MATTHEW ARNOLD.

A Study of his Youth and Ideas.

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CONTENTS

Part I. Youth.

1. Thomas Arnold and Mary Penrose.
2. The World and The Flesh.
3. Expansion.
4. Revolt and Escape.
5. Ambivalence.
6. Pyrrhonism.
7. Melancholia.
8. Obermann.
10. Wordsworth.
12. Marguerite.
13. Independence and Flexibility.

Part II. Ideas.

15. Culture.
16. Culture-Conquests. (a) Hellenism.
17. (b) Hebraism.
18. (c) Social Life and Manners.
19. (d) Art.
21. Conclusion.

Appendix. Scheme of Matthew Arnold's Ideas.

Bibliography.
References. Where no date is given in the footnotes, references are to the first edition, except in the case of the following works, of which the editions used are:

Matthew Arnold. Culture and Anarchy. Smith, Elder. 1901.
Irish Essays. Smith, Elder. 1891.
Last Essays on Church and Religion. John Murray. 1903.
Higher Schools and Universities in Germany. Macmillan. 1874.
St. Paul and Protestantism.
Smith, Elder. 1875.


Matthew Arnold considered himself highly fortunate in his parents and his upbringing. To his mother, Mary Penrose, he wrote on her birthday in 1853, "Accept every loving and grateful wish from a son to whom you have for nearly thirty years been such a mother as few sons have. The more I see of the world, the more I feel thankful for the upbringing up we had, so unworldly, so sound, and so pure." One of his father's letters, then just discovered, he described in 1855 as "ennobling and refreshing, as everything which proceeds from him always is, ... how he had forecast and revolved, even then, the serious interests and welfare of his children — at a time, when, to many men, their children are little more than playthings. He might well hope to bring up children, when he had made that bringing-up so distinctly his thought beforehand; ..." Such an upbringing, unworldly and ennobling, was certainly rare, even among the clergy during the Regency. But more remarkable than even the high tone of his early home life were Matthew Arnold's parents themselves.

Mary Penrose was the daughter of the Rev. John Penrose, Rector of Fledborough, in Nottinghamshire. She brought with her the unworldly tone of her home. When she came to train her children, she continued many of the religious practices of that home. There was, for example, "a family custom retained from the Penrose household — for each member of the family to repeat or read a favourite hymn before the children went to bed, and we were delighted (wrote Mrs. Fletcher) to hear the hymns from 'The Christian Year' repeated by little Jane Arnold and her brothers." With this high religious tone, however, went no severity or hardness, but tenderness and sweetness of nature, together with "frankness, vivacity, and quickness of observation." There was a certain charm about her. "An excellent scholar and theologian," wrote Crabb Robinson of Dr. Arnold "with a wife whom I like better than either his scholarship or his divinity." Her children were devoted to her: later all the absent ones wrote to her at least three times a week. In her old age, "with her soft face and her little red shawl," she could still charm her grandchildren. Her sympathy, with the tolerance that accompanied it, was part of the charm. "How

1 Letters, I. 19. 2 Ibid., I. 42. 3 M. R., Autobiography of Mrs. Fletcher, p. 186. 4 Ibid., p. 185. 5 E. J. Morley, p. 422. 6 Hare, Memorials, III. 327. 7 Memoir of H. O. Arnold-Foster, p. 5.
often," wrote Matthew Arnold, after her death, to J.D. Coleridge, "... shall I miss the largeness and indulgence of her judgments." And again, "She had a clearness and fairness of mind, an interest in things and a power of appreciating what might not be in her own line, which were very remarkable, and which remained with her to the very end of her life." 2

On the other side may be set the opinion of Charlotte Bronte, "Mrs. Arnold is indeed a good and amiable woman, but the intellectual is not her forte and she has no pretensions to power or completeness of character. ... (her) manner on introduction disappointed me sensibly, as lacking genuineness and simplicity — I was told that it was a 'conventional manner' but that it vanished on closer acquaintance." 3

Thomas Arnold was born in the Isle of Wight in 1795. He was educated at Winchester and Oxford, where he took a First in Classics in 1815. For the next four years he remained at Oxford, reading and tutoring. While there, his fellow-student, Trevenem Penrose, invited him to his home, where he met his future wife. In 1819, he settled down along with his mother, aunt and sister, at Laleham, near Staines, on the Thames, and prepared private pupils for the Universities. In 1820, he married Mary Penrose. He was then twenty-five, she thirty. Their eldest daughter, Jane, the 'Fausta' of Arnold's poems, was born there in 1821, and Matthew on December 24th, 1822. In 1827, Thomas Arnold was appointed headmaster of Rugby, where he remained till his death at the age of forty-seven, in 1842. In the last year of his life he also held the position of Professor of Modern History at Oxford.

With the same unworldly religious attitude as his wife, Dr. Arnold was yet a more various and divided character. Natural sluggishness alternated in him with vehemence, conservatism with revolutionary ardour.

On the one hand he was physically indolent, finding great difficulty in early rising, and was slow to abandon an established way of thinking. Associations with particular places, especially historical or family associations, had great power over him, and he was deeply attached to the Church and to his country.

On the other hand he had intervals of vehemence and intensity. He would romp and play in the garden at Laleham or "plunge with a boy's delight into the Thames" or in "merry fun ... would battle with spears with his pupils." 4 Stanley, on first coming to Rugby noted how

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1. Life of Lord Coleridge, II. 222. 2. Letters, II. 108.
4. Stanley, Life of Dr. Arnold.
fidgety he was, restlessly walking up and down the classroom, as if his nervous energy were over tense. The same vehemence easily became indignation when he was roused by seeing unfair treatment dealt to any person, or class, or cause; and then he was difficult to restrain. "I must speak out or burst," he said on one of these occasions.

Of the two tendencies, the vehement and revolutionary was the more marked in his public career. It was called out by the excess of repression and conservatism that followed the Napoleonic Wars. A proof of this spirit in him was that he and his friends at Oriel College, generally known as the Noetics, were, like all Oriel men at that time, picked for 'originality.' They were, says Mark Pattison, "distinctly the product of the French Revolution.... They called everything in question; they appealed to first principles, and disallowed authority as a judge in intellectual matters." They expected a man to be able to give a reason for the faith that was in him, and to accept no opinion until it had been challenged and had satisfied the demands of reason. That an opinion was universal, or a custom received, was not in itself sufficient; it was rather a ground of suspicion.

In this group, then, Thomas Arnold developed an attitude of opposition, or criticism, a tendency to swim against the stream. His unworldly Christianity fell in with this opposition to the world, and the two currents united in a steady and universal criticism of existing society and convention.

One of the main principles arising out of this attitude was that of equality—a principle both of the Revolution and of Christianity. It became a channel for the expression of his sympathy with the oppressed and his demand for fair play for all people and classes. It led him to advocate, for example, better conditions for the factory hands, toleration for the Irish Catholics and equality of treatment for women. Speaking of marriage and sexual morality in one of his sermons, he said, "The commandment of God .... shows no distinction of sexes; there is one sentence of condemnation for the sins of fornication and adultery, be they committed by whom they may. But because a woman's offence brings disgrace upon her family, it is visited very often with as great an excess of worldly indignation, as the same offence in man is passed over with an excessive lenity."  

All the children absorbed from their parents this intensely religious attitude. Thus from their early training religion became to all of them the most important concern in life; and their characters bore the same marks of unworldliness as those of their parents. Jane, combined "high and pure thought with all feminine charm... (...) 'The things of the spirit' were ever present, ever deeply and actively interesting to her." 2 "The 'spiritual face' of Thomas and the religious novel 'Oakfield' of William Delafield, show the same force at work.

But Matthew owed more to his parents, to his father especially, than the ideal of unworldliness. The general impression which remained with him in greatest force was the helpfulness of Dr. Arnold. This was the aspect of his work and influence that he selected to commemorate him in 'Rugby Chapel, 1857.' This aspect is there elaborated in the sustained metaphor of life as a mountain climb, beset by difficulty and danger, through which few ever attain the summit. Apostrophizing his father, Matthew Arnold says:-

Still thou turnedst, and still
Beckonédst the trembler, and still
Gavest the weary thy hand!

... ... ...
Therefore to thee it was given
Many to save with thyself;
And at the end of the day,
O faithful shepherd! to come,
Bringing thy sheep in thy hand. 3

It was the helpfulness of a man now ripe in mind, and strong in his own independence, riper and stronger than his son was to be at the same age; the helpfulness, in the words of Clough, of "rough-hewn and mountainous strength." 4

He helped his children, in a general way, by leaving them as much liberty as possible, and it is remarkable how much liberty can accompany such a high moral life as that of the Arnold family. At Rugby, a school-room was set apart for the children, and after 1833, if not before, they had a governess. They seem to have done much as they liked with the garden, where they developed a form of trench warfare with clay missiles. They had also "little cricket, gymnastics, quoits, swinging, gardening," 5 and Matthew later added fishing. They were free to come and go in the Doctor's study, and he was, even there, at their disposal. 6 They were free to choose whatever career

1. Memoir of H.O. Arnold-Foster, p. 12. 2. Ibid., p. 16.
they wished. Among the projects in the execution of which they were not only free, but encouraged, was the 'Fox How Magazine,' to which all the family contributed. They were allowed, also, to visit the London theatre at Covent Garden, hearing, in 1837, for example, Grisi in 'Don Pasquale,' and Macready, Helen Maucit and Charles Kemble in 'King John.' Some of them accompanied him on two of his visits to the Continent. In 1837, he went to France with his wife and three eldest children; and again in 1841, with Matthew and Thomas — a visit of which they retained happy memories.

Besides such liberty, the family received help in many indirect ways; Dr. Arnold would put new books in their hands, arouse new interests, and encourage special capacities. He gave them an interest, for example, in wild flowers, during their walks and picnics in the country round Fox How, their home. Jane had every encouragement in learning German, which he had himself taught her, and the annual Christmas visit of Crabb Robinson was turned to account for her in reading with him Schiller or Goethe.

The earliest stages of Matthew's education were carried on at home by his parents in much the same manner. In his eighth year, however, he was sent to Laleham, his birthplace, where Dr. Arnold's brother-in-law, Mr. Buckland, kept a small school. Under this "most severe and even brutal pedagogue," as his nephew called him, Matthew remained for two years. Among his school-fellows was Jonn Duke, afterwards Lord Coleridge. "He came to the school," wrote Coleridge later, "... a little fellow full of cleverness, and I do not say forced, but certainly unusually forward. To say by heart, for example, whole pages of Burke's speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, and to say them with real intelligence and appreciation, was certainly out of the common way in a boy of no more than seven or eight years old; ...." On leaving Laleham, he was placed, along with Thomas and another of his brothers, under the care of a tutor, Herbert Hill, a cousin of Southey's. In 1836, Dr. Arnold sent him, with Thomas, to his own old school, Winchester, "to make him familiar with a system which had woven itself into the very nature of the elder man." At the end of the year he entered Rugby, where he spent the next three years.

It was at Rugby that Matthew came most directly under his father's care, learned his leading ideas and benefited most from his power as a teacher. The extent of his debt can hardly be over-estimated. On his father's death, he remarked to Stanley that "the first thing that struck him when he saw the body was the thought that their sole source of information was gone. They had consulted him so entirely on everything." 1

It was not only the extent of his information, however, but also the breadth of his outlook, that benefited his pupils so remarkably. "He was so wonderfully," wrote Matthew, "for his nation, time, and profession, European, and thus so got himself out of the narrow medium in which, after all, his English friends lived." 2 He read German at a time when the knowledge of German literature was rare in England. His best friends, apart from relations and fellow-students, were Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador to England, and Niebuhr, the Roman historian.

The subjects in which his children were most indebted to him were religion and history. Stanley referred to these as "the two words whose meaning and hope Matthew told me we had both learned from the same source." 3 The whole question of Church and State," he wrote again in 1868, "the Irish Church, the admission of Dissenters to the Universities — how completely fortified I feel at all points by the long familiarity with the solution of these questions which all reasonable people have acknowledged to be the best." 4 That is, Dr. Arnold's solution — the identity of Church and State, or a church co-extensive with the nation, and in Ireland the recognition of the Roman Catholic as the national church. In 1877, in his last book on religious questions, Matthew Arnold was still contending for his father's idea — a national church and the comprehension of all sects therein.

In history, Dr. Arnold's method and ideas were also largely adopted by his son. He was one of the first to read history as a connected series of events and ages. He described his method thus: "Let him (the pupil) be taught .... to trace back institutions, civil and religious, to their origin; to explore the elements of the national character, as now exhibited in maturity, in the vicissitudes of the nation's fortune, and the moral and physical qualities of its race; to observe how the morals and the

mind of the people have been subject to a series of influences, some accidental, others regular; ... In short, the pupil may be furnished as it were with certain formulae, which shall enable him to read history beneficially; which shall teach him what to look for in it, now to judge of it, and now to apply it." Following this method, Dr. Arnold had formed for himself certain formulae by which to interpret history. The chief of these was the division of any society into its component classes, analyzing these, determining their influence, watching their rise and fall, and inquiring into the reasons for the changes, — following the lead of Montesquieu. There was the aristocracy, both of blood and of wealth, and there were the commons. The various forms and fortunes of aristocracies were reduced to a system, and their inter-relations made intelligible. "States, like individuals," he wrote, "go through certain changes in a certain order, and are subject at different stages of their course to certain peculiar disorders. ... The knowledge of these periods furnishes us with a clue to the study of history." The critical period came in the life of a state "when wealth begins to possess the ascendency formerly enjoyed by nobility; and thecontending parties in the state assume the form of rich and poor, the few and the many, instead of the old distinctions of nobles and commons, of a conquering and a conquered."  

Developments or changes of this kind took place in ancient Greece and Rome and could be studied in their history. The order of the changes, once determined, could then be applied to the England of the early nineteenth century. The same contest of the few and the many, of rich and poor, of "property and numbers" had been the state of England since 1688. The aristocracy of birth had dominated the eighteenth century, but with the Industrial Revolution, was giving way to an aristocracy of wealth, or a strong middle class. There was thus an ancient and a modern period in the history of every nation. The modern periods in Greek and Roman history were to be studied in this light, and the results of such study applied to the history of the nineteenth century.

Besides such ideas in the main spheres of religion and history, Matthew Arnold owed his father much in other directions. He owed him, for example, a great part of his ideas on translation, on style, on the importance of morality, on philology and on the superiority of mixed races, to mention only a few.

1. Dr. Arnold, Misc. Works, p. 359. 2. Ibid., Appendix to Thucydides. 3. Ibid.
The general impression left by Dr. Arnold, then, upon his eldest son was that of a strong helper, both in moral and intellectual affairs. But it was more. It tells of an "even cheerfulness clear":

In the gloom of November we pass'd
Days not of gloom at thy side;

And

.... to us thou wert still
Cheerful, and helpful, and firm. ¹

Dr. Arnold could be severe at times, but the impression remained. "Stern though his look could be - and often had to be - there was a vein of drollery in him, a spirit of pure fun, ... He was not witty, nor ... was he humorous, but the comic and grotesque side of life attracted him strongly. He gave to each of his children some nickname more or less absurd, and joked with us, while his eyes twinkled, on the droll situations and comparisons which the names suggested. In a sense we were afraid of him; that is, we were very much afraid, if we did wrong, of being found out and punished, and, still worse, of witnessing the frown gather on his brow. Yet in all of us on the whole love cast out fear; for he never held us at a distance, was never impatient with us; always, we knew, was trying to make us good and happy."¹ So wrote Thomas Arnold. "Stories we are told," wrote Lord Coleridge, "not to be repeated here, of the austere literalness with which Dr. Arnold restrained the lively sallies of his son, and showing that he could not see, and if he had seen that he would not have approved of, those traits which were in truth but the clothing, to those who knew them well the charming and attractive clothing, of a noble, sincere, and most affectionate nature. In trouble, from which Dr. Arnold was not exempt, he found out the sterling worth of his son; and before his death the great though somewhat stern man did justice to one who his whole life long honoured the memory of his father with the undeviating and hearty loyalty of a devoted son."³

Dr. Arnold's impression of his son was similar: he wrote of him to Lake in 1840, "... his amiableness of temper seems very great, and some of his faults appear to me less; and he is so loving to me....."⁴

On each anniversary of his father's death, Matthew used to write to his mother, always in admiration, but not blind admiration, of his father's greatness, and of his own debt to him and his work. But more than

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¹ Rugby Chapel. 1857. ² T. Arnold, P. W. L., p. 3.
⁴ Memorials of Dean Lake, p. 161.
anything he remembered the affection and the helpfulness of his parents. And when he went into the world, what most impressed him was the contrast between its hardness and vulgarity and the unworldliness and affection of his home.
2. The World and the Flesh.

............ wicked world,
The hardening heart, the calculating brain
Narrowing its doors to thought, the lying lips,
The calm-dissembling eyes; the greedy flesh,
The world, the Devil — .........

2. **The World and the Flesh.**

By 'unworldliness', the chief sentiment that he bequeathed to his eldest son, Dr. Arnold meant a very sharp opposition between the world and religion. "The world is enmity with God." But he also meant an inward as well as an outward opposition, an opposition between the flesh and the spirit. He conceived life as a constant battle, by the help of faith, against the evil of the external world and at the same time against the internal corruptions of human nature. A future, unseen world, conceived by faith, was opposed to the present visible world, which governs men's actions; the flesh, 'essentially corrupt,' was opposed to the spirit, which overcomes the flesh and makes for goodness.

This opposition Matthew Arnold absorbed, as did the other more serious pupils of Rugby, like Clough, Hughes and Stanley. In spite of considerable modifications in the scope of the terms 'the flesh' and 'the world,' they maintained the opposition all their lives. Matthew for example, quoting Bishop Wilson, wrote, "In some way or other every man is conscious of an opposition in him between the flesh and the spirit." "Words which have haunted me for the last year or two," he wrote again in 1868, "... that we should no longer live the rest of our time in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God." However different the interpretation we put on much of the facts and the history of Christianity, we may unite in the bond of this call, ..." Still using Paul's words, he wrote to his mother "... for progress in the direction of the 'seeketh not her own' there is always room, up to the very end, or, at least, near it." 

The chief moral opposition implied in the conception of unworldliness was that of truth and sincerity on the one hand and convention on the other. The world was insincere, conventional; it acted from selfish and preconceived or interested motives, chiefly monetary and material; it did not, it could not, arrive at the truth, nor tell it. Dr. Arnold taught sincerity and truthfulness in the face of the world's hostility, however fierce. His sons and pupils learnt to speak out fearlessly the highest truth they knew.

1. Epistle to James, IV. 4. ; Oakfield, II. 31. (W.D. Arnold).  
For rigorous teachers seized my youth,
And purged its faith, and trimm'd its fire,
Show'd me the high, white star of Truth,
There bade me gaze, and there aspire;  

Every convention or catchword of the world must, then, be approached in antagonism, and called on to produce its credentials. The wider the acceptance of any convention, also, the more suspicious should they be of its truth. The right direction in which to swim was against the stream. So W.D. Arnold makes Oakfield, the hero of his novel, oppose the convention of duelling among the officers in the Indian Army, and maintain his unworl'dly attitude in spite of all contrary influences. Matthew always remained faithful to this sentiment. Speaking through the mouth of Empedocles, he says:

Yes, I take myself to witness,
That I have loved no darkness,
Sophisticated no truth,
Nursed no delusion,
Allow'd no fear!

He took special note when an American critic praised this quality in his early poems and linked him in this respect with his father. He admired Goethe for the same attitude:— "His thorough sincerity — writing about nothing that he had not experienced — is in modern literature almost unrivalled."  

This sentiment affected particularly the ideas of Matthew Arnold and his friends on social and political matters. Social life was full of the conventionality and insincerity they had been taught to oppose. Jowett, the intimate friend of both Stanley and Matthew Arnold, states their position generally: "Suppose a person acquainted with the real state of the world in which we live and move, neither morosely depreciating, nor unduly exalting human nature, to turn to the image of the Christian Church in the New Testament, how great would be the contrast! How would the blessing of poverty contrast with the real, even the moral advantages of wealth! the spiritual, almost supernatural, society of the first Christians, with our world of fashion, of business, of pleasure! the community of goods, with our meagre charity to others! "A little later, referring to the double standard of sexual morality, a ruling convention: "... again, consider how society, sometimes in self-defence, sets a false stamp on good and evil; as,

in the excessive punishment of the errors of women, compared with Christ's conduct to the woman who was a sinner.\textsuperscript{1}

The idea of convention was thus merged with that of inequality. According to the world's practice, neither workmen nor women were treated as equals in human dignity or as possessing human rights; they were not ends, but means. Jowett expressed this point also; "When men are acknowledged," he says, "to be in the sight of God equal, how strange it seems that one should be heaping up money for another, and absolutely dependent on him for his daily life."\textsuperscript{2} He goes on to describe the feelings of young men, such as himself or Arnold or Clough, who had looked at the world in the light of these ideals: "Susceptible minds ... may carry such reflections very far, until society itself appears evil, and they desire some primitive patriarchal mode of life. They are weary of conventionalities; they want as they say to make religion a reality; to place all men on a religious, social, political equality."\textsuperscript{3}

In similar language Dr. Arnold describes the same absolute cleavage between the religious life and the practice of the world. It is vain, he says, to "attempt to serve God and Mammon together; to reconcile the low standard of your companions with that purer and higher one ... with which it has been your happiness to be made acquainted."\textsuperscript{4} The way to wealth and the recognition of the world lay through 'practice'. Practice meant politics or industry. Politics meant jobbery or insincerity. Industry would compel a denial of morality altogether. In any industrial system working to the motto of 'Laissez faire', like the industry of the 'forties, there was no law but the law of the strongest. There was no freedom of thought or action, no beauty, no manners.

Two other aspects of the world are closely connected with the 'practice' of politics and the wealth of industry. Political practice is symbolised by Arnold as the Law. Wealth is a means towards pleasure. Both pleasure and the Law are concerned with outward things. They do not touch the inward working of the spirit, or satisfy the inward working of the conscience.

With the Law Jowett contrasts the inward, spiritual principle of Faith: "Faith, then," wrote Jowett in 1855, "according to the Apostle (Paul) is ... opposed to the law, and of a nature purely moral and spiritual. It frees man from the flesh, the law, the world, and fro

\textsuperscript{1} Dr. Arnold, Sermons preached in the Chapel of Rugby School (1832), p. 143.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
himsel$ also; that is, from his sinful nature, which is the meeting of these three elements in his spiritual consciousness."

Or the outward law may be opposed to the inward law of conscience; and the letter of the law to the spirit of it. This opposition is the basis of 'The Sick King in Bokhara.' The King tries to rise above the literal to the spiritual interpretation of the law. Although King, he cannot over-ride the law.

They that bear rule, and are obey'd,
Unto a rule more strong than theirs
Are in their turn obedient made.

Out of pity he tries to pardon or let off easily the poor man who has infringed the letter of the law and who now stands before him self-accused.

Justice, O King, and on myself!
On this great sinner, who hath broke
The law, and by the law must die!

The Vizier and the Ulema also repeat the phrase, 'as the law is.' The King orders:

"Ston'd must he be, the law stands so:
Yet, if he seek to fly, give way:
Forbid him not, but let him go."

But the man will not fly: he dies by the law. Being sick and a young man, the King complains:

..... what I will I cannot do.

but at last he finds an outlet for his inward sense of law and justice, and for a clemency that is above the law:

But what I can do, that I will.

He therefore orders the poor man to be buried richly in his own royal tomb.

The world is also characterized by the pursuit of pleasure, to which its wealth is a means. In ascribing this pursuit to the world both Dr. Arnold and, in his youth, Matthew Arnold, seem to have held a peculiar form of psychological Hedonism. According to this theory, the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the sole actual motives of human conduct. The man of

1. Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, etc. (1855), II. 485.
the world acts with a view to present pleasures: the religious man prefers to act with a view to future or unworlthy pleasures. If men have faith enough to reject present and worldly in favour of future and unworlthy pleasures, they have the religious life; if not, they sink into wickedness. There are therefore, according to this interpretation of conduct, but two alternatives, religion or the pleasures of the world and the flesh. To abandon the one is to accept the other. Mycénus, for example, on losing faith in a just God, gives himself up to

...... dances crown'd with flowers,
Love, free to range, and regal banquetings.

...... all the tumult of the feast,
Flush'd guests, and golden goblets, foam'd with wine;

The pleasures that influence worldly action are those attendant on riches, or those furnished by pride, self-love, passion, idleness — the pleasures 'of the senses and the current thoughts.' There are the pleasures offered by the New Sirens, the love-potions crown'd moments with the weight of years.

and there are the pleasures of wealth and position, power and influence, action and excitement.

Like his father, Matthew Arnold appreciated the more this outward opposition of world and flesh to religion and soul, because of the strength of the conflict within himself. Wealth, influence, pleasure, were within his grasp. He had naturally a spark of that ambition which his father expressed in the phrase, 'Aut Caesar aut nullus.' To Jane he wrote, "I am by nature so very different from you, the worldly element enters so much more largely into my composition, that as I become formed there seems to grow a gulf between us, which tends to widen till we can hardly hold any intercourse across it." He continued, "I intend not to give myself the rein in following my natural tendency, but to make war against it ...." 1

And the stronger the world showed itself, and his' natural tendency' towards the world, the stronger became his determination to fight against and control it. Had the world been already so victorious: let him, her foe, fight but the harder.

1. Dr. Arnold, Sermons (Rugby), p. 15, p. 143, etc.
"Behold," she says, "so many rages lull'd,  
So many fiery spirits quite cool'd down:  
Look how so many valours, long undull'd,  
After short commerce with me, fear my frown.  
Thou, too, when thou against my crimes wouldst cry,  
Let thy forboded homage check thy tongue."---  
The World speaks well: yet might her foe reply—  
"Are wills so weak? then let not mine wait long.  
Hast thou so rare a poison? let me be  
Keener to slay thee, lest thou poison me."  

As a vehicle for the poetic expression of this whole  
conception, the subject of Ulysses, especially his relations to the  
Sirens and to Circe, attracted both Arnold and Clough. Clough, for  
example, in 'Dipsychus,' pictured any possible surrender to the world  
in terms of this story: as did Arnold in 'The New Sirens' and 'The  
Strayed Reveller.' Or they turned to the story of Samson and the  
Philistines. But the chief subjects through which Arnold expressed,  
or intended to express, his ideas, were those of Empedocles and Lucretius.  
Empedocles illustrated chiefly the outward side of the opposition,  
Lucretius the inward.  

Empedocles is 'ever at war with man.' He is, like Arnold, one  
 whose youth was fed on other food, was  
[trained  

By other rules than are in vogue to-day:  

... in a world he loves not must subsist  
In ceaseless opposition.  

Empedocles' picture of Sicily is a thinly veiled  
description of Liberal England. Where  

The brave impetuous hand yields everywhere  
To the subtle, contriving head;  
Great qualities are trodden down,  
And littleness united  
Is become invincible.  

Everywhere  

What anguish of greatness  
Rail'd and hunted from the world  
Because its simplicity rebukes  
This envious, miserable age!  

1. The World's Triumphs.
The inward side of the opposition also appears in the poem, but especially the appeal of pleasure, but it plays only a subordinate part.

The fable of Lucretius, on the other hand, was to express chiefly the opposition of flesh and spirit. But for the appearance of Tennyson's poem on the same subject, Arnold would probably have completed and published this poem. Lucretius, at first engrossed by the spirit, but afterwards, owing to the power of Lucilia's love-philtre, losing the sway of the spirit over the flesh, would have furnished Arnold with a companion-piece to Empedocles, and completed the expression of this fundamental idea of his life and work.

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3. Expansion.
3. Expansion.

Adolescence is normally a period of transition. About the age of fourteen or fifteen, the child becomes a youth and passes through a series of important physical and mental changes into manhood. The senses are sharpened. New susceptibilities awake, new desires, new ideas, a new world. He finds, both in himself and outside, a larger life. He expands.

Thomas Arnold considered that this process affected his elder brother beyond the average. His temperament became at this time, he says "exuberant" and "versatile".

Matthew himself, thinking mainly of his adolescence, described the artistic or poetic temperament as "...mobile, inconstant, eager, thirsting for new impressions...." For poetry has its rise in this stage of development. Poetry, as interprets of the natural world, has for its basis, he says in his essay on Maurice de Guérin, "an extraordinary susceptibility to impressions; in exercising it the poet is in a great degree passive (Wordsworth thus speaks of a wise passiveness); he aspires to be a sort of human aeolian-harp, catching and rendering every rustle of Nature. To assist at the evolution of the whole life of the world is his craving, and intimately to feel it all:

'..... the glow, the thrill of life,
Where, where do these abound?'

is what he asks: he resists being riveted and held stationary by any single impression, but would be borne on for ever down an enchanted stream." He demands ever more and more of this sensibility. He is the Strayed Reveller asking:

Faster, faster,
O Circe, goddess,
Let the wild thronging train,
The bright procession
Of eddying forms,
Sweep through my soul!

1. Thomas Arnold, Passages in a Wandering Life, p. 56.
2. Essays in Criticism: Maurice de Guérin.
Impressionability is open to painful as well as to pleasurable sensations. The poetic temperament therefore both enjoys and suffers greatly. The poet enters into the suffering of his characters:

......—such a price
The Gods exact for song;
To become what we sing. 1

He has the vision of the Gods. 2 But, what the Gods have not, he has this suffering:

These things, Ulysses,
The wise bards also
Behold and sing.
But oh, what labour!
O Prince, what pain! 3

The same craving for impressions that made Arnold a poet led him to travel. He notes the connection of travel with impressionability in Maurice de Guérin. "In the same spirit", he says of him, "he longed for travel. 'When one is a wanderer', he writes to his sister, 'one feels that one fulfils the true condition of humanity'. And the last entry in his Journal is—'The stream of travel is full of delight. Oh, who will set me adrift on this Nile!" 4 In 1865, Arnold wrote, "I have no doubt I shall again feel the charm and stir of travel again, as I did when I was young." 5 Ulysses, the great wanderer, attracted him; as did the Gipsies. This epicurean delight in the variety of sensory impressions was directed, among other things, to Nature. In Nature he found 'fragrant glooms' and 'odorous pines' and

Scent, and song, and light and flowers. 6

This side of the expansive process brought him closer to the classics, to the 'pagan spirit', which treats life according to the demand of the senses: This led him also to the appreciation of the return to the life of the senses in the Renascence, in the eighteenth century, and in Heinrich Heine, of whom he wrote as "a man who could feel not only the pleasurableness but the poetry of the life of the senses (and the life of the senses has its deep poetry); ...." 7 His appreciation of Keats, "the early lost and admirably gifted Keats," 8

1. The Strayed Reveller. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid.
8. On Translating Homer, p. 69.
also reflects this sensuous tendency. He was able, through this side of his expansion, to appreciate the exclamation of Keats, "O for a life of sensations!" And the 'deep poetry' of the senses shows clearly in his own work, in:

The cowering Merchants, in long robes,
Sit pale beside their wealth
Of silk-bales and of balsam-drops,
Of gold and ivory,
Of turquoise-earth and amethyst,
Jasper and chalcedony,
And milk-barr'd onyx stones. 1

or:
And saw the merry Grecian coaster come,
Freighted with amber grapes, and Chian wine,
Green bursting figs, and tunnies steep'd in brine; 2

or:
......—the frail-leaf'd, white anemone—
Dark blue-bells drench'd with dews of summer-eves—
And purple orchizes with spotted leaves— 3

The susceptibleness to the Newmanic power of words"at Oxford is but another aspect of the same temperament. Already in childhood words had held him; and in adolescence their power was so much the greater. One of the earliest recollections describes his return for the holidays from school at Laleham. He was then about nine years old. The family at Rugby were astonished at the amount of slang that Matthew had acquired from his companions, and which he now poured forth with uninterrupted flow. He poured out his ideas on paper with a similar fluency. "As a boy," he said, "I used to write very quickly, and at first it was with an effort that I compelled myself to write more slowly and carefully ...." 5 To the end of his life he remained a great conversationalist.

The one defect in his appreciation and command of language was his ear. As, in music, he was "by way of being without an ear",—Wagner's music "says little to me" 7—so, in poetry, as has often been pointed out, he could write such lines as

When the forte of folly fall 8

or
Self-school'd, self-scann'd, self-honour'd, self-secure. 9

or
...... us the Sea receiv'd. 10

1. The Strayed Reveller. 2. The Scholar Gipsy. 3. Ibid.
To the rhythms and associations of language, however, he was susceptible enough. Phrases haunted him. Speaking in 1863, "... some fifteen years ago—"

he said, "I remember pestering those about me with this sentence, the rhythm of which had lodged itself in my head, and which, with the strangest pronunciation possible, I kept perpetually declaiming: " and he gave a passage from The Centaur of Maurice de Guérin. The rhythm and music of language also, drew him to Shelley, probably with the publication of Shelley's complete poems in 1839. The influence of Shelley on his verse is quite clear in The Strayed Reveller and other Poems: that of Byron has disappeared. Shelley was, in this respect at least, a more powerful influence than Byron, with a more subtle command of language and a more musical tone:

.... the breeze
Carried thy lovely wail away,
Musical through Italian trees
Which fringe thy soft blue Spezzian bay.

The Strayed Reveller, Arnold's first volume, shows more than any of his later works the influence of his poetical reading. It abounds in phrases taken from numerous sources, and in reminiscences of numerous English poets. It opens with a sonnet (To Nature) in the manner of Wordsworth. It contains about a dozen reminiscences of Shelley. As Professor Saintsbury points out, there are many traces of the influence of Tennyson's Poems of 1842, of Moore (A Modern Sappho) and of Keats. Phrases also occur from Pope's Rape of the Lock, Goldsmith's Deserted Village, Poe's The Raven, Coleridge's Kubla Khan, and, most frequently of all, from the Bible.

Arnold not only read, but also wrote, a good deal of verse while at Oxford. He had previously written much in the Fox How Miscellany, at home; and in the school magazine at Rugby. All that has been published from this period is the Rugby prize-poem, Alaric at Home. At Oxford, he won the Newdigate Prize in 1843 with Cromwell. The sonnet, Shakespeare, belongs to 1844; and the poems of The Strayed Reveller were presumably over the period 1844-9. His brother

1. Essays in Criticism: Maurice de Guérin.
2. Stanzas from The Grande Chartreuse.
Thomas says of this Oxford time, "He was cultivating his poetic gift carefully," and also supplies the information that "Goethe displaced Byron in his poetical allegiance." It was at this time, too, according to Clough, that Wordsworth "had taken M. under his special protection." In poetry Arbold found an outlet or channel of expression for his newly developed emotions. He sought emotion as he sought new sense-experience. There was often an element of pain in it. He found it 'stormily sweet'. But on the whole the sweetness predominated. The joy of existence filled his veins, the delirium of being young, the feeling that

We are young, and the world is ours,
For man is the king of the world.

Speaking of early death, he wished for the victim:

Give him emotion, though pain!
Let him live, let him feel: I have lived!
Heap up his moments with life,
Triple his pulses with fame!

Emotion and these early pleasures of adolescense to him then wore the forms of the Graces, while he himself

..... in your train at morning
Stroll'd and sang with joyful mind,

And we too, from upland valleys,

Left our awful laurels hanging,
And came heap'd with myrtles to your throne.

Afterwards he could say, of this early time,

But, for me, my thoughts are straying
Where at sunrise, through the vines,
On these lawns I saw you playing,
Hanging garlands on the odorous pines.

When your showering locks enwound you

1. T. Arnold, Passages in a Wandering Life, p. 56.
4. The Youth of Man. 5. Haworth Churchyard.
And your heavenly eyes shone through:
When the pine-boughs yielded round you,
And your brows were starr'd with dew.

He felt

The strong hand that beauty around him hath furl'd.

and conceived a type of beauty with soft cheek, white
shoulder, golden-haired, strangely smiling, or with
soft ash-coloured hair, arch eyes, mocking mouth.
He longed for 'the storms of love' and wrote

Ere the parting kiss be dry:

Among the chief sources, or outlets, of his emotion
it is worth while to mention the theatre. At Easter,
1837, he and Thomas spent the short vacation in
London, when, says Thomas, 'I had the unspeakable
pleasure of hearing Grisi, .... in "Don Pasquale";
and Mario as Count Almaviva. I think it must have
been on the same occasion that we saw that wonderful
cast of "King John" at Covent Garden, in which
Charles Kemble played the bastard Faulconbridge,
Macready King John, and Helen Faucit the Lady
Constance.' Such visits must have occurred frequently
during these Oxford years. It is therefore not
unnatural to find Matthew recording a visit to the
Edinburgh theatre, probably in 1841; and it is interesting
to note the spell there cast over him. "I remember
how, in my youth, after a first sight of the divine
Rachel .... in the part of Hermione, I followed her
to Paris, and for two months never missed one of her
representations." Now Rachel "excelled .... in
intensity and the portrayal of fierce passions, particular­
ly evil and malignant passion ". The low and muffled
tones of her voice "under the influence of passion
possessed a thrilling and penetrating quality
which was irresistible." Matthew Arnold's emotions were obviously strong,
often too strong. If he had his mother's delicate
and sensitive spirit, he had also his full share of
his father's intense feeling, his indignation. On
occasion he let this feeling slip into his poetry,

2. The New Sirens. a. Ibid. 3. A Modern Sappho.
where it is directed against self-complacency and narrowness of mind; the 'Independent Preacher' is called 'restless fool': and after some argument with a similar type as to a point of religious belief, he cries:

For God's sake, believe it then.

It has been pointed out, also, that the frequent use of ejaculations in his poetry is a proof of this intense underlying emotion. In later life he retained this impatience and emotion, although he seldom allowed it to break out. "He was critical and impatient with people who did not come up to his standard."

At times he showed the same fidgety disposition that Stanley had noted in Dr Arnold, "One gets fidgeted", he wrote to J. D. Coleridge, in 1864, "when one has an indefinite time to wait for something one has got greatly interested about". Other signs of nervous excitability appear in the frequent bilious attacks from which he used to suffer as a boy. It is not improbable that this state of nervous tension was in some way connected with the onset of angina pectoris of which both he and his father died. As early as 1846-7, when he was only twenty four, he was told by an eminent physician that the action of his heart was not regular.

His banter and practical joking formed an outlet, in a different direction, for this emotional and excitable temperament,

So full of power, yet blithe and debonair,
Rallying his friends with pleasant banter gay.

We hear of his 'charming waggery' at Oxford. In January 1842, when Dr. Arnold was delivering his first course of lectures as Professor of Modern History, the whole family went up to Oxford. Matthew had then been in residence for three months, "We visited him", says Thomas, "at his rooms in Balliol...... When he had got us all safely in, he is said to have exclaimed, "Thank God, you are in!" and when the visit was over, and he had seen the last of us out on the staircase, "Thank God, you are out!" "Our friend Matt", writes

J. Manley Hawker, to J. D. Coleridge, on March 11, 1843, "utters as many absurdities as ever, with as grave a face"; and, a few months later, "we arrived ... after sundry displays of the most consummate coolness on the part of our friend Matt, who pleasantly induced a belief into the passengers (of the coach) that I was a poor mad gentleman, and that he was my keeper. . . . . This is a stupid epistle, but A. has been bothering me in the early part of it. . . . . I laugh too much", Arnold admitted, in a letter to Coleridge the following year, "and they (his friends) make one's laughter mean too much."

All observers agree in stressing another cognate trait of Arnold's adolescence, his foppery. Thomas mentions his fashionable dressing at Oxford. "His Olympian manners", says Max Müller, "began even at Oxford; there was no harm in them, they were natural, not put on. The very sound of his voice and the wave of his arm were a love-like." "His manner", writes Charlotte Brontë, of her meeting with him in 1850, "displeased from its seeming foppery.... ere long a real modesty appeared under his assumed conceit." "I had with me" writes Crabbe Robinson in the same year, "Matth: Arnold, a very gentlemanly young man, with a slight tinge of the fop that does no harm when blended with talents, good nature and high spirits."

But there was also a serious side to this emotional expansion. Arnold's 'unworldly' training could not, and did not now, suddenly vanish. His early religious sentiments rather expanded and deepened. With the fits of elation and waggery alternated moods of thoughtfulness, depression, and melancholy. The religious movements and discussions of Tractarian Oxford, Dr. Arnold's sudden death, the Irish potato famine, and the announcement of his own possible early death, all converged to accentuate the deepest current of his feelings, the side of his nature which justified those who, like George Sand, saw and appreciated it, in calling him a 'young Milton'? But these moods he kept for the most part concealed. Many of his closest friends, such as Shairp, never saw or suspected their existence until they were afterwards revealed in his poetry.

