THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY

NAZISM AND COMMUNISM

Thesis submitted to the University of Glasgow

for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the

Faculty of Arts.

By

ZEVEDEI   BARBU

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S u m m a r y

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   The present thesis is an investigation into the

nature of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life.

One of the author's main aims is to use terms that cover

at the same time the sociological and the psychological

aspects of democracy and totalitarianism. Thus, the term

"way of life" is meant to imply a particular social and

cultural pattern as well as a particular type of behaviour

and personality.

   The analysis of the process of democratisation of

the ancient Athenian community and of modern American,

French and British societies led me to the following

main ideas: A. Every process of democratisation leads

to a flexible society, i.e., to a social structure open

to change and novelty, and yet, preserving its own basic

character. B. Every proces of democratisation leads to

an individualised pattern of life. The economic and

political individualism, the religious individualism

initiated by the Reformation, the individualism in art

and philosophy are various aspects of this basic drive
towards individualisation. C. Every process of democratisation
is connected with a strong drive towards the rationalisation
of the pattern of life. A diminution of the power of tradition,
a rational economy, a rational administration and type of
authority, a rational mode of thought which counterbalances
the power of religion (secularisation) are all characteristic
aspects of this. D. The process of democratisation is closely
associated with periods of social and spiritual prosperity.
In conclusion, the democratic way of life is, at the socio-
logical level, characterised by a flexible, rational, dynamic
and individualised social organisation of a group of individuals.

The terms used to describe the sociological aspects of
the democratic way of life were subsequently transposed to
the psychological plane, to describe the democratic behaviour
and the democratic type of personality. Thus, it is pointed
out that individuals living in periods of democratisation,
or in constituted democratic societies have a more flexible
mental structure then the individuals living in other types
of society. The mental functions dominating the process of
adjustment to a democratic world are reason, intellect and
intelligence. The particular meaning of these terms is
revealed by contrasting the mental structure of such individuals
with that of the individuals living in the medieval or the
modern totalitarian societies, The individuals living in
a democratic world are confident in the power of their mind;
their behaviour is conditioned to a rational and "inner"

type of social authority which is described as the authority
of law, as conscience, or as "constitutional morality".
In conclusion, the democratic personality has a strong ego
structure, the ego being a general concept which covers all
the main individualising functions of the human mind. This
type of personality is at the same time the result and the
cause of an individualised world.

In contrast to democracy, the totalitarian way of life
is characterised, on the sociological plane, by a rigid
social organisation. The mind of the individuals belonging
to a totalitarian world is rigidly organised round one idea
or feeling; their behaviour is determined by irrational
emotional factors even when at the surface they display a
strong tendency towards rationality.

Nazism and Communism are two totalitarian ways of life
characteristic of our time. Both are rooted in the same
state of mind, i.e., in the feeling of insecurity aroused
in the members of various national groups, or economic
classes, as the result of their failure to adjust themselves
to a rational social organisation, or to a dynamic and
unstable pattern of life. Nazism is in essence a reaction
against an individualised an rational pattern of life and
an escape into irrationality. The "emotionalisation" of
the pattern of behaviour in every sector of life constitutes
its main trait. Thus, the Nazi way of life is characterised
by a type of society based on primitive emotional bonds, by
an emotional attitude towards authority and by an emotional

logic expressed in a mythical kind of thought.

Communism solves the same basic problem of contemporary man in a different manner. The need for security manifested in the modern working classes and in certain sections of modern Russian society has led, not to an escape into irrationality, but to an excess of rationalisation. An excessively rational economic and social system and a rigid pattern of historical development are the main aspects of this.

A new type of onsciousness - class consciousness - appears which is the instrument by which the Communist type of man organises his world rigidly according to the schemes of a rationalistic conception of life.

The thesis presents a comparative study of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life rather than the study of democracy an totalitarianism in themselves. Generally speaking democracy can be regarded as the individual's and group's adjustment under conditions of leisure, totalitarianism as the individual's and group's adjustment under conditions of stress.

The factual data on which this study is based are furnished by the analysis of various democratic and totalitarian civilisations, supplimented by the results of a series of recent psychological researches based on questionnaires, interviews and clinical observation.

CONTENTS

The Psychology of Democracy

INTRODUCTION.

> History is a picture gallery
> containing few originals and a great
> many copies.
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville

The present study as a whole has the character of an introduction. For, in spite of the effort of adducing as many factual data as possible in support of the main theses, expounded in it, I still remained in the end with the vivid impression that the study opens many more problems than it solves. If there is any positive result brought about by the present study, this is to show how a social psychologist opens the door to the study of the political structures of various modern societies. That is why in this introduction it would be advisable to outline the main ideas which guided the author's mind.

Sociology and Psychology. One of my first concerns was to find or to build up a common ground between sociology and psychology and thus to look at the problem of democracy and totalitarianism from two points of view at once. From the very outset I felt the need to escape a purely political approach and to speak about democracy and totalitarianism

totalitarianism (Fascism and Communism) as ways
of life. Needless to say, I have been aware of the
difficulty any one has to face when working with such
a general and vague concept as that of a way of life.
But on the other hand, it was obvious to me that a
common ground between two disciplines so different
and opposed in their approach could not be found
without resorting to a less specialised and less
precise vocabulary. The concept of "way of life"
includes both a specific social and political structure
and a specific type of behaviour and personality.

It seems to me that many difficulties involved in
the study of the democratic and totalitarian ways of
life can be considerably diminished by acquiring the
technique of thinking on two planes, sociological and
psychological. Consequently my next concern was to
establish a series of correspondences between the
sociological and psychological aspects of the
democratic and totalitarian ways of life. Thus,
starting with the analysis of a series of phenomena
characteristic of various periods of democratisation
both in the ancient and modern worlds, I was led to
the idea that democratisation is closely associated
with a series of processes by which the common pattern
of life of a group of individuals becomes flexible.
The transitions from the medieval to the modern economic

economic system, from the rigidly organised medieval
community to the dynamic society, gradually created
in the Western world since the Renaissance, from a
stable spiritual world dominated by religion, to a
world permanently open to changes and revisions,
as science progresses, are in fact aspects in the
process of flexibility of the culture-patterns of
Western societies. Democracy is consequently defined
as a flexible society, i.e., a social structure open
to change and novelty, and yet preserving its own
basic character.

Since flexibility has thus been established as
one of the key concepts in the sociological aspects
of the process of democratisation, I transplanted it
on to the psychological level and applied it to the
mental structure of the individuals living in a
historical period of democratisation or in a con-
stituted democratic society.   It seemed to me that the
transition from a non-democratic to a democratic period
is also closely connected with an increased degree of
flexibility in the mental structure of man. Thus, the
mechanism of adjustment of the medieval man - if one
can speak in such general terms - was dominated by more
or less fixed types of reaction and his mind was more
rigidly organised than that of modern man round certain
habits, prejudices, sentiments and ideas. On the other

other hand, the mind of the individuals living in
the modern era becomes more and more dominated by
mental functions and structures which makes it
possible for them to adjust to a complex and changeable
world. One of these structures is reason which I
described as the individual's capacity to grasp the
order of change, and the unity in variety.
Intelligence is another function required for the
adjustment to a world dominated by change and novelty.
Consequently the individual living in the modern
world, i.e., the man who creates and maintains the
democratic way of life, makes more and more use of
intellectual, and less and less of emotional and
instinctive functions in his adjustment.   As the
result of this his own mental structure is rendered
more flexible, i.e., more adaptable to a changeable
environment.

The analysis of the same historical periods
revealed the fact that the process of democratisation
led gradually to an individualised social and cultural
pattern. Economic and political individualism,
religious individualism since the Reformation as well
as individualism in art which started with the
Renaissance and culminated in Romanticism, are basic
features in the culture-patterns of Western societies.
And here again I transferred the concept of individual-

individualisation on to the psychological plane.
I therefore endeavoured to prove that the mind of
modern man becomes more and more dominated by
structures and traits which individualise his
behaviour. I have borrowed from psycho-analysis
the concept of the ego with the intention of covering
under one term the main individualising traits and
structures of the human mind. The growing tendency
noticed in the members of modern societies to
individualise their adjustment to the various aspects
of their world led me to the conviction that the ego
became more and more dominant in their mental
structure.

All periods of democratisation are characterised
by strong tendencies towards the nationalisation of
the pattern of life. The tendency towards a rational
type of economy, towards a rational type of social
authority, expressed in its purest form in the
authority of law, and a rationalistic type of thought
are the main aspects of this. On the psychological
plane one can easily observe that the mental structure
of the individual belonging to these periods is
dominated by reason; rational attitude towards
authority and toward his fellow beings, rational
attitude towards things and towards the world as a
whole are the main characteristics of this type of man.

The combination of the processes of individualisation
and of rationalisation, both being characteristic
of the historical periods of democratisation, leads
to a crucial point regarding the mental architecture
of the democratic personality. The behaviour of this
type of personality, his social behaviour in
particular, is guided by a rational and individualised
type of authority. One can call it the authority of
reason, of conscience, or simply, inner authority.

I have noticed also that almost all periods of
democratisation are periods of social and spiritual
prosperity. This led me to the idea that one of the
mental characteristics of the individuals living in
democratic societies consists in a strong feeling of
security. This is displayed as self-confidence, and
trust in the power of the human mind. The conviction
that his own mind is the best guide to his actions is
deeply rooted in this type of man.

Democracy and Totalitarianism. Fascism and
Communism are products of our time. This means that
some sociological traits of the modern world as well
as some psychological traits of the individuals
belonging to it, must be common to both, democracy
and totalitarianism. Many processes, sociological
and psychological, which were necessary for the
democratisation of the way of life in Western Europe,

Europe, have, in different circumstances, contributed
to the creation of a totalitarian way of life.
The creation of a flexible and individualised social
structure, the weakening of tradition, the decreasing
importance of prejudice and emotionality in the
social life of contemporary man, the confidence in
reason have all led directly or indirectly to the
creation of a totalitarian way of life. Change and
fluidity in the structure of society are important
traits of the democratic way of life; the feeling and
the desire of change are also important categories of
the democratic frame of mind. They are, however,
counterbalanced in the mind of the individual by the
deep conviction that his mind can understand and master
his environment, however rapid its transformation.
Hence the feeling of security and freedom characteristic
of the democratic man.

But not all social groups and sub-groups belonging
to our contemporary world could adjust themselves to a
flexible pattern of life. Moreover, in many individuals
and groups the change and fluidity of the pattern of
life aroused the feeling of instability and insecurity;
the desire of change has thus turned into anxiety of
change, the feeling of freedom has become fear of
responsibility. Thus, the frame of mind of modern man
suffered a radical change which in the long run resulted

resulted in a new type of adjustment individual and collective. Fascism and Communism are two of the most characteristic aspects of this type of adjustment.

The basic trait of the Fascist way of life and of the Fascist personality consists in an increased importance of the emotional factors in individual and group behaviour. Since reason proved incapable of organising a changeable and complex environment the whole pattern of life underwent a process of de-rationalisation. A social structure based on emotional primitive bonds, emotional attitudes towards authority, irrational and magic way of thinking in the field of culture are aspects of this process. Compared with the drive towards rationality, characteristic of the democratic way of life, Fascism is a symptom of regression in group behaviour.

Communism is rooted in the same human situation. The solution is however looked for in a different direction. The anxiety created in the modern working class by a series of disruptive changes and by the effects of a rational economy, the tension created in various sections of the modern Russian people by a long series of inner conflicts characteristic of the Russian culture pattern, the insecurity created in the backward areas of poverty, have all resulted in an increased tendency towards rationalisation. A super-

super-organised economic system, from which "the
crises are forever eliminated", a rigidly organised
state, a fixed pattern of historical development, are
all meant to cure the basic insecurity from which many
social groups belonging to the contemporary world
suffer. The same crises in the rational pattern of
democracy has led in some cases to an escape into
irrationality and the unconscious, while in others,
to an increased effort towards rationalisation.
How to adjust himself to an increasingly fluid pattern
of life while retaining his basic frame of mind, is a
problem which the men belonging to a democratic world
have sometimes failed to solve.

Though the expression has not been used, this
study is permeated with the idea that Fascism and
Communism are group adaptation syndroms. The
evolution of modern civilisation have reached a point
at which the equilibrium, i.e. the adequate adjustment
of some individuals and groups cannot be attained
but in the following two ways: (a) a resurrection
of the primitive instinctive and emotional forces of
the mind, and (b) a desperate effort to increase the
control of consciousness and reason over all aspects
of human behaviour. The former can be considered
as syndrom of regressive group adjustment, while the
latter, a syndrom of "progressive adjustment". But

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But regressive,(or to the right) and progressive,
(or to the left) has the same meaning when the
movement starts from a state of flexible equilibrium.
The main result is in both cases the same, i.e., a
rigid organisation of the pattern of human life. In
the first case this was done in the name of the blind
forces of instinct and feeling, in the second, in
the name of the omniscient human reason.

Though this may over-simplify the whole problem,
it would, however, be useful to consider democracy
as a group adjustment under conditions of leisure,
and totalitarianism as a group adjustment under con-
ditions of stress. Hence the feelings of ease and
freedom involved in the democratic way of life and the
feeling of effort and rigidity involved in the
totalitarian way of life. This may serve as an answer
to the questions whether, in Communist societies,
individual freedom and the flexibility of the pattern
of life are merely matters of time, and, whether the
individual born and brought up in these societies feels
as free as the individual born in democracy. The
reality is that the totalitarian way of life is the
fruit of stress and anxiety. As such it contains in
itself the seeds of rigidity; it cannot develop but
within its own character, or collapse.

Psychology and History.   History was my main
source of information. The Athenian community and
civilisation, the beginning of American society,
the French Revolution and certain aspects of modern
British civilisation furnished the material for the
democratic way of life. The German community under
the Nazi regime and contemporary Soviet society
formed the empirical basis for the study of the
Fascist and Communist way of life. Certain aspects
in the evolution of the modern Western world, the
evolution of the working class in particular, added
also material for the study of Communism.

This approach to a psychological subject seems
anachronistic in our experimentalist era. An
experiment with small social groups in the manner of
Lewin or Moreno would have perhaps carried greater
conviction for many psychologists. I toyed with the
idea for quite a while and finally I had to give it
up. The reasons are many. Firstly I could not help
recognising that with regard to the democratic way of
life and even to the mental structure of the democratic
personality I have learned much more from Tocqueville,
Edmund Burke, Max Weber, Sombart, F.H.Knight than from
Lewin and Moreno. As for the Communist and the
Fascist ways of life and personality types I had in
front of me the published works of the leading repre-

representatives of these movements as well as the living examples of Soviet and Nazi societies. Most useful were my own experiences, for I have lived successively under three political regimes: democracy up to 1938, Fascism from 1938 to 1944, and Communism from 1944 to 1948. As I was keenly interested in, and often deeply involved in, the political life of my country of birth (Roumania) my own experiences have offered significant material for the study of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life. The experiences gathered from my diplomatic missions in various Western countries have also furnished material for the present study.

I am under the impression that the experimental approach to group psychology has very seldom furthered the understanding of the phenomena pertinent to this field. The experiments set up to demonstrate the specific type of organisation and authority in a democratic or authoritarian group revealed less, and that in a much more confusing manner, than what I previously knew from the observation of everyday life and from the study of various democratic and totalitarian civilisations. It seems that the psychologists and the sociologists concerned with this approach are much more interested in trying out a method - the experimental method - than in the furthering of human knowledge in this field. The instrument has become

become more important than what it is supposed to serve. Thus I soon discovered that it was a feeling of reality that led my way towards history in order to study some important aspects of group behaviour. This gave me the opportunity of studying the patterns of life of various groups on a natural scale, and in their most accomplished forms. I could select my examples of democratic and totalitarian societies in a manner which enabled me to make an idea about the main sociological and psychological factors characteristic of the two ways of life. After I had thus framed my concepts of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life I subsequently made use of the main results furnished by recent psychological researches on this matter, based on experiments, tests, questionnaires, interviews and clinical observation. The main results obtained by the analysis of various historically realised democratic and totalitarian societies were on the whole supported and completed by those obtained by the methods mentioned above. I found this proceeding useful, and if the present study has a message it is to persuade the social psychologist to appeal as often as possible to history; in the historical forms of various civilisations he will find a fertile ground for the study of human social life.

Methods. I started the study of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life by the analysis of a series of concrete cases of democratic and totalitarian civilisation. Athenian, American, French and British democracies are in the first category. Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia are in the second. But my main aim was to use these specific social forms as empirical ground for investigating into the nature of democracy and totalitarianism. I have therefore consciously attempted to build up "ideal types" of democracy and totalitarianism. One can say that at this stage of my study I applied the method of "phenomenological reduction", i.e., from the mass of empirical data, sociological and psychological, I gradually proceeded towards the determination of a few central features characteristic of the democratic or totalitarian ways of life. I may have been arbitary, I may have made mistakes, but the conviction that this was the best way of organising a rich and often incoherent material offered by the study of history did not for a moment leave me throughout my work on the present study. Thus, I have found that the processes of social and cultural flexibility, or rationalisation and of minimisation of power are characteristic of all democratic societies. The processes of social and cultural rigidity, of the "emotionalisation" or super-rationalisation of life and that of the concentration

concentration of power are, on the other hand,

characteristic of all modern totalitarian societies.

Finally, I transposed all these on the psychological

plane and defined what one may call an ideal type

of democratic or totalitarian behaviour and

personality.

I did not stop here in my search for the ideal

type. Aiming at finding terms by which to cover

sociological, psychological and spiritual phenomena,

I defined democracy as an ethical way of life.

Human personality and inter-personal relation form the

basis of the scale of value in such a society. The

essence of democracy is human dialogue. Thus I tried

to point out the futility of defining democracy in

terms of liberal economy. A way of life based on

economic values is basically individualistic and as

such it cannot form the essence of democracy. It

was only during the liberal period of Europe that

homo economicus put on an ethical mask. Thus he

worked himself into believing that by persuing his

own interests he aimed at the happiness of the many.

Democracy is not a purely religious way of life either, for,

this is based on "logos" i.e., the absoption of the

human essence into a transcendental order. A

balance between the divine and secular order was

necessary in order to make a democratic way of life

life possible. And finally, democracy is not a
political way of life the essence of which lies in
the external character of social authority. Strong
religious and political elements are found in a
totalitarian way of life. But what really constitutes
the essence of totalitarianism is its complete
impermeability to an ethical way of life as described
above.

In order to complete the picture of the ideal types
I described democracy as a way of life dominated by
the feelings of ease, naturalness which arose from a
certain harmony in the pattern of life. The Greek
term "eukosmia" and what the French mean by "douceur des
moeurs" are adequate expressions of this state of
affairs. The totalitarian way of life is, on the
other hand pervaded by extreme emotions, by the
feeling of effort and rigidity, and by the tension
aroused by an ambivalent attitude in life, i.e., the
feeling of unlimited power alternates with the feeling
of impotence, the feeling of insecurity is carefully
covered by an inflated sense of adventure, the fear
of chaos is strongly repressed by rigid organisation.

The empirically minded sociologists and
psychologists may find fault with a certain detachment
from facts and a certain tendency towards abstract
thinking displayed throughout this study. I can only

only say that this was necessarily implied in my approach. Here I touch upon another point regarding the method used in this study. My approach was an intengalist one. I wished in the first place to see the democratic, the Fascist and the Communist ways of life as parts of a whole, or as stages in the unfolding of the historical process of contemporary civilisation. I was often under the impression that, concentrating too much on their interrelation, I missed certain important aspects of my subject. But I regarded this as a necessary limitation and "parti pris" of my work. What I should like to stress here is that my intention was to present a comparative view of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life rather than the study of democracy, Fascism and Communism in themselves.

I have avoided any "reductionist" view of democracy and totalitarianism and of contemporary European civilisation in general. The temptation was great to consider with Marx the economic process, or with Max Weber the religious factors, as the basis of modern civilisation and to infer from this the psychological changes in modern man. But this would have implied that I as a social psychologist know much more than I do in fact know. That is to say, I know that one specific factor of modern civilisation can be

be considered as the originator or the cause of others. This assumption forms the basis of a reductionist point of view. I refrained as much as possible from any reductionist attitude be it called economism, idealism, sociologism - in the manner of Karl Mannheim for instance - or even psychologism. I do not know, for instance, whether a series of sociological phenomena characteristic of the process of democratisation preceded in time or whether they caused the psychological phenomena characteristic of the same process. I have considered the historical process as a whole and pointed to its various aspects, economic, sociological, spiritual and psychological, without assuming that they determined each other in a specific manner and order. My assumptions were that they belong to a structure and that they are conditioned by the whole to which they belong.

A reductionist attitude requires metaphysical ferment and a considerable power of belief which I do not possess. Throughout this study I was unable to decide what is more important in the historical process; the sociological or the psychological factors, society or the individual. If I have to say something about this problem, my conviction is that behind all this - the individual, society, psychological and sociological factors - there lies the process of

of history itself which in its unfolding relies at one time on individual, while at others, on supra-individual factors.

What I have just said is connected with a certain point in my approach, namely, with my political prejudices. It is only fair to say that I started the present study with a strong prejudice for democracy. (Political prejudices substitute the native country of a political refugee). And although these prejudices have not diminished in vigour, yet, with the advance in the present study they became mingled with the conviction that the totalitarian forms of our times sprang up by a certain necessity from the historical process. I am referring to the psychological and moral concept of necessity. Consequently as true child of my age I became partly resigned in front of, and partly terrified by the "monster" of history. I seem to read in a new context the meaning of the ancient myth: Chronos creating, and then eating his own offspring. Sometimes this inner tension burst out in emotional attitudes and value judgments.

Before closing this introduction I feel I have to mention the extent to which I am aware of the main shortcomings of the present study. The canvas on which I chose to paint was too large; my ability to deal with historical facts was often too limited, and

and the extent to which I could rely on psychological research in this field was insignificant. I can sum up all these difficulties by saying that the nearer I came to the end of this study the more I realised that I was at the beginning. It is with this feeling that I closed the last chapter.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY.

Je vois que les biens et les maux se
répartissent assez également dans le monde.
Les grand riches disparaissent ; le nombre
des petites fortunes s'accroit; les désirs et
les jouissances se multiplient; il n'y a plus
de prosperités extraordinaires ni de misères
irrémédiables. L'ambition est un sentiment universel,
il'y a peu d'ambitions vastes. Chaque individu
est isolé et faible; la societé est agile, prévoyante
et forte; les particuliers font les petites choses,
et l'État d'immenses.

Alexis de Tocqueville.

CHAPTER I

THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE.

"Our city is thrown open
to the world".
                    Pericles.

Democracy as a Frame of Mind. Democracy as a political

concept can be described in terms of methods or techniques

of government. "We are called a Democracy - says Pericles

in his funeral speech- for the administration is in the

hands of the many, and not of the few". Formulae such

as government of, by, and for the people, the sovereignty

of the people, universal suffrage, popular and responsible

government, and others are often used for the description

of democracy.

But in spite of this rich and colourful collection

of formulae, anyone attempting to define democracy has an

almost impossible task. The reason for this lies in the

fact that the validity of all fundamental concepts normally

involved in such a definition has been seriously challenged

by various historical conditions in which democracy has

been realised. Even Aristotle, while agreeing that the

main feature of democracy consists in "the election of

magistrates by all, out of all", becomes involved in a

long/

discussion about the meaning of the concept of

"the many". Finally he has to specify that the

many who rule in a democracy "are also poor", while

the rich, who govern in aristocracy, are "at the

same time few in number". (Politics. Transl. Benjamin

Jowett. Oxford and Clarendon Press IV,p.152).

Today it would be easy to prove that decisions

taken by "the many" - who are also poor - are not

necessarily democratic. During the last century

some absolutist monarchs were in favour of extending

the right to vote to the propertyless classes in the

hope that they would be more conservative, i.e., more

in favour of the absolutist regime, than the well-to-do

classes. 1.

1. Max Weber mentions such cases in "The Theory of
Social and Economic Organization". English Translation
by A.M. Henderson. Wm. Hodge & Co. Ltd., Edinburgh.
Last Chapter. Ignazio Silone, dealing with this problem,
gives the example of King Humbert of Italy who increased
the electorate from 150,000 to two millions for the obvious
reason that an electorate of two millions who were poor
and illiterate was more easily manageable than the former
one. (The School for Dictators, Engl. Transl. by Davis
and E. Mosbacher, London, Jonathan Cape, 1939, p. 264).

The results of a series of modern "plebiscites"

leads inevitably to the conclusion that universal suffrage,

or decisions taken by majorities are but political

instruments which can serve democracy as well as other

forms/

of government.   One has therefore to take into account
a number of factors influencing the behaviour of the
people in political matters in order to specify under
what conditions the majority act democratically.   Thus
one has to specify first of all that the concept of
majority enters into the definition of democracy only
to the extent to which the many possess, and know how
to make use of, political power in their community.
This obviously means something more than a simple political
equality contained in the formula "one man one vote".

Self-government is undoubtedly an essential feature
of democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville, amongst others,
lays particular stress on this.   In the people's interest
and participation in the life of their community, in their
wish and capacity to conduct their own affairs, he sees
not only the spring, but also the main guarantee of
democracy.   On this point he goes as far as to distinguish
between self-government and good government, i.e.,
government carried on by an enlightened group in the best
interest of the people.   A democratic reform, or democratic
action in general, has to "be brought about not only with
the assent of the people, but by their hand".   (On the State
of Society in France before the Revolution of 1789. Transl.
Henry Reeve, London, 1873, p. 203.)

Now/

Now this is obviously true, but it requires
certain qualifications.   In order to make their society
"by their hand" the members of a group have to possess
considerable experience in, and knowledge of, public
administration.   They need also certain institutions
which allow them to take a share in the making of their
society.   But they need something more than this; they
need a specific frame of mind, i.e. certain experiences,
attitudes, prejudices and beliefs shared by them all,
or by a large majority.

Before describing the main features of this frame
of mind, it would perhaps be necessary to state that
we are not prepared to reduce the concept of democracy
to it alone.   A specific state of mind is always involved
in a democratic society, but this can hardly be grasped
and judged unless it is translated into enduring institutions.
We are, however, of the opinion that the safest guarantee of
a democratic way of life is to be found in a frame of mind.
Without this, democratic institutions cannot grow ;   if
they are introduced from outside, their life is short.
Examples to prove this are easy to find.   The rapid decline
and final death of Middle and East European democracies, in
the period between the two World Wars, was not caused
primarily by the weakness of the democratic institutions
existing/

in these countries.   Sometimes and in some places the democratic mechanism of government was as good as anywhere else.   And yet in most of these countries democracy was voted out after a short life.   One must infer from this that the frame of mind of the people was unsuitable for such a regime.

1.   One of the basic traits of the democratic frame of mind can be described as the feeling of change. The feeling shared by the members of a community, that their personal, and their communal life as well, are in a state of permanent transformation and re-adjustment forms, so to speak, the first category of the democratic frame of mind. Due to this the individual regards his society as an open structure, ready to keep pace with the process of general change, and with the changes taking place in its members in the first place. We classify this trait of the democratic frame of mind as a feeling, because of its general and undifferentiated nature. Considering its origins one can call it also a habit of mind, i.e., that particular habit of mind, shared by the majority of the members of a group, to adjust themselves, and to adjust the structure of their society to the ever changing conditions of life.

It is obvious that the individuals could not have acquired/

such a habit had they not lived through periods of
considerable historical change.   Thus the democratic
regimes are normally preceded by periods of great
change which affect the structure of society as a
whole.   Greek democracies followed a period of
radical transformation in the structure of Greek
societies. During the Vlllth and Vllth centuries
there took place ~~the Dorian invasion and~~ the transition
from the primitive patriarchal to an aristocratic
social organisation.   A period of great changes
started then, which culminated with Cleisthenes's
political reforms.   New colonies and big cities were
founded, new classes and ways of life made their
appearance.   A similar historical pattern applies to
the Western world in the period preceding the rise of
modern democracies. The Renaissance is but the apex
of a long process of change. High above all new forms
of life stands the capitalist economy which, due to
its rapid development, induces in many individuals -
in the inhabitants of the town in particular - the
feeling of change, novelty and social growth. There
was a flow of new things, new ideas, new aspirations
and new forms of life for which one needed not only an
open mind, but an open and fluid social pattern to
integrate them all.

    It/

It is this feeling of change and social dynamism
which formed the basic element in the mind of the first
emigrants to America who, after cutting off all their
connections with the old society, made full use of it
in building up the first modern democracy.   In France
there was needed a revolution before this frame of
mind, of which the feeling of permanent change and
transformation was a component, found expression in
new social institutions.   In England the process was
slow, but obviously in the same direction.

The individual belonging to post-Renaissance
societies had to develop to a maximum his capacity
for adjustment to change and novelty. It is because
of this that the feeling of change becomes fundamental
category of its mind. Sometimes the effects of this
feeling remain unconscious, at other times they are
projected at the conscious level as a theoretical
construct. Thus the same feeling of change which was
a basic trait of the democratic frame of mind, became
articulated in a theory of evolution or a philosophy
of progress.   It is very easy to prove the existence
of such a phenomenon in modern culture-patterns, for
there is no other period in human history in which a
greater concern is shown with the rational formulation
of/

the phenomena of change and evolution. In the early
stage of this period Vico made the attempt towards the
articulation of this deep mental category of modern
man in a philosophy of history, later on, Diderot, in a
philosophy of progress, and later still, Hegel does the
same thing by laying the foundation of a logic of change
and evolution. Though it is generally held that the
Greeks were less aware of the changeable character of
things, one can hardly say that their mind remained
completely unaffected by the feeling of change. The
philosophical doctrine of Heraclitus and Thucydides'
profound sense of history are characteristic from this
point of view.

On the social plane the feeling of change is
articulated in the conviction, and in the social
behaviour resulting from it, that society is an open
structure in a state of permanent readiness for change.
"Our city is thrown open to the world" says Pericles
about his democratic Athens.

2. The feeling of change cannot be regarded as
an isolated trait; the social and cultural behaviour
generated by it is moulded by other categories of the
democratic frame of mind. Thus, the feeling of change
and/

any other category of the democratic frame of mind
are parts of a whole.

The individuals who create or live in democracy
do not only hold the belief that their society is in
perpetual change, but also that this change is the
direct result of their own activities. Consequently
the feeling that society grows from within, by the
activity of its members, individuals and corporate
bodies, can be considered as another category of the
democratic frame of mind. This manifests itself under
many forms. Firstly the individuals who create and
live in a democratic organisation possess that habit
of mind according to which they take it for granted
that the growth of society is determined by endogenic
factors. Secondly, they hold the belief that the
relationships between them naturally crystallise in a
common pattern of life which will finally harmonise
the interests of everyone of them. Thirdly, and this
is partly implied in the previous point, these individuals
act on the assumption that the activity of each of them
is equally necessary for the life and development of
their own society.

Like the feeling of change, the feeling that the
growth of society is determined from within by the
activity of its members rests on a series of habits of
mind/

formed in certain communities by a long historical

process.   The first condition leading to the formation

of these habits of mind in some ancient Greek communities

is to be found in that complex of factors which define

the so-called genius of the race.   Suffice it to mention

the Greeks' fondness for public meetings, and their

creative capacity in the field of social relations,

in order to prove this point.   But there were a series

of other, more concrete, factors which contributed to

the formation of these habits of mind.   Most important

of all is the rise and development of the middle classes

in Athens, which was accomplished by the beginning of

the Vth.century.   To these classes belonged individuals

who reached and preserved their position in the existing

society by their work and intelligence; moreover it was

due primarily to the specific activities carried on by

these individuals that new forms of life appeared in the

midst of an old patriarchal society.   It was therefore

only natural for these individuals to possess in a higher

degree than others the feeling that society on the whole

grows from within by the activities of its own members.

The kind of activity they led awakened in them earlier

than in other sub-groups the conviction that they are

the creators of their society.

    There/

There is another aspect of the Greek society of
that period that contributed towards the formation
of the belief that the structure of society is based
on the participation of its members. This consists
in the need and the effective experience of social
co-operation which stood at the origin of the type of
organization known as "Polis". The "Polis" rose as
the union of several rural settlements representing
tribal groups and families. (The process is known as
"Synoecism". A. Croiset : Les Démocraties Antiques.
Paris, Flammarion, Ed. 1909 p. 275).   This would have
been impossible without a long and successful experience
in co-operation, and co-ordinated social action, which,
we presume, resulted in the feeling that society was
in a high degree a matter of common activity and
agreements dictated by the nature of common interests
and experience.

In European societies, the source of these habits
of mind is to be found in the experience gained by the
inhabitants of the towns in the administration of their
common affairs. The administrative autonomy of the towns
is a characteristic feature of Western medieval society.
(According to Tocqueville the French village also
enjoyed a certain degree of local autonomy).   In England
the/

system of local autonomy was preserved throughout the modern era. It is therefore little wonder that the "bourgeois" played such an important part in the building up of Western democratic societies. For, like the Greek member of the middle classes, the modern bourgeois possesses in a high degree the feeling that he cannot only conduct, but even create his own society.

It is not too difficult to find how the belief that society is a matter of co-operation originated in the mind of modern man. The need for, and the experience of co-operation among various social groups, divided and antagonised by a system of privileges, against an autocratic monarch formed in fact an important feature in the rise of modern societies and states. This was noticed throughout the rise of the British modern state, and formed at the same time the central motive in the prelude to the French Revolution. In the example of co-operation between the "three orders" set forth, in 1787, by the province of Dauphiny, can be grasped the pattern of a new society resulting from the common activity of, and agreements among its components, i.e. of a society which builds up its form from within. It is this social pattern that lurked in the minds of the Pilgrim Fathers leaving the old Continent.

When/

When they settled down in America they put it into
practice in its purest form. There was no constituted
body or class within their small groups; the individual
had to be not only a soldier in the protection of his
own society, but also a pioneer in the making of it.
Later, the French Revolution repeated the same pattern
when breaking down the old social order to its basic
units, the individuals, and subsequently trying to
build up a new society from the net of inter-individual
relationships. The conviction that each individual
is a maker of his society is a basic trait of a
democratic frame of mind.

At the cultural level this trait is articulated
in various forms. In the feeling that each individual
is, in his own way, an agent in the making of his society
lies the seed of both the doctrine of equality and that
of freedom. With regard to the former we are only too
well aware that in its most radical form, as total
equality, or equalitarianism, it is not necessarily a
feature of democratic society. We cannot, however,
help noticing that certain equalitarian conceptions
arose in the culture-pattern of every community in
process of democratisation. In some communities, whose
members/

showed particular inclinations towards rational
thinking, such as the Athenian and the French
communities, equality was worked out into an ideal
concept and considered as specific to a democratic
way of life. Equalitarian tendencies formed also a
specific feature in the early American society.
There they crystallised in the doctrine of equal
rights, or more recently, in the concept of equal
opportunities. Movements such as that initiated
by the Levellers show clearly that the ideal of
equality formed an important feature in the early
stages in the democratisation of the British community.
The lure of such an ideal was, however, short-lived, due
to the congenital inclination of the British people to
empirical thinking. Equality was considered as an
"abstract right". (Burke).

As for the doctrine of freedom one can say that
it can be found in every democratic culture-pattern.
Its origins lie, as stated before, in the conviction
that the structure of society is not based on a
permanent and fixed order, and that, on the contrary,
it results from the activity of each of its members,
from their common experiences, from their interactions,
deliberations and agreements. This conviction is
obviously itself the structuration of a great variety
of/

experiences in self-government which certain
communities as wholes, or certain parts of a
community, had gained. In Athens, the doctrines of
freedom crystallised, depending upon the various
stages of social evolution, in concepts such as :
isegoria (equality of speech), isonomia (equality
before the law), isocratia (political equality),
parrhesia (equality and freedom of speech).   In
Western society its most typical crystallisation is
seen in the doctrine of economic liberalism.   But
whatever its expression, the doctrine of freedom is
rooted in the deep belief - which forms an essential
category of the democratic frame of mind - that the
structure of society rises from, and develops in the
function of the experiences and will of a number of
individuals living together.   From the same conviction
springs up the conception that society is ultimately a
matter of "contract" which formed one of the basic
ideological pre-requisites in the process of democratisa-
tion of modern societies.

    3.   From what has been said so far one can easily
infer that a democratic frame of mind contains also a
specific attitude towards authority, as one of its
categories./

To start with, one can say that the basic element of
this attitude consists in the feeling of instability
and relativity of power and authority.   One would
perhaps understand better this aspect of the democratic
frame of mind if one described it as the awareness,
present in various degrees in the members of a certain
community, that the holding of power and authority
implies the concession made by one part to another
part of the community.   In other words it implies
a process of delegation.

As for the historical context of this trait one
can say that the feeling of the unstable and relative
character of political power was certainly aroused by
those periods of rapid transformation and social unrest
preceding some democracies.   The contest of power
between the Eupatrids and the kings, on the one hand,
and among the Eupatrids themselves, on the other, had
certainly something to do with the presence of this
feeling in the minds of the Athenians.   The same can
be said about the struggle between the European aris-
tocracy and monarchy, and between the Church and State.
But this is not all.   On the contrary it would be easy
to prove that in certain circumstances the contests
of power, and social instability do not necessarily lead
to/

the feeling of the relative character of authority.
The formation of this specific attitude towards
authority in Western man is in fact determined by
a complex of circumstances. Most important of all
is the process of secularisation which, as will be shown
later, shook the foundation of absolute authority in
the mind of modern man.

Interpreting the process of democratisation as it
took place on the Continent - in France in particular-
one is often inclined to believe that the feeling of
the relative character of power and authority, so
characteristic of modern man, comes mainly as a reaction
from the absolutist regime preceding the democratic era.
Thus the early meaning of democracy was "no more than
opposition to the privileges of the old powers, the
clergy and the feudal nobility; hence the negation of
those values which served to uphold their position".
(A. von Martin, The Sociology of the Renaissance. Kegan-
Paul, London 1945, p.4). In fact the reaction against
permanent and absolutist power constitutes only one
element in the composition of the democratic attitude
towards authority and power. This lies at the basis
of that aspect of the democratic attitude towards
authority which has been called "negative freedom", and
which/

is in fact a natural outcome of the struggle for
liberation from an authoritarian regime. In this
respect one has to recognise that the democratic
attitude towards power and authority contains the
seeds of anarchy which may grow out into trees whenever
the soil is favourable.   There is no need to prove
this by examples.

But, as just stated, this is only one aspect −
the negative one − of the democratic attitude towards
authority. The social experience leading towards
the creation of modern democracies show clearly that
the attitude towards authority could not be a negative
one exclusively.   The authority based on absolute
power was undoubtedly negated, but another type of
authority took its place. This is the internal authority
of reason and conscience. One can speak in this case
about a displacement of authority which is characteristic
of modern man;   the confidence in, and reliance on
external and divine authority was gradually transformed
into confidence in, and reliance on the powers of human
reason and conscience.

But human reason and conscience are not social
authority in themselves. Here comes an important point
in the formation of that aspect of the democratic frame
of mind/

which refers to the nature of social authority. The
experiences in self-government, in building up new
social forms and groups, characteristic of some modern
Western communities, implanted into the individual
the conviction that the authority resting on the
principles of the human mind - logical and moral - can
be imparted to other individuals by deliberation. The
same experiences implanted also the conviction that the
authority founded on the individual's reason can be
concentrated by an act of common will, and conferred
as such upon a man, a party, or an institution.   In
other words, authority can be represented.

Therefore, the essence of the democratic attitude
towards authority consists in the concept of that inner
and personal authority which is an individualised
authority.   This authority can be concentrated by
agreement and conferred upon a representative. Hence
the social order is a representative order.   It ought
also to be said that authority is conferred, yet never
entirely transferred.   This is due to the conviction
shared by every individual member of a democratic
community, that he himself is an agent in the making
of his society; hence the exercise of social power is to
him an act of agreement by deliberation, rather than an
act/

of assenting.   Whenever a community of people are
ready to transfer the power and authority to a
leader or a party there is an obvious proof that they
lack the democratic frame of mind, even when this
transfer is carried out by impeccable democratic
methods.   The best example of this kind is furnished
by the German people of today.   They had once transferred
the power to Hitler, and the great numbers of votes
given to Adenauer in September 1953, gives us ground to
believe that they are ready to repeat the act. It is
either the people's lack of confidence that they can
create their own society "by their hand", or the
existence of some other factors that make it impossible
for them to resist the transference of power and its
concentration in the hands of a few.

The articulation on the social plane of the
feeling of the relative and representative character
of power and authority is seen in the doctrine and
practice of the division and balance of power, in the
decentralisation and minimisation of power which are,
in one form or another, present in all modern democracies.

4.   This last category of the democratic frame of
mind can be described as an attitude of confidence in
reason.   But before saying anything on this account we
have to recognise the fact that we are aware of the
existence/

of a widely-spread opinion according to which a democratic way of life must necessarily be rooted in an empirical attitude in life.   It would follow from this that the organisation of social life according to a rational order is the very opposite of democracy. British society is often mentioned as an example which proves the close connection between empirical thinking and democracy.   Moreover, formulae such as "Laissez-faire", "wait and see", and above all the concept of individual freedom which applies to all democracies testify to the same connection between empirical attitude in life and democracy.

But when we speak about the democratic frame of mind we are only secondarily interested in the cultural or ideological aspect of democracy.   It is true that some democratic nations are addicted to an empirical while some others to a rational way of thinking. But this difference is not as deep as is often thought.   For, the action of a free individual in a flexible society is always carried out on the deep - often unconscious - presupposition that it leads to, and ends in a rational order, i.e. that this action will be finally adjusted to a harmonious social pattern which reveals the norms of/

reason.   This is waht we mean here by the feeling of confidence in reason;   it is a constitutional element of the individual's mind which sometimes is manifested - at the cultural level - as the cult of reason, some other times as a strong conviction that "an invisible hand" leads man on to the right path. Very often it appears as blind confidence in order, i.e. the very opposite of the fear of instability and chaos.

There is no need to show how these feelings, all of them being various aspects of confidence in reason, have been manifested in various modern societies since the Renaissance. It would perhaps be useful to mention here that the process of secularisation has something to do with this. The decline of the faith in the trans-cendental (divine) reason has gradually been compensated in the mind of modern man by a stronger confidence in the imminent order of the universe. During the Renai-ssance this feeling of confidence is inspired by the belief in the existence of two kinds of reason: the cosmic reason which assures the order in the physical universe, and the human reason which has the double function of recognising the order of the cosmic reason, and at the same time, of creating a rational order in the universe.   With the advance of the modern era the latter/

function becomes more and more emphasised. Thus the
confidence in the creative power of human reason,
reached a peak when the process of democratisation
began.

Since we have to come back later on to the problem
regarding the relationship between reason and democracy,
we must try now to answer the question : How did this
category of the democratic frame of mind originate
in modern society ?   While we retain a purely psychological
point of view, it would be necessary to start by saying
that the feeling of confidence in reason was necessary
as a balancing factor in the mind of the individual who
had to adjust himself to a world of change and novelty;
it was necessary for this individual to develop the
belief that there was an order and stability behind the
change, and that there were certain regulative principles
which put a check upon change.   Therefore free individual
action and flexible, open, and even atomised society are
for this type of man not only possible but even safe since
they obey a certain fundamental order.   Whatever the
change may be, certain basic principles, certain "fun-
damental human rights" have to be respected.   This deep
conviction is knitted in the ideological pattern of many
democracies. l. British democracy seems to be

     l. Tocqueville rightly notices that the democratic
nations/

are fond of general ideas.   The democratic historians
resort much more often to "general causes" than the
aristocratic historian. (Democracy in America. Transl.
by H. Reeve. N.Y. Alfred Knopf, Chap.XX).

an exception. But in the light in which we regard

here the democratic frame of mind, this exception seems

to be only apparent.   For, while in other communities

the individuals show their confidence in a set of

principles expressed by a rational doctrine, in the

British community, they place their confidence in a

form of practical reason, i.e. in a set of norms,

traditions, "prejudices" and "prescriptions". While

in the former case the change is checked and guided

by the order of reason, in the latter, the "expediency"

in life has to compromise with the order of "permanence",

stored in a body of prejudices and prescriptions.   It

is the confidence in this order that compensates for the

necessity of adjustment to a world of change and novelty.

If one replaces the expression "confidence in reason" by

"confidence in a fundamental order", this often over-

stressed difference between the British and other democratic

frames of mind becomes considerably diminished.

The individuals living in a world of rapid change,

and in a dynamic social structure in particular, develop,

apart from the feeling of confidence in a fundamental order,

a/

series of habits of mind which facilitate an adequate
adjustment to a changeable environment.   This is
another important source of the need of reason in
modern man.   For reason is that complex of mental
functions, or habits by which the individual is able
to grasp the unity in diversity, and the order of
change.   Perhaps the term habit is not entirely
adequate in this context, for it implies a certain
rigid organisation of the forms of reaction and
adjustment. Reason on the other hand presupposes a
high degree of mental flexibility which enables the
individual to compare things, to establish differences
and identities, and finally to compromise.   This
complex of operation makes necessary the development
in the highest degree possible of that mental structure
which can establish by a system of relations a formal
order between events, or things so as to make adjustment
possible. New events demand new relations, and con-
sequently re-adjustment.

At the root of this type of adjustment one can
certainly find the belief that there is a certain order
in the nature of things.   This belief was, as we have
seen, displayed by both the Greek and modern man.   On
the other hand, this type of adjustment would hardly
have been possible without the feeling of confidence in
the/

capacity of human mind, and without a strong feeling

of security, both individual and collective.

The confidence shown by modern man in the power of

his mind was in many ways justified. For, throughout

the modern era he grew more and more convinced of the

fact that his mind is flexible enough not only to

make possible his adjustment to an immediate environment,

but also to grasp connections between the elements of

this environment so as to foresee and master the course

of events.   The development of positive science during

the modern era is the main aspect of this phenomenon.

To account for the feeling of security one has to

start from the fact that the historical periods leading

to democratisation are periods of progress and prosperity.

There is no need to bring proofs in the support of this

assertion with regard to Athenian, British and American

societies. And though the same thing can be said about

Western society as a whole, during the post-Renaissance

period, many people are still inclined to think that the

economic frustration of the French lower class were

among the main factors leading to the democratic changes

initiated by the Revolution.   This is not however the

opinion held by Tocqueville - and he was followed by

many others - who produces sufficient facts to prove

that the period immediately preceding the Revolution was

on the whole marked by considerable prosperity. 1). It

can/

therefore be safely said that it was this general

state of prosperity that aroused first in man confidence

in himself and in his society.

1.   "....in no one of the periods which followed
the Revolution of 1789 has the national prosperity of
France augmented more rapidly than it did in the twenty
years preceding that event" (The State of Society.....
p. 212).

It is of course difficult to work with such vague

concepts such as economically frustrated communities.

But if one can rely on the observation of a series of

recent events in European history, we can conclude that

it is very seldom that an economically frustrated people

fought for the overthrow of an authoritarian order.   The

contrary can be said; the need of security, normally

frustrated in such people, causes them to accept and

create a rigid authoritarian order.   We hope to prove

this, in the second part of this study.

There is a strong sense of security, both individual

and collective, involved in any process of democratisation.

This will come out clearly from what we have to say at a

later stage.   For the moment it will be enough to point

out that this sense of security is aroused by the

expanding character of society, and by the conviction,

shared by many inidividuals, that the human mind is

flexible enough to organise the experience in any field

of reality.   This flexible character of the mind is

expressed/

by a particular structure whose function it is to relate
the data of environment, to compromise between their
various aspects, to organise them so as to make adjust-
ment possible. This structure has been called reason;
today one can speak about intelligence, or the ego as
fulfilling approximately the same functions. We shall
see later that the mental structures which can be called
reason, intelligence, or the ego have gradually come into
the foreground of the mental life of modern man. They
are the most suitable tools for adjustment to a flexible
society, and to a changeable universe.

The confidence in reason being a basic category of
the democratic frame of mind becomes articulated in a
great variety of forms at the social and cultural levels.
Most aspects of the democratic culture-pattern are deeply
affected by rationalistic thinking. Even more striking is
the fact that any democratic period is marked by a general
tendency towards rationalising the field of social re-
lations. In any democratic community the conviction is
widely spread, that society can be organised according to
rational ends, that the people meeting together and
deliberating upon their own interests can find common goals
and ways of action which make an equal appeal to everyone of
them. One can further on say that every democratic comm-
unity is founded on the conviction of its capacity for
self-legislation, i.e. the/

conviction that any diversity of of interests can
finally be solved in a compromise, that any new
experience can emerge in a general scheme of action.
The first Puritans landing on the barren coast of
New England (1620) had the strong conviction that,
by their combination into a "body politick", they
could "enact, constitute, and frame such just and
equal laws, ordinances and acts, constitutions and
offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most
meet and convenient for the general good of the Colony
...." (From the constitutive act signed by this group
of immigrants. Quot. from Tocqueville : Democracy in
America, p. 35. Italics ours.)

This section regarding the constitution of the
democratic frame of mind can be concluded as follows:
The individuals belonging to a group in process of
democratisation uphold the conviction that their society
is a self-legislative body, and that its individual
members can formulate their own interests in a common
pattern of life.   This pattern is flexible so as to
include them all, and to remain still open to new
experiences, and to new wishes the individuals may have
in the future.   The power of self-legislation and the
flexible character of its organisation form two main
features of a democratic community.

Psyche and History./

<u>Psyche and History.</u>   We have begun the study of
democracy with the description of the democratic
frame of mind, and thus established that its main
traits consist in the feeling of change, in the deep
conviction that the individuals make their society
"by their hands", in the relative and representative
character of social power and authority, and in the
confidence in reason.   In doing so we have left the
impression that democracy is a purely psychological
reality.   This may be true, but it would be wrong to
understand by this that democracy, ancient or modern,
or the democratic way of life in general, sprang up
from the mind of some particular individuals and groups,
like Athena from Zeus' head.   What we really mean when
saying that democracy is a psychological reality is
that any democratic institution, and any democratic
organisation, is prepared by a series of inclinations,
feelings, convictions and habits of thinking in the mind
of the people long before its historical realisation.
At a certain period, and in a certain historical context
these mental elements are translated into institutions
and modes of social behaviour which together form a
democratic society and a democratic way of life.   This
happened in various Greek communities and in various
modern nations.   We are prepared to go even further and
say:

that, when this frame of mind is lacking, democratic institutions cannot grow; if they are introduced from outside they are likely to be mutilated or to disappear altogether after a short time. The example of various Greek cities, where democracy was introduced by the Athenians (Samos) the example of Mexico, where the early American democratic institutions failed to take root, the unsuccessful attempt towards the democratisation of Germany and of Eastern Europe in the inter-war period, can be adduced as proofs. Democracy grows out of its own soil. This means that it requires specific experiences and specific mental changes in a community before appearing as historical reality.

But, on the other hand, one can say that the democratic frame of mind is itself a historical product. In the previous section we have endeavoured to show how the feelings, the dispositions, the beliefs and the habits of thought which make up the democratic frame of mind have grown out of a series of experiences characteristic of certain communities and certain historical periods. Thus, the conviction that society is a flexible and open structure, the confidence, common to the members of a group, that they can make their society by their hands, are mental products gradually built/

up in societies undergoing a process of rapid growth,
in which there exists an intense process of cooperation
between its members, and in which, at least a number of
the individuals have a considerable amount of experience
in self-administration. This happened in a series of
Greek and modern communities. This shows that the
democratic frame of mind is itself determined by
sociological factors, a fact which seems to contradict
the assertion made in the previous paragraph that
democracy is the product of a particular frame of mind.

We have obviously reached the heart of the dilemma,
sociologism-psychologism, which we lay no claim to have
solved. We might however minimise the importance of
this dilemma by the following formulation of our problem:
It is obviously true that the democratic frame of mind
developed and became articulated as the result of a
particular pattern of experiences. In modern societies
these experiences are furnished by an expanding and
rational economy, by quick social changes, and by certain
political methods. But these experiences have no meaning
in themselves. Moreover, in the flow of historical
process they are more or less disconnected events. Here
comes the creative characters of the mind. The mental
factors resulting from the experiences characteristic of
a rational economy, and of a changeable society formed
an/

integrated structure with those resulting from the
experiences in self-administration, social co-operation,
etc. And it is the integration of these factors into
a whole that forms the basic layer of a democratic
frame of mind. Thus, the members of some modern
communities have gradually become aware - most of them
have felt this unconsciously - that the type of social
order which suits them best is a flexible society, i.e.
a society open to changes according to the conditions
of life of its members. But at the same time, the people
became aware of something even more important, i.e. that
they can realise this type of society for the simple
reason that they discovered in themselves inclinations,
feelings and habits of mind which directed them towards
this end. They expressed this in a simple manner :
A society based on flexible order, on the participation
of every one of its members, a society capable of self-
legislation, with a representative form of authority,
in a word, a democratic society, was necessary because
it corresponded to human nature. Apparently they were
little aware of the fact that human nature, as they
defined it, was formed by a long process, and, in specific
historical conditions. In the next chapter we shall try
to/

describe the main aspects of the social and spirital
world which contributed most to the formation of the
democratic mind and of the democratic way of life
of modern European man. At the same time, we shall
endeavour to throw light on an opposite process,
i.e. how this mental nucleus of democracy grows up
into history. The way a democratic frame of mind
grows into history can be thought of in a manner
similar to the way this first chapter grows into
the present book.

C H A P T E R II.

A FLEXIBLE SOCIETY.

> Italy, always delighted in a
> new thing, has lost all stab-
> ility......; a servant may
> easily become a king.
>
>   Aeneas Sylvius.

<u>Some Economic Aspects in the Flexibility of Socio-
cultural Patterns in Modern Europe</u>.   In what follows
we propose to give a brief account of the most important
economic changes taking place in post-Renaissance
Europe in order to show the degree of flexibility
acquired by the socio-cultural patterns of various
European societies as a result of them ~~changes~~.   It
would perhaps be advisable to state at the very
beginning that on no account do we wish to create the
impression that the economic factors are the most
important elements in the structure of a society and
even less so in the democratisation of Western Europe.
One of our main endeavours is to keep away from any
"reductionist" approach to human society, economic or
otherwise.   The flexibility of various European socio-
cultural patterns is due to a complex process from which
we detach, for the time being, the economic aspects.

        Many sociologists, even among those who cannot be
called/

materialistically-minded, are inclined to describe
in economic terms the main changes which have taken
place in European civilisation since the Renaissance.
They consequently speak of a new type of economy
which grew up as a result of the Renaissance and
which has since dominated the modern way of life.

For Alfred von Martin, for instance, the mediæval
system in the field of economy was based on small units,
on "the order of small men, peasants and artisans, who
by the work of their hands earned their keep, in
accordance with the necessities of their rank, their
traditionally fixed needs". (Op. cit. p 8.)   The
large mediæval estates did not bring any specific
note into this system, due primarily to the indolent
mode of life of their owners.

The important fact should be noted that mediæval
economic activity, be it that of the "small men" or of
the landlords, is primarily agricultural.   The typical
economic unit is, as Max Weber calls it, the "budgetary
unit" meaning that both production and exchange are
orientated towards, and limited by, the immediate
necessities of consumption.   The individual is completely
dependent upon the group for his subsistence, while the
group itself is dependent upon long, traditionally
organised modes of economic activity.   Therefore the
whole/

system provides both the individual and the group with but a small degree of freedom in their respective spheres of activity.

It is against this background that the modern capitalist economy developed. The first step consists in the accumulation of large fortunes due to a series of historical circumstances, the commerce between European cities and foreign lands being the most important of them. The new type of fortune is measured, not in land, but in money. We shall deal in the next section with the important part played by money, as a means of exchange, in the flexibility of various European socio-cultural patterns. For the moment we attempt to sketch the main changes produced in the economic field by the capitalist system. To start with, the basic economic unit in such a system is no longer the budgetary unit, but the profit-making unit, or enterprise. 1). Consumption no longer sets a limit to production. On

1). Aristotle touches upon a main difference between a budgetary and a profit-making unit when speaking about two functions of money: a. selling in order to buy, and b. buying in order to sell. (G. Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens. London p. 351).

The terms subsistence and exchange economy do not cover entirely the concepts of budgetary and profit making units.

the contrary, the central tendency is to increase production above the level of consumption with the aim of/

its commercialisation. Production should be market-
orientated, i.e., adapted less and less to the

consumers needs - which have in time become themselves

conditioned by production, i.e., manufactured - and

more and more to the competition with other profit-

making units. The man belonging to this type of

economy is, as W. Sombart says, dominated by rational

gain-seeking (Gewinnstreben), a fact that differentiates

him sharply from the man belonging to a pre-capitalist

age. Thus, the new economic order has gradually changed

important aspects in the structure of man and of his

society. New drives have been installed into the way

of life of European communities which resulted in a

high development of the flexibility and dynamism of

their social and cultural structures. Rationalisation

and competition are amongst the most important of these

drives. Let us say a few words about each of them.

A profit-making enterprise explains by itself the

nature of competition. Since a full examination of this

point is obviously beyond the interest of this chapter,

we would rather focus our attention on the following

specific questions. How can one account for the fact

that the economic order, based on profit-making enterprise,

promotes the individual as its operational units, thus

turning/

the whole economic system and the whole way of life
into a field of competition, emulation and rivalry
between individuals ? How can one account for the
fact that the old economic order, based on guild
organisation, with price fixing and compulsory
corporisation, became, in the modern era, broken down
into as many units as there were individuals with
self-initiative ?   In other words, how does the new
economic order become individualised ?

The first answer to these questions is suggested
by the rational character of a profit-making enterprise.
The enterprise consists in an organised action towards
an end, implying choice of means and the possibility of
calculating the value of each step towards the achievement
of the end. What really matters is the end in view, and
for this, prominence is given to the individual's
initiative and abilities, rather than to his birth and
rank.   In no other historical period has human society
been dominated by stronger and better defined rational
ends than these. For their fulfilment, no socio-cultural
factor is required, no particular faith, no particular
ideology, no status, save two factors inherent in the
ends themselves : money and intelligence. Intelligence
is purely formal in character, i.e. its main function
is to weigh and organise any circumstances of life which
may/

lead to the chosen end.

The individualising tendencies in the economic order are expressed first of all in the system of ownership. Max Weber considers, for instance, the expropriation of workers of the means of production, taking place at the beginning of the modern age, as one of the main aspects of the rationalisation of economic activity. (By rationalisation he means chiefly the organisation of an activity in the view of a maximum of efficiency). Whether this phenomenon has in the long run proved to be rational, is a deba-table question. But it has certainly proved the value of the individual as a centre of initiative in the economic field, and in more than one way. It has, in the first place proved the superiority of the individual owner of the means of production over the mediaeval corporated group. This superiority is measured in rapidity of decision, in willingness to accept risks, and, on the whole, in the owner's capacity to harmonise his effort with the intrinsic requirements of the profit-making enterprise. For it is generally agreed that many commercial and industrial enterprises were built up by the savings of thrifty individuals. The system of dividends, for instance, is often regarded as a method of rewarding abstention from immediate satisfaction,/

and thus an incentive for increasing the original
capacity of enterprise by building up an ever-growing
working capital. Collective management and ownership
cannot adapt themselves so rapidly and thoroughly to
the conditions required by the efficiency of enterprise.

The very same process, i.e. the expropriation
of workers of the means of production, resulted in the
loosening of the ties between the individual and his
community of work, on the one hand, and his society in
general, on the other. This is mainly due to the role
played by money in the new economic order which
gradually created a new type of social integration.
Both the owners, as profit-makers, and the workers,
as wage-earners, have to a great extent reduced their
social bonds to those which could be expressed in
terms of money. In what follows we shall deal with
the part played by money in the evolution of the modern
economic order, and of modern society in general. But
before anything else we have to say that our interest
is confined to the two following aspects of this
important problem. To what extent has money contributed
to the rationalisation of modern European societies;
and to what extent has its influence rendered the patterns
of these societies more flexible, therefore more liable
to/

democratisation?

As we have already mentioned, the rationalisation
of an action consists in its organisation in the view
of a maximum of efficiency.   The process of rational-
isation presupposed the following conditions : a). clear
ends in action, b). freedom of choice among alternative
means, (assured in the economic field by free markets),
c). a minimum of waste, d). systematic control over
the various steps and conditions of action.   Since all
these presuppose the capacity to calculate, money is
obviously the most adequate means of rationalisation
of human action in general and of economic action in
particular.   The reason for this is that money offers
the greatest possibility of calculating the elements
and the stages of action in order to increase its
efficiency.   When the components of an action and their
inter-relations are expressed in money, that action
reaches a maximum of rationality.   In this case the
pattern of action is reduced to money-accounting which
is obviously an ideal example of rational action.

The rational organisation of economic action
has gradually become a prototype of organisation in
modern society as a whole.   Calculability, rentability
and efficiency have become the dominant norms in the
evolution of this society.   Max Weber is one of the
first/

to draw attention to this important phenomenon.
He considers the concept of rationality as one of the
key concepts in the understanding of capitalist economy
and of modern society as a whole. Phenomena of an
exceptional importance in contemporary society such
as those of bureaucratisation and free labour, are,
for him, the results of this drive for rationalisation
dominating the modern world.

With regard to the part played by money in
rendering the pattern of modern societies flexible
we distinguish the following points.

A. There is no need to insist upon the flexibility
of an economic order based on money as a means of
exchange. It seems enough to mention the difference
between natural and monetary economy regarding the
flexibility of transaction, or the role played by the
"budget" in the capacity of an economic unit to adjust
itself to various conditions. Due to money, the process
of exchange has become more flexible, i.e. more adjust-
able to the interested parts.

B. The relationship between the individual and
his community affected by the increased importance of
money in modern societies. Firstly, the relationship
between the individual and the institutionalised
authority of his society, the state became more flexible,
and/

objective, at the same time, since they began to

be arranged in terms of money.   This is the case

of the individual's obligations to the State, paid

in income-tax, as compared with his duties towards

the landlord, in a feudal system.   The obligations

paid in money are more flexible because they can be

more easily adjusted to the particular conditions

of each individual, than can feudal duties.   They are

also more objective in the sense that they take the

character of a deal, with no feeling of personal

obligation, as was usual in a feudal system.

C.   Money was often used as a means of buying

liberty for the individual, i.e. the periodic duties

towards the landlord were paid once and for all, in a

round sum of money.   The social status of the individual

was, by this, radically changed.   (Money was used to
buy freedom, not only for the individual, but sometimes
for a whole community.   Re case of Louis XIV who commer-
cialised the municipal liberties of the French towns   is
well-known.) (See Tocqueville; The State of Society, p.53).

D.   Money induces a high degree of flexibility

not only in the relationships between individual and the

State, but also in inter-human relationships in general.

An interhuman relation stated in terms of money gains in

flexibility because it can more adequately be defined

than/

any other kind of human relation.   Firstly, it
lasts only as long as money is involved, i.e. as long
as there are paying and paid agents in it.   Secondly,
the engaged parties are psychologically dependent
on one another only to the extent to which they are
paid, or to which they pay.   Their personality can
remain outside the system of relationships.   Thus the
relationship between employer and employed, is in
principle not one of domination-submission, but one of
a formal and impersonal system of obligations on both
sides.   The relationships are not loaded with either
social factors such as status and class, or with
psychological factors such as superiority-inferiority.
The use of money has already contributed to that technique
of inter-human relations by which the individuals can be
related to each other without engaging their personalities,
or engaging them as little as possible.

E.   Another aspect of the influence of money is
seen in the great capacity for individualisation
characteristic of the modern way of life.   Work, abilities,
consumption, etc. when expressed in money become so
flexible that one could fix the place of every individual
on the dimensions described by them.   This brings a
high possibility of differentiation between the individual
members of the group, and consequently a high degree of
formal/

freedom. It brings, on the other hand, a widening of the socio-cultural space, creating specific scope for the personality of each individual. This is, as we shall see later on, an important condition of democratisation.

F. Under the impact of money, every human relationship tends to become a "transaction". This allows better opportunity for the individual to find his right place in a net of relationships. It allows, also, more scope for change and improvement in the pattern of social relationships. It is not by chance that the theoretical founders of modern democracies stress the "transactional" or the "contractual" character of human society, and of the State in particular. Society is, in their view, an agreement which can be broken and re-formulated as many times as the parts decide to do so. This is the highest degree of flexibility human society has ever achieved.

G. There is another aspect of the impact of money upon modern life brilliantly analysed by George Simmel (Philosophie des Geldes). This can be stated briefly as the supremacy of the category of quantity in modern civilisation. The tendency characteristic of modern science to look at the quantitative aspect of phenomena is at least partly a result of this trend. The idea of/

steady progress, by adding new small quantities to the old stock, is another aspect of the same phenomenon. Most suggestive is Simmel's opinion that democracy, with its central concept of majority, is a financial conception of life. It is number that counts. In this consists author attempt to link democracy with a specific economic system which is, in our own view, a far too narrow perspective.

H.   Much more significant for a democratic way of life is the lack of the "formal character of money". (Simmel). Money knows no social norms; it tends to confer power and prestige to anyone who possesses it, no matter what his class and status.   Due to this particular quality, money produced in a relatively short period a real revolution in a society rigidly organised for centuries.   During and more so after the Renaissance the individual could move upwards and downwards within his own society according to his luck in the matter. Thus money has infused the development of modern societies with a new tempo. This caused not only flexibility, but even instability in the structure of these societies. Already in the Renaissance, Aeneas Sylvius seems to grasp the essence of the era opening up under his eyes when writing about his own country: "Italy always delighted in a new thing, has lost all stability...; a servant may easily become a king". (Quot.from von Martin op.cit.p.5).

Now let us pass on to the second aspect of the
modern economic order which contributed to the flex-
ibility of the pattern of modern societies, thus
preparing the ground for democracy. This consists
in the competitive character of modern economic activity.

The sources of the modern competitive spirit lie
in the gain-seeking which constitutes one of the central
features of the modern economic system. Due to this
drive, the rigid mediaeval economic order was gradually
transformed into a fluid structure in which the individual's
position was determined by his capacity to resist and to
break the attack of his competitors.

There are two aspects in the evolution of the
modern competitive spirit which, due to their close
connection with the flexibility of the pattern of modern
societies, deserve special attention : 1). Competition
as the driving force of economic activity, and 2).
competition as an "ideal" or as a regulative principle
of modern life.

1. Competition is originally a technique indis-
pensable to the profit-making enterprise. This means that
the main motive of economic activity is the drive for
profit, and that one of the principal methods of achieving
this is competition, But due to a series of factors
inherent/

in the modern economic system, competition has become
in itself a motive of economic action. (An autonomous
motive). This would imply that one can act economically
for competition's sake, or, for the values involved
in the struggle with other individuals, and for the
prospective pleasure of winning over one's opponent.
Some economists go as far as to define the essence of
economic activity in modern society, as a "competitive
game" (Fr. H. Knight. The Ethics of Competition. Allen
and Unwin, 1935). This seems to us to give an exag-
gerated importance to the competitive spirit in modern
capitalist society. In fact, the central motive of
economic action in this society has always been the
maximisation of income. But this, nevertheless, shows
clearly the fact that one of the most characteristic
aspects of the modern economic order consists in a
perpetual race between the individual members of a
community. It also shows the dynamic and flexible
character of a society based on such an economic system.

2. It has been said very often that modern man is
an economic man. This implies that his world-outlook and
his culture-pattern are dominated by economic values.
That is why many students of contemporary civilisations
speak about economic action and values as ideals of life,
and about economic, or competitive ethics as a type of
ethics/

prevailing in the contemporary world. We cannot enter into the discussion of this important aspect of contemporary life. For our present purpose it seems enough to point to the undeniable fact that, in modern societies, economic value has gradually become an independent and finally a dominant value.

The first step towards the independence of economic value from other values consists in the conviction, rooted in long practice, that economically-orientated action can more easily attain its own aim when separated from religious, political or moral considerations. Hence the autonomy of economic value from other socio-cultural values. Max Weber sees in this another characteristic aspect of the rational nature of capitalist economy. "When economically orientated action - he writes - is dominated by a religious faith, by warlike passions, or by attitudes of personal loyalty, and similar modes of orientation, the level of rational calculation is likely to be very low". (op. cit. p. 194).

The explanation may vary, but the fact remains clear that the economic values and the economic style of life gain more and more independence, and finally supremacy, in the modern world. As early as the beginning of the Renaissance in Italy, the Popes had to aquiesce in the fact that money-making and finally, the style of life

created/

by the business man , had their place in society side
by side with other styles of life such as that of the
monk or of the warrior.

One of the important aspects in the evolution
of the economic way of life in the modern world is seen
in the battle between the economic and political order
of modern societies. This is, in fact, the struggle
of the individial against the State with the aim of
freeing his economic purposes from any constriction
other than that imposed by a free market. In this
process lies the origin of what has been called the
negative aspect of modern liberty (Simmel), i.e., the
tendency characteristic of modern man, to reduce to
the lowest possible degree the function of the state
and of government in his society so as to create as
large as possible an arena of free competition between
individuals.

This negative aspect of modern liberty - the
withdrawal of the State - was strongly supported by a
series of events taking place at the beginning of the
modern era. Thus an "avalanche" of geographical and
scientific discoveries has resulted in the loosening
of the ties between the individual and his society.
Moreover, these discoveries aroused in the individual
the feeling of a permanently open frontier for his
initiative and imagination. There, in the new territories,

social organisation had a relatively small importance
for the success of the individual's actions, which were,
at least at the beginning, economic actions.   This
strengthened the feeling that "getting ahead in the world"
(Knight) as an individual is a supreme command for
economic action and for life in general.

But the same events and strivings, characteristic
of the economic order at the beginning of the modern era,
aroused in modern man something much more significant
from our specific point of view, i.e. the feeling of
the fluid character of his society.   ~~Thus~~ Man became
more and more aware of the flexibility and provisionality
of society as a pre-established structure of life in a
group.   Thus the feeling that the individual can build
up his own society wherever he goes became an important
element of his mind.   All depends entirely upon the
capacity of agreeing with others.   This state of mind
is certainly due, to a considerable extent, to the impact
of the modern economic way of life based on competition.

Due to the influence of the economic type of action,
the whole social life had the tendency to style itself
after the model of the market. Today one very often uses
the expressions "market-society", or "competitive society"
in order to describe the particular features of modern
society.   This means from our own point of view, that
the socio-cultural pattern of modern societies has been
gradually/

divided up in to as many units as there are individual
members.   Each individual member works on the assumption
that getting ahead in the world as an individual, in
competition with other individuals, is the supreme norm
in life, and that the structure of society grows
naturally out of the net of competitive actions. Society
is, in fact, a huge compromise, a general contract.

In conclusion we can say that, as a result of the
competitive spirit and the drive of rationalisation,
new processes take place within European societies which
hasten their democratisation. First of all "time" becomes
an important dimension of life in society. This phenomenon
so revealing for the flexibility of a socio-cultural
pattern, deserves much more attention than we are able to
pay in this study.   Due to the new tempo, infused in
modern society mainly by the spirit of competition,
quickmindedness and alertness have become fundamentally
important human qualities.   Thus time has added a new
dimension to the socio-cultural space in which the
individual can be differentiated. Great possibility
of individual differentiation means flexibility in the
socio-cultural pattern, i.e. a democratic condition of
the first order. There is no wonder that it is in the
Italian cities of the Renaissance that for the first
time, the big tower clock, significantly placed in the /
near

vicinity of the market, started to strike each quarter
hour. The new type of society, the flexible society, lives
in time.

Closing our discussion of the economic aspect of the
flexibility of the modern European socio-cultural pattern
we should like to dwell briefly on the system of private
land-ownership. The reason for this lies in the particular
significance this aspect of economic life has for the
democratisation of modern societies.

An important step forward towards the flexibility
of modern economic order has been made with the division
of big estates into small-holdings. Land for those who work
and live in it constituted one of the main points of the
programme in European democratic movements. It also con-
stitutes one of the most expressive formulae of the indiv-
idualisation of the modern economic order. As a result of
this, one of the main sectors of modern economy has been
broken down into individual units consisting of small-
holdings run by the head of a family.1).

1). The fact that in the eighteenth century the French
peasant "not only ceased to be a serf, he had become an
owner of land" is considered by Tocqueville among the main
causes of the Revolution. (State of Society...p.29). This
was the case neither in Germany, where the peasants were
still literally "ascripti glebae", as in the Middle Ages.
Nor in England, where "there had been peasant landowners,
but, the number of them had considerably decreased".(Idem,
p.30). It is the aspirations and the struggle of these
peasants towards the liberation of their land from the
burdens imposed upon it by the nobility and the Church that
Tocqueville considers an important factor driving towards the
Revolution.

A similar phenomenon is noticed in the Athenian Commun-
ity. During Cleisthenes' rule, there grew up a class of
peasantsholders of land, a fact which constitutes an import-
ant aspect of the process of democratisation taking place
during that period. (Groiset. Op. Cit. p. 57).

The organic link between personality and ownership
characteristic of an agricultural economy based on
small-holdings makes this system, in many respects,
more flexible than that of capitalist economy. For
the peasant, or the farmer has a natural capacity to
adjust his standard of living to the supreme interest
of his independence as a land possessor. A series of
restrictions and losses are more easily supported by a
small household than by a large agricultural unit
working on a capitalist model. That is why an agricultural
economy of capitalist type is far more sensitive to
cyclical fluctuations than an agricultural economy based
on peasant farming.

The flexibility of the system based on small house-
holds is primarily due to its individualised, almost
personalised, character. The individual, peasant, or
farmer, extends his personality to his own possession;
he is often identified with the "possessor" of the land.
Unlike the industrial worker or the capitalist, who are
ready to blow up the whole economic system when ever
they feel that it no longer suits them, the peasant
perishes or survives with his possession. From this
organic quality of the system springs up the "mystic"
bond between man and land which made many people -
Spengler/

for instance - believe that land owndership is the
only natural form of possession, i.e. the only adequate
basis for the development of man as an individual and as
a group.   (Spengler makes a distinction between "Besitz"
(property) as a means of self-realisation, and "Vermögen
(possession or fortune) as an end which transforms man
into a means.JAHRE der ENTSCHEIDUNG (Quot.Ed.p.71).
Some of the makers of the French Revolution saw also
in the formula "land for everybody", and a society
based on self-sufficient small holders, artisans and
shopkeepers, the strongest guarantee of liberty. Saint
Just grows enthusiastic whenever he touches upon this
point.   The highest happiness offered by the Republic
consists, according to him, in "la volupté d'une cabane,
d'un champs fertile cultivé par vos mains, une charrue,
un champs, une chaumière à l'abri de la lubricité d'un
brigand, voilà le bonheur" (Saint Just Quoted by J.L.
Talmon The Origind of Totalitarian Democracy, Secker and
Warburg London, 1951 p. 162).   There is one aspect of
rural economy based on the system of small holdings which
has a particular significance today for a democratic
way of life.   The system of "parcellation" has undoubt-
edly led to individualism in this economic sector. But
from the psychological point of view it is important to
know/

that this has not necessarily led to a competitive system of the industrial and commercial type. With the exception of a few highly industrialised countries, the peasant does not see himself, in his work, or in his relationship with others, under the perspective of the market society, i.e. in competition. His land, his cattle, his household are primarily "his own".

This gives him the feeling of a complete independence and unity rather than that of being related to, or in competition with, others. In his way of life the accent falls on the independence and uniqueness of human personality, rather than on its quality of being a member in a group. This does on no account mean that peasant society is not integrated. It means only that the integrating factors are of instinctive, traditional, and above all of moral character; they are not subject to formal reason and practical arrangements, as is normally the case in industrial society. The basis of society being, so to speak, assured, the prevailing tendency of each member of a peasant society is to be himself, to grow into himself. He seldom feels the need of giving up part of his personality by joining various types of "organisations" whose purpose it is to protect him from others, for the simple reason that he does not live in a competitive/

world.

A type of society made up by small-holders
contains in itself protective measures against two
anti-democratic trends inherent in the structure of
modern commercial and industrial society : the trend
of super-organisation, and its opposite, disintegration.
This system refuses over-rationalisation by its own
nature, i.e., the tendency to put efficiency, economic
and social, above everything, and to organise the
group accordingly.   The peasant, as landowner, cannot
be rigidly organised in a system of production in which
he is reduced to an executant.   Any rationalisation
of agricultural economy has to start by the expropriation
of the peasants which amounts to their "mutation" into
a completely different social class.   This is the last
blow given to democracy by contemporary totalitarianism.

On the other hand, peasant society, of all societies,
needs the least super-organisation for the simple reason
that it does not suffer from the disintegrating effects
of competition.

Political Aspects of Flexibility.   One often says that
the Renaissance marks the transition from "community" to
"society". Since lack of space does not allow us to
discuss/

critically the foundation of this thesis, the use of
the terms "community" and "society" in this study is
but a convenient way of pointing out a series of
differences between mediaeval and modern society.

Size is often believed to be the main difference
between community and society. Though important from
a psychological point of view, size is, in our opinion,
not a necessary difference between these two types of
social organisation. The real difference consists in
their respective degree of flexibility. A community is
a relatively static and rigid type of socio-political
organisation. It is based on a traditional - normally
authoritarian - type of authority. Life in a community
is dominated by religious or quasi-religious ways of
thought. There, time is not an important dimension of
life. "Everything temporal is to it no more than a
parable, a symbol of the metaphysical, and nature is but
a reflexion of the transcendental", writes A.von Martin
about the mediaeval community. (Op. cit.p2).

The basis of human relationships is in a community,
primarily emotional. The individuals are linked together
by bonds of blood, community of faith, mystic ties with
the land, and by an age-long tradition. The attitude
towards authority in particular is saturated with emotional
factors, always involving certain hierocratic elements.
The inner/

structure of a community often though not necessarily shows rigidity resulting from strong barriers between sub-groups. The barriers may separate different classes, different castes, or simply the rulers from the ruled. Authority has a strong subjective character. The main reason for this lies in the fact that the relationship between ruled and rulers is regulated by emotional factors such as indiscriminate confidence, or fear, rather than by rational and practical arrangements.

This leads us to the following important point: The passing from community to society means a gain in rationality of human social and political organisation. By analogy with the use of the concept of rationality in the previous section, we can say that this implies first of all, the structuration of a group of individuals in the function of a series of conscious common ends. The degree of consciousness of the common ends is such that they are not only postulated by, but experienced and expressed in a manner adequate to each individual member. Thus, the individual's conformity with the organised action of the group does no longer spring from tradition and emotional compulsion, but from deliberation. As a result of this, the individual has "conscious legitimate expectation" from his conformity with the common ends. (Knight, Op. cit. p. 335).

We/

We have previously mentioned that the process of
rationalisation implies self-knowledge of the group.
A long period of stability in the life of the group
leads to the emergence of a set of common ends and
common modi vivendi. When the individuals become
aware of this, i.e. when they become aware of the fundam-
ental conditions of their life together, we say that the
self-consciousness of the group appears.

The self-consciousness of the group, as described
above, constitutes a basic condition of self-legislation,
in a political sense. In this case the individual
members of the group are capable of knowing the ends
common to them all, or to a majority of them, and of
working out techniques for their fulfilment. When the
common experience and the common ways of action in a group
are formulated in a set of general principles, one usually
says that the group has a constitution. This means that
the group has agreed "upon a process and a mechanism for
securing agreement on particular issues". (Knight Op. cit.
p. 342).

Self-knowledge, which results in self-legislation,
induces a high degree of rationality and flexibility in the
organisation of the group. The first implication of this
is that the main issues regarding the organisation of
the group can become rational ends for each of its members.

It/

also implies that the pattern of organisation of the group has become flexible to the extent of being more or less adequately represented in each individual member.

