining three areas: that of needs, value (particularly moral value), and ought-statements. We saw that there are many parallels between these concepts.

Need, we said, was most appropriately described as a composite relation between person P (although this could be a being other than a person), object of the need X, and Y a state of affairs constituting the satisfaction of the need. We distinguished between needs necessary for the preservation of life, and needs for other things.

This distinction however was pointed out to be relative: it is not one which could be used as the criterion of, e.g. the seriousness of need, nor of distinguishing need from mere desire or preference. One result of this is that adventitious need is apparently the most typical kind of need; adventitious need being the formation of goals during the course of purposeful, conscious behaviour and practical reasoning.

This relation to man's nature as an agent of rational, purposive behaviour with ends and objectives, means that need is closely tied in with value. This is most obviously true for instrumental value, where the means-end concept fits admirably with a need-goal duality. Moral goodness is related to needs, we suggested, in that special needs were involved: we called these needs heteronomous needs. By this term we mean needs which people (or, as before, other beings) have for each other; in particular, for their actions. In this way the goodness of a morally good action has the same sort of basis as other good objects, and loses its separate, mysterious nature.

If true, this suggests that morality is the most general form of ethics, where we mean by ethics a code of behaviour which is specific to certain activities or occupations. For example, medical ethics exists to enable the pursuit of medicine by various individuals in a way which does not harm either practitioners or clients, and thereby maximises the good done by medicine.

Morality, on our account, would therefore be such an ethics, of needers; the existence of morality would ensure that the business of needing, and the satisfying of needs, could be carried out by purposive agents in a way which was not self-defeating.

This likelihood of being self-defeating is a very real possibility, in that objects of need are likely to be objects of more than one need, and thus the satisfaction of need is likely to be a very limited affair (as is the consequent existence of needing beings, since their existence depends upon need being satisfied), unless there is some system of recognising and acting upon, or in accordance with, the needs of others. This system is known as morality.

If we wished to extrapolate our arguments, we could say that this is the basis of a universal need, which all needing beings have, for the co-operation and forebearance of others in their enterprises. It is upon the basis of such a universal need that moral phenomena can be seen as meaningful, and from which they draw their justification: and this would

answer the anti-realist argument (see Hudson, 1970, p304) that there is no identifiable thing which all men need, and hence that morality is a matter of choice, of human invention (q.v. Mackie, 1977). The implication of our position is that this is false: morality would seem necessarily concomitant with (because necessary for) the existence of needing beings, not something which can be deliberately chosen or created.

Our position is consistent with that of Warnock, insofar as he sees morality as a device to counteract limited sympathies, and to ameliorate the human condition.

We then considered the topic of 'ought-statements', and the moral imperative. Given the close association of ought and good, it is not surprising that we were able to draw very close parallels between need-statements and ought-statements. Both were seen to refer to things which were needed as means to ends, in the case of oughts these means were primarily actions. We also looked here at reasons for actions, particularly as these apply to moral action.

The rest of the work was devoted to seeking evidence for the assertion that heteronomous need forms the content of morality, and we shall survey in the next section, the evidence we brought forward.

9.3 Evidence for the Argument.

Much of the present work, as we have said, concentrates on finding evidential grounds for the theory we advanced about heteronomous needs as forming the content of morality. We shall here briefly reiterate and evaluate this attempt to confirm our theory.

The concept of a moral right was examined in Chapter IV, and we saw that there were remarkable formal similarities between this concept and that of need. The distinction between claim-rights and liberties, the correspondence of duties to rights, special v general rights, the

individual/collective tension, the 'inalienability' of rights: all of these have been shown to have corresponding features in needs.

If we add to this the fact that an empirical examination of those things held as rights reveals them to be things which are also needed, then the conclusion seems inescapable that need has close logical ties to the notion of right: the most likely such tie is that rights are allocated or assigned according to need, that need is the basis of rights.

This permits us to infer that since to observe such moral rights is to perform our moral duty, and to observe such rights is to observe need, then to observe and act upon the needs of others is to perform our moral duty, which is our central claim.

We looked at Utilitarianism, where pleasure and happiness are seen as consituting the good, and we pointed out the limitations of this: where happiness and pleasure were not seen as good, and pain and suffering are good, it was reasons of need which could be adduced as explaining the variation of value. Thus, we could use need as a demonstration that Utilitarianism had not correctly identified the content of morality.

By considering the central place of desire in the production of happiness and pleasure, we were able to explain why Utilitarianism was, in general, correct: in those cases where it failed to explain moral evaluation, we could show that there was an underlying need which escaped the net of Utilitarian explanation. In this way, we showed that a theory of morality based on need had an explanatory power, and theoretical supremacy, when compared to Classical Utilitarianism, being able to explain both its shortcomings and its successes.

Intrinsic value was considered, and the importance of this concept in moral philosophy was shown to be no obstacle to claiming that needs formed the content of morality: we were able to demonstrate, for a wide range of intrinsic goods, the basis of their value in needs. The concept of need allows us to integrate the two notions, of intrinsic and instrumental value, where 'intrinsic' is interpreted as meaning 'desired

for its own sake'. This allows us to consider intrinsic goodness as a limiting case of instrumental goodness, and this interpretation allows us to give a satisfactory account of the important role of intrinsic goodness in morality.