1. Life and Correspondence of Lord Coleridge, I. 126.
Expansion of sense and emotion was naturally accompanied by expansion of intellect and ideas. This was probably facilitated by the death of Dr. Arnold, in 1842, when Matthew was only nineteen. "The development of the two elder sons at the University," says Mrs. Humphry Ward, was probably very different from what it would have been had their father lived.\(^1\) Matthew read voraciously, getting to know as far as possible the best that had been thought and said in the world. With Sainte-Beuve for his guide, he penetrated deeply into French literature; he had the assistance of the Bunsens, Stanley and Jowett, for German; he read a good deal of Italian; his knowledge of Latin and Greek, firmly founded by his father, he deepened considerably.

As a scholar, he was brilliant. J. D. Coleridge had remarked on his precocity at Isleham. At Winchester, he "took so good a place in the school that he was beyond the reach of faggings;\(^2\) and even then he found the work light.\(^3\) Many years after, in the 'seventies, Moberley, then Bishop of Salisbury, (writes T. H. S. Escott), "circumstantially recalled to the present writer the extraordinary impression produced during his first Winchester half by Matthew Arnold's intimacy, acquired from his father, with the historical aspects and references of Shakespeare's plays and of Scott's novels.\(^4\) His election at Oriel, after taking only a second class, is a convincing testimony to the recognition of his brilliance at Oxford also.

But at this time his interest did not lie in the routine work of the University; the course did not attract him; and both before and after going up to Oxford, he was "equally brilliant, desultory and idle.\(^5\) His laziness called forth many comments. In August 1840, Dr. Arnold wrote to Lake, his tutor, "Matt does not know what it is to work because he so little knows what it is to think. But I am more hopeful about him than I was: ... I think that he is not so idle as he was, and that there is a better prospect of his beginning to read in earnest. Alas! that we should have to speak of prospects only, and of no performance as yet which deserves the name of 'earnest reading'. \(^6\) "Want of knowledge of his books," wrote Lake.

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2. Letters, i. i.  
3. Times, April 17, 1889.  
4. Fortnightly Review, April, 1911.  
5. Memorials of Dean Lake, p. 72.  
lost him his 'first', when he was obliged to go into the schools at the end of his third year.1 His companions seem to have twitted him with the same failing. In a letter to Coleridge, he speaks of "those miserable insinuations about laziness, carelessness, and so on, which too many of my friends are apt to indulge in...."2

Yet, while neglecting his 'books', Arnold was reading widely in other directions. The truth is that he allowed his interests to carry him away. Where he was interested, he was brilliant. His brother illustrates this tendency in Matthew during his youth: "Ratiocination did not at that time charm him; and the demonstration of what he did not care to know found him languid. Later on, when he applied his mind to reasoning, he found no difficulty; and some writer who knew the facts has lately told how easily and quickly he mastered the principles and terminology of Logic, when it was necessary for him to take up that subject as a substitute for Euclid at his Examinations."3

The change itself from Rugby to Oxford was a great part of the cause of such idleness in otherwise energetic natures. At Rugby there had been a premature casting of responsibility on young shoulders. The prefects had been expected to do all they could to assist the Doctor in his aim of producing Christian gentlemen first and scholars second. With Oxford came a sudden easing of the strain. "You see, at Rugby," says Tom Brown, "I was rather a great man. There one had a share in the ruling of 300 boys, and a good deal of responsibility, but here one has only just to take care of oneself and keep out of scrapes."4 There was not even, at Oxford, enough study to keep them actively interested. "Had I not read," says Clough, "pretty nearly all the books? was I to go on keeping up my Latin prose writers, for three years more? Logic and Ethics had some little novelty; there was a little extra scholarship to be obtained in some of the college lectures. But that was the utmost.—— An infinite lassitude and impatience, which I saw reflected in the faces of others, quickly began to infect me. Quosque Latin prose?"5

The standard was indeed rising, especially in Balliol and Oriel—the two prison-houses6 with which Arnold was associated. But the Tractarian movement absorbed all the intellect of these years (1833-45) and little attention could be spared for the regular reading course. Even had it been otherwise, the dead hand of Clarendon still lay heavy on Oxford. "In 1846," says Mark Pattison, "we were in old Tory Oxford; .... there was the unquestioning satisfaction in the tutorial system, i. e. one man teaching everybody everything; the same belief that all knowledge

was shut up between the covers of 4 Greek and 4 Latin books, "I.

Arnold and his friends were therefore left with nothing of interest to study, and no one to take charge of; and at the same time with no one to guide and direct them. A life of idleness, if they wished. They made the most of it. They escaped from the work—not a difficult matter—and lived in Oxford "as in a great country-house." They escaped to the country-side round Oxford, the Cumnor Hills, Bagley Wood, the 'stripling Thames'. Thither they would often take the volumes that met the needs of their expanding interests, Glanvil, or Goethe, or Emerson, or George Sand. Or they would gather in each other's rooms to discuss the questions of the hour and the perennial problem of youth. These discussions sometimes took place in Clough's rooms on a Sunday; at other times in the Decade, a small debating society which included J. D. Coleridge, Stanley and Jowett. Matthew Arnold was received into it when he came up to Oxford. "We met in one another's rooms," says Coleridge. "We discussed all things, human and divine. We thought we stripped things to the very bone . . . . We fought to the very stumps of our intellects and . . . . many a fruitful seed of knowledge was sown on these pleasant, if somewhat pugnacious evenings." The intellectual habits formed by Dr. Arnold, his reduction of everything to first principles, his questioning spirit, his love of truth, were not thrown away.

An important factor in this intellectual ferment seems to have been W. G. Ward, Tutor of Oriel. Ward was at that time probably the most brilliant personality in Oxford. He had assumed the leading role in the Oxford Movement about 1843, on Newman's retirement to Littlemore. He was in addition a brilliant talker and much frequented the Balliol Common-room. He had early come under the influence of Utilitarianism, especially of J. S. Mill. Through Ward, Oriel and Balliol men became familiar with Mill's Essays, then appearing in the Westminster Review. According to Lake, these were 'eagerly devoured' by them all. Mill's Logic, on its appearance in 1843, was reviewed by Ward in the British Critic and was shortly after introduced as a text-book. It was probably also through Ward and Mill that Oxford men first became acquainted with Saint-Simon and his disciple Comte. The latter he introduced into Oxford "before it was known to those who were afterwards called Comtists."

Many of Mill's ideas are repeated in Arnold. Arnold has the same distrust of mere numbers, or pure democracy, the same demand for state-intervention in such concerns as education; the same stress on culture as an offset and obstacle to the universal mediocrity ahead.

1 Pettison. Memoirs. p. 244.
2 Coleridge. 3 G. Ward and the Oxford Movement. App. C. (Lake)
4 Ibid. App. D. (Jowett.)
Mill attached great weight to the important ideas "which have been thrown into circulation," and to "an acquaintance with the thoughts and deeds of the great minds which precede" a man. For ideas are "a power in history." He also suggested for England something like the French Academy, to encourage, or at least to set a standard for, ideas. The English party-system kills ideas: Englishmen dislike and distrust them. The French, on the other hand, accept and apply them. Mill speaks of "the rapidity with which an idea thrown into French soil, takes root, and blossoms, and fructifies..." So he passes to the characteristics of different races, comparing, for example, the French with the Irish. His Essays also made familiar the Comtist conception of the dual movement in the history—critical or negative epochs alternating with organic or constructive, an idea that became one of the foundations of Arnold's thought.

But what was probably, for their general expansion, of much profounder importance, Arnold and his friends "discovered George Sand, Emerson, and Carlyle, .... Consuelo, in particular, was a revelation to the two young men (Matthew and Thomas) brought up under the 'earnest' influence of Rugby. It seemed to open to them a world of artistic beauty and joy of which they had never dreamed; and to loosen the bands of an austere conception of life, which began to appear to them too narrow for the facts of life. Wilhelm Meister, read in Carlyle's translation at the same time, exercised a similar liberating and enchanting power upon my father." (Thomas) The social enthusiasms of George Sand also affected him greatly. Thomas Arnold records that about 1846 he did not "feel sure that Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, especially the second part, the beauty and calm power of which deeply impressed me, might not contain the true medicine for the world's maladies. The notion of an organized society closely linked with the past, directed by a "Rond" of wise and good men—thinkers, educators, rulers, artists—seemed wonderfully attractive." From Wilhelm Meister, Matthew drew the central idea of culture, a perfection at once many-sided and harmonious. This idea justified, centred and guided his adolescent expansion. It led him to cultivate every power of which he felt himself possessed, and to get to know how other men had cultivated their peculiar powers. It also led him to use these cultivated powers in an effort towards social perfection, in concert, as far as possible, with other like-minded men of other nations.

\[1\] J. S. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions. (1859)
\[2\] Ibid., p. 73. 4Ibid., T. 217. 5Ibid., T. 235.
The immediate result was that Arnold widened his ideas from a comparatively narrow to a progressively broader basis. To his original ideal of an unworldliness founded chiefly on religion, he now added the ideals of art and knowledge. Religion, then, had to share its exclusive place in his outlook, to become one of a group of ideals which went to make up culture. But his hold on morality remained firm, if indeed it was not strengthened by being thus complemented. Nor did he love the world or the flesh more than formerly, though he felt strongly such an attraction towards them as he had never before had to combat.
4. Revolt and Escape.
4. Revolt and Escape.

The process of adaptation to the expanded world is for the youth slow and painful. He encounters rigid barriers in nature and society, thwarting the development of his new expanding powers. He finds these powers themselves impatient of control and difficult to harmonise. He becomes increasingly aware of a conflict with the outer world of society and at the same time of an inner conflict with his awakening instincts. The youth may react to the change of adolescence in various ways. He may—he commonly does—conform to the demands of society, so far as he can; complete conformity can only come with time. He may, on the other hand, rebel and either resist or escape. He may try to assert himself through nonconformity of any kind, or he may seek an escape in literature, day-dreaming, running away, or even suicide. It was the method of rebellion and escape rather than the method of conformity that Matthew Arnold followed during adolescence.

It is one of the real indictments of Dr Arnold's training that it aggravated, rather than mitigated, the difficult transition from boyhood to manhood, by overemphasising the attitude of opposition to the world, the side of revolt. This had the effect, in those pupils who were most influenced by him, of prolonging far beyond the normal period, their effort to reach a definite standpoint in life. The absoluteness of the ideals with which he inspired them, made conformity all the more difficult. He led them to demand too much—more than the world could ever give, even at its best—and they were thrown so much the more inevitably into opposition.

It would also seem as if Matthew Arnold's home life had been too sheltered and too full of affection and sympathy. The need for these, and their absence in the world, formed still another point of repulsion from life. In his earliest published poem, Alaric at Rome (1840), he wrote:

.... we feel the world is dull and low.
A little while, alas! a little while,
And the same world has tongue, and eye, and ear,
The careless glance, the cold unmeaning smile,
The thoughtless word, the lack of sympathy!

In Switzerland: A Farewell (1852), there is still the same note:

But in the world I learnt, what there
Thou too wilt surely one day prove,
That will, that energy, though rare,
Are yet far, far less rare than love.
The first onset of adolescent revolt appears in the incident related of Arnold's year at Winchester. He was then between fourteen and fifteen. Following his habit of perfect truthfulness, and probably unaware—or even in spite of being aware—of the attitude likely to be adopted by his schoolfellows, he made some remark to the Headmaster on the "light character of the work they had to do". His companions, fearing heavier work, regarded such a remark as an unpardonable offence.

According to a writer who attended Winchester in the same year, "A high tone of honour was kept up in the school, truth being scrupulously adhered to between the boys themselves, and by them towards the Masters, except in one particular ... and this was when telling the truth would bring another individual into trouble". The result was that, towards the end of the session, Arnold was one of the victims selected to undergo "that singular form of ostracism known as 'cloister-pealings', when the victim was led out before the whole school, and exposed .... to a rain of 'pontos', round missiles made of the crumb of new bread".

The punishment, though not in itself severe, was probably sufficient to bring home to Arnold the adolescent conflict with the social environment and to rouse the spirit of rebellion—all the more because of the contrast between such mob-action and his previous home-life. Through such incidents he understood and sympathized with Shelley's feelings at school, and could describe Maurice de Guérin as having "a temperament almost as unfit as Shelley's for common school life." And it is worth noting that it was Shelley the rebel who, probably about this Winchester time, first attracted Arnold: Shelley "the brilliant and attaching rebel who in thinking for himself had of old our sympathy so passionately with him ...." The incident of the 'pontos' is also linked with Arnold's admiration for the other great aristocratic rebel, Byron. At the end of that session, about two or three weeks later, Arnold declaimed, on closing day, the last speech of Marino Faliero in Byron's drama of that name. "He was adjudged to have obtained the palm of rhetoric over the whole school" by this declamation. Apparently his temporary unpopularity vanished. But it had left its mark.

Just before leaving Rugby, Arnold gained a verse-prize with Alaric at Rome. The motto is from Childe Harold—"I had been very much reading Childe Harold" and many of the passages are close imitations from Byron. In the Oxford prize-poem Cromwell, Arnold, as he says himself, "was just in the tail of the subsiding wave of Byronism." Marino Faliero still supplies the theme, or the treatment of it. In his Preface, Byron says: "an order to make Cromwell disembark from the ship in which he would have sailed to America, destroyed both King and Commonwealth." Arnold chose for the situation of his poem this critical moment in Cromwell's career.

He found Byron's cry 'stormily sweet.' He found consolation in Byron's revolt against the world.

............. our soul
Had felt him like the thunder's roll.
With shivering heart the strife we saw
Of passion with Eternal Law.
And yet with reverential awe
We watch'd the fount of fiery life
Which serv'd for that Titanic strife."

Even when his own revolt was over, Arnold could still admire the courage of Byron's: "Byron, the greatest elementary power, I cannot but think, which has appeared in our literature since Shakespeare." Byron was eminent by his 'inborn force and fire.' And in his letters, Arnold compares him with Goethe and Wordsworth,—great in his own line, that of passion, as they were in theirs.

At times, instead of conflicting directly with the world in his revolt against it, Arnold would escape, or wish to escape. Both movements were the reactions—though in opposite directions—of the unworldliness in which he had been trained, against an environment that would annihilate all his ideals.

Among other forms of escape, emigration suggested itself to several of Mr Arnold's sons. Thomas emigrated to New Zealand in 1847; William to India a little later. Matthew, although he did not follow their example, found equivalents for emigration in travel and rambling. The desire to escape also finds expression in his fishing expeditions. In 1843 he wrote to J. D. Coleridge, from Westmoreland, of "the
great delight of the year, fly-fishing. . . You
cannot conceive the delight I find in my solitary
fishing among the mountains here.1

Arnold also refers to 'dreaming' as one of
the characteristics of his youth. The word occurs
with great frequency in his early poems, and seems
to refer to the castles in the air, which he built
out of his ideals.

Dreams dawn and fly: . . .

His poems often run towards phantasy, picturing some
far off region, where dwell a peace and beauty and
romance not found in his own iron world. J. C.
Shairp describes him at Oxford as

.... half adream chaunting with jaunty air
Great words of Goethe, catch of Berenger.3

and Max Müller relates that he was "full of dreams
and schemes".4 In a letter of 1853, Arnold communic­
ates one of these day-dreams to his wife: "I don't
know why, but I certainly find inspecting peculiarly
oppressive just now; but I must tackle to, as it
would not do to let this feeling get too strong.
All this afternoon I have been haunted by a vision
of living with you at Berne, on a diplomatic appoint­
ment, and how different that would be from the
incessant grind in schools; but I could laugh at
myself, too, for the way in which I went on drawing
out our life in my mind."

The world against which he revolted and from
which he would fain have escaped, was an iron
world, the world of the Industrial Revolution. Even
at Oxford this world forced itself upon his notice.
The charm and seclusion of the Middle Ages was then
being disturbed for the first time by the irruption
of the manufacturing interest. New-rich merchants
and factory-owners were sending their sons; manu­
facters like Chanter who "could just write his
name and was making a colossal fortune by supplying
bad iron rails to the new railway companies."5 Like
Wordsworth, Arnold condemned these tendencies of
the age. He saw,—he with his ideals of equality and
human dignity,—

The complaining millions of men
Darken in labour and pain;7

1Coleridge, Life, etc., T. 124. 2To Fausta: A Question. 3Glen Desseray, p. 218
6Hughes, Tom Brown at Oxford. 7The Youth of Nature.
He saw the crush of competition:

Crowded and keen the country grows. ¹

He had

... thoughts, not idle, while before me flow

The armies of the homeless and unfed; ²

He knew well the condition of the great cities

that had sprung up or expanded with industry. He

knew 'the rank life of towns' and appreciated

Cruikshank's picture 'The Bottle'; he knew the state

of the poor in London—beggars in Belgravia, ³ and the

'squalid streets of Bethnal Green'. He saw the

poverty of happiness and of nobility that was in

England:

... the men of the crowd

Who all round me to-day

Bluster or cringe, and make life

Hideous, and arid, and vile; ⁴

He saw that

The brave impetuous hand yields everywhere

To the subtle, contriving head;

Great qualities are trodden down,

And littleness united

Is become invincible. ⁵

He was also well acquainted with the hardness, the

pursuit of wealth and pleasure, the convention and

hypocrisy of the middle classes; their vulgarity as

exemplified in Macaulay and America, their Liberalism

as it appeared in the politics of the 'forties.

For Liberalism represented all the forces of

the world as the Arnold family had been brought up

to oppose it. It was associated with the whole

forward movement of the middle classes, their growing

wealth, their increased political influence after

the first Reform Bill, and their connection with

Dissent in religion. To all three forces,—laissez-

faire, democracy and Dissent, with their attendant

qualities and consequences, Arnold remained all his

life opposed. In other words, he joined, like his

father, in the 'Interventionist' reaction that swept

the country from about 1835 to 1850, the movement

of pity for the oppressed working classes, the

starving Irish, and all the other victims of the

¹Resignation. ²To a Republican Friend. ³To George

Cruikshank, Esq. ⁴West London. ⁵East London.

⁶Rugby Chapel. ⁷Empedocles on Etna. ⁸Cazamian. Le

Roman Social.
Hungry Forties. He was thus opposed to the middle classes, and in sympathy with the aims of such men as Peel, Disraeli and Shaftesbury, who, however else they might differ, were agreed in making the alleviation of the distress the centre of their policy.

It was largely through his opposition to Liberalism that Newman also influenced Arnold. For the Oxford Movement, in so far as it was a creation of Newman's, was chiefly a reaction against the spirit of Liberalism. To this extent, at least, the spirit of Newman coincided exactly with that of Dr Arnold. This is partly what is referred to in Arnold's statement to J. D. Coleridge: "I find it perfectly possible to admire them both (Dr Arnold's sermons and Newman's.)" To the hardness and vulgarity of middle-class Liberalism, Newman opposed a "keen desire for beauty and sweetness". Liberalism had for the cardinal points of its belief the Reform Bill of 1832, and local self-government, in politics; in the social sphere, free-trade, unrestricted competition, and the making of large industrial fortunes; in the religious sphere, the Disestablishment of Dissent, and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion." It was in his opposition to this predominant tendency that Arnold found help and fortification in Newman. "Nothing," he said, "can ever do away the effect you have produced upon me, for it consists in a general disposition of mind rather than in a particular set of ideas. In all the conflicts I have with modern Liberalism and Dissent, and with their pretensions and shortcomings, I recognize your work."4

From Newman's ideas and from Newman's solution to the conflict with Liberalism, he was far removed. Newman's retreat into the Roman Catholic Church he found "to speak frankly, .... impossible." 5 Neither he nor his brother Thomas, according to Mrs Humphry Ward, "ever showed, while there (at Oxford), the smallest tendency to .... Newmanism. .... He was never touched in the smallest degree by Newman's opinions. He and my father (Thomas) and Arthur Clough, and a few other kindred spirits, lived indeed in quite another world of thought."6 What led Matthew, but not Thomas, to listen to Newman's ideas on Liberalism was "the Newmanic power of words" 6 and the "ordo concatenatioque vari", the dovetailing and long-drawn effort by which this power was attained.

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1 Coleridge, Life, etc., I. 123. ([Jan, 1843.)
2 Culture and Anarchy, p. 24. 3 Ibid., p. 23.
4 Unpublished Letters, p. 56. 5 Discourses in America, p. 139.
6 A Writer's Recollections, pp. 11-12.
Arnold, then, confirmed from his own experience his father's opposition to the world. He maintained his 'unworldliness'. Many a time, then and later, he wished to escape, but rigorously restrained any hankering in that direction, knowing that his true work and development did not lie that way. His opposition was reinforced by Byron and Shelley, Newman, Béranger and Saint-Simon, among many others. It is doubtful if it required much reinforcement. Even the expansion of adolescence, the attraction of the world and the flesh for his senses, emotions, and intellect, were not of sufficient force to break into the attitude in which he had been reared and in which, with no great modifications, he was always to remain.
5. Ambivalence.

The real distrusts me, and I cannot find the ideal.

Amiel. Trans. Mrs W. Ward.
5. Ambivalence.

The coincidence of expansion and revolt produced in Arnold. Outwardly the world and its pleasures, inwardly the pleasures and desires of the flesh, became more attractive and less guilty than before. Yet he still retained his unworldly ideals out of which had sprung revolt. The result was a simultaneous attraction and repulsion.

Ah! two desires toss about
The poet's feverish blood.
One drives him to the world without,
And one to solitude.

He was now truly "dipsychus"—double-minded. It was not, as has been commonly represented, a severing of the heart from the intellect. It was a twofold attraction in which both heart and intellect were on both sides at once.

In each aspect of his nature,—the outward and the inward—two courses of action were possible. In the outward aspect, he could have followed his unworldly attitude and carried it in the face of all opposition, as the hero does in his brother's novel 'Oakfield'. He could also have retired from the world and lived the hermit-life, like Obermann, or,—what would come to much the same thing,—he could have entered the Roman Catholic Church, like Newman. On the other hand, he could have followed his sensual and emotional leanings and lived like the rest of the world as he saw it, abandoning, as a matter of course, his unworldliness. As to the inward aspect of his nature, he might, in the same way, have taken two opposite courses. He might have given himself up, like the world, to the life of pleasure. Or he could have lived the life of the ascetic, denying himself all satisfaction of the senses and the body.

Neither course, neither acceptance of the world and its ways nor complete isolation from the world, was practicable. Yet he desired both. Until he could reconcile the values of the two, of flesh and spirit, of the world and solitude, he was condemned to be bandied about between them. This is the dilemma of Empedocles as he appeals to Apollo:

1 Stanzas in memory of the author of 'Obermann'.
2 C.f. e.g. R. H. Hutton: Literary Essays; J. M. Murry: Discoveries.
Where shall thy votary fly then? back to men?
But they will gladly welcome him again once more,
And rid him of the presence of himself,
And keep their friendly chatter at his ear,
And haunt him, till the absence from himself,
That other torment, grow unbearable:
And he will fly to solitude again,
And he will find its air too keen for him,
And so change back: and many thousand times
Be miserably bandied to and fro
Like a sea wave, betwixt the world and thee,
Thou young, implacable God! and only death
Shall cut his oscillations short, and so
Bring him to poise. There is no other way.1

Arnold, like Empedocles, could not live out of
the world.

I in the world must live.2

Yet the world remained repulsive, despicable. Its
deal of pleasure, for example, Arnold analysed
again and again. He saw in it no satisfaction for
body or soul. Interspersed with fits of pleasure
were fits of depression,—

Mad delights, and frozen calms—
Mirth to-day and vine-bound tresses,
And to-morrow—folded palms—
Is this all? this balanced measure?
Could life run no easier way?
Happy at the noon of pleasure,
Passive at the midnight of dismay?3

To the New Sirens, the votaries of pleasure, came,
or would come, the same fates as to the old:

.... your scents have shed their sweetness
And your charms are overblown.4

Even the intervals of pleasure themselves do not
satisfy.

Pleasure to our hot grasp
Gives flowers after flowers,
With passionate warmth we clasp
Hand after hand in ours;

Nor do we soon perceive how fast our youth is spent.5

1Empedocles. 2Obermann. 3The New Sirens. 4Tbid.
5Empedocles.
Again, Arnold says,

That longing of our youth
Burns ever unconsumed:
Still hungrier for delight as delights grow more rare.

Nor could any other aspect of the world satisfy his ideals. The times were out of joint. Nowhere could the real and the ideal meet. In the great upheaval of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution everything was in confusion: and, to make matters worse, unintelligent reaction, repressing progress, was in full sway all over Europe. Ideals, having once been glimpsed and half-realized, soared romantically high. The new wine of democracy and equality was threatening, but was yet powerless, to burst the old bottles of feudalism and mediaevalism. Arnold, through his father, was naturally in the main current of the Christian-Revolutionary movement and therefore profoundly discontented with the actual condition of things.

Yet for a long time Arnold and his friends lived on the hope of some reconciliation of their ideals and the world. They hoped that the actual might be brought nearer the ideal. Indeed, about 1842, many things did seem, even in those bad days, to point to the approach of a better time. In the English Church there was Newman, in politics Peel, in social criticism Carlyle and Saint-Simon, in literature Emerson; and there were the Chartists at home and, after a few years, the revolutions abroad. There was also George Sand.

Speaking of Newman as he was about 1840, Arnold wrote, "... he seemed about to transform and to renew what was for us the most national and natural institution in the world, the Church of England." The English Church, was certainly rising, about that period, out of the lethargy of the eighteenth century and Arnold had, on the surface, every reason to rejoice that Newman was leading that movement.

In politics, he fixed his hopes on Peel. So, it seems, did Arnold and his friends. The "little interior company" of which Thomas Arnold speaks as existing inside the Decade club, seems to have been in agreement on most points. What Thomas Arnold says of Clough might equally have been written for Matthew. "After I came up a time it was agreed that we four (Matthew, Thomas, Clough, Walrond)
should always breakfast in Clough's rooms on Sunday morning. These were times of great enjoyment. Sir Robert Peel was in power; he was breaking loose more and more from the trammels of mere party connexion, and the shrewd Rentoul, who then edited the Spectator, welcomed in the Conservative chief the only true statesman that England had seen since the days of Canning. The Spectator of the day before used to arrive at breakfast-time, and the leading articles were eagerly read and discussed. Ireland especially—as Rentoul seemed to hold—conciliated by the Maynooth Bill, the Colleges Act, and other healing measures, lade fair no longer to pose as England's difficulty. With this estimate of Peel Clough seemed on the whole to be in cordial agreement.

In the social sphere, changes seemed no less imminent. Theories and ideals had therefore room enough to flourish. The chief of these, apart from Goethe's, to attract Arnold and the 'interior circle' was that of Saint-Simon. Saint-Simon aimed at a government carried on by the 'captains of industry' for the good of the State. These men, Clough said in one of the club debates, "were the real rulers of England." The State would take over, according to this scheme, the rights of property vested in private individuals. This would involve the abolition of personal inheritance, and, in England, the end of primogeniture and the aristocracy. Arnold fully expected such a change to take place very soon, whether or not it came in the exact way required by Saint-Simon. In 1848 he wrote, "... still the hour of the hereditary peerage and eldest sonship and immense properties, has, I am convinced, ... struck." He was immensely interested in Emerson's prognostics: "He gives our institutions as they are called, aristocracy, Church, etc., fine years; I heard last night; long enough, certainly, for patience, already at death's door, to have to die in." Eight years later, he was of the same opinion, and still associated it with the name of Saint-Simon. "The English aristocratic system," he wrote, "splendid fruits as it has undoubtedly borne, must go. I say it does not particularly rejoice me to think this, because what a middle-class and people we have in England! of whom Saint-Simon says truly: "Sur tous les chantiers de l'Angleterre il n'existe pas une seule grande idée.""
The last hope of a regeneration of the world came to them in 1848, the year of revolutions. As one revolution after another failed, Arnold pinned his faith to the next. His Sonnet to the Hungarian Nation, one of the last to revolt, shows his state of mind:

Not in sunk Spain's prolong'd death agony;
Not in rich England, bent but to make pour
The flood of the world's commerce on her shore;
Not in that madhouse, France, from whence the cry
Afflicts grave Heaven with its long senseless roar;
Not in American vulgarity,
Not wordy German imbecility—
Lies any hope of heroism more.
Hungarians! Save the world! Renew the stories
Of men who against hope repell'd the chain,
And made the world's dead spirit leap again!
On land renew that Greek exploit, whose glories
Hallow the Salaminian promontories,
And the Armada flung to the fierce main.

The oppressors of the rebellious peoples were to him "ye imbeciles in present power", and were described as "doom'd, pompous, and absurd". Clough, his ardent "republican friend", visited both Paris and Rome during the revolutions there, hoping to see the dawn of a new era. Arnold, not so optimistic, might appeal to the Hungarian Nation, but he was prepared for the worst. He sent Clough some advice in that sense. He was

Rather to patience prompted, than that proud
Prospect of hope which France proclaims so loud;
or, as Clough quotes him, "The Millenium won't come this bout."

So, till the last revolution died away, he went on with some hope of a change in affairs. Beside this hope, however, ran a growing discontent that one hope after another should betray him, a lurking doubt of the sufficiency of his ideals. For there seemed to be no hope of reconciling the world and the flesh with his ideals. He remained, therefore, in the same double-minded condition, attracted by both sides, but unable to effect any reconciliation of them in theory, or to find any in practice. Some compromise was apparently necessary.

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1 Horatian Echo. 2 To a Republican Friend. Continued. Prose Remains, p.143.
Towards such a compromise he was already working. But it took a long time to come: and meantime his feverish blood continued to be tossed about between the world and solitude, between the flesh and the spirit.
6. Participate.
Arnold's mind, thus already divided, was further confused by troubles within one side of its aspirations. On the spiritual side there arose doubts concerning the religion which had formed its basis. These doubts were connected not with the moral, but with the intellectual, foundations of religion. Yet they had a certain reaction on the main division, where morals were in some degree involved. For they inclined to impair the strength of the unworldly outlook, or at least to shake confidence in it.

Doubt was, of course, the inevitable consequence of expansion, and its price. Indeed, Dr Arnold had himself begun the process. He had, after a struggle, accepted Nietzsche's thesis of the presence of myths in Greek and Roman history. He had then, in the last years of his life, carried this 'mythical' theory from classical into Biblical criticism, and was therefore on the same lines as Strauss and Baur (the German theologians) whom he had not read. F. W. Newman records that in a short conversation, Dr Arnold, discussing the longevity of the patriarchs, the Mosaic cosmogony and the Old Testament chronology, "treated these questions as matters of indifference to religion; and did not hesitate to say, that the account of Noah's deluge was evidently mythical, and the history of Joseph 'a beautiful poem'".1 In a second interview, he found that Dr Arnold treated the Synoptic gospels in the same way, preferring to "rest the main strength of Christianity on the gospel of John... the vivid and simple picture of a divine reality, undeformed by credulous legend".2

The progress of doubt in religion had been accelerated by the Oxford Movement. According to Wilfrid Ward, one of the two great principles insisted on by the Oxford philosophers (the Tractarians) was "the necessarily changeable aspect of all science, and of historical science inclusively".3 They illustrated this principle by the changes that had taken place in the explanation of the sun's movement as, for example, in the theory of Galilec. The idea of historical science as in a constant flux, they turned against Strauss and Baur, and all other critics whose methods appeared subversive of Scriptural authority. For these critics were so quickly and so constantly improving on each other, that further changes in

Their views were bound to follow, and no stable interpretation seemed within reach. As it seemed to Clough, who had been swept up in the vortex of the Oxford Movement, it was

To gather acts from far and near, ....
And knowing more may yet appear,
Unto one's latest breath to fear,
The premature result to draw—
Is this the object, end and law,
And purpose of our being here?


Clough, in his early years at Oxford, became directly acquainted with the writings of Strauss and Baur. He seems to have held, says Thomas Arnold, "that the mythical theory of Strauss and the New Testament chronology of Baur, were alike unanswerable." Arnold, coming to Oxford a few years later, adopted the same views. But he came too late to be much affected by the Oxford Movement itself. The real expansion of his mind in theology came from Germany through his friends Clough, Jowett and Stanley. In the years before 1844, Jowett and Stanley had been exploring the then little known realms of German theology. To extend and consolidate their knowledge, and find answers to the questions they had raised, they undertook a tour in Germany. Setting off in August 1844, they sought out and conversed with Ewald the theologian at Dresden, and with Von Humboldt, Ranke, Neander, and others. "None of them," says Stanley, "struck me so much as Ewald." The two friends also studied closely, or added to their knowledge of, the course of German idealist philosophy from Kant to Hegel.

For the time, however, the deeper study of German theology rather aggravated than solved their doubts. The reason is plain. Their doubts arose, not from questioning the truths of religion, but from uncertainty as to the true historical facts and their interpretation. "Our trouble," said Matthew Arnold many years after, "has ... been with doubts whether things which people assured us really existed or had really happened, but of which we had no experience ourselves and could not satisfy ourselves that anyone else had experience either, were really as those people told us." There were, for example, facilities for addition and interpolation, for adding touches to what the original documents made...
Jesus do, for amplifying, above all, what they made Jesus say. In doubts of this kind only time and scholarship could avail.

But before the tide set in a positive direction, the historical doubts touched one dogma of Christianity after another. The chief point on which the attention of Arnold and his friends seems to have first centred was the doctrine of the Atonement. Clough, writing to his sister in 1847, asks, "What is the meaning of 'Atonement by a crucified Saviour'? ... That there may be a meaning in it, .... I don't deny; but I do deny that Mr Neile, .... or Pusey, or Newman himself, quite know what to make of it." Jowett, influenced by Baur on this question, which, as then accepted and understood, was repugnant to his moral sense, came to the conclusion, in 1855, that:

1. Our Lord never describes His own work in the language of atonement or sacrifice.

2. This language is a figure of speech borrowed from the Old Testament, .... only a mode of speaking common at a time when the rites and ceremonies of the Jewish law were passing away and beginning to receive a spiritual meaning.

From this point, doubt crept slowly from one fact or dogma to another. In 1855 Jowett "disbelieved in the story of Jonah and the whale," but he kept his judgment in suspense as to whether the Law had or had not been given from Sinai; and "even when he felt most sceptical, his belief in immortality had never wavered." In 1866, however, he had far advanced on this position. "We believe in a risen Christ, not risen, however, in the sense in which a drowning man is restored to life, nor even in the sense in which a ghost is supposed to walk the earth, nor in any sense which we can define or explain. We pray to God as a Person, a larger self; but there must always be a sub-intelligitur that he is not a Person. Our forms of worship, public and private, imply some interference with the course of nature. We know that the empire of law permeates all things." Religious doubt, in Matthew Arnold, seems to have begun from the time of his father's sudden death in 1842, at the early age of forty-seven. He was then himself nineteen. This event, at any rate, accelerated and at the same time gave direction to the process. Mycerinus, written probably about 1843, shows the effect of the blow. This question raises the question

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which would naturally force itself on Arnold, of the justice and nature of God.

... on the strenuous just man, Heaven bestows, Crown of his struggling life, an unjust close.

Arnold began to recognise the force of Necessity. He desponds:

... friends smile and die
Like spring flowers.
Our vaunted life is one long funeral.

He cannot answer the questions which these blows suggest. With Mycerinus, it is:

... but something I would say—
Something—yet what I know not:
We are Ignorant where to stand, or whom to avoid.

It is the Sick King in Bokhara:

O Vizier, thou art old, I young.
Clear in these things I cannot see.
My head is burning; and a heat Is in my skin, which angers me.

To the call of the New Sirens:

I am dumb. Ales! too soon, all
Man's grave reasons disappear.

In 1844, doubt had already taken a firm hold, and there appeared no way out. In the sonnet Shakespeare, written in that year, he says:

We ask and ask, .......
....... the foil'd searching of mortality,

In 1850, Charlotte Brontë, who met him at Ambleside, wrote to her friend Harriet Martineau there, "I was given to understand that his theological opinions were very vague and unsettled, and indeed he betrayed as much in the course of conversation." Even in 1855, when he had attained to clearness on poetry, he was still, as to religion,

Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
The other powerless to be born,
With nowhere yet to rest my head,
Like these, on earth I wait forlorn.

1 To Faust: A Question. 2 Fragment of an Antigone. 3 Shorter, C. Bronte, etc., III. 183. (1896), pp. 458-9. 4 Grande Chartreuse.
This state affected all Arnold's group for about the same length of time, that is, till 1856 or 1857. "For nearly ten years", wrote Thomas, of the year 1856, "—For nearly ten years my mind had been in a welter of uncertainty on the subject of religious truth."* W. D. Arnold, through his hero, refers to one side of the same situation in Oakfield (1853) as "the great problem which I, at the threshold of life, have to solve—which baffled me at Oxford,—and which is still too much for me here." But even after 1856 it took another ten years before Matthew Arnold was able to settle into his "firmer manhood." As late as 1868, he talks of the beginning of a new time to him, especially through "the gradual settlement of my own thought." His doubts followed a course parallel to that of Jowett or Clough. Beginning with the existence and justice of God, he went on to doubt immortality:

... these dreams of curs,

Shall we go hence and find they are not dead?

and, in the lines Written by a Death-Bed, he asks concerning the peace that death gives:

And when this boon rewards the dead,
Are all debts paid, has all been said?

So he continued from one dogma to another. The result was universal doubt,—doubt not only of the dogmas themselves and of history, but of everything. The intellect itself and its competence to reach truth, fell under suspicion. Arnold was here in accord with the Oxford Movement and perhaps unconsciously owed something to its influence. For the Tractarians, as they cast suspicion on science and its progress, also cast suspicion on the intellect, the instrument of science. J. H. Newman, for example, wrote, "I am considering the faculty of reason actually and historically; and in this point of view, I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is towards a simple unbelief in matters of religion. No truth, however sacred, can stand against it in the long-run."*
Arnold felt this weakness of the intellect, this incapacity to deal adequately with the problems that overwhelmed it, the distractions that foil its best efforts, its fragmentary comprehension of the world.

The wit and counsel of man was never clear, Troubles confuse the little wit he has.

He says again, through the mouth of Empedocles:

"Hither and thither spins
The wind-borne mirroring soul,
A thousand glimpses wins,
And never sees a whole;

Man is a creature

Who knows not what to believe
Since he sees nothing clear,
And dares stamp nothing false where he finds nothing sure."

Thomas Arnold described this state of mind in himself as Pyrrhonism. "There seemed to be nothing which was not matter of opinion, nothing which rested on a firm objective basis. To no teacher or authority could I subscribe, for besides the fulness of my own intellect, I could never be sure that I rightly understood him whom I desired to follow. . . . . a spontaneous general reaction against set in within me against the conclusions, whether in politics, metaphysics, or religion, which not long before had seemed most certain."2

By 1847, Arnold seems to have recognised the secondary importance of such perplexities as that which troubled his brother Thomas concerning the historical truth of the New Testament record. Like Clough, he seems to have found firm ground in the idea that the doctrines and truth of Christianity are based, not on historical facts, but in the life and soul of man, in the nature of things, independent of time and place. The earlier historical doubts could therefore be laid by: attention must now be concentrated on the absolute truth of Christian doctrine and on its efficacy in raising the moral life. Clough was therefore of the opinion,—and Arnold evidently went along with him—that "The thing which men must work at will not be critical questions about the Scriptures, but philosophical problems of Grace, and Free Will, and of Redemption as an idea, not as a historical event."3 To the solution of these problems they accordingly turned, that is, to


Prose Remains, p. 113.
philosophy and the great philosophers.

Bossuet says of Grotius, that when he was dissatisfied with the religion in which he was born, "Il frappa, pour ainsi dire, à toutes les portes, pour trouver un refuge à sa religion chancelante." How many in the two centuries since Grotius have followed his example, and with what various results! So wrote Thomas Arnold, applying the quotation to his own course. It applies equally to his Brother's: the word 'chancelante' especially fits Arnold's own metaphor:

Who dare, thou ask'st, in these bad days, my mind?

The first 'door' at which he knocked was that of Descartes, the apostle of doubt. "And who", said Arnold, "in this our day of unsetlement and of impatience with authority, convention, and routine, who in this our day of new departures, can fail to be attracted by the author of the "Méthode" and by his promise? I admit nothing which is not necessarily true." "I put aside everything about which I can imagine there being the smallest doubt." What could we, who demand that the propositions we accept shall be propositions we can verify, ask more?" "And we ourselves accordingly", he continued, "... did betake ourselves once to Descartes with great zeal, ..."