We cannot stress strongly enough the idea that without the crystallisation of the common experiences of the group into rational ends, in the mind of its individual members, the passage from community to society is not possible. In this very phenomenon lies the main difference between these two types of social organisation. While, in a community, the common ends are mainly unconscious, buried in tradition or in emotional factors, in society, they are conscious and rational. Their rational character does not necessarily mean that they are weak; it only means that their nature is such as to allow deliberation on them, and consequently personal adjustment. In other words they allow a democratic way of conformity. (1).

(1). This is the proper place to stress again the idea that what has been said so far in this section, though founded on a series of historical cases, defines rather an ideal case of flexibility in the political structure of a group. It implies for instance that its structure is sensitive to each member of the group. This only shows the difficulty involved in the definition of socio-political concepts. One has to postulate the "ideal type", otherwise the organisation of the empirical material is almost impossible.

In what follows we try to describe various political aspects/

in the drive towards flexibility characteristic of
the pattern of modern society. There is one process
which shall be dealt with in particular, i.e. the
minimisation and decentralisation of power.

Minimisation of power results from the extension
of the sphere of political decision in a group from one
man to a section of the population, and finally to the
people.   Under its negative aspect the same process
can be formulated as the limitation of the power
concentrated in a certain sector by its diffusion in
all sectors of society. These are some of the main
modes of minimisation of power, most of them being
characteristic of modern societies.

A. Even in mediaeval absolutist society one can
find certain processes which lead in the long run to
minimisation of power. This is seen not so much in the
transfer of kingly power by the creation of nobility,
as in the rise of an administrative body. The exercise
of power, in a feudal system, led to the creation of an
administrative body and bureaucracy which, due to its own
technical training, one the one hand, and to the incapacity
of the landlord, on the other, was allowed more and more
initiative and independence.   This resulted in the limit-
ation of the effective power of the lord. This specific
form of minimisation of power might be considered as a
characteristic/

aspect in the rise of British Democracy. Albert Beebe
White represents an extremist view on this point.
(Self-Government at the King's Command. Univ. of
Minnesota Press, 1933). In his view, the sources of
self-government and democracy in England should not be
looked for in the wish and the struggle of the people
to rule themselves. This is a common belief which
cannot be proved with facts taken from the history of
England. Self-government and the positive drive in
the people for ruling themselves is the result of
the habit of mediaeval English kings to use local
people of all classes in public affairs.
As a result of this, the people were trained in the art
of government. "The thesis is - writes White - that
English kings, working in what they believed to be their
own personal interest, so used the English people in
government, laid upon them for centuries such burdens,
that they went far towards creating the Englishman's
governmental sense and competence, that Norman and
Angevian royal training has been more potent than an
urge to self-government in Anglo-Saxon blood". (p. 2).
One of the conclusions is that ".. the early House of
Commons was a royal creation to meet the royal needs".(p.2).

B.   The political system of "collegiality" is a
rudimentary/

form of decentralisation of power.   It implies that
the decision of one chief can be delayed or vetoed by
another. (The system of Ephors, of the Consuls in Rome
and that of the "Capitani del Popolo" can be taken as
an example).   In some cases the disposition of a
monocratic authority can be carried out only after
formal consultation, and approval of another specific
type of authority.   A particular case of "collegiality"
is when the chief is primus inter pares. Advisory bodies
to a monocratic chief - Senatus Romanus for instance -
and the Privy Council are other forms of "collegiality".

The significance of "collegiality", as a form of
authority, is from our point of view, the following.
Though in no sense a specific democratic phenomenon,
"collegiality" produces a certain (limited) minimisation
and diffusion of power. This is the result of competition
for the position of power. Collegiality implies a
plurality of candidates for the same office, and a
number of persons in the same office whose spheres of
authority are not always well-defined.   Max Weber is
of the opinion that it was in terms of collegiality that
the separation of power in England started. (The appro-
priation of governing power by the privileged groups, and
the financial need of the monarchs led to the necessity
of consultation and of compromise over the budget).

C.   The/

C. The rise of opposition as a legally constituted body is certainly one of the most important steps towards the minimisation of power. Opposition implies open contest of power and authority within a social organisation.

Thus opposition rises naturally from the exercise of power, i.e. it is inherent in the dialectic of power. Any concentration of power in a group gives rise not only to a passive resistance in various sectors deprived of power, but also to an active tendency to oppose, weaken and destroy the power-holding body. And as the power has an accumulative tendency, so has the opposition.

Considering some concrete circumstances contributing to the rise of opposition in Modern Europe it seems that its origin lies in the tendency of monocratic authority to strengthen, rather than to weaken its power. Absolutist rulers were naturally interested in having round them opposing groups in order either to keep themselves well informed, or to play the opposing interests against each other. But the advantages drawn by these rulers from their role of intermediary were inevitably counteracted by a gradual minimisation of their power. This was the natural result of the well-known game of making concession to the weakest in order to keep the strongest in check./

Finally in Western societies it was through the representative bodies of various groups that a real opposition to monarchy was formed. In England, the system of the two Houses of Parliament and in France the representative bodies of the three estates formed the basis of the minimisation of absolutist power.

D. A political party is an association of individuals with the ultimate end of securing power for its leaders. We cannot enter here into the analysis of different types of political parties. We confine ourselves to a brief description of the significance of these parties for the process of minimisation of power. In principle the existence of more than one party in a group implies that power is divisible. This formal condition comes to an end only when a party assumes all the power for itself.

The origin of political parties lies in the organisation of various sub-groups- classes, occupational groups, national or family groups, etc. on a political basis, i.e. with the view to securing power within the whole group. But whatever their origin, the parties have to define their position in the group as a whole by formulating in one way or another their manner of exercising power. This is in fact, the normal technique of recruiting their supporters. In this lies another aspect of minimisation of power in the sense that power

becomes/

conditioned by a certain formulation, i.e. it is obtained and maintained only when moulded into a programme which, in time, becomes itself a preamble to the position of power.

E.   The highest degree of minimisation is obtained when power is diffused from a small circle into the whole group. In this case, the consultation of the members of the group makes the authority legitimate. In other words, power lies with the group as a whole, and is being granted to a few by the mechanism of representation. The highest degree of diffusion of power is expressed by the democratic principle of formal political equality, or by the formula "one man, one vote".

The system of universal suffrage cannot by itself guarantee the diffusion of power implied in the formula one man, one vote. This is seen in many cases of plebiscite. The fact that, by plebiscite, authority draws its power from the group, does not necessarily lead to minimisation of power in the group. Sometimes the high degree of confidence shown by the people in their leader may incite the latter to concentrate unlimited power in his hands. This certainly happens when the attitude towards authority is strongly emotionalised and when the whole political structure of the group rests on emotional/

rather than rational factors.

We take again the opportunity of stressing the idea that democracy is first of all a way of life, i.e., that democratic mechanisms and techniques, though faithfully applied, may lead to forms of authoritarianism, if the way of life of the group contains powerful anti-democratic tendencies. Strong emotional integrating factors are examples of this.

F. The most important technical means for attaining and maintaining the minimisation of power are : 1. Short terms of office for the power-holding group, or personality. 2. Liability to be recalled at any time. 3. A strictly defined mandate for the conduct of office. 4. Obligation to give account and submit any unforeseen matter to the people (through its representative bodies). 5. Administrative decentralisation.

All the forms of minimisation of power mentioned above produced various degrees of flexibility in the political structure of modern societies. Concentration of power renders the socio-political structure of a group rigid in the sense that the majority of individuals live within social and political forms in the creation of which they did not take part. Minimisation or diffusion of power, on the contrary, offer to each individual member the possibility of moulding the structure of his own society.

C H A P T E R   111.

THE   PARADOX   OF   DEMOCRACY.

> Entre une société de fer et une
> de glace ou de porcelaine il n'y
> a pas à choisir.
> > Diderot.

Freedom and Order.   As has been pointed out in the
first chapter, democracy is closely related to an
empirical attitude in life.   Such as attitude implies
primarily that the flow of life is very little, if at
all, hampered by pre-established norms or patterns.
One can even say that the only sense of direction in the
life of the individual, or of the group, is to be found
in the stream of experience.   Thus, an empirical attitude
in life involves the highest degree of freedom for the
individual, freedom which is circumscribed only by the
limits of his own experience.   Formulae such as "laissez-
faire", "wait and see" or "getting ahead in the world"
which have been at various times applied to various
aspects of the democratic way of life, express this
basic freedom.   The degree of spontaneity and liberty
enjoyed by the members of a democratic group in their
political, economic, religious and moral manifestations
may/

easily give them the impression that the only source
of norms and restrictions in life lies in themselves,
in the limits of their own experience.

And yet one can hardly define democracy as a way
of life based on a purely empirical attitude in life.
Common observation shows that democratic institutions
and a democratic way of life grow more strongly and
more rapidly in those communities whose members do
more spontaneously than the members of other communities
what they ought to do. Moreover, the process of
democratisation met with better conditions in those
communities in which the building up and the maintenance
of a common pattern of life was facilitated by various
factors, historical, geographical or psychological.
This obviously suggests that democracy presupposes a
rational ~~- not necessarily goats that democracy pre-
supposes a rational~~ - not necessarily rationalistic -
attitude as well, i.e. that the life of the individual
within the group, and the evolution of the group as a
whole, are enlightened by certain norms and principles.
Therefore the concepts of freedom and spontaneity have to
be applied in a specific manner, to a democratic way of
life; one has to say that freedom means freedom to
integrate and plan, in a social sense, while spontaneity
means the possibility of choosing between given solutions.
In/

both cases the paradox is obvious. 1.

1.   It is no wonder that the ancient Greeks were
the real creators of the democratic way of life. For
one of their most outstanding mental features consisted
in their equal capacity to enjoy and enrich the forms
of life through the senses, and, at the same time, to
grasp more clearly than any other people the great
framework of life and the basic principles of human
experience in general.

This basic paradox is reflected in all the main

aspects of a democratic way of life.   A characteristic

instance is given by Aristotle when trying to define

freedom and equality as two fundamental concepts of

democracy.   Both concepts are for him easily definable

on a purely rational level.   But he asks himself how

can one define these concepts on an empirical level,

i.e. how are freedom and equality possible in a given

community ?   In practice freedom clashes, according

to him, with order.   In other words, it contradicts

the existence of a given pattern of life. Equality,

on the other hand, comes up against hierarchy, excellence

and even justice. The only way out is in a paradoxical

formulation of these concepts.   Aristotle does not

hesitate to take this course by defining democratic

freedom as freedom within the law. (Politics. English

Transl. by Benjamin Jowett, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Book IV, 4, and 14.)   With the concept of democratic

equality Aristotle seems to be in even more serious

trouble. His doubt is aroused by the question : How can

one/

realise and maintain equality amongst the members of
a group ? Should it be "created", if it is not found
in the natural condition of the community ? Consider-
ing the emphasis Aristotle lays on the institution
of ostracism, and the prominence given by him to the
opinion of Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, on this
matter, equality is in his eyes more of an "ought",
an ideal product of reason, rather than an empirical
condition of life.[1)] But what sort of equality is the
equality created by political measures ? This implies
that, when equality is not observed the "stronger ones"
use their power to maintain it, or to create it again.

[1)] Thrasybulus asked Periander for advice about the
troubles caused in his state by outstanding people.
Periander did not speak a word, but in front of
Thrasybulus' herald cut off the tallest ears of corn
till he brought the field to a level. Thrasybulus
understood from this that he had to cut off the heads
of the principal men in his state.(Arist.op.cit.lll.
13. p. 130).

The same kind of situation is even more clearly
demonstrated by modern European democracies. The
authors of the French Revolution, both the ideologues
and the politicians, concentrated their main effort on
the question of how to work out the pattern of life
of free men in a free society. Though they all regard
freedom as an empirical condition of human life, they
were almost obsessed with the principles by which
freedom is guaranteed. They prescribed freedom for
the/

individual, but wanted at the same time to make certain that he acted in accordance with what was required of him as a member of his society. Thus the politicians worked for the liberation of man from the chain of society, and displayed at the same time an even greater zeal for the building up of such (social) "Institutions" by which man is forbidden to act except freely. These apostles of freedom came finally to contradict themselves and formulated in the crudest way possible the basic paradox of democracy : the terror of freedom. If this means anything, it is that freedom as an empirical condition of human existence cannot be realised and maintained but by a certain degree of organisation, i.e. rationalisation of life.

The paradoxical character of democracy results from two socio-psychological processes necessarily involved in the democratisation of a community. Democracy requires the crystallisation of the experience in a group of individuals in a common pattern of life, and the liability of this pattern to be expressed in terms of conscious rational ends. This we call the process of rationalisation. But democracy requires also that the common pattern of life should be flexible enough as to be adjusted to the world of each individual member of the group. In this consists the capacity of the social pattern to individuate. The processes of rationalisation/

and individuation oppose each other, yet they complete each other in the structure of the democratic way of life. Let us analyse their nature more closely.

Rationalisation. Many aspects of the process of rationalisation were touched upon in the previous chapter, particularly when describing the difference between "community" and "society". It was stated there that the crystallisation of the experience of a group of individuals into a common pattern of life is a necessary condition for the existence of both community and society. The main difference between community and society lies in the nature of the common pattern of life. In community, this pattern is made up of irrational factors. The individual is linked with other individuals in a common life by instinctive and emotional ties; he is rarely conscious of the nature of these ties, and even if he were conscious, he can exercise little if any control upon them. The individual is driven from behind into the pool of communal life by being unable to discuss the motives of, or to deliberate on the aims of his life in a group. His personality submerges itself in the structure of his community.

The main characteristic of society is, on the other hand, that the patterns of communal life can be formulated as conscious ends./

It would perhaps not be entirely accurate to say
that in society, as distinct from community, tradition
loses its grip upon the mind of the individual. The
important thing is, however, that in society, the store
of common experience is from time to time projected
into conscious goals existing in the minds of the
majority of the individuals. Due to this, an important
part of the common pattern of life is decided at
the conscious level of the individuals' mind. This
does not necessarily imply that the individual is always
aware of the common interests and goals which unite him
with the other members of the group; it implies only
that he can find such interests and goals and that he
can express them in such a manner as to correspond to
certain constitutive rules of the human mind. Firstly,
the individual is aware of his own interests, and those
of other members of the group, secondly, he is ready
to deliberate with others, and to compromise in order
to find both, a community of interests and a common way
of action towards their achievement. Consequently,
one can say that the main difference between community
and society lies not as much in the fact that, in the
latter, the individuals are conscious of their common
interests, as in their readiness and capacity to
formulate by deliberation their common experiences and
interests/

as conscious goals and to organise their group accordingly. In this lies the basic condition of the process of rationalisation.

Social institutions in general can be considered as embodiments of the common ends of a group of individuals. But the rational nature of the interests and goals which tie up a group of individuals becomes more transparent when they are expressed in programmes of government, or, generally speaking, in a plan for conducting their common affairs. For in this case it is obvious that a number of individuals form an organisation to the extent to which they have found, and agreed upon a series of common ends. They type and the duration of their organisation is dependent on the duration and the nature of their goals. The highest degree of rationality in the structure of a group is attained when the individual members decide not only upon the best course of their action, but also upon the most adequate form of their organisation for the achievement of their common interests and ends. Thus, a series of general principles and laws are established. In these lie the origins of the process of self-legislation by which the group assumes for itself the function of framing laws, ordinances and constitutions, from time to time, as shall be thought convenient/

to the general interests.

Though there is no apparent need to prove
that the formulation of a common pattern of life in
a body of laws, or in a constitution, represents a
high degree of rational organisation, it would be
advisable, in view of later developments of the
present chapter, to throw a certain light on the
rational character of laws. This character derives
from the fact that they are established in the function
of conscious ends shared by the members of a group.
Each individual is therefore supposed to know the
purpose of the law; the authority of the law is based
on the evident character of its purpose. (In this lies
the main difference between laws and customs; the
individual performing a custom is not conscious of the
purpose of his behaviour). The rational character of
a law is also seen in the abstract and impersonal
character of its authority. Thus, both the application
of, and obedience to laws are primarily rational acts
involving as few emotional factors as possible which
would otherwise be unavoidable when the authority is
personal, i.e. a king or a leader.

Common observation shows that almost all groups
in process of democratisation manifest strong tendencies
towards a rational type of organisation. This is seen
in: A) the application of certain abstract principles
to/

the social and administrative organisation of the
group, B) in the ease with which the group can
formulate its pattern of life in a system of laws,
i.e. in a high capacity for self-legislation, and C)
in a general trend existing in the culture-pattern
of the group to condition the individual's social
behaviour to a formal and abstract type of authority
represented by the laws.

A). The Athenian community, while still at the
beginning of its democratisation, was fully re-organised
on a rational basis. Cleithenes broke down the old
organisation of local groups, consecrated by tradition
(Fratries), making use of an almost geometrical scheme
in the building up of the new organisation. He was
guided in his reform by the requirements of a rational
administration exclusively. It is important to notice
that, at the basis of the first modern democracy,
American society, one can find the same type of rational
organisation. The federal system itself can be adduced
as the main proof. There was no tradition and no
emotional factors that caused the inhabitants of the
various American States to form a nation and to unite
into a federal system. "The American people", "The
Federal government" were at that period but concepts
covering a rational necessity ; the Union was an
"ideal notion"/

and the Federal Government depended on "legal fictions".
(Tocqueville: Dem. in America p. 166). There is no
need to prove the existence of similar processes in
eighteenth century French society. There, the main
aim of the 1789 Revolution was to demolish the old
order based on tradition, and to frame a new society
within the principles of reason. Consequently, a
new administrative order sprung up from the requirements
of a rational organisation. Even social authority
itself was wrapped up in an abstract concept, the
sovereignty of the people. 1).

1. Trends towards a rational order are noticed
long before the Revolution. A highly centralised
administration, the system of "intendants" in particular,
and the use of statistics in order to improve the
efficiency of the administrative apparatus, noticed
throughout the eighteenth century, are the main aspects
of this. Tocqueville rightly points out that the
Revolution did not create, but strengthened these trends.

There is another aspect of this general drive
towards rationalisation worth mentioning. Any group
entering upon a process of democratisation changes its
internal order, from one based on the right of birth,
to one based on the right of wealth. In Athenian society
this change started with Solon and culminated in
Cleisthenes' reform. American society starts off on
this foot from the very beginning, and any later attempt
towards the establishment of a land aristocracy was
doomed/

to failure.   The French Revolution brought to an end
the old social order, based on privileges conferred
by birth.   In Great Britain, a similar process took
place at a slower pace throughout the modern era.
This specific change demonstrates the often mentioned
connection between democratisation and the rise of
the middle classes.

Whether the above change took place gradually
or abruptly the results were the same: A rigid
organisation, based on traditional and irrational
factors, was transformed into a more flexible
organisation based on the initiative and intelligence
of the individual members of the group. As shown
in the previous chapter, a social order in which the
economic factors play an important part becomes liable
to rational organisation.

B.) The drive of a group towards a rational
type of organisation is seen also in its capacity
for self-legislation. We are here referring primarily
to the ease and rapidity with which some groups of
individuals can express their common experiences and
interests in a set of general principles which they
regard as authoritative guides for their subsequent
social action.   The important thing should be emphasised
that these general principles represent in an abstract
form, i.e. as laws, the interests of all members of
the/

group, or at least, of a majority of them. The task
of the legislator - who may be an individual or a
selected body of professionals - is merely to give
expression to a series of already crystallised forms
of collective experiences and interests. After the
law is enacted, the individual members of the group
feel and behave as if they themselves were its authors.

An exceptional facility for self-legislation
is a distinctive mark of nearly all social groups in
process of democratisation. Athens had, according to
Aristotle, no less than eight constitutions from Solon's
to his own time. (See "The Constitution of Athens",
Transl. by Kurt von Friz. Hafner, N.Y. 1950). This
means that within this period, Athenian society had
re-formulated eight times its basic principles of
organisation, not mentioning the multitude of more
specific laws. The early American society showed an
extraordinary zeal and facility for law-making. The
same phenomenon is noticed in French society during the
revolutionary period in particular. This quality of
a social group in process of democratisation often
became a vice in a constituted democratic society; the
ability of a group of individuals to formulate their
common interests in a set of general principles and
laws turned into an excessive readiness to abandon laws
hardly/

put in application and to coin new ones. Thus,
the instability of laws is a characteristic feature
of Athenian society. The same phenomenon is noticed
by Tocqueville in America. "The facility and excess
of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our
governments are most liable". (Tocqueville quoting
"The Federalist" Op. cit. p. 206). Jefferson himself
was aware that the instability of laws was "a serious
inconvenience" (Ibid. p. 206). On this subject
Tocqueville concludes : "Hence America is, at the
present day, the country beyond all others where laws
last the shortest time. Almost all American constit-
utions have been amended within thirty years".(Idem p.
257).

Instability of laws may be considered easily as
a weak point in the organisation of a group; it may
spring from, and lead to social instability. But the
same phenomenon is an obvious trait of a democratic
pattern of life. By their facility to change old,
and to make new laws the individuals keep the structure
of their society open to new conditions of life, hence
ready to mould itself according to the ever-changing
wishes and interests of its members. The facility of
law-making characteristic of certain groups is based
mainly on a series of traits common to their members.
The individuals belonging to these groups show an

exceptional/

inclination towards public meetings, towards
discussions and debates; their interest in and
knowledge of public affairs rank higher than in
the individuals belonging to other groups. The
Athenians, the Americans, and since the end of the
eighteenth century, the French, can be given as
typical examples. These are important qualities
in the individual members of a democratic society.

C). The tendency to condition the individual's
social behaviour to a formal and impersonal type of
authority noticeable in all groups undergoing a process
of democratisation, constitutes another aspect in the
process of rationalisation. The prominent place given
to judiciary institutions and the respect paid to the
law are common characteristics of these groups. Athenian
society distinguished itself - at least after Solon -
by the existence of a great number of law courts and
tribunals as well as by the readiness of the Athenian
citizens to resort to law on any matters touching the
maintenance of public order. Cleisthenes was praised
above all for the way in which he succeeded in instilling
respect and obedience to laws in the Athenian citizens.1).

1. Most characteristic in this respect was the
institution of "Euthynos". Each tribe appointed an
"Examiner" (Euthynos) whose task it was to sit during the
regular market hours at the statue of the eponymous hero
and collect the charges against the magistrates which
any citizen had the right to make. The "examiner" had
then to bring the charges to the local judges. (Aristotle.
The Athenian Const. Ed. Quot. p. 49).

America offered from the very beginning the
example of a society dominated by the judiciary
power. While the legislative and the executive
powers were minimised by decentralisation, the
judiciary was, on the contrary, concentrated in the
Federal Courts and in the Supreme Courts of the
United States. There is no other modern society
more concerned than American society with methods and
institutions by which the laws can be enforced. "The
majesty of the law", as Tocqueville puts it, is
certainly a distinctive mark of this society. (Op. cit.
p. 139). And since the expression "the majesty of the
law" is mentioned, it should be said that this can also
be applied to modern British society. The specific way
in which this can be understood will be dealt with at a
later stage.

In conclusion one can say that all democratic
societies have conditioned the obedience of their
members to the abstract and impersonal authority of
the law. In Athens, Great Britain, and in Continental
democracies, this process was possibly only after the
individual's obedience was deconditioned from the personal
authority of an absolute ruler. In America this process
was to a lesser degree necessary.

The creation of an abstract-impersonal form of
authority was due mainly to a series of measures of
rationalisation/

to which democratic societies were submitted. Rational
methods in administration, rational principles in the
making and the application of laws, and respect for
the law, are the most important to them. These measures
have induced in the people the need and ability of using
reason in their social adjustment.

Thus, Athenian citizen could hardly use his instincts
or feelings in his adjustment to the "administrative
system of "demes", as he normally did in his adjustment
to the old system of "fratries". A "deme" was an
abstract unit appealling to him only as a rational
necessity. The same can be said about the attitude
of an American citizen towards "Federation", and to a
great extent, about the attitude of a Frenchman of the
Revolution period, towards the supreme reality of his
society, "the people". Like the authority of the
law, the "Bederal" authority and "the sovereignty of
the people" are primarily based on the individual's
capacity for grasping the meaning of these concepts.
Speaking simply, we may say that he used his power of
discrimination to find the necessity of its conformity
with the kind of order on which its society was based.
This takes us straight into the nature of the process
of individuation which, like rationalisation, is normally
found in the democratisation of a group.

Individuation: The adjustment to a rational type of
authority and to a rational social order is fully

only when the individual experiences the principles

on which the authority and the order of his society

are based, as constitutive principles of his mind;

only when his social conformity springs from logical

coercion and inner evidence. This is the result of

the process of individuation which operates in an

opposite direction to that of rationalisation.

The process of individuation depends on two

categories of factors, one belonging to the social

order, or to the pattern of life of the group, the

other to the mental structure of the individual.

A pattern of life is not an undefinable abstraction

for it cannot exist unless it crystallises in various

specific forms. One can even speak about a "nisus

formativus" inherent in the pattern of life of every

society, in the sense that the net of inter-individual

relationships has the tendency to crystallise in a series

of more or less definite forms of life. Thus, the

pattern of life of a community develops as a series

of inter-individual forms of life normally called

social values and institutions. A series of common

drives, desires and aspirations, plus a series of

experiences related to them, form structures of their

own which subsequently act as organising schemes for the

individual's experience.   Consequently the individual's

behaviour in the economic field is moulded by the

economic/

values and institutions of his community, his behaviour
in the sphere of political life is moulded by the
political values of his community, his attitude towards
life and the world as a whole is moulded by the religious
values dominant in his group. In this way the individual's
experiences are patterned in certain specific directions
characteristic of his society. E. Spranger described
six fundamental forms: religious, theoretical, aesthetic,
economic, political and social, in which the pattern of
life of a group can be expressed. These forms are at
the same time six fundamental models after which
individuals can mould their personality. Needless to
say, Spranger has not exhausted the number of forms in
which the formative urge of a common pattern of life
can express itself. For, the formative urge of a common
pattern of life is by no means confined to social and
cultural values. It crystalises also in living models
such as outstanding personalities, or specific groupings,
religious political cultural, etc. It crystalises in
"schools" or trends of thought. In principle a common
way of life can materialise in each individual member of
the group to the extent to which the individual can live
according to the requirements of his group, and yet
retain his individuality.

Here we touch upon an important aspect of the
process of individuation, which explains the close
connection between it and a democratic way of life. The

distinctive character of a democratic way of life,
consists in its capacity to crystallise in as many
forms as there are individual members of the group.
This is properly speaking the process of individuation.

It would be inaccurate, however, to infer that
because of its capacity for individuation, a democratic
social order is completely atomised, and that a democratic
pattern of life does not contain anything beyond and
above the individual. Its capacity for individuation
should be seen entirely in the function of its flexible
nature. Though a democratic pattern of life has its
own character, not reducible to its individual members,
it has, at the same time, the ability to integrate new
conditions of life as they come, and above all the ability
to adjust itself to the condition of life of its members,
or to the majority of them. Flexibility, in this case,
means not only changeability and expedience; it cannot
be defined in fact but as a paradox, i.e. the capacity
inherent in a social order, or in a collective way of
life, to integrate into itself the individual with his
own interests, and to contain at the same time an inter
and supra-individual order. 1.

1). In the capacity to be flexible lies the main
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian way
of life. For, a totalitarian way of life cannot indiv-
iduate. If it takes concrete shapes, in a personality
or a party, this structuration becomes exclusivist.
The leader, or the party are, in this case, neither an
individuation nor a particularisation of the common way
of life,/

but the way of life as a whole is its absolute form.
As will be shown at a later stage, a totalitarian way
of life is always "outside" the individual members of
the group. In order to adjust itself the individual
has first to lose his identity. This is mainly because
a totalitarian way of life grows up without the partic-
ipation of the members of the group.   Sometimes the
common pattern of life is borrowed from another community
and forcibly applied; sometimes it is the pattern of
life of the same community revived by a process of group
regression (Nazism). At other times this pattern of
life consists in a rigid crystallisation of the experiences
of a sub-group which has been subsequently applied to
a large community living in different historical and
geographical conditions. (Contemporary Communism). In all
these cases the common pattern of life is external to
the majority of the individuals and as such cannot but
partly be introjected by them.

But, as stated before, individuation depends upon
factors existing in the individual himself. In a
democratic society the individual's mental structure
is flexible.   This makes it possible for him to adjust
himself to the social order of his group and to the
pattern of communal life and remaining himself at the
same time.   The individual possesses habits of mind by
which he can easily compromise between his own interests
and those of others.   The same habits of mind allow him
to establish a balance between his own personality and
his society as a constituted whole.

Lacking a better word we are inclined to use in
this context the concept of introjection, but without the
motivation attributed to this term by psychoanalysis.
What in the first place we mean is that a social order or
a communal way of life has to be internalised, or intro-
jected by the individual in order to become democratic.

By/

this the individual's attitudes towards their society
are radically changed; they feel that the institutions
of their society, the laws which regulate its course,
and the authority which applies the laws spring up
from their own life, and correspond to their fundamental
expectations from life. The adjustment to their society
is determined less by external coercion, and more by the
internal authority of reason.

Needless to say, the introjection of social order
and the experience of social authority as inner authority
does not necessarily imply the individual's identification
with his group. The structure both of society and of the
individual's mind, being flexible, adjust themselves to
each other. Introjection merely makes the individuals
feel that they are the authors of the order on which their
society is based. Introjection enables them to compromise
between their personal freedom and the order of their
society. 1.

1). Many people believe that individuation-intro-
jection is a matter of time. Moreover, any common way
of life is at the beginning external to the individual
members of the group, but becomes in time assimilated and
therefore democratic. Communism, for instance, will become
the natural way of life of Russian people, and will there-
fore be based less on external coercion and more on
individual spontaneous reaction. The present organisation
of the Bolshevik Party, as a permanent "avant guarde" of
the people does not support this belief. But one can
hardly overlook the great concern of the Bolshevik regime
with the process of individuation-introjection. The cult
of "heroes" as embodiments of a Communist way of life and
the techniques of indoctrination can be adduced as proofs
of this. And yet, the pattern of life is not flexible
enough/

to individuate and to be introjected. The individual
who joins the party organisation has to undergo a
process of "transfiguration" (Lenin).

Inner Authority as the Check of Freedom. The process
of individuation-introjection shows that any democratic
way of life presupposes a preliminary organisation of
the individual's mind so as to form in him, apart from
the habit of conforming, the disposition towards
voluntary action in the interest of his community.
What really lies at the foundation of this mental
readiness, whether reason or sentiment, or a blend of
both, is hard to decide. Important is the fact that
such a phenomenon can be detected as a preliminary
condition of every historical process of democratisation.

Grote (G.) hits very near the mark when considering
the phenomenon of "constitutional morality" as the keynote
of Athenian democracy. In this consists, according to
him, the greatest achievement of Cleisthenes' constitution-
al reform. For it is due to this reform that the Athenian
citizen became infused with that readiness towards
voluntary action in the interest of his community. Here
is the admirable description given by Grote of this
process: "It was necessary to create in the multitude, and
through them to force upon the leading ambitious men,
that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term
constitutional morality - a paramount reverence for the
forms/

of constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities
acting under and within those forms, yet combined with
the habit of open speech, of action subject only to
definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those
very authorities as to all their public acts- combined
too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every
citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the
forms of constitutions will be not less sacred in the
eyes of his opponents than in his own". Grote sees the
same phenomenon at the basis of modern Democracies, "This
co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint -
of obedience to authority, with unmeasured censure of
the persons exercising it - may be found in the aristocracy
of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy
of the American United States : and because we are familiar
with it, we are apt to suppose it a general sentiment;
though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to
establish, and diffuse among the community, judging by
the experience of history. (History of Greece. John
Murray, London, 1862, vol.III pp.131-132.)

It seems that Henry Jones Ford seizes upon the same
fundamental condition of a democratic way of life, i.e.
the infusion of the individual's mind with the pattern of
life of his group, when writing: "Where liberal institutions
have been successful they seem to have been dependent upon
some past discipline maintained by coercive authority".

(Representative Government. Quoted by A.Beebe White
Op. cit. p. 130)

It would take too long to show how the "liberal
institutions" in France were dependent upon the past
discipline forced upon the people. It is enough to
mention that the long tradition of a strongly centralised
government had something to do with this. France became,
before any other nation of Europe, an organised nation,
and a community of people conscious of their unity. No
wonder therefore that the French Revolutionaries made
constant appeal to the social consciousness and patriotism
of the Frenchmen: they were certain that every Frenchman
would find in himself the guide to his social action, and
thus, the liberties bestowed upon the individual by the
Revolution would be used in the interest of the whole
community.

It is much more interesting to see the development
of this phenomenon - which can be called "constitutional
morality", internalised social authority, or simply, respect
for the law - in American society. This society offered
at its very outset a unique example of the enforcement of
a drastic code of laws upon the individual. The code of
laws promulgated, for instance, by the State of Connecticut,
in 1650, starts with the penal laws and it is entirely
based on the Holy Writ. "Whoever shall worship any other
God - starts this code - than the Lord, shall surely
be/

put to death". The death penalty was provided also for
blasphemy, sorcery, adultery, rape, an outrage offered
by a son to his parents. Intercourse between unmarried
persons was severely repressed by whipping, pecuniary
penalties and subsequent marriage; lying was checked by
flogging, or a fine; the attendance on divine service
was compulsory.

Tocqueville remarks that "the legislation of a rude
and half-civilised people was thus applied to an enlight-
ened and moral community".(Op. cit. p.37). But that is
not exactly the point. It is that these tyrannic laws
caused to form in the individual's mind not only a strong
respect for the laws in general, but also a clear awareness
of certain fundamental principles upon which the life of
his community - and of any human community - was based.
The individual grew conscious of the fact that certain
principles cannot be denied whatever the degree of freedom
he may be allowed in various fields of social life. This
check put upon his action, thoughts and feelings, comes
from an inner authority.

Tocqueville evidently touches upon one of the main
characteristics of a democratic personality, and of a
democratic group, when saying that in American civilisation
of his time combined harmoniously the "spirit of religion"
with
which "the spirit of liberty". By the spirit of religion
he understands the main binding forces of a community of
people; these are included here, in the first place, the

reverence for certain fundamental principles on which

human society rests, and the respect for the laws and

institutions through which these principles work. By the

spirit of liberty he means first of all individual freedom,

political and economic. In American society the former

is the guide of, and the check put upon the latter. "Under

their (American) hand-writes Tocqueville- political

principles, laws, and human institutions seem malleable,

capable of being shaped and combined at will. As they go

forward the banners which imprisoned society and behind

which they were born, are lowered......a field without

horizon is revealed..." Then he continues: "But having

reached the limits of the political world the human spirit

stops by itself; in fear it relinquishes the need for

exploration; it even abstains from lifting the veil of the

sanctuary; it bows with respect before truths which it

accepts without discussion". "Thus in the moral world

everything is classified, systematised, foreseen and

decided beforehand; in the political world, everything

is agitated, disputed and uncertain". (Op. cit. pp.43-44).

In conclusion one can say that a way of life based on

the presupposition that the individual is free and independ-

ent, and that he is the author of his society, cannot arise

and be maintained unless a new type of social authority is

formed. This is the inner authority lying in the mind of

every individual. The work of this authority is seen in

the individual's respect for the principles on which human

society is based, in his respect for a series of

"prescriptions" and "prejudices", or for certain rational
principles which regulate the life of his society.
Without this type of authority, freedom,and therefore
democracy, is not possible ; it would quickly change
into anarchy, or tyranny.

A democratic way of life requires therefore a specific
type of personality, i.e. an individual who possesses in
himself the authority and the order necessary for the
maintenance of his society. It is only as a result of
this that society can dispense with, or at least reduce,
the use of coercive authority. The "virtuous citizen" on
whose shoulders the French revolutionaries placed the
weight of the new society, the "virtuous individual",
so often mentioned and desired by Jefferson, and the
"characters" which according to Brüke form the essence of
democratic life, are but various specimens of this
personality. It is the distinctive mark of this personality
to do freely what ought to be done in the general interest
of his society and of mankind. The individual possessing
such a personality responds, consciously or unconsciously, to
the existence of a double front in human life, a front of
empirical reality and expediency, and one of ideal and
permanence. This quality which is characteristic of a
democratic way of life will be dealt with more fully in
the next chapter.

C H A P T E R   IV

IDEOLOGY   AND   DEMOCRACY.

With-out vision the people perish.

<u>Rationalism.</u>   The current use of the term ideology
shows that it implies not only an abstract intellectual,
but also a practical order, a body of ideas which
determines in the mind of the individual a particular
type of social action and a particular way of life.
The concept of ideology, used in this sense, is opposed
to the basic tenets of democracy.

But, because democracy cannot be described in terms
of a specific ideology, one cannot say that it has no
specific ideological character, or that ideas and theories
are to it no more than the straw which it uses for its
bed. It would, however, be necessary to state from the
very beginning that what is characteristic of democracy
is not a specific idea or theory, but a specific cultural
climate. In what follows we shall describe certain motives
of thought and certain intellectual attitudes which are,
in our opinion, inherent in a democractic way of life.

Democracy is usually associated with rationalism.
The main reason for this is that both modern and ancient
democracies rose and developed in historical periods in
which a rationalistic way of thinking was predominant.
The most powerful rationalistic element in modern

modern democracies consists in the assumption, which
forms the touch-stone of modern philosophy, that every
individual has in himself the capacity of reaching
general ideas. The political implication of this is
that the private interests of an individual can be
expressed in such a way as to form a common body with
the interests of others, sometimes with the interests
of all members of his group. Therefore matters of common
interest can be solved by deliberation with the whole group.

From this first tenet of modern rationalism to the
assumption that human history and society are rational,
and that there is in the nature of man a series of
universal traits discovered by the American revolutionaries
of 1783, is a far cry. Today it is quite obvious that
the former assumption does not necessarily call for the
latter. Yet, considering the historical contexts of some
modern democracies, one can readily agree that, from a
psychological point of view, these two aspects of modern
rationalism were closely interwoven. The belief that
individual reason is but a fragment of universal reason,
that all human nature is essentially the same, and that
there are fundamental "rights", was a psychological con-
dition which settled to a great extent the fate of
American and French democracies.

There is no need to discuss the question whether the
basic tenets of modern rationalism have in the long run
been favourable to a democratic way of life. A series of

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of "experiments" in social organisation characteristic

of the modern era have shown that it is one thing to

hold the conviction that the world rests on a rational

order, and another to act upon human society with the

purpose of making it fit into that order. On the other

hand, it would be only fair to recognise the difficulty

of knowing to what extent one can hold the conviction that

human history has a rational pattern and at the same time

to resist the temptation of wilfully directing and

correcting the course of history in order to fit its own

pattern. The examples of Plato in Syracuse, of

Robespierre in France, and of Lenin in Russia seem to

prove that this temptation cannot easily be kept in check.

But the fact that the rationalistic creeds which

presided over the process of democratisation of many

modern societies have later parted company with a democratic

way of life, does on no account mean that empiricism in

itself has been more successful in this respect. The

critics of modern rationalism have sometimes come much

too quickly to the conclusion that the anti-democratic

trends visible in many contemporary societies, such as

political totalitarianism or the super-rationalisation of

industrial life, are but the tribute paid by contemporary

man to the rationalistic creeds of the eighteenth century.

It is obviously true that totalitarianism, planning, over-

rationalisation, etc., follow the pattern of modern

modern rationalism, but their success is, at least
partly, explicable as a reaction from those modern
philosophies rooted in the creed that the world has to
be taken "as it is", and that the supreme principle is
to go ahead in life with no awareness of any established
values which give direction to human action.

As we have suggested elsewhere, democracy is rooted
both in a rational and in an empirical attitude to life.
First of all, democracy is not incompatible with the
idea of a pre-established order in history. It is not
the existence of such an order, but the relationship
between it and the empirical condition of human life that
really matters from a democratic point of view. A dynamic
balance and harmony, as opposed to identity, or to an
irremediable conflict, between a pre-established order
and an empirical plane of life, forms one of the most
characteristic traits of modern democracy. The ideological
climate of modern democracies is based on a dualism which
expresses itself differently according to historical and
sociological circumstances. Human action taking place in
such a climate contains inseparably both an element of
permanence and of local and relative expediency.

The Socio-psychological Sources of Cultural Dualism.
One has to look far back for the sources of the dualism
lying at the basis of Western civilisation in the Christian
conception of a religious-sacred and a secular plane of
life. But as the religious aspect of a democratic way of

of life will form the topic of a special section, for
the moment, we would rather concentrate our attention
on the secular aspects of this problem. One notices
in modern Western culture a parallel development of two
trends of thought, one dominated by the category of
"the universal", the other by that of "the individual".
One emphasises the rational and universal order in the
understanding of the world, while the other, the con-
tingent and the individual character of existence. The
evolution of the former trend reached a peak in the
period of the Enlightenment. The latter trend follows
more than one line in its development. Its roots lie in
the moral value assigned to the human individual by
Christianity. To this was added gradually the individualistic
drives inherent in modern economy, the empirical
orientation of modern science, the individualistic tend-
encies of the art of the Renaissance, the religious in-
dividualism of the Reformation and the revival of the con-
cept of ancient democracy during the 18th century.

The first attempt to balance these two trends which has
direct bearings on the cultural climate of modern democracies,
is to be found in the Cartesian concept of individual reason.
Various attempts in the same direction are also made by a
series of conceptions and philosophies connected with so-
called liberal democracy. Locke's concepts of "reason",
"natural rights", or "natural law" are on the whole meant
to establish a certain harmony between the universal and

and individual, between public, or general and private
interests. But the balance established by this type of
thought is at best a precarious one. The main concern of
liberal democracy has always been the individual. And
it is in the interest of the individual as such that the
theoreticians of liberal democracy took the trouble to
create the belief that the individual acting on the basis
of his own interests is not only harmless for the general
interest, but even serves that interest, the belief that
a man who is guided by self-interest is also "led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which is not his
intention". (A.Smith).

Much more significant for the cultural climate of
democracy is the balance between "the universal" and
"the individual" produced by Rousseau and Romantic thought.
Though fully aware of the incompatibility between various
aspects of his personality and a democratic way of life
we hold the conviction that Rousseau's thoughts and
personality foreshadow,in many respects, a type of thought
and personality which is characteristic of modern democracy.
Both Rousseau's thought and personality disclose a mental
structure articulated at the same time by the culture
pattern of the Enlightenment, based on the concept of
universal order, and by the individualistic trends
developed since the Renaissance which form the nucleus of
modern liberalism. In this way he can be considered as a
prototype of Romantic personality whose basic formula was

was "individualised reason". Leaving aside, for the moment, a series of problems aroused by the later development - in Hegel and Marx in particular - of the concept of universal reason, one can easily grasp that Rousseau's thought contains in itself the psychological ingredients of democratic behaviour. It presupposes that type of personality which has in itself both the condition of its own independence and freedom, and the pattern according to which this freedom has to be used in order to fit into the common way of life. A democratic way of life implies, according to Rousseau, individual freedom within a well-defined pattern; freedom for the individual's will provided that h e wills also the "general will". Rousseau wants democractic freedom as in Athens, but for a Spartan type of citizen.

The totalitarian elements involved in the concept of the "general will" have often been pointed out. But whenever one takes an integral view of Rousseau's thought one finds it difficult to brand the author of "Emile" as one of the fathers of modern totalitarianism. The main difficulty seems to arise from the fact that Rousseau was definitely not an integrated personality; the democractic elements of his mind could not form an harmonious structure. In this respect Rousseau was a typical example of a personality lacking the reality function. This is primarily shown by his tendency to fall towards two extremes. He sacrifices everybody for his own interests, and, at the same time,

time, sacrifices himself for the interest of "humanity",
he lies in seclusion, and, at the same time, makes public
his own personality in all its nakedness. (This remarkable
need for sincerity and authenticity is by no means an
authoritarian feature.) He is equally impressed by the
rational aspect of human life and by its spontaneity.
"Emile" and "The Contract" appeared in the same year as if
to stress the dual articulation of life. The fact that
"the universal" and "the particular", reason and feeling,
the pattern of communal values and the aspirations of his
own individuality could not be balanced in him is not
necessarily a sign of totalitarian trends in his personality.
The lack of integration in his personality is due to a
great extent to sociological rather than psychological
factors. Had Rousseau lived in a society in which individual
freedom was a recognised value he would very likely have
been an integrated personality. He would certainly have
suffered less from the need of making a case of his most
"personal" drives, habits and feelings. Perhaps he would
not have written "Les Confessions".

Aspects of Dualism in British Society.   It is much more
difficult to see the sources of dualism in the cultural
climate of British democracy. The rationalistic element
which is so prominent in French democracy shines here
through its absence. Even if one admits a certain connection
between Locke's concept of "natural rights", i.e. men
living together according to reason, and the cultural climate

climate of British democracy, this situation is not very much changed, due mainly to the meaning of the concept of reason in this context.

In spite of this, a basic dualism is inherent in the cultural climate of British democracy.   The terms of dualism are, however, different from those noticed in French democracy.   In British democracy the integrative factors lie not in reason but in tradition, not in a set of general principles explicitly defining the nature of man, but in a store of communal values, institutions, ceremonials, and in "unspoken understandings which regulate so much the common life" (Sir Fred Clarke. The Educative Society, London p.75).

The norms of life established in tradition are evidently empirical in their origin.   But it would be a mistake to judge the function of tradition by this alone in British society.   For, one does not require great perspicacity to notice that in this country tradition has a super-empirical function.   The traditional way of life, be it expressed in habits of thought, prejudices, or the law of the land, moulds with a greater precision than any regulative principle of reason the whole range of experiences of the individual and of the group.   If in France, or in the United States of America, individual freedom is guaranteed and limited by a body of rational principles

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principles of a "written" constitution, in Great
Britain this is done by a set of "unspoken under-
standings".

The dualism lying at the basis of the cultural
climate of British democracy is defined in terms of an
established order expressed in tradition, and in the
novelty of every human experience, in terms of "the
old" and "the new". And it is the balance between
these two terms that constitutes one of the basic
features of the cultural climate of British democracy.
This balance is expressed in the English sense of
gradualness, i.e. in that kind of flexibility in the
English culture pattern and in the mental structures of
the individuals belonging to it, which makes possible
a smooth transition in both senses between "the old"
and "the new". The fact that the modern English State
has not grown upon the ruins of medieval society, as
did some continental states, but has grown by the
assimilation of that society, is often given as an
example of this sense of gradualness. The British never
give up an old form of life unless the new one is strong
enough to fight the old and to assume for itself the
authority of tradition. But during this fight the new
form gradually fashions itself after the old one, while
the old form takes on new characters. This process is
slow and continuous. Thus, change in social life

life does not imply a reconstruction of the whole
world outlook in the light of "the new order" which
presents itself as a new "Messiah", but a slow, yet not
blind, flow of life. The British concepts of form and
order mean tradition; the concept of change means
evolution.

There is another aspect of the dualism in the
cultural climate of British democracy worth mentioning.
Its terms are the individual and the law. We hasten
to say that these terms are not as different as they
appear from those of tradition and novelty if one bears
in mind the connection between tradition and law
characteristic of this country. The British have
solved the opposition between social order and individual
freedom by an equal respect for the supremacy of the law
and of human personality. Referring to the origin of
this trait in the cultural climate of British democracy,
Giuseppe Maranini writes: "Throughout the Middle Ages
the English people had assimilated, synthetised and
expressed in social realities and political institutions
both the Roman faith in the "law" and the Christian
faith in the human personality". (Miti e Realità della
Democrazia. Studi Politici. Anno 1. No.1. 1952 p.92)
Due to this basic dualism, British democracy has been,
on the whole, less inclined than other modern democracies
to fall into the extreme of a "rugged individualism",

or of an authoritarian order. Even when a strong
State and a strong law were necessary - the recent
measure of nationalisation can be taken as an example -
means were found to put them first of all into the
service of the human personality.

Democracy and the Philosophy of Compromise.

Jose Ortega y Gasset sees in Kantianism the philosophy
of a merchant, for its inner structure is based on
"bargain": bargain between the outside and inner world,
between an a priori and an a posteriori, between a
transcendental and an immanent plane of life. We
consider critical idealism as one of the most adequate
expressions, at the philosophical level, of the
cultural climate of democracy. Dualism, balance and
compromise, which are fundamental concepts in critical
idealism, shown its connection with a democratic cultural
climate.

Knowledge is, according to critical idealism, a
compromise between two structures, the intellect and
the sensibility, between a rational and an empirical
condition of human life. Dualism in the field of
knowledge is ensured by the formal character of the
intellect. The categories of the intellect, though
necessary conditions of any knowledge, are empty forms
unless they realise themselves in a compromise with
experience. Thus, critical idealism gives no justification

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justification for a totalitarian conception of the
world, i.e. for that tendency of the human mind to
create a pure rational order in life.

The basic dualism of critical idealism seems to
be lost in the field of moral action. This is at
least the impression made by Kant's Romantic followers,
who assume that, according to Kant, an action is moral
only so far as it conforms to its ideal pattern as
expressed by the Categorical Imperative. Consequently
in the field of moral action the two orders of
existence, rational and empirical, are identical.
But how far the Romantics – including Marx–were justified
in holding political action, is quite a different
matter.

The meaning of Kantian ethics should be looked for
in quite a different direction. If it has a political
implication, that cannot be other than individual
freedom. Like "les philosophes" and like Rousseau in
particular, Kant cannot conceive freedom but for the
individual who is aware in one way or another of the
pattern of human action in general. This awareness is
made possible by the office of the Categorical
Imperative. As an "authonomous personality " each
human being has the inner capacity for free action
in the line of human interest in general. This proves
that dualism is not superseded even in moral action.

For the concept of "authonomous personality" implies
that the individual qua individual fulfils the
General will.

There is another aspect of critical idealism which
shows its close connection with a democratic cultural
climate. This refers to the picture of man emerging
from it. Man has, according to this philosophy, a
highly differentiated and heterogeneous mental
structure. There is a high degree of independence
between his faculties, namely, between his intellect,
feeling and will. It is only fair to say that this
picture of man is not entirely a creation of critical
idealism. Kant himself is not quite satisfied with
the state of discord between human faculties. He is,
however, not very successful in his attempt to
reconcile them. The independence of human faculties
means, briefly speaking, that human will does not
always "will" what human intellect "knows", and
vice versa, and that human feeling does not necessarily
follow the same path as human intellect and will.
If one could give a more extensive application to a
well-known Pascalian expression one would say that
each faculty has its own "reason". The image of
man emerging from this is certainly not that of a
monolith. If he is a united structure this is the
result of a series of compromises and balances between
various factors. Man is a forum for debate rather than

than a platoon of execution.

It is Romantic philosophy, as a reaction from Kant, that worked out the picture of a monolithic man who foreshadows in many respects the contemporary totalitarian man. Hegel's main point of discontent with critical idealism consists in the gap created by this between human faculties. If, on the moral plane, man can be aware of the universal order of existence, Hegel cannot see any reason why the same man could not be capable of knowing the absolute order and willing it at the same time. Thus, dualism withers away, leaving room for monism with its fundamental concept of identity between the inner and the outer world, between a transcendental and an immanent, an ideal and natural order. Knowledge is no longer a compromise between man and the external world, and social action does no longer spring from a compromise between various wills, but from an absolute order lying at the basis of things. One of the political implications is that non-conformity, even partial, with that order, cannot be called individual independence or originality, but sheer ignorance and finally deviation. These are some of the main premises of modern monism, idealistic or materialistic, which can be considered as the background of totalitarianism of the right or of the left.

Religion and Democracy. There is a widespread
belief that religion gives rise to,and supports,anti-
democractic trends in a culture pattern by its
resistance to change and by its attachment to a form
of absolute authority. This is not entirely true.
The part played by religion in a culture-pattern is,
in the first place, determined by its relations with
other factors of the pattern, and only in the second
place by its body of doctrine. There are religions,
or stages in the evolution of a religion, which contributed
actively to the creation of a democractic way of life.
Christian religion can be taken as an example.

Because of lack of space we have to confine our
present discussion to that aspect of Christianity which
has contributed most to the rise of the cultural
climate of modern democracies. This consists in the
Christian conception of the double structure of human
life. The existence of a transcendental and an immanent
order in life has created in the individuals and the
groups belonging to Christian civilisation a series of
tensions and dynamic balances which have in the long run
prepared the ground for the rise of a democractic way
of life.

The ideals preached by Christianity, though working
as regulative principles in life, belong to an order
beyond the grave and as such they can never be realised

realised at the empirical level of life. The ideal
of universal brotherhood can be taken as an example.
Thus a dualism is created in life which under specific
historical conditions becomes a positive element in
the cultural climate of democracy. This took place
at that moment in the evolution of Western man when a
balance was created between the transcendental and the
immanent dimensions of life. Historically speaking
this phenomenon resulted from the process of secularisation
of life started by the Renaissance.

It would be a mistake to consider the process of
secularisation as synonymous with that of the
democratisation of various European communities. This
would simply imply that the less importance given to
the sacred and transcendental dimension of life the
more intensive the process of democratisation. Present-
day Communism shows the fallacy of this supposition.
The democratic significance of secularisation consists
in the fact that this process has resulted in the
diminution of the religious aspect of life, thus making
possible a balance between the transcendental and
immanent, sacred and secular, ideal and real aspects of
life. It is the balance between these two dimensions
and not the substitution of one by another, that
prepares the ground for a democratic way of life.

What is the origin of this balance?

During the Middle Ages the whole realm of human life was under the domination of a religious, transcendental order. It is due to the Renaissance and the Reformation that important aspects of life were secularised. We have already mentioned how modern economic activity escaped from under the tutelage of the Church, and thus provided man with new ends in life as strong as the religious ones. Already in the early Renaissance, the Catholic Church was ready to find a compromise between the guiding values of a religious, and those of an economic way of life. Making money was an "acceptable" way of life provided that those engaged in it fulfilled certain obligations towards the Church. The same readiness for compromise is seen in the artistic field. The taste for a secular art- an art whose value lay in itself - grew side by side with the taste for a religious art. If, on the one hand, the artists of the Renaissance accepted the religious symbols as means for expressing their artistic emotions, on the other hand, religion itself threw open its gates to many aspects of secular life as seen through the eyes of those artists. In the political field a long series of conflicts, and compromises between religious and political authority, ended finally in the separation of the State from the Church, thus bringing secularisation in another important aspect of life.

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One of the most important psychological results
of the separation between religious and secular life
was an increase in man's self-awareness and
responsibility. After the shrinking of the authority
of the Church as a result of the Reformation, Western
man as individual and group, became more and more
conscious that he had to create standards of action
and values in life for himself. Even in the religious
field the Reformation laid the responsibility of
salvation on the individual's shoulders. This aspect
in the evolution of Christianity and of Western man
in general has formed the object of many important
studies, most of them agreeing upon its great sig-
nificance for the development of the Western democratic
way of life. Max Weber, for instance, sees, among others,
an increased distance and tension between "ideal" and
"real" as the result of the secular spirit of the
Reformation. One meaning of this is that the fall of
the authority of the Church had increased in man the
consciousness of the necessary effort to adjust himself
to the ideal order upheld by his religious convictions.
One of the outlets of this inner tension was in a drive
towards work, enterprise and production which lies in
fact at the basis of modern capitalism. Erich Fromm
sees in the increased self-responsibility resulting
from the spirit of the Reformation, not only a demo-
cratic phenomenon, but also the very root of the fear

fear of freedom in contemporary man which, as we
shall see later, constitutes a main condition of
present day totalitarianism.

Both the increased distance between "real" and
"ideal" and the fear of freedom show that the process
of secularisation aroused in man an urgent need for
the reformulation of the problem of salvation at a new
cultural and psychological level. How could the
individual, eliberated from the traditional tutelage of the
Church, lead his life so as to obtain salvation? The
answer to this question was: by the guidance of an
inner evidence which gave him the sense of value in
life under any circumstance. Thus the secularisation
of life caused a unique spurt in the development of
modern man's conscience. Since in this phenomenon
lies the main democratic significance of secularisation
let us analyse it in some detail.

A specific psycholigical pprocess is closely
connected with the growth of conscience in modern men.
The minimisation of the power of religion has been
parallelled by the displacement of an external and
absolute type of authority by an inner authority.
The insecurity aroused in man by his emancipation from
the divine order characteristic of the Middle Ages lies
at the basis of this process. As the result of this
displacement, man's reliance on the supreme power and
wisdom of God was at least partly transformed into

reliance of human power and reason; the faith in
God became faith in man. Modern rationalism and
humanism are the direct outcomes of this displacement.
Psychologically, secularisation became possible to
the extent to which the transcendental order was
rendered immanent, to the extent to which the historical
process itself became redemptive, and to the extent
to which the individual's conscience took upon itself
the task of guiding and organising life.

One might believe that, because of its close
connection with the process of secularisation, the con-
science of modern man is oriented mainly towards the
relative values of life, and that its main function is
to guide and organise man's actions towards the achieve-
ment of a series of secular values artistic, economic,
political, etc. In this case the structure of modern
conscience is thoroughly historical, i.e., it is but a
means of justification of what happens on the empirical
plane of life. This is not the case. Proofs can easily
be found which show that part of the contents of modern
man's conscience are of transcendental order, and that
due to this fact he has made permanent efforts to guide
and organise his life according to ideal ends. The
presence of these ends in his conscience is due to the
displacement and the introjection of the religious
transcendental order. The makers of American democracy

democracy fought the old regime in the name of the
law of God which they read in their consciences
(John Brown, for instance.)   "The rights of man"
have the same character of sacredness as the voice of
God. The supreme respect for human personality lying
at the basis of British democracy is rooted in the
Christian conception of human life. The humanitarian
conscience of the French revolutionaries offers
also ample proofs of its religious extraction. Their
language discloses this, even when their actions take
on an anti-religious character. The frequent use in
political contexts of expressions such as "evangile",
"credo", "martyrolog^{ie}", "Bonne Nouvelle de liberté",
show that their conscience was impregnated with the
values of the transcendental world of Christianity.
(See F. Brunot: Histoire de la Langue Francaise,
Tome IX pp. 623 and following.)

    We stop here with the analysis of modern man's
conscience. Its main trait consists in its dual
character, in the sense that it is the source of two
types of values, namely, a set of transcendental-ideal
values and a set of immanent empirical values. The
conscience of modern man is a dynamic structure whose
main task is to produce a dynamic balance between a
transcendental and an empirical order of life. Due to
his specific structure, modern man has the capacity of
adapting himself both to a transcendental and an immanent

immanent order of life. He is able to combine the will
of God with the necessities of life. Needless to say,
this was not possible before the process of secularisation
started. For, as we have already shown, it was
primarily due to this process that the will and the
reason of God based on the external authority of the
Church was introjected and transformed into inner
authority. This unconscious process strengthened the
conviction that man could govern himself if he only
had an adequate knowledge of the laws of his mind.
The belief in the power of self-government, individual
and collective, and the belief that man can act freely
under the only "sovereignty of his developed conscience",
(Lord Acton) form the basic feature of the cultural
climate of democracy.

In conclusion we stress the main idea of this
section as follows: Christianity became a strong
element in the cultural climate of democracy at the
moment when, due to its historical evolution, a balance
was created between the religious and secular planes of
life. The process of secularisation has made this
possible. But it is the balance between religious and
secular life, not secularisation in itself, that matters
for democracy. Without secularisation, Western man
would have remained in an immature state and unconscious
of his ability for self-government. Too much
secularisation and the total abolition of the divine

divine order of life has aroused in man uncertainty
and a morbid need for dependence. Deprived of the
security of belief in a transcendental order, he has
linked his destiny, by the ties of absolute faith with
a series of empirical forces. In this lies the origin
of modern secular myths which form an important
psychological ingredient in contemporary totalitarianism.
Faith in the human species, in a nation, in a social
class, in a race, in a providential leader, in an
ideology, has successively compensated for the total
lack of faith in a super-human divine order. It is
worth noticing that those European communities whose
religious development led more easily towards the
balance between religious and a secular life were ready
earlier than other communities for the process of
democratisation. "It hath been the wisdom of the
Church of England... to keep the mean between two
extremes", says an old document. (Church of England,
the Preface to the Authorised version.) At that time
the extremes were: an excessive drive towards
secularisation represented by most of the Protestant
sects, and the religious absolutism of Rome. It is no
wonder that this community has opened up the road to
modern democracy both in their own country and in
America.

Secularisation was necessary up to the point at
which European man gained the conviction that he could

could follow from an inner impulse the pattern of
reason and moral life instilled into him by centuries
of Christian civilisation. This is the real function
of the so-called modern conscience which forms the
nucleus of democratic personality.

Ethics and Democracy. The main problem regarding
the relationship between democracy and ethics lies
in the question: how can the individual act in the
interest of the group having the motives of his own
action in himself? In other words, how is it possible
for a moral end to be of an inter-individual character,
and yet not to lead to individual self-alienation?
Answering these questions from a psychological point
of view one can say that freedom in the moral field is
possible for the main reason that, due to the process
of individuation, the individual has in himself the
capacity for acting according to general ends.[1]

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[1]   If moral law is nothing but introjected communal
values it would follow that personality is not a forum
of free decision and consequently the feeling of
spontaneity characteristic of moral action is but a
psychological resultant of the conformity to necessity.
This would seem to weaken the ethical foundation of
democracy. A few details on the process of introjection
would perhaps help to dispel this impression. First
of all there is no introjection without projection.
The child does not in fact introject the father figure
as an objective reality. The introjected figure is
the result of a series of needs and desire of the child
blended with a series of expectations which the father
has from him. The same process takes place in the
integration of a social norm in a democratic cultural
climate. The introjected social norms are experienced
by the individual as his own conscience; they are not

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not only a mirror of external coercion and authority,
but also a projection of his own individuality.
Conscience is at least partly the expression of the
individual in his relationships with others in various
circumstances. It is not only a result of the
individual adaptation, but also his own self-realisation.

One usually says that in such circumstances the

individual acts according to reason. Needless to say,

this does not necessarily imply the identification of

the individual with general ends. One of the main

assumptions of democracy is that the individual knows

and realises these ends as an individual. This shows

clearly the main feature of democratic ethics. This

type pf ethics can neither spring from, nor lead to,

monism, for monism implies the identity of the

individual with the general interest. Democratic ethics

presuppose a basic dualism, a balance between the

individual and society, personality and humanity,

freedom and order. Today this basic dualism is more

clearly noticeable than ever for the simple reason that

in some democratic societies its terms tend to fall

apart and thus to form two separate ethics, a univer-

salistic and a relativistic ethics. The idea should,

however, be stressed that these ethical trends are found

in one form or another in any democratic cultural

climate, ancient or modern.

One often makes the mistake of speaking about Greek

ethics, the ethics of perfection. Such an expression

can be truly applied only to a certain Greek period, i.e.

to a pre-democratic, Homeric culture-pattern. With
the rise of the middle classes in Athens, which
reaches its peak in the democratic period, this
ethical ideal was parallelled by another. The end
of life consisted not only in doing glorious things
at any cost, but also in "getting ahead" in the world
by a series of compromises between various empirical
conditions of life. The existence of the two ethical
trends is fully tested by the clash between Socrates
and the Sophists, by the clash between two conceptions
of military action and of glory, that of Alcibiades
and that of Nicias. Socrates himself bears witness to
the existence of the two ethical trends, for he speaks
about two types of gods, his own god, the source of
absolute truth and good, and the gods of the city, as
the representatives of the communal values empirically
crystallised in traditions and institutions. He
realises that in man these two trends should work
together; after spending all his life preaching his
own god he willingly dies for wronging the gods of the
city.

In modern democracies ethical dualism is disclosed
by the co-existence of Christian ethics, of universal
brotherhood, and of the individualistic ethics of com-
petition. There is no need for entering into a detailed
description of this phenomenon. Suffice it to say that
in modern democracies these two trends, though opposed

opposed to each other, have worked together for a long time.

Democracy represents, from the ethical point of view, a dynamic balance between an ethics of the absolute and an ethics of empirical life. When this balance is upset, democracy itself is threatened. After the Periclean era the two ethics fall apart. The ethics of the absolute takes the way of idealism through Plato, while the ethics of expedience is developed by the Sophists. The ethical ideal is consequently divided. The man of that period had to choose between living according to reason or excelling in the expediency of life. Today one of the greatest weaknesses of modern democracy is seen in the conflict between Christian ethics and the individualistic ethics of competition.

Democracy and the Double Dimension of Life. The dualism found in nearly all aspects of a democratic cultural climate leads us to the conclusion that the structure of a democratic way of life is defined by two dimensions, one ideal and transcendental, the other empirical and immanent. The first can be referred to psychologically as the feeling of transcendence, permanence and sacredness in life. The implications of this dual character of life are many. We can mention only the most important of them.

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A.   A way of life based on two dimensions, as described above, develops in man the tendency and the ability to adjust himself to comprehensive and distant goals.   Distance and comprehensiveness, however, do not, define the real character of these goals, but their ideality.   Some goals of life belong to a transcendental order.   This is not simply a paradigmatic order (Mannheim) or a pre-established plan of life. The order prescribed by these goals, though acting upon life, is irrealisable in the sense that it over-flows by far the empirical condition of life.   As a result of this, human life has a timeless as well as a historical character. This endows the individual and the group with a high level of aspiration and a particular dynamism in life.

B.   The first sign of the present of a trans-cendental order in the cultural climate of democracy is seen in the fact that a series of fundamental con-cepts of democracy do not get their full meaning except on a purely ideal plane.   These are the con-cepts of freedom, equality and fraternity.   We have seen elsewhere that Aristotle's difficulty in defining these concepts came exactly from his tendency to look at them from an empirical point of view.[1]

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[1] Tocqueville regards the gradual development of the principle of equality in modern society, as "a providential fact ..... it is universal, it is lasting, it constantly eludes all human interference...." (Democracy in America, p.6)

Freedom, equality, and fraternity are realised only
in the man's work and hope for freedom, equality,
and fraternity. To become disillusioned because
they do not become realities means not understanding
their basic character and their function in human
life. The attempt to realise them by any means —
the realisation of "equality" in contemporary
Communism for instance — springs up from the same
ignorance.

C. The double dimension of life is one of the
main sources of tolerance, as a value of the European
democratic culture. Living within the frame of high
ideals, and being aware of their unrealisable
character at the same time, moreover, measuring one's
actions against these ideals, leads in the long run
to a strong feeling of self-limitation and humility.
This feeling, applied to inter-human relationships,
promotes understanding for, and tolerance towards
one's fellowmen.

It is difficult to follow on a psychological
plane how this process has taken place in various
modern communities. It took more than a millenium
until the spirit of humility instilled in man by
Christianity became tolerance in everyday life.
An analogy may help us to understand this phenomenon.
It is a fact of common experience that tolerance
towards oneself and towards others increases with age.

The adolescent shows little tolerance to himself and
to others because his life is rigidly guided by far-
distant ideals. The tolerance of the grown-up comes
from his ability to grasp compromises between an
ideal and empirical conditions of life. This age
was reached by Western civilisation during and after
the Renaissance by the process of secularisation.

D. It is worth mentioning another important
significance of the double dimension of life for
psychology. Modern psychology rightly depicts the
human mind as having a double structure, the
unconscious and the conscious. These two structures,
though opposed, compensate each other. At a later
stage we shall see the importance of this phenomenon
for a democractic form of behaviour.

E. A democratic way of life began to prevail in
Western civilisation at the moment when a balance
between the two dimensions of life was achieved. The
supremacy of one dimension, transcendental or
immanent, leads to the end of a democractic and to the
beginning of a totalitarian way of life. The Fascists
suppressed the transcendental dimension of life by
the secular myths of leadership and race. The
Communists call the transcendental dimension empirical
and immanent and work accordingly. In this way any
ideal is turned into an immanent aim, into a political
slogan. In both types of social organisation life is

is unidimensional.

The Scale of Values in Democracy.   It is
difficult to imagine a democratic way of life
flourishing in a cultural climate dominated by a single
value.   In the Western culture-pattern the condition
of the independence of, and of the balance between
its cardinal values was laid down by the Renaissance.
As a result of this, the main social and cultural
values were emancipated from the supremacy of religious
value.   In what follows we intend to give a table of
the cardinal values of modern civilisation pointing
also to their specific functions.

1.   Religious value is characterised by the feeling
of dependence from a supra-individual and trans-
cendental authority. Its fundamental trait is defined
by the concept of the sacred. The actions determined
by religious ends are intended to fit into a premanent
sacred order, i.e., to bring salvation. From the social
point of view, religious value is integrative.
Anthropological researches show that everywhere, and at
all times in history, God or the gods are the same for
a given social group as a whole and that they compel
the individual members to behave in a certain specific
way, thus increasing the coherence of the group.

2.   Aesthetic value is based on the concept of form.
It has often been said, and we are inclined to support
the view that the category of individuality is essential

essential for aesthetic value. The main aim of an aesthetically orientated action is to re-create the world as seen through the experiences of an individual. Romatic art is the best demonstration of this point of view. During the Romantic period, a creator of art and indeed every work of art was considered as a perspective of the universe. In an aesthetic act the individual is too much concentrated on himself. That is why Spranger defines the aesthetic type of man as egotistic and anti-social. This seems to be an exaggeration, but it is nevertheless true that aesthetic value is not socially integrative.

3. Scientific value is rooted in the tendency to adapt oneself to the immediate empirical conditions of life. Its fundamental category is that of "under-standing", i.e., of establishing relationships between the elements of the empirical world. But in spite of this, the ultimate aim of scientific action is not to build up a unitary picture of the world. Scientific activity is essentially analytical; it is firstly concerned with fragments of existence, called facts or experiences, and only secondary with their organization into a united whole. The unity attained by the interrelation of facts is provisional and relative. This unity is entirely dependent on facts. Change, progress and relativity are basically scientific concepts.

An analtyic attitude towards the world is
obviously disintegrative for the simple reason that
it increases the feeling of instability and fragment-
ariness in life. The rapid tempo introduced by science
into modern life, though it once helped to render
flexible the pattern of modern societies, is today
considered as one of the main causes of social
instability and disintegration.

4.   Political value is essentially integrative.
Any action determined by political ends takes place
at the group level, i.e., it is meant to make the
individual act as a member of a group and the group
act as a unit. The feeling of belonginess and coercion
and the consciousness of an external authority are
necessarily involved in political action. That is
why there seems to be an obvious connection between
religious and political values. Both of them contain
the element of external authority and coercion, but
their methods of coercion differ.

5.   Moral value is also essentially integrative.
Action pursuing moral ends springs from the consciousness
of being member of a group. As distinct from religious
and political,moral action is guided by internal
authority (conscience).

6.   Economic value is in modern societies' dis-
integrative. It is rooted in the individual drive for

for acquisition and ownership. Contemporary
Communist experiments have not yet invalidated the
assumption that <u>Homo economicus</u> is not a social man.

The evolution of the scale of values since the
Renaissance shows firstly a permanent tendency of all
values towards a certain independence from religious
value, secondly, a tendency towards autonomy existing
in each cardinal value, and thirdly, a tendency
towards a certain balance between integrative and
disintegrative values.   All these trends are closely
connected with the process of democratisation.

The separation of aesthetic from religious values
was, as mentioned before, already noticeable in the
early Renaissance. The Italian painters of the
Renaissance populated the church with common faces
seen in the street.   "The saints themselves appeared
as "bons bourgeois" (von Martin op.cit. p.26.)
(See for instance the evolution of the human face
from the earlier periods to Cimabue, Giotto, Signorelli
and to Raphael).   A new approach to nature, no longer
religious, but aesthetic, appeared during the same
period. The ideal of the Renaissance "<u>literati</u>" was
to disengage themselves from any kind of "<u>ordo</u>" and
to look at the world as personality, as an "<u>uomo</u>
<u>singolare</u>" or "<u>unico</u>" who shaped the world according
to his own style. The independence of aesthetic value
reaches a peak in Romanticism, when in fact it
dominates all other values.

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The liberation of science from the control of religion took place during the same period. The full significance of this phenomenon cannot be discussed here. But, on the whole, the rise of science has brought with it considerable interest in the empirical and practical conditions of life. It has increased also the confidence in human power, and belief in unlimited progress. All this was paralleled by a disregard towards the transcendental order of life and by a unique readiness for change.

The separation of political value constitutes a long process culminating in the separation of the State from the Church. Symptoms of the dominant part played by political value were seen in many modern dictatorships. But the supremacy of political value over all other values is clearly realised in contemporary totalitarian societies.

During the humanistic period of the Renaissance there took place the separation of moral from religious value. In this humanism can be found the basic condition of various "secular ethtics". During that period the Christian virtues were gradually paralleled and counterbalanced by formal "virtu", signifying "initiative and ability and all forms of dynamic strivings by the individual". (von Martin op.cit. P.39) "Eloquentia" and "sapientia" for instance were qualities equal in their value to

value to Christian virtues.

We have already dealt with the separation
of economic from religious value.

In conclusion we should like to point out the
following indeas. One of the main conditions of a
democratic cultural climate was laid down by the
separation of the cardinal cultural values from
religious value. This process was completed by a
certain degree of autonomisation of each value. As
the result of this process, Western man has acquired
the feeling of plurality of ends in life, and the
conviction that he as an individual in a group has a
certain degree of freedom in choosing the supreme
goal in life. In this lies an important condition
of a democratic cultural climate which we call
cultural heterogeneity. Its full psychological
significance will be seen at a later stage. For the
moment we can say that cultural heterogeneity is a
condition of mental flexibility and tolerance which
are two aspects of democratic behaviour. In order to
realise the importance of cultural heterogeneity it is
enough to consider what are the possibilites of growing
up as a personality in a cultural climate dominated by
religious value and what these possibilities are in a
cultural climate whose cardinal values are in a
dynamic balance. The number of roles an individual can

can play is considerably greater in the latter
case, a fact which increases both the flexibility
of the social pattern and the degree of individual
freedom.

> ... the better the government.
>
> Aristotle.

The cardinal socio-psychological concepts ...
... are the concepts of individuality, ...
... and leisure. ...

C H A P T E R V.

THE CARDINAL SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS
OF DEMOCRACY.

The citizens should be moulded to suit the
form of government under which they live.   For
each government has a peculiar character which
originally formed and which continues to preserve
it.   The character of democracy creates demo-
-cracy, and the character of oligarchy, creates
oligarchy;   and always the better the character
the better the government.

<div align="right">Aristotle.</div>

The cardinal socio-psychological concepts of demo-
-cracy are the concepts of individuality, critical mind,
objectivity and leisure. It would be perhaps necessary to
state from the very beginning that, in spite of the fact
that we call them "cardinal", a certain arbitrariness in
their selection was unavoidable.   We can however offer
two reasons for our choice: firstly, these concepts have
been closely associated with the democratic evolution of
modern civilisation, and secondly, they are in many ways
border--line concepts between sociology and psychology.
Because of these two reasons we are convinced that any
introduction to the psychological aspect of democracy should
start with the analysis of these four concepts.

Individuality. A definition of individuality from

a psychological standpoint implies the concepts of structure
and of motivation.   With regard to the former it is
necessary to point out that it is not"structure", as a
substance that defines best the concept of individuality.
It would be more appropriate to refer to individuality as
to a structurising process, i.e., as to the capacity of the
individual to shape and integrate in a particular way the
various data of his experiences.   As a structurising
process individuality implies the character of uniqueness.
With regard to the second concept one can say that,if the
psychologist does not consider individuality as a centre
of motivation, or as a self-determining system, he may
leave almost entirely the study of human personality to the
sociologist, biologist or economist.   How human action is
determined within the specific mental structure of an
individual has been the main problem of the psychologist
of all times.

The relationship between democracy and the concept of
individuality cannot be understood adequately without look-
-ing at the historical aspect of this concept.   One of the
first examples of a civilisation based on the category of
individuality is offered by ancient Athens.   Why, and how
this happened are questions which add to "the Greek miracle".
Many people are inclined to stress the economic factor in
the explanation of the individualistic trends of Greek
civilisation.   Kitto, for instance, thinks that the rise

of the town-market had much to do with the development
of the ancient Greeks as " a race of brilliant individuals
and opportunists". (The Greeks. Penquin. p.70).   On the
other hand, much is to be said about the part played by
religion in the development of the individualistic trends
of Greek civilisation.   We have, however, to confine the
discussion of this important problem to those of its aspects
which lead us as quickly as possible to the connection
between the concepts of individuality and democracy.   Thus,
two aspects of Greek civilisation have an exceptional
significance from this point of view, i.e., the emergence
of "man" as a dominant form of existance, and the emergence
of the individual as a free agent in life.   One can
illustrate these processes by an example taken from a drama
created during the democratic period of Athens, i.e.,
Aeschylus' "Orestea".   Orestes, the central character of
this trilogy emerges gradually out of the influence of
super-human forces which decide upon his actions, and
destiny, into a world where man determines his own actions.
In the first stage of his development he is the instrument
of the moral laws of the universe which assert themselves
impersonally (a crime ought to be punished).   In the second
stage, he plays in the hands of the mystic forces of life
(Furies), while in the third, he appears as an individual
before other individuals, Athenian citizens, in order to be
judged for his deed.   In this way, the first important /

idea is pointed out that men rather than the Gods
- Olympians or Furies - settles man's destiny.

But this general statement regarding man's position
in the cosmos does not exhaust the significance this tragedy
has for the understanding of the value of human individ-
uality.   Orestes is acquitted for his crime by the
Areopagus, but the votes on either side - guilty or
innocent - are equal;   hence the judges are neither for
the rigid application of the universal moral laws, of which
Orestes was the instrument when punishing the crime of his
mother, nor for the emotional mystic forces which, in spite
of the moral laws demand Orestes' punishment as the murderer
of his mother.   The verdict means simply that public
order prevails upon personal vengeance and family ties.

The significance of this tragedy is not confined, as
often claimed, to a sociological fact, i.e., the transition
of Athenian society from a primitive community, based on
the organic ties of family and kinship, to a superior type
of organisation based on formal principles.   No less
significant is the psychological aspect of the verdict
mentioned above.   The equality of the number of votes on
each side suggests that the final decision rests with
Orestes himself; he as an individual has to decide the
meaning of his actions.   This certainly shows the emergence
of the individual as an autonomous centre of decision in
life, and the emergence of conscience as inner authority/

and as the main guarantee of order in life.   Historically
speaking this is the stage at which Grote would place the
rise of "constitutional morality", when the Greek individ-
-ual had already internalised the fundamental norms of life
of his community.   Thus Aeschylus in "Orestea", like
Dostoevsky in "The Brothers Karamasov", deals with "crime
and expiation", rather than with "crime and punishment".

In conclusion one can say that, in ancient Greek
civilisation, the main democratic features of the concept
of individuality were worked out as follows: individuality
is a quality of life which arises only in a system of
relationships with other beings.   One can find here in nuce
the two main democratic aspects of the concept of individ-
-uality: individuality as an end in itself, and individ-
-uality as "member" of a group.

A brief note on the evolution of the concept of
individuality within Western culture throws an additional
light on the relationship between this concept and the
democratic way of life.   The main stages of this process
are as follows: 1. The meaning of human individuality during
the Middle Ages constitutes a highly controversial problem.
The thesis held by the representatives of historical material-
-ism, and by historians such as Jakob Burckhardt, according
to whom individuality is a product of the modern era, suffers
from crude "sociologism", in the approach to the problem of
human personality.   Burckhardt's view that mediaeval man /

did not exist as "individuality", but as "class", or
professional category is obviously rooted in the over-
-statement of some peculiar aspects of the mediaeval
world.   In the mediaeval world, the meaning of individ-
-uality is a derivative one, because of the dominance in
this world of a series of supra-individual forms of life
expressed by religion in particular.   The place of the
individual in the mediaeval cosmos was that of an executor
of a supra-individual order;   his own conscience and reason
are but "emanations" of this order.   The only mental
categories defining human individuality were those of
dependence and submission, i.e., those defining man as
a "subject", or a citizen of a world rigidly organised by a
supra-human force.   This does not, however, preclude the
existence of man as an individuality; it means only that
socially man was not an agent, save in a class or profess-
-ional category.   2. There is an aesthetic flavour in the
Renaissance concept of individuality.   The stress falls
on the individual's power to create the world in which he
lives.   This is but an aspect of the Renaissance man's
revolt against "ordo", i.e., against any kind of pre-
-established form of life.   One can say that the spirit
of the age was to replace "ordo" by <u>nisus formativus</u>,
i.e., to substitute for a static order the creative power
of life.   The revolt against the supra-individual order
of the Church, characteristic of the Reformation, is an /

aspect of this large process.