Lastly, we saw that the truth of value-judgements can be adequately accounted for by granting needs as the content of morality. This accords with the general , yet difficult to substantiate intuition that talk of right and wrong, good and bad is actually about something which is out there in the world, independently of our judgements, feelings and statements about it.

All of these features are, I think, practical strengths of the theory which we advanced, and when considered with the logical parallels between needs and the concepts which we looked at, of goodness, ought-statements, the purposive, rational nature of man, and moral goodness, the theory appears to have captured an important part of the truth.

It probably does not have all of the truth, and in the next section we shall look at areas where moral realism seems unable, as yet, to supply a wholly satisfactory acount of moral phenomena. However, the parallels and the concomitances to which we have drawn attention show that some of the truth has been approached, and they also show that a denial of this would require a new theory which could explain not only more of the facts, but the reason why needs seem to give us an apparently good explanatory basis for moral phenomena.

9.4 Summary: tasks for Moral Realism.

The theory of moral realism which we have advanced allows us to engage in detailed description, investigation and explanation of value phenomena in an empirical and objective way. For example, we were able to advance several reasons for particular moral ought statements; intrinsic value was shown to be related essentially, albeit indirectly, to actual instances of desiring, approval etc., and we could describe and account

for features of moral rights, and other theories such as utilitarianism. As we concluded in the last section, I believe it must be admitted that such needs as we have described form the essential basis of morality: if this were not so, then I think these needs would not provide such a powerful explanatory tool, as we have shown, for looking at issues in moral philosophy.

Nevertheless, much ground remains to be covered, even though it be admitted that needs form the content of morality.

One such area requiring much work is the question of the nature of a moral being. We have implicitly held, throughout, that humans are not the only moral beings. This probably would gain general agreement, moral wrong _can_ be done to , e.g. pet poodles: however, can such beings be moral _agents_ also? I believe that they can, and of course our treatment of the issue here entails this: but this is plainly contentious ground, and the exploration of the extent of the moral realm seems both extremely difficult, and supremely important.

Although we cannot even begin the investigation here, my view is that the realm of moral beings (i.e. whether we include a given being or not) is not something which we can decide in advance; thus perhaps it is exclusions from the moral realm which require investigation and clarification. This is prompted by the apparently unstoppable progress of the ecological movement, which sees the welfare of _all_ living things as a unity, such that all living things have needs for each other. If needs are essentially determinative of morality, then all living things are moral beings. Thus the Buddhist monk with his scrupulous, and sometimes ridiculed, attention to the life of even the merest insect may possibly be setting us an example which we should, morally, emulate.

Another area which requires much work is a re-integration of moral philosophy. Logical positivism launched upon it a challenge which has not really had a response, and this is perhaps not unrelated to the tragic excesses in the early wars of this century: if the objective status of right and wrong are in doubt, people must feel at some basic level the

loss of moral certainty and control. This might conceivably, given the right political and social ambience, result in genocide, torture and social destruction on the level we see it this century.

Moral philosophy is still to recover from the setback which it suffered, as seen in the entrenched, dogmatic resistance to any form of moral realism (see, e.g. Hudson, 1969). We must find a middle ground between the vacuity of stating that talk of moral values is sheer rhetoric and emotion on the one hand, and that it is idle, metaphysical nonsense on the other hand. At present moral realism is tackling both positions.

For example, we found ourselves attacking a metaphysical view of intrinsic value (see chapter 7), and appealing to empiricist arguments such as those of Mackie and of Blackburn in doing so, yet in the same breath (see section 9.2, and Blackburn in Casey, ed., 1971) disagreeing with them on what seems to me to be strains of subjectivism in their positions.Similarly, our position towards Hume is ambivalent: on the one hand, we wish to concur with his emphasis of the importance of the affections, yet on the other hand wish to maintain that this does not rule out the objectivity of moral discourse.

Thus, the development of moral realism will allow the formation of a basis upon which moral philosophy, and the status of morality itself can regain a credibility which it still seems to lack. Such credibility can only be attained when the more destructive repercussions of the logical positivist critique (which critique we have acknowledged to be on the whole beneficial), such as the subjectivist and linguistic approaches which it spawned, can be dealt with and settled.

Finally, there is what Warnock termed the peculiar indecisiveness, or arguability about moral matters, which seems to obtain no matter which theory is adopted (see Warnock, 1967, p73, p76).Such 'arguability' must be admitted and can, I think, be accounted for by a theory of need, since needs seem themselves to be essentially arguable, particularly those which we have termed 'flourishing needs' (see section 3.6): nevertheless,

this poses a dilemma for the moral realist. If we can specify the exact content of morality, the kind of facts underlying values and evaluation, as we have claimed, how then are we to proceed in a world where there seems to be endemic vagueness about moral disputes, and where no firm conclusions seem ever generally accepted? What is the role of the moral philosopher in moral debate?

I leave these questions open, being outwith our immediate stated objectives. They have answers, and morality is large and important enough I believe for the philosophical consideration of these questions to be of only small significance: we have established that morality and moral reasoning exists independently of its study, thus moral philosophy has a part, but only a part, to play within the larger picture of moral behaviour.

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