Arnold found in Descartes, however, two fatal flaws. The first was the famous 'Cogito, ergo sum', on which, as a proposition self-evident and beyond the reach of doubt, Descartes raised the structure of his philosophy. He could not understand what Descartes meant by 'exist' (sum). After searching through many labyrinths of etymology for the meaning of the term, he came to the conclusion that it conveyed nothing, either to himself or to its author, as to the nature or existence of God, which Descartes had deduced from it. The second flaw lay in the argument from perfection. Descartes argued that an imperfect world involves the idea of perfection, and that the idea of perfection which we have implies the objective existence of such perfection. Arnold replied that we have no clear idea of complete perfection, but only of degrees of perfection—an idea derived from the comparison of one actual good with another. "The less or more in ourselves of whatever we account good, gives us a notion of what we call perfection in it." The argument from perfection was sometimes applied to knowledge and happiness. In Empedocles on Etna, Arnold replied:

1 T. Arnold, P. W. L., p. 152. 2 Sonnet: To a Friend. 3 God and the Hills, Chap. II. 4 Ibid.
Fools! that in man's brief term
He cannot all things view,
Affords no ground to affirm
That there are Gods who do!
Nor does being weary prove that he has where to rest.¹

Arnold did not fare much better with Hegel than with Descartes. After the visit of Stanley and Jowett to Germany in 1844, Hegel indeed became familiar to Oxford men. Jowett was for a time "considered as the representative of German heresy at Oxford."² It was through Jowett that the Hegelian philosophy, as represented by T. H. Green and the brothers Caird, became the dominant philosophy for half a century. Arnold studied Hegel at this time, and may have derived from him some temporary assistance. But not much. Recalling that period, and his study of Descartes, and the meaning of 'being', he calls Hegel "one of those great men, those masters of abstruse reasoning, who discourse of being and non-being, essence and existence, subject and object, in a style to which that of Descartes is merely child's play. These sages only bewildered us more than we were bewildered already. For they were so far advanced in their speculations about being, that they were altogether above entertaining such a tyro's question as what being really is."³ In the essay on Spinoza and the Bible he summed up Hegel's contribution to thought: "... Hegel seized a single pregnant sentence of Heraclitus, and cast it, with a thousand striking applications, into the world of modern thought."⁴ So Jowett said to Tollemache, "It's a good thing to have read Hegel, but now that you've read him, I advise you to forget him again."⁵

Arnold came to the same conclusion as to Bishop Butler, whose work entered into the Oxford course of study. "A man", says Arnold, "who is looking seriously for firm ground, cannot but soon come to perceive ... that there is no help to be got from it."⁶ Butler's belief in miracles and in the fulfilment of prophecy ensured his being left behind by the Zeit-Geist which had driven Arnold and his friends from their old positions. Butler did help 'in some measure', however, not through his dogmas, but through his "profound sense, that inattention to religion implies "a dissolute immoral temper of mind".⁷

¹Empedocles on Etna. ²Tollemache, Jowett, p. 69. (2nd ed.) ³G. and B., II. ³.⁴E. in G., Spinoza and the Bible. ⁵Tollemache, pp. 70-1. ⁶Last Essays, Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist. ⁷Ibid.
Philosophy, then, as such, was of little or no value. As Clough had said of it as early as 1840:

Away, haunt thou not me,
Thou vain philosophy!
Little hast thou bestead,
Save to perplex the head,
And leave the spirit dead.

What value philosophy had, it had only incidentally, through the ideas it cast into circulation, through the personality of the philosopher, through his moral influence, or through his poetry. A philosopher, to Arnold, was "a just and fruitful object of contemplation much more by virtue of what spirit he is of than by virtue of what system of doctrine he elaborates." What a remarkable philosopher really does for human thought," he says again, "is to throw into circulation a certain number of new and striking ideas and expressions, and to stimulate with them the thought and imagination of his century or of aftertimes. ... To be great, he must have something in him which can influence character, which is edifying; he must, in short, have a noble and lofty character himself, a character ... in the grand style. The philosopher in whom Arnold took most constant delight was Plato, but it was the poet rather than the philosopher in Plato that he admired. Of Wordsworth he speaks in a similar vein: "His poetry is the reality, his philosophy ... is the illusion. Perhaps we shall one day learn to make this proposition general, and to say: Poetry is the reality, philosophy the illusion."

Philosophy, therefore, did not, and apparently could not, solve the problems or put an end to the doubts of Arnold. It left him, if anything, more confused, in deeper doubt than before.

Doubt had spread over everything, and was now indeed Pyrrhonism. Even love fell into doubt. Clough, in 1840, chose as one of the four mottoes of his Amours de Voyage, the sentence:

Il doutait de tout, même de l'amour.

Arnold wrote:

Blame thou not therefore him, who dares
Judge vain beforehand human cares.

Who needs not love and power, to know:

Love transient, power an unreal show.
"The time comes," he says elsewhere,—sooner or later the time comes,—to individuals and even to societies, when the foundations of the great deep are broken up, and everything is in question.... "1 It is

.... the Doubt that assails all things.2

and The something that infects the world.3

1 Lost Essays, Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist.
2 Letters, I.8. 3 Resignation.
7. Melancholy.
Il (Chateaubriand) a comme engendré cet ennui incurable, mélancolique, sans cause, si souvent doux et enchanteur dans son expression, sauvage et desséchant au fond, et mortel au cœur, mortel à la bonne et saine pratique familière des vertus,—le mal de René, qui a été celui de tout notre âge, maladie morale qui, après avoir régné cinquante ans plus ou moins, et avec des variantes sans nombre, est aujourd'hui à peu près disparue. . . . . . . cet ennui qui va s'épancher à travers le monde, qui cherchera partout l'infini et l'indéterminé, le désert; . . . .

Arnold was now approaching the turn of his youthful romantic course. He had set out with infinitely high unworldly ideals. He had found himself invincibly obstructed by the constitution of men and nature. He had rebelled. At the same time he had been attracted by the world. The beliefs on which he had rested his superstructure of ideals had themselves given way. So he remained cleft by conflicting forces and clinging to whatever survived of his hopes and wishes, still striving to realise whatever remained of his desires. But these desires and ideals were destined to be robbed of fulfilment like the rest, simply because they demanded of the world more than it could give. Their character partook too much of the infinite.

He had longed, with his expanding adolescent sensibility, for all the 'untravelled world' of experience, the 'bright procession of eddying forms', for pleasure and the satisfaction of the senses.

... our youthful blood
Claims rapture as its right;
But youthful blood exhausts itself, its faculty for delight wanes. Even then

That longing of our youth
Burns ever unconsumed:
Still hungrier for delight as delights grow more rare.

After a time

At once our eyes grow clear:
and we see that

The world hath fail'd to impart
The joy our youth forbodes,
Fail'd to fill up the void which in our breasts we bear.

He had longed, with his expanding curiosity, for all knowledge, and certain knowledge. But this is just as impracticable as to absorb all pleasure.

Look, the world tempts our eye,
And we would know it all!
We map the starry sky,
We mine this earthen ball,
We measure the sea-tides, we number the sea-sands;

Empedocles on Etna.
We scrutinise the dates
Of long-past human things,
The bounds of effac'd states,
The lines of deceas'd kings;
We search out dead men's words, and works of dead men's hands;

We shut our eyes, and muse
How our own minds are made,
What springs of thought they use,
How stiffen'd, how betray'd;
And spend our wit to name what most employ unnamed;

But still, as we proceed,
The mass swells more and more
Of volumes yet to read,
Of secrets yet to explore.
Our hair grows gray, our eyes are dimmed, our heat is tamed.

The intellect of man, then, cannot "span the illimitable All". Thought stops short of its object, inevitably short, leaving

Nothing but a devouring flame of thought—
But a naked, eternally restless mind.

For the intellect fails not only in covering the width of reality, but also in penetrating its depth. The mind seemed to Arnold, at this period, to lack any affinity with its object, to have no power to penetrate its final nature.

To the elements it came from
Everything will return,
Our bodies to earth;
Our blood to water;
Heat to fire;
Breath to air.
They were well born, they will be well entomb'd.
But mind? ....

Where will mind and thought find their parent element?

But mind—but thought—
If these have been the master part of us—
Where will they find their parent element?
What will receive them, who will call them home?
But we shall be in them and they in us,
And we shall be the strangers of the world,
And they will be our lords, as they are now;
And keep us prisoners of our consciousness,
And never let us clasp and feel the All
But through their forms, and modes, and stifling veils.

Empedocles on Etna.
As the desire for experience and knowledge, from its infinite character, frustrated itself, so also Arnold's political and religious ideals, from their infinite expectations, left him, as they were shattered one after another, nothing but the empty husk of desire.

First came the secession, in 1845, of Newman to the Roman Catholic Church. Ward followed. It was Newman who had seemed to Arnold about "to renew and reform .... the English Church." Peel, the political hope of the Decade, split his party over the Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, and lost all influence in politics. In the years 1845-7, the horrors of the Irish potato famine showed the impotence of the English Government, and emphasized the injustice of its treatment of Ireland. In 1848, Chartist fizzled out and one after another the revolutions abroad were crushed. Thus the only movements from which Arnold might hope for even a partial fulfilment of his ideals were for the time checked. These were the 'shocks' of which he so often speaks:

For what wears out the life of mortal men?
'Tis that from change to change their being rolls:
'Tis that repeated shocks, again, again,
Exhaust the energy of strongest souls,
And numb the elastic powers.2

Already in 1847 he declared his dissatisfaction and disgust with politics as it subjected him to shock after shock, with

... the daily quickening pace
Of the invading multitude populace3

on the one hand and on the other with the

... imbeciles in present power,
Doom'd, venomous, and absurd.3

His conclusion was:

Omit, omit, my simple friend,
Still to inquire how parties tend,
Or what we fix with foreign powers

Is no concern of ours.3

1 Discourses in America. (Emerson.) p. 139. 2 The Scholar Gipsy. 3 Horatian Echo.
The movements of 1848, Chartism at home and the revolutions abroad—roused his interest again, but not his enthusiasm. "It is so hard," he wrote from Lansdowne House in that year, "to sequester oneself here from the rush of public changes and talk, and yet so unprofitable to attend to it. I was myself tempted to attempt some political writing the other day, but in the watches of the night I seemed to feel that in that direction I had some enthusiasm of the head perhaps, but no profound stirring." And about the same time: "I .... retire more and more from the modern world and modern literature which is all only what has been before and what will be again ...." One by one the various movements guttered out, and Clough's conclusion was the only one possible:

Farewell, politics, utterly! 3

The general result was a state of intense desire for the great and noble, but an entire absence of any object that might satisfy the desire; a desire to be at one with the world, but no chance of realisation; a desire for social regeneration, but not the faintest prospect of progress; a desire for truth, but no sign of certainty on the horizon; only a gleam here and there, ineffectual, ephemeral; only desire and ideals empty of their end. The 'Powers that sport with man' have

.... hurl'd him on the Field of Life,
An aimless unallay'd Desire. 4

Arnold was now

... the pale Master on his spar-strewn deck

Still bent to make some port he knows not where,
Still standing for some false impossible shore. 5

He knew now

.......... their silent pain
Who have long'd deeply once, and long'd in vain; 6

In the light of this, his own experience, he was able later to put his finger on those passages in G. Sand that expressed his and her malady: Lelia crying, for example, "I grope in darkness, and my tired arms grasp nothing save delusive shadows. And for ten thousand years, as the sole answer to my cries, as the sole comfort in my agony, I hear stirr, over this earth

1Letters, I, 5. 2Ibid., T. 15. 3Amours de Voyage, T. T. 3.
4Destiny. 5A Summer Night. 6Ibid.
accurst, the despairing sob of impotent agony. For ten thousand years I have cried in infinite space: Truth! Truth! For ten thousand years infinite space keeps answering me: Desire, Desire. ¹

The effect of such a condition is ennui—Leopardi's noia—a state of melancholy. Into this state Arnold seems to have been plunged about 1842-3 and to have remained to some degree for the next fifteen years. He was, of course, constitutionally disposed to melancholy, and his predisposition was now reinforced by his mode of life. Melancholy came as a natural reaction against the over-exertion of the mind. He and his friends had "heads o'ertaxed":

But so many books thou readest,
But so many schemes thou breasted,
But so many wishes feedest,
That thy poor head almost turns.³

He was too much exercised over the final problems of the universe:

Weary of myself, and sick of asking
What I am, and what I ought to be,"¹

He had become, as he makes Empedocles say of himself, 'thought's slave'. To complete his weariness of spirit came the influence of the outside world:

... it is not sorrow, as I hear,
Not suffering, ......

Nor: 'tis the gradual furnace of the world,
In whose hot air our spirits are upcurl'd,
Until they crumble, or else grow like steel—²

In David Grieve, Mrs Humphry Ward outlines such a state of mind, brought on chiefly by religious doubts, but also partly by mental strain, in a mind as idealistic as Arnold's. She calls this particular state 'intermittent melancholia'. Her analysis of this state no doubt owes something to her knowledge of her uncle's youth. However that may be, it was intermittent melancholia that fell on Arnold.

Joy comes and goes: hope ebbs and flows
Like the wave.³

¹ Mixed Essays, George Sand, p. 384. ² The Scholar Gipsy. ³ The Second Fest. ⁴ Self-Dependence. ⁵ Tristan and Isolde.
⁶ To Fausta: A Question.
Arnold attributed the same state of mind to Empedocles, who, to escape from it, leaps into the crater of Etna:

..... The numbing cloud
...cuits off my soul: I feel it, I breathe free.
Is it but for a moment?
Ah! boil up, ye vapours!
Leap and roar, thou sea of fire!
My soul glows to meet you.
Ere it flag, ere the mist
Of despondency and gloom
Rush over it again,
Receive me! Save!

He detected the same malady in Lucretius, and the cause of it: "The predominance of thought, of reflection, in modern epochs is not without its penalties; in the unsound, in the overtasked, in the over-sensitive, it has produced the most painful, the most lamentable results; it has produced ...... the feeling of depression, the feeling of ennui." And no doubt, if he had completed his poem on Lucretius, melancholy would have formed another of the aspects of his character to be portrayed.

The effect of melancholy Arnold describes again and again in his poems. The main characteristic is the vanishing of joy, of youth. The world becomes flat and unprofitable. Empedocles, who is in this the best representative of Arnold, is in revolt against the world, the "swelling evil of his time", so that "the times look sad and black to him". He recalls his younger days:

Then we could still enjoy, then neither thought
Nor outward things were closed and dead to us,
But we received the shock of mighty thoughts
On simple minds with a pure natural joy;
And if the sacred load oppress'd our brain,
We had the power to feel the pressure eas'd,
The brow unbound, the thought flow free again,
In the delightful commerce of the world.

This joyful time is gone, however, and he is dead to every natural joy'. "I only", he exclaims,

Whose spring of life is dried, whose spirit has fail'd—
I, who have not, like these, in solitude
Maintain'd courage and force, and in myself
Nurse'd an immortal vigour—I alone
Am dead to life and joy; therefore I read
In all things my own deadness.

1 Cp. also the essays on e. g. Gray and E. de Guerin.
2 On the Modern Element in Literature.
With joy goes youth. It dies 'in the fires of anguish',
the 'gradual furnace of the world',
Which kills in us the bloom, the youth, the spring—
Which leaves the fierce necessity to feel,
But takes away the power—this can avail
By drying up our joy in everything,
To make our former pleasures all seem stale.

Arnold envied the Scholar Gipsy because of his freedom
from this
.... strange disease of modern life,
With its sick hurry, its divided aims,
Its heads o'ertax'd, its palsied hearts,
He warns him to avoid the modern 'mental strife', for, at
its contact,
... thy glad perennial youth would fade,
Fade, and grow old at last, and die like ours.

The other main effect of melancholia was the weakening
of the will. The mind, divided and beset by doubt, can
arrive at no decision. It merely fluctuates. Melancholy
has
Palsied all our deed with doubt,
Arnold is now one of those
Who fluctuate idly without term or scope
Who never deeply felt, or clearly will'd,
Whose insight never has borne fruit in deeds,
Whose weak resolves never have been fulfill'd;
Who hesitate and falter life away,
He has still
....... the old unquiet breast
That neither deadens into rest
Nor ever feels the fiery glow
That whirls the spirit from itself away.

He admits:
Our lane, disguise it as we may
Its weakness, is a faltering course.

\(^{1}\) Modern Sappho. \(^{2}\) Tristan and Iseult, III. \(^{3}\) Obermann
\(^{4}\) Once More. \(^{5}\) The Scholar Gipsy. \(^{6}\) A Summer Night.
The prototype of his fluctuating will be found in
Hamlet. Hamlet, from an attitude to life very similar
to his own, showed him clearly his own tendencies, his
own melancholy, his own weakness, his own inaction. It
was as the creator of Hamlet, more than in any other way,
that Shakespeare inspired the famous sonnet, and the
lines:

All pains the immortal spirit must endure,
All weakness that impairs, all griefs that bow,
Find their sole voice in that victorious brow.

Hamlet represented the modern tendency of which Arnold, in
his youth, knew himself the victim,—the growing-pains of
a modern age. It was "... the dialogue of the mind with
itself" which "has commenced; ...... we hear ...... the
doubts, we witness the discouragement, of Hamlet and of
Faust." Of this doubt and discouragement Arnold, in his own
poetry, intended Empedocles to be a representative.

Himself vacillating in this way, Arnold admired those
characters who had what he had not, and who knew what they
wanted and went straight to their goal, those 'sterner
spirits',

Who, though the tendence of the whole
They less than us might recognise,
Kept, more than us, their strength of soul.

Cato, who took his life 'dauntlessly': Byron, because

..... in anguish, doubt, desire,
Thy fiery courage still was strong.

Wellington, who

Saw one clue to life and follow'd it.

the Scholar Gipsy, who likewise had

.... one aim, one business, one desire,

being "born in days when wits were fresh and clear."

Arnold could, in this, admire even the men of the world,
who had at least the power and energy of decision,

Who, with such passionate zeal
Are, what we mean to be.

I, too, he says again,

Have prais'd the keen, unscrupulous course,
Which knows no doubt, which feels no fear.

Preface to Poems, 1853, p. vi. 2Tbid. 3Courage. 4To the
Duke of Wellington. 5The World and the Quietist.
6Switzerland: A Farewell.
Arnold's melancholy was probably never as deep as that of Leopardi or Senancour. Of the Gipsy Child by the Sea-shore, he says, making light of it:

Glooms that go deep as thine I have not known:
Moods of fantastic sadness, nothing worth.'

And outwardly he was still able to preserve his banter, his 'blithe and debonair' attitude. William Wordsworth, (grandson of the poet) for example, writes to Crabb Robinson, as late as 1858, "It seems to me that these young gentlemen who are as melancholy as night, and kick under the burden of life.... seem sufficiently resigned and prosperous when one meets them." 2 And even in 'the deep wide sea of misery', there was many a green isle. There was sleep, and work, and the senses.

The Guide of our dark steps a triple veil
Betwixt our senses and our sorrow keeps:
Hath sown, with cloudless passages, the tale
Of grief, and eas'd us with a thousand sleeps. 3

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1 To a Gipsy Child by the Sea-shore. 2 Correspondance of Crabb Robinson with the Wordsworth Circle, (Ed. E. J. Morley), pp. 825-6. 3 To a Gipsy Child.
Mais chez Obermann, la pensée, l'imagination et le cœur sont suffisamment en accord et en équilibre, dans ce sens que leur état de souffrance réciproque et de tiraillement sourd peut durer et s'éterniser. Aussi Obermann est-il le vrai type permanent de la situation morale dont René nous figure avec idéalisation un moment.

Sainte-Beuve. Chateaubriand et son Groupe littéraire.
Arnold's first approach to health out of this depressed and tangle state was stoicism. He found himself checked on every hand by events and things, subject to a malady he did not yet fully understand, and unable to find any fixed point on which to take his stand. The best he could do was to endure; to try to reconcile himself to the nature of things and to suffer stoically what he could not mend. He asked therefore to be given the will *to neither strive nor cry*; he tried to attain to the calm of nature, to find and follow the law of his own being, as the forces of nature did theirs, and to renounce desires which were not in conformity with the true needs of his being.

He made acquaintance early with the stoic Epictetus, probably just after the death of his father in 1842:

\[ \text{Who prop, thou ask'st, in these bad days, my mind?} \]

\[ \text{Much he, whose friendship I not long since won,} \]
\[ \text{That halting slave, who in Nicopolis} \]
\[ \text{Taught Arrian, ....... 2} \]

Shakespeare he admired as out-topping knowledge and the ills of man, a true stoic, but without the suffering of the stoic: self-secure.

\[ \text{All pains the immortal spirit must endure,} \]
\[ \text{All weakness that impairs, all griefs that bow,} \]
\[ \text{Find their sole voice in that victorious brow.} \]

He asks of the Gipsy-child, also victorious over the ills of life:

\[ \text{Is thine the calm of stoic souls, who weigh} \]
\[ \text{Life well, and find it wanting, nor deplore:} \]
\[ \text{But in disdainful silence turn away,} \]
\[ \text{Stand mute, self-centred, stern, and dream no more?} \]

In 1855 he recalled how the last poem of Emily Brontë, (1846) the poem of a stoic, roused him with a call to greater independence and courage in his wavering course, the poem beginning *"No coward soul is mine*. "And She"—he says, "whose soul

Knew no fellow for might,
Passion, vehemence, grief,
Daring, since Byron died,
That world-fam'd Son of Fire; She, who sank
Baffled, unknown, self-consum'd;
Whose toe bold dying song
Shook, like a clarion-blast, my soul.¹

This period in Arnold's life, from approximately
1843 to 1848, was known to his friends by the name of
the modern stoic to whom especially he had recourse,—
Sénèqueur, the author of Obermann. "With Renan to see
Sainte-Beuve, .... " says Grant-Duff. "We talked of
many things; of Met. Arnold and his Obermann Period."²
Arnold later apostrophised him as
Thou master of my wandering youth.³

He imagines Sénèqueur addressing him in the stanza:

"And is it thou," he cried, "so long
Held by the world, which we
Loved not, who turnest from the throng
Back to thy youth and me?" ⁴

This period was at its height in 1846, when Arnold made
a visit to France, calling on George Sand at her home at
Nohant, and then travelling over to Switzerland and
Obermann's country. He was "voyageant en Suisse et y
suivant la trace d'Obermann".⁵ For Obermann were to him
associated, as he wrote to Sainte Beuve: " ... l'idée
que j'ai de lui se liant toujours dans ma pensée avec
celle de la Suisse française."⁶

Obermann summed up in himself more completely than
any other the romantic maladies to which Arnold was at
this time subject. He rose above them, as Arnold was now
trying to do, by his stoicism. He was, next to Goethe
and Wordsworth, the only modern spirit who had attained
to "see his way"⁷—to interpret the troubled age in which
he lived and attempt a solution:

The hopeless tangle of our age—
Thou too hast scannd'd it well.⁸

He was "le vrai type permanent"⁹ of the romantic melan­
choly and the romantic stoicism.

¹Saworth Churchyard. ²Sir W. E. Grant-Duff. Notes from a
Diary, I. ⁴/², ²²-²³. ³Obermann once More. ⁴Tbid.
⁵Sainte Beuve, Chateaubriand et son Groupe Littéraire,
⁸Sainte Beuve, op. cit., I. ³⁴¹.
Secancour, like Arnold, had begun with unworldliness, pitched his ideals too high, been driven to despair, rebellion and escape, and when his ideals fell short, he was left with melancholy and empty desire. Arnold recalls his youthful debt to him:

...... sad, tranquil lore.

Again I feel its words inspire
Their mournful calm—serene,
Yet tinged with infinite desire
For all that might have been,

The harmony from which man swerved
Made his life's rule once more!
The universal order served!
Earth happier than before! 1

But Obermann, in his melancholy, was composed, as Arnold had not then learned to become:

Immovable thou sittest; still
As death; composed to bear.
Thy head is clear, thy feeling chill—
And icy thy despair.2

For refuge from the world Obermann had fled to a solitary life with Nature. From Nature he had set himself to learn resignation, impassivity, calm. So the refuge of Nature opened to Arnold. In Resignation he expressed this attitude to Nature and its lesson for man:

Enough, we live:—and if a life,
With large results so little rife,
Though bearable, seem hardly worth
This pomp of worlds, this pain of birth;
Yet, Fausta, the mute turf we tread,
The solemn hills around us spread,
This stream that falls incessantly,
The strange-scrivelled rocks, the lonely sky,
If I might lend their life a voice,
Seem to bear rather than rejoice.

Of the hills, he says

Their joy is in their calm.3

Obermann and his stoicism, then, served Arnold for a time. But as he returned to his works in 1849, when he had himself largely risen out of the mood of melancholy, he felt that Obermann's was not a natural or healthy calm. Obermann Once More. 2Ibid. 3Faded Leaves: On the Rhine.
I turn thy leaves: I feel their breath
Once more upon me roll;
The air of languour, cold, and death
Which brooded o'er thy soul.

There is no comfort in Obermann, no help for those in doubt:

Fly hence, poor Wretch, who'er thou art,
Condemn'd to cast about,
All shipwreck in thine own weak heart,
For comfort from without:

A fever in these pages turns
Beneath the calm they feign;
A wounded human spirit turns
Here on its bed of pain.

Through his works

There sobs I know not what ground tone
Of human agony.

But the final message of Obermann was not the agony and despair, the melancholy and stoicism which Arnold at this time found in him. It was not the negative but the positive side of him to which Arnold remained attached, the high ideals, the unworldliness. More than all, it was to the joy and hope which Obermann desired but failed to attain. Senancour, wrote Arnold long after, "a little known but profound French moralist, .... has said admiringly: 'The aim of man is to augment the feeling of joy, ...'". So Senancour exhorts him in his manhood:

"What still of strength is left, employ,
That end to help men gain:
One mighty wave of thought and joy
Lifting mankind again!"

Literature and Dogma, Grant-Duff records, was presented to him by the author, with the inscription, "In memory of Obermann". Literature and Dogma was a contribution to the wave of thought and joy. It is no accident, then, that Arnold put in the mouth of Obermann the verses that express many of his most fundamental ideas on his own age and its tendencies, and what hope there was for the future. It is Obermann, too, who forecasts the religion of the future.

'Stanze in Memory of ...."Obermann." 2Last Essays on Church and Religion, p. 4Obermann Once More.

Grant-Duff, Out of the Past, II. 88.
Alone, self-poised, henceforward man
Just labour; must resign
His all too human creeds, and scan
Simply the way divine.'

But even with such a positive element in his
attitude, Obermann and his stoicism had no sufficient
cure for Arnold's ills. He had only a certain 'fellow-
ship of mood', sincerity, a love of nature, and the
power of endurance. Arnold must bid him a regretful and
affectionate farewell.

And thou, sad Guide, adieu!
I go; Fate drives me: but I leave
Half of my life with you.

'Obermann Once More. 2Stanzas ...... "Obermann".
MYSTICISM.

On the mind's lonely hill-top lying,
I saw man's life go by like a breath,

Newbolt.
A little later, probably about 1847-50, Arnold shows a decided vein of mysticism. This attitude is partly collateral with the stoical, and partly its sequel, its extreme. The evils of the finite world Arnold revolted against: and where revolt was ineffective, he must needs suffer stoically. But where escape was open, he took it: and mysticism was an escape. It was an escape into his own mind, his own ideals. At the same time it was a union with the Absolute, the All, counter-balancing his impatience with all finite things which had betrayed his hopes and had sent shock after shock against his idealism—the infinite in which all ideals are realized, all perfection attained.

"Nothing finite is true," says Amiel, "is interesting, is worthy to fix my attention. All that is particular is exclusive, and all that is exclusive repels me. There is nothing non-exclusive but the All; my end is communion with Being through the whole of Being." There is little doubt that it was from this angle that mysticism chiefly attracted Arnold. "The desire for the all," he says in his essay on Amiel, "the impatience with what is partial and limited, the fascination of the infinite.... It is a prosaic mind which has never been in contact with ideas of this sort, never felt their charm."

In these moods the only reality which remained to Arnold was the reality of his own mind and of the All of which his mind was a fragment. The external world became his dream, losing its substantiality. In 1849, for example, he entertains this view as one alternative theory of the nature of the world—a sort of mystical idealism:

If, in the silent mind of One all-pure,
At first imagin'd lay
The sacred world; and by procession sure
From those still deeps, in form and colour drest,
Seasons alternating, and night and day,
The long-mused thought to north, south, east and west
Took then its all-seen way:

...... O waking on Life's stream!
By lonely pureness to the all-pure Fount
(Only by this thou canst) the colour'd dream
Of Life remount. 1

In Utrumque Paratus.
The world, the 'long-mused thought', becomes for his mind, as it was for the infinite mind, an idea, dependent on the mind for its reality. But Arnold retained sufficient contact with it to contemplate from his height the spectacle of the world as it unrolled itself before him. The world

... seems

To lie before us like a land of dreams."1

This attitude Clough calls pictorial-ness. "Pictorial-ness," he says, "yes; that, when it becomes a wonderful vision of all things, is 'the 'Spirit of the Universe'. The pictorial attitude is not a good one for one's continuous life, but for a season it transports one out of reality." 2 The poet is the great seer, and is therefore most nearly in contact with the universe, and at the same time most transported out of reality. To Arnold, in 1849, or 1850, Goethe typified this attitude:

And he was happy, if to know
Causes of things, and far below
His feet to see the lurid glow
Of terror and insane distress,
And headlong fate, be happiness."3

Arnold no doubt thought also, as Clough did, of the famous lines of Lucretius:

Suave, mari magnos turbantibus aequora ventis
E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; .......

In his first acquaintance with Goethe at Oxford, Arnold had been forcibly affected by a passage in Carlyle's translation of Wilhelm Meister, dealing with the idea of the poet and poetry. The translation emphasizes, still more than the original, the idea of the poet as seer, or spectator raised above the conturbations of humanity. Wilhelm Meister after speaking of the discontent of most men, says: "Now fate has exalted the poet above all this, as if he were a god. He views the conflicting tumult of the passions; sees families and kingdoms raging in aimless commotion; sees those inexplicable enigmas of misunderstanding .... occasioning convulsions unutterably baneful."5 Not only does he see the wide world, but also the past and the future. Arnold, with this passage in his mind, describes the poet as spectator of all time and all experience. He

Sees, in some great-historied land,
A ruler of the people stand;

1 Dover Beach. 2 Remains, p. 179. 3 Memorial Verses.
4 De Rerum Natura, II, II. 1-2. 5 Carlyle's Translation, (1857-8), I. 69.
Sees his strong thought in fiery flood
Roll through the heaving multitude;

Surveys each happy group that fleets,
Toil ended, through the shining streets;

He sees the gentle stir of birth
When morning purifies the earth;
He leans upon a gate, and sees
The pastures and the quiet trees.

Lean'd on his gate, he gazes: tears
Are in his eyes, and in his ears
The murmur of a thousand years:
Before him he sees life unroll,
A placid and continuous whole;

Arnold had already used this, or a similar, idea, in The Strayed Reveller. There the gods have this power of vision.
The Gods are happy.
They turn on all sides
Their shining eyes:
And see, below them,
The earth, and men.

He returned to it again in Balder Dead. On Balder's death, Odin rode away

To Lidskialf, and sate upon his throne,
The Mount, from whence his eye surveys the world.
And far from Heaven he turned his shining orbs
To look on Midgard, and the earth, and men.

The greatest poets have also this power of vision. Homer, though blind, is

... the old man, who, clearest-souled of men,
Saw the Wide Prospect, and the Asian Fen,
And Tmolus' hill, and Smyrna's bay,

Sophocles

... saw life steadily and saw it whole.

With the Gods, the poet escapes from the 'iron round' of life. He is set free from the power of the moment, from
passion, from Chance, from the 'business' of men. So he gains a 'rant security'. He escapes through his power of vision, his lucidity of soul. To live truly, he must have wide vision. He must stand apart from life, a spectator, viewing life truly because he subdues his own feelings and energies to scan Nature and Man. So he 'draws homeward to the general life' by renouncing his own. 

The poet, then, has from the Gods vision, as they have themselves; but he has also, as the Gods, who are happy, have not, the pain of everything he sees. He has 'borne immortals pains'. Through his quicker sensibility he feels deeply.

... such a price
The Gods exact for song;
To become what we sing.

This, then, is the attitude of 'pictorial' mysticism which, Arnold says, lends itself well to poetry. Along with this, Arnold also adopted naturally some of the apparatus of mysticism, what Clough calls his 'rehabilitated Hindoo-Greek theosophy'. It contained, of course, the anima mundi or soul of the world, as one of its fundamental ideas. Of this world-soul, individuals are merely fragments or incarnations. During life, these are separated by their finiteness, but they long to be reunited in the All, from which they came,

For surely once, they feel, we were
Parts of a single continent.

For at that time,

Long, long since, undower'd yet, our spirit
Roam'd ere birth, the treasuries of God:

Hence their real affinity, real though often concealed:

Yet we shall one day gain, life past,
Clear prospect o'er our being's whole;
Shall see ourselves, and learn at last
Our true affinities of soul.

And we, whose ways were unlike here,
May then more neighbouring courses ply;
May to each other be brought near
And greet across infinity.

\textsuperscript{1}Resignation. \textsuperscript{2}The Strayed Reveller. \textsuperscript{3}E. in C., 2nd series, Amiel. \textsuperscript{4}Remains, p. 373. \textsuperscript{5}Switzerland: Taolation.

\textsuperscript{6}Self-Deception.
How sweet, unreach'd by earthly jars,
My sister! to behold with thee
The hush among the shining stars,
The calm upon the moonlit sea.

In life, however, individuals remain separate, finite;

A God, a God, their severance rul'd;
And made between their shores to be
The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea.

They remain ignorant of each other:

And what heart knows another?
Ah! who knows his own?

But the real and underlying affinity remains. The whole conception is Goethe's. In his 'Fragment über Die Natur', which Arnold must have studied very carefully, Goethe says, speaking of Nature, "Sie macht Klüfte zwischen allen Wesen, und alles will sich verschlingen. Sie hat alles isolirt, um alles zusammen zu ziehen."

This Hindoo-Greek theosophy implies also pre-existence:

... before we woke on earth, we were.

After death, the transmigration of souls:

... the soul
Which now is mine, must re-attain
Immunity from my control,
And wander round the world again;

and immortality,

In the sounding labour-house vast
Of being,

but perhaps not for all:

No, no! the energy of life may be
Kept on after 'he grave, but not begun;
And he who flagg'd not in the earthly strife,

From strength to strength advancing—only he,
His soul well-knit, and all his battles won,
Mounts, and that hardly, to eternal life.

1 Switzerland: A Farewell. 2 Ibid.: Isolation. 3 Ibid.: Parting.
4 Self-Deception. 5 Faded Leaves; The River. 6 Rugby Chapel.
7 Immortality.
But Arnold realized the dangers of this view of life. He knew its value, but its value lay partly in its temporary nature. It was a halting-place, on the right road; it was one of several attitudes to be held simultaneously. But if treated as permanent or allowed a monopoly, it was fatal. Both Clough and Arnold record their sense of this danger. Such ideas, wrote Arnold, "lend themselves well to poetry, but what are we to say of their value as ideas to be lived with, dilated on, made the governing ideas of life? Except for use in passing, and with the power to dismiss them again, they are unprofitable." Clough says, "As to mysticism, to go along with it even counter to fact and to reason may sometimes be tempting, though to do so would take me right away off the terra firma of practicable duty and business into the limbo of unrevealed things, the forbidden terra incognita of vague hopes and hypothetical aspirations. But when I lose my legs, I lose my head; I am seized with spiritual vertigo and meagrems unutterable." Towards the end of his life, Arnold wrote of Amiel in similar terms. "Amiel was paralysed by living in these ideas of 'vague aspiration and indeterminate desire', of 'confounding his personal life in the general life', by feeding on these ideas, treating them as august and precious, and filling hundreds of pages of Journal with them. He was paralysed by it, he became impotent and miserable." Arnold also criticized his own poems of this period, in these same adjectives, vague and indeterminate.

The pictorial or mystical view, then, had charm, lent itself to poetry, and served as a stage towards a later, more positive development. It allowed Arnold to retain his ideals,—realized in the All if not on earth,—and therefore to reassert some sort of positive attitude to the universe. In doubt, it was something to cling to. It sheltered his ambivalence, by allowing him to be thus at one with the world, the soul of the world, through poetic vision, and yet to remain hostile to particular aspects of it which did not accord with his ideals.

But his melancholy remained, his doubts, his ambivalence. His nature was still a battle-ground of unruly impulses, unharmonized, flesh warring against spirit, the world against the soul. For these, mysticism was no cure. It was still too far removed from everyday life and practice. He was still, so far as he took the mystic view, out of touch with the concrete world, too much concerned with his own mind and its ideals, and too little concerned with the object and the nature of things.

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1. E. in C., 2nd series, Amiel.
2. Prose Remains, pp. 120-1.
Under cover of his pictorial view, and side by side with it, there began to develop the various concrete and positive forces which were to bring Arnold to his final equilibrium. Although in itself abstract, and to some extent withdrawn into the subjective world, 'pictorial-ness' was yet compatible, through poetry, with a return of interest in the external universe, of which it was a vision. For a time, too, it set aside his religious questioning by giving him some sort of interpretation of life, temporary though it might be. He had thus a respite during which to set in order his other troubles and internal conflicts, and at the same time gained confidence that a true religious orientation would come with time.

In this way the year 1848—he had just reached the age of 25—marks for Arnold the beginning of a new time. He himself certainly seems so to have thought, considering the previous years as too negative and unprofitable to be of any value, except perhaps for the formation of his own character and as a stage in the evolution of his more mature attitude and ideas. It was presumably for this reason that—probably at his own wish—his letters begin with the year 1848.

In the few years immediately following, also, signs of growing clearness and confidence begin to appear. In 1849, for example, he was getting "more of a distinct feeling as to what I want to read." In 1853, speaking of Sohrab and Rustum, he wrote, "I .... never felt so sure of myself." The following year he expressed "a stronger desire than usual not to vacillate and be helpless, but to do my duty". He remarked that "To make a habitual war on depression and low spirits, which in one's early youth one is apt to indulge and be somewhat interested in, is one of the things one learns as one gets older. They are noxious alike to body and mind, and already partake of the nature of death." Finally, "the hour of agony and revolt passed away for her [George Sand] as it passed away for Goethe, as it passes away for their readers likewise. It passes away and does not return; .... "

The first stage in this recovery was the recapture of an interest in the finite, concrete world. The cure is that which is prescribed for Empedocles:

*But lead him through the lovely mountain paths,*  
*And keep his mind from preying on itself,*  
*And talk to him of things at hand and common.*

Such an interest in common things Arnold had always pre-

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1 Letters, I. 11. 2 Ibid., 30. 3 Ibid., 41. 4 Ibid., 50. 5 Mixed Essays, George Sand, p. 396. 6 Empedocles on Etna,
served in poetry. The practice of poetry had done much to maintain for him a positive and stable attitude during his worst period of doubt, melancholy, and stoicism. For poetry must deal with the concrete world in a positive way. While all other truths totter and fall, the truth of poetry remains. It is stable. Poetry is unaffected even by the negative theories of the poet, in so far as it must be the expression of a positive, not a negative, attitude to life. It implies a judgment that life, or some of it, is beautiful. It is further an escape from the ugliness, the iron round, of life, as mysticism is: and yet it maintains concrete contact with life, as mysticism does not.

To the power of poetry were now, about 1847-8, added several other powers, which together completed the process of restoring Arnold's mind to its equilibrium with the world and which at the same time solved the conflicts and divisions by which it had been beset. Of the chief of these powers was Wordsworth. Wordsworth had himself passed through a similar stage of development. He had begun with high hopes and a prospect of their early fulfilment, through the French Revolution,

France standing on the top of golden hours
And human nature seeming born again.

He had, like Arnold, seen these hopes shattered, and had passed into a state where he yielded up moral questions in despair. He had finally been restored to moral and mental health, to his true self, by three main influences, Nature, Poetry, and his sister Dorothy. In reality, he had not been altered farther

Than as a clouded or a waning moon.

The Prelude, in which appeared some account of this development, was not published till just after his death in 1850. But Wordsworth had, as early as 1845, taken Arnold "under his special protection," and, no doubt, Arnold was acquainted, directly or indirectly, with the subject-matter of the Prelude. In 1849, at any rate, Arnold classed Wordsworth with Goethe and Senancour, as the only modern writer who had both undergone the same mental disease as himself—romanticism—and had also found for it a satisfactory, or at least a working, solution. Wordsworth had attained to "see his way." He found his cure in Nature and the simple primary affections of those who live in contact with Nature. There he found joy. But he won joy at the cost of giving up the problems of thought, which had been largely responsible for his melancholy. He had "retired into a monastery."
But Wordsworth's eyes avert their ken
From half of human fate;¹

so far as he went, however, Wordsworth was a physician. His
poetry is great, Arnold says, "because of the extraordinary
power with which Wordsworth feels the joy offered to us in
nature, the joy offered to us in the simple primary affect­
ions and duties; and because of the extraordinary power with
which, in case after case, he shows us this joy, and renders
it so as to make us share it.