Through the Renaissance man becomes a free agent in his own world. His freedom is based on his power of creation. Thus man takes on himself an attribution granted up to then to a transcendental power. The main note of the period is seen, however, in the specific belief that man is creative as an individual. Leonardo da Vinci, for instance, speaks of a "Ragione cosmica", and a "Ragione individuale", which he characterises by two modes of creation, one followed by Nature, the other, by man. Nature begins "della ragióne (cosmica) e termine nella sperianza", while man "bisogna seguire in contrario", i.e., from experience to reason.

At the basis of the Renaissance meaning of the concept of individuality lies the belief that individual reason is a fragment of universal reason. Thus its activity, though starting from an opposite position to that of uni-
-versal reason, leads to the same result. The spirit of the Renaissance presupposes a process similar to that described by Grote as "constitutional morality". While, during the Middle Ages, the order of human life, social and individual, remained external, as an emanation of transcendental reason, during the Renaissance man realised that the same order was also in himself. The Cartesian concept of individual reason is, in the light of what we have said so far, but a final result of a long process of

introjection of the universal reason.   The individual

defined as possessor and creator of the order of his society

and world forms a basic feature of a democratic way of life.

3.   Romanticism brings forth a new aspect in the mean-

-ing of the concept of individuality.   Under its impact,

individuality is conceived as a fundamental category of

the universe.   For, on the one hand, the universe exists

only in individual forms, and, on the other, each individ-

-uality is at least potentially the universe itself in a

specific configuration.   Thus, the Romantic period can be

described as the imperialistic stage in the development of

the concept of individuality.   This is mainly due to the

conviction underlying the Romantic thought according to

which there is a relationship of identity between the

logical structure of individual mind and the structure

of the external world.   Hegel, for instance, analyses

the structure of human consciousness on the assumption

that its articulation is identical with that of the world

as a whole.   (Phaenomenologie des Geistes).

In the Romantic concept of individuality the stress

falls on the unifying forces lying at the basis of the

process of self-consciousness.   Thus, "individuality"

marks the highest point in the inner articulation of the

universe, i.e., the point at which the universe is an

united whole, as the result of becoming conscious of itself.

No wonder, the psychology of this period is the psychology

of self-consciousness exclusively.

With regard to the democratic significance of the
Romantic concept of individuality the following points are
important: the individual's mind is "individualised
universality"; hence human individuality is the bearer of
both an individual and a universal form of existence. The
individual contains within the structure of his mind, in
an individualised form, the basic condition of mankind,
and of his group. In this lies the guarantee of its free-
-dom, moral, political, and economic.

A particular stress has to be placed on the moral
aspect of the Romantic concept of individuality. The
individual, as the bearer of universal order, is a moral
agent whenever it acts according to its own nature; it is
from the moral point of view, "autonomous personality".
(Kant is a Romantic in ethics). This is a crucial point
in the evolution of a modern man's conscience. The con-
-viction that free individual action, or action controlled
by inner authority, leads to a harmonious social and
political world forms an important condition of modern
democracy.

4. The concept of individuality characteristic of
economic liberalism is also rooted in the conviction that
free individual action leads to harmonious social pattern.
But in the economic field, the belief in the rationality of
the individual's action takes on a specific character. /

Reason becomes devoid of any content, and thus reduced to
a formal faculty.   By this, the structure of human
individuality underwent an important change, in the sense
that "intelligence" became the dominant trait of the human
mind.   As distinct from the Renaissance and Romantic concept
of reason which involve certain social and cultural values,
intelligence is defined by contemporary psychology as a
formal capacity of the individual to adjust himself to the
environment.   This is little else but the psychological
expression of that mechanism of adjustment and of that type
of mental structure necessary in the economic environment
of modern civilisation.   We shall come back to this aspect
in the evolution of modern man.

    5.   One can distinguish in the present times two main
tendencies in the development of the concept of individual-
-ity.   One comes as a consequence of liberalism, and is
manifested as the complete lack of the feeling of integrat-
-ion;   the second is a resultant of long experience in a
mechanical type of social co-ordination characteristic of
modern industrial society.   The former tendency leads to
an anarchic type of individuality.   The world is, for this
type of individual, devoid of order;   the individual's actions
and aspirations are not supported but by its own will, often
against an hostile world.   Existentialism gives an adequate
expression to this aspect in human individuality.

    The second trend in contemporary civilisation leads /

to the development of an industrial type of individuality. The condition of work in an industrial society has shaped the concept of individuality into that of a participant in a common task.

Summing up the historical aspect of the concept of individuality the following ideas should be pointed out: in ancient Athenian and in modern Western cultures, individuality was defined from two main aspects; (a) Individuality as a unique embodiment of life, and as an end in itself, and (b), Individuality as membership of a group. Both ancient Athenian and modern cultures offer sufficient proofs that the main condition of a democratic way of life consists in a balance between these two tendencies in the definition of human individuality; i.e., individuality as an end in itself, and as a function--al category. In Athens, the conditions of democracy were ripe when the individual as an end in himself was counterbalanced by the reality of the "Polis". "In the winning of his livelihood -says Kitto - he (the Greek) was essentially individualist; in the filling of his life he was essentially "communist" ". (Op. cit. p78).

When the balance between these two meanings of the concept of individuality is upset democracy itself is in danger. Here one can grasp an essential difference between Greek and Western civilisations. In Athens,

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the accent had generally been stronger on individuality
as an end in itself. Consequently anarchic individualism
was the disease from which this civilisation died.   In
Western civilisation, the accent seems, after many
oscillations, to have fallen on individuality as functional
reality;   contemporary totalitarian societies can be adduced
as a proof of this.

   The Critical Mind.   The critical mind consists in the
individual's capacity to accept, or to reject propositions,
or, to take a course of action prompted by his own judgment,
i.e., by the interpretation of the situation through the
formal laws of his own intellect.   This is obviously an
ideal case of the functioning of the critical mind, for the
formal laws of the intellect are always imbued with deep
unconscious factors.   Whenever someone joins a political
party by free decision, one can easily find that his
decision was partly determined by a series of irrational
factors such as feelings of friendship, family ties, and
others.   According to certain trends in contemporary
psychology, these irrational factors play a preponderant
part.   We have, however, to stress the idea that a political
action or attitude is not democratic unless it is decided
at the rational level of the individual's mind, i.e.,
unless the individual works out in his mind the motive and
the possibilities of his action.   In other words, action in
a democratic pattern requires deliberation, that is to say,

the critical attitude of mind, before any decision is taken.

The development of the critical mind goes hand in hand with the dominance of intellect in man's adjustment to his environment. This constitutes a psychological as well as a sociological process. We have already shown the way in which modern society has favoured the development of intellect at the expense of instinct and feeling. This is the main reason why intelligence as a purely formal capacity has become an important mechanism of adjustment in the modern world. Since we have touched several times upon this problem, for the moment it would be enough to stress once again the general idea that the whole structure of modern civilisation has required an increase of the import--ance of intellect in the process of adaptation. Roman--ticism did in fact, very little for the so-called re--habilitation of human emotionality. For, even after the Romantic period, the most comprehensive form of adjustment to the physical and social environment of modern man was that furnished by scientific knowledge, i.e., a form of adjustment based on "objective" observation and assessment of the external world, with as little interference as possible from emotionality and will. To see things as they are related to each other, and to grasp their own structure and laws, constitute for modern man the first requirement of his adjustment.

In no other culture had knowledge based on the

observation and on the formal relationship of things and
events, dominated to such an extent the whole range of life
as in modern Europe.   In fact, most of the known cultures
- Greek culture being excepted - "knowledge" is not
problematised; the act of knowledge does not spring up from
a specific attitude to life, but on the contrary, it is
submerged in the global act of adjustment and as such is
intermingled with feeling and will.   In modern civilisation
knowledge has not only become the main aspect in man's
adjustment, but human life in its entirety is dominated by
it.   Instincts, emotionality, will, and cultural values
are at its disposal.

From the standpoint of psychology, the critical mind
can be described as that type of reaction which is character-
-istic of an act of intelligence.   The main feature of an
intelligent type of reaction consists in the distance mind
(the organism) puts between the stimulus and the final form
of satisfaction, or in the capacity of an individual's mind
to bear the tension aroused by a stimulus as long as the
search for an adequate reaction requires.   This is not
possible in a habit, or instinctive type of reaction.   At
the instinctive level of behaviour, reaction is direct and
urgent.   In this case the mind enjoys a very low degree of
freedom.   An act of intelligence is, on the contrary, a
"detour" reaction in which a certain degree of leisure is
necessary.   The aim of such a type of reaction is not

only the release of tension, but also mental efficiency.
This means that the organism, while reacting, disposes of
enough leisure and detachment from its own action as to
grasp and retain the best ways and conditions leading to
the pursued goal, and thus, to improve the mechanism of
reaction itself.   An act of intelligence is a profit-making
enterprise; it brings the satisfaction of the immediate
needs, and at the same time capitalises the surplus, for
the future of the enterprise.   While the reaction based
on instinct and habit are dominated by the present,
intelligent reaction is dominated by the future;   past
experiences are used in the solution of the present situa-
-tion, but, at the same time, the attempt is being made
to integrate the present solution with as many circumstances
as possible which may arise in the future.   Thus, an
intelligent reaction is eminently prospective, i.e.,
it tends to be oriented towards distant and comprehensive
goals.   Since this aspect of behaviour is closely connected
with the problem of freedom, we shall come back to it at
a later stage.

In order to throw more light on its democratic function
it would be useful to say something about the principal
forms of institutionalisation of the critical mind.

1.   Various rituals of thinking either as a prelude
to an immediate action, or, as a "theoretical" attitude
towards life are institutionalised forms of the critical

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mind.   We on no account suggest that these are character-
-istics of a democratic way of life exclusively.   What we
want to say is that critical faculties are better develop-
-ed in a democratic culture.   Pericles goes so far as to
suggest that the habit of thinking in itself, and the habit
of taking decisions based on critical examination are better
developed in a democratic, than in a non-democratic, society.
"For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act,
and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from
ignorance but hesitate upon reflection", says he with
reference to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.

2.   The establishment of formal logic as a pattern
of thinking is another institutionalised form of the
critical mind.   The importance attributed to this type of
logic, in both Greek and Western civilisations, may be taken
as a proof of the connection between the critical mind and
democracy.   In the formal character of the logical principles
of thought lies one of the sources of the inner type of
authority, the authority of evidence, characteristic of
a democratic way of life.

3.   Democratic government itself is an institution-
-alised form of the critical mind.   As we have mentioned
before, the functioning of the critical mind requires the
following conditions: (a) leisure which makes possible a
more comprehensive view of the situation, (b) speculations
about the various possibilities of satisfaction, and /

(c) decision taken in awareness of the total number of
conditions involved in the situation.   A democratic form
of government is, in its turn, based on the participation
of all members of the group, and on the technique of debate.
Decision taken by the method of free discussion is there-
-fore a solution integrating the totality of conditions
involved in a situation, i.e., the interests of all
individual members.

Objectivity.   We have shown in the previous chapter
that democratic society is an individualised society.
Bearing in mind that democracy implies a specific concep-
-tion of the world, one can extend this formula by saying
that the democratic world is an individualised world.
This world is composed of a multitude of self-contained
units, persons, or things, which are formally related to
each other, i.e., their mutual relationship neither exhausts
nor annihilates their individuality.   The adjustment to
such a world requires the presence of specific mental
function – or attitude – which we call spirit of object-
-ivity.   The definition of the spirit of objectivity may
vary;   it might be formulated as the "adequatio rei
intellectus", i.e., the capacity of the individual mind
to mirror the world as it is, or the ability to interpret
the world in the light of the formal laws of intellect.(Kant).
But whatever its definition the spirit of objectivity
implies the individual's capacity to look at the world/

through the categories of otherness, multiplicity, and of formal relationship. In what follows we shall discuss the meaning of these categories and their relation with a democratic way of life.

The most important trait of the spirit of objectivity consists in the quality of the mind to grasp "the other", the non-self, or the non-identical - be it the external world as a whole, or specific persons and things - as having the reason for its existence in itself. Paradoxically enough one can formulate this aspect of the objective spirit as the capacity of the human mind to apply the category of "subject" to various parts of the world outside oneself. Needless to say, this quality is to a great extent deter--mined by experience and culture. Up to the age of six the child can hardly grasp the objective aspects of the external world, for, in his own world, things exist "for himself" only; he is the only subject and the only object and anything else is reduced to his own qualities by way of projection. If one considers the main differences between the so-called primitive and civilised man, one comes to the same conclusion. The social world of the primitive is to a lesser degree than that of the civilised divided into self-contained units, i.e., individualities; his physical world is not divided into "objects" as distinctly as that of the civilised. The primitive does not see formal, but "substantial" relations between the aspects

of his world; he reduces these aspects to a vague unity.

The essence of the objective spirit lies, at least in modern European civilisation, in the capacity of the individual to keep in balance two categories of factors involved in his contact with the world: one category defining the "ME", and the other, the "NON-ME". One cannot speak about an objective attitude towards the world when one category is reduced to the other.[1]

(1)
    Psychologically speaking the objective spirit is rooted in a balance between the projective (extraceptive) and introjective (intraceptive) processes of the mind. Too much introjection results in the annihilation of the "me" factors, while too much projection results in the annihilation of the "non-me" factors. Thus objectivity is based on the function of a specific mental structure which produces the balance between the internal and external of the individual.

The balance between the factors defining the inner structure of the individual such as drives, desires, aspirations, etc., and the conditions of the external world is produced and maintained by the ego. The presence of the ego signifies first of all that the mental life of the individual is structurised in a unity of its own. By this the individual differentiates itself from its surroundings, which consequently become the general "other". But the ego means also a unity among other unities, i.e., the unities which are other individuals. From this specific point of view it is important to mention that the rise of the ego in the child is in the function of his relations with others, the members of his family coming in the first /

place.   The structurising of the child's mind goes hand
in hand with the feeling of his own separatedness from
others, and naturally, of others from himself.   Thus,
the child's ego emerges as a relational reality between
himself, the external world as a whole, and "the others",
defined as other egos.   Most important are the relationships
with other members of his society.   In this respect one can
easily say that the ego is a sociological category, i.e.,
it defines itself as a point in a net of inter-individual
relationships.   Therefore "the other" which is one of the
categories of the objective spirit is inherent in the rise
of the ego.   (Sociological points of view in the rise of
the ego are represented by G.Mead; Mind, Self and Society.
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934. and Hans Günther; Person-
lichkeit und Geschichte.   Walter Beyschlag. Augsburg,1947).

It is obvious that the function of the ego does not
lead to a self-centred type of action, as one is inclined
to think.   Though defining the mental unity of an individ-
ual _qua_ individual, the ego is foremost a balancing structure
whose main function is to render flexible both the inner
drives of the individual, so as to make them fit the
conditions of the external world, and the conditions of the
external world, so as to adjust them to the inner drives
of the individual.   We propose the attribute "objective"
for that type of reaction which, when analysed, discloses
a balance between the inner world of the individual and/

the external world, physical and social.   Such a type of reaction is the direct result of a flexible structure existing in the individual's mind which compromises between the individual and the external world.   This compromising activity is sometimes called the reality function.   We prefer the term objectivity to that of "reality", for the main reason that the representatives of depth psychology have systematically failed to make it clear what they mean by reality.

If one looks at the historical aspect of the spirit objectivity one can see in a better light its connections with the function of the ego, and its significance for the democratic way of life.   The beginning of the modern era constitutes again a crucial point both in the development of the spirit of objectivity and in the part played by the ego in the mental structure of modern man.   In the mediaeval world, characterised by a stable order, the individual's adjustment was dominated by the power of habit and tradition.   There were rare circumstances in which his society failed to provide him with ready-made forms of adjustment.   The ego played a minor part in the mental structure of mediaeval man, for the ego presupposes that the individual is himself an active factor in the process of adjustment, i.e., it presupposes an individualised type of reaction.   The Renaissance, caused a radical change in the mental structure of man.   The individual found /

himself confronted by new problems, indeed by a new world, for which the old pattern of behaviour, the old ideas, habits, feelings, etc., were no longer adequate.   Hence he was more and more insistently required to work out for himself modes of adjustment to his world, and therefore more and more liable and ready to individualise his behaviour.   This made necessary a rapid growth of the ego, and the dominance of the individual's mind by it.   For the ego is called upon to find a form of adjustment there, where secure but rigid instinctive reaction fails, and where the pattern of habit and of culturally conditioned reaction is insufficient.   When adjustment cannot be individualised, either because of the rigidity of instincts or because of a strong cultural conditioning, the function of the ego is reduced.   Then the Id or the super-ego - to use two psychoanalytical terms - become dominant.

The very condition which makes for the dominance of the ego makes also for the rise of the spirit of objectivity. Objective knowledge is the first and the most important step towards the individual's adjustment to a world in change, and novelty renders the established forms of adjustment - instincts and habits - inappropriate.   This brings in the foreground of the individual's mind the need to "observe" the aspects of his environment, to grasp their specific structure, and above all, their inter-connections. What is the structure of the world, what is the new/

"ordo" which does not fit into the old pattern of adjust-
ment, are questions which lead to the growth of the
objective mind.

The study of the rise of the objective mind within
modern civilisation justifies the following psychological
conclusion: an objective attitude towards the world, and
the need for objectivity can be interpreted as compensa-
tions for the feeling of insecurity aroused in man by the
fall of mediaeval order, based on transcendental reason
and the power of tradition. The need for reconstructing
a new order in his world so as to escape the feeling of
chaos, led modern man to the reorganisation of his environ-
ment on a new basis. He became more and more interested
in the nature of things, in how they relate to, and produce
each other. Due to this new attitude every detail and
accident became necessary for the reorganisation of the
world. The order of this world was guaranteed only by
the chain of formal relationships among things and events.
Nothing came from outside.

The insecurity aroused in human beings of that period
by the fall of the mediaeval order had been, during the
Renaissance, transformed into a positive attitude towards
life. Interests in things and in their interdependence,
guaranteed not by divine reason, but by formal laws, became
a new form of adjustment which asserted itself against
the old religious pattern of behaviour. Already in /

the fourteenth century, Jean Buridan boasted that his
explanation of the world could dispense with the hypothesis
of the divine agencies.   From this mental attitude grew
up modern science which is in many ways the very embodiment
of the objective spirit of modern times. (H.Butterfield,
"The Origins of Modern Science", Bell & Sons Ltd.,
London, 1950,p.7).

It is worth mentioning that the transition to the
modern era was associated also with the feeling of security
and progress.   This compensated for the insecurity aroused
by secularisation.   To the man of that period, the aspects
of the world brought about by the Renaissance were un-
doubtedly new, and even strange but not hostile; his mind
was dominated by wonder, i.e., inquietude mixed with
confidence, rather than by fear.   This facilitated the
exercise of the critical mind in the process of adjustment.

An objective attitude is often conceived as opposed
to a mystic or magic attitude.   The latter has been
described as being characteristic of primitive man.   The
world of the primitive is, because of his magic mind,
dominated by the category of community; hence his mechan-
isms of adjustment are collective.   ("Collective
representations", as Levy Bruhl calls them.).   The world
of the primitive is not an individualised world, for both
his physical and social environment is seen by him in the
perspective of the whole.   The members of his society/

can, to a lesser degree than modern European man, individualise their behaviour; their mind is under the levelling pressure of the "Totem".

The objective spirit creates and individualises the world. The unity in such a world is guaranteed by formal laws according to which things are related to each other. The mystic and magic mind, on the contrary, does not see the world as made up of differentiated things; it does not grasp how one separate thing influences and produces another separate thing, but how all things are the products of one and the same reality, the "Totem". The objective spirit establishes formal relations between things, the result being that, the things related preserve their identity. The magic mind establishes substantial relations and thus annihilates the identity of things. The objective mind operates with the categories of otherness, multiplicity and formal relations, while the magic mind with those of "sameness" and "the whole". As we shall see later, the world of the magic mind is utterly incompatible with a democratic way of life.

The mind of the primitive is dominated to a greater extent than that of the individual belonging to modern Western civilisation by structures and functions which collectivise the individual's adjustment. From the analysis of the primitive's behaviour one cannot easily

conclude that he possesses the feeling of the specific

character of his personality, or that the various situations

in which he may find himself have their specific character.

His reactions are guided by collective formulae, and are

directed not as much towards the specificity of the

situation as towards a general factor lying behind the

things and events of his world.   Any change in his world,

in himself and in others is, for him, an act of intervention

of this general factor.   Consequently, any act of adjust-

-ment to the primitive's world requires the individual's

identification with his group.   This is a type of adjust-

ment characteristic of the super-ego, being quite opposite

to the type of adjustment produced by the ego.   For, the

ego works out forms of adjustment by which the individual

satisfies the social norms without losing the individual's

specificity.   This is a more or less formal adaptation.

The type of reactions and the type of human inter-

relations produced by the super-ego lead sooner or later

to "Gleichschaltung", or "communion", i.e., to the

annihilation of the individual character of things and

persons.   The type of reaction and of inter-human

relations springing from the ego are formal, i.e., they

preserve, and even increase the individual character of

things and persons.   This world, based on the individual

and specific character of things and persons forms the

framework of the democratic way of life.

It does not take long to prove the democratic

implications of the spirit of objectivity. A culture-
-pattern dominated by the magic mode of thinking lacks
some basic conditions of a democratic way of life. The
individual using this type of thinking fails to grasp
and to respect the individuality of the others and to
integrate himself in his society as one individual among
other individuals equal to himself. He lacks the category
of multiplicity in his social behaviour.

Elements of magic thought can be found not only in
primitive, but also in contemporary totalitarian society.
One of the most conspicuous traits of the Nazi personality
and group consists in their inclination towards mythical
type of thought; the Nazi world, like the primitive, is
dominated by the category of the whole. The Communist
culture-pattern, in spite of its rationalistic trends, is
also dominated by the category of the whole.

Leisure. As the concept of leisure has been used
in so many different ways, it would be advisable to start
by saying something about the meaning attributed to it in
the present context.

The expression, "sense of gratuitousness", can often
be used to indicate certain important aspects in the concept
of leisure. Thus, leisure can be defined as opposed to
the concept of "usefulness", or of the practical. It
would imply in this case that attitude of mind by which
someone can engage in activities without previously think-
ing about the useful or practical results involved in /

such activities.   Useful results may follow, but they do
not constitute a condition for the individual's engagement
in such activities.

Contemplation, or the contemplative attitude, can also
be used in order to circumscribe the meaning of the concept
of leisure.   Thus, leisure would imply the individual's
ability to disengage himself from time to time from his
daily cares and immediate duties, and to view life as an
onlooker.   In this case, leisure widens the individual's
field of vision and makes him aware of aspects in life
which would have been completely hidden to him had he been
under the pressure of the necessities of existence.

Leisure is involved in many psychological and socio-
logical aspects of the democratic way of life.   For the
sake of brevity we cannot mention here, but a few of these
aspects.

1.   To start with, leisure constitutes a necessary
condition for the functioning of the critical mind.   Why
this is so can easily be understood when one takes into
account that the main function of the critical mind is to
facilitate the individual's adjustment to distant and
comprehensive goals in life.   Any feeling of pressure
minimises the chances of such adjustment.

Leisure is also a necessary condition in the function-
ing of the ego.   While the Id urges the mind to react
according to the rigid pattern of instincts, and while /

the super-ego takes the clashes of adjustment existing in
the cultural millieu, the ego resorts to flexible schemes
in order to enable the individual to work for himself the
forms of adjustment.   In this case the feeling of leisure
is necessary.

2.   The connection between leisure and the democratic
way of life is important also from a sociological point of
view.   This will more clearly be seen when we describe the
way of life in a totalitarian, as compared with a democratic
society.   For the moment it would be enough to mention the
idea, dealt with in a previous chapter, that an important
condition in the development of a democratic way of life
consists in a long period of security and in the feeling
of ease, individual and collective.   This facilitated the
rise of a flexible social organisation of the group, and of
a flexible mental structure in the individual.   In such
circumstances, the individual is allowed a high degree of
freedom in his social adjustment.   The opposite happens
when the group lives under conditions of stress; its
organisation becomes rigid.   That is why one can describe
a democratic group as a society organised under conditions
of leisure, while a totalitarian group as a society organ-
ised in conditions of stress.

In a democratic society the individual has the
opportunity, much more often than in a totalitarian society,
to escape the task resulting from his being a member

of an organised whole.   This act of detachment gives him
the feeling of relief and leisure in life which is hardly
possible in a totalitarian society.   For, there the individ-
ual lives permanently under the pressure of his social
task.   How to be "useful", as a member of the group, is a
question hanging over his mind even in the most secluded
corner of his life.

       There are other aspects of a democratic way of life
which show that the feeling of leisure and the sense of
gratuitousness are necessary components in it.   Here are
a few of them:

(a) The system of education in a democratic society should
be mentioned first.   It is an obvious fact that the period
of childhood and of training for life is longer in a demo-
cratic society than primitive, mediaeval, or contemporary
totalitarian societies.   While in a primitive, or in a
totalitarian society the individual is acquainted with the
strain of life, by becoming a full member of its group at
a relatively early age, (in Communist societies the
indoctrination starts at the age of five), in democratic
society the individual lives in a world of its own up to
the age of adolescence, sometimes even later.   This fact
has a twofold significance for the feeling of leisure.
Firstly, during that long period of childhood, the individ-
ual acquires the habit of thinking that life for oneself
may be as important as life as a member of one's society.

Secondly, due to a long childhood, the process of social
conditioning takes place slowly, smoothly, with no "trauma",
and feeling of compulsion, as often happens in a totalit-
arian society.   This forms a basic condition in the feeling
of freedom, characteristic of the individual's adjustment
to a democratic society.

(b)   The democratic mechanism of government - elections,
parliamentary debates, etc., - requires leisure for its
adequate application.

(c)   From the sociological point of view it is important
to notice that leisure became a value in both Greek and
modern European civilisations.   This should clearly be
distinguished from either laziness and sloth, or from the
"absenteist" attitude in life involved in the mediaeval
concept of <u>vita contemplativa</u>.   In Greek civilisation ,
leisure was raised to a cultural value by the importance
attributed to contemplation and speculation.   Leisure was
in this case almost equivalent to spiritual activity.   In
modern civilisation, the value of leisure is demonstrated
by a specific cultural phenomenon known under the name of
"autonomy of values".   In Germany, this phenomenon was
signalled - and exaggerated - by Nietzsche and his follow-
ers as a conflict between "Kultur" and "Leben".   The
autonomy of culture is in fact rooted in the value attributed
to that kind of spiritual activity which is not immediately
controlled by, or put in the service of the practical   /

requirements of human life. Formulae very much in use
towards the end of the last century, such as "science for
the sake of science", "art for art's sake", "philosophia
pura", were various expressions of this aspect of modern
civilisation. All of them expressed at the cultural level
the presence of the feeling of social security and ease
in life characteristic of that golden period of modern
democracies. Needless to say the autonomy of cultural
values is completely absent in contemporary totalitarian
societies. There, any form of spiritual activity is
rigorously integrated with the basic conditions of group
survival and prosperity.

C H A P T E R VI.

MIND AND DEMOCRACY.

Presque tous les extrèmes s'adoucissent

et s'emoussent. Tocqueville.

The Psychological Meaning of Flexibility. When the

complexity of life situations renders the direct and

rigid mechanisms of instinct and habit insufficient,

consciousness becomes the main dimension of the psyche.

The main sign of this is seen in the flexible and com-

-prehensive character of behaviour. Since no fixed

type of reaction fits the situation, the whole psycho-

-logical field of possible responses is kept in readiness.

The reaction starts off by exploration, calculation and

tentative organisation of the field. Flexibility is

in this case but a particular capacity of the mind to

grasp and adjust itself to a variety of conditions,

actual and potential. Needless to say, this is not

possible at the instinct or habit level of reaction.

In a democratic way of life the individual's mind

is dominated by consciousness. This means that human

behaviour is primarily directed by what happens at the

conscious level of the mind; i.e., it results partly,

or totally from an act of deliberation. It is true that

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in democracy, as in any other type of society the attitude towards one's fellow-beings, towards authority, and towards social institutions in general, are resultants of a series of data and experiences with which the individual is present--ed by his society.   But in Democracy the final shape of this attitude is normally determined by an individual act of deliberation and conscious choice.

We are only too well aware that in depth psychol--ogy human social behaviour is motivated mainly at the unconscious level of the mind.   But depth psychology itself is a historical product; it deals with the mental structures of a type of man who lives in a critical period of modern democracies.   That is why its assumptions and conclusions cannot invalidate the fact that, in certain historical periods, and in certain civilisations, con--sciousness plays a greater part in the mental structure of a man, than in others. We by no means suggest that in a democratic way of life the unconscious does not exist; on the contrary, its presence is, as we shall presently see, necessary.   But the man's world is styled by con--sciousness.   Thus, the social world is made up of in--dependent units, the individuals, who create the structure of their society by deliberation and compromises; the physical world is also made up of independent units, things and facts, in formal relations with each other. (1)

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(1)

For a more detailed discussion of the historical character of psycho-analysis see Z.Barbu.: The Historical Pattern of Psycho-Analysis.   The Brit. J.Soc., vol. 111, 1, 1952 pp. 64-76.

It seems useful for our present purpose to compare the reaction taking place at the conscious level of the mind with the instinct and habit type of reaction.

One obviously cannot characterise the instinct and habit type of reaction by a total absence of conscious--ness;   consciousness is very often present in the execu--tion of an instinct reaction.   But the decision and the construction of such types of reaction is always uncon--scious.   And it is precisely the construction of the reaction in a specially adaptive way, however, which is characteristic of the conscious level of the mind.   There the decision is of a deliberative nature; i.e., it takes place in the widest possible field involving the multi--plicity of conditions which are present in consciousness. This is in contrast to the instinct and habit type of reaction, where the tendency is to narrow the field as much as possible in order to gain rapidity and precision.

Behaviour at the conscious level is of a purposive character in the highest degree.   Movement in the field of reaction is neither blind and directed by chance, nor rigid and fixed to a particular element of the situation, but exploratory and adaptable.   This means first of all, that the elements of the situation are endowed with a

functional value; i.e., they become stages and aspects in the construction of the reaction. A goal-oriented reaction is not determined in the sense that the field of reaction does not contain the final shape, but rather the design of the adequate reaction. Consequently the individual is not driven by already established forms of reaction, as in the case of instinct and habit, but moves creatively towards the achievement of an end.

Translating what has been said so far in terms of group psychology one can say that one of the main con--ditions of a democratic way of life is laid down at the moment when the principal unconscious integrative factors of the group become conscious. Integrating factors working unconsciously can be regarded as the geographical and biological conditions of the group, as well as the traditional forms of life. Conscious integrating factors are, on the other hand, expressed in rational goals for the realisation of which individuals organise themselves in a society. A constitution, or a body of laws are typical examples of such rational goals.

Historically speaking the process of democratisation is closely connected with an increase in the number of conscious rational factors in the organisation of a group. In Greece, the passage to democracy is parallel with the transition from a community based on unconscious bonds to a society conscious of itself and integrated on the basis

of a series of rational factors.   In European democrat-
-isation a similar passage was made from a mediaeval
community to a modern society.   Both democratic periods
are characterised by a passionate search for a conscious
rational basis in social integration.

Reason, Intellect, Intelligence. Anyone attempting
to define these three concepts is faced with an almost
impossible task.   One can, however, hardly avoid dealing
with such concepts if one wants to gain an adequate idea
about the main functions of the conscious level of the mind,
and particularly of the part played by consciousness in
the mental structure of the individual belonging to a
democratic civilisation.   In what follows we shall look
at these concepts from a purely psychological point of view,
with the ultimate end of throwing certain light on their
significance for a democratic way of life.

Though these terms have been used in different con-
-texts, they have, from the psychological point of view,
the following common traits:

1. The function of reason, as well as that of intellect
and intelligence, presupposes the presence of conscious
goals and of conscious effort in the process of adjustment.
This is quite opposite to the type of adjustment based on
habit, sentiment, or prejudices, in Burke's sense of this
word.

2. Reason, intellect and intelligence are creative

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forms of adjustment in the sense that they all presuppose
critical analysis of the situation, deliberation on the
elements presented by it, and a progressive construction
of the form of adjustment; all of these imply that the
final form of reaction is created in the field of reaction.
This is also opposed to habit, sentiment and prejudice,
which presuppose the/existence of an unconscious form of pre-
reaction.   Consequently reason, intellect, and intelli-
-gence imply an element of change and novelty in the
situation.   It is in this type of situation that their
function is mostly required.

It is not easy to establish the differences between
the functions of reason and those of intellect and intelli-
-gence, without falling into a particular system of thought.
It seems, however, that the term reason can normally be
applied to that complex of mental functions which enables
the individual to find, or to establish, general principles
or norms regarding the organisation of his environment.
This is done in the interest of the individual's adjust-
-ment.   Though its ultimate purpose is to establish
general principles and laws, a mental activity described
as rational is directed towards particular facts and
experience.   In this consists - as stated before - the
difference between an act of adjustment based on reason
and one based on prejudice or sentiments.   A religous

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attitude, for instance, presupposes also a certain order, but this order is not open to experience.

Needless to say, reason is not, from a psychological point of view, a very clear concept. It is obvious that the general principles which it establishes are connected with experience, but the nature of this connection is not altogether clear. Considering the meaning attributed to reason by many modern thinkers one is often under the impression that its function is, to a considerable extent, independent of experience. Firstly, the principles of reason imply certain values which express the emotions and the wishes of a group of people rather than their empirical conditions of life. Secondly, the principles of reason are ideals of life, the existence of which cannot be proved by experience; moreover, they are often opposed to experience. Thus, individual freedom has been considered in many civilisations a rational end, and yet its application contradicts some of the fundamental empirical aspects of human life. One can see from this, that reason has certain points of contact with prejudice; it applies to life, general schemes which are not support-
-ed by the evidence of experience.

Intellect is much more dependent on experience than reason. It is that structure, or, simply speaking, that part of the mind, whose function is to organise and unify the individual's experience in order to facilitate its

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adjustment.   The activity of intellect can neither over-
-look, nor supersede, experience.   But, though dependent
on experience, intellect has its own content.   Modern
philosophers usually refer to intellect as the layer of
certain formal laws.   These laws, although they may have
an empirical origin, certainly exist prior to the experi-
-ential data which they organise.   But, on the other hand,
although the mental reaction based on intellect and the
resulting adjustment follow certain pre-established norms,
it is, nevertheless, true that these norms are formal:
hence the individual takes nothing into account except
these laws - no feeling, no external persuasion, and no
social value - that might influence his attitude and his
decision in a given situation.   A correct application
of these formal laws to his experience is the supreme
guide for his adjustment.

The difference between intellect and intelligence
is perhaps one of degree.   Contemporary psychology
emphasises the following three characteristic points
in the definition of intelligence: 1. Intelligence is a
formal capacity;   2. Its essence lies in the individual's
capacity for establishing relations between things and
events (Spearman), and;   3. Intelligence is the capacity
of an organism to adjust to new situations (W. Stern).
The main implication of this is that intelligence has
no content of its own, and that the ultimate aim of an act

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of intelligence consists in the achievement of the
proposed goal, or, more generally speaking, in adjust-
-ment itself.   Thus, an act of stealing or a crime can
involve as much intelligence as a medical diagnosis, or
a military operation; the farmer working on his land can
display the same amount of intelligence as Bertrand
Russell writing his books.   The real problem is, how
quickly and fully they can establish relations between the
elements of the specific situations in which they find
themselves, and consequently to work out the solution which
best suits their purpose.   As intelligence produces the
adjustment to a specific situation, its task is to work
out solutions relying as much as possible on the elements
presented by the situation.   This implies as little feel-
-ing, personal inclination, or pre-established opinion,
and as much cold analysis and freedom of deliberation as
possible.

The most important aspect of an act of intelligence
consists in the individual's capacity for grasping the
specificity, and therefore the novelty, of a situation
and of working out the most suitable form of adjustment.
Thus, any act of intelligence involves a strong tendency
towards exploration, and adventure; the greater the
independence from old forms of adjustment, the better.
This does not necessarily mean that the individual dis-
-cards the old forms and rules of adjustment but that /

he keeps his mind as free as possible from them, always
being ready to try them out, or to dispense with them.
The important thing is to keep the mind flexible and
ready to resort to new forms of adjustment as required
by the situation.

Two basic things have to be fulfilled by an act of
intelligence: the mind should be quick in discovering
the relations between the elements of the situation;
i.e., in grasping the logic of facts, and quick in grasping
the connection between the new elements in the situations
and the interests of the individual.   The former require-
-ment implies the presence of consciousness in the highest
degree possible, the latter the presence in the individual
of a strong feeling of security.

It has been mentioned more than once in this study
that reason, intellect and intelligence are mental functions
necessary for adjustment to the modern world, and conse-
-quently they have become dominant traits in the mental
structure of modern man.   The transition from a stable
universe and a rigid social organisation founded on divine
order to a world of rapid change made necessary the active
intervention of the individual's mind with a view to find-
-ing or constructing another kind of order lying at the
basis of nature and society.   Newton's concept of nature,
and Rousseau's concept of society, are typical expressions
of this basic trait existing in the mind of modern man.

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But the transition to the modern world means also
man's liberation from a series of old traditional forms of
adjustment, formed during a long period of stability.   This
made it even more necessary for the man of the Renaissance
to rely for his adjustment on mental functions and struct-
-ures different from those prevailing in the adjustment
to the mediaeval world.   While in the mediaeval world,
feeling (faith) and habit played an important part in the
process of adjustment, in the modern world, reason and
intelligence took their place.   Man needed more and more
flexibility and initiative to adjust to a world in trans-
-formation;   he needed above all more confidence in the
capacity of his own mind to grasp the relation between
things, to organise his environment, and to discover new
forms of adjustment.   This is approximately the task
of intelligence.

No wonder that the society that grew up from the soil
of the modern era bears in many respects the mark of that
type of social adjustment which is characteristic of
reason and intelligence.   This is the society suitable to
an individual with a flexible mental structure, ready to
take into account the new conditions of his own, and of his
group life, always ready to grasp new relations between
himself and others and to include them in the flexible
structure of his society.   This is the form of society
suitable to an individual confident in his own judgment,

and above all, in the capacity of his mind to mould the
structure of his society according to circumstances.   One
can find in all this the implicit belief that society is
the result of conscious activity, the belief "that abstract
reason, or imagination may be utilised not only to study,
but to direct the course of society", as the late followers
of Locke put it.   (Russell Kirk: "Burke and the Philosophy
of Prescription".   J. of the History of Ideas, Vol. XIV,
                        (1)
No.3, 1953 p. 367.).   If one adds to this , not only to
"direct" but to create, this would mean that society is
the result of a collective act of intelligence.

(1) Statements like this caused Burke's fulminations
against the age of reason.   According to him, society is
the work of Providence which asserts itself - unconsciously
of course - through tradition, prejudices and prescriptions.

Consciousness - the Unconscious and the Double
Dimension of Life.

The decline of the democratic way of
life in Western civilisation is marked, among other things
by an increased interest in the psychology of the uncon-
-scious.   The prominence given to depth psychology, and
to psycho-analysis in particular, is the proof of this.

A democratic way of life implies, as stated above, a
considerable increase in the conscious dimension of human
life; i.e., conscious motives in the individual's behaviour
and conscious integrating factors in the group life.   It
would, however, be a mistake to consider the absolute
supremacy of consciousness in mental life as the most
adequate expression of a democratic way of life.   Demo-

-cratic man is not a monolith: a strong dominance of conscious, or unconscious factors in the mental life of an individual is a sign of a totalitarian, rather than a democratic way of life. A democratic way of life is, in fact, the result of a certain balance and compromise between consciousness and the Unconscious. Here are a few aspects of this phenomenon.

We are fully aware that the psycho-analytical picture of the mind does not entirely tally with our present brief description of the conscious and unconscious levels of the mind. Our present interest lies, however, in the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious factors of the mind, and in the mechanisms of reaction characteristic of each, rather than in the contents of consciousness and the Unconscious. Thus, the mechanism of reaction originated in, and directed by, an unconscious factor is essentially the same whatever the quality of that factor may be. An unconscious drive impels the individual to act rigidly in an atmosphere of high tension. Hence the inflexibility and the uncompromising character of its reaction. The only aim and norm of this type of reaction consists in the pleasure derived by an immediate reduction of tension. Consciousness tends, on the other hand, to integrate the reaction in the largest possible context of life. Thus, any reaction taking place at this level acquires the character of indirectness, flexibility

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and leisure.

In spite of the obvious opposition between these two
mechanisms of adjustment, the main function of conscious-
-ness is to compensate for, rather than to contradict,
the Unconscious.   Whenever in contact with unconscious
factors, such as primitive impulses, repressed drives, or
complexes, consciousness makes the attempt to render them
flexible, and thus to prepare the individual's mind for
compromise.   The general tendency of the conscious level
of the mind is to integrate each reaction into a whole
bigger than itself: briefly speaking, consciousness
prepares the final reaction in awareness of "the other",
i.e., of what is not "now", not "here" and not "this".

Further, one can say that the function of the
consciousness is to create rational situations; i.e.,
to establish relations among various specific mental
manifestations, or events, and to regard their development
as members of a whole.   In this case an unconscious
factor is harmonised with the total number of conditions
of the individual's life.   The function of the Unconscious
is, on the contrary, to create irrational situations; the
law of a reaction motivated by unconscious factors is:
"all or nothing", "now,or never"; there is no sense of
balance and harmony in such a reaction.

The individual living in a democratic civilisation
is characterised by a balance between the conscious and /

unconscious structures of his mind.   Though based on a
fundamental duality, the psychological structure of this
individual forms an integrated whole.   One could say
therefore that an important psychological condition of a
democratic way of life appeared at that moment in the
mental evolution of modern man, when the conscious
dimension became strong enough to counter-balance, but
not so strong as to entirely suppress, the unconscious
dimension of his mind.

A characteristic aspect of our time is that the
balance between the conscious and the unconscious dimens-
-ions of mental life has been upset.   Thus, contemporary
civilisation and the mind of contemporary man, can no
longer be considered as equilibrated, but as ambivalent
structures, in the sense that they oscillate between too
much consciousness and rationality, and too much uncon-
-sciousness and irrationality.   This is the beginning of
a totalitarian civilisation and of a totalitarian type of
man.   Facism, with its inclination towards mysticism and
irrational forms of life, constitutes the pole of the
Unconscious;   there, man's behaviour is dominated by
unconscious factors.   Communism shows, on the other hand,
oscillation towards the pole of consciousness.   One can
speak in this latter case of a super-consciousness (some-
-thing equivalent to the mediaeval concept of "super-
-rationality") which brings under its spell the whole /

realm of life, social, economic, and artistic.   Excess
of rationality is the main symptom of a Communist civil-
-isation.

There is another important aspect in the relationship
between consciousness and the Unconscious.   This refers
to the compensatory nature of this relationship.   Conscious-
-ness is much more closely tied up with the empirical
condition of the individual's life than the Unconscious;
its function is to grasp and to adjust to the empirical
conditions of its environment.   The transcendence of these
conditions is mainly the work of the Unconscious, in the
sense that, whenever an unconscious drive cannot be
gratified at the empirical level of life, this level
becomes overlaid by means of a series of unconscious
mechanisms such as displacements, sublimation, idealisation,
and projection.   The final result is a new dimension of
life which grows as a compensatory world to the empirical
one;   this is the world of dreams, of religion, of art
and philosophy.

We hasten to say that we are not prepared to support
the view that the transcendental dimension of life can
entirely be explained by the work of the Unconscious.
What we should like to say is only that the double dimens-
-ion of life, empirical and transcendental, is expressed,
on the psychological plane, by the work of consciousness

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and the Unconscious.   In terms of depth psychology, the

Unconscious contains the mechanism of ideal formation by

which it creates a compensatory world to the empirical

one.   At the conscious level of his mind the child has

but a series of experiences proving that his father does

things he cannot do.   His Unconscious however, produces an

ideal form of these experiences which is expressed at the

conscious level in the feeling that his father is almighty.

This feeling transcends the empirical condition of life

and compensates for it by an ideal form which satisfies

the particular structure of the child's mind.

The world created by the Unconscious has an auton-

-omous and ideal character.   This means that it represents

an opportunity for the empirical wishes of the individual

without thereby becoming itself empirical.   A work of art,

or a religious experience, can easily satisfy an unsuccess-

-ful love, or failure in a practical enterprise, and yet

this does not take the form of an empirical type of

satisfaction, i.e., it does not furnish the experience of

realisation in an empirical sense.   Hence the feeling of

transcendence, i.e., of an ideal world the origins and the

construction of which are inaccessible to consciousness.

But the important point is that in a democratic way of

life the transcendental world is institutionalised as such;

it constitutes an accepted mode of life which has its aim

in itself.   This does not happen in a totalitarian way

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of life. In Communist civilisation , for instance, the
transcendental dimension of life is, in principle, repressed;
any ideal form of life - art, religion, philosophy - has to
be rendered immanent, thus becoming not only integrated
with, but directed by, empirical conditions of life.   Even
reveries have to conform to this.   In a democratic way of
life, the transcendental world can be at the service of
the empirical conditions of life, without the individual
being aware of this.   In a totalitarian way of life, on the
contrary, the products of the unconscious are consciously
put at the service of the practical requirements of life.
Thus the spontaneity and the freedom involved in their
creation are lost.

The work of the Unconscious, as has been expounded
above, is of some importance for the experience of freedom.
It provides outlets to many tensions produced by the
insufficiencies of the physical and social environment.
Lewin and Freud have pointed to the importance which the
imaginary level of life has in many tensions created in the
individual and in the group by the frustrations and conflicts
taking place at the empirical level of life.   The part
played by Christian religion, with its ideal of universal
brotherhood, in smoothing the inter-individual and inter-
-group conflicts in Western society can be adduced as an
example.   The displacement of aggression upon an ideal
form of evil and danger (The Devil) can certainly be   /

considered as one of the decisive factors in the rise of
the spirit of tolerance in modern man.   The satisfaction
of the individual's drives at an imaginary level produces
deflection and therfore an increase in the flexible
character of his behaviour.

The Psychological Aspects of Freedom.   It has been
shown previously that the intelligent type of reaction
requires leisure, and that situations of stress tend to
produce reactions of the instinctive type.   The real
difference between these two forms of reaction can be
assessed in terms of freedom.   In this context freedom
has two aspects: (a) the degree of freedom displayed by
the reaction itself in its development towards its final
form, and (b) the relative independence of the ego in the
situation; the ego may preserve a certain distance from
the situation which increases the exploratory power of the
mind.

Any situation of stress, normally produced by a high
degree of frustration, minimises the degree of freedom in
human behaviour.   Koehler and Birch, amongst others,
noticed that animals, after a long period of food privat-
-ions, failed to behave intelligently.   The whole reaction
field became narrowed down to a stereotyped and inadequate
reaction.   The animals "throw" themselves in one direction
or another, without being able to calculate the results
of their reactions, or to combine them in a final form of

adjustment.   Under mild food privations the field remains
fluid and "transparent";   the animal sees and calculates
the implications of its reactions.   (Birch, H.G.; The
rôle of motivational factors in insightful problem-solving.
J. Comp. Psychol. 38, p.295 - 317, 1945:).   Lewin notices
that a child who normally shows a high degree of mental
flexibility and imagination in his play behaviour, resorts
to stereotyped reactions when frustrated;   e.g., the blocks
are used merely as things to bang about. (Barker, R.,
Dembo, T., and Lewin, K.: Frustration and aggression: an
experiment with young children.   Univ. of Ia. Stud. Child
Wel., 18, No.1).

How can the reduction in the degree of freedom be
explained?   In a situation of high tension resulting from
the frustration of a fundamental drive, the individual
seeks an immediate answer.   In most cases intelligence
gives way to instinct.   An instinct operates in terms of
maximum of urgency; "now or never", "all or nothing",
"in this way and in no other", are the normal formulae
of instinctive reaction.   This obviously minimises the
degree of freedom in the field of reaction.

An organism under conditions of stress behaves
according to the principle of the concentration of power;
psychical energy concentrates in the frustrated area which
discharges in the form of a short circuit.   The situation
becomes rigid in the sense that the organism simplifies

the whole field of reaction to correspond to the immediate
satisfaction of its present aim.   Thus the individual's
behaviour is entirely decided by one of its constitutive
factors, to the neglect of the others.   Figuratively
speaking one can say that a minority rules over a majority.

In conclusion one can say that frustration in general
and increase of pressure in particular produce a low degree
of freedom in the psychological field, and can consequently
be considered as psychological factors contributing to
anti-democratic behaviour and to an anti-democratic way of
life.   There is no difficulty in proving this point with
regard to individual behaviour.   That is why we should
like to spend more time in what follows in discussing this
problem in terms of group psychology.

One of the basic conditions of democratisation consists,
as already mentioned, in a long period of stability and
security in the life of the group.   In such circumstances
the social and cultural pattern of the group becomes
flexible, and consequently the system of inter-individual
relations allows a high degree of freedom.   The Athenian
community can be taken as a first example.   Of all Greek
cities Athens achieved the highest degree of security and
stability.   It should be said that in spite of the fact
that during the Vth century, the Athenian community under-
-went situations of threat, these did not reach such
intensity and duration as to affect the system of

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inter-individual relations in the community, and consequent-
-ly to prevent the process of democratisation.[1]

(1)
   Groiset underlines the fact that, in the Vth century
the Athenian community reached a high degree of stability:
"Elle (Athènes) n'était pas alors une cité de conquète et
de combat". (Op. Cit. p.72).

   In the same sense security and social stability are

characteristic of all modern societies in the periods

immediately before or during their democratisation.   The

fact that the process of democratisation in the modern

world starts in Great Britain, the country enjoying the

longest period of stability in Europe, is significant from

this point of view.   Tocqueville counts isolation and

stability amongst the first conditions for American

Democracy.   The lack of imminent danger which made the

maintenance of a standing army unnecessary is related to the

rise of British Democracy, by Macaulay, and to the rise of

American democracy by Tocqueville.   The fact that the

strongest democracies are today in those countries less

afflicted by the insecurities of modern life, such as

Switzerland, Scandinavia, and Great Britain, can also be

adduced as a proof that stability and security are import-

-ant conditions for a democratic way of life.

   When the members of the group are frustrated in their

need for security, the social pattern of the group becomes

rigid.   European mediaeval communities offer good examples

of groups organised under conditions of stress.   The

insecurity, individual and collective, dominating European
society after the downfall of the Roman Empire is respons-
-ible for this phenomenon.   This is one of the reasons
why the Church, as the dominant institution of mediaeval
society - though in itself not necessarily of an authorit-
-arian character - is closely associated with an authorit-
-arian type of social organisation.   The condition of a
rigid form of social organisation existed, at that time in
the air.   Fascism is also given as an example of a group
under conditions of stress.   This will form the subject
of the second part of the present study.   For the moment,
our interest is concentrated on what happens when a
collectivity is under conditions of stress.

A group can be frustrated in many ways in its need
for stability and security.   The frustration might be
aroused by a danger from outside, the group being threat-
-ened by another group, or by a danger from within, such as
a political, economic, or spiritual crisis.   The rigidity
of the pattern of life of a community during times of war
is a usual phenomenon and requires very little explanation.
The imminent character of the danger allows neither leisure
in the process of taking common decisions, nor freedom for
the individual in carrying out his part of responsibility.
Even more characteristic from this point of view, is the
frustration of the need of security produced by a danger
from within.   An economic crisis can be taken as an

example.   The first symptom of rigidity is seen in the
fact that as a direct result of the crisis, society becomes
divided into a series of sub-groups , or classes, rigidly
organised within themselves, and normally in conflict with
each other.   The sub-groups and classes accuse each other
of being responsible for the crisis.   If the crisis is deep
enough to threaten the survival of the community, the rigid-
-ity of the social pattern may take the following aspect;
the group as a whole loses the capacity of working out
solutions - of the crises - which are based on the free
expression of the majority, or of the totality of its
members.   The proposed solutions are of a radical charac-
-ter; they are the expression of a sub-group, and as such
represent the specific interest of that group exclusively.
The working-class, for instance, sees the solution in "the
communisation of all property", and naturally in the
"liquidation" of other classes; the middle classes, on the
other hand, work out the solution to the same crisis in
terms of its own conception of security which means greater
opportunity for private earnings and savings.   The
political power which, previous to the crisis, was diffused
in all classes, tends now to be concentrated in one or other
of them, depending upon circumstances.   The final result
is that the community takes on the form of an authoritarian
organisation where a minority decides upon the interests of
all.

A characteristic illustration of the connection exist-
-ing between frustration and insecurity, on one hand, and
rigid social organisation, on the other, is seen in the
totalitarian tendencies existing in nearly all workers'
organisations today.   The root of this phenomenon should
be looked for in a series of social and economic events
presiding over the development of this class within modern
society.   A frustrated feeling of security and an accumu-
-lated aggression produced by various critical periods,
at the beginning of industrial society, constitute the basic
elements in the psychology of this class.   We shall deal
more fully with this phenomenon in the last part of the
present study.   For the moment we confine ourselves to
mentioning that the frustrated security explains to a great
extent the lack of flexibility and of the sense of comprom-
-ise, as well as the inclination towards a rigid social
organisation characteristic of this class.

Concluding, one can say that any frustration, and any
inner or external conflict which brings about a real threat
for the group, tend to diminish the degree of freedom of its
pattern of life.   A great frustration can cause the dimin-
-ution of freedom in the pattern of life of a group in two
main ways: it can produce either an accumulation of
aggression in the frustrated group, or fear and insecurity.
An aggressive group is always liable to rigid military types
of organisation.   Fear and insecurity in a group of

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individuals work very often in exactly the same direction;
i.e., towards a rigid social organisation and the
concentration of political power in the hand of a "strong"
man who is regarded by the members of a group as their
"saviour". The reduction of fear and insecurity seems,
therefore, a necessary condition for the creation of a
flexible type of organisation in a group. No wonder,
Roosevelt listed "freedom from fear" among the conditions
of democratisation in the present world.

C H A P T E R VII.

DEMOCRACY AND EVERYDAY LIFE.

"We live at ease, not like the
Lacedaemonians who undergo laborious
exercises which are to make them
brave". -- Pericles.

"La vie n'est pas très ornée mais
très aisée et très passible". --
- Tocqueville.

<u>Life and Principles</u>.   The feeling of ease is by far
the most general trait of mind in a democratic society.
Though we call it feeling, it is in fact a para-psychologi-
cal factor; something which exists in the pattern of life,
and yet can never be entirely translated into terms of
individual consciousness.   In a democracy, the pattern
of life itself has the character of naturalness, of some-
thing which only the Greek term "Eucosmia" can translate;
it radiates the elements of the conviction - perhaps never
fully articulated at a conscious level - that the problems
of life can be solved within the normal exercise of the mind.
The limits of the supernatural are well defined, and there
is little inclination to resort to "extraordinary" measures.
Thus, the possibilities of tension, which leads necessarily
 to a rigid organisation of life, are rigorously circum-
scribed.   What the individual cannot achieve by himself,
he can achieve in co-operation with others.   Any tension
is immediately absorbed into the whole of life in exactly /

the same way as a slight poison is absorbed and annihilated by a healthy organism. The individual manages to keep his impulses and aspirations flexible; groups, classes, or corporations seldom create situations of mutual exclusion in their interrelations. State and the individual, on one hand, and leadership and masses on the other, do not form separate poles in the pattern of life.

It would not however, be completely accurate to conclude from this that democracy is the realm of spontaneity. On the contrary, the individual and the group show strong inclinations to live according to, or to observe, certain principles even in their every day life. In post-war Britain, many people belonging to various classes imposed upon themselves considerable restriction in smoking, prompted mainly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer's exhortations. It is nevertheless true that this is not a very common example, and that one might well be induced to see in it some condition of stress, or even some anti-democratic traits lurking in the British way of life. This compels us to state again that what is characteristic of democracy is not the existence, or the absence, of certain well-defined principles, or prescriptions, but the specific relation existing between these principles and prescriptions and the individual.

One usually says that in democracy, the individual appropriates the norms and the rules of life by a process /

of free acceptance, or by assent. This does on no account imply that, in a democracy it is pure chance that decides upon the individual's beliefs, attitudes and ideas. In a democratic, as in a totalitarian way of life, the individual is presented with a well-defined social and cultural world, in which the stimuli are pre-arranged, so as to encourage or discourage the formation of certain kinds of beliefs and principles. The characteristic of a democratic way of life consists, however, in the fact that the individual constitutes by himself a selective centre, i.e., the external factors leading to the formation of certain beliefs and principles in life are organised in the function of his own needs.

As for the individual's attitude towards the principles governing his life, it can be characterised briefly as objective, or critical. Moral principles, religious beliefs or political ideas are, in democracy, inner convictions. They define the individual's nature and yet they do not engulf his personality, for it is the individual himself who applies them. In this consists one of the most characteristic traits of a democratic mental structure, which, lacking a more appropriate term, can be considered as one aspect of the spirit of objectivity. Although they are "his own" beliefs and principles, the individual is never possessed by them; his ego preserves a certain distance from each particular situation in which these /

idea mentioned above by saying that under personal feelings
we understand a series of states of mind which define the
way an individual in a community perceives himself as well
as the others with whom he is in contact, as personalities.
The main personal feelings are manifested under the follow-
ing forms:

1. Tactfulness is manifested in the flexible character
of an inter-individual relation, or of a course of action,
as a result of the fact that these are conditioned by the
specific personality of the individuals involved in them.
Thus, tactfulness should be distinguished first of all from
"tactics", the latter being manifested in the flexible
character of a course of action with the view of facilitating
to the maximum possible, the achievement of a fixed goal
which pre-exists the situation and dominates the personali-
ties of the individuals involved.   Contrary to tactfulness,
tactics is directed only towards the goal which is to be
achieved by neglecting the personality of the individuals
involved, or by using them as simple means.   The distinc-
tive mark of tactful action does not consist in the lack
of a guiding principle, or of a general goal, but rather
in the adjustment of this principle to the personalities
of the individuals concerned, and above all, in the fact
that the personalities of these individuals constitute
values which condition the specific pattern of action.
Thus, the pattern of a tactful action is determined by /

both its proposed goal, expressed as an idea or as a value,
and a series of concrete psychological factors aroused in
the interplay of human relationships taking place in the
course of action. The method of breaking bad news in a
civilised society, when the principles of truth and reality
have to enter into compromise with the feelings and ideas
of the individuals concerned, can be taken as an illust-
rative example, of tactfulness. A political compromise
can be taken as an example of tactical arrangement. While
in the former, the interests of the parts concerned are
fused, in the latter, in each part the original goal is
kept in suspension with a hidden purpose to be thrown into
the battle under more favourable circumstances, and thus
to win an undisputed victory for itself.

One often says that between tactfulness and tactics
there is but a difference of degree. It is however obvious
that in a democratic way of life the accent normally falls
on tactfulness and real compromise in human intercourse,
whereas, in a totalitarian way of life, the accent falls
on tactical arrangements. In a totalitarian way of life
the principles and the general goals of action dominate
and often crush the personality of the individuals as well
as the specific structure of the groups concerned.

2.   Politeness is another form of behaviour based on
personal feeling which is in fact partly involved in
tactfulness.   It can be defined as a tactful intervention /

in a system of interrelations, normally taking place in
the present, with the main intention of facilitating
the free manifestation of the personalities of the individ-
uals concerned, and particularly of that of the individual
towards whom politeness is directed.   The actual aim of
an act of politeness is to produce in the addressed
individual the feeling that he is a positive factor in
the (social) situation.   This is done by arousing in him
the feeling that his weaknesses are spared, his good
qualities are noticed, and that his personality - as it
is - occupies a necessary place in the situation.   Polite-
ness may be turned into flattery if flattery is necessary
to put the other at ease.   This applies to cases in which
people suffer from some complex.   When by excessive
politeness one creates false personalities in others this
trait ceases to have a democratic value.

3.   Decency is another form of behaviour under which
personal feelings can be shown.   Since it is closely
related to politeness it may well be considered as another
aspect of the same trait.   Decency can be defined as a
tactful withdrawal from a social situation with the view
of producing in others the same feeling of ease which we
have just defined.   Thus, what the polite man does through
his intervention, the decent man does through his non-
-interference and tactful distance from others.   In
decency, there are crystallised all those feelings and /

attitudes defining the respect for the personality of others, and for anything through which that personality manifests itself, i.e., those feelings and attitudes which define the values of "privacy". It would be useful to distinguish between decency and self-negation, the latter indicating an attitude towards oneself, rather than a social act. Decency is very closely related to what one usually calls the unassuming attitude or character, which forms a distinctive mark of the democratic personality. It is also necessary to mention that an unassuming attitude does not mean self-denial or abnegation; it implies only a certain self-limitation, and self-effacement with the view of not denying to others the opportunity of free manifestation as a result of one's own privileged position.

Of a certain sociological interest is the fact that the French show their personal feelings, i.e., the way they perceive themselves and others in a social situation, more in the line of politeness, while the British do so in the line of decency.

The sense of humour constitutes another aspect of personal feelings. Its essence lies in the capacity for laughing at oneself. Though its ways and means are different from those of decency, the sense of humour leads to the same self-effacement in order to produce the feeling of ease in others.[1]

(1)
    In some communities the sense of humour is considered
as a high social value. The Scots, for instance, seldom
miss an opportunity of praising themselves for their
"dry humour".   In these cases the individual uses humour
as a social technique, with the view to excel rather than
self-effacement.   But it is nevertheless true that this
kind of excellence does seldom embarrass the personalities
of those present.

    The lecturer in his class produces the feeling of ease

in his audience by exposing jokingly his own limitations

and weaknesses. He may produce a similar result in himself,

by reducing the inner tension resulting from his shyness.

Laughing at others can also be considered humour, if by

exposing the weakness of a person one produces the feeling

of ease and spontaneity in other persons involved in the

situation.   Ridiculing others, and big people in particular,

comes into this category.   This trait is better seen in

the French "éprit" rather than in the English sense of

humour.(1)

(1)
    Thomas Mann considers laughing at oneself and at others
the sign of artistic imagination, and of Bohemianism. We
are ready to agree that a democratic way of life implies
a certain "Bohemian" attitude in life.   This seems to be
one of the facets of the feeling of ease, leisure and
"douceur des moeurs" which are closely connected with
life in democratic societies and opposed to the spirit of
solemnity dominating in an authoritarian society. (T.Mann,
- Talk on the Third Programme, B.B.C., 1952).

    There are certain psychological traits implied in the

sense of humour which have a particular significance for

the mental structure of democratic personality.   Namely,

the sense of humour requires a great flexibility of mind

and an exceptional capacity for objectivity.   Both of these
traits are necessitated by the act of laughing at oneself.
For, on this occasion, the individual's mind looks at
itself with detachment, as if it were an object.

The most intimate connection between the sense of
humour and the democratic way of life is seen in the fact
that the sense of humour helps the individual and the
group to create and to maintain a high degree of flexibility
in their pattern of life.   Due to the sense of humour
many tensions are reduced which otherwise would have led
to conflicts in the individual, or in the social field.
The sense of humour prevents the individual from making
a serious and important case of himself, or of others,
when living in exceptional circumstances - fortunate or
unfortunate.   Thus, the sense of humour often helps the
Briton to be "a good loser", and to avoid in this way
a tension between himself and his competitor which might
have led to authoritarian behaviour in both.   The sense
of humour may also help to avoid the oppressiveness of an
unfortunate experience and consequently to reduce the
"trauma" created by such an experience.   Even after the
1940 defeat, the French often referred to the unfortunate
incident as "cette drôle de guerre".

Here is the proper place to mention that the sense
of humour presupposes a balanced and self-confident mind.
His ego being strong enough the individual can easily/

accept the bad as well as the good points of his personality; the self-defending mechanisms are relatively weak. The sense of humour transforms personal glory and misfortunes into simple incidents in life. One is strong enough not to succumb under the tension normally created by such experiences, and one always has the courage to look at the other side. Thus the sense of humour makes the person who possesses it easy to live with.

Sociologically it is important to point out that the sense of humour is wide-spread among two great democratic nations, the British and French. One of the most striking traits of a totalitarian community and personality is certainly their lack of humour. This is demonstrated by both Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. The sense of humour has little scope in a culture-pattern, or in a frame of mind dominated by deep tensions. "Alle Revolutionäre sind humorlos", says Spengler. (Jähre der Entscheidung. München, C.H. Beck's die Verlag, 1833, p.143).

There has been very little said about the social significance of personal feelings. Many consider them as simple "manners" and as such, they refer to the social entertainment of a specific social stratum, rather than to the structure of personality or to that of a culture--pattern. Many others think that personal feelings are unnecessary relics of an old world and do not fit into the structure of a democratic society. Thus, too much /

a display of such feeling is often considered as a sign
of insecurity and of a lack of spontaneity.

For us, personal feelings have a particular social
and psychological significance.   They demonstrate a
specific attitude in life which can be described as
interest in human personality.   In this respect we entirely
agree with Bertrand Russell when he says that one of the
striking characteristics of Communism consists in
"a complete absence of kindly feeling".   (The Intellectual
Error of Communism. World Review, March 1950, page 41).
It is obvious that in a totalitarian society the interest
is not in man, but in the principles or in the pre-estab-
lished programmes with which men are integrated as numbers
only.

In democracy there exists a series of expressions
used in every day life which demonstrate interest in
human personality. Thus, modes of addressing people such
as "how do you do?", "how are you?", or "how are you getting
on?" suggest, even when said perfunctorily, interest in
the way a particular individual feels in a certain situation.
The accent falls on that individual's feelings.   This is
completely lacking in a totalitarian society, as we shall
show later.

We should like to close this section with a brief
consideration of a series of other emotional factors whose
significance for a democratic pattern of life is a /

controversial matter.   Such are the emotional complexes

of ambition, jealousy, envy and love.   One is usually

inclined to assign these feelings to human nature in

general, therefore considering them as having no signifi-

cance for a specific social and cultural pattern.   The

Communists and even certain politically nondescript

anthropologists have, however, challenged this view.   The

Communists consider these feelings - with the exception

perhaps of ambition - as belonging to a specific social

and cultural pattern, usually known as the petty bourgeois

way of life.   One of the main aims of Communism is to

supersede this stage in human society.   But as the problem

stated in such terms is far too wide and controversial to

be discussed in this study, we have to confine our present

considerations to the democratic significance of these

feelings.

Ambition is a complex psychological trait.   Like

self-assertion and self-respect it can easily be considered

as belonging to the category of personal feelings.   But

our present interest lies mainly in the object and the

direction of ambition.   In democracy the main object of

ambition consists in the increase of personal prestige.

The way leading to this end may vary according to the

scale of the values characteristic of each culture-pattern.

But, though personal prestige is usually gained by creating

or respecting accepted social values, what an ambitious

man really aims at is an increase in the feeling of self-
-importance and personal superiority.   Alcibiades, who
is the prototype of ambitious man, living in the last
phases of a great democratic civilisation, says about
himself , "And where is the injustice if I, or anyone who
feels his own superiority to another, refuses to be on
a level with him".   It seems that in a democracy, ambition
can be defined as a dynamic factor of individual differ-
entiation, i.e., of the individual's betterment, and of
the feeling of superiority, in a specific matter.   It
would be inappropriate to infer from this that ambition
necessarily leads to concentration of power - the super-
iority of an individual over others - and therefore to the
weakening of democracy.   In democracy, ambition is a
general feeling; each individual has it for himself.
This results in minimisation, rather than in concentration,
of power.   In democracy, "l'ambition est un sentiment
universel; il y a peu d'ambitions vastes", says Tocqueville.
(De la Democratie en Amerique.   Paris CalmannLevy 1888.
p.554).

       The situation is quite different in a totalitarian
society.   Communists do not like even the use of the word
ambition.   In their society, ambition seems to take the
way of self-annihilation;   the ambitious man sacrifices
himself in order to increase the prestige of the party.
Ambition thus becomes equivalent to obedience.

In order to see the difference existing in this respect between a democratic and a totalitarian society, it is worth mentioning the main forms of institutionalisation of the feeling of ambition. In democracy ambition is institutionalised in the system of ownership, in social status, in personal glory, and in other ways. All these are recognised values. In a totalitarian society, the only institutionalised form of ambition is in obedience and faithfulness to the leader; hence a man satisfies his ambition to the extent to which he is recognised by the leader as a faithful follower. Thus, in democracy, ambition constitutes a driving force leading towards differentiation and individuation, according to the size of property, social status, power of originality, etc. In totalitarian society, it leads to the construction of a social monolith based on the hierarchy of power.

Jealousy and envy are described by Communists as emotional resultants of an economic system based on private ownership, i.e., of the system lying at the basis of Western democracies. As such they are bound to disappear with this system;perhaps this makes psychologists such as V. V. French and Fr. Alexander consider jealousy and envy as specific traits of the emotional pattern of democracy. (Alexander, F., Our Age of Unreason. N. Y. J. B. Lippincott. Co.).

It is however difficult to support this view. /

For, in the first place, there is little evidence that
jealousy is weak or has completely disappeared in
Communism.   The fact is that the manifestation of this
feeling has taken there a completely new direction.   In
a Communist society, infidelity towards one's own friends,
wife, or parents is often experienced as infidelity towards
the party and the leader, if the person towards whom the
infidelity was manifested happens to be in a closer
association with the party, than the infidel.   On the
other hand infidelity towards, or betrayal of an individual
does not arouse jealousy if motivated by a greater fidelity
towards the party.   The infidelity of one member of the
party towards another is not experienced by the individuals
concerned as jealousy, if its direction is to greater
fidelity towards the party.   Thus the tendency is to
depersonalise this feeling rather than to annihilate it,
i.e., to turn it into an emotional state which defines the
attitude of an individual towards an institution or towards
a principle, rather than towards another individual.

Here we touch upon an idea which opens up a compara-
tive view between the emotional patterns characteristic
of democracy and of totalitarianism.   In a democratic
society, feelings like ambition, jealousy or love are
individualised; hence the individuals are the only terms
in the function of which these feelings are experienced
and assessed.   An individual is jealous of another

/

because the latter is not faithful to himself, because he
does not respect himself as a personality.   An individual
loves another because of the intrinsic value of his person-
ality.

The feeling of love can be given as an illustrative
example of individualisation.   One of the immediate results
of love is an increase of self-awareness and self-importance.
When in love two individuals are unique in each other's
eyes; they are the supreme value to each other.   Their
love is conditioned by their own personality, and by nothing
else.   But this way of feeling is much more characteristic
of democratic than totalitarian society.   In this respect
Vera Gherassimova significantly warns contemporary Soviet
writers of having lost the habit of dealing with love stories.
She quotes from a novel where a young man stops suddenly in
his love confession, by saying, "This is not the right
moment; I have to go to vote on the resolution taken by
the factory committee".   (Literaturnaia Gazeta, 1952).

Tolerance. Recent researches in the field of social
behaviour seem to show that tolerance emerges as one of the
basic traits of the democratic personality.   Its main
aspects are: adherence to liberal values such as liberal
views in religion and family life, and lack of racial, class
and national prejudices.   Thus, like personal feelings,
tolerance also requires the same flexibility of mind which
is rooted in the conviction that human personality is a

value in itself.

In what follows we shall discuss the main aspects of the spirit of tolerance in modern European societies.

As mentioned in a previous chapter, one of the important sources of tolerance in modern man lies in that trait of Christian civilisation which we have called the double dimension of life. There is no need to insist on this problem again. It is enough to mention that the ideal dimension of life constitutes one of the sources of self--limitatiom and humility in modern man. Man can achieve but a relative and precarious adjustment to the Christian ideals of life; hence the attitude of understanding towards human weakness and imperfection which forms a basic factor in the development of the spirit of tolerance.

The increase in social and cultural heterogeneity characteristic of the modern world, as compared with the homogeneity of mediaeval communities, is another important source of the spirit of tolerance in modern man. The greater the variety of social and cultural factors contributing to the formation of a personality, the greater the chance of developing in that personality tolerant attitudes in life. The religious development in seventeenth and eighteenth century England offers a good example of the connection between socio-cultural heterogeneity and the spirit of toleration. It is during this period that the mediaeval unity of English society was broken down/

due to the appearance of various religious groups. The important fact, mentioned by many students of this period, is that the spirit of tolerance cannot be attributed to the inner doctrine of these new religious groups: of all these only the Independents and the Levellers genuinely believed in religious tolerance. R. Niebuhr suggests that the tolerance displayed by the people of that period was the result of practical reason; in a society split up in various religious faiths, each hoping to prevail upon the entire nation, and none of them strong enough to achieve this end, the only working solution was religious toleration. One can say about tolerance what Niebuhr says about democracy in general, that in a sense "it is the fruit of a cultural and religious pluralism created by inexorable forces of history". (The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness. London, Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1945 p. 85). The concept of practical reason, which has just been used, means, if translated in terms more pertinent to the language of the present study, the capacity of an individual and of a group to adjust themselves to situations containing various and heterogeneous conditions. It rests in fact on the individual's and the groups capacity to compromise with other individuals and groups, in their process of adjustment.

From the motivational point of view, tolerance is closely connected with the feelings of security and stability. The connection between these feelings and the democratic way/

of life, has been dealt with previously.   Our present
considerations are confined to the connection between
tolerance and frustration, on the one hand, and between
tolerance and the feeling of security, on the other.

When an attitude or a habit is formed under conditions
of stress it tends to be rigid.   A habit formed in early
childhood under pressure of punishment, or the habits and
attitudes formed in the army can be given as examples.
Many religious beliefs are emotional systems built up under
conditions of stress, i.e., fear and insecurity.   This is
the principle reason why individuals holding such beliefs
are intolerant in matters of religion.   When a scientific
conception, a philosophical conviction, or a political
attitude is formed as an answer to a frustrated need which
keeps the individual's mind under the pressure of a high
tension, it tends to be dogmatic and authoritarian.   A
psychologist who becomes Freudian because of his own
complexes, a politician who becomes a Marxist in order to
relieve by this a great tension created in his mind by his
class prejudices, a new nationality taken in order to solve
a series of conflicts with the former one, tend to become
dogmatic, authoritarian, or chauvinist, respectively.   The

renegade forms the proper ground for the study of these
phenomena.

When, on the contrary, an attitude, or a belief is /

formed in conditions of leisure, i.e., when they are not
conditioned by a long frustrated need, they tend to be
flexible.   The formation of the in- and out-group attitudes
and feelings can illustrate this statement.   In Transyl-
vania, for instance, where the two cohabitant groups such
as Roumanians and Hungarians, have been in conflict for
centuries, the in- and out-group feelings are exclusivist
on both sides.   In Switzerland, on the other hand, where
a series of historical conditions have led to co-operation
among various ethnic groups, the individuals have formed
flexible and tolerant in- and out-group feelings.

Niebuhr, in hismentioned work, points to another
problem regarding the connection between tolerance and
lack of inner tension.   Commenting on the rise of religi-
ous tolerance in England he writes: "It must be admitted
that toleration in religion could not possibly have been
achieved in any modern democratic society had there not
been a considerable decay of traditional religious loyalties
Tolerance is the virtue of people who do not believe
anything, said Gilbert Chesterton, quite truly." (Op. Cit.
p.91).   Thus, Niebuhr associates religious tolerance
with the weakening of religious faith which is an histori-
cal as well as a psychological truth.   Historically this
is the result of the process of secularisation taking place
in the Post-Renaissance European societies.   The tension /

involved in the fundamental religious question, i.e., what is the ultimate meaning of life, was considerably reduced in the post-Renaissance man.   This in the long run made for more tolerance in his behaviour.

Summing up what has been said so far about the psychological sources of tolerance, one comes to the following main ideas: flexibility in attitudes and in behaviour in general is the result of the individual's adjustment under conditions of leisure.   This type of adjustment is dominated by intellectual factors.   When, on the contrary, the modes of reaction - attitudes, beliefs, ideas - are formed under conditions of stress, i.e., in situations dominated by emotive factors, they tend to be rigid, thus leading to intolerance.

The few researches already done on the psychology of tolerance give - as far as they can be systaematised - a certain support to the ideas expounded above.   According to the results obtained, for instance, by Eugene L. and Ruth E. Hartly, on the basis of a test of social distance completed with clinical observation, the main traits of tolerance and intolerance are the following:

1.   Tolerant individuals have a high need for achievement, a strong tendency to accomplish something difficult, to master objects, human beings or ideas, to be independent, to overcome obstacles, to increase self-regard by successful exercise of talent, to work with singleness of purpose /

towards a high distant goal.   They are interested in imaginative activities, inner processes, theories, artistic conception, and religious studies.   They are, further characterised as possessing strong desires for personal autonomy, associated with lack of need of dominance, strong need of friendliness along with personal seclusiveness, fear of competition, dislike of violence; they are able to appreciate the contribution of others; they are serious about moral questions.

2.   Intolerant individuals are occupied with "outer events", with the enjoyment of clearly observable results; they have a tangible mechanical outlook.   They are unwilling to accept responsibilities, and are ready for the acceptance of conventional mores.   They manifest absorption in pleasurable activities; are emotional rather than rational; egotistic; interested in physical activity and bodily health; relatively uncreative; unable to deal with anxiety except by fleeing from it.   Their physical activities have a compulsive character, i.e., they tend to escape an inner tension.   (Harley, E. and R: Tolerance and Personality Traits, Reading in Social Psychology. N.Y. Henry Holt & Co., 1947).

It would not take long to demonstrate on the basis of the foregoing data, that tolerance is a trait noticed in individuals who possess a high degree of flexibility in their attitudes and ideas and that this flexibility

is mainly due to the fact that they are integrated at a high level in their culture-pattern. The fact that tolerant individuals are interested in imaginary activities, theories, etc., that they work with singleness of purpose towards distant goals, constitutes sufficient proof of this. Integration at the theoretical level and work in the function of distant goals show first of all the element of leisure, and the lack of that kind of tension which produces directness and rigidity in behaviour by its urgent character. On the other hand, the tangible mechanical outlook, unwillingness to accept responsibility, dominance of emotional factors and the element of compulsion manifested by intolerant individuals constitute sources of rigidity in their reactions, and therefore of intolerance in their behaviour.

Democracy, Attitudes, and Prejudices. An attitude is "an enduring organisation of motivational, emotional, perceptual and cognitive processes with respect to some aspects of the individual's world". (Krech and Crutchfield: Op. cit. p.152). Confining ourselves to social attitudes, and at the same time using simpler language, one can say that a social attitude is a highly organised mode of reaction with regard to various aspects of the individual's
such
social and cultural environment,/as religious institutions, the state, leadership, etc.

With regard to political attitudes, social/

psychology is not altogether clear.   It usually treats

conservatism and radicalism as more or less political

attitudes, or at least as having strong political ingredients

in their structure.   In principle we agree with this point

of view.   The main trait of conservatism is resistance to

change in social and cultural matters, satisfaction with

the status quo, and a series of implications of this, such

as a low degree of open-mindedness, difficulty in grasping

the positive meaning of a new experience.   All this implies

liability to prejudice.   Radicalism is, on the other hand,

characterised by readiness to change, dissatisfaction with

the status quo, open-mindedness.