"The source of the joy from which he thus draws is the
truest and most unfalling source of joy accessible to man.
It is also accessible universally."²

It was in this way that Wordsworth had appealed to
John Stuart Mill. He had re-opened, or perhaps simply
opened, the channel of his emotions, his delight in the
simple primary affections and in nature, after a youth
devoted entirely to the one-sided exercise of the reasoning
faculties.³ Now, he re-opened this channel for Arnold
after a similar over-exertion and melancholy.

He spoke, and loosed our heart in tears.⁴

This is Wordsworth's "healing power". Arnold had early
felt the power of Nature:

.... in my helpless cradle I
    was breathed on by the rural Pan.⁵

He had lost the feeling of delight in Nature, so long as he
lay under the cloud of melancholy. He had cried to Nature
to renew her influence:

    "Ah, once more," I cried, "ye Stars, ye Waters,
    On my heart your mighty charm renew."⁶

It was Wordsworth who effected this renewal.

He laid us as we lay at birth
On the cool flowery lap of earth,
Smiles broke from us, and we had ease;
The hills were round us, and the breeze
Went o'er the sunlit fields again;
Our foreheads felt the wind and rain.

Our youth return'd; for there was shed
On spirits that had long been dead,
Spirits dried up and early closely furl'd,
The freshness of the early world.⁷

For

.... he was a priest to us all
Of the wonder and bloom of the world,
Which we saw with his eyes, and were glad.⁸

¹Obermann. ²E. in C., 2nd series. Wordsworth. ³Mill,
Autobiography. ⁴Memorial Verses. ⁵Lines Written in Kensington
Gardens. ⁶Self-Dependence. ⁷Memorial Verses. ⁸Ibid.
Nature renews the freshness and the joy of youth, when
the world has caught the spirit in its hot shrivelling
grasp.

In The Youth of Man, Arnold calls to Nature to pre­
serve in man this spirit of youth and its delight in the
world. He cries to Nature:

Make, oh, make yourselves felt
To the dying spirit of youth!
Come, like the breath of the spring.
Leave not a human soul
To grow old in darkness and pain.
Only the living can feel you:
But leave us not while we live.

Nature, then, is one antidote to the overstrain of thought
imposed by the modern age. It restores youth; and it
draws outward the self-tormenting mind of man, establishing
a healthy balance between the mind and its object.

Arnold's re-born delight in Nature suffered a shock
on the death of Wordsworth. He felt as if the delight
were dependent on the man who had restored it, and with
his death

... darkness returns to our eyes.

He surmounts the shock; however, and disperses the dark­
ness. The joy of Nature is independent of the poets who
act as her interpreters:

"They are dust, they are changed, they are gone.
I remain."

Arnold had now permanently recaptured his early delight in
Nature. Now again he can enjoy continuously and unhampered
the countryside of Laleham or Oxford or Ambleside. Now
again he can enjoy the "great delight of the year, fly­
fishing", in the solitude of the mountains;

Scarce fresher is the mountain sod,
Where the tired angler lies, stretch'd out,
And, eased of basket and of rod,
Counts his day's spoil, the spotted trout.¹

Now again his emotions flow freely. He realizes the value
of the primary emotions, which depend on the simple things
of life.

Is it so small a thing
To have enjoy'd the sun,
To have lived light in the spring,
To have loved, to have thought, to have done;²

¹ Lines Written in Kensington Gardens. ² Empedocles on Etna.
Among the chief primary emotions that restored Arnold's joy in life and dispersed the clouds of melancholy was love. He had fallen in love by 1849, if not earlier, with Lucy Wightman, to whom he was married in June, 1851.

In two passages he refers to the effect of being in love on such a state of mind as his own then was. Sometimes, he says, though rarely,

When our world-deafen'd ear
Is by the tones of a lov'd voice caress'd—
A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again:
The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain,
And what we mean, we say, and what we would, we know. ¹

Again, looking back many years later: "Every one knows," he says, "how being in love changes for the time a man's spiritual atmosphere, and makes animation and buoyancy where before there was flatness and dulness. One may even say that this is the reason why being in love is so popular with the whole human race,—because it relieves in so irresistible and delightful a manner the tedium or depression of common-place human life. And not only does it change the atmosphere of our spirits, making air, light, and movement where before was stagnation and gloom, but it also sensibly and powerfully increases our faculties of action. . . . This, I say, we learn from the analogy of the most everyday experience;—that a powerful attachment will give a man spirits and confidence which he could by no means call up or command of himself; and that in this mood he can do wonders which would not be possible to him without it." ²

¹ The Buried Life. ² St. Paul and Protestantism, pp. 61-2.
II. GOETHE.
It was to Goethe, more than to any other single influence, that Arnold owed his recovery. Goethe had the width of view and acquaintance with ideas that were lacking to Wordsworth. He knew and held the key to all Arnold's troubles, religious, mental and moral. It was Goethe, Max-Müller wrote, who "helped him to soar, where others toiled and sighed." Arnold did not, he admitted, ever hope to reach Goethe's pinnacle of detached serenity, where he sat in Olympian isolation, asking no love and expecting none.

And Goethe's course few sons of men
May think to emulate.¹

For Arnold could not dispense with affection and love. His need of affection, the result of his affectionate home-life, led him to sacrifice great prospects in politics or diplomacy, in order to marry. He also saw and marked clearly Goethe's faults. But, with these allowances, he found in Goethe the man most fitted to bring him out of the oscillating confusion in which he then lay.

In a letter to his mother on May 7, 1848, he wrote, "I have been returning to Goethe's Life, and think higher of him than ever. His thorough sincerity—writing about nothing that he had not experienced—is in modern literature almost unrivalled." On July 29, 1848, he is again occupied with Goethe's Life. In January, 1851, he had read the correspondence with Frau von Stein, was reading the letters to Lavater, and talked of getting those to Auguste zu Stolberg. At the same time he sent to his sister, Jane, as a present, Goethe's Tasso.

In Goethe, and especially in his Dichtung und Wahrheit, and his Gespräche (Eckermann), Arnold recognized a kindred temperament. Goethe showed every one of his own tendencies. There was the same impressionability, the same intensity, the same insatiable desire for experience, the same artistic leanings towards simplicity, poetry, disinterestedness, the same conflict between body and soul, mediaeval and modern, leading to the same religious doubt and melancholy. Goethe's description of his own general state just before writing Werther, would exactly fit Arnold: "We have here to do with those whose life is embittered by a want of action, in the midst of the most peaceful circumstances in the world, through exaggerated demands upon themselves." It was precisely through such exaggerated demands upon himself and the world that Arnold had been driven into ambivalence and melancholy. Goethe first showed him what his trouble was, and that it was not peculiar to himself but typical of his age, the modern age. Much more, he showed him the cause and

¹ Auld Lang Syne, p. 115. ² Obermann. Letters, 1. 9. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 15. Werke, XXIV. 166.
the cure of the disease, how one could adapt oneself to such an age, how one could live an adequate life in it, and what was the task of one who lived in such an environment.

Goethe was to Arnold "by far our greatest modern man." The emphasis is on the modern. He was the greatest modern man because of the "width, depth, and richness of his criticism of life." He was therefore more valuable to Arnold than poets of "other and more alien times, who as poets rank higher". For he interpreted the modern world, explained its elements, its wants, the cure of its evils. In his Werther period, he had himself felt the various ills of Europe, and in his serener manhood had found a remedy.

Physician of the Iron Age
Goethe has done his pilgrimage.
He took the suffering human race,
He read each wound, each weakness clear—
And struck his finger on the place
And said—Thou ailest here, and here.

What Goethe found in Europe was mainly the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the growth of the modern spirit. The old Europe was dying, the new coming to birth.

His eye plung'd down the weltering strife,
The turmoil of expiring life;

He saw that what was required was to assist the process to proceed as quickly and as smoothly as possible, to dissolve and liberate from the old forms and ideas, and to establish adequate new ideas and forms in their place. In his work, therefore, Goethe conceived himself as a liberator.

Among other mediaeval ideas then surviving was that of the sharp separation of religion and the spirit from the flesh and the world, the opposition in which Arnold had been reared, and out of which had sprung his ambivalence and melancholy. He was now seeking some reconciliation of the two sides of the opposition, some transition from the mediaeval to the modern outlook. By showing him how this was to be achieved, by interpreting to him the many conflicting currents of that age of transition and the connection with them of his own ills, Goethe was to Arnold a deliverer, a liberator.

It was Goethe who first showed him his malady and that of his age—romanticism, and the normal, healthy state to which he should strive—classicism. "Classisch ist das Gesunde, Romantisch das Kranke." Romanticism was the product of the mediaeval opposition, through the infinite ideals

Mixed Essays, A French Critic on Goethe, pp. 311-2.
Memorial Verses. 3 Ibid. 4 Maximen und Reflexionen: Werke, II. 247.
it originated, and the frustration of these excessive ideals by the nature of things. The root of the trouble, then, was desire, but desire without any object upon which to rest, without any hope of fulfilment, empty desire. "This desire," says Leopardi, the great romantic, "when it is not satisfied nor on the other hand directly opposed by what is contrary to enjoyment, is ennui. Ennui is the desire for happiness left, so to speak, pure."* To cure ennui or melancholy, it is not enough to follow, as Arnold did, the stoic philosophy of Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, or Senancour. To renounce the object of desire is not to cure desire. It is only to deflect it from the actual to the All, or the visionary: it is to leave it without an object, unsatisfied, pure. Ennui remains. The desire must be satisfied. But when it aims at the infinite it cannot be satisfied. Desire must, therefore, be restrained within limits, and turned to practicable aims. This is the process through which Goethe shows Meister and Faust passing in order to attain a happiness that their infinite desires had sought in vain. As Schiller wrote to Goethe, "If I had in bare words to define the goal which Wilhelm Meister finally reaches... I should say, "he steps from an empty and undefined ideal into definite, active life, but without losing any of his idealising power."* It is, again, his learning to limit himself, but in this very limit again finding his way to the infinite by means of form, ... this I call the crisis of his life; the end of his apprenticeship...."*3

After describing Amiel's 'bedazement with the infinite', Arnold immediately counters with Goethe's corrective, as he had found it in his own experience: "Nay, the thoughts which have positive truth and value, the thoughts to be lived with and dwelt upon, the thoughts which are a real acquisition for our minds, are precisely thoughts which counteract the 'vague aspiration and indeterminate desire' possessing Amiel ......: they are thoughts insisting on the need of limit, the feasibility of performance. Goethe says admiringly—

'Wer grosses will muss sich zusammenraffen! In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister.'

..... The ideas to live with, the ideas of sterling value to us, are, I repeat, ideas of this kind: ideas staunchly countering and deducing the power of the infinite and indeterminate, not paralysing us with it."*4

1 Zibaldone, VI, 127.
Desire must therefore no longer lead to an impractical visionary escape, or a violent, unreasoning rebellion, but must be turned into a limited, positive channel. This is classicism, das Gesund. Even in his most romantic and melancholy years, Arnold had always kept in close touch with the classical spirit, partly through constant reading of Greek and Latin authors, and partly through the writing of poetry on their model. Goethe now showed him that here lay one avenue of return to health. Here, in poetry, was a limited channel into which to turn his unlimited emotions, a form to which to mould, by which, therefore, to control, his vague feelings. "What is not interesting" in poetry, he says in the Preface to the Poems of 1853, "is that which .... is vaguely conceived and loosely drawn; a representation which is general, indeterminate, and faint, instead of being particular, precise, and firm." Poetry in itself is not enough; it must be poetry written in the classical spirit, poetry in which the form is precise and strongly marked. As he says again, in the Preface to Merope, "Powerful thought and emotion, flowing in strongly marked channels, make a stronger impression; ...... in the metrical form, the very limit gives a sense of precision and emphasis. This sense of emphatic distinctness in our impressions rises, as the thought and emotion swell higher and higher without overflowing their boundaries, to a lofty sense of the mastery of the human spirit over its own stormiest agitations; ...... " The reading and practice of the classical in poetry was therefore, with its demand for precision and particularity, an antidote to his vague mysticism and indeterminate desires.

Goethe showed Arnold still another channel into which to direct this stream of the particular and the limited. "I went on troubling myself about general ideas; says Goethe, "until I learnt to understand the particular achievements of the best men." So, in the period between 1848 and 1850, Arnold made a practice of reading a good deal of biography. After returning to the life of Goethe he mentions reading the lives of Napoleon, Scott, Burns, Byron, and no doubt he might have added Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius (for Empedocles), Boswell, Franklin, and a good many more.

He found a further antidote to the indefiniteness of mysticism in work or duty,—not work for its own sake, as Carlyle preached, but work as dealing with the actual, outward world and as counteracting his inward dreaming. He and Clough seem to have found here their chief safety for a time. Absolute problems might wait. Finite existence must go on, and for mental and spiritual health, contact with the finite world must be maintained.

Max, und Reflex. ¹Letters, I. 11.
It seems His newer will
We should not think at all of Him, but turn,
And of the world that he has given us make
What best we may.

Or, as Clough again expressed it: "Is it for nothing, but for the foolish souls of men to be discontented and repine and whimper at, that he has made this very tolerably beautiful earth, with its logic and arithmetic, and its exact and punctual multifarious arrangements, &c. &c.? Is it the end and object of all finite creation that sentimental human simnpletons may whine about their infinite longings? Was it ordered that twice two should make four, simply for the intent that boys and girls should be cut to the heart that they do not make five? Be content, when the veil is raised, perhaps they will make five! who knows?" "... only time can work out any sort of answer.... for us. 'Solvitur ambulando,' he says. "All things become clear to me by work more than by anything else. Any kind of drudgery will help one out of the most uncommon either sentimental or speculative perplexity; the attitude of work is the only true one in which one can see things properly." Arnold's final attitude to the vagueness of mysticism, the indeterminate in life, on the one side, and to the process of limitation on the other, shows sufficiently his agreement with Clough and his reaction against the indefinite: "No one has a stronger and more abiding sense than I have of the "daemonic" element—as Goethe called it—which underlies and encompasses our life; but I think, as Goethe thought, that the right thing is, while conscious of this element, and of all that there is inexplicable round one, to keep pushing on one's posts into the darkness, and to establish no post that is not perfectly in light and firm. One gains nothing on the darkness by being, like Shelley, as incoherent as the darkness itself."+ Activity, then, can be limited in these ways, by work and duty: it can be studied in the lives of great men. Expression can be limited by the form in poetry. It still remains, however, to find some standard for desires. They are to be limited, certainly: but what are the true limits? what does man really desire? what, when desired and attained, will truly satisfy? This can be discovered only by finding what his true nature is, what it really desires; that is, by self-examination. Man does not really desire the infinite and unlimited: he is not thereby satisfied. What, among finite, limited ideals, are the true ones? He must learn, therefore, his true self, his true needs and powers, and cultivate these. He has gone astray, has 'wandered', like Meister, Clough, 'Prose Remains,' p. 181. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 180. 4Letters, I, 249.
by following the demands of his apparent, superficial, self.

For there is a dualism in the self: there are two selves. There is a real self and an apparent self. The apparent self is obvious, on the surface: the real self, the soul, lies deeper, and is hard to find. It is the real self that must be found and satisfied, if man is to gain happiness and content.

The New Testament lesson was that men have a 'best and real self' as opposed to their ordinary and apparent one, and that their happiness depended on saving this best self from being overborne. Then to find his own soul, his true and permanent self, became set up in man's view as his chief concern, as the secret of happiness; and so it really is.'

'Below the surface-stream, shallow and light,
Of what we say we feel—below the stream,
As light, of what we think we feel—there flows
With noiseless current strong, obscure and deep,
The central stream of what we feel indeed:

And by this alone are we truly characterised.'

First, then, in order to come at and learn his real self, man must discard his apparent self, as such. The apparent self is the self of the senses, the appetites, convention, pleasure, and everything that Arnold had been brought up to associate with the flesh and the world. It is, in Aristotle's words 'the movement of thought and desire': in St. Paul's, 'the flesh and the current thoughts.' Now it was the apparent self that had demanded the infinite, both in worldly ideals and in the satisfaction of the expanding senses. Arnold had not been able with either to satisfy his real self, for the real self, as he was discovering, was content with moderate, limited, ideals and satisfaction. Purely personal attitudes, then, assertions of the apparent, superficial self, must be renounced.

The chief of these attitudes was rebellion, the assertion of the personal self against a world which did not grant it its desires. Arnold therefore abandoned the attitude of revolt. He now condemned this attitude, both as being personal and as being negative. He also condemned, therefore, those who adopted such an attitude—in so far as they did so: those 'attaching rebels', Byron and Shelley, and Senancour and Charlotte Brontë. He condemned Villette, because Charlotte Brontë had nothing in her mind but "hunger, rebellion, and rage." Goethe said of Byron: "... his perpetual negation .... is

1Literature and Dogma, III. 2.  2St. Paul and Prot., PP. 83-4.
3L. and D., VII. 2.  4Letters, I. 90.
injurious event to his excellent works. For not only does the discontent of the poet infect the reader, but the end of all opposition is negation; and negation is nothing. ... For the great point is, not to pull down, but to build up, and in this humanity finds pure joy." ¹ Arnold adopted and extended the criticism:

For what avails it, all the noise
And outcry of the former men?—

What helps it now, that Byron bore,
With haughty scorn which mock'd the smart,
Through Europe to the Aetolian shore
The pageant of his bleeding heart?

What boots it, Shelley! that the breeze
Carried thy lovely wail away,
Musical through Italian trees
Which fringe thy soft blue Spezzian bay?
Inheritors of thy distress
Have restless hearts one throb the less?

Or are we easier to have read,
O Obermann! the sad, stern page,......²

In place of the negative, rebellious spirit, 'der Geist
der stets verneint', must be cultivated a positive outlook, to satisfy the real self. For

No small profit that man earns,
Who through all he meets can steer him,
Can reject what cannot clear him,
Cling to what can truly cheer him!³

Of Amiel and the negative or useless side of his work, Arnold wrote in the last year of his life, "I would have abstained from writing about him if I had only to disparage and to find fault, only to say that he had been overpraised, and that his dealings with Maia seemed to me profitable neither for himself nor for others."

Obermann, the prototype of those who, like himself, had held excessive and infinite personal ideals, Arnold also renounced:

Away the dreams that but deceive!
And thou, sad Guide, adieu!
I go; Fate drives me; but I leave
Half of my life with you.⁵

¹ Eckermann, Feb. 24, 1835. ² Grande Chartreuse. ³ The Second Best. ⁴ E. in C., III: Amiel. ⁵ Obermann.
And with these ideals, he renounced, on the other hand, the desires, impulses, and emotions, which, with them, were the source of his agony and revolt. He renounced, in the 'Marguerite' poems, the lust of the eye and the pride of life; he renounced his 'ill-school'd spirit', the temper which cries to the Independent Preacher, 'Fool!'; his polemical tendency, in order to adopt an unpolemical style.

But, even after renouncing the personal self, he had still to find the real self. This was not so easy. For the real self is often buried by convention:

I knew the mass of men conceal'd
Their thoughts, for fear that if reveal'd
They would by other men be met
With blank indifference, or with blame reprov'd:
I knew they liv'd and mov'd
Trick'd in disguises, alien to the rest
Of men, and alien to themselves—

or buried by the events of the passing day, and so unregarded:

Fate, which foresaw
How frivolous a baby men would be,
By what distractions he would be possess'd,
How he would pour himself in every strife,
And well-nigh change his own identity;
That it might keep from his capricious play
His genuine self, and force him to obey
Even in his own despite, his being's law,
Bade, through the deep recesses of our breast,
The unregarded River of our Life
Pursue with indiscernible flow its way;
And that we should not see
The buried stream, and seem to be
Eddying about in blind uncertainty,
Though driving on with it eternally.

Sometimes, however, as now with Arnold, attention is called to this true but buried self:

But often in the world's most crowded streets,
But often, in the din of strife,
There rises an unspeakable desire
After the knowledge of our buried life,
A thirst to spend our fire and restless force
In tracking out our true original course;
A longing to inquire
Into the mystery of this heart that beats
So wild, so deep in us, to know
Whence our thoughts come, and where they go.

Sonnet: Worldly Place.  2Sonnet: To an Independent Preacher.  3The Buried Life.  4Ibid.  5Ibid.
But even when the desire for this knowledge is aroused, no one ever fully succeeds in discovering the true, hidden self, the soul:

And many a man in his own breast then delves,
But deep enough, alas, none ever mines:
And we have been on many thousand lines,
And we have shown on each talent and power,
But hardly have we, for one little hour,
Been on our own line, have we been ourselves;
Hardly had skill to utter one of all
The nameless feelings that course through our breast,
But they course on for ever unexpress'd.
And long we try in vain to speak and act
Our hidden self, and what we say and do
Is eloquent, is well—but 'tis not true: 1

Arnold repeats the same idea under various forms and figures. It is, for example, the soul keeping apart 'in its lone fastness high' 2 or

The spirit bloweth and is still,
In mystery our soul abides; 3

or

The vastness, the grandeur, the gloom
Of the unlit gulf of himself. 4

or again Goethe's expression (from Socrates), the Daemon. Even the greatest minds, who depend most on the influence of this hidden self, know little of it.

You know not yourselves—and your bards,
The clearest, the best, who have read
Most in themselves, have beheld
Less than they left unreveal'd. 5

Yet sometimes the true self does pierce the layers of convention and current interests:

Yet still, from time to time, vague and forlorn,
From the soul's subterranean depth upborne
As from an infinitely distant land,
Come airs and floating echoes, and convey
A melancholy into all our day. 6

Or again, a man becomes aware

That an impulse, from the distance
Of his deepest, best existence,
To the words, "Hope, Light, Persistence,"
Strongly stirs and truly burns ! 7

1The Buried Life. 2Morality. 3Palladium. 4Morality. 5The Youth of Nature. 6Ibid. 7The Buried Life. 8The Second Best.
Or, though rarely, love may loose him from the bondage of his apparent self and reveal to him his true self: then

A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again:
The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain,
And what we mean, we say, and what we would, we know. ¹

To find his genuine self, then, is sufficient to cure a man of the attitude of 'agony and revolt' and set him with his face towards a right attitude in hope and persistence. And this is the one way in which happiness and a true life can be attained.

Once read thy own breast right,
And thou hast done with fears!
Man gets no other light,
Search he a thousand years.
Sink in thyself! there ask what ails thee, at that shrine! ²

The history of the human spirit, the study of its various manifestations, may, however, assist in the true interpretation of the soul. To know oneself, one should also know the expression given to the soul in art, religion, science and knowledge, and social life, by the greatest minds.

For happiness, therefore, man must know himself, and, as a means to that, must know also the best that has been thought and said. Finally, he will study the world, that is, the conditions under which the self must act and by which the limits of its action are set.

¹ The Buried Life. ² Empedocles on Etna.
The real self, once freed from the tyranny of the apparent self, will proceed with the work of culture. In this work, however, it cannot proceed alone. It must take along with it the apparent self, the body and its appetites. But it will take them under control, it will rule them. Arnold is here following the Greek view of morality. He quotes from Aristotle: "The living being is composed of soul and body, whereof the one is naturally ruler and the other ruled," and continues, "Aristotle goes on to distinguish the body, over which... the rule of the soul is absolute, and the movement of thought and desire, over which reason has a constitutional rule,' in words which exactly recall St. Paul's phrase for our double enemy: 'the flesh and the current thoughts.'" The body and the movement of thought and desire are for Arnold no longer absolutely opposed to the soul, to culture, but only relatively opposed, in so far as they are not under control and subservient to the needs of the soul.

This view shows a considerable change from Arnold's early opposition of flesh to spirit. The flesh is no longer evil in itself, nor is the world. They can, they must, be included in a full life. It is only when they assert themselves at the expense of the soul, that they are evil, and produce, not culture, but anarchy. There is no longer, then, any question of denying either the world or the flesh. The opposition, and with it all its effects,—rebellion, doubt, and melancholy—disappear. Arnold has substituted the Greek for the mediaeval Christian view.

With this new view to guide him, Arnold abandoned or condemned those authors on whom he had relied for his former view. Senancour and the ascetics had denied one main sphere of man's activity—they denied the body or they renounced society. "The Imitation of Thomas a Kempis, Arnold says, exquisite as it is, belongs "to a class of works in which the perfect balance of human nature is lost, and which have therefore, as spiritual productions, in their contents, something excessive and morbid, in their form something not thoroughly sound."

Yet the essence of Arnold's original view remains. To the anarchy of the flesh and the world he was as much opposed as ever. In the self, he had still, and saw that men had still, to struggle against the anarchic tendencies of the flesh and the current thoughts. In the world, the disciple of culture had, as in a different way any government had, to struggle against the anarchic tendencies of the people.

1Literature and Dogma, VII. 2. 2Ibid. 3Culture and Anarchy, Preface.
The suppression of anarchy, however, is not enough. Given law and order in place of anarchy, progress must follow, progress towards perfection. For nothing would satisfy Arnold—still thus much of an idealist—but the highest culture attainable, the highest possible cultivation of the faculties or powers of the soul. These powers Arnold mapped out, in approximate fashion, as the powers of knowledge, conduct, art, and social life or manners. For the perfection of the soul all must be satisfied, and satisfied harmoniously. In all of them, the real self, not the apparent, must be considered, and in all the idea of limitation and definiteness must be observed.

In the first, knowledge—one must recognize the limitations, that is, the laws and capabilities, of the intellect, and resign the quest of the infinite. Arnold here confined himself within definite limits, attempting definite, limited advances, studying little except the best, leaving no subject till he had made it perfectly clear to himself, pushing out into the darkness and establishing 'no post that is not perfectly in light and firm.' His interest, also, he increasingly freed from the apparent self, from the wonders of the passing day. He would no longer see things as his personal inclinations or his prejudices moved him to interpret them, but would see through to their real nature, their 'ideal' character, would see them 'as they really are.'

Already in 1848, he showed this desire. Speaking of an article of Carlyle's on Louis Philippe and the Revolution in France (1848), he said, "The source of repose in Carlyle's article is that he alone puts aside the din and whirl and brutality which envelop a movement of the masses, to fix his thoughts on its ideal invisible character." In the same strain: "I read ... Bacon, Pindar, Sophocles, Milton, Thomas à Kempis, and Ecclesiasticus, and retire more and more from the modern world and modern literature, which is all only what has been before and what will be again, and not bracing or edifying in the least." In Empedocles, written about the same time, he shows Pausanias advised by Empedocles to follow a similar course:

As models for this impersonal attitude in the use of the intellect, Arnold studied chiefly three men, Sainte-Beuve, Spinoza, and Goethe; Sainte-Beuve, whom he calls a 'naturalist in criticism': Spinoza, who so influenced Goethe by this very quality, in his denial of final causes: and

\[\text{Letters, I. 4.} \quad \text{Ibid. 15.}\]
Goethe, with his profoundly impartial mind, a mind for which "the popular philosophy which explains all things by reference to man, and regards universal nature as existing for the sake of man, and even of certain classes of men, was utterly repulsive."¹

In attempting the second, the moral, side of culture man must, in the same way, recognize the limits set by the nature of things, and by his true self. He must not attempt the infinite in morality. He will not imagine the universe to be wholly moral or wholly working towards morality. He will not imagine of his welfare that

The world does but exist that welfare to bestow.²

He will realize, on the one hand, that Nature does support morality, that there is a power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness: but that, on the other hand, many of the forces of Nature are, or may be, altogether heedless of morality. Justice does exist objectively and eternally:

Not time, not lightning,
Not rain, not thunder,
Efface the endless
Decrees of Heaven—
Make Justice alter,
Revoke, assuage her sentence,
Which dooms dread ends to dreadful deeds,
And violent deaths to violent men.³

But the just may suffer with the unjust:

Streams will not curb their pride
The just man not to entomb,
Nor lightnings go aside
To leave his virtues room;
Nor is the wind less rough that blows a good man's barge.⁴

So, in the other important lines of culture,—art and social life,—the real self can be asserted only by renouncing its self-assertion and recognizing and working within the limits set by the true self of man and by the nature of things.

The great thing, then, for Arnold, was to work towards culture, first for oneself, and then for society. For both the process was the same, the renunciation of infinite desires for limited ideals, getting to know one's real self and its needs, and satisfying these in harmony and under control. This was the line of advance which, running alongside of mysticism and so many other currents, was alone able to bring Arnold to his final permanent outlook on life.

¹ E. in C., Spinoza and the Bible. ² Empedocles on Etna. ³ Merope. ⁴ Empedocles on Etna.
19. Marguerite.
The various currents of Arnold's youth, and especially of this period of mysticism (1848-50), are nowhere better reflected than in the group of poems which may be loosely called the Marguerite poems. Strictly speaking, only Switzerland and The Terrace at Berne deserve the name. They alone mention Marguerite, and they alone are self-consistent. The series Faded Leaves (1858) and single poems in the same strain, like Excuse (1852: re-named Urania, 1869), Indifference (re-named Euphrosyne, 1869), and Calais Sands (1867), are to be considered separately from the Marguerite poems proper and from each other.

Akin to these, in that they treat of various aspects of love or passion, are The Forsaken Mermaid, The Church of Brou, A Modern Sappho, Tristan and Iseult, The Neckan, and The New Sirens. All of these will here be dealt with together.

In these poems, which are specially devoted to love and passion, may be found also the sentiments of unworldliness and equality, the rebellion against the standards of the world, the melancholy, the romantic pessimism, the struggle of the higher and lower selves, the indecision of the doubting, divided self, the renunciation and stoicism, the Hindoo-Greek theosophy, the influence of Goethe, the appeal to the calm and independence of Nature, and, finally, the striving towards the light, culture and self-control,—the whole range of Arnold's youthful development.

But precisely by reason of the huddle and confusion of tendencies, these poems are unsatisfactory as poems or as series,—although some of them succeed singly. Arnold himself expressed this view of his first two volumes (The Strayed Reveller and Empedocles on Etna) in a letter to his elder sister, Mrs Forster: "Fret not yourself to make my poems square in all their parts, but like what you can.... The true reason why parts suit you while others do not is that my poems are fragments,... while you are a whole; the whole effect of my poems is quite vague and indeterminate—this is their weakness; a person therefore who endeavored to make them accord would only lose his labor; and a person who has any inward completeness can at best only like parts of them; in fact such a person stands firmly and knows what he is about while the poems stagger weakly and are at their wit's end..... do not plague yourself to find a consistent meaning..... which in fact they do not possess through my weakness." 1

1 Arnold Whitridge, Unpublished Letters of Matthew Arnold, pp. 18-9.
What is true of Arnold's early poetry as a whole is specially true of the Marguerite poems. They are vague and indeterminate, and have thus lent themselves to various interpretations. From a study of the successive additions, changes of title, grouping and order, of the series Switzerland and Faded Leaves, it can be seen how indeterminate was Arnold's mind respecting them. In spite of this indeterminateness, however, the currents or 'fragments' in these poems can be singled out with comparative certainty, and interpreted in the light of Arnold's youth and of the later development and expression which he gave to the ideas here employed.

During the phase of Pyrrhonism, Arnold and his friends doubted love as they doubted everything else. The doubt originated, like their other doubts, from their excessive ideals, and the absolute contrast between these ideals and those of the world. The friends held in common a high spiritual conception of the dignity and equality of woman, and believed that for true love this was essential. In the world, which called hardness force and lightness wisdom, true love was rare, since the equality and dignity of woman was not recognized; marriage was made subservient to considerations of money or rank, and woman was the victim of passion. Their ideal was the love of the spirit; the world's was the love of the senses.

But they were not wholly repelled by the love of the senses. Their adolescent nature, in such vigorous frames as those of Arnold, Clough or Hughes, was strongly moved by the world and the senses, by passion. They did not regard passion as the whole of love, but they felt that it should have at least some part in it. Their problem was to find precisely what part, and to see that the senses had their demands harmonized with those of the spirit without being allowed to dominate and bring anarchy into the soul.

Pending the solution of this problem, Arnold was therefore, as regards love, in the same state of ambivalence as towards other aspects of life. He oscillated between the two needs, the physical and the spiritual. For neither could he find any satisfaction in the world without or any reconciliation in the spirit within, until reconciliation could be effected, his ideals would remain in conflict with his own nature. He still asks:
Why each is striving, from of old,
To love more deeply than he can?
Still would be true, yet still grows cold? ¹

And, as long as he cannot answer, he is in doubt of
love itself. In the words quoted by Clough,

Il doutait de tout, même de l'amour.²

Even where he feels that he could love truly, and reach
some solution in practice if not in theory, he comes
into conflict with the force of circumstance and destiny,
the 'not-ourselves'. Desire, in such conflict, is again
left empty of object and of satisfaction.

In this dilemma, Arnold and his friends sought
some solution in whatever had been written touching
the problem. They found much in Goethe, especially in
the Gretchen episode in Faust, and in the somewhat
similar situation in Hermann and Dorothea. They found
still more in Sainte-Beuve's Volupté, where the author's
adolescent experience was used to depict a mental
conflict similar to their own. Froude, in The Nemesis
of Faith, used one of the situations from Volupté,
while Arnold's threefold analysis of love in Urania,
Euphrosyne, and Marguerite, bears a rough correspondence
to the three types selected by Sainte-Beuve. It was
in this novel that Arnold seems to have found in its
most clear-cut form, his ruling idea of the opposition
of spiritual to sensual love and to have found analysed,
by a master of analysis, the springs of his own mental
dualism.

Arnold treats first the conflict of fate with our
desires, whether high or low. The not-ourselves, or
fate, it is to be remembered, is whatever is outside
our control. It may be in us or outside: it is not
within our power. It may assist or oppose the course
of love, as chance may decide. But it takes no more heed
of our desires or wishes in love than it does in any
other matter. Under such forms as Fate, Accident,
Death, or Poverty, it may put a sharp end to happiness
in love, or may even prevent happiness from beginning
at all.

¹: Destiny.  ²: Motto to Amours de Voyage.
In Calais Sands, Arnold writes to his future wife out of a situation in which he is himself faced with an obstacle—a financial obstacle—to marriage. "Lady Sandhurst (Arnold's daughter)", according to Mr. Kingsmill's information, "insists that Calais Sands was written to her mother, and adds that her father was too badly off to think of marriage till he got his inspectorship. . . . . She says that he followed them about unknown!"

In Faded Leaves, Arnold imagines a similar situation of desire invincibly obstructed. The lover, he begins by saying, in a poem which expresses his general idea,—the lover has somewhere his affinity, but Fate, in one form or other, may prevent him from finding her.

And some find death ere they find love;
So far apart their lives are thrown
From the twin soul that halves their own.

And sometimes, by still harder fate,
The lovers meet, but meet too late.
— Thy heart is mine !—True, true ! ah, true !
— Then, love, thy hand !—Ah, no! adieu! 

In the poems of this series, the meeting does take place, but too late. The lady, it seems probable, is already married.

'Tis true, indeed, an iron knot
Ties straitly up from mine thy lot;.....

At first, therefore, the lover does not declare his love:

My heart is swollen with love unsaid.

He does, however, make the declaration later. In reply, she speaks to him of "the sure consolations of Time"; but he cannot forget. In any case, she does not love him. He is on his way to the high Alps, and as he floats along the Rhine at nightfall, with his 'deep, habitual smart', his 'agony of grief', his melancholy, he turns for calm to Nature. He turns from the unfavourable aspects of the not-ourselves and from his fruitless conflict with it, to the more favourable aspect—the quiet of the hills,—and applies it to the healing of his turbulent spirit. He apostrophises those hills, once volcanos:

Those blue hills too, this river's flow,
Wore restlessness once, but long ago.
Tam'd is their turbulent youthful glow:
Their joy is in their calm.¹

In the same way other obstacles intervene to interrupt the love of others of Arnold's heroes and heroines. In A Modern Sappho, it is a rival. Religious difference forms the barrier in The Neckan and The Forsaken Merman. In The Church of England death cuts short the happiness of the Duke and his smiling bride. Tristan and Iseult, brought together under the influence of a love-spell, enjoy their love also for a brief moment: they have met too late.

In general, the idea of these aspects of the universal order as they conflict with love and frustrate its fruition, is expressed by Arnold by the term 'a God'. The whole conception might be summed up in his stanza:

Who renders vain their deep desire? —
A God, a God their severance rul'd;
And bade between their shores to be
The unplumb'd, salt, estranging seas.²

The very distinctness of individuals is thus a part of the dividing not-ourselves, conflicting with love by making it difficult truly to know any other person, making us strangers to each other:

And what heart knows another?
Ah! who knows his own?³

Further, not only the obstacles to love, but the very act of falling in love, is determined by forces outside of our control. It is the work of that part of the not-ourselves that is in us, but transcends us—a mysterious power⁴, the Daemon of Goethe or Socrates. The occasion of falling in love, the person chosen, the circumstances, all depend largely on this Daemon. They are due, so far as the human element is concerned, to the forces which Arnold, following Goethe, calls briefly 'affinity'. He believed that everyone has somewhere his 'twin soul', that halves his own. And,—a last barrier—that affinity may fail to be recognised, owing to the worldly conventions that overgrow and conceal the true soul.

4. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 60
Obstacles and the not-ourselves apart, there remains, in Arnold's love-poems, the great problem of love and passion, flesh and spirit. Arnold depicts both types: Urania, or Heavenly Love: and in The New Sirens, Fleshly Love. The Switzerland series marks an intermediate and shifting stage between these two extremes.

In Urania, Arnold presents the conception of spiritual love, or an aspect of it, but rather by contrast with passion than in a positive way.

She is not cold, she is not light;
But our ignoble souls lack might.

Yet she could love, those eyes declare,
Were men but nobler than they are.

She sees through the passion of men, enslaved as they are by their 'current desires',

Our petty souls, our strutting wits,
Our puny labour'd puny passion-fits—

and she scorns them. When she does love, it will be someone

..... of some worthier race than we;

So she suffers. It is the best that such love can do in the world:

.......... Two bleeding hearts
Wounded by men, by Fortune tried,
Outwornied with their lonely parts,
Vow to beat henceforth side by side.

The world to them was stern and drear:
Their lot was but to weep and moan.
Ah, let them keep their faith sincere,
For neither could subsist alone! 1

So, probably to his wife,

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, and beautiful, and new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Not certitude, nor peace, nor help from pain; 2

1. Indifference (Euphrosyne). 2. Dover Beach.
Opposed to Urania is Euphrosyne. She knows nothing of either true or spiritual love. She is a creature of impulse, flitting here and there. She has no bleeding heart, nor the constancy of those wounded and tried by Fortune. She is self-sufficient, with 'unconquer'd joy'. She is not really in love at all, but only expresses her own high spirits.

It was not love that heav'd thy breast,
Fair child! it was the bliss within.

She is one of the

...... souls whom some benignant breath
Has charm'd at birth from gloom and care,
These ask no love—these plight no faith,
For they are happy as they are.

Still more strictly opposed to Urania is the idea of the New Sirens. The Sirens resemble Euphrosyne in wearing the forms of 'pensive Graces'. But they appeal more directly to the emotions and the senses, an appeal to which Arnold was so susceptible:

I, who in your train at morning
Stroll'd and sang with joyful mind, ....

It is the appeal of pleasure and ease, as against the ardours of knowledge and the uncertainty of all human opinion.

"Come", you say, "opinion trembles,
Judgment shifts, convictions go:
Life dries up, the heart dissembles:
Only, what we feel, we know:
Hath your wisdom known emotions?
Will it weep our burning tears?
Hath it drunk of our love-potions
Crowning moments with the weight of years?"

The answer is significant of his doubt and melancholy:

I am dumb. Alas! too soon, all
Man's grave reasons disappear:
He renounces, however, the attractions of the Sirens, calling his poem a Palinode, or recantation. For, even in his doubt, he is confident of several things. He trusts that, although he himself has not yet found an answer to the problem, an answer can be found. To the beguiling of the Sirens he replies:

Yet, I think, at God's tribunal,
Some large answer you shall hear.

He knows that pleasure, however attractive for the moment, does not permanently satisfy. He asks:

Is the pleasure that is tasted
Patient of a long review?
Will the fire joy hath wasted,
Mus'd on, warm the heart anew?

He therefore invites the Sirens to consider the consequences of their life:

But, indeed, this proud possession—
This far-reaching magic chain,
Linking in a mad succession
Fits of joy and fits of pain:
Have you seen it at the closing?
Have you track'd its clouded ways?
Can your eyes, while fools are dozing,
Drop, with mine, edown life's latter days?

Yet, in his melancholy, he cannot find in his heart to reproach them. Is he any better off than they?

....... doth my lot
Find assurance in to-morrow
Of one joy, which you have not?
O! speak once! and let my sadness,
And this sobbing Phrygian strain,
Sham'd and baffled by your gladness,
Blame the music of your feasts in vain.
All these scattered threads,—the contrast and
conflict of love and passion, the appeal of pleasure,
self-sufficiency and dependence in love, the part of
the not-ourselves and Nature,—are drawn together in
the Switzerland series, the Marguerite poems proper.
These poems are a sort of spiritual history of Arnold's
progressive renunciation of the senses for true love,
of the personal for the objective and universal, of the
conventional for the best self.

The scene is laid in Switzerland, at Thun, a town
situated where the Aar issues from the twin-lakes
Brienz and Thum, with the Oberland and Jungfrau in the
background—a scene which Arnold could describe from
personal acquaintance.

The main theme is contained in the first two poems,
To My Friends and The Lake. In the first of these the
hero (who is not to be identified with Arnold except
in his psychological experience) takes leave of Marguerite,
who is described. She says that by the following year
she will have forgotten him. He reflects that he may
also have forgotten her. This had evidently happened
to both before, so much are they under the dominion of
impulse and Time.

Marguerite says: "As last year went,
So the coming year'll be spent:
Some day next year, I shall be,
Entering heedless, kiss'd by thee."

and again:

Many a broken promise then
Was new made—to break again.

Other impulses and current desires distract their interests,
and forgetfulness sets in.

What, my Friends, these feeble lines
Shew, you say, my love declines?
To paint ill, as I have done,
Proves forgetfulness begun?
Time's gay minions, pleas'd you see,
Time, your master, governs me.

Ah! too true. Time's current strong
Leaves us true to nothing long.

The last poem of the *Switzerland* series drives home the same conclusion.


In the same poem (*Absence*) he regards the inability to rise above the passions, impulses, and current desires and events of the passing day, as the curse of life:

_This is the curse of life, that not_
_Al nobler, calmer train_
_Of wiser thoughts and feelings blot_
_Our passions from our brain;_

_But each day brings its petty dust_
_Our soon-chok'd soul to fill;_
_And we forget because we must,_
_And not because we will._

_It is in the attempt to overcome this servitude to impulse that_
_I bade my heart more constant be;_¹

_While he endeavours to rise, however, Marguerite remains a creature of impulse_

_..... unalter'd with the year._

_Her character has already been described in To My Friends; eager, impetuous, tender, kind, frank, mocking, arch, graceful, blue-eyed and smiling, with 'unconquer'd joy'. She bears some resemblance to the girl described in Indifference and to the Heroine of Mrs Humphry Ward's The Marriage of William Ashe—a French type. One might almost describe her, in a variation of Arnold's own phrase on the average Frenchman, as 'la femme sensuelle moyenne'. Her superficial, current self, a mixture of convention, impulse, pride, guile, and passion, follows the world's demands in thinking lightness force—and wisdom and hardness force. For she is 'light', the direct opposite of Urania._

_To the lips, ah! of others,
Those lips have been prest,
And others, ere I was,
Were clasp'd to that breast._²

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1. To Marguerite. 2. Parting.
Goethe describes the same character in Lilli 1 with her volatile nature, her former lovers, her childlike acceptance of the world's ways. "It was so natural to her gratefully to satisfy everyone." Goethe also describes a similar character in the 'arch' (Carlyle's word) Philina, in Wilhelm Meister.

But with the hero of these poems it is different. He had in him a good deal of the same nature as Marguerite. But during the previous year, apparently the previous two or three years, he has—and this is Arnold's own experience—been passing through a stage of metamorphosis, of conflict between his new-born desires or impulses and his higher ideals, his more unworldly self. He is striving to renounce passion for a truer conception of love, which shall include passion but shall not be dominated by it. He must free himself from

...... passions, and the state
Of struggle these necessitate. 3

In the meantime, however, the strife of the two tendencies in him, of flesh and spirit, is not completely over:

I struggle towards the light; and ye,
Once long'd for storms of love!
If with the light ye cannot be,
I bear that ye remove. 4

To gain such a height, where no personal desires or current events can dominate, and where he can attain to real independence and so to real love, he must return to solitude, to isolation. "And thou," he says to himself,

...... thou lonely heart,
Which never yet without remorse
Even for a moment did'st depart
From thy remote and sphered course
To haunt the place where passions reign,
Back to thy solitude again! 5

The same theme has already occurred in Faded Leaves. In The New Sirens, Nature and the health and solitude of Nature are also opposed to the ideal of pleasure:

1: Wahrheit und Dichtung. Goethe, Werke; vol. 22.
4: Absence. 5: To Marguerite.
But I hear the north wind blowing;  
And I feel the cold night-air.  
Can I look on your sweet faces  
And your proud heads backward thrown,  
From this dusk of leaf-strewn places  
With the dumb woods and the night alone?

For solitude, or 'living alone', as Stanton explains in a discussion of the word in W. D. Arnold's novel, Oakfield, means "to live really; the inward, spiritual, true life"; it implies the governing of one's own spiritual life, instead of being governed by anything external, like current events or pleasures, and living in spiritual anarchy. Nature lives in this way, alone, yet following the law of her own inner being. The commandment for man, then, is:

Live by thy light, and Earth will live by hers.

So here Arnold appeals to Nature, alone like himself, or his hero, and impersonal, objective and calm, as it is his aim to become:

Or if not quite alone, yet they  
Which touch thee are unmelting things—  
Ocean, and Clouds, and Night, and Day;  
Lorn Autumns and triumphant Springs;

Leaving Marguerite, he calls to Nature:

Fold closely, O Nature!  
Thine arms round thy child.

To thee only God granted  
A heart ever new;  
To all always open;  
To all always true.

Ah, calm me, restore me!

He is sure enough of himself and clear enough as to his ideal, to be now able to assert its superiority over the lower ideal of passion with which he had, in great part, approached Marguerite. The lower is still strong:

Again I spring to make my choice.

3. To Marguerite.  4. Parting.  5. The Lake.
But the higher is gaining ground:

Again in tones of ire
I hear a God's tremendous voice—
"Be counselling and retire!"

His conscience, the God within him, representing the nobler part of his nature, asserts itself with more and more success. He may protest:

Ah, warn some more ambitious heart,
And let the peaceful be!

but he recognises the justice of the warning, and retires. The rest of the Switzerland series is the history of the retir.

The first result of the change in him, the approaching victory of his better nature, is an increasing alienation from Marguerite;

Far, far from each other
Our spirits have grown.

To her the change is disconcerting. Her lover's mind has lost its previous unity. He has no longer the energy and will of the single-minded. His melancholia—

for his state of mind is Arnold's own—has left him with an 'unstrung will'. Neither is he master of his emotions.

I too have felt the load I bore
In a too strong emotion's sway:
I too have wish'd, no woman more,
This starting, feverish heart, away:

I too have long'd for trenchant force
And will like a dividing spear:
Have prais'd the keen, unscrupulous course,
Which knows no doubt, which feels no fear.

Yet she still looks to him for strength and stability, as women do:

And women—things that live and move
Min'd by the fever of the soul—
They seek to find in those they love
Stern strength, and promise of control.

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1. The Lake.  2. Ibid.  3. Parting.  4. A Farewell.
They ask not kindness, gentle ways;
These they themselves have tried and known:
They ask a soul that never sways
With the blind gusts which shake their own.

Marguerite, therefore, soon becomes languid:

Thy hand lay languidly in mine—
Thy cheek was grave, thy speech grew rare.1

The pity of it is that, in her real nature, she is
his affinity. He calls her 'my sister'.

And we, whose ways were unlike here,
May then more neighbouring courses ply;
May to each other be brought near
And greet across infinity.3

As it is, in the world,

We school our manners, act our parts;
But He, who sees us through and through,
Knows that the bent of both our hearts
Was to be gentle, tranquil, true.4

To learn her true nature, as he is learning his, to
learn what true love is, and how false are her ideas
borrowed from the world, she will require the teaching
of experience:

But in the world I learnt, what there
Thou too wilt surely one day prove,
That will, that energy, though rare,
Are yet far, far less rare than love.

Go then! till Time and Fate impress
This truth on thee, be mine no more!
They will: for thou, I feel, no less
Than I, wert destined to this lore.5

On his side, also, there is reason for parting. He
now sees—now that he can contrast love with passion—the
justice of the warning given by his conscience. The
warning is confirmed in A Dream, as if his unconscious
or buried self were reiterating the command already
given in The Lake. The hero and his friend, Martin,
sailing down a 'green, Alpine stream', sweep past a
plank-built cottage. On the balcony appear the forms
of Olivia and Marguerite. They wave a greeting for a
moment and then the 'darting River of Life, loud
thundering, bore us by'. There follows Parting, in

1. A Farewell. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid.
which the voice of Marguerite is heard, but without her appearance. This poem develops the reasons for the necessity of retiring. The hero then says farewell, returns her copy of the romantic 'Letters of Ortis', and ends in Absence. Ends, but not altogether. The powers of destiny have perhaps not finished with Marguerite. To round off, Arnold added a last poem, The Terrace at Berne. His hero has lost all touch with Marguerite, lost indeed all trace of her. But he indulges various conjectures as to her fortunes. Is she still there, at Thun, or is she dead, or altered, or has she returned to her native France?

The last of these suggestions is accompanied by the idea of Marguerite, the creature of impulse and the world's demands, meeting the fate which often befalls such—prostitution.

Or hast thou long since wander'd back, 
Daughter of France! to France, thy home, 
And flitted down the flowery track 
Where feet like thine too lightly come?

Doth riotous laughter now replace
Thy smile, and rouge, with stony glare
Thy cheek's soft hue, and fluttering lace
The kerchief that enwound thy hair?

This is the final possibility for Marguerite that had made him retire. Had he not retired, he would have been responsible—probably—for driving her to such a course.

The idea of the connection between physical passion and prostitution is common to Arnold and his friends. It comes from Goethe. After the seduction of Gretchen by Faust, her brother Valentine says to her:

Du fingst mit Einem heimlich an,
Bald kommen ihrer mehre dran,
Und wenn dich erst ein Duzend hat,
So hat dich auch die ganze Stadt.

In Tom Brown at Oxford (by Thomas Hughes) Hardy's warning to Tom on his proposed outing with Patty, the barmaid, is a sufficient illustration of this idea. Clough is also very definite. In The Bothie of Tober-na-Vuolich, Philip, placed in contact with Katie, the daughter of the farmer of Rannoch, suddenly realizes whether he is drifting. He abruptly leaves the farm, haunted by a vision:

Still in my dreams I am pacing the streets of the
dissolute city
Where dressy girls slithering by upon pavements give
sign for accosting,

He continues, in explanation, beginning with Goethe’s
own words from Hermann und Dorothea:

I now first see how it happens,
Feel how tender and soft is the heart of a girl; how
passive
Fain would it be, how helpless; and helplessness leads to
destruction.
Maiden reserve torn from off it, grows never again to
reclote it,
Modesty broken through once to immodesty flies for
protection.
Oh, who saws through the trunk, though he leave the
tree up in the forest,
When the next wind casts it down,—is his not the
hand that smote it?

Arnold, in Switzerland, saw his hero in exactly
the same light. As the first to ‘saw through the
trunk’, he would be responsible for the destruction
of Marguerite; he was, like Philip, warned in time,
took the warning, and the eventuality, though it may
now have happened through the agency of another, can
no longer be laid to his charge.

So Arnold, like his hero, ‘struggled towards the
light’. These poems are simply his counterpart to
Wilhelm Meister’s renunciation of passion: “Each
transitory impulse I will study to withstand, and
even the most earnest I will keep within my bosom;
no woman shall receive an acknowledgment of love from
my lips, to whom I cannot consecrate my life!”

Through renunciation, out of melancholy, arises a
new man, stripped of old illusions, deprived of
somewhat of the old joyousness and vivacity, but
nobler, more at one with life, more complete. He is
nobler because he is rid at the same time of the old
intellectual doubts and victorious over the thraldom
of the flesh and the senses.

For cold is his eye to mere beauty, who, breaking
The strong band which beauty around him hath furl’d,
Disenchanted by habit, and newly awaking,
Looks languidly round on a gloom-buried world.

1. Carlyle’s translation: Works (1857-8), vol. 15, p. 228;
But deeper their voice grows, and nobler their bearing,
Whose youth in the fires of anguish hath died. 1

The conclusion of A Modern Sappho, in which the heroine waits till her lover's passion for another is thus disillusioned, and till he rises above it to real love, completes the idea:

Haest thou with myrtle-leaf crown'd him, O Pleasure?
Crown, crown him quickly, and leave him for me.

For her lover, she says to herself,
As he drifts to fatigue, discontent, and dejection,
Will be brought, thou poor heart! how much nearer to thee!

Deliverance, then, is at hand. Arnold's favourite symbol for the process and the hope of its completion is that of sunrise. In The New Sirens:

In the pines the thrush is waking—
Lo, yon orient hill in flames:

—Shall I seek, that I may scorn her,
Her I lov'd at eventide?
Shall I ask, what faded mourner
Stands at daybreak, weeping by my side?....

Pluck, pluck cypress, O pale maidens!
Dusk the hall with yew!

And in Obermann Once More, on the renunciation of melancholy and Obermann's outlook:

And glorious there, without a sound,
Across the glimmering lake,
High in the Valais depth profound,
I saw the morning break.

Arnold must go on, then, like his hero, to 'rescue his life from the cold to the passing moment and to his bodily senses, to ennoble it, to make it eternal'.

Marguerite, as in Faust, represents a stage in this rescue, for her lover had loved her truly, so far as he could. It was a love mixed with much clay, but still love, and held prospect of being ennobled had Marguerite, his true affinity, been able to rise to it above her sensual nature and the conventions of her French world. In the same way, Arnold went on fighting against the tyranny of the flesh and the senses, and yet fashioning an ideal of love that should give them their due place.

The one thing needful, then, Arnold found to be culture, which alone is able to unite the real and the ideal. The Marguerite poems mark the limitation of love and the synthesis of its real and ideal, or its physical and spiritual aspects. They show Arnold as entertaining no longer a romantic, but a classical or cultural conception of love, and thus as free, or in process of becoming free, from the dualism of his earlier outlook. He had realized that the cure for the romantic attitude in love is limitation, as he had already found it to be for romantic self-assertion. He had now the solution of the practical problems raised by the romantic outlook in the spheres of the two chief human instincts,—the instinct of reproduction, and the instinct of self-preservation. If unrestrained and unlimited, the instinct of self-preservation leads to rebellion and negation, the instinct of reproduction to prostitution. Harnessed and guided by culture and the classical spirit, the same instincts lead, the one to charity and benevolence, the other to chastity and purity. Religion represents the conquest by culture of the one, marriage of the other. Arnold married in 1851, and about the same time his religious views began to clear and his practice to gain in decision. The limitation of the crude instincts of the flesh on the one hand, and on the other of the soaring idealism of the spirit, found in religion and marriage a reconciliation and a cure for their opposing ills. His cure now in essentials complete, Arnold was safely on his way 'towards the light'.
13. Independence and Flexibility.
that is the sin of dependence." 1 For this type of independence, which is not isolation or 'hermitising', Stanton uses Keble's phrase, 'to live alone', that is, 'to live really; the inward, spiritual, true life.' 2

So long as this independence of the inward, true self is preserved, a great deal of outward traffic with the world is permissible. Outward conformity with much of the world's practice is both desirable and necessary. For, to bring the world along the path of culture, to fight whatever makes against culture in the world, it is necessary to know the world's ways, and to use the world's own weapons. This is the attitude, essentially, of Clough's Dipsychus:

.... How much soe'er I might submit, it must be to rebel;

Dipsychus compares himself to Samson in the hands of the Philistines, planning their destruction, as Arnold planned the discomfiture (and salvation) of their English counterparts:

And am not I, though I but ill recall
My happier age, a kidnapped child of Heaven,
Whom these uncircumcised Philistines
Have by foul play shorn, blinded, maimed, and kept
For what more glorious than to make them sport?
Wait, then, wait, O my soul! grow, grow, ye locks,
Then perish they, and if need be, I too.

In thus submitting to the world, the 'kidnapped child of Heaven' runs the risk of losing his own ideals and of succumbing to the temptations of the world. He must therefore be doubly on his guard: he must make the strength of the world an additional argument to whet his purpose: he must reply to the world, boasting of her strength:

"Are wills so weak? then let not mine wait long.
Hast thou so rare a poison? let me be
Keener to slay thee, lest thou poison me." 3

The difficulty was to carry this idea into practice. How was Arnold to stand apart from the world as a spectator and at the same time to impel it towards culture? The answer given by Arnold and many of his friends was that literature and the literary life alone fulfilled the conditions. "... in these days..." says Oakfield, "... his is a true spirit—wisdom who keeps apart, and listens, and observes, and thinks, and when he finds a season, speaks a rare word or two. That, in short, the literary man .... is about the best off of all others. 

W. D. Arnold, Oakfield, I. 215 seq. 2Tbid.

Sonnets: The World's Triumphs.
courses of action so clogged and blocked up with meanness, and worldliness, and Mammon, that the service of God is well nigh choked out of them...." Literature therefore became Arnold's vantage point. As poet and critic, he escaped from the 'iron round' of current events and practical life, while maintaining contact with the true course of things and working towards culture.

Poetry and literature, however, are not guaranteed to keep a man alive. Arnold had to find some bread-and-butter position, entailing a minimum of outside, practical interference, and compatible with the pursuit of literature. He found it, like Clough and two of his own brothers, in the Inspectorate. It had the additional recommendation that it might serve as a further point of attack on the actual world and as another line of advance for culture.

The champion of Culture requires two complementary qualifications for his task: he requires a definite scheme of what constitutes culture in the various spheres of activity in society; and he requires flexibility, the power to pass with ease from one point of that scheme to another as need arises. The scheme must be founded in experience and based on the real nature and needs of man, as expressed in his history and institutions. It must be wide enough to cover all the essential departments of human activity. But it must yet be flexible enough to be applicable to the condition of man and society at any stage in their development, to any particular occasion and circumstances. It must be available for advance along whatever line is at the moment necessary; it must also be prepared for the defence and consolidation of the conquests that the human spirit has already won.

In spite of vacillation and incomplete conversion, Arnold's position was even at this time (1856) clear enough in outline for him to have such a scheme of human nature and its culture. "At that age (34)," he says of Bishop Butler, "a man is, I think, more likely to attempt a highly systematic, intricate theory of human nature and morals, than he is afterwards. And if he does attempt it, it cannot well be satisfactory. The man is hardly ripe for it, he has not had enough experience. So, at least, one is disposed to say, as one regards the thing from the point of view of a more mature age oneself." Arnold's early scheme, though perhaps too highly systematic and intricate, certainly contained the basic ideas on which he founded his life-work, and was clear and definite enough to guide his activity even from its public beginning in 1849.\footnote{W. D. Arnold, Oakfield, II. 280. \footnote{Last Essays on Church and Religion, p. 121.}}
His later scheme was less systematic, more approximate. He found that culture and rigorous system did not go together. There must be room for free play and adjustment. Enumerating the 'powers' which go to the perfection of human life, as those of conduct, knowledge, art and manners, he adds, "this scheme, though drawn in rough and plain lines enough, and not pretending to scientific exactness, does yet give a fairly true representation of the matter." 1 Opposed to this approximate method of culture is the rigour of philosophical, scientific, and religious systems, to which culture is antipathetic. "Culture is always assigning to system-makers and systems a smaller share in the bent of human destiny than their friends like." 2 Culture reads and considers, and passes on. "Culture tends always thus to deal with the men of a system, of disciples, of a school; with men like Comte, or the late Mr. Buckle, or Mr. Mill. However much it may find to admire in these personages, or in some of them, it nevertheless remembers the text: 'Be not ye called Rabbi!' and it soon passes on from any Rabbi. ... culture,—eternally passing onwards and seeking,..." 3

The approximate and inclusive character of the scheme of culture allows for flexibility. It allowed Arnold a variety of points of attack and defence in his war on its behalf,—"that variety of activity which is, in my opinion, necessary for producing a fruitful effect in a country like this." 4 "Sometimes, no doubt," he says elsewhere, "turning oneself one way after another, one must make unsuccessful and unwise hits, and one may fail after all; but try I must, and I know that it is only by facing in every direction that one can win the day." 5 With the same flexibility, he adapted himself to circumstances and opportunity, so long as he could serve culture. "I understand," he wrote to his mother, "what you feel about my graver and gayer manner, but there is a necessity in these things, and one cannot always work precisely as one would. To be able to work anyhow for what one wishes—.... is a blessing to be thankfully accepted." 6

This is the explanation of much that is at first bewildering and confusing in Arnold's life-work, regarded as a whole,—its apparently inconsequent variety, his apparent abandonment of poetry, his incursions into theology and politics, his apparently conflicting, because occasional and fragmentary, judgements, his apparent inconsistencies. In reality, no author ever more carefully planned his work round one central purpose, or was more consistent in his fundamental ideas throughout his whole career. The very width of his interests and the very organic inter-relation of his ideas have tended to obscure their true nature and intention.

1Discourses in America, pp. 101-2. 2Culture and Anarchy, p. 27. 3Ibid., p. 99. 4Letters, I. 361. 5Ibid., I. 310. 6Ibid., I. 335-6
To advance the culture of England, and especially of the English middle class, Arnold used all the various methods at his command,—direct criticism of English middle class life, literature, and religion; efforts to establish compulsory State-education for its children; the clearing its religion of non-essentials and the defence of the essentials when threatened; the bringing of foreign ideas to enlarge its provincial outlook; the arousing of its interest in art; and the improvement of its understanding of Ireland. In his famous Preface to the Poems of 1853, he took an opportunity of opening his attack. He there criticized, among other things, Shakespeare as a literary model, and English methods of literary criticism, while at the same time laying down sound directions for the guidance of English poetry. In Merope (1858), he tried to bring England into touch with the Greek spirit. In 1859, taking advantage of the Italian rising of, he entered the sphere of political controversy, with England and the Italian Question. His three lectures On Translating Homer continued the work of Merope, and again attacked English critical methods and English contemporary literature, particularly as represented by Ruskin and Macaulay. In the same year he published The Popular Education of France, which brought the experience of France (with Holland and Switzerland) to bear on English education, and began his long crusade for the culture of the English middle classes through a national education. This line he continued at intervals, with A French Eton (1864), Higher Schools and Universities on the Continent (1868), and a Special Report on Elementary Education Abroad (1868). In Essays in Criticism (1865), and On The Study of Celtic Literature (1867), he attempted further to modify and broaden English ideas by bringing to bear on them the views and outlook of foreign literatures.

About 1867, the end of his Oxford Professorship, there seems to come a definite break in Arnold's course. With the publication of New Poems in that year, he practically abandoned poetry. For the first time he directly entered the arena of social and political criticism and controversy. In the religious field he produced four main works, St. Paul and Protestantism (1870), Literature and Dogma (1871), God and the Bible (1873), and Last Essays on Church and Religion (1877). Then, having said his say, he abandoned this field.
The reason for this apparently sudden divergence from poetry and literary criticism into religion and social criticism has been disputed. Professor Knickerbocker^{1} sees in it a desire on Arnold's part to complete his father's work in these spheres,—work interrupted by an early death. His son was now approaching the age (47) at which Dr. Arnold had died.

Mr. Kingsmill^{2} goes a step farther and sees here the decisive point in the degeneration of a poet into a prophet, the common lot, he thinks, of so many Victorians. The cause of Arnold's degeneration he takes to be the dead hand of his father, reaching out and constraining him from the grave, as it had previously done, according to Mr. Kingsmill, in the alleged love-affair with Marguerite. The true reason, here imperfectly grasped, for the change, is that now, and only now, did Arnold's thought on religion become clear to himself. The connection in his mind between his father's work and his own is therefore—not the completion of that work, nor a father-complex—but the contrast between his father's social and religious thought and his own. This contrast does not lie in the thought itself, but in the process by which it was acquired and developed. It is the contrast between Dr. Arnold's whole mind and his own divided mind: Dr. Arnold's ripeness, his own unripeness. With a single mind, unhampered by doubt, Dr. Arnold had been able to devote his whole energies to saving others. His son, with divided mind, fluctuating and melancholy, had much ado to save himself, to prepare himself for saving others, as, with his father's philanthropic unworldliness, he wished to do. He had already expressed this idea in a letter to his mother, and in Rugby Chapel, 1857. He and those who set out with him on the climb of life, admit:

..... We bring
Only ourselves: we lost
Sight of the rest in the storm.
Hardly ourselves we fought through,
Strip'd, without friends, as we are.

With Dr. Arnold it was not so:

But thou would'st not alone
Be saved, my father! ..... Still thou turnedst, and still
Beckonedst the trembler, and still
Gavest the weary thy hand!

^{2}Matthew Arnold. 1928. ^3Letters, I. 42.
Therefore to thee it was given
Many to save with thyself;
And, at the end of the day,
O faithful shepherd! to come,
Bringing thy sheep in thy hand.

In 1867-8, Arnold was only just achieving the settlement of his ideas, at an age when his father had long ripened his, at an age when his father had been cut off from expressing them further. He knew that he was liable to be cut short in his own work by the angina pectoris which had been fatal to his father and grandfather. What if he should be so cut short just when his mind was reaching clearness and unity, just when his effective work was about to begin? "Now," he wrote in 1868, "I am within one year of papa's age when he ended his life; and how much he seems to have put into it, and to what ripeness of character he had attained! Everything has seemed to come together to make this year the beginning of a new time to me; the gradual settlement of my own thought, little Basil's death, and then my dear, dear Tommy's ... All these things point to a new beginning, yet it may well be that I am near my end, as papa was at my age, but without papa's ripeness, and that there will be little time to carry far the new beginning. But there is all the more reason for carrying it as far as one can, and as earnestly as one can, while one lives." ¹

In addition, Arnold was, in the religious work of these years, simply changing his ground with the changing age, defending a position which now began to be seriously threatened. Science and rationalism together had shaken the faith of many. The moment seemed ripe for Arnold, with his popular style, his aloofness from practice, either of church or state, his acknowledged literary position, his gift for controversy, and his now settled thought, to apply his lifelong study of religion to the saving of the fundamental truths of Christianity, to the defence of religion as a culture-conquest. Besides, he found this easier, in his circumstances, than to go on writing poetry, as he had intended. "He once told me," says F. W. H. Myers, "that his official work, though it did not check his prose-writing, checked his poetry; ..." ²

¹ Letters, I. 401. ² Fortnightly Review, May, 1888. (Vol. 49, p. 724.)
The same period (1867-77), saw the publication of various essays in social criticism, of which the chief are Culture and Anarchy and Friendship's Garland.

The last dozen years of his life were filled chiefly by his contributions to the solution of the Irish Question,—direct essays on Ireland, a selected edition of Burke's writings on Ireland, and discussions with his brother-in-law, W. E. Forster, Secretary for Ireland (1880-2) under Gladstone. At intervals, also, he published occasional essays, such as The French Play in London, which aimed at reviving among the middle classes the love of art and the theatre which, as Puritans, they had long forsaken. He continued, too, his effort to disseminate culture by making known the best that had been thought and said in the world, partly by further literary essays, collected in Essays in Criticism, Second Series, and partly by his selected editions of Wordsworth and Byron.
PART II.

INPAS.
14. MAN AND THE WORLD.
Arnold, then, replaced the dualism of mediaeval Christianity by the unity of the Greek idea of culture. In this he was following the main trend of modern thought away from the unlimited and the infinite towards the finite and the fragmentary. He abandoned the absolute for the relative. He discounted the time-honoured claims—the cause of so much doubt and melancholy—to absolute truth, absolute reality, absolute happiness. Man knows too little, he found, his will is too weak, his powers are too small and too fallible, to justify such claims. He must for the future be content with a second-best, with moderate desires, fragments of truth and reality, partial achievements in morality.

Man's finite mind never attains to the whole of reality:

Wither and thither spins
The wind-borne mirroring soul,
A thousand glimpses wins,
And never sees a whole;¹

and again:

Man's measures cannot span the illimitable All;²

Human truth is likewise relative. "Our truth on these matters," says Arnold of religious questions, "and likewise the error of others, is something so relative, that the good or harm likely to be done by speaking ought always to be taken into account. ... The man who believes that his truth on religious matters is so absolutely the truth, that say it when, and where, and to whom he will, he cannot but do good with it, is in our day almost always a man whose truth is half blunder, and wholly useless."³ Truth is therefore relative, not only in itself, but also in its application: "there is a time, as the Preacher says, to speak, and a time to keep silence."⁴ It is relative to the sphere of human activity to which it refers: "there is," for example, "truth of science and truth of religion: truth of science does not become truth of religion until it is made to harmonize with it."⁵ The same relativity applies to morality. In all these matters man can attain only a relative, not an absolute, end. "The less and more in ourselves of whatever we account good, gives us a notion of what we call perfection in it. We

¹Empedocles on Etna. ²Ibid. ³Literature and Dogma. Preface. ⁴Ibid. ⁵Dr. Stanley's Lectures on the Jewish Church. ⁶Macmillan's Magazine, Feb. 1863.
have degrees of pleasure, and we talk of perfect, infinite pleasure; we have some rest, we talk of perfect, infinite rest;... What we mean is, a great deal of pleasure, rest, knowledge, power; as much of them as we can imagine, and without the many lets and hindrances to them which we now experience. Our idea of a perfect being, all-knowing, all-powerful, is just like that idea of a myriagon, of which Descartes himself speaks somewhere. ... it is not a clear idea, it is an idea of something very big, but confused. Such is our idea of an infinite substance, all-knowing, all-powerful." Our partial opinions themselves are altered, even without our consciousness of the change, by experience and the Zeitgeist.

Born into life—in vain,
Opinions, those or these,
Unaltered to retain
The obstinate mind decrees;
Experience, like a sea, soaks all-effacing in.

Human experience is the only ground of our knowledge of reality. Experience, as it widens, inevitably dissolves such ideas as are not in consonance with it. It shows, for example, that "Miracles do not happen." It puts aside the popular idea of immortality—we have no experience of a soul existing apart from a body. And it shows that our knowledge and our morality are not absolute, but relative.

But, while attaching primary importance to the finite and the relative in his view of the world, Arnold still preserved something of the absolute or pantheist attitude. He was conscious, outside the fragments of reality of which we have definite and determinate knowledge, of the great stretch of the unknown, the unexplored. He found it useful, even necessary, while awaiting the course of further exploration and determination, to postulate certain general truths concerning reality as a whole. But it was reality conceived, not as a vague and illimitable All, but as something limited and to be reached by definite, limited advances. Moreover, he kept this conception in the background of his work and thought, as a kind of framework to be completed, while concentrating meanwhile on the limited, determinate steps to be made towards it. He thus sums up, in a letter, his ideas concerning this element, unknown and beyond our conscious control, the element which he calls, after Goethe, the Daemonic, "I think, as Goethe thought, that the right thing is, while conscious of this element, and of all that there is inexplicable round one, to keep pushing on one's posts into the darkness, and to establish no post that is not perfectly in light and firm."

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God and the Bible. II. 5. 2Empedocles on Etna. Letters, I. 249.
This Daemonic element is present both in man and in the world outside him; it is "both in us and around us": it "underlies and encompasses our life". In us, it is "the Muse, the inspiration, the God". It is, as he calls it, the "inward spring, which seems more and more to gain strength, and to promise to resist outward shocks. ... But of this inward spring one must not talk, for it does not like being talked about, and threatens to depart if one will not leave it in mystery."

The spirit bloweth and is still,
In mystery our soul abides:

Outside, the same element appears as the Anima mundi, with which the soul, the inward daemon, is in accord.

What are we all but a mood,
A single mood, of the life
Of the Being in whom we exist,
Who alone is all things in one.

Spirit who fillest us all!
Spirit, who utterest in each
New-come son of mankind
Such of thy thoughts as thou wilt!

Arnold asks to be granted, on his death-bed, a last sight of the world, so that he may feel at one with this spirit:

There let me gaze, till I become
In soul, with what I gaze on, wed!
To feel the universe my home;
To have before my mind—......

The pure eternal course of life,......

Thus feeling, gazing, let me grow
Comps'd, refresh'd, ennobled, clear;
Then willing let my spirit go
To work or wait elsewhere or here!

The soul of the world appears under various finite forms, each in accord with, and supporting, some aspect of man's true self. Reality is thus many-sided. There is, for instance, the "law of intellectual beauty, the eternal not-ourselves that makes for intellectual beauty." This objective law coincides with the law in the self, by which it is satisfied when it makes for intellectual beauty. There is a law which makes for truth. The self is in harmony with the nature of things.
when it follows truth, and therefore finds satisfaction in that pursuit. Arnold might have added that there is a law of social life and manners, an eternal not-ourselves that makes for manners and social life. The same is true, of course, of morality, and of religion, which is 'morality tinged with emotion'. There is a law in the soul by which it can only realize itself and be happy when obeying this moral law. The moral law, like the others, is largely daemonic, beyond our conscious control. The moral order, of which this law is the expression in the soul "stretches around and beyond the strictly moral element in us, around and beyond the finite sphere of what is originated, measured, and controlled by our understanding and will."²

"By this element we are receptive and influenced, not originate and influencing;... So we get the thought of an impulsion outside ourselves which is at once awful and beneficent."² This element transcends the conscious "expectations and calculations" of "our personal agencies of reason and conscience". The ordinary moral action of reason and conscience, "the voluntary, rational, and human world, of righteousness, moral choice and effort"³ requires this other daemonic element for its supplement. For this element is a sense of the universal moral order, "the necessary, mystical, and divine world, of influence, sympathy, emotion...," "with which we are then in harmony. For, outside of ourselves, likewise, there is "a rule of conduct not of our own making, into which we are born, and which exists whether we will or no;"⁴ "To follow that central clue in our moral being which unites us to the universal order, is no easy task; and here again we are on the most sure ground of experience and psychology."⁵ Again, "On our following the clue of moral order, or losing it, depends our happiness or misery; our life or death in the true sense of those words; our harmony with the universal order or our disharmony with it; our partaking, as St. Paul says, of the wrath of God or of the glory of God."⁶ For this law, in us and in the world, may be called God; whom Arnold usually describes as the "stream of tendency, not-ourselves, which makes for righteousness". There are, therefore, two aspects of God, "God in conscience, the righteous judge", and "God in the world, the eternal and divine power from which all life and wholesome energy proceed".

Experience proves that to follow this law is necessary to happiness; "The constitution and history of things show us that happiness, at which we all aim, is dependent on righteousness"⁷. This applies to nations as well as to individuals. "States are saved by their righteous remnant", as individuals are by their personal righteousness. Other

things being equal, the just prosper, because they are at one with the nature of things.

But other things are not always equal. There are aspects of Nature which do not support morality or truth or any faculty of the soul, and which hamper or defeat human effort. Arnold recognized this in one of his earliest poems, Mycenyus. There, he treated the question with a yet uncertain hand. In Empedocles, however, he had quite fixed his attitude: he recognized the limits set by Nature to human action and desire.

We mortals are no kings
For each of whom to sway
A new-made world upsprings
Meant merely for his play:
No, we are strangers here; the world is from of old.

In vain our pent wills fret,
And would the world subdue.
Limits we did not set
Condition all we do;
Born into life we are, and life must be our mould.

The world

Is on all sides o'ershadowed by the high
Uno'erleap'd Mountains of Necessity,
Sparing us narrower margin than we deem.¹

Fifteen years later, in 1867, Arnold enlarged the province of Necessity and the not-ourselves to include the forces of heredity, and inserted the stanza:

Born into life—man grows
Forth from his parents' stem,
And blends their bloods, as those
Of theirs are bint in them;
So each new man strikes root into a far fore-time.²

Arnold also recognized, in Empedocles, that aspect of Nature which not only conditions and limits, but is definitely mimical to human effort, which knows nothing of justice or morality.

Streams will not curb their pride
The just man not to entomb,
Nor lightnings go aside
To leave his virtue's room;
Nor is the wind less rough that blows a good man's barge.

¹Sonnet: To a Republican Friend. Continued. ²Empedocles on Etna.
Nature with equal mind,
Sees all her sons at play,
Sees man control the wind,
The wind sweep man away;
Allows the proudly riding and the foundered bark.

Yet, Arnold maintained, in spite of these forces and their action, Nature remains on the side of justice and morality.

Not time, not lightning,
Not rain, not thunder,
Efface the endless
Decrees of Heaven—
Make Justice alter,
Revoke, assuage her sentence,
Which dooms dread ends to dreadful deeds,
And violent deaths to violent men.1

The two aspects of Nature, however, the moral and the non-moral, often clash. Rain and lightning, although unable to modify justice or the 'decrees of Heaven', are often strong enough to annul their operation. For, in this point of view,

Nature and man can never be fast friends.2

Confining himself to this non-moral side of Nature, Arnold goes on to develop the contrast:

Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more,
And in that more lies all his hope of good.
Nature is cruel; man is sick of blood:
Nature is stubborn; man would fain adore:
Nature is fickle; man hath need of rest:
Nature forgives no debt, and fears no grave:
Man would be mild, and with safe conscience blest.
Man must begin, know this, where Nature ends;

Besides the forces of Nature, there are other elements in the not-ourselves which are hostile to man. There is, for example, "the blind power which we call Fortune"3; and there are "the ill-deeds of other men", which often make "our life dark".4

This uncertain or hostile element in Nature and the not-self plays a very large part in modern life, as Arnold recognized. ".... in the new, real, immense, post-pagan world,—in the barbarian world,—the shock of accident is unceasing, the serenity of existence is perpetually troubled, not even a Greek like Heine can get across the mortal stage without calamity."5 The world, Merope. 6To an Independent Preacher. 7Essays in Criticism, II. Keats, p. 118. *Emped. on Etne. 8E. in Crit.,
Pagan and Mediaeval Christian Sentiment.
he says again,

Wath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.1

This Arnold took to be the real view—not an expression
of pessimism or of a mood of melancholy. He quotes
frequently the sentence of Goethe to Schiller in the
same sense: "From Homer and Polygnotus I every day learn
more clearly that in our life here above ground we have,
properly speaking, to enact Hell."2 As in contrast with
this open-eyed outlook, Arnold condemned Ruskin's
"tender pantheism"3; the modern sentimentality that he
applied to nature and Homer. For the mass of mankind,
Arnold realized, life is full of hardship.4

The complaining millions of men
Darken in labour and pain;5

They are in contact with unfavourable aspects of the
world, aspects which they do not fully understand, and
which, therefore, they cannot control.

Against this aspect of the world man can only
brace himself to bear as best he can. The true self,
like the Stoic, is independent of the current events
that affect the apparent self, and meets calmly the
shock of accident, without external assistance:

The Soul
Breasts her own griefs: and urg'd too fiercely, says:
"Why tremble? True, the nobleness of man
May be by man effac'd: man can controul
To pain, to death, the bent of his own days.
Know thou the worst. So much, not more, he can."6

When Arnold himself suffered in this way by the loss of
his eldest son, in 1868, he was found consoling himself
with the Stoic Marcus Aurelius.7

Such then is man's action and sphere. His chief
end is the perfection of his true self, in harmony with
the moral, and often in conflict with the non-moral,
forces of Nature. With the help of what enlightenment he
and the human race have already won, he must go steadily
forward to complete and subdue the finite and incomplete
both in the self and in the world, and thus in the midst
of darkness and anarchy to introduce culture.

1Dover Beach. 2E. g. On Translating Homer, p. 6. 3Ibid.
5The Youth of Nature. 6Sonnet: To George Cruikshank, Esq.
7Letters, xi.
15. **Culture.**
15. Culture.

Man must, then, subdue and turn to his own advantage the non-moral forces of the world; and, if that is not possible, endure their action with stoicism. He must also defend himself from the disruptive forces in himself and direct them into some one channel, in harmony with the nature of his true self and of the world.

In learning to obey the law of his true self,— which is culture,— man has an important lesson to learn from Nature. For Nature, in so far as she obeys the law of her being, her true self, is a model for man. Nature formerly passed through a phase of internal conflict and turbulence (the analogy is, of course, at this point, loose and poetical, not strictly scientific), such as man, owing to the opposition in him of the apparent self and the real self, now suffers.

Ah, Quiet, all things feel thy balm!
Those blue hills, too, this river's flow,
Were restless once, but long ago,
Tam'd is their turbulent youthful glow:
Their joy is in their calm.