On the basis of this brief description one is inclined

to conclude that radicalism is nearer to democracy than

conservatism, and that conservatism includes authoritarian

elements.   But this cannot be stated without incurring

the danger of being equivocal.   For, it is obvious that

from a democratic point of view it is neither change in

itself, nor the readiness to change, that matters, but the

direction of change and, above all, the degree of freedom

and flexibility in the social pattern allowed by this

change.   If this is not/taken into account, one can

easily take the compulsive dynamism of Nazi or Communist

societies for radicalism, and democracy.   It would mean

also neglecting the fact that readiness to change is but

one category of the democratic frame of mind and that it /

has to work in co-operation with others, and this was demonstrated in the first chapter.

But in spite of all this, it would be convenient to treat radicalism as being nearer to democracy than to Conservatism, because it implies a higher degree of flexibility in the individual's political attitudes. Conservatism can, on the other hand, be considered as being nearer to authoritarianism because it facilitates a rigid attitude in political matters. But as shown in the previous passage, this position can be controversial. That is why we should like to formulate our question regarding the nature of political attitudes in the following manner: what makes an attitude democratic and what makes it authoritarian?

A high degree of heterogeneity of the cultural field in which an attitude is formed is one of the basic conditions of its democratic nature. A great variety of political experiences, the co-operation of various political ideas and factors in the formulative field of an attitude contribute to its flexibility. The lack of tension, internal and external, is also an important condition in the formation of a democratic attitude. Any tension aroused by the individual's experience in contact with various aspects of his political environment will result in a hasty organisation of these experiences into rigid attitudes.

K.Lewin deals in various studies, and under various aspects with the concept of homogeneity-heterogeneity of

the life-space.   He describes the life-space of the

American child, in contrast with that of the German child,

as possessing degree of heterogeneity.   "The school -

writes Lewin - may be a region of rigid discipline and

little freedom, whereas the atmosphere of his family life

may be soft and provide plenty of freedom."   Then further,

"The educational situation in the United States as compared

to Germany seems to be characterised by regions of very

different degrees of freedom and sharply determined bound-

aries of these regions.   In a Froebel nursery school in

Germany, for example, the child is usually more guided

and regulated in his play and his outdoor activities than

in a comparable American nursery school." (Resolving

Social Conflicts. N.Y., Harper Brothers, 1948, pp. 10 -11).

Needless to say, the attitudes formed by the American

child are, due to the diversity of factors entering into

their composition, more flexible and therefore more

democratic.

The German culture-pattern of the inter-war period

contained the most characteristic conditions for the

formation of anti-democratic attitudes.   The whole pattern

was dominated by great tension, aroused by deep frustration

of the group.   The elementary need for individual security

and that of the international prestige of the German nation

were deeply frustrated.   A series of emotional factors

such as the feeling of insecurity, love for the humiliated/

"fatherland", admiration for the Leader, hatred for every-
thing which was not German, had, in time, structurised all
the aspects of German life round them.   The perceptual,
emotional, and cognitive field of the majority of Germans
was gradually limited to a certain category of stimuli.
Thus, the degree of heterogeneity of the German social and
cultural pattern became lower and lower.   There lie the
social and cultural origins of stereotype attitudes and
prejudices displayed by many Germans during that period,
i.e., of rigid and repetitive reactions towards their
country, their nation, their leader, towards Jews, etc.
The excessive homogeneity of the cultural atmosphere resulted
in an over-simplified structuration of the individual's
and group's reactions towards various aspects of their world.
The emotional tension created in members of the group acted
as a selective scheme for their experiences; some experiences
remained imperceptible to them, while others were grossly
distorted and magnified. [1]

(1)
        Various researches on the psychology of attitudes
suggest the conclusion that individuals with strong emotional
needs tend to form rigid attitudes towards various aspects
of their political world.   Carlson, H.B., Harris Remmers
and Ellison, C.E., show a positive correlation between
strong religious faith and conservatism, and between lack
of religious faith and liberal attitudes to life.   Levin
is of the opinion that an essential change in a rigid
attitude can be achieved only by lessening the pressure
of the motivational and emotional factor on which it is
based.   Thus, the lessening of envy will lead to a more
flexible attitude towards social classes. (Krech and
Crutchfield: Op. Cit. p.176).

<u>Democracy and Language</u>. For a general characterisation
of the language of a society in process of democratisation
one could easily use the observation made by Thucydides with
reference to the social instability of his Athens; "The
meanings of words had no longer the same relation with things,
but was changed by them (revolutionaries) as they thought
proper." (Thucydides. Transl. B. Jowet, Oxford. p.222).
The structure of the language itself becomes more flexible
in the sense that - interpreting Thucydides by Saussure's
terminology - the link between "signe" and "signifié" becomes
in many cases looser. New meanings are given to old words,
and new words are coined to designate old things.

If one takes the French Revolution as a process of
democratisation, one can select the following phenomena:
(F.Brunot, Histoire de la Langue Francaise., Tome LX, p. 623
and following).

1. The shift in the meaning of a group of words by
their displacement from one field of reality to another.   A
series of religious expressions such as "évangile", "credo",
"martyrologie", "Bonne Nouvelle de Liberté" were displaced
from a religious, and inserted into a political context.

2. The tendency, existing only in the early part of
the Revolution, to break down the pattern of the language
by the invasion of words and expressions coming from various
"patois".   This tendency was counterbalanced by "une
politique de la langue" towards standardisation which was /

obviously an authoritarian trend of the Revolution.

3.   An important aspect of the loose connection
between words and things is shown also in the inflation
of the revolutionary vocabulary with emotional factors.
The emotional potential of words such as "nation", "patrie",
etc., was such that their meaning had the tendency to over-
flow any empirical and logical connotation.   They could
be taken as expressions of magic rather than logical thought.
They meant all, and nothing, at the same time.   Brunot
rightly calls them "mots illusion".

From the socio-psychological point of view Tocqueville
"reflections" upon the development of the English language
in America are of exceptional importance.   (Democracy in
America.   Chap. XVI).   As compared with the language of
an aristocratic society "where few words are coined because
few things are made", the language of a democratic society
(American) has a strong tendency towards change.   "In the
midst of this general stir and competition of minds many
ideas are formed, old ideas are lost, or reappear, or are
subdivided in an infinite variety of minor shades."   One
sees therefore the reflection in the language of a flexible
democratic social structure.

Most revealing is the specific direction in the
development of these two categories of languages.   The
English language in America developed its vocabulary from
the jargon of the parties, the mechanical arts, or from /

the language of trade. If new words are introduced in
an aristocratic language, they are usually taken from the
Latin, the Greek, or the Hebrew.   After the fall of
Constantinople, the French language was invaded by new
words all having Greek and Latin roots.   In the English
language Milton alone introduced over six hundred words
derived from the same languages.   It is clear therefore
that the rigid structure of an aristocratic language cuts
off its connection with the concrete life of society.

The rigid stratification of an aristocratic society
is reflected in the structure of its language by a sharp
distinction between the learned language and a great variety
of dialects.   Tocqueville makes the remark that there is
no "patois" in the New World, and that it is disappearing
in all countries touched by democracy, where words coming
from all "patois" are intermixed in the common pool of
the language.   This reflects the intermixture of ranks,
and the fluidity induced in the structure of society by
the principle of equality.   The results of this fluidity
are not always favourable to the structure of the language
itself.   In fact, it is precisely because of this that
the language of a democratic community is, according to
Tocqueville, inclined towards ambiguity in the use of
words.

It is a common practice in a democratic society to /

make a certain innovation in language by giving "an
unwonted meaning to an expression already in use."   This
introduces a certain ambiguity in the meaning of many
words, and makes it possible for various individuals to
modify these words according to their own purposes.   The
result is that the meaning of such words remains in an
unsettled condition.   This phenomenon affects, according
to Tocqueville, the quality of the writing in democratic
societies.   For, there is a characteristic tendency in
these writers to dwell upon groups of ideas leaving in
the reader the vivid impression of the ambiguity existing
in their mind.

Closely connected with this is the passion for
general ideas and generic terms mentioned by Tocqueville
as one of the most characteristic features of a democratic
language.   "Democratic nations are passionately addicted
to abstract expressions because these modes of speech
emlarge thought and assist the operations of the mind by
enabling it to include many objects in a small compass".
The examples given by Tocqueville are "capacities", in
abstract, for men of capacity, without specifying the
field in which their capacities are applied; "actualities"
used in the same abstract way, and the French word
"eventualites".   Finally, he gives as another example
his use of the word "equality" in an absolute sense.   This
inclination existing in the language of a democratic   /

society "enlarges and obscures the thought", at the same
time.   "With reference to language - concludes Tocqueville -
democratic nations prefer obscurity to labour."

The tendency for "ambiguity" and "obscurity" is
evidently one of the most characteristic aspects in a
democratic society.   It reflects at the language level
the fluid pattern of this society.   The fact that the
language itself preserves a high degree of flexibility
greatly facilitates the functioning of the ego and
consequently the process of individuation.   The possibility
of adjusting to his own experiences the structure of the
language and the meaning of words increases in the individual
the power of self-realisation.   This also constitutes
the safest guarantees against "clichés" and stereotypes
in language which are the mark of a totalitarian culture-
-pattern.

The preference of a democratic society towards vague
and general ideas and towards generic terms can also be
considered as a symptom of flexibility characteristic of
both the individual and the group.   Let us take the
example given by Tocqueville referring to his own use of the
word "equality" in abstracto.   As we have often said, one
of the main features of a democratic structure, individual
and social, consists in its capacity to guide its empirical
activity according to a set of ends, which, though existing
in the individual, act as transcendental forces.

Equality is one of these ends.   In a true democracy there
always is a dialogue between an empirical and transcendental
dimension of life.   As soon as a concept like equality
is taken from its abstract world, and considered as an
immanent (empirical) end of life, democracy is in danger.
Supposing we specify and say " economic equality", and
take the necessary measures for its realisation.   This
very action will lead to a strong and permanent exercise
of force in the introduction and maintenance of economic
equality.   The democratic character of society will be
lost by this.   Soviet society is in fact an example of
a concrete immanent meaning of the concept of equality.

C H A P T E R VIII

DEMOCRATIC PERSONALITY

> He should know how to govern like a
> free man, and how to obey like a free man.
>
> Aristotle.

<u>Personality and the Culture-Pattern</u>. One can conclude
from the previous chapters that a democratic way of life
expresses itself in a specific type of personality. We
are, however, unable to give a straight answer to the
question, whether a democratic personality creates a
democratic culture-pattern, or a democratic culture-
pattern creates a democratic personality. Moreover, we
are inclined to think that this kind of question leads
nowhere, and for the time being both a democratic culture-
pattern and a democratic personality could appropriately
be considered as aspects of a great process in the his-
torical evolution of certain societies.

That type of personality is democratic which shows
enough flexibility in its inner organisation, in its
attitudes, feelings ideas and action, to understand other
personalities as "others" and not as its own projections,
to co-operate and to construct a way of life on the basis
of free exchange of experience with others; that type
of personality which is flexible and free enough to avoid

its rigid integration with the culture-pattern of its own group, particularly when that group is exclusive towards other groups.

Though the California research on "Authoritarian Personality" will be more accurately dealt in the second part of the present study, it would, however be useful to sketch here the portrait of "liberal non-authoritarian" personality emerging from it. The liberal personality - which is but another term applied to democratic personality - is flexible, intraceptive, and has great capacity for intense interpersonal relationship. It is opposed in its main traits to the authoritarian personality which is rigid, extraceptive, repressed, conforming, stereotyped in its thinking, and intolerant of ambiguity. In social behaviour the liberal personality has less need than the authoritarian personality to perceive similarities between his own and others' values and attitudes. His reactions to others will be more individualised, his evaluation more objective. On the whole, he is better equipped than the authoritarian to use subtle personality cues. (The general results of the California research are published in T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik and others; The Authoritarian Personality. N. Y. Happer & Brothers, 1950.) There is no need to insist upon the similarities of this description of the democratic personality, based on clinical interviews, projective tests, and questionnaires of social

of social attitudes and the description put forward in the
present study, based on the structural analysis of various
democratic culture-patterns.

Organisation Based on the Ego. In his study of the
structure of sentiments V.V. French comes to the conclusion
that people with highly organised philosophico-religious
beliefs have firm ego structures. They consciously recognise
and accept both strength and weakness as parts of their
own selves. People with less organised philosophico-
religious beliefs, are, on the other hand, considered as
having weak ego structures, (and a strong super-ego structure;
they accept only what is good as part of their own selves,
repressing and suppressing what is bad. (V.V. French: The
Structure of Sentiments. J. of Personality, 15, pp.247-282,
and 16, pp. 78-108 1947.)

Interpreting the above data in the light of what has
been said so far with regard of the psychological aspects
of democracy, the following points are important: Highly
organised persons have a positive orientation in life; they
have worked out for themselves a system of sentiments which
springs up naturally and harmoniously from the basic con-
dition of their personalities. The system of goals and
aspirations set up by their beliefs integrates their
personality as a harmonious whole. Consequently, they
consciously recognise weakness as part of their personalities;
there is no inner conflict and repression in their minds

for, their egos are strong enough to guide their perso-
nalities as a whole on the way indicated by these beliefs.

Less organised persons have adopted the same philoso-
phico-religious beliefs on the basis of a system of moti-
vation which has not entirely grown from the specific
structures of their personalities. Their beliefs are
conventional; moreover, they often use them as shields,
furnished by their society, against trends and tendencies
in their personalities which are at variance and even in
conflict with these beliefs. Thus they have adopted a
system of philosophico-religious beliefs in order to coun-
ter-balance their fundamental lack of religious feelings,
their immoral wishes, or to combat their fundamental
feelings of insecurity aroused by their antisocial ten-
dencies. Unlike the personality with strong ego structure
this type of personality contains in itself the source of
permanent tension; all tendencies contravening its system
of beliefs have to be strongly repressed. In this inner
tension, and in the repression resulting from it, lies the
basis of an anti-democratic personality. For the tension
itself, as already pointed out, leads to a rigid mental
organisation. Thus the anti-democratic person represses
rather than harmonises or integrates the divergent drives
of his personality. One way of doing this is by rigidly
submitting to, or rigidly applying the conventions of his
society. In this case the authoritarian personality is

excessively conformist, bigoted or a fanatical nationalist.

But the main point in what has bee^said so far is that
the democratic personality regards the forms of his society
as his own; he expresses these forms in terms of his own
experience, and accepts them without arousing an inner
conflict, whereas the anti-democratic personality looks
upon the forms of his society as external; he adopts them
as shilds against his own inner conflicts. Thus, in the
first case, one can speak about a fundamental correspon-
dence between the structure of personality and the structure
of society, whereas in the second, one can speak about a
basic - unconscious - conflict. This is but another way
of saying that democratic personalities make their society
"by their hands", while authoritarian personalities accept
it from outside.

V. V. French also makes the observation that persons
with highly organised philosophico-religious beliefs show
greater differentiation and greater integration within
the structures of their personalities, less unconscious
components and less intensity than persons with less
organised beliefs. Of exceptional significance here is
the finding that there are fewer unconscious elements in
the structure of highly organised persons. This means in
the first place, that their personalities are adequately
expressed at the conscious level of their mental structures,
i.e. the beliefs they hold and the attitudes they display

do not conflict and therefore they do not repress the deep strata of the mind. Their mental structures are flexible enough to keep the balance between the various drives of their personalities, and to integrate any experience without the dangers of inner conflict. The personality structure is not normally threatened, or devastated by unconscious factors set loose from time to time by defects in the mechanism of repression, thus causing irrational behaviour.

Democracy and Personality Variation. Due to its elasticity, a democratic society allows for a high degree of differentiation in the personalities of its individual members. In principle, each individual can develop his own personality as a unique mental structure resulting from the free adjustment of the individual to his environment, and, at the same time, from his capacity to adjust the environment to himself. This lies in the nature of the process of individuation-introjection.

But it ought to be noticed that, though elastic, a democratic way of life has its specific and well-defined character which it tends to preserve by facilitating the development of that type of personality which best suits it. This however, is not carried out by forcing the individuals into uniformity, but by providing a great number of social and cultural dimensions in which their personalities can develop. The greater the number of dimensions the stronger the democratic character of a social and cultural

pattern. In what follows we shall deal with the main traits of a democratic way of life which facilitate the differentiation among the personalities of its individual members.

1. A degree of heterogeneity of cultural influences regarding the development of the individual's personality. This results no only in a high degree of flexibility in the mental structure of every individual, but also in a great inter-individual variation. The individuals are offered various possibilities of developing their personalities, according to the various aspects of their culture-pattern.

2. The double dimension of life characteristic of a democratic way of life can be considered as another trait facilitating inter-indevidual variation. In democracy, the individuals can structurise their personalities round various ideal values which are sometimes in opposition to the empirical condition of life in their society; From time to time the individual can become the citizen of an ideal world. This mode of personality integration is allowed by religion, by philosophy, by art or science to any of which the individual can entirely dedicate his life. The personality integrated with such cultural values represents a specific way of life which in democracy, is regognised and accepted as such and not brought down to the empirical level of life as in a totalitarian society.

.3. The plurality and relative autonomy of cultural values constitutes another "differential" trait in democracy. The cultural space of democracy is defined by a series of dimensions, religious, artistic, scientific, political, economic and moral. Each particular dimension, and each configuration of two or more, offer various possibilities of personality structuration. Some of the fundamental personality types are, as E. Spranger has shown, determined by the organisation of the individual's mind round one, or a configuration, of the values. It follows that the greater the differentiation of cultural values the greater the differentiation of personality structure. In an authoritarian culture-pattern this differentiation is nonexistent; one value is supreme, be it religious (hierocratic culture) economic (Communism) or political (Nazism).

4. There are a series of other important differential traits which have been dealt with elsewhere. Time is an important dimension of life offering a large possibility for inter-individual differentiation in modern democraties. We have mentioned this problem when dealing with the new "tempo" infused by the spirit of the Renaissance in modern societies. The competitive character of modern economy is closely connected with this, and can be considered also as another differential trait in modern democracies.

But since the list of these traits differs from democracy to democracy, it would be advisable to formulate the problem

of individual differentiation in democracy as follows: a
democratic culture-pattern is pluri-dimensional with regard
to the process of personality formation. It is organised
in such a manner that any one of its trends, aspects and
levels offers possibilities for the development of the
individual's personality; each of its points can be trans-
formed in to a "niche" which moulds someone's personality.
In principle one can say that the degree to which a culture -
pattern is democratised can be judged according to the number
of directions in which the personality of its individual
members can be differentiated. As shown in a series of
previous chapters, the flexibility of a democratic culture-
pattern is such that everyone of its members can, individualise
the language, the attitudes towards authority, towards various
institutions, and in principle, all forms of reaction
necessary for life in the group.

   We have chosen present British society for the purpose
of illustrating this aspect of a democratic way of life.
The reasons for this are various. By saying relatively
little about British Democracy we might have left the
impression that we are among those who over-stress the
aristocratic elements in contemporary British society.
This would obviously follow too closely in Tocqueville's
footprints, even more than Tocqueville himself would have
done, had he been alive to-day. It means also to neglect
a series of aspects of the British community which can easily

be given as examples of a democratic way of life. In this
sense one can hardly find, in the present democratic world,
a better example of a pluri-dimensional culture pattern than
that of the British community. But since it is hard to
handle such a vast sociological and psychological reality
with the purpose of testing an idea, it would be advisable
to concentrate our present interest on a few specific aspects
of the British way of life and to show their significance
for the process of personality variation.

In Britain, individuals are differentiated according to
their social and economic class.[1] For, unlike America, and

(1)   Pierre Maillaud, though brilliant in his analysis
of the English way of life, confounds class struggle with
class consciousness, and thus draws inadequate conclusions
with regard to class differencies in this Country. (The
English Way of Life. Oxford Univ. Press. 1945 Chapter II).

to a greater extent unlike France, here the classes are
in peoples' behaviour. Individuals can differentiate their
personalities according to their religious beliefs to a
greater extent than in any other democratic country, with
the exception of America. Britain being a highly indus-
trialised society, individuals can differentiate according
to their professional interests and training. But, as we
do not consider any of these forms of differentiation as
specific to British society, we cannot insist on them. We
should like instead to pass on to a series of other aspects
of the British way of life which have a particular signifi-
cance for the process of individual differentiation.

Let us start with A) time, and B) hobbies.

A. In the American culture-pattern, the dynamism and variety of life is to a great extent aroused by the extension of the present into the future. The rapid tempo of change and the hope for to-morrow make the individual permanently aware of the large range of possibilities for the development of his personality. In Britain, the dynamism and variety of life are mainly due to the extension of the present to the past. More than any living nation the British have - though sometimes unconsciously - an accurate sense of the past; of the presence of the past rather than of its pastness. This renders the life-space of the individual belonging to this community richer in possibilities of development. Things and forms of life which in any other society would be considered dead, are here alive and endowed with the same significance and value as the newest ones. In manner of dressing, the Victorian style intermingles harmoniously with Dior's so that everyone has a great variety at his disposal by which to exteriorise his taste and personality. In art, philosophy, and literature, a new architect, a new poet or a new novelist, however great he may be, cannot even temporarily weaken in people's taste and manner or feeling the continued presence of Wren, Shakespeare or Fielding. The British as a community refuse except on very rare occasions - to be driven - moved is a better word by an event, or an idea to the point of acting uniformly as a crowd. A "new look" in dressing, art, or

philosophy, may captivate certain individuals, or even a
certain section of the population, but seldom the community
itself, as may happen in other countries. In the streets
of London, or Glasgow one can see young men dressed after
the newest fashion of Paris or New-York - or so they think -
side be side with others whose manner of dressing is but
a slight variation on what was fashionable fifty years ago.
Taste in this country cannot crystallise itself in a general
"idea", and thus regiment the whole community. For some,
this is lack of taste; we prefer to call it fondness of variety.

One can even say that in Britain there is a certain
resentment against uniformity. This is seen in many great
and small things; it is seen in people's fondness of provin-
cialism, in the pride they take in their system of local
administration, and in many other aspects of life. In some
churches of England and Scotland pre-established forms of
prayer are hardly used; the minister and the congregation
have, so to speak, to improvise for themselves.

B. The inclination widely spread among members of the
British community to have a hobby, and particularly the
institutionalisation of this inclination, constitute another
proof of the possibility for individual differentiation
offered by the British culture-pattern. For a hobby is
obviously rooted in the individual's desire - which is, in
this case, supported by his society - of developing his
personality along a particular line which makes it possible

for him to break away from his role as a member of society,
and thus, to be himself. Hobbies are, on the whole, expres-
sions of the feeling of privacy and desire to differentiate
which are experienced with a unique intensity in this country.
(Paul Halmos described this aspect of life in Britain in his
"Solitude and Privacy". Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1952.). Thus, animated by these feelings, the individual
members of the British community develop their personalities
in a great number of directions, and in a great variety of
forms. They earn the mark of "uniqueness" and specificity"
in a great variety of sports, in bird watching, in horse
and dog racing....... In Great Britain one is "somebody" as
a Cambridge blue, or doing "excellent foot work at cricket".

To be "oneself", and "on one's own" is a tendency which
deeply affects everybody in this country. There is no other
community in which the individual resents vertical relation-
ships with others with a greater intensity, and relationships
of sub- and super-ordination in particular. A clerk, a
servant, and even a char-lady, when taking up a new job,
feel that, their first concern is to find "their own" place.
Their main interest is to find out what they are "supposed
to do". Once this is achieved, they have won their inde-
pendence, for, later on, whenever someone asks for their
services their first reaction is to make sure whether they
are supposed to do this or not, and to act accordingly.
Thus, any individual avoids being dependent upon others in

the exercise of his job; he makes himself responsible to
a kind of abstract authority which consists of certain
rules and requirements established by agreement, or by
tradition, and which define "what he is supposed to do".
Even waiters in restaurants are obedient to nothing but
to what they are supposed to do; hence they reduce to a
minimum their positions as "executants" of the customers
wishes. They listen to their customers as long as they
need to know "the menu" they want; after that, the job is
wholly in their own hands, and the customer has no choice
but to wait and to submit.

If in certain cases the relationships of sub- and
super-ordination are unavoidable, the general tendency is
to "localise" them as carefully as possible. If the pupil,
the student, or even the soldier is compelled to accept
a position of sub-ordination in the class room, or barracks,
he is ready to forget all about it, as soon as he leaves
these places. In any other country a student or a pupil
would be pleased to greet his teachers, and thus to show
consideration and even dependence; he would even try to
catch his teacher's attention. It seems to be different
in Great Britain, or at least in Scotland. Here the
students, or the pupils rarely show such behaviour; when
out of the class rooms they are "themselves"; no longer
students or pupils.

The taste for local administration, for private

enterprise and personal initiative, for provincialism in
language, as well as the aversion for general ideas and
theorising are still strong in this community. There is
nothing more foreign to their minds than the attempt to
oppose life with ideas, or to mould its free course through
a body of doctrine or to a pre-established scale of values.
It is paradoxical to notice that the same community which
gave birth to Puritanism behaves as if the human mind has
no power to guide the impulse of life; mind's activity and
products are subservient to life as this manifests itself
in all its variety of individual forms. The greatest
wisdom is to seize and respect this variety. In theatres
and concert halls, Britons share their applauses almost
equally among different performers and items. This is a
sign of their understanding of variety rather than lack
of taste. At a dress show in Britain the models are of
all ages, all shapes, and of all sizes; the display is for
everybody, starting with the slender young girl and ending
with the plump figure of a conscientious house-wife. On
these occasions one feels the presence of a world of beauty,
of a world of unreal and sublime forms, less than on similar
occasions in Paris; instead one has a strong feeling of
reality and of the great variety of forms under which life
manifests itself.

It is only natural that this specific drive for differen-
tiation should be compensated by a series of tendencies for

integration. To mention only a few examples, this is seen
in the readiness obvious in every Briton to join as many
"clubs" as possible, to form associations or to organise
his activities socially.

The same integrating tendency is seen in the curious
English fondness for uniforms. In this country, each club,
each association, each theatre or picture house, has its
own uniform. We call this tendency "curious", for, as the
previous sentence proves, the individualistic spirit of
these people has turned their fondness of uniformity into
a real taste for variety in uniforms. Thus the spirit of
differentiation seems to be triumphant over all. This
proves again that Tocqueville was right when describing
the main trait of British democracy as the drive towards
freedom and differentiation, as opposed to the drive towards
equality characteristic of French democracy.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NAZISM.

"Dort auf der Insel kein Staat, sondern eine
Geselschaft freier Privatmenchen, die Geschäfte machen,
hier an der Grenze nach Osten, nach "Asien" hin ein
Staat im strengsten und anschpruchvollsten Sinne,
aus der Tradintion der Ritterorden erwachsen, welche
Kolonisation trieben; dort statt der Autorität des
Staafes der Parlamentarismus privater Gruppen, hier
statt des wirtschaftlichen Liberalismus die Diszipli-
nierung der Wirtschaft durch die politische Autorität.
Staat und Partei sind Gegensätze. Partei und Autori-
tät sind auch. "

                          Oswald Spengler.

CHAPTER I.

DICTATORSHIP OF THE RIGHT.

> " nothing appears more surprising to
> those who consider human affairs with a
> philosophical eye than the easiness with
> which the many are governed by the few."
>
> David Hume.

The German political regime of the period between 1933-1945 is generally known under the name of Nazism or Hitlerism. Though lasting a relatively short period of time it embodied in its doctrine and practice the most characteristic totalitarian trends of our century. Like Italian Fascism and many other Fascist movements,Nazism was a dictatorship of the right, i.e., a political organisation based on exclusivist and aggressive nationalism under the personal dictatorship of a leader.

From the political point of view Nazism was characterised by the concentration of absolute power in the hands of the leader who exercised it by means of his own party organised in a military manner. It was a typical one-party system in which democratic electoral methods were replaced by occasional plebiscites on issues selected by the leader.

From the economic point of view Nazism was a particular case of a controlled economy. In principle the system of

of private ownership remained untouched.   Free
enterprise however was considerably limited by the
interference of the State in the processes of production
and distribution.

The Nazi regime required the individual's total
integration with the aims of his group as represented
by the leader and his party.   Nazis were against that
kind of life which allows the individual a "quiet"
fulfilment of his social duties.   They asked for
enthusiasm and sacrifice for the common cause.   Nazism
was firstly a "stato d'animo" (Mussolini) and only in
the second place a political formula.

At the cultural level Nazism was a case of directed
culture,with an official ideology, coined by the leaders
of the Party enforced upon the whole cultural activity
of the community. The cultural outlook had a strong mystic
character, without being religious; it was idealistic, and
yet not oriented towards spiritual values; it called itself
revolutionary, and in spite of this it was not progressive,
but on the contrary, traditionalist.   The ideal of man was
embodied in the strong man or in the possessor of political
power.

Contrary to Democracy, the main process taking place in
Nazi society consisted in the concentration of power and
in a rigid structurisation of the entire pattern of life.
In order to explain this and its bearing on Nazism, we
propose to analyse the main aspects of the concentration of

of power in contemporary European society.

Economic Aspects of the Concentration of Power.   Two
main trends in European economic liberalism can be
connected with the concentration of power: the accumulative
character of wealth, and the weakening of the State as a
result of economic individualism.   Since the weakening of
the State by economic individualism implies a series of
political factors we shall deal with it in the next section.

The accumulative character of wealth is one of the
intrinsic features of the system of economic liberalism
in the sense that "wealth can be used to get more wealth"
(Knight).   As a consequence of this, the economic system
which is generally considered as the core of individual
freedom has gradually developed within itself a series of
factors which have in the long run worked against the
system as a whole.   The system of monopolies, for instance,
made possible the rigid organisation of the whole economic
field according to the interests of a few individuals, thus
rendering the free activity of others difficult, if possible
at all.

All the main remedies for the repercussions of economic
individualism show in various degrees the concentration of
power in the hands of the State.   Here are the most
important of these remedies.

A.   A series of protests against individual inequality
resulting from economic individualism came firstly from

from various labour movements and various groups of
social reformists, all of them fostering the same hope,
i.e., that a real political equality, obtained by the
strict application of the formula "one man one vote",
would in time counterbalance the effects of economic
individualism. However this hope proved to be vain. That
is why when later on some of these movements came into
power they had to resort to direct action in the economic
field of free enterprise for the realisation of their
equalitarian purposes. Their economic policy can adequately
be described as "Steuerpolitik" (Spengler), i.e., the
correction of the concentration of wealth and of economic
inequality by the mechanism of taxation. Some of these
movements resorted for the same purpose to large schemes
of nationalisation. All political movements included in
this category are in essence democratic for the following
two reasons: Firstly, they make use of the machinery of
the democratic State in order to carry out their economic
policy. Secondly, they regard the individual's free choice
of ends and means in order to secure his own happiness as
an important ideal for human society in general.

B.   Communism constitutes another remedy for the re-
percussions of economic individualism. But, unlike the
former remedy, it abolishes all the fundamental traits of
democratic society. In order to maintain economic equality
this regime suppresses individual freedom altogether.

C.   The remedy for economic individualism offered by

by Fascism is by no means easy to describe. It is in
essence anti-democratic and yet not touching the principles
of private ownership and free enterprise. Fascism opposes
Liberalism as well as Socialism. Mussolini who had a far
greater capacity than Hitler for rationaling his own position,
says: "Now Liberalism is on the point of closing the doors
of its deserted temple, as people feel that its agnosticism
in economic matters, its indifference in politics and morals
would bring about, as it has already done, the certain ruin
of the States" (Mussolini Le Fascisme. Paris 1933 p.19.)

Two main factors have to be taken into account in order
to understand the Fascist position in the economic field,
and the concentration of power involved in this. Firstly
the presence in the field of a communist remedy for the reper-
cussions of economic individualism, which aroused in the well-
to-do classes fear and need for protective measures, and
secondly a widely spread discontent in the great masses of the
people which was directly produced by economic inequality.
This latter phenomenon was manifested as equalitarian
aspirations among the lower strata of various European
societies. In Italy and Germany both factors were intensified
by a series of specific social and political circumstances.
As a consequence of the First World War the position of the
high income groups in Germany, and to a certain extent in
Italy, was threatened not only by Communism, but also by
unfavourable international competition. On the other hand
the discontent of the masses produced by economic

economic individualism was further increased by a series
of economic crises as a direct result of a lost war.

In consequence of their precarious position the
economically dominant classes in Germany were ready to
create or to accept, as the case might be, that economic
and political formula which promised to protect them from
both Communism and the effects of international competition.
On the other hand those sections of the population most
stricken by economic insecurity were also ready to give
their political support to that man or organisation which
promised to put a quick end to their frustrations. The
methods used to this end did not matter. Any method ~~was~~ would be
the right one provided that it worked. In this way a great
part of the German people transferred for good their only
power, the power of voting, to an autocratic leader and to
an authoritarian organisation in order to be saved from the
effects of a long period of economic insecurity. In many
cases this was not a deliberate act, but an inevitable result
of a series of external circumstances. In many other cases,
however, this action was prompted by a great disappointment
with the democratic methods of government. Thus a good
proportion of the German population resorted voluntarily to
the establishment of a dictatorship in the hope that
dictatorship would succeed where democracy had failed.

The only important opposition to the Nazi economic order
was that of the German working-class organised by the
Communist Party. Their opposition was prompted by their

their own economic programme. But the resistance of the
working class was soon broken down. The weakening of the
political power of the working class was primarily a long
struggle between the two working class parties, Socialist
and Communist. On the eve of Hitler's victory the workers
were divided and the Socialist and Communist leaders con-
centrated their main efforts on fighting each other. Often
the Communists joined hands with the Nazis in their struggle
against the Socialists. The two-front economic policy
was another important factor responsible for the weakening
of the working class resistance. On one side the Nazi
regime curbed the power of the upper-classes by putting
their economic aspiration under the protection of the State,
while on the other, it weakened the resistance of the
working classes by integrating their economic aspirations
with the interests of the same State. It is worth
mentioning that the new State was not the State of a specific
class but the State of the nation represented by the Leader
and his Party. Thus the Nazi State absorbed in itself the
power from all stata of the nation.

The two-front policy is the most striking feature of
Nazi economic order, and it explains to a great extent the
sudden concentration of absolute power in the hand of a
group with no political tradition, with no specific social
basis, and above all, at least at the beginning, with no
very clear ideas regarding the practical measures to be
taken in the field of economics. The Party appealed to the

the well-to-do classes stressing its resistance to any class programme of economic reform. In the language of the upper-classes this meant that no revolutionary method was to be used against them. (See Hitler's speech to the German Industrialists. February 20, 1933). To the lower-classes the Party preached the possibility of a new type of equalitarianism so as to set at rest their fears of economic liberalism. (See Hitler's speech to the workers of Rhein-Metall-Borsing plant, December 10, 1940.) The socialist flavour of the Nazi economic order was ostentatiously advertised by a certain check put on free enterprise, by the system of "compulsory cartels", and by other measures by which the State intervened in the economic field. And yet the system of profit-making for the owners of the big enterprises was more flourishing than ever before. The spirit of private enterprise was generally encouraged. The State itself created by its aggressive policy large scope for the expansion of the big monopolies. The alliance between the State and the big monopolies was an obvious fact though its terms were never explicit. In spite of the intervention of the State a certain degree of economic freedom for the individual could hardly be denied. But this freedom had its own rules. It meant freedom for small enterprises to be in cartels with the big enterprises, and freedom for both within the limits of the State. "Liberty of the State and of the individual in the State". (Mussolini).

The same regime talked to the working class in a different language. It showed great concern for "the well being of the masses", found devices-temporary of course - to reduce unemployment and raise wages,etc., But above all the regime made an unique fight to turn the interest of the masses from material values in life. In this way a new basis for equality was provided for. Economic equality was considered unnatural, its methods were "extrinsic and mechanical". The new equality was guaranteed by the total integration of each individual with the nation and the State. Nazists refuted the equalitarian tendencies implied in class consciousness - leading to the classless society - as well as those implied in human conscience. These tendencies were replaced - psychologically speaking they were displaced - by equality and fraternity between the members of a closed group. The guarantee of equality is given neither by a social class nor by a humanitarian consciousness, but by a series of bio-psychological factors such as common blood,tradition, beliefs, etc., all of them defining the feeling of group belongingness. Identification with the nation to the degree of annihilation of personal individuality was the fulfilment of all equalitarian aspirations.

Economic Theses on Nazism. The nucleus of these theses is found in Lenin's "Imperialism as the last Stage of Capitalism" written before the rise of any Fascist State in Europe (1916). According to Lenin, Fascism was bound to

to appear at a certain stage in evolution of the
European capitalistic system. When various national
economic systems, organised in national trusts, could no
longer find in the colonial territories sufficient scope
for their development, they would satisfy their intrinsic
need for expansion by attacking each other. In this way
the big monopolies of various European nations would pave
the way for that political regime most capable of
organising the whole nation for aggression against their
own competitors. Racial and nationalistic idealogies were,
for Lenin, but suprastructural aspects of these basically
economic conflicts.

Dr. F. Neumann applying Lenin's formula in an
orthodox way to Nazism writes: "German National Socialism
is nothing but the dictatorship of a monopolised industry
and of the big estate owners, the nakedness of which is
covered by the mask of a corporative State" (The Decay of
German Democracy. Pol. Quarterly 1933, p. 525.)

The same fundamental idea appears in various shapes.
Sometimes the stress is laid on the tendency of German
monopolists to eliminate Jewish competition, but at other
times, on the decline of European capitalism and the con-
sequent intervention of the State in order to save the
big monopolies from ruin. Charles Bettelheim, among
others, sees the core of Nazism in the aggressive policy
of the magnates of German industry disguised by the State:
"Les monopoleurs ont entre leur mains tous les "leviers de

de commande" ..." "L'État dans ces conditions ne peut rien faire contre le capital monopoleur, il ne peut que l'aider, etre son serviteur et son valet" writes he in his "L'Économie Allemande soñs le Nazisme: (Libraitie Marcel Rivière et Cie, Paris 1946, p.81.)

The idea running through all these views is simple: Nazism is in essence an economic phenomenon, and the Nazis were but puppets in the hands of German monopolies and trusts.

Conclusion to the Economic Section. That support was given by German industrialists to Hitler's regime is an incontestable fact. And yet one can hardly explain the enormous concentration of power characteristic of this regime based exclusively on this fact. The economic aspirations and programmes of all other strata should be taken into account. The attitude of the Party towards private ownership appealed to the big estate owners; its respect for private enterprise won the lower middle classes, and its policy of full employment brought the support of the working classes. Most important of all is the Party's intermediary position, temporary though it was, between the economic interests of the upper and lower-classes. In this respect Fascism in general and Nazism in particular can be considered as being among the first economic and political formulae to draw the greatest advantage possible from the contradiction between capital and labour in comtemporary industrial society. The Nazi

Nazi regime does not solve this contradiction. On the
contrary, it plays on it to its own advantage. Its
leaders were skilled enough to devise symbolical solutions
and substitutes for the aspirations of both the upper and
lower classes. Consequently an "Ersatz" economic regime
was created, i.e., a forced rhythm in production, a
policy of subventions, artificial measures in the
financial field, old and decayed firms were artificially
kept alive while the rise of new ones was prohibited.
Full employment ensured by war economy, and a vague
revolutionary language were among other substitutes for the
aspirations of the lower-classes.

This explains to a great extent why Nazism cannot be
considered simply as the regime of big industry in disguise.
It is true that one can see a transfer of power from the
representatives of German big industry to a political
organisation. But this does not simply mean a conversion
of economic into political power, as Lenin would like to
put it. Power came into the hands of the Nazi leaders
from more than one section of German society. Nazi leaders
obtained power by playing various interest groups against
each other rather than by playing themselves into the hands
of a specific interest group. This could only be possible
if these groups had been uncertain of their own ends. This
was apparently the case. For the post-war social instability
created in all groups alike, a state of discontent,

discontent, insecurity, and confusion (Meinungchaos)
which increased their suggestibility and credulity.
It was this state of mind more or less common to all
classes which was exploited by the Nazi leaders;this
state of mind forms the basis of their power. " .....
Hitler aimed to invite the discontented of all classes.
Much of his following still adhered to anti-capitalist
tenets, but he was building up a movement on large scale
subsidies from the political funds of the heavy industry
and big business." (Sir Lewis Namier: Re Megalomania
of Adolf Hitler. The Listener, February 12, 1953,p.252)
The Political Aspects of the Concentration of Power in
Contemporary European Society. The main argument against
political individualism is based on the practical
inefficiency of the democratic system: the inefficiency
of the method of universal suffrage to select the best
people for the Government, the inefficiency of the
parliamentary system to cope with the problems and the
tempo of contemporary life, etc.. Every major difficulty
experienced in various democratic States has been in one
way or other referred to the original inefficiency of
the system as such. Even the basic assumption of
democracy, individualised reason, has been violently
attacked in order to prove that the masses cannot govern
themselves.

Behind this criticism the belief has steadily grown
up that only a Government willing and capable of

of restraining the freedom of the individual could solve
the crisis of contemporary society. The realisation of
this belief has taken, in contemporary society, the
following main directions:

A. The political power should be taken from the masses
and given to an elite or to a powerful, sometimes
providential, individual. The role of the masses is
primarily that of trusting and obeying their leaders. This
is the solution taken by the totalitarian movements of
the right.

B. A programme of government cannot be a subject of
discussion for the masses. The value of such a programme
is warranted by a particular awareness of the historical
progress of mankind which is the privilege of a particular
economist class and of its leaders. Therefore such a
programme should be carried out no matter what the attitude
of the masses towards it might be. The programme itself
constitutes the principle of authority and the role of the
masses is only to understand and follow it. This is the
attitude taken by Communism and in certain respects by
various socialist movements.

Both these ways (A and B) lead to the concentration of
power, i.e., the strengthening of the State at the expense
of the individual and society. In what follows we should
like to give a brief description of the most important
aspects of the concentration of power in contemporary
society pointing at the same time to its significance for

for the rise of Nazism.

Even in Great Britain the two tendencies described above are obvious. Alderton Pink criticising British Democracy from the right, writes: "Nobody I suppose, would be prepared to maintain that the British House of Commons contains the six hundred best brains of this country...." (A Realist Looks at Democracy, London, 1930 p.165) H. Laski criticising British Dem. from the left, believes that the attainment of power by the Labour Party was bound to result in a radical transformation of parliamentary government. In order to carry out its programme the Labour Party would have to take vast powers, and legislate under them by ordinance and decree: "it would have to suspend the classic formula of normal opposition" (Democracy in Crisis, London. Allen and Unwin, 1933, p.871)

It is worth noticing that contrary to Laski's opinion, the Labour Party carried out a series of important reforms without suspending the democratic constitution of this country.

<u>State and Society.</u>   It has been often said that the French Revolution has indirectly led to the strengthening of the power of the State within contemporary French society. This is the result of the breaking down of the rigid pattern of medieval society and the separation of the State from society which were in fact the two main achievements of the Revolution.

The central tendency of the Revolution was to replace the rigid medieval order by a flexible structure whose only components were individuals. The aim of the Con- stitution of 1791, for instance, was to liberate all social forces and to enable them to resolve freely into a new harmonious pattern. The pattern was, at least from the social point of view, of a classless society. Making allowance for his impressionistic language, Spengler is

is essentially right when noticing that from Iacobinsm
to Bolshevism there had been in the Western world an
uninterrupted drive towards the destruction of the society
based on status and rank, and towards its substitution by
an "undifferentiated herd".   Contemporary society has
obviously lost much of the character termed by Spengler
"Informsein".   Yet Spengler completely fails to see that
the effects of the collapse of the old order can hardly be
followed on a single line of evolution.   In spite of a
certain tendency towards fluidity and even disintegration
one cannot say that in modern society the "prestige of
the State" has been steadily falling since the French
Revolution.   On the contrary, in the new type of society
created by this revolution, the State arises as the sole
unifying factor and the only compensation for so many
disintegrating processes.

The French Revolution shows how difficult it is to
create a flexible social pattern as historically opposed
to a previous rigid one, preventing at the same time the
concentration of power. The Jacobin Constitution of 1793
and the entire development of the integrating factors in
the revolutionary French culture-pattern offer a clear
proof of this difficulty. An atomised social system was
in fact only a temporary target for the Revolution, and
the presence of powerful unifying forces was soon and
urgently required if society was to survive. "The General
Will" postulated by Rousseau as the supreme guarantee of

of social cohesion was given a more concrete meaning.
Consequently "the People", "the Nation", "Fatherland"
and "Institutions" (Saint Just) and even the proletarian
(Babeuf) were alternatively considered as embodying the
"General Will". More about the bearings of these concepts
on the political dictatorship of the right will be said
later. For the moment we should like to follow the
strengthening of the State as a need for social cohesion.

To start with we should like to say that we cannot
accept without reservation the conclusions of some con-
temporary thinkers. Talmon is one of them, according to
whom the French Revolution is in essence a totalitarian
phenomenon, and Rousseau and Saint Just are but two sen-
timental forefathers of Hitler and Lenin. We should like
to point only to the idea that the rise of the State as the
symbol of various forces leading to the concentration of
power lies in the original pattern of the French Revolution
and of any modern democratic revolution. Moreover the
rising power of the States forms one of the basic features
of a society based on political individualism, and
particularly when individual freedom grows as a reaction from
an absolutist regime of medieval type. Sooner or later
the State appears as the only brake put on the disintegrating
forces resulting from individual freedom, and the greater
the freedom the stronger the unifying forces of the State.
This is to show that the Jeffersonian ideal of democratic

democratic government, "he governs best who governs least", has a very limited application. In a wide historical perspective we can even say that it does not form the essence of a social regime based on individual freedom. For even in America "rugged individualism" has rapidly developed towards the growing power of the State and "active government". Tocqueville was perhaps the only one who clearly foresaw the necessary rising power of the State in a democratic society of modern type. "I am of the opinion", he says, "that in the democratic ages which are opening upon us, individual independence and liberties will ever be the product of artificial contrivance; that centralisation will be the natural form of Government" (Tocq. quoted by Mayer p.48 op cit.)

The Party-System and the Concentration of Power. The evolution of the party system shows another trend in contemporary European society leading to the concentration of power. We mention but two aspects of this important process. The first refers to the inner structure of every political party in a democratic society, while the second refers to the relationship between various political parties within the same society.

In his study of the evolution of various parties in France and Germany during the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, Robert Michels comes to the conclusion that all these parties had shown an increasing tendency towards the concentration of power within

within their own structure (Political Parties. Engl. Transl.
by Eden and Cedar Paul. N.Y. Heart's International
Library Co. 1915). Michels calls this process "oligarchis-
ation".

The main symptons of oligarchisation noticed by
Michels are: A. The tendency existing in every party, con-
servative liberal or socialist, to base its creative
activity on a limited number of its members; B. The
tendency to consider the electorate as a means of obtaining
power. The main conditioning factors of oligarchisation
can be summarised as follows: A. The natural tendency
of the leader to organise their party in such a way as to
consolidate their own position; B. The gratitude of the
masses towards the leaders; C. The general passivity of
the masses in political matters. As technical aspects of
the concentration of power Michels mentions :(a) the
necessity of the differentiation of the functions within
the party which results in the detachment of the leaders
from the rank and file, and (b) the gradual transformation
of the leaders into "professionals" aspiring to stability
and irremovability. Finally, Michels cannot refrain
from the formulation of a law, an antidemocratic law, of
human society. Oligarchosation is, according to him,
one of the natural tendencies of human political life.
It arises from the necessity to consolidate and discipline
a political aggregate, and to establish a certain dominance
of the elected over the electors. "Who says organisation

organisation says oligarchy" (p.401.)

Even if we cannot accept such far-reaching conclusions, a series of factors regarding the evolution of political parties in contemporary society, point in this direction by themselves. Perhaps we have to stress again that the process of the concentration of power within a political party is only a particular case of a larger process taking place in a society based on political individualism. Michels rightly notices the existence in every democratic party of another process, opposed to that of oligarchisation i.e., the tendency to increase the individual's aptitude for criticism. He does not seem, however, to be aware of the antithesic character of these two processes and of the way they condition each other in a democratic society.

There are other aspects in the evolution of political parties relevant for the concentration of power. The most conspicuous aspect consists in the cumulative character of political power. (Power wants more power). As this point will be dealt with elsewhere, we pass on to the problem of the relationship between political parties in a democratic society and its bearings on the concentration of power.

In some continental democracies the main guarantee of political freedom consists in the existence of two or more political parties, thus allowing the individual freedom of choice. Yet the competitive character of these parties, and the fact that they measure their strength against each other in numbers of voters, has tended to lead to situations

situations in which a party, after winning an absolute
majority, has maintained power for itself exclusively
by eliminating all other parties from the political
field. This happened, for instance, in Germany in 1933,
and shows another way in which the party system can con-
tribute to the concentration of power. The scheme of this
process is the following. When a democracy is transformed
into partitocracy (the rule of the parties, not the rule of
the people) it may lead to the absolute supremacy of the
strongest party, and consequently to a one-party system.

The one-party system is the main feature of
contemporary totalitarianism. For a closer understanding
of this type of totalitarianism one has to take into
account the inner structure of the party that assumed power
for itself exclusively. As compared with democratic
parties this is a completely new type of political
organisation. The usual position of a party in a
democratic society is that of an expedient or a device
for government. Though such a social instrument can never
be a pure instrument, it is in general an intermediary
factor between society and the State, and it cannot identify
itself with either. When a party deviates from this inter-
mediary position by identifying itself with either State
or society it changes its own structure and becomes a
totalitarian party or "a party of a new type" (Lenin).
In this case the party is no longer an expedient for
government but rather a model for society. Needless to say,

say, in such cases society itself changes its character by losing its capacity for self-organisation and self-government. The impulse for order comes for a particular in-group which has detached itself from the rest of society and imposes its own organisation upon the whole.

"Majorities", "Masses" and "The People" as means towards the Concentration of Power. In Democracy the individual alone is the bearer of political rights. He cannot, however, make use of them except by compromising with enough people to form a majority, by his integration with "the people", or in some cases characteristic of revolutionary periods, by his action in the masses. No practical measure regarding the organisation of his group can be taken save as the result of the will of the majority, the will of "the people", of as action of the masses. The analysis of these basic problems of Democracy reveals another aspect of the concentration of power in contemporary society.

1. The decisions of the majorities forms one of the fundamental conditions of a democratic society. However, the question has often been raised whether majorities are sufficient guarantees of democratic ways of life. The majority may decide (as it actually did in the Post-Periclean Athens, and several times in contemporary Europe) to limit or to abolish individual freedom by submission to an autocratic leadership.

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Who can check the power of the majority in the name of democratic priniples of life? Answering this question Tocqueville reveals once more his fears as to the future of modern Democracy. (J. S. Mill has a similar attitude). He perceives in the early stage of American and French Democracy a new type of the concentration of power, named by him the tyranny of the majority. "When I see", he says, "that the rights and the means of absolute command are conferred on any power whatever, be it called a people, or upon a king, upon an aristocracy, or a democracy, a monarchy, or a republic, I recognise the germ of tyranny". (Democracy in America, Qut.Ed. p.260.) 1)

(1) Tocqueville cannot see any other remedy for this danger but the application of the principle of the balance of power, i.e. any kind of social power should be checked by another power. He speaks also about the sovereignty of mankind which can occasionally be invoked against the sovereignty of the majority or of the people. How this can work in practice is difficult to know. (Ibiden - chapter XV)

2. There are some other ways in which the rule of the majority or of the people may lead to the concentration of power. The main reason for this lies in the fluidity and instability of a political system based on the direct consultation of the people. The revolutionary stages of various Democracies can be taken as an illustration. During such periods power is often exercised directly by the people. The Politically oriented action of the crowds in the street, or decisions taken in big meetings, are various expedient ways in which the people may express their will. The majority has in these cases an elastic meaning. It is,

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is, however, systematically invoked by the leaders of
such meetings and crowds as the will of the "multitude",
or of the people.

These modes of exercising power and authority result
in a high degree of fluidity in the political structure
of society. This is by no means opposed to the purposes
of a democratic revolution.   Yet this situation very soon
leads to the very opposite of Democracy. The big
oscillations, hesitations and changes of moods characteristic
of such situations very soon create a general feeling of
insecurity and fear of chaos. The effect of this is such
that even the greatest enemies of the old regime, overthrown
by revolution, desire a quick restoration of order and
security. It is at this stage that a counter-revolutionary
stream originates, i.e., the fluidity and insecurity normally
created by the exercise of power directly by the people
inevitably ends in a general need for strong authority.
A period of "consolidation" starts in the way. In some
cases the leaders brought into power by such circumstances
substitute their personal rule for the rule of the people.
(Napoleon Bonaparte).

Essentially the same process has taken place at various
speeds, in nearly all European societies. In principle one
could say that one of the main aims of democratic society
is to keep the door of revolution ajar - if the meaning of
revolution is not necessarily confined to a bloody change.
The political structure of a democratic society has to

to preserve that degree of fluidity to make any change in the interest of the people possible. Trotski's concept of permanent revolution is in this sense but an idealised form of this feature of democratic society.

From the practical point of view the problem of the people's consultation has been solved in European Democracies by the system of political parties and parliamentary representation. The parties represent various aspects and configuration, of the people's interests. However, the party system and parliamentary representation, though correcting to a certain extent the effect of direct consultation, do not entirely eliminate the concentration of power. This shows that the fruits of a social system permanently open to change are essentially the same. The incoherent nature of the majority of the people has led in many modern democracies to an ever increasing number of political parties, from the usual two-party to a forty-party system. The very existence of such a great number of political formulae is in itself an element of instability. To this has been added a series of other phenomena working to the same effect, such as: (a) an ever-increasing incoherence of the political action of the people as a result of the incoherent action of the political parties upon the people; (b) a permanently open opportunity for demagogy as a result of the political parties' competitive action for power; (c) a gradual diminution of the political role of the people which has often been compensated for by a formal cult of the people and of popular support; /

support; and (d) a general disillusionment concerning the party-system of Democracy.

It would take us too long to go through all these points in order to prove that the need for a central undivided authority which has been lately manifested under various forms in nearly all contemporary societies is at least partly derived from this situation. The fear of insecurity and the desire for a stable and efficient government is perhaps the most general way of describing this process. Analysing the structure of modern (American and French) democratic society, Tocqueville sees its future in two main lines: It is either that this society enters into an uninterrupted series of changes - of which the French Revolution was only the first step - one which cannot end but in anarchy, that chronic malady well known to the ancient peoples, or that it ends in the tyranny of the majority with the possibility that the majority itself decide for an authoritarian government.

3. We should like to stress the fact that the process of democratisation of European society was from the very beginning imbued with the equalitarian aspirations of the masses. In some cases - in British Democracy for instance - the practical effect of these aspirations was retarded and displaced, but its existence can hardly be denied. The French Revolution instead considered equality as a justified democratic aspiration. Since then the wave of equalitarianism has in various forms touched practically

practically every European society.

Equalitarian aspirations have aroused in many
people a negative attitude towards the rise of the masses,
a fear of the "vertical invader" as J. Ortega Ya Gasset
puts it. The same feeling has often been expressed as
the fear that a levelling process might destroy Western
civilisation. In the reaction towards the equalitarian
aspiration of the masses lies another factor leading to
the concentration of power. First of all equalitarian
aspirations have been canalised in the direction of
economic equality. Socialism and Communism are the two
main political formulae provided by the Western culture
pattern for the realisation of economic equality. Both
of these have made use of a strong State to this end.
Therefore both of them represent various aspects of the
concentration of power in Western societies.

But not all equalitarian aspirations have materialised
in economic equality. Therefore Socialism and Communism
were not the only political devices for their fulfilment.
Fascism considered economic equality as artificial, and
consequently provided a new formula for the fulfilment of
the equalitarian aspiration of the masses. Equality was,
according to this formula, possible only by the individual's
identification with the group. Needless to say, the
equalitarian aspiration of the masses has led in this way
to another form of the concentration of power.

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4. Democracy has introduced in the arena of political struggle "the people" as an active factor of decision. For Rousseau, for instance, the people is a monolith, i.e. able to express its will unanimously. In the first stages of the struggle for democracy,(in France) the individual freed from the bonds of medieval society, had no other frame of reference/for his political action than the people as a whole. The people's will is the right and lawful way. "The individual becomes lost in the mass and fixes his eyes solely on the mighty all-embracing vision of the people as a whole". (Tocquevill, Quoted by Mayer, Op.cit. p.47)

"The people", though a democratic reality in itself, contains a series of factors that may in certain circumstances lead to a totalitarian society. This is mostly because it represents a primitive concentration of power which in modern society could not be completely broken down in spite of the democratic devices of the majority, party system or proportional representation. It might happen that "the people" as a monolith places its trust in one man or one party exclusively, and invests him with unlimited power. The result is a regression in the process of democratisation or a collapse of Democracy.

In what follows we should like briefly to describe the main aspects of contemporary European society which show how, under various circumstances, "the people" act as a monolith and consequently lose the flexibility

flexibility necessary to any democratic society.

A. "The people" might act as a monolith and place its fate in the hands of a man or a party when long and deeply felt aspirations are not fulfilled, or in situations of imminent danger, real or created by propaganda. The equalitarian aspirations characteristic of any democratic society may serve as examples. In contemporary society these aspirations have been gradually (built or forced up until they crystallised in a series of political programmes for the masses under the force of authoritarian movements of the right and of the left. Economic insecurity or the insecurity characteristic of times of war can also produce the same effects.

B. A series of conditions for the growth of "the people" as a monolith have been directly created by the social disintegration resulting from the practice of democracy in various contemporary societies. The incoherence of the group and the spirit of "faction" created, on one hand, by the action of political parties, and on the other, by the pattern of competitive individualism, have in the long run aroused in the individual the need for stable integration with, and belongingness to the group. This need was exploited by various political movements. In Germany for instance, the Nazi movement satisfied the individual's need for belongingness by activating the primitive irrational layers of human solidarity such as community of blood, feeling, tradition, etc. The result was that this movement,

movement created in the midst of modern society a community
of a primitive type in which emotional bonds formed the
guarantee of social unity. Consequently the machinery of
democracy based on the opinion of the majority, the
electoral system,etc., was discarded. At the new level
of unity the people acted as an organic whole. Decisions
on the basis of unanimity and unlimited confidence in the
leadership were but natural consequences of this position.

C. A long period of conflict between various
European States and the spirit of international competition
characteristic of the modern era have also led to the
increase of the feeling of group belongingness often called
national consciousness, and has consequently set at work
that undefinable factor, the people as an organic unity.

These desires for unity and belongingness which formed
the psychological movements had the feeling that they lived
in "the century of the masses", when positive programmes
meant to catch separate sections of the community formed
no longer adequate political tools. The task they set
themselves was to exploit that aspect of social life which
would gain for themselves not only a section, not only the
majority, but the unanimity of their community. Any card
played towards this end was a good one. The situation was
ripe in Italy and Germany. Mussolini and Hitler did not
care for majorities; their position was strong enough to
make it possible for them to liquidate the opposition and
to abolish the constitution with the passive acceptance of

of all. They went far on the way to crystallising the will of their own peoples as a monolith, for any of their main decisions could be based on a "plebiscite". Under Hitler's regime the German people itself behaved like a tyrant. "The decrees of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant" (Aristotle Politics IV, 4, p.57. Quated Ed.). This happens when a dictator knows how to play on the frustrated desires of a people.

German Democracy. We are inclined to think that, in spite of the existence of certain democratic trends, the very meaning of democracy remains foreign to the German culture- pattern. For it seems that the German community has systematically failed to see the possibility of a socially organised group, without unlimited exercises of power coming from one or other of its sectors. Too much power has never been an evil from the point of the leaders in this culture-pattern.

It is revealing to notice that the founder of the German modern State, Bismarck, though living in the midst of a liberal Europe, completely fails to see in Liberalism a value in itself. He conceives Liberalism as a means for the exercise of power. One would almost think that Liberalism is for him but a technique in the hands of the despot. "There are times" - he says in 1881 - "for a liberal, and times for a dictatorial Government; as every-thing is changeable, one cannot expect any eternity on this matter". (Bismarck Qut. by Spengler: Politische Schriften,

Schriften,München 1933 p.148).

It is even more revealing, and to a certain extent, puzzling to analyse the definition of Democracy given by a German liberal, Max Weber. In his conversation with Ludendorf, after the defeat of 1918, he sketches the following description of Democracy: "In a Democracy the people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the chosen. leader says: Now shut up and obey me. People and party are no longer free to interfere in his business". He continues: "Later the people can sit in judgment. If the leader has made mistakes, to the gallows with him". (Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Translated and Introduced by H. Gerth and C. Wright-Mills. London, Kegan Paul, 1948. Qat, from the introduction.) Though the technical aspect of Democracy is not denied one can hardly fail to be struck by the rough almost unchecked exercise of power allowed in such society. The leader asks for absolute confidence while the people act in the manner of a revolutionary tribunal.

O. Spengler, who in many respects expresses adequately the very essence of the modern German culture-pattern, is completely blind to the idea of Democracy. He cannot conceive of any lasting society without a rigid hierarchy of status and rank and without the supremacy of the State (Staatshoheit) which automatically eliminates the idea of political parties. His ideal of future society is embodied in the concept of "Prussianism" based on the primary bonds

bonds and general mobilisation of the individual in the service of the State. This society should be in a permanent state of "Informsein fur eine Aufgabe" (Op.Cit. p.136).

Hitler takes the same line when defining "Germanic" Democracy as opposed to "Jewish" Democracy as follows: "In contrast to the"Jewish" here stands the true Germanic democracy of free choice of a leader, who takes over all responsibility for his deeds and omissions. Here there is no voting of a majority for each and every question, but only the choice of one man, who must then stake his life and fortune on his own decisions. If one should object that under this condition it would be hard to find anyone who would dedicate himself to such a perilous task, then I have only one thing to say "Thank God that therein lies the very essence of Germanic democracy - that the very greatness of the responsibility frightens off incompetence and weaklings". (Mein Kampf Ouat. Gilbert Op.Cit. p.53).

The authoritarian element running through all these "views" on social organisation forms the pervasive feature of German political thought. For Germany could seldom conceive for herself another type than a war-time or an emergency type of democracy. The emergency character is in fact the expression of a series of basic features in modern German society. Most important for the understanding of this phenomenon is the fact that the Germans were the last

last Western people to attain national unity. Since the
end of the eighteenth century there has been in Germany a
permanent problem of unity within the limits of a
national state. This strong tension towards national
integration forms a basic element in German totalitarianism.
The building up of a strong State, the Prussian militaristic
ideal of society, the necessity of maintaining quasi-
medieval symbols of authority, a strong emotionalisation of
the idea of "Fatherland" and of "Germanic" community, etc.
are but a few aspects of this historical condition. (The
need of unity is expressed in the German sociological
thought as an obsession with the "fundamentals" of human
society).

The unity anxiety was considerably aggravated during
the inter-war period due to a partial dismemberment of
Germany as a result of the Versaille Peace Treaty, and of a
series of inner crises, economic and political. From this
point of view Nazism can be described provisionally as the
political expression of an ethnic group organised under
conditions of emergency.

The Social Basis of Nazism. According to the social
class standpoint in politics Nazism - and Fascism in
general - is the "revolution" of the lower-middle classes,
i.e., the political outlook of the German small bourgeoisies.
Although this approach is akin to the basic tenets of the
doctrine of economic materialism, it nevertheless clashes

clashes with the orthodox Marxian thesis of Nazism according to which Nazism is a political formula worked out by the representatives of German industry, in the circumstances created by the post-war period. The two points of view can hardly stand side by side. Either the lower-middle classes are used as material for the political manoeuvres of the big industrialists, and played a passive part in the rise of Nazism, or Nazism is the political outcome of the lower-middle classes' way of life, and the economic upper classes adjusted their interests to it by an act of opportunism.

In spite of the fact that one of the best known psychological theses of Nazism bases some of its main assumptions on the class character of this political phenomenon we can find little support for any class approach to this movement. In the composition of Nazism there is such a great variety of social elements that its students would be helped greatly if they could see its main features at the German group level as a whole in the twentieth century historical setting. Social class references would certainly be necessary, but only after the general character of Nazism had been carefully framed.

The German Workers' Party founded by Anton Drexler in 1918 (Munich) can be considered as the preliminary crystalisation of Nazism. This Party's policy is one of broad socialism. It is in fact one of those parties hastily built up to fill the social and political vacuum following the defeat of 1918. Then political orientation of the German

German working-class during that period is anything but clear.
If there was a general feature of this party, apart from its
socialistic flavoured ideology, it was a general political
disengagement in its members, i.e. a readiness to do anything
about the situation in which they were involved as the
result of a lost war. The later evolution of the party
proves this.

Hitler, a completely unknown man at that period, joined
this party in 1920. Already in 1921 he took over the leader-
ship renaming it as: The German National Socialist Workers'
Party. (N.S.D.A.P.). The name itself indicates the work
done by Hitler within the party between 1920-21, and at the
same time the political disengagement of its members. The
party emerged in fact as a compromise, or rather as a con-
fusion between a series of socialistic - proletarian and
nationalistic factors. This original blend, persisting
throughout the existence of the Nazi movement, made it
difficult to insist too much on its class character in the
usual sense of this expression.

In 1922 the upper structure of the Party took on a
definite shape. Julius Streicher, a Bavarian schoolmaster
with socialist views, and suffering from the obsession of
"the rape of Christian girls by Jews" joined the Party.
During the same year the leadership was completed with Alfred
Rosenberg, an architect who had fled to Munich from Baltic
Russia, and who held strong anti-semitic, anti-catholic and
anti-Russian views, with Rudolf Hess, Herman Goering, Ernst

Ernst Roehmm, Robert Lay and others. Goebbels and Franz
Frank joined the leadership in 1925.

With such a leadership it would again be difficult to
detect any definite class feature in the Nazi movement.
On the contrary one can say that one of its most outstanding
traits consisted in its lack of social bias. The whole
movement was in a state of political disengagement, i.e.,
it had no definite programme and tried with nebulous phrases
to catch the most general aspirations of the people as a
whole. Thus it was the people as a whole that formed the
social basis of the Party from its very beginning. To find
an acceptable cure for the privation and humiliation in
which the German nation as a whole was thrown by the 1918
defeat, to formulate hopes for the near future, to canalise
the general state of discontent and aggression, these were a
few points on which the Nazis founded their social basis.

In 1925 Hitler published the first part of "Mein Kampf",
in which the German people as a whole is depicted as the
Master-Race striking back at its oppressors, World Jewry, the
signatory powers of the Versailles Treaty, Bolshevism. The
concept of World Jewry as the main aggressor was previously
worked out in the "Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion", a
fabrication of the Tzarist policy, published by Rosenberg in
1922.

As a result of its electoral success in 1932 (232 repre-
sentatives in the Reichstag) the Party grew both in its
doctrine and membership further towards the upper-classes, thus

thus weakening the only serious resistance to its coming
to power. The Party's vague economic policy and above all
its advertised anti-communist leanings, brought in a number
of industrialists and bankers such as: Fritz Thyssen, I.G.
Farben, Krupp, Hylmar Schact, von Ribbentrop, etc. The
movement seems to have grown now as a miniature of the nation,
as the membership list of 1935 shows: 32.1% manual workers;
20.6% white collar employees; 20.2% independents; 13%
officials; 10% peasants; 3.4% others. (Figure taken from
K. Mannheim:Diagnosis of Our Time, London. Kegan Paul,1943,
p.167.) The class structure of German society according to
the census of 1925 gives the following figure, in millions:
40.7 industrial workers; 10.7 urban middle class; 9 small
farmers; 2 bourgeoisie including landowners. (Taken from
W. Reich:The Mass Psychology of Fascism. Oregon Institute
Press N.Y. 1946 p.8 and 9.)

At first sight the composition of the Party seems to
indicate a preponderantly dominant middle-class element.
On closer examination, however, the two lists can hardly
be compared. Categories such as: white collar employees,
independents and officials can only arbitrarily be considered
as forming together a social class. (One has therefore to
take into consideration the usual criticism waged against).
The class approach to Nazism suffers from the ambiguity
inherent in concepts such as the middle-class, or the lower-
middle classes, or petty bourgeoisie which are often applicable
only in very general terms. Many people considered as

as belonging to the lower middle classes are either in a
transitory social status, or form by themselves a category
floating between the upper and lower classes. The character
of transitoriness in their status, or simple classlessness
seems to be more significant for the social basis of Nazism
than the class character of the German community. The next
section will deal with this point.

Déclassés and Nazism. Ignazio Silone's views on the dominant
part played by the "déclassés" in the rise and development
of Fascism might well be applied to Nazism. The core of
Mussolini's movement was formed, according to him by the
"arditi", a more or less socially and psychologically
homogeneous group in post-war Italian society. The group
consisted of former volunteers, officers and troops, in number
approximately 20,000. Most of them were delinquents used
during the war as shock battalions. Many of them belonged to
the "lumpen proletariate". All were aggressive people who,
during the war, found in the militaristic way of life the most
adequate outlet for their personalities. Other categories of
déclassés mentioned by Silone are: Demobilised officers not
entirely assimilated to the post-war society, numbering
approximately 160,000 in the period between 1919-21: ambulant
merchants; black-marketeers, and people with no specific job,
or with no job at all, simply vagabonds. Students formed a
particular category. The well-to-do peasants, and particularly
those who became so during the war, were also among the first
supporters of Fascism. They formed a category of their own

own cut-off from the rest of the peasantry due to their
higher level of aspiration on the social scale, and
particularly by their fear of becoming the victims of the
agrarian reform then strongly supported by the poor
peasantry. (See Silone: Der Fascismus. Europa Verlag.
Zurich, pp.82 and following.)

The same social composition is to be found in
Nazism. The demobilised officers from the German Army,who
could not, for various reasons, be absorbed by the post-war
German society, and who found it hard to give up their
militaristic habits, constituted an important Nazi group.
Goering was one of them. The déclassé-character is
noticeable in nearly all other groups forming the movement.
The category described as "manual workers" (31.1%) was made
up mainly by: "lumpen proletarians", i.e., a group below
the standards of the industrial workers, and by those
industrial workers who did not integrate with the structure
of their own class, traditionally communistic or socialistic
in orientation. The peripheral elements of every class
formed the nucleus of Nazism. Typical representatives were
people such as Ribbentrop, falling between aristocracy and
bourgeosie, or socially dislocated personalities like Hess
(born in Egypt), Rosenberg and Hitler himself. No less
important are a category of people who, failing to grasp
the post-war condition of the German society, identified
themselves with highly inadequate concept of their own class.
The Nazi aristocratic group is in this category; it joined

joined the movement mainly to maintain or to remake the position held by the Junkers in Imperial Germany. Another important category is formed by the post-war German youth, i.e., adolescents freshly free from the authority of their own families, with no clear idea about their own or their country's future. And lastly come the "failures", like Hitler himself, people with no social status.

It would perhaps be appropriate to describe in a few words the common character of all these groups. "Déclassés" or persons manifesting symptoms of being déclassé could be considered as all the people who fail completely of partly to integrate themselves with one of the institutionalised sub-groups of their society. All the individuals coming under this category suffer from lack of social attachment. In this way they can by analogy with psycho-pathic personalities be called socio-pathic personalities. As psycho-pathic personalities are liable to all forms of delinquency, so are socio-pathic personalities liable to political delinquency in particular, i.e., breakers of the social and political order of their own society.

Something more will be said about the connection between the psycho-pathic and socio-pathic personality at a later stage. For the moment we should like to consider socio-pathic personality by itself. The fact should be stressed to start with that modern industrial society has a great capacity for creating socio-pathic groups. Its fluid character and its rapid growth are among the main causes of this phenomenon.

The impersonal character of this type of society and the mechanical integration of the individual with it can also be considered to lead to the same result. Post-war Germany found herself in a significant position from this point of view. The crises resulting from the defeat of 1918 considerably increased the number of non-integrated groups and individuals.

The Nazi movement can be considered a meeting point for all groups and individuals with an unstable social status as a result of a deep disrupting process taking place in the post-war German society as a whole. It is therefore the classless element rather than a particular social class that should first be taken into account for the understanding of Nazism. The movement itself represents, by its social composition, a fairly adequate cross-section of German society; it forms a blend of all social classes though rather through the peripheral than through the most representative of their members. As opposed to any socialist party - obviously a class-party - and to any democratic party based on a particular social group, Nazism represents in its structure the nation on a small scale. This is one of the first conditions making for its totalitarian character.

The dynamic elements in Nazism is formed by the peripheral, déclassé and socio-pathic individuals and groups. Their common trait consists in their high degree of frustration as a result of their failure to achieve a stable social integration. This might explain a great deal of their aggressive character and their readiness for revolutionary action.

The same general conditions explain the ambiguity in the social attitude of the Nazi leaders. They act for a new order and yet within the limits of the old one: they hate and love at the same time the existing order of their own society. They respect the social classes, and at the same time they equalise them by their identification with the State and Nation. Their political action reflects both their desire to integrate themselves with a social class and their failure to do so.

There is very little in Nazism that could be ascribed unambiguously to the lower-middle classes or to any other specific class. Its xenophobia - its anti-semitism in particular - might originate in the petty-bourgeoisies narrow nationalism as well as in the struggle between the German and Jewish capitalists. The scale of values and the ethics of the Nazi world could be attributed to any class. The spirit of adventure, for instance, seems to be closer to the upper than to the lower-middle classes. The manner in which this was manifested in the Nazi culture pattern was certainly nearer to the déclassés group than to any other group or class.

Silone is not very far from the truth when he says that Fascism tried to please everybody, every main social force existing in an "advanced capitalist society". Simply formulated the solution offered by Nazism is this: Any inner conflict in society is superseded by the reality of the "Nation".

CHAPTER II

THE WELTANSCHAUUNG OF NAZISM.

> Give me a button and I will make men
> die for it.
>
>> Napoleon Bonaparte
>
> My acts are always based upon a political
> mode of thinking.
>
>> Hitler.

The Age of Unreason. There are two fundamental points
by which the irrational leanings of a political movement
can be tested: its attitude towards man and its attitude
towards society.

The Weltanschanuung of Nazism rests on the assumption
of the irrationality of human nature. Human action, ~~and~~
~~human will in general,~~ is guided by instincts, intuition
and feelings. Will has its ends in itself, and it
reaches its purposes more adequately if not embarrassed
by reasoning. Though doubting the ability and power of
reason, Nazis are neither sceptics nor nihilists.
According to their convictions, will and feeling provide
human knowledge and action with a greater degree of
certainty than reason. Human action, though basically
irrational, leads by itself to order, to a new type of
order. For, while the fundamental category of rational
order is that of equality, and agreement between equals,

equals, the order springing from the irrational factors
of the human mind rests on the feeling of "distance"
(Nietzsche); it expresses itself as power hierarchy.
Referred to the standards of reason, the Nazi type of
man is bad, aggressive and barbarous. But these traits
are in the Nazi value world the spring sources of life.
The man who possesses them is therefore strong and full
of virtue. His most important virtue consists in the fact
that he can impose his will by force, and fears force at
the same time. This human quality becomes the main feature
of the Nazi way of life. Man's wisdom is shown in his
ability to discover the leader and to let himself be ruled
by him. Needless to say, this wisdom is by no means the
work of reason. For will and affection guide the people
towards the choice of their leader, rather than reason.
The leader himself would very seldom,if at all, use reason
to get the consent of the people. His strongest weapons
consist in his power and its capacity to fascinate and to
dominate. "Because it might well happen that force may
help to create consent, and because in any case there would
be force if consent came to fail". This statement made by
Mussolini in the early days of his regime (March 7, 1923)
reveals unambiguously the Fascist conception of man.{See Ref. N°   }

　　As to the nature of society, Nazism is radically
opposed to the rationalist conception of the Enlightenment.
Social organisation, whatever its size and ends, cannot be
subject to debate and "contract". One of the great faults

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faults of the nineteenth century was to create and
foster the belief that society could be organised
rationally by discussions and programmes. As a result
society has gradually become the prey of the corrupting
reason of the politicians. The truth is that society is
founded on irrational factors, its essence lying in the
primitive emotional bonds which unite a group of
individuals and which cannot be changed by reasoning.
Society is a mystery of Nature, an "Ungegeben" which reveals
itself only in symbolic forms and in words loaded with
emotional forces, in myths, in the action of the group, or
finally in the personality of the leader. It is on no
account a matter of reasoning.

Nazis do not believe in the rational nature of this-
story. Therefore, they resort to force in order to
organise society and to give shape to the historical processes
Action resulting from force constitutes the only organising
drive in history. There is no pre-established order or
scale of values: the pattern of society reveals itself in
action as a hierarchy of power.

To say that the Nazi of Weltanschauung is a reaction
against the nineteenth century rationalism is to over-
estimate the importance of ideology in this political
movement. It would also mean to assign to its doctrine
too high a degree of unity. It is true that the Fascists
ideologues made frequent references to the protagonists of
modern irrationalism such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

But in spite of this it is very hard to see the development of their thought as a systematic reaction from modern rationalism. This makes it even more necessary for us to construct their world outlook from the implications of their statements with regard to various aspects of life. With the exception of Giovanni Gentile who is in fact a rationalist (see "Genesi e Struttura della Societa". Turino Sansoni 1946) there is no Fascist who had ever made the attempt to think out the answers to the fundamental problems posed by a Fascist way of life. For Fascism there is no Joseph de Maistre, for instance, to throw over the fundamental assumptions or Rationalism. Many of the fundamental aspects of the Fascist Weltanschauung seem to float in an atmosphere of ambiguity. This is due to various causes. First of all Fascism, and Nazism in particular, was a short-lived regime. Secondly, ideology was for this regime little more than a tool for the exercise of power. Thirdly, and this the most important cause, a strong element of ambiguity and ambivalence lies at the root of Nazism as it lies at the root of any behaviour, individual or collective, based on conditions of stress. This idea will be taken up at a later stage of this study.

The Totalitarian Society. The Italian Fascists, Gentile in particular, rightly invoke the name of Hegel when defining the totalitarian character of Fascist society. The pattern of such society is ultimately given by the Hegelian "concrete Idea", i.e., the Idea which has reached the state

state of its full realisation. At this stage the con-
tradiction between ideal and real, universal and particular,
potential and actual, totalitity and multiplicity, is
superseded. The Idea lives adequately in its concrete
forms of manifestation and these forms represent adequately
the Idea, or the whole, they belong to. On the social plane,
this means that society as a whole or pattern is realised
in each of its members, and that the life of each individual
is a particular case in the life of its society. Conse-
quently society is not merely a concept, or a general term
for a multiplicity of individuals, but exists in the same way
as the individual himself. It has a will of its own, the
work of which is seen in all integrating and coercive forces
holding the individuals together and leading them towards
common ends. Hegel himself gives several examples of society as
being concrete in its existence. The State is one of these.
The State is for Hegel a category of existence as real as
the individual himself. (The Monarchy of Friedrich Wilhelm II
is one example of the embodiment of Idea). There are also
other manifestations of society as concrete existence thought
of by Hegel, such as "the People", as "organic totality" of
individuals, a great personality or a hero. (Napoleon). In
the social field as anywhere else the Romantics were at pains
to prove the existence of general ideas. Consequently the
State, the people and the heroes are not empty forms or
symbols fo the totality of the individuals, but "concrete
totalities".

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Although the Fascists made use of the machinery of the State in order to curb the centrifugal tendencies of the individual, the State in itself, being too abstract, too formal and too rational, could not adequately incorporate "the totality" of individuals. The totalitarian reality of the Italia n Fascists in the Corporative Society which is an intermediary term between the individual and the State. In this way Fascism distinguishes itself from both Socialism for which the State is all, and from Democracy for which the individual is all. The Corporative Society is the "concrete Idea", i.e., the form in which the individual integrates himself naturally with his group. The root of this concrete totality should be looked for in a series of irrational factors. The individuals are bound together by a common tradition, by the mysterious forces of the Roman Empire or by the outstanding personality of the Duce.