Nature, so to speak, has now realized her real self. Man, therefore, in order to pass from a divided to a unified internal economy, in order to attain the calm which will follow from complete obedience to the law of his real self, will follow the course already taken by Nature. He will observe the principles upon which Nature now acts, and will apply these to the guidance of his own future course.

The chief lesson which man will learn from Nature is that of 'Toil unsever'd from Tranquillity'. The activity of Nature is calm, at times even cheerful; this Arnold contrasts with the inward strife and unrest of man, and with his outward strife against the current events and the conventions of the world:

Yes, while on earth a thousand discords ring,
Man's senseless uproar mingling with his toil,
Still do thy sleepless ministers move on,
Their glorious tasks in silence perfecting:
Still working, blaming still our vain turmoil;
Labourers that shall not fail, when man is gone.

Man should be as independent of opinion, as closely centred in the performance of his real task as Nature is. Clough, for example, had boasted his religious independence and yet asked for approval from others. Arnold's advice

1 Faded Leaves: On the Rhine. 2 Morality. 3 Sonnet: One Lesson, Nature. Ibid.
to him, and endeavour for himself, he expressed through the double analogy of children demanding approval and of Nature demanding none:

Children (as such forgive them) have I known,
Ever in their own eager pastime bent
To make the inquisitive bystander, intent
On his own swarming thoughts, an interest own;
Too fearful or too fond to play alone.
Do thou, whom light in thine own inmost soul
(Not less thy boast) illuminates, control
Wishes unworthy of a man full-grown.

Nature's great law, and law of all men's minds.
To its own impulse every creature stirs:
Live by thy light, and Earth will live by hers.

For to be independent of opinion necessarily implies a certain isolation, such as Clough was suffering: it is the isolation of the elements:

Alone the sun arises, and alone
Spring the great streams.

But man need not recoil from such isolation. It really constitutes his greatness, as it constitutes the greatness of Nature. It is not the isolation of complete separation: it is the isolation of independence, of living to the true self, of obeying the inner law of one's being, of working in the world according to that law: as the powers of Nature,

Who, though so noble, share in the world's toil,
And though so task'd, keep free from dust and soil.

From Nature, then, Culture learns to be harmonious, independent or inward, and general. It must cultivate the powers of man towards a harmonious equilibrium: it must cultivate the inward man, independent of fortuitous external influences: and it must be as general and universal in scope as the work and laws of Nature.

The general conception underlying Arnold's idea of a harmonious, inward, and general culture is the Greek conception of human nature. This conception divides man, as did Plato and Aristotle, into reason and appetite, the real self and the apparent self. Appetite connotes the body and the current thoughts and desires, the animal part or basis of humanity. Reason controls, harmonizes, and sublimates the appetites towards a human, civilized, social life.

1 Sonnet: Religious Isolation. 2 In Utrumque Paratus. 3 A Summer Night.
This conception is supplemented by the analogy of the State and the individual. The classes in society correspond to the appetites in the individual: the State to reason. The State controls, harmonizes, and sublimes the current, selfish desires of single classes towards a human, civilized, social life. The culture of the State must also be, like that of the individual, inward and general.

In this Greek attitude there is no question of thwarting or denying any of the instincts or appetites. "All tendencies of human nature are in themselves vital and profitable; when they are blamed, they are only to be blamed relatively, not absolutely." They are to be blamed that is, only in so far as they assert themselves at the expense of the general harmony. They are not to be denied, but to be governed, made elements in a total perfection. "The immense spiritual significance of the Greeks is due to their having been inspired with this central and happy idea of the essential character of human perfection;..."2

In the individual and in the State, therefore, culture consists in the full control of all the appetites. Until there is order among them, anarchy reigns, and no progress is possible. Each appetite, each class, then demands its own particular satisfaction, and conflicts with the desires of other appetites and classes and with the needs of the soul and of the State as an organism. Order is therefore essential. "Great changes there must be.... yet order there must be.... So whatever brings risk of tumult and disorder, multitudinous processions in the streets of our crowded towns....—our best self, our right reason, plainly enjoins us to set our faces against. It enjoins us to encourage and uphold the occupants of the executive power, whoever they may be, in firmly prohibiting them. But it does this clearly and resolutely, and is thus a real principle of authority, because it does it with a free conscience;..... It knows that it is establishing the State, or organ of our best collective self, of our national right reason."3 In establishing order in the midst, or in face of the threat, of anarchy, force is thus often justified. "Force till right is ready."4 The State, in Britain, for example, was justified, in applying coercion to the anarchy of Ireland, but only if it then proceeded to deal with the injustices of Ireland. W. E. Forster here found the justification of his Coercion Bill, and Froude of his views on the solution of the Irish Question.5 The State may and must, in the same way, force the individual to control to a certain extent his own appetites, and thus form for himself a basis on which he may rear his own culture.
Order once established, culture is ready for progress or expansion. The human spirit is free to strike out on all sides into new paths, to modify those already in existence, to make new culture-conquests. There begins accordingly an epoch of expansion. But expansion is accompanied by a loosening of the old foundations, a gradual slackening of the order which alone has made expansion possible. There is therefore a growing alarm and reaction, especially when progress is too rapid or violent, and the loosening of the foundations too great: when the conduct of progress has fallen into the hands of those whom Arnold calls Jacobins, who wish, in the interests of some rigid theory, to carry the new advance to extremes.

Who cry aloud to lay the old world low
To clear the new world's way.\(^1\)

From these causes a contrary movement arises to preserve the culture-conquests already achieved, an epoch of concentration. There is thus in the progress of the human spirit a double rhythm—expansion and concentration. The protagonist of culture must carefully observe this rhythm and adapt to it the work required.

In an epoch of expansion, the task of culture is to direct the movement and progress of ideas into the proper channels, so that it may not confine itself to one side of human perfection to the neglect of others. If change threatens to become too rapid or revolutionary, and to sap the foundations of existing order and culture, the task becomes that of preserving those foundations while assisting smoothly to proceed the change actually necessary to allay the fierceness of the revolutionary fervour.

In an epoch of concentration, the task of culture is to prevent the dominant care for order from running into the extreme of reaction and opposition to all change whatever. Culture must here again work for the dissemination of fresh ideas among the reactionaries, and for the restoration of the confidence necessary for a further movement of expansion.

Arnold lived in an epoch of expansion: the epoch of concentration aroused in opposition to the French Revolution was over. His work was therefore adapted to the needs of such an epoch. How should this expansion proceed, under what conditions, towards what end? In what direction was it actually proceeding, and how far was it astray from the true path? What did culture demand for progress to perfection, and how far did this epoch of expansion fail to satisfy the demand?

\(^1\) Progress.  \(^2\) From Saint-Simon.
Arnold approached the problem of determining the elements of culture from the comparative angle. It is easier to see what is lacking to a man or a nation and what will complete their perfection when comparison is made with men and nations of other times and places. Arnold therefore constantly directed his attention and the attention of England to the achievements of past ages and of foreign countries. From both sources he tried to discover into what channels effort had with greatest success been directed, from which of them England had most to learn. These channels generally took the form of customs, manners, institutions. They are what Goethe calls Culture-conquests. The main such conquests made by society are marriage and the family, the State, and the Church. Mrs. Humphry Ward, Arnold's niece, states this idea clearly in David Grieve: "All these centuries the human animal has fought with the human soul. And step by step the soul has registered her victories. . . . marriage, the family, the State, the Church. Neglect them, and you sink into the quagmire from which the soul of the race has been for generations struggling to save you." 1 To these may be added the culture-conquests of art, and those of knowledge and science.

A rough scheme of man's powers can now be formulated. The main 'lines' or 'powers' of the mind are those of intellect, conduct, beauty, and manners. Of the four, conduct, or Hebraism, is fundamental. It is 'three-fourths of life'. It is essential to the safety of States as of individuals. "The Eternal has attached to certain moral causes the safety or the ruin of States." 2 So men of culture and poetry have often failed in morality, and "they have been punished wherein they erred". 3 He is thinking of Heine and Burns. So the Greek conception of life was premature and Greece decayed: "The indispensable basis of conduct and self-control, the platform upon which alone the perfection aimed at by Greece can come into bloom, was not to be reached by our race so easily; centuries of probation and discipline were needed to bring us to it." 4 The other chief power, that of knowing, or Hellenism, is essential both in itself and also as a guide to conduct. Action requires knowledge. It is useless merely to say, with Carlyle, "Work while it is called to-day", or "Serve God by action", for "acting and instituting are of little use unless we know how and what we ought to act and institute." 5 The powers of art and of social life, though not so fundamental, are equally necessary to perfection, and must be related to knowledge and conduct as these have been to one another.

1 Bk. VII, Ch. XV. 2 Disc. in Amer., p. 69. 3 Culture and Anarchy, p. 18. 4 Ibid., p. 96. 5 Ibid., p. 6.
On these four main lines, however, the human spirit does not advance evenly and simultaneously: it is inclined to oscillate, concentrating now on one, now on another. Just as, over the whole field of cultural progress, there are alternate movements of expansion and concentration, so, in the subdivided theatres of operation, there are alternate advances and halts (or retreats), along the different lines. "History is a series of waves, coming gradually to a head, and then breaking." This is specially true of the two main lines of knowledge and conduct. "As we look back", says J. A. Froude, who shared most of Arnold's opinions, "we see times of change and progress alternating with other times when life and thought have settled into permanent forms; when mankind, as if by common consent, have ceased to seek for increase of knowledge, and, contented with what they possess, have endeavoured to make use of it for purposes of moral cultivation." Thus "by alternations of Hebraism and Hellenism .... the human spirit proceeds; and each of these forces has its appointed hours of culmination and seasons of rule." In England, for example, after the moral cultivation of the Middle Ages, came the Renaissance, "an uprising and reinstatement of .... Hellenism." The Renaissance had, however, "a side of moral weakness, and of relaxation or insensibility of moral fibre" and provoked against itself a reaction in the direction of morality, Puritanism.

This scheme, and its numerous subdivisions, "though drawn in rough and plain lines enough, and not pretending to scientific exactness", has the advantage of possessing sufficient flexibility to allow of its application to all sorts of circumstances. It is wide enough to cover all human activity, and yet remains accurate enough to give adequate and positive guidance. In short, it is an admirable instrument of culture: it is a scheme of ideas which can be consistently and universally applied to life.

1st Hellenism.

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16. Hellenism.

On the side of intellect and knowledge, culture is Hellenism, the knowledge of man and the world. It implies the knowledge of nature, man's environment, as it is given in the physical sciences; and the knowledge of man, how he has reacted to natural environment and social conditions, as given in the mental and political sciences, and in art. The record of man's knowledge of himself and nature is best preserved in literature. And among the mass of literary production, culture will select the best. Hellenism may therefore be described as "the acquainting ourselves with the best that has been said and known in the world, and thus with the history of the human spirit." It comprises, in a word, the knowledge, through literature, of the culture-conquests of the human spirit as expressed in its history. To know man, one must know his experience.

A knowledge of literature is essential, not only for understanding, but also for progress. It saves time, on the one hand, while on the other, by the breadth and variety of its influence, it acts as a check on individual caprice. Tradition and authority must thus be given their due weight, as the vessels of the experience of the race, both as enabling us to understand and to advance.

Literature, in this sense, means, not merely belles-lettres, but literature in its widest sense, "everything written with letters or printed in a book. Euclid's Elements and Newton's Principia are thus literature. All knowledge that reaches us through books is literature." A knowledge of Greek and Roman literature, for example, means "knowing the Greeks and Romans, their life and genius, and what they were and did in the world; what we get from them, and what is its value." It implies a knowledge of "Rome's military, and political, and legal, and administrative work in the world;" it implies knowing Greece "as the giver of Greek art, and the guide to a free and right use of reason and to scientific method, and the founder of our mathematics and physics and astronomy and biology ...." The best that has been thought and said among modern nations similarly implies a knowledge of the work of such men as Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and Darwin.

1 Lit, and Dogma, Intro. 2 Disc. in Amer., p. 90. 3 Ibid, 48. 4 Ibid. 91. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 82.
Hellenism includes, in particular, the acquainting ourselves with the achievements of those ages which have most clearly resembled our own, the modern epochs of Greece under Pericles and of Rome under Augustus. For those epochs are as truly modern as ours. They exhibit all the true characteristics of a modern age: outwardly, the banishment of civil war, the assertion of order in the State, and the multiplication of the conveniences of life; inwardly, the growth of tolerance, the formation of taste, the capacity for refined pursuits, and the appearance of the critical spirit. They preserve what in preceding epochs is of value for culture, and liberate from what is retarding and inadequate: their aim is a "natural and rational life" according to the demands of the imaginative reason.

A modern epoch, in this sense, is "founded on a rich past and upon an instinctive fulness of experience": it is a "significant, highly-developed, culminating epoch." It therefore provides "an immense, moving, confused spectacle", which includes all important events, institutions, science and art, that is to say, all culture, up to the present. The Augustan age of Rome, for example, is "perhaps, on the whole, the greatest, the fullest, the most significant period on record; it is certainly a greater, a fuller period than the age of Pericles. It is an infinitely larger school for the men reared in it; the relations of life are immeasurably multiplied, the events which happen are on an immeasurably grander scale. The facts, the spectacle of this Roman world, then, are immense;..."

The "rich past", however, which is so vital a characteristic of a modern epoch, is also the cause of its complexity and confusion. So many conflicting currents, from so many conflicting sources, come down to it out of its past, bearing ideas, customs, and institutions, that confusion is inevitable. Rachel, the Great French actress, is a typical product of a modern epoch:

In her, like us, there clash'd, contending powers, Germany, France, Christ, Moses, Athens, Rome. In presence of such a spectacle the mind is bewildered, and suffers from "impatient irritation". It demands an interpretation, but the spectacle is so complex that its interpretation is a task of immense difficulty. Yet the demand grows in proportion to the difficulty, and with it grows the effort towards understanding. "It

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"perpetually excites our curiosity", yet at the same time "perpetually baffles our comprehension."¹

The result is ennui. Speaking of Lucretius, a modern poet in a modern age, Arnold says: "The predominance of thought, of reflection, in modern epochs, is not without its penalties; in the un­sound, in the overtaxed, in the over-sensitive, it has produced the most painful, the most lamentable results; it has produced .... the feeling of depression, the feeling of ennui."² The great modern man—and this is why Arnold called Goethe the 'greatest modern man'—is he who can interpret the complex spectacle of his age. He it is who delivers or liberates the mind from ennui and impatient irritation: and he is the greater as he succeeds in zealously supplying this liberation. It is a work for thought and ideas, for criticism. "The deliver­ance consists in man's comprehension of ... present and past. It begins when our mind begins to enter into possession of the general ideas which are the law of this vast multitude of facts. It is perfect when we have acquired that harmonious acquiescence of mind which we feel in contemplating a grand spectacle that is intelligible to us."³ The modern age, then, requires a true point of view from which to contemplate a significant spectacle. "He who communicates that point of view to his age, he who interprets to it that spectacle, is one of his age's intellectual deliverers."⁴

He, however, who is not in sympathy with his age, and who, instead of trying to understand and liberate, withdraws from it into himself, cannot be an adequate interpreter. He becomes "overstrained, gloom-weighted, morbid; and he who is morbid is no adequate interpreter of his age."⁵ For this reason Lucretius is not an adequate interpreter of the Augustan age, nor is Virgil. Lucretius withdrew to natural science and Virgil to the country and the Georgics. Horace, also, is inadequate: he is "without faith, without enthusiasm, without energy."⁶ They are interpreters, certainly, but not adequate. So Leopardi, Senancour, and Foscolo are inadequate. So with the whole romantic movement in England. Two only, Byron and Shelley, made the attempt at an adequate interpretation, but failed for lack of support from their age. Byron failed also because he had not "the intellectual equipment of a supreme modern poet"⁷ Of the others, "Wordsworth retired ... into a monastery. I mean, he plunged himself in the

¹ Modern Element in Lit. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid. ⁴ Ibid. ⁵ Ibid. ⁶ Ibid. ⁷ E. in Crit., Heine.
inward life, he voluntarily cut himself off from the modern spirit. Coleridge took to opium. Scott became the historiographer royal of feudalism. Keats passionately gave himself up to a sensuous genius, to his faculty for interpreting nature; and he died of consumption at twenty-five."

In a modern epoch, the rich heritage of the past is not only confusing; but, by its own native inertia, by the tenacity with which its established ideas cling to life, it also cumbers the advance towards liberation and a natural, rational life of the intelligence. Many of the old ideas are obsolete; the empty forms remain after the spirit has departed which was their life. This applies to all spheres of culture, but in England it is especially true of the sphere of knowledge and intellect, for the English, as Arnold was fond of quoting from Goethe, "are pedants." In intellectual things they have, more than any other people, clung to what is customary, worked by rule of thumb, and not by reason and ideas. They are therefore slow to feel the breath of the modern spirit, now "awake almost everywhere," and with them the discrepancy between the old ideas and the new spirit is likely to be most deeply accentuated.

"Modern times find themselves with an immense system of institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, customs, rules, which have come to them from times not modern. In this system their life has to be carried forward; yet they have a sense that this system is not of their own creation, that it by no means corresponds exactly with the wants of their actual life, that, for them, it is customary, not rational." The modern spirit is "the sense of want of correspondence between the forms of modern Europe and its spirit, between the new wine of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the old bottles of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, or even of the sixteenth and seventeenth."...

The awakening of the modern spirit is mainly the work of 'our indispensable eighteenth century', especially of the French Encyclopaedists. The French Revolution, based on their ideas, overthrew the old political and social system, and the old ideas attached to it: and Napoleon laid the foundations of a new and modern order. In England, more gradually and peacefully, the modern spirit "has now almost entirely dissolved the strong feudal habits of subordination and deference." England has outgrown...

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1 E. in Crit., Heine.  
2 Irish Essays; The Incompatibles. I.  
3 E. in Crit., Heine.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
7 Friendship's Garland, p. 77.  
8 Ibid., p. 130.
"a feudal organisation, and the political command of an aristocracy", and to this extent is awake to the modern spirit. But, much more than France, England preserves, in her aristocracy, her Church, her social and political institutions, the traditional feudal forms. Comparing the two countries, Arminius, in Friendship's Garland, says, "You may have done, — for you, — much for religious toleration, social improvement, public instruction, municipal reform, law reform; but the French Revolution and its consequences have done, upon the Continent, a great deal more."  

The modern task, then, and for England more than for France, is to dissolve, by fresh knowledge and ideas, what remains of the feudal and traditional system in so far as it does not correspond with the demands of modern life: "what we must have to study is that we may not be acrid dissolvents of it." By his own procedure, Arnold showed what he meant by this. He advanced smoothly and gradually, with good humour, and as much charm and urbanity as possible. He avoided the futile and retarding acridness of polemics and controversy. He seldom argued, or gave his logical reasons. He stated his conclusions and criticisms. With his sinuous, easy, unpolemical style, his fine irony, and his many-sided experience of life and literature, and with perfect honesty and outspoken sincerity, he continued to dissolve old systems of thought and belief by simply repeating new ideas till they took hold, and by neglecting or exposing the older ideas they were intended to replace.

The first task of criticism, in order to interpret and liberate the age, is therefore to introduce the best ideas and to give them currency, to make them prevail, whether orally or in books. It must thus import fresh ideas from the great reservoir of common European intellectual culture. A nation's intellectual life, to escape stagnant provinciality, and to dissolve smoothly the encrustations of its feudal past, must rest on an international foundation. "The civilized world is to be regarded as now being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action, and working to a common result; and whose members have for their proper outfit a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another. Special local and temporary advantages being put out of account, that modern nation will in the intellectual and spiritual sphere make most progress, which most thoroughly carries out this programme."  

Goethe says,—again it is from Goethe that Arnold draws his leading idea,—that what is important

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Footnotes:
1 Friendship's Garland, p. 77.  
2 Ibid., p. 139.  
3 E. in Crit., The Function of Criticism.  "Disc. in America, p. 83."
is not the peculiarities, but the universal qualities, in a nation—not that wherein it differs merely—but that in which it has seized and pre-eminently developed some side of the perfection which is the aim of all. "What is truly excellent is distinguished by its belonging to all mankind." But in order to discover and acquire the universal contribution of each nation, it is essential first to learn those very peculiarities which are not a part of that contribution. The peculiarities of each nation must be learned, and allowance made for them, in order by these means to hold intercourse with it; for the special characteristics of a nation are like its language and its currency: they facilitate intercourse, nay, they first make it completely possible." It is thus necessary to begin with a philosophy of national character, founded on experience and observation. Arnold found this idea current in Coleridge, J. S. Mill, Michelet, and, at the source, in Goethe and his contemporaries. "A philosophy of laws and institutions, not founded on a philosophy of national character, is an absurdity," wrote Mill in 1838. He might have applied the same generalisation to a philosophy of intellectual progress. Having evolved such a philosophy of national character, and allowed for the national peculiarities that it explains and classifies, one nation may proceed to appropriate, as far as is possible and necessary, those elements with which other nations can supply it. Here, however, for most men, intervenes the barrier of language. And here arises the function of the translator as an instrument of Hellenism. "Every translator," says Goethe, "is to be regarded as a middleman in this universal spiritual commerce, and as making it his business to promote this exchange (of ideas): for, say what we may of the insufficiency of translation, yet the work is and will always be one of the weightiest and worthiest affairs in the general concerns of the world." The translator gives to his people the power of absorbing something of the culture of other peoples. "Thus," continues Goethe, "each translator is a prophet to his people. Luther's translation of the Bible has produced the greatest results, though criticism gives it qualified praise, ..." Sc, when Long, in translating Marcus Aurelius, spoke harshly of his most eminent forerunner, Jeremy Collier, Arnold retorted that "the acquaintance of a man like Marcus Aurelius is such an imperishable benefit, that we can never lose a peculiar sense of obligation towards the man who confers it." Conversely, "the translator," says Goethe, "works not alone for his own nation, but

1 Correspondence between Carlyle and Goethe (1827), p. 25.
2 Ibid., pp. 24-5. 3 Dissertations and Discussions, Bentham.
likewise for the one from whose language he has taken the work."¹ For a nation absorbs the sap of a book till it is dry: but often finds a new pleasure and benefit in it, under the fresh and unfamiliar form of a translation.

The main concern of a translator, then, ought to be to transfer the spirit and culture of a great author from one language into another. His one aim should be to reproduce the 'general effect' of a foreign author for his own people. Arnold himself did much in this direction to transfer into English and make accessible the Greek spirit and culture. In defence of his much abused play, Merope, for example, he wrote, "What I meant them was to see in it a specimen of the world created by the Greek imagination. This imagination was different from our own, and it is hard for us to appreciate, even to understand it; but it had a peculiar power, grandeur, and dignity, and these are worth trying to get an apprehension of."² Merope represents chiefly the Greek world of Sophocles, Schrab and Rustum that of Homer, while Empedocles on Etna, in the songs of Callicles, gives something of the world of Pindar.

On the translating of Homer, "the most important poetical monument existing"; it was thus natural for Arnold to speak particularly, to ensure, if possible, that translation of such a great author should not fail of its function. In his three lectures On Translating Homer, he determines what constitute the main qualities of Homer's work, and what means are adequate to reproduce these qualities in English.

Towards the introduction of new ideas, then, Arnold assisted as far as he could. In this, however, he was not working alone, nor was he, as elsewhere, running counter to the current of his age. He was merely supplementing and perfecting a movement already in course of evolution, a movement of ideas. For, within the modern epoch, his age was an age of expansion: and "the essence of an epoch of expansion is a movement of ideas."³ With the long peace after the Napoleonic Wars, European ideas were filtering into England. The advance in material comfort and prosperity was also, as he saw, quickening intellectual activity. For "man, after he has made himself perfectly comfortable and has now to determine what to do with himself next, may begin to remember that he has a mind, and that the mind may be made the source of great pleasure. . . . Our ease, our travelling, and our unbounded liberty to

³On Translating Homer, p. 1. ⁴Culture and Anarchy, p. 45.
hold just as hard and securely as we please to the
practice to which our notions have given birth, all
tend to beget an inclination to deal a little more
freely with these notions themselves, to canvass them
a little, to penetrate a little into their real
nature. Flutterings of curiosity, in the foreign
sense of the word, appear amongst us..." 1 Thus in an
epoch of expansion, the spirit of Hellenism begins to
advance. Its movement is at first slow and its demands
elementary. The writer who most successfully satisfied
this awakening demand of the early Victorian intellect
and who was therefore most popular, and, for the time,
most useful, was Macaulay, whose ideas were exactly
suited to this stage of intellectual expansion. In
time, however, the intellect, having quickly sucked the
substance of Macaulay, would push a step farther, and
so continue. Ideas would begin to multiply and circul­
ate. 2

The critic's business here is to ensure that the
best ideas, and the most necessary ideas, are intro­
duced, that the current of expansion flows in the
right direction. He must fix a high and comprehensive
standard, based on the best that has been said and thought
by the few greatest minds of the world. To this touch­
stone he will bring all new ideas.

The best new ideas introduced into a modern age of
expansion must also be harmonized with each other and
with such existing ideas as are still adequate.
"The one salvation" of an epoch of expansion is "a
harmony of ideas" 3 Expanding thought, that is, must
be organized and combined along one direction, so
that the forces of expansion may not spend themselves
on various lines in isolation. Pure ideas must,
accordingly, be linked up with conduct, art, and
social life, in which spheres they might otherwise
prove unedifying and baneful. Colenso's arithmetical
researches in Old Testament history, and Strauss's
application of pure reason to the New Testament, are,
though perhaps in themselves correct, are unedifying
because they fail to relate abstract ideas to the
religious and moral content of the works they deal
with. They transport ideas, without harmony or
adjustment, into the sphere of conduct. Similarly,
the France of the eighteenth century was penetrated
by the ideas of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, and
Rousseau: but the French Revolution, without allowing
these ideas to work their gradual transformation,
carried them abruptly over into the sphere of practical
politics. The result was not to advance, but to check,
intellectual, and even practical, culture. 4

244-7. 3 Culture and Anarchy, p. 45. 4 The Function of
Criticism.
The best ideas, once introduced and harmonized, must then be applied to life. This means, not that they are to be carried into practical religion or politics, but simply that they should be allowed to play freely on our stock notions which they are to dissolve. From practice the critic must stand aloof. For in the application of ideas to life, as in all his labour in the service of ideas, in acquiring, disseminating and harmonizing them, he must see them as they really are: he must work in a disinterested spirit: and it is only by remaining apart from practical life that he can achieve this. To enter the sphere of practice, especially in England, would be at once to become an 'interested' party, and therefore to check the free play of ideas: it would be for criticism "to lend itself to ... those ulterior, political, practical considerations about ideas which plenty of people will be sure to attach to them, which perhaps ought often to be attached to them, which in this country at any rate are certain to be attached to them quite sufficiently, but which criticism has really nothing to do with." The true critic must isolate himself from such considerations if he is to preserve his disinterestedness and his honesty. It is only by the work of a small body of such disinterested observers and critics, working in concert throughout Europe, that sound effective progress can be made in serving the thought of the modern epoch of expansion.
17. Hebraism.
Conduct, the sphere of Hebraism, is three-fourths of life, the largest tract of experience. It is also the most vital tract, for without a groundwork of conduct nothing of the first importance can be achieved in any other sphere of culture. Those nations, then, like France, as those poets, like Heine and Shelley, who have lacked this basis of morality and neglected this major tract of experience, have fallen short of greatness; while those others which, like England and Germany, have given a pre-eminent place to conduct, have, on some lines at least, justified themselves and accomplished work of the first rank.

The moral conquest made by these latter nations, and by their individual members, is due to Hebraism, the moral culture they have inherited from the Jews. "To walk staunchly by the best light one has, to be strict and sincere with oneself, not to be of the number of those who say and do not, to be in earnest,—this is the discipline by which alone man is enabled to rescue his life from thraldom to the passing moment and to his bodily senses, to ennoble it, and to make it eternal. And this discipline has been nowhere so effectively taught as in the old school of Hebraism." *

Conduct has been thus mainly taught under the shape of religion. Religion includes morality. The ideal of religion is "a human nature perfect on the moral side," and religion remains "the greatest and most important of the efforts by which the human race has manifested its impulse to perfect itself." All religions are valuable in proportion as they have led men towards moral perfection.

Children of men! the unseen Power, whose eye
For ever doth accompany mankind,
Hath look'd on no religion scornfully
That man did ever find.

Which has not taught weak wills how much they can,
Which has not fall'n on the dry heart like rain?
Which has not cried to sunk self-weary man:
Thou must be born again.*

But religion has this advantage over pure morality, that it adds the "tide of a joyful and bounding emotion", which is necessary "to make moral action perfect".* Religion is "morality tinged with emotion". Morality of

Ibid., p. 2. "Progress. *E. in C., Marcus Aurelius,
Lit. and Dogma, Chap. I.
itself, prescribes "to human life fixed principles of action, fixed principles of conduct." But a life according to speculative principles, to reason and duty, is "for the sage only". For the rest of mankind, "they have neither force of intellect enough to apprehend them clearly as ideas, nor force of character enough to follow them strictly as laws." They require, to carry them along their course, "an inspiration, a joyful emotion." Even for the sage, whose moral atmosphere of reason and duty is in general "bleak and grey", religious emotion may have some value of its own.

With this difference, morality and religion pursue the same ideal, "to take possession of human life, to save it from being abandoned to passion or allowed to drift at hazard, to give it happiness by establishing it in the practice of virtue." Both bring us into line with the moral not-ourselves, and so satisfy a law of our being. Faith, in the practice of religion, is the confidence, without visible proof, that in acting morally, we are upheld by the moral order of the universe, that in acting immorally, we are automatically punished wherein we err. It is "a power of holding fast to an unseen power of goodness." To attend to the working of this moral order, to have confidence in it, and to act in line with it, "requires more steadiness than to attend to the momentary impressions of hunger, fatigue, and pain; therefore it is called faith, and counted a virtue." Faith is this emotional identification of oneself with the moral order, as distinct from the purely moral identification of reason and duty. It is greater than these, and sufficient where these fail. Their "mere commanding and forbidding is of no avail, and only irritates opposition in the desires it tries to control." With Paul, for example, "those multitudinous motions of appetite and self-will which reason and conscience disapproved, reason and conscience could not yet control, and had to yield to them".

The central idea of religion, then, is that of conquering, with the support of the moral order of the world emotionally conceived, our appetites or "the obvious faults of our animality". The two chief human appetites are those of the uncultured instincts of self-preservation and reproduction. The first expresses itself in temper, the second in sensuality. The corresponding virtues, representing the expression given by culture to these instincts, are charity and purity. The victory of religion lies in the conquest of temper and sensuality, and in making charity and purity the rule of the inward life." There are in 


God and the Bible, Ill. 3: Last Essays on Church and Religion, xvi.
man two contending selves: "one, a movement of first impulse and more involuntary, leading us to gratify any inclination that may solicit us, and called generally a movement of man's ordinary or passing self, of sense, appetite, desire; the other, a movement of reflexion and more voluntary, leading us to submit inclination to some rule, and called generally a movement of man's higher or enduring self, of reason, spirit, will... for a man to obey the higher self, or reason, .... is happiness and life for him; to obey the lower is death and misery."¹

The higher, moral self is greater in permanent strength than the ordinary self. This is natural, since the universe makes for morality and happiness. Might is, in general, on the side of right. The experience of mankind has proved this. It has decided that, in general, the actions that make for permanent happiness are not the first movements of appetite and desire, but the less voluntary movements of reason and spirit. Those actions, then, are best for man, that give most enduring satisfaction, and actions have degrees of value in proportion to the permanent happiness they afford, or as they satisfy the higher self. This principle applies not only to actions, but also to every phase of the moral life. Our affections, for example, "according as they serve this deep instinct (the desire for happiness) or thwart it, are superior in strength,—not in present strength, but in permanent strength; and have degrees of worth according to that superiority."²

The moral order of the universe, which supports the higher self and its virtues, is God—"the Power, not-ourselves, which makes for righteousness". "Moral life is the gift of God, is God."³ He is both the moral order and the virtues through which men express that order.

'Tis God himself becomes apparent, when God's wisdom and God's goodness are display'd,

For God of these his attributes is made.+ This idea of God is adopted mainly from The Analogy of Religion of Bishop Butler. Butler makes a powerful use of "a course of life marked out for man by nature, whatever that nature be."⁵ Speaking of virtue and vice and their rewards and punishments, Butler hears "the voice of nature in the conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For, our being

⁴ Sonnet: The Divinity. ⁵ Lit. and Dogma, I.3.
so constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favoured and disfavoured, rewarded and punished respectively as such, is an intuitive proof of the intent of nature that it should be so. ...."¹

This tendency in nature is a proof that there is "somewhat moral in the essential constitution of it."²

Arnold proceeds to interpret, in terms of these conceptions of God and the moral life, the formation and progress of Christian dogma. These essential ideas, he said, could all be found in the New Testament. But they are there expressed in a form largely figurative—they are indeed largely figurative themselves—a form shaped by the poetical Eastern imagination, and the imagery with which Jesus found that imagination already possessed. For "Jesus loved and freely adopted the common wording and imagery of the popular Jewish religion."³ "By his admirable figure of the two lives of man, the real life and the seeming life, he connected this profound fact of experience with that attractive poetry of hopes and imaginings which possessed the minds of his countrymen. Eternal life? Yes, the life in the higher and undying self of man. Judgment? Yes, the trying, in conscience, of the claims and instigations of the two lives, and the decision between them. Resurrection? Yes, the rising from bondage and transience with the lower life to victory and permanence with the higher. The kingdom of God? Yes, the reign amongst mankind of the higher life. The Christ the Son of God? Yes, the bringer-in and founder of this reign of the higher life, this true kingdom of God."⁴ In the same way "the substantial basis of the notion of expiation ... is the bitter experience that the habit of wrong, of blindly obeying selfish impulse, so affects our temper and powers, that to withstand selfish impulse, to do right, when the sense of right awakens in us, requires an effort out of all proportion to the actual present emergency. We have not only the difficulty of the present act in itself, we have the resistance of all our past."⁵

Unfortunately though naturally, however, as Arnold goes on to show, the figurative expression of these vital moral truths was in time crystallized into dogma. Instead of being regarded truly as "fluid, passing, and literary", as it was meant to be, the figurative expression has come to be treated as "rigid, fixed, scientific".⁶ Men were now asked to believe in a literal resurrection, judgment, eternal life. These have become 'accredited dogmas', from which it is now the business of the modern spirit to
liberate religion. So long, however, as people did literally believe even in these dogmas, they benefited morally. The system worked, because it preserved the moral life and was a sanction and explanation of morality. "Christ lived while we believed."

While we believed, on earth he went,  
And open stood his grave, 
Men call'd from chamber, church and tent,  
And Christ was by to save.

But the modern spirit has outgrown these dogmas: the progress of thought and criticism has shown their inadequacy. And since men have ceased to believe in the literal or dogmatic interpretation of them, they are becoming powerless to conserve the moral life.

Now he is dead. Far hence he lies  
In the lone Syrian town, 
And on his grave, with shining eyes,  
The Syrian stars look down.

The millions suffer still, and grieve;  
And what can helpers heal  
With old-world cures men half believe  
For woes they wholly feel?

And along with the outworn ideas many are inclined to discard the morality which they upheld. "Many say 'The Bible takes for granted this story and depends on the truth of it; what, then, can rational people have to do with the Bible?' So they get rid, to be sure, of a false ground for using the Bible, but they at the same time lose the Bible itself, and the true religion of the Bible."  

But the moral life must go on. It must find new ideas, or a new interpretation of the old ideas, on which to rest. Fortunately, a new interpretation is here sufficient. Little is necessary but to restore the true moral content of the existing system, and to renew its vital contact with morality. The husk of scientific dogma need only be removed, and the kernel of moral truth figuratively or poetically contained in it will again be set free.

This is what Arnold attempted for St. Paul and the New Testament generally,—to show the poetical nature of their work, and to interpret their real message. Paul's real teaching, for example, was not

Obermann Once More.  
1Tbid.  
2Lit. and Dogma, X, 1.
to be found, as commonly claimed, in the Calvinistic
dogmas of predestination, original sin, and justifica-
tion: they are to be taken as referring to an internal
phenomenon accomplishing itself in the believer's
consciousness. They are: dying with Christ, resurrection
from the dead, growing into Christ. These are all
figures describing the normal perfecting of the moral
life. For example, "The essential sense in which Paul
uses the term resurrection is that of a rising, in this
visible earthly existence, from the death of obedience to
blind selfish impulse, into the life of obedience to
the eternal moral order." Moral life, then, should
continue, as when men believed in a literal resurrec-
tion, to follow the higher self; "our whole course must
be a crucifixion and a resurrection." By identifying
ourselves with Christ, in this moral experience, we
preserve what is essential in Christianity. He is our
ideal: He has overcome the conflict with the lower
self, and lives only to the higher; He is risen. "Those
eternal vicissitudes of victory and defeat, which
drove Paul to despair, in Jesus were absent. Smoothly
and inevitably he followed the real and eternal order,
in preference to the momentary and apparent order.""°

The main emphasis of religion, in short, is
shifting from the external to the internal. Man can
no longer rely on external commands given by some
moral authority, or believe that his moral life can
be saved for him by some external covenant or sacrifice;
he must henceforth obey independently the voice of his
own conscience and work out his moral salvation in his
own life. From Syria, says Arnold,

"Comes now one word alone!

From David's lips this word did roll,
'Tis true and living yet:
No man can save his brother's soul,
Not pay his brother's debt.

Alone, self-poised, henceforward man
Must labour; must resign
His all too human creeds, and scan
Simply the way divine."

But, in working out his own salvation, the individual
is not left bare of assistance. He has still the Bible,
and the example of the Jews, whose moral experience it
contains. "As long as the world lasts, all who want to
make progress in righteousness will come to Israel for
inspiration, as to the people who have had the sense for

God and the Bible, VI, 3. 2St. Paul and Prot., p. 92.
Ibid. 103-4. 4Ibid., 64. 5Obermann Once More.
righteousness most glowing and strongest; and in hearing and reading the words Israel has uttered for us, carers for conduct will find a glow and a force they could find nowhere else. As well imagine a man with a sense for sculpture not cultivating it by the help of the remains of Greek art, or a man with a sense for poetry not cultivating it by the help of Homer and Shakespeare, as a man with a sense for conduct not cultivating it by the help of the Bible!  

The individual requires also the support of the Church, both for the width of its views, the leisure it gives him from unprofitable religious searching and debate, and the permanence with which it maintains and inculcates the culture-conquest of Hebraism. 

Thus the individual, while he remains for the future the centre of religion, must have external support. He is, in religion as in other spheres of culture, striving counter to the natural tendency of the average men about him, and he will succeed in developing his best moral self in proportion partly "to the force of the original instinct within", but partly also "to the hindrance or encouragement" he meets from without. The Church and the Bible are the best external encouragement he can at present secure.

1 Lit. and Dogma, I. 5.  
2 Culture and Anarchy, p. 70.
12. Social Life and Manners.

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18. Social Life and Manners.

(1) The State.

Closely related to Hebraism, or individual conduct, is politics, which is concerned with social conduct. Politics, as it should be, deals with the question: how to live. "The true and noble science of politics is even the very chief of the sciences, because it deals with this question for the benefit of man not as an isolated creature but . . . . . for the benefit of man in society." It is concerned with civilisation, or "the humanisation of man in society." It is social culture.

Actual politics, unfortunately, is far removed from this ideal: it was to Arnold "that 'wild and dreamlike trade' of insincerity"? "I have no very ardent interest . . . . . " he says, "in politics in their present state in this country. What interests me is English civilisation; and our politics in their present state do not seem to me to have much bearing upon that."3

The relation between politics and Hebraism runs parallel to the relation between the State and the individual. They are complementary abstractions from a single complex synthesis—man in society. They are composed out of the same elements and they coincide, by different methods, in aiming at the happiness of man. For the morality and happiness of the individual are identical with the morality and happiness of the race. The long experience of the race has proved that benevolence, 'a regard for the good of others', is superior in permanent strength to the private contracted affection of self-love. "For men are solidary, or co-partners; and not isolated. And conscience, in a question of conflict between a regard to the good of others and a regard to our own private good, is the sense of experience having proved and established that, from this reason of men's being really solidary, our private good ought in a conflict of such kind to give way; and that our nature is violated . . . . if it does not."4 For our benevolence, the virtue of the instinct of self-preservation, is satisfied by regard for the good of others, but not satisfied by regard for our private interest alone.

2E., in C, 2nd series, Tolstoy.
3Irish Essays, p. 25. (Ecce, Convertimur ad Gentes.) 4Last Essays on Church and Religion, Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Gaist, p. 83.
But politics also differs considerably from Hebraism, as the State from the individual. Hebraism is inward, and, in modern times, depends more and more on the individual.

The aids to noble life are all within.¹

Social life, on the other hand, deals with man more on the external side, and depends more and more on the institutions, forms of government and civilization of the State, in which the individual has objectified his morality.

Man's chief social Culture-conquests are the State, the Church, marriage, the family, and, more recently, the educational system. These institutions contain and fix "the fundamental rules which poor human nature has worked out, with such infinite difficulty and pain, for the protection and help of its own weakness."² The State and the Church exercise a general control, chiefly over the instinct of self-preservation, while marriage and the family perform a like function for the instinct of reproduction. These institutions, which have hitherto proved fittest for the control and culture of the human instincts, it is the business of society to sanction and support. "One of the first objects of men, in combining themselves in society, has been to afford to the individual, in his pursuit of ... instinct, the sanction and assistance of the laws, so far as may be consistent with the general advantage of the community."³

The key to Arnold's views of social life and institutions is his conception of the State. As opposed to the prevailing English individualism and laissez-faire politics and economics, he held, with Hegel and Napoleon and the Greeks, that the State ought to control and regulate, for the good of its citizens, all national activities. Not only the nation's purely cultural activities, which laissez-faire writers, like J. S. Mill, would have allowed, but also, to a great extent, those competitive industries which to them were sacrosanct.

"The State is what Burke very well called it—the nation in its collective and corporate character."⁴ In this sense the State is the reason or soul of the nation, its best and universal self, as opposed to the separate classes and individuals and their self-interest or private appetites. Struggles break out between the classes or individuals in a nation, as between the appetites in the soul, each striving for its own immediate and temporary advantage, and yielding to its uppermost impulse. The State, like the individual, requires

¹Worldly Place. (Sonnet.) ²Mrs H. Ward, David Grieve. ³Irish Essays, p. 181. ⁴Ibid., p. 96.
the authority of reason or its best self to control such impulses. If reason so governs in the State, the result is progress towards culture; if, on the other hand, the classes are allowed to strive each for immediate and personal gain, the result is anarchy. The State, then, should inculcate, and if necessary compel, order and progress among its classes and citizens. What we require and have not yet, says Arnold, is "the notion—so familiar on the Continent and to antiquity, of the State ... entrusted with stringent powers for the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals."

As against the State, therefore, individuals have no rights, only duties. There are no 'natural' rights. Rights are the creation of law, of the State. They are the "sanctions and assistance" which the State gives to certain instincts when pursued in the direction of culture, that is to say, "so far as may be consistent with the general advantage of the community." There is, for example, no natural right of property. "Let us beware of this metaphysical phantom of property in itself, which, like other metaphysical phantoms, is hollow and leads us to delusion. Property is the creation of law. It is effect given, by society and its laws, to that natural instinct in man which makes him seek to enjoy ownership in what he produces, acquires or has." Again, "I do not believe in a natural right, in each of a man's children, to his or her equal share of the father's property. I have no objection to the eldest son taking all the land, or the youngest son, or the middle daughter, on one condition: that this state of things shall really work well, that it shall be for the public advantage."

As against the State, likewise, classes have no natural rights. Under a democratic system, however, classes tend to assert their separate claims, without consideration of the general good. The class interests of the many tend to out-balance those of the few, by mere force of numbers. But the many lacks principle and persistence; "if to-day its good impulses prevail, they succumb to-morrow; sometimes it goes right, but it is very apt to go wrong." The country is then ruled by "the likes and dislikes of the bulk of the community, or of some large body or bodies in the community." The representatives of the people are hampered by the class interests of the bodies they represent. It becomes necessary, or at least prudent, for the government to "coax popular prejudices rather than of its own volition to control the impulses of the State."
than counteract them." The newspapers reflect and aggravate this tendency. Even more, perhaps, is it reflected in the party system. This is fatal to good and disinterested government. The class, like the individual, must be controlled and its 'natural' rights powerfully repressed for the general good.

The exact form of government which Arnold would require, on this view of the State and the individual, he nowhere expressly indicates. Presumably it would vary according to the nature of the country and its degree of civilization. Its one guiding principle, however, would be the preference of the general to the private good, the suppression of self-assertion and anarchy. In no State, therefore, could the many, the classes, which represent self-assertion, be fully entrusted with the government. There are required a few men, but the more the better, who will exercise morality in politics, putting their best self and the best self of the nation to guide its progress. In each class such men are to be found, "a certain number of aliens .... —persons who are mainly led, not by their class spirit, but by a general humane spirit, by the love of human perfection." These are "the remnant". As morality saves individuals, so the disinterested government of the remnant may save the State. The function of the remnant would be not only to govern, but also to act, outside politics, as "a class of disinterested non-political observers, observing and reporting faithfully, and telling the nation of its mistakes and prejudices". They would be moved, not by party catchwords, but by ideas, which they would apply to politics. Burke was such a man, "the greatest of English statesmen", because he was "the only one who traces the reason of things in politics, and who enables us to trace it too." Burke is so great because, almost alone in England, he brings thought to bear upon politics, he saturates politics with thought; ..... His greatness is that he lived in a world which neither English Liberalism nor English Toryism is apt to enter;—the world of ideas, not the world of catchwords and party habits." On this condition, and on condition of preserving order, democracy may be possible. Once class and party interest, to which it lends itself, are counteracted by morality and ideas, it may provide a valuable training in both local and national self-government.

1 Schools and Universities on the Continent (Preface to 2nd ed. 1874), p. viii. 2 Ibid. 3 C. and A., p. 70. 4 Disc. in Amer., Numbers. 5 Irish Essays, The Incom­ patibles. p. 10. 6 E., in C., The Function of Criticism.
Private morality requires also the support of the Church. "The Church is necessary, the clergy are necessary." The Church, since all require its support, is best linked to the State, and thus co-extensive with the nation. It "is properly a national society for the promotion of goodness." As the State should represent the best self and right reason, so the Church should represent the best and most reasonable morality and religion of the people. It should be "of the religion of all its citizens without the fanaticism of any of them." Religion, again, "is too great a thing, too universal a want, to be well dealt with except nationally."

A national Church will form an authoritative centre tending to make a high standard prevail, free from the eccentricities and provinciality which infect private sectarian religious bodies. Sound ideas tend to prevail more rapidly in an institution, especially a national institution, than among isolated persons. In conduct, as in thought, association assists progress: and "by coming to be more and more dwell upon and to possess men's minds more and more, the true ideal will acquire ... a fulness and force which no isolated endeavours can give to it."

A national Church, better than any other, answers to the needs of development and transition. It allows gradual continuous change. All change, but especially change in religion, must be made gradually, maintaining as far as possible the old forms to express the new spirit. "We should avoid violent revolution in the words and externals of religion. Profound sentiments are connected with them; they are aimed at the highest good, however imperfectly apprehended ... They are to be used as poetry; ... to purge and raise our view of the ideal at which they are aimed, should be our incessant endeavour." During transition, a national Church maintains these externals of religion, and the religious emotion attached to them, until the new ideas can be reconciled and adapted and made edifying. And it is the emotion that is important, the thing that may be destroyed by a too abrupt change in ideas. A national Church, then, being in closer contact than any other with the progress of the national spirit, can best adjust religious emotions and sentiments to its new ideas and new spirit without useless friction. A national Church, also, possesses naturally latitude enough for modification and development. "A historic Church cannot choose but allow the principle of development, for it is written in its institutions and history." Its tendency is to avoid stringency of definition, to leave room for growth. In England, for example, "if we look for..."
the positive beginnings and first signs of growth, of disengagement from the stock notions of popular theology... it is among Churchmen... that we shall find them. The Puritans, or Dissenters, are not in contact with the main current of national growth: their beliefs centre on a few points of doctrine rigidly defined: when the stir of growth reaches them, it comes from the national church. The historic Church of England, proceeding by development, has shown much greater freedom of mind as regards the doctrines of election, original sin, and justification, than the Nonconformists have; and has refused, in spite of Puritan pressure, to tie herself too strictly to these doctrines, to make them all in all. When great men, likewise, have appeared among the Puritans, it is from the national Church that they originate. The fruitful men of English Puritanism and Nonconformity are men who were trained within the pale of the Establishment, — Milton, Baxter, Wesley.

The national organization of religion has certain other advantages. It is an economy of effort. A swarm of private religious sects wastes power;... absorbs... force... is not good, therefore, for mental progress. Dissenting bodies have always to be on the alert in defence of the particular tenets on account of which they separated from the Establishment. Their attention is thus by so much withdrawn from the fundamentals common to both, and most necessary for progress in conduct. "One may say that to be reared a member of a national Church is in itself a lesson of religious moderation, and a help towards culture and harmonious perfection. Instead of battling for his own private forms for expressing the inexpressible and defining the indefinable, a man takes those which have commended themselves most to the religious life of his nation; and while he may be sure that within those forms the religious side of his own nature may find its satisfaction, he has leisure and composure to satisfy other sides of his nature as well." Establishments are also favourable to culture since they "tend to give us a sense of a historical life of the human spirit, outside and beyond our own fancies and feelings;... they thus tend to suggest new sides and sympathies in us to cultivate;..."

Separation from a national Church is therefore seldom justified. The aim of a Church is to be "a society for the promotion of goodness" and only when it fails in this one essential is it justifiable to separate. The English Church was thus justified in separating from the Roman Catholic Church: "it was the immoral practice of Rome that really moved her to separation. And she maintained that she merely got rid..."
of Roman corruptions which were immoral and intolerable, and remained the old, historic, Catholic Church of England still. "1 Luther was justified by the immoral practice of selling indulgences; 2 Separation from any other motive is wrong. If men have separated on account of discipline, "they were wrong, because for developing its own fit outward conditions of life the body of a community has, as we have seen, a real national power, and individuals are bound to sacrifice their fancies to it; if they separated on points of dogma they were wrong also, because, while neither they nor the Church had the means of determining such points adequately, the true instinct lay in those who, instead of separating on such points, conceded them as the Church settled them, and found their bond of union, not in notions about the co-eternity of the Son, but in the principle: Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity."3 The Puritans, since they separated from the Establishment for opinions, were not justified. Not only did they thus weaken the national effort towards goodness, they also made development impossible. For they assumed that they had the complete interpretation of the Gospel in the particular scheme of dogmas for which they separated—opinions which admit, therefore, of no modification, expansion, or development. Further, the progress of the Zeitgeist, in criticism and the widening of experience, shows that these particular dogmas rest on a misinterpretation of Paul’s doctrines. The Puritan Churches have accordingly no further reason for a separate existence. They should now unite with the Church of England. By remaining separate, they are running counter to the vital religious needs of unity and continuity. Further, by their scission, they not only weaken themselves and the general cause of religion, but also, by the opposition they create, tend to aggravate the conservatism of the national and Catholic Churches, "to extend and prolong the reign of a Catholic Church untransformed, with all its conflicts, impossibilities, miseries."4 Only a Catholic Church, Arnold believed, could supply unity and continuity in religion, together with perfect mental sanity and freedom, but only if it were transformed. "A Catholic Church transformed 16, I believe, the Church of the future."

1Prot. and the Ch. of Eng. (St. Paul and Prot.) p. 168.
2Ibid. 167. 3Ibid. 165. 4Last Essays, etc. p. 164.
For social culture, education is also essential, that it may be general, education should be universal. "There must be sufficient schools and there must be securities for their fitness". Individuals, like Bell and Lancaster, and institutions, like the Church, which supported them, had failed to provide sufficient fit schools for the nation. The laissez-faire principle had been tried and found inadequate. Even laissez-faire economists, like J. S. Mill recognized that the system could not be extended to education. The law of supply and demand might be satisfactory in matters where people could judge competently of the commodity concerned. "But", says Arnold, and Mill agreed with him, "the mass of mankind do not so well know what distinguishes good teaching from bad." Private schools, also, "want the securities which, to make them produce even half of what they offer, are indispensable—the securities of supervision and publicity." To provide sufficient schools, with these adequate securities for their fitness, it was necessary to withdraw education from private control, and put it into the hands of the only authority capable of meeting the demands—the State. A Minister of Education would require to be appointed, assisted by an Advisory Committee of educational experts.

The culture-conquest of marriage, under the protection of the State and the Church, is concerned with the instinct of reproduction. The virtue related to the reproductive instinct is chastity, or purity, and marriage is the fittest channel which culture has, in the experience of the race, found for this instinct. Arnold quotes with approval Goethe's opinion, "What culture has won of nature we ought on no account to let go again, at no price to give up. In the notion of the sacredness of marriage, Christianity has got a culture-conquest of this kind, and of priceless value, although marriage is, properly speaking, unnatural." Elsewhere Arnold quotes Renan's "Nature cares nothing about chastity." His answer is that "human nature, our nature, cares about it a good deal".

For our real self finds in purity its salvation, in the neglect of purity its ruin: "by dissoluteness", he quotes from Plato, "we feed and strengthen the beast within us, and starve the man. Dissoluteness, sensuality, or lubricity, once admitted and fostered, ... eats like a canker, and with difficulty can ever be brought to let go its hold again, but for ever tightens it. Hardness and insolence come in its train: ..."

Chastity and marriage save human nature from these. They limit and direct the reproductive instinct. They form a culture-conquest which is the greater and more valuable for the strength of the instinct it has harnessed, and the magnitude of the evils which attend its failure. "And here, indeed, in the relations between the sexes, we are on ground where to walk right is of vital concern to men, and where disaster is plentiful. Who first in the early and tentative up-struggling of our race, who first discerned them, this peril of disaster, this necessity of taking heed to one's steps? Who was he that, amid the promiscuous concubinage of man's commencements—if we suppose that out of the sheer animal life human life had to evolve itself and rise—who was he who first, through attachment to his chance companion or through attachment to his supposed offspring, gathered himself together, put a bridle on his vague appetites, marked off himself and his, drew the imperfect outline of the circle of home, and fixed for the time to come the rudiments of the family? Who first, amid the loose solicitations of sense, obeyed ... the mighty not ourselves which makes for moral order, the stream which was here carrying him, and our embryo race along with him, towards the fulfilment of the true law of their being?—became aware of it and obeyed it?"

Whoever he was, he must soon have had imitators, for never was a more decisive step taken towards bringing into human life greater order, and with greater order greater well-doing and happiness. So the example was followed, and a habit grew up, and marriage was instituted."

Sensuality leads, among other things, to seduction, a denial of purity and marriage, and of the human equality which is the basis of marriage. Seduction implies that the woman is treated, not as a human being, but as a means to the satisfaction of the man's ordinary self and current desires. It was for this reason that Arnold condemned seduction and indeed any irregularity in sex-relations.

"I dislike seduction-dramas (even in Faust the feeling tells with me)," he wrote to H. A. Jones, of his play Saints and Sinners, "and... the marriage of the heroine with her farmer does not please me as a dénouement." After reading Dowden's revelations of Shelley's 'inflammability', he wrote, "one feels sickened for ever of the subject of irregular relations." Of Goethe's connection with Christiana Vulpius, he says, "That connexion both the moralist and the man of the world may unite in condemning." Seduction is a step on the way to prostitution. Goethe, in Faust, puts this idea into the mouth of Gretchen's brother, Valentine. Hardy warns Tom Brown of it, as Elapeth indirectly warns Philip, in The Pothic of Tober-na-Vuolich; and Arnold refers to it in The Terrace at Ernes. With such consequences the rule of purity is broken in practice. "Practice may offer it a thousand contradictions, in what M. Taine calls the triste défilé, the dismal procession of the Haymarket, and in what a sage or a saint might, perhaps, in like manner call the dismal procession of the Bois de Boulogne." In the sphere of theory, "we have had argumentative systems of free love and of re-habilitation of the flesh". But the truth and necessity remain. Free Love is "fatal to progress". "And whatever now makes the perception or the rule fluctuating, does it tend," asks Arnold, "so far, not to emancipate men, but to replace him in the bondage of that old, chaotic, dark, almost ante-human time, from which slowly and painfully he had emerged when the real history and religion of our race began?"

1 God and The Bible, III. 5. 2 Letters, pp. 271-2.
3 E. in C., 2nd series, Shelley. 4 Mixed Essays, A French Critic on Goethe, p. 293. 5 Cp. Chap. 12. (Marguerite.) 6 God and the Bible, loc. cit. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
As man rises in the scale of civilization and culture, there becomes increasingly necessary a certain delicacy in the relations of man and woman. Various prohibitions, whether of law or of custom, prescribe some of the channels in which it has been found best for the less obvious feelings to flow; and it is essential to the elevation and sanctity of marriage that delicacy and refinement should thus be preserved. Arnold found his countrymen specially wanting in the observance, even in the perception, of these refinements.

Combating the Bill for enabling a man to marry his deceased wife's sister, he stigmatized it as a measure showing the want of delicacy inherent in the English middle classes. Where they failed in this direction was, "as far as the relations of love and marriage are concerned, in becoming alive to the finer shades of feeling which arise within these relations, in being able to enter with tact and sympathy into the subtle instinctive propensions and repugnances of the person with whose life his own is bound up, to make them his own, to direct and govern in harmony with them the arbitrary range of his personal action..."

As to the arguments which the Dissenting middle classes drew from Leviticus in support of this Bill, Arnold asked: "Who, that is not manacled and hoodwinked by his Hebraism, can believe that, as to love and marriage, our reason and the necessities of our humanity have their true, sufficient, and divine law expressed for them by the voice of any oriental and polygamous nation like the Hebrews? Who, I say, will believe, when he really considers the matter, that where the feminine nature, the feminine ideal, and our relations to them, are brought into question, the delicate and apprehensive genius of the Indo-European race, the race which has invented the Muses, and chivalry, and the Madonna, is to find its last word on this question in the institutions of a Semitic people, whose wisest king had seven hundred wives and three hundred concubines?"

For the same reason, Arnold condemned the English divorce courts, if not for their principle, at least for their methods. "When one looks, for instance," he says, "at the English Divorce Court,—an institution which perhaps has its practical conveniences, but which in the ideal sphere is so hideous; an institution which neither makes divorce impossible nor makes it decent, which allows a man to get rid of his wife, or a wife of her husband, but makes them drag one another first, for the public edification, through a mire of unutterable infamy,—when one looks at this charming institution ...—one may be permitted to find the marriage-theory of Catholicism refreshing and elevating."

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The Family is a culture-conquest won over the instinct of self-preservation or self-assertion. The command, "Honour thy father and thy mother", represents part of this conquest. It was justified by the addition it made to culture and order, and by the happiness which, in the nature of things, attends such conquests and additions: "... this extending of the family bond, this conquering of a little district from the mere animal life, this limiting of the reign of blind, selfish impulse, brought, we may well believe, more order into the homes of those who practised it, and with more order more well-doing, and with both more happiness." 1

Arnold's advocacy of birth-control rests partly on the perfecting of the family and partly on the more general ground of culture and equality. He quotes Senancour in this sense, "Inequality is in the nature of things; but you have increased it out of all measure, when you ought, on the contrary, to have studied to reduce it.... Either do not bring men into existence, or, if you do, give them an existence which is human." 2 He attacks roundly the Liberal fetishes of population and production under Free Trade. The Liberals argued that the increased population benefited by the increased production so far as to be able to increase their standard of living, to rise, even the lowest of them, above the subsistence-level, since production more than keeps pace with population, and since the rising level of comfort and enlightenment acts as an automatic check on population. Arnold's answer was that "as we now manage the matter, the enlarged conception of what is included in subsistence does not operate to prevent the bringing into the world of numbers of people who but just attain to the barest necessities of life or who even fail to attain to them; while, again, though production may increase as population increases, yet it seems that the production may be of such a kind, and so related, or rather non-related, to population, that the population may be little the better for it." 3

Birth-control is therefore necessary, and the education of the poor in its methods. Speaking of the London slums and the children in them, Arnold says, "And yet surely, so long as these children are there in these festering masses, without health, without home, without hope, and so long as their multitude is perpetually swelling, charged with misery they must still be for themselves, charged with misery they must still be for us ......; and the knowledge how to prevent their accumulating is necessary, even to give...."

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1 God and the Bible, III. 5. 2 Obermann. The Academy, Oct. 9, 1869. 3 Culture and Anarchy, p. 146.
their moral life and growth a fair chance!"\textsuperscript{1} And again, with a wider application: "...... to bring people into the world, when one cannot afford to keep them and oneself decently and not too precariously, or to bring more of them into the world than one can afford to keep thus, is .... just as wrong, just as contrary to the will of God, as for a man to have horses, or carriages, or pictures, when he cannot afford them, or to have more of them than he can afford; and ..... the larger the scale on which the violation of reason's law is practised, and the longer it is persisted in, the greater must be the confusion and final trouble."\textsuperscript{2}

In politics, then, in religion, in education, even in marriage, perhaps also in the region of art, the support of the State is necessary to the individual. The State alone can provide a central authority, which may be guided by right reason, to check man's natural tendency to anarchy and strengthen him in his weakness. Wilhelm von Humboldt was the sort of statesman with the sort of ideas and policy that Arnold had in mind. "He saw, of course, that, in the end, everything comes to this,—that the individual must act for himself; and he lived in a country, Germany, where people were disposed to act too little for themselves, and to rely too much on the Government. But even thus, such was his flexibility, so little was he in bondage to a mere abstract maxim, that he saw very well that for his purpose itself, of enabling the individual to stand perfect on his own foundations and to do without the State, the action of the State would for long, long years be necessary.\textsuperscript{3} It is not, then, that the individual may be suppressed, but that he may, through limitations wisely imposed and assistance wisely given, by the State, finally become able, as far as he possesses the natural capacity, to attain perfection. It is authority conferring freedom.

Beside the main powers of knowledge, conduct, and social life, culture reserves a place hardly less important for the power of beauty. This power, like the rest, is essential for the complete and harmonious perfection of the higher self, and is supported, like them, by the nature of things. There is, for example, in the universe, a "law of intellectual beauty, the eternal not ourselves that makes for intellectual beauty". Whether it appears in nature or in persons, the not ourselves that makes for beauty is dumb. But it finds expression through art, as the moral not ourselves finds expression through moral action. Nature, as Goethe says, "has no language or speech, but she creates tongues and hearts, through which she feels and speaks." It is Nature's force in the artist, the 'Daemon' in him, not under his own conscious control, that forces him to express what Nature feels. Art is thus mostly involuntary, or, as we should say, subconscious. Goethe so regarded his poetic talent. "The exercise of this poetic gift," he says, "could indeed be excited and determined by circumstances; but its most joyful, its richest action was spontaneous—nay, even involuntary." This very Nature, however," he says again,"... was subject to long pauses, and for considerable periods I was unable, even when I most wished it, to produce anything." Arnold adopted this idea:

We cannot kindle when we will
The fire that in the heart resides,
The spirit bloweth and is still,
In mystery our soul abides:

Wordsworth, in his moments of inspiration, writes, says Arnold, with power, "a force greater than himself seeming to lift him and to prompt his tongue, so that he speaks in a style far above any style of which he has the constant command, and with a truth far beyond any philosophic truth of which he has the conscious and assured possession." The power to interpret and render life "is within no poet's command; here is the part of the Muse, the inspiration, the God, the not ourselves!" So of Byron: "When he warms to his work, when he is inspired, Nature herself seems to take the pen from him as she took it from Wordsworth, and to write for him as she wrote for Wordsworth, though in a different fashion, with her own penetrating simplicity."

2. Ibid. 270. Wahrheit und Dichtung.
3. Ibid. 280-1. Morality.
5. Ibid. 155.
6. Ibid. 198-9.
Art is not so fundamental as the other human powers, but it represents a higher and more comprehensive achievement. It is built on a foundation of knowledge, conduct, and social life, with which it cannot dispense. But it rises above the attainment of any of these, considered singly. In satisfying the sense for beauty, it must also satisfy and include the other powers of life, though not aiming at usurping their special functions. Art, therefore, contains in itself a more universal degree of culture, and is more satisfactory to the harmony of the soul. It is more adequate.

Of the various arts, Arnold deals in greatest detail with poetry, which he considered the greatest and most adequate of them. "Poetry," he says, "is nothing less than the most perfect speech of man, that in which he comes nearest to being able to utter the truth." 1 "The crown of literature is poetry." 2 He quotes from Goethe with approval, as we know from Max-Müller, "I deny poetry to be an art. Neither is it a science. Poetry is to be called neither art nor science, but genius." 3

Poetry is greater, for example, than painting or music. Adopting Lessing's view of painting, Arnold says of the painter:

In outward semblance he must give
A moment's life of things that live;
Then let him choose his moment well,
With power divine its story tell! 5

The musician works in a sphere similarly limited:

Some source of feeling he must choose
And its locked fount of beauty use,
And through the stream of music tell
Its else unutterable spell;
To choose it rightly is his part,
And press into its inmost heart. 6

But the poet must do what the painter and the musician have done, though not in the same way, nor to the same extent: he must

Be painter and musician too!
The aspect of the moment show,
The feeling of the moment know! 7

and in addition he must express the movement of life:

E. in C., 2nd series, 128. 2 Ibid. 257. 3 Auld Lang Syne, p. 112. 4Intro. to Portrait Collection of the Hundred Greatest Men, Vol. I.11. 5 Epilogue to Lessing's Erocoon. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.
The thread which binds it all in one,
And not its separate parts alone!

His eye must travel down at full
The long, unpausing spectacle;¹

A difficult and dangerous task! For many are drawn
to the spectacle, fascinated.

It draws them on, they cannot save
Their feet from its alluring wave;
They cannot leave it, they must go
With its unconquerable flow.²

Many faint and fall by the way. They are ill prepared
for such a task:

Ill found in strength, in wits, are they!³

Sometimes they catch a glimpse, but they die without
ever having "mirror'd on their soul" the complete
spectacle of life.

Only a few the life-stream's shore
With safe unwandering feet explore;
Untired its movement bright attend,
Follow its windings to the end.⁴

But these few interpret life as no other artist has
done, or can do, and they have the joy of their success,
the joy of the poet.

Then from its brimming waves their eye
Drinks up delighted ecstasy,
And its deep-toned, melodious voice
For ever makes their ear rejoice.
They speak! the happiness divine
They feel, runs o'er in every line.
Its spell is round them like a shower;
It gives them pathos, gives them power.

And brightest is their glory's sheen
For greatest has their labour been.⁶

¹Epilogue to Lessing's Laocoon. ²Ibid. ³Ibid. ⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid. ⁶Ibid.
Poetry is more intellectual, more interpretative, than the other arts. It thinks much more than they do. "Along with the plastic representation it utters the idea." It is more explicative than art", and less artistic, "but in closer correspondence with the intellectual nature of man, who is defined, as we know, to be a thinking animal."  

Poetry requires a basis of thought or criticism: "the elements with which the creative power works are ideas; the best ideas, on every matter which literature touches, current at the time; at any rate we may lay it down as certain that in modern literature no manifestation of the creative power not working with these can be very important or fruitful." Poetry is necessary, concreteness and a command of metre and language are necessary, but thought, and the criticism of life that issues from thought, are fundamental. It is the weakness of the English Romantic poets "that they had their source in a great movement of feeling, not in a great movement of mind." "It is a great deal", Arnold wrote to his mother,"to give one true feeling in poetry, but I do not at present very much care for poetry unless it can give me true thought as well."

Such, poets, is your bride, the Muse! young, gay, Radiant, adorn'd outside; a hidden ground Of thought and of austerity within.

It is not the business of poetry to supply the ideas by which the complex spectacle of the modern age is to be interpreted; that is the work of philosophy. Neither is poetry concerned to determine which among these ideas are most adequate; that is the work of criticism. But it is the business of poetry to know and interpret man and the world. Since these, especially in modern times, are "very complex things, the creation of a modern poet, to be worth much, implies a great critical effort behind it;..." Poetry is, briefly, a criticism or interpretation of life, a judgement of value, made "conformably to the laws of poetic truth and poetic beauty". Poetry thus presupposes an effort on the part of philosophy and criticism. Poetic interpretation differs from philosophy or criticism, however, in adding to their ideas the power of emotion and joy, and the intimate contact of its magic.

Poetry interprets man and nature, and in proportion to the efficacy of its interpretation it has a moral and a natural magic. "The grand power of poetry is its
interpretative power; by which I mean, not a power of drawing out in black and white an explanation of the mystery of the universe, but the power of so dealing with things as to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new, and intimate sense of them, and of our relations with them. When this sense is awakened in us, as to objects without us, we feel ourselves to be in contact with the essential nature of those objects, to be no longer oppressed and bewildered by them, but to have their secret, and to be in harmony with them; and this feeling calms and satisfies us as no other can.¹ 
Maurice de Guérin, for example, had this "most profound and delicate sense of the life of Nature, and the most exquisite felicity in finding expressions to render that sense."² "To make magically near and real the life of Nature, and man's life only so far as it is a part of that Nature, was his faculty: .... This faculty always has for its basis a peculiar temperament, an extraordinary delicacy of organisation and susceptibility to impressions; in exercising it the poet is in a great measure passive (Wordsworth thus speaks of a wise passiveness); he aspires to be a sort of human Aeolian harp, catching and rendering every rustle of Nature."³

Poetry interprets also by having moral profundity. It interprets, that is, "by expressing, with inspired conviction, the ideas and laws of the mind inward world of man's moral and spiritual nature."⁴ It consists in "the noble and profound application of ideas to life;... the ideas

"On man, on nature, and on human life,"

which he has acquired for himself."⁵ Such ideas Arnold calls moral ideas, and such profundity, moral profundity. He is careful to point out, of course, that he uses the word 'moral' in a very wide sense. 'Whatever bears upon the question, "how to live", comes under it."⁶ He makes it clear that he does not intend by it either moral or didactic poems, strictly so called: he means poetry dealing with life on a wide basis of thought. Neither does he intend philosophic poetry. Wordsworth's formal philosophy, his 'scientific system of thought',¹ seven importance for his value as a poet. It is rather a hindrance to our appreciation: "we cannot do him justice until we dismiss his formal philosophy."⁷

¹ E. in C., M. de Guérin. ²Ibid. ³Ibid. ⁴Ibid. ⁵Ibid.
Poetry thus combines a moral with an intellectual interpretation or deliverance. The best poetry provides a moral deliverance, not only in the profundity of its interpretation of man, but also in its silent effect on the character of those who maintain contact with it.

"The mighty power of poetry ..., resides chiefly in the refining and elevation wrought in us by the high and rare excellence of the great style. We may feel the effect without being able to give ourselves a clear account of its cause, but the thing is so." ¹ For the great, or 'grand', style is the product of the 'high seriousness' which is Nature's greatest gift to the poet, "the σοφιστεία, the high and excellent seriousness, which Aristotle assigns as one of the grand virtues of poetry", ² and which "comes from absolute sincerity". ³ Along with the grand style goes also truth of interpretation. Poetry in the grand style is therefore silently formative both morally and intellectually, in those who come under its influence.

Poetry possesses, moreover, a universality lacking to every other interpretation of life. It satisfies the intellect, the emotions, morality, and art. It is superior to the purely intellectual interpretation given at any time by science or philosophy, and to the purely moral interpretation given by moral and social codes or by religion. "More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us." ⁴ Accordingly, "it is to the poetical literature of an age that we must, in general, look for the most perfect, the most adequate interpretation of that age—for the performance of a work which demands the most energetic and harmonious activity of all the powers of the human mind. Because that activity of the whole mind ..., is in poetry at its highest stretch and in its most energetic exertion." ⁵

Poetry is greater than science by its universality. Science appeals to the intellect alone. Where poetry has natural magic, "the interpretations of science do not give us this intimate sense of objects ..., they appeal to a limited faculty, and not to the whole man." ⁶ Science, in itself, and by itself, becomes in the end, to all but a few specialists, unsatisfying. For it remains isolated from the sense of beauty and the sense of conduct. It has not engaged the emotions and affections. ⁷ The mediæval universities and their education did relate the little knowledge they had to the other powers of man, and to his emotions. Their ideas are gone, and new scientific ideas stand in their place. But these ideas have not yet been related to the rest of life, and are therefore, by themselves, wearying and unsatisfying.

"Science thinks, but not emotionally. It adds thought to thought, accumulates the elements of a synthesis which will never be complete until it is touched with beauty and emotion; and when it is touched with these, it has passed out of the sphere of science, it has felt the fashioning hand of the poet." Science is thus less interpretative than poetry, which heightens with emotion the idea given by science. "This is what we feel to be interpretative for us, to satisfy us—thought, but thought invested with beauty, with emotion." How precisely poetry achieves this, Arnold admits that he does not know. It certainly does so. The best art, poetry and eloquence have a fortifying, and elevating and quickening and suggestive power, capable of wonderfully helping us to relate the results of modern science to our need for conduct, our need for beauty. Hence the farther science advances and the more it replaces old conceptions by new, the greater will be the need for poetry and eloquence.3

Poetry is greater than religion by its permanence. Poetry "attaches its emotion to the idea", religion to the fact. The modern spirit dissolves and discredits the historical facts of religion. "There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has materialised itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it."4

So with philosophy. "The philosophies", says Arnold, "are so perishable that to call up the memory of them is to pass in review man's failures .... And the one philosopher who has known how to give to such constructions, not indeed solidity, but charm, is Plato, the poet among philosophers, who produces his abstractions like the rest, but produces them more than half in play and with a smile."5 Arnold speaks again of "our philosophy, plumbing itself on its reasonings about causation and finite and infinite being; what are they but the shadows and dreams and false shows of knowledge?" He prefers to consider philosophers, like religious thinkers, as contributors to the progress of culture than as builders of systems. Spinoza, for example, is "a just and fruitful subject of contemplation much more by virtue of what spirit he is of than by virtue of what system of doctrine he elaborates."6

Poetry thus rises above religion on one side and science and philosophy on the other. It is the most complete interpretation of the universe. It gives, like science and philosophy, an understanding of man and nature; in the form of tragedy, it produces in us, like religion, "a sentiment of sublime acquiescence in the course of fate, and in the dispensations of human life"; while by its metrical form, "the very limit gives a sense of precision and emphasis" which "rises, as the thought and emotion swell higher and higher without overflowing their boundaries, to a lofty sense of the mastery of the human spirit over its own stormiest agitations." 2

The future is with poetry, the greatest of the arts. "Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry." 3

Preface to Merope. 1 Ibid. 3 E. in C., 2nd series, The Study of Poetry.
II. England's Culture.
Such was the general scheme, or as much of it as he considered it necessary or convenient to express, that Arnold applied to England and the English. He applied it piecemeal, according to the occasion, determining the application both by the more permanent needs of England and by her situation at any given moment.

The permanent genius of England, he thought, lay in a combination of "energy with honesty." These are pre-eminently moral qualities. England's contribution to culture, her attainments in culture, are thus pre-eminently along the line of morality and religion.

"No people in the world has done more to attain ... moral perfection than our English race has." But on the other lines of culture England is wanting. Her Hebraism, her religion, has been won at the expense of art, manners, and knowledge. The defect on these lines vitiates Hebraism itself, since no element of culture is perfect in isolation. Morality without knowledge, art and manners, is a limited affair. The moral perfection reached by England, great as it is, cannot be other than a relative perfection, even in its own sphere. Only by correcting its own preponderance, by introducing other elements, can Hebraism complete its own perfection and that of England.

The moral progress of England is due, in the main, to the middle class: and the defects of the middle class in the other spheres of culture are the greater for the prominence they have given to morality. It was to this class, then, that Arnold chiefly addressed his efforts. "The master-thought by which my politics are governed is .... The thought of the bad civilization of the English middle class." By the Reform Bill of 1832, they were already the governing class. They formed a defective and undesirable governing class, for they suffered from "a defective type of religion, a narrow range of intellect and knowledge, a stunted sense of beauty, a low standard of manners."+

The preponderating tendency to Hebraism in England found its strangest expression in the religion of the middle class,—Puritanism. Puritanism was originally a reaction provoked in the middle class by the side of moral weakness in the Renascence; at the beginning of the seventeenth century, "the great English middle class, the kernel of the nation, ... entered the prison of

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Puritanism and had the key turned on its spirit there for two hundred years”. In this captivity, the English nation lost touch with the main current of European culture, which was advancing on the line of science and knowledge, its true line at that period. Puritanism was thus a side-current. “Far more than two hundred years the main stream of man’s advance has moved towards knowing himself and the world ....; the main impulse of a great part, and that the strongest part, of our nation has been towards strictness of conscience”.

But the basis of morality given by Puritanism remains a better than any other on which to establish the harmonious structure of culture. Arnold freely recognized the value of this basis. “I do not wish it”, he says, “to remain in possession of the field for ever, or too long. But as a stage and a discipline, and as means for enabling that poor inattentive and immoral creature, man, to love and appropriate and make part of his being divine ideas, on which he could not otherwise have laid and kept hold, the discipline of Puritanism has been invaluable; and the more I read history, the more I see of mankind, the more I recognize its value.

We insisted, however, with equal or greater emphasis, on the defects of Puritanism, and equally braced himself to expand its knowledge, art, and manners.

England’s lag in science and knowledge made it now necessary for her as quickly as possible to make up the ground lost in that direction. If done in the right spirit, this need not injure morality. “Now, and for us”, says Arnold, “it is a time to Hellenize; for we have Hebraised too much, and have over-valued doing. But the habits and discipline received from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal possession; and, as humanity is constituted, one must never assign to them the second rank to-day, without being prepared to restore them to the first rank to-morrow ....”. Arnold’s religious writing was thus rather in the sphere of Hellenism than in that of Hebraism. Its final object was indeed to preserve religion and conduct, but it aimed at doing so by putting religion and conduct on a more consistent basis of reason and knowledge. “So true and prophetic are Vínet’s words: ‘We must,' he said, ‘make it our business to bring forward the rational side of Christianity,....’” St. Paul and Protestantism develop the theses that the Puritans have misinterpreted St. Paul’s teaching, chiefly through lack of that Hellenism, or spirit of criticism against which they had reacted. “What in St. Paul is secondary

1. E. in C., Heine. 2. Culture and Anarchy, p. 103.
3. Discourses in America (Numbers), pp. 70-1.
and subordinate, Puritanism has made primary and essential; what in St. Paul is figure and belongs to the sphere of feeling, Puritanism has transported into the sphere of intellect and made formula. On the other hand, what is with St. Paul primary, Puritanism has treated as subordinate; and what is with him thesis, and belonging ... to the sphere of intellect, Puritanism has made image and figure."  

In Literature and Dogma, Arnold extended the same thesis and criticism to the Bible as a whole. "To understand that the language of the Bible is fluid, passing, and literary, not rigid, fixed, and scientific, is the first step towards a right understanding of the Bible."  

God and the Bible defended and carried farther the arguments of Literature and Dogma. Last Essays on Church and Religion dealt more directly with the Puritans, or Dissenters, and their separation from the Church of England: and made some final comments on the nature of Christian theory and dogma.

Arnold was no more blind to the faults of the English Church than to the faults of its dogma. His adolescent doubts and investigations had ensured that. "Some reconstruction of the English Church", he wrote in 1863, "... is becoming fast inevitable." Again he says, "It is not easy for a reflecting man, who has studied its origin, to feel any vehement enthusiasm for Anglicanism; Henry the Eighth and his parliaments have taken care of that." Yet he never wavered in his opinion that the Church of England, as a national institution for the promotion of goodness, was the best means to religion and morality that England possessed, the "most beneficent social and civilizing agent", the most secure "shelter and basis for culture". Therefore, he argued, the Puritans ought to unite with the English Church. It is national. It has culture. It is comprehensive. It has the historical tradition, and allows for progress. It is eminently reasonable. "To make its operations, therefore, more effectual, all good men ought to unite in it." He adds that "the objections of the Protestant Dissenters to uniting in it are trivial." He concludes, "the more the sense of religion grows, and of religion in a large way ...... the more will the present attitude, objections, and complaints of the Dissenters indiscourage men's minds to them. They will, I firmly believe, lose ground; ......" So he takes leave of "this whole barren and retarding question of Church and Dissent."  

The narrowness of English middle class religion is chiefly due to deficiency in knowledge and criticism, to lack of ideas. The function of criticism is to stir
the mind to activity by allowing a stream of fresh thought and ideas to play freely on its stock notions and habits. Arnold assisted, as far as he could, this play of ideas. He brought England into contact with every other important civilization and its ideas, as the Essays in Criticism best illustrates. By these essays he made familiar in England much of the best in English literature, the culture of Greece and Rome, the ideas of Germany, the application of ideas of France, the charm of Celtic literature, Heine and Spinoza, Dante, Emerson and Tolstoi.¹

But the main instrument by which he hoped to see an effective change worked in the English middle class was education. It was the education of the middle class, he said, in private schools like Dotheboys' Hall, that "helps to produce in them ... a narrow range of intellect and knowledge."² With an education of this kind, their instinct for intellect and knowledge "has been maltreated and starved; because the schools for this class, where it should have called forth and trained this instinct, are the worst of the kind anywhere."³ With the English middle class schools, Arnold contrasts the public schools of the Continent. It was the contrast which he had found on his first visit in 1858, that determined his attitude to English education and social life. "For twenty years, then,—ever since I had to go about the Continent to learn what the schools were like there.... I have felt convinced that for the progress of our civilisation, here in England, three things were above all necessary:—... public schools for the middle classes."⁴ To transform the middle classes, one had first to transform their education. This can be done only with the assistance of the State. To bring education under state-control thus became one of the central aims of Arnold's life, an aim achieved partly during his life-time by the Education Act of his brother-in-law, W. E. Forster, and brought nearer complete realization since his death.