The Nazism the "totality" is created by irrational factors exclusively. The main totalitarian category is that of "Das Volk". For Nazism also the state is a means. "It is a basic principle, therefore, that the State represents not an end but a means..... Its purpose is in the maintenance and advancement of a community of human beings with common physical and spiritual characteristics". (Mein Kampf, quoted by E.R.Huber: Verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschem Reiches - Hamburg,1939, pp.54-55.) The reality of the people imposes upon the individuals tasks and duties which prevail upon their personal interests. The bonds between the individual and "the people"

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are fundamentally emotional. The way in which the
totalitarian reality of Nazi society is expressed suggests
the presence of a magic and symbolic form of thinking.
Words like "Fatherland", "German" etc. were loaded with such
an emotional power that the mere perception of them created
in individuals the feeling that they all are one. The effect
of such words was similar to that of the Totemic symbols in
a primitive tribe, or to that of the symbol of the cross among
the early Christians. The Roumanian Fascists used to symbolise
their "totality" by a tiny bag of Roumanian soil which they
carried with them as a talisman; whenever the bag was shown
by one of them, there was no sacrifice in the world a
"legionar" would not make for the interest of his country. [1]

[1] We are under the impression that Schelling's thought may
more appropriately be connected with the Nazi Weltanchauung
than that of Hegel. The latter is too much of a rationalist.
The Nazi totalitarian reality is rather Schelling's concept
of the "Absolute", governed by the law of identity, then the
Hegelian Idea. It is the whole, prior to its differentiation.
The revival of the Schellingian philosophy in the last years
of the Nazi era can be adduced as a proof of the connection
suggested by us.

"The people" as a manifestation of the totalitarian
reality is however not specific to Nazism. The two specific
forms of the Nazi totalitarian reality are: A. 'Race'. and B.
The Leader.

A. 'Race' constitutes the most accurate form of totalitarian
reality. Though the individual submits blindly to the
dictates of 'Race', he remains free because it is in his nature
to do so. 'Race' is the voice of the group in him. This is
the basic assumption on which the Nazi leaders had developed

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developed their own ideas about the Germanic Race. The
purity of the race came first, for the purer the race the
stronger its binding forces over the individual. Purity in
the racial character means first of all superiority in the
sense that the totalitarian reality is more adequately
represented. Consequently Nazis made appeal to those racial
theories which demonstrated the superiority of the German
Race on the ground of its purity. (Huston Chamberlain).
On the psychological level they had systematically worked for
the creation of strong positive in-group and negative out-group
feelings in the members of their own society. (See point 4
of the programme of the Nazi Party.)

B. The totalitarian reality is manifested also though
the personality of the "Fuhrer". "The Fuhrer" is first of
all a charismatic figure. He embodies the will of the people
and creates binding forces of such a nature that the individual
cannot fail to integrate totally with the supreme interest of
his group. "The Fuhrer", though an individual, is the embodi-
ment of the Germanic Race, the "geniale momentum" of the
German nation. He is"the bearer of the people's will" or"the
objective people's will" (Huber, Op.Cit. pp.194a -200.)
As such he is an adequate realisation of the totalitarian
reality.

In conclusion, the unifying forces of Nazi society,
whatever their name, are irrational. Consequently they do
not allow any deliberation concerning the conforming behaviour
of the individual. The individual's mind cannot be divided
with regard to their acceptance. Nor can the members of the

the group divide themselves in to _pro_ and _contra_ and follow
the decision of the majority. With regard to the interests
of the group as expressed by "The Fuhrer", there cannot be
partial or gradual consent, but unavoidable unanimity. The
formula is all or nothing.

The Scale of Values of Nazism. The dominant value in the
Nazi Weltanschauung is the political value. This means that
the most important processes within the Nazi culture-pattern
are those which create power and authority with the unique
end of strengthening the unity of the group. In order to
understand the nature of this phenomenon it is necessary to
point out that the dominance of political values implies
social integration produced by external authority. A few
data regarding the historical background of Nazism will make
this idea clear.

We have shown in various places that a high degree of
instability experienced by the German society after the First
World War ranks among the main historical conditions of Nazism.
This socially disintegrating process had been translated on
the psychological plane into an intense, almost morbid, desire
for unity. The same social instability had been translated
on the psychological plane in a state of apathy. Arendt
(Op.Cit.p.80) describes this state in German society as
"verzweifelten Urteils-unfähigkeit" or "Meinungs-chaos".
Anyone with definite opinions would have to stand the chance
to become "authority". Hitler, as we shall see later on, was
certainly the man. Only unity could counterbalance this state

state of insecurity. Nazism is a political answer to this situation. Its leaders had from the very beginning realised that there were factors in German society which worked for unlimited concentration of power if only that could be shown to be in the interest of group unity. The situation called, therefore, for the supremacy of the political value in the German culture pattern.

Bare exercise of power, i.e. giving orders and seeing them carried through, was only one among many other methods used by Nazis in order to creat the unity of the group round their own party. They resorted to persuasion in all its forms such as a strong police, a strong army, and propaganda based on scientific methods. All realisation in the field of culture, their ideology, their art, their myths, their economic system served the same purpose, i.e., the unity of the group.

In what follows we should like to analyse the significance of the fact that the Nazi culture-pattern was dominated by political values.

A. The first implication of this was that the groups as a whole was under a condition of stress. Order and unity within the group constitute therefore elementary conditions of survival. As the flustrating conditions of German society from which the Nazi movement sprung were shown before there is no particular need to discuss them again.

B. The culture-pattern of a society under stress has not a clear and stable scale of values. The explanation of this should be looked for in the process of life objectivation. When

When life, individual and collective, is under a condition
of permanent threat the process of objectivation is poor,i.e.,
life does not project itself in objective norms and values
which form pre-established regulative ends for the individual's
and group's behaviour. In the pattern of life characteristic
of Nazism, human action could not be moulded according to pre-
established set of values. For the world of values was a
vacuum. The most striking characteristic of this pattern of
life was that action had its end in itself; it was the supreme
value. On the ethical plane this enhanced a chronic crisis
of human conscience.

This phenomenon has induced many people to see materialistic
trends in the Weltanschauung of Nazism. Trevor-Roper, for
instance, calls Hitler "a complete and rigid materialist".
(Hitler's Table Talk, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1953,
Introduction p.XXXIII) Ethical materialism, however, can
hardly be applied to a man with such a strong feeling of
adventure and so little a sense of reality. We can talk in
this case about a strange ethical phenomenon which we name
the "mystique" of action. The urge for action is in Nazi
society of such an intensity that it could not be fashioned by
any scale of avlues. This basic urge is manifested in Hitler's
fascination with "great" actions and plans. "Great" means in
this case something "absolute", something which cannot be
defined within a definite conception of history, or within a
certain scale of values; it is in fact a purely psychological
category and as such it can be defined only by the feeling of

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of "the extraordinary" "unheard of", "breath-taking"...
The Empire he wants to build up, the "Autobahnen" he wants
to construct - from Berlin to India -, and the monuments he
intends to leave to posterity can hardly be judged within a
given system of political, practical or artistic values.
In all his "plans" there is something beyond reality and
beyond the human condition.

Any human feeling and any cultural value is regarded by
Hitler as being subordinated to his "great" actions. He
speaks about love äs "a competition in which the most Nazi of
he-Germans deserved the most conventionally well-proportioned
of she-Germans"; children are to him "material of conquest
and colonisation"; moral values are simply prejudices.
(Trevor-Roper, Op.cit.p. XXXIII). In his utter incapacity for
looking at the events of life in the light of a spiritual
order, or rather in his incapacity for spiritualising life
lies the root of Hitler's "lack of human note" that impressed
so many people who knew him. (A. Zoller: Hitler Private,
Dusseldorf, 1949, refers to this, p.49)

The only thing Hitler unreservedly admires in man is his
power and will for action. He admires Stalin as "a beast",
reverences Mussolini for his determination, and the only

The same thing can be said about the Nazi group as a
whole. Ϝ   it was not the unity and the action of the group in
order to achieve certain pre-established ends but rather unity

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unity and action in themselves that formed the basic
character of Nazi society. As compared with Communism,
Nazism has no philosophy of history. This was substituted
by the "mystique" of action. "Action has buried philosophy",
said Mussolini entering Rome. This Marxian slogan was an
adequate expression of the psychological structure of Fascian
in general and Nazism in particular.

The mystic of action forms a fundamental trait in the
Weltanschauung of Nazism. That is why we should like to
analyse its significance in more detail.

C. The Nazi culture-pattern bears in many respects the
sign of a disturbing ambivalence in the group situation. The
feeling of insecurity reaches such a degree of intensity that
one can say that life and death present equal chances. The
first term of this ambivalence is expressed, at the ideological
level, in the "mystique" of action and adventure, while the
second in the "mystique" of death. Both trends coexist in the
Nazi Weltanschauung.

To start with it is worth while mentioning that the success
in Italy of Gentile's "activism", of the philosophy "del atto
puro" is symptomatic. In Nazism we have no such clear concept-
ualisation of existence; there philosophy is almost buried under
the urge for action. We can, however, find a series of trends
all of them pointing in the same direction. Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche for instance are officially supported. A series of
mystic concepts forming the foundation of the racial ideology
comes under the same category. The essence of these consists in

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in their dynamism rather than in their episteological function. Concepts such as "Germanic", "Führer", "Jewish", etc. are in essence simple words covering an irresistible urge for action.

Faust's belief that in the beginning was "action", which seems to outline an important aspect of the German culture, reveals at the same time the essence of the Nazi group frame of mind. For it is not "logos" but "action" that lies at the foundation of existence. Hitler is in complete agreement with Mussolini on the following important point: Action is the starting point of political society. The people feel their solidarity and the necessity of social organisation only when they act in common. Therefore make them act or want to act before anything else. Common action is all; discussion and reasoning are a waste of time. Hitler could never get tired of repeating that his movement is "a political fighting force" and not "a debating society". Both Mussolini and Hitler built up a political "movement" before having a positive programme of government. [1]

(1) The psychological implication of the priority of action seems to be a sympton of strong repression and therefore of the dominance of mental structure by unconscious factors. Blind will breaking through and neglecting the structure of consciousness and of conscience is a fundamental trait in a Nazi pattern of life. This will be dealt with appropriately at a later stage.

The "mystique" of death forms the other basic trait of the Nazi Weltanschauung. Sometimes death is seen

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seen as a positive value, as a beautiful end to an
heroic act.   In one form or another the cult of death is
noticeable in all Fascist organisations.   In Roumania, for
instance, the "Iron Guard" had instituted the "team of
death", or "nikadors" as the "elite" of the movement.
The "nikadors" did not hesitate a moment to bring death
upon the enemies of their organisation, and did not - so
they said - fear death for themselves.

.But in Nazi society death often appears as an
obsession with the dread of life, as feeling of fear and
insecurity.   Hitler for instance, sees himself surrounded
by hostile forces; Nature itself hides hostile intentions.
(See Table Talk pp. 5 and 87).   This basic emotional theme
is instilled into the whole Party: all its members live
and act under the assumption that their country is about
to be assassinated by powerful enemies.

This feature of Nazism is crystallised, at least
partly, in Existentialism.   The concept of "Angst", the
nagation or the ignorance of any objective values - reducing
thus existence to an individual act of living - are in our
own opinion traits in German society which enter into the
structure of Nazism.   Martin Heidegger, conscious of this
fact made - between 1933 and 1936 - a strong attempt to
raise his philosphy to the rank of an official doctrine
in Nazism.   His failure is perhaps due to the individual-
istic character implied in Existentialism.   We still think,
however, Heidegger was right and the Nazi ideaologues wrong

wrong with regard to the intimate connection between Existentialism and Nazism.

D. Nazi ethics is an outstanding example of ambivalence. Both life and death as pure concepts are considered as supreme values. There is nothing between or above to give meaning to life or to death.

In the Nazi Weltanschauung life has its end in itself. We hasten to say however that there is little of an hedonistic or Dyonisian attitude involved in the Nazi conception of life. Concepts such as plentitude of life or full life with no further determination seem to cover what the exponents of Nazi ethics consider as the supreme value. The highest degree of life, plentitude, is attained in the exercise of power. That is why the ideal man is the political man in the sense that he embodies life at its highest potential. But this very point shows the ambivalence of the Nazi ethics. For power has, in the Nazi world, a specific meaning. It primarily means struggle and fight against dangers and death. Life as an exercise of power means "adventure" or "vivere pericolosamente". Among the early slogans of the Italian Fascists there is one most revealing on this matter:"Me ne frego", i.e.,I do not care, or more adequately, "I am not afraid".

Death is also a supreme value in the Nazi Weltanschauung. This is shown in the cult of self-sacrifice, individual and collective. But here too we have to notice that in the Nazi world there is no system of ideal values which gives meaning to the act of dying. To die for what? The answer

answer to this question lies in one of the most
characteristic aspects of Nazi ethics. Lacking a system
of values which would give meaning to life and death,
they supply the individual and the group with a series of
"Ersatz" values. The Party, the Leader, the "Fatherland"
are among these values. Therefore to live and die for
them means to realise positive values in life. But as
long as the Party, the Leader and the Fatherland are not
themselves integrated in a set of values Nazi ethics
remain obviously as "Ersatz" ethics. The Party and the
Leader were ethically free to do whatever they liked with
the individual's faith in them; the Party and the Leader
acted in an axiological vacuum. Their only conscious end
for action consisted in the enjoyment derived from the
exercise of power, in the doctrine of total war, or
"scorched earth war".

E. There is nothing in the Nazi Weltanschauung that
might give objective support to human action. Action
derived its goal and strength from itself, according to
the method of auto-suggestion (Coué). The world from
beyond is destroyed by the atheistic mood prevalent in
Nazi while the imminent spiritual world by their crude
vitalism. The main cause of this state of affairs should
be looked for in the incapacity of life to project itself
in a system of objective values which is, as we have
already mentioned, one of the important traits of the Nazi
Weltanschauung. In the same trait is to be found the
original of the irrationalistic trends of the Nazi

Nazi Weltanschauung. And since a system of values constitutes the natural medium of rationalisation, we can attribute to the same trait the Nazi incapacity for giving reasons. They would not and could not give "reasons" for their actions, since they had no true system of values in which to integrate them. The Nazi basic argument "we will because we will" translates an important characteristic of their own way of life. They could not formulate their action in the function of conventional values, or in terms or objective conditions of life, because they were utterly incapable of compromise. Anybody attempting to compromise was in their eyes a liar and a traitor. The rigidity and the urgent character of their action was such that it could never be formulated save in terms of its total success. Consequently the Nazi had no real use for diplomacy. They always preferred the language of war. Any treaty turned in their hands into a Diktat.

The main characteristic of human action in the Nazi pattern of life consists in the fact that it is not value-oriented. Its driving force is always deeply buried in the unconscious structure of mind, wherefrom it springs up with the force characteristic of compulsive behaviour. Hence its rigidity.

Myths and Myth-Making in the Nazi Weltanschauung. The Nazi world is populated with myths. The myth of the Master Race and of the providential leader are the most outstanding ones. With the exception of a short period at its very outset, when an attempt was made to revive the old

old Germanic paganism, all Nazi myths are fabrications
according to modern scientific prescriptions. The first
implication of this was that they had to be verified
empirically. The myth of the Master Race, for instance,
remained a myth as long as it mobilised the people in
order to assert here and now the superiority of the
Germanic Race.

Here we have to bring in again the idea of life's
incapacity to project itself into a system of objective
values. The post-war German society was so intensly
obsessed with its survival as a separate group that it
completely failed to formulate any of its experiences in
a system of universal modes of life. As such it had no
open door to humanitarianism. This shows a sharp contrast
between Nazi and Communist societies. For the working-
class (revolutionary acts on the assumption of the universal
humanitarian end of its own action, which in turn leads to
classless society, i.e., to its own sacrifice for the sake
of humanity. This is not the case in Nazi society. Its
ends are in itself as a closed group. It works for its
own superiority and for the subjugation and the annihilation
of the whole world.

The Nazi way of life has no ideal dimension, i.e. it
has no imminent rational order, like Communism, and no
transcendental order like democracy. The group is
absorbed in its own empirical condition of life. Its
power of idealisation does not go far beyond a series of
incoherent and loosely-shaped wishes and fantasies about /

about its vital strivings, its past and future. This morbid obsession with itself works its way out in myths and in action-anxiety, both being escapes from insecurity and fear of death. VITA ACTIVA SUB SPECIE MORTIS.

INTRODUCTORY   NOTE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS   OF   NAZISM.

Throughout the first part of the present study
we have found the comparative method useful and
necessary in order to determine the character of
Democracy as distinct-from sometimes opposed to -
that of Fascism or Communism.   Consequently, many
psychological aspects of Nazism have been dealt with
in earlier chapters regarding the psychology of
Democracy.   For this reason, we confine the present
section regarding the psychology of Nazism to two
problems only: The first refers to Nazism as a
particular case of regressive group behaviour. The
second concerns the structure of the Nazi personality
as a variation in the contemporary type of authoritarian
personality.

C H A P T E R   III

NAZISM   AS   REGRESSIVE   BEHAVIOUR.

> Me ne frego!
>
> Early Mussolinian slogan.

The concept of regression has often been applied to
the behaviour of the Nazi group and to the behaviour
of many Nazi leaders. For Gilbert, for instance,
regression forms the key concept in the understanding of
Nazism. Consequently, one of the conclusions of his
study is that Nazism is a pathological phenomenon, i.e.,
a typical case of group maladjustment. We intend to
reserve for a later stage any discussion concerning the
psycholo-pathological implications of the idea of
regression. For the moment we should like to use the con-
cept of regression mainly as a working hypothesis, and to
regard various aspects of the Nazi way of life by analogy
with what happens in regressive behaviour of the individual.
To start with, we should like to give a brief description
of a series of aspects of Nazism which can be interpreted
as reversions to an early stage in the development of
human society in general and of German society in

in particular.

The German Cultural Lag and Nazism.   The Western

democratic institution could not instantaneously

absorb and incorporate in its system all the beliefs

and attitudes characteristic of a previous absolutistic

regime.   "A long tradition of submission to despotism" -

writes Gilbert -" which had prevailed for centuries in

Germany, Russia, Spain and Italy had left too strong

a trace of authoritarian thinking and ego involvement

among the people and their potential leaders to be

readily abandoned in favour of the democratic-socialistic

millenium."   (Op.cit. p.12).   Therefore the cultural lag

is, in this particular context, formed by all those

elements belonging to the absolutist regime repressed

by the democratic process of modern society.   In this

case it can be called the authoritarian lag of modern

society. [1]

[1]   W.F. Ogburn, to whom the concept of cultural lag
is due, uses for its definition formulae such as the
"imbalance" an invention in one part of the world
causes with other parts of culture related to it, or
"the lag in time between the initial change and the
change in the correlated part, or parts of culture".
W.F. Ogburn: "Social Effects of Technology in
Industrialised Societies" in International Social
Science Bulletin Unesco, Vo. IV, No.2, p.277.

The authoritarian cultural lag works within the

culture pattern of a group in the manner of an uncon-

scious dynamic structure.   In a democratic culture the

people often revert to a despotic rule when the

democratic formula cannot provide them with an adequate /

adequate satisfaction. The reversion to this old pattern of authority is positively meant to bring a greater degree of security and stability than that available in democracy. The process of erversion explains to a great extent the frequent apparition of dictatorships in the modern democractic era. Gilbert, for instance, refers to the Napoleonic regime as "a reversion to an authoritarian rule after a too drastic attempt to impose democracy on an authoritarian culture." Napoleon is considered by him as a proto-type of modern dictators.

Nazism is obviously a regressive adjustment of the German society of the inter-war period. Yet, we think, that one could hardly say that the Napoleonic and the Hitlerian regimes belong to the same category of social and psychological phenomena, as Gilbert would like to suggest. Though not altogether denying the presence of some regressive elements in it, one can easily see that the substance of Napoleonic dictatorship consists in the consolidation of a society deeply disrupted by new and advanced ideal. Some elements of a democractic revolution remained throughout this regime, in spite of Napoleon's personal dictatorship. There is nothing of the kind in Nazism. Hitler did not consolidate any democratic or socialist revolution. If one could speak about a certain consolidating action of Nazism, this would be in a quite different sense. For Hitler made little, if any, use

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use of the "advanced" social, political and cultural
elements of contemporary society. In this he is
different from Napoleon and from many contemporary
dictators of the right such as Kemal Ata Turk and even
Mussolini. As compared with Hitler, Napoleon was an
"enlightened" tyrant. This places him in a different
social and psychological category.

Hitler consolidates German society, threatened as
it was with disintegration, and none of the consolidating
factors used by him belonged to the contemporary stage
of European society. On the contrary these factors
belong to a predemocratic era, and mainly to a primitive
type of society.   The reversion of contemporary
German society under Hitler goes back to the patriarchal
level of social evolution. If every dictatorship in a
democratic era is taken as a symptom of regressive
adjustment, then we have to stress the idea that the level
of regression reached by Nazism is deeper than that
reached by any other dictatorial movement taking place in
our democratic era.

Nazism borrows from contemporary civilisation only
the techniques of the concentration of power and of the
organisation of a rigid social solidarity.   It is in
this respect no more indebted to this civilisation than
modern Japanese society. In both cases the technological
factor of Western civilisation was used to build up a
patriarchal authoritarian society.

As for the ideological factors specific to Nazism it

it is obvious that they were borrowed from certain

irrational trends of Western civilisation. Yet we have

to point out again that the ideological factors have a

peripheral position in Nazism; they are completely sub-

servient to a series of volitional and emotive factors.

For thought Nazis talked the language of several

ideologies, as we have shown in an earlier chapter, these

were simply words used for expedient purposes of

propaganda. In decisive moments the Nazis thought "with

their blood" or, according to the maxim of the Roumanian

Legionaries, "with the axe". Their urge for action

prevents them from both, an ideological and an empirical

~~orientation~~ compromise with the real condition of life.

They were simply instinctive.

The reversion to medieval absolutist symbol of

authority is only one aspect of Nazi society and not **even**

the most significant one.   Undoubtedly the **symbol of**

the "**Kaiser**" as an absolutist ruler, and the Prussian

pattern of society, both revived by Nazism, are symptoms

of regression. But the main symbols of power and social

integration are the charismatic leader and the feeling

of the "organic unity" of the Germanic group. In this

way the reversion reached by Nazism goes back to a

patriarchal type of human organisation. This fact calls

for an enlargement of the concept of cultural lag.

The concept of cultural lag is based on the social

function of repression, i.e., a culture-pattern or a way

way of life is repressed by another in the evolution of a group. The democratic culture-pattern for instance had "repressed" medieval absolutism. From the purely sociological point of view we can speak about the conflict between two culture-patterns, or about the oppression or suppression of one pattern by another. Psychologically we speak about repression, meaning in the first place that the conflict has been internalised by the individual, who builds up in his own mental structure a repressing mechanism directed against the old culture-pattern in such a way that he is integrated into the new one. Now, since the repressed culture-pattern forms a dynamic structure in the unconscious it may come out during periods of crisis in the evolution of the group. Reversion is one of the possible results of this kind of situation. Consequently regression occurs when a group reverts to an old and repressed pattern of organisation because of its incapacity to integrate with the pattern offered by its contemporaneous historical level.

Nazism is an outstanding example of the way a repressed patriarchal pattern substitutes all other later developed social patterns. Firstly the German group under Nazism, in its pressing need for integration, had skipped over both the secular and pragmatic rationalism which forms the essence of modern democratic society, and the transcental (moral) rationalism of medieval society. The

The "Terra ferma" of the German group's regression into the past is formed by a social pattern based on emotional solidarity. At this level the group reaches such a degree of integration that it closes itself within a world of its own with no capacity for moral standards towards other groups. This is the pattern of interhuman relationships and group formations characteristic of primary groups, such as the small size family belonging to modern European society or the big-size family of a primitive tribe. We have only to add that this pattern has been repressed by or integrated into the rational pattern of modern society.

This deep layer of inter-individual relationship and group formation cannot be enlightened by any ideology in the usual sense of this word. It is accessible only to symbolic and mythical forms of representation. Thus, what is commonly called Nazi ideology is but a heap of myths symbolising a pattern of social integration deeply repressed in modern man. The symbols of the individual's identity with the group are expressed by racial myths, by the use of uniforms or by the method of "Gleichschaltung". The symbol of the paternalistic position of authority is expressed by the myth of the providential leader and so forth. All these beads of symbolic thought were put together on the string of emotional logic.

Mythical Thinking as a Regressive Sympton. Mythical thinking consists in a "system" of symbols whose meaning overflows the empirical and logical condition of human   /

human knowledge. Take for example the function of the concept of "Jew" in the Nazi world. Its empirical condition consists in the religious difference between a Jew and a Christian. On this basis it can be used as discriminative concept. The Nazis, however, built up on this empirical and logical basis a long series of meanings: Jews are for them the worst enemies of the German people, an assertion which obviously has little if any empirical foundation. Then follows: Jews are the worst enemies of human civilisation, and finally, Jews are the symbol of evil in the world. "Jew" has in this last context a symbolical function. It arouses contempt, hatred, aggression, etc. in any situation no matter the empirical or logical conditions in which it is used. In the Nazi culture-pattern the function of such concepts is neither empirically or logically circumscribed. These concepts operate under the category of the "whole" in the sense that they take their significance from the Nazi world as a whole. The Nazi world is really at stake when the word "Jew" is uttered. To the extent to which the concept of "Jew" participates to the meaning of the Nazi world as a whole it may be considered as a negative form of the concept of "Totem".i.e., it defines undiscriminatingly the non-entity of the Germanic group. The totemic symbols positive and negative constitute the totalitarian basis of Nazi society.[1]

[1] For the function of the category of the "whole" in primitive society see R. Thurnwald "Ethnologie und

und Psychoanalyse", in Hanz Prinzhorn: Auswirkungen der Psychoanalyse in Wissenschaft und Leben, Der Neue Geist Ver., Leipzig 1928.

Mythical thinking overpowers the individual's mind. Symbolic concepts such as those of "Jew", "Germanic", "Race". "Führer", etc. can never be submitted enitrely to the individual's power of discrimination. Their main function is to create collective states of mind and thus to make the individual respond to them as an undistinguishable member of the crowd or group. In such circumstances the individual has no other criterion for his reaction save the way the group or the crowd feel and act. His own mind is in suspension.

One of the main problems of Nazi organisation was to facilitate the permanent contact between the individual and his group. Consequently a series of means of communication - or rather of communion - were created to this end. The verbal symbols mentioned above constitute only one category of this means. These are words loaded with emotionality so as to arouse in the individual a primitive feeling of belongingness. There are also other categories of means of communication between the individual and the group such as uniforms, (Brown Shirts(, insignia, gestures ceremonies, cults. Perhaps the most important of all is the salute "Heil Hitler" whose function was to bring any social encounter between individuals quickly under the auspices of the group. Art was also considered as means of parti-

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participation in the group, i.e. art that takes the
mind off the individual back to a heroic patriarchal
type of society. Wagner is, and to a certain extent,
Stefan Georg, has served this purpose. A certain quality
of the voice could also be used in order to induce in
the individual's mind the feeling of the presence of the
group: a generally high pitched voice bursting out at
certain intervals in explosions of rage or pathetic
invocations as if a secret power from the outer world
worked behind the speaker. Sometimes completely meaning-
less expressions were used to create in the individual
the same "totalitarian" states. "EIA' EIA', ALA"
(D'Annunzio) was one of those expressions at the sound
of which the Italian Fascists used to get enraged.

In conclusion the language tended under the impact
of the mythical thought to be governed by a series of
symbols whose function was to arouse in the individual's
mind the overwhelming powers of the totalitarian reality.
In this way language was no longer a mere instrument for
the individual to relate and adjust himself to his
environment and to other individuals qua individuals, but
rather an instrument to keep his mind under the pressure
of the group. We can say that the mythical thought has
the function of revealing to the individual the presence
of the group, and as such it can be considered as a means
of inter-communion rather then inter-communication.

The Regressive Elements in Socialist Economy. Hitler

Hitler calls his regime "National Socialism". ~~The~~ State
interventionism is undoubtedly the main socialistic
feature of this regime.

We should like to suggest in this brief note that
socialist economy contains in itself some important
regressive elements. Marx and Engels rightly saw in the
idea of a socialist-collectivist economy a recurrence
of a primitive economic system named by them primitive
communism. The conclusion they drew from this was that a
socilist system is more compatible with the true nature
of man than any individualistic system, and further,
that capitalist economy has caused man's estrangement
from himself.

The facts show that socialistic and collectivistic
features in the economic field appear regularly when a
society finds itself under conditions of stress. Times
of war best illustrate this. When its security is
threatened the group reverts to a lower and less flexible
level of integration which recalls in many respects the
pre-individuation period of human society. Socialism
is one of the modern expressions of this process of
reversion. It should only be added that the main
socialistic features existing in the various economic
systems of today are in fact remants of war economy.
(Max Weber -"Der Sozialismus. Phöbus, Vuenna,1918, and
Peter F.Drucker - "The New Society", London, Heineman,
1951, offer economic data in ~~the~~ support of this thesis.)

The Causes of Regression. The springboard of regression consists in the insecurity created by frustrating conditions of life. The main function of this mechanism is therefore to supply the individual or the group with a basis of security. This is the meaning of the group's or individual's withdrawal and the reversion to an old pattern of behaviour. In other words, the present situation, superseding by its complexity the limit of the group's adaptability, requires the reversion to an earlier simpler form of adjustment.

As an example of the way in which the concept of regression has been applied to Nazism we should like to sketch the main ideas of Fromm's study "The Fear of Freedom". (London, Kegan Paul,1942) Fromm takes the evolution of the experience of freedom within the modern world as the starting point of his study. The perspective of individual freedom opened up by the Renaissance and the Reformation has, according to him, reached in our era a critical point. Modern freedom defined itself as a reaction from medieval society, i.e., it grew in step with the dissolution of the primary bonds characteristic of the small-size organisation of medieval community, and in step with the weakening of the integrating forces of religion as they were represented by the Catholic Church. But - as Fromm notices - if some results of this process have led to modern Democracy, some others have led to social disintegration. Modern society has not supplied the individual with any

any integrating values in life strong enough to compen-
sate for the loss of the bonds of the medieval community.
In this way contemporary society has gradually made the
need for freedom aimless. For in this society the
individual is free to develop his own potentiality, to
realise himself, feeling at the same time that there is no
scope for this freedom, i.e., there is nothing outside
himself to give sense to his life, and thus to separate
freedom from vacuum and nothingness. Here Fromm points
out that as long as freedom meant freedom from (medieval
anti-individualistic society) the experience of freedom
in modern mad had a full meaning. The moment of crisis
is marked by the projection of the experience of freedom
into the future, as freedom for. To this type of freedom
modern society has failed to give a satisfactory answer.
The main sympton of this crisis is shown in the insecurity,
aloneness and fear of personal responsibility unavoidably
implied in the experience of freedom in contemporary society
in which the socially and spiritually integrative values
are on the verge of disappearance.

The direction in which the crisis of freedom is solved,
suggests the Dostoevskian formula outlined in "The Grand
Inquisitor" (Brothers Karamazov), i.e., escape from
freedom into security by an indiscriminate acceptance of
external authority.[1]

(1) Dostoevski is fully aware of the implication of this
formula. He pleads for the stability of the revealed
truth as it is represented by the Church authority, as

as against an individualised contact with God. At the same time he is for the priority of security guaranteed by secular authority, over individual freedom. In conclusion Dostoevski aks for a firm foundation for contemporary society achieved by a rigid system of beliefs and responsible authority rather than by its being subjected to dispute and reinterpretations.

Nazism is, according to Fromm, one of the historical forms of this escape from freedom. The individual escapes the burdens of freedom and responsibility by his unconditional surrender to a despot and by his uncritical acceptance of a body of secular beliefs and myths arranged for him by an authoritarian regime. In some European communities the age-long repressed desire for security and dependence has burst out and consequently the individual is ready to accept or create a model of society which would satisfy it. In this case regression consists in the fact that the urgent need for integration and belongingness provokes a reversion of some groups to a pre-rationalistic and pre-individualistic type of civilisation.

There is no doubt that Nazism is partly determined, by the fear of freedom and responsibility in contemporary man and by its positive aspect as escape into authoritarianism. Fromm's only mistake consists in laying too great a stress on the importance of this process in the psychogenesis of Nazism. Consequently he completely fails to see an opposite process which has been taking place in modern society parallel to that described by him as "fear of freedom". This is the type of integration produced by modern society which is - as E. Durkheim suggests - a

a counterbalancing process to the disintegration and
specialisation inherent in large scale organisations.
We can talk therefore about the fear of integration, the
lack of individual freedom and initiative existing in
contemporary man side by side with fear of freedom and
responsibility. Philosophies such as Personalism and
Existentialism, as well as various trends of political
anarchism, constitute various manifestations of this basic
condition of contemporary man. Paradoxically enough, this
process has also contributed to the rise of Nazism. This
has happened in two main ways: On the psychological level
it has gradually led to the annihilation of the individual
by the weakening of his critical mind. On the social
plane it has gradually created a type of civilisation whose
main characteristics consist in a high degree of inter-
individual dependence - a factory type of society. This
made it the more easy for the Nazi leaders to create a
highly integrated society.

In conclusion Fromm's view is useful in illustrating
one aspect if the dialectics of freedom in modern society.
As long as freedom is predominantly negative, meaning freedom
"from", it represents a positive value. The moment it
becomes prospective, as freedom "for", it leads to self-
denial. If the answer required by freedom "for" is not
given, it arouses in the individual insecurity, fears,
aloneness, and consequently desires for belongingness, and a
desperate need for "Mitsein", as the existentialists put it.
An authoritarian civilisation would be an answer to this

this fear of freedom. This answer denies, however, the legitimacy of the question. But on the other hand, if a positive answer is given, by laying down the sense of freedom in a rational order, in a clear-cut philosophy of history the final result would be the same, i.e., freedom negates itself. Nazism represents the first attitude towards freedom in contemporary society, Communism the second. We take again the opportunity of emphasising an important idea of this study: Nazism results from the irrational, Communism from the over-rational factors of contemporary civilisation.

The Effects of Regression. The effects of the process of regression undergone by German society during the inter-war period, can be studied under two main headings. A. The authoritarian character, and B. the process of "Gleichschaltung".

A. Fromm considers the concept of authoritarian character as the key concept in the psychology of Nazism. Generally speaking, the authoritarian character is the outcome of the structuration of a series of mental factors produced mainly by the process of regression. Anxiety, insecurity, and repressed desire for belongingness, are a few of them. The main point is that the structuration of these factors forms the basis for an individual as well as for a social authoritarian character. The latter is defined for the first time by Fromm as a structural characteristic of a group.

The main trait of an authoritarian character consists /

consists in an ambivalent attitude towards authority.
This means that the authoritarian personality and group fall
alternately or concomitantly into the extremes of dominance
and submissiveness. On the political plane an ambivalent
attitude towards authority leads to an authoritarian organ-
isation. For in this type of organisation, based on a rigid
hierarchy of power, the individual can satisfy both his need
for belongingness-submissiveness by his complete integration
with the group and by obedience towards the higher-ups; and
at the same time his need for dominance towards those below
him by his status in the system.

   With regard to the social basis of the authoritarian
character Fromm concentrates his attention on the lower-middle-
classes, which, according to him, form the background of
Nazism. In accordance with the ideas outlined in a previous
chapter we should like to reformulate this problem as follows:
The post-war (1918) German group as a whole forms the basic
social unit affected by a series of authoritarian traits
produced by the process of regression. Yet at this level the
authoritarian traits form a loose structure; they are, so to
speak, in a floating state. The German lower-middle-classes,
represent a new level in the structuration of a series of
authoritarian traits. The structuration of these traits takes at
this level a more permanent character than in the German group
in general. The reasons for this are various. The first -
and this is mentioned by Fromm - consists in the fact that the
German lower-middle-classes are more intensely affected by the

the process of regression. The economic crisis,
inflation in particular, had a deeper impact on them.
The second reason, also mentioned by Fromm, is that the
social and economic position of the lower-middle-classes
lent itself to an authoritarian character.   These classes
have an intermediary position between the working-classes,
towards which they show dominance and superiority, and the
upper-classes which they regard as the very embodiment of
their social aspirations.   The third reason why the lower-
middle-classes display more than any other class
authoritarian traits specific to Nazism refers to the
class structure of the German society as a whole.   The
German working class, like any other European working class,
had long before the outcome of Nazism built up another type
of authoritarian character which forms the basis of
Communism.   In one respect at least these classes
suffered less than the lower-middle-classes from the
feeling of insecurity produced by post-war circumstances.
For unlike any other class they had a philosophy of
history on which they hung their desire for security.

   The third level in the structuration of the
authoritarian factors is formed by the "déclassés" group
of post-war Germany. We find in these people additional
reasons for insecurity and need for belongingness.
Finally, the highest concentration of authoritarian traits
is realised in a series of abnormal personalities such as
Hitler, Hess, Goebbels who had displayed throught their

their lives pathological forms of authoritarian behaviour.
Thus the authoritarian character emerges in four stages
of intensity and purity. It is seen firstly in a diluted
form in the German group as a whole, then reaches
higher and higher degrees of intensity in the lower-middle -
classes, in the socio-pathic group (declasses), and
finally in the psycho-pathic group. Nazism rises as the
integration of these superimposed levels of authoritarian
behaviour within German society.

B. The Process of "Gleichschaltung". Technically,
"Gleichschaltung" is used in order to indicate the process
of co-ordination and conformation of German organisation
of all types with the pattern of the Party. Ultimately,
this process led to the identification of the individual
with the interests of the group as they were represented
by the leaders of the Party. To start with, one can
describe the process of "Gleichschaltung" as the reversal
of the fundamental values of Democracy. For it brings with
itself the weakening and sometimes the annihilation of all
the values founded in the concepts of individuality,
critical mind, objectivity and sense of leisure. As we
have already discussed the position of these concepts with
regard to totalitarianism we should like now to pass on to
a series of specific aspects of the process of
"Gleichschaltung."

On the intra-individual plane, "Gleichschaltung"
produces a rigid integration of the individual's mental

mental life round one specific factor. In other words
the whole dynamics of personality comes under the rigid
control of a single or of a few ideas or feelings,
loosely symbolised by "Race", "Führer" "Fatherland",etc.
This works in the manner of an obsessional mechanism.
One cannot hold ideas if not connected and checked by
this central factor; one cannot love or hate but in the
manner approved by it; one cannot perceive save within
the schemes allowed by it.

On the inter-individual plane the process of
"Gleichschaltung" works for the identification of every
individual with his own society and thus for the creation
of the totalitarian reality. The sense of values in the
Nazi world is given by the degree of group identification.
Thus the individual realises himself by self-annihilation.

The regressive elements involved in the process of
"Gleichschaltung" are better seen when we consider the
irrational roots of this process. "Gleichschaltung"
represents a primitive mode of social integration, and it is,
in this sense the outcome of an inferior type of Superego.
Flügel describes the function of an interior type of
Superego as consisting in the individual's identification
with his environment. In this case the Ego cannot counter-
balance the anarchic and anti-social character of the
primitive drives of the Id, except by creating forms of
identification between an individual and the other members
of his group. In more intelligible words, the Ego produces

produces the illusion that the individual is one and
the same reality with the group. Consequently the
destructive character of his primary drives ultimately
turns against himself. A rudimentary Superego is forged
in this way and is projected in a series of myths about
the common origins of the members of the group (descendance
from the same Gods), a series of cults regarding the
ancestors, and a common tradition. These are more or less
the integrating forces operating in patriarchal societies.
(Flügel: Man, Morals and Society, London, Duckworth,1945).

The appearance of such a structure in the Nazi group,
and in German society as a whole, is undoubtedly, the
result of regression. This primitive Superego is projected
in the Nazi myths which, following the culture-pattern
of the twentieth century sometimes take the form of
scientific theories. These myths are produced by a series
of integrating drives operating within the German group.
In their turn they strengthen the in-group ties to the
degree of the individual's annihilation. All that is good,
pure and healthy comes from inside the group. Thus the
individual's capacity for love is entirely absorbed within
the group. On the other hand, the same myths help the
projection of the individual's aggression towards the out-
groups. All that is bad and morbid comes from outside the
group.

Thus we can say that the process of "Gleichschaltung"
means the identification of the individual with his group,
which group in its turn fails to integrate itself at an

an inter-group level. While the values of self-centredness are completely denied to the individual they are bestowed upon the group; while freedom and spontaneity have no meaning for the individual, the group is based on anarchy. For we can say that the ultimate meaning of Nazism comes from its being an experiment in absolute freedom - anarchy- for the group. In other words it means the structuration of the group below the international level of integration which forms one of the distinctive notes of modern Western civilisation. The norms of group behaviour are determined by the group's obsession with itself rather than by its relationships with other groups. For the authoritarian group is incapable of compromise and flexibility, thus incapable of being aware of the other as equal. "Never tolerate the establishment of two continental powers in Europe", writes Hitler stressing in this way the need for uniqueness in the German group. (Mein Kampf. p.756. Quoted by Raymond E. Murphy in "National Socialism". U.S.A. Government Press Office, Washington, 1943, p.55. Italics are ours.) The group lives in a monadic primitive world fashioned upon the formula: One group, one world.

The Limitations of the Concept of Regression. The outburst of a series of irrational factors - mainly repressed desire for security and belongingness - has undoubtedly created in contemporary man certain dispositions which precipitated the rise of Nazism. As we

we shall see at a later stage the psychology of the
Unconscious applies well to Nazism. And yet it seems
difficult, if possible at all, to determine the degree in
which the irrational factors had contributed to the
structuration of the Nazi society. It is enough to mention
some "rational" conditions of Nazism in order to understand
in what this difficulty consists.

A. A strong aggressive policy is not necessarily the
product of irrational factors set free by regression or
otherwise. It might as well as based on the reality
principle and as such resulting from an objective assess-
ment of the international situation, or at least of the
policy of other groups with regard to our own. The policy
of power which animates the U.S.A. in the present circum-
stances is very little, if at all, determined by irrational
factors. On the contrary, it looks like a realistic
adjustment to the world situation as created by the post-
war position of the Communist block.

B. A series of social techniques enabling the con-
centration of power in the hands of the few should also be
taken into account.

C. The reaction against Communism, and the structuration
of various political forces in Germany, as a means of
resistance, cannot be considered as an irrational factor,
but rather a rational orientation in the political reality
of post-war Germany. Many people joined the Nazi movement
out of a rational calculation, i.e. they had chosen the

the lesser evel of the two.

D. The role played by international capital in the
post-war German economy, and the policy of appeasement of
the Great Powers, can also be considered as rational
factors contributing to the rise of Nazism.

E. One could on no account overlook a series of
"historical accidents" all leading towards Nazism. One of
these was the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on
January 30, 1933.[1]

[1]
There is a current opinion that Hitler's appointment
was in the last instance a matter of political intrigue;
"he was jobbed into office by a backstairs intrigue......"
by a shoddy deal with the "Old Gang", writes Alan Bullock.
(Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. Oldhams Press, London,
1952. Quoted by Sir Lewis Namier in "The Megalomania of
Adolf Hitler. Listener February,12, 1953, p.251.)

Hindenburg made a grave decision and took on himself a
responsibility which most probably another head of the State
would have avoided. His friend in arms, Ludendorff, wrote
to him on that occasion "By the appointment of Hitler to
the Reich Chancellorship you have put our holy Fatherland
at the mercy of one of the greatest demagogues of all times.
I prophesy that this unholy man will plunge the Reich into
chaos, will bring unimaginable misery to the nation, and
coming generations will curse you in your grave for what
you have done." (Gilbert op.cit. p.72).   It is difficult
to assess how much Nazism owes to Hindenburg, to his
judgment and character, but it certainly owes something.

CHAPTER IV

PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN NAZISM.

Say what you will about Hitler, but don't accuse
him of being moral.
                                    Goering.

General Considerations.   Nazi society was a rich
ground for psycho-pathological research.   No wonder
therefore that psycho-analysis has ~~given way to its~~
~~imperialistic tendency and~~ reduced this political
phenomenon to a few psycho-pathological concepts such
as paranoia, compulsion, obsession, homosexuality and
others.

In this chapter, we make an attempt to indicate
some of the main aspects of Nazism which can be described
as various forms of mental disorder.   We shall confine
ourselves to those psycho-pathological aspects of
Nazism which offer a safe ground for discussion, such as
the process of regression and various forms of acting
out a basic insecurity, individual and collective.   In
the course of our discussion we shall distinguish two
aspects of the sources of psycho-pathological phenomena
in Nazism: a psychogenetic and a sociogenetic aspect.
Throughout this chapter we shall draw heavily on the

the material supplied by Gilbert in his study of the

principal Nazi war-criminals at the Nürenberg trial.

<u>Psychogenesis</u>. We propose to describe briefly

the pathological factor found in four of the top Nazi

leaders: Hitler, Goering, Hess and Frank.

<u>Adolf Hitler</u>. Since most of the data and the

suppositions regarding Hitler's personality have been

in circulation for the last two decades, we shall confine

ourselves to a very few points which are, in our opinion,

indispensable to the understanding of the psychology of

Nazism. All the psycho-analytical portraits of Hitler

agree on the important point that he showed strong

paranoid symptons. Excessive aggression and obsessional

reactions are among the most important of these. Various

data regarding Hitler's private life lead to the

hypothesis that these manifestations were accentuated

by a series of unsolved Oedipal conflicts, though their

origin was probably much deeper. The Oedipal motivation

of H's paranoid hostility consists,according to a

psycho-analytical point of view, in his repressed hatred

towards his father - which sometimes is interpreted

as a defence against his homosexual attraction towards

him. His father's violent character, his alcoholic

addiction, and the fact that H. was aware of the rumour

that his father was a bastard with Jewish blood in him

are the main data brought in support of this supposition.

Later on in life H. often remembered the humiliation he

he had to go through as a child because of his father's character. In the same unsolved Oedipal conflict lies the source of a series of other traits of H's. personality such as:(a) His mother fixation; (b) his latent homosexuality, or as Gilbert very cautiously puts it ".... his emotional attachment to men stronger than to women"(op.cit. p.64) and finally (c) a series of revulsions from alcohol, meat, etc....

For the understanding of the psychogenesis of his obsessional character one has to mention the projection and displacement of his aggression. The excessive aggression resulting from strongly repressed infantile conflicts is projected by the Ego upon the external world. Firstly the Universe as such is for H. imbued with disruptive and hostile forces. Nature and destiny were for him layers of a capricious and hostile power. No human power over nature can be justified. "But a simple storm is enough and everything collapses like a pack of cards" (Table Talk p.5). In this respect H's. Ego is either in defence or in attack against the world; never peaceful co-operation.

In the social world the projection of his repressed aggression is gradually canalised itself in the direction of a series of social and cultural factors characteristic of post-war Germany. Thus his aggression was first of all projected upon the enemies of his country, i.e.,the main signatories of the Versailles Peace Treaty. This process was parallelled by his identification with his/

his own victimised people. But the most effective outlet

for his obsessive aggression consisted in his antisemitism.

One can distinguish three stages in the development

of H's, antisemitism. The first, though perhaps not the

most important, is closely connected with the Oedipal

conflicts mentioned above. The origin of his hatred

towards the Jews and persecution of them lies in the dis-

placement of his hatred towards his father. An important

detail of H's, life supports this psycho-analytical

hypothesis. Apparently his father was the illegitimate

son of a Jew in whose house his grandmother worked as a

servant. Gilbert gives this information, as not yet

verified. But he rightly points out that the important

thing is in this case, not the truth itself, but the

obvious fact that H' was aware of this allegation. He

was blackmailed on this matter by his half-brother, Alois

Hitler, and according to Frank he even tried to destroy

the records regarding the alimony payments to his grand-

mother by a Jew. The conclusion would be that his anti-

semitism is at least partly prompted by his unconscious

wish to clean himself from his violent, drunken and morally

impure father. On the other hand, the displacement of

his aggression or death wishes on Jews might have served

to modify his negative attitude towards his "bad father",

and thus to preserve the good father figure.

The second stage in the development of H's, anti-

semitic attitude consists in another traumatic experience

occurring later in his life. While in Vienna as a young

young painter he became infatuated with a seventeen-year
old girl. According to Greiner (Gilbert op.cit. p.32)
this was a deep and desperate love which was met with
constant rejection by the girl. The end seems tragi-
comic, but was not so to Hitler. The girl married a
promising young business man, who happened to be of half-
Jewish parentage. Gilbert relates various incidents
connected with this unfortunate love affair - a threatening
letter sent by Hitler to the young business man, scenes in
the street, etc. - all showing H's outbursts of rage
against the dirty Jews who dared to violate Christian girls.

The third stage in the development of H's anti-
semitism - by far the most important of all - is determined
by cultural factors. In Vienna during his youth, and
later on in Germany, Hitler had met with strong antisemitic
feelings, sometimes antisemitic ideologies and movements
(The Christian Socialist Party of Karl Lueger, and a
series of youth organisations such as the Pan-German
Burchenschaften, in Vienna, and the German Nationalist
Party of Anton Schönerer) which gradually crystalised
his need for objects of aggression. In post-war Austria
and Germany the Jews were gradually transformed into
scapegoats for the economic frustration of the masses
for fustrated national pride in the young generations,
and at the same time for the frustrated need for higher
profits and the dominance of various German industrial
groups. The same Jews became for Hitler the principal scape-
goats of his repressed aggression.

In his psycho-analytical portrait of Hitler Fromm groups
his findings round the concept of authoritarian character,
which has in fact paranoia as one of its aspects.   The
ambivalent attitude towards authority is displayed by Hitler
in a multitude of forms. At an ideological level his
submissiveness is reflected by his conception of man as
determined by forces outside himself (destiny) while his
need for dominance is reflected mainly in his political
ideas. The same ambivalence is manifested at a deeper
level, in states of excessive shyness, needs for isolation,
self-accusation, and fears of persecution alternating with
hysterical outbreaks of aggression, and finally in
feelings of powerlessness alternating with an excessive
lust for power.   Fromm lays a particular stress on the
pathological root of H's itler authoritarian character, by
dealing at some length with his masochistic and sadistic
inclinations.

There is no doubt that H's itler personality lends itself
freely to the psycho-analytical vocabulary.   As we have
already seen the Oedipul Complex constitutes the central
concept from which radiate traits such as homosexuality,
sexual impotence, masochism, sadism and others. Since the
task of discussing the legitimacy of these concepts as
applied to H. seems to be difficult, particularly in a
postmortem analysis, we have to resort to a less ambitious
scheme for the understanding of H's itler abnormal character.
To start with we should like to take insecurity as the key

key concept of our analysis and to show the various

modes under which it was displayed by H's personality.

For the feeling of insecurity is so deeply rooted in Hitler

that we can designate him as the proto-type of the

personality built up on this feeling and consequently as a

model of Nazi authoritarian personality. His family life

as a child constitutes the first source of insecurity in

his personality. His irresponsible father creates by his

unmannered and violent behaviour a permanent threat to

H's expectation for tender affection. The same situation

is responsible for the fact that H's mother turns all her

affection towards him thus arousing in him a negative

attitude towards belongingness and sentimentality. The

envy and jealousy of his step-brothers, because he

monopolised the mother's affection, form an additional

source of insecurity presiding over his early years of

development. Later conditions of his life, such as his

failure as an artist, the "tragedy" of his first love,

economic privations, etc. come to foster this first layer

of insecurity. One the socio-cultural plane the collapse

of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the country of his birth,

the defeat and the humiliation of Germany, the country of

his ideals, his lack of social status due to his lower-

middle-class origin, all these constitute further con-

ditions for insecurity.

Now let us outline the main manifestations of the

frustrated need for security in H's personality.

A. Perhaps the most characteristic of all these

these manifestations consists in his explosive deeds
for self-assertion indicating his urge to prove to
everybody - to himself in the first place - the secure
basis of his personality. We can call this the desire to
demonstrate his own existence. His aggressiveness is
undoubtedly rooted in this aspect of his personality.
His tendency towards adventure - vivere pericolosamente -
can also be traced to the same basic condition. His
"iron will-power" his lust for power are but various
dimensions of his need for self-demonstration, On the
phantasy level his projection of himself as the pro-
vidential leader of the Master Race is rooted in the same
basic insecurity. All these forms of insecurity are anti-
social in their character.

B. The frustrated need for security is manifested in
Hitler also by the denial of any desire for belongingness and
security. "I do not need security", or "I do not care",
are the usual formulae for this mode of acting out a basic
insecurity. (This is exactly the opposite to the democratic
unassuming character.) Characteristic in this respect
is H's insensibility, and even hostility, towards the most
important tender bonds in life. Love and family are in
his eyes outweighed by the practical necessity of having
children; religious feelings are signs of weakness;
moral affection are prejudices. The Nietzschean concepts
of the Super-man can be considered the results of this
particular mode of playing out a basic insecurity. All
these aspects of H's feeling of insecurity are anti-

anti-social and destructive.

C.   A further series of manifestations of the same
basic insecurity noticed in the so-called "esprit
certitudien" of which Hitler is a typical representative
is closely connected with what has been said under 'B'.
The main sympton of this trait of Hitler's personality
is seen in his readiness to give a "definite" opinion
on practically all circumstances of life.   Doubt in
thinking, suspension, lack of opinion, as well as
"scrupples" in action are for him amongst the worst
things modern Democracy has produced.   "Hitler's real
superiority"- writes one of the ablest interpreters of
his life - "rests on the fact that he has an opinion
in any situation, and that this opinion fits without
difficulty into his Weltanschauung".   (Dr. Hannah Arendt:
By Hitler zu Tisch. Der Monat, Heft 37, Oktober,1951
p.89.) Not only has he an opinion but he expresses it
with the strongest conviction possible as if the whole
world testified to its truth. He shouts it out until
he produces a fanatical belief both in his own mind and
in that of his listeners. His mind which has horror of
doubt, uncertainty and chaos becomes only at this point
really satisfied.

It is precisely this horror of doubt and uncertainty
that drives his mind to work out quick answer to every
problem and thus fill the flaws of his universe.   In
this lies another aspect of his personality, and indeed
of any "esprit certitudien", namely, his simplemindedness.

Hitler finds everything marvellously simple; the whole
world is for him a simple "system" of meanings easily
seen by "virgin" minds. It is only the Jews, the
intellectuals and the military professionals that
complicate matters. (Table Talk. p.66.) H.R. Trevor-
Roper rightly calls hitler one"of the most formidable
among the "terrible simplifiers" of history..."
(Introduction to Table Talk, p.XXV.)

Hitler can easily afford a "simplified" version of
the world - he is even delighted to talk about this
particular quality of his mind - for the simple reason
that his mind is not really interested in "knowledge".
His opinions, preceding or following his actions - are
little more than hasty and superficial justifications
of his actions. As soon as he is ready for new action
his imagination flies over the whole field of his
memory, where mutilated ideas and theories are stored, and
chooses the one which seems to him most suitable to the
occasion. In order to justify his racial policy he sees
it as being rooted in a "natural law" and invokes the
principle of the survival of the fittest. In this way
he sets his mind at rest, for "what holds good for
monkeys, holds good in the highest degree for the
human species also".

D.   Another mode of playing out a fundamental
insecurity also seen in Hitler consists in the deep desire
to be accepted and loved by the group. In Hitler this is a
compensation for his repressed desire for belonginess,

belonginess, and can very well be considered as
another form of self-assurance. To this aspect belong
H's excessive need for integration and identification
with the German group and his particular need for
"loyalty". Since the need for loyalty plays an important
part in H's life we should like to discuss it in some
detail.

Hitler's group identification is facilitated by
certain qualitites of the German people as well as by
certain qualitites of his own personality. During the
inter-war period German society itself had experienced
the feeling of insecurity under various forms. H's
modes of reaction to the condition of insecurity lying
at the basis of his personality corresponded therefore
to a main condition of life of the German group as a
whole. It is worth mentioning in this context H's
remarkable capacity for understanding - feeling or
sensing seem to be better words in this particular case -
the dominant symbols of the German culture-pattern of his
time. This made it easy for him to produce the fusion
between the basic conditions of his personality and that
of the German group and thus to cut for himself the
figure of a true representative of the nation. His gift
of oratory and demagaguery are of paramount importance in
this respect. For he could, so to speak, instinctively
find the most efficient words to stir up and to intensify
the basic insecurity of his people. To their feeling of
inferiority he offered the myth of the Master Race, to

to their repressed security and self-assertion he
offered an aggressive policy; their guilt was answered
by his strong capacity to create scapegoats. It was
this capacity for reading the mind of the people that
brought him outstanding political success in a relatively
short time, a fact which gave him self-confidence and
the courage to assume great responsibilities. It was
therefore easy for him to leap from one extreme to
another, i.e., from a basic lack of security, self-
confidence and feeling of belongingness to over-confidence
and complete identification with the will of the people;
from an outcast to a providential man embodying the
highest qualities of his own race.

Now a few words about Hitler's need for loyalty and
belongingness.

The only obvious fact, in this respect, that H.
expects absolute loyalty to himself from every member of
his Party. "Meine Ehre heisst Treue" was the oath taken
by the members of S.S. organisation. In the light of
psycho-analysis the motives of this need in Hitler's
personality spring mainly from his homosexual inclination.
The Party - at least its nucleus - seems, according to
this thesis, a strange love affair. Consequently Hitler
treated the Party members according to the emotional
logic of love. The case of Röhm is often cited as a
proof of this. Yet one can hardly avoid the common
observation that the need for loyalty is a characteristic

characteristic not only of Hitler but of many revolutionaries
who did not show any sign of homosexuality. Saint Just,
Robespierre, Lenin, Stalin are only a few of them.
This makes us think that ~~and~~ paranoid tendencies offer
a sufficient basis for the explanation of this need.
Great need for the loyalty of others is one of the
characteristic traits of that type of personality built,
up on the feeling of insecurity. Any critical attitude
towards such a personality is bound to arouse his
insecurity which at one of its extremes might arouse
suspicion and fears of persecution. The emotional logic
of this personality is all or nothing, complete loyalty
or infidenity and treason.

Hitler's identification with the German group takes
us to one of the most important traits of his personality.
This refers to his attitude towards society. Many
investigators in this field seem to hold in one way or
another the opinion that Hitler had a strong Superego.
This is a compensation for his weak Ego which was incapable
of mastering his powerful anti-social drives. If we give a
rational expression to an unconscious process we can say
that Hitler identifies himself with the German group, he
builds up a Party, in order to create in himself the com-
fortable feeling that he is not a "merle blanc" and that
his fundamental tendencies are not anti-social and immoral.
Gilbert himself, after classifying Hitler as a paranoid
psycho-path, comes to the conclusion that he did not lack
a Superego. "His extraordinary sensitivity to status and

and approval by the in-group bespeaks merely a

distortion of the Superego function".   (Op.cit. p.284).   (1)

(1) According to O. Fenichel the identification with
one's own group consists in an unconscious process the
effect of which is that the individual overcomes a basic
ambivalence in his personality.   By this he objectifies
and satisfies his aggression in out-groups, and his
Eros in the in-group.   Thus he plays out an inner
conflict. (O. Fenichel: The Psychoanlysis of Anti-
setitism.   American Imago,I, 1940).

The way in which the concept of the Superego is used

in the analysis of H's personalities involves ambiguities'

in its meaning.   If we take the Superego as a mental

structure whose function is to repress the anti-social

impulses in the individual, by creating at the same time

inter-individual modes of behaviour, then Hitler had a

strong and a very weak Superego at the same time.   For

it is perfectly true that he integrated himself with his

own group, but the group itself is an anti-social group

par excellence, and became even more so under H's rule.

Morevor Hitler created a Party based on the rule of force

which appealed to the individual in the measure in which

the individual himself had strong anti-social needs.

The individual joined the Party not as "homo socialis"

but rather to cover his lack in this human quality.

In other words Hitler created a society of socio-pathic

personalities organised in the manner of the "Fuks

Divisionen".   In this sense we cannot infer from his

group identification the existence in his personality of

a strong Superego structure.   We can hardly say that an

anti-social psycho-path who joins a "gang" has a stronger

stronger Superego than one who acts on his own.[1]

[1] This basic ambiguity can be avoided only if one creates a distinction within the concept of the Superego, and say that Hitler had a "socially" strong but "morally" weak Superego - This distinction sounds artificial, for the simple reason that social integration normally implies moral qualities.

The case of Hitler seems to be that of a psycho-pathic personality who integrated himself with a group in order to gratify his own anti-social tendencies. We see in this a victory of the basic impulses of the <u>Id</u> rather than the victory of the Superego. This is characteristic of most personalities built up on the feeling of insecurity of which Hitler is proto-type. This is also the most striking feature in the Nazi type of authoritarian personality. As we shall see in the next chapter, this type of personality suffers from an incapacity to project his own experience at an inter-individual level and thus to create objective norms of behaviour based on self-restraint (unassuming character) and compromise with others. These personalities form outstanding examples of self-centred individualities. Thus when they integrate themselves with the group this is meant to satisfy their anti-social tendencies. The only social "order" in such groups is the hierachy of power experienced emotionally by the individuals, i.e. love or fear for the strong and contempt and ruthlessness for the weak. On the other hand, the group itself is self-centred, and therefore has no moral standards in its

its relationships with other groups.

Hitler's personality is not absolutely deprived of the capacity to project social modes of behaviour. The image of an heroic society, the myth of the Master Race, the dream of a united strong Fatherland are proof of this. But they are far too vague and as such unfit for the standards of contemporary society. Moreover their function was mainly to compensate for the fundamentally anti-social tendencies of his Party and to a certain extent of the Germanic group. As such it is hard to consider them as the manifestation of a well-constituted Superego, They suggest in fact the smouldering aches of a collective unconscious, a stage in the evolution of mankind at which one can hardly distinguish the function of the Superego in the individual. For at this stage the group exists primarily as an "organic" necessity for the individual. The repressing forces - repression being taken as a psychological mechanism, i.e., as an enodopsychic phenomenon—of the primary impulses are weak. For the individual's life is integrated with a super-individual order by the pressure of external forces - coming from inside (fear of the stronger) and from outside the group - rather than by the functions of an inner structure of his own mind. In conclusion, the individual's identification with an anti-social group cannot be taken as a sign of the exitence of a strong social function in his own mind.

Hermann Goering.   Goering, like Hitler, Hess and

Frank, is considered by Gilbert as belonging to the

"revolutionist" group within the Nazi movement.

Clinically he is labelled as an aggressive narcissistic

personality. As a child he was fascinated by military

displays, uniforms and parades. Later he identifies

himself with the military Junkers cast, with its ideals

of patriotism, glory and war. He is to the last moment

of his life obsessed by the heroic myth of Siegfried

and makes a supreme effort to remain as a hero in the

German history books. Throughout his life he had shown

a deep contempt for peaceful, ordinary people. "Naturally,

the common people do not want war ..... it is the leaders

of the country who determine the policy ......"(From his

conversation with Gilbert April 18, 1946, Op.Cit. p.117.)

With regard to his identification with the German

people his case is similar to that of Hitler."He introcepts"

writes Gilbert - "the social values of his culture to the

extent they gratify his egotistical needs and provides

outlets for his aggressive drives" (Gil. p.284).   In

Speer's words he was "doping himself with morphine and

stealing art treasures from all over Europe when Germany

was in agony" (Ibidem p.105.) His Ego-inflated

personality constituted a perfect outlet for the

aggressive mood of the German people fostered by the Nazi

movement. He joined the Nazi revolution "precisely because

it was a revolution, not because of the ideological stuff".

(Gilbert p.248) most probably that clinically he is a hypomanic.

Rudolf Hess. Clinically he is hysteric-paranoic. His hysteria is manifested in a series of amnesias; the character of his paranoia was passive, mainly as persecution. The Nazi movement with its myths of persecution made were acceptable to him and his need for martyrdom. (I.R. Rees deals in detail with Hess' personality. - The Case of Rudolf Hess, London, 1947.)

Hans Frank. He is clinically described as a latent homosexual. Various fragments from his conversation with Gilbert are symptomatic from this point of view. "One must not say that Hitler violated the German people, he seduced them", or "he seduces us only to destroy us". (Gilbert Ibidem, p.148).

We have insisted rather disproportionately upon the psycho-pathological aspects of Hitler's personality. The purpose of this was to demonstrate that one can distinguish in the structure of his personality the basic elements of Nazi authoritarian personality. Goering, Hess, Frank, and others such as Goebbels and Himmler, can also offer material for the construction of this type of personality. But the authoritarian behaviour of these people can in many respects be considered as being conditioned by their cultural environment and by

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by the structure of the Party in particular. Hitler,
on the other hand, gives from himself. He uses
creatively the latent and loosely connected authoritarian
elements of his social and cultural environment. He is
himself a proto-type of authoritarian personality and in
co-operation with a series of factors existing in his
social environment he builds up an authoritarian
organisation.

In conclusion the main psycho-pathological symptoms
found in the chief Nazi leaders can be classified under
the following points:

1. Aggressive paranoia - sado-masochism - latent
    homosexuality. Typical representative: Hitler.

2. Narcissism - typically displayed by Goering.

3. Passive paranoia, latent homosexuality (persecution),
    mystic sentimentalism, typically represented by Hess.

Sociogenesis.   We come up against, as we did many
times before, the problem of the relationship between the
personal and the social. Can we explain the pathological
factors involved in Nazism only by the present of a series
of psycho-pathological traits in its leaders. Or have
we to resort, for the solution of this problem, to certain
qualities of German society during the rise and growth of
Nazism? Although we are ready to answer the second
question in the affirmative, we cannot hide the feeling
of difficulty generally involved in this kind of question.
We are on safe ground when talking about the presence of
psycho-pathological elements in Hitler and other Nazi

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Nazi leaders, for the simple fact that a certain
amount of empirical evidence is available in this sense.
In his study Gilbert made use of reliable psychological
methods. But when trying to analyse the pathological
elements involved in the German culture-pattern, during
the period preceding Nazism, we cannot rely on any
systematic research, psychological or anthropological.
The few data made available by Dick's study on various
Nazi concentration camps cannot help very much since
they refer to Nazi post-war mentality. In this case the
psychologist's only choice is to give his own inter-
pretation to a series of historical facts selected by
him as symptomatic for the mental structure of the German
group during the period under consideration. The hypo-
thetical elements have to be very strong indeed. And yet
one can understand very little the function of various
psychological factors in Nazism, without this hypothesis.
For Hitler's paranoia personality, or Goering's narcissistic
traits, symptomatic as they were, could hardly create a
series of mental characteristics in the Nazi group, or in
the German group, had they met indifferent or hostile
surroundings. The fact is that they built themselves on,
and exploited, elements already in the minds of many
members of German society.

Many psychological researches give the impression that
one could easily find in the structure of German society
the same psycho-pathological symptoms as in H's., or other

other leaders' personalities. The hypothesis lying at
the basis of these researches seems to be the following:
paranoia and narcissistic personalities cannot become
leaders but in a paranoia or narcissistic society or group.
Although we cannot unreservedly agree with this way of
reasoning in social psychology, we should like, all the
same, to indicate the most important pathological aspects
of German society which have a certain significance for
Nazism.

1. The concept most accurately covering all the
important pathological symptoms shown by German society
during and immediately preceding Nazism is that of a
socio-pathic group. As mentioned elsewhere, we defined
this concept in analogy with the concept of psycho-pathic
personality. As in the case of psycho-pathic personality,
the socio-pathic character of the group is motivated by a
basic insecurity, and as in the case of psycho-pathic
personality again, the acting out of the effects of
insecurity leads to a morbid urge for self-assertion of the
group. Hence the authoritarian character of its organ-
isation, its policy based on force, and its anti-social
behaviour.

Insecurity can be considered as the main cause of
German society's failure to adapt itself to the twentieth
century democratic way of life. For this basic insecurity
prevented the German group from keeping itself in
permanent contact with the historical level of European

European civilization and from projecting its
aspirations as a group on the values created by this
civilization. This basic insecurity destroyed the
frame of reference for the aspirations of the German
group, thus formed the background for the process of
regression suffered by this group under the Nazi regime.
For regression is prompted,as we have seen,by the need
for a new frame of reference. In this particular case
the new frame of reference is found in a patriarchalistic
type of society.

The lack of the adequate frame of reference has a
particular socio-logical importance, which in the case of
Nazism has received too little attention. This is the
group trait that can explain to a great extent the
importance played by the déclassés and psycho-pathic
personalities in the Nazi movement. For it is this socio-
logical category and this personality type that can more
successfully crystallise the various mental vectors in a
group with a lost frame of reference. Its disorientation,
its fears and revolt against a hostile environment, and
finally its urge to escape into adventure, all these find
their highest expression in that type of personality and
group described by us as socio-pathic. The insecurity
renders the group itself socio-pathic, by developing in
it a chronic incapacity to attach itself to the values
of the civilization to which it belongs.

We hasten to say that we cannot describe the whole of
the twentieth century German society as having a well-

well-defined socio-pathic structure. Its general state
of insecurity and its incapacity to integrate with
European democratic civilization can be considered only
as a fertile ground in which a socio-pathic structure
could develop. A series of latent socio-pathic factors
existing in German society as a whole have crystallised
in clearer forms in its classless groups, and finally in
a series of psycho-pathic personalities. [1]

(1)
   It is the socio-pathic character manifested by
German society under the Nazi rule that made Gilbert
consider Nazism as a case of maladjusted group behaviour.
 "At the present stage of man's evolution aggression no
longer serves the purpose of survival but of extinction".
(Ibidem, p.316.)

   2. The paranoiac features of the German culture-
pattern have been for a long time a subject of debate.
Fromm, Laswell and Brickner (R)M.(Is Germany in Curable?,
Philadelphia, 1943) among others, make an important point
of this. Brickner speaks about a paranoic German culture
wondering whether this is curable or not. (The most
frequent paranoiac symptoms referred to are: Self-
glorification (Narcissism) and obsessional forms of
aggression).

   Gilbert takes a different view - a moderate one - with
regard to the application of the concept of paranoia to
the German group and to its culture-pattern. He asks for
a re-formulation of all clinical concepts when applied to
social conflicts and disorders. Consequently he speaks
about a cultural pseudoparanoia as characteristic of

of German society. This means that one can find
certain paranoiac trends in the German group, although
its members cannot be classified as clinical cases of
paranoia. He bases his view on the fact that in a
clinical examination during the Nürenberg Trial, only a
few Nazi leaders showed signs of clinical paranoid
tendencies. The members of the Nazi group, and, with a
few exceptions, of the German group as a whole, behaved
as if they were paranoiacs because their personalities
were directed by their culture. Their perceptions,
emotions and thoughts were conditioned by a process of
cultural learning to such an extent that they showed
signs of delusional behaviour. A series of prejudices,
religious beliefs and myths exercised an obsessional
pressure upon them. In the totalitarian State created
by Nazism - Gilbert concludes - the national behaviour
resembles paranoia, i.e., behaviour based on systematised
delusions (innate superiority) and aggression.

It is easy to agree with Gilbert's general request
regarding the necessity of re-formulation of the clinical
concepts before applying them to the group or culture-
pattern. It is not so easy, however, to follow him in
his attempt to establish the difference between clinical
and cultural paranoia. On this subject he says: "We
can describe this as a cultural pseudo-paranoia because
it is only a cultural phenomenon and does not involve the
breakdown of the mental reality-testing function. The

The possibility of reality-testing has simply been artificially limited by the nature of the cultural learning process (Idem p.271). It seems to us that it is precisely the defectiveness of the reality-testing function that forms the most striking trait of modern German culture, and that this cannot be explained but by the same type of deficiency in the members of the German community. Nazism "actualised" this trait in the sense that the individuals and the sub-groups suffering most from this deficiency emerged as the ruling stratum of German society. Nazism as the "geniale Momentum" of the German people means in this particular context precisely that the German people have reached perfection in one of their fundamental traits.

, If we understand by the reality-testing function a congenial flexibility of the individual's and group's behaviour so as to reach compromise between divergent factors existing either in their inner structure or in their environment, then the defectiveness of this function in modern German society is obvious. At the theoretical level, this is shown by that striking incapacity of modern German thought to reach a balance between the mind and the external world, and in its almost morbid repulsion for dualism. This is the trait which forms the core of Mario Pensa's study of the German culture-pattern. (Das Deutsche Denken, Zurich, 1948) As compared with the classical thought (of Greek origin) characterised by the balance between object and subject, reality and knowledge,

knowledge, universal and particular, the main task of
modern German thought is to upset this balance by
creating an over-powering "Self" with imperialistic
tendencies towards - against is a better word - the
external world. The concept of the Self of the German
mystics, Kant's transcendental Ego, Hegel's theoretical
Ego, and Nietzsche's practical Ego are various steps
towards this end. German idealism on the whole is a clear
sign of dilusional trends within modern European
civilization. The same incapacity for compromise is
displayed in practice by the "Real Politik". Self-
centredness of the individual and of the group, to the
extent of denying the existence of the external world
in its own right, so characteristic of German culture,
forms the main symptom of defectiveness in the reality-
testing function. Therefore, there is no difference
between clinical and cultural paranoia from this point of
view; the reality-testing function is defective in both.

The important question arises whether one can describe
an individual who is perfectly integrated with German
culture under Nazi regime, as having his reality-testing
function impaired, therefore not liable to clinical
paranoia. Would it not be more accurate to take the view
that his identification with that culture - which shows
signs of defectiveness in the reality-testing function-is
a sign that his own mind is defective from the same point
of view? There is in that individual a readiness to
distort the world in a particular manner - paranoiac -

and the Nazi culture-pattern presents a proper medium
for this. That is why he clings to it and makes out of
it the "means" of expressing his own mind. That this
particular individual cannot easily be declared a clinical
case of paranoia is obviously true. But it seems necessary
to add to this that the meaning of the concept "clinical"
is relative. Is there not some value in social psychology
for viewing the individual who displays symptoms of
paranoiac behaviour and who lives in culture-pattern
impregnated with paranoiac trends, as a clinical case of
paranoia?

3. Compulsion is also often connected with Nazism.
It is shown in the rigidity and the repetitiveness of
behaviour-pattern such as crossing oneself, saluting,
shaking hands, executing "mechanically" meaningless orders
and in other ways. Gilbert is again of the opinion that
the compulsive traits in the Nazi group cannot be explained
as "a ritual set up by the individual and adhered to rigidly
beyond self-control as a necessary mechanism to deal with
(his own) anxiety" (Ibid. p.272.) It cannot therefore be
regarded as a compulsive behaviour in a clinical sense, but
as a cultural pseudo-compulsion. As to the question in what
exactly consists the "pseudo-compulsion" character of the
German group, Gilbert gives a not altogether clear answer.
One might, however, infer that the main symptoms of com-
pulsion are shown in the group's readiness to exhibit
stereotyped behaviour, in its fondness of "order" and
discipline, and very vaguely speaking, in its Prussianistic

Prussianistic attitude to life. The Nazi regime had
intensified the militaristic character of German culture
to such an extent that the individual belonging to the
German community carried on the group behaviour rituals
with very little or no possibility of resistance. There was
no scale of values to put a check to his rigid adherence and
loyalty to the group. He would exterminate people en masse,
he would kill children in order to satisfy this loyalty.
Cultural pseudo-compulsion consists therefore in the
culturally conditioned tendency in the individual "to carry
to the extreme the repetition of group behaviour rituals"
(ibid. p.273). Gilbert makes the point clear that the
individuals themselves - according to the results of his
investigation at the Nurenberg Trial - show no sign of
clinical compulsive behaviour. But, - may we ask,- does
the concept of clinical compulsion imply something more
than acting out an anxiety in a socially non-conformist
manner, or a ritual set for acting it out, therefore
rendering the individual liable to hospitalisation? If the
members of the Nazi group or of the German community could
act out their own anxieties - their fears of persecution
for instance - in a institutionalised form, does this fact
make their behaviour less compulsive in a clinical sense?
Concerning this point, there is something else we should
like to add which is completely overlooked by Gilbert.
The motivation of the compulsive behaviour characteristic
of the German group lies in the anxieties created in the
group by a series of historical conditions. It is therefore

therefore the acting out of the "general" anxiety that
leads to a generalised form of compulsion. As long as
the majority of the individuals belonging to this group
accept and make this pattern of behaviour their own - be
it under Prussian absolutism, under Bismarck or Hitler -
the right conclusion from this is that they have in
themselves the condition of compulsive behaviour. This
is not meant to minimise the part played by a series of
cultural factors in the behaviour of the Nazi leaders,
or in the members of the German group under Nazi rule,
but rather to re-establish a balance between the
cultural and personal factors in the determination of
this behaviour. In order to explain the behaviour of
the "comparatively moral and respectable members of
Hitler's entourage", Gilbert resorts to the concept of a
defence mechanism in value conflicts. These leaders as
well as the majority of the German people suffered from
"semi-conscious suppression of insight" rather than
from any pathological disorder. In the conflict between
their own hostile, ethnocentric group and the democratic
humanitarian world, they failed to make "full use of
mature observation and reason for fear of disturbing a
comforting belief or set of values" (Ibid, p.277). In
plain words they lost their heads in favour of their own
group interests. The defence mechanisms referred to by
Gilbert are: A. The obviation and diversion of insight,
and B. the selective constriction of affect. Due to the
first mechanisms, the perceptions unfavourable to the

the Nazi set of values were averted, the contact with reality being confined to those aspects which reinforced the social values established by this regime. Gilbert found that many Nazi leaders did not know and did not believe in the atrocities committed by the SS. The second mechanism produces selective empathy, indifference and hostility, the result of which consisted in the crystallisation of all positive feelings round the in-group, and of all negative feelings round the out-groups.

There is no doubt that in many Germans certain aspects of behaviour were influenced by these mechanisms, and that many such people "knew not what they did". We agree that these mechanisms characteristic of the conflicts between an authoritarian and democratic culture and of social conflicts in general, are taken by, or imposed upon, the individuals from outside. But the mere fact that these mechanisms take control of the individuals' mind, shows that the individuals themselves need them and that a series of inner conflicts must have been at work in every individual in order to make the mechanisms as efficient as they were in many members of the German community under the Nazi regime. Therefore "the comparatively normal and respectable" people must have had their own lack of balance in order to become the victims of a series of obviations and diversions of insight and of selective constrictions of affect.

In conclusion we are ready to suggest that cultural

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cultural pseudo-paranoia and pseudo-compulsion seem to

be but the "institutionalisation" of a series of

paranoiac and compulsive dispositions existing in various

degrees in the great bulk of the German population and

in its leaders in particular.   For the determination of

these dispositions we have to look into the process of

individuation in the conditions offered by contemporary

German society, and by Nazi society in particular.

This will be the task of the next chapter.

C H A P T E R   V

NAZI   AUTHORITARIAN   PERSONALITY.

> Trust your sword rather than the portcullis.
>
> (Icelandic Saga).

The Hierarchy of Individuation in a Threatened Society.
The structural analysis of various Western societies dealt
with in several previous chapters has led to the following
conclusions: Various processes taking place within con-
temporary Western society in general, and German society in
particular, have gradually built up a specific pattern of
development of human personality. The psychological analysis
of this type of personality can give us the clue to the under-
standing of some important aspects of Nazism and Fascism in
general.

Though at a later stage of our study we feel the need of
reminding the reader that we do not speak in terms of
casuality and on no account of unilinear causality. The
social and cultural conditions of twentieth century Europe,
and of Germany in particular, certainly contain in them-
selves the "motives" of a specific structure of human
personality. On the other hand, this type of personality
forms a suitable "medium" for the manifestation of the
fundamental aspects of the German culture-pattern under

under Nazism.   Yet we have to stick to a descriptive
point of view in dealing with these phenomena, with very
little knowledge of the causal relationship between them.
Conveniently one can consider these phenomena, i.e.,
specific cultural factors of contemporary society, a
specific personality type, ~~class~~ as various aspects in
the evolution of Western man and his society.