The actual education of the middle classes was partly responsible also for their 'stunted sense of beauty'. The improvement of their schools would therefore help to remove this defect also. In the same direction Arnold lent his influence to the revival and re-organization of the theatre. He went so far as to suggest that the theatre should, like the schools, be taken under the care of the State. "Let Liberal statesmen", he says, "despise and neglect for the cure of our present imperfection no means, whether of public schools, now wanting, or of the theatre, now left to

itself and to chance, or of anything else which may powerfully conduce to the communication and propagation of real intelligence, and of real beauty, and of a life really humane." He points to the French theatre as an example of what can be done by organization, and of how it may be done—"a society of good actors with a grant from the State on condition of their giving with frequency the famous and classic stage-plays of their nation, and with a commissioner of the State attached to the society and taking part in council with it.

The society was self-governing, and was run in connexion with the school of dramatic elocution at the Conservatoire. England, with its Elizabethan drama, the plays of the Restoration and of Goldsmith and Sheridan, with her great actors, and a growing demand for the theatre, could imitate the success of the French. "I see", he says, "the middle class beginning to arrive at the theatre again after an abstention of two centuries and more, arriving eager and curious, but a little bewildered." And, indeed, in his last years, he did see the first of the revival and to interest himself in the new dramatists, like Henry Arthur Jones.

In the extension of the reading of good literature, Arnold saw yet another powerful stimulus to the sense for beauty in the English middle class. The best in literature is in itself formative. He therefore advocated, again on the French model, the publication of cheap books, or cheap editions of the best books.

The defective education of the English middle classes is also responsible, with their disproportionate attachment to religion, for their "low standard of social life and manners". The lack of manners and courtesy had made itself felt especially in England's dealings with the Irish, "who have by nature excellent manners themselves, and .... feel the charm of manners instinctively". The hard, imperfect, English civilization, and its want of courtesy, repelled them. One of the characteristic defects of the English, as their civilization stands, is coarseness, want of delicacy and refinement. "They adhere rigidly to the laws of morality which are clearly laid down for them. But outside this defined region, "in the wide region of uncertain ground, where rules of action cannot be prescribed, and where men must guide themselves by consideration for the feelings of others", the Hebraised member of the middle class, through his lag in knowledge, manners, and art, "was altogether or almost a stranger". This verdict, passed by Froude on Henry viii, was likewise passed by Arnold on the English middle class.

They wanted delicacy. Froude continues, "Such consideration is a virtue which can be learned only in the society of equals, where necessity obliges men to practise it." ¹

English middle class culture, with these its defects, may be aptly summarized as Philistinism: "on the side of beauty and taste, vulgarity; on the side of morals and feeling, coarseness; on the side of mind and spirit, unintelligence,—this is Philistinism".² It is almost endemic in England because she has lacked the flexibility necessary to transfer her main effort from Hebraism to other lines of culture; the authority to provide a fit education for her citizens; and the equality which social life demands for manners and delicacy.

Culture should also be general. The equality for lack of which England lacks manners and social life, is the greatest obstacle also to the extension of culture to all classes. Without equality, culture cannot become general. Now England consists of "three distinct and unfused bodies,—Barbarians, Philistines, Populace".³ This threefold classification is, of course, approximate. Arnold admits, for example, "that the middle class has no naturally defined limits, that it is difficult to say who properly belong to it and who do not ... ."³ His own test was an educational one: the middle class meant "those who are brought up at establishments which are more or less like Salem House, and by educators who are more or less like Mr. Creakle".⁵ Even this test, however, fails in accuracy, for "there is a certain portion broken off at the top which is educated at better [establishments]".⁶ In general, too, the middle class, so educated, "comes between those who labour with their hands, on the one side, and people of fortune on the other ... ."⁷ The main distinction is clear enough, in spite of cross-classifications or wavering boundaries.

Above the middle class are the Barbarians—the aristocracy. It is a survival of the feudal system, and must and will disappear. It is a class materialised, with a culture chiefly external. The culture of the Barbarians is largely physical: they have "the passion for field-sports;... The care of the Barbarians for the body, and for all manly exercises; the vigour, good looks, and fine complexion which they acquired and perpetuated in their families by these means,—all this may be observed still in our aristocratic class".⁸ Their ideals have been "worldly splendour, security, power, and pleasure".⁹

Their culture lies also in the sphere of social life and manners. They excel in chivalry, "with its characteristics of high spirit, choice manners, and distinguished bearing". The excess of this quality in their culture is a power of "haughty resistance" which makes them valuable in an epoch of concentration, when the established order is to be defended. Their defect of the same quality in them is evident in their "want of sense of the flux of things, for the inevitable transitoriness of all human institutions; in an age of expansion they are bewildered and helpless: they then show "an excessive and pusillanimous uneasiness for resistance." This defect is chiefly due to a fatal want of ideas, which are essential in a time of expansion. An aristocracy is naturally inaccessible to ideas. Already in 1849, Arnold noted their stupidity. To the instinct for intellect and knowledge ... the aristocratic class and its agents, the Tory statesmen, give no satisfaction. To large and clear ideas of the future and of its requirements, whether at home or abroad, aristocracies are by nature inaccessible."

On the side of beauty—so defective is English culture as a whole—the aristocracy makes almost the sole contribution. They give "some satisfaction .... to this baffled and starved instinct for beauty, by the spectacle of a splendour, and grace, and elegance of life, due to inherited wealth and traditional refinement; and to the instinct for fit and seemly forms of social intercourse they give some satisfaction too." In general, up till the present age, Arnold admits, the aristocracy has governed well. "Formerly your aristocracy led; it commanded the politics of the country; it had an aristocracy's ideas,—limited enough, but the idea of the country's grandeur and dignity was among them;—it took your middle and lower class along with it, and it made the great war which the battle of Waterloo crowned." The work of the old era was to prevent the formation of a second Roman Empire, and to maintain a store of free, rich, various national lives for the future to work with and bring to harmony. This was a work of force, of energy; it was a work for an aristocratical power .... You were an great aristocratical power, and did it." The aristocratical spirit, of which Waterloo was the triumph, found expression chiefly in Scott and Byron: "Scott expressing its robust, genial conservatism, holding by a thousand roots to the past; Byron its defiant force and indomitable pride".

Even in Arnold's own day, the aristocracy as a whole was "the best, the most energetic, the most capable, the honestest upper class which the world has ever seen". They had done, and were doing, indispensable work in training, guiding, and protecting the nation; but in an epoch of expansion and ideas, and before the advancing tide of equality, they could not endure: "the English aristocratical system, splendid fruits as it has undoubtedly borne, must go".

The Populace, as a class, "is still an embryo... not having the same experience and self-knowledge as the aristocratic and middle classes. Honesty it no doubt has, ... but ... in an untrained and inchoate state". Its excellence lies in its powers of sympathy and action. The excess of this mean quality is its inclination to mob-action and violence; its defect is the want of sympathy and action. It is brutalised. This is the class that suffers most from the prevailing inequality. Arnold quotes De Tocqueville's explanation "the common people is more uncivilised in aristocratic countries than in any others, because there, where persons so powerful and so rich are met with, the weak and the poor feel themselves overwhelmed, as it were, with the weight of their own inferiority; not finding any point by which they may recover equality, they despair of themselves altogether, and suffer themselves to fall into degradation".

While the classes of England are thus unequal and unfused, "France is fused into one nation by the military spirit, and by her democracy, the great legacy of 1789, and subsisting even amidst her present corruption". In reducing her social inequality, and fusing together her three classes, England has thus obviously something to learn from France. She must, like France, reduce "those immense inequalities of condition and property ... of which, our land system is the base". With this aim in view, Arnold recurs frequently to the essential difference between the English and the French land systems. Drawing his information from the Code Napoleon, from his own acquaintance with France, and perhaps from Mill's Political Economy, he shows how Napoleon's laws of inheritance have reduced inequality by breaking up the feudal estates and encouraging the métayer system; while the English laws of primogeniture and entail, feudal in their nature and at one time necessary, have maintained inequality by preserving beyond their season the estates of the aristocracy. England's need, then,

by causing the subdivision of large estates, either through a modified law of inheritance or otherwise, to effect a wider and more equal distribution of land. This change, Arnold thought, would reduce "the power and aloofness of the aristocracy", and the inequality which so weighs on the Populace.

As in France, also, there is required in England a genuine municipal system in the country districts as well as in the towns. "Nothing", says Arnold, "struck me more, both in France and elsewhere on the Continent, than the working of the municipality and municipal council as established everywhere, and to observe how it was the basis of all local affairs, and the right basis." The introduction of a municipal system in the country districts of England would form for the English agricultural labourer, for example, "a first and invaluable stage in political education; more helpful by far, because so much more constant, than the exercise of the parliamentary franchise". For experience has established "that it is well for any great class and description of men in society to be able to say for itself what it wants, and not to have other classes, the so-called educated and intelligent classes, acting for it as its proctors, and supposed to understand its wants and to provide for them".

It is also in the interest of the Populace to further the establishment of sound secondary education for the middle class, who would soon have completely in their hands the government of England and of themselves. For want of such education, too, the best members of the Populace would have no facilities by which they could rise into the social stratum above them, "to the great advantage of society".

"For twenty years, then," wrote Arnold in Irish Essays, summing up his social programme, "... I have felt convinced that for the progress of our civilisation, here in England, three things were above all necessary: a reduction of those immense inequalities of condition and property amongst us, of which our land system is the base; a genuine municipal system; and public schools for the middle classes." The first would reduce the power and aloofness of the aristocracy; the municipal system would allow a voice to the agricultural labourer and begin his political education; while the middle classes, whom the lower classes will emulate, will be brought nearer to a liberal and cultured life by a fit education.

To persuade England to adopt these means for improving her social culture, it was necessary to combat the prevailing English tendency to laissez-faire and individualism, and the prevailing fear of the State. English ideals tended to favour the action of the ordinary self, both in the individual and in the community. The ideals of the ordinary self of England are exhibited chiefly in her politics and commerce; in politics, by the party system, in economics by the theory of laissez-faire. These are alike impatient of the control and restriction necessary for real culture: and alike represent an outward, mechanical, selfish conception of life, opposed to the inwardness, which, with harmony and universality, real culture demands.

The English economic theory, expressed in free trade and non-intervention by the State, was an application to commerce of the ordinary self. It allowed the subordination of social welfare to ruthless competitive profit-making, ignoring the harm that ensued to its victims. It was a denial of culture, an assertion of unlimited licence and selfishness. Froude, who, like Goethe and Arnold, viewed history as a series of culture-conquests, makes clear this attitude: "to have beaten back", he says, "or even to have struggled against and stemmed in ever so small a degree, those besetting base-nesses of human nature, now held so invincible that the influences of them are assumed as the fundamental axioms of economic science; this appears to me a greater victory than Agincourt, a grander triumph of wisdom and faith and courage than even the English constitution or the English liturgy." ¹ In the sixteenth century, the State limited the self-assertion of the individual in the interest of the nation; the State will require, though not necessarily in the same way, to limit the "basenesses of human nature" embodied in the laissez-faire economic practice of the nineteenth. Considerations of inward culture must often be lent force enough from the State to outweigh considerations of economics, the claims of the inward to outweigh those of the external self.

Party politics, similarly, reflect the self-interest of each class, its desire to do as it likes, irrespective of the interests of the nation as a whole. Classes seek their own interests in this way for want of intellectual and moral, that is, inward, power to rise above their own catchwords, stock notions, and habits, to intelligent ideas of what is required by a particular national situation and of the needs of the nation as they vary with progress and occasion. They follow catchwords and habits "staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically". Ideas themselves have become mere outward symbols to which they have blindly and out of self-interest attached themselves, and from the tyranny of which, when outworn, they cannot win free; instead of inward and vital conceptions, held only so long as true and applicable, to be willingly abandoned when better are available. The aristocracy are impervious to ideas, the middle classes are too devoted to Hebraism to give them proper attention, the populace have few or none for want of education or intelligence.

The State, then, representing the nation in its corporate capacity, that is, its best intelligence and morality, must control the selfish and unenlightened aspirations of individual classes and parties. But more is needed than mere restraint or control by the State. Classes and individuals themselves must be transformed, taught to realise the best interests of the nation and to prefer these to their private interests, to party or laissez-faire. They must be transformed inwardly, made to feel that their ideals, for true happiness, ought to be "in an internal condition separable from wealth".

To inculcate State-action, to stress the need for morality in politics, to apply ideas to current political practice and social life, to dissolve stock notions and habits, to advocate all methods, such as education and the printing of cheap books, by which ideas might be brought more freely into circulation, to ridicule existing unintelligent methods, and to contrast with them the methods of other countries,—these became with Arnold the elements of a general effort to substitute inwardness for mechanism in England. On the moral side, he strove for the preservation and enlarging of the national religion and morality; for in the end it was by these alone that the State, or the rulers of the

State, could govern. Without these, self-interest in individuals, classes and parties, anarchy, all the evils of uncontrolled democracy; but with these, the possibility of the higher self, control of economic laissez-faire and political parties in the best interests of the nation, reduction of mechanism and increase of true inward culture.

To persuade the English people of their shortcomings, to make their culture harmonious, general, and inward, was a matter of immense difficulty for one man, even if assisted, as Arnold was, by a few like-minded friends. He had to bring all his resources to bear on the task, and they must needs be efficient. His chief weapon, apart from his general basis of long-revolved ideas, was his prose style. Style did not come easily to Arnold, and he had been long in its developing. "The prose style which is so much admired," says William Sharp, "was no unacquired faculty, and the present writer well remembers hearing Mr. Arnold emphasise the fact that he had spent years of rigorous technical training in the literary use of the English language." 1 The main reason for Arnold's difficulty in evolving a fit prose is plain enough. He excelled, as was natural to his abstract type of mind, in seizing leading ideas, and in expressing them briefly. The practice of summarising, to which Dr. Arnold gave so much time, accentuated this natural tendency. He was less successful, however, in deploying his concentrated ideas, in connecting them into a unified work in a prose that should be natural and flowing. It was the art of expansion and transition that he had to acquire. The want of it can be clearly seen in his earlier prose, like England and the Italian Question, and even in Essays in Criticism, where the style tends to be too compressed and "gnomic." 2 Only by careful attention to the "dovetailed" style of the Greeks, by a study of French prose, by reading and hearing J. H. Newman, by avoiding the "infinitely repellent particles" 3 of Emerson, did Arnold attain the "requisite wholeness of good tissue" 4 the "ordo concatenatioque veri," 5 which was to him the foundation of prose. Expansion and connection once mastered, however, Arnold had at his command a style unrivalled for effectiveness. It combined with the smoothness of Greek or French prose the concreteness and concentration of his natural gnomic power. His nephew, William Thomas Arnold, who had apparently learned something from him in this

direction, illustrates both the general method and its value: "I read through all those letters to supply myself with six short quotations. But then they will come in so happily——. I feel more and more that a general style of lecturing is felt to be vague and leaves little impression if it is not lit up in this sort of way." Such quotations, or compressed phrases of his own, served with Arnold as a nucleus round which to weave his web of prose. They were concrete, clear, and memorable. To add to their effectiveness, he used unblushingly the repetition which, from his experience of education, he knew to be essential to the teaching of his lesson. In later years, he sometimes allowed it to become a mannerism; but generally he confined its use to justifiable ridicule or concentration, and used it successfully. Its effectiveness can be measured by the number of expressions that he threw into circulation. Repetition was also an effective substitute for controversy, which he always tried to avoid. He did not reply to criticism, unless he had something new to add: it entailed a waste of time and energy which he could not afford, besides carrying him no farther forward in his mission. For this reason, he took an example from Benjamin Franklin, setting forth his opinions, accompanied by some phrase like "I say", "It seems to me", or "I will not discuss". When his opinions were challenged, he simply repeated them, trusting to time and to common sense to make them prevail. In addition, he at times adopted, both for defence and attack, the attitude of Socratic irony—dissociating himself from the pedantic systems of philosophers and specialists, and donning the armour of common sense and assumed ignorance.

The whole scheme for England's culture, thus effectively presented, centres therefore on one point, the need for some authority to counteract the excessive individualism of English life and character. The only authority capable of assuming the functions required is the State. English individualism must be corrected—not destroyed, for it is a good enough thing in its place—by State-action. But it must be a State above party interest, representing the best mind of the nation, and criticised and assisted by the most cultured minds in the country.

In politics, such an authority can alone control the selfish interests of parties and classes and ensure the safety of a democracy. This alone can provide for all classes the necessary local self-government, which forms so essential a part of their political education. Only the State can afford means of culture to individuals and societies which could not provide it, or provide it so well, for themselves. In the Church, the State will corroborate the best effort of the nation towards morality. In art, it may encourage a side of culture too much neglected among the English people. While an Academy like the French might not be possible in England, some such central authority, whether under the State or not, would help to counteract the provinciality of English literature and criticism. Arnold saw clearly that in no other way could English culture be so effectively served, as things then stood, as by the increase of the authority of the State in all, or almost all, directions.
21. Conclusion.
Conclusion.

Such, in outline, were the youth and leading ideas of Matthew Arnold: the system of ideas which he formed, mainly between 1840 and 1850, and the application he gave to them in Victorian England. Beginning with an unworldly training and outlook, he passed during adolescence through a rebellious and idealistic romanticism into a romantic melancholy, deepened by constitutional and external factors, but relieved by fits of hilarity. He took refuge, first in the stoicism of Senancour, later in mysticism; and found a final cure in the limitation of desires and ideals learned from the poetry of Wordsworth and the culture of Goethe. The ideal of culture he developed and articulated to cover his own activities and those of England.

With the possible exception of S. P. Sherman's Matthew Arnold: how to know him, no adequate interpretation of Arnold's work has yet been generally received, or indeed produced. The few men, like John Morley, or Thomas Hardy, or even Leslie Stephen, who might have written such a full appreciation, have left only fragments: while most others have touched no more than superficially or with prejudice on the externals of his work. It is, in itself, a significant corroboration of Arnold's view of English criticism that among the enormous mass of writing on his work, almost nothing has touched the heart of it or touched it as a whole.

The reasons lie in the nature and scope of his work and in the methods he used. His work is not, and did not pretend to be, scientifically or philosophically complete; it is approximate and unfinished. But it was planned as a whole, consciously and deliberately. It was executed as a whole. Arnold had a clearly conceived and closely interrelated set of ideas, of which everything he did, whether in personal life or in literature, was a partial expression. More than any man of his age, he set the current of his life to one clear goal,—culture for himself and society,—to the attainment of which all his action was both subordinate and, as far as practicable, auxiliary. His life and work are best described as an attempt to make of them a work of art, in the Greek style; in his own words, "fit details strictly combined, in view of a large general result nobly conceived."

1. See the scheme given in the Appendix.
2. Discourses in America, p. 133.
But the details, so various and so scattered, have obscured the large general result which Arnold conceived. He wrote for a particular public, seizing particular opportunities and using particular methods which were likely to prove specially effective. He was flexible. He was topical and occasional. He was therefore fragmentary. This is pre-eminently true of his critical essays—a form which in itself implies fragmentary treatment. His essay on Heine, for example, treats him mainly as a liberator of humanity, a disseminator of ideas, and touches very lightly on his moral side. Arnold wished, in this essay, to inculcate on England the value of ideas. But in his letters, he lays more stress on Heine's moral weakness. To his mother, he wrote, 'He has a great deal of power, though more trick; however, he has thoroughly disgusted me. The Byronism of a German, of a man trying to be gloomy, cynical, impassioned, moqueur, etc., all à la fois, with their honest bonhomistic language and total want of experience of the kind that Lord Byron, an English peer with access everywhere, possessed, is the most ridiculous thing in the world..... I see the French call this Heine a "Voltaire au clair de lune", which is very happy.' And to J. L. Davies, 'That man was a genius who could really use his tools! What perfection of cleverness he has, as clear as Voltaire he is, and with all the depth of Germany. But he was a precious scamp for all that.' A similar collection of Arnold's occasional criticisms, would thus tend, in others of his literary judgments, to restore the balance which so often leans in the Essays in Criticism.

Arnold's irony has also been the cause of much misunderstanding and inadequate criticism. It was too subtle for the majority of Englishmen. His general Socratic profession of ignorance has been accepted at its face value: his admission of his ignorance of the Celtic languages and literatures has been allowed to depreciate a book where, apart from various linguistic conjectures, Arnold is as sound as anywhere; his professed ignorance of philosophy, is still used as evidence that he had little or no knowledge of philosophy. Because he avoided controversy and arguments, he threw himself open to the charge of dogmatism. His politeness and restraint have given the impression of coldness or weakness.

1. Letters, I. 910. 2. C. L. Davies, From a Victorian Pest-Bag, p. 76.
But perhaps the main source of misinterpretation both of the man and his work lies in ignorance and misunderstanding of his youth, and failure to relate it to his later life. Partly this is Arnold's own doing. He attached extreme importance to his work and its effect on English Culture, and relatively little importance to himself as the channel through which the work was done. Chiefly for this reason, so far as we can judge, he preferred that no official biography of him should be written; that his negative, rebellious, melancholy years should be forgotten in the positive work of his maturity; and that his letters, if published, should, omitting this period, begin with his twenty-sixth year, the opening of his ' firmer manhood'. Comparative ignorance has thus, until recently, shrouded Arnold's youth, and allowed attention to be focussed on his work and teaching.

Attention has now been turned, however, on his youth, and the lack of definite information leaves to speculation a free field. It is only by a real and balanced interpretation of his youth that the errors of such speculation can now be corrected and attention again centred on the work rather than on the life of Arnold. Conjectures have gained plausibility from the early poems, which, being ' vague and indeterminate', lend themselves admirably to various theories, and which can in their turn be understood by a more adequate knowledge of the circumstances in which they were written. The conclusions hitherto drawn, naturally with insufficient knowledge, are responsible for the so-called 'Marguerite' theory, and for what may be termed the 'Jeremiah' view of Arnold.

The 'Marguerite' theory has arisen out of recent study of Dr. Arnold1 and of Matthew Arnold's early poems. It is largely a product of anti-Victorian or anti-Puritan bias, which assumes that Arnold was a Puritan and a Victorian. According to this theory, Matthew is related to his stern father by means of a father-complex, the operation of which, in the absence of other evidence, is illustrated from the 'Marguerite' poems. His father's posthumous influence having put an end to an early love-affair with 'Marguerite', Arnold is then supposed to take revenge for his frustration by preaching to England for the rest of his life, from a poet degenerating into a prophet.2

1. E. g. in Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians.
2. Hugh Kingsmill, Matthew Arnold.
The 'Jeremiah' view of Arnold, expressed by innumerable critics, regards him as another Dipsychus, and his poetry and life as mainly on the elegiac note. Similar views treat him as a man who had lost irreparably his early faith, and who lived with no religion or, at least, no hopeful one.

The critics have here spread over Arnold's whole life his development at one stage. The period of 'Agony and Revolt' of which he speaks, and which belongs chiefly to the decade 1840-50 "passed away never to return". This was the melancholy period, this and no more. But Arnold, in many later poems, expressed such a state of melancholy and pessimism as he then experienced himself, but had outgrown. These must be taken for what they really are—references not to a present but to a past state of mind. Arnold may introduce them, as he most commonly does in his essays, because they are, typical, not of his own permanent outlook, but of the modern age, or of some other period that suffered from the same mental disorder. The note of discouragement and melancholy is therefore rather imaginary as applied to the maturity of Arnold. He casts sometimes a backward look to the past from which he has broken away, the power of associations has a strong hold on him,—that is the element of truth in these views. But he became and remained a man with a unified attitude to life, sure of himself and his powers, his message and work, regarding the world with a stoical serenity and detachment which is very far from despair or pessimism.

Another fertile source of misinterpretation arises from the severe limitations that Arnold imposed, or had imposed, on his work: the degree to which he limited his activity purposely, and the degree to which it was limited for him by circumstances. In the bewildering variety of his attack on the world, he did not forget the lesson he had learnt from his romantic youth and from Goethe. He knew, or soon learnt to know, his own limitations. "He did not think", for example, "that he had a talent for novels." He was probably right. He seems also to have recognised early that he had little talent for drama, as such. And having no practical experience in these lines, he seldom, if ever, gave a set criticism of novel or drama. Those subjects, on the other hand, which he did treat were only such as he had long revolved, such as he really understood and had sympathy with.

1. Max Muller, Auld Lang Syne, p. 112.
The subjects of his essays are almost altogether those authors, like Spinoza, Goethe, or Byron, who had attracted and interested him at Oxford. The types he chose were those, mainly, who had passed through experiences similar to his own, and with whose nature he had most points of contact—modern types, like Obermann, the de Guerins, or Marcus Aurelius, souls suffering from the mal-adjustment of their ideas to the modern world, from melancholy, doubt, ambivalence. Among these, also, his knowledge was wide enough to allow him to select those who had something of value to say to England, and to the occasion. Thus he left much unsaid, bringing forth only as he saw need and opportunity. "His mind", as his close friend, Jowett, said on his death, "was very far from being exhausted."2 He has not touched, as he might have done if necessary, on truth, beauty, or manners, with anything like the same fulness of detail as he was called on to devote to religion. He has been reproached with neglecting what seemed to many the most important current of his time, the nationalist movement in Europe.3 But that movement concerned English culture very indirectly, and he could affect its course but little. That he was fully alive to its interest and significance is clearly enough shown by his letters and poems of the years around 1848, and by his "England and the Italian Question." There is, in short, hardly a subject on which he was not qualified to touch: he was compelled to choose the most effective which he had time to handle.

His work was limited, not only by his own conscious purpose, but by external circumstances. His poetry, he told F. W. H. Myers, was checked by his official work,4 and it was only some moving and personal event, such as the death of Clough or Stanley, that could overcome the check. He was truly, and laughed at his being, Pegasus im Joche.5 It was not that the poetic vein was drying up. It was that, like Goethe, he had an existence a sujet et, and lived, besides, in an age less favourable than Goethe's to the writing of great poetry. He was beginning to feel the weight of this already in 1858, when he says: "... it is not so light a matter, when you have other grave claims on your

powers, to submit voluntarily to the exhaustion of the best poetical production in a time like this." ..... It is only in the best poetical epochs (such as the Elizabethan) that you can descend into yourself and produce the best of your thought and feeling naturally, and without an overwhelming and in some degree morbid effort; for then all the people around you are more or less doing the same thing." ..... to approach perfection in the region of thought and feeling, and to unite this with perfection of form, demands not merely an effort and a labour, but an actual tearing of oneself to pieces, which one does not readily consent to (although one is sometimes forced to it) unless one can devote one's whole life to poetry."1

No estimate of Arnold which omits consideration of these limits can hope to be just or effective. He cannot be condemned, or valued, for what he did not achieve or intend. To understand is here, as always, the first and greatest step in criticism: it is only when the purpose and scope of his work is clear that criticism can begin. This step once made, Arnold's merits and defects may be safely recognized for what they are.

His own best critic, he sums up, in a letter to his mother, one side of his work in poetry, in what may well stand as a final judgement: "My poems represent, on the whole, the main movement of mind of the last quarter of a century, and thus they will probably have their day as people become conscious to themselves of what that movement of mind is, and interested in the literary productions which reflect it. It might fairly be urged that I have less poetical sentiment than Tennyson, and less intellectual vigour and abundance than Browning; yet, because I have perhaps more of a fusion of the two than either of them, and have more regularly applied that fusion to the main line of modern development, I am likely enough to have my turn, as they have had theirs."2 He is having his turn, and is likely more and more to have it, while Tennyson and Browning recede. He wears better.

Yet there will always be certain factors which make against Arnold's poetry, and hinder its wide acceptance. Of this he was himself aware, especially with regard to his earlier poems. He withdrew his first volume (The Strayed Reveller) after only a few copies had been sold. "My last volume", he says,

"I have got absolutely to dislike." He second volume he also withdrew. The whole effect of these two volumes he considered "quite vague & indeterminate." He is right. His real poetry begins in 1853, where most critics imagine that it ends. Sohrab and Rustum is probably the first poem that is entirely satisfactory—determinate enough to be so.

His early poetry suffers, too, from its limited range. It is mostly confined to the interpretation of the main experience of his youth, his melancholy 'Obermann' period. Few people, comparatively, go through such an experience. The necessary conditions are confined to a few of the best minds and are not to be found in all classes or in all ages. It is to those who pass through such a stage that Arnold's poetry will always make its strongest appeal.

Outside the early poems of melancholy, however, is a period of positive, healthy, concrete poetry, small in bulk, but of exquisite workmanship. Even this body of poetry is limited, not only in bulk, but also in range, partly by the demands of his official work, partly by the nature of his genius. Official work limited his poetry to subjects which compelled him to write, such as the death of his friends. His genius limited his range through his inherent lack of dramatic power. That he possessed some degree of this power is proved by the 'Marguerite' poems, by Sohrab and Rustum, and by Merope; but they also prove that he had it in no high degree. Occasionally, also, his ear played him false, and he wrote harsh lines like:

When the forts of folly fall
or
..... us the Sea receiv'd.

His command of the new metres that he tried to introduce, though in general sure-footed, sometimes shows imperfect in places. This defect, and the unfamiliarity of the metres themselves, detracts from the value and even more from the appeal of some of the poems.

It is often discussed whether Arnold's poetry or his prose is better or will last longer,—a tribute to the achievement of both. His contemporaries generally ranked his prose first. It had a wider and more immediate appeal. "Matt ....knows", says Froude, "that he is strongest in criticism, and

therefore cares most to be praised for his verses. Enough can be said justly in praise of this side of him without flattery." He was perhaps strongest in criticism. But in addition his prose was thrown into a world which was much poorer in criticism than in poetry, and where criticism could effect a more appreciable work. The age itself was, from its conditions, more favourable to criticism, and less favourable to great poetry. His poetry, too, from its style and tone, could never, as a whole, become so widely popular as his prose. Yet, from the nature of poetry itself—and poetry was for Arnold the highest form of literature or art—it will be more permanent. Part of his criticism is ephemeral: it is concerned with phases of speculation that have passed or will pass: numerous topical references have no point for posterity. Although a very large proportion is durable, its general appeal has contracted. His poetry, on the other hand, goes on expanding its influence. Editions of his poems continue to multiply, editions of his prose to diminish.

In English literature, Arnold holds a higher relative position in prose than he does in poetry. He is our greatest literary critic. No one has written with such effect on religion, or with so wide an appeal: few so well on social or political affairs. His criticism, like his poetry, owes most to its rich background of intellectual culture, his sound ideas on man and nature in general, and the insight with which he has applied them to life. Much of this culture and taste he owed to Goethe and the Greeks. Much he owed to the freedom of his Oxford years, the experience of Winchester, London, Westmoreland, France and the Continent, and to the range of mental development through which he then passed. That experience, and the extraordinary receptivity of his nature, taught him to appreciate many attitudes of the human mind, giving him a breadth of appreciation which is extremely rare. By untiring and systematic industry, he built up out of his youthful experience and reading the plan of culture which he lacked leisure fully to complete; and developed a prose style in which his critical structure will long be preserved.

1. Sir John Skelton, *The Table Talk of Shirley*, pp. 139-140.
Yet he is not a great thinker in the sense that he made any new discoveries in thought or criticism. It was in the assembling of his materials, gathered from the whole field of thought, that he showed his greatness, in the fitting them together into a symmetrical and well-founded structure. As he wrote to his mother, "if one spirit seems richer than another, it is rather that it has been given to him to find more things, which it might equally have been given to others to find, than that he has seized or invented them by superior power and merit." Arnold found more things because he had the energy and the means and the disinterestedness to look for and detect them, and the skill to combine and apply them when they were found. That is his originality.

He is great and original also in his advance along the main line of modern thought. His social criticism is continued in the work of Shaw and Galsworthy, Bennett and Wells. His outlook on life and his return to the Greeks may be seen, with differences, in Hardy. Aldous Huxley continues the ideal of Greek culture and the attack on the medieval opposition of body and soul, the criticism of English Philistinism and vulgarity. Modern poetry and criticism lay more stress on thought and pay more attention to form and structure.

Pragmatism, in William James and his successors, is but following in the footsteps of Arnold and Goethe. The State has absorbed more and more the functions he laid down for it. The Irish Question has been solved by self-government, which he and Froude had foreseen as the only method remaining after Gladstone had failed. Religious dogma has gone far in the direction of Arnold's interpretation of St. Paul and of the New Testament. Of his educational writings the Bishop of Hereford, addressing the British Association at Cambridge, said, "Had some English statesman been enabled to take up and give effect to Mr. Arnold's chief suggestion (scientific system and method in education), as Humboldt and his colleagues gave effect to their ideas in Prussia in the years 1808 and onwards, the advantage to our country to-day would have been incalculable." Most of his suggestions have now been adopted.

4. Quoted in op. cit., p. 80.
Matthew Arnold flung into English thought and society such a torrent of fresh ideas as it had never before encountered. He criticised England as it had never before been criticised. He presented to England such an ideal of a full and perfect life as it had never seen or attempted. He set a standard of excellence in English literature which will long remain fruitful. He was, said one of his finest critics, John Morley, "the man of letters whom I should like to place in the front line of my generation in serious drift, influence, importance, and social insight". He remains, and probably will remain for us, the most vital and fruitful writer of the nineteenth century.
Scheme of Matthew Arnold’s ideas.

1. Culture
   - Harmonious
     - Intellect (Hellenism)
     - Conduct (Hebraism)
     - Social Life and Manners
   - General (all classes)
     - Inward, opposed to outward
     - Mechanism
     - Politics
       - Economics (Laissez-faire)

   - Need for greater equality between classes.

   - Barbarians (Materialised)
     - Qualities: Sport
     - High chivalry
     - Manners
     - Defects: Intellect

   - Philistines (Vulgarised)
     - Quality: Hebraism
     - (Self-reliance)
     - Defects: Intellect
     - Manners
     - (Art) Beauty

   - Populace (Brutalised)
     - Qualities: Sympathy
     - Action
     - Defect: Mob-action, violence

   - Needs: Intellect — Schools
     - Manners — Municipal System
     - Beauty — The Theatre, Literature, etc.
2. Poetry.

Estimates.
- Personal
- Historic
- Real (Touchstone: single lines of the best poets.)
  - Architectonics (Structure)
  - Truth of
  - Manner and Style
    - Diction (Felicity)
    - Movement (Rhythm)
  - Matter and Substance.
    - Man
    - Nature
      - Style
        - Conventional
        - Faithful
        - Greek
        - Magical

3. Prose.

True (Attic)
- Regularity
- Uniformity
- Precision
- Balance

False (Provincial)
- Asiatic
- Corinthian
- Aggressive
- Eruptive.
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B. Criticisms, Reviews and Reminiscences.
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A. Works.

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### A. Chronology of Matthew Arnold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Life</th>
<th>Contemporary Events</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>Born at Laleham.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>Dr Arnold Headmaster of Rugby.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830-2</td>
<td>At school at Laleham.</td>
<td>Shelley's Poetical Works.</td>
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<td>1836</td>
<td>At school at Winchester.</td>
<td>Carlyle, Wilhelm Meister.</td>
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<td>1839</td>
<td>At Rugby School.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1841</td>
<td>Visit to Northern France with Dr Arnold, Jane and Thomas.</td>
<td>Tennyson. Poems.</td>
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<td>1842</td>
<td>Death of Dr Arnold.</td>
<td>Stanley. Life of Dr Arnold.</td>
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<td>1844</td>
<td>B. A. of Balliol.</td>
<td>First visit of Stanley and Jowett to Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>Elected Fellow of Oriel.</td>
<td>Sainte-Beuve. First signed ed. of Volupté.</td>
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<td>1846</td>
<td>Teaching at Rugby.</td>
<td>Irish potato famine.</td>
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<td>1846</td>
<td>Visit to France and Switzerland: G. Sand.</td>
<td>Fall of Peel.</td>
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<td>1847</td>
<td>Private Secretary to Lord Lansdowne.</td>
<td>Poems. By Currer, Ellis, and Acton Bell.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>Warned about irregular action of his heart.</td>
<td>T. Arnold, jun., sails for New Zealand.</td>
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<td>1848</td>
<td></td>
<td>Year of Revolutions.</td>
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<td>1848</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failure of Chartism.</td>
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<td>1848</td>
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<td>Stanley in Paris.</td>
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<td>1848</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clough in Paris and Naples.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clough. The Bothie of Tober-na-Vuolich.</td>
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</table>
1849. "The Strayed Reveller and Other Poems". Sonnet "To the Hungarian Nation".

1850

1851. Appointed Inspector of Schools.
Married Lucy Wightman.

1852. "Empeorcles on Etna".
1853 Poems (with Preface).

1855 Poems. Second Series.

1857 Professor of Poetry at Oxford (till 1867).

1858 "Merope. A Tragedy."
1859 England and the Italian Question.
Educational mission to France, Holland, etc.

1861 Popular Education in France. On Translating Homer.

1862 Last Words on Translating Homer.

1864 A French Eton.
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Death of W. D. Arnold.
Darwin. Origin of Species.
Sainte-Beuve. Chateaubriand et son Groupe littéraire.
1870 St Paul and Protestantism
1871 Friendship's Garland.
1872 A Bible Reading for Schools.
1873 Literature and Dogma. Death of Arnold's
1874 Higher Schools and Universities in Germany.
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C. Subject Index to E.

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Byron. See Barnard, Grierson, Swinburne, M. H. White.

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"Church of Erou." See Poetry.

Church of England. See Theology.

Classics. See R. E. C. Houghton.

Criticism. See Literary Criticism, Social and Political Criticism.


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Emerson. See Burroughs.


Ethics. See Boyer, Bradfield, J. B. Brown, Chrisman, Flexner; Theology.

"Falkland." See Goldwin Smith.

"Forsaken Merman." See Poetry.

French Literature. See Kelso, Legouix, Maischhofer, Romer.

German Literature. See Kelso, Lassen.

Goethe. See Orrick, H. White, M. H. White.

Harrison, Frederic. See Bennett.


Influence. See Littell, Scudder.


Italian Literature. See Kelso.

Italian Question. See Social and Political Criticism.

Joubert. See Rice.

Leopardi. See Bickersteth.


(1923.) See Gerhardt, Lovett.


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Lowell. See C. L. Moore.

Melancholy. See G. R. Elliot; R. E. C. Houghton.

"Merope". See Poetry.

Morris, William. See Skelton.

Newman, J. H. See Fuller, Hutton, Tristram.

Nature. See J. R. Moore, Mackie.
Nonconformists. See Theology.

Obermann. See Guthrie.

Oxford Poems. See Poetry.

Pater, Walter. See Bendz, Eliot.

Pessimism. See J. R. Moore.


"The Forsaken Werman". See Praz (Italian trans.)

Oxford Poems. See Taunt.

"The Scholar Gipsy". See Yvon.

"Sohrab and Rustum". See Franklin, Giles, Wilkinson.

Prosody. See Franklin, Saintsbury.

Theory of Poetry. See Knickerbocker.

Politics. See Social and Political Criticism.

Prosody. See Poetry.

Prose. See Gates; Style.

Renan. See Mott.

Reputation. See Adams, P., Williams.

Rossetti, D. G. See Fuller.

St. Paul and Protestantism. See Theology.

Sainte-Beuve. See Fürrer.

Scholar Gipsy. See Poetry.

Senancour. See Guthrie.

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Sherman. See De Mille.

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Political Theory. See Elias, R. H. Murray, Oakeshott.

"Sohrab and Rustum". See Poetry.

Spencer. See Bennett.

Style. See Abernethy, Brownell, Japp.

Swinburne. See P. Bayne, H. Grierson.

Theatre. See H. Elliott, Matthews.

Theology. See Ethics.


"A Comment on Christmas". See Goodwin.


Tolstoi. See Stoddard.

Thought. See Dawson.

Wells, H. G. See Sherman.

Wilde. See Bendz.

Wordsworth. See Bickersteth, Cooper, Swinburne.

Works, 1903-4. See Gerould.