If we have to describe in a single word the structure
of the field leading to that form of individuation which
contains in itself the basic conditions of authoritarian
behaviour, we would say "insecurity".   Recent psycho-
logical researches, based mainly on clinical and
experimental methods, have - we hope - very little to
quarrel with ~~in~~ this general assumption.   For they nearly
all stress in one way or another the fact that
authoritarian personality presupposes individuation in
conditions of insecurity.

The ~~map of the~~ main sources of insecurity in con-
temporary Western world can be ~~drawn~~ setout as follows:

A.   The rapid tempo of change of modern society is
usually considered as the most general source of
insecurity in modern man.   The frequent crises in various
aspects of modern society and the general social
instability are closely connected with this tempo of change.

The twofold meaning of the instabliity and relativity
of social forms in a civilisation based on individual
freedom should be pointed out.   Change in itself does not

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not produce insecurity as long as it is considered
for the better. This presupposes either the
existence of a strong faith in the rational character
of social evolution, or a sustained empirical proof
of the increased well-being in the majority of
individuals, as a direct result of change. When
these two factors are weak, or do not exist at all,
change becomes a source of insecurity in the
individual. This is the case in many contemporary
Western societies.

In these societies social instability has been
experienced primarily as lack of scope for individual
freedom. For the individual's freedom is no longer
guided and guaranteed by any creed and by any firm
social organisation. Consequently the individual
experiences the feeling of freedom along with the
conviction of its futility. Free for what......?
"Free to die",is often the answer. This slogan used
today by second-rate Marxists is still catching, for
it translates a deep mental condition of contemporary
man. Freedom without firm social and psychological
grounds is associated in the individual's mind with
fear and insecurity.

Another important source of insecurity in con-
temporary man can be described as follows: During
the twentieth century the Western culture-pattern
offers very few outlets for the individual's

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individual's frustrated need for security. In this
consists one of the main conditions of the process of
individuation specific of Fascist authoritarian
personality. This very condition shows also the main
difference between Nazi, mediaeval and Communist types
of authoritarian personality. For mediaeval man
integrates himself with an autocratic social order by
transferring his need for personal security and
freedom into a transcendental world, with which he is
linked by faith. The need for security and freedom
in Communist man is, on the other hand, satisfied by
his reliance on the power of secular reason; the success
of his action and the security of his existence are
guaranteed by the rational character of history. But,
as we have seen before, the structure of the European
culture-pattern of the twentieth century offers little
support for the belief in either the transcendental or
secular order. Consequently the modes of experiencing
security and freedom are, in this culture, almost non-
existent. The structuration of personality takes place
in an instable background, and at the ebb-tide of a
rationalistic era.

This is the cultural topography of the individuation
of Fascist man. Its formula is: man-in-a-hostile-world;
human life is guaranteed neither by a steady empirical
progress, nor by a rational order. Human personality
grows in the vacuum left by the fall of the transcendent,

transcendent, upheld by religion, and a shrinking rationalism. In this existential context, insecurity oftem amounts to desperation. The main binding force in life seems to be a blind will for existing. The grotesque Hitlerian "we will for we will", or "who has, has", represent a basic mental condition in contemporary man.

B. The list of the causes of insecurity lying at the basis of authoritarian personality is not complete without taking into account the specific situation of modern German society. The social and economic causes of insecurity in the inter-war period have been dealt with elsewhere. For the moment we should like to emphasise that source of insecurity which is most characteristic of the formation of the Nazi type of authoritarian personality. This consists in the failure of German society to integrate with contemporary European civilisation. The conflict between the ethnocentric German culture and democratic humanitarian - at least as aspiration - European civilisation reaches one of its peaks in the twentieth century. This increases in the German group the feeling of isolation and hostility towards the surrounding world. Parallel to this grows the need for a strong integration of the group within itself. This constitutes one of the major motives in the formation of Nazi personality.

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Some Aspects of Individuation under Conditions of Insecurity.

1.   One of the most characteristic features of a personality which has grown up in conditions of insecurity consists in a low degree of self-integration. The feeling of insecurity constitutes a constant source of instability in the structure of this personality. The conviction that the circumstances of life are stronger than it is itself forms one of its pervasive traits.   Its self-confidence and self-initiative are usually weak save where insecurity is repressed and over-compensated.

The relationship established by this type of personality with the external world shows signs of deficiency in the reality-testing function.   Personalities formed under conditions of insecurity are much more inclined than any other type to blame external circumstances for their own failures.   They have the feeling of being surrounded by a hostile world to which they react in an ambivalent manner: expressing either excessive aggression, in order to break down the hostility, or total submission.

There is considerable projection at work in these personalities.   (This is the most common reason why it is uaually held that their reality-testing function is defective.)   Their thwarted self-assertion and their excessive number of repressed tendencies form in the

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the Unconscious a pool of aggression which, when
escaping the repressing forces of the Ego, are projected
upon other people or upon the external world in general.
In this case their own impotence is seen by them as
others' impotence, their own aggression as aggression
in others.

Concluding this section we can say that the first
characteristic of the personality grown up in conditions
of insecurity consists in a weak Ego structure. This
is shown in its low degree of self-integration and in
the defectiveness of its reality function.

2.   A personality with a weak Ego structure has a
particular tendency to form a compensatory structure,
i.e., to build up a hypertrophied or inflated Ego
which displays a high degree of integration. This
phenomenon lies in the "logic" of the process of indiv-
iduation in conditions of insecurity and it is the work
of the mechanisms of repression, compensation and pro-
jection.   The same desire for security which forms the
basis of inferiority and lack of self-confidence may
lead, if strongly repressed, to an excessive need for
self- assertion and superiority. Weakness becomes
"fear of weakness", (T.W.Adorno, and others, The
Authoritarian Personality, Harpers and Brothers , N.Y.
1950, p.801) and positive tendency to overcome insecurity.
In this case the centre of the personality is formed by
what we have previously called the urgent need for self-

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self-demonstration. In common language one would say
that these people are full of themselves. One the social
plane they like to be noticed by others and to enjoy
prestige. The methods used by them to achieve this vary.
They often pay particular attention to manners in speech
and dress, showing a particular fondness for pomp and
showmanship. They may also resort to aggression in order
to win approval and prestige.

The inflated Ego personality sets high standards for
himself. He worships great personalities and often
identifies himself with one of them. Goering,for instance,
identified himself with Siegfried. Identification with
the "Führer" was a common phenomenon in Nazi youth.

Repressed desire for security can be compensated by
a categorical denial of the need for security. In this
case the individual represses any passivity and need for
belongingness in life. He exhibits an exceptional, mostly
animal, courage and an intense drive for adventure. Any-
thing that gives order to life may form the target for his
aggression. The supreme value to him is "reliance on
oneself". "Trust your sword rather than the portcullis",
as the motto of this chapter suggests.

In this way the individuation based on insecurity forms
a compensatory structure as superiority and grandeur.
For the weak Ego is inflated by modes of behaviour which
show over-confidence and a high degree of security in life.
But beneath this demonstration of power lies a basic stratum

stratum of shyness and cowardliness, which bursts out from
time to time.

3.   A weak Ego often determines a high degree of inte-
gration with the group. This is a means of escaping
insecurity and lack of personal initiative. Personalities
with a weak Ego structure identify themselves preferably
with those groups which compensate for their need for
security as well as for their compensatory drives, the
need for power, adventure, showmanship, etc. Military
organisations are a great attraction to these personalities,
for they seem to satisfy best the basic drives of this
type of personality: need for integration and submission
and need for aggression and dominance. The society built
up by these personalities is of a military type.

4.   Strong repression is another important aspect of the
process of individuation under conditions of insecurity.
The great number of privations and frustrations presiding
over the process of individuation build up in the structure
of the mind strong defence mechanisms among which re-
pression is one of the most important.

Common observation shows that repression of the funda-
mental tendencies often results in an attitude of frugality
in life. Yet when repression is strong - and this is the
case in the process of individuation under conditions of
insecurity - it may result in a certain indifference and
even aversion towards the manifestation of a series of
fundamental drives - such as food and sex - and the

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the emotional states related to them. This can be
manifested under various forms, such as an attitude of
superiority towards "vulgar pleasure", or strong aversion,
obsessional nausea, and aggression towards people indulging
in such pleasures.   It might also lead to an ascetic
ideal in life as it did in many Nazi leaders.   This last
attitude was a common trait in "legionari", a Roumanian
Fascist movement combined with religious revivalism.

Various recent researches on the structure of
authoritarian personality have brought into evidence rich
material regarding this point.   Else Frenkel Brunswick in
her study of the "antisemitic personality", which, though
not identical has many traits in common with the Nazi
personality, shows that at the question"What would you
like to do most if you have only six months to live?",
very few people holding antisemitic views referred to
sensual pleasure.   (Else Frenkel Brunswik R.N.Sanford:
Some Personality Factors in Antisemitism, J.of Psychol.
1945, 20, pp.271-291 and La Personalité Antisémite,
Les Temps Modernes, 1950, 60 pp. 577-602.)

There are two mechanisms which play a predominant
part in strongly repressed personalities: A. Reaction-
formation and B. Projection.

A.   A repressed tendency may turn into its own opposite
and seek for satisfaction under this new form. A
strongly repressed hostility is often disguised in
excessive amiability and politeness; a repressed sexual
impulse may appear as abstention; a desire for dirtiness,/

dirtiness, as an exaggerated cleanliness, etc..

Strongly repressed anti-social tendencies - aggressive or narcissistic - may turn into moral rigorism. Loyalty to, and identification with the group, resulting from strongly repressed anarchic tendency, constitutes a typical reaction formation in Nazi personality.

B.   Another mode of acting out a strongly repressed tendency is by projecting it upon others. A repressed immoral wish or desire for dirtiness is projected upon other people who consequently become targets of hatred. Thus the individual does not only clean himself od dirty intentions and immorality but sees himself as a champion of morality and cleanliness.

The projection upon others of one's own repressed desires, because socially unacceptable, forms the basis of the scape-goat mechanism. This is the main concept used by psycho-analysis for the explanation of the antisemitic traits in Nazi Germany and of other forms of national prejudice.

Concerning the structure of Nazi antisemitism many psycho-analytical studies stress the fact that the anti-semitic personality in general suffers from strong desires for dirtiness, moral and physical, which, being strongly repressed, are projected upon Jews. Consequently the Jews are hated because they are dirty, licentious in matters of sex or with lax moral standards in matters of money. A strongly repressed sexual impulse in Hitler and Julius Streicher - to mention two outstanding cases - makes them

them suffer from the obsession of the rape of
Christian girls by Jews.

The value of this thesis is that it stresses the
role played by repression, as a purely endopsychic
process, in national prejudices. It fails, however,
to give a clear idea regarding the existence of
strong repression mechanisms in the great majority of
the members of the German group. This is usually
attributed by the representatives of this thesis to
the authoritarian methods used by German parents in
bringing up their children. For us the origin of
repression lies in the nature of the process of
individuation under conditions of insecurity, of which
the parental attitude towards the child is only one
aspect.

Needless to say, the mechanisms of repression and
projection do not explain away the antisemitic
attitude in Nazi Germany. A series of cultural factors
should be taken into account. Chief of all is the
objective difference and conflict between two ethon-
centric cultures: German and Jewish. [1]

[1] We do not deal in great detail with the antisemitic
aspect of Nazism for the simple reason that we are not
quite certain whether antisemitism should be regarded
as a key factor in the structure of authoritarian
personality or authoritarian group in the way this idea
is presented by T.W. Adorno and others in "The
Authoritarian Personality" (Harper and Brothers N.Y.
1950). Antisemitism seems to be a problem of its own,
a free floating psycho-social factor in modern civil-
isation. There have been democratic groups showing anti-
semitism (France) and authoritarian groups which did not
(Soviet Russia and Italian Fascism.)

5.   Individuation in conditions of insecurity con-
stitutes one of the main causes of ambivalent attitudes
to life. A strong mecnahism of repression is closely
connected with this phenomenon.

The most general aspect of ambivalence can be seen
in the conflict between the open and the deep "couches"
of personality. At the deep level one finds immoral
tendencies which are covered, at the manifest level,
by moral rigorism, charity, ascetic aspirations, etc.;
at the deep level, aggression, anti-social and anarchic
tendencies, covered at the manifest level by strong
social feelings, spirit of sacrifice, obsessional pre-
occupations with order, symmetry and social construct-
iveness; at the deep level, insecurity, while at the
surface woolly optimistic ideas. The deep layers of
insecurity, craving for help and belongingness are at
the manifest level covered by a high cult of "discretion",
by suspicion towards everybody, and often by a real
veneration of the "unique and strong man". Sometimes the
deep "couches" break through the open "couches" and con-
sequently the ambivalent structure of personality
appears in its nakedness.

The most usual type of ambivalence studied by
experimental workers in this field, is presented by the
individual's attitude towards his own parents. E.
Frenkel-Brunswick has demonstrated by means of the
Thematic Apperception Test that the antisemitic persons
studied by her showed at the conscious level great

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great respect, admiration and devotion towards their own parents, while in their projections in the TAT they manifested hostility towards parental figures.

The relationship with one's own parents constitutes, of course, only one context in which the ambivalent dispositions characteristic of a personality grown up in conditions of insecurity are manifested. The same ambivalence is manifested towards authority, i.e., submission and anarchic tendencies at the same time. At the social level the disposition towards ambivalence is acted out under the form of two contradictory social roles: a revolutionary, and, at the same time, a well-integrated personality with the values of his own society: constructed for the future, but with strong veneration for tradition and archaic forms of life; mystic and atheistic at the same time. (For details see Chapter Totalitarian Trends in Our Times.)

Patterns of Individuation under Conditions of Insecurity. The main trends of the process of individuation in a psycho-social field of insecurity can be described as follows:

1. The individual grows excessively self-centred. The basic formula of this personality type is: "Nobody loves me... I love myself". The modes of manifestation of this basic formula of individuation are varied. The individual is highly preoccupied with himself, manifesting at the same time a strong tendency to relate himself to others. His basic need to be accepted and

and loved forms a central point in the development of
his personality. Social abilities are developed to
the maximum possible in this type of personality.
Exactly what these abilities would be depends much on
the dominant values of the group. Verbal abilities
seem however to rank among the top social abilities in
nearly every group. In this sense the individual will
show keeness about how to use the cultural symbols of
his own group. But his urgent need for acceptance directs
him towards that kind of ideas and that kind of style,
written or spoken, which have the highest power of
circulation possible. The public platform and journal-
istic writing are among the most adequate means for
his ends. He is likely to manifest a congenial aversion
from heavy and highly eloborated ideologies.

This type of personality possesses a certain degree
of psychological insight, but the limitation of this con-
sists in the difficulty of making others like and accept
him. For, though in contact with others, he is incapable
of dialogue. The striving for acceptance by others is
seen in a series of other traits of this personality
such as amiability, manners, and inclination towards
showmanship. In political life this type of personality
manifests remarkable inclinations towards demagoguery
and servilism; in religion, strong aptitude for pharisee-
ism; in art, preference for formalism and grandiloquence.
In the economic field he makes a good "contact man".

Homosexual trends are often present in this personality
always obsessed with the desire to be loved.   This is one
of the dominant patterns of individuation in German society
during the inter-war period.   Goering, von Ribbertrop,
von Schirack... are various examples of these specific
trends existing in the German culture-pattern.   The
German group itself showed strong inclination towards self-
centred affection.   Nazi nationalism is usually regarded
as a case of group Narcissism.

2.   Individuation under conditions of insecurity might
form paranoid tendencies in the personality.   While
insecurity and the need for acceptance are the narcissist
essentially feminine, being displayed in a prostitute
manner, in the paranoid, they are essentially masculine.
The paranoid's relationship with the external world, with
the social world in particular, is dramatic.   The basic
insecurity develops in the individual an excessive need
for assertion which is discharged aggressively towards
either the external world or towards himself.   The basic
formula of this pattern of individuation is: "If you do
not accept me, I kill you all, or I kill myself".   This
is but a paraphrase of what Saint Just once said addressing
the enemies of the Revolution, who apparently were the
whole French nation minus the members of the Jacobine Club.
The process of individuation involves in this case an inner
contradiction: The individual's world is sharply divided
into two categories: partisans and enemies.

The former category embodies the "security" space of
the individual being wrapped up in his love and con-
fidence. The latter becomes a symbol of insecurity
attracting to it all the individual's hatred and
suspicion. The individual is utterly incapable of a
de-emotionalised, rational relation with the world.

Though possessed by a morbid need to be in relation-
ship with others this type of personality is incapable
of being in dialogue. When he dominates or hates, he
annihilates the other; when he submits, he annihilates
himself.

This type of personality is dictatorial and
charismatic in politics, in religion, "visionnaire" and
"possessed". He displays strong tendencies towards
missianic action in every field of life.

Hitler's personality is based on this pattern of
individuation. The German group as a whole also show
similar traits, such as strong in-group positive, and
strong out-group negative feelings. The "total war"
formula used by Nazism, corresponds to the basic formula
of this pattern of individuation;"if I am not accepted I
kill you all, or I kill myself".

3. A third form of the process of individuation in
conditions of insecurity can be that of the individual's
withdrawal or detachment from the world. The formula is:
"I do not care, I am not responsible, I am in fact nobody".
The personality resulting from this form of individuation

individuation displays schizoid tendencies. The
individual cuts off his emotional ties with the external
world to the degree of impassibility. He suffers even
more than the two previous types of anti-social tendencies.

A totalitarian society of the Nazi type ~~may pointed~~ is
~~entirely Gilbert gain~~ fertile ground for such person-
alities. Their social integration is purely mechanical
for their social behaviour is controlled by the formal
principles and discipline of the group, rather than by
their concrete relationship with others. The author-
itarian group cultivates resistance against respons-
ibility and confines their roles to that of being
"executants" of orders. Gilbert describes SS Colonel
Hoess as an outstanding example of this personality type.
As the commandant of the Ausschwig Extermination Camp
he ordered the extermination of more than two million
Jews without the slightest emotional participation. Such
a personality is completely "desensitised". Its anti-
social actions are carried out in perfectly cold blood.
Aggression and crime/with it merely techniques in the
execution of the laws of destiny hanging over its head.

The German group as a whole had shown schizoid
features by its self-centredness, isolation and de-
sensitised aggression.

These are the main trends in the process of
individuation under conditions of insecurity. They can
be spoken of in terms of psycho-pathology as Narcissitic,

Narcissitic,paranoid and schizoid trends. It would, however, be advisable to conceive them primarily as vectors existing in the psycho-social field of the process of individuation. The personality structure tends in such circumstances to develop in the directions indicated by these vectors. Even when a particular personality shows no signs of clinical Narcissism, paranoia or schizophrenia, he would manifest in some way or other preferences towards modes of life compatible with these. In Germany these preferences were manifested in a great majority of the population by their attachment to,and even identification with, leaders who showed manifest signs of Narcissism, paranoia or schizophrenia. These leaders had by their personalities actualised the most characteristic possibilities or patterns of individuation of the German culture-pattern. They were, so to speak, ideals of individuation.

We are using here the terms Narcissism and Narcissistic not in a strictly psycho-pathological sense. Narcissism is not a disease at the same level as paranoia or schizophrenia; it is a sympton found in all neuroses and psychoses. Narcissistic is not a well-defined type of personality either. The emphasis here is put on modes of individuation. Individuation is a psycho-social term, an intermediary concept between the concepts of individuality and that of social environment. It is meant to designate a series of trends and vectors

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vectors existing both in the individual and in his
social environment. These trends and vectors are
attributes of the psycho-social field, i.e., of the
system of interrelations between the individual and
his society, and as such they direct the formation
of the personality of each individual member of the
group.

Though clinically different, these types of
individuation have, from the psycho-social point, a
common basis. The result of them all is an unethical
personality and ultimately an unethical group. Since
this formulation seems to contradict one of the
fundamental aspects of Nazi personality, i.e., the
spirit of self-sacrifice, we should like to say a few
words on this matter.

We consider Nazi authoritarian personality as
suffering from the incapacity to relate itself to
others in terms of inter-communication. His relations
with others are not invested with moral values such as
altruism and objectivity. For the authoritarian
personality has a permanent inclination to see the other
in the function of his basic need for security. He is
guided in his relationships by the pressing question:
Is the other with or against me? Does he or does he
not ascertain my own position in life? This basic
need prevents the authoritarian personality from projecting
his relationship with others into a set of objective

objective values. "The others" are good or bad, not
because of their intrinsic qualities, or because they
fulfil social values. They are good or bad because
they are partisans or because they are not. Even when
the authoritarian personality judges other in terms of
values accepted by the group, such as good or bad
patriots, this is not a morally objective judgment.
For this personality adopts ideas and feelings not as
social values, but as answers to its personal need for
security; he identifies himself with the values of his
group. Consequently his appreciation of others answers
the same basic question: Are they with or against me?
The psychological reality is the same but the phraseology
is different. For he would speak not in terms of my
partisans or enemies, but in terms of the enemies of the
people or patriots.

One often characterises Nazi authoritarian personality
as suffering from split morality in the sens that it
shows one moral standard for the in-group and another
for the out-groups. This social aspect of authoritarian
personality disguised its true nature, i.e., its chronic
moral crisis. For one of the main characteristics of
this personality consists in a total absence of moral
standards. Hitler and all Nazi leaders applied
essentially the same formula to their relationships with
Party members and with outsiders. There were no
objective values by which Party members were considered

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considered good or bad people. The leader's personal
feeling of confidence supplied the only criterion of
judgment in this matter. As soon as the leader would
feel that some members were critical, "objective" or
"neutre" he would throw them into the enemy camp or
liquidate them, no matter whether or not they had a real
attachment to the Nazi cause. The test all Party members
had to pass was to satisfy the Leader's demand for
personal loyalty. "The laws are valid only because they
bear my name", said Hitler to Hans Frank when the latter
asked him to give a legal form to the Röhm affair in
1934. (Gilbert, Op.Cit. p.76).

Therefore the behaviour of Nazi authoritarian
personality is/determined by its need for self-demonstration.
This shows a complete incapacity of being in dialogue.
Even when strongly integrated with the group, this
personality finds itself in a situation of self-sufficiency.
As a Narcissist he is self-sufficient because he polishes
his own personality with the values of his civilisation
only to make himself conspicuous and loved; as a paranoid
he is incapable of half-way meetings with others, and as a
schizoid he is incapable of interest in the external
world. This incapacity of being in dialogue - while
integrated in the group - forms the main symptom of the
moral crisis of Nazi personality. Nazi society can
paradoxically be defined as unethical society: (Raubtier
Geselschaft".)

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The Crisis of Individuation and Authoritarian

Personality.   The spirit of conformity to the degree
of group identification shows deficiency in the process
of individuation. As we have already shown the Nazi
personality is easily inclined to take on stereotyped
modes of reaction, i.e., to mould its emotionality
according to the pattern of the group, to think with
"official" ideas, to avoid personal responsibility, and
on the whole to reduce his behaviour to a few clinhes
offered by his own group. "Think for yourself" does not
apply in this case.

Deep analysis reveals a certain connection between
insecurity and lack of individuation. According to this
view, insecurity is reflected first of all on the
emotional pattern of personality. The insecurity produced
in the child by his parents behaviour- mother-separation,
negligence and other factors determining instability in
the environment - prevents the child from acquiring a
uni-linear sense of values in life. The first layer of
ambiguity in the world of values is determined by the
internalisation of the parental figures. For they are
internalised as good and bad figures, according to their
behaviour, at the same time. The other elements of the
environment being themselves in a state of instability
cannot help the child to escape from this primary
ambivalence. Many psycho-analysts interpret the spirit
of conformism and group identification in the authoritarian

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authoritarian personality as defences against this
fundamental ambivalence. In this way the values of one's
own group become the criterion of good and right, while
those of the out-group, the criterion of bad and wrong.
The basic ambivalence is solved by a rigid distinction
at the conscious level between good and bad.

Yet, in spite of all this rigid social integration,
the Nazi personality suffers from lack of integration.
For the inner integration of this personality is weak.
His weak Ego, his lack of self-reliance, make him adopt a
conventional Superego. Thus he sticks desperately to
conventional opinions because he has neither the initiative
nor the courage to form his own; he adheres mechanically
to the prejudices of his group because he fears his anti-
social and anarchic tendencies; he identifies himself
with the group in order to maintain his precarious mental
balance. The ideas he holds, the feelings he displays
and the prejudices he fanatically defends are shields
against himself. They act as external forces and the
individual has no power to transform them into an internal
personal structure. The moment an idea becomes his own -
not supported by external authority - its sense would
become ambiguous, and consequently the individual would be
no longer sure of its validity. That is why this type of
personality is afraid to individualise itself.

C H A P T E R I.

THE SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNISM.

<u>Introduction:</u>   A careful delimitation of the subject-
matter of this last part of our study is necessary for a
twofold reason: Firstly, the social and cultural processes
dealt with in the two previous parts explain certain
aspects in the rise and development of twentieth century
Communism; Secondly, it is practically impossible to include
the whole variety of problems related to contemporary
Communist societies in a study concerned chiefly with a
comparative view of European democratic and totalitarian
societies. Consequently the present study concentrates on
two main groups of factors which in our opinion occupy the
key position in the structure of European Communist
societies. The first group refers to the structure and
evolution of the modern working class, while the second to
various aspects in the evolution of modern Russian society.
Though we regard contemporary Communism as springing from a
double source, <u>we gradually concentrate our attention on that</u>
<u>particular type of Communist organisation which has been</u>
<u>realised in Soviet Russia.</u>   Thus, other Communist organ-
isations spread today throughout the world fall into the

the second plane. We might well say that this study
deals with the psychology of Bolshevism rather than of
Communism, Bolshevism being a proto-type of contemporary
Communism.

Economic and Social Origins.   Communism is often
regarded as a purely economic phenomenon, i.e., an answer
given by contemporary man to a series of economic
problems characteristic of his society. The system of
ownership constitute, therefore, the main difference
between Communism and other types of society. Needless
to say, this is a reflection of the Marxian view on
European history which shuts out any attempt at a psycho-
logical interpretation of Communism.   This makes it the
more necessary for us to stress the view, often expressed
in this study, that we regard the economic and social
factors mentioned below as aspects rather than as causes
of Communism. We can hardly understand the structure of
~~the~~ Communism, particularly in its last stage as Bolshevism,
if we cannot see these factors intermingled, throughout
their evolution, with a series of psychological factors.

Contemporary Communism is often confined to a
particular type of industrial revolution, started in 1917,
in Russia, and then extended to other European and Asiatic
areas. The truth of this opinion lies in the fact that
industrialisation has actually created a new situation in
the structure of Western society. Marxists describe this
as a new type of relationship between the basic factors of

of the process of production. What they have in mind
is primarily the concentration of the means of pro-
duction in the hands of a small number of individuals -
industrialists, capitalists or simply, employers - and
the complete separation of the workers or employees from
the means of production. In what follows we make the
attempt to see the psychological aspects of this process.
In other words, we try to express this process in terms
of human interrelations.

We cannot reist the temptation to characterise the
situation created by industrialisation in terms of two
factors growing in opposition to each other. There are,
on the one hand, the owners of the mans of production
running their own enterprises on the basis of free
market economy, i.e., in terms of profit-making. They
have gradually grown into the modern type of "homo
economicus" for whom the whole field of human inter-
relations is controlled by economic causes. On the other
hand there are the employees who, being separated from the
means of production, tend to cut off all relations with
their employers and their work which cannot be expressed
in terms of money. As "wage-owners" their main tendency is to
form a separate social group and to regulate their
relations with other groups in purely commercial terms,
i.e., to integrate themselves with their society according
to the rules of the market. In conclusion, the
relationship between employers and employees becomes more

more and more formulated in terms of rational economy.

The first main repercussion of the rationalisation of human relationships in this sector of modern society is shown during the big industrial crises immediately following the Napoleonic wars. Though these crises can hardly be detached from the political and psychological background of each country in which they took place, we make the attempt to look at their general aspects and to point to the psychological factors involved in them.

From the psychological point of view it is important to notice that the problem of the responsibility for the economic crisis becomes gradually the spring-board of one of the main social tensions during the first half of the last century. Which of the two groups, the employers, or the employees, was to bear in the first place the repercussions of the crisis? The solution of this problem brings out more and more clearly the antagonistic nature of the relationship between the two groups. The employers, following their own pattern of life, regarded all the elements of their enterprise - including the employees - from a purely rational viewpoint. Their major concern was how to re-adjust the enterprise to the new market conditions. Cuts in the number of employees and in wages - sometimes to an "inhuman level" - came along with other "rational" measures such as cuts in profits and expenditures, rise in prices and struggle for new markets. The workers were, from the employer's point of view, subject to the

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the same rules as all other elements of the enterprise;
they were "merchandised". This attitude was bound to lead
to unemployment, and consequently to instability and
insecurity in the employee groups.

It is apparent, therefore, that one of the main sources
of the social unrest and conflict which began during that
period was human inter-relationships, and that the economic
crisis can be regarded as a precipiting circumstance of
this. It is in fact the over-rationalisation of human
inter-relations that forms the basis of a series of
tensions within modern societies which in the long run
leads towards Communism. For today it is easy to see that
the employers had responsibilities towards their employees
which could hardly fit into a purely rational scheme
regarding the functioning of their own enterprise. On the
other hand, the tie between the employees and their work was
closer and more complex than could be formulated in terms
of wage-earning. They had to partake in the fluctuation
of the economic system much more than they were ready to do
on the basis of their purely rational attitude towards it.

The consequences of an over-rationalised system of
human relationships has in this case led to the domination
of this system by a series of irrational factors. The
feeling of insecurity aroused in employees, resentment and
aggression against their employers, who, in their turn,
reacted with the same resentment and aggression. This has
gradually developed into a deep contradiction within modern

modern society that made many people believe that its
only remedy consisted in a new type of society comepletely
opposed to the existing one.   The need for a closer
integration of the individual with his society and for
more social responsibility form, so to speak, the mental raw
~~mental~~ material of the new social structure.

The beginning of the modern working movements can be
dated at about the historical period referred to above,
i.e., the first half of the nineteenth century.   They
originated in the need felt by the industrial workers to act in
~~lead~~ an organised manner for the protection of their own
interests.   But from the very beginning their action was
directed mainly against the group of the employers which
they regarded as the main obstacle lying in the way of
their struggle.   Between 1830-50 there took place the
first industrial strikes.   These were clear signs of a new
social and psychological phenomenon known today as the
conflict between capital and labour.   Since the nature of
our study does not allow us to enter into a detailed
description of this important stage of the development of
the working-class movements we have to confine ourselves to the
following schematic formulation of its main aspects.
The industrialisation of modern society has created a new
social category, the industrial workers.   The more intensive
the process of industrialisation the larger and better
defined this category.   The fluctuations inherent in the
industrialisation of European society resulted in instability

instability and insecurity in the position of the industrial workers. The degree of their insecurity can be judged by the fact that wages constituted their only means of subsistance. Payment for their work in factories constituted, so to speak, the vital link between them and the rest of society. Any cut in their wages, any break in their work or any period of unemployment threw the workers completely outside society. In this phenomenon lies the main condition of the rise of the modern proletariat as a specific soôcial group. The expression "inner proletariat" lately applied to the same social category is only partially adequate. Though as a social group the modern proletariat originates in industrial society, its mind grows at the periphery, or completely outside this society. After a certain time the proletariat comes from "outside" to conquer and destroy it. Although this attitude is characteristic of a later stage in the development of the proletariat it has, nevertheless, been in its structure from the very beginning.

There are aspects in the rise and development of the industrial proletariat which ask for further qualification if this phenomenon is to be regarded as one of the sources of Communist society. Two main aspects are to be distinguished in the attitude of this new social category towards the rest of society. Some of the industrial workers, though constituting a self-contained social body,

body, have gradually found "rational" means for their integration with society as a whole. By rational means we understand those means which are pertinent to the political and moral structure of modern democracy. This attitude is characteristic of the so-called Social Democratic movements. Though struggling for radical reforms political, social and economic, these movements have, by and large, respected the practices and the sense of gradualness characteristic of democracy.

Other workers' movements have gradually cut off any possibility of their re-integration with modern society. Their only hope was to see the collapse of the society from which they sprang up, and their action was directed towards this end exclusively. These movements led to Communist society as we know it today.

It is also worth while distinguishing two stages in the evolution of the conflict between the industrial proletariat and the rest of society. This conflict is in its first stage "localised" between the employees and the employers. It was the employers who attracted in this first stage all the hatred and all the negative feelings aroused in the industrial workers by the process of proletarisation. Thus, the world of the proletariat it was split, according to the logic of emotional states of insecurity, into two areas: one belonging to oneself and to one's own friends, and the other, to the enemy. This historical position was later spoken of in terms of a

a conflict between two social forces, the employers and the employees. The intensification of this conflict leads to a second stage in the attitude of the proletariat towards society. A deeper degree of frustration and insecurity fostered by a day by day struggle with a stronger enemy had led to the generalisation of the conflict, i.e., to a diffuse and incoherent manifestation of bitterness and aggression in the proletariat. All society was regarded as the cause of its frustration. Consequently the foundation of society itself had to be changed in order to make it possible for the proletariat to live in a friendly world.

We do not say that this "generalised" aggression is the result of the economic conflict between capital and labour, or of the social conflict between employers and employees exclusively. There are a series of other factors which pour aggression and distrust into the mind of the working class. The general dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in European society and culture during the second half of the last century, is one of these factors. The confluence between the nihilistic mood created in European "Intelligentsia" throughout this period and the state of mind of the industrial workers contributed to the generalisation and the intensification of the feelings of discontent and aggression. The insecurity and aggression aroused in the employers' group by the anarchy of production has also contributed to the

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the generalisation of the conflict.

There is one aspect of this complex process which by far outstrips all others in its importance. This is the growth of the new social category of the industrial workers as a self-contained body, as a society within society. As we have mentioned above, the industrial workers became conscious of themselves as a "class" in an attitude of detachment from and conflict with society. From this tension between the proletariat and society springs the spark of class consciousness which has gradually become a factor of prime importance in contemporary society. As class consciousness forms one of the key concepts in the last part of this study, we should like now only to indicate, in a few words, the historical context of its birth, as follows: 1. The industrial workers became conscious of themselves as a special group in a period of social instability resulting in the first place from the periodical crises of the economic system of modern society. 2. They have grown conscious of themselves in permanent conflict with the social and economic group of the employers. In time, this conflict has become generalised in the sense that the whole of society is perceived by the workers as an enemy of the working class. Thus the self-consciousness of the proletariat undergoes a process of inflation. The proletariat assumes for itself the "mission" of constructing a new society in which the condition of all mankind will be improved.

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3. In conclusion, one can say that insecurity, aggression and the need for a radical change in the conditions of life form a basic layer in the structure of class con-
                (1)
sciousness.

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    It is important to notice that insecurity and conflict seem to have led to the rise of individual consciousness as well. An intensified conflict between the organism and its environment because of the insufficiency of the instinctive pattern and adjustment, played an important part in the rise of human consciousness. The rise of the self-consciousness of the industrial workers was considerably facilitated by the fact that their professional training resulted in a general improvement of their education. This fact places the industrial proletariat in a superior position to any other category of proletariat and explains to a certain extent the relatively quick development of their awareness of the fact that they form a homogeneous social group.

What has been said so far constitutes only the first stage in the development of the working class consciousness. We have confined ourselves to a sketchy picture of the historical conditions within which the industrial workers grew up as a sociological category. This forms the setting with--in which takes place the "drama of proletarisation" or the traumatic experiences which led to the rise of class consciousness in modern civilisation. The next section will show how class consciousness articulates its primitive layer, thus becoming a factor of prime importance in the building up of Communism.

The Ideological Articulation of Class Consciousness.
Kautsky is of the opinion that class consciousness, "socialist consciousness" in his own terms, is an imported element in the European **proletariat,** and that the

the "bourgeois intellectuals" are its authors.
(Monnerot op.cit. p.39.) The term "imported" is in this
case inadequately applied. The contribution of the
bourgeois intellectuals was mainly to articulate the
self-consciousness of the working class, i.e., to
structurise inclinations and attitudes already existing
in the members of this class. The "ideology" adopted by
the working movements grew in fact out of the same ground
as the working class itself. This ideology gave shape
to a series of trends existing in the industrial society
of the first half of the nineteenth century. That is why
its immediate effect upon the working movements was to
create clear ends for their aspiration and actions. It
is very likely that without ideology the working class
would have played the role of a capricious and troublesome
youngster, instead of a vigourous revolutionary.

Before describing the main aspects of the ideological
factors characteristic of Communism we should like to
stress the fact that, unlike what happened in Nazism, the
function of the ideological factor in Communism was of
vital importance. This seems to be a paradox, for it
invalidates one of the fundamental principles of the
Communist doctrine, according to which the material-
economic factor is the only decisive factor in the
evolution of human society. In spite of this, Communist
society and the Communist way of life often give the
impression of a scientific experiment with the ultimate

ultimate end of verifying a theory. It gives the
impression that somebody with a book under his nose shapes
the course of human society and human life in general so
as to fit it into the paragraphs and the chapters of his
book.

In the treatment of the Communist ideology we have to
confine ourselves to that system of philosophical,
economic and political thought which is known as Marxism-
Leninism. Other trends of Communist ideology found
throughout the evolution of Western civilisation, though
important in themselves, play a minor part in the under-
standing of the psychological aspect of contemporary
Communist society. Regarding the development of Communist
ideology, one fact should be stressed in particular.
At its very foundation lies the attitude of opposition to
modern European culture. Its first aim is to "demolish"
Western civilisation, and to build up a substitute for it.
Consequently, concepts such as "materialism", "objectivism",
"dialectics", "scientific", etc. gain their full meaning
only as opposed to idealism, subjectivism, dogmatism,
staticism, or metaphysicism, which form, according to Marx,
the main "idola" of modern Western thought.

According to his temperament and philosophical training
Karl Marx belongs to German Romantic philosophy.
Hegelianism was the first and best system known to him. And
though from an early age he departs from all Romantic
systems, his own thought remains deeply infused with the

the spirit of romanticism. Marx believes even more than his master, Hegel, that the world as a whole can adequately be expressed by a closely knitted system of ideas, and that ideas reform the world. And yet Marxism has a quality not possessed by any other Romantic system. Refusing to admit that it is a "personal" system, i.e., an individualised mirror of the world, it claims to be the way of thought of the modern working class in the present, and of mankind in the future. Marxists have, therefore, organised the working class on the foundation of this belief. In other words, the working class as an organised political body becomes the executive of an ideological system.

It is convenient to distinguish two aspects in the Marxist system: A. Dialectical Materialism and B. Historical Materialism.

A. Dialectical Materialism is the explanation of the world through dialectical logic. It is a method of understanding as well as a general conception of the world. The fundamental principles of dialectical Materialism are firstly, constitutive forms of the external world, and then, categories of the human mind. They are as follows:

1. The priority of matter in the world constitutes the first principle. By this principle, Marx reverses Hegel's idealistic position in metaphysics. For, according to Marx, life, mind, human consciousness, and ideas in general are but attributes of matter. Engels

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Engels goes as far as to express the hope that it will be possible in the future to demonstrate how life was created from the inorganic, hence how consciousness appeared. (Anti-Dühring. French Transl. Paris 1946, p.99.) Lenin makes in his "Empirio-Criticism" an attempt to prove that matter exists before, independently, and outside consciousness.

The principle of the materiality of the world, though fundamental for the doctrine of dialectical materialism, is not clearly worked out. The main difficulty lies in the fact that Marxists approach this essentially metaphysical problem, in an anti-metaphysical manner. Thus, they come up against serious difficulties when trying to give a definition to the concept of matter. For Lenin, the only specific quality of matter is that of "objective reality". "Matter is a philosophical category serving to show the objective reality given to man by his sensations, which copy, photograph, and reflect it, without its existence being subordinated to them". "Empirio-Criticism. French Transl. Oeuvres Completes. Ed.Soc. Paris vol. xiii, p.97). Later, Deborin seems to slip slowly into an idealistic position, when conceiving the essence of matter as "the sum of mediations, i.e., relationships and links". Mitin believes that this difficulty is solved if matter is defined as"..... the whole world existing independent of us". He seems not to realise that the ideas of other people are included in

in his definition of matter . (For quotations see:
Z. Barbu "Marxist Philosophy and European Thought.
Philosophical Quarterly. April,1953.)

In the Soviet culture-pattern the principle of the
priority of matter is in fact reduced to a practical
attitude towards life. This is expressed in the belief
that a change in the material (economic) conditions of
life entails a change in the whole of society.

2.   The second principle of dialectical materialism
is the principle of the whole, or the integralist
principle. According to the doctrine of dialectical
materialism, Nature and the world as such constitutes an
organised whole in which things and events are in dynamic
interconnection. The clearest formulation of this
principle is found in Lenin's "Philosophical Notebooks".
Father A. Wetter who has written one of the best
commentaries on present-day Soviet philosophy is of the
opinion that Lenin is on this point very near to a
Plotinian conception of the universe and to a religious
Russian conception of the world at the same time.
(Il Materialismo Dialettico Sovietico.Turin 1948.)

Recently the integralist principle has been re-formulated
in the principle of "partisanship" which constitutes one
of the guiding ideas of the Soviet culture-pattern. The
root of the concept of "partisanship" can be found in
Marx's conception of the class character of human thought
and action. Lenin takes a step further in this direction

direction when considering the Party, and not the
working class as a whole, as the true expression of a
Communist society.   But the concept of "partisanship"
has only recently been recognised as one of the dominant
ideas of Soviet culture. This was done by A.Zhdanov
in 1947. (Problems of Philsophy. No.1 Moscow 1947.)
According to the principle of "partisanship" every
fundamental idea, scientific or philosophical, should
involve in itself the conditions of Soviet society as
these are seen at a given moment from a central point of
view. This central point of view is the Party, better
said, the leadership of the Party. The full meaning of
an idea can be grasped only after it has been completely
integrated with the structure of Soviet society as
represented by the Party. Pokovski's and Marx's ideas,
for instance, were true and objective within social
structure thoroughly engaged in the struggle against the
bourgeois residuums characteristic of the early Soviet
society. After that, their meaning was lost. Zhdanov
himself criticises G. Alexandrov's book, "The History of
Western Philsophy" by accusing the author of having become
infected with the "objectivist" spirit of bourgeois
schools, and having forgotten class warfare and the Party
outlook in his consideration of Western philosophical
thought. The fact that Alexandrov allows to Hegelian
philosophy its progressive aspects is, for Zhdanov, a
fallacy for the specific reason that this weakens the

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the class consciousness of Soviet youth and undermines
Party vigilance. Hence class and Party conditions force
Alexandrov to assert that Marx found nothing progressive
in the whole bourgeois philosophy and that it was he
who built up everything from the very beginning.

It is important to stress that the whole to which
the integralist principle refers is not of a theoretical
character.   Western students of Communism often make
the mistake of judging the validity of a Communist
idea according to its consistency with the theoretical
system of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. It is in fact
not the theoretical whole to which knowledge is referred,
but the empirical, practical, and above all political,
whole. Thus it would not be absurd to learn that Soviet
philosophers cannot give a proper definition to the con-
cept of "totality", unless Soviet agriculture is fully
mechanised. It is noticeable that the discussion of
"possibility" and "reality", as categories of matter,
broke out in the middle of the struggle between Stalin
and Trotsky. More stress on "possibility" was Trotskysm,
while more stress on "reality" was Stalinism.   This
concrete-integralist meaning of any concept should never
be overlooked when judging the truth, or objectivity,
of Communist ideas.

3. The principle of contradiction, or the power of
the negative is the third principle of dialectical
materialism. Its clearest formulation is, to our

our knowledge, given by Lenin in his "Philosophical
Notebooks". A "unity of opposites" lies, according to
Lenin, at the basis of everything and every event.
Every form of manifestation or affirmation is possible
only at the expense of a form of repression and negation.
But, at certain moments, the repressed and negated
part of things and events wins over the manifest part,
and consequently things and events turn into their own
opposites. This process constitutes the main form and
source of change and evolution in the world, material or
spiritual. In the social plane any domination by a
class involves the repression (oppression) of others.
Change and progress in the structure of society occur
when the oppressed classes overthrow the ruling ones
and organise the whole of society according to their own
way of life. Class struggle is therefore the source and
the mechanism of progress in society.

The same principle is re-formulated at the present
level of the evolution of Soviet society by Zhdanov.
Since Communist society is a classless society the
                                    can
source of social progress/no longer lie in the class
struggle. According to Zhdanov the process of class
struggle is replaced in Communist society by the practice
of criticism and self-criticism. By the practice of
criticism and self-criticism the Party becomes aware of
the existence within itself of two contradictory positions,
or groups of factors; the "old" and the "new", the
regressive and progressive . Thus progress is due to the

the struggle between the "old" and the "new", i.e., to
the Party ability to supersede the old forms of life.

It is worth noting that today Communists no longer
talk of society, but of Party. They consider the Party
not only as the symbol of social unity, but as the social
whole itself. The processes taking place in the Party
decide upon the evolution of the whole society.

4. The principle of evolution is the fourth
principle of dialectical materialism. Two important
aspects of the Marxian concept of evolution are of a
particular interest.

A. Matter - the material aspect of every form of
existence - constitutes the source of transformation.
Social and mental forms of life are but reflections of
material changes. We can call this an infra-structural
explanation of evolution. This mode of explaining the
process of evolution has a deep meaning in Communist
societies. It means, first of all, that any process of
change takes place upwards, i.e., it starts in the basic
strata of reality. Since the material factor of society
is, according to Marx, expressed by human economic
activity, any social change should be initiated, in this field.
B. Change and transformation are dialectical. This means
that change in nature and society cannot be conceived
as continuous lines, but a system of dialectical leaps.
A form of life does not develop by a natural process of
growth, for at a certain moment it becomes superseded by

by another form, and thus a new level in the evolution
of life appears. Consequently, the contradiction and
struggle between the forms of reality constitute the
principle of change. This reveals the revolutionary
conception of change underlying Communist thought and
action. Change and progress are possible only by violent
atcion for they always imply the destruction of inimical
forces. The Communist conception of change is better
seen in the next section which deals with the doctrine
of historical materialism.

B. Historical materialism consists in the
application of the principles of dialectical materialism
to the historical process. Thus, in accordance with the
principle of the priority of matter, the doctrine of
historical materialism stresses the idea that the economic
factor lies at the basis of human society and civilisation.
By economic factor, or economic activity, Marx understands
mainly the system of ownership of the means of production.
Thus the system of ownership forms the "infra-structure"
of society, while human social, political and cultural
forms constitute a "super-structure". The changes taking
place in human society and civilisation are in essence
determined by the changes in the structure of human
economic activity. For Marx there are five fundamental
stages corresponding to five economic systems:
1. Primitive Communism, 2, Sclavagist society, 3.
Feudalism, 4. Capitalism and 5. Communism. The evolution -

evolution - or better, the revolution - from one to
another occurred in a dialectical manner, i.e., by the
development of the inner contradictions existing in each
social and economic structure. The negated social forms,
the oppressed social classes, grew out of their own
society. At a certain moment in their development, they
were able to impose their own way of life upon the rest
of society and thus to create a new stage in the
historical evolution of mankind. Therefore the class
struggle forms the fundamental condition of the
historical process.

The last stage in the class struggle is described
by Marx and Lenin as the struggle between the bourgeoisie
and working class. Marx displays on this point a
magnificent dialectical skill and an acute sense of
tragedy which reminds us in many ways of the adolescent
playwright in him. He describes the rise of the modern
proletariat as the result of the inner contradiction and
of the power of the negative in modern industrial society.
The proletariat is the product - the son - of modern
Capitalism. But capitalists, as the typical repre-
sentatives of the dominant classes in modern society,are
at the same time described as the oppressors and therefore
the negation of the proletariat. This process of
negation reaches a dramatic stage when the proletariat
is robbed of its human quality and becomes a simple
merchandise. By this the value of a worker, as a man,is
completely dominated by the value of his work on the

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the market.

The struggle and the victory of the proletariat is
regarded by Marx as the "negation of the negation", as
the "expropriation of the expropriators" the result of
which is the overthrow of the capitalist stage in human
society and the forthcoming of its opposite, Communist
society. To oppose the society from which it has sprung
up, constitutes in fact the first condition of the rise
of the proletariat. Thus, while the bourgeois society
is a class society, Communist society is classless while
the nation State forms the characteristic of the former,
the latter is international, and so forth.

We should like to end the description of the ideolo-
gical factor of Communism by mentioning Lenin's contri-
bution to its political aspect. This concerns the nature
of historical evolution. Some of Marx's interpreters held
the view that since the principles of Dialectical
materialism lie in the nature of matter, historical evolution
leads by itself to its final end, Communism. This way of
thinking was known as "mechanicism" or "economism" and
became a central idea of Social Democracy. The ideas of
class struggle and revolution play a secondary part in this
conception of the historical process. Against this inter-
pretation Lenin stresses the active role played by the
working class in the evolution of mankind. According to
him the historical process, though based on objective laws,
must be "helped" by the conscious action of the working

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working class organised by the Party. In Lenin's view
the political aspect of the historical evolution seems
to outstrip by far the economic one. That is why Lenin's
main interest lies in the political organisation of the
working class, and in the creation of the Party as an
"avant-garde" of this class. He insists on the necessity
for the working class first to conquer the political
power, and then to act upon the economic aspect of society.

CHAPTER II.

THE POLITICAL ARTICULATION OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
- THE PARTY -

The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood,
because a partisan was more ready to dare without
asking why. For party associations are not based
upon any established law, nor do they seek the public
good; they are formed in defience of laws, from self-
interest.
                Thucydides.

The Party is the totalitarian reality in a Communist
society. It is "the whole" as Lenin refers to it, i.e.,
the society itself becoming conscious of its unity.
In the Soviet Union, the Party is referred to as "the
organising and guiding force of the Government", "the
heart and the brain of the people", "the guide and the
teacher of the workers".. (The Official Manual of the
Agitator). The party can at the same time be conceived as
an organism of its own, a body within the body of society,
or a "corpus mysticum" of any Communist society.

The development of the Communist parties throughout
the world shows the gradual embodiment of class conscious -
ness into a political factor of the first order in
twentieth century European society. For these parties are
the crystallisation of a series of trends of modern life

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life which could not be absorbed into the structure of
contemporary society. They are also structurations of a
series of mental states and habits which could not be
integrated in the mental structure of the individual living
in this society. All these social and mental aspects of
life have formed a vital centre of their own, and finally
found their expression in the Party of the working class.
This party can be considered as a new mode of life
structuration, a new type of organism which strives to
adjust modern life and society to its specific structure.
The Russiah Bolshevik Party is the most active, the most
viable of these collective organisms. It is class con-
sciousness in a state of perpetual mobilisation and anxiety.

In what follows we should like to mark the most
important stages in the development of that Communist
organisation which finally became the Russia Bolshevik
Party. We shall concentrate our attention round those
aspects which show the gradual articulation of class con-
sciousness, so as to prepare a certain basis for the
psychological considerations following later.

The Social Basis of the Party. The fact that the
Party has grown up as a political expression of the working
class tells very little about its structure and particularly
about its political tactics and programme. The working
class is merely the raw material from which the Party is
forged. For, it is only a small section, the most "conscious"
elements or the "avant-garde" to the working class which acts

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acts decisively upon the structure of the Party.
Therefore the process of becoming conscious of the pro-
letarian condition of one's own class constitutes a basic
factor in the rise and development of the Party. This
process implies, in fact, something much more than the
spontaneous development of the European working class
within the historical condition of the last century, or
of the Russian working classes during the first decades
of this century. It implies the damming up of a wide and
diffuse historical process whose main stages can be
described as follows: 1. The growth of the social
importance of the industrial workers, which is a normal
implication of the process of industrialisation.   2.
The formation within the group of industrial workers of
an upper-stratum which used their social "organisatory"
and political activities as a means to rise in the social
scale, and thus to escape the condition of manual workers.
Their main ambition was to become "leaders" within their
own group. 3. The blend of this group of workers with
elements coming from other social groups, particularly
middle class intellectuals. 4. This was followed by the
indoctrination of some of the industrial workers with a
particular ideology and by the development from within
this group of a specific type of leadership, in which
religious-messianic elements are intermingled with
concrete political action. All this amounts to the "trans-
figuration" of the working class.

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The first important step in the building up of
the Communist Party consists in the transformation of
the anarchic mood and passive nihilism which was at the
beginning of the last century, one of the basic attitudes
of the industrial workers towards their own society. In
psychological terms this can be called the transformation
of a negative into a positive attitude. The character
of the nineteenth century anarchism, which is widely
spread among the industrial workers, is of a reactionary
nature. Bakunin himself, though a typical representative
of a combative anarchism is very often obscure with
regard to the social meaning of the anarchic action. He
criticises Marx, for instance, for trying to impose upon
the workers a rigid Prussian organisation and an author-
itarian discipline. (Benoit P. Hapner: Bakounine et le
Panslavisme Revolutionaire; Marcel Riviere, Paris.)
Although Bakunin and Proudhon took a step further from
the individualistic anarchism of Stirner, they are totally
opposed to the subservience of the anarchic action to the
interest of a social group which strives towards a new
type of society. The Proudhonist and Bakuninist workers
are against the use of strikes and against the organ-
isation of the working class even when these are initiated
by recognised working class authorities. (The First
International). Though they act in a group, they refuse
to acknowledge the unity of the working class, either as
a basis of their action or as a basis of a new type of

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of society.   Alain Sergent and Claude Namel (L'Histoire
de L' Anarchie Vol.1. Paris. Portulan Ed.) rightly
describe this type of anarchism as regressive in the
social sense, or as the revolt of the individual against
the type of integration required by industrial society.
At the root of this revolt lies the image of the golden
era of a primitive society described by ideologues like
Rousseau.   This applied to the anarchic attitude of the
industrial workers has the following meaning.   The
industrial proletariat, though refusing to be exploited,
does not know how to change its condition of life into
something else.   It displays a purely negative attitude
and a diffuse discontent and aggression.

Marx is not alone in realising the essentially
reactionary and regressive frame of mind of the industrial
workers during the first half of the last century.   Nor
is he alone in demonstrating the necessity of workers'
organisations for the struggle against the employers and
the whole industrial society.   He is, however, one of the
first who understood that this struggle cannot be conducted
on the basis of compromise and gradual improvements in the
position of the workers, but on the basis of revolutionary
action.   The meaning of revolution is in Marx's mind equal
to a social cataclysm.   Workers "have nothing of their own
to secure and fortify; their mission is to destroy all
previous securities for, and insurance of, individual
property". (Manifesto London, The Communist Party 1948,
p.11.)

Marx is, by his origin and by his personality structure, detached enough from his society to see a positive meaning in the worker's refusal to integrate themselves with the industrial order. Cherishing in his heart the proletariat's boycott of the nineteenth century society he takes the trouble to justify it. But what is important in his thought is not the justification of the proletariat's attitude in causal, but in teleological and prophetic terms. The proletariat is right in his boycott of modern society because it can create his own society, a complete new society. The proletariat is the treasurer of a new world. In this lies Marx's exceptional power of intuition which explains his great influence in our times. This aspect of his thought inflamed the mind of the proletariat and transformed their passive destructive nihilism into a constructive attitude towards human history.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the proletariat had in itself a certain mental readiness for messianic ideas. Marxian ideology strengthened those inclinations and worked them out into a rational system. Marx and Engels produced the design of the proletariat mission by indicating the "necessary" stages in the evolution of human society as a whole, by synchronising all this process with the innermost wishes of the proletariat, at the same time not forgetting to stress the necessity for unity and struggle in the working class. Needless

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Needless to say that under the pressure of the messianic idea all these were quickly appropriated by the proletariat. It remained only to pass on to the action of organisation.

In this mental state created in the proletariat by its condition of life and by the influence of Marxian ideology lie the main conditions of a new type of class party. This is a party less interested in progressive measures than in total revolution, less interested in the present, than in the future. From this nucleus springs up the Bolshevik type of party.

Therefore, when Lenin at the beginning of the present century built up the first party of a "new type" he based his action on these mental trends created in the proletariat by its own position in modern society which is later illuminated by a series of ideologies instilled into the working class by various groups of intellectuals which have in common with the working class a deep discontent and revolt against the order of their own society. The party organised by Lenin has only from the ideological point of view ~~only~~ a class character. Lenin has to choose between two extreme possibilities regarding the political action of the proletariat: Courageous and revolutionary action carried out by isolated individuals, or slow action carried out by the working class as a whole in its "spontaneous" development towards a dominant political role. He solves this dilemma by creating the Party as a

a synthesis between these two extremes. Lenin conceives
the Party as a political organ of the most active and
determined elements of the whole society, united in
their political action by their resentment against the
existing social order and by their belief in the
historical mission of the proletariat. The Party becomes
from the very beginning the medium of political action
of those individuals who are by their own personalities
most inclined to organise themselves in a military
manner and to live in permanent mobilisation for the
fulfilment of their goals.

In conformity with Lenin's idea the eligibility to
the Party membership, and to its leadership in
particular was restricted, not de jure but de facto, to
the most advanced sections of the industrial workers,
i.e., those workers who were in the highest degree
conscious of the particular interest of the working class,
who had factory discipline, and at the same time, high
political and social aspirations.

Thus the eligibility to the Party was by no means
confined to the members of the working class. On this
point, Lenin writes: "We must have our men everywhere, in
all social strata, in all positions which allow a
knowledge of the resources and the mechanisms of the
State. We need such men not only for propaganda and
agitation, but above all for organisation". (Lenin
quoted by Monnerot op.cit. p.40). Lenin refers here in

in the first place to the members of the "Intelligentsia",
irrespective of their social belongingness, who were
determined to struggle for the proletarian revolution.
Here is included"... a portion of the bourgeois
ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of
comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a
whole". (Manifesto p.11.)

What Lenin wants most is a stable organisation, at
least a stable leadership composed by people trained in
the class struggle. He asks for full-time revolutionaries
who should stop working in factories and live at the
expense of the organisation, "people whose profession
consists in revolutionary action".(Lenin quot. by Monnerot
op.cit. p.40).

Here comes an important point. The party conceived
by Lenin though the party of the working class, consists
of professional revolutionaries who have become conscious
of the historical mission of the proletariat. This
historical mission of the proletariat is in fact an idea,
existing in their own heads for which there was no
immediate need to consult and to get the approval of the
working class as a social body. Moreover, they could
decide <u>ad libitum</u> on the tactics of the political struggle,
for they have in their own minds the plan of the class war.
Thus the Party is <u>for</u>, but not necessarily <u>of</u> the working
class. It forms an advanced detachment in the struggle of
the proletariat for its historical fulfilment. The Party

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Party is the self- consciousness of the working class
in its high degree of articulation, for it reflects in
itself not only the present but the whole future of this
class.

Who formed the basis of the Party?

To answer this question we have to go back to the
concept of socio-pathic personality and to apply it in
this specific context. The "avant-garde" of the working
class is made up by people who for one reason or another
failed to integrate themselves with their own society.
The "déclassés" in a broad sense, or the "disinherited"
form the body of élite of the "avant-garde". Though the
feeling of "disinheritance" is wide-spread in the group
of industrial workers the adherence to the party cannot
be considered as being decided by the simple fact of
belonging to this group. This adherence is rather a
personal matter, being related to the particular way in
which the feeling of "disinheritance" is experienced from
case to case. Those individuals belonging to the proletariat
or other social groups who could find a social substitute
for their feeling of disinheritance and a positive meaning
for their resentment against their own society formed the
basic strata of the party. The "idea" rather than the
reality of the proletariat as an elected class provided a
strong bond between these people and at the same time an
efficient remedy for their personal feelings of disinherit-
ance. This shows an important trait in the individuals

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individuals attracted to the party ~~who were~~ "of a new
type". They were people who had an outstanding capacity
of socialising their personal resentment; the drive to
form a group of their own in order to provide better con-
ditions for the solutions of their personal problems
was a common trait in them. They claim that the new type
of social group resulted from their unity ~~which~~ belongs
to the working class. But at the same time they stress
the uniqueness of their group by distinguishing themselves
from two categories of workers which constitute by far
the majority of the working class, i.e., the workers who
accept passively their proletarian condition, whom they
scornfully call "Lumpenproletariat", and the workers who
deserted their class by integration with the bourgeois
society, called "opportunists".

Once socialised, the resentment in the above-mentioned
people grows in intensity. The fact that they form a
group of their own contributes to detach them completely
from their own society and to create in them a fanatical
belief in their own aims and ideas. The ideology of the
group - the Party ideology- was to them not only a body
of ideas, but the protective shell of their own life.
Outside it they could perceive nothing but hatred and
danger. These people fit perfectly the revolutionary type
described by Nitchaev, and they formed the first nucleus
of the Russian Bolshevik Party.

The following important idea should be noted. The

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The basis of the Party is not made up by people who
belong to, or are integrated with a class, working class
or any other, but by people who do not belong. It is
not the reality of belongingness that constitutes the
driving force of the Party, but the desire for belong-
ingness. It is not the industrial workers as an inte-
grated group, within itself and within its own society,
that prepares the ground for a totalitarian organisation
crystallised in the party "of a new type", but rather
their desire for belongingness and their desire for
unity and social strength. And finally it is not the
inner capacity of modern society to create classes that
leads to Communist revolution,and to totalitarian
society, but the incapacity of this society to integrate
its own members in its own structure. In other words,
it is the capacity of modern society to create "declasses"
that constitutes the prime moving force in the rise of
contemporary totalitarian society. The fundamental process
seems to be the struggle for class rather than the class
struggle. Therefore the Party is made up by those products
of modern society, individuals or groups, which over-
socialise their anxiety for belongingness and integration.
Those who join the Party belong to that psychological
category who, because of a long period of insecurity and
frustration, live under pressure of a deep desire for a
radical change in themselves and in the external world.
In Lenin's opinion when somebody joins the Party he

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he undergoes a process of transfiguration. One
meaning of this might be that he who is weak becomes
strong, he who is alone becomes a "comrade", he who
wavers becomes ruthless and dogmatic.

Thus the rise of the Party offers one of the best
illustrations of the power of the negative. In
psychological jargon this means the power of the com-
pensatory mechanisms of the mind, or the working of the
contradiction existing in the structure of the human
mind between the Unconscious and consciousness. Through
the Party, the regressive and passive inclinations of
the "déclassés" become progressive and active and the
disorganised and impotent masses are transformed into
a strong and rigid organisation. Through the Party,
spontaneity turns into sense of direction and consciousness,
rewolution becomes a systematised professional action,
and finally the past is completely darkened by the future.

The Concentration of Power within the Party. The
position of the Party within the proletariat and the rest
of society becomes clear from the very beginning. The
Party is the embodiment, and at the same time, the
instrument of the future society. Therefore its decisions
have the authority of the absolute truth and of the
fatality of the historical process.

The expression "the fatality of the historical process"
suggests an important aspect of the evolution of the
Party. Marx and Engels point out the fact that Communists

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Communists are "in their practice the most advanced and
resolute section of the working class parties".
(Manifesto p.13).   On the other hand they make it quite
clear that the Communist party takes the power from the
proletariat, and that in a Communist society all the
power should be in the hands of the proletariat.   But
the relationship between the party and the proletariat,
i.e., how the party gets and maintains power, constitutes
for a certain period a confusing point in the evolution
of contemporary Communist society.   Lenin himself takes,
on a purely ideological plane, an ambiguous attitude
towards the "role" of the Party within the proletariat.
The Party is according to him, an "avant-grade", and as
such it works out the "line" of the proletariat's
political action.   But does it take the "line" from the
proletarian masses, i.e., does it rely on their spontaneity,
or does it create this line in its Head-Quarters?   Lenin
is obviously against the spontaneity of the masses, for
the masses need a brain and that brain is the Party.
But he cannot solve unambiguously the relationship between
the Party and the masses.   The problem is solved later
in the practical field in the struggle between Trotsky
and Stalin.

In his writings Trotsky gives the impression that had
it not been for the appearance of a particular type of
personality in the foreground of the Party, the proto-
type of which is Stalin, the role of the Party in Russian

Russian Communist society would have been different.
In other words, the concentration of power in the hands
of a few top leaders, or the personal dictatorship of
one leader, would have been avoided.

This is in fact an academic argument. If one bears
in mind the historical conditions - certain psychological
factors being here included - in which Lenin created the
Party "of a new type", one could easily notice that the
mechanism of power and the position of the Party in
Communist society are decided "in nuce". Lenin's Party
is in the first place the organisation of those individuals
and groups who are sociologically and psychologically at
the periphery,of, or completely outside, society. The
Party rises as a form of socialisation of the insecurity,
resentment and the desire for belongingness prevailing
in the mind of these individuals and groups. Moreover,
Lenin's Party is the meeting point of a series of strong
conflicts existing within modern Russian society.
All this points to the psychological conclusion that only
a strong authoritarian organisation could completely
satisfy these types of men and groups, and that only an
organisation of military type could adequately serve
their ends.

The main qualitites which made one eligible for the
Party were determination, ruthlessness, need for domination
and destruction and a series of others, as they were laid
down by Nitchaev in his "catechism". This led naturally

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naturally to the rise within the Party and ultimately to its domination by individuals who excelled in these qualities. Stalin represented the type of man required at its best. His victory is therefore written in the birth certificate of the Party "of a new type". In this sense the assertion that Stalin is the creation of the Party, the first new man, seems to carry considerable weight. This cannot be said about Lenin. For studying his personality in the function of his political activities - the creation of the Party in particular - one is often under the impression that he is himself apart from his activity, sometimes bigger, sometimes smaller, sometimes dominating, sometimes dominated by his creation. Stalin, on the other hand, fits perfectly into the Party: he is nothing by himself, he grows through the Party, and the Party grows through him. Stalin can be regarded as the proto=type of the totalitarian man to the extent to which the Party constitutes the "pattern" of Communist society. Deutscher significantly calls his biography of Stalin in subtitle "A political biography".

The structure of the Party decided by itself that the holders of power should quickly be reduced to smaller and smaller groups. Thus during the revolutionary period the Bolshevik Party had quickly assumed all the power for itself by banishing all other parties. Within the Party the power is concentrated in the hands of a Central Committee, consisting during 1917-19, of no more than

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than 20 members.   In the first stage of the revolution
the Committee itself became dominated by six powerful
individuals: Lenin, Zenoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev,
Bukharin, and Stalin.   Within the Central Committee there
were two organisations: The Politburean - formed in
1917 - and the Orgbirean (organisatoric bureau), formed
in 1919.   (They represent in fact two influential groups).
In 1922 came into being the Secretariat of the Committee
placed at the very top of the pyramid of power.   Stalin
was elected in the Secretariat in 1922, becoming within
a few years the indisputable leader of the Party.

The concentration of power within the Party can be
accounted for in many ways.   We have so far confined
ourselves to pointing out that the Party itself contains
the seed of this phenomenon.   One can also look at this
phenomenon in the light of the process of "oligarchisation"
which, according to Robert Michels, exists in every
European political party.   The development of this process
within the Bolshevik Party seems to illustrate in the
clearest way possible the general principle regarding the
inner organisation of a group under conditions of stress.
The more difficult it is for a party to take and maintain
power and the more radical are the changes advocated by
its programme of government, the more rapid and
intensive the oligarchisation.

In what follows we should like to describe two

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two mechanism of the concentration of power characteristic of the Party "of a new type": A. Bureaucratisation and B. Bolshevisation.

A. The practice of class struggle in Russia increased the prestige of the Workers' Committees. The main reason for this lies in the skilful propaganda these committees made for themselves. Any important success was normally attributed to the "excellent" leadership, and any failure to the recalcitrance of the masses or to the "criminal" action of the class enemy. These committees - functioning clandestinely - were constituted mainly of professional revolutionaries, who, through long practice, became experts in the technique of organisation. Throughout the conspiratorial period the meetings of these committees were held in secret - even today the meetings of the Communist committees take place preferably during the night - and their decisions were communicated to the other members of the Party, and to the fellow-travellers, if necessary, as a fixed line of action which would not allow any debate and change. One of the main points regarding the activity of these committees was that their decisions had to be based on "unanimity". One, and only one, point of view had to prevail over all others, otherwise the unity of action of the masses could not be assured. A split in Committee was regarded as one of the most dangerous things for the political action of the proletariat. Majorities were

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were not enough, for the resentment of the minority might have resulted in a definite split, and finally, in the collapse of the whole organisation. These conditions regarding the functioning of such a committee determined its monolithic structure as well as its liability to fall under the exclusive domination of one of its members, usually the secretary.

This mode of functioning and organisation remained typical for the Party even after the conspiratorial period was over. The professional revolutionaries, the technicians of political action, formed the Party committees in Soviet Russia, and in any other Communist society. They took decisions, insisting always on unanimous consent, which decisions were consequently communicated to the Party as its own line. The rise in the hierarchy of the Party of those who were skilful in committee-work was thereby assured. The power was normally taken by this special type of bureaucrat, by the "comitard" as he was sometimes called.

Stalin's gifts were first of all those of a "comitard" and of a technician of insurrection. His capacity to communicate with the masses was very limited, and it was in any case by far outweighed by his ability to pull the strings in a committe, in order to assure unanimity for his point of view. His success within the Party was obviously based on shrewdness, and innumerable machinations, all of them justified by the same principle,

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principle,i.e., the necessity of unity in action.
"Unity of view in programme, tactics and organisation
forms the basis on which our party is being built. If
the unity of view crumbles, the party, too, crumbles".
(Stalin quoted by Deutscher I. "Stalin. A political
biography. Oxford Univ. Press. 1949 p.59.)

Krupskaia - Lenin's wife and secretary - obviously
referring to Stalin, writes: "The "comitard" was a man
of self-assurance; he was aware of the enormous influence
of the Committee upon the masses; in principle he did
not allow any democracy within the party". (Souvenirs sur
Lenine p.174. English Ed. p. 93).

B. A definition of the process of Bolshevisation
is by no means easy to formulate. To start with, this
process can be conceived as something similar to the
radicalization of a political organisation, i.e., the
taking over of the key positions by those members who hold
extremist views on the specific line of their own organ-
isation. This is naturally followed by the elimination of
those members who manifest readiness towards compromise
with other organisations. We can speak about an "acute"
and a "chronic" aspect of Bolshevisation existing in every
Communist party. The periodical purges refer to the former
aspect. As a result of a purge there are eliminated from
the Party firstly, all those leaders who cannot show
enough flexibility to accept the official line of the
Secretatiat. At the same time, there are eliminated also
those party members who are potentially in conflict with

with the official line, as a whole, or with some of
its points. These are people who were accepted in
the party on tactical grounds, or as a matter of
political expediency. The social democrats for instance
were incorporated with the Party mainly on such grounds,
and were subsequently purged in various stages. In
France and Italy many peasants joined the Communist
Parties on account of their desire for a large-scale
land-reform, or on various other grounds, none of them
belonging to the specific political programmes of a
Communist party. Most of these peasants are far from
being Communists. Yet they are kept on the membership
lists for the simple reason that the Communist parties
in France and Italy need action, for the time being,on
a large basis. A turn in the line of these parties
might result, at any moment in their elimination and
consequently in the reduction in the membership list
to those who joined the Party unconditionally. There
are phases in which the Party closes its doors, shutting
out all members accepted under the title of "relatives",
"friends", or "guests". During such periods the Party
is no longer "a hospitable patriarchal family, welcoming
any sympathiser in its midst" but "...... a fortress,
the doors of which will be opened only to the worthy"
(Stalin quoted by Deutscher, op.cit. p.59).

One can speak, as we have said, about a chronic
process of Bolshevisation. Any turning in the party line

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line produces its victims. The result of this is that
the members who identify themselves with the line, who
are always where the Party is, rise gradually in the
hierarchy of the Party and become its leaders. Thus,
the power concentrates in the hands of those who
display the greatest capacity for discipline, the
greatest determination in carrying out the orders, and
who are ready to sacrifice everything for the unity of
the Party. The Party becomes in this way a perfect
medium for the exercise of absolute power by a leading
group or by a personal leader.

J. Monnerot seizes upon another characteristic
aspect of Bolshevisation. According to him, the
Western Communist Parties undergo a process of
Bolshevisation to the extent they surrender unconditionally
to the supremacy of the Russian Bolshevik Party, to the
extent to which Moscow becomes the centre of decision
for all Communist parties, and the Soviet interests
dominate their political line. The replacement of the
old native leaders by Moscow trained Communists con-
stitutes an important aspect of this process.

In order to complete the meaning of the phenomenon
of Bolshevisation we find it necessary to look at it
from a purely psychological point of view. What happens
when a Party member becomes a "Bolshevik"? How can we
define this particular type of man?

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Combativity is perhaps the most outstanding
mental trait of a Bolshevik. This does not necessarily
imply that he is a quarrelsome man or an hysterical
aggressive. On the contrary, a Bolshevik gives the
impression of a self-possessed and inhibited man. His
combativity is socialised in an almost militaristic
manner, i.e., it is displayed, not at the individual,
but at the group level. When the Party gives the signal
for attack, defining the target at the same time, the
Bolshevik becomes automatically aggressive. Thus the
Bolshevik, though giving the impression of self-
possession, is always ready for attack, always in
search of an enemy. Once the enemy is identified and
the attack unleashed the Bolshevik becomes ruthless in
the extreme. He does not spare anything to destroy
his enemy.

It is exactly the lack of combativity and ruthlessness
that Russian Communists object to in the Western Communists
and it is the combative and ruthless type of man that they
try to create the world over,through the process of
Bolshevisation. They are aware of the difficulty of this
task, for they often notice the regretful fact that,in
the West, not even the Party leaders are Bolsheviks, i.e.,
true Communists. Stalin calls Togliatti "a professor
who could write a good article, but did not know how to
rally the people and to lead them to a goal". Of Thorez
he says; "Even a dog which does not bite, bares its
teeth when it wants to frighten someone. Thorez cannot

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cannot even do that much". (From Stalin's conver-
sations with a group of Jugoslav Communists. Vladimir
Dedijer "Tito Speaks" Weidenfeld Nicolson. London,1953
p. 283). Here Stalin obviously touches upon the main
point regarding the personality of a Bolshevik. For,
the Bolshevik is a man permanently living under the need
of biting. It should only be added that he barks very
little. This is a point which differentiates him from
a Fascist.

I, myself, was surprised how far the Western
Communists differ from the true Bolshevik type. Between
1946-48 I had the opportunity of knowing some of the
Western Communist leaders, and being previously well
acquainted with the Bolshevik type prevailing in the
Russian Party, I could hardly help feeling that, with very
few exceptions, all these leaders were in danger of being
"purged". And I would not be surprised in the least to
see this happening as soon as the Western Parties undergo
                                    (1)
a true process of Bolshevisation.

(1)
    My impressions were strengthened by the observation
made by the leaders of the Roumanian Communist Party
about various Western Communists who visited Roumania
during that period. Their "joviality" and their
incapacity to "bare their teeth" was a shock to the
Roumanian Communists, who were by then thoroughly
Bolshevised. One of these Western leaders created grave
suspicion in the mind of Roumanian leaders as to whether
he was really a Communist or something else.

Needless to say, not all the members of the Russian
Party are Bolsheviks to the same degree. During my

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my participation in the Paris Peace Conference (1946)
I was often under the impression that Vishinsky's
aggression and combativity were not exactly of a
Bolshevik type. He, too often and too quickly flared
up into a rage as if everything was to him personal
matters, and not a few times I was really expecting him
to let slip the word "I", a fatal word for every
Bolshevik. On the other hand, Molotov's combativity,
dull, even, and conveying the feeling that there was no
retreat, was in itself much more of a Bolshevik type.
This can hardly be surprising knowing that Molotov grew
up as a Bolshevik, while Vishinsky, a bourgeois lawyer,
joined the Party late in his forties.

Communist Totalitarianism. The Communist Bolshevik
Party has been built up as the political articulation
of the modern proletariat. It has gradually moulded its
inner structure in the function of an ideology. Mis-
trusting the "spontaneity" of the proletariat, the Party
has detached itself from the masses and became exclusive
possessor of the idea of a new society completely opposed
to modern democracy. In Russia first, and then in various
other countries, this image of society has been enforced
upon the existing society. Thus, one can say that, at
the present stage, Communist societies are the product of
an idea. The Party moulds the individual and his society
according to an idea which comprises in itself the present
and the future possibilities of man. This idea of society

society would sooner or later suppress every
empirically constituted and naturally grown form of
society. State, nation, family would "wither away",
and even the Party itself, for the Party will become
"the whole". Thus human history would become the
field of technology; instead of a "natural" there would
be a "manufactured" society, a society machine.

The proletarian ideology rose and spread as the
imagery of a series of traumatic experiences
characteristic of the modern proletariat, of Marx, and
of the Russian people. It bore in many respects the
mark of "dreamlikeness" and escape from unsatisfactory
conditions of life combined with the hope for
absolute happiness. And yet this can hardly be called
an escape into irreality. The psychological concept
of "reality-fantasy" has a relative meaning on the
social plane. In the last century, European society
has been continually fostering the proletariat's imagery,
introducing new contents into it, so that today this
imagery, this artificial growth, takes the form of
reality. In the meantime the delirious self-consciousness
of the proletariat has adjusted itself to its own
imageries, creating in this way a new type of mental
balance and a new sense of reality. The individuals
born and grown in a Communist society have no other
sense of reality, except that which allows them a satis-
factory adjustment to the social world created after the
proletarian ideology. Another type of adjustment, and /

and adjustment to another world, seems to them unreal
and untrue. It is the first time since Christianity,
in European civilisation, that an idea has given birth
to a new society and world. There is, however, a
fundamental difference between the two "revolutions".
In the former, the idea is transcendental, while in
the latter, immanent. From the psychological point of
view this is of a crucial importance, as we shall see
later.

CHAPTER III

RUSSIA AND COMMUNISM.

> Having ideas in one's head which can never be
> applied is a torture, a terrible torture.
>
> N. Tkachov.

The outburst and the success of the Communist
Revolution in Russia constitute even today a surprise
for many people. The main reason for this it that
the economic conditions of that country were not ripe
enough at the time when this event took place. It is
obvious that in this case Communism is regarded primarily
as an industrial revolution. To hold rigidly to a purely
economic point of view means to refuse to see the inner
aspect of Communism as a phenomenon of its own.
Communism is not an industrial revolution, but "the"
revolution of our time. It is the negation of modern
society. Marx was obsessionally inclined to put things
"upside down", and this is the most characteristic
impulse he could grasp and foster in the working move-
ments of his time. When he learned that his ideas had
fallen on good ground in nineteenth century Russia, and
that certain aspects of Russian rural economy supported
a communist system of ownership, he was quite willing to

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to revise some important points in his system of thought so as to fit it into the scheme of an agricultural society.[1]

[1] This point is dealt with in Fr.Lenz's "Staat und Marxismus" mentioned by O.Spengler in "Jahre der Entscheidung" Munchen 1933, in a footnote, p.89. Lenz puts forward the view that Marx was ready to give up his theory about the role of the proletariat and to create another revolutionary theory based on the historical mission of the peasantry.

It is very likely that Lenz's view is based on the often quoted letter written to Marx round 1880 by the Russian populist Vera Zasulich. In that letter Marx was asked whether Russia might skip the capitalist stage of evolution on account of certain features in her system of land ownership. Vera Zasulich was referring to the existence in Russia of an old type of commun rural property (the village commune). Marx's answer to this question has been differently interpreted. Wetter, analysing the text of both letters is inclined to think that the answer is in the affirmative. (Op. cit. p.86). I agree with this interpretation. It should be added perhaps that the answer was a diplomatic "yes", but non the less positive. Later on Lenin being more Marxian than Marx himself was of a different opinion on this matter.

If this proves anything, it is that Marx was interested in "revolution" and not in an industrial revolution, as will be seen in one of the following chapters, dealing with his personality.

If we accept the view that the main trait of Communism consists in its being the revolution of modern society, i.e., the explosion of a series of tensions existing in that society then we can look at the modern Russian culture-pattern as a characteristic, almost unique, centre of tensions, and consequently infer that it was good ground for this revolution. We have, however, to state from the very beginning that, considering the variety of problems involved in the study of Russian society and culture, we can hardly do justice to this part of our study. We have to confine ourselves to those aspects of the Russian

culture-pattern which are most directly involved in the development of the Communist type of totalitarian society. Our main aim is to show how a series of tensions existing in this society had produced in many generations of Russians a negative attitude towards modern European society, and the desire to create another form of society completely opposed to this.

But before entering into the discussion of this problem it would be advisable to say that we are aware of the complexity of the subject and of the great range of possible interpretations. The reaction against the absolutist regime of the Tsars, the tension between the landlords and a landless peasantry, the existence of some communist features in the system of landownership, or the lack of education in political freedom are very often considered- together or separately - as the main contributing factors to the rise of Communism. In what follows we shall try to focus attention on certain aspects of the Russian culture-pattern and way of life which have,in our opinion, contributed to a great extent to the rise of Communism and to the formation of the Bolshevik type of personality.

Conflict between two Cultures. The main characteristic of the pre-revolutionary Russian political system consists in a specific relationship between the autocratic ruling group and the rest of society. While the ruling group identified itself with various aspects of Western civilisation, the rest of society remained all the time integrated with a Russian native culture. Consequently the

the conflict between the ruling group and the masses,
naturally existing in any absolutist regime, was in
this case even more accentuated by a difference in
culture-pattern. One should add to this the well-known
tendency in the ruling group to westernise Russian society,
and above all the specific methods used to this end.
If we had to say in a few words what seems specific of
the Russian ruling group we should say that this group
always had an "experimentalist" attitude towards their own
society as a whole. As a result of this, Russian society
had undergone a long series of "planned reforms". In
other words, its development has always been under the
pressure of a specific programme or pattern of progress.
Here are some of the main stages in this characteristic
mode of development.

A. The builders of the first Russian State, the Variags,
came from outside Russia. When they devised their vast
programme of political organisation, the Russian peoples
looked upon them as complete strangers whose manners and
language they did not understand. But the building of
the State went on in spite of the enormous gap between
the ruled and ruling groups.

B. The same process took place under Ivan the Third,
who enforced upon the Russian people the idea of Tsar and
Tsardom, having in mind the pattern of a Western empire,
the Third Rome. He could not win over to his "plan" any
but a small minority of "boyars" and part of the clergy. The

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The people remained therefore completely outside the pattern of their own state, and of the culture of their own rulers.

C. Russian feudalism is in many ways an artificial product. It was manufactured in a ~~purely~~ quasi mechanistic manner by the rulers of the State. The Tsar sent his duty men to various parts of the country where they were given land and serfs. This method strengthened in the people the feeling of a strange and enforced social order.

D. The reforms of Peter the Great did not but further these processes. The forced hair-cutting and beard-shaving are in fact aspects of the same experimentalist attitude towards the historical process. Peter the Great offers a unique example of the way society can be moulded by a "technocrate",i.e., a ruler who shapes the historical process in the manner a carpenter shapes his wood. His action of Westernisation went so fast and deep that one could rightly say that he created in Russia a new type of man who is in many ways the ancestor of the present-day Bolsheviks.

E. There are a series of other important stages in this long process. A Toynbee (Reith Lectures 1952) refers to the ~~immediate~~ post - Napoleonic period as another characteristic effort made by Russia to catch up with the West through a series of quick reforms.

Communism is obviously the last stage in the process of Westernisation, and, in our own opinion, the highest stage in the experimentalist attitude towards human

human society. Society, culture, the individual, all
are permanently measured against the yardstick of a
fixed ideology, and of a pre-established plan of progress.

The action of Westernisation, resulted in one of the
most intense conflicts, created by the encounter of two
cultures. It can in many respects be compared with the
tension produced in the ancient world by the clash between
the Graeco-Roman civilisation and Christianity. The
geographical position of Russia explains, at least
partially, the intersity of this conflict. For, modern
Russia had to experience and to re-solve within herself the
conflict between Asia and Western Europe. Being in many
respects Asiatic, the Russian peoples had by historical
necessity to live under the permanent strain of catching
up and keeping pace with Western civilisation. Though we
consider this phenomenon as one of the most specific
sources of Communist society in present-day Russia, in
what follows, we can only give a very brief description of
its most important aspects.

1.   The important fact should be noted that the encounter
between Western and Russian cultures had gradually been
transformed into an inner conflict in modern Russian
society in the sense that the two cultures became in time
two different ways of life open to the Russian individuals
or groups. A definite choice of one made necessary the
struggle against the other. Consequently, Russian society
can be considered as a typical case of a group living for a

a long period under a condition of stress caused by an
intense inner conflict. An analogy with the acting out
of an inner conflict by an individual may help us to
understand various aspects of Russian life connected in
one way or another with the inner conflict mentioned above.

Any period of radical change when two ways of life
conflict with each other, normally produces a high degree
of introspection in the individuals belonging to this
period. The inclination of modern Russian writers towards
psychological analysis, and the important contribution
made by them to the knowledge of the human mind, are, in
our opinion, phenomena closely connected with the inner
conflict in modern Russian culture.

But an inner conflict results also in a high degree
of insecurity. One of the basic aspects of insecurity
resulting from an inner conflict in the structure of
society and culture is manifested as a feeling of apathy and
of a lost meaning of life. This is normally noticeable
in some outstanding personalities, but it can be seen under
various forms also in the group as a whole.

An important sympton of a loss of meaning of life can
be seen in the inclination of the nineteenth century
Russian intellectuals towards general and often vague ideas
and theories, and in their obsession with "ultimate"
problems. These problems seem to spring up directly from
an "under-world", being in no way derived from a systematic
philosophical thinking which these writers might have

have borrowed from the West. In this context Spengler is
right where talking about "the feeling of the steppe",i.e.,
vague and indefinitely states of mind, as one of the main
features of the Russian "soul".

The inclination of Russians towards "totalitarian"
ideas constitute another sign of the tension and insecurity
which characterise their culture-pattern. There is no
other European nation displaying a greater fanaticism of
ideas than the Russians. They hang on to one idea, stretch
it so as to comprise in it the whole world, and then play
out their whole lives around it. Prince Kropotkin was
obsessed with the application of the Darwinian principles
of evolution to human life; Lenin behaved in the same way
with regard to the philosophical system of Marx. "Having
in one's head ideas which can never be applied is a torture,
a terrible torture", says the Russian Jacobin,Tkachov.

The attempt made by Berdiaev and Chestov, among others,
to find in modern Russian thinking the preliminaries of
contemporary existentialism seems partly justified. Russians
have, as a rule, displayed a strong inclination to live up
to one idea. The need of acting out an inner conflict
existing at the core of their way of life forms the root of
this characteristic mental trait of theirs. They seem always to be
always searching for a formula of life, for a total idea,
with which they identify themselves in order to escape the
indecision and ambiguity of their culture-pattern. The
evolution of Russian thought in the last two centuries shows

shows an almost obsessional preoccupation with the
formula of a new way of life completely distinct from the
existing social forms. This is one of the main mental
dispositions which has gradually appeared in the mood of
"total revolution" which forms the basic feature of Communism.

2.   A strong inner conflict in a culture-pattern often
produces in individuals a neutral attitude and indifference
towards cultural values, This is certainly the case with
the modern Russian culture-pattern. The Nineteenth century
European nihilism as a fashion of thinking, had soon become
one of the characteristic features of the Russian "Intelligentsia".
It was there that European nihilism was first worked out
into a general attitude towards life, and then made a basis
for social action under the form of social anarchism. In
these anarchic movements is to be found the germ of what has
been later called "active nihilism", of which the Russian
Communist Party is the last extraction. Through Bolshevism,
European nihilism becomes rationalised aggression and
destruction, in the sense that the negation of social values
becomes itself an ultimate value.

3.   The nihilistic trends existing in modern Russian society
are manifested in the exceptional capacity of this society
to create "deracinated" or outcast people. Generally
speaking, any quick and radical turning in social evolution
is bound to sweep aside various groups of individuals who
may never catch up with the evolution of their own society.
Thus one of the factors contributing to the creation of a
modern proletariat, for instance, consists in the quick

quick change introduced in modern society by the
process of industrialisation. The process of Western-
isation brought similar results in modern Russian society.

But the long conflict between a Western and a native
way of life can explain by itself the existence of such
a great number of outcasts. Many members of the Russian
upper and middle classes, and many members of the
"intelligentsia" in particular, could not satisfactorily
integrate themselves with either of the two conflicting
ways of life. The result of this was that they remained
in a non-descript social category, and in a neutral
position towards the values of their own civilisation.

The "outcasts", by their numbers and by their influence,
formed one of the main problems of modern Russian society.
Very often they are spoken of in terms of a new social
category, of a new human type. They became favourite
heroes in literature, described as "superfluous people" when
they are passive nihilists, or as revolutionaries, when they
are active nihilists. In their own isolation the outcasts
dream of, and act for, a new society and culture. And the
more they cut themselves off from their society, the more
their idea of another society is opposed to the existing
society, and the more they become fanatical believers in
their own ideas.

One of the main causes of the violent clash between the
"old regime" and the revolutionary order in France con-
sisted, according to Tocqueville, in the fact that the new
society was primarily the mental product of a particular

particular type of man, "les philosophes". These men
had the courage to place themselves outside their own
society and to protest against its injustice. The
Russian "outcasts" are in a similar position with regard
to their own society. They construct in their own minds
the image of a new society as a protest against the
society with which they failed to integrate themselves.
Emotional factors such as their insecurity, their
frustrated desire for belongingness, their resentment
against the society from which they had been cut off, are
all woven into their idea of the new society and of the
men who would compose it.

Historically speaking, the "outcasts" originated a
series of social movements known under various names,
yet being in essence very much alike. They all manifest
an aggressive and an uncompromising attitude of unique
intensity towards the existing social order. For them,
there was nothing to be spared in the authoritarian
Tsarist society. These movements constituted the "milieu"
necessary for the formation of a man with a completely
new outlook in life, the fanatic and "total" revolutionary
who regarded the destruction of his society as a sacred
duty. Netchaev, one of these "outcasts" who is now con-
sidered as one of the early forerunners of the Bolshevik
type of revolutionary, wrote in his "Revolutionary
Catechism": "A revolutionary is a damned man; he has no
personal interest and affairs, no sentiments, absolutely

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absolutely nothing of his own, not even a name. "His

name is dominated by one interest only, one thought and

one passion; the revolution. The only science known to

him is destruction. He despises and hates with all his

heart and throughout his life the order of present society".

(Retranslated from the Italian, Netchaev quot. Wetter

op.cit. p.68)
(1)

(1)
    The Revolutionary Catechism is sometimes attributed to
Bakunin. See Boris Nicolaievsky and O.Maenchen-Helfen:
Karl Marx, Man Fighter.
    Methuen and Co. London,1936, p.347. Nicolaievsky
describes, Netchaev as an impostor, liar and ordinary
criminal.

    When, at the beginning of the century Lenin launched

the formula of a party made up of "professional"

revolutionaries, the mental structure of such type of man

had already existed among the outcasts of Russian society.
                     only
It remained for him ~~only~~ to provide such a group of

revolutionaries with an ideology and with precise methods

of action, ie., to transform this somehow incoherent group

into a political movement able to face the problems of its

own time. Marat's formula, i.e., an absolutism can not be

overthrown but by another absolutism, was, so to speak, in

the air.

4.   Not less important is the development on the intellectual

plane of the inner conflict characteristic of the modern

Russian culture pattern. The most important aspect of the

conflict produced in the "intelligentsia" by the process of

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of Westernisation consists in the split of the
"Intelligentsia" into "Wsterners" and "Slavophiles" which
took place in the first half of the last century.

To know which of the two trends contributed most to
the rise of Communist society in Russian is a difficult
problem. The important fact is, however, that the split
itself shows firstly the specific character of the crisis
existing in the Russian culture-pattern, and, secondly,
the pressing need for a unifying formula. The Westerners"
saw this formula in various aspects - trends or ideologies -
of Western civilisation and consequently struggled for
the reformation of Russian society in this sense. They
are undoubtedly for change, radical and quick. It is not
so easy, however, to define the political and sociological
position of the "Slavophiles". They do not plead by any
means for a statu quo . For, their discontent with the
Tsarist Russia of that time is sometimes deeper than that
of the "Westerners".   Since their belief is that Russia
does not belong to the West they stress the separatist
note of the Russian way of life. It is this trait in the
"Slavophile" group that explains their inclination towards
various forms of collectivism, which they oppose to the
individualistic trends of Western civilisation. [1]

(1)
    Dostoevsky deals with this idea in "The Brothers
Karamazov". The Grand Inquisitor prefers security to
individual freedom; prefers the established truth to
innovation. All the main characters of this novel,
Aliosha, in particular, demonstrate the idea that the
individual is responsible in his action for the whole
human race. Berdiaev significantly writes about himself

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himself that "The Ego has been a fatality, both for himself and for God"

The same trait explains also their preference for a rural way of life as a form of protest against Western urbanisation. Both groups, the "Westerners" and the "Slavophiles" prepared the idea of a new Russia, a better one, in this way fertilizing the roots of the Russian Communisy movement.

The outcast character could be extended to the nineteenth century "Intelligentsia" as a group. This is, by and large, due to the process of Westernisation which created a big gap between the educated strata and the rest of society. As a result of this, one can often find in the Russian "Intelligentsia" the feeling of being suspended in the air. Sometimes this feeling is expressed as self-accusation and guilt for not being able to help the back-warded masses. These feelings are particularly characteristic of those intellectuals who belong to the nobility, and who are usually called the "repentant noblemen". At other times the same feeling of isolation and superfluousness comes out in the Russian "Intelligentsia" as an intense desire to intermingle with the lower strata. And as extremism is one of the characteristics of the Russian mind, this desire was experienced by many intellectuals as a Messianic calling. Consequently, they gave up their own way of life and identified themselves with the peasants or with the industrial workers of their country. Tolstoy, for instance, suffers periodically from

from this feeling. The "populist" movement as a whole
can also be considered as an outcome of this impulse.
And, finally, Communism itself has very much profited
by this tendency. For Marxist ideology, and later on the
activity of the Party, offered to the "Intelligentsia" a
good opportunity for the satisfaction of their chronic
thirst for humanitarian action, and an excellent remedy
for their feeling of guilt aroused by their isolation from
the masses. Even today the Communist parties all over the
world regard Lenin's demand made upon intellectuals as one
of his brightest ideas. The intellectual should,
according to Lenin, eradicate any possible difference
between himself and manual workers. He should live among
them and as they live. This idea fitted perfectly into the
frame of mind characteristic of most Russian intellectuals
at the beginning of this century. The same idea is found
in all Communist organisations of today under the form of
a certain mistrust of and even hatred towards intellectuals,
and under the well-known Communist drive to level the
difference between "town" and "village".

5.   After this brief description of the contribution made
by the "Intelligentsia" to the Communist movement, a glimpse
of the growth of the revolutionary idea in Russian imaginative
literature may prove ~~itself~~ rewarding. One could readily
agree that there is a certain peculiarity about the
characters depicted in this literature. One can see in the
first place a certain incompatibility between the Western
logical mind and the mental reactions of these characters.

They all seem possessed by vague states of mind, by
sudden aggressive impulses, by an inexplicable "apathy",
or by a "furor" of action unusual for the mind of
Western man. These characters radiate also a strong
feeling of ambivalence in life. For they are either too
passive or too active, either too humanitarian or too
destructive, too vague in their own minds or utterly
obsessed by one precise idea. In the evolution of these
imaginary characters, one could easily read the same
stages and aims as in the evolution of Russian society
and of the "Intelligentsia". From a vague, almost lost,
sense of life gradually grows a strong urge for destruction
which in time becomes enlightened by the aspiration towards
a new formula of life. Pechorin, Lermontov's hero, travels
infinitely in order to kill his boredom or silence his
deep anxiety and insecurity. He does not belong anywhere,
for he cannot overcome the deep inner conflict of his
culture. Gogol's Chichikov travels also, and amuses
himself with the unusual business of buying "dead souls".
He is a strange individuation of the old culture-pattern,
a dead soul himself, who got lost in nineteenth century
Russia. Gonchatov's creation, Oblomov, is the quaint
essence of a loss of the feeling of life. His inner
conflict reaches such an intensity that it kills in his
mind any initiative and any inclination to action. He is
"the horizontal" man, a man completely devoid of will.

A way out from this existential stagnation is seen for

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for the first time in Eugen Onegin (Pushkin), as a man
possessed by completely irrational impulses for action
and diffuse aggression. He kills his best friend and
then gets lost in the world. His crime is motivated by a
secret drive for excitement and constitutes the spark of
an active nihilism. In Raskolnikov (Dostoevsky) the
elements of the inner conflict come into the open, with a
clear sense of action at the same time. Raskolnikov
strives towards the integration of his personality, i.e.,
the elimination of the duality of the Russian culture-
pattern, by murdering in himself the pattern of the Western
world symbolised in the old money-lender. He reaches
peace of mind in Siberia - the core of the Asiatic way of
life - and in Christianity. The same way is taken by
Necludov the hero of Tolstoy's "Resurrection". The feeling
of conflict and duality in life reaches in him a unique
intensity. There is no solution for him, but in his
renunciation of the way of life offered to him by his
society, and in his "re-birth" for another life. The
spirit of his struggle is Christian, yet his methods and
means remind us in many respects of those used later on
by Communists. (For example, he divides his land among the
peasants who live on it.)

The sense of action increases in intensity and clarity
in later literary products. Sanin, the famous hero of
Artzibashev, is an active nihilist; he lacks only integration
with a social group to be a perfect Bolshevik. [1]

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(1)
    Essenin, the poet of the Revolution experienced in
himself the same feeling of duality and a desire to
eliminate the inner conflict at the same time. He
confesses that he had always been under the impression
that a precipice divided his life completely into two,
and that he had always lived in the uncomfortable position
of trying to reach the opposite shore with one leg.

We should like to close this section by a short com-
parison between the imaginery and the real aspects of
Russian life, during the period under consideration. One
has the impression that the growth of the revolutionary
idea on the fantasy level, from Pechorin to Sanin, is one
and the same process with the growth of the revolutionary
mind from Nitchaev to Lenin.   Though at a different
historical level, Lenin's action is of the same type as
Raskolnikov's. He kills the way of life of his society
in order to make room for the world of his beliefs. The
final scene from Crime and Punishment, i.e., Raskolnikov
holding the Bible in his hand, can be applied symbolically
to Lenin as well. ~~But there is an important difference.~~
The book in Lenin's hand is "Das Kapital".

    Russian Messianism.   Space does not allow us to mention
any but the most important aspects of this phenomenon. The
idea of a great mission ~~with~~ which Providence entrusted
to the Russian peoples is inseparable from modern Russian
history.   Under Ivan the Terrible it appeared as a striving
towards imperium mundi - the Third Rome - then, as the
aspiration to spread throughout the world the true faith,
i.e., "Orthodoxy", and even later, under the form of

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form of "panslavism", i.e., the belief that Moscow as
the capital of the united Slavs will "become the guide of
liberated humanity". (Bakunin.)

The causes of this phenomenon may vary according to
the historical periods of the evolution of the Russian
peoples. We are, however, inclined to think that one of
its main causes lies in the inner conflict created in
the Russian way of life by the process of Westernisation.
More precisely, the repression of the native culture, of
the traditional way of life, by a forcible and ruthless
imposition of Western civilisation constitutes the
formation mechanism of this Messianism. The inferior,
the barbaric and the repressed Russia, the Russia martyred
by her Westernised rulers becomes, in the mind of the
people, "mother Russia", "Holy Russia" or universal
Russia. "We are a backward people and therein lies our
salvation", wrote the poet Mikhailov around the middle of
the last century. At the root of Russian Messianic
feelings lies an inflated national consciousness as a
result of the persecution and humiliation of a national
group. This is illustrated by the rise of the Jewish
Messianic idea, and by the rise of German nationalism
between the two world wars. In modern Russia we cannot
speak of any specific source of frustration and humiliation
of the people if not that produced by an autocratic regime
and by the tension created in her culture by Westernisation.
The tension created by the drive existing in most of the

the Russian autocrats to catch up and overpass the
West can be considered as the main cause of Russian
Messianism.

The universalistic and Messianic character of
Communism came as a new promise for the Messianic trends
of Russian society. The Bolshevik leaders, Stalin in
particular, were particularly concerned wirh rhe fusion
between Russian Messianic feelings and the Messianic
trends of the modern proletariat. It ought only to be
said that Communist society constitutes the meeting
point of three Messianic trends, i.e. that of the modern
proletariat, of the Russian peoples, and the Jewish
Messianism brought in by Marx. Thus the dynamics of
Communism is explicable by the convergence - perhaps a
unique phenomenon in human history - of three forms of
inflated group consciousness: The consciousness of
persecuted Jewry of all times, the consciousness of the
frustrated modern proletariat,and the consciousness of
the Russian peoples whose patriachal way of life was
ruthlessly repressed by Westernisation. Its exceptional
power to appeal to the poor, to the failures, to the
insecure, lies in this web of feelings which led to its
birth.

CHAPTER IV

THE RATIONAL DYNAMICS OF COMMUNISM.

<u>Introduction</u>. According to the followers of
Marx and Lenin, Communist society emerges from modern
European society with logical necessity. It is the
logic of the historical process that leads to this end.
The individual accepts, therefore, the Communist way
of life as soon as he grasps within his own conscious-
ness the logic of human society. The only psychological
factor implicated in this process consists in an act of
AWARENESS on the part of the individual, i.e., a
reflection in his mind of the historical reason. Once
this has occurred, the mental life of the individual
is captivated by the mechanism of history. Thus,
psychology is superseded by sociology, and this is, in
its turn, superseded by economics.

It would be not entirely accurate to infer from this
that Marx and Lenin ignored completely the role played
by the psychological factors in the process of history.
They were aware of their importance, and, in their political
activities, they often exploited the feelings of
insecurity, hatred and envy existing in the working class.
Yet they do not assign to the psychological factors any

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any dynamic roles in the historical process. To them,
the logic of history and society is the logic of the
economic process, and the psychological factors have to
follow it. For Marx and Lenin the proletarian dictator-
ship is only a transitory stage in the development of the
historical process, for the simple reason that they over-
looked completely the essential influence upon the course
of history of such a factor as the lust for power. They
also considered "terror" as a simple political means to
set right and accelerate the rational pattern of historical
evolution.

Today their onesidedness, because of the under-
estimation of the psychological factor in history, becomes
obvious. For one easily notices that the psychological
resultant of terror may lead to the structuration of
Communist society in forms unforeseen by the rational
schemes established by Marx and Lenin. The terror
motivated by the carrying out of a rational plan in society
usually arouses resistance and "sabotage". This calls
for more terror until the whole rational pattern is
reduced to a series of restrictive measures for the pro-
tection of the ruling group. This means "permanent"
rather than "temporary" dictatorship. On the other hand,
the terror characteristic of the Communist rulers arouses
in the rest of the world fear and disapproval which is
very likely to result in the co-operation and even
unification of various "capitalist" countries against

against Communism. This is again a point unforeseen
by the Marxian pattern of history which stresses far too
much the conflict between capitalist countries and their
mutual annihilation.

Some Rational Factors in Communist Behaviour. By
rational motives in Communist behaviour we understand
those motives which are based on phenomena and processes
whose existence in the social environment of the
individual can be proved in such a manner as to satisfy
the present scientific methods and the logical require-
ments of contemporary man. Those motives are also
rational which can be justified in the function of values
characteristic of contemporary civilisation. Here are
some of the most important of these motives:

1. The anarchy of production and the periodical crises
inherent in a competitive economic system should be
mentioned first. The abolition of private ownership and
its replacement by a collectivist system can at any moment
be formulated in terms of rational necessity irrespective
of its practical consequences. Common observation shows
that many people have become Communist or fellow-
travellers solely because they thought it necessary to
correct the insufficiences of the economic system of
private ownership. Many other people, who could not
formulate these objective difficulties of modern society
in a rational system, but who saw these difficulties
all the same, turned Communist from a legitimate desire

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desire to change some aspects of their society. We
consider also this desire to change an objectively
unsatisfactory position as another rational motive in
the acceptance of Communism. Many Italian and French
peasants, supporters of the Communist parties, find
themselves in this position. They have joined the
Party for the wrong reason, i.e., hoping for a land
reform which will make them the masters of the land they
work and live on.

2. Though they are of an emotional nature, we consider
sympathetic feelings as belonging also to the category
of rational motives in Communist behaviour. Compassion
for those suffering from material privation, the sense
of social justice and other humanitarian and Christian
values, belong to this category. There are individuals
who joined a Communist organisation in the hope that the
causes of this state of affairs will disappear in the
society foreseen by such a movement.

3. Two important trends in modern civilisation,
rationalism and scientism can also motivate the acceptance
of Communism.

Communist ideology continues the line of European
rationalism initiated by the Enlightment. Thus it
formulates at a new level the conviction of the rational
nature of history and man. This makes an exceptional
appeal to many intellectuals of today and for many other
categories of people. For, this conviction supplies them
with the necessary weapon against mysticism and ignorance.

By the acceptance of the Communist ideology, many
intellectuals have the genuine feeling that they
integrate themselves with the most valuable and pro-
gressive trends in the evolution of contemporary
civilisation. Those who are familiar with the logical
stringency and the scientific armour of Marx's
"Capital" for instance, can well understand the import-
ance of systematic rational thought and a rationalistic
attitude in life in the acceptance of Communism.

Communists claim that their ideology is scientific;
they consider dialectical materialism as "the science
of science". This obviously constitutes another
rational motive in the acceptance of Communism. For
many intellectuals have adopted Communist ideology
on the ground that it is more scientific than any other
philosophy of today, and that it stands uncompromisingly
for the supremacy of the scientific values in life.
Whether this is true depends a great deal upon the
definition of science. It is nevertheless true that
Marxism is, by its materialism, against mysticism,
idealism and religion, which are in the eyes of many
people the main enemies of modern science and con-
sequently of the modern conception of progress.

There is no other philosophy of today more likely
to stimulate man's pride to become the master of
nature than Marxism. In biology, Lysenko advocates the
idea that the scientific control of nature enables man

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man to create new forms of life, thus foreshadowing
the image of man-made and man-controlled universe.
Soviet economists, historians and sociologists work on
the assumption that human society is rational and
therefore bound to respond to human rational influence
upon it. In their scientifically-oriented minds, they
go as far as to consider society and history as open
fields for "experimentation". Speaking about the role
played by the Soviet writers, Stalin significantly
coined the expression, the "engineers of the human
mind". "Engineer" is undoubtedly the word which covers
the most valuable attitude towards life in a Communist
society.

The lure of science and romanticised scientific
attitude in life constitute one of the greatest
attractions of Communism. In backward agricultural
countries, Communism has the appeal of an advanced
industrial stage whose fruits will be enjoyed
by all. Many intellectuals of South East Europe and
of China, and many peasants as well have joined the
Communist movements of their own countries as a result
of having in mind the advantages of industrialisation
in a collective agricultural system.

Desire to find a remedy for the anarchy of pro-
duction, sympathetic feelings for the victims of
exploitation and of social injustice, raction from
mysticism, and the desire for integration with the

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the rationalistic and scientific values of con-
temporary civilisation have undoubtedly led many
individuals towards Communism. But these "motives"
alone cannot explain the specific psychological aspects
of a Communist organisation in the way in which this is
being realised in Russia and in many other countries.
On the basis of the rational motives mentioned above
one can easily understand the acceptance by many
individuals of an economic system based on collective
ownership, or of a social structure based on the
principle of collective responsibility. But all these
traits, however. important they are in themselves, are
nevertheless peripheral for the understanding of a
Bolshevik type of organisation. Such an economic system,
or such a social structure, can be built up without the
abolition of the moral value of human personality, and
by methods acceptable to the moral and intellectual
standards of Western civilisation. Instead of this we
see that present-day Communist societies constitute in
many ways a denial of the fundamental value of Western
civilisation. They replace the value of personality
with that of the group, the critical mind with dogmatism,
and desire for freedom with desire for excessive
domination or excessive submission. These are aspects
of Communism which cannot be understood in the light of
the above mentioned rational factors.

The fact is that the Communist Parties often recruit

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recruit and select their members in complete ignorance
of their rational motives for joining these parties.
The fact that someone holds a Marxian view in economics
or philosophy does not necessarily make him a good
Communist. The most important qualities making him
eligible and valuable for the Party are ruthlessness,
aggression, submission, and, above all, a great capacity
for hatred. The members displaying these traits have a
far greater chance than any others to pass the test of
Bolshevisation. They have the necessary ability of
retaining their hold on the wagon of the Party however
winding and jolty the road may be. This shows that
there are a series of other mental factors, which play
a greater part than the rational ones in the process
of becoming a Communist and in the specific structure of
a Communist group.

CHAPTER V

THE IRRATIONAL DYNAMICS OF COMMUNISM.

> The curtain was dropped, my favourite saint
> of saints was sacked, and I had to call for new Gods.
>
> Marx in a letter to his father.

<u>Introduction.</u> In this study we have more than
once pointed out that the structure of contemporary
Communist society could be better understood as the
progressive realisation of an idea of society, than
the organic growth of a community of people. This
idea of society arose as the crystallisation, at the
rational level, of a series of trends, economic, social
and psychological, characteristic of nineteenth century
European society, as these trends were seen by Karl
Marx. Later on Marx's follower, Lenin, re-shaped Marx's
social philosophy in the light of the social conditions
in Russia at the beginning of this century.

Both Marx and Lenin projected their own personalities
in their work, both theoretical and practical, to such
an extent that one could rightly presume that without
them the Communist movements and the structure of the
Communist Party and society would have shown considerable
differences from what they are today. In what follows
we propose to discuss some of the main aspects in the structure

structure of Marx's and Lenin's personalities which can
be recognised as elements in the personalities of most
individuals who integrate themselves with a Communist
organisation.

Some Significant Aspects in Marx's Personality.   It
is a striking fact that the development of Marx's per-
sonality bears a strong resemblance to the development
of the working class in the historical conditions of the
last century.   There is no wonder, therefore, that he
became the prophet of the working class.

Marx can be considered as[a]unique case of frustrated
and repressed personality.   One of the main frustrating
conditions of his life lies in his Jewish origin.   The
fact that his family decided to become Christian, though
a common phenomenon at that time, shows all the same that
the adjustment to German society of that period con-
stituted a problem.   Considering the later development of
Marx's personality, his political aspirations in
particular, one can readily agree that this feeling of
separatedness, the feeling of the "never to be washed
off Jew", as Heine put it, constituted a centre of
traumatic experience in his life.   As in many similar
cases, this condition led to an uncommon power of intro-
spection, to "more depth" (Heine) to the apprehensiveness
and irritability which are characteristic of his behaviour.

His multilateral gifts and his difficulties of choice
in life can be considered as other sources of frustration

frustration for his personality. At the age of 18,
Marx shows clearly the signs of a self-seeking man,
living permanently at the peak of his need for self-
assertion. In inexplicable haste he writes poetry,
lyrical, satyrical, dramatic, as well as volumes of
metaphysical effusions. His initial intention is to
become a lawyer, but he buries himself in the study of
philosophy, and finally becomes an economist. As
such, he is still open to radical changes in his line
of interests; he gives the impression that he would
have done well in history, or in any other social
science, had chance led him that way. He could have
arrayed the forces of his great intelligence on any
front of social life, as soon as he had a glimpse of
hope for a final viatory which meant for him no more and
no less than a new world.

But all this considerable intellectual capacity
proved in the long run of little help for his need to
succeed, for his hankerings after fame as a "common
poetaster" (Franz Mehring parphrasing Marx's father, m.
Karl Marx, Allen and Unwin, London, 1948, p.4). The
trouble seems to come from the fact that he does not
like the easy way. Moreover, he seems to throw barriers
in the way of his success. It is very likely that the
need of self-assurance and self-assertion reached in
him, at a very early age, such a high degree of tension
that he was carried beyond the restrictions of everyday
life. He cannot be satisfied by adjustment to

to recognised values.   Self-fulfilment can be
achieved only by revolution.   Marx, like his hero, the
proletariat always lives under the desire to break the
chain of institutionalised life.

Such an intensive need for self-assertion, on the
one hand, and such a spread of energy in so many
directions, on the other, were bound to bring frustration.
Marx is frustrated first of all in his artistic
aspiration.   The poet Chamisso refuses the publication
of his literary essays.   Then in one of his desperate
moods, he writes to his father: "The concern caused by
Jenny's illness, the failure of all my work for which
I'swotted' in vain, the resentment caused by having
been compelled to make my own idol from a conception
which I hated (Hegel), made me ill...." "Once recovered
I burned all my poems and all my sketches for short-
stories" (Letter to his father. 10 Nov.,1837. Retransl.
from French. Marx "Oeuvres Philosophiques. Tom II.
A Costes, Paris, 1935). These states of mind, by no
means common in a young man of 19, convey with crystal
clarity how badly Marx took his failures.   The fall must
have come from a considerable height.

This on on account means the end of high hopes and
desperate strivings for self-realisation. But the
awareness of failure - of hitting beyond the mark - grows
steadily in him to the point of forming a centre of his
own, an insecure, pessimistic Marx.   And the more he

he becomes aware of this part of his personality,
the more possessed he becomes with the desire to
overcome it by a revolutionary act of self-assertion.
When Engels meets Marx for the first time, in 1844,
he finds in him an arrogant, revengeful and intolerant
Marx side by side with a pessimistic one. (Marx as
Writer. Times Lit. Suppl. Sept.8, 1950, p.558). This
is exactly the pattern of feelings disclosed by Marx
himself in the above-mentioned letter written seven
years previously to this date. A spirit of enthusiasm
and over-confidence which drive him to attack the
supreme spiritual authority of his time, Hegelian
philosophy, alternates with a whole gamut of negative
feelings, such as " a veritable rage of irony", doubt,
insecurity and despair. This ambivalence persists as
one of the main features in his personality.

There is another source of frustration in Marx's
personality which illustrates clearly the irrational
dynamics of a Communist totalitarian. Marx's highest
aspiration is to be a political leader and to excel
as such in the practical field of social life. How this
ideal of life came to take hold of the mind of a man
endowed with so many and various intellectual gifts is
not easy to understand. It is very likely that this
strong aspiration springs from the feeling of frustration
embedded early in his personality. His repressed need
for security, and self-realisation might well cause him

him to make this choice. He might have felt

intuitively that there was no fuller satisfaction for

self-assertion tha*n*\the exercise of political power.

But the same drive for political power can be

interpreted as a form of rationalisation of his basic

insecurity. By this he seems to throw a series of

impenetrable barriers across the way leading to self-

realisation, so that any bitterness, any amount of rage

and revolt, and finally any failures, become a priori

justified. This looks very much like the case of the

pessimistic, grumbling girl who believes the reason

of her unhappiness ~~consists~~ lies in the fact that she is not

a man and therefore cannot become a soldier. When she

is told that she can, at any moment, join the army, she

candidly answers that she wants to join the "Foreign

Legion", one of the few, if not the only, military

institutions where women are not allowed.

But whatever its interpretation, this drive in

Marx's personality proved to be a source of frustration

throughout his life. A series of circumstances,internal

and external, stood in the way of its realisation. Marx's

Jewish origin undoubtedly constitutes a certain difficulty

from this point of view. But far more important is the

fact that, contrary to his expectations, no proletarian

revolution took place during his life-time. And there

is a third frustrating circumstance, which is of an

internal nature; Marx has very few qualities necessary

necessary to a man of action, *and certainly* no outstanding political

talents. His work in the First International, between

1864-1874, showed him an irritable man, with not enough

flexibility for the work of co-ordination which is

required even from an authoritarian leader. He "could

not manage the International except through intermediarie

(Times Lit. Suppl. Art. cit. o.557). Marx's management

of the International constitutes a controversial issue.

Mehring for instance is inclined to think that Marx

displayed enough flexibility and spirit of tolerance and

that he did quite well in managing the General Council

of the International. The fact remains, however, that

after ten years of existence the General Council lost

almost all its influence upon the workers' movements in

England and on the Continent, and that this was perhaps

not entirely, but to a great extent, due to its leadership

Marx was often accused of intolerance by the leaders of

the working *-class* movements. Giuseppe Mazzini referring to

Marx's activity in the International, described him as

"a German, a man of penetrating but corrupting intelligence

imperious, jealous of the influence of others, lacking

strong philosophic or religious convictions, has, I fear,

more hatred, if righteous hatred, in his heart than love".

(Nicolaievsky, op.cit. p.271). Bakunin builds up his

own revolutionary movement and calls it, as distinct from

that of the International, "the anti-authoritarian

Communism". There is one point in particular on which

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which Marx shows little flexibility - and this shows
again his dominant drive to exercise political power -
namely the political character of the International.
When he becomes aware that his plan to "politicise" the
International, i.e., to transform it into a super-
ministry of International Affairs, has failed he gives
a mortal blow to the whole organisation by transferring
its offices to New York.

Marx's need for power remains frustrated throughout
his life. His mind has the difficult task of creating
substitutes for it. This makes Marx a typical case of
a political man "manqué", one who can never entirely
express himself in a substitute role.   As a young man
he gives himself enthusiastically to poetry, but the
demonic man of action within him soon breaks through the
poetical imagery. He becomes deeply unsatisfied with
"this poetry thoroughly idealistic" where, "real things
vanish" giving way to "a diluted and shapeless senti-
mentality". (Quoted letter.) This feeling of the
"unnatural", seems to translate the deep reality of his
own personality, the desire for power which cannot be
satisfied in poetry. Later, he attempts to find an
outlet in philosophy, which proves again to be a poor
disguise for his need for power. His style is aggressive
and full of investives, like that of a political debate.
The prime aim of his philosophical thought is to "de-
molish"" Hegelianism as the official philosophy of his

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his time, and finally to demolish philosophy itself.
For, the highest stage of "philosophy" consists in an
act of self-suppression and in its becoming practical
(political) action. As a political pamphleteer Marx
shows the same attitude but in an extreme form. He writes with
the sword and curses like a proletarian turned into a
general by a revolution. Marx's ambition as an
intellectual is to write a book which will revolutionise
human society and turn the whole world upside down.
And even his ambition which today seems so legitimate
for the father of Communism, led in him to frustration:
he dies before finishing this capital book, with his
mind full of doubts as to its final shape and it effect.
Thus Marx finds in his intellectual emigrations and
deviations little or no satisfaction for the basic need
of his personality.   With a remarkable intuition of
the basic condition of his own life he writes at the age
of 16: "We cannot always take up the profession for which
we feel ourselves suited; our relations in society have
begun to crystallise more or less before we are in a
position to determine them" (Mehring. Op.cit. p.5).
Fundamentally he remains a "stranger", a displaced person,
in any of these territories. Perhaps this particular
aspect of his inner life makes him so apprehensive for
the process of "self-estrangement" of mankind in general,
and of the proletariat of his time in particular. However,
we hasten to say that this can hardly be explained as a

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a mere projection. We are rather inclined to believe that one and the same process takes place both in Marx and in his own society. Consequently Marx grasps the process of self-estrangement in his society and in himself at the same time.

It is obvious that interests in poetry, drama, philosophy and science constituted for Marx forms of self-alienation. Sometimes this deep process rises in Marx to a conscious level. He gives the impression of looking at himself from outside and perceiving a multiplied image of himself, like a series of satellites without a sun, or rather like a series of statues of himself. "There are moments in life which put a rigid barrier to the past, indicating at the same time a new direction". ⁱn such moments" .... we would like to raise a monument to what- we-have-lived, to what is lost from the action point of view and remains only in our feelings". These are moments when Marx "sacks his favourite" Gods and calls for new ones, (Qut.Letter). He breaks with himself whenever he passes into a new field of reality in the search of self-assertion. All these passages constitute so many stages in his self-estrangement.

Concluding from what has been said so far, we can say that the main characteristic of Marx's personality consists in a strong inner conflict resulting from the impossibility of self-realisation. It would be perhaps

perhaps more accurate to describe this as a
succession of conflicts and tensions between an uncon-
scious structure dominated by a strongly repressed
desire for power and a conscious structure (the con-
scious Ego) which can offer only substitutes for the
satisfaction of this desire. In his own terms the
inner tension is aroused by an "infrastructure" which
is in "permanent revolution" in order to create an
adequate "super-structure" for itself. The phenomenology
of this conflict in Marx's personality is rich and
varied. In what follows we can mention but a few
aspects which are, in our own opinion, revealing for
the psychology of the Communist totalitarian man.

1. Ambivalent attitudes can be considered as
among the most characteristic symptoms of this conflict.
We have already referred to states of enthusiasm, rage
and omnipotence followed quickly by pessimism and
despair. Marx's attitude towards Hegel discloses
ambivalent feelings clearly. Hegel is for him the great
master of dialectics, and, at the same time, the author
of "an odious philosophy". He shows respect towards
Hegel but only after turning his system upsidedown.
(See the Preface to the second edition of Capital.
p.XCV in the French Molitor edition. A. Costes, 1946.) [1]

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   Ambivalence can be seen in his everyday life. The
revolutionary Marx shows strong feelings of dependence
towards his wife.

A series of other ambivalent attitudes can be found only after a careful analysis of the texture of his thought. First of all his style as a writer bears the mark of an ambivalent personality. The dry scientific style of "Das Kapital" contrasts sharply with the romantic, speculative, and frequently sentimental style of his philosophical works. All his works, the political ones in particular, show a mixture of objective argument and of the careful consideration of facts, with a tendency towards easy generalisation, based on a disturbing reliance on personal intuitions. Marx's attitude towards Man discloses another aspect of his ambivalent personality. He sees the greatness and uniqueness of man in his power to create his own history, in his revolutionary substance. But at the same time he writes in his last book: "My standpoint, from which the evolution of economic formation of society is viewed, as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains. (Preface to the first Ed. of Capital Ed.Cit. p. LXXX). The ambiguity regarding man's responsibility in history, which was later developed as "mechanicism" and "dialectics", as Trotskysm and Stalinism, moreover the ambiguity of the Party's position in Communist society - "avant-garde" or direct expression" of the masses - are all rooted in Marx's ambivalent attitude towards man.

Another sign of ambivalence can be seen in Marx's need for identification with the social group of the proletariat.

A man fundamentally incapable of compromise in his
relations with others becomes the founder of a
collectivistic way of life. This aspect of ambivalence in
his personality becomes, as we shall soon see, an
important problem in the evolution of the Communist Party.
Marx himself solves it on a purely ideological level by
identifying himself with the absolute truth expressed in
his philosophy of history. Thus his fears of being
alone and anti-social are dispelled by the fact that the
Gods - the new Gods - are on his side. Since he is on the side of
humanity he can afford to be against everybody. When
he feels that the whole world is against him, he calls
it "bourgeois", therefore condemned to perish according
to his philosophy of history.

2. According to what we have said so far the reader
acquainted with contemporary psycho-pathology may be
expecting us to apply to Marx the clinical concept of
paranoia. We are, however, not prepared to take this step
for, on the one hand, our knowledge of Marx's life is not
deep enough to support such a view, and, on the other
hand, Marx's personality displays such a complexity of
traits that any separate clinical concept fails to
describe it adequately. But there are some symptomatic
manifestations of paranoia worth mentioning. The final
conclusion remains entirely with the psychopathologist
who would take the trouble to study Marx's life from his
own point of view.

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Thoughts of aggression and persecution abound in
his writings. We have already mentioned the "rage"
followed by disillusion aroused in his struggle against
the Hegelian philosophy. Sometimes he conveys the
feeling that he lives surrounded by a hostile world.
"Free scientific research in the field of political
economy attracts upon itself the most violent, mesquin,
and abominable passion ever experienced by the human
mind, i.e., the fury of private interests".(Capital
Quoted Ed. p. LXXX). It should be added to this that
Marx means by "scientific" research his own and similar
research. A few pages later he describes how the German
bougeoisie ".. has attempted to organise the conspir-
atyen of silehce round "Capital" (Ibldem ,l.LXXXIX).
Sometimes he rises above his universal hostility in a
splendid isolation, comforted by the feeling of his
superiority. On one of these occasions he quotes Dante:
"Segui il tuo corso et lascia dir le gente".

But as a rule his aggression cannot be expressed at
such an abstract philosophical level. He more often
projects it on various aspects of the external world.
Following his writings one can see how his aggression
becomes systematically organised round the bourgeoisie
(1)
and the bourgeois world.

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How Marx works out the concept of bourgeoisie as the chief-object of his aggression is worth careful psychological investigation. The process is certainly far more complex than his writings allow us to understand. The meaning of "bourgeoisie" which is heavily loaded with emotional factors, goes far beyond the protest against the unjust social order created by the conflict between capital and labour. In the Marxian concept of "bourgeoisie" one can often grasp attitudes characteristic of the early nineteenth century German intellectuals against "philistines". The frequent use of the words "philistine" and "philistinism" in his and Engel's writing can be adduced as a proof of this. On the other hand Marx owes a great deal in this respect to St. Simon, who as an aristocrat, looks at the "vile bourgeoise" with profound ~~despiceble~~ hatred.

We say the bourgeois world because it is not easy to make a clear distinction between the "bourgoisie" as a specific object of aggression, and the "bourgeoisie" as the symbol of the whole external world against which Marx pours out discontent and hostility. For, in Marx's conception the bourgeoisie certainly means a specific social group, but at the same time it represents the order of modern society as a whole. In this latter case Marx's aggression against the bourgeoisie means aggression against the social order of his time. This implies a diffuse form of aggression which brings to mind the generalised aggression characteristic of certain stages in the evolution of the modern proletariat.

Thus, as a result of projection, the bourgeoisie becomes for Marx the symbol of hostility dominating the external world. It constitutes a mysterious hostile power hidden in the "infra-structure" of the world and

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and working in a "super-structure" under a series of masks, i.e., ideologies, religion, politics, etc. There is nothing thoroughly friendly, nothing straight in the whole (bourgeois) world. That is why he sets for his philosophy the prime task of unmasking the enemy, a process which becomes an almost compulsory rite in the activity of the Communist Parties of today. This task cannot be fulfilled save by the demolition of the whole social world.

This seems to be a suitable place for pointing out that Marx's aggression was systematically directed against authority and order. It is almost impossible to understand the hatred of his attacks against Hegelianism, at a time when he had no real substitute for it, and no clear idea about its insufficiencies, if not as a result of a deep-seated revolt against authority. It is this irrational factor of his personality that forms the basis of the first point of his philosophical programme, i.e., the demolition of the Hegelian conception as an expression of the recognised order of German society. This programme is extended later to the demolition of the whole of contemporary society. In this way Marx's consciousness of himself grows up in permanent disagreement and conflict with the official world. In fact, Marx's consciousness articulates its own content in the function of this basic conflict. From this point of view Marx's consciousness follows the

the same line of development as the self-consciousness
of the modern proletariat: It grows in conflict with
the world and ends by creating its own world.

3. The conflict with the world forms a closed
circle in the development of Marx's personality.
The discontent and the aggression resulting from his
own failures were projected on to various aspects of
the external world as injustice and hostility against
himself. This increased even more the feeling of
frustration, and raised the conflict with the world
to such a tension that finally no compromise was
possible. Under the impact of this tension his con-
scious Ego grows outside the real world into a world
of its own, outside the present world into a world
of the future. In this lies the source of the
Messianic character of Marx's thought. The weak man
in a desperate struggle with an odd enemy comforts
himself by believing that the Gods are on his side.
Marx inflates his Ego so that the world should submit
to its dictates.

The development of the Messianic character of his
personality follows various stages. One can discover
in the young Marx a pressing tendency towards self-over-
estimation. This looks like an attitude of bravado or
sheer boasting. Characteristic from this point of view
is a passage from the quoted letter to his father:
"During my indisposition I have read Hegel from one end

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end to the another, acquiring at the same time a close
knowledge of most of his disciples". What sort
of indisposition, it was and how long could it last so as
to give him time enough to read the whole of Hegel,
is a puzzling question. Keeping in mind that at
the time when this letter was written (1832) Hegel
had already published his main works, this is simply
incredible. But such an assertion might have satisfied
the desire of an ambitious young man of 19.

Later on his Messianic tendencies are expressed
at a socio-cultural level. Marx objectivises his
repressed desire for success in the struggle for the
progress of a particular social class, and in a
philosophy of history. From now on he would speak
no longer on behalf of himself, no longer on behalf of
subjective individual factors, but on behalf of the
proletariat and of a set of objective laws of history
which would lead the proletariat to its final victory.
The proletariat cannot fail in this historical mission
for the ruler of the world is obviously on its side.

It is curious to notice that Marx is more than
any other modern thinker - with the exception of
Feuerbach and Nietzsche - aware of the inner mechanisms
of Messianic thought. He is convinced that every
social class uses religion as a support for its own
interests, i.e., every victorious social class wins
the Gods over to its own side. And yet Marx is

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is completely blind to the fact that the proletariat's
belief in the absolute truth of its own cause, in
the pre-established order leading to its victory, is
a phenomenon of the same kind. He uses Feuerbach's
criticism of religious faith (God is man's son) only
as far as this does not touch his personal "faith".
For, according to what we have said so far, it seems
obvious that he was personally involved in the
historical mission of the proletariat.

Messianism in general can be described as
satisfaction at the unreality level. As a cultural
phenomenon, Messianism is a prospective myth, in the
sense that the frustrating conditions of the present
turn the people's mind towards a golden age of the
future.

One can distinguish three main components in the
Marxian Messianic inclinations: his personal situation,
his situation as a Jew, and the situation of the
modern proletariat. All three situations are solved
in his mind by the formula: oppressed people -
elected people. The direction in which he resolves
his own critical situation and that of the proletariat
is predominantly towards the future. For, with the
exception of a vague myth of a primitive communism,
there is nothing in the past which might bring comfort
to the present. Personally Marx hated both the present
and the past. The past, and even less the present do

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do not contain proper conditions for self-realisation.
On the contrary, life in the past and in the present
lead to self-estrangement. (Marx knows this only too
well from his own experience).

4. The specific quality of Marx's genius consists
in his exceptional power of transferring at the rational
level the deep emotional factors resulting from a
series of traumatic experiences in himself - as
individual, and as a Jew - and in the modern proletariat.
Perhaps the expression "rational level" is misleading.
It would be more appropriate to say that Marx transfers
in the key of consciousness a series of unconscious
factors. The repressed need for security and self-
assertion in himself and in the modern proletariat ~~are~~ is
the most important of these factors. We have a
particular reason for saying that he transposes a series
of unconscious factors to the key of consciousness rather
than to the key of reason. For, on closer examination,
one notices that Marx's thought displays in a very
curious way a logical deficiency. The impressive
strength of his argument is not always, and not
exclusively, based on logical stringency. There is
always something in Marx which works on the mind of
the reader from beyond the logical concatenation of his
ideas. This is a deep conviction, an almost vital
necessity, which often puzzles the logical mind. He
conveys the impression that he knew the answer to all

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all problems he deals with, before giving any thought
to them. Sometimes he is so self-assured that the
critical reader cannot help feeling that he is being
laughed at and told: "You fool, you are compelling me
to prove what a child knows already". Matters which
perplex anybody, Marx calls "self-evident". In this
specific aspect of his mind is to be found the origin
of his dogmatism, which we shall like to discuss
presently.

We shall deal more adequately with the problem of
dogma in the next chapter. For present purposes it
seems enough to give an operational definition of dogma,
in order to understand the origin of one of the main
features of Marx's personality. A dogmatic attitude
rises from the presence in consciousness of an uncon-
scious factor which cannot be entirely formulated in
rational terms. Dogma is a fundamental truth, i.e., a
truth from which one can derive other truths, but which
is in itself underivable. Behind this truth lies an
unconscious factor inconvertible into consciousness.

Marx gives expression to his own, and to the
proletariat's repressed desires in the theoretical con-
struction of dialectical and historical materialism.
The final victory of the proletariat becomes, therefore,
a necessary stage in a rational argument. But at the
same time, he unconsciously takes all possible measures
to disguise the emotional substance of his thought and to

to construct defences against its subjective
character. His materialistic conception of the world
and his naive realism in the field of knowledge can,
from the psychological viewpoint, be considered as
fulfilling this particular purpose. Marx sincerely
believes his ideas and theories are but mirrors of an
external reality. He would call stupid, foolish or
dishonest anybody who would think otherwise. But in
fact he does not question critically his claim to
objectivity, for the simple reason that he takes it for
granted that his own mind and the human mind in general
are mirrors of the external reality.   If this is so,
how can his ideas be rooted in his own feelings and
desires? How can they be subjective, when he makes such
strong provisions for objectivity? And finally, how
can they be contradicted and ignored, when they are
written in the nature of things.   His ideas are real,
objective and absolutely true, not because he needs them
to be so, but because they represent the laws of external
reality. In this respect Marx is typical of scientific
dogmatism.

There are some other ways in which Marx disguises
the emotional and subjective character of his ideas.
He takes a great deal of trouble - perhaps too much
trouble - to make people believe that he did not reach
the truth expressed in his philosophy by any mystic,
personal, or metaphysical process. His thought merely

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merely expresses the logic of facts. But he is
somehow aware that no logic would incontrovertibly
prove the materiality of the world, the economic laws
of historical materialism or of the historical mission
of the proletariat. Then he would say that the logic
he speaks of is not the logic of individual consciousness,
but that of class consciousness. On this point the
Marxian thought takes a turning never met before in the
whole history of philosophy. Marx claims that his funda-
mental ideas are meaningful and form a rational whole
only within class consciousness. Thus, the standards
to which they ought to be referred are not the standards
of the individual mind, but the requirements for political
action of the proletariat which are reflected in the
structure of class consciousness.

Class consciousness considers true and objective
those ideas which enlighten and support the deep-seated
need of the proletariat for overcoming its insecure
position. The stronger this need, the stronger the
attachment to these ideas, and consequently, the more
dogmatic becomes the truth expressed by them. These
ideas are not the result of the immediate experiences of
Marx or of the proletariat. Therefore their validity
cannot be assessed according to their fitness to the
empirical conditions of life. They are the projection of
a"complex", aroused by a series of frustrating experiences
in the early history of Marx and the modern proletariat.

As such they work as **fixed** ends in everyday experience.
That is why Marx, and after him all Communists, do not
submit their ideas to the test of facts or of every-
day experience; ideas are true or false according to the
ends they fulfil.   Life in a Communist society has a
strong resemblance to life in a religious community:
actions and ideas are eschatologically justified.

Though Marx defines class consciousness in purely
rational terms, its emotional substance is only too
transparent.   Marx's hostility towards irrational factors
in life could certainly be interpreted as a defence
mechanism.   He spares no energy in his war against
mysticism, religion, dogmatism and subjectivism, stressing
all the time the mission of his philosophy to replace
mysticism and religion by reason and science, subjectivity
by objectivity and dogmatism by dialectics.   His
obsession with the idea of pruning the human mind of the
weeds of sentimentalism, of utopianism and of "fetishism"
springs from the same need of self-defence.   Significant
from this point of view is also his obsession with the
phenomenon of consciousness, with the striving of life -
social life in particular - to become self-conscious.
Proletarian society is society perfectly conscious of its
own structure and functioning, a society working like a
concept.   (1)

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The same obsession with the phenomenon of con-
sciousness is noticeable in German Romantics-Marx
being one of them - who more than any other philosophical
school based their thought on emotional - personal -
experiences, and who looked very closely into the uncon-
scious stratum of mental life. What German Romantics -
including Marx - mean by consciousness is certainly a
false consciousness or the Unconscious in disguise.
This may be one of the reasons why Hegel's ideas, for
instance, though impecably wrapped up in rational
formulae, led in the long run to mysticism and
irrationalism, in Fascist society, and to dogmatism, in
Communist society. Hegel's ideas are over-loaded with
factors of an emotional nature which slacken the
critical mind when accepted. To be with Hegel, or
with Marx, involves always a certain danger of "conversion"
and total devotion.

If we try to formulate in a general conclusion what

we have said so far, we would say that the underlying

process of Marx's life consists in a deep crisis of

individuation. None of the successive roles taken by

him throughout his life satisfied his deep strivings and

aspirations. In order to establish a balance between

himself and his environment he became, through his

father, a Christian, then poet, philosopher, economist,

political pamphleteer, professional revolutionary, etc.

He changes country after country .... but all in vain,

for there always remained something in himself that could

not take shape and be satisfied. As a result of this,

Marx appears throughout his life as a man incapable of

fulfilling the demand he made upon himself, and incapable

of giving it up. We think that these demans spring

from his urge for power and his insatiable need for

security. The awareness of this insatiable "Self" made

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made him hate any compromise, any flexible and
evolutionary progress, and any free and peaceful arrange-
ments between human beings, things and events.

He projects his own situation as a man of power,
sentenced to perpetual disguise, upon his society and
formulates the first principle of his social philosophy,
i.e., the dual existence of human society as infra-and
super-structure. Social life is for him an introcate
texture of substitutes, compromises, illusions, and
mystifications. We cannot be ourselves because of the
money we possess, because of our class, because of our
ideas. In their turn, social classes, the State,
religion, etc. are but masks put on real life. Reality and
truth are beyond them, in the "infra-structure" the
main task of which is to hide itself under the veil of
illusion and deception. Marx finds a real passion in
disclosing life's impotence to grow to its proper forms.
But at the same time he is fascinated by the problem of
how to pull off the masks and reveal the reality as "infra-
structure". For as long as it can hide itself it remains
an essentially evil force, a source of unhappiness for
mankind. When he finds it, he calls it "capital", and
never ceases to denounce its machinatious. He recognises
in "capital" the greatest source for "power" in his
society. Is it not a projection of his own "infra-
structure", the lust for power which tortured him so
much?

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With his keen power of reading through and beyond the appearance of life, Marx's true vocation would have been that of a psychologist. But even here he is the victim of self-deception, self-estrangement, in his own words. He denies to himself this natural inclination of his mind, and this denial is radical, for psychology means nothing to him. Thus all his feeling for depth was extraverted, leading him towards the foundation of depth sociology and socio-analysis.

Lenin's Personality. Three men were very close to Marx: Engels, Trotsky and Lenin. They expressed three different ways in which his inner conflict could be acted out and his personality integrated.

Engels is the first to call Marx a "genius", i.e., the most free of men, a man who creates his own world. This would imply that Marx's personality could have been integrated at the fantasy level. Therefore Marx would escape from, rather than realise his desire for power and security. Though Marx is extremely sensitive to this "epithet",he feels all the time that his personality remains something apart from his ideology. Ideology is, after all, a "super-structure", a plan for action, not action itself, tactics to win the power, not power itself.

Trotsky is the embodiment of Marx's insatiable desire for development and assertion, the embodiment of his suspicion of the limiting external circumstances which might bring the expansion of his own self to a halt,

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halt, before its full development. Weaknesses and
fears might lead the proletariat to compromise with
the bourgeoisie before its historical mission is fully
realised. The Marx of Trotsky is "permanent revolution".
Ultimately this is a Marx based only on his unconscious
self and refusing any determination in given historical
conditions. This comes out clearly from Trotsky's con-
cept of the proletariat. For the first condition of
the proletariat's strength and the first guarantee of
its victory is to remain in permanent consultation with
itself, and stir its own revolutionary impulses. During
the revolution, the masses become their own executive
organ; they cannot share and compromise over their own
p ower even with their own leaders. Trotsky sees a Marx
satisfied in his tendency for security and domination,
who is at the same time a Marx living in the vacuum
created by his destructive action.

Lenin alone represents a successful attempt to
achieve a Marx endowed with the sense of reality. He
ignores both Marx the prophet, who had a tendency to
annihilate himself by identification with an absolute
order as expressed by his ideological work, and Marx the
revolutionary, who tends to annihilate himself in per-
manent revolt and aggression. Lenin sees a Marx acting
at reality level. This is neither a universal nor a self-
seeking Marx, but a Marx in the concrete historical
setting of Russia at the beginning of this century. We

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We do not ~~like to~~ suggest that Lenin has a balanced personality in the usual meaning of this word. He does not eliminate anything essential from Marx, for the sake of making him fit into a given sociological reality. What he really does is to examine the <u>sociological feasibility</u> of Marx as a system, and to devise, by ~~the~~ means of a series of compromises between an ideology and a sociological reality, the necessary stages in the realisation of this system. Lenin is the first who had a glimpse of the death of Marx's philosophy <u>qua</u> philosophy and of its transformation into concrete reality.

The first and the most obvious idea derived from the study of Lenin's life is that, in contrast with Marx, he is the political man <u>per se.</u> He manifests early in his life an anxiety to assert himself against authority, i.e., to become authority itself. Unfortunately we know Lenin only when this tendency of his personality is already socially integrated, in the sense that he is already a member of one of the many Russian revolutionary movements. His resentment and aggression take therefore, from the very beginning, the form of an organised social action with the precise objective of over-throwing the Tsarist regime. Whether this authority-anxiety is in Lenin a deep personal factor remains an open problem for us. What we know is that Lenin is the son of a civil servant, (School Master)

and that in Tsarist Russia civil servants were a kind
of officer in the army. When he was seventeen years
old, his eldest brother was executed (1887) for having
taken part in an attempt against Alexander III. As
a result of this, Lenin is excluded from the St.
Petersburg University. Apparently, already at this
stage his destiny is settled. Being already well-
versed in Marx, he consecrates his life to the
"revolution."

We stress the idea that the most characteristic
aspect of Lenin's resentment and revolt does not consist
in their motivation, but in the fact that from an early
age his revolt was socialised. This means that he
started at an early age to discharge his aggression
in socially organised action, being bound to assert
himself in a concrete historical manner. This is not
the case with Marx or Trotsky.

A series of factors contributed to the development
of Lenin's personality in this specific sense. First
of all, at a very early age he assimilates Marxism as a
theoretical guide for political action. After this he
is never in doubt or in search of the ends of his revolt.
Secondly, Russian society was a natural sphere for
revolutionary action throughout last century. In this
society Lenin finds the most determined and efficient
type of revolutionary in late nineteenth century Europe.

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He himself grows up in this revolutionary atmosphere.

Due to these conditions the fundamental question, "What is to be done?", has for Lenin a concrete and precise meaning. He wastes far less time than Marx with fundamental questions, such as whether and when the conditions of revolution are ripe. Lenin knows that revolution is necessary in Russia. Therefore his main question is "What is to be done" here and now, with these people, against this enemy and within this ideological pattern? He needs a living dialectics, i.e., a method of action by which all these factors are made to work together for the revolution.

Marx's struggle with Utopian socialism is a theortical argument; Lenin manifests a phobia of fantasies. He withdraws at the first moment he feels that contact with the ground is not solid enough. "One step forwards, two steps backwards" forms his basic tactical principle. His favourite mythological figure is Antheus.

Marx studied Klausewitz assiduously, Lenin has the science of strategy and tactics in himself. He is flexible and unscrupulous; devoted to his own idea and at the same time paying full attention to everything in his environment which may lead in one way or another to its realisation. One of his tactical principles is rooted in Marx's advice to the members of the Communist League, in 1850, i.e., to make an alliance with the

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the "bourgeois democrats" and to kill them at the
same time. The proletariat movement is for Lenin
primarily a question of tactics which like any tactics
consists in a series of compromises between the final
end and the real conditions of the situation, and in
the capacity for making every factor of the situation
work for this end as long as this is necessary. Unlike
Marx, Lenin shows himself as a master of compromise.
First of all he creates a compromise between the two
theses which divided the Russian socialists over a long
period of time, that of the spontaneity of the masses
and mechanicism. This compromise is the Party "of a
new type" which mobilises the masses and, at the same
time, integrates them in a rigid organization having a
fixed object of attack. The Party is at the same time
an "avant-garde" of the revolution and a brake put on
the working class. He builds up a Party based on the
activity of professional revolutionaries, and yet, he
is more than once against the "comitards" or the
"technicians". He is against them whenever he feels
that the Party becomes, because of their activity, the
prey of "routine". In 1917, and at the beginning of
1918 he bases the political line of the Party on the
"Soviets", (the workers' organizations), a fact which
creates a conflict between him and the technical body
of the Party. Thus he clashes with his own creation.
The "comitards" accuse Lenin of "Trotskysm" while Lenin

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Lenin accuses them of stupidly repeating a formula
learned by heart instead of studying the originality
of new and living situations. (B. Suvarin, "Stalin"
Quot. by Benno Sarel, "Lenine, Trotsky, Staline et le
probleme du Parti revolutionnaire", Les Temps Modernes.
No. 73 1951 p.870). In 1923, just before his death,
Lenin is ready to open an attack against Stalin as the
chief "comitard" in order to render the structure of
the Party more flexible and thus capable of absorbing
in itself the multifarious aspects of the working class
struggle. It was not his "democratic" feelings, as
Trotsky suggests, but rather his strong sense of reality
that determines this attitude in him. He regards the
bureaucratic and monolithic structure of the Party as an
artificial construction. In Lenin's hands dialectics
become tactics. This is undoubtedly the result of his
outstanding capacity to seize upon the weak aspects of
his enemy, and to grasp at the same time the community
of interests between himself and his enemy. All these
elements are fused together by Lenin's mind and used as
weapons in the battlefield. He never loses his quality
of a tactician even in his intellectual work. As soon
as he feels that his ideas get the better of him he
beats a retreat. "One step forwards, two steps back-
wards", remains always his first tactical principle.
He applies it during the NEP, making a quick return to
liberal economy, and on many other occasions.   /

Lenin writes books as a tactician, not as a dealer with ideas. With the exception of his "Philosophical Notebooks", where,due to his isolation in Switzerland, (1914-16) he gives himself up to intellectual activities - all his books spring from,and are meant to solve concrete situations in the political struggle of the Party. The ad hoc character of his books always prevails over their ideological structure. Consequently, these books are primarily guides to political struggle. In this respect his intellectual production is far more homogeneous than that of Marx. Even his main philosophical work, "Empirio-Criticism", is a polemic with his political opponents.

How can we account for this high sense of reality in Lenin?

We have already mentioned that, unlike Marx, Lenin is not a displaced political man. This means that he possesses the proper inner and external medium to act as a political man throughout his life. Therefore he does not need to displace his mental energy in other fields of activity. It also means that he has social gifts which were lacking in Marx. Though irritable and quarrelsome he possesses that degree of flexibility which enables him to find points of contact with others. He starts by assuring for himself a safe position from which he then manoeuvres individuals and groups against each other.

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When his own organisation squeezes him into a tight
corner - and this happened more than once in his life -
he strengthens his position by relying on outside
individuals or groups, as long as he needs to defeat the
inside opposition.   One occasion on which this took place
was between 1907-9 when Lenin relied on Mensheviks in
his struggle against the opposition coming from his own
organisation - Bogdanov Rykov and Krassin.   Sarel Op.
cit. p. 867.) One should mention in addition to his own
social gifts those of his wife, Krupskaia, who manifests
a keen interest in his political activities.

We realise that by saying that he has social gifts
we do not explain the origin of Lenin's sense of reality.
This simply means that his sense of reality is applied
in the political field.   In the explanation of Lenin's
particular sense of reality, of his gifts for compromise
and his power to create social forms we have to start
from the fact that he grew up in an organised group of
revolutionaries.   Whether these qualities of his are the
result of education exclusively constitutes a particular
question which we cannot answer now.   What is important
is the fact that his revolutionary tendencies were at a
very early age integrated in a socially organised action.
In this way he never experienced the drama of Russian
revolutionary "Intelligentsia" expressed in Tkachov's
words: "Having ideas in one's head which can never be
realised is a torture, a terrible torture".   For him the

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the revolutionary Russia with its Marxist ideology
and its political organisation is a reality, we can say
reality itself. He cannot think and act but through
this reality.

Somebody - Plechanov we think - said of Lenin
that he talked and thought so much about revolution that
he was bound to make one. This is true in the sense
that Lenin had in himself as data of his own personality,
the fundamental conditions of revolutionary Russia.
Thus he can correctly be called a "national type" (the
expression belongs to Sarel). As Trotsky says, he
represents not only the Russian worker but the Russian
peasant as well. We can add that he has in himself the
basic elements of a Russian and a Western revolutionary
intellectual.   Perhaps this heterogeneous character
of his mental structure explains to a certain extent his
capacity for compromise and his flexibility in the
realisation of his political programme.

We have to stress once again the idea that Lenin's
concept of reality is, in the social field, identical
with the revolutionary Russian society.   In this respect
he is a genius of realisation. He grasps the vague
revolutionary forces diffused throughout the Russian
social environment and immigrates them into powerful
revolutionary organisation. No one before or after him
could easily find more the way from potentiality to
actuality, in the social field, i.e., the passage from

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from vague aspirations and a variety of almost
meaningless discontents to an efficient and organised
revolutionary movement. This subterranean reality was
his own reality, and his work led to its expression in
the Party. While Marx grasped in the modern proletariat
the seed of revolt, and developed from it the idea of
revolution, Lenin sees this idea in reality and helps
it to grow into the tree of revolution.

Because reality is for Lenin the reality of the
revolution, his meaning of the concept of compromise
and his capacity for compromise is limited. Lenin
uses all the elements of Russian society - inner con-
flict, classes, feelings - with the express purpose of
creating the Communist reality. But throughout his
activity he is never in real compromise with non-
revolutionary society. He never goes half way to meet
the non-revolutionary elements of society. His meaning
of compromise can be formulated as follows: Befriend
your enemy, your opponent in order to liquidate him more
easily. And this is the meaning of compromise instilled
by him into the Communist Party all over the world.

Lenin is ruthless and unprincipled, but eminently
tactful from the point of view of political action.
Towards the "bourgeois" world he has no morality, though
he is completely integrated with the values of his own
world, the revolutionary world. His behaviour can be
described paradoxically as a form of moral immorality.

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For he is so closely integrated with his Communist
order that he can claim - he did in fact - that his
disruptive activities are moral and even humanitarian.

Though at the moral level he completely identifies
himself with the idea of Communist society, he seems
to preserve a certain intellectucal flexibility which
is completely lost in his followers, as we shall
presently see.

Stalin's Personality. When Lenin died Communist
society was still in a state of fluidity. He preserved
to the very end of his life the character of a tactician.
He was always ready to exploit new possibilities, to try
new movements and to engage new forces. This
differentiates Lenin both from Marx, who is wrapped up
in his "idea" of a new world, and from Stalin, who is
caught in the reality of the new society. Due to the
historical stage of the Revolution and to a series of
factors involved in his personality, the rise of Stalin
means the absolute end of the "idea". In Marxian terms,
Stalin represents the self-suppression of philosophy and
its displacement in practical action. The Party as a
stable form or organisation is the only reality in
Stalin's eyes. His only task is to make it work
efficiently. To exploit possibilities and let the Party
open itself to new forms of organisation and to new
modes of life is against its own interests. Less debate
means less dissension which results in a greater capacity

capacity for action. As early as 1911 Stalin called
the polemic between Lenin, Trotsky, Martov and Bogdanov,
concerning vital points of orientation, a "storm in a
glass of water". Lenin himself after his quarrel with
Bogdanov Rykov, and Krasin, fearing that much discussion
would harm the unity and the efficiency of the Party,
turned towards Stalin as to a saviour. And it was at
Lenin's recommendation that Stalin was in 1912 co-opted
in the Central Committee and made responsible for the
delegation of this Committee in Russia.

One usually refers to Stalin as to a bureaucrat
and a consolidator. This means that once he takes the
leadership the Party, as the expression of Communist
society, can no longer grow from within, its potenti-
alities being exhausted. Nor can it change its
structure as the result of its contact with the external
environment. There is no inner effervescence in the
structure of the Party, because the Party has already
produced its type of man and its type of action. Thought
and action become "cliché" and routine in character.

Stalin is the first outstanding example of the new
type of man. His mental elements are almost identical
with those of class consciousness, which will form the
subject of the next chapter. But before this, we should
like to say something more about the relationship between
Stalin's personality and the structure of the Party.

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If from what we have said so far the reader will
understand that Stalin as a personality had no influence
upon the structure of the Party, we are ready to make a
fair recognition that our own ideas regarding this
particular point can hardly be organised to such a degree
as to lead unambiguously to a clear-cut conclusion.
This situation seems to arise from the difficulty of
using in this context the concept of personality as an
individual having its own feelings, its own ideas and
will which leave their specific mark on society and
history. Though recognising that in this way we throw a
serious obstacle in the way of psychology, we are tempted
to suggest that, at this stage in the evolution of the
Party and of Communist society, it would be profitable
to abolish the classical concept of personality and to
replace it with the concept of the Party, as a collective
personality. For whenever we try to analyse the influence
of Stalin on the evolution of the Party we have to face
the same difficult problem. Is his action prompted by his
passions and by his impulses, or is that action the
resultant of a general atmosphere, of a series of trends,
habits of mind, mechanisms existing in that collective
organism called the Party? One thing seems certain:
Stalin's success is not due to his popularity in the Party
and even less to his populatity in Soviet society. We
are inclined to think that his success is due to the fact
that he always was "the Party man" the man who knew how to

to ride on the line indicating the "necessary"
evolution of the Party. His utterly "anti-democratic"
attitudes are certainly rooted in the fact that he never
sought to accord his action with the opinion of the
individual members of the Party, but rather to the spirit
of the Party, i.e., to a complex of factors economic
and psychological which held together that strange
collective organism. Those who know something about the
role played by the LINE in a Communist society, about
its power, its independence and its caprices will under-
stand that such a position is possible.

In his biography of Stalin, Deutscher seems to be
involved in the same kind of difficulty. Dealing with
the conflict between Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders -
Bukharin in particular - he starts by making certain
allowances for the role played by Stalin's "private
ambitions" in this conflict. Then he stops abruptly as
if surprising himself treading on a wrong path. He closes
this episode, so important in the evolution of the Party,
by the enumeration of a series of objective conditions
written in the nature of Soviet society which made Stalin
act in the way he did (Op.cit. Chap.VIII The Great Change.)

But this is not the whole truth. For there is
another perspective, completely opposed to the one
mentioned above, from which Stalin's personality can be
viewed. This is Stalin as an individual with an iron
will, who works his way up to the top of the Party most

most of the time struggling with individuals and
groups representing views opposed to his own.   This
is the man who finally creates a new stage in the
evolution of the Party and of Communist society called
Stalinism. The mental make up of this Stalin, if
analysed, may disclose important psychological factors
in the composition of contemporary Communist society.

Since a choice between these two views is difficult,
we would rather leave room for both and conclude the
present chapter as follows: If Stalin's political
activity proved that behind it there was a personality
having its private interests and ambitions, this might
be considered as the last case in which a personality,
in the usual sense of the word, stood at the head of
the Party. After Stalin's death the Party can no longer
be considered as an agglomeration of individuals shaped
by the will of one leader. The Party, and the C.C. in
particular - is itself an organism which functions like
an integrated personality. We would not hesitate to
look upon it as upon a new form of life individuaition.
Its leaders bear less and less the mark of personalities.
The struggle between them, if there is any, will look
less and less like a struggle between independent
individuals which might put the Party in danger, and more
and more like a struggle between the cells of an organism.
Malenkov, Beria or Molotov are cells rather than organisms.
Who can sense the pulsation of a personality under words

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words and phrases like the following:-

"Our friends respect us because we are strong, and will respect us only as long as we are strong. The weak are not respected. If we are respected it means that we shall not be hindered in our task of construction. It is wrong and dangerous to overestimate one's strength, but still worse to underestimate it, because then one is liable to be stricken by panic". (Quot from Manchester Guardian, March 7/195.)

Stalin's elementary and depersonalised style is pushed here to an extreme. Malenkov is literally the mouthpiece of the Party and it becomes more and more the only personality in Communist society. There is little wonder that Malenkov has started his own regime with the battle against "the cult of personality", and against "the mastery of _individual_ formulations and quotations" of Marxist-Leninist theory. The positive aim of this battle consists in the confirmation of "the collective character" of the Party's leadership. (See Beria's accusation act. Italics ours.)

C H A P T E R   VI

THE   PSYCHOLOGY   OF   DOGMA.

Dogma and Myth.   In Part II of this study we have
shown that the most striking feature of the Nazi way of
life consisted in the inclination of the individual
belonging to it towards mythical thinking on one hand,
and in the readiness of his culture pattern to provide
his mind with myths on the other.   If we have to define,
in the same way the specific psychological feature of a
Communist way of life this undoubtedly consists in the
individual's dogmatic attitude to life, and the readiness
of his culture-pattern to provide his mind with elements
of dogmatic thought.

One usually defines dogma as an idea which can neither
be checked by the logical functions of the individual
mind, nor revised in the light of subsequent experience.
It should be added that dogma implies the imposition of an
idea by means other than the stringency of the rules of
human understanding.

For Marxists, dogma has a specific meaning.   They
call dogmatic any idea or any ideology which persist after
the material conditions which gave rise to it have been
superseded.   In this specific context Stalin speaks (The

(The Problems of Leninism) of two kinds of Marxism: dogmatic and creative Marxism. While the former turns Marx's ideas into dead formulae, the latter transposes them into a living organism, by their uninterrupted adaptation to the concrete situations of life. Soviet Communism belongs, according to Stalin, to the latter. We cannot enter into a full discussion of this problem, but we should like to make the following two points:

A. Recent experience has shown that, although material conditions were quite different in South East Europe, the Communists applied the same precepts and the same methods as in the Russia of 1917. The Soviet attack on Tito offers a recent example of a dogmatic rather than a creative Marxism. B. The material conditions referred to by Marxists follow in their evolution the fixed pattern prescribed by Historical materialism. The ideas describing the changes which take place in the material condition of Communist society belong to a dogmatic body of doctrine. Consequently, the concept of change cannot be opposed to that of dogma since the pattern of change is dogmatically established and asserted.

Myth stands for hope or horror, dogma for the most rigorous form of knowledge, i.e., for concepts. Myth-making rests on the power of the imagination to mould emotional factors; myths may serve as guides for reason, but very seldom do they replace it entirely. Dogma, on the other hand, rests on the power of the intellect to transpose emotional factors into its own key, yet failing

failing to change their irrational nature. The
fathers of the Church moulded the emotional need lying
at the basis of Christianity into a set of fundamental
truths. Marx, Engels and Lenin did the same with their
own emotional tensions and with those of the modern
proletariat as well. While in myths we have to do with
more or less complex projections of emotional factors,
in dogma we are faced with the CONVERSION of emotionality
into reason, or with the conversion of unconscious into
conscious forms of experience. Thus myth reveals itself
for what it really is, while dogma is a false
merchandise, i.e., emotionality and irrationality dis-
guised as intellect. The process of conversion explains
to a great extent the compulsory and intolerant
character of dogma. The certitude, the universality, and
the rigidity inherent in dogmatic knowledge is the reflex,
at the level of consciousness, of a repressed emotional
situation resulting from precarious and insecure con-
ditions of life. This arises as a defence mechanism
when the admission to consciousness of the emotional
situation of insecurity makes the adjustment to life
difficult or impossible. From this primitive basis,
dogma-making develops into an autonomous mechanism of
the mind in the sense that the individual or the group
develop negative attitudes towards anything subjective
and emotional, and against anything unstable and cir-
cumstantial. This goes hand in hand with the growth of a

a compulsory need for putting any experience of life

under the protection of an objective and absolute order.

Marxian dogma is rooted in the need of Marx and

of the modern proletariat to repress their emotional

experience of insecurity, created in them by various

conditions of life. It expresses, at the same time,

the need, deeply seated in Marx and the proletariat,

to convert their "cases" into general problems, i.e.,

the desire of the proletariat to become "universal".

The result of this repression is that, today, the pro-

letariat justifies its ideas and actions not by its

traumatic experience and the emotional result, but by

the objective qualities of the working class, and by

the universal laws of history. Its emotional need has

been converted into the objective and rational order of

the world which cannot fail to assert itself. [1]

[1]
    Psycho-analytical thinking offers another example
of dogmatism in contemporary civilisation whose origins
are similar to those of Marxism. It is know that Freud
arrived at the formulation of the basic concepts of
psycho-analysis by self-analysis, i.e., by the awareness
of his own "disorders". This particular and subjective
basis of the psycho-analytical concepts has been con-
verted into a set of objective laws of the human mind.
The concept of the Oedipus complex can be taken as an
example. For Freud, the Oedipus complex is a con-
stitutional element of the human mind, existing in all
individuals and in all historical times. In this way
the subjective and circumstantial character of Freud's
knowledge becomes a law of the psychological universe.
Freud's great concern with the "scientific" character
of psycho-analysis is significant in this respect.
He wanted psycho-analysis to be neither more nor less
than a rigorous science whose object is the universal
laws of the mind.
    A great proportion of psycho-analysists are like

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like Freud. They are converted to psycho-analysis because they have personal experiences which fit into the psycho-analytical pattern. But almost instantaneously they reach the conviction that psycho-analysis is the only explanatory system of mental life and consequently psycho-analysis is "the science" of the mind. This phenomenon cannot be understood but by assuming that the conversion of their own "complexes" into objective laws of psyche constitutes for them a form of acting out of their "trauma" and therefore is an inner necessity. They find a real help in their solidarity with others. In this way they try to escape their "peculiarities" by generalising them by the means of a theory. The modern proletariat proceeds in the same way; it generalises its own case and transforms the world into a universal workers' society.

The dogmatic attitude of psycho-analysists does not consist in the personal and subjective source of their knowledge, but in their tendency to subtract this knowledge from under the influence of any personal and relative factor. They mistrust and suspect anyone who discriminates between various aspects of their doctrine. If psycho-analysis is accepted it should be accepted as an indivisable truth, and its practice carried out in an "orthodox" manner. Like Communists they have their own heretics, and like Communists also, they systematically fail to see the point of view of their opponent. A Freudian would explain any anti-Freudian attitude as a "defence mechanism", i.e., as a refusal to recognise the sexual essence of psyche. A Marxist would call his opponent a "bourgeois" meaning by this that he has strong economic and social reasons to oppose Marxism.

Marxian Dogma and the Displacement of Religion.

J. Monnerot uses "le deplacement du sacré" as the key psychological mechanism in the rise and the development of Communism. He understands by this, the repression of religious experience which takes place in modern man under the impact of science, on one hand, and the displacement of the repressed religious need into various fields of secular activity on the other. This constitutes, in our opinion, a useful application to sociology of two fundamental psycho-analytical concepts, that of repression and that of displacement. Since this is closely connected

connected with the origin of Communist dogma, we
should like to put forward our own point of view on
this matter.

From the cultural point of view one can distinguish
various stages in the repression of the religious mode
of experience in modern man.

During the Enlightment the religious mode of
experience is repressed to the extent that its sub-
stance is irrational. It is, however, accepted by the
individual's consciousness to the extent that it can
become an element in the rational scheme of the universe.
~~In other words, religion is accepted only to the extent~~
~~that it does not conflict with a rational conception of~~
The tendency is to
~~the world. Thus, I. Kant~~ conceives religion "within the
(Kant)
boundaries of reason", ~~while~~ The French Revolution
suppresses the religious mode of experience in principle
and replaces it with the cult of reason. Robespierre's
attitude towards religion, for instance, is characteristic
of a culture-pattern dominated by science. He accepts
religion as a need of the people. Thus, he spares the
religious feelings of the masses to the extent that he
can use them in the service of the Revolution. Religion
is, therefore, a "means" which should be used within the
rational scheme of the Revolution.

The specific relationship between religion and
Communism is rooted on the critique of religion made
by the Hegelian group of the left, Marx being one of them.

The starting point of this stream of thought consists in Hegel's view on Christianity. Christianity marks for Hegel a particular stage in the evolution of "Idea", i.e., a historical embodiment of Reason. Starting from this general statement <u>Strauss</u> makes the attempt to determine the historical element involved in the structure of Christianity. The empirical conditions of Jewish society and of the Graeco-Roman world constitute for him important elements in the rise and the development of Christianity. Thus the sacred and transcendental character of religion is according to Strauss always intermingled with a series of empirical conditions of life. <u>Feuerbach</u> is the first to formulate a radical critique of religion from this specific point of view. He denies in principle any transcendental element in the composition of religion and consequently explains it as a purely empirical phenomenon rising from the material conditions of human life. "God is man's son" is the inevitable conclusion of Feuerbach's point of view.

Feuerbach's critique constitutes the starting point of Marx's view on religion. But the idea should be stressed that it is a starting point only. For Feuerbach, though maintaining that religious modes of representation are projections of the material conditions of man, does not go deeply enough into the implications of this assertion. He declares himself incapable of understanding the transition from unconscious matter to consciousness.

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In other words, he shrinks from the analysis of the
process according to which certain material conditions
of human life are transformed into religious representations.
Moreover he explicitly says that he is aware of the
vacuum existing between the Unconscious and consciousness.
Or, it is precisely on this vacuum that Marx wants to
build up his own view of religion. To start with, he
arbitrarily fills this vacuum with reason. Consequently
religion becomes, for him, a purposive action. It is,
in fact, a tool created and used by the ruling class for
their economic and political purposes. Thus, being a
product of class society it will necessarily disappear
in a classless society, i.e., in a proletarian society.

It is worth while analysing the bearing of this con-
ception on religious experience and on its repression in
particular, in a Communist society.

Marx has an ambivalent attitude towards religion.
As a representative of scientific rationalism, he sees
in religion a simple "mystification" of reality and as
such he opposes it as he opposes any form of fideism.
He places himself - and so do his followers - in the
"avant-garde" of the struggle against mysticism and
ignorance. Marx is, in this respect, in a far more advanced
position than his master Feuerbach. Feuerbach's criticism
resulted undoubtedly in a paralysis of the transcendent
element of religious experience. According to him there
was no basis for the sacred character of religion. But,

But, and this is an important point, the religious
mode of experience was in principle possible as a
natural phenomenon. Marx, on the other hand, takes a
short cut by declaring religion not only a disturbing
phenomenon for the rational order of the universe,
but also an ill-intended action, an important source
of man's exploitation by man. Here Marx is in almost
the same position as Freud. Religion is for Freud
simply maladjustment and, as such, it should be con-
trolled and finally "suppressed" by reason.

Marx lived in a period of enthusiastic belief in
the power of science, and of reason in general.
This made it easier for him to find outlets for
repressed religious feelings and needs. The rational
order of history, extracted from the "scientific"
analysis of modern European society and expressed in
the doctrine of historical materialism, capture all his
faith and power of worshipping. Therefore, unlike
Feuerbach, who apparently stops at the first crisis of
the need of the sacred in man, Marx shows signs of an
exceptional power to displace religious need in other
fields of mental activity. For Feuerbach God is dead,
and in that he is a representative of European nihilism.
Marx's mind cannot be kept for long in a negative
position. If God is dead he "calls for new Gods"; he
even sees the concrete image of Him in the modern
proletariat.

Marx's attitude towards religion is that of a dis-

disillusioned fanatic, rather than that of a cold
scientist resigned to a Godless universe. He uses the
rationalistic critique of Christianity only to pave
the way for another Messiah.

It is exactly the same psychological pattern which
works in the modern proletariat. The position of the
proletariat towards religion is only indirectly affected
by the progress of science. Its faith is shaken
primarily by its misfortunes which resulted in its
desolidarisation from modern society whose God fails to
come to its rescue. The Marxian doctrine and the
activity of the Communist Party precipitated the re-
pression and the displacement of the proletariat's need
for religion. At the same time they produced a positive
and negative transference of religious need. For,
according to the Marxian doctrine, the God who failed
to help the proletariat is not its own God, but the God
of its enemy, the ruling class. Thus the old God became
the bad God, and as such it was expelled from con-
sciousness. But in spite of this, the modern proletariat
is even less prepared than Marx to accept a Godless
universe. For the same doctrine, which helped it to
expel the old God, helped it to create "its own" God.
The new Messiah is preached by Marx in the form of a
new society, from which the redeeming of the proletariat
must come.

It is worth while mentioning that the part of the

the Marxian doctrine which describes the new world
as completely devoid of mysticism and religious modes
of experience has only superficially touched the mind
of the proletariat. The operation which takes place
is the displacement, rather than the suppression of
religious need. Once the religious need is detached
from a transcendental object it is successively dis-
placed upon various empirical objects such as the
"Human species", the proletariat as a social class,the
Party, Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov.......... This process
is still operating in various forms, depending on the
historical setting of various Communist societies.
The formula is: Your God is dead, long live "our" God.
We have purposely confined the displacement of religious
need to what seems most characteristic of modern
Communist society. Monnerot rightly shows that the
phenomenology of this process in modern society is much
larger. He treats the secular myths of modern man as
among the most conspicuous results of the displacement
of religious feelings. The Myths of "nation" and of
"people" were both launched by the French Revolution, the
myth of "human species" formed the core of the socialist
movement of the nineteenth century, the myth of
"individuality", characterised Romanticism, and finally
the myths of "race" of "collectivity" and that of State
are various concrete forms of this process.

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There is another myth, however, overlooked by
Monnerot, which has an important bearing on Communism.
This is the myth of science, which has grown steadily
since the Renaissance, with a sharp spurt in the nineteenth
century. In its struggle against the sacred character of
religion science has assumed for itself this character.
Marx and Engels express but a current opinion when
claiming that the salvation of mankind will come from
science. That is why they consider it only right that in
the society conceived by them the throne of religion
should be usurped by science. "In the history of natural
science - writes Engels- God is treated by his defenders
as Frederik Wilhelm II was by his general and servants in
the campaign of Jena. Little by little the whole army
capitulates; the fortresses one after another fall in
front of the advance of science which ends by conquering
the infinite domain of nature with no place for the
Creator's refuge" (Dialectique de la Nature. Marcel
Riviere et Cie, Paris, 1950, pp.264-265.) Considering
the impressive progress of science, it is only natural for
Marx and Engels to put their own ideas under the tutelage
of science. But, surprisingly enough, they do this not
because they feel the need to verify them in every-day
experience, or to justify them in the light of reason
applied to experience, but, in order to endow them with
the highest authority possible, and thus to protect them
from criticism based on experience and reason. This shows

shows an important feature of their minds, which has become characteristic of Communist man. Scientific language is for this man a cloth which covers his dogmatic thought, i.e., it is a way of declaring their ideas sacrosanct.

The Critique of the Critique of Religion. According to an opinion supported in many psychological and sociological quarters, Russian Communism is in essence a religious phenomenon. More precisely, it is an example of secular religion. The roots of this phenomenon lie in the repression of religious experiences taking place in modern society in general, and in Communist society in particular, and in the displacement of religious need upon a series of empirically definable situations such as an ideology, a political party or a leader.

We do not question the existence of the processes of represession and displacement in Communist society. Yet we can hardly agree that this results in a real religious phenomenon. Since the analysis of such an important question of principle would take us far beyond the purpose of this study, we have to confine ourselves to the main points of our own position as follows:

The transference of the repressed need of sacredness does not mean that a new religion is created, nor even that a new kind of religious experience is in course of

of development. This means only what it really says,
namely, that man is in need of an absolute point of
reference in life, in need of a dogmatic knowledge,
or in need of establishing a relationship of absolute
dependence between himself and a certain empirical
condition of life. There is more than one way of
fulfilling this need; it can be fulfilled by
metaphysics, by art, by science, or by a political act.
It can also be achieved by the simple act of friend-
ship or love. But, though all of these manifestations
are motivated by the human need for absolute depend-
ence and security, none of them can be said to touch
the essence of religion. For, apart from its
motivation, religion consists in a particular expression
of human inner experiences rooted in the need for
absolute dependence. In this expression, which takes
place at the conscious level of mind, lies the essence
of religious experience. Briefly speaking, the essence
of religious experience consists in the freedom of the
individual's consciousness to link itself by "faith"
with a transcendent world, to call that world "God",
and to base the meaning of life on this. Religion is
opposed to any act by which man limits himself to an
empirical condition of life.

The mistake of those who consider Communism as a
religious phenomenon springs from the fact that they
take too narrow a view of religion. They reduce

reduce religion to some particular condition of mind such as projection, compensation, or, generally speaking, the urge to escape an empirically definable insecurity. All these are, in our own opinion, aspects of religion, but they do not make religion. They form the contents of the psychology of religion, not of religion itself.

The psychology of religion starts off from the point that religious belief is an answer to a state of insecurity. Consequently, it studies certain empirically definable states of insecurity, in children or in certain collectivities, and infers from this the rise and development of religious behaviour in general. The interest of psychology is concentrated on motivation, which is defined as a certain state of insecurity in the human mind. But the psychologists often gloss over the important fact that, from this angle, they can never grasp the essence of religion. For at this motivational level they cannot quite distinguish between a religious experience, a crime, or incest. An historically and empirically conditioned state of insecurity can express itself as an outburst of religious feelings, as an aggressive war, or as a collapse of any kind of faith.

This is the reason why we consider that religion is not historically conditioned. It is true that religion, as the need for sacredness in life, is the answer to a state of insecurity in man. Yet this state

state is not a "certain" state, i.e., created under certain empirical conditions. It is rather the state of insecurity and incompleteness which characterises the human condition as a whole. Religious experience transcends the human condition in that it answers the insecurity of the human condition in general. We hasten to say that this insecurity of the human condition in general is not a metaphysical phenomenon. Its peculiarity is that it is far more difficult to define than any specific state of insecurity and thus it cannot readily form the object of an empirical science.

These are the main reasons why we think that Communism, though displaying a series of religious symptoms, is not a religious phenomenon. Communist dogma manifested in the Communists' belief in the Marxian doctrine, in their readiness to accept the words of their leaders as sacred, is rooted in a certain need for security, created in the modern proletariat and in the Russian people by specific historical conditions. The immanent rational order as described by historical materialism, the belief in the historical mission of the working-class, and the worshipping of Communist leaders satisfy this particular state of insecurity. These manifestations are no more religious than the child's belief in the strength of his father, or the adolescent's worship of his girl-friend. They do not answer the fundamental need for the sacred and transcendent in man.

The first proof of this is the fact that in Communist society religious need is experienced by people alongside political dogmatism. The 1936 Constitution makes only a start in the acknowledgment of the existence of a genuine religious need in Soviet Russia.

In conclusion one can say that Communist society displays a crisis for the sacred in life, rather than an impulse to make life sacred. True religion can not exist in a culture-pattern where life is deprived of its transcendental dimension. The dogmatic assertion of an immanent rational order, and the belief in the Party and its leaders, as the agents of this order, do not have a religious meaning. They do not express a need to transcend an empirical condition, but rather a strong need for the rationalisation of an empirical state of insecurity created in a group.

Communist Dogma as a Symptom of Over-Rationalisation. We have said already that dogma and dogmatic inclinations result from the invasion of consciousness by unconscious irrational factors, disguised in rational forms. The emotional conditions of Marx and the modern proletariat, their fears, their insecurity and hopes crystallised at the conscious level of the mind in a series of scientific laws which demonstrate the rational articulation of the world. How can we prove that the fundamental concepts of the Marxian doctrine are disguised emotional factors? The main proof consists in

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in the fact that their acceptance or refusal are on no
account conditioned on the logical norms of human
understanding. Who can prove empirically, or who can
conclude from the logical analysis of the data furnished
by nineteenth century science, the materiality of the
universe, or the economic substance of human society,
or the destiny of the modern proletariat which is
described in such precise terms by Marx?   Man's
decision on issues like these comes from behind, some-
times in spite of the rational laws of his mind.   It
is faith, rather than scientific proof, that has the
last word on these big issues.   The modern proletariat
regards the fundamental ideas of Marxian philosophy
as absolute truth, and not as empirically founded con-
cepts, for the simple reason that they justify in an
objective manner its emotional situation, its fears,
aggression and hopes.   In this lies the main source of
the dogmatic character of these ideas, and of the
unflinching belief Communists have in the truth which
they express.   Any doubt about these ideas, and any
allowance made for their opponents, constitutes a
relapse to insecurity and darkness over the future of
the proletariat and of those identified with it.

　　We cannot understand the origin and the function
of dogma in Communist society except ~~but~~ as an excess of
rationalisation, or an over-rationalisation.   This
process can be viewed from two main aspects, a cultural
and a psychological one.   /

We have already mentioned that Communist ideology
crystallises in a period of strong belief in reason
and science. One of the main characteristics of this
period consists in man's tendency to establish scientific
laws in the field of history and of social sciences.
Marx himself extends the power of reason, under its
most precise formulation, as scientific laws, in the
field of economics and sociology. By implication he
extends the same rational pattern in the field of
psychology, to the extent to which he considers
psychological phenomena causally connected with social
and economic factors. In this field, however, rational
laws, functioning according to the model of physical
science, cannot be maintained without falling into a
dogmatic attitude, i.e., without entrusting these laws
with power which does not entirely derive from the facts
to which they refer. This is precisely what Marx does.
He bases his scientific claim in the field of sociology
and psychology upon a set of absolute truths.   The
materiality of the universe is the first and the most
important of these truths. If every sociological and
psychological phenomenon depends ultimately on material
factors, then the claim of treating the field of
sociology and psychology in the manner of physical science
is fully justified. Thus, the prestige of science
characteristic of his period made Marx apply its pattern
in all fields of life, the result of which being an

an excessive rationalisation which is inherited by
his followers.

From the psychological point of view the process of
over-rationalisation is rooted in the emotional state
of insecurity, intensively experienced by the modern
proletariat. Rationalisation is, in this case, something
like a compulsory ritual, by which the proletariat acts
out a deeply repressed desire for security. Thus,
the mind of the proletariat is in permanent need of
accepting and creating schemes of understanding and
action, by which its position in life is assured in
advance with mathematical certitude. The proletariat's
apprehensions and fears become in this way baseless because they
are against the object laws of history; its hopes will
certainly come to fruition, for they are supported by
these laws.

This is the proper place to say something about the
almost obsessional concern with "reason" and "conscious-
ness" so characteristic of Communists. We have already
mentioned that one of the main features of Marx's
personality consists in his effort to bring the whole
realm of existence under the control of consciousness.
This remains also as a main impulse in Communist man and
society. Communists flatter themselves that in their
own world the economic, social and political processes
are very little, if at all, subjected to chance. As
a contrast with Fascists, they never base their actions

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actions on feelings or momentary impulses. Consequently they are never too tired to state to themselves and to others the "reasons" of their action. Any task given to a Communist has to be based on rational motives. He is asked to repeat and to appropriate the whole range of reasons presented according to the Party line until it is made certain that there is no place for doubt and no need for further debate in his mind. At their meetings, Communists debate for hours and days on points, which for any outsider seem trivial details, until the reasons for their final decision appear clear in the mind of each member.

The Communist trials illustrate best their excessive need for rationalisation. In the first place, they never pass sentence without trial, as the Nazis often did. Moreover, they are never satisfied if the defendant accepts his sentence passively. They ask him, to analyse himself and to find the reasons for his offence or crime, and they prepare him to this end by various techniques. He has to <u>argue and to plead</u> against himself. Bukharin can be mentioned as a typical example.

Needless to say, the "reasons" offered by defendants have a peculiar character. They appear to the logically-constituted mind understandable and not understandable at the same time. They are intelligible to the mind which can accept as dogma, firstly, the principles of dialectical materialism, and secondly, the norms of/

of another kind of consciousness completely different
from individual consciousness. For when a Communist
rationalises, he does not justify his action or his
intention in the light of logical thought, but interprets
his own problems according to the norms and requirements
of class consciousness, with the structure of which we
shall deal in the next chapter.

C H A P T E R   VII

THE   PSYCHOLOGY   OF   CLASS   CONSCIOUSNESS.

A New Point of Contact Between Man and the World.
The Communicat "lives" for his group as thus organised
by the Party. Consequently the content of his mind
is shaped and communicated according to the structural
conditions of class consciousness. This condition of
the human mind is acknowledged by Soviety psychology
which is avowedly against any kind of depth psychology
or the psychology of the Unconscious, and at the same
time, against the psychology of consciousness to the
extent that consciousness means a structure of the
individual's mind. The Unconscious in itself does not
count, because there is nothing in the individual's mind
that is not a reflection of the rational structure of
his society. Consciousness is, on the other hand, an
inter-individual rather than an individual structure,
for the simple reason that the individual cannot exist
isolated from his society. The true object of psychology
is class consciousness, i.e., the mode under which human
beings become aware of themselves as a group.

The position of Soviet psychology is by no means
clear. As a science it is still looking for its birth

birth certificate, for in a culture-pattern, where the mind is the reflection in man of the material conditions of life, psychology could easily be reduced to economics and sociology. But we know that the object of Soviet psychology is a new type of man, the concrete man or man as society. The mind of this man is structurised in what we call class consciousness. As an operational concept, class consciousness can be described as a mental structure whose functions are to guide and organise the contact with the world of the human group. Whether the existence of such a structure is possible may be disputed. The anthropologists (Levy Bruhl) have brought various data regarding a primitive stage in the evolution of human society where the mind of the individual is completely submerged in that of the group. Historians such as Jakob Burckhardt conceive medieval man as existing as class rather than as individual. In principle there is nothing against the occurrence of a stage in the life of a community at which the individual's mind is articulated by those experiences which are significant for the life of the group exclusively. The existence of class consciousness should, therefore, be regarded in the light of this probability.

Considering the Marxian doctrine from a purely psychological point of view, we can say that class consciousness is the psychological aspect of the world. It is in fact the only psychological factor that reflects the world from the right angle, i.e., the world as a

a historical process. It follows from this that
the human being as adequately integrated (adjusted to)
in the universe to the extent he thinks, feels and acts
as a group.

For the definition of class consciousness it is
worth noting that the concept of the natural human group
is for Marx identical with the concept of social class,
and that the social class rather than the individual is
the natural unit of human existence. Marx's argument
on this point is by no means psychological. The human
being becomes, he says, a factor in the process of pro-
duction, and therefore an entity in the historical process,
only as class. Since for Marx the difference between man
and animal consists in the fact that "men create their
own history" it becomes obvious that man is not himself
except as social class, for only as such can he become a
determining factor in his own history. In other words,
man as class creates and masters his own history, while
as individual, he is created and mastered by it.

The social class is, according to Marx, an economic
category - a decisive factor in production - it can,
however, become a psychological one to the extent that
the individual identifies himself with his class and
becomes by this an active factor in history. It is not
seldom that Marx gives the impression that the social
class is an "incarnated" economic category and as such
it behaves as a personality having its own Ego, and, at

at any rate, its own consciousness. Sometimes the
bourgeoisie is depicted by him as a hero disguised as a
Roman (The Eighteenth Brumaire) and the proletariat as
an invincible soldier marked with cicatrices.

Yet neither Marx nor any of his followers give any
clear idea about the structure of a social class from a
psychological point of view. All we can say is – and
this is in our own terms – that the social class
represents the "individuation" of the historical process,
that it is the basic unit in the battle field of human
history, and that the individual by himself represents
nothing more nor less than a soldier lost from his own
unit. The last part of "Capital" where Marx promises to
deal with the structure of the social class ends before
he says anything significant.

The Historical Topography of Class Consciousness.
According to the doctrine of Dialectical Materialism,
Communist society, or the Communist stage in human society,
is the expression of the working-class. Therefore, what
Communists designate as class consciousness, and what con-
stitutes the psychological structure of Communist man,
is in fact the self-consciousness of the working-class.

We have shown in an earlier chapter that the self-
consciousness of the working-class is a historical product
of European industrial society. Since this particular
historical context explains to a great extent the com-
position of class consciousness we repeat in a   short

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short version the argument of that chapter. The modern
proletariat became conscious of itself as a class,
during a period of economic crises in Western society.
The main psychological effects of these crises on the
proletariat are two: (1) a deep feeling of insecurity
and (b) aggression firstly diretced against the rulers
of industrial society, the employers, and then gradually
extended to the whole social system. As a result of
this situation, the proletariat has gradually detached
itself from the rest of society and created from its own
condition of life a new type of society meant to sub-
stitute the old one. Thus the process of separation from,
and conflict with, a hostile world lies at the basis
of the self-consciousness of the modern proletariat.
To this fundamental condition is added an impulse in the
proletariat as a class to create a way of life of its
own. At this stage intervened another important factor
in the structuration of class consciousness, i.e.,
Marxian ideology, which gave a rational expression to the
proletariat's attitude against an industrial society of
the nineteenth century and to its strivings for a new
type of society.

From the psychological point of view it is important
to know that what Communists call class consciousness is
the result of an historical process by which a social
group - the proletariat - grew conscious of its own
specific position, in specific historical circumstances.
Of a particular importance are the proletariat's relations

relations with other social groups and with society
as a whole. In these experiences lies the main source
of the traumata which dominate the mind of the
European working-class. For the inner experiences
aroused by the historical conditions referred to
formed a "complex" which unceasingly generates the
mental categories by which the modern proletariat
interprets the world. The categories of class con-
sciousness are therefore rooted in a "historical complex"
specific of modern European civilisation. This means
that what happened once at a specific stage in the
evolution of European society has become, in Communist
society, a general situation: what was once a concrete
experience has become a mental category in the modern
working-class.

Marx has an ambivalent attitude towards the
historical character of class consciousness. The rise
of the self-consciousness of the modern proletariat
is, according to him, conditioned by certain historical
circumstances. And yet, once constituted, class con-
sciousness loses its historical character. It is no
longer the self-consciousness of a specific group, but
human consciousness in general. Thus, Marx transposes the
historical condition of the modern proletariat to the
human condition in general. Without knowing it, Marx
has thus recognised the tendency of every psychical
complex to become a general condition of the mind,

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<u>The Structure of Class Consciousness.</u> We have
already mentioned the fact that at the basis of class
consciousness lies an emotional condition created in
the modern proletariet by a series of social circumstances
characteristic of the nineteenth century. This takes us
back to the idea that class consciousness is false con-
sciousness, in the sense that its structure and
functioning is greatly conditioned by irrational factors,
i.e., a repressed emotional condition of fear and
insecurity. The mental structure that controls and
enlightens the relationship of a Communist with his world
is impregnated by the projections of this unconscious
emotional state. That is why class consciousness shows
important symptoms of an unconscious structure: it is
collective, it is not reflexive but exclusively active,
it is not theoretical but practical.

It is not easy to define the collective, super-
individual character of class consciousness, but we can
talk about primitive-irreflexive and reflexive collective
features of the human mind. The former is predominantly
unconscious and expresses itself as emotional belongingness
to the group. The latter is on the other hand rational.
It rests on the individual's capacity to accept and work
with values, social and moral, common to a whole group.
The inter-individual character of the laws of intellect -
the logical laws - forms the largest basis of this
collective feature of the human mind.

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Class consciousness obviously belongs to the primitive level of collective tendencies in the human mind. The proletariat's solidarity, which has been transmitted to Communist societies, is rooted in the emotional state of the solodarity of a group under conditions of danger. The Communist's identification with his Party, and his unconditional surrender to the requirements of his society show nothing of a rational type of integration. And, yet, class consciousness is expressed also by the rational laws of dialectical materialism. The order based on these laws is different from that of the classical Aristotelian logic but it can be regarded as a rational order all the same. And, in spite of this, class consciousness is not a rational structure. Respsonible for this is its basic practical character.

"The question as to whether human thought is objectively true is a practical, not a theoretical, question", says Marx (Theses on Feuerbach II). Or it is exactly the definition of "praxis" that discloses the irrational character of class consciousness. For, in the last analysis, the criterion of "praxis" is rooted in a sort of instinct which guides the working-class - organised by the Party - towards a dominant position in modern society. The laws of dialectical materialism are permanently controlled by a fundamental emotional situation, defined either as fear and suspicion, or as an

an aggressive need for security. True and
objective is everything that satisfies this emotional
situation.

One of Lenin's ideals was to create a political
party which has the capacity of organising itself in the course of
action, i.e., the capacity to completely adjust its
final ends to the concrete situations of life. This
was for Lenin the highest expression of political
tactics. We are under the impression that this type of
organisation is an embodiment of class consciousness.
For class consciousness has no formal laws of organ-
isation and no inner standards. It has only a set of
final goals. Logic, as a settled rule of its own
activity, has no meaning for it. In its activity, it
takes various shapes and it uses various standards; it
might appear as its very opposite, as during the NEP
period or during the Soviet-German alliance of 1939.
The only criterion of orientation consists in final
success (of the Party) and anything which can be
instrumental to this is good, true, real and primarily
practical. Though speaking the language of the
universal laws of dialectical materialism, the activity
of class consciousness is dominated by rough emotional
categories. Anything contradicting itself is
immediately wrapped up in an emotional state of "danger"
and "enemy", while whatever fits into its own structure
becomes a "friend" a "fellow-traveller". Divergence in

in views signifies for it "split" and danger rather
than just another opinion; error means heresy and
treason, rather than ignorance.

The Categories of Class Consciousness. One normally
equates consciousness with a logical structure and
opposes it to the Unconscious. This does not hold good
for class consciousness. For, if class consciousness
is a logical structure, then its logic is different
from, and in many respects opposed to, the traditional
concept of logic. The main difference consists in the
fact that the categories of class consciousness can by
no means be described as the formal laws of human
thought. The meaning of this will be revealed by what
follows.

The first categories of class consciousness consist
in the main principles of dialectical materialism: the
materiality of the world, the principle of the whole,
the principle of contradiction, or of the power of the
negative, and the principle of evolution. Thus, in the
light of class consciousness, everything has a material
cause. This means that its laws cannot be satisfied
unless this principle is clearly confirmed in every
field of human knowledge. In the field of philosophy and
psychology, mind is the product of matter, in the field
of sociology, the underlying causes are of economic
nature, in the field of biology - as the case of
Lysenko has recently demonstrated - the material con-

conditions of life form the basis of explanation.

The principle of the whole constitutes another con-
dition of truth. This implies that knowledge based on
the structure of class consciousness is not adequate
until each particular phenomenon becomes a function in
the structure, or a momentum in the evolution of the
universe as depicted by dialectical materialism. This
is the totalitarian principle of class consciousness.
The third condition of truth is laid down by the
principle of movement $_{and}$ of evolution. Class consciousness
is not satisfied unless it is fully aware of the fund-
amental fact that "everything is in transformation".
The principle of contradiction or of the power of the
negative constitutes the fourth condition of truth.
This implies that the relationships between things are
more adequately expressed in terms of their opposition
than of their identity. The elements of the dialectical
universe condition each other by mutual struggle.

The important fact should be noticed that these
categories do not behave like formal laws of human con-
sciousness but like concrete categories of existence.
The reasons for this assumption are two.

A. The Communists hold the belief that the categories
of class consciousness are external realities. Matter
itself is constituted according to the principles of
dialectical materialism, and class consciousness does not
but mirror the dialectical articulation of the universe.

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Engels in "Anti-Duhring" and Lenin in "Empirio-Criticism" can, on this point, be classified as typical representatives of a naive realism. (For Engels, even the Kantian categories exist in the external world.)

B. As a consequence of this attitude, the Communists "reify" the categories of class consciousness, i.e., they conceive them as material forces working in the universe. One of the concrete forms of the category of matter is identified with the economic factor of human society. Therefore the universe of man is the product of the material conditions of life, as they are organised under various forms by human economic activity. The category of the whole is materialised by the Party, "that great whole" as Lenin called it. One of the main "reifications" of the category of movement consists in the pattern of social evolution as described by historical materialism. The category of contradiction is "reified" as the class-struggle, as class society, and as the struggle between the new and the old, in a classless society. If Communists cannot see the world in the function of these material forces, their theoretical and practical certitude is completely lost. What is the position of a particular phenomenon in the process of production, what stage does it represent in the process of evolution, what is its connection with the social whole as represented by the Party, are fundamental

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fundamental questions for the mind of a Communist.

There is another feature of class consciousness which increases the concrete nature of its categories. Class consciousness is primarily action, and then understanding. Therefore these categories are rather "drives" or voluntary forces than forms of understanding: they work for their own realisation in the world. The activity of the Party consists in the acceleration of the process of evolution along the lines of dialectical materialism. Class consciousness is therefore the embodiment of the constitutive principles of the universe and of the driving forces towards the realisation of these principles as well. It follows that the categories of class consciousness are not only the intellect but also in the will of the individual. They engage him totally.

Here we come to an important point regarding the structure of class consciousness, i.e., its emotional aspect. Even from a superficial observation one could conclude that the categories of class consciousness are endowed with a certain emotional tonus. This is, however, not enough for the understanding of the part played by emotionality in the structure of class consciousness. In our own opinion one has to speak of a second set of categories of class consciousness which are of an even more concrete character than those mentioned so far. These are emotional categories. Considering their concrete character we can call them

them existential categories, for their structure and functioning bear close similarity to those structural factors of human consciousness which Kierkegaard and his followers opposed to the formal laws of reason. Kierkegaard spoke of faith as the main existential category whose principal function was to promote emotional participation, or identification with the truth, thus leading to the total commitment of the individual.

This is the proper place to make a special note concerning the Russian contribution to the structure of class consciousness. We have shown in some previous chapters how Communism is a double product of modern Western and Russian culture-patterns. The main idea was that certain trends in Western European society, such as the political anarchism of the working-class and the anarchical movements in general, have been rapidly assimilated to the social and spiritual conditions of modern Russia and gradually developed into contemporary Communism. Here one can see again how the Russians assimilated another product of Western culture, i.e., a specific type of consciousness, an emotionalised consciousness. Needless to say Russians have always regarded Western Rationalism as completely incompatible with the human condition in general. They have always shown their preference for a different, a more integral contact between man and his world than that allowed by

by the formal laws of the intellect. Dostoeusky's
criticism of Western civilisation can be adduced as a
proof. Russians have been permanently yearning for a
world shaped by human wishes and aspirations.   Con-
sequently, the type of emotionalised consciousness
characteristic of the modern proletariat fulfils pre-
cisely the demand made by Russians upon the human con-
sciousness in general.

Faith is undoubtedly one of the features of class
consciousness, as we have already demonstrated when dis-
cussing the displacement of religion characteristic of
the Communist way of life. Ther are, however, a series
of other emotional factors, even more concrete than faith,
guiding the activity of class consciousness. These are
the most important:

1. Inimical feelings constitute the most intense
emotional factor in the structure of class consciousness.
The presence of an enemy is a condition of life for a
Communist individual or group. This attitude can never
be explained factually, i.e., by the analysis of the
empirical conditions of a given conflict. Hostility is
in fact a category of class consciousness. As such it
is a condition of the Communist's perception of the world
and a presupposition of its action, in precisely the same
way as causal determination is a condition of the
scientific perception of, and action upon, the material
world.   /

The modes in which this emotional category
work are very varied. The most general one can be
described as a tension aroused by the permanent
awareness of a danger or of an enemy which, if not
already facing the individual or the group, must be
round the next corner. Class consciousness is never
satisfied unless it identifies and engages the enemy.
From the same emotional category derives the com-
bative and aggressive attitude characteristic of a
Communist. Ruthlessness and determination are to a
Communist simple techniques for dealing with situations
in which the presence of bitter opposition is a
necessity. Therefore, to strike first and mortally is
a condition of adjustment in a world built up by class
consciousness. Conciliation, appeasement and com-
promise, if they ever occur, should be regarded as
tactical steps and by no means as abrogation from the
fundamental law of hostility.

Suspicion is another manifestation of this
emotional category of class consciousness. Since we
are going to deal more adequately in the next chapter
with this phenomenon, for the moment, we confine our-
selves to pointing out that suspicion is a generalised
attitude in a Communist society. For it is suspicion
that defines the essence of the inter-individual con-
tact in such a society. "The other" is first of all

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all a potential enemy. It is necessary to mention
that this attitude is shown not only to outsiders but
also to the Party members. No one who ever joined a
Communist Party could escape the feeling that, for a
period of time, he was under heavy suspicion from his own
"comrades", and that the intensity of this attitude could,
in time, decrease, but the attitude as such never dis-
appeared. Due to this attitude the new convert has
always the feeling of expiation, and, quite frequently, he
becomes suspicious of himself.

The identification of the enemy is, as we have
already mentioned, a condition of life in a Communist
group. For, the enemy certainly exists. It remains
only to be identified and fought. This is one of the
main tasks of Communist leaders, of the secret police
which exists in every Communist organisation, and of
every Party member. This is the meaning of Communist
"vigilance". The internal enemy cannot so easily be
identified as the external one, the class enemy. That
is why in a Communist group there have been developed
special techniques for the discovery of the internal
enemy. Special agents are entrusted with the task of
engaging the Party members in discussion on various points
concerning the "line". Needless to say, these agents work
on the assumption of the necessary existence of the
internal enemy. Consequently, their technique is that of
a "provocateur". The result of this is seen in the
periodical "purges" taking place in every Communist

Communist organisation.

One can talk also about directions and mechanisms in the process of enemy identification. It is usual for a Communist organisation to identify the enemy outside itself as a class enemy, counter-revolutionary movements, or as the capitalist world in general. Consequently the fears, the suspicions and the aggression existing at the basis of class consciousness are projected on these various inimical objects. But the same suspicion and aggression can take quite an opposite direction by being projected on the organisation itself. The outcome of this is the "self-criticism" which is one of the fundamental techniques of a Communist Party. The increased importance attributed to the technique of self-criticism in the Russian Communist Party is worth noting. In 1947 Zhdanov pointed out a new form of progress and evolution in Soviet society. (Problems of Philosophy Moskow. No.1 1947). He says that in a class-less society the dialectic of class struggle is replaced by the dialectic of criticism and self-criticism. This implies, in our own view, a sharp twist given to the process of enemy identification in the Bolshevik Party. After the disappearance from Soviet society of social classes and of the reactionary groups, the suspicion and aggression inherent in the structure of class consciousness are more intensely directed towards the Party itself. In Zhdanov's terms, the Party grew more capable of discriminating in its own structure, between the "old" and the "new", between the regressive and progressive. Consequently the Party displays

displays a greater ability to identify its own enemy with

the "old" and at the same time to identify itself with the

"new".   In the light of what we have said so far with

regard to the structure of class consciousness, self-

criticism is undoubtedly another mode of manifestation of

the emotional category of hostility.   Psychologically, it

is a form of self-aggression which has been translated

by Zhdanov at the cultural level into a fundamental
                                                    (1)
principle of progress in Soviety society.

(1)
        From the pathological point of view, class con-
sciousness would adequately be described as a paranoiac
structure.   Since fears, suspicion and aggression are
permanently projected either on to the external world or
on itself the individual and the group have to adjust
themselves to a world richly populated with evil forces
coming from outside, or from within.   We are inclined to
go a step further and to describe class consciousness as a
paranoia-making - structure in the sense that any individual
joining a Communist Party would sooner or later be con-
ditioned to paranoiac behaviour, i.e., would have to adjust
itself to a world in which the presence of inimical forces
constitutes a main condition of life.

        2.   The feeling of change can be considered as the

second existential category of class consciousness.   This

cannot simply be reduced to the abstract category of

evolution.   Communists "live" the change and transformation;

they experience day by day this dimension of life, and express

it under countless forms such as increased production,

better organisation, growth of the Party, etc.   Life in their

world has certainly acquired a new tempo which can be com-

pared only with that of the early days of the Renaissance or

of the industrial revolution.   But, while in the former two

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two cases the new tempo touched primarily, if not exclusively, town life, in Soviet Russia it includes country life as well. The tower clock beating every quarter, so characteristic of the Italian cities of the Renaissance, has become in Soviet Russia one of the masters of the Kolhoz-life. For, when Communists aim at the abolishment of the difference between town and village, they mean among other things to induce an agricultural worker with the same sense of time as a factory worker or a clerk.

The feeling of change engenders an optimistic state of mind in Communists. This is because one of their inner tensions- the frustrated desire for change in the modern proletariat - is reduced. Consequently they are able to bear any strain and to work hard for any length of time if they only feel that the world is changing. No wonder that the word "progressive" carries such a heavy meaning with them. Activity, in a Communist organisation, has always something of a neurotic character, as if it were motivated by unconscious conflicts. The Party members are almost permanently on the job, and it is not seldom that they collapse of exhaustion, like soldiers after a hard battle. Hardly is a job finished, but their consciousness is worried about what is to be done next. There is always something important that has not yet been done. One of the greatest dangers in a Communist society is to "get drunk with victory".

The feeling of change, in a Communist society, though powerful, is not disruptive. At least this is the way the Party members experience it. This is because change is kept under the check of a pre-established pattern. What happened to the category of hostility has happened to the feeling of change as well. Class consciousness has established it on the cultural level as a philosophy of change and evolution. This is another source of optimism and "vitality" in Communist society. For as a result of it Communists believe that the objective laws of history and of the universe work for the viatory of the working class. (Stalin "Le Materialisme Dialectique et le Materialisme Historique" Ed. Sociales Paris 1945 p.17).

3. The need for unity is another existential category of class consciousness. Whoever lived in a Communist society could easily make the observation that the mental capacity of the Party members rises to a higher level when they work in a group. Dull, uneducated, impulsive and superficial individuals, when in "committee" take decisions which reveal clearsightedness and power of understanding which can hardly be attributed to any of them separately. It seems obvious that their behaviour reaches a higher capacity for adjustment when in a group.

Like the feeling of change, the feeling of unity is deep-seated in the structure of class consciousness. The reactions springing from it are not less neurotic than those springing from the need of change. Reaction/

Reaction in group, united front, etc. seem to be
forms of acting out of the fear of aloneness, and
separatedness in the modern proletariat.   Stalin was
successful with his early slogan "unity above all"
precisely because he appealed to a category of class con-
sciousness.   The ritualistic appeal to unity occurring
in every Communist society - Malenkov made one at Stalin's
death - has one and the same source.   It does not really
mean the presence of an inner opposition and rebellion,
as many are inclined to believe, but rather an outcome of
a basic feature of class consciousness.   The same feature
of class consciousness explains in its negative aspect
the fear and ideosyncrasy manifested by Communists towards
opposition and split.   It also explains a great deal of
the defendants' reaction in a Communist trial.   A disgraced
Communist is prepared to do anything in order to regain
the favour of the Party, be that favour only a motherly
look before he dies.

"Isolation" is one of the main methods of punishment in
a Communist organisation.   The isolated individual is,
without being told beforehand, regarded as polluted; nobody
would speak to or contact him.   From our own observation
of a series of cases of isolation in a group of Communist
prisoners in Roumania (1943-44) we came to the conclusion
that this method has an immediate and disastrous effect on
the individual's mind.   In a matter of days, the victims
showed clear signs of powerful mental conflicts,   Their
moral collapse was a certainty.   Sooner or later they

they were capable of doing anything to escape the situation; they asked to be put on trial, to be sentenced ... Some of them attempted suicide. The emotional symptoms are on the whole those of an infant separated from his mother.

We should like now to draw some general conclusions as to the function of the existential categories of class consciousness. Their most outstanding trait consists in their universality. For it is quite possible to meet good Communists whose activities show little or no use of the first set of categories formulated by the basic principles of dialectical materialism, but it is almost impossible to meet one whose behaviour is not impregnated with the second set of categories. Anyone who deals with Communists, no matter his own purposes, has to bear in mind that their consciousness is structurally conditioned by a set of existential categories, functioning in the way described above.

The origin of these categories lies in the historical complex which gave birth to European Communist movements. Class consciousness has therefore grown up as opposed to modern social order under the vital necessity of unity among the disinherited, and under the pressing desire for better conditions. Hence its enemy-anxiety, its acute sense of unity and change. In this way the traumatic experience of the modern proletariat laid down the pattern of class consciousness.

The first set of categories forms a superficial
layer in the structure of class consciousness in the sense
that it can be seen as a reflection at the rational level
of the existential categories. Thus the category of con-
tradiction and the power of the negative can be regarded as
a rationalised form of the category of "hostility", the
category of transformation as the rationalisation of the
need for change, and the category of the whole as a rationalised
feeling of solidarity.

The Dialectical Structure of Class Consciousness. Every
main trait of class consciousness is opposed by another
trait. This makes class consciousness work like a balanced
structure. To start with the desire for change and the
category of transformation are counterbalanced by the
category of the whole and unity. Communists desire, and work
for change and novelty, and yet, the pattern of any possible
change is laid down in their philosophy of history and their
almost maniac inclination for planning. Their febrility
cannot simply be conceived as activity for activity's sake,
or progress for the sake of progress. For they are in
favour of destruction and revolution and yet, very far from
favouring chaos. Their action can at any rate be regarded
as "deréglement raisonné".

The belief in the materiality of the world which under-
lies the necessity of a specific form of evolution is
counter-balanced by the conscious and voluntaristic activity
of the Party as a whole, and of each member, which -

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- paradoxically - help and accelerate the realisation of what should necessarily take place. Thus the impulse for action and change lying at the basis of class consciousness is counter-balanced by the existence of fixed immanent ends. "Praxis" itself is counter-pointed by a world of ultimate ends which form an "oasis" of ideals within the structure of class consciousness.

The only category not adequately counter-balanced within the structure of class consciousness is that of "hostility". One might believe that the Communists' aggression towards out-groups is counter-balanced by their identification with their own group and by the tie of love which the members of a Communist society manifest towards each other. But they do not really love each other. In a Communists organisation there is much more inter-individual and inter-group conflict, much more competition, mutual suspicion and distrust than in any other form of society existing today.

It might also be said that their aggression is compensated by their love for peace. And yet, it seems easy to see that Communists do not mean peace as often as they use this word. In conclusion, we are under the impression that hostility is the only trait showing signs of imbalance in the structure of class consciousness. This is very likely to lead the Communist groups of today to a form of maladjustment to the present world. By maladjustment we mean that class consciousness will work against itself, by

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by creating interminable conflicts and thus engaging
Communist societies in a permanent state of war, internal
and external.

Concluding this chapter we can regard class consciousness
as a new type of consciousness. It is, in our opinion, a
different structure from that of individual consciousness for
the principal reason that it shows different modes of
organising human experience. Class consciousness does not
know formal laws, i.e., its activity is not satisfied by the
fulfilment of certain laws regarding the activity itself,
but by the fulfilment of certain ends which are part of its
own structure. These ends are projected rational forms of
a series of emotional states which lie at the origin of class
consciousness. The basic states of mind characteristic of a
particular section of modern society all saturated in the
feeling of insecurity, fear of social disintegration and
desire of change have gradually become categories of human
experience in general.

The function of class consciousness being that of making
possible human adjustment as a group, its services are
necessary to the extent to which contemporary civilisation
asks for this type of behaviour. For the moment, one thing
seems certain - many problems of life which could have been
solved not more than fifty years ago, by the individual alone,
today ask for the co-ordinated reaction of the group. This
happens in all fields of life, economic, religious,
scientific, etc. The main question is whether class con-

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consciousness is an appropriate instrument for this
type of behaviour or not. The next chapter will deal
with this problem.

C H A P T E R   VIII

CLASS   CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   DEMOCRACY.

"To our grandfather's a house, a well, a tower,
even their clothes were infinitely more familiar.
Every object was for them a vase in which they found
and preserved something human. Nowadays we are invaded
from America by empty and indifferent things, things
which are the product of imitation and which deceive us
by their likeness to life. A house in an American sense,
an American fruit, and there even a vineyard have nothing
in common with the house, the fruit and vineyard which
moved the feelings and the thoughts of our ancestors".

<div align="right">Rainer Maria Rilke.</div>

As Communist society has grown up in opposition
to the individualistic social pattern of Democracy, so
has class consciousness articulated its structure in
opposition to individual consciousness. Thus, class con-
sciousness is totally impervious to the category of
"individuality", incapable of critical activity, of
objectivity and the contemplative attitude in life. In
order to demonstrate this, we shall discuss the relation-
ships existing between class consciousness and the main
features of individual consciousness.

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Individuality. The crisis of the category of
"individuality" or of the category of the "personal",
has reached in Communist society an intensity unknown
in the history of European civilisation. The phenomenon
of "Gleichschaltung" characteristic of Nazism, can be con-
sidered a superficial change in the mental structure of
man as compared with the effects of class consciousness
upon the individual's mind. There are many features of
class consciousness which testify to its incapacity for
working with the category of individuality. Here are the
most important of them.

A. As we have shown elsewhere, one of the main traits
of conscious behaviour consists in the individual's capacity
to take into account the multiplicity of conditions involved
in his field of reaction. The motives of behaviour-drives,
desires, aspirations - are kept in suspense until the mind
discriminates, compares and compromises between the con-
ditions of the situation leading to satisfaction. The
schemes of behaviour are, at the conscious level, flexible
and refined so as to involve in the final solution as many
and as varied conditions as possible.

This type of bevahiour is not possible within the
limits of class consciousness. The individual behaving on
the basis of his class consciousness is always under the
pressure of a certain anxiety and of a fixed goal for his
action. He finds it difficult to discriminate and com-
promise between various conditions presented by the

the situation. As soon as he has to face conditions
opposed to his goal, his power of discrimination and com-
promise leaves him altogether. His mind grasps in the
situation only two categories of factors: those absolutely
identified with, and those opposed to his goal. Between
these two categories there is a vacuum, for the schemes
of his mind fail to grasp the "different", the relatively
opposed, or the "gradual". Thus a Communist cannot under-
stand the other's point of view, save under two forms: as
absolutely identical or absolutely opposed to his own.
In both cases 'the other", as an individual, is annihilated.
Human dialogue is non-existent in Communist society; the
choice is between unison and breach of relations.

B. Class consciousness works with global schemes,
cognitive and emotional, which are rigidly applied to
reality. It distinguishes classes or categories of things
rather than things in themselves. The result of this
attitude towards the world is a sort of "factorial analysis"
of reality, in the sense that the whole variety of phenomena
is organised in the function of a few fundamental concepts
such as class struggle, revolutionary and reactionary
factors, the transition of quantity into quality,etc.
Sometimes the whole Communist world is conceived in the
function of two concepts such as heavy versus light industry,
Stalinism versus Trotskysm, Stalinism versus Bukharinism
and so forth. Anything existing as a "nuance", or having
an individuality of its own is absorbed in one of these
categories.   /

The schemes of class consciousness are similar
to the "archetypes" of the Unconscious, as described by
Jung. Their operation is analogous to that of the Holy
Ghost in Byzantine paintings, where the individual forms
of reality are transfigured. In a Communist society it
is the Party that plays the role of the Holy Ghost. For
it is the Party that establishes the contents of class con-
sciousness, in the Party line, and infuses the individual's
mind with the archetypes according to which he organises
his own experiences. To ensure that scientific ideas, for
example, correspond to class consciousness, Communists have
introduced the system of collective elaboration of scientific
knowledge, on the ground that group activity is nearer to
class consciousness than individual activity. E. Tarle,
the well known historian, has been surrounded by a group
of conscientious Party men in order to keep him within the
limits of class consciousness.

C. As opposed to democracy, where the dominant process
is that of individuation, in Communist society the dominant
process is that of depersonalisation. Living in a
Communist group one is often under the vivid impression that
human inter-relations do not take place from one individual
to another. The reality which gives substance to human
inter-relations is the Party; the individuals themselves
are but "means" of communication of the contents of class
consciousness whose only bearer is the Party. The

The individuals cannot separate each other from the
Party. Two Communists in conversation very seldom and
very reluctantly put and answer "personal" questions.
Their own language seems to have lost the capacity of
expressing such questions. When an "active" Communist
happens to address one of his comrades with simple formulae
such as "How are you getting on?" or "How is your wife?",
it would be completely wrong to think that he is interested
in whether his comrade or his comrade's wife feel "fine",
"well" or "bored stiff". The real meaning of his question
is: "How are you getting on with your task as a member of
the Party?" In other words the interlocutors' interest
is in the "principle" of life as expressed by the Party,
rather than in the way of life is experienced by a partic-
ular individual.

There are other important symptoms of depersonalisation
in Communist society. On the level of practical action the
individual is not an entity. In the political field, for
instance, Communists have no use for the individual as an
agent of decision or as "vote". The political concept of the
majority has no meaning in a Communist way of life, for
the simple reason that it implies that the individual is a
factor of decision. Unanimity forms the basis of any
decision and action. If unanimous decision cannot be taken
the meeting is postponed until the conditions for unanimity
are ripe. A curious case of this kind is related by
Ignatio Silone. According to him, Stalin postponed the

the meeting of the Comintern several times and re-shaped
its composition so as to make possible an unanimous
condemndation of Trotsky. (The God that Failed. Six studies
in Communism. Hamish Hamilton, London 1850).

An important aspect of the process of depersonalisation
is reflected by the structure of language in a Communist
society. A special section of the Party, "Agitprop" is
entrusted with the coinage and the dissemination of
stereotyped expressions of "clichés" so as to enable
individuals to express their experiences in a standardised
manner. Communists seem to have ready-made expressions for
all important aspects of life. Those individuals who fail
to adjust their experiences to the meaning of these
expressions become liable to serious "deviations".

The evolution of the Russian language since 1917 shows
some characteristic aspects of the process of depersonal-
isation taking place in Soviet society. We refer in the
first place to the inclination of this language to form
abstract terms by the combination of the initial letters
or syllables of two or more words. There have been coined
over 3000 such expressions since the Revolution. Most
important from our own point of view is the fact that
nearly all these compound words or abbreviations, as they
often are called, refer to various aspects of social life.
It seems therefore that the driving force lying behind this
linguistic phenomenon consists in a tendency to codify the

the main factors existing in the social field such as

SOVDEP, KOMSOMOL, AGITPROP, NKVD, FABZAVMESTKOM, etc. (This

trend in the language is in fact an aspect of the process

of over-rationalisation dealt with in a previous chapter).

It is easy to see that in a social field so carefully

organised round a series of impersonal factors, the

individual as an active agent in the field, no longer counts.

He is lost under the influence of one of these factors or

classes, i.e., he is KOMSOMOL, SOVDEP , NKVD., etc.   In

such a culture-pattern the dynamics of social life is con-

ceived as rational concatenations of superindividual factors

rather than as a system of inter-individual relationships.

For the understanding and the control of the social field,

the Communist works with his formulae in the same manner

as the chemist does with his. More CONSOMOL, less SOVDEP,

and the composition of society changes accordingly. [1]

[1]
    A series of trends in the French language during the
Revolution shows the general tendency to codify the nature.
  (See E. Brunot: Histoire de la Langue Trancaise. Vol.X p.62).

Speech tonality shows another symptom of depersonalisation

in Communist society. Speech tonality there is usually

even, with no rising or falling, perfectly monotonous as if

a permanent censorship acts upon the individual's voice.

In conclusion, the whole structure of the language in a

Communist society prevents the individual from appearing

as "himself"; he has to appear in an official mask, i.e.,

in cliche expressions and with a depersonalised tone. Not

Not to talk loudly, not to talk much, not to talk according
to the colour of one's feelings, are by now important
canons of behaviour in such a society. (For details:
Z. Barbu, Language in Democratic and Totalitarian society.
Orbis, June 1953.)

The Critical Mind.   We have devoted a whole chapter
to prove the dogmatic character of class consciousness.
We could therefore easily draw a general conclusion by
saying that class consciousness is diametrically opposed
to critical activity. But this would not tally with the
opinion held by Communists regarding the activity of class
consciousness. For they make frequent use of words such as
criticism and self-criticism which seem to indicate specific
critical abilities possessed by class consciousness.
This makes it even more necessary for us to demonstrate that
the critical mind is in no way a quality of class conscious-
ness.

Criticism is a practice of the Party. The objects of
criticism may be the Party's attitude towards various
problems - known as the criticism of the 'line' - the
attitude of the Party members, and the 'line' of another
party. It should be noted that, in the conflict with its
members, the Party is never on the wrong side, and therefore
the result of criticism is known beforehand. With regard
to its own 'line', the Party very often recognises its
mistakes, and criticism results in a change, which might
be a 'turning' of the Party line, or a withdrawl to a
previous position.

It is the purpose of this section to show that the change in the line is only a formal recognition of an error, and that Communist experience has shown that these 'turnings' and 'withdrawals' start from, and end in a tactical attitude, not in a substantial correction of the Party line. Therefore these phenomena can hardly be considered as fruits of the critical mind.

The European critical mind, as opposed to dogmatism, is rooted in the fundamental conviction that the human mind, although possessing the power of knowing the truth, can make errors. The chance of error can be reduced by the exercise of a permanent control over the activity of mind. The very notion of control implies an attitude towards the ways and the results of our mental activity. Doubt, as a feature of the critical mind, and as the most powerful antidote to dogmatism, is a negative attitude in that it rests on the consciousness of the possibility of error. But this is counter-balanced by a positive attitude manifested in a permanent measure of precaution with the object of avoiding an incomplete or wrong application of our logical mind. The criterion of certainty consists, for the critical mind, in the observation of the rules of its own activity, not in the results of this activity, i.e., in the ideas. When these rules are not kept, the ideas, whatever they may be, have to be changed.

There is a series of other features which contribute to the meaning of the European critical mind. Ortega y Gasset,

Gasset, for instance, referring to critical idealism as
one of the expressions of the critical mind, characterises
it as a trading philosophy. It is obviously hard to deny
that the critical mind contains features very much akin to
the buying and selling attitude, to compromise, or to
adjustment to the concrete situations of life. But it is
equally difficult to confuse the critical mind with the
exclusive self-interested attitude of tradesman. It is
here, on the moral plane, that Ortego y Gasset's
characterisation is insufficient. We think that in the notion
of the critical mind there is reflected the Christian faith
in original sin. This is the main reason why it necessarily
implies a full recognition of, and responsibility for
human errors and inperfections. From the moral point of
view, the critical mind leads to modesty and straining for
self-improvement.

Communist dialectics rests on the idea of 'tactics', not
on that of the critical mind. This means that Communist
ideas and aims are fixed as guiding stars, and that only the
ways towards them can be changed. Communists do not see the
wrong side of their ideas, and controversial discussion with
them makes no sense, since they can never resort to a real
correction of their mind. Their notion of error is purely
tactical, i.e., the turnings in the line mean nothing but a
preparation for new attacks by the same idea. Here lies
the root of their 'monotony', 'stubbornness' and 'strength'.

For anyone living amongst Communists it is impossible to
notice that there is nothing more unusual for a Communist

Communist than the attitude of doubt towards his mind.
His failures do not make him modest, and it is not his
virtue to be prudent or wise in his thought, because he
is not concerned with the 'right' way. The virtue he
really values is the shrewdness which leads at any cost
to his aim.

From the practical point of view, the critical mind
leads to compromise. Marxists practise the method of
compromise, but they hold a particular view of it. Lenin
made a compromise with liberal economy during the N.E.P.;
Roumanian Communists made a compromise with the Monarchy
from 1944 to 1947; French Communists made a compromise
with the Catholic Church, etc. But all these were
essentially tactical arrangements, and sooner or later the
'eternal Communism' swept away any trace of Russian liberal
economy, Roumanian Monarchy, etc. One can never see that
substantial correction of Communist ideas which would at
any rate be an elementary sign of critical activity.

Sometimes the Party speaks openly about its own mistakes,
but only after working out a special system of explanation.
The outsiders, be they counter-revolutionaries, or unmasked
traitors, are usually responsible for any error. The Party
cannot bear the repercussions of an error, or the feeling
of guilt, and as soon as an error is committed, the
responsibility is thrown on somebody outside itself. The
notion of duality, so characteristic of the critical mind,
according to which one side watches and corrects the other,
is completely alien to a Communist's mental structure. The

The Party is not 'a goose with two wings' says Lenin.

'Self-criticism' is a term used when a Communist recognises his deviations from the line of the Party. It cannot be called critical activity because it is not based on freedom. The conclusion is always given at the very beginning, in the sense that the Party is always right. What the accused has to do is to 'qualify' his own attitude as a hostile action against the Party. The idea should be stressed that a simple recognition of fault is not enough; the accused has to perform a duty towards his party. He has to confess according to the Party requirements in connection with the trial in question, whatever the personal meaning of his mistake may have been. In the first phase of his trial, Bucharin recognised his error of being too much of an independent thinker. But this was not the right attitude. He had to put a real strain on himself to see in his earlier thoughts and actions the picture of a counter-revolutionary Bucharin, or even of a German spy. In a passage of his last confession, addressed to Western intellectuals, he lets slip an illusion to Alyosha Karamazov, who took on his own shoulders the sins of all his fellow-men. The intellectucal Bucharin spends his last moments struggling with this conception of error and responsibility.

The conclusion of this section is the following: Communism has not eliminated dogmatism, Communist thinking is guided by already-constituted ideas laid down by a

a philosophical system. Communist critical activity does not consist in a search for truth, or in a verification and correction of ideas. Truth is given, the only human task being that of finding the ways of its realisation at any cost. A Communist knows the ultimate content his mind has to attain. He is convinced that, possibly hidden behind various tactical appearances, the whole of history leads there. This fundamental attitude makes his precautions at least partly superfluous. The Communists' frequent talk about criticism and self-criticism very often reminds of the complete title of Beaumarchais's comedy: "Le Barbier de Seville, ou, sur la precaution inutile.'

Objectivity. The Communist conception of objective knowledge is very near what is normally called naive realism. Communists believe that the human mind "mirrors" the external reality. But one should not forget that they understand by human mind class consciousness. Marx goes as far as to assume that any civilisation based on the individual as the fundamental unit of life, is incapable of objective knowledge. He, and after him, all Communist ideologues, make use of a great variety of arguments in order to prove how individual consciousness "mystifies" reality, and how class consciousness grasps it adequately. We feel, however, that this is not the right way to discuss such a problem. What we should like to do instead is to answer the following two questions: A. Is class consciousness capable of objective truth? B. What is the attitude of present-day Communists towards the problem of objectivity? /

First of all class consciousness' criterion of
objectivity is practical not theoretical.   This gives a
specific meaning to what is objective and what is not
objective for a Communist.

The definition of the concept of practice is by no
means an easy task, for this concept is not clearly
formulated in Marxist writings. But since 1917 Soviet
experience has made it clear that "practice" is somehow
synonymous with the material condition of the working class
development towards its historical goal, i.e., Communism.
Hence an idea, or an action are objective to the extent to
which they are adapted to the conditions of the working
class development.   The main implication of this is that
any action - class consciousness is primarily action -
carried by men organised in a group is objective, i.e.,
corresponds to an objective order of things, if it leads
to the improvement of the life condition of the group.
Further, any schematisation, any fragmentation, organisation,
and finally any distortion of reality which facilitates the
historical goal of the group corresponds to reality in
itself, i.e., it is objective. For instance, if the working
class, organised in a political party, decide that five
million "bourgeois" should die, their decision corresponds
to an objective order of human history.

To brand this conception of objectivity as absurd does
not take us very far towards its explanation. Yet there
is not very much else to be said about it. Perhaps it would

would be helpful to re-state at this point that this particular attitude towards objectivity is rooted in a "paranoiac" concept of reality, i.e., a reality which should at any cost identify itself with one's own ideas and expectations from it.

If by objective truth one means _adequatio rei intellectus_, as it is maintained by Marx and, with small variations, by his Soviet interpreters, that class consciousness is obviously not an adequate epistemological function.   This is primarily due to the fact that its logical schematism and its psychological texture are far too simple and rigid to be adapted to the complex system of reality. As we have already mentioned, the schematism of class consciousness is incompatible with the individual forms of existence. Consequently the knowledge enabled by it is objective only if one agrees _a priori_ that the structure of reality is archotypical or "elementaristic". This, however, contradicts our common observation.   It seems to us that the belief that the world is, at an elementaristic or factorial level, more real than at the more differenentiated level of individual forms, is analogous to a nominalistic conception of reality, or to the belief in the objective reality of the schemes and concepts devised by modern science for the understanding of Nature.

Marx rejects the activity of individual consciousness on the ground that this mental structure is addicted to mystification, i.e., it coins a series of ideas about

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about reality, and later on believes in their objective
reality. This is even more the case with class consciousness.
We have shown in an earlier chapter that class consciousness
represents reality in the function of a series of ends,
which regulate the historical development of Communist
society, and that these ends are projections of the traumatic
experience of the proletariat. Therefore, even if Marx's
assumptions concerning the function of individual conscious-
ness were true, we can hardly see the advantage of class
consciousness from this specific point of view.

As a consequence of the difficulties involved in the
practical criterion of objectivity, contemporary Communists
reject the term "objectivity" altogether. In their view
the recognition of an internal or external reality in its
own right is a bourgeois weakness called "objectivism", to
which they oppose the partisan character of human knowledge.
In his criticism of G. Alexandrov's book "The History of
Western Philosophy" Zhdanov (op.cit) touches upon the problem
of truth. He accuses Alexandrov of having become infected
with the "objectivist" spirit of bourgeois schools, and having
forgotten class warfare and the Party outlook in his views
on Western philosophy. Giving as example the fact that
Alexandrov admits Hegelian philosophy its progressive aspects,
Zhdanov accuses the author of weakening the class consciousness
of Soviet youth and of undermining party vigilance. Hence
class and party conditions force Alexandrov to assert that
Marx found nothing progressive in the whole bourgeois

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bourgeois philosophy, and that it was he who built up
everything from the very beginning.

In conclusion, we can say that the concept of
objectivity, like many other concepts of Western
civilisation, has been solved in the concept of "partisan-
ship". Objective is everything which fits into the party
picture of the world. (Details on the concept of partisan-
ship in "The Social and Ideological Background of
Communism" p.11 and following.)

C. The Sense of Leisure. The fact that class con-
sciousness is primarily practical implies that the sense
of leisure and the contemplative attitude are not among
its attributes. There is a term very much in use in a
Communist society which can be adduced as a proof of this,
namely, the concept of "task". Every Communist should
have a "task" at any moment of his life. This means that
he has always something to do for the Party and for his
community. He never finds himself in the category of the
"personal", but always in that of "functional" or
"instrumental".

It was Trotsky who made the observation that the
Bolshevik Party could never get rid of the militaristic
habits acquired during the Revolution. This seems perfectly
true. A Communist society lives in permanent mobilisation
with all its members on duty. The sense of duty is so
deep in their minds that they have no adequate meaning for
words such as "forced labour" or "holiday". The

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The individual there spends most of his life in group-organised activity, or activity FOR something which lies outside himself. Forced labour is but a species of this genus of activity.

If holiday implies the individual's temporary relief from his social tasks, this carries no meaning to Communists. "Holiday" is for Communists just another way of performing their tasks in the community. The highest form of leisure consists, for them, in a form of purposive rest. This means that the individual has to take a rest in the interest of his community, and in the manner that this is arranged by his community.

The Emotional Pattern of Class Consciousness. While in democratic society the individual patterns his emotionality according to his personal relationships with things and persons, in Communist society his emotionality is modelled according to the reality of the Party which exists between him and things, and between him and persons. The Communist has little or no sense of personal feelings, as we defined these in the first part of this study. He makes contacts with persons and things mainly in his capacity of a Party member, and forms his emotional attitudes accordingly.

At this stage of our study it would look less of a paradox to say that a Communist lives as a "principle" not as a person. We hasten to say that this is not a conscious process, i.e., that he consciously injects himself with joy,

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joy, enthusiasm or sorrow whenever the Party requires
him to do so. On the contrary, a real Communist feels
elation or sorrow "naturally" at the Party success or
defeat. The reason of this lies in the fact that the
Communist does not relate himself to things and events
as a person. When he does so - and this may happen in
any Communist society - he is in fact an emotional
"deviationist". The recent history of the Communist
movements in South East Europe shows many cases of this
kind of deviationism. The main trait of the so-called
nationalist Communists, of which Tito is an example, con-
sists in a displaced emotionality. They are emotionally
fixated to their own ethnic group, and as such they have
failed to pattern their emotionality according to the
requirements of the Party. There is no other object of
love in Communist society, save the Party and the objects
it stands for. The fact that in the Soviet Union "Russia"
and "Fatherland" have recently become objects of love
should be understood in a specific way. "Russia" is an
object of love only to the extent that the content of this
concept have been completely remodelled by nearly forty
years of Communist rule. He who is acquainted with the
work done by proaganda in order to re-create an image
of historical Russia so as to fit into the Party life, or
with the work of "re-interpretation" carried out by Soviet
historians, will certainly understand this peculiar
phenomenon. But apart from "Russia" no other fatherland

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fatherland has yet become an object of love for Communists.

One can say that "Russia" has become the image of

"Fatherland" for all Communist movements in the world. (1)

(1)
    Our own opinion is that the wave of nationalism
noticed during the war is a tactical step rather than a
structural element in Soviet society. Its reasons are:
A.   To neutralise the effects of German nationalism.
B.   To counter-balance any possible mood of fraternisation
with the (bourgeois) West, and C.   To combat in advance
the "cosmopolitan" aspirations which come so naturally in
a post war period.
    The real reason of this phenomenon might be found in
 the Stalinian dialects of power.   For it lies in the
nature of these Stalinian dialectics to lift from time
to time a series of repressive measures for the simple
reason that in an interim and partial regime of freedom
the Party can better feel the pulse of the masses. These
periods enable the Party to see how far or how near the
people are to its own line.   Consequently the Party knows
what screws should be tightened in order that the line
should be maintained.

    There are a series of other minor emotional deviations

in a Communist society. Many marriages and friendships

are broken because one of the partners is not a faithful

member of the Party. Wives denouncing their husbands for

not being faithful to the Party, or children denouncing

their own parents are cases known by now to everybody.

    We have already mentioned the idea that the Communist

emotional pattern is archetypically organised, and that

this is one of the features of class consciousness.

This means that the emotional behaviour of Communists on

the whole is based on big and rigid schemes which are

grouped round two poles: The first pole is defined as

love for the Party leaders, while the second is defined

as hatred against anything non-Communist.   When we say

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say archetypical we mean that the emotional pattern
of a Communist has no schemes for small private feelings.
His world is devoid of simple enjoyments, of small and
often inexplicable sorrows of private melancholies, of
any kind of personal moods. These may exist, but his
culture-pattern has no symbols for them. For Communists
are utterly against lyrical moods which are rooted in the
intimate contact of the individual with things and persons.
These are called "petty-bourgeois" feelings, and the
Party irons them out from the minds of its members. They
are emotional moods which by their personal quality are
inappropriate to the emotional pattern of a Communist.
Lyrical poetry, which springs from the poet's intimate
contact with the world - love for another person, love
for things, love for Nature, etc. - is formally ignored or
even forbidden. Only those emotions which arouse in the
poet's contact with things having a certain significance
for the Party are worthy of the name of poetry. The
struggle against personal feelings goes so far that in
the recent Soviet novel the heroies are no longer
individuals; the general tendency is to create so- called
"collective heroes" such as a factory a kolkhoz, and
above all the Party. (Helen Rapp: The Post-War Novel in
Russia. The Listener, April, 1953, p.725.)

Friendship as an emotional attachment between two
individuals qua individuals is not allowed in a Communist
society. If two Party members appreciate each other for

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for personal reasons and consequently build up an
emotional tie, between themselves, they are liable to
emotional deviation. Communists have a special name for
these forms of emotional behaviour. They call them "small
churches" and consider them as incipient splits of the
Party. Friendship must be made under the auspices of
the Party, i.e., between individuals who never lose sight
of the fact that they are Party members. Friendship with
members of out-groups is, of course, serious deviationism.

In conclusion one can say that friendship as a
specific type of human relationship is almost non-
existent in Communist society. Party members are dominated
in their emotional relationship with each other by the
category of partisanship. In their relations with non-
members they manifest, if not hostility, a sort of de-
tachment which precludes any emotional tie. Stalin himself
used to meet people in his own house who were not directly
concerned with the activities of the Party. His attitude
towards these people can be considered as typical. At
these meetings he always took the attitude of an onlooker;
the others seemed to him actors rather than real people in
real life. It is most probably that he had the feeling
of reality only along his comrades. (References to
Stalin's behaviour in circumstances described above are
given by AHMED AMBA, in "I was Stalin's Bodyguard".
Fredricke Muller, 1953.)

There is no other feeling more dominated by the

the category of partisanship than love. Plenty of
illustrative examples can be found in Soviet literature.
A young man, in the act of confessing his love to his
sweetheart, stops suddenly and says: "This is not the
right moment; I have to go to vote on the resolution taken
by the factory committee". A film shows a young couple
meeting after five years of separation. His first words
are: "What a beautiful crop there is going to be this
year!" (Examples given by Valeria Gerasimova in
Literatunia Gazeta 1952.) Orwell has grasped an important
aspect of the feeling of love in communist society in his
novel "1984". The protagonists feel guilty when they
fall in love with each other, as if they have, by this
very fact, broken a rule or neglected an important duty.

Two important facts are closely connected with the
individual's emotional pattern in Communist society.
The first consists in the little importance accorded to
the family in the development of the individual. The
second consists in the technique of "deracination" or
"uprooting" practised by the Party with respect to all
members of the community.

The emotionality of a member of a Communist society,
as opposed to that of a member of a democratic society,
is very little, if at all, patterned on the family system
of inter-relations. The emotionality of a child, naturally
captivated by his parents, is, from a very early age,
disturbed by, and finally displaced upon far more powerful

powerful objects of love than the parents themselves,i.e.,
the Party leaders and the Party as such. The first effect
of this is that emotionality grows from an early age
round persons, things and situations in general with which
he has no direct and intimate contact. In other words,
his emotionality is patterned after symbols rather than
after concrete human beings which surround him. He loves
the Party leader because of what he "represents" for the
country. Moreover he loves the Party rather than any
particular member of it. If he happens to love a particular
member this is certainly not because of his own relations
with him, but because this member symbolises the Party.
The net of personal relationships is, in this way, from
the very beginning, "factorised", i.e., reduced to a series
of super-individual symbols. The ultimate end of this
process consists in the transference of the individual's
emotional capacity outside the sphere of inter-personal
contacts.

W. Ronald D. Fairbairn in his study "The Sociological
Significance of Communism considered in the light of
Psychoanalysis"(in Psychonalytical Studies of the Person-
ality. Tavistock Publications Ltd. London 1952.) points out
the attempt made by Communists to integrate the individual's
emotionality in the largest human group possible, i.e.,
that of the family of nations. He stresses in this way
the internationalist character of the working class
movements, and of the early Russian Communist Party. Today,

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Today, after the Stalinian period, this character is
less visible. This is why it seems more accurate to say
that in a Communist society, the individual is emotionally
integrated with the Party and with what the Party stands
for. We should like to stress in this way the idea that
the factors and the symbols round which the individual's
emotionality is structurised are in a state of perpetual
change. After a period of broad internationalism and
humanitarianism the Bolshevik Party has introduced into its
own structure symbols such as "nation", "fatherland",
"Russia" which mean a new turning in the emotional pattern
of the Soviet citizen.

The feeling of "deracination" prevailing in Communist
society is primarily the result of a well-known technique of
the Party, by which its members are submitted to frequent
changes regarding the place and the nature of their work.
In this way, the only lasting bond in the life of a Communist
is that existing between himself and the Party. The
Communist is never allowed contacts with persons, places
and things long and intimate enough to become "personal".
The clothes he wears - normally a uniform - the desk he
writes at, the glasses he drinks from .... are seldom long
enough with, or near enough to him to become really "his",
and thus to make him indulge in personal feeling about them.
For. he as a rule does not live with things and persons; he
uses them in the same way the Party uses him. This reveals
a crucial feature of the mind of a Communist. He is not
allowed to think and to feel about himself as a value, or

or as an end, but as a means in the structure of the Party. Consequently he suffers from an incapacity to regard his own connection with things as having any intrinsic value whatsoever. The Party systematically destroys, by the technique of "deracination", any emotional "couche" and any nest of warm feelings which, at one moment or another, an individual may build up in his intimate contact with persons and things. Paraphrasing Rilke, quoted at the beginning of the chapter, we can say: The world of a Communist is invaded by empty and indifferent things. There a house, a fruit or vineyard have nothing in common with the house, fruit and vineyard which move the thoughts and feelings of Western man.   In Communist society the drama of depersonalisation reaches the point of perfection. It is not only an undesirable result of industrialisation, as suggested by Rilke, but a systematic work done by a political organisation.   The final result of this work consists in the blockage of all personal feelings in the members of Communist society.

Suspicion.   The blockage of the personal feelings has important repercussions in the minds of the members of a Communist society.   In this blockage lies perhaps the greatest source of frustration in the life of a Communist. The repressed desire to be oneself, to speak with one's own voice, and in the colour of one's own feelings, can be considered as the main cause of one of the most characteristic emotional attitudes in Communist society, i.e. that of

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of suspicion. The individual acts out this deep desire
by projection; he sees the desire to escape from the rigid
impersonal rule of the Party in other persons, in
practically everybody. Thus suspicion dominates the
pattern of inter-individual relations in Communist society.
Everyone suspects everybody of not being "orthodox", and
of harbouring hostile attitudes towards the Party. Moreover
every Communist feels in one way or another that he is
hated by others just because he is a better Communist than
they are. His feeling of guilt for wishing to get rid of
the oppressing rule of the Party can be accepted by his
consciousness only after this radical distortion.

Technological Consciousness. Communists refer to
Soviet man as a new type of man. In an earlier chapter we
have also expressed the inconvenience aroused by the
application of the concept of personality to the present
leaders of Russian Communist Party.

At the present stage it is, however, difficult to know
for certain whether the Communist civilisation contains in
itself the basic conditions of a new type of human mental
structure in general, and whether this will lead to a
psychological mutation in the human species. We are under
the impression that the "old man", the historical man, with
his instincts and feelings, still exists in the Soviet man.
But, being repressed, he forms the unconscious structure of
the mind of the Soviet man. What is undoubtedly new in the
mental structure of the Soviet man is his type of con-

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consciousness. Consequently it would be more adequate to speak here about a new type of consciousness, rather than a new type of man. This is by and large class consciousness, as we have described it so far. But, since the concept of class consciousness includes in itself too many features characteristic of the working class movements preceding the realisation of Communist society, we have decided to apply another name to the consciousness of the Communist man, which suggests by itself the essence of this new type of mental structure. We call it technological consciousness. Its main traits are the following:

A. The structure of technological consciousness is "elementaristic". It reflects the world in its broad lines, in black and white. In fact technological consciousness is not a cognitive structure. Its prime concern is not with what and how the world is, but with how action upon the world is possible. Its cognitive activities are therefore limited to the requirements of immediate action.

B. The man with technological consciousness is never satisfied with merely knowing things and events, for he is always under the urge to transform the world; he suffers from action - anxiety. What Marx said about class consciousness in general applies to this aspect of technological consciousness. Class consciousness is practical, says Marx. Its function is to transform rather than to understand the universe.

C. The man with technological consciousness has an

an "experimentalist" attitude towards life. He is
pressed by the desire to master and shape the world,
physical, social and psychological. As a ruler, he is a
"technocrate"; as an artist or a writer, he is an
"engineer of the human soul"; as a simple citizen he is an
"expert". This man is incapable of contemplating and
enjoying things as they are; he can never let himself
float freely in the stream of life. Even his art is "a
manual of life to men". (Chernyshevsky. Quot by Rapp H. Op. cit.)

D. The man with technological consciousness has a
particular inclination or taste for the "artificial" and
"manufactured" in life, which goes hand in hand with a
certain detachment from nature. In this trait there is
something similar to Baudelaire's negative attitude - towards nature,
his horror for free running water, for instance. Baudelaire
could not stand water unless safely imprisoned in pipes.

In Soviet Russia anything manufactured is worthy of
the name of "culture". A tractor is worth worshipping; an
armoured car becomes the principal character - almost a
national hero - in a novel. Electric lamps are far more
beautiful than stars, as one of Azhaiev's heroes emphatically
demonstrates. (Far from Moscow, mentioned by Helen Rapp,
Op.cit.) Man's direct contact with nature is systematically
blocked. He becomes more and more surrounded by, and
imprisoned in a universe of his own production.

It remains only to be said that many elements entering
into the composition of technological consciousness can be

be found in every industrial civilisation. In Communist
society, however, these elements form a lasting structure
which dominates the mind of Communist man.

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